

THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

by  
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## CHAPTER I

### THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN ASIA

The meeting of the Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in April, 1955 was a climax in the struggle between European colonial powers and the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa. After many decades of foreign domination the people of Asia and Africa threw off European control by creating the same political environment used so successfully by the European powers for centuries. The rise of nationalism in Asia and Africa and subsequent decline of Rajahs, Sultans and other local political leaders who co-operated with the West, ushered in a new, perilous era for two-thirds of mankind.

If this new political balance had emerged at a time when the rest of the world was at peace, its direction would, perhaps, have turned inward toward economic development and improvement. However, the end of World War II did not bring the end of conflict. The rise of the bi-polar struggle has placed many of these newly independent countries in alliance with their former masters; others have come under a far more absolute imperialism, international communism. A third

group has chosen neutralism.

In order to understand the nature of the Asian Revolution and the forces which called forth the Bandung Conference it is necessary to examine first one of the most explosive ideas of man, nationalism. The environment which conditioned the growth of nationalism in Asia also played an important role in the foreign policy of many Asian nations after independence.

The twentieth-century colonial environment provided Asian students and political leaders with an opportunity to read of Jefferson and Rousseau and the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson. The two World Wars of the century greatly weakened the European powers and created a political vacuum in much of the "Non-European" world.

Nationalism and religion have been the two most explosive social forces in the history of man. Religion is as old as man himself, whereas, nationalism spread from 18th Century Europe to engulf most of the world by the middle of the twentieth century. Nationalism, like religion, reflected the character of the Asian people it represented.

At the very time nationalism was proving to be inadequate for the European powers who first created it, the peoples of Asia and Africa were using it as a tool to force the Europeans out of Asia and Africa.

The League of Nations attempted to curb nationalistic ambitions but failed, and the nations of Europe again went to war. At the close of the second war in a generation, the European powers were helpless to defend their overseas territories against the rising tide of nationalism. And so the paradox; a growing international concern with guiding nationalism among the big powers and an ever changing political climate with new voices demanding in the name of self-determination, to be heard.

Several factors provided stimulant for Asian nationalism. One important factor was the economic problems which followed the end of colonial occupation. In the rice-growing countries, the European rulers introduced the commercial system of rice cultivation which altered the growing of rice from a practice aimed primarily at self-sufficiency to one of export and profit. This demanded additional labor, and Asian immigrants were brought in, resulting in the influx of Chinese and Indians into Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, and other countries.<sup>1</sup> This naturally posed a problem of unemployment and competition with the natives so that Asian nationalism also entertained a certain amount of antagonism against these

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Emerson, R. and Thompson, V. Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, Inst. of Pacific Relations, (New York, 1952), p. 139

immigrant populations. In brief, this economic dislocation and radical change served to stimulate nationalism.<sup>2</sup>

An earlier stimulant to Asian nationalism was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Russia had traditionally been regarded in Asia as a European power. The Russian army suffered numerous defeats on its Eastern fronts, and the government was forced to sign a settlement with Japan. This was used by the Japanese as a propaganda issue to make the Asian countries aware of the victory as a triumph of the East over the West. "When Japan defeated Russia in 1904 and thereby showed that an Asian nation could defeat a great European power by adapting and improving the Western techniques of war, the victory sent a wave of pride through Asia!"<sup>3</sup>

A third factor which influenced Asian nationalism was Western education of Asians. In India and Burma the quality of education which the British extended to selected elements of the native populations was fairly high. Such an education naturally included the ideas of freedom, democracy, and liberty along with explanations of the French and American revolutions. In the long run,

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<sup>2</sup> Ball, W. M. Nationalism and Communism in Southeast Asia (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1956), p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

this made the nationalists, especially the students, more aware of their state of subjection. The differences between what was preached and what was practiced was obvious and jarring. Thus, it is natural that in many countries in East Asia, the nationalist movements started from youth and student elements.<sup>4</sup> Western education also had an impact on the economic aspects of nationalism. This was in the creation of an unemployed "educated" class of young malcontents, who had been trained only for the clerical professions. The type of education which the British gave to the youth of colonial areas was to prepare them to join the civil service or to take up administrative and clerical positions. When the number of available jobs had been filled, there emerged a great number of unemployed "intellectuals." It was inevitable that they would become the nucleus of the nationalistic movements.<sup>5</sup>

The fourth factor which stimulated the nationalist movements in Asia and Africa was President Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of self-determination. Wilson's Fourteen Points stimulated the thinking of Asian leaders particularly because he was a spokesman for a nation which had itself thrown off colonialism.

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<sup>4</sup>Payne, Robert, The Revolt of Asia (New York: John Day Co., 1947), p. 8-9.

<sup>5</sup>Vinack, H. M., Far Eastern Politics in Postwar Period (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1956), p. 314.

An historic co-incidence made the colonial Asian countries look to Japan in the 1930's. While the West was in the depths of economic depression Japan was expanding her power in China at the expense of European interests there. In terms of foreign military adventures, the prestige of Japan was at its peak when the influence of the West was hampered by economic depression. This contrast caused many Asian nationalists to look to Japan as the leader of Asia, and provided an indirect stimulant to nationalism. The intensive propaganda which the Japanese launched before World War II was designed to appeal to racial and nationalistic sentiments. Japan's "co-prosperity" slogan was particularly directed to the countries under European colonial control.

Another factor by which the Japanese contributed to the rise of nationalism was the military training given to nationalists during the Japanese occupation of their countries in World War II. After the surrender of Japan in 1945 much of the arms and ammunition still in the hands of the Japanese army fell into the hands of nationalists. It is well known that numerous guerilla units were organized into effective fighting forces during the war in Indonesia, Burma and Vietnam. These units later offered strong resistance to

the British, French and Dutch forces when they attempted to reestablish control after the Japanese surrender.<sup>6</sup>

This resistance was possible because of the training provided earlier by the Japanese. When these "nationalists" revolted against the Japanese, the allies parachuted huge quantities of arms and ammunition where ever possible to them. After the surrender of Japan, the combination of training and arms constituted a formidable bargaining position for the anti-colonialists.<sup>7</sup>

The nationalist movements which reached fruition in the post war period had their individual beginnings at various times. Of these, the Chinese revolution under Sun Yat-sin was of the greatest importance. Sun Yat-sen established the Koumintang and formulated the San Min Chu I, the Three Principles of the People, which were to act as a guide in the rise of Chinese nationalism for the next forty years.

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<sup>6</sup> Rosinger, L. K. & Associates. The State of Asia; A Contemporary Survey (New York. Akfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 7.

<sup>7</sup> Vinacke, op. cit. p. 316.

In January, 1919 he called upon "Chinese Patriots" to follow his example in taking the following oath:

I truthfully and sincerely take this public oath that from this moment I will destroy the old and build up the new, and fight for the self-determination of the people, and will apply all my strength to the support of the Chinese Republic and the realization of democracy through the Three Principles.

A hundred years earlier India had begun to ferment under British rule. There British policy and methods first aroused the desire for individual liberty and self-government.

In India, the All Congress Party, the vanguard of Indian nationalism, was formed in 1885. Later, under the leadership of Mahatma Ghandi, it followed a policy of passive resistance until independence was achieved. It is notable that this party was not only occupied in the struggle for national emancipation, but also against the social shackles resulting from the cast system and the economic level of the general populace. From the standpoint of nationalism, it will be observed that the All Congress Party became the champion of regionalism in Asia in 1947.

For the first time in Asian History the Congress created a public platform for voicing political aspirations. It represented a nation as a whole, and above all,

modified the problems of race and caste, of religion, language, and province. During the formative years, the leadership of the Congress was in the hands of men who followed the "liberalism" of the West.

However, in the twentieth century the leadership of the Congress shifted to the radical Indo-phils whose first leader was Bal Gandahar Tilak. Tilak turned for inspiration to the Hindu past and appealed to the orthodox masses arousing a fierce, semi-religious nationalism. Tilak's work was later modified and directed toward non-violence by the Indian National Congress under the leadership of Mahandas Karamchand Gandhi.<sup>9</sup>

In Burma, the nationalist movement started in the 1920's with the first students' boycott against the British, and the formation of the General Council of Buddhist Associations. The peasant rebellion of 1931, and the student strike of 1936 were the outstanding milestones in the history of nationalism in Burma. After 1945, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, under the leadership of Aung San and U Nu, agitated for independence, which the British granted in 1948.

In the early 1900's the emphasis of Indonesian nationalism, except for its Pan-Islamic and Modernist

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<sup>9</sup> Ball, W. M. op cit. p. 97.

Islamic currents, was cultural rather than political.<sup>10</sup>

In early 1942, the weak, half-hearted defense put up by most Dutch land forces against the invading Japanese made a tremendous impression on the Indonesians.<sup>11</sup> On February 14, 1942, the Japanese attacked and quickly overran South Sumatra. Early on March 1st they landed on Java and within eight days the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, Lt. Gen. Ter Poorten, surrendered in the name of all Allied forces in Java. Regardless of one's analysis of the circumstances of the Dutch defeat, it resulted in two clear consequences. First, Dutch prestige in the eyes of the Indonesians suffered a devastating blow. Second, many Indonesians were convinced that, if given arms, they could have done as well as the Japanese. When the Japanese arrived, they were generally enthusiastically received. The popular feeling that they came as liberators was reinforced by their immediately allowing the display of the red and white Indonesian national flag and the singing of Indonesia Raya, the national anthem, both of which had been forbidden by the Dutch.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 64.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 102.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. p. 160.

Shortly after their arrival, the Japanese released Sukarno, the future President of Indonesia, from a Dutch jail in Benculen, and allowed him to proceed to his home island of Java. Sukarno worked openly with the Japanese while maintaining contact with an underground resistance organization. In November, 1943 Sukarno went to Tokyo to express the thanks of the people of Java for the measure of self-government granted them by the Japanese.

Another consequence of the Japanese occupation, extremely important in developing nationalist sentiments among Indonesians was the tremendous increase in national self-confidence of most educated Indonesians. This arose from the necessity of the Japanese to employ Indonesians in most of those administrative and technical positions from which they had removed Europeans.<sup>13</sup>

On August 17, 1945 the Indonesian nationalists drew up a declaration of independence. The Indonesian revolution had been launched and the popular response throughout the archipelago was tremendous. Four years of military action against Indonesian forces, the intervention of the United Nations and pressure from the United States forced the Netherlands to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia on December 27, 1949.

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<sup>13</sup> Ibid, p. 132

In the Indo-Chinese peninsula, the causes of nationalism were found to be the following:<sup>14</sup>

- 1) The absorption of French attitudes of liberty, fraternity, and equality.
- 2) The economic difficulties arising from scattered land holdings, resulting in reduced production in agriculture.
- 3) Reliance on foreign imports, especially for consumer goods and capital machinery.
- 4) Exploitation of labor and natural resources by the French colonials.
- 5) Unemployed "intellectuals," constituting a cadre of political rebels.

The first manifestation of a regional solidarity came with the early Japanese military victories. In November, 1943 the Assembly of Greater East Asia Nations was held in Tokyo.<sup>15</sup> The meeting was attended by delegates from the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma and Thailand, all of which were under full or semi-Japanese occupation.

Towards the end of World War II the idea of a unified Southeast Asia was propagated by the South East Asia Command (SEAC) under the command of Lord Mountbatten. The command had its headquarters in Ceylon, and it seemed to make the phrase "Southeast Asia" assume military, geographic and political significance which heretofore the colonial powers had managed to avoid.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Payne, op. cit., pp. 8 -9.

<sup>15</sup>Vanderbosch, Amry, and Butwell, South East Asia Among World Powers (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1947), p. 248.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid p. 248.

It should be mentioned here that the All-India Congress and the Koumintang Party had been the leading exponents of nationalism and regionalism, although their efforts had been minor, conflicting, and irregular. A post war gathering of Asian countries was the meeting of the South East Asia League, which was held in Bangkok in September, 1947.<sup>17</sup>

The Bangkok meeting was sponsored by the Communist Viet Minh, and from the outset had obvious leftist characteristics. The leadership was contributed by the ex-Prime Minister of Thailand and the famous Laotian Communist Tran Van Luan. When Field Marshall Phibul Songram came into power in Thailand, the League was suppressed on the grounds that it was a communist front organization.

