

ABSTRACT

Title of Document: THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL PROTESTS:
A CASE STUDY OF THE KYRGYZ
REPUBLIC

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On March 24th, 2005, after ten weeks of non-violent protests across the country, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Askar Akayev, fled the country. The protests in the Kyrgyz Republic followed closely after the events in Georgia and Ukraine and policy analysts and the international media initially saw it as another example of the new wave of democracy in the post-Soviet states. This dissertation explores the reasons for the non-violent protests from January to March 2005 and how they led to the government's collapse. I use a combination of macro-level data, household opinion surveys, and field interviews to show that common causal explanations of protest behavior are poor predictors in the case of the Kyrgyz Republic. Individual levels of well-being, dissatisfaction with the government, and perception of conflict had little influence on where or when protests occurred. The role of international funding, western government influence, and local civil society were minor and relatively unimportant in determining the final outcome. The thesis

of this dissertation is that the protests started for local causes, were sustained by local political entrepreneurs, increased because of political repression and succeeded because of the failures of the government. I argue that the decisive factor that determined the final outcome of the protests was the government's repressive action against the protesters. Understanding the causes, conditions, and process of the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic is important for current U.S. policy towards other post-Soviet countries and for these countries own internal political succession dynamics. The methodology is a within case study process tracing using survey data taken immediately before the protests and event analysis based on in-depth field interviews and media reports.

THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL PROTESTS: A CASE STUDY OF THE
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC

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Dedication

To my parents.

Acknowledgements

I owe a great debt of gratitude to many people for their support, guidance and constant encouragement over the past five years. Thank you to John Steinbruner, my advisor and chair for your many hours of conversations, suggestions, and refinements. I appreciate your unfailing support through all the intellectual detours and wandering paths. To Mac Destler, thank you for being the first to encourage me to come to UMD, I've never regretted the decision. I've learned a great deal from your insights and comments on my work. To Carol Graham, thank you for your assistance and patience on the survey analysis and your support and encouragement. To Fiona Hill, thank you for opening the door to so many professional opportunities, I have learned a great deal working with you and look forward to many more future collaborations. To Mark Lichbach, thank you for agreeing to sit on a committee outside your department, I appreciate your time.

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Note on Sources and References

A large amount of this dissertation relies on interviews with primary witnesses. Many of the interviewees for personal and professional reasons requested anonymity as a condition to be interviewed. To protect all sources, I have referenced all interviews that I conducted and direct personal correspondence as “author interview” followed by a number for that reference. For those that agreed to be quoted on the record, I include the name and date of the interview. I have maintained a master copy of all interview notes and any future researcher may contact me directly for additional verification of any source.

As discussed in detail in the methodology section, I used hundreds of news sources to verify first-hand interviews. The majority of these were from wire services. I have provided the wire service and the date and the time as listed in the release. I have chosen not to list the title of the articles because often the news service would release anywhere from 5 to 15 updates a day with the same headline and no byline as they added more information as it became available; therefore, the date and the time are the important distinguishing factors.

Chapter 1: Introduction

In January 2005 protests started in isolated communities throughout the Kyrgyz Republic and gained momentum in both intensity and duration over the following six weeks. These protests expanded after the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) criticized the first and second round of parliamentary elections and local citizens viewed the results as fraudulent. The protests included some physical destruction such as the storming of government buildings and burning of security services offices. However, the protests remained remarkably non-violent. After less than two months of sustained protests across the country, President Askar Akayev's abrupt abdication of his position was sudden and unexpected for protest leaders, the general populace and international monitors.

From the 17th century peasant revolts through modern government overthrows, scholars and political leaders have asked "when will ordinary people pour into the streets, risking life and limb to lay claim to their rights?"¹ There is a vast field of research on understanding the motivations for political protests, civil conflict, and insurrection. The events in the Kyrgyz Republic appear to be another case in a long line of popular protests overthrowing a despised regime. The protests in the Kyrgyz Republic occurred shortly after the events in Georgia and Ukraine and political analysts and international civil society leaders initially saw them as another example of the new wave of democracy in the post-Soviet states. Yet, scholars soon began to question this assumption and it is noticeable by its absence in McFaul's July

¹ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2nd ed., Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 71.

2005 article on the characteristics of democratic change in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine.² The Kyrgyz Republic is an important case study both for understanding the dynamics of protest and its contribution to the theoretical literature. It is also an example of a potentially new unstable type of political protest process in the post-Soviet space.

The Kyrgyz Republic Case

There are four important anomalies that distinguish the events in the Kyrgyz Republic from other recent protest events and suggest the need for further scholarly research and policy analysis. First, there was a lack of central leadership. There was no clearly identifiable leader at any stage of the protests. The protests were local events for primarily local reasons that increased because of the repressive response of the regime. These were local protest events that only joined together on the last day for the brief protest that ousted the government.

Second, the event did not occur for predicted macro causes. The literature on conflict has identified a collection of variables that are generally agreed to be instrumental in the existence of conflict or violence. For the past fifteen years, regional specialists, civil violence experts and macro models have all predicted violent civil conflict in the Kyrgyz Republic. With a history of civil violence and low social and economic conditions, the Kyrgyz Republic met the initial conditions for violent civil conflict according to several current macro economic models.³ When the protests occurred, they were initially seen as validation of such expert's predictions. Yet, those predictive models anticipated ethnic strife and violence between citizens of

² Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005).

³ Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy*, A World Bank Policy Research Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2003), 4.

different communities and regions, none of which occurred.⁴ The initial protests do not appear to have been initiated in response to the model's key variables.

Third, the original goal of the protests remained unfulfilled. The first goal of the protesters was to reinstate their local parliamentarians, not to overthrow the government. The protests started in response to perceived illegitimate parliamentary elections. The original statements of leaders focused on the abuses of the election process. When the protesters arrived in the capital, few knew why they had come and almost no one had anticipated the final outcome of the president leaving.⁵ The result was a president forced from power, but the local parliamentarians were not reinstated—the original intent of the protests.

Fourth, research indicates that the most aggrieved individuals did not protest. It appears that those that protested were not systematically different from the general population in terms of happiness and satisfaction with government. Extensive field surveys of perceptions of conflict, happiness and satisfaction with government found no systematic differences among regions and localities that had protests and those that did not.

There may be clear explanations for each of the anomalies; however, it appears that there is a tenuous link between the initial conditions, the cause of the protests, and the final outcome.

⁴ Nancy Lubin et al., *Calming the Ferghana Valley : Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia : Report of the Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action*, Preventive Action Reports ; V. 4 (New York: Century Foundation Press, 1999).

⁵ Interviewee #51 & #47 . Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.


Thesis

This dissertation explores the reasons why non-violent protests occurred in January 2005 and led to the government's collapse. It uses a combination of macro-level data, household opinion surveys, and field interviews to show that common causal explanations of protest behavior are poor predictors in the case of the Kyrgyz Republic. Individual levels of well-being, dissatisfaction with the government, and perception of conflict had little influence on where or when protests occurred. The role of international funding, western governments, and local civil society were minor and unimportant in determining the final outcome. The thesis of this dissertation is that the protests started for local causes, were sustained by local political entrepreneurs, increased because of political repression and succeeded because of the failures of the government. I argue that it is the repressive action of the government toward the protesters—reactive dynamics—that was the most important component in determining the final outcome of the political protests.

The dissertation presents three dependent variables or causal outcomes that are examined in succession: 1) formation of protests, 2) increase of protests, and 3) collapse of government. The independent variables are in categories, first the initial conditions, second the government's repressive actions, and third, the political entrepreneur's activities (see Figure 1). The initial conditions are comprised of both the initial state of society—socio-economic conditions, history of conflict, ethnic splits—and individual perceptions—personal happiness, government satisfaction, and perception of conflict. The repressive government actions are the alienation of opposition, the failure to communicate and direct physical pressure. The political

entrepreneurs both motivated their followers and provided resources to the protesters. The first outcome state is the formation of the protests, the government repression leads to the next state of an increase in the intensity of the protests and the final outcome is the temporary unification of the opposition leading to the collapse of the government.

Figure 1: Variables and Outcomes



The political protest and civil violence literature suggest two types of motivations often apparent from initial conditions. Explanations based on individual indicators include individual perceptions and grievances, inequality, ethnicity, and identity issues. A second type of motivation involves societal or collective factors and includes macro socio-economic indicators, institutions, civil organizations, political leaders, and collective action. This dissertation argues that complete explanations should include a third component of process which is the dynamic interaction whereby individuals, groups, and institutions interact in ways that dampen, stimulate or spread protest behavior.

The research is presented in two steps, 1) initial conditions and 2) dynamic relationships. The initial conditions section argues that the neither the macro nor

micro initial conditions were motivators for the protests. The dynamic relationships section argues that it is the reactive dynamics to the government repression that determined the outcome of the protests.

Initial conditions

Why had the Kyrgyz Republic remained calm for so long in spite of a history of local violence and high macro indicators for conflict? Why did protests start in some cities and not others? I argue that initial conditions among regions did not impact where protests occurred or whether they were destructive. I examine two expected causes, the deterioration of macro-economic indicators and negative individual perceptions of well-being and satisfaction with government and find no difference in absolute indicators or in relative indicators among regions with protests versus regions without. Contrary to traditional arguments, deteriorating macro economic conditions were not a primary motivator of the protesters. In addition, my research demonstrates that these were not local protests growing from citizens' discontent with economic and social well being, the government's legitimacy or lack of democracy.

Dynamic

Why did the local protests increase in intensity? I argue that the protests were about the ability of local leaders to motivate broad popular dissatisfaction with President Askar Akayev and the ruling elite for their own purposes through local networks and connections. Supporters were encouraged through payment, food, family connections, or other means. There were only a few, very small popular uprisings without some local leader. This does not imply that there were not real

grievances by the local population, but they were motivated and encouraged by the local parliamentarians.

Why was there a sudden non-violent sudden overthrow of the government? I argue that the central government's repressive actions led to their overthrow. The government miscalculated the relative strength of the protests and their ability to respond to repression. Initial conditions of the quality of the central government were not the factors in determining the collapse; rather it was the manner and process of the protests. The repressive dynamic from the government determined the outcome. While the central government was weak and prone to collapse, if the government had not responded aggressively to the protests, the president would not have left.

Approach to the problem

The approach of this paper is to provide a detailed, comprehensive analysis of a single case study. Chapter 3 presents a detailed methodological review. The case study approach provides the opportunity to examine the details and understand micro-level motivations and interactions. A discrete case study approach can provide new insights that a macro level cross-country statistical comparison often overlooks. For example, Sambanis uses a case study approach to analyze the results of two popular statistical models used to predict civil conflict.⁶ He goes through the data sets and shows where the conclusions of the model significantly fail to match with the reality in the countries. He demonstrates that understanding the real causes of civil war demands combining macro quantitative models with an understanding of micromotives which can only be discovered through a case study process.

⁶ Nicholas Sambanis, "Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies," (Yale University, unpublished paper, 2003).

The advantage of a single, in-depth case study is that it allows the research to examine the causal linkages among initial indicators, process states and final outcomes. A microscopic approach provides the ability to see relationships that may be obscured by a lower level of magnification. The constraint on the research is in generalizing from too specific of a case. This paper will demonstrate that the events in the Kyrgyz Republic have many signatures of traditional protests and conflict and the results of the research can provide useful policy contributions and recommendations. Future research by this author and others will hopefully build on the data and analysis in this paper to conduct cross-country comparisons. This paper argues that while there are anomalies about the Kyrgyz case, the anomalies do not prevent the generalization of an argument about the relationship of process to outcome.

Both quantitative and qualitative methods are used in this case study. The quantitative methods applied are survey data analysis and event analysis based on field interviews and media reports. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, this is the first and perhaps only existing database that has responses from a cross-country randomized sampling of individual perceptions of well-being, propensity for conflict, and other key issues taken five months prior to widespread protests across the country. This is a unique opportunity to examine individual preferences for economic and social well-being, satisfaction with government, perception of corruption, and probability of conflict in the region and country. This is the first known instance of applying data taken at this level immediately prior to a series of protests and conflicts.

Event analysis provides a systematic, quantifiable process for interpreting and comparing the protests based on local data. The data is based on field research from a total of three field research trips to the Kyrgyz Republic and the collection of information from hundreds of news articles from international and local press.

The qualitative method is process tracing also based on field interviews and media reports. The process tracing approach uses micro level data to examine the casual mechanisms that link suspected causes to measurable effects. This moves beyond the direct quantifiable linkages towards understanding motivations for response and engagement.

Significance and Contribution

After the 1991 social movements in Eastern Europe, Sidney Tarrow, a major figure in the field of political protests and social movements, questioned why western scholars had failed to predict the social movements that swept through Eastern Europe.⁷ This same challenge applies to understanding the wave of movements that spread through the former Soviet Union states from 2003 to 2005, starting with Georgia in November 2003, Ukraine in December 2004 and the Kyrgyz Republic in March 2005. Initially these were seen as representative of a wave of democracy sweeping through the region motivated by external funds, yet this research questions this theory.

There are three objectives of this research: first, to provide the first systematic, detailed presentation of the timing and history of the protest events in the Kyrgyz

⁷ Sidney Tarrow, "'Aiming at a Moving Target': Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24, no. 1 (1991): 12.

Republic based on media reports and personal interviews; second, to provide insight into the field of happiness research and political protests by examining the relationship between individual surveys and protest actions; and third, to analyze the impact of repressive dynamics (government to protesters) on the process of political protests.

The events in the Kyrgyz Republic are too recent to have been extensively analyzed by academics. Understanding the causes, conditions, and process of the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic is important for current U.S. policy towards the post-Soviet countries and for these countries own internal political succession dynamic. The Kyrgyz Republic case is an important puzzle for both academics and policy makers. Is it similar to other post-Soviet protests and government overthrows, or is it fundamentally different? Is it an example of a new type of political protests that is emerging in these countries? It is possible that the Kyrgyz Republic is an outlier and was a unique event. If it is an outlier, it is important to understand why and how. If it is a symbol of a new and emerging pattern in the moderately authoritarian regimes, it is vital for the policy maker to understand the process and the implications of these protests. If we understand the reasons for the anomalous formation of protests in these communities, it might point us towards a model for understanding the broader questions of emerging conflicts in other countries.

Outline of dissertation

Chapter 2 provides a framework of the problem through a brief review of the relevant literature from the civil conflict, political protest and happiness fields.

Chapter 3 presents the methods used in the research—case study, survey analysis, and

process tracing. Chapter 4 examines the initial conditions of the individual indicators. Chapter 5 examines the initial conditions of the societal indicators and presents the timeline of events. Chapter 6 presents analysis of the dynamic relationships that influenced the protests, and finally Chapter 7 presents the key findings, contribution and policy implications.

Chapter 2: Framework of the problem—Literature Review

Overview of the literature

This research starts with a singular event and attempts to explain the processes that led to the outcome to develop a useful policy response and prediction of similar events. This requires a broad approach to the literature. There is unfortunately not a single literature that addresses the details of this case study. The literature review will by design be broad rather than deep. It seeks to raise the key questions and unresolved issues in the overlapping literatures that are applicable to this case. As the contribution of this research will be cross-cutting across several disciplines, so the literature will engage a broad selection of fields.

For purposes of this dissertation I divide the field of political protests into two major camps of analysis, predictors based on individual perceptions and on social or collective actions. This research seeks to place itself in the intersection of individual and collective theories of protests and incorporate insights from both fields. This chapter will provide a brief overview of the literature related to the theme of political protests and civil conflict, with specific attention on these two aspects of protests: individual perceptions and collective indicators. The individual perceptions section examines the literature related to relative deprivation, well-being indicators, identity, and ethnicity as predictors of protests. The collective indicators section examines general macro socio-economic, institutional, collective action and resource mobilization models as predictors of conflict.

Tarrow's book, *Contentious Politics and Social Movements*, was a major step forward in synthesizing a wide range of theories and presenting a coherent historical account of political protests from contentious politics to social movement. I will use Tarrow's definition that "contentious politics occurs when ordinary people, often in league with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents."⁸ In his topology when these forces are sustained and are "backed by dense social networks and galvanized by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with opponents. The result is the social movement."⁹

For purposes of this review, the events in the Kyrgyz Republic are defined as contentious politics. I would argue that they were not unified or sustained long enough to fit in the category of a social movement. I will use the term protests and political protests interchangeably throughout the paper to refer to this initial stage of political organization or what Tarrow calls the "political opportunity structure."¹⁰

Individual perceptions

Relative deprivation

In *Why Men Rebel*, Gurr explores the reasons why an individual rebels or commits acts of violence within the framework of society.¹¹ Gurr and his colleagues constructed various databases of revolutions, protests and wars concurrent with economic and social data about the countries. Gurr is examining not only what motivates the individual, but is beginning to look at if this same motivation is what

⁸ Tarrow, *Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 2.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 20.

¹¹ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.,: Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University [by] Princeton University Press, 1970), 532.

causes a society to act in a violent manner. Gurr concluded that the issue was relative deprivation and its relationship to expectations. Relative deprivation is defined as "actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capacities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping."¹²

Eisinger in his study of protests in inner city America notes that the urban minorities are just as likely as the middle class to protest if their level of relative deprivation is similar. It is not the class of people, but the relations within a group that provide the opportunities for protest or conflict. It is "the perception of deprivation, whether objective or subjective in relation to others in society [that] is likely to result in aggressive political behavior."¹³

A problem with the relative deprivation theories is that "outbreaks of contention cannot be derived from the deprivation people suffer or the disorganization of their societies, for these preconditions are far more enduring than the movements they support."¹⁴ Relative levels of inequality are seen by some as a given and therefore have little impact on the potential for protests.

Happiness

Individual well-being and happiness indicators provide the measurement tools necessary to interpret and predict the relative deprivation theories presented above. There are several excellent reviews of the happiness literature in existence and this

¹² Ibid., 17.

¹³ Peter K. Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," *The American Political Science Review* 67, no. 1 (1973): 25.

¹⁴ Tarrow, *Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 71.

paper makes no claim to improve on their work.¹⁵ For a working definition of happiness, this paper uses Veenhoven's definition: "the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of his life-as-a-whole favorably. In other words: how well he likes the life he leads."¹⁶ This definition allows for the broader concept of well-being and measures more than just the single answer response, "how happy are you with your life?"

Easterlin, one of the fathers of the happiness research, argues that both the classical economist's theory of increasing utility and psychologists' setpoint theory are wrong.¹⁷ The idea of setpoint theory is that everyone has a happiness position that is generally unchanged by life's circumstances. Therefore, if you are a generally happy person before winning the lottery, you will be a happy person afterwards. If you are an unhappy person before, winning the lottery will not make you happy. The same applies to health, marriage, social status, etc.

Economists would argue that increasing one's income should increase one's measure of happiness. To paraphrase the famous economist Pigou, if one's economic welfare increases, one's social welfare should also increase.¹⁸ Easterlin uses life cycle data to show that circumstances such as health and marriage also have significant long-term impacts on perceptions of happiness in addition to just income. Healthy, married people are generally happier than the converse. In reference to the influence of economic status, the issue is a bit muddier. Numerous studies have found "a

¹⁵ See Ruut Veenhoven, "Developments in Satisfaction-Research," *Social Indicators Research* 37, no. 1 (1996), Richard A. Easterlin, "Building a Better Theory of Well-Being," (University of Southern California and IZA Bonn, 2003).

¹⁶ Ruut Veenhoven, "National Wealth and Individual Happiness" in *Understanding Economic Behaviour* ed. Klaus G. Grunert and Folke Ölander (Dordrecht ; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 1.

¹⁷ Easterlin, "Building a Better Theory of Well-Being."

¹⁸ A. C. Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare*, 4th ed. (London,: Macmillan and co., limited, 1932), 3.

significant positive association between income and happiness” when using point-of-time regressions.¹⁹ However, over a lifecycle, even as income increases, happiness remains unchanged. Easterlin argues that the difference is material aspirations, every time we get something new; we then want something bigger and better. Our attainment and our aspirations are always competing. Above a minimum threshold, more money doesn’t make us happier, but health, education, and social unions might.

In general, an individual’s perceived level of happiness is based first on monetary well-being, followed by family and health. How someone perceives any circumstances “depend partly on one’s history and partly on comparison with the situation of others.”²⁰ However, material improvements over a lifetime appear to have little impact on overall satisfaction. This theory of relative improvements in happiness is challenged by Veenhoven who argues that standards of happiness are much more than simply comparisons to those around you. Rather there is a desire for attaining more and increasing one’s material well-being, regardless of those around you.²¹

Happiness and Income

A key economic variable that has a significant impact on happiness is level of income, compared at both a country and an individual level. Do people in richer countries report higher levels of happiness than those in poorer countries? As one’s income increases over time, is there a corresponding increase in happiness? Do richer individuals report higher levels of happiness than poorer individuals?

¹⁹ Easterlin, "Building a Better Theory of Well-Being."

²⁰ Ibid., 26.

²¹ Veenhoven, "National Wealth and Individual Happiness ".

There is clear evidence from numerous cross-country surveys that those living in more developed countries consistently report higher levels of happiness than those in poorer countries.²² However, these correlations between higher income countries and happiness may be driven by other factors such as human rights, democracy, distribution of income, stability, etc.²³ From numerous studies it does appear that there is a minimum threshold of income necessary to reach higher levels of well-being. Once above this minimum income threshold, there is no significant difference among countries reported levels of happiness.

A curious phenomenon noted by many authors is that while there is a positive correlation between levels of income and happiness between countries, within a country over time there is no such correlation. For example, in the U.S., income per capita grew by more than 150% from 1946-1991, yet there was a slight decrease in the level of reported well-being from 2.4 in 1946 to 2.2 in 1991.²⁴ There are many different interpretations of this finding; for our purposes, it is enough to present the finding and highlight the point that in developed countries there is much more to “subjective well-being than just income.”²⁵

A third issue is do richer individuals report higher levels of happiness than poorer individuals in the same country at the same time? Again numerous studies indicate that there is a positive correlation between income and happiness, yet the correlation is often quite low and points towards other factors as explaining the differences. Many studies find a similarity to the country comparisons, below a

²² Bruno S. Frey and Alois Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics : How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 74.

²³ Ibid., 75.

²⁴ Ibid., 77.

²⁵ Ibid.

minimum threshold (e.g. \$15,000 in a 1981-1984 U.S. study) a rise in income has a strong effect on happiness levels, however above the minimum standard there is a much weaker effect on happiness.

An important outcome from these studies is to highlight the subjective nature of perceived well-being. Individuals compare themselves within their cohort much more than across all individuals, making perception of well-being and happiness relative to those that you identify with. As Easterlin notes, “people with higher income, are, on average, happier, but raising everybody’s income does not increase everybody’s happiness, because, in comparison to others, income has not improved.”²⁶

There has been a limited amount of work to understanding how individuals in developing countries perceive happiness. Graham and Pettinato have done extensive work on Russia and for 17 countries in Latin America find that “there is no obvious relationship between income and happiness” in their sample of developing countries.²⁷ However, “average happiness levels are higher in the advanced economies than they are in the developing ones.”²⁸ As Graham highlights, happiness surveys and indices should not be seen as replacements for measures of income or consumption, but rather as additional tools to provide insight into the development process. The survey data presented in Chapter 4 finds a much closer relationship between income and happiness across countries than Graham and Pettinato found.

²⁶ Ibid., 85.

²⁷ Carol Graham, "Insights on Development from the Economics of Happiness," *World Bank Res Obs* 20, no. 2 (2005): 2.

²⁸ Ibid.

In a recent study of happiness and well-being in Russia, the authors found an unusual relationship between unemployment and levels of happiness. They found that one's level of personal satisfaction was greatly dependent on one's local community regardless of if they were unemployed. The finding suggests that "comparison with other people becomes more important to subjective well-being in times of economic turmoil."²⁹ This finding may have an impact on survey findings of respondents in Central Asia, a similar country also in economic turmoil.

Happiness and Protest

In the first page of a book titled *Happiness and Hardship*, the authors pose the important question of "why some societies seem to tolerate significant degrees of economic hardship and yet retain political and social stability, whereas others break into violent protest in response to much smaller economic declines or shocks."³⁰ The author's examine the question of individuals' perceptions of economic well-being and economic shifts but leave the salient point of the relationship between perceived levels of happiness and conflict or protests unanswered.

There have been several different studies that examine the relationship between protests and individual happiness. Some older studies seemed to imply that happy people do not protest and the majority of protesters are dissatisfied.³¹ Yet it is also clear that the level of discontent is no greater among those protesting than in the

²⁹ Andrew Eggers, Clifford Gaddy, and Carol Graham, "Well-Being and Unemployment in Russia in the 1990's: Can Society's Suffering Be Individuals' Solace?," *The Journal of Socio-Economics* 5 (2006).

³⁰ Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, *Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 1.

³¹ See Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer : Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements* (New York: Perennial Library, 1989). and William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill.,: Free Press, 1959).

general population.³² So there may be less ‘happy’ people protesting, but not a statistically significant more amount of discontented people protesting. Frey and Stutzer in a study in Switzerland, find a correlation between levels of happiness and civic engagement. Generally they find that those that participate more in local politics are statistically happier than those that don’t.³³ (As they note, this does not imply knowing the direction of the casualty arrow). Could this imply that happier people are more likely to be engaged in civic activity or actions which they view as improving their society? This question is addressed in depth in Chapter 4.

In comparison directly to riots and protests, McPhail found “the deprivation-frustration-aggression explanation receives scant empirical support when personal attributes bearing on this argument are examined in relation to individual riot participation.”³⁴ The conclusion of the majority of more recent studies is that “discontent does not appear to be a strong predictor of protest behavior.”³⁵ But it is generally accepted that those that are protesting are discontent. So levels of dissatisfaction in society may not provide a predictor, but they are a necessary component. An important unknown in the literature is if this level of dissatisfaction is only relative to one’s immediate surroundings, as noted above in reference to the income-happiness relationship, or if it is to a broader swath of society.

³² Veenhoven, "Developments in Satisfaction-Research."

³³ Frey and Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics : How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being*.

³⁴ Clark McPhail, "Civil Disorder Participation: A Critical Examination of Recent Research," *American Sociological Review* 36, no. 6 (1971): 1064.

³⁵ Bert Klandermans, "Does Happiness Soothe Political Protest? The Complex Relation between Discontent and Political Unrest " in *How Harmful Is Happiness? : Consequences of Enjoying Life or Not*, ed. Ruut Veenhoven (Rotterdam: Universitaire Pers, 1989), 6.

Recent work by Graham and others has focused on the relative levels of perceived happiness.³⁶ While Graham hasn't explicitly developed the link between her work and the protest literature, the underlying theories are the same. Most of the research on happiness and protest has occurred at a macro scale across a country. The current data provides the opportunity for a more refined analysis at a micro level by allowing comparison among local communities. Because of the decrease in popularity of the relative deprivation arguments as discussed above, there has been very little work done to link the new, more rigorous happiness research with protest or civil conflict analysis. This research hopes to make an insightful contribution to these questions.

In addition to levels of personal happiness or well-being and conflict, there is an additional issue regarding perception of the government or general social conditions. Are those that are more upset about the government more likely to protest? One direction has been to examine what Klanderman calls the "causal attribution". Studies have looked at if it is the individual or society that is to blame for the deprivation.³⁷ However this is a different question from asking about the level of satisfaction with the government or services. There has been very little research specifically using country specific data to compare participation in protests with satisfaction with government across a wide range of topics from general services to corruption to quality and fairness. Chapter 4 provides these questions in detail.

³⁶ Carol Graham and Stefano Pettinato, *Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001).

³⁷ Nathan Caplan, "The New Ghetto Man: A Review of Recent Empirical Studies," (1970).

Ethnicity and Identity

The academic and empirical support for ethnicity and identity motivations in protests and civil conflict has waned in the past few years, but ethnicity is still a relevant part of the history in the Kyrgyz Republic. For example, in these events, the role of ethnicity appears to have no significant bearing on the events. But this is important and relevant in its absence. Why was ethnicity not a fundamental issue? As will be discussed below, there has been a history of bloody ethnic conflicts in the region. What is the balance between individual identity and one's rational calculation of costs of protesting?

One sociological approach is to see conflict as motivated by clashes of identity between individuals. Rothman sees the issue of identity as a "motivating factor" in all conflicts.³⁸ The study of identity-based conflict has its roots in ethnographic studies of cultural, ethnic, racial and even sexual identities. There is little consensus of what is more important or even when identity matters most. In addition, there is a lack of linkages between identity-based conflict and the other types of conflict.

A second body of literature looks at conflict between groups below the state level. Most of this analysis focuses on ethnic, religious, racial, or other similar divisions. This approach has been called primordialism and seeks to "explain conflict in terms of psychological and cultural forces that frame the ways in which individuals within groups understand themselves and others."³⁹ Ethnic causes are a direct

³⁸ Jay Rothman, *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and Communities*, 1st ed., The Jossey-Bass Conflict Resolution Series (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1997).

³⁹ Patrick Barron, Claire Q. Smith, and Michael Woolcock, "Understanding Local Level Conflict in Developing Countries," in *Social Development Papers* (Washington, DC: The World Bank).

challenge to the early Malthusian arguments for conflict and the more modern day environmental disaster theories put forth by Homer-Dixon and others. This body of literature accepts that each individual is a composite of different identities, e.g. mother, wife, lawyer, black, ethnic minority, religion, etc., but that we form groups based on which identity is either under attack or which one we most need affirmation for at that time. If others are attacking “our” group, then often our solidarity and attachment to that group will increase and the divide between “them” and “us” will significantly widen.⁴⁰ These theorists argue that while identity is rooted in the individual it is only “manifested” and challenged within the social interactions of groups and society.

Ross in his study of conflict within pre-industrial tribes draws the conclusion that one of the primary causes for the wide variance in degree and type of conflict is significant difference found in primitive tribe’s degree of social cohesion or social interaction. His theory is based in the theory of societies or groups interdependence. He argues that the more interdependent different groups are on each other, the less likely they are to engage in conflict.⁴¹

An important issue with the sociological motivations is determining causality. Do identities sort people into groups and then they engage in conflict, or does the issue around which there is conflict force them to assume certain identities? Who determines what identity someone will assume at a certain time? It is almost impossible to disentangle the directions of influence within the interpersonal sociological issues such as ethnicity, identity, equity, etc.

⁴⁰ Rothman, *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and Communities*.

⁴¹ Marc Howard Ross, *The Culture of Conflict : Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

Collective indicators

The focus of early social analysis of revolutions and protests saw individuals as the primary players in social movements; however, collective action and social movement theorists argue “that it is life within groups that transforms the potential for action into social movements.”⁴² The new theories took from Olson’s work on collective action, microeconomic theories, and rational choice structure and moved toward examining the creation of the social movement organization.

The organization replaced the individual; the new framework was to examine contentious collective action. The new concept was the social movement organization defined by Tilly as “an organized, sustained, self-conscious challenge to existing authorities.”⁴³

Macro socio-economic predictors

Macro socio-economic indicators impact both the individual and the collective’s perception and potential for conflict or protest. For organizational structure, the macro indicators are discussed in the collective indicators section.

Civil conflict has been predicted in Central Asia and specifically the Kyrgyz Republic for the past ten years. While the events in March 2005 were not civil conflict, it is important to provide a very brief review of the key macro-indicators for civil conflict. This paper will provide only a brief highlight of the key agreements and disagreements and problems with the existing models civil conflict models.⁴⁴ The two most important papers using statistical analysis of predictors for civil conflict are

⁴² Tarrow, *Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 22.

⁴³ Tarrow, ""Aiming at a Moving Target": Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe," 18.

⁴⁴ Andrew Mack, "Civil War: Academic Research and the Policy Community," (Washington, DC: World Bank Report, 2002).

by Collier and Hoeffler (CH)⁴⁵ and Fearon and Laitin (FL)⁴⁶ both using a pooled logit analysis of panel data.⁴⁷

CH argues, "If a country is in economic decline, is dependent on primary commodity exports, and has a low per capita income and that income is unequally distributed, it is at high risk of civil war."⁴⁸ Other studies point at the previous history of armed conflicts and show that the more recent the conflict the greater potential for war.⁴⁹ In addition, high infant mortality, a mountainous environment, and the ratio of poverty in the capital to poverty in the region all influence the potential for conflict.⁵⁰

The key theme in these studies is that economic development in a country is much more important than democratic development for predicting civil conflict. All of the traditional "soft" issues in development, such as level of democracy, development aid and legitimacy of the government all fail to be statistically significant variables in the models.⁵¹ The other surprising result is that neither model finds ethnic grievances or ethnic disparity as a key indicator of violence. While there are other models that question this result, ethnicity seems to carry less statistical weight than traditionally supposed.⁵²

For purposes of this paper the important point is that the Kyrgyz Republic met all of the basic indicators for civil conflict in the most established macro models. It

⁴⁵ P. Collier and A. E. Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," in *Centre for the Study of African Economies* (2002).

⁴⁶ James D. Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 6.

⁴⁷ Sambanis, "Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies."

⁴⁸ Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap : Civil War and Development Policy*.

⁴⁹ Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," 26.

⁵⁰ Ibid. and Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict " in *Defence & Peace Economics* (Carfax Publishing Company, 2002).

⁵¹ Collier and Hoeffler, "Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict ".

⁵² Sambanis, "Expanding Economic Models of Civil War Using Case Studies."

was a country that by any macro-analysis was on the verge of open civil or ethnic war and only needed an initiating event to provide the spark

Institutional predictors

The 2003 Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) report notes that the number of democracies doubled between 1985 and 2002 at the same time the amount of global warfare has decreased by more than fifty-percent since the mid-1980s.⁵³ Development and democracy theorists argue that the process of democracy, including individual's participation and their acceptance of the legitimacy of reform are keys to preventing conflict and reducing poverty.⁵⁴

The problem is in the process of movement from an autocracy towards a fully-functioning democracy. This is similar to de Tocqueville's theory that it is when a bad government is moving towards political openness that it is most likely to experience unrest.⁵⁵ The interaction between the government and the social movements or individuals can have an important impact on the potential and sustainability of protests.

This was explored by Eisinger in his analysis of protest in American cities, "The manner in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is not simply a function of the resources they command but of the openings, weak spots, barriers, and resources of the political systems themselves."⁵⁶ His research examined the responsiveness of a government to its citizen's demands and the

⁵³ Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003 : A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2003), 12,17.

⁵⁴ Amartya Kumar Sen, *Development as Freedom* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁵⁵ Tarrow, *Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 74.

⁵⁶ Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities," 12.

incidents of protest. He suggested two important hypotheses; the first is that “protest occurs most frequently in unresponsive and unrepresentative political systems.” He defines this as a linear relationship.

The second hypothesis is that “protest occurs as a political system begins to open up.” This suggests a curvilinear relationship. Eisinger’s conclusion is that “protest occurs in a mixed system because the pace of change does not keep up with expectations, *even though change is occurring*”[emphasis in original].⁵⁷

In addition to the issue of the relative openness or closed nature of the system, there is the important factor if the government is actively conducting repression to prevent protests from occurring. The issue of the impact of repression on political protests has been extensively examined from both the relative deprivation and the resource mobilization schools of thought. Similar to Eisinger’s hypothesis, Khawaja’s article on repression in the West Bank assumes either a curvilinear relationship, based in the relative deprivation motivations or a linear relationship based in the resource mobilization theories.⁵⁸ Both of these approaches would agree that at the highest levels of repression, the level of protest should decrease.

Resource mobilization theory assumes that coercion impacts the cost of organization and therefore increased repression should lead to less social movements. Relative deprivation assumes that repression would fuel frustration and therefore would increase one’s potential to participate until some point when the repression overwhelmed the individuals.

⁵⁷ Ibid.: 15.

⁵⁸ Marwan Khawaja, "Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank," *Sociological Forum* 8, no. 1 (1993).

Khawaja's study found that increased levels of repression increased collective action, however it was not across all levels of interaction. The research distinguished between collective and individual repression and did find uneven differences in levels of action.

Collective action models

Collective action theories are important to protests and civil violence for their insight to the incentives needed for individuals to engage in protests. Firmly anchored in rational choice theory, Olson argues that without some incentives or coercion "rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest."⁵⁹ This is directly relevant to civil conflict and protests in examining the question of how rebel groups form.

Tarrow expresses it well when he says that Hirschman "complained that Olson regarded collective action *only* as a cost—when to many it is a benefit. For people whose lives are mired in drudgery and desperation, the offer of an exciting, risky, and possibly beneficial campaign of collective action may be a gain."⁶⁰ The collective action dilemma is equally relevant to peaceful groups and to protest and rebellious groups. In direct contrast to the relative deprivation and grievance theories, Lichbach points out, "Those with a reason to make a revolution do not always make their revolution."⁶¹ He specifically examines the issue of how rebel groups overcome the collective action dilemma and presents several solutions including the use of selective incentives.

⁵⁹ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Harvard Economic Studies, V. 124 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 2.

