

## ABSTRACT

TITLE OF DISSERTATION:        MOTIVATIONS FOR CHANGE IN SUPPORT  
FOR SOCIAL POLICY BILLS IN THE  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF  
REPRESENTATIVES; 1972-2002

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Much of the literature in the field of Political Science is concerned with explaining voting behavior by legislators. The central research question in this study is what causes changes in voting behavior by members of the United States House of Representatives with regard to social welfare bills? This research focuses on determining which variables sometimes supercede ideology in the decision making process of members of Congress and at what times they intervene. Thus the main hypothesis is: When factors other than personal ideology become more important to the legislator, they will override ideology as the determinant of the vote.

The factors that are expected to influence voting behavior besides ideology include: presidential influence; the condition of the economy; the presence of the Iran-Contra Scandal; the presence of the Monica Lewinsky Scandal; and the presence of Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the House. The influence of these factors is measured over a time span of 30 years. The aggregate level findings indicate that, during the last 10 years analyzed, the presence of Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the House caused Republican members of the House of Representatives to decrease their support of social policy

initiatives. The presence of the Lewinsky scandal was associated with increasing support for social policy initiatives by Republicans.

MOTIVATIONS FOR CHANGE IN SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL POLICY BILLS IN  
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS; 1972-2002

by

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Dedicated to the Memory of  
Matilda Esperance Narcisse and Linda Faye Williams  
Two Gracious Ladies

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## **Introduction**

### ***The Justification for Social Welfare Policy in the American Political Economy***

Since the Great Depression American elected officials have sought ways to assuage the harsh toll that extreme poverty takes on American citizens by enacting legislation designed to provide a modicum of economic sustenance either by direct distribution of funds or in-kind support. Crafting effective social welfare policy has also been a subject of contention among legislators. In the years after the New Deal social welfare policies have been adopted, implemented, evaluated, and changed according to the perception of what citizens need by those who have the authority to make decisions at the national, state, and local levels of government for the purpose of creating a minimal level of economic equality and social and political inclusion in the United States.

The two major parties in the United States criticize one another for their positions on various areas of social welfare policy. The Republican Party blames the Democratic Party for excessive spending to finance social welfare programs while the Democrats believe that the Republicans are not inclined to do enough. To varying degrees, members of Congress support, or are expected to support, policies that are aligned with the preferences of their constituents. For some members this leads them to support conservative policies since those who are most well off and therefore less likely to benefit from social programs are significantly more likely to make their preferences known (Verba et al., 1993). While responsiveness to constituents plays a role in determining which social policy bills members of Congress will support, the political ideologies of the individual legislators are important as well as the overall philosophy of both major parties regarding the roll of government in alleviating problems with policy initiatives.

Republicans, tend to prefer less intervention from the federal government advocating personal responsibility and self-reliance as alternatives to increasing benefits to those who qualify for assistance in areas such as housing or supplemental income. The result is inconsistency, at the federal level, of support for social welfare policy initiatives over time depending on which party is in the majority. These inconsistencies produce major problems for persons and whole communities that have benefited from discontinued programs (Wilson, 1996). For example, the discontinuance of government funded programs that created jobs in poor communities left economic vacuums in areas that flourished when they were in place.

President Reagan's budget cuts for urban centers changed the portion of these budgets made up of federal dollars from 22 per cent to 6 per cent. Revenue sharing to cities was discontinued and funding for public service jobs and training was decreased significantly. The result was deterioration of school systems, increased unemployment, and decline in city services such as sanitation, police and fire department protection.

It is important to examine the causes of rises and declines in support for social welfare bills in the U.S. Congress because of the resulting changes that affect the lives of poor and middle class Americans, who represent a significant portion of the population. Civil societies such as the United States recognize the need for social and justice and thus the need for national level legislation to maintain or improve systems that provide it.

### ***Social Welfare and Distributive Justice***

Because the policy area that is examined in this study of legislative behavior is social welfare policy, an important topic to address is distributive justice. Distributive justice, in particular has been the focus of some of the most illuminating works in

political philosophy. Conceptions of justice been debated by liberals and libertarians and to an extent has been part of the debate between liberals and communitarians. Liberals such as John Rawls have advocated distribution of goods in such a way that the least fortunate would have at least a modicum of support while libertarians such as Nozick claim that it is unjust for the state to take away resources to which a person has claims in order to distribute them to others in any situation.

Rawls's concept of justice as fairness proposes that for social arrangements to be just, distributions of goods must be fair (he doesn't advocate that they be equal). In order to achieve fairness, Rawls proposes, the following concepts must be considered: 1) impartial reasoning (termed the *original position*) and 2) the two principle of justice (Rawls, 1972).

Although the original position has been criticized on the basis of whether or not persons would act according to Rawls's predictions (Frohlich et al., 1987) Rawls uses it as a justification for distributive justice. He believed that if a person had no knowledge of what his or her lot in life would be, that is if the person could be placed behind a veil of ignorance, then that person would agree to a distributive system in which those who were worst off would have a minimum amount of resources (Rawls, 1972). Thus, he advocates a system of distributive justice on the basis that it is fair and that it would be what individuals in a given society would want. The system of distribution would be part of the justice system and be subject to the various preferences of members of society. In *Political Liberalism*, Rawls restates the Principles of Justice developed in *A Theory of Justice* as follows:

“1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls, 1993) . Justice therefore relies on fair distributions of political liberties and social and economic opportunities.

Sandel’s criticism of Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and hence his justification for distributive justice begins with his conception of the individual and his or her relationship to the community. He criticizes Rawl’s view of the person as being prior to the good arguing that the good of society should have priority since it is from society that the person takes cues on how to live the best life. Although Sandel states that the good of the society should take priority over the good of the individual he does not extend this view to a concept of redistribution or distributive justice. At the core of his views as a Communitarian, as articulated in *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Sandel believes that each person learns from social structures how he or she is to fit in and live a life compatible with the circumstances into which the person was born. He does not, as Rawls does, place emphasis on personal autonomy and the ability to carve out a way of life different than what is consistent with a person’s place in his or her community (Sandel, 1982)

When the arguments and positions taken by Rawls and Sandel are considered against current discussions in public policy it is clear that Rawls’s philosophy is aligned

with command and control policy implementation (when considering redistribution) while Sandel's is less concerned with issues of reliability and consistency in implementing policies that are redistributive in nature such as social welfare policy. Rawls believes in reaching agreements to allow persons with differing conceptions of what is preferred (explained as the concept of overlapping consensus) to live together without conflict. For Sandel formal prior agreements are not necessary and the absence of conflict should occur naturally by way of common communal indoctrination.

Rawls believes that it is not enough to depend on anything other than a prior agreement to ensure that the modicum of sustenance will be available to those who are most in need such as those who currently depend on social programs that are the results of redistributions of assets. Government provision for the needs of the poor is necessary because it offers first an entity besides individuals with their own conceptions of the good as the provider of social programs. Second, it offers provision of goods in a way that is expected to be consistent and equitable, as it is not subject to the changing preferences of individual persons. Sandel argues that a person in a society that does not place the good of the individuals ahead of the good of the society has a better chance at achieving a good society. For example if a person borrows an item or a sum of money from another it is better for repayment to be the result of a relationship based on mutual trust and concern for the wellbeing of each party than of a contractual agreement. Arrangements that nurture each individual as connected members of society, therefore, will more likely result in the provision for the good of those in need as a matter of morality instead of the result of a state mandate (Sandel, 1982).



Further, according to Sandel the likelihood of there being those in need who would have to depend on redistributions would decrease in a society that focused on communal ties and upholding communal traditions. He argues from the communitarian standpoint that each person is to understand his or her position in society and focus on developing his or her life according to the situation or place in society into which he or she was born. In opposition to Rawls he believes that the good of the community comes before the right of the individual to pursue his or her own conception of a good life. The problem with distributive justice that Sandel believes is a result of Rawls's justification of redistribution stems from the fundamental difference in the way each views the relationship of individuals to their communities. Justice based on policy set forth by the state is less valuable than the ability to act in ways that would be considered just based on moral frameworks that exist in society and are adhered to by members of society. Sandel contends that his emphasis on individuals focusing on living according to the morals of society go further than legislated justice because persons would be driven to go beyond what would be called for by legislation.

Rawls's views are consistent with liberals in the political sense while Sandel appears to advocate a position that is consistent with political conservatives. Political liberals have sought to provide for those in poverty and retirement by seeking legislation that would provide monetary and in kind support for those who need help. Legislation, it is expected, will provide consistency in delivering the services that are needed which is the arrangement that Rawl's advocated in *A Theory of Justice* (1972) and *Political Liberalism* (1995). Sandel on the other hand is more in tune with the conservative legislators who would like to see more of the responsibility of attending to the needs of

the poor to private organizations, including the faith based groups. These types of organizations are reminiscent of early forms of social welfare dating back to the colonial period in the United States. Care for the needy came from churches, relief societies, and self-help organizations before social welfare took its place on the political agenda. The orientations of the groups reflected the parochialisms and mores of the communities in which they existed and served.

The constructs that Rawls, Sandel, and others contribute to discourses in political philosophy are relevant to the debates addressing the role of redistribution in the maintenance of the welfare state in the United States. They offer illumination of important considerations for deciding whether distribution of goods to those who are in need is just or unjust for the reasons offered by Nozick, for example, who contends that any one who has acquired resources by legitimate means has a right to these resources and that any redistribution by the state of these goods is unjust (Nozick, 1974).

Redistribution it may be argued is justified in the United States because of the nature of the economy. It is known that the performance of the economy impacts the ability of persons to acquire the resources that they need to sustain life. Social welfare resulting from redistribution is therefore acceptable and necessary as well as consistent with the thinking that advocates a free market economy. For example, economic trends that result in rising levels of unemployment cause those who have lost their jobs to seek help in maintaining the basics of their lifestyles. Situations of chronic poverty necessitate the provision of social welfare remedies as well as empowerment initiatives, such as welfare to work programs to assist those in this situation in finding their way to self sufficiency.

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis believe that redistribution is necessary in states with free market systems. The contribution that they offer to the distributive justice literature has considerations for inequality resulting from market forces but suggest plans for redistribution that go beyond the traditional practices of providing monetary and in-kind support for the needy. In *Recasting Egalitarianism* (1998) they advocate arrangements that prevent poverty instead of mitigating it when it occurs. This is done by distributing economic empowerment to promote equality within a laissez-faire economy. Fostering worker-ownership of firms, home ownership, children's rights and education vouchers for the poor would alleviate poverty in a more sustainable and efficient fashion. Empowerment, Bowles and Gintis believe is a more effective solution than giving the type of remedial support that is most common.

Although their recommendations for eliminating poverty differ from traditional methods of redistribution they involve arrangements associated with the state and with markets which is contrary to the belief that markets are self-regulating. These arrangements necessary to produce worker-ownership, home ownership, children's rights, and school vouchers are seen as justified because of the belief that equality, in terms of the ability to live decently, is necessary (Bowles and Gintis, 1998).

Bowles and Gintis recognize inequality of resources as stemming from market failure. They favor taking definitive measures to promote egalitarianism however they are critical of the traditional methods of doing so. Redistribution of wealth through governance structures in the forms of the social welfare programs that currently exist, they argue, is inefficient and unreliable. It is subject to the preferences of those who

control the legislative process. As a consequence the process of promoting equality or at least a minimum level of economic viability for all is unstable.

Ideally, a structure of governance is a means of avoiding or attenuating coordination failures but there is nothing in the process determining the evolution of governance structures that insures the results. Government structures may endure because they are favored by powerful groups for whom they secure a large slice of a given pie, not because these structures foster the growth of the pie itself (Bowles and Gintis, 1998).

The conservative view, it is stated in Bowles and Gintis's proposal for adjusting the means by which we seek egalitarianism, expects that allowing the market to regulate itself is the best hope for all members of a given society. They view governance structures meant to foster equality as flawed because they view the "state as an arena for wasteful rent-seeking, while the market economy is efficient" (Bowles and Gintis, 1998 p. 9). The opposing view of liberals who support egalitarian economic policy is that state mandated remedies are the cure for poverty. Bowles and Gintis believe that both the conservative and liberal points of view fail to notice the importance of communities and the sense of trust that exists among members. Their "reconstruction of egalitarian political economy begins by recognizing that market, states, and communities, each with its characteristic capabilities and deficiencies, will necessarily play a complementary role in any governance structure worthy of support" (Bowles and Gintis, 1998, 10). From the recognition of the importance of the role of community in economic equality comes the idea that allowing all community members to have a stake in the success of the economy, such as being part of a worker owned firm is far more efficient than other means to achieving an egalitarian society. Agreeing with Robert Dahl's view in *An Economic*

*Theory of Democracy*, Bowles and Gintis believe it is cost effective because workers who have more than a passing interest in the success of the firm need less supervision (ibid).

The question of whether or not social welfare policy should be provided on a consistent basis calls to mind the question of whether or not it is necessary in the first place. Normative discussions advocating the provision of social welfare benefits by the state have claimed that it is the responsibility of the government to protect those who cannot provide for themselves and to assist those who provide for themselves under normal conditions but cannot in the case of market failure events such as unemployment or inflation. Still others feel that there are some who should be considered as entitled to receiving assistance from government and those who should not.

Applebaum (2001) distinguishes between the two types of poor people that government programs are designed to support in her article which examines affect toward the two groups of poor, termed deserving and undeserving. Two studies were involved in this research. The first was to determine whether or not the concept of deservingness was actually related to policy decisions. Respondents were asked if they believed that people made distinctions between groups of poor people viewing some as more deserving of assistance than others. This first study showed that liberal policies were more likely to be advocated if the group slated to benefit from them were made up of people perceived as deserving rather than underserving.

The second study focused on identifying factors that caused the respondents to classify certain people as deserving or undeserving. People were considered deserving were those who were “white and followed mainstream norms” (Appelbaum, 2001, 420). Applebaum goes on to identify the “attribution responsibility” which the respondents

held for certain poor people. The moral argument here is if a person was deemed to be the cause of his or her own problems then no one is obliged to help.

Karniol (1985) believes that individuals make a choice to remain poor instead of taking actions to secure wealth. He feels that policy recommendations should be for less in terms of providing benefits to those who are responsible for their own misfortune.

Hochschild notes that liberal political theorists value equality and are receptive to policies that redistribute resources for the purpose of achieving. Equality of resources, she argues, has now come to include “rights to economic and environmental well-being” for all (Hochschild, 480, 1979). “The answer to ‘how should equality be defined?’ is increasingly substantive equality of outcomes, either as an end in itself or as a prerequisite for liberty and true equal opportunity. Thus a strong argument for redistribution falls well within the traditional American values of freedom, individualism, and opportunity according to Hochschild. Further, she points out that economic growth rates make the demand for redistribution more plausible since “Decreasing economic growth can only exacerbate the economic problems of the poor and middle classes” (ibid). Other democratic nations have moved in the direction advocated by liberal theorist since the end of the Second World War. Social welfare policies and progressive taxations to support them have appeared in Sweden, Denmark, and Great Britain (ibid).

Analyzing social welfare bills in this study of Congressional voting behavior has the effect of linking domestic political economy and legislative behavior in a way that illuminates degree of stability that exists for the social safety net in the United States. Above, I discuss the views of others who argue that distributive justice is necessary on moral grounds and political grounds. Social welfare policy can be considered

inextricable from justice especially in a democratic society with a capitalistic economy. Democracy requires that individuals are able to decide for themselves (insofar as they are capable of doing so) what is best for them in regard to lifestyle (Dahl, 1972). In a free market democratic economy this requires that everyone have the ability to participate at least minimally in the in the functioning of the economy and the polity as democratic citizens. This is the only legitimate way of acquiring the goods necessary to sustain life as a free and autonomous person. If this ability is limited to only a segment of the population then the reality of freedom and democracy cease to measure up to the model of democracy that is perceived to exist in the United States<sup>1</sup>.

The central research question of this study is “What explains change in voting behavior by members of the United States House of Representatives with regard to social welfare bills?” It is often assumed that legislators have personal political ideological orientations that determine the way they vote. However, other studies have determined that personal ideology is not the only factor that influences legislators’ vote choices. This study focuses on determining which variables sometimes supercede ideology in the decision making process of each member of Congress and at what times these variables intervene.

Other studies have focused on questions such as how does presidential influence affect voting outcomes in Congress or how do campaign contributions or citizen awareness affect decision making by members of Congress. Most of these studies have aimed at uncovering the effects of single factors. This study will analyze the effects of the President, economic conditions, the presence of scandal, and the Speaker of the

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<sup>1</sup> The political behavior literature has demonstrated at length that economic resources are related to political participation. Studies in this subfield have shown that income levels are tied to education and efficacy levels both of which are positively related to levels of political participation (Brady et al. ; Campbell et al.)

House (for the last 10 years) on the way members of Congress vote on bills pertaining to social welfare policy in order to determine at what times each are dominant or not.

*Plan of the study:*

The first chapter includes a review of the key trends in the literature on congressional voting behavior and strengths and weaknesses of these contributions. Attention will be given to the fact that these theories focus on only one of many factors that would determine how members of Congress vote rather than how the set of factors become more or less important at different points in time. Here, I discuss my strategy to add to this set of theories by introducing my theory of congressional voting in which legislators make decisions about which one of a set of motivating factors will influence his or her vote on a particular bill affecting social welfare policy. My theory emphasizes the concept that certain factors have more influence at different times and discuss how established theories provide accurate descriptions of Congressional behavior at particular time intervals. Additionally, I discuss the data to be used to test the theory.

The second chapter provides a historical overview of changes in social welfare policy and address events surrounding the formulation of social policy over the period between 1972 and 2002. A key focus will be the historical implications of Congress and the role it played during this period as an institution and as a body interacting with the various presidents.

Chapter three contains the qualitative component of the project. Case studies of bills for which votes were analysed in the micro level analysis will be presented. Chapter four includes an analysis of roll call votes using the bill as the unit of analysis. This is an analysis of macro level data in which all bills selected will be analyzed in one equation.



The purpose of this chapter is to observe general trends in voting behavior that are identified by the explanatory variables used in the analysis. This is done using Ordinary Least Squares Regression since the dependent variable is operationalized as a percentage of the vote of all legislators considered, in favor of the bill. This chapter includes a detailed description of the methodology, the findings of the analysis, and a discussion of conclusions drawn from the analysis.

Since the macro level analysis, briefly described above, does not account for district level variables, the micro or district level analysis presented in Chapter six is conducted using the individual legislator as the unit of analysis. Since the dependent variable is the vote supporting or not supporting the bill, a qualitative and dichotomous variable, Logistic Regression is used. As with Chapter three a detailed description of the methodology, the findings of the analysis, and a discussion of the conclusion in addition to a comparative discussion of the macro and micro level analyses is included. The need for two levels of analysis is detailed in Chapter five.

## **Chapter 1. Major Theories of Legislators' Decision Making Strategy**

The literature addressing congressional voting behavior in the field of American Politics is vast. We might distinguish among works that explain the effects of particular institutional characteristics of Congress on the way members of Congress vote while appreciating those that offer explanations of the influence of factors external to Congress. Regarding the second category, the presidency, constituents and interest groups have been the focus of many congressional behavior studies. This chapter focuses on the major theories that offer explanations of what drives voting decisions by members of the U.S. House of Representatives. It reviews works dealing with presidential and party influence on legislators' voting decisions and those that claim that decisions are made according to ideology and not subject to outside influences such as party. Before proceeding to the discussion of theories that attempt to explain voting behavior among members of Congress I discuss the agenda setting stage of the policy process since it is the stage at which it is determined whether or not a policy problem will be addressed by Congress.

### ***Agenda Setting***

John Kingdon defines the agenda of a governing body as “the list of subjects or problems to which government officials... are paying some serious attention at any given time” (Kingdon, 1994, p.3). He further distinguishes between the governmental agenda and the decision agenda. The former is “the list of subjects that are getting attention” while the latter is “the list of subjects within the governmental agenda that are up for an active decision” (Kingdon, 1994 p.4).

Similar to Kingdon, Sinclair regards the political agenda as “a set of problems and policy proposals being seriously debated by the attentive public and policy makers” and

agenda setting as “the process through which issues attain the status of being seriously debated by politically relevant actors” (Sinclair, 1986, 35). Policy issues vary in importance and the set of agenda items take hierarchical form with there being fewer highly salient items at the top of the list and more items of decreasing saliency toward the bottom of the list. Sinclair examines the role of congressional committees to determine what if any influence they have on the political agenda. She argues that if agenda setting entails issues being brought to the attention of the public and policy makers for debate then congressional committees are appropriate actors in the agenda setting process and that other members of Congress will be especially attentive to issues raised by a committee (Sinclair, 1986).

In the absence of their ability to shape the policy agenda as they had before the loss of majority status in the 1980 general election, the Democratic party leaders began their quest to regain control of Congressional the agenda by effectively communicating their preferences to the electorate and asking for the support of other House Democrats when legislation was being drafted on the floor (Herrnson and Patterson, 1995). The Democrats saw the need to revive the House Democratic Caucus which would “create task forces to develop policy proposals that would serve as the basis for the political agenda” and also “undertake a sustained effort to develop a Democratic vision for America’s future and to articulate coherent policy positions on several interrelated issues rather than develop issues on an ad hoc basis, as it had done during the 1970s” (Herrnson and Patterson, 1995, 611). Herrnson and Patterson document that the Democratic Party, following the recommendations of the APSA committee for communicating effectively

and building party cohesion allowed them to exert some control over the agenda even in the presence of a Republican majority in Congress and a Republican president (ibid).

Other scholars have documented that the president sets the national policy agenda (Moe, 1994). Still others demonstrate that House majorities have more of a role in determining what issues become parts of Congress's agenda (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, Rohde, 1991, Cox, 2001). In addition to taking charge of the agenda, Sinclair reveals that since the late 1960s members of Congress have sought to determine the agenda despite opposition from the president (Sinclair, 1992, 1993, 1995).

Taylor focuses specifically on the domestic agenda and finds that leaders in the House and Senate have become more responsible for the agenda in the years between 1947 and 1994 (Taylor, 1998). He defines an agenda as "a set of concrete legislative proposals that have been thoroughly thought through and explicitly offered by the president or members of Congress" (Taylor, 1998, 375). In examining patterns of domestic agenda setting during the years specified he finds that in the presence of divided government the domestic policy agenda is increasingly determined by the majority party leadership in Congress, specifically by their proposal of agenda items (ibid).

Although Congress receives much attention for their role in agenda setting the president is also viewed as a key player in agenda setting process. Cohen (1995) argues that the more attention presidents have given particular policy issues in their State of the Union Addresses, the more salient these issues have become to the public. He finds that presidents can simply mention policy issues and do not have to present detailed arguments in order to generate public responses and popular presidents, according to Cohen, are no more influential than unpopular presidents

Hammond et al. find that at least 80 percent of congressional caucuses actively pursue agenda building. Congressional caucuses are, in some instances, the initial contact between Congress and actors outside of Congress. They “identify emerging problems, define parameters of those problems, and may develop legislative solutions before the issue appears on the agenda of any committee” (Hammond et al., 1985, 603). Besides placing items on the Congressional agenda, caucuses have prompted organizational change with respect to the administrative agenda by proposing and gaining personnel appointments. They have also placed program proposals on the administrative agenda in addition to helping agencies formulate the proposals that will be sent to Congress (ibid).

Another important consideration involving the agenda setting stage of the policy process is the presence of strategic agenda setting. Mouw and Mackuen argue that when forming the National agenda political actors use a strategy that accounts for long-term political goals, presidential politics, and institutional changes that may occur. Thus, similar to strategic voters in the electorate, legislators propose policy options that are imperfect representations of their actual preferences and of their constituents’ preferences (Mouw and Mackuen, 1992).

Strategic agenda setting has two implications for the overall policy making process. First, the policy content of proposals are altered so that they may be more likely to move through the other stages of the policy process and become laws to be enacted. Second, factors that are outside of the policy content will influence the way the agenda will be set. The consequence when these implications are considered from a democratic theory stand point is that legislation, instead of reflecting the needs of the electorate, will

reflect the compromises sought by legislators concerned with serving their political purposes (Mouw and Mackuen, 1992).

It is evident from the above account of the leading theories of agenda setting that many players have an effect on the congressional agenda. One might argue that this stage of the policy process is the most important because it is where political actors decide whether an issue will be considered for action by Congress at all. The next stage, voting is important to the overall policy outcome that a congressional session will produce. Whereas agenda setting initially impacts policy outcome voting continues to affect that outcome since it is the stage at which items that have made it to the agenda will either become policy or be rejected. The following is a discussion of congressional behavior at the voting stage of the policy process.

#### *Voting decisions without party influence*

The theory of responsible party government requires that parties adopt a well-defined platform, the existence of unified government, and members of the majority party voting cohesively to ensure implementation of the party's platform and realization of policy outcomes and repetition of this process (Schattschneider 1942; American Political Science Association, 1950). When these conditions are met, policy outcomes will reflect the preferences of the majority party.

Schattschneider offers further discussion of the effects of party on policy outcomes addressing the question "What sort of control could American parties in any case exercise over the administrative establishment"? (Schattschneider, 1942). He posits that party control, to the extent that it could influence policy outcomes, is difficult to detect and that policy outcomes are largely the result of legislation that is "developed

across party lines and in spite of party divisions more often than it evolves as a consequence of party conflict” (ibid). This is problematic for Schattschneider since he believes that Responsible Party government is necessary for democracy in the United States. Through the two party systems the electorate is able to choose among the two parties which will produce the types of policies that will be most beneficial (Schattschneider, 1975). As an example he discusses the need for party cohesion to remedy the high unemployment rate in the year 1945.

According to the prevailing opinion among thoughtful person, the government is now faced with problems in the solution of which it dare not fail. For the successful execution of the complex and delicate policies which it is hoped that a new depression may be avoided, political means must be found to bring about unaccustomed teamwork of Congress and the President and all agencies and branches of the government in order to integrate closely a great variety of public activities. For all of these reasons, the launching of a new program for high-level employment implies that the political system will be made to work in ways in which it never worked before. This situation calls for a political plan, on the general theory that a good cause deserves a superior political strategy (Schattschneider, 1945).