Another form of regionalism was proposed by General Aung San of Burma, who suggested economic co-operation among the Asian countries which would be an added weapon in the anti-colonial struggle.<sup>18</sup> With his assassination, however, the idea died also and his successor U Nu did not carry the program through.

Also in 1947 the Thailand Prime Minister, Nawasawat proposed a Pan-South East Asian Union, with France and Thailand to be the main sponsors.<sup>19</sup> It was to include France and

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. pp. 248-9.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. pp. 249, 250.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p. 250.

Thailand, plus Burma, Indonesia, North Borneo and India. However, the idea received apathetic response among the other countries, mainly because France was a colonial power in the area.

The first successful conference was the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi. This was mainly under Indian sponsorship and constituted the first post-war effort toward unity and co-ordination of anti-colonial drive.<sup>20</sup> Nationalist China was cool towards this idea. The result of the meeting was the establishment of a Secretariat (Non-governmental) to convene another Asian Relations Conference. This never materialized.

In 1949 a conference on Indonesia was held in New Delhi, under the sponsorship of the Indian government, for the purpose of agitating for Indonesian independence.

In 1950, Australia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia were participants in what was called the Baguio Conference. It was held under Philippine sponsorship and was intended to set up an anti-Communist alliance. The original purpose, however, was defeated by neutralist elements.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 190.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p. 201.

In 1953 the first Asian Socialist Conference was held in Rangoon.<sup>22</sup> The importance of this gathering was insignificant because it was ideological in content and very few Asian Socialists parties were in control of their governments.

In April, 1954, the leaders of India, Burma, Pakistan, Indonesia and Ceylon met together specifically for talks about relations among themselves at the invitation of Sir John Kotealala. He called upon the countries of Southeast Asia to unite in a joint endeavor to become an effective force in the preservation of world peace, expressing the hope that the nations premiers would frequently come together for consultation along the lines of the Commonwealth premiers. Thus was the Colombo Conference born.<sup>23</sup>

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Vandenbosch, Amry, and Butwell, op. cit. p. 257

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Wint, Guy. What is the Colombo Plan? (London: The Batchworth Press, 1952), p. 13.

## CHAPTER II

### NEUTRALISM

Another ideological force paralleling Asian nationalism which influenced its relationship with nations and other ideologies was the concept of neutralism. Only Pakistan among the earlier mentioned Colombo powers did not openly and positively support the doctrine of neutralism.

An understanding of the historical forces behind neutralism is necessary to comprehend the significance of the Bandung Conference.

The term neutralism is being used by many leaders who proclaim their independence from both blocs. Unlike the legal term of neutrality, neutralism is not a pre-determined position to be taken in case of emergencies. It is a day to day method of dealing with the vexing question of East-West relationships. "It asserts that each state is determined to go its own independent way in accordance with its own current estimate of its own interests; and it expresses the hope of getting along with both sides and doing business with both sides and perhaps influencing both sides and even of serving as a bridge to bring them closer together."<sup>24</sup>

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Robert Strausz-Hupe, American-Asian Tensions (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), p. 179.

The two main sources of neutralism have been colonialism, which once covered almost all of Asia and Africa and the fear of atomic war. The newly independent countries know that if it were not for the World War II and the Japanese conquest of Southeast Asia, colonialism might still rule. They also know that since 1919 communists everywhere supported their fight for independence against Western colonialism.

Since they have achieved their independence, the formerly colonial countries of Asia and Africa find themselves preoccupied with questions of industrialization and the raising of pitiful living standards.

The importance of these countries to United States foreign policy should not be underestimated. The geographic and demographic position of India, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic places them in a position to exert considerable moral pressure on Moscow and Peking.

It also happens that it is the uncommitted nations of Asia, rather than the pro-American ones, which in general have made the greatest progress toward political stability and decent standards of living.<sup>25</sup>

Essentially, neutralism is a policy of "non-alignment" with either of the two power blocs, the Russian or the American, and at least theoretically of equidistance politically from them. But it claims to be much more than

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Strausz-Hupe, op. cit., p. 196

mere isolationism. Its chief spokesman, Nehru, says it is a positive and active policy, not a negative one. Neutralism tries to mediate and prevent conflicts, not simply to stay out of them.<sup>26</sup>

In a press conference in June, 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower spoke with such understanding of the neutralists position and of the military dangers to which "committed" countries were exposed, that stalwart members of NATO and SEATO were left puzzled and resentful.<sup>27</sup> A few days later Secretary of State John Foster Dulles left the "uncommitted" countries puzzled and resentful by stating that neutralism was obsolete, and "except in unusual circumstances, an immoral and shortsighted conception." Under questioning at a press conference later, Mr. Dulles indicated that, whatever might be said about neutralism, there were, in our harrassed world, no really "immoral" neutrals, although countries which denounced collective security pacts, he felt were promoting a "somewhat wrong view of neutrality."<sup>28</sup> Here the Secretary of State evidenced no understanding of the position of India, for example, which does not connect the concept of neutrality with her foreign policy of neutralism.

In Manila, meanwhile, Vice President Nixon was explaining that the United States believes in the right of

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Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 98.

<sup>27</sup>

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Neutrality: Varying Tunes," Foreign Affairs, October, 1956, p. 57.

<sup>28</sup>

John Foster Dulles, Department of State Bulletin (Washington: Government Printing Office, July, 1956).

each nation to chart its own course, but "has no sympathy for that brand of neutralism which makes no moral distinction between communism and the free world".<sup>29</sup> These varying references to neutralism serve to point out the difficulty in identifying this concept, in dealing with specific situations.

The proponents of neutralism feel that the remaining uncommitted countries must remain independent of either bloc, because as long as they are free to support or oppose they can tip the scales in favor of peace. Once they are committed they can no longer exert sufficient influence to avoid war. It was this influence that was brought to bear on Communist China and secured agreements regarding future relations with her neighbors in Asia. While Communist China might very well transgress against South Korea or Formosa without violating her pledges at Bandung, she could no longer act freely in Laos, Burma, Siam or Cambodia.<sup>30</sup>

President Sukarno, in a speech before the Foreign Policy Association in New York on May 24, 1956, stated that the neutralist group did not advocate neutrality and did not attempt to withdraw from world conflicts. The neutralists, said Sukarno, have a part to play in the world

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<sup>29</sup> The New York Times, August 17, 1956.

<sup>30</sup> Formosa and North and South Korea were not invited to the Bandung Conference.

conflicts and will continue to act in the interests of world peace. "In the sense that the neutralists have appeared late on the world stage, they have no long tradition of any particular foreign policy, no entangling alliances, no historical enmities. Because of this, they may, through true statesmanship, be able to approach each issue with an open mind and an independent viewpoint."<sup>31</sup>

Prime Minister Nehru has also been concerned with the American reaction to neutralism. In a nationwide televised speech from Washington on December 18, 1956, he defended India's neutralism and offered reassurances about India's loyalty to the cause of democracy. He declared that India's policy of "non-alignment in any military or similar pact or alliance" was a "positive and Dynamic approach" to the problems confronting his country. In reporting on his speech, the New York Times frequently used neutralism, neutral and neutrality interchangeably to add to the confusion of this new policy.<sup>32</sup>

In the Indian view, the contest for power between the United States and the Communist bloc appears as a major source of the tensions which have arisen between India and the United States during recent years. Practically all of the points on which India and the United States take issue,

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<sup>31</sup> U. S. News and World Reports, May 31, 1956.

<sup>32</sup> The New York Times, December 19, 1956.

such as economic aid, color discrimination, the use of force in international relations, and the whole complex of questions usually called colonialism, take on their additional significance as far as the Indians are concerned, because of the cold war. Indian leaders are convinced that to become embroiled in this bipolar struggle would be tantamount to losing everything that India has gained in her long struggle for national independence.

Prime Minister Nehru has said often that there is no justification for saying that there can be only two ideologies in the world; one represented by Communist Russia and the other by some of the Western countries. "This is too great a limitation of the power of thinking, or of action. Nehru says it is true that these ideologies are, in a sense, dominating the world today and are colliding with each other. This is partly because behind these two ideologies there is enormous military and economic power. But it is not the ideology that dominates; but the power behind them."<sup>33</sup>

Whereas the United States and the Soviets feel that the East-West conflict is the most important consideration in world affairs, the neutralist view is that colonialism in the economic sense, and the building up of the underdeveloped countries constitutes the most important problem

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<sup>33</sup> Tibor Mende, Nehru (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1956), p. 74.

facing the world today.

The most striking difference between the views of the United States and those of India are regarding recognition of Red China. China looms large and important both in the Asian scene and in Indo-American relations. Shortly after the Communists came into power on the mainland, Prime Minister Nehru told a group of reporters in New York that the happenings in China are such that they cannot be ignored.

Since 1949 India has tried to support China in her dealings with the West, and has been puzzled and disturbed by the United States policy of refusing to recognize the Communist government and refusing to seat that regime in the United Nations. As far as New Delhi is concerned, it is mainly a question of Peking's being able to maintain effective control over nearly six hundred million Chinese and to rule the country with undisputed authority.

One of the major goals in India's foreign relations during recent years has been to make China more acceptable to the world. Nehru and other spokesmen in ranking positions have often reiterated their contention that there can be no settlement of the problems of the Far East or of Southeast Asia unless the central fact of the existence of the People's Republic of China is accepted and acted upon by all the nations which are concerned with the stability of

that sector of the globe.<sup>34</sup> In a speech delivered in the summer of 1954, Nehru went as far as to say that the exclusion of Red China from the United Nations was the root cause of all international trouble during the past four years, that is, since the Korean War.

The second obstacle from the Indian point of view is the United States policy of military pacts to contain Communism. These pacts, starting with NATO, have been used time and time again, according to Nehru, not to contain Communism but to continue colonialism in Africa and Asia.

India feels that our NATO allies are using the arms we furnish them to continue their domination of Africa. The liquidation of Western colonialism in Africa, its last major stronghold, and the eradication of all its vestiges on the Asian continent are basic objectives of Indian foreign policy. It might even be more accurate to call them guiding principles, for India sees colonialism almost exclusively as an abstract moral issue rather than as a mosaic of concrete political problems.<sup>35</sup> This distinction helps to explain why India, in her anticolonial policies, has come into

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<sup>34</sup> Washington Star, July 12, 1954.

<sup>35</sup> Mende, op. cit., p. 34.

serious conflict with the United States. India stands unalterably opposed to whatever "white" colonialism remains, and is apparently unable to see the problem in terms of what the West considers to be the realities of world politics.

The United States, however, is unwilling to concede to India a monopoly of the moral approach in international affairs. The United States will not accept the Indian belief in the good intentions of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, nor does it wish to place its faith in mere moral suasion where the rights of the weaker peoples to chart their own future is at stake.

Thus, since 1948, the United States has made NATO the cornerstone of international relations in the West. India, on the other hand, demands that the West accept the emancipation of colonial areas as the prime and absolute moral imperative confronting the world at this historical junction. Emancipation, says India, should be immediately, notwithstanding the expansionist threats of the Soviet and Chinese communists. In making this demand India does so without fully realizing that acceptance of such a demand would involve the disintegration of the Western defense structure.

However, there is some recognition in India of the fact that the United States, while publicly taking its stand at the side of the colonial powers, has been quietly exerting pressure on them to grant the right of self determination and self rule to the areas under their control.

India, as well as some of the other neutralists states feel that our policy of military aid and trying to build up military strength to oppose communism may bring on the war they want to avoid at all costs. They have indicated that they had rather have freedom to make mistakes on their own rather than forfeit some of their freedom in exchange for military assistance.

The psychological makeup of the leaders vary greatly within their own circle. Nehru, a Fabian Socialist from school days in England, is trying desperately to bring the Indian masses into the modern world. His efforts to improve the economic position of India's people takes priority over everything. In order to improve the economic position of India he must have peace. To avoid war Nehru would certainly wish aside any unpleasantness in international affairs, because for Nehru and India, the avoidance of conflict is a minimum requirement if the Indian people are ever to taste the fruits of the twentieth century. Nehru is also politically wise.

