

the Americans in the Occupation fought with each other to carry out policies designed to bring about their competing visions for an ideal postwar society in not only Japan, but the United States. By analyzing these ideological struggles in a framework that accounts for the postwar political shift occurring in America, we gain a greater understanding of the ideological forces which pushed Americans to focus more on national security and fighting communism than on social reform.

COMPETING VISIONS IN GHQ: NEW DEALERS, ANTI-COMMUNISTS, AND
THE POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN OCCUPIED JAPAN

by

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Note on East Asian Names

Within the text, the East Asian convention is followed for Japanese and Chinese names, with the surname first, then the given name.

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Introduction

On September 9, 1947, Commander Alfred Rodman Hussey of the United States Naval Reserve wrote to his superiors about the treatment of personnel in his theater. In his letter, Hussey warned that personnel were “being threatened, forced to resign, or discharged” in an arbitrary fashion. He additionally warned that uncorroborated statements from enlisted soldiers had become the basis for charges of minor regulation violations. These charges were, in turn, used to remove men and women employed in the theater even though said charges did not imply a lack of loyalty or integrity on the part of the accused. Finally, Hussey warned that loyalty tests were being applied in secret and targeted specific individuals “through the application of criteria which depend for their validity upon the personal opinions of the examining officers.”¹ Hussey’s memo is highly suggestive, giving the image of American soldiers and officers attacking the loyalty of their own countrymen on the basis of differing political views as opposed to serious threats in a manner foreshadowing the McCarthyite attacks that would soon take place in the United States. The people targeted in Hussey’s memo were a collection of government employees like many of the other early targets of the Second Red Scare, but one thing set them and their accusers apart from the rest. They were all staff members in the Occupation of Japan.

At the end of World War II, Japan surrendered to the Allies and was subject to an American-led Occupation until the terms of surrender for Japan, the Potsdam Declaration, were met. Under the terms of Potsdam, war criminals would be punished, Japan would be demilitarized, and “democratic tendencies among the Japanese people” would be revived and

¹ Memorandum by Alfred Rodman Hussey for Chief of Government Section, September 9, 1947, 1, File 8, 84-B: Civil Liberties, Alfred Hussey Papers, Asia Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

strengthened.² From August 28, 1945 to April 28, 1952, the defeated nation was placed under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) after the position was created and given to General Douglas MacArthur for the purpose of seeing the terms of surrender carried out.³ MacArthur would rule Japan for a majority of the Occupation before being replaced by General Matthew Ridgeway in April 1951 due to being relieved of command.⁴

The Occupation was overseen by a diverse group of military and civilian officials. In October of 1945, the General Headquarters (GHQ) of SCAP was created out of an initial staff of 2,000 American bureaucrats. GHQ/SCAP held responsibility for creating nearly all of the policies that governed Japan during the Occupation.⁵ The Japanese Government officially continued to make domestic policy, but SCAP effectively enacted its own policies for Japan through a mixture persuasion, pressure, and recommendations from staff sections parallel to Japanese ministries and agencies.⁶ Many of the top military officials in GHQ/SCAP's command

² US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), 1474-76.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv02>.

³ US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945* (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), 647-48.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v06>.

⁴ MacArthur was relieved due to his public criticism and disregard of Truman's policies and directives during the Korean War. Grant Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers: How the U. S. Military Transformed the Global Economy after World War II* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), 176-79. ProQuest Ebook Central.

⁵ "SCAP" is commonly used as shorthand to refer to the overall Occupation Government as opposed to just MacArthur or his successor in both reports from the time and modern historians' works. The policies and personnel described in this paper fall within MacArthur's period of oversight unless otherwise noted. "GHQ" was a U.S. military designation for commands in the Pacific War that went out of use soon after. It is sometimes used in place of "SCAP" or in addition when written as "GHQ/SCAP." Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy*, trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann (New York: Continuum, 2002), xxvii. For this paper, I use "SCAP" by default when referring to the Occupation Government, and "GHQ" when referring to MacArthur's overall command in the Asia-Pacific (including SCAP itself) or paraphrasing sources which used the term in the same manner as "SCAP."

In addition to the Americans, there was a small number of foreign nationals in specialist roles at SCAP. There were also Japanese citizens attending to day-to-day duties such as typing and translating who made up 40% of GHQ's staff. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xxix.

⁶ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xxviii. The Kuril, Ogasawara, and Ryukyu island chains (including Okinawa) were detached from Japanese domestic control and ruled by direct military government instead of SCAP. The Soviets controlled the Kurils, and the Americans controlled the rest. MacArthur was still responsible for the American controlled territory. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 96, 137.

structure were a part of MacArthur's other GHQs throughout the Pacific War. Some officers, including MacArthur himself, held a dual-role due to their continued service in United States Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC), which shared its headquarters building and military general staff sections with SCAP.⁷ However, SCAP had its own Special Civil staff sections separate from AFPAC which largely consisted of specialist civilians hired by the Department of Army (known as Department of Army Civilians, or "DACs") to fill out bureaucratic roles and formulate policy in line with Potsdam. Starting in 1946, the ratio of civilian to military personnel in SCAP was usually around 4:1. Although each DAC had his or her own views and politics, many of the initial staff members had worked in the Roosevelt administration's State and Treasury departments or were otherwise motivated by the same liberal reformist zeal as in FDR's administration.⁸ One former staff member from SCAP recalled that her section was filled with proponents of Roosevelt's policies and the New Deal.⁹ However, the New Dealers at SCAP were working in neither a time nor place where the New Deal was appreciated.

Throughout the 1940s, the appeal of the New Deal's liberal, reformist politics had gradually fallen to the wayside in America. Big businesses, much maligned in the pre-war days, became vital producers in the war against fascism. Labor unions, one of the key constituencies of the New Deal coalition, were increasingly viewed as too militant and extreme in their demands. Many Americans had benefitted from the economic recovery brought about by the war years. And they no longer wished to upset the new status quo they benefitted from. Republicans gained

⁷ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xxvii-xxiv, 49. AFPAC was responsible for military government duties such as policing, supervising, and assisting the local governments in Japan. It was also far larger than SCAP at the outset of the Occupation, numbering roughly 430,000 troops compared to SCAP's 2,000 bureaucrats. AFPAC was reconstructed into Far East Command (FECOM) in 1947. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xvii-xxiv, 49, 123.

⁸ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xxvii-xxix, 49; Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers*, 131.

⁹ Beate Sirota Gordon, *The Only Woman in the Room: A Memoir* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1997), 22.

seats in Congress and formed a coalition with conservative Southern Democrats.¹⁰ The heightened conservatism and antilabor sentiment gave anticommunism, long present in the background of American politics, a “solid bedrock” to rest on.¹¹ While SCAP’s New Dealers may have remained isolated from these changes if they were left to themselves in Japan, they were far from alone at GHQ.

SCAP’s civilian bureaucrats were mostly liberals and leftists, but the Army staff they worked under alongside were typically much more conservative. Takemae Eiji, a historian who studied SCAP and the Occupation in detail, noted “Many of [MacArthur’s] staff...were diehard anti-Communists to begin with, but even among those who were not, few, including the Supreme Commander himself, were entirely immune to the mood of America.”¹² Of those diehard anti-Communists, perhaps none was as virulent and powerful as Major General Charles A. Willoughby. Within GHQ’s hierarchy, Willoughby was the head of G-2 (military intelligence), giving him oversight of both military and civilian intelligence agencies during the Occupation.¹³ In his position, Willoughby pursued not only Communists but anyone who could have been considered too radical while maintaining a conservative position in GHQ debates throughout the Occupation. Throughout 1946 and 1947, Willoughby poured G-2’s resources into a report titled “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” which was meant to uncover such “radicals” among SCAP’s

¹⁰ For the malignment of big business before the war and the role of labor unions in the New Deal, see Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*, 1st ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 59-60, 119. For unions becoming too extreme in the eyes of Americans, see James T. Sparrow, *Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2011), 250-51. <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,uid&db=e025xna&AN=373133&site=ehost-live>. For the growth of businessmen’s power after the war, the conservative coalition in congress, and the new status quo for Americans, see James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 57-58, 138-39.

¹¹ Sparrow, *Warfare State*, 250-51.

¹² Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 478.

¹³ “G-2” is sometimes used to refer to a G-2 section’s chief instead to the entire section. I avoid this type of usage outside of quotes and paraphrases where I believe the intended meaning is obvious.

DACs under the premise that they were a danger to the Occupation. To men such as Willoughby however, what constituted as “radical” included much of what New Dealers believed in.

From reports that came out of SCAP, it is clear that the gulf in ideologies between groups of personnel led not just to heightened suspicions and tensions, but to outright conflicts and intra-section attacks within GHQ. In his memo from September 1947, Hussey, then the chief of SCAP’s Government Section’s governmental powers division, warned his superiors “there is a very definite feeling amongst Occupation personnel in general that Occupation authorities are on watch, not only for derelictions of duty but for critical or unorthodox attitudes and are prepared to deal summarily therewith.”¹⁴ Hussey never openly said what those attitudes were, but he made an aside comment in a draft letter that several SCAP officers also believed FDR’s views were un-American and dangerous.¹⁵ If Occupation personnel were at risk for promoting New Deal policies that were considered “unorthodox attitudes” then it raises three questions: How did those differing attitudes arise, how did the conflict between Occupation staff play out, and how did that conflict relate to the rightward shift at home?

In answering these questions, I examine the motivations and actions of the Americans who were part of the machinery of the occupation of Japan, also known as the “occupationaires.”¹⁶ I argue these individuals fought with each other to carry out policies designed to bring about their competing visions for an ideal postwar society in not only Japan,

¹⁴ Memo by Hussey, September 9, 1947, 4.

¹⁵ Draft Memorandum by Alfred Rodman Hussey for Chief of Government Section, n.d., 5, File 9, 84-B: Civil Liberties, Alfred Hussey Papers, Asia Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

¹⁶ “Occupationaire” (sometimes spelled with two *n*’s) is a somewhat rare term used in both primary and secondary sources to refer to those who were a part of the Occupation forces in Japan, including staff members of SCAP. For examples of its usage, see Harry Emmerson Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo: The Occupation and its Aftermath* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1954), 275 and Susan L. Carruthers, *The Good Occupation: American Soldiers and the Hazards of Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 283. ProQuest Ebook Central. I use it as a shorthand term to refer to American staff members of GHQ.

but the United States. SCAP's staff members who were a part of the liberal-left coalition that made up the New Deal or otherwise identified with its policies wanted to both bring about and expand those same social and economic reforms in Japan. Anti-Communists and other right-wing staff members of GHQ wanted to maintain a strong, stable state and support institutions capable of stamping out suspected subversives and radicals, and they viewed New Dealer reforms as threats to the stability of both nations. In the resulting fights, GHQ's anti-Communists attempted to purge SCAP's New Dealers over the ideological differences, insinuating that the latter were dangerous, disloyal subversives. These purges had limited success, particularly in the early years of the Occupation, but the debates shaping American politics in Washington ultimately resulted in policy favoring of security and countersubversion not only in Japan, as seen in the "reverse course" that took place, but in the U.S. as well.

Some readers may be inclined to ask why I specifically chose Japan for a study linking postwar occupation policies and internal conflicts into the political and foreign policy debates in the U.S. After all, Japan was not the only nation occupied by America after WWII. Other nations such as Germany, another axis power, or Korea, a former colony of Japan, may appear to be equally viable candidates. I specifically chose the Occupation of Japan because it provides a unique window into an American government abroad at the time when Americans were undergoing a massive political shift both internally and externally. Among the American postwar occupations, Japan was the only nation controlled by a mixture of military and civilian policymakers who had the freedom and power to enact change upon an entire country.¹⁷ In comparison, Germany had been divided into 4 different zones of control by the Allies, and Korea had not only been divided but was placed under solely military control with little immediate

¹⁷ With the exception of Okinawa, Sakhalin, and island chains mentioned in note 6.

interest in reform for American planners. Only in Japan were a varied group of American policymakers, each with different visions for reform and development, able to enact changes for a whole country with no need to accommodate or plan around a major national division. Because of its uniqueness, the Occupation government provides the closest environment to the U.S. government amongst postwar American governments outside of the U.S. itself, allowing us to see how competing postwar visions for an ideal society transcended domestic America.

My argument draws from the work done in two major fields of history. One of these fields is the history of Occupied Japan, with a particular focus on SCAP's overall role in the Occupation beyond MacArthur himself. Within this field, Takemae Eiji's work on GHQ's history, fittingly titled *Inside GHQ*, has been incredibly helpful as a source on the background and actions of GHQ, its sections, and the men and women involved in the Occupation. The other field is the history of McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare, with particular focus on the damage done to the American left inside and outside of the federal government after World War II. In recent years, some authors have mixed the two subjects in books on specific topics such as the Cold War's impact on American policies for Japan, or the rift that grew between SCAP and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) throughout the early years of the Occupation. I have naturally used these works for my thesis as well. Finally, outside of the two major fields, I consulted the work done on various individual subjects such as Willoughby's background and the decline of the New Deal. All these works together were essential for my thesis.¹⁸

¹⁸ For other valuable source on the history of the Occupation in addition to Takemae, see John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co./New Press, 1999); Masumi Junnosuke, *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955*, trans. Lonny E. Carlile (Berkeley: Center for Japanese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1985); and Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989). For McCarthyism and the Red Scare, see Ellen Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1998); and Landon R. Y. Storrs, *The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left*

By building my thesis off the existing histories on the Occupation, I hope to expand upon the link between SCAP's inner conflict and the domestic politics of the U.S. Several historians have covered both the internal attacks that anti-Communists in SCAP launched on the New Dealers and the influence that the Cold War and the shifting political ground at home had on the Occupation. The latter has particularly received attention due to a period of the Occupation known as the "reverse course," when SCAP's goals for Japan shifted. Starting around late 1947, SCAP abandoned its original emphasis on reforming Japan's political system and civil liberties and instead pushed for economic recovery under big business and austerity measures designed to stabilize the economy. SCAP additionally encouraged the development of a conservative government and rebuilt military to fight Communists and provide security.¹⁹ However, while the

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), ProQuest Ebook Central. For America's changing Occupation policy due to the Cold War, see Jennifer M. Miller, *Cold War Democracy: The United States and Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), ProQuest Ebook Central. For SCAP and the JCP's rift, see Henry Oinas-Kukkonen, *Tolerance, Suspicion and Hostility: Changing U.S. Attitudes Toward the Japanese Communist movement, 1944-1947* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003).

Two sources which were essential to my understanding of Charles Willoughby and the extreme right-wing network he was a part of were David A. Foy, *Loyalty First: The Life and Times of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's Chief Intelligence Officer*, 1st ed (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers & Book Distributors, LLC, 2023), ProQuest Ebook Central, and David Austin Walsh, "The Right-Wing Popular Front: The Far Right and the American Conservative Movement from the New Deal to the 1960s," (PhD. Diss., Princeton, New Jersey, 2020), ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

Other authors whose works particularly inspired my interpretations of the events discussed include Masuda Hajimu, *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015), <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,uid&db=e025xna&AN=931091&site=ehost-live>; Grant Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers: How the U. S. Military Transformed the Global Economy after World War II* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), ProQuest Ebook Central; and Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*, 1st ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).

¹⁹ The exact dates of, motives for, people behind, and effects of the "reverse course" commonly vary between historians, and some contend whether there even was a serious "reverse" in American intentions or policy. For a view which argues that policy changes began in early 1947 and emphasizes the continuity of the occupiers' mindset before and after, see Miller, *Cold War Democracy*, 4, 28, 51-65. For a view which argues the reverse course began in 1948 and discusses the reforms which the Occupation kept intact, see Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 233-40. For a view which argues the Reverse course consisted of fragmented, local actions at the hands of the Japanese citizens and SCAP staff acting on their own initiative in addition to recommendation from Washington, see Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*, 31-37. For a view which begins the reverse course in late 1947, lays responsibility at the feet of conservative policymakers in Washington, and argues that individual reforms never underwent a reverse, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xli, 468-75.

influence that political shifts in America had upon the Occupation has been studied, no historian that I have found has made the inner struggle at SCAP a central focus of their work. I believe that by analyzing the attacks that anti-Communists launched at their liberal and leftist enemies in the Occupation with a framework that accounts for the larger shifts in U.S. policy and politics after World War II, we gain a greater understanding of the ideological forces behind the shifts in American policy at that time. In particular, we witness how the calls security against “communism,” both real and imagined, justified the end of New Deal reform.

I have mined several primary sources for this thesis. The main types of primary sources I use in this essay are reports, memoranda, check sheets, and other operation documents from SCAP and the U.S. Army. These individual papers have come from a wide variety of places, with some held in the University of Maryland’s extensive collections focused on Postwar Japan, others found at the National Archives building in College Park and Gettysburg College’s Musselman Library, and still others received via interlibrary loan. One of the most valuable sources in this group has been Willoughby’s report titled “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP.” This report, currently held at the MacArthur Memorial Archives, provides an in-depth example of how a right-wing occupationaire tried to discredit his liberal and leftist opponents. The other major sources used for this project are the writings and recollections of former Occupation personnel. These fall into interviews (with written transcripts currently kept by the University of Maryland Special Collections and University Archives), memoirs, and contemporary reports on Japan. One book which has been particularly helpful is *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as a New Deal*, written by Theodore Cohen, a division chief at SCAP. The book acts as both a secondary history on the Occupation and a memoir written from Cohen’s perspective in

SCAP, allowing for a detailed insider's perspective. Finally, I have used a small number of books written by journalists at the time of the Occupation for a non-SCAP perspective.

Because U.S. politics in the 1940s and 1950s play a significant role in this paper, I use various labels to group together the men and women discussed based on their shared political and social views. For the sake of the reader's clarity, I define how I use the terms to refer to the two main ideological groups in this essay as follows. When I use "anti-Communists" and "anticommunism," I borrow historian Ellen Schrecker's classification of anticommunism in its modern form being a "consciously organized campaign against the left."²⁰ In the context of this paper, this refers to those who actively attempted to purge Communists and anything or anyone which was considered adjacent to communism within the American and Japanese governments and societies. I do not wish to downplay the general distaste for communism held by Americans across the political spectrum within the Occupation—many members of SCAP's labor division were strongly in favor of labor unions while also being opposed to the presence of Communists. However, the individuals who I refer to as such were outright guided by their distaste for communism and other left-wing ideologies and had zero tolerance for the existence of either, so I consider anticommunism a key part of their identity. I use "New Dealer" to refer to those members of the Occupation whose beliefs generally fell within a spectrum of liberal and leftist thought that many in the FDR administration had been a part of. The majority of New Dealer bureaucrats in the Occupation considered themselves liberals at most and rejected the label of socialist or Communist, but many also had at least a passing familiarity with and tolerance for more radically left ideals. In using these labels, I do not intend to imply the various men and women whom I discuss in this paper were unchanging and unified in their views, nor do I claim

²⁰ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 48.

their own usages of these terms aligned with mine. However, I can think of no easier way to discuss this subject.

In my analysis of the attacks led by anti-Communists in GHQ, I call upon an existing frame of analysis that posits anticommunism was not just a reaction to potential spies or the threat of Communists themselves. Instead, I consider the observation that local experiences and histories shaped how localized conflicts over communism played out, especially when the traditional order was threatened.²¹ As historian Landon Storrs put it, “Red scares erupted at various places and moments in defense of class, religious, and racial hierarchies.”²² In the case of the Occupation, Willoughby and other senior anti-Communists in the military, itself one of the most hierarchal structures in America, bore witness to younger New Deal policymakers attacking traditional structures of power such as the police and big business either directly or through supporting left-wing Japanese organizations. In response, these anti-Communists considered New Dealers as a threat to their established order, and with it the security of America and Japan. In this way, I also borrow one of historian Masuda Hajimu’s broader conceptions of the Cold War; namely that anti-Communists’ actions were part of a societal struggle against change which did not deliberately aim to engineer an environment of panic and suspicion for the sake of suppressing their internal enemies, but that the “Cold War World” their actions contributed to allowed them to do just that.²³ In the case of the Occupation, I do not believe that the anti-Communists were deliberately attempting to manufacture an environment of fear just for the

²¹ *Cold War Crucible* by Masuda Hajimu is a particularly compelling work which expands on this theme of how anticommunism was shaped by the local context not only in America, but across the post-war world.

²² Storrs, *The Second Red Scare*, 6.

²³ Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*, 283-5

purpose of removing New Dealers, but anti-Communists' perception of American security needs still emboldened them to try and purge New Dealers.

Over the course of this paper, I examine the ideological nature of the internal persecution in SCAP and how it tied into developments in the domestic U.S. In Chapter 1, I discuss the origin and structure of SCAP, the competing ideological views and policies supported by its staff members, and the roles and powers which each of those occupationaires held. The Occupation at this early stage was officially meant to carry out a liberal reform policy, yet many within the Army staff resisted drastic change. In Chapter 2, I discuss how right-wing personnel within SCAP launched numerous attacks which aimed to remove their liberal and leftist counterparts from the Occupation, most notably in the form of Willoughby's "Leftist Infiltration" report. While these attacks had questionable success, they illustrated anti-Communists' argument that political differences, prejudice, and personal disagreement were genuine grounds to consider someone suspicious and disloyal. In chapter 3, I discuss how the political shifts within the U.S. throughout the late 1940s ultimately led to the success of anti-Communists' goals, illustrating the larger link between the ideas of the Occupation's right-wingers, and the prevailing attitudes in American policymakers at the time. By looking at these developments in this sequence, we see how the same conflicts over security vs reform in the U.S. had already played out in the Occupation.

Chapter 1: Origins of the Occupation Conflict

Introduction

Beate Sirota must have felt out of place on the plane she had rode to Japan on Christmas Eve, 1945. Not only was she one of the first female civilians working in the defeated Japan, but she was also one of the few occupationaires to have lived longer in Japan than in America. According to her memoir, Sirota was born in 1923 to Jews from Kyiv who had met each other in Vienna at a young age due to their movement within the circles of Viennese high society. The Sirotas moved to Japan in 1929 after the father, Leo Sirota, secured a job as a music teacher due to his skill as a pianist. Young Beate Sirota gained firsthand experience of life as a girl and young woman in pre-war Japan, even if as a foreigner, that few others in the Occupation could lay claim to. Leo Sirota's commitment to his job kept the elder Sirotas stuck in Japan for the duration of the Pacific War, but owing to global tensions in 1939, Beate Sirota was sent to finish her schooling in America at the all-female Mills College in Oakland.²⁴

Cut off from her parents, Sirota survived on a mix of savings and part time war work at listening stations where she could employ her knowledge of Japanese. Sirota gained U.S. citizenship in 1945 and worked in the Office of War Information and FCC until the end of the war, then she searched for a job that could get her back to Japan. Using her credentials in government service and knowledge of Japanese, Sirota earned a position in SCAP's Government

²⁴ Gordon, *Only Woman in the Room*, Chapters 1-4. As Beate Gordon did not marry until after the Occupation, I refer to her in the text by her maiden name.

Although Beate Gordon's memoir is naturally biased as a source, it is one of the only major sources on her background available. In chapter 2, I discuss Willoughby's own claims about her background, though they are comparatively "absurd," to use Takemae's description. *Inside GHQ*, 162.

Section and a flight back to Japan, where she reunited with her parents.²⁵ Most occupationaires did not have as colorful background as Sirota, but each in his or her own way had their own history with Japan or government policy which brought them aboard SCAP. With those differing backgrounds came differing views.

The group of Americans who came to rule Japan and create policy in the wake of World War II were politically diverse and divided. The policies that were crafted in Washington mixed the liberal reformatory spirit of the New Deal with a desire to remake Japan, and authority to implement those policies was given to SCAP. The resulting coalition of staff members that were ordered to carry out liberal reform included traditional conservatives, right-wing anti-Communists, progressive reformers, and unionists. While SCAP was loyal to Washington overall, these differing groups within SCAP held differing visions of what was best for Japan based off their own backgrounds and politics in America, and they fought over policy, resulting in sections of SCAP discreetly working against each other. The main two groups which emerged were special civil staff section DACs fighting for New Dealer liberal reform, and more conservative military men who viewed such liberals and their policies as subversive. These two groups held the competing visions of the Occupation's goals for Japan.

In this chapter, I argue that the competing visions for policy in Japan came about due to the multiple, conflicting factions involved in the creation of Occupation policy. First, I discuss the motives for reforming Japan and how American policymakers initially came to support a liberal, reformatory policy before Japan's surrender. Next, I illustrate how SCAP was organized, including who held power in Japan, how SCAP operated under orders from Washington, and

²⁵ Gordon, *Only Woman in the Room*, Chapters 1, 4-5.

how it was divided into competing sections. Then, I cover the competing ideological views of SCAP's New Dealers and anti-Communists which led to support for competing groups of Japanese citizens. Finally, I dissect the individual backgrounds, policies, and powers of SCAP's civilian and military staff to illustrate how those competing policies were carried out by SCAP staff themselves. By examining these topics together, I chart the growth of the Occupation's early policies from pre-surrender planning to the early roles and actions of occupationaires and the competing influences which lead to intra-section attacks.

American Plans for Post-Surrender Japan

America's policymakers were making plans for the postwar world as early as 1942, with the broad goal of ensuring there would be no repeat war or resurgent enemy as had been the case between WWI and WWII. In the case of Japan, Americans wanted to ensure that Japan could no longer threaten peace or stability in Asia and the Pacific Ocean the same way in which it had done so in the preceding decades through aggressive expansion. Policymakers blamed Japan's aggression and woes on a rise in militarism and so, in addition to physically destroying Japan's ability to wage war and punishing war criminals, Americans hoped to build a strong, stable democracy which could check any such impulses. In the process of doing so, Americans hoped to enhance American prestige in Asia by using a remade Japan as an illustrative model of the benefits American-style democracy and American support could bring.²⁶ In short, as historian Dayna Barnes puts it, "planners sought to create a disarmed, nonimperial, economically stable

²⁶ Miller, *Cold War Democracy*, 3-5, 12, 19, 31-32.

Japan, which would be firmly committed to the new international system.”²⁷ What was required to bring that Japan about, however, was debated amongst Americans.

Within the State Department, there were two major factions fighting over what policies should be implemented in postwar Japan—the “Japan crowd” and “China crowd.” The Japan crowd was made up of men who had spent their years in the foreign service amongst Japanese aristocrats and businessmen who doubted commoners’ ability to democratically govern themselves. The members of the Japan crowd shared this belief and embraced the traditional Western view that the average Asian possessed little capacity for independent thought, so the Japan crowd advocated for supporting the political moderates among the old ruling classes who had not actively supported the war, viewing them as essential sources of stability and knowledge in the face of change, even if it meant “softer” peace terms. The China crowd was made up of a mixture of New Deal liberals, leftists, and dedicated Asia specialists who advocated for a stricter peace and punishment of Japan’s ruling classes due to the China crowd’s greater sympathies for China and suspicion of traditional elites. Many members of the China crowd believed that democracy had a universal appeal which could produce new democratic leadership amongst commoners and pre-war radicals. During the last few months of the war, even as the domestic fortunes of New Dealers were waning, the China crowd’s views won out, which historian John Dower attributes to the majority of Americans outside the Japan crowd favoring harsh terms for Japan and the re-arrangements in the State and War Departments in the wake of FDR’s death.²⁸

²⁷ Dayna L. Barnes, *Architects of Occupation: American Experts and Planning for Postwar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017), 5, <https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,uid&db=e025xna&AN=1496754&site=ehost-live>.

²⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 217-22. The terms “Japan crowd” and “China crowd” are somewhat informal and can vary depending upon the author—even the terms can vary slightly, as “Japan hands” and “China hands” are other common descriptors. I have chosen to use Dower’s categorization in this paper.

The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), made up of a mixture of the three departments, became responsible for drafting U.S. policy for the Occupation. Although several Republican or otherwise conservative men were involved in drafting the policy to the time of surrender, the final policy remained liberal in character.²⁹

While Potsdam promised to encourage democratic tendencies in Japan, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) document 1380/15, titled “Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper,” contained the actual detailed “blueprints” for MacArthur and his staff to work off of and guided their actions throughout the initial years of Occupation.³⁰ The combination of policies encased in JCS 1380/15 directives and initiatives taken by occupationaire led to a vast number of reforms in Japan. These included: the expansion of civil rights, the abolishment of secret police, the re-distribution of land, the formation of labor unions under SCAP’s encouragement, and the purge of accused militarists in government and business alike. Theodore Cohen, a division chief at SCAP, admitted that these were “New Deal policies” and called JCS 1380/15 “a New Deal Document,” attributing its character to the political strains and beliefs running through Americans who had lived through the New Deal so recently.³¹ In some ways, this was natural, for the Occupation had to address social reform, relief for people suffering, and economic recovery in Japan just as the New Deal had done so for America.³² In other ways, the

²⁹ Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal*, ed. Herbert Passin (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 14.

³⁰ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 104-05. In September 1945, between Potsdam and JSC 1380/15, SWNCC 150/4, “The U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” was publicly released. It contained some of the general goals and policy for Occupation but had fewer concrete policies than JCS 1380/15 and thus little impact.

³¹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 10-15, 47-48. The early Occupation’s association with the New Deal existed well before Cohen’s work, though some occupationaires disagreed with the comparison. For example, Colonel Charles Kades of SCAP’s Government Section disagreed with the notion that Japan’s Constitution (which he worked on) was a “New Deal constitution,” arguing it had roots in ideas from the 18th and 19th centuries as well as SWNCC orders created without the New Deal in mind. Charles Kades, Interview by Marlene J. Mayo, October 11-12, 1979, 187-88, transcript, 79, box 4 of 6, Marlene J. Mayo Oral Histories, 0015, Gordon W. Prange Collection, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Maryland, College Park.

³² Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers*, 131.

reforms were designed to go even further than at home in order to address the specific challenges facing Japan. For example, SCAP was given instructions to break apart the *zaibatsu*, Japan's large conglomerate combines, since it was believed their hierarchy and centralized nature enabled totalitarianism.³³ Regardless of the intent behind each reform, JCS 1380/15 empowered SCAP to enact numerous reforms on Japanese government, business, and even society.

SCAP's Powers and Organization

Control Over Japan and Control by Washington

When discussing the power held by SCAP to enact reform, it is prudent to mention the man who officially held responsibility for implementing those reforms. MacArthur, in popular history, is commonly viewed synonymously with the Occupation, thanks in no small part to his conscious efforts to cultivate his image. Even under the bounds of the chain of command, MacArthur had the power to enact wide, sweeping changes for Japan. However, despite his freedom, MacArthur played a small role in actually creating Occupation policy, as much of what he carried out was already decided in Washington and contained within JCS 1380/15.³⁴ When the policy proclamations in JCS 1380/15 were converted into concrete policies and laws in Japan, it was SCAP's staff who did the actual conversions. MacArthur occasionally weighed in on specific policies he had an interest in, such as retaining Emperor Hirohito on the Imperial throne, and his staff members did their utmost to carry out those policies.³⁵ By and large, however, he

³³ Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers*, 4. Germany's conglomerates faced the same accusation and break up.

³⁴ Marlene J. Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts" in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe, (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 49.

³⁵ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 235.

was content to trust the work of his subordinates. Thus, when discussing SCAP, it is important to understand how SCAP's bureaucrats operated.

SCAP did not control Japan directly, partly because it lacked the means to do so. Although thousands of Americans were trained for military government in Japan, MacArthur and his staff were wary of traditional area specialists and typically relegated them to local military governance or Okinawa.³⁶ Instead, SCAP hired a mixture of Army men who had advanced degrees or expertise in certain subjects and DAC specialists to fill out SCAP's bureaucracy.³⁷ Because SCAP both lacked enough staff fluent in Japanese to oversee the whole country and wanted to present reforms as originating from the Japanese people, it formed what *Chicago Sun* journalist Mark Gayn described as an "elaborate Army super-government" to force through most of SCAP's desired policies.³⁸ Through a mixture of private letters, suggestions, and indirect comments of approval or disapproval, or as Cohen called it, "A body of noncommands with the force of commands," SCAP staff would tell their Japanese counterparts what policies and changes should happen without ever officially ordering anything.³⁹ When formal directives to the government were necessary, SCAP Indexes (commonly known as SCAPINs) were used to force through Imperial Edicts and Cabinet Ordinances, though after 1947 they were used sparingly because they could be easily overturned in post-Occupation Japan. In a worst-case scenario, MacArthur had the military authority to force the policies of his headquarters through and intervene in disputes or rule directly on certain issues, ensuring SCAP almost always had the final say on decisions.⁴⁰ This state of affairs left SCAP with the responsibility for the majority of

³⁶ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 223-224.

³⁷ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xxviii.

³⁸ Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc, 1948), 340.

³⁹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 100.

⁴⁰ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 114-16.

Japan's government policies throughout the Occupation, though it did not totally prevent Japanese citizens from having a say in their governance.

After WWII, many Japanese citizens began to form their own ideas about what their country needed to change. While the argument that Americans were suited to enforce reform on Japan reflected the racially paternalistic belief that Western culture and values were naturally superior and would elevate Japan if imposed, the shock of defeat drove many Japanese citizens to search for changes on their own without waiting for the Americans.⁴¹ In the aftermath of the Japanese government's failure to win the war, the older leftist resistance movements, particularly the Communists, were vindicated, leading to a surge in both labor activism and Marxist intellectual analysis amongst Japanese.⁴² As a result, many of the newly formed trade unions were socialist in character.⁴³ Sometimes the liberal Americans dovetailed with Japanese leftist on matters such as land reform and *zaibatsu* break-up.⁴⁴ At other times the embrace of Marxist framing and thought was alien to most Americans, particularly when Japanese historians, labor specialists, and economists attempt to push beyond American ideas of reform. Still, several individual reforms and policies during the Occupation came about due to the initiative of Japanese citizens approaching SCAP for cooperation or assistance, and Japanese bureaucrats were responsible for implementation of "Virtually all basic reforms" in the words of Dower.⁴⁵ While SCAP had *de facto* control over Japan's national policies, Japanese citizens could have their own say in policy. SCAP itself was at the beck and call of Washington.

⁴¹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 207-21. While Dower highlights the racial paternalism inherent in bringing about an enforced revolution from above, he still cautions that it was a "more progressive, less racially and culturally condescending argument" than the limited changes argued for by the Japan crowd.

⁴² Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*, 26-27.

⁴³ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 92.

⁴⁴ Oinas-Kukkonen, *Tolerance, Suspicion and Hostility*, 29-30.

⁴⁵ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 236-39, 244-46.

SCAP was always subservient to orders from Washington. While for years SCAP was viewed by historians as a largely autonomous organization due to the broad discretionary power it held in implementing policy and its willingness to neglect both American and foreign policymakers, most of SCAP's policies could be traced to directives or desires back home.⁴⁶ One of the most infamous examples of SCAP's apparent disregard for policymakers was when State Department representatives meant to advise MacArthur and report on the Occupation's progress were kept in the dark on GS' biggest project, the Japanese Constitution, and forced to wire communications home through military channels. However, the State Department had already written part of the blueprint SCAP was following, and in the Occupation's later years, men from the State Department were commonly hired by SCAP.⁴⁷ Similarly, the Far Eastern Commission, made up of representatives from the Allied nations meeting in Washington, had the power to issue directives to SCAP, but it was routinely kept uninformed about developments in Japan, and the smaller Allied Council for Japan in Tokyo was reduced to an arena for arguments between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.⁴⁸ MacArthur showed his disgust towards the Soviets with his personal flair, but many policymakers in the U.S. were equally committed to maintaining American operational control over Japan while giving other nations limited role in policy, effectively sanctioning MacArthur's behavior.⁴⁹ While the occasional insults to authority no doubt irritated foreign and domestic policymakers alike, SCAP never acted radically outside of its orders.

Owing to SCAP's subservience to Washington, the policies that SCAP carried out, including the reformatory plans for Japan, inherently reflected wider American policy goals.

⁴⁶ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xxviii.

⁴⁷ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 149-50. The specific section those representatives were involved in during the early years was the Office of the Political Advisor, which was succeeded by Diplomatic Section.

⁴⁸ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 96-100.

⁴⁹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 56.

MacArthur and the rest of SCAP were subject to the military chain of command, which included the President, Chairs of the Joint Chiefs and Army Chief of Staff, and Secretaries of War and the Army.⁵⁰ While SCAP did benefit from the fact that these groups were more concentrated on Europe prior to 1948 and therefore gave Japan less immediate oversight, they were still capable of exercising their authority over MacArthur's command at any time.⁵¹ When the National Security Council issued NSC 13/2 in 1948, which directed that many liberal reform policies SCAP staff had carried out be stopped or reversed, SCAP's staff had no choice but to follow the new policy.⁵² SCAP's policies would always broadly reflect the desires of American policymakers. However, the way those desires were reflected by staff was far from unified.

Sectional Divisions and Conflict

SCAP consisted of two types of sections: Military General Staff sections, and special staff sections. These sections, together with AFPAC's own staff sections, made up the staff of the early Occupation, as demonstrated in figure 1, a basic summary of the Occupation's organization. Military General Staff sections, which exist at any military organization above a division level, were responsible for Personnel (G-1), Intelligence and Counterintelligence (G-2), Operations (G-3), and Supply (G-4).⁵³ Some of the military staff held control over both SCAP and AFPAC sections, as illustrated by the "Dual Commands" shown in figure 1, but lower level

⁵⁰ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 103.

⁵¹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 78-79.

⁵² Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 468.

⁵³ For an explanation of the structure of general staff sections, see "The General Staff System: Basic Structure," *Veritas* 7, no. 2 (2011): 43. https://arsof-history.org/articles/pdf/v7n2_general_staff_system.pdf. For a list of sections in the Occupation, see Eleanor M Hadley and Patricia Hagan Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster: A Lifelong Adventure with Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003) 62. <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/8134>. Unless otherwise noted, G-2 is used in this paper to specifically refer to the Intelligence sections Willoughby headed under MacArthur in GHQ.




Figure 1: The dual structure of the Occupation. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 136

divisions and sections were maintained separately in SCAP and AFPAC.⁵⁴ Unlike the Military General Staff sections, the special staff sections of SCAP and their divisions and branches were often in a state of flux due to the constantly changing needs of the Occupation, so their powers, names, and staff members could easily change. There were numerous special staff sections which existed in the early years of the Occupation, as demonstrated in figure 1, but there are three special staff sections which are most relevant to this thesis. The first was Government Section (GS), which was responsible for the internal affairs of Japan's civil government. The second was

⁵⁴ "Graph of G-2 Hierarchy", folder: G-2 Intel Circular, box: 8556, series entry: UD 1803, Civil Intelligence Service Record Group 331: Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, National Archives, College Park, MD.

Economic and Scientific Section (ESS), which was responsible for economic affairs, labor, finance, and industry. The third was Civil Information and Education Section (CI&E), which was responsible for public information, education, religion, and addressing sociological problems.⁵⁵ The staff of these three branches became the common targets for anti-Communists within the Occupation, but in spite of this they wielded considerable influence in solidifying policies according to their vision of JCS 1380/15.

Each of the major sections of SCAP, whether they were special or military staff, jealously guarded what they viewed as their prerogatives and duties, sometimes working at cross-purposes despite sharing the same policy guide. In one instance, GS took over business management purges from ESS due to the latter's perceived slowness. In another instance, a CI&E branch head supported police breaking a strike at a newspaper office even though ESS' labor division backed those workers' right to strike. GS maneuvered to take responsibility for police reform and the purge of militarists, policymaking fields Major General Charles Willoughby wanted G-2 to control.⁵⁶ Often the arguments between sections were due not just to competition for power but also differing attitudes. In one meeting, Willoughby severely criticized the purges of militarists carried out by GHQ, getting to the point that Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, the leader of GS, rebuked him on the spot for his attitude.⁵⁷ GS commonly won its arguments with other sections and rose to the top of SCAP early on due to its responsibility for approving legislation and the close relation Whitney had with MacArthur. As the years went on, G-2 became the other most powerful group within SCAP, particularly after initial reforms had been implemented and

⁵⁵ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 153, 172-73, 180. CI&E is rendered as "CIE" in some sources.

⁵⁶ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 146-48, 267-69.

⁵⁷ Gayn, *Japan Diary*, 42-43.

the “reverse course” brought about increased demand for intelligence services.⁵⁸ While other sections did not retain the same degree of power, they still wielded considerable influence over Japan’s development and acted according to their visions of what was best for the country.

Competing Visions in the Occupation

Background Politics

With war coming to an end in 1945, one of the key questions on everyone’s mind was what changes the nations of the world needed. Everyone coming into the Occupation was old enough to have lived through the Depression and prior World War and had witnessed the radical transformations in society, politics, culture, and economy brought about by the past decade and a half.⁵⁹ Fundamental questions such as how wealth should be concentrated, what rights an individual should be guaranteed, and what power laborers should have over their work had been raised by the transformation. Within America, president Roosevelt’s New Deal had greatly shaken the status quo of American politics with support for left-wing initiatives to a degree unthinkable in years before, yet liberals faced increasing opposition from conservatives in Congress since the late 1930s and corporate interests brought into the Government by WWII, signaling a split at home.⁶⁰ Each of the occupationaires brought his or her own vision of what Japan needed from the pre-war split, and they would compete in Japan just as they had in America. While many occupationaires (including MacArthur himself) did not fall neatly into a category, two broad groups emerged.

⁵⁸ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 146-48.

⁵⁹ Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*, 23-24.

⁶⁰ Brinkley, *End of Reform*, 16, 118-21.

One of these groups consisted of the coalition of liberals and leftists who identified with, supported, or otherwise assisted in the policies which made up the New Deal under President Roosevelt. The New Deal was a massive movement, and it would be impossible to give an explanation that would do it justice here or to encapsulate the numerous strands of thought associated with it, but certain ideals which were encapsulated in the movement were particularly relevant to the conflicts within the Occupation.⁶¹ One of the fundamental beliefs of the New Deal was that America's problems during the depression were rooted in structures of modern capitalism. While most New Dealers did not believe it needed to be replaced, they were open to left-wing ideas and willing experiment with serious government intervention and restructuring of the economy to a degree almost unheard of in American politics. Such willingness to act against big business resulted in many left-leaning and leftist groups joining the New Deal coalition, with labor unions becoming a particularly powerful ally in exchange for New Dealers' support for labor's rights.⁶² An assortment of left-leaning intellectuals, economists, lawyers, and other public figures FDR's administration even flirted with the Communist Party during the years of the Popular Front's opposition to fascism.⁶³ One of the earliest impulses amongst New Dealers was the belief that concentrated economic power, such as monopolies, had been responsible for the suffering in the depression. Many in the FDR administration not only shared the public's opposition to monopolies 1930s for their perceived role in economic injustice and corruption, but they also believed that monopolies choked the market by setting prices and that antitrust policy

⁶¹ For more reading on the groups that made up the New Deal, its rise and fall, accomplishments, and development from 1933 to the end of World War II, see Ira Katznelson, *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time*, 1st ed. (New York: Liveright Pub. Corp., 2013) and Alan Brinkley, *The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War*, 1st ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995).

⁶² Brinkley, *End of Reform*, 5-7, 119.

⁶³ Sparrow, *Warfare State*, 28.

was the key to recovery.⁶⁴ The willingness to ally and align with left-leaning groups and challenge traditional centers of power like big business earned New Dealers the ire of the Occupation's other main ideological group.

The anti-Communists in the Occupation were part of a long, dedicated movement of countersubversion which itself was made up of a core network of right-wing nativists and traditionalists combined with antiunion businessmen. The wider countersubversive movements had fought against leftist and labor movements since the latter half of the 19th century with the goal of preventing any type of worker-led revolution or mass reform. This typically led countersubversives to try and remove any sources of agitation, most commonly by attempting to deport foreign-born "radicals" involved in activist movements.⁶⁵ Since the 1930s, the American network of right-wing ideologues was united by shared opposition to communism, socialism, and New Deal liberalism (the three of which were commonly conflated) as well as militant hostility to organized labor's attacks on the rights and prerogative of capital.⁶⁶ As the New Deal brought power to the left and labor organizations, the old anti-Communist network responded, now with increased assistance from Communists' own rivals on the left.⁶⁷ One of the primary groups who American anti-Communists held ire for in the late 1930s were the members of FDR's administration who had affiliated with the Popular Front Communists.⁶⁸

Even before World War II, anti-Communists began their attacks. In 1938, the House Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities chaired by Martin Dies (and thus

⁶⁴ Alan Brinkley, *End of Reform*, 5-7, 49, 56, 59-62, 107, 113-14.

⁶⁵ For the origins and core of the countersubversive movement, see Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 48-49, 64-65. For the anti-foreign bias of countersubversives, see Sparrow, *Warfare State*, 257-58. Schrecker points to the railroad strikes of 1877 and the Paris Commune as prime inciting factors for the formation of countersubversive networks.

⁶⁶ Walsh, "The Right-Wing Popular Front," 19-20.

⁶⁷ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 64-70.

⁶⁸ Sparrow, *Warfare State*, 27-28.

known as the Dies Committee) launched a series of investigations into liberals and reformers in the administration, claiming they were Communists and left-wingers guilty of subversion who needed to be dismissed. While the committee found limited success beyond embarrassing the FDR administration, the attempt to discredit the New Deal by tying it to radicals and Communists created a powerful rhetorical link with which to attack the former.⁶⁹ The Committee also highlighted links between the labor movement and Communist Party, coinciding with a congressional attack on New Deal labor laws.⁷⁰ These assaults were put on hold by American entry into World War II, but the groundwork for later attacks was laid.⁷¹ Within the Occupation, both New Dealers and anti-Communists found themselves fighting both by proxy and directly.

Competing Work at SCAP

One of the main avenues by which ideological fights between SCAP sections played out was through Japanese citizens. Despite their position as an indirect “super-government,” the inner debates in SCAP were never removed from Japanese citizens or the press, and various staff members worked alongside their preferred groups of Japanese men and women. Colonel Charles Kades, the deputy chief of GS, freely admitted he and GS supported the Japanese socialist party in spite of his personal belief in free private, competitive enterprise because the socialists shared many of the goals of the Occupation and easily cooperated with SCAP.⁷² These associations

⁶⁹ Brinkley, *End of Reform*, 141. The committee was a successor to a prior Special Committee which investigated Nazi propaganda, but the Dies Committee limited Nazi investigations to a single day of proceedings, with one member openly stating the Communists were a larger threat. Katznelson, *Fear Itself*, 329-30.

⁷⁰ For the Committee’s linkage between labor unions and Communists, see Katznelson, *Fear Itself*, 330-331. For congressional attacks on labor laws, see Nelson Lichtenstein, *Labor’s War At Home: The CIO in World War II* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010), 19, <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/9671>.

⁷¹ For the pause in attacks on labor, see Lichtenstein, *Labor’s War at Home*, 95-96. For the pause in attacks on Communists, see Katznelson, *Fear itself*, 354.

⁷² Kades, Interview, 130.

provided benefits for Japanese groups, as Cohen noted that the labor division's vocal support for unions in the early phase of Occupation often meant that union leaders would try to "use" their meetings with Cohen to increase their prestige in the eyes of their followers.⁷³ Thanks to their good working with relations with their ideological and bureaucratic counterparts in Japan, SCAP staff could turn to outsiders if the rest of GHQ was uncooperative. One of the most notable cases of this was when Ichirō Hatoyama, the projected prime minister following Japan's first postwar election, was purged after Gayn and other press correspondents questioned him about his praise for Hitler and Mussolini in a book he wrote in 1938. Gayn admitted in his diary that "some Headquarters officers" gave him a translated copy of the book because their own attempts to bring it to attention in GHQ had gone nowhere.⁷⁴ In turn, concerned Japanese liberals and leftists denounced ultra-rightists to GS during the purges, clearly recognizing when their goals aligned with the Americans.⁷⁵ Naturally, Japanese conservatives and rightists found their own allies at GHQ in men such as Willoughby.

Willoughby and other right-wingers in GHQ routinely supported conservative Japanese politicians and policymakers. One of the politicians to get the most support was Yoshida Shigeru, the conservative the prime minister of Japan from May 1946 to May 1947 and October 1948 to December 1954.⁷⁶ The support was clearly appreciated, as Yoshida in his memoirs spoke highly of Willoughby and his military staff as "enlightened in the general sense" and "realists" who were opposed to the "idealists" in GS that Yoshida claimed were using Japan as a testing ground

⁷³ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 197-202.

⁷⁴ Gayn, *Japan Diary*, 161-64. According to Takemae, the insiders responsible were Captain Arthur Behrstock and Lt. Tom Tsukahara of CI&E. *Inside GHQ*, note 58, 269.

⁷⁵ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 269.

⁷⁶ John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*, Harvard East Asian Monographs 84 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2020), 273. <https://search-ebcsohost-com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip,uid&db=e025xna&AN=2422638&site=ehost-live>.

for progressive reform.⁷⁷ Yoshida could count on Willoughby to act as his man in GHQ to fight GS' reform. The Japanese police likewise came to G-2 for support against ESS' labor division when the latter attempted to outlaw police intervention in labor strikes.⁷⁸ Cohen charged that Willoughby's actions made him the most openly partisan officer of the Occupation, pointing to an incident in when Willoughby avoided helping out in an investigation into illegally hoarded military materials which would have implicated his anti-Communist and conservative allies.⁷⁹ While Cohen is certainly biased given the labor division's clashes with G-2, Willoughby appeared much more willing to attack graft when it gave him the opportunity to implicate his enemies. In Spring 1948, he leaked the details of a bribery scandal involving Democratic prime minister Hitoshi Ashida, top officials in his ruling coalition of Democratic, socialist, and People's Cooperative Parties, foreign correspondents, and rivals in SCAP.⁸⁰ Historian Takemae Eiji acknowledged that the corruption was wide and needed to be exposed, but also contended that Willoughby was clandestinely interfering in Japanese politics for the purpose of unseating Ashida's government, which became the last one Socialists would participate in for over four decades.⁸¹ Like the New Dealers, anti-Communists such as Willoughby never remained above the fray of Japanese politics. These battles reflected the differences in thought at SCAP.

⁷⁷ Yoshida Shigeru, *Kaisō Jūnen* [Recollections of Ten Years] (Tokyo: Shinchō sha, 1957), I, 96, 108-11, quoted in Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan*, 180-81.

⁷⁸ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 148.

⁷⁹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 349-50. Cohen also acknowledged that Japanese socialists had failed to adequately address the situation.

⁸⁰ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 164-65. Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan*, 159-61.

⁸¹ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 165.

Personalities and Competing Forces in Occupied Japan

The Civil Section Staff

To understand the conflicting visions and politics within SCAP, it helps to examine the different backgrounds and roles that occupationaires held in order to see the sparks that led to internal conflict. The Americans who that made up the various sections, divisions, and branches of SCAP varied in background, skillset, politics, and experience. The majority of SCAP's bureaucrats were American citizens, but some division and branch heads were first or second-generation immigrants. While the chiefs of almost all sections were MacArthur's generals and colonels, their own staff consisted largely of civilians with a small number of officers in leading positions, and each and every person held his or her own views.⁸² Typically, it was the DAC bureaucrats who turned the instructions within JCS 1380/15 into actual policies, as they had the expertise in relevant subjects which MacArthur's men lacked.⁸³ A majority of these early policymakers were liberals or leftists who supported New Deal style policies and left-leaning Japanese groups, while the military men tended to be more conservative. There were conservative civilians and liberally minded military men from the outset, but the division of liberal policymakers under conservative officers was the norm.

The Government Section held one of the clearest contrasts between its military leadership and civilian bureaucrats. The section chief was Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, a conservative (and reportedly antisemitic) lawyer for MacArthur in Manilla who later rejoined the general in Australia. Whitney was placed in charge of Government Section in December 1945

⁸² For a list of the military leadership of each section, see Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 63. Diplomatic Section was the only one which was run by a civilian due to its relation to the State Department.

⁸³ Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers*, 131.

and resigned in 1951 upon MacArthur's firing.⁸⁴ As MacArthur's former lawyer, Whitney was greatly trusted by MacArthur, and became the one person in SCAP who could see MacArthur at any time, giving GS greater sway in policymaking decisions.⁸⁵ A minority of early GS staff members were conservatives willing to snipe at other sections due to their politics such as Harry E. Wildes, a "rabid anti-Communist" (in the words of Takemae) who accused CI&E publications of favoring the Communist Party line.⁸⁶ However, these views were the minority in Government Section's early years due to influence of the section's deputy chief, Colonel Charles L. Kades

Charles Kades was a liberal Jewish New York lawyer with roots in Spain who was so persuasive in his arguments that Whitney constantly relied on him in spite of his own conservative beliefs.⁸⁷ Kades was, in the words of Dower, "an exemplary New Dealer" with a record of service in Federal Government agencies dating back to 1933. His work in the New Deal included acting as legal counsel for the Federal Public Works Administration and the Treasury Department and serving as an active-duty member of the War Department's Civil Affairs Division during WWII. Kades admitted to having no background knowledge in Japanese history or culture, but his legal experience in the New Deal allowed him to play a pivotal role in Government Section initiatives and programs, such as the draft of Japan's new constitution.⁸⁸ Kades position in GS made him one of the most influential liberals in all of SCAP, to the point that Takemae considers Kades' departure in 1948 to mark the end of the era of reform preceding the Reverse Course.⁸⁹ Although Kades' role and impact was beyond average, Dower notes that

⁸⁴ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 154-56.

⁸⁵ Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 62-64.

⁸⁶ For Wildes accusations, see *Typhoon in Tokyo*, 274. For Takemae's description, see *Inside GHQ*, note 122, 395.

⁸⁷ For Whitney's reliance on Kades and his background in New York, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 155-56. For Kades' ancestry, see Gordon, *Only Woman in the Room*, 22. For Kades' persuasiveness, see Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 64.

⁸⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 223.

⁸⁹ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 156.

many of the other bureaucrats brought into SCAP had equally limited pre-war knowledge of Japan but familiarity with New Deal style governance.⁹⁰ Beate Sirota recounted that the section “was by and large a group of legal scholars and professors-in-uniform. Most were believers in President Roosevelt’s New Deal; all were enthusiastic about instituting what they saw as much needed reforms in Japan.”⁹¹ While Sirota’s own background was a colorful exception to the legal professionals, her background had provided her with fluency in six languages and greater familiarity with life in Japan, and she pursued reform just as strongly.⁹²

Beate Sirota worked in the political affairs division, studying women in politics and minor parties.⁹³ Her crowning achievement in the Occupation was her work in the Civil Rights Subcommittee of Government Section’s “constitutional convention,” a weeklong process in February 1946 when GS staff drastically re-wrote Japan’s Constitution. With her subcommittee focused on ending the “feudal system of Japan,” Sirota labored to improve the rights of women, drawing on her own experience and familiarity with Japanese women’s legal subservience to their husbands. Sirota studied provisions in Weimer, Soviet, and Scandinavian constitutions to write articles on equality of the sexes and mutual consent required for marriage, and she (unsuccessfully) argued for including provisions on social welfare rights for women and children. In her provisions, Sirota essentially promoted a vision of far-reaching reform which went beyond what American women are guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.⁹⁴ After the constitutional convention, Sirota assisted with GS’ work on purging political and economic

⁹⁰ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 223.

