

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: THE POLICY WE CAN GET:
SENIORITY, AUTHORITY, AND
GENDER LEGISLATION IN ISRAEL
AND ARGENTINA

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Most explanations for women politicians' legislative agendas and their choice to represent women rely on assumptions about their individual policy preferences. Even research exploring policy variation among women assumes that it is best explained by ideological differences on the left-right political spectrum. Through a comparative case study of Israel and Argentina I show that the pursuit of gender legislation is more a function of constraints and strategic choices than policy preferences. Argentina and Israel are representative of the two main types of country cases used in the gender and politics literature – Argentina has institutionalized women's presence in the legislature, and Israel has not. This crucial difference supports the generalizability of my findings. Drawing on field work in Israel combined with cross national statistical analyses, I argue that as women gain access to powerful positions within the legislature we will observe

changes in their legislative agenda. I assume that in order to advance or succeed in politics, women will endeavor to mimic men's behavior. However, in the Argentinian and Israeli cases the picture that emerges is quite different. I find that policy variation among women generally, and the choice to advocate for gender-related legislation specifically, is driven by the degree of institutional marginalization women experience. While women may want to behave like their male colleagues as they gain seniority and enter positions of authority in the legislature, they face particular instrumental constraints. As a result, though we may expect women to expand their legislative agenda and effectively cease to advocate for niche issues like women's issues, instead I find that they are unable to do so. Marginalization within the legislature both in Israel and Argentina causes women to maintain a certain degree of commitment to women's issues. While in the Israeli case, the extreme marginalization of women in the legislature results in women exclusively working on gender-related policy, in Argentina, due to the normalization of women's presence in the legislature, I observe women legislators broadening their policy scope beyond women's issues.

This work is a significant contribution to the representation literature as it provides a clear and intuitive explanation for policy outcomes for historically marginalized communities. The larger implication of this work is that the normalization of increased descriptive representation for historically marginalized communities decreases the likelihood for large-scale social change.

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ARGENTINA

by

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Preface

"I just couldn't help thinking of the little girl you used to be, Anne. And I was wishing you could have stayed a little girl, even with all your queer ways. You've grown up now and you're going away; and you look so tall and stylish and so so different altogether in that dress as if you didn't belong in Avonlea at all and I just got lonesome thinking it all over." "Marilla!" Anne sat down on Marilla's gingham lap, took Marilla's lined face between her hands, and looked gravely and tenderly into Marilla's eyes. "I'm not a bit changed not really. I'm only just pruned down and branched out. The real ME back here is just the same. It won't make a bit of difference where I go or how much I change outwardly; at heart I shall always be your little Anne, who will love you and Matthew and dear Green Gables more and better every day of her life."

Montgomery, L. M. Anne of Green Gables.

Dedication

To the Kibbutz that raised me.

To the sisterhood that helps me soar.

To my family who loves me.

Thank you.

You are the core of who I am and what I do.

Acknowledgements

In the middle of the night August of 2005 I was in the airport with my parents, two childhood best friends, and two suitcases. My friends had stayed up all night hanging out with me in anticipation of my drive to the airport. That night, or morning, I left to go to college in the U.S.

That was the first stage of my great American adventure. This dissertation is the second stage.

This dissertation would not have been possible without my advisor Ernesto Calvo. Thank you for trusting me and believing in my work. I hope that my research meets your high standards, and that you continue to push me to be better moving forward (as you have done in the past). Thank you for patiently explaining stata and quantitative methods as I stare blankly at you and then the computer screen.

I must also recognize Paul Scham who answered my email seven years ago and encouraged me to apply to the University of Maryland. Thank you for your support throughout this academic journey and thank you for always advocating on my behalf.

Isabella and Stella, I hope that my writing is clear enough and significantly improved although I am confident you will tell me if this is not the case. Thank you for asking difficult questions and demanding I push myself theoretically and methodologically.

Leslie Schwindt-Bayer and Tiffany Barnes, thank you for patiently listening as I rambled on about my ideas for researching women's representation, and giving crucial feedback that is reflected in this work. I am still working on forgiving you both for writing the books I wanted to write, but I am grateful for having something to aspire to.

To my research assistant Noam Gannot – thank you for your diligence, your dedication, and detail-oriented work. The original dataset of Israeli legislation

used in this work was made possible due to the many hours you spent hand coding.

A joke I frequently tell is that the most rebellious thing I have ever done is go to a small liberal arts college in New England. Yet this decision changed everything. At university I found true community, self-expression, and meaning. I found my joy and enthusiasm.

To all of my friends who have expressed blind faith and support in me – Thank you! To my original Kibbutz gang; Rotem, Dafna, and Hamutal, thank you for encouraging me to pursue my dream of going to college in the U.S. Thank you Aviv for our evenings of wine and chocolate while talking about feminism, queer theory, art, music, activism, and relationships. Ronnie my superstar army friend, who is so smart and absurdly competent, I don't know how you do it! Dikla – thank you for our nights dancing in Tel Aviv, I am no longer capable of dancing till the AM but I am glad you are still my friend despite of this failure. To my college friends; Carlen, Becky, Simona, Al, Meredith, Avi, Hilla, Jasmine, David, Hana, and Audbot Flaketrone – thank you for all for your brilliance, for inspiring me with your words and actions. I make fun of Brandeis a lot, but I did in fact meet the best people there!

Thank you to the members of my Mariah Carey tribute band “Messiah Carey” Paro and Summer, for making me a better scholar, a better feminist, and a better person. Noa Milman, Karen Spira, and Ronit Berger, you are my feminist Israeli academic mafia. Thank you for giving me an image of what Israel can be.

Tory thank you for making me a list of all your favorite places in DC, I still go to all of them. Edward you are an art and fashion icon. Caity and B you are the kindest most magical beings. Liz Richardson you are posh and brilliant and I am happy to bask in your reflected glory.

My graduate school buddy, the cranky vampire, Dr. Katherine Sawyer (who will definitely hate this acknowledgement) you are a genius. You inspire me to work hard and improve my scholarship. Even when you are having a hard time you find a way to be there as a friend. I see that and appreciate all the work you do.

I have been very blessed to have a Jewish feminist coven of super women. Chelsey, Jess, Liz, and Tova – thank you! Dr. Hannah Lantos thank you for Sunday night dinners, for YA trilogies, listening, love, and challenging debates. Love you. To my mishpacha (family) – eema, abba, Timna, Yohai, Natan, Liron, and Alon aka the Balf Israel crew. I am proud to continue our long tradition of being over-educated and underpaid. I love you all so very much. You have already read this dissertation and told me it is good and that is what matters most. Thank you for reminding me how far I have come and for telling me I can do anything. Thank you for loving and supporting me unconditionally. To Savta Miriam, thank you for considering me a true intellectual. It takes one to know one. I wrote the dissertation I wanted to write.

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Chapter 1 – The Puzzle of Women’s Substantive Representation: Explaining the Role of Progressive Ambition in Parliamentarians’ Strategic Choices

1.1 – Introduction

1.1.1 Why Women?

Women matter. This is the premise at the heart of gender and politics literature. Scholars have long debated how to normalize the inclusion of women, and how to apply this to state institutions. The global trend of increasing numbers of women in state legislatures as well as greater attention given to this political phenomenon (IPU, UN 2014) suggest that a great deal of progress has been made. Research focusing on the entry of women into politics has been fairly successful at providing insights into the particular hurdles women face. However, scholarship considering the policy outcomes of diversifying legislatures has produced less insight into the relationship between the election of historically marginalized people and legislative impact. Consequently, a key puzzle remains. As women enter elected office in greater numbers, will we observe changes in the legislative agenda?

1.1.2 Explaining Gender-Related Legislative Outcomes

My dissertation provides a theory and supporting evidence for the type of legislator who advocates for women. Institutional marginalization best explains gender-related legislation and not individual policy preferences. When women

experience less systemic bias and greater legislative freedom they are more likely to broaden their agenda and propose bills that are not gender-related. Male legislators view their female colleagues as the sole representatives of women.

I explore the question of women's political representation by comparing the cases of Israel and Argentina. These countries are similar and different in particularly illuminating ways for the purpose of analyzing the substantive representation of women. Both countries have a proportional representation electoral system, multi-party system with platforms ranging from welfare state to neo-liberal economics, and both have highly centralized party systems. These institutional similarities provide significant justification for a comparison of the two cases. Furthermore, their differences allow for a deeper exploration of my theory. While Argentina has a long established and successful legislative quota system for women, Israel has no such policy in place. The difference between the two countries in women's percentages in the legislatures reflects this. Also, Israel's conflict with the Palestinians and the region contributes to a highly militarized and masculinized state (Balf, 2019 forthcoming).

This research explores the effect of institutional power, the ability to determine a legislative agenda without constraints, and progressive ambition, the desire to attain higher office, on strategic decision-making on the part of legislators. I use seniority, time in office, as a proxy for progressive ambition because I assume that the desire to remain in office suggests some degree of political ambition. In order to analyze the role of power in agenda setting I consider positions of authority in the legislature, like committee chair, as well as

co-sponsorship. These measures indicate whether the legislator's party and colleagues view the parliament member as a valuable political partner and entrust them with positions of greater influence. Contrary to our expectation; is seniority and advancement associated with reduced legislative outcomes that favor women's rights? That is to say that ***changes in strategic incentives over time may impact legislators' ability and willingness to pass gender-related bills.***

1.1.3 Puzzle

The prevalent assumption in Gender and Politics literature is that the proportion of women in the legislature ("descriptive" representation) (Pitkin, 1967) leads to outcomes for women's rights ("substantive" representation) (Carroll, 2001, Swers, 2002). However, the relationship between these two types of representation remains unclear (Wangnerud, 2009) and the causal mechanisms of this assumption remain under-theorized and under-tested.

In this work, I begin to disentangle the complexities of this relationship and propose a legislative behavior model theory that considers the impact of seniority and advancement to authority positions on the strategic choices of legislators and gender-related legislative outcomes. My dissertation addresses four important questions 1) Can legislatures be agents of social change? 2) Why do women and men legislators represent women's interests? 3) When will women and men legislators engage in the substantive representation of women? 4) Which women and which men legislators promote gender-related policies? These questions develop the set of expectations I test in subsequent chapters.

The broader implication of the findings presented in this dissertation is that institutionalized normalization of diversifying legislatures may have the opposite effect advocates hope for. Namely that existing incentive structures and institutional pressures causes legislators to abandon social policy. Consequently, increased integration of women and minorities presents new obstacles for large-scale social change – instead of actively reshaping political institutions minorities are coopted. The true result of inclusion is acclamation.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I establish the theoretical framework that serves as the basis for my study, I offer a new typology for women’s substantive representation, and then briefly introduce the cases of Israel and Argentina, which I will quantitatively analyze in later chapters. I conclude by describing the organization of the dissertation and providing an overview of each of the remaining chapters.

1.2 – Women’s Substantive Representation in Israel and Argentina

1.2.1 Political Pathways are Gendered

Gender and Politics literature has identified five categories of observations linking descriptive and substantive representation (Pitkin, 1967); estimated effects of greater proportions of women, constraining and enabling legislative contexts, legislators’ identities and interests, definitions of women’s issues, and policy making processes (Childs and Krook, 2009).

As the percentages of women in legislatures across the world rise, previous theories on a critical mass - women representing 30% of the legislature -

(Dahlerup, 1988), or a threshold/tipping point for “feminized change” (Childs and Krook, 2009) are being challenged. Scholars have yet to find conclusive evidence of a positive relationship between the number of women in the legislature and improved policy outcomes for women (Htun, Lacalle, Micozzi, 2013). Due to this remaining puzzle there is increased focus on the gendered nature of electoral systems and party systems. This means that research looks at the ways in which women’s experiences in political institutions differ, and how the institutional conditions generally favor men over women (Carroll and Tolleson-Rinehart, 2006). Scholars identify these institutional factors as the main obstacles to increasing female friendly policies and legislative outcomes (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). The argument in this body of work states that existing power structures, primarily male dominance within the party and the electoral systems are perpetuated by the political institutions. Other research suggests that scholars should focus not on what women do as a group instead they should consider what specific actors do. Such “critical actors” act individually or collectively to pursue gender related policies (Annesely and Gains, 2010) as they have a “disproportionate general influence in parliamentary settings” (Chaney, 2012).

My theory expands on this scholarship by suggesting that over time the incentive for men and women to represent women’s issues decreases. Women legislators are political actors and are therefore likely to exhibit some degree of self-interest (Ringe, 2005). As they gain seniority, women will broaden their legislative agenda to address policies with universal appeal and spend less time on specific constituent concerns such as women’s issues (Fenno, 1978). This

tradeoff occurs because of two parallel processes, the first is individual ambition and effort to position oneself as a candidate for advancement. The second process is explained by the role of party leaders as representative of broad policy interests rather than narrow informational experts (Shepsle and Weingast, 1987). This political 'lifecycle' assumes that women have progressive ambition and aim to attain leadership positions within their parties and the legislature. Consequently, as women enter agenda setting positions their willingness to promote women-friendly policies is less likely. Male legislators also have a political life cycle and demonstrate progressive ambition, however, they are not expected to represent women at any point because they have no incentive to do so. Thus as politicians gain seniority and authority, their willingness to act on behalf of minority groups decreases.

1.2.2 Case Selection

A comparative analysis of women's representation that produces generalizable results requires two main criteria, that the cases be representative and that they vary in the dimensions of theoretical interest (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). This work considers the relationship between women's presence and institutional power therefore these are the areas in which the cases must differ. In Israel the percentage of women is low relative to the global average (IPU) and there is no legislative quota system in place. Furthermore, the lack of women in positions of authority within the executive and the legislature in Israel (IDI, 2013) suggests that they also hold little political clout relative to their colleagues.


By contrast, Argentina has an effective gender quota system in place since 1991. Existing research suggests that women in Argentina have experienced some institutional integration, such as appointment to diverse committee portfolios (Barnes, 2014). These variations are also what make the cases of Israel and Argentina representative and generalizable. Particularly as they cover a relatively wide range of conditions examined within the women's political representation literature.

1.2.3 Israel and Argentina

Israel – the main case study

Between the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and 1995 there was either one woman in the Israeli government or none at all. For 25 years the sole woman to hold a ministry in the Israeli government would later become the Prime Minister, that woman was Golda Meir. As a result, in 46 years Israel only had five women in the government. These numbers are not surprising when considering that between its establishment and 1999 the Israeli legislature, from which the government is drawn, had 7 -12 women legislators (Israeli Democracy Institute, 2013).

Figure 1. 1 - Number of Women Knesset Members 1949-2018



Why is the Israeli case so interesting? Scholarship on women's participation in politics discusses the many impediments and obstacles both institutionally and socially that women face. In Israel the type of electoral system in place is largely conducive to a larger amount of women in the legislature, it is a proportional representation system with a single electoral district (Norris, 2006). These institutional factors tend to facilitate women's election (IDI, 2013). Additionally, Israeli social factors seem to imply that women are likely to get elected. For example Israeli women have been enfranchised since the establishment of the state, women politicians have reached the highest offices, women participated in the establishment of the state, and there is even mandatory conscription for women. Nevertheless, only in the last decade we observe an increase in the number of women in the legislature. Given these conditions we expect higher levels of women's representation. Although women's political

representation in Israel remains relatively low, the observable trends in women's representation are congruent with global developments indicating that circumstances in the Israeli case are generalizable.

There is a great deal of variation in the Israeli case. The multi-party system enables an exploration of the experiences of male and female legislators' behavior from a broad political spectrum. This is particularly interesting as Israeli political dimensions range from welfare state economic policies, such as the Meretz party, to the Likud party that has promoted a liberal economic policy and spear headed enormous transitions in the Israeli economy. Furthermore, there are differences among parties in their attitudes towards the role of religion in the state, the ongoing conflict and more. While most major parties in Israel now boast of a growing number of women on their lists, there remain a number of parties that do not allow women to run. Considering the impact of parties in a parliamentary democracy that do not have women, on the substantive representation of women, is a rare opportunity.

Argentina

In my work I will use Argentina as a comparative case to Israel. As the first country to adopt legislative gender quotas in 1991, Argentina provides evidence of the long-term impact of women holding a sizable share of the legislature. Additionally, as a closed-list proportional representation electoral system in which parties have near complete control over their electoral lists it resembles Israel in that it is a party-centered system. In such party-based legislatures there

is partisan bias as the majority party has a higher probability of bill passage. Such partisan bias increases over time because party leaders are able to set the agenda within committees, acting as gatekeepers for the bills under consideration (Cox and McCubbins, 2005). The similarities in the role of the party in moving a bill through the legislative stages allows me to explore the effect of the party on legislators' strategic decisions with and without quotas.

Interestingly, Israel and Argentina experienced similar political trends of economic neo-liberalization throughout the 1980s and 1990s bringing about an eventual decline of leftist parties, presenting a compelling argument for comparison surrounding social issues and the weakening of the welfare state (Van Dyck, 2017). A comparative analysis of Argentina and Israel also provides some evidence for the impact of conflict on gender-related legislative outcomes.

1.3 Developing a Typology of Women's Substantive Representation

Theory

Studies have shown that new parliamentarians are particularly active and propose a great deal of legislation in an effort to establish their reputation and credibility. This is also a result of their lack of parliamentary networks and inability to informally pursue legislative agendas (Shomer, 2009). Consequently, new Parliament Members (MP) rely on formal legislative procedures. This is particularly true for women MPs who face additional pressure to cement themselves as legitimate political actors (Balf, Working Paper). Due to their

marginalization within the legislature women may experience some difficulty shaping policy through competition (Barnes, 2016).

Furthermore, female legislators are often seen as token women (Krook and Piscopo, 2012; Dahlerup, 2014), both by their party and other legislators. Therefore, they are expected to promote women's issues to a greater extent than their colleagues. Some women legislators may advocate for women's issues because of their own policy preferences while others may view such narrow constituent interests as a low cost way to engage in position taking. Women's issues fit in a policy domain with little competition from male legislators, given that female legislators can easily claim expertise on the matter.

Female legislators' incentive to advocate for women in the legislature is relatively high when they have little access to legislative networks and informal legislative processes. Female parliament members may view advocating for gender policies as a useful tool when entering politics and justifying their presence in the party (Krook, Franceschet, and Piscopo, 2012). It may also be easier for them to pursue these niche issues precisely because they are expected to do so. Women's issues are perceived as separate from other policy domains causing Male parliamentarians to view women as primarily responsible for representing women. Some Male legislators have policy preferences that include women's issues. However overall Male Parliament Members will be less likely to spend valuable political capital on women's issues as they gain little from including these sectoral interests in their political agenda. Evaluations by the party and constituents are unlikely to penalize men for underrepresenting women

(Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). There is sufficient evidence in the extant literature showing that women propose a greater number of bills on women's issues than men do (IDI, 2013, Htun and Power, 2006, Kittilson, 2008, 2011, Piscopo, 2011, Schwindt-Bayer, 2010).

H1: New women MPs will propose a higher number of bills relating to women's issues than men legislators.

As women gain seniority their political behavior will change due to progressive ambition. Progressive ambition is defined by a legislator attempting to gain an office that is considered more attractive, and rationally seeking to maximize their expected utility (Rohde, 1979). Women legislators that are willing and able to bear the cost of progressive ambition and take risks within the existing opportunity structure; must believe that they can compete with male legislators as well as coordinate with gatekeepers in order to achieve the higher position.

Women face formal and informal barriers within the legislature. They have less professional networks, and are often excluded from leadership positions (Franchescet and Piscopo, 2014). Women struggle to compete for critical agenda setting positions because of their relative lack of informal networks and social capital within the institution. Additionally, as the legislature is male-dominated women must be particularly strategic in their coordination efforts to avoid a possible backlash from traditional power holders (Walsh, 2012; Hancock, 2014).