He knows that his personal power rests on his ability to walk the tight rope between the East and the West. The moment Nehru attaches himself to either camp he becomes not a captain but a lieutenant among many.

What is true of Nehru is also true of other neutralists. Nasser moved to power on the shoulders of the Egyptian army. Iraq and Egypt have long struggled for the rulership of the Arab World and for Nasser to remain passive is to insure his eventual collapse. Nasser, too, is aware that any alliance will only prevent the necessary flexibility he needs to unite the Arab peoples.

Sukarno also faces similar problems. He is a Constitutional President without actual power. He must continue to exercise political flip-flops to stay in power. In 1957 the Communist Party gained control of Java's main population centers at the expense of the party Sukarno himself established. Sukarno's other political foes, who are largely anti-communist, also gained at the expense of Sukarno's own party. To abandon an independent policy at this time would certainly cause the fall of Sukarno and might well result in civil war.

Another neutralist is President Tito of Yugoslavia. "Although Tito is a Communist, he has won his greatest renown by successfully fighting Moscow's attempt to dominate him and exploit his country."<sup>36</sup>

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Hamilton Fish Armstrong. op. cit. p. 60.

Another important state following neutralism is Indonesia. One word can be used to describe Indonesian foreign and domestic policy--the word is Merdeka. Merdeka has connotations which make it a shorthand reference of independence, anticolonialism, neutralism, nationalism, in fact everything. Intense national pride causes the Indonesians to react violently to any presumed threat to Indonesian independence or to the nation's complete freedom of action.

During the first few years after independence, Indonesian leaders frequently made reference to the United States in glowing terms. However, extreme nationalism dominates Indonesian reactions to all political problems, and, as such, forms the root of Indonesian-American political relations. Thus Indonesians have indicated a strong sensitivity to any apparent attempt by the United States or any other nation to influence or to intercede in Indonesian affairs. Many Indonesians also feel that NATO, SEATO and other defense alliances were organized to perpetuate colonialism throughout Asia and Africa. This feeling was enforced by demonstrations by the Indonesian Communist Party and the Party Nationalist Indonesia. The Nationalist Party was founded by President Sukarno.

Indonesia's long experience with Western colonialism, her identification with the Asian-African area and her sympathy for other Moslem countries, influences Indonesia's foreign policy.

Although Indonesia remains greatly concerned with the condition of North Africans and Arabs, the most important colonial issue for Indonesia is the dispute with the Dutch over Western New Guinea. New Guinea was part of the Dutch East Indies and still is under Dutch control, although they evacuated the rest of Indonesia in 1950. The United States has taken no part in the debate at the United Nations on this matter, and the Indonesians have taken this to mean they support the Dutch. This abstention on an issue vital to Indonesia has made understanding between the two countries difficult.

Indonesia's foreign relations are based entirely on Indonesia's version of neutralism. All major political groups - from the right wing Moslems to the Communists agree on this "independent foreign policy." The principle of non-identification with either the Soviet bloc or the West has guided Indonesia's foreign policy since the advent of complete independence in 1949.

The Indonesians invariably describe their policy as "independent" rather than neutral. The term neutralism is deliberately avoided in contexts which might be confused

with neutrality. They feel that by carrying out an independent foreign policy, there will be more opportunity to provide mediation between the conflicting powers and increase the power of Indonesia.

The similarity between Indonesia's independent foreign policy and India's neutralism is apparent in the references to mediation, non-involvement, and the promotion of peace so consistently found in Indonesian statements on foreign affairs.

The leadership of the neutralists countries has, for the most part, been trained in Western Universities and has generally accepted Western thinking. While this may seem to be an advantage to the West it also has its drawbacks. The fact that they led armies of patriots in the fight for liberation restricts the extent to which they can associate themselves with Western policies.

"To sustain the dedication and the suffering of the rebellion against the colonial powers, the leaders of independence movements had to elaborate the distinction between themselves and their rulers which they derived from a claim to superior morality or at least superior spirituality. When the battle was won the independence finally achieved, many leaders of newly independent countries have had to realize, at least subconsciously, that they were

inwardly a good deal closer to their former rulers than to their own countrymen.<sup>37</sup>

Viewed from this angle, neutralism and anti-colonialism are an absolute necessity from a domestic standpoint. The leaders may feel that by constantly reminding themselves and their followers that they are now independent will keep the masses under control until that far off day arrives when the promised economic fruits of independence will be realized.

This explains why the most strident advocates of neutrality are often the very people who in dress, bearing, and manner of thinking are closest to the West-- indeed, who often have spent very little of their lives in their own countries.

The fact that nationalism was achieved over the ruins of Western Colonialism makes it much easier for the new leaders to gain support for foreign policies which continue the theme. "These conditions produce an almost irresistible temptation to defer the solution of difficult domestic problems by entering the international arena, to solidify a complicated domestic position by triumphs in the international field."<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup>Kissinger, Henry L., Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy  
New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1958, p. 216.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 219-220.

## CHAPTER III

### EVENTS LEADING TO THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

It has been in the international field that the leaders of the newly independent Asian nations have been most active. The meeting of the Colombo powers in Ceylon presented another opportunity for the leaders to gather informally and suggest the formation of a conference to include not only themselves but all of the independent nations of Asia and Africa.

Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia said that the idea of regional cooperation among former colonial powers took shape at various social gatherings held in Washington, D. C. during the early 1950's. Dr. Ali, who was Indonesian Ambassador to the United States at the time, said that the ambassadors of several Arab and Asian nations gathered informally, usually at social gatherings in their homes and discussed the desirability of increasing their contact with one another.

Dr. Ali made an informal suggestion for a meeting of Asian and African nations in a speech before the Council of World Affairs in New Delhi. Although Nehru was skeptical of any results the conference might achieve, he reluctantly agreed to the meeting after Dr. Ali's speech was received with much acclaim in India's press.

Dr. Sastroamidjojo's suggestion was accepted in principle at the Colombo meeting and the Asian-African Conference was publicly proposed in the Colombo Powers' Joint communique of May 2, 1954.<sup>39</sup>

The purpose of the meeting was left undefined, but Indonesia's Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo in discussing it said: "Asians will have to make decisions on their own future, without interference by the Western World."<sup>40</sup>

Nothing more was done about the conference until the fall of 1954. Then, Nehru, at the prodding of Sastroamidjojo who was then on a visit to New Delhi, issued a joint statement reaffirming the desirability of such a conference to further "peace" and a "common approach to problems."

This joint statement was followed a few weeks later by a similar joint statement issued by Nehru and Burma's Prime Minister U Nu in Rangoon. The Prime Ministers of all five Colombo Powers met in Bogor, Indonesia in December, 1954 and made a definite decision to hold the conference in Bandung during the month of April, 1955.

At the close of their meeting in Bogor, the Colombo Powers set forth the four general purposes of the conference as follows:

1. "To promote good will and cooperation among the nations of Asia and Africa, to explore and advance their mutual as well as common interests, and to establish and further

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Kahin, George, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 2.

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Barnett, American Universities Field Staff, ADB-5-'55, p. 4.

friendliness and neighborly relations;"

2. "To consider problems of special interest to Asian and African peoples, e. g., problems affecting national sovereignty and of racialism and colonialism;"

3. "To consider social, economic and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented;"

4. "To view the position of Asia and Africa and their peoples in the world today and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation."<sup>41</sup>

No specific agenda items for the Asian-African Conference were proposed at the December meeting but some clues about the problems in the minds of the five conveners were provided by the subjects raised in their communique summarizing the discussion at Bogor. These included: Implementation of the Geneva conference decisions on Indo-China, Indonesia's claim to West Irian, the independence movement in Tunisia and Morocco, nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and the problems of economic cooperation and development. It was decided at Bogor that invitations would be sent to all sovereign and independent states in Asia and Africa, and that since many of those invited did not have mutual diplomatic relations it should be specifically stated that attendance at this conference would not imply any changes in the diplomatic status between nations.

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<sup>41</sup>

Ibid.

It was also decided that participants would not be bound by any decisions made at the conference unless they voluntarily accepted them.

The problems of even convening such a broad conference were apparent from the start, and the criteria established for attendance were soon violated. To induce the Arab states to come, Israel had to be excluded. South Africa was not invited because of its racist policies, yet "nations" such as the Gold Coast and Sudan were included even though they were not yet fully sovereign. Although no racial qualifications were mentioned, the three non-colored countries in Asia-Australia, New Zealand and the Soviet Union were not invited.

The invitations revealed the many problems of the various members. North and South Vietnam were invited, partially because one of the purposes was to ease tension in the former colonies in Indo-China, but North and South Korea were not. Some of the nations were technically at war with North Korea through the United Nations and others did not support Syngman Rhee of South Korea for various reasons. Communist China, which was formally recognized by only the five Colombo powers and three others among those invited, was asked to come, but Nationalist China, which still maintained diplomatic relations with many of the participants, was excluded. Japan was invited even though Indonesia, the host nation, was technically still at war with her.

Altogether, invitations were sent to 30 Asian and African countries, only one of which--the Central African Federation- declined to come. There was some hesitation on the part of Asian Countries closely aligned with the United States, to accept the invitation. However, Corlos Romulo, the Philippine Ambassador to Washington, felt that the United States should encourage the gathering. The United States neither supported or attempted to influence the proceedings.

Final reports listed the following nations in attendance: The African States of Liberia, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, and Sudan; the North African and middle Eastern states of Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey; India and Pakistan and the neighboring states of Ceylon, Nepal, and Afghanistan; the Southeast Asian states of Burma, Indonesia, South and North Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, and the only two nations which have been world powers in a military sense, Japan and the People's Republic of China.

Few major conferences have ever been held with so little clarification of aims as the Bandung Conference. Apart from the general statement of purposes drawn up at Bogor, no specific subjects for discussion were listed.

It was decided, in fact, not to try to formulate an agenda until all the invitees gathered at Bandung.

As a result, in the two and one-half months preceding the conference the field was left wide open for speculation about what the conference would consider. Much of the speculation was based upon guesses about the motives and purposes of India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Communist China's Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

There were some indications that aims of the Colombo powers might coincide to a considerable degree. Nehru, although firmly anti-communist in India, had taken a clear stand against alignment with either the Western or Soviet bloc in international affairs. He had severely criticised military alliances such as the Manila (SEATO) Pact sponsored by the United States. Nehru had advocated peaceful coexistence with the Communist states and had done everything possible to establish friendly relations with Peking.

Chou En-lai, had also, for his own reasons, attacked Western oriented military pacts and alliances and followed a line of supporting the idea of peaceful coexistence. Since the Geneva Conference, that stopped the fighting in Indo-China and established the division of

Vietnam, Communist China's foreign policy towards South-east Asian countries had clearly been one of tolerating and encouraging neutralism in that area.

In 1954 Chou En-lai had signed agreements with both India and Burma supporting the "Five principles of co-existence."<sup>42</sup>

George M. Kahin, of Cornell University, listed three important objectives of the Colombo powers in calling for an Asian-African Conference. Dr. Kahin stated that the avoidance of war between the United States and Communist China was a very important consideration. In late 1954 and early 1955 the area around Quemoy and Matsu off the East coast of China had been the scene of heavy fighting between the forces of Communist China and the Nationalists group which had fled five years earlier to Formosa. The United States had indicated that it might go to the aid of the Nationalists government in the event of an invasion of the islands by the Red Chinese.

Another objective of the conference was to encourage the diplomatic independence of the People's Republic of China. The third objective was the containment of

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<sup>42</sup>These principles were first announced in the preamble to the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet concluded on April 29, 1954, in Peking. They were reiterated in talks between Chou En-lai and Nehru in June, 1954, in New Delhi: Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems.

Chinese and Vietminh military and political power at the Southern border of China. The combatting of illegal and subversive Communist activities in their own countries was becoming a problem.<sup>43</sup>

India and Burma envisaged as a major objective of the Bandung Conference the application of a formula, first worked out by Nehru a year before, calculated to encourage China to follow a peaceful course. Though Nehru was in general convinced that China was honestly disposed to follow such a course, there remained in his mind some margin of doubt. These doubts were acknowledged by him in an unpublished circular letter written to his own Congress Party just after Chou En-lai's visit to New Delhi in June, 1954.