Thus, Schattschneider believed that the two party system was necessary and that party cohesion needed strengthening in order for policies that were most needed to emerge. Thus, according to Schattschneider, it is assumed that parties would be consistent in the types of policies that they promote. Milkis discusses the merits of Responsible Party government in the context of the New Deal arguing that New Deal party politics revealed the limits and possibilities of party government (Milkis, 1992). He notes that Schattschneider said in an address to the New York State League of Women Voters in 1940 that the commitment to party reform that accompanied the New Deal was

one of several factors that would lead to “stronger centralized party control” (Milkis, 1992).

According to Milkis, however, Roosevelt’s work in promoting the New Deal caused the demise of any hope of achieving the Responsible Party model. Roosevelt set out to overcome state and local parochialisms especially where Southern Democrats were concerned. He wanted to forge a new ideology for the Democrats as one of “militant liberalism” (Roosevelt, vol. 7, XIII). The campaign to reform the character of the two major parties had effects on the Democrats and the Republicans. However it also established a more direct link between the president and the public. Party organizations, as a result became much less important (Milikin, 1992). The institutional reforms of the New Deal promoted government in which party government was replaced by a system of governance insulated from localized politics that allowed Roosevelt to create the New Deal policies by executive actions eliminating the need for cooperation among party members in Congress (Milkis, 1991).

Milkis demonstrates that in the case of the New Deal, the Responsible Party model fails. However, Schattschneider insists that it should still be pursued for the sake of promoting government that is responsive to the needs of the electorate as he argued in “Party Government and Employment Policy” (Schattschneider, 1944). “What people do about the government depends on what they think the government is able to do. Therefore, the idea that the government is now able to protect people against the most dreaded of the manifestations of economic instability is almost certain to have a great impact on the political behavior of millions of people, many of whom have never before been drawn into the orbit of politics” (ibid). Thus he feels that people will mobilize if



they believe it is worthwhile. What should follow is the mobilization of a majority that ideologically reflects the policy preferences of the people. “That is, political means ought to be found for the mobilization of an effective majority and the organization and implementation of the power of this majority over the government as a whole, including the power to keep control of the government as a whole, including the power to keep control of the government steadily while policies are formulated and executed” (ibid).

A theoretical basis for understanding voting behavior and the problems that may arise among voters is developed by Duncan Black. Black proposes an understanding of group decision-making by exploring the ordering of preferences among members of groups. He uses the theory of “relative valuation of orthodox Economic Science or the theory of indifference curves” (Black, 1948). In doing so he shows that points arrange on a straight line representing voters or other decision makers and the schedule of preferences associated with those involved. The voting outcome or the decision made by the group will depend on where along the continuum the majority of the voters’ preferences lie. If everyone votes according to his or her preferences the committee would adopt the motion corresponding to the median voter’s optimal choice. If one or more voters with optimums above the median voter’s optimum choice votes in such a way as to give a different option a majority of votes then the outcome will be the rejection of the median voter’s optimum choice (Black, 1948). If all of the above premises are true and the outcome of the vote is different than what Black stated as the expected outcome then an explanation of the change in the expected voting behavior is expected.

Black believed that this model of group decision making could be used in explaining decision making in politics and could “present the basis for the development of a pure science of politics” (Black, 1948). Doing so would apply the same logic to political science as used in economics; however, a different definition of equilibrium would be in place. Equilibrium would now be considered in “in terms of voting, in place of the type of definition employed in economic science” (Black, 1948). To this end Black proceeded to develop the median voter theory which provides the basis for a large segment of voting behavior literature in political science. Noting that a variation of the median voter model predicts the degree to which legislators’ voting decisions will reflect the preferences of the median voters in their districts, Gerber et al. present empirical evidence that indicates that in many cases legislators make voting decisions that are significantly different from the preferences of their districts’ medians.

Gerber et al. test the median voter model by “constructing superior measure of voter preferences from a unique data set. The data set is made up of 2.8 million individual-level vote returns. They estimated the means, medians, and variance of the voters’ ideological preferences within a sample of districts (Gerber et al., 2004). By mapping the districts’ ideological orientations they were able to attach the policy preferences of the voters more accurately to that of the legislators who represented them. The result was the ability to estimate the effects of the median voters’ preferences with their legislator’s voting behavior and determine where the median voter model held and where it did not.

Despite its limitations the median voter model is still used to describe voting outcomes in other works. In the case of legislative voting behavior the median voter

model is understood as an illustration that represents an odd number of legislators ordered in an issue space in such a way that their policy preferences are single-peaked. The policy outcome corresponds to the median legislator's ideal point (Black, 1958). Bills will pass if they are of an ideological nature that does not alienate the most centrist voter. For example, if a bill that is primarily conservative appeals to the median voter and enough of those to the left of the median voter, it will pass. Similarly a liberal bill must have the support of the median voter and enough of those right of the median if it is to pass.

The median voter theory also provides the foundation for Kenneth Krehbiel's work in *Pivotal Politics* (1999) and his article, "Where's the Party" (1993). In *Pivotal Politics* he attempts to explain the behavior of legislators in situations in which gridlock is broken in Congress. The explanation he offers for ending gridlock requires that we view legislators lined up on points along a liberal/conservative continuum. Also on the continuum are points representing the bill and the status quo. The bill must occupy a point on the continuum just far enough on either side of the median voter to get enough votes from the conservatives if it is a liberal bill or from the liberals if the bill is conservative in order to avoid the possibility of a filibuster or a veto. In Krehbiel's theory the pivotal legislator is the one who occupies the last point on the side of center opposite the bill that must support the bill in order for it to pass.

According to the pivotal politics theory, then, the closer a bill is to the legislator's ideal point the more likely he or she will vote to pass the bill. This is a fundamental assumption in Krehbiel's work that is also present in "Where's the Party" (Krehbiel, 1993). He argues here that one can observe activity by party leaders in the legislative

process but partisanship still does not “explain much variation in the observed stages of organizing the legislature” (Krehbiel, 1993). He further argues that “theories of legislative politics with a party component while perhaps more realistic than their more parsimonious non-partisan counterparts—are not necessarily superior predictors of observable legislative behavior” (Krehbiel, 1993).

Krehbiel asks, “In casting apparently partisan votes, do individual legislators vote with fellow party members *in spite of their disagreement* about the policy in question, or do they vote with fellow party members *because of their agreement* about the policy in question?” (Krehbiel, 1993). This question is in keeping with another theme in his work which is that Republicans vote like other Republicans because they are individuals who happen to be Republicans and likewise for Democrats. Krehbiel argues that he is supported in the view that parties do not influence the votes of their members, however, the analysis that he presents does not disentangle the effects of individual ideology and party activism. Because the effects are indistinguishable, he concludes that there is no justification for accepting party activism as an explanation for vote choice.

Similar to Krehbiel, Cox and McCubbins, in *Legislative Leviathan*, adhere to the rational choice view of parties which they state are “too internally divided to be either practically effective or theoretically interesting” (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). In general, they argue, legislators do not vote as their party votes. Rather, they vote according to their individual preferences. If their voting patterns appear similar it is because they are of similar ideological orientations. In essence, what we observe is legislators supporting Republican or Democratic bills because they happen to be Republicans or Democrats. The difference between the arguments presented in *Pivotal Politics* and in *Legislative*

*Leviathan* is that in the latter it is argued that parties act as floor and procedural coalitions and that homogeneous party are likely to take on both roles. Thus, when able, members of the same party act together to promote rules for consideration of bills that are likely to have the affect on the vote that they would prefer. While such activities promote voting cohesion among members of the party involved, they take place, according to Cox and McCubbins because those congressmen and congresswomen have similar preferences regarding passage of the bill being considered. Prior to *Legislative Leviathan*, Cox and McCubbins argue that party voting in Congress began declining early in the twentieth century. They document trends for Republican and Democratic members of Congress from 1910 through 1980 by analyzing roll call votes while accounting for how the floor leader and the majority and minority whip voted. “If a party’s leader whip both voted on the same side, then that side was taken to be the party leadership’s position” (Cox and McCubbins, 1991)

### ***Voting decisions with party influence***

Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman (1999) through the use of statistical analysis and journalistic accounts of the actions of members of the House on the A to Z bill were able to provide support for the theory that party can determine voting outcomes. The A to Z spending plan, H.R. 3266, in 1994, was the budget proposal for that year which contained deep and very controversial spending cuts. In considering the actions on the proposal Binder et al. argue against Krehbiel’s assertion that is impossible to prove that parties are responsible for the outcome of the vote and not preference in their article on the outcome of the A to Z plan. If politics operated without parties, they conclude, there should have been a discharge of the A to Z bill. “A majority of the House had

cosponsored the bill, so a majority of the House should have signed the discharge petition. That did not happen.” (Binder et al., 1999).

The use of journalistic accounts was valuable to this study because it provided a justification to look beyond the statistical analysis that Krehbiel presented and bolstered the theoretical grounds of their own analysis. The accounts reported the actual reasons for the votes. They gave statements as to why legislators voted as they did thus giving an explanation that went beyond the observations that one could make as an outside observer. Therefore while statistical analysis has an important role in research, the observations which are converted to data are not able to tell the full story of the motivation for vote choice in this instance. This is important to note because Binder et al. take the position against Krehbiel that party matters and that he fails to demonstrate that it does not in his analysis because the observations that he uses are without objective explanation. Krehbiel’s position that Republicans vote cohesively because they are Republicans is unfalsifiable and not useful in scientific inquiry.

Further, the use of the median voter theory as the foundation for the pivotal politics theory fails because while illustrating the function of the pivotal voter in breaking gridlock it also demonstrates the ideological diversity of members of both parties. If party members vote independently of party influence cohesion can’t be explained by the “coincidence” of party membership. This approach is also used in Evans and Oleszek’s *Congress under Fire* in which they give a narrative account of actions by the Republican Party leadership during the first congressional session that the Republicans controlled in the 1990s.

Conditional party government predicts that if the majority party has homogeneous preferences it will be strong enough to pass non-centrist policy outcomes. According to this theory, the condition for party strength is related to the legislators' preferences. There may be heterogeneity across parties and homogeneity of preferences within parties. In this case the majority party, it is predicted, will be strong enough to pass non-centrist policy outcomes (Rohde, 1991; Aldrich, 1995; Aldrich and Rohde, 1995). Responding to Krehbiel (1991), Rohde (1994) argues that the power of parties in Congress is more significant than Krehbiel concedes. Likewise Jason Roberts produces evidence of persuasive party politics by showing that changes in rules and procedural details influence roll call votes (Roberts, 2007).

According to Krehbiel (1991), preferences are exogenous and are induced by the values, needs, and wants of the electorate through the electoral process. Against this view, Rohde (1991) argues that there are many other motivations for the vote. He emphasizes that appointments to committees are offered as rewards for voting a particular way. Additionally he states the following: "the interaction of the partisan, distributive, and informational considerations produces a complex legislative environment, which cannot be captured adequately by a single-motivation, universal perspective. The challenge for students of congressional politics is, I believe, not to prove that one theoretical view is superior in all situations but instead to specify the conditions under which each view applies to behavior and outcomes of interest" (Rohde, 1994).

This idea is further developed in the article "The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics". Aldrich and Rohde (1997) revisit the conditional party government theory as an explanation for the impact of

political parties on behavior within the legislature in contrast with Krehbiel's idea that majority rules and outcome is related to the preference of the median member. Their focus here is on party activism, not votes in the same sense as the median voter theory, and takes into account action to produce cohesion by parties. Aldrich and Rohde give narrative accounts of actions taken by the members of the Republican Party after they had become the majority party aimed at creating cohesion. Party cohesion is necessary, they argue, if the party is to advance its agenda.

Complementing Aldrich and Rohde, Roberts and Smith (2003) find evidence of polarization along party lines towards the end of the twentieth century. In their analysis of Congresses between 1971 and 2003 they compare the frequencies, over the years 1971- 2000, of House votes, total votes, and Committee of the Whole votes in several categories. The categories are: composition of Roll Call Votes, the percent of party votes by vote type, mean party difference in voting by vote type, Democratic Party cohesion by vote type, Republican Party cohesion by vote type and the proportion of cutpoints between party medians by vote type (taken from Poole's D-nominate data base). The findings reported are that party influence is present in all but one term of Congress. Further demonstration of the presence of party influence is found in Young and Wilkins (2007) "Vote Switchers and Party Influence in the U.S. House." In this article the authors tested the party persuasion assumption by comparing votes on final passage of legislation with the votes on closed rules. The patterns that were revealed from the pairs of closed rule and final passage votes could not exist in the absence of party influence. Similarly, Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith (2006) find that strong party



influence is present in votes on final passage and that legislative outcomes are generally on “the majority party’s side of the chamber median.”

Majoritarian chaos theories hold that majority rule is utterly unpredictable. By contrast, stability-inducing theories are intended to illuminate predictability in legislators’ behavior. It is assumed that certain players have certain procedural abilities that allow them a certain amount of control over policy outcomes. For example, the rules committee decides the terms under which a bill will be considered on the floor (closed rule or open rule, for example). This determines the chances of the bill being amended and ultimately has influence on the most practical way to vote (Ferejohn, 1986; Shepsle and Weingast, 1987).

The theories of conditional party government and responsible party government appear to account for the result of votes on bills in the House of Representatives at certain times. These are times when situations exist in which influence by the party leadership is strong enough to influence the legislators’ decisions. Conditional party government and responsible party government imply the existence of catalysts for cohesive voting behavior at crucial moments in history of the U.S. Congress.

Conditional party government comes into play when strong party leadership pursues an agenda with more vigor than usual. One example in which strong party government and conditional party government appear is the period following the change of majority status in Congress from Democratic to the Republican in the 1994 House of Representatives election. Led by Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, the Republican Party leadership appeared to have changed the distribution of votes on the conservative/liberal continuum in such a way that more liberal bills received less support

from continuing Republican legislators than the year before (Evans and Oleszek, 1997). Another example, prior to the years considered for this study, is the influence of House Speaker Cannon. Prior to Gingrich, Cannon was able to exert some degree power over the committee system and successfully promote his party's legislative agenda (Lawrence et al., 2001). These events invite investigation of the conditions under which legislators will vote differently on bills that representative of certain policy areas than they had previously.

But perhaps the role of parties is dependent upon characteristics present at the time the vote is considered. Influences external to Congress may exert a force greater than party influence or personal preferences on the decision making process of the legislators at certain times. For example, the strength of the executive branch or the state of the economy relative to the legislators' own districts may at times play a stronger role than party in the decision to support or not to support a bill (Neustadt, 1990, Shull et. al 2000, Kingdon, 1989). It is worth noting that implicit in the theory of Conditional party government, is the idea that the behavior it describes is not manifested at all times in Congress.

### ***Institutional Explanations***

Related to theories that emphasize strong influence of party leadership are those concerned with the ability of members of Congress to influence policy outcomes through institutional means. In *Competing Principles; Committees, Parties and the Organization of Congress*, Maltzman examines the roles of committees in Congress and compares the

validity of theories of the roles of congressional committees at different times and against different contexts.

Focusing on three dominant models of committee performance, the chamber-dominated model, the party-dominated model, and the independent committees model, Maltzman offers a theory of the role of committee performance. He recognizes that the fit of the three is subject to change over time and attempts to explain the conditions under which each is appropriate.

For Maltzman, it is important to understand where power lies in Congress. For more than 200 years, he states, power has shifted between party leaders, committee members and the rank and file members of Congress. Committees, he argues are “remarkably sensitive to demands placed upon them by contending principles, both inside and outside of the institution” (Maltzman 1998). Generally they seem to mirror the preferences of the majority party caucus and the chamber (Maltzman1998).

The relationship between individual legislators and institutions of governance is further explored by Lupia and McCubbins. In considering the theory that policy experts, to whom many legislators defer when making vote choices, are present in most legislative bodies they argue that legislators do not simply defer to their judgment without seeking additional information about the decisions that the experts make. In fact, Lupia and McCubbins argue, seemingly docile legislators exert a considerable amount of power over the legislative process by seeking information about the actions of those to whom authority is delegated. This control is present when authority is delegated to legislators who are policy experts but not when non-experts abdicate their authority. The difference between delegation and abdication in this case is how much the legislators are willing and

able to learn about the actions of the legislators who are the policy experts in question. Institutionally, the “legislative rules, procedures, and practices” provide the opportunities for learning (Lupia and McCubbins, 1994).

### *Sources of influence*

Kingdon (1989), in considering how legislators decide how to vote, examines the roles that sets of actors play in the decision making process of the members of Congress. He finds that of all the actors, including constituents, interest groups, party leadership and the President, no one actor plays a preeminent role. According to Kingdon’s model, when a legislator prepares to make a voting decision he or she first asks “Is it controversial?” If it is not controversial he or she finds out if there is opposition. If there is no opposition then he votes with the “environment”<sup>2</sup>. If there is opposition then he votes along with members of his “field of forces.”<sup>3</sup> If there is opposition among his field of forces then he questions whether his goals pass a critical threshold of importance. If the answer is no, he will vote with his fellow congressmen and congresswomen if they are of major importance. If he has any goals of importance he weighs a set of considerations including how salient the issue is, if the president ( of his party) considers it a high priority issue, if there is a constituency goal involved.

When examining the particular role of constituents Kingdon finds that awareness is weak. People don’t know the roll call record and members of Congress receive little constituent guidance on how to vote. When a Congress member perceives that

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<sup>2</sup> Environment-Kingdon (1989) uses this term to mean the collective position of the chamber.

<sup>3</sup> “Field of forces”- Kingdon (1989) uses this phrase to refer to the collective position of legislators that a particular member of Congress may normally vote with.

constituents have a position he or she will vote that position with .76 probability. It is not the complete explanation for congress members' votes but constituency preference is certainly a consideration (Kingdon, 1989).

Besides their constituents congressmen and congresswomen gain a large amount of information from elites who know more about what is at stake than constituents. There is a strong influence on the vote from other members of Congress. Members of Congress consult their fellow legislators who have expertise in the policy area in question Kingdon (1989) argues. He discovered that the most important consideration for choosing whom to consult is whether or not the informant agrees with the point of view of the one seeking advice.

Kingdon does not consider party leadership very important but he perceives the president as having influence in voting behavior and as the public focal point and the author of the legislative agenda. Members of the president's party appear to be more supportive of his policy agenda than those of the opposing party (Kingdon, 1989). The majority party can, however, exert sanctions through its institutional powers. "The party leadership is in a position to sanction negatively congressmen who do not behave as they would wish, by withholding certain favors over which they have control" (Kingdon, 1989).

Interest groups vary in importance with regards to influence on legislators' votes. Their influence appears minimal unless they have a connection to a legislator's constituency. They seem more important, however, when there is a constituency connection and there is a salient policy issue at hand (Kingdon, 1989).

With regard to the president as a significant actor Aldrich and Rohde (1985) document the relationship between the president and members of Congress relative to policy outcomes. They recognize that there will be compromising and that “no individual actor will often get exactly what he or she wants” in terms of policy (Aldrich and Rohde, 1985). They also believe that there may be some aspects of legislation that the actors may not like but which may be “the price by which the president purchased the support of powerful members of his own or the opposition party for those aspects of the legislation that he did favor” (Aldrich and Rohde, 1985). Consistent with the assumption in Aldrich and Rohde’s conception of conditional party government, is their belief that party strength or the effort to vote cohesively is endogenous to the legislature. The legislators decide whether or not it is in their best interest to vote with the rest of the party. If they collectively decide that it is more advantageous they become a cohesive voting force producing desired outcomes (Aldrich and Rohde 2000a, 2000b).

The theories discussed here are the prevailing theories in American politics that attempt to explain congressional behavior. As Maltzman points out in his study of the roles of committees and parties, one theory cannot be expected to explain the behavior of members of Congress in all cases or under all sets of circumstances. For this reason one of the goals of this study is to determine at what time in the years between 1972 and 2002 and under what conditions certain factors impacted the voting decisions of members of Congress.

To illustrate the statement above, one variable that has had effects on congressional voting behavior is the Speaker of the House. Speakers have varied in their strength, and abilities to promote their parties’ agendas over the history of the U.S. House

of Representatives. When all of their characteristics and goals are considered, however, the Speaker, to some degree must have the cooperation of other members of the party leadership. Accounts of Gingrich's tenure as Speaker discuss his leadership strategies and decisions that he made such as overriding seniority of members of the House in order to exert control over the committees which had a roles in shaping legislation that was of importance to the Republican party leadership, especially in terms of the budget (Sinclair, 2000; Palazzolo, 1997). Domination of the committee system was crucial to obtaining desired policy outcomes because committees play a vital in shaping policies before bills appear on the floor for a vote (Hinkley, 1971; Fenno, 1973). Although Gingrich was able to promote the Republican legislative agenda, to a point, and increase voting cohesion within his party, he eventually lost the support of his party's leaders. In a rare move, House Republicans threatened to choose a Democrat as Speaker of the House if Newt Gingrich did not step down. In the end Gingrich left the House of Representative entirely (Evans and Oleszeck 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/11/06/gingrich/>).

Changes in the temperament of the electorate also contribute to changes in congressional voting behavior. One way the effect of the attitudes of voters is manifested in congressional voting behavior is through the institution of the presidency. As mentioned earlier, Presidents are able to promote their legislative agendas because of their access to the listening American public (Evans and Oleszek, 2000). The president is able to rally public support for his positions by making use of the "bully pulpit"<sup>4</sup> to persuade Congress to support his positions (Neustadt, 1990). This influence also depends

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<sup>4</sup> The use of this term in association with the presidency stems from President Roosevelt using it to describe the White House as a platform advantageous to promoting his agenda.

on strategic choices that the president makes on which issues to promote to the public. The president will promote policy issues to the public on which his position is popular and for which Congress would not otherwise vote in favor of his positions (Canes-Wrone, 2001). Past presidents have also enjoyed high levels public approval in times of crisis which increased the likelihood of success in obtaining support for their legislative initiatives and preferences from Congress (Muir, 1992). Conversely, the president may lose his power to affect Congressional behavior for various reasons. A natural and expected occurrence is the “lame duck” period or approximately the last two years a president is expected to serve. Involvement in scandal by a sitting president could have the effect of limiting his power over congress because of decreasing public approval and limiting his ability to rally public support for his positions (Kernell, 1997). As Maltzman (1998) states, therefore, because of ever changing conditions, one theory of congressional behavior cannot explain all behavior at all times as the Pivotal Politics theory asserts.

***A Theory of changing impact of exogenous factors on legislative decision making***


As discussed earlier in this chapter, the median voter theory explains the voting behavior of a legislative body such as the U.S. Congress in terms of a continuum such as the liberal/conservative one. In these cases the members of the body occupy points on the line which indicate how liberal or conservative they are. In that illustrative case, the farthest right point would represent the most conservative member while the farthest left represents the most liberal member and those approaching the center of the line are more moderate. Whether or not a bill will pass depends on where it falls on the line. If the



majority of the legislators are liberal and the bill falls on a point on the line left of the center, it is assumed by the median voter theory, that it will have enough votes to pass since the majority of those voting are liberal and themselves left of the center point of the liberal/conservative continuum. This theory rests on the assumption that legislators vote according to their ideology, or some force that serves as a proxy for ideology.

In Figure 1 the bill is located on the point of the continuum just left of center and includes all of the liberal members who happen to represent the majority. The bill (B) is on the liberal side of the continuum yet it is not so far left as to exclude or be too liberal for legislators *g, f*, and so on and the preference of the majority is the outcome of the vote.

**Figure 1 Liberal / Conservative Continuum**



The median voter theory and Krehbiel's pivotal politics theory are spatial representations of voting behavior in that they show voters in an equilibrium state with a predicted outcome<sup>5</sup>. I do not attempt to argue against the median voter theory or the

<sup>5</sup> Krehbiel refers to the pivotal politics model as representing behavior in an equilibrium state. "Players in the game are assumed to adopt strategies that maximize their utility, conditional on the expectation that all other players in future stages of the game do likewise. The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect Nash. In more common terms, the behavior captured by this equilibrium concept can be summarized as strategic proposal, voting, and veto behavior by players in a multistage, interbranch, supermajoritarian setting. Players know the game, know each others' preferences, understand who is the pivotal voter in any given setting, and adopt optimal strategies accordingly" (Krehbiel, 1998, 25).

pivotal politics theory. While Krehbiel's theory is helpful in my analysis, the main objectives are different. My objectives diverge from his when considering cases in which ideology or legislators' ideal points, as used in the pivotal politics theory, are overridden as the determining factor for vote choice by other factors. When legislators cease voting according to their personal ideology their behavior can be represented differently and explained by a different theory. Instead of occupying fixed ideal points along a continuum in a situation in which the bill must appeal to the range of voters that includes the median voter and enough others to the right or left of that voter, legislators' positions are not fixed. Instead, I assert that cases arise in which the legislator takes positions either right or left of his or her usual position to support a bill when circumstances arise which make it more beneficial to do so.

The theory I propose is that in the absence of equilibrium, every time a legislator votes he or she considers which among a number of factors including his or her ideology, is the most influential at the time the decision is made. Otherwise stated, each legislator has a number of considerations to take into account when he or she is making the choice to vote for or against a bill. They may consider whether or not the president supports the bill, if the president proposes an incentive in the form of benefits to the legislator's district, or the position of his or her party leadership or whether or not passage of the bill will have a negative, positive or neutral impact on the legislator's constituents. The decision is made, I suggest, with regard to the consideration for external factors as well as his or her personal ideology.

Poole and Rosenthal call the legislator's ideal point the place on the preference space where the legislator is located as a result of the combination of ideology and

external influences. While I accept Poole and Rosenthal's theory, the theory that I propose is different because it offers an account of the way in which various factors are ranked by the legislators. If, for instance, a bill is being considered at a time when the president is enjoying high approval ratings and has indicated a strong degree of support for the bill, the legislator may feel more compelled to align him or herself with the popular president by supporting the bill instead of opposing it. In a different case the ideology of a legislator may direct him or her to vote in favor of a bill; however if the legislator's party leadership opposes the bill he or she may feel that there is a greater benefit associated with voting against it.