⁶⁰ Tarrow, *Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 21.

⁶¹ Mark Irving Lichbach, *The Rebel's Dilemma*, Economics, Cognition, and Society (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995), 16.

In his discussion of the Eastern European movements, referenced above, Tarrow argues that we must adapt our concepts of collective action from one time to another. "Forms of protest that would have revolutionary implications in one system or time period may be treated as routine in another."⁶² Some of the early protests in the Kyrgyz Republic, while engaging large crowds of people, were initially considered routine as street protests and even road blockades were an accepted form of protest. This is important in the discussion of action taken in Chapter 5, because the protesters had to increase the level of their protests to gain the attention of the government. Street protests had become routine and to make a point, it was necessary to escalate the tactics and the level of violence.

Resource mobilization is a type of collective action model based on rational choice with input from the fields of microeconomics and sociology as put forth by McCarthy and Zald⁶³ and expanded on by Tilly⁶⁴ and others. In the concept of resource mobilization, "movements form because of long-term changes in group resources, organization and opportunities for collective action."⁶⁵ Resource Mobilization "is the process by which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for collective action."⁶⁶

The theory of resource mobilization is more about the mechanism of managing, organizing and conducting the political protests than about the ideology, individual preferences or personal attributes of the protesters. It was originally based

⁶² Tarrow, "'Aiming at a Moving Target': Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe," 17.

⁶³ John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory," *The American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 6 (1977).

⁶⁴ Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1978).

⁶⁵ J. Craig Jenkins, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements," *Annual Review of Sociology* 9 (1983): 530.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*: 532.

on analysis of social movements in the US in the 60's and 70's and the finding that it was the acquisition and distribution of resources that allowed groups to form and sustain political activity.

Conclusion

The two major distinctions in the political protest literature are motivations based in individual perceptions and those based in social or collective actions. Relative deprivation theory and the happiness literature provide an initial framework to examine individuals' perceptions of well-being. But a significant problem is that real or relative levels of welfare are an insufficient explanation for the development of political protests. Relative levels of inequality have existed at much greater rates than levels of protest and appear to be a necessary, but not sufficient component. The happiness literature provides an alternative method to evaluate inherent differences among individuals, but the empirical links to formation of protests are tenuous and not well documented. Individual ethnicity and identity characteristics are important factors in predicting some political protests, but are not universally applicable.

Macro econometric models are useful to provide a crude measure to identify countries with a potential for conflict, but have a demonstrated weakness in providing causal mechanisms. An important historic shift in the political protest literature was from a focus on the individual to the collective or society. Resource mobilization and collective action models suggests the importance of examining specific incentives offered by political leaders on both sides of the protests and resources used by leaders to advance the protests.

The current trend in academic research and analysis is in favor of collective action models that demonstrate the relationship of the individual within a group interacting with the greater society. Protests are seen as a melding of different social movements and protest groups with overlapping and often competing agendas. Institutions and changes in political systems are viewed as either enablers or detractors from the protest process, but always as engaged. Protests are not simply isolated events led by disgruntled individuals operating outside the pressures, incentives, and benefits of a collective group.

Chapter 3: Presentation of methods

Overview of case study methodology

The approach of this paper is to provide a detailed, comprehensive analysis of a single case study. I use Bennett and George's definition of a case study as, "the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events."⁶⁷ An intrinsic benefit of a case study approach is that it "investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context."⁶⁸

Large n statistical analysis are useful at suggesting correlation between policy variables, but case study methods work best to provide information on the "underlying causal mechanisms."⁶⁹ One of the main advantages of the case study in application to the events in the Kyrgyz Republic is the case study's "value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases."⁷⁰

There is usefulness to cross-country comparisons and analysis across multiple cases. However, as George and Bennett note, "improved historical explanations of individual cases are the foundation for drawing wider implications from case studies."⁷¹ For a new and emerging event such as the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic, the first step for the researcher is to establish the initial conditions and possible causal mechanisms within the case before moving to cross-country comparison.

⁶⁷ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Bcsia Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 5.

⁶⁸ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research : Design and Methods*, 3rd ed., Applied Social Research Methods Series (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2003), 12.

⁶⁹ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 19.

⁷¹ Ibid., 110.

Case studies can take a variety of different approaches and methodologies. Because this is some of the first research done on this event, this research is first a descriptive case study where the “aim is to get the story down for the possible benefit of later policy makers, scholars and other citizens.”⁷² Second, it attempts to challenge existing theories and test new hypothesis. Third, the case study research examines if the Kyrgyz Republic is a “deviant case study” as defined by Odell, “where the main causes were present but the expected effect did not occur.”⁷³ I would expand this to include cases where the main causes were present, the expected effect DID occur, but NOT for the expected causes.

A methodological challenge is that the Kyrgyz case may be a deviant case or, more likely an example of equifinality. Equifinality is the argument that “*different* causal patterns can lead to *similar* outcomes.”⁷⁴[emphasis in original] Equifinality may provide the methodological explanation why the events in Georgia, Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic all had similar outcomes—crowds of protesters overthrowing a former Soviet leader—yet had fundamentally different patterns that led to that result. The use of a single case study that applies the method of process tracing is the first step to test this hypothesis and identify the casual mechanisms.

Within this single case study, the paper applies two complementary methodological approaches. First is the statistical analysis of survey data and event analysis to allow the testing of several hypotheses regarding the influence of the individual actor. Second, is the qualitative approach of process tracing based on field

⁷² John S. Odell, "Case Study Methods in International Political Economy," *International Studies Perspectives* 2, no. 2 (2001): 162.

⁷³ Ibid.: 166.

⁷⁴ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 161.

interviews and media reports, each of these methods are examined in detail in the following sections.

Quantitative Methods

Survey Methodology

This is the first and perhaps only existing database that has responses from a cross-country randomized sampling of individual's perception of well-being, propensity for conflict, and other key issues taken five months prior to widespread protests across the country. This is a unique opportunity to examine individual preferences for economic and social well-being, satisfaction with government, perception of corruption, and probability of conflict in the region and country. This is the first known instance of having data taken at this level immediately prior to a series of protests and conflicts. This work builds on the work of Graham, Frey and Stutzer in their recent application of well-being indicators. This section provides an overview of the survey implementation process and the survey controls used in the analysis, a discussion of the dependent and independent variables is presented in Chapter 4.

In October and November of 2004, the World Bank funded a household survey of 6,000 respondents in 4 countries in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, The Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). The author was a member of the team that wrote the questions and oversaw the survey implementation. Local firms in the region were contracted to conduct the surveys in the local language. An international consulting firm provided training assistance and methodological supervision to the field survey team. The 100 question survey of 1500 households in each of the four

countries asked questions about the respondent's economic and social well-being, their perception of the likelihood of local, regional and national level conflict, their frustration at the government, and general demographic characteristics.⁷⁵ Appendix 2 presents the full methodology report submitted by the firm that conducted the survey.

Proper survey design and analysis must address three issues: weighting, stratification and clustering.⁷⁶ Some of the problems of clustering and weights can be correctly mitigated in the design stage and the implementation of the survey.⁷⁷

The sampling procedure was a three-stage stratified clustered sampling. The

Stage 1: Random selection of urban/rural geographic units (primary sampling units, PSU)

Stage 2: Sequential random sampling of households (secondary sampling units, 2SUs)

Stage 3: Random selection of HH member with Kish grid

first stage used census data to determine similar sized geographic units and then label them as either urban or rural. From this list of all the geographic units in the country,

the team used primary probability sampling (PPS) to select a number of primary sampling units (PSUs) representative of the urban and rural population of the Kyrgyz Republic to generate 1,500 interviews. For purposes of the survey, rural was defined as “villages – rural settlements that are subordinated to rural councils (“ailny okmot”))” and urban units are “parts of large urban settlements – each city is divided into parts with populations between 3,991 and 5,364 inhabitants.”⁷⁸

⁷⁵ See Appendix 5 for a copy of the survey questions in English.

⁷⁶ C. J. Skinner, D. Holt, and T. M. F. Smith, *Analysis of Complex Surveys*, Wiley Series in Probability and Mathematical Statistics (Chichester ; New York: Wiley, 1989), 2.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 6.

⁷⁸ Lawrence Robertson, "Regional Perception Survey of Conflict Prevention and Cooperation in Central Asia: Methodology Report " (2005).

The second stage was sequential random sampling of households for secondary sampling units (2SUs) in the selected PSUs. The household lists were taken from available government data sets. The third stage was to use a Kish grid to ensure random sampling of respondents within each household. A Kish grid is a table constructed to insure random selection of individuals within a household based upon number of people in the house, age of respondents and number of clusters in the PSU or 2SU.

Because of field survey issues, some of the regions and districts were left out of the household survey, as the methodology report states:

Kyrgyzstan has 14 cities, 431 rural districts and 1,815 villages. The population of Kyrgyzstan was to [sic] 4,641,237 people, the urban population was 1,520,487 (33%), and the rural population 3,120,750 (67%) as of January, 1, 1998. Several remote or inaccessible districts are excluded from the sampling frame. This category includes one district each in Naryn, Batken, Osh, Issyk-Kul, and three in Djalal-Abad. One larger district, Uzgen in Osh oblast, was excluded due to complicated interethnic and interreligious attitudes (147,183 inhabitants). In all, 14.99% of the rural population of the country was unfortunately left out of the sample frame, (467,853 people). This is 10.08% of the total population of Kyrgyzstan.⁷⁹

There were a total of 58 PSUs selected, 37 (64%) were rural and 21 (36%) were urban. Out of the 1500 observations, 1009 (67%) are rural and 491 (33%) were urban. The observations per PSU range from 11 to 30 people, see Table 1.

The response rate for the survey was generally high at 84%. This broke down to a 70% response rate for urban areas and a 93.3% response rate for rural areas. The worst response rate was in the capital, Bishkek, at 58.2%.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

Table 1: Survey Methodology

	#PSUs	Total Obs	Obs. Per PSU		
			min	Mean	max
Rural	37	1009	22	27.3	30
Urban	21	491	11	23.4	28
	58	1500	11	25.9	30

There were several challenges in the survey implementation process which may or may not impact the final analysis. The polling took place in Kyrgyz Republic immediately after a series of local elections and there was a degree of polling fatigue. Because the World Bank survey was taken close to regional elections there was much greater scrutiny by the local government officials. There were a few cases of surveyors detained by police for several hours. Especially in the rural areas, comprehensive housing lists did not exist and the survey team had to create a household list from available data. In a small number of locations, due to poor roads or lack of transportation facilities, it was not possible to access the most remote households.⁸¹

Survey Controls

Because of the nature of the complex survey, several different controls were used in the survey design (as noted above) and in the statistical analysis. The World Bank Central Asia (WB/CA) survey exhibits the characteristics of a complex social survey. Complex surveys are defined as not meeting the assumptions of a simple random sampling (SRS) with or without replacement and not meeting the assumptions of independent and identically distributed (IID) observations. Variance

⁸¹Ibid.

estimates that assume IID or SRS for complex survey data are biased down, specifically standard errors are smaller and confidence intervals narrower.⁸²

There are several controls that can be used for complex survey data. All of the regressions were run both with the survey controls and without. The greatest impact was in the Kyrgyz Republic, the smallest effect was in Uzbekistan. For the key economic policy variables the controls had very little influence. The socio-demographic variables had some minor changes with the Standard Errors increasing, with variables that may have been significant at the .05 level now significant at the .10 level. There were only one or two isolated instances across all four countries where an important policy variable changed in level of significance with or without controls. Appendix 4 presents a full complement of regression charts comparing the results with and without controls.

A goal of the survey section is to compare survey results to data collected from around the world in situations where all of the more advanced controls may not have been applied, it is important for inter-country comparisons to maintain as similar as possible methodological structure. For all results reported in comparing cross-country, advanced survey controls were not used. I will indicate the very few occurrences where I have found that that using the controls or not using the controls is significant on the policy relevant impact of a variable. Standard proportional weighting is used for all regressions. The weighting only impacts the coefficient scores and not the SE's.

The regressions were done using an ordered logit. Because ordered logits are based on ordinal rather than cardinal variables it is not possible to compare between

⁸² Skinner, Holt, and Smith, *Analysis of Complex Surveys*, 6.

coefficient scores, only if the coefficient is positive or a negative and its relative change when analyzed with the comparator. For some models an Ordinary Least Squares model was used simply to see the differences among different policy relevant independent variables. Previous research has shown OLS and ologit models yield similar results and then it is possible to infer the relative weight of the coefficient.

Problems—DKNR

A final issue is the treatment of don't know responses during the interviews. Generally for most questions this was not an issue. For issues of happiness the level of Don't Know and No Responses (DKNR) was less than 1.3%. There were a proportionally high percentage of DKNR answers for the perception of conflict variables. In the Kyrgyz Republic it was the lowest of all four countries but still ranged from 9% to 11.23% for key questions (see Table 2).

Table 2: DKNR for Four Countries

	KAZ	KYR	TAJ	UZB
War	18.6%	11.2%	31.8%	20%
Local	11.8%	7.6%	20.8%	10.5%
Country	12.6%	9%	30.4%	16.8%
N=	1,193	1,318	1,197	1,310

Appendix 3 has a full breakdown of the level of DKNR responses by region and area. However, the results are less significant when the same model that is used to interpret the three key DV variables of local, country, and war conflict is run with DKNR as the DV. It appears that the DKNR responses are not consistently representative of one sex, religious group, regional location or any other key variable.

The problem with DKNR is the analyst doesn't know if the response means that the respondent didn't really know the answer to the question or if they do know

the answer but is worried to give their real response because of the sensitivity of the question. In countries with highly autocratic rulers, such as Uzbekistan this is of high concern to the researcher. The main concern is if there is any systematic bias in the answers. Was there a specific type of individual or region that was more likely to say DKNR? To determine any bias, identical models were run with the DV as the dichotomous variable *local, coun and war*. I collapsed all of the positive responses into one variable, 1 = Highly likely, Fairly likely, and Somewhat likely and 0 = Not likely at all, DKNR. A second model was run with 0 =Not likely at all, dropping the DKNR responses for each DV. A third model was run with the DV as only the DKNR variables, 1= DKNR, 0= all other responses.

There are two key results from the various models, one, there is not a statistically significant difference between the models that have DKNR and where it is dropped. The only two variables that show any differences are ethnic Russians and males for the war question. Generally, it appears that males are less likely to say DKNR when questioned about war. Ethnic Russians are more likely to say DKNR when asked about war or country level conflict. Those that have been ethnically discriminated against are less likely to say they don't know when asked about local conflict. It appears that those that are not as well educated are more likely to say DKNR in response to questions about local and country level conflict. While there doesn't appear to be a clear reason why they are not also more likely to say DKNR on the war question, it is logical that those with the least amount of education are the ones most likely not to know the response. The most important result from these tests is that there does not appear to be any bias in responses driven by region or any other

general social-economic patterns. It does not appear that those from the south or in more autocratic regions were any more likely than others to provide DKNR answers.

Based on the above analysis, for all reported results, the DV does not include the DKNR responses. It is important to note that the discussion above is only focused on the three policy relevant questions related to perception of conflict where there appeared to be abnormally high levels of DK/NR responses. For all variables used as both dependent and independent variables, DKNR responses were dropped for the remainder of analysis.

Event Analysis

Olzak defines an event as “nonroutine, collective and public acts that involve claims on behalf of a larger collective”⁸³ Tilly updates this concept and defines “contentious gathering”, which incorporates the concepts of protests, violence, strikes or riots as “an occasion on which a number of people . . .outside of the government gathered in a publicly-accessible place and made claims on at least on person outside their own number, claims which if realized would affect the interests of their objective.”⁸⁴

There is some discussion about what the definition of an event is and if organizations should be included or if it is only noninstitutional. For purposes of this paper, I have defined any gathering both for and against the government as an event.

⁸³ Susan Olzak, "Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action," *Annual Review of Sociology* 15 (1989): 124.

⁸⁴ as quoted in Sidney Tarrow, "The People's Two Rhythms: Charles Tilly and the Study of Contentious Politics. A Review Article," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 38, no. 3 (1996): 593.

Media analysis

I based my methodology as a starting point on Eisinger's classic event analysis and then on Tilly's refinements.^{85,86} I manually went through local and international press and wire reports from January 1 through March 26, 2005. I collected hundreds of clippings. In addition I referenced all reports by OSCE, ICG, the US Embassy and other international organizations. Almost all events were referenced by more than one source; however, single source events remained in the database. The main reason for this was that this is the first attempt to catalog the events and it is highly likely that others will come along to refine and add to this research. I wanted to cast as wide a net as possible for this first research. I did not use village level or local papers. I only used national papers or wire services that were available online. One area of research that I considered, but did not complete for lack of access and time, were the hundreds of blogs that were blogging literally live with the events as they unfolded. This was encouraged by several colleagues, but was not pursued. This still portends to be a rich data source for future researches of this event or other breaking events.

I organized the data by date, city, oblast, number of participants (where there were discrepancies between multiple sources, I took the average, my weighting process largely corrects for this bias), and type of event. I created a scale of 1 to 4 for number of days of protests, 1pt = 1 day, 2 pt = 2 days, 3pt = 3 days, 4 pt = >4 days. The mean number of days of protests was 2.48, while the mode was 1 with 41 out of 65 events. This weighting, as suggested by Eisinger and Olzak controls for the

⁸⁵ Eisinger, "The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities."

⁸⁶ Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*.

relative infrequency of long protests. I used Olzak's definition of event days, by counting an event as being the same as long as it was continual and unbroken by no more than 24 hours.⁸⁷ However, if an event shifted in both numbers and quality, I counted them as separate events. For example, if an event had started as a small protest in front of a building, but two days later, thousands of people came and attacked a building, I counted them separately. This is a debatable methodology, but I believe that there is a difference from the gradual shifting or growing of an event and a sudden change with new people arriving or new leadership, I see this as a new event, perhaps layered on top of the previous ones, but still fundamentally different.

I created a scale for the events based on my analysis of the most common types of events as well as the language used in the news reports. 1pt = Protest <300, 2pts = Protest >300<1000, 3pts = Protest >1000, 4pts = Roads blocked or physical violence, 5pts = Building seized or burned. The mean score was 3.23, the mode was 4. An additional variable was included if the police dispersed the protests. This was to provide some control for the issue of repression, although this a very blunt instrument to capture this government repression as it was much more than just physical intimidation.

For purposes of clarity, it is important to define the terms that will be used in this research. For purposes of this paper there are two delineations that will be used, one is protester and the other is opposition. A protester is a designation of tactics, while opposition is one of position in reference to the government. Not all opposition members are protesters, and not all protesters are opposition, although in this case most were. In general, I will use the term protesters to reference those that acted

⁸⁷ Olzak, "Analysis of Events in the Study of Collective Action," 127.

through marches, pickets, or gatherings against the government, when it is a different motivation, I will carefully note that. I will use the term opposition to reference political opposition to the sitting government. An opposition politician may disagree with the direction of the government, but may not have used protests as a tactic to achieve his objectives.

For purposes of this paper, external agencies is a reference to any group, either diplomatic, developmental, human rights or other that is solely funded through international funds and is registered first under international not local law. An internal agency is defined as any fund, NGO, or civil society organization that is registered locally and whose services are solely for the local population, even if they receive a majority of their funding from external sources. An agency is separate and distinct from the individual's that comprise its membership as it implies the influence of the organization not a single member. An internal agency is distinct from a protest group that has rallied around a single spokesperson, they are individuals that have chosen to self-organize, but do not represent the interests of an organization or legal entity.

Independent field interviews

I conducted independent field research in Central Asia in the summer of 2003, spring of 2005 and fall of 2005. In the summer of 2003, prior to the events, I met with local conflict prevention non-governmental organizations and obtained their reports and data on the incidences and causes of local level and regional level conflicts. I also catalogued the conflict prevention programs of the local and international donors throughout the country. Immediately after the March protests I

conducted limited field research in the spring of 2005.⁸⁸ I returned for several months in the fall of 2005 for more extensive interviews.⁸⁹ I have first hand data from interviews with local participants, protest leaders, local officials, local citizens, international observers, civil society leaders, and international diplomatic officials. In 2005, I personally interviewed more than a hundred different individuals.

The majority of these interviews were recorded; about half of the meetings were in Russian and half in English, with a very few in Kyrgyz or Uzbek which were transcribed by local translators in the country. The spring interviews were conducted over less than 10 days in Chui and Osh in May 2005. The fall interviews were conducted in Chui, Issyk-Kul, Osh and Jalal-Abad oblasts from October to December 2005. The majority of time was spent in Osh and Jalal-Abad. Because of time and financial constraints it wasn't feasible to travel to Naryn, Talas or Batkin.

At the time of the fall interviews several months had passed since the initial events and other small scale protests had happened in the intervening time. There was some loss of focus on the events. The spring interviews were less than two months since the events and were still very fresh in people's minds. I was able to interview several people on both occasions and their information differed only with minor exceptions.

The interviews were used primarily to fill in the background and motivations for the protesters. They were very useful at corroborating news stories and especially the main events in Osh, Jalal-Abad and Bishkek. If an interviewee mentioned an event that I was not able to corroborate in the media or by another witness, then I

⁸⁸ Field research funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Carnegie Corporation of New York

⁸⁹ Field research funded by the State Department Title VIII IARO grant

discarded that event. I only used events that were not in the media if they came from at least three different sources who I did not interview together. A few of the interviews were small group interviews, which incorporated much more bias into the process, but these were used only for discussions of motivations.

Many of those interviewed only agreed on the condition of anonymity. I have kept a database of all interviews and future researchers may contact me directly for additional information on any quotations or sources. For purposes of source and footnotes, I will reference all interviews that I conducted and direct personal correspondence as “author interview” followed by a number for that reference. For those that agreed to be quoted on the record, I include the name and date of the interview.

Qualitative Methods

Process Tracing

The method of process tracing uses micro level data to examine the casual mechanisms that link suspected causes to measurable effects. “The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”⁹⁰ The difference with large n studies is between observing a correlation and an underlying causal mechanism.⁹¹ Bennett and George use the example of a barometer as a “non-explanatory prediction”.⁹² A barometer is a reliable predictor of future weather patterns, but it tells us little about the mechanisms

⁹⁰ George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 206.

⁹¹ Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, "Process Tracing in Case Study Research," ed. MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, 1997).

⁹² George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 3.

that cause the weather change. The goal is not an exhaustive list of all possible causal mechanisms but to apply relevant theories to the series of events and trace the various permutations to identify a discrete number of independent variables that lead to the final outcome, “knowledge of causal mechanisms can be of practical use even when the entire causal process or path is not fully understood.”⁹³

The actual implementation of process tracing can take a variety of forms. For purposes of this paper the two primary methods are a detailed narrative and an analytic explanation. As a detailed narrative, this paper can provide a historical explanation that is necessary to test and verify existing theories and form a basis for future research and analysis. It will also provide an analytic explanation for the process of events, for “process-tracing in single cases . . . has the capacity for disproving claims that a single variable is necessary or sufficient for an outcome.”⁹⁴ The two analytical functions are process verification and process induction. Process verification assumes a limited number of existing theories which are applied to the case study to determine their validity. Process induction starts with the “purpose of finding one or more potential causal paths which can then be rendered as more general hypotheses for testing against other cases.” This induction type of approach is best for new, unique, or unexplored cases.⁹⁵

Conclusion

This research is a within case study approach that uses quantitative analysis of survey and event data and qualitative process tracing methods. Chapter 4 is the quantitative analysis of the survey data and analyzes the initial perceptions of the

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 220.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 16.

individuals in the Kyrgyz Republic. Chapter 5 presents the initial macro conditions and introduces the event analysis data as well as the process tracing methodology through the timeline of events. Finally, Chapter 6 uses the results from the event analysis and the process tracing to examine the dynamic casual processes that led to the final outcome of the government collapse.

Chapter 4: Initial Conditions: Perceptions

Research Approach/Hypothesis

The goal of this chapter is to statistically examine individual initial conditions that may influence one's participation in local protests. This chapter examines whether the Kyrgyz Republic and regions that participated in protests were significantly different from other countries and areas within the country without conflict. The events in the Kyrgyz Republic provide a unique opportunity to examine individual perceptions of well-being, satisfaction with government and perception of conflict immediately prior to cross-country protests. The timing of the survey and of the protests provides an excellent example of a natural experiment. Data was obtained throughout the country asking about the probability of an event and five months later the event occurred.

The broad research question to be addressed in this section is: Are countries and regions where protests occur significantly different in levels of personal well-being, satisfaction with government and perception of conflict than their comparators? Formally, this section will examine two hypotheses:

1. The Kyrgyz Republic is significantly different from the industrialized, the developing world and other Central Asian countries in perception of happiness.
2. Perception of individual well-being is correlated with protest events.

A problem in this research is that it is impossible to correlate an individual's perception of happiness, conflict and government with specific individuals who may have engaged in protests. The analysis includes two methods to solve this problem. The first is to use only the survey data and determine if the respondents in places

where protests occurred are statistically significantly different from respondents in other regions or countries. The second analysis is to create a profile of the protesters based on field interviews and compare it to the survey responses. The first method asks, given that you are happy, what are your general socio-economic characteristics? The second method asks, given that you are a protester, what is your level of happiness?

This chapter presents the results from the survey and will move through four sections, first the general demographic information from the survey. Second is an analysis of the happiness responses with comparisons to industrialized, developing, and regional countries. Third is an examination of the correlation between happiness and conflict and fourth are three conclusions and results from this chapter.

Cross-tab Country Results

As discussed in the methodology section, the sample is representative in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, and geographic area. See Appendix 2 for a full comparison of census data to survey sample. Table 3 provides a brief overview of some of the socio-demographics of the respondents.

Table 3: General Socio-Demographics of Respondents

	KAZ	KYR	TAJ	UZB
Male	44%	49%	48%	42%
Rural	41%	69%	72%	65%
Married	66%	68%	71%	75%
Employed	51%	46%	47%	46%
Muslim	57%	85%	95%	92%
Higher Ed in House	72%	64%	61%	66%
Ethnic Minority	46%	34%	24%	21%
N =	1193	1318	1197	1310

Key Variables

Independent Variables

There are three independent variables used for the three main regression models used in this chapter: individual satisfaction, satisfaction with government and perception of conflict. Individual satisfaction and satisfaction with government were based on a 1 to 4 scale with responses, Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, Fairly dissatisfied, Very dissatisfied, or DK/NR. The perception of conflict questions also used a 1 to 4 scale from, Highly likely, Fairly likely, Somewhat likely, Not likely at all, to DK/NR. The DK/NR responses were dropped from the analysis as discussed in Chapter 3.

Individual satisfaction

The first questions in the survey asked about the individual's level of satisfaction and happiness. Questions about personal satisfaction are positioned early in the survey to prevent their bias or corruption by specific attitudes toward other issues later in the survey process.⁹⁶ There were five questions about individual life satisfaction, these identical questions have been used in research in Latin America and Russia, allowing a high degree of cross-comparability between countries responses.

Satisfaction questions:

1. Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life?
2. How do you estimate current economic situation of your household?
3. How would you rate the economic situation in your household a few years ago in comparison with current situation?
4. Imagine a 10-step ladder where the poorest people are standing on the first, or lowest, step, and the richest people are standing on the tenth, or highest, step. On what step would you place yourself today?

⁹⁶ Charles F. Turner, Elizabeth Martin, and National Research Council (U.S.). Panel on Survey Measurement of Subjective Phenomena., *Surveying Subjective Phenomena*, 2 vols. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984).

5. How long do you think it will take for you to reach a satisfactory standard of living?

Table 4 provides cross tabs comparisons for some of the satisfaction with life questions among four countries. Across all four countries almost two-thirds of those interviewed stated that they were fairly or very satisfied with their life and a slightly higher number said their current economic situation in the household was very or somewhat good.

Table 4: Regional Satisfaction Results

Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life?				
	KAZ	KYR	TAJ	UZB
Very/Fairly Dissatisfied	37%	33%	43%	20%
Very/Fairly Satisfied	63%	67%	57%	80%
How do you estimate current economic situation of your household?				
	KAZ	KYR	TAJ	UZB
Very/Somewhat Bad	27%	31%	26%	23%
Very/Somewhat Good	73%	69%	74%	77%

Satisfaction with government

There were two questions in the survey that addressed the issue of satisfaction with the government.

1. Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in (country) today?
2. How would you describe the current economic situation in (country)?

There is a difference between the two levels of satisfaction, individual and country, with a .23 pairwise correlation between the two variables across all four countries. In a variety of different models when used simultaneously, both variables remain statistically significant. The pair-wise correlation between personal happiness and

satisfaction with country ranged from .29 for Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan to .44 for Tajikistan.

Table 5 presents the raw cross-tabulation results for these two questions. In terms of raw percentages, respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic are the most dissatisfied with the situation in the country. The other three countries have positive attitudes regarding the general satisfaction with the country.

Table 5: Satisfaction with Country

Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in (country) today?				
	KAZ	KYR	TAJ	UZB
Very/Fairly Dissatisfied	17%	55%	45%	22%
Very/Fairly Satisfied	83%	45%	55%	78%
How would you describe the current economic situation in (country)?				
Very/Fairly Dissatisfied	15%	67%	38%	27%
Very/Fairly Satisfied	85%	33%	62%	73%

Perception of conflict

There were three primary questions related to perception of conflict:

1. How likely is conflict on the local level, in your village/city, over the next few years?
2. How likely is conflict within our country over the next few years?
3. How likely is conflict between (country) and other countries in Central Asia?

These three questions will be referred to as local conflict, country conflict and war respectively. below, Table 6 presents the perception of conflict for all four countries both combined and separately. The majority of respondents in each country think that conflict at any level is not likely. The Kyrgyz Republic has a much higher percentage than any other country in each category that thinks conflict is likely. It is interesting to note that the only country in the region that has experienced widespread civil conflict is Tajikistan, yet by a wide margin the respondents do not think that

conflict of any kind is likely. Compare the country category, where every other country is over 20% and Tajikistan is at 7%. It raises an interesting question of the relation between perceptions and actual potential for conflict. As noted in Chapter 2, a history of conflict is a strong predictor of future conflict in traditional macro civil conflict or war models.

The category that respondents think is most likely to have conflict is war between two countries and the least likely is local level conflict, except for Tajikistan. Few regional analysts think that country to country conflict is highly likely in the region. As noted in the third chapter, most experts think that there may be some type of internal conflict, with civil war or low level cross border aggressions in specific locations. Yet, the type of conflict most anticipated within the country is at the national level not at the local level. It appears that few think that conflict will occur in their neighborhood or area, they anticipate it occurring somewhere else.

Table 6: Perception of Conflict

Local conflict	All Four	KAZ	KYR	TAJ	UZB
Not Likely	88%	87%	80%	96%	92%
Likely*	12%	13%	20%	4%	8%
Country conflict					
Not Likely	76%	79%	65%	93%	71%
Likely	24%	21%	35%	7%	29%
War					
Not Likely	79%	76%	60%	94%	91%
Likely	21%	24%	40%	6%	9%

**(Likely=Highly, Fairly, and Somewhat)*

Dependent Variables

All of the models used the same standard demographic control variables. The variables were age, ageSq, urban, male, married, education and country fixed effect controls. Additional models also used variables for employment and religion (muslim). Several subjective variables were also included.

Trust: “Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be trusted, or that you should be too careful in dealing with people?”

Ethnic Discrimination: “In the last several years, have you experienced instances of discrimination because of your ethnicity in (country)?”

Protested: A series of questions were asked concerning respondents previous participation in protest activities. The respondents were not a passive group, 40% of respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic had engaged in some level of protest in the past three years compared to 50% in Tajikistan and 10% in Kazakhstan. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the protest level ranged from writing a letter of complaint (14%), to signing a collective petition (16%) to partaking in an authorized (4%) or unauthorized protest (2%). 70% in both the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan said they would definitely or maybe have grievances that they would like to discuss with the authorities compared to only 47% in Uzbekistan.

Economic variables: There are several different economic variables. One is a self-reported purchasing power statement that is used in many other countries. It ranks ability to purchase basic necessities as a 1 up to purchasing luxury goods as a 5. A usefulness of this question is that it measures consumption not income. In developing countries consumption is generally much more reliable than income which can be hard to accurately account. To control for the relative nature of the scales, examples were provided:

1. Difficult to provide the family with basic food
2. Manage to provide basic food but find it difficult to pay utility bills and buy clothes
3. Can afford required foods, clothes and pay utility bills, but cannot afford such goods as TV, refrigerator, etc.

4. We can afford to buy a TV or refrigerator, but cannot afford a car, a new house or travel to another country.
5. Can buy a car, a new house or travel to another country, etc.
6. Don't know/ No Response

This five point scale was collapsed into three categories for purposes of analysis, hard to purchase (1 and 2), can purchase required (3) and can purchase high quality goods (4 and 5). As an independent evaluation of the individual's subjective response of economic status, each interviewer rated the household on a five point scale. The direct correlation between the two variables (self-evaluation and interviewer measurement) was .53%, however when you compare answers that are within one step of each other (i.e. a 3 to a 4 or a 2 to 3), there is a correlation of greater than 90% across all four countries. This high number implies that while the interviewer or the respondent might place themselves a step higher or lower than the other, there were almost no situations of the two measures significantly differing from one another. No one who perceived themselves as rich was actually seen as being poor or visa-versus, this lends credibility to the respondent's self-evaluation. Because it is more commonly used in other studies and had very little difference from the interviewer ranking, I use the self-reported purchasing power question as the base line economic indicator.

Ethnicity: A key issue in some sections of the region is the fear of ethnic tensions igniting into widespread ethnic infighting and civil war. In the Kyrgyz Republic, 66% of those interviewed self-reported themselves as ethnically Kyrgyz, 17% ethnically Uzbek, 10% as ethnic Russians and 7% as other. In the southern regions, the ratios are similar for the Kyrgyz but significantly different for the other

ethnic groups. For the entire Uzbek group, 98% live in the south and the exact opposite is true for the Russians with less than 1% in the southern regions. The minorities are clearly segregated throughout the country; this issue is discussed in more depth in the regression section.

Perceptions of Happiness

Is the Kyrgyz Republic significantly different from the industrialized, the developing world and other regional countries in perception of happiness? This thesis is answered in two stages, first by examining determinants of happiness from other national surveys in the US, Europe, Latin America and Russia and second by comparing survey results from within the region.

The Central Asian countries are very similar to other developing and industrialized countries in their perception of happiness. Table 7 provides a comparison among 16 countries in Latin America, Russia, the United States and the four countries of Central Asia. The sign indicates the relationship of that variable with the dependent variable of life satisfaction. If there is no sign then there was not a statistically significant relationship with that variable. The most important result is that the four Central Asian countries do not appear to be that significantly different from the rest of the world.

In US and Europe “the following personal characteristics are positively and significantly associated with happiness: being employed, female, young or old (not middle age), educated, married, with few children, or belonging to a high-income quartile.”⁹⁷ In their extensive review of previous happiness studies Frey and Stutzer

⁹⁷ Frey and Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics : How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being*, 4.

provide an overview of the key socio-demographic findings, age is clearly U-shaped, the young and the old are the most satisfied while the middle-aged are the most unhappy (approximately 40-43 in most developed countries).⁹⁸ Women appear to be slightly happier than men in most countries, but by a very small percentage. In the U.S., there is a clear difference between black and white, with blacks reporting lower happiness scores. There does not appear to be as great a difference for other ethnicities. Happiness and health are highly correlated; those that self-report higher levels of health also report high levels of happiness. Marriage has a consistent positive correlation with happiness. Intelligence appears to have no correlation, however; education does have a slight positive correlation, but when income levels are included significantly decreases. Finally, religion has a positive, but very small correlation.⁹⁹

When the Central Asian region as a group is compared to other regions, it is very similar. The key variables of age, marital status, employment and a wealth index are all similar to results in the U.S., Latin America, and Russia. For all the regions, age has a negative impact and age squared has a positive curvilinear relationship with happiness, those that are younger are happy and those that are older are happy. Marriage has a positive impact on happiness. In the U.S., being male has a negative impact, yet in Russia it has a positive impact, it appears to have no impact in Central Asia. Those with higher levels of education are happier. Those that are employed are significantly happier.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 53.

Table 7: Key Variables of Happiness Worldwide¹⁰⁰

Key Variables	L.A. 16 coun.	Russia	US	KYR	KAZ	TAJ	UZB	All-four CAR
Age	-	-	-	-		-	-	-
Age Sq	+	+	+	+		+	+	+
Male		+	-					
Married	+		+	+		+	+	+
Unemployed	-		-					-
Income	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Education level			+					
Urban						+	+	
Religion/ Muslim			+	+	+	+	+	+

It appears that the Kyrgyz Republic is very similar in general demographic information to other developing and industrialized countries in their perception of happiness although there are fewer statistically significant socio-demographic variables correlated with happiness than in some other countries or regions. For example, there is no difference between male or female respondents and one's marital status has no influence on the perception of happiness. However, the most important result is that the respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic don't have contradictory results with other countries. In each country, economic factors tend to have the strongest impact on levels of happiness. Unemployment has a negative impact. Wealth, measured by either income or consumption, has a positive impact on happiness. For all regions, education has a significant and positive impact when wealth levels are

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., Graham and Pettinato, *Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies*. and WB/CA Survey Analysis

excluded.¹⁰¹ The Kyrgyz Republic appears to not be significantly different in standard demographic determinants for happiness from other developing countries or western industrialized countries.

