

NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR BY ELECTED AND APPOINTED REPRESENTATIVES  
SERVING AS GROUP LEADERS OR SPOKESMEN  
UNDER DIFFERENT COOPERATIVE GROUP EXPECTATIONS

by  
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III

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
Title of Thesis: Negotiation Behavior by Elected and Appointed  
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## ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: Negotiation Behavior by Elected and Appointed Representatives Serving as Group Leaders or Spokesmen under Different Cooperative Group Expectations

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A common assumption is that the group representative is under pressure to remain loyal to his constituency while bargaining for its interests. The present investigation tested 3 factors thought to determine the extent of the representative's group loyalty for their effects upon his negotiation behavior.

Two of these factors were associated with a component of representation called the representative's group leadership status. Predictions regarding these factors were based upon the notion that a group may not be inclined to sanction the behavior of all individuals who might serve as representative to the same degree. It was suggested that group members vari-ously allow their representative to compromise the group's established position and yet consider him a loyal member of the group as a positive function of the status they accord him as a leader. It follows that the higher the representative perceives his leadership status the more willing he should be to yield from the group's position without fear of censure.

## ABSTRACT (cont.)

The first factor thought to affect the representative's group loyalty by influencing his perceived leadership status was his source of authority in becoming group representative. It was predicted that the process of election would elicit greater perceived status and thus greater yielding behavior than would the procedure of appointment. The second factor was whether the representative served as group leader or spokesman. The group leader was viewed as an individual who performs all group leadership functions, including that of negotiating for the group, while the spokesman was described as a person who acts only as the group's representative. It was predicted that group leaders serving as representatives would yield more than spokesmen due to their perceptions of relatively high leadership status.

The third factor tested was the cooperative expectations of group members. Group expectations for the representative to cooperate with opposing negotiators were assumed inversely related to the group's announced positional commitment. Accordingly, it was predicted that evidence of weak, as opposed to strong, group commitment would result in more compromising behavior by decreasing the pressure upon the representative to demonstrate his loyalty to the group.

The experimental simulation initially required each of 80 Ss to participate with 4 confederates in a prenegotiation discussion of a human relations issue. Following the establishment of a group position, half of the Ss were selected to



# ABSTRACT (cont.)

be group leaders for the purpose of guiding the group's formulation of supporting arguments. A confederate was chosen as group leader in the other groups. After the argument formulation equal numbers of Ss were elected and appointed as representatives and informed of either high or low group commitment. Willingness to compromise the group position was measured following negotiations with a confederate representative.

The results supported the prediction that elected representatives would yield more than those who had been appointed. The effect of the representative's source of authority was attributed to variable perceptions of leadership status. Conclusive findings regarding the effects of the other two factors were not obtained. The results were discussed as demonstrating the importance of isolating the representational components responsible for differential loyalty behavior by negotiating representatives.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The attempt to resolve intergroup conflict frequently involves negotiation by group representatives. In this context those who act as representatives are commonly assumed to be bound by commitments of loyalty to their groups. While the psychology of negotiation has received increased attention in recent years, however, very little research has explored the consequences of group loyalty upon negotiation behavior. The small number of studies which have been conducted have produced misleading, if not conflicting, results. This discouraging body of findings may be partially attributable to previous failures to account for the components of group representation which are associated with differential loyalty to established group positions. From this premise the influence of two representational components upon the bargaining behavior of group representatives was examined in the present study.

#### The Negotiator's Dilemma

Negotiation between counteracting groups implies that these groups pursue a common goal of reaching a settlement while maintaining contrasting points of view regarding the actual terms to be negotiated. Such a situation necessarily imposes particular demands upon the individual who serves as his group's representative. This individual is pressured to

reach an agreement with other negotiators under circumstances which also charge him with the responsibility of obtaining an advantage over them. The various stresses brought upon the bargaining representative by his dilemma have been described in discussions of negotiations ranging from those between labor and management (e.g., Walton & McKersie, 1965) to those between opposing nations (e.g., Katz, 1965).

Researchers have examined the factors which determine how the negotiator resolves his predicament from a number of perspectives. Economists, primarily interested in the rational elements of bargaining, have focused upon the logical considerations which influence the negotiator. Psychologists and some political scientists, on the other hand, have emphasized the emotional aspects of the negotiation process. Among psychologists, some have tried to account for representative behavior in terms of the psychodynamic qualities of the individual negotiator, while others have attributed negotiation outcomes to situational influences upon the representative.

Many psychologists of the latter orientation have specifically criticized those emphasizing rational and psychodynamic factors as ignoring the great extent to which the negotiator reacts to pressures emanating from the group he represents. These investigators have argued that pressure upon the representative to remain loyal to reference group commitments is a major determinant of his negotiation behavior. It will be instructive to examine the research on the negotiator's allegiance to his group's position as a function of his group loyalty.



### Group Loyalty and Negotiation Behavior

The Negotiator's Commitment to his Group's Position. The person who functions as a negotiating representative has the responsibility of trying to achieve a settlement with representatives of opposing groups. However, the degree to which this person is willing to compromise in order to reach a settlement may be strongly influenced by how committed he is to the position taken by his group. Indeed, the negotiator may not be able to achieve a settlement at all if the strength of his commitment overrides counteracting pressures upon him to reach agreement.

Illustrations of the extent to which the negotiating representative may be influenced by a strong commitment to his group's position are available from a wide range of applications. In labor-management negotiations, for example, representatives have been observed to have been so dedicated to reaching settlements consonant with their ingroup positions that prospects of reaching agreements have been severely hampered. Garfield and Whyte (1950) documented one case wherein negotiators representing labor would not yield from their commitments to union member demands even when they realized that such demands were unreasonable. Union negotiators held out for a wage increase in spite of a union economist's assurance that the industry was in such financial straits that the desired contract would be ruinous to the company. Rather than retract their untenable position, these negotiators reached an agreement with management only through the efforts of a mediator who suggested they maintain their demands but defer them

until business conditions improved.

References to the strong influence of the negotiator's commitment to his group's position also are available from observations of diplomats engaged in international negotiations. Katz (1965, p. 372) pointed out that while a national leader might be inclined to compromise national policy based upon his response to the demands of an international system, he most often does not yield to these inclinations out of a strong commitment to the established position of his country. Katz further explained that the national leader who succumbs to the demands of his international role may jeopardize his status as a patriotic representative and experience rejection by the nation he represents. Referring to public opinion as a vehicle of national sentiment, Morgenthau (1960) expressed the severity of censure which may befall a diplomat who does not maintain a bargaining position which bespeaks loyalty to his nation's position:

Public opinion, while dreading war, demands that its diplomats act as heroes who do not yield in the face of the enemy, even at the risk of war, and condemns as weaklings and traitors those who yield, albeit only halfway, for the sake of peace (p. 554).

Positional Commitment as a Function of Group Loyalty. The preceding account suggests that the negotiator's commitment to his group's position may be a product of group demands for loyal behavior. That is, the negotiator may be pressured to maintain a firm bargaining posture in order to avoid the group censure which could be applied for not representing group interests. The negotiator's behavior may be restricted by his awareness that yielding for the sake of settlement or for

otherwise logical considerations may be met with negative group sanctions if it exceeds the extent permitted under group expectations for loyalty. This rationale suggests that the negotiator is greatly influenced by pressures arising from the group he represents. His commitment to his group's position accordingly may reflect a loyalty to his group per se.

Previous investigators have often explained negotiation outcomes in terms of group loyalty. The results of frequently cited research by Blake and Mouton (1961a, 1961b, 1962), for instance, have been interpreted to support the proposition that group loyalty may pressure the negotiating representative to remain committed to his group's position. Subjects in one of Blake and Mouton's studies (1961b) participated as members of 62 groups which had been assembled for the purpose of learning about the dynamics of intergroup competition. Following a 3-day period during which individual groups developed into relatively cohesive units through extensive discussions of group decision making, each group was required to formulate a solution to a particular human relations problem. Elected representatives from each group then publicly defended their group solutions in an effort to decide which solution was most adequate. If no best solution could be agreed upon, it was understood that two or three impartial judges would make the decision. Blake and Mouton found that only two out of 62 representatives were willing to relinquish their ingroup positions, leaving 60 representatives deadlocked. The interpretation of the finding was that the representatives' ingroup loyalties restricted their freedom to exercise logic when they



represented their groups under win-lose conditions. The authors further suggested that such loyalties were due to the representatives' desires to avoid behavior which could be construed as deviant by fellow group members and evoke their censure. An additional study (see Blake & Mouton, 1962) showed that, under similar circumstances, representatives who renounced their group positions did receive the condemnation of group members who regarded their capitulation as traitorous.

The results of a study by Campbell (1960) have also been interpreted in support of the idea that the negotiator may be committed to his group's position as a result of group loyalty. Participants in this study were assigned to 2-person teams representing either labor or management. After formulating independent bargaining strategies, opposing teams negotiated for a settlement on conflicting reference group interests. Campbell found that these teams had great difficulty in achieving compromise solutions and attributed this finding to team members' partisan loyalties to their respective reference groups.

Further suggestion that group loyalty may influence the negotiator derives from a study by Vegas, Frye, and Cassens (1964). These investigators discovered that two persons exhibited no perceptual distortion and had little difficulty in agreeing upon which one had written the better essay when they did not compete as group representatives. This result may be contrasted with the aforementioned findings illustrating strong positional commitments by group representatives, especially those obtained by Blake and Mouton. The implication is that



group loyalty may be responsible for a greater allegiance to a bargaining position by an individual when he represents a group rather than only himself.

Group loyalty confounded with other factors. The previously described observational and experimental accounts have well illustrated the extent to which the bargaining representative may be committed to his group's position. However, it is possible that these accounts have mistakenly attributed the negotiator's reluctance to deviate from the established position of his group to the influence of group loyalty. This possibility arises out of the fact that previous researchers have not always separated the effects of group loyalty from the effects of other variables in investigating negotiation behavior. As a result, the interpretations given certain findings may be in question due to a confounding of the factors which influence the group representative. Non-yielding behavior attributed by some investigators to pressures upon the negotiator to remain loyal to group commitments actually may have been attributable to other influences biasing the negotiator in favor of his group's position.

Druckman (1967) has contended that the above may have been the case in the studies by Blake and Mouton and by Campbell. A general conclusion reached by Blake and Mouton was that negotiating group representatives deadlocked out of desires to loyally represent fellow group members. Druckman criticized that this conclusion does not allow for the possibility that the commitment of group representatives was at least partially determined by their unilateral participation

in prenegotiation activities. Citing previous accounts suggesting that unilateral position formation may place particular constraints upon the negotiator (Blake, 1959; Mack & Synder, 1957; Rusk, 1955), Druckman explained that unilateral participation in planning team positions could have biased representatives toward their own group solutions. The suggestion that representatives were attitudinally biased is supported by a recurrent finding in the Blake and Mouton research program (see Blake & Mouton, 1962). Participants typically evaluated their own group products as superior to those of competing groups, even after studying other group positions. Druckman also suggested that the personal characteristics of elected representatives may have been partially responsible for their positional commitments after observing that participants had rated representatives as more nonyielding than nonrepresentatives (see Blake & Mouton, 1961a). His conclusion was that "the variables of personality type, unilateral planning, and group commitment could not be separated in accounting for the nonyielding behavior of representatives...(p. 281)."

Druckman criticized the study by Campbell on similar grounds. He explained that the noncompromising behavior exhibited by negotiating teams might have been a function of prenegotiation experience rather than group loyalty. It will be recalled that team members had formulated negotiation strategies prior to the negotiation session. As Druckman pointed out, it is possible that the activity of planning bargaining strategies accounted for difficulties in reaching

mutual team agreements. The suggestion that prenegotiation strategy formulation may act apart from group loyalty in bringing about positional commitment derives support from a study by Bass (1966). Bass found that subjects who had planned strategies for representing labor and management positions failed to achieve settlements more often than subjects who had not considered bargaining tactics in their study of the issues.

Recent experimental investigations. Druckman's analysis of previous studies on group representation led him to conclude that the independent effects of group loyalty had not been demonstrated. Druckman further indicated that the interactive effects of group loyalty and other variables possibly influencing the representative could not be appraised from earlier research due to the confounding of factors and non-orthogonality of experimental designs. He subsequently conducted an experiment to discover the relative contributions of group loyalty and two other factors thought to affect bargaining behavior.

Subjects in Druckman's study were assigned to employee or employer roles on the basis of positive attitudes toward labor or management positions, respectively. In order to increase identification with these positions, subjects were told they had been assigned roles on the basis of their favorable attitudes and were given background information and rationale for their reference group views on certain issues. Personality and prenegotiation experience variables were manipulated by having high and low dogmatic individuals either plan unilateral strategies for defending their positions or participate in a



bilateral discussion of the issues before the bargaining session. The group loyalty variable was manipulated by creating "group" and "no-group" conditions. Subjects in the group condition were explicitly told to act as representatives of hypothetical labor or management organizations. They were also informed that negotiation outcomes would be based upon the team scores of labor and management representatives. Subjects in the no-group condition were directed to represent only themselves and instructed that their individual bargaining contracts would be independent of settlements reached by other participants. The positional commitment of subjects in all conditions was assessed in a simulated collective bargaining task which provided four measures of conflict resolution: speed of resolution, average distance apart, average amount of yielding, and number of unresolved issues.