In sum, following Rohde (1994) and Kingdon (1989), this project does not seek to demonstrate that one theoretical view is superior to another in the congressional literature. Rather the attempt is to specify the conditions under which each view applies to congressional voter behavior. Thus, I attempt to explain the interactive effects of a set of motivations (including ideological preferences, but also other political and individual factors). I do not argue that one theory is more plausible than the other. Instead I look over time to see when circumstances were such that the theory of conditional party government, for instance, was the appropriate explanation or when presidential power was the strongest explanation for voting behavior in the House of Representatives or when some other combination of political and individual factors explained changes in voting behavior.

The advantage to analyzing bills related to social policy, for this study, is that legislative voting behavior in regard to social policy is usually so ideologically driven that changes in behavior are more significant and interesting to research than issues in

areas that are less ideologically driven. Changes in behavior on ideological issues beg explanation as to what causes the legislator to shift either to the right or left of the way he or she normally votes on the same type of bill. Less partisan issues are less interesting for this study because by being less ideologically driven the legislator is not expected to stand on ideology as strongly as he or she is on issues that are more ideologically driven.

Congressional voting behavior concerning Civil Rights policy is an example of a policy area in which voting decisions were ideologically driven. Shifts to the right or left of the legislator's normal voting pattern are discussed by Barbara Sinclair as the conversion hypothesis in the context of changes in voting behavior in Congress on Civil Rights bills in the 1970s. Sinclair found that Congress as a whole began to vote more liberally favoring Civil Rights bills than they had previously (Sinclair, 1989). This change is more noteworthy among those who had previously opposed Civil Rights bills. The theory stated that instead of Congress becoming a more liberal body because conservative members were replaced by liberal members, continuing members began to vote more liberally on issues than they had previously, affirming the conversion hypothesis.

### ***Hypotheses***

A generally accepted hypothesis regarding decision making by members of Congress, is that they vote according to their personal predispositions, or political ideology. Some studies have defined political ideology as a function of race, gender, occupational background, and district demographics. These factors are among those considered when ADA scores are calculated for individual legislators. ADA scores are measures of ideology that include information regarding district characteristics, coalitions

in the district as well as outward indications of the legislator's ideology. The combination of these variables creates an endogeneity problem in the generation of ADA scores. Therefore, as addressed by Carson and Oppenheimer (1983), the use of ADA scores would introduce the problem of multicollinearity to the analysis.

Although ideology is discussed as a determinant of the vote in this study the use of a quantitative measure of ideology is not useful to the analysis of the problem. The theory assumes that legislators have ideological positions on most bills that they consider. The strength of those positions varies according to their area of expertise if they are considered policy entrepreneurs. A legislator is likely to hold fast to his or her position on a bill that affects their district whereas he or she may defer to the judgment of a legislator who is an expert on a policy area that is unfamiliar. What is of concern here is what factors cause change in the vote because change in behavior is an observable indicator of a change in position whereas ideology is not as readily observable. The focus on change instead of attempting to determine the thoughts of the legislators is necessary because assessing the individual thoughts of the legislators is nearly methodologically impossible whereas change is observable and therefore quantifiable (Clinton and Meirowitz, 2004). My theory rests on the assumption that legislators have a position on certain policy areas and that change in behavior when votes on similar bills is considered reflects the possibility of shift, either to the right or the left, the cause of which is investigated in this work.

The main hypothesis that is tested in this study is that as certain factors become more important to the legislator than personal ideology, in regard to achieving his or her personal goals, and then those factors will override personal ideology as the determinant

of the vote. Examples of these factors are presidential power, party leadership, and the presence of crises such as the Iran hostage situation and the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup>. or scandals such as the Watergate and Lewinsky scandals. As indicated by this list of factors or variables, two related hypotheses are included.

*Related Hypothesis 1:* If the president has high approval ratings then legislators are more likely to support his policy preferences. Approval ratings reflect how well the president is doing his job and how accountable the public holds him for crisis or scandal.

*Related Hypothesis 2:* When party leadership is strong legislators are more likely to vote according to the preferences of the party leadership.

The hypotheses discussed above address variables in the theory that are expected to explain legislative voting behavior over time. A fundamental assumption of any set of variables is that the values are different from case to case. Thus, the qualitative dichotomous (independent) variables that represent the presence or absence of certain persons or phenomena is important to this study because these variables address the element of the theory that states that factors that vary may influence the behavior of members of Congress.

The main hypothesis, which states that personal ideology may be overridden as certain factors become more important to the legislators, is included because it offers an explanation for variance in voting patterns when similar bills are considered. It is intended to provide support for the theory that ideology is not the only determinant of legislators' votes and that factors other than ideology may, at times, influence a legislator's vote. The related hypotheses discussed are intended to give substantive support to the theory by specifying exactly what factors are expected to have influence on

the legislators at the time frame addressed by in study. These two hypotheses are instances of the general theory and it is assumed that other factors that may occur would be episodically important.

***Summary:***

In this chapter I discussed the major theories that address Congressional voting behavior and how they contribute to our understanding of this subject. I outline my theory of changing influences on voting behavior highlighting the idea that influences external to Congress members' ideology have varying amounts of strength. To proceed, the next chapter is a historical account of social policy bills over 30 years; 1972 through 1992. Its purpose is to provide information about social policy legislation and the actual changes and development that have taken place in the years that this study includes.

## **Chapter 2. History of Social Welfare Policy; 1972 through 2002**

As discussed in the previous chapter, there are those who argue that a system to protect members of a society from the inevitable shocks and changes associated with a free market economy is needed in all civil societies. Such a system, commonly referred to as a social welfare system or welfare state, provides assistance to those who need help securing for themselves the basic necessities of life. This chapter documents major changes in the American social welfare system that occurred between the 1970s and the end of the twentieth century.

Social rights, including the right to benefit from a welfare state, are part of the democratization process, however, the welfare state did not begin to develop in the United States until Franklin Delano Roosevelt introduced the Social Security Act of 1935 (Quadagno, 1999). “Programs of social protection granted social rights: ‘The right to a modicum of economic welfare and security, the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society’” (Quadagno, 1999). Need based aid to those whose income is below the poverty level and social insurance which assists older citizens in their retirement years is meant to give recipients the means needed to live at an acceptable level of economic sustenance. In the United States this means the provision of basic needs including shelter, health care, and nutrition in a consistent manner. Ebbs and flows in the provision of welfare benefits due to changes in voting behavior poses risks to the integrity of the social welfare system and thus to the wellbeing of those in need.



In the United States, welfare programs are considered as parts of two categories for analytical purposes. They are social insurance which is not means-tested<sup>6</sup> and welfare assistance which is means-tested (Lester and Stewart, 2000). Social insurance includes Old Age Survivors Disability and Health Insurance (OASDHI), Medicare, and Unemployment Compensation. Welfare assistance includes Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Food stamps and in-kind assistance such as housing, Medicaid, and other social services (Lester and Stewart, 2000). The two tiered welfare system is also viewed, by some, as aid to two classes of people: deserving and undeserving recipients. Social insurance is viewed favorably by more Americans and members of Congress than Welfare assistance. Issues regarding Welfare assistance have traditionally been outwardly more divisive than those regarding social insurance (Wilson, 1996). In recent years, however, there has been an erosion of support for continuing the same level of social insurance particularly from President Bush and Republican leadership in Congress.

In the United States citizens depend, to some degree, on their Congressional representatives to advocate policies that will help them in times of need. This chapter describes changes in social welfare policy, specifically Aid to Families with Dependent Children, now Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and Social Security in the form of OASDHI from 1972 through 2002 and the role that Congress played in shaping it. It contains accounts of policies that were enacted between 1972 and 2002 and how they affected the delivery of welfare assistance and social insurance. Rather than attempting

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<sup>6</sup> Mean-tested programs are distinguished from non means-tested programs based on the those who benefit from the programs. Benefits such as TANF and Medicaid which are distributed to the poor are considered means-tested while those such as OASDHI and Medicare are distributed to older Americans who in most cases have paid into the systems that provide the benefits.

to provide a comprehensive account of the United States welfare state, this chapter, in keeping with the general intention of this work (to account for changes in the welfare state), addresses changes in policy.

### ***The 1970s***

#### *Welfare Assistance*

In 1969 President Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan to replace AFDC. Under FAP families of four with no source of income would receive \$1,600 per year. This payment would be reduced by 50 cents for each dollar earned beyond \$1,600. When a family's income reached \$3,920 all government benefits would cease (Piven and Cloward, 1977). Congress rejected this proposal for several reasons. First, liberals feared the elimination of in-kind support such as food stamps. Second, conservatives felt that FAP eliminated the incentive for the poor to seek work. Third, public opinion was strongly against the proposal and the guarantee of a minimum income (Lester and Stewart, 2000). By 1972 Congress had rejected FAP. Instead they enacted a multibillion dollar general "Revenue Sharing" program (Piven and Cloward, 1977). State and local officials advocated relief reform from the federal government but not necessarily in the form that FAP took. FAP reforms, after all, were designed to end growth in AFDC rolls rather than help with fiscal difficulties.

For those who supported reducing the number AFDC recipients, problems that were associated with poor people, specifically civil disorder and crime, were blamed on the current welfare structure (Piven and Cloward, 1977). Moreover it was thought that public concern with current welfare programs had more to do with the recipients than the programs themselves (Rogers-Dillon, 2004, Reese, 2005). The report by David Patrick

Moynihan, advisor to President Nixon perpetuated these perceptions. The Moynihan Report contained the following information.

The social fabric of New York City is coming to pieces. It isn't just "strained" and it isn't just "frayed"; but like a sheet of rotten canvas, it is beginning to rip, and it won't be too long until even a moderate force will be capable of leaving it in shreds and tatters....Among a large and growing lower class, self-reliance, self-discipline, and industry are waning; a radical disproportion is arising between reality and expectations concerning job, living standard, and so on; unemployment is high but a lively demand for unskilled labor remains unmet; illegitimacy is increasing; families are more and more matrifocal and atomized; crime and disorder are sharply on the rise. There is, in short, a progressive disorganization of society, a growing pattern of frustration and mistrust...This general pathology, moreover, appears to be infecting the Puerto Rican community as well as the Negro. A large segment of the population is becoming incompetent and destructive. Growing parasitism, both legal and illegal, is the result; so, also, is violence. It is a stirring, if generally unrecognized, demonstration of the power of our welfare machine (Moynihan, 1965).

Armed with the Moynihan report which partially blamed the welfare system for problems that were thought to be concentrated among poor people, welfare reformers set out to restructure the lifestyles of poor people with efforts to enforce work requirements. They believed that this was the action necessary to restore family stability and diminish social pathologies associated with lack of work (Piven and Cloward, 1977). One consideration that seemed to be lacking in Moynihan's analysis is that poor people did not choose to place themselves in the situations in which they lived but that the jobs that were moved out of the urban centers had not been replaced (Wilson, 1996). An additional problem was the lack of reliable public transportation for those who lived in the urban centers to go from home to work in a reasonable amount of time. Work that was available in the urban centers became inaccessible resulting in the reliance on

welfare benefits by those who did not have the means to move from their communities or commute to places where jobs were located (ibid).

In the late 1970s President Carter attempted to overhaul the welfare system by revisiting Nixon's plan. He proposed an income support program and a work benefit that would replace AFDC, SSI, and food stamp programs. Carter's plan would have allowed a family of four to receive a payment of \$2,300 until its earned income passed \$3,800. This measure would have lessened the benefits that the poor could receive as their earned income rose. Arguably, the policy would have worsened the situation for the poor who might have found that low paying jobs coupled with a decrease in benefits would not have enabled them to lift themselves out of poverty. The supplement would then be reduced by 50 cents per dollar earned above \$3,800. This measure did not pass.

### *Social Insurance*

Social Insurance began with the Social Security Act of 1935 which included the following:

Old Age Survivors Disability and Health Insurance (OASDHI) which is distributed to retired persons or their survivors. Those eligible had reached the age of 65 and had made contributions to the system and those over 72 were eligible regardless of whether or not contributions were made. Medicare is available to persons over the age of 65 regardless of income category. Unemployment compensation is available to those who are temporarily unemployed.

Since 1935 Social Insurance has been changed to accommodate the changing needs of the older segment of the population. The Older Americans Act was signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson and included the following: nutrition programs in the

community as well as for those who are homebound; programs that served Native American elders; services targeted at low-income minority elders; health promotion and disease prevention activities; in-home services for frail elders; and services that protected the rights of older persons such as the long term care ombudsman program (Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services, 2005).

Deliberation on how to improve the social security program went on for three years before the Social Security Amendments of 1972 were agreed upon. They became Public law 92-603 on October 30, 1972 and included a raise in benefits for elderly widows and widowers. The Act was amended in 1972 to include a national nutrition program for the elderly. By the later 1970s funds became more limited as a result. Vulnerable populations were frail elders, older women, minorities, rural elders, and the oldest of the elderly (United States Department of State) and forced reductions in services that they depended upon.

The repeal of the provision of the Social Security Act that treated men and women in similar situations differently improved benefits available for men approaching the age of 62. Under the old law a man the same age as a woman and with the same earnings received a lower benefit than the woman. Thus, men needed more social security credits in order to receive the same social security benefits upon retirement. The retirement test was changed so that the longer a beneficiary worked and earned, the more his or her benefit would be. The annual exempt amount of earnings was raised from \$1,680 to \$2100. This became an automatic adjustment to keep up with earnings levels increases ([ssa.gov/history](http://ssa.gov/history)).

Other changes as reported by the Social Security Administration were the following: a special minimum benefit for those who have worked in covered employment for many years, but at low levels; Higher benefits for workers who do not get social security retirement benefits before 65 but continue to work past that age; improvements in disability insurance protection (including a reduction in the waiting period for benefits and extension of childhood disability benefits to persons disabled between ages 18 and 22) as well as improved protection for a worker's dependents and survivors; extension of Medicare protection to disability insurance beneficiaries who have been on the social security disability benefit rolls for at least 2 years ([ssa.gov/history](http://ssa.gov/history)). Additional changes enacted in 1972 were: a 20 percent increase in all social security benefits to be effective in September of that year; the inclusion of provisions to automatically raise benefits as the cost of living increased; and raised from \$9,000 to \$10,800 in 1972 and to \$12,000 in 1973 the maximum amount of annual income that could count in calculating families' social security benefits.

### ***The 1980s***

#### *Welfare Assistance*

Under the Reagan administration the focus on need based welfare programs shifted from plans of guaranteed income to the reduction of the welfare rolls. "President Reagan's approach was to force welfare recipients into the job market by reducing expenditures for most social welfare programs and by tightening up eligibility requirements for the programs" (Lester and Stewart, 2000). This period marked a change in the philosophy guiding welfare policy. At the federal level, it was no longer

the case that recipients of welfare benefits would have the opportunity to receive assistance as long as was needed. In some cases they were forced to give up their benefits before they were able to provide for themselves economically.

“The passage of the Family Support Act (FSA) in 1988 marked Congress’ third try in the past twenty years to revamp AFDC” (Deperez, 2002). FSA was primarily aimed at moving welfare recipients from AFDC rolls to the workforce and was largely supported by both Republican and Democratic members of both chambers of Congress. “The FSA passed by an overwhelming margin of 96-1 in the Senate and 347-53 in the House (Rogers-Dillon, 2004). FSA contained the following four components: The JOBS program required that states enroll 20 percent of its AFDC recipients in programs to develop employability plans by 1995 in order to continue to receive federal AFDC grants. States were required to withhold child support payments from the wages of parents without custody and to set up systematic reviews of child support agreements to ensure that payments were adjusted upwardly in response to inflation and changes in the parents’ wages. Transitional benefits were to be provided to AFDC recipients who were in the JOBS program. Medicaid and child-care benefits would continue for one year after the participant moved from the JOBS program to the workforce. For minor parents, the new laws allowed states to permit them and their children to live with their parents and still qualify for AFDC benefits.

The FSA failed to have the effect desired by its supporters when it was put into practice however. The JOBS program only affected 13 percent of mothers receiving AFDC benefits and by 1992 60 percent of mothers receiving AFDC were exempted from the program entirely (Rogers-Dillon, 2004).

The Reagan administration received public support for its plans to improve the welfare system. It considered the questions of “what responsibility does the federal government have in assuring that there is a basic level of support available and in place for those who find themselves in need of financial help?” and “how should welfare assistance be provided to those who work but have wages insufficient to meet family needs?” (Story, 1982). Public opinion supported the administration’s position as reflected in the 1982 national opinion survey which was sponsored by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (Deperez 2002). The report of the survey contained the following statements: “Public welfare headed the list of services Americans would cut most severely if money were short... The Reagan program of welfare retrenchment capitalizes upon the growing public perception of substantial fraud and abuse in welfare programs...Many believe that welfare rolls are grossly inflated by the presence of able-bodied persons who should be required to work” (Deperez, 2002). The Reagan administration argued that AFDC wasted funds on “undeserving women” and increased bureaucracy as it depleted the treasury and added to the deficit (Abramovitz, 2000). Additionally, Reagan expressed his view that it was specifically blacks who benefited from welfare programs when they were able to work but faced economic problems and breakdown of family because of their own habits (Williams, 1998). He also stated his characterization of welfare mothers as professional cheats who lived better than the average American. He referred to a woman in Chicago “who:...has eighty names, thirty addresses, twelve Social Security cards, and is collecting veterans’ benefits on four nonexistent deceased husbands...She’s collecting Social Security on her cards. She’s got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each



of her names. Her tax-free cash alone is over \$150,000” (Reese, 2005;173). Welfare assistance programs, in Reagan’s view, needed to be overhauled because they enabled individuals to receive benefits by cheating and did little to protect the public against such behavior.

Reagan believed that the welfare state reflected ideals of the Great Society programs of the 1960s which produced citizen entitlement without reciprocity (Deperez, 2000). Expenditures for social programs, he believed, were responsible for the slowing of economic growth. During his first term his proposed budget called for a \$75 billion decrease or a reduction of one sixth of the funds appropriated to welfare programs. The reductions included “52 percent for Food Stamps, 29 percent for AFDC, 64 percent for WIC (Special Supplemental Feeding Programs for Women, Infants and Children), 46 percent for child nutrition, 38 percent for Low-Income Energy Assistance, and 20 percent for housing” (Deperez, 2002). Economic recovery, Reagan believed, could only come with the dismantling of social programs. Instead of dismantling all programs Congress limited the cuts to “14 percent in Food Stamps, 14 percent in AFDC, 28 percent in child nutrition, 8 percent in energy assistance, 11 percent in housing assistance, and a 9 percent increase in WIC” (Deprez,2002).

### *Social Insurance*

The 1980s saw the development of community based long-term care structures for the elderly. This meant significant state and local planning and increased involvement of private and for-profit providers. In 1984, Congress increased FICA taxes and began including federal employees as contributors to Social Security (Lester and Stewart,

2000). This legislation was meant to ensure fiscal solvency of Social Security retirement through the year 2010.

During the 1980s the most significant amendments to the Social Security Act occurred in 1983. Public Law 98-21 was enacted on March 11, 1983 to include more people as possible beneficiaries. All federal employees hired after January 1, 1984 were to be covered by the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program. This change also required inclusion of the “President, the Vice President, all elected officials and political appointees, Federal judges, members of Congress and all legislative branch employees who are not participating in the CSRS as of December 31, 1983” (ssa.gov). Those who worked for nonprofit organizations were included for work performed after December 31, 1983. The amendments also included those who worked for non-profit organizations and were 55 or older by January 1, 1984 and those fully insured under Title II of the Social Security Act provided they earn a specific amount of qualifying credits.

Changes to OASDI permitted surviving divorced spouses who remarried after the age of 60 to receive benefits from their former spouses. They also allowed disabled widows and widowers who remarried after reaching the age of 50 to receive benefits as well as disabled surviving divorced wives who remarried after age 50. The 1983 amendments mandated reductions in the old-age and disability benefits for those who would reach the age of 62 after 1985 and who are also eligible for benefits for having worked in non-covered jobs. Those who worked at least 25 years in covered jobs and those who worked for nonprofit organizations were exempted.

### ***The 1990s- 2002***

#### *Welfare Assistance*

By the 1990's welfare programs, especially AFDC had become more unpopular than ever. The public perception was that those who were categorized as “being a poor, single parent or guardian of a minor child—received a check for as long as he or she met those requirements” (Rogers-Dillon 2004, 60) which was thought to be unfair in rewarding those who did not plan for their own financial security. By 1994 fewer than 20 percent of Americans believed that most welfare recipients deserved any benefits at all (Rogers-Dillon, 2004, 60). Many welfare reformers of the 1990s wanted a return to the discretionary system of the 1960s under which social workers alone had the power to decide who was eligible, under a set of arbitrary living standards, to receive assistance. At this time both Democrats and Republicans were seeking support among “traditional white working – and middle-class” voters (Reese 2005, 174) and therefore tended to lean to the right when it came to making decisions regarding means-tested welfare benefits. President Clinton adopted the views of the Democratic Leadership Council regarding welfare as he pledged to “end welfare as we know it”. By 1994 the newly elected Republican majority was in the position to control key congressional committees and give conservative groups, the Christian Right and right-wing think tanks influence in the design of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).

Clinton and moderate Democrats in Congress initially supported training programs, job creation, and improvements to child care associated with PRWORA. The cost of such measures to reform welfare, however, did not fit in with efforts to reduce the

nation's deficit. Furthermore, he met with considerable opposition from Congress; particularly the Republican leadership. "Frustrated by congressional opposition to his welfare proposals, Clinton eased restrictions on the approval of welfare waivers to show his commitment to reform" (Reese, 2005;176). The result was termed by the Washington Post as a race to the bottom. Congress had given control of allocations to the states by substituting block grants for AFDC entitlement cash. Since block grants are not earmarked, states spent less on welfare benefits.

After many years and numerous attempts to make drastic changes in welfare assistance programs, President Clinton's Welfare Reform Act of 1996 replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. With the conversion from AFDC to TANF federal support was no longer adjusted to meet the needs of states based on the fluctuations in the caseloads. "The AFDC entitlement was based on an open-ended grant-in-aid in which the federal government matched state expenditures on a sliding scale that provided proportionally more resources to poor states. Regardless of the number of cases, the federal government paid from 50 to 80 percent of the statewide average cost of the caseload. Congress replaced this open-ended grant with a block grant and capped spending at \$16.5 billion annually" (Brown, 2003).

Under TANF states received federal funds in the form of block grants and were limited to providing welfare assistance for two consecutive years with a five year lifetime limit. States were allowed to deny welfare benefits to unmarried teenage mothers in an effort to discourage illegitimate births (Lester and Stewart, 2000). Critics on the left claimed that this was the worst case for welfare policy. Because of the Republican control of Congress, "Democrats were forced to move rightward in order to pass a

welfare reform bill” (Reese, 2005; 177). Furthermore, Clinton and congressional Democrats did not want to come across as obstructing welfare reform and lose the opportunity to gain support among white voters, especially in the South (Reese, 2005; 177). Thus, according to Reese’s research, members of Congress voted for a policy that was more conservative than their personal preferences would have dictated.

When President Clinton faced divided government in 1995 the Republicans were organized and ready to proceed with transforming their agenda into law. “The Republicans were better able to keep their members together at the various stages of the legislative process than the Democrats of the 103d Congress” (Ferejohn, 1998; 52). To strengthen party unity the Republican majority had the advantage of many freshmen ideologically committed to the Republican Party and recruited as candidates for that reason (Ferejohn, 1998). In addition Ferejohn states “the Republicans of the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress had to rely on enthusiasm, energy, and a willingness to sacrifice individual goals for shared purposes, which seems far more unusual. It is remarkable, in this regard, that this unity of purpose and action was sustained for most of the first session, even in the face of repeated warnings of electoral danger” (Ferejohn, 1998; 53).

In order to succeed in passing the legislation that they advocated the Republicans needed to work to overcome the disadvantage of their numbers. Although they were the majority party their majority status was due to only a few seats. They did not have enough seats in the Senate to prevent filibusters and they did not have enough seats in the House to overthrow a presidential veto. They would have to have unprecedented cohesion and propose policies that would appeal to moderate Democrats and Republicans or appeal to public support for their policies. They chose the latter course much to the

disadvantage of some of its own members. “To win support for a plan that was based on tax cuts for the rich and spending cuts for the poor and middle class, the budget cutters had to create enthusiasm for their plan among those who traditionally supported welfare and among the legions of people who stood to lose from a low minimum wage and massive cuts in health, housing, education, and social insurance” (Abramovitz, 2000). Support, however, for some of the Republican policies cost members from marginal districts their seats in the election following the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress by forcing them to take positions that opponents could exploit during their campaigns.

The Republicans also made use of leadership driven legislation with the use of ad hoc task forces to propose legislation. This strategy usurped the power of the committees as well as overrode members’ seniority. The committees were left with “the more mundane tasks of hearing complaints from the minority party and filling in details” (Ferejohn, 1998, Evans and Oleszek 1999). The internal workings of the committees became easier to monitor giving the Republican Party leadership more control over the legislation that left the committees. The Republicans thus had success in producing changes in social welfare policy that reflected their more conservative positions.

The committee system was used strategically with the manipulation of House Rules in the following ways: Term limits were imposed on committee chairs which was a change from previous procedures. Committee chairs’ abilities were weakened by term limits, as well as staff cuts and the elimination of proxy voting (Sinclair, 2000). While the position of committee chair was generally weakened, Democratic chairs were weakened more than Republican chairs because “They controlled the entire majority staff

of the committee and had more control over the choice of subcommittee chairs and over the assignment of members to subcommittees” (ibid).

Gingrich went beyond the rules that were specified by the 104<sup>th</sup> Congress in terms of designating committee chairs as part of the push to enact the Contract with America. He designated Republicans to serve as committee chairs even though doing so was a preemption of the normal process in which seniority had been a factor in a member of Congress’s becoming a committee chair (Sinclair, 2000). “The 104<sup>th</sup> Congress saw enormous party leadership involvement and oversight on major legislation; committee leaders were clearly subordinate to party leaders on Contract with America bills and on much of the major legislation that went into the Republicans’ attempt to balance the budget” (Sinclair, 2000, 105).