⁹¹ Gordon, *Only Woman in the Room*, 22.

⁹² Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 160.

⁹³ Gordon, *Only Woman in the Room*, 23.

⁹⁴ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 277-79. For more on the overall history of the Japanese Constitution, including a discussion on the extent to which it reflected the will of the Japanese public, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 270-92.

leaders until May 1947, then she returned to New York to remain at her parents side and marry Lt. Joe Gordon, a translator she met at GHQ.⁹⁵ Sirota was one of the most prominent women to work “in the room” working on civil reform, but government section had other notable female policymakers as well.⁹⁶

Eleanor Hadley was a GS staff member who had assisted in ESS’ Anti-Trust and Cartels Division, but like Sirota, her history with Japan went back further than the Occupation.⁹⁷ Hadley was born in Seattle to Republican parents and graduated from Mills college in 1938, then she became one the few Americans prior to the war to study in Japan. In the Fall of 1941, Hadley started pursuing a Ph.D. in economics at Radcliffe in Cambridge, MA, but the outbreak of war led to her recruitment by OSS in 1944. Hadley then worked with the State Department’s economic division and contributed to pre-surrender planning for breaking up the *zaibatsu*. Hadley began working in Japan in April 1946 after GS requested her by name while seeking staff with more knowledge of Japan. Hadley gave the work her full energy, later citing her experience in the Depression and New Deal economics study at Radcliffe as what made her a firm believer in the liberal reforms proposed in the Basic Directive to MacArthur.⁹⁸ Thus, as mandated by the directive, she and other occupationaires created *zaibatsu* dissolution programs designed to create a more competitive economy in which economic power was fairly distributed.⁹⁹ Hadley left the

⁹⁵ For Gordon’s date of departure, see Beate Sirota Gordon, Interview by Marlene J. Mayo, December 8, 1978, 53, transcript, 62, box 3 of 6, Marlene J. Mayo Oral Histories, 0015, Gordon W. Prange Collection, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Maryland, College Park, https://archives.lib.umd.edu/repositories/2/archival_objects/551892. For Gordon’s reason for leaving, see Gordon, *Only Woman in the Room*, 140-41.

Even after her return, Beate Gordon continued to work in Japan as well as the rest of Asia, promoting performers and art from across the Continent as part of the Asia Society. *Only Woman in the Room*, chapters 6-7.

⁹⁶ Amongst those working on the Constitution alone, there were at least three other women. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, note 68, 278.

⁹⁷ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 160.

⁹⁸ Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 17-18, 23-24, 42-43, 48-56, 60, 67-68.

⁹⁹ Patricia Kuwayama and Hugh Patrick, Introduction to *Memoir of a Trustbuster: A Lifelong Adventure with Japan* by Eleanor M. Hadley (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2003) 12-13, <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/8134>.

Occupation in September 1947 to continue pursuing her PhD and career.¹⁰⁰ Although Hadley and others in GS had been given responsibility for antitrust owing to GS' maneuvering in GHQ, the actual Economic and Scientific Section had its own influential members.

Economic and Scientific Section, like the Government Section, was primarily run by its bureaucrats. The chief of ESS for most of the Occupation was Major General William Marquat, another member of MacArthur's inner circle from the Philippines. Marquat was a hard and loyal worker with little experience with economics, so he relied on the ESS divisions and their chiefs for advice on the numerous responsibilities of ESS. Among the divisions, the Anti-Trust and Cartels Division and Labor Division played leading roles in reforming Japan.¹⁰¹ According to Cohen, most of the Labor Division's early officers and advisors were trade unionists, officials of U.S. Labor department, or worked in other U.S. government agencies that were used to dealing with workers.¹⁰² This led to many staff members in the labor division having strong pro-labor feelings and policy goals, even when their individual politics differed drastically. One of Cohen's staff members, Golda Stander, worked to pass Japan's labor standards law and left SCAP in 1951 in protest of SCAP encouraging the Japanese government and businesses to purge suspected radical workers. Cohen's successor as division chief was James Killen, a staunch anti-Communist and unionist owing to his background in the AFL. Like Stander, he too resigned in protest, his cause being MacArthur's choice to support a law banning civil servants from collectively bargaining or striking in 1948. Richard Deverall, the head of the labor information and education branch, was a rabid anti-Communist who claimed some of his fellow occupationaires in SCAP were part of a fifth column supporting the Communist unions he and

¹⁰⁰ Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 56, 116.

¹⁰¹ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 173-74.

¹⁰² Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 197.

Killen fought to discredit.¹⁰³ While each of these staff members held clearly different views on the extent to which Communists were a threat, all of them supported the vision of creating a stronger democratic labor movement in Japan. Perhaps the staff member closest to holding a centrist position within the division was its first major chief, Cohen.

Theodore Cohen, the labor division's chief from January 1946 to March 1947, was born in New York to Russian-Jewish immigrants who had moved to the U.S. in 1903 and 1904.¹⁰⁴ According to Herbert Passin, the editor of Cohen's memoir, Cohen was attracted to the radical movements of the 1930s while remaining anti-Stalinist, and was both sympathetic to, and "sometimes" active in, the labor movement.¹⁰⁵ Before coming to Japan, Cohen studied under Hugh Borton (one of the State Department's planners for the Occupation) at Columbia and worked for the Foreign Economic Administration's Japanese Labor Policy Section, giving him some familiarity with the country.¹⁰⁶ Despite his pro-labor stance and general alignment with other New Dealers, Cohen considered himself an anti-Communist and included AFL members amongst reference for his civil servant work.¹⁰⁷ Gayn claimed Cohen had "a pathological fear of being labelled (sic), red (though Lord knows he is not)" while Takemae implied that Cohen's liberal tendencies and relation to actual Communists in his family made him nervous about falling under the label.¹⁰⁸ Between his family background and affiliation with the AFL, it is clear that Cohen's brand of anticommunism came out of the broader struggles in the American labor

¹⁰³ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 176-77, 323.

¹⁰⁴ For Cohen's position in SCAP, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 176. For Cohen's background, see Cohen *Remaking Japan*, xxi.

¹⁰⁵ Herbert Passin, Foreword to *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal*, by Theodore Cohen (New York: The Free Press, 1987), xiii.

¹⁰⁶ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 176

¹⁰⁷ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 41, 94. The AFL was a federation of unions which traditionally had conservative leaders and Irish-Catholics among its rank-and-file members, both of whom strongly opposed Communists. Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 69-70.

¹⁰⁸ For Gayn's quote, see *Japan Diary*, 331. For Takemae's comments on the matter, see *Inside GHQ*, 176.

movement between Communists and anti-Communists.¹⁰⁹ Thus, unlike traditional anti-Communists, Cohen supported a strong labor movement in Japan, much to the consternation of others in GHQ.

In spite of his anti-Communism, Cohen believed that Japanese workers were best served by fighting day-to-day for their rights and that they would willingly remove Communists in their midst if properly supported, so he prioritized labor's rights over ousting Communists in the movement. This led to one of his largest fights with Willoughby and other anti-Communists at SCAP when he intervened in a police raid on the newspaper *Yomiuri* in the Summer of 1946, where Communists were part of a larger dispute with the owner that evolved into a strike. Although he could not officially take action, Cohen vigorously interrogated the police on their need to procure a warrant and follow proper judicial procedure to arrest suspect Communist workers, sending them the message that SCAP disapproved of their behavior. Such a message went against the wishes of other SCAP officials who had welcomed the raid.¹¹⁰ Cohen's pro-labor policy nearly cost him his job at SCAP. After a planned nation-wide general strike at the start of 1947 was stopped at the last moment on MacArthur's orders, Cohen was "kicked upstairs" to the position of Marquat's advisor to avoid any controversy falsely attributing the situation to his leniency. Despite the change, he dutifully worked in the position for three years, eventually leaving with commendations from MacArthur.¹¹¹ Cohen and his division's pro-labor attitude had attracted the ire of anti-Communists in and out of the Occupation alike. However, one other section received even more negative attention from anti-Communists.

¹⁰⁹ For a summary of the pre-Cold War history of this conflict in American labor, see Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 65, 69-72.

¹¹⁰ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 240-41, 247-56.

¹¹¹ Passin, Foreword, xiv. Cohen had personally advised against the strike, fearing it could bring the U.S. Army's wrath down on Japan's unions.

The Civil Information and Education Section and its divisions were responsible for some of the more radical social reforms in the early years of the Occupation. The section's first chief, General Kermit R. Dyke, was responsible for freeing political prisoners (including Communists), disbanding the special higher police, drafting the emperor's renunciation of divinity, and purging ultra-nationalists from schools and media.¹¹² CI&E soon gained a reputation of being overly friendly to Japanese leftists, and some occupationaires later admitted that they suspected a Communist cell existed within it.¹¹³ Gayn believed that Dyke was forced to return to America early (specifically in May of 1946) because military brass considered Dyke "pink," even though Gayn felt Dyke was just pro-labor and a believer in social security, and not even a real liberal.¹¹⁴ Ironically, in spite of its early reputation, the Education Division's Higher Education Branch was later the home of Walter C. Eells, a notorious anti-Communist who vigorously campaigned against perceived Communist elements in Japanese education.¹¹⁵ These attitudes were not the norm in the early years of the special staff sections, and reflected a break with the earlier emphasis on freedom in favor of snuffing out communism. Within the Military Staff sections, however, such attitudes were far more common.

The Military Staff

The U.S. Army of 1945 came out of a background which made its role as the arbiter of democracy and liberal reform questionable, and its relationship with civilians troubled. The

¹¹² Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 180-81.

¹¹³ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 112; Richard L.G. Deverall, *Red Star Over Japan*, (Calcutta, 1952), 38-39.

¹¹⁴ Gayn, *Japan Diary*, 237. Takemae considered Dyke a liberal while noting that he was considered a "pink" by others, but he did not speculate about an explicit reason for why Dyke returned. *Inside GHQ*, 181.

¹¹⁵ Ruriko Kumano, "Anticommunism and Academic Freedom: Walter C. Eells and the 'Red Purge' in Occupied Japan," *History of Education Quarterly* 50, no. 4 (2010): 513-37. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25799354>; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 188.

military's relationship with civilians had traditionally bordered on adversarial outside of wartime owing to cultural differences between the regular army and the rest of U.S. society. Americans traditionally favored a military of drafted civilian soldiers and looked down on supporting a standing Army akin to those in Europe, leading the soldiers and staff of the regular army to feel neglected and hated by their countrymen by the 1920s and 30s.¹¹⁶ The military had a "caste system" between officers and enlisted men, which even civilians at the time recognized and criticized for being undemocratic.¹¹⁷ The practice of planning for any war that appeared "inevitable," as the Army in the Philippines had done for Japan, was troubling enough that Gayn claimed GHQ had an obsession with a "coming war with Russia."¹¹⁸ The Army had historically been entrusted with governing abroad, but this was due to Americans' lack of dedicated institutions for overseas governance, leaving the Army being the best equipped for command and control by default as opposed to by choice.¹¹⁹ When civilians became actively involved in governance, as they had been in the Philippines, the Army had to compete for power and policymaking duties.¹²⁰ With their relationship already strained, political differences threatened the liberal reform of civilians.

One historian, David Walsh, describes the Army as a consistently anti-radical force in America, a description which is not unwarranted given that it had historically been called upon to

¹¹⁶ Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 286, 416. <https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674029620>.

¹¹⁷ For a historian's comment on the Army hierarchy, see Cindy Elmore, "Communists at the Stars and Stripes: American 'Disloyalty' or Something Else?" *American Journalism* 32, no. 4 (Fall 2015): 399. <https://doi.org/10.1080/08821127.2015.1096707>. For a civilian comment, see Wildes, *Typhoon in Tokyo*, 282.

¹¹⁸ For the Army's plans for war in the Philippines, see Coffman, *The Regulars*, 286. For Gayn's observation of Army officers expecting war with the Soviets, see *Japan Diary*, 239.

¹¹⁹ Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers*, 13-17.

¹²⁰ Coffman, *The Regulars*, 35.

suppress labor disturbances and race riots.¹²¹ Because of this duty, as well as an internal culture of hierarchy, much of the Army was conservative. Army officers were expected to stay out of politics, but during the 1930s two major generals had respectively criticized the New Deal on the floor of Congress and made extremely right-wing, antisemitic statements.¹²² Walsh also claims that the Army “was an important conduit in disseminating the antisemitic Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy theory in the immediate aftermath of World War I,” showing that many in the military aligned with America’s extreme right-wingers.¹²³ Military officers typically treated Communists and left-leaning unions as inherently subversive Russian agents who were out to ruin America’s ability to wage war, caring little for the distinction between standard militant trade-union activity and outright sabotage.¹²⁴ The average background of Regular Army brass consisted of men from the South and small towns, increasing their suspicion towards “alien” ideology or individuals. In this context, Cohen recognized he was bound to be treated with hostility given his status as a young civilian Jew from New York without an established power base.¹²⁵ While certainly not every Army officer or soldier was a right-winger, many of them were unlikely to be staunch liberals. This could easily lead to conflict, given the Army’s ultimate authority in Japan.

As a longtime officer who had spent his life in the Army, MacArthur’s political views were not much different from the average U.S. Army officer. One of the ironies of the Occupation noted by Cohen was that MacArthur, a vocally conservative general viewed as an anti-Roosevelt hero by white supremacists, anti-Communists, and other right-wingers, was

¹²¹ For Walsh’s comment on the army as an “anti-radical force,” see “The Right-Wing Popular Front,” 25. For examples of the army’s work in suppressing riots and disturbances, see Coffman, *The Regulars*, 194, 222-23.

¹²² Coffman, *The Regulars*, note 27, 245-46.

¹²³ Walsh, “The Right-Wing Popular Front,” 35. Walsh’s thesis as a whole discusses antisemitic conspiracy theories prevalent in the American right.

¹²⁴ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 107-08.

¹²⁵ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 299.

ordered to essentially carry out a New Deal.¹²⁶ MacArthur's dislikes included, in the words of historian Allan Millett, "Democrats, ... Washington agencies in general and the navy in particular, army officers who might be critical of [MacArthur's] infallible judgement, ... civilian diplomats, and Communists, generously defined."¹²⁷ Naturally, MacArthur was opposed to the involvement of anyone outside the U.S. Army in command, and even within the chain of command he had a poor relationship with FDR due to disapproving of the New Deal.¹²⁸ MacArthur was also known to have conflated "New Deal Liberals" and Jews together, similar to other right-wing antisemites.¹²⁹ Given his general beliefs and military background compared to SCAP's civilian staff, MacArthur was one of the last people expected to direct liberal reform in Japan, even with his disconnect from day-to-day policymaking.

However, MacArthur's presence was a boon to liberal reformers instead of a bane, as many former SCAP staff members who considered themselves liberal rarely had a bad thing to say about MacArthur. Cohen felt that MacArthur was not so much a devoted right-winger as an

¹²⁶ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 56, 72-74. MacArthur's conservative fame was enough that he was an abortive GOP presidential nominee in both 1944 and 1948.

¹²⁷ Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 99, quoted in Blaine Harden, *King of Spies: The Dark Reign of America's Spymaster in Korea* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Libraries, 2017), 52. Other groups MacArthur disliked included the British, "most Asians," and "potentially unfriendly representatives of the press."

Cohen also considered MacArthur to be "a longtime and highly vocal anti-Communist." *Remaking Japan*, 96.

¹²⁸ For MacArthur's opposition to civilians, see Foy, *Loyalty First*, 20. For his feud with Roosevelt, see Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 42. Roosevelt in turn distrusted MacArthur due to the latter's political support for Hoover and role in breaking up bonus army marchers.

Outside of political spats, MacArthur also resented that FDR prioritized Europe over his command during WWII. Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 69.

¹²⁹ Foy, *Loyalty First*, 56.

MacArthur's antisemitism is somewhat debatable. Cohen personally disagreed with the idea that MacArthur was an antisemite, noting that MacArthur had given him a commendation for loyal service. However, Assistant Secretary Faubion Bowers recounted an episode in which MacArthur made derogatory antisemitic comments about the Truman presidency. For Cohen's argument, see *Remaking Japan*, 68, 96. For Bowers' argument, see Faubion Bowers, "The Late Great General MacArthur, Warts and All," in *Esquire*, (January 1967), 168, quoted in Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 6-7.

“Old-fashioned patriotic populist” who was more concerned with loyalty from his staff than with their politics.¹³⁰ Both Cohen and Hadley believed that MacArthur’s populist stance let him see the value in reforms designed to foster democracy or fight domination by big business.¹³¹ A cynical interpretation by historian Howard Schonberger argues that MacArthur followed New Deal reforms only because of his campaign for the 1948 GOP nomination, pointing to how MacArthur intervened against labor as soon as he lost, but the view still suggests MacArthur recognized the initial popularity of liberal reform and tolerated any politics when convenient.¹³² Regardless of which interpretation was true, MacArthur’s combination of his conservative reputation and surprising tolerance for liberal ideas shielded the Occupation from domestic criticism early on. Conservatives could not easily attack liberal reforms when they were headed by a conservative war hero, leaving the occupationaires free to enact policies which may have been contested back home. This did not save them from criticism by MacArthur’s own staff, however.¹³³

MacArthur was surrounded by numerous right-wing officers in his inner circle. MacArthur, above all else, valued subordinate officers who rarely dissented from his views, and his senior staff was loyal to the point of sycophancy at times.¹³⁴ This core group of officers in his multiple military commands, the “Bataan gang,” included several incredibly right-wing men,

¹³⁰ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 64, 74-75.

¹³¹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 168; Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 153. Cohen also posits that MacArthur was bound by military duty to carry out the liberal reforms in JCS 1380/15, *Remaking Japan*, 63-64.

¹³² Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 63.

Colonel Kades once relayed an anecdote that MacArthur rejected Willoughby’s fears of Kades being too left-wing (a label Kades rejected) by pointing out it was fair for Whitney to have a left-wing subordinate if MacArthur had his own right-wing subordinate in Willoughby, further suggesting MacArthur did not hate those he perceived as “leftist” on principle. Kades, Interview, 129-30.

¹³³ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 74, 169.

¹³⁴ Foy, *Loyalty First*, 8, 15.

with multiple going on to become John Birch Society members years after the Occupation.¹³⁵ Cohen felt that most of these officers consisted of men who were too politically unsavvy to differentiate Communists from liberals or other radicals, yet they nevertheless convinced each other radicals were taking over GHQ, "...not aware that radical reform was official U.S. policy." During the Occupation, most of these reactionary and ultra-conservative loyalists were left to ceremonial or strictly military roles where their sway on Japanese politics was limited, though they occasionally made their presence felt even when it went against the spirit of JCS 1380/15.¹³⁶ Colonel Lawrence Bunker, an aide-de-camp to MacArthur and later John Birch, held up any directives he considered radical by refusing to forward them along until pushed to do so.¹³⁷ In an interview, one staff member who was almost purged for his views indirectly compared some of MacArthur's right-wing subordinates to fascists and blamed them for "messaging things up" at GHQ.¹³⁸ One of the men he explicitly mentioned by name was MacArthur's most influential right-wing general in SCAP, Charles Willoughby.

At the start of the Occupation, Willoughby had a limited role. Brigadier General Elliott Thorpe, G-2 of U.S. Forces in the Far East, was placed in charge of Counter-Intelligence and the Civil Intelligence Section (CIS), while Willoughby was left to combat intelligence duties.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 11-14, 138-39. The "Bataan gang," was made up of the officers who had served with MacArthur in the Philippines and escaped during the Japanese invasion, combined with a small number of officers who had left Manila before the war and rejoined him in Australia. Takemae, unlike many other historians, uses "Bataan crowd."

The John Birch Society was a national right-wing association formed in 1958 by several influential American right-wingers, and it was repudiated by mainstream conservative organizations as a "lunatic fringe" peddling conspiracy theories. Walsh, "The Right-Wing Popular Front," 14, 27-28, 127, 245-46.

¹³⁶ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 97-98, 111.

¹³⁷ Kades, Interview, 104, 135-38.

¹³⁸ Martin Bronfenbrenner, interview by Marlene J. Mayo, January 24, 1980, 44, transcript, 19, box 1 of 6, Marlene J. Mayo Oral Histories, 0015, Gordon W. Prange Collection, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Maryland, College Park, https://archives.lib.umd.edu/repositories/2/archival_objects/551849. The exact language Bronfenbrenner used was that he got "close to fascism" at GHQ, and he explicitly denied MacArthur was responsible.

¹³⁹ Foy, *Loyalty First*, 16, 50.

However, when Thorpe resigned early in the Occupation due to the peacetime reduction of his rank, Willoughby's G-2 created the Civil Intelligence Division (CID), which absorbed the duties (and eventually took the name) of Thorpe's CIS of SCAP. With his new responsibilities, Willoughby took command of the 441st Counter-Intelligence Corp (CIC), the Civil Censorship Department, and Public Safety Division. Under the Public Safety Division, Willoughby created the Loyalty Desk and Domestic Subversion Desk for investigating SCAP personnel.¹⁴⁰ Combined with other divisions G-2 controlled in SCAP and AFPAC, Cohen estimated Willoughby controlled over a fourth of GHQ's staff.¹⁴¹ This leap in responsibility effectively made Willoughby chief of U.S. Military Intelligence in East Asia and the Pacific, commanding what Takemae described as an intelligence "empire," with Willoughby as the "tsar" of what was eventually the strongest agency within the Occupation.¹⁴² Willoughby's "empire" did not necessarily give him the power to guide all of the Occupation's policies as he wished, especially during in the early years. Gordon Prange, one of Willoughby's subordinates, admitted that Whitney won every argument for MacArthur's favor throughout the Occupation. GS dominated the field of policymaking as a result, much to Willoughby's consternation.¹⁴³ However, Willoughby was also far from powerless in this regard.

¹⁴⁰ The full history of Willoughby, G-2, and intelligence within SCAP is difficult to summarize as intelligence in the Occupation was constantly in flux: branches and divisions would be renamed, sections gained and lost responsibilities, some divisions were folded into each other, split apart, and/or abolished then later recreated under new leadership. Sometimes divisions with the same acronym or even name existed simultaneously, such as a "phantom" CIS Willoughby created prior to renaming CID the same. I have attempted to summarize it in brief form; for a comprehensive summary of intelligence sections and authority throughout the Occupation which includes components not mentioned here, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 161-68.

¹⁴¹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 90.

¹⁴² Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 161.

¹⁴³ Letter from Gordon Prange to Robert Sherrod, March 1, 1975, folder: Willoughby, Charles A.—Articles, Box 15, Series 4: G-2 Historical Division: MacArthur, the Korean War, and the Occupation of Japan, Gordon Prange Papers. Special Collections, University of Maryland Libraries, College Park.

Whenever smaller issues fell within G-2's prerogative, Willoughby was sure to take advantage of them as he saw fit. One such instance occurred in August 1946 when he used his authority over the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) to suppress the film *Nihon no Higeiki* [The Tragedy of Japan] on behalf of Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida was shocked that the film drew attention to Japanese war crimes and implicitly argued the emperor was among the guilty. The film's production was promoted by the CI&E and it initially passed by the CCD with small modifications, but Willoughby forced the CCD to re-review the film and ban it. By undercutting the CI&E to support Yoshida, Willoughby sent Japanese media and press as well as the rest of SCAP the message that criticism of the emperor was entirely off limits. The message clearly stuck internally, as the next time the issue passed the CCD, its staff took the position that even implicit criticism was seen as undermining SCAP's support for the institution.¹⁴⁴ By using his powers in such a manner, Willoughby could push policies in his preferred direction.

As chief of Civil Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Willoughby had some direct power over other occupationaires due to his access to employee security files and oversight on "delinquency" reports the CID wrote on SCAP staff members, but the majority of his oversight was clandestine.¹⁴⁵ Willoughby's surveillance over SCAP personnel and Japanese citizens alike was so vast that both Takemae and Willoughby himself compared the CID to the FBI.¹⁴⁶ The

¹⁴⁴ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 389-90.

Many in SCAP military circles, including MacArthur himself as well as some of his other right-wing officers, worked to preserve both the institution of the emperor and Hirohito himself despite criticism from the American public, liberal-leftist American policymakers, and America's allies. Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, Chapter 9.

¹⁴⁵ For Willoughby's access to employee security files, see Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 90. For the CID's authority over delinquency reports, see Letter from Paul L. Stanchfield to Brigadier General W.W. Beiderlinden, September 4, 1947, 5, File 16, 84-C: Civil Liberties, Occupation Personnel, Alfred Hussey Papers, Asia Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

¹⁴⁶ For Takemae's comparison, see *Inside GHQ*, 164. For Willoughby's comparison, see Douglas MacArthur, *Reports of General MacArthur*, ed. Charles A. Willoughby and Gordon Prange, vol. 1 supplement, *MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation, Military Phase*, 1966, reprint (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1994), 79-80, 233, <https://archive.org/details/ReportsOfGeneralMacArthurMacArthurInJapan>. Although listed as

CIC was Willoughby's main means for spying on American citizens, and it collected much of the initial "derogatory information" on members of SCAP which eventually transformed into Willoughby's "Leftist Infiltration" report.¹⁴⁷ Willoughby also had spies and sympathizers within other sections of SCAP. Richard Deverall, the labor education branch chief and leading anti-Communist in ESS' labor division, was considered a "representative" of G-2 by another member of the division.¹⁴⁸ In his memoir, Cohen mentioned that a Labor Education Branch Chief was a spy reporting over the head of ESS's chief, General Marquat, to the latter's "infinite disgust" during the 1948-49 loyalty program, suggesting that such "representatives" as Deverall were not acting with the full consent of their superiors.¹⁴⁹ The CIC even recruited Japanese police to spy on Americans, something that Cohen noted was outright illegal given that Japan was still officially classified as an enemy nation.¹⁵⁰ It was through his vast intelligence network that Willoughby pursued his ideological enemies.

Conclusion

The gap in politics between the occupationaires created internal opposition and conflict around what SCAP's policy for Japan should be. While everyone worked towards what they felt was best for Japan and America according to their section's charter and Washington's initial

editors, Willoughby and Prange were responsible for writing the report. In it, Willoughby refers to the CID as the CIS due to its name change.

¹⁴⁷ For Willoughby's surveillance on Americans, see Foy, *Loyalty First*, 54. For the CIC's collection of derogatory information, see Note from W.S.W. to General Willoughby, "Civilian Employees," August 9, 1946, 1-2, "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP," Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

¹⁴⁸ Valery Burati, Interview by Kay Dove March 23, 1982, 36-40, transcript, 23, box 2 of 6, Marlene J. Mayo Oral Histories, 0015, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Maryland, College Park, https://archives.lib.umd.edu/repositories/2/archival_objects/551853.

¹⁴⁹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 113. Cohen does not use a name, but the description matches Deverall.