Thus they will not risk threatening existing power structures and opt to cooperate with party leaders in order to achieve higher office (Barnes, 2016).

This is supported by research that indicates that women make greater political gains when they conform to existing standards of practice within party politics (Kittilson, 2006). Career advancement requires legislators to both expand their legislative agenda and toe the party line on policy issues. Consequently, focusing on women's interests may have a damaging effect on a political career, by signaling that the legislator has a narrow constituency and is not suitable for advanced national positions within the party or the legislature.

In *The Impact of Gender Quotas*, Krook et al quote a female British Parliament Member saying; "in order to make progress in politics, ... you can't be too much one of the girls" (Krook, Franceschet, and Piscopo, 2012). Thus, over time women will want to signal their suitability for more critical agenda setting positions. In order to progress within the party they will indicate their alignment with party identity and ideology over a commitment to women's issues (Galligan and Tremblay, 2005).

H2 a): As women parliament members gain seniority the number of bills they propose relating to women's issues will decrease

H2 b): As women parliament members gain seniority the number of bills they propose that are not related to women's issues will increase

Competition among parties exacerbates this phenomenon (Thies, 2001; Martin, 2004). Women who are subject to extreme party discipline, where the power is centralized in the hands of party leaders will be less likely to pursue gender-related bills (Baumann, Debus, and Muller, 2015). They are encouraged to advocate for policies set by critical actors within the party (Jones 1994; Hinich and Munger, 1997). Major parties vying for control or a significant role in the coalition are more likely to encourage party unity. Minor opposition parties who are already marginalized within the legislature are likely to offer greater freedom to individual legislators to set their own policy agenda. Therefore, women in minor opposition parties are likely to pursue gender-related bills to a greater degree in all stages of seniority because they are denied access to the opportunity structure within the legislature both as women and as members of minor parties (Barnes, 2016, O'Brien, 2015).

As women gain seniority within the party and the number of women in parliament rises; male politicians' behavior remains the same. There is no incentive for male politicians to advocate for women's issues even as women reach Critical Mass. The increased presence of women does not shift cyclical policy preferences (Schofield, 1998) as the particular structure of the legislature remains and will continue to produce similar social choices (Riker, 1980). As a result, male legislators continue to expect their female colleagues to serve as the primary representatives of women. Since male legislators assume women maintain their policy preferences as they gain access to agenda setting positions, they will increasingly pressure women legislators to conform to the existing

policy agenda. Male legislators prefer to maintain the existing policy status quo that prioritizes 'masculine' policy areas. Generally, the incentive for male politicians to substantively represent women is low. This is because political issues relating to women are considered less prestigious or 'soft'. Also, men are unlikely to be penalized or rewarded electorally for proposing or passing gender-related bills (Dahlerup, 2014).

H3: As men legislators gain seniority the number of gender-related bills they propose will remain the same

Similarly, the relative low prestige of women's issues (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010) incentivizes women parliamentarians to promote non-gender related policies and legislation. Instead they will want to establish a legislative agenda that includes positions on prestigious or 'hard' issues such as the economy, foreign relations/diplomacy, etc. Highly dedicated and active women will continue to promote women's issues as they gain seniority (Ringe, 2005). As noted, we are likely to observe such women in minor parties or minor opposition parties, as they are aware of their institutional limitations.

Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) define policy areas as prestigious based on the relative amount of resources such as personnel and budget, as well as public attention the issue receives. Their definition ascribes prestige to valence issues; these are consensus issues that determine vote choice (Clarke et al., 2009; Sanders et al., 2011; Whiteley et al., 2013). National security

and the economy are most likely to impact voter decision making as most voters prioritize these issues at the ballot box. Highly dedicated and active women will continue to promote women's issues as they gain seniority. However, women with progressive ambition need to develop political credibility by addressing national security and economic anxiety.

H4: As women gain seniority the number of valence issue bills they propose will increase

If senior women who achieve critical agenda setting position are less inclined to pursue gender-related legislation but newer female legislators are more inclined to pursue gender-related legislation we may see an increase in gender-related legislative proposals but an overall decrease in the legislation passing. Due to progressive ambition senior female legislators will want to spend less time, energy, and political capital on women's issues. Many women enter politics with a political capital deficit relative to men. They have less financial resources available to them and limited support networks (Franchescet and Piscopo, 2014). The finite nature of political capital may be true for all politicians but is especially true for women politicians.

H5 a): Senior women in major parties are least likely to propose gender-related bills

H5 b): Senior women in minor parties are most likely to propose gender-related bills

In sum, rather than a positive relationship between the number of women in parliament and gender-related legislative outcomes, we are more likely to observe a curvilinear relationship in which we reach a point of diminishing returns on the number of women in parliament.

Typology of Women's Substantive Representation

My theory suggests that there are three significant types of cases when exploring women Parliament Members and substantive representation. Those most likely to represent women are legislators who have little access to positions of power in parliament, such as women in minor opposition parties. The second type of woman legislator is a member of a major party that aspires to be in the governing coalition or is in a minor party in the governing coalition. Such a legislator will view their agenda setting strategically and consider what policies they benefit the most from pursuing. Therefore, they might advocate for women's issues but will also want to avoid being pigeon-holed, thus maximizing their potential for advancement. The final type of woman legislator is in a major party in the governing coalition. Women legislators with access to powerful appointments and resources in the legislature are the least likely to choose to represent women. Further, they are the most likely to resemble men in their

legislative decision-making. The relationship between institutional power and the substantive representation of women is negative, as seen in table 1.1.

Table 1. 1 – Women Legislators Typology and Gender-related Outcomes

		Early Career	Mid-Career	Late Career
Governing Coalition	Major Party	- \ +	- \ -	- \ -
	Minor Party	+ \ +	+ \ -	- \ -
Opposition	Major Party	+ \ +	+ \ -	- \ -
	Minor Party	+ \ +	+ \ +	- \ +

1.4 – Testing the Relationship between Marginalization and Women’s Substantive Representation

1.4.1 – Data and Research Design

In the first stage of my research I assess the impact of seniority and gender. To do so, I will consider data from Israel and Argentina. My original dataset on Israel looks at consecutive Knesset sessions, the fourteenth through the fifteenth, in the years 1996-2003. This dataset spans seven years of legislative activity and captures a significant rise in the number of women in the Knesset. Furthermore, in this time period Israel experienced political upheaval as well as conflict and relative peace. After the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the right wing Likud party led by Benjamin Netanyahu beat out Rabin’s labor party

and his ideological partner Shimon Peres. In 1999 Ehud Barak of the Labor party was elected as prime minister with the stated goal of conducting negotiations and resolving the remaining conflict between Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the Palestinians. After the failure at Camp David in 2000 the second intifada erupted. The dataset also includes the second Lebanon war, and three wars in Gaza in its time span. Such a variety of diplomatic and security concerns provide interesting domestic and regional conditions for examining women's representation.

Institutionally, every Knesset year has two sessions, a winter session and a summer session, further adding to the available data points and variation. In the Israeli Knesset, the president assigns government formation to the party leader who receives the most recommendation from representatives of elected parties. Additionally, the government is always established using a coalition of parties, as no party has ever been able to win a majority of seats in the legislature. This is significant to my theory as the legislative and executive in Israel require high degrees of negotiation and coordination to effectively pursue policy. Considering how seniority impacts women legislators in such a highly competitive and bargain-intense legislature will enable me to fully explore the causal mechanisms at play.

The dataset of Argentinian legislators and legislation includes the years 1985-2007. Consequently it covers the time period before the passing of gender quotas and after. The Argentine National Congress is bicameral and has 24 electoral districts unlike the unicameral Israeli legislature with a single electoral district. These major differences enable me to explore the impact of institutional conditions on the behavior of legislators. A major similarity in the Argentine and

Israeli cases are the enormous variation in political parties and the importance of party blocs for coalition building.

By analyzing legislative output I will show that these institutional constraints create real electoral incentives to represent women across cases, and among individual parliament members.

This analysis looks at the behavior of individual legislators, so the unit of analysis is the individual legislator in each session. As discussed, I am primarily concerned with the impact of gender and seniority on the pursuit of women-related policies and bill passage. Thus, the dependent variable is gender-related bills. In addition, I coded for stages of legislation and created a dummy variable for bills that pass the floor and successfully become law. I use bill passage as a proxy for legislators' commitment to a particular issue or policy. Bill proposals and legislative initiatives are not a good measure for identifying issues that legislators are truly committed to, as a senior staffer of a Knesset Member said "*bill proposals are flexible things [i.e. do not necessarily represent an issue the legislator is truly committed to]*".

The Independent Variable is an interaction term of Gender and Seniority. In both cases, all the legislators to our knowledge identified as Cisgender (as opposed to transgender, gender queer, or gender nonconforming), and therefore binary gender terms are acceptable in this case. In this case, male legislators are coded as 0 and women legislators are coded as 1, seniority is coded based on the number of legislative terms the legislator served in.

I include in the model several Control Variables to account for alternative institutional explanations for legislative behavior: member of the opposition, member of the coalition, Women's committee, Minister, Deputy Minister, Conflict, member of a Major party, member of a Minor party, and party bloc. If a legislator is a member of the coalition, their bills are far more likely to pass because they belong to the bloc that controls the majority of the seats in the legislature. Members of the opposition however, are more likely to have greater legislative freedom. Consequently women in opposition parties are more likely to propose gender-related bills. I include a variable for a legislator's committee membership to account for whether or not a legislator served on the Women's Advancement Committee. Serving on the committee increases the likelihood that a legislator proposes a gender-related bill and possibly increases the likelihood the bill will pass. In Israel, Ministers and Deputy Ministers cannot propose private member bills and they are listed as government bills.

To analyze substantive representation, I use individual legislator data and session in the legislature data (multi-level data). This is necessary as the commitment and risk taking behavior of individual legislators' impact outcomes that occur at the aggregate. What I mean by that is that in order to pass a bill, legislators must coordinate with other legislators, they must negotiate within their parties – bill passage is a collective institutional level activity. However, to ensure that a multilevel random intercepts and random slopes model best explains my data I will also run a negative binomial count model.

1.4.2 - Organization

I test my hypothesis regarding the possible effect of political ambition, the desire to attain higher office, on individual parliament members' legislative agenda by conducting semi structured face-to-face interviews with legislative aides from Israel. I find that although Knesset members express clear policy preferences in support of women and minority issues, they do not view them as electorally advantageous. As a result, Knesset members who wish to advance within their party and in the national political arena expect to shift their legislative focus to policies they view as more prestigious. The interviews with parliamentary advisors largely supported my theory and hypothesis that ambitious politicians are more interested in dealing with valence issues, like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Exploring my original dataset of Israeli legislation, I find that over time women legislators in the Israeli Knesset co-sponsor less and propose more gender-related legislation. I hypothesize that if women were to advance in similar pathways to men legislators, we would observe similar patterns of co-sponsorship and legislative agenda setting. However, rather than increasing co-sponsorship with seniority and power as we expect based on men's legislative experience, women's co-sponsorship decreases significantly. Senior women Knesset members only co-sponsor more when a more junior woman proposes the bill and the legislation is gender-related. I conclude that women in the Israeli case experience bias within the legislature that effectively limits their policy activities. Consequently they experience a double bind – representing women, but primarily due to institutional constraints.

The relatively high proportion of women in the Argentine legislature across a long period of time enables me to explore how such conditions impact women's legislative behavior as their career progresses. I look at the relationship between committee referrals of bills in the Argentine legislature and my main explanatory variable of gender and seniority, I find that over time neither men nor women are likely to increase their support for women's issues. Women legislators in Argentina pursue gendered legislative pathways expanding their legislative agendas by increasing bill referrals in non-feminine committees. I identify distinct patterns among men and women, as they pursue different legislative pathways towards mobility and political advancement. This variation is explained by certain policy areas becoming increasingly male dominated with more time, causing women to focus their legislative attention elsewhere. Interestingly, women increase their legislative activities on the national budget and national security as they gain seniority, providing support for my theory on how strategic incentives and political ambition impact men and women's legislative behavior

The results from my main cases suggest that the substantive representation of women is likely to occur more frequently when women are marginalized. Although they do propose more gender-related legislation they are unable to advance it because of their institutional weakness. When women's presence in the legislature is normalized, high proportion of seats for lengthy period of time, their legislative behavior will mimic men and therefore they will be less likely to advocate for women's issues over time.

Legislative studies exploring legislative behavior view legislators as 'neutral' and fail to account for how gender impacts decision making within the institution. Ignoring the impact of the ways in which gender incentivizes political behavior creates an incomplete picture of democratic representation. As legislatures become more diverse, and historically marginalized populations enter political institutions in greater numbers we must reconsider and challenge existing assumptions.

In order to justify their focus on women, the gender and politics literature assumes that women act as anti-status quo political actors due to their gender. Given that women who enter politics represent a select elite that resembles male elites in these institutions - these assumptions seem a bit far-fetched. The most recent manifestation of such assertions is the critical actors' literature that argues that women will necessarily advocate for women when they have access to agenda setting positions. Theoretically, this relies on the notion that women will necessarily behave differently than men. This work aims to shed some light on when institutional conditions play an important role in determining whether women will choose to promote women's issues.

Chapter 2 – *If she feels hunger, she will go hunt food –*

How Israeli Parliament Members view Political

Advancement

2.1 Israel, the Knesset, and Women's Issues

"Today government ministers report to all of the committees with the exception of the committee on the status of women! Once again, the house committee chair moves forward with the agenda without voting on a change to the rules of procedure that would require the ministry of social equality to report to the committee. According to him, the committee deals with a "specific topic" and therefore there is no need for mandatory reporting. Don't say you didn't know, we the women, 51% of the population, are a "special topic"!"

-Tweet on July 2, 2018 by Knesset Member Aida Touma-Sliman of the Joint List and Chair of the Women's Status Committee.

The cited tweet from the Chair of the Women's Status Committee in the Israeli Knesset provides evidence of the perception of women's issues as less significant and "niche." Furthermore, the marginalization of women and minority issues impacts the likelihood of legislators choosing to advance related policies if they have long-term political aspirations. When institutional conditions and gendered attitudes interact with the legislative strategies and opportunities available to Knesset members, regardless of individual policy preference – how does that impact the substantive representation of women in Israel?

My interviews with fifteen Knesset parliamentary advisors and spokespeople support my theory of women's substantive representation. As discussed in the previous chapter, I consider the effect of progressive ambition, i.e. the desire to attain higher office, strategic decision-making, and institutional opportunity structures on the willingness of Knesset members to maintain a commitment to social issues. I find that although Knesset members express clear policy preferences in support of women and minority issues, they do not view them as electorally advantageous. As a result, Knesset members who wish to advance within their party and in the national political arena expect to shift their legislative focus to policies they view as more prestigious. The implication of these attitudes is that irrespective of the gender of the legislator, access to powerful positions within the legislature may result in decreased representation for women's issues.

2.1.2 – Legislative Agenda Setting in the Knesset

In the Knesset agenda setting is in part determined based on individual policy preferences, however, most of the interviewees expressed a desire to expand their legislative agenda to encompass issues with broad appeal. Furthermore, members in the opposition felt constrained in their ability to pursue policies that directly challenged the executive. This is because in the Israeli political system, the governing coalition has almost absolute control over the legislative agenda and further seeks to limit the ability of the opposition not only to legislate, but also to regulate government activities (Laver and Shepsle, 1994;

Arian, 2005). Interestingly, parliamentary advisers of Knesset members from smaller opposition parties expressed increased willingness to engage in position taking vis-à-vis the government in large part because they are not competing for moderate voters, and their constituent base is likely to reward them for such behavior.

Therefore, I hypothesize that access to positions of power and authority, i.e. becoming a critical actor, effective policy advocacy, will have a significant impact on an individual Knesset member's legislative agenda setting and by extension their degree of commitment to social issues. Knesset Members who would like to progress and reach decision-making positions within their party and the executive will shift to expand their agenda to focus on party platforms and valence issues. I find that although both men and women in the Israeli case express a desire to represent women, these attitudes are only partly explained by individual preference. Institutional conditions within the legislature effectively limit their policy activities. Consequently they experience a double bind with regard to representing women, that is to say that it is a preference in part dictated by opportunity structures within the legislature. Furthermore, the cost of setting aside women's issues once legislators have the opportunity to pursue more prestigious policies is low.

2.1.3 Really it is all about the conflict

The interviews with parliamentary advisers provided an important

contribution to my theory and hypotheses regarding ambitious politicians - by indicating that such legislators are significantly more interested in dealing with valence issues. Both men and women politicians consider working on policy related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the most important political issue facing Israel, and therefore the ultimate political goal. Interviewees considered the pathway to impact and significance as one that necessarily traversed through the coalition. The institutional weakness of the opposition in Israel relegated these legislators to dealing with issues based on the institutional opportunity structure. These constraints include avoiding overlap with other legislators, party agenda, and membership in the opposition in the legislature.

Based on the key finding in my qualitative data, as discussed above, I would expect women legislators to aspire to resemble men legislators in their agenda setting praxis. Although, women parliament members advocating for women is a well-documented phenomenon (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Dahlerup 2009; Reingold 2006; Thomas 1991) as the proportion of women legislators increases and the numbers of senior women legislators in particular increases are we going to observe even greater changes than previously reported? This chapter seeks to begin the exploration of possible explanations to the fundamental puzzle within gender and politics research regarding the relationship between descriptive representation – the number of women legislators – and substantive representation – the gender-related legislative outcomes (Wangnerud, 2009). Although women do maintain a commitment to

women's issues is this a result of existing institutional pressures and opportunity structures? As women gain greater access to more prestigious policy areas such as national security will they decrease support for social issues?

2.2 - Legislative Behavior Model –Women Legislators and Institutional Constraints

2.2.1 – Explaining Change in Legislative Agendas

Maintaining a clear policy preference for women's issues may create obstacles for professional advancement. Overtime, as legislators progress and attain higher office, their responsibility within the party and the legislature adjusts accordingly (Aleman, 2006). They shift from being informational experts on smaller pet policy areas (Krehbiel, 1991) and look to exert political capital on more prestigious issues. The informational expertise stage is best described in the following quote from a Legislative Adviser "it is very important in the sense that she is considered an authority, and someone who is deeply familiar with the topic, and can run discussions once every other week in the Knesset, and it takes over her day, she is really considered an expert on this topic relative to other Knesset members." The strategic transition in policy focus to electoral consensus issues was depicted in the following manner by a different Legislative Adviser; "but let us say that Knesset members that see themselves as, want to prepare the ground for a career in high power/senior positions they will express their positions on security issues for example. This is because they understand that Israeli voters vote based on security." Leadership positions within the party and

the legislature changes a legislator's constituency, making it larger and broader (Laver and Benoit, 2003).

Consequently, legislators' decision-making incentives change. As a result they are likely to seek to expand their legislative agenda in order to gain credibility and a reputation as a universal candidate rather than a niche politician (Young, 1990). Women legislators face particular hurdles within this process, for both wanting to expand their agenda and being accountable for a particular constituent group, that of women. This is apparent in the initial quote, while women legislators may want to advocate for women they may also feel tokenized and marginalized by the expectation to do so.

2.2.2 –From Information Expert to Party Leader

Legislative studies assume that legislators respond to incentives and institutional contexts, that is to say their behavior is not fixed and is likely to change. As parliament members gain seniority and enter leadership positions within the party they face additional pressure to advocate for the party agenda. Miller describes this as “Weber's asymmetry” referring to the relative impact of party leaders acting for their caucuses versus the expertise and informational advantage of elected officials on their given policy areas (Miller, 2005). Office advancement confers on the legislator a change in constituency and results in a change of strategic behavior and legislative decision-making (Fenno, 1973). Higher office requires addressing issues of concern for a larger number of voters, i.e. broad consensus issues.