To protect programs such as medicare, medicaid, social security, and the environment Clinton shifted his focus from being a legislative president to a more executive one leaving Congress to wrangle with legislation. After the Republicans went so far as to shut down the government as part of the confrontation over the 1995 budget they lost favor with the public. Clinton was able to take advantage of this situation by taking stronger positions on several issues and using the veto symbolically and as a bargaining tool (Ferejohn, 1998). By contrast the Democrats, having enjoyed majority status for so long, were unprepared to become the minority party and were, therefore, willing to follow Clinton’s agenda since they would at least be able to rely on “presidential resources and visibility to commit their congressional party to an ambitious course of legislation” (Ferejohn, 1998).

If one considered both tiers of the American welfare system a necessary and basic social right of people living under a democratic political system, then consistency in the delivery of benefits is necessary. Changes in policy should reflect society's needs and not arbitrary preferences of legislators. Examination of a time line of the American welfare system reveals less of a situation in which inconsistent support makes a difference in the lives of welfare recipients and more of one in which consistent support for weakening the system makes U.S. citizens more and more vulnerable to economic forces which can drive them to dire stages of poverty with less and less assistance to recover.

#### *Social Insurance*

Title XII amended the Internal Revenue Code to exclude Social Security benefits paid to citizens of U.S. possessions (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) from taxation if the benefits are taxed under a local law equivalent to the IRC provision which taxes U.S. citizens on their benefits.

Part A of Title XI of the Social Security Act was amended to provide Social Security Account Statements to all eligible individuals. The statement is to contain information regarding the person's wages and self-employment income; an estimate of the individuals' contributions for OASDI benefits; and an estimate of the potential monthly retirement, disability, survivor and auxiliary benefits payable on the individual's account together with a description of the benefits payable under the Medicare program of Title XVIII.

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 was enacted on November 5, 1990 and contained directives to make information for Medicare beneficiaries more



accessible. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was directed to provide information, counseling and assistance to individuals who were eligible for Medicare. The purpose was to educate potential recipients as to procedures required to apply for Medicare benefits and other related matters. HHS was also required to provide a toll free telephone number that individuals could call to receive information regarding Medicare programs as well as Medicare supplemental programs. This measure increased the availability of knowledge about Medicare benefits to senior citizens who were eligible for those benefits. The Secretary of the Treasury was directed to ensure that communications sent to beneficiaries were written in clear and simple language with the address and telephone number of the local Social Security Association office. This measure was to be implemented on July 1, 1991.

The Older Americans Act amendments of 1992 directed the Commissioner of the Administration on Aging to urge State and local agencies to implement outreach programs that would inform elderly persons of eligibility requirements for SSI, Medicaid and Food Stamp programs. They also required that any Federal agency administering similar programs consult and cooperate with the Administration on Aging.

The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 increased the percentage of Social Security Benefits that were subject to taxation from 50% to 85% for single taxpayers whose income exceeded \$34,000 and for married taxpayers who filed jointly and whose income exceeded \$44,000. Those who had income between \$25,000 and \$34,000 and were single and those who were married, filed joint returns, and had incomes between \$32,000 and \$44,000 continued to be subject to the 50% rate. This measure went into effect on December 31, 1993.


Under the Social Security Independence Program Improvement Acts of 1994 (enacted on August 15, 1994), the Social Security Administration (SSA) became an independent agency as of March 31, 1995. As a result of this legislation, Social Security fraud was to be treated as a felony as of October 1, 1994.

The 1994 legislation clarified the SSA's authority to review OASDI and SSI cases that had been closed, where there was sufficient reason to believe that an application or supporting documents were fraudulent. The SSA was also empowered to terminate benefits or disregard evidence in cases where it was determined that the reliable evidence to document a disability was insufficient.

### **Summary**

Means tested welfare programs have been targeted for reduction since Nixon's proposal of FAP. They underwent changes that affected the amount of benefits that recipients were entitled to as well as those which restricted eligibility requirements. The most recent and major change was the transitions from AFDC to TANF during the Clinton administration. Most notably this change shortened the amount of time that any person could receive welfare benefits under the now defunct AFDC program. Previous attempts to end welfare as we know it did not receive the amount of support that was present during Clinton's terms from either Democrats or Republicans. This is partially due to the shift in public opinion that was concurrent with changes in legislative behavior in Congress. The chart below depicts the percentage of the total national budget that was targeted for means tested and social security programs between 1972 and 2002.

Figure 2 Social Program Spending 1972-2002



Actual percentages are shown in the appendix.

Social insurance benefits that were in place for older Americans changed at a slower pace than need based benefits. Due to the common conception that the older segment of the population is more deserving than those who are simply poor, members of Congress were less likely to support cutbacks in their benefits as they were to support changes in need-based benefits. Thus between 1972 and 2002 the percentage of the budget designated for social insurance programs is consistently higher than that designated for means tested programs. During the first twenty years represented in this chapter, social insurance programs were expanded to make more Americans eligible, to increase benefits, and to make information as to how to obtain benefits more accessible.

They remained protected against intentions to reduce them until the beginning of the George W. Bush administration. As the chart shows there is a steady decline in the percentage of funds allocated to social insurance programs between 1997 and 2002 with the exception of an increase in 2001. At the same time, however, means tested programs seem to receive a greater percentage of the federal budget. In short, the American welfare state, when considering both social insurance and welfare assistance, has declined in the extent to which it is able to help those with economic need regardless of the source of the need; poverty or retirement.

### **Chapter 3. Case studies of Key Roll Call Votes**

#### ***Introduction***

Case studies of the bills that are analyzed at the micro level in Chapter 6 are included here to better represent the substantive nature of the social welfare policies in question than the statistical analyses alone. They are structured in a manner that gives accounts of the policy background, the reactions of legislators to the bills as proposed, and the eventual outcome of the bills. This qualitative component of this study also serves to lend a better focus on legislators' voting behavior, which is a key focus of this work.

In describing the policy background of the bills, I report the problems that existed which posed a need for a policy remedy at the federal level. These problems included changing needs of public housing residents, social security, and food stamp recipients. Public housing issues included issues regarding expansion of existing programs and the creation of new guidelines for public housing agencies to follow. The case studies of social security bills and food stamp bills addressed levels of funding and changing eligibility criteria. Bills related to unemployment insurance were concerned with extension of benefits in the face of prolonged unemployment in the major urban centers. Finally the Family and Medical Leave Act introduced a new benefit that would serve employees in need of time off from their jobs allowing them to attend to family matters such as illness or the birth or adoption of children. After describing the policy background of the bills studied, I report the reaction of members of Congress who sought to have their input considered before final passage of the bills. The communications from the various members of Congress are in the forms of floor speeches supporting or

criticizing the bill, and the content of amendments proposed. Finally the outcome of the final passage votes on the bills is given along with the changes to current policy that the bills entailed if they passed, were not vetoed, and became public laws.

The ten bills that were chosen for analysis at the district level and for case studies are key bills make up a sub-set of the 30 year analyzed in the macro analyses which were meant to show change in support for social welfare bills over time. They are representative of the following policy areas: AFDC/TANF, unemployment insurance, Medicaid, and the Family and Medical Leave Act.

### ***HR 4485 Emergency Housing 1975 (94<sup>th</sup> Congress)***

#### ***Policy Background***

Rising purchase prices for homes, high interest rates, and the decreased demand for homes during the recession in 1975 combined to create a strain on the housing industry which, at that time, was the worst since World War II (Congressional Quarterly Almanac Vol. 31, 1975, 419). The consequences of the recession impacted families tremendously (Moen, 1979). To respond, in 1974 the Federal Reserve advocated monetary policy that raised interest rates and reduced investment purchases including homes. By the end of 1975 signs that recovery was imminent were apparent. President Ford, therefore, believed that general economic recovery would transfer into recovery for the housing industry (Congressional Quarterly Almanac Vol. 31, 1975, 419). Alan Greenspan, who headed the Council of Economic Advisors for President Ford devised an economic stimulus plan which involved tax cuts for families and businesses and tax increases on foreign petroleum. Thus in response to the package of emergency aid that Congress developed in HR 4485, which included plans to stimulate the housing industry,

Ford promised a presidential veto. HR 4485 would have provided subsidies for down payments and mortgages.

### *Legislators' Reactions*

In floor debates Republicans initially attacked the bill however, their unity on this issue eroded when several members with large numbers of constituents, who would have benefited from the bill, made their preferences known. Division among members of Congress along to party-line became less apparent when Representatives of large urban areas combined their efforts to make the bill more beneficial to their constituents (ibid, 425).

Highlighting that the 15.9 percent unemployment rate in the construction industry along with the second-lowest rate of housing starts on record, Representative Henry S. Reuss (D- Wisconsin) argued that emergency aid was needed to stimulate new housing construction. Families were reluctant to buy homes because of economic uncertainty and the government subsidies; he argued would overcome this, the “greatest roadblock to construction activity” (ibid). Parren J. Mitchell (D-MD) a noted advocate of housing for the poor argued that the recession and inflation had made homeownership less of a reality for young couples and working families by virtually forcing them out of the housing market. This was an effect of the general performance of the economy and not the fault of these people he argued (ibid).

Republicans argued that the bill was poorly crafted and would have an effect opposite of what the Democrats expected. In particular, Representative Brown (R-

Michigan) asked “Would anyone advise a constituent to buy a house now if he might qualify for a subsidy later? This time lag will be critical... and this bill could turn a burgeoning recovery [of the housing industry] into a disaster” (ibid).

Republicans proposed several amendments to HR 4485. The first was a substitute that would extend the 1974 Mortgage Assistance Act (PL 93-449) until October 18, 1976. The total mortgages would have increased in value from \$7.75 billion to \$15 billion. This substitute would have had to depend on rates rising no higher than 7.5 percent. It was rejected by a vote of 126 for and 242 against.

Another amendment supported by Republicans and proposed by McKinney would have required those families receiving subsidies to commit 25 percent of their household income toward making house payments. This measure targeted middle income families and was an attempt to impose the same type of regulations on them as were in place for poor families. McKinney argued “that it was not fair to require the poor to pay a specific proportion of their income for housing if they participated in public housing or rental subsidy programs but placed no similar requirement on middle income families” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1975, 426).

Herman Badillo (D- NY) argued that the subsidy programs would not be able to operate in the 11 large metropolitan areas including New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. In these cities the median sale price of a house exceeded the \$42,000 maximum according to the current version of the bill. Badillo suggested raising the maximum to \$48,000 thus allowing comparable homes in the large metropolitan areas eligible to benefit by the HR 4485 provisions.



The House Banking, Currency and Housing Committee's Subcommittee on Housing began hearings on several emergency housing proposals that were suggested alternatives to HR 4485. The objectives included stimulation of new construction, reduction of current housing inventory, and protection of homeowners who had become unemployed.

Henry S. Reuss (D Wis.) proposed HR 29 which would stimulate new construction by providing a mortgage rate subsidy program to enable middle-income families to purchase new homes. The bill would authorize HUD to provide subsidies to make up the difference between the actual interest rate and an interest rate of 6 per cent. These subsidies would be available to families whose income did not exceed 120 per cent of their area median income if they planned to purchase home that did not have appraised values of over \$38,000.

The second proposed alternative to HR 4485 was introduced by Ashley and 84 other members of Congress. HR 34 would have provided emergency federal assistance to those who were in danger of defaulting on their mortgages because of becoming unemployed or experiencing other economic setbacks such as pay cuts. The Ashley proposal would authorize HUD to grant subsidies to make mortgage payments for qualified homeowners to avoid foreclosure. Qualified homeowners were those whose income had declined more than 20 per cent and were not expected to regain the income over the next two years. The funds would have to be repaid to the federal government at a later time and the maximum payment provided by HUD was \$375.

Gary Brown (R Mich.) proposed HR 2640, which would have extended the 1974 emergency mortgage credit program. Brown's position was that there was enough existing emergency legislation which should be put to use (CQA 1975). The 1974 program authorized HUD to buy conventional mortgages that were not insured by the federal government. The proposal called for increasing funding for the program from \$7.75 billion to \$10 billion.

### *Outcome*

The bill passed in the House and the Senate but it received 16 votes too few in the House of the required two-thirds majority to override Ford's veto. Ford stated that he vetoed the bill "due to its cost, ineffectiveness and delayed stimulus, would damage the housing industry and damage the economy" (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 489. As an alternative legislative strategy Ford proposed an authorization of an additional \$7.75 billion, under the 1974 mortgage program, in federal mortgage purchases (ibid). President Ford's veto of this bill and Congress's failure to override the veto can be considered a failure to protect the American people from economic shock by providing the necessary assistance to facilitate home buying, however, the analysis presented in this work demonstrates that higher unemployment rates increased the likelihood of a Representative voting yes (a yes vote in this case is a vote in favor of improving or maintaining social welfare policy).

***HR 4331/3982 Minimum Social Security Budget Resolution 1981 (97<sup>th</sup>***

***Congress)***

***Policy Background***

In 1981 the United States was still contending with the economic recession that caused the need for the previous bill in this series of case studies with the unemployment rate reaching 10.7 percent. In the recent past, Democrats in Congress used jobs programs to create work and therefore economic stimulus in an effort to speed economic recovery. President Regan, however, was opposed to the “make work” solution and favored the approach of creating incentives for employers in the private sector to begin hiring and training of the “hard-to-employ” (Congress and the Nation 1981). An ailing economy with no practical remedy by 1981 had begun to affect those who were retired and receiving Social Security benefits.

The viability of the Social Security system had already been in doubt and the recession combined with decrease in federal tax revenue caused the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) fund to come close to going broke. The solution Reagan proposed was to redirect funds from OADSHI, the program that provided retirement benefits, to save OASI. This was to be done by eliminating the minimum benefit that a person could receive from either program. In opposition to this proposal from the White House Congress proposed HR 4331 which would allow OASI to borrow funds from the more financially sound Hospital Insurance and Disability Insurance trust funds. This bill would also restore the \$122 minimum monthly payment that OADSHI beneficiaries were currently receiving. In a political turnabout, Reagan supported the restoration of the

Social Security measure by publicly lauding it on September 24, 1981 after demanding abolishing the minimum on May 12, 1981 (Congress and the Nation 1981).

### *Legislators' Reactions*

For a week after Regan's proposal to eliminate the Old Age Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance (OASDHI) minimum, Democrats and Republicans attacked his plan. Many members of Congress, of both parties, received high volumes of calls from their constituents urging them to oppose Regan's proposal. Although the Republicans did not support Reagan's position on this legislation, the Democrats were the most vocal in their condemnation of the proposal. "The House Democratic Caucus May 20 unanimously adopted a resolution calling the proposed changes an 'unconscionable breach of faith' and vowing not to 'destroy the program for a generation of retirees'" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1981). Also many Democrats and their senior citizen constituents staged a protest march on the Capital to protest the changes to OASDHI benefits (ibid).

There were mixed feelings among both Democrats and Republicans in the House and the Senate on the content of this bill. Senator David Patrick Moynihan the ranking Democrat in the Senate stated that the bill put "'a little cheer in the holiday season' while giving Congress 'some breathing room for devising a longer-term solution to the question of Social Security funding'" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1981). Although as Moynihan expressed, most thought that saving OASI from bankruptcy was a positive step toward improving the condition of the Social Security system many criticized that it was not enough

### *Outcome*

Passage of HR 4331 restored the \$122 minimum monthly benefit to those who were receiving it prior to its being discontinued but those who became eligible for benefits after December 31, 1981 were excluded. In addition it included the following provisions:

- Members of religious communities became eligible to receive the minimum benefit until December 31, 1991.
- OASI, Disability Insurance (DI) and Hospital Insurance (HI) would be allowed to borrow from each other's trust funds until December 31, 1991
- Payroll tax was extended to the first six months of sick pay to the exclusion of payments from and employee's third party sick-pay plan.
- The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was required to establish Aid to Families with Dependent Children home health aid experiments by December 31, 1991 in no less than seven states.
- The Federal Privacy Act for prisoners was waived so that agencies could give their Social Security numbers to HHS in order to prevent them from receiving disability benefits illegally.
- HHS was required to report to Congress its status on preventing Social Security payments from being sent to deceased individuals within 90 days.

(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1981).

### ***HR 1 Housing Act of 1986 (99<sup>th</sup> Congress)***

#### *Policy Background*

Prior to the 99<sup>th</sup> Congress, Democrats and Republicans were at odds over the appropriate legislation to enact concerning public housing. “Democrats on the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee could not convince the Republican-controlled Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee to accept a \$14.3 billion reauthorization the House had included in its budget reconciliation bill (HR 3128).” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1985). HR 3128 passed but Democrats felt that it fell short of what was needed. Thus, HR 1 was introduced by Representative Henry B. Gonzalez (D- TX) to enhance public housing programs by improving programs that were already in place and adding better programs.

HR 1, the Housing Act of 1986 contained provisions to increase funding for housing by 50% over the fiscal 1985 appropriation by adding \$22 billion to the new budget authority and 283,605 new housing units (CQA, 1985). Gonzalez’s proposal, however, was seen as too costly by Democrats who were involved in rejecting President Regan’s request for a two year moratorium on most housing aid programs along with the elimination of rural housing and grants for construction of new rental housing. The Democrats agreed to freeze funding for public housing at the 1985 levels which were \$16.7 billion for the construction of 222,962 subsidized housing units.

John Hiler (R-IN) proposed an amendment that would have deleted the requirement for HUD to notify Congress of “proposed new regulations as they were submitted to the office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review” (CQA, 1985).

This amendment was defeated by a voice vote. “Many members blamed the deregulation-minded OMB for killing or revising housing rules, and HR 1 would require ‘before and after’ disclosure of rules that HUD wanted to promulgate. Hiler met bipartisan opposition” (CQA, 1985).

Stan Lundine (D-NY) proposed an amendment that would save \$1.3 billion by “allowing FHA to sell loans in the secondary mortgage market, which in turn would sell them to investors” (CQA, 1985). This amendment was adopted.

Bill McCollum’s (R-FL) amendment which would have eliminated rental housing development grants was rejected. McCollum’s position was that “the \$76,000 it cost to build each new unit would be better spent on other programs, such as rent subsidies, which provided housing at less expense” (CQA, 1985). Steve Bartlett’s (R-TX) amendment was accepted. It called for the distribution of “public housing modernization funds by formula, which would be drawn up by 1987, rather than requiring local public housing authorities to apply for funds as they currently did.”

### *Outcome*

The bill passed by a vote of 223- 180 including the Bartlett amendment to limit the obligation of funds for new construction of public housing units to repair and renovate existing units except in limited circumstances.

***HR 3299: Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation/  
and the Catastrophic Repeal of Medicare 1989 (101<sup>st</sup> Congress)***

*Policy Background*

House Rule 3299 in 1989 was the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation of 1989. It was considered a key bill related to social policy because of the major changes that it made to the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. The bill allowed for amendments that affected the United States Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care and the National Commission on Children. This Omnibus Budget for 1990 was sponsored by the House Committee on The Budget and reported by Representative Panetta (D-DC). The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 contained several provisions that increased the benefits provided by Medicare. It expanded the coverage that beneficiaries could receive to cover inpatient services. It amended part A of title XVIII of the Social Security Act to allow patients to pay only one deductible per year in situations in which multiple hospital stays were necessary. Prior to this amendment, beneficiaries were required to pay deductibles for every event in which hospitalization was required. In addition to changing the policy on deductibles, the Act removed limitations on durations of hospital stays with the exception of inpatient psychiatric services. Coinsurance requirements for inpatient care were also eliminated.

The Act allowed beneficiaries over the age of 65 to buy into the Hospital Insurance program and imposed a coinsurance rate equivalent to 20% of the average reasonable cost for the first eight days of service in a calendar year. Post-hospital extended care was provided for 150 days per calendar year. This is a change from the previous coverage of 100 days for each “spell of illness”. The restrictions on extended



care services which were not post-hospital extended care services were eliminated. Coverage for hospice care was extended an additional 30 days. The deductible for the first three pints of blood received during a calendar year was reduced. The Federal Hospital Insurance Catastrophic Coverage Reserve Fund was established for the purpose of transferring funding outlays for part A, catastrophic coverage, with the exception of outpatient drug benefits.

Beginning in the year 1991 coverage for catastrophic expenses for outpatient prescription drugs and insulin would be available under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act. By 1990 coverage for immunosuppressive drugs for two years beyond organ transplant surgery would be available. Medicare coverage also became available for mammograms for women over the age of 65 every other year and for women between the ages of 40 and 49 who were not considered at high risk for developing breast cancer and also for women between the ages of 35 and 40.

The Rules Committee sponsored House Resolution 245 which passed the House and allowed consideration of H.R. 3299 with 6 hours of general debate and a waiver of all points of order against consideration of the bill. Debates on all amendments would have to adhere to the time limits specified in the Rules Committee's report. Debate on amendments referring to catastrophic health insurance and child care would adhere to the step by step format (Congressional Record 1989, [www.Thomas.gov](http://www.Thomas.gov)).

Representative Donnelly of sponsored House Amendment 268 which proposed the changes to the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act that were to take place with the passage of HR 3299. Under this amendment Medicare benefits would return to the levels that existed before the law that created the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act

was implemented. The Donnelly amendment passed with a vote of 360 for and 66 against it.

Representative Stark (D-CA) of sponsored House Amendment 269 which would have altered the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Act by deleting the supplemental premium and returning to the flat-rate premium for benefits including prescription drugs, respite care, improved home health and hospice care, mammogram coverage and spousal impoverishment. The Stark amendment failed by a vote of 156 for and 269 against.

The changes proposed in H.R. 3299 in 1989 were primarily intended to repeal these provisions made in the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act. Additionally, it contained measures to reduce payments for capital-related costs associated with inpatient hospital care for the last three quarters of 1990 by 15%. It increased the distance that defined a sole community hospital to more than 35 miles away from another hospital.

The medicare payment for operating costs of inpatient services was increased by the market percentage increase in the same costs. Payments to hospitals that served a disproportionate amount of low-income patients were increased and payment adjustments were authorized to sole community hospitals which experienced a decline of more than five percent of hospitalization cases when uncontrollable circumstances impacted services rendered. The adjustments were granted to cover fixed operating costs. Further measures, such as developing and supporting emergency transportation services and planning and implementing rural healthcare networks, were added to increase the accessibility to hospital care for persons living in rural areas.<sup>7</sup> Appropriations were authorized for fiscal year 1990 through 1992 for this type of program. H.R. 3299 also

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<sup>7</sup> A rural healthcare network is an organization consisting of at least one essential access community hospital, one rural referral center, or urban regional referral center in addition to one or more rural primary care hospitals which participate in the deliverance of health care.

extended the Rural Health Care Transition Grant Program through 1992. Under this provision, hospitals would be able to use grants under this program to pay for instruction and consultation by way of telecommunications to physicians in areas with health care personnel shortages.

### *Legislator's Reactions*

This bill was extremely controversial and drew remarks from several Congressmen regarding various elements of the bill such as the abundance of extraneous legislation that was embedded in H.R.3299 and the lack of fostering economically sound policy. Representative Conte stated his objection to the extraneous matters that were included in the bill and addressed the problems that he perceived resulted from them. In his view the manner in which H.R. 3299 was handled was detrimental to the legislative process and also prohibited the House from passing a satisfactory budget plan in a timely manner.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to introduce a House resolution to reform the budget process here in the House by prohibiting extraneous matters on reconciliation bills. This change in the House rules is made necessary by the budgetary mess in which we find ourselves. On October 16, just a few days away, the Congress is about to experience a train wreck in the budget process. On October 16, there will be a final report issued by the Office of Management and Budget, accompanied by a final order signed by the President, indicating that we have failed to meet our budgetary targets for fiscal year 1990, and invoking across-the-board spending cuts in discretionary Federal programs of at least 4.3 percent for defense programs and 5.3 percent for domestic discretionary programs. How did we get ourselves into this mess? Because we failed to pass a reconciliation bill in a timely fashion. That reconciliation bill is the vehicle in our budgetary process that makes the programmatic savings in entitlement and other programs necessary to meet the savings targets in the springtime budget resolution. Under the Budget Act, that reconciliation bill is to be passed by June 15. Yet here we are in October, debating the bill for the first time, with the Senate yet to act. Unlike the Senate, which has certain restrictions against this kind of piling on of legislation, the House has no rule against attachment of extraneous provisions. Mr. Speaker, the experience we are undergoing this year proves that such a rule is necessary. Consequently, I am

calling for the enactment of the resolution I introduce today. In fact, the best place to enact it would be as part of the reconciliation bill we have under consideration. ([thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r101:8:./temp/~r101bregXQ](http://thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r101:8:./temp/~r101bregXQ)).

H.R. 3299 drew criticism from Representative Craig Thomas (R-WY) who ultimately voted in favor of the bill even though he disagreed with its main objective on ideological grounds. Thomas expressed that he did not believe that this budget plan outlined in H.R. 3299 was sound economic policy and thought it to be too far to the left and a product of “tax and spend” Democrats. He agreed, however, with the parts of the bill that altered social policies that he believed were too liberal. Thomas’s reaction is an example of a legislator voting against his ideology in terms of economic policy because not doing so would have lead to the less desirable outcome of supporting poorly crafted social policy.

I support the repeal of the catastrophic health plan that was forced upon the seniors of this country last year. In talking to hundreds of seniors over the past few months, they were in almost unanimous agreement that the catastrophic tax increase was a catastrophe. The plan forced many to pay for coverage that they already had and for services that they would never use. This is an issue that needs to be addressed in a serious manner, not as an amendment to a bill of this magnitude. Given the provisions that have been adopted by the House, I have little choice but to support H.R. 3299. But that does not negate the fact that these issues were bundled into a tax bill and not considered as stand-alone legislation H.R. 3299 is apparently the ‘last train out’ for the tax-and-spend crowd in this institution, so they wanted to make sure their ‘baggage’ was all aboard. This is not right, and it’s going to come back to haunt us. The taxpayers deserve better—much better. We have to address the deficit ([www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r101:2:./temp/~r101sore5Y](http://www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?r101:2:./temp/~r101sore5Y)).