¹⁵⁰ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, note 15, 90. In this instance, Cohen commented the CIC did get a reprimand from the Chief of Staff when he reported their behavior.

orders, what encompassed “best” was wildly different for each group. To anti-Communists in the military such as Willoughby, it was the success of conservative politicians and wide-reaching surveillance over Americans and Japanese citizens alike. To New Deal liberals in the Government Section, it meant redistributing economic power from monopolies and granting Japanese citizens more civil rights. To those in ESS’ labor division such as Cohen, it meant promoting a strong labor force free from either police repression or Communists. JCS 1380/15 had set boundaries and orders for the Occupation which had dictated its overall goals of the Occupation, but occupationaires still backed differing and positions policies which worked against each other, even if some of those positions did not easily match the spirit of JCS 1380/15. As a result, the Occupation was set upon by internal strife almost from the beginning. This strife led not only to the policy fights and conflicting support for distinct groups of Japanese citizens, but to outright attacks on other sections and individuals within SCAP.

Chapter 2: Attacks Within SCAP

Introduction

In September 1946, Charles A. Willoughby's G-2 finished the first draft of the report which ultimately became "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP." The report documented the "varying degrees of leftist infiltration into GHQ through the medium of regularly employed War Department civilian personnel" on the basis that such leftist infiltration was not only a threat to the Occupation's success but "a direct menace to the security of the United States."¹⁵¹ Even after the completion of the final draft in March 1947, the report was a secret to most occupationaires outside of G-2 and the highest echelons of SCAP, due in no small part to the negative reactions it generated from other section leaders who had a chance to see it.¹⁵² General Whitney of Government Section considered the report an "attack on [his] Section," while General Marquat of the Economic and Scientific Section muttered about "those damned G-2 flatfeet" when he was invited to see the evidence they gathered.¹⁵³ When the accused "leftists" had the chance to read the declassified report decades later, they could not help but observe the flimsy yet venomous nature of the suggestions and accusation Willoughby directed towards them.¹⁵⁴ "Leftist Infiltration's" existence was symptomatic of the wider conflicts within SCAP.

¹⁵¹Report from Charles A. Willoughby to Chief of Staff, "Leftist Classification of Civilian Employee of GHQ," September 25, 1946, 1, "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP," Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA. In its first draft, the report was titled "Leftist Classification of Civilian Employees of GHQ," hence the different title used in some citations.

¹⁵² Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 93-95.

¹⁵³ For Whitney's reaction, see Memorandum from Charles A. Willoughby to C-in-C, C/S, Gen Whitney, "Leftist Personnel in GHQ," June 7, 1947, "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP," Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA. For Marquat's reaction, see Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 95.

¹⁵⁴ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 92-96; Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 145-46.

The anti-Communists in the Occupation attempted to purge their ideological rivals in SCAP for the “crime” of promoting or supporting policies which were viewed as too radical or left leaning. The targets of these attempts had, by and large, dutifully carried out their instructions to reform Japan, yet they were attacked despite their service, sometimes even because of it. Reading “Leftist Infiltration” years after she was targeted, Elanor Hadley of GS observed that either Willoughby somehow had not known or accepted that MacArthur and SCAP were following directives from Washington and chose to blame “leftists” instead, or he just took out his and his Japanese allies’ frustration on easy targets.¹⁵⁵ “Leftist Infiltration” was the most naked examples of an attack on politics, suggesting that even the mere presence of leftists in SCAP was part of an insidious plot to enact policies which would bring down Japan, but the anti-Communists in SCAP attempted to remove their rivals through a variety of other methods as well. In trying to purge anyone who did not have the “right” views, anti-Communist effectively attempted to delegitimize New Deal style reforms by portraying the “leftists” associated with them as fundamental threats to the security of Japan and America, regardless of actual evidence of subversion or espionage.

In this chapter, I argue that the anti-Communists of the Occupation believed that liberal and leftists staff members of SCAP and their politics were inherent threats to the Occupation’s success and thus needed to be removed, regardless of actual evidence. First, I illustrate that a majority of the occupationaires agreed with the basic premise that “Communists” should not be welcomed in SCAP. Then, I examine Willoughby’s “Leftist Infiltration” report. In this examination, I cover the report’s claims that New Dealers’ beliefs and policies were an inherent threat, Willoughby’s extreme right-wing beliefs as they were reflected by the report, the ways in

¹⁵⁵ Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 129-31, 150-54.

which the report functioned more as an attack than as an investigation, and the report's small impact in SCAP when it was first finished. Finally, I discuss how Willoughby and other anti-Communists continued their attempts to purge the Occupation's New Dealers through a variety of different methods, almost none of which suggested the accused had committed a serious crime, with the same logic that the anti-Communists in the United States used. By examining the report's extremity in light of the typical anticommunism in SCAP, as well as anti-Communists' persistence in purging their enemies both in the report and after, we see how the anti-Communists at SCAP essentially attempted to ban politics and views they considered too extreme.

Average Anti-Communism in SCAP

At most levels of SCAP, there was little sympathy for outright Communists or communism. Alfred Hussey, the same member of GS who wrote to his superiors that Occupation authorities were punishing staff members for "unorthodox attitudes," conceded that a "fair minded person" would understand the need for speedy and simplified examinations and dismissals with basic rights because it was "obvious" that some public employees were seeking to weaken the U.S.¹⁵⁶ In his 1949 Fourth of July message, MacArthur called communism "a movement of national and international outlawry without true philosophic basis which offers nothing but ultimate enslavement to these segments of the human race which become its prey."¹⁵⁷ Writing almost four decades after the Occupation, Theodore Cohen, one of those named

¹⁵⁶ Memo by Hussey, September 9, 1947, 3.

¹⁵⁷ Douglas MacArthur, "Message to the Press," July 4, 1949, GHQ: SCAP: GS, "A Brief Progress Report on the Political Reorientation of Japan," December 31, 1949, 46, JW-043-004, Reel 6, Justin Williams Papers, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Maryland Libraries, College Park.

a “leftist infiltrator” by Willoughby, agreed with his accuser’s assertion that actual Communist personnel were potentially dangerous due to maintaining the discipline to act in an organized manner and ability to blend into a group of liberal reformers, especially given the lax security checks caused by wartime demand.¹⁵⁸ While Cohen was more of an anti-Communist than his compatriots in other SCAP sections, he was hardly a strong outlier among Americans. According to historian James T. Patterson, by mid-1946 most Americans opposed letting Communists hold government jobs, even though anticommunism had traditionally been limited to an elite-led movement before then.¹⁵⁹ However, the majority of SCAP employees were more ambivalent than they were fearful about the possibility of Communists in their ranks.

Cohen believed, except for Willoughby, that GHQ/SCAP generally was unconcerned about subversives due to a mixture of trust in subordinates, a lack of time for investigations, and the lack of Communists to be found. In his memoir, Cohen admitted “I was preternaturally suspicious of Communist infiltration, and at no time could I count more than five or six of them in GHQ.”¹⁶⁰ Cohen could only guess that the American Communist Party was too invested into Europe and the Occupation of Germany to send men into Japan. After a limited round of dismissals early in the Occupation, Cohen felt the number had dropped to three “questionables,” which both he and MacArthur considered too small to be a threat. Cohen believed that the only serious attempt to find subversives within GHQ occurred when Washington ordered implementation of federal loyalty programs in Japan in 1948 and 1949, suggesting most staff within SCAP remained uncommitted to the hunt for subversives when left to their own

¹⁵⁸ For Cohen’s inclusion on the list, see Report from Willoughby, “Leftist Classification,” September 25, 1946, 1. For Cohen’s own comments, see *Remaking Japan*, 111-12.

¹⁵⁹ Patterson, *Grand Expectations*, 183-84.

¹⁶⁰ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 112. For comparison, Harry Wildes, another former occupationaire, claimed that there were 3,850 DACs alone at SCAP’s peak. *Typhoon in Tokyo*, 319.

initiative.¹⁶¹ However, those who were suspected to be Communists by the rest of SCAP were unlikely to stay long.

There seemingly was at least one genuine spy in the Occupation. According to Cohen, one man originally from the Foreign Economic Administration's (FEA) Economic Institution's staff had his contract with GS terminated after three months when it was discovered he and his wife had Communist connections.¹⁶² Although some of the details are inconsistent, likely due to different recollections, the man who Cohen describes matches Phillip Olin Keeney, a former staff member of the Occupation who was named in Hadley's memoir and alluded to in an interview with Kades. Combining the three accounts together, Keeney's wife was in the FEA as well and asked Hadley to deliver a closed package when the latter went to Japan. Keeney became the only civilian to arouse Kades' suspicion due to his access to sensitive materials (albeit in a position where he could do little damage) and was initially transferred from GS to CI&E. After Keeney returned to the U.S., the couple attempted to expatriate by ship to the eastern bloc. They were denied, and Phillip's wife, Mary Jane Keeney, admitted to close associations with proven members of Soviet spy rings.¹⁶³ The story of Keeney suggests that there was the potential for spies, or at least Soviet sympathizers, to exist in the ranks of SCAP, yet he was one of the only ones mentioned by multiple occupationaires. Suspected Communists were typically fired or let go because of their political views as opposed to actual subversive acts or connections.

¹⁶¹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 112-13.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 112.

¹⁶³ Kades, Interview, 112-13, transcript, 79; Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 122-23. Hadley never knew the contents of the package but pointed out that both Keeneys had to be security cleared to be in their positions.

Interestingly, while both Hadley and Kades talk about Keeney as if he successfully escaped, he and his wife were caught and brought to trial. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, *Annual Report of the Committee on Un-American Activities for the Year 1949* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office March 15, 1950), 3-4, <https://archive.org/details/annualreportfory1949unit/page/n7/mode/2up>.

The general ambivalence in SCAP did not prevent suspected Communists from losing their jobs whenever they were “found,” even if none of them were suspected to be spies. In his memoir, Cohen says that two men assigned to oversee stages and films within CI&E (in which he believed there was an actual cell) were relieved from duty and the CI&E Labor Education branch was abolished because one lieutenant was considered suspect due to being an organizer in the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU). One senior advisor who Whitney had defended for a year refused to sign a prepared statement that he had never been a Communist on the basis that doing so would abridge his civil rights, causing him to be discharged sent home.¹⁶⁴ Cohen himself, in his position as head of ESS’ labor division, screened his staff for anti-Communist labor union credentials and transferred out staff members suspected of close former connections to the party.¹⁶⁵ In one instance, he refused to extend the temporary assignment of a lieutenant after discovering he was a paid organizer for United Electrical, Radio, & Machine Workers of America (UE), which Cohen believed Communists controlled.¹⁶⁶ Cohen noted that every dismissal aside from Whitney’s advisor had taken place by the end of the Summer of 1946, before work began on “Leftist Infiltration” and at a time when the American stance towards the U.S.S.R. had only begun to harden.¹⁶⁷ In none of these cases did Cohen comment that any suspected Communist had actually taken any action before or during the Occupation that constituted a threat beyond probable membership in the party, yet these men were fired anyway.

¹⁶⁴ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 112.

¹⁶⁵ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 115.

¹⁶⁶ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 112. Cohen justified his actions with the belief that “Communist” labor leaders would not pay someone to be an organizer if he or she was not a Communist as well.

¹⁶⁷ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 112.

From what information Cohen gives us in his memoir, it appears that the early dismissals outside of Keeney were due less to security concerns than they were to politics. Ellen Schrecker, a historian who has extensively studied anticommunism, notes that UE and ILWU had numerous party members in high-ranking staff positions and that a sizeable contingent of union organizers were Communists.¹⁶⁸ However, the majority of these staffers were effective leaders and organizers committed to union over party, and their political actions beyond public statements were limited; neither UE nor ILWU stopped work during Nazi-Soviet Pact and American military buildup. In spite of, if not outright because of, their credentials in the labor movement, these unions came under fire for affiliating with Communists during the Cold War. UE and the ILWU did not collapse like most left-wing unions after the war, but the past association with Communists became toxic for their members. Schrecker notes an example in which a State Department employee was fired in 1946 for his probable Communist Party associations given his role in UE, even though he was deemed too essential to the OSS to be fired in 1942.¹⁶⁹ Just like that employee, the men at SCAP became suspicious because they were attached to a politically distrusted and disliked party, even if indirectly through their unions. I have found little evidence to suggest the practice of firing due to union connections was widespread in the early months of the Occupation, suggesting these few men had the misfortune of appearing openly close to Communists in such a way that their immediate supervisors disapproved of. The committed anti-Communists of the Occupation used a similar logic of considering politics alone sufficient justification to remove staff members when writing “Leftist Infiltration,” but the scope of who was considered a threat was vastly increased.

¹⁶⁸ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 28-30. In both unions, many of those men and women were never officially confirmed to be Communists, but their party membership was commonly suspected.

¹⁶⁹ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 30-31, 119, 187-89, 379-82.

“Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP”

The Report’s Focus on “Leftists”

“Leftist Infiltration’s” initial September 1946 draft went under the title of “Leftist Classification of Civilian Employees of GHQ” and contained nine cases documenting War Department civilian personnel who were “leftist” infiltrators. Among those cases was Theodore Cohen, then the leader of ESS’ labor division, and Eleanor Hadley, who was working on antitrust law in GS.¹⁷⁰ The report would gain its final name of “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP” and a complete second draft in March 1947, with smaller revisions continuing up to late April. It had a total of eleven cases, with Beate Sirota of GS among the new additions.¹⁷¹ These cases were compiled from various reports containing “derogatory information” on the suspects, which ranged from affiliation (both direct and indirect) with suspected Communist front groups and journalists to prior negative records with other intelligence, security, and military agencies.¹⁷² This information was compiled from a wide variety of sources, consisting of four major types: reports from confidential informants working for G-2, congressional investigations, FBI surveillance records from before the Occupation, and reports from military security services.¹⁷³

¹⁷⁰ Report from Willoughby, “Leftist Classification,” September 25, 1946, 1. The other seven cases were Joseph Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Thomas A. Bisson, Julia M. Stone, Anthony Costantino, Rose Zaretsky, Harry Brenner, and James A. Able. Able was the only one who was not part of SCAP.

¹⁷¹ N.A., Memorandum for Information, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” February 27, 1947, 17, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA. Besides the addition of Beate Sirota, Cohen and Costantino’s cases were combined into one, Zaretsky’s case was dropped, and cases on Leon Becker and Miriam Farley were added in addition to a case on the Institute of Pacific Relations.

¹⁷² Memorandum from Charles A. Willoughby to C-in-C and Chief of Staff, “Leftist Infiltration Into G.H.Q. SCAP,” April 23, 1947, 1 “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

¹⁷³ The sources used in “Leftist Infiltration” are not mentioned in one single document but instead spread throughout numerous sections. For some examples of sections which mention Willoughby’s sources, see Report from Willoughby, “Leftist Classification,” September 25, 1946, 2-4; Memorandum from Charles A. Willoughby to Chief of Staff, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” March 5, 1947, 1, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919,

“Leftist Infiltration” was one of Willoughby’s largest undertakings during the Occupation, with seven of his colonels, his top civilian aide, the CID, CIC agents, and his Special Activities unit all contributing to its development.¹⁷⁴ However, “Leftist Infiltration” was also a secret to most occupationaires; both Cohen and Colonel Kades of GS confessed they had no idea of the report’s existence until it was declassified. Cohen and Kades had recognized that they were spied on and eyed suspiciously by G-2 staff, but neither could have guessed the extent of the surveillance they were placed under.¹⁷⁵ Both men had understood the need to be on the watch for Communists, but “Leftist Infiltration” was not focused on members of the party.¹⁷⁶

Despite the general distaste for Communists even among the moderates of the Occupation, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP” conspicuously lacked direct accusations that any staff members of SCAP were outright Communists. Cohen observed that Willoughby and G-2 almost never directly accused Americans on SCAP’s staff of anything more than affiliating with Communists or pursuing the same goals.¹⁷⁷ When recommending that Cohen and Anthony Costantino, Cohen’s assistant, be removed from the rolls of GHQ and have their War Department contracts terminated, Willoughby did so on the logic that their support for a newspaper workers’ strike had “serious pro-leftist implications and have constituted...a direct threat to the interest of the occupation.”¹⁷⁸ While it may be tempting to consider the absence of that label as a relic of

Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA; Memo from Willoughby, “Leftist Personnel in GHQ,” June 7, 1947; and Memorandum for Information from CNS, “Cohen, Theodore, Chief, Labor Division, Economic and Scientific Section, General Headquarters,” September 23, 1946, 1-2, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

¹⁷⁴ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 93.

¹⁷⁵ Kades, Interview, 124-25; Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 93. Kades was spied on but never listed as an “infiltrator.” However, many of his staff were listed, much to his surprise when he found out.

¹⁷⁶ Kades, Interview, 112-14; Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 112.

¹⁷⁷ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 93.

¹⁷⁸ Report from Willoughby, “Leftist Classification,” September 25, 1946, 4. Although the cited section of the report does not explicitly mention the strike, said section refers to the portions which make it clear.

“Leftist Infiltration” being written before Senator Joseph McCarthy’s reign of terror made the fear of “Communists” more common, that appears to be unlikely given what had already occurred in the early months of the Occupation. SCAP officers and civilian division leaders already fired or otherwise let go of staff members who were accused of being Communists, so it is clear that the label was toxic even then. Willoughby’s choice of words was deliberate.

There are two likely reasons why Willoughby avoided the term “Communist.” One reason was to avoid a harder burden of proof. In a letter sent to McCarthy, Willoughby admitted “a direct accusation of being a Communist or an agent is very difficult to sustain” because only those who were best at denying or evading the accusation would become agents. The only proof “Communists” left behind was whether they followed the party line, which was hard to prove if the party line matched existing American policies. After describing the burden of proof, Willoughby hinted at the other reason he did not simply call his targets Communists in that same letter. In Willoughby’s view, it was an over-simplification to create a black and white dichotomy in which someone was either a Communist or agent, stressing that “From the viewpoint of national security, the ‘twilight-zone’ of shadings, the grey are more important and perhaps more dangerous.”¹⁷⁹ In another letter, Willoughby reminded McCarthy that the FBI considered fellow travelers to be more dangerous than card-carrying members of the party in some ways, then he added that even if some Americans involved in Communist conspiracies were “probably innocent,” they still “should know better.”¹⁸⁰ For Willoughby, it was not only easier to accuse someone of being a “leftist,” it was equally as damning as being a Communist Party member.

¹⁷⁹ Letter from Charles A. Willoughby to Speaker J. McCarthy, May 25, 1950, Folder 10: McCarthy, Joseph, Series VIII: Correspondence, Box 8, MS-024, The Papers of Major General Charles A. Willoughby Class of 1914, Special Collections/Musselman Library, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA.

¹⁸⁰ Letter [From Charles A. Willoughby to Joseph McCarthy?], n.d., 2, 4, Folder 10: McCarthy, Joseph, Series VIII: Correspondence, Box 8, MS-024, The Papers of Major General Charles A. Willoughby Class of 1914, Special

The basis for Willoughby's report was that his subjects' "leftism," regardless of any link to Communists, was inherently dangerous. Within the opening lines of the first draft, he warned that the "increasing tendency toward leftist penetration into GHQ" was a direct threat to the security of the U.S., to the progress of the Occupation, and to the Occupation's reputation. Willoughby claimed that leftist activities misrepresented the United States and were intended to encourage the Japanese Communist movement by discrediting "moderate elements" in the government and "wrecking" the cabinet of Japan's conservative prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru. Willoughby also warned of the risk that classified information could leak out by pointing to the existence of two known information leaks as well as the affiliations between SCAP staff and "leftist" newspaper correspondents.¹⁸¹ At a glance, one may assume that Willoughby was referring to a particularly radical group of leftists in SCAP. However, Willoughby made it clear in the report that there were no "good leftists."

Willoughby did not conceive of beneficial or harmless leftist activities, and he refused to entertain the notion that there was any legitimacy to leftist beliefs. Within "Leftist Infiltration," he noted that "leftist" personnel were critical of Occupation policy because they "apparently" felt the U.S. had not done enough to purge and remove "so-called reactionary elements" and properly democratize Japan. From this standpoint, he argued that the "leftists" in SCAP were using their position to encourage Japanese leftists and Communists wherever possible, discounting even the possibility that they had a valid reason to believe the Occupation had not gone far enough.¹⁸²

When G-2 produced a graph comparing the "leftist activities" of occupationaires based on their

Collections/Musselman Library, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA. This letter does not have a recipient or author written on it, but it is grouped with Willoughby's other letters to McCarthy in his papers at Gettysburg College.

¹⁸¹ Report from Willoughby, "Leftist Classification," September 25, 1946, 1.

¹⁸² Ibid.

nationality, the only types of activities listed were “no leftist activity” and “leftist activities detrimental to U.S.,” as can be seen in figure 2.¹⁸³ Willoughby, as Cohen observed, believed that “radicals” policies fundamentally weakened the government’s ability to resist communism, thereby making them threats.¹⁸⁴ Willoughby discounted the possibility that left-wing criticisms could have a valid basis or that there were leftists opposed to outright communism. While Willoughby’s list of leftist activities in figure 2 suggests he at least recognized that the majority of SCAP staff members not leftists, that fact still hides his broad view of who counted as a “leftist.”

LEFTIST ACTIVITIES AMONG GHQ EMPLOYEES





Figure 2: “Leftist Activities Among GHQ Employees.” N.A., “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP.” Willoughby believed that Russian and “Russian Satellite” descended members of the Occupation were far more likely to be “leftist” than occupationaires of any other ethnicity, hence why they were differentiated in the graph.

¹⁸³ N.A., “Leftist Activities Among GHQ Employees,” n.d., “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

¹⁸⁴ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 92.

Willoughby never explicitly defined what constituted as “leftist” to him, and he treated the “leftist” nature of his targets’ actions as if it was self-evident in the report. By looking at those actions, it is clear that “leftists” in Willoughby’s mind were not just socialists or other anti-capitalists, but New Dealers and social reformers. The actions which Willoughby considered “leftist” included advocating for a wide-reaching purge of militarists, opposing Yoshida’s cabinet, and preventing police from breaking a strike if Communists were involved. In Willoughby’s view, people were either defenders of the existing social order, or radicals threatening the government’s stability. In this black and white view, the former group consisted of Yoshida’s conservative government, while the latter group consisted of the Marxist intellectuals and socialist unions in Japan as well as the liberal DACs in SCAP.¹⁸⁵ On some level, Willoughby recognized that not all liberal and leftist politics were identical. In “Leftist Infiltration,” Hadley was noted to have “exceedingly *liberal* political and economic views, [emphasis added]” unlike every other target who was labelled as a “leftist,” signaling that Willoughby recognized a distinction between the two.¹⁸⁶ However, as Kades admitted in an interview when prompted, Willoughby treated socialists and New Dealers synonymously.¹⁸⁷ Hadley summed up Willoughby’s attitude as such: “Radical could be believing in the dissolution of the *zaibatsu*. Radical could be supportive of Anti-Trust. Radical could be, I don't know. It didn't take very much to be radical.”¹⁸⁸ Willoughby’s incredibly negative and broad definition of

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 92.

¹⁸⁶ Report from Willoughby, “Leftist Classification,” September 25, 1946, 4.

¹⁸⁷ Kades, Interview, 125.

¹⁸⁸ Eleanor M. Hadley, Interview by Marlene J. Mayo, November 18, 1978, 35-36, transcript, 68, box 4 of 6, Marlene J. Mayo Oral Histories, 0015, Gordon W. Prange Collection, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Maryland, College Park, https://archives.lib.umd.edu/repositories/2/archival_objects/551898. In context, Hadley is specifically referring to counterintelligence officers who wanted to label her as a “radical” and not Willoughby himself, but she does so in a broader conversation about Willoughby’s “campaign” against “radicals” in the Occupation.

“leftist,” and the impact it had on the report, owed itself to Willoughby’s own background and politics.

The Background to Willoughby’s Personality and Politics

Before describing how Willoughby attacked the “leftists” in SCAP, it is necessary to understand his beliefs and his background which informed those beliefs. Major General Charles A. Willoughby was born in 1892 to a Prussian baron and immigrated to the U.S. in 1910 at age 18, after which he lived a life of near constant military service until 1951 when he resigned in response to MacArthur being relieved of command.¹⁸⁹ Willoughby entered Gettysburg military college and was commissioned in the Officers’ Volunteers Corps in 1914, and he served during WWI. In the 1920s, Willoughby was a military attaché throughout Latin America, during which time he came to espouse the merits of Fascists and develop his talent for foreign languages. When he returned to the U.S., he became an instructor at Army staff schools and proclaimed himself a military historian and intelligence officer. Willoughby spent much of the 1930s in military academies teaching, learning, and writing for the military’s magazines, journals, and studies. During this time, it is alleged that he met MacArthur while the latter was visiting the staff school at Fort Leavenworth. In 1940 Willoughby was ordered to the Philippines, where he quickly became part of MacArthur’s inner circle, and in November 1941 he was officially made MacArthur’s G-2.¹⁹⁰ Early in the war, Willoughby was made G-2 for the Southwest Pacific and was soon promoted to brigadier general.¹⁹¹ Although Willoughby’s quality as an intelligence

¹⁸⁹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 90-91. Willoughby’s exact parentage and background are still questioned to this day, but his German heritage and aristocratic behavior are universally accepted details. For details, see Foy, *Loyalty First*, 1-3.

¹⁹⁰ Foy, *Loyalty First*, 3-9.

¹⁹¹ Foy, *Loyalty First*, 16. Willoughby received the temporary rank of Major General in March 1945, had it terminated in May 1946, then received it again in January 1948. Foy, *Loyalty First*, 229.

chief during the war was spotty, his loyalty to MacArthur carried him all the way to Japan.¹⁹²

Willoughby's lifetime as an aristocrat and officer in the Army left him with a strong admiration for authoritarian men beyond even the standard of most conservatives in the military.¹⁹³

When the Occupation started, Willoughby was one of the most right-wing members of SCAP's upper echelons, holding borderline pro-fascist views. Willoughby held strongly negative views of FDR and Truman, yet he praised Mussolini as late as 1939 and Francisco Franco throughout the 1950s, leading to the epitaphs of "Little Hitler" from staff and "my lovable fascist" from MacArthur.¹⁹⁴ Gordon Prange, one of Willoughby's former staff members, admitted Willoughby had a "nazi mentality" in which he served his "führer," MacArthur.¹⁹⁵ Takemae went further and stated Willoughby was a "believer in aristocratic privilege, not democracy."¹⁹⁶ In Willoughby's view, the revolutionary moments that had spanned the globe since the 1920s were excuses for anarchy and destruction, and only men such as Franco and Mussolini could be trusted to maintain order.¹⁹⁷

Willoughby considered dissension against established order dangerous, no matter the source. Paraphrasing his memoir, historian Masuda Hajimu notes that Willoughby "liked to say he had 'absolute trust' in the justice and truth of the United States and considered progressives,

¹⁹² Regarding Willoughby's merits as an intelligence officer, one historian called him "a candidate for one of the three worst intelligence chiefs of the Second World War." John Robert Ferris, *Intelligence and Strategy: Selected Essays* (London: Routledge, 2005), 261. Willoughby's most recent biographer, David Foy, attested to the value of a team of translators Willoughby assembled during the war, but Foy still admits that Willoughby distorted his reports to please MacArthur, which had devastating results during the Korean War. *Loyalty First*, 29-31, 115-16.

¹⁹³ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 91-92.

¹⁹⁴ For Willoughby's praise for fascists and the nicknames he received, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 161. For his negative views of FDR and Truman, see Kuwayama and Patrick, Introduction, 6.

¹⁹⁵ Prange to Sherrod, March 1, 1975.

¹⁹⁶ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 7.