2.2.3 – The Marginalization of Women’s Representation

Despite the growing number of women in parliaments across the globe scholars find that women’s professional political trajectories (Franchescet and Piscopo, 2014) still differ based on gender. Research has also established that women experience marginalization within the legislature due to their committee assignment (Heath et al, 2005; Towns, 2003; Thomas, 1994) due to their over representation in issue areas addressing traditional perceptions of gender roles. As previously discussed, research has indicated that contrary to our expectations, there may be a negative relationship between the number of women in parliament and the success rate of gender related bills (Htun, Lacalle, Micozzi, 2013). Additional research supporting this finding suggests that increased women’s mobilization may threaten and ultimately produce backlash from long-established power groups (Walsh, 2012; Hancock, 2014). Annesley and Gains work on the UK executive argues that a ‘gendered disposition shapes the opportunities and constraints available to feminist actors intent on altering the gender emphasis of public policy’ (Annesley and Gains, 2010).

2.3 – It takes two to make a bill go right: Rules and Parties

2.3.1 – Legislating in the Knesset

In the Israeli legislature there are three main ways to introduce legislation, private member bills (bills proposed by Knesset Members), through committee sponsorship, and government bills. Since the 1990s however, the number of private member bills has increased exponentially while the number of bills passed

through committee has decreased. These changes correspond with a weakening of the opposition that began under the Labor government in 1992. As a result, the opposition in the legislature relies primarily on formal parliamentary tools. This is further exacerbated by strong coalition discipline that enables the blocking of legislative initiatives from opposition members and the high likelihood of bill passage of government bills (Maor, 2009; Hazan and Friedberg, 2009).

Both ministers and deputy ministers cannot propose bills independently of the government. Consequently, bills initiated by the government are listed as such without particular indication of even a government ministry under whose jurisdiction it might be. Coalition members that are not cabinet ministers or deputy ministers can propose private member bills. The Israeli model of democracy is a strongly executive-dominated system (Lijphart, 1999), the goal of the cabinet is to dominate the legislative agenda and parliamentarians function as party politicians.

Private members bills undergo additional procedural hurdles that government initiated, and committee-initiated bills do not. The first is the requirement to receive approval from the speaker of the Knesset and the presidency to submit the bill to the plenum. This is primarily a ceremonial step; because at this stage the only requirement of the bill is that it cannot be explicitly racist or deny the legitimacy of the state of Israel as a state for the Jewish people. In my interviews, the issue of whether the bill requires explicit funding or budgeting was also presented as a potential roadblock for advancement.

The second procedural hurdle that is unique to private member bills is the preliminary reading. The purpose of the preliminary reading is to test whether a private member bill receives sufficient support among legislators. If the PMB passes a preliminary reading on the plenum it is then referred to the relevant committee where it will be discussed and prepared for a first reading on the plenum. Each parliamentary group or faction (party list or joint party lists) receives a quota of private member bills they can submit during each Knesset session, the faction then divides their assigned number of bills among party members. On average each legislator gets between six and eight private member bill submissions per Knesset session. The division of the quota is determined autonomously within each faction, and although usually private member bill submissions are divided equally among faction members, the party reserves the right to occasionally prioritize certain bills that better represent the party/faction agenda. Independent Knesset Members that do not belong to a faction, or that leave party lists in the middle of a Knesset session do not receive a quota for submitting PMBs. Both of these institutional rules provide a certain amount of power to the party over the individual legislator.

Government bills are prepared within the appropriate ministry with the help of expert bureaucrats and external advisors, as well as in consultation with the legal counsel office and Justice Department. Once drafted the bill is reviewed by the other cabinet ministries and various consultants. This is an opportunity for feedback and amendments before a final version of the bill is submitted for a first

reading on the plenum. As discussed, government initiated bills face less institutional constraints and this further strengthens the coalition and the executive.

Committee-initiated bills represent the smallest portion of bills presented on the plenum in the Israeli Knesset (Hazan, 2001). Committees whose jurisdiction includes institutional procedures and the legislative process are more likely to initiate bills. For example the Knesset (House) Committee deals with Knesset members immunities, rights and responsibilities, and emoluments. Other such committees include the State Control Committee, which is responsible for the state comptroller and their reporting; and the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that although the number of private member bills has ballooned since the 1990s, their likelihood of passing has decreased. As discussed, the strengthening of the executive branch, and the significance of coalition cohesion successfully blocks most opposition led legislative initiatives. In my interviews with parliamentary aides, this issue came up repeatedly.

2.3.2 – Parliamentary Factions and Agenda Setting

In the interviews, staff members discussed the important role of the parliamentary faction in guiding the legislator on policy issues and proposals. Effective legislation required strategic planning and delegation of policy areas among legislators and avoiding unnecessary overlap that “wasted” the bills

Knesset Members could propose, as articulated by Parliamentary Adviser to Knesset Member in Center Right Party “It also has to be an issue that isn’t already ‘owned’ by a large number [of Knesset members]. That also happens, that there is an issue that you are really interested in and it really is important but there are so many Knesset members that deal with it that that niche is pretty taken.”

This is an interesting point as it provides some support for the argument that as they gain seniority legislators will choose to promote their individual policy preferences. However, based on my interviews this appears to be only somewhat true. Staff members explicitly stated their desire to work on major status quo issues, foreign affairs and national security, however, institutional conditions required them to focus on relatively marginal low status social issues.

As expressed in the following quote –

“So there are two types of legislative proposals. There are legislative proposals that are on issues that are very much within the consensus, and they are usually less pompous legislative proposals. And those are all sorts of amendments to the length of service in office, and improving the rights of all sorts of communities, and I can give you all sorts of examples for this type of legislation, that are not located at the core of disagreement between left and right [political affiliation] . . . But there are other legislative proposals that are legislative proposals that it is obvious to us, certainly in the current Knesset, that their chance of passage [ranges] from close to zero to highly unlikely. Because these are legislative proposals that are very very controversial and they are at the very root of disagreement between left and right. For this reason, the perspective is the work on them is more to raise the issue within public discourse and to establish an opposition . . . and require the government to . . . respond to your legislative proposal on television and the plenum. You require Knesset members to express a position regarding this legislation they have to vote, for it, against it, abstain, they have to express some position on it.”

Parliamentary Adviser to Knesset Member in Center Right Party 2017

2.4 – Data and Methods

What is the utility of interviews and what do we stand to gain from them? Early scholarship in political science relied on informal semi-structured interviews. Such work provided scholars with insight into electoral systems, legislatures, and political behavior. As a result, scientists were able to generate testable theories. Similarly, in my work, I use the information and testimony provided to generate theory as well as anecdotal supporting evidence to my detailed quantitative data analysis.

2.4.1 – Case Study of Knesset Staff Members

I conducted a systemic examination of Knesset Members strategic long-term incentives by developing an in-depth case study of Knesset staff members. Participants were recruited via an email sent to all one hundred and twenty legislative offices in the Knesset. The response rate to the initial recruitment email was just under 20% and ultimately I was able to interview 15 of the respondents. The email detailed the researcher information and purpose of the study. They were asked to consent to a semi-structured recorded interview of 30-40 minutes regarding their experiences and opinions on the activity within the Israeli parliament.

The table below details the basic information of the participants. Unfortunately, the coalition is severely underrepresented, and opposition parties are overrepresented. Also, I was unable to recruit participants from religious parties in the Israeli Knesset despite repeated attempts. There are a number of

explanations for this, first is the effort of the Israeli left to strengthen relations with the U.S. and second the relative suspicion of religious parties to academic research. Noteworthy is the over representation of women in the sample, particularly as participants were not told that there is a significant gender component to my research. While the sample size and relative lack of variation limit the generalizable implications of this research, it is useful for providing initial insight into my theory.

Table 2. 1 - Interview Participants

Position	Party Size	Party Ideology	Sex of MK	Coalition/ Opposition
Political Adviser	Minor	Left + Palestinian	Male	Opposition
Parliamentary Adviser	Minor	Left + Palestinian	Female	Opposition
Political Adviser	Minor	Left + Palestinian	Male	Opposition
Political Adviser	Minor	Center	Male	Coalition
Spokesperson	Minor	Center	Female	Coalition
Political Adviser	Major	Right	Female	Coalition
Political Adviser	Minor	Left	Female	Opposition
Political Adviser	Independent	Center-Right	Female	Opposition
Parliamentary Adviser	Major	Center-Left	Male	Opposition
Political Adviser	Major	Center-Left	Female	Opposition
Parliamentary Adviser	Major	Center-Left	Female	Opposition
Political Adviser	Major	Center-Left	Male	Opposition
Parliamentary Adviser	Major	Center-Left	Male	Opposition
Political Adviser	Major	Center-Left	Female	Opposition
Parliamentary Adviser	Minor	Center	Female	Opposition

Based on these fifteen interviews with Knesset political advisors, spokespeople, and legislative advisors; I develop preliminary expectations for my research. After transcribing the interviews, I utilized an open-ended process of initial coding of the qualitative data and identified repetitive patterns (Saldana, 2013). In the first stage of codification (Bernard, 2006; Grbich, 2007) I specified

four main categories of influence on legislators' behavior; party, institutions, voters, and personal attributes of the representative. These categories are congruent with existing literature in comparative legislative research, further supporting my argument that despite the limitations of the data it nevertheless holds some validity. I then proceeded to search for subcategories and linkages within the data and coded for subcategories as seen in table 1.2. By applying hypothesis coding to the data (Miles et al, 2013) I consider the role of progressive ambition on legislative decision-making.

Table 2. 2 - Interview Coding

Party	Institutions	Voters	Personal attributes of Representative
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Size of parliamentary group ➤ Role within parliamentary group [party factions in legislature] ➤ Party cohesion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Coalition/opposition ➤ Rules and processes ➤ Authority ➤ Bureaucrats and technocrats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Campaigning ➤ Responsiveness to voters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Gender ➤ Race/ethnicity ➤ Legislative network ➤ Progressive Ambition ➤ Policy preferences

2.5 - Analysis

In the following section I will discuss the data gathered in the interviews and the explanations provided by Knesset member staff for their parliamentary activity. My aim is to deconstruct the relationship between institutional conditions, strategic incentives, and personal preference that result in particular

individual legislative behavior. I consider each subcategory and provide evidence pulled from the data for support.

2.5.1 - Party

The party plays a crucial role in influencing which policies are pursued in the legislature. Cox and McCubbins claim that parties delegate the power to set the legislative agenda to senior partners. These senior members hold particular agenda setting offices that determine which bills are considered on the floor and under what procedures (Cox and McCubbins, 2004). Parties have the opportunity to choose the composition of legislative committees. As a result, while new members may request committee assignments based on their policy preferences, the party prioritizes senior members requests (Baron, 2000).

Size of parliamentary group

The size of the parliamentary groups was brought up exclusively by members of minor opposition parties on the left end of the Israeli political spectrum. Among their concerns was being overwhelmed by the amount of legislative activities and their ability to respond adequately. Rather than focusing on specific legislative areas, members of minority opposition parties appeared more likely to have an expansive policy portfolio. A political adviser for a long time leftist opposition party Knesset Member described this as follows; “In small party representation it isn’t really an option to be a single dimension Knesset member. If Knesset Member A is a single dimension parliamentarian and Knesset Member B is a single dimension parliamentarian and Knesset Member C is a single dimension

parliamentarian and that is the entirety of the parliamentary group, then there are a lot of issues that do not get dealt with at all. That is why the activity within the structure of a small parliamentary group out of necessity pushes Knesset members - if they understand correctly their party responsibility - to speak broadly.”

Another political adviser explained that in small parties in the Knesset it was not possible to delegate responsibilities to other members. As minority parties, in order to advocate for preferred policies they rely on formal institutional mechanisms like committee debate and plenary activities. They have little political leverage or flexibility in the legislative arena. “Meretz is a small parliamentary group . . . so if she is a member of the Internal affairs committee that doesn’t mean she won’t show up to an education committee meeting, or a law and constitution meeting like the larger parliamentary groups do . . . MKs [of small parties] actually jump from committee to committee in order to utilize their ability to vote [cannot rely on other members to show up in their stead] . . . sometimes in the span of two hours she has to go to three different committee meetings. Which means that she needs to show up prepared with a position paper and some familiarity with the issue, to know what she is going to vote on, what she has to say about it.”

Surprisingly, a couple of opposition advisers made the argument that rather than limiting the scope of their policy activity, being a non-threatening political entity within the legislature, enabled them to take greater risk with legislative

proposals. One adviser explicitly stated that he believed his party was better able to advance major reforms on behalf of their voters because coalition parties were not concerned with his party getting support from their voter base.

The current governing coalition is made up of right wing political parties. One of these parties is Habayit Hayehudi translated as the Jewish home party. They represent the Religious Zionist movement most commonly affiliated with the West Bank settler communities. Another coalition party is Kulanu, it is led by Moshe Kahlon a former Likud party member. Their platform focuses on cost of living issues and addressing the growing income inequality in Israel. Their economic policies are the main political difference between Kulanu and the Likud. A political adviser for a small opposition party explained in their interview why as the opposition they are in a better position to effectively promote major policy reforms than the parties I just discussed - "Meretz works on the national/foreign affairs issue more than all of the larger parliamentary groups except for Habayit Hayehudi in my opinion, and maybe the Likud. Actually it almost helps you deal with other issues because every time Kahlon submits a bill to the ministerial committee, the Likud looks at the bill in the ministerial committee, they look at who will be able to take credit for it afterwards in the elections. In that sense Kahlon will not pass a bill for Yesh Atid [a large center-right party] when they are battling for votes, and the same holds true for Likud and Labor [because they are competing for constituents]. On the other hand, a bill that comes from Meretz that they [the ministerial committee] approves of they are much more open to passing it because there is no way that someone who is thinking of voting for Meretz will

vote for the Likud. Kahlon [Center-Right party] doesn't assume that there are a lot of people debating between voting for him and voting for Meretz [Leftist party]. For that reason it is much more convenient for them to cooperate with us. That is how Meretz is usually the one that manages to pass the truly large reforms . . . But usually, when they [parties] are not in direct competition with each other they manage to achieve things."

Role within parliamentary group [party factions in legislature]

Another way in which the party plays a role in determining the parliamentary agenda of members in the legislature is by forcing each member to map out and define their particular area of expertise. Party members make an effort to avoid overlap or redundant activity in one policy area. A number of parliamentary aides mentioned that they did not want to waste valuable time and energy preparing legislation in a policy field that is known to be a fellow party member's expertise. As expressed by a Political Adviser for a Palestinian Left Party Opposition Member; "Someone should really delineate and create their own path without steering away from the [party] platform, and the political plan [of the party]. In order to distinguish yourself, don't present as everyone else does, to come and work on transportation when there is someone who already focuses on that, then it isn't relevant"

The need for navigating the party apparatus successfully was mentioned repeatedly in order to both stay in office, and advance. Therefore, staff prioritized

coordination with party staff and leadership. “The party faction administrative management team in the beginning of the session always says ‘ok, you need to be prepared and ready [to submit legislation]’ . . . if there is a bill I want to propose then I submit the legislative proposals to the party faction managers/administrators and they then pass it on to the Ministerial legislative affairs committee for approval. This is why they always say in the beginning of a session would say “ok let us know which bills you intend on proposing” [because they process all legislative activities].” Participants did not discuss the party administrative apparatus as a substantive gatekeeper in matters of policy but rather as a coordination tool.

Party Cohesion

The existence of party-imposed voting and agenda setting discipline emerged time and again in the data. Establishing a legislative coalition provides collective benefits to party members (Diermeier and Vlaicu, 2011). This appeared to be particularly true for Knesset members who had a desire to advance to leadership positions within the party. However, most staff members clarified that they did not toe the party line blindly and some degree of congruency with their policy preference was necessary to garner their support (McCarty et al, 2001).

Knesset Members who were more reliant on the party and had less of an ability to utilize an independent or individual political brand appeared to be particularly beholden to the party agenda. An Adviser in a large center-left party

explained his Knesset Member's calculation regarding legislation in the following manner; "sometimes on the individual level he will say 'ok I want to create good relationships with party members" so I will try and advance legislative proposals that are relevant [to the party line] and sometimes it is more a matter of 'ok, this is an issue that I deal with, this is the agenda and it coalesces with my agenda'." Although some interviewees claimed that in parties with primaries Knesset Members had to maintain higher levels of party discipline, advisers for MKs in which the list is determined by the party leader were just as likely to say "our agenda is the agenda of the party" or that they are aware of "legislative proposals that are received as a command [from above]."

Advisers claimed that Knesset Members gain greater legislative independence when they are able to mobilize constituents and support without the party. For example, one legislative aide stated that because the Knesset Members he worked for had a great deal of support from swing voters she was less reliant on the party. In another case a political aide said "[She] is in a different situation than other legislators, she has a guaranteed spot [on the list] for the green movement . . . She doesn't exactly have a solid political home, so her politics are different on a day-to-day basis . . . She is part of the party [Zionist camp], she has factional discipline. But she is also a member of the movement, she is also a representative of the green movement."

Another impediment for party discipline is issue salience. In an interview with a political adviser for a major coalition party and relatively new Knesset

member she described how the MK differed from other members of the party in her proposal on the most contested political issue in Israel – a future Palestinian state. In the available quote, the interviewee discusses the lack of a cohesive party position and the resulting schism within the party. “In the Likud parliamentary group there are thirty different MKs and they have thirty different opinions, really! And that is also what characterizes the party ... A good example for that is the Jerusalem plan . . . according to MK Berko’s approach we need to separate from them [Palestinians]. We are already two entities that are in the same territory, and in practice in Gaza there already is a country in every way, with a military [Hamas] and with clear borders . . . And she says, ok there is a people here with a desire for self realization and there is no reason that they shouldn’t have their own place and it will be called a state but it will be a sort of state [as in there will be aspects of reduced statehood] because she talks about them not having an army, but with the ability to police [their population]. The Israeli army would still determine the rules and defend the borders. But if you ask Micky Zohar [Likud MK], it is against Begin [founder of the Likud party] and how can you be a Likud member and be anti-Begin . . . And he has is own proposal that there should be these cantons of society and irrigation and Ramallah. And he is from the same party. And the prime minister has his own [proposal] . . . Coalition does not necessarily mean cooperation and doesn’t necessarily mean one way, on the contrary it is a lot [of varying opinions].”

2.5.2 - Institutions

Coalition/ Opposition

Political Scientists have long shown a keen interest in the role of the government in policy making (Gamm and Huber, 2002). This emphasis makes sense given the dominance of the executive, especially in the introduction of legislation (Andeweg and Nijzink, 1995). Staff of Knesset members belonging to parties who might conceivably be in the coalition expressed a desire to advance policy in areas of national security and foreign affairs. However, these issues were understood as the exclusive purview of the executive. Consequently, members of opposition parties who perceived themselves as potential alternatives to the governing coalition felt excluded from prestigious policy areas, or legislation dealing with core electoral concerns.

These quotes support my claim that in the policy hierarchy in Israel, national security and foreign affairs represent the apex of political power and prestige. However, parliamentary aides for opposition Knesset members had no ability to influence such policy. One interviewee said “Anything relating to the area of foreign affairs and national security you obviously cannot advance because as long as we are in the opposition and we are left-wing we don’t have any chance ... As an aside, we had one legislative proposal that dealt with a security issue, and it was obvious to us that it was a declarative private member bill and it doesn’t stand a chance . . . If we are looking at legislative proposals, he has no ability to advance his agenda on foreign affairs and national security, he makes his position known in committee [debates], it is there he can provide his opinion and there he

can try and have an influence . . . And then really it causes you to work on legislation that deals with all sorts of social issues or softer issues.”

