ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:	COPIA RERUM: HISTORIES AND THEORIES OF RHETORICAL ARRANGEMENT
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Many rhetoric and composition scholars concentrate on developments in argument and expression. Form, however, receives comparatively less attention, leading scholars to ask "Who Took the Form out of the Process?" and to argue for "Re-fusing Form in Genre Theory." "*Copia Rerum*" responds to these invitations by reframing the history of rhetoric and composition as a history of rhetorical arrangement. Drawing on primary sources from several fields and attending to terms of art, I account for previously proposed theories of arrangement in composition studies, noting how arrangement is often conceptualized as a matter of intersentential or interparagraph linkages, organizational frames, or a series of moves; and as such, modern approaches to arrangement often reduce arrangement to a matter of argument or expression. Inasmuch as these scholars have found such inspiration from the history of rhetoric, and recognizing that many of these structural concepts are critiqued for their nineteenth-century assumptions and sometimes restricted focus on linear or static form, a turn to the history of rhetoric can enrich our understanding of arrangement.

The following chapters turn to ancient rhetoricians from Greek and Roman rhetorics to Medieval and Renaissance rhetorics. Along the way, I attend to terms of art such as *ideai, kephalaia, modi positionum,* and *figura rerum* to explore the multidimensional, responsive, synthetic, distributive, variable, and transformational possibilities of rhetorical arrangement. I find that ancient Greek discourse theorists understand arrangement as integral to composition; that other Greeks and Romans recognize the responsive and embeddable potential of mesostructures; that Medieval rhetoricians extend these practices and blur distinctions between the parts of an oration, invention, and the figures of thought; and that the Erasmian tradition clearly combines the figures of thought with the parts of an oration to show how the parts of an oration can be considered discoursal figures.

In terms of the history of rhetoric, this dissertation recovers and traces pre-modern and early-modern structural concepts and their explicit and implicit theories and pedagogies. By attending to these examples of pre-nineteenth century units of discourse, my study adds to discussions among historians of rhetoric concerning the Sophists, stasis theory, *progymnasmata*, Medieval composition, and Renaissance stylistics. In terms of rhetoric and writing studies, this dissertation situates rhetorical arrangement among writing studies, linguistics, psychology, and communication studies; accounts for shifts of structural concepts from writing studies to adjacent fields; and offers new theoretical and methodological ways of thinking about and teaching genre moves. The theories I recover and principles I explore can serve as a fresh basis for thinking about arrangement and form in composition for scholars, teachers, and students.

COPIA RERUM: HISTORIES AND THEORIES OF RHETORICAL ARRANGEMENT

by

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Introduction

> "What I am advocating for is that. . . we help our students develop an awareness of form as simultaneously constraining and generative that will empower them to understand, use, and even invent new forms for new purposes"
>
> -Richard Coe, "An Apology for Form: Or, Who Took the Form Out of the Process?" 26

The first time I had to write a 10-page paper in high school, I wasn't really sure what to do. My primary writing schema at the time was the five-paragraph essay, and my task was to write an extended essay on a literary topic of my choice. Faced with an unknown situation, I relied heavily on what I had learned about composing a thesis statement, topic sentences, and paragraphs focused on single concepts. I ended up with some reasonable topic sentences and transitions, but I also had some paragraphs that sometimes stretched to two pages long. While my writing did improve as an undergraduate, I still had trouble describing what I was doing when I was writing longer papers. As a consequence of this lack of explicit declarative knowledge, during my first semester teaching I often fell back on my previous experience with five-paragraph essays, describing longer papers as 6, 7, or 8 paragraph essays. In the end, what I needed was someone to explicitly describe for me better schemata for writing longer essays, teach me how to analyze model texts to recognize these schemata, and inspire me to think of schemata more dynamically, as more than a series of disembodied templates.

Sensing that there must be a better way, I embarked on a journey to learn more about structure for both my and my students. Along the way, I came to find that

there was not much about essay structure in textbooks or scholarship; and that when there were discussions of essay structure, these structures were often taught as or implied to be simple formulas. Victor Pellegrino's *A Writer's Guide to Transitional Words and Expressions* (1987) suggested that all organization was merely a matter of using the right transitions. Gerald Graff, Cathy Birthenstein, and Russel Durst's *They Say/I Say: The Moves that Matter in Academic Writing* (2009) in their chapter "Tying it All Together" provide templates, but also preach the gospel of transitions (101-113). Other textbooks focus less on the rhetorical dimension of style and more on the invention of arguments. Andrea Lunsford and John Ruszkiewicz's *Everything's an Argument* (2003) focuses primarily on argument and argumentation, but similarly has a brief chapter on organization ("Structuring Arguments") that comes before discussion of the stases or types of arguments. This chapter breezes past classical orations and Rogerian and invitational arguments to focus more on stringing together Toulmin arguments. For each stasis or type of claim in succeeding chapters, Lunsford and Ruszkiewicz provide a little more by way of formulas, templates, transitions, and anticipating responses to elements of Toulmin arguments. In these textbooks, rhetorical invention or style receive significant treatment, but arrangement itself does not.

This uneven treatment shows up in composition scholarship as well. If the Parlor Press / WAC Clearinghouse Reference Guides to Rhetoric and Composition can serve as a brief indicator, Janice Lauer's *Invention in Rhetoric and Composition* (2004) and John Ramage, Micheal Callaway, Jennifer Clary-Lemon, and Zachary Waggoner's *Argument in Composition* (2009) come early in the series, and Brian

Ray's *Style: An Introduction to History, Theory, Research, and Pedagogy* (2015) later in the series. The other reference guides in the series are for reading, genre, basic literacy, community literacy, writing program administration, revision, and writing across the curriculum. But there is no reference guide for arrangement.

This emphasis on invention, context, and style also bears out in recent scholarship. For example, composition scholars have reminded us that we still need to continue to develop how we think about argument (Fulkerson; Knoblauch) and others have called for reasserting the place of teaching style in composition (Connors; McDonald; Duncan and Vanguri; Ray; Butler; Butler, Ray, Vanguri). Still others have made efforts to update other canons such as memory and delivery (Porter; Adsanatham, Garrett, and Matzke). All of these efforts presuppose that the dimensions of rhetoric– invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery– lay a foundation for the development of a fuller theory of composition as a process, a foundation not simply to recover but to challenge and improve. Arrangement, I will suggest, is also essential to this effort. Rhetorical arrangement (Gk. *taxis*, Lat. *dispositio*)– that is, the structuring and organizing of language "to enhance persuasion" (Enos, "Traditional Arrangement" 40)– has received comparatively less attention. This lack of attention has led scholars such as the Canadian composition scholar Richard Coe to ask "Who Took the Form out of the Process?" and Spanish rhetoricians Antonio García-Berrio and Tomás Albaladejo Mayordomo to conclude that the rhetorical canon of arrangement has clearly been neglected. The canon of arrangement matters to rhetoric because it serves as a major site where, as García-Berrio and Albaladejo Majordomo assert, the extensional meanings collected by

invention are converted into intensional, material meaning (173). In other words, arrangement is where the results of discovery transform from a mere collection of material to curated, purpose-driven, reader-focused discourse.

Various subfields of rhetoric and writing studies, such as rhetorical genre studies, recognize the value of attending to arrangement. Arrangement focuses on the internal structure of a given genre. Rhetorical genre studies understands the internal structure of a genre as "moves," that is, a series of goal-oriented language behaviors. By attending to these moves, genre analysts strive to make the implicit explicit. A research article, for example, is much more than an introduction, body, and conclusion. Rather, each section of a research article performs actions such as situating the study relative to previous studies, identifying research gaps, and intervening to bridge those gaps. From their analyses, genre analysts recognize that the internal structure of genres is flexible (cf. Jacobson, Pawlowski, and Tardy; Berdanier). These scholars argue that writers should be taught about the suppleness of discourse. As engineering education scholar Catherine Beradanier puts it,

> students often learn to write through laboratory reports as a writing task in which they follow a strict template. This approach may lead students to be unaware that argument structure is flexible and that structure can be modified to best meet the needs of the intended audience. Students should be taught that genre extends past 'types' of writing tasks (e.g., memos, resumes, laboratory reports) and to consider the disciplinary value systems of the audience to motivate rhetorical decisions. (390)

As such, a major goal of rhetorical genre studies is not only to describe genres and genre moves, but to also empower students to develop their own rhetorical arrangements.

Given that arrangement has received less attention in rhetoric and composition studies, the purpose of this dissertation is to account for and recover theories of arrangement. My dissertation works to further the aims of rhetorical genre studies by turning to the history of rhetoric to recover theories of arrangement that can enrich our current theories of genre moves. As such, this project is driven by two major questions: First, how has the field of rhetoric and writing etudies broadly conceptualized structure and organization from 1949 to the present (and why do we conceptualize structure in these particular ways)? And second, how might a turn to the history of rhetoric enrich these conceptualizations? These historical questions entail a recovery of structural concepts that will be of interest to historians of rhetoric, as well as suggest pedagogical principles that will be of interest to teachers of writing. Throughout the history of composition studies, several theories of arrangement have been proposed which emphasize the linguistic, psychological, and communicative aspects of arrangement. Some of these approaches merely suggest prescriptive formulas, whereas others call for more descriptive and dynamic approaches to arrangement. As rhetorician Jeanne Fahnestock puts it, there must be a pedagogical focus on "the higher-level skills that would allow control and change rather than only the reflex re-creation of existing genres" ("The Once and Future Discipline" 38). As I will show, modern theories of arrangement promote important understandings of structure. Many recent theories, however, do not fully describe arrangement because

they are preoccupied with other aspects of composition such as intellection, invention, and style as discrete rather than mutually-reinforcing dimensions of discourse.[1] Inasmuch as scholars have from time to time turned to the history of rhetoric, they have found inspiration to think of arrangement in new ways. In what follows, I take up this invitation to turn to the history of rhetoric to further nuance and deepen our accounts of rhetorical arrangement.

Importance and Contributions

Rhetoric and Writing Studies

This dissertation engages with three major subfields of rhetoric and writing studies: early composition studies; more recent rhetorical genre studies; and the history of rhetoric. In terms of composition studies, this dissertation situates rhetorical arrangement among the fields of writing studies, linguistics, psychology, and communication studies, and accounts for the shift of structural concepts such as paragraphs and modes of discourse from writing studies to adjacent fields. In "Whatever Happened to the Paragraph?" Mike Duncan provides a brief history of Paragraph Theory from 1795 to the present.[2] Duncan chalks up the turn away from Paragraph Theory to a large turn in the field from "writing itself" to "contextual,

[1] For describing the canons of rhetoric or the writing process as dimensions rather than stages or phases, see Ann Berthoff ("teach revision not as a definite phase but as a dimension of the composing process" ["Recognition, Representation, and Revision" 27). Nancy Christiansen also explores the "multidimensionality of language" and refers to thought, speech, and action as "three parallel dimensions" of discourse (*Figuring Style* 10, 91).

[2] For another history of the paragraph, see Ian McGee, *Understanding the Paragraph and Paragraphing* (2018).

socioeconomic concerns" about the situation in which we write. We don't like to talk about paragraphs because such conversations quickly turn into long lists of prescriptions about what a "standard" paragraph should look like. Whatever the case, Duncan argues that it simply does not make sense to give up on "such a broad area of theory with a large amount of established scholarship, especially one that has taken off in other disciplines" such as psychology and computational linguistics" (472). Duncan is right to ask about what happened to Paragraph Theory. However, Paragraph Theory is part of a much larger issue: how do we teach arrangement and form in our classrooms? As Richard Coe argued twenty years before Duncan, the turn away from structure and form began much earlier, even back when writing scholars began to focus more on the writing process. While some pedagogies set up a dichotomy between substance and form, between process and product, Coe ultimately argues that form and substance are both essential to the composing process. Students, he believes, should "develop an awareness of form as simultaneously constraining and generative that will empower them to understand, use, and even invent new forms for new purposes" ("An Apology for Form" 27). Attention to rhetorical arrangement is an important shift in this direction.

More recently, there have been calls in rhetorical genre studies to ensure that form remains central as we also focus on the social contexts within which genre functions. Amy Devitt, for example, has called for the field to "Re-Fuse Form in Genre Study." Devitt returns to two major genre studies theorists, Carolyn Miller and Mikhail Bakhtin, to remind writing scholars that form must always be part of the equation. Speaking of Miller, Devitt writes: "Although she privileges situation,

Miller does not neglect form in her theory. Form and substance are the two key building blocks of action. . . . substance must acquire form in order to become action" (29). Devitt differentiates between form and formalism, between an awareness of the material of discourse and rigid, decontextualized approaches to that material: "I reject form but accept materialism. Individual texts have a material reality, a physical, formed existence, and their material matters to people's construction of genre. The material reality of texts is formal, but our approach to it need not be formalistic" (31). Devitt then concludes that we must "acknowledge the two-sidedness, the simultaneity, the inseparability of form, meaning, and action, of individual, social, and cultural context, of actual genres and genre-ness. Such a fusion is far more difficult and far more satisfying as genre study continues into its next twenty years of vital research" (46). How we approach form also has significant pedagogical implications. As Anis Bawarshi explains in his "Beyond the Genre Fixation," identifying "prototypical genre conventions and relating them to their social/functional purposes and in some cases also examining the ideological implications of these conventions" is not enough. Furthermore, "in our preoccupation with genres as sites of access, we have tended to privilege genres as things that can be made explicit through explication…. this is not enough." Treating genres as objects helps us to "focus on the thing-ness, how-nness, where-ness, and even the when-ness of genre," but does not elucidate the genre performance that is "subject to material, temporal, interdiscursive, interpersonal, and ideological relations" (244). "Approaching genres as performances," he suggests, will "enable[] students and instructors to examine the meanings and relations conditioned by genre as well as to

open up genre actions to new *interplays* of possible meanings and linguistic relations" (245). Theories of rhetorical arrangement, I will argue, can offer additional theoretical and methodological ways of thinking about and teaching genre moves that focus less on prescription and more on description. My dissertation provides a deeper history of concepts similar to "genre moves" that were used before the term "genre move" was proposed. Just as scholars such as Paul Rodgers and David Fleming have turned to and encouraged us to think about how the past can reinvigorate our understanding of rhetoric, my project also recovers new theoretical and pedagogical ways of thinking about and teaching genre moves. I suggest that theories of arrangement establish a systematic means of seeing genres not as static templates with set moves so much as living material assemblages; and, as such, theories of arrangement can add additional theoretical nuance to our discussions of genre moves that further accounts for the multidimensional, responsive, synthetic, distributive, variable, and transformational possibilities of discourse. As we focus more on describing and transforming arrangement, we can better enable rhetorical dexterity.[3]

History and Theory of Rhetoric

While arrangement is an integral part of many rhetorical theories, historians of rhetoric have tended to focus on the other activities of the orator. For example, histories of rhetoric have focused on invention (Mack, *Renaissance Argument*; Ong);

[3] For more on the concept of rhetorical dexterity, see Shannon Carter, *The Way Literacy Lives: Rhetorical Dexterity and Basic Writing Instruction* (2008) and Jeanine Latoya Williams, *A Framework for Raciolinguistically Just Literacy Instruction* (2021).

style (Valiavitcharska; Christiansen, *Figuring Style*); memory (Yates, Carruthers); and delivery (Christiansen, "Rhetoric as Character-Fashioning"). The canon of arrangement has received considerably less attention. The only major work to discuss classical arrangement is Lucia Calboli Montefusco's *Exordium, Narratio, Epilogus,* which mostly just descriptive surveys Greek and Roman theories on these parts of a speech without much metatheorizing. There are also articles focusing on single authors, such as David Mirhady's "Aristotle and Anaximenes on Arrangement." The only major work to discuss Renaissance theories of arrangement is Ong's *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, which focuses primarily on Ramus' development of "method," a universal means of arrangement, rather than other theories of arrangement per se. Besides these works, there are two dissertation treatments of arrangement. In her 1959 dissertation, Elnora Carrino considers arrangement from the sophists to Quintilian, describing and cataloging, but rarely commenting on differences between their theories. In his 1963 dissertation, Forrest Tucker discusses 19th century theories of arrangement, critiques them, and proposes a synthesis between these theories and psychology. Besides these, there are really no histories of arrangement that deal with the almost 2000 years between the Roman period and the 19th century.

Bridging these studies, my project synthesizes and amplifies leads from various historians of rhetoric to comment on qualities of arrangement that are sometimes but not always described under the head of arrangement. For example, whereas there have been several studies about the Sophists, Isocrates, and Anaximenes individually (cf. Gaines; Bons; Mirhady), I bring these theories together

to provide further insight into theories and pedagogies of *ideai* and *prokatalepsis* that show how rhetorical dimensions of invention, arrangement, and style overlap. Whereas some scholars have mentioned relationships between stasis theory and arrangement (cf. Pujante), I make these relationships more explicit to show how stasis theory builds addressivity and responsiveness directly into arrangement. Whereas some scholars have noted and cataloged the existence of *modi positionum* (cf. Dalzell; Worstbrock, Klaes, and Lütten), I situate these modes relative to other developments in Medieval rhetoric which lay the groundwork for Erasmus' *De copia*. And, whereas some scholars have suggested that Erasmus draws on the figures of thought and the parts of an oration in *De copia* (cf. Henderson; Christiansen, *Figuring Style*; Mack, *A History*), I show how Erasmus conflates these frameworks to further develop the concept of discoursal figures.

Scope and Reduction

In this dissertation, I deal primarily with theories of rhetorical arrangement. As such, I define arrangement in two different ways: as a named stage or dimension of discourse and as a special class of mid-level discourse elements. First, I refer to arrangement as the second dimension of rhetoric. Rhetoric is often divided into five dimensions: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. This division into dimensions is somewhat arbitrary, inasmuch as these "aspects are so interconnected in reality that one cannot easily separate one from the other, and. . . they interact so closely that any distinction between them belongs to theory rather than to practice" (Erasmus, *De copia* 301). As a shifting theoretical and pedagogical division, then, I

understand each of these dimensions as a stance toward discourse that entails its own terminology. From the perspective of invention, for example, all discourse is argument, understood in terms of stasis theory, topics theory, syllogisms, and other conceptual matters. From the perspective of style, all discourse is figure, understood in terms of various kinds and qualities of figures such as schemes and tropes and other matters of articulation. From the perspective of memory, all discourse is treasure, understood in terms of backgrounds and images. And from the perspective of delivery, all discourse is behavior, action, and drama, understood in terms of voice, gestures, moves, and acts. These dimensions and their terminologies are complementary and, taken together, provide a complex description of the composing process.

This complementarity, however, should not be taken to mean that these are completely interchangeable perspectives or that one should be collapsed into another. Each theoretical stance and its terminology is, after all, a selection and therefore also a deflection of reality, providing key insights into one but not all of the facets of discourse (K. Burke 59). We could, for example, follow Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in describing arrangement in terms of argument, an aspect of "The Interaction of Arguments" (460). As such, we would focus on "the earlier stages of the discussion on the argumentative possibilities open to the speaker," "the conditioning of the audience. . . changes of attitude brought about by the speech," and "the reactions occasioned in the audience by its perception of the order or arrangement adopted in the speech" (491). This argumentative perspective highlights the crucial importance of understanding the rhetorical situation and the role of order

in persuasion. Such a perspective is indispensable, and, in what follows, I frequently nod to instances in which arrangement is clearly integrated with invention. The argumentative perspective alone, however, implies that, if the writer understands the rhetorical situation well enough, then form will organically reveal itself (Coe, "An Apology for Form" 16). The actual process of forming and ordering passages, however, is less a matter of fully formed thought and more a matter of trying out combinations of forms and watching our arguments emerge as we write and rewrite (Berthoff, *Forming/Thinking/Writing* 25). While these perspectives are complementary, we lose sight of the complexity of composition if we completely replace one terminology with another: "if the two terms, or the two aspects of the one term, are taken as synonymous, then one side of the equation can be dropped as 'unnecessary'" (K. Burke 81). In what follows, I do not argue that one perspective is better than another. Rather, I argue that attention to rhetorical arrangement as such (rather than arrangement in terms of invention, style, memory, or delivery) provides additional ways of thinking about the multidimensional, responsive, synthetic, distributive, variable, and transformational possibilities of discourse. By multidimensional, I mean that arrangement is integrated with invention, style, memory, and delivery; by responsive, I mean that arrangements form within rhetorical situations; by synthetic, I mean that arrangement involves embedding structures within structures; by distributive, I mean that the parts of arrangement can be moved around and manifest in many different places within a discourse; by variable, I mean that rhetoricians develop repertoires of arrangement units; and by

transformational, I mean that arrangements ultimately become greater than the sum of their parts.

Second, I refer to arrangement as instances of structuring embodied in a special class of discourse elements. Focus on units of discourse matters because these units are not always found within the circumference of the second dimension of discourse. As we will see, theorists such as Anaximenes and Aristotle include the parts of an oration under the head of arrangement. In later handbooks such as those of Cicero, however, the parts of an oration are instead included under the head of invention, leaving the arrangement dimension greatly reduced. Seeing that the arrangement dimension often includes very little, we would not have much to say about it if we only focused there. I follow these discourse elements as they migrate through the theoretical borderlands between invention and arrangement. Focus on units of discourse also matters because these units embody the structuring process. A study of arrangement involves at least three problems: 1) defining units to move around; 2) defining orders to give these units; and 3) defining rationales for these orders. In this dissertation, I focus primarily on units of arrangement as a means of grounding these theories and making sense of the many names proposed for these units. The way each unit is defined implies and embodies different preferred orders and rationales for structuring.

Scholars often divide these discourse structures into four dimensions by size: metastructures, macrostructures, mesostructures, and microstructures.[4] In terms of

[4] C.f. Gere et al. 612. Discourse analyst Teun van Dijk separates mesostructures (paragraphs) from macrostructures (genre moves), and calls the highest, global level superstructures (*Macrostructures: An Interdisciplinary Study of Global Structures in*

rhetorical genre studies, metastructures correspond to genre ecologies; macrostructures correspond to genre templates; mesostructures correspond to genre moves; and microstructures refer to individual speech acts. As Frank D'Angelo has observed, these dimensions roughly align with the rhetorical canons of invention, arrangement, and style (*Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric* 28-29). To emphasize arrangement, I consider how discourse theorists work to conceptualize mesostructures. Many theorists, based on their disciplinary affiliations, will shift their attention up toward macrostructures or down toward microstructures. One of the purposes of my dissertation is to give more sustained attention to mesostructures. At the same time, many of the structures that I will highlight show that, whereas modern theorists tend to distinguish these dimensions, ancient theorists instead often overlap and blur distinctions between these dimensions.

Methodology

My primary purpose is to describe historical theories of rhetorical arrangement, weigh the strengths and weaknesses of these theories, and consider what we might gain from going *nānā i ke kumu*, back to the sources, back to history to replough the field and see what valuable tubers we have left behind or have overlooked. In the tradition of Edward P.J. Corbett's *Classical Rhetoric for the*

Discourse, Interaction, and Cognition 13, 127; "Episodes as Units of Discourse Analysis" 177). As another approach, Elżbieta Chrzanowska-Kluczewska identifies three levels of tropes: microtropes, macrotropes, and metatropes. Macrotropes such as extended metaphors, Chrzanowska-Kluczewska argues, correspond to "*dispositio*, i.e. the inner backbone of the text, its total structuring" (77). *Dispositio,* again, is the Latin term for arrangement.

Modern Student (1965), Sharon Crowley's *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students* (1994), and Frank D'Angelo's *Composition in the Classical Tradition* (1999), this project looks at pedagogical theories and assumes that what is being recovered has implications for the modern composition classroom.[5] As such, I agree with Michelle Kennerly and Damien Pfister that

> Returning to ancient texts from new. . . vantage points shakes up accepted interpretations, produces readings with different nuances, allows old terms to be revivified and reinhabited in new ways, and generates theoretical resources to guide critics, theorists, and publics in negotiating continuity and change. (3)

The history of rhetoric is a field ripe with alternative, diverse perspectives and teachings that can refresh both our understanding and our teaching.

Despite this interest in improving modern theory and practice, this dissertation also assumes the importance of historical, philological study to this enterprise. In "Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?" Edward Schiappa famously differentiates between two approaches to the study of rhetorical history that he borrows from the philosopher Richard Rorty: historical reconstruction and rational reconstruction. Historical reconstructions essentially seek to "recapture the past insofar as possible on its own terms," while rational reconstructions seek to "provide critical insight to contemporary theorists" (194). While Schiappa values historical reconstruction, he is clear to emphasize that rational reconstruction matters too: "I am not suggesting that historical reconstruction

[5] Crowley's textbook was published in its second edition with Debra Hawhee.

should be done to the *exclusion* of rational reconstruction. With Rorty, I believe that both ought to be done, but done 'separately.'" These approaches should be done separately, he believes, because "Otherwise 'historical' accounts tend to become self-affirming discoveries of early anticipations of voguish philosophical theories" (196). To illustrate his argument, Schiappa analyzes John Poulakos' reconstruction of Sophistic rhetoric, noting how concepts such as rhetoric, style, *kairos, to prepon,* and *to dynaton* must be revised in light of the historical and textual record. Poulakos was reasonably taken aback by this criticism of his work, and thus ensued what has come to be known as the "Schiappa-Poulakos Debate," which lives on in a second stage we might call the "Mao-Stroud Debate" started by LuMing Mao and Scott Stroud over approaches to comparative rhetoric.[6] As Bruce McComisky argues, though, the distinction between historical and rational reconstructions is not always clear cut: "historical and rational reconstruction are fluid points on a continuum, not all-or-nothing categories, and this continuum is best understood more generally as historial interpretation." Neosophistic appropriation, McComisky suggests, may be yet another category (9). Whatever the case, it may be difficult at times to observe and mediate these methodological differences, but "it is useful to keep in mind that the more specific the appropriation, the stronger the resulting neosophistic rhetoric" (11). The same might be said of any other theoretical or pedagogical appropriation.

Cognizant of these debates, my project focuses on "terms of art." (In *Classical Greek Rhetorical Theory and the Disciplining of Discourse,* David

[6] Stroud directly cites the Schiappa-Poulakos debate in "Pragmatism and the Methodology of Comparative Rhetoric."

Timmerman and Edward Schiappa define "terms of art" as "any words or phrases that take on reasonably specialized denotative functions within a particular language community" (1). Put another way, attention to the exact words ancient rhetoricians used or did not use in a technical way helps "avoid imposing a later-developed vocabulary on early texts of rhetorical theory" (3). It also makes similarities and differences more apparent. Ultimately, attention to exact terms is an ethical move that can lead us to more fully engage with the Other, and this engagement with the Other can ultimately lead to insight. What LuMing Mao says about comparing Western and Non-Western rhetorics also applies to the multiplicity of rhetorics in the multicultural Mediterranean and beyond: "Part of the motivating or justifying force behind comparative rhetoric is to achieve better understanding of Western rhetorical tradition by learning more about non-Western rhetorical traditions– so that Western rhetorical tradition can be reexamined, refined, and enriched through those other traditions" (413).

My project also looks to throw a larger net than previous pedagogical recoveries for the composition classroom have done. While I do look at many well-known texts, I also make it a point to also look at texts which have received less attention. Following Robert Gaines, I take a "corpus conception" to rhetorical texts that aims to "enlarge[] the scope of ancient rhetoric" by taking into account more than the usual suspects like Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian ("De-Canonizing Ancient Rhetoric" 68). I also do so because I believe attending to lesser known texts can give us a fuller picture of what rhetoric entails. As such, I draw on two Ciceronian values, wisdom (*prudentia*) and justice (*justicia*). In *On Duties*, Cicero defines wisdom as

"the full perception [*perspicientia*] and intelligent development [*veri sollertia*] of the true" (I.V.15). Wisdom involves not "treat[ing] the unknown as known and too readily accept[ing] it" but rather "devot[ing] both time and attention to the weighing of evidence" (I.VI.18). Justice, in turn, involves "rendering to every person their due" (I.V.15). In other words, we should seek to understand "what our disciplinary ancestors were trying to understand and were up against" (Connors, *Composition-Rhetoric* 20). In practice, the scholarly application of wisdom and justice, I would suggest, depends on leaning more toward rhetoric and less toward dialectic. The relationship between rhetoric and dialectic is famously compared by Zeno to the open hand and the closed fist: "clenching his fist he said that logic [*dialectica*] was like that; relaxing an extending [*dilataverat*] his hand, he said eloquence was like the open palm" (Cicero, *Orator*, XXXII.113). In this dissertation, I take a decidedly open-handed approach, as only an open hand can hope to gather and present a wide enough display of material. I aim to cover both familiar sources and unfamiliar sources to bring rhetorical arrangement out of obscurity as well as provide a different take on familiar narratives of the history of rhetoric and composition. With that said, the present study focuses on explicit ancient, medieval, and early modern Mediterranean and European theories of arrangement written by men. The composition theorists I include reflect changing gender dynamics of the field.

Chapter Outlines

This dissertation consists of five chapters. In the first chapter, I explore instantiations of arrangement in composition studies from the 1950s to the present. I

begin by dividing writing studies' history into three overlapping traditions, highlighting writing studies' interactions with linguistics, psychology, rhetoric, and communication studies. I argue that arrangement is a liminal concept which can either be partially absorbed by style (as in the case of linguistically-inflected theories) or by invention (as in the case of psychology-inflected theories). In the linguistic strand, writing studies scholars such as Francis Christensen and Willis Pitkin often atomize paragraphs (a structural unit) into groups of sentences, which are usually in the realm of style. This focus on paragraphs as groups of sentences is useful for fields such as contrastive rhetoric, translation, and computational linguistics because this focus is linear; however, when it comes to writing instruction, this approach is often taught in a decontextualized manner. In the psychological strand, scholars such as James Kinneavy and Frank D'Angelo, turn to modes of discourse and methods of development, which are usually described as conceptual units with structural consequences based on faculty psychology. While writing studies scholars often associate the modes and methods with nineteenth-century rhetoric and therefore set them aside, similar concepts, based on cognitive rather than faculty psychology, remain in circulation. Analyzing conceptual schemes or macrostructures can be useful for discourse analysis and inventional processes, but in terms of writing instruction, there is an implied danger that schemes will be taught rigidly, rather than rhetorically and responsively. Some theories do make up for some of these weaknesses. For example, in the communicative strand, speech-acts are typically sentence-level structures but are conceptualized as responsive, and rhetorical genre studies assumes discourse moves that perform social actions. Nevertheless, there is

still a danger that these structures will also be understood and taught rigidly, as in many English for Special Purposes contexts. For each of these three strands, I explore how a turn to the history of rhetoric has enabled scholars to situate and critique current practices, as well as come to more nuanced understandings of arrangement. Inasmuch as these scholars have found such inspiration from the history of rhetoric, and recognizing that many of these structural concepts are limited by their nineteenth-century assumptions and restricted focus on linear or static form, I believe a turn to the history of rhetoric will enrich our understanding of arrangement.

The following chapters turn to ancient rhetoricians to explore and recover lesser known compositional units and theoretical principles of arrangement from a time when arrangement was more clearly integrated with rhetorical theory. Beginning with the Older Sophists in chapter two, I consider ways argument schemes and rhetorical figures are structured according to the parts of an oration– exordium, narration, division, confirmation, refutation, peroration. I then look at Isocrates' *idea* as a unit of variable size that can be moved around and embedded within other *ideai,* identify *idea* theory in Anaximenes's *Rhetoric to Alexander,* then consider Aristotle's alternatives, the *koina* and the *topoi.* After discussing the ways the *exergasia* (treatment or development) of *ideai* is taken up by Pseudo-Cicero in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* in chapter three, I then turn to the *kephalaia* of Hermogenes' status theory and the *progymnasmata* to show how these units are understood as being transformable modules. Recognizing that *exergasía* often overlaps with *auxesis*, chapter four focuses on ways in which Medieval rhetoricians take up Cicero's invitation to apply amplification to all parts of an oration (not just the peroration) by

creating the concept of *modus*. The *modi positionum, modi narrandi,* and *modi dilatandi* coming out of the three Medieval new rhetorics all blur distinctions between arrangement, amplification, and style. Finally, in chapter five I look at Erasmus's letter-writing supplement *De Copia* as a site where the parts of an oration, figures of style, and *progymnasmata* become one in *res*, a combination that influences other continental rhetoricians. By attending to these examples of pre-nineteenth century units of discourse, my study adds to discussions among historians of rhetoric concerning the Sophists, stasis theory, *progymnasmata*, Medieval composition, and Renaissance stylistics. The theories I recover and principles I explore can serve as a fresh basis for thinking about arrangement and form in composition for scholars, teachers, and students.

Chapter 1: Centering Rhetorical Arrangement in Composition Studies

> "A putting together of parts to make a whole implies a recognition of parts and of wholes. Parts from which to select; wholes toward which to arrange"
>
> -Josephine Miles,
> "What We Already Know about Composition and What We Need to Know" 137

The purpose of this chapter is three-fold. First, this chapter accounts for what theories of arrangement have been proposed in composition studies, noting how arrangement is often conceptualized as a matter of intersentential or interparagraph linkages, organizational frames, or a series of moves. Second, this chapter points to instances of modern, non-composition theories which take concepts from nineteenth and twentieth century composition for granted, highlighting our need for interdisciplinary discussion and inquiry, especially in language-oriented fields such as computational linguistics, English education, and English for Special Purposes. Finally, this chapter makes an argument for the history of rhetoric as a source of contextualization and inspiration in our efforts to define and redefine rhetorical arrangement.

For sake of clarity, I divide this chapter into three predominant approaches to arrangement in composition studies: linguistic approaches, psychological approaches, and communicative approaches. These three approaches broadly correspond to the trivium of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, but seem to have developed somewhat independently of ancient precedent. Since the dawn of the Conference on College Composition and Communication (CCCC) in 1949, these three approaches have been in circulation and continue to influence us to this day. Seeking "a theoretical

foundation for the study and teaching of writing," many composition scholars and instructors turned away from literary studies to linguistics, psychology, and communication studies for academic clout (Nelms and Goggin 11). Through these cross-pollinations, composition studies developed new ways of thinking about nineteenth-century rhetorical concepts such as paragraphs and the modes of discourse (exposition, description, narration, and argument [or, as Sharon Crowley affectionately calls them, EDNA]). Each approach influences how we think of rhetorical arrangement. Generally, composition scholars divide the discourse matrix into three dimensions: microstructures (such as words, phrases, and sentences); mesostructures (such as paragraphs and genre moves); and macrostructures (the whole outline of a text) (Gere et al. 612). Linguistic theories of arrangement tend to focus on microstructural relationships between sentences within paragraphs and between paragraphs. Inversely, psychological theories of arrangement tend to focus on macrostructural, top-down organizational schemes at the expense of microstructural matters. Out of the three approaches, communicative theories of arrangement most frequently give sustained focus to meso-level discourse structures. Inasmuch as microstructures are the purview of linguistics and macrostructures are the purview of psychology, rhetorical arrangement must focus on mesostructures that make composition possible. Rhetorical arrangement exists in this liminal space of composition, between sensing structure and articulating structure. As we will see, rhetorical arrangement shifts in and out of composition studies because of this liminality. A turn to rhetorical, communicative approaches and the history of rhetoric can bring rhetorical arrangement back into focus.

Last, I want to clarify my approach to this chapter and those that follow. In each instance, I define each theory relative to its nineteenth and twentieth century contexts. I then describe common critiques and explore how these theories remain in circulation outside of composition studies proper. In defining, describing, and exploring, I am less interested in setting up a strict dichotomy between historical theory and modern theory than I am in encouraging nuanced, historicized views of these theories and their associated discourse units. While I often represent how the field feels about these theories, the ancient theories I later present validate many of the precepts taught by these compositions scholars and provide deeper grounding from which to theorize discourse going forward.

Linguistic Theories of Arrangement

> "It is my impression that in too many rhetorics and too many classrooms, the paragraph continues to dance in chains"
>
> -Virginia M. Burke,
> "The Paragraph: Dancer in Chains," 37

Linguistic theories of arrangement assume that principles that apply to a sentence also apply to a paragraph and to a whole text (Crowley, *Methodical Memory* 132). As Alexander Bain famously put it in his *English Composition and Rhetoric* (1866/1867), "Look to the Paragraphs and the Discourse will look to itself… he that fully comprehends the method of a paragraph, will also comprehend the method of an entire work. As in the sentence, so in the paragraph" (151). Similarly, in his 1963 "A Generative Rhetoric of the Paragraph," Francis Christensen at the University of Southern California paraphrases Josephine Miles, a disabled poet and writing

program administrator at the University of California Berkeley, as saying that "the paragraph seems to be only a macro-sentence or meta-sentence" (144). Christensen then famously shows the coordinate and subordinate sentence relationships in a paragraph by indenting sentences.[7] The linguist Alton Becker at the University of Michigan also takes this relationship for granted in "A Tagmemic Approach to Paragraph Analysis" (1965), where he writes that "a theory of language which explains both grammatical and rhetorical patterns can probably be made by extending grammatical theories now used in analyzing and describing sentence structure" (237). Within this line of thought, a discussion of rhetorical arrangement is a discussion about paragraphs and sentences.

Early linguistic theories such as those of Christensen and Becker formed at the height of structuralist linguistics (Nystrand, Greene, and Weimelt 273; Connors, *Composition-Rhetoric* 165-168). In "Structural Linguistics and Language Teaching" (1957), Charles C. Fries, a founding member of the Linguistic Society of America and founder of the English Language Institute at the University of Michigan, supported "finding out the functioning patterns" of language. In his conception, structural linguistics encourages "pattern practice to make automatic the control of significant contrasts of the various sets of signals a language uses" (267). Thus, structuralism often goes hand-in-hand with behaviorism. As Robert Lado, one of Fries' students puts it in his article "Sentence Structure," "*Different structures represent different systems of habits*" (13). Structural linguistics essentially promoted

[7] This paragraph, for example, has a coordinate structure (Bain, Christensen, Miles, and Becker all use the same analogy). The next paragraph has a subordinate structure. (I will avoid Christensen's indentation analysis for the sake of readability.)

the identification of patterns and variations that could then be taught via exercises and drills (Matsuda 702). For example, in their textbook *American English in Its Cultural Setting* (1956), linguists Donald Lloyd and Harry Warfel present "pattern-practice" of "schematize[d]" paragraphs with arrows to show how the first and last sentence point to the central content of a paragraph (524). Marie Aquin (1960) eagerly extends Lloyd and Warfel's variation techniques and "box paragraph" to the modes of discourse, which become a way of classifying paragraphs: "Applying these types to our box paragraph frame, we may call [the modes of discourse] the 'variables.' The frame itself, in a very flexible sense, may be called the 'constant'" (48). This language of variables and constants falls in nicely with the structuralist-behaviorist emphasis on pattern practice and suggests a decontextualized rigidity. As Aquin puts it, "language is a system of habits and… the most direct way for our students to acquire these habits is by continuous drill and repetition" (50). Such an approach can teach students to think of paragraphs as stand-alone units, but contextual factors are clearly missing. Tagmemic linguist Kenneth Pike (and another of Fries' students), directly associates all of these patterns, boxes, and slots with rhetorical arrangement, which he defines as "the art of organizing discourse by means of flexible systems of slots (or stages in a discourse) into which appropriate categories of subject-matter were fitted" (Young, Becker, and Pike, *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change* 4 [1970]). This schematized approach to paragraphs amounts to a theory of arrangement.

While these structuralist approaches to paragraphs were common, they were not the only approaches available. In contrast to these structuralist approaches, Paul Rodgers and Virginia Burke both turn to the history of rhetoric and in doing so

develop more nuanced views of paragraphs. Rodgers, for example, traces the paragraph back to the nineteenth century rhetorician Alexander Bain ("Alexander Bain and the Rise of the Organic Paragraph" [1965]); notes how the concept of the paragraph has changed over time in the works of Barrett Wendell, Fred Newton Scott and Joseph Denney, Edwin Lewis, and Wendell Johnson; and determines that paragraphing is more a matter of "rhetorical emphasis" than about building stand-alone paragraphs ("A Discourse-Centered Rhetoric of the Paragraph" [1966]). "Paragraphs," Rodgers surmises, "are not composed; they are discovered. To compose is to create; to indent is to interpret" (6). Based on this genealogical analysis, Rodgers is decidedly less interested in paragraphs and more interested in how coherence goes beyond paragraphs. As such, Rodgers proposes a new meso-level discourse unit, the "stadium of discourse." Rodgers defines stadium of discourse as a unit that "contains a single topic, together with any accrete extensions or adjunctive support that may be present" ("The Stadium of Discourse" 184 [1967]). These units are independent of, and often larger than, the paragraphs themselves. While these stadia often coincide with paragraph indentation, they often span multiple paragraphs: "Any stadium *may* become a paragraph, and many do. But a portion of a stadium may also become a good paragraph, providing that structural relationships remain clear; and a group of stadia may become a paragraph, providing the resulting bundle of material constitutes an acceptable blend" (184). Rodgers asserts that paragraphs are not the best unit to focus on unless they are seen from a rhetorical, purposive angle. The stadium of discourse may serve as a better unit for analyzing discourse beyond the level of the sentence and within the level of the whole text.

Because Rodgers turns to history rather than to linguistics, Rodgers refreshes how we think about meso-level units of discourse.

Virginia Burke (no relation to Kenneth), a scholar of black literature at the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, also turns to the history of rhetoric. Through a similar analysis of seventeenth-century paragraphs and the teachings of Alexander Bain, Edwin Lewis, Fred Newton Scott and Joseph Denney, Barrett Wendell, and E.B. Lanthopp, Burke determines that we need to stop thinking about paragraphs as distinct units. Using Kenneth Pike's physics analogy of particle, wave, and field perspectives, Burke argues that scholars often focus too much on paragraphs as discrete units. Bain, for example, "reinforces this particle view by analogizing the paragraph to the sentence" (39). Wendell, too, "freezes the paragraph as particle by excluding its wave characteristics" (40). In the end, Burke argues that theory ought to include all dimensions of paragraphs: "paragraphs move paratactically and hypothetically, not only internally but in relation to neighboring paragraphs, to sequences, and to the total field of meaning" (42). The behavior of paragraphs, she continues, "must be more fluid, more unpredictable than the behavior of the sentence. If it is to retain its distinct character, it must resist narrow schematization" (43). By turning to the history of rhetoric, these scholars are better able to contextualize the paragraph and define fresh ways to think about paragraphs.[8]

[8] The two paragraphs on Rodgers and Burke are an example of a stadium of discourse that encompasses two paragraphs rather than being limited to one, with the head passage "While these structuralist approaches to paragraphs were common, they were not the only approaches available. In contrast to these structuralist approaches, Paul Rodgers and Virginia Burke both turn to the history of rhetoric and in doing so develop more nuanced views of paragraphs." These paragraphs could become a single long paragraph, but are broken up for emphasis and readability.

Despite other arguments against linguistic theories of the paragraph and its components (Braddock; Stern; Knoblauch), Christensen's approach to Paragraph Theory proved influential (Berlin, *Rhetoric and Reality* 136-137). This influence is no doubt attributable both to how well the theory fit the cultural milieu and also to Christensen's own efforts and the efforts of his students and colleagues. Christensen's "Generative Rhetoric of the Paragraph" was republished numerous times, including as part of NCTE's 1966 *The Sentence and the Paragraph* (which included the text of the CCCC "Symposium on the Paragraph"), the 1967 *Notes Toward a New Rhetoric,* and in 1968 *The Christensen Rhetoric Program: The Sentence and the Paragraph*. This last publication was intended for and picked up by public schools, particularly through Josephine Miles, James Gray, and Miles Myers' Bay Area Writing Project (the precursor of the National Writing Project) (Winston 20; Gray 410). The generative rhetoric of the paragraph also influenced many other scholars. Robert Kaplan, one of Christensen's students at the University of Southern California, used paragraph theory to compare writing from different cultures in his 1966 "Cultural Thought Patterns in Inter-Cultural Education." Willis Pitkin, another of Christensen's students, works to make paragraph theory more functional by proposing "discourse blocs," units that blend Christensen and Rodgers's approaches to paragraphs ("Discourse Blocs" [1969]; "Hierarchies and the Discourse Hierarchy" [1977]; "X/Y: Some Basic Strategies of Discourse" [1977]; *Generating Prose: Relations, Patterns, Structures* [1987]). Additional updates include Michael Grady and Frank D'Angelo's application of the theory to full essays (D'Angelo, "A Generative Rhetoric of the Essay" [1974]); Ellen Nold and Brent Davis's cognitive

psychology approach at Stanford ("The Discourse Matrix" [1980]); and Richard Coe's application of paragraph theory to professional/technical writing, contrastive rhetoric, and basic writing at Simon Fraser University (*Toward a Grammar of Passages* [1988]). Importantly, what continued was a focus on paragraphs as groups of sentences more than paragraphs as components of larger stretches of discourse.

An awareness that paragraphs are composed of sentences is essential for writers; however, this awareness often shifts attention away from paragraphs to sentences and to intersentential and interparagraph relations. Leo Rockas, for example, suggests that the question should not be "what is a paragraph" (that is, defining the unit) so much as "how do sentences get connected in discourse?" (that is, what is happening between units) ("Further Comments on the Paragraph" 148 [1966]). This is a critical difference: defining the unit, Rockas suggests, is less important than sticking to the sentence and focusing on intersentential relations. Like Rockas, W. Ross Winterowd also leans towards a focus on connections between sentences than mid-level units in his "The Grammar of Coherence" (1970/1981; also published in his *Contemporary Rhetoric: A Conceptual Background with Readings*, 1975). Winterowd was also with Christensen at the University of Southern California. Winterowd posits relationships between "transformational units in a paragraph, among the paragraphs in a chapter, among the chapters in a book" and calls these relationships transitions (304). These transition relationships are coordinate, observative, causative, conclusive, alternative, inclusive, and sequential (see Figure 1). In "Toward a Linear Rhetoric of the Essay" (1971), Richard Larson names this movement toward intersentential connections and away from paragraphs

as such. Linear perspective, Larson believes, emphasizes the functional aspect of discourse, that discourse is not merely a conceptual hierarchy but does something (Larson refers to J.L. Austin's philosophical distinction between "what words *say* and what they *do*" [143]). By placing emphasis on "transitional materials" (145), Larson further shifts the rhetoric of the paragraph from a focus on material to a focus on how material is connected together via metalanguage.[9]

Coordinate Observative Causative Conclusive Alternative Inclusive Sequential

Figure 1: Winterowd's Transitional Relationships

This linear, sentence-level approach to passages is especially embodied in Joseph Grimes's technical report *The Thread of Discourse* (1972). As a text linguist from Cornell University working with Kenneth Pike's Summer Institute of Linguistics (a language documentation and Bible translation organization), Grimes is very aware of structural linguistics and paragraph theory, and directly cites Christensen and Becker as he carves out his research space (9). While Grimes distinguishes himself from Christensen and Becker, Grimes taps into a similar vein that emphasizes parataxis and hypotaxis (coordination and subordination) as argumentative concepts. Grimes presents a theory of "rhetorical predicates" and

[9] Using Winterowd's terms, this paragraph demonstrates (in order of appearance): Inclusivity, Conclusivity, Coordination, Causativity, Inclusivity, Inclusivity, Conclusivity, Inclusivity, and Conclusivity. The relationship between this paragraph and the previous paragraph is a Sequential relationship.

