

## ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: TOWARDS A TRANSANDEAN MAPUCHE  
POLITICS: RITUAL AND POWER IN CHILE  
AND ARGENTINA, 1792-1834

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*Towards a Transandean Mapuche Politics* examines how unconquered indigenous groups in the Southern Cone of South America impacted the transition from colony to nation (1792-1834), a moment when European and indigenous sovereignties were thrown in to question. It focuses on the intersection of indigenous politics and Latin America's Age of Revolution. This project intervenes in the growing debates over transnational history and borderlands studies to demonstrate how the transandean Mapuche-Spanish frontier was both a political and an epistemological space. Mapuche sovereignty resisted categorizations by empires and nations, impeded the political and economic projects articulated by Europeans and creoles, and compelled foreign actors to participate in Mapuche diplomatic rituals much longer than previously thought. It begins by looking at a late colonial treaty negotiation in 1793 to reconstruct diplomatic rituals developed by Mapuche leaders to defend their sovereignty. This project then extends these insights on both sides of the Andes mountain range until a military campaign led by

Argentine President Juan Manuel de Rosas against Mapuche and other indigenous groups inhabiting the Pampas in 1833-1834.

By looking at military, ecclesiastical, and Mapuche correspondence from Chile, Argentina, and Spain, it demonstrates that groups like the Mapuche, who inhabited the seemingly marginal frontiers of Spain's American empire, were in fact central actors in its transformation. Analyzing Mapuche diplomacy in southern Chile and western Argentina from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century demonstrates how indigenous relations in a border region provide different genealogies for our understanding of sovereignty in the Age of Revolution. Mapuche sovereignty ran parallel too, but intersected with the fraught end of empire and formation of nation states. These interactions along the old Spanish/Mapuche frontier, which stretched across the continent from the Pacific Coast of Chile to the mouth of the River Plate, were but the tip of the iceberg in the broader, transandean Mapuche political world that confounded the spatial imaginaries of empires and nations.

TOWARDS A TRANSANDEAN MAPUCHE POLITICS: RITUAL AND POWER IN  
CHILE AND ARGENTINA, 1792-1834

by

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Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
2017

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*For my partner, Katie Schultz.*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Choosing to spend years working in archives, researching, and writing a dissertation can be a lonely journey. Thankfully, these tasks have been infused by the camaraderie and collaboration of many people. I have benefited greatly from an incredible group of family, friends, mentors, and collaborators over my years here.

Conducting a transnational study of indigenous politics was possible thanks to the generous support of many institutions. Travel grants from the University of Maryland Latin American Studies Center and the James R. Scobie award from the Conference on Latin American History allowed me to take several preliminary research trips to Santiago. A grant from the Graduate School supported the writing and defense of my dissertation prospectus. After achieving candidacy, research fellowships from the Social Science Research Council and the Fulbright International Institute of Education supported fourteen months of fieldwork in Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and Santiago. Finally, the Mellon/American Council of Learned Societies provided me with a dissertation completion fellowship that made possible the final year of writing.

Having finished my degree alongside many students in Maryland's History and Library Sciences M.A. program, I would be remiss to not thank the staff and archivists of the many libraries and archives who helped me to find the documents that made up this dissertation. In Seville, the Archivo General de Indias staff helped me wade through the Spanish Empire's administrative structure and always took the time to help a clueless researcher properly tie his legajo. The revolving groups of summer researchers with

whom I shared many café con leche at 11am created a wonderful and supportive environment to discuss research finds and challenges.

In Mendoza, the staff of the Archivo Histórico de la Provincia helped me uncover the intimate relations between Spanish and creole officers on both sides of the Andes with the Pehuenche in the 1790s and 1810s. I would especially like to thank historian Margarita Gascón for warmly welcoming me into the interdisciplinary research community at the CONICET, and for inviting me to participate in the 2014 Seminario Interdisciplinario sobre Sociedades del Pasado. The SISPA participants provided insightful feedback for research findings at an early stage of the dissertation.

Buenos Aires was the first stop in my 2013-2014 field research, and my time spent in the Archivo General de la Nación and the archive of the Museo Bartolomé Mitre made an indelible impact on the transandean and chronological scope of my research. At the Museo Mitre I especially appreciated the support of María Ximena Iglesias and very much enjoyed our frequent banter about the best shows streaming on Netflix. While living alone in the Micro Centro for two months, Leo Clarici, Fernanda Denisa Polanco, and Ryan Edwards invited me into their social circles and introduced me to parts of the city beyond my daily strolls. I thank each of them for their friendship and companionship.

Though the majority of my research in Chile took place in Santiago, I was able to meet several excellent scholars in Temuco. José Manuel Zavala invited me to share my research with students and faculty at the UC Temuco and made an extra effort to make Katie and I feel at home on our short visit. I also thank Temuco-based scholars Yéssica González and María Eugenia Merino, whom I met in Santiago and Washington, DC respectively, for our conversations on race, gender, captive taking, and Mapudungun.

The majority of my research took place at the Archivo Nacional on Miraflores. The staff and archivists answered innumerable questions, corrected many poorly filled out request forms, and often approved requests to view original documents when the microfiche quality left something to be desired. I thank them for the patience and expertise. Though I spent less time at the Biblioteca Nacional around the corner, the Jefa of the Salón de Investigadores, Liliana Montesinos Rosas, extended her kindness and support to me during my preliminary research in 2012 and generously offered to serve as an institutional sponsor for my Fulbright fellowship. I would also be remiss if I didn't give a shout out to the less-than-3-luca lunch cafes on Miraflores, whose warm bowls of *cazuela* and excellent *pebre* got me through many cold winter trips to the archive. I would also like to give a special thank you to Fr. Rigoberto Iturriaga (QDeP), Muriel Torres, and Hermano Alexis Escárate of the Archivo del Orden Franciscano de Chile. It took many years of phone tag and knocking on the back door of the Iglesia San Francisco to meet Fr. Iturriaga, but his wisdom and the collection of the Franciscans in Chile was worth the wait. He will be missed. I fondly remember our weekly coffee breaks upstairs with Muriel, Alexis, and the other guests and researchers where we would discuss history, Transantiago, and our respective findings.

Santiago has been my second home since I first traveled there in February 2007. Since I was a young college student, Gabriela Cánovas and her son Vicente have shared their home and friendship with me. I cherish our visits whenever I can make it back to Ñuñoa. My Santiago family expanded after I began returning for research and I now count Punto as a dear friend and brother who is always around for catching up *y un carrete*. I thank my comrades from Fulbright Chile, Caro, Richard, Kristina, and Jenny,

my fellow graduate students I met in Santiago and Buenos Aires, Carson Morris, Kyle Harvey, Josh Savala, my fellow Southern Cone buddies, Geraldine Davies and Jeff Erbig, and my classmates and instructors from *Mapudungun básico: chaltumay pu peñi ka pu lamgnen*. I especially want to recognize Claudio Barrientos for his warmth, generosity, and support as a friend and mentor with whom countless times I navigated the promises and pitfalls of research over *helado* or *cafecito*.

Over the years, I've also accumulated untold debts to a wonderful collection of historians from across the U.S. In particular I would like to thank Eileen Findlay, Ray Craib, and Pilar Herr for their interest in and support for my project. I want to give warm thanks to my undergraduate mentors at the University of Wisconsin: Florencia Mallon, Steve Stern, and Stephen Kantrowitz. Florencia took me under her wing when I was a sophomore and guided me along the path that led to my interest in Mapuche history and undertaking this Ph.D. Florencia and Steve's rigorous standards for clarity of argument and encouragement for taking on big research questions stick with me to this day. I am forever grateful for the time they spent supporting me those early years, and for our continued reunions in Chile and elsewhere.

Many people at the University of Maryland helped me realize this project in ways that go well beyond scholarly training. I want to thank Jodi Hall and Lisa Klein for being friends who were willing to help me through the challenges of university bureaucracy while always keeping their doors open to a wary graduate student. Julie Greene, Laurie Frederick, Robyn Muncy, David Freund, David Sicilia, Marsha Rozenblit, and Pat Heron, have been teachers, mentors, and friendly faces around the department since I arrived.

The history and Latin American studies graduate students, current and past, have created the community which made all of this work possible. To my fellow Latin Americanists in the history department, Brandi Townsend, Shane Dillingham, Reid Gustafson, Sarah Walsh, Adolfo Polo y la Borda, Sabrina González, Shawn Moura, Enrique Rivera, Eben Levey, you've been my family. I also want to thank Steph Hinnershitz, Rob Bland, Jonathan Brower, Rob Hutchins, and my compas in the new Latin American Studies Center Graduate Writing Group, Víctor Hernández Sang, Mónica Ocasio, Britta Anderson, and Cara Snyder. They have tirelessly and selflessly shared drinks, hardships, and successes, read and commented on innumerable drafts, and been the best friends and colleagues a young academic could ask for.

Most importantly, I would like to acknowledge the members of my dissertation committee, Karin Roseblatt, David Sartorius, Daryle Williams, Alejandro Cañeque, Sarah Chambers, and Patricio Korzeniewicz. I thank Sarah, Patricio, and Alejandro for going out of their way to read this dissertation and provide insightful feedback and suggestions. I really appreciate their interest and willingness to take part in the project. Karin, David, and Daryle have given me guidance since I arrived here many years ago and shaped me into the historian I am today. They've helped me gain confidence to push against the bounds of rigid disciplinarity and I thank them immensely. And especially to Karin, who has given me untold hours of support, through thick and thin. She has centered me and encouraged me to always push my research and questions further, even if I feel like I'm alone in the wilderness.

Finally, I would like to thank the friends and family who helped get me to this point. Paul Heideman, Matt Tucker, Claire Allen, Josh Hartman, and Louis Preonas have

been with me through much of the long haul from Rhinelander, through Madison, and finally to College Park. That they still take my calls at any hour of the workday baffles me, but I love them for it.

To my parents, Debra and Craig, and my brother, Alex, I wouldn't be the person or scholar I am without your love, encouragement, excellent copy-editing, tough talk, and sympathetic ears. To Jeanette, Marge, Irv, and Bob, you were here from the beginning, but fell just short of the finish line. I'll always cherish that you never followed through on your modest concerns over the viability of my career choices. And finally, to Katie. You've been my companion, partner, voice of reason, and my best friend. You've followed me on all the twists and turns of this journey with strength, patience, and a sense of humor. This labor, I dedicate to you. It wouldn't be half as coherent or fulfilling without you. I can't wait to see where this wild ride takes us next.

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## Introduction

*Toward a Transandean Mapuche Politics* explores how unconquered indigenous groups in the Southern Cone of South America impacted the transition from colony to nation, a moment when European and indigenous sovereignties were thrown in to question. It focuses on the actions of leaders from the Mapuche people, an indigenous group whose customs and language encompassed many of the inhabitants of the southern third of modern Chile and the Pampas of Argentina, to examine the intersection of indigenous politics and Latin America's Age of Revolution.<sup>1</sup> It traces these leaders' actions on both sides of the Andes from a late colonial treaty negotiation in 1793 until a military campaign led by Argentine President Juan Manuel de Rosas against Mapuche and other indigenous groups of the Pampas in 1833-1834 to show the vibrant Mapuche diplomacy utilized by leaders to gain recognition of their sovereignty from the Spanish which they subsequently imposed on national leaders after independence. I argue that groups like the Mapuche, who inhabited the seemingly marginal frontiers of Spain's American empire, made borderlands central to the transformation from colonies to nations well into the nineteenth century.<sup>2</sup> This dissertation analyzes military,

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<sup>1</sup> I use the term "Mapuche" (literally "People of the Land" in Mapudungun) to refer broadly to the indigenous peoples sharing variants of the Mapudungun language and customs and historically inhabited the Araucanía and Valdivia Province in Chile, the modern Argentine provinces of Mendoza and Neuquén. However, I also use Mapuche to refer specifically to the majority of the indigenous inhabitants of the Araucanía, from which I separate out the "Pehuenche" ("people of the piñon") who inhabited western Argentina and the eastern Andean slopes of Chile, and the "Huilliche" ("people of the south") who inhabited the Valdivia and Chiloé regions south of the Araucanía and Cuyo.

<sup>2</sup> Volume II of the *Handbook of South American Indians* (1946), and more recently Volume 3 Part 2 of the *Cambridge History of Native Peoples of the Americas* (1999) frame the groups of the Araucanía in Chile, the southern Andes, and the Argentine Pampas in geographic terms which tend to imply peripherality to centers of colonial power: the southern Andes and the southern margins of Spanish rule respectively. Kristine L. Jones, "Warfare, Reorganization, and Readaptation at the Margins of Spanish Rule: The Southern Margin (1573-1882)." David Webber's survey of Spain's relationships with unconquered indigenous groups in the eighteenth century, *Bárbaros*, trends in this direction as well. On the Pehuenche, see also Pilar María Herr, "The Nation State According to Whom?"

ecclesiastical, and personal correspondence written and dictated by Spanish, Mapuche, Argentine, and Chilean leaders to uncover the broad political culture of Mapuche diplomacy and the inner workings of Mapuche sovereignty, which included ritual meetings known as *parlamentos*, letter writing, and alliance making. Mapuche leaders used these diplomatic practices to defend their sovereignty from the Spanish for centuries, and rapidly adapted them to the changing political terrain shaped by Chile and Argentina's independence from Spain.<sup>3</sup>

Mapuche leaders maintained their sovereignty for nearly three centuries from the Spanish, Chileans, and Argentinians not through geographic isolation or political autonomy, but through active engagement along the frontiers of their transandean world. Internal rivalries and alliances between Mapuche leaders taking place in the vast interior of the Southern Cone shaped intercultural frontier encounters with Europeans and creoles. These leaders confronted the wars of independence, which lasted from 1810-1832 in Chile and Argentina and spelled the demise of the Spanish rule, with the broad diplomatic strategies they had developed in the sixteenth century, and utilized more so in the late eighteenth. Mapuche leaders met, communicated, and debated with each other and with the Spanish colonial regime to demarcate their political jurisdictions and resolve grievances. Treaty negotiation rituals, *parlamentos* in Spanish or *Koyang* in the Mapuche language, were the most visible aspect of this intercultural diplomacy. More quotidian, though no less important, strategies included networks of bilingual indigenous and

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<sup>3</sup> I use the term “intercultural” to push against the idea that interactions between indigenous groups, empires, and nations resulted solely in the steady erosion of the former. Mapuche groups not only borrowed from and creatively interpreted European rituals, goods, and diplomacy; they infused the practices of the Spanish, and their Chilean and Argentine descendants, with their own rituals and intentions. The Spanish also employed highly ritualized diplomatic practices, and educative displays of political authority. See Alejandro Cañeque, *The King's Living Image* and Abelardo Levaggi, *Diplomacia hispano-indígena*.

Spanish messengers and go-betweens, smaller meetings or *juntas*, livestock raiding, captive taking and exchange, and trade fairs. These practices were crucial for forging military alliances and maintaining networks of communication. They also converted the building of Catholic missions in indigenous lands, a central goal of the Spanish empire, into a joint and negotiated venture. Priests needed permission from Mapuche caciques, and turned to interethnic diplomatic channels to secure consent.

Violence was also a part of Mapuche diplomacy. Mapuche men raided indigenous families and Spanish settlements on both sides of the Andes, took captives, and fought internal and external wars. Despite the decades of warfare sparked by the wars of independence and of early state formation, Mapuche leaders refused to abandon these diplomatic strategies and instead forced patriot leaders and Chilean and Argentine state makers to participate in them. The capacity of Mapuche leaders to adapt diplomatic strategies to rapidly changing political contexts as they navigated the end of Spanish rule and imposed them on the new nation states changes our understanding of sovereignty in the Age of Revolution.<sup>4</sup> Mapuche sovereignty ran parallel too, but intersected with the fraught end of empire and formation of nation states. These interactions along the old Spanish/Mapuche frontier, which stretched across the continent from the Pacific Coast of Chile to the mouth of the River Plate, were but the tip of the iceberg in the broader, transandean Mapuche political world that confounded the spatial imaginaries of empire and nation.

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<sup>4</sup> For exemplary works on indigenous and popular politics in Latin America during this period, see Peter Guardino, *The Time of Liberty*, Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation*, Marixa Lasso, "Race War and Nation," James Sanders, *Contentious Republicans*, Nancy Appelbaum, *Muddied Waters*, Sarah Chambers, *From Subjects to Citizens*, Greg Grandin, *The Blood of Guatemala*, and Laurent Dubois, *Avengers of the New World*. For the outlier cases of Brazil and Cuba, where colonial rule persisted into the late nineteenth century, see David Sartorius, *Ever Faithful*, Ada Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba*, Emília Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire*, Camillia Cowling, *Conceiving Freedom*, and Kirsten Schultz, *Tropical Versailles*.

Mapuche histories add to studies of imperial and national frontier relations and indigenous politics in colonial and postcolonial Latin America by showing how successful resistance to and frequent interaction with a colonial system created the context whereby the Mapuche defined and defended their sovereignty. Refusing to be subsumed by the *república de indios* and settled in *pueblos de indios* like indigenous communities in Peru and New Spain did not mean Mapuche leaders ignored the Spanish.<sup>5</sup> The Mapuche did not maintain their sovereignty simply due to the “the long arms and weak fingers of [the Spanish] empire-state,” by eluding outsiders, by playing competing empires off of one another, or by forming a formidable indigenous empire.<sup>6</sup> I show how Mapuche leaders adapted the hallmark institutions of Spanish colonialism to their own transandean political world to defend their sovereignty along an imperial and international frontier.

While newly independent Chile and Argentina began to covet the interior of the transandean Mapuche world beginning in the 1810s, Mapuche leaders refused to relinquish their political independence or their lands. This refusal once again made indigenous-colonial frontier spaces a critical political and epistemological locus in which Mapuche leaders sought respect for their transandean sovereignty based on extended family settlements (*lofs*) and multi-*lof* confederations (*butalmapus*). They imposed their diplomatic negotiation practices on creole leaders as Chile and Argentina sought to

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<sup>5</sup> I intentionally refer to multiple Mapuche histories in acknowledgement of the multiplicity of experiences of Mapuche leaders and families, and in response to Mapuche objections to José Bengoa’s singular “historia del pueblo mapuche.”

<sup>6</sup> Frederick Cooper, “States, Empires, and Political Imagination,” in *Colonialism in Question*, 197, James Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed*, Pekka Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*, Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*.

bifurcate the Andes as a new international border, incorporate the Mapuche as citizens, and divide their lands for colonization and economic development.<sup>7</sup>

In the midst of these changes, some creoles urged military leaders to understand indigenous politics before resorting to direct intervention. In the 1860s Santiago Avendaño, a former captive of the Ranquel indigenous people of the Argentine Pampas, wrote to Argentine General Wenceslao Paunero. Avendaño tried to discourage him from attempting a military campaign against the unconquered *indios* of the Pampas.<sup>8</sup> At roughly the same time, to the west of the Andes, several Mapuche indigenous leaders tried to shape their relationship with the Chilean republic by allying themselves with two federalist uprisings against the Conservative central government in 1851 and 1859.<sup>9</sup> Avendaño wrote to Paunero not only as a former captive but as Argentina's General Interpreter with the frontier indigenous peoples. In his letter, Avendaño beseeched the General to understand that even though the indigenous groups of southern Chile and Argentina had long-term rivalries with one another, they were capable of rallying around a "common cause."

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<sup>7</sup> On radical assertions of indigenous sovereignty that challenged European and creole understandings in the eighteenth century, see Sinclair Thomson, "Sovereignty disavowed: the Tupac Amaru revolution in the Atlantic World," *Atlantic Studies* 13, no. 3 (2016): 407-431. Studies of Native Americans and indigenous peoples in the "classic" North American borderlands of northern New Spain, which became the U.S. and Mexico, has generated the largest scholarly interest in this question in the US academy. For examples see Juliana Barr, *Peace Came in the Form of a Woman*, Brian DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*, Karl Jacoby, *Shadows at Dawn*, Pekka Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*. On Mapuche frontier experiences in the aftermath their conquest by Chile in 1883, see Mallon, *Courage Tastes of Blood*, Álvaro Bello, *Nampülkafe*, and Thomas Miller Klubock, *La Frontera*. For Argentina, see for example Silvia Ratto, "La lucha por el poder en una agrupación indígena" and Daniel Villar and Juan Francisco Jimenez: "La tempestad de la guerra."

<sup>8</sup> *Memoria del ex cautivo Santiago Avendaño (1834-1874)*, edited by Father Meinrado Hux, Buenos Aires: El Elefante Blanco, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> On the elite class divisions driving the Chilean federalist uprisings of 1851 and 1859, see Maurice Zeitlin, *The Civil Wars in Chile*. The only monograph length study, which dedicates significant space to Mapuche participation on the side of the government and the federalists, is Arturo Leiva, *El primer avance*, but José Bengoa's *Historia del pueblo mapuche* and Jorge Pinto's *De la inclusión a la exclusión*, mention these events. On popular republicanism in mid-nineteenth century Chile, see James A. Wood, *The Society of Equality*.

What would Chile say, Avendaño argued, if Spain threatened Peru [Even though Peru and Chile are enemies]? They would say that the inferred offense to [Peru] threatened them as well since Peru is a neighbor and brother of the same origin with the same language, and many related interests between the two... [A]nd what if they took Chile after Peru? ... The Argentine Republic, the Eastern State [Uruguay] and Paraguay? ... Well the *indios* know this as well as we do, they know that once a tribe is gotten rid of, defeated, [and] annihilated, evil keeps moving forward until it gets rid of, defeats, and annihilates everyone.<sup>10</sup>

Avendaño employed the powerful metaphor of the nation state, and its neighboring band of warring brothers, to make the internal politics of unconquered indigenous groups legible to outsiders. In other words, one articulation of sovereignty, the international relations of nation states, stood in for another, indigenous sovereignty, a political project that actively challenged the former. Nearly half a century after both Chile and Argentina won independence from Spain, Mapuche and other indigenous inhabitants profoundly impacted the direction of state formation and national politics from seemingly marginal frontier spaces far from the corridors of power.

As this dissertation shows, Avendaño's metaphor was only partially accurate. Mapuche politics *were* anything but homogenous. Rivalries between indigenous leaders and confederations mattered, much like the frictions between neighboring nations that characterized nineteenth century Latin America. From the mid-eighteenth through the nineteenth century many Mapuche, Huilliche, and Pehuenche leaders at times found common ground in their engagement with Spain, Chile, and Argentina, and at other times they ferociously battled over access to resources and for external military support. However, Mapuche sovereignties were not as easily reducible to the nation state as

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<sup>10</sup> All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. Santiago Avendaño to General Wenceslao Paunero, "12 paginas relativas a la paz que se debe firmar con el cacique Catriel y la ayuda del gno. a las tribus. que el dto. topográfico fije los lugares para los fortines y en base a eso la exploración de terrenos un plan coherente para la terminación de la guerra con el indio," 30 Sept. 1864, Museo Bartolomé Mitre, Fondo Wenceslao Paunero, 7-0-3982, p. 8.

Avendaño would have hoped. In fact, this equivalency—that of centralized authority, common subjects inhabiting a common geographic space, and clearly defined internal boundaries—misunderstood the flexibility of internal indigenous politics. While the nation served as a powerful analog for understanding indigenous political strategies in the nineteenth century (and it continues to animate many Mapuche mobilizations for autonomy from Chile and Argentina today),<sup>11</sup> the case of the Mapuche on both sides of the Andes creates the possibility for developing an indigenous genealogy and framework for understanding sovereignty and diplomacy in the Age of Revolution (1789-1848).<sup>12</sup>

Mapuche sovereignty involved the working out of internal rivalries and collaborations that could be related to raiding, captive taking, justice, intermarriage, vengeance, or spiritual beliefs. This interethnic diplomacy involved ceremonial rituals, networks of go-betweens and emissaries, and gift giving practices that were later extended to interactions with the Spanish and Chileans. The internal Mapuche rivalries dovetailed with the partisan garb of external politics—loyalty to the Spanish King, support for pro-independence forces, citizens, or federalists—but they were not confined to them. But empires, from the Inka to the Spanish, or nations could not undo the boundaries of this world until the 1880s. Continued Mapuche reliance on the calculus of successful interethnic diplomacy from the eighteenth century defined the resiliency of

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<sup>11</sup> Sarah Warren, “A Nation Divided,” Pablo Marimán, Sergio Caniuqueo et. al. *¡...Escucha, winka...!*, José A. Marimán, *Autodeterminación*, and Luis E. Cárcamo-Huechante, ed., *Ta ñ fijke xipa rakizuameluwün*. The US and Canadian Governments’ fraught legal recognition of Native American and First Nations sovereignty based in treaty rights differentiates America cases from that of the Mapuche in Chile, who received some titles to communal land without state recognition of treaties with the Spanish. This has produced a rich critical indigenous studies literature on sovereignty in the North American context. For example, see K. Lomawaima and David E. Wilkins, *Uneven Ground*, Thomas Biolsi, “Imagined Geographies,” Paul Nadasday, “Boundaries Among Kin,” and Aileen Moreton-Robinson, ed., *Critical Indigenous Studies*.

<sup>12</sup> This periodization comes from Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, where he foregrounds a North Atlantic epicenter driven by the twin revolutions of the French and the Industrial.



Mapuche diplomacy. It limited the actions and aspirations of Spanish reformers and confounded patriot leaders who often misunderstood and became impatient with Mapuche hesitance to accept offers of citizenship and inclusion into the new body politic.

The case of the Mapuche shows that frontiers and borderlands were more than areas of imperial and nation state expansion, or bi-cultural-détente, but were crucial to nation states generally, and Argentina and Chile specifically. As the Comanche exerted influence over nation building in North America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries between the Spanish and the national governments of the United States and Mexico, so too did the Mapuche shape the course of empire and nation in South America.<sup>13</sup> But the Mapuche intervened in these processes for centuries from 1540 until 1883. The Mapuche leaders and confederations that made peace with the Spanish in return for protection, aid, and recognition, or those who grew powerful by raiding European frontier settlements did not dissolve themselves. They actively involved Spanish, Chilean, and Argentine leaders in their internal conflicts before, during, and following independence.

If, as Jeremy Adelman says, the challenge of victorious creole “lawmakers was to reterritorialize sovereignty in previously colonial spaces to be filled with nations in the making,” we must reckon with the fact these were also indigenous spaces with their own methods and articulations of diplomacy and sovereignty.<sup>14</sup> As Chapter One shows, Spanish colonial spaces conformed to the limits of a previous project of empire: that of the Inka, which was also detained by successful Mapuche resistance. The indigenous groups neighboring Chile and Argentina checked the expansion of nation states and the

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<sup>13</sup> Hämäläinen, *Comanche Empire*.

<sup>14</sup> Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic*, 345.

early era of incipient capitalism through political strategies and historical memories of previous struggles drawn from the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries.<sup>15</sup> The expressions of transandean Mapuche politics studied here offer an alternative modality of place and region whereby the genealogy of indigenous political imaginaries rooted in colonial-era interethnic negotiations bewildered the articulation of the hegemonic postcolonial configuration of space and power—the nation state.

### **Sources, Methods, and Theory**

If archives represent a “foggy mirror” through which historians attempt to reconstruct the motivations, actions, and beliefs of people, the task becomes even murkier when studying groups and individuals subordinated by or excluded from the power structure, which created the archives in the first place.<sup>16</sup> As many post- and anti-colonial scholars have shown, the collection, transmission, and organization of data into archives signifies an act of epistemological and ontological violence to subaltern groups—slaves, indigenous groups, colonized peoples.<sup>17</sup> Yet, the archives of empires, conquering and occupying armies, and nations often represent a crucial means for historians, activists, and descendants of marginalized peoples to access that history for study and for projects of oppositional claims making. Throughout this dissertation, I remain attentive to what colonial and postcolonial archives silence, fragment, and dismember. But I also emphasize what is amplified, what can be pieced together, and what sits awkwardly

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<sup>15</sup> On the role of indigenous leaders as go-betweens, power brokers, and co-creators of colonial culture in the Americas, see Yanna Yannakakis, *The Art of Being In-Between* and Alida C. Metcalf, *Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil*.

<sup>16</sup> Florencia E. Mallon, “The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies,” 1506.

<sup>17</sup> On violence, power, and colonial archives see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*, Marisa J. Fuentes, *Dispossessed Lives: Enslaved Women, Violence, and the Archive* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), Joanne Rappaport and Thomas B. Cummins, *Beyond the Lettered City*, Gabriela Ramos and Yanna Yannakakis, eds., *Indigenous Intellectuals*, Antionette Burton, ed., *Archive Stories*, and Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain*.

alongside documents confidently attesting to the intentions of Spanish, Chilean, and Argentine administrators. Moreover, I encountered how Mapuche experiences captured by different empires and nations became chronicled and organized across the Atlantic world. In response, I worked with different archives in three countries to counteract the centrifugal forces of outsiders on Mapuche history and knit together the truly transandean nature of Mapuche politics in this period. This project wrestles with this fraught nature of the archive, and the historian's relationship to it, while providing a subtle, ongoing immanent critique of the idea that archives neatly corresponded to the intentions of their creators.<sup>18</sup> As Florencia Mallon argues, if we navigate between "the postmodern literary interest in documents as 'constructed texts' and the historian's disciplinary interest in reading documents as 'windows,' however foggy and imperfect, on people's lives... we are left with the tension, an irresolvable and fertile tension, that can continue to inspire and energize our work."<sup>19</sup>

The dialectic of collaboration and competition that characterized intercultural diplomacy along the transandean Mapuche frontier generated frictions, which were captured by indigenous, creole, peninsular, and mestizo observers on both sides of the divide. This project primarily relies on the paper trail generated by these encounters: the military and ecclesiastical correspondence written by officers, administrators, and priests of the Spanish Captaincy General of Chile, the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, and the nations of Chile and Argentina. Physically alongside these sources in the colonial and

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<sup>18</sup> As the archive, and the nature of Spanish, Chilean, and Argentine correspondence has already fragmented the experiences and actions of the Mapuche, throughout this dissertation I have elected to focus primarily on letters which tend to deal exclusively with the Mapuche, or that dedicate entire paragraphs to them. More work is to be done chasing the single phrase or mention of Mapuche in my existing body of research, but this will be the task for the manuscript.

<sup>19</sup> Mallon, "The Promise and Dilemma," 1506.

national archives exist many letters written and dictated by Mapuche leaders to Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean allies and antagonists, especially during the nineteenth century. These Mapuche letters represent a stark example of how Mapuche leaders participated in a Spanish technology of power—the written word, the Spanish language, and the form letter—and imbued it with their own political imperatives. Despite the barriers of language, dictation, transcription, and meaning between Mapuche and non-Mapuche leaders, which mediated the production of these documents, these letters provide, and unparalleled example of how Mapuche leaders responded to and made demands upon creole and peninsular Spanish leaders.

I provide an innovative rereading of these sources by applying three theoretical and methodological approaches. First, I treat the Mapuche frontier as an epistemological space as well as a political and physical one. Following Mezzadra and Neilson, I acknowledge that borders between nations, and the colonial frontiers that preceded them in Chile and Argentina specifically, and across the world generally, “are essential to cognitive processes, because they allow both the establishment of taxonomies and conceptual hierarchies that structure the movement of thought.”<sup>20</sup> Though these taxonomies and hierarchies were created in specific frontier contexts on both sides of the Andes, Mapuche, Spanish, Chilean, and Argentine leaders living and serving great distances from this region recognized the power of these spaces and frequently traveled to them to participate in diplomatic rituals. Parlamento negotiations served as the most visible example of this. More than topographical, juridical, or political spaces, or given facts of conquest and expansion, this dissertation treats frontiers, borders, and boundaries as messy and contested spaces where “social worlds and subjectivities” are produced and

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<sup>20</sup> Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, *Border as Method*, 16.

defined.<sup>21</sup> This approach conceptually disempowers imperial or postcolonial knowledge at the expense of indigenous power. The imbrication of physical and political boundaries between Mapuche groups alongside those between the Mapuche and outsiders means that these divisions are more than simply objects of study.

Second, inspired by the transnational and spatial turns, I read these sources in conversation across the colonial/national chronological and geopolitical divide to challenge the “hermeneutic preeminence of nations.”<sup>22</sup> Joining Chilean, Mapuche, and Argentine ethnohistorians and contemporary Mapuche activists, I conceive of eighteenth and nineteenth century Mapuche polities as existing within the transandean Mapuche nation, Wallmapu.<sup>23</sup> The Mapuche families, confederations, and political jurisdictions in this space represent “units that spill over and seep through national borders, units both greater and smaller than the nation-state.”<sup>24</sup> Recent transnational studies have shown how the movement of sailors, slaves, and goods created alternate spatial imaginaries to the political geographies mapped and claimed by empires.<sup>25</sup> The Mapuche too wove alternative spatial *and* political imaginaries to the Spanish, Chileans, and Argentines, but they achieved this through more than untethered movement. While Mapuche groups moved back and forth across the Andes to raid, take captives, fight, trade, and escape, they also consistently defended their *lofs* and contested frontier spaces (like the Bío-Bío River) for centuries. Capturing a fuller picture of the Mapuche strategies that undergirded

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<sup>21</sup> Mezzadra and Neilson, *Border as Method*, 17. On frontiers as places of unpredicatability, see Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, *Friction*, and R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, “The Violent Edge of Empire.”

<sup>22</sup> Micol Seigel, “Beyond Compare: Historical Method after the Transnational Turn,” *Radical History Review* 91 (Winter 2005): 63.

<sup>23</sup> Marimán, Caniuqueo et. al. *j...Escucha, winka...!*, Marimán, *Autodeterminación.*, Álvaro Bello, *Nampülkafe*, Warren, “A Nation Divided.”

<sup>24</sup> Micol Seigel, “Beyond Compare: Historical Method after the Transnational Turn,” *Radical History Review* 91 (Winter 2005): 63.

<sup>25</sup> Ernesto Bassi, *An Aqueous Territory*, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra*.

this political world involved visiting archives in Spain, Chile, and Argentina to look for traces of Mapuche activities and research against the grain of isolated national archives that alone cannot adequately reflect the connections and continuities in Mapuche history on both sides of the Andes. Even Mapuche activities within the geographic boundaries of modern-day Chile cannot be fleshed out in Chile alone: crucial records related to the Huilliche in Valdivia and Chiloé and their 1792 uprising (Chapter 2) exist in the Captain General of Chile's correspondence in Seville, Spain, not in Santiago, Chile.

Additionally, a transnational approach involves skepticism toward colonial and postcolonial political jurisdictions and spatial categories, in this case Captaincy General, Province, Viceroyalty, and nation. I push against the arbitrary separation of Mapuche activities into these aforementioned categories by taking seriously the familial and regional categories described by Mapuche people and Spanish chroniclers of their activities, and showing how entangled and misread these categories were. Nevertheless, I support Lara Putnam's observation that "Just as governance is structured in nested geographic units, so too is the information generated by governing."<sup>26</sup> To link together the nested-nature of power across a broad scale, each chapter examines what Silvia Ratto has called "distinct frontier structural scenarios" in southern Chile and Argentina. By providing a deeper examination of localized frontier experiences, it is possible to draw out the texture of interethnic diplomacy and the political connections between these seemingly isolated places and reveal the interplay of the local and the transandean across the colonial/national chronological divide.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Lara Putnam, "The Transnational and the Text Searchable," 381.

<sup>27</sup> Silvia Ratto, "¿Otras independencias? Los territorios indígenas rioplatenses en la década de 1810."

While current calls for Mapuche autonomy in Chile and Argentina and for rights to the transandean Wallmapu look different than Mapuche power in the colonial period, Mapuche leaders in my research cared deeply about the actions—positive and negative—of the Spanish Empire and the nations of Chile and Argentina. Many Mapuche leaders interacted regularly with each of them as allies and antagonists in different moments. In this sense, the case of the Mapuche undermines Stephen Aron and Jeremy Adelman’s call for caution against “borderlanders” projecting “the idea of community sovereignty with rights that even transcend nation states... onto peoples who, a century ago, cared little for states and less for nations.”<sup>28</sup>

Finally, I apply ethnohistorical insights into the Mapuche adoption of Spanish-language letter writing to conceive of fragmentary Mapuche sources as a type of indigenous archive—living within the confines of the colonial archive, but taking on a life of its own. As Kathryn Burns recently reminded us, writing and the project of the Spanish Empire in the Americas were inextricably linked since Columbus’ fateful errant arrival on the beach of Guanahani in October 1492.<sup>29</sup> Papers and the written word also mattered to subjects and opponents of empire. Even the physicality of letters, more than accounting, declaring, or communicating information (which of course they did) granted power and legitimacy to Mapuche leaders. In November 1814, a western Argentine frontier commander stationed south of Mendoza wrote the following evocative statement to independence hero General José de San Martín:

One of the things that most honors adult pehuenche Indians is having and saving letters that relate friends and correspondence with dignified men. There is not one

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<sup>28</sup> Adelman and Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders,” 841.

<sup>29</sup> Kathryn Burns, *Into the Archive*, p. 1. On writing and possession in the early Spanish Empire see also Rolena Adorno, *Polemics of Possession*. For an evocative transnational study of the power of papers, see Jean M. Hébrard and Rebecca Scott, *Freedom Papers*.

cacique that does not have dispatches from presidents or *gobernadores*, and when they travel to different towns they present them as a testament of the magnitude of their person... In the *parlamento* that we just recently celebrated, everyone insisted on showing me their dispatches, and here was even one that was forty-two years old.<sup>30</sup>

By the eighteenth and nineteenth century, it was common practice for elite Mapuche to have their own scribes and notaries, send their children to mission schools, and receive gifts of paper, ink, and wax on both sides of the Andes.<sup>31</sup> These Mapuche letters provide a crucial window into leadership practices. I attempt to reconstruct the fragmented traces of Mapuche voices in colonial documents and Mapuche letters not to find the “authentic” or “pure” subaltern subject, but to offer a glimpse of an indigenous archive that ran parallel to yet interpenetrated with the colonial archive; what Chilean sociologist Jorge Pávez has called the *malal* or *toldo letrado*, or the lettered community.<sup>32</sup> Spain, Chile, and Argentina’s archives consumed and occluded traces of the *malal letrado*. Mapuche letters were stored within hostile institutions like indigenous petitions written in other parts of Latin America during the colonial period.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, this project intermingles an analysis of the content of Mapuche letters—received and sent—with their importance for the legitimacy and prestige of Mapuche leaders.

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<sup>30</sup> José de Susso to José de San Martín, 9 Nov. 1814, Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Mendoza (hereafter AHM), Época Independiente, Sección: Gobierno, legajo 46, foja 3, carpeta 235.

<sup>31</sup> Julio Esteban Vezub, “Mapuche-Tehuelche Spanish Writing and Argentinian-Chilean Expansion During the 19<sup>th</sup> Century,” in Adrien Delmas and Nigel Penn, eds., *Written Culture in a Colonial Context: Africa and the Americas 1500-1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2012) 215.

<sup>32</sup> Jorge Pavez Ojeda, ed., *Cartas Mapuche: Siglo XIX* (Santiago, Chile: CoLibris and Ocho Libros, 2008), 39.

<sup>33</sup> Julio Vezub, *Valentín Saygüequé y la “Gobernación Indígena de las Manzanas”*. *Poder y etnicidad en la Patagonia Septentrional: 1860-1881* (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2009). For instance, correspondence dictated by the influential Mapuche cacique of the central plains of the Araucanía, Francisco Mariluán and his enemy Venancio Coñuepan, during the 1820s are found in volumes of Chile’s Concepción province and Ministry of War. This practice became outright theft when Chile and Argentina’s encroaching armies captured caches of Mapuche letters during the 1870s and 1880s.



These theoretical and methodological approaches allow me to plot a different path for indigenous sovereignty, diplomacy, and the origins of nations in Latin America. Contemporary attacks by multinational corporations and Chilean and Argentine officials and intellectuals on Mapuche claims for autonomy and rights serve as a constant reminder of the power of the nation state to erase indigenous polities or even imperial-indigenous frontier arrangements and reduce them to a national question.<sup>34</sup> Even with these insights, however, the many motivations of Mapuche leaders imperfectly captured by the colonial archive and narrated in this dissertation remain as frustratingly illegible to the twenty-first century reader as they did to the eighteenth century Spanish administrator, or the nineteenth century Chilean general. Nevertheless, these traces of a powerful yet dismembered Mapuche politics survive in the colonial archives of Chile, Spain, and Argentina. They attest to a history otherwise.

## **Historiography**

This dissertation thus responds to the dearth of studies of Latin American indigenous groups who never succumbed to the Spanish in this period in order to offer an alternative political and cultural genealogy of the nation state in Spanish America.<sup>35</sup> It joins the growing new political history of the Age of Revolution to offer a chronological, geographic, and conceptual reorientation by suggesting that the period ought to be

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<sup>34</sup> For example, see Rolando Hanglin, “Quiénes son los mapuches?,” Sep. 16, 2014, *La Nación*, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1727466-historia-mapuche> and Fionuala Cregan, “Argentina’s Mapuche Community Stands Up to Benetton in Struggle for Ancestral Lands,” Aug. 21, 2016, *Truthout*, <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/37309-argentina-s-mapuche-community-stands-up-to-benetton-in-struggle-for-ancestral-lands>

<sup>35</sup> For the former, see Mark Thurner, *From Two Republics, to One Divided*, Guardino, *The Time of Liberty*, Jordana Dym, *From Sovereign Villages to National States*. The Spanish Borderlands of Northern New Spain remain the most significant exception, though these studies are usually classified as New Indian history or revisionist history of the US West. DeLay, *War*, Hämäläinen, *Comanche*, Patricia Limerick, *Legacy of Conquest*.

defined by the crisis of the politics sustaining colonial hegemony and its afterlives following the end of Empire.<sup>36</sup> It proposes an indigenous periodization stretching from the 1780s Andean rebellions and lasting until Chile and Argentina's military campaigns to vanquish indigenous sovereignty in the 1870s and 1880s. In other words, it charts the critical decades of the rise, persistence, and erosion of indigenous politics to recalibrate the territorial and political origins of the nation state. The final separation of colonies from colonizers, largely achieved in the 1810s and 1820s, did not erase the centuries of political contestation that shaped and made possible colonial culture and rule. In the case of Mapuche, we see not a story of the rise of capitalism or necessarily the end of empire and rise of nation states, though these dynamics were certainly influential. Instead, we see how unconquered indigenous people impacted and navigated these changes in ways that did not neatly correspond to hegemonic politics of the time. It is both an eighteenth and nineteenth century story, characterized by the crisis of colonial rule and the contentious, multipolar process of state formation in its aftermath.<sup>37</sup>

This dissertation combines insights from studies of indigenous groups in Latin America's long nineteenth century with research on indigenous go-betweens to show how Mapuche actions played a crucial role in Chile's independence from Spain, and the ways in which the politics animating their actions could have decidedly non-Atlantic origins. Sergio Serulnikov and Eric Van Young show that in the case of late-eighteenth century Upper Peru (present-day Bolivia and Peru) and early-nineteenth century Mexico, indigenous and peasant frustrations with village politics, priests, and modifications to

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<sup>36</sup> Lasso, "Race War and Nation," James Sanders, *Contentious Republicans*, Nancy P. Appelbaum, Anne S. MacPherson, and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, eds., *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America*, Michael A. McDonnell, "Rethinking the Age of Revolution," *Atlantic Studies*, 13, no. 3 (Jul. 2016): 301-314.

<sup>37</sup> Peter Guardino, *Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico's National State*, Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation*, Charles Walker, *Smoldering Ashes*.

indigenous authority motivated subaltern violence, not the spread of Enlightenment notions of liberty and equality.<sup>38</sup> In fact, Sarah Chambers, Peter Guardino, and Mark Thurner have shown how Spanish colonial subjects in Peru and Mexico chafed against the changes in their juridical, racial, and social categories catalyzed by the aftermath of independence from Spain.<sup>39</sup> Across Spanish America, many indigenous communities and free people of color also refused to abandon privileges and protections related to social rank, land, and tax status gained over centuries of struggle and negotiation.<sup>40</sup>

Centering unconquered indigenous intermediaries in my narrative of the Age of Revolution unsettles the traditional North Atlantic geographic and European/Enlightenment conceptual scope of this period. Mapuche groups initially dislodged the Spanish conquest regime, but they maintained their transandean territory for centuries by using more than force. Histories of indigenous people's role in shaping hegemony and colonial culture in the late Spanish Empire and the processes of postcolonial state formation have largely examined groups previously incorporated by the colonial system.<sup>41</sup> In the case of Chile and Argentina, Mapuche leaders engaged with the colonial system from beyond it, while also imposing pre-Colombian ritual negotiations and protocols on would-be Spanish conquerors, and creatively adopting Spanish modes of communication, goods, and titles into their transandean networks of communication, exchange, and rivalry.<sup>42</sup> As Yanna Yannakakis reminds us in the case of colonial Oaxaca,

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<sup>38</sup> Sergio Serulnikov, *Subverting Colonial Authority* and Eric Van Young, *The Other Rebellion*.

<sup>39</sup> Chambers, *From Subjects to Citizens*, Guardino, *The Time*, Thurner, *From Two Republics*.

<sup>40</sup> Appelbaum, MacPherson, and Roseblatt, eds., *Race and Nation*.

<sup>41</sup> Mallon, *Peasant and Nation*, Guardino, *The Time*, Laura Gotkowitz, ed., *Histories of Race and Racism*.

<sup>42</sup> For debates on the nature and content of *parlamentos* see Jimena Pichinao Huenchuleo, "Los parlamentos hispano-Mapuche como escenario de negociación simbólico-político durante la colonia," in *Ta ñ fijke xipa rakizuameluwün: Historia, colonialism y resistencia desde el país Mapuche*, 2nd ed., ed. (Temuco, Chile, 2013) 25-42; Carlos Contreras Painemal, "Koyang: Parlamento y Protocolo en la Diplomacia mapuche-castellana Siglos XVI-XIX," (Berlin, 2007), <http://www.fdc1->

“the possibility of violence always lurked in the background of these interethnic political processes.”<sup>43</sup> In the absence of a colonial monopoly of force in Chile and western Argentina, however, Mapuche groups were often the protagonists of violence. I show how these practices, learned over years of contact with Spanish officials in different jurisdictions, made possible the continued defense of Mapuche sovereignty through the crisis of Spanish rule and the dismantling of the colonial system. Thanks to Mapuche leaders on both sides of the Andes, the political and conceptual preeminence of the nation state cedes ground the other sovereignties defended, defined, and asserted by indigenous leaders.

This dissertation asserts that indigenous politics in Latin America’s borderlands provide a window into the “silenced” and “disavowed” place of indigenous sovereignty in the Age of Revolution.<sup>44</sup> Historians have challenged the paradigm that frontiers and borderlands primarily signified spaces of imperial or international competition in the Americas by demonstrating the important contributions of native and indigenous

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berlin.de/fileadmin/fdcl/Publikationen/Koyang-Parlamento-y-Protocolo-en-la-Diplomacia-mapuche-castellana-Carlos-Contreras-Painemal.pdf; Luz María Méndez Beltrán, “La organización de los parlamentos de indios en el siglo XVIII,” in *Relaciones fronterizas en la Araucanía*, ed. Sergio Villalobos R. (Santiago, Chile, 1982) 109-173; Margarita Gascón, “Quillin: rito araucano y paz interétnica en el contexto de una crisis ambiental” *Revista TEFROS* 11 (2013); José Manuel Zavala Cepeda, *Los mapuches del siglo XVIII: Dinámica interétnica y estrategias de resistencia*, 2nd ed. (Temuco, Chile, 2011) 141-168; Guillaume Boccara, *Los vencedores, historia del pueblo mapuche en la época colonial*, 2nd ed., trans. Diego Milos (Santiago, Chile 2009); and Tom D. Dillehay and José Manuel Zavala, “Compromised Landscapes: The Proto-Panoptic Politics of Colonial Araucanian and Spanish Parlamentos,” *Colonial Latin American Review* 22 (2013): 319-343.

<sup>43</sup> Yanna Yanakakis, *The Art of Being in Between*.

<sup>44</sup> On silencing the Haitian Revolution, see Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*. For a reconsider of Trouillot and the practice of disavowing these events, see Sibylle Fisher, *Modernity Disavowed*. For emblematic accounts of the Age of Revolution generally, and in Spain America in particular see Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic*, and John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*. More recently, historians have engaged with peripheral regions and subaltern engagement with these events. See John Tutino, ed., *New Countries*, and the contributors to the Special Issue of *Atlantic Studies*, “Rethinking the Age of Revolution,” edited by Michael A. McDonnell. For works explicitly examining indigenous rebellions at the beginning of the Age of Revolution, especially those taking place in Peru and Bolivia, see Sinclair Thomson, *We Alone Will Rule*, Charles F. Walker, *The Tupac Amaru Rebellion*, and Serulnikov, *Subverting*.

assertions of power along these spaces during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.<sup>45</sup>

Moreover, other actors participated in boundary making practices. Powerful indigenous groups such as the Comanche, Apache, and Mandan also participated in defining jurisdictions and shaping the terms of passage across them.<sup>46</sup> This dissertation participates in these affirmations of indigenous agency, primarily studied in the borderlands of New Spain, the lower Mississippi, and the modern Southwest United States, while asserting the need for a more hemispheric understanding of indigenous politics. By including the Southern Cone of South America, it shows that frontiers and borderlands were central to interethnic politics in the eighteenth century, and continued to have purchase on state formation in the nineteenth century by imbuing new meaning into partisan subjectivities (patriot, royalist, federalist, centralist) and spatial arrangements (province, state, nation) in both periods.<sup>47</sup> It widens our understanding of how indigenous

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<sup>45</sup> Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders," and the critical response from John R. Wunder and Pekka Hämäläinen, "Of Lethal Places and Lethal Essays," *American Historical Review* 104, no. 4 (Oct. 1999): 1229-1234.

<sup>46</sup> Barr, *Peace Came*, DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*, and Elizabeth A. Fenn, *Encounters at the Heart of the World*.

<sup>47</sup> Competing Chilean interpretations of Mapuche history have debated the extent to which contact along the outskirts of the Araucanía contributed to the pacification and cultural assimilation of the Mapuche. One school of thought was inaugurated by the publication of the collection of essays *Relaciones Fronterizas en la Araucanía* in 1982. Historian Sergio Villalobos and others adherents of the *relaciones fronterizas* historiographical school argue against the idea that the colonial period was characterized by constant interethnic violence. Instead, while violent clashes did characterize first century of Spanish rule, during the following centuries, commerce, the emergence of institutions of peaceful negotiation, and lucrative tribute created Mapuche dependency on the colonial system. These dependencies contributed to processes of Mapuche cultural mestizaje guaranteed a period of relatively peaceful consolidation of the frontier. After 1850, increased settler and economic penetration into the Araucanía and Chile's military invasion in 1862 opened the disintegration of the frontier space, which concluded with the victory of the Chilean military in 1883. Conversely, many Chilean ethnohistorians and anthropologists have examined eighteenth-century Mapuche kinship and cultural practices in the Pampas and Chile as forms of resistance to Spanish rule. Rather than experiencing dependency and cultural loss, the eighteenth century represented the apogee of Mapuche political and economic strength. Nonetheless, many of these authors downplay the implications of their arguments past independence or suggest that capitalist development and military superiority allowed projects of Chilean state formation to triumph over indigenous resistance. Both historians and anthropologists tend to either separate the colonial and national periods or read backwards from the results: the eventual loss of Mapuche territorial and cultural independence. Sergio Villalobos R., Carlos Aldunate, et. al eds. *Relaciones Fronterizas en la Araucanía* (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile,

peoples in the Americas “create, machinate, initiate, and control,” instead of simply reacting and adapting the empires, and by extension, nations.<sup>48</sup>

But Mapuche experiences during the colonial and national periods diverge from those of the Comanche in important ways. Though the transandean Mapuche world was rarely a space of inter-imperial or transimperial encounters, fears of this competition certainly influenced Spanish administration of the region. Aside from a brief Dutch seizure of Valdivia (Chapter One) and a British occupation of Buenos Aires in 1806, Spain’s European rivals avoided making inroads into the interior of the Southern Cone. Moreover, internal Mapuche politics never reached the status of an indigenous empire. They did rely on networks of trade, communication, and raiding of Europeans and other indigenous groups for captives and livestock. However Mapuche leaders maintained complicated and changing rivalries between themselves pulled outsiders into internal indigenous conflicts and produced interethnic military alliances throughout this period.

Moreover, while the case of the Mapuche contributes to our hemispheric understanding of indigenous politics in imperial and national frontier spaces, it also provides a cautionary tale for how we characterize and name indigenous polities. While groups like the Comanche acted like an empire but without the coherent ideological apparatus, contemporary Chilean and Argentinian intellectuals and politicians have used imperial language of conquest and dispossession to describe Mapuche movement east of the Andes to invalidate land claims and communal rights.<sup>49</sup> While acknowledging the

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1982), Pinto, *De la inclusión a la exclusión*, Bengoa *Historia del Pueblo Mapuche*, Bello, *Nampülkafé*, Bocarra, *Los vencedores*, Zavala *Los Mapuches del siglo XVIII*.

<sup>48</sup> Wunder and Hämäläinen, “Of Lethal Places,” 1232, Ernesto Bassi, *An Aqueous Territory*, Cynthia Radding *Landscapes of Power and Identity*.

<sup>49</sup> Rolando Hanglin, “Quiénes son los mapuches?,” Sep. 16, 2014, *La Nación*, <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1727466-historia-mapuche>.

importance of the concept of sovereignty to understand the interethnic engagement which prevented foreign incursion into the heart of the southern cone, rather than naming a unified Mapuche polity which never existed, this study instead focuses on the individual leaders and the ceremonial family settlements (*lofs*) and politico-military confederations (*butalmapus*) these leaders represented.

While Chilean and North American scholars have imbued frontier spaces with extensive methodological and explanatory weight given the level of documentary traces of encounters there, I show how processes originating in the vast interior of the Mapuche's political dominions were equally if not more important. The practices used by Mapuche groups—in concert and in competition with each other—to secure treaties and agreements from empires and nations provide a historical basis for conceptual and political alternatives to the spatial and political arrangements of power presented by empires and nation states. Wallmapu, therefore, was not just a memory or path not taken, but a reality inscribed in interethnic frontiers for a significant period of time.

## **Chapter Outline**

To emphasize how Mapuche leaders developed broad diplomatic strategies for defending their sovereignty by engaging with the Spanish and their indigenous rivals on both sides of the Andes, my dissertation is divided into three chronological sections on the colonial period, the independence era, and early republican state formation. First, Chapter One introduces the Mapuche—their political practices and social organization—and the geography of southern Chile and western Argentina from the pre-conquest period until the eighteenth century. Chapter Two analyzes a rebellion of the Huilliche-Mapuche

people living near Valdivia during the aftermath of the Age of Andean Insurgency—a period of extensive indigenous rebellion from 1742-1782 in the Viceroyalty of Peru (modern Peru and Bolivia). It shows how eighteenth century Mapuche and Spanish leaders turned to the diplomatic ritual of the *parlamento*, or interethnic parley, to hammer out their respective sovereignties by negotiating conflicts and mediating violence over their competing interests. In particular, it examines two 1793 *parlamentos* between the Spanish and the Mapuche to show that any changes to the empire in southern Chile had to take into account Mapuche political interests and secure their consent. Moreover, the chapter looks at another *parlamento* to the south in Valdivia that followed the Huilliche (southern Mapuche) uprising to offer a counterpoint in the balance between the Spanish and the Mapuche in different regions. Evidence of this uprising relies on the writings of local Franciscan missionaries, themselves a quintessential pillar of Spanish colonial rule, to explain that the uprising had less to do with inherent Mapuche rebelliousness, as current Chilean historiography asserts, or anti-Spanish sentiment, and more to do with Spain's broken promises of aid and protection against other Mapuche groups allied with the Spanish. It places these *parlamentos* in the aftermath of nearly a decade of warfare between Pehuenche, Huilliche, and Mapuche groups over access to the Pampas for raiding and trade to better understand how intra-indigenous rivalries shaped their engagement with the Spanish.

Chapters Three through five examine different aspects of Mapuche involvement in Chilean and Argentinian independence. Chapter Three picks up in the final days of the 1793 *parlamento* discussed in Chapter One. It explores the largely ignored relationship between the Pehuenche Mapuche, who inhabited the foothills and valleys on both sides of



the Andes, and independence leader José de San Martín, who formed the Army of the Andes in the province of Mendoza in the viceroyalty of Río de la Plata. It focuses on the experiences of a local missionary: the Mapuche Franciscan Francisco Inálican, who came from Southern Chile. The only Mapuche to become an ordained Priest, Inálican became the principal interlocutor in a parlamento between the Patriots and the Pehuenche south of Mendoza at a critical juncture during the wars of independence. Chapter Four examines the actions of the pro-Chilean Mapuche leader Venancio Coñuepan to argue that throughout each period of Chile's war for independence (1810-1818), Mapuche leaders drew upon their long-standing diplomatic strategies to engage with both Spanish and anti-Spanish forces. Spanish and revolutionary patriot leaders constantly sought alliances with Mapuche against their enemies. Mapuche leaders like Coñuepan, in turn, required would-be allies to participate in diplomatic rituals like parlamentos despite the uptick in violence wrought by the independence struggles. Rather than staying aloof from events transpiring in Santiago or Concepción, it shows that the Araucanía and the Mapuche were crucial to the fate of Chile. Chapter Five examines Coñuepan's most implacable enemy, the pro-Spanish leader Francisco Mariluán, to understand the motivations for Mapuche actions during the civil war, known as the War to the Death, between supporters of Spain and the Chilean military following Chile's independence in 1818. The chapter analyzes Mariluán's extensive correspondence as Chile courted his support in 1824 and 1825 to show how Mapuche efforts to impose their diplomatic strategies on Chilean leaders produced violent moments of misunderstanding and impatience that threatened Mapuche practices of leadership and alliance making. Mariluán and other Mapuche leaders continued to rely on hallmark diplomatic rituals to

engage with Spanish royalists and the Chilean government. In 1825, Mariluán participated in the first and last parlamento between the Mapuche and the Chilean government. The treaty recognized Mariluán's sovereignty, which underscored how the nation states in this region corresponded to the old Inka frontier—a geographic arrangement once again determined by successful Mapuche resistance to foreign incursions.