The results, reported to be consistent across all four dependent measures, showed main effects for both the personality and prenegotiation experience variables, but not for group loyalty. As predicted, high dogmatics indicated greater resistance to compromise than low dogmatics and prenegotiation strategy formulation accounted for greater positional commitment than bilateral study experience. However, compromise behavior was not significantly affected by whether individuals bargained for themselves or negotiated as group representatives. Thus, Druckman's experiment produced no support for the proposition that the negotiating effectiveness of the group representative is hampered by pressures of group loyalty.

Recently, however, Vidmar (1971) has challenged that the



Druckman experiment did not provide an adequate test for the effects of group loyalty. He approved of Druckman's experimental separation of previously confounded factors, but criticized that the manipulation of group loyalty itself made tenuous any conclusion regarding the effects of this variable.

Vidmar claimed that,

Because subjects were told they had been assigned to a reference group on the basis of favorable attitudes, were instructed to pretend that they were members of this organization, and were given a position paper for that organization, the manipulation very likely could have induced a feeling of "commitment" to the reference group in the no-group subjects as well as the group subjects (p. 49).

This analysis suggests that similar group commitments could have commanded similar loyalties on the part of subjects in both group and no-group conditions. Under such circumstances it would not have been possible to obtain differential group loyalty effects.

Vidmar (1971) conducted a study to explore the effects of group loyalty from a different perspective. Claiming that group loyalty is not a unidimensional concept, he attempted to isolate the effects of what he termed "representational role obligations." Role obligations, he explained, require the negotiator to represent constituency interests satisfactorily in order to merit certain rewards or avoid certain punishments controlled by members of his reference group. This component of group loyalty can be viewed as distinct from the negotiator's attitudinal alignment with his reference group's position which arises from his identification with the group. As precedents for his investigation of representational role obligations per se, Vidmar cited earlier field observations and

recent laboratory research. Walton and McKersie (1965) and Iklé (1964) had alluded to the role requirements that may restrict the negotiator's behavior, independent of his personal beliefs, in field studies of labor and international negotiations, respectively. Vidmar and McGrath (1970) had concluded that accounting for role obligations is important in understanding representative behavior following a laboratory study of McGrath's (1966) model of negotiation.

Vidmar's experimental test of the proposition that representational role obligations hinder negotiation effectiveness involved the assignment of subjects to roles as members of two fictitious organizations. Rolls were allocated on the basis of attitudinal alignments with organizational positions favoring either broad or career-oriented educational perspectives. Half of the subjects occupying each membership role participated in either a negotiation or a discussion condition. Preceding attempts to settle the educational issues in decision-making groups containing one member from each organization, subjects in both conditions were given the opportunity to study individually their respective organization's unilateral position description. Negotiation condition subjects were told to prepare themselves as representatives of their organization and its demands, while discussion condition subjects were informed that their exposure to a partisan position had been in the interest of making them experts on a particular viewpoint. Also, each subject in the negotiation condition was paid a salary to defend his organization's position and given the added incentive of a monetary prize for defending this position

better than fellow representatives. Each discussion condition subject was paid a salary to try to reach a mutually constructive solution and was promised a monetary reward for being a member of the best decision-making group. As a result of this complex manipulation the effects of representational role obligations were expected to be manifest only in the negotiation condition.

A second variable, mediation, was also studied by having subjects who initially had indicated relatively neutral attitudes serve as mediators in half of all decision-making groups. The prediction was that mediators would improve the effectiveness of groups in the negotiation condition, especially as compared to their effects upon discussion condition groups.

The measure of overall negotiation effectiveness was the product of three ratings of solution acceptability: two ratings of how acceptable the solution was to the partisan organizational viewpoints and one rating of how acceptable the solution was to the educational community of both organizations. Analyses of this performance criterion and questionnaire measures of subjects' interpersonal reactions indicated support for both hypotheses. Asserting that negotiators' personal attitudes had been held constant, Vidmar concluded that "negotiators' representational role obligations, by themselves, are detrimental factors in negotiation effectiveness (p. 57)."

An important implication from Vidmar's study is that group loyalty can be separated conceptually into two distinct components. Vidmar called these components "attitudinal commitment"



and "representational commitment." As previously alluded to, attitudinal commitment reflects the negotiator's identification with his reference group, while representational commitment refers to the negotiator's loyalty to his group's position arising from his representational role obligations. Vidmar explained that attitudinal commitment is a characteristic of the individual negotiator but that representational commitment is situational in that it is brought about by sanctions which can be administered by the negotiator's reference group. Drawing upon observations of international negotiations (Brown, Berrien, & Russell, 1966, pp. 478-494) and labor disputes (Walton & McKersie, 1965, pp. 228-309), Vidmar further proposed that these two components may operate either separately or conjointly to influence the negotiator. In labor-management negotiations, for instance, while the negotiator representing labor may be under pressure to defend his group in his role as its representative, he may or may not be inclined to do so out of an attitudinal alignment with group interests. A complementary observation by Stagner (1956, pp. 236-237) was that the union leader, as a spokesman for labor, may be bound with the responsibility of giving loyal expression to the demands of union members regardless of whether they be in total accord with his own.

The recent investigations of both Druckman and Vidmar experimentally controlled for extraneous factors previously confounded with group loyalty. However, the conclusion reached in Vidmar's study, that the representational component of group loyalty may operate to restrict negotiation effectiveness, is



inconsistent with Druckman's failure to find group loyalty effects. As previously described, Vidmar claimed that the manipulation in the Druckman experiment may not have provided an adequate test for the influence of group loyalty. Lately, however, Druckman (1971) has countered Vidmar's criticism on the grounds that it was based upon procedural misunderstandings. Druckman elaborated upon the specific procedures he had used in arguing against the probability that subjects in his no-group condition had felt committed to their reference groups. He pointed out that these subjects had been assigned roles as workers of a nonunionized company, had been given background information and rationale carefully designed not to imply reference group demands, and had received instructions to represent only themselves during negotiations. He also referred to an additional finding that "group representatives wanted their 'team' to come out favorably significantly more than individuals (no-group condition) wanted 'themselves' to come out favorably (p. 274)" as suggesting that the group and no-group conditions did differ in felt commitment.

Druckman further contended that Vidmar's conclusion regarding the effects of representation are suspect due to the confounding of this variable and instructional set in his own experiment. It will be recalled that subjects in Vidmar's negotiation condition were offered money to compete against opposing individuals in trying to achieve a mutually constructive settlement. Druckman argued that these instructions could have fostered competitive and cooperative dispositions among respective group-representing and self-representing subjects.

Citing previous research showing differences in the yielding behavior of competitively and cooperatively set negotiators (Summers, 1968), he pointed out the possibility that Vidmar's results reflected the influence of instructional set rather than representation per se.

Druckman also criticized Vidmar's manipulation for failing to characterize the constituency interests which Vidmar had implied are associated with representational role obligations. He appraised the importance of accounting for constituency-related aspects of group representation as follows:

Such factors as the nature of the constituency..., the extent to which they can exert an influence over negotiation process and outcomes..., and the amount of responsibility delegated to the representative can perhaps be considered as components of the concept of representation. Significant effects for representation may reflect the strength of the one or more components made salient in a particular manipulation (p. 274).

Current status of group loyalty as a determinant of negotiation effectiveness. Previous experimental research has not clearly demonstrated group loyalty to be a major determinant of negotiation behavior. Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude at this stage of investigation that the negotiator's positional commitment is not strongly influenced by pressures upon him to remain loyal to his group. Some experimental failures to provide conclusive evidence for the effects of group loyalty may have been the result of inadequate experimental controls. Even conceding to Druckman's contention that his study produced negative findings under appropriate experimental procedures, it is possible that group loyalty

effects may be manifest under different situational contingencies. Druckman, himself, conceded to this possibility.

In accord with Druckman's recent suggestion, it may be that the investigation of group loyalty would profit by preliminary study of the components of representation itself. Many experimenters appear to have ignored the dimensionality of group representation in investigating group loyalty effects. Yet, the desire to be loyal to one's group cannot be presumed identical for all individuals who might act as group representative or for the same representative under different group conditions. Furthermore, the extent to which the negotiator's behavior is seen to constitute an expression of loyalty to his group can be suggested to vary for different representatives and under different constituency expectations. Resolving the issue as to the effects of group loyalty may necessarily involve discovering the components of representation most likely to account for strong representative loyalties and the circumstances which give rise to their expression.

#### Components of Group Representation

No systematic attempt has yet been made to determine which components of group representation are most likely associated with a high degree of group loyalty and its manifestation through the negotiation behavior of group representatives. However, implications can be drawn from the psychological literature as to what some of these components might be. These implications derive from previous research characterizing the forces which operate upon the individual within the confines of his particular member-group relationship as well as from



earlier negotiation studies. The importance of accounting for different representational components in previous investigations of group loyalty may have been partially overlooked due to the mediating effects of other factors influencing negotiating representatives.

Some Components Suggested from Previous Research. As Vidmar's conceptual analysis of representational role obligations has indicated, the negotiator's loyalty can be viewed as the product of constituency-controlled sanctions. The variety of group sanctions which may induce the individual to comply with constituency demands has been illustrated by Cartwright and Zander (1968, pp. 144-145). Certain sanctions are quite informal in nature and obtain their influence from the group's expression of acceptance or rejection of member behavior. The strong pressures which may be exerted by these informal controls have been observed in numerous investigations (e.g., Hemphill, 1961; Schachter, 1951; Sherif & Sherif, 1953, 1956). Other group sanctions are based upon relatively formal systems of providing rewards and punishments. A common incentive to live up to group expectations, for instance, is the promise of receiving monetary compensation. Thus, a number of specific group sanctions exist, each exerting a somewhat different kind of pressure upon individual group members. However, all groups cannot be presumed to have equal access to these sanctions. It follows that the enforcement of group demands for loyal behavior from a group representative depends upon which sanctions his group can apply. The sanctions available to the representative's constituency may be an important component of

group representation to consider in the investigation of group loyalty effects.

The group's application of available sanctions to exert pressure upon its representative and the degree to which this pressure will be effective can be seen as contingent upon the strengths of two other representational components. The group can be expected to exercise more control over its group representative when the goals he is required to represent as negotiator are more important to the group. The extent to which the representative is influenced by pressures to conform to group expectations in turn may depend upon his attraction to the group. If the representative values his group membership quite highly because of the satisfaction he receives in affiliating with other group members, for example, the threat of rejection or expulsion from the group may be effective in bringing about his allegiance to group demands. The importance of group goals and the representative's attraction to his group also may be projected to affect what has been called the negotiator's attitudinal loyalty. Regardless of pressures arising from possible group sanctions, the representative may strongly defend his group's goals because he feels they are important to other group members. The specific goals he represents as negotiator may be divergent from his own, but he may be loyal to group demands because he identifies with his group in other ways. The degree to which he generally identifies with his group in turn may be a reflection of his overall attraction to his group.

The representational components discussed thus far may be



investigated as to their relative importance in accounting for differential group loyalty. Some idea of their joint responsibility in bringing about heightened group commitment, however, may be afforded by examining the concept of group cohesiveness. Reviews of research such as those by Cartwright (1968) and Secord and Backman (1964, pp. 337-339) have documented numerous studies showing increased group cohesiveness associated with stronger demands upon members to be loyal to their groups. Furthermore, these reviews pointed out that the extent of group cohesiveness has been consistently determined by the representational factors previously suggested as determinants of group loyalty; namely, the salience of group sanctions, the importance of group goals, and member attraction to the group. The degree of group cohesiveness accordingly may be a composite index of the influences of many different representational components upon negotiating group representatives.

Since greater group cohesiveness has been associated so frequently with enhanced group loyalty, a closer examination of the forces which bring it about may suggest other important components of group representation. Some relevant factors which have been investigated as determinants of group cohesiveness are the interdependence of group members accompanying intergroup competition (see Bass & Duntzman, 1963; Sherif & Sherif, 1969), the attitudinal similarity among group members (see Fiedler, Meuwese, & Oonk, 1961; Newcomb, 1960), and group size (see Thomas & Fink, 1963). Group Size, for example, may be an important factor to consider in discovering which aspects



of representation are conducive to strong group commitments. The negotiator may be under less pressure to remain loyal to his group's position when he represents a larger group in a bargaining situation. This possibility receives support from Thomas and Fink's generalization from earlier investigations that as group size increases there is a decrease in group cohesiveness. The results of previous studies of representational loyalty may have been confounded by failure to account for differences in group size. For instance, Blake and Mouton's (1961b) study employed groups ranging from seven to 12 members, yet no attempt was made to assess any differences in either the degree of group cohesiveness or representative behavior in light of size differences.