"rhetorical propositions," each of which "expresses a semantic relation among *arguments*" rather than among sentences, paragraphs, etc. (141). Grimes open list of rhetorical predicates include paratactic rhetorical predicates (Alternative, Response, Collection); hypotactic rhetorical predicates (Attributive, Equivalent, Specific, Relation, Evidence, Analogy, Representative, Replacement, Constituency); and neutral rhetorical predicates (Sequence, Adversative) (see Figure 2). Inasmuch as Grimes does not apply these rhetorical predicates to the study of longer passages of discourse, his theory remains in the realm of sentence-based theories of rhetorical arrangement (Hendricks 958; Dressler 321). However, inasmuch as these rhetorical predicates define relationships between argument propositions rather than between sentences, Grimes' work has implications for rhetorical arrangement.[10]

[10] Here's a Grimean analysis of this paragraph by sentence: Representative, Attributive, Adversative, Representative, Specific, Response, and Alternative. The relationship between this and the previous paragraph is Sequence.

Paratactic Rhetorical Predicates	Hypotactic Rhetorical Predicates	Neutral Rhetorical Predicates
Alternative Response Collection	Attributive Equivalent Specific Explanation Evidence Analogy Representative Replacement Constituency	Sequence Adversative

Figure 2: Grimes' Rhetorical Predicates

Back at the University of Southern California, William Mann and Sandra Thompson draw directly on Grimes to develop Rhetorical Structure Theory, another application of and approach to linguistic theories of rhetorical arrangement, especially those emphasizing relationships between shorter segments of discourse. In a series of technical reports, Mann and Thompson, along with their team at the Information Science Institute at the University of Southern California, initially developed RST with an eye towards text description and computational linguistics applications, such as text generation by computer programs. In "Relational Propositions in Discourse" (1983), Mann and Thompson's theory describes intersentential relationships: "These relational propositions arise between portions of the text, allowing people to perceive relationships between parts of a text even though each of these parts may be longer than one sentence" (2). Drawing on speech act theory, Mann and Thompson then suggest that their relational propositions that follow from these predicates "are involved in relational illocutionary acts" by which two portions of text are joined together (14). Returning to the sentence/paragraph analogy, they assert that these

relations hold not just between clauses but also between other lengths of text: "they cannot be viewed as 'interclausal' in the sense of being defined on clauses, but must rather be seen as relating entire portions of texts" (23). Whereas Grimes mostly restricts his study to intersentence relations, Mann and Thompson hint at the possibility that these relations operate on other levels as well.

In "Rhetorical Structure Theory: Description and Construction of Text Structure" (1986), Mann and Thompson revise their relational propositions to develop RST. While their theory is removed from structuralism by many years, structuralist echoes continue. RST divides language into "*text spans*," each of which consist of a "*nucleus*" and "*satellites*" (roughly synonymous with theme and rheme). Nucleus and satellite spans, when put in relation, constitute "*schemas*," their new term for relational propositions. Mann and Thompson focus on eight of these schemata, many of which recall Winterowd and Grimes's categories: evidence, antithesis, elaboration, concessive, conditional, circumstance, and motivation/enablement (2; see Figure 3). Like Christensen, Mann and Thompson describe these schemata as "functional hierarchical relationships" ("Rhetorical Structure Theory: A Framework for the Analysis of Texts" [April 1987]). And the structuralist focus on patterns persists inasmuch as schemata "are simple predefined patterns specifying how regions of text combine to form larger regions, up to whole texts" (3).

In their fullest treatment of RST, Mann and Thompson claim that their theory can be applied beyond sentences. RST, they assert, is "insensitive to text size, and has been applied to a wide variety of sizes of text" ("Rhetorical Structure Theory: A Theory of Text Organization" 2 [June 1987]). Their hints about longer spans of text,

however, does not last. In "Rhetorical Structure Theory: Looking Back and Moving Ahead" (2006), Maite Taboada and William Mann explain that RST's unit of focus has come to be primarily independent clauses (429). They acknowledge that initially they had hoped to apply RST to "large unit sizes, such as orthographic paragraphs or subsections." However, Taboada and Mann admit that RST tends to get messy when it is applied to larger units: "Difficulties arise because in larger units, it is much more likely that there are multiple units that are in some RST relation to items outside of the unit. This sets a practical upper bound on detailed RST analysis…. In general, analysis of larger units tends to be arbitrary and uninformative." Rather than turn to RST for the analysis of larger units, Taboada and Mann suggest that macrostructures or "constituents of a genre" may work better (430). RST builds on Grimes' effort to outline relations between spans of text in non-sentence-bound ways by proposing a system of schemata. These schemata have potential to describe units of discourse beyond the level of the sentence and below the level of the whole text but, like other linguistically-inflected theories of arrangement, are more comfortable at the microstructural sentence level.[11]

[11] Using RST, the movement in this paragraph can broadly be considered a Thesis/Antithesis (RST claims X but really has Y limitation), but also contains other schemata such as Solutionhood ("Mann and Thompson claim"), Evidence ("'insensitive to text size'"), and Concession ("They acknowledge that"). Schemata over multiple paragraphs (such as the Justification of my project) can also be roughly discerned.

Winterowd	Grimes	Mann and Thompson
Coordinate Observative Causative Conclusive Alternative Inclusive Sequential	<u>Paratactic</u> Alternative Response Collection <u>Hypotactic</u> Attributive Equivalent Specific Explanation Evidence Analogy Representative Replacement Constituency <u>Neutral</u> Sequence Adversative	Solutionhood Evidence Justification Motivation Reason Sequence Enablement Elaboration Restatement Condition Circumstance Cause Concession Background Thesis/Antithesis

Figure 3: Comparison of Selected Linguistic Theories of Arrangement

Linguistic theories of arrangement, for better or worse, rely heavily on analogies to sentences. Because of this reliance, these theories often hold closely to discussions of sentences and relations between sentences. These theories also maintain a structuralist edge and interest in defining discrete teachable units and simple exercises. These theories, I would suggest, are at their best when they encourage writers to be mindful about how they move from one sentence to the next within a paragraph and from one paragraph to the next in an essay. Their emphasis on the logical operations in these interstitial spaces, and their efforts to describe mesostructures, to say nothing of the times when they attend to readers and effects as well, also shows great potential. However, inasmuch as paragraph theories lose sight

of mesostructures are taught mechanically or rigidly, compositionists reasonably hold these theories pedagogically suspect. A theory of arrangement should consider cohesion and coherence, the arrangement of sentences and the use of metalanguage to weave patches of text together. However, a theory of rhetorical arrangement must also, like Paul Rodgers and Virginia Burke imply, take into account the conceptual and argumentative aspects of structure.

Psychological Theories of Arrangement

> "the task of the composer is to find the forms that find forms; the structures that guide and encourage growth; the limits by means of which development can be shaped"
>
> -Ann E. Berthoff,
> *Forming/Thinking/Writing* 153

Whereas linguistic theories of arrangement assume an analogy between sentences, paragraphs, and texts, psychological theories of arrangement assume an analogy between language and thought. A particular pattern of thought, the assumption goes, will result in a particular pattern of discourse (Crowley, *Methodical Memory* 97, 120). Bain, for example, turns to faculty psychology to correlate purposes of speaking ("to inform, to persuade, to please") with parts of the mind ("the Understanding, the Will, and the Feelings") and types of composition:

> [Kinds of Composition] that have for their object to inform the UNDERSTANDING, fall under three heads-- *Description, Narration,* and *Exposition.* The means of influencing the WILL are given under one head, *Persuasion*. The employing of language to excite

> pleasurable FEELINGS, is one of the chief characteristics of *Poetry*. (19)

These types of composition are known as the modes of discourse. For example, James McCrimmon's *Writing with a Purpose* (1950/1967) lists three "patterns of organization," the "illustrative, analytical, and argumentative" (56). The 14th edition (Trimmer, 2004) lists narrative, description, process analysis, comparison, classification, definition, and causal analysis (130-145).[12] Each of these patterns suggests purposive mental operations. As James Kinneavy puts it in reference to his own list of discourse types, "To each of the four modes of discourse there corresponds a principle of thought" (37 [*A Theory of Discourse* 1971/1980]). Frank J. D'Angelo goes further, explicitly arguing for "a conceptual theory of rhetoric which deals with the relationship between thought and discourse" (*A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric* 1 [1970]). For D'Angelo, the rhetorical canons of invention, arrangement, and style are all instantiations of the same conceptual patterns:

> the topics of invention, the patterns of arrangement, and the stylistic aspects of sentences, when they reveal similar conceptual structures, are all closely interrelated. We call these processes 'topics' when they serve a heuristic function; we call them 'patterns of arrangement' when they are used to organize discourse; we call them 'stylistic'

[12] This edition no longer lists McCrimmon as the author, but the structure and content are mostly the same. For more on the longevity of this textbook, see Robert J. Connors, "Thirty Years of Writing with a Purpose" (1981). As of 2023, it seems that there will not be a 15th edition.

> when they inform sentences. All, in fact, are symbolic manifestations of the same underlying thought processes. (28-29).

Thus correlated, D'Angelo believes that patterns of arrangement clearly correspond to patterns of thought: "If. . . the predominant organizational pattern of a mode of discourse takes the form of a comparison, then the writer must have gone through the inventive process of comparing in order to produce that pattern" (56).

The modes of discourse tend to focus on top-level organizational patterns which provide outlines for thinking and writing. Within this framework, composition scholars provide guidance for how to develop each type. Some of this guidance is presented as the only option, whereas other guidance focuses more on how these patterns should be treated dynamically. Henry Noble Day in *The Arts of Discourse* (1867/1875) includes methods of development for each mode of discourse. For the explanation mode, Day writes: "The particular processes by which this is chiefly effected are six in number,– NARRATION, DESCRIPTION, DIVISION, PARTITION, EXEMPLIFICATION, and COMPARISON AND CONTRAST" (67). For an "illustrative pattern," McCrimmon focuses rather on a logical metaphor: "The movement within this pattern is from general to particular. The discussion moves toward a more and more specific statement of what is implied by the opening general statement" (56). Kinneavy, however, advocates a more dynamic approach: "The ultimate danger, the Achilles heel of classical rhetoric, is to insist on a rigid formula which must be adhered to" (265). Similarly, D'Angelo deliberately correlates the methods of development with the *topoi* but also asserts that these methods must be understood dynamically: "they are to be considered dynamic organizational

processes, symbolic manifestations of underlying mental processes, and not merely conventional, static patterns" (57). Mina Shaughnessy, too, associates the modes of discourse with the *topoi*: "Most of the thought patterns we have been reviewing here are familiar to many teachers already as the topics of rhetoric" (*Errors and Expectations* 272 [1977]). Through this association, scholars see parallels between the history of rhetoric and modern composition studies.

While the modes of discourse and methods of development have frequently been critiqued for not reflecting actual practice (Meade and Ellis) nor real needs or inventional processes (Coe, "Closed System Composition"; Eckhardt and Stewart; Harrington, Keith, Kneupper, Tripp, and Woods), the loudest arguments against these concepts came from revisionist disciplinary histories in the 1980s and 1990s. These scholars include Robert J. Connors, James Berlin, and Sharon Crowley. Just as Rodgers and Burke historicize paragraphs and thereby come to new ways of thinking about paragraphs, these scholars' histories increase awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of the modes of discourse and methods of development.

One line of argument against the modes of discourse put forward by these historians is that the modes of discourse are often treated as decontextualized formulas. In "The Rise and Fall of the Modes of Discourse" (1981), Robert J. Connors, a student of Edward P.J. Corbett, shows that the modes rose to prominence "because they fit into the abstract, mechanical nature of writing instruction at the time" and fell "as other, more vital, ideas about writing appeared in the 1930's and after" (453). The principal danger of the modes of discourse is that they "represent an unrealistic view of the writing process, a view that assumes writing is done by

formula and in a social vacuum" (454). As he argues in "Static Abstractions and Composition" (1983), these concepts may seem like "neat, comprehensive-sounding conceptual schemes that are easy to teach," however they have no real contact with what students need to learn" (11). While Andrea Lunsford, another of Corbett's students, argues that such is a misunderstanding of nineteenth-century rhetorics, she agrees that many theorists treat the modes of discourse problematically ("Alexander Bain's Contributions to Discourse Theory" 299 [1982]). In her response to Connors' "Rise and Fall" article, Sharon Crowley is less concerned with the psychology underlying the modes of discourse so much as with the way that intention is treated reductively:

> What is obviously missing… is the notion of audience, without which the concept of discourse is nonsense…. The real problem with EDNA [exposition, description, narration, argument], then, is that she is not rhetorical. Any viable composition theory must include all the important elements of discourse: writer, text, and audience. (90)

Inasmuch as the modes of discourse do not take into account the rhetorical situation, their theoretical and practical value is suspect.

In addition to concerns that the modes of discourse ignore the rhetorical situation, another line of argument is that the modes of discourse are stand-ins for more complex arrangement processes. In his 1984 *Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American Colleges,* James Berlin also focuses on the ways that this approach to arrangement reduces invention:

> The *invention* of discovery of classical rhetoric is replaced by a managerial invention. . . . Rhetoric, it is asserted, cannot teach the discovery of the content of discourse, but it can teach students to manage it, once found, so that it appeals to the appropriate faculty. This new invention is thus made a part of arrangement. (64)

Crowley, too, sees emphasis on the modes of discourse as deliberately displacing invention (*The Methodical Memory* 1 [1990]). As such, arrangement is often sublimated into invention or style: "many current-traditional authors maintained that rhetoric, and hence composition, had only two canons: invention and style. Arrangement, suspended as it was between the binaries of thought and expression never quite found a comfortable home in their textbooks." Crowley notes how rhetoricians Alexander Jamieson and Samuel Newman "submerg[ed] their treatment of arrangement within that given to style" and how other times arrangement would be "submerged within invention, as when various sorts of aims were associated with their respective orders of development within genres." This submersion is possible, Crowley asserts, because of the language/thought assumption that this theory depends on (121). While scholars such as Nan Johnson in her *Nineteenth-Century Rhetoric in North America* (1991) seeks to defend nineteenth-century rhetoricians' efforts to bring invention and arrangement together (185-187) and and Robert Connors in his *Composition-Rhetoric: Backgrounds, Theory, and Pedagogy* (1997) generally aims to understand nineteenth-century rhetoricians on their own terms, critiques of the modes of discourse rule the day. Because these scholars turn to the history of rhetoric, they

are able to contextualize these concepts, put them in perspective, and argue for alternative approaches.

Contemporaneous with this turn to the history of rhetoric and composition was a turn to cognitive psychology, particularly in the interest of studying the writing and reading processes (Nystrand, Greene, and Weimelt 273, 281). A popular theory in applied linguistics and English education is Schema Theory.[13] Like the modes of discourse, Schema Theory depends on the language/thought analogy (and, occasionally, the modes of discourse live on as schemata). For example, Teun A. van Dijk in his *Macrostructures: An Interdisciplinary Study of Global Structures in Discourse, Interaction, and Cognition* (1980) deliberately blurs distinctions between discourse and thought. In defining macrostructures, van Dijk emphasizes that these structures "characterize *higher* or more *abstract* levels of semantic information and information processing," information processing being a cognitive psychology term for thinking (13). Speaking of global coherence, van Dijk adds that "Besides these textual functions, the schematic categories may also have developed from or still have pragmatic, cognitive, and sociocultural functions" (127). Bonnie Meyer, too, explores how "*mental representation[s]*" or writing plans guide writers' composing processes by organizing main ideas, ordering topics by hierarchical importance, and moving from old to new information ("Reading Research and the Composition Teacher: The Importance of Plans" 37 [1982]). And Rosalind Horowitz in "Text Patterns: Part II" (1985) notes that instruction in "pattern awareness" (i.e., students

[13] D'Angelo connects schema theory to the *topoi* in "*Topoi,* Paradigms, and Psychological Schemata" (1981).

recognizing the patterns in model texts) must be followed by deliberate instruction in "pattern processing," that is, how to think through this kind of structure (536).

Just like the modes of discourse also include discussion of ways to develop each mode and encourage dynamic understandings of these modes and methods, Schema Theory sometimes also suggests flexible approaches. Richard Anderson, Rand Spiro, and Mark Anderson, educational psychologists at the University of Illinois Center for the Study of Reading, suggest that schemata are composed of "*slots* or placeholders that can be *instantiated* with certain particular cases." The extent to which information does or does not fit into these slots determines what is considered meaningful ("Schemata as Scaffolding for the Representation of Information in Connected Discourse" 434 [1978]). A little less tied to structuralist, mechanistic metaphors of slots and fit, David Rumelhart clarifies that schema are not strict formulas: "A schema is not so rigidly applied that no variation is allowed. The schema only provides the skeleton around which the situation is interpreted" ("Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition" 37 [1980]).[14] In addition to being composed of variables, Rumelhart also explains that schemata can "embed;" operate at "all levels of abstraction;" represent "knowledge rather than definitions;" are "active processes;" and, as "recognition devices," are "aimed at the evaluation of their goodness of fit to the data being processed" (40-41). In other words, schemata are not merely plans or outlines of a whole discourse; schemata operate on multiple levels of discourse. Rumelhart also adds that these are activated both bottom-up from

[14] I'd like to thank Wayne Slater for introducing this reading at the 2018 Stasis Symposium.

linear processing of data and top-down from overall concepts of how the data should be organized: "where *conceptually driven* activation goes from *whole to part, data-driven* activation goes from *part to whole*" (42). One does not simply use one schema and call it a day; rather, schemata are constantly shifting.

A flexible model of schemata provides space for questions of mesostructure. Nevertheless, reading scholarship has often questioned the relationship between bottom-up and top-down discourse processing. Patricia Carrell, a second language reading scholar, argues that we need to give more attention to top-down structures. In "Cohesion Is Not Coherence" (1982), Carrell argues against M.A.K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan's *Cohesion in English* (1976). She argues that contextual-semantic architecture is just as important if not more important than linguistic markers: "Unlike the textual analysis approaches," she believes, "which operate as though [the text] occurred in a vacuum– schema theory takes the text processors into account." Because of this attention to the mind, "coherence of a text is a matter of content which happens to have linguistic consequences" (482). More sharply, Carrell writes: "Cohesion is not the cause of coherence; if anything, it's the effect of coherence" (486). Backing up this position, Carrell shows that ESL readers remember more when taught about expository patterns such as causation and problem/solution ("The Effects of Rhetorical Organization on ESL Readers" [1984]). Besides showing that the modes of discourse and methods of development remain in circulation even as they are questioned on a historical front, Carrell essentially argues that we should pay less attention to bottom-up linguistic theories of arrangement in favor of top-down psychological theories of arrangement.

By shifting attention away from linguistic theories of arrangement, Schema Theory loses sight of mesostructures and comes to treat structure as a guide for readers rather than for writers. In "The Effects of Selected Text-Forming Structures on College Freshmen's Comprehension of Expository Prose" (1984), Duane Roen and Gene Piché, English Education scholars from the University of Minnesota, agree with Carrell that "micro-level cohesive elements are less important than certain macro-level structures previously described as rhetorical predicates" (8).[15] Looking at reading comprehension, they found that "the presence of between-sentence cohesive conjunctions did little to increase reading rate or written free recall" in expository discourse (18). Roen and Piché conclude that "Rhetoricians' advice to use intersentential cohesive conjunctions (transition words) to produce more coherent expository writing may need qualification" (19). In essence, this conclusion is a blow to linear linguistic approaches to arrangement, suggesting that we should emphasize coherence rather than also cohesion. Alternatively, Wayne Slater, also trained at the University of Minnesota, does not argue against linguistic approaches, but focuses on macrostructures structures to the exclusion of both mesostructures and microstructures. In "Teaching Expository Text Structure with Structural Organizers" (1985), Slater had ninth graders read expository text from a history book with the aid of a "structural organizer" (a list of passage contents) and an "outline grid" (a blank outline with top-level structures such as problem-solution and claim-support in the margin). Students who used these heuristics performed better on a multiple choice test than students who only took notes (716). More recently, Pyle et al. ("Effects of

[15] This article comes from Roen's dissertation, which was directed by Piché.

Expository Text Structure Interventions on Comprehension: A Meta-Analysis" [2017]) have confirmed that teaching expository text structures aids reading comprehension, and Mar et al. ("Memory and Comprehension of Narrative versus Expository Texts: A Meta-Analysis" [2021]) have also confirmed that recall is better with narrative structures than expository structures. Attention to top-level structures clearly matters, especially for readers. But providing organizers, grids, and structures for writers begins to suggest that arrangement might remain a matter of filling slots rather than dialogic response between writers and readers in a rhetorical situation. As John Swales of the University of Michigan's English Language Institute puts it in *Genre Analysis: English for Academic and Research Settings* (1990), "schema theorist's emphasis on cognition has tended to isolate the text from its communicative purpose and from its environment" (88).

Psychological approaches to arrangement assume a relationship between language and thought in which the writer's thought determines language and that language determines the reader's thought. As such, approaches such as the modes of discourse and Schema Theory provide insights both for the creation and reception of meaning by means of structures, some of which outline mesostructures and others which give outlines of whole texts. However, inasmuch as psychological theories focus too much on global coherence and treat global coherence as rigid, we still have an incomplete theory of discourse, one in which form is suggested but has yet to fully emerge. As historians of composition have argued, we must treat these psychological concepts more carefully. A writer should attend both to the bottom-up, linguistic aspects of language and to the top-down, psychological aspects of language that make

coherence possible. Communicative approaches can help us center mesostructures and give a theory of arrangement a third leg to stand on.

Communicative Theories of Arrangement

> "Genre has become the keyword in this movement to create a more dynamic, dialectical, contextual conception of *dispositio*, of structure as a factor in psychological and social processes of writing"
>
> -Richard Coe, "'Prophesying After the Event': The Archaeology and Ecology of Genre" 2

Communicative theories of arrangement do not assume that paragraphs are analogous to sentences or that language is analogous to thought. Rather, communicative approaches assume that language is analogous to action (Fahnestock, "Modern Arrangement" 45). As J.L. Austin puts it in his *How to Do Things with Words* (1962), "to *say* something is to *do* something" (12). Instead of asking questions about what's going on in a paragraph or going on inside someone's mind, communicative approaches ask questions about observable public implications of language use. Within this framework, microstructures, mesostructures, macrostructures, and even metastructures (groups of texts acting in concert) can be considered actions that take place on a stage rather than a piece of paper. As such, communicative approaches also show great potential and discuss mesostructures more frequently; but, because they often focus on metastructures and macrostructures and have not received a historical treatment comparable to what linguistic and psychological theories have been subject to, communicative approaches have yet to fully engage with rhetorical arrangement.

Rhetorical Genre Studies is an example of a communicative approach which understands arrangement as a collection of elements, acts, or materials that work together. However, while genre studies scholars recognize that material is being collected, they are not entirely clear on what to call this material. Ultimately, Rhetorical Genre Theory emphasizes context and action to the exclusion of form (Hyon 696). Echoing Mikhail Bakhtin ("thematic content, style, and compositional structure– are inseparably linked to the *whole* of the utterance and are equally determined by the specific nature of the particular sphere of communication" 1227), speech scholars Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson define genre as "a complex, an amalgam, a constellation of substantive, situation, and stylistic elements" or "a group of acts" (*"*Form and Genre" 18, 20 [1978]). These acts must be "bound together by an internal dynamic" to create a "fusion of elements" (21, 23). Elements and acts are ostensibly mesostructures, but are left undertheorized. In "Genre as Social Action" (1984), Carolyn Miller works to define "generic fusion." Miller initially suggests that there are three levels of meaning– speech acts, propositions, and context– and that essentially form (structure) and substance (meaning) combine again and again into a hierarchy of meaning elements: "When form and substance are fused at one level, they acquire semantic value which is then subject to formalizing at a higher level" (159). Miller revises her hierarchy of meaning into the following dimensions: experience, language, locution, speech act, episode or strategy, genre, form of life, culture, and human nature (162). By making explicit this "episode or strategy" level between the speech act and the genre, Miller begins to articulate a theory of rhetorical arrangement for genre studies, but does not

go further into defining these episodes and strategies. In effect, genre scholars like Miller recognize that there are mesostructures, but do not define them. This lack of definition allows for these forms to be anything– text, images, sounds, etc.– and, in fact, scholars over the years have proposed many theories that invoke principles of arrangement such as collage (Burke, "Why Not Try Collage?" [1959]; Elbow, "Collage: Your Cheatin' Art" [1997]), remediation (Yancey, "Made Not Only in Words"; Ridolfo and DeVoss, "Composing for Recomposition" [2009]), remix (Palmeri, *Remixing Composition* [2012]; Edwards, "Framing Remix Rhetorically" [2015]), and assemblage (Johnson-Eilola and Selber, "Plagiarism, Originality, Assemblage" [2007]; Preston, "Project[ing] Literacy: Writing to Assemble" [2015]; Yancey and McElroy, *Assembling Composition* [2017]). Whatever the case, the goal of theory is to make the implicit explicit so that we can act more mindfully and deliberately. While it is important to define the material of arrangement broadly, writers of text also need ways to think about the arrangement of text.

Whatever focus there is on mesostructures and arrangement, genre studies often shifts away from analysis of text to analysis of context. Many scholars have turned to contextual concepts such as genre sets (Devitt, "Intertextuality in Tax Accounting" [1991]), genre systems (Bazerman, "Systems of Genre" [1994]), genre repertoires (Orlikowski and Yates [1994]), and genre ecologies (Spinuzzi and Zackry [2000]; Spinuzzi, *Describing Assemblages* [2006]). Whatever the metaphor, these theories emphasize that genres do not work alone, and situate genres within their larger contexts. Awareness of context is essential to arrangement, but so too is text. In "Genre, Genres, and the Teaching of Genre" (1996), Amy Devitt recognizes this

drift and argues that the field should find a balance between focusing on form and focusing on context: "As we have moved away from equating genre with textual form, the abstractness of the concept has at times made it difficult to distinguish genre from the context of which it is a part" (609). Devitt reiterates her call to include form in "Re-fusing Form in Genre Study" (2009). A "complete understanding of genre," she asserts, "will need to include the language forms that serve to achieve. . . purposes and effects, the forms that make generic action happen" (27). Inasmuch as genre studies has become "action-based. . . returning form to genre study will require reconfiguring form as rhetorically, socially, and culturally contextualized" into a "dynamic and rhetorical view[] of form" (28). Again: "A balanced genre study should address the whole and the part, the context and the form, without denying either" (33).

Whereas this branch of Rhetorical Genre Studies privileges mode and context over form, another branch of Rhetorical Genre Studies privileges agency and interaction over form. This emphasis on agency and interaction, however, continues to gesture toward form and structure. Scholars such as Charles Bazerman and Anne Freadman fall into this camp. In "Systems of Genres and the Enactment of Social Intentions" (*Genre and the New Rhetoric* 1994), Bazerman looks to speech act theory to articulate another approach to genre that can account for both "micro-acts and social macro-structure," that is, text and context (79). In his description, a text is a collection of acts: "The various smaller speech acts within the larger document contribute to the macro-speech act of the text, and each of the subacts must carry its weight." The sum becomes more than its parts when larger organizational frames

("macro-acts") are discernible: "the minor actions that go into [a macro-action] would be hard to understand, hard to attribute intention to, hard to see as effective acts, without the frame within the macro-act" (89). Here, Bazerman understands the parts of genres as individual speech acts which have bearing on the total interpretation of a genre. Unfortunately, he does not go further into defining different sizes of speech acts but rather treats them all as either micro-acts or macro-acts. Nothing like "meso-acts" is discussed.

Anne Freadman's work also draws on speech act theory, but places major emphasis on this matter of interpretation and the delimiting of interpretations; her focus is more on the interactive nature of genres and less on their parts. With that said, Freadman does represent an implicit theory of responsive form. In "Anyone for Tennis?" (1987, reprinted in 1994 in *Genre and the New Rhetoric*), Freadman discusses the extent to which genre constrains a particular kind of response. This response entails dynamic structure. Freadman uses a comparison with a tennis match to make her point. A tennis match is not merely a matter of "exchanging balls" or clearly interpretable meanings. Rather, it is "exchanging shots," acts that can be played in different ways. A shot can have "a *different value* for each of the two players" and must be returned in some manner for the game to continue (92-93). In terms of interpretation, then, "the playing of shots is to allow the value of those shots to be subject to play, and the meaning of the interaction to be the upshot of the perpetual modification of each shot by its return." Indeed, "each return shot is determined by the shot to which it is a response.... Returns, and readings, work within

certain clearly marked conventions, and *with the material at hand*" (93-94). Here, "*material*" implies the formal structure of the genre or text.

Within this conception of genre as give-and-take, as a game, Freadman refers to a theory of arrangement in terms of "strategy and tactics"' rather than genre in terms of part and whole (95). Rather than assuming that "the features of a [single] text will correspond to the rules of the genre" (97), a theory of genre as a game takes a text as "tactical" (i.e., the realization of strategies) and assumes that

> (ii) the rules of a genre, and the formal properties of a single text, will not correlate; but rather
>
> (iii) the two texts of a generic pair will have different properties, like question and answer, theory and refutation.
>
> (iv) one of the things a text will do is play its partner, whether or not that partner is 'present'. In order to do so, it must *represent* its partner... (98)

In other words, genres are not so much about formal characteristics as they are about strategic and tactical moves, and these moves consist of actional pairings. Within a genre, "tactical moves are made by both players, and these moves can be described as speech acts: commands, requests, complaints, advice, reassurance," and "tactical lee-way" is possible (100). Genre, Freadman asserts, "is not absolute... it is pragmatic" (106). Texts can "deploy a range of tactics," that is, more than one set of structures. Furthermore, while "To understand the rules of the genre is to know when and where it is appropriate to do and say certain things," a rhetor should understand that "To use these rules with skill is to apply questions of strategy to decisions of timing and the

tactical plan of the rhetoric" (113). The system of relations among "distinct features" of a text "frames, *and thus situates*, a text as genre" (117). These frames are structures. Later, in her article "Uptake" (2002), Freadman considers how this understanding of form might inform pedagogy: "Of course there are standard forms, and effective rhetoric depends in part– but not only in part– upon knowing them. It is clear that if all we do, and all we teach our students to do, is to mimic the standard forms, then our classes will be nothing but exercises in nonserious generic etiolations" (47). Freadman believes that this interactive approach transcends distinctions between text and context: "the distinction between the text and context cannot be maintained" she writes, because context leads to text and text leads to context ("The Traps and the Trappings of Genre Theory" [2012]). Genre, then, is not so much about form as about recognizing the living process of meaning making.

Scholars in argumentation and applied linguistics also define genres in terms of speech acts, but come to different conclusions. Perhaps because of their linguistic interest in form, applied linguists work to define the "organizational patterns in genres" (Hyon 695). Here, more than anywhere else, rhetorical arrangement comes to the fore, as mesostructures and macrostructures are described as groups of speech acts. Seeking to describe the structure of argumentation, Stephen Toulmin sketches another avatar of the discourse hierarchy in terms of "*micro-arguments*" and "*macro-arguments*" (*The Uses of Argument* 94 [1958/1988]). German linguist Werner Kummer defines an argumentative text as "a sequence of speech-acts" ("Aspects of a Theory of Argumentation" 25 [1972]). Kummer suggests that a text amounts to a "goal-directed complex action" that is made up of "sub-goals, the single arguments of

argumentation." Kummer does not consider mesostructures, but, like other scholars sampled here, assumes a discourse hierarchy of structures and suggests that argumentation usually follows a problem-solution macrostructure (29). Further articulating this hierarchy, British linguist Guy Aston suggests that in spoken discourse "acts combine to form moves, moves to form exchanges, exchanges to form transactions, and transactions to form the speech event," but questions the extent to which this hierarchy can also be applied to written discourse ("Aspects of Structure in Argumentative Discourse" 472 [1977]). Finnish linguist Sonja Tirkkonen-Condit further elaborates the mesostructures that make up the argumentative macrostructure into Situation, Problem, Solution, and Evaluation ("Toward a Description of Argumentative Text Structure" 225-226 [1984]). Similar categories, it will be noted, show up in other taxonomies I have surveyed. Tirkkonen-Condit then asserts that an analyst can discern "dominant acts and sequences" by "identify[ing] speech acts in the text which best represent a section" (read: mesostructure) "or the text as a whole" (read: macrostructure) (231). Later, Ulla Connor explores how different cultures develop each of these mesostructures ("Argumentative Patterns in Student Essays" [1987]) and argues with compositionist Janice Lauer for more study of argumentative text structure ("Cross-Cultural Variation in Persuasive Student Writing" [1988]). Each of these scholars defines mesostructures as collections of micro speech acts which combine to form macro speech acts. Inasmuch as these scholars are naming these mesostructures, they are developing a theory of arrangement.

This speech act theory of arrangement and similar emphasis on the stages of argumentation inform John Swales' *Genre Analysis: English in Academic and*

Research Settings (1990). Drawing on research on discourse communities, genre, task, and schemata, Swales centers arrangement by explicitly describing and discussing mesostructures as mesostructures. Swales describes structure as a movement that comprises multiple moves. The introduction of a research article, for example, involves moves such as "Establishing a Territory," "Establishing a Niche," and "Occupying the Niche" (141). While such steps may seem relatively simple, compare these to Ken Hyland's contemporary "A Genre Description of the Argumentative Essay" (1990). Like these other applied linguists, Hyland aims to describe the mesostructures that make up an argumentative essay, but oversimplifies. Taking student essay exams from Papua New Guinea (assuming no influence from Papuan rhetoric) and articles from British and American newspapers, Hyland suggests that all essays include three major stages, 1) thesis, 2) argument, and 3) conclusion– each stage containing four to five moves, most of which are optional (69). David Schneer (2014) disagrees with Hyland. Schneer suggests that Hyland's three-part argumentative essay structure is, in effect, the five-paragraph essay (621). But Schneer comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that the two most common organizational structures are introduction-thesis-argument-conclusion and introduction-argument-conclusion/proposition (631). While defining mesostructures is an important first step toward representing a theory of arrangement, theories of arrangement must also consider the interactive and agentive dimensions of arrangement.

Communicative theories of arrangement emphasize that discourse does not happen within a vacuum. Attention to how contextual factors influence discourse

decisions is crucial to a complete theory of discourse. Communicative theories are similar to linguistic and psychological theories of arrangement in that these theories also aim to account for what happens between the level of the sentence and the level of the whole discourse. Communicative theories go further, though, in emphasizing the processual, interactive, and interpretive dimensions of arrangement, and make the study of genre moves a central issue in genre studies. More could be done, however, to ensure that we not only recognize mesostructures but also explore their functions in context.

Conclusion: Rhetorical Theories of Arrangement

So far in this chapter I have presented three approaches to arrangement. Each of these approaches provides important insights into arrangement, teaching us that passages of writing must be woven together, follow patterns that suit our purposes and that readers can recognize, and that are in some way responsive to context. Notwithstanding these teachings, these theories tend to privilege microstructures and macrostructures, leaving mesostructures undertheorized. At best, these theories define and place mesostructures between microstructures and macrostructures. But, as historians of rhetoric and composition have suggested, these theories can go even further toward outlining theories that are empowering to the core. Rodgers and Burke, for example, found that paragraphs are more about rhetorical emphasis than they are about filling in slots. And Connors, Berlin, and Crowley recognized ways in which the modes of discourse and methods of development are understood independently of the rhetorical situation. However, as I show in my introduction,

little or no work has been done to put genre moves and arrangement itself into historical context before the 1800s. A turn to the history of rhetoric can give us a better sense of where we have been so that we can better decide where we want to go.

The history of rhetoric shows great promise for the study of arrangement. Richard Leo Enos, for example, describes arrangement as an "Architecture for Creativity" that goes beyond structuralist slot-thinking so prevalent in linguistic approaches to arrangement. Enos points to Cicero's *Partitiones Oratoriae* as an example of Cicero encouraging, not fixity, but "great flexibility in structuring compositions to the limitations of the situation" (108). These "schema," rather than being "format commands" or "prefabricated pigeon-holes that can be unthinkingly used to slot ideas," are instead "highly defined and localized patterns of arrangement" that are "intended to aid both structure and even the invention of discourse." Indeed, Enos asserts, the great teacher Quintilian also conceived of "invention within arrangement." Therefore, "*For Cicero, invention occurs within a domain: that is, arrangement provides a structure, an architecture for the creation of ideas"* that "are intended for effective, responsive discourse," "systems for structuring expression which are responsive to the peculiarities of situations" (109). Rather than restrict creativity, then, rhetorical arrangement might enable it: "What was imprecisely characterized as a 'constraint' is nothing less than a degree of freedom replacing unstructured, random thought masquerading as 'creativity'" (110). Similarly, Donald Stewart implies that classical rhetorical arrangement is more adaptable and flexible than the typical five-paragraph essay: "many writers and users of textbooks which

advocate the five-paragraph essay apparently have little if any knowledge of classical rhetoric's development and adaptation of the five-part oration" (93).

A knowledge of the history of rhetoric can be a powerful thing. Earlier, I introduced Frank D'Angelo and Sharon Crowley. For many years, D'Angelo worked to continue building his conceptual theory of rhetoric. In particular, D'Angelo was interested in describing a trope-based theory of arrangement ("Prolegomena to a Rhetoric of Tropes" [1987]; "Tropics of Arrangement: A Theory of '*Dispositio*'" [1990]; "The Four Master Tropes: Analogues of Development" [1992]). From 1992 to 1998, however, D'Angelo turned away from this project to work on a more historically-informed projected tentatively titled *From Narrative to Argument; Rhetoric in Late Antiquity* ("The Rhetoric of Ekphrasis"). This project, later published under the title *Composition in the Classical Tradition*, turned away from the modes of discourse to the much older and more theoretically robust *progymnasmata*– graded, rhetoric-oriented creative writing exercises. D'Angelo explicitly contrasts the *progymnasmata* with the modes of discourse: "exposition is to be understood not so much as a free-standing genre of discourse, as in the nineteenth-century forms or modes of discourse, but as an aspect or function of a larger rhetorical process or as one of the parts of a longer argument." He continues:

> I was surprised to find, buried in this venerable rhetorical tradition, the foundation for the current traditional composition pedagogies based on the forms of discourse (description, narration, exposition, and argumentation) and the methods of development (comparison, contrast, definition, cause and effect, and exemplification). The

> *progymnasmata* reframe the forms of discourse and modes-based pedagogy within the realm of rhetorical purposes and actions. And they also overcome the problems of empty formalism, lack of purpose, and arhetoricality for which current-traditional and other kinds of pedagogies have come under fire in recent composition theory. (xii-xiv)

He then argues for teaching the *progymnasmata* for six reasons: 1) they are a graded sequence; 2) they "connect the spoken and written word"; 3) they are multicultural (they "have their analogues in the literature of the Near East, the Middle East, Asia, and so on…. non-Western students… can identify with rhetorical and literary exercises that have their roots in an oral culture that stress moral values"; 4) they "connect rhetoric to literary study"; 5) they "serve the purpose of moral instruction"; and 6) they "can help speakers and writers develop the rhetorical skills needed for participation in an civil society" (1-2). For each exercise, D'Angelo then provides the basic structure, importantly including how this structure can be expanded, contracted, reordered, and sometimes even repurposed. In other words, an amplification principle is present in this theory. By turning to the history of rhetoric, D'Angelo finds a new way of thinking about arrangement that helps him overcome problems with psychological theories of arrangement.

Like D'Angelo, Crowley eventually turns away from nineteenth-century rhetoric by looking to the older Greco-Roman rhetorics. Her classically-oriented textbook, co-authored with Debra Hawhee, is *Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary*

Students (1994/1999). In this textbook, Crowley and Hawhee argue that ancient rhetoric

> was situational rather than conventional…. differed markedly from modern school rhetoric, which presents composers with an abstract set of pseudo-scientific rules that dictate what a finished discourse ought to look like. Where ancient rhetorics began with rhetorical situations, modern discourse theory begins with forms or genres…. [The ancient rhetoricians] never assumed that a given discourse situation could be adequately met by employing generic formulas. (xiii)

While they forefront rhetorical invention by dedicating half of the textbook to that canon (xiv), Crowley and Hawhee are also careful to note that in this textbook

> There is no talk about the so-called 'modes of discourse' or about writing the research paper, since these are nineteenth-century additions to the lore of school rhetoric. Indeed, th[is] book abandons altogether the modern notion that composition is a formalist, rule-bound task. We think that this attitude toward composition is arhetorical and counterproductive for students and teachers alike, since it abstracts the act of composing from real human interaction. We also think that the ancient attitudes about composing are preferable to the rule-governed, text-centered tradition of writing instruction that American composition teachers inherit from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century rhetorical theory. (xv)

This is Crowley's argument from *The Methodical Memory*, augmented by recourse to classical rhetorics.

When Crowley and Hawhee come to arrangement proper in chapter 10, they emphasize the contextual, communicative aspects of arrangement. For example, they explain that arrangement "depends in large part on the rhetorical situation, so the *kairos* questions given in chapter 2 might prove to be useful aids to arrangement" because of the temporal and spatial aspects of *kairos*. Pointing to the military entailments of the Greek arrangement term *taxis*, they explain that "the connections between *kairos* and arrangement become clear: attention to *kairos* suggests the possibility of achieving an advantage with optimal placement of arguments, propitious timing, or a combination of the two. We believe it is crucial to consider the spatial dimension of *kairos*" (199). They then outline the parts of the oration in a relatively traditional manner. However, concepts relative to arrangement also surface in their chapter on style and on the *progymnasmata*, and these hint at the potential importance of rhetorical figures and the *progymnasmata* to arrangement. In their discussion of style, Crowley and Hawhee include a section on "Sententia Borrowed from Invention and Arrangement" (254-255). To show borrowings from arrangement, they note, based on the anonymous *Rhetoric to Herennius*, *divisio, distributio, frequentatio, propositio* and *enumeratio*, "figures of thought [that] repeat on the sentence level the parts of arrangement suggested for whole discourses" (255). Of the *progymnasmata*, they note that

> the *progymnasmata* may look and feel artificial or formulaic to contemporary writers. However, the directions for amplification that

> accompany some of them are meant to be freely interpreted; for example, not every encomium must have the same number of parts, and the parts need not always appear in the ame order. This freedom of interpretation and arrangement is what distinguishes classical exercises from the prescriptive formulas laid down in modern school rhetoric. (321)

Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students, like *Composition in the Classical Tradition*, suggests that ancient rhetorics have much to offer modern composition theory to make up for our continued reliance on nineteenth-century rhetoric alone. Style and the *progymnasmata*, too, may have value to a theory of rhetorical arrangement.

Ancient theories of rhetorical arrangement are unique in that they are expressly dedicated to the middle of the discourse hierarchy, describing units of discourse above the level of the sentence and below the level of the whole text. Like a three circle Venn diagram, linguistic, psychological, and communicative theories of arrangement overlap on this concern for this level of discourse. Ancient theories of rhetorical arrangement transcend these other approaches. While arrangement is a liminal concept that is often eclipsed by invention and style and negatively associated with nineteenth-century rhetoric, ancient approaches to arrangement give more sustained attention to arrangement. As such, ancient theories are unique in that they often assume overlapping relationships between invention, arrangement, and style. To bring rhetorical arrangement out of obscurity while also articulating a clear ground

between invention and style, we would do well to follow the examples of Rodgers, Burke, Connors, Berlin, Crowley, and D'Angelo in turning to the history of rhetoric.

Chapter 2: Exploring Arrangement: The *Ideai* and *Eide*

> ". . . we should consider most accomplished the man who is able to draw together [*athroizo*] the most ideas [*dianoiai*] held by others and to articulate them most elegantly" -Isocrates, *To Nicocles* 2.41

> "What happened in the past is available to all of us, but it is the mark of a wise person to use these events at an appropriate time, conceive fitting arguments about each of them, and set them out in good style" -Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 4.9

The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that ancient Greek discourse theorists recognize the importance of attending to units of various sizes. Whereas modern theorists often suggest that mesostructures exist but do not name them or lose sight of them, ancient theorists recognize that mesostructures exist and understand them as central to their project. Whereas we moderns often understand rhetoric as a matter of discrete, linear processes—first you find, then you arrange, then you shape—ancient theorists did not divide rhetoric the way we do. As I will show, the elements of discourse, which eventually are taken as central to the canons of invention, arrangement, and style, originally had a much closer, ambiguous relation to one another. As Kenneth Burke famously put it, "Distinctions… arise out of a great central moltenness, where all is merged" (*Grammar of Motives* xix). Many of the concepts that I will discuss in this dissertation can be traced back at least to the early days of the Greek disciplining of discourse, particularly in accounts of Sophistic, Platonic, and Isocratean education and their associated "terms of art." From these early concepts, theories of discourse and theories of rhetoric become increasingly articulated and reconstituted. However, many of the features found in earlier times can serve as a foundation from which to better understand where arrangement

concepts come from and why, conceptually, these categories blur and shade into one another. All of the principles of arrangement that I will highlight hereafter come as consequences of these blurred categories. Inasmuch as we look at these overlaps and see discourse and rhetoric with new eyes, we can see new routes through the history of rhetoric which privilege questions regarding the relationship between macrostructures, mesostructures, and microstructures and their implications for pedagogy.

