

Who Likes Americans and Who Doesn't: Assessing Effects of Fundamentalism, Liberal Values, and Prosociality on Tunisian Attitudes

Jeffrey W. Lucas  · Mansoor Moaddel · Kelly Beavan

Received: 18 October 2024 / Accepted: 23 June 2025 / Published online: 4 September 2025
© The Author(s) 2025

Abstract A survey experiment assessed effects of religious fundamentalism, liberal values, and prosocial behavior on Tunisian's evaluations of fellow Tunisians and Americans. Participants high in religious fundamentalism and low in liberal values evaluated Tunisian targets more positively than American targets. The finding on liberal values was best accounted for by an explanation based in ethnocentrism, and the finding on fundamentalism by a social identity explanation. Additionally, irrespective of target nationality, participants upgraded targets they viewed as prosocial.

Keywords Survey experiments · Nationalism · Social identity · Fundamentalism · Liberal values · Prosociality

✉ Prof. Dr. Jeffrey W. Lucas · Prof. Dr. Mansoor Moaddel · Dr. Kelly Beavan
Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, 2112 Art-Sociology, College
Park, MD 20742-1315, USA
E-Mail: jlucas2@umd.edu

Prof. Dr. Mansoor Moaddel
E-Mail: moaddel@umd.edu

Dr. Kelly Beavan
E-Mail: kbeavan@umd.edu

Wer mag Amerikaner*innen und wer nicht: Auswirkungen von Fundamentalismus, liberalen Werten und Prosozialität auf die Einstellungen tunesischer Bürger*innen

Zusammenfassung Ein Umfrageexperiment untersuchte die Auswirkungen von religiösem Fundamentalismus, liberalen Werten und prosozialem Verhalten auf die Bewertung von Landsleuten und US-Amerikaner*innen durch Tunesier*innen. Teilnehmer*innen mit stark ausgeprägtem religiösem Fundamentalismus und niedrigen liberalen Werten bewerteten tunesische Zielpersonen positiver als amerikanische. Der Befund zu liberalen Werten ließ sich am besten durch Ethnozentrismus erklären, der zu Fundamentalismus durch soziale Identität. Verhalten, das als prosozial wahrgenommen wurde, führte zu einer positiveren Bewertung beider Zielgruppen.

Schlüsselwörter Umfrageexperimente · Nationalismus · Soziale Identität · Fundamentalismus · Liberale Werte · Prosozialität

1 Introduction

We describe a project designed to assess relationships between religious fundamentalism, liberal values, and prosocial behavior in predicting support of foreigners among local populations. Identifying optimal ways to garner support from local populations has been a formidable challenge for policymakers in resolutions of war, insurgency, and terrorism. The issue has become especially important in asymmetrical warfare in which combatants are not military forces of nation-states. In these conflicts, support from local populations is important for reasons including reducing social support for insurgents, enhancing the legitimacy of emergent authority, restoring peace and social order, and protecting citizens both at home and abroad (Levi and Stoker 2000). In the absence of local support, a military campaign might not only fail to defeat an insurgency but also inadvertently contribute to its popularity.

Situations of insurgency or military conflict aside, favorable attitudes from people who live beyond one's national borders are important in successfully framing policy toward other countries. Friendly relations with other nations lower the likelihood of miscommunication, improve both the amount and quality of intercultural exchange, and enhance the trust that is necessary for sustained business transactions. In-group solidarity and outgroup mistrust contribute to xenophobia and hostility among nations (Inglehart et al. 2006). Thus, identifying successful strategies to build positive relations with members of other countries is of paramount importance for political conduct in any country.

Although winning hearts and minds is widely recognized as an important task, achieving it is exceptionally difficult. For example, United States involvement in another country often entails engagement in a variety of actions that might be perceived differently by different segments of local populations. And a policy adopted to win local support may be interpreted in a contrary way by a host population or contradicted by other policies. Additionally, members of any host population constitute a diverse group in terms of values and attitudes toward outsiders. For ex-

ample, individuals vary on religious fundamentalism, liberal attitudes, xenophobia, and general attitudes toward out-group members (Moaddel 2021).

Given the complexities of government involvement in other countries and the heterogeneity of local populations that makes it difficult to determine the types of actions that will be most effective at garnering support from them, it is crucial to identify and assess factors that may contribute to appeasement or antagonism. We attempt one step toward overcoming these difficulties by employing an experimental design that allows us to determine (1) whether perceptions of altruism assist, and perceptions of selfishness inhibit, support from the local populations and (2) unique effects of people's orientations toward religious fundamentalism and liberal values, on such support. Our overriding goal is to identify factors that contribute to positive sentiments among local populations as important issues for consideration in foreign and security policy.

We administered the experimental design in a full-scale national survey carried out in Tunisia. Specifically, we investigate perceptions of in- and out-group members in a nationally representative sample of Tunisians, focusing on effects of religious fundamentalism, liberal values, and pro-social behaviors. Results demonstrate the utility for policymakers to pursue strategies that promote the development of liberal values and discourage fundamentalism in other countries. In addition, they show a positive effect of altruistic behavior by Americans working in the country in garnering favorable attitudes toward the U.S. As we discuss, they also demonstrate unique effects of fundamentalism and liberal values in the types of effects they have on views of in- versus out-group members.

2 Theoretical Development

A major concern for American interests abroad has been anti-Western sentiments in the Middle East and North Africa. Parsing out the factors that contribute to these sentiments is an important task for public policy, and understanding the roles of various factors in producing attitudes is important in advancing the research literature. Islamic fundamentalist movements have been one important factor that have contributed to anti-Western sentiments. Although the roots of Islamic fundamentalists movements date at least to the 1920s in Egypt and the 1940s in Iran, four events in the late 1970s were particularly important in contributing to a worldwide Islamic revivalism. The first happened in 1977 with General Zia al-Haq's military coup in Pakistan and the subsequent Islamization project launched by his regime. The other three transpired in 1979: the Iranian revolution that brought Shia fundamentalists to power; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which produced worldwide Muslim mobilization against the invasion; and the Muslim militants' seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca (Ayubi 1980; Dekmejian 1980; Kepel 1985; Roy 1994; Almond et al. 2011; Moaddel 2005).

The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the formation of Islamic regimes in several Middle Eastern countries did not produce a stable religious order. Rather, the region witnessed the outbreak of Shia and Sunni sectarian conflict, violence against religious minorities, and suicide terrorism. Religious domination and authoritarian

Islamic rule did, however, beget a liberal response from some segments of Middle Eastern societies, culminating in the rise of liberal movements, beginning in Iran and followed by the Arab Spring. A key dimension of conflict in the region has become between Islamic fundamentalism and liberal nationalism (Moaddel 2020, 2021). We propose that both religious fundamentalism and liberal values play important roles in Middle Eastern attitudes toward Westerners.