The final component of the first hypothesis is the comparison of the Kyrgyz Republic to other Central Asian countries. Because of the use of the same survey methodology it implicitly takes into consideration the ethnic and language similarities of the region and allows a broader exploration of the issues. For this section the countries were compared using ordered logit models with the perception of happiness as the dependent variable.

¹⁰¹ Graham and Pettinato, *Happiness and Hardship : Opportunity and Insecurity in New Market Economies*, 76-77.

Table 8: Individual Happiness--Regional Comparators

DV: Individual Happiness (ordered logit)	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>			
	All Four	All Four	KAZ	KYR	TAJ	UZB
Purchasing Hard	-1.672	-1.658	-2.676	-1.871	-0.879	-1.165
	[19.77]**	[19.50]**	[14.08]**	[11.12]**	[4.98]**	[7.80]**
Purchasing Required	-0.722	-0.727	-1.154	-1.075	-0.234	-0.503
	[9.13]**	[9.14]**	[7.32]**	[7.18]**	[1.27]	[3.27]**
Muslim		0.558	0.213	0.524	0.537	1.045
		[6.46]**	[1.36]	[2.76]**	[1.94]	[4.85]**
Protest All		-0.33	-0.573	0.061	-0.483	-0.47
		[5.18]**	[3.29]**	[0.52]	[4.21]**	[4.00]**
Trust		0.062	0.353	-0.105	0.185	0.084
		[1.00]	[3.15]**	[0.87]	[1.47]	[0.64]
Ethnic discrimination		-0.702	-0.735	-0.011	-1.833	-1.354
		[4.50]**	[2.70]**	[0.05]	[3.74]**	[3.34]**
Ethnic Minority			-0.01	0.276	-0.913	-0.26
			[0.07]	[2.08]*	[6.85]**	[1.81]
KAZ	0.141	0.12				
	[1.74]	[1.39]				
TAJ	0.107	0.054				
	[1.36]	[0.68]				
UZB	1.43	1.319				
	[17.45]**	[15.82]**				
Demographic controls:	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	5018	5018	1409	1318	1331	1463
AdjR2	0.0868	0.0954	0.1212	0.0802	0.0827	0.0844
Not significant (NS): Male, Urban, Ed. (Higher) <i>Absolute value of z statistics in brackets</i> <i>* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%</i>			NS: Male, Unemployed-KAZ, Urban- TAJ			

See Table 8 above for all of the results for regional perception comparisons.

Model one uses standard socio-demographic and economic control variables and model two incorporates broader subjective control variables as presented earlier in this chapter. The two important results are that first, there does not appear to be any significant difference among Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, and second, the model indicates that respondents in Uzbekistan are statistically significantly happier than those in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Both Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are positive compared to the Kyrgyz Republic, but the results are not statistically significant. It appears that respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic are not statistically less happy than their regional comparators. The finding that respondents in Uzbekistan are on average significantly happier than those in the Kyrgyz Republic is a bit surprising. Uzbekistan has the most repressed government compared to the other countries surveyed and its general economic situation is deteriorating. The issue of why Uzbek responses are so high has more to do with intrinsic factors in Uzbekistan and less about the responses in the Kyrgyz Republic. Since this dissertation is focused on the responses in the Kyrgyz Republic, the issue of the Uzbekistan responses is not addressed in detail.¹⁰²

The third model in Table 8 examines the key socio-demographic factors and subjective indicators that impact perception of individual happiness by country. Across all four countries, age, and ageSq have a negative impact on their perception of personal level happiness, there is no statistical difference between men or women respondents and those that say that purchasing basic necessities is hard are less happy than those that have the highest levels of purchasing power. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan, those that say they can purchase required goods are statistically less happy than those that can easily afford luxury goods and there is no significant difference between urban and rural respondents. Married respondents are statistically happier in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic.

¹⁰² This is the first publication reporting regression results from this survey. In recent presentations of the results, the reliability of the Uzbekistan responses has been severely challenged. The criticism is that Uzbekistan is so repressed that no one will give you an honest answer; all of the responses must be biased. This issue of positive biased responses will be addressed in detail in future publications that examine all four countries.

The impact of education on happiness is more varied throughout the region. Uzbekistan is the only country where levels of education had no impact on happiness. The Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are similar in that generally, those with lower levels of education are less happy than those with a higher education. While all of the other countries indicate that those with incomplete higher education, but above a secondary education level, are statistically happier than those that have completed higher education, only in Kazakhstan is it statistically significant. Employment had no statistical impact on level of happiness, except in Kazakhstan, where the unemployed were less happy. While there are minor differences, what is important is that across the region with its broad variations in geography, economic growth and political freedom, there was much greater similarity in baseline socio-demographics than differences in regards to perception of happiness.

When subjective issues or perceptions are added to the models, the countries still look quite similar although key differences begin to emerge. There are two key findings where the Kyrgyz Republic appears slightly different from its regional comparators. First, the Kyrgyz Republic is the only country where those that had already engaged in some level of protest had a positive impact on happiness, but it was not statistically significant. In the other three countries it was both negative and significant. Are those that protest in the Kyrgyz Republic happier than those that do not? While this response is not statistically significant in this model, this idea is examined in more depth in the last section.

The second finding is that minorities are statistically happier in the Kyrgyz Republic than their comparators. In Tajikistan, those that were in the minority were

statistically less happy than those in the majority ethnic group. What is interesting in the Kyrgyz Republic is when the ethnic minority variable is compared across the different groups; none of them are individually statistically significant, ethnic Uzbek ($z=1.59$), ethnic Russian ($z=0.50$) and other ethnicity ($z=1.88$). Even though it is a weak finding in the Kyrgyz Republic, it is intriguing, because in other cross-country happiness research, minorities have statistically lower levels of happiness. In the Kyrgyz Republic, the Uzbek minorities are generally wealthier than their Kyrgyz counterparts. This may be driving some of the positive happiness response. While there have been historic ethnic tensions as will be presented in the next chapter, the region also has a history of ethnic and religious tolerance because of its historic role as a cross-roads of trade and commerce. In the protests in March 2005, contrary to expectations, ethnic minorities did not play a role in the protests. Was this driven by the fact that they are happier or were there other stronger factors? The next chapter addresses this issue in more depth.

Is the Kyrgyz Republic significantly different from other Central Asian countries in perception of happiness? The Kyrgyz Republic does not appear to be significantly different across a wide variety of demographic, economic and subjective characteristics. There are differences among the countries, but there is no observable pattern or type of respondent in the Kyrgyz Republic that is consistently statistically different from the other three countries. While there appears to be a significant difference in perception of happiness between Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, it does not hold between the other two countries in the region.

Perception of Happiness Correlated with Protests

The second hypothesis is that perception of individual well-being is correlated with protest events. This hypothesis is examined first by comparing levels of individual happiness across oblasts, second by controlling for intensity of protests in regions and third by comparing the profile of protests by region.

In-Country Comparators

If happiness and protest are positively correlated than we would expect to see that regions in the country that are less happy are where protests occurred. Are the regions in the Kyrgyz Republic significantly different from each other in perception of happiness? The hypothesis of most regional scholars is that there is a significant difference in attitude between the northern regions of the country and the south. As presented in the overview of the region, the south is depicted as a region fermenting with anger and strife. This model examines that contention.

The first model in Table 9 compared all of the country to the Ferghana Valley region; while this area did have a negative perception of happiness it was not statistically significant. The second model compared all oblasts to the capital city Bishkek. There are several oblasts that have a statistically significant negative perception of happiness when compared to those in the capital. Batkin and Jalalabad had negative perceptions of happiness and are both in the south, but the largest southern region, Osh was not significant. This model also indicates that the negative perceptions are spread across the country, with Naryn in the east and Chi in the north both registering strong levels of dissatisfaction. It is interesting to note that Batkin and Naryn both register the highest levels of personal dissatisfaction, yet while Naryn

did have some early protests; Batkin had almost none and didn't get involved until the very end; Talas a region with widespread protests is not statistically significant.

Table 9: Individual Happiness—In-Country Comparators

DV: Individual Happiness (ordered logit)			
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Ferghana Valley	-0.232		
	[0.132]		
BAT (South)		-0.745	
		[0.300]*	
Jalal-Abad (South)		-0.546	
		[0.260]*	
IK (North)		-0.154	
		[0.284]	
NAR (East)		-0.732	
		[0.330]*	
OSH (South)		-0.481	
		[0.257]	
TALAS (North)		0.09	
		[0.353]	
CHUI (NORTH)		-0.532	
		[0.263]*	
Region: South			-0.276
			[0.151]
Region: East			-0.113
			[0.189]
Economic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1318	1318	1318
AdjR2	0.081	0.0855	0.0811
Not significant: Urban, Male, Unemployed			

The one consistent finding is that every region had a lower level of individual happiness compared to the capital except for Talas, but they were not all statistically significant. It does appear that regions in the Kyrgyz Republic are different from each other in perception of happiness, but there is not a clear regional distribution, nor does the pattern of individual personal satisfaction match with the pattern of where protests occurred as will be discussed in Chapter 5 & 6.

As noted above a difficulty in this methodology is that it is not possible to identify who exactly went to the protests. One approach is to take the data on where protests occurred and control for the relative level of intensity of the protests. The significant methodological problem is that the survey responses are taken prior to the protests occurring, so it is a temporal problem to use control data from when after the survey was taken. However, if the data on protests is used as a predictor, i.e. dependent variable, it is less of a concern. It uses the data taken at a specific time to predict future events.

Alternative Hypotheses

Individual well-being or happiness was tested for a relationship to regions where protests occurred based on an extensive literature both suggesting a relationship and empirical evidence arguing against. I present two alternative hypotheses concerning the relationship of protests and perceptions. I suggest that the measure of one's satisfaction with government may be a much stronger predictor of protest than individual perceptions. Alternatively, individual perceptions of the potential for conflict may be a useful predictors of where or if conflict will occur.

Satisfaction with Government

Regional Comparators

The majority of people were individually satisfied with their lives and economic situation (Table 4), but the same does not hold for their satisfaction with the country or economic situation. There is a clear separation of the standards and satisfaction at the household level and the national level.

When the regions within the Kyrgyz Republic are compared, every region had a majority dissatisfied with the situation in the country, except for Naryn oblast,

which incidentally is the poorest oblast in the country. By oblast the region with the most amount of dissatisfied responses was in Chui oblast and in Bishkek, the richest and most prosperous sections of the country. Of all ethnic Uzbek respondents, a small majority (54%) was satisfied, the only ethnic group satisfied with the situation in the country. The Russians had the strongest dissatisfaction (74%). Table 10 presents the results from regression models with the ordered logit dependent variable as level of satisfaction with the country. As expected from the cross-tabulations, all of the countries had statistically significantly more positive responses than the Kyrgyz Republic. When subjective variables are added to the model, the difference among the countries remains; it appears that there is a significant difference between the Kyrgyz Republic and the other three countries in satisfaction with the government.

When the countries are compared individually, there is a significant difference among the demographic variables. The Kyrgyz Republic is the only country where if one was male, employed or younger impacted one's satisfaction with the government. Muslims are more satisfied with the government both in the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan and those that were ethnic minorities were less satisfied. Income levels appear to matter less in the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan for predicting satisfaction with government. It appears that there is a significant difference between the respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic and the other regional comparators in satisfaction with government.

Table 10: Satisfaction with Government

DV: Satisfaction with Government (ordered logit)						
	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>			
	All Four	All Four	KAZ	KYR	TAJ	UZB
Purchasing Hard	-0.79	-0.773	-1.543	-0.637	-0.181	-0.688
	[9.60]**	[9.36]**	[7.79]**	[4.19]**	[1.06]	[4.55]**
Purchasing Required	-0.232	-0.241	-0.604	-0.193	0.185	-0.356
	[2.95]**	[3.05]**	[3.61]**	[1.43]	[1.03]	[2.28]*
Muslim		0.347	0.144	0.828	0.311	0.982
		[3.98]**	[0.82]	[4.49]**	[1.15]	[4.40]**
Protest All		-0.304	-0.385	0.015	-0.429	-0.395
		[4.71]**	[1.98]*	[0.13]	[3.73]**	[3.23]**
Trust		0.274	0.591	0.013	0.326	0.486
		[4.30]**	[4.70]**	[0.11]	[2.53]*	[3.56]**
Ethnic discrimination		-0.803	0.397	0.469	-0.709	0.148
		[5.12]**	[2.24]*	[3.63]**	[5.22]**	[0.98]
Ethnic Minority			-0.711	-0.905	-0.997	-0.307
			[2.46]*	[3.91]**	[1.95]	[0.71]
KAZ	1.779	1.724				
	[20.69]**	[18.91]**				
TAJ	0.637	0.622				
	[8.05]**	[7.72]**				
UZB	1.847	1.792				
	[21.82]**	[20.83]**				
Demographic controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	5018	5018	1381	1318	1283	1414
AdjR2	0.0771	0.0856				
NS: Male, Married, Ed. <i>Absolute value of z statistics in brackets</i> <i>* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%</i>			NS: Age, Married, Ed., Unemployed Significant only in KYR: Male, Age & Employment			

In-Country Comparators

Table 11: Satisfaction with Government—In-Country Comparators

DV: Satisfaction with Government	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Ferghana Valley	0.28		
	[0.123]*		
BAT (South)		-0.16	
		[0.282]	
Jalal-Abad (South)		0.381	
		[0.245]	
IK (North)		-0.002	
		[0.272]	
NAR (East)		0.824	
		[0.328]*	
OSH (South)		0.687	
		[0.241]**	
TALAS (North)		0.263	
		[0.341]	
CHUI (NORTH)		-0.049	
		[0.248]	
Region: South			0.38
			[0.142]**
Region: East			0.261
			[0.183]
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Econ Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1318	1318	1318
Not significant: Married, education <i>Absolute value of z statistics in brackets</i> <i>* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%</i>			

In Table 11, model 1, the Ferghana Valley is more positive towards the government when compared to the all other regions in the Kyrgyz Republic. When examined by region, it appears that the southern region is again more positive when compared to the north. The oblast that appears to be driving the result is Osh, with a highly significant strong positive satisfaction response. The other large southern area Jalalabad is also positive, but not statistically significant. The interesting result is that there does appear to be a geographical difference among the regions, but it is respondents in the north that are the most dissatisfied with the government. This does

not match with the reality of the protests. The protests started in the regions and moved towards the capital, as noted above this contradicts the data on personal levels of dissatisfaction being higher in the regions.

There are statistically significant differences among the different regions within the country. However, these differences are not along the anticipated divide between the north and the south. There does not appear to be a coherent story of why some regions are less satisfied with the government. While there is a correlation between economic variables and satisfaction, the economic indices appear to have little influence in predicting which region would have higher levels of satisfaction with government. There does not appear to be a correlation between satisfaction and regions where protests occurred.

Perceptions of Conflict

This section examines the questions related to perception of conflict and willingness to protest and act on grievances against the government. Regional conflict indicator models often use responses from local citizens concerning the potential for conflict in their region. Are individuals reliable predictors of the potential for conflict in their region? If a respondent thought conflict was likely (a minority for all three categories) they were asked several follow-up questions concerning reasons for conflict, the form of conflict, and participants in the conflict. See Table 12 for specific types and percentage of responses. In direct match with what the majority of people had complaints about, most people thought that the reasons for local or country conflict would be economic issues (poverty, unemployment, taxes, etc.) followed by the failure of government (corruption, failed

elections) Most people think that any conflict in country will take the form of mass riots, followed in ranking by swearing and insults.

The respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic were very accurate in their prediction of the primary causes and pathway of protests. While the question specifically referenced civil conflict, respondents focused on mass riots and personal insults as the instrument for implementing the conflict. The respondent's interpretation of conflict is important. The respondents interpreted conflict as anything ranging from swearing and insults to armed conflict. The word in Russian is a cognate and has a broad interpretation; therefore it is important to see that the form of conflict referenced was mass riots and protests.

Table 12: Reasons and Form of Conflict

What can be possible reasons for such conflict?*	Country	Local
Economic Issues	28%	30%
Failure of Government	17%	22%
Crime	11%	10%
Religion, ethnic or clan issues	11%	7%
Land or water	9%	15%
General societal frustration	7%	4%
Other	16%	13%
In which form can the conflict be over the next few years?*		
Mass riots	46%	41%
Swearing and insults	22%	36%
Armed conflict	16%	7%
Slight use of physical force	16%	14%
Other	1%	1%

*(Only those that gave a "likely response" in the Kyrgyz Republic)

Regional Comparators

Standard control demographic variables such as employment, age, male or female, and marriage appear to have no statistical impact on perception of conflict

even without additional control variables. Urban respondents think that local and country conflict is more likely than rural respondents. Economic levels has very little statistical impact on perception of conflict at any level, with a minor impact on country conflict with those at the mid-level of income thinking it is less likely than those at higher income levels. Education has a mixed correlation with perception of conflict, but generally, the more educated one is the more likely they think conflict is going to occur at all levels.

In comparison to the region, respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic are statistically significantly more likely to think that conflict is going to occur at all three levels of conflict. When subjective controls are added, those that have protested before are more likely to think conflict will occur. Ethnic minorities in the Kyrgyz Republic are less likely to think conflict will occur, but in contrast, those that have been ethnically discriminated against think conflict will occur.

For space, the results are presented below only for local conflict for each country. When the regression is run individually for each country, the Kyrgyz Republic continues to appear very different. For local conflict, in all countries urban respondents think conflict is likely. Economics has no statistical impact when evaluated individually by country and almost no impact in the Kyrgyz Republic; except for the better educated thinking local conflict is more likely. The Kyrgyz Republic is closest to Kazakhstan in responses for local conflict and the most different from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

For country conflict, urban residents again think it is more likely in the Kyrgyz Republic; economics, education and all demographic controls don't have any

influence. Ethnic minorities think there is a low probability of local conflict, country conflict or war. For the Kyrgyz Republic, war is very similar to country conflict—no basic demographic or economic variables are significant.

Table 13: Regional Comparators—Conflict

DV:	<i>Local</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>War</i>	<i>Local</i>			
	All Four	All Four	All Four	KAZ	KYR	TAJ	UZB
Urban	1.044	0.548	0.096	0.56	1.225	1.921	1.119
	[0.113]**	[0.084]**	[0.093]	[0.203]**	[0.165]**	[0.446]**	[0.248]**
Purchasing Hard	0.108	-0.19	-0.138	0.239	0.253	-0.727	0.29
	[0.139]	[0.105]	[0.116]	[0.275]	[0.208]	[0.447]	[0.315]
Purchasing Required	-0.234	-0.222	-0.119	-0.241	0.016	-0.754	-0.124
	[0.131]	[0.099]*	[0.107]	[0.240]	[0.187]	[0.451]	[0.357]
Muslim	-0.058	-0.319	-0.266	0.024	-0.44	-0.863	-0.744
	[0.185]	[0.149]*	[0.155]	[0.256]	[0.240]	[0.540]	[0.400]
Protest All	0.334	0.221	0.283	0.533	0.305	-0.287	0.661
	[0.112]**	[0.087]*	[0.095]**	[0.266]*	[0.156]*	[0.357]	[0.230]**
Trust	-0.274	-0.429	-0.137	-0.788	0.129	-0.295	-0.571
	[0.115]*	[0.089]**	[0.091]	[0.211]**	[0.162]	[0.456]	[0.333]
Ethnic discrimination	1.445	1.173	1.171	1.13	1.928	-0.321	1.283
	[0.181]**	[0.162]**	[0.171]**	[0.342]**	[0.241]**	[1.257]	[0.511]*
KAZ	-0.493	-0.512	-0.575				
	[0.205]*	[0.163]**	[0.170]**				
TAJ	-1.113	-1.353	-2.438				
	[0.350]**	[0.257]**	[0.302]**				
UZB	-0.212	0.39	-1.414				
	[0.195]	[0.138]**	[0.157]**				
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4390	4171	4005	1205	1218	1030	1293
PseudoR2	0.1304	0.0904	0.1149	0.076	0.1098	0.1806	0.1373
NS: Age, AgeSq, Male, Employed, Marriage Absolute value of z statistics in brackets * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%				NS: Age, AgeSq, Male, Marriage			

The strongest predictor for attitude towards local conflict, country conflict or war was if one has been ethnically discriminated against. At first this appears to be intuitive, these individuals feel pushed aside from society and strongly feel disenfranchised. However, it is a small minority that is driving this response; the vast majority (94%) had not experienced any discrimination in the country because of their ethnicity. Of the 6% who had been discriminated against, 45% were Kyrgyz,

followed by 26% Russian, and only 19% Uzbek. This is the exact reverse of the ethnic populations in the country. For some reason, the majority ethnicity in their country is complaining of ethnic discrimination. Another similar question asked respondents to rank the current relations among different ethnic groups; a strong majority (86%) said that they were very or somewhat good. As will be examined later, this may be driving the intense response related to conflict and protests. The ethnic majority feels that they are entitled to certain rights and feel discriminated against when individuals from a minority ethnicity have greater access to economic opportunities or other advantages.

Based on the regression analysis presented above, the Kyrgyz Republic is significantly different from other Central Asian countries in perception of potential for conflict. Respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic are more likely to think all levels of conflict, local, country and war are going to occur than their comparators throughout the region.

In-Country Comparators

When compared across regions in the Kyrgyz Republic, those that are in the Ferghana Valley are less likely to think conflict at any level will occur compared to everyone else in the country. As shown below in

Table 14, Batkin, Jalalabad and Osh, the three southern oblasts, are all statistically significant from Bishkek in their perception of the potential for conflict. Respondents in each region think all types of conflict are less likely to occur, with Osh having one of the strongest values.

When the regions are compared as a group, the southern region is statistically less likely to think local and country conflict will occur. However there is no statistical difference between the eastern region and the northern region. Similar to the findings for the levels of government satisfaction, there is a significant difference between the north and the south, but the north is more concerned about conflict than the south. It appears that individuals may not be good predictors of whether conflict will occur in their own region. Most people may assume that it can't happen in their neighborhood.

Table 14: In-Country Comparators--Conflict

DV:	Local	Country	War
<i>Model 1</i>			
Ferghana Valley	-0.59	-0.56	-0.122
	[0.176]**	[0.141]**	[0.138]
<i>Model 2</i>			
BAT (South)	-0.828	-1.146	0.252
	[0.382]*	[0.341]**	[0.313]
Jalal-Abad (South)	-0.669	-0.667	-0.316
	[0.293]*	[0.259]*	[0.267]
IK (North)	-0.427	0.193	0.2
	[0.330]	[0.284]	[0.300]
NAR (East)	-1.29	-0.916	-0.507
	[0.455]**	[0.366]*	[0.347]
OSH (South)	-1.599	-0.605	-0.308
	[0.337]**	[0.265]*	[0.268]
TALAS (North)	-0.701	-0.625	-0.906
	[0.445]	[0.368]	[0.393]*
CHUI (North)	-0.208	0.1	0.225
	[0.299]	[0.258]	[0.265]
<i>Model 3</i>			
Region: South	-0.751	-0.582	-0.123
	[0.193]**	[0.158]**	[0.156]
Region: East	-0.464	-0.062	-0.003
	[0.240]	[0.194]	[0.197]
Demographic controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Econ Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subjective controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1218	1200	1170
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets			
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%			

Conclusions

The general public in the Kyrgyz Republic in November 2004 were upset at the government for failing to provide basic services and for extreme corruption. They blamed the local and national government for not addressing any of their personal or their community's needs. The data suggests that the primary areas of dissatisfaction were about economic and social concerns, not about the rights of political expression, free speech or a free media.

This section started by presenting two hypotheses. The results indicate that the Kyrgyz Republic is not statistically significantly different from comparators around the world, in the region and in-country in terms of perception of individual happiness. Within the country, small differences were found among oblasts where the southern respondents had slightly higher levels of individual satisfaction. Second there is not a strong relationship between levels of individual happiness and regions where protests occurred. The alternative hypothesis showed that the Kyrgyz Republic is statistically different from other countries in the region in satisfaction with government, but there is not a correlation between in-country levels of satisfaction with government and protests.

The data from the survey in Table 15 suggests several important conclusions and also presents several puzzles for the researcher, a few of which I have highlighted throughout the previous sections. This final section presents three key results from the survey; first, the lack of importance of personal levels of individual happiness, second, the relative importance of dissatisfaction with government, and third, perception of conflict as a poor predictor for regions, but strong between countries.

Table 15: Characteristics of Respondents & Regions in the Kyrgyz Republic

<u>Satisfied</u>	
Individually:	Younger or older, married, Muslim, and ethnic minority
Government:	Younger or older, employed, Muslim, and ethnic minority
<u>Dissatisfied</u>	
Individually:	Less education and less money.
Government:	Urban, male, poor, higher education, ethnically discriminated against
<u>Anticipate Conflict</u>	
Local:	Urban, higher education, protested, ethnically discriminated against
Country:	Urban and ethnically discriminated against
War:	Ethnically discriminated against
<u>Low Probability of Conflict</u>	
Local:	Ethnic minorities
Country:	Muslim, ethnic minority
War:	Muslim, ethnic minority, trust
Regions in the Kyrgyz Republic*	
<u>Satisfied</u>	
Government:	Ferghana Valley, Naryn, Osh
<u>Dissatisfied</u>	
Individually:	Batkin, Jalal-Abad, Naryn, Chui
<u>Low Probability of Conflict (as compared to Bishkek)</u>	
Local:	Ferghana Valley, Batkin, Jalal-Abad, Naryn and Osh
Country:	Ferghana Valley, Batkin, Jalal-Abad, Naryn and Osh
War:	Talas
*no dissatisfied with government or satisfied individually regions.	

Individual satisfaction

The results suggest that individual perceptions of wellbeing are not reliable indicators of potential for political protests. This does not suggest that the individual happiness levels don't provide some useful foundation, but independently they are poor predictors. As discussed in Chapter 2, relative deprivation and conflict theories based on individual levels of dissatisfaction have shown to lack empirical substantiation. This research further supports the finding that an individual's level of personal happiness is a poor predictor of conflict. The concept of the "poor, unhappy

protester” appears to not be a workable or useful theory in this case. It may be that the converse is actually true.

In the Kyrgyz Republic those that had previously protested against the government were on average happier, but not statistically significant at the .05 level, but are at .10. As noted above this is a weak indicator that those that have protested in the Kyrgyz Republic actually have higher levels of individual satisfaction. Frey and Stutzer, discussed in Chapter 2, find a correlation between levels of happiness and civic engagement. Those that participate more in local politics are statistically happier than those that don't.¹⁰³ (As they note, this does not imply knowing the direction of the casualty arrow). It may be that the protesters in the Kyrgyz Republic were happier than those that didn't protest because in emerging democracies, like the Kyrgyz Republic, political protests have become a legitimate form of political engagement. Street protests are not the product of deep grievances rather they are the legitimate expression of basic discontent with the government. In a more developed democratic process, institutions, civic organizations and town meetings would provide forums for the public expression. Citizens in nascent democracies seek any means available to express their political attitudes; when the voting box is viewed as corrupt and institutions don't exist, street protests become the legitimate form of expression.

These participants are therefore not personally aggrieved with high levels of personal dissatisfaction, but the exact inverse, they are relatively personally happy and seek a mechanism to express their political attitudes.

¹⁰³ Frey and Stutzer, *Happiness and Economics : How the Economy and Institutions Affect Well-Being*.

This theory of ‘happy protesters’ has some validation based upon the interviews with participants. But it only captures a certain type of protester during a discrete period of time. As the timeline in Chapter 5 will show, there were significant differences in the type and attitude of protesters as the protest shifted in time and space. These happy protesters were part of the earliest protests and the final day protests. They were the ones who initially came out into the squares to express dissatisfaction with their candidate losing. They were also included in the final protest in Bishkek. It however doesn’t capture the radical and more vocal protesters that joined later into the protests and increased the physical violence and strength of the protests. These protesters appeared to have had a very different agenda.

One problem with interpretation is that these ‘happy protesters’ were simultaneously dissatisfied with the government. A traditional model of linking happiness to protest would assume: $Y(\text{protest}) = b_1(\text{unhappy}) + b_2(\text{low economic status}) + b_3(\text{vector of personal traits}) + \text{epsilon}$. This research suggests an alternative construction: $Y(\text{protest}) = b_1(\text{happy}) + b_2(\text{high dissatisfaction with gov't}) + b_3(\text{low economic status}) + b_4(\text{vector of personal traits}) + \text{epsilon}$. The dissatisfaction with government may be the more important variable in determining the probability of ones participation in protest. However while the correlation between the variables is low, it’s not possible to completely disentangle the direction of influence between the two variables.

The unanswered question is what type of protests do ‘happy protesters’ participate in? Is there a useful predictor based on economic satisfaction or potential for political expression that would indicate when this type of protest would occur?

The results here are suggestive and indicate the need for more research based on happiness indicators and potential for protest.

Dissatisfaction with Government

Respondents in the Kyrgyz Republic are significantly less satisfied with the government than in any of the other countries. This finding suggests that these protests were based on dissatisfaction with the government and a desire to change the government. The survey indicates that it is possible to distinguish between countries based on levels of dissatisfaction with government, but within a country, the differences were more complicated. It is a puzzle why regions away from the capital were more satisfied and why urban and better education respondents were the most dissatisfied. It is not clear why southern regions are less dissatisfied with the government when they receive the least amount of services and support. The expectation was that southern regions would have greater dissatisfaction with the government, the result was the opposite. Southern regions were actually more satisfied with the government than other regions. This runs counter to the thesis that the regional protests could be explained by differences among oblasts. It lends credibility to the thesis that it was not the regional differences that sparked the protests, but rather the specific actors and circumstances in each place which encouraged the protests.

Perception of Conflict

The final category of questions suggested as a predictor were questions related to perceptions of conflict. Similar to the satisfaction with government issues, there appears to be a difference among countries with the Kyrgyz Republic respondents

significantly more likely to perceive a greater probability of conflict than respondents in the other countries. There is a difference among the local oblasts in their perception of conflict, with the urban areas and specifically the capital having a statistically significant greater perception that local conflict will occur, compared to other regions.

This matches with the strong predictor results from the urban variable that was observed across all of the countries. Those that are in the cities, specifically the capital, and are slightly better educated are more likely to anticipate conflict at the local level than any other group. Is this because they have better access to information about what is really occurring in the country? Information flows up to the capital but not back to the regions. These well informed urban representatives may be reliable predictors of where conflict could occur in the future. Or they may base their perception on an irrational, unsubstantiated attitude towards the regions as being less stable and more probable for conflict and violence.

Why is the south, the one region with the greatest history of conflict, the one region that does not anticipate conflict? Is it similar to Tajikistan, the only country with a civil war, but no one predicts it occurring again? Why are regions where violence has occurred less likely to predict violence, although empirically it is more likely to occur? Unfortunately, these questions are beyond the scope of this research and specifically the capabilities of this data. The question of perception of conflict appears useful for distinguishing among countries, but not for identifying regions within a country.

This section has provided the parameters for where conflict may occur and identified some of the key variables that influence one's perception of satisfaction with government and perception of conflict. But the survey data is inadequate in providing a clear explanation for the process of the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic. There are many contradictions in the data and it is impossible to clearly identify motives to initiate and sustain the protests. The next section presents the initial conditions of the country, the history of protests, and the timeline of the March events.

Chapter 5: **Initial Conditions & Timeline**


This section starts with an overview of the macro-economic and social conditions in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2005. It then presents a brief history of relevant protests, conflicts, and significant events in The Kyrgyz Republic from 1990 till 2005: the conflict in Uzgen, land reform protests, the Ak Sai shooting, and the 2000 election protests. Finally it details a timeline of the events in 2005. The goal of this section is to provide an important perspective and understanding of the road leading to the March 2005 events. The election protests in March did not come out of a vacuum and while the paper's primary thesis is the priority of the process over initial conditions, the initial conditions set the stage and provide determination for what tactics and strategies were useable and useful. The details of the protests, timing and events in March are explored in some detail with the objective of showing the enormity and magnitude of the events, as well as the temporal and spatial patterns of the protests.

Macro socio/economic environment

The Kyrgyz Republic is a country that is slowly creeping forward with reforms but with few natural resources and almost no industrial base it is still one of the poorest countries in the region. It had positive GDP growth from 1998 until 2002 when a pit fire at the Kumtor gold mine retarded GDP by .05%.¹⁰⁴ The impact of the accident indicates the dependence of the country on its primary commodity export. Since 2002, the GDP per capita grew from \$290 USD in 2002 to \$440 USD in 2005. In comparison to the rest of the region, the Kyrgyz Republic's GDP per capita is only

¹⁰⁴ "The World Economic Outlook Database," (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003).

Figure 2: GDP Growth (annual %)



Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2006

slightly higher than Tajikistan. GDP growth again decreased from 2004 to 2005.

According to field research, the standard of living in rural areas has been getting worse while the percent of severe poor increase each year.¹⁰⁵ The infant mortality rate is lower than any of the neighboring countries, but is still high compared to developed countries; it ranked 110 out of 177 countries in the 2006 UNDP Human Development Index.¹⁰⁶ For indicators traditionally used in civil conflict predication, more than 90% of the surface area of the country is considered mountainous.¹⁰⁷

Using the CIDCM model, Kyrgyzstan's political environment place it in the highest risk area for civil conflict because it is a country caught between full democracy and

¹⁰⁵ Interviewee #55 & #56, Interviewed by Author, Kyrgyz Republic, 2003.

¹⁰⁶ UNDP, *Human Development Report: Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis* (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

¹⁰⁷ UNDP, *The Kyrgyz Republic: Millennium Development Goals Progress Report* (Bishkek, The Kyrgyz Republic: 2003).

anocracy.¹⁰⁸ Finally, there is a high degree of ethnic disparity; ethnic Kyrgyz comprise about 65% of the country with Uzbeks and Russians combining for approximately 25%.¹⁰⁹

History of Conflict

Pre-1991

“In the summer of 1990, one of the most violent ethnic conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union exploded in the southern Kyrgyz town of Uzgen and spread to the neighboring villages which set astride the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Lasting almost six days, 171 Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Russians were killed, and more than 5,000 crimes perpetrated (murder, rape, and robbery).”¹¹⁰ The initial cause of the conflict was over distribution of land, but it turned into a violent ethnic cleansing. A Kyrgyz analyst writes that “the participants in the mass violence had no official leadership. Rather, these were cases of uncontrolled mass paranoia, based mainly on fear and conformity with mob values.”¹¹¹ The inner-ethnic fighting was only stopped by the intervention of Soviet troops. The killings and crimes were primarily perpetrated by young men and the violence fueled by extreme ethnic prejudices and a mob mentality.

Fifteen years later, these events have not been forgotten by the local population and there is an open recognition of the delicate ethnic balance that exists,

¹⁰⁸ Marshall and Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2003 : A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*. (Anocracy is CIDCM’s term for a country between a western democratic level and full autocracy.)

¹⁰⁹ UNDP, *The Kyrgyz Republic: Millennium Development Goals Progress Report*.

¹¹⁰ Kevin Jones, "Land Privatization and Conflict: Is Kyrgyzstan a Model?," in *In the Tracks of Tamerlane : Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century*, ed. Daniel L. Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, Center For Technology and National Security Policy, 2004), 259.

¹¹¹ Anara Tabysheva, "The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Ethnic Conflict in the Fergana Valley," in *Peaceworks* (United States Institute of Peace, 1999).

specifically in the south of the country. The violence ultimately led to the downfall of the Communist leaders who were seen as ineffective and unresponsive and to the appointment and election of Askar Akayev as a new voice for economic and social reform in the country.¹¹²

1991-2005

Since the early 1990's, Central Asia, the Kyrgyz Republic and specifically the southern area of the Ferghana Valley has been identified by national and international observers as a potential zone of intense inter- and intra-ethnic fighting. Located in the heart of Central Asia, the Ferghana Valley is bordered by three countries: The Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The Valley encompasses more than 20% of the population living in Central Asia and "has a higher population density and more economic distress than most other parts of Central Asia."¹¹³ The living standards for the majority of people in the region continue to deteriorate and Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic represent the lowest indices for the region in the UN Human Development Report Index.¹¹⁴

In 1997, former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot issued a dire warning about the potential for conflict, "religious and political extremism and . . . outright war" in Central Asia.¹¹⁵ In 1999, a panel of regional experts in the landmark study, *Calming The Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central*

¹¹² Ibid., 22.