Chapter Six follows Mapuche groups east of the Andes during the 1820s and 1830s to explore how their engagement with newly-independent Argentina drew upon their experiences in Chile. Specifically, I examine correspondence written during the rise to power of Governor of Buenos Aires Juan Manuel de Rosas. De Rosas established an extensive network along the southern Argentinian frontier in exchange for alliances with independent indigenous groups that included the eastern Mapuche. An epilogue will consider Mapuche engagement with nascent federalist movements in Chile and Argentina and offer remarks on the persistence of transandean politics in the violent military campaigns to subdue the indigenous groups of the Araucanía and the Pampas.

## Chapter 1: Conquest Denied: Mapuche Diplomacy, 1480-1790

The Chilean and Argentinian militaries violently defeated and resettled the Mapuche people of modern-day Chile and western Argentina during the 1870s and 1880s, but they were not the first foreigners intent on conquering this region of the Southern Cone of Latin America.<sup>50</sup> Neither were the sixteenth century invasions of Mapuche lands led by Spanish conquistadors. Under the reign of Tupa Yupanqui (c. 1448-1482), the Inka Empire made the first foreign incursion into central and southern Chile.<sup>51</sup> In the late 1400s, an armed expedition departed south from Cusco, the center of the Inka Empire or Tawantisuyo (“The Four Regions Together.”)<sup>52</sup> The expedition aimed to expand the southern region of the empire, Collasuyu (High Plains Region), which would come to incorporate much of southern Peru, Bolivia, northwest Argentina, and Chile (Appendix, Figure 1.1). It sought gold, silver, and copper, new lands for agriculture, and human labor for state projects.<sup>53</sup> Inka warriors followed paths down the eastern slopes of the Andes that cut west and east across the Pampas near the site of modern Mendoza and through the Atacama Desert in northern Chile. They managed to subjugate the indigenous inhabitants of Chile’s central rift valley up to the Maule River. According to archeological data—forts and ceramics—the Inka conquered and incorporated the inhabitants from the southern reaches of the Atacama desert to the

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<sup>50</sup> On twenty-first centuries political alliances between Mapuche in Chile and Argentina, see “Los mapuches de Chile se unen a los de Argentina y preocupan al Gobierno,” *La Nueva Mañana*, Jan. 16, 2017, <http://lmdiarlo.com.ar/noticia/7329/los-mapuches-de-chile-se-unen-a-los-de-argentina-y-preocupan-al-gobierno>

<sup>51</sup> Tom D. Dillehay, *Monuments, Empires, and Resistance*, Chapter 1, Viviana Manríquez, “Purum Aucua, ‘Promaucaes’: de significados, identidades y ethnocategorías. Chile central, siglos XVI-XVIII,” *Boletín de Arqueología PUCP*, 6 (2002): 337-354

<sup>52</sup> “Engineering the Inka Empire – The Four Suyu,” Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian, <http://nmai.si.edu/inkaroad/engineering/activity/four-suyus.html>

<sup>53</sup> Tom D. Dillehay, *Monuments, Empires, and Resistance*, in particular Part Three, Section: “Becoming Andean: Andean, Inka, and Araucanian Interaction.” Loc. 1508.

central valley of Chile as far as 100 to 300 kilometers south of the site where the Spanish would found Santiago in 1541. While the Inka expedition may have reached even farther south—near the future Spanish city of Concepción and south of the Bío-Bío River—the Inka faced determined resistance from the indigenous inhabitants and were forced to retreat to the Maule River.<sup>54</sup>

Each of these three waves of conquest, which stretched from the fifteenth to the end of the nineteenth century, confronted the military, diplomatic, and cultural boundaries imposed by Mapuche and other indigenous families in the lands that would become southern Chile, and central and western Argentina. Tawantisuyo, the Viceroyalty of Peru, the Captaincy General of Chile, the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, and finally the nation states of Chile and Argentina all reckoned with, and were forced to recognize, representatives of a transandean Mapuche polity. This Mapuche world faced both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and drew the gaze of indigenous and European administrators away from squabbles in their capitals and with their rival empires. Though this Mapuche polity was never unified—families and confederations throughout its history vied for influence and resources—foreigners had to play by its rules. This then is a history of how Mapuche families, through pre-Columbian diplomatic practices fashioned to the hostile arrival of outsiders asserted and earned recognition of their sovereignty in a moment in which the relationship of space and power was a central question across the Americas.

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<sup>54</sup> Dillehay argues that contemporary scholars ignored sixteenth and seventeenth century Spanish chroniclers who suggest that some of Inka may have reached much farther south than previously acknowledged. For instance, when Spanish conquistador Pedro de Valdivia reached the lands near the Bío-Bío River in the mid-sixteenth century, the Mapuche inhabitants allegedly called the Spanish “Inka” and their horses “llamas of the Inka.” Dillehay “*Monuments, Empires, and Resistance*, Loc. 1508-1518.

The Inka called the people they conquered living between the Maipo and Maule Rivers, and those who stymied their southern expansion, “Promaucaes” or “purun aucca.”<sup>55</sup> In Quechua, these signified ‘wild enemy, rebel.’ The prefix “purun” indicated “barbarous, wild, native, or uncultured,” a term the Inka Empire generally applied to frontier and newly conquered peoples, and to their own ancestors. These terms also implied the determined military resistance the Inka faced, which resulted in the first frontier between the groups that would become the Mapuche and a foreign empire. A century later, the Spanish erroneously transformed these terms from imperial categories to ethnonyms for all peoples living from the central valley to the southern island of Chiloé.

Like many indigenous groups in the Americas, the inhabitants who faced down the Inca conquest west of the Andes called themselves “the people,” or “*che*.” Early twentieth century anthropologists believed central valley Chilean indigenous groups were Amazonian in origin. In this account, they came from a split in the Tupi-Guaraní and pampas indigenous groups. These peoples left the southern Amazon, passed through the Gran Chaco of Argentina and the Río de la Plata, and began a nomadic life in the pampas before settling west of the Andes.<sup>56</sup> Subsequent archaeological research revealed, however, that humans inhabited central southern Chile at least since 500 to 600 B.C.E.<sup>57</sup> Recent findings at the Monte Verde site in the X Region (Los Lagos) near Reloncaví

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<sup>55</sup> The term has interesting parallels with the Spanish use of the term “bárbaro” for unincorporated indigenous groups, Webber, *Bárbaros*. For an in-depth analysis of the etymology of these terms, see Viviana Manríquez, “Purun Auca.” On debates over the use of Promauca and Auca to describe the Mapuche see José Millalén Paillal, “La sociedad Mapuche prehispánica: *Kimün*, arqueología y etnohistoria,” in Pablo Marimán, Sergio Caniuqueo et. al. *...Escucha, winka*, 17-52, especially 38, and Guillaume Boccara, “Etnogénesis, Mapuche; Resistencia y Restructuración entre los Indígenas del Centro-Sur de Chile (Siglos XVI-XVIII),” *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 79, no. 3 (Aug. 1999); 425-461.

<sup>56</sup> Summarized in Bengoa, *La historia*, 16. See also Volume II of the *Handbook of South American Indians* (1946).

<sup>57</sup> Bengoa, *La historia*, 17-19, relies on Bernardo Berdichewsky.

Sound suggest evidence of humans as old as 12,500 years.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, while many have referred to the Pampas of central and western Argentina as a desert, implying an inhospitable and uninhabitable environment, these lands were a crucial crossroads and region of longstanding human activity.<sup>59</sup>

Roughly one million people inhabited Chile at the time of the Spanish conquest in the mid-sixteenth century, with the highest concentration living in the Mapuche-dominated regions from the Itata River to the Island of Chiloé.<sup>60</sup> A wide range of practices and forms of settlement permitted these groups to maintain a large population in the absence of the centralized, tributary states ruled by the Inka in the central Andes and the Aztecs in Tenotchtitlan. The Spanish governor of Chile, Martín García de Loyola, explained to the King in 1593 that the primary reason for his inability to conquer the rebellious indigenous groups was the Mapuche's decentralized political system of territorial organization and leadership.<sup>61</sup>

The basis of Mapuche social organization centered was around patrilineal and patrilocal kinship groups (*lof* or *rewe*). Within these multifamily settlements, the guiding concepts were, on the one hand territorial (*tuwün*), e.g. the place a person (*che*) was from, and the preservation and protection of family lineage (*küpan*).<sup>62</sup> *Lofs* consisted of a series of houses (*ruka*) around a ceremonial center (*rewe*), which were often located on a constructed mound or natural hill (*küel*). The greatest density of archaeological evidence of pre-Hispanic *küel* exists in the fertile valleys of the coastal Nahuelbuta mountain range

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<sup>58</sup> The Archaeological Institute of America, "Monte Verde Under Fire," *Archaeology*, <http://archive.archaeology.org/online/features/clovis/>

<sup>59</sup> Mónica Alejandra Berón, "Dunes, hills, waterholes, and saltpeter beds: Attractors for human populations in western Pampa, Argentina," *Quaternary International* 422 (Nov. 2016): 163-173.

<sup>60</sup> Kristine Jones briefly surveys the dearth of accurate historical demographic studies of the Mapuche in "Warfare."

<sup>61</sup> José Millalén, "La sociedad Mapuche prehispánica," 33.

<sup>62</sup> Millalén, 33.

south of the Bío-Bío, though some do exist in western Argentina.<sup>63</sup> Much like the *ayllu* extended family community characteristic of the Central Andes, the *lof* in Mapuche society encompassed the ritual center of all activity—economic, political, religious, and domestic.<sup>64</sup> It also served as the spatial foundation for broader alliances and relations with indigenous and non-indigenous groups and thus contestation over the content and control over the *lof* and leadership constituted a key point of encounter. Mapuche men both represented their *lofs* in negotiation with other *lofs* and with the Spanish. Though a rigid hierarchy of political authority dominated by men based on age, wealth, and military prowess, Mapuch leaders continually invoked the support or trepidation of their *lof*, or *reducción* as the Spanish came to call, in negotiations with the Spanish. Thus, although only a fraction of a *lofs* members participated in interethnic and inter-Mapuche diplomacy, one's earned representation of a *lof* constituted a central aspect of a Mapuche leader's authority and prestige.

Diversity and dispersion characterized the human geography of these lands at the time of the Spanish conquest. Despite the physical and familial separation of various *lofs*, they commonly united for various reasons. Intermarriage, along with extensive celebrations marking seasonal, annual, and harvest times, and the paying of bride prices, cemented one form of union. Deliberation over and meting out of justice, economic aid, and war represented another. Though Mapuche individuals traveled to trade with, take captives, or escape from attacks of other *lofs*, the ceremonial space represented something

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<sup>63</sup> Dillehay. *Monuments, Empires, and Resistance*. Dillehay confirmed the existence of Küel in *puelmapu* (land of the east, modern Argentina) in personal correspondence with the author, though he does not deal with them in his published studies.

<sup>64</sup> For an introduction to the political economy of the Central Andean *ayllu* in the aftermath of the conquest, see Steve J. Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*.

that Mapuche groups remained affixed to and resolved to defend from the Inka and Spanish conquests.

Families took advantage of the temperate climate and ecological niches (ocean and riverine coasts, valleys, plains, and temperate forests) of the Araucanía and the western Pampas to practice a wide range of gathering, hunting, horticulture, and trade. They collected mollusks and fished along the Pacific coasts, while other groups hunted native lions and camelids on both sides of the Andes, though this formed a small portion of caloric intake. Unlike the Mediterranean climate of the central valley north of the Maule River, in the temperate and rainy interior regions between the coastal Nahuelbuta mountain range and the Andean cordillera, families enjoyed extensive rainy seasons, which allowed them to raise an extensive array of seasonal crops, such as beans, quinoa, squash, and potatoes, in the temperate and rainy interior regions between the coastal Nahuelbuta mountain range and the Andean cordillera. Frequent precipitation and flood plains produced by snow-fed rivers also meant sophisticated irrigation systems were unnecessary.<sup>65</sup>

Roughly a half-century following the initial Inka foray into Chile, in 1524 and 1526, Spanish conquistador Francisco Pizarro began the invasion and overthrow of the Inka Empire, which resulted in the creation of the Viceroyalty of Peru (1526-1572). In the 1530s and 1540s, conquistadors Diego de Almagro and Pedro de Valdivia attempted separate missions to subdue the southern reaches of Inka rule in Chile. While Almagro's expedition in 1536 failed to create a permanent presence in Chile, the second attempt, led by Valdivia, implanted Spanish rule in Mapuche lands. In 1540, after receiving the title of Lieutenant Governor from Pizarro, Valdivia began the conquest of Chile. Several

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<sup>65</sup> Bengoa, *La historia*, 21-22.



hundred soldiers and over one thousand indigenous *yanaconas* (personal servants and soldiers) from Peru accompanied Valdivia's expedition. Valdivia opted for the desert route to avoid the treacherous passage through the Andes, which had doomed Almagro in 1536. Valdivia's band continued their march through the present-day city of Coquimbo south to the Mapocho River valley, where in 1541 they encountered the picunche (people of the north) and their leader, Michimalonco. Upon arriving in Chile, Valdivia caught the indigenous peoples of central and southern Chile off guard and founded the cities of Santiago, La Serena, Concepción, Imperial, Villa Rica, Angol, and Valdivia over the next twelve years. A year after departing from Cusco, Valdivia proclaimed the foundation of the settlement of Santiago de la Nueva Extremadura from Santa Lucía Hill.<sup>66</sup>

Less than five years later, Michimalonco led a rebellion that destroyed Santiago and postponed Valdivia's expedition to the heart of Mapuche territory several hundred kilometers south of Santiago. In 1546, Valdivia set his eyes on the lands of the south and its rumored gold deposits. Like the Inka, after crossing the Itata River and approaching the Bío-Bío, Valdivia met stiff resistance (Appendix, Figure 1.2). He founded the Pacific coastal settlement of Penco at the mouth of the Bío-Bío, which would become the future site of the port of Concepción. Over the next decade, Valdivia organized a series of expeditions into Mapuche territory by land and by boat along the coast where he declared the nearby Mapuche subject to the encomienda and forced them into gold prospecting and servitude.<sup>67</sup> He famously established seven fortified towns in Mapuche territory to

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<sup>66</sup> Andrea Ruiz-Esquide Figueroa, *Los indios amigos en la frontera araucana* (Santiago: DIBAM, 1993) 22.

<sup>67</sup> On the encomienda in Chile, see María Isabel González Pomes, "La encomienda indígena en Chile durante el siglo XVIII," *Revista Historia (Chile)* 5 (1966): 7-103, and José Manuel Zavala C., "The Spanish-Araucanian World of Purén and Lumaco Valley in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Tom D. Dillehay, ed., *The Teleoscopic Polity*, 55-76.

aid in this process: Arauco at the southern shore of the Bío-Bío River delta, Tucapel in the western valleys of the coastal mountain range, Angol in the central plains of the south of the Bío-Bío near the eastern valleys of the coastal range, La Imperial in the southern central valley, Villarrica to the southeast of Imperial near the Andes, Valdivia, an inland port near the southern Pacific coast of the Araucanía, and Osorno, in the central plains near Valdivia roughly halfway to Chiloé Island.<sup>68</sup> He also organized the first Spanish expedition to western Argentina, which resulted in the foundation of Mendoza in 1561 and Chilean control over the province of Cuyo, of which Mendoza was the capital, until the late-eighteenth century.

Iberians declared unconquered Mapuche south of the Bío-Bío to be subject to the *mita* labor draft and *encomienda* like indigenous communities in highland Peru.<sup>69</sup> These rights were distributed amongst conquistadores and Peninsular Spanish citizens, or *vecinos*. The encomendadores hoped to employ indigenous labor from the coastal and central plains of the Araucanía to mine gold deposits near the headwaters of the Laja and Bío-Bío rivers in the Andean foothills to the east. Unfortunately for the Spaniards, the most powerful Mapuche kinship groups inhabited these regions. In the eastern and western valleys of the coastal Nahuelbuta mountain range lived the groups who constituted what the Spanish came to call, the *estado indómito*, the unconquerable state (Appendix, Figure 1.3).

The highest concentration of Mapuche families and strongest resistance to the Spanish came from the valleys in the coastal Nahuelbuta mountain range in the northwest

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<sup>68</sup> Here is a list of the years in which many towns were destroyed: Santa Cruz de Coya, 1599; Santa María la Blanca de Valdivia, 1599; San Andrés de Los Infantes (Angol), 1599; La Imperial, 1600; Santa María Magdalena de Villa Rica, 1602; San Mateo de Osorno, 1603; and San Felipe de Araucan (Arauco), 1604.

<sup>69</sup> See Steve J. Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples* and Karen Spalding, *Huaro-chiri* for analyses of the Andean labor drafts.

of the Araucanía.<sup>70</sup> The Spanish named this region *estado indómito* (the unconquerable state) or simply, *el estado*, for the tenacity of Mapuche resistance they faced (or perhaps, by invoking a more coherent political unit, they hoped to find a legible concept through which to understand their continued military defeat).<sup>71</sup> From the valleys of Tucapel and Arauco to the west, Mareguano-Catiray to the north, and Puren/Lumaco to the east, Mapuche families in these fertile valleys challenged the encomienda system in numerous ways. Drawing on knowledge of the rivers and climate, Mapuche groups manipulated flood plains and the rainy season to harass would-be Spanish conquerors. They burned crops and fields. Some Mapuche families retreated to more fortified places of residence known as *malales*, while others fled to the south and east. Mapuche resistance to Spanish desires for gold and labor inaugurated a period of intense warfare and conquest known as the Arauco War.<sup>72</sup>

In December 1553, Mapuche groups from the *estado* under the military leader (*toqui*) Caupolicán, destroyed the fort of Tucapel, captured, and killed Valdivia, and sparked a cycle of rebellions and wars that lasted into the 1640s and halted Spanish expansion in the south. In particular, the Mapuche rebellion of 1599-1603 destroyed the Seven Cities founded by Valdivia, some of which were never repopulated until the 1860s. The Mapuche succeeded in expelling the Spanish thanks to their superior military tactics

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<sup>70</sup> Dillehay, "Introduction," in *The Teleoscopic Polity*, 4.

<sup>71</sup> Julio Esteban Vezub, "El estado sin estado entre los araucanos/mapuches," *Chungará* (Arica), 48, no. 4 (2016): 723-727.

<sup>72</sup> On the hunt for gold in southern Chile in the sixteenth century see José Manuel Zavala C., "The Spanish Araucanian World of the Purén and Lumaco Valley in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in Dillehay, *The Teleoscopic Polity*, 55-73.

which capitalized on heavy winter rains, rapid assimilation of European horses, and knowledge of the densely forested lands of the south.<sup>73</sup>

Additionally, the Spanish faced the threat of foreign invasion of their colony. In 1599, 1600, and 1614, Dutch traders exchanged goods with indigenous groups in the Araucanía and the Huilliche near Valdivia and Chiloé Island. Additionally, in 1643, the Dutch took the southern port of Valdivia, which had been abandoned in the aftermath of the successful Mapuche revolt in 1598-99. In response, the crown approved the only *situado*, Royal military budget and transfers, and professional army, consisting of 2000 soldiers, outside of Havana to the southern frontier of Chile (Appendix, Figure 1.6). This response is especially extraordinary given that Spanish conquerors faced indigenous hostilities in many frontier regions such as New Spain.<sup>74</sup>

The Mapuche rebellion expelled the Spanish populations from near the Bío-Bío to Reloncaví Sound near Chiloé. Spanish settlement of the region ceased and the colonial project shifted from colonization and religious conversion to a defensive military operation, which left little space for the creation of towns. Concurrently, disease and the system of *encomienda* labor greatly reduced the indigenous population north of this boundary in central Chile. By the end of the sixteenth century, the southern margins of the Spanish empire in the Americas consisted of a series of forts linking the settlements of Concepción and Santiago in Chile, with Mendoza, San Luis and Buenos Aires east of

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<sup>73</sup> Margarita Gascón, "The defense of the Spanish empire and the agency of nature," R. C. Padden, "Cultural Adaptation and Militant Autonomy Among the Araucanians of Chile," in J. Kicza, ed., *The Indian in Latin American History*, 69-108.

<sup>74</sup> Gascón, "The defense of the Spanish empire and the agency of nature," Rodolfo Urbina Burgos, "La rebelión indígena de 1712: Los tributarios de Chiloé contra la *encomienda*," *Tiempo y espacio* 1 (1990): 73-86, and Gabriel Guarda, *Nueva historia*.

the Andes. It remained relatively unchanged until the nineteenth century.<sup>75</sup> The defensive military policy for the Chilean portion of this frontier fixated on the Mapuche, and anxieties over foreign invasion produced a situation in which Spanish leaders were forced to seek diplomatic solutions with them.<sup>76</sup> The end of this bloody period of resistance to the Spanish arrested the conquest and produced a new form of ritual diplomacy whereby the Spanish Crown recognized Mapuche families' power to maintain their own practices of governance outside the bounds of Spanish rule: the *koyang* or *parlamento*.<sup>77</sup>

### 1.1 Negotiation and Defensive War: Mapuche politics in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century

In 1641, in the plains of Quilín, the first *parlamento*, or interethnic treaty negotiation, between the Spanish and Mapuche ended the cycle of revolt and violence of the past half-century.<sup>78</sup> The highest political, military, and religious representatives of Santiago and Concepción, including the Governor of Chile, Francisco López de Zúñiga, accompanied by dozens of soldiers and hundreds of indigenous auxiliaries met in the heart of the Araucanía and negotiated peace terms with a *gran toqui*, many *lonkos* (literally “head”), and over one thousand warriors.<sup>79</sup> The Governor guaranteed absolute territorial control of the Mapuche south of the Bío-Bío River, an end to Spanish enslavement of Indians, and the dismantling of the Angol fort. The Mapuche, in turn, pledged to aid the Spanish in the case of another foreign invasion, given the vulnerability of the colony in the face of the Dutch aggression. The *parlamento* represented a fusion of

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<sup>75</sup> Kristine Jones, “Warfare, Reorganization, and Readaptation at the Margins of Spanish Rule: The Southern Margin (1573-1882), 138.

<sup>76</sup> Gascón, “The Defense,” 12-15.

<sup>77</sup> Abelardo Levaggi, *Diplomacia*, Julianna Barr, *Peace Came*, Carlos Lázaro Avila, *Las fronteras de América*, and Richard White, *The Middle Ground*, and David J. Weber, *Bárbaros*, to name a few, have noted that time and time again indigenous peoples in the Americas forced Europeans to participate in their own diplomatic rituals.

<sup>78</sup> On Quillín see Gascón, “Quillín: rito araucano y paz interétnica.”

<sup>79</sup> Gascón, “The defense of the Spanish.”

Spanish frontier diplomatic practices that had taken place in New Spain, and the adaptation of Mapuche negotiation political rituals to new ends.<sup>80</sup> While the Spanish treated the subsequent agreements as an international treaty, the Mapuche treated the *parlamento* as a larger-scale version of the quotidian negotiations that took place between various *lofs*. The creation of this frontier space produced neither peaceful *convivencia* nor constant violence.<sup>81</sup> Violence—both individualized acts of captive taking or killing by Spanish and Mapuche, and open Mapuche rebellions—punctuated the colonial period. However, after Quilín, the frontier became an important node of negotiation and resources for working out internal Mapuche and Spanish politics.

The Quilín agreement effectively divided the lands into two jurisdictions: the Spanish, from the valley of Coquimbo to the Bío-Bío River, the military plaza of Valdivia, the island of Chiloé, and the province of Cuyo around the city of Mendoza east of the Andes; the Mapuche, the territories south of Mendoza and between the Bío-Bío River and Chiloé Island. The frontier space created between Spanish and Mapuche possessions became a space of exchange, violence, rivalry, and negotiation. Mapuche leaders who professed their loyalty to Spain received titles (*caciques gobernadores*),

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<sup>80</sup> For debates on the nature and content of *parlamentos* see Jimena Pichinao Huenchuleo, “Los parlamentos hispano-Mapuche como escenario de negociación simbólico-político durante la colonia,” in *Ta iñ fijke xipa rakizuameluwün: Historia, colonialismo y resistencia desde el país Mapuche*, 2nd ed., ed. (Temuco, Chile, 2013) 25-42; Carlos Contreras Painemal, “Koyang: Parlamento y Protocolo en la Diplomacia mapuche-castellana Siglos XVI-XIX,” Luz María Méndez Beltrán, “La organización de los parlamentos de indios en el siglo XVIII,” Gascón, “Quillín: rito araucano y paz interétnica en el contexto de una crisis ambiental” Zavala, *Los mapuches del siglo XVIII*, Guillaume Boccara, *Los vencedores*, and Tom D. Dillehay and José Manuel Zavala, “Compromised Landscapes.”

<sup>81</sup> On the notion of *convivencia* on the Bío-Bío frontier, see Andrea Ruiz-Esquilde Figueroa, *Los indios amigos en la frontera araucana*. On the tense peace achieved through parlamentos viewed as a process of Mapuche acculturation, see the essays in Sergio Villalobos, R. Carlos Aldunate et. al. *Relaciones fronterizas en la Araucanía*, especially Méndez Beltrán, “La organización de los parlamentos.” On warfare and ethnogenesis in colonial and indigenous contexts more generally see R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, “The Violent Edge of Empire” in R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, eds., *War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare* (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1992) 1-30.

salaries, gifts such as tobacco and military garb, and the ability to call for *parlamentos* to resolve grievances. This new class of Mapuche leaders gained prestige within their communities for their ability to travel to Spanish forts, engage with colonial officers, and receive tribute from the Spanish.<sup>82</sup> Spanish administration shifted toward one of “defensive warfare,” pioneered by the Jesuit Luis de Valdivia, whereby the frontier would be garrisoned, but religious conversion and resettlement of families into Indian Towns (*pueblos de indios*) would be negotiated between priests, frontier officials, and caciques. A similar policy was followed in Mendoza, whereas the southern fort of Valdivia was garrisoned with professional soldiers and would receive a *real situado* from Lima or Potosí to guard against foreign invasion. Valdivia, in other words, served principally as a military fortification. Unlike the Spanish along the Bío-Bío frontier in Concepción, missionary activity and diplomatic relations with the Huilliche in the interior of the province were limited to the most proximate indigenous families until the eighteenth century.

The Spanish side of the frontier centered in the Concepción province in Chile, and Cuyo across the Andes. The Concepción province consisted of a string of lightly garrisoned frontier forts and missions along the Bío-Bío River and south of Mendoza with little to no non-military settler presence. The only population centers in the province were Concepción on the coast and Chillán nestled in the slopes of the Andes. The former was the seat of military governance and of the bishopric, while the latter would become

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<sup>82</sup> On European and creole gift giving as a form of indigenous tribute collection in the mid-nineteenth century Argentina, see Geraldine Davies Lenoble’s dissertation, “Filling The Desert: The Indigenous Confederacies Of The Pampas And Northern Patagonia, 1840-1879.”

home to the Order of St. Francis' Colegio de Naturales.<sup>83</sup> These conditions prevented the creation of Indian towns and the concurrent judicial and economic system of the *república de indios* as the Spanish had created in Peru and New Spain. Given the military détente achieved by Mapuche resistance to the conquest, the Spanish focused less on colonization and the extraction of Indian labor and more on military defense and peacekeeping. In fact, in the eighteenth century, an official in Santiago admitted to the Viceroy of Peru that the “free Indians pay no tribute,” a crucial source of revenue in other parts of Spanish America.<sup>84</sup> In this context, Spanish officers and translators knowledgeable of the Mapuche language (*Mapudungun*), alongside first Jesuit and then Franciscan missionaries began to take on important roles as intercultural intermediaries and negotiators.

In Concepción and Valdivia, the Spanish relied on a *lenguaraz* (bi-lingual interpreter), a *comisario de naciones* (commissioner of Indian nations), and *capitanes de amigos* (captains of friendly Indians), to carry out their diplomacy with the Mapuche.<sup>85</sup> *Capitanes de amigos* often lived in or near Mapuche *lofs* south of the Bío-Bío with permission from the local caciques. They carried messages in both directions, and represented one of the most quotidian encounters between these groups. Many times, the captains were incorporated as kin into Mapuche families, or were former escaped or released captives, like Santiago Avendaño. By the outbreak of the independence wars, patriot and royalists viewed the captains as untrustworthy picaresque figures who had

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<sup>83</sup> Superintendente of Chile Jorge Escobedo to Viceroy of Peru Teodor de Croix, 13 Dec. 1785, Santiago, Archivo General de Indias (hereafter, AGI), Gobierno, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 315.

<sup>84</sup> Superintendente of Chile Jorge Escobedo to Viceroy of Peru Teodor de Croix, 13 Dec. 1785.

<sup>85</sup> On these frontier officers, see especially Andrea Ruiz-Eskilde Figueroa, *Los indios amigos en la frontera araucana* (Santiago: DIBAM, 1993) and José Manuel Zavala Cepeda, *Los Mapuches del siglo XVIII: Dinámica interétnica y estrategias de Resistencia* (Temuco : Ediciones Universidad Católica de Temuco, 2011).



“gone native.”<sup>86</sup> The *comisarios* oversaw the actions of the *capitanes*, and like the translators, attended *parlamentos* and other smaller meetings with Mapuche leaders. Ignacio Pinuer, a *comisario* from Valdivia, expressed this complicated role as intercultural emissary and paternalist defender. To be a *comisario*, Pinuer “carried/brought the word of the *indios* [to Spanish officials] and it is my obligation to keep them calm/peaceful and friendly, and fulfill my duty as their Protector as Your Majesty orders.”<sup>87</sup> In other words, *comisarios* represented Spanish efforts to monitor Mapuche groups beyond their control while also offering an important forum for caciques to communicate their frustrations and demands to the Spanish.

In the absence of the typical Spanish colonial system of justice and coercion that incorporated native lords as allies during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spain developed an extensive system of tributary *lonkos* and Mapuche soldiers. These *indios amigos* (friendly Indians) and *caciques gobernadores* received payments from the royal coffers and staffs of office, which imbued them with newfound authority in their *lofs*. In *parlamentos*, Spanish and Mapuche attendees recognized caciques gobernadores as some of the highest representatives of their domains, and they received priority in speaking order, though they were not the only caciques that attended. *Cacique principal* was another Spanish designation for a prestigious Mapuche leader, though it did not always signify a Royal salary like the *gobernadores*. These titles heightened the legitimacy and prestige of the *gobernadores* with their families and with Spanish frontier officials. They

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<sup>86</sup> For a study of *capitanes de amigos* during the Chilean war of independence see Rodrigo Araya, “Alianzas mapuches durante la guerra a muerte, 1817-1823” and Fernando Ulloa Valenzuela, “Los españoles araucanos: mediación y conflicto durante la Guerra a Muerte. Chile 1817-1825.”

<sup>87</sup> Ignacio Pinuer, AGI, Gobierno, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 188. “I que lleva la voz de los Indios y que es de mi obligación mantenerlos en quietud y amisticio y cumplir como Protector de ellos lo que su Magestad Ordena.”

also clashed with other *lofs* that remained hostile to the Crown from time to time.<sup>88</sup>

Additionally, several pro-Spanish *lonkos* permitted their *lofs* to be settled as *pueblos de indios* and admitted missionaries into their *lofs*, and sent their sons to Catholic schools.<sup>89</sup>

As we will see, this took place in the Araucanía, Valdivia, and Mendoza in the 1790s, and into the 1830s and 1840s along the Buenos Aires and Pampas frontiers.

Catholic Missions and missionaries in Concepción and Valdivia, as in many parts of the empire, played an important role that went well beyond the “spiritual conquest” and religious conversion of indigenous groups. Jesuit priests in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries wrote extensive chronicles and observations about the Mapuche. They attempted conversion and the giving of the sacraments in an ambulatory manner in the Araucanía—passing through the region several times a year—instead of building missions among the Mapuche. After the Jesuit expulsion from the Spanish Empire in 1776, the Franciscan Order took over the work of tending to the flock of unconverted Mapuche. They chose a mission-based style of interaction. By the end of the eighteenth century, Franciscans had established and operated twenty missions—many on Mapuche lands (twelve on the coast and central plains of Valdivia, three in Concepción, two of which were south of the Bío-Bío, and five near the Andes, which had been destroyed by Mapuche rebellions).<sup>90</sup> Perhaps most surprising was the rapid acceptance of Franciscan missionaries by the Huilliche in the second half of the eighteenth century compared to the very limited presence of missions in the Araucanía. This expansion in Huilliche lands,

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<sup>88</sup> Ruiz-Esquilde, *Los indios amigos* and Zavala, *Los Mapuches*.

<sup>89</sup> Ruiz-Esquilde, *Los indios amigos*.

<sup>90</sup> Fr. Juan Ramon, “Estado general de las Misiones del Colegio de Prop Fide de San Ildefonso de la Ciudad de Chillan Reyno de Chile y los frutos hechos de este que entraron al cargo de sus Misioneros con expresión del año en que fue fundada cada una y los Religiosos empleados en ellas, instruido el año de Señor de 1815,” Chillán, AGI, Gobierno, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 208.

often requested directly by caciques, would prove to be a significant node of interethnic diplomacy and violence.

The crystallization of this new missionary strategy along the frontier did not occur at the expense of previous modes of diplomacy. Mapuche and Spanish leaders continued to call for *parlamentos* to resolve grievances, exchange good, and cement alliances. Chilean and North American scholars have understood *parlamentos* along a spectrum ranging from “mediating institutions” to projects of indigenous acculturation and Spanish techniques of surveillance. Nineteenth century Chilean historians, typified by Diego Barros Arana and Claudio Gay, and their descendants, were quick to dismiss these events as a drunken party, a wasteful expense, and a useless effort at diplomacy.<sup>91</sup> In the 1980s, Chile’s “frontier relations” historians argued that in the eighteenth century, the frequency of *parlamentos* reflected a shift from bellicose relations between Spanish and Mapuche to one of peaceful *convivencia*. Increased contact along the Bío-Bío River frontier, with Mapuche crossing north to trade and negotiate, softened what they saw as the belligerent indigenous propensities of earlier generations.<sup>92</sup> David Weber and Abelardo Levaggi placed *parlamentos* into the category of a particular form of Spanish-Indian diplomacy.<sup>93</sup> Jorge Vergara and Rolf Foerster challenged this limited geographic focus on the Bío-Bío Frontier and on the war/peace dichotomy by suggesting that *parlamentos* constituted political strategies of competing hispano-creole and indigenous leadership structures. In

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<sup>91</sup> Written between 1881 and 1902, in the immediate aftermath of Chile’s final military conquest of the Mapuche, Barros Arana’s characterization of the 1793 *parlamento* in his multi-volume *Historia General de Chile* remained highly influential into the late twentieth century. *Historia General de Chile*. Vol. XII 62-63.

<sup>92</sup> See especially Luz María Méndez Beltrán’s contribution to Sergio Villalobos R. et. al., *Relaciones fronterizas*. A decade later, Andrea Ruiz-Esquilde Figueroa continued the “convivencia” analysis of frontier relations in her study of *capitanes de amigos* in the colonial period.

<sup>93</sup> Weber, *Bárbaros*, Levaggi, *Diplomacia*.

their estimation, *parlamentos* were a crucial “mediating institution” between Spanish and Chilean state and indigenous political structures.<sup>94</sup>

Recently, Mapuche and Chilean scholars such as Jimena Pichinao Huenchuleo and José Manuel Zavala have breathed new life into debates over *parlamentos*. In different ways, they have asked how *parlamentos* constituted an important Mapuche forum for cultural expressions of authority, diplomacy, and rivalry among different groups instead of representing solely a Mapuche-Spanish interaction.<sup>95</sup> Mapuche leaders, in turn, used *parlamento* ceremonies and agreements and maintain their legitimacy within their *lofs* and *butalmapus*. *Parlamentos* thus represented one significant and, from an archival point of view, highly visible part of an evolving strategy for Mapuche governance and diplomacy. Others have suggested that while these ceremonies were not simply a vector of Mapuche acculturation to European politics and cultural loss as scholars argued in the 1980s, the ceremonies still represented techniques of colonial surveillance. Spanish officers used *parlamentos* to document Mapuche population, leadership structures, and observe Mapuche lands and practices in a biopolitical manner. Thus *parlamento* still represented a technique of colonial domination, which emerged as Mapuche militarily stymied Spanish conquest.<sup>96</sup>

The *parlamento* represented the imposition of Mapuche diplomatic practices and politics of governance on the Spanish, which resulted in *Spanish* accommodation and adaptation of European modes of interaction. Nonetheless, *parlamentos* following 1641

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<sup>94</sup> Rolf Foerster G. and Jorge Iván Vergara, “¿Relaciones interétnicas o relaciones fronterizas?” The clearest argument for *parlamentos* as mediating institutions is from sociologist Jorge Iván Vergara, *La herencia colonial del Leviatán*.

<sup>95</sup> Pichinao, “Los *parlamentos*.”

<sup>96</sup> Zavala, Jorge Pavez, Dillehay, and Boccara have offered critical revisions of the *relaciones fronterizas* acculturation thesis from Villalobos, et al.

did much more than establish the topographical limits of Spanish sovereignty. While historians have attributed the origins of *parlamentos* to the Spanish strategy of “defensive warfare” based on missions and negotiation developed by the Jesuit Luis de Valdivia in the 1600s, *parlamentos* grew out of pre-Columbian Mapuche gatherings for celebrating victories, holding war councils, and negotiating peace.<sup>97</sup> While Europeans hoped to use these meetings to expose Mapuche to Catholicism and other Spanish cultural practices, Mapuche representatives utilized these multi-day forums to continue sharing ritual and cultural practices of their own.<sup>98</sup>

Many Spanish officials believed that *parlamentos* were merely “the ceremonies [the Spanish and Mapuche] use in the treaties.” For the Mapuche, the capacity of *lonkos* to call for and attend *parlamentos* demonstrated influence over Spanish officials that in return produced resources—from food and drink to gifts and symbols of Royal recognition—non-interference in Mapuche affairs, or military aid. It was also an opportunity for Mapuche to celebrate rituals of oratory, exchange gifts, and assess the strength and composition of Mapuche families with whom they did not have frequent contact.<sup>99</sup> Nineteenth century French naturalist Claude Gay acknowledged the pre-Columbian origins and defined the *parlamento* in much greater detail.

This proud people has volunteered many times to make peace with their enemies. Since the year 1640 when the first *parla* with the Spanish took place, peace has been renewed many times either due to violence [tortura] between them or the arrival of a new Governor of the Kingdom--either way peace has been negotiated in many *juntas* of the two nations... The Spanish call this council *parlamento* and the *indios* call it *huinca-coyan* from the words *huinca*- [which means] white, for

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<sup>97</sup> See especially, Contreras, “Koyang,” 32-38 and Méndez Beltrán, “La organización.”

<sup>98</sup> Pichinao Huenchuleo, “Los parlamentos hispano-Mapuche,” 33-38.

<sup>99</sup> Pichinao, “Los parlamentos,” 33-38.

the color of the nation to whom it is applied... and *-coyan* [*koyang*] for small council or assembly...<sup>100</sup>

Gay's commentary, which he based on extensive research of Chilean archives and sixteenth and seventeenth century chronicles for his multi-volume *Physical and Political History of Chile*, alluded to two crucial aspects of the parlamento: first, its pre-Columbian origins, and second, that it was a dynamic ritual that responded to changing circumstances.

In 1796, the Spanish Military Commander of Concepción, Francisco de la Mata Linares, suggested another principal component of parlamentos: their regularity. Mata Linares defined *parlamentos* in the following terms:

A parlamento is a solemn assembly that every Captain General of the Kingdom [of Chile] celebrates once in the time of their reign with the frontier indios whereby they ratify their vassalage to S.M [su majestad], agree upon certain points, or confirm the agreements related to Religion, State, or War from previous parlamentos.<sup>101</sup>

While European diplomacy may have held that treaties retain their validity unless broken or modified, we see from this statement that Mapuche agreements required renewal. New Spanish or Mapuche leaders and their representatives needed to take part in the interpersonal ritual of the parlamento to seal pacts and reaffirm their validity.

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<sup>100</sup> Archivo Nacional Histórico de Chile (hereafter ANHCh), Fondo Claudio Gay, vol. 38 (ex 47), p. 16. "Este orgulloso pueblo se ha visto prestado muchas veces a unir a hacer la paz de sus enemigos. Desde el año 1640 en que parla primera vez la hicieron con los Españoles la ha renovado muchas veces ao ya por totorua se haya habido de ella a por entrada de nuevo Gobr en el Reyno por cualquiera de estos motivos la paz le trata mucha junta de los dos naciones u prto la y entrea... Este consejo le llama por los españoles Parlamento y por los Yndios huinca-coyan de las palabras huinca que algunos ... que .. porque blanco, por el color de la nación a que se lo han aplicado quando la propia ... es y de la palabra coyan que ... concilio o asamblea, y asi querra decir que con ellos junta con ..."

<sup>101</sup> The author, Francisco de Mata Linares was the Brigadier General of the Royal Armies and Military Commander of the Frontier. "Relacion de la providencia de Concepción del año 1795," Francisco de la Mata Linares to don Eugenio de Llaguno, 1 Jan. 1796, AGI, Gobierno, Audiencia de Chile, 221, no. 10. Parlamento es una Junta solemne que cada Capitan General del Reino celebra una vez en el tiempo de su mando con los Indios Fronterizos en ella ratifican el vasallage a S.M., acuerdan varios puntos, o confirman los acordados en Parlamento anteriores sobre Religion, Estado, y Guerra."

Mapuche and Spanish leaders continued to call *parlamentos* throughout the colonial period. But, for the Mapuche, they represented only part of the diplomatic practices necessary to resolve hostilities, renew alliances, negotiate captive exchange, and hammer out the terms of missionary and commercial excursions south of the Bío-Bío.<sup>102</sup> *Parlamentos* initially took place on both sides of the Bío-Bío, though increasingly they were held to the north in Spanish domains.<sup>103</sup> Hosting *parlamentos* cost the Crown dearly in gifts, food, and drink. In fact, the frequent occurrence and widespread knowledge of *parlamentos* in Chile, especially in the eighteenth century, meant that Spanish, Mapuche, and Pampas indigenous leaders on both sides of the Andes used the term “*parlamento*” to signify many forms of negotiation or parlay, from the large *parlamentos generales* like at Quilín with representatives from far flung Mapuche domains, to smaller parleys at frontier forts.

Although *parlamentos* eased tensions along the Bío-Bío frontier, they did not bring about a state of *convivencia* during the colonial period. Nor did *parlamentos* predominantly provide Spanish officers and missionaries a chance to learn and effectively implement new disciplinary practices for corralling the Mapuche into Indian towns (*pueblos de indios*).<sup>104</sup> Despite widespread attendance by Mapuche representatives from different parts of the Araucanía, Spanish officials consistently complained of Mapuche incomppliance with the terms of the treaties.<sup>105</sup> Instead of being imperfect forums for negotiation, *parlamentos* reflected the absence of a central Mapuche political authority. Agreements with the Spanish had to be balanced with the vagaries of internal

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<sup>102</sup> Mendez Beltran, “La organización,” Weber, *Bárbaros*.

<sup>103</sup> Dillehay and Zavala, “Compromised Landscapes.”

<sup>104</sup> Boccarra cited in Pichinao, “Los parlamentos.”

<sup>105</sup> Sergio Villalobos, *Vida fronteriza en la Araucanía*, 191.

Mapuche relations in the Araucanía and east of the Andes. In fact, the most significant conflict during the eighteenth century involved a near-decade long war between Pehuenche and Huilliche families over control of raiding in the Pampas even though many of these families had made peace agreements with the Spanish in Mendoza, Concepción, and Valdivia (see Chapter Three).

Though parlamentos have caught the eye of historians in the past few decades, less has been written about how pre-Columbian practices, such as the parlamento, factored into Mapuche internal changes in governance and resistance to the Spanish. While Mapuche families on both sides of the Andes never consolidated into a centralized governing structure, during the eighteenth century several confederations, or *butalmapus*, began to crystalize in the Araucanía, Cuyo, and Valdivia. Alliances forged with the Spanish and resources received at parlamentos strengthened many Mapuche vis-à-vis other Mapuche families and played a role in keeping the Spanish north of the Bío-Bío River. As such, this ritual played a constitutive role in the consolidation and extension of Mapuche power from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century alongside other processes of intercultural exchange and warfare.<sup>106</sup>

## **1.2 The Mapuche in the Bourbon Era**

Significant geographic and political changes impacted the transandean Mapuche world during the eighteenth century. As in many parts of the Spanish Americas, indigenous populations experienced a relative demographic rebound from the devastation wrought by the diseases and violence introduced by the conquest. Moreover, Mapuche

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<sup>106</sup> On warfare and ethnogenesis in colonial and indigenous contexts see R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, "The Violent Edge of Empire." The primary ethnogenetic thesis regarding the Mapuche can be found in Boccara, *Los vencedores* and Guillaume Boccara, "Etnogénesis Mapuche."



men incorporated Spanish horses. Horses became a new source of wealth as well as a basis for long-distance transandean networks of trade, captive taking, raiding, and warfare. Mapuche men from the Araucanía began to increasingly participate in the hunting theft of livestock and taking of Spanish and indigenous captives from settlements near Mendoza, Córdoba, and Buenos Aires. This mobility allowed Mapuche, Pehuenche, and Huilliche to dominate trade in salt extracted from the Pampas, dried meat (*charqui*), livestock, wool, and captives. Given the inefficiencies of Spanish maritime deliveries from Lima to Valparaíso and Chile, frontier dwelling Spaniards frequently found themselves relying on these Mapuche goods.

Additionally, many *lofs* in distinct regions aligned under the leadership of increasingly powerful *lonkos* and kinship groups on both sides of the Andes. The post-Quilín political stability achieved in Chile through *parlamentos*, Mapuche incorporation of Spanish horses, and new opportunities to hunt, capture, and raise large livestock herds in the Pampas shifted the density of intercultural and intra-Mapuche interactions from the Araucanía across the Andes to the Pampas.<sup>107</sup> This had much to do with the infrequency of full-scale war with the Spanish and the greater quantity of trade between indigenous groups and the Spanish across the Pampas. These new trade networks sent salt, meat, leather, and other goods from Buenos Aires to Valdivia in the south and Lima and Potosí in the north. Informal trade fairs took place in frontier forts in the Araucanía known as *conchavos* between Mapuche and Spanish soldiers, merchants, and settlers.<sup>108</sup> This highly lucrative trade combined with the domestication of horses by Mapuche communities

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<sup>107</sup> On the importance of horses to indigenous peoples of the Southern Cone see Peter Mitchell, “I Rode through the Desert.”

<sup>108</sup> Jorge Pinto, ed. *Araucanía y Pampas: un mundo fronterizo*, Sebastián L. Alioto, *Indios y ganado en la frontera*.

meant that wide scale theft of livestock, goods, and captive taking (*malocas*) meant that wealth and effective negotiation with the Spanish could displace military prowess as a source of prestige among Mapuche men.<sup>109</sup>

These changes on both sides of the Bío-Bío River, including new sources of prestige and power from raiding and captive taking, gave rise to more permanent inter-*lof* confederations, or dominions, known as *butalmapus* and the consolidation of Mapuche power in the hands of a number of Mapuche families.<sup>110</sup> Controlling trade routes to Santiago and Valdivia and access to valleys for pasturing cattle and passing to the Pampas became an opportunity for certain *lonkos* to dominate broader sections of territory and consolidate leadership into fewer hands.<sup>111</sup> On the Chilean side of the Andes, there were roughly four *butalmapus*, though each dominion was not so stable as to have one clear leader. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, many contradictions existed within each *butalmapu*: rivalries and alliances between families played out alongside disagreements over whether to support or oppose the Spanish. One existed along the Pacific coast south of the Bay of Arauco, another in the central plains, a third in the south around Valdivia and Chiloé, and a fourth in the pre-cordillera and the Argentine foothills of the Andes. Colonial and post-colonial government, military, scientific, and ethnographic documents reveal confusion and ambiguities over the ethnonyms of these inhabitants. Sometimes the indigenous inhabitants are referred to as the *costinos* of the Pacific Coast, the *abajinos* or *llanistas* of the central plains, and the *arribanos* of the pre-

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<sup>109</sup> Álvaro Bello, *Nampülkafe*.

<sup>110</sup> For a summary of the Araucanization of the Pampas literature, see Martha Bechis, "Interethnic Relations," Daniel Villar, Juan Francisco Jiménez, and Silvia Ratto, *Relaciones inter-étnicas en el sur bonaerense, 1810-1830*, and Raúl J. Mandrini and Sara Ortell, "Repesando viejos problemas: observaciones sobre la araucanización de las pampas."

<sup>111</sup> Holdenis Casanova G., "La alianza hispano-pehuenche y sus repercusiones en el macroespacio fronterizo sur andino (1750-1800), 72-92.

Andean slopes and valleys. Additionally, Spanish colonial documents report confusion between the toponymic ethnonyms and other ethnonyms: *Pehuenche* (western and eastern Andes slopes, valleys, and plains) *Huilliche* (near Valdivia and south of the pehuenche), *Ranquelche* (Pampas), and *Tehuelche* (Northern Patagonia) and many more. Though all of these groups can be considered Mapuche because they shared a common language, albeit with different dialects, and many cultural and social practices, I will use Mapuche to refer to groups living between the Bío-Bío and the Toltén Rivers in the historic Araucanía, Huilliche to refer to families living south of the Toltén near Valdivia, and Pehuenche to describe the groups living in the Andes valleys on both sides of the Andes and south of the city of Mendoza.

Spanish descriptions of late colonial parlamentos attest to the fact that caciques who controlled the butalmapus represented their lofs in negotiations with the Spanish and acted as gatekeepers to Mapuche territory on both sides of the Andes.<sup>112</sup> For instance, the Pehuenche who inhabited the Andes and the territories from Mendoza to the south consolidated their power over a large swath of territory in the late eighteenth century. They acted as a key ally and arbiter between the Spanish and other indigenous groups.

The creation of these larger, extra-*lof* alliances with more discretely defined territorial dominions could be a bloody process. From the mid-seventeenth to the mid-eighteenth century, indigenous groups carried out a series of significant raids (*malones*) on frontier settlements from Mendoza to Buenos Aires, and the Atlantic coastal outposts to the south, which historians have named “the War of the Malón.” They took cattle and

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<sup>112</sup> Each chapter of this dissertation provides an example of this. One less commented upon event where we can clearly see this was a 1770s parlamento called by the Governor of Valdivia wherein each *lofs* cacique traveled to the plaza to testify in favor of a Spanish request to build a mission in their lands. AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 188.

captives, making the livelihood of Spanish settlements precarious, and many indigenous groups wealthy and powerful.<sup>113</sup> This expansion of Mapuche groups east of the Andes pushed the Spanish to consider their interethnic policies. In 1718, Spanish King Felipe II dictated a Royal Cédula encouraging administrators in Santiago and Mendoza to increase colonization beyond frontier spaces. This sparked rebellions against new settlers and missions in Chile: the effort to expand Spanish authority failed. Officials turned to making alliances and peace through *parlamentos*.

A few decades later, these dynamics sparked a slow-burning war between Pehuenche and Huilliche leaders inhabiting both sides of the cordillera. These groups had access to several well-watered and lower elevation passes that facilitated easy access back and forth through the Andes. The Spanish, on the other hand, could only cross the dangerous path between Santiago and Mendoza.<sup>114</sup> At stake for the Pehuenche, Mapuche, and Huilliche was access to the Pampas for raiding and captive taking from Spanish *estancias* south of Mendoza and along the frontier spaces in Río de la Plata. It also gave them access to trade in livestock and salt from the pampas salt flats so necessary for Spanish livelihood as well. At the same time, between 1770 and 1800, the Pehuenche of Malalhue, the lands south of Mendoza between the headwaters of the Salado and Colorado rivers, forged a powerful alliance with the Spanish.<sup>115</sup> Other Pehuenche families inhabited many of the lands from the Maule River near Chillán in Chile, and had made peace with the Spanish in the 1756.

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<sup>113</sup> For a unique study of how gender and race played out in the experiences of Christian women captives, see Yéssica González, “Indias blancas territorio adentro. El cautiverio femenino en la Frontera de la Araucanía, siglos XVIII y XIX.”

<sup>114</sup> Kristine Jones, “Warfare, Reorganization, and Readaptation,” 154.

<sup>115</sup> Holdenis Casanova G., “La alianza hispano-pehuenche,” 72-92.

In the context of the war of the malón, more populous and powerful Mapuche and Huilliche groups surrounded the Pehuenche on both sides of the Andes as they attempted to raid them and the Spanish in the Pampas and Cuyo. Moreover, frontier commander of Mendoza, José de Amigorena (see Chapter Three), led armed expeditions to punish the Pehuenche. A fratricidal conflict broke out between Pehuenche leaders over whether to openly support the Spanish. Eventually, the eastern Pehuenche became the principal allies of the Spanish and began a concerted campaign alongside them to punish the Huilliche and stop transandean raiding. These peace negotiations and joint military actions involved *parlamentos* with Spanish officials in Concepción and Mendoza.

The eighteenth century also witnessed significant changes in the territorial, economic, and political vision of the Spanish Empire. In an effort to pay off debts accrued by the Crown in continuous Continental military conflicts in Europe, Bourbon reformers made a series of significant reforms in the Americas. They created more *audiencias* (courts) to insure justice and legitimacy, they tinkered with tax policies, changed administrative posts to assert Peninsular control over creoles, and they created new administrative units. In 1776, the Crown created the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata and expelled the Jesuit Order from the Americas. Shortly thereafter, the administration of Cuyo Province and the city of Mendoza was shifted to Buenos Aires.<sup>116</sup> Furthermore, the Bourbons adopted new policies to foster peace with independent indigenous groups for

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<sup>116</sup> In the 1780s, the Spanish imposed another administrative reform on Chile: the creation of intendancies. Intendancies were province-like subunits of the Viceroyalties and Captaincies General staffed by governors from elsewhere in the empire General to cut down on patronage and overly close local ties between subjects and authorities. In Chile, the intendancies of Santiago and Concepción were created, while the military plaza of Valdivia and the island of Chiloé remained separate jurisdictions from the rest of the Kingdom with closer ties to Lima. For a discussion of this, see correspondence in AGI, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 315.

the sake of limiting expenditures.<sup>117</sup> In the case of Chile, *parlamentos* and frontier diplomacy had taken place during Hapsburg rule. In many ways, the experiences of Mapuche groups and the Chilean colonial state anticipated many of the changes in the fringe areas of the empire. For the first time, Bourbon Spanish officials also began attempting to collect detailed demographic data on the Mapuche in Chile. A 1796 census revealed the following information and demonstrated the Spanish understanding of the four *butalmapus*, and the constituent elements of Mapuche hierarchy and social organization.<sup>118</sup>

Though no Spanish officials ruled the Mapuche, these imperial reforms were inextricably linked to the political changes in the transandean Mapuche world. Bourbon efforts to mollify autonomous indigenous groups in the Americas for the sake of increasing colonial revenues meant that Spain spent thousands of pesos on food, preparation of *parlamentos*, and tribute to *caciques gobernadores* to avoid open warfare. The combined effects of Bourbon efforts to avoid costly conflicts with the Mapuche and the inter-Mapuche struggles over captives, livestock, and access to the Pampas produced several significant conflicts in the second half of the eighteenth century. These conflicts lessened in the last decades of Spanish rule, but provide key context for understanding this period.

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<sup>117</sup> Weber, *Bárbaros*.

<sup>118</sup> Pedro del Río, “Resumen de la cantidad de indios infieles con separación de sexos y edades que habitan desde el río Biobío hasta el Toltén,” Los Ángeles, 20 Nov. 1796, ANHCh, Fondo Claudio Gay, vol. 38, pp. 1-28

**Figure 1.4: Estimation of the population of *indios* from the Bío-Bío to the Toltén, 1796<sup>119</sup>**

<b>Butalmapu</b>	<b>Population</b>	<b>Parcialidades<sup>120</sup></b>	<b>Caciques</b>	<b>List of <i>ayllarewe</i><sup>121</sup></b>
Coast (Pacific)	39,828	106	102	Arauco, Tucapel, Rañhalhue, Tirua, Cuhinco, Imperial, Cholchol, Boroa.
Angol	20,678	51	41	Angol, Nininco, Puren el viejo, Minas, Lemulemu, Quillin, R., Ripeco, Imperial Alta, Maquegüa
Plains (Llanos)	24,610	48	32	Colgüe, Cayllion, Collico, Chacaíco, Requen, Quechereguas, Traiguen, Llamueo, Trub Trub, Lulamavida, Ayllipen.
Pegüenches	10,188	29	19	Villacura, Rucalqüe, Degono, Chanco, Cuira, Guanbali, Caibuyaumal, Nequen, Dagüegüue, Pino
Total	95,304	229	229	39

### 1.3 Conclusion

By the end of the eighteenth century, some 250 years after the founding of Santiago and Mendoza, the Spanish empire had failed to make deeper inroads than the Inka empire into the heart of the Southern Cone. While Mapuche, Huilliche, and Pehuenche lived in and traversed across a fraction of this space, the diplomatic strategies

<sup>119</sup> Pedro del Rio, “Resumen.”

<sup>120</sup> Most likely “parcialidad” was interchangeable with “reducción,” which the Spanish used to refer to a single or group of *lofs*.