Discussion to this point has dealt with components of representation suggested to affect the magnitude of the representative's desire to be loyal to his group. Other representational components may be important because they account for the circumstances in which the representative's negotiation behavior constitutes an expression of his loyalty. Druckman's recommendation to consider the extent to which the constituency can exert an influence over negotiation process and outcomes may be examined from this perspective. Although Druckman did not elaborate upon his suggestion, it may refer to the expectation that demands upon the representative are not as great when his constituency is able to exert more control over the bargaining procedure and has a greater voice as to final outcomes. The constituency may be able to act as its own representative to the degree that it can exercise pressure tactics

over opposing groups or make decisions to accept or reject competing positions. This may be the case when a group can threaten to strike or has the opportunity to vote on proposed settlements. Under such circumstances the role requirements of the individual representative are likely to be less extensive. As a consequence, the negotiator is probably under less pressure to exhibit loyalty to his group.

The nature of group goals also may be examined as a component of representation affecting the way in which group loyalty is expressed through negotiation behavior. One way group goals can be categorized is by considering them as either economic or ideological in nature. Katz (1965, p. 382) has observed that while groups with conflicting economic goals are often willing to settle their differences through logical compromise, groups holding competing ideological viewpoints are seldom able to reach any agreement by rational assessment procedures. This observation suggests that a group desiring some economic benefit from negotiations might expect its representative to deviate somewhat from the original group position if logic dictated that a settlement would not otherwise be possible. As is implicit in the findings of many studies of individual bargainers (e.g., Gallo, 1966; Komorita & Barnes, 1969; McClintock & McNeel, 1967), the degree of concession expected probably would depend upon the particular costs of not reaching agreement. It follows that the representative who risks losing important economic gains for his group by his failure to yield as expected may lose his status as a loyal group member.



On the other hand, the representative who refuses to compromise his group's ideological principles probably is not as likely to be treated as disloyal. As Katz indicated, ideological group goals are not amenable to logical discussion, and their "all-or-none" quality demands that they be defended without concession. It can be argued that "winning" under such circumstances consists more of remaining steadfast in maintaining the ingroup's position than settling on the most appropriate moral solution. This may be due to the fact that failure to reach a settlement on ideological differences is not nearly as costly to the group as is failure to exhibit a strong commitment to its ethical standards. For the above reasons, then, it may be important to consider the nature of group goals in investigating the relationship between the representative's negotiation behavior and his desire to be loyal to his group.

The preceding survey of possible components of group representation should not be considered as an exhaustive treatment of all factors influential in bringing about group commitment and determining the means of its expression. Nevertheless, it may serve to indicate the necessity of accounting for certain parameters of the representative-group relationship in the assessment of group loyalty effects. Finding significant effects for group loyalty may be contingent upon the preliminary investigation of particular representational components.

Mediating Effects of Nonrepresentational Factors. The negotiator's behavior is of course the composite result of all



the forces acting upon him to either concede or maintain his group's position. The pressures exerted upon the negotiating representative by factors operating outside the representative-group relationship have been reviewed elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Nemeth, 1970; Sawyer & Geutzkow, 1965; Vidmar & McGrath, 1967). It may be, however, that group-related pressures to represent constituency interests are mediated by the effects of some nonrepresentational factors. To illustrate this possibility, two nonrepresentational factors frequently present in negotiations by group representatives are presently discussed.

A factor commonly assumed to influence negotiation effectiveness is whether or not a mediator is able to arbitrate a settlement. In particular reference to negotiations between group representatives, Stevens (1963) suggested that the effect of mediation is to aid agreement because the representative can shift the responsibility for compromise to the mediator. Stevens commented on mediation as a face-saving device as follows:

In this way the posture in retreat is more comfortable. The (representative) has been constrained by the mediator, not by his opponent, and he lives to fight again without what might otherwise be significant impairment of his status (p. 134).

In what can be considered an extension of Steven's analysis, Vidmar (1971) interpreted earlier research by Landsberger (1955) as implying that the beneficial contribution of mediation is proportional to the conflict produced by group demands for loyalty. The results of a study by Pruitt and Johnson (1970), although dealing with subjects bargaining on their own

behalfes rather than as group representatives, can be construed to support this contention. Pruitt and Johnson found that mediator intervention relieved feelings of personal weakness to a greater extent under high conflict manipulations involving time pressure and opposing negotiator concession rates. Vidmar's own experiment provided a more direct test of his proposition. Under conditions already described, Vidmar discovered that mediation resulted in greater negotiation effectiveness for representatives with role obligations, especially as compared to mediation effects upon representatives without these obligations. There is some evidence, then, that the nonrepresentational effects of mediation reduce the pressures upon the negotiator to display group loyalty by avoiding compromise behavior. Even taking caution that Vidmar's results may be interpreted differently due to possible manipulation problems, the prospect that mediation moderates group loyalty effects should be instructive for future research.

A nonrepresentational factor which has been given little analytical or experimental attention is that of prenegotiation experience in negotiation teams. Since negotiators often join with other representatives of their group either to study the issues or plan strategies preceding bargaining procedures, it may be important to discover any effects this group experience has upon loyalty behavior. Vidmar and McGrath (1967, p. 69) have conjectured that possible consequences of team preparations are reinforcement of attitudes toward the reference group, distribution of responsibility for negotiation decisions, and more accurate perceptions of the reference group's position.



The last consequence can be seen to affect what Druckman called team position planning. Bass's (1966) experiment has demonstrated that the effect of such prenegotiation planning is to increase noncompromising behavior. The first and second consequences, however, may be interpreted as directly influencing the individual negotiator's desire to be loyal to his group and the extent to which he feels compelled to express it, respectively. Attitudinal reinforcement is likely to enhance group loyalty while sharing decision responsibilities probably allows greater latitude for its expression. As with the nonrepresentational factor of mediation, then, team preparation would well be considered a factor which may alter group loyalty effects.

#### The Present Study

Earlier discussion has revealed that many components of representation may be involved in determining the extent and expression of the representative's loyalty to his group. It has been suggested that an adequate test for group loyalty effects depends upon discovering prominent aspects of these several components and then making them operative in manipulations which distinguish group representatives from nonrepresentatives. One way of finding out which factors noticeably effect differences in loyalty pressures is to directly assess their relative influence upon the compromising behavior of group representatives. In this perspective two components of group representation not previously mentioned are presently examined under the prospect that they can account for differential loyalty behavior.



Leadership Status of the Group Representative. The suggestion has been made that the degree to which the negotiator loyally represents his group's position may largely depend upon the group's ability to sanction his behavior. Given that effective sanctions are available, however, the group may not be inclined to apply them equally to all individuals who might act as representative. Some individuals may be permitted a greater latitude of deviation while serving in the role of negotiator. The following rationale for this possibility provides the background for subsequent discussion concerning potentially important aspects of a component of group representation which will be called the leadership status of the group representative.

The idea that group members who deviate from established group norms are not always met with negative sanctions from the group derives mainly from the research of Hollander (1958). Hollander asserted that each group member builds up a certain number of "idiosyncrasy credits," based upon his positive contributions to the group, which entitle him to engage in norm-discrepant behavior. He further explained that the extent of idiosyncratic behavior which the group tolerates from any member before invoking censure is in proportion to the number of credits this person has accumulated. The number of group-awarded credits held by any one individual Hollander saw as a reflection of his status in the group. According to this analysis a high-status member would be permitted to deviate from group standards to a greater extent than a low-status member.

Hollander's conceptualization can be applied to negotiation situations to explain why the group representative may be permitted to compromise his group's position yet maintain his standing as a loyal group member. Since the negotiator is likely to have arrived at his position by virtue of positive contributions to his group, it is probable that he possesses a sufficient number of group credits to allow him some deviation in representing his group's position. Because of his status as group representative he may be able to reach a compromise settlement without fear of receiving negative sanctions. This application of Hollander's ideas rests upon the assumption that the representative occupies a high-status position within his group. Support for this assumption comes from the fact that the representative is popularly viewed as performing a leadership function. Discussion thus far has rather indiscriminately referred to individuals who represent the respective interests of counteracting groups as group representatives, bargainers, and negotiators. However, anyone acting in such a role is by popular definition also a leader. The individual who carries out negotiations is commonly accorded some leadership status whether it be in government, industry, or politics.

Taking note of the status differential existing between the representative as a leader and other group members may help to explain compromise behavior by bargaining representatives. Yet, reference to the literature on leadership finds very little direct support for the notion that a group permits its representative a certain degree of deviation because of his leadership status. Aside from some mention that one



function of a leader is to act as group spokesman, investigators have not frequently considered intergroup negotiation in terms of the leadership behavior displayed by negotiating representatives. Moreover, as Gibb (1969, p. 269) and Hollander and Julian (1969, p. 391) have pointed out, leadership research has largely ignored the implication from the early work of Hollander and others (e.g., Hughes, 1946) that the group leader may be under less pressure to conform to group norms than other group members due to his comparatively high status.

Despite a general failure in the study of leadership to examine group tolerance for deviant leader behavior and to extend the concept of leadership to the area of intergroup negotiation, some relevant inferences can be drawn from a few studies which have been conducted. For example, an investigation by Jones, Gergen, and Jones (1963) showed that low-status subjects were prone to conform to the opinions of high-status subjects on certain issues. Status was determined by class seniority in a ROTC program under the assumption that high status accompanied the leadership role of "commander." The authors' interpretation of the results was that low-status subordinates expressed agreements with the attitudes of leaders in order to ingratiate themselves. This conclusion implies that the members of a group may readily comply with the opinions of the group leader in deference to his status. It follows that the leadership status accorded the group representative may enable him to compromise his group's position somewhat under the prospect that he can gain his constituency's acceptance of his reasons for doing so.



The results of other leadership studies are applicable to the investigation of group loyalty insofar as they imply that the group representative's compromising behavior is a variable function of factors which can alter his leadership status within the group. Hermann and Kogan (1968) conducted one of the few studies to examine directly the relationship between a representative's leadership status and his negotiation behavior. These investigators manipulated status by appointing each member of experimental dyads as either a leader or a delegate. Upperclassmen were appointed as the leaders and underclassmen as the delegates under the assumption of a preestablished status hierarchy based upon class membership. Each dyad was instructed to reach a consensus on the solutions to a set of hypothetical, life-like situations and then to separate into 4-person or 5-person groups to negotiate the issues with their counterparts from other dyads. The results showed that leaders yielded from the initial dyadic agreements to a greater extent than delegates. The authors concluded that the leaders' higher status within their reference groups was responsible for their greater willingness to compromise previously agreed-upon solutions.

While the above interpretation is fully consistent with present considerations, several features of the experimental situation may qualify the applicability of the findings. First, the manipulation of status was by experimental assignment and may not be representative of emergent status differences resulting from interactions among reference group members. Second, the effects of the manipulation may have been

due to factors confounded with those connoting differential status. Factors associated with other differences between upperclassmen and underclassmen may have been sources of extraneous influence. Also, since only delegates were told they would have to report back on their bargaining activities, leaders may have negotiated with less fear of receiving reference group sanctions. Finally, some nonstandardized procedures may have biased the results. Negotiation groups were not uniform with respect to group size and there was evidence of prior acquaintance in dyads as well as in negotiation groups. Thus, generalizations from the above findings to account for the representative's bargaining behavior as a function of the leadership status accorded him by his reference group are limited due to several procedural inconsistencies.

Other leadership findings suggestive of how the representative's leadership status might affect his negotiation behavior have resulted from studies specifically concerned with leadership endorsement, a variable recently emphasized as important to the study of leadership in general (see, e.g., Fiedler, 1967). Research on endorsement has demonstrated several consequences of differential support of the group leader by other group members. An experiment by Michener and Lyons (1970) showed, for instance, that mutual positive endorsement of a relatively high-status leader reduced the probability that revolutionary coalitions would be formed to restrict his behavior. The likelihood that the group leader adjusts his behavior according to his perception of the degree to which he is endorsed has been indicated in a study by Hollander, Julian,

Sorrentino (1969). These investigators found that leaders were more likely to downgrade the decisions of subordinate group members and rely upon their own inclinations when they perceived themselves as highly supported. A complementary finding by Dittes and Kelley (1956) was that individuals conformed less to group norms the more they believed their group accepted them. Thus, it appears that the leader who is highly endorsed will be able to exercise more freedom in deviating from concerted group opinion out of the realization that his high status offers protection against retaliatory action by the members of his group. This explanation of the consequences of leadership endorsement has relevant implications for the study of negotiation by group representatives. For example, because he is performing in a leadership capacity the representative may be able to yield from his group's established position, but only to an extent determined by the endorsement of other group members.

Preceding discussion has suggested that the representative's bargaining behavior may be profitably assessed in terms of the status hierarchy existing within his reference group. The representative's role as group negotiator can be appropriately conceptualized as according him esteem as a leader within this hierarchy. A cursory examination of relevant leadership studies has indicated further that the representative's tendency to compromise his group's position may depend upon the influence of factors which decide his relative leadership status. Accordingly, further investigation of the leadership status of the group representative as a component of group



representation may afford a better understanding of loyalty behavior.