Discourse Elements in Sophistic Teachings and Plato's Alternative

One of the first instances of an explicit Greek theory of arrangement can be found in the work of Plato (approx. 428-347 BC), an Athenian philosopher and aristocrat. Plato's discussion of arrangement emphasizes that by his time sophists--foreign, non-citizen teachers in Athens-- were beginning to theorize and teach discourse as composed of parts that they could teach anyone who could pay, rather than just the Athenian elite.[16] In the *Phaedrus* dialogue (c. 370 BC), Plato's character Socrates follows his discussion on the discovery of arguments by saying that, when

[16] David Timmerman, Edward Schiappa, and Wilfred Major ("Terms of Art and Inferring Theory: When Did the Parts of a Speech Become Formalized?") point out that while the term *prooímion* is mentioned in the works of Athenians Xenophon and Isocrates, none of the other terms to name the parts of speech are used reflexively and conceptually (147-148). Plato's account, however, shows that by his time "there is now a lively industry in analyzing, organizing, and providing nomenclature for the division of speeches" (169). Susan Jarratt (*Rereading the Sophists*) emphasizes that the elite were uncomfortable with the "shift from birth to wealth as a criterion for rule" (84). With such economic and political changes in Athens, the early sophists were likely seen by the elite as agents of social mobility rather than the status quo. Hence, elites such as Plato and Aristotle were not keen on the sophists' presence in Athens. It probably also did not help that the Sophists were for the most part non-Athenians.

critiquing a speech, one should ask whether or not the "parts of the speech appear to have been thrown together at random?" or "Is it evident that the second point had to be made second for some compelling reason? Is that so for any of the parts?" (264B, trans. Nehamas and Woodruff). These are questions relevant to order and arrangement. He then feigns not knowing whether or not there really is reason for an arrangement, saying that he "thought the author said just whatever came to mind next" —a particularly organic approach— and petitions his friend Phaedrus to name the principles or doctrines of order (264B). Phaedrus demurs, and Socrates offers a principle: "Every speech must be put together like a living creature, with a body of its own; it must be neither without head nor without legs; and it must have a middle and extremities that are fitting both to one another and to the whole work" (264C). By means of these questions and this organic metaphor, Socrates introduces the belief that a speech must have formal coherence. We will not see this organic metaphor for arrangement again for a long time.

Socrates then reviews the Sophists' teachings on the elements of a discourse. In doing so, his focus is especially on what we would consider arrangement; however, he also includes material within the structure of the speech that we in our time associate with other canons of rhetoric. Crucially, Plato considers these elements of speech together as the core scheme of rhetorical teachings. Phaedrus charges Socrates with not discussing what is usually considered the art of public speaking, at least, the theory as put forward in "the books on the art of speaking" (266D). Socrates then turns to consider the parts of an oration, "the fine points of the art" (266D), as represented by his contemporaries, the non-Athenian sophists. He lists the

following parts of an oration without attribution: first, Preamble (*prooimion*) (266D), "Second… the Statement of Facts [*diegesis*] and the Evidence of Witnesses [*martyria*] concerning it; third, Indirect Evidence [*tekmerion*]; fourth, Claims to Plausibility [*eikos*]." He also nods to the various other parts discussed at the time, starting with the teachings of Theodorus of Byzantium: "And I believe at least that excellent Byzantine word-wizard adds Confirmation [*pi*] and Supplementary Confirmation [*epipistis*]" (266E) and "Refutation [*elenchos*] and Supplementary Refutation [*epexelenchos*], to be used both in prosecution and in defense" (267A). Socrates also includes contributions of the Sophists such as the poet Evanus of Paros, including the "Covert Implication and Indirect Praise" and even a possible nod to what would later be associated with a theory of amplification attributable to Gorgias of Leontini: "make small things [*mikra*] appear great [*mega*] and great things small, they who express modern [*kainai*] ideas in ancient garb, and ancient ones in modern dress [*kainos*]… argue both concisely [*syntomon*] and at infinite length [*apeira*] about any subject" (267A-B; see also Bons 131). Socrates also notes Prodicus of Ceos's admonition that a speech be "neither long [*makros*] nor short [*brachys*] but of the right length [*metrios*]" (267B). He then includes what will be later called proofs and figures that he attributes to Polus of Acragas: "And what shall we say of the whole gallery of terms Polus set up-- speaking with Reduplication [*diplasiologia*], Speaking in Maxims [*gnomologia*], Speaking in Images [*eikonologia*]… Good Diction" (this last is attributed to Licymnius of Chios and Protagoras of Abdera) (267C). After all these many parts, we come to the conclusion (*telos ton logon*) or "Recapitulation" (*epanodos*), the "summarizing [of] headings [*kephalaia*] at the end and reminding the

audience what they've heard" (267D; more on *kephalaia* in the next chapter). Socrates claims that handbooks of the time emphasized units of discourse in this manner. To this list, in his *Rhetoric* (c. 335 BC) Aristotle also includes "a*ntiparabole* [reply by comparison]" and "replies to the opposition [*antidikon*]" which "belong to the proofs," as well as types attributable to "the followers of Theodorus," including "the *epidiegesis* [supplementary narration] and *prodiegesis* [preliminary narration]." Later, Aristotle also, perhaps in jest, refers to the poet Licymnius's "'sudden and speedy attack' [*epourosis*] and 'wandering' [*apoplanesis*] and 'ramifications' [*ozos*]" (III.13.3-5.1414b, trans. Kennedy). Figure 4 lists these many elements listed by Plato and Aristotle together.

Element	Attributed to	Cited in
Pooimion (Introduction)	(unknown)	Plato
Prodiegesis (Preliminary Narration)	Theodorus	Aristotle
Diegesis (Narration)	(unknown)	Plato, Aristotle
Epidiegesis (Supplementary Narration)	Theodorus	Aristotle
Martyria (Witnesses)	(unknown)	Plato
Tekmeria (Proof/Indirect Evidence)	(unknown)	Plato
Eikos (Plausibility)	(unknown)	Plato
Pistis (Confirmation)	Theodorus	Plato
Epipistis (Supplementary Confirmation)	Theodorus	Plato, Aristotle
Antidikon (Reply to the Opposition)	(unknown)	Aristotle
Antiparabole (Reply by Comparison)	(unknown)	Aristotle
Elenchos (Refutation)	Theodorus	Plato, Aristotle
Epexelenchos (Supplementary Refutation)	Theodorus	Plato, Aristotle
Hypodelosis (Covert Implication)	Evenus	Plato
Parepainoi (Indirect Praise)	Evenus	Plato
Megala, Smikra (Amplification)	Gorgias	Plato
Apeira, Syntomon (Minimization)	Gorgias	Plato
Diplasiologia (Reduplication)	Polus	Plato
Gnomologia (Maxims)	Polus	Plato
Eikonologia (Images)	Polus	Plato
Poiesis Euepeia / Orthoepeia (Good Diction)	Licymnius, Protagoras	
Epanodos (Recapitulation / Conclusion)	(unknown)	Plato, Aristotle
<u>(Unclear position in list)</u>		
Epourosis (Sudden and speedy attack)	Licymnius	Aristotle
Apoplanesis (Wandering)	Licymnius	Aristotle
Ozos (Ramifications)	Licymnius	Aristotle

Figure 4: Sophistic Elements of Speech[17]

[17] Robert Gaines ("Theodorus Byzantius on the Parts of Speech") reviews only twelve parts attributable primarily to Theorodus from Plato and Aristotle. I follow Plato in combining the parts/elements from Theodorus and the other sophists like Plato and Aristotle do, rather than separating them out according to modern categorizations.

While Plato and Aristotle may be exaggerating the teachings of these sophists and focus too much on their technical contributions rather than their contributions to political philosophy and ethics (Jarratt 95, 116), there are two important observations I would like to make about this aggregated list of technical terms. First, these parts are not "those of the canonical division" of *prooimion, diegesis, pistis,* epilogue (Timmerman, Schiappa, and Major 169). In fact, Plato's summary list (with Aristotle's corroboration and additions) does not discriminate between what we in our day would consider larger segments of discourse (*prooimion, diegesis*) and what will later be considered smaller argument schemes (*martyria, tekmeria*) and figures of style *(syntomia, poiesis euepeia*).[18] All these parts are listed together, not divided by size or by rhetorical canon. Second, all of these stylistic terms ("gallery of terms [*mouseia logon*]") come after the proof and before the recapitulation, which is similar to later patterns that emphasize marked figures of style clustering toward the end of a speech (see Pseudo-Cicero below). In Plato's rendition of the Sophists' teachings, arrangement is not distinguished from style. Rather, argumentative and stylistic elements seem to be embedded in a larger structure.

This embedding may also reflect an important part of Sophistic education. In *On Sophistical Refutations,* Aristotle famously describes "paid teachers of contentious argument (*eristikos logos*)" whose training (*paideia*) "resembled the

[18] *Martyria, tekmeria,* and *eikos* may even be larger structures during this period. Timmerman, Schiappa, and Major suggest they appear as distinct parts of an speech in Antiphon of Rhamnus: these elements "correspond more to the elements that dominate the speeches of Antiphon (narrative, arguments from evidence, arguments from probability) than the canonical four divisions, although the ordering of these elements in Antiphon is not fixed" (169).

system of Gorgias" in that "some of them gave their pupils to learn by heart speeches." The problem with this kind of education, Aristotle argues, is that

> they conceived that they could train their pupils by imparting to them not an art but the results of an art, just as if one should claim to be about to communicate knowledge for the prevention of pain in the feet and then were not to teach the cobbler's art and the means of providing suitable foot-gear, but were to offer a selection of various kinds of shoes. (2.34.183b-184a)

This passage is often taken to be a censure of Sophistic teaching, although Aristotle does differentiate between sophistic and contentious arguments (1.11.171b). Whatever the case, Plato provides a different account in the *Phaedrus* of Sophists a generation earlier.

After discussing the above elements of discourse, Socrates distinguishes between preliminaries of an art and the art itself. Socrates argues that the Sophists have the preliminaries of the art of rhetoric, but do not understand rhetoric itself. These preliminaries include "all the marvelous techniques we just discussed– Speaking Concisely and Speaking in Images and all the rest we listed" (269A). Socrates then suggests that the Sophists of his day teach how to combine these elements, rather than memorizing whole speeches as Aristotle's eristic teachers do:

> So they teach these preliminaries and imagine their pupils have received a full course in rhetoric, thinking the task of using each of them persuasively and *putting them together* [*synistasthai*] *into a*

> *whole speech* is a minor matter, to be worked out by the pupils from their own resources (269C; emphasis mine).[19]

If this passage can be taken as representative, then there is actually a strand of sophistic education that deliberately teaches these elements of discourse and their combination. Some may find this education to be preliminary, but it provides a glimpse of how these elements– including organizational elements– may have been taught.[20]

Socrates, of course, has his reservations with this approach to arrangement, rhetoric, and education, and proposes his own scheme to explain how to develop and order discourse. He dismisses the Sophists' theories as "threadbare" (268A) because the sophists are "ignorant of dialectic" (269C) and because they lack a "serious understanding of the nature of the soul" and of "the nature of the world as a whole" (270C). He then proposes his own teachings twice (271A-B, 277B-C), always emphasizing that one should first learn truth about the world and about the soul and then, and only then, consider how form ought to correlate to the nature of the soul:

> First, you must know the truth concerning everything you are speaking or writing about; you must learn how to define each thing in itself; and, having defined it, you must know how to divide it into kinds until you reach something indivisible. Second, you must understand the nature of the soul, along the same line; you must determine which kind

[19] Carrino also recognizes that Socrates finds elements-oriented discourse education to be merely preliminary (55).

[20] For more on reconstructing sophistic pedagogies, see Debra Hawhee, "Bodily Pedagogies: Rhetoric, Athletics, and the Sophists' Three Rs."

> of speech is appropriate to each kind of soul, *prepare and arrange your speech accordingly, and offer a complex and elaborate speech to a complex soul and a simple speech to a simple one*. Then, and only then, will you be able to use speech artfully, to the extent that its nature allows it to be used that way, either in order to teach or in order to persuade. This is the whole point of the argument we have been making. (277B-C, emphasis mine)

While Socrates recognizes that there exists other important principles such as *kairos* that determine when to use different elements of discourse ("'when, in addition, he has grasped the right occasions [*kairos*] for speaking and for holding back; and when he has also understood when the time is right [*kairos*] for Speaking Concisely [*brachylogia*] or Appealing to Pity [*eleeinologia*] or Exaggeration [*deinosis*] or for any other of the kinds of speech [*eide logon*]'" [272A]), Plato's own organizing principles for speech structure are grounded in an almost metaphysical knowledge of the nature of the world and the nature of the soul. He is more interested in teaching and persuading by definition and division than by precept or principle.

Discourse Elements in Isocratean Teachings

Active about the same time as Plato, Isocrates (436-338 BC), another native Athenian employed by the elite, has his reservations with the Sophists, at least the Sophists of his time.[21] One of his concerns is that Sophists are trying to formulate

[21] As Yun Lee Too emphasizes, Isocrates is relatively conservative, see *A Commentary on Isocrates'* Antidosis, p. 26. Too explains that Isocrates identifies himself with the early sophists, rather than later sophists who he singles out in his

rules for an activity that cannot be reduced to rules: "they fail to notice that they are using an ordered art *(tetagmene techne*) as a model for a creative activity" (*poietikon pragma*)" (*Against the Sophists* 13.12, c. 392; trans. Mirhady and Too). He also takes issue with their terminology: "They promised to teach lawcourt skills and picked out the most wretched of terms, which those opposing this education ought to have used, not those supporting it" (13.19). Rather than use the terminology of Plato or the Sophists, Isocrates writes about a concept that he sometimes calls *idea* and other times calls *eidos.* As Robert Sullivan explains, *idea* and *eidos* come from the same verb (*eidon, "*to see") and are often translated as form, shape, figure, or kind. As such, *idea* and *eidos* are sometimes treated interchangeably (80). By referring to *idea* and *eidos*, Isocrates shows that, while speeches may be constituted from smaller parts, these parts can be mixed and are part of an open, rather than a closed set. These parts, also, must be chosen as original responses to persons, times, and places.

There has been much discussion among classicists and rhetoricians about what Isocrates means by the term *idea*.[22] This term is important because it potentially encompasses argumentative, organizational, and stylistic schemes. Jeroen Adrien Bons emphasizes that in general fourth century BC usage, *idea* or *eidos* can both refer to appearance, shape, property, and kind or type (23). This is the same word Plato uses for his more narrow, metaphysical Theory of Forms, but with a wider range of non-metaphysical meanings. Sullivan suggests that Isocrates uses this term six ways,

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Against the Sophists. He might make this identification because he himself was a student of early sophists such as Prodicus and Gorgias.

[22] See Jeroen Adrien Bons, *POIETIKON PRAGMA: Isocrates' Theory of Rhetorical Composition* chapter 2 for a review of this literature.

to mean genre, figure, topic, element, fashion, or trait (80-81). In *Against the Sophists*, Isocrates uses this term to differentiate his teaching from the teaching of the sophists. He writes that what the sophists teach is merely introductory: "I contend that it is not all that difficult to gain a knowledge of the forms (*ideai*) that we use in speaking and composing all speeches, if a person surrenders himself… to those who know something about them." If we can trust Plato that the list of speech elements is central to their teaching, then here the *ideai* may refer to those elements. Isocrates then describes what he adds:

> But to choose from these [*ideai*] the necessary forms for each subject, to mix them with each other and arrange [*taxai kata tropon*] them suitably, and then, not to mistake the circumstances (*kairos*) but to embellish the entire speech properly with considerations (*enthymemata*) and to speak the words rhythmically and musically, these things require much study [*epimeleia*] and are the work of a brave and imaginative soul. (13.16-17)

Here, it is unclear whether Isocrates is using *ideai* to refer to larger parts (arrangement) or smaller parts (style). Scholars agree, though, that these *ideai* must be something like "elements of the propaedeutic rhetorical training, i.e., knowledge of technical precepts on composition and style" (Bons 30; see also Gaines "Isocrates," 166; Sullivan 84; Haskins 71). In this passage, *ideai* are elements, including figures but also including argumentative schemes (Sullivan 89).

Isocrates also refers to *ideai* in his *Antidosis* (353 BC), where there are indications that *idea* includes organizational in addition to argumentative and stylistic

schemes. As such, the concept of *idea* does not differentiate between macrostrucutures, mesostructures, and microstructures: rather, this concept implies that these are all types of the same material. For example, Isocrates describes the composition of his speech: "It was by no means a small matter to have in view such a large topic, *synthesize and draw together* so many different types [*ideai*] of discourse, make later passages fit with earlier ones, and make them all agree with one another" (15.11, trans. Mirhady and Too; emphasis mine). Gaines suggests that Isocrates uses *ideai* in this passage to refer to "large, structural, units of discourses, independent blocks of material that can be worked into a speech" (86; see also Too 101). Bons extracts five ways Isocrates applies these *ideai* to discourse: selection, whole and part, plurality, connection, consistency (32). Comparing the use of *ideai* in these two passages (13.16, 15.11), we get a sense of how Isocrates uses the same term to refer to figures of style and material of arrangement; only the context of the term differentiates the two. Bons cautions that "One should not conclude… that Isocrates' 'parts' were identical with prooemium, diegesis, etc." (35); however, the wide range of uses of the term and the comparison with the sophists' *ideai* does suggest compellingly blurred or as yet non-existent boundaries.

Isocrates gives an example of embedding and weaving passages together in the *Antidosis*. In this speech, Isocrates writes against the claim that his teaching does not contribute to the common good of society and therefore he must pay the *antidosis* tax. In the course of his speech, Isocrates elects to incorporate extracts from his previous speeches in the body of this speech:

> I shall present to you the very speeches [*logoi*] I have spoken and written so that you will not conjecture but will know clearly what they are like when you vote on them. I could not declare them all from beginning to end, since the time allotted me is short. But, like fruits, I shall try to offer a sample of each.

Isocrates reasons that this selection will allow his readers to "easily recognize my character, and you will learn the power of my speeches," that is, it will be easier to evaluate his character and contributions if there is a larger sample size (15.54). While he refers to *logoi* rather than *ideai* in this passage, Isocrates clearly shows an active interest in composing speeches out of already existing material.

The teaching of *ideai* is essential to Isocrates' pedagogy. In his *Epistle 6* (*To the Children of Jason*), Isocrates provides another outline of his pedagogy that includes the *ideai* as an aspect the composing process:

> The very first precept I shall present is one of those most often repeated. I am accustomed, that is, to tell the students in my school of rhetoric that the first question to be considered is-- what is the object to be accomplished by the discourse as a whole and by its parts? And when we have discovered (*heuresis*) this and the matter has been accurately determined, I say that we must seek the rhetorical elements (*tas ideas*) whereby that which we have set out to do may be elaborated (*exergasia*) and fulfilled. And this is the procedure which I prescribe with reference to discourse, yet it is a principle (*stoicheia*)

> applicable not only to all other matter, but also to your… life. (8, as quoted in Reid 17; see also Gaines "Isocrates" 165)[23]

Here too, Isocrates is thinking of a system that uses *ideai* to refer to forms that could either be arrangement elements or stylistic elements. Just as we saw in his passage from *Against the Sophists,* Isocrates divides his art of discourse into distinct processes, each centered on *ideai.* Of course, Isocrates is opposed to merely listing these *ideai*. Speaking of *ideai* as common topics in prose and verse (rather than forms of discourse), he notes that there are too many *ideai* to count:

> You must first learn that there are as many kinds (*tropoi*) of prose as of verse. Some authors have spent their lives investigating the genealogies of the demigods; others have interpreted the poets; others sought to compose histories of wars…. It would be no small task for someone to count all the forms (*ideai*) of prose." (*Antidosis* 15.45)

Innumerable though they may be, training in these forms and how to combine them is essential to Isocrates's program.

This focus on *ideai* features prominently in another passage in the *Antidosis* which relates the *ideai* to physical training. Physical training is another place where forms or stances can be combined. Describing his educational program, Isocrates compares his *philosophia* to physical training or *gymnasia* because "these two kinds

[23] *Exergasia* or *ergasia* comes from the root word *ergon* (work, act, deed, event). *Exergasia*, then, can be a general or specific "working out" of material, as well as performance. For uses of *erga* as "accomplishments" in Isocrates, see Gagarin, "*Logos* as *Ergon* in Isocrates."

of education… use similar methods of instruction, exercise, and other kinds of practice" (15.182). He continues:

> When they take on pupils, physical trainers instruct their students in their positions (*schemata*) that have been discovered for competitions, and those whose concern is philosophy pass on to their pupils all the structures [*tas ideas*] which speech (*logos*) employs. When they have given them experience and detailed knowledge of these, they again exercise the students and make them accustomed to hard work, and then force them to synthesize (*syneirein*) everything they have learned in order that they may have a more secure understanding and their views (*doxai*) may be better adapted to the right moments (*kairos*). (15.183-184)

In this iteration, the *ideai* are comparable to the physical *schemata* of athletes.[24] Just as a martial artist learns stances, positions, and moves, the Isocratean writer learns how to combine the material of the art to develop distinct plays. And, as mentioned in the *Against the Sophists* passage, responding to *kairos* is a major factor in determining the structure of the discourse. By comparing the *ideai* to physical *schemata*, Isocrates does not posit strict differences between inventional, organizational, and stylistic *ideai*. Rather, his division (or lack thereof) suggests important conceptual slippage between these categories that we now treat as separate domains.

[24] On the physical aspect of this training and discussion of this passage, see Debra Hawhee, "Bodily Pedagogies: Rhetoric, Athletics, and the Sophists' Three Rs," p. 151 and *Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece,* p. 147.

A last factor of Isocrates's craft of discourse that I will mention is *kainos.* *kainos,* as Bons explains, is an emphasis on newness and novelty in discourse (110). That is, while a writer is expected to take *kairos* and audience considerations into account, these considerations must be balanced with *kainos,* the writer's efforts to own their discourse. While she does not note *kainos* as a conceptual term, Ekaterina Haskins refers to this audience-writer balance in terms of performance, citing the folklorist Richard Bauman's definition of performance: "'a mode of communication… the essence of which resides in the assumption of responsibility to an audience for a display of communicative skill, highlighting the way in which communication is carried out, above and beyond its referential content'" (68). Rather than a surpassing of referential content, however, Isocrates seems to be more concerned with negotiating the balance between the audience's expectations and the writer's purposes.

As Bons notes, Isocrates frequently invokes *kainos* at the beginning of his speeches. Following Bons (137), let us continue to focus on *Antidosis.* In the very beginning of that speech, Isocrates emphasizes that his speech is "new [*kainos*] and different [*diaphora*]" and may "appear eccentric (*atopos*) to many" (15.1). This speech is new and different because here Isocrates does not merely create a speech that will meet expectations-- he creates a speech that includes extensive quotations of his previous speeches as he defends his life and career. He is writing a speech that is different because it arranges material in a novel way. In her commentary on the *Antidosis,* Too connects this concept of novelty to the general belief that "The skilled orator must be able to handle otherwise familiar themes, material, and literary forms

in a new fashion, i.e., 'making old things new,'" and directs us to *Against the Sophists* 13.13 (89). In paragraph 13 of that piece, Isocrates argues that in order to "discover things to say that are entirely different from what others have said," the speaker needs the following: "The greatest indication of the difference is that speeches cannot be good unless they reflect the circumstances (*kairos*), propriety (*to prepon*), and originality [*kainos*]." I mention *kainos* because as a principle it sets the stage for later developments in responsive arrangement and amplification.

The Sophists (primary Theodorus) and Isocrates are important to the history of arrangement because they theorize the elements of discourse large and small. In doing so, they do not strictly differentiate between what we would call argumentative, organizational, and stylistic schemes. Instead, these elements are all embedded in the same theoretical framework. Whereas the Sophists seem to believe there is a clear list to be had, Plato and Isocrates avoid making lists of elements because the precise parts either matter less (Plato) or that it is more important to consider how to synthesize these elements than to list all elements (Isocrates). The Sophists and Isocrates especially pave the way for addressing an issue I will take up at greater length below and in other chapters: the relationship of arrangement to style. The fact that we find all of these elements together allows us to consider how arrangement is integral to a fuller understanding of invention and style.

Responsive Arrangement in Anaximenes

Developments in the next generation of Greek arts of discourse move from this combined list of inventional, organizational, and stylistic terms to a list of distinct

conceptual categories. Through this differentiation, arrangement moves from being a key organizational scheme for the art of discourse to a separate step in the process of composition. Despite this differentiation, however, the Sophistic outline remains influential. Anaximenes of Lampsacus and Aristotle of Stageira's theories of arrangement also emphatically name and discuss parts rather than treating them in more general contours like those of Athenians Plato and Isocrates. However, whereas we only have a brief outline to understand the Sophists' approach to arrangement, in Anaximenes and Aristotle we see how arrangement is more than a list of parts: the choice of arrangement is dependent on and responsive to the larger context of discourse.

While Anaximenes's *Rhetoric to Alexander* (c. 340 BC; see Chiron 240) and Aristotle's *On Rhetoric* (c. 350-330; see Chiron 243) were written around the same time (both were, in fact, nearly contemporary tutors of Alexander the Great at Pella, Macedonia), some scholars suggest that both texts are adaptations and responses to a common text (Mirhady 293; Noël 333), or that Aristotle might have even revised *On Rhetoric* after reading *Rhetoric to Alexander* (see Chiron 261; Kraus 277). Because of this relation, I will discuss *Rhetoric to Alexander* before discussing *On Rhetoric*. In doing so, it will become apparent where Aristotle follows the same tradition regarding arrangement and when he departs from it.

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* is organized into three strands that resemble the order given in Isocrates. "We could speak about these matters most readily if we took them up individually," Anaximenes writes, "and enumerated their capacities

[*dynameis*], their uses [*chreiai*], and their practices [*praxeis*]" (1.2; trans. Mirhady).[25] While Anaximenes does not clearly use Isocrates' terminology, he is also thinking of a process that is centered on form; and as he thinks about form, distinctions between microstructures and mesostructures remain rough at best. Anaximenes first uses "capacities" to discuss seven kinds (*eide,* again, related to *ideai*) of speeches (proposition, opposition, praise, criticism, prosecution, defense, investigation). While he refers to *eidos* rather than *ideai,* Anaximenes also privileges a discussion of formal strategies and techniques. Second, "uses" covers a lot of material, including

- elements of argumentation (plausibility [*eikos*], examples [*paradeigmata*], *tekmeria,* enthymemes, maxims [*gnomai*], signs, *elenchoi*, witnesses [*martyres*], oaths, torture [7.2]);
- elements that in later theories might be considered figures of thought (anticipation [*prokatalepsis*; 18.1], pre-anticipation [*antiprokatalepsis;* 18.13], appeals [*aitemata*; 19.1], repetition [*palillogia*; 20.1], irony [21.1], urbanities [*asteia*; 22.1], to lengthen [*mekynein*; 22.3], to shorten [*brachylogein*; 22.5]);
- elements, under the rubric of composition of words (*synthesis*, 23.1) or expression (*hermeneia,* 28.3), that in later theories might be considered

[25] While he does not make the connection to the *Rhetoric to Alexander,* Harry Caplan believes that in Isocrates's speech *Panegyricus* 4.9 Isocrates refers to *chresis* (Caplan, *Rhetoric to Herrenius,* p.106 note a; Caplan is discussing the chreia exercise specifically). This use of the term in this context, however, is not quite parallel with the other outlines of Isocratean curriculum discussed above: "For the deeds of the past are, indeed, an inheritance common to us all; but the ability to make proper use (*kata-chres-asthai*) of them at the appropriate time (*kairos*), to conceive the right sentiments about them in each instance, and to set them forth in finished phrase (*onamasin*), is the peculiar gift of the wise" (*Panegyricus* 4.9, trans. Norlin). A better Isocratean connection can be found in *Against the Sophists* 13.17: "the student must learn the forms (*eide*) of speeches and practice [*gymnasthenai*] their uses [*chreisis*]."

figures of style ("three sorts of word, simple, combined, or metaphorical. There are likewise three positions: one ends in a sounded syllable in the transitions (between words) and begins from a sounded, a second begins from an unsounded syllable and ends in an unsounded, and a third connects unsounded syllables to sounded" etc. [23.1-2]); and

- more elements that might be considered figures of thought (antithesis, parisosis, similarly; 26.1).

Just as was the case with the Sophists' list, argumentative forms blur with stylistic forms. Third, "practices" involves arranging the parts of speech. The parts (*mere*) of a speech are included under this head. This triad– capacities, uses, practices– is different from the Isocratean triad *heuresis, ideai*, and *exergasia*, though there are resonances, especially in terms of *praxeis* and *exergasiai*. Further, this approach is different from the Sophists mentioned by Plato and Aristotle because the parts of the speech are treated separately from the genres of speeches and separately from argumentative and stylistic elements. These developments in theories of political discourse (*politikos logos*) augment theoretical divisions and articulations that will, in Aristotle's treatment, result in proto-canons of rhetoric.

Before getting to Aristotle, however, it is important to consider how Anaximenes treats these "practices" of the parts of the oration. Anaximenes plausibly intends his treatment as pedagogical teachings regarding the purposes and orderings of the parts of a speech. Let us start first with the recapitulation that comes before this section. Anaximenes writes:

> Since we know the common powers [*dynameis*] of all the species [*eide*] and their differences and uses [*chreseis*] from what has been said before, if we accustom ourselves and practice [*gymnnasomen*] taking them up according to preliminary exercises [*progymnasmata*], we shall have a large supply of them for writing and speaking. (28.4; trans. Mirhady)

While Plato mentions Sophistic exercises and Isocrates refers to the importance of exercises in his own teachings, this passage is understood to be the first recorded instance of *progymnasmata* (see Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* 202). Here, Anaximenes is going through the three categories of his organizational scheme. Rather than end with *praxeis,* however, he ends with *progymnasmata,* pedagogic exercises rather than strict theory. Equating the final member of Anaximenes's triad, *praxeis* or *taxis,* with *progymnasmata,* we can reasonably assume that what will follow– the parts of a speech– will be described from a pedagogical standpoint, rather than for outlining a hard-fast theory of a single order of arrangement.

For each *eidos* of speech, Anaximenes gives guidance as to how its parts are arranged, and the purposes of these parts: "we must arrange (*taxis*) speeches coherently (*logoi somatoeide*) with regard to the species (*eide*)" (29.5). Anaximenes leads off with the parts of the proposition speech type– demegoric, deliberative speeches for proposed actions. The parts Anaximenes lays out seem to be *prooimion*; *diegesis* (sometimes referred to as *diegesis* [c.f. 31.3] but more frequently referred to by words such as *apangelia* [report] and words with the *dieg-* root, including *diegelthein, diegiomen, diegiontes, diegion*); *bebaiosis* (rather than the sophistic or

Aristotelian *pistis*, though *bebaiosis* includes *pistis*); *prokatalepsis* (anticipation, rather than the sophistic *elenchos*); and *epilogos.*[26] *Prooimion, bebaiosis, prokatalepsis,* and *epilogos*— are clearly referred to as terms of art, whereas narrative is implied but rarely nominalized. Many of these parts are similar to parts outlined by Plato and by Aristotle and other later rhetoricians. The opposition speech likewise has an introduction, narrative, proofs, anticipation, and conclusion; though, being a speech in response to a proposition speech, the opposition introduction might be more to the point: "Those speaking against proposals discussed by others must first, in the introduction, put forward what they are going to speech against" (34.8). Speeches of praise and criticism have introductions, followed by a genealogy of the subject rather than a narrative of facts (35.5). Prosecution speeches (36.16-29) have introductions, *apangelia, bebaioiseis, prokatalepseis,* and *epilogoi.* Defense speeches have introductions, a refutation of the prosecution's narrative ("We shall pass over what the prosecuting speakers let the audience know, but we shall set forth and refute what they made them believe" [36.31]), proof, and *prokatalepsis.* Interrogations

[26] David Mirhady ("Anaximenes and Aristotle on Arrangement") seems to believe that Anaximenes does not think of *epilogos* as a term of art ("curiously, no peroration seems to be envisioned by Anaximenes.... At any rate, he does not label it" [295]). This claim does not bear out in the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, which points to four instances in the *Rhetoric to Alexander,* all of which clearly refer to conclusions as either microstructures or mesostructures. As a microstructure: "When what is testified is persasive and the witness truthful, the testimony needs no comment (*epologon*), unless you wish briefly to say a maxim or enthymeme for the sake of urbanity" (15.2); "You must not remove the conclusions (*epilogos*) from the parts in the middle nor attach them to every part, but whatever points you wish the audience to understand thoroughly, repeat them, especially at the end" (22.7). As a mesostructure: "In these ways we shall, in the conclusions (*epilogoi*), put ourselves in a friendly light and the opponents in a bad light" (36.51); "Regarding the conclusion (*epologos*), we shall remind the audience what has been said by again discussing the headings" (38.10). I would like to thank Vessela for pointing this out.

(*eroteseis*) have some qualities in common with the other *eide,* but do not have the same parts. In fact, "The investigative species (*eidos*) does not occur often by itself but is mixed with other species and is particularly useful for debates" (37.1).

For most of these types of speeches, Anaximenes gives guidance concerning each of these sections. For my purposes, let us consider how the *prooimion* and *prokatalepsis* reveal that arrangement is be responsive to context. The purpose of the *prooimion* seems to be threefold. First, the *prooimion* should be "a preparation of the audience and a description of the headings [*kephalaia*] of the matter for those who do not know it." Second, it "calls for attention." Third, it "makes the audience friendly toward us" (29.1). These are possibly precedents for the later teaching that an introduction should render the audience receptive, attentive, and well-disposed.[27] The last, friendliness (*eunoia*) especially accentuates how an audience's stance might influence the structure of a speech. For example, if an audience is already well-disposed, there is no need for this step: "If they happen to be friendly, it is superfluous to talk about goodwill" (29.7). The discussion then turns to prejudice (*diabole*), the case when the audience is clearly not well-disposed: "Those who have incurred prejudice must suffer the prejudice with regard to themselves, with regard to the matters about which they are speaking, or with regard to their speech" (29.10). Based on the audience's disposition, Anaximenes advises the speaker to get right to the point or to respond to prejudices first:

[27] Harry Caplan makes this connection between the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and later exordium theory (*Rhetoric to Herennius,* p. 12 note b).

> If we encounter no prejudice, either toward ourselves, our speech, or the subject, we lay out the proposal straightway at the beginning, and call for attention and a favorable hearing later. If there is some prejudice arising from what has been said about us, after anticipating the audience and introducing concise defenses and excuses against the prejudices, we shall make the proposal and call for attention. (29.27-28)

Whereas the Sophists, Plato, and Isocrates focus on the parts more generally, Anaximenes provides insight into how these parts are differently disposed depending on the disposition of the audience.

Anaximenes provides similar audience-focused guidance in his discussion of the *prokatalepsis*. Anaximenes discusses *prokatalepsis* twice, once in his discussion of general argumentative tactics (section 18) and again in his discussion of the parts of discourse (section 33 and section 36 paragraphs 19-42). It will also be noted that in later renditions, *prokatalepsis* will be understood more narrowly as a figure of style (*prolepsis*), not a distinct part of the oration. In section 18, Anaximenes describes the *prokatalepsis* as an anticipation of "the reproaches of the audience and the speeches of those who will respond and remove the difficulties that they impose" (18.1). He then gives guidance for these in two different locations in the speech: 1) if reproach "occur[s] at the beginning of speeches" (18.5) or if 2) the opponents "create a disturbance when the speech is advanced" (18.8). He also provides guidance about anticipation in first speeches and second speeches, including anti-anticipations (18.12-14). In discussing proposal speeches, Anaximenes adds:

> This is the way you tear up the possible objections (*antilogiai*) to what you have said. You must minimize (*mikra poiein*) their arguments and amplify (*auxein*) your own…. You must set the arguments side by side, whenever yours is stronger, or multiple arguments against multiple, or one against many, or many against one, comparing them every way and amplifying your own but making your opponents' weak and small. We shall use anticipation in this way. (33.1-3)

In the course of describing these smaller rhetorical and argumentative moves, Anaximenes here refers to at least two locations of anticipations– in the beginning or introduction of a speech, and in the course of a speech. He also provides guidance as to how these anticipations can involve taking on opposing arguments one by one. Last, in discussing prosecution speeches, Anaximenes refers to the anticipation as a larger part of a speech rather than as a smaller tactic: "After the confirmation (*bebaiosis*) we shall anticipate (*prokatalepsiometha*) what we expect the opponents to say and arrange arguments (*antidikous tatttontes*) in response to them" (36.19). Anaximenes then gives a long list of what might be said and how the speaker might respond to those objections, including ambiguity, letter and intent, and conflict of laws (future interpretive stases) and efforts to shift blame (a future stasis category) (36.24-28). All these points considered, Anaximenes gives guidance for anticipations that challenges future distinctions between style and arrangement in that he speaks of anticipation both as a smaller move and as a move that can take place at various points in an argument. Whether as a microstructure or as a mesostructure, anticipation, like the *prooimion*, changes in response to the audience, the opponents,

the judge– the rhetorical situation in which the discourse is embedded. There is not one standard way of arranging a speech; rather, the arrangement depends on the context.

Quintilian cites Aeschines and Demosthenes speeches over Ctesiphon as examples of speeches that are arranged differently according to the circumstances (7.1.2-3). In this case, Aeschines argues against Ctesiphon for "illegal motions" in favor of Demosthenes (3.3; trans. Adams). Aeschines begins by positioning himself as a defender of justice, the rule of law, and democracy (3.6). He then elects to dwell on the legal responsibilities of Athens' leaders: "I hope how that what I have said is a sufficient introduction to my complaint as a whole; but I wish to speak briefly about the laws themselves which govern the rendering of account by public officers, the laws which are in fact violated by Ctesiphon's resolution" (3.9). As such, Aeschines begins with questions of law (Quintilian 7.1.2). After giving a brief narration, Aeschines then launches into an anticipation, rather than saving the anticipation for later: "But, fellow citizens, in opposition to the statement of the case which I have just presented, they will urge a different argument. . . . Well, to their arguments I will oppose your law" (13-14). In this rhetorical situation, because Aeschines believes that a knowledge of the law is sufficient to decide what is right and what is wrong. Because of this trust, once he states the law, Aeschines feels the stage has been set to anticipate counterarguments right after the narration rather than saving them for later. Demosthenes, however, takes a different approach to defend his friend Ctesiphon. Seeing as Aeschines has made the first speech, Demosthenes must decide the extent to which he will follow the arrangement set by his opponent or choose a different

path (Quintilian 7.1.3). Demosthenes constructs his speech with a long *diabole*, addressing the case against him and his client. He begins with a traditional call for an impartial hearing (18.1-2), insinuates that Aeschines has something to gain from this case as well (18.3), pleas for goodwill (18.6), and, all in all, takes the opportunity to slow down the case and work through a much longer narration, proof, and digressions with embedded decrees, a letter, and an indictment (18.18-18.109). Only then does Demosthenes turn fully to a section of anticipation: "My remaining task, I think, is to speak of the proclamation and of the audit. . . . As for Aeschines' topsy-turvy miscellany of arguments about the statutes transcribed for comparison, I vow to Heaven that I do not believe that you understand the greater part of them, and I am sure they were quite unintelligible to me. I can only offer a plain, straightforward plea on the right of this matter" (18.110-111). In the following passages, Apsines of Gadara identifies at least three separate refutations (5.14, 20, 24). Demosthenes' whole speech is a response to both Aeschines and the people of Athens. Once he anticipates the concerns of the Athenians, Demosthenes then turns to more directly respond to Aeschines's arguments. The examples of Aeschines and Demosthenes demonstrate that Anaximenes' teachings about the *prooimion* and the *prokatalepsis* bear out in actual practice. These mesostructures come about not by chance but in response to rhetorical situations.

Optional and Distributed Arrangement in Aristotle

In *On Rhetoric,* Aristotle of Stagira follows a similar model. Aristotle seems to divide his treatment into three to four parts. Whereas Isocrates has *heuresis, ideai,*

and *exergasia,* and Anaximenes has *dynameis, chreseis,* and *praxeis,* Aristotle has *dianoia* or *pistis, lexis,* and *taxis.*[28] Upon closer reading, however, Aristotle does seem to use similar terms, but with different definitions.[29] For example, Aristotle's famous definition of rhetoric also refers to capacity (*dynamis*), but now capacity is possibly more about abstract "means" than about understanding specific speech situations: "Let rhetoric be [defined as] an ability (*dynamis*), in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion" (I.1355b2.1; trans. Kennedy). Aristotle also speaks of *eide* which are "concerned with… underlying subject" matter and which enable rhetoric to hit upon truth because of their content (I.1358a.1.21).[30] Similar terminology aside, Aristotle is understood to be thinking about rhetoric in a more philosophical way than Anaximenes. In Aristotle's other introduction (chapter 1), Aristotle deliberately distinguishes his focus on enthymemes and the "'body' of persuasion'" from other handbook writers who "give most of their attention to matters

[28] For these terms, see II.1403a26.5 and III.1403b1.1-2. These may be an interpolation by a later editor since book three may have been added later (see Kennedy's headnote on p. 193), but the scheme holds up well. Arirstotle seems to divide rhetoric into three parts, either invention/style/arrangement ("there are three matters that need to be treated in a discussion of speech—first, what will be the sources of the *pisteis*, second concerning the *lexis*, and third how the parts of the speech ought to be arranged" [3.1.1]) or invention/style/delivery ("The first thing to be examined was naturally that which came first by nature, the facts from which a speech has persuasive effect; second is how to compose in this language[*lexis*]; and third is something that has greatest foce but has not yet been taken in hand, the matter of delivery [*hypokrisis*]" [3.1.3]). It is unclear if Aristotle means that arrangement and delivery are one and the same, or if he means that delivery is an aspect of style

[29] See the special issue on the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (*Rhetorica* vol. 29, no. 3) for comparisons of Anaximenes and Aristotle's technical vocabulary for argumentation.

[30] See Kennedy's footnote 68. Elsewhere, Aristotle calls these *stoicheia* (elements) and *topoi,* particularly special topics.

external to the subject" through describing the organization and parts of a speech rather than underlying arguments within that speech (I.1354a1.3):

> ... it is clear that matters external to the subject are described as an art by those who define other things; for example, why it is necessary to have the introduction [*prooimion*] or the narration [*diegesis*] and each of the other parts; for [in treating these matters] they concern themselves only with how they may put the judge in a certain frame of mind, while they explain nothing about artistic proofs, and that is the question of how one may become *enthymematic*. (I.1354b1.9)

Aristotle acknowledges that other handbook writers (perhaps including Anaximenes) focus on the part of an oration, but suggests that by doing so they are focusing too much on external issues and not enough on the content of the message itself. Aristotle's treatment, then, makes a deliberate effort to recast earlier terms to better correspond with his own understanding of philosophy. Among other things, this approach seems to be the first to treat argumentation and style in separate categories, rather than in an integrated category like Isocrates or Anaximenes.

With that said, when it comes to arrangement (*taxis*), Aristotle falls mostly in line with the same tradition that Anaximenes follows. That is, Aristotle identifies and traces four parts of the speech (with some name changes)-- *prooimion*, narration, proof (*pistis*), and *epilogos*.[31] And, just like Anaximenes describes the parts for all of

[31] Later editors seem to have separated *diabole,* which was part of the *prooimion* for Anaximenes, into a separate chapter in Aristotle. If the chapter break is ignored, Aristotle treats *diabole* at the same point that Anaximenes does. See Mirhady, "Aristotle and Anaximenes on Arrangement" pp. 297-298 for comparison of these treatments of *diabole.*

his seven genres, Aristotle does the same for his three genres, deliberative (*symbouleutikon*), judicial (*dikanikon*), and epideictic (*epideiktikon*). As Anaximenes discusses anticipations, Aristotle instead discusses *amphisbetesis* (points which are open to dispute), which are later taken to be precursors to stasis theory.[32] Anaximenes's genre of interrogation (*erotesis*) also makes it into Aristotle's treatment, but no longer as an independent genre (chapter 18). Thus far, then, the treatments of arrangement are roughly the same and Aristotle' treatment is mostly unoriginal. Figure 5 (below) shows how Isocrates, Anaximenes, and Aristotle compare on these and other points.

Isocrates	Anaximenes	Aristotle
1. *Heuresis*	1. *Dynameis (Ideai)* a. *Protreptikon* b. *Apotreptikon* c. *Egkomiastikon* d. *Psektikon* e. *Kategorikon* f. *Apologetikon* g. *Exetastikon*	1. *Dianoia*/*Pistis* (Invention) a. (Intro. Entechnic *Pisteis*) b. *Eikos* i. *Semeia* c. *Tekmeria* d. *Genos, Eide* of Rhetoric i. *Symbouleutikon* 1. *Protreptikon* 2. *Apotreptikon* ii. *Dikanikon* 1. *Kategorikon* 2. *Apologistikon* iii. *Epideiktikon* 1. *Epainos* 2. *Psogos*
2. Ideai	2. *Chreseis* a. *Pisteis ex auton logon* i. *Eikos* ii. *Paradeigmata* iii. *Tekmeria*	e. Entechnic *Pisteis* i. *Pathos* ii. *Ethos* iii. *Koinoi Topoi* iv. *Idea/Stokheia*

[32]For example, see Liu, "Aristotle and the Stasis Theory: A Reexamination." For Aristotle's avoidance of anticipation, see Mirhady, "Aristotle and Anaximenes on Arrangement" p. 301.

	iv. Enthymemes v. *Gnomai* vi. *Semeia* vii. *Elenchoi* b. *Pisteis Epithetoi* i. Testimony ii. Oaths iii. Torture c. (unnamed category) i. *Prokatalepsis* ii. *Antiprokatalepsis* iii. *Aitimata* iv. *Pallilogia* v. Irony vi. *Asteia* vii. *Mekyneia/Brachylogia* viii. *Synthesis* ix. *Antithesis* x. *Parisosis* xi. Similarity	v. *Koina* f. Atechnic *Pisteis* i. Testimony ii. Tortures iii. Oaths g. *Koina Pisteis* (Entechnic) i. *Paradigmata* ii. *Gnome* iii. *Enthymemes* iv. *Lysis, Enstasis* 2. *Hypokrisis* (Delivery)? 3. *Lexis* (Style) a. *Metaphora* b. *Ta Psykhra* c. *Eikon* d. *To Hellenizein* e. *Onkos/Syntomia* f. *To prepon* g. *Eiromene/Katestrammene* h. *Asteia* i. *Pro Ommaton Poiein* j. *Energeia* k. *Paroimiai* l. Hyperbole
3. *Exergasia*	3. *Praxeis/Taxeis* (all genres) a. *Prooimion* i. *Diabole* b. Narration c. *Bebaiosis* d. *Prokatalepsis* e. (*Erotesis*-separate genre) f. *Analogisteon en kephalaia*	4. Taxis (all genres) a. *Prooimion* i. *Diabole* b. *Diegesis* c. *Pistis* (+*Elenchos*) d. (*Erotesis*-genre or part?) **e.** *Epilogos*

Figure 5: Comparison of Isocrates, Anaximenes, and Aristotle's Schemes[33]

[33] For a similar comparison chart, see Mirhady, "Introduction" in *Influences on Peripatetic Rhetoric: Essays in Honor of William W. Fortenbaugh,* p. 5-6. Note how Aristotle divides the second argumentative/stylistic heading into multiple categories, but the third arrangement category is much the same. The arrangement category is bolded. Points of similarity between Anaximenes and Aristotle are italicized.