2.1 Religious Fundamentalism

Religion plays a significant role in the lives of a great number of people. It typically represents a particularly strong source of identity because of its distinctive worldviews, grounding in organization and group membership, affirmation in periodic rituals, and objectification in symbols (Herriot 2014; Ysseldyk et al. 2010). It binds people into moral communities (Graham and Haidt 2010), and research finds that people prefer to associate with others who share their religious beliefs (Hall et al. 2010; Johnson et al. 2012a; Rowatt et al. 2005). In terms of attitudes toward others, which is the concern of this paper, some evidence relates religiosity in general to intolerance. Indicative of this relationship is how priming religious concepts produced more racially prejudice attitudes (Johnson et al. 2010) and that self-reported religiosity has been found to be associated with more bias toward out-group members and favoritism toward in-group members (Johnson et al. 2012b). In a meta-analytic review on links between religiosity and racism in the United States, Hall et al. (2010) found that racism in part reflected intergroup dynamics, with persons who hold strong religious in-group identities especially likely to denigrate racial out-groups.

Religious fundamentalists identify particularly strongly with their religions. Wibisono et al. (2019), for example, found that fundamentalists attached greater importance to their religious identity than to any other identity. Further, Galen et al. (2011) found that in-group biases especially affected evaluations of others for persons high in religious fundamentalism. They found that persons high in religious fundamentalism consistently rated a religious target higher on moral and social dimensions than a non-religious target, compared to people low in fundamentalism whose ratings did not show these distinctions. Importantly, they found this even when the targets' religion was not explicitly stated to participants but might rather be inferred from information that was implied but not overtly stated. Also, foreshadowing our results, the effects in the study appeared to be driven by religious fundamentalists uprating those they perceived like themselves on religiosity rather than down-rating those they perceived as not religious. In other words, ratings of non-religious targets were similar among participants both low and high in religious fundamentalism, but participants high in religious fundamentalism rated religious others as quite high compared to ratings of those low in religious fundamentalism.

We noted that some research links religiosity to intolerance. This is not always the case. In particular, some research has found that elements of religious practice or certain types of religious beliefs can tend to be associated with intolerance, as opposed to religiosity itself (Kandil 2023; Karpov 2002; Spierrings 2019). Fundamentalism is one such type of belief, and fundamentalists have consistently been found to be

more intolerant than non-fundamentalists (Almond et al. 2011; Doebler 2014). For example, Gold (1991) showed that members of a Hindu religious fundamentalist movement were likely to say that foreign races did not deserve rights as citizens. Additionally, items measuring intolerance are found to correlate highly with religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer 2003; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004). Across the Abrahamic faiths, people with stronger fundamentalist orientations tended to display stronger feelings of xenophobia (Moaddel and Karabenick 2021). In the context of the Middle East, Muslim fundamentalists displayed a highly critical, if not hostile, attitude toward Western culture, considering the latter as decadent and admonishing the faithful of its menace for the Muslim way of life (Moaddel 2005).

We employ a comprehensive conception of religious fundamentalism and assess its link to attitudes toward Americans in a North African country. As we discuss, it considers the subject as a multi-dimensional construct, consisting of varied yet interrelated components such as religious exclusivity or ingroup solidarity, religious intolerance, disciplinary conceptions of the deity, and literalism.

2.2 Liberal Values

Liberal democracy is the constituting feature of the Western cultural tradition. This tradition evolved from several revolutionary developments, including the Reformation that started in 1517, resulting in the recognition of religious pluralism, the monarchical revolution that produced the nation state in the seventeenth century, the eighteenth-century Enlightenment that gave rise to the idea of political equality, and the social revolutions that supported different forms of social equality, including equality between the sexes (Chiot 1985; Barzun 2000). Liberal democracy rests on the recognition, exaltation, and celebration of individuals' private judgments about, and ability to decide, matters related to their lives, giving precedence to their choices and preferences over parental authority, patrimonial domination, and religious instructions. These all, particularly individual autonomy, represent liberal values.

The operational definition of the idea of individual rights and individualism has been subject to diverse interpretations. The expression, according to Weber, "includes the most heterogeneous things imaginable" (Weber et al. 1991, p. 178). Individualism, according to Lukes (1971, p. 48), carries "a pejorative connotation, a strong suggestion that to concentrate on the individual is to harm the superior interests of society." This view has been commonly shared by factions across the political spectrum and historically supported by a large segment of organized religions, including the theocratic Catholic reactionaries in nineteenth-century France who believed that the social order had been "shattered to its foundations because there was too much liberty in Europe and not enough religion" (Lukes 1971, p. 46). We do not attempt here to wade into different treatments of expressive individualism but instead define it relatively narrowly as attitudes about the value of individual autonomy and expression. In addition to being a component of liberal values, expressive individualism has been found to be associated with principles such as equality and tolerance of foreigners (Ciftci 2022). We also focus on gender equality and secular politics as features of liberal values. Many treatments of gender equality focus on structural differences in opportunities and outcomes between women and men.

Our focus is on values, and thus on attitudes toward gender inequality. We focus on the extent to which individuals believe that women should have the same opportunities as men in different domains and on perceptions of the capabilities and preferred subservience of women relative to men. Views on gender equality have been found to be associated broadly with views toward outsiders; for example, holding sexist beliefs is associated with both racism and nationalism (Deckman and Cassese 2021; Sidanius 1993).

Secular politics entails the separation of religion and politics. Again, because our focus is on liberal values, we focus on attitudes about the desirability of politics being separated from religion. Although this might be seen as a relatively straightforward view on whether government business should be carried out independent of religious influence, it can have numerous dimensions, such as belief in whether religious leaders should have more authority than others in a society or whether laws should be based in religious texts. Research has found that secular politics are associated with relatively more liberal and tolerant views (Özgül 2014; Kuru 2009).

As we discuss in our Methods section below, we measured liberal values through a set of items assessing expressive individualism, gender equality, and secular politics. Because each of these elements of liberal values are associated with variables such as tolerance and nationalism, we expect relationships between liberal values and attitudes toward foreigners. Additionally, because sentiments toward outsiders are driven not just by attitudes and beliefs of a host population but also by actions of those outsiders, we expect consequences of perceptions of prosociality to affect orientations toward outsiders.

2.3 Prosociality

Whether a country has a predominantly positive orientation toward the West, the U.S. in particular, likely depends on the extent to which more people in that country adhere to liberal values than they do to religious fundamentalism. Fundamentalist and liberal orientations are outcomes of the dynamic of complex sets of historical and cultural factors, which Western liberal democracies may have only limited power to influence. One area in which Western countries may be able to directly contribute to the formation of favorable attitudes among an indigenous population is in demonstrations of prosocial behavior, or behavior carried out to benefit others.