¹⁹⁷ Foy, *Loyalty First*, 5. Foy illustrates that Willoughby's disdain for such movements was also coated in blatant white supremacy by pointing to examples in which Willoughby derided the "savages" in non-white countries who fought for revolutionary self-determination while praising Mussolini for his brutal conquest of Ethiopia.

liberals, and communist sympathizers who criticized the country his enemies.”¹⁹⁸ While what constituted this “justice and truth” was left unsaid, what is clear is that Willoughby believed America’s existing social and economic order was fine and anyone attempting to change or improve it did not have the same “trust” or loyalty that he did. Cohen observed that Willoughby’s life in the aristocracy and military left him with little understanding of why poor civilians might turn to socialism or communism. Thus, he was unable to conceive of or care about the reasons why anyone else was willing to challenge the existing order of the world.¹⁹⁹ When Willoughby did consider any motives or reasoning, his thoughts were filtered through his extreme paranoia.

Willoughby commonly saw conspiracies around himself. In 1952, one of his former staff members privately wrote to Prange that Willoughby suffered from egomania and a persecution complex.²⁰⁰ Prange later stated that Willoughby “did not have a clear, rational mind nor did he have any conception of the thing called objectivity in history.”²⁰¹ Willoughby’s existing paranoia was made worse by his investigation of a wartime Soviet spy network in Japan. In his pre-execution confession in 1944, the network’s leader, a German communist named Richard Sorge, admitted that he received the assistance of an American journalist named Agnes Smedley while in Shanghai. Smedley and the Sorge case became Willoughby’s obsessions, and he repeatedly stressed his belief that the two were part of a massive ring operating in America and China even after J. Edgar Hoover noted the numerous flaws of Willoughby’s reports.²⁰² Willoughby’s

¹⁹⁸ Charles A. Willoughby, *Shirarezaru Nihon senryo: Wirobi kaikoroku* [Unknown Occupation of Japan: Willoughby Memoirs] (Tokyo: Bancho shobo, 1973), 136–137, quoted in Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*, 28.

¹⁹⁹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 91-92.

²⁰⁰ “Woody” to Gordon Prange, October 24, 1952, Folder: Willoughby, Charles Andres—Correspondence (1952), Box 16, Series 4: G-2 Historical Division: MacArthur, the Korean War, and the Occupation of Japan, Gordon Prange Papers. Special Collections, University of Maryland Libraries, College Park.

²⁰¹ Prange to Sherrod, March 1, 1975.

²⁰² Foy, *Loyalty First*, 55-57. While Comintern documents published decades later ultimately implicated Smedley in China, she was nowhere near the important agent Willoughby assumed she was. She died in 1950 before she could

persecution complex combined with his discovery of an existing spy ring made him certain that other Americans in Japan who went against his policies and his view of America were out to get him. His delusions were fed by the existing networks of American right-wingers.

Willoughby was part of a larger network of right-wing activists in the United States who held equally extreme beliefs. Like Willoughby, many other right-wingers had an upper-class background and conflated communism, socialism, and the New Deal liberalism together as a single threat to their existing social order. Like Willoughby, these right-wingers had militantly hostile reactions to FDR and the New Deal. Many of them typically espoused equally conspiratorial, as well as antisemitic, views that a global Jewish and Communist conspiracy had infiltrated America and aimed to destroy the country with a socialist New Deal.²⁰³ Willoughby rarely expressed such antisemitism openly when in uniform, but he conversed with other men who did, undoubtedly contributing to his own belief that a conspiratorial group of “leftists” had “infiltrated” SCAP to destroy the Occupation from within with their policies.²⁰⁴ Willoughby did his part to stay inside this network in any way he could, first by writing letters to McCarthy during the Occupation, then by writing for right-wing magazines such as *National Review* and *American Mercury* after his retirement.²⁰⁵ Willoughby’s combination of right-wing beliefs, inability to accept progressive criticisms, paranoia, and membership in a larger network of right-wing Americans combined together to form the Occupation’s most rigid anti-Communist.

file a libel suit in response to the Army drawing, and then dropping, charges of complicity in spying, which naturally made Willoughby more suspicious.

²⁰³ Walsh, “The Right-Wing Popular Front,” 19, 21-22, 113.

²⁰⁴ Walsh, “The Right-Wing Popular Front,” 161. Willoughby’s list of “leftist infiltrators” included multiple Jewish staff members of SCAP.

²⁰⁵ Walsh, “The Right-Wing Popular Front,” 25-27.

Willoughby would attack other staff members on the basis of political views and personal suspicion instead of actual evidence.

Willoughby's Personality Manifested in "Leftist Infiltration"

Willoughby's choice of targets in "Leftist Infiltration" mainly consisted of those who held "wrong" politics or had otherwise wronged him. From the start of the Occupation, Willoughby was infuriated by the reforms suggested by SCAP's civil staff and JCS 1380/15. He disapproved of the purge of former nationalists and military officers, the decentralization of Japan's police force, and the limits placed on the ability of policy to intervene in labor disputes, as they were all ideas which went against his own belief in the need for strong authority and hierarchy.²⁰⁶ When writing the report, Willoughby attacked the rival sections who he considered responsible for these policies. He singled out the research analysts in SCAP's three main branches of civil staff (GS, ESS, and CI&E) due to their importance in creating these policies, with GS employees receiving particular focus due to making up the plurality of "infiltrators" in his report.²⁰⁷ The labor division of ESS in also earned his ire, with 3 of the report's 11 final targets coming from the division alone.²⁰⁸ In highlighting these rival sections who he claimed were filled with infiltrators, Willoughby included hints at his overall disdain for civilians. Even before WWII, Willoughby (alongside MacArthur) was opposed to anyone outside the U.S. Army sharing command with officers, so he used the report to signal the "evidence of wholly inadequate

²⁰⁶ For Willoughby's disapproval of SCAP's civil staff policies, the extent of purges, and police decentralization, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 162. For his disapproval of JCS directives and the limits on police involvement in labor disputes, see Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 92.

²⁰⁷ For an example of Willoughby singling out research analysts and civil staff, see Memorandum from Charles A. Willoughby to Chief of Staff and C-in-C, "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP," April 24, 1947, 2-3, "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP," Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA. For an example of him singling out GS employees, see Report from Willoughby, "Leftist Classification," September 25, 1946, 1.

²⁰⁸ They were Cohen, Costantino, and Leon Becker, another member of the division.

investigations and screening at the time of engagement of civilian personnel for service in this theater.”²⁰⁹ Throughout “Leftist Infiltration,” Willoughby combined this mixture of ideological and sectional rivalry with his own personal disgust when he labelled staff members as “infiltrators.”

Whenever Willoughby referred to “well-known patterns of leftist infiltration” he saw manifest in SCAP’s American civilians, he focused on the various aspects of their background which he personally found abhorrent.²¹⁰ The most common “pattern” he saw was American “experts” on the Far East with a Russian or stateless background graduating from small colleges using a degree as “academic cover for ultimate, long-range fifth column activities,” then working in “leftist” and “communist front” organizations. Every element of Willoughby’s “Genus Tokyo” (his term for those who he claimed followed the pattern) represented something he found suspicious due to his own beliefs.²¹¹ Willoughby argued that the title of “expert” was just a cover to get into important policymaking positions via a web of unquestioned “mutual recommendations,” as if his opponents could not get to their positions on their own merits. The “leftist” organizations these experts came out of were the center of Willoughby’s imagined conspiracy, with the Institute of Pacific Relations receiving the brunt of Willoughby’s scorn.²¹² The reason behind Willoughby antipathy towards “small” colleges was hinted at in one his later letters to McCarthy, in which he went on a similar tirade and mentioned “Corvallis or some other

²⁰⁹ For Willoughby’s pre-war distaste for non-army involvement, see Foy, *Loyalty First*, 20. For his comment on civilian personnel, see Memo, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” February 27, 1947, 1.

²¹⁰ Report from Willoughby, “Leftist Classification,” September 25, 1946, 1.

²¹¹ Memo from Willoughby, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” March 5, 1947, 1.

²¹² Memo, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” February 27, 1947, 2-3. The Institute of Pacific Relations was a research organization specialized in the study of Asia which came under fire for being alleged Communist machinations during the McCarthy era. Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 244.

Pacific college.”²¹³ Given his aristocratic background and time spent in officer’s academies, he likely held an elitist contempt for the value of younger and smaller colleges which combined with his existing paranoia and hatred which led him to believe that such graduates were not “real” academics. For Russians and those whom he considered “Russian Satellites,” Willoughby had an entire section of the report dedicated to how many of them were in GHQ, considering them to be an “ipso facto menace” even if they or their family had left long before the Russian Civil War and birth of the Soviet Union.²¹⁴ Willoughby’s personal hatreds not only colored his judgement of who was a threat, but it also affected how much he considered someone a threat.

If there were actual Communists in SCAP, then Willoughby appeared less interested in them than he was in “leftists.” The initial report which led to “Leftist Infiltration” came about when the CIC compiled a list of nineteen civilian employees it had “derogatory information” on, including four men who were outright suspected of being Communists.²¹⁵ In response to this report, Willoughby mentioned he already suspected some of the people named. However, Willoughby showed little interest in highlighting the actual Communist connections (real or imagined) of the suspects and demanded that the report focus on their actions during the Occupation. These actions included getting a candidate for prime minister purged by leaking his pro-fascist writings to the press, supporting labor parades in the face of police opposition, and

²¹³ Letter from Charles A. Willoughby to Joseph McCarthy, January 28, 1951, 1-2, Folder 10: McCarthy, Joseph, Series VIII: Correspondence, Box 8, MS-024, The Papers of Major General Charles A. Willoughby Class of 1914, Special Collections/Musselman Library, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA.

²¹⁴ Memo from Willoughby, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” April 24, 1947, 2. Although what constituted a “satellite” nationality was never fully clarified, Willoughby’s definition covered ancestry ranging from former imperial territory and future Warsaw Pact members (E.g. Polish, Hungarian, Romanian) to then-neutral border states (e.g. Turkish), with no account for historical differences or divides. Notably he included Austria, the birthplace of one of his targets, but not his native Germany despite the two nations’ close history and Soviet occupation in both. According to Cohen, most of those listed in this category were Jewish, suggesting antisemitism played a part in his definition. *Remaking Japan*, 93.

²¹⁵ Note from W.S.W., “Civilian Employees,” August 9, 1946, 1-2. The four suspected Communists were Grajdanzev, Bisson, Able, and Roger S. Rutchick. Although the report said nineteen, the actual number of cases printed was eighteen, with multiple additional names scribbled in the margins.

arguing over the semantics of words in the Japanese constitution in a manner that aligned with socialists.²¹⁶ When the first “Leftist Infiltration” report was finished, one of the four “Communists” from the initial CIC report was dropped altogether, and a suspected Communist who was not in SCAP was grouped with the less significant cases.²¹⁷ By the time of the final draft, Willoughby’s list included Leon Becker, a member of the labor division of ESS and, according to Cohen, the son of a confidential FBI informant on Communist infiltration.²¹⁸ The report admitted Becker had four-way security clearance and no definite link to Communists, yet he was still included because his “leftist” activities, Russian background, lack of university training and young age made him “unfit” to work with Japanese officials.²¹⁹ To Willoughby, the greater threat to the security of the Occupation, and with it America, was those whose politics or background were an affront to him. The two prime examples in the report were the cases on Eleanor Hadley and Beate Sirota.

Willoughby’s inclusion of Eleanor Hadley in the report marked the most extreme instance in which Willoughby attacked someone for the policy they had carried out. In the initial draft of “Leftist Infiltration,” Hadley was treated as a bigger threat than actual suspected Communists, even though the report admitted there was no proof she was sympathetic to Communists and the most she had done was hold liberal views and associate with leftist journalists. She was not

²¹⁶ Comment from Charles A. Willoughby to Col. Wood, “G-2 Comment,” August 15, 1946, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

²¹⁷ Report from Willoughby, “Leftist Classification,” September 25, 1946, 3-5. Rutchick was the one who was dropped, while Able was the non-SCAP member.

²¹⁸ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 94. Cohen does not explicitly use his name, but he gives the tab of the report Becker is covered in.

²¹⁹ N.A., Summary of Information, “Becker, Leon, Chief, Working Qualifications Branch, Labor Division, ESS, GHQ,” January 15, 1947, 1-2, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

even labelled a “leftist,” but instead a liberal.²²⁰ When she read the report years later, Hadley observed G-2 had nothing to accuse her of and at most suggested she was vulnerable to “exploitation” due to her “immaturity” and association with “leftist” members of GHQ and Joseph Fromm, a journalist for *World Report*, during her time in Tokyo.²²¹ Despite not even being able to group her with other “leftists,” Willoughby was convinced Hadley was a threat.

In her memoir, Hadley relayed the story of how a G-2 counter-intelligence agent interviewed a friend of hers in Japan in 1952 (after both Hadley and Willoughby had left) and tried to coax out a statement that the economic deconcentration program Hadley worked on was designed to hurt Japan. Economic deconcentration was a JCS directive decided at the highest levels of the U.S. government and designated the official policy from 1945 to the time that Hadley left, and MacArthur publicly stated his approval for it during the Occupation. Hadley was painted as “unfriendly” to Japan, and therefore the U.S., for following U.S. state policy. Willoughby and his Japanese allies, among which were major business owners and conservative party leaders, refused to believe breaking up large conglomerates was done with Japan’s best interest at heart.²²² Instead, because the Soviet Union was also anti-*zaibatsu*, that meant anti-*zaibatsu* policies, even those decided at top levels U.S. government, were Communist policies in Willoughby’s eyes.²²³ Reading Willoughby’s report years after it was written, Hadley could only conclude that either Willoughby was in denial that MacArthur and SCAP were following directives from Washington and blamed “leftists” instead, or that he just took out his frustration

²²⁰ Report from Willoughby, “Leftist Classification,” September 25, 1946, 3-5.

²²¹ For Hadley’s reading of the report, see Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 145. For the memo itself, see Memo, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” February 27, 1947, 13. According to Hadley, Fromm was considered “loyal” by the FBI in the 1950s.

²²² Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 125-31. While Willoughby had left by then, Hadley posited that G-2 agents were still following his mindset.

²²³ Hadley, Interview, 36-37.

on an easy target.²²⁴ Given Willoughby's penchant for seeing conspiracy in his enemies, it was likely a combination of the two. While Hadley was targeted due to Willoughby's hatred of her policies, Beate Sirota was targeted because of Willoughby's hatred of her background.

Willoughby's case against Beate Sirota brought out his worst personal biases, as can be seen in his letters to his top civilian aide, Dr Spinks.²²⁵ In one letter to Spinks, Willoughby confided his theory that the Sirotas were long-term Russian agents bound for America who used Soviet protection to move to Japan and avoid internment.²²⁶ He then revealed his personal disdain for Sirota by adding that "With or without juridicial [sic] proof, we should rae [sic] the question why we, the U.S. should reach for and employ these murky twilight zone syspects, [sic] instead of sticking to bona-fide America citizenship, with a simpler and more understandable background."²²⁷ In another letter, Willoughby displayed the full depth of his prejudice. He referred dismissively to Sirota's status as one of thousands of "small college" graduates because "[no one] in their right mind, considers them an 'expert' of anything," he mocked her English for being the kind "spoken in a foreign household," and he dismissed her knowledge of Japanese and familiarity with Japan as an "accident of arrival frok[sic] abroad." On the last point, he believed that military translators and nisei would be more reliable.²²⁸ Willoughby insisted that Leo's birth in Kyiv made the family inherently Russian and blamed "a small Jewish clique... partly State

²²⁴ Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 129-31, 150-54.

²²⁵ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, note 25, 93.

²²⁶ Letter from Charles A. Willoughby to Dr. Spinks, n.d., "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP," Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA. The elder Sirotas were sequestered into the town of Karuizawa like foreign citizens from neutral nations, forced to barter and search for supplies and food, and regularly spied on by secret police. Gordon, *Only Woman in the Room*, 90-93.

²²⁷ Letter from Willoughby to Spinks, n.d.

²²⁸ Letter from Charles A. Willoughby to Dr. Spinks, "G-2 Comment," n.d., "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP," Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA. Willoughby's own German accent had remained thick after decades in the U.S. His preference for military translators likely came from his own team of Nisei and trained translators from the war. Foy, *Loyalty First*, 15, 23.

supported” for getting the family into Japan through mutual recommendations with the same language that he had used to refer to the networks which SCAP’s experts belonged to. Finally, Willoughby dismissed Sirota’s proposed reforms for the police as a childish emulation of her father’s hatred of them owing to prior harassment, then Willoughby bemoaned “a stateless jewess, a hastily acquired citizenship, wielding the power of the United States [sic] and the prestige of MacArthur.”²²⁹ Although the official report toned down the explicitly antisemitic language, it still referred to the Sirotas’ membership in “a small Russian-Jewish musician clique” in which one member was linked to Sorge, and it cast doubt on the Sirotas background in Austria.²³⁰ Even though Willoughby’s grievances against Sirota were based on personal suspicion and no evidence concretely linked her to Communists, he insisted in a memo that her case was one of the most important for the “pattern” he saw.²³¹

Willoughby refused to believe that Sirota’s actions against the police in Japan had any legitimacy in American policy or basis in her decade of experience in Japan because the actions went against his right-wing views of an ideal society. Instead, he drew upon prejudices which echoed the same fears as other right-wingers in America: that “radical” Jews who were part of a Soviet conspiracy were attempting to infiltrate America (or in Willoughby’s case, the

²²⁹ Willoughby to Spinks, “G-2 Comment,” n.d. In her memoir, Sirota included photographic evidence of her father’s Austrian (officially German due to *Anschluss*) passport, and with-it citizenship, attesting to her origins. Gordon, *Only Woman in the Room*, 95.

There was a small community of Jewish-European artists in Japan who fled Europe in the 1930s and, like Leo Sirota, became teachers. Nassrine Azimi and Michel Wasserman, *Last Boat to Yokohama: The Life and Legacy of Beate Sirota Gordon*, (New York: Three Rooms Press, 2015), 49-50.

²³⁰ N.A., Summary of Information, “Sirota, Miss Beate, Research Analyst, Public Administration Division, Government Section, GHQ,” January 15, 1947, 1-3, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

²³¹ Inter-Office Memorandum from Charles A. Willoughby to Col. Bratton and Col. Myers, “Leftist Classification of Civilian Employees, SCAP,” February 22, 1947, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

Occupation) and push it towards Communist rule.²³² To that end, he pictured Sirota's father as a shadowy figure with no background who mysteriously appeared in Vienna in the early 1930s, ignoring that he was a pianist who lived in Vienna since 1904 due to heightened antisemitism in the Russian Empire.²³³ To Willoughby, it was impossible for Viennese police to write a letter of recommendation to get "Russian" refugees into Japan without foul play since "European Police Directors do not do that sort of thing." Willoughby felt so strongly about Sirota's parents that he berated his staff for failing to include them when they were the "punch" of her report.²³⁴

Willoughby's reliance on his own "patterns" and such "punch" instead of concrete evidence of subversion ultimately made "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP" a personal attack on his enemies for their backgrounds and politics, not an investigation into infiltration of SCAP.

"Leftist Infiltration" as an Attack on Others

"Leftist Infiltration" was an attack on the staff of sections and policies that Willoughby loathed. Willoughby relied on such personal attacks in part because it was too difficult to challenge the actual reform policies during the early years of the Occupation when MacArthur supported them. In other words, Willoughby attacked reformers because he could not attack their reforms.²³⁵ In a letter to Whitney in which he discussed how some GS staff affiliated with the Institute of Pacific Relations, he concluded "I hope that I have unmasked the *real character* of

²³² For a full dissection of American right-wing antisemitism in the first half of the 20th century, see Walsh, "The Right-Wing Popular Front."

²³³ For Willoughby's account, see Willoughby to Spinks, "G-2 Comment," n.d. For Gordon's account of her father's background, see Gordon, *Only Woman in the Room*, 42. While it's understandable that Willoughby would not be obliged to take Sirota entirely at her word and there's no way to know exactly what, if anything, she told him or others before 1947, he appears to have made no effort to verify his version of her father's background.

²³⁴ Inter-Office Memorandum from Gen. Willoughby to Col Bratton, Col Myers & Maj Norberg, "Leftist Investigation," February 20, 1947, Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP," Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

²³⁵ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 74, 92.

some of your employees and raise doubt in your mind as to their real purpose out here and get you to read the astonishing dossiers already available. [emphasis added]”²³⁶ Willoughby’s comment suggests he was equally as interested in discrediting his targets as he was in identifying them as threats to the Occupation. Perhaps the best evidence of his intentions is in which sections he chose to cut out of the report.

On some level, Willoughby himself appeared to recognize that his report was an attack on liberals and leftists and not a professional investigation. One of the clearest signs of this recognition is the removal of the section on Carlos Marcum, a former member of CIS in the early days of the Occupation and the chief of public administration in GS at the time of the report. The report initially included a case on Marcum because he had allegedly extended the purge of Japanese nationalists and militarists to local government and businesses without consulting with CIS liaisons. Willoughby claimed that in doing so, Marcum had broken protocol and disregarded proper U.S. policy by appearing to be too sympathetic to Japanese leftists. The report also highlighted that Marcum had a history of drinking, allegedly abused men under his command during the war, and acted “arrogant” with Japanese officials.²³⁷ However, following a conversation with MacArthur, Willoughby admitted he had to soften references to the purge because it was GHQ policy, and “needling” would weaken the report.²³⁸ When he did drop the

²³⁶ Message from Charles A. Willoughby to Brig. Gen Whitney “Attention Called to Propaganda by the Institute of Pacific Relations” February 19, 1947, 2, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

²³⁷ C.N.S. Memorandum for Information, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” February 27, 1947, 14-15, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA. Note that although this source shares a largely identical citation to another document of the same title and date, though with a given author of “C.N.S.,” it is a different version of said document.

²³⁸ For documents in which Willoughby confessed he needed to soften the report, see Inter-Office Memorandum from Charles A. Willoughby to Col. Bratton, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP, CIS Special Rpt,” March 5, 1947, 2, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA; and Inter-Office

section, Willoughby wrote to his subordinates that “I cannot afford to use this paper as a vehicle of arguing against the pruge[sic] which is a fait-accompli.” In other words, Willoughby could not continue his attack if it upset MacArthur. In the same letter to his staff, he attached a “disinterested staff reader’s” review of the section. The reviewer noted it was G-2’s responsibility to provide evidence for statements and urged the removal of Marcum’s section if that was not possible because “as it is now written, it leaves [the reader] wondering how much of this is fabricated on rumor and circumstantial finger pointing.”²³⁹ Willoughby did not comment on the content of this criticism, but given its inclusion, he likely recognized that others believed his accusations were dubious and attaching his personal issues risked dragging the report, and with it his overall attack on “leftists,” down.

Although there was undoubtedly an element of personal grievance and disagreements embodied in Willoughby’s choice of targets, it must be stressed that he was not writing “Leftist Infiltration” solely to settle his grudges. Given his politics and paranoia, it is highly likely that Willoughby genuinely believed that some of the liberals and leftists in SCAP were security risks who needed to be removed for the safety of America. He was far from the only anti-Communist in the Occupation who mixed ideological hatred and genuine suspicion with personal battles. For example, Richard Deverall, a member of ESS’ labor division and one of Willoughby’s fellow anti-Communists at SCAP, vigorously claimed that Communists and fellow travelers operated

Memorandum from Charles A. Willoughby to Col Bratton, Col Myers, Bethune, Jordan, Brown, O.D. Info, “Foreigners Employed in General Headquarters,” April 20, 1947, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA, the latter of which contains Willoughby’s “needling” comment. According to the latter memo, MacArthur was apprehensive about a *Newsweek* article attacking his staff for the economic purge, and MacArthur wanted to maintain public unity backing the policy. For more on the attack and MacArthur’s reaction, see Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 166-68.

²³⁹ Letter from General Willoughby to Col. Bratton and Col. Duff, April 28, 1947, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

within SCAP to support Communists in Japanese labor.²⁴⁰ However, one of Deverall's co-workers, Valery Burati, suspected that Deverall labelled specific staff members as communists over personal grievances, such as when he felt slighted that a Nisei interpreter within ESS was switched to another staff member.²⁴¹ While Burati's account suggests an undeniably personal element to Deverall's accusations, Deverall had accused numerous occupationaires who he otherwise had little personal interactions with, suggesting that he simultaneously believed that there were real Communists in SCAP who needed to be removed for ideological reasons, and that anyone who acted against him deserved the label of Communist.

Willoughby was a similar case: his politics and paranoia combined personal rivalries and grievances with what he viewed as genuine threats to the Occupation to the point that they were one and the same in his eyes. Willoughby had specifically chosen the less volatile term of "leftist" instead of "Communist," and he genuinely viewed "leftist" behavior as inherently subspinous and worth focusing on in the report. Still, the fact remains that Willoughby felt he needed to prevent the report from angering MacArthur even though he never openly admitted that the Marcum section constituted a wrongful accusation. If Willoughby was merely acting within his duties and reporting on people who were "infiltrators" and security threats, then it would have been his duty to report all evidence of such threats to his commander, irrespective of MacArthur's opinion. While his unwillingness to include the section can partly be blamed on MacArthur's own inability to brook criticism, it also suggests that Willoughby recognized his

²⁴⁰ For examples, see Deverall, *Red Star Over Japan*, 24, 37-40, 145.

²⁴¹ Burati, Interview, 36-39. According to Burati, the real reason why the interpreter switched was because Deverall made "homosexual advances" on him.

report was less of an evidence-based finding on a serious threat than it was an emotional attack which depended on the mood of his “audience” (in this case, the other officers in GHQ).

In the comments he made while papering the drafts of “Leftist Infiltration,” Willoughby showed that he was more concerned about the presentation of the report than the facts it found or the success of its investigation. When preparing the second draft of the report in February 1947, Willoughby noted that domestic American newspapers were filled with accounts of anti-Communist investigations and purges and decided “This is as good a time, psychologically, to revive our own situation... ‘the leftist influence in Headquarters.’”²⁴² Just a week later, he admitted his fear that “This should be handled carefully. It is a single chance to make (or unmake) a point. I believe that it is not as strong as the original dossiers I read.”²⁴³ Instead of relying on the strength of evidence for his claims or conceding that such evidence did not exist, Willoughby felt that SCAP’s “leftists” would not be considered threats unless MacArthur was already receptive to the ideas of purges and investigations. Despite the report’s premise that the “infiltrators” were dangerous radicals whose actions and connections inherently made them a security risk, Willoughby could not envision more than one chance to seriously convince MacArthur, even though the evidence should have done that job sufficiently at any time. Instead of being a proper investigation, “Leftist Infiltration” was ultimately, to quote Cohen, “an ultra-conservative general’s revolt against a liberal Occupation by means of character assassination.”²⁴⁴

²⁴² Inter-Office Memorandum from Gen Willoughby to Col Bratton, Col Myers, and Maj Norberg, “Leftist Investigation,” February 9, 1947, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA.

²⁴³ Inter-Office Memo from Willoughby, “Leftist Classification of Civilian Employees, SCAP,” February 22, 1947.

²⁴⁴ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 93.

“Leftist Infiltration’s” Impact

The other officers of SCAP recognized “Leftist Infiltration” for the attack that it was as early as 1947. In a memo to MacArthur, Whitney, and SCAP’s Chief of Staff written in June of that year, Willoughby was forced to apologize that the report “caused resentment on the part of Government Section” and recognize that Whitney viewed the report was an attack on his section.²⁴⁵ Although he was not included in the apology, Marquat was equally incensed at Willoughby’s attack on ESS and showed similar disregard for the report.²⁴⁶ Both men were far from committed liberals, but the combination of Willoughby’s faulty logic and his attack on them was too much to accept.