The representative's source of authority. It has been suggested that the representative's leadership status is reflected by the degree to which he is endorsed by his constituency. Discovering the relationship between the representative's compromising propensities and his leadership status may therefore depend upon finding those factors which bring about differential group endorsement. One of the few studies conducted with this purpose in mind was performed by Michener and Tausig (1971). These researchers found that one determinant of the endorsement accorded an elected leader by nonleaders was the perceived support of that leader by other group members. Perceived support was manipulated by distributing bogus communications among nonleaders indicating each other's general satisfaction with the leader's behavior. It will be instructive to examine further the variable of perceived member support with special attention to an alternate means by which it has been manipulated.

Raven and French (1958) employed a more indirect means of manipulating evidential support for the leader in investigating the basis of leadership influence. Their study was designed to assess the effects of the leader's source of authority in either election or appointment upon his acceptance by group members. The process of election can be construed as providing each group member with an overt manifestation of the person his fellow members support as leader while the procedure of appointment can be interpreted as providing no information

regarding consensual support. Accordingly, it might be expected that elected leaders would be endorsed to a greater extent than appointed leaders. This was the result which Raven and French obtained.

However, a recent study by Julian, Hollander, and Regula (1969) produced no main effect for source of authority in a measure of endorsement taken after leaders had ostensibly served as spokesmen for their groups. No difference was found in this final measure in spite of a tendency for group members to evaluate elected leaders more positively than appointed leaders at one point in the experiment. Moreover, a complex interaction among source of authority and two other variables, the spokesman's perceived competence and his task success, suggested that election may actually be involved in making the leader the more likely candidate for group censure. The nature of this interaction showed that the elected spokesman had to be both perceived as competent and successful at his task in order to achieve endorsement while the appointed spokesman needed only to be either perceived competent or successful. The authors interpreted this result as indicating the relatively high demands which may accompany the leader whose source of authority is in election.

The findings of Julian et al. may not necessarily contradict the idea that the leader may gain the endorsement of group members because they perceive his election as evidence of his support by others. This possibility arises out of a closer examination of what the group might expect of a leader who is highly endorsed. The proposition has been made that the highly



endorsed leader may be allowed some deviation from group norms as a result of his comparatively high status within the group. However, deviation might be tolerated only as long as the leader maintains his image as a competent and loyal group member. If his deviant behavior comes to be perceived as incompetent or traitorous, group members might be expected to react with consternation. A study by Wiggins, Dill, and Schwartz (1965) has suggested that while a high-status individual is permitted minor deviation from group standards, he is indeed heavily sanctioned for major transgressions, even more so than lower-status members. Earlier findings by Hamblin (1958) are also consistent with this formulation. Hamblin found that a group tended to replace its leader if he could not solve a group crisis problem, in spite of the fact that he previously exerted a great influence over group members. According to the preceding explanation, then, it makes sense to hypothesize both increased demands and greater endorsement for the elected leader. Furthermore, it can be argued that Julian et al.'s failure to replicate Raven and French's finding for source of authority may have owed to the specific circumstances of their experiment. The effects of source of authority upon endorsement might be singularly pronounced in other situations, such as when endorsement is assessed prior to the leader's participation in the task or when the task outcome cannot be interpreted so readily in win-lose terms.

While further study is needed to detail the influence of the leader's source of authority upon his endorsement by group members, the purpose of considering this variable in the present



line of investigation was to gain a suggestion as to its possible influence upon the leader himself. If the means by which the leader comes to represent his group mediates the degree to which he is endorsed by altering the perception of group members that he is mutually supported, it can be presumed that the leader is aware of this fact. Unfortunately, the literature provides very little information as to what the individual leader's reaction might be to his own source of authority. Aside from research already mentioned, a few studies (e.g., Borg, 1957; Carter, Haythorn, Shriver, & Lanzetta, 1951; Goldman & Fraas, 1965) have distinguished between elected and appointed leaders, but these studies examined group performance under different sources of leadership authority rather than the behavior of leaders themselves. The results of these studies evidenced no systematic differences in the performance of groups having elected or appointed leaders. However, the influence of many group members upon a leader may be more noticeable than the influence of one leader upon many group members, especially when the task is performed solely by the leader.

One purpose of the present experiment was to assess the effects of source of authority upon the negotiation behavior of the group representative. With little in the way of direct precedent it was predicted that the process of election would elicit greater yielding behavior from the group representative than would the procedure of appointment. This prediction was based upon earlier discussion suggesting that election engenders a higher perceived leadership status on the part of

the representative with the consequence that he anticipates more tolerance from nonrepresentatives for compromising their position. This reasoning carries with it the further assumption that the representative functions in a leadership capacity when he bargains for the other members of his group.

The representative as group leader or spokesman. Aspects of the leadership status component of representation other than source of authority may also be examined in the attempt to account for the representative's loyalty behavior. One factor which may influence the representative's perception of his leadership status is suggested from the conceptual analysis of leadership in terms of the number of leadership functions performed by any one individual within his group. Gibb (1969) has given expression to the usefulness of this theoretical approach as follows:

There is one important advantage in conceiving the leader in terms of the frequency of his performance of leadership acts or functions. Leadership is probably best conceived as a group quality, as a set of functions which must be carried out by the group. (The) concept of "distributed leadership" is an important one. If there are leadership functions which must be performed in any group, and if these functions may be "focused" or "distributed," then leaders will be identifiable both in terms of the frequency and in terms of the multiplicity or pattern of functions performed (p. 215).

Gibb's notion that leadership functions may be variously distributed among group members has important implications for the study of representative behavior. It has been contended that the group representative is accorded leadership status by virtue of the fact that he performs a leadership function. Yet, acting as group negotiator may be only one of his leadership responsibilities. Depending on the nature and scope of



his group's activities he may also allocate work assignments to other members, guide group discussions, or arbitrate the worth of member contributions. On the other hand, his only unique role within the group may be to act as its spokesman in intergroup bargaining situations. Furthermore, different situational demands may require that other group members will sometimes be called upon to bargain for the group. Thus, in groups where a number of leadership functions exist, the representative's overall leadership status may be contingent upon how many of the available leadership functions he individually performs. The degree to which any one function affords the representative status as a leader, of course, depends upon the importance of that particular function to the achievement of group goals.

The present experiment was designed to investigate the concept of distributed group leadership as it applies to negotiation behavior. An arbitrary distinction was made between the representative as either "group leader" or "spokesman." The representative as group leader may be conceived of as a person occupying a position of focused leadership in the sense that he performs all available leadership functions within the group, including that of acting as group spokesman. In contrast, the representative as spokesman may be viewed as an individual serving in only one leadership capacity among those distributed within the group. It was predicted that the group leader acting as representative would exhibit more yielding behavior during the bargaining process than would the group spokesman. This prediction was based upon the posited



relationship between leadership status and idiosyncratic behavior. An individual representing his group solely as spokesman was not expected to rate his leadership status as highly as a group leader and therefore was not expected to perceive as much group-awarded credit for idiosyncratic behavior.

Cooperative Expectations of Group Members. A component of representation which is readily suggested by common sense but which has received no concentrated experimental attention can be termed the cooperative expectations of group members. The group negotiator's dilemma has been described as arising out of his mixed motivation to cooperate with opposing negotiators for the sake of settlement while arguing for their acceptance of the unilateral interests of his group. Naturally, the negotiator's constituency values an agreement which meets all or most of its demands more highly than one which necessitates a great deal of concession. However, as discussion on the nature of group goals has suggested, there may be situations in which the constituency may be willing to yield somewhat from its initial position in order to avoid losing all benefits by refusing any settlement. Whatever the conditions might be which would foster a willingness to compromise, the group would likely communicate any such desire to its negotiating representative. This communication could take the form of expressed group expectations that the representative cooperate with contending negotiators during the bargaining session. The result of such a mandate should manifest itself in the representative's compromising behavior. It follows

that the representative may be under less pressure to remain loyal to his group's original position when he realizes that some degree of compromise is expected by the members of his group.

Although there is little reference in the literature to negotiation behavior as a function of cooperative group expectations, relevant implications can be extracted from a number of studies which have examined the effects of instructional set upon individuals bargaining for themselves. These studies typically have manipulated instructional set by leading subjects to believe that they were either to cooperate or compete with their opponents. Nemeth (1970, pp. 301-302) has reviewed this research with the conclusion that cooperatively set individuals are more likely to yield to their opponents than individuals operating under a competitive orientation. It may be recalled that the results of Summer's study, previously mentioned in connection with Druckman's (1971) criticism of Vidmar's research, are in accord with this contention. Nemeth indicated that earlier experiments by Deutsch (1958) also support this general proposition. Deutsch found that subjects who were told to consider the welfare of both themselves and their partners were significantly more cooperative than subjects told either to consider their own welfare and to defeat their partner or to consider their personal welfare only. Nemeth cited additional investigations corroborating Deutsch's findings. Kanouse and Wiest (1967) discovered that more cooperation was elicited from subjects instructed to conceive of their partners and themselves as cooperating team



members than from those informed to act on their own behalves. Similarly, Crawford and Sidowski (1964) obtained results which showed that individuals given a cooperative set were willing to give away more points to their partners than individuals who were encouraged to be self-oriented. The findings of an additional study by Gallo and Dale (1968) demonstrate that the effects of instructional set may be pronounced even under very subtle manipulations. These investigators found that the experimenter's facial expression and tone of voice were effective in influencing subjects to cooperate or compete during a PDG task.

The importance of accounting for cooperative or competitive instructional sets has been well documented with respect to bargaining individuals. Yet, investigations of group loyalty effects have failed to take advantage of research in this area. It may be profitable to examine the cooperative expectations which the group may hold for its representative in terms of instructional set. The representative's perception of his group's expectations to cooperate or compete with opposing negotiators may dispose him, respectively, toward compromising or noncompromising behavior. Such was the prediction of the present experiment.

Experimental Predictions. The present experiment tested three predictions concerning the influence of the two components of group representation previously focused upon as responsible for differential loyalty behavior by bargaining representatives. Two of these predictions were derived from the expected influence of two separate aspects of the leadership



status component, the representative's source of authority and whether he is the group leader or group spokesman. A third prediction arose from anticipations regarding the influence of the cooperative group expectations component. Based upon previous considerations, these predictions were formally expressed in the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. Elected representatives yield more from their groups' established positions during intergroup negotiations than appointed representatives.

Hypothesis 2. Group leaders serving as representatives compromise their group positions to a greater extent than spokesmen.

Hypothesis 3. Representatives are more likely to exhibit yielding behavior under relatively high cooperative expectations of group members.

## CHAPTER II

### METHOD

#### Subjects

Ss were 80 male undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology classes at the University of Maryland who volunteered for the experiment in order to obtain extra course credit.<sup>1</sup> They were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions.

#### The Negotiation Issue

The issue for negotiation centered upon the question of appropriate treatment for a juvenile delinquent named Johnny Rosello. Johnny's situation was portrayed in a modified version (see Appendix A) of a case history previously made available by Evans (1948). This case history provided a background against which Johnny's latest delinquent behavior could be adjudged, but left open the verdict as to the type of treatment he should receive for his actions. The specific issue to be decided by negotiating Ss was whether Johnny should receive lenient or harsh treatment in light of his background.

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<sup>1</sup>Data from an additional eight Ss were either not obtained or discarded. Three Ss knew an experimental confederate, three Ss took an initial position on the negotiation issue (Number 5 on the subsequently described Preferred Treatment Scale) which prevented the standardization of further procedures, one S had seen the confederates participating in an earlier session, and one S failed to complete the experiment due to a bomb scare.

This issue was seen to offer certain advantages for the present experiment. Several researchers (e.g., Emerson, 1954; Schachter, 1951; Schachter, Nuttin, De Monchaux, Maucorps, Osmer, Duijker, Rommetveit, & Israel, 1954; Ward, 1970, p. 102) have noted that Ss were typically sympathetic in their reactions to Evan's case history but they find it plausible for others to hold contrasting viewpoints. The likelihood of a lenient modal opinion regarding Johnny's deviancy made it possible to standardize the positions of some confederate group members as comparatively lenient. It was important for Ss and confederate group members to be of similar opinion so that choosing Ss as group representatives would appear appropriate in all conditions. The probability that Ss would find it tenable for some of their peers to differ radically in opinion afforded standardization of a confederate negotiator's position as comparatively nonlenient. The issue of what treatment should be prescribed for Johnny was also seen as relevant to the contemporary concerns of Ss. Public attention focusing upon the rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents was coincident with Ss' participation in the study.

### General Procedure

Prenegotiation Session. The prenegotiation session was designed to establish a reference group for each S and to generate a group position which he could later defend as the group's representative. Each S was made to believe that he would be participating in a discussion with four other males who had been similarly recruited. In actuality, these other individuals were experimental confederates. The same four



confederates were used throughout the study. Their behavior was standardized across all experimental conditions.