A major distinction between Aristotle and Anaximenes is Aristotle's emphasis on the optionality of the parts of the oration and how the nature of one part can manifest in other parts of the oration. Anaximenes does not directly address the optionality of the parts of any particular kind of speech. Contrariwise, at the outset Aristotle contends that, contrary to contemporary proliferation of parts of a speech, the core of a speech is the statement and its support and the other parts are unnecessary: "The necessary parts, then, are *prothesis* [proposition] and *pistis* [proof]" (III.1414a13.4). At most, he will admit of four parts: "prooemion, proposition, proof, and epilogue" (III.1414b.13.4). In judicial speeches, if "the subject matter is clear or short," however, "there is no need of a prooemion" (III.1415a14.6). The same goes for deliberative speeches: "they are concerned with what the audience knows, and the subject needs no prooemion except because of the speaker or the opponents" (III.1415b14.11). Further, things which lead to attentiveness are considered extraneous: "all such things are outside the real argument: they are addressed to a hearer who is morally weak and giving ear to what is extrinsic to the subject, since if he were not such a person, there would be no need of a prooemion except for setting out the headings of the argument in order that the body [of the speech] may have a 'head'" (III.1415b14.8). Because "Well-known actions should [only] be recalled, [not described in detail]," epideictic speeches "have no need of narrative" (III.1416b16.3) and in judicial speeches "The defendant's narration can be shorter; for what is in doubt is whether something happened or whether it was harmful or unjust or not important, so one should not waste time on what is agreed unless something contributes to the defense" (III.1417a16.6). And, of

course, narrative is moveable: “Narratives should occur in many places and sometimes not at the beginning” (III.1417b16.10). Aristotle also notes that the principles of one part can be applied in other parts as well. Regarding the *Prooimion*, he writes: “making the audience attentive is a feature common to all parts of a speech, if there is need of it” (III.1415b14.9). Aristotle also recognizes that Isocrates mixes elements of different genres in his proofs: “In epideictic one should interweave the speech with praise as Isocrates does” (III.1418a17.11). And regarding Epilogues, Aristotle notes that one should review major points similar to how they would in an introduction: “In the prooemion it is right to identify the subject, in order that the question to be judged not escape notice, but in the epilogue one should speak in recapitulation of what has been shown” (III.1419b19.4). Aristotle thinks of these many parts as optional and their principles applicable to other parts. Although Aristotle, from his point of view as a logician and dialectician, considers argument most important, Aristotle has a sense that speeches do not have a set, rigid structure. Rather, the structure of the speech should be tailored to the situation.

Anaximenes and Aristotle’s approaches to arrangement highlight ways in which arrangement is responsive to context. Arrangement is not a mere list of terms as Plato represents the Sophists’ art. Rather, contextual factors such as audience dispositions (Anaximenes) and genre expectations (Aristotle) influence the choice of arrangement. A speech is not a mere monologue, but is instead dynamically paired with other speeches-- second, third, fourth speeches, and so forth. This dynamism requires that arrangement be flexible. And as Anaximenes suggests (and Isocrates

before him), an effective pedagogy ought to exercise students in these forms in order to build their organizational repertoires.

Conclusion: Synthesized Arrangement

In this chapter, I have shown how ancient Greek theorists such as the Sophists, Socrates, Isocrates, Anaximenes, and Aristotle make questions of arrangement and mesostructures central to their theories of discourse. These theories stand in contrast to modern theories which often treat arrangement as separate or reduce arrangement to invention or style. For ancient Greek theorists such as the Sophists and Isocrates, the elements of discourse are not hierarchically ordered into clearly defined micro-, meso-, and macrostructures; rather, these elements of discourse blur and meld into one another. Because they often understand the synthesis of discourse as simultaneously inventional, organizational, and stylistic, ancient theorists like Isocrates and Anaximenes treat the elements of discourse not as set frameworks but as dynamic responses to rhetorical situations by attention to *kairos* and to *kainos*. And, while he does work to separate invention, arrangement, and style, Aristotle's teachings also witness that arrangement is much more than filling slots in predetermined outlines. By attending to these Greek terms of art, we can better understand how arrangement is essential to the art of discourse. A new understanding of rhetorical arrangement must recognize the multidimensionality and responsiveness of discourse.

Chapter 3: Systematizing Arrangement: The *Kephalaia*

> "You should know that *progymnasmata* are miniature rhetoric" - John of Sardis, *Commentary on Aphthonius* Pr.3

In his *Controversiae,* Lucius Annaeus Seneca the Elder presents an anthology of his favorite orators, with summaries, outlines, and analyses of their declamatory speeches or *controversiae*. Seneca prefaces each book with comments on the state of declamation in the Roman Empire and reminisces on the orators of the past. In recalling the late Marcus Porcius Latro, with whom Seneca studied in Corduba, Seneca comments on Latro's personal regimen of rhetorical exercises. Latro was keenly aware of how speeches are composed of material that can be added to a speech and practiced separately. Latro, for example, would argue back to his teacher Marullus by "pointing out the epigrams [*sententiae*] which could have been interspersed in the arguments of Marullus, still in mid-declamation" (1.Pr.22). Less confrontationally, Latro also practiced exercises on their own:

> He practised another sort of exercise: one day he would write only "exclamations" [*epiphonemata*], one day only enthymemes, one day nothing but the traditional passages we properly call *sententiae,* that have no intimate connection with the particular *controversia,* but can be quite aptly placed elsewhere too, such as those on fortune, cruelty, the age, riches. This type of *sententia* he called his "stock" [*supellex*]. He also used to write out figures on their own, such as would go into a *controversia.* (1.Pr.23)

In practicing adding material and compiling material, Latro keeps in mind that all of this material amounts to a repertoire for composing speeches.

Seneca believes it is essential to remember this principle: exercises are composed for the sake of future speeches, not for themselves alone. Seneca faults Gaius Albucius Silus for not understanding this principle, especially in his overwrought argumentation:

> His argumentation had a further fault that he would develop a question not as part of a *controversia* but as a *controversia.* Every question had its own statement, its treatment, its digressions, its appeal to anger, even its epilogue. Thus it was that he set himself a single theme, but actually spoke a number of themes. You may ask: shouldn't every question be developed in all its detail? Of course, but as an adjunct, not as the whole. No limb is manageable if it is as large as the body. (7.Pr.2)

Comparing Latro with Albucius is instructive. Albucius, like Latro, senses the importance of practicing parts. However, unlike Latro, Albucius treats parts as wholes. In an effort to be comprehensive, Albucius actually becomes less coherent, less focused. Seneca, then, asks crucial questions about composition: how do we mediate between parts and wholes? How can we ensure that all our parts are focused toward the same goal? And how might we teach these principles to our students?

My purpose in this chapter is to explore how Greek and Roman rhetoricians further systematize theories of discourse elements by recourse to stasis theory and the *progymnasmata*. Stasis theory provides a means of determining focus and relevance,

and accounts for how parts are reordered and proportioned according to the rhetorical situation. Exercises such as the *progymnasmata* theorize relationships between parts and wholes, while also maintaining a sharp focus on pedagogy. Both theories– the *progymnasmata* and stasis theory– converge with arrangement in the concept of *kephalaia* or "headings." The rise of stasis theory matters because stasis theory acts as an organizing principle for arrangement, helping rhetors understand how different situations call forth different argumentative structures. Whereas many modern theories tend to be decontextualized, stasis theory keeps essential elements of the rhetorical situation front and center. The relationship between parts and wholes, too, provides rhetors with further understanding of how to compose embeddable and scalable modules.

Earlier approaches to arrangement understand audience, genre, and context abstractly. The chief organizing principles for arrangement seem to be the psychology of the audience and to some extent the dialogic encounter between a speaker and an opponent before a judge, jury, or other assembly. This theorizing of discourse was designed for education in Athenian democracy. As we fast forward from the fourth to the first century BC, however, conditions have shifted significantly. In the interlude, Athenian democracy has ended; Greek cultural hegemony (Hellenism) has extended from Hispania to India; and, the Roman Republic is becoming stronger and stronger. While the theorizing of deliberative discourse among rhetoricians seems to take a hit from the fall of Athenian democracy, the theorizing of judicial discourse continues.

As an integral part of the Hellenist educational paradigm, rhetorical training continues for youths and as a propaedeutic for training in law and government. While the organizing principles for arrangement remain similar through such changes, greater emphasis on judicial discourse coincides with the rise of stasis theory. Stasis theory provides a means of defining points of disagreement and the stances or positions of speakers on opposite sides of this issue. Whereas a concept such as *kairos* suggests context, stasis theory specifically names key argumentative relationships in a discussion. Early Roman rhetoricians build on and extend Greek stasis theory (attributed to Hermagoras of Temnos) and grapple with how to synthesize arrangement and stasis theory, shifting from emphasizing context generally to formalizing the responsive dialogic we see in Isocrates, Anaximenes, and Aristotle. Let us first look at the *Rhetoric to Herennius* (c. 80 BC) attributed to Pseudo-Cicero.

Stasis Theory as an Organizing Principle

In terms of arrangement, Pseudo-Cicero's *Rhetoric to Herennius* provides insight into the shifting role of arrangement, the relationship of arrangement to stasis theory via *tractatio* (a Latin term for Isocratean *exergasía*), and the relationship of arrangement to delivery and style.[34] The *Rhetoric to Herennius* is also deeply invested in thinking about the relationship between parts and wholes, conceptualizing a speech as a collection of nested and overlapping argumentative structures. Whereas

[34] For *tractatio* as Latin for *exergasia*, see Caplan, *Rhetoric to Herennius,* p. 25 note f.

modern composition theories tend to focus more on microstructures or more on macrostructures, the theory of rhetoric presented in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* assumes that all of these structures are intimately entwined. Because we do not have the original Greek texts that the *Rhetoric to Herennius* is based on, it is unclear if Pseudo-Cicero's mesostructures are the same as the *kephalaia,* but in later Greek theories these same mesostructures are referred to as *kephalaia*. Therefore, a study of the *Rhetoric to Herennius* is important to a discussion of the *kephalaia.*

In previously mentioned Greek theories, arrangement was treated as a separate part of discourse and rhetorical theory. This section of theory could be fairly integrated with the rest of discourse theory (as in Anaximenes) but could also completely separate from inventional and stylistic concerns (as in Aristotle). Whatever the case, the canon of arrangement included the parts of an oration: the exordium, narration, proof, conclusion, and other parts. In the *Rhetoric to Herennius,* however, these mesostructures are not really discussed under the heading of arrangement or *dispositio*, the "the ordering and distribution of the matter, making clear the place to which each thing is to be assigned." Rather, these mesostructures are discussed under invention or *inventio,* "the devising of matter, true or plausible, that would make the case convincing" (I.2.3; trans. Caplan). Indeed, these mesostructures provide the main scheme for the whole of invention across three books, acting as a scaffold for the other material of rhetoric (Enos, "Ciceronian *Dispositio* as an Architecture for Creativity in Composition"). These mesostructures have become inventionalized and the arrangement heading itself has consequently become an "almost empty" theoretical division (May and Wisse 30).

In fact, arrangement itself only comprises three translated pages, from III.9 to III.10. In this formal discussion of arrangement, Pseudo-Cicero discusses two kinds of arrangement, "one arising from the principles of rhetoric, the other accommodated to particular circumstances [*casum*]" (III.9.16). The kind based on the principles of rhetoric follows the six parts of an oration which Pseudo-Cicero includes under invention (exordium, narration, division, confirmation, refutation, and conclusion), and five-part individual arguments (proposition, reason, proof of reason, embellishment, and resume):

> It is likewise on the principles of the art that we shall be basing our Arrangement (*dispositio*), not only of the whole case through the discourse, but also of the individual arguments…. This arrangement (*dispositio*), then, is twofold– one for the whole speech, and the other for the individual arguments (III.9.16-17).[35]

As I will discuss below, this five-part argument form (the epicheireme) is an example of how structures can be individuated on a larger or smaller scale. So much for the first kind of arrangement. Whereas this first kind of arrangement suggests a set order, the other kind of arrangement departs from the canonical order: "there is another Arrangement, which, when we must depart from the order imposed by the rules of the art, is accommodated to circumstance [*tempus*] in accordance with the speaker's judgement" (III.9.17). Such changes should only be made "when our cause [*causa*] demands them" (III.9.17). This second kind of arrangement requires the rhetor to

[35] Cicero in *Divisions of Rhetoric* (see below) also posits two types of arrangement.

adapt their arrangement to the circumstances, to use their best judgment rather than merely reproduce the order prescribed in this rhetorical handbook.

Besides rearranging the relationship of arrangement to invention, Pseudo-Cicero also describes new relationships between arrangement and stasis theory. Stasis or *constitutio* is derived from the core of a rhetorical situation: the interaction of two speakers or "the joining of the primary plea of the defense with the charge of the plaintiff." There are three kinds of stases: the conjectural, the legal, and the juridical (I.11.18). Pseudo-Cicero embeds his discussion of stasis theory in his larger discussion of the parts of the oration; indeed, he discusses stasis theory where the Anaximenes discussed *prokatalepsis* and quasi-stasis concepts, in the Proof (*confirmatio*) and Refutation (*confutatio*) sections, before discussing Conclusions. In placing stasis theory here, Pseudo-Cicero emphasizes that stasis theory itself suggests orders of mesostructures:

> It remained for me, as it seemed, to show by what method (*ratio*) we can adapt the means of invention to each type of issue (*constitutio*) or its subdivision (*partem constitutionis*), and likewise what sort of technical arguments (which the Greeks call *epicheiremata*) one ought to seek or avoid; both of these departments belong to Proof and Refutation. (II.1.2).

Pseudo-Cicero then proceeds to discuss the Conjectural stasis by discussing the contents of its Narration: "In a Conjectural cause (*causa*) the prosecutor's Statement of Facts (*narratio*) should contain, intermingled and interspersed in it, material inciting suspicion of the defendant, so that no act, no word, no coming or going, in

short nothing that he has done may be thought to lack motive" (II.2.3). This is important: Pseudo-Cicero treats the Conjectural stasis not merely as a stance: the Conjectural stasis is also a kind of cause, an entire discourse that has its own unique body of arrangement guidelines.

Pseudo-Cicero provides six parts that presumably follow this conjectural *Narratio*: "The scheme (*ratio*) of the Conjectural Issue includes six divisions (*in sex partes est distributa*): Probability, Comparison, Sign, Presumptive Proof, Subsequent Behaviour, and Confirmatory Proof" (II.2.3). Here, the term "*partes*" is ambiguous and can simply mean points to be considered rather than organizational parts; however, in this case an organizational interpretation is warranted. Consider the following. The first part, Probability, includes motive, which was part of the Narration as well (II.2.3). Motive appearing in these two places suggests that a Conjectural Narration can blend into or should be integrated with the Confirmation and Refutation. Also, the other parts of the Conjectural Confirmation and Refutation suggest that rhetoricians such as Pseudo-Cicero are not content to merely teach argument generally. Rather, these rhetoricians may be thinking explicitly about how argumentation affects the organization, the arrangement of a speech. And they do not stop there: for each stasis-specific part, Pseudo-Cicero provides further questions and topics that might be discussed and so on for the other two stasis types.

It is clear, then, that these guidelines can apply to the Confirmation and Refutation sections of a speech. It is not so clear, though, whether or not these parts are to be taken singly or together– i.e., should the rhetor choose one argument out of this list or follow the whole list? Pseudo-Cicero's discussion of the parts of the legal

stasis further confirms that these lists can indeed be taken together. Pseudo-Cicero is most detailed when discussing arguments about the letter vs. the spirit of a law. In this passage, note the sense of order of these arguments:

> . . . speaking in support of the letter [of the law] we shall employ (*utemur*) the following topics (*loci*): first, after (*secundum*) the Statement of Facts (*narratio*), a eulogy of the framer and then (*deinde*) the reading aloud of the text, (*deinde*) next the questioning of our adversaries. . . then (*deinde*) a comparison of the text with the admitted act of our adversaries. . . . After (*Deinde*) that the interpretation devised and given to the text by our adversaries will be disparaged and weakened. Then (*Deinde*) the question will be raised. . . . Then (*Deinde*) we shall ascertain the writer's intention and present the reason why he had in mind what he wrote. . . . Thereupon (*Deinde*) we shall cite examples of judgements rendered in favor of the text. . . . Finally (*Deinde*), we shall show the danger of departing from the letter of the text. The commonplace (*locus communis*) here is that against one who, though confessing that he has violated the mandates of a statute or the directions of a will, yet seeks to defend his act. (II.9.13)[36]

Here again, the mention of the Narration suggests that what follows is organizational. With that said, these are not in a strict order– these elements, while detailed, are likely

[36] Pseudo-Cicero provides these lists of organizational moves for both prosecution and defense speeches. While Cicero, Quintilian, and Hermogenes (below) also consider the moves of both sides, for sake of brevity I only include this list from Pseudo-Hermogenes.

choices rather than requirements. These are *loci*, places rather than parts; and the adverb *deinde* ("next") suggests some temporal or spatial sequence to this list, but does not suggest a specific order the same way as an ordinal set like "first, second, third" would.[37] It would be strange, though, to only use one of these rather than use several of these.

After walking through these different mesostructures of the speech, Pseudo-Cicero goes a step further, bringing in a discussion of the microstructures that make up the mesostructure. This discussion is framed in terms of fleshing out arguments, "to develop (*tractare*) these arguments elegantly and completely (*ornate et absolute*)" (II.18.27). The phrase "These arguments"' presumably refers to the stasis-specific parts mentioned above. This particular *tractatio*, the epicheireme, seems to provide yet another outline of the internal structure of the individual parts of the Confirmation and Refutation sections: "By the following method, therefore, we can ourselves remember what we have said in each place (*loco*), and the hearer can perceive and remember the distribution of the parts of the whole cause (*totius causae tum unius cuius*) and also in each particular argument (*argumentationis*)" (II.18.27).[38] The "parts of the whole cause" and of "each particular argument" emphasize that the epicheireme has an organizational function that is integrated with an argumentative function. Just like a stasis macrostructure can be divided into mesostructures, the epicheireme too can be divided into parts: "The most complete and perfect argument,

[37] Only later, in discussing the *tractatio* of the epicheireme (see below), does Pseudo-Cicero use a more abstract, non-sequential listing word, *item* ("again"). C.f. II.20.33 to II.29.46.

[38] For the epicheireme as a type of *tractatio,* see Antoine Braet, "Hermagoras and the Epicheireme," p. 336.

then, is that which is comprised of five parts (*in quinque partes est distributa*)" (II.18.28). The parts of the epicheireme further imply organizational units. The parts are Proposition, Reason, Proof of Reason, Embellishment, and Resume (II.18.28). These seem to parallel some of the parts of the oration as well as parallel some of the stasis-specific parts, but on smaller and smaller scales that can be embedded in one another. Table 3 provides a possible correlation between these systems of *tractatio*– parts of the oration, stasis-specific parts, and the epicheireme.

Parts of the Oration	Stasis-Specific Parts	Epicheireme
Exordium Narration Division Confirmation & Refutation →	Probability (*Motive, Manner of Life*)	Proposition Reason
	Comparison Signs (*Place, Time, Duration, Occasion, Hope of Success, Hope of Escaping Detection*) Presumptive Proof Subsequent Behavior Confirmatory Proof (*Special Topics, Common Topics*)	Proof of Reason Embellishment
Conclusion		Resume

Figure 6: *Tractatio* Systems of a Conjectural Speech

Besides these three systems that articulate relationships between stasis theory and arrangement, the *Rhetoric to Herennius* also carries on these relationships between larger and smaller discourse units. These relationships are similar to those we saw in Anaximenes's treatment of *prokatalepsis* in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, where *prokatalepsis* is conceptualized both as a microstructure (smaller argumentative scheme) and as a mesostructure (larger part of an oration). For

example, Pseudo-Cicero writes about Division as both a part of a whole speech (I.10.17) and as a figure of thought:

> There is the following difference between the present kind of Division and that other which forms the third part of a discourse, and which is treated in Book I, next after Statement of Facts (*narratio*): the former Division operates through the Enumeration or Exposition of the topics to be discussed throughout the whole discourse; whereas here the Division at once unfolds itself, and by briefly adding the reasons for the two or more parts, embellishes the style. (IV.40.52)

Pseudo-Cicero makes the connection between larger organizational units and smaller stylistic units even clearer when he writes that a Conclusion can be used in four places, rather than one place: "We can in four places use a Conclusion: in the Direct Opening, after the Statement of Facts (*narratio*), after the strongest argument, and in the Conclusion of the speech" (II.30.47). Pseudo-Cicero makes the connection between the concept of big Conclusions and small conclusions in his discussion of *chreia* or *expolitio,* another figure of thought:

> But when we descant upon the same theme (*res*), we shall use a great many variations. Indeed, after having first expressed the theme simply, we can subjoin the Reason, and then express the theme in another form, with or without the Reasons; next we can present the Contrary (all this I discussed under Figures of Diction). then a Comparison and an Example (about these I shall say more in their place); and finally the Conclusion (the essential details of which were discussed in Book

> II, when I showed how one should bring arguments to a close; in this Book I have explained the nature of that figure of diction which is called Conclusion). (IV.43.56)

Referring to "essential details" elsewhere rather than insisting that the Conclusion figure is separate, Pseudo-Cicero clearly shows that he is thinking of the Conclusion as both a part of a whole speech (that can appear in different places in a speech) and as a figure of style. In such cases, Pseudo-Cicero continues in the spirit of Isocrates and Anaximenes, who also suggest that forms can be applied as both larger and smaller units of discourse.

As if that were not enough, Pseudo-Cicero also explains where in the whole discourse figures may appear. In doing so, he shows just how important arrangement is as a scheme for framing rhetorical theory. Just as Pseudo-Cicero and his sources are keen on the relationship between arrangement and invention, so too are they focused on the relationships between arrangement, delivery, and style– using arrangement as the quilt pattern upon which arguments, tones, and figures are sewn. First, Pseudo-Cicero correlates arrangement with the different tones of delivery (*pronunciatio*), a newer canon of rhetoric focused on vocal and physical movements. "Flexibility" (*mollitudo*) Pseudo-Cicero divides into three tones (*oratio*), the Conversational Tone, the Tone of Debate, and the Tone of Amplification:

> The Tone of Conversation (*sermo*) is relaxed, and is closest to daily speech. The Tone of Debate (*contentio*) is energetic, and is suited to both proof and refutation. The Tone of Amplification (*amplificatio*) either rouses the hearer to wrath or moves him to pity. (III.13.23)

While the conversational tone is not explicitly connected to parts of the speech, the debate tone is directly related to the Proof and Refutation. The amplification tone is implicitly the same as one of the three parts of the Conclusion: *enumeratio, amplificatio, commiseratio* (II.30.47).[39]

Second, Pseudo-Cicero correlates arrangement with style. He begins by relating the three kinds of style (Grand, Middle, and Simple) with parts of the oration. The Grand style, in particular, is used "if to each idea are applied the most ornate words that can be found for it… if impressive thoughts are chosen, such as are used in Amplification (*amplificatio*) and Appeal to Pity (*commiseratio*); and if we employ figures of thought and figures of diction which have grandeur" (IV.8.11). The Amplification and Appeal to Pity, again, are parts of the Conclusion. The example Pseudo-Cicero gives for the Grand Style, too, comes from the Conclusion of a speech (Caplan, *Rhetoric to Herennius,* p. 256 note b; IV.8.12). Later, Pseudo-Cicero directly refers to the parts of the speech in which figures of diction and figures of thought tend to be used. For example, the apostrophe "expresses grief or indignation (*indignatio*)"– indignation being one of the functions of the Conclusion (IV.15.22). Reduplication (*conduplicatio*) is "the repetition of one or more words for the purpose of Amplification or Appeal to Pity" (IV.28.38). Thus far, we see some correlation between these figures and the Conclusion of a speech. There is also some correlation with stasis theory: Elimination (*expeditio*) can "furnish the strongest support to conjectural arguments" (IV.29.41). The Accumulation (*frequentatio*) is

[39] Carrino generally recognizes that Pseudo-Cicero integrates arrangement and delivery (122).

also “very useful in conjectural causes” (IV.40.53). Turning to the figures of thought, Vivid Description can bring “either indignation (*indignatio*) or pity (*misericordia*)” (IV.39.51). Refining (*expolitio*) can be used “in the Embellishment of an argument (*exornabimus argumentationem*), which I discussed in Book II,” that is, within an epicheireme, within a confirmation, within a speech (IV.44.57). Personification (*conformatio*) “is most useful in the divisions under Amplification (*amplificatio*) and in Appeal to Pity (*commiseratio*)” (IV.54.66). Again and again, figures seem to cluster in the Grand Style in the Conclusion of a speech. This clustering is similar to what we saw in the list of speech elements that Plato attributed to the Sophists. Figures, of course, can be applied elsewhere in a speech, and the Grand Style is not only for the Conclusion but can plausibly be used in the other parts of a speech. As Pseudo-Cicero says of the Dwelling on the Point (*commoratio*): “this topic (*locus*) is not isolated from the whole cause like some limb, but like blood is spread through the whole body of the discourse” (IV.45.58). But it is clear that the figures and the parts of a speech are correlated in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* and many figures can be found in or near the Conclusion of a speech.

All of this discussion of figures in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* suggests a pedagogical function. Pseudo-Cicero hints at this function when he writes that paranomasia is “to be used very sparingly when we speak in an actual cause, because their invention seems impossible without labour and pains. Such endeavors, indeed, seem more suitable for a speech of entertainment than for use in an actual cause” (IV.22-23.32). Later, he explains that the *chreia* or *expolitio* is useful for both training and actual practice: “it not only gives force and distinction to the speech

when we plead a cause, but it is by far our most important means of training for skill in style. It will be advantageous therefore to practise the principles of Refining in exercises divorced from a read cause, and in actual pleading" (IV.44.58). At least in these two instances, Pseudo-Cicero shows awareness that speeches can be used for pedagogical purposes, entertainment purposes, and actual persuasive purposes. While Pseudo-Cicero does not directly suggest a pedagogy of arrangement like Anaximenes does, Pseudo-Cicero is thinking of a pedagogy of style. Inasmuch as Pseudo-Cicero correlates arrangement and style, these pedagogies may be aggregable.

The *Rhetoric to Herennius* is an important example of changing conceptualizations of arrangement. While the *dispositio* heading is itself limited, the parts of the oration remain the backbone of rhetorical theory. Concepts of arrangement are then integrated with argumentation via stasis theory and through articulations of the relationship of arrangement to delivery and style. From Isocrates to Anaximenes and now to Pseudo-Cicero, we see an increase in the specificity of the articulation of theory. We also see ways in which organizational principles are instantiated not only in terms of parts of a speech but also in terms of different *tractatio* (including stasis parts and epicheiremes) and at times even figures. Stasis theory, in particular, has become a major component of and organizing principle for arrangement.

From Stasis Theory to Repertoire

The importance of stasis theory to arrangement is presented another way in the rhetorical works of Marcus Tullius Cicero. Rather than discuss stasis theory as pertinent to what comes after the Narration of a speech, Cicero makes stasis theory all encompassing in *On Invention* (c. 87 BC), and introduces stasis theory before discussing the parts of a speech. At the outset, he explains that "every subject which contains in itself a controversy to be resolved by speech and debate involves a question about a fact, or about a definition, or about the nature of an act, or about legal processes" (I.8.10, trans. Hubbell). It is only after studying the stases, Cicero claims, that one can then continue with the rest of invention: "Then, after all these points about the case have been discovered, the separate divisions (*partes*) of the whole case must be considered" (I.14.19). Cicero provides the following justification for placing stasis theory first. In order to determine the stasis, a rhetor must consider "what the question in the case is (*quaestio*), and the excuse or reason (*ratio*), the point for the judge's decision (*iudicatio*), and the foundation or supporting argument (*firmamentum*)" (I.18.18). Cicero directly references the *iudicatio* part of stasis theory as he discusses the relationship between stasis theory and arrangement:

> … if you wish the first part of the speech to have a close agreement and connection (*congruere et cohaerere*) with the main statement of the case, you must derive it from the matters which are to be discussed afterward. Therefore, when the point for decision (*iudicatio*) and the arguments which must be devised for the purpose of reaching a decision have been diligently discovered by the rules of art, and

> studied with careful thought, then, and not till then, the other parts of the oration are to be arranged in proper order. These seem to me to be just six in number: exordium, narration, partition, confirmation, refutation (*reprehensio*), conclusion. (I.14.19)

Here, stasis theory clearly acts as an organizing principle: in order to have argumentative congruence and cohesion, the orator needs to first understand the *iudicatio* and related details about the case. We will see similar arguments in Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* discussed below.

The relationship between stasis theory and arrangement, for better or worse, figures less prominently in Cicero's later rhetorical works. However, in these later works Cicero seems to understand stasis theory as an important means of integrating philosophy and rhetoric. For example, in *On the Ideal Orator* (55 BC), Cicero argues that the orator must understand philosophy in terms of stasis theory, questions regarding the "acquisition of knowledge (*cognitionis*)" or "factual inference (*coniectura*), definition (*definitio*), and what I might call 'attendance' (*consecutio*)" and "practical action (*agendum*)" concerning "moral duty (*officii*)" and "producing or allaying, or even removing, some emotion (*animorum*)" (3.29.113; 3.30.118; trans. May and Wisse).[40] Here, stasis theory is more a matter of invention and style than it is a matter of arrangement. While earlier Cicero recognized stasis theory as an

[40] See also *Divisions of Oratory* 18.61-19.67 and *Topics* 21.79-22.86. For commentary on the full passage, see Montefusco, *La dottrina degli "status" nella retorica greca e romana,* pp. 45-47 and David Mankin's commentary in *Cicero: De Oratore Book III,* pp. 196-209.

organizing principle for a speech, later Cicero does not explore this relationship much further.

Arrangement, however, still matters to Cicero, if not in conjunction with stasis theory, then as another overarching concept. For example, in *Divisions of Oratory* (c. 53 BC), Cicero gives arrangement an important role by dividing rhetoric into two major parts, matter (*res*) and language (*verba*) (1.3). Both *res* and *verba*, Cicero says, "have to be invented [*invenienda*] and have to be arranged [*collocanda*]" (1.3). He notes that, while arrangement (*collocare*) is a part of both invention and style, arrangement proper typically refers to inventional arrangement (1.3). Also, when Cicero begins his discussion of arrangement, he explicitly connects natural and artificial arrangement to the *thesis* and *hypothesis*, the universal and particular arguments: "in an unlimited inquiry (*infinita quaestione*) the order of arrangement is almost the same as that in the arrangement of topics which I have explained; but in a limited inquiry (*definite quaestione*) we must also employ the means designed to excite the emotions" (3.9).[41] In other regards, too, Cicero follows his predecessors in emphasizing the moveable nature of the parts of the oration, including the following:

- Narrations ("When this situation arises, it will be necessary to distribute the narrative piecemeal throughout the speech and to add an explanation directly

[41] Carrino does not recognize the stasis to arrangement connection; however, she argues that "there is little consistency in the concept of *dispositio* (*collocatio*) in Cicero's six rhetorical works" (155) and that "Cicero added nothing original to previous rhetorical writings on *dispositio*" (158). While I agree that Cicero comes off as eclectic, these additions to arrangement theory (making invention and style primary and connecting theses and hypotheses to natural and artificial arrangements) seem to be unique to Cicero.

after each section so that the remedy may heal the wound and the defense may immediately lessen animosity" [*On Invention* I.21.30]);

- Digressions ("Or this may well be done after our arguments have been proven or after those of our opponents have been refuted, or in both places, or in all parts of the speech, if there is enough importance and substance to the case" [*On the Ideal Orator* III.77.312);
- Refutations ("Either you must deny the whole of what your opponent has assumed in arguing his case…. But the proper way is to whittle them away one by one, and thus the whole of them will be demolished" [*Divisions of Oratory* 7.44]); and
- Amplifications ("But amplification, although it has a special place of its own, often even occupying the first place and almost always coming at the end, nevertheless ought to be employed in the rest of the course of the speech, and particularly when some statement has either been supported or challenged" [*Divisions of Oratory* 8.27; trans. Rackham; see also 14.52, 38.135).

For Cicero, then, stasis theory comes to be more of an inventional than an organizational purpose. Yet Cicero seems to agree with much of arrangement theory separate from stasis theory, and adds innovations of his own.

Cicero's later innovations in arrangement theory are driven by his turn to topics theory. Topics (*topoi, loci*) can be defined may ways, similar to how Isocratean *Ideai* can have many meanings.[42] For sake of brevity, I will discuss topics

[42] For example, Sara Rubinelli lists the following uses of the term: 1) Subject-Matter Indicator, 2) Scheme of Argument, 3) Argument, and 4) Ready-Made Argument (*Locus Communis*). See "The Ancient Argumentative Game: *Topoi* and *Loci* in

generally, as methods of argument. Key to topics theory is an emphasis on developing and maintaining an argumentative repertoire, a store of arguments that can be drawn upon to respond to situations fluently. This theory surfaces briefly in Aristotle's discussion in his *Topics,* where he writes about "obtain[ing] an abundance (*euporesomen*) of reasonings" (I.8.105a) and also writes that "you should have a good supply (*euporein*) of definitions and have those of familiar and primary ideas ready to hand" (VIII.14.163b).[43]

Topics and a repertoire of argument methods figure prominently in *On Invention.* There, Cicero writes that

> ...it will not be inconvenient to set forth in the beginning, without any attempt at order or arrangement, a kind of raw material for general use (*silvam atque materiam universam ante permixtim et confuse*) from which all arguments are drawn, and then later to present a way in which each kind of case should be supported by all the forms of argumentation (*omnibus argumentandi rationibus*) derived from this general store. (I.24.34)

This is to say, invention involves amassing a collection of arguments before making a selection from that store. Arrangement is implied in this selection process within invention:

Action" and *Ars Topica*: *The Classical Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero*.

[43] Euporia is the goddess of abundance, one of the Horae. Another instance of this term can be found in Theon's *progymnasmata*: "Then one should change the argument and refute each of the things said separately, beginning with the first, and trying to find a supply of things to say (*topon logon euporein*) in reply to each part of the fable on each topic" (76).

> For the present we have merely scattered in an irregular and random manner the numbers and modes and parts of argument (*numeros et modos et partes argumenandi confuse et permixtim dispersimus*). Later we shall distribute and choose (*discripte et electe*), and from this material (*ex hac copia digeremus*) we shall explain in order what is appropriate to each kind of case. (I.30.49; translation based on Hubbell)

In *On the Ideal Orator,* Cicero also thinks of arrangement as the "order and arrangement of material and the commonplaces (*ad ordinem collocationemque rerum ac locorum*)" (II.76.307). Significantly, topics (*loci*) are what is being ordered, rather than parts (*partes*). Emphasis on building and selecting from this repertoire also features in his *Orator* (46 BC): "But he will not use this stock (*copia*) unintelligently, but weigh everything and select…. Therefore he will exercise judgement, and will not only discover something to say, but will estimate its value" (15.47-48); as well as in Cicero's *Topics* (44 BC): "From the great variety of them [the topics] there is supplied a great store of arguments (*magna argumentorum suppetit copia*" [17.65]; "A careful study of the topics of arguments will permit… even jurisconsults to discourse fluently (*iuris etiam peritis copiose de consultationibus*)" [17.66]).

This consistent emphasis on "*verborum et sententiarum copiam*" (*On Invention* II.15.50), inclusive of organizational topics, seems to fall in line with Aristotle's emphasis on long lists of topics rather than lists of structural units. A rationale for an open list of forms rather than a closed list of formulas can also be

identified in Isocrates. In *On Invention,* Cicero insists that there is "great difficulty in formulating rules" (I.30.50). Further, he writes:

> But you must note in the exposition of these arguments (*in horum locorum expositione*) and of those that follow that all do not fit every case. As, for example, every word is spelled with some letters, but not with all, so the whole store of arguments (*omnis argumentorum copia*) will not fit every case, but, necessarily, only a part of them. (II.5.16).

Compare this passage with the following passage from Isocrates' *Against the Sophists*:

> Who– besides them [the sophists]-- has not seen that while the function of letters is unchanging and remains the same, so that we always keep using the same letters for the same sounds, the function of words (*logoi*) is entirely opposite…. The greatest indication of the difference is that speeches cannot be good unless they reflect the circumstances (*kairos*), propriety (*to prepon*), and originality *(kainos*), but none of these requirements extends to letters. (13.12-13)[44]

Whatever the case, Cicero is more interested in a system that allows for building a flexible repertoire than a mere set of rules. Therefore, while Cicero does find significant value in stasis theory, he finds topics theory equally important. Cicero serves as an important instance in this history because in *On Invention* he initially

[44] It will be noted that this anti-structuralist comparison contrasts with the Bainian principle "As in the sentence, so in the paragraph" (see Chapter 1) but is in agreement with Coe's emphasis on an open set of rhetorical patterns ("Closed System Composition").

proposes a way of placing stasis theory at the forefront of both invention and arrangement. While he does not pursue this relationship much further, he shows other ways that argumentation and arrangement can still be flexible, aggregable constructs.

From Stasis Theory to the Rhetorical Situation

In his *Institutio Oratoria* (c. 95 AD), Marcus Fabius Quintilianus follows Cicero's *Divisions of Oratory* scheme, dividing rhetorical theory into *res* and *verba*, invention and style, with arrangement applying to both:

> if [a speech] is short and included in one sentence (*una conclusione finitus*), it may perhaps call for no further consideration. But a speech of greater length requires attention to a greater number of particulars, for it is not only of consequence what we say and how we say it (*quo loco*), but also where we say it; there is need therefore also for arrangement (*dispositione*). (3.3.2, trans. Watson)[45]

Quintilian also shares Cicero's thought that arrangement is a selection from a store of material gathered by invention:

> But as it is not enough for those who are erecting edifices to collect stones, materials, and other things useful for the architect unless the hand of the workman be also applied to the disposition and collocation (*disponendis eis conlocandisque*) of them, so in speaking, however

[45] Latin from the Loeb edition. See 3.3.7 for Quintilian's direct citation of *Divisions of Oratory*. See Pujante 172-173 for a discussion of this two-part division.

> abundant be the quantity of the matter (*abundans rerum copia*), it will form but a confused mass and heap unless similar arrangement bind it together, dispose in regular order, and with its several parts connected with another. (7.Pr.1)

As in Cicero's work, arrangement in Quintilian is an important part of the rhetorical composing process.

Significantly, Quintilian dedicates a whole ten-chapter book (Book 7) to arrangement proper. This treatment is much longer than the mere page or two we find in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* and Cicero's works. Of course, Quintilian follows his predecessors in using the parts of the oration to organize his books on invention (Books 3-6); indeed, the parts of the oration are mentioned prominently in all the books of the *Institutio Oratoria* except Books 10 and 12. I will consider some of these references below. But first, Book 7 is curious. As David Pujante recognizes, the majority of this book is dedicated to stasis theory (173-177).[46] Quintilian introduces stasis theory in Book 3 as part of the introduction to invention, and stasis theory is actively referenced all the way through the books on invention, Books 3 to 6. Intriguingly, Quintilian then discusses stasis theory again, now in the service of arrangement.

Why does Quintilian discuss stasis theory and arrangement together? Quintilian, like Cicero in *On Invention*, considers stasis theory an important index of

[46] Carrino only remarks that "*Status* assisted *dispositio* of all kinds of proof, but the ordering of proofs was seen to vary according to the plan of analysis used" (185).

context. In reviewing his terms, Quintilian establishes a causal relation between context and arrangement:

> Let division (*divisio*), then, as I signified above, be the distribution of a number of things into its component parts (*in singulas*); partition (*partitio*) the regular distribution of parts into their members (*in partis discretio*), and a just disposition (*ordo recta*) connecting (*conlocatio*) those that follow with those that precede; and arrangement (*dispositio*) a due distribution of things (*rerum*) and their parts (*partium*) in their proper places (*in locos distributio*). But let us remember that arrangement is often altered (*dispositionem plerumque utilitate mutari*) to suit the interest of a cause and that the same question is not always discussed (*tractandum*) first by both parties. (7.1.1-2)

That is, the arrangement of a speech depends often on the order of the speakers; whoever speaks first has an opportunity to set the tone of the debate. Thus far, Quintilian has not articulated a relationship between stasis and arrangement, but has suggested that the interaction that stasis categorizes as of utmost importance.

Quintilian then goes through suggestions for both parties and then through the stases. Later, in chapter ten, Quintilian refers directly to the relationship between stasis and arrangement:

> There are other particulars which allow facility for instruction only when the subject (*materia*) on which we have to speak is propounded, for not only must a whole cause (*causa*) be divided into its general questions (*quaestiones*) and heads (*locos*), but these divisions

> themselves must also have their own distribution and arrangement of matter (*ipsae partes habent rursus ordinem suum*). In the exordium (*prohoemio*) there is something first, something second, and so on, and every question (*quaestio*) and head (*loco*) must have its own (*suam*) disposition of particulars like single theses. (7.10.5)

The "general questions" and "heads" refer to the stases.[47] Stasis theory, then, entails unique arrangements according to the kind of case at hand. Stasis theory is therefore especially important because it does not only guide invention: it also guides arrangement.

Elsewhere, Quintilian refers to the "nature of the case" as another way of thinking about arrangement. For example, speaking of narrations and when to move them, he writes, "But the nature of a case sometimes justly changes this order (*Sed hoc quoque interium mutat condicio causarum*" (4.2.25). Further, precepts can be disregarded if "the nature of the cause obliges us to" (4.2.103). "It makes a great difference," he insists, "what the nature of the case which we state is (*Sed plurimum refert quae sit natura eius rei quam exponimus*)" (4.2.116). Indeed, the "most effective arrangement of a pleading" is "*oeconomia,* which cannot be made but when the whole cause is spread as it were before us, and which tells us when we ought to" include and exclude parts and when to address and ignore different contextual factors

[47] "What I call position (*statum*), some term the "settlement" (*constitutionem*); others the "question" (*quaestionem*); others "that which appears from the question" (*ex quaestione appareat*); and Theodorus [of Gadara, student of Hermagoras of Temnos] styles it the "general head", *kephalaion genikotaton,* to which everything else is referred (*ad quod referantur omnia*)." (3.6.2; see also 3.11.3, 27)

(7.10.11-13). A knowledge of the case-- including the stasis of the case-- is crucial to thinking about the context and arrangement of the case.

With this perspective, Quintilian follows Aristotle and Cicero in describing how the nature of an exordium (4.1.73; 4.2.26), narration (4.2.35), partition (3.9.2), proof (4.2.53; 5.8.2), and recapitulation (6.1.8) can be applied anywhere in a speech.[48] He also seems to follow Pseudo-Cicero in discussing how figures correlate with the different parts of the speech. For example, he writes of those figures "by which proof, to which I have given the first place, is rendered more strong and efficacious" (9.2.6). He then discusses the figures such as interrogation (*interrogare vel percontari*; 9.2.6-15) and anticipation (*praesumptio* or *prolepsis*; 9.2.16-18), which in Anaximenes's *Rhetoric to Alexander* were also a genre and a part of a speech, respectively. Quintilian does not describe figures as parts, but figures that were once theorized as parts show up in the *Institutio Oratoria.*[49] Quintilian's views on arrangement are very much in line with the views of many who came before.

Quintilian also aligns with these theorists when it comes to his approach to rules and pedagogy. Quintilian is famously against rules except as pedagogical

[48] For the exordium, Quintilian directly references Aristotle: "Aristotle, indeed, denies that [an exordium] is ever necessary in addressing able judges…. Sometimes, on the other hand, the nature of an exordium (*prohoemii vis*) is found in other parts of the speech, for in the statement of facts (*narratione*), or in the course of our arguments, we occasionally ask the judges to attend or to be favorable to us" (4.1.72-73)

[49] Quintilian also follows the Isocratean comparison of bodily postures to figures, though without the martial arts entailment: "The first [sense of figure] signifies the form of words, of whatever it may be, just as our bodies, of whatever they be composed, have a certain shape. The other [sense of figure]... is any deviation, either in thought or expression, from the ordinary and simple method of speaking, just as our bodies assume different postures when we sit, lie, or look back" (9.1.10)

scaffolding. On the issue of rules, he writes: "rules must generally be altered to suit the nature of each individual case, the time, the occasion, the necessity itself; consequently, one great quality in an orator is discretion." He then directly references the parts of the speech: "Whether an exordium be necessary or superfluous, whether it should be short or long… the nature of the causes themselves must show." The actual speech situation itself is much more important than the so-called rules:

> the precepts of oratory are not established by laws or public decrees, but whatever is contained in them was discovered by expediency. Yet I shall not deny that it is in general of service to attend to rules, or I should not write any; but if expediency shall suggest any thing at variance with them, we shall have to follow it, deserting the authority of teachers…. an orator, in all his pleadings, should keep two things in view: what is becoming and what is expedient; but it is frequently expedient and sometimes becoming to make some deviations from the regular and settled order… (2.13.2-7)

Indeed, "The work of eloquence is extensive and of infinite variety, presenting something new almost daily" (2.13.17). Like Isocrates and Cicero who at times eschew rules, Quintilian is interested in teaching students to think flexibly about the things he teaches them, including arrangement.