Another Political Adviser for a center left opposition Knesset member illustrated the dynamics at play in the following manner; “When you are in the opposition it is like you are standing outside in front of a display window, like children looking at the window display and just see all the best merchandise from the outside. You cannot really have an impact, there is always this sentiment in the public “why doesn’t the opposition do more?” the opposition by definition can only talk, mostly. It [opposition] can delay government actions, can make it more difficult, but at the end of the day the government controls Israel and the opposition if it has a bill the most it can do is get public attention for that legislation, but you cannot pass it. But we are in the business of politics to change reality so obviously we want to be in the government.”

Even members of the governing coalition viewed national security as solely under the jurisdiction of the executive. A spokesperson for a center party coalition Knesset member said “Obviously in the Israeli Knesset the core problem is the problem of borders, divisions, schisms, and many national affairs problems. Bibi [Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] doesn’t deal with the disabled, and the poor and so forth, at the moment he is dealing with whether Iran will attack or not, ok? That is Bibi. Now the parties, we do deal with those [social issues].”

There was slight variation among parliamentary aides in the opposition. Some advisers for smaller parties, particularly parties who were unlikely to be in

the governing coalition, tended to measure legislative effectiveness as the ability to advocate for any given policy. Whereas larger parties, that had aspirations to be in the governing coalition, viewed legislative effectiveness as the ability to dictate policy, and specifically determine national security policy.

A Political Adviser for a Left Palestinian party Knesset member provided the perspective of small opposition parties when he said “Being effective and being in the coalition are not necessarily correlated. There are a lot of MKs that are in the coalition and they are very ineffective, and really unable to advance their world view in the Knesset despite the entire parliamentary tool kit being available to them. . The way to do it is through cooperation you cannot pass a legislative proposal without having some sort of breadth to it. Breadth in two senses, the first being parliamentary, that is to create partnerships among MKs from different parliamentary groups, both from the coalition and the opposition. So that there are many allies and interested parties that the bill will pass and so that you can present it not as a legislative proposal that is oppositional and its sole purpose is to disrupt the coalition but rather something that elicits wide approval. And the second aspect of creating breadth to a legislative proposal is creating breadth outside of the Knesset. It is hard to imagine a legislative proposal from the opposition that passes without public pressure. The coalition members after all are attentive to the public barometer. They have coalition discipline that binds them but they do hear what people write on their Facebook wall, they hear from their advisors what people email them [the advisors regarding this topic], they hear what phone calls the office received, and they appear in party branches, and

town halls, and appear in public panels and hear the voices from the audience, or they read the newspaper and the comments. And the public discourse does seep...”

Rules and Processes

The legislative process is notoriously arduous and complex. A great deal of scholarly attention has been given to the institutional parameters for policy-making and legislative behavior (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992) as well as the combination of competition and coordination among legislators. However a complicating factor is the sheer amount of technical and procedural knowledge needed in order to effectively advance policy. Political advisors were particularly likely to express frustration at what appeared to be a simultaneously bureaucratic system and a fairly erratic process. As one political adviser commented, the main determinant for successful policy making was luck. The learning curve for gaining procedural and institutional knowledge as well as familiarity with the various personalities in the legislature is very steep.

An interesting example of the need for institutional knowledge was a political adviser to a Knesset member who left their party in the middle of the session but maintained their seat in the legislature. Both the adviser and the MK herself had to navigate completely unfamiliar procedures as a result of this political move. Initially it was unclear to them how the independent Knesset member would be able to propose legislation without party administered quotas for bill proposals. She described the situation in this quote “All of these rules of

what is allowed/permitted and what isn't in the Knesset is all written down in the Knesset protocols. The problem is that it is a very dry text, in legalese. Even if you are able to understand what the text means it is difficult to then apply those rules to real life political situations in the Knesset. It isn't like there is a section that says; "if a Knesset member quits their party, they don't have quotas [for legislative proposals], but the way to deal with this is with special days and then you can..." It isn't written down like that, you have to figure it out. There are advisers that know how, and there are advisers that don't. It is mostly a matter of experience." Tuesdays are dedicated to particular issues and often involve some press and public invitations for relevant interests groups. In our interview the adviser mentioned the example of a day for the visually impaired. In order to submit legislation they had to propose it on a Tuesday during a special session and the bill had to be relevant to the subject matter.

Another notable comment was a parliamentary advisor expressing a desire to have a manual that included the names and phone numbers of relevant actors and offices. "The orientation I got was very technical, like how you pass a bill, and not political. No one taught me with whom I should speak in the various offices in order to pass certain bills. I wasn't told that you should ALWAYS talk to the ministry of finance office and get their position. No one told me that there are [internal] politics and you should talk to this person and not that person. These are things that I had to figure out on my own . . . She is a freshman Knesset member and she had a legislative aide in the previous Knesset that was part of the coalition so things were much simpler for Yesh Atid. They had 20 seats and a legal counsel.

That is what I would have taught myself in the beginning, how to pass a bill including phone numbers and emails of all the relevant people.”

Authority

Seniority is important not only because senior parliament members have greater power to request their preferred committees and dictate their own areas of parliamentary focus, they are also more likely to be assigned chairmanship of committees. Institutional positions of authority like Committee Chair; enable legislators to regulate the government, ensure policy implementation, and provide them with subpoena power. In addition, having existing working relationships with government bureaucrats is also helpful for advancing policy. Those parliament members and staffers that are better able to foster such relationships are also more likely to be successful in advocating for their parliamentary agenda. This institutional knowledge plays out in a variety of ways; familiarity with the obscure rules within the legislature, that allows staff to bypass or exploit existing rules, good working relationships with staff in various ministries increasing the likelihood of cooperation, as well as political credibility and ability to exert pressure.

The advantage of being a senior politician that wields a great deal of political power was depicted by a Parliamentary Adviser to a Knesset member who had previously been the leader of their party, Minister of Defense, and a candidate for prime minister. The adviser said of his boss “First of all when he

walks into the Knesset, into a committee, he [his position] has additional gravitas (additional weight) relative to other Knesset members, especially those that are in their first Knesset . . . when he goes into committee people listen to him more, he has a lot of experience, even if he wasn't in the debate from the very beginning, he knows how to contribute a lot from his experience, obviously even with the media. I have colleagues that work with Knesset members that are less known to the public, less senior, less familiar and they don't have a place the way he does, morning edition [yoman haboker] on reshet bet [major radio] forums ... certain media sources that he has more access to [prestigious with larger audiences]"

A Political Adviser to a Knesset Member who at the time was opposition chair viewed political clout with greater apprehension. She said "there are advantages and disadvantages to being the faction coordinator and opposition chair. The advantage is the power that comes with it and all of the media attention because you have a major position in the legislature so more people want to hear from you, but the disadvantage is on the personal level . . . you cannot leave until the Knesset closes, we usually close the room after the guards turn off the lights. Also leadership can come at a cost with other legislators. As a leader you can place yourself as a permanent member in your preferred committee, but the question is what you give others in return, do you give something in return for calling the shots . . . As the chair of the opposition she negotiates the disbursement of membership in committees vis-a`-vis the coalition."

Committee chairmanship came up repeatedly in the interviews as a significant institutional tool for advancing policy. Subpoena power of committee chairmanship and oversight of the executive were seen by participants as the most important political mechanisms available to them when holding such positions. As stated by a Political Adviser to a Left Opposition party Knesset member “The drug abuse committee is relatively small in comparison with the internal affairs committee and there are less topics on her table but it is still significant and it [the committee and chairmanship] creates a lot of work [for the staff and MK], a lot of things you can advance, it holds a certain degree of power, and you can place issues on the public agenda, and summon government ministries to you, and work with the health maintenance organizations . . . So when you are a Knesset member all you can do is approach the Minister of health about it, or speak to the Knesset legal counsel but you don’t really have any enforcement ability. Now [as a subcommittee chair] you can summon representatives from the HMOs to the committee in the Knesset, or summon the relevant government representatives, so now we have the tools to do things”

While certain institutional positions grant Knesset Members significant leverage and formal means for pursuing legislative goals, informal networks and relationships were also seen as highly significant. A Political Adviser for an independent Knesset member mentioned that “I can’t speak for MKs but for parliamentary advisers, the seniority thing is an issue, it is a THING. If the offices in the Knesset know you, it is much easier for you to promote policies and people are more helpful, and go easier on you. However if you are new, in my opinion it

is much more difficult. I personally have gone through some difficult things, and if you don't know anyone, they don't feel like they owe you much."

Bureaucrats and Technocrats

As Huber and McCarty argue there is a tension between the rational bureaucratic expertise and the desire of political actors to achieve their legislative goals (Huber and McCarty, 2004). The dynamic between the bureaucrats in various ministries and Knesset members described in the interviews seemed fairly antagonistic. Although some staff members discussed cooperation and collaboration with professional technocrats, many described bureaucrats as a main impediment to achieving their policy goals.

For most of the interview participants legislative committees were useful legislative mechanisms only if the Knesset member held the position of chair. Otherwise, many viewed committee meetings and debates as platforms to gain media attention due to contentious and provocative grandstanding. Many of my interviewees prioritized working with career bureaucrats over preparing for committee meetings. A Political adviser in the opposition explained "committees are just for discussions, it's the clerks [professional bureaucrats] that make decisions. If there isn't someone powerful that others fear and can get others to take action, there is no real power behind these committees other than public discourse . . . the professionals in the various ministries, the career bureaucrats, they are important factors in changing policy in the country, that and the coalition.

When it deteriorates, it is the coalition that can push. The opposition has very little power, and is getting even weaker with the right wing's "advanced democracy" [sarcastic tone]."

Another Adviser attributed legislative success to promoting their bill among ministry employees rather than among other Knesset members. They said "you would mostly need the professional bureaucrats which are mostly in the relevant ministries. For example, a recent bill regarding transportation required incessant lobbying with the transportation ministry and social security. Once we got them we were able to get government/executive support."

2.5.3 - Voters

Campaigning

In Israel there is a great deal of variation among parties in the selection process of candidate lists (Shomer, 2009). Previously, the major parties such as Labor and Likud had an internal committee that determined the makeup and order of the list. However, in the 1990s a number of parties instituted a primary system (Rahat and Hazan, 2007). Importantly, this was not implemented universally and to this day the party leader enjoys complete control over the list in approximately a third of the parties in the Knesset. The differences between legislators who are members of parties with primaries and those without produced divergent approaches to campaigning and reelection. For example, staffers of Knesset members confronting party primaries listed public events and

town halls as a regular part of their weekly schedule. Only 6% of eligible voters in Israel are registered party members exacerbating political polarization in Israel (IDI, 2014). Knesset member staffers in parties without primaries expressed a desire to appeal to swing voters, whereas in parties with primaries there was a clear effort to appeal to their core voter base.

The single exception to this approach was the parliamentary adviser to a Knesset member who successfully brought new voters to her party and enjoys a public profile due to a successful past as an activist. She was a leader of the 2011 tent protests when thousands of Israelis camped out in tents in downtown Tel Aviv on Rothschild Boulevard to oppose the high cost of living in Israel, lack of affordable housing, and growing income inequality. He felt that she was able to attract swing votes, and was therefore less reliant on the party base. The parliamentary adviser explained that “she is known for not dealing that much with the inner-party [members of the central party committee or party membership] issues we can call it . . . She isn’t concerned with going to bar-mitzvahs in order to get the support of party activists who object to a bill she is trying to promote. That does not impact her that much, but she is an exception in that sense . . . she basically says to herself “the larger public opinion in the party” what you may call the “free votes/independent voters/ swing voters” in the party, they support me. These are voters who are less mobilized by the party institution itself or by party-affiliated institutions like the histadrut [the major national labor union] . . . these are the organized votes. She is less reliant on these [voter] resources and therefore she has less incentive to [appeal to them].”

A spokesperson for a Knesset member in the governing coalition discussed her approach to getting the candidate reelected. Because in this particular party the list is determined by the party leader signaling your value to the party is less straightforward. The aide claimed that their reelection strategy relied on attracting key demographics and proving that the Knesset member was invaluable to their party's electoral success - "we do try and recruit activists. We do try and present her to the world. You can introduce her to the single mothers because they are part of her agenda, young people who are not supported by their families, because you know that tomorrow these young people will become voters . . . It is enough for me to have twenty five party branch leaders from different cities that proclaim that she [the MK] has to be on the list or they will not support the party."

Responsiveness to Voters

Although Israel has one of the smallest parliaments per capita, advisors placed a high premium on addressing constituent requests. In many of the interviews, staffers discussed pursuing policies that were first introduced to them by public complaints that were referred to the office. In most cases, the Knesset member was either a member of a lobby or committee that directly addressed the topic of concern, however this was not always true. Women and minority Knesset members were more likely to receive referrals pertaining to those populations. The prioritization of constituent concerns and direct deliberation with voters is explained by the preferences of a given Knesset member.

In recounting her staff's approach to voter requests a political adviser for the opposition chair said "we take a lot of legislation from referrals. For example, the issue of raising the age of retirement for women, we got involved because of the amount of public requests we received from constituents. This isn't necessarily a feminist issue, we just received so many women reaching out to us saying in two months we have to retire and within six months we won't have any money coming in, not from social security, or from our pension, what do we do? We realized that there is a gap, on the one hand we warned them [the Knesset] but on the other hand it became massive because of the women." In this quote she is describing a policy that received a lot of public attention in Israel, the issue of raising the age of retirement for women. Advocates and women's organizations were unable to reach a consensus on whether this legislation would ultimately harm or benefit women.

Another political adviser described how voter requests and public referrals helped their office identify systemic issues that require the Knesset member's attention. In this case the Knesset member had been in office for a long time and is known for being a very progressive legislator. His aide said that they regularly have around a dozen unpaid volunteers and interns helping out in their office and they are the ones that process communications with voters. "Legislative proposals emerge from our interns and volunteers that tell us for example; "I received twenty requests for the same problem" and then we understand that this is not a private problem of a particular person but rather it is likely a systemic problem and then the volunteer or the intern along with the Knesset's legislative

bureau drafts a legislative proposal to provide a wider response to this problem that we realize is not a personal problem.”

2.5.4 – Personal Attributes of Representative

Gender

As mentioned in the presentation of my data, I have an over representation of women Knesset member staffers. The percentage of women in the 20th Knesset was 27%. While gender is not a synonym for woman, the only staff members to address the sex of the Knesset member were those working for women. A plausible explanation for this is the common perception that a legislator who is a man represents the neutral legislator. Women Knesset members are still regarded as the exception and therefore their staffers automatically provide a gendered analysis of their activities and experiences. Those working for women Knesset members discussed gender in terms of motherhood and the ability to work on national security. It is illuminating that these are the two arenas in which their boss’s gender is most palpable.

Parliamentary aides explained that the personal experiences of Knesset members impacted their legislative agenda. For women Knesset members a significant experience that emerged repeatedly in the data was motherhood. On political adviser explained the Knesset member’s interest in education policy as follows; “she has a young daughter in the education system. This issue [of education] is very difficult to deal with because it is very difficult to legislate on.”

A spokesperson stated that motherhood was an important part of the Knesset

member's brand and served as an informational shortcut for some of the policy areas she is concerned with. "Now her angle is very much the single mothers issue, because she is actually a single mother, a single mother who is co-parenting, so in the same vein there is also the issue of alimony [etc]."

Parliamentary aides for women Knesset members viewed legislative activity on national security as both politically valuable but also complicated. As a result, they sought to frame their efforts in the national policy arena as woman friendly and legitimate. "Look, when it comes to foreign affairs and security she wasn't a general so there isn't anything you can do but it is very important to her not to forfeit that arena to men, she doesn't want to forfeit it to generals who came from the army. [It should not be the case] that the debate [on national security] isn't the purview of the public, and it is only a military discourse. That is first of all. Second of all she approaches it not from a place of [military] strategy but from a human resources perspective. Like conscription of the Haredi population, and women's conscription, and lone soldiers [soldiers whose families are not residing in Israel either temporarily or permanently]. She leads on the issue of lone soldiers. Also, she had a campaign for women soldier-teachers. She proposed a bill to prevent the cancellation of that track. So she focuses more on the army and society [the interaction of the two, and less on national security policy] less on army generals. The third thing we focus on is foreign affairs, she leads heads the parliamentary delegation to the European council, she attends conferences, and meets many international leaders, so that is also part of her work, is foreign affairs and diplomacy for the state of Israel." While the parliamentary adviser

acknowledged the monopoly of military figures on national security in Israel, they tried to participate in the debate by discussing the army as a public company with human resources issues. Furthermore, the Knesset member's focus on diplomacy and staffing in the military is in line with existing research on women defense ministers (Barnes and O'Brien, 2017).

Regardless of the constraints of a masculinized security debate (Balf, 2019) parliamentary staff of women Knesset members identified national security policy as a stepping-stone for political advancement. This is evident in the following quote from a Parliamentary Adviser of a center left opposition Knesset member "but let us say that Knesset members that want to prepare the ground for a career in senior positions they will express their positions on security issues for example. This is because they understand that Israeli voters vote based on security and a Knesset member [female conjugation], woman, young [junior, freshman] always comes from a very difficult place because it is much easier to be a white man in his fifties, a lieutenant colonel on reserve. It is harder to be a woman in this world. But yes, these are the things that you need to express a position on if you want to prepare [for higher office]."

Race/ Ethnicity

About twenty percent of the Israeli population is not Jewish and the vast majority of these citizens are Palestinians (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018). Furthermore, the second largest political faction in the opposition is the Joint List,

which includes Palestinian nationalists, the communist party, and Islamists. Parliamentary advisers to Palestinian Knesset members described a number of distinctive components to their experiences as minorities in the legislature. Palestinian Knesset members expressed a desire to address issues confronting their communities “we also accounted for the regional background, he is from the Negev, from a historically marginalized community [Bedouin] . . . so we also considered social and local characteristics in everything.” Although most parliamentary staff for Palestinian MKs also mentioned a need to frame legislation as broadly as possible in order to garner the support of Jewish-Israeli legislators.

The Druze community is an ethnic and religious minority within the Arabs in Israel and account for less than 2% of the population of Israel. There are approximately one hundred and thirty thousand Druze in Israel proper, mostly located in the North. Politically they are seen as distinct from Palestinians for a variety of reasons however a major cause for this difference is that Druze men serve in the military. Nevertheless as a non-Jewish minority in Israel they experience discrimination similar to Palestinian citizens (Nisan, 2010). A major issue of contention for the Druze community is the difficulty in obtaining building permits and legally expanding their villages. A political adviser discussed how the Knesset member he worked for tried to represent his community on these issues - “obviously [He] is a Druze so we also consider the Druze population in a lot of our activities. For example, with regard to building permits and registration, he lead that whole thing as the representative of the finance minister on that topic.”

There are only two Palestinian women Knesset members. Knesset member Hanin Zoabi is the first Palestinian woman elected to the Knesset from a Palestinian party list. Although there have been a few previous Palestinian women, all of them were members of Jewish parties, namely Meretz and the Labor party. MK Zoabi has experienced a great deal of scrutiny due to her outspokenness and activism. Most notable is her participation in the infamous flotilla incident. Her political adviser described navigating a hostile environment in the Knesset creating additional obstacles for advancing her policies. "For example, Hanin has a private member bill that requires inspection of children's playgrounds for things like swing-sets and playground slides . . . This is something that seemed to appeal to all the women parliamentary aides, and they all said it was a very important bill ... but then they said that the woman Knesset member doesn't want to sign on to something that Hanin is signed on to, and definitely not if Hanin is the main author of the bill. So sometimes it is very hard, it is really frustrating"

Legislative network

Considering coordination and negotiation among legislators further helps us understand legislative behavior. Legislators compete to achieve their goals, however, they must also engage in bargaining and compromise in order to influence the policy-making process as legislative outcomes reflect preferences at the aggregate. A core assumption in this literature is that legislators compete for scarce resources (Mayhew, 1997). Furthermore, they coordinate strategically in

order to achieve their goals more effectively (Cox, 1997). Consequently legislative behavior can in part be explained by competition among legislators.