Upon his arrival at the laboratory S was ushered into a room along with the experimental confederates by E, a male graduate student. Five chairs had been arranged in a circle within the room. Such an arrangement was considered necessary so that the effects of factors relating to seating position would not be confounded with those of the independent variables. (The effects of irregular seating arrangements upon leadership emergence have been demonstrated in studies by Howells and Becker (1962) and Ward (1968).) The confederates preceded S into the room and selected their seats, leaving the unoccupied seat for S. Each confederate selected the same seat in every session. This procedure was aimed at standardizing the pattern of communication between Ss and the respective confederates. When the group had been seated, E gave the following introductory instructions.

In a moment I will explain the purpose of this study. Before I do so, I'm going to pass out some cards on which I'd like you to print your first names. Please pin these cards on your shirts so that everyone will be able to see them.

E distributed the identification cards and waited until the group members had filled them out and pinned them to their clothing. He then described the alleged purpose of the study.

This is a study of decision-making processes which take place in real life situations. One of the common processes by which many important decisions are reached in our society consists of two particular stages. The first stage is the formulation of independent solutions to a given problem by groups who view the problem from different perspectives. The second stage is the comparison of these group solutions by group representatives who meet in order to work out a mutually acceptable solution. Today's

experiment is specifically concerned with this two-stage process as it operates in the juvenile court system. As you might know, a common procedure in the juvenile courts is for the department of social work and the prosecutor's office to prepare separate recommendations on how to handle a juvenile who breaks the law. Persons representing these two departments then get together to make the final decision as to what treatment should be recommended. You will be taking part in a simulation of this decision-making process.

Your task will be to discuss the case history of a young juvenile delinquent named Johnny Rosello as though you are members of the department of social work and to reach a decision on what should be done with him. Another group is meeting in a separate room and is being assigned to discuss Johnny's case from the viewpoint of the prosecutor's office. Later on we will simulate the second stage of the juvenile court process by having representatives from each of your groups meet to determine the best general solution to Johnny's problems.

Now I'm going to give each of you a copy of the case history along with a Prescribed Treatment Scale showing seven alternative treatments which might be prescribed for Johnny. Each of you should read the case history carefully to yourself and circle the number on the Scale which corresponds to the treatment you personally feel Johnny should receive. Then, as a group, discuss Johnny's situation and try to reach a consensus on the most appropriate statement.

I'll be tape-recording your discussion from the next room. You will have 15 minutes. Are there any questions?

After answering any questions by S, E passed out copies of the Johnny Rosello case and the Prescribed Treatment Scale (see Appendix B) and then left the room.

The confederate seated to the right of S initiated the discussion by suggesting that group members announce their respective positions.

Maybe we could start by telling each other what solutions we have personally chosen. I chose Number 2.

The confederate continued by briefly explaining the reasons



for his position. He then looked toward S, inviting him to speak next. When S had given his position and his reasons for it, the remaining confederates did likewise. All confederates advocated that Johnny should receive lenient treatment, yet they did express minor differences in opinion. Two confederates defended the second alternative on the Prescribed Treatment Scale, while the remaining two confederates selected the first and third alternatives, respectively, as their preferred solutions. The assignment of alternatives was kept constant across all experimental conditions. Confederates supported their respective positions by referring to appropriate aspects of Johnny's background appearing in the case history. If S did not take part in the ensuing discussion for any period approximated to be two minutes in duration, the confederates solicited his participation by asking him to clarify the position he had announced. They were careful not to monopolize the conversation, allowing S to make comments whenever he desired.

When E left the experimental room, he went to an adjacent room which was equipped with a 1-way mirror and a tape recorder. The recorder, whose microphone extended into the experimental room, had both monitoring and taping capabilities. E began recording the session when the group had finished reading the case history to themselves and proceeded to note the number of comments which S made during the discussion. A single comment was operationally defined as any verbal expression which constituted a complete thought. This measure was taken in order that any association between S's rate of participation and his negotiation behavior could be controlled for statistically



in testing the experimental predictions. (Numerous investigations ( e.g., Bass, 1949) have found a person's sociometric leadership rating to be positively correlated with his talking rate. One implication is that the amount of talking a person does might also be positively associated with his perception of leadership status and therefore with his compromising behavior.) After the 10 minutes allowed for discussion had elapsed, E re-entered the experimental room and gave the following instructions.

Now that you have had a chance to arrive at a group opinion on how Johnny should be treated, I'd like you to take another 10 minutes to organize the arguments you feel support this opinion. After you have done this, a representative from your group will meet with a representative from the group taking the viewpoint of the prosecutor's office to compare group solutions and the arguments for them.

So that you can systematically arrange your arguments for comparison with those of the other group, I would like to have someone act as group leader in formulating your group's position. First, however, I want to find out which alternative on the Prescribed Treatment Scale best represents your opinion as a group. I'll take a poll of your individual choices. Please indicate your personal opinions as to the treatment Johnny should receive by circling the appropriate numbers on these pieces of paper.

E then distributed copies of the Opinion Poll (see Appendix C) which asked each group member to choose among treatment alternatives "1" through "7." This procedure provided a measure of S's individual opinion regarding the issue for negotiation and allowed statistical control over this opinion in assessing the effects of the experimental manipulations. (Previous discussion has indicated the importance of considering representational role obligations independently from personal attitudinal commitment.) After the group had circled their choices, E

collected the slips and pretended to calculate the average number selected. Due to the particular alternatives chosen by the experimental confederates and the likelihood that S would respond toward the lenient end of the Scale, E was able to announce:

It appears that the average alternative of your group is Number 2 on the Scale.

E subsequently implemented one of the procedures later described to arrange for one of the group members to serve as group leader. When the group had a member functioning as its leader, E handed this member a sheet of paper and gave these instructions:

Here is a sheet of paper on which you can write down the arguments your group formulates in support of its position. You should try to lead the group in developing these arguments so that they will be systematically organized.

You will have 10 minutes for discussion. Any questions?

After E had answered any questions by S, he left the experimental room and entered the adjacent room. During the group's formulation of its position he recorded the session and noted the number of comments made by S. In 10 minutes he returned and instituted one of the procedures used to arrange for S to be the group's representative. E directed himself toward S and informed him of his task.

As group representative you will take part in the simulation of the second stage of the juvenile court's decision-making process. You and the representative of the prosecutor's office will have the task of developing a joint recommendation for consideration in sentencing. After your joint conference is over, you can return here and tell the group what recommendation you have made.



Because of the possibility that this group's opinion will be different from the other's, reaching an agreement with the other representative may require one or both of you to alter his group's opinion. In this situation you might want to know how the rest of the group feels about changing the group position. So that you will have this information, I'm going to have the others indicate on these slips of paper how committed they are to your group's position.

E then passed out Cooperative Expectations Sheets (see Appendix D) to the confederate group members. When they had filled them out, E collected them and made a pretense of calculating the average commitment indicated. He marked this average on a separate Sheet and handed it to S.

This is the average degree of commitment which the other members have indicated. Now, wait here a minute and I'll see if the other representative is ready to meet.

E left the room to give the impression he was soliciting the other representative. He returned in about one minute to tell S:

O.K. Come with me and I'll take you to meet with the other representative. Bring the sheet on which the group's arguments are written and the other materials I passed out with you.

Negotiation Session. As their task was completed, the confederate group members noted any unusual observations and then assembled to meet the next S. Meanwhile, E escorted S to another room. A male confederate was waiting in the room, posing as the representative of the other group. He was carrying the same experimental materials that S had been asked to bring with him. Two chairs had been placed in the room and arranged to face each other. E introduced the two representatives and explained their task.



(S's name), this is (confederate's name). Why don't you each have a seat. (The confederate selected the same chair in every session.)

Each of you has been chosen to represent your group opinion on the Johnny Rosello case; (S's name), you from the viewpoint of the department of social work and (confederate's name), you from the viewpoint of the prosecutor's office. As you have each been told, it will be your task to reach a common solution to Johnny's problems. I'd like you to inform each other of your respective group positions and then compare your arguments for them. If your group opinions are the same, try to establish which arguments best support this position. If your group positions differ, try to reach an agreement on the best possible solution and develop the best arguments for it.

You will have 10 minutes. Do you have any questions?

E answered any questions and left the room.

The confederate representative initiated conversation with S by announcing his group's position and asking S to do the same. The confederate's position corresponded to Number 7 on the Preferred Treatment Scale and was kept constant across all conditions. During the discussion the confederate used variations of three standard arguments in maintaining that Johnny should receive harsh punishment. The first argument was that Johnny persisted in stealing despite having been shown love and kindness; the second was that past disciplinary treatment had not been effective because it had not been consistently applied; the third was that the law demands that Johnny be punished for what he did. The confederate did not deviate from his original position at any time during the session. (A study by Kelley (1966) has demonstrated that differential yielding may be elicited by different concession behavior on the part of opposing bargainers.) In no session did the confederate know the condition in which S was participating. The same confederate was used in every session.

When nine minutes had elapsed, E returned and told the representatives that one minute remained for discussion.

You have one more minute.

The confederate representative took E's intervention as a signal that he should ask S a specific question before the discussion ended. S's answer to this question, which the confederate later noted on the Confederate Representative's Feedback Sheet (see Appendix E, Item 1), was one dependent variable of the experiment. This question was:

What position are you willing to take so we can reach an agreement?

After the last minute allotted for discussion has passed, E returned and gave final instructions.

Your time is up. Now I'd like to find out which solution you can agree upon as most appropriate for Johnny by having each of you fill out a questionnaire. This questionnaire asks you to indicate the common alternative chosen for Johnny if your group positions were initially the same. If your positions were initially different, it asks you how much you would be willing to change your positions in order that an agreement can be reached.

The questionnaire also asks some other questions about how you feel in your roles as group representatives. When you have filled it out and we are able to see what solution you agree upon, you can go back to your groups and tell them what has been decided.

E gave the representatives copies of the Postnegotiation Questionnaire (see Appendix F) and waited until they had finished filling them out. The Questionnaire was designed to provide a measure of the alternative on the Preferred Treatment Scale S would accept in making an agreement when not under any pressure to vocalize this alternative to the confederate negotiator, to assess the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations, and to determine how S felt about various aspects of

the experiment. E then dismissed the confederate representative and debriefed S.

The confederate indicated on the Confederate Representative's Feedback Sheet his impression of S's commitment to his group's position by marking a 7-point bipolar scale ranging from "Committed" to "Not committed" (see Item 2). He also wrote a brief commentary on S's behavior during the negotiation session (see Item 3).

### Manipulations of the Independent Variables

Source of Authority. Half of the Ss were led to believe they had been elected as group representatives, while the other half were appointed by E.

The Elected Representative (ER) condition was created through an election procedure instigated when E returned to the group following its formulation of arguments supporting its position. E's instructions were:

Now I'd like you to elect a member of your group to be your group representative. Please write the name of the person you individually want to be representative on one of these slips of paper.

After distributing and collecting the election slips, E informed S that he had been chosen as the group's representative before continuing with the instructions which explained his task.

(S's name), it looks like you have been chosen to be your group's representative.

The Appointed Representative (AR) condition was created by E's appointment of S as the group representative. The manipulation was specifically designed to create the impression that S's appointment was by chance rather than out of any preference



for S by E. Following the group's formulation of its position, E told the group:

Now I'd like to appoint someone to be the representative of your group. So that each of you would have the same chance to be representative, I decided before the experiment began to appoint the person who happened to sit in a certain chair. (E looked at S.) (S's name), your chair was the one I chose, so this makes you the group's representative.

The Representative as Group Leader or Spokesman. Half of the Ss in each of the ER and AR conditions served as representatives after having been group discussion leaders, while the other Ss acted solely as spokesmen.

The Group Leader (GL) and Spokesman (S) conditions were established by appointing either S or a confederate group member as discussion leader, respectively. The same confederate was always appointed in the S condition. E appointed the group leader after announcing the results of the opinion poll. Appropriately addressing himself either to S or the confederate, he said to this individual:

(S's or confederate's name), I'd like to have you be the group's leader in formulating a position.

Cooperative Group Expectations. An equal number of Ss informed of different cooperative group expectations participated in each of the conditions previously described.

The group expectations variable was operationally defined in terms of commitment to the group position. The manipulation was carried out through the use of the Cooperative Expectations Sheets toward the end of the prenegotiation session. Each Sheet contained a 7-point scale ranging from "Not committed" (numbered "1") to "Committed" (numbered "7"). E marked the

scale at "2" for Ss in the High Cooperative Expectations (HCE) condition and at "6" for Ss in the Low Cooperative Expectations (LCE) condition.

The way in which the Cooperative Expectations Sheet was distributed, either clockwise or counterclockwise, determined which end of the scale the confederates marked. This procedure was adopted to avoid suspicion by S if he noticed that the other group members inappropriately marked their scales. The confederates were unaware of S's condition prior to the manipulation.