¹¹³ Lubin et al., *Calming the Ferghana Valley : Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia : Report of the Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action*, xv.

¹¹⁴ UNDP, *Central Asia Human Development Report* (Bratislava, Slovak Republic: UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2005).

¹¹⁵ Strobe Talbot, "A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia," ed. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute (Washington, D.C: Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1997).

Asia predicted a high potential for strife within the next few years.¹¹⁶ The *Peace and Conflict, 2001* report by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management, states “The Asian heartland is a . . . serious crisis zone.”¹¹⁷ A 2002 International Crisis Group report on Central Asia states, “there is the clear danger that if relations between the states involved in border disputes deteriorate, the potential for conflict will sharply rise.”¹¹⁸ In a Department for International Development (DFID) 2002 report, the impact of development aid in the Ferghana Valley was highlighted as a potential cause of serious conflict.¹¹⁹

None of the dire predictions have occurred. Small protests erupted over land reform and other specific local issues in the Kyrgyz Republic, but widespread protests and conflict has not engulfed the region. Some regional pundits have pointed to the topic of this paper, the political protests in 2005, as an example of the region out of control. Yet a compelling feature of these events was how well controlled the protests were, except for one or two isolated instances, it was not a wild, unruly mob rampaging through the country.

Land reform is an example of a contentious issue that has a high potential for violent conflict, but never erupted. However, it was a key underlying motivation for some aspects of the March protests. In the southern part of the country, the relationship to land is different from the north because of the scarcity of irrigated land. In the southern regions the population is much denser than in the north and

¹¹⁶ Lubin et al., *Calming the Ferghana Valley : Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia : Report of the Ferghana Valley Working Group of the Center for Preventive Action*.

¹¹⁷ Ted Robert Gurr, Monty Marshall, and Deepa Khosla, *Peace and Conflict Report* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, 2001), 2.

¹¹⁸ "Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential," (Brussels: International Conflict Group, 2002), 6.

¹¹⁹ Tony Vaux and Jonathan Goodhand, "Disturbing Connections: Aid and Conflict in Kyrgyzstan," (Oxford: INTRAC, 2001).

there is much greater competition for the scarce resources of useable land.¹²⁰ However, in spite of these tensions, there have been remarkably few large-scale protests or violent events over land. The key exception is the incident in Ak-Sai in 2002.

Aki-Sai

“In March, 2002, five people were killed and as many as 62 wounded when police fired on a crowd protesting outside the southern city of Kerben, Kyrgyzstan.”¹²¹ The crowd had gathered to protest the imprisonment of a popular local politician, Beknazarov. A parliamentarian from the southern region of Jalal-Abad, he had previously been a regional prosecutor and was accused of improper conduct as a prosecutor. Political analysts and opposition leaders believed that the real reason was his outspoken criticism of the President and several land deals that the President had concluded with China. Almost immediately upon his arrest, crowds formed in the town of Kara-Suu in the Jalal-Abad region to protest. Several hundred supporters went on a hunger strike to demand his release. A few days after his trial started, the crowd in Kara-Suu took eight regional government officials hostage and seized the local government building.¹²²

As the trial reached its end point, thousands of demonstrators gathered, blocking roads and marching towards the courthouse. Police intervened to stop the crowd and while reports differ, it appears that the police fired first into the crowd killing 5 people and wounding many more.¹²³

¹²⁰ Interviewee #43, Interviewed by Author, Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹²¹ Jones, "Land Privatization and Conflict: Is Kyrgyzstan a Model?," 259.

¹²² RFE/RL, February 19, 2002

¹²³ RFE/RL, March 18, 2002

An important aspect of these protests is that Kurmanbek Bakiev, one of the leaders of the March 2005 protests and the current President, was Prime Minister at the time of the Ak-Sai shootings. In 2002 he “accused people of ‘provoking mass disorder’ in the village of Kerben in the province of Jalal-Abad. He said law-enforcement officials were forced to fire in self-defense when the protest turned violent.”¹²⁴

The immediate outcome of the shooting was that Beknazarov was released from prison under the condition that he would try and stop the protests and Prime Minister Bakiev and the leaders of the security apparatus were forced to resign.

There are four key long-term outcomes from the Ak-Sai event, the failure of the security services, the power of a protest to collapse a government, the rise of Beknazarov and finally, the tactical lessons learned in managing a protest. The actual process of the shooting will never be completely understood, but it is clear that the police fired on an unarmed crowd. The outcome for the public was an indictment of the security services and an increase in distrust of the police. The outcome for the police was the fear of using any force on a crowd. In interviews with security members in 2005, they all pointed back to the events in 2002 as strongly influencing their lack of interest in engaging the protesting crowds.

The second outcome of the events was the lesson that a crowd of popular protesters could collapse a government. Weeks after the shooting, the Prime Minister and the government were forced to resign. It was the first time that a government in the former Soviet Union had been forced to resign because of popular protests. It is an interesting irony that the Prime Minister forced to resign because of the political

¹²⁴ RFE/RL, March 18, 2002

protests was Kurmanbek Bakiev, the leader of the protests in March 2005 and the new president elected in July 2005.

The third outcome was that it brought Beknazarov, the jailed political leader to national attention and established him as a national opposition leader. It also guaranteed support to him from his region in the south. Beknazarov would play an important role behind the scenes in planning and implementing the protests in the spring of 2005.

The final outcome is that the incidents in March of 2002, the blocking of roads, seizing government buildings, taking hostages, large scale local protests, etc. were all tactics that were used again in March 2005. In Tarrow's language these had become part of the "repertoire of contention".¹²⁵ It established what was possible for the crowds to accomplish and the mechanisms how they should be implemented.

The events in Ak-Sai were an important event that interviewees regularly referenced. It was an important emotional and practical reference point for the protesters. As one local reporter commented, "Aksai was not financed. It started in the fields and was only about ideology. In March, the Yurtas, food, buses, transport, etc. were paid for by someone!"¹²⁶ His comment raises a point discussed in the later sections, the fundamental difference between the two protests; however, the key point is that the Ak-Sai protests played an important role in framing and providing motivation for both the protesters and the police in March 2005.

¹²⁵Tarrow, *Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, 20.

¹²⁶ Interviewee #24. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

2000 elections

The last parliamentary elections were in the spring of 2000 and at that time there were also protests over the rigging of the elections. But the protests were relatively small and for over a hundred days a small number of protesters camped out in the capital city of Bishkek. There were not widespread protests across the country and the protests in Bishkek were not led by any one opposition leader, but seemed to be much more representative of a group of frustrated rural farmers who felt that sitting in the capital was the only way to show their displeasure for the election.

After the Presidential elections in the fall of 2000, even though the elections were not considered free and fair by the OSCE, there were very few protests across the country and no wide spread protest movement.

Expectations for March 2005

There was an overwhelming expectation from the citizens that the 2005 Parliamentary elections would not be fair. Several individuals interviewed mentioned that the politicians had votes to sell and there were plenty of people willing to buy.¹²⁷ A group of local employees at a community health organization described how the price for a vote goes up during Election Day, the price ranging from 100c. in the morning to 500c in the evening (\$2.5-12.5). As a local agriculture specialist commented, “in the winter there is politics to make money, in the summer there is farming.”¹²⁸

Numerous local respondents stated that as the date for the elections approached they all anticipated that the elections would be illegal and would be

¹²⁷ Interviewee #48. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹²⁸ Interviewee #48. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

stolen.¹²⁹ There was a very strong perception throughout the country that the election would not be clean. This bias, whether true or not, had an important role in guiding people's reactions after the election. The perception of illegal activity was so strongly ingrained that it's questionable if the regime could have done anything to convince the populace that they conducted a fair election.

According to a Western diplomat, "There were not high expectations that elections would be any different from before", many of the campaigns were quite dirty because so much money was involved.¹³⁰

As an indication of what senior local political officials were saying, on February 22nd only a few days prior to the election, the Ombudsmand for the country, Tursunbai Bakir uulu stated that "in his view elections in 2005 would be the least fair of all."¹³¹ An opposition leader in the south said that he knew from the very beginning that the election would not be real and was prepared to organize pickets if needed in support of opposition candidate Bakiev.¹³²

In an article a few days before the election, the Financial Times reported that there was a potential for another Ukraine or Georgia style revolution, but "nonetheless, Kyrgyzstan's elections are expected to pass peacefully. Voters are apathetic. The opposition is divided. Television is government controlled."¹³³ This was a view echoed in numerous interviews locally. While people anticipated that the elections would not be free and fair, they did not anticipate that it would lead to widespread protests and revolt. Even when small protests started to occur across the

¹²⁹ Interviewee #43. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹³⁰ Interviewee #09. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹³¹ EurasiaDigest, 2-28, IRIN

¹³² Interviewee #53. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹³³ Financial Times, 2-25, Gorst

country, it wasn't heavily reported on by the national TV and a lot of citizens were unaware of what was happening. Many people regarded them as just paid supporters coming out for their candidate and having no real impact on the wider issues.¹³⁴

The general economic situation was slightly improving prior to the March events, the banking situation improved, the financing was better, overall economic growth was up. But according to numerous local businessmen interviewed, everything else was as it had always been, tax, customs, corruption, etc hadn't changed at all. Medium-size businesses were tired of being controlled by the government. They had lost any respect for Akayev and they were saying, "Anyone but Akayev."¹³⁵

The general expectations prior to the Parliamentary elections by the local citizens, civil society and international observers were that the elections would not be fair and would be conducted illegally as they had been for many years. But there was also not an expectation that wide scale protests would occur. There were a few protest leaders who were planning to organize protests and encourage another colored revolution, but they were a small minority.

As mentioned above, another important event that shaped the expectations were the events in Georgia and Ukraine the year before. Akayev took the lesson from these events that the only way to prevent the overthrow of his government was to shut-down the opportunities for the opposition and to prevent them from protesting. Akayev believed that the Rose and the Orange revolutions had been led and funded by western organizations so he tried to shut down western funded media, NGOs and

¹³⁴ Interviewee #54. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹³⁵ Interviewee #14. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

civil society. Akayev failed to understand the different dynamics that were at play in both the Ukraine and Georgia process and failed to understand that pushing back on the opposition would only create more pressure for them towards his regime.¹³⁶

The President had already extended his term in office once and the anticipation by the opposition was that Akayev was going to protect his interests by remaining in office or appointing one of his children as President or Prime Minister. When the President's son and daughter announced they were running for the Parliament this reinforced the conviction and apprehensions of the opposition.

Timeline of events March 2005

Overview

As early as mid-January, months ahead of the elections, protests started in Bishkek and by February had spread to isolated communities throughout the Kyrgyz Republic. The earliest protests started even before the actual elections as protests of pre-election fraud and were initiated simultaneously without contact or information between regions. After the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) criticized the parliamentary elections, the protests increased and significantly expanded in intensity and duration after a second round of elections were also widely viewed as fraudulent. The largest and most destructive protests were in the south of the country. Large-scale protests did not spread to the north until near the end.

This timeline will start in early January 2005 since the previous section already covered the years and months leading up to the end of 2004. There are five major components to the timeline, the first period is the pre-election period, starting

¹³⁶Fiona Hill and Kevin Jones, "Fear of Democracy or Revolution: The Reaction to Andijon," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (2006).

from early in January until the first election on February 28th; second, from the first election until the run-off election on March 13th; third, from March 13th till March 20th; fourth March 20th till March 23rd, fifth, and finally the events of March 24th.

Pre-Election

The majority of serious infractions and restrictions on the democratic process occurred prior to Election Day. As the OSCE/ODIHR final election report stated, in the time period prior to the elections, there was “widespread vote-buying, de-registration of candidates, interference with independent media, and a low level of confidence in electoral and judicial institutions on the part of candidates and voters.”¹³⁷ For most of the local citizens, the problems weren’t the actions on the day of the elections, but the process leading up to it. A former government official commented that it sent a dangerous signal to the politicians running that anyone could use dirty tactics.¹³⁸

On January 7th, five former diplomats were excluded from running by a regional court that declared that they had failed to live continuously in the country for the mandated five years prior to running.¹³⁹ One of the diplomats was Roza Otunbaeva, the former Ambassador to the UK and the US and a leading candidate for the presidential elections that fall. She would have been running against Bermet Akayeva, the President’s oldest daughter. Supporters of Otunbaeva held small protests in the capital from the 8th of January until the 31st. Otunbaeva declared an end to the protests when it became clear that she was not going to be allowed to run.

¹³⁷ OSCE, "The Kyrgyz Republic: Election Observation Mission Final Report " (2005), 1.

¹³⁸ Interviewee #15. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹³⁹ OSCE, "The Kyrgyz Republic: Election Observation Mission Final Report ", 10.

The majority of candidates that wanted to run were allowed. More than 90% of those that originally registered participated in the first round of elections; from 425 initial candidates, 23 withdrew, 12 were deregistered and one died.¹⁴⁰ The problem for the Akayev regime was that the deregistered candidates were very popular and had strong local support they were able to immediately rally onto the streets.

All of the protests weren't against the government. In the capital city of Bishkek, on February 3rd there were groups collecting "signatures both for the resignation of President Akayev and for extending his term."¹⁴¹ In Bishkek, on February 5th was an early protest led by the Coalition for NGOs where about 300 "meeting participants shouted 'Down with Akayev'".¹⁴² Almost a month prior to the parliamentary election, this is one of the first recorded incidents where people were specifically protesting about removing Akayev. In an interview after the events, the director of the Coalition claimed that they were not there to protest against Akayev, but only for "free and fair elections."¹⁴³

On the same day in the southern city of Osh, a group led by opposition politician Otunbaeva and civil society leader Ismailova attempted to hold a forum on free elections. They were prevented by the local government officials to gather at a public building and went to a local restaurant. The local police made them leave the restaurant and broke up the meeting on the grounds that they failed to have an official permit for a gathering.¹⁴⁴ The government had already prevented Otunbaeva from

¹⁴⁰ Interviewee #09. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹⁴¹ EurasiaDigest, 2-07, 16:18

¹⁴² EurasiaDigest, 2-07, 10:47EST from Interfax and AP

¹⁴³ Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹⁴⁴ EurasiaDigest, 2-07, 16:18EST

running for office, but continued to harass and intimidate anyone remotely capable of gathering supporters.

In mid-February several very popular local politicians were excluded from running because of different minor infractions of the election code. On February 19th, about a week prior to the elections, crowds in the eastern town of Kochkor started blocking roads to protest their local candidate's exclusion from standing for election. A few days later in the far eastern town of Kara Kol, a crowd of about 750 protesters picketed a local district court and another 300 blocked an important transit road to the eastern region. At the same time, in the far west of the country in Talas, a former Akayev supporter and government official was prevented from running and more than 1,300 of his supporters protested at a district court.

A week from the elections, protesters had cut down trees and set up tents to block three key roads in the country. At one site, protesters blocked off the access to the main gold mine in the country, an important source of foreign currency and the largest international investment.

In one of the largest protests, more than 3,000 supporters of two local candidates blocked the road to the poorest region in the country, Naryn. On the 23rd of February, K. Bakiev went to visit and speak to these protesters. This is the first instance of links starting to form between different protesters and national opposition leaders.¹⁴⁵ On the Wednesday before the elections, protesters continued to block key roads and in the late afternoon in the eastern city of Balykchy, protesters for the first time seized a local administrative building.

¹⁴⁵ EurasiaDigest, 2-28, Akipress

As an indication that the protesters were only supporting their local candidate, a group of protesters in the town of Typ dispersed after a local court reinstated the local candidate. The next day, on the 24th, the Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of five popular candidates and local protests in their regions increased immediately including local supporters of A. Japarov who seized a government district building in Kochkor.¹⁴⁶

The next day, protesters supporting the deregistered candidates agreed to disperse. They stated that they would “vote against all” in the election.¹⁴⁷ This is an interesting option on the ballot that allows voters to vote against everybody listed. If enough people vote this way, it annuls the election and new candidates have to come forward and a new election has to take place. Under Kyrgyz election law, in a first round election, a candidate has to receive at least 50% of all the votes to win, if no one does, the top two candidates have a runoff about two weeks later. The fact that they were willing to use the ballot box for their specific candidate reinforces the localized nature and dynamics of the protests.

1st Round

The elections were held on Sunday, February 27th with a turn out of about 60%. There were few major reports of problems during the day, although 11% of all polling centers did report some type of problem, from minor issues to preventing people from voting.¹⁴⁸ The OSCE officially stated that “while more competitive than previous elections, [the elections] fell short of OSCE commitments and other

¹⁴⁶ EurasiaDigest, 2-28, GazteaKG, AKIpress EurasiaDigest, 2-24, 10:06, RFE/RL EurasiaDigest, 2-28, Kabar

¹⁴⁷ EurasiaDigest, 2-28, Interfax

¹⁴⁸ OSCE, "The Kyrgyz Republic: Election Observation Mission Final Report ", 2.

international standards for democratic elections in a number of areas.”¹⁴⁹ An international political expert working in country, pointed out that while there were numerous voting infractions, many members of the opposition still lost their districts legitimately. They were outspent and often out organized because they hadn’t expected to face formidable, well-organized and well-funded opponents.¹⁵⁰

On the actual day of the election, the process appeared to be much better than prior elections with the use of inking, transparent ballot boxes, and numerous local and international observers. There was an interesting gulf between the international community’s perspective on the elections and the local communities. As the OSCE Ambassador stated, the “international community thought it was the best, locals thought it was the worst.”¹⁵¹ As discussed in the previous section, part of the difference is expectations; local observers were “ready for a real election.” The international community focused on Election Day; the locals on all the time far ahead of the elections. The election was perceived locally as very dirty with more money involved than before, and several known criminals and corrupt businessmen running. In addition, the court decisions were quite corrupt, deciding in reverse of what people had just voted.¹⁵² Yet in spite of these very real limitations, the reality was that it may have been the most transparent and competitive election in the history of the country.

In the first round, the pro-government party Ala-Kyrgyzstan won the vast majority of seats. For the opposition it was a huge setback, they had anticipated

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 1.

¹⁵⁰ Interviewee #21. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹⁵¹ Interviewee #26. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹⁵² Interviewee #09. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

winning at least 25 to 30 seats and won only a handful. An opposition NGO leader commented that in Bishkek there was a feeling of resignation that the establishment had shifted and they should start looking for ways to accept the new reality with Akayev and his children in power.¹⁵³

Immediately after the election results were announced, 600 supporters of A. Tolonov blocked roads and key north-south traffic in the town of Kara Suu in Osh oblast. 3,000 supporters of T. Alimov protested in the streets in Aravan, Osh, 10,000 supporters of Sadyrbaev marched on the mayor's office in Nookan, Jalal-Abad and finally a few hundred people gathered in Bishkek, "waving yellow and pink banners."¹⁵⁴ As will be discussed in more detail in the later sections, the initial protests were primarily in the northern regions, but the largest protests after the elections were in the south. Part of this is because more candidates were deregistered from running prior to the elections in the north and more candidates lost their seats through the election process in the south.

The next day, more protesters came out to block roads and protest in government centers. One group in Aravan, Osh agreed to unblock a road after the local court agreed to hear the candidate's complaints on March 2nd.¹⁵⁵ On March 3rd, a grenade was thrown onto the balcony of opposition leader Roza Otunbayeva's apartment. No one was living in the apartment at the time as it was being repaired. Opposition leaders saw it is a clear provocation by the government, the government

¹⁵³ Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹⁵⁴ EurasiaDigest, 3-07, 9:33EST, Burke AFP, 03-01, 2:05GMT
EurasiaDigest, 3-07, 9:33EST, BurkeAFP, 03-01, 2:05GMT
EurasiaDigest, 3-07, 9:33EST, Burke

AFP, 03-03, 10:25GMT, AFP, 2-28, 1:12PM GMT, Coleman

¹⁵⁵ AKIpress, 3-01, 5:10GMTAFP, 03-01, 2:05GMT

official statements implied that it was planted by the opposition to engender sympathy for the opposition position. The level of distrust and animosity between the government and the opposition leaders increased significantly.¹⁵⁶

On the same day, March 3rd, in Osh, hundreds of protesters for both the elected parliamentarian, D. Sabirov and the opposition candidate, P. Tolonov protested and came close to clashing in the center square, only prevented from violence by police that stepped in and separated them.¹⁵⁷ On the 4th, in Jalal-Abad, a major city in the south, “over 300 people seized by storm” the Governor’s office. This was the first time the opposition seized a Governor’s or Oblast Administration building. The crowd was “demanding [the] resignation of President Askar Akayev, the governor of Jalal-Abad region and his deputy, the mayor of the town of Jalal-Abad and the heads of local law-enforcement agencies”¹⁵⁸

Saturday March 5th was an important turning point for the opposition protesters throughout the country because they solidified their control over the Jalal-Abad Oblast Administration building that would become a focal point for the protests over the next few weeks. According to news reports, in Jalal-Abad at 14:00 local time, there was a “clash between protesters and personnel” over the regional administration building that had been seized the previous day.¹⁵⁹ However, the struggle was short as by 19:00 the media reported that the “situation . . . is calm and stable” with approximately 80 people inside the building and 100 on the street in

¹⁵⁶ AFP, 03-03, 10:25GMT

¹⁵⁷ AFP, 03-03, 3:41GMT

¹⁵⁸ AKI press, 03-04, 8:56GMT

¹⁵⁹ AKIpress, 03-05, 920GMT

front.¹⁶⁰ Protesters would remain in control of the government building in Jalal-Abad from the 4th until the 24th, except for a short period early on the morning of the 20th.

As word of the protests in Jalal-Abad spread, supporters of Sadyrbaev, who were continuing their protests in Nookan, a few hours away, threatened to march down to Jalal-Abad in support of their fellow protesters.¹⁶¹ This is one of the earlier references to protesters offering to link with other protesters from throughout the region.

On the same day, 400 supporters of D. Chotonov continued to protest in Kara-Kulja, in Osh oblast and hundreds of supporters of A. Kulbaev held protests in front of the Lenin District Court in Bishkek and 500 supporters of N. Kasiev protested in At-Bashy district in Naryn oblast.¹⁶² In the ongoing dispute over the government building in Jalal-Abad, by Sunday the 6th about 150 occupied the building, while 100 soldiers prevented more from entering and another 700 "demonstrated in the square outside chanting 'Down with Akayev'". Throughout the day, protesters began arriving from other nearby cities.¹⁶³ This is the first reference to protesters from one region traveling to another area in support of a local protest. Jalal-Abad was to become the focal point of protests over the next few weeks.

On Sunday the 6th, almost 2,500 supporters of Kadyrbekov blocked the Bishkek-Torugart road. This road is the main access point for all trade between the Kyrgyz Republic and China; as well as an important route to get trade into eastern

¹⁶⁰ AFP, 03-04, 5:17pmGMT

¹⁶¹ AFP, 03-05, 12:30GMT, Coleman

¹⁶² EurasiaDigest, 3-07, 9:33EST, Kabar, KelKel, Azattyk

EurasiaDigest, 3-07, 9:33EST, Kabar, KelKel, Azattyk

EurasiaDigest, 3-07, 9:33EST, Azattyk

¹⁶³ AFP, 03-06, 12:06GMT

Uzbekistan and northern Tajikistan.¹⁶⁴ Another group of protesters blocked the road from the main cities up toward Naryn. When the Naryn Governor tried to return to the oblast center he was detained at the roadblock by protesters for about six hours, but was released after negotiations by a local leader of the civil society community.¹⁶⁵

On Monday, the 7th, protests started for the first time in the farthest east region of Issyk-Kul, about a hundred people protested and demanded the resignation of the Governor.¹⁶⁶ In Jalal-Abad, the government building continued to be occupied and the crowds swelled to more than 1,500-2000 people outside with young people marching through the square shouting "Akayev Resign".¹⁶⁷ In one of the earliest examples of opposition leaders joining forces and speaking to supporters from other regions, national opposition leaders Otunbaeva, Sydykov, and Sadyrbaev spoke to the crowds in Jalal-Abad on Tuesday the 8th.

In Uzgen, a small town in between Jalal-Abad and Osh, 500 protesters organized by Jusupaliyev seized the mayor's office and led chants against the President.¹⁶⁸ On Wednesday the 9th almost 200 supporters traveled to Osh from Kara-Kulja District to protest in front of the government building.¹⁶⁹ The protesters specifically came to Osh as it is the regional center in the south and considered the second capital of the country. There were few if any "local" protests held in Osh; similar to Jalal-Abad it was used as a focal point for regional protests. In the southern town of Kara Suu, supporters of A. Tolonov attempted to seize the government

¹⁶⁴ AKIpress, 03-06, 15:25GMT

¹⁶⁵ AFP, 03-08, 5:32PMGMT

¹⁶⁶ AKIpress, 03-07 8:34GMT

¹⁶⁷ AKIpress, 03-07, 5:37gmt

¹⁶⁸ AFP, 03-08, 5:32PMGMT

¹⁶⁹ EurasiaDigest, 3-14, 8:56EST, Interfax, AKIpress

building. This was the third attempt to seize a government building in the past week.¹⁷⁰ In Bishkek, several students, most of them members of the youth organization "Birge", held a thirty-minute protest at National University one of the very few protests held in the capital city of Bishkek during this time.¹⁷¹

On the 10th, the opposition parties finally united together to form a Coordination Council and elected K. Bakiev as the Council leader.¹⁷² This was a significant step, as a key weakness of the Kyrgyz opposition was their lack of a unifying front. One of the success factors in both Georgia and Ukraine was that they were able to unite together against the government.¹⁷³

In the northern town of Ivanovka, a few miles from Bishkek, 500 rallied in support of Andashev and were dispersed by 150 police with some protesters sustaining minor injuries.¹⁷⁴ In the north of the country, the police were much more willing to use force. In the south the police were either completely overwhelmed in numbers or choose not to use force for fear of making the situation worse or because of general lassitude. In the north there was less hesitation and more willingness to initiate actively breaking up gatherings. Part of this was the influence of the Ak-Sai events on the security services in the south. No one wanted to be responsible for more attacks on civilians.

¹⁷⁰ EurasiaDigest, 3-14, 8:56EST, AKIpress

¹⁷¹ EurasiaDigest, 3-14, 8:56EST, AKIpress

¹⁷² RIA Novosti, 03-10, 5456976

¹⁷³ Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul, *Revolution in Orange : The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie endowment for international peace, 2006).

¹⁷⁴ AFP, 03-12, 4:30PM GMT

2nd Round

On Monday, March 14th, the OSCE criticized the second round of the elections for almost the same reasons as the first round. During the second round there was voting in 39 of the 75 districts.¹⁷⁵ After the second round of elections, only six opposition figures won compared to twenty in the last parliament. Similar to the first round, the day of the election was relatively quiet with protests starting back up the next day.

Protesters in the south and in the west immediately responded with large scale protests. 1,000 supporters of A. Madumarov took over the local government office in the southern town of Uzgen, and in a village to the south of Osh, supporters of M. Sultanov blocked the roads.^{176,177} In Talas, 2,000 supporters of R. Dzheenbekov gathered at the Oblast Administration and another 3,000 blocked the road between Talas and Taraz, Kazakhstan.¹⁷⁸ After protesting for several hours in front of the Oblast Administration building, the protesters broke past police barricades and seized the central government building in Talas.¹⁷⁹ The Governor of Talas and the head of Bakay-Ata district administration were both held hostage.¹⁸⁰ Protesters now controlled the Jalal-Abad and the Talas Governor's offices.

The 15th in Jalal-Abad was an important day for the opposition as they organized a "Kurultai". A "Kurultai" is an ancient gathering dating back to the selection of Khans and Emirs with the purpose to choose through an election process

¹⁷⁵ AFP, 03-13, 5:41GMT

¹⁷⁶ AFP, 03-14, 5:30PM, GMT

¹⁷⁷ EurasiaDigest, 3-15, 10:12EST

¹⁷⁸ Interfax, 03-14, 1556 GMT

¹⁷⁹ AKIpress 03-14, 15:30GMT

¹⁸⁰ Interfax, 03-15, 7:01GMT

the next ruler. It has no legal authority, but was a very powerful revival of an ancient custom. Reports differed, but somewhere from about 5,000 to 15,000 protesters and representatives from throughout the region gathered that day. According to video footage that I have seen, the number appears to be much closer to the 5,000. It was shown as an orderly and well-managed process. The main opposition leaders appeared and spoke, and K. Bakiev was selected as the representative leader of the people.¹⁸¹ According to a New York Times reporter there, about 2,000 attended and 400 police looked on "while speaker after speaker denounced the election".¹⁸²

As one participant commented, that day it was a celebration for the opposition. Politically, it was an important development for at least symbolically, the people were choosing their own new leaders. While it only represented a fraction of the population and was in a small city in the south, it was an important moment. Two parallel political structures were starting to emerge, the one managed by the White House in Bishkek and the one managed by K. Bakiev in Jalal-Abad. Many observers felt that the south was lost to the White House on the 15th.¹⁸³

The same day in Osh, several hundred supporters from mountainous villages continued their protests against the government.¹⁸⁴ In Bazar-Kurgan, in the Jalalabad region, the head of the regional administration and his deputy were taken hostage and then released later in the day.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ AFP, 03-15, 11:45GMT

¹⁸² NYT, 03-16, Pala

¹⁸³ Interviewee #35. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹⁸⁴ AFP, 03-15, 11:45GMT

¹⁸⁵ AKIpress, 03-16, 12:51GMT

The next day in Osh, on the 16th, the crowd became more violent in their attempt to break through the police cordon around the government building.¹⁸⁶ Speaking publicly for one of the first times since the elections, President Akayev denounced the opposition stating that they were trying to start a civil war.¹⁸⁷

In another region in Jalal-Abad, supporters of T. Madiyarov seized the local government building and blocked the road to Toktogul, a major water reservoir.¹⁸⁸ In addition, protesters blocked the southern road to Tadjikistan.¹⁸⁹ At this point all but one or two of the main roads into the country were blocked by protesters.

On the same day, 600 protesters seized the district building and held the mayor hostage in Kochkor, Naryn.¹⁹⁰ A new district leader was appointed by the crowd of more than 3,000.¹⁹¹ On March 17th, 100 Supporters of Yusupov clashed with about 200 supporters of Tolonov in the southern border town of Kara Suu, near Osh. Tolonov's supporters used horsemen to drive Yusupov's supporters away; the police finally separated the two groups and prevented any physical violence.¹⁹² In Toktogul, Jalal-Abad, supporters of Madiyarov occupied the state administration building.¹⁹³ In Osh, after weeks of growing protests, hundreds of demonstrators finally seized the Governor's office in the center of town, which "police barely resisted".¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁶ AKIpress, 03-16, 13:33GMT

¹⁸⁷ AFP, 03-16, 4:43PM GMT

¹⁸⁸ AFP, 03-16, 4:43PM GMT

¹⁸⁹ AFP, 03-16, 4:43PM GMT

¹⁹⁰ AKIpress, 03-17, 10:51GMT

¹⁹¹ AKIpress, 03-17, 10:51GMT

¹⁹² AKIpress, 03-17, 11:02GMT

¹⁹³ AKIpress, 03-18

¹⁹⁴ ITAR-TASS, 03-18

As of March 18th, the governor's offices were held in Jalalabad, Talas, and Osh. The same day, Ar-Namys, a political party backing jailed politician F.Kulov started a small rally in the center of Bishkek.¹⁹⁵

March 20-23rd

The government believed that it had to retake control of the regional government offices. Early on the morning of March 20th at approximately 5:30AM, Ministry of the Interior Special Forces stormed the government buildings in Osh and Jalal-Abad and physically removed all of the protesters.¹⁹⁶

According to interviews with survivors, "each of the men had a police stick. They didn't differentiate [between] ladies or men, they beat up everybody, pulled their hair. We tried to prevent them from beating up youngsters, but we got beaten severely."¹⁹⁷ As the protesters were taken away in two Kamaz trucks, some of the younger protesters jumped off the back of the trucks because they feared they were being taken to be shot.

As one middle-aged woman stated, "I personally thought that I will die, but when we came to Suzak and they told us to write explanatory letter I started thinking that I will live further. They scared us so much that I thought I will be killed. And then they drove us home, they thought that now we are scared and will not do anything."¹⁹⁸ This same woman returned back to the square later in the day to attend the growing protest. As will be analyzed further, the harsh reaction by the government served as a spark to the opposition and to galvanize support from

¹⁹⁵ AKIpress, 03-18, 8:16GMT

¹⁹⁶ ITAR-TASS, 03-20

¹⁹⁷ Interviewee #51. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

¹⁹⁸ Interviewee #51. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

throughout the region. The attacking and beating of the women and children spread quickly. There were many rumors, all untrue, that up to as many as ten protesters had been killed.

Later in the day as news spread about the events, more than 10,000 protesters marched on the government building in Jalalabad. About 2,000 were armed with sticks and stones and used a bus to break down the police building. They burned the Interior Services building and the prosecutor's office. More than 700 protesters moved into the Governor's building, hanging banners out the window demanding Akayev's resignation.¹⁹⁹

From an eyewitness, who was in the bazaar in the center of Jalal-Abad, she said that everyone at the bazaar was aware of the events and knew what was happening. They were using their mobile phones and were in contact with others coming into town. By around noon more and more people from the villages came into town and most people left the bazaar to go towards the center of town. One woman witnessed people gathering in the streets, some with rocks, sticks and a Kamaz full of rocks. She said that it didn't appear that anyone was really leading the protests, it appeared that no one knew what was happening.²⁰⁰

Opposition leader Rosa Otunbayeva stated in an interview that day that "people took control over the city by midday." In her words, all police in Jalal-Abad passed on the side of the people. 'One can easily say that these regions are under popular control'.²⁰¹ Later in the day the Jalal-Abad airport was seized and covered

¹⁹⁹ AFP, 3-20, 5:08GMT

²⁰⁰ Interviewee #16. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁰¹ RIA Novosti, 3-20

with rocks and burning tires were lit around the airport with the goal of preventing the government from flying in special troops to quell the uprising.²⁰²

After the storming of the building in Jalal-Abad, numerous eye witnesses stated that no one saw any policemen on the streets at all. They had all left and gone home, with many of them refusing to wear their uniforms outside. People self-organized into groups patrolling the streets wearing red armbands and calling themselves, “Kirk Chovo” or 40 helpers, after the legendary helpers to Manas.²⁰³

People came from all different regions and areas now to support the protest. Depending on the reports, there were at a minimum 10,000 and possibly as high as 20,000 people in and around the center square in Jalal-Abad on the 20th and 21st. There were as many as seven large yurtas (local round felt houses) set up on the square. Throughout the protest in Jalal-Abad, local people gathered money to support the protesters. One local organization reported that they took up a donation of about 1000c (+/- \$25) and some of them even took a few protesters into their homes. Most of the people in the town were sympathetic with the demonstrators even if they didn’t go out and protest themselves.²⁰⁴

The next day, March 21st was the celebration of the holiday Nooruz, the Turkish celebration of the New Year, traditionally one of the largest celebrations in the country. In Osh, the government thought that everything was over after they had brought in the Special Forces to move people out as they had done in both Osh and Jalal-Abad. In Osh, the local officials started organizing for the Nooruz celebration; things appeared to be back to normal with kids on the square and musicians

²⁰² RIA Novosti, 3-20, 18:43GMT

²⁰³ Interviewee #16. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁰⁴ Interviewee #49. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

playing.²⁰⁵ According to eyewitnesses in Osh, on the morning of the 21st, around 11am they saw people in the wrestling center owned by E Bayaman preparing with clubs and bottles. As these witnesses walked to the square they saw children and parents dressed for Nooruz and the government preparing a parade.

There were about 200 police in riot gear in front of the government building in Osh. A little after noon a crowd started to gather in the center of town in front of the Lenin Statue and then a mass of more than 500 people, some armed with sticks and bottles and some on horseback, started toward the government building.²⁰⁶ The people stormed the building much more violently than they had the week before when they had first seized the building. The protesters had a clear tactic of putting women in front and using them as shields. The Special Forces had the building surrounded and the people surrounded them. There was no response by the local militia. “No one wanted to take responsibility to shoot or to respond.”²⁰⁷ According to members of the security services interviewed later, the Special Forces and the local militia did not get a specific green light from Bishkek to use force. When the women rushed in like a wave against the police force the police just stood to the side and let them come in. One witness stated that the police station and the Prosecutor’s office were both attacked and partially burned and then the crowd stopped and left these buildings, “it appeared to be very controlled and very targeted.”²⁰⁸

Similar to Jalal-Abad , the crowd seized the Osh airport and attempted to seize a local TV station, but were talked out of it by the station manager who promised

²⁰⁵ Interviewee #07. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁰⁶ Interviewee #12. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁰⁷ Interviewee #07. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁰⁸ Interviewee #07. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

additional coverage of the local events.²⁰⁹ Reuters reported that the "city's police chief later told the crowd he had ordered his men to cross over to the opposition."²¹⁰

From an interview with a senior special security forces employee in Osh, on the 21st he was at work and called and told to take off his uniform because people were getting wild and that some people had started to beat policemen. His chief told them to work only in groups, so "all three guards came in to work together at that time." He said that the senior authorities never gave the green light for shooting on the 21st. He was told not to use guns or batons if people came toward them; they were supposed to let them come.²¹¹

Again similar to Jalal-Abad, there were no policemen or local militia on the streets, after the protests. One witness stated that the last time they could remember seeing a police officer was on Sunday the 21st. There was a citizen's militia brigade walking the street keeping order, almost all witnesses reported that overall there was very good discipline in Osh and Jalal-Abad.²¹²

This was not an out of control wild crowd rampaging and destroying the city. There was order and control. Some of the control was from the leaders of the protests, but some of it was the self-organization of the local citizens. According to witnesses and participants, the patrols were locally generated and self-organized.