We predict that prosociality will affect attitudes toward in- and out-group members in our sample. Research has found prosocial behavior to have numerous positive reputational consequences (Simpson and Willer 2015), except when others question the motivation behind those behaviors (Berman and Silver 2022). In general, research finds that those who engage in prosocial acts are cooperated with more often (Barclay 2004; Willer 2009), granted higher status (Hardy and Van Vugt 2006), evaluated as warmer (Kawamura et al. 2021), and favored more as partners in exchanges (Barclay and Willer 2007). Thus, we should expect positive reputational benefits to accrue from perceptions of prosocial behavior. The relationship, however, is not straightforward. When individuals make judgments about the behavior of others, they judge the motives of those others, and if they are disinclined to see a person's prosocial behavior as driven by altruistic considerations, the prosocial behavior will

likely not lead to positive reputational effects (Carlson et al. 2022; Kafashan et al. 2014).

2.4 Social Identity Processes Versus Ethnocentrism

Our review of the literature indicates that religious fundamentalism and liberal values are associated with prejudicial attitudes toward outsiders, and we might also expect that those prejudicial attitudes will affect how persons make judgments about motivations for prosocial behavior. If we in fact find that those higher in religious fundamentalism and lower in liberal values evaluate outsiders compared to insiders relatively more negatively, different processes might be at work. It may be that persons high in religious fundamentalism and low in liberal values are relatively more intolerant and ethnocentric than others, with the result that they evaluate outsiders more negatively. Alternatively, evaluations might be driven by social identity processes (Hogg 2016). Perhaps in-group favoritism among persons high in religious fundamentalism and liberal values are associated with favoring others like themselves, with affinity for similar others driving effects. We develop a set of predictions in our hypotheses section below that allow us to adjudicate between these distinct explanations in our analyses.

3 The Case of Tunisia

Our data comes from a vignette experiment embedded in the second wave of a full-scale national values survey carried out in Tunisia in 2015. Tunisia is an overwhelmingly Muslim country, with more than 99% of residents identifying as Sunni Muslim (U.S. Department of State 2021). The country has for about a decade been a relatively democratic exception to the nearly uniform authoritarian rule characterizing countries in its region, but recent authoritarian measures such as the suspension of the elected parliament have undermined democracy in the country (Ridge 2023). Also, public support for democracy in Tunisia is complex. Some argue that Tunisians favor whatever system will be best for the social safety net and employment (Cook 2021). Further, Tunisians might have conceptions of democracy inconsistent with democratic ideals. Schedler and Sarsfield (2007), for example, argue that Tunisians tend to express support for democracy but show some support for authoritarian alternatives, hold vague ideas of what democracy is, and hold views of democracy that are incompatible with ideals of liberal democracy. Additionally, the country has seen an uptick in populist politics, which some attribute in part to inappropriate neoliberal policies imposed on the country by external entities (Naazer 2019). In other words, Tunisia is precisely a country where foreign entanglements have had unintended consequences and where garnering support from local populations is of paramount importance.

4 Hypotheses

We conducted a vignette experiment (described in detail in the Methods section below) in which participants in Tunisia evaluated a person (always a male) in a vignette they were read by the person administering the survey. The vignette concerned either an American or Tunisian employee of an organization who engaged in activities to help local Tunisian communities. Further the employee either was or was not rewarded by his organization for the activities. We assessed attitudes toward the American versus Tunisian employee, how the attitudes varied by whether the activity was framed as pro-social, and the extent to which religious fundamentalism and liberal values among participants were associated with these views.

Our predictions concern perceptions of Tunisians toward fellow Tunisians and Americans. We might have picked any number of countries other than Tunisia as an out-group category for the vignette design. We chose the United States because it is the sole superpower and is in general quite well known in the region. America's strong support for Isreal and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 have played strong roles in shaping Islamic sentiments toward the United States. France, given its historical presence in the region, would have been the most obvious alternative country to use as a representative of the West in the vignettes. In the surveys, however, 35% of respondents indicated that they would not like to have French as neighbors, while 54% indicated the same thing for Americans. Thus, Americans as the out-group category likely allowed us the best opportunity to identify effects of our independent variables.

Whether our findings with Americans as the out-group category would hold for other Western countries is a question for future research. Our goal is to demonstrate a process; specifically, how fundamentalism, liberal values, and prosocial conduct together affect perceptions of in- and out-group members. It will be the task of future research to identify factors that exacerbate or mitigate against the processes identified in our research. Thus, as we note in the Conclusion below, caution is necessary in attempting to conclude that findings on attitudes toward Americans will hold in the same manner for attitudes toward other countries.

We expect that participants will follow in-group processes of favoritism in their evaluations, and that they will thus evaluate a Tunisian target more positively than an American target. This is Hypothesis 1: *Participants will evaluate the Tunisian employee more favorably than the American employee.* As discussed in our literature review, both being high in religious fundamentalism and low in liberal values are associated in various ways with devaluing outsiders. Thus, we expect higher scores on religious fundamentalism and lower scores on liberal values among participants to be associated with relatively more positive evaluations of the Tunisian compared to the American target. Hypothesis 2: *Relatively higher evaluations of Tunisians than Americans will be associated with a) higher scores on religious fundamentalism and b) lower scores in liberal values.*

We propose that engaging in prosocial behavior without receiving organizational rewards is a signal that the prosocial behavior is motivated by altruistic intentions. Thus, we expect participants to evaluate targets more positively if they did not receive organizational support for their prosocial activities than if they did. Hypothesis 3:

Participants will evaluate the employee more favorably when the employee does not receive rewards from his organization for the prosocial activity. We expect that participants will largely already assume that prosocial activities carried out by Tunisian targets are motivated by the best interests of the country. Thus, when American targets are not rewarded for their prosocial acts, it might be an especially strong signal that the acts were driven by altruistic interests. Thus, we predict that American targets will especially receive an evaluation boost by language indicating that they are not receiving rewards from their employer for the prosocial activity. Hypothesis 4: *There will be an interaction between rewards for the prosocial act and target nationality such that evaluations of Americans benefit relatively more than evaluations of Tunisians when the prosocial activity is not rewarded by the target's organization.*

4.1 Ethnocentric Predictions

If Hypotheses 2a and 2b that predict especially large gaps in evaluations between American and Tunisian targets among participants high in fundamentalism and low in liberal values hold, different processes might account for the support. For example, if the gap in evaluations between American and Tunisian targets is larger for participants high in fundamentalism than targets low in fundamentalism, it might be due to those high in fundamentalism downgrading American targets or upgrading Tunisian targets. If the gap is due to persons high in fundamentalism holding intolerant attitudes (Doebler 2014), the gap would likely be due to them downgrading American targets. This possibility is reflected in Hypothesis 5: *A negative relationship between religious fundamentalism and evaluations of Americans compared to Tunisians (Hypothesis 2a) will be explained primarily by participants higher in fundamentalism evaluating Americans more negatively.*

Similarly, if persons low in liberal values tend to be relatively less tolerant and more ethnocentric (Özgül 2014), then a larger gap in evaluations between American and Tunisian targets among participants low in liberal values might be driven by those participants holding relatively more negative views toward Americans. Thus, we predict with Hypothesis 6: *A positive relationship between liberal values and evaluations of Americans compared to Tunisians (Hypothesis 2b) will be explained primarily by participants lower in liberal values evaluating Americans more negatively.*