<sup>121</sup> In Mapudungun, *ayllarewe* literally means “nine rewe,” or a number of *lofs* clustered around several ceremonial centers (*rewe*).

of their leaders not only detained Spanish expansion, but also consistently earned European recognition of their sovereignty. This sovereignty was defined and defended not through isolation, indigenous military superiority, or Spanish weakness, but through frequent interactions with Spanish officials in southern Chile and western Argentina. While the Bourbon monarchs and their reformers hoped to more powerfully integrate their empire to compete in the burgeoning Atlantic economy, like Tiwantisuyo, and the Hapsburg Viceroyalty of Peru, the new Bourbon jurisdictional units of Río de la Plata and the Captaincy General of Chile still conformed to frontier spaces defended by Mapuche in the late fifteenth century. This was not a smooth and uniform process—violence, competition, ethnogenesis, and vengeance marked interethnic and inter-indigenous relations and social organization throughout this period. Neither was this transandean frontier a stand-in for irreconcilable partisan divides. It was a site of interaction, exchange, and violence. Indigenous families and Europeans clashed, collaborated, and changed based on these interactions. As we shall see, the frontier became a crucial locus of politics that persisted through the end of the second empire to implant itself in this region.



## Chapter 2: The Mapuche in the Age of Andean Insurrection, 1790-1793

From 1742 until 1782, indigenous peoples across the viceroyalty of Peru rose up against the Spanish colonial system more frequently than ever before.<sup>122</sup> Violence and rebellion stemmed from many places: frustrations with the corruption of local Spanish or *casta* leaders, the exploitative *mita* labor draft, or Indian taxes. Sometimes indigenous communities and leaders expressed this anger through petitions to the King, or local acts of protest and violence against Spanish magistrates (*Corregidores de indios*). Other times they took the form of bloody insurrections, as in Juan Santos Atahualpa's 1742 rebellion in the jungle near Peru's central highlands, or more famously, the revolts led by native lords (*kurakas*) José Gabriel Condorcanqui (Túpac Amaru II), Tomás Katari, and Julián Apasa (Túpac Katari) that engulfed the southern parts of Peru and Bolivia from 1780-1782. The tumult of these decades shook the very foundation of Spanish rule; it "galvanized the best hopes of native Andean peoples, and turned into reality the worst nightmares of the colonial elite."<sup>123</sup>

Longstanding indigenous frustrations with Spanish exploitation intertwined with dislocations created by Spanish alterations to colonial administration to create an explosive conjuncture. Chile was not immune to this tumultuous climate despite Spanish success guaranteeing relative frontier peace through *parlamentos* throughout this period. These radical challenges to Spanish rule came precisely at the time when the Bourbon Monarchy concocted a sweeping series of reforms for the administration of the Indies.

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<sup>122</sup> Steve J. Stern, "The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742-1782: A Reappraisal," 34, in Steve J. Stern, ed., *Resistance, Rebellion and Consciousness*. For fine-grained studies of the broad insurrections in this period, see Thomson, *We Alone Will Rule*, Walker, *The Tupac Amaru Rebellion*, and Serulnikov, *Subverting*.

<sup>123</sup> Stern, "The Age," 35.

These so-called Bourbon Reforms were instigated to maximize profitability and cut out corruption by eliminating local ties between functionaries and their subjects.<sup>124</sup> In Chile, this meant attempting to build military fortifications, missions, and roads for communication through lands controlled by the Mapuche and Huilliche.

Though the Mapuche inhabited and controlled the southern extremes of the Andean regions of the Viceroyalty of Peru, now split between the Captaincy General of Chile and the new Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata (1776), their experiences have been conspicuously left out of the Andean insurrectionary paradigm and chronology.<sup>125</sup> Despite the fame of *parlamentos* for guaranteeing stability in the region, Pehuenche, Huilliche, and Mapuche leaders interacted with the Spanish well beyond the Bío-Bío River and its characteristic cycle of *parlamentos* and negotiation. Significant rebellions and outright wars *did* take place between Mapuche families and against the Spanish in 1723, 1766, the 1770s and 1780s, and in 1792. In fact, while the rebellions in the Central Andes were more geographically widespread and the participants numerous, the small-scale 1792 insurrection in the Huilliche territory of southern Chile threatened the administrative goals of the entire Captaincy General. In September, several Huilliche leaders attacked haciendas and missions in the central plains of the Valdivia province. As in the aftermath of the Túpac Amaru rebellions in Peru and Bolivia, the Spanish used vindictive violence against the Huilliche to stamp out the rebellion and eliminate indigenous claims to sovereignty in the region. The Spanish Captain General, Ambrosio O'Higgins, feared the spread of the rebellion could inflame the entire region and derail

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<sup>124</sup> On the Bourbon reforms, see Webber, *Bárbaros*, Mark A. Burkholder, *From Impotence to Authority*, Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution*.

<sup>125</sup> For studies of Mapuche politics of resistance in the eighteenth century, see Zavala, *Los mapuches*, and Boccara, *Los vencedores*.

his plans for administrative reforms in the region. The causes of the rebellion, though disputed by witnesses, shared many characteristics with those in Peru and Bolivia, such as the aggressive Spanish alteration of previous interethnic agreements, Spanish violence, and failed appeals to Spanish religious and military leaders to act as arbiters of disagreements.

Unlike Peru and Bolivia, previous eighteenth century rebellions along the Bío-Bío River often produced new alliances and agreements between the Spanish and certain Mapuche leaders affirming continued Mapuche sovereignty through *parlamentos* instead of punitive force. The Mapuche politics of rebellion and reconciliation coincided with and departed from the hallmark traits of Andean insurgency. Much like their Andean counterparts, Mapuche families expressed their frustrations to the Spanish through cycles of violence against the Spanish administration, and by appeals to Spanish officials to recognize their authority in *parlamentos*. But despite exceptional moments of violence, like the 1792 Huilliche rebellion, this never devolved into a period of widespread anti-colonialism and revanchist bloodletting. Moreover, unlike in Peru and Bolivia, most Mapuche, Pehuenche, and Huilliche leaders emerged from this era with Spanish recognition of their continued sovereignty. To highlight these continuities and departures, this chapter considers the clash between inter-Mapuche ritual diplomacy, long-term Spanish recognition of Mapuche sovereignty, and changing Spanish administration brought about by the Bourbon Reforms to better understand the ritual aspects of negotiation and rebellion that helped Mapuche leaders defend their lands in the final decades of Spanish rule.

This chapter analyzes Mapuche diplomatic rituals and protocols in the 1790s to understand the interplay between alliance making, rebellion, and imperial reforms in the last decade of the eighteenth century. It shows how borderlands and peripheral zones of the empire—northern New Spain, the Río de la Plata, the Pampas, and the Araucanía—weathered this period of imperial reform and indigenous resistance.<sup>126</sup> Furthermore, this exposition reveals the resiliency and near-universal acceptance of Mapuche diplomatic rituals on both sides of the Andes.

In the frontier spaces of the Araucanía, Valdivia, and Cuyo, Bourbon Reformers had greater obstacles to realizing their goals than poor administration and stagnant economic practices. As the Spanish state tried to secure passage through indigenous lands and build stable indigenous communities and parishes, Mapuche, Pehuenche, and Huilliche (“people of the south” living south of the Toltén River in the jurisdictions of Valdivia, Chiloé, and the parallel lands across the Andes) leaders continued to force ecclesiastical, military, and political leaders to recognize their sovereignty, participate in slow-moving and deliberate diplomatic negotiations that crossed multiple indigenous jurisdictions, and expend great resources on gifts, tribute, and ceremonial meetings. Other times, they engaged in open rebellion, and the possibility of insurrection occupied the minds of the Spanish in Chile. These practices made frontier diplomacy necessary for the Spanish to realize many imperial reforms in the Southern Cone and would set precedents for indigenous loyalty and animosity toward them in the wars of independence in the early nineteenth century.

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<sup>126</sup> Webber, *Bárbaros*,

## 2.1 Ambrosio O'Higgins: A Bourbon Reformer and the Mapuche

In May 1788, the Viceroy of Peru named Ambrose (Ambrosio) O'Higgins Vallenar President and Captain General of Chile (1788-1796).<sup>127</sup> Upon assuming office, O'Higgins, father of the future Supreme Director Bernardo, declared his intention to personally conduct a survey of the entirety of Chile.<sup>128</sup> He had previously spent years as a military commander and intendant of Concepción province, working to achieve stability along the Bío-Bío frontier by improving fortifications and securing peace with the Mapuche. In this capacity, he had hosted and attended *parlamentos* with Mapuche caciques, the most significant of which took place at Negrete in 1784.<sup>129</sup> In the spirit of reform within the Spanish Empire, O'Higgins promised the Council of the Indies he would survey the state of Chile's economy, administration, and military. He intended to improve, as much as possible, the dire state of commerce, agriculture, and mining; put the conduct of the subdelegates and judges of public justice under his personal scrutiny; and report on the ports, military, and maritime fortifications in the event of an attack from a rival European power.<sup>130</sup> In addition, O'Higgins hoped to collect cartographic, climatological, and biological data on the kingdom.

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<sup>127</sup> Born in Ireland, O'Higgins had worked as a merchant in Cádiz, Spain, and the Americas. He became a Spanish cavalry officer in Chile in 1770 and the Commander General and Inspector of Militias in 1780. Following his decade of military service on the Bío-Bío frontier in Concepción, the Viceroy of Peru Teodoro de Croix named O'Higgins intendant of Concepción. In 1788, he ascended to the position of Captain General and President of Chile. As Captain General, he oversaw many public works improvements, including the building of several cities in the Central Valley of Chile, and improving the road from Santiago to Valparaíso. After his successful term as Captain General, in 1796, he was named Viceroy of Peru. Por las aptitudes demostradas en estos cargos, recibió el título de Gobernador en 1788. "Ambrosio O'Higgins," *Memoria Chilena*, accessed 7.18.16, <http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-94300.html>

<sup>128</sup> Letter of Ambrosio O'Higgins, 9 Sep. 1788, Archivo General de Indias (hereafter AGI), Gobierno, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 196, Microfilm AGI, 1381, no. 8, pp. 97-100. O'Higgins and his scribes frequently signed his correspondence "Higgins."

<sup>129</sup> "Apuntes relativos al Reino de Chile," Archivo Nacional Histórico de Chile (hereafter ANHCh), Fondo Hidrográfico Vidal Gormaz, vol. 14, plate 8, pp. 204-217.

<sup>130</sup> Letter of Ambrosio O'Higgins, 9 September 1788, AGI, pp. 98-99.

O'Higgins was not the first official to take on this task. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the presidents and provincial governors of Chile implemented many of the reform projects taking place across the Spanish empire during the eighteenth century. Chilean officials sought to maximize revenues by combating contraband sales (wine, textiles, and livestock primarily) between Europeans, mestizos, and Mapuche south of the Bío-Bío and across the Andes. They aimed to decrease reliance on maritime corridors for supplies and communication by opening and stabilizing a road stretching roughly 450 kilometers from the Pacific port town of Concepción at the mouth of the Bío-Bío river through the Mapuche and Huilliche lands along the coast of the Araucanía to Valdivia (Appendix, Figure 2.1). Governors in Concepción, Valdivia, and Chiloé Island also worked—often at cross purposes—to build a 260-kilometer road through the heart of Huilliche domains to connect Chiloé and Valdivia.<sup>131</sup> They prioritized the refurbishing of military and naval defenses in Concepción and Valdivia, given the near-constant warfare with Spain's British and Dutch enemies. In fact, the president of Chile named an engineer as Governor of Valdivia explicitly to improve the port's maritime fortifications.<sup>132</sup> The history of sixteenth century Dutch invasion of Chile, Spain's frequent wars in Europe, and the aftermath of the Andean rebellions of the 1780s made defenses and careful negotiations with the Mapuche and Huilliche paramount for O'Higgins.

The conversion of *indios* to Christianity continued to animate the eighteenth century administration of Chile over two centuries after the conquest. In 1767, King

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<sup>131</sup> On efforts to police contraband across the Andes, see Ambrosio Higgins to the Subdelegado del Partido de Curicó, 29, Jan. 1794. ANHCh, Fondo Capitanía General, vol. 507, p. 83.

<sup>132</sup> "Relación del estado de la plaza militar de Valdivia," 29 Sep.. 1783, AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 188. See also, Gabriel Guarda, *Nueva historia de Valdivia* and Carlos Lázaro Avilés, *Las fronteras de américa*.

Carlos III (1759-1788) changed the direction of the Spiritual Conquest of unconverted indigenous groups by suppressing and expelling the Company of Jesus from its possessions. Missionary work was replaced by the Order of St. Francis, who along with the Captains General tried to compel and entice the Mapuche to settle into *pueblos de indios* and permit the building of missions south of the Bío-Bío and in the interior of Valdivia province. While religious historian Garbriel Guarda argued that the suppression of the Jesuits “decapitated” the evangelical, educational, cultural, and economic importance of Valdivia,<sup>133</sup> it did not destroy missionary activity in the region. In fact, the number of missions built exploded in Valdivia in the decades after the suppression of the Jesuits when the Franciscans took over. Eleven of the twelve missions run by the Franciscans in Valdivia were created after 1776.<sup>134</sup> The Franciscans ran the Chilean branch of Propaganda Fide out of Chillán, where they also controlled the *Colegio de Naturales* (Native School) to educate children of prominent Mapuche in Spanish reading, writing, arithmetic, and the Catholic faith. In contrast to the Araucanía, Franciscan priests rapidly established a network of missions in the interior of Valdivia. In April 1792, Father Francisco Perez, President of Missions for Valdivia, reported nine working missions under his care, eight of which were built in Huilliche lands outside of the military plaza.<sup>135</sup> Consistent funding did not follow this rapid expansion of missionary work.<sup>136</sup> As will become clear, the task of establishing this network of missions

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<sup>133</sup> Gabriel Guarda, *Nueva historia de Valdivia*, 58.

<sup>134</sup> Manuel Fernandez, “Rason de los productos de los ramos de vacantes mayores y menores, en el bienio de 1809 y 1810 y de las pensiones y gastos a que están afectos,” 31 Jan. 1816, Santiago, AGI, Gobierno, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 208.

<sup>135</sup> Fr. Francisco Perez, President of Missions, 30 Apr. 1792, Valdivia, Archivo del Orden Francisco de Chile (hereafter AF), Asuntos Varios, vol. 7, p. 259.

<sup>136</sup> Governor of Valdivia Lucas de Molina passed several funding requests from Francisco Perez to O’Higgins in December 1792. Father Francisco Perez to Lucas de Molina, ANHCh, Fondo Capitanía General, vol. 410, pp. 185-186.

responded to more than Franciscan commitment to the conversion of indigenous peoples to Catholicism. Often Huilliche caciques explicitly petitioned the Spanish governors of Valdivia to build missions on their lands.

Carlos III also created new administrative units: he split up the southern margins of the Viceroyalty of Peru into a new Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata (modern Argentina) and the Captaincy General of Chile, and imposed a new system of regional government known as the intendancy system. This new configuration split Mendoza and Cuyo, the principal region of interaction with the Pehuenche, from Chile for the first time, but it did not bifurcate transandean Mapuche politics and sovereignty. Finally, despite these new administrative units, Spanish officials attempted to maintain peace along the old frontiers spaces of Chile and Río de la Plata: Cuyo, the Araucanía, and with renewed vigor in the southern region of Valdivia.

Nevertheless, two notable exceptions differentiated Chile and western Argentina from the rest of South America: first, the near complete lack of *pueblos de indios* and their concomitant legal infrastructure (*república de indios*) and revenue base (Indian taxes); second, that much of the land upon which Chileans hoped to exercise these reforms were effectively occupied by the Mapuche.<sup>137</sup> In turn, Mapuche subjects in Chile did not have recourse to the protests within or against the colonial legal system like indigenous groups in the Central Andes. In this context, Mapuche and Spanish leaders on both sides of the Andes needed to forge alternative means of navigating, checking, countering, and bargaining over the future of the region. Therein lay the importance of the *parlamento*.

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<sup>137</sup> On the lack of *pueblos de indios* and the financial strain this put on frontier administration, see the letter from the Superintendente of Chile Jorge Escobedo to viceroy of Peru Teodoro de Croix, 13 Dec. 1785, Santiago, AGI, Gobierno, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 315.



Lurking within Spain's hemispheric effort to maximize efficiency and profitability within a stagnant economic corner of the empire was the burning need to engage in transandean Mapuche diplomacy and exchange politics of the Mapuche. In addition to imposing their sovereign control of lands along the southern margins of the empire, Mapuche, Huilliche, and Pehuenche groups controlled trade routes and resources in the most important commodities in the region.<sup>138</sup> They had access to salt deposits in the Andes and the Pampas so crucial to preserving meat, and they captured and raised significant herds of cattle and horses so necessary for movement and food. To make inroads into this unregulated transandean trade, O'Higgins turned his attention south from Santiago to the Archbishopric of Concepción and the "frontier de indios." Following his survey of the northern reaches of Chile in 1789, he declared his intention to host a *parlamento general* to renew peace and stability with the unconquered Mapuche. He hoped to unite "all of the Nations of the (infidels) *infieles*.... [and] to ease... the same concerns in the other regions of the butalmapus of the Plains and the Coast."<sup>139</sup> In other words, the success of O'Higgins's vision for southern Chile hinged less upon collecting economic and military intelligence or curbing administrative malfeasance than upon hosting a parlamento with representatives from all four *butalmapus*.

The centrality of parlamentos to the interethnic political culture of Chile was no secret to the upper echelons of the empire. O'Higgins' explained to the Council of the Indies that the need to host a parlamento and receive Mapuche consent to fulfill his goals was neither radical nor revolutionary. In fact, it was a constitutive part of the interethnic

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<sup>138</sup> On these transandean circuits of Spanish and indigenous commerce, see Jorge Pinto, ed., *Un Mundo Fronterizo*, and Carlos Sempat Assadourian, "El sistema de la economía colonial."

<sup>139</sup> Letter of Ambrosio O'Higgins, 9 Sep. 1788, pp. 97-98. "Para apaciguar ... la misma inquietud en las demás comarcas de los Butalmapus de Llanos y la Costa."

political culture. According to O'Higgins' aide de camp, attending a parlamento was "in conformity with what is practiced by every new Government of the Señores Captains Generals that are from this Kingdom [of Chile]." <sup>140</sup> The Military Commander of Concepción echoed this sentiment in 1796, when he emphasized the regularity of parlamentos for resolving all matters of administration in the province:

A parlamento is a solemn assembly that every Captain General of the Kingdom [of Chile] celebrates once in the time of their reign with the frontier *indios* whereby they ratify their vassalage to [His Majesty], agree upon certain points, or confirm the agreements related to Religion, State, or War from previous parlamentos. <sup>141</sup>

The Spanish desire to build new Franciscan missions, secure safe passage through Mapuche lands for commerce and mail, and maintain frontier peace and stability became the densest nodes of Spanish-Mapuche interaction during the late-Bourbon era.

For instance, in 1776, the Governor of Valdivia Joaquín de Espinosa hosted a parlamento with several Huilliche caciques from the upriver domain of Quinchilca in order to fulfill their request for a mission on their lands. <sup>142</sup> The attendees included eight caciques, several of their brothers, and many followers. <sup>143</sup> These representatives traveled to Valdivia at the request of the Governor, where they received gifts and listened to sermons from Espinosa and the Spanish *lengua general* (interpreter). For Espinosa, the

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<sup>140</sup> Judas Tadeo Reyes, "Ceremonial del Parlamento General Celebrado en el Campo de Negrete..." AHNCh, Fondo Real Audiencia, vol. 3204, plate 23, p. 336. Judas Tadeo Reyes was Ambrosio O'Higgins's aide-de-camp and scribe.

<sup>141</sup> The author, Francisco de Mata Linares was the Brigadier General of the Royal Armies and Military Commander of the Frontier. Francisco de la Mata Linares to don Eugenio de Llaguno, "Relación de la providencia de Concepción del año 1795," 1 Jan. 1796, AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 221, no. 10. "Parlamento es una Junta solemne que cada Capitan General del Reino celebra una vez en el tiempo de su mando con los Indios Fronterizos en ella ratifican el vasallage a S.M., acuerdan varios puntos, o confirman los acordados en Parlamento anteriores sobre Religion, Estado, y Guerra."

<sup>142</sup> "Decreto [para] formar Junta y recibir los Caziques e indios y oír su dho," Valdivia, 30 Dec. 1776, AGI, Gobierno, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 188. For a map of the river system with the location of the Quinchilca mission in relation to Valdivia, see the work of nineteenth-century naval cartographer Francisco Vidal Gormaz, *Continuación de los trabajos de exploración*.

<sup>143</sup> "Decreto [para] formar Junta."

“spread of true religion to Indios [was] still the most important goal” of his administration.<sup>144</sup>

As was customary, each Huilliche leader responded to the Spanish proposals through their interpreters. The *lonkos* uniformly accepted the proposition to build a mission at Quinchilca, emphasizing their loyalty and obedience to the King, the Spanish, and God. One cacique declared his intention to “imitate” his ancestors who had maintained peaceful relations with the Spanish, including the new Franciscan missionaries in the region. Another indicated that no other governor before Espinosa had “sent armed men to defend them from their enemies, or treated him with such love or warmth.” Most likely, the ongoing violent competition between Huilliche, Mapuche, and Pehuenche families over raiding Spanish settlements in the Pampas and Mendoza, and the Pehuenche-Huilliche wars had put pressure on weaker families to seek Spanish protection in the form of missions and armed assistance. Less wealthy leaders would not have had the strength or clout to take advantage of the burgeoning transandean livestock economy, or secure blanket protections from the Spanish in general *parlamentos*. It had not always been custom in this cacique’s lands to admit missionaries, but due to recent fear of starvation and lack of support from the Spanish, his warriors and caciques beseeched him to accept the mission.<sup>145</sup> These responses hint at the disjuncture between Spanish and indigenous motivations that could nevertheless coincide in agreements through the ritual of the *parlamento*.

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<sup>144</sup> The Audiencia de Chile echoed this sentiment in 1793 in the aftermath of O’Higgins’s Negrete *parlamento* in a report to the Council of the Indies. Real Audiencia de Chile, “...Los particulares aecidos en el Parlamento de Indios infieles de aquellas Fronteras,” 16 Sep. 1793, AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 226.

<sup>145</sup> “Decreto [para] formar Junta.”

Although the Franciscans commenced building the mission at Quinchilca some fifty kilometers east of Valdivia the year following this successful parlamento, the ceremony and its aftermath revealed that the fulfillment of Bourbon and Mapuche desires came from distinct motivations.<sup>146</sup> While the Spanish hoped to expand the Spiritual Conquest into the interior of Valdivia, these Huilliche caciques hoped to secure necessary resources and protection from their enemies. This point became even clearer later in 1777, when the *comisario de naciones* Ignacio Pinuer warned the Franciscans that they were setting a dangerous precedent of Huilliche expectations. Pinuer was inundated with petitions for missions and feared the consequences if Valdivia lacked the resources to fulfill them.<sup>147</sup> Thus, within the seemingly overlapping goals crystalized in the parlamento accord existed potential for conflict and discord.

Another example took place along the Bío-Bío River in 1784, when O'Higgins organized a parlamento as the intendant of Concepción. Spanish officials traveled 120 kilometers southeast of Concepción along the Bío-Bío to the central plain of Negrete where they met several hundred caciques and nearly 2,000 captains and followers. The treaty terms he proposed to the Mapuche revolved around regulating interethnic trade (four specific dates for trade fairs were selected); policing and punishing Mapuche raiding north of the Bío-Bío River; and trying to encourage Mapuche to take up agriculture as a means of cultural enlightenment and to contribute to the colonial economy.<sup>148</sup> These changes would have encouraged a more sedentary economic lifestyle in the Araucanía, theoretically decreasing movement east to participate in cattle raiding

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<sup>146</sup> The Quinchilca mission sits in the modern city of Los Lagos.

<sup>147</sup> Ignacio Pinuer to Reverendos Padres y Señores, "Solicitud de los caciques de los Llanos," 29 Jul. 1777, AGI, Gobierno, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 188.

<sup>148</sup> "Apuntes relativos al Reino de Chile," ANHCh, Fondo Hidrográfico Vidal Gormaz, vol. 14, plate 8, pp. 204-214.

and captive taking. They would have also hopefully tied a more dynamic labor force to the stagnant local economy. During the deliberations, the highest Spanish-recognized representatives of the butalmapus, the caciques gobernadores, symbolically tied together their staffs of rule they had received from the Spanish, heard speeches from O'Higgins, and elected speakers to respond as did the caciques in Valdivia. The Mapuche leaders accepted the Spanish treaty terms and additionally agreed to send a permanent ambassador to Santiago. That the Spanish sought Mapuche consent in this fashion further indicated the importance of working with allied Mapuche to implement the Bourbon reforms in Chile and avoid insurrection. These peace treaties also sowed the seeds of possible future conflicts. They attempted to align the lands covered by the agreements—and thus the portions of sovereign Mapuche domains—with the new viceroyalty of Río de la Plata and the Captaincy General in Chile. This attempted to project the Spanish-recognized barrier of Andes to the transandean Mapuche world. In an instance that will be explored in greater depth in the next chapter, these agreements sought to divide the political authority of the Pehuenche in Chile from those on the other side of the Andes near Mendoza, even though these Pehuenche groups did not attend the meeting.

## **2.2 Reforms and Resistance in Valdivia: The 1792 Huilliche Uprising**

Over the next 12 years, O'Higgins' ascension to Chilean Captain General exemplified the quotidian entanglement of Bourbon goals and Mapuche diplomacy peculiar to this corner of the Spanish empire. The goals of his administration for southern Chile—expanding missions, securing safe passage along the coast of the Araucanía to Valdivia and from Valdivia to Chiloé, cementing a general frontier peace, and defending

the over 1,000 kilometer Pacific coast of Mapuche domains from foreign invasion—involved extensive engagement with the Mapuche in the Araucanía and the Huilliche in Valdivia. However, O’Higgins’ desires for peace and stability became caught up in rivalries between Mapuche groups and Huilliche frustrations with broken Spanish promises of aid and protection. These roiling tensions suggest that under this broad reliance on peace treaties existed explosive conditions akin to those seen in the Central Andes.

Spanish efforts to expand and facilitate overland commerce and communication from Concepción to Valdivia, and from Valdivia to Chiloé to ease the burden of maritime transportation began decades earlier. Over time, coastal Araucanía Mapuche leaders granted the Spanish permission to safely pass through the roughly 400 kilometers necessary to reach Valdivia. Promises of military protection from their indigenous enemies, respect, and gifts to each community were necessary to secure the route. The last 220 kilometers from Valdivia to Chiloé that passed through Huilliche lands, however, remained largely impassable. Successive governors of Chiloé and Valdivia had failed to develop a common approach to diplomatic relations with the various Huilliche families living in the central plains of Valdivia, which made achieving an umbrella agreement impossible. Nor had the governors agreed upon the best route for the road to take. In parallel fashion, Huilliche leaders held the Spanish jurisdictions of Chiloé and Valdivia in differing esteem, demonstrating greater favor toward the peaceful intentions of Valdivia’s governors while rejecting the violent forays from Chiloé’s colonists.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> For the most comprehensive history of the relations between Huilliche, Chiloé, and Valdivia see María Ximena Urbina Carrasco, *La frontera de arriba*. For a shorter discussion see, María Angelica Illanes, “La cuarta frontera.”

For instance, in March 1759 Governor of Valdivia Antonio Sáez Bustamante reported that a Huilliche group had invited the Spanish to settle and fortify the path necessary to open up the road to Chiloé in their lands. Yet, less than 20 leagues from Valdivia, he exclaimed that Spanish troops were attacked by a different group of *indios*. The Spanish soldiers only escaped because another contingent of unidentified Huilliche *indios amigos* came to their defense.<sup>150</sup> These divisions between Huilliche families and Spanish political disagreements over how best to approach the Huilliche largely halted construction of the road for several decades.

During the next two decades, internal Huilliche rivalries drew Spanish officials into their conflicts and complicated the possibility of achieving consent for the road project. In a 1777 parlamento, a cacique of the Bueno River plains ceded lands under his authority to the Spanish to build a fort. The cacique Payllaó gave this gift with the expectation that the Spanish would defend his family from enemy attacks. All might have been harmonious if only the Spanish had kept up their end of the bargain. In less than a year, the Spanish reneged on their promises. When faced with attacks from rival *indios*, the cacique beseeched the Spanish for aid.<sup>151</sup> While the commander of the new Bueno River fort sent a few members of the garrison, none opened fire in Payllaó's defense. Even when the enemies came within close proximity of the fort, no one fired and the raiders made off with a large part of the wealth of Payllaó's livestock. Franciscan observers argued that this episode was the origin of Huilliche mistrust of the Spanish in

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<sup>150</sup> Antonio Sáez Bustamante to Don Miguel de Acuña, 28 Mar. 1759, AGI, Chile, 188, no. 26.

<sup>151</sup> Francisco Xavier Alday, "Manifiesto sobre el Azlamto. del Año 1792. con Fecha 20 de Nov de 1792," AF, Asuntos Varios vol. 0, p. 51.

Valdivia generally, and Río Bueno specifically. Two years later, in a similar raid, Payllaó lost his life when once again Spanish commanders refused to intervene on his behalf.<sup>152</sup>

Indigenous groups ceded land for Spanish fortresses as buffers against enemy attacks in other parts of Wallmapu and Spanish American borderlands more generally.<sup>153</sup> Such a strategy often included the foundation of missions and the distribution of food and gifts, and Spanish access to indigenous trade networks and markets. It was a common political calculus adopted by caciques. In Cuyo and Araucanía, several caciques, especially Pehuenche leaders, successfully traded land for protection from the Spanish during the war of malon, and the Pehuenche-Huilliche war that began in the 1770s.<sup>154</sup> Less powerful Huilliche families' decisions to seek Spanish missions and armed protection coincided with this rise in violence, the articulation of Bourbon desires for frontier peace, and the arrival of Franciscan missionaries in Valdivia. The attacks on Payllaó were likely by-products of these interethnic conflicts. Spanish officials could have earned respect, legitimacy, and access to the lands necessary for their road from the Huilliche had they kept their end of the bargain. In the years following Payllaó's death, Spanish commanders continued to watch extraordinary acts of violence and theft visited on the *indios amigos*. The Franciscan missionaries kept their sacred "obligation" to advocate on the Huilliche's behalf to the commanders of Valdivia, and the Franciscan Order in Chillán. Nevertheless, not once did the Spanish send out a punitive mission against the attackers, nor were the culprits ever captured.<sup>155</sup> Reaching a defensive agreement with the Spanish that the Spanish chose to ignore time and time again would

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<sup>152</sup> Alday, "Manifiesto," 52.

<sup>153</sup> On Chile, see Gabriel Guarda, *Flandes indiano: Las fortificaciones del Reino de Chile, 1541-1826* (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1990), Webber, *Bárbaros*.

<sup>154</sup> See Chapter 3.

<sup>155</sup> "Manifiesto," pp. 52-53.



have compounded Huilliche frustrations. Franciscan ineffectiveness in lobbying on their behalf would not have been lost on the Huilliche, either.

During the rule of governor of Valdivia Pedro Gregorio de Echenique (1779-1785), the Bueno River Huilliche demanded the end of Spain's presence on their lands. The caciques saw the ineffectiveness of Franciscan petitions on their behalf and decided to break the pacts that allowed missions on their lands.<sup>156</sup> Manifesting their dissatisfaction, the Huilliche sent messages across the Andes to the Pehuenche asking for an alliance to expel the Spanish from their lands. They even sent an arrow signifying war. The caciques also held a large *junta general* "a stone's throw away from the [Bueno River] fort" to emphasize their anger toward the Spanish. Franciscan observers believed that the Huilliche realized that they could not find peace under the "Spanish yoke" and thus hoped to return to the "solitude and independence" they had enjoyed after the 1599 uprising, which expelled the Spanish from the region. In response, the governor of Valdivia ordered the arrest of the three principal Huilliche leaders. He then sent the prisoners to Santiago. While two caciques died, the third, Queypul, would go on to lead a 1792 uprising. Nevertheless, the governor agreed to Huilliche demands to remove the Río Bueno fort. Alday concluded the removal of the fort was "insufficient to uproot the heart of the indios' aversion and rage they had cultivated against the Spanish." The Huilliche caciques would not soon forget these violations of trust and interethnic diplomacy.

Despite the arrest of these leaders, Alday noted that the Huilliche generally celebrated the departure of the Spanish military presence, while expressing warmth and possessiveness toward the missions and priests.<sup>157</sup> Yet, Huilliche made a strong

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<sup>156</sup> "Manifiesto," p. 53.

<sup>157</sup> "Manifiesto," pp. 53-54.

distinction between missionaries, soldiers, and *vecinos* (Spanish settlers): no forts or settlers would be allowed to return. While several Huilliche communities in the region did sell land to Spanish settlers, the caciques of Río Bueno never sold “even an inch of land” on their bank of the river nor any livestock.<sup>158</sup>

The second half of the 1780s witnessed new pressure on Huilliche leaders from O’Higgins, Governor of Valdivia Mariano Pusterla, and Governor of Chiloé Francisco Hurtado to secure a pathway for the Camino Real. In 1787, Hurtado commissioned two exploratory, yet highly armed, expeditions from Chiloé to determine if a coastal path or one that cut through the central plains would be better. Aside from the fact-finding intent of the expeditions, historian María Ximena Urbina suggests Hurtado was prepared to make war against the Huilliche with the slightest provocation.<sup>159</sup> By contrast, Pusterla had been in peaceful negotiations with the Huilliche leader Catiguala. Franciscan missionaries from the interior of Valdivia personally advised Pusterla that the Huilliche were not of one voice: he must be wary to not raise jealousies of rival Huilliche leaders.<sup>160</sup> However, Catiguala did give Pusterla permission to build the road through the center of the province from 1788 to 1790. In the next two years, engineers moved south from Valdivia to work on widening the road.

While the Spanish viewed Huilliche lands solely in terms of safe passage, Huilliche leaders’ continued request for missions, gifts, and military protection often put them at cross purposes with Bourbon reformers. In 1791, Catiguala expressed the urgency of his overtures to Valdivia by holding a junta in view of the Bueno River mission in the center of the province. In it he asked Governor Pusterla’s emissaries for

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<sup>158</sup> “Manifiesto,” pp. 53-54. On Huilliche lands sales, see Illanes, “La cuarta frontera.”

<sup>159</sup> Urbina, *La frontera*, pp. 277-279.

<sup>160</sup> “Manifiesto,” p. 54.

troops to protect him from his rivals and from a potential Spanish invasion from Chiloé.

The cacique asked for six or seven soldiers to reside in his lands to defend against the

invasion from the caciques Colúm, Huayquipagi and Copayan who lived nearer to

Valdivia.<sup>161</sup> As the Franciscan missionary from the Bueno River mission wrote,

There is nothing more known than that the only motive the *indios* had for asking Spanish to enter their lands was the fear they had of their enemies; and their goal for consenting to the establishment of a fort, was nothing more than the desire to live in peace, free from *malocas*, and sudden attacks, that they experienced every day from their neighbors, hoping that through this request that they could be aided by the Spanish in any occurrence.<sup>162</sup>

A commitment to this protection never materialized. Nevertheless, Catiguala spent the

better part of 1792 petitioning for another form of protection: a mission on his lands.<sup>163</sup>

As both petitions stalled, the Bueno River Huilliche found themselves pinned in between

rival Huilliche, Spanish missionaries, and the governors of Chiloé and Valdivia. This

friction pushed Catiguala first into an alliance with his Huilliche neighbor on the northern

shore of the Bueno River, Queypul, and in September 1792, into open rebellion against

the Spanish.<sup>164</sup> Thus the veneer of peaceful interethnic negotiations that predominated in

Chile cloaked explosive tensions.

On Friday 21 September 1792, the cacique Queypul, who lived near the Bueno

River mission, invited a Spanish *capitán de amigos* to his residence on the pretext of

having a drink. Queypul was one of the three caciques arrested by the previous governor

of Valdivia following a junta by the Bueno River fort. Following the captain's arrival, he

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<sup>161</sup> "Manifiesto," p. 54.

<sup>162</sup> "Manifiesto," p. 51, "No hai cosas mas sabida, como que el unico motive qe tuverion aquellos Yndios, pa pedir, fuesen Espaõnles a sus tierras, fue el miedo, qe tenian conevido a sus Enemgios; y que todo su fin para consenter, qe se estableciese el fuerte, no fue otro qe el deseo de vivir con sosiego, libres de las malocas, y hostilidades repentinas, qe todos días experimentaban de sus vecinos, esperando por este medio ser auxiliados de los Españoles en qualquier acontecimto."

<sup>163</sup> Guarda, *Nueva historia*, p. 104.

<sup>164</sup> Urbina, *la frontera*, p. 293.

and Queypul enjoyed a night of carousing and gunfire, which the Franciscans considered customary at Huilliche gatherings. The next morning, Queypul allegedly ordered his *mocetones* to track and kill the Spanish officer.<sup>165</sup> During the same weekend, the nearby cacique Tangol ordered the killing of his capitán de amigos. Capitanes de amigos were the most quotidian personification of Spanish authority in the domestic spaces of Huilliche families. Thus their deaths would have been much more alarming to Spanish officials than the killings of random settlers. On the evening of Sunday 23 September, without warning, Queypul and Tangol began an attack on a Spanish hacienda near the Río Bueno mission. By the morning of 24 September, neighboring Huilliche including Catiguala, joined Tangol and Queypul in an attack on the Bueno River mission and the nearby Spanish haciendas.


Catiguala, Queypul, and Tangol targeted missionaries, Spanish settlers, and their possessions. Their followers burned several haciendas, took herds of livestock, targeted mission buildings, and killed the priest, Antontio Cuzcoo. Accounts disagree on the precise manner of his death, but all agree that it was slow and violent. The attackers killed at least four Spanish Christians, including Cuzcoo. A cook hiding in the mission allegedly heard a cacique order the beheading of his victims.<sup>166</sup> The mission's priest, Father Manuel Ortiz, was absent at the time of the attack. Ortiz would subsequently serve as the chaplain of the Spanish expedition to punish the Huilliche.

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<sup>165</sup> Francisco Perez to Father Benito Delgado, 17? Oct. 1792, AF, Asuntos Varios, vol. 7, pp. 211-215. Urbina shares this narration of events though she draws on a letter from O'Higgins, which relied on Perez' account. Urbina, *La frontera*, p. 300.

<sup>166</sup> Perez to Delgado, p. 212.

Figure 2.2: Map of the 1792 Uprising<sup>167</sup>



The next day, Queypul's warriors crossed to the southern bank of the Bueno River and continued the attack on haciendas near the Cudico mission. Followers of Catiguala and Tangol reportedly joined them. Though the uprising did not spread beyond this portion of the plains of Valdivia, the Huilliche attacked and burned five haciendas and took many cattle, sheep, and horses. In total, Huilliche rebels killed as many as thirty Spanish colonists, an alarming number considering the sparse Spanish population in the region.<sup>168</sup>

While observers of the uprising disagreed on the exact event that sparked the uprising, all linked Huilliche anger to Spanish expansion into Huilliche lands.<sup>169</sup> As one missionary wrote, Huilliche fears of Spanish violence “[were] not things born of a recent

<sup>167</sup>Raul Molina O., Eduardo Castillo V., Raul Rupailaf M., María Alicia Fuentes D., and Sebastian Cox V., *Territorio mapuche huilliche de Osorno y legislación (Historia de un despojo)*, p. 25.

<sup>168</sup> For more instances of violence, see Francisco Perez to Alejandro Garcia, 23 Oct. 1792, AF, Asuntos Varios, vol. 7, p. 223. Urbina says 30, *La frontera*, p. 300.

<sup>169</sup> Father Alday and Father Perez wrote the primary accounts of the uprising. In addition to the above, see Father Francisco Perez to Lucas de Molina, ANHCh, Fondo Capitanía General, vol. 410, pp. 185-186, 193.

coincidence; but its origins come from long ago and have many deep roots, even deeper than most think.”<sup>170</sup> For the previous decades, Spanish officials lacked coordination in negotiating the passage of the road through this area. They remained inattentive to the obligations agreed upon in *parlamentos*, and the ongoing dynamic of inter-Huilliche raiding and violence. Though this rebellion did not spread into a general uprising like those in the Andes, the Bueno River Huilliche’s frustration with an incoherently implemented Bourbon project pushed them to rebel. This rebellion, and the memory of Huilliche support for sixteenth century Dutch invasions against Valdivia, threatened to undermine O’Higgins’ goals for frontier stability along the Bío-Bío, and the Pehuenche-Spanish alliance in Mendoza earned over the previous decades (see Chapter 3). News of these events gave heightened urgency to O’Higgins’s entreaties with Mapuche leaders in the Bío-Bío and shaped the decision to use naked force to subdue the Huilliche.

### **2.3 A Tale of Two *Parlamentos*: Negrete and Las Canoas, 1793**

Even though the rebellion took place in an isolated corner of Chile, O’Higgins recognized that it potentially threatened all of the goals of his administration. He feared the Huilliche *caciques* would receive a sympathetic hearing from Mapuche in the central plains and coast of the Araucanía, which could jeopardize his plans to host a general *parlamento* and build the Camino Real. In response, O’Higgins decided to host a second *parlamento* in 1793 with the rebellious Huilliche.

For the Negrete *parlamento*, he hurriedly tapped into Mapuche networks of communication to combat the spread of the rebellion and prepare the *parlamento*. He ordered messengers sent to the *cacique gobernador* of Arauco at the southern mouth of

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<sup>170</sup> “Manifiesto,” 51.

the Bío-Bío delta (just south of the port of Concepción), asking him to spread word of O'Higgins's desire for a parlamento to other coastal Mapuche.<sup>171</sup> More explicitly, he sent word to the cacique gobernador of Angol, in the central plains of the Araucanía, warning others to “not take part in the disturbances in Valdivia, refuse and deny the arrow [a symbol of war], and do not go and take part in any *junta* convoked [by the rebels]” or he would severely punish anyone who disobeyed.<sup>172</sup> Threats alone did not compel Mapuche actions. That these groups decided to abstain from joining the rebellion largely stemmed from Mapuche willingness to disseminate his message through their domains to their allies and antagonists.

Before hosting the second parlamento with the Huilliche, O'Higgins ordered a military expedition against Queypul, Catiguala, and Tangol. The campaign against the Huilliche led by Captain Tomás de Figueroa used violent retribution to quickly and indiscriminately resolve the question of Spain's allies and enemies.<sup>173</sup> Between October 1792 and January 1793, Figueroa, led an infantry battalion from Valdivia, treating the “rebellious caciques with no compassion” in his efforts to pacify all Huilliche in the region.<sup>174</sup> Father Manuel Ortiz, who survived the uprising by being absent from the Bueno River mission in September, acted as the expedition's chaplain. Extraordinary and indiscriminate violence characterized Figueroa's expedition.

On 21 October, Figueroa decided to make examples of the Huilliche living near the destroyed haciendas in the Cudico district thereby sending a message to the rest of the

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<sup>171</sup> Ambrosio O'Higgins to Governor Intendant of Concepción, 23 Nov. 1792, AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 226, pp. 6-8.

<sup>172</sup> Ambrosio O'Higgins to Governor Intendant of Concepción, 23 Nov. 1792, AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 226, pp. 6-8.

<sup>173</sup> Figueroa was a known drunk who eventually led the royalist opposition to Chilean forces in Valdivia.

<sup>174</sup> Ricardo Donoso and Fanor Velasco, *Historia de la Constitución de la Propiedad Austral*, p. 144.

Huilliche. Soldiers hung the cacique Manquepan, two of his sons, and 17 warriors. He sent the heads of Manquepan and his sons to Valdivia to be displayed publicly. These Huilliche rejected the last rites offered by Father Ortiz. In the name of the King, Figueroa seized all of the group's children and women, and confiscated their livestock.<sup>175</sup> After this incident, Figueroa traveled south and captured caciques Iñil and Catiguala, who avoided execution by claiming their innocence and aiding Figueroa in his efforts. In November, the expedition discovered the lost ruins of Osorno and used it as a base of operations to punish the Huilliche.<sup>176</sup> In an emblematic attack, Figueroa's forces "killed twenty Pehuenche and Huilliches even though they denied their participation in the revolt. They also decapitated four women and two children."<sup>177</sup>

With the Huilliche rebellion drowned in blood, O'Higgins accelerated his original plan for a parlamento with the "Indian inhabitants of the four cantons, or butalmapus from the sea to the cordillera, and from our southern barrier, the [Bío-Bío] River to the Toltén [river]" which ran parallel some 350 kilometers to the south.<sup>178</sup> In other words, the event would involve Mapuche of the historic Araucanía, not the Pehuenche of Cuyo, who lived in the new viceroyalty, or the Huilliche inhabitants in the Valdivia province, which began on the southern shores of the Toltén. Despite this geographic focus, Spanish observers did record the attendance of Pehuenche residing east of the Andes (Figure 2.4). To organize this grand parlamento, O'Higgins once again had to rely upon Mapuche

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<sup>175</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia*, Tome XII, pp. 67-69.

<sup>176</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia*, Tome XII, pp. 67-69.

<sup>177</sup> Alfred Noggler, *Cuatrocientos años de misión entre los Araucanos* (Temuco, Chile, Editorial San Francisco: 1982), quoted in Molina et. al., *Territorio*, p. 24.

<sup>178</sup> This narration relies upon Judas Tadeo Reyes, "Ceremonial del Parlamento General Celebrado en el Campo de Negrete..." 11 Mar. 1793, AHNCh, Fondo Real Audiencia, vol. 3204, plate 23, pp. 336-342.



networks of communication to spread word of the date (early March), place (Negrete), and treaty terms.

Once confirmed, O'Higgins informed his frontier commanders to dispatch captains and lieutenants *de amigos* to their assigned Mapuche families to announce the decision.<sup>179</sup> At the time, many of these officials lived, had families, and accumulated livestock south of the Bío-Bío alongside Mapuche *lofs* to which they were assigned. Additionally, the General Commissioner of Indian Nations (*comisario general de naciones*) personally crossed the Bío-Bío along the coast all the way to Toltén on the southern coast of the Araucanía, in order to host smaller meetings with all of the prominent leaders of the interior and the central plains.<sup>180</sup> Such a delicate effort to disseminate information and coordinate attendance attested to the need for suasion and interpersonal contact in order to unite caciques to a Spanish cause.

O'Higgins's grand parlamento finally took place in early March 1793.<sup>181</sup> A careful description of the ritual aspects of the event paint a picture of the unique interethnic politics at play in this part of the Spanish empire. This would be the largest and most expensive of the century. Nearly 4000 Mapuche and Spanish officials met at Negrete, "...a plain at the shore of the so-called Duqueco River, exactly at the mouth of

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<sup>179</sup> "Ceremonial," p. 336.

<sup>180</sup> The author's description of each cacique's domains offers a complicated picture of what "butalmapu" meant to the Spanish and Mapuche leaders. This letter describes Colcura, Santa Juana, and Santa Fe—former Spanish forts and missions—as butalmapus, not the coast, the central plains, and the Andean foothills as many scholars have argued. Nor does this seem to be in conformity with the quadripartite division of the Araucanía. In this paragraph, Colcura butalmapu stretched to Arauco, near Concepción at the mouth of the Bío-Bío; Santa Juana, in the central plains, reached to Angol; and Santa Fé reached to Colgué. "Ceremonial," p. 336.

<sup>181</sup> Real Audiencia de Chile, "...Los particulares acesidos en el Parlamento de Indios infieles de aquellas Fronteras," 16 sep. 1793, AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 226.

the mighty and well known Biobio, which is effectively the limit of this frontier.”<sup>182</sup>

Before the Mapuche delegations arrived, O’Higgins gave detailed orders for the preparation of the ceremonial space at Negrete. This construction most likely began on February 23.<sup>183</sup> These included the construction of shelter for Mapuche and the Spanish garrisons that would remain throughout the proceedings. The grounds were to be arranged in a fenced-in quadrilateral shape with palisades. Near the entrance would be a chapel and the quarters of the Captain General, Bishop, Commander General, Secretary, Chaplin and other Spanish officials. Further along the side would be the houses for the troops with an atrium or arbor on which would be unfurled the Royal Banner. This space would be flanked by artillery. Along the other wall would be the mess halls and kitchen for the Spanish leaders and troops. On the opposite side would be food sellers with exits on all sides for passing traffic, and the militias would be stationed there. The indios would be put in nearby encampments (Figure 2.3). The arbor in which the ceremony would take place would be near the entrance. Inside, the seating was divided into four rows of wooden benches reaching to the walls. These were to be the seating spaces for the Butalmapus.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Francisco de la Mata Linares to don Eugenio de Llaguno, “Relación de la providencia de Concepción del año 1795,” 1 Jan. 1796, AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 221, no. 10. On the location of parlamentos and their role in interethnic surveillance, see Tom D. Dillehay and José Manuel Zavala, “Compromised Landscapes.”

<sup>183</sup> “Ceremonial,” p. 401. Tadeo notes that his report covers the events from February 23 through March 7.

<sup>184</sup> “Ceremonial,” p. 337.

**Figure 2.3 Parlamento at Negrete<sup>185</sup>**



Shortly following the completion of construction, Mapuche from all four butalmapus began to arrive (Figure 2.4). Delegates traveled from all four butalmapus in the Araucanía and from east of the Andes to hear the Spanish proposal and make their own claims on behalf of their families. The Chilean Real Audiencia characterized the attendees as being governed by an “a vast number of different passions, discomfitures, and reciprocal impetuosities, for which the Pehuenche Indians were the primary instigators.”<sup>186</sup> Singling out the Pehuenche attested to the scope of the dislocation and fear injected into politics in the Araucanía by the Pehuenche-Huilliche wars even after the Pehuenche and Spanish in Mendoza had forged an intimate alliance (See Chapter 3). The Audiencia’s characterization reflected the fact that within greater expressions of Mapuche unity, and Spanish recognition of a broad Mapuche sovereignty south of the Bío-Bío, changing rivalries cut across the stable image of homogeneous “indios” divided

<sup>185</sup> Claudio Gay, “Parlamento del President Ambrosio O’Higgins, Negrete 3 de marzo 1793,” in *Atlas de la historia física de Chile*. <http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-98601.html>

<sup>186</sup> Audiencia de Chile, 16 Sep. 1793, AGI, Gobierno Chile, 226, p. 1.

into four precise politico-spatial butalmapus. The complications arising from the Huilliche uprising in Valdivia further contributed to this conjuncture of instability.

**Figure 2.4 Mapuche Present at Negrete Parlamento<sup>187</sup>**

Butalmapu	Reducciones	Caciques	Capitanejos	Mocetones	Others <sup>188</sup>	Total
Arauco	13	61	10	344	14	429
Angol	11	40	20	571	13	644
Colhue (Colgue)	18	46	27	1009	0	1,082
Eastern Pehuenche	6	10	8	279	0	297
Western Pehuenche	12	14	3	187	0	204
Totals	60	171	68	2390	27	2,656

On March 4, the parlamento began. O'Higgins ordered the troops to assemble extremely early in order to prepare for the arrival of the Mapuche delegations. Partially for reasons of ceremony and respect, but undoubtedly as a show of martial force, O'Higgins carefully orchestrated the arrival and cannon fire to welcome the caciques. The entrance of the Mapuche attendees paralleled the orchestrated presentation of the Spanish. The caciques, capitanejos and mozetones entered with their respective followers, each carrying the insignia of the white flag. The Cacique Gobernador and the

<sup>187</sup> Numbers drawn from "Estado que manifiesta los casiques respetables, capitanejos I mocetones de los cuatro Butalmapus de esta frontera que han concervado al parlamento celebrado en el campo de Negrete por el M. S. presidente gobernador capitán jeneral de este reino de Chile... Don Ambrosio O'Higgins el los día cuatro al siete del año 1793," Biblioteca Nacional de Chile (hereafter BNC), Collection Manuscritos Medina, Tome 274, pp. 470-471. Part of the discrepancies in the calculations of attendees in this document and my own may stem from the lack of a category for women, children or other Mapuche without these three titles (See note below). When there is a discrepancy in totals, I defer to the document. Another possibility may be that some of the numbers are illegible in the original version. Claudio Gay suggests the attendance was closer to 180 gobernadores and caciques and 347 more companions for a total of 527. This seems far too low. Gay, *Historia*, vol. 4., p. 211.

<sup>188</sup> Women and Mapuche who do not fit the role of cacique, capitanejo, or moceton are not listed separately in this document. This column's value is calculated based on the differences between the total and the three listed categories. Even when no "others" can be calculated, such as with the butalmapu of Colhue, it may be because women were not recorded. See the discussion of the extensive gifts given to Mapuche women below.

Commissioner of Indian Nations would lead each delegation into a circulation formation, mounted on horseback and make three revolutions around the grounds. During each pass, the delegations “roared, made an uproar, and played their music with bugles, *pibilcas*, and their other native instruments.” After the Mapuche delegates took their seats and O’Higgins and the Spanish authorities entered, Spanish troops fired a volley of artillery to mark the commencement of the parlamento.

According to custom, the parlamento began with each cacique passing by to individually greet O’Higgins and his entourage with an embrace and the Mapuche salutation, “Mari mari.” Afterwards, the caciques, the Governador of the Frontier, the Bishop, and the Captain General all relinquished their staffs, bound them together, and placed them at the center of the room where they were held by two Mapuche warriors. With this ceremonial act, the Commissioner of Indian Nations and the General Interpreter recited a solemn oath “to faithfully translate and explain the reasons and reciprocal responses of the Señor Captain General and of the Indios, and they named two of the most qualified missionaries in the Indian language, so that they could guarantee the quality and accuracy of the translations of the interpreters.”<sup>189</sup>

The opening rituals completed, the Spanish began the oratory component of the parlamento. O’Higgins called the attendees to attention and greeted the Mapuche in the name of the King. Through the Comisario de Naciones, he described his motives and objectives for calling the meeting and explained the beneficent intentions of the King who offered protection through the Captaincy General.

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<sup>189</sup> “Ceremonial,” p. 339.

His first concern was gaining approval for the establishment of missions along the southern shore of the Bío-Bío.<sup>190</sup> As in the early days of the “Spiritual Conquest” of the Americas, the Spanish continued their hope to “promote, spread, preserve, and increase the Religion and worship of our true God and Lord...” Yet, conversion alone was not enough. O’Higgins concretely pushed for permission to build churches and convince Mapuche groups to settle alongside them as had happened in Valdivia. Perhaps reflecting the fraught experiences in Valdivia, he explicitly stated that new mission settlements would be “garrisoned” for protection.

O’Higgins’s second objective sought the transformation of the Mapuche economy in light of the frightful economic state of the Spanish frontier inhabitants, and in contrast to the growing wealth in livestock and textiles of the frontier Mapuche.<sup>191</sup> He proposed teaching newly settled Mapuche the advantages of agriculture and livestock raising, which they had viewed with “indifference, coldness, and disdain.”<sup>192</sup> Certainly Mapuche commitment to Spanish-style agriculture and livestock tending would have been lukewarm given the actual dynamics of their economy. Their prowess at animal husbandry drew from their access to transandean valleys and grasslands for seasonal rotation, fattening, and grazing, and increased their supply of new heads. In other words, access to these spaces represented a crucial source of Mapuche power, which Spanish commercial and military regulation threatened.

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<sup>190</sup> Audiencia de Chile, 16 Sep. 1793, AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 226, p. 1.

<sup>191</sup> On the dynamic Mapuche textile economy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries see Manuel Llorca-Jaña, “A Reappraisal of Mapuche Textile Production.”

<sup>192</sup> “La segunda es, haver abrasado el establecimiento de los Ramos de Labransa y Crianza, qye hasta aquí los miravan con indiferencia, olvido o desgreño, cuyo valor, y provecho les hizo conocer, y aprecian la prolija ilustración del Presidente.”

The Camino Real represented the third major proposal in O'Higgins's speech. He asked the delegates for a guarantee of safe passage for overland communications and commerce through the Araucanía that had been previously disrupted by their periodic rebellions. While Mapuche attendees largely assented to this request, no Huilliche attended in order to approve the southern portion of the road. As we shall see, O'Higgins achieved this access through his punitive expedition and a parlamento several months later.

After delivering this speech, a cacique principal delivered the first response in the *Mapudungun* to O'Higgins. Before speaking, he took O'Higgins's place in the arbor and proceeded to swear upon the staffs of rule and address individually O'Higgins, each cacique gobernador, and the caciques and representatives of Angol. "In a high voice," he began to exhort and persuade Mapuche attendees to accept the graciousness of what they had just heard from the Captain General. The other caciques principals, in turn, responded to the speaker. Though O'Higgins' secretary did not bother to record their responses, he noted that this call and response was common during the first day of a parlamento.<sup>193</sup>

The second day of the parlamento, 5 March, began with the same ceremony as the first. The first Mapuche speaker came from Angol. However, the cacique principal, with the consent of his delegation, chose another of his caciques to speak on his behalf since the individual had "a greater reputation for eloquence and prudence."<sup>194</sup> This admission introduced another wrinkle into the understanding of Mapuche authority. Oratorical eloquence undoubtedly mattered between Mapuche and toward the Spanish in the context

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<sup>193</sup> "Ceremonial," p. 339.

<sup>194</sup> "Ceremonial," p. 339.

of parlamentos and smaller juntas. However, there could be a division of labor within lofs and butalmapus such that caciques or caciques gobernadores did not possess all skills. Yet, the skills were necessary within a collective leadership, which had designs on capably navigating intra-Mapuche relations and extracting alliances and aid from the Spanish in the eighteenth century. The Angolino cacique gobernador submitted the request for an alternate speaker to O'Higgins for his blessing. The new representative then continued in a similar manner as the previous day's speaker.