For his part, Willoughby admitted to no wrong-doing or mistake in the letter outside of “faulty or tactless phraseology” within the report’s summary pages, as if to say the report had made no factual errors or poor judgements of its subjects beyond being too confrontational. Willoughby defended his overall behavior by claiming that “The national trend is anti-communistic” and citing Executive Orders mandating inter-departmental information warnings. Willoughby also maintained that known subversives were running free in headquarters for a year, providing a graph of eight people on whom he had some type of derogatory information.²⁴⁷ Even in the years after the Occupation, Willoughby would boast of the “leftists” he caught in his letters to other right-wingers.²⁴⁸ However, while Willoughby maintained that he had done no wrong, the

²⁴⁵ Memo from Willoughby, “Leftist Personnel in GHQ,” June 7, 1947.

²⁴⁶ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 95.

²⁴⁷ Memo from Willoughby, “Leftist Personnel in GHQ,” June 7, 1947. Willoughby specifically cites Executive Order 9135 from April 10, 1947, but the names and dates do not match. He likely meant the infamous loyalty order, 9835, but the date still does not match.

²⁴⁸ “Leftist Infiltration” from Charles A. Willoughby to C-in-C, January 10, 1949, Folder 30: Kohlberg, Alfred, Series VIII: Correspondence, Box 7, MS-024, The Papers of Major General Charles A. Willoughby Class of 1914, Special Collections/Musselman Library, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA.

differences between the targets listed in the final draft of “Leftist Infiltration” compared to his “apology” memo revealed his exaggerations.

Within Willoughby’s final memo, five of the eleven people he had named on the final draft of “Leftist Infiltration” were absent. This group included everyone added after the initial 1946 draft and three-fifths of those with a Russian or “Russian satellite” background.²⁴⁹ One of the two new additions to Willoughby’s memo was a suspected Communist who was dropped after the initial CIC report, and the other person he added was absent from every prior report even though he was the only one with proof of Communist Party membership listed.²⁵⁰ Sirota, Cohen, and Hadley, each of whom had been highlighted by Willoughby as a major security risks at various points throughout the report’s development, were conspicuously absent when Willoughby had to defend his choice of targets under scrutiny. As Cohen commented, the report proved “the G-2 was not really serious about uncovering Communists but was more intent on labelling as ‘leftists’ those he thought too liberal.”²⁵¹ His accusations would have crumbled if a serious light was shown on them, and so he had to restrain himself in the face of pushback even while admitting no wrongdoing. Despite his apology, Willoughby could not save the report.

For all Willoughby’s power and all the effort poured into the report, “Leftist Infiltration” had little direct impact on the Occupation. Willoughby could bring up affiliations with potential front organizations or point to SCAP staff who were more left leaning than the average

²⁴⁹ Memo from Willoughby, “Leftist Personnel in GHQ,” June 7, 1947. Hadley, Cohen, Sirota, Farley, and Becker were those absent.

²⁵⁰ Memo from Willoughby, “Leftist Personnel in GHQ,” June 7, 1947. Rutchick was the man absent from all but the CIC report, and the Communist Party member was listed as “Keeney,” who was seemingly the same as the Keeney other Occupationaires listed as a spy (see notes 162 and 163). While Willoughby later that claimed Keeney was one of the “infiltrators” he found, Keeney was released from duty months before the apology memo. For Willoughby’s claim, see Willoughby to McCarthy, January 28, 1951, 1-2. For the record of Keeney’s release, see U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee, *Annual Report*, 3-4.

²⁵¹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 93.

American, but he never proved a single leftist or liberal was an outright Communist. Out of thousands of GHQ civilian personnel, Cohen estimated maybe half a dozen at most merited a further examination; hardly a mass infiltration like Willoughby claimed was occurring.²⁵²

Whitney and Marquat refused to cooperate on the report after the attacks and MacArthur chose to ignore the report, limiting the knowledge of its existence to G-2 and the highest levels of SCAP.²⁵³ Although MacArthur had personally shared many of Willoughby's dislikes and was, in Cohen's words, "a longtime and highly vocal anti-Communist," he also knew Willoughby well enough to recognize that the report was exaggerated and built on flimsy evidence. Without strong evidence, MacArthur was not going to give up on liberal reform programs just because his intelligence officer had a grudge against policy.²⁵⁴ In the closed environment of SCAP with co-workers and superiors who were well familiar his biases, Willoughby's accusations carried little meaning, and his warnings of the threat to American security were recognized for the political attacks that they were. The immediate failure of the Willoughby Papers did not spell an end to G-2's targeting of liberals and leftists, however. Many occupationaires were still attacked based on their views and policies, but in isolated incidents instead of single list.

G-2 Harasses SCAP Personnel

Despite the secrecy and failure of "Leftist Infiltration," Occupation personnel reported that they were singled out by G-2 because of their political opinions and views. Alfred Hussey of GS maintained that members of SCAP suspected "the existence of a deliberate plan to remove

²⁵² Ibid., 96.

²⁵³ For MacArthur ignoring the report, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 163. For Marquat and Whitney refusing to cooperate and the report staying secret from SCAP, see Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 93-95.

²⁵⁴ For the various dislikes MacArthur and Willoughby shared, see Foy, *Loyalty First*, 7, 20, 56. For Cohen's quote and the assertion that MacArthur knew Willoughby too well, see *Remaking Japan*, 96.

from this theater all Occupation personnel holding political or economic views contrary to those occupying positions of authority and charged with responsibility for the military security of the Occupation,” even if there was no decisive evidence of said plan’s existence.²⁵⁵ Although Hussey did not openly say what those opposing views were, he believed that FDR’s views were also considered “Un-American” and dangerous by some SCAP officers.²⁵⁶ Hussey’s observations date from 1947, before the Federal Loyalty Program was implemented in Japan but after “Leftist Infiltration” was finished, suggesting G-2 continued acting on its own initiative even after MacArthur turned down the report. In an interview decades after the Occupation, Martin Bronfenbrenner, a former member of ESS from 1949 to 1950, recalled rumors that Willoughby and other officers were trying to purge New Dealers and label them Communists at some point before he arrived.²⁵⁷ From Hussey’s observations and Bronfenbrenner’s recollection, it is clear that enough harassment occurred for personnel at SCAP to feel G-2 and other anti-Communists were running a secret campaign to have liberals and leftists purged.

Numerous accounts of the Occupation, ranging from contemporary observations and staff recollections to historians’ writings, make some mention of staff being purged or otherwise forced to return to the U.S. In his memo, Hussey mentioned “Occupation Personnel of all ranks are being threatened, forced to resign, or discharged in the most arbitrary manner.”²⁵⁸ In May 1947, journalist Mark Gayn wrote “From many men I heard tales of the continuing feuds among General MacArthur’s aides, and of the purge now in progress within Headquarters under General Willoughby’s direction. Its apparent goal, correspondents say, is to remove from Headquarters all

²⁵⁵ Memo by Hussey, September 9, 1947, 2-3.

²⁵⁶ Draft Memo by Hussey, n.d., 5.

²⁵⁷ Bronfenbrenner, Interview, 30-31.

²⁵⁸ Memo by Hussey, September 9, 1947, 1.

those who appear opposed to the military design for a safe and conservative Japan.”²⁵⁹ Takemae noted that some liberals who had served CI&E’s Information Dissemination Section early in the Occupation were gone by late 1946 for arousing Willoughby’s suspicions.²⁶⁰ Willoughby himself claimed that there were “fellow travelers” at GHQ until he “got after” them.²⁶¹ Many of these types of comments are light on details, leave out names, or avoid documentary references that would point to an official record of release, making it difficult to ascertain the extent of any type of purge. However, it is clear from these statements that a subtle purge of liberals and leftists was attempted by the Occupation’s Anti-Communists for years. These purge attempts took many different forms, but they all treated their targets’ political beliefs as either implicit or explicit reasons to be removed from the Occupation.

One of the main ways that leftist members of SCAP were attacked was through dismissals which obscured the basis for discharges, with one such method being the application of Civilian Personnel Regulations (CPR) 60.3. According to a memo from November 1947 authored by A.H. Onthank, the director of Army civilian personnel, CPR 60.3 “authorizes removal of an employee when the background investigation develops information which, if known at the time of recruitment, would have disqualified the individual for employment.” Because said background information was classified, employees did not receive substantive statements on the reason for discharge, nor were dismissals reviewed beyond procedural grounds, leaving no opportunity for defense.²⁶² Hussey’s memo reveals that several members of

²⁵⁹ Gayn, *Japan Diary*, 490.

²⁶⁰ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 395.

²⁶¹ Willoughby to McCarthy, January 28, 1951, 1-2.

²⁶² Memorandum from A. H. Onthank for Mr. Kenneth D. Johnson, “Discharge of Subversive Civil Service Personnel,” November 4, 1947, 2-3, Folder 11: Loyalty Program, Box 1: Records of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Records of the Office of Civilian Personnel, Subject Files, 1948-53, Series Entry: UD 50: Administrative Services Division. Civilian Personnel Branch. Subject Files 1948 1953. Record Group 319: Records of the Army Staff National Archives, College Park, MD.

SCAP were served notices of separation throughout September 1947 with only a single week to reply in writing and no opportunity to see their charges. In these cases, CPR 60.3 was cited as the legal basis for removal following a failed character and loyalty investigation.²⁶³ The chief of SCAP's Civilian Personnel Section (CPS) confirmed that background information in these cases came from G-2.²⁶⁴ Jacob Miller, one of the 19 staff members listed by the CIC a year prior, attempted to receive his specific charges from the CPS in person only to be redirected to Colonel Duff of CIC, one of the many colonels involved in "Leftist Infiltration."²⁶⁵ However, Duff was on a two-week vacation and could not be substituted for within Miller's six days to respond. Miller could only bemoan "I have been deprived of my right to make answer to the charge against me."²⁶⁶

The men charged with disloyalty did what they could to fight back. In their responses, the accused noted prior security checks they passed, the difficulty of responding to allegations and testimony that they could only guess at, the damage a disloyalty dismissal would do to their careers and work, and the difficulty and time it took to appeal in Washington. These men asserted that they were confident they could disprove any serious affiliation with Communists if charges

²⁶³ Memo by Hussey, September 9, 1947, 2; Letter from Ronald S. Anderson to Commanding General Eighth Army, September 8, 1947, 1-3, file 1, 84-C: Civil Liberties, Occupation Personnel, Alfred Hussey Papers, Asia Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Notice from E. M. Connor to Dr. Oscar M. Elkins, "Notice of Separation (Disqualification)," September 17, 1947, file 8, 84-C: Civil Liberties, Occupation Personnel, Alfred Hussey Papers, Asia Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Notice from E.M. Connor to Jacob I. Miller, "Notice of separation," September 2, 1947, file 11, 84-C: Civil Liberties, Occupation Personnel, Alfred Hussey Papers, Asia Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. For Ronald Anderson there is no actual letter of separation citing CPR 60.3 in the Hussey Papers, but Anderson does mention being denied hearing and appeal, and Hussey groups him with those who received CPR 60.3. Even if Anderson was not officially charged on this basis, it is clear he ran into similar problems.

²⁶⁴ Letter from E. M. Connor to Dr. Oscar M. Elkins, September 22, 1947, file 9, 84-C: Civil Liberties, Occupation Personnel, Alfred Hussey Papers, Asia Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

²⁶⁵ For Miller's prior investigation by the CIC, see Note from W.S.W., "Civilian Employees," August 9, 1946, 1-2. For his attempts to address charges, see Letter from Jacob I. Miller to Civilian Personnel Section, "AG 201-Miller, Jacob I. (2 Sept 47) CP-E," September 4, 1947, 1-2, File 12, 84-C: Civil Liberties, Occupation Personnel, Alfred Hussey Papers, Asia Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

²⁶⁶ Letter from Miller, "AG 201," September 4, 1947, 2.

were left open.²⁶⁷ They protested what they saw as fundamentally undemocratic, with one of the accused, Dr. Oscar Elkins, likening it to a witch hunt and another, Miller, admitting “my sense of fair play feels utterly violated.”²⁶⁸ Outside of SCAP, Onthank commented that field installation and overseas commanders had repeatedly used CPR 60.3 in the “interest of national security” following background investigations, even though the rule “was not written as a basis for removing persons of questionable loyalty.”²⁶⁹ Two months later, the author of a memo to Onthank admitted “procedures for dismissing employees in overseas commands as a result of investigations involving loyalty are presently most inadequate.” CPR 60.3 was discontinued as a method of removal because it had no legal or regulatory basis and “resulted in many problem cases” and appeals to the Civil Service Commission.²⁷⁰ The memo left it unsaid if these “problem cases” included SCAP dismissals, but the timing makes it likely. Willoughby’s G-2 may have been able to harass leftist and liberal personnel behind the wall of classified information, but they struggled to claim to maintain that their vision of questionable loyalty constituted a legitimate security risk.²⁷¹

²⁶⁷ Letter from Anderson, September 8, 1947, 2-3; Letter from Oscar M. Elkins to Chief of Civilian Personnel Section, September 23, 1947, 1-4, file 10, 84-C: Civil Liberties, Occupation Personnel, Alfred Hussey Papers, Asia Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Letter from Jacob I. Miller to Chief of Staff, “Departmental Action Involving Separation from service for alleged failure to pass loyalty and character investigation,” September 5, 1947, 1-3, file 13, 84-C: Civil Liberties, Occupation Personnel, Alfred Hussey Papers, Asia Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

²⁶⁸ Letter from Elkins, September 23, 1947, 1-4; Letter from Miller, “Departmental Action,” September 5, 1947, 3.

²⁶⁹ Memo from Onthank, “Discharge of Subversive Civil Service Personnel,” November 4, 1947, 2-3.

²⁷⁰ [J. A. Madigan Jr and Howard F. Ross?] Memorandum for A. H. Onthank “Loyalty Investigations for Civilian Personnel Assigned Overseas,” January 21, 1948, 2, Folder 11: Loyalty Program, Box 1: Records of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Records of the Office of Civilian Personnel, Subject Files, 1948-53, Series Entry: UD 50: Administrative Services Division. Civilian Personnel Branch. Subject Files 1948 1953. Record Group 319: Records of the Army Staff National Archives, College Park, MD.

²⁷¹ At least two of those who Hussey referred to in his memo were not forced out of Japan. In addition to Stanchfield (see note 273), Ronald Anderson left Japan voluntarily in 1949. Ronald Anderson, Interview by Marlene J. Mayo, September 22, 1980, 51, 82-83, transcript, 2, box 1 of 6, Marlene J. Mayo Oral Histories, 0015, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Maryland, College Park, https://archives.lib.umd.edu/repositories/2/archival_objects/551832.

In the absence of official discharges due to suspected communistic tendencies or disloyalty, there were other methods through which personnel could be removed. In September 1947, Paul M. Stanchfield, the deputy chief of the labor division of ESS at the time, reported that he was found guilty of two infractions: staying at a Japanese home forty minutes past curfew and giving a gift worth less than \$1.50 to a Japanese citizen.²⁷² Stanchfield was given two choices: resign with no marks on his record and go home with a letter of commendation, or receive the maximum punishment of fifteen day suspension without pay (\$600) and remain under constant surveillance with a third delinquency report as immediate grounds for dismissal. Only after Stanchfield mentioned his plan to write a letter of complaint did the colonel who first warned him suggest a reduced punishment.²⁷³ Though Stanchfield did not leave, he still wrote his letter because of the sheer disparity between his “crimes” and punishment. At the time, Stanchfield observed that his “attitude” of criticizing regulations appeared to be the real reason such a harsh penalty was recommended.²⁷⁴ G-2 had their existing reasons to suspect Stanchfield: he had worked under Cohen and his name was scribbled onto the margins of the initial CIS check sheet on those whom it had derogatory info.²⁷⁵ However, his suspicion that his “attitude” had marked him as someone slated for removal was accurate.

²⁷² Letter from Stanchfield, September 4, 1947, 1-6. Stanchfield noted that many of the regulations were unpredictable, poorly publicized, or ran counter to American and Japanese Culture. Even interrogators from the CID could not recall anyone who regularly observed each and every regulation.

²⁷³ Letter from Stanchfield, September 4, 1947, 1. The punishment dropped to a two-day suspension, a minor reprimand, and a third delinquency charge being evaluated depending on merits. Ultimately, Stanchfield was never sent home. He continued to work under James Killen, then the chief of the labor division, until both resigned on July 30, 1948, in protest of SCAP’s ban on collective bargaining rights for Japanese government employees. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 332.

²⁷⁴ Letter from Stanchfield, September 4, 1947, 1-2.

²⁷⁵ For Stanchfield’s inclusion on the check sheet, see Note from W.S.W., “Civilian Employees,” August 9, 1946, 1. For Stanchfield’s work under Cohen, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, note 57, 177. Stanchfield was never mentioned in “Leftist Infiltration” itself.

Years after the Occupation, Bronfenbrenner recalled that the regulations dictating personnel behavior normally were not enforced, but “If they wanted to kick you out of the country, they’d apply the rules.”²⁷⁶ These rules included proper “attitude,” as Stanchfield had observed. The most common cause of “attitude” issues in the eyes of Occupation officials was criticism of the Occupation. John Gunther, a journalist writing in 1951, commented that it was “illegal for *American* members of SCAP to criticize SCAP. If an American official consistently demonstrates a hostile attitude, he will be asked to leave Japan.”²⁷⁷ For some personnel, “hostile attitude” included criticizing Occupation regulations, as in the case of Stanchfield.²⁷⁸ For others, a bad attitude included criticizing SCAP’s policies for Japan, as in the case of Valery Burati, a former chief of labor relations and education within ESS. In an interview, Burati recounted that he made critical public comments implying Occupation police assisted Japanese police in keeping May Day protestors out of the Imperial Palace in 1951. As a result, Burati was sent home on the charge of violating civil service regulations. In retrospect, Burati admitted that his history of “plainspokenness” and a prior charge of being a Communist did not help his case.²⁷⁹ Although criticism itself was not inherently political, Wildes, himself an anti-Communist, admitted that MacArthur’s men saw almost any criticism as inherently leftist regardless of source.²⁸⁰ While “wrong attitude” became the easiest way GHQ’s anti-Communists could accuse

²⁷⁶ Bronfenbrenner, Interview, 30. In context, “they” is not specific, though Bronfenbrenner is likely referring to Occupation authorities in general.

²⁷⁷ John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur: Japan, Korea, and the Far East* (New York: Harper, 1951), 124. Italics in original. It was also illegal for Japanese citizens, though the punishment was different.

²⁷⁸ Letter from Stanchfield, September 4, 1947, 1-3, 6-7.

²⁷⁹ Burati, Interview, 50-54. Burati noted that he beat the Communist charge, but the case remained on the record. Takemae suggested that Burati’s contribution to creating *Sōhyō*, a left-oriented, non-communist council of trade unions that quickly shifted into anti-Americanism, made dismissal inevitable and denouncing SCAP’s May Day actions was only the final straw. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 493-94.

²⁸⁰ For Wildes’ comment on criticism, see *Typhoon in Tokyo*, 288. For Wildes’ anticommunism, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, note 122, 395. In context, Wildes was mainly referring to the treatment of newspapers, but the mentality was evident elsewhere.

occupationaires of being improperly loyal, it was not their most powerful tool. That was the federal employee loyalty program.

The loyalty program marked the one time in which occupationaires had their loyalty investigated on Washington's orders, with G-2 acting as the investigators. Created in the early 1940s and formalized in 1947 under Truman's orders, the program was officially intended to prevent the employment of Communists in response to charges of Soviet spies in the government by subjecting suspect employees to "loyalty screenings" and FBI investigations.²⁸¹ For overseas Army civilian personnel, the FBI retained responsibility for initiating and concluding a case if it found "derogatory information," while "the proper Defense agency" was responsible for the overseas portion of investigation.²⁸² Cohen provides one of the few accounts of the loyalty program's implementation in Japan starting in 1948. According to Cohen, a division chief in ESS and "some less prominent officials" were sent home, though the chief was restored after a stateside investigation. When conducting the program, G-2 and GHQ's security officers considered any SCAP staff who associated with Japanese intellectuals to be inherently suspect, as the latter were usually socialists. One American middle-level official was reported to be running a Communist cell in his house because the weekly English discussions he hosted with college students turned to current events, with G-2 tipped off to the development by their Japanese informants. To Cohen, the most the investigation did was make GHQ unpleasant to work at due to the "continuous loyalty-security process," as SCAP's reform policies had already

²⁸¹ Storrs, *The Second Red Scare*, 1-9.

²⁸² Memorandum for the Record from A. H. Onthank, "Subject: Meeting at White House on Loyalty Investigations for Overseas Civilian Personnel, 23 January 1948" January 23, 1948, 1-2, Folder 11: Loyalty Program, Box 1: Records of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Records of the Office of Civilian Personnel, Subject Files, 1948-53, Series Entry: UD 50: Administrative Services Division. Civilian Personnel Branch. Subject Files 1948 1953. Record Group 319: Records of the Army Staff National Archives, College Park, MD.

been thrown out in favor of economic buildup. Still, Cohen admitted the investigation drew the biggest focus to internal “subversives” in SCAP’s history outside of Willoughby’s report.²⁸³ It is perhaps fitting that the height of G-2’s hunt for “Communists” corresponded to the loyalty program which did the same back home, as the overall purge attempt already resembled the domestic campaigns against “Communists” in the government.

The logic of the federal employee loyalty program had allowed for many of the same abuses which G-2 had heaped on SCAP’s liberals running the Occupation. As historian James Patterson notes, “The very word ‘loyalty’ was problematic, encouraging zealots to bring charges on vague and imprecise grounds.” Accusers could withhold anything designated secret without the accused having the right to know or confront accusers, as evidence was a dossier available only to loyalty board members.²⁸⁴ These traits could be seen in G-2’s practices, whether through treating misdemeanors and “attitude” as sufficient basis for removal, or through using CPR 60.3 to deny their targets the right to review evidence. Even the loyalty investigation’s main basis for determining guilt—association with liberal organizations that had been placed on the Attorney General’s list—matched Willoughby’s own patterns of treating liberal and “leftist” action and connections as evidence of “infiltration” in “Leftist Infiltration.”²⁸⁵ These similarities were recognized as early as 1952, when Biographers of MacArthur claimed Willoughby was known as the “Senator Joe McCarthy of the Occupation” and called his time in Tokyo his “worst performance” for the persecution and blacklisting of “good and hard-working” Americans who opposed his policies.²⁸⁶ However, there was one notable difference between the Occupation and

²⁸³ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 112-13.

²⁸⁴ Patterson, *Grand Expectations*, 190-91.

²⁸⁵ For placement on the Attorney General’s list being an issue, see Patterson, *Grand Expectations*, 190-91.

²⁸⁶ Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, *Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), 182.

back home. The loyalty program drove out numerous leftists in the civil service in the process, yet Willoughby's purges appear to have had a mixed record of success at best, if not outright a total failure.²⁸⁷

George Kennan, the head of policy planning at the State Department during the middle years of the Occupation, commented in his memoir that:

[SCAP's] members could be happy in later years that their chief had been a high military officer and not a civilian; otherwise the hand of congressional suspicion and denunciation would certainly have fallen upon them in no uncertain way during the heyday of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. The very immunity that SCAP enjoyed to charges of this nature gives rise, it seems to me, to interesting conclusions about the motivation of the whole wave of governmental witch-hunting that was at that time about to ensue.²⁸⁸

Kennan was of course ignorant to the persecution and attacks going on inside of SCAP, and he failed to mention the post-Occupation hearings that certain occupationaires were subjected to. However, in one sense he was right to suggest that occupationaires' position in the military may have protected them while inside SCAP. Willoughby had written a massive report and used countless methods to go after occupationaires on the basis that they posed a threat to America and the Occupation, yet nearly every effort ended in failure or with limited results compared to similar campaigns in America. Willoughby's appeals to security seemingly fell flat because his superior and co-officers were just as familiar with the security needs and risks to the Occupation as he was. With his existing personality and focus on "leftists" for the mere crime of being "leftist," Willoughby could not easily drum up the same fears that would later be used in the McCarthyite campaigns back home, despite both drawing from the same wellspring of

²⁸⁷ For more on how the loyalty program drove out civil service employees, see Storrs, *The Second Red Scare*, 1-9.

²⁸⁸ George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, 1st Pantheon Paperback ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 391.

anticommunism. Instead, Willoughby's attacks were seen for the conspiracy theories and petty attacks that they were.

Conclusion

Willoughby and the other anti-Communists at SCAP attempted to purge their rivals in SCAP on the basis that New Dealer and leftists politics and policies were an inherent threat. Communists were never welcomed within SCAP, but Willoughby's report went far beyond the norm by fundamentally attacking the idea of having left-leaning staff members in the Occupation. Whether these staff members were outright leftist or just liberals, Willoughby's argument came down to refusing that their ideas had any legitimacy as American or Japanese policy. Holding left-wing beliefs was not only treated as a sign of probable subversion or disloyalty but additionally treated as a disloyal act itself. "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP" failed to make major headway, yet Willoughby and other anti-Communists at SCAP continued to attack their ideological rivals in the hopes of removing anyone who held the "wrong" policies. While the success of the purge is questionable, anti-Communists at SCAP made it clear that they believed left-wing politics were inherently a threat that needed to be removed from society at any cost. Ultimately, "Cold War emotions," in words of historian John Dower, made the blacklisting of New Dealers and discrediting of their ideas acceptable back in the United States.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 239

Chapter 3: Anticommunism Outside of GHQ and the Reverse Course

Introduction

Eleanor Hadley of GS, like many outside G-2, was not aware of the existence of “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP” when she left Japan in September 1947 nor when she finished her Ph.D. in June 1949. She was naturally surprised to discover that, without warning or official acknowledgement, she was placed “under a cloud” that prevented her from continuing her career in the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. In other words, Hadley been blacklisted.²⁹⁰ Years of service in the government dutifully carrying out the antitrust policies ordered by headquarters had meant nothing because someone had marked that she was a risk who should be kept out of government work. When Hadley finally had the chance to read “Leftist Infiltration,” she observed that G-2 had not officially accused her of anything and only suggested she was vulnerable to “exploitation” due to her “immaturity” and association with leftist members of GHQ and journalists during her time in Tokyo.²⁹¹ Hadley’s struggle to continue her career in the government after her time in the Occupation due to a basic association with leftist thought was unfair but not unique. Many SCAP employees struggled to find careers when returning Washington as early as 1947 due to rumors and attacks alleging that they were too left-leaning or outright Communists.²⁹² Americans had shifted against the same policies and people who had once been trusted to reform Japan, just as anti-Communists had always distrusted them.

²⁹⁰ Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 121-24, 134.

²⁹¹ For Hadley’s reading of the report, see Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 145-46. For the report’s suggestions, see Memo, “Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP,” February 27, 1947, 13.

²⁹² Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*, 29-31.