Quintilian's discussions of pedagogical exercises imply this flexible perspective. For example, in Book 2 he describes the *progymnasmata*, exercises from

Greek rhetoric that he translates into Latin.[50] Whereas earlier rhetoricians I have mentioned hint at the existence of a system of exercises, here we have an instance of actual description of such exercises. The first exercise Quintilian lists is the narration, which, in particular, he notes can be both an exercise and "that which we use in pleadings," in other words, the narration part of the speech itself (2.4.2). This exercise has flexibility built in, in that this exercise involves having students tell a story, then "go over their story again, and pursue it from the middle, either backwards or forwards" (2.4.15). That is, there is not one single way to tell a story; in fact, it can be told in more than one direction. Quintilian then gives the Greek names for the next exercises, confirmation (*kataskeue*) and refutation (*anaskeue*), which he does not directly tie to parts of the oration, but ostensibly-- given the order and the names-- these could be preparatory for parts of the speech (2.4.18). The same might go for the comparison and commonplace exercises, moves that come toward the end of the prototypical speech, especially in conclusions (2.4.21-22). We will find more details on how the *progymnasmata* relate to arrangement below. A Quintilianesque lecture on rhetoric, too, involves arrangement, as Quintilian has students take turns reading a speech aloud, then consider "the cause for which the oration was composed," then "observe what method is adopted in the exordium for conciliating the judge; what clearness, brevity, and apparent sincerity is displayed in the statement of facts (*narratione*)" and so forth, before coming to a discussion of style (2.5.6-9). Arrangement is a necessary feature of both the *progymnasmata* and further studies in

[50] Carrino generally recognizes the *progymnasmata* as part of Quintilian's theory of *dispositio* (184).

rhetoric. While Quintilian does not outline all the specific ways in which the context (case and stasis) influence arrangement, he does expound on the fluidity of the functions of the parts of the oration and the ways in which stasis theory and the orator's judgment might determine that ultimate structure. He clearly sees stasis theory as a means of organizing responsive speeches.

Correlating Stasis Heads and Arrangement

Finally we come to Hermogenes of Tarsus, who in *On Issues* (c. 180 AD) propounds a concept of stasis theory that could be construed to incorporate both arrangement and the give-and-take of the prosecution and defense into a single system. Hermogenes's system of stases involves the division (*diairesis*) of questions "into what are known as heads (*kephalaia*)" (28; trans. Heath).[51] We have, of course, seen this term used before to refer to the major points of a speech in Anaximenes and to the stases in Quintilian. Understanding the division of stases into *kephalaia* sets the stage for the other aspects of rhetorical theory: "the reason for learning the classes and modes is to ensure that we use the appropriate style of discourse (*ideai ton logon*) when treating problems in exercise (*meletomen*)" (*On Issues* 34).[52] Like Cicero and Quintilian, Hermogenes takes stasis theory as an important index of context.

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[51] Numbers are for pages in Rabe; Greek from Rabe.

[52] Hermogenes treats styles in *On Types of Style* (*Peri Ideon*), where he mentions arrangement of words (*methodos*) as figures of thought: "figures of thought, which are the same as the approach (*methodos*)" (222; trans. Wootten). While he refers to this micro-arrangement, Hermogenes barely mentions macro-arrangement in this work. While Hermogenes's use of the term *idea* may recall Isocrates, the Neoplatonist Syrianus (c. 430 AD) suggests that *idea* and *eidos* refer to different concepts in Hermogenes: "An idea is a quality of speech" (rather than a part or passage of speech as Isocrates would have it); "A species (*eidos*) differs from an idea

For each of the logical stases (conjecture, definition, counterplea, counterposition) Hermogenes describes a list of *kephalaia.* By way of illustration, let us take a look at the conjectural stasis. Hermogenes divides the conjectural stasis into ten *kephalaia*: "exception (in some cases); demand for evidence; motive; capacity; sequence of events (*to ap arches achri telous*); counterplea; objection; transposition of cause; persuasive defense; common quality (*koine poiotes*)" (43). What is curious about these *kephalaia* is that they are reminiscent of the parts of a speech for two opposing speeches. For example, the "*sequence of events*" can be considered analogous to *diegesis* or narration, as both review questions of "who? what? where? how? when? why?," but it is unclear whether this term refers to a microstructure or a mesostructure (47). The "*objection*" involves either "refutation or. . . counter-representation," refutation being a traditional part of an oration (48). "C*ommon quality*," Hermogenes tells us directly, "are epilogues and second speeches" (52).[53] Hermogenes, then, refers to some *kephalaia* as analogous to parts of the oration, thereby showing how stasis theory affects arrangement.

Furthermore, Hermogenes does not focus on only one speech. Rather, he focuses on multiple exchanges of the prosecution and the defense. In his commentary on *On Issues,* Malcolm Heath suggests that Hermogenes divides this chapter on the conjectural stasis into four parts: preliminary arguments (exception); primary

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in the same way that a genus differs from a species and the whole from the part," that is, species refers to the three genres of rhetoric, judicial, deliberative, and epideictic and idea refers to the matter that is blended to make these genres possible (as quoted in Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, p. 220).

[53] In his rhetoric, the Neoplatonist Porphyry argues that epilogues and second speeches are two different things, not equivalents (Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* 442.18, as cited in Heath, "Porphyry's Rhetoric: Text and Translation," p. 32).

arguments contesting the crime (demand for evidence, motive, capacity, sequence of events); secondary arguments contesting the meaning of the act (counterplea, objection, transposition of cause, persuasive evidence); and the "exploitation" (common quality) (81; see 80-91 for full discussion). That is to say, for each of these four stages of the encounter between prosecution and defense, both sides argue the case from these *kephalaia.* What Heath does not mention, however, is that Hermogenes continues to make remarks about the relationship between these *kephalaia* and the parts of the orations of the multiple speeches going back and forth between the prosecution and defense. For example, "*Sequence of events* generally belongs to the prosecution" (47) and "The *persuasive defense* is an inversion of the sequence of events" (50)-- that is, the prosecution will put forward one narration and the defense in a follow up speech will put forward a counter-narration. Also,

> Prosecutors, after their proofs, run through the charge in the manner of a common topic… and summarize each of the relevant points (*epana-kepha-ioumenon*). . . . defendants too summarize points in a similar way, but make a different use for them, appealing for pity and stirring up emotion. (52)

In other words, Hermogenes not only suggests how stasis theory guides arrangement via the *kephalaia,* but also theoretically considers this interaction between the prosecution and the defense. Table 4 suggests, roughly, how these *kephalaia* might line up with arrangement and the roles of prosecution and defense; it also includes the parts listed in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* for comparison.

Heath's Division	Oration Parts	Conjectural *Kephalaia*	*Partes* in *R.H.*
Preliminary Argument		Exception	
		Demand for Evidence	
Primary Argument		Motive	Probability
		Capacity	Comparison
(crime contested)	Narration	Sequence of Events	Sign
			Presumptive Proof
			Subsequent Behavior
			Confirmatory Proof
		Counterplea	
	Refutation	Objection	
Secondary Argument		Transposition of Cause	
	Narration		
(sign contested)	Epilogue	Persuasive Evidence	
Exploitation		Common Quality	

Figure 7: Stages of Encounter, Parts of the Oration, and *Kephalaia*

Pseudo-Hermogenes in *On Invention* provides additional guidance regarding organization below the level of the *kephalaia.* Pseudo-Hermogenes discusses the *kephalaia* as part of the confirmation and refutation parts of a speech, perhaps similar to how Pseudo-Cicero discusses the stases when he comes to the same parts of the speech: "Now it is our purpose to show how, when the art of division is presumed, we take up and confirm each of the headings (*kephalaia*)" (3.4.132; trans. Kennedy). Pseudo-Hermogenes discusses "how to invent an epikheireme that confirms the headings [*kephalaia*] or the refutation (*lysis*), and how to invent an elaboration (*ergasia*) that confirms the epikheireme, and how to invent an enthymeme that confirms the elaboration" (3.4.133). The discussion of epicheiremes and *ergasia* are similar to Pseudo-Cicero's discussion of the same varieties of *tractatio*. Briefly,

Pseudo-Hermogenes writes that the epicheireme should be stated and introduced using a protasis (introduction), hypophora (proposition of the opponent), antiprotasis (denial of the proposition), and a lysis (refutation of the proposition), "which is also called an anthypophora" (3.4.133-134).[54] There may also be an introductory enstasis and antiparastasis, or "'direct and indirect refutation'" (3.6.137 note 120) and biaion refutation (3.3.138). Epicheiremes themselves are "derived from the circumstances (*peristaseis*)," including "place, time, manner, person, cause, and action" (3.5.140). Epicheiremes are then followed by elaborations (*exergasiai*) from what are ostensibly *topoi*, including "from comparison, from example, from the lesser, from a greater, from an equal, from an opposite" (3.7.148-149).[55] Last, to this is appended enthymemes (3.8-3.9).[56] In this way, Pseudo-Hermogenes moves from stasis theory to *kephalaia* to epicheiremes to *topoi* and enthymemes, from larger arrangement down to the smaller arrangement and working out of argument units.

Pseudo-Cicero, Cicero, Quintilian, Hermogenes, and Pseudo-Hermogenes provide important insights into the ways that stasis theory can serve as an organizing

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[54] This may recall the preliminary portion of an argument in which the two parties define their stasis positions in opposition to one another, c.f. Cicero, *On Invention,* 1.13.18 where he speaks of "what the question in the case is (*quaestio*), and the excuse or reason (*ratio*), the point for the judge's decision (*iudicatio*), and the foundation or supporting argument (*firmamentum*)."

[55] Besides Pseudo-Hermogenes, Theon in his *Progymnasmata* explains that epicheiremes "should be taken from the following topics (*ex topoi*): the unclear, the implausible, the inappropriate, the deficient, the redundant, the unfamiliar, the inconsistent, the disordered, the inexpedient, the unlike, the false" (76). Pseudo-Hermogenes, however, discusses how epicheiremes are supported by, rather than derived from *topoi* (epicheiremes, in turn, are derived from circumstances).

[56] In his *Artis rhetoricae* (c. 400 AD) , C. Chirius Fortunatianus connects the *exergasia* and enthymeme to style rather than only to invention: "Exergasia, *id est elocutio enthymematum* (*Exergasia,* that is, enthymematic style)" (2.29; my translation)

principle. Expanding on the theories of arrangement espoused by the likes of Anaximenes and Aristotle, these later rhetoricians provide more detail as to how arrangement is not only a matter of optional parts, but is also intimately entwined with all the processes of Western rhetorical theory. These rhetoricians show that context, as formalized in stasis theory, can directly influence the overall arrangement of a speech down to the smaller arguments that comprise the speech parts.[57] Arrangement also acts as a clear theoretical backbone for invention, delivery, and style. Arrangement, too, can be theorized to correspond with pedagogical goals and exercises.

The *Progymnasmata,* Arrangement, and the *Kephalaia*

As I have discussed these theories of arrangement, I have also made an effort to describe the pedagogical goals and exercises described and implied by these rhetoricians. Many, if not all, of these proposed arrangement theories were developed with pedagogical goals in mind. Similarly, the *progymnasmata* forefront arrangement, the organization of larger and smaller units of discourse. These exercises show how many of these principles of arrangement can be taught. In chapter one of this dissertation, I introduced Frank D'Angelo, Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee's turn

[57] Stasis theory, of course, is only one way of thinking of arrangement. Fortunatianus, for example, lists seven other modes: "*Quot modi sunt naturalis ordinis? Octo. Qui? Totius orationis per tempora, per incrementa, per status, per scriptorum partes atque verba, per confirmationis ac reprehensionis discrimen, per generales ac speciales quaestiones, per principales et incidentes* (How many modes of natural order are there? Eight. Which? Of all orations by times, by increments, by stasis, by parts of writing and words, by confirmations and distinguishing refutations, by general and specific questions, by heads and divisions)" (3.1; my translation)

toward these exercises, the *progymnasmata*. In this chapter, I have provided context for the *progymnasmata*, and will discuss the theory informing these exercises in more detail. As I do so, it will become more apparent how the parts of discourse are embeddable and scalable.

As D'Angelo noted, the *progymnasmata* provide instruction in the parts of an oration. Nicolaus of Myra (c. 450 AD), for example, explicitly notes how many of the exercises "teach the use of prooemia, some of narrations, others of arguments in antitheses and solutions, and there are also some that practice use of epilogues" (5; trans. Kennedy, from Felton's Greek text). As he has it, the fable exercise trains in "composing the narration" (9); the narrative exercise obviously trains in Narration but "we also use it in the arguments and especially in proofs based on example, and even in epilogues" (15); the chreia and maxim exercises "provide[] practice in all" the parts of a speech (23; 28); the refutation and confirmation exercises train in "all five parts of a speech, except epilogues" (33); the common-place exercise "has been said… [to] fulfill[] the need of an epilogue and… should be elaborated as in a second speech" (39); the comparison exercise trains in "invention of prooemia and composition of narrations" (62); the ecphrasis exercise "will practice us for the narrative part" (70); and the thesis exercise "is receptive of all the parts of speech" (76).[58] Nicolaus shows that there is a clear relationship between the *progymnasmata* and the parts of the oration that they train in. As John of Sardis (c. 850 AD) puts it in

[58] The section discussing parts for the encomium and invective is missing from available manuscripts of Nicolaus's *Progymnasmata*. Aphthonius also says that the common-place "is like a second speech (for the prosecution) and an epilogue (in a trial)" (16). In his commentary, John of Sardis describes four types of second speeches (*deuterologia*) (94, 5).

his commentary on Aphthonius of Antioch's (c. 350 AD) *Progymnasmata*, "the *progymnasmata* rightly follow the order of the parts of speech" (36; trans. Kennedy).[59] A speech is not spun out of whole cloth; rather, it is a composition of multiple parts that can be practiced individually.

Nicolaus gives further guidance as to which *progymnasmata* can function on their own versus as parts of other speeches– that is, which of the exercises are embeddable. Of narrative (*diegema*), he writes:

> Some *progymnasmata* are parts, some are wholes and parts; those are parts that are always found as parts of other hypotheses [speeches]; those are parts and wholes that are sometimes worked in as parts of something else, sometimes themselves make up a whole theme. Now narrative is only found as parts of something; for it always fills the use of a part and never is sufficient for a whole theme in political speaking, unless one would say, and say quite wrongly, in the case of ecphrases, which are, so to speak, parts of narratives… (17)

Nicolaus makes similar statements for the other *progymnasmata*, writing that chreia (23), maxims (28), refutations and confirmations (34), and theses (76) can only be studied as parts of speeches but do not constitute whole speeches on their own. The common-place (46), the ecphrasis (70), and the introduction of a law (79) can be either parts or wholes. The exact division between which *progymnasmata* can stand

[59] An anonymous prolegomenon on Aphthonius's *Progymnasmata* similarly notes that the *progymnasmata* "give us preliminary training for the parts of a political speech; for fable practices us in features of prooemia, and narrative and ecphrasis in narrations, and refutation and confirmation in proofs, and common-place in epilogues" (75; trans. Kennedy, from Spengel's Greek text).

alone and which are meant to act as parts of larger wholes is arguable. Theon, for example, contradicts Nicolaus regarding the narrative, arguing that "historical writing is nothing other than a combination of narrations" (60) and "It is possible to weave narration into narration whenever we try to narrate two or three narrations at the same time" (92). But the exact division is not as important as our recognizing that here we have a set of exercises that can be used individually and in combination to create larger wholes.

Furthermore, the *progymnasmata* act not merely as parts of larger compositions but have their own parts. Speaking of the chreia exercise, Aelius Theon of Alexandria (c. 100 AD) describes *prooimia* and the internal organization of the chreia: "After the prooemion one should state the chreia, then next the supporting arguments" (105-106; trans. Kennedy). Speaking of the fable exercise, he writes about "weav[ing] in narrative" with the fable and writes that there can be "several conclusions (*epilogoi*) for one fable" (75). He also emphasizes how to "refute and confirm" fables and suggests that "the prooemion should be appropriate to the fable" (76). For the thesis exercise, Theon also describes ways in which exercises are compounded and given parts: "We shall get prooemia of theses either from a maxim supporting the thesis or from a proverb or a chreia or a useful saying or an historical report, or from encomion or invective (*psogos*) against the thing which is in question. There is no narration in theses… after the prooemion we will arrange the headings (*taxomen ta kephalaia*)" (120-121). A pseudo-Hermogenean *progymnasmata* handbook also describes parts, including the following parts for a maxim: "brief encomion of the speaker, as in chreias; simple statement; statement of the cause; a

contrast; a comparison; an example a judgement…. The final topic (*topos*) is support from a judgment. Let the end be an exhortation" (10; trans. Kennedy). Nicolaus also refers to what will come after a *prooimion* in an encomium (50). Such statements assign individual *progymnasmata* exercises their own parts. In this way, each exercise is its own speech in miniature and can be woven into other exercises.

At times, these parts are referred to by the names of the parts of an oration. Other times, these parts are referred to as *kephalaia*, an important term we have seen several times now. In particular, Aphthonius uses this term to refer to the parts that make up the internal structure of an exercise. Concerning the chreia, he writes: "you should elaborate (*ergosomai*) it with the following headings (*kephalaia*): praise, paraphrase, cause, contrary, comparison, example, testimony of the ancients, brief epilogue" (23). This last part, the brief epilogue, further emphasizes that the exercise acts as a speech in miniature. Nicolaus uses similar language regarding the chreia: "A chreia is divided into the following headings (*kephalaia*)" (24). This term, *kephalaia*, recurs again and again in Aphthonius and Nicolaus's discussions of the *progymnasmata*. Just as it was in previously mentioned theories, *kephalaia* in the *progymnasmata* has a structural, organizational meaning.

Kephalaia is often discussed with *exergasia*, as we see in the Aphthonius quote above. *Exergasia* involves thinking of these exercises as scalable, that is, they are of variable length. *Exergasia* has been used generally to refer to the development of a speech (Isocrates) as well as a specific way of expanding on an argument (*tractatio* of *loci* in Pseudo-Cicero), and way of expanding on the *kephalaia* of stases using epicheiremes, *topoi*, and enthymemes (Pseudo-Hermogenes). In the

progymnasmata handbooks, exercises are worked out through a variety of means. Theon, for example, describes the ways of practicing chreia:

> Chreia are practiced through restatement (*apaggelia*), grammatical inflection (*klisis*), comment (*epiphonema*), and contradiction (*antilogia*), and we expand (*epekteinomen*) and compress (*systellomen*) the chreia, and in addition (at a later stage in study) we refute (*anaskeuazomen*) and confirm (*kataskeuazomen*). (100)

Elsewhere, Theon also writes of paraphrase (*paraphrasis*), elaboration (*exergasia*), and contradiction (*antirrhesis*), ostensibly means of practicing any progymnasma (107-112).[60] Taken together, this list of practices is unique because these range from changing the expression of an exercise (restatement/paraphrase, inflection) to small additions (comment, contradiction), to changing the length (*exergasia* [expanding, compressing]) to responding in full to another exercise (refutation, confirmation).[61] Inasmuch as these exercises can be practiced both on a small scale and on a large scale, it is possible to think of their accompanying *kephalaia* too as referring to a discourse unit of variable length. A *kephalaion*, then, is more than a head sentence;

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[60] The narrative (*diegema*), for example, is explicitly described as being scalable. As Pseudo-Hermogenes has it, a narrative (*diegema*) exercise is different from a narration (*diegesis*) part of a speech because a narrative is of one act whereas a narration is of many acts: "A narrative (*diegema*) differs from a narration (*diegesis*) as a piece of poetry (*poiema*) differs from a poetical work (*poiesis*). A *poiema* and a *diegema* are concerned with one thing, a *poiesis* and a *diegesis* with many" (4; see also Aphthonius 22, Nicolaus 11-12).

[61] Playing on McLuhan and Ong's technological determinism arguments, it is plausible that the size of student wax tablets and their drafting process would necessitate writing in chunks that could fit their tablets. Writing, at least in these wax drafts, would be pliable rather than rigid. All of these *progymnasmata* practice methods would need to fit the available tablets (unless drafted on papyrus or parchment), but could still admit variable lengths.

rather, a *kephalaion* also refers to the whole passage developed from that head sentence.

The *progymnasmata* are a deliberate effort to outline a pedagogy of rhetoric predicated on theories of arrangement. The *progymnasmata* are explicitly described as being preparatory to writing the parts of a speech. Furthermore, the *progymnasmata* have their own internal structure that can be described in terms of parts of an oration as well as in terms of *kephalaia* that can be developed through *exergasía* and other practice methods. These exercises and *kephalaia,* too, can be practiced on a small scale of paraphrases and grammatical inflections and on larger scales of greater length and responsiveness. In these ways, the *progymnasmata* show how principles of embedded discourse elements can be deliberately practiced. The *progymnasmata* are another way of thinking of arrangement flexibly.

Conclusion: Contextualized Arrangement

In the previous chapter, I explored how arrangement is central to the art of discourse. I argued that ancient Greek discourse theorists believed that the elements of discourse were interrelated and that these elements ought to be organized in response to the rhetorical situation understood as *kairos* and *kainos*. In this chapter, I have argued that Greek and Roman rhetoricians also recognize the interrelatedness of the elements of discourse and the importance of the rhetorical situation. Building on this foundation, these rhetoricians further systematize the elements of arrangement through concepts such as stasis theory, *kephalaia*, and *tractatio*. Rhetoricians such as Pseudo-Cicero, Cicero, Quintilian, Hermogenes, and Pseudo-Hermogenes make stasis

theory rather than *kairos* their organizing principle. Using stasis theory, these rhetoricians demonstrate that we do arrange the *kephalaia* of our speeches differently under different conditions and that these conditions can be defined. In terms of pedagogy, these collections of *kephalaia* can be further developed via *tractatio* or *exergasia* of various preliminary exercises such as the *progymnasmata.* Unlike modern exercises like the modes of discourse which are often practiced without context, the *progymnasmata* have attention to context built in. And the *progymnasmata* take it as doctrine that we compose in chunks and these chunks are ultimately parts of much more comprehensive discourse genres. A new understanding of rhetorical arrangement, then, must not only look to the way that structures interrelate and respond but must also look to the ways that structures work alone and in concert. A new pedagogy of rhetorical arrangement, too, will, like Cicero and Quintilian, also ask questions about arrangement repertoires.

Chapter 4: Entangling Arrangement and Amplification: The *Modi Positionum et Dilatandi*

> "But amplification, although it has a special place of its own, often occupying the first place and almost always coming at the end, nevertheless ought to be employed in the rest of the course of the speech" -Cicero, *Divisions of Oratory* 8.27

As discussed in the previous chapter, Greco-Roman rhetorics sometimes mention amplification as mesostructure (the *amplificatio*), as general strategy applicable to all structures (*auxesis, megethos*), or as a method of developing macrostructures with mesostructures and microstructures (*exergasia, tractatio*). As a mesostructure, amplification is usually discussed as a sub-part of the Conclusion of a speech, a means of developing the Conclusion. In the *Rhetoric to Herennius*, for example, the Conclusion is divided into the Summing Up, the Amplification, and the Appeal to Pity (2.30.47). In *On Invention*, Cicero follows a similar division: the Summing Up, the Indignation, and the Conquest (1.52.98). For the Amplification, Pseudo-Hermogenes lists ten topics (*loci communes*) (2.30.47-49); and, for the Indignation, Cicero lists fifteen (1.53.101). All of these amplificatory topics are localized in Conclusions of speeches. As such, amplification is only a sub-element of arrangement, rather than something more fundamental.

Later in his career, however, Cicero begins to suggest that topics and amplification are actually essential to all parts of a speech, not just Conclusion. Arrangement, as Cicero has it, is the "order and arrangement of material and the commonplaces (*ad ordinem collocationemque rerum ac locorum*)," the arrangement of *res* and *loci* rather than *partes* (*On the Ideal Orator* 2.76.307). In the topics,

Cicero sees a system for argumentation that applies to but can also transcend speeches, that can enable "even legal scholars to discourse copiously" (*Topics* 17.66). As quoted in the epigraph above, Cicero also sees amplification as essential to all parts of a speech, not just the Conclusion. Despite his enthusiasm for topics and amplification, Cicero stops short (or was stopped short) of theorizing how these three concepts– amplification, topics, and arrangement– might be more explicitly integrated.

In this chapter, I will argue that Medieval rhetoricians take Cicero up on this invitation to make amplification more central to arrangement. Amplification is a major concern to rhetoricians in the High Middle Ages (1000-1350 AD) and their contemporary communicative culture more generally. Their growing interest in and need for rhetoric coincided with major economic and demographic growth in Western Europe, frequently attributed to the end of Viking, Magyar, and Muslim invasions; improved trade routes; and developments in the feudal system, including the growth of ecclesiastical bureaucracy (Blum and Dudley 214).[62] The standardization of written and spoken Latin during the Carolingian period (800-1000 AD) seems to have also preceded this economic and demographic growth (Blum and Dudley 216-217).[63] Whatever the case, during this period there is an increased concern for government and business correspondence (*formulae, ars dictaminis*, *ars notandi*), basic literacy education (*ars grammatica, ars poetriae*) and ecclesiastical education (*ars*

[62] See also Ward 18-19; Richardson 54; Conley 90.
[63] Blum and Dudley, following McLuhan's colleague Harold Innis, suggest that the standardization of Latin enabled the economic development to follow– a classic technological determinism argument.

praedicandi). When faced with new rhetorical situations, Medieval rhetoricians at first turned to traditional teachings on rhetorical arrangement.

Quickly, however, these rhetoricians recognized that their new contexts for writing called for new approaches to rhetoric. Each of these programs prompted developments in theories of rhetoric that involve a variety of amplificatory practices. Medieval rhetoricians theorized new microstructures used to develop mesostructures, similar to how some linguistic approaches to arrangement, such as those of Frank Christensen and Alan Becker, emphasize what happens within a paragraph rather than between paragraphs. Medieval rhetoricians begin to think of style not only as a matter of figures of words and figures of thought but also as a matter of microstructures called *modi positionum* and *variationes narrationis* used to develop Narrations, not just Conclusions. These rhetoricians will also begin to think of invention not only as a matter of topics but also as a matter of microstructures called *modi dilatandi* used to develop Confirmations, not just Conclusions. As such, Medieval rhetoricians begin to make amplification more central to composition and arrangement, thinking not just about how discourse is multidimensional and should be responsive to context but also how discourse is composed of variable, not just aggregable elements. These rhetoricians differ in how explicitly they describe relationships between amplification, argumentation, and arrangement; however, through their computational thinking, these rhetoricians provide the raw material that enables later developments in repertoire-focused pedagogies such as Desiderius Erasmus' *copia*.

Uptakes of Arrangement in the Arts of Letter-Writing

Initially, the arts of letter-writing draw significantly on the Greco-Roman outline of rhetoric, especially in their treatment of arrangement. In particular, the arts of letter-writing often provide guidance about varying the parts of a letter, how some parts are optional and moveable. Alberico, a monk at the Monte Cassino Abbey, assumes that a letter will have the same parts as an oration. As described by James Murphy, Alberico lists exordium, narration, argumentation, and conclusion. He also adds the Salutation, a small effort to adapt the scheme to letter-writing, but a sign of growing interest in the question of whether classical rhetoric can be applied wholesale to this new art of discourse or should rather be adapted (Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages* 206-207). The anonymous Bolognese *Rationes dictandi* (1135) is another early example that assumes that the parts of a letter are the same as the parts of an oration and that many of these parts are optional. *Rationes dictandi* begins by describing the parts of a letter, including "the Salutation, the Securing of Good-will, the Narration, the Petition, and the Conclusion" (7; trans. Murphy). Following Alberico of Monte Cassino's *Dictaminum radii* (c. 1087), this anonymous Bolognese author builds on the Greco-Roman oration structure. In *Rationes dictandi,* qualities of the traditional Exordium, Narration, Proof, and Conclusion are present, while the Salutation is new and the Petition is not followed by Confirmation and Refutation. The author then goes through each part, giving special attention to the Salutation, the first impression. Perhaps following classical precedent from Aristotle and Cicero (see chapters two and three), the author notes that the quality of the Exordium should appear not just in the beginning of the letter but distributed throughout the letter: "in

the remaining parts of the letter a not inconsiderable goodwill is expressed again and again" (18). The updates here show that arrangement is still considered a major resource; and while this may be the "approved and basic format" for beginning letter-writers, the arrangement can also be determined "in accordance with circumstances" (6).

The *Rationes dictandi* places this accord with circumstances front and center by discussing which parts are optional. In the chapter "Concerning the Shortening of a Letter," the author gives explicit guidance about which parts can be condensed and which can be left out. The Conclusion, he notes, may be left out "either because the usefulness or inconvenience of what has been said before is already clear, or because the letter has been lengthy in its other parts and therefore the prolongation of a tedious letter is being avoided." The Petition likewise "is frequently passed over because the sender intends to ask for nothing" (20). A letter can also begin with the Narration, remove the Salutation and Securing of Goodwill, only have a Petition and Conclusion, only have a Petition, and have only a Salutation and a Narration, but cannot only have a Securing of Goodwill or a Conclusion (20-21). The fact that these choices are to be made in accord with circumstances suggests that these choices are substantial rather than merely formal transformations of decontextualized letters.

Several other arts of letter-writing also mention which parts are optional. Transmundus in his *Introductiones dictandi* (1180) mentions optionality in relation to the rhetorical situation: "there is no need to give all of these parts a place in every letter, for it frequently happens that neither the intention of the writer nor the topic under discussion needs the support and help of all" (10.21; trans. Dalzell). The

anonymous *Ars dictandi aurelianensis* (c.1200) discusses optionality in a chapter on Diminution (again, the opposite of amplification):

> Privileges, decretals, and contracts do not have Salutations….
>
> Whenever a Conclusion is not attached, [it is] for two causes: either because the letter is excessively brief… or because it has become convenient to leave it out…. A Petition can be removed just as is frequently done in informal letters; however, a Petition being removed, the Narration must not be removed, for without either one you cannot have a letter. A Narration can be removed, but not in remitted letters. An Exordium can be removed easily enough. Therefore, it is possible to constitute a letter sometimes from two parts, sometimes from three, sometimes from four. No less than this will produce a letter. (109-110).[64]

Likewise, in his *Summa dictaminis* (c. 1226), Guido Faba similarly emphasizes that a letter does not need to be composed of all parts of the letter; some parts can stand on their own:

> It is possible, moreover, to constitute a letter, in a certain imperfect manner, from whatever part: indeed, only from the Narration… Also,

[64] I would like to thank Vessela and Jeanne for their help with this and the succeeding translations from Medieval Latin. Latin in Rockinger: *"Priuilegia, decretales, contractus non habent salutacionem…. quandoque conclusio non aponitur duabus de causis vel quia nimis prolixa est epistola… vel quia facta est conmoditas…. Peticio quandoque remouentur, sicut frequenter fit a remissiuis epistolis, set remota peticione non debet narracio remoueri, nam sine vtraque nulla constabit epistola. Narracio potest remoueri, at non in remissiuis literis. Exordium satis de facili potest remoueri. Sic ergo potest constare epistola quandoque ex duabus partibus, quandoque ex tribus, quandoque ex quatuor, neque minus erit epistola."*

> you can constitute a letter only of the Petition… But you cannot constitute a letter from only the Salutation… Also, you cannot constitute a letter from the Exordium alone… Also, you cannot constitute a letter from only a Proverb... (333-334)[65]

In yet another instance, the anonymous *Tria sunt* notes briefly: "Moreover, there is not always need for all five of these parts" (675; trans. Camargo). In all these cases, optionality is unambiguously an aspect of the arrangement of a letter. While they do not directly invoke the concept of amplification, these rhetoricians are thinking about arrangement as flexible, responsive, and also expandable.

As an example of optionality, consider the following knight's privilege included in Transmundus' *Introductiones dictandi*, broken down into parts of an oration:

> [Salutation] In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.
>
> [Preamble] Since we have received from God nothing better than the soul, it is our duty to grant to God for the sake of the soul those things that we hold especially dear.
>
> [Narration] For since "with God there is no respecter of persons by reason of their nature– since we are all of the same creation and the whole of the human race proceeds from the same mass,– no one lies

[65] Latin in Rockinger: "*Potest autem constrare epistola, licet quodammodo imperfecte, de qualibet parte epistole: ex sola quidem narratione…. Item ex sola petitione potest constare epistola…. Ex sola salutatione epistola stare non posset…. Item ex solo exordio stare non posset…. Item non potest stare epistola ex solo proverbio...*"

> under the yoke of servitude through necessity of nature, except by a wicked practice which transgresses nature.
>
> [Confirmation] But even so, since many have been subjected to the yoke of servitude by an evil and harsh custom, and since nothing is dearer than liberty, I, A., knight, instructed by the Divine Spirit, for the relief of my soul and the souls of my parents, do free my serf B., together with his heirs and with all the possessions which he has to-day or will have hereafter, from the yoke of servitude, in perpetuity. And if any of my kindred or if any other desires or attempts to infringe this liberty, let his attempt prove futile; and, in addition, let him pay in accordance with the law three hundred silver marks to the King's majesty.
>
> Publicly enacted in the year of grace…, in the reign of Pope…m in the reign of King…
>
> I, A., chancellor of King Philip, have signed it.
>
> Given at Meaux, on the nth day. (154; trans. Danzell)

In terms of optionality, we might make two observations about this privilege letter. First, this letter clearly does not have a Conclusion. Based on the nature of this kind of letter, once the terms of the agreement are set forth the letter ends. Second, the Confirmation itself contains the main message: this serf is set free and no one should take his liberty away again. The rest of the letter adds important context to this message; but this letter could reasonably stand if it only included the names of the parties, the message, and the date.

The anonymous *Rationes dictandi* also attends to how parts of a letter can move. Moveability is a principle of arrangement that appears most clearly in the Medieval arts of letter-writing. In the chapter "Concerning the Movement of Parts," the anonymous author of the *Rationes dictandi* begins by emphasizing that the writer should consider the physical order in which the reader will engage with the letter. Generally, the parts should be "arranged in such an order that they are seen by the reader to be clearly used and explained… so that a letter thus set up would be seen clearly to perform the function of a messenger" (21). The "approved and basic format" is meant to fulfill these expectations. However, the author does not stop there or content himself with merely suggesting that there is an artificial approach to arrangement. Instead, he notes that the Narration can come before the Securing of Goodwill, the Securing of Goodwill can come after the Petition, the Petition can come before the Narration, and complex Narrations and Petitions can be intermingled (21-24). He also gives warnings and examples for each of these schemes. Moveability is also a feature in the anonymous *Ars dictandi aurelianensis,* where there is a chapter titled "On Change" (*De conmutacione*). The guidance there is brief, but states that the Salutation must always be in the opening position ("Here is the Salutation, which does not change its place").[66] This emphasis on moveability is something that we have rarely seen before. Anaximenes and Cicero, in particular, mention moveability in relation to the Refutation. In the *Rationes dicandi,* moveability is applied not only to refutation but to every single part of the letter. All

[66] "*Ecce salutacio, que locum non mutat.*"

parts of the letter are subject to moveability as concepts of arrangement come to be applied more generally.

As an example of moveability, consider Letter 117 from the monk Peter Damian (c. 1064). In this letter, Damian writes to encourage his secretary, Ariprandus, who felt ashamed for not studying the liberal arts before joining the ministry. The structure of this letter mostly follows the standard parts of an oration, but in a different order: Salutation, Narration, Digression, Refutation, Proofs, Petition, Conclusion, Prayer. In the Salutation, Damian follows standard procedure, calling to Apriprandus and well-wishing:

> To Ariprandus, the son of holy expectation, the monk Peter the sinner sends the affection of his fatherly love. (318; trans. Blum)

After a brief preamble on the relationship between a servant and his Lord, Damian gives a short Narration or statement of the facts:

> You, my son, admit that you are often assailed and suffer from depressing thoughts because, while having a docile mind and a facility for study, you sought first the approach to the light of truth before learning the blind wisdom of the philosophers; and that you fled to the desert, following the footsteps of fishermen, before you could become dedicated, I will not say, to the pursuit but to the folly of the liberal arts. (318-319)

Damian then readily adds a digression, a part of a letter that is often moved around:

> So it is no wonder that the ancient adversary should assail you at the very beginning of your service, in the same kind of combat in which

> he overcame the first parents of the human race, just as the world began. For these are the first words of the serpent spoken to the woman, and with these hissing sounds the dragon filled her heart with poison. "God knows," he said, "that on whatever day you eat of it"– without doubt, of the fruit– 'your eyes will be opened and you will be like gods, knowing good and evil." Take note, brother, do you wish to learn grammar? Learn how to decline God in the plural!... (319)

After several more digressions, Damian comes to a Refutation. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Refutation usually comes after the Confirmation, but can move around depending on the rhetorical situation. Damian states his Refutation in proper progymnasma style:

> But perhaps you may say, "I will convert many if I should be endowed with the grace of preaching, and should possess great facility with words." And I reply that Eleazer also could have rallied many from idolatry if he had lived, and both the Maccabees and countless martyrs of Christ would have been able to fortify many for the supreme test of faith if they had resolved to defer the torments of persecution that they had endured. But since one gives greater inducement for bearing the suffering of execution by martyrdom rather than by preaching, while disregarding encouraging words they bequeathed to their followers an example that they might imitate. You too will find it easier to influence those who see you following in the footsteps of Christ, than

> to persuade those who hear you by any amount of words you speak. (321)

Damian then launches into more digressions, pausing only once to say "I will not stop to enumerate the many advantages that Hugh, a cleric of the church of Parma, possessed, because I would annoy you with too many digressions" (325). After proving his point with a long list of digressions and examples, Damian finally comes to his conclusion:

> May Almighty God, dear son, instruct you in the knowledge of His law, and illumine your heart with the light of true wisdom. May he accept from your own hands the sacrifice of yourself as living victim, and form you to grow in the spiritual life. May He allow you to stay in Him and may He delight to repose in your heart, so that, as He has promised, like a branch on the vine you may never stop growing in good works. Amen.

All in all, Damian's letter demonstrates how a Medieval letter writer follows the broad strokes of Greco-Roman rhetorical arrangement and is also very ready to add parts and move parts around for his purposes.

So far, then, we see in the arts of letter-writing that these principles of arrangement are alive and well. Anonymous of Bologna, Transmundus, Anonymous of Orleans, Guido Faba, and the anonymous *Tria sunt* agree on the optionality of parts; Anonymous of Bologna and Anonymous of Orleans agree on and add the moveability of parts. At times, the amplificatory concept of expanding and

contracting a letter is also evident. The following developments in amplification take place in this context.

The Arts of Letter-Writing and the *Modi Positionum*

A significant development in the arts of letter-writing is the deliberate application of amplification to Narrations rather than Conclusions. In letter-writing, introductory material and Narrations receive more attention than Confirmations or Conclusions (C. Lanham 115). Principles of amplification seem to come gently unmoored and, like matured jellyfish polyps, spread to other corners of the ocean of discourse. An early example of applying amplificatory concepts to letters can be found in Adalberto Samaritano of Bologna's *Praecepta dictaminum* (1115).[67] Adalberto is known for criticizing the monk Alberico of Monte Cassino, who implied in the earlier *Dictaminum radii* that letter-writing could draw significantly from classical rhetoric (Murphy 207). Contrariwise, Adalberto, an independent *dictator* or teacher of letter-writing, "urged the creation of a separate discipline of letter writing" (Richardson 55). Adalberto's innovations with amplificatory concepts may be an example of this newer approach. As to arrangement, Adalberto focuses primarily on the Salutation, the way a letter is addressed. But after this discussion, and before he considers style (a critical juncture for theories of amplification), Adalberto describes something he calls "*positionum modi*." "Having briefly treated individual letters and

[67] I would like to acknowledge Dalzell's notes to a corresponding passage in Transmundus for this lead on the *modi positionum*. Dalzell mentions Adalberto, the *Aurea gemma,* and Hugo of Bologna as proponents of the *modi positionum* (197). However, she does not comment on the value of this theory for amplification and arrangement as I do.

their modes," he writes, "now, let us say a few words about subjoining the modes of diverse arrangement and in what way they begin and how they open the door, so to speak" (57).[68] Adalberto then gives his positions:

> The modes of arrangement are many; they are seven in number. One is fashioned by similarity, another by comparison, another by condition, another by absolution, another by conjunction, another by repetition, yet another by conversion. (57)[69]

In one manuscript, Adalberto associates these modes with the mesostructures of arrangement:

> We will treat all of these modes singly in order, but first it should be shown how it is possible to conveniently begin simple letters of inquiry by means of every part of an oration, as can be recognized in the letters of various authors and of our own. (58)[70]

In another manuscript, Adalberto further emphasizes the uniqueness of his treatment by comparing it to Alberico's briefer treatment:

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[68] Latin in Schmale: *"De singulis igitur modis, fili dulcissime, epistolarum breviter pertractatis, ad quam similitudinem plures poterit componere cor docibile, nunc de modis diversarum positionum et orationum pauca subnectere studeamus et quandam viam incipientibus et quasi ianuam aperire introeuntibus."*

[69] "*Positionum modi sunt diversi; sunt numero septem. Nam alius fit per similitudinem, alius per comparationem, alius per conditionem, alius per absolutionem, alius per coniunctionem, alius per repetitionem, alius per conversionem.*"

[70] "*De quibus omnibus singillatim tractabimus in sequentibus, sed primum ostendedum est propter quosdam simplices interrogantes epistolas ab omnibus partibus orationis convenienter posse incipere, ut in auctorum diversorum epistolis et nostris potest cognosci*."

> We will treat all of these singly in order, but first it must be shown that it is not worth inquiring after those trifes which Alberico in his book on letter-writing has pretended to teach, which peddlers scatter abroad (58)[71]

Adalberto takes issue with how Alberico teaches letter writing and the style of letters. Adalberto clearly thinks of himself as representing a superior letter-writing tradition, a tradition which provides this list of *modi positionum*.

Adalberto is not entirely clear about what he means by *modi positionum*, however his examples suggest that he is thinking of *modi positionum* in a way similar to how Greeks and Romans would use commonplaces, arguments drawn from culture and literature. Each example suggests both inventional and stylistic qualities. An example of conversion (X follows Y) is "Wherever there is friendship, there is also benevolence; for just as malevolence is a consequence of enmity, so benevolence is a consequence of friendship" (59).[72] Examples of comparison (X contrasted with Y) include "*So great is He, you should humble yourself in all things*" and "*Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly*" (59).[73] An example of condition (X is the state of Y) is "If each citizen would live and be on good terms with fellow citizens, just as the civil law prescribes, they would preserve the honor and condition of their state equitably, which would follow if, in every public matter, they were in agreement, with

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[71] Both versions included in Schmale: "*De quibus omnibus singillatim tractabimus in sequentibus, sed prius ostendedum est non eas nenias debere inquiri, quas Albericus in libro dictaminum finxit et quidam nugigeruli per latum spargunt*"

[72] *"Ubicumque est amicitia, ibi est benivolentia; ut enim malivolentia inimicitie, ita benivolentia consequens est amicitie."*

[73] *"Quanto magnus est, humilia te in omnibus";* "*Discite a me, qui mitis sum et humilis*"

usefulness and integrity" (60).[74] Absolution (the relationship between X and Y is clear): "The strength and faith of the Holy Catholic Church is disturbed and confounded when people's faithlessness and rashness advance among unbridled men" (60).[75] Repetition (X, Y, Z) :

> It is right to be submissive to priests, to be servants to priests, to supply the needs of priests humbly, for from them comes the baptism of regeneration, from them sacred oblations, from them the ceremony of consecration for a holy church and clergy, and by them the sustenance from the vine in granted to be distributed for the vigilant guardianship of all their flock by the Holy Spirit working more secretly, by whose command the priest is rightly obeyed. (61)[76]

And an example of similarity (X is like Y) is "For as the ray of Phoebus covered by a cloud, although not seen on earth, nevertheless blazes unhindered in the sky, so the passion of love, entangled in some preoccupation, although not often seen in action, nevertheless blazes in the mind" (72).[77] Like a topic, each example instantiates a scheme of thought, focusing on adjuncts, qualities, properties, contrast, and

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[74] *"Si civis cum civibus, qualiter ius civile precipit, viverent ac concordrent, honorem et statum sue civitatis equabiliter retinerent, quod conequerentur, si in omni utilitate ac honesstate rei rubice concordarent."*

[75] *"Grassante effrenis populi perfidia ac temeritate sollicitatur atque confunditur vigor et religio sancte ecclesie catholice."*

[76] *"Pastoribus est obtemperandum, pastoribus famulandum, pastoribus suppliciter suppeditandum"*

[77] "*Ut enim Phebi radius nube tectus, etsi non videatur in terra, integer tamen ardet in celo, ita amoris flagrantia quibusdam occupationibus irretita, [etsi] no spectatur crebro in opere, integra tamen ardet in mente*"

similarities. But each example also adorns speech, increasing presence and extending perception. In other words, these modes also amplify.

This list– similarity, comparison, condition, absolution, conjunction, repetition, conversion– is significantly different from earlier lists of amplification techniques. Pseudo-Cicero's amplificatory *topoi* for Conclusions, for example, are designed to stir feelings only at the end of a speech. Adalberto's *modi positionum,* however, seem to have a wider application. A comparison, for example, could be an argumentative concept and/or stylistic concept. It could even be organizational concept. While *topoi, loci,* and *positio* have the same basic meaning of "place," the *modi positionum* are unique places for the Medieval arts of letter-writing. These modes are also distinct from the *kephalaia* of the *progymnasmata*. Using Pseudo-Hermogenes' *Progymnasmata* as an example, *kephalaia* have more of an organizational flare ("Let the elaboration be as follows: first, a brief encomium of the speaker or doer; then a paraphrase of the chreia; then the cause…") or grammatical/figural touch ("The figures [*skhemata*] of narratives are five: direct declarative, oblique [or indirect] declarative, interrogative, asyndetical, comparative") (3.7; 2.4-5). While the *modi positionum* may have some grammatical value, they are clearly distinct from both *topoi* and *kephalaia.*

Pseudo-Cicero	Adalberto
Authorities Effects (victim) Effects (result of no action) Effects (on future crimes) Effects (we cannot make a mistake in the case) Intentional Act Cruel Act Unique Act **Comparison** Enargia	Similitude **Comparison** Condition Absolution Conjunction Repetition Conversion

Figure 8: Amplification Techniques in Pseudo-Cicero and Adalberto

Adalberto is the first of many Medieval rhetoricians who seek to develop this new set of tactics. In his *Rationes dictandi prosaice* (1119), Hugo of Bologna defends Alberico against Adalberto (53; see also Richardson 55).[78] Despite this animosity, Hugo seems to accept the tradition Adalberto is drawing on, especially in this matter of modes. Hugo refers to these techniques as *epistolarum modos*, something to be treated after matters of arrangement and before matters of style: "And since the Exordium, Narration, Conclusion, *Captatio benevolentia*, colons and commas have been sufficiently treated, let us now move toward the various types of these letters" (72-73).[79] Hugo divides his modes into a natural mode and artificial modes, somewhat similar to the classical natural versus artificial arrangement precept (see chapter three). These artificial *epistolarum modos* include conditional,

[78] "*ob hoc Aginulfi uel Alberti samaritani temeritatem et indisciplinate doctrine nouitatem huic introductioni preponere uel parificare satagunt*"
[79] "*Et quia de exordio narratione et conclusione ac beneuolentie captatione, de colis quoque et comatibus sufficienter tratatum est, nunc ad diuersos epistolarum modos transeamus*"

similitude, similitude from the contrary (*similitudo ad contrarium*), exhortation (*coortatoria*), decree, absolution, cause, effect (*efficativa*), comparison, commemoration, adversative, tense, imperative, negation, interrogative, infinitive, and disjunctive. This list shares many similarities with Adalberto's list, and this list adds "different moods that a writer may assume" and "variety of syntax" (Dalzell 197), which does reflect some similarities with Pseudo-Hermogenes (cited above). Although he prefers Alberico over Adalberto, Hugo of Bologna adds to this tradition of *modi positionum,* wherein these modes act as a series of potentially amplificatory techniques tailor-made for the arts of letter-writing. And, with Adalberto, Hugo seems to distribute and apply these modes generally to the whole body of the letter, not just to a single section. The modes, therefore, constitute a sub-theory of arrangement– not so much about mesostructures, but about something between mesostructures and microstructures. As the anonymous *Aurea gemma* (1119) puts it: "And an asserted position is like an arrangement because whatever it gathers, it places with it an adjoining period" (92).[80] These modes, then, are not merely amplificatory; they are also potentially essential to arrangement itself.