Both staffers for opposition and coalition members discussed the importance of a legislative network for advancing their legislative agenda. Coalition members focused on their desire to signal a broad mandate for their policy proposal. However, opposition members viewed legislative networks as tools for circumventing or overcoming coalition control; “the more members you have from the coalition [signed on to the bill] they can assist with convincing the relevant minister.” For most staffers, familiarity with key actors and the ability to recruit committed co-sponsors was the primary vehicle for achieving their goals.

Variation in size and affectivity of legislative networks was best explained by the individual Knesset member’s ability to establish relationships and partnerships with other Knesset members “we map out who are the interested parties and who are useful partners [he] usually approaches them personally stops them on the plenum during session ... If a Knesset member understands the job correctly he should take the opportunity to stop people in the halls and reach deals.”

Another important factor was seniority. Senior Knesset members with existing legislative records and reputations had an easier time gaining support for their work, and were more likely to be sought after for cooperation. In an interview with an aide of a Knesset member considered a rising star in her party, he depicted the change in attitude from other legislators as such “when she first

came [to the Knesset], new Knesset members did not approach her because they viewed her as a competitor [uses both genders] so they approached other veteran Knesset members. Once she gained seniority, a lot more people approached us to support their bills ... as she became a more interesting public persona in Israel, so more people wanted her to sign on to their bill." A Political adviser with a long track record as a field activist for the party explained that his existing connections as well as the returning Knesset member he worked for made legislation easier; "[He] was here before so he knows some of the MKs and I also [know people] because I was a political activist . . . The longer you are somewhere there are always opportunities to meet people, and the more people you meet it helps cooperation because you know that this MK has similar interests and you can work together. Obviously the personal relationship is very important."

Progressive Ambition

Progressive ambition is defined by a legislator attempting to gain an office that is considered more attractive, and rationally seeking to maximize their expected utility (Rohde, 1979). This sentiment was best articulated by a spokesperson I interviewed when she said "if she tells me now 'I want to go on a media blitz and do an article in *la-isha* [a woman's magazine] and I will put my agenda in it [in the write up] in order to move up the ladder' I will absolutely get that for her . . . If she said, 'ok, I am putting the girl with a nanny and we are plowing through the

country [campaigning]' . . . All of it depends on her decisions. ***The moment that she feels it, if she feels hunger, she will go hunt food.*** And if not, then she won't."

All interview participants were asked about their long-term legislative agendas and aspirations for advancement. Both men and women Knesset members articulated the relationship between addressing national security and higher office in Israel. Women Knesset members' staff expressed greater concern regarding the potential for gender bias and the need for a strategic approach in order to overcome preference for male leadership in Israel. Additionally, staff members clarified that advancement within the party ranks required greater adherence to the party policy agenda.

Politicians in Israel understand that national leadership demands a clear position on core electoral concerns, namely the conflict. In fact, the economy was not mentioned as a policy expertise necessary for advancement. Parliamentary staff viewed national security policy statements as a strategic choice that needed to be well thought out and well timed. Exemplifying this dilemma was a Political adviser for Knesset member seen as part of the young leadership in her party "At the end of the day maybe very slowly it will be appropriate to change the direction of the work so that there is more, like a little, increased attention on legislation at the expense of the supervising activities . . . and maybe also in terms of her areas of focus, her agenda in order to get to other places . . . Also to attract new constituent audiences within the party, which is entirely a long-term vision . . . Also, how shall we say this, maybe express positions on various issues. When she

has ambitions to move ahead she will express them or not. I would give an example but it is obvious...”

Party leadership however necessitates toeing the party line and promoting the party apparatus. Thus advancement within the party means relinquishing some degree of policy independence and entrepreneurship. As was explicitly stated by a Political adviser for a Knesset member who at the time was rising up the party ranks “[She] sees herself as part of the future leadership of Meretz, and part of the future senior leadership of Meretz. She doesn’t want to be the party chair, at the moment she is not running to be [party leader], that might change in the future. Essentially [She] has gone through a bit of a process from a Knesset member that dealt with smaller social issues when she began ... to things that are in themselves Meretz issues, in the Knesset she will deal with issues that she assumes and thinks that Meretz will deal with.”

Policy Preferences

In the data I find a great deal of support for the argument that personal policy preferences inform Knesset members legislative agenda. Individual beliefs, experience, knowledge, and expertise are crucial components of a given legislator’s thought process on their policy positions. Also, I find that these policy preferences remain stable over time regardless of whether the Knesset member actively pursues them. Staff members made clear that even though legislators’

expressed some flexibility on policy preference, a degree of congruity with their ideal point was necessary for backing a legislative proposal.

2.6 – The Strategy of Creating a Legislative Agenda

2.6.1 – Personal Preferences or Institutional Constraints?

In my interviews I did not find that politicians were uninterested in gender issues or a variety of social issues. On the contrary, many staff members explained in great detail the effort that their bosses went to address social inequalities by focusing on access to resources, education, environmental justice, consumer protections, government transparency, and more. Like in the case of a Palestinian and leftist party Knesset member “he deals with a wide range of issues, feminist issues, lgbtq issues, workers’ rights, equality for the Arab population, property rights, and human rights.”

Even women parliamentary aides working for women Knesset members viewed gender issues as having little long-term strategic value. The general approach to gender-related legislation is illustrated in this quote from a Parliamentary adviser; “it doesn’t create visibility, there is nothing you can do, it doesn’t produce headlines like the Jerusalem law or even consumer issues or housing reforms and so on. This is relatively an issue that doesn’t speak to most of the public in Israel. And also, it isn’t an issue that . . . at the end of the day very few women vote for a party based on their activities in support of women, elections are determined by security issues, economic issues, not because of gender equality.”

However, most of my interviewees worked for Knesset members in the opposition. They described being effectively limited in the policy areas they could even attempt to legislate on. “Big ticket” legislation is always difficult but is also almost exclusively handled by the government. Meaning that politicians who would like to affect change must seek to enter the coalition and the government. Thus the staffers admitted that social policy legislation was at least in part a result of marginalization within the legislature. In this sense the major puzzle of my work emerges, gender issue policy is the result of legislative marginalization and not legislative empowerment.

Another paradox that emerged is the awareness that focusing on social inequalities plays well in the media and in the public but does not map out a road to power or provide political longevity. The spokesperson I interviewed considered national security as far too divisive and unlikely to get her Knesset member positive media attention. She said that “[she] is very well liked because she deals with issues like single mothers, students, and young people . . . The moment that someone comes in with an agenda like that, it is nicer. When you come in with a right wing national agenda you end up being very niche, you are seen as only helping the settlers, or the opposite occurs, you are perceived as only helping Arabs. You understand? To be nationalist is to be edgy, more at the extreme, being social is more mainstream.” In this case the politician being discussed is fairly new and not currently competing for party leadership. Ultimately, politicians who want to be leaders in their party and in the legislature

must develop credentials on valence issues. This is because national security best explains vote choice in Israel (Shamir and Arian, 1994).

There was widespread agreement regarding the role of the identity of the Knesset Member in impacting policy agendas. A senior advisor for a Bedouin Knesset Member described working on identifying and addressing the main hurdles affecting that community, such as lack of access to education, water, and electricity in unrecognized Bedouin villages. But he also said that they spent time trying to frame these issues with broad appeal in order to build wide support within the legislature. Being niche means a smaller likelihood of legislative success. A spokesperson for a woman Knesset Member in a center-right party described how becoming a mother impacted her boss's legislative agenda. Another advisor for a Druze Knesset Member for a center-right party mentioned the importance of the Druze community to their activities in the Knesset and policy preferences.

Committees also play a role in developing or shifting a Knesset Member's legislative activities. The party or the joint list office divvies up committee assignments. Senior members have greater ability to choose their preferred assignments while freshman members must often negotiate over the remaining assignments. This of course varies slightly by party size; freshman members in smaller parties can exert greater influence over assignments but are largely marginalized due to their parties' overall marginalization within the legislature.

Due to the enormous amount of work required in preparing for committee debates, discussion, and legislation they serve as a crucial educational experience where legislators gain expertise and try out policies. Thus committees act as gatekeepers but also as informational testing ground. Committee assignments can have long-term influence on legislators. The senior advisor for a very senior Knesset Member in the labor party said that his boss requested to be on the women and gender equality committee because he was a member when the committee was first established and this caused him to develop a lifelong commitment to these issues. Others described how being assigned to certain committees caused the Knesset member to develop an interest and a passion for the policy area of that committee. Fundamentally, gaining crucial knowledge in one area is hard fought political capital that Knesset Members are reluctant to lose or render useless. The time and effort spent working on the committee should not go to waste.

Being a Committee Chair also has enormous power although major committees are reserved for senior members of the coalition. However, even being a chair of a small and non-permanent committee comes with benefits such as the ability to subpoena documents and individuals, invite government ministry representatives, and work directly with state bureaucracy.

There was some disagreement surrounding less formal platforms within the Knesset. The impact of participation in parliamentary lobbies was not clear. For many of the legislative advisors the lobbies' lack of statutory authority

rendered them useless. Whereas spokespeople and political strategist were a bit more generous in their descriptions of the ability to build coalitions with Knesset members you have a common area of interest. A political strategist for a first term Knesset Member from the Likud party considered lobbies a useful legislative tool for gaining support for policy objectives. Also, she believed lobbies provided leadership opportunities for the Knesset Member she worked for. Although she belongs to the governing party, due to her lack of seniority and relative marginalization, it appears she viewed lobby activities as an alternative route to articulating her policy positions and building a political reputation.

This coalition Knesset member is a former brigadier general with an impressive academic and military background. Despite this, she chose to forego her initial more security/foreign policy committees, and focus on more social committees. Notable, was her choice to use lobbies to introduce her approach to foreign policy and security issues. For example, she views herself as a leading activist within the Israeli legislature on the issue of Boycott Divestment and Sanctions, and what she and many others perceive to be the increasingly hostile and anti-Israel global atmosphere.

Differences among staff members also depended on their seniority within the Knesset, within politics generally, or their personal professional experience. As in many legislatures, parliamentary staff positions are often short-term with high rates of turnover. It is work for the relatively young. All interviewees were between late twenties and mid-thirties.

2.6.2 – Concluding Remarks

The major aim of this work is to examine the strategic thinking that guides Israeli Knesset members' legislative behavior. How do individual Knesset members advocate for policies and map out long-term goals. By exploring this process with their staff rather than directly with the Knesset members themselves, it was my intention to diminish the level of bias in self-reporting. The questions focused on technical knowledge and practice within their offices rather than a normative debate of their policy positions. Respondents detailed their approach to legislative advocacy, policy-making, and discussed common obstacles in their work. Although, there was some order to the questions the conversational style of the interview and its semi-structured quality meant that I often did not follow the original interview instrument. I deliberately prioritized conversational flow and depth of response.

In my interviews with parliamentary aides a number of issues were mentioned repeatedly, primarily the effect of being in the opposition. In the Israeli legislature, a government bill is very likely to pass due to the majority coalition. Increased polarization contributes to a decrease in cooperation across the aisle. Most aides of opposition parliament members described the necessity of cooperation with members of the governing coalition in order to pass legislation. That is to say that a bill is far more likely to pass initial institutional hurdles if it appears that it enjoys coalition support. There are limitations to this in terms of substantive policy-making as bills must not challenge or threaten government policy.

From these interviews a key narrative about the strategic role of social and gender issues emerged – they are useful when you are weak. The utility of advocating for gender issues such as education, child care, etcetera, is largely determined by the legislators’ inability to impact valence issues. Firstly, valence issues such as the economy and security will only be determined by the governing coalition. For members of the opposition, legislative proposals on foreign policy, national security, or economic policy is purely posturing. They know it has absolutely no chance of even being presented on the plenum. Secondly, proposing legislation on social issues establishes credibility among core supporters but is unlikely to garner support from swing voters. This is further evidence that social issues remain niche because they are unlikely to enjoy broad support.

Most importantly, I observed in my interviews a clear gendered bifurcation in attitude towards support for gender-related issues. Staff members of male legislators were either ambivalent about support for gender issues or women’s issues or expressed a deep commitment to such policy while clarifying that this is not what the legislator is known for. I observed the opposite among women. Most staff members for women Knesset members expressed unquestionable commitment to women’s issues but a desire to expand their legislative agenda.

Chapter 3 - Less Power and more Gender Legislation:

The Case of Women Knesset Members Legislative Behavior and Patterns of Co-Sponsorship

3.1 - Introduction

“She is that type of person, the only issue she doesn’t deal with is tourism . . . that was our inside joke among staff members and then she brought in health tourism and we wanted to kill her... She deals with a lot of issues [legislatively] for better or worse, not just as a feminist, issues like national security, inequality for historically marginalized communities, things she has always dealt with but people don’t see it because it is easier to put her in a box.”


The quote above, taken from a parliamentary aide of a woman Knesset member exemplifies the dilemma women legislators face regarding their commitment to women’s issues. Based both on my theory and my qualitative analysis, I expect women legislators to increasingly resemble men legislators. This is in contradiction to the well-documented phenomenon of women parliament members advocating for women. I argue that as the proportion of women legislators increases, and the number of senior women in particular increases, we will observe greater changes and greater variation in legislative behavior than previously reported. In this chapter, I explore my theory of seniority, progressive ambition, and substantive representation quantitatively by analyzing Israeli legislation in the fourteenth and fifteenth Knesset. My qualitative data indicates

that women do maintain a commitment to women's issues, however, existing institutional pressures and opportunity structures heavily impact this. As women gain greater access to more prestigious policy areas such as national security will they decrease support for social issues generally and women's issues more specifically?

3.1.1 – What does political advancement mean for women Knesset Members?

As they gain seniority, women legislators in the Israeli Knesset co-sponsor less and propose more gender-related legislation. A compelling explanation for these findings is that women in the Israeli legislature experience seniority and power differently than their men colleagues. Rather than increasing co-sponsorship with seniority and power as we expect, based on men's legislative experience, women's co-sponsorship decreases significantly. I hypothesize that if women were to advance in similar ways to men legislators, we would observe similar patterns of co-sponsorship and legislative agenda setting. Instead, I find that women in the Israeli case experience bias within the legislature that effectively limits their policy activities. Consequently they are doubly marginalized – first as colleagues and collaborators, and secondly as policy makers. Gender-related legislation in Israel occurs primarily because of institutional constraints.

Figure 3. 1 – Comparing Seniority of Men and Women 14-15 Knesset



* Note: The frequency represents the number of bills proposed by men and women, respectively in the dataset based on length of time served in office. Junior men Knesset members proposed the largest amount of bills.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the interviews I conducted with parliamentary aides supported my theory and hypotheses that ambitious politicians are most interested in dealing with valence issues. Therefore, both men and women politicians consider working on policy related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict the most important political issue facing Israel, and the ultimate political goal. Interviewees understood membership in the coalition as a requisite condition for having a significant impact on policy in Israel. The institutional weakness of the opposition relegated these legislators to dealing

with issues that do not challenge the executive. Thus their legislative agenda was determined by the institutional opportunity structure. Additional constraints included avoiding overlap with other legislators, the party agenda, and interest group pressure.

Maintaining a clear policy preference for women's issues creates obstacles for professional advancement for women. This is because ambitious senior legislators endeavor to achieve greater authority within the party and the legislature. Leadership positions within the party require legislators to consider the good of the party, this includes its ability to recruit candidates, win seats in the legislature, and pursue its preferred political agenda. As a result, as legislators progress and attain higher office, their responsibility within the party and the legislature adjusts accordingly. Such positions within the party and the legislature changes a legislator's constituency, making it larger and broader. Consequently, legislators' decision-making incentives change, and they are likely to seek to expand their legislative agenda in order to gain credibility and a reputation as a universal candidate rather than a niche politician. Women legislators face particular hurdles within this process. While they may aspire to expand their agenda they are seen as primarily accountable to women constituents. This is apparent in the opening quote - while women legislators likely want to advocate for women they may also feel tokenized and marginalized by the expectation to do so.

In this chapter I show that men legislators are seen as more valuable

collaborators as they gain seniority. That is to say that junior legislators do not seek out senior women to cosponsor bills. The exception to this is junior women legislators who ask senior women to cosponsor gender-related bills. Consequently, overtime women legislators appear to increase their gender-related legislation. As they gain seniority, women legislators in Israel do not benefit from power and status as men do and remain different than men in their legislative behavior. Even though women become more successful at passing legislation overtime, they are still significantly less successful than their male peers.

The legislative behavior model in this work considers legislative outcomes a result of coordination and competition among legislators. Additionally, I account for legislative behavior given changing incentives. That is to say, it is unlikely that individual legislators issue preferences will change dramatically over the course of their political career, however, institutional incentives and opportunities will impact their legislative agendas. Therefore, rather than arguing that women care less about women over time, I am claiming that women need to adjust their legislative behavior based on the expanding constituency associated with party leadership and positions of authority within the legislature.

3.2 – Role of Political Power in Decision-making and Collaboration

3.2.1 – Policy-Making and Agenda Setting

Scholarship on legislative behavior considers a number of factors for

explaining decision-making and policy outcomes within the legislature. One debate centers on the role of individual characteristics of legislators for determining policy preferences and legislative activity. Another debate considers the impact of the party agenda on individual legislators' policy positions and actions. Recent scholarship on Western Europe attempts to connect these debates to better elucidate agenda setting within multi-party parliaments (Baumann, Debus, and Muller, 2015). More simply put, how do institutional conditions and individuals interact to produce policy outcomes – and which factors better explain observable political behavior?

In his work, Nils Ringe makes an important theoretical distinction between the fixed nature of parliamentarians' "normative and cognitive positions" (Ringe, 2005) and their latent policy positions. Consequently, "long-standing and consistent *ideological preferences* do not automatically translate into more immediate and inconsistent *policy preferences*"¹ (Ibid). This is because parliamentarians' policy positions are operationalized and mediated through the electoral structure and political contestation (Jones 1994; Hinich and Munger, 1997). Parliament members may have particular ideologies that they maintain throughout their career, but they will adapt their policies based on the existing

¹ Ringe clarifies this by saying: "Ideological preferences are defined as sets of norms and values which are long-standing, durable, and difficult to change or abandon (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Scott 2001). They are represented in the dominant dimensions of an ideology space. Policy preferences are the potentially ambiguous and inconsistent positions taken toward particular policy issues or proposals, based on the consideration of immediate pay-offs"

institutional context as part of a strategy for reelection and career advancement.

According to Baumann, Debus, and Muller personal characteristics of individual legislators will determine their policy preference when party discipline and various institutional constraints play a lesser role. Their research focuses on moral issues debating religion with technological advancement. As parties often do not have a clear position on such matters, personal characteristics are more likely to impact legislative decision-making (Baumann, Debus, and Muller, 2015). Certain policies therefore may allow for individual legislators to pursue their long-standing ideological preferences.

Similarly, Lanny Martin argues that issue divisiveness and issue salience within a governing coalition determines the time frame of bill introduction. The significance of an issue will impact the institutional incentive to address it and to address it more effectively. All of this suggests that issues that are more niche and more distant from valence issues will allow for parliament members to pursue an agenda independently of the party. However, as the issue becomes more important to the party, legislators will experience a heightened degree of party discipline.

3.2.2 – Co-Sponsorship

Previous scholarship on legislative behavior in comparative politics has sought to better understand how institutional contexts impacts legislators'

preferences. Such research projects explored a myriad of legislative activities such as; roll call voting, speeches on the floor, drafting amendments, and sponsoring legislation. Scholars have used co-sponsorship to estimate policy ideal points, power within the legislature (Rocca and Sanchez, 2008), and legislative networks (Crisp et al, 2004).