The anti-Communists within GHQ such as General Willoughby ultimately won out on the final policies of the Occupation because the United States' political and social landscape during the late 1940s and early 1950s had increasingly aligned with that of anti-Communists. With the rising predominance of McCarthyism, the occupationaires who anti-Communists had failed to discredit while in Japan lost their jobs, while anti-Communists in GHQ found ready and willing audiences for their views.²⁹³ American policy shifted rightward domestically as left-aligned politics and the more radical aspects of the New Deal became associated with “traitors” and “Communists,” while abroad, the goal of reforming Japan was curtailed in favor of fighting Communists in Asia and moving away from the reforms of the New Dealers. The anti-Communists in Japan had a limited role in directly bringing about these changes, but they nonetheless benefitted from the rising conservative tide at home that brought like-minded policymakers to power.

In this chapter, I argue that the anti-Communists in GHQ were “vindicated” and won their desired policies for Japan not because of the success of their rhetoric and actions in SCAP, but rather because conventional wisdom about the threat of Communists and antipathy to liberal-left policies in the U.S. came to match that of anti-Communists more than of New Dealers. First, I illustrate how SCAP's staff became linked to the wider assault on Asia specialist during the Red Scare, both through Willoughby's contributions to McCarthyite investigations and the through the blacklisting and trials hearings former staff were subjected to. Next, I examine the decreasing tolerance for left-wing ideas and ascendancy of economics over reforms in American politics and

²⁹³ As a note on “McCarthyism,” I do not use the term only refer to the time that Senator Joseph McCarthy was active in politics, nor solely to his extreme and infamous methods. Instead, I borrow on Schrecker's usage of the term as a way to refer to the “anticommunist crusade” which influenced American politics between 1946 and 1956 and resulted in one of the broadest waves of political repression in American history. Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, x-xvii.

policy during the late 1940s both in general and specifically in regard to Japan. Finally, I discuss how the anti-Communists of GHQ did little to directly bring about these changes but still benefitted from the ideological ascendancy of their ideas. By emphasizing how anti-Communists ideologically aligned to the changes and developments in America despite their lack of direct influence on the U.S., I demonstrate how the strands of anti-New Deal thought ran through dedicated anti-Communists and post-WWII policymakers.

SCAP Staff and the Red Scare

Willoughby's attacks in SCAP both foreshadowed and dovetailed with the overall attack on Asia Specialists in the State Department throughout the early 1950s.²⁹⁴ Although a majority of SCAP's personnel were from outside the traditional pool of Asia specialists in America, some Japanese history and economic experts from the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) had been recruited on SCAP's request.²⁹⁵ As a result, both the anti-Communists and former IPR staff within SCAP became entangled in the China Lobby's McCarthyite campaigns against the IPR for its perceived role in the State Department's "loss" of China.²⁹⁶ On the anti-Communist side, Willoughby continued his own fight against the IPR by assisting in the campaign to discredit Owen Lattimore.

Lattimore was the largest left-leaning American scholar and commentator on East Asian affairs, an editor for the IPR, and a wartime employee of government agencies engaged in Asian

²⁹⁴ For a summary of these attacks, see Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 246-58.

²⁹⁵ For more on the lack of specialists, see Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 220-23. For SCAP's request for IPR experts, see Kades, Interview, 112.

²⁹⁶ The China Lobby was an informal group of politicians and opinion makers who blamed Communists in the State Department for "losing" China to Mao Zedong. For a summary of the China Lobby as well as how the IPR was persecuted during the early 1950s, see Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 44, 244-52.

affairs, making him a prime target for the China Lobby.²⁹⁷ Alfred Kohlberg, an industrialist and leading member of the China Lobby, and Joseph McCarthy, who had already made unfounded accusations that Lattimore was a top Soviet agent, both sought Willoughby's files on Lattimore to implicate him as a spy, and Willoughby was happy to oblige.²⁹⁸ In May 1950, Willoughby wrote to McCarthy there was little local info on Lattimore, but he also affirmed his support for McCarthy's efforts and his plan to move from his "confidential" remarks to public assistance.²⁹⁹ In early 1951, Willoughby promised McCarthy that he was sending one of his best men to Taiwan for more info, though again he came up short. As historian David Walsh comments, Willoughby was contributing this time and effort to the China Lobby's crusade amid the massive intelligence demands of the Korean War.³⁰⁰ Willoughby, seemingly due to a combination of his personal beliefs and perception of what his duty as MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence entailed, felt that his mission to purge "Communists" and "fellow travelers" extended to anyone who was in anyway connected to America's policies for Japan or Asia as a whole. For former occupationaires, fighting against this purge was a long, painful process.

When Eleanor Hadley was put "under a cloud," she was not directly banned from government work like others who were subjected to hearings due to the nature of the report on her. While Willoughby had suspected that she was affiliated with the IPR, her connection was short and distant enough from Lattimore that she was never drawn into any trials.³⁰¹ Instead, due

²⁹⁷ Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 247. Lattimore was not personally involved with the State Department or SCAP despite the IPR's association with both.

²⁹⁸ For Kohlberg and McCarthy's attempt to seek files, see Walsh, "The Right-Wing Popular Front," 163. For McCarthy's unfounded accusation, see Patterson, *Grand Expectations*, 199.

²⁹⁹ Willoughby to McCarthy, May 25, 1950.

³⁰⁰ Walsh, "The Right-Wing Popular Front," 163-64.

³⁰¹ Willoughby differentiated Hadley from other personnel affiliated with the IPR due to her work with the Japanese council instead of the American council. Memorandum for Information from CNS, "Hadley, Miss Eleanor M, Governmental Powers Division, Government Section GHQ," September 23, 1946, 1-2, "Leftist Infiltration Into SCAP," Box 18, Reel 919, Record Group 23: Papers of Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur Memorial Archives,

to the fact she was considered a probable security risk, agencies informally turned Hadley's job applications down through methods like abolishing a position she applied for so that they did not lose time and a budgeted hiring "slot" establishing the necessary security clearance for a job. Because Hadley could never formally go through the hiring process for any agency, she could never protest her treatment or review why she was now considered a security risk.³⁰²

It took a decade and a half before Hadley could return to fulltime government work. While Hadley could still turn to academic work and write on Japan's economy, she was kept out of the executive branch until 1966. She was finally security cleared when her former boss at SCAP, Brigadier General Courtney Whitney, vouched for her loyalty and she took an unpaid job so that no hiring slot was lost while waiting to clear her security.³⁰³ Hadley continued her work in the government until 1984, during which time she returned to Japan between 1967 and 1974 as part of the United States Tariff Commission. Years after her work ended, Hadley had the chance to read "Leftist Infiltration" and finally understand the baseless, flimsy nature of Willoughby's suggestions that had kept her out of the government for so long. Hadley believed that she or any of her associates could have easily discredited the suggestions if she had been formally allowed to challenge them—it was only because G-2's report was impossible to open that her case remained unassailable.³⁰⁴ While Hadley ultimately overcame the damage done to

Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, VA. I cannot find other sources which confirm if Hadley was an IPR editor for the Japan Council or not. She did not mention it in her memoir, but Kades recalled her alongside other IPR affiliated personnel with SCAP, though he was unsure if she had actually joined with the rest of them. Kades, Interview, 112-13.

³⁰² Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 121-24, 134, 145.

³⁰³ Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 145-46. Hadley credits her senator, Henry S. Jackson of Washington, for the unpaid job idea.

³⁰⁴ Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 145-49. The Tariff Commission was the name of International Trade Commission prior to 1975.

her, Willoughby had still derailed her career for over a decade. Some of SCAP's other New Dealers were even less fortunate.

T.A. Bisson was another IPR alum at GS who suffered from the Red Scare after his work in the Occupation, though his work at SCAP had been divided between land reform and the purge of economic leaders. Bisson was called to testify before the McCarran Committee in March 1952, years after he had left SCAP, with his loyalty to the U.S. at question.³⁰⁵ Unlike Hadley, Bisson had a public role in the IPR as an associate editor for the organization's main journal, *Pacific Affairs*, and within it he had commonly taken liberal and leftist stances when discussing affairs in Asia. He had also visited Mao Zedong together with Owen Lattimore during the War. During his testimony to the McCarran committee, Bisson mainly received scrutiny for his history in China and a wartime article in which he claimed Chinese Communists were more democratic than the Nationalists, but he was also questioned about his relation to Japanese Communists during the Occupation. Bisson had previously written his belief that Japan's political moderates and the *zaibatsu* could not be trusted, and that Japan could only achieve a peaceful democracy if the Imperial regimes opponents became the nation's new leaders, several of whom were Communists. Bisson's experience with the McCarran Committee, combined with a subpoena by the chairman of California's Un-American Activities Committee, likely led to his dismissal from Berkely soon after. Bisson went on to teach at the smaller Western Women's College of Ohio, and he wrote critically about U.S. policy in Asia until his death in 1979.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁵ For Bisson's work with the IPR the McCarran Committee's call for him to testify, see Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 108. For Bisson's work in SCAP, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 160. The Committee, named for its leader Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, launched its investigation into the IPR in mid-1951. Schrecker, *Many Are the Crimes*, 250-51.

³⁰⁶ For Bisson's IPR articles, McCarran Committee hearing, firing and life after Berkely, see Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 94-98, 108-10. For Bisson's visit to Mao, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 160.

Even though Bisson had not been convicted of anything officially, his brush with the Committee had been enough to derail his career entirely.

What is notable about Bisson's persecution by the McCarran Committee is that it was not the first or even second time he had been persecuted for his politics. Bisson was subpoenaed to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1943 owing to writings prior to Pearl harbor which advocated for an alliance with the U.S.S.R. to contain Germany and Japan, and he was one of the targets who Willoughby focused the most on in "Leftist Infiltration."³⁰⁷ Willoughby clearly saw the link between his attack on Bisson in 1947 and the general attack on the IPR, for he wrote to McCarthy that there were "fellow travelers" and "Communists" who were IPR "stooges" in the Occupation until he "got after" them, and G-2 had contributed to the McCarran hearings.³⁰⁸ Willoughby's responsibility for actually "getting" Bisson is dubious at best: Bisson's testimony and subsequent firing took place over a year after Willoughby's letter, and Bisson cited wanting to get back to his family and frustration with his work as the reason he left Japan, at most making G-2's investigations a partial, unnamed factor for why he left Japan.³⁰⁹ However, regardless of whether Willoughby and G-2 were directly involved in Bisson's McCarran hearings or they only contributed indirectly, one fact remains the same. Both Willoughby and the McCarran Committee claimed Bisson was suspicious because he was affiliated with the IPR and expressed left-wing beliefs prior to the Cold War. Although Bisson's politics and associations were not considered suspicious enough by the rest of GHQ to be worth

³⁰⁷ For Bisson's House Un-American Activities Committee subpoena, see Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 94. For an example of Willoughby's focus on Bisson, see Inter-Office Memo from Willoughby, "Leftist Classification of Civilian Employees, SCAP," February 22, 1947.

³⁰⁸ For Willoughby's comments, see Willoughby to McCarthy, January 28, 1951, 1-2. For G-2's role in the McCarran Committee hearings, see Deverall, *Red Star Over Japan*, 47-48.

³⁰⁹ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 103-04.

dismissal from his position in 1947, now they had become the basis to keep him out of a job in the private sector. In the era of McCarthyism, not only could occupationaires risk renewed scrutiny years after they had left the Occupation with little hassle, but sometimes even those who escaped Willoughby's notice in Japan found themselves under new scrutiny at home.

Many of the early staff members of the Office of the Political Advisor (POLAD), a section of SCAP largely composed of State Department personnel who were absent from Willoughby's attack on Department of Army Civilians in "Leftist Infiltration," were subjected to Senate hearings and loyalty boards in 1950s, with one such staffer being John K. Emmerson.³¹⁰ Emmerson was at POLAD until February 1946, during which time he endorsed a "positive policy" of providing American support to any political party which could build a democratic coalition for Japan's future, including the Japanese Communists.³¹¹ Emmerson considered himself a "Japan hand," but his wartime work in China and association with members of the State Department's "China hands" had "tainted" him, and he became one of the many State Department staffers blamed for "losing" China.³¹² In light of his purported supported for Japanese and Chinese Communists, his loyalty was questioned and he was subjected to an FBI investigation and hearings in the early 1950s. One of the most infamous rumors about his time in Japan was that he had given a grand parade endorsing Communists leaders on their release from

³¹⁰ Oinas-Kukkonen, *Tolerance, Suspicion and Hostility*, 220.

³¹¹ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 240.

³¹² John K. Emmerson, *The Japanese Thread: A Life in Foreign Service* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 255, 299. Within the State Department, the Japan hands and Japan crowd consisted of those who had more prewar experience in Japan. owing, to their prewar familiarity with the Japanese upper class, they typically doubted the ability of Japanese commoners to govern themselves and encouraged softer postwar punishments. The China hands and China crowd they were a part of included a spectrum of New Deal liberals, leftists, and general Asia specialists who were more sympathetic to China and pushed for greater democratic reform and postwar punishment of Japan's ruling class. Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 217-20.

Emmerson supported more progressive policies while in Japan than most Japan hands, but like them he had greater prewar familiarity with Japan than China.

prison; in reality MacArthur ordered that Emmerson free the political prisoners, and he had driven them back to headquarters for a brief interrogation in a standard Army truck with little fanfare or attention. Association with Communists had been a required part of Emmerson's job, yet doing his duty was now treated as a sign of disloyalty.³¹³

The anti-Communists at SCAP fed the flames of suspicion. Despite being in a position to know better, G-2 staff repeated the rumor during McCarran Committee hearings, and Willoughby wrote to Chiang Kai-Shek and Madame Chiang that Emmerson smuggled Nosaka Sanzō, one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, back into Japan from his exile in China.³¹⁴ Willoughby was one of the few negative character witnesses during the FBI's investigation. In his statement, Willoughby claimed Emmerson was part of a conspiracy alongside other POLAD members, civilian Asia specialists, and Japanese Communists. Emmerson and his defense team had to respond to each and every one of his charges, during which time Willoughby's predecessor in SCAP, Brigadier General Elliott Thorpe, asserted in an affidavit that Willoughby was just one of many disgruntled people seeking discredit Emmerson's actions without any direct contact or firsthand knowledge.³¹⁵ Emmerson was ultimately cleared, but the investigation kept him out of Far East affairs for years afterwards.³¹⁶ Willoughby's accusations were repudiated, but the anti-Communists at SCAP found an audience.

³¹³ Emmerson, *The Japanese Thread*, 256-60, 307-23.

³¹⁴ For G-2's role in the McCarran Committee, see Deverall, *Red Star Over Japan*, 47-48. For his repeat of the Nosaka Sanzō story, see Letter from Charles A. Willoughby to H. E. Generalissimo & Madame CHIANG Kai-shek, May 12, 1951, 2, Folder 23: Chiang Kai-Shek (Madame), Series VIII: Correspondence, Box 7, MS-024, The Papers of Major General Charles A. Willoughby Class of 1914, Special Collections/Musselman Library, Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, PA.

³¹⁵ Emerson, *The Japanese Thread*, 312-13, 324-25. Willoughby's G-2 was not responsible for the Occupation's intelligence agencies until May 1946, months after Emmerson had left. Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 163-64.

³¹⁶ Emmerson, *The Japanese Thread*, 328-29. Emmerson faced a senate committee hearing five years later, though Willoughby's particular accusations were not highlighted.

Certain comments from Emmerson's loyalty board review make it clear that anti-Communists in SCAP contributed more to Emmerson's problems than Willoughby's statements to investigators. The only negative testimony in the review came from Eugene Dooman, a member of the State Departments' Japan crowd who retired shortly after the end of World War II. Dooman's testimony included two major accusations: that the State Department policy for Japan mirrored the U.S.S.R.'s policy for postwar satellites, and that Emmerson enthusiastically supported such questionable policies to assist Communists in their drive to take over Japan. During his testimony, Dooman admitted most of his knowledge about Emmerson in Japan was hearsay and that he never suspected anything serious about Emmerson until a talk with unnamed Army officer friend in GHQ cast doubt on POLAD's staff. Emmerson believed Dooman was motivated by his hatred at being unable to guide the State Department's direction for Japan after 1945, causing Emmerson to inadvertently become "an outlet for [Dooman's] bitterness and frustration, a symbol of the politics he felt he had to fight."³¹⁷ Dooman had his reasons to be as bitter: he expected to be chosen as political advisor to MacArthur per the wishes of the retiring Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, but instead a China hand, George Acheson Jr, was chosen by the new Under Secretary, Dean Acheson.³¹⁸ However, the fact remains that Dooman's testimony itself was based on rumors and hearsay inside GHQ. Whether Dooman's "friend" was Willoughby, a G-2 staff member, or just a committed anti-Communist, his testimony shows how anti-Communists in Japan could influence the domestic perception of their liberal and leftist

³¹⁷ Emmerson, *The Japanese Thread*, 314-21.

³¹⁸ Hugh Borton, *Spanning Japan's Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton*, (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2002), 157. Grew was the pre-war ambassador to Japan and a leading figure of the Japan crowd, while Acheson had no special knowledge of East Asia and wanted a stern policy towards Japan.

enemies when there was a sympathetic audience back home. Often, it was more than the reputation of individuals which could be tarnished.

The anti-Communists at SCAP could influence the domestic perception of the overall Occupation in addition to individual occupationaires. One of the most powerful men anti-Communists influenced was George Kennan, the hawkish head of policy planning in the State Department whose “Long Telegram” in 1946 helped establish the policy of “Containment” which guided U.S. foreign policy for decades afterwards. When reading his memoir, Theodore Cohen of ESS’ labor division observed that Kennan parroted Willoughby’s comments after the “pleasant evening” the two had together during Kennan’s visit to Japan in early 1948.³¹⁹ In his chapter on Japan, Kennan claimed SCAP’s policies were ideologically consistent with the U.S.S.R. and weakening Japan, leaving the country open to Communist subversion. In addition, Kennan claimed “one often heard it suggested” that these policies were due to “Communist infiltration” in SCAP despite the fact that MacArthur dismissed the threat posed by what was at most a small handful of Communists among the thousands of staff in GHQ.³²⁰ Kennan paraphrased Willoughby’s comments on infiltration as authoritatively as he did partly because he was not as familiar with Willoughby as the rest of SCAP was, so he would not have known how politically biased Willoughby was, nor would he have known that Willoughby was naturally paranoid. Kennan admitted he had no basis to determine if Communists influenced SCAP’s lower levels, and he added that it was improper to engage in “governmental witch-hunting” and judge any governmental institution’s operations for appearing to reflect or advance the Soviet

³¹⁹ For Cohen’s observation, *Remaking Japan*, 416. For Kennan’s “pleasant evening” comment, see, *Memoirs*, 385. For any who read Cohen’s work, the page numbers he cites for Kennan’s memoir differ from my own, as Cohen used an older edition.

³²⁰ Kennan, *Memoirs*, 376, 387-91. The policies Kennan named included land reform, trust-busting, purging Japanese militarists, and police reform, with trust-busting being highlighted for its similarity to Soviet views.

cause, so it is unlikely he would have supported Willoughby's more extreme accusations about the intent of occupationaires.³²¹

However, even if Kennan knew Willoughby was exaggerating the issue of "Communist infiltration," he still agreed that SCAP's policies were flawed. In the same paragraph in which he condemned judging SCAP based on superficial similarities to the U.S.S.R., Kennan admitted that if SCAP were judged on that metric, it "would have been many times more suspect than the State Department." He finished his chapter on Japan by calling his work on the reverse course the second most significant contribution he ever made in the government, only behind the Marshall Plan.³²² If Kennan was willing to make such dramatic claims about the Occupation years after his visit and the height of the Red Scare, then it is hard to believe that he did not agree with Willoughby's assertions about SCAP policy even when using his own judgement. What Willoughby gave Kennan was not a new idea about the dangerous Communists and "leftists" infiltrating SCAP. Instead, Willoughby gave Kennan an insider's frame of reference for making arguments against SCAP policy which Kennan already agreed with. This reflected the larger change happening in the United States during the post-WWII years.

America's Changing Politics and Policies

Overall Changes

The persecution of liberal and leftist SCAP employees after they returned home and the turn against SCAP's policies by Washington's policymakers were symptomatic of the larger

³²¹ Kennan, *Memoirs*, 390-91

³²² *Ibid.*, 390-93.

changes occurring in America in the late 1940s. Willoughby's attacks on liberals and "leftists" and his recommended policies in Japan met with little success 1946 and 1947, but both foreshadowed American policy changes in response to growing tensions caused by the Cold War and the developing Red Scare at home. As Cohen commented, "The foreign policy of any nation is largely a function of its domestic politics" and in America after World War II, Republicans and Southern Democrats had decisively defeated New Dealers in the 1946 congressional elections.³²³ After over a decade of New Deal policies and a war fought in the name of a new liberal world order, numerous Americans were content to support a conservative coalition which would maintain their new, improved status quo.³²⁴ This rise in support for conservative policies combined with a growing antipathy to the labor movement in response increased labor militancy at the end of war. In these conditions, it was easy to spread right-wing fears about Communists to a large swath of Americans.³²⁵

With political winds shifting right, dedicated anti-Communist activists such as J. Edgar Hoover who had long hoped to destroy communism in America were now able to present their programs as the right practices to fight the Soviet Union's influence in the developing Cold War. Both longtime, die-hard anti-Communists and political moderates supported the goal of getting Communists out of government even if they disagreed about the extreme methods used by men such as McCarthy. The door was opened for loyalty boards and investigations of anyone who had ever aligned with Communists, including numerous occupationaires.³²⁶ The combination of a general rightward political shift and the growing anticommunist crusade which tarred anything or

³²³ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 309.

³²⁴ Patterson, *Grand Expectations*, 138-39.

³²⁵ Sparrow, *Warfare State*, 250-51.

³²⁶ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, Xi-xvi.

anyone leaning too much to the left as “Communist” pushed numerous American liberals to move away from the more left-wing programs they had supported in the 1930s. In the process, the programs initiated during the New Deal which had been intended to regulate and redistribute capital were greatly hampered. Many of the leftists within the FDR and early Truman administration who had pushed for more social democratic policies were either marginalized or forced into the political center.³²⁷ The result of this change was summed up by historian Ellen Schrecker as such: “McCarthyism destroyed the left.”³²⁸ This change in domestic policy was accompanied by shifting foreign policy priorities.

In the years after World War II, American foreign policy underwent numerous changes in response to developments in Europe and Asia. With the destruction of a shared enemy (Germany), the lack of leverage the U.S. had over the U.S.S.R.’s recovery compared to wartime expectations, and the rapid subordination of Eastern Europe to Soviet backed Communists, the wartime alliance between the Americans and Soviets collapsed much faster than wartime planners expected.³²⁹ Although there were still overtures for peace throughout 1946, by early 1947 U.S. opposition crystallized and American policymakers believed their nation was in a life and death struggle with Soviet Union and communism as a whole.³³⁰ The Truman administration began to follow Kennan’s recommended policy of “Containment,” in which the U.S. aimed to prevent the expansion of Communist movements across the globe. This was primarily done by

³²⁷ For more on how the social democratic goals of the New Deal were crushed and American politics were pushed rightward during the Second Red Scare, see Storrs, *The Second Red Scare*, 1-9, 12-15.

³²⁸ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 369.

³²⁹ Eduard Mark, “October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1927-1947,” *American Historical Review* 94, no. 4 (October 1989), 948-56. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1906590>. Numerous authors who have argued about who and what caused the Cold War, but for my purposes, I focus on the developments that surprised U.S. policymakers.

³³⁰ Ralph B. Levering, “Toward Cold War Thinking: Editorial Reactions to Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech in North Carolina Newspapers,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 14, no. 4 (December 2016), 340–49. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2016.1230255>.

funneling economic and military aid into nations across the world to keep their economies strong and their governments stable so that communism had less appeal, with Western Europe's recovery from the ravages of World War II prioritized.³³¹ In Asia, however, Chinese Communists successfully won the Civil War against the Nationalists, dashing long-standing American hopes that China would one day become a friendly regional power.³³² With domestic politics now spurning anything which was deemed too left-wing, and developments in China turning to America's disadvantage, Washington's policies for the nearby Japan could easily change if given the right push.

Japan Policy Changes

One of the main pressure groups to push for a change in America's policy for Japan was a group known as the American Council on Japan and its allies, which historian Howard B. Schonberger terms the "Japan Lobby" in a similar vein to the China Lobby.³³³ The group was a collection of businessmen, lawyers, journalists, and policymakers (many with experience or economic interests in Japan) who fought against SCAP's economic policies, such as the dissolution of the *zaibatsu* and labor reform. The Japan Lobby's main argument was that America's primary goal following the Communist victory in China should be the speedy recovery of Japan's economy so that America could remain allied to an economic powerhouse in Asia which could act as a bulwark against Communism. Under this logic, far-reaching reforms focused on workers and social welfare hampered the buildup of capital needed for economic recovery.³³⁴ Although MacArthur's reputation as a conservative had initially protected

³³¹ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 157-58.

³³² Oinas-Kukkonen, *Tolerance, Suspicion and Hostility*, 6-7.

³³³ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 135. The Council was not officially formed until 1948, but its founders and their allies were active before then, so I find it more appropriate to refer to the group here as the Japan Lobby.

³³⁴ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 134-43.

Occupation policy from right-wing criticisms against SCAP's programs, such protection could not last forever, especially where the economy was concerned.³³⁵ Throughout 1947, *Newsweek* magazine, in which members of the Japan Lobby worked, blamed "radicals and incompetents on MacArthur's Staff" (and by extension, MacArthur himself) for creating inflation and distress in Japan's economy.³³⁶ The constant attacks eventually reached a boiling point.

The Japan Lobby's largest attack came about after James Lee Kauffman, a lawyer representing numerous U.S. corporations in Japan, obtained a copy of a confidential document on *zaibatsu* dissolution and economic deconcentration titled FEC-230. *Newsweek* subsequently published FEC-230 excerpts alongside Kauffman's argument that plan was designed with socialist intent and would ruin Japan's economy.³³⁷ MacArthur and Colonel Kades of GS defended the program and argued against its alleged leftist credentials by pointing out that Japanese Communists disproved of it, but policymakers throughout the executive branch sided with the Japan Lobby and FEC-230 was publicly attacked in the Senate. Throughout the constant attacks, the Japan Lobby found allies within the government. Willoughby became a sympathetic contact despite the criticisms levied towards his beloved MacArthur, former president Herbert Hoover, then head of the Famine Emergency Committee, leaked information on Japan's reparations to *Newsweek*, and Under Secretary of the Army William Draper gave the magazine confidential information.³³⁸ These individual contacts no doubt helped *Newsweek's* make its

³³⁵ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 74, 169.

³³⁶ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 135-43.

³³⁷ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 140. FEC-230 was specifically a document submitted to the Far East Commission based on the results of a mission to research Japanese combines in early 1946. FEC-230 was formally adopted in 1947 and became the basis of a Japanese economic deconcentration law passed in December 1947. In her memoir, Hadley argued that FEC-230 had a limited impact due to the long-time it took to be officially adopted, and she pointed out that deconcentration was part of initial JCS directives, but the U.S. government had changed its policy goals since 1945. Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 67, 79-82, 112-16.

³³⁸ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 135-43. Schonberger does not state what Draper's confidential information was.

attacks more accurate, but what helped the Japan Lobby more was that policymakers in the executive branch were already sympathetic to the core arguments about the need for economic stability.