As the theory of *modi positionum* develops, these amplificatory techniques move from general application to a whole letter to the Narration part of the letter exclusively. In his *Introductiones dictandi* (1180), Transmundus applies the modes

[80] "*Et est posifcio dicta quasi depositio, eo quod, quicquid colligit, cum finitimo puncto deponit*." The *positionum modi* from the *Aurea gemma* include similitude, comparison, condition, absolute construction, resolution and exposition, repetition, and conversion (93). Contrary to Murphy's statement that the *Aurea gemma* "offers little material for the history of *dictamen*" (220), this statement shows that *Aurea gemma* is at least important to the history of arrangement for making this connection to *modi positionum* explicit.

primarily to narration, rather than to the whole letter, to the salutation, or to the proof or conclusion. Thus, these generalized modes find a home within a theory of arrangement, within a part of a speech. Transmundus describes "*variatione narrationis*" that include many of the same modes as the *modi positionum* list. "Variations" is a unique term that can be associated with amplification. These variations include present tense conjugations, future tense conjugations, past tense conjugations, comparison, condition, resolution and exposition, absolution, repetition, and conversion (20.1-30). As Dalzell notes, this is essentially the same list that we saw in Adalberto, Hugo, and the *Aurea gemma*, plus grammatical items (197). Reference to the time of narrations can also be found in the anonymous *Rationes dictandi*: "some Narrations are written about the past, others about the present, and still others about the future" [18]) and in Peter of Blois's *Libellus de arte dictandi rhetorice* (1180) ("Some narrations are of the present, some of the past, some of the future…" [63]).[81] Despite these similarities, Adalberto applies these modes to the Salutation and Hugo and the *Aurea gemma* apply these modes to the letter more generally. By applying the modes to the Narration, Transmundus's approach further emphasizes that these modes can be applied even to this part of the letter. In this way, amplificatory concepts begin to be applied to multiple parts of a composition beyond the Conclusion, extending the Isocratean/Pseudo-Ciceronian amplificatory concept of development (*exergasía*, *tractatio*).

[81] Latin in Camargo: "*Narrationum alia de presenti, alia de preterito, alia de futuro"*

The Arts of Poetry and the *Variatione Narrationis*

A parallel case of narrative modes can be found in the arts of poetry, particularly those in the tradition of Geoffrey of Vinsauf. Whereas theorists of letter-writing for the most part implicitly associate their modes with arrangement and amplification, Vinsauf connects the modes to amplification more explicitly. In his *Poetria nova* (c.1200), Geoffrey focuses primarily on the writing of stand-alone narrations and makes amplification essential to the composition of these narrations. For example, Geoffrey divides his treatise into sections on 1) "the ordering of material," (arrangement) 2) "with what scales to establish a delicate balance if meaning is to be given the weight appropriate to it," (amplification) 3) "see that the body of words is not boorishly crude but urbane," (style) and 4) "ensure that a well-modulated voice enters the ears and feeds the hearing" (delivery) (21; trans. Nims). Rather than divide the art into invention-arrangement-style-memory-delivery as classical rhetoricians do, Geoffrey divides the art into arrangement-amplification/abbreviation-style-delivery.[82] Here, amplification is clearly in this liminal space between arrangement and style, the same space that the modes occupy. In this scheme, amplification and abbreviation take a much more central role in composition. Unlike previous rhetoricians where either arrangement or amplification is foregrounded, Vinsauf collapses these concepts into an almost seamless process. The parts of arrangement, here, follow a tradition in poetics to divide a poem or short

[82] He does, of course, mention invention in passing and has a short section on memory, but in this *divisio* of his treatise, Vinsauf makes much more ado about amplification.

prose composition into beginning, middle, and end.[83] With that said, variability of approaches matters in poetics, too; and Geoffrey lists eight different ways to order narratives and poems, an especially organizational and amplificatory move.

This list of eight artificial arrangements for narratives is an indication of how important arrangement and amplification are for Geoffrey. Geoffrey treats arrangement and amplification as essential to poetry and narratives– something suggested by classical rhetoricians, but more fully realized by Medieval rhetoricians. For Geoffrey, arrangement seems to be a matter of ordering and then expanding and adding material to poetry and narratives. As to ordering, Geoffrey writes that a narrative can start

> 1) at the end;
>
> 2) in the middle;
>
> 3-5) with a proverb drawn from the beginning, middle, and end; and
>
> 6-8) with an exemplum drawn from the beginning, middle, or end. (22-23)

[83] For example, see Aristotle, *Poetics*: "It [the epic] should have for its subject a single action, whole and complete, with a beginning, a middle, and an end. It should thus resemble a living organism in all its unity" (23.1459a; trans. Butcher). John of Garland in his *Parisiana poetria* (c. 1235) draws from Vinsauf's work on prose, the *Documentum de modo et arte dictandi et versificandi*, for this three part scheme. Garland has "Any subject has three aspects: beginning, middle, and end (or commencement, development, and conclusion of the work, and similar labels)" (650; trans. Lawler). In Vinsauf's *Documentum*, these parts are the *principium, progressus,* and *consummatio* (Copeland and Sluiter 650, note 37). *Progymnasmata* writers such as Pseudo-Hermogenes (available to Medieval rhetoricians through Priscian the grammarian) do not comment on narrative structure so much as classify types of narrative.

Geoffrey repeats the same advice in his *Documentum de modo et arte dictandi et versificandi* (I.7-A.12), and, following Geoffrey, John of Garland in his *Parisiana poetria* (c. 1235) references this same list of eight (650). Together, these eight modes in the *Poetria nova* are meant to act as branches with shoots, a tree metaphor like the one used for the arts of preaching: "Three branches of [artistic] beginning have thus been discovered by careful search: end, middle, and proverbs. A fourth branch is exemplum; but this one, too, like the one before it, rises up in three shoots" (23).

In Geoffrey's scheme, amplification and abbreviation follow immediately after arrangement but before style. Geoffrey emphasizes that amplification and abbreviation are expandable and stylistic. Both involve "The poem's development (*progressus*)" (25).[84] First, Geoffrey relates amplification and abbreviation to width and length by comparing these concepts to waterways and paths. Regarding width, he writes that "there will either be a wide path or a narrow, either a river or a brook." This water metaphor suggests variability in intensity and space. Regarding length, he writes that "You may advance at a leisurely pace or leap swiftly ahead. You may report the matter with brevity or draw it out in a lengthy discourse" (25). This path metaphor suggests both temporal and spatial variability. In both metaphors, Geoffrey does not describe amplification and abbreviation as matters of argument or as matters of style. Instead, amplification and abbreviation are understood as organizational concepts.

In what follows, Geoffrey goes beyond just listing ways to order a narrative and lists eight techniques of amplification and seven of abbreviation of narratives.

[84] Latin from Faral 203.

His techniques of amplification (*gradus,* "positions" or "steps") are repetition, periphrasis, comparison, apostrophe, personification, digression, description, and opposition.[85] Just like the list of letter-writing *modi positionum,* this list is very different from the list of amplificatory *topoi* found in classical rhetorics (with the exception of Comparison) and very different from the *kephalaia* or even *schemata* of the *progymnasmata*. However, this list shares some slight similarities with the *modi positionum* of the arts of letter-writing in terms of Repetition and Comparison. Table 2 compares Geoffrey's *gradus* or amplificatory techniques to Pseudo-Cicero's *topoi,* Pseudo-Hermogenes's *schemata* for narratives, and Transmundus's *variatione narrationis*. As this table shows, with few exceptions Geoffrey has a unique list of amplification techniques. Whereas Pseudo-Cicero's topics are localized to the Conclusion portion of a speech, Geoffrey's topics are specific to constructing poetry and narratives. Whereas Pseudo-Hermogenes' schemata emphasize the grammatical moods of a narrative, Geoffrey is thinking of a concept beyond grammar. And whereas Transmundus seems more focused on grammar and argument, Geoffrey is more focused on description and narrative proper.

[85] Geoffrey gives a similar list in his *Documentum de modo et arte dictandi et versificandi*: description, circumlocution, digression, personification, and apostrophe (B.1.2). Everard the German includes the list from *Poetria nova* in his *Laborintus* (c.1250; 346). Latin text in Faral.

Pseudo-Cicero	Pseudo-Hermogenes	Transmundus	Geoffrey
Authorities Effects (victim) Effects (result of no action) Effects (on future crimes) Effects (we cannot make a mistake in the case) Intentional Act Cruel Act Unique Act **Comparison** Enargia	Direct declarative Oblique declarative Interrogative Asyndetical **Comparative**	Present tense Future tense Past tense **Comparison** Condition Resolution and Exposition Absolution **Repetition** Conversion	**Repetition** (*interpretatio, expolitio*) Periphrasis (*circuitio, circumlocutio*) **Comparison** (*collatio*) Apostrophe (*apostrophe, exclamatio*) Personification Digression Description Opposition[86] (*oppositio, oppositum*)

Figure 9: Amplification Techniques in Four Traditions

While this list has less in common with *topoi*, *kephalaia*, *schemata,* and *variatione narrationis*, Geoffrey's list has more in common with stylistic figures, especially figures of thought– which Geoffrey discusses again in his section on style. This relationship here is extremely important: while figures of amplification do occur in classical rhetorical treatises, here the figures of thought themselves are implied to be amplificatory. Table 3 gives a comparison, using Pseudo-Cicero's list of figures of thought compared to Geoffrey's list of amplification techniques and figures of

[86] The anonymous commentary *In principio huius libri* seems to connect this amplification technique to Aristotle: "And here the Topic of Opposites is meant, for this topic is taken from that one" (56; trans. Woods). Woods suggests the reference is to *Topics* 2.7.113a (55n668.2).

thought.[87] Geoffrey's list of amplification techniques clearly has more in common with figures of style than it has with *topoi, kephalaia, schemata,* or even the *modi positionum.* The techniques of repetition, personification, description, and opposition all have exact or close analogues in the figures of thought. Of the other figures of thought, Pseudo-Cicero instead considers apostrophe a figure of diction (4.15.22); and in other schemes, periphrasis is also a figure of diction. This leaves comparison– which can be a figure and a *topoi*– and digression, which is often taken as a part of a speech, but is taken by some to be a figure of thought. Each technique of amplification in this list, therefore, is similar to figures, figures of diction but especially of thought. This amplification is argumentative inasmuch as the figures of thoughts enhance an argument; and this amplification is contextual inasmuch as the figures Geoffrey selects help flesh out narratives. In discussing this list of amplification techniques and a list of figures of thought, Geoffrey seems to suggest that these techniques are merely figures writ large.[88]

[87] Englehardt also recognizes the general influence of Pseudo-Cicero's *Rhetoric to Herennius* on Vinsauf's *Poetria nova,* but does not describe any connection between Vinsauf's modes of amplification and Pseudo-Cicero's figures of thought: "[The poetic modes] stem, for the most part, from the ancient and anonymous *De ratione ad C. Herennium,* and seem by their nature to suggest that the theory which they now subserve evolved in some measure from the *praexercitamina* [*progymnasmata*] of the ancient schools, transmitted by Priscian to the Middle Ages" (741). The connection to *progymnasmata*, though, is another note in favor of seeing poetic amplification techniques as organizational and structural rather than only stylistic.

[88] In his analysis of these amplification techniques, Faral recognizes connections to the figures of thought in the *Rhetoric to Herennius* (61-85). However, he does not comment on implications of this relationship, that these amplification techniques and the figures of thought are drawn from the same source and therefore suggest that figures can be applied on at least two levels of discourse.

Pseudo-Cicero Figures of Thought	Geoffrey Figures of Thought	Geoffrey Amplification Techniques
Distributio *Licentia* *Deminutio* ***Descriptio*** *Divisio* *Frequentatio* ***Expolitio*** *Commoratio* ***Contentio* (Antithesis)** *Similitudo* *Exemplum* *Imago* *Effictio* *Notatio* *Sermoncinatio* ***Conformatio* (Personification)** *Significatio* *Brevitas* *Demonstratio*	*Distributio* *Licentia* *Diminutio* ***Descriptio*** *Disjunctio* *Frequentatio* ***Expolitio*** *Commoratio* ***Contentio*** *Similitudo* *Exemplum* *Imago* *Effictio* *Notatio* *Sermoncinatio* ***Conformatio*** *Significatio* *Brevitas* *Demonstratio*	**Repetition** (*interpretatio, expolitio*) Periphrasis (*circuitio, circumlocutio*) Comparison (*collatio*) Apostrophe (*apostrophe, exclamatio*) **Personification** (*prosopopeia*) Digression (*digressio)* **Description** (*descriptio*) **Opposition** (*oppositio, oppositum*)

Figure 10: Figures of Thought and Amplification Techniques. Similarities in bold and italics.

However, while Geoffrey's techniques could ostensibly be applied to longer stretches of discourse, he tends to focus on shorter compositions– poems and prose narratives. As Desiderius Erasmus suggests in his *De conscribendis epistolis* (1521) Medieval letter-writers seem to have written less, believing in "the old nonsense of no letter over twelve lines long," an arbitrary "magic circle" that does not reflect the actual practice of classical letter writers (13; trans. Fantazzi). Whatever the case, the context of poetry instruction does seem to justify a focus on microstructures rather than mesostructures, and perhaps explains why Geoffrey's amplification techniques and figures of thought are not perceptually distant from each other. Assuming that

students learning with this treatise would write shorter compositions on small wax tablets and rely on memory rather than fully written compositions, it makes sense that the focus would be on smaller rather than on larger discourse structures. However, just as we saw that the *modi positionum* went from being inventional and stylistic elements in Adalberto Samaritano to localized organizational elements in later letter-writing manuals, the *gradus* may also take on some structural qualities.

The application of the eight places to start a narration may give a clue as to how Geoffrey's doctrine was received. In the anonymous *Tria sunt* (1256 *terminus post quem*), the author goes so far as to refer to the narration, confirmation, and conclusion sections of a prose composition as sentences rather than passages. Taking Geoffrey's advice to develop the composition from a base proverb, the *Tria sunt* focuses on grammar: "A certain proverb should be found, in one part of which the meaning of the single verb that is designated to stand for the subject matter may be placed and in the other part the meaning of another verb may be placed." The writer is then invited to draw the narration part of the composition from this proverb: "Afterwards, let the statement of facts (*narratio*) be made from one part of the proverb and let the conclusion be fashioned from the other." These parts are all radically grammatical, that is, sentence-level:

> And in this way the three sentences [*clausulae*] of the composition may be derived, the first comprising the proverb, the second the statement of facts (*narratio*), and the third the conclusion. But since the quantity is meagre, we can draw out the middle sentence, that is, the sentence containing the statement of facts (*narratio*), and

> strengthen it with arguments, on the one hand, and confirmations of arguments on the other, and so extend the composition [*dictamen*] infinitely. (672; trans. Camargo).

While the *Tria sunt* does consider the development of this arrangement with arguments and confirmations, this focus on sentence-level considerations suggests that Geoffrey's teachings on the narration (its starting places and amplification modes) is for shorter, beginner compositions, and not longer, more professional compositions. This brevity also seems to be borne out in extant Medieval student poems, some of which might be only three lines long (C. Lanham 135).[89] As Conrad of Mure puts it in his *Summa de arte prosandi* (1275):

> The method of writing can be understood through an eighth way, because we prose writers can place schemes and types and rhetorical colors of words and *sententiae* wherever we want, so long as in placing them we in no way exceed a limit. Whence here, with the many causes of brevity omitted, we would designate what the seven *modi positionum* are with which a letter can be adorned: namely completion, comparison, relation, conversion, resolution, repetition, and similitude. (443)[90]

[89] Wood suggests that shorter compositions were part of abbreviation exercises (*Classroom Commentaries* 66).

[90] Latin in Rockinger: "*Octauo modo per quomodo potest intelligi modus scribendi, quia nos prosatores scemata et typos [sic?] et rhetoricos colores uerborum et sententiarum ponere quandoque possumus, ita ut eos ponendo modum nullatenus excedamus. Unde hic multis causa breuitatis omissis dicamus, quod vii sunt modi positionum, quibus dictamen poterit exornari: scilicet absolutio, conparatio, conditio, conuersio, resulutio, repetitio, similitudo*."

Seeing that the *modi positionum* may be *exornationes*, that is, figures, it is reasonable to conclude that Geoffrey and other Medieval poetry theorists did not have particularly long compositions in mind.

The *Tria sunt* includes an example letter that shows ways in which these *modi* can be applied as microstructures but might also line up with the parts of a letter. Here is that letter divided into parts and lines numbered for reference:

> [Salutation] 1. To John, his master most reverend, King by God's grace of England, Arthur, albeit his captive, asks that you take pity on your nephew's abundant misfortunes.
>
> [Preamble] 2. Royal wrath should be tempered by clemency, and princely mercy punishes less precisely.
>
> [Narration] 3. I have earned, I confess, I have earned the penalty that I suffer. 4. Indeed, after the days of my father, after the life of my grandfather, after the vicissitudes of my uncles, in you only would I have had the assurance of kinship and friendship. 5. But against so great a friend I shamelessly presumed to plot warlike follies and insidious altercations, deceived to be sure by hostile suggestion. 6. Not my uncle, not my father, not my own blood was I competent to remember. 7. But now I give thanks to the mercy of Heaven, which has granted me both to recognize what I am and to repent my deluded stupidity.
>
> [Petition] 8. So may God restore me to your friendship or at least provide me milder imprisonment.

> [Conclusion] 9. I would not wish that I, completely exempt, had not tasted this prison, which has brought me back to my uncle and freed me from the Gallic seducer. (354; trans. Camargo, in Camargo, "Epistolary Declamation")

At first blush, this fictional letter is relatively simple in that it has all the basic parts of a letter: Salutation, Preamble, Narration, Petition, Conclusion. Furthermore, with the exception of the Narration, this letter only dedicates one sentence to each of the other parts. Many of these sentences, however, can also be analyzed into *modi positionum*. For example, Sentence 2 (the Preamble) is a conversion; Sentence 3 is an absolution; Sentence 4 is a repetition; Sentence 5 is a comparison; Sentence 6 is a repetition; and Sentence 7 is an absolution. That the conversion in Sentence 2 functions as one part of the letter, and that most of the other *modi positionum* are concentrated in the Narration suggests that the *modi positionum* are essential to how we understand Medieval letters and their composition. These teachings can be applied one sentence at a time, but can also function as parts of the letter.

The application of modes to Narrations, though, is less crucial than the general sense that the internal variety of Narrations needs to be theoretically explicit. For instance, Geoffrey of Bologna in his *Summa de arte dictandi* (1190) includes an entirely different list but keeps the same focus on Narrations. Writing on the "Diversity of Narrations," he argues that "There is a rhetorical narration and there is a dictaminal narration…. The form of narrations is manifold. Indeed, there are

altogether as many modes of narrations as there are letter-writers" (900).[91] Geoffrey of Bologna references Transmundus as a great writer, then moves on to discuss the "On the Method of Inventing the Narration." However, rather than cite Transmundus's list of narrative modes, Geoffrey of Bologna propounds a different list: "This study has two parts: the state of things and the purpose of the human mind. Narration, from the state of things, proceeds in various ways. For it is invented according to fortune, affection, fame, custom, and conviction" (901).[92] This list has no points in common with either Transmundus's list or Geoffrey of Vinsauf's list. But this list is evidence that yet another Medieval rhetorician believed that the Narration of the letter is an essential place of variation and argumentation. Geoffrey of Bologna may not be a Geoffrey of Vinsauf, but he is still interested in the Narration as this site of amplification.[93]

Ultimately, the *modi positionum* from the arts of letter writing constitute a unique construct that is both related to arrangement (Adalberto of Samaria, the anonymous *Aurea gemma,* Hugo of Bologna) or very much situated in arrangement (Transmundus). Geoffrey of Vinsauf takes this construct further by inserting *gradus*

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[91] Latin text as transcribed by *Documenta Catholica Omnia*: "*De diversitate narrationis. Est narratio rhetoris et est narratio dictatoris…. Narrationum multiformis est forma. Totus enim narrationis modus est, quotus dictatorum numerus*."

[92] "*De modo inveniendi narrationem…. Huius studii due partitiones sunt: status rerum et humane mentis propositum. A statu rerum multipliciter prodit narratio. Invenitur enim iuxta fortunam, affectionem, famam, conseutudinem et convictum.*" These steps have more in common with the *progymnasmata* than the *variatione narrationis*: "The properties of the person are origin (*genos*), nature, training, disposition, age, fortune, morality, action, speech, (manner of) death, and hat followed death" (Theon 5.78).

[93] There is a minority argument that Geoffrey of Bologna is actually Geoffrey of Vinsauf before he moved to Vinsauf (Camargo, "Introduction" 7).

into this space between arrangement and style, referring to these collected *gradus* as amplification techniques, and turning to figures of thought for both amplification and style. Despite these exciting moves, theories of *modi positionum, variatione narrationis*, and *gradus*, however, tend to remain in the realm of microstructures. By applying primarily to microstructures, these amplification techniques have some relationships to arrangement, but also some significant relationships to style. While some of these techniques ostensibly also relate to inventional concepts such as *topoi*, many *modi* also apply to style and grammar. Amplification and arrangement are beginning to become entangled to fill a space between invention and style, but further entanglement is possible. While contemporaneous, the arts of preaching do take this entanglement a step further.

The Arts of Preaching and the *Modi Dilatandi*

The arts of preaching show other approaches to entangling invention, arrangement, and style. As is the case with the arts of letter-writing and poetry, preaching manuals also explicitly theorize arrangement and produce their own specialized *modi*. However, whereas the arts of letter-writing and poetry tend to lean more toward style and Narrations, the arts of preaching place more emphasis on invention and Confirmations. By holding more tightly to invention, some of the arts of preaching nestle amplification within arrangement or make both synonymous.

Like the arts of letter-writing and poetry, preaching manuals explicitly theorize arrangement, often in traditional Greco-Roman ways. In his *Summa de arte praedicandi* (c. 1220) Thomas of Cobham explicitly differentiates poetic arrangement

from sermon arrangement. "Poets," he writes, "divide their poems into three parts, that is, the proposition, the invocation, and the narration [*propositio, invocatio, narratio*]" (624; trans. Copeland and Sluiter). "Orators," however, "divide up their speeches in other ways. The kind of division that rhetoric gives is more appropriate to the preacher in his preaching than the aforesaid poetic divisions of discourse" (625). Having noted the value of rhetoric to the preacher and having described the parts, Cobham also emphasizes that the processes of rhetoric– invention, arrangement, style, memory, delivery– should all be brought to bear on the composition of the parts of the oration:

> The parts of the oration in rhetoric, no matter how well they are ordered, cannot be put to good and discerning use without reference to the parts of the art of rhetoric as a whole. Thus one must know how to apply the elements of the whole art to the parts of the oration. (630)

Similar to early writers of the arts of letter-writing and poetry, early writers of the arts of preaching at first turn to Greco-Roman rhetorics. While not all writers of the arts of preaching will draw explicitly from Greco-Roman rhetorics for the divisions of rhetoric and the parts of the oration, Cobham's work is a useful example of a trend of turning to rhetoric in the absence of a rhetorical theory specific to preaching (Jennings, "Medieval Thematic Preaching").[94] Cobham distinguishes the arts of

[94] Also on Cobham, see Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,* p.p. 319-325. Alexander of Ashby's *De modo praedicandi* (c. 1197) is another example of the early Ciceronian trend: "There are four parts of a sermon, to wit: prologue, division, proof (*confirmatio*), and conclusion. The entire material of the sermon is proposition and authority" (trans. Murphy, in *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages,* p. 313). For Ashby's departure from Ciceronian arrangement, see Murphy 315-316.

preaching from the arts of poetry especially in terms of arrangement. This awareness of differences between these genres will impact how these rhetoricians conceptualize arrangement and amplification for sermons.

Despite their early emphasis on Ciceronian rhetoric, the Medieval arts of preaching ultimately develop their own theories of arrangement, with amplification under that conceptual umbrella. Of particular interest are theories concerning the scholastic or thematic sermon. Under this rubric, arrangement consists not of prologue-narration-proof-refutation-conclusion, but of some variation of protheme-theme-division-development (*prosecutio*)-conclusion (Murphy 325).[95] On the surface, these two schemes seem remarkably alike: a protheme is like a prologue, a development is like a proof, a conclusion is, well, a conclusion. But the dropping of narration and refutation, the increased value of division, and the equation of proof with development is unique. These changes are likely attributable to Medieval preaching's reliance on scripture and authority, a direct extension of earlier homiletics in which a rabbi or preacher would read a scripture passage and then comment on it.[96]

By equating proof with development, the Medieval arts of preaching make amplification a sharply inventional and organizational concept that synthesizes the argumentative and expansive qualities of amplification. Just as the arts of letter-writing and poetry apply amplification to Introductions and Narrations instead of

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[95] See also Caplan, "Classical Rhetoric and the Medieval Art of Preaching" 87 and Wenzel, *Medieval 'Artes Praedicandi': A Synthesis of Scholastic Sermon Structure* 47-86.

[96] On Jewish and early Christian preaching, see Murphy 269-284. On more general interactions between rabbinic education and Hellenist education, see Richard Hidary, *Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash.*

Conclusions, the arts of preaching apply amplification to Proofs. Attention to the modes of dilation or moves for developing sermons highlights this synthesis and emphasis on proof. Juan de Fusignano's *Libellus artis predicatorie* (c. 1310), for example, argues that "the words of Scripture are pregnant (*fecundus*), and from a short thema one can develop (*dilatare*) a long sermon" (3.1; trans. Wenzel). Using a common analogy, Fusignano compares the sermon to a tree, which, "after it has sprouted secondary branches, still expands (*dilatare*) through twigs." A sermon should therefore follow a similar organic design: "so a sermon must not rest on the division of the thema and the subdivision of its parts alone, but must have it expanded further, so that it is built up in a proper way" (7.1). This is to say, dilation (amplification) is not separate from the argument and organization of the speech, but is a necessary extension of it. Fusignano then outlines his twelve ways of dilating a sermon (*modi dilantandi sermonem*): 1) concordant authorities, 2) discussion of words, 3) multiple meanings, 4) interpretation and description, 5) comparison, 6) synonyms, 7) properties, 8) similitudes, 9) opposites, 10) whole and parts, 11) cause and effects, and 12) reasoning.

These modes of dilation are very different from Pseudo-Cicero and Cicero's affective amplificatory topics. These topics are also different from the *modi positionum* and even Vinsauf's *gradus* except for the modes of description and comparison.[97] However, this list bears some resemblance to Cicero's *loci interni* and

[97] Englehardt briefly comments that there is a difference between the modes in the arts of preaching and the arts of poetry: "Like homiletic theory, significantly, the poetic is comprised of eight modes, but these modes are not derived from the sciences of dialectic or exegetics" (741).

externi in his *Topics*: whole, parts, definition, adjuncts; conjugate, genus, species, similarity, difference, contraries, adjuncts, antecedents, consequents, contradictions, cause, effect, comparison (2.6-3.11; see Table 4 below). And in *Orator,* Cicero does say that topics (*loci*) are "a kind a sign or indication of the arguments from which a whole speech can be formed (*traherentur*) on either side of the question" (13.46). Whole and parts, similarity and difference, cause and effects, and comparison are the same for Cicero and Fusignano; and there may be a relationship between definition and discussing words, multiple meanings, and property. As such, this Medieval art of preaching is clearly drawing on argumentative rather than traditional amplificatory topics. We might also say that this Medieval art of preaching replaces the amplificatory topics with argumentative and interpretive topics.[98] Seeing as the

[98] While there is some variance from treatise to treatise, the modes of dilation generally maintain an emphasis on interpretation and argumentation. Jean de Rochelle in his *Processus negociandi themata sermonum* (c. 1245) lists proposition derivation, second-person word forms, antithetical authorities, different words, multiple meanings, concordant authorities, and interpretation (in Wenzel, *The Art of Preaching: Five Medieval Texts and Translations*). In *Forma praedicandi* (1322), Robert of Basevorn lists definitions and classifications, division, reasoning, concordances, similarities, properties, interpretation, and causes and effects (in Murphy, *Three Medieval Rhetorical Arts* 180-184). Francesc Eiximenis in *Ars praedicandi populo* (c.1400) lists cause, circumstances, authorities and examples, concomitance, opposites, numbers, prayer, cause (again), and focus on the New Testament (in Díaz Díaz, "El 'Arte de predicar al pueblo' de Francesc Eiximenis [Traducción y Notas]"). And in *Ars praedicandi* (1476), Martín de Córdoba lists definition, division, reasoning, concordances, comparison, cause and effect (including interpretation), literal interpretation, gradatio, and combination (in Díaz Díaz, "El 'Arte de predicar' de Fray Martín de Córdoba: Tradicción y Notas"). For a compound list of twenty items, see Caplan, "Classical Rhetoric and the Medieval Theory of Preaching" 88-90. For curious departures from a full-blown list of modes of dilation, see Henry of Hesse in Caplan, "'Henry of Hesse' on the Art of Preaching"; and *Vade in Domum, Hic Docet,* and *Quamvis* in Wenzel, *The Art of Preaching: Five Medieval Texts and Translations*. For a reading of each mode, see V. Kennedy, *Concepts of Amplification in Rhetorical Theory* 107-133.

argumentative topics can ostensibly be used independently of their original philosophical and forensic contexts, it makes sense that Medieval theorists working in a different context would pivot to these topics.

Comparison of Medieval *Topoi and Modi*			
Cicero	Fusignano	Vinsauf	Transmundus
Whole and Parts **Definition** Adjuncts Conjugate Genus and Species **Similarity and Difference** **Contraries** Adjuncts Antecedents and Consequents **Contradictions** **Cause and Effect** **Comparison**	Concordances **Discussing Words** **Meanings** Interpretation and *Description* ***Comparison*** Synonyms **Properties** **Similitudes** ***Opposites*** **Whole and Parts** **Cause and Effects** Reasoning	Repetition Periphrasis *Comparison* Apostrophe Personification Digression *Description* *Opposition*	Present tense Future tense Past tense *Comparison* Condition Resolution and Exposition Absolution Repetition Conversion

Figure 11: Comparison of *Topoi* in the Three Medieval Arts. Similarities between Fusignano and Cicero in bold. Similarities between Fusignano, Vinsauf, and Transmundus in italics.

Whereas the *modi positionum* teach ways to vary a Narration, the *modi dilatandi* teach ways to vary a Confirmation. In so doing, the arts of preaching emphasize that amplification and argumentation go hand in hand. For example, consider this anonymous sermon on Luke 11:14-28 prepared for the third Sunday in Lent. Drawing on Biblical commentaries and model sermons, this preacher's sermon consists of a thema, protheme, restatement of the thema, introduction of the thema, restatement of the thema, division of the thema, development of its parts, and a closing formula (Wenzel, "From Scripture to Sermon" 31-32). This preacher takes

the passage "Jesus was casting out a demon, and that was mute" as his thema (32). After some introductory matters, he divides his sermon into three parts: "In these words we can consider three things: A name of outstanding worth, Jesus; an act of incomparable power, was casting out a demon; the hiding of truth, that was mute" (34). Each of these parts constitutes the Confirmation; and it is here that the *modi dilatandi* take precedence. Using Fusignano's list to analyze the first part, we can identify *modi dilatandi* such as concordances ("Bernard comments on this as follows: 'If you write something, it won't please me unless I read 'Jesus' there" [34]); discussion of meanings ("In this name shines forth his mercy, because, as we said earlier, 'Jesus' means 'savior'" [35]); and opposites ("Now, the greater dignity a thing has, the more serious it is to sin against it. But God's name has a greater dignity than an apple" [35]). Each *modi dilatandi* serves not only to amplify but to flesh out the argument as to why Jesus' name is outstanding. The *modi dilatandi*, therefore, are essential to the development of a sermon's Confirmation.

Besides the emphasis on amplification as argumentative, the Medieval arts of preaching also bring amplification into closer correspondence with arrangement, further integrating the two. For example, in his *Forma praedicandi* (1322) Robert of Basevorn follows classical rhetoric in keeping amplification within the process of arrangement. This embedding is evident in Basevorn's account of the twenty-two "ornaments" of sermon craft, which can be divided into the processes of classical rhetoric:

Invention ("Invention of the Theme"),

> Arrangement ("Winning-over of the Audience, Prayer, Introduction, Division, Statement of Parts, Proof of Parts, **Amplification**, Digression, which is properly called 'Transition,' Correspondence, Agreement of Correspondence, Circuitous Development, Convolution, Unification, Conclusion,"),
>
> Style ("Coloration"), and
>
> Delivery ("Modulation of Voice, Appropriate Gesture, Timely Humor, Allusion, Firm Impression, Weighing of Subject Matter") (132; trans. Krul).

That Basevorn avoids the traditional 5-part scheme in favor of a 22-part scheme is suggestive of how Medieval rhetoricians sought to create new rhetorics for new exigencies by dissolving previous relationships between concepts to allow new emphases. But what is also curious here is that while Basevorn includes amplification within his account of the parts of the sermon, this amplification is not, as it is in classical rhetorics, embedded in the Conclusion, or, as in the arts of letter-writing and poetry, the step right before style. Rather, Basevorn places amplification right after Proof and right before Digression and other forms of development and argumentation. In doing so, Basevorn does not necessarily equate amplification with argumentation, as does Fusignano. It is possible that Basevorn may understand amplification as something added to proof. However, Basevorn clearly keeps amplification and argumentation conceptually near one another. This example further confirms that amplification in the Medieval arts of preaching takes on a more fully

argumentative function. Medieval amplification is not so much a means of adding fluff as amplification is a means of adding argumentative substance and force.

Another example of bringing invention, amplification, and arrangement together can be found in *Ars praedicandi populo* (c.1400) by the Catalán Francesc Eiximenis. Eiximenis is remarkable because he makes invention synonymous with amplification and then describes an explicit connection between this argumentative amplification and arrangement. Eiximenis begins by outlining another non-traditional list of rhetorical processes: "The principle of order (*ordo*) of this mode is schematically, in summary, comprised of three parts: the first enables the intellect; the second enables the memory; and the third enables craft and diction" (3.7).[99] This order, which helps the preacher "speak in an ordered way" (3.7), is composed of argumentative preaching modes.[100] Eiximenis divides this "power to proceed in an orderly manner in investigating that subject matter" (i.e., invention) into a series of rules (3.7.1).[101] These items are essentially the modes for amplifying a sermon: 1) cause, 2) circumstances, 3) authorities and examples, 4) concomitance, 5) opposites, 6) numbers, 7) prayer, 8) cause (again), 9) cite the New Testament, and 10) cite a

[99] Translation based, in part, on Díaz Díaz's Spanish translation, which is in turn based on Martí of Barcelona's 1936 Latin edition. "El principio del orden se resume esquemáticamente en tres apartados: el primero coadyuva a la inteligencia; el segundo coadyuva a la memoria; y el tercero coadyuva al estilo y la dicción." "*Ordo autem huiusmodi continent summarie tres partes: prima iuvat intelligenciam; seconda iuvat memoriam; tercia iuvat studium et linguam*."

[100] "el predicador eximio debe predicar de forma ordenada"; "*predicator excellens debet ordinate loqui*"

[101] "proceder ordenadamente para investigar sobre este punto"; "*ordinate vis procedere ad indagandum istam materiam*"

Psalm (3.7.1.1-3.7.1.10). Whereas Fusignano and Basevorn focus these modes on amplification, Eiximenis uses them for invention.

While these modes are discussed in service of invention, Eiximenis does not lose sight of their amplificatory aspect. For example, in discussing the first rule, Eiximenis comments that "if you should desire to amplify [*dilatare*] any of these four [causes] in that given order, then you would be able to proceed in a copious and eloquent way" (3.7.1.1).[102] This statement leads right into the second rule: "In order to have more copious [*copioso*] material while preaching, consider the position and order through the following verses" (3.7.1.2).[103] For each rule, Eiximenis uses this language of amplification (dilation) and copia– here indistinguishable from invention. Here, amplification is not folded into arrangement; rather, amplification is sharply argumentative.

Eiximenis does not mention arrangement separately, but does reference the parts of an oration in his discussion of the ordered method for style. When he does mention arrangement, he makes it a point to reemphasize that arrangement and argumentative amplification draw on each other. In his discussion of style (*lingua*), he notes three parts of the modern sermon: "For they generally divide their sermons into three parts: the first is called introduction, the second is called the introduction of

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[102] "si se quiere amplificar una cualquiera de estas cuatro, si se observa puntualmente este orden, entonces se podrá proceder de forma fluida y elocuente"; "*si dilatare volaris quodlibet horum quatuor, isto ordine dato, tunc poteris procedere diserte et copiose*"

[103] "Para disponer de una material más abundante a la hora de predicar, considerese el tema propuesto y su disposición ordenada a través de las siguientes circunstancias"; "*Ad copiosorem materiam habendam ad predicandum considera propositum et ordinem per hos versus subquentes…*" This is an early instance of associating arrangement with copia as well.

the theme, the third receives the name of distinction and development."[104] Notably, Eiximenis does not divorce this arrangement from amplification and invention:

> Moreover this method has been devised for managing and inventing copious material [*copiam materie*] for preaching; wherefore, how much the preacher expands himself in several modes over his own theme, so much the more material occurs to him for preaching. (3.7.3.6)[105]

He also notes that this arrangement is useful for memory and for style (3.7.3.6). Then Eiximenis gives guidance for these three parts, including several modes for the introduction of the theme (response to the proposition, distinction, authority, quote, natural reasoning, history, enthymeme, apparent syllogism, solution of the theme, syllogism) and acknowledges that this is an open list ("The introduction of the theme can be constituted in a many different ways" [3.7.5.11]).[106] Including separate modes for the introduction is special because it shows that Eiximenis is applying amplificatory thinking in multiple parts of sermon composition. And for the

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[104] "por lo general dividen sus sermones en tres partes: la primera se denomina introducción, la segunda se llama introducción del tema, la tercera recibe el nombre de distinction y prosecución"; "*ipsi enim suas predicaciones communiter dividunt in tres partes: prima vocatur introduccio, secunda dicitur thematis introduccio, tercia appellatur distinccio et prosecucio*"

[105] "Verdad es que este método ha sido diseñado con la finalidades de disponer y de hallar abundancia de material para la predicación; de ahi que, cuanto más se explaya el predicador de mil formas distintas sobre su tema, tanto más material se le ofrece para predicar."; "*Istem autem modus inventus est ad habendum et ad inveniendum copiam materie ad predicandum; unde quanto predicator pluribus modis se diffundit super suo themate, tanto occurrunt sibi plures materie ad predicandum*." This is also to say that Eiximenis is thinking not only of rules, but of methods for collecting material as well.

[106] "De mil formas distintas puede hacerse la introducción del tema"; "*Multis aliis modis potest fieri introitus ad thema*"

development, Eiximenis asserts that this part was made for argumentative amplification: "However, the division of the theme was devised in order to provide the preacher copious material for preaching" (3.7.6.1).[107] Essentially, rather than discuss style, Eiximenis discusses arrangement.[108]

Like the Medieval arts of letter-writing and poetry, the arts of preaching directly theorize relationships between invention and arrangement and imply relationships with style as well. Most rhetoricians place amplification somewhere between invention and style, a conceptual field amplification shares with arrangement. Whereas the arts of letter-writing and poetry place amplification between arrangement and style, some of the arts of preaching instead combine arrangement and amplification and sometimes even invention, arrangement, and amplification. While some Medieval rhetoricians clearly borrow from classical rhetoric (for example, Alberico of Monte Cassino, Thomas of Cobham), many other rhetoricians respond to contemporary needs by theorizing *modi*, a concept that allows amplification to be applied to Narrations and Proofs, not only to Conclusions. These various developments, from the continuance of principles of arrangement to the

[107] "La división del tema fue ideada para proporcionar al predicador abundancia de material para predicar."; "*Divisio autem thematis inventa fuit ad dandum predicatori copiam materie ad predicandum*."

[108] This confusion of arrangement and style may be the influence of Augustine's *De doctrina Christiana* (436 AD). Augustine divides preaching into discovery (*inventio*) and presentation (*proferendus*). Augustine includes arrangement (the parts of the speech) under presentation. He first mentions arrangement when he discusses wicked rhetoricians who know about the exordium, narration, confirmation, refutation, and peroration, treating these parts as the core of rhetoric (4.2.3). That is, when he talks about rhetoric, the first thing that comes to mind is arrangement and the second thing that comes to mind is style. Augustine later asserts that the preacher should know these parts as well (4.4.6).

development of *modi positionum* (letter-writing), *modi narrationum* (poetry), and *modi dilatandi* (preaching), show an emergent theoretical integration of arrangement and amplification. From the perspective of arrangement, the Medieval period is not fly-over country, but is rather an important site where amplification and arrangement increasingly blur into one another.

Conclusion: Particularized Arrangement

This chapter highlights Medieval theories of rhetoric and the ways in which they reconsider the relationships between arrangement, amplification, style, and topics theory. Whereas previous Greek and Roman theories emphasize the responsive and synthetic aspects of arrangement, Medieval theories emphasize arrangements' optional, moveable, and variable qualities. These variables, defined as *modi positionum* and *modi dilatandi*, blur distinctions between the parts of an oration, the topics of invention, and figures of thought by bringing more of rhetoric under the head of amplification. In their hands, amplification becomes a quality that can be applied not only to Conclusions but also to Salutations, Narrations, and Proofs. By making amplification more central to rhetoric, Medieval rhetoricians imply that the development, the *tractatio* of speech, does not always proceed in a single manner. As such, there is a need to collect and teach these variations.

While they do not discuss this repertoire-focused approach to pedagogy, Medieval rhetoricians' interest in collecting and using variations extends to their development of supplementary materials for writing. Medieval rhetoricians frequently composed collections of Salutations, Exordia, Antethemes, proverbs,

doctrine, and the like as aides to busy letter-writers and preachers. Ann Moss considers these collections and other quote collections as part of a culture of *florilegia,* "flower-collections" (24). For example, Siegfried Wenzel, a specialist in Medieval sermons, notes that Medieval preachers often relied on a variety of preaching aids, including collections of commonplaces such as the *Summa collationum, sive Communiloquium* (c.1270) by John of Wales ("Chaucer" 141) and "such reference aids as collections of distinctions or biblical concordances" (*The Art of Preaching* 244). The sermon on Luke cited above is an example of a discourse written with these aids, which takes up the source material in unique ways.

John Bromyard's *Summa praedicantium* (c. 1350) is another example of supplementary material for the arts of preaching. For each virtue and vice, Bromyard lists examples and authorities (*exemplum et auctoritas*), all with a cross-referencing system that ideally would allow a preacher to quickly look up examples and authorities for a virtue or vice. In his Prologue to the *Summa praedicantium,* Bromyard emphasizes the importance of developing sermons based on these virtues and authorities: "how excellent it is to magnify inheritance and virtues. As therefore what inheritance you augment, to some extent you invent from what your predecessors themselves in some way bequeathed from their industry." Here, Bromyard seems to consider invention as at least two distinct processes. First, there is the process of invention itself, left undefined but associated with *augere* and *augmentare,* i.e., amplification and development. Then there is another process that somehow or to some extent can draw on material collected by someone else in a collection such as this. Bromyard does not provide much more comment on how he

conceptualizes invention or how ideally the preacher will use this resource. It is entirely possible that a preacher could overuse this resource and the seemingly over-schematic arts of preaching, though Wenzel's studies of Medieval sermons suggests otherwise ("The Sermon as Art Form"). Clearly, though, Bromyard sees his collection as an aid to invention, rather than a replacement for invention.

The existence of various preaching aids emphasizes that treatises on the art of preaching and other supplements were not stand-alone works, but existed as a part of a larger genre ecology. While these collections may seem strange to modern readers, these collections reflect the extent to which this culture values variations and amplification. As Malcolm Richardson puts it: "although few would insist that a formulary is engaging late-night reading, formularies reveal the deep structure of medieval letter writing" (61). While Medieval preachers had materials such as the *Summa praedicantium* at their disposal, this fact does not preclude Medieval preachers from mindfully composing their sermons. And it is important to note that these supplementary materials provide raw material for amplification: the existence of these materials indicates not only that Medieval preachers think of invention broadly but also that amplification involves working with repertoires. These explorations of invention, arrangement, amplification, style, and repertoires will be taken up by later rhetoricians who will bring all of these parts together in yet another iteration: *copia rerum*.

Chapter 5: Integrating Arrangement: *Res* and *Figura*

> "division and distinction are not only figures of thought but instruments of disposition as well" -Agostino Valier, *Rhetorica Ecclesiastica* 275

Few model letters and speeches were as prominent in the Renaissance classroom as those of Cicero. Indeed, as the historian Paul Grendler puts it, "it is impossible to overestimate the importance of Cicero as a cultural and literary model" in this period (216). The great preceptor Philipp Melanchthon captures such an analysis in his *Dispositio orationis quam pro Archia poeta* (1533). In this speech, Cicero argues that the Syrian poet Aulius Licinius Archias, one of Cicero's early rhetoric teachers, qualified for Roman citizenship. The *Dispositio* provides a brief analysis and summary of this speech followed by an annotated text.