### *Outcome*

HR 3299 was passed by a vote of 272 – 128 in the House (Roll call 379) on November 22, 1989. It was agreed to by the Senate and cleared for the White House on the same day. The bill was signed by the president on December 19, 1989 and became Public Law number 101-239 ([www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

### ***HR 3040: Unemployment Insurance Reform Act of 1991 (102nd Congress)***

#### *Policy Background*

House Rule 3040 of the 101<sup>st</sup> Congress was sponsored by Representative Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL) on July 25, 1991. This act repealed the Federal-State Extended Unemployment compensation Act of 1970 and was intended to establish a Federal Unemployment Insurance program. Such a program would provide Federal supplemental compensation to persons who had used the maximum benefits afforded them under State law; who had no rights to compensation under State law; or were not receiving compensation under Canada's unemployment laws. It required agreements on policy between the federal government and the state governments; a federal supplemental compensation account; supplemental benefit periods; payments to States having agreements for the payment of Federal supplemental compensation; and measures to address fraud and overpayments. The program, as proposed, also required the repeal of the extended unemployment compensation program. The Federal government would then pay 100 percent of the funds to be distributed as benefits to individuals by the states.

H.R. 3040 contained modifications to the following eligibility provisions. The modifications included limitation on disqualifications under State Law; payments of

unemployment compensation to former members of the armed forces; optional benefits for certain school employees; treatment of certain determinations; promotion for retraining of long-term unemployment compensation recipients; and treatment of certain youth service program participants (congressional record 1991).

Additionally, the bill required the establishment of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation consisting of seventeen members and the Secretary of Labor as the chair person. The council's function was to evaluate the unemployment compensations program with regard to its countercyclical effectiveness, the adequacy of benefits available to participants, solvency and efficiency. Eight members of the council were to be appointed by the president and eight by Congress. Of the appointees, the bill intended, four to be members of Congress, four would be representative of business interests, four of labor, and four with interests of State governments.

### *Legislators' Reactions*

In his introduction of H.R. 3040 Representative Rostenkowski stated the need to pass this legislation acknowledging that the recession entailed the need to extend unemployment compensation. He pointed out that under the bill the additional 10, 15, or 20 weeks would be provided to those who lived in states where the unemployment rate was 6, 7, or 8 percent and only if the state's unemployment rate had increased by at least 20 percent of the state's average rate over the previous two years. Because of the recession, workers were running out of benefits at rate of 33 percent compared to 28 percent at the beginning of the recession. "This translates to over 1 million more workers running out of benefits this year compared to last year for a total that could reach 3.5

million” (Rostenkowski, Congressional record 1991, [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)). Rostenkowski also pointed out that the Joint Economic Committee discovered that the job loss rate in the 1990’s recession was more severe than the average of the five previous recessions. The need was great and impossible to ignore according to Rostenkowski as he stated the following: “At the same time, the current extended benefits program activated an additional 13 weeks in only eight States, and today it is activated in only three States. In contrast, during the recession in 1980, all States were activated on extended benefits. What more evidence do we need?” (Rostenkowski, Congressional record 1991, [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

Those opposed to HR 3040 argued that it would eventually translate into fewer jobs by increasing the payroll taxes on small businesses. In essence, the bill would have exacerbated the same situation it was intended to remedy (Representative Ireland, Congressional record 1991).

Representative Romano Mazzoli (D-KY) stated that the additional 30 weeks of unemployment benefits would benefit people in his home state of Kentucky who were jobless. They could receive up to an additional 13 weeks of benefits. The bill also addressed veterans and reservists returning from Operation Desert Storm. They would only have to wait one week instead of four to qualify for unemployment benefits; they would have to be on active duty for 90 days instead of 180 to qualify; and they could receive up to 26 weeks of benefits instead of only the 13 weeks that were allowed.

Representative Nancy Pelosi (D- MD) also voiced opposition to the Unemployment Insurance Reform Act of 1991: “Mr. Speaker, expressions and symbols of concern such as the one issued by President Bush in response to long-term

unemployment will not answer the needs generated by his economic policies. The consequences of the last decade of shutting down investments in our prosperity and selling ourselves short are now hitting California with full force. We need more than symbols to sustain the loss of nearly 100,000 manufacturing jobs and more than 50,000 construction jobs in the last year. The State's shrinking middle class is being doubly squeezed by the decline in high-paying and middle-paying skilled jobs and the cuts in public services needed by parents and children. Many of those forced out of the job market in this unrelenting recession were the source of security for three generations" (Pelosi, remarks, September 16, 1991 [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)). Ms. Pelosi was in favor of legislation that would extend unemployment benefits because there had to this point been no evidence of economic recovery during the recession that she referred to which left many workers jobless for extended periods of time.

### *Outcome*

H.R. 3040 was passed in the House on September 17, 1991 by a recorded vote of 283-125 (Roll number 267). On June 19, 1992 the bill was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar with the following amendments proposed: Senate amendment 1185 provided for a substitute amendment and was proposed by Senator Dole (D-KS). Senator Graham (R-SC) proposed Amendment 1187 that would include, in the bill, provisions for work, savings, and investments for the purpose of stimulating economic growth, the creation of jobs, and opportunity. Senator Brown (D-OH) proposed Amendment 1189 to encourage negotiators to reach an accord in the interests of American coffee consumers.



Senator McCain (R-AZ) proposed Amendment 1190 to require a 60 vote majority for the Senate to pass any bill that would raise taxes

On October 1, 1991 the bill was cleared for the White House and was signed in the Senate on October 9<sup>th</sup> it was presented to President Bush who vetoed it. The veto override failed to win a two thirds majority with a vote of 65 in favor and 35 against on October 16, 1991. Federal legislation designed to increase benefits to the unemployed failed to be enacted.

***HR 5679: Department of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1992 (102nd Congress)***

*Policy Background*

HR 5697 was sponsored by Representative Bob Traxler (D-MI) in the 102<sup>nd</sup> Congress. It made changes and provided funding for the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD). For the VA, it made appropriations for the year 1993 for the Veterans Benefits Administration including the Native American Veteran Housing Loan Program Account. Appropriations for the Veterans Health Administration (including the Health Professional Educational Loan Payment Program) and departmental administration. The bill authorized the transfer of funds between specified appropriations, the use of those appropriations for consultant services and to pay the prior year's obligations for some benefits (Congressional record; [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

More of this bill, however, pertained to HUD. It made appropriations for fiscal year 1993 to fund housing programs, community planning and development, research and technology, fair housing activities, and management and administration. It imposed limits on the amounts of specified loan obligations and guaranteed commitments of the Government National Mortgage Association.

The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act was amended by HR 5679 to allow institutions of higher learning to become eligible for public housing youth sports programs and for payment of transportation costs associated with these programs. Grants for these programs were to be used for residents of public housing in which substantial drug problems existed (Congressional Record; [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

Funds were made available for the renewal of expiring low-income subsidy contracts, grants for public-housing agencies to implement measures to eliminate drug-related crime in public housing projects, and rehabilitation programs to assist homeless persons. Additionally, the corporation Milton Residences for the Elderly, Inc., received special funding for development costs when operating in conjunction with a HUD project.

HR 5679 made specific references to several cities that were targeted for funding. The City of Springfield, Massachusetts was allowed to retain grants for housing development awarded for use in connection with the Symphony Apartments if the city commenced construction or substantial rehabilitation activities before October 1, 1993. The City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was to retain grants for public housing awarded for use in connection with the Washington Square Phase II housing development project if construction or substantial rehabilitation activities began before October 1, 1993. Certain

recaptured funds for housing projects in Camden, New Jersey were made available for housing projects and the Oklahoma Department of Commerce was authorized to use community development grant funds for the repayment of a loan for economic development. Youngstown, Ohio was given environmental clearance waivers in order to receive funding for three urban development action grant projects (Congressional Record; [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was amended to provide authority for a low-rent housing project in Jefferson County, Texas. Additionally, low-income housing funds that were previously authorized for Port Arthur, Texas were reallocated to include Rockwall and Galveston.

This bill required that the Office of Lead Based Paint Abatement and Poisoning Prevention become based in the Office of the Secretary of HUD. The office was given responsibility for all matters related to lead based paint abatement along with research related to lead associated with housing as well as lead abatement. HUD was required to make revisions to the fiscal year 1992 fund availability for public housing development/major reconstruction of obsolete projects to eliminate limitations on the amounts of such funds available for public housing replacement activities. The Secretary of HUD was to take the necessary steps to assist two projects of the United Cerebral Palsy of New Jersey, Inc., in Newark and Teaneck New Jersey. The HUD secretary was also required to forego and forebear efforts to recapture funding from the Housing Authority of Seattle, Washington and to restore funds previously recaptured. This was based on a finding regarding tenant utility allowances. The HUD secretary was also required to forgive the debts of McLain, Mississippi related to public facilities loan. McLain would therefore be

relieved of its indebtedness to the Federal Government for the outstanding principle balance of the loan, accrued interest, and other fees and charges associated with the loan.

Several directives for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) were also required. The FEMA director was required to promulgate a schedule of fees applicable to persons subject to its radiological Emergency Preparedness regulation. FEMA was allowed to store Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs) to provide assistance for those in need during disasters or emergencies and to make them available to the Interagency Council of the Homeless for domestic, civilian assistance. FEMA was also required to merge the National Preparedness Directorate with the State and Local Programs and Support Directorate.

Under this bill the Department of Veterans Affairs was prohibited from entering into any new lease of property in excess of what was specified without a report submitted to the congressional Committees on Appropriations. The Resolution Trust Corporation was directed to report to Congress no less than once each month on its review of insolvent institution cases resolved by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).

The Environmental Protection Agency was directed to report to Congress with recommendations on the reauthorization of the Safe Drinking Water Act and to conduct a multi-media risk assessment of radon. The Science Advisory Board was to review the study and afterwards submit a recommendation to the administrator who would forward the recommendation with the EPA assessment to the proper Congressional committee.

### *Outcome*

The bill was introduced in the House on July 23, 1992 and was passed by the House on July 29, 1992 by a vote of 314-92 (Roll Call vote 344). It was passed by the Senate by a vote of 92-3 on September 9, 1992. The bill was signed by President Clinton on October 6, 1992 and became Public Law Number 102-38.

### ***HR 4: Work Opportunity Act of 1995 (104th Congress)***

#### *Policy Background*

Sponsored by Representative Clay E. Shaw (R-FL), the Work Opportunity Act of 1995 contained major legislative changes to social welfare programs which were addressed in Titles 1 through 2 of the Act. Title I addressed the use of the block grant system to provide TANF funds to the states. The purpose of the legislation was to promote flexibility in states which administered programs that assisted families with minor children; provided job opportunities and preparation for families in need; and attempted to lower the number of out-of-wedlock pregnancies, especially among teenaged girls, with established goals to do so in fiscal years 1996 through 2000.

Title II addressed several areas involving Supplemental Security Income (SSI). It ordered that persons would not be considered disabled if alcoholism or drug addiction contributed to a person's determination of disability by the Commissioner of Social Security. If, however a person is disabled and eligible for benefits and also has an alcohol abuse problem or drug addiction the Commissioner would be required to refer the person to the appropriate State agency in charge of implementing the State's plan for treatment

of alcoholism and substance abuse, and his or her benefits would be directed to a representative payee so that the disabled person would not escape receiving treatment for alcoholism or drug addiction.

SSI benefits would be denied to individuals or dependent spouses if the person had fled to avoid prosecution or has violated the terms his or her parole. Title II of the Work Opportunity Act of 1995 also established the National Commission on the Future of Disability which it charged with the development and execution of studies of all matters related to the adequacy of Federal programs that served persons with disabilities.

Children under the age of 18 who are determined to have mental or physical impairments resulting in limitation of functions which could lead to death or last longer than 12 months were considered eligible for SSI benefits as they had in the past. Changes to SSI for children included the elimination of references to maladaptive behavior in regard to personal and behavioral functions. Also, the Commissioner of Social Security was ordered to cease individualized functional assessments for children which had been mandated by title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Each child that was determined to be disabled would need to be reevaluated by the Commissioner no less than every three years to judge whether or not the child was still in need of eligible for benefits.

Title III made changes to the food stamp program under Subtitle A, "Food Stamp Reform" and Subtitle B "Anti Fraud and Trafficking". Subtitle A amended the Food Stamp Act of 1977 by providing means for the transition of low-income families and households from economic dependence to self-sufficiency by requiring adults to work. It also sought to promote employment "as the primary means of income support for

economically dependent families and households” and to strengthen families by promoting “healthy family functioning and family life” through the measures named.

Changes to the Food Stamp Act of 1977 included instituting a certification period not to exceed 12 months or 25 months if the adult members of the household are elderly or disabled, or primarily self-employed. The inclusion of the following was introduced to the Act: “A state may establish criteria that prescribe when individuals who live together, and who would be allowed to participate as separate households – shall be considered a single household without regard to the common purchase of food and preparation of meals”. Adults who exercise parental control over a child who has an absent parent may participate in the food stamp program if they are willing to assist state agencies in identifying of the child (when child’s parents are not married) and with securing child support or alimony payments. Under the Act no person may receive food stamp benefits if he or she has not complied with court orders to pay child support and the penalty for participating in programs in two or more states is permanent disqualification. Individuals are not eligible to participate in food stamp programs if, during the previous 12 months, they received benefits for six months or more during which time the person did not work at least 20 hours per week or failed to comply with the requirements of a work program for at least 20 hours per week. This measure excludes those who are under 18 or over 50 years of age; are medically certified as unfit for employment; or are a parent or member of a household with responsibility for a child.

### *Legislators' Reactions*

President Clinton sent his veto message which acknowledged that Congress had made an effort to include his goals into that year's welfare legislation but that H.R. 4 did not do enough to facilitate moving individuals from welfare to work. He objected to the deep budget cuts that worsened welfare policies, not in just in terms of decreasing benefits but, by also causing life style changes that decreased the quality of life for the poor. "I urge the Congress to work with me in good faith to produce a bipartisan welfare reform agreement that is tough on work and responsibility, but not tough on children and on parents who are responsible and who want to work" (President Clinton, January 22, 1996, Congressional Record [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

Representative Spector, who opposed the bill, voiced his reaction to the president's veto addressing issues specific to the concept of welfare as federal entitlement and the problem of dependency that it creates. He stated "There is no federal entitlement to welfare for individuals. Each State devises its own program. The Federal Government provides a matching grant. Abolish the matching grant and you can reasonably expect a race to the bottom." (Representative Spector, January 10, 1996; Congressional Record [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

The Work Opportunity Act of 1995 included an amendment that required the immigration status of those seeking welfare benefits to be reported to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This measure, it was argued by the New York City's Mayor Rudolf Giuliani, was in conflict with the executive order issued by the Mayor of New York in 1984 which prohibited city employees reporting illegal aliens to the INS. The policy was ordered by the mayor to alleviate the fear of deportation that aliens had



which kept them from seeking help from public agencies when in need of medical attention, or when they were crime victims.

### *Outcome*

H.R. 4, The Work Opportunity Act of 1995 was introduced in the House on January 4, 1995. It passed the House on March 24, 1995 by a vote of 234-199 and the Senate on September 19, 1995 by a vote of 87-12. On December 29, 1995 it was presented to the President and was vetoed on January 9, 1996.

### ***House Rule 1 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (103<sup>rd</sup> Congress)***

#### *Policy Background*

The findings of Congress prior to the introduction of this legislation were that the number of households in which both parents or the only parent worked outside of the home was increasing at a significant rate. It was determined that there was a great need for young children to have their parents available to them in early childhood and that parents should also be available to care for families with serious illnesses. At the time there were no employment policies in place to secure a person's job in the event that he or she needed time off to care for young children or sick family members.

The purpose of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, sponsored by Representative William D. Ford was to establish public policy that would "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of the family, to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family integrity" (congressional record 1993). The Act was intended to provide the entitlement

to employees to take up to twelve months leave to attend to medical situations, the birth or adoption of a child, the care of a child, spouse, or parent with a serious illness with consideration for the interests of the employers. The Act was also intended to comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by minimizing the potential for gender discrimination by proposing that leave is made available for medical reasons as well as maternity-related disability.

Employees eligible to benefit from FMLA are those who, as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 203 (e)), have been employed for at least 12 months and have worked at least 1250 hours with the employer from whom he or she is requesting leave during the previous 12 month period. Excluded from the set of eligible employees are “any Federal officer or employee covered under subchapter V of chapter 63 of Title 5, United States Code or any employee of an employer who is employed at a worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 employees if the total number of employees employed by that employer within 75 miles of that work site is less than 50.

Employees who take leave granted under FMLA may return to the job that he or she held before taking the leave or a position with equivalent, benefits, pay, and other employment terms. Benefits are to remain as they were prior to the date the leave began.

### *Legislators’ Reactions*

HR 1 was ready to be sent to President Clinton for signing only one month after it was introduced. Its sponsor William D. Ford stated that “I admit to being as excited and hopeful for this country as I was in 1965 when I came to this floor for the first time to help President Lyndon Johnson by passing all those people programs which eventually

became known collectively as the Great Society. I honestly believe that our people and our working families need our help as greatly today as they did then” (Congressional record, 1993, [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

Ford also thanked others who fought for the bill such as Democratic Representatives, Bill Clay (D-MO), Pat Schroeder (D-CO), Pat Williams (D-MT) and Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT). He also acknowledged the help received from Republicans Marge Roukema (NJ) and Bill Goodling (PA). The success of HR 1 in 1993 seemed to indicate to Ford an increase in bipartisan ship

Republican Representative Doolittle (CA), however, voiced opposition to the Family and Medial Leave Act for the following reasons. Although the bill is intended to be “pro-women” it would probably cause 45 percent of small businesses to favor hiring women past childbearing age. Also, Doolittle claimed that government mandated leave would cause 55 percent of businesses to reduce or eliminate other employee benefits. Paid vacations, unpaid personal leave, and health insurance are likely to be affected. Forty-six percent of small businesses would likely reduce the number of jobs that they currently offer to low-skilled workers. According to Doolittle’s interpretation of the bill it “hurts women, harms families, and kills jobs. I urge Members to vote ‘no’” (Congressional record, 1993, [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

### *Outcome*

House amendment 4 was sponsored by Representative William F. Goodling (R-PN). Its aim was to allow employers the option of offering their employees a flexible benefit plan which could include FMLA as one of a set of options that the employees

could select. Employers would not have to allow employees to take up to 12 week of family and medical leave if they had not chosen it as an option under the flexible benefit plan. The amendment failed by a vote of 187-244.

House amendment 6 was intended to reinstate previously deleted language which required employer reduced leave schedule for an employee. It was meant to state that unpaid leave could be taken under a “reduced schedule” if the employer was in agreement with such an agreement. The amendment passed by a vote of 223-209. By a vote on passage of 265-163, H.R., 1 passed the House on February 3, 1993. It passed the Senate by a vote of 71-27 and was cleared for the White House on February 4, 1993. On February 5, 1993 the bill was presented to and signed by President Clinton and became Public Law No. 103-3.

## ***HR 2: Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act of 1997 (105<sup>th</sup> Congress)***

### *Policy Background*

This bill was sponsored by Representative Rick Lazio to provide decent, safe, and clean housing to low income families. It would contribute to the supply of affordable housing by repealing the United States Housing Act of 1937 and deregulating and ending control over agencies that deliver affordable housing; encouraging mixed income communities; requiring accountability and recognizing effective management of public housing projects; generating economic opportunities for public housing residents to become self-sufficient and transit out of public housing and federally subsidized homes; changing the existing voucher program to a form that resembles the operation of the

private housing market; and replacing or revitalizing troubled public housing developments.

The terms of agreement proposed under the Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act included measures to foster self-sufficiency. The intent of this legislation was to encourage heads of households to move their families away from assisted housing into unassisted housing. Each adult member of households receiving assistance was expected to contribute at least 8 hour of work per month within the community (excluding political activities). A target date by which the families intended to progress from assisted to non assisted housing was required. Resources, services, and assistance to facilitate self-sufficiency were to be made available to the families.

Section 106 of the bill required the submission of specific local housing management plans. Public housing agencies were to submit a five year plan to the Secretary of HUD which included: 1) its mission statement, 2) goals and objective and 3) capital improvement overview. Agencies were to submit these plans for the 5 year period beginning with the first fiscal year that assistance was received by the agency under the Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act of 1997 and each following fiscal year.

The report of the annual local plan would address: 1) the needs of low and very low-income families residing in the community, 2) financial resources available to the agency, 3) the population served including requirements for eligibility, requirements for selection of eligible families, procedures for unit assignments, standards of occupancy requirements, procedures for maintaining waiting lists, criteria for denying housing assistance, 4) statements of rent determination, 5) operation and management 6) grievance procedures, 7) capital improvements, 8) demolition and disposition of housing

developments owned or operated by the agency, 9) designation of housing for the elderly and disabled, 10) conversion of housing to public housing, 11) homeownership activities, 12) economic self-sufficiency and coordination with other agencies, 13) crime prevention and safety measures, 14) annual audits, and 15) troubled agencies.

Financing for public housing agencies was to be in the form of block grants with the agreement that the agencies would provide the following: housing that is healthy, safe, and clean; financially sound operation of the housing units; compliance with guidelines relevant to the use of the block grant amounts; opportunities for residents to take part in making decisions regarding quality of life in their housing communities;.

Public housing units may be rented only to families who are classified as low-income families at the time of occupancy. If the tenants' income increases, the agency will not be penalized for noncompliance if the agency continues to rent other units that become vacant to low income families. This act also included measures to prevent concentration of low-income families. Section 222 of Section B of Title II of the Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act states that:

A public housing agency may not, in complying with the requirements under paragraph (1), concentrate very low-income families (or other families with relatively low incomes) in public housing dwelling units in certain public housing developments or certain buildings within developments. The Secretary may review the income and occupancy characteristics of the public housing developments, and the buildings of such developments, of public housing agencies to ensure compliance with the provisions of this paragraph (Congressional Record 1997, [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

Each agency that administers public housing is required to establish flat rental amounts for each dwelling unit. It is to be based on both the rental value of

the unit and a structure that does not create a disincentive for moving out of public housing. The rental rate should not exceed 30 percent of the families' monthly adjusted income or 10 percent of the families' monthly income. Minimum rental rates can be no less than \$25 per month or more than \$50 per month.

Home ownership plans may be implemented by public housing agencies in accordance with this act and with the local housing management plan. Units transferred to public housing residents may be part of existing public housing dwelling units or project or other units used as public housing by the agency.

Eligible purchasers are low-income families already receiving public housing assistance or those who are not. Other entities with the purpose of facilitating homeownership by low-income families may purchase units for the purpose of selling them to low-income families. They must sell the units acquired to low-income families within 5 years after purchase. The agencies may place additional requirement on potential buyers such as employment, participation in employment counseling programs, evidence of regular income.

The major changes to public housing that occurred with this bill were the repeal of certain provisions of (1) the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974; specifically the assisted housing allocation for elderly and handicapped families. (2) The Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act (public housing rent waivers for police, excessive rent data, Indian housing childhood development, one-stop perinatal services, energy efficiency demonstration, mixed-income new communities demonstration, youth sports programs); (3)

Housing and Community Development Act of 1987 (certificate and voucher holders, comprehensive transition demonstration); (4) Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (opportunity for fair housing, Omaha homeownership demonstration); (5) Housing Act of 1954; (6) Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1981 (development managers' payment); (7) Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1991; (8) Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983 (childhood development); (9) Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1988; and (10) the Department s of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development and Independent agencies Appropriations Act of 1996 (public housing conversion).

### *Legislator's Reactions*

Representative Bobby L. Rush (D-IL) voiced opposition to H.R. 2 referring to it as “Dooms Day Legislation” and another example of the “Contract on America”. Rush asserted that the power the bill gave to local public housing authorities would result in thousands of low-income families being driven out of public housing which should be preserved for those who need it most. H.R 2, he stated, did nothing to help poor families secure jobs that paid wages sufficient to support their move from public housing. The language in the bill that required 8 hours of community service to be performed by adults who did not have jobs was, according to Rush, draconian since volunteer work is not required of others who receive other types of aid. “Do we require ‘volunteer work’ in exchange for the right to receive other types of Federal assistance in the forms of farm



subsidies, the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), corporate welfare, or loan guarantees?” (Congressional record; May 7, 1997, [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

The main problem with The Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act was that it required families to move toward self-sufficiency but included no provisions by which low-income families could do this. The focus on self sufficiency should be on securing jobs that generated living wages with the idea that moving from public housing would follow.

It was reasoned that the very poor would suffer under the Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act by Congressman Velazquez. The government, he argued was abandoning its commitment to the poor by giving a \$300 billion tax cut to the wealthiest Americans while taking money away from the poor who lived in public housing. Under this act, poor families would have to spend more of their income on housing or face homelessness. “Mr. Speaker”, stated Velazquez “is this what the Republicans stand for; giving tax breaks to the rich while throwing poor children onto the street? H.R. 2 is extremely unfair and must be stopped.” (Congressional Record; April 16, 1997; [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

Representative James A. Leach, who supported the act called upon liberal democrats who opposed the Act to consider the position of Tony Blair who had just warned against laws that promoted dependency on the government instead of self sufficiency. “Much like Prime Minister Blair’s ‘New Labor philosophies, H.R. 2 creates a mutuality of obligation between public housing residents and the Federal Government. The approach contained in the House bill is intended to help end the cycle of poverty, where generation follows generation in an environment devoid of hope and opportunity,

and instead encourage self-sufficiency and the process of moving people from welfare to work” (Congressional Record; June 26, 1997; [www.thomas.gov](http://www.thomas.gov)).

#### *Outcome*

The Housing Opportunity and Responsibility Act of 1997 was introduced in the House on January 7, 1997 and passed by a vote of 293 to 132 (Roll no. 127, 1997) on May 14, 1997. The bill was sent to the Senate but not to President Clinton.