Nehru later developed the thesis of Red China's willingness to abide by the Five Principles of coexistence might be increased if "an environment" could be created which would make it difficult or at least awkward for her to flout these principles. This environment could be created by Red China's reiterated public pledge of adherence to the principles against a background of a watchful Asian public opinion.

Such an environment could constitute a significant moral restraint against any diviation from these principles.

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<sup>43</sup>Kahin, op. cit., p. 4-5.

The more frequent Red China's pledge to observe these principles, and the wider the audience, the more substantial would be the environment - and the clearer the restraining force. The Asian-African Conference was seen as providing maximum conditions for the building up of this environment.

The Indians, Burmese, and Indonesians, from experience in their own nationalist movements were convinced that China's nationalism was a force of such strength as to ensure that she will not align her foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union unless this is seen to be clearly in her own national interest. Thus, they believed that if China were given wider contacts and a broader range of diplomatic maneuver, she would tend to move away some distance from the Soviet orbit. It was their opinion that to the extent that this distance increases the tendency towards world politico-military polarization would be diminished.

Nehru believed that China was probably devoted to a policy of peace for several years to come and would not undertake aggressive action unless persuaded that the United States was preparing for hostile action against her.

Moreover, it had long been the view of all five Colombo powers that one factor conducive to a warlike attitude on China's part was her leaders' lack of contact with the outside world. They believed the Chinese had

developed a distorted impression of the outlook of the non-communist governments of Asia towards the West. They also believed that China underrated their dislike of China's close relationship with the Soviet Union.

The Colombo leaders felt that if the Chinese established further contacts with Asian leaders and came to understand their outlooks in international affairs they would be less inclined to undertake policies which would cause a world war.

Thus the governments of the five sponsoring countries felt that the Asian-African Conference could provide an opportunity for China to increase her diplomatic independence of Soviet Russia.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, December 18, 1958, Indonesian Consulate, New York City. Dr. Ali and the author spent three hours discussing the Bandung Conference and the role of the neutralists at the Conference. Much of the material selected for this paper was discussed at length with the Conference chairman. The statements regarding the People's Republic of China made by the author were discussed with the former Indonesian Prime Minister.

## CHAPTER IV

### BANDUNG CONFERENCE

The problem of providing for an agenda for the Asian-African Conference was left undecided by the host countries and the invitations stipulated that the invited nations themselves would decide what should be taken up at the meeting. The day before the Conference was scheduled to begin Prime Minister Nehru contacted the twenty two delegations that had arrived and, to save time during the regular conference, decided to adopt rules governing the order of business, procedure and agenda.

Nehru had been skeptical from the beginning about the ability of the nations to accomplish anything substantial at the Conference and, in an effort to minimize the danger of division, attempted to cancel the pre-arranged schedule that had allotted twenty minutes to the head of each delegation to present his greetings and introduce ideas and suggestions. If this procedure was to be followed the opening speeches alone would take two full days. Nehru was also of the opinion, though he did not express this to most delegates, that elimination of these speeches might forestall introduction of particular controversial problems and partisan sentiments which might deal an early blow to hopes for the conference's unity and harmony. Again the

twenty-one assembled delegations agreed to accept India's stand, but in this case the agreement of many was grudging.<sup>45</sup> Pakistan's delegation was headed by Mohammed Ali, who arrived in Djakarta shortly before the meeting was over and refused to accept the decisions. Pakistan was particularly dismayed because she was one of the sponsoring nations. Many other delegations that arrived the next day, April 18, also sided with Pakistan. The decisions were later reversed and each delegation was allowed, as previously agreed on, to address the Conference.

The drama surrounding the opening session took on added meaning with the arrival of Chou En-lai. Several days earlier an Indian airliner, The Kashmir Princess, had crashed, killing several members of the Red Chinese delegation. On the morning of April 18th, thousands of Indo-Chinese citizens lined Djalan Afro-Asian, Bandung's main avenue, to cheer the Chinese Premier. The Indonesians gave their fellow Moslem--Gamel Abdel Nasser a tremendous welcome also.

President Sukarno of Indonesia gave the welcoming address and set the tone of the meeting:

Sukarno quickly made reference to the unique makeup of the Conference. "This is the first intercontinental conference of coloured peoples in the history of mankind! It is a new departure in the history of the world that leaders of Asian and African peoples can meet together in their own

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<sup>45</sup>President Sukarno, Report on Indonesia, Indonesian Embassy, Washington, D. C., June, 1955.

countries to discuss and deliberate upon matters of common concern. . . . for many generations our peoples have been the voiceless ones in the world. We have been the un-regarded, the peoples for whom decisions were made by others whose interests were paramount, the peoples who lived in poverty and humiliation."<sup>46</sup>

Sukarno introduced the colonial issue by reference to an analysis of colonialism he had made earlier. ". . . then I drew attention to what I called the 'Life-line of imperialism.' This line runs from the Straits of Gibraltar, through the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, The South China Sea and the Sea of Japan."<sup>47</sup> One of the audience, Premier Nasser of Egypt, eliminated the Suez Canal from Sukarno's list fifteen months later.

The changed map of Asia was acknowledged. "The passive peoples have gone, the outward tranquillity has made place for struggle and activity. Irresistible forces have swept the two continents."

A second major issue was introduced when Sukarno made mention of the fear of impending atomic conflict. "Yes, we are living in a world of fear. The life of man today is corroded and made bitter by fear. Fear of the future, fear of the hydrogen bomb, fear of ideologies." The conference

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<sup>46</sup>

Ibid

<sup>47</sup>

Ibid

went on record in its final communique as giving; "anxious thought to the question of world peace and cooperation. It viewed with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war."

The President was also cognizant of the many differences which separated the delegates. He said however: "We are united, for instance, by a common destation of colonialism in whatever form it appears. We are united by a common destation of racialism. And we are united by a common determination to preserve and stabilise peace in the world." The noted speaker again made reference to colonialism when he warned the delegates not to think of colonialism only in the classic sense. "Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, and actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation." The intensity of feeling on this subject is underlined by the thirteen times Sukarno made reference to colonialism during this opening address.

He made reference to America's role as the first nation to successfully overthrow a colonial government. "The battle against colonialism has been a long one, and do you know that today is a famous anniversary in that battle? On the eighteenth day of April, one thousand seven hundred and seventy five, just one hundred and eighty years ago, Paul

Revere rode at midnight through the New England countryside, warning of the approach of British troops and of the opening of the American War of Independence, the first successful anti-colonial war in history."

At this point the Indonesian president returned again to the prospects of an atomic war. " Not so long ago it was possible to take some little comfort from the idea that the clash, if it came perhaps could be settled by what were called "conventional weapons" - bombs, tanks, cannons and men. Today that little grain of comfort is denied us, for it has been made clear that the weapons of ultimate horror will certainly be used, and the military planning of nations is on that basis." ". . . What can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We can mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace."

The next speaker was Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia and newly elected President of the Asian-African Conference. Much of the credit for convening the conference goes to Dr. Ali. He first introduced the idea to the Colombo members while he was Foreign Minister of Indonesia. Later, when he was chosen Prime Minister, he actively began enlisting active support for the meeting.

Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo said that the foremost reason which gave birth to the Conference was the agonizing tensions from which the world was suffering. He asked: "Where do we, the people of Asia and Africa, stand and for what do we stand in the world dominated by fear; the fear that on any one day another war may be unleashed upon mankind, bringing horrors of destruction never dreamed of before?" Both Sukarno and Sastroamidjojo were concerned over remarks made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Council on Foreign Affairs in New York a year earlier. It was before this body that Secretary Dulles announced his massive retaliation policy.<sup>48</sup>

Sastroamidjojo reiterated the anti-colonial theme and charged that colonialism was among the main causes of present day tensions. "It may be true that the larger part of mankind accepts the obvious truth that colonialism is to be considered as a thing of the past, but the fact remains that colonialism is still very much alive."

"Next to colonialism, we meet racialism as an important source of tension. Racialism, in fact, is often- if not always- an aspect of colonialism, based on feelings

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John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy,"  
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, No. 761,  
(Washington, D. C., January 25, 1954.)

of superiority by the dominating group."

"Another and very serious source of tension is the low standard of living in practically all the Asian and African countries. For centuries our countries poured a never-ending stream of profits into the dominating countries, while we ourselves stayed poor and underdeveloped. In the aftermath of World War II, we won our independence, but our political freedom could not yet bring us economic independence nor erase the backwardness and underdevelopment from which our people have suffered so long."

Sastroamidjojo pointed with pride to his handiwork. "The world is following this conference with great interest and high hopes.. " .If we are able to express our desire and determination for peace in unmistakable terms, if our laborers will have some salutary influence on the way of thinking of mankind, if we can contribute to eliminating fear and want, so eagerly hoped for by all, then the Conference will have fulfilled its historic task."<sup>49</sup>

Despite pride in his efforts at convening the Conference, Dr. Ali was justifiably disappointed in the reception given it by the United States. The Soviet President, Voroshelov sent cabled greetings before and after the Conference. The United States Department of State remained cool throughout, although, Dulles later conceded that the

<sup>49</sup>

Report On Indonesia, op. cit.

Conference did contribute towards easing world tensions.<sup>50</sup> Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine Ambassador to the United States, represented his country at Bandung. He introduced a note of realism in an otherwise romantic setting. Romulo said: "There are at least three things more to be said here about this matter of national political freedom."<sup>51</sup>

"First it is perilously easy in this world for national independence to be more fiction than fact. Because it expresses the deepest desires of so many people in the world, it can be unscrupulously used as a shibboleth, as a facade, as an instrument for a new and different kind of subjection. ....I wonder if in such countries you could read in the press or hear in the public speeches of their spokesmen anything resembling the open criticism and other attacks that were common fare in places like India and the Philippines even before independence. I wonder if any of the spokesmen of these countries would ever speak as freely in criticism of the bigger country to which they feel friendly or allied as, say, we in the Philippines speak our minds about the United States....I think we ought to say plainly to each other when we think a puppet is a puppet."<sup>52</sup> This

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Interview with Dr. Ali Asatroamidjojo, (New York: December 18, 1958.)

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Carlos Romulo, Vital Speeches, City News Publishing Co., (New York: June 1, 1955)

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George Kahin, The Asian-African Conference. Cornell University Press, (Ithaca, New York: 1955), p. 9.

direct assault on the communist definition of freedom and independence was well understood by the delegates, a majority of which were educated in the Western-liberal tradition.

Romulo then directed his remarks to those countries who achieved political independence without corresponding increases in freedom for their people. "Secondly, is political freedom achieved when the national banner rises over the seat of government, the foreign ruler goes, and the power passes into the hands of our own leaders? Is the struggle for national independence the struggle to substitute a local oligarchy for the foreign oligarchy?....Is political freedom where only one political party may rule? .... It strikes me that autocratic rule, control of the press, and the police state are exactly the worst features of some colonialist systems against which we have fought all our lives and against which so many of us are still fighting."

The third item that Romulo chose for discussion was one which Nehru and Chou En-lai had attacked vigorously in many public speeches. Romulo defended the need of the smaller nations to enter into defensive arrangements with larger friendly powers to protect their newly won independence. "Finally, in this world of contending great powers, the independence of the small or weak nation is at best a

precarious and fragile thing. Obviously, the ultimate greater freedom will lie in a greater coherence, a uniting of regional and physical strength, in the greatest possible common action by all to avert the disaster of a new world war."<sup>53</sup>

Prime Minister Gamal Abdel Nasser, of the Republic of Egypt also spoke on the opening day. Prime Minister Nasser echoed the call of the two previous speakers in expressing concern over the growing danger of atomic war. "All over the world there is a growing sense of insecurity. The fear of war has been aggravated by the development of mass-destructive weapons capable of effecting total annihilation. The stakes are high in terms of the survival of mankind."<sup>53</sup>

The Egyptian leader also brought up the necessity for ending colonialism as a requirement for easing international tension. "Last, but not least, is the liquidation of colonialism which has always been a source of friction and unrest. Since the days of colonial expansion, the problem of colonial rule by alien powers has lain at the roots of many wars. We have been witnessing for some years the rising tide of nationalism not only in our part of the world but also in various parts of Asia and Africa. Our own experience shows us that nationalism when thwarted creates difficult problems; but if it is dealt with wisely

<sup>53</sup>

Kahin, op. cit. p. 10

and realistically, it responds with friendship and generosity. . . . I hardly need to emphasize that we live now in a difficult age and that the people have awakened and nothing can stem the tide of nationalism and progress."