On the 21st in the morning, after Jalal-Abad had been taken by force the night before, the head of the President's Administration, Jaspekarov, announced at a press conference that everything in Jalal-Abad was under control of the government. This

²⁰⁹ ITAR-TASS-3-21

²¹⁰ Reuters, 3-21, 5:04AM

²¹¹ Interviewee #45. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²¹² Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

triggered a great deal of anger in Jalal-Abad and was part of the impetus for moving the protests to the north, so that they could show the country what was actually happening.²¹³

Symbolizing the radicalization of the opposition after the March 20 and 21st events in Jalal-Abad and Osh, Rosa Otunbayeva stated on Monday the 21st, that "we have one aim only: to oust this government . . . There is no need for talks anymore."²¹⁴

The events in Jalal-Abad forced the President to react. On Monday the 21st, Akayev indicated that he was willing to talk to protesters. In addition the AP reported that on the 21st, "Akayev orders CEC [Central Election Commission] and Supreme Court to investigate alleged violations".²¹⁵ On Tuesday the 22nd, the President addressed the country and Parliament stating that the "opposition is too fragmented for talks." In addition he "condemned 'homegrown revolutionaries' as ' individuals who are guided by foreign directives and inflict harm on their own people while receiving funds from abroad.'"²¹⁶

There were few, managed pro-government rallies during this time. On the 22nd there was a pro-Akayev rally in Bishkek. The rectors of the Universities were asked to support Akayev and students from the National Universities were forced to attend to show support for the government.²¹⁷ There was also a small pro-government rally held in the far eastern town of Kara-Kol in the Issyk-Kul oblast with a few hundred people protesting for order and stability.²¹⁸

²¹³ Interviewee #53. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²¹⁴ AP, 3-21, 8:25EST, Totogulov

²¹⁵ AP, 3-21, 8:25EST, Totogulov

²¹⁶ EurasiaDigest, 3-23, 10:25EST, AKIpress

²¹⁷ Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²¹⁸ ExpressKabar, 3-21, 12:00GMT

On Wednesday, the 23rd, the President fired the Interior Minister and Prosecutor General and replaced them with the much more defiant and stronger Dushebaev and M. Sutalinov. Interior Minister Dushebaev stated, "police can use 'any legal means, including physical force, anti-riot gear, and authorized weapons' in order to establish 'constitutional order.'"²¹⁹ The same day, the Defense Minister Topoev flew to Osh and met briefly with the "people's Gov, Aryykov" in order to prepare for negotiation talks between the Prime Minister and the opposition on the 24th.²²⁰

On the afternoon of the 23rd, a group of NGOs held a rally with the stated intention of providing information about what was actually happening in the south of the country. There was very little if any information in the north of actual events in the south of the country. Included in the gathering were students from Bergi, Kel-Kel, and from American University.²²¹ Most of the speakers were civil society leaders who had not been involved in the protests until this point. The meeting on the 23rd was broken up first by drunks sent into the crowd as *agent provocateurs* and then police arrested the civil society leaders.²²² Ironically, there were few if any political opposition leaders either at the meeting or arrested, the vast majority were NGO representatives who had played a very minor role up to that point in the events.

March 24th

The events of March 24th, the day that President Akayev fled the country demand a rather lengthy treatment. These events will also be discussed in the

²¹⁹ EurasiaDigest, 3-23, 10:25EST, RFE/RL

²²⁰ EurasiaDigest, 3-23, 10:25EST, RFE/RL

²²¹ Interviewee #40. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²²² Interviewee #21. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

analysis of the Reactive Dynamics section. On the 24th the opposition agreed to start the demonstrations in three places in Bishkek: near Osh Bazaar (the Nazeraliev center), Koch Jor and behind the Jorgo Kenesh. The idea was to have separate protests so it would be more difficult for the police to break-up.²²³ According to some organizational leaders the expectation was that they would spend more than a week, possibly up to ten days in the square. They made plans to have yurts set up, to have cooking locations, and to have water brought in. They had no anticipation that it would all be over in a few hours.²²⁴

Civil society members said that they were informed about the gathering only a few days in advance. From other interviews with opposition leaders it appears that there had been a plan for some time to work from outside the capital towards the center, but that the exact date and time was only fixed after the sudden reaction in Jalal-Abad and Osh on the 20th and 21st. It was then that plans were set to have a rally in Bishkek on the 24th and people began to travel from the south towards the north. Representatives from the Western Embassies and international organizations stated that they found out about the rally either the morning that it occurred or only the evening before. It was quite clear in interviews that this was planned and executed almost exclusively by the opposition politicians not by civil society or the international community.

The White House had also received information about the rally and had prepared by deploying military and police in riot gear as well as groups of young men

²²³ Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²²⁴ Interviewee #01. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

that were given helmets and wooden shields as well as blue arm bands to show that they were loyal to Akayev.

A former professional boxer and martial arts expert stated that he saw boxers, karate experts and other sportsman hired by the White House involved in the protests both on the 23rd and the 24th. These sportsmen who wore white caps to separate them from the crowd were also used to break up the meeting on the 23rd in Bishkek. There were approximately 500 “White Hats” who were needed because the militia was unable to intervene.²²⁵

By 10am on the 24th, the crowd in front of Nazaraliev’s center was growing larger. The location was near the Osh bazaar (the name of the largest bazaar in Bishkek) and as traders called out to each other to go to the protest, almost the entire bazaar shut down that day, similar to the process in Jalal-Abad. In the crowd there were many different groups with placards representing their region and political leader. It was well organized enough that they had time to arrive, organize and make placards. Representatives from all over the country, Naryn, Koch Kor, Jalal-Abad, Talas, Osh, were all represented. Those gathered at the center listened to speeches before starting the few miles walk towards the White House. This crowd formed the core which gathered more people as they went through the streets. There were reports of people getting off buses, leaving from the sidewalk and coming out of shops to join in the march down the street. All of the known opposition leaders were gathered at the front and led the march.

Very few of the people that were there had any idea of what was going to happen or what the plan was. The loudest chants were for Akayev to leave, but few

²²⁵ Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

believed that it might actually happen. The leaders were urging the crowd to be prepared to stay on for many days. The opposition leaders repeated many times that, “We’ve come to get a change in government”. They expected a long peaceful demonstration and then perhaps an orderly transfer of power.²²⁶

Nothing happened to prevent the peaceful march as they walked down the main boulevard taking up all four lanes of traffic and marched up towards the White House and the central square. From photographs and eyewitnesses, it was difficult to see from the beginning to the end of the crowd, it stretched for so many miles down the road. As the crowd approached the White House (they were walking parallel to the White House) soldiers at first attempted to stop them, but they must have received orders to let them continue, because they quickly backed away. Video footage shows a few soldiers moving to be in front of the crowd as well as young men many in leather jackets with blue armbands gathering and then suddenly melting away back towards the White House with one large man in plain clothes motioning for the others to move away and follow them down the street.

The group moved past the White House and gathered in front of the new liberty statue. A second smaller group representing the social democratic party had also arrived at this point in the center of town from the other direction. Opposition leaders passed around a bull horn and spoke to the crowd. The leaders were not asking for Akayev to leave, but there were banners saying “Akayev Resign” and it was a regular chant of the crowds. The leaders asked for Akayev to come and listen.

After a short time of speeches, from the side of the park between the White House and the crowd, young men came running towards the crowd with shields,

²²⁶ Interviewee #54. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

wearing helmets and blue ribbons and started throwing stones at the crowd. At first the crowd started to disperse and moved towards the edge of the square. The opposition leaders called out to the crowd to restrain themselves and to seek shelter on the other side of the square, but after several minutes of this the “crowd was not able to restrain themselves very long.”²²⁷ There were lots of unemployed, poor and young men in the protest crowd and they were not going to have a small group of men throw stones at them. They picked up the stones thrown at them and started to throw them back.

People ran away towards the buildings for safety, but when the crowd saw that they had all the stones, they took them and started to throw them back.²²⁸ A participant stated, “None of the people would have gone to the White House if rocks had not been thrown.”²²⁹

A small group of soldiers came down Chui many of them on horses and pushed the crowd back, but again the crowd surged back towards the police who quickly scattered and ran away to the gates, some were caught and beaten by the crowd. One young protester seized a police horse and galloped around waving a flag and encouraging the protesters. By now some of the crowd had pushed up against the gates of the White House. Between the first and second backlash, a crowd of about a 100 young men arrived from Osh wearing yellow ribbons. They were sportsman trained in the south and served as an important catalyst and energy in responding to the police.²³⁰ They marched to the gates of the White House and then helped to break

²²⁷ Interviewee #54. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²²⁸ Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²²⁹ Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²³⁰ Interviewee #54. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

down or climb over the fence and break into the White House. By this time there was no one left defending the building.

Akayev had left the White House about a half-hour before it was stormed. A few of his senior government officials remained in the building and were beaten. According to a Moscow radio interview with Akayev, the last order that he gave was that force should not be used to prevent the taking of the White House.²³¹

Immediately after the events there was a similar reaction in Bishkek to what happened in the south, “the people did not support the police, so the police disappeared that day.”²³² The police would remain off the streets during the period of looting for the next few days until former Mayor and security forces leader Felix Kulov appealed to them to return to their jobs.

As an international observer commented, the day after the ‘revolution’ water cannons were out cleaning the streets, the garbage was being collected and all of the street cars and buses were running on schedule. In spite of the upheaval, the basic requirements of a government continued to function.²³³

Conclusion

The deteriorating macro-economic conditions created an environment that was conducive to political unrest and protests. The history of ethnic violence and experience with political protests provided the necessary knowledge and repertoire of tactics and contention that could be deployed as needed. These provided the necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the political protests to start. As the detailed timeline demonstrated, the key factor in the growth of the protests was the

²³¹ Ekho Moskv (Moscow). March 29, 2005 1318 GMT, in Russian.

²³² Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²³³ Interviewee #14. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

interaction between the government and the protesters. The next section takes the details of the timeline as presented in this chapter and provides analysis on the dynamic processes that drove the protests forward.

Chapter 6: Dynamic Relationships

Overview

This paper's research question is why did non-violent protests occur in January 2005 and lead to the government's collapse? Chapter 4 showed that personal levels of well-being, dissatisfaction with the government, and perception of conflict had little influence on where or when protests occurred. Chapter 5 argued that the initial macro conditions were actually improving or had not significantly changed to provide a causal motivation for the protests. Chapter 5 also discussed the history of previous protests and suggested that while this was an important motivator and facilitator once the protests started, they were not the initiating or even the most important sustaining cause. The thesis of this dissertation is that the protests started for local causes, were sustained by local political entrepreneurs, increased because of political repression and succeeded because of the failures of the government. I argue that it is the repressive action of the government toward the protesters that was the most important component in determining the final outcome of the political protests.

As noted in Chapter 1, McFaul identifies seven characteristics in the other protests in the former Soviet countries: a semiautocratic regime with a degree of political competition, an unpopular incumbent, a united and organized opposition, independent electoral-monitoring capabilities, a modicum of independent media, the opposition's capacity to mobilize large numbers of protestors, and splits among the state's military, police, and security forces.²³⁴ The first section of this chapter

²³⁴ McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism."

examines these seven points and discusses their relative degree of importance in the Kyrgyz Republic. The process of events in the Kyrgyz Republic was significantly different from the protests in Ukraine and Georgia, but the research suggests that there is a greater similarity between the Kyrgyz Republic and other post-Soviet countries facing political succession. I argue that the role of international funding, western governments, and local civil society were minor and had limited impact on the initiation or sustaining of the Kyrgyz events. The following three sections examine the start of the protests for local reasons, the increase of the protests through the actions of political entrepreneurs, the sustaining of the protests based on repressive actions of the government and the success of the protests because of the failures of the Kyrgyz government.

Protest themes

A semiautocratic regime with a degree of political competition

The Kyrgyz Republic was a semiautocratic regime that had previously allowed a degree of political competition, but was in the process of restricting and constraining all political opposition. As noted in Chapter 2, a government that moves from highly restrictive towards a more open environment is undertaking a potentially dangerous and explosive process. In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, the country was moving backwards toward a more repressive environment. I argue that it is even more dangerous to move backwards than to slowly open to political competition. The citizens are told that they are in a democracy, but their freedoms are slowly taken away from them. The irony is that the Kyrgyz Republic was making some progress forward in large-scale political reforms, but it was perceived by the population to be

moving backward and attempting to consolidate power that it had previously relinquished.

An unpopular incumbent

The Kyrgyz Republic had an unpopular incumbent, but he was not up for election in the spring of 2005. In both Ukraine and Georgia the elections were for the president, in this case, it was parliamentary elections that brought down the president, but the new parliament remained. This is one of the fascinating ironies and conundrums of the outcome of these political events—the catalyst for the original protests, ousting the parliament, did not succeed, but the protests went away when the president fled from power. The president was extremely unpopular and had become a favorite ‘punching bag’ for every political, economic, or social problem in the country. The weak and ineffective parliament received almost no criticism and all the blame went towards the president. So while there was an unpopular president, he was not up for election until the fall of that year. It was his actions towards the parliamentary elections that led to his government’s collapse.

United and organized opposition

A key difference in the events in the Kyrgyz Republic was the lack of coordination among the opposition. Eventually, some members of the opposition formed a coalition and were able to select a public representative, K. Bakiev. But this was not a representative coalition and did not include the leaders of two of the largest protests in Osh and Talas. The meeting of the Kuralti on the 15th was another example of a partial unification of the opposition, but it was primarily a restatement

of the group that had formed a week before and was attempting to put a veneer of legitimacy on the illegal taking of government buildings.

It was not until the last day, the 24th, when the different groups of protesters and opposition leaders were able to organize to bring together almost all of the different factions and protesters from across the country. It is interesting to note that the one day that the opposition was able to organize together was the same day the government collapsed. The unification of the opposition lasted no longer than the time the protesters were on the square. By the next day, the coalition had collapsed and as subsequent political activities have demonstrated, there was never any unified or consistent message or theme of the opposition other than to remove Akayev.

Independent electoral-monitoring capabilities

Similar to the other countries, the Kyrgyz Republic did have independent electoral-monitoring capabilities by both local and international monitors. The OSCE led the international monitoring mission with 30 long-term and 175 short-term observers. The Coalition of NGOs provided the largest local observation mission with hundreds of local observers supported primarily with funds from the US Embassy. The international reports appeared to have some impact, the levels of protest increased significantly after both elections and the statements by the OSCE. However, there is no way to distinguish if the motivation was the candidates losing the election or the OSCE statements.

I would strongly argue that the OSCE statements were at best tertiary and most likely immaterial to the increase in protests. The OSCE statements were mainly fodder for the local civil society, NGOs, and the international diplomatic missions.

These organizations used the OSCE statements repeatedly in their interviews and statements, but they were never mentioned in any of my field interviews and also are not mentioned in the media interviews with protesters at the time. In contrast, in Ukraine and Georgia there was a high awareness of the impact of the international monitors and it was a much more sophisticated group of protesters who were aware of the usefulness of the international pressure.²³⁵ Because these protests were about local politicians for local reasons, the international observations had little impact on the initial protests.

A modicum of independent media

The Kyrgyz Republic had almost no independent media. In Ukraine there was a national level medium that was able to continue broadcasting throughout the country during the crisis. In the Kyrgyz Republic there was only one radio station with limited broadcast and a few newspapers that had a very limited readership. There was no national level opposition media that systematically reported on the events across the country. The newspaper MSN was an opposition newspaper that was printed with the support of Freedom House with US Embassy funds. The US government funded an independent printing house to provide the small independent newspapers in the country an opportunity to continue printing after the Kyrgyz government had forced the local companies not to print their papers. However, the distribution of the newspaper was less than 150,000 and had a very limited distribution outside the capital.²³⁶ It was a paper aimed at the intelligentsia and those in the capital; its most significant influence was in informing the leaders in the north

²³⁵ Åslund and McFaul, *Revolution in Orange : The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*.

²³⁶ Greg Walters, "Kyrgyz Press Helped to Speed Akayev's Fall," *The Moscow Times*, March 31 2005.

of what was occurring in the south. The protests that started in these isolated communities were not led or participated in by people who read the newspaper. In an unscientific poll, I would ask people in the villages I interviewed what newspapers they read and if they had ever heard of MSN, they almost all read one of the daily government or moderate newspapers. Except for civil society leaders, most people didn't know about the paper, including some key protest leaders in the south.

The US funded printing plant lost their power for a day until the US Embassy supplied back-up generators and the fight over the printing press became an important issue for the international community and the local NGOs, but in spite of their statements claiming large levels of influence, I argue that the opposition papers had a minor impact on the spread of the protests.²³⁷

The one medium that appears to have had some influence was the radio broadcasts of Radio Azattyk. This is a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty funded program that broadcasts in the Kyrgyz language. It has a limited broadcast, but is well known especially in the southern regions. The radio broadcasts were mentioned by many people when I asked where they found out about the protests. Radio Azattyk had reporters in the center of Jalal-Abad throughout the protests and provided some of the most up-to-the minute accurate reporting in the Kyrgyz language.

The other medium was the internet. This was primarily used by those in the capital to follow what was happening in the regions. There are hundreds of internet cafes throughout the city of Bishkek (it has the highest per capita ratio of internet

²³⁷ Craig S. Smith, "U.S. Helped to Prepare the Way for Kyrgyzstan's Uprising," *The New York Times*, March 30 2005.

users in the region!)²³⁸. These are relatively inexpensive and were heavily used by students to follow the events. As I mentioned in the methodology section, there were hundreds of blogs, message boards, and chat sites that were providing real time information from across the country. Because they were updated in real time and because several people would comment on the same event from having viewed it from different perspectives it offers a fascinating mosaic of information collaboration. I anticipate that this will be a significant data mine for future research of this and other regional protests.

The opposition's capacity to mobilize large numbers of protestors

The opposition did have the capacity to mobilize large numbers of protestors, as demonstrated in the protests in the capital on the last day, but what is important to note is that they were not coordinated protests. The process of the protests and the final result in the Kyrgyz Republic lacked leadership and central control for the events. The protests were local events led by local leaders that only on the last day came together for the brief protest that ousted the government. As discussed in Chapter 5 with the timeline, large numbers of protests came out in Naryn, in Talas and in Jalal-Abad at different times, but these were not coordinated events and in some ways had less impact on the national government because of the lack of central organization. The only time that the opposition coordinated was for one day.

Splits among the state's military, police, and security forces.

The police and security apparatus were divided throughout the country and not under any real central control. Local militia quickly sided with local political leaders. The central government had very little widespread control. The government

²³⁸ Bank World, *World Development Indicators* (2006).

was fundamentally very weak and out of touch with the reality of what was happening in the rest of the country. Militia in the south of the country quickly switched over to the opposition side and openly supported the opposition. In the north, some of the militia simply did not get involved in events and stayed home — this was more a tacit form of support than the open support in the south.

There were some splits among the state's military, police, and security forces. The most important was the split from the north to the south. The police in the south did not react harshly to the protests and were often, as in Jalal-Abad, in support of the protesters. As noted in the timeline, after March 20th there was no police presence in either Osh or Jalal-Abad. The central operating organs of the country had no control over these areas.

The Ministry of Interior was still in support of the President, but they were also not willing to use excessive force on the protesters. It was Interior forces that removed the protesters from the buildings in Jalal-Abad and Osh. While the tactics were clearly aggressive and meant to send a harsh and powerful message, none of the men used weapons and all of the protesters except for a few of the leaders were let go immediately after signing a statement that they would not participate again in protests. While these actions served to incite the crowds, in terms of levels of police brutality, this was a quite mild affair.

It is unclear what the role of the Ministry of Defense played in any of this. The Minister of Defense was acting as a go between with the leaders in the south in attempting to secure negotiations with the government. The main forces used in front of the White House were from the Ministry of Interior. There does not appear to have

been a 'palace coup' by the military switching sides at the last minute. My information indicates that they were waiting to see what would happen.

Lack of external influence

In Ukraine, Georgia, and the Kyrgyz Republic, foreign aid and interference was seen by the local government, the international media and other countries as a key cause and motivating factor. In reference to Ukraine and Georgia, McFaul writes, "foreign aid played no independent role in any of these breakthroughs (and rarely does), but contributed to the drama by increasing or decreasing the relative value of each of the seven factors."²³⁹ The role in the Kyrgyz Republic of these external actors was greatly exaggerated in both the international and the local press during and immediately after the events. As Hill and Jones noted in an earlier article:

"The international and regional media coverage of the Kyrgyz events and the Colored Revolutions glossed over Akayev's failings as well as the domestic crisis and misguided actions that hastened the government's demise. Instead, in the case of all three states—the Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine, and Georgia—the role of the international community, the individual countries' domestic civil societies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the local media was hyped and often misconstrued. A nefarious role was also assigned to the United States. Because of the active presence of U.S.-supported NGOs in all the "afflicted" countries working on democracy promotion and issues such as political party development, voters' rights, and electoral reform, media observers portrayed a pattern of blatant U.S. intervention to install its allies in key countries on Russia's borders."²⁴⁰

There were several different spheres of organizations promoting democracy that all played some role in the spring events. There are the international western official organizations, including the U.S. Embassy, the German Embassy (the EU representative Embassy), USAID, the OSCE, and the UN. There are the international democracy assistance programs, primarily funded by USAID funds, these include, the

²³⁹ McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism."

²⁴⁰ Hill and Jones, "Fear of Democracy or Revolution: The Reaction to Andijon," 8.

National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), Internews, IFES, Freedom House and OSI which is funded through Soros Foundation.

The role of the international external actors was very limited during the February to March period of 2005. Perhaps the most important role that the international organizations had played was in education and training programs over the past few years. While some members of the opposition had benefited from these trips, unlike in Georgia and Ukraine, few of those that had studied in the west or worked closely with the western embassies were included in the final government. There is some irony to the statements by the Russian government and media that the west, specifically the US and organizations such as Soros had directly financed and caused the protests. If they had caused them, then they did a poor job at realizing their goals. The new government was decidedly less favorable towards the west than the Akayev government had been for most of its rule.

According to US government representatives, the USG probably spent about 1.5 million USD on the election. A third of this was a special one-time funding to support the technical process of inking voter's fingers, similar to efforts in Afghanistan. Another third went through small grants to local organizations to provide election information and another third went to train and fund international and local observers as well as to train election commission members.²⁴¹ USAID was generally unsuccessful in getting people involved to lobby on specific issues. Most of the organizations agreed to work only on providing general election information. As Coalition director Edil Baisolov, said, there is a "myth of all the support from US and

²⁴¹ Interviewee #09. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

International organizations.”²⁴² When asked the level of influence of US government funding on the process, a US government diplomat stated that “Perhaps people were more aware of what a fair election should be,” they continued, “I believe it had a very indirect effect.”²⁴³ This presents an interesting situation, either international organizations did a lot more and aren’t willing to admit it, of which no hard evidence exists or they really did have no influence. One would assume that they would want to take credit for the money they spent. The apparent reality is that the programs had very little influence and only played a minor role in the events. The latter interpretation is much more logical and additional interviews and contacts support this argument.

There was an indirect influence of US government support, for example, the Media Center which is in the center of Jalal-Abad and is run by IREX with funds from the USG, played an important role in disseminating information about the protests. It was the only place where journalists could get out information every few minutes. The media center is less than a minute from the central square, so local journalists could be on the square observing and then run up and provide continuous updates. In local interviews, several journalists mentioned the importance of the place.²⁴⁴ In addition, Radio Azattyk mentioned earlier was supported through US funds.

Lack of internal organizations influence

Internal agencies include local NGOs and civil society organizations that serve to monitor political, democratic and human rights events in the country. One of

²⁴² Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁴³ Interviewee #09. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁴⁴ Interviewee #35. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

the largest of these is the Coalition of NGOs, founded in the early mid-1990's through the work of NDI and the direct financial support of NDI and USAID. Since then, the Coalition has become one of the most outspoken organizations for democracy in the country. Currently led by the youthful Edil Baisolov, the Coalition is very popular with the international community. Partially because of his fluency in English and articulate manner, Edil is one of the most quoted and interviewed government activists in the country. Another key local NGO is Counterpart, again founded with USAID funds, Counterpart is primarily a clearing house for providing small grants to local NGOs and civil society organizations on a wide range of issues, from health and poverty alleviation to women's rights and free and fair elections.

The local NGOs and civil society did play two important roles, one was to help facilitate the spread of information about what was happening in the regions to the international community. The Coalition of NGOs played a key role in getting this information out to the international community, including western media as well as other international organizations. The Coalition had a small army of close to a hundred observers scattered throughout the country using cell phones to report back to Bishkek about what was happening in the local villages. The Coalition provided information to the elite in Bishkek as well as the rest of the world of what was happening. They were an information pipeline, not the instigators or creators of the event.²⁴⁵

It was only when all the information came together that one could see it as a whole. The leaders had no plan or idea that the revolution would happen. Much of the information being put out by the local press was coming from the Coalition

²⁴⁵ Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

observers who were actually on the ground throughout the country. As the director of the organization acknowledged, the information dissemination “really was the most important role of the Coalition.”²⁴⁶

Counterpart had received a grant from USAID to promote fair and unbiased elections and to provide impartial observation. However, there were problems with the implementation at a local level. Grantees were often refused permission for trainings from local authorities and heads of Universities would prohibit trainings of any kind at their facilities.²⁴⁷

The second role that the local NGOs and civil society played was in moving information from the regions to the local population in the north. The youth organization Kel-Kel played an important role in spreading this information. On March 21st, during the Nooruz celebrations, they passed around printed sheets that had pictures and a description of what had occurred the day before in the south when the Regional Governor’s buildings had been stormed by the government and then retaken violently by the protesters. According to Kel-Kel leaders, they gave these sheets to policemen who were very interested in what was happening since they were not receiving information from any other source. The information that Kel-Kel shared was potentially destabilizing since the fact that the south was out of the control of the government for the past few days was new information to most people. Rumors had been circulating, but to have the facts that ‘the people’ were in control of the south was very powerful. It’s impossible to measure the full impact of this information flow, but it is hard not to imagine it to be quite demoralizing for a local

²⁴⁶ Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁴⁷ Interviewee #40. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

policeman to realize that his colleagues in the south had been completely overrun and were no longer patrolling the streets.

In comparison to Georgia and Ukraine, the youth organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic were very underdeveloped and did not play a significant role in the protests. As discussed above, the one youth organization that had a minor influence in the March events is Kel-Kel (although they have played a more important role in subsequent elections). Kel-Kel was started in mid January 2005 in response to pressure on students who felt they were being forced to vote for Bermet Akayev (the President's daughter). Several students came together because they believed that there was a need for open information to the students about their rights. A few of the original founders had spent time in Ukraine as election monitors and had observed the influence of the student-run organization "Pora". At its inception, Kel-Kel's actions were limited to Bishkek and a very small number of young people were involved. During the February elections some of the Kel-Kel members were election monitors. As noted above, because of the lack of a formal news dissemination process, a key role that they started to play was in providing information in the north about events in the south.²⁴⁸ In interviews with current Kel-Kel members in the south of the country, they said there was almost no involvement of Kel-Kel members or leaders in any of the protests in the south. The organization did not formally establish regional chapters until after the March events in preparation for the Presidential elections.

Even the leaders of the "opposition" did not believe that it was possible to actually overcome the repression of the government. While small protests were held in Bishkek prior to the elections, they were not large scale mass demonstrations,

²⁴⁸ Interviewee #01. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

because it didn't look like anything positive could result from the protests. The head of the Coalition of NGOs said that at the start of the protests after the elections, "you could feel it in forums and discussions in Bishkek, the people in Jalal-Abad looked like 'bad sports'. It really looked like the protests were going nowhere; it was just relatives of losers rocking the boat."²⁴⁹ The 'establishment' in Bishkek didn't suspect that it would ever grow into a larger movement, few of the elites suspected early on that the revolution would grow to the size that it eventually did. The local organizations were taken by surprise by the power of the local protests. For example, the Coalition didn't find out about the rally in Bishkek until late on the 22nd. The event was planned by the opposition candidates, not by the civil society or NGOs; they were just additional members that joined in.

While there was some minor influence of the local independent press and of the local NGOs and civil society, their influence was on the edges and had influence only in the capital. According to a western aid employee who works directly with local NGOs, the local civil society had very little influence and was "doing very little planning, only reaction." Fundamentally, "civil society was not really a part of the process."²⁵⁰ The public went around the institutions and the institutions missed the opportunity. The March events were outside the influence of local organizations or institutions because they were not involved at all in the process of the protests.

Lack of influence of Colored Revolutions

In spite of the press attention and speculation about the close connection between Ukraine, Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic, the reality is that there were very

²⁴⁹ Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁵⁰ Interviewee #33. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

limited links. The most important impact of the Ukraine process was in two ways, one was the conceptual notion of people in a former Soviet country huddled in the cold standing up to the government and the result being a complete capitulation of the government. A few members of the civil society had been in Ukraine and they returned motivated to have the same result in the Kyrgyz Republic. Ironically, these individuals played minor if insignificant roles in the subsequent events, they were swept aside by the local protest dynamics. The second impact was on the government. They took the lesson that the only way to prevent a Colored Revolution was to prevent crowds from gathering and to prevent key candidates from even running for office. This lesson learned had a significant impact on the local protests. For it was the reaction by the government to the protesters that was the single most important factor for motivating the protests.

Local Dynamics

There are four important phases to the protest cycle, the initial motivations, the increase in the protests, the sustaining of the protests and finally the success of the protests. Local dynamics were the most important factor for the initiation of the protests. The protests in March 2005 were about the ability of local leaders to motivate local popular dissatisfaction with Akayev and ruling elite for their own purposes. The overwhelming response from numerous interviews was that at the start the protests were only about the elections, not about removing Akayev. This is reinforced by looking at the structure and slogans of the early protesters. Most of them came out in support of a specific local politician and as in the case of some of the largest early protests in Koch Kor and Naryn, the crowds went away when either

their local politician was reinstated on the ballot or when they decided that the best option would be to use the power of the vote to “vote against all”.

After the second election, when candidates that had been deregistered in the north lost or were not allowed to run, there were few if any large protests. In the south, the main protests started later, but significantly increased after popular candidates lost in the election. As the protests shifted from the north to the south, they also shifted in theme, from local, to more regional and national issues.

There were limited protests prior to the first election where people chanted for Akayev to leave, but these were definitely in the minority and appear to be just an indication of the continual dissatisfaction with Akayev and not something new specifically focused on the elections or even realistically expecting that anything would change.

Chapter 3 presented the initial methodology for measuring the intensity of the events. Figure 3 shows the distribution by region for both the event level and number of days.²⁵¹ The X axis is the duration of events and the Y axis is the sum of the intensity of events by day in that region. The different colors of the bars represent the number of events that day. For example in Naryn in the week of March 4th there was a day with six separate events and the next day there were only three events.


²⁵¹ An initial statistical examination of the intensity of the events suggests a power law distribution with a rank/size exponent of -0.8. Power law distributions are often associated with phenomena which emerge from local interactions including civil violence which unfolds according to local tactical rules. The data appear to reinforce the argument that the events emerged from uncoordinated local dynamics. However, the small number of events (n=66) precludes a detailed examination or the drawing of any clear statistical inference. (See Tim R. Gulden, "Spatial and Temporal Patterns in Civil Violence," *Politics and the Life Sciences* vol. 21, no. 1 (2002).)

Figure 4 is the same data shown in a slightly different way. Each region and the specific cities where protests occurred are listed. The darkness of the square indicates the intensity of the protests. For example, if you look at the week starting on March 4-11, there were protests of different intensity occurring in every oblast except for Talas. The earliest protests were in Bishkek, then Issyk-Kul and Naryn and not until several weeks later did protests suddenly start across the country. After the later elections the number of protests significantly increased, but it was only in the final week that the number of protests decreased and the intensity increased.

At the earliest stages there was very little flow from one protest to another, the protests “were all about the local protests for local reasons that were unconnected.”²⁵² The fact that a protest occurred in one region had little or no influence on a protest occurring in any other region. The protests started independently and organically. While there may have been linkages in terms of knowledge flow and personal connections between protests, it was not an initiating cause.


²⁵²Interviewee #05. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

Figure 3: Intensity and Duration of Protests




**Sum of
intensity**

(# of stacked bars =
total # of events
per day)



**Sum of
intensity**

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per day)



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



Figure 4: Duration of Protests



Who came

The identification of who came to the protests and why they came provides support to the theory that the protests started as local events for local reasons. The majority of early protesters were direct supporters of candidates from their region and area. In the south, the first protests had only a few hundred people, but in response to actions by the government, more supporters arrived and then others came for very different reasons. As a local leader commented, those that came were “first real protesters, then criminal element, then the opposition layered on top and finally, NGOs providing the final frosting of legitimacy.”²⁵³

There were clear differences in the composition of the protesters both by time and by location. The first protests had large numbers of rural, poor, middle-aged women. Over time the protests shifted and more young rural men became involved. There were also significant differences by region.²⁵⁴

It is as important to see who did not come to the protests. The middle class and the intelligentsia stayed at home and off the streets. Some observers are critical of the protests because they failed to incorporate these classes. They point to it as an example of why many of the long-term demands of the revolution failed. This is also a reason why the events remained in the category of “contentious politics” and never moved in the direction of a “social movement”. It was local people using the methods of contentious politics while the leaders failed (or didn’t try) to create a wider social movement.

²⁵³ Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁵⁴ Interviewee #48. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

Matching the positive attitudes of Uzbek minorities from the survey in Chapter 4 with the situation in the country, there were very few Uzbeks involved in the protests, most of the Uzbeks lived in the towns and the Kyrgyz lived in the villages. However, most probably the more important reason is that the few Uzbek candidates that ran for office won. There was no reason to take to the streets to support their candidates.

Most of the protesters and the parliamentarians who had lost their seats were in rural Kyrgyz areas. The people involved in the protests were not from Jalal-Abad or Osh city. It was people from the surrounding localities, not from the cities.²⁵⁵

While there were a reasonable amount of young people involved in the protests, overall the role of students and student protest organizations in the south was fairly marginal. They did not have a lead role and acted more as provocateurs when needed to rally the crowd. In an interview with student leaders from the group Kel-Kel, they suggested that there were few students from the cities involved at the start.

Just as there was a shift over time in the goals of the protests there was also a shift in who participated. At the start in Jalal-Abad it was mainly older women and men. After the events on the morning of the 20th, a large number of young people took to the streets and the tenor of the crowd became much more violent. A Peace Corps Volunteer who lived in the center of Jalal-Abad observed the crowd on the 20th and said that “at first the crowd was friendly, but at the end of the crowd were young men with riot sticks and shields.” These men were already a little drunk and were much more agitated. They beat the volunteer and took away his camera.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁵ Interviewee #07. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁵⁶ Interviewee #11&12. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

When the profile of those that came to protest is compared to the survey of attitudes, it turns out that almost none of the categories are statistically significant. It is useful to reference the attitudes of these groups of protesters from the survey data and specifically Table 15 in Chapter 4. The group that is most personally dissatisfied is those with less education and less money from Jalal-Abad, Naryn or Chui oblast. Some of this matches with the initial protesters, but in the survey, rural/urban or male/female had no statistical difference, two very important factors in the composition of the original protesters.

Figure 5: Profile of Protesters

Start	Mid	End
Rural	Rural	Rural
Women	Men/Women	Men/Women
Middle-Aged	Middle-Aged/Youth	Middle-Aged/Youth
Poor	Poor	Poor
North/South	South	South/North

For example, while the variables for men and urban residents are both statistically significant, the interaction variable, i.e. respondents that are both urban and men is not statistically significant. The same is true for the category of rural poor women, they are not statistically significant for either individual levels of happiness or dissatisfaction with the government. This lends further reinforcement to the argument that it was not just individual's personal levels of grievances that motivated them to protest, but it was the influence of their local political leaders.