### ***S 1150 Food Stamps for Legal Immigrants (105<sup>th</sup> Congress)***

#### *Policy Background*

Title V, Subtitle A of the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998 contained provisions to restore benefits to those who had been eligible to receive food stamps but because of Public Law 105-33, the budgetary legislation passed in 1997 lost this benefit. President Clinton was insistent on S. 1150 containing provisions that would restore food stamp eligibility to legal immigrants. Under the 1997 budget law 935,000 legal immigrants lost their eligibility status to receive food stamps (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1998, C-11). Specifically, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA- Public Law 104-193) mandated restrictions which affected certain legal immigrants. “The 1996 welfare law barred most legal aliens from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and the Food Stamp Program. Also, states may limit alien access to Medicaid and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF, which replaced AFDC). ‘Qualified aliens’ arriving after August 22, 1996, are barred from these and most other means-tested

programs for 5 years after arrival” (CRS Library of Congress, Joyce Violet, Education and Public Welfare Division, June 30, 1998)

While the major focus of this bill was agriculture research Democrats and President Clinton were able to fashion a conference report, House Report 105-492, that mandated the allocation of \$818 million to restore food stamp benefits to legal immigrants who were elderly and disabled. The benefit was specifically targeted to those in the above category who had been in the United States at the time this particular welfare law was signed (ibid). Of the 935,000 immigrants who lost their food stamp benefits 250,000 would have them restored (ibid).

Title V amended the Food Stamp Act of 1977 to reduce funding for fiscal year 1999 and 2000 employment and training. It set limits for reimbursements to states for administration of food stamp programs with consideration of other reimbursements for Medicaid and AFDC. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 were also amended to extend the eligibility period from five to seven years for refugees and asylees (Congressional Research Service, 1998; Thomas.gov).

### *Legislator's Reactions*

This measure added to S. 1150 met with opposition from the Republican (then the majority party) leadership in the House lead by Majority Leader Dick Armey, R-Texas. The rule to consider the bill in the House would have eliminated the food stamp provision from the bill entirely however, the rule was voted down and the food stamp provision remained after pressure from others members of congress forced the Republicans to

abandon their position (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1998, C-11). A new rule for considering S. 1150 which kept the provision for legal immigrant was passed by a vote of 364-50 (ibid).

Dave Camp, R- Michigan expressed on behalf of his party that restoring the food stamp benefit was a welcome change. He stated that action “would protect elderly disabled immigrants while ‘maintaining the underlying policy on welfare for newly arriving immigrants achieved in the welfare law, that those who arrived after 1996 must work or naturalize before becoming eligible’” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1998, 20-16).

### *Outcome*

S. 1150 was passed in the House under the provisions of House Resolution 365 which removed the language “An Act to ensure that federally funded agricultural research, extension, and education address high-priority concerns with national or multistate significance, to reform, extend and eliminate certain agricultural research programs, and for other purposes” (Congressional Research Service, 1998). This statement was replaced by the following: “An Act to reform, extend, and repeal certain agricultural research, extension, and education programs, and for other purposes’, as passed by the House” (ibid). The final passage vote in the House took place on June 4, 1998 and the bill passed by a vote of 364 for and 50 against (Roll No. 204). S. 1150 was signed by President Clinton on June 23, 1998 and became Public Law Number 105-185

## **Chapter 4. Macro Analysis of Roll Call Votes**

The previous chapter was an historical outline of changes in the United States' welfare state between 1972 and 2002. It discussed the shift from more to less state sponsored help for those who are in economic need and for those who need to have their futures financially secured in retirement. A closer look into the causes for these substantial changes is warranted because economic stability is necessary for the perpetuation of civil society. Civil society depends on its members having the means to a decent, safe, and secure way of life. Each member must have at least a modicum of basic necessities to live a decent life (Sales, 1991). To begin the analysis of what causes change in support for social welfare bills that are meant to preserve and enhance the American welfare state, this chapter reports the findings of four tests regarding how macro level environmental factors determined the votes of legislators on social welfare bills between 1972 and 2002. It also discusses the methodology used and how it provides information on changes in the voting behavior of members of the House of Representatives.

### ***Methodology***

I check to see if there is empirical support for the hypothesis that if certain factors become more important to the legislators than personal ideology, in regard to achieving their personal goals, then they will override personal ideology as the determinant of the vote and also for the following related hypotheses:

1. If the president has high approval ratings then legislators are more likely to support his policy preferences. Approval ratings reflect how well the president is doing his job and how accountable the public holds him for crisis or scandal.
2. When party leadership is strong, legislators are more likely to vote according to the preferences of the party leadership.

These related hypotheses specify the possible influence of the president and the party leadership since the literature surrounding Congressional behavior includes empirical evidence of the president and party leadership having influence on Congressmen and Congresswomen's votes (Neustadt, and Aldrich et al.). They are included in this study in order to test whether or not any one factor explains influence on Congressional voting behavior and that the strengthening of influence from one source may impact voting decisions at one time while another source of influence may become stronger and more influential at another time.

An important element of the main hypothesis is that factors affecting legislators' behavior change in importance to each legislator. At one time a particular factor can be the most important determinant of the vote and at other times it may not matter at all. The analyses presented in this chapter explain changes in the importance of a set of factors. The method of analysis is Ordinary Least Squares Regression and change is captured by the coefficients that are significant in the analyses. These coefficients represent the rate that legislators voted in favor of a bill meant to improve or sustain a particular social welfare program because of the factor represented by that independent variable. If a variable is insignificant, the interpretation is that it did not cause any statistically significant change in the vote. If a variable is significant it affected support

for social welfare bills at the rate indicated by its coefficient. A positive significant coefficient of 34.4, for example, means that the variable increases the rate that the legislators will support social welfare bills by 34.4 for every unit increase in that variable.

These tests are expected to determine whether or not the hypotheses intended to support the theory should be accepted or not accepted. If all the equations are significant then the hypothesis are accepted and the theory can be considered valid. If all the equations are insignificant then the hypothesis cannot be accepted and the theory is incorrect based on the analyses presented here. This would occur if the model is misspecified; that is if the variables chosen to explain variation in the legislators' votes fail to account for the changes in the dependent variable. Another reason for the models to fail to achieve significance is an insufficient sample size. If the number of cases is too low the analysis will not be able to determine with an acceptable degree of confidence, the effects of the explanatory factors on the variation of the votes. If any of the equations are significant then the theory can be accepted and one or more of the hypotheses can be accepted based on the variables that are significant in the significant equations.

Because the theory being tested emphasizes the changing importance of factors associated with legislative voting behavior it is not surprising that some equations may be insignificant. The presence of some insignificant equations does not lead to an acceptance of the null hypotheses as long as there is at least one significant equation. Rather, the presence of both significant and insignificant equations demonstrates the aspect of the theory that addresses the idea that particular influences on legislators' voting decisions come and go and change in order of importance. As previously discussed the analyses are used to demonstrate that factors that influence voting decisions

change in importance. The variables used in the aggregate level analyses represent the same type of variables over the three subsets of the thirty years studied.

Each set of years contains president and economic conditions as variables. For the second two sets of years, 1983 through 1992 and 1993 through 2002 the presence of scandals is also included as explanatory variables. This method is an effective way to test whether or not the effect of the variables changes over time; time being a proxy for changes in the political climate in which members of Congress vote. The concept of passing time is reflected in the chronological order of the votes that are analyzed.

The variables analyzed in the macro level analyses are president operationalized as dummy variables coded 1 for is president and 0 for is not president for Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton and George W. Bush. Each variable representing president was interacted with the presidential approval variable to form the variable representing president used in the analyses. That is, the value for each case of the president variables is multiplied by the corresponding value for each case of the presidential approval variable. The interacted variables identify the time that each president in the study was in office in relationship to the dependent variable and the degree of popularity that each president had at the time the legislators voted on each bill. The combination of president and presidential approval is a better indicator of influence on the vote than president and presidential approval used separately in the analysis. It indicates when a president is in office and when he is not while simultaneously indicating his approval rating. For these analyses, the president variable is a useful indicator of legislators' voting behavior since popular presidents have historically had success in promoting their agendas among members of Congress. As an independent variable,



president is used to determine if social welfare bills were supported or not supported by members of Congress because of presidential influence.

The presence of scandals is used in the analysis to determine whether or not they impeded the ability of sitting presidents to advance their agendas on social welfare policy. The purpose of including scandals is as follows: Even if the scandal does not affect presidential approval it is possible for it to divert public attention from domestic policy making, thereby nullifying the effect of presidential influence. Public attention was more focused on scandals such as Watergate, the Iran-Contra scandal and the Lewinsky scandal than on the legislative agenda. This was so no matter what effect the scandals had on presidential public approval. Additionally, the presence of scandal may decrease the amount of effort that the president is able to devote to furthering certain items on his legislative agenda. The scandals included are the Iran Contra scandal, the Iran Hostage Crisis, and the Lewinsky scandal all operationalized as dummy variables coded 1 for present at the time the bill was considered and 0 for not present at the time the bill was considered.

During the Iran Hostage Crisis President Carter's approval rating declined (Gallup). Reagan's approval rating declined during the Iran-Contra Scandal (Gallup). President Clinton's approval rating during the Lewinsky scandal was higher than it was before the scandal broke and after the impeachment took place (Gibson and Gleiber, 1999). The different reactions to scandals by the public are important to the theory I propose because it highlights the possibility of varying responses to similar phenomena. For example Nixon's approval rating fell during the Watergate scandal and his impending impeachment. In contrast, Clinton's approval rating rose during the Lewinsky scandal

and his impeachment (Gallup). One difference between the former and latter case was the difference in the performance of the economy. Clinton presided during a time of economic prosperity and this accounted for his increasing public approval.

Because Newt Gingrich was reported to have exerted an unusually large amount of influence on the Republicans in the House of Representatives thereby increasing voting cohesion, a variable representing Gingrich's presence is included and coded 1 for present and 0 for not present. Economic indicators are used to measure the effect of the condition of constituents on the legislators. Constituent awareness and opinion of the bill may be important in some studies; however, on the subject of social welfare, public opinion polls may not directly reflect the need for social welfare provisions as well as economic indicators. For example, persons who may have benefited from a social welfare program such as unemployment insurance may not feel compelled to support maintaining or enhancing social welfare programs. Because their need may have been short term, their experience with receiving welfare benefits may be limited. Not perceiving themselves as dependent on welfare programs may transfer to not perceiving the need for providing social welfare programs to the extent that they are in the United States. Similarly awareness will not indicate opinion or need. The economic conditions that constituents face, therefore, were determined to be the best measure of constituent influence on the legislators. The legislators would be more informed about the overall economic conditions of his or her district than each individual constituent would may be since they are each equipped with staff to keep them abreast of this type of information. This variable is operationalized as the interaction of the national unemployment rate and the change in the consumer price index.

Because party leadership is expected to have an effect on Congress members' the Republican and Democratic votes and analyzed separately. Pressure for voting cohesion by the Democratic Party leadership is not expected to have an effect on the voting patterns of Republican members of Congress. The converse is also true. Additionally, party members in Congress are not expected to vote out of loyalty to a president of the opposite party. Further, it is established that Democrats traditionally have supported sustaining or increasing social welfare programs through legislation at a higher rate than Republicans. To analyze the votes of Democrats and Republicans together would fail to address ideas implicit in the theory. Republican Party leadership affects members of the Republican Party in Congress while Democratic Party leadership affects Democrats in Congress. The theory attempts to account for changes in voting patterns, therefore, two different types of voting patterns cannot be effectively analyzed for variance at once.

### ***Results***

The analyses include bills voted on over a span of thirty years; 1972-2002. The dependent variable is the percentage of the two party votes by continuing legislators. The data are separated into three sets of ten year time spans to maximize the number of continuing legislators' votes that are analyzed. The president variables for Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Bush, and George W. Bush are expected to yield negative coefficients for the Republican Congress members indicating that the presence of a popular Republican president increases the likelihood the legislator will not cast votes favoring social welfare bills. The signs are expected to be opposite when the Democrats votes are analyzed indicating that the presence of Republican presidents does not decrease the likelihood of Democrats to vote in favor of social welfare bills. The Economy variable is expected to

yield positive signs when the Democrats' votes are analyzed indicating that as inflation increases so does support for social welfare bills. This variable is not expected to have the same effect on the Republicans' votes. The Iran-Contra variable is expected to have a positive sign for both Democratic and Republican votes. The presence of this scandal may have coincided with a perceived weakening of presidential approval and, therefore, a departure from supporting the president's legislative preferences may have occurred for Republicans. The Gingrich variable is expected to have a negative coefficient for Republicans and a positive coefficient for Democrats. This result is expected because of the control that Gingrich exerted over Republican members of Congress and especially those in key positions on committees (Evans and Oleszek, 1999 and Sinclair, 2000).

One-tailed tests for significance are used because the theory posits a direction of causality from the independent variables to the dependent variables. The results are reported in Tables one, two, and three. The three tables below report the results from the OLS Regression analyses.

Table 4.1. Congressional Support for Social Policy Bills between 1972 and 1982

	<u>Republicans</u>		<u>Democrats</u>	
Variables	Coefficient	Sig.	Coefficient	Sig.
Nixon	-.179	(.278)	.060	(.351)
Ford	-.172	(.261)	.049	(.362)
Carter	-.376	(.037)	.061	(.289)
Reagan	-.372	(.095)	.146	(.160)
Economy	-.198	(.348)	.263	(.205)
Constant	59.425	(.000)	73.207	(.000)
N=152				
	Sig. .214		Sig. .886	
	Rsqr. .047		Rsqr. .012	

(One-tailed test)

Table 4.2. Congressional Support for Social Policy Bills between 1983 and 1992

	<u>Republicans</u>		<u>Democrats</u>	
Variables	Coefficient	Sig.	Coefficient	Sig.
Reagan	.139	(.342)	.068	(.344)
Iran Contra	13.431	(.052)	3.399	(.202)
Bush	.075	(.392)	.004	(.487)
Economy	.277	(.362)	.313	(.210)
Constant	42.781	(.018)	77.539	(.000)
N=117				
	Sig. .471		Sig. .528	
	Rsqr. .031		Rsqr. .028	

(One-tailed test)

Table 4.3. Congressional Support for Social Policy Bills between 1993 and 2002

	<u>Republicans</u>		<u>Democrats</u>	
Variables	Coefficient	Sig.	Coefficient	Sig.
Gingrich	-15.410	(.025)**	.529	(.455)
Lewinsky	34.463	(.004)***	-7.107	(.178)
Clinton	.506	(.123)	.078	(.382)
WBush	.264	(.243)	.059	(.389)
Econ	-.004	(.496)	-.470	(.039)**
N=231				
** 95% confidence				
*** 99% confidence				
	Sig.= .008		Sig.= .314	
	Rsqu=.066		Rsqu=.026	
(One-tailed test)				

The equations estimated for the first two sets of votes were insignificant while the equation in the third set in which the Republican vote was the dependant variable was significant. The equation in the third set in which the Democratic vote was the dependant variable was also insignificant. All are presented here to demonstrate that the null hypotheses can be rejected even though this actually occurs only in the later of the thirty years and only with Republican members of Congress. Reporting the insignificant equations demonstrates that the theory is validated in stating that legislators' behavior and the effect of exogenous influence varies over the course of the thirty years studied. It was expected that the variables would have different effects in each equation and the significant results for the Republican equation in the third decade of the study supports the theory that factors expected to have influence on voting behavior change in their effectiveness.

The variables in the significant equation, 1993-2002 Republicans, that explain most of the variance are the presence of Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the House and the presence of the Lewinsky scandal. The Gingrich variable was expected to be significant because of the reported control that Gingrich exerted over House Republicans in order to generate the increased cohesion necessary to advance the agenda of the Republican leadership. As Evans and Oleszek report, the Republican Party leadership was unusually active in encouraging voting cohesion in order to enact the Contract with America. The same model would produce substantive information that may prove interesting if used with data describing different types of policy such as domestic or foreign policy in which the influence of the president on

congress might vary<sup>8</sup>. One consideration is that the influence of the president may have a different effect because of the differences in the relationship between congress and the presidency from issue to issue. Examining a different type of policy for the purposes of testing the model in a different area is not necessary for this study since the goals are: 1) to explore the consistency or lack of consistency in support for social welfare policy and 2) to reject the null hypothesis which is that legislators do not change their voting patterns as a result of outside influences.

The coefficient for the Gingrich variable is negative indicating that support for social welfare bills declined among Republican legislators while Gingrich was Speaker of the House. Because the dependant variable is operationalized as the percent of the vote supporting social welfare bills by continuing members of the Republican Party in the House of Representatives, this negative coefficient validates the second related hypotheses that members voting patterns changed because of Gingrich's influence. Specifically, the coefficient indicates that among continuing members of the House of Representatives the members voted in favor of enhancing or preserving the status quo of social welfare policy with a probability of -15.410. This means that the Gingrich had the ability to influence change in the vote among Republicans and that influence caused a decline in support for social welfare policy.

With a positive coefficient of 34.463, the variable representing the Lewinsky scandal carried the most explanatory power in the equation estimated with Republican votes as the dependent variable in the third equation. During the time

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<sup>8</sup> Steven Shull demonstrates that the relationship between the president and congress changes from issue to issue. He develops a typology to predict when will oppose one another and when they will agree and looks over time from the Eisenhower to the Clinton administration to examine changes of how the two branches interact (Shull, 2000).



between the news of President Clinton's involvement with Monica Lewinsky and the impeachment that followed, support among Republicans for social welfare bills increased. This is explained by the fact that Clinton's approval rating was higher during the Lewinsky scandal than it was before and after (Gallup). The Clinton variable which is an interaction of presidential approval ratings and the dummy variable representing the dates that Clinton was in office is insignificant possibly because the Lewinsky variable explained so much of the total variance in the equation. Although the equation for the Democrats' voting behavior on the same set of bills was insignificant, it is still necessary to discuss this result in comparison to the Republican equation estimated for those bills. The fact that the analyses yielded a significant result for Republicans and not Democrats indicates that outside factors expected to bring about changes in voting behavior on social welfare bills failed to do so when Democrats were considered. The explanation for this result is that there is less variance associated with Democratic votes on social policy legislation than there is with Republican voting.

The Republican analysis indicates that Gingrich's influence had a significant impact only within his party. Democrats were not influenced by Gingrich's presence, however the theory and methodology dictate that inclusion of this variable is necessary for the purpose of distinguishing the importance of the factors thought to influence behavior. Similarly, the Lewinsky variable had an effect on Republican members; making them more likely to favor social welfare policy. However, in the same years, for Democrats, there was no statistically significant change in voting behavior.

When considering the theory of this study, that when certain factors become more important than a legislator's personal ideology he or she may make a vote choice that is contrary to his or her ideology, and the hypotheses that are tested, the conclusion reached is that factors expected to influence voting behavior on the continuing members of congress used in the analyses did not have an effect in the first twenty years indicating that voting patterns were consistent. In the last ten years two factors were reported to have influenced voting behavior among Republican members of the House of Representatives. The Democrats in the last ten years remained unaffected.

The R squares reported in each equation are low indicating low goodness of fit of the models. In this case low R squares are acceptable because the intention of the analyses is descriptive instead of inferential. The goal is to prove that voting patterns change as a result of factors external to the legislators' ideology. It is not meant to suggest that the results reported here will predict future behavior even if associated with a similar situation. Instead it is meant to show that Congressional voting behavior is stochastic enough that the theories that attempt to explain it are successful in certain instances. As the theory states, influence varies, therefore the purpose of the analysis is not to demonstrate that external factors influence voting behavior in all cases but to show empirically that it does. Even though the analyses are meant to be descriptive rather than inferential, more investigation into factors associated with various levels of support for social welfare bills is warranted. This is discussed further in Chapter five.

This chapter examined voting behavior by members of Congress at the macro level. To gain more knowledge on why legislators voted in favor or against social policy legislation, a micro level examination of roll call votes is necessary in order to determine the effects of district level conditions. Chapter 6 contains analysis of the votes on 10 key social welfare policy bills between 1972 and 2002. The next chapter describes the relationship between the two levels of analysis and discusses the benefits of using both in this research.

## **Chapter 5. The need for two levels of analysis**

### ***Explaining the relationship between the macro and micro level analyses.***

Considering the contributions that many theories make to understanding phenomena is important to scientific inquiry because along with accepting the idea that multiple indicators are necessary to account for variance in subjects studies it is also understood that the effects of explanatory variables increase or decrease in strength over time. The structure of this study does not lend itself to the use of Time Series analysis because the data are not arranged in equal time intervals. Change over time can still be measured, however, using techniques that assume the general linear model.

The analysis in this dissertation addresses the behavior of continuing members of the House of Representatives on one type of bill. The use of one type of bill eliminates the need to include a measure of ideology as an explanatory variable. A legislator can only vote yes or no on a single bill, therefore his or her ideological orientation, with regard to that particular issues, is either for or against that particular type of legislation. For example, if a legislator is generally against providing welfare, his or her votes would routinely reflect that he or she was against the bills that favored maintaining or increasing social welfare benefits. A shift from a position of not supporting social welfare legislation to one of supporting social welfare legislation designed to maintain or increase programs would indicate a departure from that person's previous position.

Researchers cannot determine what thought processes a legislator may have (Carson and Oppenheimer, 1984). One can only observe outward behavior. Thus, the ideal points discussed in other areas of the legislative behavior literature are primarily based on observable behavior. This study is justified then in classifying changes in observable voting behavior as a move away from an ideal point to vote in concert with another. It may be argued that this is simply a change from one ideal point to another; however, there are two lines of reasoning to address this claim. First, if a legislator changes from one ideal point to another, this action is still classified as a change in behavior. It is still the case that the original ideal point has been abandoned. Understanding the reasons for the change in ideal points is the purpose of this research. Second, a legislator may not change ideal points but for some other reason casts a vote that is inconsistent with his or her established, observed ideal point. The reasons for this behavior are addressed in this research.

The above discussion serves to reinforce the basic tenant of this project which is that within scientific inquiry it is important to proceed with the assumption that research can only be conducted on observable phenomena. Specifically, accounting for variance in voting behavior can only be achieved through the observation and study of behavior. Researchers can discuss indicators of ideal points based on actions that legislators take.

In the macro level analysis presented in this dissertation, the votes of continuing members of congress are analyzed. There are two reasons for proceeding in this way. First, the nature of the data and problem investigated requires a set of

votes that is consistent with regard to issue area. This is the only way that change in voting preferences for a bill type can be assessed. The use of votes by non-continuing members would prevent detection of change because it would be impossible to disentangle changes in one person's vote from changes in the vote outcome resulting from substitutions of voters while using macro level data.

Second, because this study is concerned with the situation described by the conversion hypothesis rather than the replacement hypothesis, it is best served by using continuing members. Discussions of these two hypotheses have dealt with the most effective way of accounting for general shifts in position by congress. The first asserts that shifts are due to changes in members' voting behavior due to forces that come into effect. The second attributes shifts in the legislative outcomes to change in the make up of the two houses of congress as new members replace outgoing members. This study is concerned with changes in legislative outcome due to the conversion of members, or to members voting differently than their ideal point or usual voting pattern would suggest.

A possible question that may arise when considering this research design is does using only continuing members introduce an endogeneity problem to the research? It could be argued that a legislator's longevity is affected by the votes he or she casts or that he or she votes a certain way in order to win future elections. The expectation here would be that a direction of causality between longevity and voting behavior is unclear or that the voting behavior is a function of constituent voting behavior. Whether or not legislators' behavior is dependent on constituents voting

behavior is inconsequential to this research because longevity is not an independent variable in this analysis. In fact in the equations estimated there is no variance in longevity at all. The aggregate votes of members who were in office during the same range of years were analyzed.

If it can be determined in a different study that the behavior of some is dependent on constituent preferences there is still no effect on the internal validity of this study since the purpose of the macro level analysis is to demonstrate that it is possible for legislators to vote differently than their ideal point would suggest. Thus this research assumes that there are ideal points although they are not fixed. Demonstrating this claim is the function of the macro level analysis.

The macro level analysis stops at demonstrating that change occurs. This demonstration is one of the main goals of this project. It is now necessary to discuss what is expected of the explanatory variable in the macro analysis. The discussion that follows refers to the reasons certain independent variables were included in the analysis. It differs from the discussion in the previous chapter in which the results of the analysis is presented. Instead this discussion concentrates on explaining and justifying the structure of the methodology that is used for the macro level analysis.

Time series analysis is able to demonstrate change over time with data that occur with equal time intervals. The general linear model and in the case of Ordinary Least Squares regression is also able to demonstrate change that occurred at various points in time. The coefficients representing the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable by definition indicate change. To illustrate, the regression

equation below indicates how change in the independent variables results in change in the dependent variable.

$$Y = a + Bx_1y_1 + Bx_2y_2 + e$$

On the right side of the equation the expression  $Bx_1y_1$  symbolizes that for every unit increase in  $x$  there is a  $B$  unit increase in  $Y$  on the left side of the equation.  $B$ , of course, represents the numerical coefficient identified in the output generated by computing the equation. If, for example,  $Y$  the dependent variable represents the percentage of Democrats voting in favor of bills to increase or maintain social policy programs, then that percentage may increase as the value of the independent variable  $x$ , increases. The amount that the value of the independent variable changes is reflected in the coefficient  $B$ . Accordingly, if the independent variable  $x$  increases by 2 and the  $B$  coefficient is equal to 20 then the dependent variable is increased by 40. Where  $x_1$  represents party influence and  $Y$  represents the percentage of Democrats supporting the social welfare bills increases by 20. Therefore, in the macro level analysis it is expected that the presence or non presence of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush as presidents would have an effect on the percentage of Democrats and Republicans voting in favor of social policy bills. This effect or rate of change would be reflected in the coefficients corresponding to those variables. The same is expected for variables representing party strength and economic performance.

The design of the macro level analysis is such that change over time is reflected by OLS coefficients in the absence of the ability to use time series analysis.



The design is limited however, because it is unable to provide a deeper understanding of why the (macro level) independent variables have the effects observed while demonstrating that change in levels of support occurs. The overall project is enhanced if exploration of those effects is included. Inquiry into reasons for variance in support for social policy needs to be included in this study and is the reason for the inclusion of the micro level analysis.