On its third day the Conference went into the first of a long series of closed sessions devoted to discussions of substantive matters, and the Political Committee became the principal center of activity.<sup>54</sup>

During the meeting Chou En-lai pledged China's support of the Arab dispute with Palestine and in doing so linked the situation in the Middle East with his own problem with Taiwan. The strongly worded statement was not approved by the committee, however. Next the committee passed a resolution in favor of Indonesia's stand on West Irian. The Egyptian resolution on French North Africa was accepted in the following manner: "In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa their right to self-determination, the Asian-African Conference declares its support of the rights of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia to self-determination and independence, and urges the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of this issue without delay."<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup>Kahin, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>55</sup>Final Communique of Asian-African Conference, Report On Indonesia.

The most explosive issue of the Conference was introduced by Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon. Kotelawala told the members that: "There is another form of colonialism, however, about which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in our minds and to which some of us would perhaps not agree to apply the term colonialism at all. Think, for example, of those satellite states under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe--of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Are not these colonies as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa or Asia? And if we are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty to openly declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?"<sup>56</sup>

Kotelawala continued: "Indonesia took the strongest position on the North African question. Her delegate, Foreign Minister Sunario, asked that there be established a Committee of Good Offices which would have the function of closely following developments in North Africa and taking whatever measures it deemed proper to mediate between the French government and the people of North Africa in order to lessen tension."<sup>57</sup>

The remarks of the Ceylonese delegate almost disrupted the romantic illusion of solidarity the Conference had tried so hard to attain. Chou En-lai, fearing that Chinese policy would be dragged into the discussion,

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<sup>56</sup>Sir John Kotelawala, New York Times, April, 1955.

<sup>57</sup> Kahin, op. cit., p. 18.

announced that he would insist on delivering an oral speech in defense. However, these remarks were made in a hearing closed to the public and the Ceylonese Prime Minister did not offer his remarks to the general Conference in the form of a resolution.

Mohammed Ali of Pakistan stated that it was "unrealistic to condemn French colonialism while ignoring that of Soviet Russia, an imperialistic nation with satellites which had brought many people under its heel." China was not included in these remarks. "The distinguished delegate of China should not misunderstand the purpose . . . China is certainly not imperialistic."<sup>58</sup>

The discussion continued and the representative from Iran mentioned Iran's relations with Soviet Russia in 1946 when the Soviets withdrew from Iranian territory after strong intervention from the U. S. He mentioned the danger of subjugation, infiltration and subversion from Soviet agents within his own country.

"Nehru, gravely concerned over the disharmonious and disruptive drift of debate, then attempted to salvage the situation by classifying the countries of Eastern Europe as non-colonial and outside the field of the Conference's consideration. They were, he argued, recognized as sovereign and independent by the United Nations, and if the Conference chose to relegate them to the status of

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<sup>58</sup>Mohammed Ali, Times of Indonesia, Djakarta, April 19, 1955.

colonies it was challenging the United Nations' basis of recognition."<sup>59</sup>

The closed session also brought forth a charge by Burma's U. Nu that the United Nations "had more than one yardstick for measuring aggression." He was referring to a number of ex-Koumintang soldiers who fled into Northern Burma after the fall of China to the Communists. Burma has been trying to push them back into China or have them evacuated to Formosa since early 1950.

Cambodian Prince Norodom said that most of the states mistrusted the Communists and that the validity of co-existence was up to the Communists.

At this point the delegates of Turkey and Pakistan defended their right to join defensive pacts with the West. "Turkey's delegate strongly supported Pakistan's principle of collective self-defense, arguing that to co-exist a country must be prepared to defend itself; for small countries this meant collective defense arrangements, without which Turkey would have lost her independence."<sup>60</sup>

Nehru had gone on record many times earlier against any military pacts whatever and he singled out NATO for abuse.

The Indian leader then went into an attack on NATO and accused it of being a protector of colonialism. He charged: ". . . do the Honorable members of this assembly

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<sup>59</sup>Kahin, op. cit., p. 21

<sup>60</sup>Kahin, op. cit., p. 23.

realize that the NATO today is one of the most powerful protectors of colonialism? I say that explicitly. I am not saying that indirectly, but directly and explicitly. . . . We get letters from the NATO powers telling us 'You should not do anything in regard to Goa, you should not do this or that.'<sup>61</sup> Goa is a colony of Portugal, a NATO member, on the southwestern coast of India.

Nehru's position on military pacts was well-known before his speech to the political committee.

However, when the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel in June, 1950, India was among the first to join with the democratic countries in denouncing it as aggression, and promptly sent an Indian Army hospital unit to South Korea. Nehru explained later that "Any military assistance is beyond India's capacity and would make little difference." At the same time he declared that it was "perfectly clear" that North Korea launched a full-scale and well-planned invasion. Later, in carrying out the armistice terms in Korea, India contributed five thousand troops who supervised the repatriation of the prisoners.<sup>62</sup>

Although quick to accuse North Korea of aggression, India refrained from naming China as the aggressor after the Chinese Army had crossed the Yalu River to engage U. S. troops. But in China's eyes, as Peking had warned New Delhi, MacArthur's advance on the Yalu, not the Chinese

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<sup>61</sup>Nehru, Mimeographed release by Indian Information Service, Bandung, April 22, 1955.

<sup>62</sup>U.S. News and World Reports, Washington, D.C., September 15, 1950.

reaction to it, was an act of aggression. These proposals and actions hardly accord with neutralism as the world understands it. India's foreign policy therefore, as Nehru has often insisted, is independent and not neutral.<sup>63</sup>

Nehru then asked the political committee to consider the steps that might be taken by the Bandung powers. He suggested that the first step should be to make their views clear. He said that India would never take part in a war unless it was necessary to defend the sub-continent itself. He said: "If I join any of these big groups I lose my identity; I have no identity left, I have no view left. . . . If all the world were to be divided up between these two big blocs what would be the result? The inevitable result would be war. Therefore, every step that takes place in reducing that area in the world which may be called the unaligned areas is dangerous and a step that leads to war."<sup>64</sup> Nehru then stated his position on the security pacts. He said that every pact--meaning NATO, SEATO, Warsaw--has brought on insecurity and not security to the countries which have entered into them.

Chou En-lai submitted to the will of Nehru and was prepared to forgo speaking and hand out a written text in order to save time. However, he later delivered a second speech in reply to the addresses of several of the

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<sup>63</sup>Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru, The MacMillan Company, New York-1947, pp. 441-456.

<sup>64</sup>Nehru, Indian Information Service, op. cit.

delegates. "Apparently for Chou En-lai the addresses of several of the delegates were a matter of serious concern. He did not discard his mimeographed speech; it remained official, but he requested leave to supplement it with an oral address which he likewise designated as official. In this unscheduled off-the-cuff addendum Chou appeared to be deeply concerned both over the anxieties of Cambodia and Thailand regarding Chinese policy and over the strongly anti-Communist tone exhibited by so many of the delegates."<sup>65</sup>

In the mimeographed speech passed out to the delegates in lieu of a formal address, Chou En-lai seconded many of the statements already presented by earlier speakers. He also saw great significance in the conference because: "It is the first time in history that so many countries of Asia and Africa have gathered together to hold a conference. On these two continents live more than half of the world population."<sup>66</sup>

The Premier of 600 million Chinese also made the expected attack on colonialism: "Ever since modern times most of the countries of Asia and Africa in varying degrees have been subjected to the plunder and oppression of colonialism, and have thus been forced to remain in a stagnant state of poverty and backwardness. Our voices have been suppressed, our aspirations shattered, and our destiny placed in the hands of others."

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<sup>65</sup>Kahin, op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>66</sup>Chou En-lai, Vital Speeches, op. cit., p. 1275.

Chou then made reference to the changes that nationalism and the erosion of British, French and Dutch power made in Asia and Africa: "Now the face of the Asian-African region has undergone a radical change. More and more countries have cast off or are casting off the shackles of colonialism. The colonial powers can no longer use methods of the past to continue their plunder and oppression. The Asia and Africa of today are no longer the Asia and Africa of yesterday."

The expected attack on the United States came in reference to support of the Nationalists on Taiwan and the U.S. policy of overseas military bases. The communist theme of experimenting with the atomic bomb with Asian lives was also introduced. "The United States continues to create tension in the Taiwan area. Countries outside of Asia and Africa are establishing more and more military bases in the Asian and African countries. They are clamoring openly that atomic weapons are conventional arms and are making preparations for an atomic war. The people of Asia shall never forget that the first atomic bomb exploded on Asian soil and that the first man to die from experimental explosion of a hydrogen bomb was an Asian.<sup>67</sup>

The theme which many of the delegates presented concerning the ban of atomic weapons and a general reduction

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<sup>67</sup>Chou was making reference to the Japanese fisherman who died as a result of radioactive fall-out from an American Hydrogen Bomb test at Bikini.

in armaments was also mentioned by Chou En-lai: "The peace movement of the people in different countries has become more extensive and intensive. They demand that first of all the big powers should reach agreement on the reduction of armaments. They demand the prohibition of atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. They demand that atomic energy be used for peaceful purposes in order to bring welfare to mankind. . . . Like other countries in Asia and Africa we (China) are in urgent need of a peaceful international environment for the development of our independent and sovereign economy."<sup>68</sup>

The most "politically" important portion of Chou's mimeographed presentation went almost unnoticed at the time. This was his reference to the Suez Canal: "The struggle of the Egyptian people for the restoration of their sovereignty over the Suez Canal Zone, the struggle of the Iranian people for the restoration of sovereignty over their petroleum resources, and the demand for the restoration of territorial rights of India over Goa and of Indonesia over West Irian (West New Guinea), have all won sympathy from many countries in Asia and Africa." The immediate result of the Bandung Conference as far as Red China was concerned was diplomatic recognition from Egypt. The result as far as Egypt was concerned was perhaps a psychological boost for Nasser and

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<sup>68</sup>Chou, *Vital Speeches*, op. cit., p. 1276.

diplomatic support from the Asian and African nations for his subsequent nationalization of the Suez Canal Zone fifteen months later. The climate created by the Asian-African Conference stimulated and gave popular support to those nationalists who heretofore lacked international stature to complete their programs.

The supplementary speech was delivered orally by Chou En-lai on the second day of the Conference.<sup>69</sup> The speech quoted earlier was handed to the delegates after he delivered his supplementary address in response to criticisms he felt other delegates had directed against China.

"The Chinese delegation has come here to seek common ground, not to create divergence," said Chou. "Now first of all I would like to talk about the question of different ideologies and social systems. We have to admit that among our Asian and African countries we do have different ideologies and different social systems. But this does not prevent us from seeking common ground and being united." The common ground Chou sought was the "Five Principles of Co-existence" agreed on earlier between Nehru and Chou En-lai and later by U Nu of Burma and Chou En-lai.

The question of the lack of religious belief on the part of communist nations interjected in the Conference

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<sup>69</sup>Chou-Enlai, Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, 18th--24th April, 1955: Speeches and Communiques, Jakarta: Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia, May, 1955.

an anti-communist note that Chou felt he must answer. "Freedom of religious belief is a principle recognized by all modern nations. We Communists are atheists, but we respect all those who have religious belief. We hope that those with religious belief will also respect those without." Chou went on to say that China had seven million communists and tens of millions of Moslems and Buddhists, Protestants and Catholics and called for the community of Asian and African countries to unite those with religious belief and those without.

Chou then turned directly to the problems raised by Cambodia and Thailand regarding dual nationality of Chinese living within their country. Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand had charged that Thailand faced the threat "of infiltration and subversion, if not direct aggression," from a Thai politician organizing Thai-speaking Chinese in Yunnan province. Prince Wan also attacked the old Chinese custom of regarding all Chinese regardless of birth, desire, or domicile as citizens of China: "I also know for certain the attitude adopted by the People's Republic of China in regard to the so-called persons of dual nationality in Thailand or, in other words, to the Chinese community of 3,000,000 in Thailand out of a population of 18,000,000."