All the while, the comisarios and other translators remained by the speaker's side to convey his propositions and arguments to the Captain General. They pointed out which points were conducive to the Spanish position, which would immediately impact certain caciques, and when it would be each attendee's turn to speak.<sup>195</sup> The responses to the speaker began with the butalmapus and reducciones nearest to the Frontier ("Barrera" in his words) and ended with the farthest geographically. During a respondent's turn, he would stand, and if need be, conference with his delegation in order to proceed unanimously. On serious and directly relevant issues, the entire delegation would retire to the shelter of their leader to reach a consensus.<sup>196</sup>

The third day began with a series of discussions by the caciques gobernadores and O'Higgins in which they asked questions about each of Spain's proposed treaty terms. Following the long discussion, the attendees were settled into a circle. The caciques gave a long, translated, speech to O'Higgins in which they expressed their "tranquil faithfulness" to the King and their willingness to comply with the stipulated treaty terms. After the caciques' speeches, a new ritual element began. O'Higgins, the Bishop of

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<sup>195</sup> "Ceremonial," pp. 339-340.

<sup>196</sup> "Ceremonial," p. 440.



Concepción, and the rest of the clergy remained standing with the caciques gobernadores kneeling. The rest of the Mapuche remained behind the circle. The Catholic attendees all made the sign of the cross, while the “Infieles” raised their right hands. The Comisario de naciones then asked the indios to “solemnly swear their promise” and then shouted an order for a fifteen shot canon salute. With the report of each shot, the participants shouted “vivas” for the King.<sup>197</sup> To further emphasize the unanimity of Mapuche leaders’ acceptance of the peace terms, the Captain General would take the hand of the Cacique Gobernador of the Butalmapu of Angol, who would take the hand of the leader of Colgüe (from the coast), who would reach out to the Pehuenches. The rest of the caciques would embrace and exchange words of congratulations thereby performing a symbolic display of the unity of rival sovereignties and geographies.<sup>198</sup>

The closing of the oral “meeting” component of the parlamento, did not end the parlamento. A series of other ritual practices followed. Next, the participants roasted an entire bull (toro o nobilo) in the middle of the arbor, which had held the meeting. The consumption of the meat was highly symbolic: the Captain General made the first cut, then the rest of the Spanish negotiators, followed by the rest of the Mapuche. They shared a single plate to “demonstrate their union, friendship, and the equal division of a cask of wine between the four butalmapus.”

The apparent unity forged during the proceedings the previous days’ ceremonies and discussions hid the fact that the parlamento structure also fostered division between and within the butalmapus. Once the final meal finished, the previously bound staffs were

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<sup>197</sup> “Ceremonial,” p. 440.

<sup>198</sup> “Ceremonial,” p. 440.

returned to their owners.<sup>199</sup> After the separation of the staffs, O'Higgins opened his private quarters for individual meetings with caciques. Specifically, he heard "complaints [and] individual petitions." The physical petitions were not archived along with this account, but O'Higgins' secretary noted their content. In these private meetings, caciques asked for personal favors on behalf of their subordinates, described internal differences and feuds within their domains or with their rivals, made accusations against individual Spaniards, and requested new *capitanes de amigos* or the replacement of the current ones. The official united front of the four *butalmapus* toward the Spanish coexisted with frustrations, alliances, and grievances between and within them.

On the final day, gift giving occurred, as was common in all Spanish-indigenous frontier ceremonies in Chile and Argentina. Only here is there an indication that families, or at least women, also attended the *parlamento*, even if they did not participate in the deliberations. For example, the Spanish gave all of the Mapuche attendees, including the women, jackets, hats, scarves, belts, gold, and lapis lazuli "all at the King's expense." Gifts for caciques and their wives were a fixture of Spanish-indigenous frontier diplomacy in the Americas.

Even though the circumstances in Valdivia and Concepción provinces differed greatly at this moment, O'Higgins still chose to utilize the *parlamento* to present his plans to the Mapuche and Huilliche. The ostensible solemnity, fraternity, and unity with which the Araucanía Mapuche and Pehuenche approved O'Higgins' proposed reforms in March stood in stark contrast to *parlamento* that took place later that year and opened the last stretch of the Royal Road through Valdivia. The violence of the Tomás Figueroa's

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<sup>199</sup> "Ceremonial," pp. 400-401. The staffs, according to Tadeo, were made of wood. Caciques's staffs were adorned with two evenly spaced rings, *gobernadores* three to distinguish rank. The *gobernadores* also had a silver point and were larger.

punitive expedition against the Huilliche sought more than simple retribution for murdered missionaries and stolen property. It served as a pretext for O'Higgins to implant the Spanish presence in the heart of the Huilliche lands near the Bueno River. Having achieved a general peace at Negrete and cauterized the spread of the Huilliche rebellion, O'Higgins could present the routed Huilliche with a *fait accompli* after years of waiting on negotiation and foot-dragging from the governors of Chiloé and Valdivia. In August and September 1793, these goals would be presented to Huilliche leaders and approved in *parlamentos*. *Parlamentos* were thus important ceremonial events embedded in contingent networks of violence and diplomacy. As we can see here, the scales of power could be tipped by indigenous families abilities to stymie Spanish conquest, or the Spanish could gain the upper hand by securing indigenous support for their actions.

In the midst of Figueroa's campaign against the Huilliche, Spanish forces discovered and seized the ruins of Osorno, a city destroyed during the 1599 Mapuche uprising. Even though O'Higgins had ordered Figueroa to subdue the Huilliche by force, Figueroa's successful campaign and O'Higgins's new general peace in Negrete allowed him to shift his rhetoric toward the Huilliche from a bellicose toward a conciliatory tone. He ordered Figueroa and Valdivia's Governor to assure the Huilliche they "would find [him] willing to forgot all of the recent events, and that he would bring justice and punishment to those who had taken up arms against the [other Huilliche]." <sup>200</sup> Since the uprising and Figueroa's campaign prevented any Huilliche from traveling to the Negrete *parlamento* in March, O'Higgins asked Father Alday to convince the *caciques* near Osorno to negotiate.

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<sup>200</sup> Ambrosio O'Higgins quoted in Denoso y Velasco, *Historia*, 142. "un entero olvido de todo lo pasado y que les hare justicia, castigando a los que les hubiesen dado ocasión de tomar las armas para vengar sus agravios."

In August and September 1793, Spanish officers and Franciscan priests held two *parlamentos* with local *caciques*. From 21-25 August, Father Alday, and several officers met with the *caciques* and families living near the Quilacahuín, Dallipulli, and Cudico missions who had abstained from the rebellion.<sup>201</sup> The Spanish treaty demanded these *caciques* cease raiding other Huilliche and the Spanish, allow safe passage for mail and goods through their lands, offer support as guides, pledge fidelity to the Crown, and fight its enemies. More importantly, and in contradistinction to the Negrete *parlamento*, these *caciques* agreed to fully embrace the Franciscan spiritual conquest: Acts 4 through 9 mandated *caciques* to admit missionaries into their lands and cede lands, protection, and resources to sustain the missions. More invasively, all Huilliche were ordered to baptize their children and send them for Christian instruction; unmarried individuals would marry in the Church, and they would cease practicing healing or spiritual rituals (*machitun*). Despite the more punitive terms of the treaty, the ceremony closed in a similar way to Negrete, with the participants embracing each other.

Shortly thereafter, the Spanish representatives traveled to the epicenter of the rebellion, near the Canoas River in the center of the province, to meet with the rest of the *caciques* of the province. Two of the leaders of the rebellion, Queypul and Tangol, had fled to the mountains, though Queypul was eventually captured and brought to Santiago.<sup>202</sup> The *parlamento* began on 8 September and included Catiguala, Iñil and Canihu, who had participated in the uprising, but had been spared execution by Figueroa. The Canoas *parlamento* treaty included the cessation of significant portions of land to the Spanish. The first article boldly declared that from then on, the Spanish would settle in

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<sup>201</sup> "Actas del parlamento de Quilacahuín," transcribed in Donoso and Velasco, *Historia*, pp. 147-149.

<sup>202</sup> Real Audiencia de Chile, "...Los particulares acesidos en el Parlamento de Indios infieles de aquellas Fronteras," 16 Sep. 1793, AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 226.

Osorno, “the lands of *their* ancestors” that built the fort in the sixteenth century, in the central plains some 100 kilometers south of Valdivia.<sup>203</sup> Avoiding the irony of such a characterization, the treaty explicitly referred to ruins of the Spanish city Osorno. The Spanish not only seized the ruins at the confluence of the Damas and Canoas (Rahue) rivers, but claimed a corridor that stretched from Osorno to the Andes “from now until eternity in favor our King, Master of whichever action or Right that they or their successors could have to these lands.”<sup>204</sup> In addition, the Huilliche pledged to be “constant friends of the Spanish” and offer them aid whenever possible, allow safe passage for commerce through their lands, support the building and maintenance of missions, and participate in Catholic life.

While these events neatly corresponded to the parlamento customs witnessed throughout the eighteenth century, two curious statements were included in the final treaty. First, the parlamento attendees agreed to place the blame for the uprising squarely on the one absent cacique principal: Queypul. Despite his absence, the caciques pledged to make the terms binding upon him. Second, two days later, the Rahue cacique Caniu informed Alday that he only granted his lands to the Franciscans for “use and not as property” and articulated that he would remain the legitimate owner of the agreed upon lands.<sup>205</sup> These final points suggest that in the absence of a consistent military threat from the Spanish, the Huilliche refused to abandon their political dominion of the region. Even though O’Higgins oversaw the rebuilding and modest settlement of Osorno in 1796, no

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<sup>203</sup> My emphasis.

<sup>204</sup> Ricardo Donoso and Fanor Velasco, *Historia de la Constitución de la Propiedad Austral* (Santiago: Imprenta Cervantes, 1928) 144, found in Carlos Contreras Painemal, “Los Tratados celebrados por los Mapuche con la Corona Española, la República de Chile y la República de Argentina (PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2010) 100-102.

<sup>205</sup> “Acta del parlamento de las Canoas,” in Donoso and Velasco, *Historia*, pp. 143-146.

foreigner would establish a definitive presence in the interior of Valdivia until the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>206</sup> Despite O'Higgins's ostensibly successful use of force and diplomacy toward the Mapuche and Huilliche to achieve reforms in Chile, he could not exercise definitive power beyond the Bío-Bío River more effectively than the Inka or Pedro de Valdivia.

## 2.4 Conclusion

The Huilliche rebellion and the two parlamentos analyzed in this chapter underscore the centrality of ritual diplomacy in the transandean Mapuche world for Mapuche and Spanish strategies of reconciliation and violence. That Spanish and Mapuche leaders recognized the legitimacy and effectiveness of parlamentos, in times of peace and in the aftermath of rebellions and repression, explain this region's divergence from patterns that characterized the Age of Andean Insurgency in other parts of the Empire. In other words, the elasticity of Mapuche diplomacy, and Spanish participation in and recognition of these rituals, prevented the emergence of widespread anticolonialism and bloodletting seen in the heart of the viceroyalty of Peru.

The parlamento involved highly orchestrated protocols of communication, deference, debate, and exchange to which Spanish and Mapuche participants acknowledged. It served as a unique intercultural negotiation ritual that represented the central strategy through which Spanish officials hoped to enact a series of reforms and avoid indigenous insurgency in the frontier areas of Chile in the eighteenth century. As we have seen, they served both to ease and amplify indigenous frustrations with Spanish

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<sup>206</sup> Jorge Iván Vergara, *La herencia colonial del Leviatán*, and Vicente Perez Rosales, *Times Gone By: Memoires of a Man of Action*.

administrative reforms. While the ritual aspects of the event involved expressions of harmony, fealty, and respect instead of naked force, contradictions and conflicts coursed through the heart of the proceedings. The accounts of the Negrete and Canoas parlamentos revealed curious clues to operations of Mapuche motives that differed from Spanish interpretations and logics. This persistence of Mapuche power in the Araucanía checked the Bourbon spirit of reform in Chile.

While parlamentos tended to produce peace accords, they did not erase tensions. They were a forum that powerful *lonkos* could place demands on the Spanish, or as in the case of the Huilliche, the Spanish could use to impose terms of surrender upon Mapuche. This however was an exception. The parlamento signified an unavoidable process by which Spanish reformers solicited the consent of the Mapuche. This set a series of expectations and concrete memories for how profound political changes would be negotiated, expectations and memories that would not evaporate when the Napoleonic invasion of Iberia precipitated a crisis of Spanish rule and unleashed winds of reform across the hemisphere.

### Chapter 3: The Pehuenche and the End of Empire in Mendoza, 1793-1817

The reform measures Captain General Ambrosio O'Higgins proposed to the Mapuche and Huilliche in 1793 sought changes to lands west of the Andes. This geographic focus correlated with King Carlos III's creation in 1776 of the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata that placed Mendoza under the jurisdiction of Buenos Aires, severing it from Chile for the first time since the sixteenth century. Perhaps Spanish reformers hoped the imposing heights of the southern extension of the Andes mountain range that divided Chile from Mendoza, which included the highest peak outside of Asia (Aconcagua at 22,838 feet), would finally serve as a logical political barrier between Spain's possessions. From the point of view of indigenous leaders and Spanish administrators on both sides of the *cordillera*, this barrier was fictitious even if it anticipated the eventual bifurcation of Chile and Argentina following independence from Spain.<sup>207</sup>

The Pehuenche domains on both sides of the Andes represented an extension of the frontier dynamics witnessed along the Bío-Bío River north to Chillán, south toward the Toltén River, and east into portions of the modern Argentine provinces of Mendoza, Neuquén, and Río Negro. More than simply another political and physical division, the eastern frontier was also an epistemological space where Pehuenche leaders worked out the meaning of Spanish subject, sovereignty, amigo, and enemigo through frequent diplomatic and bellicose interactions. Mendoza and the adjacent Andean slopes and valleys represented a continuation of the southern frontier of Spanish rule in the Americas, which extended northeast to San Luis and Córdoba in Upper Peru and ended in

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<sup>207</sup> On the contradiction between the Andes as a barrier and a vector of movement, see Andres Núñez, Rafael Sánchez, and Federico Arenas, eds., *Fronteras en movimiento e imaginarios geográficos: La cordillera de Los Andes como espacialidad sociocultural*.



Buenos Aires, and until 1776 a part of the Captaincy General of Chile. South of these places lived between 100,000 and 300,000 autonomous indigenous peoples who faced minimal contact with Europeans.<sup>208</sup> Pehuenche families dominated the western edge of the Pampas and the wooded foothills and mountain passes of the Andes, lands known as Mamül Mapu and the País de las Manzanas,<sup>209</sup> which had served as crucial arteries for exchange, raiding, and the pasturing of livestock since before the Spanish conquest.<sup>210</sup>

During the second half of the eighteenth century, many Pehuenche became important allies of Spanish reformers and rivals of indigenous leaders on both sides of the Andes. The actions of the Pehuenche from the 1793 Negrete parlamento until their attendance of a parlamento organized by independence leader José de San Martín in 1816, shows how transandean indigenous diplomacy and sovereignty influenced the nature of the creole independence struggle, and matched their transandean struggle to liberate Argentina, Chile, and Peru from Spanish rule. Moreover, as Pehuenche had shaped the meaning of colonial political subjectivities in different ways than in the cores of Spanish rule, so too did they imbue unforeseen meanings to Patriot, Royalist, and citizen following the outbreak of the independence wars. This led to the concrete persistence of transnational indigenous politics through the crisis of Spanish rule and the origins of the nations of Chile and Argentina. Pehuenche relations with Spanish frontier officers, priests, and independence leaders show why this region represented a

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<sup>208</sup> Kristine Jones, "Warfare, Reorganization, and Readaptation," 138-139.

<sup>209</sup> Mamül Mapu means "land of firewood/sticks (leña)" in Mapudungun, and País de las manzanas, means "country of the apple orchards."

<sup>210</sup> María José Ots, Pablo Cahiza, and Margarita Gascón, "Articulaciones del Corredor Trasandino Meridional: El Río Tunuyán en el Valle de Uco (Mendoza)," Presentation, Seminario Interdisciplinario sobre Sociedades del Pasado, Mendoza, Argentina, 6 Oct. 2014 and Mónica Alejandra Berón, "Dunes, hills, waterholes, and saltpeter beds: Attractors for human populations in western Pampa, Argentina," *Quaternary International* 422 (15 Nov. 2016): 163-173.

reformulation of pre-Colombian sovereignties as part of the puzzle for understanding the end of Spanish rule and the wars of independence in both countries.

### **3.1 Of Secret Meetings and Salt: The Pehuenche and O'Higgins**

In September 1793, the Chilean Audiencia (high court) portrayed the Pehuenche as important allies. The Audiencia recognized the Pehuenche as “faithful friends of this dependency.”<sup>211</sup> Such a description came in contradistinction to the Huilliche who “value their independence so stubbornly that they clash with and destroy each and every other Nation.”<sup>212</sup> Years earlier, they described the Huilliche as “corsairs and invaders of the Pampa and the Spanish settlements.”<sup>213</sup> These characterizations referred to two armed conflicts that colored transandean politics in the second half of the century. First, the War of the Malón (raid), which consisted of increasingly frequent indigenous raids on Spanish frontier settlements in Argentina to take livestock and captives. Second, from the 1770s until the 1790s, Pehuenche and Huilliche men fiercely competed over passage through the Andes to the Pampas to facilitate the War of the Malón. Despite the administrative separation of Chile from Mendoza in 1776, these conflicts revealed how intimately tied transandean indigenous and colonial politics continued to be. Indigenous leaders related to Spanish officials on both sides of the Andes, their internal rivalries spilled across the colonial frontiers, and their conflicts compelled the participation of the Spanish armed forces. Thus indigenous sovereignty and diplomatic practices continued to mediate Bourbon efforts to engineer spatial and political changes to southern edge of its empire.

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<sup>211</sup> Audiencia de Chile, “...Los particulares acecidos en el Parlamento de Indios infieles de aquellas Fronteras,” 16 Sep. 1793, AGI, Gobierno, Chile, 226, p. 3.

<sup>212</sup> “...Los particulares,” p. 3.

<sup>213</sup> Francisco Vivancos, Pedro Nolasco del Rio, and Pedro Quijada to Ambrosio O'Higgins, 1 May (or 5 Jan) 1789, AGI, Chile, 211, Correspondencia del Presidente Ambrosio O'Higgins, Microfilm 1388-90, 33.

Mapuche, Huilliche, and Pehuenche groups fought each other, while Spanish officers in southern Chile and Mendoza fought to punish certain groups and reconcile with others.<sup>214</sup> These new battle lines involved commerce—trade of livestock, hides, and salt extracted from the Andes and the Pampas—and military protection from other rival indigenous groups. Such conflicts intimately tied together the fates of the Spanish and Pehuenche on the eve of the wars of independence.

During the eighteenth century, Mapuche and Huilliche groups greatly expanded their raiding of Spanish ranches along the internal frontiers of Argentina southwest of Buenos Aires and Córdoba in north central Río de la Plata. These areas experienced a more populous and permanent Spanish settlement project than any of the frontiers in Chile or Mendoza. Raiding the domesticated and escaped livestock from these settlements became the source of wealth and prestige for many Mapuche, Huilliche, and Pehuenche men. Competition over these new networks of commerce and raiding created conditions for transandean violence with the Spanish and other indigenous groups. Livestock-rich indigenous groups in the Araucanía and Cuyo (Mendoza Province) were powerful players in this game. In fact, these men became so wealthy and powerful that Spanish settlers frequently purchased livestock and textiles from animals raided and stolen in other parts of the region.<sup>215</sup>

The Pehuenche inhabited the privileged and contentious crossroads for commerce, grazing of livestock, and communication between Chile, Upper Peru, and Buenos Aires

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<sup>214</sup> Kristine Jones, “Warfare, Reorganization, and Readaptation.” For an example of an Argentine parlamento taking place south of Mendoza over this issue, see José de Amigorena, “Parlamento celebrado con los indios Pehuenches, en el que queda reconocido como gobernador de esta tribu el cacique Pinchintur, Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Mendoza (hereafter AHPM), Época Colonial, Carpeta 29, doc. 35.

<sup>215</sup> On eighteenth century Mapuche trade networks, see Alioto, *Indios y ganado*, and Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, ed., *Araucanía y Pampas*.

in the burgeoning political economy of raiding (malocas) and trading (conchavos).<sup>216</sup> The articulation of this economy, dominated by indigenous groups, involved increased movement of Mapuche and Huilliche groups across the Andes.

Argentinian scholars have named and heatedly debated this process of the “Araucanization of the Pampas.”<sup>217</sup> Many Pehuenche controlled access to the transandean valleys south of Mendoza up to the Huilliche domains on the opposite side of Mendoza. These valleys became crucial for passage east for raiding and for grazing herds sold and eaten by indigenous groups.<sup>218</sup> Competition over these spaces and resources generated bitter divisions between Pehuenche, Huilliche, and Mapuche leaders, and heightened Spanish concerns over frontier security. As indigenous leaders vied over lucrative commercial routes, captives, and livestock, the Spanish on both sides of the Andes responded diplomatically and militarily. In 1756, Chilean governor Manuel Amat y Junient tried to make an alliance with the Pehuenche living in the mountains near Chillán. Across the Andes, the Spanish built the fort of San Carlos in 1770, some forty leagues south of Mendoza, to facilitate interethnic communication and military surveillance in the region.<sup>219</sup> A decade later, frontier commander José Francisco de Amigorena carried out attacks against the Pehuenche south of Mendoza to prevent them from collaborating in Huilliche raids across the Pampas.<sup>220</sup>

For example, in 1787, Amigorena, reported a conversation with Pehuenche Cacique Gobernador Pinchitur about the frictions generated by raiding in the Pampas:

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<sup>216</sup> Alioto, *Indios y ganado*.

<sup>217</sup> For a summary of these debates see Sara Ortelli, “La ‘araucanización’ de las Pampas: ¿Realidad histórica o construcción de los etnólogos?,” *Anuario IEHS* 11 (1996): 203-225.

<sup>218</sup> Sebastian Alioto, *Indios y ganado*, and Álvaro Bello, *Nampülkafé*.

<sup>219</sup> Francisco Ignacio Perez, *El fuerte y el cuartel de San Carlos*, 13-15.

<sup>220</sup> Holdenis Casanova, “La alianza hispano-pehuenche,” 89.

[The Huilliche's and Ranquelche's] raids and offenses against the frontiers of this Viceroyalty, with their continuous hostilities and *malocas* have pillaged excessively and now these rebels find themselves extremely powerful with chests of silver and gold, haciendas, and a multitude of Christian slaves which they share amongst the different enemy caciques... of the region named Mamel Mapu.<sup>221</sup>

Additionally, the growing economy in cattle, horses, and sheep in the Río de la Plata region outside of Buenos Aires became a significant source for Mapuche, Pehuenche, and Huilliche wealth and prestige. Due to poor enclosures and other reasons, escaped livestock, known as *cimarrones*, bred with native stock and alongside the growing herds in Argentinian estancias created new opportunities for indigenous raiders.<sup>222</sup> The rapid growth of indigenous herds actually outpaced the Spanish ability to provide meat to its peripheral settlements, such as Carmen de Patagones on the Atlantic coast and the frontier towns along the Bío-Bío. These settlements came to depend on contraband trade with the Mapuche and other groups for their rations of meat and livestock.

Ironically, as Mapuche and Pehuenche groups increasingly controlled the networks of commerce across the southern Cone that linked them to the Viceregal and Atlantic economies, frontier settlers in Patagonia, Concepción, and Mendoza became increasingly dependent on Mapuche for food and trade goods. The explosion of Mapuche and Pehuenche wealth in livestock allowed them to develop high quality raw wool and a hand crafted ponchos (*chamales*) industry. South Americans and Europeans alike sought textiles sold by Mapuche along the Bío-Bío frontier. Frequently acknowledged, though seldom examined in detail, Manuel Llorca-Jaña has demonstrated that Mapuche groups developed a sophisticated and wide-ranging textile economy, which met demands in

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<sup>221</sup> "Parlamento Celebrado con los indios Peheunches," Mendoza, 17 Oct 1787, AHPM, Sección: Gobierno – Indios, Carpeta 29, doc. 35, p. 3. In mapudungun Mamel Mapu means "land of sticks/firewood."

<sup>222</sup> Alioto, *Indios*, Jones, "Warfare."

Spanish, British, and Chilean markets.<sup>223</sup> Indigenous economies and sovereignties, then, continued to upstage the imposition of new viceregal units and built on bourbon economic and population growth.

After accumulating significant herds of sheep during the eighteenth century, Mapuche women began producing better quality raw wool and finished textiles—primarily ponchos—than their Chilean and Argentinian counterparts. One nineteenth-century observer noted, “Some of the [Pehuenche] ponchos accepted by the general [San Martín] were by no means contemptible as specimens of native manufacture, particularly in the liveliness of the pattern, and the permanence of the colours.”<sup>224</sup> In fact, due to selective breeding practices that maintained the quality of sheep’s wool, Mapuche raw wool supplied Chile’s textile industry in the 1800s. Llorca-Jaña points out that Spanish explorers Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa even noted during the 1730s and 1740s “in Concepción the inhabitants clothed themselves with either coarse woolens produced at home, or with Mapuche textiles, being barely able to afford European wool manufactures.”<sup>225</sup>

The growth of powerful indigenous leaders linked to transandean economies of trade and raiding generated frictions and violence that encouraged some to seek out Spanish support and protection. According to O’Higgins, an alliance between the Pehuenche and the Spanish had existed for decades and was enforced and monitored from Santiago *and* Mendoza.<sup>226</sup> Broadly speaking, the northern Pehuenche who lived in

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<sup>223</sup> Manuel Llorca-Jaña, “A Reappraisal of Mapuche Textile Production.”

<sup>224</sup> William (John) Miller, *Memoirs of General Miller, in the service of the republic of Peru*, 253.

<sup>225</sup> Llorca-Jaña, “A Reappraisal,” p. 106.

<sup>226</sup> Historian Holdenis Casanova backs up this assertion in his chapter “La alianza hispano-pehuenche” by showing how Santiago and Concepción sought a Pehuenche alliance as early as the 1750s and that the peace achieved by Amigorena in Mendoza took several decades longer to achieve.

the valleys closest to Mendoza in Argentina and Chillán in Chile supported Spanish efforts to rein in raids by the southern Pehuenche and the Huilliche who enjoyed backing from the *llanos* (central plains) of the Araucanía.<sup>227</sup> To secure such an alliance the Spanish hosted *parlamentos* and sent military excursions against the Huilliche.<sup>228</sup> These dynamics certainly contributed to the anxieties of the Bueno River Huilliche who carried out the 1792 uprising near Valdivia.

While the Spanish hoped to protect frontier inhabitants and limit (or tax) contraband, such as livestock and wine, in all parts of the newly founded Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, Pehuenche leaders had different aspirations for engaging with the Spanish. As in the Araucanía, *lonkos* sought recognition as *Caciques Gobernadores*, a source of prestige that included a title and promises of military and material aid. In October 1787, the Pehuenche cacique Pinchitur invited frontier commander Amigorena to participate in a *parlamento*, “in the customary manner of the frontier of the Kingdom of Chile.”<sup>229</sup> More than any other Pehuenche leader, Pinchitur saw the importance of an intimate alliance with Spaniards in Mendoza. Demonstrating the Pehuenche’s intimate knowledge with the political culture to the west, Pinchitur proposed a friendship, and alliance, and asked for royal recognition as the governor and representative of the other caciques that accompanied him.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>227</sup> For an example of the Pehuenche/Huilliche conflict, see Francisco Esquibel Aldao to comandante de armas don José Francisco de Amigorena, Mendoza, 18 Sep. 1787, AHPM, Sección: Gobierno – Indios, Carpeta 29, doc. 34.

<sup>228</sup> José Francisco Amigorena to the subdelegado de armas de San Juan, don Francisco Javier Jofré, Mendoza, 7 Sep. 1787, AHPM, Sección: Gobierno – Indios, Carpeta 29, doc. 33. Many other examples populate this carpeta, including details of a 1780 military expedition against the cacique Ancan (doc. 26), a Pehuenche delegation to Mendoza proposing a prisoner exchange to Amigorena (doc. 27), and a August 1784 peace treaty (doc. 28).

<sup>229</sup> “Parlamento Celebrado con los indios Peheunches,” p. 2.

<sup>230</sup> The other Pehuenche attendees who acknowledged Pinchitur’s leadership included the following: “...los Casiques Pinchintur, Govor de la Nacion Pehuenche, su hermano el casique Cannuan, ambos a dos

During the proceedings, which resulted in the recognition of Pinchitur as a cacique principal, the *lonko* also demonstrated fluency in the discourse of vassalage to the King of Spain. Amigorena reported that Pinchitur, “With gestures of friendship, subordination, and fidelity, professing themselves as the legitimate vassals of the Sovereign, and friends of ours, [and] acknowledging the dominion of the King.” This political dexterity intertwined seamlessly with the *fait accompli* of continued Pehuenche control of their lands. This political victory for Pinchitur, however, was not one-sided. In 1789, Spanish officials organized a Pehuenche raiding party to ambush and kill the Huilliche “caudillo” Llanquitor, who was infamous as a “corsair and invader of the Pampas and Spanish settlements.”<sup>231</sup> Spanish officers organized the raid at the Chilean frontier fort of Los Ángeles, and explicitly acknowledged that it was to take place “between the gobernaciones of Buenos Aires and Chile.” Llanquitor’s death removed one of the primary belligerents in the conflict.

Even so, the reverberations of both the War of the Malón and the Pehuenche-Huilliche war influenced the directions of O’Higgins’ plans for the Negrete Parlamento, and Mapuche caciques’ willingness to seek aid and protection from the Spanish in Valdivia and Concepción. In September 1792, O’Higgins received word from Mendoza that he should take precautions in case the Huilliche were preparing a surprise attack on

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hermanos del Casique Gobernador Ancanamun; acompañando a estos los caciques Carrelipy, principal cuadillo de los casiques Pehuenches de los Piñones, primer hermano del citado Pichintur, y Camuan con otros de la parcialidad que se hallaban hasta aquella sazón sin render vasallaje ni obediencia a la Nación Española que lo fueron el dicho Carrilipi, Matamala, Qurricapa, Que pullan con los mas casiques Amigos de la misma Nacion Camueman (alias) Pellon, el casique Roco, Antipan, hijo del Difunto Quentenau, Antepan, y El Casique fronterizo Carilef...” The Sargent Major Miguel Teller and two Pehuenche language interpreters accompanied Amigorena. “Parlamento Celebrado,” p. 1-2.

<sup>231</sup> Francisco Vivancos, Pedro Nolasco del Rio, and Pedro Quijada, “Relata lo ocurrido a los indios infieles de la Frontera,” Los Angeles, Chile, 1 Jan. 1789, AGI, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 211, (Microfilm\_AGI, 1388-90), no. 33.



the Pehuenche and the frontiers of Chile.<sup>232</sup> Mendozaan officials noted that, over the past year “the raids of these faithless [Huilliche] nations” had been nearly continuous, to the point that O’Higgins found himself obliged to step in so as to “avoid disturbing the calm of the friendly butalmapus and protect the few Pehuenche settlements that occupy [eastern slopes] of the cordillera.” The Pehuenche in particular, he noted, had been defending these passes against their enemies, “as our true allies.” Moreover, despite Pehuenche attacks on the Spanish during the 1769 uprising, O’Higgins acknowledged that since they had given the Spanish “constant examples of their loyalty and service, for whose merit I have given them all of the protection and support of Troops and Militias” against the Huilliche. In this report we see how the Spanish continued to value the alliance with the Pehuenche as vital to their military defense and their efforts for general peace on both sides of the Andes. These events were far from localized along the eastern slopes of the Andes. Officials in Buenos Aires noted the Huilliche threats to the Pehuenche, and O’Higgins even admitted that these events accelerated his plans for a parlamento along the Bío-Bío.<sup>233</sup> Moreover, O’Higgins’s orders exhibit some of the elements of reciprocity expected by the Pehuenche. In exchange for their Pehuenche loyalty, the Spanish felt obliged to provide them support.

These events—and the aftermath of O’Higgins’ 1793 Negrete Parlamento—showcase the inescapability of the transandean interethnic politics in Chile and western Argentina. Even though O’Higgins aimed to involve the four butalmapus of Chile and propose peace terms binding within the Captaincy General, over 500 Pehuenche from the

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<sup>232</sup> Ambrosio Higgins Vallenar to Don Nicolás de Arredondo, 20 Sep. 1792, Archivo General de la Nación (hereafter AGN), División: Colonia, Sección Gobierno, Carpeta 45-06-09, Chile 1783-1802.

<sup>233</sup> Gobierno de Buenos Aires to President of Chile, Ambrosio O’Higgins, 14 Aug. 1792, AGN, División: Colonia, Sección Gobierno, Carpeta 45-06-09, Chile 1783-1802.

other side of the Andes attended the ceremony.<sup>234</sup> One of the parlamento's resolutions was that the caciques principales who attended were expected to hold meetings in their domains to report the terms of the parlamento to those who could not attend. They also expressed the new obligations to their followers.

Before the ink dried on the Negrete peace treaty, O'Higgins and several Pehuenche leaders organized a secret parlamento less than a week later to discuss a joint military and commercial project for extracting salt from the Pampas.<sup>235</sup> Though all Mapuche representatives at Negrete promised their loyalty to the Spanish King, O'Higgins favored several Pehuenche leaders with whom he intended to broker an agreement that went beyond general peace terms. On March 9, less than a week after the closing of the parlamento, O'Higgins invited the cacique gobernador of the Pehuenche Don Buenaventura Caullamante, along with Calbuqueu, Ynayman, and the other Pehuenche caciques principales to the frontier plaza of Los Ángeles. O'Higgins' designation of Caullamante as leader of all of the Pehuenche papered over what would have been disunities and divisions on a north/south and east/west axis. The meeting was secret.<sup>236</sup> O'Higgins proposed a series of joint Pehuenche-Spanish salt expeditions to the Pampas on an annual or biannual basis. Joint Spanish-indigenous expeditions were already taking place from Buenos Aires, Córdoba, and Mendoza.<sup>237</sup> None yet departed

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<sup>234</sup> See Figure 3 in Chapter 2.

<sup>235</sup> See "Acta de la Junta de Los Angeles con los Pehuenches, 9 de marzo de 1793," ANHCh, Fondo Capitanía General, vol. 504, p. 81 and Judas Tadeo Reyes "Parte del Documento relativo al Parlamento de Valle en Mayo de 1793," ANHCh, Fondo Hidrográfico Vidal Gormaz, vol. 14, plate 8, p. 238.

<sup>236</sup> "Acta de la Junta de Los Angeles con los Pehuenches, 9 de marzo de 1793," p. 81 and "Parte del Documento relativo al Parlamento de Valle en Marzo de 1793," pp. 238-239.

<sup>237</sup> "Parte del Documento relativo," p. 238.

from Chile.<sup>238</sup> Salt was a crucial component for meat preservation and production in Chile and Argentina, and this commercial importance underscored the fierce competition for access to it. Given the scarce existence of salt in southern Chile and its abundance in certain parts of the Pampas, access required transandean encounters and agreements.

O'Higgins argued that a joint venture would save Chile money by replacing salt shipped from Lima. Moreover, with the aid of Spanish military protection, provisions, and regularization of the excursions, greater amounts could be extracted per trip. Finally, such Spanish support would give O'Higgins and the Pehuenche a military and political advantage over their common enemies: the Huilliche. O'Higgins declared, "a joint Spanish-Indian expedition would erase all of the inconveniences of [individual] expeditions, for it would be assured by superior [military] force even if the Huilliche broke the peace we recently offered them."<sup>239</sup> As the Spanish tried to regulate contraband trade across the empire, they also hoped to secure a stronger monopoly of salt. In 1786, Chilean and Mendozaan officials aimed to apply contraband regulations to Mapuche caciques as well. The caciques of San Fernando, Colchagua, and Maule, the provinces directly to the north of Concepción, were forced to obtain passports from Spanish authorities to carry out salt extraction missions to the Pampas.<sup>240</sup>

The few Pehuenche invited to the secret meeting inhabited the strategic Andean passes between Chile and Cuyo. Therefore, the search for a stable peace was not the only motivation for the meeting or the parlamento. Neither was the Mapuche-European

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<sup>238</sup> José Francisco Amigorena to Ambrosio de Benavides," 24 Jun. 1786, ANHCh, Fondo Capitanía General, vol. 507, p. 72; and Ambrosio de Benavides to José Francisco Amigorena," 24 Jul. 1786, ANHCh, Fondo Capitanía General, vol. 507, pp. 71 y 74.

<sup>239</sup> "Acta de la Junta de Los Angeles." "*cesando todos estos inconvenientes con la práctica de una expedición combinada entre Españoles e Yndios, y asegurada por medio de fuerzas superiores aun para el caso de quebrantar los huilliches la paz que acaban de ofrecer.*"

<sup>240</sup> José Francisco Amigorena to Ambrosio de Benavides, 24 Jun. 1786, p. 72, Ambrosio de Benavides to José Francisco Amigorena," 24 Jul. 1786, p. 71, 74.

dichotomy the primary axis by which these inter-ethnic agreements were understood. In fact, the forces necessary to gain access to salt and transandean commercial routes through the Pampas required a particular alliance that could not fit in the confines of a general parlamento with antagonistic lineages represented. The Pehuenche leaders agreed to accompany the Spanish and grant access across their lands in exchange for military protection, mules, food, and equipment for salt extraction. In other words, while many of the *lonkos* of the Araucanía and the Andes and the Captain General hammered out a peace agreement, the Spanish were simultaneously negotiating more complicated alliances with broader geographical implications.

The Negrete treaty only recognized the independence of the Mapuche on the Chilean side of the Andes and did not countenance its extension into the jurisdiction of Cuyo south of Mendoza. The Pehuenche faced the need to cede part of their territorial control in the form of Spanish passage for salt in exchange for an agreement with O'Higgins that would guarantee military protection from the Huilliche. Salt was a Spanish priority since the Pehuenche already had access to the salt flats in the Pampas.<sup>241</sup> Both parties shared a common enemy: the Huilliche to the south who raided the frontier estancias in Argentina. Therefore, for the Pehuenche Caullumante and his caciques, the offer of protection and the possibility of the weakening of the Huilliche would have been pivotal.

While it is unclear if these joint missions came to fruition, the agreement was neither the first nor the last collaboration between the Pehuenche and the Spanish.

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<sup>241</sup> For progress on Spanish salt extraction in 1796, see Francisco de la Mata Linares to don Eugenio de Llaguno, "Relación de la providencia de Concepción del año 1795," 1 Jan. 1796, AGI, Gobierno, Audiencia de Chile, 221, no. 9, p. 9.

Pehuenche entanglement with the Spanish only increased following the 1793 agreement with O'Higgins. In addition to stopping transandean raiding, Spanish officials and lonkos focused on regulating the passage of interethnic merchants and traders (*conchavadores*) through Mapuche territory, especially the prohibition of wine sales to Mapuche on both sides of the cordillera. The Commander of Militias and the Frontier of Mendoza, Don José Amigorena, received word from O'Higgins and the Subdelegate of the Colchagua province in Chile, Ambrosio de Benavides, that he should prevent the sale of wine to the Pehuenche in his jurisdiction and stop Mapuche caciques from crossing the Andes from the west. In 1794, O'Higgins asked the Subdelegate of Curicó to give gifts to several visiting caciques and caution them to be wary "that the Spanish of this jurisdiction do not under any pretext pass to the other side of the cordillera to reside or trade (*conchabar*) with the Indios."<sup>242</sup> Officials in the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata and Mendoza communicated to O'Higgins that the prejudicial impact of non-Mapuche selling contraband to the Mapuche was so great they considered making it a capital crime. Additionally, they informed the Chileans that another part of combatting illicit commercial enterprises would be obtaining the permission of the Pehuenche living south of Mendoza to pursue criminals into their lands.<sup>243</sup> Mendocino officials even went so far as to enlist several Pehuenche caciques to combat transandean contraband trade in wine carried out by mestizo traders in indigenous lands without state or indigenous sanction.<sup>244</sup> The volume of this trade and its actual fiscal threat to the Spanish are impossible to verify

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<sup>242</sup> Ambrosio Higgins Vallenar to Señor Subdelegado del Partido de Curicó, 29 Jan. 1794, ANHCh, Fondo Capitanía General, vol. 507, p. 83.

<sup>243</sup> Vicente de la Cruz to Ambrosio O'Higgins, 29 Sep. 1794, ANHCh, Fondo Capitanía General, vol. 507, p. 88.

<sup>244</sup> Francisco Xavier Bustamante to Ambrosio O'Higgins, Curicó, 3 Feb. 1794, ANHCh, Fondo Capitanía General, vol. 507, p. 84.

and were most likely exaggerated. But the unregulated movement of Spanish traders, and their characterization as dangerous violent types, could have upset agreements between Mapuche and Spanish leaders. Nevertheless, this crack down on interethnic exchange and the porosity of these frontier spaces once again revealed the ways in which persistent indigenous sovereignty undermined broader Bourbon project of asserting trade monopolies, eliminating contraband trade, and sharpening the enforceability of its authority.

### **3.2 Luis de la Cruz and Father Francisco Inálican: the Pehuenche, 1800-1810**

In aftermath of the interethnic wars of this period, a singular event took place in the pre-cordillera Chilean settlement of Chillán. In 1794, Francisco Inálican, son of a Mapuche lonko from the Araucanía, graduated from the Franciscan Order's *Colegio de Naturales* (School for Natives). He became one of only two Mapuche to receive ordination in the entire three centuries of Spanish presence in Chile.<sup>245</sup> Shortly afterward, he was sent by the Archbishop of Santiago to Mendoza to hear confession and convert the Pehuenche inhabitants of the region.<sup>246</sup> Inálican's training at the Colegio de Naturales,

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<sup>245</sup> Most likely Inálican's father was the cacique from Imperial referred to in this excerpted letter written by Ambrosio O'Higgins: "Cacique Ynalican y me amigo he llegado ayer a esta plaza de Los Angeles, con el solo destino de celebrar un Parlamento general con todas las Naciones de esta Frontera y os lo comunico inmediatamente, para que dispongais isn perdida de tiempo marchar para este destino de manera que estéis aquí a los sietes deias de la primera Luna en que he resuelto dar principio al Parlamento = Copmo vos eres uno de mis principales amigos y mejores servidores al Rey cuento con que no dejareis de estar aquí en aquel tiempo siempre y de tu fidelidad al Rey = Confiado en esto principios, yo exijo además de vos que sin perdida de tiempo embiareis vuestros mensajes de mi parte al Cacique subesor de Vilquen, y a los de Chilli, para que os sigan a este destino, después que hayan combidado y persuadido a los del sur del Toltén a que el mismo fin expreso que antes de partir a vuestra casa despachare a tus mensajes a los del otro lado de la imperia y Boroa, exitandoles a su venida para el Parlamento y que deseo a que concurren a un acto... "Carta del gobernador O'Higgins al Cacique de La ymperial Don Felipe Ynalican," 24 Dec. 1792, AGI, Estado 85, no. 7. This quotation appears in Guillaume Boccara, *Los vencedores*, 277.

<sup>246</sup> For a short biographical sketch of Inálican, see Cristián Leal Pino and Rigoberto Iturriaga Carrasco, *Frailles Franciscanas en tiempos de la independencia: Francisco Inalican y Luis Beltrán. Documentos para su estudio*. Santiago: Publicaciones de Chile, 2009.

which included mastery of Spanish, his close relationship with the Franciscan-run seat of Propaganda Fide in Chillán, and Mapuche cultural and linguistic background placed Inálican in a privileged position as an intermediary between the Pehuenche and Spanish, and subsequently the Patriots under San Martín.

Inálican's 1805 arrival in Mendoza Province to run the mission at the San Carlos fort coincided with the final parlamento between the Spanish and the Pehuenche before the outbreak of the wars of independence. His role as bilingual go-between imbricated with his duties as a missionary, when he acted as the primary translator for both Spanish and Pehuenche leaders in the 1805 negotiations to build the new fort of San Rafael to the south of Mendoza in Pehuenche domains.

On 2 April 1805, Spanish officials met with 23 Pehuenche caciques and 11 captains southeast of Mendoza at the site of the future fort. If the Pehuenche agreed to cede the lands necessary to construct a Spanish fort at the confluence of the Diamonte and Atuel Rivers, the Spanish promised to not seize indigenous lands or attempt to enslave the Pehuenche.<sup>247</sup> The Pehuenche accepted these terms. Additionally, the caciques Carrilef, Cumiñan, and the cacica María Josefa—many of whom had been represented by Pinchitur in the 1787 parlamento—agreed to settle their families near the fort in order to be in closer proximity to the new church, which was to be erected in the fort. Inálican was assigned to run the church and tend to the spiritual needs of the soldiers and Pehuenche inhabitants. As a result, the fort of San Rafael became imbued with religious, political, and commercial significance. The treaty once again recognized that the Pehuenche were faithful vassals of the Viceroy, the Captain General of Chile, and,

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<sup>247</sup> “Copia de los artículos del Parlamento efectuado entre el sargento don Miguel Zeles Meneses y los Caciques Pehuenches en los Ríos Diamante y Atuel,” 3 May 1805, AHPM, Época Colonial, sección Indios, Carpeta 30, doc. 49. Found in Leal and Iturriaga, *Frailes Franciscanos*, 26-27.

most importantly of the King. Yet, this loyalty coexisted with Spanish recognition of Pehuenche territorial independence, and the implicit fact that any Spanish military maneuvers required Pehuenche assent.

Inálican's presence at San Carlos and San Rafael and his ability to move between Pehuenche and Spanish spaces helped to mark the forts as a place of negotiation and intercultural interaction, and foreshadowed their later relevance to independence leaders like José de San Martín. However, his position as intermediary and his Mapuche heritage did not guarantee that the Pehuenche who settled near the forts would abandon their cultural practices and abdicate their ties to their lands. Like the Franciscans in Valdivia, he struggled mightily to settle caciques near the fort and convince them to abandon certain practices (such as polygamy) in order to be baptized.<sup>248</sup> Inálican's experiences demonstrated once again that indigenous willingness to engage in intercultural diplomacy, and even make concessions to the Spanish, such as ceding lands for missions, did not represent the erosion of the cultural and spatial boundaries of their sovereignty.

The Spanish obligations to the Pehuenche in the 1805 parlamento, while appearing modest, belied the continued power exerted by the Pehuenche on the Spanish. In November 1805, the Intendant of Concepción, Luis de Alaba, organized a parlamento at the Los Angeles fort in Chile with the Pehuenche in order to gain permission for a transandean expedition to Buenos Aires.<sup>249</sup> The expedition was to be led by the *acalde*

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<sup>248</sup> Leal and Iturriaga, *Frailes Franciscanos*. See also Letter of Francisco Ynalican, 13 Aug. 1805, Archivo General de la Nación de Argentina (hereafter AGN), Fondo Colonia, Sección Gobierno, Sala IX, Chile, 1803-1809, Legajo 46-6-10.

<sup>249</sup> Luis de la Cruz, *Viaje a su costa, del Alcalde provincial del muy ilustre Cabildo de la Concepción de Chile*. For more on Cruz's expedition diary, see Carolina Depitris, "Del testimonio científico a la narración literaria: el diario de la expedición de Luis de la Cruz (1806)," *Revista de Estudios Latinoamericanos* 42 (2006): 107-129.



*mayor* of Concepción, Luis de la Cruz y Goyeneche.<sup>250</sup> Cruz's 1500-mile expedition would be the most important exploration of the Patagonian coast of Argentina conducted by the Spanish (Figure 3.1).<sup>251</sup> Moreover, it spoke to the fact that indigenous leaders' willingness to engage diplomatically with outsiders along frontiers while refusing to allow settlement or free passage through their lands, not geographic difficulties like the Andes, represented the barrier to European knowledge of and settlement in the Southern Cone despite European maritime superiority and the increasing sophistication of their terrestrial scientific expeditions..

Cruz received formal instructions from the Intendant of Concepción Luis de Alaba to search for places advantageous for "commerce and communication," especially for safe mountain passages; record distances, pasturage, and other topographical features; and find suitable locations for settlements and forts in the interior of the Pampas and along the Patagonian coast that could speed land and sea transit between the Río de la Plata and Lima. Surveyor Tomas Quesada accompanied the expedition to collect topographical and geographical data. These directives neatly aligned with the eighteenth-century Bourbon reforms.<sup>252</sup>

In spite of the confidence of Cruz's superior, these imperial imperatives were inextricably linked to and modulated by interethnic encounters with the Pehuenche. A quarter of Intendant Alaba's orders to Cruz spoke of how to relate to these unconquered indigenous groups. For example, Alaba commanded Cruz to observe the "number of

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<sup>250</sup> Cruz would eventually become an ardent supporter of the Patriot cause, be arrested by the Spanish in 1814, and serve several political roles in independent Chile. José Lanao to viceroy of Peru José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa,

"Relación de los Prisioneros que existen en las casas de la ... Inquisición pertenecientes de Alto Perú y Chile," 25 May 1814, AGI, Archivo de José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, Diversos 3.

<sup>251</sup> Cruz, *Viaje*, ii.

<sup>252</sup> Luis de la Cruz, *Viaje*, 1.

forces, character, customs, of [Spanish] inhabitants, and nations of indios... and the threat posed by each group to Spanish communication and traffic.” Additionally, Cruz’s orders empowered him to determine how best to conquer the natives by friendship or by force.<sup>253</sup> Moreover, Cruz carried a written copy of his orders, signed by Alaba, to serve as a passport that he would present to all caciques he met. The reference to force and conquest in his passport would have been aimed at the indigenous groups of the Pampas, not the Pehuenche who had agreed to act as guides and protectors of the expedition.

**Figure 3.1: Map of the Cruz Expedition, 1806<sup>254</sup>**



<sup>253</sup> Cruz, *Viaje*, 1.

<sup>254</sup> Carlos Wood, “Mapa de Chile y Argentina que demuestra el viaje que hizo don Luis de la Cruz de Concepción a Buenos Aires en 1806,” Chile, 1825, Colección: Archivo Nacional, id MC: MC0058388, <http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-86719.html>, accessed 6 Mar. 2017.

Cruz's final orders involved recommendations for gaining indigenous support for his mission by avoiding hostile gestures and appearances. Even if Cruz discovered efficient land routes on his journey, he must try to convince caciques along the path to respect Spanish commerce. He must attempt to take detailed observations of the caciques he encountered and the location of their residences. Additionally, he should secure the good order of his passage through treaties or agreements with the *caciques* by presenting a Royal Passport to any Spanish "officials, caciques, or indios" they encountered, which would attest to the intentions of his mission. These undertakings would hopefully, in Alaba's words, "avoid grave prejudice."

From the onset, Cruz learned that his Royal authority alone could not secure his expedition's safe passage through Pehuenche territory. In March 1806, Cruz set out on his forty-seven day journey.<sup>255</sup> He required Pehuenche permission to pass the Andes, and support as guides and emissaries to cross the jurisdictions of the indigenous groups of the Pampas. He set out from Los Angeles, weighed down with many gifts for the Pehuenche and the other indigenous he would encounter. However, as the expedition proceeded up the Laja River to the Pehuenche-controlled pass of Antuco, Cruz was forced to wait until another parlamento could take place with the local caciques. When the caciques arrived, they embraced the Spanish party and promptly asked for a copy of party's passport and orders. After electing the cacique Calbuqueu to speak on their half, the Pehuenche agreed to the mission's terms (which they had already approved in November 1805), but

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<sup>255</sup> "Reseña Biográfica Parlamentaria. Luis de la Cruz Goyeneche," *Historia Política Legislativa de Congreso de Chile* <[http://historiapolitica.bcn.cl/resenas\\_parlamentarias/wiki/Luis\\_De\\_la\\_Cruz\\_Goyeneche](http://historiapolitica.bcn.cl/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Luis_De_la_Cruz_Goyeneche)>. Accessed 8 Jun. 2016.

explained that they were unable to allow the group to pass since their cacique principal Manquel had not yet arrived.

The following day, Manquel arrived and the true deliberations could begin. The Spanish believed the meeting to be purely a symbolic act whereby Cruz would be placed under the care of the Pehuenche. But, to Cruz's dismay, the cacique did not easily offer his blessing to the mission. In fact, he complained that the "high officials" on the frontier were paying attention to the needs of the *llanistas*. Calbuqueu peppered Cruz with questions about fulfilling a long series of promises, including military protection against the Huilliche. While the rest of the caciques acknowledged their pledges to the Spanish, they said that Cruz could *only* travel with the Pehuenche cacique named Laylo who had made the direct promise in the November parlamento. Manquel confirmed Laylo's promise, though Laylo tried to back out of it. Calbuqueu and Cruz threatened Laylo with the poor example such a refusal would have on their alliance, and eventually he offered his son as a guide. This episode underscored the crucial fact that a Pehuenche-Spanish alliance was multidirectional. Spanish rulers could not fiat Pehuenche submission. Nor could the Pehuenche be treated as a homogenous political unit: each cacique had competing and overlapping obligations among the indigenous and European sides of this alliance.<sup>256</sup>

### **3.3 Independence, José de San Martín, and the Army of the Andes**

The easing of hostilities in the Araucanía, Valdivia, and Cuyo during the 1790s and 1800s, and the relative prosperity enjoyed by certain Mapuche groups during the eighteenth century could not withstand the aftermath of Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion

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<sup>256</sup> This narration draws from Cruz, *Viaje*, 7-16.

of Spain and Portugal in 1807. The Napoleonic invasion precipitated a crisis of colonial rule in the Americas. During the second year of the Peninsular War, Bonaparte deposed King Ferdinand VII and placed his brother Joseph on the throne. This act removed the symbolic and political head of the Spanish Monarchy and led to the creation of *juntas* (administrative councils) in Spain and the Americas that sought to rule in the name of the deposed King. The political demands of the *juntas* depended on the local context of their emergence. They became an arena for inter-elite struggle over the future of the Indies and gave voice to expressions of loyalty to, frustration with, and rejections of Spain.<sup>257</sup>

Three years after Napoleon's invasion, in May 1810, creole lawyers and soldiers in Buenos Aires deposed the Viceroy of Río de la Plata, established a *junta*, and exiled Spanish leaders who refused to recognize their political authority. Every major city in the viceroyalty, except Córdoba, acknowledged the *junta*'s political power. Upper Peru (modern Bolivia and Paraguay) and Montevideo (Uruguay) also rejected the *junta*. These divisions sparked an internal war, though Buenos Aires was the only viceregal capital to never be re-conquered by the Spanish.<sup>258</sup>

On September 18, peninsular and creole nobles in Santiago, Chile followed a path similar to the insurgents in Buenos Aires. These parties held an open assembly (*cabildo abierto*) and founded an interim government, or *junta*, known as the Primer Junta Nacional de Gobierno. Chile's *junta* did not take the pro-independence character of *juntas* in Mexico. It declared its loyalty to the deposed King, but not the Viceroy of Lima or the liberal Cortes in Cádiz, Spain, which proclaimed to rule in his name (for more, See Chapter 4).

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<sup>257</sup> Adelman, *Sovereignty*, Sartorius, *Ever Faithful*.

<sup>258</sup> For a brief overview of Chilean and Argentine independence see David Bushnell, "The Independence of Spanish South America," in Leslie Bethell, *The Independence of Latin America*, 95-154.

The rule of the junta in Chile was short lived. In 1813, the Viceroy of Peru ordered the military invasion of Chile in order to reestablish the rightful rule of King Ferdinand VII. The expedition landed near the Mapuche domains in the southern port of Concepción, and headed north to retake Santiago. By 1814, Spanish forces under General Manuel Osorio had taken Santiago, and forced the insurgent army to flee across the Andes to Mendoza, whose leaders had recognized the Buenos Aires junta. As patriots in Buenos Aires sent expeditions to secure control over the interior of the former Viceroyalty of Peru, they dispatched 36-year-old José de San Martín to Mendoza to take over the governorship of Cuyo. San Martín's primary task was to organize the Army of the Andes to liberate Chile, and once achieved, continue north to begin the siege of Peru. Having fought in the Spanish army and on Iberian soil for years, participating in the struggle against the Napoleonic invasion after 1808, San Martín returned to his native Buenos Aires and began to fulfill his desire to aid the cause of independence.

Despite the significant political changes wrought by the creation of the revolutionary juntas in Santiago and Buenos Aires, Pehuenche leaders seemed to treat frontier officials south of Mendoza in the same manner that they had under the previous political regime. For example, in September 1813, Father Inálican transcribed a letter to the Governor of Mendoza on behalf of the caciques Marco Goyco, Vicente Goyco, Curiniñan, and Maria Josefa. The caciques emphasized that the governor continue to recognize the purpose of Fort San Rafael, its relationship to their power, and the still reigning obligations agreed upon by the Spanish, irrespective of the current Patriot government in Buenos Aires. These caciques conveyed the bitter complaints of the most powerful Pehuenche leaders, Neicuñam and Millaquiñ, that the fort was supposed to be

garrisoned in order to protect the wives, sons, and daughters of the Pehuenche from their enemies.<sup>259</sup> Moreover, they had granted lands to the Spanish for the fort so such a garrison could subsist—work, plant and harvest—and so that their people could convert to Christianity. However, the upheavals of this period did create unforeseen consequences for Pehuenche politics. Chilean and Argentine soldiers encamped in Cuyo, they complained, had been engaging in criminal behavior, even a murder.<sup>260</sup>

The simultaneous Spanish defeat of the patriot juntas in Chile, and the recognition of the Buenos Aires patriot government by Mendoza's elite created a rift in the political continuities maintained across the Andes in the previous decades. This rift strained Pehuenche leaders by forcing them to negotiate on two fronts: with the Spanish who now controlled Chile, and with the two patriot factions that made up the Army of the Andes—San Martín and the exiled Chileans. In early 1814, following another example of Chilean soldiers stealing Pehuenche horses, frontier commander José de Susso concluded in a letter to San Martín's predecessor, "In my opinion the *indios* are extremely sensitive and it is of absolute necessity to take interest in [them] and make their cause one with ours."<sup>261</sup>

In response, the governor wrote a personal letter, which Susso shared with the Pehuenche. The governor addressed the leaders with the honorific "Señores caciques," calling them "my friends and brothers." He expressed pain at hearing the news of the

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<sup>259</sup> In actuality, according to an 1808 survey of the fort, the effective garrison was only 49 people. Leal and Iturriaga, *Frailes Franciscanos*.