4.2 Alternative Social Identity Predictions

As discussed, an alternative social identity process might drive larger gaps in evaluations by nationality among those high in fundamentalism and low in liberal values. A core finding of research on social identities is that individuals tend to evaluate in-group members more positively than out-group members (Brown 2000), and as discussed, religion tends to be a particularly strong source of identity (Herriot 2014). Over 99% of Tunisians are Muslim, as were all our participants. We expect that participants would assume that a Tunisian target was Muslim, but that they would be less certain about the religious affiliation of an American target. Although the percentage of Americans who are Muslim is low (just over 1%), participants might

conclude that a Muslim American might be especially likely to work in Tunisia. Thus, we expect that participants high in religious fundamentalism will see fellow Tunisians as in-group members on the social identity of religious affiliation but be uncertain about the group membership of American targets. If this is the case, social identity processes would lead us to expect that relatively more favorable evaluations of Tunisians than Americans among participants high in fundamentalism would not be due to them downgrading American targets (as predicted in Hypothesis 5), but rather to them upgrading Tunisian targets they see as in-group members. Hypothesis 7: *A negative relationship between religious fundamentalism and evaluations of Americans compared to Tunisians (Hypothesis 2a) will be explained primarily by participants higher in fundamentalism evaluating Tunisians more positively.*

By the same social identity process that leads us to Hypothesis 7, we expect that participants high in liberal values will likely conclude that American targets also hold such values. The very framing of support for democracy among Tunisians, for example, is in the extent to which people support Western styles of government. Alternatively, participants will likely be less certain about the extent to which Tunisian targets hold liberal values given the country's complicated level of support for such values (Cook 2021). Thus, from a social identity standpoint, if participants low in liberal values evaluate Tunisians relatively more favorably than Americans compared to participants high in liberal values, it might not be due to participants low in liberal values downgrading Americans (as predicted by Hypothesis 6), but rather participants high in liberal values upgrading Americans. Thus, we predict in Hypothesis 8: *A positive relationship between liberal values and evaluations of Americans compared to Tunisians (Hypothesis 2b) will be explained primarily by participants higher in liberal values evaluating Americans more positively.*

Hypothesis 2 predicts more favorable views of Tunisians compared to Americans among participants high in fundamentalism and low in liberal values. Hypotheses 5 and 6 on one hand, versus 7 and 8 on the other, provide alternative mechanisms that might explain support for Hypothesis 2. Hypotheses 5 and 6 are based in literature finding relatively higher levels of intolerance among persons high in fundamentalism and low in liberal values. Hypotheses 7 and 8 are based on research finding that people feel more affinity for in-group members. Thus, Hypotheses 7 and 8 are in competition in our analyses with Hypotheses 5 and 6. Additionally, because research finds religious affiliation to be a strong source of identification, and we can find no evidence that holding liberal values acts as a social identity, we enter our analyses with more confidence in Hypothesis 7 (the social identity prediction on fundamentalism) than Hypothesis 8 (the social identity prediction on liberal values).

It may be that the explanations rooted in ethnocentrism and social identity processes both explain attitudes among participants. If this is the case, the result would be to reduce the strength of findings for either set of predictions. Thus, non-support for the social identity or ethnocentric predictions might indicate a need to seek to better isolate the processes. Support for either would leave us especially confident in the strength of the findings. We describe our research design below.

5 Methods

5.1 Design and Participants

We analyze data from the adult population in Tunisia from the 2015 Middle Eastern Values Study (MEVS). The survey produced 2398 completed face-to-face interviews from a nationally representative sample of 3070 respondents interviewed in 2013 (a response rate of 78%). The full survey instrument consisted of more than 250 items. These items measure values, beliefs, attitudes, and perceptions in areas such as culture, religion, religious fundamentalism, liberal values, gender, family, politics, morality, trust, economic status, and demographics. We embedded in the survey a vignette survey-experiment in a 2×2 factorial design that varied nationality of target (Tunisian or American) and support for prosocial activity of the target (organizational support or not). We assessed in particular attitudes toward the American versus Tunisian employee, how the attitudes varied by whether the target's organization supported the target's prosocial activities, and the extent to which religious fundamentalism and liberal values among participants affected these views.

The participants included 58% women, and the average age was 47 years old. On average, they had three children, and 66% of participants were married, 22% had never been married, and 12% were either divorced, separated, or widowed. The majority (89%) identified as Sunni-Muslim, and on a scale from 1 (not at all religious) to 10 (very religious), average self-described religiosity was a 6. The average highest level of education completed was secondary school (technical/vocational type). In terms of self-reported social class, 39% identified as either lower or working class, 40% as lower-middle or middle-class, and 21% upper-middle class; and 59% indicated that they were currently unemployed, and the average household income per month was between 501–1000 Tunisian Dinars (roughly equivalent to \$ 150 to \$ 300).

By random assignment, 600 participants completed a vignette in which a Tunisian employee behaved prosocially and had organizational support, 584 participants completed a vignette in which a Tunisian employee behaved prosocially and did not have organizational support, 607 participants completed a vignette in which an American employee behaved prosocially and had organizational support, and 604 participants completed a vignette in which an American employee behaved prosocially and did not have organizational support.

5.2 Procedure

Participants in the survey-experiment first answered numerous items that included our measures of religious fundamentalism and liberal values (see Measures section below). Depending on the participant's condition, research team member then asked participants to imagine a scenario as follows:

Imagine that this recent event occurred in your community. An (American/Tunisian) employee who works for the (U.S. government/Tunisian government) has been working in your community for about one year. He is in charge of

money that he is usually allowed to distribute to projects he decides are useful. The (American/Tunisian) employee recently decided to allocate this money to build a national center for advancement of technology in your community. This project is welcomed and desired by respected members of your community. The (American/Tunisian) employee's supervisor said that (if the project is implemented, the employee would be promoted, because the project is a priority/the employee would be permitted to implement the project but would not be paid for his time because the project is not a priority). The employee decided to implement the project. The employee made sure that the respected community members would receive credit and recognition for establishing the national center for the advancement of technology.

After hearing the vignette, participants answered several questions about the target in the vignette that allowed us to test our hypotheses and then proceeded with other items in the larger panel study.

5.3 Measures

Our independent variables included target nationality, support for prosocial activity, religious fundamentalism, and liberal values. We manipulated the first two of these in the survey-experiment. We measured religious fundamentalism and liberal values through survey items (see below). Our dependent variables included a range of attitudes, described in the Dependent Variable section below, on the target in the vignette.

5.3.1 *Religious Fundamentalism*

We measured religious fundamentalism using the Moaddel-Karabenick (2018) Fundamentalism (MKF) Scale. The scale is designed to be applicable to followers of all the Abrahamic faiths. For example, a question in the scale asks participants to express level of agreement with the statement, "The (Quran/Bible/Torah) is true from beginning to end." Because all our participants were Muslim, we asked the Islam versions of all questions.