In his analysis, Melanchthon understands *Dispositio* as inclusive of both the parts of an oration and figures of thought: "For the beginning of Arrangement we will treat the Exordium. We shall discuss the rest of the oration and the cause thereafter. And this method of distributing thoughts brings many advantages which we will employ here" (Aiii.r).[109] The advantages of this study of arrangement, he continues, include an understanding of authorial intent, the order of arguments, and cohesion and coherence, which allows the student to better imitate and judge speeches (Aiii.r-

[109] My translation. "*Initio oikonomiam Exordii trademus. De reliqua oratione, et de caussa postea dicturi sumus. Ac multas utilitates adfert haec ratio distribuendarum sententiarum, qua hic utemur."* I am using a 1533 edition, but the reader may consult the *Corpus Reformatorum* volume 16, pp. 890-920 for corresponding text. Because a version of this chapter was prepared for publication elsewhere, it is in Chicago rather than MLA format.

Aiii.v).[110] In the following analysis, Melanchthon moves smoothly from discussing the parts of an oration to the figures of thought to dialectical schemes. He begins by explaining that "The Exordium is drawn from the Common Place that it is our natural duty to repay kindness" (Aiii.v).[111] Continuing, he explains that the first period of the Exordium contains an *incrementum;* the second period contains an *apologia, circumstantiae,* and *circumductio;* and the third period contains a *conclusio* or an enthymeme (Aiii.v-Aiiii.v). Melanchthon next identifies two *occupationes* or responsive anticipations (Aiiii.v-Av.r) before noting the Proposition (Av.v). After considering the Narration and Confirmation, Melanchthon then identifies another *occupatio* (Aviii.r). This *occupatio* is followed by other figures such as *concessiones* (Aviii.r); *objectio, ratio, correctio, exemplum,* and *collatio* (Aviii.v). Finally, Melanchthon comes to the "Peroration, which contains a *Deprecatio*" (Biiii.r).[112] This structure is then reviewed in the printed margin annotations for the speech text (see Figure 12).

[110] "*Primum enim voluntatem uniuscuusquem [sic] authoris, is demum recte adfequi poterit, qui seriem omnium sententiarum contemplabitur, et animaadvertet quomodo inter se consentiant. Deinde cum in alienis scriptis rationem coniungendi sentencias animadverterimus, scribemus et ispi magis coearentia. Plurimum itaque prodest haec diligentia consyderandae dispositionis in oratione, tum ad imitationem, tum etiam ad iudicandum*."

[111] "*Locus Exordii sumptus est ex Communi loco, scilicet ex officio referendae gratiae*."

[112] "*Postea sequitur Peroratio, quae continet Deprecationem, in qua argumenta caussae brevissime repetuntur, ur sit in Epilogis. Telos.*"

Exordium (*Incrementum, Apologia, Circumstantiae, Circumductio, Ratio, Conclusio, Occupatio, Solutio, Occupatio, Propositio*)

Narration (*Gradatio, Pathos, Minor/Conclusio/Major, Pars Minoris, Epilogus*)

Confirmation (Witnesses, *Collatio, Conclusio, Amplificatio*)

Confutation (*Propositio, Comprobatio, Occupatio, Correctio, Congeries, Simile,* Final Cause, *Objectio, Concessio, Ratio, Correctio, Exemplum, Conclusio, Repetio, Collatio, Transitio, Similitudo, Consequens, Comprobatio, Antecedens, Consequens, Amplificatio, Exemplum, Apologia, Exemplum, Redit, Conclusio, Exemplum, Amplificatio, Ratio, Exemplum, Conclusio, Repetitio loco communis, Minor*)

Peroration (*Deprecatio*)

Figure 12: *Dispositio* of *Pro Archia poeta.*

Melanchthon's *Dispositio* of *Pro Archia poeta* suggests the extent to which Renaissance rhetoricians went beyond classical sources such as the *Rhetoric to Herennius.* Whereas the *Rhetoric to Herennius* primarily suggested that most figures would cluster in the Conclusion of a speech (see chapter five), Melanchthon's reading identifies figures in all parts of this oration. This distribution of figures is similar to the Medieval distribution of amplification beyond the Conclusion of a speech (see chapter six). And, whereas the *Rhetoric to Herennius* and Medieval rhetoricians show some awareness of a connection between arrangement and figures of thought, Melanchthon sees these concepts as being clearly integrated.[113]

The purpose of this chapter is to look further into this Renaissance relationship between arrangement and the figures of thought. In previous chapters, I

[113] For more on Melanchthon's editions of classical speeches, see Carl Joachim Classen's section on "Melanchthon's Commentaries on Pagan Authors," in *Rhetorical Criticism of the New Testament*, pp. 168-174.

argued that different ways of conceptualizing compositional units encourage us to recognize important principles of arrangement, such as responsiveness, optionality, distribution, development, repertoire, embeddedness, and scalability. Each of these principles is essential to fleshing out a fuller theory of arrangement. In this chapter, I argue that the integration of the parts of an oration and the figures of thought brings added attention to the principles of scalability and repertoire. From this perspective, arrangement is not only a matter of building and working with a repertoire but also a matter of organizing that repertoire of scalable, discoursal figures. To develop these claims, I begin with Desiderius Erasmus's *De duplici copia rerum ac verborum commentarii duo* (1512/1534), in which Erasmus ties the figures of thought to arrangement. In particular, I argue for the importance of this second part of *De copia* to the history of rhetoric. In what follows, I demonstrate that Erasmus's second notebook, *De copia rerum*, is patterned according to two significant frameworks that implicate not only style and topical invention but also structural invention—that is, invention according to the parts of an oration: exordium, narration, proof, and conclusion. Through these frameworks, Erasmus combines the figures of thought with the parts of an oration in a way that conceptualizes figures as parts and parts as figures. These frameworks are significant for at least two reasons. First, these frameworks give us insight into how this second notebook is organized: Erasmus does not throw his methods of enrichment (*rationes locupletandi*) together haphazardly, but rather organizes them deliberately. The sources of these frameworks, in turn, add to our understanding of Erasmus's sources and influences, including the ways in which he draws on both classical and contemporary sources. And an eye to these

frameworks enables us to recognize similarly compelling frameworks in other Renaissance rhetorical handbooks.

Second, by combining the resources of style and structural invention, Erasmus implies that the processes of composing sentences and passages can happen at the same time. As Erasmus observes, *res* and *verba* "are so interconnected that in reality one cannot easily separate one from the other, and. . . they interact so closely that any distinction between them belongs to theory rather than to practice."[114] This partitioning of discourse is significant. As García-Berrio and Albaladejo Majordomo note, there is a "need to articulate in a suitable way the theoretical successiveness of the rhetorical components to the simultaneousness of the concrete rhetorical operations of verbal enunciation."[115] Writing about classical rhetorics, Robert N. Gaines emphasizes that some rhetorics are organized by the parts of an oration (such as Apsines of Gadara's *Techne rhetorike*), while other are organized by genres (such as Anaximenes's *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*), the tasks of the orator (such as Aristotle's *Rhetorica*), or some combination or conflation of these three (such as the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*).[116] Of these configurations, Gaines singles out treatises

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[114] Erasmus, *De copia*, 301.
[115] García-Berrio and Albaladejo Majordomo, "Compositional Structure," 174.
[116] Robert N. Gaines, "On the Rhetorical Significance of P. Hamb. 131," *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 7, no. 4 (1989): 335-337, https://doi.org/10.1525/rh.1989.7.4.329. For a similar categorization, see Charles Guérin, "Cicero as User and Critic of Traditional Rhetorical Patterns: Structural Authority from *De inventione* to *De oratore*," in *Texts of Power, the Power of Text: Readings in Textual Authority across History and Cultures*, ed. Cezary Galewicz (Kraków, PO: Homini, 2006), 70-73. A strand of Gaines's work identifies instances of the structural approach in Greek rhetorics. See Robert N. Gaines, "Theodorus Byzantius on the Parts of a Speech" and "Isocrates, Ep. 6.8," *Hermes* 118, no. 2 (1990).

organized by the parts of an oration as being a "distinct and enduring current in the tradition of ancient rhetoric" with pedagogical value.[117] While these categories are used to describe classical and not Renaissance rhetorics (and the Renaissance period had many more options to choose from), these and similar categories reveal that differences in treatment are real and they matter. Erasmus's *De copia rerum* is not organized by genres or by tasks, but rather by parts of discourse. By conceptualizing parts of an oration as figures and figures as parts of an oration, Erasmus presents an interconnected theory of rhetoric, a theory which implies that rhetorical processes of invention, arrangement, and style overlap. As Frank J. D'Angelo notes, invention, arrangement, and style "reveal similar conceptual structures," are "all closely interconnected," and are "symbolic manifestations of the same underlying thought processes."[118] Similarly, Ann E. Berthoff argues that "In composing, everything has to happen at once—or it doesn't happen at all."[119] "The handful of Renaissance rhetoricians who purposely broaden the notion of figure to form of any kind," Christiansen writes, "simply bring theory into alignment with general practice" and "provide[] a recursive model of composition, which is built into the curriculum and which balances and completes the linear model provided by the typical sequence of rhetoric's departments."[120] Ultimately, Erasmus's *De copia rerum* embodies one of

[117] Gaines, "Rhetorical Significance," 340.
[118] Frank J. D'Angelo, *A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, 1975), 28-29.
[119] Ann E. Berthoff, "Recognition, Representation, and Revision," *Journal of Basic Writing* 3 (1981), 21, https://clearinghouse.colostate.edu/jbw/v3n3/berthoff.pdf.
[120] Christiansen, *Figuring Style,* 49; 88-89.

these more holistic theories of rhetoric that sets the terms for many other Renaissance rhetorics.

In what follows, I begin by presenting these two frameworks, considering their sources and other Renaissance rhetoricians who recognize that Erasmus is indeed using these frameworks. I also trace these frameworks to classical and Renaissance sources and consider what these frameworks reveal about Erasmus's understanding of rhetoric. Once I have discussed the existence, causes, and value of these frameworks, I then highlight their reception in other Renaissance rhetorical handbooks to further confirm that Erasmus's frameworks not only exist but also have value for the study of the figures of thought in Renaissance rhetoric more generally.

Erasmus's Integration of Style and Structural Invention

Framework 1: Figures of Thought

The first framework Erasmus uses to structure *De copia rerum* is the list of stylistic figures of thought (*exornationes sententiarum*) found in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* IV.[121] Through this framework, Erasmus equates the Pseudo-Ciceronian concept of *sententia* (thought, opinion, judgment, maxim) with the broader Ciceronian concept of *res* (thing, thought, matter, case, reason, motive, ground,

[121] Cummings generally recognizes that Erasmus's distinction between *verba* and *res* is a distinction between "figures of speech and of thought" and that "'Richness of subject-matter' corresponds to what the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* calls *figurae sententiarum*" ("Encyclopaedic Erasmus,' 189-190). However, Cummings does not consider how direct and significant this correspondence is.

theme, topic, subject matter).[122] Furthermore, almost every one of Erasmus's methods of amplifying matter (*rationes locupletandi*) uses the exact same term used by Pseudo-Cicero, including *consequentia, descriptio, notatio, effictio, sermocinatio, divisio, exempla, similitudo, imago, contentio,* and *expolitio.* For others, Erasmus does not use the exact term, but uses phrases with similar meanings (*distributio: genera parteis*; *frequentatio/commemoratio: accumulatione*; *demonstratio:*

[122] Erasmus's use of the term *res* may be attributable to Cicero. As previously discussed, Cicero in his later *Partitiones oratoriae* divides all rhetoric (not just figures) into matter and language, *res et verba*:

> CICERO JUNIOR: In what do the speaker's personal resources consist?
> CICERO SENIOR: In matter and in language [*rebus et verbis*]. But both matter and language have to be found [*inventire*] and have to be arranged [*collocare*]– although the term 'invention' is used specially of the matter and 'style' of the language, but arrangement, though belonging to both, nevertheless is applied to invention. With delivery [*actio*] go voice, gesture, facial expression and general bearing, and all of these are in the keeping of memory [*memoria*]. (Cicero, *On the Orator: Book 3. On Fate. Stoic Paradoxes. Partitiones oratoriae,* trans. H. Rackham [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942], 1.3)

In Cicero's earlier *On the Ideal Orator,* however, Cicero uses the same terminology as Pseudo-Cicero, *verba et sententiae* (3.201; Latin from Loeb edition), though, as Cave notes, he does say "fullness [*copia*] of content [*rerum*] begets fullness of words [*verborum*]" more generally (3.125; Terence Cave, *The Cornucopian Text: Problems of Writing in the French Renaissance* [New York, NY: Clarendon, 1979], 6). While Knott suggests Quintilian is the source (Erasmus, *Opera Omnia,* 10), Quintilian barely uses *res*; rather he refers to *dianoia, mens, sensus,* and *sententiae* instead of *res* to refer to figures of thought (Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*, trans. Donald A. Russell [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002], 9.1.17). Quintilian does, however, briefly echo Cicero's *Partitiones oratoriae* 1.3 in *Institutio oratoria* 8.Pr.6: "That all speech consists of things and words [*rebus et verbis*]; the study of things is Invention, of words Elocution; Disposition is involved in both; the whole is retained by Memory and made acceptable by Delivery." For another suggestion that *res* is a broader concept than *sententiae*, consider Lorenzo Valla's chapter on *res* as the chief transcendental genus in *Dialectical Disputations* (*Retractatio totius Dialecticae cum fundamentis universae Philosophiae*) (Lorenzo Valla, *Dialectical Disputations*, vol. 1, trans. Brian P. Copenhaver and Lodi Nauta [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012], 1.13-37).

descriptio; *conformatio: prosopopoeia*). This means Erasmus only sets aside five figures of thought, two of which he moves to figures of style in *De copia verborum* (*deminutio, brevitas*) and three which he simply does not include (*licentia, ambiguitas, abscisio*) (see Figure 13).[123]

[123] The "figures of thought" frame is not present in Erasmus's earlier version of *De copia,* the "*Brevis de copia praecepta*" (c. 1499; Erasmus, "*Brevis de copia praeceptio*," in *Familiarium colloquiorum formula*e, *et alia qvaedem, per Des. Erasmum Roterodamvm* [Basel: Johann Froben, 1518], 64-74.e5r). However, the *Brevis* does include formulas for *comparatio, simile, exemplum, impossible,* and *contraria* (71-74).

Pseudo-Cicero's Figures of Thought	Erasmus's *Rationes locupletandi*
Distributio *Licentia* *Deminutio* *Descriptio* *Divisio* *Frequentatio* *Expolitio* *Commoratio* *Contentio* *Similitudo* *Exemplum* *Imago* *Effictio* *Notatio*[124] *Sermoncinatio* *Conformatio* *Significatio* *Exsuperatio* *Ambiguitas* *Consequentia* *Abscisio* *Similitudinum* *Brevitas* *Demonstratio*	Genus/Species (*genera, parteis*) Antecedents (*praecedentes*) Causes (*causa*) Results (*enumeratio comitatii vel consequentiae*) Description (*evidentia*) Description of a Thing (*hypotyposis, apodeixis*) Description of a Person (*prosopographia, notatio, effictio, sermocinatio*) Description of Place (*topographia*) Description of Time (*chronographia*) Digression (*egressio, digressio, excursus*) Epithets (*epithetis*) Circumstances (*circumstantiae*) Amplification (*amplificatio*) Headings (*propositiones, divisiones*) Accumulation of Proofs (*accumulatio probationum et argumentorum*) Commonplaces (*loci communes*) *Exempla* *Similitudo* *Imago* *Contentio* *Sententiae* *Expolitio* Apologues (*apologi*) Dreams (*somni*) Fictitious Narratives (*fictis narrationes*) Theological Allegories (*allegoriae theologicis*) Multiplication of Parts of Oration (Method 12)

Figure 13: Figures of Thought and *Rationes locupletandi*

[124] Knott (*Opera Omnia*, 209, note 302) recognizes that *notatio* occurs in both Pseudo-Cicero and Erasmus.

This "figures of thought" frame is significant to the study of *De copia* for at least two reasons. First, Erasmus seems to follow the Medieval line of thought that brings about the modes of dilation. As the medievalist George Englehardt noted, Erasmus's methods of amplification are reminiscent of modes found in the Medieval arts of preaching and poetry (and, I would add, the arts of letter-writing).[125] Take, for example, Geoffrey of Vinsauf's *Poetria nova* (c. 1200): in both his sections on amplification and figures of thought, Geoffrey turns to the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.[126] Erasmus was aware of Geoffrey and spoke highly of him.[127] However, while it is true that both rhetoricians consider the figures of thought to be amplificatory, Erasmus seems to go far beyond Geoffrey in his use of the figures of thought. Whereas Geoffrey only draws on a few figures of thought for amplification, Erasmus wholeheartedly adopts nearly all the figures of thought for amplification and sets them in a different order. Inasmuch as Erasmus draws more comprehensively from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* it is more likely that Geoffrey and Erasmus share the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* as a common source.[128] This common source explains

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[125] George John Englehardt, "Medieval Vestiges in the Rhetoric of Erasmus," *PMLA* 63, no. 2 (1948): 742, https://doi.org/10.2307/459441.

[126] For the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* as Geoffrey's source for figures of thought, see Margaret F. Nims, "Explanatory Notes," in *Geoffrey of Vinsauf:* Poetria nova, trans. Margaret F. Nims, revised by Martin Camargo [Toronto, CA: Pontifical Institute of Medieaval Studies, 2010], 88-91. Nims does not note the relationship of Geoffrey's modes of dilation to the figures of thought.

[127] Marjorie Curry Woods, *Classroom Commentaries: Teaching the* Poetria nova *across Medieval and Renaissance Europe* (Columbia, OH: The Ohio State Press, 2010), 262-263.

[128] Englehardt notes similarities between the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and the *progymnasmata* in relation to the Medieval poetic amplification methods ("Medieval," 741). However, he does not make a direct connection to Erasmus and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, nor to the second notebook. King and Rix broadly say that "Erasmus borrowed material from [the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*] for some of his

why both Geoffrey of Vinsauf and Erasmus use the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* to frame amplification.[129]

Second, this frame is significant because it apparently blurs distinctions between style and invention. This implicit equation may explain why Erasmus's chief commentator, Veltkirchius (Johann Toltz von Veltkirch, a friend of Philip Melanchthon, equates *copia rerum* with invention and dialectic on the one hand and with style on the other. As Veltkirchius puts it: "Copy [*copia*] of words is born from Grammar, copy of things is born from Dialectic; but Rhetoric brings its ornament of speech, and light to both."[130] In his introduction to the second notebook, Veltkirchius reiterates that *copia rerum* comes "from the Topical places of Dialectic."[131] He also repeatedly connects Erasmus's methods to dialectical topics. This is noteworthy because it is a departure from Erasmus, in that Erasmus himself only mentions *topoi*

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illustrations" and notes that the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* includes tropes under figures of words (*On Copia,* 4), but their comments on the *De copia* and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* stop there.

[129] Additionally, understanding that the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is the common source clarifies that this second notebook is probably not based on Rudolph Agricola's treatment of copia in *De inventione dialectica.* As Lisa Jardine explains, early on Erasmus would mention Agricola to ride on his coattails, but ultimately had little actual engagement with Agricola's works ("Inventing Rudolph Agricola: Recovery and Transmission of the *De inventione dialectica."* in *Erasmus, Man of Letters: The Construction of Charisma in Print* [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993], 83-98).

[130] As translated in Baldwin, *Shakespere's*, 176. M. Veltkirchius, *In D. Erasmi libros De duplici copia, verborum ac rerum, commentarius non minus vutlis quam eriditus M. Ventkirchii, oratoriae professoris in schola Wittengerbensi* (Paris: Chretien Wechel), 1539, Aiii.r: "*Verborum quidem Copia nascitur ex Grammatica: rerum Copia nascitur ex Dialectica: sed utrique; suum orationis ornatum & lumen adhert Rhetorica.*"

[131] Veltkirthius, *In D. Erasmi libros*, 63: "*Capita copiae Rerum descripta, quae quidem nascuntur prorsum ex locis Topicae Dialect. Ut infra sigilatium videbimus, et experiemur*."

in his section on accumulation of proofs.[132] However, Veltkirchius sees Erasmus's whole scheme, not just proofs, as inventional and dialectical. For example, in his introductions to the first two methods Veltkirchius associates the first method with "from whole to parts, from parts to whole, from sufficient division, and from remote parts" and the second method with "from antecedents" and "from adjoining accidents."[133] Such statements may explain why many scholars understand *copia rerum* as inventional.[134] However, as Christiansen notes in *Figuring Style*, Veltkirchius ultimately shows that Erasmus's methods are categorically figural rather than simply inventional.[135] As Veltkirchius puts it, "Others call them [i.e., schemes of thought] the proof of things [*argumenta rerum*] because by them not only is the body

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[132] Erasmus, *De copia*, 606.

[133] Veltkirthius, *In D. Erasmi libros*, 67: "*Estque haec vulgatissima ratio docendi in methodo: nascitur autem hoc caput primum ex locis Topicis Dialecticae, quos vocant a toto ad partes, a partibus ad totum, a sufficiente divisione, a remotione partium*" (67); "*Secundum caput Copiae rerum, est enumeratio antecendentium, quod prorsum nascitur ex loco Topices Dialectices qui vocatur ab antecedentibus, & item ex eo qui vocatur a communiter accidentibus*" (67).

[134] Renaissance rhetoricians influenced by Veltkirchius include Lucas Lossius, *Erotemata dialecticae et rhetorice Philppi Melanthonis, et praeceptionum Erasmi Roterodami, de utraque Copia Verborum & Rerum* (Frankfurt: Peter Braubach, 1550); Joannes Susenbrotus, *Epitome troporum ac schematum et Grammaticorum & Rhetorum* (Lyon: Joannes Frellonio, 1551); Juan Lorenzo Palmireno, *De arte dicendi libri tres* (Valencia: Pedro de Huete por Baltasar Simon, 1578); and Simon Verepaeus, *Praeceptiones de verborum et rerum copia* (Cologne: Gerwin Calenius & Johann Quentel, 1590). Modern scholars influenced by Veltkirchius include T. W. Baldwin (25); Donald King and H. David Rix (*On Copia*, 5); R. Hugh Schram, Jr. ("John of Garland and Erasmus on the Principle of Synonymy," *The University of Texas Studies in English* 30 [1951], 33, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20776027; Walter J. Ong (*Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* [Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958], 124); Terence Cave (*Cornucopian Text*, 18, 19); Thomas O. Sloane ("Schoolbooks and Rhetoric," 118); and Peter Mack (*A History of Renaissance Rhetoric*, 81-86). Veltkirthius, in turn, was likely influenced by Rudolph Agricola (for more on Agricola's influence, see below).

[135] See note 7 above.

of the speech increased, but also the body of the case. Such Erasmus considered in his second book, not separating the parts of causes, that is the arguments and the places of invention, from the schemes, that is the ornaments and the places [*locis*] of style."[136] According to Christiansen, by considering these methods as figures Veltkirchius shows the "malleability of the figure category" and suggests that "all the forms are figures and… figures are not specialized devices for an elevated, literary style but rather forms in general."[137] Veltkirchius does not directly recognize the Pseudo-Ciceronian figures of thought framework; however, Veltkirchius does recognize figures as a comprehensive way of thinking about the integration of invention and style.

While the importance of topical invention to *De copia* may be a later development, an expanded sense of figures is evident in the way Erasmus draws from Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* to flesh out each method of *copia rerum*. While Erasmus follows the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* for his overall scheme in *De copia*

[136] M. Veltkirchius, *D. Erasmi Roterodami De duplici copia verborum ac rerum commentarii duo* (London: Henry Middleton, 1573), 193v; as quoted in Nancy L. Christiansen, "Revisioning Stylistic Analysis and Renaissance *Elocutio*," *Style* 53, no. 2 (2019): 166-167, trans. Grant M. Boswell. See also Christiansen, *Figuring Style,* 64-65. The edition I am using is Veltkirthius, *In D. Erasmi libros*, 151: "*Alii nominant argumenta rerum, quod his non tantum orationis, sed & caussae corpus augeatur & increscat. Talia plaeraquem Eras. in hoc 2 commentario recensuit, hoc tamen modo, ut non admondum separarit partes causarum in argumenta & locos inventionis a schematibus, id est, ornamentis & locis elocutionis.*"

[137] Christiansen, "Refining" 166. Christiansen also notes that Philip Melanchthon in his *Elementorum rhetorices libri duo* (1532) considers the whole of *De copia* a book on figures which "'provide the greater abundance of circumstances'" (Mary Joan La Fontaine, "A Critical Translation of Philip Melanchthon's *Elementorum rhetorices libri duo*," Ph.D. diss., [University of Michigan, 1968], 262).

rerum, Erasmus rarely paraphrases Pseudo-Cicero for each section.[138] Rather, Erasmus draws more passages, examples, and paraphrases from Quintilian.[139] Importantly, Erasmus does not present this material in the same order that Quintilian does. Instead, Erasmus draws significant material from many parts of Quintilian's *Institutio*, not just his section on style. For example, Erasmus draws from Quintilian's discussions of *progymnasmata* (book 2), invention (books 3-6), and style (books 8-9) (see Figure 14). By drawing material from all over Quintilian's *Institutio* rather than just from the books on style, Erasmus shows not only that he is familiar with Quintilian but that he sees these methods of amplification as simultaneously inventional and stylistic. Quintilian's material adds inventional weight to the Pseudo-Ciceronian stylistic frame.

[138] However, Erasmus directly references the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* regarding *Notatio* (*De copia,* 583), *Sententia* (628), and *Expolitio* (630, 631).
[139] See Knott's notes in Erasmus, *Opera Omnia*.

Erasmus	Quintilian
Genus/Species (*genera, parteis*)	
Antecedents (*praecessere*)	
Causes (*causa*)	
Results (*enumeratione comitatii vel consequentiae*)	
Description (*evidentia*)	6.2.32; 4.2.63; 8.3.61, 62
Description of a Thing (*hypotyposis, apodeixis*)	9.2.40
Description of a Person (*prosopographia, notatio, effictio, sermocinatio*)	
Description of Place (*topographia*)	
Description of Time (*chronographia*)	4.3
Digression (*egressio, digressio, excursus*)	
Epithets (*epithetis*)	5.10.104
Circumstances (*circumstantiae*)	8.4
Amplification (*amplificatio*)	5.9, 10; 3.8; 4.4, 5
Headings (*propositiones, divisiones*)	5.1, 9, 10
Accumulation of Proofs (*accumulatione probationum et argumentorum*)	5.10.53
Commonplaces (*loci communes*)	5.9, 11
Exempla, Fabula	
Similitudo, Parabola	
Imago	2.4.20-21
Contentio	5.2.37
Sententiae	
Expolitio	5.11.17
Apologues (*apologis*)	
Dreams (*somnis*)	4.2.88
Fictitious Narratives (*fictis narrationibus*)	
Theological Allegories (*allegoriis theologicis*)	
Multiplication of Parts of Oration (Method 12)	

Figure 14: Erasmus's *Rationes* and Sources Passages in Quintilian

Framework 2: The Parts of an Oration

The second framework makes the connection between figures of thought and structural invention and arrangement clear. Erasmus's second frame are the parts of an oration.[140] This second frame brings these stylistic aspects of these amplification methods into explicit relationships with structural invention rather than topical invention.[141] For many of these amplification methods, Erasmus notes where the method would be found in a speech. The locations of these methods follow the traditional order of the parts of an oration and confirm that Erasmus is organizing the second notebook with this scheme. For example, Erasmus notes that the Description of Things, Description of Places, and Description of Times can each be used as introductions to narrations: "I think I should remind you that descriptions of this sort [of things] consist mainly in the exposition of circumstantial details, especially those which make the incident particularly vivid, and give the narrative [*narratio*] distinctiveness"; "[Description of Places] is a very common method of introducing a narrative [*narratio*]"; "[Description of Times] is often used to begin an account of events [*narratio*]."[142] Erasmus therefore conceptualizes each of these methods/figures

[140] Mack briefly suggests that Erasmus's "book 2 includes material from the *progymnasmata* and from the parts of the oration" (*A History* 81). My analysis expands on this observation, showing that the second notebook not only includes this material but is organized with this material in mind.

[141] If Erasmus had used the topics to organize the figures of thought, he would likely have used an order similar to Cicero's (*Loci Interni:* Definition, Enumeration of Parts, Etymology, Conjugates*; Loci Externi:* Genus, Species, Similitude, Differentia, Contrary, Adjunct, Antecedents, Consequents, Repugnants, Cause, Effect, Comparison, Authority). See Cicero, *Topica*, in *On Invention. The Best Kind of Orator. Topics*, trans. H.M. Hubbell (London, GB: William Hienemann, 1949), II-III. Seeing as Erasmus does not follow this order, Erasmus clearly has a different scheme in mind.

[142] Erasmus, *De copia*, 579, 587, 588.

(*hypotyposis*, *topographia*, *chronographia*) as passages that can be found in the Narration section of an oration. Later, Erasmus connects Headings (*propositiones*) with division (*divisio*): "These main propositions are quite often advanced in the division, by which I mean the section of the speech immediately before we step off into the argument, where we set out in general terms what we are going to say, and in what order."[143] The next amplification method, which takes up the bulk of the second notebook, is fittingly "the accumulation of proofs and arguments" ("The Greek word for these is *πίστεις*"), the function of next part on the list.[144] Through this second frame, it is evident that Erasmus reorders Pseudo-Cicero's figures of thought so that they follow the parts of an oration order (see Figure 15). And these figures/methods are each fleshed out using Quintilian's teachings on invention, arrangement, and style.

[143] Erasmus, *De copia*, 604.
[144] Erasmus, *De copia*, 605.

Pseudo-Cicero's Figures of Thought	Erasmus's *Rationes*	Parts of an Oration
Distributio *Licentia* *Deminutio* *Descriptio* *Divisio* *Frequentatio* *Expolitio* *Commoratio* *Contentio* *Similitudo* *Exemplum* *Imago* *Effictio* *Notatio* *Sermoncinatio* *Conformatio* *Significatio* *Exsuperatio* *Ambiguitas* *Consequentia* *Abscisio* *Similitudinum* *Brevitas* *Demonstratio*	Genus/Species (*genera, parteis*) Antecedents (*praecedentes*) Causes (*causa*) Results (*enumeratio comitatii vel consequentiae*) Description (*evidentia*) Description of a Thing (*hypotyposis, apodeixis*) Description of a Person (*prosopographia, notatio, effictio, sermocinatio*) Description of Place (*topographia*) Description of Time (*chronographia*) Digression (*egressio, digressio, excursus*) Epithets (*epithetis*) Circumstances (*circumstantiae*) Amplification (*amplificatio*) Headings (*propositiones, divisiones*) Accumulation of Proofs (*accumulatio probationum et argumentorum*) Commonplaces (*loci communes*) *Exempla* *Similitudo* *Imago* *Contentio* *Sententiae* *Expolitio* Apologues (*apologi*) Dreams (*somns*) Fictitious Narratives (*fictis narrationes*) Theological Allegories (*allegorae theologicis*) Multiplication of Parts of Oration (Method 12)	Narration Narration Narration Digression Division Proof

Figure 15: Erasmus's Combined Frameworks for the *De copia rerum*

Like the "figures of thought" frame, the "parts of an oration" frame has precedent in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Cicero's *De inventione,* both of which feature structural invention. In both of these rhetorics, invention is a matter of developing each part of an oration—with statis theory, types of cases, and even topics theory embedded in that framework. Pseudo-Cicero, in particular, also correlates the figures of thought with the parts of an oration. However, unlike Erasmus, Pseudo-Cicero primarily connects the figures of thought to the Proof and Conclusion of a speech, rather than each part of the speech. For example, he writes that *Descriptio* can bring "either indignation (*indignatio*) or pity (*misericordia*)," both of which are functions of a Conclusion.[145] *Expolitio*, too, can be used "when we embellish argumentation (*exornabimus argumentationem*), which I discussed in Book II," that is, within an epicheireme, within a Confirmation, within a speech.[146] *Conformatio* "is most useful in the divisions under Amplification (*amplificatio*) and in Appeal to Pity (*commiseratio*)"—again, sub-parts of a Conclusion.[147] Again and again, figures seem to cluster near the Conclusion of a speech. Figures, of course, can be applied elsewhere in a speech: as Pseudo-Cicero says of *Commoratio*: "this topic (*locus*) is not isolated from the whole cause like some limb, but like blood is spread through the whole body of the discourse."[148] But Pseudo-Cicero is not as wide-ranging as Erasmus on this point.

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[145] [Cicero], *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* trans. Harry Caplan (London, GB: Harvard University Press, 1999]), IV.39.51.
[146] [Cicero], *Rhetorica,* IV.44.57.
[147] [Cicero], *Rhetorica,* IV.54.66.
[148] [Cicero], *Rhetorica,* IV.45.58.

To better understand why Erasmus applies these figures of thought across all the parts of an oration, we can look to Stephanus Fliscus's *Sententiarum variationes, seu Synonyma* (1475/1477), one of the first Italian letter-writing handbooks to cross the Alps.[149] Scholars agree that Erasmus was familiar with Fliscus.[150] In fact, Erasmus clearly lists Fliscus as one of the contemporary *synonyma* writers he aims to surpass.[151] Fliscus, a student of renowned pedagogue Gasparino Barzizza of Bergamo, opens his collection of variations by distinguishing synonyms (variations) of words (*verba*) and of thoughts *(sententiae*).[152] As scholars have recognized, Fliscus

[149] Stefano Fieschi of Soncino. Albrecht von Eyb includes Fliscus' text together with Barzizza's *De eloquentia opusculum perutile* in his *Margarita poetica* (1472), first printed in Nuremberg. In that text, *De eloquentia* seems to correspond to *copia verborum* and the *Sententiarum variationes* seems to correspond to *copia rerum.* The first print editions under Fliscus' name (1475) come from Augsburg and Cologne. See Green and Murphy, *Short-Title*, 194, 203-204. Other early letter-writing texts moving north include Agostino Dati's *Elegantiolae* (1470, Cologne; Green and Murphy, *Short-Title,* 157) and Niccolò Perotti's *Rudimenta grammatices* (1479, Paris; see Green and Murphy, *Short-Title,* 336).

[150] Cave, *Cornucopian Text*, 11; Knott, *Opera*, 10; Gideon Burton, "From *Ars dictaminis* to *Ars conscribendi epistolis:* Renaissance Letter-Writing Manuals in the Context of Humanism," in *Letter-Writing Manuals and Instruction from Antiquity to the Present: Historical and Bibliographic Studies,* ed. Carol Poster and Linda C. Mitchell (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2007), 94-95. Brian Cummings ("Encyclopaedic Erasmus," *Renaissance Studies* 28, no. 2 [2014], 190) and Ann Moss (*Printed Commonplace-Books and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought* [Clarendon, 1996], 107) also recognize generally that Erasmus is connecting to the *synonyma* tradition, but does not center the connection to Fliscus.

[151] Erasmus, *De copia*, 285: "Nor am I disposed to mention authors like Isidore or Marius or Philiscus, who are at so many removes from *copia* that they are unable to express their thoughts in good Latin even once."

[152] Stefano Fieschi. *Sententiarum variationes seu Synonyma* (Perugia: Robertus Anglicus, 1477), A2r: "*Cum superiora verborum synonyma tibi breviter absoluissem, mihi in mentem venit, ut aliquas etiam tibi variationes inscriberem: quas profecto variationes sentenciarum synonyma non indecenter appellari licet*."

then organizes his synonyms of thought by the parts of an oration framework.[153] Fliscus directly references this framework, noting that synonyms of thoughts can

> either go with the contiguous parts of a rhetorical oration and with many of the arguments, so that they would strongly draw together and engage the same exaggerating and corroborating. Which variations, as those more suitable and more appropriate fit among the parts of invention, it seems to me, I arranged under those parts.[154]

In Albrecht von Eyb's version of *Sententiarum variationes* in his *Praecepta artis rhetoricae* (1488), this last sentence is even more explicit: "Which variations, both conveniently and more fittingly you may indeed be able to invent, are Exordium, Narration, Division, Confirmation, Confutation, Conclusion."[155] Inasmuch as Erasmus generally draws on Fliscus, and this specific framework for variations is clearly found in Fliscus's discussion on varying thought, there is a high probability that Erasmus's framework is no accident, but is the same framework found in Fliscus, a framework that uses the Ciceronian parts of an oration to organize variations (or, in Erasmus's case, methods of creating variations).[156]

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[153] Judith Rice Henderson, "On Reading the Rhetoric of the Renaissance Letter," *Renaissance-Rhetorik/Renaissance Rhetoric,* ed. Heinrich F. Plett (Boston, MA: De Gruyter, 2012), 152; Mack, *A History,* 232.

[154] Fieschi, *Sententiarum,* A2r: "*Quae vel ad coniungendas partes rhetorice oratonis, et argumentationis plurimum vaterent: ut ad easdem exagerendas et corrobrandas admodum conducerent et expedirent. Quas variationes ut commodius et condecentius eas in inventionis partibus convenire mihi visum est sub ipsis partibus ordinavi.*"

[155] Albrecht von Eyb, *Aeneae Silvii Senensis, praecepta artis rhetoricae,* Basel: Johann Amerbach, 1488, A2r: "*Quas quidem variationes et commodius et condecentius eas invenire possis quae sunt Exordium, Narratio, Divisio, Confirmatio, Confutatio, Conclusio*"

[156] See Burton, "Renaissance Letter-Writing Manuals," 94-95 for a comparison of Fliscus's and Erasmus's approaches to *variationes*. Because Burton works with Eyb's

As noted above, many Renaissance rhetoricians (and modern historians of rhetoric) tend to follow Veltkirchius's *De copia* commentary that focuses on the relationships between *copia rerum* and invention. [157] However, there is at least one Renaissance rhetorician who explicitly recognizes that the second notebook is also organized around the parts of an oration. Possibly because of censorship of Erasmus's works in Spain, the monk Miguel de Salinas includes a digest of *De copia* embedded in his *Rhetorica en lengua castellana* (1541).[158] In this digest, Salinas directly invokes the parts of an oration frame: "He who wishes to be abundant may dilate the parts of the oration by the forms that follow."[159] Salinas begins with the Exordium,

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version that was attributed to Enea Silvio Piccolomini (Pope Pius II), Burton refers to Piccolomini. Eyb served as Pope Pius's chamberlain in the 1450s.

[157] Possibly following Cicero's *Partitiones oratoriae* or the *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* Veltkirchius subordinates arrangement to invention (Veltkirchius, *D. Erasmi*, 193v-193r, as quoted and translated in Christiansen, *Figuring Style* 60): "'The nineteenth chapter of the *De copia* has to do with the multiplication of the parts of the oration, and although this chapter is chiefly one of invention and not of style, you plainly see that Erasmus does not entirely separate the parts of invention in this commentary from the parts and figures of style, since both pertain equally to the knowledge and copiousness of rhetorical speech.'" Veltkirthius, *In D. Erasmi libros,* 147-148: "*Decimumnonum caput Copiae rerum est multiplicatio partium orationis Rhetoricae, et cum hoc caput praecipuum sit inventionis no elocutionis, plane vides Eras. non admodum separare in hoc commentario partes inventionis a partibus figurisque; elocutionis, cum utraque ex aequo pertineat ad scientiam copiaque; rerum, ut saepissime iam dictum est.*" Miguel de Salinas also subordinates arrangement to invention (*Rhetorica en lengua castellana: en la qual se pone muy en breve lo necessario para saber bien hablar y escrivir.* [Alcalá de Henares: Juan de Brocar, 1541], fol. lxxvi): "Invention has six parts: exordium, narration, division, confirmation, refutation, conclusion." "*La invencion tiene seys partes. Exordio/narracion/division/confirmacion/confutacion/conclusion.*"

[158] For more on Miguel de Salinas, see King and Rix, *On Copia*, 3, and Mack, *A History,* 301.

[159] Miguel de Salinas, *Rhetorica,* fol. lxxxviii.v. My translation. "*El que quisiere ser abundoso dilatara las partes de la oracion por las formas que se sigue.*" There is a Spanish critical edition by Encarnación Sánchez García (Miguel de Salinas, Rhetorica en lengua castellana*: Edición, introducción, y notas*, ed. Encarnación Sánchez García,

then moves to the Narration: "The Narration allows more dilation in many ways."[160] Salinas includes Erasmus's Methods 1-6 and 8 under Narration (fol. Lxxxix.r-fol. xci.r): "These seven methods of dilation belong to the Narration."[161] After this, Digression can be "in the Confirmation"; and, skipping Epithet and Amplification, Salinas notes that Headings can come "at the end of the Narration or at the beginning of the Confirmation."[162] Then comes the methods of amplifying Confirmation: "Now we may come to the method of dilation that belongs to the part of invention that follows after the Division, which is the Confirmation."[163] Here, Salinas reviews most of the methods of developing *exempla* from Method 11.[164] Then, he wraps up this section with a note that these methods can be applied in other parts of the oration: "And with this I conclude the methods of dilation that seem to pertain to the Confirmation and Refutation. However, these and the other demonstrated methods might be used in other parts."[165] Salinas then applies Method 9 (Amplification) to the Conclusion, noting that he has already discussed Amplification in his treatment of the

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[Napoli, IT: L'Orientale Editrice, 1999]). Sánchez García, however, does not take note of this framing.

[160] Miguel de Salinas, *Rhetorica,* fol. lxxxix.r: "*En la narracion se sufre mas dilatar por muchas maneras.*"

[161] Miguel de Salinas, *Rhetorica,* fol. xci.r: "*Estas siete maneras de dilatar pertenescen a la narracion*."

[162] Miguel de Salinas, *Rhetorica,* fol. xci.v: "*Algunos no ponen la division por parte de la invencion / mas antes la incluyen en la confirmacion. Otros ya que la pongan hazen la proposicion fin de la narracion o principio de la confirmacion.*"

[163] Miguel de Salinas, *Rhetorica,* fol. xciiii.v: "*Agora vengamos a la manera de dilatar que paresce pertenescer a la divsion que es la confirmacion*."

[164] Miguel de Salinas, *Rhetorica,* fol. xcv.r-fol. cii.v.

[165] Miguel de Salinas, *Rhetorica,* fol. cii.v: "*Y con esto concluyo las maneras de dilatar que parescen pertenescer a la confirmacion y confutacion: no embargante que estas y las demas señaladas a cierta parte pueden servir a otras*."

Amplification part of the speech elsewhere in his handbook.[166] Last, he saves Method 7 (Epithets) to the end and states that Epithets can be applied anywhere in the speech.[167] In these many instances, Salinas recognizes that *De copia* is organized around the parts of an oration. Whereas Erasmus suggests the structure as he comments on each method of amplification, Salinas explicitly groups these methods by the part of an oration they might be found under. In this way, Salinas further confirms that Erasmus is using this framework for the second notebook.

Attention to these methods not only as figures of thought but also as parts of an oration highlights the ways that Erasmus also follows the spirit of the *progymnasmata*, recognizing that the *rationes locupletandi* can comprise whole passages. As Nicolaus the Sophist explains, "Some *progymnasmata* are parts, some are wholes and parts; those are parts that are always found as parts of other hypotheses [speeches]; those are parts and wholes that are sometimes worked in as parts of something else, sometimes themselves make up a whole theme."[168] While he did not have access to Nicolaus the Sophist's *progymnasmata*, Erasmus certainly has

[166] Miguel de Salinas, *Rhetorica,* fol. cii.v-ciii.r: "*A la conclusion se referira la manera de dilatar por amplificacion. . . . Las maneras de amplificar estan puestas en la rhetorica passada hablando de la conclusion: y porque alli se pueden ver no es menester dezir aqui mas*."

[167] Miguel de Salinas, *Rhetorica,* fol. ciii.r: "*La postrera manera de dilatar que mas aun que ninguna de las dichas se pudiera poner sin diferencia en cualquier parte de la rhetorica es por Epitheto*." It will be noted that Epithets do seem out of place, or at least repeats material from the the first notebook (Mack, *Renaissance Argument* 308; see also *A History* 85). This may be why Salinas ultimately saves Epithets for the end.

[168] "The *Preliminary Exercises* of Nicolaus the Sophist," trans. George A. Kennedy, in *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Leiden, NL: Brill, 2003), 139.

this principle in mind.[169] For example, Erasmus notes various topics for a Description of Time such as descriptions of "peace, war, sedition, party strife. . . . should be dealt with separately on occasion as an exercise for our ingenuity, but a complete description contains the all."[170] Like a *progymnasmata* exercise, a Description exercise can be performed as smaller compositions or as segments of larger compositions. Speaking of *Expolitio*, Erasmus describes individual parts for an exercise: "A complete 'elaboration' [*expolitio*] contains seven parts: statement, reason, rephrasing the statement (to which one can add the reason restated), statement from the contrary, comparison, illustrative example, conclusion."[171] These parts are directly from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium.*[172] If *expolitio* was simply a microstructure—like many figures of thought seem to be— it could not reasonably contain all these parts; but a *progymnasmata*-like exercise, a mesostructure applicable at the level of a passage or even a whole discourse, could. Another example is Erasmus's emphasis on providing introductions and conclusions for individual

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[169] Caplan recognizes the relationship between *Expolitio* and *Chreia* ([Cicero], *Rhetorica*, 365 note C) and between *Conformatio* and *Prosopopoeia* (398 note A). In his introduction to the *Progymnasmata,* Kennedy also notes some similarities (George A.. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric,* [Leiden, NL: Brill, 2003], xi). Other figures of thought in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* that are *progymnasmata*-like include *Descriptio* (*Hypotyposis*), *Similitudo* (*Synchrisis*), and *Demonstratio* (*Ekphrasis*). In addition to the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, Erasmus certainly had other *progymnasmata* available—including Quintilian's, Priscian's, and possibly Aphthonius's (see Green and Murphy, *Short-Title*, 27 for available editions of Aphthonius). However, Erasmus primarily seems to follow the *Rhetorica ad Herennium.*

[170] Erasmus, *De copia*, 588.

[171] Erasmus, *De copia*, 630.

[172] [Cicero], *Rhetorica*, IV.43.56: "after having expressed the theme simply, we can subjoin the Reason, and then express the theme in another form, with or without the Reasons; next we can present the Contrary. . .; then a Comparison and an Example. . . and finally the Conclusion."

modules. “If any proposition seems rather difficult to swallow,” Erasmus notes, “one will have to prepare the way for it with a little introductory section.”[173] This “little introductory section” acts as an Exordium for a smaller segment of an argument. And at the end of the segment there can be a Conclusion: “Each summarizing section can be enriched by its own epilogue.”[174] In this regard, Erasmus seems to be thinking of passages of discourse as modules that can be composed separately but that can also be aggregated. Principles that apply at the level of the whole discourse, the whole oration, can be applied on a small scale as well.