<sup>260</sup> "Fray Francisco Inalican al Señor Gobernador, trasmitiéndole una suplica de los Caciques: Marcos Goyco, Vicente Goyco, Cuiniñam, y la cacica Da Maria Josefa Roco y Lemunahuel – Capitanejo del Gobernador Neicuñam," Mendoza, 28 Sep. 1813, AHPM, Sección: Gobierno, Serie: Correspondencia, Carpeta 234, doc. 51, pp. 2-4.

<sup>261</sup> "Oficios de don Jose de Susso dirigidos al Gobernador Intendente de Mendoza (Juan Florencio Fernada)," 19 Feb. 1814, AHPM, Época Independiente. Sección: Gobierno. Serie: Correspondencia, Legajo 8, Carpeta 235, no. 2.

thefts, declaring “he who does evil to you also does evil to us since we are the same family... do not believe that the government of Chile ordered [their soldiers] to carry out this act.” In addition to offering apologies, he informed his Pehuenche allies that he had asked the Chilean government in exile to compensate the affected parties. Otherwise, he noted that the Pehuenche could send a representative to the government of Chile to collect their horses or payment. This letter demonstrates the continued importance of the Pehuenche alliance with Mendozaan officials, and the relevant transandean dimensions of these politics. The Governor of Cuyo hoped to overcome divisions between political authorities on both sides of the Andes so that the Pehuenche understood that the alliance extended to and was valued by both Chile and Cuyo.<sup>262</sup>

This episode shows the strains put on late-colonial interethnic pacts by the Spanish colonial crisis. Though creoles and peninsular Europeans struggled over new forms of governance and rule, Pehuenche leaders held valid agreements and obligations signed in good faith in the previous years. The caciques observed that one crucial edifice of colonial intercultural relations, the Spanish military frontier apparatus, could not enforce its parts of the obligation. This shows the extent to which Pehuenche groups intended to extend these pacts to the new officials in Cuyo.

The Mapuche priest Inálican represented a bridge between the competing political projects and attempted to adapt Pehuenche’s demands to the new creole leaders in order to resolve local grievances and maintain such agreements. He continued delivering the

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<sup>262</sup> “Oficios de don José de Susso dirigidos al Gobernador Intendente de Mendoza (Juan Florencio Fernada),” 20 Feb. 1814, AHPM, *Época Independiente*. Sección: Gobierno. Serie: Correspondencia, Carpeta 235, Legajo 8, no. 2.



sacraments to loyal Pehuenche.<sup>263</sup> More interestingly, these emissaries, who had chosen to settle near the fort, remained linked to networks of authority and obligation beyond the frontier. These connections, and the willingness of frontier Pehuenche and Mapuche to negotiate with either Spanish or patriots would have heightened San Martín's fear of a prolonged Spanish occupation of Chile and Peru.

Despite the pro-independence movement's contempt for the Church and missionary priests as a pillar of subversion and Spanish rule, Inálican quickly became a crucial go-between for San Martín in his relationship with the Pehuenche.<sup>264</sup> In particular, Inálican worked with the Pehuenche caciques who had emerged triumphant from the late-eighteenth century Pehuenche-Huilliche wars and who had cemented their alliance with Spain. These included the cacique Gobernador Neicuñam and the cacique Millaquiñ and their subordinates Carrilef, Carripan, and the cacica Doña María Josefa Roco who ruled the lands between the Diamonte and Atuel rivers south of Mendoza known as Malalgüe. San Martín stepped onto a political terrain deeply contoured by this alliance and the reciprocal obligations, which bound Mendoza to these Pehuenche leaders.

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<sup>263</sup> Father Francisco Inálican to Juan Florencio Terrada, 25 Apr. 1814, AHPM, Sección: Gobierno, Serie: Correspondencia, Carpeta 234, doc. 80, no. 3.

<sup>264</sup> The Archives of the Franciscan Order, as well as commentaries by patriot politicians and liberal historians contain a litany of abuses aimed at the Church and its priests during the war of Independence. For an example of patriot hostility to the Church, see a letter from Bernardo O'Higgins to the Ministry of War, 3 May 1817, AHNCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol 28, p. 108: "Los Frayles españoles que engordaba el Colegio de Chillan han dirigido exclusivamente la opinión de estos Pueblos. Su doctrina mortífera fue oída con su misión y deferencia: son raros los hombres que en este Partido y sus comarcas hayan tenido la audacia suficiente para no ceder la superchería de aquellos impostores. Pues atáquese este mal por los mismos principios. Mande U.S que inmediatamente vengan seis y ocho Frayles Franciscanos patriotas a toda prueba a poseer este convento con especialísimo encargo de que en el pulpito, el confesonario, y cuantas ocasiones se presenten enseñen al pueblo el patriotismo; en inteligencia que los nuevos poseedores no adquieran derecho al Convento, ni menos a las demás propiedades a los Frayles prófugos. Dios Guarda Quartel gral de Chillan."

In the wars of South American independence, alongside Simón Bolívar, no other figure looms larger than General José de San Martín.<sup>265</sup> Yet, when San Martín arrived in the city of Mendoza in September 1814 to organize the Army of the Andes, engaging with the Pehuenche occupied an integral part of the military and economic focus of his command.<sup>266</sup> Such an alliance could guarantee safe passage through the mountains, and bring word if the Spanish tried the same. In fact, the revolutionary government in Buenos Aires formally thanked the Pehuenche for preventing Spanish forces from crossing into Cuyo and threatening Mendoza.<sup>267</sup> San Martín's frontier officers and Inálican knew that to win indigenous support, they would have to combat Spanish royalist efforts to strengthen old alliances sealed in *parlamentos*. Patriot correspondence in Mendoza attests to this fact. They kept abreast of Mapuche activity in Chile. Patriot frontier officials in Mendoza and southern Chile corresponded over Spanish efforts to maintain their relationship with the coastal Mapuche of Arauco with gifts and short circuit patriot recruitment efforts.<sup>268</sup> That many caciques on both sides of the Andes enjoyed the title of *gobernador*, and evinced a desire to negotiate through *parlamentos*, reflected material markers of the bounds of indigenous sovereignty and its ties to the former Spanish frontier regime in Chile.

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<sup>265</sup> For a brief overview of San Martín's role in Argentine independence, his time in Cuyo, and his relationship with indigenous groups, see Carlos Martínez Sarasola, *La argentina de los caciques. O el país que no fue*, pp. 49-62.

<sup>266</sup> Francisco Ignacio Perez, *El fuerte y el cuartel de San Carlos*, pp. 43-46.

<sup>267</sup> Gervasio Antonio de Posadas, "Testimonio de gratitud hacia el Gobernador, Caciques, Capitanejos, y demas individuos de la Nacion Pehuenche, impidiendo con su ayuda la internación del enemigo de Chile en la Provincia de Cuyo, especialmente al Cacique Manguelin," 14 Dec. 1814, AHPM, Época Independiente, Serie: Gobierno

Sección: Correspondencia con la provincial de Buenos Aires, Carpeta 606, doc. 154.

<sup>268</sup> "Comunicaciones varias del Gobierno de Chile al Gobernador Intendente de Mendoza," 12 Feb. 1814. AHPM, Sección: Exterior-Chile, Carpeta 701, doc. 55.

For these reasons, as early as May 1814, Inálican wrote to the governor—San Martín’s predecessor—requesting permission to travel to Mendoza and personally advise him on the frontier situation.<sup>269</sup> Later that year, Inálican implored San Martín to solidify his friendship with “our countryman the Pehuenches” in a parlamento as soon as possible.<sup>270</sup> He also emphasized that it would be an existential threat to “our sacred cause” if the frontiers were to fall under the control of another enemy indigenous nation.

For instance, in October 1814, the Cacique Millaguin, along with thirteen men and eight women traveled to San Rafael fort to participate in a small parlamento. Through an interpreter, who came with the party, the Pehuenche “expressed their affection” for the new governor. In turn, in the name of San Martín, Susso gave them gifts, which included a horse blanket, a saddle, spurs, scarves, tobacco, and hats.<sup>271</sup> He added an addendum to his description of the meeting, in which he encouraged San Martín to make the sacrifice necessary to “embrace the cacique for whom this ceremony is of the greatest value.”

In order to achieve this goal, San Martín and the Patriots needed to travel to the Pehuenche’s territory. Holding a parley in indigenous domains represented the obverse of common practices in Chile during the eighteenth century. Tom Dillehay and José Manuel Zavala argue that parlamentos shifted from the seventeenth century where they primarily took place south of the Bío-Bío toward the north, in Spanish possessions. Pehuenche

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<sup>269</sup> Father Francisco Inálican to José de San Martín, 10 May 1814, AHPM, Sección: Gobierno, Serie: Correspondencia, Carpeta 234, doc. 80.

<sup>270</sup> Father Francisco Inálican to José de San Martín, 20 Oct. 1814, AHPM, Sección: Gobierno, Serie: Correspondencia, Carpeta 234, doc. 80, no. 1 .

<sup>271</sup> José de Susso to José de San Martín, 19 Oct. 1814, AHPM, Sección: Gobierno, Serie: Correspondencia, Carpeta 235, 40, pp. 2-3. He again refers to this small parlamento on 30 October.

leaders frequently left their lands to negotiate at San Carlos or San Rafael. In the 1810s, however, they expected the Patriots to reciprocate. In Susso's words,

My love for the Patria compels me to exceed myself in order to explain to you how the [situation with the Pehuenche] appears to me, and as now we do not have time to call a parlamento, it would be essential to hold [the meeting] in their village and bring the corresponding gifts.<sup>272</sup>

Pehuenche expectations for resources and support as precursors to making peace meant that San Martín needed to embrace indigenous customs. Though Patriots and their Spanish predecessors in Buenos Aires had had little contact with the Pehuenche, Spanish frontier officials in Mendoza and Concepción had worked intimately to collaborate with and combat the friendly and hostile Pehuenche for the last half-century. Susso emphasized that several Pehuenche caciques knew of recent unwillingness of Chileans to participate in parlamentos during the Patria Vieja or during their exile in Mendoza. This knowledge of negotiations, or lack thereof, in Chile and Argentina shows how Pehuenche drew on the movement of people and information across the Andes to determine their loyalties and secure support and tribute. It also underscored the fact that Pehuenche leaders calibrated their reception of patriot and royalist overtures to each party's willingness to negotiate. They were thereby able to make or refuse alliances based on what they saw as advantageous.

As San Martín's plans to cross the Andes for the liberation of Chile began to materialize, the General finally decided to meet with the Pehuenche. In late 1816, San Martín participated in two parlamentos with the Pehuenche. The first took place in

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<sup>272</sup> "Oficios de don José de Susso dirigidos al Gobernador Intendente de Mendoza (Juan Florencio Fernada)," 18 Feb. 1814, AHPM, Época Independiente. Sección: Gobierno. Serie: Correspondencia., Legajo 8, Carpeta 235, p. 1. Original text: "El amor a mi Patria me ha ase exederme exponiendo a VS lo que me parece en el asunto, y como ahora no tenemos tiempo pa llamarlos a Parlamento, seria preciso aserlo allá en sus toderías llevando la gratificación correspondiente."

September at the San Carlos fort, and the second toward the end of the year in the encampment of the Army of the Andes (though little description exists of this event). In the September parlamento, Father Inálican served as the interpreter and translator.

Since the Spanish forces in Chile outnumbered the Army of the Andes, some six to seven thousand to roughly four thousand respectively, San Martín hoped to secure permissions for his expedition to pass to Chile and ask the Pehuenche to provision the army with livestock and horses.<sup>273</sup> While little is known about the parlamento, roughly 50 caciques attended, and the ceremony lasted between six and eight days. According to one of San Martín's advisors, William Miller, the general brought many gifts of food and clothing, as had been customary in all parlamentos. In one of the only pieces of San Martín's correspondence acknowledging the parlamento, the General reported to Intendant of Cuyo that he had provided a fine coat to the Governor Necuñán in the recent parlamento with the "nación Peguenche."<sup>274</sup> According to Miller, the Pehuenche arrived in a column and style that reflected preparedness for war. The men and the horses were painted, and patriot cavalry accompanied their ranks, firing blanks to welcome the guests. Many women and children followed behind the men. Miller estimated some 2,000 Pehuenche and creoles in total attended the ceremonies.<sup>275</sup> Following the opening ceremonies, the Pehuenche caciques and war captains followed San Martín to a cloth-covered table in the center of the fort to begin deliberations.<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>273</sup> José de San Martín to Gobierno de Buenos Aires, 10 Sep. 1816, Cuartel General de Mendoza, quoted in Martínez Sarasola, *La argentina*, 51. On the size of each army, see *Memoires of General Miller*, 89.

<sup>274</sup> José de San Martín to the Intendant Governor of Mendoza, 15 Oct. 1816, Cuartel General de Mendoza, AHPM, época Independiente, Carpeta 284, doc. 37.

<sup>275</sup> *Memoires*, 94.

<sup>276</sup> *Memoires*, 89-91.

After the Pehuenche were seated in proximity to San Martín according to authority, Father Inálican articulated the Patriot case for an agreement.<sup>277</sup> Inálican reminded the Pehuenche of the positive relations they had had with the new government in Mendoza, and expressed San Martín's wish to continue "the harmony so happily established." In asking their permission to pass into Chile, Inálican described the Spanish as "strangers in the land, whose views and intentions were to dispossess them of their pastures, rob them of their cattle, and carry off their wives and children..."<sup>278</sup>

This description appears at odds with the extremely close relationship the Pehuenche had maintained with the Spanish over the previous three decades. Nevertheless, the Pehuenche leaders deliberated, and all but three caciques decided in favor of the patriot proposal. Perhaps the fact that the patriot frontier officials in Mendoza (Susso and Inálican) remained the same through the change in power, and that the child of Ambrosio O'Higgins (Bernardo) represented the Chilean patriots, suggested that the delicate balance of frontier negotiations established in the late eighteenth century remained intact. Thus, Pehuenche caciques could relate with the government of Mendoza as they had previously. But, as revealed in the next chapter, violence shattered much of the frontier regime in southern Chile, causing rifts between Mapuche leaders over whether to stay loyal to Spanish forces, or throw their lot behind the insurgents. Whatever the reason, the majority of the Pehuenche attendees pledged their support to San Martín and promised to keep the three who rejected the proposal in check.

Three months after San Martín received Pehuenche permission to cross to Chile, the Army of the Andes began its liberation of Chile. The main force of the army departed

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<sup>277</sup> While rightly identifying the Mapuche origins of the Priest, Miller incorrectly named him "Julian" instead of Francisco.

<sup>278</sup> *Memoires*, 91-93.

its encampment on 19 January 1817 and arrived in the valley of Chacabuco near Santiago on 13 February. The crossing represented one of the most ambitious and iconic episodes of the wars of Spanish American independence. By mid-1817, San Martín and Bernardo O'Higgins had driven the Spanish from Santiago.

### 3.4 Conclusion

Observers of San Martín's parlamento and Argentine historians have described the event as a brilliant *ruse de guerre* by San Martín.<sup>279</sup> Knowing that word of the parlamento and its subsequent agreement would travel quickly from creole and indigenous participants, San Martín hoped that the Spanish Military Governor of Chile Manuel Osorio would divide his forces to defend the passes both to the north and south of Mendoza. Thus divided, San Martín and Bernardo O'Higgins would lead the bulk of the Army of the Andes through Los Patos pass, while Juan Gregorio Las Heras took the rest through Uspallata pass to face a diminished force. Spanish correspondence from Chile to Lima and Spain attested to the existence of spies crossing the Andes to and from Mendoza, and the palpable fear of San Martín's invasion. From this point of view, San Martín's knowledge and effective performance of the intricate intercultural aspects of the parlamento appear feigned or based on cunning. The active participation of the Pehuenche is thus reduced to that of pawns playing in to the greater designs of the *próceres* (independence heroes).

In order to rethink the *gesto sanmartiniano*, as San Martín's meeting with the Pehuenche came to be called, this chapter has examined the extensive correspondence to and about the Pehuenche written by Spanish Commander of Arms José Francisco de

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<sup>279</sup> *Memoires*, 89. Martínez Sarasola, *La argentina*, Miguel Angel de Marco, *La Guerra de la frontera*.

Amigorena, father Inálican, and Patriot Commander of the Mendoza Frontier, José de Susso in order to understand the webs of politics and negotiation in which San Martín became ensnared. Pehuenche encounters with these leaders allow us to probe the ways in which transandean connections were not ancillary to the violent transition from colony to nation. In fact, Pehuenche leaders refused to abandon the indigenous geographies and diplomatic strategies that barred Inka and Spanish expansion since the fifteenth century, and quickly identified the willingness and hesitance of royalists and patriots in Chile and Mendoza to respect them. They demonstrated how transandean indigenous sovereignty and diplomacy was capable of responding to, and making pacts with all parties in the partisan struggle between royalists and patriots, thus making Pehuenche support a prized and pivotal aim for the Army of the Andes in Mendoza

Nevertheless, according to historian Oriana Pelagatti, “the pax Sanmartiniana can be conceived of as the result of the utilization of colonial strategies and actors in a new direction.”<sup>280</sup> When we set San Martín’s style of governance in the context of the aftermath of the eighteenth century Pehuenche-Huillliche wars and the upheavals that precipitated the crisis of Spanish rule, we are able to see how the Pehuenche near Mendoza become close allies of the Spanish on both sides of the Andes. This relationship could not be taken for granted, but required constant renewal and stoking through *parlamentos*, gift giving, communication, and reciprocal obligations. Analyzing these extensive encounters between Pehuenche leaders, their go-betweens, and Spanish priests and military officers in the previous decades inverts Pelagatti’s assertion: the Pehuenche adapted old diplomatic means to new circumstances, thus molding the terrain upon which

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<sup>280</sup> Oriana Pelagatti, “Política y religion en la frontera sur de Mendoza. Fr. Francisco Inalicán. 1805-1822,” *Estudios sobre clero iberoamericano*, p 91. Quoted in Leal and Iturriaga, *Frailes Franciscanos*, 11.



the pax sanmartiniana could emerge. From this point of view, Pehuenche leaders refused to be marginalized, or turned in to pawns and cannon fodder.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>281</sup> On resisting the portrayal of subaltern participation in the wars of independence as cannon fodder, see Marxia Lasso, “Race War and Nation,” and James E. Sanders, *Contentious Republicans*.

#### **Chapter 4: The making of a Cacique Patriota: Venancio Coñuepan and Bernardo O'Higgins, 1810-1818**

The recognition of Mapuche sovereignty south of the Bío-Bío River and Cuyo by Spanish officials in parlamentos near Concepción and Mendoza took place as Europeans, creoles, and mestizos bitterly divided themselves to remake the Spanish American empire, first through the Bourbon reforms and then through the wars independence (1810s-1820s). Mapuche leaders too were divided in this period, and like their European counterparts, their struggles were transnational in scope. Nor did Mapuche sovereignty, like that of the Spanish, imply political unity or homogeneity.<sup>282</sup> While many caciques accepted the status of caciques gobernadores and indios amigos, many others refrained from supporting the Spanish. Inter-indigenous conflicts peppered the second half of the eighteenth century—the War of the Malón and the Pehuenche-Huilliche wars—sharply dividing Mapuche, Pehuenche, and Huilliche leaders and serving as a gravity well that pulled in Spanish frontier administrators from Concepción to Buenos Aires. Through these entanglements, Mapuche, Pehuenche, and Huilliche leaders remade the meanings of Spanish subject, sovereignty, friend, and enemy and adapted these understandings to the changing context of war between Spanish loyalists and creole patriots. This was the state of affairs when independence broke out.

Loyalties and animosities among Mapuche families during the eighteenth century imbricated with this rising conflict between expressions of loyalty to the Spanish King and pro-independence sentiments that burst forth after Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808. By the turn of the century, the Pehuenche nearest to Mendoza and the four butalmapus of the Araucanía had agreed to general peace terms and become valuable

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<sup>282</sup> Chambers, *Families in War*.

allies of the Spanish, and some of the Huilliche leaders near Valdivia had ceded dominion of their lands following Spanish violence and coercion. These alliances and rivalries, and their expressions in concrete territorial political dominions, demonstrated the distinctiveness of frontier indigenous politics in this corner of the Spanish empire from those incorporated into the *república de indios* in the core centers of Peru and New Spain and the frontier spaces of North America.

The outbreak of Spain's colonial crisis in the 1810s magnified these conflicts and brought them to the fore, especially in southern Chile. Mapuche leaders maintained their contradictory relations to their peninsular and creole neighbors as they made and remade the subjectivities of Spanish subject, patriot, royalist, and eventually citizen. In other words, despite the crisis of Spanish rule, the Mapuche frontiers continued to be a critical and contradictory epistemological space. The following two chapters examine how already existing internal Mapuche rivalries dovetailed with the partisan divides of the independence period. They played into royalist/patriot conflict on both sides of the Andes, but were not confined to it. The wars of independence in Chile and western Argentina were a Mapuche war.<sup>283</sup>

These chapters analyze Mapuche involvement in Chile's independence wars to demonstrate that the diplomatic practices necessary to defend their sovereignty went well beyond the classic colonial *parlamentos*. They involved intimate meetings between Mapuche leaders, the sending and receiving of emissaries and letters dictated in Spanish,

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<sup>283</sup> In *Los araucanos y la guerra de la independencia*, Tomás Guevara asserted that Chile's independence war was a Mapuche war, but by that he meant the great quantity of Mapuche people involved in the conflict and that inter-Mapuche violence was a prominent feature. This chapter goes beyond to look at the politics of alliance-making sustained in the late colonial period and complicated by the outbreak of violence in the Araucanía to expose both Spanish and Chilean misunderstanding of Mapuche diplomacy, assert the period as a watershed in Mapuche political history, and emphasize that expressions of Mapuche sovereignty were essential to understand the motivations of indigenous leaders.

and the fragile coalition building needed to accept or reject peace terms. Patriot misunderstandings of and impatience with these slow-moving diplomatic channels, and increasingly violent inter-Mapuche rivalries often frustrated this process, producing an internal Mapuche war that existed alongside the independence war and continued into the 1830s when it spilled into Argentina.

To offer a glimpse into how Mapuche leaders adapted transandean Mapuche diplomatic practices to shape the unfolding independence period, we must examine the most visible expression of Mapuche sovereignty, the *butalmapu*, and the stories of two prominent Mapuche rivals on competing sides of the independence wars—Venancio Coñuepan and Francisco Mariluán. The majority of Mapuche leaders maintained their loyalty to the Spanish given their previous agreements and positions as *caciques* *gobernadores*. However, several opted to support the creole insurgents who sought to radically alter the relationship between the Americas and the Monarchy. One such leader was Venancio Coñuepan.<sup>284</sup>

From 1814 until his death in 1827,<sup>285</sup> this Mapuche lonko became a crucial ally to two of the most important nineteenth-century creole political leaders in the Southern Cone: Chilean Supreme Director Bernardo O’Higgins and future president of Argentina,

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<sup>284</sup> To piece together a biographical sketch of Coñuepan, I draw on Bengoa, *La historia*, pp. 75-81, Guevara, *Los araucanos*, Tomás Guevara and Manuel Mañkelef, *Kiñe mufü trokiñche ñi piel/Historias de familias siglo XIX* (CoLibris Ediciones, Santiago, 2002) 171-174, Daniel Villar and Juan Francisco Jiménez “Indios Amigos. El tránsito progresivo desde la autonomía a la dependencia étnica en un sistema de contactos múltiples. El caso de Venancio Coihuepan en sus momentos iniciales (1827, frontera sur de Argentina, 146-164, in Jorge Pinto, ed., *Araucanía y Pampas*.

<sup>285</sup> Spanish and patriot correspondence, and subsequent historians have spelled Venancio’s surname in various ways. Coihuepan and Coñuepan seem to be the most common. Jorge Pavez argues for versions of Mapuche names more faithful to Mapudungun and less to Spanish. In this case, he chooses to use “Koñwepang,” *Cartas Mapuche*, 170. While sympathizing with the political thrust of Pavez’ position, I opt for Coñuepan as it is the spelling I find most frequently in the documents and makes it easier for scholars and curious parties to find more information about Don Venancio.

Juan Manuel de Rosas.<sup>286</sup> Francisco Mariluán, who had enjoyed a Spanish Royal salary since 1779, was Spain's most important Mapuche ally in the central plains (llanos) of the Araucanía. He was also Coñuepan's most implacable enemy. Despite Coñuepan's years of loyalty to the patriot cause, Chilean officers spent much of the final years of the independence wars trying to win Mariluán's allegiance, which they achieved in an 1825 parlamento (Chapter 5). By exploring the relationship between the Coñuepan, Mariluán, the other Mapuche confederations, on the one hand, and the patriot/royalist wars from 1810 until 1825 on the other, we can see how the working out of internal Mapuche rivalries interpenetrated with but did not subsume itself to the struggle over the Spanish empire.

This period was crucial for understanding transandean Mapuche diplomacy and sovereignty in the Age of Revolution and its aftermath because, while the boundaries of the Mapuche world remained after Chilean and Argentine independence, for the first time an external violent conflict moved across the Spanish/Mapuche frontier. Additionally, the emergence of two nation states in the place of the previous Spanish jurisdictions represented a new form of politics concerned with the unity of citizens in a concretely defined territory and a radical break from the political culture of empire. Independence leader Bernardo O'Higgins' military struggle in the Concepción province and the Bío-Bío region in 1817 and 1818 revealed how warfare and violence catalyzed by the crisis of Spanish rule introduced a new level of precariousness and contingency to Mapuche alliance making. This redrew the understandings of the relationship between space, violence, and diplomacy. From this point forward, indigenous alliances with Spanish or

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<sup>286</sup> Chapter 6 will examine Coñuepan's move east to Argentina following independence, and the transposition of these politics to the Pampas and the rise of Rosas in the 1820s.

creole leaders would often require joint participation in military excursions against their allies' indigenous enemies, which invited a foreign military presence into the heart of Mapuche lands in the Southern Cone. Though not guaranteeing the eventual military occupation of the Araucanía, Pampas, and Patagonia, this dynamic foreshadowed state and indigenous strategies that culminated in Chile and Argentina's final wars to conquer the Araucanía and the Pampas in the 1870s and 1880s.

#### **4.1 The Four Butalmapus: Mapuche Politics and the End of Empire**

Throughout the eighteenth century, the most common object of Spanish diplomacy with the Mapuche was not necessarily an agreement with an individual or *lof*, but a general peace with the four butalmapus. As was the case in 1793, Ambrosio O'Higgins' desired a parlamento with representatives of all of "Indian inhabitants of the four cantons, or butalmapus, from the sea to the cordillera, and from our southern barrier, the [Bío-Bío] River to the Toltén [river]."<sup>287</sup> The Spanish thus defined the butalmapu as a canton, an administrative unit, to make it legible. Spanish observers and subsequent historians naturalized these administrative units by grounding them in a geographic and not necessarily a political reality: the Pacific coast, the central plains east of the Nahuelbuta mountain range, the Andean foothills, and the southern plains between the Malleco River and the Toltén (and sometimes Valdivia). As Vicuña Mackenna mused, "... in each of these geographic zones, diverse in their geological formation and climate, corresponds a populace with unique characteristics, even though all are ethnologically classified as the denomination of the same race. From here the semi-fabulous division,

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<sup>287</sup> Judas Tadeo Reyes, "Ceremonial del Parlamento General Celebrado en el Campo de Negrete..." 11 Mar. 1793, AHNCh, Fondo Real Audiencia, vol. 3204, plate 23, pp. 336-342.

but in reality the logic of the four Butalmapus of Arauco."<sup>288</sup> Colonial administrators and Mapuche people frequently adopted these geographic divisions to name each zone's inhabitants: *costinos* (coastal people, Spanish), *araucanos* (people of Arauco Bay), or *lafkenche* (people of the body of water); *llanistas* (people of the plains), *abajinos* (lowlanders), or *arribanos* (highlanders, for the piedmont of the Andes); Pehuenche (people of the piñon or Pehuen), Huilliche (people of the South), Puelche (people of the east of the Andes). We also see many examples of Mapuche groups named for their proximity to abandoned Spanish missions or forts, such as Angolinos who were named for the Mapuche near Angol on the southern shore of the Bío-Bío (Appendix, Figure 4.3).

**Figure 4.1 Butalmapus and Mapuche Groups, West to East**

Author	Butalmapus				
Vicuña Mackenna <sup>289</sup>	Costinos	Llano central (Angol to Lumaco)	Southern llanos (Huilliche)	Pehuenche	
Guevara	Costinos	Llanistas		Pehuenche	
Bengoa	Costinos	Abajinos/Arribanos	Ultra Cautín	Hombres de la Cordillera	

**Figure 4.2 Butalmapus mentioned in 1817 Patriot Correspondence, West to East**

Coast (costinos)	Angol (Angolinos) Llanos (Llanistas)	Pehuenche
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Neatly drawn battle lines between indigenous partisan loyalties, and the belief that their existed four unified Mapuche political confederations (butalmapus) have been

<sup>288</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 74.

<sup>289</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La guerra*, 74.

insufficient for understanding Mapuche participation in these conflicts.<sup>290</sup> On the one hand, patriot and Spanish leaders had to prove to Mapuche leaders the worthiness of their cause through continued negotiation, protection, and gift giving. Allegiances were fluid and subject to rapid changes and reversals. Mapuche leaders on all sides continued to rely on interethnic networks of communication and negotiation (*parlamentos*) and expected the same of their non-indigenous allies. On the other hand, the relatively idealized notion of four distinct and stable Mapuche confederations—or *butalmapus*—which emerged during the eighteenth century does not hold up to the events which took place beginning in the 1810s.

Revisionist ethnohistorical accounts argue that instead of *butalmapu*, the correct term was *fütramapu*, or great/large territory.<sup>291</sup> Even though common geographic location still tended to characterize these great territories, this interpretation asserts families tended to frequently interact with their most proximate neighbors, for ceremonial, economic, social, or kinship reasons. In other words, these were both spatial and *political* relations akin to confederations or extensive military, social, and economic alliances. The seemingly stable geographic delineations of the coast, central plains, or Andean piedmont could be cut by internal Mapuche rivalries and by those made with patriots or royalists. Mapuche loyalties and rivalries cut across *butalmapus* and divided leaders living in

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<sup>290</sup> On the Mapuche and the patriot-royalist conflict in Chile, see Bengoa, *La historia*, pp. 135-150, Pinto, *La formación del estado*, pp. 64-77, Pilar María Herr, “The Nation-State According to Whom?,” Joanna Crow, “Troubled Negotiations,” Paulina Peralta Cabello, “Ni por la razón, ni por la fuerza,” Tomás Guevara, *Los araucanos en la revolución de la independencia*, Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *La guerra a muerte*, Pablo Mariman Queménado, “La república y los mapuche,” Rodrigo Araya, “Alianzas mapuches durante la guerra a muerte, 1817-1823,” and Fernando Ulloa Valenzuela, “Los españoles araucanos: mediación y conflicto durante la Guerra a Muerte. Chile 1817-1825.”

<sup>291</sup> Zavala, *Los mapuches*.



each.<sup>292</sup> As we saw in Chapter 2, even if *parlamentos* expressed general agreements between the four *butalmapus* and the Spanish, they also created space for working out of internal rivalries. Colonial-era diplomacy had always been a space of interethnic and inter-Mapuche negotiation. The location of a *lof* did not serve as an explanatory metric for understanding Mapuche allegiances. The partisan and the inter-Mapuche conflicts imbricated constantly in the war of independence. This chapter demonstrates that loyalties were a messy process; they were constantly subject to alteration. But all parties refused to abandon the interethnic negotiation frameworks of the past.

Coñuepan and Mariluán's experiences applying hallmark strategies of Mapuche diplomacy in the wars of independence embodied the frictions generated by Spanish and Mapuche sovereignties in this period and evinced the crucial part played by inter-Mapuche and external political events in the gestation of Mapuche politics. Coñuepan and Mariluán both came from the central plains of the Araucanía, the Llanos. The Llanos *butalmapu*, according to Chilean anthropologist José Bengoa, consisted of the densely populated eastern valleys of the old *estado indómito* (Puren and Lumaco), and the central valley plains between the Malleco River and the modern city of Temuco, Chile, nearly 300 kilometers southeast of Concepción. Bengoa notes that the *llanistas* were also called *arribanos*, *huenteches*, and *moluches* (people of war).<sup>293</sup> Though neither Mariluán nor Coñuepan lived in lands abutting the Bío-Bío frontier, both had frequent contact with the Spanish and subsequently the patriot and Chilean armies.

Venancio Coñuepan was born sometime between 1770 and 1780 during a relatively calm period in the Araucanía, while the Pehuenche-Huilliche war raged across

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<sup>292</sup> On the notion of four *butalmapus*, see for instance Bechis, "Interethnic Relations," Bengoa, *Historia*, Boccara, *Los Vencedores*, Zavala, *Los mapuches*.

<sup>293</sup> Bengoa, *Historia*, 80.

the Andes.<sup>294</sup> His *lofs* were located between Lumaco in the southeastern valley of the coastal Nahuelbuta mountain range and the Chol Chol River in the Araucanía. This region was part of a butalmapu that included the Puren and Lumaco valleys, the historic *Estado Indómito*: the heart of Mapuche resistance to the Spanish conquest. It stretched northeast toward Los Sauces and south along the Chol Chol River near the modern town of Repocura. Known collectively to the Spanish as *abajinos* (lowlanders) or *lelfunche* in Mapudungun, these families were among the most populous and wealthy because they controlled some of the most fertile lands in the Araucanía.<sup>295</sup>

Nearly a century after Coñuepan's death, the caciques Paynefilu and Paynemal recalled that from a young age, Coñuepan was distinguished for his prowess in battle. "Few wielded the lance with as much ability as Coñuepan," according to these caciques. His great grandson, Antonio Coñoepan H., recalled in 1982 that the "first Venancio" was "a very fierce cacique, the most capable and intelligent *indio*, cunning in warfare."<sup>296</sup> Venancio had several prominent brothers, Kallfupang, Wenchenawel, and Millapang, as well as many wives and children.<sup>297</sup> He was familiar with the Spanish language, *parlamentos*, and other forms of interethnic contact with the Spanish. Two of his sons, Ramón and Mariano, attended a Spanish Catholic school in Concepción, where they learned to read and write in Castilian. Ramón would accompany his father to Argentina in 1827 (see Chapter 5), and in the 1840s and 1850s earn the title of "indio amigo" in the Argentine national army.<sup>298</sup> Coñuepan even liked to dress in European military garb, and carry a saber or sword like the Spanish and patriots, a practice that would be more

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<sup>294</sup> Bengoa, *Historia*, 71

<sup>295</sup> Bengoa, *Historia*, 71.

<sup>296</sup> Bengoa, *Historia* 78.

<sup>297</sup> Guevara and Mañkelef, *Kiñe mufü*, 171.

<sup>298</sup> Villar and Jiménez, "Indios amigos," 149.

common for caciques in the nineteenth century. In 1819, he requested, “coats and knives in iron scabbards” as gifts from the patriots to distribute to his followers.<sup>299</sup>

But perhaps most importantly, Coñuepan’s descendants, allies, and Chile’s *historia oficial* remembered him for his early opposition to Spain and loyalty to Chile. “In all of the war of the king, the ancient ruler of Chile, [Koñuepan] was with the patriots. From the beginning, he decided [to support] the Chileans.”<sup>300</sup> In nineteenth-century liberal politician and historian Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna’s words, “Because of his fondness [for the patriots] and his instincts, Coihuepan had allied with the patriots from the outbreak of the war.”<sup>301</sup> Coñuepan participated in many of the patriot’s southern campaigns to dislodge the Spanish.<sup>302</sup> He would even become close friends with future Supreme Director of Chile, Bernardo O’Higgins.<sup>303</sup> For his support of the patriots and Chileans, Coñuepan received the military title of Sergeant Major in the Chilean army after the Chile’s declaration of independence in 1818.<sup>304</sup> It is unclear why Coñuepan chose to ally with the patriot insurgents against the Spanish in the 1810s, but this decision left him at odds with most of the butalmapus, including Francisco Mariluán.

Francisco Mariluán was one of the most powerful and influential *lonkos* in the Llanos, living near Pilguen some 150 kilometers northeast of the Lumaco valley, and 18 kilometers southeast of the modern city of Mulchen.<sup>305</sup> Since 1779, Mariluán had

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<sup>299</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 235-236.

<sup>300</sup> Guevara and Mañkelef, *Kiñe mufü*, 171.

<sup>301</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La guerra*, 455.

<sup>302</sup> Hux, *Caciques borogas y araucanos*, 162.

<sup>303</sup> On efforts by Patriot General Bernardo O’Higgins to secure an alliance with Venancio Coñuepan in 1817, see AHNCh, Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 27, page 24, 10 Sep. 1817, Bernardo O’Higgins to Comandante General de la Frontera, and vol. 28, page 385, 6 Oct. 1817, Bernardo O’Higgins to Comandante General de la Frontera.

<sup>304</sup> Luis Salazar refers to Venancio Coñuepan as “The sergeant Major Don Benancio [sic] Coñuepan” in Luis Salazar to Juan de Dios Rivera, 4. Mar. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pp. 46-47.

<sup>305</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 298.

received a Spanish Royal salary and title of cacique gobernador. Mariluán even went so far as to have one of his sons enlist in the Spanish army.<sup>306</sup> He received an education in Spanish and the Catholic religion at the Colegio de Naturales run by Franciscan missionaries in Chillán and sent two of his sons to attend as well. Mariluán referred to himself as a Christian in an 1824 letter to a Chilean officer to emphasize the extent to which he understood the suffering of Spanish families residing near Mariluán who fled the Chilean army.<sup>307</sup> Nineteenth-century Liberal historian Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna—who went on to take an exterminationist position toward the Mapuche—went so far as to praise Mariluán for his “valor” and prowess in battle in defense of the Spanish King.<sup>308</sup> As a representative of the King amongst the independent Mapuche, Mariluán would have attended many *parlamentos* and been conversant in the discourses and strategies of forging alliances with Spain. This would have involved translating the concerns of his people to representatives of the Crown, and conveying his understanding of agreements with Spain back to the members of his *lofs* through written and verbal communications in Spanish and Mapudungun.<sup>309</sup> In addition to his valor and military mind, Mariluán’s legitimacy and prestige also flowed from his intercultural dexterity with the Spanish and

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<sup>306</sup> Bengoa, *Historia*, 81-82

<sup>307</sup> Mariluán refers to his own Christianity in a 5 March 1824 letter to Pedro Barnachea emphasizing the extent to which he understood the suffering of Spanish families residing near Mariluán who fled the Chilean army: “Como cristiano conozco el perjuicio tan terrible de que les resulto a estas infelices las pérdidas perjuicio.” Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnachea. 5 Mar. 1824, Archivo Histórico Nacional Chileno (hereafter AHNCh), Fondo Intendencia de Concepción (FIC), vol. 75, pp. 49-51.

<sup>308</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La guerra a muerte*, 681-682. On the exterminationist rhetoric espoused by Vicuña Mackenna during the time he wrote *La guerra a muerte*, see Alejandro Bottinelli, “El oro y la sangre que vamos a prodigar.” Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna y la inscripción del imperativo civilizador en el discurso público chileno,” in Rafael Gaune and Martín Lara, eds., *Historias de racismo y discriminación en Chile* (Santiago, Chile, 2009) 105-122.

<sup>309</sup> Vezub, “Mapuche-Tehuelche,” 215. On the particular go-between experiences of lonkos when pulled between the political and cultural demands of their communities, Mapuche rivals, Spain, and Chile, see Rolf Foerster and Marcelo González Gálvez, “Comunidad Mapuche, Sociedad Winka, y el “Tercero Incluido”: Los Porma de Paicaví Durante los Siglos XIX y XX,” *Revista Chilena de Antropología* 28 (2013): 7-28.

indigenous groups in the Araucanía and the Pampas.<sup>310</sup> Early twentieth century ethnographer Tomás Guevara attributed Mariluán's "culture, which distinguished him from the ordinary *indio*" to his close friendship with the Franciscan missionaries in Chillán.<sup>311</sup> By the 1820s, he led roughly fourteen *lofs*<sup>312</sup> stretching from the eastern valley of Lumaco in the coastal Nahualbuta mountain range to the pre-cordillera, and from the Bío-Bío to the Malleco River, Mariluán was also one of the most ardent and longstanding allies of Spain during the war for Chilean independence and the *guerra a muerte* (1819-1825).

Focusing on these two Mapuche leaders reveals the inner-workings of Mapuche diplomacy that went beyond the parlamento ritual, and the tensions at the heart of Mapuche sovereignty at the molecular level. The actions of Coñuepan and Mariluán during the wars of independence left a quite unique paper trail: dozens of letters, especially dictated by Mariluán, to, from, and about these leaders exist in Chile and Argentina's archives. These letters show how Mapuche leaders incorporated Spanish literacy and intercultural emissaries into their networks of communication and rivalry. Their actions, described by themselves and their patriots and royalist collaborators and enemies, revealed the delicate relationship between a Mapuche leader, their Mapuche rivals and followers, a partisan conflict between outsiders, and the divided expressions of Mapuche sovereignty. In this sense, Mariluán and his rival Coñuepan embodied a much earlier incarnation of what Chilean anthropologists Rolf Foerster and Marcelo González

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<sup>310</sup> Jimena Pinchuleo and Foerster and Gálvez, "Comunidad Mapuche."

<sup>311</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 298.

<sup>312</sup> The preamble to the 1825 Treaty of Tapihue describes Mariluan as "Gobernador de 14 Reducciones." As Zavala has pointed out, the Spanish most likely used the terms "reducción" and "parcialidad" to refer to *lofs* and *ayllarewe*.

Gálvez call the “included third.”<sup>313</sup> Rather than being isolated or an “excluded third” from both Spanish and Mapuche worlds, *lonkos* were both part and not part of all parties involved. In other words, they walked a fine line. Yet, *lonkos* held more authority than a typical intermediary. Pacts of reciprocity and obligation bound Mariluán and other caciques to their community members. They received recognition, legitimacy, and prestige from their communities and from the Spanish and Chileans—in the form of titles, salaries, and staffs of rule. Prestige gained from one side could aid and also threaten legitimacy with others. Coñuepan and Mariluán could face approbation and displeasure from all sides in times of crisis and conflict.

Spun out to the particular context of Chile’s war for independence, Coñuepan and Mariluán’s obligations to their followers intersected with and deviated from the political objectives of the patriots and royalists. By centering Coñuepan and other Mapuche caciques in this narrative, we can see how frontier encounters captured by colonial archives gave new meanings to Spanish subject, patriot, enemigo, and amigo. They also produced disagreements and misunderstandings over the meaning of Mapuche political units, such as the butalmapu. We see that caciques in the coastal (*constinos* or *lafkenche*), Angol (*angolinos*), Coñuepan’s lowlands (*abajinos*), central plains (Llanista), and Pehuenche butalmapus struggled to define and situate themselves in relation to the conflagration occurring to their north. In this process, the patriot and royalist causes mattered to Mapuche leaders, but not in ways easily deciphered by patriot leaders.

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<sup>313</sup> Foerster and González, “Comunidad Mapuche,” 8. Pichinao, “Los parlamentos.” For comparative examples of indigenous leaders navigating multiple worlds to maintain their legitimacy, see Yannakakis, *The Art Grandin*, *The Blood*; Serulnikov, *Subverting*.

## 4.2 The Patria Vieja and the Reconquista, 1810-1817

The Napoleonic invasion of Spain and Portugal in 1807 catalyzed a crisis in imperial rule of the Americas. This crisis unfolded in distinct ways across the Americas in frontier spaces and imperial centers. In Chile, three years after Napoleon's invasion, peninsular and creole nobles in Santiago on September 18, 1810 held an open assembly and founded an interim government, or *junta*, known as the Primer Junta Nacional de Gobierno. Even though Chile's junta declared its loyalty to the deposed King, it represented the first institution of self-government in the Captaincy General. Its loyalty was to King Ferdinand VII, but not the Viceroy of Lima or the liberal Cortes in Cádiz, Spain, which proclaimed to rule in his name. On July 4 1811, the junta formed the first National Congress. After the Santiago junta was overthrown in September by a coup led by the more radical liberal Carrera brothers, a second junta was formed by southern elites in Concepción along the Bío-Bío River on 15 September 1811.<sup>314</sup>

The winds of change in Spain's American empire unleashed by Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula blew across the Bío-Bío River in a familiar form. While Chilean historians have emphasized the revolutionaries' failure to win significant Mapuche support for their cause, from at least 1811 onward they could count on several allies.<sup>315</sup> During April and May of 1811, the leaders of the Patria Vieja sent several hundred soldiers to Buenos Aires to aid the revolutionaries of the United Provinces of Río de la Plata. Among those were the sons of two "ulmenes caciques principales" of the coastal butalmapu of Arauco, Santiago Lincogur and Juan Tammallanca. Both had

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<sup>314</sup> For an analysis of these events attentive to how gender and family ties shaped partisans rivalries and vengeance in elite politics, see Sarah C. Chambers, *Families in War and Peace*. For other summaries see, Simon Collier, *Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence*, Alfredo Jocelyn Holt, *La independencia de Chile*.

<sup>315</sup> Peralta, "Ni por la razon ni por la fuerza."

enlisted in the patriot expedition.<sup>316</sup> While documented instances of Mapuche participation in the regular forces of the war of independence were rare, their existence suggests some Mapuche groups embraced the patriots, and their message potentially resonated with still burning resentment of the Spanish frontier regime and their allies.

Southern patriot leaders from the Concepción junta, who carried considerable political and military weight, knew the importance of a favorable relationship with the Mapuche. To gain and maintain a healthy relationship with the Mapuche, the new junta of Concepción sent emissaries south of the Bío-Bío River to the settlements of these *indios amigos*.<sup>317</sup> Despite these momentous changes to the north and across the Atlantic world, the quotidian interactions between Mapuche and non-Mapuche in the region remained strikingly similar. Patriots disseminated their call for a parlamento through colonial intermediaries: capitanes de amigos, translators, and Mapuche messengers. On 24 October, the junta's leaders welcomed thirteen *lonkos* and over 400 *mocetones* to the *palacio oficial* in Concepción. Hoping to replicate the ceremonial aspects of parlamentos, the leaders provided gifts, music, and food to the Mapuche and informed them of the change of government in Chile.

While Concepción's leaders understood these intercultural diplomatic protocols, they underestimated the close relationship between many Mapuche and the Spanish frontier regime of missions and forts. They quickly learned that any reforms affecting the Araucanía were subject to push back from their potential allies.<sup>318</sup> The Pehuenche, who

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<sup>316</sup> "Del Comisionado de la Primera Junta Dr. Antonio Álvarez ..., a la Junta Provisional de Gobierno de Mendoza," Santiago de Chile, Apr. 1811, AHPM, Época Independiente, Sección: Exterior-Chile, Carpeta 701, doc. 6.

<sup>317</sup> Tomás Guevara, *Los araucanos en la Revolución de la independencia*, 238-240.

<sup>318</sup> Fr. Raymundo Fuertes, Fr. Domingo González, Fr. Francisco Xavier de Alday, Fr. Juan Lopez Aro, "Relación que de la conducta observada por los Padres Misioneros del Colegio de Propaganda Fide de la Ciudad de Chillan desde el año de 1808 hasta fin del pasado de 1814 hace su Prelado el Rd Padre Fray Juan



had made peace with the Spanish in the 1780s, challenged the Concepción patriots when they targeted the missions run by the Franciscan order. They deprioritized the maintenance of the missions at Arauco (across the Bío-Bío from Concepción in the coastal butalmapu) and Tucapel (125 kilometers southeast of Concepción in the Andean foothills), and threatened to shutter the Franciscan branch of Propaganda Fide in Chillán. Chillán and Tucapel resided in close proximity to the domains of the northern Pehuenche. When these Pehuenche leaders heard word of this action against the Franciscans, they successfully demanded of the Concepción patriots that the missionaries remain in the area.<sup>319</sup>

Nineteenth century liberal and contemporary historical accounts of this period argue that the vast majority of the Mapuche refused patriot overtures and maintained their loyalty to the Spanish. José Bengoa explicitly stated in his famous *Historia del pueblo Mapuche* that the butalmapus of the coast, llanos, and upper frontier overwhelmingly supported the Spanish forces.<sup>320</sup> While much of the documentation suggests such loyalties, contemporary accounts written by Franciscan priests argue that in 1813, patriots “seduced” and “deceived” the *indios* of the coast and the llanos to support their cause.<sup>321</sup> This Franciscan narration of the Patria Vieja substantiates the fact that the Concepción patriots allegedly called the coastal caciques of Arauco just across the Bío-Bío, and of Nacimiento in the Llanos 150 kilometers southeast for a parlamento. In it, the

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Ramón en virtud de oficio que para ello le pasó el Rdo Padre Fr. Melchor Martínez comisionado por el Superior Gobierno del Reyno para la colección Histórica que manda su Magestad se haga de los sucesos acaecidos en este de Chile desde su ausencia de la Monarquía hasta su restablecimiento en el trono,” 22 de Jul. 1816, AGI, Audiencia de Chile, Chile, 208.

<sup>319</sup> Fuertes, Gonzalez, Alday, and Aro, “Relación,” p. 3.

<sup>320</sup> One exception noted by Guevara was the followers of the cacique Neculpan, who lived near Santa Fé on the northern side of the coastal Nahuelbuta mountain range in the western Araucanía. Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 244.

<sup>321</sup> “Relación,” pp. 9.

Franciscans allege the patriots used “promises and gifts” to entice costino and llanista caciques into an alliance. The Mapuche attendees agreed to prevent and detain Spaniards of any persuasion from passing through their lands to Valdivia. If they faced any resistance, the Mapuche were allowed to kill and bring the head to the Patriots in exchange for payment.<sup>322</sup> Despite the priest’s scorn for gift-giving and alliance making, this description fits with both Mapuche and Spanish experiences of diplomacy in Concepción province from the previous century.

Meanwhile, in late 1812 and early 1813, the Spanish Viceroy of Peru, José Fernando de Abascal, began organizing to stamp out the reforms and the general liberalization of the economic and political spheres in his corner of the empire brought about by the Constitution of Cádiz (1812). He ordered the military invasion of Chile.<sup>323</sup> The first expeditionary force left El Callao in Peru in January 1813, under brigadier Antonio Pareja. Rather than land near Santiago in the port of Valparaíso, Pareja chose ports in close proximity to Mapuche domains. He landed in the loyalist strongholds of Chiloé and Valdivia, gathered 2000 men, and set sail for Concepción to seize the port of Talcahuano. Afterward, the Spanish expedition headed north to Santiago and in April defeated patriot leader José Miguel Carrera at Yerbás Buenas, but were stopped near Chillán. Following this defeat, the National Congress took military command of the patriot armies from Carrera and passed it to Bernardo O’Higgins, Carrera’s political rival.

The arrival of Antonio Pareja’s expeditionary force turned the Concepción province into a war zone subsequently throwing the frontier regime of ritual negotiation, gift-giving, and meanings of ally and enemy into disarray. Even though his troops

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<sup>322</sup> “Relación,” pp. 7-8.

<sup>323</sup> For correspondence between Abascal and the successive commanders of the expeditions to Chile, see AGI, Archivo de José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, especially Diversos 3.

defeated a small patriot army (“insurgents” according the Franciscans)<sup>324</sup> some 240 kilometers north of Concepción in April, they were not able to cross the Maule River and take Santiago. In the aftermath, the patriots retook the frontier. According to the account of the *Patria Vieja* written by hostile Franciscan missionaries in Chillán, patriot supporters looted and burned ranches and committed a litany of abuses against priests and Church property, including summary execution and public flogging.<sup>325</sup> In one instance, they said insurgent soldiers publicly stripped a priest, put a gun to his chest and demanded he declared “Muera el Rey, Viva la Patria.”<sup>326</sup> Many loyal Spanish *vecinos* fled to the mountains and forests of the Upper Bío-Bío region instead of “going against their King and Lord.”

Although costino caciques had attended at least two parlamentos with Concepción patriots during the *Patria Vieja* in which they had heard overtures of peace, by the end of 1813, costino leaders asked for a parlamento with the Spanish commanders. Three hundred and twenty caciques and *mocetones* traveled roughly 200 kilometers from the coast to Chillán to meet with Spanish officers. Several women attended as well, a rare occurrence. During the proceedings, the costinos promised armed support—when necessary—and free passage through their lands to the king’s troops, to whom they would issue passports. More than simply a pledge of support, the costino Millacura, who received a staff of rule, *aguardiente*, and a bust of King Ferdinand, became the primary go-between for small Mapuche-Spanish parleys at forts along the Bío-Bío into 1814.<sup>327</sup>

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<sup>324</sup> Guevara, “Los Araucanos,” “Los insurgentes se apropiaron el nombre de Patriotas, y al cuerpo de la insurgencia llamaban Patria: estos dos nombres notados en la relación con rayas dan a entender su verdadero significado.”

<sup>325</sup> “Relación, pp. 4-12.

<sup>326</sup> “Relación,” p. 7.

<sup>327</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 252-253.

This brief episode reveals that Spanish and patriot knowledge of intercultural diplomacy created the possibility to secure support from the coastal and llanos Mapuche, but it was not enough. What seemed to matter to caciques, despite previous pledges of support to both patriots and Spanish leaders, was not the unity of the four butalmapus' stance toward outsiders, but the power, protection, and resources that could be provided. Within a year of the first Spanish expedition, the Concepción junta was defeated and its military presence driven from the region. Mapuche leaders knew to consider both the peace terms offered by outsiders, the strength of their presenters to back them up, and the capacity of the alliance to amplify their prestige and influence within the Araucanía. In this case, the Spanish reconquest was an unambiguous demonstration of strength and a potential rekindling of diplomatic recognition of Mapuche sovereignty as practiced during the eighteenth century.

While the precise moment of Coñuepan's early pro-patriot stance is unknown, in 1813 and 1814 his decision to align with them put him at odds with the majority of caciques in his own and the neighboring butalmapus of the coast, Angol, Llanos, and the Andean foothills Pehuenche (Appendix, Figure 4.3). The Angol butalmapu lay between Coñuepan and the Bío-Bío River, the Llanos to the east on the opposite shore of the Chol River, and the coast to the west across the Nahuelbuta mountain range. In the early period of the war (1813-1814), he experienced rivalries with the Lumaco and Puren caciques, and the costinos. He supported and participated in attacks against the Spanish expeditionary forces, and joined in battles and raids on Spanish settlements north of the Bío-Bío.<sup>328</sup> At any moment between 1813 and 1817, ethnographer Tomás Guevara

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<sup>328</sup> Guevara and Mañkelef, 172.

asserted, there were ten times as many Mapuche fighters as Spanish.<sup>329</sup> Pressure to align one's domains with patriots or royalists meant entering into hostile relations with other butalmapus. Even when patriots achieved small victories in Concepción province, *lonkos* in the coastal and llanos butalmapus sympathetic to the Spanish, Francisco Mariluán most prominent among them, provided refuge, fighters, and passage to the Spanish.<sup>330</sup> That smoldering of Mapuche rivalries took on a life of their own from the patriot/royalist struggle. This made the conflict a Mapuche war.

In 1814, a pro-patriot stance was destined for failure. Viceroy Abascal sent a new contingent to Concepción in January 1814, the same year that King Ferdinand returned to power in Spain and derogated the Constitution of Cádiz. The King ordered a complete reassertion of his rule over the Indies. After the Spanish invasion under Gabino Gaínza won a series of victories over southern patriot leaders Juan Mackenna and Bernardo O'Higgins, the patriots agreed to sign a truce on 3 May 1814 known as the treaty of Lircay. Despite patriot expressions of loyalty to the King, Viceroy Abascal rejected the truce and sent more troops under Manuel Ossorio in August. After Ossorio defeated the Patriots at Rancagua in early October en route to retaking Santiago, patriot soldiers and officers, including O'Higgins, fled across the Andes to Mendoza.<sup>331</sup> They did not return to Chile until the Army of the Andes crossed west in January 1817.<sup>332</sup>

The clear and present danger to Spanish sovereignty caused by the Chilean revolution, and the subsequent Spanish plan to strangle the nascent independence

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<sup>329</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 259-260.

<sup>330</sup> I have found no documentation attesting to Mariluán's actions during the Patria Vieja, aside from the assertions by Guevara and Vicuña Mackenna that he supported the Spanish until 1824.

<sup>331</sup> "Patria Vieja (1810-1814), *Memoria Chilena*, Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos (DIBAM), <http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-100853.html>, accessed 1/25/17.

<sup>332</sup> "La Reconquista española (1814-1817), *Memoria Chilena*, Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos (DIBAM), <http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-3671.html>, accessed 1/25/17.

movement's aspirations to a different type of sovereignty threatened but did not validate the interworking of Mapuche sovereignty. When Abascal's 1814 expeditionary force finally drove the patriot army under O'Higgins from Chile, Coñuepan and his family also fled. He led his family from the eastern foothills of the coastal Nahualbuta mountain range east across the Chol Chol River, to the Llanos butalmapu and the Andean foothills. There he built *malales*, or forts, to defend themselves and protect their livestock and possessions.<sup>333</sup> While the retreat of an army across the Andes in Chile was unprecedented for Europeans and their descendants, strategic flight was a common Mapuche practice. During the eighteenth century, lonkos frequently moved to *malales* in order to avoid raids from their rivals, and prevent the capture of their families and livestock herds.<sup>334</sup>

The Spanish reconquest meant Mapuche leaders could return to a familiar process of negotiation and engagement with the frontier. While Coñuepan fled, Mapuche from the coastal, Angol, and Llanos butalmapus made possible the Spanish seizure of the string of forts and settlements along the Bío-Bío River up to Chillán. Spanish administration of the key frontier nodes of encounter had returned. During the Spanish reconquest, caciques who had entered into the patriot-royalist conflict around the creation of the Concepción junta in 1811 began to recruit other caciques who had abstained from the war to their cause. The costinos who had traveled to Chillán in 1813 to meet with the Spanish in particular aided in the retaking of the frontier. During 1814, the costino cacique gobernador, Millacura, used his clout to convince other caciques to fight on behalf of the King.<sup>335</sup> Like the costinos, the Pehuenche were also active recruiters for the Spanish cause. The support of the costino and Pehuenche butalmapus in Chile for the

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<sup>333</sup> Guevara and Mañkelef, *Kiñe mufü*, 172.