The scale includes four components, each with four questions that have Likert-style response items that range from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The Deity component of the scale asks participants their belief in the role of God in people's life choices and outcomes, such as whether religious infractions will bring punishment from God. The Inerrancy component of the scale includes items on sacred texts, such as that the Quran has correctly predicted all major events in human history. The Exclusivity component addresses whether the individual follows the one true religion, such as whether only Muslims are going to heaven. The Intolerance component attends to openness to dissent, such as whether criticism of Islam should be tolerated. The 16 items in the MKF scale, which has been tested and validated extensively across the Abrahamic faiths (Moaddel and Karabenick 2018, 2021), have high reliability (16 items; $\alpha = 0.787$) in our sample.

5.3.2 *Liberal Values*

We also measured liberal values using a validated scale developed by Moaddel and Karabenick (2018) (for a complete inventory of items in the Religious Fundamentalism and Liberal Values Scales, see Moaddel 2020). The scale includes the three dimensions discussed in our literature review above: expressive individualism (two items), gender equality (five items), and secular politics (four items). Items in the expressive individualism component concern attitudes about individual expression and freedom, such as whether parental approval or love is a more important basis for marriage. Gender equality items measure beliefs about women relative to men, such as whether university education is more important for boys than for girls. The secular politics dimension measured attitudes about the extent to which religion and politics should be separated and about democracy more broadly, such as whether Tunisia would be a better place if religion and politics were separated. The scale showed $\alpha = 0.63$ reliability in our sample.

5.3.3 *Prosociality*

Prosociality refers to the behavior of a person (target) that is intended to benefit others (receivers). We contend that the perception of the receivers toward the target is a function of whether the prosocial behavior of the target is perceived as motivated by an altruistic concern for the receivers. The vignettes that participants were read varied by whether the targets were Tunisian or American and by how the target benefits from his prosocial behavior. For half of participants, the target would be promoted if the project was implemented and would receive a promotion. For the other half of participants, the target's pursuit of the project would be unpaid because it was not viewed by the supervisor as a priority. We viewed the target not being rewarded for the activity but pursuing it anyway as likely to be seen as an expression of altruistic behavior. We describe below results on a manipulation check to determine whether participants in fact viewed the unpaid employee as sacrificing his own interests for the project.

5.3.4 *Dependent Measures*

21 items measured participant responses to the target in the vignette. These included items asking the extent to which they believed the employee is well qualified for his work position, contributes to well-being of my community, and cares about my community. Particular items concerned issues such as trust, whether the participant would publicly support the employee, and whether the participant would want the employee as a neighbor. Participants indicated the extent to which they (dis)agreed to each of the statements along a 4-point Likert scale (1 = Strongly agree; 4 = Strongly disagree).

We employed an exploratory factor analysis on the 21 dependent items. A correlation matrix revealed large intercorrelations between variables, in addition to a significant Bartlett's Test ($p < 0.001$) and large Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure ($KMO = 0.979$), confirming that a factor analysis among these items is appropriate. We em-

ployed the principal components factor extraction method. Communalities ranged from 0.49 to 0.76. Two components with eigenvalue of greater than 1.0 explained nearly 63% of the total variance. These components were rotated using Varimax rotation method to generate an orthogonal solution.

Factor 1 contained nine items which generally measured good/bad evaluations of the actor's work ethic and job competence, such as how talented and competent he is (e.g., "I think the employee is well-qualified for his work position" and "The employee is successful at the things he tries to do"). We named this factor "favorable". A follow-up reliability analysis found these nine items from the *favorable* factor to have high internal consistency ($\alpha=0.91$).

Factor 2 contained an additional 12 of the dependent variables. These items appeared to capture ethical or moral evaluations and perceptions of trust, such as the employee's honesty and loyalty to the community (e.g., "I trust this employee" and "The employee prioritizes the well-being of my community above his own interests"). We named this factor "trusting". Reliability analysis found the *trust* factor to have high internal consistency ($\alpha=0.94$).

6 Results

6.1 Manipulation Checks

We first conducted one-way ANOVA to check our experimental manipulation on whether participants perceived that the actor in the vignette behaved prosocially. We asked participants whether "this employee sacrificed his own interests for this project," along a Likert-type scale (from strongly disagree to strongly agree). Participants in the prosocial (i.e., unpaid) condition scored significantly higher ($F(1, 2165)=139.20, p<0.001$) on this item ($M=3.11, SD=1.50$) than those in the non-prosocial (i.e., paid) condition ($M=2.56, SD=1.52$). Another item asked participants whether they believed the employee "only did the project for his own good." A Welch's *t*-test showed a significant difference between organizational reward conditions on this variable in the expected direction ($t=6.289, p<0.001$), confirming that our prosociality manipulation operated as intended.

6.2 Hypothesis Tests

We predicted that participants would follow in-group processes of favoritism in their evaluations, and that they would thus evaluate a Tunisian target more positively than an American target (Hypothesis 1). As an initial test of this hypothesis, we conducted a Kruskal-Wallis *H* test to determine if favorable perceptions of employees differed by the nationality of the employee presented in the vignette: an American employee ($n=1128$) or a Tunisian employee ($n=1131$). Results established that there was a significant difference in evaluations between the two groups ($\chi^2(1)=5.59, p=0.018$).

Supporting Hypothesis 1, a regression analysis using factor 1 (*favorable*) revealed that on average, participants reported significantly more favorable evaluations of

Table 1 Favorable Evaluations by Employee Nationality Condition and Religious Fundamentalism (Interaction)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Employee Nationality (Ref= American)	0.096** (0.026)	0.094** (0.026)	-0.269 (0.155)
Religious Fundamentalism	–	0.067** (0.025)	0.009 (0.034)
Nationality × Fundamentalism	–	–	0.117** (0.049)
<i>n</i>	2260	2221	2221

Note: Ordinary least squares linear regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.01$

Table 2 Favorable Evaluations by Employee Condition and Liberal Values Index (Interaction)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Employee Nationality (Ref= American)	0.096** (0.026)	0.095** (0.026)	0.476** (0.133)
Liberal Values Scale	–	0.068** (0.025)	0.142** (0.035)
Nationality × Liberal Values	–	–	-0.145** (0.050)
<i>n</i>	2260	2260	2260

Note: Ordinary least squares linear regression coefficients. Robust standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.01$

employees depicted as Tunisian than American ($F(1, 2258) = 13.35, p < 0.001$). Using our second factor (*trusting*) as the dependent variable produced consistent results also lending support to Hypothesis 1. Participants reported higher perceptions of trust toward Tunisian employees compared to American employees ($F(1, 2250) = 58.06, p < 0.001$).¹

Hypothesis 2 predicted that Tunisian targets would be evaluated relatively more favorably than American targets among participants higher in religious fundamentalism (2a) and lower in liberal values (2b). Table 1 displays stepwise regression analyses that examined the independent and interactive effects of target nationality and religious *fundamentalism* on favorable perceptions of employees. The significant interaction between religious fundamentalism and target nationality supports Hypothesis 2a (Model 3, $\beta = 0.117$, $SE = 0.049$, $p = 0.018$); participants higher in religious fundamentalism evaluated Tunisians relatively more favorably than Americans compared to participants lower in religious fundamentalism.