This problem of large alien populations living within national boundaries caused considerable trouble in almost all the countries of Asia. Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, and the

Philippines contain large numbers of Chinese citizens who remain unassimilated after generations of living outside China. This was clearly an issue which could not be explained away as anti-colonialism or anti-communism. It was anti-Chinese, and until China, regardless of her internal political control, could assist in solving this problem she would find it difficult to become acceptable to her Asian neighbors.

In this context, Chou said the problem of dual nationality was "something left behind by old China. . . . up to date Chiang Kai-shek is still using some very few overseas Chinese to carry out subversive activities against the countries where they are residing. The people's government of new China, however, is ready to solve the problem of dual nationality with the government of the countries concerned."

"Peking's willingness to carry out this promise was attested to later during the course of the Conference by Chou's negotiation of a treaty with Indonesia providing for the ending of dual nationality."<sup>70</sup>

The conciliatory attitude exhibited by Chou En-lai did much to lessen the fear of China in the eyes of other delegates. Nehru and others had felt that China was willing to get along better with her neighbors, and this seemed to confirm this belief.

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<sup>70</sup>Kahin, op. cit., p. 14.

## CHAPTER V

### THE RESULTS

The results of the Bandung Conference in terms of the aims of its five sponsors, particularly of their three foreign policy objectives, were fulfilled. Bandung tried to create the sort of environment that would serve as a moral restraint against possible Chinese tendencies of aggression. This was enough to decrease the danger of war between China and the United States. This view was also held by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Mr. Dulles expressed the view in a press conference that "the situation in the Formosa area is becoming less hazardous--there is less danger of war--than in the past few months." The Secretary of State stated: "At the Bandung Conference, the Asian nations have made it clear that they do not feel that the Formosa issue should be resolved by a resort to war by one side or the other."<sup>71</sup>

If the United States was willing to negotiate it would damage the improved reputation China had won at Bandung if she resorted to force without giving negotiations a fair trial. The moral restraint issued at the conference was against Chinese aggression or overt political

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<sup>71</sup>Dulles, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, No. 773, Washington, D. C., May 4, 1955.

involvement in Southeast Asia. Chou's repeated statements before the twenty-nine nations denied any aggressive designs by the Chinese communists.

Chou En-lai gave specific assurances to particular states against an overt action and cooperated in inducing North Vietnam to do the same. These statements by Chou were seen as making it awkward, in terms of Asian public opinion, for China to take covert actions in Southeast Asia. It was felt, also, that the local communist parties might induce Peking to scale down activity in those countries which she courted most.

The leaders of the five sponsoring nations believed that it would be easier for China, as a result of the Conference, to develop diplomatic independence of Soviet Russia. For at Bandung she had emerged significantly further from her previous isolation, and Chou En-lai had made her more acceptable to a number of states, particularly in the Near East. In fact, the most important country in the Near East--Egypt--offered diplomatic recognition a year later as a result of the contacts made at Bandung.

Peking's prospects for wider Asian-African support in the United Nations had been increased by Chou's efforts during the Conference to declare China's support for the principles of the United Nations' Charter.

It was also probable that his strong backing of the Arab states on the Palestine question had suggested to

some of their delegates that they might derive further advantage in this matter if Peking were represented on the Security Council.

The Chinese also profited by Jawaharlal Nehru's assistance at the Conference. Also as a result of the meeting, the Chinese sent a cultural delegation to Burma and established a consulate-general at Lashio, in North Burma. Nepal and Afghanistan established diplomatic relations with the Red Chinese in 1955.

Chou En-lai was also active in making friends with old enemies. At the Asian-African Conference, Chou gave a dinner for Romulo, the chief Philippine delegate, and Prince Wan Waithayakon, the chief Thai delegate. He also suggested a treaty of non-aggression with the Philippines, to show that the Chinese Communist had no aggressive designs against that country.

As Egypt heads the Arab bloc in the Middle East and North Africa, special efforts were made by the Reds to cultivate close relations with the Egyptian delegates. The Egyptian Minister of Religious Foundations, Sheikh Akmed Hassan El Bakhouri was invited to visit Communist China, particularly Sinkiang where a large Moslem community lives.

Discussions between the Chinese Communist delegates and the Egyptian Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mohammed Abon Nousseis, were held toward promoting closer economic cooperation between their governments. During the visit of Egyptian delegates immediately after the close of

the conference, a three year trade treaty was signed.

At Bandung, China moved closer to the rest of Asia, and Asia whose political atmosphere was less tense and whose leaders were for the most part less apprehensive and understood one another better than before the Conference. And at Bandung, non-Communist Asia asserted its will to be heard more attentively in the halls of world diplomacy.

The Conference represented an effort by these countries to regain their personality and international dignity and was an assertion of the personality vis-a-vis the West.

This successful assertion of Asian and African personality tended to beget an increased greater determination to share more fully with the West in decisions affecting the interest's of their countries. It seems likely that this determination will, in the future, grow and endure.<sup>72</sup>

The Bandung Conference has meant different things to various observers. Each view is somewhat colored by the individual's past experiences and by what he wishes to read into the meeting. Nehru, Pannikar and Fitzgerald saw in the Conference a support of India's neutralist policy. Chou En-lai saw in it an opportunity to exhibit "New China" in a favorable light. Kotelawala and Wan used it to warn against international communism.

Gamal Abdel Nasser perhaps viewed it in terms of

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<sup>72</sup>Similar opinions have been expressed by George Kahin, op. cit. and Frank Moraes, editor Times of India, Bombay, July 15, 1955.

future support for the nationalization of the Suez Canal. His later actions seem to indicate a new bravado in face of Western pressure. The smaller nations only attended as guests--not participants. They were included only to fill up the seats.

Since April, 1955, many of the nations have taken a stronger stand against the West. Sukarno of Indonesia, Sayyed of Jordan, Azm of Syria, and Hassan of Yemen have all been more difficult in their dealings with the West. Bandung has certainly served to encourage actions which appear to have resulted in political defeats for the democratic world. But have they been defeats? Certainly they have resulted in black anti-Western headlines in much of the world's press. However, the best defense against communism is strong nationalism.

It is far too early to judge what role the Bandung Conference will play in the twentieth century. To the contemporary Western world our times are called the "Atomic Age" or the "Space Age." To future historians it is more likely to be known as the Age of the Asian-African Revolution. Two-thirds of the earth's population is engaged in a political and social revolution unparalleled in modern history. For us in the United States, the problem of adjusting our national policies to the changing political map of the world is far more important in the long run than refinements of the missile race.

The speakers at the Afro-Asian Conference spoke harshly of past experiences with the West and with the white race in general. They spoke freely of co-existence and peaceful cooperation through the United Nations, but there was an unmistakable pale of racism throughout the entire proceedings. The delegates spoke freely of the need of technical assistance from the more highly developed nations and at the same time criticised the policies that created economic progress.

The majority of the representatives were well aware of the work and time required to build up the economy and improve the social life of their people. None so far have found the courage to risk their popularity in order to institute the changes that must come before a nation can be transformed into a modern state. China alone has shown a willingness to extract supreme sacrifices from her people in order to industrialize. She has created a political state, under the name of communism, which has frightened even the most dedicated Marxists in the Soviet Union.

The nations which gathered at Bandung met there in much the same atmosphere which surrounded the American delegation to Paris after the end of World War I. The same Wilsonian optimism, the same Wilsonian faith prevailed. The same disregard or underestimation of the age old forces of self-interest was evident at Bandung.

The complex created at Bandung was a reaction against

the bi-polarization of the world after World War II. The sponsors of the event felt that they could keep their nations from being drawn into the orbit of the West or the Communist bloc. They also felt that China was more Asian than Communist and would also see the advantages of the independent foreign policy they so proudly advocated.

The extent of their misjudgement has become more apparent each day. "The revolt in Tibet, with its profound impact on Indian and Southeast Asian opinion, and the sharp split in the Arab world between Kassem's Iraq and Nasser's United Arab Republic, together may well mark the end of a little era of post war history."<sup>73</sup>

Now the Bandung complex is slowly and painfully adjusting itself to the world of realpolitik. The Bandung "feeling" was not destroyed by the "imperialist" which furnished the straw men for the opening speeches. It was destroyed by the same political forces which sang its praises so loudly and used its slogans for their own benefit. International Communism has a long history of using the most expedient methods to gain favor. They have never hesitated to destroy in order to build political advantage for themselves.

The Communist destruction of Bandung is most evident in the nations that figured so prominently at the meeting.

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<sup>73</sup>The Reporter, "The End of Bandung", New York, April 16, 1959, p. 2.

Indonesia's President Sukarno has all but lost his power because he let the Communist become too strong in his own country. The Indonesian Army has taken over effective control of the government to keep the Communist under control.

In India, Nehru's control over the Congress Party has faltered because of the Chinese action in Tibet. U Nu of Burma has been replaced by the commander of the Burmese Army who immediately launched a drive to mop up Communist insurgents who have been at war with the country since independence in 1948.

And Dr. Rex De Costa of Ceylon declared that the situation in Tibet clearly violates the United Nations principles of religious freedom. He was speaking to the 1959 Assembly of the World Veterans Federation meeting in Rome. He spoke, on behalf of delegations of veterans from Ceylon, India, Republics of China, Korea and Viet-Nam, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan and Thailand.

An article published in New Delhi quoted President Nasser of the United Arab Republic as charging "A communist master plot to seize Iraq, split Syria and Egypt, and create a Red Empire in the Middle East." Nasser said that the "enormous Soviet good will built up over three years of friendship was lost in less than three weeks." The President told R. K. Karanjia, Editor of the Indian News magazine, Blitz that the story of the Middle East conspiracy began when communists planned a coup in Syria before the merger with

Egypt early in 1958.<sup>74</sup>

Thus the hopes of the sponsors of the Bandung Conference to withdraw from the cold war have failed. Nehru himself accused the Chinese Reds of bringing the cold war to India. The newly independent nations of Asia and Africa arrived on the world scene too late to enjoy isolation. The more fully developed nation states will not allow independence in a world in which action, however small, by any of the large powers has its immediate effect throughout the world.

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<sup>74</sup>R. K. Karanjia, Blitz, New Delhi, April 16, 1959.

## CHAPTER VI

### COMMENT

The Bandung Conference attracted some of the leading journalists from throughout the world. Each felt that the Conference represented "a sense of history."

K. M. Pannikar, a leading Indian journalist, writing in the May 2, 1955 issue of The Nation, felt that the significant fact about the Asian-African conference was that for the first time Asian and African leaders conferred among themselves about matters of interest to their peoples and to the world in general."

"The Geneva Conference on Indo-China was attended by France, England, and America, but not by Burma, or Indonesia, or India, which had at least as much interest in peace in this area as Britain or America."

It is against this background that the Afro-Asian Conference must be viewed. The first Asian conference was held in New Delhi, in 1946, and was meant to indicate that Asia was awake. At that time, no Asian country except China was in a position to formulate independent views. Japan was under occupation. India, Burma and Indonesia were only on the road to freedom. The second Asian conference was held in New Delhi in 1947 and was for the specific purpose of mobilizing opinion for Indonesian independence.

Thus the Bandung Conference was the first clear affirmation of the right of Asian and African people to an independent voice in the settlement of their own affairs.

". . . yet these desperate states have a fundamental unity of approach to certain major problems. The most obvious point is their desire to see the right of all nations to freedom accepted as a general principle. All the participating states except Japan have at one time or another been under colonial rule."<sup>75</sup>

Some of the states, especially in Southeast Asia, are equally if not more apprehensive of communism than imperialism. However, there is no denying that for the most part the principle of great power protection appears to them to be nothing less than colonialism under a new guise. The maintenance of independence against both colonialism and communism is the first point on which the majority of these nations are united. This view of Mr. Pannikar is consistent with Nehru's: That Indian diplomacy is attempting to sell the uncommitted nations on its non-alignment policy.