<sup>334</sup> León, *Maloqueros y conchavadores*.

<sup>335</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 250-251.

Spanish came as no surprise, given their close relations with the colonial regime in Mendoza and Concepción.<sup>336</sup> The Llanos and Angol butalmapus, however, were much more divided. As these patriot/royalist Mapuche battle lines began to form, they became increasingly blurred as the internal Mapuche rivalries set in motion by this process ignited. But, despite this dislocation what mattered more to Mapuche leaders was the willingness of Europeans and creoles to engage in ritual diplomacy and respect their control of the Araucanía, not the particular partisan message of each side. These priorities meant Mapuche leaders imbued different meanings to patriot and royalist than the ideological disagreements between creoles and peninsulares.

#### **4.3 The Patria Nueva and the First Southern Campaign, 1817-1818**

The Spanish reoccupation of Chile seemingly stymied patriot overtures toward Mapuche in the Araucanía until O'Higgins' 1817 return from Mendoza. Of course contact with the Pehuenche south of Mendoza persisted in this patriot stronghold. Aside from early twentieth-century oral testimonies, which noted Coñuepan's retreat in 1814, little information exists about his activities under the Spanish Reconquista regime.<sup>337</sup> Yet, a hint of his activities can be found in the records of the Liberation Campaign of Chile housed in Buenos Aires.

In August 1815, the son of a Mapuche captain of Arauco (in the costal butalmapu) arrived in Mendoza. He had been sent by "the cacique Venancio Cohiguepan" to pass along information of Coñuepan's mission to keep the Army of the Andes abreast of events in Valdivia and the Araucanía. While the content of the message was unclear, San

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<sup>336</sup> Though some historians, such as Peralta, read this as an early rejection of the values of the Chilean patria, and others deride Mapuche royalism as an "addiction" to the Spanish King.

<sup>337</sup> Guevara and Mañkelef, *Kiñe mufü*, 172.

Martín noted that Coñuepan was renowned for his support of the “Sacred Cause of America, and for his influence with the native tribes” of Chile.<sup>338</sup> Coñuepan seemingly continued to be an integral informant and interlocutor for the patriots in Mendoza during the Reconquista period. His access to networks of communication and his prestige proved valuable. Coñuepan’s flight in 1814 from his homelands in the Nahuelbuta mountain range did not preclude his engagement with Mapuche politics or the patriot-royalist conflict on both sides of the Andes. In spite of the collapse of the frontier regime in Chile, such networks of communication and diplomacy survived.

Two hundred years ago, the Army of the Andes of the United Provinces of Río de la Plata under José de San Martín and the exiled Chilean Patriot army under Bernardo O’Higgins began their journey from Mendoza to liberate Chile from the Spanish Reconquista regime.<sup>339</sup> The patriots spent over two years of preparation in exile in Mendoza before they set forth to liberate Chile in January 1817. Shortly after San Martín’s army passed into Chile, they met Spanish forces north of Santiago in the valley of Chacabuco. On 12 February, San Martín defeated the Spanish army before reinforcements could arrive. He quickly moved to take Santiago and forced most of the remaining Spanish forces to flee to Lima.

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<sup>338</sup> Letter of José de San Martín, 9 Aug. 1815, Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Sala X, Manuscritos, 27-8-7, p. 140-141.

<sup>339</sup> On the two hundredth anniversary, Chilean officials caused a controversy by refusing to attend the ceremony commemorating the bicentennial despite the participation of Argentine politicians. Eliana Díaz and Leonardo Casas, “200 años del cruce de Los Andes: ninguna alta autoridad chilena asistió a conmemoración,” 9 Feb. 2017, *Biobiochile.cl*, <http://www.biobiochile.cl/noticias/nacional/region-de-valparaiso/2017/02/09/200-anos-del-cruce-de-los-andes-ninguna-alta-autoridad-chilena-asistio-a-conmemoracion.shtml>, accessed 14 Feb. 2017. Also, see Ariel Dorfman’s recent essay, “How We Overcame Tyranny Before,” 11 Feb. 2017, *New York Times*, [https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/opinion/sunday/how-we-overcame-tyranny-before.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region&\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/11/opinion/sunday/how-we-overcame-tyranny-before.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-left-region&region=opinion-c-col-left-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-left-region&_r=0)



In the interim, O'Higgins began setting up a government capable of combatting Spanish loyalists and armed forces. He ordered imprisonment, exile, summary execution, and set up a *Tribunal of Vindicación* to try enemies and issued a decree to seize their property.<sup>340</sup> Meanwhile, Royalists fled to Concepción's major port, Talcahuano. Other Spanish soldiers, patriot deserters, and dispossessed southerners fled across the Bío-Bío and took refuge among the Mapuche.

Chilean independence could not be completed without driving out these Spanish forces. Talcahuano, Concepción, and Valdivia had been the landing points for all previous Spanish invasions since 1813. For the Spanish, this vital maritime connection mattered more than the terrestrial roads across the Araucanía so prized by Ambrosio O'Higgins.

While consolidating their power in Santiago, San Martín and O'Higgins neglected pursuing royalist forces south of Talca.<sup>341</sup> In January and February 1817, only 100 or so regular soldiers under Ramon Freire fought to take Talca. As the Chilean officer Jorge Beauchef, an architect of the seizure of Valdivia in the 1820s wrote, "While we danced and courted the *señoritas* of Santiago, the rest of the Spanish army lost no time; they took refuge in the south and fortified Talcahuano."<sup>342</sup> On 19 February, the Eleventh Division under Argentine General Gregorio las Heras began its march to join Freire and take Concepción. They set their sights on liberating Concepción, the primary conduit for Spanish invasions from Peru, in order to prevent the landing of future Spanish expeditionary forces. Yet desertions, a lack of resources, and fatigue delayed the

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<sup>340</sup> On the first actions of O'Higgins's government see Diego Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, Tomo XI, pp. 7-32, For punishments see especially p. 10 and Chambers, *Families*.

<sup>341</sup> Arana, *Historia*, 37-38.

<sup>342</sup> Jorge Beauchef, quoted in Arana, *Historia*, 37, fn. 24.

division's arrival till March. By then, nearly 1370 Spanish soldiers had settled in Talcahuano.

From the onset of their southern campaign, patriot leaders learned that their characterization of Spanish rule as tyrannical and of subjecthood as enslavement misunderstood the long arc of Mapuche engagement with the colonial project. Argentine General Gregorio de las Heras and O'Higgins hoped to take the coastal forts, using them as a base of operations for retaking the interior of the province (Appendix, Figure 4.4). In April 1817, the patriot Division of the South under Heras numbered 1,296.<sup>343</sup> To consolidate patriot control over Concepción and prepare for the siege of Talcahuano, Heras, on behalf of O'Higgins, issued a proclamation to the residents of Concepción aimed at "calming the country."<sup>344</sup> The proclamation conveyed the idea that "the army of the United Provinces of Río de la Plata in unity with the [army] of Chile, has no objective other than the end of the Spanish despot, that has violently usurped us for many years." Those who rejected the patriot offer of reconciliation, however, would be deemed to have declared in favor of the enemy and forfeit their property.<sup>345</sup>

Heras combined a reconciliatory strategy with one of surveillance. While attempting to maintain control over the city and its inhabitants, Heras sought out information about the recently deposed Spanish forces and the Mapuche on the other side of the Bío-Bío. He kept fifty guerrillas in the city with the sole purpose of monitoring Spanish forces and helping Patriot prisoners escape imprisonment. His spies noted in

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<sup>343</sup> Nicacio Ramallo to Gregorio de las Heras, "State of Forces of the Divisions of the South," 10 Apr. 1817, Concepción/Penco, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 49, p. 23.

<sup>344</sup> "Proclamation of the Supreme Director of State," 7 Apr. 1817, Concepción, AHNCH, MG, vol. 49, p. 11, and General Gregorio de las Heras to Supreme Director of State, 7 Apr. 1817, Concepción AHNCH, MG, vol. 49, p. 12.

<sup>345</sup> "Proclamation," 7 Apr. 1818.

April that Spanish soldiers remained outside of the city in their trenches, but that a shortage in their supplies was immanent.<sup>346</sup> His spies also reported “the other side of the Viovio (sic) supports the Enemies (por los enemigos).” The “other side,” in this case, referred to the coastal butalmapu Mapuche inhabitants, or the *lafkenche*, near the Bay of Arauco at the mouth of the Bío-Bío. Most *lafkenche* had pledged to support the Spanish Reconquista in a series of parlamentos in the previous years, and continued to permit Spanish forces in their lands, including the fort of Arauco.

Nevertheless, the nearly 1,300-strong Division of the South was in no position to move against the Spanish on either side of the Bío-Bío in early 1817. Heras’ forces were beset by a significant mutiny by nearly half of the 11<sup>th</sup> Batallion near the Maule River. These deserters turned to banditry, and brought “anarchy and desolation” to the people of the region.<sup>347</sup> Sickness, a lack of horses, heavy seasonal rains, and the need to safeguard Concepción also contributed to Heras’ inability to move against royalist forces.<sup>348</sup> O’Higgins even wrote to General San Martín asking for naval support from Buenos Aires for the rapid defeat of the Spanish presence in Arauco, to the south, which would prevent resupplying ships arriving from Lima.<sup>349</sup>

O’Higgins’ request for naval support never materialized. His new strategy for taking Arauco and securing the rest of the frontier would have to involve forging alliances with Mapuche across the Bío-Bío. In April, he created the Division of the Frontier. With fifty soldiers, the new division departed Concepción along the northern shore of the Bío-Bío, retaking forts from the Spanish before seizing the crucial fort of Los

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<sup>346</sup> General Gregorio de las Heras to Bernardo O’Higgins, 12 Apr. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, p. 23.

<sup>347</sup> Letter to Bernardo O’Higgins, 9 Apr. 1817, ANHCh, MG, vol. 28, p. 3, no. 11.

<sup>348</sup> Heras to O’Higgins, 12 Apr. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, p. 23.

<sup>349</sup> Bernardo O’Higgins to General José de San Martín, 22 Apr. 1817, ANHCh, MG, vol. 28, pp. 93-94.

Angeles in the central plains.<sup>350</sup> Los Angeles had been the nerve center for Spanish relations with the Mapuche throughout the eighteenth century, and had been the staging grounds for many parlamentos and interethnic trade and diplomatic fairs. Following these rapid victories, the Division crossed the Bío-Bío, taking Nacimiento on 13 May, and then sent soldiers back downriver toward Concepción by boat to take Santa Juana. Meanwhile, future Supreme Director of Chile Ramon Freire led 350 soldiers further south of the river to Arauco. To animate the troops weary of rain and sickness, and prone to desertion, O'Higgins promised they could pillage "all the property of the enemies of our cause."<sup>351</sup> This order referred to the Spanish and did not extend to Mapuche possessions. He ordered commanders to respect the residents of Nacimiento, as it lay south of the river in Mapuche territory. By 16 May, O'Higgins confidently reported to Buenos Aires that he was in possession of all of the fortifications on the southern shore of the Bío-Bío from the Andean headwaters at Antuco in Pehuenche domains to Concepción.<sup>352</sup> By the end of May, Freire had defeated the 200 royalists in Arauco.<sup>353</sup>

Yet control of the old chain of Spanish frontier forts did not signify dominion over the south. O'Higgins knew that if he were to achieve a general peace with the Mapuche as his father had in the 1790s, it would be essential to host parlamentos and secure alliances with the four butalmapus. However, O'Higgins underestimated the extent to which partisan rivalries had jarred inter-Mapuche relations on the southern shore of the Bío-Bío. A general parlamento in which representatives from all corners of the Araucanía

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<sup>350</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 255-256.

<sup>351</sup> Bernardo O'Higgins to Captain José Cienfuegos, 8 May 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, MG, vol. 28, p. 113. O'Higgins reiterates these orders in O'Higgins to Director Delgado, 16 May 1817, Concepción, ANCh, MG, vol. 28, p. 123.

<sup>352</sup> Bernardo O'Higgins to Supreme Director of Buenos Aires, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 28, p. 125, O'Higgins to the Commander of the Division of the Frontera, 29 May 1817, Concepción, ANCh, MG, vol. 28, p. 135.

<sup>353</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 257.

sat together in peace and unity was an impossible dream. In June, O'Higgins explicitly acknowledged that the "fierce enemies of our country," the remaining Spanish soldiers, openly associated with the Mapuche ("bárbaros") in order to recapture Chile—a piece of land they were "unworthy of treading upon."<sup>354</sup> O'Higgins approved calls by frontier commanders for militiamen and artillery to punish the Spanish and their Mapuche supporters. But, he ordered the troops in the Arauco fort to maintain a defensive position so as not to antagonize the coastal Mapuche. Several weeks later, Spanish forces that sought refuge in the coastal butalmapu killed 10 soldiers when a patriot captain disobeyed this order and pursued Spanish troops into Mapuche lands. While it was unclear who exactly killed the 10 soldiers, O'Higgins hoped to avoid antagonizing the costinos with a violent patriot military expedition into their lands. Nevertheless, O'Higgins reported to San Martín that "order had been restored" after the incident, and "he [was] sure that with the *indios* punished and their vile seducers exterminated, they will not return to provoke our vengeance."<sup>355</sup> O'Higgins's refused to decouple the practice of punishment from that of reconciliation.

Despite being a southerner himself, and the illegitimate son of Ambrosio O'Higgins, Bernardo developed a myopic interethnic diplomacy that ignored Mapuche memories of engagement along the transandean frontier. Protection and punishment could occur on both sides of the Bío-Bío, but Mapuche leaders needed to be consulted, have their grievances heard, and be given time to communicate amongst themselves.

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<sup>354</sup> O'Higgins to the Commander of the Plaza of Arauco, 11 Jun. 1817, Concepción, ANCh, MG, vol. 28, p. 266 O'Higgins' use of "bárbaro" to describe the royalist *lafkenche* most likely signified a politically partisan and cultural pejorative: it marked the use of violence to reject or stymie the patriot's "just cause." Whereas, *barbaro* was not always used in this sense by the Spanish Empire.

<sup>355</sup> O'Higgins to General in Chief of the Army of the Andes and Chile [José de San Martín], 10 Jul. 1817, Concepción, ANCh, MG, vol. 28, p. 150.

Moreover, the meanings of enemy and friend required deeds—fulfillment of promises of goods and protection—not only words and promises. Mapuche leaders had not been seduced by the Spanish: they steadfastly imposed their own diplomatic strategies on all outsiders. Patriot commanders would need to reconcile their use of violence and implement more diplomatic approaches to the southern campaign if they were to convince powerful caciques of their intentions. For example, in June, while ordering another attack against the coastal Mapuche near Arauco, O'Higgins wrote, "it will be opportune that you write to the casiques (sic) in my name, making manifest to them my good will toward them, and my desire that we have a meeting, or parlamento, to make them aware of my charitable intentions."<sup>356</sup> O'Higgins' hoped that his surname would carry weight south of the Bío-Bío if it invoked the conciliatory memory of Ambrosio, much like the prestige of great caciques played an important place in internal Mapuche diplomacy.

The patriots quickly recognized the great prestige of the name Venancio Coñuepan among the four butalmapus, and actively sought him out. While it is unclear when Coñuepan emerged from his *malal* (fortified residence) and returned to his dominions near the valley of Lumaco after his hasty departure in 1814, but by June 1817 his name began to populate patriot correspondence. Buried within a general command to spread O'Higgins' good will south of the Bío-Bío emerged the recognition that a sound relationship with Coñuepan would be crucial to patriot victory. "If it is possible," O'Higgins' ordered, the Commander of Arauco should "send calls to the *indio* Venancio with his people, announcing our triumphs, my garrison in this city, where I promise him

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<sup>356</sup> O'Higgins to the Commander of the Plaza of Arauco, 11 Jun. 1817.

the greatest advantages lie.”<sup>357</sup> This entreaty implied that Coñuepan expected continued proof of the patriots’ commitment to an alliance, even after Coñuepan had given support to the Patria Vieja governments. Given the frustrations patriots faced with the costinos for harboring Spanish soldiers, Coñuepan’s control of the other side of the coastal mountain range—the Lumaco and Puren valleys, and western portions of the central plains—made him a lynchpin for stabilizing this region. Coñuepan’s strength and the location of his domains, however, also made him subject to the Mapuche rivalries within his own Llanos butalmapu, and with pro-Spanish caciques to the north in Angol and to the west along the coast.

The patriot pivot to court Coñuepan in mid-1817 further revealed that rivalries divided Mapuche groups within each of the butalmapus, and compelled Mapuche leaders to leave their homes and fight in neighboring butalmapus. In other words, butalmapus may have been geographically defined, but their internal politics were contingent, heterogeneous, and subject to external (patriot-royalist) and internal Mapuche pressures. In late June 1817, several weeks after O’Higgins dispatched messages in hopes of reaching Coñuepan, costino warriors ambushed and routed patriot soldiers and several of their Mapuche allies: the costino cacique Canumilla, and the Angolino cacique Manuel Dumulevi. The targeted group had been pursuing Spanish and other costinos near Arauco.<sup>358</sup> According to rumor, the enemy costinos “spilled the blood of the valiant caciques Canumilla and Dumulevi by slitting their throats.” However, patriot officers

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<sup>357</sup> O’Higgins to the Commander of the Plaza of Arauco, 11 Jun. 1817, Concepción, ANCh, MG, vol. 28, p. 266.

<sup>358</sup> José Ignacio Zenteno to Coronel Andrés Alcázar,” 4 Jul. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, MG, vol. 27, p. 2. According to Alcázar, Dumulevi’s family lived near el Tambillo, roughly seven kilometers directly south of Nacimiento. Andrés del Alcázar to Bernardo O’Higgins, 20 Jul. 1817, Nacimiento, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, p. 80.

soon found out that Canumilla and Dumulevi had narrowly escaped into the coastal mountain range and fled on foot to their homes in the Llanos.<sup>359</sup> Patriot leaders used this attack, and rumor of these caciques' deaths as a pretext to inspire Mapuche vengeance in the central plains against the Spanish, and their allies, the "disloyal [pro-Spanish] costinos." Dumulevi and Canumilla, who narrowly escaped the costino ambush, traveled across the coastal Nahuelbuta range to accompany patriot forces away from their butalmapus. Dumulevi's *lofs* were in the central valley region of Angol and Canumilla's in another part of the Arauco coast.<sup>360</sup> Rather than O'Higgins's hoped for general peace, armed activities south of the Bío-Bío fostered bloody rivalries within the butalmapus further making a general peace impossible.

Dumulevi and Canumilla's return to Nacimiento around 20 July attested to the threats intra-Mapuche and patriot-royalist violence posed to the continued effectiveness of Mapuche communication networks for negotiation. Dumulevi and Canumilla, to whom Alcázar referred as "porteros," or gatekeepers of the butalmapu of Angol, had been working to bring the cacique gobernador of Angol, Juan Carilan, the roughly fifty kilometers to the fort of Nacimiento to negotiate. After receiving the message, Carilan sent the capitanes de amigos residing in his domains and his comisario de naciones, Don Cebastian Libaja, to spread the word. The patriots' message traveled from "cacique to cacique," but did not reach further than the gobernador of Repocura, Talmalubu, roughly 130 kilometers to the south. A costino raid across the coastal mountain range into the

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<sup>359</sup> Andrés del Alcázar to Bernardo O'Higgins, 11 July 1817, Nacimiento, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, p. 76. For a fine-grained discussion of capitanes de amigos during this period, see Rodrigo Araya, "Alianzas mapuches durante la guerra a muerte," and Fernando Ulloa Valenzuela, "Los españoles araucanos."

<sup>360</sup> Andrés del Alcázar to Bernardo O'Higgins, 11 Jul. 1817.



Angol butalmapu, which included the burning of homes and crops, prevented its dissemination.<sup>361</sup> Most importantly, the patriot message could not reach Coñuepan.

When Alcázar learned that efforts to convene the caciques of the Angol butalmapu had been stymied, he ordered two of his capitanes de amigos to disguise themselves as frontier traders (*conchavadores*) and attempt to contact Coñuepan on his behalf. Dias and Rios professed to be “intimate” friends of the cacique.<sup>362</sup> This subterfuge reflected the longstanding acceptance by Mapuche of non-Mapuche *conchavadores* in the Araucanía. It also implied the alarm potentially generated by the movement of plain-clothes soldiers in the region, given the brewing rivalries between *angolino*, *costino*, and *llanos* leaders.

At the same time, caciques from the Llanos, directly east of Angol, responded positively to patriot overtures for a parlay. The representative of the cacique principal Don Pedro Maripil, and the caciques of Bureo, which lay some twenty-five kilometers east of Nacimiento along the southern shore of the Bío-Bío, personally visited Alcázar. In their meeting, for which Alcázar used the verb “parlar,” he expressed O’Higgins’ desire for unity and friendship, extended his offer of protection, and gave gifts. Even though the Bureo caciques and Maripil’s representatives explained that news of patriot promises had not reached all of their lands, they left pleased, offering to work “to calm the Butalmapu of Angol” by involving themselves in the affairs of their neighbors. Despite this new alliance, they did not declare war on all Spaniards, as the patriots may have hoped. In fact, the caciques wished to continue a calm and friendly relationship with “their

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<sup>361</sup> Andrés del Alcázar to Bernardo O’Higgins, 20 Jul. 1817, Nacimiento, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, p. 80.

<sup>362</sup> Andrés del Alcázar to Bernardo O’Higgins, 20 Jul. 1817.

Spaniards.”<sup>363</sup> An alliance with the patriots against the costinos did not signify the forsaking of older ties to Spanish allies and friends living in or near their *lofs*.

Coñuepan’s primary antagonist during the 1819-1925 civil war known as the *guerra a muerte* (war to the death), Francisco Mariluán (Chapter 5), came from south of the Bureo area.

The increasing importance of a patriot alliance with Coñuepan became manifest in the aftermath of the violence along the coast, which threatened to spill into the Llanos and Angol butalmapus. O’Higgins developed a two-part strategy, involving the movement of a division led by Ramon Freire south of the Bío-Bío and a reinvigorated diplomatic push in the central plains of the Araucanía that would culminate in a parlamento.

For the latter, Secretary of War and Navy José Ignacio Zenteno ordered commander of the frontier Andrés de Alcázar to cross the Bío-Bío to Nacimiento and organize all of the *capitanejos* and *capitanes de amigos* to travel as far south as Venancio’s lands promising all of the caciques principales “friendship [and] protection.” These represented the butalmapus of Angol and the Llanos (the plains, between the Bío-Bío and the eastern slopes of the coastal range). A day earlier, O’Higgins gave the same order to the Lieutenant Governor of the Los Angeles.<sup>364</sup> Alcázar reiterated the need to travel to the “two butalmapus of Angol and *llanos*” to encourage their caciques, “and in particular D[o]n Venancio Coihuepan” to visit Nacimiento.<sup>365</sup> These go-betweens were empowered to embody O’Higgins in their entreaties with the caciques since the intense

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<sup>363</sup> Andrés del Alcázar to Bernardo O’Higgins, 20 Jul. 1817.

<sup>364</sup> Bernardo O’Higgins to Lieutenant Governor of Los Angeles, 3 Jul. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, MG, vol. 28, p. 284.

<sup>365</sup> Andrés del Alcázar to Bernardo O’Higgins, 9 Jul. 1817, Nacimiento, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, p. 75.

rains of the winter “have not permitted [O’Higgins] to personally embrace [the caciques].”<sup>366</sup> Zenteno explicitly asked the emissaries to convince Mapuche leaders that Spanish were their “primary and common enemies,” emphasizing that they “have and continue to come to usurp the land.”<sup>367</sup> He claimed that “we have not made war on our brothers the *indios*,” the Spanish in Arauco had. In doing so, he offered a backhanded pardon for previous transgressions against the patriot cause by arguing the caciques had been “seduced” by the Spanish.

Ultimately, Zenteno and O’Higgins hoped to forge an alliance whereby the Llanos and Angol Mapuche would “make war of fire and blood” against the “Araucanos”: the enemy costinos of Arauco Bay.<sup>368</sup> Either by experience with the delicate nature of negotiation with Mapuche leaders, or disbelief in Mapuche trustworthiness, Zenteno ultimately hoped that even if the Llanos and Angol caciques “reject our cause,” the *capitanes de amigos* “must inflame the caciques” such that they would take out their aggression on the Spanish south of the Bío-Bío and their Mapuche sympathizers.

As we saw in Chapters Two and Three, and will see in the case of Coñuepan’s primary antagonist (Francisco Mariluán) in Chapter Five, messengers and visits to *lofs* alone could not seal pacts of allegiance, or resolve hostilities. They only initiated the process. By 9 July, even though Freire had taken Arauco weeks earlier, Alcázar continued negotiating with Angolino and Llanos leaders in hopes of hosting a *parlamento* in Nacimiento.<sup>369</sup> As had become ritualized during the colonial period, O’Higgins ordered Alcázar to prepare the wine, meat, and other gifts necessary for hosting the

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<sup>366</sup> Bernardo O’Higgins to Lieutenant Governor of Los Angeles, 3 Jul. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, MG, vol. 28, p. 284.

<sup>367</sup> Zenteno to Alcázar, 4 Jul. 1817.

<sup>368</sup> Zenteno to Alcázar, 4 Jul. 1817.

<sup>369</sup> José Ignacio Zenteno to Andrés de Alcázar, 9 Jul. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, MG, vol. 27, p. 6.

parlamento.<sup>370</sup> Presenting gifts of sabers, indigo, and colored scarves to the caciques was not simply a reward or enticement, but essential to avoid Mapuche resentment. It was part of the reciprocity involved in sealing an agreement.<sup>371</sup> Coñuepan was known for his anger toward generals who forgot the gift giving custom.<sup>372</sup> This expectation of the respect for the ritual aspects of diplomacy seemed to have survived the war, yet the ripple affect of such agreements across the butalmapus would have been extremely limited.

These events in the winter of 1817 demonstrated that seemingly marginal imperial frontiers and unconquered indigenous people could have a decisive impact on the end of colonial rule and the emergence of nations. Intimate Spanish relations with Mapuche leaders and patriot inability to win the south made impossible the security of central Chile and hampered their participation in the liberation of Peru. The exercise of Mapuche diplomacy directly delayed the fateful Guayaquil Conference between San Martín and Bolívar in Ecuador in 1822. The delicate and highly ritualized Mapuche strategies of diplomacy, communication, and reciprocity developed over the past century was frequently short-circuited. This short-circuiting threatened the broader regional aspirations of all sides in the armed conflict.

While neither side abandoned these cultural or political touchstones and practices, war and partisan violence made reaching agreements and fulfilling obligations increasingly precarious. We can begin to see that what drove caciques and their followers to support different sides during this period had less to do with the specific promises and practices of either the Spanish or the Chilean leaders. The protocols of meetings and gift

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<sup>370</sup> On July 10, O'Higgins ordered the commander of the frontier, Andrés Alcázar, to prepare the wine, meat, and other gifts necessary for hosting such an event. Bernardo O'Higgins to Lieutenant Governor of Los Angeles, 10 Jul. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 28, p. 286.

<sup>371</sup> Andrés del Alcázar to Bernardo O'Higgins, 11 Jul. 1817, Nacimiento, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, p. 76.

<sup>372</sup> Guevara and Mañequelef, 172.

giving looked rather similar. According to Alcázar, interethnic emissaries like the *Comisarios de Naciones* (Commissioner of Indian Nations) was convinced of the importance of respecting Mapuche customary practices, *ad mapu*. In his words,

without the threat of trampling this custom [*ad mapu*], [our cause] will gain ground. I do not doubt that with patience everything will go our way and our Project will succeed in spite of the Araucanos [near Arauco Bay] and [the rest of the] Costinos, who know something and fear it moving forward given the inconveniences they put forward to impede the passage of our Capitanes [de amigos].<sup>373</sup>

In the midst of warfare and dislocation, Mapuche leaders still insisted on asserting their own political culture on negotiations with the Patriots.

Although the Pehuenche from south of Mendoza seemed to have primarily been involved with San Martín in Mendoza, patriot leaders in Chile developed relations with the Pehuenche from Chillán and the headwaters of the Bío-Bío near Antuco Valley, roughly 180 kilometers east of Concepción. Alcázar's "dear friend," the Pehuenche cacique Coliman, and his Araucanía allies from the central southern plains, *lofs* of "Quilaco, Mulchen, Caullín, Rinaico, [and] Malleco" also pledged before Alcázar, the Angolino Juan Millaleo, and the llanista Dumulevi their desire for unity, peace, and friendship with the patriots. Interestingly, Mulchen was in extremely close proximity to the pro-Spanish leader Mariluán, though his name is not mentioned. However, Coliman and his party mentioned that they had sent word of the patriot peace offer directly to the costinos, but that it had been rejected. Nevertheless, while these Pehuenche and llanistas pledged to live in peace and support a "new Government of the Patria," their ultimate

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<sup>373</sup> Andrés de Alcázar to Bernardo O'Higgins," 11 Jul. 1817, Nacimiento, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, p. 76.

goal was “to extinguish the fire in the interior of their butalmapu” and secure passage for patriot troops through their lands.<sup>374</sup>

In the aftermath of these negotiations, O’Higgins began circulating concrete articles for peace between the patriots and all of the butalmapus, especially those who had been “seduced by the Slaves of Spain.”<sup>375</sup> In three articles, he promised “an eternal and durable peace between this government and its subjects with all of the Nations that live from the other shore of the Bío-Bío until the ends of the land” and a general amnesty for “everything that has come to pass in the time of hostilities,” a promise they only partially kept for the Spanish.<sup>376</sup> Finally, he promised the return of all captive women, children, and property taken from our “brothers the caciques” and their subjects who were taken in the actions around Arauco. In return, he asked the Mapuche to turn over any outsiders who had taken up arms against the patria. On the same day O’Higgins released his declaration, Zenteno ordered the commander of Arauco to prepare to release the Mapuche women and children prisoners held in Concepción. Zenteno described the action as proof that “they had never ceased respecting [the allied Mapuche] or caring for them as brothers descended from the same Mothers.”<sup>377</sup>

This type of rapprochement, which drew upon metaphors of kinship and gender, reflected a framework for building new forms of coordination by reconfiguring older ties of allegiance, land, and power. As in the 1790s, Mapuche politics and motivations infused this framework from which patriot leaders drew to push their own agenda. In his

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<sup>374</sup> Andrés del Alcázar to José Ignacio Zenteno, 21 Jul. 1817, Nacimiento, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, p. 81.

<sup>375</sup> Declaration of Bernardo O’Higgins, 3 Aug. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, MG, vol. 27, pp. 12-13.

<sup>376</sup> On Spanish and Chilean punishment of alleged and actual enemy sympathers during the Reconquista and the Patria Nueva, see Chambers, *Families in War and Peace*.

<sup>377</sup> José Ignacio Zenteno to the Commander of the Plaza de Arauco, 3 Aug. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 27, p. 12.

dissemination of O'Higgins' articles of reconciliation, José Zenteno noted that the largest threat posed by the "rebellious" Mapuche was their importance as a Trojan horse for Chile's domestic and foreign enemies. If Mapuche leaders rejected a general peace, then he ordered his emissaries to push the Mapuche into a state of neutrality. This meant, in practical terms, traveling to the Mapuche settlements in order to "sidetrack the harmonious relations that they have with the rebels."<sup>378</sup> Such a strategy implied that the patriots understood that alliances were not based on any kind of enduring sympathies, but on calculation.

The July negotiations in the Angol and Llanos butalmapus showed that a unity of all the Mapuche nations like those achieved in the colonial period were not possible. Frustrations with patriot incursions south of the Bío-Bío and the intensification of internal Mapuche hostilities that spilled over into different butalmapus shaped the noncommittal nature of certain Llanista and Angolino leaders. By the end of August, Alcázar reported a rumor of a large contingent of hostile Mapuche marching in his direction.<sup>379</sup> Within two days, the Mapuche of the butalmapu of Angol rose up against the patriot forces in the area.<sup>380</sup> Despite O'Higgins' overtures for peace and reconciliation, a new wave of violence and division broke out south of the Bío-Bío.

O'Higgins characterized the motivation for the uprising in two ways. First, he believed it to be a ploy by the Spanish to divide his forces and weaken the siege on Talcahuano. From a military point of view, these events did put pressure on O'Higgins's forces that had been laying siege to the Spanish-controlled port north of Concepción. He

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<sup>378</sup> José Ignacio Zenteno to the Commander of the Plaza de Arauco, 7 Aug., 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 27, p. 13.

<sup>379</sup> Letter of Andrés de Alcázar, 29 Aug. 1817, Nacimiento, ANHCh, MG, vol. 24, p. 38.

<sup>380</sup> Bernardo O'Higgins to the Director Delegado," 31 Aug. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 28, p. 171.

even suggested that it was “very probable” that the Spanish aided and fostered the insurrection from Valdivia, especially in hope of challenging Arauco.<sup>381</sup> Secondly, he suggested that new opportunities for theft and pillage motivated Angolino attacks on frontier settlements. O’Higgins certainly found no fault in his own fomentation of internal Mapuche rivalries in the coast and the Llanos over the past months.

After a swift military defense of Nacimiento, the most proximate fort across the Bío-Bío from Angol, O’Higgins attempted to end the uprising through a parlamento with gifts for the Angolinos. Within the first week of September, O’Higgins had already received word of the “positive disposition for peace” of some of the caciques of Angol. In particular he mentioned the caciques Antinao and the pehuenche Coliman.<sup>382</sup> Though Coñuepan’s name appeared infrequently in patriot correspondence during August, in September O’Higgins once again reminded his frontier commanders of how much weight Coñuepan’s support would carry.

Shortly thereafter, 10 caciques and 70 mocetones arrived at the frontier fort of San Carlos to show their support for the patriots and denounce the Angolinos. The Angolinos had not responded to O’Higgins’ invitations. O’Higgins wrote to capitán de amigos Gaspar Ruiz asking him to reiterate to the Llanista caciques that the patriot’s only desire was for “peace and reciprocal harmony while we are trying to liberate the country from the oppression, cruelty and tyranny” of the Spanish. To this end, he predicted “there will come a day when all of the people of the Country have united, and made war against our enemies, who will realize their error and deception and cry their repentance when

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<sup>381</sup> Bernardo O’Higgins to the Commander General de la Frontera, 22 Sep. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, MG, vol. 27, pp. 27-28.

<sup>382</sup> Bernardo O’Higgins to the Commander General de la Frontera 3 Sep. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 27, p. 32.



considering and seeing palpably all of the evil they have done.”<sup>383</sup> Once again, O’Higgins chose to place blame for Mapuche opposition to the patriots directly on the Spanish—insinuating that they were in some sense pawns easily seduced—while evincing other reasons why Mapuche leaders refused to flock to his cause.

Eventually, many Pehuenche inhabitants of the Andean foothills near Chillán, like Coliman, answered O’Higgins’ call. While writing to Gaspar Ruiz regarding the meeting in San Carlos, he mentioned that he was being visited by the *capitan de amigos* of the pehuenche, Julian Grandon. Grandon represented the cacique gobernador Sebastián Colimanque. While the previous chapter detailed the events by which Pehuenche south of Mendoza came to support San Martín and the patriots, it is worth noting that in 1817 other Pehuenche could also be counted on in the Araucanía. This support was deemed worthy of lavish gifts, including food and drink, a staff, two pounds of gold, a saber, and a seal of the coat of arms of the Patria for Colimanque in gratitude for his “good services.”

Still, many Angol and Llanos caciques hesitated to back the patriots. Since Angolino caciques avoided frontier forts for fear of reprisal for the uprising, all parties continued to rely on Mapuche messengers and go-betweens. O’Higgins’ overtures of peace and his sense of the “good dispositions” of the Angolinos all came from messengers from the Llanos butalmapu. At the same time, he asked the Llanistas and Pehuenche to be more than messengers to achieve the neutrality of, or peace with, the Angolinos: he hoped to convince them to attack the Angolinos.

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<sup>383</sup> Bernardo O’Higgins to Captain Gaspar Ruiz, comisionado de la Plaza de San Carlos, 5 Sep. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 27, pp. 20-21.

During late September, O'Higgins learned the Pehuenche Coliman and other Llanista messengers' word of Angolino openness to negotiate with him had been false.<sup>384</sup> Patriot leaders, try as they might, could not grasp the pressures facing individual caciques from the Spanish or other Mapuche, or the role that intrigue and deceit may play in interethnic diplomacy. Perhaps San Martín's famous ruse (Chapter Three) actually reflected long-standing practices of frontier relations never fully detected by Spanish administrators. After learning of the Angolino's deceit, and hearing word of Angolino preparation for future attacks, O'Higgins wrote to the Commander General of the Frontier to strategize over how best to convince the Pehuenche Antinao and Coliman, and the Llanista Dumulevi, to attack the rebels. He also suggested the need to reach out to Coñuepan secretly.<sup>385</sup> Not only did O'Higgins alert the costinos of his intention to send 500 troops against the Spanish attackers of Arauco, but he made it known that he wished the Spanish and indigenous captives and enemies to suffer "exemplary punishments."<sup>386</sup>

While Mapuche and patriot leaders focused on drawing the battle lines in the Araucanía, rumor of the arrival of a new Spanish expeditionary force continued to fray negotiations. On 16 September 1817, O'Higgins received a letter from Andrés de Alcázar warning him of an imminent Spanish invasion of Arauco aimed at reasserting Spanish control over the Bío-Bío River frontier.<sup>387</sup> Though Alcázar reported only 400 soldiers in the Spanish expedition, he underscored the persistence of Mapuche allegiances with the still-hidden Spanish forces in the interior of the coast. He reported that Spanish forces

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<sup>384</sup> Bernardo O'Higgins to the Commander General de la frontera, 22 Sep. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 27, pp. 27-28.

<sup>385</sup> Bernardo O'Higgins al Comandante General de la Frontera, 10 Sep. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 27, p. 24.

<sup>386</sup> Bernardo O'Higgins al Comandante General de la Frontera, 24 Sep. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 27, p. 30.

<sup>387</sup> Andrés de Alcázar to Bernardo O'Higgins, 16 Feb. 1817, Nacimiento, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, pp. 36-37.

hiding in the Nahuelbuta mountain range had maintained contact with the “rebellious Araucanos” hoping for their support. For the first time, a patriot leader admitted another motivation for Mapuche hostility or trepidation toward the patriot cause: fear of intra-Mapuche violence. Aside from the neutral Mapuche with whom patriots continued to the negotiate, “the rest, *out of fear*... have not decided on our behalf.”<sup>388</sup> Royalist military victories, he indicated, could be decisive in shifting allegiances against the Patria.

For instance, on 6 October O’Higgins learned that Dumulevi had raided a Patriot owned frontier hacienda. That Dumulevi had survived the Royalist costino attack earlier that year and had been O’Higgins’ principal interlocutor in Angol made the attack feel like a betrayal. However, the Spanish frontier regime had for centuries served as a source of material wealth, sustenance, legitimacy, and prestige for caciques. Raiding frontier settlements never completely ceased on either side of the Andes in spite of general peace agreements. With the evaporation of trade partners and Spanish resources, and the shortages caused by warfare and new dangers over crossing other butalmapus for commerce or raiding, this attack would not have been surprising. Nor would it have necessarily been a betrayal of Dumulevi’s allegiance to the patriots.

These events exposed the difficulties Mapuche leaders experienced as they applied their diplomatic practices to a period of open warfare. Rather than abandoning these protocols, the patriot-royalist conflict complicated internal Mapuche political objectives—prestige and authority for caciques, stability and protection of their homes and livestock herds, access to frontier resources, and secure movement through the region. Participating in the independence war was not mutually exclusive with the Mapuche war. In fact, neither could extinguish the other. These realignments occurred in

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<sup>388</sup> Italics mine.

many butalmapus. For instance, Pehuenche and Llanista leaders learned how to incorporate the emancipationist discourse of O'Higgins to legitimize their own interests while attacking their rivals. Around the time of Dumulevi's raid, Pehuenche leaders participated in a parley with Gaspar Ruiz. They asked permission to join the Patriots "in service of the common cause... because we must finish off the traitorous [Angolinos] at all costs."<sup>389</sup> While this certainly could be interpreted as a wholesale adoption of Patriot rhetoric, it also demonstrated a savvy understanding of Patriot symbolism in which these caciques could productively cloak their interests in waging their own rivalries.

After months of diplomatic efforts by caciques and patriots, more violence broke out across the region in October. O'Higgins finally received word that he could count on the protection of Coñuepan and the other caciques of the Llanos for patriot attacks on the Angolinos.<sup>390</sup> This pledge became increasingly important as hostilities around Nacimiento spread east up the foothills of the Andes and toward the headwaters of the Bío-Bío to the regions known as the Isla de la Laja and the Alta Frontera (Upper Frontier). According to reports, the belligerent Mapuche group supported by the Spanish reached 2,000. To meet this offensive, Ruiz entreated with the Pehuenche and Antinao to aid the patriots. The followers of the pro-patriot cacique Julian Leviluan, alongside Commander José María de la Cruz, a future Chilean general and federalist, managed to defeat the Spanish and their supporters in the Alta Frontera. Meanwhile in Nacimiento, Patriot forces repelled another attack by the Angolinos, which resulted in the deaths of Dumulevi, his son, and the son-in-law of Colipi—a prominent cacique of the region. In

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<sup>389</sup> Pedro Ramón Arriagada to Bernardo O'Higgins, 3 Oct. 1817, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 23, p. 214.

<sup>390</sup> Bernardo O'Higgins to the Commander General de la Frontera," 6 Oct. 1817, Concepción, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 28, p. 385.

response, the patriot Mapuche pursued the perpetrators back to their butalmapu, sacking the homes and belongings of the Spanish, and putting the rest to the torch along the way.<sup>391</sup>

As Coñuepan began backing the patriots more openly, this uptick in violence showed that many Mapuche saw abstention from the conflict as the best strategy. Much like Coñuepan had retreated to his fortified home in 1814, self-preservation animated many families. Patriot officer Pedro Arriagada captured the Pehuenche leader Colimo, putting his superior, the cacique Coliman, in a bind as to whether or not he would support O'Higgins.<sup>392</sup> On 27 October, Coliman informed Arriagada through his representative Julian Grandon, that his people would make peace with them. Coliman had "no desire to fight and ...many of his people were wounded." In the same letter, Arriagada reported that the "very Patriotic" Cacique Gobernador of Santa Fe, Lebiluan, had hidden from the latest insurrection in the Andes foothills. As the Patriots countered these attacks, Lebiluan requested permission to arm 200 men in order to defend his *lof*. O'Higgins acquiesced, believing this would further secure the frontier.<sup>393</sup>

In these two instances, we see a reticence by certain Mapuche groups to openly fight other Mapuche groups embroiled in the conflict between Patriots and Royalists—or to appear to the Chileans to take sides. Leaving one's butalmapu in support of either side could leave one's own families and lands vulnerable. In one instance, the violence visited upon Pehuenche families compelled some to withdraw from the conflict and others to

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<sup>391</sup> Andrés de Alcázar to Bernardo O'Higgins, 20 Oct. 1817, Nacimiento, ANHCh, MG, vol. 49, p. 152.

<sup>392</sup> MG, vol. 28, no. 398. Antinao to attack Angolinos. He's an ally, coliman maybe not so much? Or did they capture an ally to pressure him further?

<sup>393</sup> Pedro Ramón Arriagada to Bernardo O'Higgins, 27 Oct. 1817, ANHCh, Fondo Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 23, p. 262.

flee. The obverse of this position, however, entailed the seeking of revenge upon return from such flight.

By the end of 1817, the entire patriot army had abandoned Concepción province. On 17 December, O'Higgins received word that the Viceroy of Peru had organized a new expedition under Mariano Osorio to retake Chile. O'Higgins made the decision to end the siege of Talcahuano and return to Santiago to prepare for its defense. Meanwhile, he ordered the complete evacuation of all inhabitants of Concepción province south of the Maule River.<sup>394</sup> "When passing through, the enemy must not find anything but a desert, homes without inhabitants, field without crops and without livestock."<sup>395</sup>

Within a year, O'Higgins, San Martín and the patriots had successfully repulsed the Spanish invasion, secured control over central Chile, and declared independence from Spain. Nevertheless, the Patriot departure left a massive power vacuum in which escaped Spanish officers, deserters, and Mapuche leaders vied for control of Concepción and the Araucanía. Despite O'Higgins and San Martín's achievements in central Chile, early Chilean leaders could only dream of a unified nation stretching from the Atacama Desert to Cape Horn.<sup>396</sup> Concepción Province, Cuyo, and the Araucanía would once again be engulfed in a conflagration from 1819 until 1825, known as the *guerra a muerte*. Independent Chile's army would return to Concepción in 1819 to attempt to pacify the south.

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<sup>394</sup> Diego Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile*, vol. 11, pp. 324-329.

<sup>395</sup> Bernardo O'Higgins, quoted in Barros Arana, *Historia*, vol. 11, pp. 325.

<sup>396</sup> Recent studies of these frustrated hopes include Mariman, "La república," Herr, "The Nation-State," Peralta, "Ni por la razón," and Joanna Crow, "Troubled Negotiations: The Mapuche and the Chilean State (1818-1830)."

#### 4.4 Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, patriot (and subsequently Chilean) military leaders failed to convince Mapuche leaders to unanimously support their cause. Throughout the Patria Vieja, Reconquista, and Patria Nueva, Mapuche leaders in the four butalmapus demanded patriot leaders participate in the same ritual negotiations and diplomatic communications as they had for the previous century. They also expected protection and material support (gifts and goods) in exchange for their loyalty. O'Higgins' disposition to negotiate combined with his strategy of military maneuvers south of the Bío-Bío presented a contradictory picture to Mapuche leaders. Moreover, partisan patriot-royalist conflicts exacerbated divisions between Mapuche groups within the four butalmapus. War upset the quotidian agreements and balances of power earned over decades. The consequences would be heightened in the guerra a muerte, and would reverberate across the Andes to the Pampas in subsequent years. The rise and reconciliation between Coñuepan's greatest rival and the Chilean army in the next eight years offers new insights into this process.

Like the interethnic peace agreements forged in the 1790s, alliances continued to respond to and be undermined by the contingencies of war, trust, and legitimacy. Missteps in the delicate dance of diplomacy by Coñuepan, the patriots, or other Mapuche groups could and did threaten these pacts. Other Mapuche leaders chose to flee or abstain from the conflict rather than making an alliance. Interethnic alliances with the Spanish or patriots did not imply common motivations or goals. Competing interests of all parties—the patriot war effort and Coñuepan's strength and legitimacy vis-à-vis his *lofs* and other Mapuche leaders—often undermined agreed upon promises and obligations.

Rapprochement, when and where it took place, drew upon metaphors of kinship and gender and aimed not only to build new forms of coordination but also to sever older ties to land and power.



## Chapter 5: Between the *lof* and the liberators: Mapuche Authority in the *guerra a muerte*, 1819–1825

The meanings of sovereignty, polity, and belonging over which Spanish royalists and Chilean patriots had clashed since 1810 became even muddier when inflected by the massive participation of Mapuche, Pehuenche, and Huilliche leaders. As the conflict time and again moved into the Araucanía and south of Mendoza, the transandean Mapuche-Spanish frontier continued to be a critical political pivot over which the fate of the liberation of Spanish America would be decided. More subtly, it was also the epistemological space over which the content of subject and citizen, ally and enemy, would be hammered out. These epistemological processes produced political and identarian arrangements that diverged greatly from those fashioned by indigenous communities near the old centers of Spanish rule in the new postcolonial landscape.

When Bernardo O'Higgins evacuated Concepción province at the end of 1817, he set his armies on a path that resulted in the liberation of central Chile from Spanish rule. This departure, like that caused by the 1814 Spanish Reconquista, failed to extinguish the ongoing Mapuche war in the Araucanía. In February, patriot leaders declared independence from Spain, and in early April O'Higgins and San Martín defeated the primary Spanish army at Maipú near Santiago. As the victorious patriots debated how best to govern Chile and how to organize an expeditionary force to begin the liberation of Peru, Spanish soldiers and officers returned to Concepción and the Araucanía. Once again, war engulfed Chile's south, making it the stage for Spain's last stand in Chile.<sup>397</sup> For the Mapuche, this conflict had not abated. This last stand involved the first two

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<sup>397</sup> Vicuña, *La guerra*, 2-5.

Supreme Directors of Chile (O'Higgins and Ramon Freire), several thousand former Spanish soldiers and colonists, and Mapuche, Pehuenche, and Huilliche families on both sides of the Andes. From 1819 until 1825, the extension of the Chilean independence war, the *guerra a muerte*, continued to introduce unprecedented levels of violence to the Mapuche lands, and dislocation between Mapuche confederations.

Military maneuvers by Spain and Chile alone could not end the *guerra a muerte*. As in the previous half-decade, partisans of both sides competed for the allegiance of Mapuche groups. But now securing alliances with pro-Spanish Mapuche became essential for Chile to eliminate the Spanish foothold in Chile. While neither patriot nor Spanish leaders could organize grand *parlamentos* like those of the 1790s, Mapuche leaders on all sides of the war did not abandon diplomacy to defend their sovereignty. They continued to rely on the broad array of ritual diplomatic strategies including seeking obligations of mutual protection and resources, sending and waiting for the arrival of messengers and go-betweens, and organizing small *parlamentos* to debate and consecrate agreements.

For the first time, this conflict witnessed another crucial Mapuche diplomatic strategy: the dictating and receiving of letters in Spanish. Francisco Mariluán and Venancio Coñuepan, like many others on both sides of the Andes dictated and received dozens of letters from their allies and antagonists. It became extremely common for indigenous leaders and their Chilean and Argentine allies to write one another beginning in the 1850s, but the *guerra a muerte* witnessed an early example of this practice.<sup>398</sup>

During the *guerra a muerte*, a uniquely large quantity of these letters were dictated and

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<sup>398</sup> Vezub, *Valentín Saygüequé*, Ingrid de Jong and Silvia Ratto, "Redes políticas en el área araucopampeana: la Confederación indígena de Calfucurá (1830-1870), Jorge Pavez Ojeda, ed., *Cartas Mapuche*.

received by Mariluán. Letters expressed the frustrations and pressures faced by Mapuche leaders from each other, Chile, the Spanish, and their family dependents and subordinates. Despite the dislocations wrought by a decade of war, Mapuche leaders continued to insist that letters and meetings were crucial for decision-making. This fact has been occluded by the fact that the Spanish-Mapuche *parlamentos* of the previous century left a larger footprint in colonial archives and thus received more historical attention. Large Spanish-Mapuche *parlamentos* and smaller meetings were the culmination of a longer, and far messier, process of intra-Mapuche negotiation carried out by *lonkos*. Letter-writing was an important element of that process.

An analysis of Mariluán's letters and the gestation of his 1825 alliance with Chile dramatically display how Mapuche politics had changed in the crucible of the independence wars. No more would representatives from all corners of the Araucanía come together with frontier officials to celebrate a general peace, nor would indigenous sovereignty beyond the frontiers of Concepción, Cuyo, and as we shall see in Chapter 6, Buenos Aires, be near impenetrable barriers for outsiders. Chile's peace with Mariluán was not a general peace with the four *butalmapus*: it gave extensive authority only to Mariluán, Chile's former enemy, and not Coñuepan or their other Mapuche allies. As creole pioneers and their supporters remade the Spanish Viceroyalties into strikingly similar, but new, polities, Mapuche sovereignty shifted as well. Amidst this change, Mapuche leaders continued to insist on interethnic diplomacy and the primacy of their sovereign domains even if they did not claim it for *all* Mapuche spaces. This period displayed the contours and pitfalls of Mariluán's diplomacy in the context of decades of

warfare and showed how the *denouement* of the *guerra a muerte* both threatened and reinforced significant aspects of Mapuche authority as practiced for centuries.

The clearest testament to the resiliency of Mapuche diplomatic practices and individual leaders' strategies for maintaining their sovereignty comes from the fact that from 1822 until 1825 Chilean leaders actively sought peaceful reconciliation with the most powerful Spanish Mapuche Francisco Mariluán, and held their first *parlamento* with Mariluán, granting him, and not Coñuepan, extensive powers. By 1822, Chilean soldiers and their Mapuche allies had killed the principle leaders of the Spanish resistance to Chile in the Araucanía. Their deaths did not end the conflict. Between 1822 and 1825, Chilean officers and their Mapuche allies like Coñuepan tried to round up the last Spanish supporters in the region and punish pro-Spanish Mapuche. This chapter explores the fraught process by which Chile and Mariluán reached an agreement to end the war in an early 1825 *parlamento*. It looks at the rich correspondence between Mariluán and Chilean officers in 1824. These letters offer a unique insight into the mounting pressures faced by Mapuche leaders from internal Mapuche rivalries and from the royalist-patriot conflict. They revealed that both conflicts overlapped, but that Mapuche motivations should not be reduced to external partisan framework.

### **5.1 The Patriot Retreat and the *guerra a muerte*, 1818-1822**

As San Martín and O'Higgins' victorious armies remained in central Chile in 1818, the Spanish regrouped along the Bío-Bío. This delay allowed Spanish commander Francisco Sánchez to receive aid from Peru. Only then did San Martín and the Chilean

leaders realize the threat in the south. They organized a new army to retake Concepción, but it did not reach Chillán until January 1819.<sup>399</sup>

Meanwhile, the remaining Spanish settlers north of the Bío-Bío who had ignored O'Higgins' 1817 evacuation order, which accompanied his march north to liberate central Chile, fled into the mountains or across the Bío Bío River to take residence in the lands of friendly caciques in Arauco and the Llanos. The frontier chain of forts was completely abandoned.<sup>400</sup> Sánchez reached out to royalist caciques by sending capitanes de amigos and translators with whom they had rapport to "conquer their friendship." However, Sánchez set the terms of these military alliances: none who refused the alliance would be pardoned, neither women nor children.<sup>401</sup> Not all Mapuche accepted these terms. In November 1818, San Martín ordered the new Chilean intendant of Concepción Ramon Freire to send peace terms to Sánchez in Concepción. Sánchez rejected it. In the process, San Martín's own messenger, Vicente Benavides, defected and switched his loyalty to Spain.<sup>402</sup> In response, Chilean intendant Ramon Freire sent 1600 soldiers to take Concepción.

Shortly after the Chilean army reached Nacimiento and Los Angeles in January 1819, Sánchez evacuated the Concepción province. Against the wishes of the Viceroy of Peru, Sánchez abandoned the city and split his forces in two. As many as 10,000 colonists and volunteers evacuated and fled south through the Araucanía to the fort of Valdivia in

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<sup>399</sup> Vicuña, *La guerra*, 3-5.

<sup>400</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 276 and Vicuña Mackenna, *La guerra*, XXII.

<sup>401</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 282-284.

<sup>402</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, Chapter 3.

January 1819.<sup>403</sup> Only Spanish alliances with enough of the divided costino Mapuche facilitated this passage.

**Figure 5.1. Principle Mapuche Caciques and their allegiances (west to east), ca. 1818<sup>404</sup>**

<b>Allegiance</b>	<b>Coastal Mapuche (<i>costinos</i> or <i>lafkenche</i>)</b>	<b>Central Plains Mapuche (<i>Llanistas</i>)</b>	<b>Transandean Foothill and Valley Mapuche (<i>Pehuenche</i>)</b>
<b>Patriot (Chile)</b>		Venancio Coñuepan, Juan Colipí	Melincan.
<b>Royalist (Spain)</b>	Güerchunquir, Lencapí, Martín Cheuquemilla.	Francisco Mariluán, Juan Magnin Wenu	Martín Toriano, Juan Neculman

Despite this friendly relationship, the Spanish forces still had to pay tolls and homage to each family they passed.<sup>405</sup> The rest of the Spanish troops and Mapuche allies created a montonera force under former patriot Vicente Benavides. These bands remained near the frontier and began a guerrilla war against Chilean fortifications along the Bío-Bío.

The split in Spanish forces in 1819 inaugurated the *guerra a muerte*, named by liberal historian and politician Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna for its no quarter and scorched earth tactics.<sup>406</sup> Chilean commander Ramon Freire wrote to O'Higgins in March

<sup>403</sup> Vicuña, *La guerra*, 164-166.

<sup>404</sup> Guevara, *Los araucanos*, 298-309 and Vicuña, *La guerra*, 74-78.

<sup>405</sup> Guevara.

<sup>406</sup> It may have also been a direct allusion to Simón Bolívar's 1813 declaration of "war to the death" against Spanish-born residents of Venezuela. The most significant accounts of the Chilean *guerra a muerte* are Vicuña, *La guerra*; Lara, *Crónica*, Vol. 2, which heavily relies on Vicuña; and Guevara, *Los araucanos*. See also, Herr, "The Nation-State"; Peralta, "Ni por la razón, ni por la fuerza," Bengoa, *La historia*, pp. 135-150, Pinto, *La formación del estado*, pp. 64-77, Crow, "Troubled Negotiations," Paulina Peralta

1819 calling the conflict a “destructive war, [characterized by] throat slitting, theft, and arson.”<sup>407</sup> Spanish, Chilean, and Mapuche combatants sacked towns and fortifications such as Chillán, Los Angeles, Talcahuano and Concepción various times, taking and killing captives, stealing livestock, and setting fire to homes and possessions. The majority of Mapuche leaders in the butalmapus of the coast, central plains, and the cordillera supported the Spanish by providing refuge, aid, and soldiers. Mariluán personally led several attacks against Chilean troops. The situation became a bloody détente with Chilean forces frequently withdrawn due to political turmoil in Santiago and the need to continue the liberation of Peru from Spain.