Table 2 shows results of regression analyses on target nationality and *liberal values*. The liberal values and target nationality interaction is significant ($\beta = -0.145$, $SE = 0.050$, $p = 0.004$), supporting Hypothesis 2b. Participants lower in liberal val-

¹ For all results we present, patterns of significance were identical across the *favorable* and *trusting* factors. For reasons of space, we hereafter only present results on the *favorable* scale, which we believe is closest of the two to the intent of our predictions. Analyses on the *trusting* scale are available from the authors.

ues evaluated Americans compared to Tunisians relatively more negatively than participants higher in liberal values.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants would evaluate employees more favorably when the employee did not receive rewards from his organization for the prosocial activity (i.e., “unpaid project” condition) as compared to when the employee completed the project for pay. We conducted a Kruskal-Wallis H test to determine if favorable perceptions of employees differed by support for prosocial activity of the target: organizational support ($n = 1147$) or no organizational support ($n = 1112$). The test revealed a statistically significant difference in evaluations between the two groups ($\chi^2(1) = 14.78, p < 0.001$). Participants evaluated employees more favorably when the employee did not receive rewards from his organization for the prosocial activity (i.e., the project was unpaid), supporting Hypothesis 3. Thus, results show that prosocial behaviors resulted in more positive evaluations.

Hypothesis 4 predicted an interaction between rewards for prosocial act (unpaid or paid project) and employee nationality (American or Tunisian). We expected evaluations of Americans to benefit more than evaluations of Tunisians when the prosocial activity was not rewarded by the target’s organization (i.e., unpaid project). An ANOVA test ($F(3, 2256) = 7.46, p < 0.001$) confirmed the main effects of each manipulation independently on favorable perceptions, in which ingroup (Tunisian) employees ($\beta = 0.087, p = 0.018$) and unpaid projects ($\beta = 0.069, SE = 0.017, p < 0.001$) were viewed more favorably. The interaction between the two, however, was not significant, and Hypothesis 4 was not supported; Americans did not benefit significantly more in evaluations than Tunisians when the prosocial activity did not receive organizational rewards.

6.3 Ethnocentric and Social Identity Predictions

Hypothesis 2a and 2b that predicted relatively more positive evaluations for Tunisian than American targets among participants high in religious fundamentalism and low in liberal values were both supported. Hypotheses 5 and 6, versus hypotheses 7 and 8, propose alternative potential mechanisms for those effects. Hypotheses 5 and 6 present an ethnocentric mechanism which predicted that individuals high in fundamentalism (Hypothesis 5) and low in liberal values (Hypothesis 6) would downgrade American targets. Hypotheses 7 and 8 are based on a social identity mechanism which predicted that support for Hypotheses 2a and 2b would be driven by individuals high in fundamentalism (Hypothesis 7) and low in liberal values (Hypothesis 8) upgrading Tunisian targets. We first consider the predictions on fundamentalism (Hypotheses 5 and 7) and then the predictions on liberal values (Hypotheses 6 and 8).

Fig. 1 displays plotted predictions of favorability evaluations based on religious fundamentalism and target nationality. As can be seen in the figure, the gap between evaluations of Tunisian and American employees is driven by evaluations of Tunisians. Specifically, participants high in fundamentalism did not evaluate Americans any more or less favorably than participants low in fundamentalism ($\beta = 0.03, p = 0.515$), whereas fundamentalism had a significant relationship with evaluations of Tunisian employees ($\beta = 0.196, p < 0.001$). Further, the interaction between re-




Fig. 1 Adjusted predictions of Employee Nationality $\times$ Fundamentalism Interaction




Fig. 2 Adjusted predictions of employee nationality $\times$ liberal values interaction

ligious fundamentalism and target nationality is significant ($\beta=0.117$, $SE=0.049$, $p=0.018$). Thus, Hypothesis 5 was not supported, and Hypothesis 7 was. In other words, results on religious fundamentalism were consistent with the social identity explanation and not the ethnocentric explanation.

Hypothesis 6 predicted that relatively higher evaluations of Tunisians than Americans among those low in liberal values would be driven by evaluations of Americans, whereas Hypothesis 8 predicted that they would be based in differences in evaluations of Tunisians. Fig. 2 displays plotted predictions of favorability based on liberal values and target nationality. As can be seen in Fig. 2, evaluations of Americans are responsible for favorability rating differences between participants high and low in liberal values. Liberal values did not significantly predict evaluations of Tunisian employees ($\beta=0.013$, $p=0.708$), but it did predict evaluations of Americans ($\beta=0.125$, $p=0.002$). The interaction between liberal values and target nationality interaction is significant ($\beta=-0.145$, $SE=0.050$, $p=0.004$). Thus, Hypothesis 6 was supported and Hypothesis 8 was not: results on liberal values were consistent with the ethnocentric explanation and not the social identity explanation.

7 Discussion

As expected, we found that participants evaluated Tunisian employees more favorably than American employees. We also found that persons high in religious fundamentalism and low in liberal values evaluated Tunisians compared to Americans more positively than persons low in fundamentalism and high in liberal values. Analyses of these differences supported a social identity explanation for religious fundamentalism but not for liberal values. As we noted, religion is a social identity, whereas holding liberal values is not, and so these findings were not surprising. We also found that actors engaging in prosocial behaviors led to more positive evaluations among participants; this finding held for both Tunisian and American targets.

Our data indicates that individuals high in religious fundamentalism upgraded those they viewed as in-group members on religious identity (i.e., fellow Tunisians, who they likely assumed were Muslims). When evaluating American targets, for whom participants would likely not be able to draw conclusions about religious identity, participants high and low in religious fundamentalism did not significantly differ. This is not consistent with an approach that predicted ethnocentrism would lead those high in religious fundamentalism to downgrade foreigners based on any general intolerance resulting from strong religious identification, religious nationalism, anti-Western sentiments, and/or strong feelings of superiority over non-Muslims.

Results show that individuals low in liberal values downgraded out-group members (i.e., foreigners) in their evaluations. This finding was consistent with an ethnocentric explanation that predicted high levels of intolerance among those low in liberal values. It did not support a social identity explanation; those high and low in liberal values did not differ significantly in their evaluations of Tunisians, perhaps because standing on liberal values was not a social identity among participants.