In their 1996 work Krehbiel and Kessler present the main debate in co-sponsorship research between the position-taking hypothesis (Mayhew, 1974) and the signaling hypothesis (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1989). According to the position taking hypothesis legislators seeking reelection will make public endorsements of legislative proposals they deem electorally beneficial among their constituents. Because passing legislation is costly, legislators may benefit comparably simply by supporting a position rather than expending political capital to advance it. The signaling hypothesis claims that legislators use co-sponsorship to make up for information asymmetry among legislators. Thus the target audience to which they are trying to communicate relevant information about their political intentions is within the legislature among fellow legislators. The purpose of signaling to other legislators is to increase support for a particular proposal (Wilson and Young, 1993; Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996; Wawro, 2000) and build a coalition (Fenno, 1989, 1991; Light, 1992).

Similarly, Aleman, Calvo, Jones and Kaplan state; “cosponsoring is a voluntary activity that only discloses the positive predisposition of legislator towards a bill” (Aleman, Calvo, Jones, Kaplan, 2009). Although the action of co-

sponsorship implies a positive view of the bill it provides little information on whether a legislator is opposed or merely ambivalent about it. Consequently, there is an asymmetry in our ability to determining the meaning of a 'yea' and a 'nay.' Within the literature, there is a consensus that co-sponsorship communicates ideological content. In fact, Aleman et al find that the "same underlying causes shape the cosponsoring and voting behavior of legislators..." (Aleman, Calvo, Jones, Kaplan, 2009, 110).

Further exploring the relationship between co-sponsorship, individual legislator preferences, and institutional context is research on differences in patterns co-sponsorship based on identity; such as gender, or racial minority. In her work, Swers finds that congresswomen in the U.S. are more likely to cosponsor legislation on women's issues when they are in the majority party (Swers, 2005). However, other scholars find that co-sponsorship can be indicative of relative weakness or marginalization within the legislature. Rocca and Sanchez show that minority congress-people both sponsor less and cosponsor less than nonminority congress-people (Rocca and Sanchez, 2008). In her work, Barnes argues that co-sponsorship among women will vary depending on the institutional conditions. When there are weak party constraints we will see women collaborate more. Furthermore, seniority in office, affiliation with the executive party, and belonging to a women's caucus or committee also make collaboration more likely (Barnes, 2016). Thus, patterns of co-sponsorship can provide insight not only to policy preferences but also to legislators' status and

position within the institution.

3.3 – Theory and Research Design

Based on the agenda setting literature and existing gender and politics literature I assume that women politicians do prioritize women's issues more than men. While these ideological preferences may remain consistent throughout their career, in order to get reelected and potentially advance within the party and the legislature they make strategic choices prioritizing policy preferences based on the existing institutional conditions and opportunity structures. One way to advance in their career could be to make strategic policy choices, another is to establish crucial legislative networks.

H1: Senior women will decrease gender-related bill proposals relative to junior women legislators

H2: Senior women will increase non gender-related bill proposals relative to junior women legislators

In order to increase the likelihood of legislative success legislators seek out powerful partners. Such partners may be powerful due to their relative seniority, their party affiliation – being in the coalition, position of authority within the legislature like committee chair, or speaker of the house. All things being equal women should gain power and authority as they remain in successive Knesset sessions. As a result, we would expect senior women to be sought after as legislative partners at similar rates to men colleagues.

H3: A) Senior women will increase co-sponsorship
B) Senior women will be equally likely to collaborate with men as with women

To test the hypotheses regarding the effect of gender and seniority on legislative decision-making, I rely on a multi stage method of analysis of the legislative process in Israel. I consider the conditions that facilitate the promotion of gender-related and non gender-related policies throughout this process, while paying particular attention to the influence of progressive ambition, the desire to attain higher office, to explain variation between men and women. The legislative behavior model in this work emphasizes the impact of seniority, as a proxy for progressive ambition on a legislator's ability to compete, network, and utilize existing precedent in order to successfully pursue policies. I assume that only ambitious politicians who believe they have the ability to keep their seat in the legislature and potentially advance will choose to continue to run for reelection rather than quit. Additionally, gender plays a crucial role in access to agenda setting positions and the ability to collaborate with critical actors. To assess long-term commitment to policy areas, and the effect of the presence of women, I look at which policies are pursued, and to what degree they are pursued by legislators at various stages of the legislative process. These stages include: bill initiation, co-sponsorships, and legislative committees.

Israel

There are relatively few in-depth studies of women in Israeli politics. One of the most important studies of women in Israeli politics looked at women in local

governments. A key finding in this research is the systemic marginalization of women and the framing of their politics as part of the 'private sphere' (Herzog, 1999). The Israeli Democracy Institute found that women in Israel are severely underrepresented numerically both in the legislature and in the cabinet. They also find that women are more likely to propose gender-related bills (IDI, 2013; Golan, 2015), however they do not analyze co-sponsorship or bill passage. Finally, trends among women voters in Israel resemble global trends in that they skew slightly left in their political preferences. Despite this bias for more leftist parties women voters in Israel are just as likely to hold conservative attitudes towards national security as men. Thus, women are not more 'peaceful' than men (Shamir, 2015).

In this work I expand on previous research by exploring how institutional conditions impact women's political decision-making in the Israeli legislature. By introducing an explanatory mechanism for women's substantive representation I answer a major puzzle in the gender and politics literature generally, and in the Israeli case in particular.

As discussed in the introduction, my original dataset includes two consecutive Knesset sessions, the 14th and the 15th session, during the years 1996-2003. This time period captures an immense amount of diplomatic activity, a rise in the number of women, and even electoral reform (Arian and Shamir, 1999). There are over seven thousand pieces of legislation in the dataset. I coded for method of bill introduction, whether by Knesset member, government introduced legislation, or committee. Additionally, I coded for each stage of the legislative process from a preliminary vote on the plenum to bill passage. However, in this

chapter I will only explore bill introduction and the substantive policy area of the bills.

This analysis looks at the behavior of individual legislators, so the unit of analysis is the individual legislator in each session. I am primarily concerned with the impact of gender and seniority on the pursuit of women-related policies and coordination among legislators. Thus, the dependent variable is gender-related bills introduced on the plenum. This best measures legislators' interest in a particular issue or policy.

The main independent variable is an interaction term of gender and seniority. In both cases, all the legislators to our knowledge identified as cisgender (as opposed to transgender, gender queer, or gender nonconforming), and therefore binary gender terms are acceptable in this case. Male legislators are coded as 0 and women legislators are coded as 1. Seniority is coded based on the number of legislative terms the legislator has served.

I include in the model several control variables to account for alternative institutional explanations for legislative behavior: member of the opposition, member of the governing coalition, committee chair, and party ideology. In the Israeli case centrist parties are proxies for party size since all major parties are located at the center of the left-right political spectrum. If a legislator is a member of the governing coalition, their bills are far more likely to pass because they belong to the bloc that controls the majority of the seats in the legislature. Members of the opposition however, are more likely to have greater legislative freedom. Consequently women in opposition parties are more likely to propose

gender-related bills. I include a variable for committee chair as a proxy for an authority position in the legislature. I assume that legislators who serve as committee chairs are better able to promote their preferred policies. In Israel, Ministers and Deputy Ministers cannot propose private member bills. These are listed as government bills. As I explained in the introduction, private member bills are bills introduced by Knesset members (Shomer, 2009).

I use individual legislator data and session in the legislature data (multi-level data). This is necessary as the commitment and risk taking behavior of individual legislators' impact outcomes that occur at the aggregate. Simply put, to promote a bill, legislators must coordinate with other legislators, they must negotiate within their parties – legislation is a collective institutional level activity. I first run a probit model to determine whether there is a relationship between my independent variable of gender*seniority and my dependent variable of gender-related legislation. This measures whether women legislators' support for women's issues varies over time.

3.3.1 – Gender-Related Legislation Analysis

To analyze substantive representation, I hand coded the legislation and divided them into four categories as they pertain to gender – non gender-related, gender-related, feminist, and anti-feminist. I used existing categorization from gender and politics literature for coding gender-related and feminist legislation. Schwindt-Bayer's (2010) definition of women's issues distinguishes between two categories: the first category considers visible gender inequalities in the public or

economic sphere which I coded as ‘feminist’; the second category considers issues of care and/or compassion relating (mostly) to the private sphere which I coded as ‘gender-related’. In the first category I include the following: “policies liberalizing divorce and reproductive rights, equalizing the civil rights of men and women in terms of education, employment, pay, training, property ownership and inheritance, marriage, mobility, and political representation; providing family and medical leave, subsidizing child care, addressing domestic abuse, sexual assault, violence against women, and providing for women’s healthcare” (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers, 2007, 556). The second category refers to issues relating to the care of children, public/social welfare, the environment, and other issues thought to arise from an ethic of “care” (Tronto 1993).

Table 3. 1 - Gender, Seniority, Authority and Gender-related Bill Proposals in Israeli Knesset


Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.
Gender	0.1684975	0.1279796	0.188	-0.0823378
Seniority	-0.0464369	0.0180601	0.010	-0.081834
Gender*Seniority	0.2512195	0.0512111	0.000	0.1508475
Opposition	0.1032894	0.0455709	0.023	0.013972
Center-Left Parties	0.0620877	0.0531711	0.243	-0.0421258
Center-Right Parties	-0.1474774	0.0874678	0.092	-0.3189113
Committee Chair	0.1920969	0.0523684	0.000	0.0894566
Minister	-0.1033787	0.1974277	0.601	-0.4903299
Deputy Minister	-0.0969226	0.4580223	0.832	-0.9946299
_cons	-1.260705	0.0525019	0.000	-1.363607

Probit regression
 Log likelihood = -2160.3946
 Pseudo R2 = 0.0568

Number of observations = 5778
 LR chi2(9) = 260.18
 Prob > chi2 = 0

After computing the marginal effects of the probit model I find that if a legislator is a woman there is a .213 increase in the probability that gender-related legislation will be proposed. This is a large and statistically significant effect. Being in the opposition or committee chair also increases the likelihood that the legislator will propose gender-related legislation. While both those variables are statistically significant their effect is much smaller than being a woman or being a senior woman. The results of the probit model clearly show that as women gain seniority in the Israeli Knesset their likelihood of proposing gender-related legislation increases dramatically, and this finding is statistically significant.

Figure 3. 2 - Gender-Related and Non Gender-Related Bills by Legislator Sex in the 14-15 Israeli Knesset



* Note: Model Estimates from Table in Appendix


The graph above shows the predicted likelihood that women Knesset Members will propose gender-related legislation. The results from the probit

model in the table and the logit model in the graphs do not support my hypothesis that women will propose less gender-related legislation as they gain seniority. In fact, the opposite is true; as women gain seniority in the Knesset they are exponentially more likely to propose gender-related bills. What therefore explains these extreme results? As expected, men Knesset Members maintain a lack of commitment or interest in women's issues. Their behavior is supported by existing finding that argue that men view women as primarily responsible for representing women substantively and have little incentive to advocate for women's issues.

My results indicate that the divergence between men and women in the Israeli Knesset is quite stark. The graph above clarifies that senior women Knesset Members do not expand their legislative agenda by proposing more non gender-related bills. Considering the implication of both graphs it is clear that there is a gendered division of labor within the Israeli Knesset. Women deal almost exclusively with gender-related legislation whereas the opposite is true for men. Consequently, my main assumption that women will become more like men in their legislative agenda as they advance in their political career is not supported by the data.

3.3.2 – Gender-related versus Feminist Policy

Figure 3.3 - Feminist and Anti-Feminist Bills by Legislator Sex in the 14-15 Israeli Knesset



* Note: Model Estimates from Table in Appendix

I coded bills as feminist if they explicitly endeavored to address gender inequality in the state of Israel. For example, there were a number of proposed bills in the dataset suggesting institutionalizing various types of quotas either in public service or political offices. Such bills were coded as 'feminist.' I coded bills as anti-feminist if they institutionalized or promoted inequality among men and women. A number of bills in the dataset suggested enforced gender segregation in public spaces or businesses. Other examples included further disenfranchising women in divorce proceedings, healthcare choices, or preventing them from serving in the military.


What emerges from my results is an image of an Israeli legislature that deals with women issues almost exclusively as an issue of 'care.' Rather than endeavoring to address gender inequality, Israeli legislators view women's issues

almost exclusively within the prism of women's traditional roles in the private sphere as caretakers. Consequently, women legislators maintain fairly nominal commitment to feminist issues and men show no interest in promoting equity in Israeli society. On the contrary, men are far more likely to propose antifeminist legislation. These results provide some insight to the relative stagnation of gender equality in Israel.

3.3.3 – Co-Sponsorship

After analyzing the substantive policy focus of legislators I will now test my co-sponsorship hypotheses. Based on the co-sponsorship literature I expect that as women gain seniority they will enjoy some relative gains in terms of power within the legislature. As a result, women legislators will be sought after as potential collaborators at similar rates to their senior men peers. Furthermore, if women legislators are viewed by their colleagues as valuable co-sponsors then we will observe senior women legislators co-sponsoring at higher rates across policy domains. Yet, this is not the case. On the contrary, senior women in the Israeli legislature co-sponsor less than do freshman women legislators.

Figure 3.4 - Co-Sponsorship, Gender, and Seniority in the Israeli Knesset



*Note: Model Estimates from Table in Appendix

These results hold even when I included controls for ideology, coalition, opposition, authority within the legislature (committee chair, deputy minister, speaker, deputy speakers), and committee assignment. Thus, hypothesis 3a and 3b are also not supported. Women in the Israeli legislature do not collaborate at similar rates to men as they gain seniority. Interestingly, junior women legislators also prefer collaborating with men. That is to say, senior women legislators do not gain power and status with seniority as men do. As a result, senior women legislators are the least likely to co-sponsor and are effectively cornered in their legislative activity. This is because both their individual legislative activity narrows and their collaboration with other legislators diminish. This quantitative analysis contradicts the findings in my interviews. Parliamentary aides for women Knesset members explicitly stated that as the MK gained seniority more colleagues asked them to sign onto their bills.

3.4 – Discussion of Results

3.4.1 – Explaining Senior Women Knesset Members' Co-Sponsorship Decline

I hypothesize that women choose to invest only in issues that they are highly committed to. Men legislators on the other hand agree to cosponsor more often because they are less concerned with public perception or potential penalty for less effective legislative behavior. Much like in other professional fields, women use their power to prioritize quality over quantity. These results are supported by research that suggests women mimic dominant group behavior, i.e. men, by devaluing fellow members of the minority group and exhibiting a preference for coordinating with majority group colleagues (Kanthak and Krause, 2012).

According to interviews I conducted with parliamentary aides, new legislators are often excited to legislate and propose a larger number of bills (Shomer, 2009). Junior legislators consider formal legislation the main parliamentary tool available to them as well as the primary way in which they will be evaluated. A political aide said that in the beginning junior legislators often sign on to bills almost indiscriminately. Later on they realize that some of those bills are not good, or do not promote their politics, and this causes them to be more cautious. Research suggests that women are risk averse and believe that the penalty for legislative or political mistakes is heavier for them. Consequently women become more selective about the bills they sign onto. The effect on women who find co-sponsors to be untrustworthy as it relates to the content or full

implications of the bill might be greater. A legislative aide described women feeling “duped” in such cases.

3.4.2 – Putting Women Knesset Members and Gender Legislation in one Corner

In Israel women initially pursue less gender-related issues but as they become increasingly marginalized, and they do not gain access to leadership opportunities they may become reliant on gender issues to achieve legislative success. The Israeli data doesn’t necessarily negate the main premise of the theory that given the opportunity women will shift away from gender-related issues. What it does show is that in Israel there is evidence that women between 1996-2003 in Israel had yet to be given significant structural opportunities for advancement within the legislature.

What explains these rather confounding results? As women gain seniority they are not seen as valuable political partners in the Israeli case. Their increased attention to women’s issues cannot be fully explained by personal political preferences. This is because a lack of political collaboration with legislators means that they have less institutional opportunities to broaden their agendas. For women Knesset members staying in office does not result in new legislative avenues but instead limits their political behavior. I argue that the findings presented are best explained by gender bias within the Knesset.

Interviews with parliamentary aides suggested that women were as likely as men to want to expand their legislative agenda and progress to authority positions within the party and the legislature. The quantitative analysis however

exposes the remaining institutional obstacles for women in Israel. I find that in Israel, women's substantive representation is a result of marginalization and not necessarily personal preferences.

In this chapter I show that the marginalization of women within the Israeli Knesset forces them to be niche politicians. Furthermore, for women, gaining seniority and authority does not result in greater choice and flexibility within the legislature. In the following chapter I will explore whether women in the Israeli Knesset are able to leverage seniority and become more effective legislators despite these institutional constraints.

Interestingly, women's choice to cooperate with more powerful partners suggests that rather than behaving differently than men, women are mimicking men legislators. The comparison of Argentina and Israel suggests that institutional contexts enable variations in women legislators behavior however in both cases women will endeavor to fit existing patterns of legislative behavior, specifically masculine and patriarchal patterns of legislative behavior. In Argentina women shift away from women's issues over time, whereas in Israel women struggle to adjust their policy. In the Israeli case women emphasize collaboration with men, and inadvertently reinforce their own marginalization by cooperating with men only on women's issues.

Chapter 4 - Developing a Typology for Women's Substantive Representation and Legislative Success

4.1 - Introduction

"It doesn't create visibility, there is nothing you can do, it doesn't produce headlines like the Jerusalem law or even consumer issues or housing reforms and so on. This is relatively an issue that doesn't speak to most of the public in Israel. And also, it isn't an issue that . . . at the end of the day very few women vote for a party based on their activities in support of women, elections are determined by security issues, economic issues, not because of gender equality."

Legislative Aide Center Right Party 2017

Electoral success in Israel is determined by the ability to pursue policies that voters care about. However, the previous two chapters produce a complex picture of the political reality women face. On the one hand, they recognize that they must present themselves as politicians who deal with a broad range of policy issues, while on the other, quantitative data suggests that their legislative focus narrows over time. In the following chapter, I analyze variation among women legislators in the Israeli Knesset based on party, positions of authority within the legislature, and legislative success. Do these institutional conditions impact gender-related policy outcomes in Israel? In chapter two I addressed the question why do women and men legislators represent women. Chapter three continued by asking when will women and men legislators represent women, and now I will address which women and which men legislators represent women?

My theory of the substantive representation of women provides a typology for which women will choose to advocate for women at every stage of their political career. Based on my findings from the previous chapter, I conclude that in the Israeli case men are highly unlikely to represent women. I argue that women from minority opposition parties are most likely to pursue gender-related policy and I found some support for this assertion in my qualitative data. Namely, that support for social issues generally, and women's issues specifically is explained by relative weakness within the legislature. Legislators that occupied positions of relative power; senior members of the coalition in agenda setting positions, were seen as able to impact the issues the legislative aide quoted above defined as electorally significant.

In order to determine the institutional conditions that predict whether legislators introduce and promote gendered legislation I look at two important dimensions; first, the degree to which legislators become desirable partners for legislative activities as they gain seniority. Secondly, what type of legislative content the party organization demands you produce. I find that as women gain seniority in Israel they are not sought after for co-sponsorship. I therefore consider co-sponsorship one possible proxy for authority in the legislature. Furthermore, the increase in gender-related legislation among women over time suggests that parties may require them to focus on gender issues.

Women Knesset Members – Typology of Power and Gender-Related Outcomes

		Early Career	Mid-Career	Late Career
Governing Coalition	Major Party	- \ +	- \ -	- \ -
	Minor Party	+ \ +	+ \ -	- \ -
Opposition	Major Party	+ \ +	+ \ -	- \ -
	Minor Party	+ \ +	+ \ +	- \ +

4.1.2 – Role of the Party

Political scientists have long debated the effect of the party on individual legislators choices. Some argue that individual policy preferences are more likely to determine legislative outcomes; such theory proposes that there are no party effects independent of preferences. This means that party cohesiveness is a by-product of legislators’ preferences rather than a party effect (Mayhew 1974; Krehbiel 1993). Others provide a number of explanations and predictive models for party effects.