Despite the machinations between generals and competing elite factions in Santiago, and the continuing struggle between the new Chilean government and Spanish forces in the south, the guerra a muerte continued to be a Mapuche war.<sup>408</sup> Following Chilean independence, and as early as 1819, Coñuepan began supporting Chilean excursions against Benavides south of the Bío-Bío. He also pursued his rivalry with Mariluán and the other powerful royalist cacique Juan Magnin Wenu, a Huilliche living in the plains south of Mariluán and Coñuepan. In turn, a patriot officer referred to Coñuepan’s other Ilanista compatriot, Juan Colipí, as a “dear friend.”<sup>409</sup>

The guerra a muerte unfolded in three phases: the rise and fall of San Martín’s former messenger, the Spanish *montonera* leader Vicente Benavides (1818–1822), the reconciliation between Francisco Mariluán and Chile (1822–1825), and the displacement

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Cabello, “Ni por la razón, ni por la fuerza,” Mariman Queménado, “La república y los mapuche,” Rodrigo Araya, “Alianzas mapuches,” and Ulloa Valenzuela, “Los españoles araucanos.”

<sup>407</sup> Ramon Freire to Bernardo O’Higgins, 3 Mar. 1819, Santiago, quoted in Vicuña Mackenna, *La guerra*, 18.

<sup>408</sup> Ironic admission from Tomás Guevara given that he titled his history of this period “The Araucanos and the Chilean Revolution for Independence.”

<sup>409</sup> Gaspar Ruiz to Bernardo O’Higgins, 5 Jul. 1819, AHNCh, Ministerio de Guerra, vol. 49, page 218.

of the conflict to Argentina under the direction of the bandit Pincheira family and the Pehuenche (1825–1832). The rest of this chapter will focus on the first periods, whereas the next chapter begins with the third.

Between 1819 and 1822, Chilean and Spanish guerrillas and their Mapuche allies set fire to the southern frontier. In addition to Vicente Benavides, Spanish montonera leaders included Juan Manuel Picó, and a priest, Juan Antonio Ferrebú.

Massacres and reprisals were common. Vicuña Mackenna argued that Spanish bloodthirstiness, such as an 1820 massacre of Chilean prisoners at Tarpellanca in the Upper Frontier, came in response to a precedent set by a patriot massacre of Peninsular Spanish soldiers in San Luis near the Pampas.<sup>410</sup> Mariluán's followers supposedly participated in the massacre at Tarpellanca.<sup>411</sup> This was not the first time Mariluán had sent his forces to fight the patriots and their Mapuche allies in the central plains. He even left his domains to fight alongside Spanish officer Antonio Carrero to punish the “indios patriotas” in the coast of the Araucanía.<sup>412</sup> He was himself injured while helping to lead an attack on the fort of Tucapel in 1819.<sup>413</sup>

After the Tarpellanca massacre, the Spanish burned Los Angeles fort. Throughout 1819 and 1820, all sides traded small military blows from Chillán to Los Angeles, and along the old frontier chain of forts from the Pacific to the Andes. By the end of 1820, Ramon Freire recalled his troops to Concepción to concentrate on dislodging the Spanish from Talcahuano port and protecting Santiago north of the Maule River. While the Chileans were able to take Talcahuano in December, they left the Spanish leader Juan

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<sup>410</sup> Vicuña Mackenna, *La guerra*, XXIV. Argues the massacre at Tarpellanca was an echo of the massacre of Spanish prisoners from Maipu, which took place in San Luis, in the United Provinces of Río de la Plata.

<sup>411</sup> Vicuña, *La guerra*, 23.

<sup>412</sup> Vicuña, *La guerra*, 294.

<sup>413</sup> Vicuña, *La guerra*, 95-96



Manuel Picó as the “absolute owner of the two great arteries of the war of mobility: the [coastal Nahuelbuta] mountains and the Bío-Bío.”<sup>414</sup>

Following the Chilean victory in Talcahuano, Benavides expressed interest in peace with Freire in which the Bío-Bío River would serve as the battle line between both armies. Each would agree to a prisoner exchange, unmolested commerce, and a safe passage for Spanish forces to Lima. The gesture proved to be a subterfuge for Benavides and his costino and llanos allies to attack the north of the Bío-Bío in the heart of Concepción Province and Chillán.<sup>415</sup> These maneuvers definitively shifted the war into the Araucanía, and 1821 witnessed new levels of bloodshed as well as the reemergence of Coñuepan and Mariluán as major players.

By 1821, Freire and Coñuepan hoped to bring the fight to Mariluán, and his allies Pico and Benavides. Freire sent emissaries to find Coñuepan and ask him to root out Mariluán. Even though he was of advanced age at the time, Vicuña Mackenna described Coñuepan as “indomitable... the first lance and greatest politician of Arauco.”<sup>416</sup> Benavides, meanwhile, sent Mariluán and Mañil’s warriors to attack pro-Chilean Mapuche in the Nahuelbuta valley of Lumaco. He worked to unite more caciques from south in Imperial and Bureo to his side, because they were enemies of the Lumaco valley Mapuche.<sup>417</sup> As these battles raged between Mapuche groups, Coñuepan hoped to accelerate Freire’s promise to send troops to his aid. The Chileans delayed, and Benavides was able to harass Chillán again. Nevertheless, within the next few months, in February 1822, Chilean forces managed to capture and execute Benavides. This pushed

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<sup>414</sup> Vicuña, *La guerra*, 213.

<sup>415</sup> Vicuña, *La guerra*, 260-262.

<sup>416</sup> Vicuña, *La guerra*, 290.

<sup>417</sup> Vicuña, 294.

Pico into the position of the “true and only representative of the King in Chile.”<sup>418</sup> His base of operation was near Mariluán in the Llanos.

## **5.2 Letters and parlamentos in the final year of the guerra a muerte, 1824-1825**

A confluence of events put an end to the guerra a muerte in Chile, the most important of which was Mariluán’s decision to forsake the Spanish cause and make peace with Chile. First, Patriot Mapuche and Chilean forces managed to capture and execute the Spanish montonera leaders, Benavides, Juan Manuel Picó, and the priest Juan Antonio Ferrebú. Breaking the Spanish leadership allowed Chile’s frontier commanders and Mapuche allies to press their attack into the heart of the central plains and Andean foothills of the Araucanía, lands dominated by Mariluán. The deaths of the Spanish guerilla leaders did not end the guerra a muerte. Mapuche rivals continued to fight each other, while others sued for peace with Chile. By 1825, Mariluán made peace with Chile. Mariluán and Chilean leaders’ “diplomatic turn” from late 1823 until 1825 shows that Mapuche leaders still expected Chilean leaders to participate in parlamentos and other protocols of Mapuche diplomacy.

Secondly, once again Chile’s army abandoned the south. In 1823, General Ramon Freire marshaled the frontier armies to join an unfolding revolution in Santiago, depose Supreme Director Bernardo O’Higgins, and claim the title himself. Freire’s government quickly promulgated an agenda toward the Araucanía that involved holding parlamentos

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<sup>418</sup> Vicuña, 366.

with hostile Mapuche. However, this agenda also involved the advance of the frontier past the Bío-Bío River and the introduction of foreign colonists on Mapuche lands.<sup>419</sup>

By October 1823, Supreme Director of Chile Ramón Freire and the Chilean Congress approved funds for a parlamento with Mapuche leaders from both sides of the conflict to end the War to the Death. Exhaustion and attrition made peace an appealing prospect for patriot and royalist Mapuche alike. However, the parlamento never took place despite Freire traveling south to personally attend. Chile's demands for the rebuilding of frontier forts, the resettlement of Mapuche into towns under Chile's jurisdiction, and the introduction of foreign colonists into the Araucanía were too onerous for Mapuche leaders.<sup>420</sup> Furthermore, memories and continued realities of inter-Mapuche violence closed off the possibility for a unified Mapuche peace agreement with Chile. Nevertheless, by 1823, Mariluán and his formerly pro-Spanish Mapuche allies directed their efforts to ending the violence in their lands by achieving internal agreements between warring caciques, or by engaging with the Chilean offers of peace. But, Chile's 1823 peace terms, and their continued support for Coñuepan and other pro-Chile Mapuche threatened Mariluán's capacity to negotiate peace between pro-Spanish Mapuche and Chile in 1824. The delicate balance required for Mariluán's network of emissaries and organization of parlays, which required responses and travel from other *lonkos* was frequently upset by Mapuche, Chilean, and Spanish violence. By the end of

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<sup>419</sup> "Sesión 45, 11 julio 1823," *Sesiones de los cuerpos legislativos de la República de Chile, 1811 a 1845. Tomo VII: Congreso de Plenipotenciarios I Senado Conservador, 1823*, Valentín Letelier, ed. (Santiago, Chile, 1889) 273-274, no. 453. Thank you to Sarah Chambers for sharing this citation. See also Eduardo Téllez, Osvaldo Silva Galdames, and Mabel Cantuarias Palacios, "El parlamento y tratado de Yumbel (1823). La primera tentativa paz y union perpetua entre la república de Chile y los mapuches," *Cuadernos de historia* 41 (2014).

<sup>420</sup> Téllez et. al., "El parlamento y tratado de Yumbel."

1823, the Governor of Concepción lamented that “effectively all of the machinery of pacification of the [Mapuche] land has been disorganized.”<sup>421</sup>

Chilean commanders from Freire to the capitán de amigos who eventually brokered the 1825 peace treaty, Pedro Barnechea, viewed Mariluán as a crucial go-between for achieving a general peace with enemy Mapuche leaders. This put him in a contradictory position in which he bargained with Chile on behalf of his own *lofs* while maintaining friendly relations with Mapuche groups who remained enemies of Chile. On 1 January 1824, Mariluán dictated a letter to Pedro Barnechea describing a meeting between himself, several caciques in his domain, and his ally, the royalist Pehuenche cacique Antinao.<sup>422</sup> In its aftermath, Mariluán acted as an intermediary, or spokesperson, to convey Pehuenche support for reconciliation with Chile as he was also in the process of switching allegiance away from Spain. This act revealed Pehuenche knowledge of Mariluán’s capacity to dictate convincingly letters in Spanish to the Chileans. The letter implied that Chilean officials had already recognized Mariluán as the “cacique principal” of his domains and in turn Mariluán characterized himself as the representative of “all of my [*lofs*] from Malleco to the Bío-Bío River.” In other words, Mariluán emphasized the recognition of his authority by Chile, his own followers, and by other pro-Spanish Mapuche.

Nonetheless, the letter illustrated how Mariluán’s authority did not permit him to mandate support for Chile. Mapuche diplomacy obliged Mariluán to invite his followers and opponents to his *lof* at Pilguen, offer them a forum to speak, and attempt to persuade them in person regardless of their chosen side in the War to the Death. After Mariluán

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<sup>421</sup> Juan de Dios Rivera to Pedro Barnechea, 8 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pages 40-41, no. 140. .

<sup>422</sup> Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnechea, 1 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, Intendencia de Concepción, vol. 75, f. 41-42.

sent messengers around the Araucanía, caciques and *ülmenes* (prestigious and wealthy Mapuche men) responded by traveling to Mariluán's residence. There they heard the peace overtures Governor of Concepción Juan de Dios Rivera read to them in a ritual setting before deciding to trust Mariluán's desire for reconciliation with Chile. Mariluán's brother Cauchulaf and Mariluán's own caciques respected his desire to refrain from raiding against "[either] the Spanish or the *naturales*." They also favored his suggestion to parley for peace with the Chileans. Another cacique sacrificed a horse to demonstrate his commitment to Mariluán's negotiation with Chile. The Pehuenche Antinao, an antagonist of Chile, alongside his *ülmenes*, upon hearing the peace offer committed their "heart... and all of their determination for the tranquility of the land." "The land" was a common Mapuche expression in correspondence of the time signifying their own *lofs* and the entirety of the Araucanía. Several others from Malleco in the central-southern plains of the Araucanía showed their support for an end to the conflict by declaring that they did not come from "bad parents and that the spirits of their ancestors gave them "good counsel" to end the "fire" in their lands. Even though many expressed enthusiastic commitments to peace, not everyone from the llanos or the coast attended. This both compounded Chilean frustration with Mariluán's supposed foot-dragging and reflected the limits of Mariluán's authority: he did not possess the power to compel Mapuche from other butalmapus to attend.<sup>423</sup>

Mapuche leaders needed to effectively orchestrate the delicate diplomatic routines to host inter-Mapuche meetings and potentially put out the fires in the region. This was especially true when the participants were to be belligerent Mapuche, Chilean, and

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<sup>423</sup> Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnechea, 1 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, Intendencia de Concepción, vol. 75, f. 41-42.,.

Spanish parties. Even in the guerra a muerte, Mariluán's authority and clout could be measured by his ability to tap into a network of Mapuche and non-Mapuche intermediaries. *Capitanes de amigos* (Captains of Indian Friends), a hallmark of frontier interethnic negotiations in the colonial period, played an important part in the War to the Death. Chilean leaders labeled these frequently bilingual former Spanish officers living alongside the Mapuche as morally and politically compromised "Spanish Araucanos."<sup>424</sup> One such officer named José Ortiz served as Mariluán's scribe.<sup>425</sup> Another, such individual, Rafael Vargas, lived near Mariluán and reported to Governor Rivera on the details of Mariluán's junta.<sup>426</sup> Yet another, Luis Salazar, accompanied Mariluán's rival Venancio Coñuepan.<sup>427</sup>

Traveling parties of Mapuche ambassadors and *capitanes de amigos*—often handpicked by caciques—familiar with the inter-Mapuche relations and the Mapuche language played a critical role in conveying written and oral messages of the Chileans and caciques to other *lofs* in order to persuade them to accept a settlement with the government.<sup>428</sup> In January 1824, Mariluán insisted to Barnechea that he must wait to hear from all Mapuche *lofs* before consenting to peace terms. In particular, Mariluán needed the response from a diplomatic mission he had sent to "all of the [central plains] *reducciones* and also those of the coast" before convoking a parlamento.<sup>429</sup> Chilean impatience with these practices compelled Mariluán to reiterate the unprecedented

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<sup>424</sup> Ulloa, "Los españoles araucanos," and Araya, "Alianzas mapuches."

<sup>425</sup> Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnechea, 1 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, Intendencia de Concepción, vol. 75, f. 42-43.,.

<sup>426</sup> Rafael Vargas to Pedro Barnechea, 7 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pages 38-39.,.

<sup>427</sup> Luis Salazar to Juan de Dios Rivera, 4 Mar. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pages 46-47.,.

<sup>428</sup> *Capitanes de amigos* had been a fixture of frontier interethnic politics since the sixteenth century. Though an officer in the Spanish colonial military, Ulloa, "Los españoles," argues that individual interests, not partisan politics, motivated *capitanes de amigos* in the war for independence.

<sup>429</sup> Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnechea, 8 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pages 42-43.,.

precariousness of the political balance in the Araucanía. Before entering in to any peace agreements, Mariluán beseeched Barnechea to inform Chile's frontier officers "that if in times when there was no war it was hard to get agreement, imagine now that all of the land is and has been so entangled in a living fire the likes of which we have never before experienced..."<sup>430</sup>

The term "fire" appears frequently in Mariluán's letters to the Chileans. While appearing to be a metaphor for the conflagration of war engulfing the Araucanía, "fire" likely had a deeper, ritualized significance in Mapuche-Spanish diplomacy. In an addendum to the description of the 1793 Negrete parlamento, the author included a description of a closing peace ceremony, which had ended many mid-eighteenth century parlamentos. Ambrosio O'Higgins' secretary mentioned this ritual took place at the 1784 Negrete parlamento, but the Spanish learned of it in the 1760s. Before departing a parlamento, each delegation separately bid farewell to Chile's governor. In these final moments, caciques individually offered advice and renewed their promises and thanksgivings toward him.

Afterward, Spanish soldiers formed up in columns 30 paces from the arbor during the last day, after all parties reached an agreement on the treaty terms. The participants then lit a bonfire, and the casique of Angol broke his lance in front of the Captain General. He then proceeded to place the pieces of the lance in the fire. The Spanish Sargent Major, in turn, broke a firearm, which he too threw upon the fire. Then the rest of the Caciques Goberandoes from the remaining three butalmapus did the same, while repeating "vivas" to the King to the accompaniment of artillery fire. The Spanish Calvary then rode past the Captain General and greeted the attendees with their standards and then

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<sup>430</sup> Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnechea, 8 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pages 42-43.

returned to their formation. The indios mounted their horses and did the same; making three passes around the fire. Then the commissioner of natives took four flags and threw them into the fire, which was then extinguished with wine. Tadeo wrote the act represented how the problems that “had inflamed the lands of the indios remained and would remain extinguished.” The caciques then uncovered the charred pieces of the lances and presented them to the Captain General who put them in the “caja del cabildo de Santiago.”<sup>431</sup> More than a simple act of approving a treaty, this closing ritual emphasized an agreed upon ritual for ending hostilities and renewing peace. Mariluán’s lament that it had become impossible to extinguish the flames of conflict during the *guerra a muerte* thus had a specific meaning and referent.

The Governor of Concepción Juan de Dios Rivera ignored Mariluán’s plea. If the Mapuche did not respect the Chilean timeframe for keeping their promises, Rivera ordered, “We must make them understand that we do not need to beg them, ... because our character is very distinct from the *bárbaros*.”<sup>432</sup> Rivera’s use of the Spanish colonial category *bárbaro* to describe all unconquered *indios* in order to assert Chileans’ radical difference ignored the sophisticated interethnic diplomacy between unconquered Mapuche and the Spanish.<sup>433</sup> It put in stark relief his aversion to Mapuche-style diplomacy associated with the Spanish period. Rivera’s attitude, combined with military incursions against Mariluán and his allies, blunted the effectiveness of inter-Mapuche diplomacy. Additionally, it eroded the legitimacy of great leaders like Mariluán within their *lofs*. Rather than acknowledging the threat to Mariluán’s position as a prestigious

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<sup>431</sup> Judas Tadeo Reyes, “Ceremonial del Parlamento General Celebrado en el Campo de Negrete...” 11 Mar. 1793, AHNCh, Fondo Real Audiencia, vol. 3204, plate 23, p. 442.

<sup>432</sup> Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnechea, 8 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pages 42-43.

<sup>433</sup> Weber, *Bárbaros*, Levaggi, *Diplomacia*.



go-between and power broker, Rivera's continued insistence on force undermined Mariluán's strategy for peace.

Chile's violent strategy threatened another pillar of Mapuche authority: wealth. The collapse of the Spanish frontier eliminated the frequent trade fairs where transandean Mapuche traders—*conchavadores*—sold the livestock, textiles, and other goods necessary for Spanish and Chilean colonists. Capitán de amigos Rafael Vargas reported to Barnechea that he had overheard a group of Mapuche men near Andean headwaters of the Bío-Bío and La Laja Rivers complaining, "Chileans [settlers] are selling the land and making any commerce between [the Mapuche and the frontier inhabitants] impossible."<sup>434</sup> Furthermore, Rivera ordered Chilean forces to "maintain an active war in [Mapuche] territory" and continue aid to Chile's allies and Mariluán's rivals: Coñuepan and Colipí.<sup>435</sup> Rivera's instructions to Barnechea, explicitly called for the targeting of extensive Mapuche livestock herds: the material basis of Mapuche prestige and livelihood.<sup>436</sup>

To that end, in March and April, Chilean forces organized an expedition of 300-400 troops against the Pehuenche of Trapa-Trapa and their Spanish irregular supporters at the headwaters of the Bío-Bío in the heart of the Andes.<sup>437</sup> They targeted the ample herds of livestock of "enemy" Mapuche, at times taking as many as "1000 sheep, 300... cows, and roughly 400 mares and horses."<sup>438</sup> These herds served as the basis for trade, raw materials, and as an important measure of wealth and prestige within Mapuche

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<sup>434</sup> Rafael Vargas to Pedro Barnechea., 7 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pages 38-39 ,

<sup>435</sup> Juan de Dios Rivera, 27 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pages 3-4.

<sup>436</sup> "Instrucciones que observará [sic] el Comandante de la división destinada Trapa Trapa por Pedro Barnechea," 1 Apr. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, p. 11.

<sup>437</sup> Pedro Barnechea, 1 May 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, page 18. On the differences in political orientation between the northern Pehuenche near Chillán, Chile, the southern Pehuenche near Trapa-Trapa, and the Pehuenche south of Mendoza near see Herr, "The Nation-State" and Leonardo León Solís, *Los señores*.

<sup>438</sup> Juan de Dios Rivera, no date, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, p. 3.

communities. A Chilean officer even reported that the Trapa-Trapa Pehuenche and their allies had rounded up their livestock in order to hide them from the expedition.<sup>439</sup>

That this offensive struck exceedingly close to Mariluán was no mistake. Rivera feared that Mariluán could potentially threaten the stability of the new nation by further dominating the Mapuche groups living in the Andean pass of Antuco, a crucial nexus for commerce, military defense, and movement between Chile and Argentina.<sup>440</sup> Rivera doubled down on his support for patriot Mapuche while attempting to cut off Mariluán's potential allies. "It is necessary to carry forward the promise that the Government has made to those who voluntarily joined our forces with the objective of destroying the enemy *indios* as much as possible," Rivera claimed.<sup>441</sup> Alongside the previous attack, on the opposite side of the Araucanía, Chilean forces conducted a violent campaign against the coastal Mapuche to support Coñuepan while he began his foray into the southern llanos controlled by Juan Magnin Wenu and Mariluán. Rivera's and Coñuepan's goals coincided insofar as they wanted to isolate Mariluán, while they also diverged: Chile desired an alliance with Mariluán and Coñuepan sought his military defeat.

Chilean military incursions in the Araucanía and the longstanding hostilities between their principal ally Coñuepan and the object of their diplomatic efforts, Mariluán, undermined Chile's diplomatic turn toward the Mapuche after 1823. Coñuepan's allegiance with the patriots and the Chilean government came at great personal cost: warfare embroiled his lands for over a decade. As Rivera expressed frustration with the pace of negotiations with Mariluán, he simultaneously received

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<sup>439</sup> Juan de Dios Rivera, 5 Mar. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pp. 6-7.

<sup>440</sup> Pedro Barnechea to Juan de Dios Rivera, 18 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, p. 44.

<sup>441</sup> Juan de Dios Rivera, 26 Feb. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, p. 4.

demands from Coñuepan for an increase in military protection for his people.<sup>442</sup>

Coñuepan's participation in campaigns across the Araucanía meant leaving his own *lofs* and livestock exposed to raids. In early March 1824, *capitán de amigos* Luis Salazar recommended that Rivera provide the forces necessary (and promised) to Coñuepan for his maneuvers south of the Bío-Bío.<sup>443</sup> With this support, Coñuepan pushed south to attack the central plains of the Huilliche controlled by the royalist cacique Juan Mangin Wenu, Mariluán's key ally.

At the same time, former Spanish officer turned patriot Antonio Carrero fought alongside the "*naturales* resolutely in favor of our system" to dislodge the Spanish and their supporters from the coast. During the coastal campaign, Chilean forces discovered Mapuche had held the Spanish accountable for the years of violence. Soldiers found that many Mapuche had killed Spanish supporters and destroyed their homes in anticipation of the attacks.<sup>444</sup> This retribution can perhaps be attributed to costinos blaming Spanish refugees and montoneras in their lands for serving as a pretext for foreign invasion. In 1817, recall that the coastal butalmapu had been divided between supporters and opponents of the patriots, but that it had largely attempted to work with O'Higgins.

Rivera's strategy for terminating hostilities, born of impatience with Mariluán, fundamentally misunderstood the integuments that knit together Mapuche authority. As the coastal campaign revealed, attacks by Chile's Mapuche allies reverberated through Mapuche political networks. Retribution by Chile's Mapuche allies against pro-Spanish or rival Mapuche rather than reconciliation was frequently the result. In another case, *capitán de amigos* Rafael Vargas attributed the motive for a revolt by the pro-Spanish

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<sup>442</sup> Juan de Dios Rivera to Pedro Barnechea, 4 Jan 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, p. 1.

<sup>443</sup> Luis Salazar to Juan de Dios Rivera, 4 Mar. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pp. 46-47.

<sup>444</sup> Luis Salazar to Juan de Dios Rivera, 4 Mar. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, p. 47.

Pehuenche from the southeastern Araucanía valleys near Lolco and Lonquimay to the fact that the Patriot cacique Milipan had raided the Pehuenche, killed the cacique Gielipan, and taken many families captive.<sup>445</sup>

Chilean correspondence during this period accused Mariluán of reneging on his promises to promote stability and held him accountable as the threat to peace. Chilean officers intimated that Mariluán had raided north of the Bío-Bío, and had collaborated with the now deceased infamous Spanish montonera leader José Manuel de Pico, and abstained from attending a parlamento.<sup>446</sup> In regards to the parlamento, Mariluán explained, “I have neither missed [it] nor has my friend [Ramon] Freire proceeded to send any expenses [to us].” Unlike the Spanish custom of providing food, gifts, and resources for Mapuche at parlamentos, the Chilean leaders had committed a serious breach of etiquette by not complying with this common practice. Mariluán had every reason to be suspicious of Chile’s motives both for their lack of decorum in interethnic diplomacy as practiced by the Spanish and for their continued support of his Mapuche rivals. As Chileans insisted on imputing a collaborative relationship between Mariluán and the montoneras, so too would Mariluán have been aware of the duplicitousness of Chile’s continued support for Coñuepan’s aggression in the Llanos and the coast. Warfare also caused the evaporation of frontier trade, the stability of Mapuche livestock herds and raiding opportunities, and promises of military protection and gifts from frontier forts. The disappearance of sources of prestige so central to Mariluán’s first decades of leadership, combined with his reservations toward Chilean faithfulness would

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<sup>445</sup> Rafael Vargas to Pedro Barnechea, 7 Jan. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pp. 38-39.

<sup>446</sup> Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnechea, 5 Mar. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pp. 49-51.

have complicated his efforts to preserve his sovereignty and hampered Chilean efforts to rapidly resolve the guerra a muerte.

Mariluán condemned the Chileans, in a fraternal manner, for misunderstanding the long-standing nature of negotiations worked out during centuries of colonial rule.

... what more do you want of me than that I have worked with the *la tierra* and in a war as bloody as we have had, when in times of peace I have become accustomed to the fact that the government warned us one or two years before they sent emissaries to the four butralmapus (sic) but *la tierra* has not received emissaries, nor translators, nor *capitanes de amigos* so for them to accuse me of such a thing and if it wasn't as I am telling you ask those who have experience and have worked in it and know the rules of the *naturales*.<sup>447</sup>

Mariluán's frustrations with Chilean disregard for proper interethnic diplomatic channels went hand in hand with his efforts to end the hostilities once and for all. In response to Chilean intransigence, Mariluán continued to emphasize his desire to send ambassadors to other caciques in order achieve calm. He ultimately threatened that if "war were declared, as you warn me, I would tell all of the lands that my *huinca* (non-Mapuche) friends had deceived me... I do not want to war with anyone."<sup>448</sup>

The fraternal, albeit cautionary tone of Mariluán's letter to Barnechea paints two pictures: one of an aging leader attempting to knit together a peaceful resolution to war, the other of a previously authoritative Mapuche figure struggling to maintain the waning support of his caciques due to the vagaries of war. Mariluán reiterated that even though he had faced attacks from Chileans and their Mapuche allies, and that frontier officers had not returned his imprisoned daughter despite their promises, "there had been no

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<sup>447</sup> Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnechea, 5 Mar. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pp. 49-51.

<sup>448</sup> Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnechea, 5 Mar. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pp. 49-51.

spilling of any blood on his behalf.”<sup>449</sup> He had exhausted all efforts to end the cycle of retribution set in motion by the *guerra a muerte*.

But Mariluán’s obligations to Chile had to be weighed alongside the obligations he had to less powerful Mapuche groups with whom he had peaceful relations. While he denied accusations of providing aid to the Spanish in 1824, he admitted “if I gave aid [to anyone], it was the Cacique Collipal of the Pehuenches because Melipan [Coñuepan’s ally] attacked him without cause as it is invariable that no Pehuenche has gone to raid Melipan...” If “this fire continues burning”, Mariluán lamented, “it will be in vain to try to put it out.” Mariluán illustrated to Barnechea how internal Mapuche dynamics of conflict played out in the Chilean-Spanish war and offered ideas about how to extinguish both. War could be maintained, though it might have been premised on cycles of negotiation and reconciliation as it had during the Spanish period. Nevertheless, Chilean meddling in intra-Mapuche conflicts threatened to set in motion a series of events that diminished opportunities for peace by undermining Mariluán’s exercise of authority and influence.

### **5.3 The Tapihue Parlamento, 1825**

In 1823, the cacique principal of Lumaco Venancio Coñuepan dictated a letter to Supreme Director of Chile Bernardo O’Higgins. O’Higgins and Coñuepan had been close collaborators during the Chilean war for independence and the *guerra a muerte*. At the beginning of the year, a coup deposed O’Higgins and forced him into exile. Intendant of Concepción Ramon Freire, who had led the Chilean war effort in the *guerra a muerte*, took his place as Supreme Director. Coñuepan’s letter lauded O’Higgins’ family for

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<sup>449</sup> Francisco Mariluán to Pedro Barnechea, 5 Mar. 1824, ANHCh, FIC, vol. 75, pp. 49-51.

having always looked upon “the Araucanos” as “part of their same species.” He specifically singled out his father, former Spanish Captain General of Chile and Viceroy of Peru Ambrosio, for praise. Perhaps inspired by the coup against O’Higgins, Coñuepan continued, “I will only tell you that no event should cause you to weaken your spirit and when you have no other sanctuary count on your araucanos...”<sup>450</sup> While this expression of loyalty to the ex-Supreme Director may have been simply a symbolic gesture, the change in Chilean administration would have cast doubt on Coñuepan’s intimate alliance with Chile.<sup>451</sup> Would old promises be fulfilled? Two years later, this question was answered. In January 1825, Chile made peace with Mariluán, not Coñuepan. While Mariluán received the title of deputy and recognition of his dominions and authority, by 1827, Coñuepan would find himself driven from his homeland like O’Higgins.

After over a decade of political turmoil and war over the fate of the Spanish Captaincy General of Chile, Chilean commander Pedro Barnechea on 7 January, 1825 agreed to peace terms with the formerly pro-Spanish Mapuche leader Francisco Mariluán.<sup>452</sup> This agreement in Chile’s quest for independence from Spain largely ended the *guerra a muerte* west of the Andes. Curiously, the treaty, which defined Chile’s sovereignty from the Pacific Ocean to the Andes, and from the Atacama Desert to the

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<sup>450</sup> Venancio Koñwepang to Bernardo O’Higgins, ¿Talcahuano?, circa 1823 in Mariano José Campos Menchaca, *Nahuelbuta*, Buenos Aires and Santiago: Editorial Francisco de Aguirre, 1972, 160-161, quoted in Jorge Pavez Ojeda, *Cartas Mapuche*, 170.

<sup>451</sup> Symbolic or superlative rhetoric expressing the lengths indigenous groups would go to support their European allies was not uncommon in the Southern Cone in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In fact, Ranquel caciques in the Pampas promised to come to the support of the Spanish in Buenos Aires in the face of an 1806 British invasion of the city.

<sup>452</sup> The original can be found in the Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, Sala Manuscritos Medina, vol. 439, “Acta del Tratado de Tapigüe, 7 de enero de 1825.” Fernando Ulloa also transcribed a version of the treaty in Leonardo León Solís, *O’Higgins y la cuestión mapuche: 1817-1818* (Santiago, Chile, 2011). A further contextualization, and images of the original, can be found in Eduardo Téllez L., Osvaldo Silva G., Alain Carrier, and Valeska Rojas C., “El tratado de tapihue entre ciertos linajes mapuches y el gobierno de Chile [1825],” *Cuadernos de Historia* 35 (2011): 169-190. All English translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

island of Chiloé, reenacted the same political arrangement with the Mapuche as had the Spanish Captaincy General of Chile. Even though the agreement recognized the Bío-Bío as a jurisdictional dividing line, the agreed upon peace was not between Chile and the four butalmapus, but between Chile and Mariluán. This outcome further cements the idea that the independence war contained within it a Mapuche war, a war in which caciques competed within and between the butalmapus for influence and allies in the tumultuous political drama unfolding to their north and east. In the end, Mariluán remained in the Araucanía and Coñuepan permanently crossed the Andes and left the Araucanía behind.

The particular agreement in which Mariluán succeeded in earning Chile's recognition of his authority and deescalating the conflict in his lands diverged from the type of agreement Mapuche leaders had earned from the Spanish. Despite pressure on Mariluán from Chile and Coñuepan over the previous year, at the Tapihue parlamento, Barnechea and Mariluán came together to "[form] a single family... in perpetual unity and brotherhood" in a Chilean state that would stretch from the Atacama Desert to the far reaches of the southern Chiloé archipelago.<sup>453</sup> Chile laid formal claim to this vast territory and decreed all its inhabitants to enjoy the full "pleasure of the prerogatives, grace, and privileges" of Chilean citizens.<sup>454</sup> Yet, while Spanish officials counted friendly Mapuche as subjects of the King, they never laid claim to Mapuche lands, instead opting to grant recognition of their dominions south of the Bío-Bío to nearly Chiloé. Moreover, in the eighteenth century, such grand agreements had always been made between the Spanish and leaders from *all four* butalmapus, not with a single leader who for decades had been their primary antagonist.

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<sup>453</sup> Téllez. et al., "El Tratado de Tapihue," Articles 1 and 2.

<sup>454</sup> Article 3.



This individual agreement devolved powers and responsibilities to Mariluán that had previously been enjoyed by all cacique gobernadores and principales. Mariluán's followers would receive access to public education, but would be expected to fight all enemies of Chile, foreign or domestic, turn over all Chilean deserters and Spanish prisoners, and respect the passage of soldiers and mail through their lands. As a signatory and Deputy for his fourteen *reducciones*, a generic Spanish approximation of the *lof*, Mariluán was further expected to enforce the peace terms on his dependents and neighbors, and contribute warriors to pursue the last Spanish forces across the Andes.<sup>455</sup> To seal the new pact of brotherhood, Article 33 called for the unfurling of the national flag, a ten shot cannon salute, in accordance with Chilean martial customs, the breaking of Chilean swords and four Mapuche lances, in accordance with Mapuche customs, and a general cry of "Long live unity!"<sup>456</sup> These rituals once again extinguished the fire in the land. But, the parties who would break and burn their arms did not represent all butalmapus of the Araucanía.

This "new Chilean family" looked surprisingly familiar to prior interethnic pacts crucial to a *lonko*'s authority toward his followers and outsiders. It relied upon Mapuche political practices and territorial boundaries that had been forged by centuries of interaction between Mapuche groups and with the Spanish on both sides of the Andes, and now reaffirmed by creole patriots in Santiago. Articles 19, 20, and 22 recognized the Bío-Bío as "dividing line with our new allied brothers" and regulated passage across the line through the issuance of passports by Chilean and Mapuche officers. The passport regime also aimed to regulate transandean raiding and trading by Mapuche and non-

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<sup>455</sup> Article 24.

<sup>456</sup> Article 33.

Mapuche, a reflection of the centrality of such movement to Mapuche and frontier political economy. Furthermore, the treaty mandated that Chile and Mariluán would continue to celebrate parlamentos and, at Mariluán's insistence, Chile would assume Spain's gift giving role paying for the ceremonies. It also preserved the system of bilingual go-betweens: comisarios de naciones, capitanes de amigos, lenguaraces generales, and Mapuche caciques' networks of emissaries.

Despite the similarities between Chile's agreement and those of the Captaincy General, much had changed from the late eighteenth century parlamentos and their general peace agreements with the four butalmapus. This treaty referred only to Mariluán by name, recognizing him as deputy to his fourteen *lofs* near the headwaters of the Bío-Bío and La Laja Rivers.<sup>457</sup> Mariluán's rivals also appeared in the treaty, though they were not imbued with the same authority. Article 10 asked all of Mariluán's caciques to return any captives taken from Chile's "antiguos aliados"—Mariluán's Mapuche rivals who had supported the patriots. Moreover, Chile demanded that Mariluán forget the past injuries committed during the war for independence. Perhaps for this reason, Mariluán insisted in Article 21 that Chile rebuild its frontier forts near his domains for protection from Mapuche retribution. Ultimately, the Tapihue agreement enshrined the struggle of powerful lonkos—Mariluán and his rivals—attempting to maintain their legitimacy and territorial domains while balancing pressures from the Spanish and Chileans, but also from their Mapuche followers and enemies.

In the months before the 1825 Tapihue parlamento, Coñuepan floated to Mariluan the idea of a joint action against the Pehuenche supporters of a bandit group led by the

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<sup>457</sup> The preamble to the treaty described Mariluán as "Gobervador de 14 Reducciones." As José Manuel Zavala has pointed out, the Spanish most likely used the terms "reduccion" and "parcialidad" to refer to *lofs* and *ayllarewe*, Zavala, *Los mapuches*.

Pincheira brothers who had been attacking piedmont settlements near Chillán, Mendoza, and the Pampas during the guerra a muerte. Such a maneuver would have won praise from Supreme Director Freire, who himself ordered an expedition against these groups in the early 1830s. It is unclear whether or not Mariluán or any of his followers assented to this request. Either way, Coñuepan did travel east of the Andes. The exact reasons for Coñuepan's exodus remain unknown.<sup>458</sup> According to captive turned Ranquel officer Santiago Avendaño, whose declaration opened this dissertation, Chile's other longstanding llanista ally Lorenzo (son of Juan) Colipí drove Coñuepan out the Araucanía. Another theory holds that he left with the support of Chilean authorities in order to confront the Pincheira brothers and break into the Pampas salt trade on Chile's behalf.<sup>459</sup> What is known is that in 1827, Coñuepan and his followers settled on the other side of the Pampas near the Atlantic coastal fortification of Bahía Blanca.

After Tapihue, Chile's gaze shifted to Santiago and the political battles that would decide the direction of the new country.<sup>460</sup> The frontier region, which had been depopulated, bled, and burned for decades, remained in economic stagnation until the 1840s. During this period, land speculators and squatters pushed beyond the Bío-Bío River, eventually turning it into a battlefield between federalists and centralists in the 1850s.

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<sup>458</sup> For biographical notes on Coñuepan, since Villar and Jiménez, page 149.

<sup>459</sup> The latter comes from Pedro Melinaw, a Mapuche man, in 1868. Both of these theories are highlighted by Jorge Pavez Ojeda in the introduction to *Cartas Mapuche*. 59. Pavez suggests that letters written by Venancio's nephew Venancio, and his nephew's second son in the 1870s and 1880s confirmed a belief in longstanding positive relationship with the Chilean government. Villar and Jiménez support the belief that pursuing the Pincheiras was the primary motivation for Coñuepan's expedition east (151). They also suggest that perhaps they sought to rescue the daughter of a Chilean governor named Juana Seguel who may have been captured by the Pincheira brothers.

<sup>460</sup> Simon Collier, *Ideas and Politics*.

The inter-Mapuche balance of power was undeniably changed by the guerra a muerte and the resolution at Tapihue. Perhaps because Mariluán was favored in the treaty, many Mapuche moved east to the Pampas and frontiers of Buenos Aires and the Atlantic coast. Some fled retribution in Chile and others looked for new opportunities for raiding and trading. Venancio Coñuepan was the most prominent *lonko* to follow this path in the 1820s. Coñuepan and other Mapuche groups' arrival in the Pampas came at a crucial moment in Argentinian political history: the rise to power of Juan Manuel de Rosas.

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

What Mariluán and Barnechea agreed to in January 1825 rendered fictitious the territorial and political reach of Chile over the Araucanía. Although Barnechea and the treaty's framers portrayed a confident and triumphant nation exacting concessions from a war-weary indigenous opponent, Mariluán would have viewed it as a continuation of the centuries-long efforts of Mapuche leaders to make agreements with Spain to preserve their autonomy from Spain, protect themselves from Mapuche rivalries, and maintain legitimacy within their communities. Chile's independence war and the guerra a muerte threatened to erode the basis on which Mapuche lonkos had shaped their authority and guarded their sovereignty for centuries. Patriot-royalist strife injected new levels of violence into intra-Mapuche alliances, squeezed the economic viability of physical protection of lofs and shattered the interethnic networks of negotiation linked to Spain's frontier administration. Nevertheless, Mapuche leaders on all sides of the conflict

refashioned well-known diplomatic strategies to forge new alliances with belligerent parties.

The persistence of these Mapuche politics of contestation and authority offers a reimagining of the transition from colonial to national rule. Animated less by a clash between Enlightenment ideals and those of the *ancien régime* stemming from Europe, the struggle for the direction of the region took place in lands dominated and political parameters forged by unconquered indigenous groups. The actions of Mapuche leaders like Mariluán and Coñuepan exacted concessions from both sides in the conflict and injected new meanings into the contested ideas of sovereignty, subject, and citizen. Mariluán's actions in particular during the year preceding the Tapihue parlamento reflected the fact that Mapuche diplomacy signified more than the large parlamento ritual. It was a resilient mode of interaction that involved letter writing, messengers, war, meetings, and careful deliberation. Fiat and force alone could not sway divided groups of Mapuche leaders to support different sides, or reconcile their own particular interests and motivations. As a result, while prior Spanish-Mapuche negotiations brought about a semblance of unity in the Araucanía that papered over simmering rivalries, now internal Mapuche diplomacy and sovereignty indeed looked much more akin to Santiago Avendaño's 1860s metaphor of a group of neighboring nation states at war. However, the ferocity of inter-indigenous warfare during the independence period and the *guerra a muerte* revealed that Avendaño's characterization underestimated the extent to which these indigenous nations would invite foreign militaries into their lands to gain an advantage over their enemies. Yet, ultimately Mariluán's efforts allowed Mapuche to maintain their dominion over the Araucanía at great cost during the interregnum caused

by Spain's colonial crisis in the Americas. This dynamic would reach a fever pitch as the conflict in Chile shifted across the Andes to the outskirts of Buenos Aires.

After Tapihue, Chile's gaze shifted to Santiago and the political battles that would decide the direction of the new country.<sup>461</sup> Moreover, Coñuepan and other Mapuche groups' arrival in the Pampas came at a crucial moment in Argentinian political history: the rise to power of Juan Manuel de Rosas. The Chilean frontier region, which had been depopulated, bled, and burned for decades, remained in economic stagnation until the 1840s. During this period, land speculators and squatters pushed beyond the Bío-Bío River, eventually turning it into a battlefield between federalists and centralists in the 1850s. In these conflicts, too, Mapuche would figure as important players.

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<sup>461</sup> Simon Collier, *Ideas and Politics*.

## Chapter 6: Parlamentos al estilo chileno: Transandean Mapuche politics on the Buenos Aires Frontier, 1825-1834

The Tapihue treaty may have been the last major parlamento celebrated between Mapuche leaders and the Chilean government, but it was not the last parlamento. Nor was it the end of the scaffolding of interethnic diplomacy, which directed how Mapuche families navigated the end of colonial rule. In fact, within two years of Mariluán's peace treaty with Chile, Venancio Coñuepan and several other Mapuche participants in the guerra a muerte found themselves demanding that frontier officials of the United Provinces of Río de la Plata participate in "Chilean-style parlamentos."<sup>462</sup> Between 1827 and 1834, this handful of Mapuche families from the coastal, llanos, and Pehuenche butalmapus became enmeshed in the rise to power of famed Argentine leader Juan Manuel de Rosas. In the process, Mapuche and other indigenous leaders infused Rosas' frontier policies and the concomitant articulation of Argentinian federalism with the diplomatic strategies and understandings of sovereignty previously seen in Araucanía, Cuyo, and Valdivia. Even though the wars of independence cracked new fissures into the transandean Mapuche world, the displacement of Mapuche people and politics influenced the unfolding of state formation in Chile and Argentina.

The transandean Mapuche frontiers continued to be a crucial epistemological and political space for the definition and enforcement of inclusion and exclusion from the new body politic despite the forced and voluntary flight from Chile of prominent

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<sup>462</sup> Martha Bechis, asserts that in the nineteenth century, many Pampas indigenous groups demanded "parlamentos al estilo chileno," suggesting the transandean fame of these events and the expectation that significant frontier officials would not only attend the meetings, but provide lavish gifts. "Estrategias de asimilación de algunos aborígenes del área pan-araucana durante el siglo XIX," in Martha A. Bechis, *Piezas de etnohistoria y de antropología histórica*, 36.

indigenous and creole independence leaders in the waning years of the guerra a muerte.<sup>463</sup>

In Chile and the United Provinces (Argentina), as we shall see in this chapter, creole leaders were forced to participate in indigenous frontier diplomacy and tacitly recognize indigenous boundaries even as leaders of the former Spanish colonies attempted to realign and police the bounds of sovereignty in the Americas through the imposition of new borders. These contestations over the meaning and enforcement of space and power came from both creole and Mapuche worlds. New leaders—Mapuche and creole—emerged to play prominent roles in the process of state formation in Chile and the United Provinces of Río de la Plata, insofar as their objectives became entangled with the boundaries of the transandean Mapuche world during the 1820s and 1830s.

While Mapuche leaders continued to engage with military and political officials on both sides of the Andes through parlamentos, alliances, and networks of messengers; interethnic politics in the Pampas also witnessed the changes wrought by the guerra a muerte in the Araucanía: the significant intrusion of a military invasion led by Rosas against the Ranquel and Pehuenche people in 1833. These attacks by outsiders in heart of the Pampas, lands which had been a near complete mystery to the Spanish, splintered indigenous confederations and introduced a level and scope of violent competition never before seen. This changing context put to the test the political culture developed over centuries between indigenous groups in the Araucanía and the frontier regions of the Pampas and Patagonia. Would these centuries-old rituals for regulating negotiation and

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<sup>463</sup> On exile as a common form of punishment utilized by Spanish and Chilean forces against enemy loyalists in Chile's independence wars, see Chambers, *Families in War and Peace*. On Mapuche movement across the Andes as a result of war, see Bechis, "Estrategias de asimilación," Silvia Ratto, "La lucha por el poder en una agrupación indígena: el efímero apogeo de los boroganos en las pampas (primera mitad del siglo XIX), Ingrid de Jong, "Entre el malón, el comercio y la diplomacia: dinámicas de la política indígena en las fronteras pampeanas (siglos XVIII y XIX). Un balance historiográfico."



hostility that formed the scaffolding for Mapuche claims to territorial independence have continued relevance in the ensuing decades? The experiences of Mapuche groups who resettled in the Pampas near Buenos Aires with other indigenous groups and the Argentinian governments suggest they did. But these experiences also demonstrated the changes imprinted by the wars of independence on the Araucanía and Mendoza had been extended to the outskirts of Buenos Aires.

Discussions of *porteño estanciero* and military officer Juan Manuel de Rosas' first rise to power (1825-1834), and his engagement with frontier indigenous groups have been divorced from his role as the progenitor of Argentinian federalism.<sup>464</sup> While Ricardo Salvatore analyzes soldiers' memories of military service in the independence and frontier wars as important federalist rituals, he elides a deeper discussion of the indigenous interethnic rituals in which Rosas participated in order to maintain a stable frontier regime.<sup>465</sup> In many ways, Rosas represented the apotheosis of Spanish-Mapuche diplomatic engagement as practiced during the second half of the eighteenth century. Bringing Mapuche and indigenous experiences to bear on the early years of *rosismo* offers an opportunity to claim an alternative genealogy of federalism in Argentina and Chile; one rooted in colonial interethnic diplomacy and the possible coexistence of indigenous and non-indigenous sovereignties.

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<sup>464</sup> John Lynch, *Argentine Caudillo* and Ricardo Salvatore, *Wandering Paysanos*. The best and most comprehensive study of Rosas' frontier policy with indios amigos and enemigos by María Laura Cutrera explicitly focuses on ethnohistorical questions and is not concerned with federalism per se. Cutrera, *Subordinarlos, someterlos y sujetarlos al Orden*.

<sup>465</sup> While Ricardo Salvatore discusses memories of military service in the independence and frontier wars as an important federalist ritual, he elides a deeper discussion of the indigenous interethnic rituals in which Rosas participated to maintain a stable frontier regime.

## 6.1 Frontier Politics in the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, 1776-1820

Since the eighteenth century, the Salado River, which flowed southeast into the Atlantic Ocean roughly 200 kilometers south of Buenos Aires, had served as the southwestern frontier between the Spanish and the autonomous groups of the Pampas and Patagonia.<sup>466</sup> Unconquered indigenous groups controlled the vast territories beyond this line, and south of Córdoba and Mendoza. In both the arid and humid Pampas lived several indigenous groups who had traded, fought, and exchanged with the Mapuche throughout the eighteenth century. The primary group in the Pampas was called the Pampas or Ranquel (Ranquelche in Mapudungun), and in northern Patagonia, the Tehuelche.<sup>467</sup> The Ranquel, and especially the Tehuelche, were different linguistic groups who gained familiarity with Mapuche language and cultural practices thanks to trade, raiding, and captive taking from the Araucanía during the eighteenth century.

Though the Salado River had not evoked the level of conflict, negotiation, and ratification that the Bío-Bío had in Chile, Bourbon administrators in the second half of the last century of Spanish rule investigated the possibility of advancing the frontier.<sup>468</sup> As in the Araucanía and Cuyo, several caciques earned recognition and titles from the Buenos Aires government and engaged in diplomatic gestures. For instance, the Pampas cacique Lorenzo declared to frontier officials in the late eighteenth century that there is “enough space for *indios* and [Christians]. Harmony is possible and useful. But if you

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<sup>466</sup> Mayo and Latrabusse, *Terratenientes, Soldados y cautivos: La frontera, 1736-1815*, 28.

<sup>467</sup> Alicia Haydée Tapia, “Archaeological Perspectives on the Ranquel Chiefdoms in the North of the Dry Pampas, in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” *International Journal of Historical Archaeology* 9, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 209-228.

<sup>468</sup> On new settlements in the Entre Ríos region to the north of Buenos Aires, see Julio Djenderedjian, “Roots of Revolution: Frontier Settlement Policy and the Emergence of New Spaces of Power in the Río de la Plata Borderlands, 1777-1810,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 88, no 4. (2008): 639.

look for a scuffle, you will have one.”<sup>469</sup> The Pehuenche-Huilliche war of the 1770s and the War of the Malón, the object of which had always been the frontier ranches of Río de la Plata, also enveloped the Ranquel and Tehuelche. Years later, in the final stages of Chilean Governor of Concepción Luis de la Cruz’s 1806 expedition brought him into contact with many Ranquel families.<sup>470</sup> The Ranquel would have been aware of events taking place on the other side of the Viceroyalty and the Andes, and that those events intertwined with the experiences of the Ranquel south of Buenos Aires.

Though Spanish explorers first established the settlement that would become Buenos Aires in the sixteenth century, much of the Pampas and Patagonia remained unknown to them. Nevertheless, Spanish colonial officials, traders, and captives had been in contact with the people inhabiting the Pampas and Patagonia to varying degrees since the sixteenth century. In fact, several scientists and cartographers accompanied Juan Manuel de Rosas’ military expedition into the Pampas in 1833 in order to take detailed climatological and physical observations.<sup>471</sup>

Unlike in the Araucanía and Cuyo, the southern frontier of the Buenos Aires province had not been the stage for major indigenous uprisings, and the Pampas did not become a theater in the independence wars. Aside from the Pehuenche-Huilliche wars along the cordillera and the rise of long-distance *malones*, peninsular and creole administrators, Buenos Aires had enjoyed a modicum of peace with the frontier indigenous groups between 1780 and 1810.<sup>472</sup>

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<sup>469</sup> Meinrado Hux, *Caciques puelches, pampas y serranos*, 75. Quoted in Carlos Martínez Sarasola, *La argentina de los caciques*, 36.

<sup>470</sup> Carlos Martínez Sarasola, *La argentina*, 36-37.

<sup>471</sup> Department of Topography to Rosas, 21 February 1833, Buenos Aires, X-27-5-5.

<sup>472</sup> Silva Ratto, “Negocio Pacífico,” de Jong, “Entre el malón, el comercio y la diplomacia.”

Shortly after Napoleon invaded Spain and deposed King Ferdinand VII, French leaders sent an emissary to Buenos Aires hoping to convince Viceroy Santiago Liniers to become an ally. At the same time another movement emerged in Buenos Aires: adherents of the Carlolist movement, which aimed to place Ferdinand's older sister Carlota Joaquina, who had fled to Brazil with the Portuguese court, on the Spanish throne.<sup>473</sup> After two separate attempts to form juntas in opposition to the Viceroy in Montevideo and Buenos Aires, a revolutionary junta was created in Buenos Aires in May 1810. This junta and the city of Buenos Aires, despite its political divisions, "never succumbed to conquest or counterrevolution."<sup>474</sup>

Nevertheless, the junta's call for support in the old Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata tore the region asunder. While Cuyo acknowledged the junta, Santiago Liniers, the viceroy of Peru, Abascal, and other Spanish officials organized a military counterrevolution against Buenos Aires. Córdoba, Upper Peru, Paraguay, Montevideo, and the Banda Oriental all became theaters of conflict. By June 1814, patriot forces defeated the Spanish navy around Montevideo and completed the siege of the city. This victory allowed patriot leaders to focus on Upper Peru and to dispatch José de San Martín to Cuyo to prepare for the invasion of Chile.

Three processes contributed to a state of upheaval faced by the indigenous groups of the region. As in Chile and Mendoza, these events created extraordinary pressures on the autonomous indigenous inhabitants of the Pampas and Patagonia. First, military conflicts fragmented the frontier regime of the historic Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata. Though the frequency of frontier contact in Chile and Cuyo dwarfed that of Buenos

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<sup>473</sup> Bethell, *The Independence of Latin America*, 93-95.

<sup>474</sup> Bethell, *The Independence*, 116.

Aires, the capitol's gaze and resources shifted elsewhere. Beyond the severance of relations between certain caciques and their Spanish benefactors—which included resources, titles, and military protection—military deserters and civilians from both sides of the conflict and subsequent civil and external conflicts sought refuge beyond the established colonial frontiers. These events, combined with the state of insecurity of the United Provinces' borders: aggression from the Portuguese in the Brazilian empire to the north, and a separatist movement and royalist backlash in Córdoba threatened the stability of the new Argentinian nation and the viability of its economic growth centered on exportation of livestock-related goods.<sup>475</sup>

Second, in the midst of warfare, administrators and elites in Buenos Aires Province sought to reshape the postcolonial economy by augmenting the livestock export economy in the province.<sup>476</sup> This involved taming the highly mobile gaucho labor force, setting up export processing plants for tallow and hides, and securing and advancing the frontier.<sup>477</sup> This process put pressure directly on the Pampas; between 1810 and 1815, in the midst of the independence wars, the tallow and hide industry began flourishing. To expand, cattle owners needed more pasture and the end of indigenous raids on their herds. In response to the ongoing wars and the growing cattle interests, Supreme Director Juan Martín de Pueyrredón passed a law requiring non-landowners to serve two years of military service, or five on the frontier.<sup>478</sup> In turn, frontier landowners and livestock processors demanded money and support for punitive military incursions against the frontier *indios* and the outright invasion of the Pampas. These efforts failed to stop raids

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<sup>475</sup> On Argentine economic growth, see Salvatore, *Wandering Paysanos*.

<sup>476</sup> Djenderedjian, "Roots of Revolution."

<sup>477</sup> On the culmination of this process several decades later, see Salvatore, *Wandering Paisanos*.

<sup>478</sup> Tulio Halperin Donghi, "La expansión ganadera en la campaña de Buenos Aires, 1810-1852."

for control of the Pampas.<sup>479</sup> Rosas developed a different strategy for frontier peace in which indigenous leaders would be invited to settle near forts and receive livestock and resources from the central government in exchange for becoming *indios amigos*. This line of settled groups would ostensibly serve as a barrier and deterrent to raids from *indios enemigos*. He would also combine this diplomatic strategy with widespread military incursion against the *enemigos*.<sup>480</sup>

Finally, the unresolved political contradictions and legacies of violence produced by the guerra a muerte washed up on the shores of Buenos Aires. These events caused defeated Spanish royalists, bandits, fleeing Mapuche and Pehuenche, and indigenous maloqueros to move east of the cordillera from Chile in the last years of the guerra a muerte in Chile and southern Mendoza. Some sought economic opportunities, others protection and an escape from violence.<sup>481</sup> The itineraries of Venancio Coñuepan's followers and the Mapuche exodus from Boroa (the Boroganos or Boroanos) examined in this chapter offer a vantage to analyze the changing meanings of sovereignty, violence, and diplomacy in this region. Each group eventually joined forces with Rosas against other local indigenous groups and found themselves in complicated arrangements of aid and military reciprocity against relatives and friends.<sup>482</sup>

In 1816, delegates from the former viceroyalty of Río de la Plata traveled to San Miguel de Tucumán located in the northwest of modern Argentina to form a new congress. Some provinces did not send representatives, including the Banda Oriental

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<sup>479</sup> Martha Bechis, "La diáspora araucana y sus consecuencias en la guerra de Arauco," 15, in Bechis, *Piezas de etnohistoria*.

<sup>480</sup> Cutrera, *Subordinarlos*.

<sup>481</sup> Bechis, "Estrategias de asimilación," Ratto, "La lucha por el poder," de Jong, "Entre el malón, el comercio y la diplomacia: dinámicas de la política indígena en las fronteras pampeanas (siglos XVIII y XIX). Un balance historiográfico," Daniel Villar and Juan Francisco Jiménez "Indios Amigos."