8 Conclusion

There have been ongoing debates among historians and social scientists on the causes and consequence of ingroup-outgroup relationships, ingroup solidarity, and nationalism. Earlier theorists, known as perennialists (e.g., Fishman 1980; Connor 1994) or primordialists (e.g., van den Berghe 1978), variously considered nations as perennial and historical in phenomenon, saw little difference between ethnicity and nationality, and believed that nationalism is a natural outcome of the evolution of ethnicity, tribe, and other manifestations of early group formation. Later, historians cast doubt on whether a common language, religion, and territory necessarily produces nationalism. These historians proposed that nation and nationality are cultural artifacts; they were invented in recent history, when a conjunction of events and processes interacted to produce the new political module (Gellner 1964, 1983; Anderson 1983, Hobsbawm 1990; O'Leary 1997). As a third alternative, Smith (1988) proposes that the modern nation is not invented but rather reconstructed out of the cultural values, norms, and identities that were inherited from pre-modern eras.

The foregoing analysis attempted to contribute to the ingroup-outgroup aspect of this debate. It incorporated an experimental design in a national survey to parcel out influences of four key factors in shaping attitudes toward outgroups: national identity, prosociality, religious fundamentalism, and liberal values. Our analysis indicated as we expected that participants in general accord a greater value to their own nationality than they do to others. The love of one's country, however, "can be generous, compassionate, and intelligent, but it can also be exclusive, deaf, and blind" (Viroli 1995, p. 6). These two aspects may be construed as nationalistic and patriotic dimensions of group solidarity (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). The nationalist dimension tends to capture primarily the relational and synchronic interactions among nations. Patriotism, on the other hand, is not relational. Instead, it is self-referential, unrelated to other nations. It rests on the feeling of love for one's country—its natural beauty, peoples, and contributions to human development, historical progress, and the extent to which people of a nation treat one another fairly.

The other three factors that our experimental design highlighted assessed these two dimensions, showing that ingroup love and outgroup hate were not simply reciprocally related (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). Rather, both are affected by differences across individuals. As our analysis showed, insofar as people adhered to religious fundamentalism—which like nationalism is synchronic, relational, and exclusivist—they place greater value to their own nationality (based, we propose, on similar standing on religious identity). On the other hand, those who adhere to the principle of individual liberty and gender equality tend to be more patriotic—the virtue of their society, for them, lies in the extent to which they treat one another on the principle of individual freedom and equality. Therefore, they may be more appreciative of Western societies for their achievements in the domains of liberty and equality. Finally, the behavior of the outgroup emerged as important in attenuating nationalism and ingroup solidarity. When the outgroup acts, or is perceived to act, more selflessly toward in-group members, participants developed more favorable attitude and deeper trust toward those outgroup members.

The outgroup members that respondents considered in the vignettes were Americans, and we must be cautious in concluding that the processes we find would hold when considering attitudes toward other countries. America, like any country, has a unique set of attributes and actions that shape Tunisians attitudes toward the country, and these factors might interact with our independent variables in ways different than would occur for other countries. Our design required us to choose some country to represent the out-group. This is a limitation of our research, and future research would be valuable in determining if the processes we identify are altered when considering different representations of the out-group.

In sum, our results showed that fundamentalism, liberal values, and prosocial behavior were all related to perceptions of fellow nationals versus foreigners. The nature of the effects of fundamentalism and liberal values, however, were distinct. We found no differences on fundamentalism in evaluations of foreigners, but we found that those high in fundamentalism upgraded those they could be certain shared their religious faith. We found no effects of liberal values on evaluations of fellow nationals, but we found that those low in liberal values significantly downgraded foreigners. We find these distinctions (as reflected in Figs. 1 and 2) to be particularly interesting and worthy of future research. For example, findings that persons high in religious fundamentalism tend to be intolerant of outsiders might reflect more complex processes than researchers typically consider. Additionally, applied research would be valuable in assessing the extent to which our central findings hold; specifically, that fostering liberal values and efforts to decrease religious fundamentalism are likely important steps toward building positive relationships with foreign countries. Such findings would have important implications for foreign and security policy in identifying routes toward facilitating positive trade relations and decreasing conflict, because as we note support from local populations is crucial for such endeavors.

Open Access Dieser Artikel wird unter der Creative Commons Namensnennung 4.0 International Lizenz veröffentlicht, welche die Nutzung, Vervielfältigung, Bearbeitung, Verbreitung und Wiedergabe in jeglichem Medium und Format erlaubt, sofern Sie den/die ursprünglichen Autor(en) und die Quelle ordnungsgemäß nennen, einen Link zur Creative Commons Lizenz beifügen und angeben, ob Änderungen vorgenommen wurden. Die in diesem Artikel enthaltenen Bilder und sonstiges Drittmaterial unterliegen ebenfalls der genannten Creative Commons Lizenz, sofern sich aus der Abbildungslegende nichts anderes ergibt. Sofern das betreffende Material nicht unter der genannten Creative Commons Lizenz steht und die betreffende Handlung nicht nach gesetzlichen Vorschriften erlaubt ist, ist für die oben aufgeführten Weiterverwendungen des Materials die Einwilligung des jeweiligen Rechteinhabers einzuholen. Weitere Details zur Lizenz entnehmen Sie bitte der Lizenzinformation auf <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de>.

References

- Almond, G. A., Appleby, R. S., & Sivan, E. (2011). *Strong religion: The rise of fundamentalisms around the world*. University of Chicago Press.
- Altemeyer, B. (2003). Why do religious fundamentalists tend to be prejudiced? *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 13(1), 17–28.
- Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (2004). A revised religious fundamentalism scale: The short and sweet of it. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 14(1), 47–54.
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. Verso.