A second issue, and to Pannikar the most important one, is the principle of racial equality. Though the problem today is mainly confined to Africa, the Asian states are no less concerned, for the doctrine of Apartheid in South Africa is directed as much against Asians as against Africans.

It should be remembered that Japan championed the

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<sup>75</sup>K. M. Pannikar, The Nation, p. 287.

cause of Asian equality as long ago as 1919 at the peace conference in Paris. In the United Nations, India and other Asian countries have been fighting strenuously for the acceptance of the principle. To the African, it is one of the overriding questions. A third and equally important issue facing the powers that met at this time was the fear of nuclear weapons. "The nations which threaten each other with atomic and hydrogen bombs are having difficulty enough to provide for protection against the effects of explosions. The nations of Asia and Africa are altogether helpless."<sup>76</sup> These nations see themselves threatened with annihilation in a war which they do not consider their own and in which they do not want to become involved.

Another view of the Asian-African Conference was expressed by C. P. Fitzgerald a faculty member of the Australian National University and author of Revolution in China.

"The Afro-Asian Conference represents the most positive expression so far achieved of the Indian policy of non-alignment."<sup>77</sup> The independent nations of Asia and the few independent states of Africa met to settle the causes of friction between them and to demonstrate to the West that Asia was well able to handle its own affairs.

Fitzgerald said that although the former colonial

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<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 289.

<sup>77</sup>C. P. Fitzgerald, The Nation, p. 288.

powers are resigned with more or less good grace to the independence of their colonies, they are still reluctant to admit that they are no longer needed to run their foreign affairs. He feels that the West is obsessed with the dramatic clash of communism with capitalism, and is impatient with the theory of non-alignment in the struggle against communism. If the countries which adhere to non-alignment were, in fact, to be invaded by aggressive communists, the west would have to come to their aid not from affection, but from fear of any increase in Communist strength.

The Indian view, represented at the Conference by Nehru, would not deny that this situation could arise. It claims that the possibility of such a situation happening is made more remote by the policy of non-alignment. The difference in view stems ultimately from a different assessment of the forces behind Asiatic Communism. The West easily assumes that China's motives are closely allied with those of the Soviet Union; the Asians see China primarily as one of themselves, an Asian people that has achieved independence and strength. This strength was not achieved in the way Asia would like, but none the less an example to them all. The Indians, therefore, believe that China has limited objectives which can be realized without prejudice to the rest of Asia, and that it has legitimate grievances which should be redressed by the offending powers which have refused recognition and opposed its admission to the United Nations.

Norman Cousins, editor of The Saturday Review, journeyed to Bandung for an eyewitness account of the proceedings. He called the opening ceremonies "the graduation exercises of two continents--graduation into equality in the family of free nations."<sup>78</sup>

He went on to say that the most remarkable thing about the Asian-African Conference was the sense of history it represented and reflected. The nations at Bandung possessed as large a variety of political views and cultural and religious backgrounds as exists anywhere in the world; yet all the delegates seemed to feel they were part of one vast idea to which each was paying homage. The work of the conference, the public and private sessions, the general statement which required so many hours of debate and compromise--all this was minor compared to the symbolic significance of the event.

The process of breaking loose from colonial rule had been celebrated, but now for the first time, all at once and in a single place, more than one billion three hundred million human beings, who had achieved freedom, were observing the total event. It created a sense of exultation and kinship difficult to describe. The historical momentum was so great that it affected almost

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<sup>78</sup>Norman Cousins, The Saturday Review, May 21, 1955, pp. 7-8.

everything that was said or done.

Most of the delegates had a single answer for the question that was put before them at the end of the Conference: "What would you say was the principal significance of Bandung?" Their answer in one form or another: "The fact that it was held."<sup>79</sup> Triumphs or defeats over conference statements were lost alongside the mountainous fact that each person present gloried in the historical aura of the occasion.

The men at Bandung marked their freedom, but there was neither gloating over the event nor the eruptive release of resentment towards their former captors or governors. Carlos P. Romulo keyed the spirit of the meeting when he said: "The success of this Conference will be measured not by what we do for ourselves, but what we do for the whole human community. It is the cause not only of Asia and Africa, it is the cause of the human community in a world struggling to liberalize itself from the chaos of international anarchy. In short, our cause is the cause of man." Romulo called on the delegates to use their perception of history and their vital purposes toward the making of a better tomorrow.

"Finally, the key to Asia and Africa is in our own history. The closer we get to the real meaning of what happened in America 183 years ago, the easier it may be to understand the dominant accent of the twentieth century. The

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<sup>79</sup>Ibid.

liberation of Asia, in which America figured so prominently, helped set the stage for Bandung. We still have a place on that stage."<sup>80</sup>

Official United States support of the Bandung Conference was voiced in 47 languages through the 78 transmitters of the Voice of America. The following eye-witness account was written by Barry Zorthian, Program Director for the Voice of America, and broadcast in April, 1955:

There is little doubt about the historical significance of this conference as the first in which participants are limited only to nations from areas of the world which, short years ago, were centers of colonialism. And it may well be that simply the coming together of delegates will be the major significance of the conference. Certainly it will be extremely difficult in six short days to do more than exchange views of mutual problems and agree on some general principles.

The atmosphere and festive spirit in Bandung, both among delegates themselves and the ordinary people of Indonesia, shows how important is this pride. The Conference has symbolism to Asians and Africans--a feeling that now they have emerged to full partnership in the world political picture.

This feeling is based on many aspects of this conference. It is 'our' conference to the people here. It is 'our' preparations which produced the machinery for the conference. These are 'our' leaders; important world news is being made by us. You correspondents from the West are our guests.

Certainly these feelings are natural and perhaps inevitable. But it is also important to note that the basis for this pride did not result from the present conference. . . .

The conference may be a concrete symbol of the role Asians and Africans play in world affairs, but that role has developed over the years.

The reason for the emotional and deep felt consciousness of this new role by Asians and Africans may

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

be found in the dramatic suddenness with which these two continents have emerged in world affairs. Ten short years ago, this conference could not have been held, certainly not on the present basis. The five sponsoring powers--India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia--were under British or Dutch control; the Philippines was still a commonwealth, Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos were French colonies. Japan was on the verge of surrender and occupation, Ethiopia was occupied, and other nations in the Middle East were under foreign domination or direct control."<sup>81</sup>

Many observers looked on the Conference as a probable battle-ground between Chou En-lai and Nehru. "Chou had demonstrated at Geneva that he is one of the world's most accomplished diplomatists. At Bandung, he taught the class a lesson on the timing of diplomatic moves. Halfway through the Conference, just when it was necessary to remind everyone how obliging he could be, Chou signed a treaty with Indonesia which called upon Chinese living in Indonesia to decide whether they wished to be Chinese or Indonesians. Ever since the Ching dynasty Chinese Governments have always considered Chinese born anywhere, and no matter what their adopted nationality, to be Chinese."<sup>82</sup>

The timing was designed to influence the other Asian delegates, most of which had Chinese minority problems within their own countries.

Interpretations of the Afro-Asian Conference are as numerous as were delegates and observers.

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<sup>81</sup>Barry Zorthian, Asian-African Commentary #1, Central Program Services Division, Voice of America.

<sup>82</sup>Alex Josey, "Looking Back at Bandung," Eastern World, London, June 1955, p. 17.

The General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, Ajoy Ghosh, saw Bandung as a struggle between two opposing forces. "On one side was the might of resurgent Asia, and on the other, ranged against it, were those who wanted Asia to line up behind the imperialists."<sup>83</sup> Communists and freemen alike, however, recognized the significance that it was the "first Conference where representatives of Asian and African peoples not only came together and discussed their own problems, but also took certain decisions which would help them chalk out their own future."<sup>84</sup> Whereas Ghosh saw the Conference as a victorious phase in the battle against imperialists which began at Dien Bien Phu, other more historically minded writers have seen it as a milestone in the long evolution of Western liberalism.

On December 26, 1957, a conference billed as The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference convened in Cairo. This was an unofficial conference which was attended by delegations from many of the nations which took part at Bandung and the addition of one more--Soviet Russia.

The Soviets have repeatedly tried to be included in the Asian section of the Afro-Asian bloc. Yevgeny Zhukov was the Soviet delegate to Cairo of which he wrote: "The Cairo Conference will undoubtedly occupy a place of honour in the history of the great progressive movements of our

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<sup>83</sup>Ajoy Ghosh, "The Bandung Conference," Political Affairs, New Century Publishers, Inc., New York, June 1955, p. 13.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

time."<sup>85</sup> He went on to describe the events which followed the Bandung Conference as having "wrought great changes in Africa and Asia. The forces of progress have grown stronger and increased in number. Imperialism's efforts to prop up the old, doomed world--the world of violence, oppression and colonial slavery--are destined to failure. Cairo, the successor to Bandung, is clear proof of this."<sup>86</sup> Despite the Soviet writer's enthusiastic support of the Cairo meeting the governments of India and Indonesia disavowed any connection or support of the meeting.

Three noted American writers have recently written articles on the subject of neutralism and the U. S. policy toward the concept. Henry A. Kissinger in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy said:

The importance of U.S. leadership is all the greater because many of the leaders of the newly independent nations have so little understanding of international relations and of the nature of power. Although they distinguished themselves in the struggle with the former colonial powers, the independence movements, almost without exception, provided a poor preparation for an understanding of the element of power in international relations. Based on the dogmas of late nineteenth-century liberalism, especially its pacifism, the independence movements relied more on ideological agreement than on an evaluation of power factors, and to this day the claim to superior spirituality remains the battle cry of Asian nationalism.

It is imperative that the uncommitted powers understand not only the benefits but also the duties of independence. Many of the leaders of the newly independent

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<sup>85</sup>Yevgeny Zhukov, "From Bandung to Cairo" International Affairs, Soviet Society For the Popularization of Political and Scientific Knowledge. Moscow, February 1958, p. 52.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

states have found the temptation to play a major role in international affairs almost overwhelming.<sup>85</sup>

Unless the newly independent nations learn that every action has a price in the international field as well, they will increasingly seek to play a global role that is beyond either their strength or the risks they are willing to assume.

Reinhold Niebuhr objected to the over emphasis on military pacts by U.S. leadership in an article in The New Leader:

Frequently our emphasis of military pacts and strategic geography often paints a distorted picture of the U.S. in the minds of Asians, a picture which to a large degree conforms to the slogans of Communism propaganda. While the U.S. is one of the few nations in history without an imperialist background, we are now grouped together with the militarists of Prussia and Japan. One of the reasons for this predicament is our reliance on our obvious military superiority to get us out of situations which we could have avoided with foresight. When we get into serious difficulty we rely on our power of retaliation. We are therefore tempted to an undue reliance on the obvious might we possess, particularly since our apprenticeship in the leadership of world affairs has been brief, and we have not had time to accustom ourselves to the acquisition, and to know the importance of prestige as a source of power; or to learn patience with the endless complexities of loyalties and resentments of traditions and established forms of cohesion which govern the actions of nations. . . .

We are preoccupied with our 'defense perimeter' in Asia and have little interest in the vast political complexities of the great continent except to express consistent contempt for the great uncommitted nation, India, though that country's neutralism is not informed

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Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, Inc., 1958.

by the slightest degree of sympathy for Communism.<sup>86</sup>

In an article titled "Neutrality: Varying Tunes" Hamilton Fish Armstrong described neutralism as a "jumble of wishful, hopeful, opportunitistic but not necessarily unfriendly propositions."<sup>87</sup>

All in all, the term neutralism as it is being used in political discussion today is something quite different from what it has meant traditionally in the textbooks of international law and thus probably from what it was in the mind of Secretary Dulles--the lawyer.

To the wide-ranging leaders today who proclaim their independence, neutrality is not a declaration in advance of a fixed position to be taken in case of war, or a claim to right against belligerent encroachment. It is a political expedient. It is not passive but active. It asserts that each state is determined to go its own independent way in accordance with its own current estimate of its own interests; and it expresses the hope of getting along with both sides and even of serving as a bridge to bring them closer together. In other words, it is a jumble of wishful, hopeful, opportunistic but not necessarily unfriendly propositions.