<sup>482</sup> Ratto, "Caciques, autoridades fronterizas y lenguaraces: intermediaries culturales e interlocutors válidos en Buenos Aires (primera mitad del siglo XIX), Cutrera. *Subordinarlos*.

(modern Uruguay) and Paraguay, which had already declared independence. On July 9, the delegates declared independence from Spain. After the congress returned to Buenos Aires in 1817, the fragile United Provinces of Río de la Plata was ripped apart by a conflict between Unitarians and the Federal League Provinces of Santa Fé and Entre Ríos. The armed conflicts between these groups, and the fratricide bloodletting in Buenos Aires sparked by these rifts came to be known as “the anarchy.”

In the midst of the anarchy, Buenos Aires Governor Gregorio de las Heras was torn between a growing conflict between the interior provinces and Buenos Aires, and war with the Empire of Brazil along the eastern shore of the River Plate (the Banda Oriental). To effectively wage war on both frontiers, las Heras decided that Buenos Aires required peace, or at least a *détente*, with the indigenous inhabitants of the southwest frontier of the province.<sup>483</sup> In the 1820s, former royalist and patriot caciques and creole bandits had crossed the Andes and entered the Pampas. While some sought aid and protection at frontier forts that they had come to expect in Cuyo and the Araucanía, others came to continue the War of the Malón. The *guerra a muerte* had arrived on the shores of the Río Salado.

In 1825, Las Heras decided to commission landowner and officer Juan Manuel de Rosas, Felipe Senillosa, and Juan Lavalle to secure a peace treaty with the frontier indigenous groups and study the possibilities for fortifying and advancing a new frontier line. As head of the *Comisión Pacificadora de Indios* (Indian Pacification Commission), Rosas aimed to prevent the constant *malones* that threatened frontier livestock estancias and divided the provinces’ military capacity.<sup>484</sup> For example, in 1826, the cacique Chañil

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<sup>483</sup> Cutrera, *Subordinarlos*, 19.

<sup>484</sup> Silva Ratto, “Negocio Pacífico,” 193.

promised to accept Rosas' peace terms if the officer kept his promise of aid and protection. He also made tentative non-aggression pacts with Ranqueles that would apply to the frontiers of Córdoba, Santa Fé, and Buenos Aires. Rosas' commission also succeeded in gaining great knowledge of the physical frontier along the Salado River. They placed boundary markers along frontier line beginning at Tandil. Rosas demonstrated the possibility of advancing and securing the Buenos Aires frontier by making agreements with *indios* and designating them *amigos* by participating in interethnic negotiation.<sup>485</sup>

By the end of the decade, Rosas' commission had succeeded in building a series of forts along the frontier: Fort Federación covered the departments (guardias) of Rojas, Salto and Luján; Fort 25 de Mayo, near lake Cruz de Guerra, linked Federación to Laguna Blanca; and at the southern extreme of the province, stronghold Protectora Argentina near the Atlantic coastal settlement of Bahía Blanca.<sup>486</sup> These new forts and their respective jurisdictions would become nodes for settlement of and negotiation with *indios amigos*, and points of communication with the still autonomous *indios aliados*—friendly indigenous groups who chose not to settle by the forts.<sup>487</sup> They also served as a defensive perimeter from and launching point for punitive actions against *indios enemigos*.

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<sup>485</sup> *Política seguida con el aborigen*, volume IV, tome 2, pp 37-38.

<sup>486</sup> Cutrera, *Subordinarlos*, 19-20.

<sup>487</sup> Silvia Ratto draws a distinction between *indios amigos* and *indios aliados*. The former offered military and other aid to the Buenos Aires government in exchange for subjecting themselves to the government regime, settling alongside frontier forts, receiving material aid, and military protection. The latter, however, refused to submit the government—Rosas included—though they often provided supported it in against rival indigenous groups.



## 6.2 Indios Amigos and Enemigos in the Pampas, 1820-1833

Three principle indigenous bands from the Araucanía and Cuyo traveled to the Pampas in the 1820s and 1830s: Coñuepan and his followers, southern Ilanista Mapuche from Boroa (the Boroganos or Boroanos), and the Pehuenche allies of the bandit pro-Spanish Pincheira brothers. The former two eventually became allies of Rosas and received the colonial denomination *indios amigos*. The latter fell in to the camp of *indios enemigos*, alongside several of the Ranquel confederations of the Pampas. The fragile and fluid web of relations between these groups and Rosas produced the largest institutionalization of frontier gift giving (the Peaceful Negotiation with the Indians policy) and the most violent foreign military intervention into the Pampas before the late nineteenth century Campaign to the Desert (1833-34). Despite the extreme polarization of this conjuncture, the hallmark strategies of Mapuche frontier politics once again surfaced front and center.

During the general chaos of the war of the *guerra a muerte*, six royalist siblings from Chillán named Pincheira created a montonera band that raided cattle and undefended places near the Maule River and south in Chile, and the southern settlements of Cuyo. Led by the brothers Juan Antonio, Santos, Pablo, and José Antonio, and joined by their sisters Rosa and Juana, these bands terrorized the countryside until Chilean General Manuel Bulnes defeated most of their remaining forces in 1832 in the Battle of Epulafquen, near the border of Chile and Argentina, several hundred kilometers south of Mendoza.<sup>488</sup>

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<sup>488</sup> Herr, "The Nation State," Ana María Contador, *Los Pincheira: Un caso de bandidaje social. Chile 1817-1832*.

The Pincheira were not alone in their raids. Many Pehuenche from near Chillán, most prominently the cacique Martín Toriano, joined the montonera. When the Pincheira shifted their activities more intensely east of the Andes to target the frontiers near Córdoba and Buenos Aires, Toriano and other Mapuche joined them. Even though Bulnes killed most of the brothers in 1832, the remnants of the band, joined by the Borogano confederation, settled in Salinas Grandes.<sup>489</sup> They used this crossroads of the Pampas as a base of operations to raid the Argentine frontiers. Breaking the Boroganos and Pehuenche by diplomacy or force became a primary goal for Rosas.

Aside from Coñuepan, the most prominent Mapuche group in the Pampas during the 1830s originated in the southern coast of the Araucanía near Boroa, an important theater of the *guerra a muerte*. Led by the caciques Cañiuquir, Rondeau, and Canuillan, the Boroganos made their way across the Pampas toward the Atlantic and the Patagonia following an 1821 Chilean massacre against them.<sup>490</sup> Most likely for this reason, the Boroganos accompanied the infamous bandits, the Pincheira Brothers, and posed a significant threat to the frontiers of Buenos Aires and Córdoba. The Borogano Mapuche confederation thus sealed their fate not in the battle between Benavides and the Chilean military in the 1820s, but between Juan Manuel de Rosas and the indigenous inhabitants of the Buenos Aires interior in the 1830s.

In the early 1820s, the Boroganos settled in the heart of the Pampas, roughly two hundred kilometers north of Bahía Blanca near the important salt lakes, grazing area, and commercial crossroads of Salinas Grandes. They encamped at a place called Guaminí and focused on raiding frontier settlements and engaging with the Ranquel followers of the

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<sup>489</sup> Ratto. "La lucha."

<sup>490</sup> Silvia Ratto, 237. In reference to the massacre, see Bechis, "Interethnic Relations," 68.

cacique Llanquetrúz, one of Rosas' primary indigenous enemies. In the process, Ranquel and Borogano families intermarried, forming a complicated kin- and political confederation.<sup>491</sup> Their presence began to preoccupy frontier officials, and Rosas in particular, in 1830. At that time, the Boroganos dominated these large salt flats in the Pampas.<sup>492</sup> Martha Bechis has argued "the Boroans (sic) were the only Chilean group that ever dominated from the Pacific to the Atlantic."<sup>493</sup> Their preeminence lasted until another massacre against them carried out by other Mapuche and Ranquel groups in 1834.

It is believed that Coñuepan arrived in the Pampas during the middle of 1827, some two years following the Tapihue treaty. He joined a group of Mapuche led by ally, Luis Melipan, and his brothers or cousins Collinao and Mellinao. Additionally, the group consisted of allied caciques Ancavilu, Nanculvilu, several hundred spearman, and a contingent of Chilean soldiers under Lieutenant Juan de Dios Montero.<sup>494</sup> The Argentine commander of Fort Independence at the modern city of Tandil, Coronel Ramon Estomba, reported the movement of "Don Benancio and a Lieutenant of the same state [Chile]" with roughly 1,000 soldiers and several dozen Chileans.<sup>495</sup> In August 1827, Estomba received a request for aid from Coñuepan's band in their continued fight against the Pincheira because of their lack of numbers and provisions.<sup>496</sup> Fearing that a refusal would drive Coñuepan into the arms of the Pincheira, Estomba and the government offered to settle Coñuepan near Bahía Blanca and provide protection and aid.

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<sup>491</sup> Ratto. "La lucha."

<sup>492</sup> Ratto, "La lucha," Meinrado Hux, *Caciques Borogas y Araucanos*.

<sup>493</sup> Bechis, "Interethnic Relations," 68.

<sup>494</sup> Villar and Jiménez, "Indios amigos," 150.

<sup>495</sup> Archivo General de la Nación (hereafter, AGN) Sala VII, 14-6-1, quoted in Villar and Jiménez, "Indios amigos," 150-151.

<sup>496</sup> AGN X-14-6-1 quoted in Villar and Jiménez, "Indios amigos," 152.

The settling of indigenous families near forts for protection from enemy indios was certainly not new. Examples abound in the Southern Cone as well as in other frontier spaces of the former Spanish Empire. We have seen similar cases with similar promises in both Valdivia and Mendoza. However, the turning point in Coñuepan's journey east took place when he first had a fortuitous meeting with then Commander of Militias Juan Manuel de Rosas.

Despite Coñuepan's desire to stage a return to Chile, pressure from the Pincheira bands standing between him and his homelands forced Coñuepan to accept the government's offer to settle near Fort Independence. From this point on, roughly 20 followers of Coñuepan, Pedro Melinao and Martín Collinao, roughly 200 in total became *indios amigos* of Argentina. Following the death of Don Venancio's ally Melipan at the hands of the Pincheira, Coñuepan finally decided to settle outside of Bahía Blanca at the Fort Protectora Argentina after its foundation in April 1828.

Coñuepan's allegiance seemed to be so treasured by provincial authorities, that Don Venancio began receiving livestock and aid at the expense of other *amigos*. The commander of Fort Independence reported that a requisition of 120 mares received from a local *estanciero* that had been destined to local "casiques aliados" be redirected to Bahía Blanca for Coñuepan. This left the four to five hundred *amigos* living near the fort without any aid.<sup>497</sup> In the following two years, Coñuepan's forces fought alongside Rosas' Argentinian forces on two fronts: against the Pincheira and against Rosas' political enemies, the Unitarian armies led by Juan Levalle, Rosas' former frontier comrade. This alliance was essential for Rosas' broader political agenda, and therefore the origins of *rosista* federalism, as he rapidly assumed power over the province in

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<sup>497</sup> R. Vergares to Jose Rondeau, 26 Mar. 1828, Fortaleza Independencia, AGN Sala X, 14-10-6.

1829.<sup>498</sup> Rosas' relationship with Coñuepan revealed that his frontier strategy valued *amigos* willing to fight against his political enemies (indigenous and non-indigenous) more than those simply willing to settle by frontier forts. In other words, his policy required active military allies, and reflected part of the changes to indigenous sovereignty and diplomacy witnessed earlier in the Araucanía, but on a greater scale.

Having lost the ties of prestige and politics carefully built over decades along the Bío-Bío River, Don Venancio and his followers became intimately tied to the project of Rosismo until his death in 1836. After settling near Bahía Blanca, Coñuepan received significant provisions and livestock from Rosas. In February 1832, roughly a year before Rosas would commence his extensive military campaign against the *indios enemigos* into the interior of the country, the translator of Bahía Blanca received a reimbursement of 10,000 pesos for 1000 mares destined for the "tribe of Coñuepan."<sup>499</sup> Though gaps exist in the regularity of payments to Coñuepan, three years later, on August 6, 1835, Rosas ordered 6300 pesos disbursed to provision the followers of the casiques "Benancio Coyuepan and Niquimille."<sup>500</sup>

Coñuepan, however, was not an anonymous part of Rosas' ascendant frontier policy. Juan Manuel corresponded personally with Coñuepan using the honorific "Don," and referring to him as "my dear" and "esteemed" friend."<sup>501</sup> Moreover, Rosas' salutations wished Coñuepan good health and described himself as Venancio's "compatriot." He also asked Coñuepan to pass along his good wishes to "Ramon Collinao, Juan, and the other leaders." This suggested Rosas had detailed knowledge of

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<sup>498</sup> Villar and Jiménez, "Indios amigos," 153-157.

<sup>499</sup> 17 Feb. 1832, AGN, Sala X, 43-7-3.

<sup>500</sup> Juan Manuel de Rosas to Comisario Don Pedro Rodriguez, 6 Aug. 1835, AGN, Sala X, 43-7-3.

<sup>501</sup> Juan Manuel de Rosas to Don Venancio, 20 Sep. 1833, Rio Colorado, AGN, Sala X, 27-5-7.

the hierarchies within his *amigo* groups. Beyond these fraternal sentiments, which in and of themselves echo the tenor of correspondence between Mapuche, patriots, and royalists during the *guerra a muerte*, the brief communications between Coñuepan and Rosas offer further insights into the inner workings of indigenous engagement with Rosas.

Though we only possess Rosas' half of the conversation, it is possible to discern how Coñuepan drew upon his relationship with Rosas to achieve his own ends. In one instance, he sought support for freeing family members captured by his indigenous rivals. Despite other concerns getting in the way, Rosas responded that he had charged another *amigo*, Lorenzo Lefipan, to act as an intermediary to secure their release. This brief glimpse into Coñuepan's transposition of diplomatic strategies common in the *guerra a muerte* to his dealing with Rosas opens the possibility for examining the changing meaning of colonial interethnic rituals in the changing context of state formation.

Coñuepan's arrival in the Pampas coincided with a period of internal and external conflict, which produced experimentation by the Buenos Aires government toward the southern and western frontiers of the province.<sup>502</sup> Rosas' utilization of these tactics to win the loyalty of Mapuche *indios amigos* began before 1829, when he had not yet reached the governorship of the province. His entreaties with Venancio Coñuepan, beginning in 1827, represented the formative period for his peaceful policy toward the *indios*. Coñuepan's alliance with Rosas against the Pincheira, and eventually Rosas' Argentinian and indigenous enemies, formed a blueprint for rosista policy toward the frontier and its inhabitants.<sup>503</sup> Settling near a frontier fort, receiving provisions, and military protection in exchange for military support and intelligence would become the cornerstones of Rosas'

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<sup>502</sup> Silvia Ratto, "Indios amigos e indios aliados. Orígenes del 'negocio pacífico' en la Provincia de Buenos Aires (1829-1832), 5, quoted in Villar and Jimenez, "Indios amigos," 147.

<sup>503</sup> Villar and Jiménez, "Indios amigos."

*Negocio Pacífico de Indios*. Thus, at this policy's heart were the Mapuche strategies of interethnic relations freshly carried from experiences during the *guerra a muerte*. But, this transposition also reflected the changing spatialization of Mapuche sovereignty: alliances and rivalries in the interior could involve the entrance of foreign military expeditions.

### **6.3 The Boroganos and Rosas**

Harried by the Pehuenche cacique Manuel Toriano but supporting the Pincheira, the Borogano caciques Cañiuquir, Rondeao, Caniullan, Melin, Marileu, and Yaytaru quickly became the object of Rosas' *Negocio Pacífico de Indios*. The Boroganos realized the need for resources and protection.<sup>504</sup> They subsequently reached out to new potential allies, indigenous and Argentinian. Rosas, on the other hand, believed he could pressure the Boroganos to break from Pincheira since he held Cañiuquir's wife and daughter captive.

As was common practice in the Araucanía, Juan Cañiuquir, the cacique principal of the Boroganos, reached out to Bahía Blanca. New malones from Toriano and the Pincheira had begun to target the Boroganos, driving them toward the fort. In November 1830, Cañiuquir's scribe Pablo Millalican (Millalikang)<sup>505</sup> wrote to the Commander of Bahía Blanca. He reported a twenty-day delay in their planned flight to Patagones due to the frequent malones from Toriano and his allies. Unable to flee or fight Toriano alone, Millalican asked Commander Martiniano Rodríguez for mercy and a favor. Specifically,

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<sup>504</sup> Silvia Ratto argues that these six caciques shared power over the Boroganos, though Cañiuquir was the most senior due in large part to his role and primary negotiator with Rosas and the Argentinians.

<sup>505</sup> I'm sympathetic to Jorge Pavez' more linguistically accurate Mapuche nomenclature, but I have to make a decisions about Spelling in Documents and Spelling according to Mapudungun scholars.

he requested the release of a friend and five horses of his held captive at the fort, and that Rodríguez provide him with flour and tobacco.<sup>506</sup>

To secure their support with Rosas, the Boroganos initiated the exchange of diplomatic emissaries. Cañiuquir sent the scribe Millalican with their Chilean ally, Miguel Miranda, and their *mocetones* to negotiate with Rosas' representatives in Bahía Blanca. Rosas received the Borogano delegation with the pomp and circumstance of visiting dignitaries: ceremonial troop formations, artillery fire, women tossing flowers, and shouts of "Viva la paz."<sup>507</sup> Miranda and Millalican even described how Rosas ate with the three caciques that accompanied them even going so far as to serve them dishes he had made "with his own hands." These ritualized displays of deference and respect should not only be read cynically. Rosas and the province of Buenos Aires desired stability on the frontier in order to advance it. The potential for destabilization by wars *or* new confederations between Pincheira, Pehuenche, Borogano, and Pampas would have rendered such a goal impossible.

While Miranda and Millalican's delegation reported the kindness, generosity, and humility Rosas displayed during their visit, the Boroganos previous experience with the Spanish and patriots along the Bío-Bío frontier suggested that words and gifts alone would not suffice to secure an alliance. The Boroganos' desire for stability and safety from their common enemies may have coincided with elements of Rosas' plan, but they stemmed from internal concerns as well. More so than the exchange of gifts, courtesies or

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<sup>506</sup> Pablo Millalican to Martiniano Rodríguez, 21 Nov. 1830, Guaminí, AGN, Sala VII, 3-3-2, f. 116-118. Transcribed in Pavez, *Cartas Mapuche*, 187-188.

<sup>507</sup> Millalican and Miguel Miranda to Rodríguez, 28 Nov. 1830, Guaminí, AGN, Sala VII, 3-3-2, Fojas 117-118 transcribed in *Cartas Mapuche*, 191-193. Jorge Pavez argues that the letter looks as if it was written by Millalican's hand, but signed by Miranda. This seems logical given Millalican's role as scribe in the confederation.



even military promises, Rosas' release from captivity of Cañiuquir's wife, Doña Luisa, and daughter, Doña Carmelita, seemed to have opened the possibility for achieving peace.<sup>508</sup>

Internal rivalries in the Borogano confederation also influenced their diplomatic approach to Rosas. While Cañiuquir may have been the cacique principal, six caciques led the Boroganos confederation. Miranda and Millalican expressed concerns upon their return to Guaminí that Rosas had not sent nearly enough gifts to satisfy all six, their other *compañeros*, or the *mocetones*. Thus, fine words and niceties amongst leaders might work in elite politics, but it could not satisfy the elements of redistribution and reciprocity necessary to maintain consensus and prestige within the different parts of the confederation.

Continued pressure from Toriano meant that despite their trepidation, the Boroganos quickly made peace with Rosas.<sup>509</sup> Acceding to the request for aid and military support in their time of need seems to have cemented the loyalty of Millalican to Rodríguez, and by extension, Rosas. Yet, such an agreement proved more complicated than one of simple unilateral subordination. Millalican, on behalf of the Borogano caciques, heaped praise upon the "Señores Argentinos" for having such a great leader and man in Rosas.<sup>510</sup> Rather than expressing a relationship of servant or subordinate to the Provincial government, Millalican asserted on behalf of Cañiuquir, "I am also a Man, happy, very content in the world; for having earned from [Rosas] such praise, when my

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<sup>508</sup> While it is not possible to discover the extent to which Doña Luisa lobbied in her captivity for such a course of action, this case suggests important parallels to the interethnic politics in Northeast New Spain (East Texas) described by Julianna Barr in *Peace Came*.

<sup>509</sup> Millalican and Miguel Miranda to Rodríguez, 28 November 1830, pp. 192-193.

<sup>510</sup> Millalican to Rodríguez, 28 November 1830, Guaminí, AGN, Sala VII, 3-3-2, pp. 118-119 transcribed in *Cartas Mapuche*, 189-190.

merits and services, in the Province, are so small, so infinitesimal... that I would have believed Lord, that no one would have given me thanks for my ...services.” He drew upon colonial religious and partisan discourse of the period to describe Rosas as the “steadfast defender of our Holy Religion of our Lord Jesus Christ,” whose enemies “must not love Justice nor respect Reason; they must therefore be enemies of our Holy Religion... and in return I will be their enemy...”

Despite lauding their new Argentinian allies, the Boroganos’ experiences with the *guerra a muerte* tempered the risks they would take to fulfill their alliance.

The connective tissue between these events and indigenous engagement with Rosas went well beyond physical contact. Having crossed the cordillera on their path to the Pampas, Millalican’s letter directly referred to his relations with José de San Martín and other patriot and Spanish leaders before him, in order to warn Rodríguez not to take the alliance for granted. Some time between 1814 and 1818, Millalican and the other Boroganos from the coastal butalmapu of the Araucanía had contact with José de San Martín. (Or perhaps, San Martín served as a stand in for prominent hispano-criollo leaders who had broken their promises to the Mapuche). Reflecting on the encounter, Millalican expressed frustration to the Argentine Commander of Bahía Blanca for having been deceived by the falseness of San Martín’s courtesies, “... he made me feel esteemed, but his affection was a pretense, his courtesies false...”<sup>511</sup> He felt betrayed by the treatment he received in spite of the “good services” working on behalf of peace he rendered to San Martín. More explicitly, Millalican asserted his trepidation over this new alliance

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<sup>511</sup> Millalican to Rodríguez, 28 November 1830, Guaminí, AGN, Sala VII, 3-3-2, pp.118-119 transcribed in *Cartas Mapuche*, pp. 189-190.

I hope to god that our new Great Leader, Rosas, is not like San [Martín]; like so many others who have disregarded me many times; have made me unhappy; and have themselves been unhappy; because they abandoned a pure man; that never was unfaithful, or evil toward them, a man who would die first, that did not commit ugly/hateful acts against his Superiors and Parents: a grateful man, and faithful till death!<sup>512</sup>

In employing the imagery of faithfulness, loyalty, and sacrifice, as well as the consequences of their betrayal, Millalican drew on the foundational discourses of the patriot cause to pledge Borogano support for the United Provinces. Asking not to be referred to as “Casique mayor” in his correspondence, Millalican stated, “I am working in favor of peace, to avoid many evils, to honor you, and [give] Glory to my adored Leader; and Americano brother...” He ended his message with a postscript that declared, “I am not a cacique, *antual*, I am a captain of the Patria, I was born in the midst of Caciques, yes, I do not deny it, it is true, thank God.” In many ways this final declaration anticipated and inverted Santiago Avendaño’s characterization of Mapuche sovereignty as akin to neighboring nation states. To make legible to Argentine officers the depths of his loyalty, Millalican used the language of brotherhood and the revolutionary appellation “Americano.” While recognizing his indigenous origins, he chose to embody the character of a captain of the Patria. Yet, even if Millalican and the Boroganos attempted to forsake or deny their non-European origins, they did not offer up to Rosas their sovereignty or autonomy.

But, like most conflicts along the Mapuche frontiers in the Southern Cone, there were more than two sides. Rosas and Rodríguez were not the only parties interested in an alliance with the Boroganos. On 14 December 1830, Llanquitrú, the Cacique Principal

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<sup>512</sup> Millalican to Rodríguez, 28 November 1830, Guaminí, AGN, Sala VII, 3-3-2, pp. 118-119 transcribed in *Cartas Mapuche*, 190.

of a large Ranquel band, participated in a parlamento-like “Junta General” with the Boroganos just weeks after Borogano peace at Bahía Blanca. In the 1820s, the Boroganos had settled near Llanquitrutz, and many had intermarried with his extended family. Fifty-four Borgano and Ranquel caciques in total attended.<sup>513</sup> Llanquetrutz had famously refused to sign any peace agreement with Buenos Aires, drawing ire and eventually repression from Rosas. Two days later, Cañiuquir and Mariano Rondeao sent a letter to Rosas describing the Junta.<sup>514</sup> They narrated that they encountered Llanquetrutz while in pursuit of the Pehuenche Toriano in the Salinas Grandes region. They explained to Rosas that they did not see pledging their fealty to Argentina as mutually exclusive from allying with Llanquitrutz. In fact, they told Rosas that they gave the Ranquel cacique their respect and deference as well as the title of General of the Nation, “because he deserves it, for being the owner and lord of the country...such that we are subjects of his...” The Boroganos hoped to convey to Rosas the complicated kin and political ties in which they were enmeshed, and the fact that they saw themselves as subject to and respectful of Llanquitrutz’s authority. It is also likely that they wrote on behalf of Llanquetrutz in order to prevent an invasion of the Pampas to subdue him. The Borogano leaders desired “true friendship and an alliance” with Llanquitrutz *and* with Rosas. This admission to Rosas suggested that the Boroganos recognized different jurisdictions than the nation state. That the Boroganos offered such deference to Llanquitrutz challenged the idea that Mapuche encroachment into the Pampas signified a foreign invasion, as some have described the “Araucanization of the Pampas.” Mapuche came to raid, like Toriano and the Pehuenche

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<sup>513</sup> Juan Ignacio Kaniwkir and Mariano Rondeao to Juan Manuel de Rosas, 16 december 1830, Chillhué, AGN, Sala X, 23-9-4, pp. 133-134 and 450-451, transcribed in *Cartas Mapuche* 194-198.

<sup>514</sup> Juan Ignacio Kaniwkir and Mariano Rondeao to Juan Manuel de Rosas, 16 december 1830, Chillhué, AGN, Sala X, 23-9-4, Fojas 133-134 and 450-451, transcribed in *Cartas Mapuche*, 194-198.

followers of the Pincheira, others to escape, seek protection, and negotiate, like the Boroganos.

Cañiuquir and Rondeao even went so far as to beseech Rosas to give up his old animosities and accept Llanquitrú as a friend too. While not giving specifics, they explained their embarrassment upon arrival at the junta over misinformation spread about their peace with Rosas. “Falsehoods always travel faster than truths,” they reminded the Governor, even among indigenous confederations. Perhaps, the Boroganos referred to their consternation at the inferior quality and quantity of gifts brought by Miguel Miranda from his visit with Rosas. Fourteen caciques out of the fifty-four and their mocetones were extremely angry because they had not received anything, and this severely hampered Cañiuquir and Rondeao’s efforts to convince Llanquetrú to make peace with Rosas. Rosas, in turn, blamed Millican for not reporting to him the number of caciques and mocetones traveling in his delegation. They referred to another perceived insult wherein Rosas displayed his finest clothes to one of their brothers, Guicham, but refused to grant him any as a gift. These grievances ultimately related to the need to satisfy the complicated hierarchies of kin and station within the respective indigenous societies.

Despite the instances of embarrassment, the Boroganos reported the favorable desire for peace on the part of Llanquitrú. All parties involved swore, “with God as their witness for all time,” that all of the caciques and mocetones would never break their word in relation to peace and friendship. They nominated another delegation to travel to Buenos Aires to deliver their words and negotiate an alliance with government. Specifically, they hoped “to remedy all of the evil, all of the ruin, all of calamities... that originate in war.” The delegation once again included Pablo Millalican, the cacique

Canuillan, two captains, Miguel Miranda, and several mocetones. Within their talk of war and peace, however, the Junta spoke of the desire to have their children attend schools where “they teach the children of nobles so that they make friends and companions with children their own age” in order to guarantee the perpetuity of their alliance. The conception of a perpetual political alliance, then, had much to do with blood and kinship, fictive or otherwise. By extension, the Borogano’s who dictated this letter continued to refer to Rosas as a good friend and brother of theirs.

Though a minor point in the junta, the participants hoped to preserve another aspect of frontier relations: peaceful trade at forts and frontier towns. Their last request was to protect the dignity and bodies of their own *conchavadores* when they brought their wares to market at frontier forts and Buenos Aires. The image of the indigenous trader bringing essential goods, they seemed to hint at, had been undermined by the upheavals of independence and the frequency of frontier *malones*. Rosas’s backing might restore some respect for frontier trade and bring a level of stability to interethnic relations such that raiding might play less of a role in satisfying the activities of *mocetones*.

The junta with Llanquitrú at the end of 1830 in many ways set the stage for the complicated balancing act played by the Borogano leaders in relation to Rosas, the *indios enemigos*, and the Ranqueles under Llanquetrú with whom they created ties of marriage and co-dependence in Salinas Grandes. That the Borogano confederation found itself in the midst of such complicated political and social calculus further highlighted the limitations of the *amigo/enemigo* dichotomy drawn upon by Rosas and the Spanish before him. These ties would be tested and frayed in the subsequent years leading up to Rosas’ Campaign into the interior of the Pampas and Patagonia.

#### 6.4 Things Fall Apart: Rosas' Campaign to the Desert, 1833-1834

In December 1832, during the final months of Rosas' term as Governor of Buenos Aires Province, he proclaimed his intention to carry out a campaign across the Northern Patagonia and Pampas to exterminate the indigenous enemies of the country. Rosas aimed to free Christian captives taken by the *indios enemigos*, end frontier raids, and punish the Pehuenche under Toriano, and the Ranquel caciques Llanquitrutz and Chocorí.<sup>515</sup> In September 1833, Rosas initiated a three-pronged invasion of the Pampas. One division would depart from Mendoza heading south and east under direction of Juan Facundo Quiroga. A second would head south from Córdoba, and a third, under Rosas, would follow the path up the Colorado River.<sup>516</sup> These divisions were to converge on the eastern slopes of the Andes in the "Pais de las Manzanas" (Country of the Apples Orchards), in the modern province of Neuquén.<sup>517</sup> More than a campaign of conquest—for Rosas had no intention to settle the interior of the country—he intended to exact revenge from the *enemigos*. In this process, Rosas counted on the support of several *indios amigos*. The Ranquel followers Juan Catriel and Cachul joined the military campaign, as did many of the Boroganos.<sup>518</sup>

The level of violence Rosas injected into the centuries-long interethnic relations of the Pampas echoed the dynamics of the Chilean independence wars in the Araucanía, but to a much greater degree and territorial scope. Rosas's campaign created new rifts

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<sup>515</sup> For a wealth of correspondence on the campaign between and about Rosas and his *indios amigos* and *enemigos*, see AGN, Sala X, 27-5-7.

<sup>516</sup> División de la Izquierda to the División del Centro, Regimiento de los Andes, and tropas de San Luís and Córdoba, 26 Feb. 1833, Buenos Aires, AGN, Sala X, 27-5-5.

<sup>517</sup> The Pais de las Manzanas became one of the bloodiest theaters of Julio Roca's Conquest of the Desert in the 1870s and 1880s. The Argentine military turned on the rule of this region, the cacique Valentín Sayhueque, who had been a long-time ally of the central government. Vezub, *Valentín Saygüequé*.

<sup>518</sup> Hux, *Caciques puelches, pampas y serranos*.

between indios amigos and enemigos and dramatically changed the political calculus of indigenous sovereignty east of the Andes. When once parlamentos and alliances preserved boundaries between European descendants and indigenous groups, now they required the subversion of the old Spanish frontiers and signaled the armed entry into their interior. Nevertheless, while Rosas' campaign did advance the frontiers of Argentina toward the interior; it did not result in the enclosure of the Pampas and Patagonia.<sup>519</sup>

On March 25, 1834, Rosas wrote in the Diary of the Expedition that the course of the Colorado River and much of the Pampas was, for the first time, "open for our children."<sup>520</sup> In effect, Rosas effused the new possibilities presented to the Argentine nation as a result of the punishment of the *indios enemigos*. He achieved these aims through practices of alliance making and warfare drawn from his Spanish predecessors in Chile and Argentina, and from negotiations with Coñuepan and the Boroganos in the 1820s. The "success" he had claimed would not have been possible without the active support of those Pampas, Boroganos, and Mapuche that chose to ally with him.

Beyond temporarily expanding and securing the interior frontiers of the nation, Rosas made clear that he had succeeded in the principal goals of the campaign: freeing Christian captives and punishing the Ranqueles. His summary of the final months of the campaign, written to Commander General of Arms, Coronel Major Agustin Pinedo, on the same day of the last entry of the Diary, laid bare the scope of violence and dislocation

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<sup>519</sup> To garrison some of the new points along the frontier, Rosas left behind 200 soldiers in Carmen de Patagones, 300 in Fort Argentino, and a fortin with 50 men and indios amigos in the Rio Colorado to ensure passage between the two. Juan Manuel de Rosas to Agustín Pinedo, 25 Mar. 1834, Arroyo Napenta, AGN, Sala X, 27-5-2.

<sup>520</sup> Juan Manuel de Rosas, *Diario de la expedición al desierto (1833-1834)*, 135.



that ensured his victory.<sup>521</sup> Rosas boldly declared, “The majority of the tribes that remain independent are already subdued,” by which he meant “tamed,” or rendered militarily impotent and scattered. He additionally reported that the many Christian captives had been liberated from their indigenous captors.<sup>522</sup> The Ranqueles who had traveled great distances from the Pampas to raid the frontiers of Córdoba and Santa Fe had been “immediately punished” and pursued mercilessly by Argentine soldiers and Boroganos in extreme summer heat and winter cold. This band killed the Ranquel cacique Mulato and two of their most important leaders. The Ranqueles faced such treatment even though Rosas acknowledged, “it is probable that they continue to rob in order to live,” noting the starvation conditions they had to face.

Rosas’ proclamation of the campaign’s achievements belied the difficulties his troops faced. Perhaps none was greater than the fact that geography of the Pampas—both ethnic and physical—remained a near complete mystery. Spanish cartographic and military expeditions had never successfully catalogued the region. Even the *indios amigos* under Cachul and Catriel did not have complete knowledge of the region either. All belligerents additionally faced the difficult seasonal and physical conditions of a region they had not made war in before. Without acknowledging the impact of these circumstances on the *indios amigos*, Rosas described the “difficulties of all types” faced by his troops in order to make war: long distances, lack of adequate winter attire, and perilous terrain.”<sup>523</sup>

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<sup>521</sup> Juan Manuel de Rosas to Agustín Pinedo, 25 March 1834, Arroyo Napenta, AGN, Sala X, 27-5-2.

<sup>522</sup> For lists of many of the captives freed during the campaign, see AGN, Sala X, 27-5-2, images 21, 22, 74-84.

<sup>523</sup> Rosas, *Diario de la expedición*.

Nonetheless, he proudly stated “all has been overcome and the enemies had been pursued in this manner to their most remote hideout and have been exterminated.” Rosas did not employ the term “exterminated” idly. In fact, the human cost of his campaign presented a picture of the unprecedented carnage foisted onto the transandean Mapuche world.

The many surprises and encounters that have taken place have resulted in 1,415 indios killed, 382 warriors imprisoned, 1,642 rabble (chusma) of both sexes, 409 Christians saved of the most barbarous captivity, 2,200 heads of cattle, 1,600 sheep, 1,800 breeding mares, and 2,455 horses... Among the dead can be counted the Casiques, Payllareú, Pilniloncoy, Millao, Millacal, Treurepan, Chorcoan, Loncon, Meilato, Quarquen, Piñiquanquen, Llancalien, y and among the prisoners, Paynen, Cayuepan, Catriú, Villicalquing, Yanqueman, Tuquiñan, Quiñijual, Calbfuequen, Naquelan, Rinque, Quepayñan.<sup>524</sup>

Beyond the number of those slain and captured, Rosas wholeheartedly admitted that the actual number of casualties was much higher. These statistics did not include “The number of dead caciques and other indigenous of all classes of age and sex, who by our own knowledge, have succumbed to hunger, or to cold while fleeing and crossing the cordillera...”<sup>525</sup>

As was true in Chile and Cuyo, correspondence between Rosas and his Borogano and Pampas allies revealed the continued divisions between indigenous groups that claimed *amigo* status. In the aftermath of the campaign, Catriel wrote to Rosas about the possibility of turning over a Pampa woman held by the military over to Borogano cacique Cañaquil.<sup>526</sup> Catriel reportedly heard word of the Borogano request from his ally Reylef who had witnessed a group of Boroganos requesting a visit with Rosas. The woman in

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<sup>524</sup> José Manuel de Rosas, “Resumen” AGN, División Nacional, in Guerra y Marina, Sección Nacional, Sub Serie: Expedición a la Frontera Sur, Sala X, 27-5-2. 1831-1834

<sup>525</sup> José Manuel de Rosas, “Resumen” AGN, División Nacional, in Guerra y Marina, Sección Nacional, Sub Serie: Expedición a la Frontera Sur, Sala X, 27-5-2. 1831-1834

<sup>526</sup> Casique Catriel to Juan Manuel de Rosas, 13 Jun. 1834, Arollo de Tapalques, AGN, Sala X, 27-5-2.

question, wrote Catriel, was the sister of the Pampa cacique Quiñegual, who had beseeched Catriel to ask that she not be turned over. Catriel faced pressure as well from his subalterns and the cacique Nicasi, whom he reminded Rosas were *his* “amigos and companyeros.” The rationale behind this petition came from the fact that one group of Rosas’ amigos attempted to take control of the kin of another group of amigos. Both groups attempted to take advantage of their *amigo* status with Rosas to strengthen their positions vis-à-vis their rivals. As Catriel stated, “In virtue of the fact that Cañiquil never carried out his end of the bargain with us and is our enemy.”

Furthermore, Rosas’ allies were not immune from the blowback of Rosas’ violence toward his enemies. The bloody aftermath of the campaign did not guarantee immediate prosperity or stability for Rosas’ *amigos*. In the months after the campaign, Catriel wrote to Rosas saying that he was unable to visit him because of the thefts and violence they faced from his own *indios* due to hunger. “There is not a single night,” lamented Catriel, “in when they do not kill at least four to six horses.” Catriel beseeched Rosas to quickly send mares and food because there was nothing to eat and not enough horses for riding.<sup>527</sup>

In response to Catriel’s two requests, Rosas responded with deference and paternalism respectively.<sup>528</sup> To his “Dear brother Catriel[I],” Rosas emphasized that he would take into account Catriel’s plea on behalf of Quiñegual’s sister and “proceed as you request.” Yet, in terms of his worry over starvation, Rosas expressed suspicion that Catriel was deceiving him: “you already know that when I distributed [these supplies] to

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<sup>527</sup> Catriel to Juan Manuel de Rosas, sin fecha, AGN, Sala X, 27-5. This letter is placed in the legajo between a letter from Rosas to Catriel on June 17 and from Catriel to Rosas on June 13, 1834. In Rosas’ letter, he refers to the issue of a lack of mares, which leads me to hypothesize that it was dictated after the end of the campaign, sometime during June 1834.

<sup>528</sup> Juan Manuel de Rosas to Catriel, 17 Jul. 1834, San Martín, AGN, Sala X, 27-5-2.

you it was to satisfy you for two months, and if it was not enough... it would not be my fault, but that of those who have wasted it or who would not have known how to care for their ration, or had decided to sell some of their animals.” His appeal to personal responsibility must have seemed especially callous given the rigorous nature with which Rosas demanded his allies pursue their enemies through the previous spring.

One paragraph later, however, Rosas wished his old ally well and expressed concern over Catriel’s health and the condition of an ocular disease that afflicted him. In fact, he had written to the Minister of War, Tomás Guido, a month earlier asking permission for Catriel and his family to come to Buenos Aires to receive treatment for the grave condition “he contracted as a result of the last campaign against the indios amigos.” Even this gesture, which included a furnished house in the capital for his treatment and convalescence, was not immune to the contradictions of *amigo* status. Apparently, Rosas informed Guido that previously two houses had been available for the recuperation of allied caciques, but now when “indios of diverse tribes” come together in the house, they fight. Their prejudices and animosities against one another “can not always be remedied.”<sup>529</sup>

## 6.5 Conclusion

The decade following the 1825 Tapihue treaty between Francisco Mariluán and the Chilean government witnessed the transposition of Mapuche diplomatic strategies and expectations of the possibility to negotiate recognition for indigenous sovereignty across the Andes. The rivalries and alliances that had infused the patriot-royalist conflict in

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<sup>529</sup> Juan Manuel de Rosas to Tomás Guido, 1 Mes de América (May) 1834, Fuerte Azul, AGN, Sala X, 27-5-2.

Chile moved to the province of Buenos Aires as its leaders began a protracted campaign against the rest of the United Provinces of Río de la Plata. When Mapuche and Pehuenche families settled alongside, fought against, and married into the Ranquel families in the heart of the Pampas, they forced frontier officials like Juan Manuel de Rosas to engage in frontier interethnic diplomacy as witnessed for centuries in Chile and Mendoza. The Buenos Aires frontier transformed into a vital political and epistemological space for the working out of military alliances and rivalries, but also the very shape of Argentina and the transandean Mapuche world. A war between creoles could not take place if the indigenous world continued as a live wire of interethnic conflict now displaced east following the *guerra a muerte*.

This transandean connection revealed that the politics practiced by Mapuche, Huilliche, and Pehuenche groups in the eighteenth century continued to condition indigenous actions—and creole responses—in the decades following the end of Spanish rule. Indigenous leaders asserted diplomatic norms and demanded negotiated recognition of their sovereignty at this formative Latin American moment when former Spanish subjects worked out the meanings and shapes of nations, citizenship, partisan loyalties over federalism and centralism, liberalism and conservatism, and Atlantic and American elites worked to insert the hemisphere into the globalizing capitalist economy.

More than constitutions, representative governments, or universal rights, the *parlamento*, exchange of letters between caciques and non-indigenous allies, and interethnic military alliances determined the fate of the vast interior of the Southern Cone. Like San Martín's meeting with the Pehuenche in 1816 and Bernardo O'Higgins' peace gestures in 1817, Rosas had to choose whether to embrace these politics in his rise

to power or reject them at his peril. The power and influence of the caciques of the Pampas, Cuyo, and Araucanía compelled these luminaries of elite politics to take part in rituals fashioned from well beyond colonial and national administrative and cultural centers.

But, these rituals took place in a changing economic and political context. For the first time, with the brief exception of the Pehuenche-Huilliche wars, interethnic alliances compelled indigenous leaders to carry out extended violent pursuit of their indigenous enemies. To receive the backing of Rosas, which included animals, food, and promises of military protection, these leaders needed to turn on kin and allies. At times these burdens coincided with already existing inter-indigenous rivalries, such as between the Boroganos and the Pehuenche. Other times, such as Rosas' mission to destroy Llanquitrú, it meant fighting friends. As newly independent elites struggled for political power in new countries all the while trying to fashion national economies, insert themselves into the increasingly capitalist Atlantic economy, and realize territorial claims within newly drawn and highly contested borders, this type of military alliance foreshadowed the late-nineteenth century campaigns of extermination in Chile and Argentina. Rosas' military expedition and the denomination of *indio amigo* or *enemigo*, thus had bloody consequences well beyond the immediate aims of the campaign. Violence reaching well past the Spanish-indigenous frontiers into the heart of sovereign indigenous territories was a new tool to work through these local, national, and transnational forces. The Bourbon dreams of stability along frontiers and peace with unconquered indigenous groups meant that general peace treaties signed by the four butalmapus throughout the colonial period might never be possible again.

## Conclusion

Despite the violence of the guerra a muerte and the Rosas campaign, neither Chile nor the United Provinces could claim control over the Pampas or the Araucanía. The old barriers to the Inka and Spanish continued to prevent mapping and scientific explorations, national and foreign colonization, internal or export-oriented economic development, and the implantation of the juridical and political institutions of citizenship and taxation. More than simply making the implantation of these common state formation strategies difficult, Mapuche and other indigenous groups' continued sovereignty posed a threat. However, the Bío-Bío, the Río Salado, and the Andes were not impermeable barriers. In the decades following the guerra a muerte, Chilean landed elites, squatters, and landless laborers flooded across the Bío-Bío River. Fraudulent sales and outright theft of lands frequently took place. But, as one Chilean historian noted, "purchasing property [in the Araucanía] and receiving correct paperwork was one thing, but actually asserting ownership of the land was quite another."<sup>530</sup> To challenge this, Mapuche leaders invoked parlamento agreements from the 1790s, which declared the Bío-Bío as the dividing line with Chile to and carried out raids and attacks against the settlers. More alarmingly to Chilean leaders, Mapuche leaders once again sharply divided themselves by supporting both sides in federalist uprisings against the conservative Santiago government of Manuel Montt in Concepción and Talca in 1851 and 1859. They provided refuge for a French immigrant who claimed to be the King of the Araucanía in the 1860s; and many refused to accept colonization and military occupation until 1883.

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<sup>530</sup> Arturo Leiva, *El primer avance a la Araucanía: Angol 1862*, 50.

As in the colonial and independence periods, Chile and Argentina worked with Mapuche allies during the Occupation of the Araucanía (1862-1883) and the Conquest of the Desert (1870s-1880s) to defeat their indigenous enemies. However, in the final stages of the conflict, the national armies turned on their former allies. Spanish American independence did not foretell the military defeat of indigenous sovereignty. Pressures generated by the increasing insertion of Chile and Argentina into transoceanic capitalism during the second half of the centuries meant that the stakes of interethnic alliances had changed. To understand this point, we must decouple the end of colonialism and native sovereignty. This story, then, was not a chronicle of a conquest foretold.

From 1792 until 1834, the still intact transandean Mapuche world looked decidedly unlike an empire or nation. When the former captive turned military officer Santiago Avendaño tried to make indigenous political rivalries legible to the Argentine government by comparing them to neighboring nations in the 1860s, he belied the fact that the politics of indigenous groups in the interior of the Southern Cone could never fit into the political or spatial framework of the nation state. Nor had they conformed to or acted like the projections of the Spanish or Inka empires. The diplomatic strategies and articulations of sovereignty developed, refined, and imposed by Mapuche, Huilliche, and Pehuenche leaders maintained the boundaries of the transandean Mapuche world in reaction to centuries of attempted conquest. Their military and diplomatic responses were themselves refracted through the inner workings of internal indigenous rivalries and alliances well beyond the failed reach of foreign conquerors.

Such a history can only be understood transnationally. The arbitrary imposition of Spanish, Chilean, or Argentine geographic, political, or historiographic frameworks onto



Mapuche histories distorts the actions and beliefs of Mapuche leaders and their followers by severing vital transandean connections and processes. More concretely, Mapuche, Huilliche, and Pehuenche leaders refused to limit their movement, negotiation, and settlement to boundaries and jurisdictions imposed (or imagined) by European and creoles leaders. The Andes never represented an impenetrable barrier. Groups negotiated, raided, traded, communicated, and took captives in multiple frontier locales. They engaged with Spanish, Argentine, and Chilean officials and settlers at many places, often simultaneously. Parlamento agreements, while seemingly binding toward the indigenous participants, did not prevent leaders from testing the bounds of the terms or attempting to impose them on indigenous and non-indigenous officials in different parts of Cuyo, the Pampas, or the Araucanía. A transnational approach to Mapuche history therefore represents a corrective to the projection backwards of national and regional models that assume the inevitability and stability of the nation state for the study of unconquered indigenous groups in the Americas, North and South.

From a methodological standpoint, because indigenous actions have been fragmented and dismembered by colonial and national archives, the documentation of a single nation or empire cannot hope to construct the experiences of unconquered indigenous groups. For example, the experiences of Venancio Coñuepan, Chile's most fervent Mapuche ally in the *guerra a muerte* becomes abruptly truncated if we rely on Chilean archives alone. Mentions of his actions during the Spanish Reconquista and his engagement with Juan Manuel de Rosas were only made by observers east of the Andes and thus found their way into the archives of Mendoza and Buenos Aires. What is more, a transnational research agenda makes possible a more capacious fleshing out of the

indigenous archive of letters, utterances, and allusions to alternative indigenous political agendas and epistemological processes and intentions.

While indigenous leaders did not see their worlds as nations or empires, their diplomatic strategies for defending their sovereignty converted the transandean frontiers into a vibrant political *and* epistemological space that differed greatly from other densely populated indigenous regions under Spanish rule. Historians of colonial and postcolonial indigenous politics in Latin America have aptly demonstrated how indigenous peoples creatively adapted to institutions of colonial or national rule even if such strategies ultimately secured their subordination. For instance, during and after independence, indigenous communities in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru gave their own radical interpretations of subjecthood, citizenship, loyalty, and equality that pushed their meanings beyond those limited definitions desired by colonial and national elites. They used their communal status and rights inherited from the colonial period to produce radical and unanticipated interpretations of liberalism and federalism in the nineteenth century. The Mapuche, however, acted upon and shaped elite categories and identities from a markedly distinct cultural and political genealogy. They never faced incorporation into and subordination by Spanish colonial institutions like *pueblos de indios* or the *república de indios*. In fact, they maintained and created their own hierarchies, practices of negotiation, and expressions of authority beyond the reach of, but in intimate contact with, the Spanish. This indigenous sovereignty, and the diplomatic practices that undergirded it create the possibility for reimagining indigenous politics, sovereignty, and colonialism in Latin America.

Treating indigenous, imperial, and national frontiers as epistemological spaces allows us to detect some of the subtle differences between empires and nations. The shift from the Spanish empire to the nations of Chile and Argentina becomes clearer when viewed from the parlamento ritual. From 1790 to 1825, the geographically loosely defined Spanish viceroalties and Spanish willingness to participate in regular general parlamentos shifted to more rigidly bordered nations and singular agreements, like the treaty signed with Mariluán. Though the Spanish generally used the term “bárbaro” to characterize all unconquered indigenous peoples bordering their empire, they had a flexible approach to their indigenous subjects, allied and enemy, on both sides of the Andes. They accepted treaties while recognizing sovereignty and accepted friendly Mapuche as subjects without subordinating them to the colonial regime. This allowed local officials to work out agreements on the capillary level. Following independence, Chileans and Argentines demanded more of their allies and evinced a more coercive approach to their enemies even while continuing to participate in Mapuche diplomatic rituals. This can be seen most clearly in Rosas’ frontier politics. On the one hand, this engagement represented a begrudging acceptance of indigenous ritual diplomacy and a testament to the power of indigenous leaders. It was a return to the common Spanish practice of accepting interethnic diplomacy into their imperial administration. On the other, it suggested that in exchange for state recognition and material support, indigenous allies on both sides of the Andes would be forced to allow state entrance into their lands and be expected to engage militarily the government’s enemies.

Although the transandean Mapuche frontier continued as a barrier between indigenous and non-indigenous sovereignties well past the 1820s, the crucible of the

independence wars changed this world. For the first time, interethnic military alliances meant joint military incursions into the heart of the Araucanía and the Pampas from the onset of the guerra a muerte in 1819 until the end of Juan Manuel de Rosas' campaign against the Ranquel and Pehuenche in 1834. Patriot and then Chilean soldiers joined Coñuepan in his excursions against pro-Spanish Mapuche in Chile. Mariluán spent a year negotiating peace with the Chilean army while also receiving delegations from Chile's Pehuenche enemies. Carrying out agreed upon military actions against enemies was bloody and drawn out, but not exterminationist. Chile never chose to consecrate a blanket peace with either leader or their followers and instead opted to recognize Mariluán's sovereignty over his part of the llanos butalmapu. This agreement involved his permission for Chile to cross his lands to pursue their enemies. Across the Andes on the Buenos Aires frontier, Rosas handcrafted agreements with indios amigos like Coñuepan and the Boroganos that avoided clearly defining indigenous and Porteño sovereignties. Instead, agreements involved exchanging resources and military support to punish enemy indios. Territorial boundaries could be sundered to chase after enemies instead of leaving that up to the Mapuche aliados. Unlike in the previous centuries, these agreements revealed that the interior was at play, not necessarily for settlement and colonization, but for "security."

These assertions lead me to conclude that we must decouple, or put another way, disentangle, the end of Mapuche sovereignty from the end of empire. In Chile and western Argentina, the end of Spanish rule did not extinguish Mapuche sovereignty or diplomatic strategies for its preservation. In fact Chile and the United Provinces of Río de la Plata's interethnic relations along the frontiers of Concepción, Buenos Aires, Mendoza,

and Valdivia looked surprisingly similar to those engaged in by the Spanish. The geography was similar too: the new national borders conformed to the viceregal boundaries, which were originally determined by Mapuche resistance to the Inka and Spanish. The undoing of Mapuche sovereignty came more than a half-century after the end of Spanish rule showing that alliances with the Spanish were not the only reason for Mapuche strength.

Nevertheless, Mapuche many leaders' diplomatic willingness to align with outsiders against their indigenous rivals offers some clues for understanding the defeat of indigenous sovereignty. Indigenous leaders' continued use of ritual diplomacy to make alliances with Rosas in his campaign against the Ranqueles or with Chilean federalists against the central government in 1851 and 1859 meant that the stakes for preserving a particular leader's sovereignty would be much steeper. These pacts invited foreign military incursions into their lands. In 1825 *only* Mariluán received special permissions and protections in exchange for carrying out the demands of the Chilean military. Rather than recognizing continuous loyalty to an overseas monarch, even with perturbations caused by imperial reforms and rotating officials, engagement with nations meant indigenous leaders' support was subject to the erratic changes in partisan administration within postcolonial Latin American nations.

Alongside the hallmark long nineteenth century struggles over slavery and abolition and the contentious undoing of colonial corporate racial identities and legal structures, we must include the persistence of the domains and strategies of border-inhabiting indigenous peoples like the Mapuche, Pehuenche, and Huilliche. While Chilean historians and politicians have woven a narrative of Chile's exceptionally early

achievement of constitutional republican rule and stable, democratic governance, perhaps what made Chile, and by extension Argentina, so exceptional, was the tenacity of indigenous groups to draw on colonial-era interethnic diplomacy to hem in the national economies and jurisdictions of these nations into the 1870s and 1880s.

These are questions of contemporary relevance to Mapuche groups on both sides of the Andes today. As Chilean and Argentine elites, politicians, and transnational corporations try to divide Mapuche political rights into national or regional questions facing one nation or the other, Mapuche activists fighting to frame and defend their own meanings of sovereignty. What kinds of politics Mapuche peoples are going to articulate and occupy, and what places they claim as ancestral and sovereign are part of twenty-first century political discourse. Efforts to defend, or disempower and delegitimize these claims, however, are not new. Looking back at the transandean Mapuche world, and the strategies utilized by Mapuche leaders to maintain it in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, can provide inspiration and historical precedents for the claims and political projects for liberation and autonomy today.

## APPENDIX


### Chapter 1:

**Figure 1.1: The Inca Empire**<sup>531</sup>



<sup>531</sup> Brian S. Bauer, R. Alan Covey, Terence N. D'Altroy, "The Inca Empire," *National Geographic.com*, <http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/04/inca-empire/interactive-map>, accessed 3/5/17.


Figure 1.2: Pedro de Valdivia and the Conquest of Chile<sup>532</sup>



<sup>532</sup> Instituto Geográfico Militar, “Ruta de conquistadores. Pedro de Valdivia,” Ministerio de Educación, Gobierno de Chile, <http://www.curriculumenlineamineduc.cl/605/w3-article-23182.html>, accessed 3/7/17




Figure 1.3: The Estado Indómito<sup>533</sup>



<sup>533</sup> José Manuel Zavala Cepeda and Tom D. Dillehay, "El "estado de arauco" frente a la conquista española: estructuración sociopolítica y ritual de los araucano-mapuches en los valles nahuelbutanos durante los siglos xvi y xvii," *Chungara: Revista de Antropología Chilena* 42, no. 2 (2010): 433-450.


Figure 1.5: “Map of the lands inhabited by the Araucanos in Chile,” 1795<sup>534</sup>




<sup>534</sup> Juan Ignacio Molina, *Compendio de la historia geografica natural y civil del Reyno de Chile*. Volume 2, Madrid: Antonio de Sancha, 1788-95. Accessed via *Darwin Online*, <http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?pageseq=1&itemID=A811.02&viewtype=text>



**Figure 1.6: “General Map of the Frontier of Arauco in the Kingdom of Chile,”  
1795<sup>535</sup>**




**Figure 1.7: Layout of the Frontier Forts of Arauco, 1795<sup>536</sup>**



<sup>535</sup> Molina, *Compendio de la historia geográfica*

<sup>536</sup> Molina, *Compendio de la historia geográfica*

Figure 2.1: City of Valdivia, 1776 (Pacific Ocean at bottom)<sup>537</sup>



<sup>537</sup> Relación del gov[ierno] del Exmo. Virrey d. Juan de Amat hecha a su sucesor el exmo. S.D. Juan de Guirior: comprehensiva desde 12 de oct[ub]re de 1761 hasta 17 de julio de 1776, "Plano del puerto de Valdivia, elevado geométricamente en la América Meridional..." España, 1776, 2 v., [9] h. de láms. Pleg. Found at <http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-70415.html>, accessed 3/6/17.



**Figure 4.3: Sketch of the locations of Mapuche groups in 19<sup>th</sup> Century Chile<sup>538</sup>**



<sup>538</sup> José Bengoa, *La historia*, pp. 68-69

Figure 4.4: The Southern Campaign<sup>539</sup>



<sup>539</sup> Google Earth. Imagery Date: 12/13/2015. 37°20'25.74" S; 72°10'19.32" W; 742ft elev, eye alt, 152.44 mi.

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AF	Archivo del Orden Francisco de Chile, Santiago
AGI	Archivo General de Indias, Seville
AGN	Archivo General de la Nación, Buenos Aires
AHPM	Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Mendoza, Mendoza
ANHCh	Archivo Nacional Histórico de Chile, Santiago
BN	Biblioteca Nacional de Chile, Santiago
MBM	Archivo del Museo Bartolomé Mitre, Buenos Aires

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