## CHAPTER III

### RESULTS

#### Experimental Hypotheses

Analytical Procedure. The experimental hypotheses were tested on two separate dependent measures of yielding. The first measure was S's verbal answer to the confederate representative's question of what alternative on the Preferred Treatment Scale he was willing to accept in order to reach an agreement. The second was S's written response to essentially the same question in Item 3 of the Postnegotiation Questionnaire. The written measure was taken in order to assess any differential effects of the independent variables when S was not asked to declare his intentions publicly before the opposing representative.

The experimental predictions were tested by performing  $2 \times 2 \times 2$  analyses of covariance on the measures of yielding.<sup>2</sup> Two covariates were used in the initial analyses, S's rate of

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<sup>2</sup>Analysis of covariance was considered an appropriate statistical technique even under the possibility that the yielding measures did not derive from a purely interval scale. Since all analyses were performed with equal  $n$  per cell and satisfied subsequent tests of other basic assumptions, it was felt justifiable that unbiased inferences could be based upon the results of these analyses. (See Adams, 1966; Anderson, 1961; and Baker, Hardyck, and Petrinovich, 1966; for further discussion of the use of parametric techniques when interval-scaled data cannot be readily assumed.)



participation during the discussion of the case history and S's personal opinion toward the issue as indicated in the Opinion Poll.

The rate of participation index was calculated as the number of comments Ss made per minute of discussion. The number of comments was assessed independently for each of 78 Ss by a graduate student who listened to the tapes of the sessions and also timed each discussion period. Judgments for one S could not be made because of a faulty tape, for another because a tape broke while recording his session. The obtained judgments correlated highly with those made by E ( $r = .90$ ), indicating high reliability. E's assessments were used to compute all participation indices. His judgment was available for the S whose tape was faulty; also, the clarity of the monitoring system used for each session and the advantage of visual observation afforded greater distinguishability among Ss' and confederates' comments than did the session tapes. The average rate of participation for all Ss was 2.7 comments per minute. This average was based upon data from 79 Ss. It was substituted as the participation rate of the S whose tape broke. As the time of this S's discussion period was not known, his rate of participation could not be calculated.

The index of personal opinion was taken as S's response to the Opinion Poll rather than the opinion he initially indicated by circling an alternative on the Preferred Treatment Scale in order to account for any change in his opinion associated with the group discussion. Eighteen of the 80 Ss were found to have shifted their opinions after their groups

had discussed the issue, 16 toward the average position taken by confederate group members. The number of Ss who shifted was approximately the same in all experimental conditions. S's response to the Opinion Poll was employed as the covariate index because it was considered a more precise measure of S's personal opinion prior to the experimental manipulations.

Following the covariance analyses using both covariates the percentage of variance accounted for by any significant effect was estimated.<sup>3</sup> Covariance analyses using each covariate separately and analyses of variance were subsequently performed. The estimated percentage of variance accounted for by any effect found significant in an initial covariance analysis was calculated from the results of these subsequent tests. This procedure afforded information regarding the strength of an effect without adjustments for the concomitant variables.

Test of Hypotheses. It was predicted that Ss in the ER, GL, and HCE conditions would exhibit greater yielding than Ss in the AR, S, and LCE conditions, respectively.

The analysis of covariance<sup>4</sup> on verbal yielding responses with Rate of participation and Personal opinion as covariates (see Table 1) revealed a significant main effect for Source of authority ( $F = 6.82$ ,  $df = 1/70$ ,  $p < .05$ ). The adjusted means reported in Table 2 show that, as predicted by Hypothesis 1,

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<sup>3</sup>The proportion of variance accounted for was estimated by computing the  $\hat{\Omega}^2$  statistic (see Hays, 1963, p. 407).

<sup>4</sup>All analyses reported were subjected to  $F_{\max}$  tests for homogeneity of variance and to tests for homogeneity of regression, where appropriate. The results indicated no significant departures from either homogeneity of variance or regression.

Table 1

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Verbal Yielding Responses  
with Rate of Participation and Personal Opinion as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	1.04	2.27
Source of authority (A)	1	3.11	6.82*
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.34	<1
L x A	1	.08	<1
L x C	1	.00	<1
A x C	1	.18	<1
L x A x C	1	.21	<1
Regression	2	4.13	9.04***
Error	70	.46	

\* $p < .05$ .

\*\*\* $p < .001$ .



Table 2

Adjusted Cell Means of Analysis of Covariance on Verbal  
Yielding Responses with Rate of Participation  
and Personal Opinion as Covariates

<u>Source of authority</u>	<u>Leader or Spokesman</u>	<u>Cooperative group expectations</u>		<u>Total</u>
		<u>Hi</u>	<u>Lo</u>	
Elected	Leader	3.88	3.55	3.63
	Spokesman	3.61	3.49	
Appointed	Leader	3.33	3.40	3.22
	Spokesman	3.14	3.00	
<u>Total</u>		<u>3.49</u>	<u>3.36</u>	

Note.--The total for the Leader condition was 3.54; the total for the Spokesman condition was 3.31.

Ss who were elected as representatives compromised their group positions to a greater extent than Ss who were appointed. This effect accounted for an estimated 6% of the variance. The estimated proportion of variance accounted for with only Rate of participation as a covariate (see Appendix G, Table 1) was 2%, with only Personal opinion as the covariate (see Appendix G, Table 2) was 7%, and with no covariate (see Appendix G, Table 3) was 3%. (The unadjusted means and standard deviations are reported in Appendix H.) The results indicated no support for either Hypothesis 2 or 3 concerning the compromising behavior of Ss who served as group leaders or spokesmen or those who received different cooperative expectations, respectively.

The covariance analysis on written yielding responses with Rate of participation and Personal opinion as covariates (see Table 3) also produced a significant Source of authority main effect ( $F = 5.41$ ,  $df = 1/70$ ,  $p < .05$ ). In support of Hypothesis 1, Ss elected as representatives yielded more than Ss appointed as representatives (see Table 4). The estimated proportion of variance accounted for by this effect was 5%. The variance estimate with Rate of participation as the only covariate (see Appendix G, Table 4) was 1%, with Personal opinion as the only covariate (see Appendix G, Table 5) was 6%, and with no covariate (see Appendix G, Table 6) was 2%. (The unadjusted means and standard deviations appear in Appendix I.) Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not supported by the results.

The significance tests on the verbal and written measures of yielding produced essentially the same results. Seventy-four

Table 3

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Written Yielding Responses  
with Rate of Participation and Personal Opinion as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.32	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	2.44	5.41*
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.64	1.42
L x A	1	.00	<1
L x C	1	.05	<1
A x C	1	.00	<1
L x A x C	1	.21	<1
Regression	2	4.00	8.86***
Error	70	.45	

\*p < .05.

\*\*\*p < .001.



Table 4

Adjusted Cell Means of Analysis of Covariance on Written  
Yielding Responses with Rate of Participation  
and Personal Opinion as Covariates

		<u>Cooperative group expectations</u>		
<u>Source of authority</u>	<u>Leader or Spokesman</u>	<u>Hi</u>	<u>Lo</u>	<u>Total</u>
Elected	Leader	3.78	3.55	3.61
	Spokesman	3.61	3.49	
Appointed	Leader	3.32	3.30	3.24
	Spokesman	3.34	3.00	
<u>          </u>	<u>          </u>	<u>          </u>	<u>          </u>	<u>          </u>
Total		3.51	3.34	

Note.--The total for the Leader condition was 3.49; the total for the Spokesman condition was 3.36.

of the 80 Ss gave identical responses on both measures. Of the six Ss whose written responses differed from those they gave verbally, three indicated a willingness to yield more and three indicated a willingness to yield less from their group positions. These Ss did not appear to be concentrated in any particular experimental condition.

#### Effectiveness of Experimental Manipulations

Leadership Status. The predictions of Hypotheses 1 and 2 rested upon assumptions that Ss in the ER and GL conditions would perceive themselves higher in status than would S in the AR and S conditions, respectively. These assumptions were tested in a  $2 \times 2 \times 2$  analysis of covariance on responses to Item 8 of the Postnegotiation Questionnaire with Rate of participation and Opinion discrepancy as covariates. Opinion discrepancy was calculated as the absolute difference between a S's personal opinion and the group average following the opinion poll. This index was considered to account for any association between a S's opinion and his perceived status more appropriately than the directional index of his personal opinion. The results (see Appendix G, Table 7) indicated a main effect only for Source of authority ( $F = 6.34$ ,  $df = 1/70$ ,  $p < .05$ ) which accounted for an estimated 6% of the variance. The ER condition adjusted mean (4.99) was higher than the AL condition adjusted mean (4.08), suggesting that the manipulation was effective in eliciting the expected differences in perceived status.

Group Commitment. It was postulated that Ss' perceptions of how committed their groups were to establish group positions

would be inversely related to their perceptions of the cooperative expectations of group members. Accordingly, Hypothesis 3 depended upon Ss in the HCE condition perceiving their groups as less committed than Ss in the LCE condition. Ss' perceptions were tested in a  $2 \times 2 \times 2$  analysis of covariance on responses to Item 4 of the Postnegotiation Questionnaire with Rate of participation and Opinion discrepancy as covariates. Opinion discrepancy was used as a covariate instead of Personal opinion due to the likelihood that any association of individual opinion with perceived group commitment is more accurately characterized by an index of discrepancy rather than directional difference in opinion. The Cooperative group expectations main effect (see Appendix G, Table 8) was significant ( $F = 20.06$ ,  $df = 1/70$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and accounted for an estimated 19% of the variance. The lower adjusted mean of the HCE condition (4.12) as compared to the LCE condition (5.56) showed that Ss given Cooperative Expectations Sheets marked at the low end of the scale rated their groups as significantly less committed.

#### Post-hoc Analyses and Descriptive Information

Several post-hoc analyses were performed and descriptive indices were calculated. The resulting information was used to provide some characterization of the experimental setting rather than to test any specific expectations.

Comments during Argument Formulation. E's assessments of the numbers of comments Ss made during the argument formulation period were analyzed to determine possible differences between GL and S condition Ss. E's judgments for 79 Ss correlated



highly ( $r = .80$ ) with those made from tape by the same graduate student who had estimated discussion period comments. (An independent estimate was not obtained for the S whose tape broke.) The results of a 1-way analysis of covariance with Rate of participation and Opinion discrepancy as covariates (see Appendix G, Table 9) revealed a significant effect ( $F = 24.51$ ,  $df = 1/76$ ,  $p < .001$ ) which accounted for an estimated 15% of the variance. The adjusted mean of the GL condition (27.69) was higher than that of the S condition (19.89), indicating that Ss assigned to lead group discussions made more comments than Ss who participated only as group members.

Voting Preference. The voting preferences of GL and S condition Ss who participated in the election process (ER condition) were analyzed by a chi-square analysis of two voting response categories. One category was preference for the confederate who served as group leader in the S condition; the other was preference for anyone other than this particular confederate, including oneself. The analysis of data presented in Appendix J produced a significant effect ( $\chi^2 = 6.14$ ,  $df = 1$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Inspection of the respective voting preference totals suggested that Ss were more likely to vote for a particular group member if he had previously functioned as group leader during the argument formulation period.

Postnegotiation Questionnaire Items. Questionnaire Item 5 asked Ss to indicate their personal commitment to the established group position prior to the negotiation session. The mean for all Ss was 5.21, indicating relatively high commitment.

Items 6 and 7 related to Ss' perceptions of the confederate negotiator. The respective means of 3.11 and 5.55 suggested that Ss were less than fully persuaded by the confederate's arguments but that they liked him personally. Mean ratings of 5.08 and 5.09 for Items 9 and 10, respectively, showed that Ss perceived their groups to have placed some confidence in their abilities to defend group positions yet felt under greater than average pressure that they might have to compromise their group opinions. The responses to Items 5 and 9 were submitted to separate 2 x 2 x 2 analyses of covariance with Rate of participation and Opinion discrepancy as covariates (see Appendix G, Tables 10 and 11, respectively) while the responses to Items 6, 7, and 10 were subjected to covariance analyses with Rate of participation and Personal opinion as covariates (see Appendix G, Tables 12, 13, and 14, respectively). No significant effect was found in any of the analyses.

Item 11 was an open-ended question asking Ss whether their behavior as representatives had been any different than it would have been if they had been representing only themselves. Forty of the 80 Ss answered "yes," commenting that they had taken into account the feelings of fellow group members in negotiating the issue. Twenty-three Ss answered "no" with the explanation that they would have behaved similarly if representing themselves since their own opinions did not essentially differ from those of their groups. Five Ss responded with "no" accompanied by definite comments that their groups had had no influence over their negotiation behavior. Responses of the remaining 12 Ss could not be clearly categorized with respect to perceived

group influence. No discernible pattern of answers appeared concentrated in any one experimental condition.

Ss were given the opportunity to comment on their perceptions of the experimental hypotheses in Item 12. No S indicated suspicion of the experimental deceptions. The guesses of 22 Ss as to the experiment's purpose were categorized as determining what compromise was fairest in deciding the kind of treatment to prescribe for juvenile delinquents, implying that some compromise on the issue was both expected and desirable. These responses seemed randomly distributed among the experimental conditions.