It is very difficult to make generalized comments about the protesters across the country, for example, even with two regions as close geographically and culturally as Osh and Jalal-Abad there were important differences in the attitudes of the protesters. In Jalal-Abad, according to participants and eye-witnesses, the people

that went to the protests “came to really protest”. They were very committed to supporting their candidate and eventually to ousting Akayev. The people that came were the unemployed, the poor, the old people, and the rural/village people. In Osh things were quite different; it lacked the prolonged protests both inside and outside the central government building. Several observers commented that Osh was much more artificial than Jalal-Abad. In Jalal-Abad it was primarily older women and men and a small amount of younger men, in Osh the preponderance was younger men. It was very clear that it was a different political group organizing the protests. In Osh it was heavily controlled by one particular leader with strong ties to the regional criminal network. It was people from his group that organized and seized the government building; very little genuine public interests were represented in Osh.²⁵⁷

While local Jalal-Abad residents did not participate in the protests, they generally seemed to be supportive of the process and would assist with payments for food. In contrast, in Osh, the local residents interviewed were not at all interested in the protests and saw the protests as a dangerous distraction and tried to stay as far away from them as possible. There was a clear antipathy in Osh towards the protests; they were seen as only involving criminal fighting.

The crowd that gathered on the morning of the 24th in Bishkek made up a different dynamic than those that had gathered at other protests throughout the country. It was the most cosmopolitan and integrated of any of the protests. There was a diverse crowd with people from outside the city as well as many people who were in the capital as a result of internal migration. These workers hadn’t been at other protests, many were from the south but were working in the bazaar, driving

²⁵⁷ Interviewee #38. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

taxis, or doing other manual labor jobs, one political observer referred to them as the “fifth column”.²⁵⁸ The crowd included people that had been protesting for weeks in the south, people who joined off the streets that morning and student leaders from the North. It also included for the first time, representatives of the civil society community. In the protests throughout the country, civil society played a very minor role and had rarely attended any protests. On the 24th, they were there marching in the front, ready to give speeches and lend their support to the opposition. The wave of protests from around the country had finally come crashing into the capital and it swept along every type of anti-government, opposition, civil society, and democratic reform organization in its wake.

Why come

What were the protesters motivations? Why did people come and protest? Why did they sit in the square in the cold for weeks? Understanding why they came out on the street and stormed the buildings is one of the fundamental questions in analyzing protest dynamics. From extensive field interviews it appears that the protesters came because of individual motivations based on economic dissatisfaction and a perception of loss of economic opportunities combined with collective encouragement from local political entrepreneurs.

The first aspect of the individual motivations was a growing economic inequality between the rural and urban regions and a belief that the local leaders could assist them. There was a general feeling that their economic problems were the fault of the government. As noted in the earlier section, the general economics of the

²⁵⁸ Interviewee #03. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

country were improving in February 2005, but these benefits hadn't reached the rural population in the south. The protesters were fearful that they were getting poorer and thought that they saw others doing better. There was a significant disconnect from what they were seeing in the cities and their lives in the villages. Of course, poverty is not the only reason that people came out on to the streets. Poverty had existed in these regions for a long time and there had been much greater inequality. But it was the combination of the growing economic inequality with the fear of being left out of the economic growth that intersected with the perception that the elections were stolen from them. If their local politicians had been elected, they still would have been poor and probably no better off, but it would not have been another insult to have the one sphere of their lives where they at least had a small measure of influence taken away from them.

The second aspect of poverty was the opportunity cost. Many of the people who came were poor people from the region. Poverty was not only a motivation, but it also provided the opportunity. Those that had no work or were farmers waiting for the season to start had nothing to lose by coming and no threat of recriminations at their work place.²⁵⁹ For example, there were many supporters of the opposition living in Jalal-Abad, but they were not willing to leave their jobs both for financial considerations as well as the fear of reprisals. Some of the organizations and individuals that worked in Jalal-Abad collected money to assist the protesters in buying food, lodging, etc.

Did they come because they were paid? One of the statements that the government regularly made and was repeated in the press and often even by

²⁵⁹ Interviewee #51. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

international observers was that all of the protesters were there because of money, yet one international reporter admitted that he never saw any payments for protesters.²⁶⁰

There is strong anecdotal evidence that people were paid to vote and to show up on Election Day. At a minimum, voters were provided food and the cost of their transport on Election Day, not a lot different from any successful political machinery world wide. The more contentious issue is if protesters were paid to come to the square or to block the roads. One international representative in the south said that he had heard that 200-300com was paid each day to protesters. I heard this statement from numerous government and international sources, the price ranging from 100-500com. However, there is almost no hard evidence of protesters before, during or after the election being paid for their participation. From a logistical standpoint on many days there were thousands of protesters, even if one takes an average of 500 people at 200c for up to 20 days it's around \$50,000. It's not an unrealistic amount of money and I'm sure much larger bribes have been paid for less important outcomes, but that amount of money dispersed over hundreds and thousands of people is difficult to do and people talk about it. The strongest argument against the payments was simply that no one had any hard evidence of it occurring. In addition, those that really had the finances to help fund the protest didn't get involved until the very end. There is clear evidence that these individuals helped with organizational costs and transportation costs as the protests reached a peak in the last few days. But paying large sums for organizational costs is very different from actually paying all of the protesters that stood in the square.

²⁶⁰ Interviewee #35. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

An important caveat and cultural note is that in the west, payment is routinely thought of as limited to a financial transaction. Someone gives me money to perform a specific service. In this region, payment for everything from a new house to wages to taxes might be in-kind in the form of wheat, fruit, milk, gas, etc. or might even be completely non-material in the sense of allowing my child into the better school, getting a better job, or access to some other resource. Many of these local politicians are strongly supported because they provide patronage in the old-fashioned Chicago politics sense of the word. They make sure that those that supported them are well rewarded through jobs, loans, opportunities, etc. The local parliamentarians were seen as much more responsive to the needs of the people and often actually capable of helping them. A large percentage of them were wealthy businessmen who would often finance buildings, community work and gatherings out of their personal finances, well aware that this increased their local support. So when these local parliamentarians were blocked from getting into office in a rather nefarious manner, the people were protesting to prevent the future loss of patronage and in thanks for what they had already received. Were they paid a daily wage for standing in the square? Extensive interviews indicate that this was extremely rare. Did they anticipate some positive future outcome to themselves directly or to their community, most assuredly, but there is a huge gulf between anticipated payment and actual payment.

While the protesters did not receive payment for attendance, they usually did receive food while they camped out. For many of the poor farmers who have nothing else to do during the late winter months, this may have provided some secondary

incentive to stay. I would argue that it would not have been enough incentive to gather, in addition there was no guarantee that food would appear, but as one started to stay for a few days; it may have been a factor in preventing people from leaving, in keeping a core group of dedicated protesters amassed.

A field leader of the opposition stated emphatically that “no one was paid, how could we have paid thousands of people to come, how could we pay them?” He continued in a defiant tone, “not for money would people sleep in the streets and in cold buildings for 20 days.” He did acknowledge that they helped pay for food and transport, but that was all.²⁶¹ There is some truth to his argument; this was an organic protest that grew in ways that no one expected. After the ‘gentle’ take over of the Jalal-Abad government building, the protesters were literally trapped inside. No one had expected that they would either, one, actually take the building that day or two, remain isolated in the building for another 20 days. For several days no one was allowed in or out. A local conflict prevention NGO was later allowed to serve as a liaison and shuttled food and basic supplies through the police line into the building for the protesters inside. Having interviewed protesters who were inside the building it was very clear that they had no original intention of staying in the building and while they had strong support for their candidate they had not anticipated being trapped in a cold building for several weeks. The statements that the protesters had to be paid is similar to the government’s statements that everyone in the square was drunk, it was an attempt to discredit the protests and portray them as incompetent, drunk, paid for rebels.

²⁶¹ Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

Political Entrepreneurs

At the end of the 1800's, Le Bon wrote about the leaders of crowds, "In the case of human crowds the chief is often nothing more than a ringleader or agitator, but as such he plays a considerable part."²⁶² In the events in the Kyrgyz Republic these "agitators" played the key role in promoting the initial protests. The early protests were led by aggrieved local leaders who were usually politicians who had either been deregistered or who had lost their election. There were a few opposition politicians who won their local elections, but because of pressure from the Akayev regime or of personal ambition, motivated their supporters to join the protests against Akayev. I label these political leaders *political entrepreneurs* because of their interests in using the protests to advance their personal, political and often business interests.

The local people came to support their local political entrepreneur who was able to gather people because of the support that he had provided or could provide in the region. Even when a few of the protests prior to the elections had grown very large with thousands of people, such as in Koch-Kor, it was still an isolated protest about the local politician, not part of a larger network.

The majority of evidence indicates that the protests were organized around a single local leader and used whatever local means, e.g. blocking strategic roads or attacking buildings that would be most useful and powerful in their area. As noted earlier, these actions were the "repertoire" of the protesters. They were using successful tactics that had been used in former protests in 2000 and 2003. The

²⁶² Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd, a Study of the Popular Mind*, [12th impression] ed. (London,: T. F. Unwin, 1920).

takeover of the government buildings was a new strategy that did not have widespread use prior to these events. Why this new tactic was used and how it became so popular is an interesting question for future research.

These political entrepreneurs came from very different backgrounds and had very little in common other than the pressure applied to them by Akayev's government. One of the most important 'revolutionary' figures was Beknazarov from the town of Ak Sai in the south. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Beknazarov had played a critical role in the events two years before in 2003. Beknazarov in spite of regular pressure from the White House had still maintained some marginal loyalty to the regime, but over time through the repeated actions of the government they continued to push Beknazarov away. One international observer pointed out that it was the White House that turned Beknazarov into a revolutionary national figure.²⁶³

Many of the main opposition leaders had been senior members of the Akayev government. Kumanbek Bakiev was the Prime Minister until forced to resign in 2003, while he had opposed the government on different issues, he wasn't seen as a vocal radical. K. Bakiev had put in place a very well organized political machine to prepare for a Presidential run in the fall of 2005. In a lengthy and very open interview with the current mayor of Jalalabad and a former key party leader for K. Bakiev, he revealed that he had been working for the past two years at a local level throughout the south in building up support for K. Bakiev. From local meetings to regional forum, they were putting into place a solid grassroots operation. This foundation of

²⁶³ Interviewee #16. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

contacts and support was used during the revolution, but interviews suggest that it was actually planned for a legitimate Presidential run.²⁶⁴

In Talas, a province to the west of the capital, the protests gathered in support of R. Jenbekov, who had formerly been a close member of the President's inner circle. He was prevented from running because he had not stepped aside to allow a relative of the President's wife to run. He had not been a part of the opposition prior to these events and never played an active role in working with the opposition until the very end. Through strong-arm tactics and direct political oppression, the White House pushed him to become a part of the opposition and for his supporters to eventually seize the government building in Talas.²⁶⁵ He stated many times that his only goal was to have the opportunity to run for office and to be a parliamentarian. He led one of the largest protests in the country and occupied the second government building after Jalal-Abad, yet he was not closely linked with the main opposition groups.²⁶⁶

Bayaman Erkinbayev was a parliamentary deputy and a businessman from the south who controlled a huge share in the largest trading market in the region, the Kara Soo market. In addition he also was rumored to be involved in the drug trafficking from the Tadjik border north into Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Numerous reports, including Erkinbayev's own statements and interviews after the events indicated that he paid for most of the gas money for buses to transport protesters to Bishkek on the

²⁶⁴ Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁶⁵ Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁶⁶ An interesting question that no one seems to have any answer for is why the Talas government building was not attacked in the early morning of the 20th, like the government buildings in Osh and Jalal-Abad.

21st and 22nd.²⁶⁷ The individual's who retook the government building in Osh were almost exclusively his supporters and workers. They used his building as a staging ground and he paid for supplies for the group.²⁶⁸

There was very little connection among individual protesters between regions. While local protesters may have encouraged their friends or family members to join them at the protests, it did not have an important impact on growing the protests throughout the country. Unlike in Ukraine where different groups of citizen protesters linked up across the country in solidarity before gathering to stay several weeks in Kiev, in the Kyrgyz Republic, it appears that groups of protesters remained within their own groups. For the local protesters, my research shows that there was very little network interaction beyond the local community. In the south, there are a few isolated examples prior to the election of some protesters threatening to link up with other protesters in a neighboring community. When word spread that the crowd had taken the Oblast building in Jalal-Abad, it became a rallying point and protesters started to arrive from other cities.²⁶⁹ This is the earliest reference I can find to protesters from one region traveling to another area in support of a local protest.

The only network dynamic was among the opposition leaders. Many of the political entrepreneurs were well known politicians so they obviously knew the other opposition leaders, but only a small number of them were directly working together. There is an early example of K. Bakiev coming to speak at a rally in Naryn and it is the earliest example of linkages created from one region to another. It is most likely

²⁶⁷ Interviewee #04 & 07. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁶⁸ B. Erkinbayev was assassinated on September 22, 2005.

²⁶⁹ AFP, 03-06, 12:06GMT

that K. Bakiev went because he was interested in running as a presidential candidate later that year and wanted to be seen as a national candidate.

The first gathering of opposition leaders was in late February when five or six candidates running in the south knew they were going to be prevented from running for office and they started to band together to protest and organize together.²⁷⁰

Jalal-Abad became a rallying point for opposition leaders, and in one of the earliest examples of opposition leaders joining forces and speaking to supporters from other regions, national opposition leaders Otunbaeva, Sydykov, and Sadyrbaev spoke to the crowds in Jalal-Abad on Tuesday the 8th.

The unification of the many parts of the opposition into the Coordination Council was an important step. Links between some regions increased with the creation of the Coordinating Council for this was the first time that the opposition was at all organized and tried to present a united front. While this did bring together many of the most outspoken opposition leaders, it did not bring together all of the key leaders involved in the protests. There was some disconnect between the role of the Coordinating Council and the actual protests. It was formed on top of it, but without any direct relation or control of the protests. For example, the protests in Talas were not under the coordination of the Council, the protests in KochKor and Issyk-Kul also did not have representatives on the Council and a key leader in Osh, B. Erkinbayev was not a member of the Council and to my knowledge never took part in its decision making process. The main role of the Council was to provide at least some type of unified face to the media and the international community. Its role also increased as the protests elicited more pressure from the government.

²⁷⁰ Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

Reactive Dynamics

How did the protests grow from local protests to widespread protests against the central government? This section explores in detail the reactive dynamics between the Akayev government and the opposition that led to the increase in the protests. Over time there was an important, but subtle shift in the south and eventually throughout the country in the formation of the protests. The protests started for the individual candidates, but as the government failed either to listen to their demands or responded harshly to the actions, the protests began to coalesce around opposition to the government.

The Akayev government repeatedly showed how little it understood the main goals and incentives of the protesters by alienating and marginalizing their few supporters and radicalizing the opposition through the oppressive nature of the regime. This included deregistering former loyal supporters and pushing away any support that had existed for the government. This section presents analysis defining the negative dynamic between the government, the opposition and the general populace.

This section examines the actions of the Akayev regime that contributed to the negative feedback loop between the government and the opposition. There are three key actions that the government took, they 1) alienated political leaders; 2) failed to communicate; and 3) increased physical pressure on protesters and the opposition.

Alienated political leaders

The protests increased because of sustained pressure from the Akayev regime. At every opportunity for rapprochement Akayev's regime pushed local supporters

towards the opposition because of their harsh response. A common theme from people interviewed was that it was Akayev's fault that he was removed from power. He took more and more actions each day to alienate his few remaining supporters and to galvanize the opposition. An international observer stated that "Akayev lived in a Potomkin village. Had the President clearly said that he would not run, it [revolution] would not have taken place." Akayev failed to convince the public or the international organizations that he was serious about reform. The opposition "managed to surf on a wave of instability" created by Akayev's actions.²⁷¹

By the end of the protests, there was no one left to support the government. For a government that was generally quite benign by regional and international standards, they went from having a loyal cadre of supporters both within the government, civil society and the international community to being seen as the pariahs of a democratic process. When given an opportunity, support withered away for the main reason that the government pushed them away.

As shown in the timeline, the government led a concerted effort at preventing opposition candidates from either running for office or implementing their campaigns. The government believed that they could shut down the opposition and maintain control of the government. An important event in forming the opposition leaders' attitude was the deregistration of Roza Otunbaeva, the former Ambassador to the UK and the US. The protests by her supporters were rather small and received little coverage in the national news. It is unlikely that residents throughout the country were aware of what was happening. Otunbaeva is well known to the international community from her work as an ambassador and is a capable

²⁷¹ Interviewee #26. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

spokeswoman for the opposition. However, she is not widely known throughout the country and has never held an elected office. Her deregistration became a rallying cry for civil society, the international monitors, and the western embassies, but was not even mentioned in interviews throughout the country. Her role was to speak to the international community and provide pressure through the diplomatic channels. It also gave the appearance of a much greater opposition movement than actually existed.

If the government had only alienated opposition leaders such as Otunbaeva who have little local, grassroots support, there would have been few protests. A key mistake of the government was to incite very popular local leaders. As the previous section on political entrepreneurs indicated, many of them had been supporters of the President

As the President threw away his support for previously loyal followers, they turned against him. They begin to rally their supporters not just to get elected but to throw out Akayev. It was in response to government intervention, not preplanned for the protests to increase in the regions and move towards the center.²⁷²

Failed to communicate

Another key mistake that only served to alienate the opposition was the decision not to talk or engage in any dialogue with the opposition. Several international and local opposition leaders believed that if Akayev had come out in the first few days when the protests started and made some immediate concessions things may have turned out differently. As the protests progressed they became more and

²⁷² Interviewee #31. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

more about removing Akayev and he lost all opportunity to intervene. Dialogue is fundamental to a democracy and people wanted a leader who would talk to them and be responsive.²⁷³

An example of how the protests shifted because of the failure to communicate is the initial event in Jalalabad. Before the election, the first protest gatherings were people who supported K. Bakiev. The protesters requested to meet with the Governor or some government representative to express their concerns, but no one would come to meet them. Prime Minister Tanev publicly stated that only drunk people were in the center square in Jalalabad causing problems. The reality was that everyone in the local area knew that it was actually old people who sat all day in the square. This inflammatory language from the government only increased the outrage of the protesters and their supporters. More people started to gather and local supporters began to provide them with food. A local reporter in Jalal-Abad who witnessed the daily events said that he saw a significant increase in numbers of protesters after the government's negative statements.²⁷⁴ A local Jalal-Abad resident said "more and more people kept coming, but no one from the Government would come and listen to our concerns."²⁷⁵

According to those in the center square in Jalal-Abad on the 4th, a large crowd had gathered demanding to speak to the governor or a government representative. One participant stated that there had never been an intention of seizing the building. They described a situation where as the afternoon wore on and people were tired, rumors would fly that someone was coming out to speak to them and the crowd

²⁷³ Interviewee #35. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁷⁴ Interviewee #35. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁷⁵ Interviewee #16. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

would start to press towards the gates of the compound. As it got later people were worried that no one would come out that day and kept moving up to the gates and eventually moved into the compound and overtook the building.²⁷⁶

If someone had come out to speak to the crowds, would they have dispersed and had their problems resolved? Not necessarily, but it is highly unlikely that they would have seized the office of the Oblast Administration, an important tactical and symbolic victory. The protests may have continued on for even several months as protests had occurred in prior years, little would have actually been resolved, but violence may have been avoided.

Increased physical pressure

There are several key examples and actions that almost everyone interviewed pointed towards as being important examples of increased physical pressure from the Akayev government that served to galvanize the opposition against Akayev, specifically the events on the 20th, the 23rd and the 24th. I argue that the use of the Special Forces on the morning of the 20th to throw the protesters out of the government buildings in Osh and Jalabad was probably the most important action that set in place the chain of events leading to the overthrow on the 24th. It is highly probable that without those events, things may have reached a stalemate or a negotiated agreement. The harsh reaction by the White House increased the radicalization of the opposition and removed any remaining support from moderates that may have existed for the government.²⁷⁷ As discussed above in the timeline, after the protesters were kicked out of the government building in Jalal-Abad there

²⁷⁶ Interviewee #04. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁷⁷ ITAR-TASS, 03-20

was an immediate and powerful reaction later in the day that swept through the town and the protests re-took the building in a much more violent manner—in many ways it presaged the taking of the White House a few days later. The community was incensed when it heard the rumors of protesters that were killed and the true stories of the rather violent handling of women and young protesters.

The government argued that it had a right to assert its authority over a government building and needed to allow the government to operate. This is an important point and it is to the government's credit that no small arms or weapons were used in the re-taking of the building. But the government had lost any fragment of legitimacy in the south and there was no way that control was going to be restored without a slow and measured approach. The government's argument is in the abstract valid, but is another illustration of how out of touch the administration was with the reality of the situation. To not anticipate a strong negative reaction by the local protesters was so naïve as to border on a completely irrational flagrant disregard for the amount of discontent that was building on the part of the protesters.

On the evening of the 23rd, the administration used excessive and very aggressive tactics to break up the meeting of the civil society in Bishkek. Several eye witnesses said that drunken women and agitators were brought in to provoke the crowd. The irony is that breaking up the meeting on the 23rd had little impact on the key opposition leaders as they were not in attendance. Those that met on the 23rd were primarily representatives of the civil society and local NGOs. They had had very little influence on events up to this time throughout the country and had little influence in the direction of the protests. According to numerous participants, the

meeting's goal was to serve as a forum to inform the media and residents in the north about the situation in the south. It was heavily attended by representatives of the international development and diplomatic community. They were eye witnesses to the aggressive tactics of the government. Up until that point, they had only seen limited coverage and heard reports of the activities in the south; on the evening of the 23rd it became real for them. This had a significant impact on the events after the fall of the government and colored much of the early reporting about the influence of the civil society and NGOs.

If the meeting on the 23rd had progressed without incident, it would have provided virtually no incentive for the protesters and little if any change to the government. However, the public hauling away and beating of well respected civil society leaders in full view of the international representatives and press served to completely alienate the Akayev regime from any lingering international support that may have existed.

The events on the 24th are the final and clearest example of the concept of repression leading to reactive dynamics. It is a reasonable and highly defensible assertion that Akayev would not have been chased out the back door of the White House if he had not provoked the crowd. It was another opportunity where the Akayev regime continued to make the wrong choice at every opportunity offered to them.

A participant in the events on the 24th believed that “none of the people would have gone to the White House if rocks had not been thrown.”²⁷⁸ Numerous interviews with participants in the crowd that afternoon reiterated the point that

²⁷⁸ Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

people on the square said that they never would have attacked, if it had not been for the agitator's. It was further proof of the failed strategy of Akayev and his staff.²⁷⁹

It is interesting that the leaders in their speeches were not asking for Akayev to leave. There were numerous banners written with slogans saying for Akayev to leave and it was the most popular chant of the crowd, but most of the leaders asked for Akayev to come and listen to their demands. Some of them may have wanted Akayev to resign immediately, but in interviews with several of the leaders, their goal was not to overthrow the government through a street protest. They wanted to put pressure on the government to force the President to acquiesce to their demands and peacefully transfer power.²⁸⁰

The White House had a clear plan of using sportsmen as agitators to provoke the crowd into violence. After government supported sportsmen threw rocks and attacked the crowd, the crowd realized that they now had all the rocks and there were a lot more of them than the sportsman or militia. It was a back and forth flow of events where the government was clearly outmanned and had no anticipation of the power of the potential response.

The poor planning on the part of the White House is rather astounding in retrospect. Even if they had been successful in provoking the crowd into frenzy, how would they then control them? The number of security forces arrayed that morning was quite small. Did they assume that the crowd would not respond and scatter, if so then why attack them? If they assumed that they would respond and wanted to provoke more unrest, how did they plan to respond once the crowd was agitated?

²⁷⁹ Interviewee #26. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

²⁸⁰ Interviewee #31. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005.

Few of the militia had any arms and they had been specifically told not to use guns on the protesters. It was similar to provoking a caged animal and then being shocked by the violence of its response, the government completely and fatally misunderstood the ability for their own forces to protect the White House and to withstand any attack.

If my assumption is correct that the protesters had no defined plans to seize the government building that day and only responded when provoked, then the failure of the government to understand this premise was a key component to their downfall. Part of the problem in answering these questions is that it has been very difficult to gain information from senior government leaders who made decisions at the time. I had some interviews with lower level government officials, but when I was in the country no senior official from the former regime was willing to be interviewed. Former President Akayev has recently given a few interviews in Moscow and these are the first on-the-record statements that provide a little insight into what the government believed. In addition, there are secondary sources from the diplomatic community who met directly with Akayev during this time.

Dynamic Failure

As discussed in Chapter 2, the repression literature indicates that the relationship between repression and protest is either a negative linear or a curvilinear relationship, in both situations at the most extreme level of government repression, the amount and intensity of protests should decrease. In the Kyrgyz Republic case it appears that it was a positive linear relationship. Khawaja suggests that as repression increases protests may increase for the individual until a point where the government overwhelms the protesters. It may be that a graph of the relationship in the Kyrgyz

Republic would be curvilinear, but events did not go on long enough to see the strength of the response of the government. For purposes of the repression literature, the Kyrgyz Republic case is potentially an example where repression increased the level of protests both at the individual and the collective level. The qualitative story does suggest that the government used an insufficient level of repression—enough to provoke, but not enough to control the protests. It appears that the level of repression increased and the level of protests simultaneously increased in a clear positive linear relationship.

Is the distinction between successful and unsuccessful protests simply the level of repression? If the repression is intense enough will the government simply overwhelm the protesters? These questions can not fully be answered with this data, but it is suggestive that once a government initiates repression they have to use it efficiently or they may lose control.

Why did the protests succeed in overthrowing the government? The final success of the protests was because of the failures of the Akayev government. As discussed above, the government ineffectively applied repression to the protests that resulted in the protests increasing.

The former-Soviet countries have applied two different approaches to local protests. The first approach is to increase repression and effectively prevent any opposition leaders from creating protest movements. If citizens do protest, then the reaction is harsh and severe. The former-Soviet countries have a common susceptibility to using repression as the immediate response to any problem. In

countries such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus and Russia this has proven effective in the short-run at preventing any large-scale protest movements.

The second approach is a negotiated legal process. These post-Soviet countries are in the difficult position that they lack the fundamental legal and social institutional development necessary for negotiated agreements. Ukraine and Georgia tried to use a negotiated approach through their use of the courts and the legal system to implement political change. The inconclusive outcome from these countries demonstrates how difficult this process is to achieve.

The Akayev government attempted a third approach of using some repression and some legal methods. This middle ground approach used moderate levels of repression, as discussed above, and tried to use negotiating and legal tactics to maintain control. It used enough repression to provoke the political entrepreneurs and to increase the level of protests. It also failed to effectively use a legal process or negotiated agreement.

Is this a story of an unsuccessful application of repression? That is the lesson that many of the other countries have taken. In statements by both the President of Uzbekistan and the President of Russia, both of them implied that the reason for Akayev's government collapse was his unwillingness to effectively use force against the protesters. In the short-term, this analysis may be correct. If the Akayev government had done more than just antagonize the political entrepreneurs and had actually physically removed them, the protests would probably have died out in the short-term. However, the long-term consequences of the increased political repression may have resulted in more violent protests.

I argue that an alternative approach for the Akayev government was benign indifference to the protests. As discussed above, protests have occurred in the Kyrgyz Republic on a regular basis for the past fifteen years. If my analysis is correct that the protests grew in size only when the government increased repression, than an effective response may have been to ignore the small scale protests around the country and allow them to burn out.

The leverage of the protesters is to create self-defeating reactions by the government. If the government is capable of resisting the urge to respond harshly, they may actually be able to dampen the growth of localized protests. When the government becomes a part of the dynamic interaction process with the protesters, they have seeded their control to the process. Through resisting direct intervention and response to the protests, the leverage of the protesters is diminished. Similar to a terrorist attack, the power of the terrorists is not in the act, but in provoking a disproportionate response from the government.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

When Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was asked by Henry Kissinger his opinion of the French Revolution, his response was “it’s too early to tell.”²⁸¹ Similarly, given that only two years have passed since streets protests forced President Askar Akayev to flee the Kyrgyz Republic; it is difficult to identify the long-term ramifications of this sudden political overthrow. In the short-term, many policy analysts, government officials, and regional governments have already drawn incorrect and dangerously misleading conclusions. The leadership of both Uzbekistan and Russia has taken the lesson that increased repression is necessary to prevent similar crowd protests.²⁸² Understanding the cause and process of the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic is important for U.S. policy towards post-Soviet countries and for these countries own internal political succession dynamic.

This dissertation is one of the first academic research endeavors to examine why political protests occurred in the Kyrgyz Republic from January to March 2005 and resulted in the collapse of the government. This research provides insight in three important areas, first, the causes and process of protest in the specific case of the Kyrgyz Republic, second, the relationships between happiness, satisfaction with government, and potential to protest, and third, the dynamic of political repression. This final chapter explores each of these areas and suggests specific contributions and insights.

²⁸¹ Tina Rosenberg and Priscilla B. Hayner, "The Unfinished Revolution of 1989," *Foreign Policy*, no. 115 (1999).

²⁸² Hill and Jones, "Fear of Democracy or Revolution: The Reaction to Andijon."

There are three main conclusions of this research. One, initial conditions are poor predictors for the location of political protests. Two, the protests were motivated by local political entrepreneurs and lacked both external and internal civil society support. Third, the Kyrgyz government's use of political repression was the most important cause for the increase in intensity of the protests and for the collapse of Akayev's government.

The key conclusions and contributions are organized by the three dependent variables or causal outcomes: 1) formation of protests, 2) increase of protests, and 3) collapse of government.

Formation of protests

The initial causes of these protests are not predictable based on the social, economic or individual perceptions of the individual protesters. The important outcome is that the standard predictive models were not useful to determine when or where protests would occur. The statistical models for individual levels of well-being and satisfaction presented in Chapter 4 demonstrated a lack of support for the relative deprivation or individual perception literature. Theories based on cross-country macro-data fare poorly at predicting either the potential or timing for the political protests in the Kyrgyz Republic.

The conclusion from the analysis of the statistical models, the macro-economic conditions and the history is that initial conditions are poor predictors for the location of political protests. Based on the political protest and civil violence literature as presented in Chapter 2, there are two types of motivations for political protests rooted in initial conditions, explanations based on individual indicators and

societal or collective factors. In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, both individual and collective factors influenced the composition and formation of the protests, but neither factor fully explains the casual mechanisms for the start and growth of the protests. There are four important components of this conclusion.

First, the Kyrgyz Republic is not statistically significantly different from comparators around the world and in the region in terms of perception of individual happiness. Within the country, small differences were found across oblasts with the southern respondents having slightly higher levels of individual satisfaction. This finding challenges policy prescriptions that assume significant cross-country differences in perception of well-being.

Second, there is not a strong relationship between levels of individual happiness and regions where protests occurred. While there were clear differences among some regions, they do not appear to follow the pattern of the protests. As noted in Chapter 4, it is not possible to conclusively prove the individual level of happiness of each protester. However, we would expect to find the patterns of protests corresponding to the levels of happiness if individual levels of happiness were correlated with protest events.

Third, street protests are not necessarily the product of deep personal grievances rather they are often the legitimate expression of discontent with the government. In a more developed democracy, civil society institutions, civic organizations and town meetings provide forums for public expression. Citizens in nascent democracies seek any means available to express their political attitudes;

when the voting box is viewed as corrupt and institutions don't exist, street protests often become the legitimate form of expression.

These *happy protesters* do not have high levels of personal dissatisfaction, but the exact inverse, they are relatively happy and seek a mechanism to express their political attitudes.

Fourth, dissatisfaction with government may be a useful cross-country indicator of potential for conflict. The alternative hypothesis in Chapter 4 showed that the Kyrgyz Republic is statistically different from other countries in the region in satisfaction with government, but there is not a correlation between in-country levels of satisfaction with government and protests. This suggests that protesters were dissatisfied with the government, but as discussed above, did not have low individual levels of happiness. Intuitively, an individual may be personally satisfied and happy, but be highly dissatisfied with the government and show his discontent through street protests and mass movements. The relatively high level of dissatisfaction made the Kyrgyz Republic susceptible to protest dynamics—perhaps the equivalent of a weak unstable system.

Increase in protests

Why did the protests increase? The main conclusion is that the protests were motivated by local political entrepreneurs and lacked both external and internal civil society support. There are two analytical components to this conclusion. First, the actions of political entrepreneurs both motivated the protesters and provided resources. These political entrepreneurs used the initial public discontent for the elections and then incorporated it into their own agendas. The initial protests were

not a referendum on the president, but to show support and loyalty for their local candidate.

The field interviews indicate that the protesters came because of a combination of personal grievances with their general socio-economic conditions and dissatisfaction with the Akayev government. But these grievances had existed for many years. What changed was the potential to lose benefits accrued through the actions of their local political entrepreneur. The local people came to support their local political entrepreneur because of the support that he had provided or could provide in the region.

Second, the role of international funding, western governments, and local civil society was minor and unimportant in determining the final outcome of the political protests. As repeatedly noted in Chapters 5 & 6, the internal civil society was useful in informing the outside world about the events, but they had no impact on the start of the protests or the conclusion. International funding, specifically money from the U.S. government was used to monitor the elections and support local voter awareness campaigns. While there may have been some marginal increase in awareness of the process of voting, the timing and causes of the protests indicate that this funding was not connected to the initiation or to the increase of the protests.

Unfortunately, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and other states have justified the shutting down of international and local NGOs in the belief that the events in the Kyrgyz Republic were influenced and determined by western government funding and civil society.

Collapse of the government

Why did the government collapse after only a few weeks of protests? The third conclusion is that the Kyrgyz government's use of political repression was the most important cause for the increase in intensity of the protests and for the collapse of Akayev's government. The government miscalculated the relative strength of the protests and their ability to respond to repression. Initial conditions of the quality of the central government were not the factors in determining the collapse. While the central government was weak and prone to collapse, if the government had not responded aggressively to the protests, the president may not have been forced to leave.

The primary cause for the increase in the political protests was the repressive action of the government toward the protesters and political entrepreneurs. The government took three actions that led to an increase in political protests; they alienated political leaders, failed to communicate, and increased physical pressure on protesters and the opposition.

The alienation of political leaders pushed the political entrepreneurs against the government. As discussed in Chapter 6, many of the leading political entrepreneurs were former government officials and had not been opposition leaders. The government tried to prevent them from running for office, registering for campaigns, organizing political activities and even holding local political rallies. These actions, often towards previously loyal government supporters, pushed away many key local political leaders who saw their political and economic fortunes crashing if they were blocked by the Akayev government.

These local leaders motivated their supporters through appeals to their loyalty and deep-seated grievances towards the ruling regime. As discussed in Chapter 6, there is no hard evidence and only limited anecdotal proof that protesters were paid in cash or bribed to march on the streets. Many of them did receive food and their transportation was paid when they traveled to Bishkek, but they did not sleep in cold buildings for weeks or march on the streets in front of armed soldiers because they were paid.

The government refused to engage in any effective dialogue with the opposition. A line of communication and negotiation was open at the very end through intervention of the OSCE, but the president refused to participate directly and was not a supporter of negotiating with the opposition. It is unlikely that the president could have remained for another term, but with elections scheduled for October 2005, it is highly probable that a negotiated agreement could have been reached that guaranteed the President would step down in a controlled transfer of power.

The final component was the increase in physical pressure and repression towards the protesters. As detailed in Chapter 5, the physical attacks in Jalal-Abad and Osh on the 20th and in Bishkek on the 23rd and 24th resulted in a substantial increase in the number of protesters and the level of violence. As noted in Chapter 2, there is some disagreement in the literature regarding the expected response to an increase in repression. In this case, each time the repression increased, the protests increased, there appears to be a positive linear relationship. However, as I argued in

Chapter 6, it is possible that the relationship is curvilinear if the amount of repression was increased.

The Akayev government was ineffective at both repression and negotiation. The attempt to find a middle strategy of using both techniques in a limited manner was completely ineffective. As I presented in Chapter 5, if the government had either allowed the protests to continue without any intervention or repression, it is reasonable to conclude that the protests would not have increased and would have eventually dissipated. Alternatively, if the government had used extreme force, such as firing on the crowds or killing opposition leaders as has been done in other post-Soviet states, it is possible that the government would not have collapsed at that time. This severe repression would have endangered long-term stability and increased the potential for large scale civil conflict.

A part of the story that has not been fully explored because of lack of data and information is the motivation for Akayev's actions. To his credit, he refused to ever give the command to use deadly force and according to his own statement, as he left the White House the last order he gave to the police and National Guard was to not use their weapons.²⁸³ Rather than focus on the idiosyncratic actions of a particular leader, I argue that this dynamic choice of either increased repression or negotiation is a common theme that many of the rulers in the post-Soviet countries will face.