### ***Structure of Micro Level Analysis***

While the macro level analysis only demonstrates that legislators don't always vote in a manner consistent with their ideal points because of national level external factors the micro analysis investigates voting behavior at the district level. Specifically, district level variables are used to analyze votes on bills with the legislator as the unit of analysis. The explanation of how micro or district level data has the effect of deconstructing macro level events is as follows.

It is demonstrated by the aggregate level tests that the presence of Newt Gingrich as Speaker of the House and the Monica Lewinsky scandal had significant effects on Republican support for social policy bills. This effect does not however explain factors at the district level which may have enable these variables to have an effect. The reasoning here is that the conditions such as economic well being and other demographics may condition the effect of the variables used in the macro level analysis. For instance, in districts with higher median income levels the members of Congress elected are likely to have more in common ideologically, with the Republican Party leadership. In contrast, a district in which a higher percentage of

the members have blue collar jobs, the representative may be ideologically opposed to the Republican Party leadership. These district level differences affect the relationship between the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable in the macro level analysis.

The macro level dependent variables are functions of the district level variance analyzed in the micro level analysis. This is the linkage between the micro and macro level analyses and the reason for conducting both in the study. Treating the congress member as the unit of analysis in the micro analysis deconstructs the macro level unit of analysis which is the vote on bills included. This methodology illuminates the effects that were at work to make up the aggregate level data and results. It is necessary to conduct micro and macro level analyses in this study because ultimately the micro level data influence the macro level data.

One concern is whether or not the macro level analysis creates a situation of ecological fallacy. This research flaw occurs when the researcher tries to infer from the aggregate level, conclusions about the micro level. This study avoids the ecological fallacy problem because the aggregate level data and analysis is not expected to provide explanations for district level events. It is intended, as stated in throughout in discussions regarding, theory, hypothesis, and research design that it is used to trace aggregate change in the vote of groups of continuing members of congress. The aggregation that results in the data that make up the variables used in the macro level analyses has the effect of canceling out micro level variance. For example in the case of the *economy* variable individual district values for this variable

differ from each other therefore the effects of low values and high values are cancelled out. It supplements this information that is gained the micro level analysis is included for the purpose of demonstrating the effects of district or micro level variables.

### *Expectations of Micro level variables*

The variables selected for the micro level analysis are those representing district level phenomena which are thought to affect the type of representative that would be elected from a district and therefore how he or she would vote on social policy bills. The set of independent variables represent district level demographic factors that reflect the socioeconomic status and, ultimately, the needs of the districts population.

It is expected, for instance, that the variable representing the percentage of the districts' population that has passed the age of 65 (OLDER 65) will reveal the effect of the presence of senior citizens in the population. The expectation is that the higher the percentage of the population over the age of 65 the more likely the congressman or congresswoman is to support legislation aimed at enhancing or maintaining benefits that directly impact that group such as OASDI and Medicare.

BLUE COLLAR and FINANCE offer information on the economic status of the districts while BANK addresses the amount of funds held in the banks of each district. Separately, each of these variables has the potential of affecting the voting behavior of the congressmen or congresswomen representing the districts. When the

aggregation of votes of legislators is considered and these percentages are no longer separated it is only possible to observe their combined effects as they are manifested in the aggregated vote choices analyzed in the macro level analyses. The same is true for the district level variables FORBORN, POPSQUAREMILE and UNEMPLOYMENT.

The analysis of votes at both the aggregate and district level provides first, a demonstration of legislators voting differently from their ideal points. This is the sole purpose of the aggregate level analysis. Secondly, through the individual level analyses, the district level effects that contribute to the voting outcomes can be observed. The micro level analyses therefore support the macro level analyses by deconstructing the macro level dependent variable. Using this approach allows a broader understanding of the reasons legislators seem to vote differently than their ideal points would indicate.

## **Chapter 6. Micro –level analysis of Key Roll Call Votes**

The macro level analysis presented in the Chapter 4 gives a description of conditions at the National level that affected congressional voting behavior on social policy bills. To add to the understanding of how legislators arrive at voting decisions on social policy bills; an analysis of district level indicators is necessary. This chapter addresses conditions at the district level by using the Congressional district as the unit of analysis. Ten key bills, pertaining to social policy, that made changes to parts of the welfare state and are each part of the overall focus of this research, are the dependent variables. Certain years were left out because the vote did not have enough variance to be analyzed or because there were no social policy key votes in that year. This is a common occurrence since the House meets in two year terms and certain policy areas may be addressed in one year of the term or the other. Included in the set of bills analyzed were those that affected public housing, emergency housing, the Family Medical Leave Act, Veterans' affairs and HUD, food stamps, and social security. A brief description of the bills is presented in this chapter. More details of the evolution of each bill were presented in chapter five which contains the case studies of these bills.

The bill that was analyzed for 1981 was HR 4331/ HR 3982, Minimum Social Security Benefits/ Budget Reconciliation. Sponsored by Bolling, a Democrat from Missouri, this bill was intended to end debate and avoid an amendment to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 which would restore minimum Social Security benefits. It passed 271 to 151.

HR 1, in 1986, a Housing Act, was sponsored by Bartlett, a Texas Republican. Its purpose was to limit the obligation of funds to repairing existing public housing instead of constructing new public housing except in limited circumstances. The amendment was adopted by a vote of 223 to 180.

For the year 1989 HR 3299 was analyzed. It was the Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation/Alternative Revenue Package. The bill was an amendment which would exclude a capital gains cut included in the reconciliation bill. The amendment also substituted restored deductibility for Individual Retirement Accounts and provided a deficit-reduction trust fund plus an increase the marginal tax rates from the highest incomes from 28 percent to 33 percent.

HR 3040 was analyzed for the year 1991. The vote on this bill was the passage vote for the permanent extension of unemployment benefits for up to an additional 20 weeks over the normal period of time. The estimated cost for this measure was \$6.3 billion at the time the bill was considered. A funding cut of \$1.2 million to the Veterans Administration and HUD was the aim of HR 5679 in 1992. A nay vote was a vote in favor of President Clinton's position. For the year 1993 the Family and Medical Leave Act was considered.

For the year 1995 the vote on the final passage of HR 4 was analyzed. This was the final passage vote on the Welfare Overhaul process. If passed the legislation would have ended entitlement status of welfare programs replacing it with five predetermined block grants. The bill passed with a vote of 234 for and 199 against. President Clinton was against passage. A similar type of bill was voted on and analyzed for 1997. HR 2 the Public Housing System Overhaul plan was intended to

replace low-income housing programs with block grants. A no vote was one in favor of President Clinton's position. The bill was passed with 227 votes for it and 132 against it.

S 1150, in 1998 was an adoption of a rule to allow a point of order necessary to reduce by \$818 million the funding to give food stamps to legal immigrants. It was rejected by the House by a vote of 120 for and 289 against it.

This set of social policy bills offers the opportunity to compare the impact of the independent variables on the vote during different years and on different types of bills within the set of social welfare bills. They are the types that assist those facing economic hardship as well as those who earned the benefits offered through military service or by paying into the social security system before retirement as well as the Family and Medical Leave Act which allows employees to take leaves of absence for personal illness or family illnesses or events such as the birth or adoption of a child. District level analysis has the ability to give a direct representation of the effects of variance in economic and demographic factors on the legislators' voting behavior. For example, some districts may have higher levels of unemployment or higher percentages of retirees.

The following discussion of the ten logistic regression analyses focuses on comparing the effects of the independent variables with their counterparts across the equations. The central research question in this study is what influences legislators' vote choices, therefore the coefficients related to the Log- odds are reported and compared because a discussion and comparison of the converted logit coefficients within the individual equation does not contribute the understanding of the change in

support for social policy bills which is the focus of the research question. Discussion of the independent variables compared across equations, however, provides information on the motivations for the votes from year to year.

The independent variables used in the analyses are the percentage of persons over the age of 65 in the district (OLDER65); the number of persons in the district who held blue-collar jobs (BLUECOLLAR); the number of person in the district who were born in a country other than the United States (FORBORN); the number of persons in the district who held jobs in the finance industry (FINANCE); the amount of funds held in the banks in the district (BANK); the number of persons who were unemployed in the district (UNEMPLOYMENT); and the average population per square mile of the district (POPSQUAREMILE). The data were obtained from the Congressional District Database at the University of Colorado. In the discussion that follows, each independent variable is discussed in terms of which equation it achieved significance and in comparison to its explanatory power across the other equations.

OLDER 65 is used to measure the effects of the number of persons who were old enough to receive OASDI and Medicare benefits on legislators' votes on bills that affected those programs. It is expected that as this number increases the legislators would be more likely to support bills that improved the lives of their constituents specifically through these programs and also through other programs that serve those with limited income since many incur a further reduction in income around the age of 65. The effect of this variable was expected to be positive in the more recent years analyzed because of the changes in age requirements for one to receive OASDI



benefits. OLDER 65 was significant only in the year 1998. The dependent variable for that year was the key social policy bill, S 1150 Food Stamps for Legal Immigrants, was intended to decrease the availability and amount of food stamps to legal immigrants. A vote no was a vote to keep funding for legal immigrants at the current level and, therefore, a vote favoring social policy. The bill was rejected 118-98 by Republicans and 2-190 by Democrats.

FINANCE and BLUECOLLAR were included to determine whether or not the types of jobs that constituents held influenced the legislators' support for social policy bills. The FINANCE variable was negative and significant in the years 1981 and 1997. It was positive and significant in 1986 and 1992. The BLUECOLLAR variable was positive and significant in 1991. These results suggest that legislators are more responsive to the needs of white-collar workers than they are to blue-collar workers.

BANK is negative and significant in 1973 and 1992. The bills analyzed for those years pertained to Emergency Housing and H.R. 5679 which addressed both Veterans Affairs and HUD. This bill was an amendment to decrease funding for the Veterans Administration and for HUD. A vote no was a vote in favor of preserving the current level of funding. BANK is positive and significant in 1981 when H.R. 3982, the bill to restore Social Security benefits, is the dependent variable. A yes vote is a favorable vote. The indication here is that when the amount of cash assets in a district have an effect on the legislators' vote on social policy bills it is likely to be a negative effect. Taken together, the results of these three equations suggests that even when more cash assets generally mean less support for social policy bills,

consideration of the two tiered welfare state still exists. This Social Security bill benefited older people. It improved the part of the welfare state that is considered to benefit the “deserving” poor.

The variable representing the number of persons who were born in a country other than the United States, FORBORN, was positive and significant in 1973, 1991, and 1998. It was negative and significant in the years 1981, 1986, and 1991. The bills 1973, 1991, and 1998 funding for emergency housing, H.R. 3040 to provide extensions in unemployment insurance and, S. 1150 which provided food stamps for legal immigrants. The bills considered in 1973, 1981 and, 1986 were AFDC, Social Security, and H.R. 1 a proposal to limit the obligation placed on funds for new construction of public housing units to repair of existing units where possible. The analyses indicate that the presence of those who were not native born citizens had a negative influence on the vote for these types of bills. Social Security, public housing and AFDC are more long term assistance type programs than Emergency housing, unemployment insurance and food stamps. The later three types of welfare assistance appear to be of the type that are needed quickly and for a shorter period of time than the others discussed here. As the immigrant population in an area rises there is frequently a housing shortage and a shortage of jobs. Emergency housing, unemployment insurance, and food stamps offer immediate assistance while the economy of the area has a chance to adjust to the increase in population.

**Table 6.1 Influence of Foreign Born Population and District Wealth**

	1973 Emergency Housing	1981 Social Security
FORBORN	1.67E-05 (p=.0313**)	-1.4E-05 (p=.0328**)
BANK	-6.5E-06(p=.00865**)	3.48E-05 (p=.1001*)

This results for 1973 and 1981 contrast with respect to the BANK variable.

The signs of the coefficients in equations in which BANK was significant are the opposite of their counterparts for the FORBORN variable. The indication here is that as cash assets increase the support for emergency housing decreases while it simultaneously increases as the number of immigrants increases. Conversely, when increasing Social Security benefits are considered, support is positively influenced by cash assets and negatively influenced as the number of immigrants increases.

FINANCE was negative and significant in 1981 and 1997. It was positive and significant in 1986 and 1992. The dependent variables for which FINANCE was negative and significant are Social Security and Public Housing. This result indicates that there was less support for these programs in districts with larger numbers of persons with careers in the finance industry in the years analyzed. The dependent variables for which FINANCE was positive and significant were public housing (1986) and Veterans Affairs/HUD (1992). The indication is that funding for housing and veterans affairs/ HUD was supported more in districts with higher numbers of persons employed in the finance industry in 1986 and 1992.

UNEMPLOYMENT was negative and significant in 1986, 1989, and 1997. It was positive and significant in 1973, 1991, 1992, and 1993. The dependent variables for the years that UNEMPLOYMENT was negative and significant were bills pertaining to public housing in 1986 and 1997 and medicare 1989. These are bills that seem to have no obvious linkage to the unemployment rate. However, as mentioned earlier, public housing tends to be a longer term form of welfare assistance where as unemployment for individuals is more sporadic even when the rate of unemployment fluctuates. Medicare affects those who are retired and are not considered unemployed. It is logical, therefore, that the percentage of those unemployed in a district would have an inverse relationship with the likelihood of a member of Congress to support a medicare bill.

POPSQUARMILE was positive and significant in 1981, 1992, 1993, and 1997 and negative and significant in 1973 and 1986. With the exception of 1993 all of the bills for which POPSQUARMILE was positive and significant dealt with housing assistance. As the population per square mile increased the likelihood of a vote supporting emergency housing (1973), Veterans Affairs/HUD (1992), and public housing (1997) also increased. Population per square mile also had a positive impact on the likelihood of supporting the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993.

Social security (1981) and Public Housing (1986) were affected negatively by POPSQUAREMILE. The results for the analysis of 1986 and 1997 are of interest since the effects of the population per square mile are opposite one another for the same variable in each year. This result shows that there is change in support for similar bills over time in the House of Representatives; however it is consistent with

the membership replacement hypothesis of vote change rather than the membership conversion hypothesis. This level of analysis is only able to demonstrate replacement while the macro level is able to demonstrate the occurrence of conversion. The tables reporting the results of the analyses are below.

**Table 6.2 Emergency Housing 1973**

Independent variables	B	SE	P
Bank	-6.5E-06	2.722E-06	.00865**
Unemployment	.0001	4.6956-85	.0043**
Popsqumile	3.88E-05	2.548E-05	.06405*
Forborn	1.67E-05	8.990E-06	.0313**
Finance	4.91E-06	2.613E-05	.4255
Bluecollar	-1.6E-06	7.439E-06	.4144
Over65	1.66E-06	8.264E-06	.4204
Constant	-.5738	.8346	.24585
N= 485			
95% confidence **			
90% confidence *			
(One-tailed test)			

**Table 6.3 Minimum Social Security Benefits/Budget Reconciliation 1981  
[HR 4331/HR 3982]**

Independent variables	B	SE	P
Older 65	1.03E-05	8.471E-06	.1114
Bluecollar	-1.0E-05	7.533E-06	.0880*
Bank	3.48E-06	2.718E-06	.1001*
Forborn	-1.4E-05	7.481E-06	.0328**
Finance	-3.8E-05	2.449E-05	.0597*
Unemployment	-4.9E-05	4.091E-05	.1165
Popsquaremile	-2.0E-05	1.515E-05	.0915*
Constant	-1.7986	.8103	.0132**
N= 486			
95% confidence**			
90% confidence*			
(One-tailed test)			

**Table 6.4 Housing Act 1986 [HR 1]**

Independent variables	B	SE	P
Older 65	-4.4E-06	4.352E-06	.1584
Bluecollar	5.12E-06	1.047E-05	.3123
Bank	6.20E-07	1.391E-06	.3278
Forborn	-3.0E-05	6.985E-06	.0000***
Finance	4.43E-05	2.890E-05	.0268**
Unemployment	-8.3E-05	2.657E-05	.0009***
Popsquaremile	-9.0E-05	5.973E-05	.0657*
N= 435			
99% confidence***			
95% confidence**			
90% confidence*			
(One-tailed test)			

**Table 6.5 Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation/ Catastrophic Repeal  
Medicare 1989 [HR 3299]**

Independent variables	B	SE	P
Older 65	-8.2E-07	5.610E-06	.4417
Bluecollar	-1.5E-06	1.271E-05	.4518
Bank	-3.2E-07	1.680E-06	.4250
Forborn	-4.6E-06	4.506E-06	.1515
Finance	2.87E-05	3.511E-05	.2072
Unemployment	-9.9E-05	2.036E-05	.0002***
Popsquaremile	-1.1E-05	2.036E-05	.292
N= 435			
99% confidence ***			
(One-tailed test)			

**Table 6.6 Unemployment Benefits Extension/ Passage 1991 [HR 3040]**

Independent variables	B	SE	P
Older 65	1.79E-06	4.282E-06	.3381
Bluecollar	1.98E-05	1.043E-05	.0289**
Bank	-1.5E-06	1.429E-06	.1461
Forborn	1.75E-05	6.226E-06	.0025***
Finance	3.36E-06	2.698E-05	.4505
Unemployment	.0002	3.103E-05	.0000***
Popsquaremile	-9.2E-06	2.620E-05	.3627
N= 435			
95% confidence **			
99% confidence ***			
(One-tailed test)			

**Table 6.7 Fiscal 1993 Veterans Affairs and HUD,  
Independent Agencies Appropriations/ Space Station Cuts 1992  
[HR 5679]**

Independent variables	B	SE	P
Older 65	4.05E-06	4.059E-06	.1590
Bluecollar	1.22E-05	9.520E-06	.1045
Bank	-3.0E-08	1.382E-06	.0151**
Forborn	-5.3E-08	3.952E-06	.4947
Finance	5.56E-05	2.512E-05	.0134**
Unemployment	9.86E-05	2.466E-05	.0000***
Popsquaremile	2.84E-05	2.188E-05	.0970*
Constant	-3.3238	.8420	.0000
N= 435			
90% confidence *			
95% confidence **			
99% confidence ***			
(One-tailed test)			

**Table 6.8 Family and Medical Leave 1993 [H.R. 1]**

Independent variables	B	SE	P
Older 65	5.9E-06	5.410E-06	.1688
Bluecollar	-8.6E-06	1.074E-05	.2117
Bank	2.50E- 07	6.929E-07	.3593
Forborn	-6.3E-07	3.805E-06	.4342
Finance	-1.6E-05	2.033E-05	.2132
Unemployment	.0001	2.878E-05	.0000***
Popsquaremile	.0004	.0001	.0007***
Constant	-1.5143	.9243	.0507
N= 435			
99% confidence ***			
(One-tailed test)			



**Table 6.9 Welfare Overhaul/ Passage 1995 [HR 4]**

Independent variables	B	SE	P
Over 65	-3.7E-06	4.828E-06	.2246
Bank	-4.5E-07	6.217E-07	.2362
Bluecollar	3.17E-06	9.210E-06	.3694
Forborn	-5.7E-06	2.453E-06	.0104**
Finance	1.05E-05	1.659E-05	.2638
Unemployment	6.55E-07	2.106E-05	.4876
Popsquaremile	1.69E-05	2.071E-05	.2078
Constant	.3898	.7597	.3039
N= 435			
95% confidence**			
(One-tailed test)			

**Table 6.10 Public Housing System Overhaul 1997 [HR 2]**

Independent variable	B	SE	P
Over 65	-7.3E-06	4.997E-06	.0718*
Bluecollar	-1.1E-06	1.000E-05	.4572
Bank	-7.7E-07	6.409E-07	.1143
Forborn	-2.2E-06	2.396E-06	.1827
Finance	-4.5E-05	1.751E-05	.0049**
Unemployment	-3.4E-05	2.240E-05	.0666*
Popsquaremile	3.33E-05	2.250E-05	.0694*
Constant	2.8726	.8172	.0002***
N= 435			
90% confidence *			
95% confidence **			
99% confidence ***			
(One-tailed test)			

**Table 6.11 Food Stamps for Legal Immigrants 1998 [S 1150]**

Independent variables	B	SE	P
Over 65	-5.5E-6	5.560E-06	.1612
Bluecollar	-8.0E-07	1.047E-05	.4697
Bank	-9.2E-07	7.786E-07	.1189
Forborn	2.74E-06	3.106E-06	.1886
Finance	-2.3E-06	1.974E-06	.4536
Unemployment	-2.4E-05	2.603E-05	.1758
Popsquaremile	-.0001	6.451E-05	.0404**
N= 435			
95% confidence**			
(One-tailed test)			

### *Summary*

The goal of this chapter was to complement the macro level analyses presented in Chapter 4 by providing a district level analysis to give more details regarding conditions at the district level that may have an effect on the legislators' votes or a conditioning effect on the macro level independent variables. The results, while not addressing the theory and hypothesis of this study in directly, do add to the total information that the study is able to provide. Information gained regarding district level indices is valuable in that they point to explanations as to individual legislator's behavior at single points in time. Changes in aggregate legislative voting behavior overtime are better measured at the macro level but the micro level analyses give a closer look at factors that possibly contribute to the macro level results. The macro level results speak to changes due to outside influence other than ideology and district level concerns that are not able to be measured using district level data. These micro level analyses, however, provide information that could serve to launch more research into district level effects on votes in the House of Representatives.

## Conclusion

The hypothesis that the quantitative analysis at the aggregate level was meant to support is that vote choices are influenced by factors other than the legislators' personal political ideology. Ideology can be thought of as the set of political beliefs that one holds which generally predict a person's opinions on various subjects or his or her preferences when having to choose between more than one option.

In the context of this study, an appropriate example of a legislator making a vote choice based on ideology would be a Representative who believes that citizens live day to day with no significant influence on the economy in which they interact in order to provide themselves with life's necessities. Believing that each person is entitled to possess at least the basic necessities to sustain life and that an event, such as unemployment, that takes away one's ability to obtain basic necessities is considered a problem associated with the economy rather than the personal failure, that legislator would prefer to support legislation that provides unemployment benefits. Since the theory holds that it is possible for the legislator in the above example to vote against bills that would help a group of individuals that he or she believes deserves assistance, the aggregate level analysis measures the extent to which this situation occurs.

The element of the methodology used to measure this phenomenon is the observation of change in voting behavior over time. The observation is made through the interpretation of the significant B coefficients yielded by the Ordinary Least

Squares analyses. The percentage of the legislators voting in favor of continuing or expanding social policy programs is analyzed for groups of continuing members of the House of Representatives. Following the median voter theory and the Pivotal Politics theory the initial assumption is that the legislators are voting according to their political ideologies. When percentages vary across similar bills the question of why this occurs needs to be addressed. According to the analysis presented here, during the years 1972 through 2002 variation in the percentage of support among continuing Republicans was attributed to the presence of Newt Gingrich's Speaker of the House and the time frame during which the Lewinsky scandal occurred. Specifically, the coefficient corresponding to the Gingrich variable was negative and significant, in the equation analyzing the Republican's votes, indicating a decline in the support for maintaining or improving social welfare programs. Conversely, the coefficient related to the Lewinsky variable was positive and significant indicating a rise in support for maintaining or expanding social welfare programs. The implication of the empirical evidence of varying levels of support for social welfare bills is that theories that maintain that ideology is the sole determinant of vote choice are falsified. As the coefficients generated by the OLS regression analyses indicate, the effect of each variable partialled out from the optimal combination of all the variables justify the claim that these two factors influenced the vote.

The findings of the aggregate analyses invite normative discussion of the consistency in which social welfare is provided in the United States. Are social welfare benefits available consistently because of the need for the for the government to protect citizens from the shocks in the economy that occur from time to time or is

the provision of social welfare benefits to be subject to interferences in the decision making processes of duly elected legislators chosen to represent their constituents? The normative arguments by democratic philosophers and economists described earlier suggest the former.

In terms of the accountability that legislators have to their constituents, the district level analyses provide a portrayal of what conditions influenced votes on key social policy bills. As discussed, legislators voted on key bills according to the needs of their districts. For example, regarding HR 3040, unemployment benefits extension in 1991, as the percentage of blue collar constituents increased so did the likelihood of supporting an extension of unemployment benefits. This variable was significant with a confidence level of 95%. The variable representing the percentage of those unemployed also increased the likelihood of a vote in favor of this bill with a confidence level of 99%.

The district level analyses were included in addition to the national level analyses to give further insight into congressional behavior in general. The findings of the district level analyses indicate that members of Congress were responsive to the conditions in their districts in most cases. Variables that indicated poverty such as the percent of those unemployed or who are elderly had positive effects on the votes if the bill was one that served people in need. Similarly, those that indicated wealth had the opposite effect on those types of bills. The details of the bills analyzed were given in the case studies of those bills so that readers could have a more in depth description of them.

Among those who take a position of advocating the provision of social welfare benefits are political actors who sponsor bills intended to preserve social policy initiatives, the political philosophers discussed earlier, and citizens who either benefit from these benefits or simply believe that they are a necessary part of democratic society. Because support by policy makers is ever changing, advocates must make their preferences known. Brady et. al (1995) document that legislators are responsive to constituents that make their policy preferences known. They also make the distinction between which groups are more and less likely to become politically active to the degree necessary for their preferences to be heard. Those who are the least efficacious, they show, are most in need of social welfare benefits. Thus, the preferences that are most often heard, according to Brady et. al are the middle to upper class constituents.

These findings reported by Brady et. al are from aggregate level analysis. The district level analyses presented here demonstrate that demographic factors impact the probability of voting in a manner that supports social welfare policy. These two sets of empirical results both indicate that the provision of benefits generated by social policy legislation will decline if advocates do not remain active.

The purpose of this project was to demonstrate that members of Congress sometimes vote in accordance with factors other than their preferences. It was also meant to demonstrate that the United States welfare state is affected by changes in levels of support for policies that make up social welfare programs. These tasks were accomplished in the national level analysis since it showed, in the last ten years analyzed, that Gingrich's presence had an effect on the votes of Republican members

of Congress. This result allows the rejection of the null hypothesis which is that votes do not change because of factors outside of political ideology.