There are two main theoretical arguments supporting the concept that political parties impact legislators’ behavior. The premise of both theories is that political parties are not solely derivative of party member preferences. The party cartel model argues that electoral incentives determine legislative party organization. Individual party members benefit from the party’s positive reputation and ability to mobilize voters. Consequently, they will empower party

leaders and support policy outcomes that reflect the median member of the majority party. Applications of this model emphasize the ability of party leadership to control the legislative agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2002, 2005).

Alternatively, the conditional party government model views shared preferences as the core of legislative party organization. In this model, legislators establish parties to reduce the transaction costs of building and maintaining a policy coalition. Thus, legislators are likely to empower party leadership when polarization between parties is high, and cohesiveness within the party is strong. Under these circumstances party leaders establish legislative discipline that go beyond what we would expect taking into account individual preferences alone (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 1997a, 1997b, 1998; Collie and Brady 1985; Cooper and Brady 1981; Cooper, Brady, and Hurley 1977; Froman and Ripley 1965; Huitt 1961; and Rohde 1991).

Despite some weakening of parties in Israel and increased public focus on individual politicians, Israel remains a party centric political system. Furthermore, it is worth considering in what ways parties influence the legislative behavior of politicians in the Israeli case. Whether, as my interviews suggest, membership in the governing coalition and rank within the party play a significant role in a legislator's policy focus. Or whether, the most significant explanatory variable for gender-related legislative outcomes is the systemic marginalization of women within the Israeli Knesset.

4.1.3 – Impact of Authority

Legislators are not equally effective policymakers. This is because some legislators possess the ability and skill to influence policy independently of the party, while others rely to a greater degree on beneficial institutional conditions like their ranking within the party. Senior party members have a greater degree of influence on the party agenda but are also viewed as responsible for actively promoting party policy preferences and ensuring electoral success (Baron, 2000). In her work on cabinet ministers, Alexiadou, establishes a typology that includes loyalists, partisans, and ideologues. She argues that cabinet ministers who are loyal to party leadership, do not have an independent policy agenda, and value their office more than personal ambition, are loyalists. She defines partisans as “party heavy weights” and party leadership, whereas ideologues prioritize achieving policy goals (Alexiadou, 2015). This is a useful configuration for asking how personal preferences interact with party politics.

Significantly, Alexiadou recognizes that institutional conditions impact political actors ability to determine the legislative agenda. Achieving agenda-setting positions requires party loyalty, even for those that she terms partisans. Legislative scholars claim that low ranking legislators, or freshman legislators endeavor to be informational experts, developing particular areas of policy knowledge. Expertise combined with legislative effectiveness helps them build their legislative reputation and signal their skills to the party apparatus. Multi term legislators who are no longer junior expect to benefit from their experience by moving up the ladder in the party. Their commitment to the core of the party

agenda intensifies as their political career becomes increasingly dependent on the party's electoral success. Arguably the notion of an ideologue or maverick is most difficult to identify and measure. Most centralized party systems, such as Israel, have little patience for legislators who habitually pursue policy that is not a priority for the party. However, Alexiadou states that ideologues are those that are able to promote policy independently of the party. It is worth considering two important points, that certain parties will allow for greater independence of members and secondly that legislative independence may be gendered.

4.2 – Typology of Women's Substantive Representation

In the previous chapter I found that as they gain seniority women in the Israeli Knesset narrow their legislative agenda to focus more on gender-related legislation. However, I have yet to address the questions I presented regarding possible variation among women legislators depending on their ability to gain power within the party and legislature. Positioning within the legislature impacts their legislative agendas. Women that are subject to extreme party discipline, where the power is centralized in the hands of party leaders, will face additional pressure to pursue policies the party apparatus views as advantageous.

My theory stipulates that major parties vying for control or a significant role in the coalition are more likely to encourage party unity. Minor opposition parties who are already marginalized within the legislature are likely to offer greater freedom to individual legislators to set their own policy agenda. Therefore, women in opposition parties are likely to pursue gender-related bills

to a greater degree in all stages of seniority as representative of their individual policy preferences and because they are denied access to the opportunity structure within the legislature both as women and as members of weaker parties (Barnes, 2016, O'Brien, 2015). Furthermore, women in governing coalition parties will be sought after more as co-sponsors, thus increasing the likelihood that their legislative record will be broader.

H1 a): Senior women in the governing coalition are less likely to propose gender-related bills

H1 b): Senior women in the opposition are more likely to propose gender-related bills

However, my findings in previous chapters suggest that institutional marginalization contributes to the narrowing of women's legislative agenda causing them to focus on gender-related legislation. Consequently, an alternative to the hypotheses stated above is that women facing extreme party discipline will be coerced into pursuing gender-related legislation. Additionally, larger parties that are able to legislate effectively across a broad range of policy areas, may view women party members as informational experts on gender issues and have little incentive to support women broadening their policy scope. Whereas women legislators in weaker parties that experience greater legislative independence are able to develop expertise in non gender-related issue areas. Furthermore, smaller parties expect their members in the legislature to advocate for constituents in all

policy domains as they lack the seats to delegate specific issues to particular legislators.

H2 a): Senior women in the opposition are less likely to propose gender-related bills

H2 b): Senior women in the governing coalition are more likely to propose gender-related bills

Regardless of women's relative authority or seniority within the party; male politicians' behavior remains the same. There is no incentive for male politicians to advocate for women's issues at any point. The increased presence of women does not shift cyclical policy preferences (Schofield, 1998) as the particular structure of the legislature remains and will continue to produce similar social choices (Riker, 1980). As a result, male legislators continue to expect their female colleagues to serve as the primary representatives of women. Since male legislators both assume that women prefer to work on women's issues and also believe that they benefit from the perception of being woman friendly both individually and as a party - they will increasingly pressure women legislators to focus on gender-related legislation. Male legislators prefer to maintain the existing policy status quo that prioritizes 'masculine' policy areas due to its gendered hierarchy. Generally, the incentive for male politicians to substantively represent women is low. This is because political issues relating to women are considered less prestigious or 'soft'. Also, men are unlikely to be penalized or

rewarded electorally for proposing or passing gender-related bills (Dahlerup, 2014).

H3: As men legislators gain seniority the number the number of gender-related bills they propose will remain the same regardless of party size or coalition/opposition

The relative low prestige of women's issues (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010) incentivizes women parliamentarians to promote non-gender related policies and legislation. Instead they want to establish a legislative agenda that includes positions on prestigious or 'hard' issues such as the economy, foreign relations/diplomacy, etc. In my interviews, participants repeatedly mentioned their aspiration to work on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as they viewed it at the core of Israeli electoral concerns. For legislative aides, legislating on social issues or narrowly conceived policy was in large part explained by their lack of legislative agenda authority and power. My findings do not reject the role of personal preferences in promoting women's issues, but do suggest that given the opportunity legislators may prioritize more salient political matters.

Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005) define policy areas as prestigious based on the relative amount of resources such as personnel and budget, as well as public attention the issue receives. Their definition ascribes prestige to valence issues; these are consensus issues that determine vote choice (Clarke et al., 2009; Sanders et al., 2011; Whiteley et al., 2013). National security and the economy are most likely to impact voter decision making as most voters

prioritize these issues at the ballot box. Highly dedicated and active women will continue to promote women's issues as they gain seniority. However, women with progressive ambition need to develop political credibility by addressing national security and economic anxiety.

H4: As women gain seniority the number of valence issue bills they propose will increase

As legislators gain seniority and experience we would expect them to become more effective legislators, this should be particularly true for women. Some researchers have found women to be more effective legislators than men (Anzia and Berry 2011; Volden and Wiseman 2011; Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer, 2013). In Israel the executive and the coalition have a clear monopoly over the legislative agenda. However, if women legislators are narrowly focused on gender-related legislation and such policies are not viewed as challenging status quo policies on national security - this may facilitate higher success rates.

H5: Bills proposed by senior women are more likely to become law


Perhaps somewhat ironically, the marginalization of women legislators and women's issues may contribute to greater legislative success.

4.2.1 – Data and Methods

I use my original dataset of over seven thousand pieces of Israeli legislation from the 14th and 15th Knesset from 1996-2003. Women represent 18% of the

legislators in the dataset. As we can see women legislators are over-represented in left-leaning parties in the data. It is worth noting that in recent years there has been an increase of women legislators in center-right and right parties. In fact, rising numbers of women in the Israeli legislature can in part be explained by an increase of center/center-right parties who prioritized including women in their list (Shamir and Rahat, 2017).

Figure 4. 1 - Percentage of Women across the Political Spectrum in 14-15 Knesset




Note: The dataset includes parties categorized as 'religious' referring to Jewish political parties supporting the incorporation of Jewish law in the Israeli state (e.g. the National Religious Party and United Torah Judaism), and 'Palestinian' parties such as Balad/at-Tajamu al-Watani ad-Demokrati. While religious parties forbid women from running for office, the first Palestinian woman to win a seat in a Palestinian party is not included in the dataset as she entered office in 2010

In addition to coding the substance of the legislation and seniority, I also coded party membership, committee membership, and a variety of authority


positions within the Knesset and the government. My theory explores whether women’s legislative behavior resembles men as they gain seniority and access to positions of power. Based on the graph below it appears that women in the Israeli Knesset enjoy access to positions of power at relatively similar rates to men. The only exceptions are ministerial positions and the speakership of the Knesset. Women are particularly like to hold positions of secondary authority such as deputy minister, deputy speaker, and to chair a temporary subcommittee or committee of inquiry (which are under the jurisdiction of a permanent legislative committee). In fact they are more likely than men to hold these positions.

Figure 4. 2 - Authority Positions in 14-15 Knesset by sex



The graph however is misleading as it suggests that women are more likely than men to hold a number of positions that would appear to provide them with greater influence on the legislative agenda. However, as men represent more than 80% of the legislators in the dataset, their likelihood to hold such positions is smaller because there are so many of them. This becomes abundantly clear once I disaggregate the data to look exclusively at committee chairs. Only the Women’s Status and Gender Equality Committee and the Committee for Immigration, Absorption, and Diaspora Affairs had a woman chair - all other committee chair positions were held by men.


Figure 4. 3 - Committee Chairs in the 14-15 Knesset by sex



The narrowing of women’s legislative activities comes into sharper focus when looking at committee membership. Women legislators are significantly more likely to be assigned committees that either directly dealt with gender-

related legislation like the Committee on Women’s Status and Gender Equality or a temporary subcommittee on women’s issues. However, women were clearly excluded from the Finance Committee, the Economic Affairs Committee, and the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee. In sum, women were excluded from committees that dealt with some of the most electorally salient policy areas.

Figure 4. 4 - Committee Membership in 14-15 Knesset by sex



4.3 - Analysis

4.3.1 – Women Knesset Members, Parties, and Gender Policy

When running basic logit models to calculate predictions of likelihood to propose gender-related bills I find that women are more likely to propose such bills regardless of whether they are in the opposition or coalition and it is statistically significant. Furthermore, women in left and center-left parties are far

more likely to propose gender-related bills and that is statistically significant. However, women in center right parties were less likely to propose gender-related bills by .031 and this result was also statistically significant.

Table 4. 1 - Women in Governing Coalition and Gender-related Legislation

	Coefficients	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	0.7374848	0.2735578	0.007	0.2013214	1.273648
Coalition	0.248088	0.184702	0.179	-0.1139213	0.6100972
Gender*Coalition	-1.325098	0.4549063	0.004	-2.216698	-0.4334977
Seniority	-0.022739	0.0437758	0.603	-0.1085379	0.0630599
Gender*Seniority	0.2694708	0.1077568	0.012	0.0582713	0.4806702
Coalition*Seniority	-0.1193437	0.0686866	0.082	-0.253967	0.0152796
Gender*Coalition*Seniority	0.5990756	0.182104	0.001	0.2421583	0.9559929
Center-Left Parties	0.1855188	0.0908445	0.041	0.0074668	0.3635708
Center-Right Parties	-0.1872937	0.1683289	0.266	-0.5172122	0.1426248
<u>_cons</u>	-2.27157	0.1357627	0	-2.53766	-2.00548
Logistic regression	Number of observations = 6936				
	LR chi2(9) = 300.11				
	Prob > chi2 = 0				
Log likelihood = -2420.0894	Pseudo R2 = 0.0584				


Table results support hypotheses 2A and 2B that senior women in the governing coalition are more likely to propose gender-related bills than women in opposition parties. These results are statistically significant and hold when controlling for ideology. As the graphs below show, regardless of political ideology

there is a clear decrease in co-sponsorship for women legislators as they gain seniority. Indicating that in the Israeli Knesset party membership does not help women legislators overcome systemic marginalization.

4.3.2 – Left or Right does not matter

The largest parties in both the 14th and 15th Knesset were ideologically from the center-left to the right wing on the Israeli political spectrum. Most significantly it appears that women legislators in leftist parties experienced less of a decrease in their co-sponsorship as they gained seniority. This result also supports the premise of hypothesis 2B as it suggests that women in weaker parties have greater legislative independence and experience less institutional marginalization.


Figure 4. 5 - Co-Sponsorship across Parties



Note: Model Estimates in Appendix

The data clearly shows women legislators losing male cosponsors on non-gendered legislation as they become more senior. This process is indicative of marginalization through party structures. Women are not seen as valuable political partners even as they remain in office. They do not experience power like their male colleagues. While men legislators in the Israeli Knesset experience similar levels of co-sponsorship throughout their career and regardless of the substantive content of the bill, women legislators' trends are reversed. For every gender-related legislation bill proposal there is a 0.27 decrease in the likelihood that there will be a male cosponsor.

Figure 4. 6 - Share of Male Co-Sponsors and Gendered Legislation 14-15 Knesset




Note: Model estimates in Appendix

4.3.3 – Men opt out of Women’s Substantive Representation

Both the descriptive data and the statistical models presented support the hypothesis that men do not represent women at any stage of their career. In the Knesset women are segregated into committees that deal exclusively with gender and women’s issues. In fact, their opportunities for authority and advancement are located exclusively within gender-related policy fields. Men dominate agenda setting positions in the Knesset, they chair almost all of the committees, and hold the most powerful positions in the legislature like Speaker of the House. This contributes to the marginalization of women within the Knesset and the view that women are primarily responsible for the representation of women constituents. It also allows men to avoid advocating for women, but remain highly electable.

Figure 4. 7 - Substantive Bill Proposals 14-15 Knesset



Note: Linear Predictions. Model Estimates in Appendix

The only policy area in which women increase their legislative activity is in the broad category of social issues. In stark contrast, men's legislative activity appears to remain fairly stable across policy domains with the exception of social policy. This is further evidence of the ghettoization of women in the Israeli Knesset. The patterns depict the entirely different circumstances women in the Israeli Knesset face compared to their colleagues. Even if we were to assume that women politicians had strong individual preferences for social policies, the effect would not be this significant. The data presented clearly illustrates the systemic narrowing of women's policy agenda.

Therefore, I do not find support for my fourth hypothesis. Senior women do not increase their legislative activity on valence issues because they are unable to do so. We know that women legislators consider valence issues significant and express their ambition to work in this domain however institutional conditions limit their ability to do so. The picture that emerges is that women's legislative activity is far more impacted by institutional conditions than men legislators. Although they self-report similar levels of institutional obstacles to legislative activities, women are significantly hindered compared to men.

4.3.4 – Women, Gender-related Legislation, and Bill Passage


Most legislative proposals in the Israeli Knesset are blocked at early stages of the process. Members of the opposition often struggle to get private member bills passed the Ministerial Committee for Legislation, an executive committee made up of government ministers, who determine whether the bill will make it to

the floor for a preliminary reading. Once a private member bill passes these two hurdles it goes to a first reading in which the bill is discussed on the plenum and then voted on for committee referral. In the dataset just over 70% (5,244 out of 7,413) of the bills were blocked, in the vast majority of cases the bills did not pass preliminary reading. Private member bills that do not pass the Ministerial Committee for Legislation are not included in the dataset consequently the data might even be overestimating success rates for bills. Only 10% of bill proposals become law.

Figure 4. 8 - Rates of Bill Passage Success by Content and Legislator Sex

Rates of Bill Passage Success by Content and Legislator Sex

Predictive Margins of gender with 95% CIs



Note: Model estimates in Appendix

Women in the Israeli Knesset do become more effective legislators as they gain seniority. Compared to men they become slightly more successful at passing

non-related legislation, passing just over 10% of their bills and this matches the general success rates of the Israeli legislature. However, the difference between men and women legislators when looking at gender-related legislation reflects my findings so far – women’s legislative activity on gender-related legislation increases exponentially as they gain seniority. They shift from legislating at similar rates to men on all issues to specializing in gender policy. In addition, they are quite successful at passing bills on gender issues. Women’s bill passage success rates with regards to gender-related legislation, is twice that of their non gender-related legislation at just over 20%. This supports Hypothesis 5 in which I argue that women become more effective legislators over time. Furthermore, they are particularly successful at advocating for women’s issues.

4.4 - Conclusion

In sum, women in Israel develop a niche specialty within the Israeli legislature. Women’s issues become the exclusive policy domain of women legislators in the Knesset due to systemic marginalization and institutional constraints. This is not to exclude the possibility that women may have individual preferences supporting gender-related policy, still, their legislative activity is largely dictated by institutional constraints. They work on and pass the policy they can get, rather than having the ability to develop their legislative agendas strategically. Men in the Israeli Knesset are able to balance their policy preferences with strategic legislative activities, while women are pushed into narrow issue areas. The picture depicted in the data shows women politicians in

Israel successfully advocating for women. Unfortunately, this is largely a function of institutional weakness. The question remains, what would their legislative activity look like if they had greater ability to diversify their issue areas. If they were seen as desirable legislative partners on a whole host of issues, would we see them shift away from gender policy? Finally, what does it mean that advocacy for women's issues or social issues are a function of institutional weakness and marginalization?

Chapter 5 - The Political Life Cycle and Gender-related Legislation: Exploring Seniority and Policy Outcomes in the Argentine Legislature

5.1 - Introduction

As Deputy Juliana Di Tullio became the first majority leader of the Front for Victory block (the Peronist block) in the Lower House of the Argentine Congress in December of 2013, she was interviewed by one of the major newspapers about the responsibilities of the position. She said: "I am not a free thinker, I am a party cadre". The comment was made as she described the importance of advancing President Cristina Fernandez goals in the Argentine House. Juliana Di Tullio was one of the fiercest proponents of women rights and LGBT legislation in the House, and as she was elevated to majority leader, she had to concentrate on advancing a broader agenda. That also entailed a more active and visible role battling with the opposition to support the proposals of the government. Di Tullio's quote reflects the change in legislative priorities that takes place as legislators achieve higher office within parliament and must adjust to their fiduciary roles as party gatekeepers. For women this can mean compromising on issues long championed and held dear.

5.1.1 – Argentina and Critical Mass

In the previous chapters I identified the relationship between institutional marginalization and the substantive representation of women by analyzing the

Israeli case in depth. This following chapter evaluates my hypotheses regarding women broadening their legislative agenda as they gain power and seniority in the case of Argentina. I do this by analyzing committee bill referrals over a twenty-year period. I show that in Argentina women experience less marginalization and as a result they are able to pursue policies outside of traditional women's domains.