The success of the communists in appealing to the underdeveloped nations of the world has its roots in Western colonialism. The active support of feudal classes, slavery and nationalistic backwardness by European colonial powers has resulted in a long and tortuous default. It is only in this context that the successes of Soviet and Red Chinese communism in the underdeveloped countries can be understood. The West has failed to show non-Western peoples a sensible

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<sup>86</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Limits of Military Power" The New Leader, New York, May 30, 1955, p. 16.

<sup>87</sup> Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Neutrality: Varying Tunes," Foreign Affairs, October 1956, p. 64.

way to become industrialized. China and India have become the pivot of the world. India is fumbling for a way out of centuries of poverty. China, under communist rule, is clearly advancing towards industrialization. What has taken the Soviets forty years to accomplish may be in reach of the Chinese in twenty.

In those areas still outside the communist yoke the West has yet to put forward a program for economic development. India, Latin America, the Middle East and Southeast Asia are searching for a solution other than communism. That communism may not serve this cause any better than capitalism is not the major point. The point is that the communists may well win the world struggle without firing a single missile or a single atomic bomb. Karl Marx remarked in 1853: "Impotence expresses itself in a single proposition: the maintenance of the status quo."<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>88</sup>C. Wright Mills, The Causes of World War Three, Simon and Schuster: New York, 1958, p. 73.

## TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The Asian-African Conference, convened by the Governments of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, met in Bandung from the 18th to 24th of April, 1955.

In addition to the sponsoring countries, the following twenty-four countries participated in the conference:

Afghanistan, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam, the State of Vietnam and Yemen.

The Asian-African Conference considered the position of Asia and Africa and discussed ways and means by which their peoples could achieve the fullest economic, cultural and political cooperation.

### A. ECONOMIC COOPERATION:

1. The Asian-African Conference recognized the urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region. There was general desire for economic cooperation among the participating countries on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty.

The proposals with regard to economic cooperation within the participating countries do not preclude either the desirability or the need for cooperation with countries

outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital.

It was further recognized that assistance being received by certain participating countries from outside the region through international or under bilateral arrangements had made a valuable contribution to the implementation of their development programs.

2. The participating countries agreed to provide technical assistance to one another to the maximum extent practicable, in the form of:

Experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes, exchange of know-how, and establishment of national and, where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in cooperation with the existing international agencies.

3. The Asian-African Conference recommended:

The early establishment of a special United Nations fund for economic development;

The allocation by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development of a greater part of its resources to Asian-African countries;

The early establishment of an international finance corporation, which should include in its activities the undertaking of equity investment; and

Encouragement of the promotion of joint ventures among Asian-African countries in so far as this will promote

their common interest.

4. The Asian-African Conference recognized the vital need for stabilizing commodity trade in the region.

The principle of enlarging the scope of multi-lateral trade and payments was accepted. However, it was recognized that some countries would have to take recourse to bilateral trade arrangements in view of their prevailing economic conditions.

5. The Asian-African Conference recommended that collective action be taken by participating countries for stabilizing international prices of and demand for primary commodities through bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and that as far as practicable and desirable they should adopt a unified approach on the subject in the United Nations Permanent Advisory Commission on International Commodity Trade and other international forums.

6. The Asian-African Conference further recommended:

Asian-African countries should diversify their export trade by processing their raw materials whenever economically feasible before export; intra-regional trade fairs should be promoted and encouragement be given to the exchange of trade delegations and groups of businessmen; exchange of information and of samples should be encouraged with a view to promoting intra-regional trade; and normal facilities should be provided for the transit trade of landlocked countries.

7. The Asian-African Conference attached considerable importance to shipping and expressed concern that shipping lines reviewed from time to time their freight rates, which are often to the detriment of participating countries. It recommended a study of this problem and collective action thereafter to induce the shipping lines to adopt a more reasonable attitude. It was further suggested that a study of railway freight of transit trade may be made.

8. The Asian-African Conference agreed that encouragement should be given to the establishment of national and regional banks and insurance companies.

9. The Asian-African Conference felt that exchange of information on matters relating to oil, such as remittance of profits and taxation, might eventually lead to the formulation of a common policy.

10. The Asian-African Conference emphasized the particular significance of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for Asian-African countries.

The Conference welcomed the initiative of the powers principally concerned in offering to make available information regarding the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; urged the speedy establishment of an international atomic energy agency which should provide for adequate representation of the Asian-African countries on the executive authority of the agency; and recommended that Asian and African governments take full advantage of the

training and other facilities in the peaceful uses of atomic energy offered by the countries sponsoring such programs.

11. The Asian-African Conference agreed to the appointment of liaison officers in participating countries, to be nominated by their respective national governments, for the exchange of information and ideas on matters of mutual interest.

It recommended that fuller use should be made of the existing international organizations, and participating countries who were not members of such international organizations, but were eligible, should secure membership.

12. The Asian-African Conference recommended that there should be prior consultation of participating countries in international forums with a view, as far as possible, to furthering their mutual economic interest. It is, however, not intended to form a regional bloc.

#### B. CULTURAL COOPERATION.

1. The Asian-African Conference was convinced that among the most powerful means of promoting understanding among nations is the development of cultural cooperation. Asia and Africa have been the cradle of great religions and civilizations, which have enriched other cultures and civilizations while themselves being enriched in the process.

Thus the cultures of Asia and Africa are based on spiritual and universal foundations. Unfortunately, cultural contacts among Asian and African countries were

interrupted during the past centuries.

The peoples of Asia and Africa are now animated by a keen and sincere desire to renew their old cultural contacts and develop new ones in the context of the modern world. All participating governments at the Asian-African Conference reiterated their determination to work for closer cultural cooperation.

2. The Asian-African Conference took note of the fact that the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa, in whatever form it may be, not only prevents cultural cooperation but also suppresses the national cultures of the peoples.

Some colonial powers have denied their dependent peoples basic rights in the sphere of education and culture, which hampers the development of their personality and also prevents cultural intercourse with other Asian and African peoples.

This is particularly true in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, where the basic right of the people to study their own language and culture have been suppressed.

Similar discrimination has been practiced against Asian and colored peoples in some parts of the Continent of Africa.

The Conference felt that these policies amounted to a denial of the fundamental rights of man, impede cultural advancement in this region and also hamper cultural cooperation on the wider international plane. The

Conference condemned such a denial of fundamental rights in the sphere of education and culture in some parts of Asia and Africa by this and other forms of cultural suppression. In particular, the Conference condemned racialism as a means of cultural suppression.

3. It was not from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry with other groups of nations and other civilizations and cultures that the Conference viewed the development of cultural cooperation among Asian and African countries.

True to the age-old tradition of tolerance and universality, the Conference believed that Asian and African cultural cooperation should be developed in the larger context of world cooperation. Side by side with the development of Asian-African cultural cooperation, the countries of Asia and Africa desire to develop cultural contacts with others. This would enrich their own culture and would also help in the promotion of world peace and understanding.

4. There are many countries in Asia and Africa which have not yet been able to develop their educational, scientific and technical institutions. The Conference recommended that countries in Asia and Africa which are more fortunately placed in this respect should give facilities for the admission of students and trainees from such countries to their institutions. Such facilities should also be made available to the Asian and African people in Africa, to whom opportunities for acquiring higher education are at present denied.

5. The Asian-African Conference felt that the promotion of cultural cooperation among countries of Asia and Africa should be directed towards:

First, the acquisition of knowledge of each other's country;

Second, mutual cultural exchange; and

Third, exchange of information.

6. The Asian-African Conference was of the opinion that at this stage the best results in cultural cooperation would be achieved by pursuing bilateral arrangements to implement its recommendations and by each country taking action on its own wherever possible and feasible.

C. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION:

1. The Asian-African Conference declared its full support of the fundamental principles of human rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Conference declared its full support of the principle of self-determination of peoples and nations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and took note of the United Nations resolutions on the right of peoples and nations to self-determination, which is a prerequisite of the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights.

2. The Asian-African Conference deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination which form the basis of government and human relations in large regions of Africa and in other parts of the world. Such

conduct is not only a gross violation of human rights, but also a denial of the fundamental value of civilization and the dignity of man.

The Conference extended its warm sympathy and support for the courageous stand taken by the victims of racial discrimination and especially by the peoples of African and Indian and Pakistani origin in South Africa; applauded all those who sustained their cause; reaffirmed the determination of Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their own countries; and pledged to use its full moral influence to guard against the danger of falling victims to the same evil in their struggle to eradicate it.

D. PROBLEMS OF DEPENDENT PEOPLE.

1. The Asian-African Conference discussed the problems of dependent peoples and colonialism and the evils arising from subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation. The Conference agreed:

First, in declaring that colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end;

Second, in affirming that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation;

Third, in declaring its support of the cause of freedom and independence for all such peoples; and

Fourth, in calling upon the powers concerned to grant freedom and independence to such peoples.

2. In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-determination, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay.

#### E. OTHER PROBLEMS.

1. In view of the existing tension in the Middle East caused by the situation in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, and called for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine and of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question.

2. The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian, based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The Asian-African Conference urged the Netherlands Government to reopen negotiations as soon

as possible to implement their obligations under the above-mentioned agreements and expressed the earnest hope that the United Nations could assist the parties concerned in finding a peaceful solution to the dispute.

3. The Asian-African Conference supported the position of Yemen in the case of Aden and the southern parts of Yemen known as the protectorates, and urged the parties concerned to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

#### F. PROMOTION OF WORLD PEACE AND COOPERATION.

1. The Asian-African Conference, taking note of the fact that several states have still not been admitted to the United Nations, considered that, for effective cooperation for world peace, membership in the United Nations should be universal, called on the Security Council to support the admission of all those states which are qualified for membership in terms of the Charter.

In the opinion of the Asian-African Conference the following among the participating countries which were represented in it--Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal and a unified Vietnam--were so qualified.

The Conference considered that the representation of the countries of the Asian-African region on the Security Council in relation to the principle of equitable geographical distribution was inadequate. It expressed the view that, as regards the distribution of the non-permanent seats, the Asian-African countries which, under the

arrangement arrived at in London in 1946, are precluded from being elected, should be enabled to serve on the Security Council so that they might make a more effective contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. The Asian-African Conference having considered the dangerous situation of international tension existing and the risks confronting the whole human race from the outbreak of global war in which the destructive power of all types of armaments, including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, would be employed, invited the attention of all nations to the terrible consequences that would follow if such a war were to break out.

The Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war are imperative to save mankind and civilization from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty toward humanity and civilization to proclaim their support for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion to bring about such disarmament and prohibition.

The Conference considered that effective international control should be established and maintained to implement such prohibition and that speedy and determined efforts should be made to this end. Pending the total prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and thermonuclear

weapons, this Conference appealed to all the powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experiments with such weapons.

The Conference declared that universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concerned speedily to bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective international control to this end.

3. The Asian-African Conference gave anxious thought to the question of world peace and cooperation. It viewed with deep concern the present state of international tension with its danger of an atomic world war.

The problem of peace is correlative with the problem of international security. In this connection all states should cooperate especially through the United Nations in bringing about the reduction of armaments and the elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control. In this way international peace can be promoted and nuclear energy may be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would help answer the needs, particularly of Asia and Africa, for what they urgently require are social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

Freedom and peace are interdependent. The right of self-determination must be enjoyed by all peoples in freedom, and independence must be granted with the least possible delay to those who are still dependent peoples. Indeed all nations should have the right freely to choose their own political and economic systems and their own way of life in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Free from distrust and fear and with confidence and goodwill toward each other, nations should practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors and develop friendly cooperation on the basis of the following principles:

1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations, large and small.
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country.
5. Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
6. a. Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any

of the big powers, b. Abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.

7. Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

8. Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means such as negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, as well as other peaceful means of the parties' own choice in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

9. Promotion of mutual interest and cooperation.

10. Respect for justice and international obligations.

The Asian-African Conference declares its conviction that friendly cooperation in accordance with these principles would effectively contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, while cooperation in the economic, social and cultural field would help bring about the common prosperity and well-being of all.

The Asian-African Conference recommended that the five sponsoring countries consider the convening of the next meeting of the Conference in consultation with the participating countries.

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