Commitment Ratings and Comments by the Confederate Representative. The ratings from Item 2 of the Confederate Representative's Feedback Sheet were analyzed in a  $2 \times 2 \times 2$  analysis of covariance with Rate of participation and Opinion discrepancy as covariates (see Appendix G, Table 15). As suggested by the lack of significant results, the confederate perceived no differences in commitment to group positions among the experimental conditions.

Comments from Item 3 of the Feedback Sheet indicated that the confederate representative did not feel Ss were suspicious of the true purpose of the study.



## CHAPTER IV

### DISCUSSION

#### Negotiation Behavior and the Representative's Leadership Status

The results provide support for the notion that the representative's perceived leadership status within his group is a determinant of his negotiation behavior. Confirming the prediction of Hypothesis 1, elected representatives indicated a willingness to yield from their established group positions to a greater extent than appointed representatives both publicly before the opposing negotiator and privately when asked for a final written decision. The compromising tendencies of elected representatives can be appropriately attributed to their perceptions of higher leadership status. Individuals elected as representatives rated their status significantly higher than did those who had been appointed. Furthermore, several individuals reported feelings of enhanced status following their election as group representatives in response to open-ended questionnaire items and debriefing inquiries.

The finding that the representative's source of authority in either election or appointment was a factor influencing bargaining behavior is consistent with Hollander's (1958) basic assertion that the degree to which a group member deviates from group norms is a function of his status within the group. In Hollander's terminology, the "idiosyncratic" yielding behavior

of elected representatives can be explained as a consequence of their perceptions of "group-awarded credits." Being elected probably evidenced to these representatives that they had earned sufficient credits through group participation to allow them discretion in negotiation group positions. In contrast, representatives who were appointed received no overt assurance from fellow group members that they had contributed positively to the group as their appointment was purely on a chance basis. This rationale is in accord with previously discussed implications from leadership studies concerned with group endorsement. It will be recalled that the results of these studies suggest that a person functioning in a leadership capacity is more willing to engage in norm-discrepant behavior the more he believes he has the endorsement of other group members.

The present finding is also in agreement with Hermann and Kogan's (1968) description of the relationship between leadership status and the risk-taking behavior of group representatives during negotiations. Hermann and Kogan contended from their findings of greater risk taking by upperclassmen as compared to underclassmen that the freedom to deviate from established group positions is a positive function of the representative's leadership status. While the experimental evidence for this inference is subject to previously mentioned criticism, the present results confirm the basic assertion of these investigators and extend its applicability to situations wherein perceptions of leadership status are emergent from within the reference group rather than based upon preestablished status hierarchies.

Thus, in line with previous research, it appears that the representative's source of authority can influence the degree to which he remains committed to his group in bargaining their interests. Furthermore, the effect of the representative's source of authority can be attributed to an accompanying perception of leadership status which determines the degree of his assurance that negative reference group sanctions will not be applied as a result of his negotiation behavior.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that whether the representative served as group leader or spokesman would affect his perception of leadership status and therefore his yielding behavior. The results failed to provide support for this hypothesis. Group leaders did not indicate a greater willingness to compromise their group positions than spokesmen either publicly during negotiations or privately in their written responses. The test on the effectiveness of the manipulation in inducing differential perceived leadership status likewise revealed no significant differences between leaders and spokesmen.

One possibility is that the experimental procedure did not afford an adequate test of the above hypothesis. The general contention has been made that the representative is more likely to exhibit idiosyncratic bargaining behavior the more he has functioned in other leadership capacities within his group. This presumes that perceptions of higher status derive from the performance of additional leadership responsibilities available to group members. Yet, some experimental observations suggest that the present method may not have incorporated an additional leadership function to be performed by the group



leaders which was regarded as very prestigious. Many individuals indicated during the debriefing that they had attached no particular importance to the role of guiding the group's formulation of arguments. Several individuals who had served as group leaders specifically mentioned they had received no feeling of enhanced status upon being assigned to the role. Other comments were to the effect that the group leader's task had been viewed as a somewhat menial duty necessary only for the purpose of recording developed arguments. Thus, it is possible that the manipulation was ineffective due to a failure to establish a suitably prestigious leadership function.

Yet, it was discovered that some differences did exist between leader and spokesman representatives. Group leaders made more comments while guiding the group's formulation of supportive arguments while spokesmen were more likely to vote for the confederate group member who had functioned as group leader. The possibility of an ineffective status manipulation is not necessarily inconsistent with these findings. The greater number of comments by group leaders can be ascribed to the fact that they invariably offered or were asked to read the arguments which had been formulated back to the group. Differences in the numbers of unique verbal contributions made during argument formulation may not have appeared if such comments alone had been counted in the assessment of participation rates. The voting preferences of spokesmen also may be explained as due to factors not affecting perceived leadership status. Postexperimental interviews revealed that subjects saw the need for the group representative to be the person who had fashioned the way

arguments were organized and who, in many cases, could read his own handwriting.

Nevertheless, it is also plausible that the expected differences between group leader and spokesman compromising tendencies and perceptions of leadership status did not obtain because of the mediating effects of nonrepresentational factors. The possible influences of moderating variables is subsequently discussed. In any case, it is suggested that a definite conclusion regarding the negotiation behavior of representatives performing group leader and spokesman functions will depend upon the results of future research. The concept of distributed versus focused leadership can still be considered fruitful in application to the study of representative behavior.

#### Negotiation Behavior and Cooperative Group Expectations

It has been argued that representatives are responsive to the cooperative expectations of group members in negotiating group positions. This contention was tested in the present experiment by operationalizing cooperative group expectations in terms of the group's expressed commitment to its position. However, no experimental support was obtained for the prediction of Hypothesis 3 that representatives would compromise their group positions to a greater extent under indications of relatively low group commitments. No effects were found in spite of results showing that representatives differed in their perceptions of how committed their groups had been to established positions.

The failure to find differential yielding as a function of cooperative group expectations is inconsistent with the results of previous investigations (see Nemeth, 1970, pp. 301-302) showing that individuals bargaining for themselves are susceptible to a cooperative instructional set. As previously discussed, these results have indicated that more compromising behavior can be elicited if the experimenter asks negotiators to cooperate with each other than if he gives them instructions to compete or to bargain only for their own interests. It was expected that similar effects would obtain when the negotiator's reference group was the source of differential cooperative instructions rather than the experimenter.

A closer examination of the experimental manipulation may provide some explanation for the lack of significant results. Representatives were informed of relatively low group commitment through the use of a bipolar scale. The number of alternatives on this scale was the same as the number of alternative positions on the issue and the marked alternative coincided with the position always taken by the group. Some of the representatives may have mistakenly interpreted the scale marking as the group's final position. Support for this possibility comes from confederates' comments that they were sometimes asked for clarification on exactly what the scale indicated. Representatives mistaking the scale marking as an index of group position might have similarly misinterpreted the questionnaire item.

It is also conceivable that group experience preceding the manipulation was the main determinant of perceived group



commitment. Several subjects revealed that the low commitment rating they had received seemed inconsistent with perceptions arising from previous interaction within the group that group members were quite highly committed. Subjects might have given questionnaire ratings to accord with information on the scale they had brought with them rather than with their general impressions. This possibility receives some support from the observation that many subjects referenced their group commitment scales in responding to the questionnaire.

An alternative rationale for considering that the manipulation was not particularly effective concerns the means by which the expectations variable was operationalized for experimental investigation. The representatives may not have associated the group's positional commitment with expectations for them to cooperate with the opposing negotiator. The likelihood that representatives failed to perceive this contingency is not great, however, since specific instructions were given as to the purpose of the commitment scale. Representatives were told the scale would provide them with information on how group members felt about compromising the group position during negotiations. Nevertheless, some individuals may not have understood these instructions.

The finding of significant differences on representative's ratings of how committed their groups had been makes it less likely, however, that cooperative group expectations were not appropriately communicated. Perhaps participants' inclinations to respond to cooperative expectations were mediated by other sources of influence. For instance, it may be that strong

personal commitments to the group position overrode any tendencies to base negotiation decisions upon group expectations. The results did indicate that subjects were generally quite highly committed to the group opinion. A basis for considering this possibility comes from the earlier explanation that the representative's compromising behavior must be seen as a reflection of his loyalty to personal beliefs as well as to those of fellow group members.

The following discussion treats other nonrepresentational factors which may have moderated the effects of the group expectations variable. It is suggested that a more definitive test for the cooperative group expectations component awaits research which can examine this aspect of group representation under various levels of extraneous sources of influence.

### The Experimental Environment

A general description of the experimental environment may contribute to a better understanding of the present results and permit some characterization of the nonexperimental situations to which they can be generalized.

Predicting compromising behavior on the basis of reference group expectations presumes that the representative desires to be loyal to his group. There is some evidence that subjects in the present study did negotiate out of feelings of group loyalty. Several representatives mentioned group obligations in bargaining their positions and many indicated they would have behaved differently if representing only themselves. Subjects generally reported high commitment to reference group



opinions prior to negotiations and felt their groups had some confidence in their abilities to defend these opinions under pressures to compromise. The participants' commitment to group positions can be attributed in part to their desire to avoid negative group sanctions since they fully expected they would have to report back to their groups to explain their negotiation behavior.

Nevertheless, the context of the experiment probably did not command extensive loyalty on the part of group representatives. The sessions were brief and subjects knew that their associations with other group members would not last beyond the experiment. Under these circumstances it is possible that they were not too concerned about receiving severe sanctions for any non-representational behavior. This situation may be contrasted with those described by Stagner (1956), for instance, wherein union negotiators were subject to severe reprisal from union members with whom they had established lasting and important trusts. In a similar atmosphere the strength of the effects found in the present study may have been much greater and the influence of factors for which predicted effects did not obtain may have been manifest. It would be profitable to examine the leadership status and cooperative expectations components under conditions more likely to be characterized by a strong interdependency between representatives and fellow group members.

Examining the experimental environment in terms of the influences operating outside the representative-group relationship may help explain why most representatives conceded initial group positions in spite of indicating they were highly committed



and that opposing arguments were not very persuasive. Some pressure to compromise may be attributable to representatives' perceptions that cooperating in reaching agreement was both expected and desirable. Research by Kelley, Shure, Deutsch, Faucheux, Lanzetta, Moscovici, Nuttin, Jr., Rabbie, and Thibaut (1970) was shown that cooperation in bargaining can be viewed to be "good" as well as "weak" by negotiating parties. Cooperative expectations may have been generated by certain demand characteristics of the experimental task. Instructions on the nature of the juvenile court process could have led representatives to believe that agreement between the social worker and prosecutor's office factions was expected. Another reason representatives may have compromised is that they liked the confederate negotiator and were sympathetic to his demands. This possibility is in line with research by Daniels and Berkowitz (1963) and McGrath (1966). In any case, there is some suggestion that nonrepresentational factors mediated the effects of predicted sources of influence upon representative behavior.

Although the presence of other factors may have restricted the effects of the experimental variables, the results must be viewed as encouraging. Unprecedented findings were obtained regardless of the possible influence of extraneous factors and despite the fact that representatives negotiated upon an issue with an extremely limited range of possible solutions. It is likely that the experimental effects would be more pronounced given other situational contingencies.

### Conclusions and Implications

The present research helps to clarify the issue concerning the effects of group loyalty upon negotiation behavior. The finding that elected representatives compromised their established group positions more than those who were appointed demonstrates the importance of isolating the components of representation responsible for differential commitment to constituency interests. One such component appears to be the leadership status accorded the representative. The implication is that bargaining differences between a group representative and an individual representing only himself are contingent upon factors which determine the representative's desire to remain loyal to his group.

The results are inconclusive regarding the effects of two other factors thought to influence yielding behavior. Predictions were that the cooperative expectations of group members and whether the representative served as group leader or spokesman would also affect the extent of representative loyalties during negotiation. It is suggested that the influence of these factors be explored in future investigations under different situational contingencies.



## APPENDIX A

### JOHNNY ROSELLO CASE

(The following case history has been extracted from one actually prepared by a social worker who investigated Johnny Rosello's background. Please read this case history carefully and try to gain an understanding of Johnny's situation from a social worker's viewpoint.)

Johnny Rosello is the son of immigrants who settled in a large Eastern industrial city. There are nine other Rosello children. Johnny is the second youngest child in the family. The Rosellos live in one of the worst slums in the city. It is known for its high rate of crime and juvenile delinquency. It is a neighborhood of factories, junk yards, poolrooms, cheap liquor joints, and broken homes.

Johnny's father has died, and four of the older Rosello children have married and moved away. What is left of the Rosello family is beset with a number of problems. The children are always getting into one difficulty after another, and Mrs. Rosello is continually going from school to police station to court, listening to complaints about them. Only Georgie, the oldest of the remaining children, assumes any responsibility toward the others. Yet, he often beats the rest of the children when Mrs. Rosello implores him to do something after they get out of hand.

Johnny's mother tries to pacify landlords by keeping her troublesome children out of the house and on the streets as much as possible. One after another of the Rosello boys has become known to the police. Five of Johnny's brothers, starting in childhood, have run up police records covering charges of disturbing the peace, breaking and entering, larceny, perjury, assault and battery, and malicious injury. Johnny, himself, spends his share of time at the police station, as the following interview indicates.