An important lesson from the Kyrgyz case is that ineffective implementation of either approach guarantees instability and only results in provoking the opposition. However, of the two choices, ineffective repression is the worst decision. An alternative solution to this dilemma may be to a third option of choosing neither

²⁸³ Ekho Moskv (Moscow). March 29, 2005 1318 GMT, in Russian.

repression nor negotiation, but what I consider benign indifference. Benign indifference recognizes that protests are occurring, allows them to occur, but doesn't try and prevent them or use repressive measures to punish the leaders. As discussed in Chapter 6, because of the relative weakness of the institutional abilities of the former-Soviet states, it is also very difficult to focus all of the efforts on legal methods to negotiate a settlement. Either traditional solution, repression or negotiation, places undue pressure on a system that it is not capable of withstanding. If the government allows small-scale protests to occur, they provide a mechanism for frustration to be released without directly endangering the government. The most difficult part of this approach is that it is the most demanding personally on a government leader. It takes great strength of character to allow protests against the government to occur and not respond. While theoretically useful, this approach may not be practically viable.

Policy Recommendations

The goal of this research has been to understand the dynamics of the political protests in the Kyrgyz Republic in March 2005. These initial conclusions and contributions are important both for academic scholars of protests and conflict, but perhaps have more immediate importance and relevance for political analysts and government officials determining policy in the post-Soviet states. In conclusion, I offer three policy recommendations based on this research and the conclusions presented above.

First, the focus for preventing and responding to political protests should be on developing the institutional capacity within the government to effectively manage protests. Long-term economic and social development policies are important for the

general well-being of a country and for decreasing its risk for engaging in political or civil conflict. Yet as it is impossible to predict where or when a conflict may occur, it is more important to devote money and resources towards developing countries ability to respond to political protests.

Second, the international community should decrease its emphasis on elections as the litmus test for determining the democratic growth of a developing country. Elections serve a useful process in allowing the local citizens to express their grievances with the ruling elite. However, they can also serve as flash points for both the government and the opposition. While the role of the international community was minor in initiating the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic, they still played a key role in applying undue pressure to a weak and fragile government. The international community should decrease their focus on elections and increase attention and funding for the long-term institutional foundation that is necessary for sustained democratic development.


Third, countries that engage in severe political repression towards opposition leaders or protesters should be severely sanctioned and internationally condemned. One outcome of this research is that ineffective repression can lead to an increase in protests. This could be interpreted to imply that the solution is to significantly increase repression. However the humane and democratic interpretation is that any repression is ultimately unsuccessful in preventing political protests if there are underlying social and political grievances. The policy concern is that the lesson that other post-Soviet countries took from the case of the Kyrgyz Republic is that increased repression is the only solution to political protests. On a global or even

regional scale of repression, the actions in the Kyrgyz Republic were benign, but repression has both a relative as well as an absolute measure. Since the events in the Kyrgyz Republic, repression in other countries has included arresting opposition leaders, torturing civil society spokesmen, and even shooting into crowds of protesters. Countries should be strongly encouraged to refrain from political repression through both positive inducements as well as negative consequences for repressive behavior.

In conclusion, the political protests in the Kyrgyz Republic have many similar attributes to contentious political activity over the last few centuries. But the Kyrgyz Republic case also points towards a process of protests different from the other post-Soviet countries. The important lessons are the lack of relevance of initial personal indicators, the relative influence of political entrepreneurs and the significant negative impact from increased government repression.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Map of the Kyrgyz Republic



Source: Produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Accessed from <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kyrgyzstan.html>

Appendix 2: Survey Methodology Report

Regional Perception Survey of Conflict Prevention and Cooperation in Central Asia

Funded by the World Bank

Implemented by Counterpart International

July 2004 – February 2004

Methodology Report

Lawrence Robertson

February 15, 2005

Introduction

The project uses public opinion polling to gather and then analyze a sample that represents the entire population of each of four different countries of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The samples of 1,500 residents of each country and the methodology used to obtain these samples differs slightly in design initially for each country, as discussed below.

Central to a good survey is a strong procedure to select a sample of people to interview. In more developed countries, surveys can be conducted by phone and random methods used to selected phone numbers on a nationwide basis to produce a true random national sample. In less developed countries, with correspondingly weak telephone penetration, face to face interviews must be conducted, and other sampling procedures developed to determine who to interview to approximate a random nationwide sample.

For all four Central Asian countries in this survey, the sampling procedure is a three-stage stratified clustered one. Census data on the territorial dispersion of the population is used as the base to start the sampling methodology. The sampling procedure takes the total population of the country, considers geographic units within the country as either urban or rural, and then develops random procedures to select who to survey in three stages: first by randomly selected smaller geographic urban and units in each province (the primary sampling units or PSUs), second randomly choosing households within these units, and third, to randomly select which household member to interview in each household.

The sampling frame used to divide these four countries into smaller geographic units to randomly sample from differs slightly for each Central Asian country, based on differences in data availability on the population of the country and its dispersion. Subsequent sections explain the sampling methodology used and how this sampling frame differs in each country. Then all four countries have PSUs, random selection of households, and random sampling of individuals within households using the same

methods, which are discussed at length only in the first country example – Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has 14 provinces plus the cities of Almaty and Astana which are considered separate units. All provinces are divided into districts, of which there are 198 in the country. Districts incorporate towns (with more than 100,000 inhabitants), small towns (with between 30,000 to 100,000 inhabitants) and villages (less than 30,000 inhabitants). A number of villages, in turn, are incorporated into rural districts (selskiy okrug). In total, Kazakhstan has cities of Almaty and Astana, 17 towns, 258 small towns, 2,140 rural districts, and 7,986 villages. The population of Kazakhstan was 14,953,126 people, of which 8,377,303 (56%) lived in urban areas, and 6,575,823 (44%) lived in rural areas as of January 1, 2004.

In Kazakhstan, since interviewers would not be allowed in electoral districts that use administrative restrictions to prohibit access of outsiders or that are unsafe for polling, 395 city electoral districts are excluded from the sampling frame. These 19.6% of the total number of electoral districts in the country are hospitals, prisons and military zones. The estimate of the population in excluded electoral districts is not available, because there is no resident population in these areas as defined in the census.

The sampling frame for Kazakhstan was developed from a list of three types of small territorial units, which are the primary sampling units (PSUs) used in the survey. The three are: small settlements of less than 3,000 inhabitants for which each is a distinct PSU; parts of large settlements divided into populations between 2,500 and 5,000 for urban settlements and 1,500 to 3,000 for rural settlements each as a separate PSU; and electoral districts from large settlements each as separate PSU. Such a procedure is suboptimal, but needed when there is no information on a population in administrative-territorial units smaller sizes (such as there is by makhallas in Uzbekistan).

Sampling is through three-stage stratified clustered sampling. First, PSUs are determined by province stratified by urban and rural population size. This primary probability sampling (PPS-sampling) of PSUs selects a total of 61 PSUs represent the urban and rural population of Kazakhstan to generate 1,500 interviews. Second, sequential random sampling of households is done to select secondary sampling units (SSUs) in the selected PSUs. Third, a Kish grid is used to ensure random sampling of respondents within each household.

To generate PSUs, each province is treated as a separate unit for sampling. For each province, sampling is proportionate to the share of the population of the country that it comprises, which in turn is divided into the share of the urban and rural population each province comprises of the entire country. This allocation is done for all 16 provinces. Based on their size relative to the entire urban and rural population of the country, the proportion of the sample that should be drawn from each urban and rural

population of each province to represent the nation is determined. For example, Akmola has 748,930 residents, which is 5.0% of the population of Kazakhstan. Thus in a sample of 1,500 residents of the country, 5% or 75 people are drawn from Akmola. The share of urban and rural interviews is determined from the proportion of the country that the urban and rural population is for the province. Provinces with larger urban and rural populations will have more people selected for interviews relative to those with smaller populations. Again, for Akmola, 349,153 people are urban residents, which is 46.6% of the province. This leads to sampling 35 of these city dwellers. 399,777 people are rural inhabitants, 53.4% of the population of the province, which leads to sampling 40 rural residents from Akmola.

The number of PSUs to be sampled to achieve the needed quota for urban and rural residents in each province depends on a minimum number of interviews to be achieved per PSU, the costs of data collection, supervision, control and follow-up, as well as minimum effective number to conduct the survey in a PSU. The number of people surveyed varies in Kazakhstan in the 61 PSUs surveyed from a low of 8 to a high of 30 people. An approximately equal number of interviews are allocated respectively for each selected urban and rural PSU.

Then the actual geographic units (PSUs) in each province to be polled are determined by a random process. A list of all urban and rural PSUs is composed for each province. The probability a PSU is selected for the survey depends on the size of either the urban or rural population within it. The PPS-sampling is carried out by sorting these units by size and randomly choosing which PSUs to survey over and over until the required number of urban and rural units is reached. To stick with the Akmola example, the quota of 35 urban residents can be reasonably reached by surveying 2 urban PSUs, and querying 18 people in one and 17 in another. For the quota of 40 rural respondents, again 2 PSUs are selected randomly and 20 respondents will be selected in each. Thus interviewers will visit 4 different randomly selected PSUs in the province to find these 35 urban and 40 rural Kazakhstanis.

Sequential random sampling of households is done by supervisors and interviewers during the fieldwork through a special form with random numbers that is used to draw a sample of households. Ideally, when interviewers brief local authorities that they will be conducting a survey in the district, they obtain a list of households from the authorities. However, in many cases the lists of households were made by interviewers without participation of local authorities because the administration was either not willing to provide assistance or was located far away from the district. Sequential random sampling is done by random numbers associated with serial numbers of households in the list. Once a household has been selected, it cannot be selected again. Any household where the interview fails, from not finding the household or respondent refusal, is replaced with the next one randomly selected, according to the order of the random numbers. Selection is repeated until a required number of interviews is reached in each PSU.

A kish grid is used to randomly sample respondents within households. To selecting a single adult in each selected household, 8 types of Kish grids each with different selection of respondents are combined together under strict proportions to ensure almost equal overall probability for any eligible household member to be chosen to participate in the survey. All household members eligible for the survey are sorted by gender, the primary sorting, and then by age, the secondary sorting. Each is assigned a serial number and a respondent is determined according to the type of Kish grid. Kish grids were assigned to each sample address randomly and in advance to avoid the tendency for interviewers' to interview a "convenient" rather than random household member.

As the table below indicates, the achieved sample differs somewhat from the characteristics of the population found in the prior census. Surveys in Central Asia typically have these issues: an underrepresentation of men and youth, who are difficult to find due to their higher geographic mobility. Weighting is used to somewhat reduce these disproportions statistically.

Table 1: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE TO CENSUS IN KAZAKHSTAN

Variable	Census	Sample			
		Pure	Diff.	Weighted	Diff.
Sex (2004)					
Male	48.1%	43.5%	-4.6%	45.4%	-2.7%
Female	51.9%	56.5%	4.6%	54.6%	2.7%
Age (2004)					
18-19	6.1%	3.5%	-2.6%	4.5%	-1.6%
20-29	24.5%	18.7%	-5.9%	20.4%	-4.2%
30-39	21.2%	23.5%	2.3%	21.9%	0.7%
40-49	20.4%	22.7%	2.2%	22.2%	1.8%
50-59	12.0%	12.5%	0.4%	13.8%	1.7%
60 and older	15.7%	19.2%	3.5%	17.2%	1.6%
Nationality (1999)					
Kazakh	53.4%	54.5%	1.1%	55.9%	2.5%
Russian	30.0%	30.3%	0.4%	28.1%	-1.9%
Other	16.6%	15.2%	-1.4%	16.0%	-0.6%
Education (1999)					
Primary education and lower	20.9%	17.1%	-3.8%	15.6%	-5.3%
Secondary specialized	27.8%	32.7%	4.8%	31.7%	3.8%
Completed secondary	36.4%	29.5%	-6.9%	30.4%	-6.0%
Non-completed higher	1.8%	4.6%	2.8%	5.1%	3.3%
Higher education	13.1%	16.1%	3.0%	17.2%	4.1%

In fieldwork, 181 potential respondents refused to participate, and thus are non-respondents. The average response rate is thus 89% (1,500 of 1,681 cases). Non-response is registered if a completed interview is not achieved after three interviewer callbacks. High numbers of non-response were noted in Akmola, where the response

rate was 65.8%; elsewhere response rates were always above 80%. Non-response was more common in urban than rural areas, with the response rate for urban respondents 86.1% compared to 93.7% for rural residents. Rural residents are more willing to cooperate, less mobile, and are typically listed in more accurate population registers than those in urban areas. Most non-responses are from respondents emphatically refusing to participate (47.5% of all non-responses), with an additional 18.8% of nonrespondents a result of family members refusing to call the selected family member in for an interview. Finally, 15.5% of non-responses are the result of the designed respondent not being home for any of the three call-backs.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has 7 provinces, with Bishkek city is considered as an eighth province for the survey. Each province is divided into several districts (rural areas) and city councils (“gorodskoy kenesh”). Overall Kyrgyzstan has 56 units (44 districts and 14 city councils). Districts incorporates villages, city councils incorporates cities (one for each city council) and villages (although these are not in all city councils). Villages are incorporated into rural districts (“ailny okmot”). Kyrgyzstan has 14 cities, 431 rural districts and 1,815 villages. The population of Kyrgyzstan was to 4,641,237 people, the urban population was 1,520,487 (33%), and the rural population 3,120,750 (67%) as of January, 1, 1998.

Several remote or inaccessible districts are excluded from the sampling frame. This category includes one district each in Naryn, Batken, Osh, Issyk-Kul, and three in Djalal-Abad. One larger district, Uzgen in Osh oblast, was excluded due to complicated interethnic and interreligious attitudes (147,183 inhabitants). In all, 14.99% of the rural population of the country was unfortunately left out of the sample frame, (467,853 people). This is 10.08% of the total population of Kyrgyzstan.

The sampling frame for Kyrgyzstan is constructed from a list of small territorial units that are the primary sampling units which are of two types: villages – rural settlements that are subordinated to rural councils (“ailny okmot”) and is used as a unit for the sampling; and parts of large urban settlements – each city is divided into parts with populations between 3,991 and 5,364 inhabitants. As in Kazakhstan, such configuration of the sampling frame is required when there is only census data available for the population in urban settlements and there is no information available on the population in administrative-territorial urban units of smaller sizes (such as makhallas in Uzbekistan).

As in Kazakhstan, the sampling scheme for Kyrgyzstan has:

- proportionate stratification by population of provinces;
- for all provinces:
- proportionate stratification by urban/rural population within provinces;
- PPS-sampling of PSUs within urban/rural strata
- sequential random sampling of households (Secondary Sampling Units - SSUs) in selected PSUs;

Kish grid based sampling of respondents within households.

Thus, the sampling is three-stage stratified clustered sampling, with all three stages conducted identically to the Kazakhstan example above. 58 PSUs in Kyrgyzstan are selected from the sampling frames, with the number of interviews varying between 11 and 30 people per PSU.

The sample distribution of main demographic characteristics can be compared with census data from 1999 (with 2000 data used for education section).

Table 2: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE TO CENSUS IN KYRGYZSTAN

Variable	Census	Sample			
		Pure	Diff.	Weighted	Diff.
Sex (1999)					
Male	49.4%	48.80%	-0.56%	49.92%	0.56%
Female	50.6%	51.20%	0.56%	50.08%	-0.56%
Age (1999)					
18-20	10.02%	9.93%	-2.10%	11.67%	1.66%
21-30	28.77%	27.93%	-4.90%	29.45%	0.68%
31-40	24.64%	23.07%	1.20%	19.09%	-5.55%
41-50	15.87%	20.53%	2.10%	21.05%	5.18%
51-60	7.84%	9.07%	0.40%	10.10%	2.26%
61 and older	12.87%	9.47%	3.40%	8.63%	-4.23%
Nationality (1999)					
Kyrgyz	64.86%	65.53%	0.67%	65.34%	0.48%
Russian	12.51%	10.40%	-2.11%	9.44%	-3.07%
Ukrainian	1.05%	0.47%	-0.58%	0.31%	-0.74%
Uzbek	13.79%	16.80%	3.01%	17.50%	3.71%
Kazakh	0.88%	0.87%	-0.02%	0.80%	-0.09%
Tadjik	0.88%	0.40%	-0.48%	0.54%	-0.34%
Tartar	0.94%	0.67%	-0.28%	0.46%	-0.48%
Dungan	1.07%	0.20%	-0.87%	0.26%	-0.81%
Corean	0.41%	0.87%	0.46%	1.06%	0.65%
German	0.45%	0.47%	0.02%	0.46%	0.02%
Uigur	0.97%	0.27%	-0.70%	0.35%	-0.62%
Other	2.19%	3.07%	0.87%	3.49%	1.30%
Education (2000)					
No education	2.45%	0.00%	-2.45%	0.00%	-2.45%
Incomplete secondary	21.37%	8.13%	-13.23%	7.94%	-13.42%
Full secondary or incomplete higher	52.68%	53.00%	0.32%	53.27%	0.58%
Academic liceum, technical school, college	11.86%	20.67%	8.81%	20.66%	8.81%
Completed higher	11.64%	18.13%	6.49%	18.07%	6.43%

282 cases of nonresponse were observed. The average response rate is about 84% (282 of 1782 cases. 210 of these cases were in urban areas, leaving a 70.0% response rate for cities, while 72 cases were rural, for a 93.3% response rate in rural Kyrgyzstan. Respose rates were over 92% for all but Osh (89.6%) and Bishkek, where 177 people refused to participate, leaving a response rate of 58.2%. Most

urban nonrespondents emphatically refused to participate (176 people or 83.8% of all urban residents that were non-responsive).

Tajikistan

Tajikistan has 4 provinces, with the city of Dushanbe then considered a separate fifth province. These provinces have 58 districts, with 17 cities and 7 settlements (“posyolok”) of provincial submission. Districts incorporate rural settlements or villages, which are incorporated into rural districts (“djamoat dekhhot” and “poselkovyi djamoat”). In total there are 23 cities (17 cities of provincial submission and 6 cities of district submission), 47 settlements (7 settlements of provincial submission and 40 settlements of district submission), 356 djamoat and 3,803 villages. The population of Tajikistan was 6,187,561 people, of whom 1,686,095 (27%) were urban, and 4,501,466 (73%) were rural as of January 20, 2000.

Several remote or inaccessible districts were excluded from the sample from since they are practically impossible to get to due to their remote location or absence of transportation. These are three districts in Sogd province, that have a population of 248,290 people, which is 0.1% of the urban population of the country and 5.5% of the rural population – a total of 4.01% percent of the country.

The sampling frame for Tajikistan is based on the list of small territorial units (primary sampling units - PSUs) of three types:

Villages – rural settlements subordinate to djamoats, each is a separate PSU.

Parts of large rural settlements, divided into populations of between 2,504 and 4,835 inhabitants as separate PSUs.

Parts of large urban settlements, divided into populations of between 2,450 and 4,903 inhabitants as separate PSUs.

Like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the sampling is three-stage stratified clustered sampling for Tajikistan. First, proportionate stratification is done by the population of provinces, with proportionate stratification by urban/rural population within provinces (except the city of Dushanbe which is all urban) and then a PPS-sampling of PSUs within these urban and rural strata. Second, sequential random sampling of households (Secondary Sampling Units - SSUs) is done in selected PSUs. Third, Kish grids are used to sample respondents within households.

For Tajikistan, 56 PSUs are randomly selected from the sampling frame, and between 7 people (for urban areas in Gorno-Badakhshan, which is a tiny proportion of the urban population of the country) and 29 respondent interviewed in each.

The sample distribution of the main demographic characteristics can be compared with census data from 1989 (with data from 2000 used instead in the nationality section). These data have changed substantially over fifteen years and the dramatic change in the economy, society, and polity with the civil war and other changes that have accompanied independence. The data are weighted, which somewhat reduces the typical disproportionate probability of selection of men and youth.

Table 3: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE TO CENSUS IN TAJIKISTAN

Variable	Census	Sample			
		Pure	Diff.	Weighted	Diff.
Sex (1989)					
Male	49.7%	45.9%	-3.8%	47.9%	-1.8%
Female	50.3%	54.1%	3.8%	52.1%	1.8%
Age (1989)					
18-19	8.1%	5.6%	-2.5%	6.6%	-1.5%
20-29	35.0%	25.7%	-9.2%	30.8%	-4.2%
30-39	21.8%	28.7%	6.8%	23.4%	1.6%
40-49	11.2%	21.2%	10.0%	19.5%	8.3%
50-59	11.9%	8.3%	-3.5%	9.8%	-2.0%
60 and older	12.0%	10.5%	-1.6%	9.9%	-2.1%
Nationality (2000)					
Tadjik	79.9%	74.2%	-5.7%	75.7%	-4.3%
Uzbek	15.3%	21.1%	5.8%	20.8%	5.6%
Russian	15.3%	2.7%	-12.6%	2.1%	-13.2%
Other	3.7%	2.0%	-1.7%	2.6%	-1.1%
Education (1989, age 15 and older)					
Incomplete secondary	25.2%	22.3%	-2.9%	22.9%	-2.3%
Full secondary or incomplete higher	52.7%	49.1%	-3.6%	49.7%	-2.9%
Academic liceum, technical school, college	13.1%	15.0%	1.8%	14.2%	1.0%
Completed higher	9.0%	13.7%	4.7%	13.2%	4.2%

In comparison with the 2000 census nationality data, the number of Uzbeks has grown and the number of people of other nationalities (especially Russians) has appreciably diminished. This is due to high levels of unemployment and increased migration of Tajik men to Russia for work and, on the contrary, the settled way of life of many Uzbeks who have remained in agriculture. Second, census data overestimates the proportion of the titular nationality since belonging to this nation provides advantages in employment, careers, and education. In opinion polls, when no supporting documentation is required, respondents preferred to name their ethnicity as that which they actually identify themselves.

During the fieldwork, 88 cases of nonresponse were observed. The average response rate is about 94% (1,500 of 1,588 cases - due to using the sequential sampling of households the nonresponse had no effect on the final sample size). Generally, nonresponse was registered if a completed interview had not taken place, and an interviewer had made up to 3 callbacks. The response rate was 84.4% in urban areas and 98.9% in rural ones. In Dushanbe the response rate was 73.3%. Two-thirds (67.1%) of urban non-responses came from respondents not being at home; few emphatic refusals to participate were noted in Tajikistan.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has 12 provinces, the Republic of Karakalpakstan, and the city of Tashkent. Each province has several districts for a total of 168 districts in the country. Each district has a number of cities, small towns and villages. Of the 233 cities and small towns in Uzbekistan, 76 cities are subordinated directly to provinces due to their importance. The population of Uzbekistan was 25,523,000 people, of which 9,410,700 (37%) were urban residents, and the 16,112,300 (63%) were rural residents as of May 2002. Several districts, practically inaccessible from an absence of transportation or remote location, are excluded from the sampling frame. These two cities, one small town, and one district in Navoi have a population of 95,300, 0.9% of the urban population and 0.1% of the rural population of the country – a total of 0.4% of the population of Uzbekistan is excluded from the sampling frame.

The sampling frame for Uzbekistan has primary sampling units (PSUs) of two types: MK (“Mahallinskiy Komitet”) - town makhalla committee. Makhallas are the traditional neighborhood committees which have been revived (and in some urban areas artificially created) by the Uzbek government; SSG (“Selskiy Skhod Grazhdan”) - village council. This type has been used for rural areas in all recent surveys.

The sampling scheme then has the following three standard stages:

- proportionate stratification by population of provinces;
- for all provinces (include *Tashkent city* as urban stratum);
- proportionate stratification by urban/rural population within provinces;
- PPS-sampling of PSUs within urban/rural strata;
- sequential random sampling of households (Secondary Sampling Units - SSUs) in selected PSUs;
- Kish grid based sampling of respondents.

Thus, the sampling is three-stage stratified clustered sampling.

There are 63 PSUs are selected from the sampling frames, with the number of respondents to be interviewed in each varying between 17 and 29 in different PSUs.

The sample distribution by the main demographic characteristics can be compared with data of Statistical Department of Republic of Uzbekistan from January 1, 2002.

Table 4: COMPARISON OF SAMPLE TO CENSUS IN UZBEKISTAN

Variable	Census	Sample (18 years and older, 2004)			
		Pure	Difference	Weighted	Difference
Sex					
Male	49.0%	41.3%	-7.7%	44.1%	-4.9%
Female	51.0%	58.7%	7.7%	55.9%	4.9%
Age					
15-19	7.5%	5.2%	-2.3%	6.4%	-1.1%
20-29	30.8%	22.3%	-8.5%	27.1%	-3.7%
30-39	24.2%	27.5%	3.2%	21.4%	-2.8%
40-49	18.2%	21.8%	3.6%	21.1%	2.9%
50-59	7.9%	10.1%	2.2%	11.3%	3.4%
60 and older	11.4%	13.2%	1.8%	12.8%	1.3%

No comparisons are made on nationality, education and marital status of population because data from the last census data for these categories is not available.

During the fieldwork, 766 cases of non-response were registered (non-eligible units are excluded from this count). The average response rate is about 66% (1,500 of 2,266 attempts). Generally, the non-response case was registered if an interviewer had made up to two failed callbacks. Below is listed the response rate by residence:

Table 5. Response rate by urban/rural and provinces

No	Residence	Response	Non-response	Response rate
	Urban	553	432	56.1%
	Rural	947	334	73.9%
1	Karakalpakstan	91	20	82.0%
2	Andijan	134	41	76.6%
3	Buhara	87	20	81.3%
4	Jizzakh	61	11	84.7%
5	Kashkadarya	135	56	70.7%
6	Navoi	47	24	66.2%
7	Namangan	119	50	70.4%
8	Samarkand	164	110	59.9%
9	Surhandarya	108	28	79.4%
10	Syrdarya	39	11	78.0%
11	Tashkent	143	79	64.4%
12	Fergana	163	66	71.2%
13	Horezm	82	40	67.2%
14	Tashkent city	127	210	37.7%
TOTAL in Uzbekistan		1 500	766	66.2%

As one can see, the response rate in rural areas is higher than in urban areas. In Tashkent city very much high level of refusals is observed (response rate barely about 38%). This is caused mainly by the following factors:

rural residents are more willing to cooperate;

they are less active in sense of movement, therefore more reachable;

the theme of interview sets people on the alert;

population registration and register maintenance in cities are generally worse which leads to poor quality sampling frames.

The influence of first two factors is aligned lately because of a falling of a scale of living of people.

The table below showing the structure of non-response proves these assumptions.

Table 6. Non-response structure by causes

No	Cause of non-response	Urban		Rural		TOTAL	
		Freq.	%	Freq.	%	Freq.	%
3	Nobody at home	39	8.2%	20	5.1%	59	6.8%
4	Respondent was not at home by that time	11	2.3%	14	3.6%	25	2.9%
6	Emphatic refusal by respondent	9	1.9%	9	2.3%	18	2.1%
7	Household members refused contacting respondent	191	40.0%	122	31.2%	313	36.1%
8	Respondent was drunk			1	0.3%	1	0.1%
9	Respondent could not talk (sick, abnormal, very old, etc.)	7	1.5%	17	4.3%	24	2.8%
10	Not at home for a long time (long absence)	175	36.7%	151	38.6%	326	37.6%
11	Address was not found, does not exist	23	4.8%	25	6.4%	48	5.5%
12	Address is not residential	20	4.2%	11	2.8%	31	3.6%
13	Repeat address or out of range of actual count of households in the PSU (sampling technical causes – see 0)	2	0.4%	21	5.4%	23	2.6%
TOTAL		477	100.0%	391	100.0%	868	100.0%

In this table are included the causes of non-response owing to a non-eligible units (causes 11,12) and technique of sampling of households (cause 13, see also 0). Thus, 40% of all the causes in the urban areas is the “household members refused contacting respondent” (cause 7), as compared with the corresponding 31.2% in the rural areas. This cause has the most spread for urban people and the second at the prevalence for rural areas (about 31% of all causes of non-response), because the theme of interview (the internal politic, interethnic problem etc.) makes people mistrustful and situation with the criminality (especially in the cities) is very complicated.

Otherwise, cause 10 (“not at home for a long time”) is second at the prevalence for urban areas (about 37%) and first for rural areas (about 39% of all non-response causes). This cause is spread for urban and rural people because they migrate in searches of earnings.

The similar reasons called cause 3 “nobody at home” and 4 “respondent was not at home by that time” (8.2% and 2,3% for urban and 5.1% and 3.6% for rural areas accordingly). Besides for these causes there is one more explanation – employment of urban population and “cotton campaign” for rural population.

The causes 6, 8, and 9 met not frequently. Therefore we may not make any conclusions.

The sampling frame quality is revealed by comparing the share of cause 11 “address was not found, does not exist” – 4.8% in the urban areas versus 6.4% in the rural. In the urban areas 2.8% of the non-response are “Address is not residential” (cause 12).

In the rural areas this cause makes 4.2% of all causes of non-response. In most cases it originates from that a household, in order to get an additional land plot from a makhalla committee for running subsidiary economy, declares itself to be actually consisting of two households – parents’ and a new, young one. Then the makhalla committee registers a new household and allocates a plot. However, this “household” continues living with the parents, making the new address not residential. Most urban cases are connected with fitting apartments for small offices, cafes, renting to foreigners, etc. More apartments in the cities are thrown (owners have left in searching of earnings).

Appendix 3: Don't Know and No Response Regressions

Three models of DKNR responses for the Kyrgyz Republic.

KYR	Model 1 Conflict Likely= Yes, Not Likely & DKNR=0)			Model 2 Conflict Likely =Yes, Not Likely=0)			Model 3 DKNR=1, All others=0)		
age	0.026 [0.81]	-0.011 [0.44]	0.002 [0.06]	0.019 [0.57]	-0.017 [0.62]	-0.005 [0.19]	-0.028 [0.67]	-0.04 [0.98]	-0.027 [0.74]
age2	0 [0.81]	0 [0.36]	0 [0.14]	0 [0.53]	0 [0.47]	0 [0.07]	0 [0.68]	0 [0.84]	0 [0.68]
urban	1.114 [6.94]**	0.707 [5.13]**	0.089 [0.65]	1.23 [7.52]**	0.808 [5.65]**	0.183 [1.28]	0.678 [2.95]**	0.426 [1.96]*	0.478 [2.44]*
male	0.259 [1.73]	0.157 [1.28]	0.346 [2.91]**	0.209 [1.37]	0.155 [1.22]	0.223 [1.80]	-0.389 [1.78]	-0.135 [0.68]	-0.731 [3.89]**
married	-0.126 [0.69]	0.04 [0.26]	0.064 [0.43]	-0.158 [0.84]	0.049 [0.31]	0.127 [0.83]	-0.214 [0.85]	0.145 [0.60]	0.232 [1.06]
pp_hard	0.128 [0.64]	-0.199 [1.18]	-0.252 [1.55]	0.082 [0.40]	-0.266 [1.53]	-0.327 [1.94]	-0.373 [1.24]	-0.347 [1.23]	-0.387 [1.53]
pp_required	-0.043 [0.24]	0.019 [0.13]	-0.077 [0.54]	-0.08 [0.44]	0.024 [0.15]	-0.1 [0.66]	-0.057 [0.22]	0.099 [0.42]	-0.064 [0.30]
ed_sec_inco	-0.915 [2.08]*	-0.337 [1.05]	-0.712 [2.28]*	-0.896 [1.97]*	-0.186 [0.55]	-0.674 [2.07]*	0.949 [1.91]	0.979 [2.04]*	0.453 [1.05]
ed_sec_tech	-0.215 [0.95]	-0.043 [0.22]	-0.285 [1.49]	-0.166 [0.72]	-0.019 [0.09]	-0.33 [1.65]	0.448 [1.31]	0.285 [0.85]	-0.157 [0.55]
ed_sec_reg	-0.233 [1.10]	-0.131 [0.72]	-0.205 [1.16]	-0.21 [0.97]	-0.061 [0.32]	-0.227 [1.21]	0.292 [0.86]	0.609 [1.92]	0.065 [0.24]
ed_high_inco	-0.293 [1.11]	-0.244 [1.07]	-0.108 [0.49]	-0.325 [1.20]	-0.221 [0.94]	-0.099 [0.43]	0.317 [0.81]	0.421 [1.13]	0.101 [0.32]
employed	0.04 [0.25]	0.134 [1.00]	-0.337 [2.59]**	0.083 [0.50]	0.21 [1.52]	-0.285 [2.10]*	0.62 [2.54]*	0.527 [2.38]*	0.428 [2.12]*
muslim	-0.633 [2.74]**	-0.472 [2.38]*	-0.608 [3.17]**	-0.695 [2.95]**	-0.67 [3.18]**	-0.827 [4.01]**	-0.551 [1.84]	-0.921 [3.34]**	-0.726 [2.80]**
eth_min_kg	-0.958 [4.82]**	-0.807 [5.21]**	-0.461 [3.22]**	-0.966 [4.81]**	-0.812 [5.13]**	-0.491 [3.33]**	0.005 [0.02]	0.091 [0.40]	-0.076 [0.35]
Constant	-1.424 [2.17]*	-0.076 [0.14]	0.286 [0.55]	-1.145 [1.71]	0.281 [0.50]	0.844 [1.56]	-2.01 [2.26]*	-1.594 [1.91]	-1.032 [1.36]
Observations	1318	1318	1318	1218	1200	1170	1318	1318	1318

Absolute value of z statistics in brackets

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Appendix 4: Survey Control Models

Comparison of models using survey controls for cluster and stratification.

DV: Well-being	KYR	KYR	KAZ	KAZ	TAJ	TAJ	UZB	UZB
	SVYSET	W/O SvySET	SVYSET	W/O SvySET	SVYSET	W/O SvySET	SVYSET	W/O SvySET
male	0.236	0.173	0.064	0.046	-0.148	-0.1	-0.145	-0.069
	[0.128]	[0.115]	[0.131]	[0.111]	[0.130]	[0.112]	[0.124]	[0.108]
age	-0.048	-0.056	-0.039	-0.029	-0.049	-0.049	-0.101	-0.1
	[0.030]	[0.025]*	[0.029]	[0.021]	[0.031]	[0.022]*	[0.028]**	[0.022]**
age2	0.001	0.001	0	0	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	[0.000]	[0.000]*	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]*	[0.000]**	[0.000]**
ed_sec_tech	0.313	0.326	0.159	0.144	0.227	0.282	-0.483	-0.47
	[0.272]	[0.263]	[0.248]	[0.180]	[0.247]	[0.190]	[0.207]*	[0.169]**
ed_sec_reg	0.547	0.577	0.305	0.301	-0.074	-0.159	-0.331	-0.343
	[0.242]*	[0.252]*	[0.265]	[0.181]	[0.189]	[0.139]	[0.172]	[0.160]*
ed_high_inco	0.616	0.66	0.904	0.786	1.137	1.03	-0.67	-0.363
	[0.290]*	[0.292]*	[0.423]*	[0.294]**	[0.311]**	[0.241]**	[0.783]	[0.446]
ed_high_com	0.698	0.742	0.379	0.387	0.801	0.797	-0.433	-0.53
	[0.265]*	[0.278]**	[0.251]	[0.206]	[0.208]**	[0.200]**	[0.267]	[0.218]*
employed	0.042	0.138	0.25	0.3	-0.015	-0.069	0.221	0.22
	[0.130]	[0.123]	[0.150]	[0.125]*	[0.165]	[0.110]	[0.126]	[0.111]*
single	0.426	0.599	0.01	0.226	0.437	0.527	0.623	0.769
	[0.314]	[0.305]*	[0.284]	[0.240]	[0.404]	[0.309]	[0.419]	[0.304]*
married	0.395	0.699	0.225	0.309	0.81	0.9	1.152	1.353
	[0.245]	[0.257]**	[0.200]	[0.175]	[0.338]*	[0.257]**	[0.297]**	[0.238]**
widow	0.116	0.522	-0.087	0.007	0.703	0.584	0.07	0.408
	[0.419]	[0.355]	[0.285]	[0.238]	[0.367]	[0.314]	[0.346]	[0.297]
ses_ml_low	-2.448	-2.421	-2.615	-2.357	-1.442	-1.575	-1.297	-1.464
	[0.267]**	[0.192]**	[0.247]**	[0.178]**	[0.280]**	[0.172]**	[0.282]**	[0.170]**
ses_mod	-1.312	-1.173	-1.062	-0.934	-0.485	-0.527	-0.56	-0.732
	[0.218]**	[0.165]**	[0.184]**	[0.158]**	[0.200]*	[0.155]**	[0.214]*	[0.161]**
Observations	1327	1327	1474	1474	1483	1483	1487	1487

Standard errors in brackets

* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Appendix 5: Survey Questionnaire (English)

FINAL

August 30, 2004

PERCEPTION SURVEY IN CENTRAL ASIA

[INTERVIEWER FILLS OUT]

- A. Country
- B. Province (oblast')
- C. District (rayon)
- D. City
- E. Rural community
- F. PSU
- G. Address
- H. Respondent's first name
- I. Interviewer #
- J. Gender of interviewer
- K. Date
- L. Time started
- M. Gender of respondent
 - 1. Male
 - 2. Female

[INTERVIEWER QUESTIONS]

What language would you prefer to use in our survey today: Uzbek, Russian, Kazak, Tajik, Kyrgyz, or Karakalpak?"