Reception and Influence of Erasmus’s Frameworks

According to Mack, *De copia* was the most popular Renaissance rhetorical handbook, with more than 169 printings between 1490 to 1620, compared to 147 printings of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* 145 printings of the *Partitiones oratoriae*, and only 71 printings of Aristotle’s *Ars rhetorica.*[175] *De copia*, of course, was not the only popular Renaissance rhetorical handbook on the market, and was influential in some areas more than others. So far, I have referenced Veltikirchius’s commentary and Salinas’s paraphrase to confirm that Erasmus’s methods of amplification are organized according to the Pseudo-Ciceronian figures of thought and the traditional parts of an oration. In what follows, I will consider how other Renaissance rhetoricians implicitly follow Erasmus by integrating the figures of thought and the parts of an oration. By combining the figures of thought and the parts of an oration in

[173] Erasmus, *De copia*, 652.
[174] Erasmus, *De copia*, 653.
[175] Mack, *A History*, 31.

these ways, Renaissance rhetoricians continue to combine style with structural invention.

Figures of Thought Ordered by the Parts of an Oration

At first glance, most lists of figures seem to have been thrown together haphazardly. To some extent, we can clearly distinguish the extent to which any given Renaissance rhetorician draws on the likes of Pseudo-Cicero, Cicero, Quintilian, or Hermogenes for their list. Beyond source criticism, however, we are still left with a great variety of lists. Faced with these lists, Renaissance rhetoricians have a choice to make: leave the list as is or modify the list according to some alternative organizing scheme. As Jeanne Fahnestock suggests, "as a byproduct of their close scrutiny" of the figures, Renaissance theorists "began to organize and rationalize them in different ways."[176] Sometimes, these organizing schemes are inscrutable. Other times, as we see with Erasmus, we can discern and interpret these schemes.

Like Erasmus's *De copia*, Omer Talon's Ramist *Rhetorica* (1548) is another noteworthy example of organizing the figures of thought according to the parts of an oration scheme. Talon derives his list of figures from Quintilian (see Figure 16); however, unlike Quintilian, Talon divides his list of figures of thought into four groups: petition and response, fiction, separation, and amplification.[177] Figures of

[176] Jeanne Fahnestock, *Rhetorical Figures in Science* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 12.
[177] Omer Talon, *Rhetorica* (Lyon: Thibaud Payen, 1553), 19: "*Genera eius quatuor distingui quodammodo possunt: Primum in petitione aut responsione: Secundum in fictione: Tertium in abruptione: Quartum in amplificatione.*"

petition include *optatio, deprecatio, addubitatio,* and *communicatio*; figures of response include *permissio* and *concessio,* as well as *subjectio* and *prolepsis*; figures of fiction (*fictio*) include *prosopopoeia* and *praeteritio*; figures of separation include *digressio* (long and short)*, aversio, reticentia (aposiopesis*), and *correctio*; and figures of amplification include *exclamatio, sustentatio,* and *licentia*.[178] Significantly, each of these categories seems to correspond with a part of an oration or letter: figures of petition and response correspond to the Exordium, figures of fiction to the Narration, figures of separation to the Confirmation or Petition, and figures of amplification to the Conclusion. This order of the figures of thought suggests that, while Talon reduces the total number of figures, he recognizes the parts of an oration framework as fundamental.

[178] Talon, *Rhetorica*, 20-38.

Quintilian	Talon	Parts of Oration/Letter imposed by Talon
Interrogatio *Dissimulatio* *Prolepsis* *Dubitatio* *Communicatio*	*Optatio* *Deprecatio* *Dubitatio* *Communicatio*	Petition
Sustentatio *Permissio* *Exclamatio* *Licentia*	*Permissio* *Concessio* *Subjectio* *Prolepsis*	Response
Prosopopoeia *Sermocinatio* *Apostrophe* *Hypotyposis* *Topographia* *Dissimulatio* *Antiphrasis* *Confessio* *Concessio* *Consensio*	*Prosopopoeia* *Praeteritio*	Fiction (Narration)
Aposiopesis *Digressio* *Praecisa* *Ethopoeia* *Emphasis* *Comparatio*	*Digressio* *Aversio* *Aposiopesis* *Correctio*	Separation (Proof)
	Exclamatio *Sustentatio* *Licentia*	Amplification (Conclusion)

Figure 16: Figures of Thought in Quintilian and Talon

Cypriano Soarez, a Spanish Jesuit in Portugal, takes Talon's outline and adds the figures of thought back into that scheme.[179] While he adds many figures back into the list, he maintains the parts of an oration framework. In his popular *De arte rhetorica libri tres* (1562/1568), Soarez does not explicitly divide his figures of thought into four categories as Talon does. However, Soarez's list broadly adds to each of the four categories using other figures from Quintilian.[180] For what would ostensibly be figures of petition and response that might serve to render an audience or reader attentive, well-disposed, and receptive, Soarez has *interrogatio, responsio, subjectio, prólepsis, correctio, dubitatio,* and *communicatio.*[181] These are followed by figures that are all narrativistic: *prosopopoeia, apostrophe, hypotyposis, aposiopesis, ethopoeia, emphasis, sustentatio,* and *praeteritio.*[182] The next possible group all seem to be more clearly matters of proof and petition rather than "separation": *licentia, concessio, parenthesis, ironia, distributio*.[183] And the last possible group seem to correspond to a conclusion: *permissio, deprecatio, execratio, epiphonema,* and

[179] For more on Ramism in Spain, see Luisa López-Grigera, "An Introduction to the Study of Rhetoric in 16th Century Spain," *Dispositio* 8, no. 22/23 (1983), 7-8, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41491633; and Jorge Fernández López, "Rhetorical Theory in Sixteenth-Century Spain: A Critical Survey," *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 20, no. 2 (2002), 143-144, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/rh.2002.20.2.133.
[180] Fellow Jesuit Pedro Juan Pepinyá perhaps overlooks the Ramist reorganization of the figures of thought because Soarez uses Quintilian. See Pedro Juan Pepinyá, "How to Teach Children Latin and Greek (1565)," in *Jesuit Pedagogy, 1540-1616: A Reader,* ed. Cristiano Casalini and Claude Pavur (Chestnut Hill, MA: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2016), 248-249.
[181] Lawrence J. Flynn, "The *De Arte Rhetorica* (1568) by Cyprian Soarez, S.J.: A Translation with Introduction and Notes," Ph.D. diss., (University of Florida, 1955), 336-343.
[182] Soarez, *De arte,* 343-350.
[183] Soarez, *De arte,* 350-356.

exclamatio.[184] Soarez adds to Talon's list, all the while keeping the same parts of oration scheme– a testimony to the persistence of the association of structural invention with style.[185]

While he does not use the same figures of thought list, the preceptor Johannes Sturm also uses the parts of the oration as a framework for organizing his figures of thought. In Book I of his *De universa ratione elocutionis rhetoricae* (1576), Sturm turns back to the Greek concept of *ideai.* In his definition of style, Sturm equates *ideai* with utterances, forms, figures, modes, and genres: "And this is style, the form either of utterance or sentence, and the same is either spoken or uttered; which for this reason is called the kinds of form, and even in the example of Plato is called *idea. . . .* But inasmuch as each of these are style, either speaking or form, or figure, or mode, then genre or proper virtue (what word even Aristotle called the kinds of speaking) are distinguished."[186] Thus conceived, Sturm combines Hermogenes' *On Types of*

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[184] Soarez, *De arte,* 356-359.

[185] For other uptakes of Talon's order and categories, particularly in Spain, see Francisco de Castro, *De Arte Rhetorica. Dialogi Quatuor* (Seville: Francisco de Lyra, 1625), 153-172) and Francisco Joseph Artiga, *Epitome de la eloquencia española. Arte de discurrir y bablar con agudeza, y elegancia en todo genero de sumptos, de orar, predicar, conversar, coponer embasadas, cartas y recados* (Huesca: José Lorenzo de Larumbe, 1692), 286-287.

[186] Johannes Sturm, *De universa ratione elocutionis rhetoricae* (Kraków: Bernhard Jobin, 1576), A.r: "*Est autem elocutio, forma sive sermonis, sive orationis, et ipsum sive loquendi, sive dicendi genus.quod idcirco etiam γένος τόν λόγος, καὶ εἶδος dicitur, atque etiam Platonis exemplo ἰδέα est nuncupata. Quo nomine Hermogenes est mexime delectatus: qui se Demosthenis putat dicendi formam expressisse. Sed quoniam omnis elocutio, dicendi sive forma, sive figura, sive modo, aut genere, sive propria virtute (quo verbo Aristotles setiam vocat dicendi genus) cernitur*." See also Christiansen, *Figuring Style* 65. Pedro Juan Núñez, another proponent of Hermogenes, also combines *idea* with *sententia*: "*Elocutio igitur in duas disputationesa [sic] nobis dividitur: unam de figuris, alteram de ideis*" (Pedro Juan Núñez*, Institutionum rhetoricarum libri quinque* [Barcelona: Sebastian de Cormellas, 1593], 257).

Style (a collection of *ideai*) with the figures of thought (chapters 6-42). While the combination of the *ideai* and the figures of thought is remarkable on its own, it is also noteworthy that Sturm changes Hermogenes's order of *ideai.* The Hermogenean order is: Clarity (Purity, Distinctness); Dignity / Grandeur (Solemnity, Asperity, Vehemence, Brilliance, Florescence, Abundance / Fullness); Carefulness / Beauty, Rapidity; Character (Simplicity, Sweetness, Subtlety, Modesty); Sincerity; Indignation; and Force.[187] The Sturmian order, however, is: Purity, Solemnity, Brilliance, Simplicity, Sweetness, Modesty, Dignity, Vehemence, Asperity, Rapidity, Sincerity, and Force. Like Erasmus's reordering, this reordering is purposeful: Sturm rearranged *ideai* are in the order of the parts of an oration. There are three textual indications that confirm this point. First, there is a juncture at chapter 9 (*De sententiis, orationis conductae*) where Sturm shifts from the *idea* of Dignity to the *idea* of Character, which may also be interpreted as a shift within an Exordium or between an Exordium and a Narration.[188] Second, there is a juncture at chapter 18 (*De multiplici ratione affirmandi, et affeverandi*) that shifts from the *idea* of Character to *ideai* and figures of thought that are all ostensibly forms of argumentation that correspond to Proof.[189] And third, around chapter 29 (*De Paramythia, In Methodo Deinotetos*), there is a shift from argumentative forms back to amplificatory and narrativistic forms that seems to correspond with a Digression and Conclusion (see Figure 17).[190] This section is the followed by figures of amplification (chapters 30 to 35), *energeia*

[187] Hermogenes. *Hermogenes'* On Types of Style. Trans. Cecil W. Wooten (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1987.
[188] Sturm, *De universa,* 19.
[189] Sturm, *De universa,* 48.
[190] Sturm, *De universa,* 109.

(chapter 36), *prosopopoeia* (chapter 37), *prosopographia* (chapter 38), *ethopoeia* (chapter 39), and forms of argumentation (chapters 40 to 42). Like Erasmus, Sturm develops a rhetoric organized not so much by separate canons of rhetoric as by a blend of these canons. In fact, when he turns to prosody (*compositio*) in Book III, Sturm cycles back through the *ideai* with attention to the rhythmic elements of these patterns. After discussing Subtlety and decorum, Sturm turns to thinking explicitly about the parts of an oration within *compositio* in chapter 28, *De partibus orationis*, before discussing Brilliance and Florescence .[191]

[191] Sturm, *De universa,* 789.

Hermogenes	Sturm	Parts of an Oration
Clarity	Purity	Exordium
Purity	Solemnity	
Distinctness	Brilliance, Dignity	
Dignity, Grandeur	*De sententiis, orationis conductae*	Narration
Solemnity	Simplicity	
Asperity	Sweetness	
Vehemence	Modesty	
Brilliance	Irony	
Florescence	Gnome	
Abundance,	Method	
Fullness	*Parrhesia* (Free Speech)	
Carefulness, Beauty	*De multiplici ratione affirmandi, et*	Proof
Rapidity	*affeverandi*	
Character	*Anastrophe*	
Simplicity	Rapidity	
Sweetness	*Confessio*	
Subtlety	*Apostrophe*	
Modesty	Sincerity	
Sincerity	*Interrogatio*	
Indignation	*Responsio, Subjectio, Conglobatio*	
Force	*Occupatio*	
	Paramythia	
	Force	Digression,
	Diachresis	Conclusion
	Conglobatio	
	Congeries	
	Ratiocinatio	
	Enumeratio	
	Energia	
	Prosopopoeia	
	Prosopographia	
	Ethopoeia, Dialogismos	
	Dilemma	
	Enumeratio per remotionem	
	Frequentatio	
	Similitudo	
	Example	

Figure 17: Figures of Thought in Sturm's *De universa*

While Erasmus is rarely cited for reordering the figures of thought and expanding their scope, Talon, Soarez, and Sturm show that the parts of an oration framework proved attractive and influential. By organizing the figures of thought in these ways, these rhetoricians suggest not only a potential tool for memorizing these lists, but also imply that the parts of an oration are figures and figures can in turn comprise larger units of discourse.

Figures of Thought Ordered by the Topics

There are, of course, many other Renaissance rhetoricians who do not follow this order. Many rhetoricians turn to classical sources for their figures of thought order or come up with other schemes that remain unidentified. Some other identifiable frameworks are drawn from Rudolph Agricola's *De inventione dialectica* (1515/1539). Notably, Agricola treats amplification and *copia* separately. Agricola's theory of dialectic encompasses the rhetorical ends of teaching, moving, and pleasing. In this scheme, Agricola makes amplification a matter of moving an audience and *copia* a matter of pleasing an audience (forms of affective amplification).[192] This is clearly not the same framework that Erasmus uses. Agricola does not go into much detail about amplification and pleasing; however, Agricola's intellectual descendants

[192] Rudolphus Agricola, *De inventione dialectica libri omnes et integri* (Alardus Amstelredamus, ed. Cologne: Johann Gymnich, 1539), 386. See Mack, *Renaissance Argument,* 203-226.

do expand on this point.[193] Agricola does suggest, though, that topical invention applies to amplification and *copia*.[194]

Philip Melanchthon's *Elementa rhetorices* (1531/1542) is an example of building on Agricola's teachings on amplification, *copia*, and topics theory.[195] Here, Melanchthon treats amplification as a matter of style and combines the figures of thought with amplification and topics theory rather than with structural invention, an Agricolan rather than an Erasmian choice. Right after discussing figures of grammar and figures of thought (including the Quintilianesque *interrogatio, subjectio, exclamatio, dubitatio, paradox, asyndeton, communicatio, permissio, paeteritio, aversio, licentia*), Melanchthon then treats figures of amplification separately, with a nod to Erasmus.[196] Because Erasmus's *De copia* is available, though, Melanchthon writes that he will brief.[197] He also notes that these figures come from dialectical topics, and groups figures according to the topics, rather than according to the parts of an oration.[198] The first method of amplification Melanchthon lists is a form of thetic amplification ("to transfer the hypothesis to the thesis, that is, to transfer the cause to

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[193] Agricola, *De inventione,* 401-402. See Mack, *Renaissance Argument,* 307-309.
[194] Agricola, *De inventione*, 400: "*Copia vero et brevitas in dicendo, quoniam praesertim istis inter caetera delectamus et offendimus, constantque etiam inventione ista, no alienum videtur ab institutio nostro, paucis de his dicere.*"
[195] For the 1531 date, see William P. Weaver, "*Triplex est copia*: Philip Melanchthon's Invention of the Rhetorical Figures," *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 29, no. 4 (2011), 370 note 13.
[196] For a note on Melanchthon's division of figures of thought from those of amplification, see Fahnestock, *Rhetorical Figures in Science,* 12.
[197] Melanchthon, *Elementorum,* 263. It is also important to recognize that Melanchthon had considered another way of dividing *copia* in his earlier rhetoric. See Weaver, "*Triplex est copia*," 370-371.
[198] Melanchthon, *Elementorum,* 263. The connection between these figures and the topics has also been noted by Jeanne Fahnestock, "Rhetorical Stylistics," *Language and Literature* 14, no. 3 (2005), 226.

the commonplace").[199] His next method encompasses forms of Definition, including *similia, tapeinosis, interpretatio, synonymia, expolitio.*[200] Then follows types of Division (*distributio*), including *dialysis, congeries,* and *incrementum.*[201] For Cause (*aetiologia*), he has *dicaeologia, anagkai, translatio, color, calumnia,* and *gradatio.*[202] For Contraries (*contentio*), *antithesis, antimetabole, inversio, communicatio, correctio, rejectio, occupatio, concessio, paraomologia/paradiasteles,* and substitution.[203] For Similarities or comparison, *exempla, apologia, parabolae, eikon, prosopopoeia, sermocinatio*.[204] After *gnome* and *chreia* come Circumstances and Signs (*hypotyposis, pathopoeia, transitio, parentheses*).[205] Many of these figures overlap with figures of thought on other lists (*interpretatio, expolitio, antithesis, communicatio, correctio, rejectio, occupatio, concessio, exempla, apologia, parabolae, eikon, prosopopoeia, sermocinatio, gnome, transitio*) and *progymnasmata* (*chreia, apologia, parabolae, prosopopoeia*). But Melanchthon organizes these figures of thought by topics, not by parts of an oration.

In his *De arte dicendi* (1578), the Valencian humanist Juan Lorenzo Palmireno also follows an Agricolan bipartite division of affect and amplification when categorizing his figures of thought.[206] Palmireno's figures of thought that move

[199] Melanchthon, *Elementorum,* 264.
[200] Melanchthon, *Elementorum,* 273.
[201] Melanchthon, *Elementorum,* 281.
[202] Melanchthon, *Elementorum,* 283.
[203] Melanchthon, *Elementorum,* 290.
[204] Melanchthon, *Elementorum,* 296.
[205] Melanchthon, *Elementorum,* 298-99.
[206] Juan Lorenzo Palmireno, *De arte dicendi libri tres* (Valencia: Pedro de Huete por Baltasar Simon, 1578), 2.23: "*Duplex est sententiarum figura; nam aut figuratur Orationis habitus quasi vestitus, vel affectus, aut ipsius corpus augetur*."

include *interrogatio, pysma, epitrochasmus, indignatio, exclamatio, execratio, aporia, communicatio, subjectio, scholion, expeditio, oxymorum, sustentatio, paralipsis, apostrophe, epitrope, concessio, licentia, deprecatio, diabole, epiplexis, hypocrisis* (2.23-27). Palmireno's figures of thought that amplify include *climax, epiploce, gradatio, ascensus, antimetabole, antithesis, communicatio, correctio, aphorismus, apodioxis, procatalepsis, procatasceue, paramologia, paradiastole, transitio, aetiologia, color, epexegesis, incrementum, comparatio, congeries, digressio, tapinosis, gnome, exclamatio, noema, distributio, frequentatio, emphasis, auxesis, litotes,* and *endiadys* (2.27-35). Some of these figures of thought are potentially organizational, such as *transitio, digressio,* and *distributio.* Others are clearly marked as amplificatory, and sometimes there is overlap. Whatever the case, this is most certainly not the Ramist nor the Erasmian division.

Furthermore, Palmireno is especially Agricolan in combining topics theory and *copia* theory. For each topic, Palmireno gives the topic, then a corresponding non-Erasmian *copia rerum* exercise, then examples from Cicero, poets, and himself. For example, Palmireno points out that to exercise ourselves in the topic of Efficient Cause we might compose an "enumeration of the multiple efficient causes," including "What were the simultaneous causes, Who instigated it, What was undertaken on this occasion, What is hoped to be achieved, [and] What assurance was given."[207] Palmireno follows the same structure for his other topics, including Final Cause (*copia*: add ends), Effects (*copia*: add effects), Subjects and Adjuncts (*copia*: add

[207] Palmireno, *De arte,* 3.10: "*Enumeratione multarium causarum efficientium copiosam orationem efficit. . . . Quae fuerint simultatis causae, Quis instigator, Quae suscipiendi belli occasio, Quae vindendi spes, Quae utriusque fiducia*."

subjects and adjuncts), Opposites (*copia*: *enumeratione*), Comparison (*copia*: *exempla*), Division (*copia*: *distributio*), and Definition (*copia*: *descriptio*).[208] While Palmireno does not follow Erasmus, Palmireno is thinking about ways in which topics manifest in discourse and can be added to discourse. He also directly explains how figures of thought spring from the topics: "You will thus acknowledge that the figures of style emanate from invention: From the topic of Definition, emanate *auxesis* and *tapeinosis*. From the topic of Division, *dilemma* and *dialysis*. From Causes, *aetiologia* and *dicaeologia*. From Opposites, *antithesis* and *antimetabole*. From the topic of Genera, *gnome* and *epiphonema*. From Adjuncts, *hypotyposis, affectus, execrationes, objurgationes, obtestationes*."[209] In all this exposition, Palmireno clearly believes that invention involves both topics theory and *copia* theory, and that figures, including figures of thought, stem from topics. The move/please and topics schemes, like the parts of an oration scheme, enable the rhetor to memorize and retain the figures of thought. But these schemes represent a significantly different approach to amplification and figures that for the most part ignore questions of structural invention. In this case, we have inventional figures, but not clearly discoursal figures.

[208] Palmireno, *De arte*, 3.10-42.
[209] Palmireno, *De arte*, 3.40: "*Ex Inventione Elocutionis figuras emanare, sic agnosces. Ex loco Definitionis, emanant Auxesis, Tapinosis. Ex loco Divisionis, Dilemma, Dialysis. Ex causis, Aethiologia, Dicaeologia. Ex Oppositis, Antithesis, Antimetabole. Ex loco Generis, Gnome, Epiphonema. Ex adiunctis, Hypotyposis, Affectus, Execrationes, Obiurgationes, Obstestationes*."

Conclusion: Fractalized Arrangement

As Lawrence Green points out, the history of rhetoric in the Renaissance is an important moment in which rhetoricians were especially concerned with either adapting Greco-Roman rhetorics (Platonic, Aristotelian, Ciceronian, Progymnasmatic, Hermogenean, etc.) to better fit Renaissance society and culture, or adapting Renaissance society and culture to better fit these Greco-Roman rhetorics. "Some of the most inventive and successful rhetorics," Green remarks, "all but abandon the Roman approach," including Erasmus's *De copia*.[210] However, Erasmus appears to take the figures of thought from the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and, inspired by Stephanus Fliscus, sorts the figures of thought according to the parts of an oration. This unique reordering of rhetoric dovetails with greater Renaissance interest with topical invention (as seen in Veltkirchius), but also pairs significantly with structural invention (as seen in Salinas). By bringing these many concepts together under the head of *copia*, Erasmus shows that he truly sees invention, arrangement, and style as integrated processes. Whereas Medieval rhetoricians generally think about amplification and lay the groundwork for bringing the parts of an oration and the figures of thought together, Erasmus weaves all of these strands together. Perhaps taking their cue from Erasmus, Talon, Soarez, and Sturm also chose to integrate structural invention and figures of thought in ways that not only serve as supplementary confirmation that Erasmus was purposefully reordering the figures of thought but also show that many other rhetoricians found this integration compelling.

[210] Lawrence D. Green, "Demosthenes, Cicero, and Philip of Spain," *Advances in the History of Rhetoric* 7, no.1 (2004): 144, https://doi.org/10.1080/15362426.2004.10557229.

With that said, it is certainly important to recognize that this was not the only organizing framework in circulation. Other rhetoricians, such as Melanchthon and Palmireno, turn to Agricola's teachings on dialectic and topics theory. And still others, such as Peter Ramus, replace arrangement with other concepts such as method; or, like the authors of letter-writing manuals, argue for genre-specific parts.[211] Truly, the Renaissance was an explosion of perspectives made possible by the humanist movement and the advent of the printing press. Nevertheless, the Erasmian tradition (as opposed to the Agricolan tradition) combines the figures of thought with the parts of an oration to show how the parts of an oration can be considered discoursal figures. While the integration of structural invention and style via a combination of the parts of an oration and the figures of thought is not the only approach out there, this approach is important because it encourages us to recognize that the units of discourse that are being arranged, that are being composed, can span from a one sentence figure to a passage long part of oration. As figures of thought are equated with parts of an oration, these figures of thought become additional structural options available to the rhetor, which enable the rhetor to better recognize the variety and suppleness of discourse.

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[211] As Erasmus put it in his *De conscribendis epistolis* (1522), "Yet in heaven's name, how are these things [the parts of a judicial oration] relevant to a letter?" (Erasmus, *Literary and Educational Writings 3: De Conscribendis Epistolis / Formula / De Civilitate,* trans. Charles Fantazzi, vol. 25 [Toronto, CA: University of Toronto Press, 1985], 76). All the same, even Justus Lipsius in his 1592 *Epistolica institutio* encourages students to keep a commonplace book of *formulae* which explicitly includes a focus on "*composition* [*contextum*] (arrangement, narration, coherence, transition, breaking off, closing)" (Justus Lipsius, *Principles of Letter*-Writing: A Bilingual Text of *Justi Lipsi Espistolica Institutio,* trans. R.V. Young and M. Thomas Hester [Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996], 43).

Conclusion: Toward a Rhetorical Pedagogy of Arrangement

> "Teaching by its nature takes hold of the past in order to proclaim and to create the future." -Jim Corder, "Studying Rhetoric and Teaching School" 23

In this dissertation, I set out to further the pedagogic goals of rhetorical genre studies by turning to the history of rhetoric to recover theories of arrangement that can enrich our current theories of genre moves. My first question asked "How has the field of rhetoric and writing studies conceptualized structure and organization from 1949 to the present and why do we conceptualize structure and organization in these ways?" To answer this question, I have argued that modern theories of arrangement fall into three broad categories based on writing studies' engagement with other fields: linguistic, psychological, and communicative perspectives. These perspectives offer important insights into the argumentative, conceptual, and behavioral aspects of discourse, teaching how to enmesh sentences and paragraphs within a rhetorical situation through cohesion and coherence. However, these perspectives often reduce arrangement to a matter of argument or expression. Arrangement does involve call and response, the weighing of top-down organizational patterns, and a series of moves. But historians of composition and rhetoric such as Paul Rodgers, Virginia Burke, Sharon Crowley, Robert Connors, and Frank D'Angelo suggest that there is even more at play. Historically aware rhetorics treat arrangement as an integral and unique dimension of discourse and highlight the ways in which the parts of arrangement are linked, expanded, extended, and amplified. A turn to ancient, medieval, and early modern rhetorical theories can complement and nuance

contemporary insights by offering a deeper foundation and description of the properties of mesostructures.

Following on this assumption, my second question asked "How might a turn to the history of rhetoric enrich our conceptualizations of arrangement? How do ancient rhetoricians think similarly and differently about arrangement, and what pedagogic principles can we learn from them?" To answer this question, I explored terms of arrangement in Greek, Roman, Medieval, and Renaissance contexts. By attending to terms such as *idea*, *kephalaion, modus positionis,* and *figura rei,* I identified ways in which ancient rhetoricians think of mesostructures not only as argumentative, conceptual, and behavioral—as modern compositionists do—but also as multidimensional (cf. Theodorus of Byzantium; Isocrates; Anaximenes; Erasmus); responsive (cf. Isocrates; Anaximenes; Pseudo-Cicero; Quintilian); synthetic (cf. Pseudo-Cicero; Nicolaus the Sophist); distributive (cf. Aristotle; Cicero; Anonymous of Bologna); variable (cf. Quintilian; Adalberto of Samaria; Geoffrey of Vinsauf; Erasmus); and, at time, also transformational (Isocrates; Seneca; Erasmus).

Attention to these properties of arrangement in ancient rhetorics helps us recognize these properties of arrangement in modern rhetorics. Francis Christensen, for example, though sometimes maligned for focusing on structure to the exclusion of rhetorical situation, does think of arrangement as both structural and generative; of elaboration as response; and of paragraphs as compositions of interrelated sentences. Frank D'Angelo, though sometimes challenged for his interest in the methods of development, rightly maintained that arrangement is an intergral dimension of discourse. And rhetorical genre theorists such as Charles Bazerman readily recognize

that genre moves entail invention; depend on rhetorical situations; and comprise whole bundles of speech acts working in concert. Ancient rhetorics provide additional validation for contemporary perspectives on arrangement. Inasmuch as ancient theories promote these and other properties of arrangement, ancient rhetorics also constitute a comprehensive terminology for thinking not only about key relationships between and positions of mesostructures, but also about how to develop student repertoires and composition practices. To conclude this dissertation, then, this final chapter looks at these doctrines through the prism of pedagogy to consider further implications and a rationale for the teaching of arrangement.

The Very Least a Pedagogy of Arrangement Should Teach

In practice, there are many ways to teach any given concept. Just as there are many teaching methods, so are there many theories informing these approaches. At times, the multiplicity of options can be overwhelming. In second language writing, for example, one teacher might lecture on the parts of an essay, another will discuss examples, and yet another might simply ask students to start writing. For further illustration, consider the following two approaches. "Show and Tell? The Role of Explicit Teaching in the Learning of New Genres," Aviva Freedman wonders whether genre structures can be taught explicitly or are better learned in practice. Freedman draws on research in the acquisition of spoken language to argue that the acquisition of genre structure is most likely implicit (237). Jeanne Fahnestock, however, argues in "Genre and Rhetorical Craft" that this intuition does not suddenly appear but is more likely "the product of much earlier tuition." Rather, composing a

genre involves craft, as "reasoned prose" is what gives students more trouble than freer forms of writing (270). These two examples, and those given earlier in this dissertation (ex: Kaplan, Swales, Hyland, and Schneer), show that we are dealing with many different approaches to teaching genre and by extension arrangement, the structural trace of genre.

In second language teaching, there have been various efforts to consolidate the field by defining theory-informed pedagogical principles. The example of second language teaching is instructive for how we think about composition studies. In "Macrostrategies for the Second/Foreign Language Teaching" (1992), B. Kumaravadivelu tries to make sense of various teaching methods (such as Grammar Translation, the Input Hypothesis, the Interaction Hypothesis, and Communicative Language Teaching) by articulating "Macrostrategies," that is, "general plans derived from theoretical, empirical, and pedagogical knowledge related to L2 learning/teaching." These macrostrategies include principles such as "create learning opportunities in class" and "contextualize linguistic input" (27). Later, in "The Postmethod Condition" (1994), Kumaravadivelu gives a rationale for describing macrostrategies, arguing that teachers should not be bound to a single method but should instead be prepared to respond to a teaching situation using the method that makes most sense to them at that time (29). This approach enables teacher autonomy and promotes "principled pragmatism" rather than eclecticism (30-31). And, in "Toward a Postmethod Pedagogy" (2001), Kumaravadivelu also notes that this growing list of macrostrategies is effective because it is particular, practical, and possible (538). Alternatively, in *Second Language Acquisition and Task-Based*

Language Teaching (2015), Mike Long describes two levels of principles: methodological principles and pedagogic procedures. By methodological principle, Long means "universally desirable instructional design features, motivated by theory and research findings. . . which show them to be either necessary for SLA or facilitative of it." Pedagogic principles, then, "comprise the potentially infinite range of options for instantiating the principles at the classroom level" (301). Using a similar rationale, the CCCC has prepared various position statements, including *Principles for the Postsecondary Teaching of Writing* (1989/2015), which argues, among other things, that writing instruction should "emphasize[] the rhetorical nature of writing," "recognize[] writing as a social act," "enable[] students to analyze and practice with a variety of genres," and "recognize[] writing processes as iterative and complex." By articulating guiding principles, scholars define what matters most and can prioritize their instruction by focusing on the overarching principles.

What, then, would be a fitting list of macrostrategies or methodological principles for teaching arrangement?

Here, I would suggest that there are at least three approaches to teaching arrangement. I have hinted at these approaches throughout this dissertation, but I will name and define them here. These three are prescriptive, descriptive, and empowering approaches to teaching arrangement. This taxonomy is similar to Mike Duncan's prescriptive/descriptive taxonomy (which he in turn takes from Eden and Mitchell). On the one hand, prescriptive or formalist approaches emphasize the explicit teaching of structures, structures which are "definite" and "ideal" and can be "described, measured, and emulated for instructional purposes" (471). In other

words, prescriptive approaches treat arrangement as a rigid structure with set rules that students must follow with exactness. When we learn how to write resumes, for example, we are often faced with a long list of do's and don'ts. Teaching how to fill in box paragraphs or argument outlines or the headings in a template, while perhaps based on description, also tend to be prescriptive. In Freirean terms, a prescriptive approach is essentially a "pedagogy of exhortation" rather than a "pedagogy of knowing" (Berthoff, "Recognition, Representation, and Revision" 22). On the other hand, descriptive or functionalist approaches emphasize that structures are harder to pin down because they depend on context (Duncan 471). In other words, descriptive approaches look at how form actually functions in a rhetorical situation and teach students to learn from model texts how to respond to common situations. When we learn how to write a technical report, for example, our supervisor might give us an example report and review the function of each part of the report before setting us to write. An inductive approach, like the one described by Patrick Hartwell in "Teaching Arrangement: A Pedagogy" would also fit into this category, as Hartwell asks students to "record some informal conversations, noting when the topic shifts or is expanded" and extrapolate precepts for writing from these observations (550-551). Genre studies are often descriptive, looking at the parts of a genre and considering how they are "socially situated and culturally embedded" (Bawarshi and Reiff 197). But is a descriptive approach a "pedagogy of knowing," an assertion of rhetorical agency and rhetorical dexterity?

Finally, there are empowering approaches. Empowering approaches to arrangement center the writer's choices and creative power. Richard Coe, again,

advocated for "an awareness of form as simultaneously constraining and generative that will empower [students] to understand, use, and even invent new forms for new purposes" ("An Apology for Form" 26). Jeanne Fahestock, too, called for more pedagogical focus on "the higher-level skills that would allow control and change rather than only the reflex re-creation of existing genres" ("The Once and Future Discipline" 38). Often, as Bawarshi and Reiff explain, empowering approaches promote the teaching of "alternative genres":

> A teaching approach that develops critical awareness of genre should, in addition to teaching students to critique a genre's ideologies, teach them an awareness of how to produce alternatives. One criticism that has been leveled against an RGS approach to literacy teaching is that it focuses on analysis and critique of genres, stopping short of having writers produce alternative genres or practice using genres to enact change. . . . In this way, genre analysis can move beyond teaching academic forms to teaching purposeful rhetorical uptakes for social action and can enable students to engage more critically in situated action (Bawarshi and Reiff 200)

In other words, an empowering approach to arrangement similarly focuses not only on past genre moves but also on future genre moves. When we learn how to compose a multimodal project, for example, we would consider the functions of the generic components and consider how we might move toward distinction. As we move students from rigid to more plastic understandings of arrangement and discourse, students become more aware of the options available to them. They come to learn

that a technical report, for example, is more than a bunch of headings. Rather, each heading serves a purpose; and if a given rhetorical situation does not call for that purpose, or calls for that purpose in another way, great writers will make the change. And, in the end, this is the goal of rhetorical education: to enable students to negotiate reader expectations and writer purpose, to both accommodate audiences and invite them to see in new ways.[212]

Modern theories of arrangement often remain at the level of description and prescriptions based on that description. Ancient theories of arrangement, however, are often fluent in all three of these approaches. Isocrates, for example, takes a descriptive approach when he argues that the forms of discourse are innumerable. While he might deign to give the occasional precept related to *kairos*, Isocrates in the same breath calls for attention to *kainos*, that is, seeking new and fresh ways to look at even the most threadworn material. Cicero, Quintilian, and a handful of Medieval and Renaissance rhetoricians also promote a turn to repertoire systems such as topics theory and its variants in order to prepare students to not only respond to their rhetorical situations but also to do so with good judgment, ever ready to create living genres rather than simply regurgitate the past. While more exercise-minded rhetoricians such as Pseudo-Cicero, the *progymnasmata* writers, and Geoffrey of

[212] The three-tier taxonomy that I use is similar to developmental psychologist Michael Tomasello's mimicry / imitation / emulation model and cognitive psychologist Ronald Kellogg's knowledge-telling / knowledge-transforming / knowledge-crafting model. However, these developmental models were designed to describe culture and writing development in children and youth, respectively. When I write about differences between different approaches to arrangement, I am thinking more of how a teacher represents arrangement to their students no matter their age. I'd like to thank Michael Israel for pointing out the similarities with Tomasello's model.

Vinsauf might seem to be teaching to a template, these rhetoricians also stress the importance of the rhetorical situation and the ways in which writers can make these genres their own. Ancient approaches to teaching arrangement can be empowering inasmuch as they reveal principles that put the writer front and center. Commenting on Quintilian, Anne Freadman writes, "Quintilian is concerned. . . with practice. Practice entails agency. The important question for the schoolmaster is how the passive, receptive learner becomes an agent" ("A Tardy Uptake" 126). Genre can be "defined as a collection of resources available to be drawn on in a variety of situations" or "by its purported originating exigence":

> In the former case, agency is performance, the site of strategic and tactical choice exercised on the basis of training or experience, or simply of street-smarts; in the latter, the agent is subjected to the genre, a passive occupant of the subject-position(s) it sets out (129)

Ancient and contemporary rhetorics offer principles that can guide the teacher as they help students expand their repertoires and thereby enhance their agency, their ability to act deliberately.

If we now have methodological principles to guide our approaches to teaching arrangement, what might our pedagogical principles look like? While there are many lessons to be had, let me highlight three: the principle of response, the principle of embedding, and the principle of integration.

First, there is the principle of response taught to us so clearly by ancient rhetoricians such as Anaximenes, Cicero, Quintilian, and Hermogenes and modern compositions such as Paul Rodgers, Carolyn Miller, Anne Freadman, and Anis

Bawarshi. Like a dancer shows awareness of how their body is moving in direct pairing with another, a writer can choose to anticipate how *and where* to best respond to their readers. Aeschines and Demosthenes, as well as Cicero himself, are examples of how a writer might respond to another more directly. Rather than always save a refutation for the end of a speech, these orators demonstrated that we can begin anticipating and responding from the very beginning. As more recent examples, linguist Emily Bender frames her article "On NYT Magazine on AI: Resist the Urge to be Impressed" as a response to another article. "Yes, there's an urgent need to address the harm being done by so-called 'AI' and to set up effective regulation and governance so that those who are impacted by this technology have power over how it is deployed," Bender writes,

> But no, the harms aren't going to come from autonomous 'AI' that just hasn't been taught appropriate values. And no, the solution isn't to build 'AI' (or 'AGI') faster or 'outside of megacorps. . . . What's needed is not something out of science fiction—it's regulation, empowerment of ordinary people and empowerment of workers.

Rather than discuss her position in isolation from that other aticle, Bender defines her position early on and then moves into her proofs. Similarly, columnist Kevin Roose, in his article "Don't Ban ChatGPT in Schools. Teach with It," recognizes that his arrangement depends on his rhetorical situation. Roose begins with his lines of argument ("The first reason not to ban ChatGPT in schools is that, to be blunt, it's not going to work"; "The second reason not to ban ChatGPT from the classroom is that,

with the right approach, it can be an effective teaching tool"). Then, Roose gives a fuller refutation, complete with concession and counter, later in his article:

> Now, I'll take off my tech columnist hat for a second, and confess that writing this piece has made me a little sad. I loved school, and it pains me, on some level, to think that instead of sharpening their skills by writing essays about 'The Sun Also Rises' or straining to factor a trigonometric expression, today's students might simply ask an A.I. chatbot to do it for them. I also don't believe that educators who are reflexively opposed to ChatGPT are being irrational. . . . But the barricade has fallen. ("Don't Ban")

While he has his position, Roose also recognizes this place as an opportunity to show his audience that he has no ill will toward them. With these examples in mind, we might revise our Position Paper prompts to not only require responses to alternative viewpoints and counterarguments, but also draw students' attention to ways in which example essays respond to alternative views in different places based on their stance and interpretation of the rhetorical situation. Attention to this principle of response enables students to better comprehend their material response to others.

Second, there is the principle of embedding. Pseudo-Cicero, Nicolaus the Sophist, and Erasmus are among the ancient rhetoricians who explore this principle; modern scholars such as Virginia Burke, Frank D'Angelo, and David Rumelhart also recognize this principle. This pedagogic principle draws attention to the fact that essays are composed of modules, movements that can be found woven in and through one another, frames within frames. A key situation where this principle stands out is

when we consider how to integrate narratives into our academic writing, whether that be in an advanced composition classroom or a creative writing classroom. An ancient example can be found in Gregory of Nazianzus' *First Invective Against Julian.* In this discourse, Gregory argues against restrictions on freedom of speech and religion imposed by the Emperor Julian against Christians. These restrictions sanctioned the use of the Greek language, which Gregory found preposterous. In the course of his litany of ills, Nazianzus shares a brief anecdote to illustrate his point:

> Are *poems* thine by right? Do they not rather belong to that old lady who, being bumped on the shoulder by someone that was running violently in the opposite direction, as the story goes, in reviling the vehemence of his haste, gave utterance to epic verse? And this same verse having greatly taken the young man's fancy, and been more carefully reduced to meter, created thy poetry, so greatly admired. (1.108)[213]

Through this anecdote, Gregory argues that poetry is a natural occurrence that cannot be taken away. This anecdote of the angry woman who spouted poetry is embedded within Gregory's larger argument. Gregory sees stories as an essential resource for persuasion.

The principle of embedding includes both the embedding of Narrations and the embedding of smaller narratives, whether they be fictional or factual. For example, in his article "The Writing on the Wall" (musings on OpenAI), Steve Johnson narrates the history of the OpenAI company over the course of four

[213] I have yet to find the source of this anecdote.

paragraphs. The first sentence of each paragraph serve to illustrate the contour of this Narration:

> "OpenAI's origins date to July 2015, when a small group of tech-world luminaries gathered for a private dinner at the Rosewood Hotel on Sand Hill Road, the symbolic heart of Silicon Valley."
>
> "The agenda for the dinner on Sand Hill Road that July night was nothing if not ambitious."
>
> "The OpenAI founders would release a public charter three years later, spelling out the core principles behind the new organization."
>
> "While the OpenAI charter may have been less cavalier than 'Don't be evil," it took several years for the organization to work out in practice how to honor its tenets."

In this multiparagraph passage, events are arranged in chronological order and are presented as a way of setting the stage for what is to come later in the essay. This is not a brief story or anecdote, but a longer section embedded within an essay. Inversely, Johnson also embeds a narrative later in his article:

> In March 2021, OpenAI published a research paper in which it trumpeted the discovery of what it called 'multimodal neurons' in the deep-learning software – inspired by a real class of neurons in the human brain that are activated together in response to general categories or concepts. Studying the simulated neural networks inside the CLIP software, the researchers discovered a 'neuron' that was reliably activated by the general concept of spiders, even if the visual

> cues triggered that reaction were sharply different in form. They called it the Spider-Man neuron, because it activated not just by images of spiders but also by illustrated Spider Men from comic books and photos of people in Spider-Man costumes. (It was even activated by images of the word 'spider' spelled out.)

This narrative is not so much a fictional anecdote as in Gregory's speech, but is a description of a research article. Embedding narratives of research is a natural kind of story that frequently occurs in academic and professional writing. Students can be encouraged to explore how narratives can show up anywhere in an essay, not just in an Introduction.

The third and final pedagogic principle that I will highlight is the principle of integration. My opening passages from Isocrates and Seneca describe this principle. Contempoary scholarship into composition as remix and assemblage (cf. Edwards; Preston) invokes this principle. Although not highlighted in my dissertation, Rebecca Nowacek's *Agents of Integration: Understanding Transfer as a Rhetorical Act* also represents a contemporary instantiation of this principle. Essentially, this principle draws attention to how a writer brings together disparate pieces of knowledge and weaves them together into a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Just as the proverbial bee ingests pollen from a wide variety of flowers and synthesizes honey, so a writer has to learn to think holistically and identify ways to make sense of apparent chaos. Earlier, I mentioned how Isocrates embeds excerpts from his speeches into his larger work, the *Antidosis* and includes brief introductions and conclusions to contextualize these speeches. Similarly, Gregory Nazianzen describes

his embedding of scriptural references as patches in a larger tapestry: “Do ye not mark how I weave my song out of sacred words and thoughts? and, as it were, with what belongs to others, I exalt and decorate myself, how I grow inspired in my joy?” He continues: “I spurn everything humble and human, cementing together and joining one thing with another, and bringing into one whole what belongs to the same spirit” (1.17). Bringing materials together also invokes the concept of curation—selecting and presenting material while making an effort to show some kind of wholeness and unity. As a more recent example, in her book *See You in the Streets: Art, Action, and Remembering the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire*, Ruth Sergel writes about the intersections of art and coalition work. To do so, Sergel weaves personal essays from coalition members together with archival materials, her own photography, and her own biography and musings. Like a museum exhibit, this collection starts with a Welcome chapter, then leads us through the gallery. It is not always clear if Sergel is the protagonist or if the Coalition is. But it is clear that Sergel is deliberately thinking about how she brings all of this material together and effecting coherence. Portfolio assignments are a great way to teach the principle of integration. As students are asked to frame and contextualize their portfolios, students move in the direction of more deliberate composing, thinking, and being.

These three principles—the principle of response, the principle of embedding, and the principle of itegration— support students as they come to understand the dynamic nature of arrangement, to understand that arrangement involves listening, wholeness, and transcendence. Arrangement is not a matter of learning formulas or

following templates; rather, arrangement is a living response that brings various sources and tactics together to form a coherent action.

The Very Idea of Arrangement

In "The Very Idea of a *Progymnasmata*" David Fleming engages in his own search for methodological principles of rhetoric and the *progymnasmata*. He argues that we should focus less on bringing back ancient rhetorical exercises wholesale and instead focus more on defining and teaching those principles that underly these exercises. The end of rhetoric, Fleming contends, is "neither a text nor a skill nor some body of knowledge but a set of deep-seated verbal habits and dispositions oriented to public effectiveness and virtue" (114). "It has not been my purpose here," Fleming writes, "to propose a new *progymnasmata* for our time but rather to try to see through the history of the exercise-cycle to an educational idea that we might appropriate for ourselves in designing such programs" (117). Whether we decide to bring back the *progymnasmata* and similar exercises in rhetorical arrangement or work out new approaches, the articulation of principles can help us create a more theoretically robust framework from which to act.

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