The character of the executive branch had changed after World War II, and the policies for Japan which had been written during wartime were subject to change as a result. At the time of surrender, the Allies' plan for Japan's economy was that SCAP should punish big business and encourage economic democracy, American aid should be limited to the task of preventing mass starvation, and Japan was responsible for repairing its own economy.³³⁹ However, America's policymakers grew to have a different outlook. Many of the policymakers who staffed new war agencies and replaced the older civilian leaders during WWII were centrist and conservative corporate figures with backgrounds in business, banks, and Wall Street. For example, Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, was both a corporate lawyer and longtime Republican.³⁴⁰ Three factors pushed these men towards the Japan Lobby's ideas. First, these new policymakers hoped to cut American aid expenditures to Japan down for the sake of American taxpayers by forcing the Japanese economy back on its own feet.³⁴¹ Second, men throughout the military and executive branch believed that without sufficient economic recovery and free enterprise, democratic reform would not take hold. The idea was hardly new to American policymakers on the left or right, but unlike those in SCAP who viewed monopolies and economic concentration as impediments to recovery, those in the State Department believed the ongoing attacks on *zaibatsu* and constant union activity were hampering growth.³⁴² Finally, anti-Soviet feelings

³³⁹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 529.

³⁴⁰ Brinkley, *End of Reform*, 118-21, 145-46, 179, 190.

³⁴¹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 399-400, 406-07.

³⁴² Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers*, 132-42.

dominated Washington following the end of the war and the alliance.³⁴³ Thus, when the Japan Lobby advocated for a self-sufficient, economically healthy Japan to stand against communism in the Pacific and claimed that plans such as those in FEC-230 needed to be stop, policymakers in the executive branch such as Kennan easily agreed that it was time for a change.³⁴⁴

The main instrument of change was NSC-13/2, a policy signed by Truman in October 1948 which ordered MacArthur to stop reform legislation and focus on Japan's economic recovery.³⁴⁵ To do so, NSC-13/2 recommended that reparations and the purge of Japanese militarists needed to be stopped, and that more power should be concentrated in the Japanese government and police, effectively undoing large portions of the same directives which MacArthur had followed for 3 years. Historian Takemae Eiji summed up Washington's new orders as follows: "SCAP would intervene directly in the economy, suspend the civil liberties of suspected Communist sympathisers [sic] and, with the advent of war in Korea, raise a de facto Japanese army."³⁴⁶ The Occupation was to enter its reverse course.

As the reverse course went underway, SCAP changed its goals for Japan. Japan was no longer to be treated like a defeated enemy who needed to be reformed, but like a friend who needed to be built up as the "workshop of Asia" and a democratic bastion against regional totalitarianism, in line with the policy of containment.³⁴⁷ With the change came a sharper condemnation of "Communists" in Japan, both in and out of SCAP. On the outside, SCAP gave Japanese lawmakers and businessmen the backing to fire thousands of public and private

³⁴³ Patterson, *Grand Expectations*, 99-102.

³⁴⁴ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 142-43.

³⁴⁵ Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers*, 145.

³⁴⁶ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 468. "NSC" stands for the "National Security Council," which drafted the document.

³⁴⁷ For the shift from treating Japan as an enemy to an ally, see Miller, *Cold War Democracy*, 62. For Japan's new role as a "workshop of Asia" acting against communism, see Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan*, 77-78.

workers accused of left-wing sympathies during 1949 and 1950, in a period referred to as Japan's "red purge."³⁴⁸ In the process, Japan's workers who had seen their rights expanded upon during the early years of the Occupation were now subject to regular crackdowns.³⁴⁹ Internally, SCAP suffered from censure of the liberals and leftists attached to America's Asia policies throughout the early 1950s, which most infamously resulted in the unflinching hard line American policymakers took towards Vietnam, leading to war.³⁵⁰ While America's programs for Japan suffered far less, Cohen observed that America's own "red purge" pressured U.S. officials to work with conservative businessmen and spurn unionists and socialist intellectuals, who in response maintained a constant anti-American attitude and spoiled wider chances for cooperation years after the Occupation ended.³⁵¹

The reverse course was essentially forced onto SCAP by Washington. MacArthur attempted to fight back against NSC-13/2's policies, especially the initiatives to end economic deconcentration and rebuild Japan's military, but he was powerless to stop them.³⁵² Instead, power over the economy and any related policy was given to Joseph Dodge, a Detroit banker given near unlimited authority to carry out Washington's economic stabilization program for Japan which aimed at ending inflation. The "Dodge line" was an austerity program which slashed public spending, public consumption, and credit in favor of long-term economic growth which pushed for more export-oriented growth. As a result of Dodge's cuts, a combined total of a million government, municipal, and industrial workers lost their jobs, and the only large

³⁴⁸ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xli. Masuda Hajimu argues that the Red Purge in the private sector, while initially sparked by MacArthur's order to remove Communists at newspapers, was largely carried out by Japanese employers who willingly went beyond the wishes of ESS' Labor Division. Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*, 232-38, 243.

³⁴⁹ Miller, *Cold War Democracy*, 52.

³⁵⁰ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 372-73.

³⁵¹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 461-62.

³⁵² Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, 74-83.

businesses formed out of the old *zaibatsu* were in a condition to survive deflationary pressures. Although inflation stopped, industrial production also slumped, and left-wing unions which opposed the program saw their rights cut down.³⁵³ Though the Dodge line was far from the only element of the reverse course, the usurpation of MacArthur's power, and with it the New Dealers who had supported social democratic initiatives, represented one of the cleanest breaks with 1945 that the Occupation experienced. Power had moved out of the hands of the New Dealers and into the hands of Washington's new conservative policymakers.

SCAP's Anti-Communists and the Reverse Course

While it may be tempting to place Willoughby and the other anti-Communists at SCAP as the instigators of the "reverse course," it is hard to argue SCAP would not have been pushed to change policy anyway as soon as the conservative wave in American politics crashed against SCAP policies that were still based on wartime beliefs. The anti-Communists at GHQ certainly helped to fan the flames at home by leaking information, supporting initiatives against SCAP's older policies, and staining their rivals' reputations by implying that they were secret Communists and traitors. However, SCAP's reforms became easily available public knowledge as soon as other Americans were allowed in Japan in August 1947. It is difficult to imagine a reality in which the same American businessmen and congressmen who had pushed for the Taft-Hartley act two months before would appreciate *zaibatsu*-busting or labor reform, regardless of

³⁵³ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 468-70. Japan's economic recovery ultimately came about due to an economic boom brought about by the American need for military supplies in Korea during the Korean War. Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 541-43.

how they found out about it.³⁵⁴ In his memoirs, Cohen comments that Thomas Dewey's staff responded to the news of "radicals" at SCAP by crafting a "hit list of SCAP 'New Dealers' to be fired when their man was elected" once he appeared set to win the 1948 presidential election. Cohen provides no evidence for the claim, so the story could easily be fake, but it captures the real sentiment that America's conservative policymakers and politicians were ready to do away with the remnants of the New Deal, even if not on the grounds of disloyalty like Willoughby.³⁵⁵ Some Americans wanted to keep the spirit of the New Deal alive, of course, but those who did became a minority in policymaking positions, not only back home but even in Japan.

As the Occupation dragged on, SCAP's early reformers thinned out for several reasons. While a small number of occupationaires had been purged by G-2, the majority of were willing, albeit not always enthusiastic, to leave Japan. Some of them, such as Hadley and Beate Sirota of GS, chose to go home because their contracts had expired, they felt their primary goals at SCAP had been accomplished, and they had professional careers and family back to return to in the U.S. Some of them left because they realized the reforms and policies they fought for were no longer supported. In one notable example, Kades was sent to Washington in late 1948 to examine the Japan Lobby, discredit Kauffman's report, and temper the reverse course. When he failed to make any progress, he resigned from SCAP in May 1949.³⁵⁶ Some SCAP staff members resigned in protest of the new policies SCAP carried out, with two such cases occurring in ESS. James Killen, Cohen's successor as head of the labor division, resigned in response to the ban on civil service workers' rights to strike and collectively bargain, while Golda Stander, one of Cohen's

³⁵⁴ Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 113. For a brief discussion of how the American business community used anti-Communist sentiment and the Taft-Hartley Act to attack labor's New Deal gains, see Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, 183-90.

³⁵⁵ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 310-11.

³⁵⁶ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, note 35, 147; Masumi, *Postwar Politics in Japan*, 167.

staff, resigned when SCAP encouraged Japan's red purge.³⁵⁷ A few of the older staff members remained, such as Cohen, but many of them were forced to tone down their more liberal policies and compromise by adapting to Washington's directives.³⁵⁸ As the reformers from the original months of the Occupation left, they were typically replaced with conservative technocrats less interested in social reform.³⁵⁹ With Washington's changing directives and the drop in liberal reformers which partly came about due to said change, it is difficult to suggest that Willoughby or other anti-Communists in GHQ had a direct role in bringing about the reverse course. However, Willoughby had played a key part in the Occupation's turn away from reforming Japan in favor of enhancing its security against "Communists."

Willoughby was always in favor of preparing Japan for a potential war with the Soviet Union, and he was willing to partner with Japanese men who would have ordinarily faced justice under the aegis of reform. Since the start of the Occupation, Willoughby had recruited Japanese militarists, ex-military intelligence personnel, military police, and thought police for spying on suspected Communists in and outside of Japan. Among his recruits were former war criminals.³⁶⁰ Willoughby's willingness to ally with such men reflected his own beliefs, but it also echoed the broader view of the U.S. Army and Pentagon. Under orders Army orders, he prevented Shirō Ishii, the leader of the infamous Unit 731, from being arrested, and he maintained a core of the Imperial General Staff and Imperial military records. When the National Police Reserve (a de facto army) was created in response to the Korean War, Willoughby attempted to instate the same

³⁵⁷ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 176-77.

³⁵⁸ Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*, 29-31. Cohen retired in 1950, before the end of the Occupation, but he remained in Japan and worked with a Canadian import company. "Finding Aid for the Theodore Cohen Papers, 1945-1980," Online Archive of California, Accessed April 18, 2025, <https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt4f59p62m/>.

³⁵⁹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 432.

³⁶⁰ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 511-13; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 165.

Imperial General Staff that he preserved into its leadership, though both MacArthur and Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru turned his proposal down.³⁶¹ Willoughby took these actions throughout the Occupation because he was convinced that the officers of Imperial Japan would be a valuable ally in the inevitable war with the U.S.S.R.³⁶² While MacArthur, Japanese moderates, and SCAP demurred, the Pentagon backed Willoughby's basic conviction that letting war criminals and former enemies run free was a worthy sacrifice in the name of fighting Communists, both real and imagined. As the reverse course shifted SCAP's priorities, Willoughby's view that Communists were an existential threat gained more credence at SCAP.

The reverse course suited the anti-Communists at SCAP well. Takemae noted that the intelligence establishment of the Occupation took on an increasingly central role as SCAP's policies were reoriented in late 1947, with G-2 ultimately becoming the most powerful section in the Occupation.³⁶³ Washington's goal of making Japan a bulwark against communism not only placed increased importance on intelligence and security, but it also provided legitimacy to the anticommunist crusade in GHQ. In 1948, a British observer blamed Willoughby for deliberately propagating a hysterical attitude at GHQ in which Communists, not militarists or fascists, were considered the number one enemy of the Occupation. Although such hysteria fell flat when "Leftist Infiltration" was finished in early 1947, now it had its found mark; by mid-1949 other sections of SCAP were promoting efforts to ferret out Japanese Communists³⁶⁴ Once Japan's "Red Purge," came about G-2, GS, ESS, and the CI&E all played a part in coordinating SCAP's

³⁶¹ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 254, 487-89.

³⁶² Foy, *Loyalty First*, 53.

³⁶³ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 148, 161.

³⁶⁴ Walter E. Grunden, "Physicists and 'Fellow Travelers': Nuclear Fear, the Red Scare, and Science Policy in Occupied Japan," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 25, no. 4 (2018): 354, 360.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/26613848>.

informal contribution to and endorsements of the purges. When the Korean War gave increased urgency to the efforts to “decommunize” government service and industry, it was Willoughby’s Counter-Intelligence Corp that supplied lists of “subversives” to the Japanese government.³⁶⁵ The change in Washington’s priorities had come from the forces outside of GHQ, but the anti-Communists there were more than willing to put the new American policies into practice in Japan. The anti-Communists proved equally willing to attack their rivals in SCAP under the guise of new policies.

When the orders from Washington resulted in changes to SCAP’s policy towards Japan, G-2’s staff was empowered to continue their existing policy of attacking SCAPs New Dealers, only now with the backing of Washington. G-2 took responsibility for implementing the federal government’s loyalty screenings and review boards within Japan, and while the extent to which Americans were purged as a result remains unclear, what is clear is that occupationaires underwent renewed surveillance and questioning at the hands of “unsophisticated security officers,” in Cohen’s words.³⁶⁶ Conditions were unpleasant enough that one former staffer, Martin Bronfenbrenner, admitted in an interview that he chose to leave Japan before he was convicted of anything once he realized he was about to go through an uncomfortable loyalty screening process.³⁶⁷ As late as 1952, during the last months of Occupation after Willoughby was gone, G-2 remained empowered to pursue and question the associates of former occupationaires

³⁶⁵ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 480-85.

³⁶⁶ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 112-13.

³⁶⁷ Bronfenbrenner, interview, 37-39. Specifically, Bronfenbrenner claimed he would have been subject to Public Law 88, in which you had to clear yourself of charges you did not even know the nature of, so it was possible to spend time and money refuting you were a Communist when the actual reason you were being purged could be due to unrelated issues like drinking or sexuality. Bronfenbrenner believed he was found suspicious because he accidentally paraphrased the American Communist Party in an official paper and affiliated with suspected Communists in Japanese universities, and he thought that he would not have gotten out as easily as he did if the Korean War did not take priority.

for the sake of determining said occupationaires' loyalty.³⁶⁸ GHQ's anti-Communists were using the same method of questioning associates and challenging loyalty to the U.S. which became synonymous with McCarthyism back home. The anticommunist crusade within SCAP had started and stalled on its own, but it easily linked up to the wider anticommunist crusade and initiatives brought about in the United States.

Conclusion

Overall, the anti-Communists in SCAP won their policy victories because the changes which were occurring at home broadly aligned with their own beliefs. Just as anticommunism fueled Willoughby's attacks on "leftists" in the name of security, it fueled the censure of liberals, leftists, and their beliefs both at home and abroad in the name of loyalty and taking a firm stance against the Soviets. Anti-Communists' enemies in Japan could be challenged, discredited, and even blacklisted once attachment to New Deal-inspired policies and politics became dangerous. With the political shifts came new policymakers in Washington who agreed with the warnings that SCAP needed to build up Japan's ability to fight communism and drop any new reforms which impeded that goal, leading to the reverse course. While the political and social changes which led to the reverse course were largely beyond the control of anti-Communists at GHQ, the results of those changes were quickly embraced. The conservatives and anti-Communists at SCAP whose ideas had originally been the minority when the post-surrender policies were being drafted for Japan had found the same current of anticommunism which birthed their policies had now taken root in the United States.

³⁶⁸ Hadley and Kuwayama, *Memoir of a Trustbuster*, 125-31.

Conclusion

Summary and Takeaway

Over the course of this thesis, I have argued that the New Dealers and anti-Communists who were placed in control of the Occupation of Japan undercut and actively fought each other due to their fundamental disagreements about what the postwar needs of both Japan and American were. SCAP's liberal and leftist policymakers and who had worked in FDR's administration or otherwise identified with the goals of the New Deal had pursued a similar reformist policy in Japan meant to address social ills such as excessive concentration of economic wealth and limited civil rights. GHQ's anti-Communists and right-wing officers viewed these policymakers as secret Communists or fellow travelers, and their policies as subversive means of weakening conservatives and others who were needed to stamp out the threat of communism. As a result, SCAP's anti-Communists launched repeated attacks meant to discredit both New Dealers themselves and their beliefs, arguing that both were fundamental threats to American interests and the fight against communism. While anti-Communists in SCAP had relatively limited success purging their opponents or shifting policy their own, the political and social shifts at home ensured that their beliefs were shared and supported by American policymakers and politicians.

One of the most notable elements of Willoughby's argument that liberals, leftists, and their ideas were fundamental security risks is that his extreme accusations predated the height of McCarthyism. That is not to say that his anticommunism was unprecedented for its time: countersubversives had long been active in American politics, the political machinery for

suppressing “Communists” had been in place before the start of WWII, and moderate members of SCAP had already dismissed a small number of suspected Communists by mid-1946.³⁶⁹ Some historians, such as Ellen Schrecker, even argue that the broad postwar anti-Communist crusade which McCarthy symbolized started moving to the center of American politics that same year.³⁷⁰ However, historian Masuda Hajimu has also illustrated that anti-communist politics in the late 1940s appeared “rather nonchalant and casual” and “expressing disagreement and discontent were still quite common” before the Korean War brought renewed urgency and fear to the issue.³⁷¹ In spite of the general “casual” attitude, Willoughby and his G-2 had acted on the belief that a wrong “attitude” or conflicting political views from their own had constituted a threat to the Occupation that needed to be removed. To that end, Willoughby began his work on “Leftist Infiltration” on his own initiative, less than a year after the Occupation had started and before Truman’s executive order in 1947.³⁷² In a time when the calls for renewed security against the Soviet Union and communist infiltration were just beginning, why did Willoughby already consider liberal-left politics a fundamental threat to the security of the Occupation?

Willoughby’s reasoning was undoubtedly due in part to his extreme right-wing views and established anticommunism, meaning he would have suspected the worst of “Communists” and fellow travelers at any time. The anti-Communist campaign had already acted in part as a conservative backlash against threats to orderly society, and Willoughby would have naturally seen such threat to order as threats against the security of America.³⁷³ However, he also would

³⁶⁹ For the discussion on existing political machinery, see chapter 1. For the discussion of other members of SCAP being dismissed under suspicion of being Communists, see chapter 2.

³⁷⁰ Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*, xvi.

³⁷¹ Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*, 55-56. Schrecker concurs that the most extreme manifestations of McCarthyism did not occur until the senator’s heyday. *Many are the Crimes*, xvi.

³⁷² See Chapter 2.

³⁷³ For the anti-Communist campaign acting as a conservative backlash against threats to order, see Masuda, *Cold War Crucible*, 24. For the discussion on Willoughby’s views, see chapter 2.

have had a different perspective on security than most Americans at the time. In the immediate years after WWII, a sizeable number American citizens wanted to leave behind conflict, Congress had wanted to cut military expenditures and the number of men in service, and many business leader were not yet sure of the value of foreign markets or military production.³⁷⁴ For many, it would take years after the war before the need for enhanced “security,” even at the cost of liberties and reforms, was necessary.³⁷⁵ For the military however, contributing the security of America and American operations was one of central duties of nearly all staff members. Thus, any ideas which were perceived as going against the military establishment or making its job harder—such as challenging the authority of police to arrest suspected radicals or deconcentrating wealth and therefore impeding the necessary economic buildup to maintain security—could be construed as a threat.³⁷⁶ Willoughby may have been particularly sensitive to such “threats,” but as shown by the report on the use of CPR 60.3, other overseas commanders had zealously removed those of “questionable loyalty” in “the interest of national security.”³⁷⁷

As chapters 2 and 3 show, New Dealers and their policies were considered obstacles to economic recovery and security at best and outright threats at worst not only in the Occupation but eventually back home as well. That is not to say Willoughby or the anti-Communists within the Occupation were personally responsible for the transformation back home, nor that they simply pursued an opportunistic way to exploit fear around their enemies. However, the link between the military and the debate that reform was at best an impediment to security invites further consideration into the role that the former played in the political shifts of the late 1940s.

³⁷⁴ Patterson, *Grand Expectations*, 121-22.

³⁷⁵ Schrecker personally points to 1949 as the year that national security became a defining concern of Americans. *Many are the Crimes*, xiv.

³⁷⁶ Such policies are described in chapter 1.

³⁷⁷ Memo from Onthank, “Discharge of Subversive Civil Service Personnel,” November 4, 1947, 2-3.

The role which internal security forces such as the FBI played in fighting communism and “Communists” both real and fake has been well documented.³⁷⁸ Likewise, numerous historians have discussed how security concerns regarding the Soviets led to an increased focus on military and economic buildup even if at the expense of social welfare.³⁷⁹ By linking the military’s conception of security needs and threats to the decisions about what America’s postwar needs, we further the understanding of the role the U.S. military played in America’s rejection of continuing the New Deal at home.

Further Study and Final Thoughts

Over the course of writing this essay, my research generated several questions which call to be answered by future research. One of the most gnawing questions I was unable to answer is: what actually happened to a majority of those who were targeted by Willoughby and other anti-Communists in SCAP? As far back as 1989, historian Howard B. Schonberger recognized “There is no study of the purge of ‘radicals’ within SCAP,” despite references made to it in the memoirs of former staff.³⁸⁰ As far as I’ve determined, that study has not been written in past 36 years. While this thesis was started partly as my own attempt to answer this question, I never found the official records for any loyalty-based dismissals, and due to the constraints of time, I have been unable to pursue them further. What I have found is evidence arguing both for and against the idea that there was a widespread purge which forced occupationaires to leave Japan.

³⁷⁸ For an example of a work which tackles the subject, see Schrecker, *Many are the Crimes*.

³⁷⁹ Miller, *Cold War Democracy* particularly explores how American policymakers ultimately came to pursue such a policy within Japan.

³⁸⁰ Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, note 35, 104.

The main reason it is hard to argue that there was a widespread, successful purge is that certain individuals who were explicitly targeted by Willoughby either during or after the Occupation were never forced to leave. Hadley and Emmerson were not blacklisted by Willoughby until after their time in Japan ended, while neither Cohen nor Sirota ever suggested that they were seriously barred from employment or pressured to leave, which is particularly notable in Cohen's memoir as he speaks at length about the suspicions held by military brass towards him. In addition, I found no files which indicate whether the few removals and threats I read of (such as in Alfred Hussey's report on SCAP staff being targeted) were ultimately forced through, nor if anyone repealed charges and returned to Japan as Cohen implied. One Japanese historian, Sodei Rinjiro, fought against a statement by another historian, Michael Schaller, that MacArthur permitted Willoughby to purge New Deal liberals in 1948. Sodei argued that the purge is largely a myth because most reformers left before 1948 either out of disillusionment or satisfaction, so "In actuality there were not many 'New Deal liberals' left to be purged in 1948."³⁸¹ Strictly looking at what occurred in 1948 and after alongside Schaller's work, I must agree with Sodei that Schaller's claim about MacArthur approving a purge which occurred in 1948 is not adequately supported by the sources he cites. In my own research, I could not definitively find that an organized, wide-reaching purge was ever officially ordered or carried out, and most sources which discuss New Deal occupationaires leaving imply that the majority did so willingly. However, it is equally clear that some occupationaires were unwillingly forced out of Japan.

³⁸¹ For Schaller's assertion, see *Douglas MacArthur*, 156. For Sodei's argument, see Sodei Rinjiro, "Janus-faced MacArthur," review of *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* by Michael Schaller and *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan* by Howard B. Schonberger. *Diplomatic History* 15, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 624, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24912143>.

In his memo, Hussey explicitly mentioned “Occupation Personnel of all ranks are being threatened, forced to resign, or discharged in the most arbitrary manner.”³⁸² While I have not been able to confirm the final fates of a majority of these personnel in any other source, the sentiment of occupationaires being purged is backed up by sources both outside of the Occupation (Gayn) and long after (Bronfenbrenner), implying there were at least enough instances for others to believe it was a regular occurrence. Furthermore, as I discuss in chapter 2, there are so many isolated references to staff being sent home that, even discounting those who resigned due to pressure, it is doubtful that everyone successfully appealed or returned. Thus, although there is no proof to definitively confirm a widespread, organized purge successfully occurred, I would argue these three facts: a purge was attempted (as seen in “Leftist Infiltration”), individuals and small groups of liberals and leftists were occasionally sent home as late as 1951 (as in the case of Valery Burati), and the threat of purge was bad enough that staff members’ morale was impacted (mentioned in multiple source which bring the topic up).³⁸³ For future researchers, I believe a dedicated study of the purge should aim to answer examine key details which would give a better account of the damages done. Key questions should include: How many staff members were able to successfully appeal their loyalty cases or have them dropped? Did New Dealers make up the majority of those subject to regulation violation cases or other “delinquency” reports? Did position or role in the Occupation affect the success rate of removals, and if so, why did position matter? Did removals either increase or decrease as the Occupation drew on, or once the Korean War started?³⁸⁴ Although time constraints have

³⁸² Memo by Hussey, September 9, 1947, 1.

³⁸³ See chapter 2 for reference to these subjects.

³⁸⁴ I believe this may be particularly interesting to examine, as the Korean War would seemingly provide an impetus for increased security procedures, but nearly all of SCAP’s New Dealers had left by mid-1950. In his interview, Martin Bronfenbrenner assumed that the Korean War kept GHQ staff too busy to pursue a planned case against him. Bronfenbrenner, Interview, 39.

prevented me from answering these questions, I hope someone else may be able to pick up the torch and do so.

Another natural avenue for future research would be to compare the conflict at SCAP to the inner politics of other American occupation governments, such as in Germany, Korea, and Austria. As previously described, the Occupation of Japan was relatively unique, so both the personnel who would have staffed the other occupation governments, and the subjects which they would have debated, would be vastly different.³⁸⁵ While the differences in internal conflicts could speak to the different conditions each occupation faced, the similarities could prove to be more illuminating. If any of the other Occupations had a near-comparable internal “Red Scare,” it could speak to how universal the American experience of McCarthyism was at the start of the Cold War, even when far away from any congressmen or domestic investigators.

One perspective I have sadly been unable to use within this paper is that of Japanese citizens themselves. While the intent of this paper is to illustrate how the domestic anti-Communist crusade manifested in an American government an ocean away, that does not mean the Japanese men and women who SCAP governed had no relation to the internal fights at SCAP. As I have alluded to in my paper, many Japanese citizens, including the prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru, played off the rivalries and divisions within SCAP to bring about their desired policies. The State Department even recognized that it had become a normal occurrence by 1949.³⁸⁶ However, due to my inability to read or speak Japanese, I have been forced to rely solely on English language sources. In addition, I have been unable to read either the memoir of another individual targeted Willoughby (T.A. Bisson) or Willoughby’s last written account of the

³⁸⁵ See Introduction.

³⁸⁶ Madsen, *Sovereign Soldiers*, 148-49.

Occupation, as both are written in Japanese and have not been translated into English outside the occasional paraphrased statement.³⁸⁷ I have greatly benefitted from the translations of Japanese historians such as Takemae Eiji as well as the works of American historians who have chronicled how different people in Japan experienced the Occupation, but ultimately, I can only scratch the surface of how the division at SCAP was experienced and understood in Japan. It could very well be that such sources would completely change my understanding of the conflicting views inside the Occupation. In some ways, I believe this study will not be truly complete until someone else examines the two sources together. I can only hope I see the results of such a study in my lifetime.

If this thesis should contribute to anything aside from future research, I hope this paper elucidates to the extent to which politics guides individual policymakers and those responsible for carrying policy out, even amongst those in positions where they are traditionally expected to be impartial. The boundary between military and civilian life does not prevent either side from playing politics, nor does it prevent prejudice or pettiness from interfering in duty. At a time of great partisan divide in this country, I believe this lesson is essential to remember both so that we do not presume our own bureaucrats or military leaders are incapable of the same mistakes, and also so that we realize some of the same problems which exist in our institutions today have roots stretching back decades ago which we have had to confront and overcome time and time again.

³⁸⁷ These two works are T.A. Bisson, *Nihon senryo kaisoki* [An Occupation Memoir] (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1983) and Charles Willoughby, *Shirarezaru Nihon Senryo: Wirobi kaikoroku* [The Unknown Occupation of Japan: Memoir of Willoughby], (Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1973).

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