"I'm in the police station, too. Plenty! Saturdays, they have kids' day. We'll be in this long corridor. There'll be all little kids sitting down. They'll bring us in an' those jerks, the cops, they'll be sitting there an' this one cop, he's always insulting us. 'You little bastard,' he'll tell me, and he'll belt me. I'm just dirt to him."

Johnny is also a trial to his teachers. They complain that he is "nervous, sullen, obstinate, cruel, disobedient, disruptive." "Teachers can stand him for only one day at a



## APPENDIX A (cont.)

time," one has said. "He talks to himself. He fights. When in Miss Clark's room, he attempted to kick her. He isn't going to be promoted. He knows this and refuses to study." With every new failure Johnny is compelled to some new misbehavior. Once, at the beginning of a new semester, he told his teacher, "I wasn't promoted. O.K.! This year I'm going to make plenty of trouble." With every new punishment Johnny's conviction grows that his teachers, like everybody else, are "against him."

Johnny has been seeing his parole officer, Mr. O'Brien, for some time now. During the months of Mr. O'Brien's friendship with Johnny, his teachers have found that he has been making a tremendous effort to behave himself but that he is "like a kettle of boiling water with the lid about to blow off." Johnny managed to get through the last term at school without too much trouble and was promoted, but school has not been out long now and he is into trouble with the police again, this time for breaking into a house and stealing \$50 worth of jewelry.

Mr. O'Brien has visited him and reports that Johnny seems "unhappy, but stolid and apathetic, though once or twice, as we talked, he verged on tears." Johnny doesn't deny the theft. In fact, he even confesses to it. Once Mr. O'Brien asked him, "Even when I thought you were being a good boy, Johnny, were you stealing all the while?" Johnny's reply was, "Yes, sometimes. But lots of times I didn't steal because I thought of you and the things you told me."

## APPENDIX B

### PRESCRIBED TREATMENT SCALE

Please circle the number of the alternative which you feel represents the kind of treatment which should be prescribed for Johnny.

1. Love, kindness, and friendship are all that are necessary to make Johnny a better kid. If he can be placed in a more agreeable environment--a warm, friendly foster home for example--his troubles will clear up.
2. Johnny should be put into surroundings where most emphasis will be placed on providing him with warmth and affection but where he will be punished if he really gets out of hand.
3. Johnny should be sent into an environment where providing him with warmth and affection will be emphasized slightly more than punishing him but where discipline and punishment will be frequent if his behavior warrants it.
4. Johnny needs an equal measure of both love and discipline. Thus, he should be placed in an atmosphere where he will be disciplined and punished if he does wrong but rewarded and given affection if he behaves himself, and where equal emphasis will be placed on both love and discipline.
5. Though they should not be too strong and frequent, punishment and discipline should be more emphasized than kindness and affection. Thus, Johnny should be placed in an atmosphere where he will be seriously disciplined but which will allow opportunities for warmth and kindness to be shown him.
6. Johnny should be sent into surroundings where most emphasis will be placed on disciplining and punishing him, but there should be the possibility for praise and kindness if he really behaves himself.
7. There's very little you can do with a kid like this but put him in a very severe disciplinary environment. Only by punishing him strongly can we change his behavior.

APPENDIX C  
OPINION POLL

Please circle the number below which represents the alternative on the Preferred Treatment Scale you personally feel is most appropriate for Johnny.

1    2    3    4    5    6    7



## APPENDIX D

### COOPERATIVE EXPECTATIONS SHEET

How committed are you to the position the group has taken? (Mark an "X" in the most appropriate interval of the rating scale.)

Not committed   \_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_   Committed

APPENDIX E

CONFEDERATE REPRESENTATIVE'S FEEDBACK SHEET

Subject's Name \_\_\_\_\_

1. What position did the subject say he was willing to take in order to reach an agreement?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

2. How committed was the subject to his group's position?

Committed \_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_ Not committed

3. Comments:

APPENDIX F

POSTNEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Representative's Name \_\_\_\_\_

1. What was your group's initial position? (Circle the number which represents the appropriate alternative on the Preferred Treatment Scale.)

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

2. What was the other group's initial position?

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

3. If these positions were not the same, indicate the position you would have been willing to accept in order to achieve a compromise agreement.

1   2   3   4   5   6   7

4. How strongly would you say the rest of your group feels about your group's original position? (Mark an "X" in the most appropriate interval of the rating scale.)

Strongly \_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_ Don't care

5. How much were you personally committed to this position before talking with the other representative?

Not committed \_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_ Committed

6. Did you find the other representative's arguments persuasive?

Persuasive \_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_ Not persuasive

7. Do you like the other representative?

Dislike \_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_ Like

8. How much status do you feel you have as your group's representative?

Very much \_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_ None at all



## APPENDIX F (cont.)

9. Do you feel your group has placed confidence in your ability to defend its position?

No confidence \_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_ Much confidence

10. While acting as representative have you been concerned with the possibility that you might be under pressure to compromise your group's opinion?

Concerned \_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_:\_\_ Not concerned

11. Has your behavior as your group's representative been any different than it would have been if you had been representing only yourself? Briefly explain.

12. Can you guess the purposes of the experiment?

## APPENDIX G

### TABLES OF SUMMARIES OF COVARIANCE AND VARIANCE ANALYSES

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Table 1

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Verbal Yielding  
Responses with Rate of Participation as a Covariate

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.53	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	1.34	<2.39
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.21	<1
L x A	1	.23	<1
L x C	1	.14	<1
A x C	1	.32	<1
L x A x C	1	.06	<1
Regression	1	.40	<1
Error	71	.56	

Table 2

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Verbal Yielding  
Responses with Personal Opinion as a Covariate

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.90	1.97
Source of authority (A)	1	3.89	8.50**
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.32	<1
L x A	1	.06	<1
L x C	1	.01	<1
A x C	1	.30	<1
L x A x C	1	.18	<1
Regression	1	7.71	16.85***
Error	71	.46	

\*\* $p < .01$ .

\*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 3  
Summary of Analysis of Variance on Verbal Yielding Responses

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.45	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	1.80	3.22
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.20	<1
L x A	1	.20	<1
L x C	1	.20	<1
A x C	1	.45	<1
L x A x C	1	.05	<1
Error	72	.56	



Table 4

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Written Yielding  
Responses with Rate of Participation as a Covariate

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.08	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	.92	1.66
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.46	<1
L x A	1	.06	<1
L x C	1	.02	<1
A x C	1	.02	<1
L x A x C	1	.06	<1
Regression	1	.31	<1
Error	71	.55	

Table 5

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Written Yielding  
Responses with Personal Opinion as a Covariate

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.25	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	3.06	6.78*
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.62	1.39
L x A	1	.00	<1
L x C	1	.02	<1
A x C	1	.01	<1
L x A x C	1	.18	<1
Regression	1	7.56	16.76***
Error	71	.45	

\* $\underline{p} < .05.$

\*\*\* $\underline{p} < .001.$

Table 6

Summary of Analysis of Variance on Written Yielding Responses

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.05	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	1.25	2.27
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.45	<1
L x A	1	.05	<1
L x C	1	.05	<1
A x C	1	.05	<1
L x A x C	1	.05	<1
Error	72	.55	



Table 7

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Perceived Status with  
Rate of Participation and Opinion Discrepancy as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.07	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	15.17	6.34*
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.09	<1
L x A	1	.16	<1
L x C	1	6.15	2.57
A x C	1	.06	<1
L x A x C	1	.72	<1
Regression	2	4.74	1.98
Error	70	2.39	

\* $p < .05$ .

Table 8

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Perceived Group  
Commitment with Rate of Participation and  
Opinion Discrepancy as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.04	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	1.04	<1
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	41.52	20.06***
L x A	1	.01	<1
L x C	1	.00	<1
A x C	1	4.99	2.41
L x A x C	1	1.98	<1
Regression	2	7.62	3.68*
Error	70	2.07	

\*  $p < .05$ .

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 9

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Argument Formulation  
 Comments with Rate of Participation and Opinion  
 Discrepancy as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman	1	1197.93	24.51***
Regression	2	1433.42	29.33***
Error	76	48.88	

\*\*\*p < .001.



Table 10

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Expressed Personal  
Commitment with Rate of Participation and  
Opinion Discrepancy as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.05	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	1.78	<1
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	4.06	1.69
L x A	1	.17	<1
L x C	1	7.28	3.02
A x C	1	1.59	<1
L x A x C	1	.95	<1
Regression	2	32.22	13.37***
Error	70	2.40	

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 11

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Perceived Group  
Confidence with Rate of Participation and  
Opinion Discrepancy as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.21	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	4.80	3.84
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	2.60	2.08
L x A	1	1.78	1.42
L x C	1	1.39	1.11
A x C	1	.65	<1
L x A x C	1	.14	<1
Regression	2	6.65	5.32**
Error	70	1.25	

\*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 12

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Perceived Argument  
Persuasibility with Rate of Participation and  
Personal Opinion as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	3.96	1.62
Source of authority (A)	1	2.65	1.08
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	6.70	2.74
L x A	1	.64	<1
L x C	1	.67	<1
A x C	1	.90	<1
L x A x C	1	1.17	<1
Regression	2	9.43	3.85*
Error	70	2.45	

\* $p < .05$ .



Table 13

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Expressed Liking  
for Confederate with Rate of Participation  
and Personal Opinion as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.51	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	1.12	<1
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.37	<1
L x A	1	.27	<1
L x C	1	.77	<1
A x C	1	2.03	1.22
L x A x C	1	.01	<1
Regression	2	.89	<1
Error	70	1.66	

Table 14

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Expressed Pressure  
to Compromise with Rate of Participation  
and Personal Opinion as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	.32	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	.13	<1
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	.59	<1
L x A	1	1.16	<1
L x C	1	8.57	2.89
A x C	1	2.90	<1
L x A x C	1	7.55	2.54
Regression	2	10.90	3.68*
Error	70	2.97	

\* $p < .05$ .

Table 15

Summary of Analysis of Covariance on Confederate's  
Commitment Ratings with Rate of Participation  
and Opinion Discrepancy as Covariates

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Leader or Spokesman (L)	1	1.37	<1
Source of authority (A)	1	1.96	<1
Cooperative group expectations (C)	1	8.22	1.93
L x A	1	4.77	1.12
L x C	1	6.68	1.57
A x C	1	7.29	1.71
L x A x C	1	.63	<1
Regression	2	47.69	11.18***
Error	70	4.26	

\*\*\* $p < .001$ .



# APPENDIX H

## CELL MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON VERBAL YIELDING RESPONSES

<u>Source of authority</u>	<u>Leader or Spokesman</u>		<u>Cooperative group expectations</u>		<u>Totals</u>
			<u>Hi</u>	<u>Lo</u>	
Elected	Leader	<u>M</u>	3.80	3.40	3.58 .71
		<u>SD</u>	.63	.97	
	Spokesman	<u>M</u>	3.60	3.50	
		<u>SD</u>	.52	.71	
Appointed	Leader	<u>M</u>	3.40	3.40	3.28 .75
		<u>SD</u>	.70	.70	
	Spokesman	<u>M</u>	3.10	3.20	
		<u>SD</u>	.88	.79	
<hr/>			<hr/>		<hr/>
Totals			3.48 .72	3.38 .77	

Note.--The totals for the Leader condition were  $\bar{M} = 3.50$  and  $SD = .75$ ; the totals for the Spokesman condition were  $\bar{M} = 3.35$  and  $SD = .74$ .

# APPENDIX I

## CELL MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON WRITTEN YIELDING RESPONSES

<u>Source of authority</u>	<u>Leader or Spokesman</u>		<u>Cooperative group expectations</u>		<u>Totals</u>
			<u>Hi</u>	<u>Lo</u>	
Elected	Leader	<u>M</u>	3.70	3.40	3.55 .68
		<u>SD</u>	.68	.84	
	Spokesman	<u>M</u>	3.60	3.50	
		<u>SD</u>	.52	.71	
Appointed	Leader	<u>M</u>	3.40	3.30	3.30 .76
		<u>SD</u>	.70	.68	
	Spokesman	<u>M</u>	3.30	3.20	
		<u>SD</u>	.95	.79	
<hr/>			<hr/>		<hr/>
Totals			3.50 .72	3.35 .74	

Note.--The totals for the Leader condition were  $\bar{M} = 3.45$  and  $SD = .71$ ; the totals for the Spokesman condition were  $\bar{M} = 3.40$  and  $SD = .74$ .

# APPENDIX J

## CONTINGENCY TABLE OF VOTING PREFERENCE WITH COLLAPSED CATEGORIES FOR GROUP LEADER AND SPOKESMAN CONDITIONS

<u>Condition</u>	<u>Voting Preference</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Confederate Group Leader</u>	<u>Other</u>	
Group Leader	2	18	20
Spokesman	9	11	20
<u>Total</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>40</u>



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