[CHANGE ORDER SO STATE LANGUAGE OF COUNTRY IS THE FIRST CHOICE]

Uzbek

Kazak

Tajik

Kyrgyz

Russian

Karakalpak

[INTERVIEWER READS INTRODUCTION]

(Read) My name is _____, and I am working with Expert Fikri, a sociological research center. Our Center regularly conducts opinion surveys to study people's opinions on various questions. As you probably know, study of people's opinions is important for understanding how people live, what their concerns and

aspirations are, and what they would like to change in their society. In this survey, in every oblast of the country, we are studying people's perceptions and opinions of social conditions, individual and family economic well-being, the current state of the economy, and regional links and cooperation in Central Asia.

You were selected by chance and no one else can be interviewed instead of you. All information you provide will only be used in an aggregate form, along with the answers of thousands of other people. Your name, address and your personal opinion will not be released to any government department or other organization. This interview will take about 40 minutes.

In the course of the interview, if you don't know the answer or don't have an opinion, feel free to say so. If I go too fast or too slow, or if you don't understand the question, let me know.

Now, before we begin, do you have any questions of me?

DEMOGRAPHICS

How old are you?

What is your main ethnic heritage?

[RECORD VERBATIM] _____

What is your marital status?

[CARD]

Married

Married by religious ceremony nikoh

Married, but my spouse lives elsewhere because of work

Live with somebody but not registered (grazhdanski brak)

Single and never married

Divorced

Widowed

DK/NR

What is the highest level of education you have received?

Incomplete secondary school (8-9 years) or less

Specialized secondary school (technical or vocational school)

Complete secondary school (10-11 years)

Incomplete higher education or bachelor's degree

Complete higher education, master's degree or greater

DK/NR

What is the highest educational level achieved by a member of your household other than yourself?

Elementary and incomplete secondary school (8-9 years) or less

Specialized secondary school (technical or vocational school)

Complete secondary school (10-11 years)

Incomplete higher education or bachelor's degree

Complete higher education, master's degree, or greater

DK/NR

LANGUAGE

What language do you think in?

What other languages do you speak?

[OPEN ENDED, LIST UP TO 6]

No other language

Uzbek

Russian

Kazak

Tajik

Kyrgyz

Karakalpak

Other (specify)

SATISFACTION AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS

Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life – very satisfied, fairly satisfied, fairly dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

Very Satisfied

Fairly Satisfied

Fairly Dissatisfied

Very Dissatisfied

DK/NR

How would you describe your household's current economic situation - is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?

Very good

Somewhat good

Somewhat bad

Very bad

DK/NR

How would you rate the economic situation in your household a few years ago – was it much better, somewhat better, the same, somewhat worse, or much worse?

Much better
Somewhat better
The same
Somewhat worse
Much worse
DK/NR

Imagine a 10-step ladder where the poorest people are standing on the first, or lowest, step, stand the and the richest people are standing on the tenth, or highest, step On what step would you place yourself today?
[RECORD THE NUMBER]

How long do you think it will take for you to reach a satisfactory standard of living?
[SHOW CARD]

I already have it
In 5 years
In 10 years
In 15 years
In 25 years
It will take at least 50 years
Never
Other (specify)DK/NR

CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL COHESION

I am going to read you a list of various activities. I would like you to tell me, if over the last few years you have been involved in any of the following activities in the past three years

[READ ONE BY ONE AND MARK THE RESPONSE]

	Yes	No	DK/NR
1. Write a letter of complaint to local or national authorities			
2. Sign a petition to local or national authorities			
3. Ask your local council to resolve the issue (use appropriate name, e.g. mahalla committee)			
4. Organize people in your mahalla/village to address the issue			
5. Contact the press/media			
6. Take part in an authorized protest, such as meeting, strike, picket, etc.			

In the past 12 months, have you heard of any instances where people in your village or city have joined together to bring their grievances to local government (hokimiat, mahalla committee, or village council)?

Yes

No

DK/NR

Are there grievances that you together with the representatives of your community would like to discuss with authorities – is it definitely, maybe or no?

Definitely

Maybe

No

COMMENTS (record)

DK/NR

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND COOPERATION

Has the frequency of interaction with your relatives decreased or increased over the last few years?

Increased (**SKIP TO Q-19**)

Stayed the same (**SKIP TO Q-19**)

Decreased

DK/NR (**SKIP TO Q-19**)

If DECREASED, why do you think the frequency of interaction has decreased?
[RECORD VERBATIM]

Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?

People can be trusted

You can't be too careful

DK/NR

In the past 12 months did you participate in any unpaid communal activities (such as beautification of the neighborhood), in which people came together to do some work for the benefit of all?

Yes

No (**SKIP TO Q-22**)

DK/NR (**SKIP TO Q-22**)

If YES, what exactly did you do in these communal activities?
[RECORD VERBATIM]

SITUATION IN THE COMMUNITY

In your opinion, what are the three most critical issues that people in your village/city faces today?

[OPEN ENDED, RECORD VERBATIM UP TO THREE]

Compared to few years ago, do you feel less safe or more safe when you go walking about alone when it is dark - is it much more safe, somewhat more safe, about the same, somewhat less safe, much less safe?

More safe

About the same

Less safe

DK/NR

INTEREST OF GOVERNMENT IN YOUR LIFE

Do the local authorities (hokimiat, mahalla committee, or village council) take interest in and responds to the needs of people in your city/village?

Always

Often

Sometimes

Rarely

Never

DK/NR

Does the national government take interest in and responds to the needs of people in your city/village?

Always
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
DK/NR

Are unofficial leaders, people who do not work for hokimiat or mahalla committee, more active in your city or village than hokimiat or mahalla?

Yes
No
NO SUCH LEADERS
DK/NK

Do you or anyone in your immediate family receive any kind of subsidy from the state during the last 12 months? Please do not include pension.

Yes
No
DK/NR
CONFLICT

Now let's talk about disputes and conflicts that sometimes happen between different groups or people in the society.

Where do people usually go to attempt to resolve disputes and conflicts:

[OPEN ENDED, RECORD VERBATIM]

[SHOW CARD]

	Mahalla Committee	Respected neighbors or relatives	Hokimiat	Court	Police	Other (Specify)	DK/NR
Within a family							
Between families or neighbors							
Between people living in the border rayons of neighboring countries							

Are there organizations, movements, or groups in society causing problems in your COUNTRY?

Yes

No (**SKIP TO Q-31**)

DK/NR (**SKIP TO Q-31**)

[If YES] what groups or organizations do you have in mind?

[RECORD VERBATIM. DO NOT USE ACRONYMS OR ABBREVIATIONS FOR NAMES OF ORGANIZATIONS.]

How likely is conflict within COUNTRY over the next few years– highly likely, fairly likely, somewhat likely, not likely at all?

Highly likely

Fairly likely

Somewhat likely

Not likely at all (**SKIP TO Q-35**)

NR/DK (**SKIP TO Q-35**)

Conflict over what? Name up to three reasons.

[RECORD VERBATIM]

What kinds of groups might be in conflict? Name up to three groups.

[RECORD VERBATIM, DO NOT USE ACRONYMS OR ABBREVIATIONS.]

How intense might this conflict be?

Armed conflict
Mass disorder
Minor instances of physical violence
Aggressive verbal attacks
Other (specify)
DK/NR

How likely is conflict on the local level, in your village/city, over the next few years – is it highly likely, fairly likely, somewhat likely, or not likely at all?

Highly likely
Fairly likely
Somewhat likely
Not likely at all (**SKIP TO Q-38**)
NR/DK (**SKIP TO Q-38**)

Conflict over what? Name up to three reasons.
[RECORD VERBATIM]

How intense might this conflict be?

Armed conflict
Mass disorder
Minor instances of physical violence
Aggressive verbal attacks
Other (specify)
DK/NR

How likely is conflict between COUNTRY and other countries in Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan - over the next few years - is it highly likely, fairly likely, somewhat likely, or not likely at all?

Highly likely
Fairly likely
Somewhat likely
Not likely at all (**GO TO Q-41**)
NR/DK (**GO TO Q-41**)

Conflict with which country and over what?
[READ COUNTRY NAME AND RECORD VERBATIM REASONS OF CONFLICT IN THE TABLE BELOW]

How intense might this conflict be for each country named?
[RECORD IN THE TABLE BELOW]

War
Severing diplomatic relations

Armed conflict
 Mass disorder
 Minor instances of physical violence
 Aggressive verbal attacks
 Other (specify)
 DK/NR

	Possible	Reasons	Forms of conflict
With Kazakhstan	Yes/No	RECORD VERBATIM	CODE
With Kyrgyzstan	Yes/No		
With Tajikistan	Yes/No		
With Turkmenistan	Yes/No		
With Uzbekistan	Yes/No		

RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS

Which is of more importance to you, your ethnicity or your citizenship?
 [ACCEPT ONLY ONE RESPONSE]

Ethnicity
 Citizenship
 EQUALLY IMPORTANT
 DO NOT CARE ABOUT EITHER
 DK/NR

How would you describe current relations among ethnic groups in COUNTRY – are they very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?

Very good

Somewhat good

Somewhat bad

Very bad

DK/NR (**SKIP TO Q-44**)

Why do you think so?

[OPEN ENDED, LIST ALL THAT RESPONDENTS NOTE]

Generally, how much do you feel in common with members of these different groups – do you have much in common, little in common, nothing at all in common with:

	Much	Little	Nothing	DK/NR
Majority nationality				
Russians				
Other largest ethnic group				

[Nationalities specific to the country surveyed]

In your opinion, will current relations among ethnic groups in COUNTRY change for the better, stay the same, or change for the worse over the following periods of time?

	Change for the better	Stay the same	Change for the worse	DK/NR
Over the next year				
Over the next 5 years				
Over the next decade				

How do you rate COUNTRY's policy towards the following groups in the COUNTRY – is it very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, very unfair?

	VF	SF	SU	VU	DK/NR
Russians					
Largest minority					

[Nationalities specific to the country surveyed, e.g., Uzbeks in KG, Uzbeks in TJ, Tajiks in UZ.]

In the last several years, have you experienced instances of discrimination because of your ethnicity in COUNTRY?

Yes

No (**GO TO Q-49**)

DK/NR (**GO TO Q-49**)

What have your experiences been like?

[RECORD VERBATIM]

ATTITUDES TOWARDS NEWCOMERS

Have new people moved to your village or city in the last few years?

Yes

Yes, my family and I moved here (**GO TO Q-51**)

No (**GO TO Q-53**)

DK/NR (**GO TO Q-53**)

Where are these people from?

RECORD COUNTRY NAME _____

Other Oblast of COUNTRY _____ 98

DK/NR _____ 99

ATTENTION: INTERVIEWER, **GO TO Q-52**

Where did you and/or your family move from?

RECORD COUNTRY NAME _____

OTHER OBLAST OF COUNTRY _____ 98

DK/NR _____ 99

In your opinion, are there any tensions between newcomers and local people? If yes, what kinds of tensions?

Yes (specify) _____

[RECORD VERBATIM]

No

I want to remind you that if you don't know the answer or don't understand the question, please feel free to say so.

BORDERS

Now I'd like to ask you several questions about borders between COUNTRY and other Central Asian countries.

What impact have borders between COUNTRY and other Central Asian countries had in the following areas – is it very positive, positive, no impact, negative, or very negative?

[SHOW CARD. READ AND MARK THE RESPONSE TO EACH CATEGORY]

	V Pos	Pos	No Imp.	Neg.	V Neg.	DK
a. trade, transport, transit across new borders						
b. access to water						
c. access to energy (electricity, fuel, etc.)						
d. ability to make financial transactions for business						
e. access to family, friends, or business associates						
f. conflict, insecurity and crime						
g. drug traffic and use						
h. ability to communicate in one common language						

How do you rate border relations between COUNTRY and its Central Asian neighbors over the last few years?

[SHOW CARD]

[DO NOT ASK ABOUT THE COUNTRY THAT YOU ARE IN]

	IC	IS	U	BW	BSW	DK/NR
Kazakhstan						
Kyrgyzstan						
Tajikistan						
Turkmenistan						
Uzbekistan						

If you have traveled to any other Central Asian countries since 2000, what was the purpose of your travel? Select all that apply.

[SHOW CARD, ASK FOR THE FOUR COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE ONE YOU ARE IN]

No travel [ONLY VOLUNTARY ANSWER]

To find work

Business or trade

For my current work

To visit relatives or friends

For vacation

Shopping

Other (specify)

DK/NR

	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan
To find work	1	1	1	1
Business or trade	2	2	2	2
For my current work	3	3	3	3
To visit relatives or friends	4	4	4	4
For vacation	5	5	5	5
Shopping	6	6	6	6
Other (specify)				
No travel – only voluntary answer	98	98	98	98
DK/NR	99	99	99	99

[IF TRAVELED] Have you encountered any of the following problems when traveling to any of the Central Asian countries?
[SHOW CARD, CHECK ALL THAT APPLY]

Time-consuming visa processing
Expensive visa
Mistreatment at the embassy
Mistreatment at the border control
Mistreatment at customs control
Difficulty with registration in the country of visit
Denial in registration in the country of visit
Expensive or unavailable air-tickets
Crossing the border took an inordinate amount of time
Mistreatment in a country of travel a result of national or ethnic identity
Bribes to immigration and customs officers at the border.
Other (Specify)
DK/NR

LABOR AND TRADE MIGRATION

How many children do you have?

RECORD

NO CHILDREN 99

Did you or anyone in your household leave your village or city to work or engage in trade between 2004 and the present? It can be any kind of a trip, except for “komandirovka”.

Yes

No (**GO TO Q-75**)

DK/NR (**GO TO Q-75**)

What country did you primarily go to for work or trade?

Kazakhstan

China

Kyrgyzstan

Russia

Tajikistan

Other (Specify)

Within Uzbekistan

DK/NR

ATTENTION, INTERVIEWER! QUESTION 60 IS ONLY FOR THOSE WHO HAVE TRAVELED WITHIN COUNTRY IN Q-59. FOR OTHERS, GO TO Q-61

Which oblasts of COUNTRY did you go to?

List of oblasts with codes goes here

Traveled within my Oblast 98

DK/NR 99

Did you go to a city or village?

City

Village

Both city and village

NR

What type of work or trade did you primarily engage in the other village or city?

[SHOW CARD]

Agriculture sector

Construction and house renovation

Trade (**GO TO Q-63**)

Services

Industry

Consulting, science, culture

Other (specify)

DK/NR

ATTENTION, INTERVIEWER! Q-63 IS ONLY FOR THOSE WHO DID TRADE

If trade, what goods did you primarily trade?

Agricultural produce

Food products

Goods produced in the country where you traded

Goods not produced in the country where traded

Gasoline/oil/diesel fuel

Agricultural inputs (fertilizer, seeds, etc.)

Other

DK/NR

ATTENTION, INTERVIEWER! Q-64 IS ONLY FOR THOSE WHO DIDN'T DO
TRADE IN Q-62.

What exactly did you do?

RECORD VERBATIM. DO NOT ACCEPT ANSWERS LIKE "ENGINEER" OR
"WORKER"

How often do you go to work or trade outside your village/city?

[SHOW CARD]

Every Day

3-4 times a week
3-4 times a month
3-4 times a year
Other (specify)_____
DK/NR

How long do you usually remain away?
[SHOW CARD]
Return same day
2-3 days
2-3 weeks
2-3 months
Other_(specify)_____
DK/NR

How many trips did you make during 2004?
_____.

What year did you first go to work outside your place of residence?

DK/NR

What did you do before leaving?
[SHOW CARD]
Independent entrepreneur
Head/manager of company or organization
Farmer
Specialist with higher education
Specialist with secondary education or vocational training
Worker
Military, law enforcement
Student
Retired and don't work
Housewife or on maternity/child care leave
Was unemployed
Other (specify)
DK/NR

Did you have friends or relatives living there when you first traveled there?

Yes

No

DK/NR

What is the primary reason you went to work or trade outside your place of residence?

[SHOW CARD]

No work in our village/city

Better opportunities elsewhere

Earn money for special events (wedding and the like)

Other (Specify) _____

DK/NR

Has the household's financial situation changed as a result of your working or trading outside of your village/city?

[SHOW CARD]

Improved considerably

Improved somewhat

Hasn't changed

Became worse

Became significantly worse

6. DK/NR

What percentage of your total household income in 2004 constitutes income from your trips?

RECORD ____%

What were two major difficulties if any, that you had when traveling and staying outside your village or city for work or trade?

[RECORD VERBATIM UP TO TWO]

Now I will ask you a few questions about security in COUNTRY and its cooperation with other countries.

SENSE OF SECURITY AND PERCEPTION OF OTHER COUNTRIES

In your opinion, where does the greatest threat to the security of COUNTRY come from, Choose up to two.

[SHOW CARD]

From another former Soviet republic

From some other foreign country

From religious organizations

From organized crime (**SKIP TO Q-77**)

Feel no particular threat at all (**SKIP TO Q-77**)

Other (specify) **(SKIP TO Q-77)**
DK/NR **(SKIP TO Q-77)**

Which one (republic, country, organization) poses the biggest threat?
[RECORD VERBATIM]

DK/NR

COOPERATION

Which country in Central Asia do you regard as the most important partner for COUNTRY?

[Exclude the country currently surveyed]

1. Kazakhstan
2. Kyrgyzstan
3. Tajikistan
4. Turkmenistan
5. Uzbekistan
6. NONE OF THESE (voluntary)
9. DK/NR

Which countries outside of Central Asia do you regard as the most important partners for COUNTRY? Name up to three countries.

Country name_____

Country name_____

Country name_____

NONE

9. DK/NR

How do you assess the economic cooperation in Central Asia over the last 2 to 3 years – is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?

1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Somewhat bad
4. Very bad
9. DK/NR

What are the two most important issues for cooperation between COUNTRY and other Central Asian countries?

[SHOW CARD, ACCEPT UP TO TWO ANSWERS]

Trade, transport, transit of goods across new borders

Regional security

Migration, movement of people across borders for work

Water management

Environmental issues

Financial services, such as financial transactions, money transfers and convertibility

Drug trafficking and use

Human trafficking, especially women and children

Social security and welfare

Other (specify)

DK/NR

SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY

Regarding the overall situation in COUNTRY today - are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in COUNTRY today?

[SHOW CARD]

Very Satisfied

Fairly Satisfied

Fairly Dissatisfied

Very Dissatisfied

DK/NR

What are the three most important problems in COUNTRY today?

[RECORD VERBATIM UP TO THREE.]

How would you describe the current economic situation in COUNTRY -- is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?

Very good

Somewhat good

Somewhat bad

Very bad

DK/NR

When do you think people in COUNTRY will live better?

[SHOW CARD]

People already live well

In 5 years

In 10 years

In 15 years

In 25 years

It will take at least 50 years

Other (specify)

DK/NR

Please look at the following list of governmental functions. Please rate the quality of these functions provided by the state as very poor, poor, fair, good, or very good:

[SHOW CARD. READ CATEGORIES AND MARK RESPONSES ONE BY ONE]

	V Poor	Poor	Fair	Good	V Good
a. healthcare services					
b. secondary education					
c. higher education					
d. pensions					
e. programs for youth (solving problems of youth)					
f. social assistance programs					
g. protecting the rights of ethnic minorities					
h. maintaining good relations with other Central Asian countries					

Please tell me how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with each of the following:
[SHOW CARD]

	Completely satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Fairly dissatisfied	Completely dissatisfied	DK/NR
a. security in the country					
b. respect of rights of citizens by authorities					
c. customs services					
d. border guards					
e. law enforcement officials (police, persecutor, courts)					
f. opportunity of citizens to influence the State power					
g. level of political freedoms					
h. level of independence of the mass media					

FAIRNESS

When you think about how fairly people are treated in society, how would you say that people like yourself are treated by the following institutions? Would you say that you are treated: always fairly, mostly fairly, sometimes fairly and sometimes not, mostly unfairly, or very unfairly by:

[SHOW CARD]

	Always fairly	Mostly fairly	SF, SN	Mostly unfairly	Very unfairly	DK/NR
a. local government (Hukummat)						
b. National government						
c. community council (use the appropriate name, e.g., mahalla committee)						
d. collective farm – selsovet (use the appropriate name) [DO NOT ASK IN URBAN AREA]						
e. police						
f. courts						
g. tax authorities						
h. clergy (of mosques and churches)						

CORRUPTION

Now two questions about corruption. In your opinion, how serious is the level of corruption in COUNTRY– is very serious, somewhat serious, not too serious, not a problem at all?

Very serious

Somewhat serious

Not too serious

Not a problem at all

DK/NR

As I mention various organizations, please tell me how much corruption you think there is among people in each of them – A great deal, a fair amount, not very much, none?

[SHOW CARD. READ CATEGORIES AND MARK RESPONSES ONE BY ONE.]

	GD	FA	NVM	None	DK/NR
<i>The courts</i>					

<i>The police</i>					
<i>Clergy</i>					
<i>Healthcare institutions</i>					
<i>Universities and other institutions of higher education</i>					
<i>Secondary schools</i>					
<i>Local government</i>					
<i>National government</i>					
<i>Mahalla committee</i>					
<i>Passport and Registration Offices</i>					

RELIGION

What role do you think Islam plays in the political life of COUNTRY – a very important role, a somewhat important role, a small role, no role at all?

An extremely important role
A somewhat important role
A small role
No role at all
DK/NR

What role do you think Islam should play in the political life of COUNTRY – a very important role, a somewhat important role, a small role, no role at all?

A very important role
A somewhat important role
A small role
No role at all
DK/NR

What is your religion?

Islam/Muslim

Russian Orthodox

Christianity

Other (specify)

Atheist/no religion (**GO TO Q-96**)

DK/NR

How many times a day do you pray?

RECORD

LESS THAN 1time/DAY (DURING HOLIDAYS OR DURING RAMAZAN) 8

DK/NR 9

ATTENTION, INTERVIEWER! QUESTIONS 94 AND 95 ARE FOR MUSLIMS ONLY. FOR OTHERS MOVE TO QUESTION 96.

Do you know what jihad means in Islam?

Yes

No (**GO TO Q-96**)

DK/NR (**GO TO Q-96**)

Some people say that jihad is a fight of a Muslim with the devil inside oneself, others say that it is a fight of a Muslim with non-Muslims. Which point of you do you share?

Jihad is a fight of a Muslim with the devil inside oneself

Jihad is a fight of a Muslim with non-Muslims

I AGREE WITH BOTH POINTS OF VIEW

Other (specify)

DK/NR

DEMOGRAPHICS CONT.

We are coming to the end of the interview. The last questions are about you and your household.

Are you currently employed?

Yes (**GO TO Q-98**)

No

If unemployed, what is your current status?

[SHOW CARD]

Student

Retired or disabled, do not work

Housewife, or currently on child care leave

Temporarily unemployed and looking for a job

Temporarily unemployed and not looking for a job

Other (specify)

DK/NR

INTERVIEWER, GO TO Q-99!

Please tell, which category on this card describes your position on your current job?

[SHOW CARD]

Independent entrepreneur

Head/manager of company or organization

Farmer

Specialist with higher education

Specialist with secondary education or vocational training

Worker

Military, law enforcement

Other (specify)

DK/NR

Please look at this card. Which one statement best characterizes the situation in your household?

[SHOW CARD]

Difficult to provide the family with basic food

Manage to provide basic food but find it difficult to pay utility bills and buy clothes

Can afford required foods, clothes and pay utility bills, but cannot afford such goods as TV, refrigerator, etc.

We can afford to buy a TV or refrigerator, but cannot afford a car, a new house or travel to another country.

Can buy a car, a new house or travel to another country, etc.

Don't know/ No Response

What are three main sources of income for your household?

[SHOW CARD]

Salary, wages

Cash or in-kind rent/lease payments received (for land, equipment, machinery, housing or other premises)

Any land plot, except for farm

Private enterprise

Farm plot

Pensions

Unemployment insurance

Social assistance

Money or in-kind assistance from relatives in the country

Money or in-kind assistance from relatives outside of the country

Other (specify)

DK/NR

SES by Observation:

High

Moderate/high

Moderate/low

Low

Not discernable

Appendix 6: Survey Questions

Survey of Conflict Prevention and Cooperation, 2004

Description of labels and values of database variables

Q1	What language do you prefer to use during our conversation?
Q2_DECADE	Age of respondent (by decade)
Q3	Nationality of respondent
Q4	Marital status of respondent
Q5	Highest level of education of respondent
Q6	Is there anybody in your household who has a higher educational level than yours? If yes, what is that level?
Q7	What language do you think?
Q8	What other languages do you speak fluently?
Q9	Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with your life
Q10	How do you estimate current economic situation of your household?
Q11	How would you rate the economic situation in your household a few years ago in comparison with current situation?
Q12	Imagine a 10-step ladder where the poorest people are standing on the first, or lowest, step, and the richest people are standing on the tenth, or highest, step. On what step would you place yourself today?
Q13	How long do you think it will take for you to reach a satisfactory standard of living?
Q14A	Did you write a letter of complaint to the national or local authorities in the past three years?
Q14B	Did you sign any collective petition to the national or local authorities in the past three years?
Q14C	Did you ask your mahalla committee to resolve any issue in the past three years?
Q14D	Did you organize people in your mahalla/village to resolve any issue in the past three years?
Q14E	Did you contact the press/media with any problem in the past three years?
Q14F	Did you take part in an authorized protest (meetings, strikes, pickets) in the past three years?
Q14G	Did you take part in an unauthorized protest (meetings, strikes, pickets) in the past three years?
Q15	In the past 12 months, have you heard of any instances where people in your village or city have joined together to bring their grievances to local government (hokimiat, mahalla committee, or village council)?
Q16	Are there grievances that you together with the representatives of your community would like to discuss with authorities?
Q16C	Comments of respondent to question 16
Q17	Has the frequency of interaction with your relatives decreased or increased over the last few years?

- Q18 Why do you think the frequency of interaction has decreased?
- Q19 Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be trusted, or that you should be too careful in dealing with people?
- Q20 In the past 12 months did you participate in any unpaid communal activities (such as beautification of the neighborhood)?
- Q21 What exactly did you do in these communal activities?
- Q22 In your opinion, what are the three most critical issues that people in your village/city faces today?
- Q23 Compared to few years ago, do you feel less safe or more safe when you go walking about alone when it is dark?
- Q24 Do the local authorities (hokimiat, mahalla committee, or village council) take interest in and responds to the needs of people in your city/village?
- Q25 Does the national government take interest in and responds to the needs of people in your city/village?
- Q26 Are unofficial leaders, people who do not work for hokimiat or mahalla committee, more active in your city or village than hokimiat or mahalla?
- Q27 Do you or anyone in your immediate family receive any kind of subsidy from the state during the last 12 months excepting pension?
- Q28A Who usually resolves disputes and conflicts within the family?
- Q28B Who usually resolves disputes and conflicts between families and neighbors?
- Q28C Who usually resolves disputes and conflicts between people living in the border rayons of neighboring countries?
- Q29 Are there organizations, movements, or groups in our society causing problems?
- Q30 What organisations or groups do you have in mind, when you talk about organisation or groups causing problems in our society?
- Q31 How likely is conflict within our country over the next few years?
- Q32 What can be possible reasons for such conflict in our country over the next few years?
- Q33 What groups or individuals can take part in this conflict in our country over the next few years?
- Q34 In which form can the conflict be in our country over the next few years?
- Q35 How likely is conflict on the local level, in your village/city, over the next few years?
- Q36 What can be possible reasons for such conflict in your city/village over the next few years?
- Q37 In which form can the conflict be in your city/village over the next few years?
- Q38 How likely is conflict between (country) and other countries in Central Asia?
- Q39A1 Can a conflict be between (country) and Kazakhstan?

- Q39A2 Because of which reasons the conflict can be between (country) and Kazakhstan?
- Q40A In which form can the conflict be between (country) and Kazakhstan?
- Q39B1 Can a conflict be between (country) and Kyrgyzstan?
- Q39B2 Because of which reasons the conflict can be between (country) and Kyrgyzstan?
- Q40B In which form can the conflict be between (country) and Kyrgyzstan?
- Q39C1 Can a conflict be between (country) and Tadjikistan?
- Q39C2 Because of which reasons the conflict can be between (country) and Tadjikistan?
- Q40C In which form can the conflict be between (country) and Tadjikistan?
- Q39D1 Can a conflict be between (country) and Turkmenistan?
- Q39D2 Because of which reasons the conflict can be between (country) and Turkmenistan?
- Q40D In which form can the conflict be between (country) and Turkmenistan?
- Q39E1 Can a conflict be between (country) and Uzbekistan?
- Q39E2 Because of which reasons the conflict can be between (country) and Uzbekistan?
- Q40E In which form can the conflict be between (country) and Uzbekistan?
- Q41 Which is more important to you, your ethnicity or your citizenship?
- Q42 How would you estimate current relations among people of different ethnic groups in (country)?
- Q431 Why do you estimate current relations among people of different ethnic groups in (country) as good relations?
- Q432 Why do you estimate current relations among people of different ethnic groups in (country) as bad relations?
- Q44A How much do you feel in common with Kazakhs?
- Q44B How much do you feel in common with Kyrgyz?
- Q44C How much do you feel in common with Tajiks?
- Q44D How much do you feel in common with Uzbeks?
- Q44E How much do you feel in common with Russians?
- Q45A How will change the current relations between people of different nationalities in (country) over the next year?
- Q45B How will change the current relations between people of different nationalities in (country) over the next five years?
- Q45C How will change the current relations between people of different nationalities in (country) over the next decade?
- Q46A How do you rate policy of our government towards Russians living in (country)?
- Q46B How do you rate policy of our government towards Tajiks living in (country)?
- Q46C How do you rate policy of our government towards Uzbeks living in (country)?

- Q47 In the last several years, have you experienced instances of discrimination because of your ethnicity in (country)?
- Q48 In what form was expressed discrimination of your rights in (country) because of your nationality?
- Q49 Have new people moved to your village or city for work or for living in the last few years?
- Q50 Where are people have coming for work or for living come from?
- Q51 Where did you and your family move from?
- Q52 Are there any tensions between newcomers and local people?
- Q521 What conflicts between newcomers and local people are there?
- Q53A What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian countries had in trade, transport, transit across new borders?
- Q53B What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian countries had in access to water?
- Q53C What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian countries had in access to energy (electricity, fuel etc.)?
- Q53D What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian countries had in ability to make financial transactions for business?
- Q53E What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian countries had for access to family, friends, or business associates?
- Q53F What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian countries had in conflict, insecurity and crime?
- Q53G What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian countries had in use and traffic of drugs?
- Q53H What impact have borders between (country) and other Central Asian countries had in ability to communicate in one common language?
- Q54A How do you rate border relations between (country) and Kazakhstan over the last few years?
- Q54B How do you rate border relations between (country) and Kyrgyzstan over the last few years?
- Q54C How do you rate border relations between (country) and Tajikistan over the last few years?
- Q54D How do you rate border relations between (country) and Turkmenistan over the last few years?
- Q54E How do you rate border relations between (country) and Uzbekistan over the last few years?
- Q551 If you have traveled to Kazakhstan since 2000, what was the purpose of your travel?
- Q552 If you have traveled to Kyrgyzstan since 2000, what was the purpose of your travel?
- Q553 If you have traveled to Tajikistan since 2000, what was the purpose of your travel?
- Q554 If you have traveled to Turkmenistan since 2000, what was the purpose of your travel?
- Q555 If you have traveled to Uzbekistan since 2000, what was the purpose of your travel?

- Q56 Have you encountered any of the following problems when traveling to any of the Central Asian countries?
- Q57 How many children do you have?
- Q57_REC How many children do you have?
- Q58 Did you leave your village/city in 2004 for work or trade, irrespective of trip duration?
- Q59 What country did you primarily go to for work or trade?
- Q60 Which oblasts of (country) did you go to for work or trade?
- Q61 Did you go to a city or village for work or trade?
- Q62 In which sphere of business you were mainly engaged in the place where you went for work or trade?
- Q63 What goods did you primarily trade or trade?
- Q64 What exactly did you do during your trips for work or trade?
- Q65 How often do you go to work or trade outside your village/city?
- Q66 How long do you usually remain away for work or trade?
- Q67 How many trips for work or trade did you make during 2004?
- Q68 What year did you first go to work or trade outside your place of residence?
- Q69 What did you do before your first leaving for work or trade?
- Q70 Did you have friends or relatives living there when you first traveled there?
- Q71 What is the primary reason you went to work or trade outside your place of residence?
- Q72 How much has the financial situation of household changed in result of your working or trading outside of your village/city?
- Q73 What percentage of your total household income in 2004 constitutes income from your trips for work or trade?
- Q74 Name please two major difficulties, that you had when traveling and staying outside your village or city for work or trade?
- Q75 In your opinion, where does the greatest threat to the security of (country) come from or there is not such threat at all?
- Q76 Which one (republic, country, organization) poses the biggest threat?
- Q77 Which country in Central Asia do you regard as the most important partner for (country)?
- Q78 Which countries outside of Central Asia do you regard as the most important partners for (country)?
- Q79 How do you assess the economic cooperation in Central Asia over the last 2 to 3 years?
- Q80 Name please the two most important issues for cooperation between (country) and other Central Asian countries?
- Q81 Are you generally satisfied or dissatisfied with the situation in (country) today?
- Q82 In your opinion, what are the three most important problems in (country) today?
- Q83 How would you describe the current economic situation in (country)?
- Q84 When do you think people in (country) will live better?

Q85A	Please rate the quality of healthcare services provided by government of (country)?
Q85B	Please rate the quality of secondary education provided by government of (country)?
Q85C	Please rate the quality of higher education provided by government of (country)?
Q85D	Please rate the quality of pensions provided by government of (country)?
Q85E	Please rate the quality of solving problems of youth provided by government of (country)?
Q85F	Please rate the quality of social assistance and programs provided by government of (country)?
Q85G	Please rate the quality of protecting the rights of ethnic minorities provided by government of (country)?
Q85H	Please rate the quality of maintaining good relations with other
Central	Asian countries provided by government of (country)?
Q86A	How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with security in the country?
Q86B	How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with respect of rights of citizens by authorities?
Q86C	How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with customs services?
Q86D	How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with border guards?
Q86E	How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with law enforcement officials (police, persecutor, courts)?
Q86F	How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with opportunity of citizens to influence the State power?
Q86G	How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with level of political freedoms?
Q86H	How satisfied or dissatisfied you are with level of independence of the mass media?
Q87A	How fairly does khokimiat treat you and people like you?
Q87B	How fairly does national government treat you and people like you?
Q87C	How fairly does president administration treat you and people like you?
Q87D	How fairly does mahalla committe treat you and people like you?
Q87E	How fairly do heads of rural community treat you and people like you?
Q87F	How fairly does militsia staff treat you and people like you?
Q87G	How fairly do courts treat you and people like you?
Q87H	How fairly do tax authorities treat you and people like you?
Q87I	How fairly do clergy (of mosques and churches) treat you and people like you?
Q88	In your opinion, how serious is the level of corruption in (country)?
Q89A	How much corruption you think there is among staff of the courts?
Q89B	How much corruption you think there is among staff of the militsia?
Q89C	How much corruption you think there is among clergy of mosques and churches?

- Q89D How much corruption you think there is among staff of healthcare institutions?
- Q89E How much corruption you think there is among staff of universities and other institutions of higher education?
- Q89F How much corruption you think there is among staff of secondary schools?
- Q89G How much corruption you think there is among staff of local government?
- Q89H How much corruption you think there is among staff of national government?
- Q89I How much corruption you think there is among staff of mahalla committee?
- Q89J How much corruption you think there is among staff of passport and registration offices?
- Q90 What role do you think Islam plays in the political life of (country)?
- Q91 What role do you think Islam should play in the political life of (country)?
- Q92 What is your religion?
- Q93 How many times a day do you pray?
- Q94 Do you know what jihad means in Islam?
- Q95 Some people say that jihad is a fight of a Muslim with the devil inside oneself, others say that it is a fight of a Muslim with non-Muslims. Which point of you do you share?
- Q96 Are you currently employed?
- Q97 If unemployed, what is your current status?
- Q98 Which category on this card describes your position on your main job?
- Q99 Which one statement best characterizes the situation in your household?
- Q100 Name please three main sources of income for your household.
- Q101_GROUPS How many members are there of your household?
- Q102 The level of welfare of the household according to observation of interviewer

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