- Ayubi, N. N. M. (1980). The political revival of Islam: The case of Egypt. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 12(4), 481–499.
- Barclay, P. (2004). Trustworthiness and competitive altruism can also solve the “tragedy of the commons”. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 25(4), 209–220.
- Barclay, P., & Willer, R. (2007). Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 274(1610), 749–753.
- Barzun, J. (2000). *From dawn to decadence*. Perennial.
- van den Berghe, P. (1978). Race and ethnicity: A sociobiological perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1(4), 401–11.
- Berman, J. Z., & Silver, I. (2022). Prosocial behavior and reputation: When does doing good lead to looking good? *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 43, 102–107.
- Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past achievements, current problems and future challenges. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30(6), 745–778.
- Carlson, R. W., Bigman, Y. E., Gray, K., Ferguson, M. J., & Crockett, M. J. (2022). How inferred motives shape moral judgements. *Nature Reviews Psychology*, 1(8), 468–478.
- Chirot, D. (1985). The rise of the West. *American Sociological Review*, 50(2), 181–195.
- Ciftci, S. (2022). On Weber, pathogens, and culture: A global empirical analysis of religion and individualism. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 61(2), 331–348.
- Connor, W. (1994). *Ethnonationalism: The quest for understanding*. Princeton University Press.
- Cook, S. A. (2021). How the West misunderstood Tunisia. Foreign Policy. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/27/saied-coup-tunisia-might-not-want-democracy/>. Accessed 2 Dec 2024.
- Deckman, M., & Casese, E. (2021). Gendered nationalism and the 2016 US presidential election: How party, class, and beliefs about masculinity shaped voting behavior. *Politics & Gender*, 17(2), 277–300.
- Dekmejian, R. H. (1980). The anatomy of Islamic revival: Legitimacy crisis, ethnic conflict and the search for Islamic alternatives. *Middle East Journal*, 34(1), 1–12.
- Doebler, S. (2014). Relationships between religion and intolerance towards Muslims and immigrants in Europe: A multilevel analysis. *Review of Religious Research*, 56(1), 61–86.
- Figueiredo Jr., R. J. P. de, & Elkins, Z. (2003). Are patriots bigots? An inquiry into the vices of in-group pride. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(1), 171–188.
- Fishman, J. (1980). Social theory and ethnography: Neglected perspectives on language and ethnicity in Eastern Europe. In P. Sugar (ed.), *Ethnic diversity and conflict in Eastern Europe* (pp. 69–99). ABC-Clio.
- Galen, L. W., Smith, C. M., Knapp, N., & Wyngarden, N. (2011). Perceptions of religious and nonreligious targets: Exploring the effects of perceivers’ religious fundamentalism. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 41(9), 2123–2143.
- Gellner, E. (1964). *Thought and change*. Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and nationalism*. Cornell University Press.
- Gold, D. (1991). From Vedic truth to Hindu nation. In M. E. Marty, & R. S. Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms observed* (pp. 531–593). University of Chicago Press.
- Graham, J., & Haidt, J. (2010). Beyond beliefs: Religions bind individuals into moral communities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14(1), 140–150.
- Hall, D. L., Matz, D. C., & Wood, W. (2010). Why don’t we practice what we preach? A meta-analytic review of religious racism. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14(1), 126–139.
- Hardy, C. L., & Van Vugt, M. (2006). Nice guys finish first: The competitive altruism hypothesis. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32(10), 1402–1413.
- Herriot, P. (2014). *Religious fundamentalism and social identity*. Routledge.
- Hill, P. C., & Williamson, W. P. (2005). *The psychology of religious fundamentalism*. Guilford Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990). *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, and reality*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hogg, M. A. (2016). *Social identity theory*. Springer VS.
- Inglehart, R., Moaddel, M., & Tessler, M. (2006). Xenophobia and in-group solidarity in Iraq: A natural experiment on the impact of insecurity. *Perspectives on Politics*, 4(3), 495–505.
- Johnson, M. K., Rowatt, W. C., & LaBouff, J. (2010). Priming Christian religious concepts increases racial prejudice. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 1(2), 119–126.
- Johnson, M. K., LaBouff, J. P., Rowatt, W. C., Patock-Peckham, J. A., & Carlisle, R. D. (2012a). Facets of right-wing authoritarianism mediate the relationship between religious fundamentalism and attitudes toward Arabs and African Americans. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 51(1), 128–142.
- Johnson, M. K., Rowatt, W. C., & LaBouff, J. P. (2012b). Religiosity and prejudice revisited: In-group favoritism, out-group derogation, or both? *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, 4(2), 154–162.

- Kafashan, S., Sparks, A., Griskevicius, V., & Barclay, P. (2014). Prosocial behavior and social status. *The Psychology of Social Status*, 139–158.
- Kandil, E. (2023). The relationship between religions and tolerance. *International Journal of Humanities and Language Research*, 6(2), 1–14.
- Karpov, V. (2002). Religiosity and tolerance in the United States and Poland. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 41(2), 267–288.
- Kawamura, Y., Ohtsubo, Y., & Kusumi, T. (2021). Effects of cost and benefit of prosocial behavior on reputation. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 12(4), 452–460.
- Kepel, G. (1985). The Ulema, the Intelligentsia, and the Islamists in Egypt: Social system, transcendental order, and translated order. *French Review of Political Science*, 424–445.
- Kuru, A. T. (2009). *Secularism and state policies toward religion: The United States, France, and Turkey*. Cambridge University Press.
- Levi, M., & Stoker, L. (2000). Political trust and trustworthiness. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3(1), 475–507.
- Lukes, S. (1971). The meanings of individualism. *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 32(1), 45–66.
- Moaddel, M. (2005). *Islamic modernism, nationalism, and fundamentalism: Episode and discourse*. University of Chicago Press.
- Moaddel, M. (2020). *The clash of values: Islamic fundamentalism versus liberal nationalism*. Columbia University Press.
- Moaddel, M. (2021). Changing values in the Middle East: Secular swings and liberal leanings. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. <https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/changing-values-middle-east-secular-swings-and-liberal-leanings>. Accessed 21 Mar 2023.
- Moaddel, M., & Karabenick, S. A. (2018). Religious fundamentalism in eight Muslim-majority countries: Reconceptualization and assessment. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 57(4), 676–706.
- Moaddel, M., & Karabenick, S. A. (2021). Measuring fundamentalism across the Abrahamic faiths. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 60(3), 669–697.
- Naazer, M. A. (2019). Nationalism in the Muslim world: A curse or blessing? *Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal*, 3(1), 30–42.
- O’Leary, B. (1997). On the nature of nationalism: An appraisal of Ernest Gellner’s writings on nationalism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 27, 191–222.
- Özgül, C. (2014). Legally Armenian: Tolerance, conversion, and name change in Turkish courts. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 56(3), 622–649.
- Ridge, H. M. (2023). Democratic culture theory in Tunisia. *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa*, 14(1), 69–85.
- Rowatt, W. C., Franklin, L. M., & Cotton, M. (2005). Patterns and personality correlates of implicit and explicit attitudes toward Christians and Muslims. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 44(1), 29–43.
- Roy, O. (1994). *The failure of political Islam*. Harvard University Press.
- Schedler, A., & Sarsfield, R. (2007). Democrats with adjectives: Linking direct and indirect measures of democratic support. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(5), 637–659.
- Sidanius, J. (1993). The interface between racism and sexism. *The Journal of Psychology*, 127(3), 311–322.
- Simpson, B., & Willer, R. (2015). Beyond altruism: Sociological foundations of cooperation and prosocial behavior. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 41, 43–63.
- Smith, A. D. (1988). *Ethnic origins of nations*. Blackwell.
- Spierrings, N. (2019). The multidimensional impact of Islamic religiosity on ethno-religious social tolerance in the Middle East and North Africa. *Social Forces*, 97(4), 1693–1730.
- U.S. Department of State (2021). 2021 Report on international religious freedom: Tunisia. <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/tunisia/>. Accessed 21 Mar 2023.
- Viroli, M. (1995). *For love of country: An essay on patriotism and nationalism*. Clarendon Press.
- Weber, M., Gerth, H., & Mills, C. W. (1991). *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology*. Routledge.
- Wibisono, S., Louis, W., & Jetten, J. (2019). The role of religious fundamentalism in the intersection of national and religious identities. *Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology*, 13.
- Willer, R. (2009). Groups reward individual sacrifice: The status solution to the collective action problem. *American Sociological Review*, 74(1), 23–43.
- Ysseldyk, R., Matheson, K., & Anisman, H. (2010). Religiosity as identity: Toward an understanding of religion from a social identity perspective. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14(1), 60–71.