Overall, the implications of the findings of the empirical analyses are that when researching congressional behavior, the stochastic nature of the actions of Congress as an institution must be taken into account. Chapter two relates many different theories of Congressional voting behavior each with empirical demonstrations. What we learn from my research and other theories is that competing explanations exist because congressional voting behavior is not constant. It is affected by factors both internal and external to the institution. This observation in turn has substantive implications for social welfare policy.

In researching congressional voting behavior in regard to social welfare bills it was noted that surges and declines in Congressional support for these bills creates inconsistency in the degree to which social welfare benefits are provided. This is an inconsistency that matters in the degree to which many citizens are able to be included as full members of society.



# Appendix A.

## *Percent of the Budget allocated for Means-Tested and Social Insurance Programs*

year	total outlays	%social security	%means tested
1972	230.7	17.08%	7.33%
1973	245.7	19.62%	6.80%
1974	269.4	20.42%	7.50%
1975	332.3	19.14%	7.73%
1976	371.8	19.55%	8.20%
1977	409.2	20.45%	8.11%
1978	458.7	20.14%	7.67%
1979	504	20.36%	7.60%
1980	500.9	23.38%	8.98%
1981	678.2	20.33%	7.61%
1982	745.7	20.64%	6.95%
1983	808.4	20.84%	7.04%
1984	851.9	20.67%	6.81%
1985	946.4	19.70%	6.57%
1986	990.4	19.84%	6.67%
1987	1004.1	20.43%	6.97%
1988	1064.5	20.37%	7.24%
1989	1143.6	20.15%	7.35%
1990	1253.2	19.67%	7.51%
1991	1324.4	20.14%	8.70%
1992	1381.7	20.64%	10.21%
1993	1409.5	21.43%	11.10%
1994	1461.9	21.68%	11.66%
1995	1515.8	21.99%	11.98%
1996	1560.5	22.24%	12.00%
1997	1601.2	22.63%	12.12%
1998	1652.6	22.76%	12.12%
1999	1701.9	22.74%	12.45%
2000	1788.8	22.70%	12.65%
2001	1863.9	23.04%	12.96%
2002	2011	22.50%	13.42%

## Appendix B

### *Aggregate Data Set*

Bill	Date of vote	% Rep vote	aid type	% Dem vote
ICPSR				
v348	8/9/1972	74	socsec	90
v498	8/9/1972	12	foodstam	6
v510	8/9/1972	86	oldamer	86
v547	8/9/1972	26	welfare	91
v566	8/16/1972	8	welfare	80
v645	8/16/1972	62	welfare	80
v38	3/13/1973	65	oldamer	90
v75	4/18/1973	96	oldamer	83
v122	5/31/1973	86	pubhth	83
v235	6/30/1973	59	unempl	80
v237	6/30/1973	80	socserv	78
v260	7/19/1973	5	foodstam	68
v262	7/19/1973	12	foodstam	77
v264	7/19/1973	18	foodstam	77
v343	9/13/1973	41	schlunch	91
v344	9/13/1973	88	schlunch	94
v408	10/18/1973	18	schlunch	52
v417	10/31/1973	31	pubhth	88
v589	3/4/1974	78	pubhth	75
v611	3/19/1974	90	eldrcare	62
v764	3/20/1974	78	houspub	68
v770	7/21/1974	18	foodstam	56
v771	7/28/1974	6	foodstam	46
v847	7/31/1974	82	unempl	83
v954	10/2/1974	51	oldamer	81
v1026	11/26/1974	86	welfare	86
v1051	12/12/1974	90	unempl	94
v1073	12/18/1974	74	unempl	93
v71	3/24/1975	19	schlunch	73
v73	3/25/1975	96	schlunch	51
v79	4/8/1975	79	oldamer	93
v86	4/9/1975	92	schlunch	92
v122	4/20/1975	8	schlunch	67
v123	4/28/1975	10	wic	74
v124	4/28/1975	19	schlunch	71
v206	6/5/1975	73	pubhth	74
v260	6/24/1975	58	houspub	92
v271	6/25/1975	40	pubhth	86
v388	9/8/1975	44	houspub	74
v616	12/19/1975	79	medcaid	85

v696	3/16/1976	90 socsec	85
v776	4/29/1976	12 foodstam	75
v780	4/30/1976	4 unempl	30
v847	5/26/1976	12 houspub	33
v848	5/26/1976	54 houspub	63
v905	6/16/1976	15 foodstam	74
v937	6/22/1976	98 foodstam	96
v957	6/24/1976	73 oldamer	60
v1004	7/1/1976	29 daycare	75
v1126	8/26/1976	87 socsec	88
v1127	8/26/1976	2 socsec	41
v1128	8/26/1976	35 welfare	53
v1130	8/30/1976	54 socsec	82
v1211	9/20/1976	12 medcaid	71
v32	2/24/1977	22 unempl	57
v33	2/24/1977	26 unempl	46
v72	3/15/1977	10 unempl	74
v110	3/31/1977	90 pubhth	79
v158	4/28/1977	69 houspub	81
v221	5/13/1977	37 unempl	57
v229	5/17/1977	61 unempl	88
v243	5/18/1977	10 foodstam	69
v244	5/18/1977	8 foodstam	67
V245	5/18/1977	28 foodstam	75
v322	6/4/1977	59 socsec	88
v326	6/15/1977	8 oldamer	79
v340	6/21/1977	10 foodstam	85
v442	7/27/1977	8 foodstam	72
v443	7/27/1977	10 foodstam	86
v444	7/27/1977	4 foodstam	61
v445	7/27/1977	41 foodstam	75
v446	7/27/1977	18 foodstam	68
v447	7/27/1977	22 foodstam	81
v448	7/27/1977	43 foodstam	93
v449	7/27/1977	14 foodstam	82
v451	7/28/1977	12 foodstam	82
v452	7/28/1977	45 foodstam	89
v475	8/2/1977	53 foodstam	93
v485	8/4/1977	39 oldamer	63
v549	9/23/1977	73 medcaid	79
v608	10/13/1977	94 medcaid	65
v651	10/26/1977	92 socsec	90
v652	10/26/1977	88 socsec	90
v653	10/26/1977	45 socsec	78
v654	10/26/1977	10 socsec	68
v655	10/26/1977	51 socsec	75
v657	10/27/1977	0 socsec	58
v658	10/27/1977	73 socsec	93

v695	11/30/1977	10 socsec	67
v696	11/30/1977	0 socsec	65
v701	12/6/1977	22 welfare	48
v1133	6/22/1978	6 foodstam	72
v1226	7/21/1978	67 socsec	57
v1232	7/25/1978	75 socsec	79
v1261	8/1/1978	92 socsec	90
v1309	8/9/1978	86 unempl	49
v1310	8/9/1978	6 unempl	63
v1338	8/16/1978	0 welfare	74
v1369	9/8/1978	18 unempl	65
v1370	9/8/1978	55 unempl	58
v1437	9/22/1978	16 unempl	82
v1438	9/22/1978	33 unempl	72
v1511	10/12/1978	96 oldamer	89
v107	5/2/1979	25 foodstam	88
v125	5/8/1979	4 welfare	32
v142	5/14/1979	18 welfare	49
v 160	5/23/1979	31 welfare	39
v178	6/6/1979	75 welfare	84
v184	6/7/1979	57 houspub	78
v302	7/11/1979	39 foodstam	92
v314	7/16/1979	71 pubhth	84
v403	8/27/1979	0 welfare	72
v404	8/2/1979	92 welfare	95
v417	9/6/1979	63 socsec	39
v453	9/2/1979	6 welfare	62
v488	9/28/1979	47 welfare	53
v575	11/7/1979	92 foodstam	91
v576	11/7/1979	0 welfare	73
v577	11/7/1979	18 socsec	72
v694	1/30/1980	14 unempl	69
v695	1/30/1980	18 welfare	73
v882	5/8/1980	31 foodstam	88
v883	5/8/1980	29 foodstam	78
v884	5/8/1980	43 foodstam	85
v885	5/8/1980	18 foodstam	77
v886	5/8/1980	4 foodstam	57
v887	5/8/1980	22 foodstam	82
v891	5/13/1980	78 foodstam	95
v899	5/14/1980	75 foodstam	80
v911	5/22/1980	92 socsec	92
v1048	7/21/1980	100 socsec	85
v1105	8/21/1980	14 houspub	74
v1112	8/22/1980	55 pubhth	64
v1211	9/30/1980	22 unempl	87
v1212	9/30/1980	59 unempl	89
v1213	9/30/1980	71 pubhth	92

v188	7/31/1981	84 socsec	96
v270	7/31/1981	25 foodstam	85
v295	11/16/1981	6 welfare	80
v357	12/16/1981	94 socsec	96
v370	2/10/1982	31 welfare	70
v470	5/26/1982	49 welfare	87
v471	5/26/1982	61 welfare	84
v504	6/16/1982	2 houspub	37
v505	6/16/1982	2 houspub	37
v593	8/4/1982	14 unempl	78
v594	8/4/1982	39 unempl	82
v595	8/4/1982	12 unempl	80
v596	8/4/1982	74 unempl	82
v604	8/10/1982	82 welfare	82
v607	8/10/1982	12 foodstam	78
v687	9/21/1982	35 foodstam	66
v26	3/3/1983	67 unempl	83
v30	3/9/1983	12 socsec	70
v53	3/24/1983	50 socsec	63
v135	5/24/1983	86 oldamer	95
v199	6/16/1983	88 unempl	93
v242	7/13/1983	26 houspub	96
v303	8/2/1983	68 unempl	53
v309	8/3/1983	10 socsec	89
v310	8/3/1983	28 socsec	80
v324	9/13/1983	41 welfare	43
v339	9/21/1983	3 unempl	77
v341	9/21/1983	26 unempl	92
v344	9/22/1983	17 welfare	60
v346	9/22/1983	59 welfare	86
v354	9/29/1983	24 unempl	91
v444	11/8/1983	19 welfare	89
v522	2/2/1984	89 welfare	91
v529	2/9/1984	91 welfare	91
v578	4/11/1984	20 foodstam	90
v601	5/1/1984	35 foodstam	86
v602	5/1/1984	62 foodstam	96
v746	6/26/1984	91 welfare	98
v810	8/1/1984	31 foodstam	93
v811	8/1/1984	30 foodstam	90
v812	8/1/1984	100 foodstam	86
v825	8/8/1984	93 oldamer	98
v880	9/26/1984	92 oldamer	93
v885	10/2/1984	98 socsec	96
v127	5/23/1985	53 socsec	99
v128	5/23/1985	89 socsec	83
v242	7/25/1985	6 houspub	64
v243	7/25/1985	15 houspub	71

v244	7/25/1985	17 houspub	75
v246	7/25/1985	72 houspub	90
v290	9/18/1985	34 foodstam	93
v291	9/18/1985	18 foodstam	92
v292	9/18/1985	36 foodstam	92
v293	9/18/1985	75 foodstam	96
v309	10/2/1985	46 welfare	98
v324	10/8/1985	43 foodstam	73
v404	12/5/1985	77 welfare	95
v802	9/12/1986	65 houspub	77
v803	9/16/1986	84 welfare	98
v867	10/9/1986	3 houspub	26
v22	1/27/1987	67 homeless	86
v27	3/5/1987	62 homeless	93
v28	3/5/1987	47 homeless	78
v29	3/5/1987	66 homeless	87
v33	3/5/1987	60 homeless	87
v155	5/28/1987	66 oldamer	86
v156	5/28/1987	67 oldamer	87
v157	5/28/1987	79 oldamer	72
v158	5/28/1987	62 oldamer	85
v159	5/28/1987	86 oldamer	87
v173	6/10/1987	55 houspub	91
v175	6/10/1987	64 houspub	82
v176	6/10/1987	58 houspub	94
v236	6/30/1987	68 homeless	92
v274	7/22/1987	43 medcaid	94
v276	7/22/1987	68 medcaid	93
v321	9/22/1987	79 houspub	92
v473	12/16/1987	76 welfare	62
v475	12/16/1987	52 welfare	88
v608	5/10/1988	88 foodstam	97
v657	6/2/1988	74 medcaid	93
v687	6/22/1988	37 houspub	50
v689	6/22/1988	85 houspub	96
v710	7/7/1988	38 welfare	67
v746	8/3/1988	48 homeless	86
v758	8/9/1988	84 houspub	95
v788	9/9/1988	76 welfare	66
v855	9/30/1988	62 welfare	91
v147	7/20/1989	23 houspub	90
v267	10/4/1989	92 medcaid	74
v268	10/4/1989	13 medcaid	57
v273	10/5/1989	10 headstrt	83
v375	11/21/1989	92 medcaid	69
v377	11/21/1989	79 medcaid	76
v430	29-Mar	8 headstrt	82
v431	3/29/1990	20 welfare	86

v432	3/29/1990	7 welfare	94
v433	3/29/1990	24 welfare	83
v438	4/3/1990	82 foodstam	88
v465	5/3/1990	95 foodstam	86
v479	5/16/1990	98 headstrt	94
v480	5/16/1990	88 headstrt	97
v553	6/20/1990	99 welfare	79
v554	6/20/1990	93 welfare	95
v606	7/18/1990	21 foodstam	75
v660	8/1/1990	68 foodstam	83
v43	3/7/1991	5 houspub	82
v71	3/22/1991	72 welfare	77
v80	4/17/1991	34 medcaid	90
v95	4/17/1991	23 entitlme	95
v150	6/6/1991	71 houspub	39
v151	6/6/1991	9 houspub	55
v152	6/6/1991	3 houspub	67
v153	6/6/1991	85 houspub	79
v209	6/26/1991	69 unempl	97
v210	6/26/1991	57 medcaid	95
v263	8/2/1991	69 unempl	94
v267	9/12/1991	81 oldamer	86
v269	9/16/1991	64 unempl	73
v274	9/17/1991	5 unempl	25
v275	9/17/1991	74 unempl	70
v277	9/17/1991	31 unempl	86
v295	10/1/1991	35 unempl	91
v357	10/29/1991	18 welfare	80
v392	11/6/1991	22 welfare	81
v406	11/14/1991	83 unempl	95
v417	11/19/1991	61 medcaid	88
v458	2/4/1992	83 unempl	92
v540	4/9/1992	54 oldamer	63
v541	4/9/1992	69 oldamer	76
v633	6/9/1992	18 unempl	88
v825	8/6/1992	1 welfare	86
v826	8/6/1992	14 foodstam	89
v833	8/11/1992	77 foodstam	77
v50	2/24/1993	8 unempl	88
v51	2/24/1993	19 unempl	90
v63	3/4/1993	20 unempl	87
v119	25-Mar	93 socsec	95
v199	5/26/1993	2 welfare	93
v229	6/14/1993	81 medcaid	80
v290	28-Jun	88 houspub	21
v296	6/29/1993	92 houspub	19
v305	6/29/1993	80 foodstam	59
v309	6/29/1993	88 foodstam	58

v321	6/30/1993	34 welfare	91
v338	7/14/1993	0 socsec	91
v339	7/14/1993	0 socsec	96
v399	8/2/1993	36 houspub	93
v416	8/5/1993	0 welfare	87
v518	10/15/1993	28 unempl	88
v519	10/15/1993	42 unempl	89
v554	11/4/1993	1 unempl	64
v608	11/21/1993	97 medcaid	97
v619	11/22/1993	10 welfare	83
v625	11/23/1993	40 unempl	95
v794	11/12/1994	98 socsec	97
v802	5/17/1994	98 socsec	98
v928	6/29/1994	100 welfare	8
v929	6/29/1994	48 welfare	96
v932	6/29/1994	18 houspub	92
v935	6/29/1994	8 houspub	97
v936	6/29/1994	3 houspub	0
v937	6/29/1994	55 welfare	95
v959	7/19/1994	69 welfare	95
v969	7/21/1994	94 welfare	93
v970	7/21/1994	98 welfare	99
v971	7/21/1994	45 welfare	91
v973	7/22/1994	2 imigrati	76
v1071	8/11/1994	62 socsec	87
v1059	9/22/1994	48 welfare	94
v1119	10/6/1994	100 socsec	97
v1129	10/7/1994	90 medcaid	97
v50	1/25/1995	99 socsec	90
v54	1/26/1995	99 socsec	71
v60	1/26/1995	3 socsec	90
v72	1/30/1995	0 homeless	71
v73	1/30/1995	0 homeless	78
v74	1/30/1995	0 welfare	70
v76	1/30/1995	0 medcaid	66
v78	1/30/1995	0 medcaid	85
v79	1/30/1995	1 oldamer	62
v84	1/31/1995	0 welfare	73
v87	1/31/1995	0 welfare	65
v90	2/1/1995	0 welfare	84
v267	3/22/1995	2 welfare	98
v268	3/22/1995	2 welfare	86
v270	3/22/1995	96 welfare	61
v271	3/22/1995	94 welfare	63
v272	23-Mar	93 welfare	92
v273	3/23/1995	57 foodstam	98
v274	3/23/1995	98 child	100
v275	3/23/1995	99 child	97



v276	3/23/1995	3 welfare	52
v277	3/23/1995	99 welfare	48
v279	3/25/1995	3 welfare	94
v307	4/6/1995	99 houspub	94
v308	4/6/1995	2 medcaid	85
v311	4/6/1995	1 medcaid	90
v312	4/6/1995	96 medcaid	90
v352	5/18/1995	8 socsec	41
v353	5/18/1995	71 socsec	96
v355	5/18/1995	0 medcaid	95
v375	5/18/1995	2 medcaid	90
v389	6/14/1995	97 homeless	32
v448	6/29/1995	0 medcaid	96
v477	6/30/1995	95 medcaid	62
v552	7/20/1995	2 foodstam	94
v553	7/20/1995	34 foodstam	98
v598	7/27/1995	1 houspub	93
v599	7/27/1995	4 houspub	88
v600	7/27/1995	8 houspub	75
v601	7/27/1995	71 houspub	91
v602	27-Jul	37 houspub	88
v603	27-Jul	1 houspub	92
v604	7/27/1995	95 homeless	21
v624	8/2/1995	24 welfare	83
v629	8/3/1995	22 medcaid	77
v631	8/3/1995	85 welfare	88
v736	10/19/1995	0 medcaid	0
v737	10/19/1995	0 medcaid	0
v739	10/19/1995	0 medcaid	76
v740	10/19/1995	0 medcaid	94
v741	10/19/1995	1 medcaid	99
v743	10/24/1995	97 oldamer	95
v750	10/26/1995	96 socsec	94
v751	10/26/1995	2 medcaid	28
v800	11/14/1995	1 welfare	100
v811	11/16/1995	0 welfare	94
v822	11/17/1995	1 welfare	98
v847	12/5/1995	99 socsec	95
v870	12/14/1995	94 socsec	93
v871	12/14/1995	1 socsec	95
v885	12/21/1995	0 welfare	94
v886	12/21/1995	1 welfare	97
v887	12/21/1995	1 welfare	86
v923	2/1/1996	0 socsec	92
v925	2/1/1996	90 socsec	94
v978	3/21/1996	1 welfare	93
v992	3/28/1996	97 socsec	1
v993	3/28/1996	95 socsec	7

v997	3/28/1996	86 socsec	61
v1002	3/29/1996	93 foodstam	52
v1048	5/8/1996	7 houspub	98
v1049	5/8/1996	2 houspub	79
v1051	5/9/1996	8 houspub	92
v1054	5/9/1996	73 houspub	98
v1055	5/9/1996	6 houspub	94
v1056	5/9/1996	1 houspub	57
v1071	5/16/1996	98 medcaid	65
v1073	5/16/1996	0 medcaid	60
v1074	5/16/1996	1 medcaid	97
v1114	6/6/1996	98 welfare	64
v1115	6/6/1996	0 welfare	98
v1116	6/6/1996	0 welfare	67
v1131	6/12/1996	3 welfare	98
v1154	6/20/1996	40 welfare	67
v1155	6/20/1996	25 welfare	78
v1165	6/25/1996	10 houspub	58
v1167	6/26/1996	83 houspub	84
v1168	26-Jun	18 medcaid	69
v1203	7/12/1996	8 socsec	97
v1204	7/12/1996	96 socsec	99
v1223	7/18/1996	10 foodstam	87
v1224	7/18/1996	97 foodstam	80
v1225	7/18/1996	5 welfare	99
v1226	7/18/1996	2 welfare	85
v1248	7/24/1996	96 medcaid	97
v1274	7/31/1996	0 welfare	90
v1276	7/31/1996	0 foodstam	84
v1277	7/31/1996	1 foodstam	74
v1278	7/31/1996	97 foodstam	44
Thomas.gov			
rc55	19-Mar	100 child	98
rc56	3/19/1997	88 uemploy	100
rc57	3/19/1997	2 uemploy	87
rc58	3/19/1997	1 uemploy	97
rc59	3/19/1997	10 uemploy	99
rc72	4/8/1997	98 houspub	95
rc73	4/8/1997	100 foodstam	89
rc96	4/30/1997	100 child	100
rc100	5/1/1997	3 houspub	77
rc101	5/1/1997	30 houspub	96
rc102	5/1/1997	5 houspub	88
rc103	5/1/1997	1 houspub	74
rc104	5/6/1997	1 houspub	83
rc106	5/7/1997	0 houspub	85
rc119	13-May	0 houspub	85
rc120	5/13/1997	2 houspub	81

rc121	5/13/1997	1 houspub	100
rc122	13-May	1 houspub	46
rc123	5/13/1997	1 houspub	77
rc126	5/14/1997	0 houspub	87
rc127	5/14/1997	1 houspub	75
rc137	5/16/1997	3 uemploy	83
rc138	5/16/1997	73 uemploy	95
rc246	7/8/1997	0 child	0
rc276	7/16/1997	64 houspub	92
rc277	7/16/1997	26 houspub	100
rc280	7/16/1997	90 uemploy	100
rc286	7/22/1997	6 uemploy	100
rc287	7/22/1997	1 uemploy	94
rc289	7/22/1997	99 uemploy	99
rc569	7/22/1997	16 uemploy	97
rc26	3/3/1998	91 homeless	99
rc116	4/29/1998	100 socsec	98
rc162	5/19/1998	100 houspub	99
rc197	6/4/1998	100 uemploy	98
rc228	7/11/1998	4 uemploy	87
rc295	7/17/1998	4 houspub	93
rc297	7/20/1998	99 child	89
rc332	7/23/1998	28 houspub	92
rc352	7/29/1998	92 houspub	23
rc426	9/14/1998	81 houspub	85
rc462	9/25/1998	100 socsec	2
rc464	9/25/1998	100 socsec	9
rc516	10/10/1998	99 medcaid	100
rc533	10/15/1998	94 foodstam	92
rc164	5/26/1999	100 socsec	96
rc256	6/25/1999	92 child	87
rc257	6/29/1999	100 veterans	100
rc392	9/8/1999	74 houspub	65
rc393	9/8/1999	12 houspub	63
rc394	9/8/1999	21 houspub	77
rc401	9/9/1999	91 houspub	81
rc403	9/9/1999	93 houspub	18
rc451	9/27/1999	99 oldamer	99
rc490	10/7/1999	23 health	100
rc513	10/19/1999	97 socsec	100
rc573	11/5/1999	95 socsec	86
rc13	2/13/2000	100 socsec	94
rc208	6/28/2001	61 houspub	100
rc209	6/28/2001	27 houspub	100
rc210	6/28/2001	34 houspub	98
rc221	7/11/2001	96 houspub	100
rc252	7/19/2001	0 welfare	86
rc254	7/19/2001	4 welfare	94

rc281	6/26/2001	77 houspub	88
rc282	6/26/2001	2 houspub	66
rc283	1-Jun	1 houspub	25
rc285	6/26/2001	100 houspub	42
rc286	6/27/2001	0 houspub	73
rc287	6/27/2001	9 houspub	87
rc288	6/27/2001	9 houspub	97
rc289	6/27/2001	4 houspub	90
rc293	6/30/2001	91 houspub	73
rc294	6/30/2001	12 houspub	76
rc295	6/30/2001	4 houspub	100
rc297	6/31/2001	97 houspub	67
rc328	8/2/2001	2 health	92
rc329	8/2/2001	4 health	100
rc330	8/2/2001	6 health	100
rc332	8/2/2001	0 health	100
rc378	10/11/2001	60 health	100
rc379	10/11/2001	71 health	97
rc380	10/11/2001	34 health	98
rc381	10/11/2001	84 health	98
rc441	11/15/2001	0 oldamer	94
rc442	11/15/2001	0 oldamer	83
rc467	12/4/2001	99 socsec	97
rc16	2/12/2002	99 homeless	100
rc90	4/11/2002	11 oldamer	96
rc92	4/11/2002	99 oldamer	16
rc160	5/14/2002	100 socsec	100
rc168	5/16/2002	3 welfare	99
rc170	5/16/2002	1 welfare	94
rc282	6/28/2002	99 socsec	3
rc421	9/26/2002	96 health	11

## Appendix C

### *Data Sources*

#### *Aggregate Level Analysis*

Variables	Source
Bills and Votes	ICPSR and Thomas.gov
Nixon's Approval Rating	Gallup
Ford's Approval Rating	Gallup
Carter's Approval Rating	Gallup
Reagan's Approval Rating	Gallup
Bush's Approval Rating	Gallup
Clinton's Approval Rating	Gallup
G.W. Bush's Approval Rating	Gallup

#### *District Level Analysis*

Variables	Source
Bills and Votes	Congressional Quarterly Almanac
BANK (amount of dollars in district banks per capita)	University of Colorado; Congressional District Data Set
UNEMPLOYMENT (% of district Unemployed)	University of Colorado; Congressional District Data Set
FORBORN (% of population born in outside of the United States)	University of Colorado; Congressional District Data Set
FINANCE (% of district employed in financial industry jobs)	University of Colorado; Congressional District Data Set
BLUECOLLAR (% of the district employed in bluecollar jobs)	University of Colorado; Congressional District Data Set
POPSQRMILE (the average number of persons living in one square mile)	University of Colorado; Congressional District Data Set
OVER65 (% of the district over the age of 65)	University of Colorado; Congressional District Data Set

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