As a pioneer of the global quota movement Argentina represents a case of a successful and long-term increase in the number of women elected. In fact, within ten years of quota implementation, over thirty percent of the Chamber of Deputies/ Lower House were women. After the implementation of the quota in the Upper House in 2001, women's presence increased from 5.7% to 37.1%. However, scholars have found that such developments have not produced the expected results in terms of substantive representation of women (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Htun, Lacalle, and Miccozzi, 2013; Piscopo and Francheset, 2014; Barnes, 2016). By testing my theory of progressive ambition and its impact on gender-related legislation in a country that has achieved critical mass - women being 30% of the legislature (Dahlerup, 1988) - I explain why the so called threshold or tipping point for "feminized change" (Childs and Krook, 2009) is unlikely to occur.

5.1.2 – Women and Committee Assignments in the Argentine Congress

Previous research on Latin America and committee appointments finds that women's overrepresentation in social issues committees is congruent with

legislator preferences. However, women's underrepresentation in powerful committees in typically masculine domains are not consistent with legislator preferences and therefore can be attributed to discrimination (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010). Other scholars looking at the United States Congress and Danish local councils find that committee assignments do reflect legislator preferences (Bækgaard and Kjaer 2012; Thomas 1994). Furthermore, some scholars challenge the claim that discriminatory practices influence committee assignments (Brown et al. 2002; Kerevel and Atkeson 2013; O'Brien 2012).

In her work on committee assignments in Argentina, Barnes looks at how the adoption of quotas and changes in women's numeric representation influence women's appointments over time. She finds that in the immediate period following quota implementation women experience marginalization and are far more likely to be appointed to women's issues committees. However, within fourteen years of quota implementation women and men are equally likely to be assigned women's issues committees. Additionally, over time women become more likely to be appointed to powerful committees in the lower chambers. Thus she argues that although there is a backlash to quota implementation once a sufficient amount of time has passed women are able to gain the skills and legislative networks to access powerful networks within the legislature (Franchescet and Piscopo, 2014; Barnes, 2014). Importantly her findings support my argument that women politicians want to broaden their legislative agenda, as well as providing further evidence that Argentina is a useful comparative case to Israel.

5.1.3 – Do Women in Argentina experience a ‘Political Life-Cycle’?

As addressed in the introduction and subsequent chapters I predict that over time the incentive for men and women to represent women’s issues decreases. In other words, scholars will see diminishing returns on the presence of women. As women advance and enter agenda setting positions, their willingness to promote women-friendly policies becomes less likely (Fenno, 1978). This is because women legislators are political actors and are likely to exhibit some degree of self-interest (Mayhew, 1997). Furthermore, pressure from the party and the legislature impact women as they do men (Cox and McCubbins, 2004). Meaning that legislators transition from freshman parliament members operating within an informational model (Krehbiel, 1991) of legislative behavior –legislators provide necessary information and expertise - to senior parliament members within a fiduciary/authority model (Rohde, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Laver and Shepsle, 1996) of legislative behavior – party leaders promote strategic party-defined policies. Consequently I assume that women’s political decision making will resemble men unless there is discrimination such as in the Israeli case.

As women in Argentina gain seniority and access to more powerful positions they are better able to navigate the political system and make strategic choices regarding their career. As a result, they will choose expand their legislative agenda and spend less time on specific constituent concerns (Fenno, 1978) or ‘niche’ issues like women’s issues. This political ‘lifecycle’ assumes that women have progressive ambition and aim to attain leadership positions within

their parties and the legislature. Furthermore, I assume that the substantive representation of women is in part a strategic political choice. For this reason, men legislators are not expected to represent women, because there is little penalty or reward in advocating for women.

5.2 – Explaining Patterns of the Substantive Representation of Women in Argentina

Initially, as the numeric representation of women in Argentina increased women legislators experienced a backlash from male legislators pigeon-holing them within women's issues committees (Heath et al, 2005). Additionally, they faced institutional barriers such as men preferring to keep powerful positions (Schwindt-Bayer, 2010) or lack of expertise in particular policy areas (Barnes, 2014). Some women legislators may view advocating for gender policies as a good way to justify their entry into politics and presence in the party (Krook, Franceschet, and Piscopo, 2012). Further using gender as a strategy are women who consider it easier to pursue gender policy precisely because they are expected to do so and are viewed as inherent experts on the matter (Swers, 2002, Schwindt-Bayer, 2010, O'Brien, 2013, Dahlerup, 2014). This marginalization hypothesis argues that women in politically weaker positions, such as freshman legislators, are more likely to propose gender-related legislation in Argentina.

As the numeric presence of women becomes institutionalized in the Argentine legislature and a sufficient amount of time has passed since the implementation of quotas, women may be better able to overcome institutional marginalization. This normalization process may encourage ambitious women to

seek higher office and powerful appointments in committees focusing on less feminine policy areas. Therefore we may observe empowered or emboldened women legislators increasing their legislative activity in more masculine domains. Women's increasing political power as well as their access to authority positions will be associated with reduced gender-related legislations.

5.3 – Data and Research Design

In order to test my theory in Argentina I rely on a multi stage method of analysis of the legislative process; from bill proposal to committee referral. I first analyze variation in legislative activity between freshmen women and senior women in the Argentine congress. I then analyze the probability of men and women's bill referrals across committees. I use this as a proxy for gender-related legislation. This approach emphasizes the relationship between institutional constraints and individual legislator's behavior. By analyzing legislative output I will show that these instrumental constraints influence political advancement, create real electoral incentives that impact women's substantive representation among individual parliament members.

The independent variable is an interaction term of gender and seniority. I use seniority as a proxy for progressive ambition. In Argentina, all the legislators to my knowledge identified as Cisgender (as opposed to transgender, gender queer, or gender nonconforming), and therefore binary gender terms are acceptable in this case. Men legislators are coded as 0 and women legislators are


coded as 1, seniority is coded based on the number of years the legislator served in office.

I utilize individual legislator data and session in the legislature data (multi-level data) for my model. This is necessary as the commitment and risk taking behavior of individual legislators' impact outcomes that occur at the aggregate. However, to ensure that a multilevel random intercepts and random slopes model best explains my data I will also run a poisson regression model.

Similar to Israel, Argentina has a closed-list proportional representation electoral system in which parties have near complete control over their electoral list. This means that it is a party-centered system and allows me to control for the effect of the party on legislators' strategic decisions. The dataset of Argentinian legislators and legislation I use includes the years 1985-2007. Consequently it covers the time period before the passing of gender quotas and after which is significant for assessing the normalization process in my theory. The Argentine National Congress is bicameral and has 24 electoral districts. Furthermore, the dataset accounts for eleven congressional 2-year terms in the Lower House and nearly four 6-year terms in the Upper House adding to the variation in the data.

However, there are a number of issues with the case of Argentina that may weaken my argument, namely that lengthy legislative careers in Argentina are not common. Only 19% of federal deputies in Argentina were reelected between 1989 and 2003 (Jones & Hwang, 2005). Nevertheless, Argentina is a good case study for exploring the long-term effect of institutionalized numeric representation of women and legislative outcomes.

Figure 5. 1 - Rate of Women Legislators in Argentina 1985-2007



5.4 - Analysis

5.4.1 – Do Women Legislators Resemble Men?

In order to gauge whether there is any statistical validity to my underlying assumption that women legislators will endeavor to mimic men legislators' career trajectories, I ran models using my stated independent variable of gender*seniority. As this is count data, I use a poisson model to observe the impact of seniority and gender on bill introduction. I include a control variable for authority as the primary explanation of legislative behavior by using the proxy variable of Committee Chair. Additionally, I consider an interaction of gender and committee chair to see whether the authority model better explains women's

behavior. Finally, I have control variables for the two major parties, the Peronist Justicialist Party and the centrist social-liberal Radical Civic Union party, in the Argentine legislature to respond to the alternative explanation of party control for legislative behavior. As the dataset begins before the implementation of the quota, I included a within estimator for Congressional session.

Table 5. 1 - Seniority, Gender, and Bill Proposal in the Argentine Congress

	(1) Bills Submitted (LN)	(2) Bills Submitted (LN)	(3) Bills Submitted (LN)
Female	0.120*** (0.0441)	-0.0976 (0.0743)	0.0878* (0.0476)
Seniority	0.0301*** (0.0102)	0.0174 (0.0108)	0.0320*** (0.0101)
Female*Seniority		0.103*** (0.0276)	
Committee Chair	0.0211 (0.0449)	0.0513 (0.0452)	0.0147 (0.0502)
Female*Committee Chair			0.229** (0.113)
Peronist		-0.258*** (0.0441)	-0.256*** (0.0443)
UCR		-0.265*** (0.0479)	-0.266*** (0.0480)
Constant	2.123*** (0.0859)	2.378*** (0.0919)	2.358*** (0.0918)
Fixed Effects by Congress	YES	YES	YES
Observations	2,249	2,241	2,241
R-squared	0.030	0.053	0.049

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Poisson model. Dependent variable is the count of bills proposed to Congress between 1987-2007

The first model predicts bill introduction looking at women, seniority, and committee chair but does not include my main explanatory interaction term of


gender*seniority. The second model considers my independent variable gender*seniority as well as the control variables for the two major party blocks, and finally the third model tests the interaction term for gender*committee chair. These models allow me to consider the impact of both seniority and authority on women's bill introduction. Based on these predictions for every additional year women are in the legislature we will observe a .1 increase in legislative proposals. When women are in a position of authority such as committee chair for every additional year they are in office we will observe a .2 increase in the number of bills proposed.

The results in table 5.1 and the predicted probabilities for women legislators in figure 5.2 suggest that the relationships between gender, introduction, and enactment are robust but should be analyzed with care. These results support existing scholarship by showing that new legislators tend to introduce lots of bills, as do legislators with little authority and small parties. The reason is that such legislators' policies are less frequently approved, so their main legislative currency is "bill introduction".

At every stage of seniority women introduce more bills than men, and their rate of bill introduction increases exponentially as can be seen in figure 5.2. Women's increase in bill proposals is not correlated with bill success. In fact, the success rate for women's bills relative to bills proposed by men declines over time. Importantly, women in positions of authority like committee chair have increasingly similar levels of success relative to men. This provides tentative support for my claim that as women have access to positions of power we observe

similar patterns to men. Generally these results do not support my theory that women legislators will resemble men in their legislative behavior. In the following section I compare men and women legislators' substantive policy.

Figure 5.2 – Women Legislators Bill Proposal and Success Rate Overtime



Note: Model estimates from Appendix

5.4.2 – Substantive Representation of Women in Argentina

To analyze substantive representation I looked at committee referrals overtime as a proxy for the policy preference of legislators. In the Argentine congress there are two significant pillars, the legislative party blocs and the committee system. While the parties govern the house, committees are institutionally responsible for the substantive debate over legislation. Since the 1980s committees have grown in importance as the amount of legislation proposed by legislators has ballooned (Calvo, 2014). Therefore, bills referrals to committees are a good measure for the policy preferences of individual legislators and an indication of their commitment to the issue.

The dataset includes over ninety committees. Due to the large amount of committees and bills in the dataset, I chose to present the committees with the largest number of bills referred to them as they best reflect legislative patterns and produce better predictions. I divided the resulting thirty committees into three very broad categories (see table 5.2) based on the work of Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson, 2016). Their categorization is in part based on whether the jurisdiction of a cabinet ministry comports with issues that have traditionally been viewed as more appropriate for men or for women. Additionally they consider the relative prestige of a ministry based on its resources (budget and personnel) and the expected public attention. These two measures are not fully correlated as some masculine areas, such as science, hold relatively low prestige. Nevertheless, the majority of feminine policy issues are of low prestige (family, children, etc.).

Table 5. 2 – Legislative Committees in Argentina

Masculine policy area	Neither Feminine nor Masculine	Feminine Policy area
Commerce; Foreign Affairs and Worship; Criminal Legislation; Budget and Finance; Administrative and Municipal Affairs; National Defense; Finance; National Economy and Investment; Industry and Trade; Agriculture, Public Works; Fisheries; Powers and Regulations; Mining, Energy and Fuels; Labor Legislation; Transportation	Justice Affairs; General Legislation; Petitions; Environment Protection; Science and Technology	Social Policy and Public Health Services; Social Security; Family; Women; Education; Culture; Children and Adolescents; Human Rights and Guarantees

A cursory glance at the number of committees in each category shows that the majority of committees with a large number of bill referrals are in masculine policy areas. The budget and finance committee received the largest number of bills referrals with over thirteen thousand bills. In comparison, only one thousand and two hundred bills were referred to the women's committee. Such descriptive empirical data provides some initial insight as to the prioritization of women's issues or lack thereof.

I argue that over-time ambitious senior women will endeavor to legislate in prestigious policy areas rather than focusing on niche or less prestigious social issues. Given the dichotomous coding of my dependent variable, bill referral or not, I use a logit model to estimate the likelihood that legislators will refer bills to a particular committee using my independent variable of gender*seniority. I then ran adjusted predictions to make these results more tangible. Adjusted predictions compute the probability of an event occurring for an individual who has specific characteristics, in this case, women legislators with seniority.

The first series of graphs show women's predicted proportion of bill referrals to feminine policy committees. Based on these results we see that women do maintain commitment to women's issues overtime thus disproving my second hypothesis. However, I find significant support for my first and third hypotheses as women refer a greater number of bills to committees that deal with women's issues relative to men. Furthermore, we see that men maintain stable levels of support for feminine policy areas indicating that they see little incentive to advocate for women.


5.4.3 – Feminine Committees

Among the committees that deal with women's issues, specifically the women's issues committee and family committee, a clear pattern emerges of women being the primary source of bill referrals. These predicted probability graph support existing scholarship as well as my findings from the Israeli case, that women are marginalized and tokenized within the legislature. Notably, neither men nor women are likely to significantly increase their advocacy in these committees. Women legislators refer the majority of bills to the women's issues committee and the family committee and this remains stable throughout their career. The gap in bill referrals between men and women remains stable suggesting that men view women as responsible for advocating for women and family matters.

However, as we look at the predictions of bill referrals to committees whose jurisdiction deals with policy viewed as traditionally appropriate for women, a different pattern of legislative behavior emerges. In both the culture and education committees we see a clear decrease of bills referrals by women over time. Rather than women entirely abandoning legislation that is explicitly gender-related, they are decreasing their support for private sphere and care legislation; like education, health, and culture. Why is there such a marked difference between bills referrals by women in the culture committee in comparison to the women's issues committee? Women may view gender-related legislation as a strategic necessity. This is because they are viewed by their party and voters as

informational experts such policy. Perhaps women legislators are concerned that they will be electorally penalized by voters if their advocacy for women decreases. This is a particularly interesting finding if we consider that ambitious women will pursue legislative agendas that provide them greater mobility within the party. Unlike in the Israeli case in which support for social policy and women’s issues only increases as women gain seniority, in Argentina we see greater variation in women’s legislative behavior.

Figure 5.3 – Bill Referrals to Feminine Committees




Note: Model estimates from Appendix

5.4.4 – Committees that are neither Feminine nor Masculine

The results in committees that are neither feminine nor masculine vary and a clear pattern does not emerge for women legislators. Among men legislators

there is an increase in bill referrals in committees whose jurisdiction includes legal and formal regulatory mechanisms. It is possible that men legislators view policies addressing formal institutional rule making like the Petitions committee or the Justice committee as pathways towards more prestigious centers of governmental power. Furthermore, as men and women gain seniority the deviation in bill referral in these two committees increases. Additional research is required to better ascertain the gendered dynamics emerging in these predicted outcome graphs.

Figure 5. 4 – Bill Referrals to Neither Feminine nor Masculine Committees



Note: Model estimates from Appendix C

The Environmental Protection committee predicted probabilities graph supports research suggesting that the environmental policy field is more women friendly

(Peeples and DeLuca, 2006) as I observe convergence among men and women legislators in bills referrals.

5.4.5 – Masculine Committees

Based on my hypothesis that women's increasing political power along with the normalization of their presence in the legislature - I expect to see an increase in the predicted proportion of bills women propose over time in masculine policy areas. I find support for my theory in predicted bills referrals to masculine policy committees. As women gain seniority in Argentina they refer more bills to committees whose jurisdiction deals with policies associated with men. Although women legislators in Argentina maintain support for women's issues throughout their political career, they also make an effort to broaden their legislative agendas. These findings indicate that the long-term effect of a gender quota in Argentina has produced some normalization for women legislators in contrast to Israel where women continue to face institutional bias.

The predicted increase in bill referrals by women overtime in committees that oversee and regulate industries, economic affairs, and labor is markedly different to the stability of bill referrals by women in committees working on criminal justice and domestic security. As women focus on trade, various production and labor regulation, men appear to increasingly devote legislative energy to the justice system, homeland security, and crime. Much like in the committees that were neither in the feminine nor the masculine domain there appears to be a gendered division in legislative focus overtime.


It is clear based on these predicted probability graphs that women expand their legislative agenda beyond solely focusing on women's issues. Although their legislative choices do not imitate men legislators, it does appear that women make particular strategic choices over time. The data shows that women who want to be successful politicians and progress within the legislature and the party must conform in distinct ways. Primarily, women need to expand their legislative agenda and develop credibility in policy areas that are not exclusively within the feminine domain. However, as in the Israeli case there does appear to be some marginalization of women within the Argentine legislature. There are a number of possible explanations for the dominance of bills referrals by male legislators to particular committees. The legislative monopoly of men in these policy domains may be a result of the deliberate exclusion of women. Another possibility is that women are opting out of competing with men in these arenas and making strategic choices about the viability of their legislative agenda.

These results also support my assertion, that overtime both men and women's commitment to women's issues is unlikely to increase. This is because women politicians are strategic actors whose legislative agenda is in part explained by individual preferences but is also explained by their ability to promote a particular policy. Ultimately, the goal for ambitious politicians is to have access to prestigious and powerful portfolios and those are consistent across gender.

An exception to these results is the Foreign Affairs committee where I find that women initially refer more bills, however over time there is a significant decline. Men on the other hand appear to greatly increase the number of bill

referrals to the Foreign Affairs committee. Much like in other cases, this gendered divergence in legislative behavior uncovers possible institutional bias towards women by inferring that diplomacy and foreign policy remain the exclusive purview of men.

Figure 5.5 - Bill Referrals to Masculine Committees



Note: Model estimates in Appendix

5.5 – Considering the impact of ‘Normalization’ for Women

Even though I do not find full support for my theory of a decrease in support for women’s issues there are observable related results. First and foremost the logit models of individual committees show that both men and women expand their legislative agenda by increasing bill referrals in non-feminine committees. These results indicate that men and women pursue different legislative pathways towards mobility and political advancement. Furthermore, the marginalization of women within the legislature represents a major hurdle for women as certain policy areas become increasingly male dominated over time. This is exemplified in the following committees; public works, petitions, cultural and foreign affairs, and criminal legislation. Interestingly, in the major consensus issue areas such as the national budget and national security the data provided evidence that as they gain seniority women increase their legislative activities in these domains as we would expect. Despite not seeing a clear decrease in referrals for women’s issues or social issues there is an apparent stagnation in legislative activity.

The findings presented in the Argentina case suggest that further analysis is required to conclusively say that women’s political gains within legislatures and the long-term effect of numeric representation will have a negative impact on the substantive representation of women. Nevertheless, this analysis gives some credence to my theory. Additionally, the results in this chapter show that when women experience less institutional marginalization they expand their legislative agenda. Even though we continue to observe women legislators behaving

differently than men, by introducing more gender-related legislation, it is unclear whether increased normalization of women in the legislature will impact this phenomenon. Women have policy preferences that cause them to represent women's issues, however, their advocacy is in part explained by the institutional constraints they face.

5.5.1 – Conclusions and Implications

Scholars often explore legislative behavior by viewing legislators as 'neutral' and fail to account for how gender impacts decision making within the institution. Ignoring the ways in which gender incentivizes political behavior creates an incomplete picture of democratic representation. As legislatures become more diverse, and historically marginalized populations enter political institutions in greater numbers we must reconsider and challenge existing assumptions.

In order to justify their focus on women, the gender and politics literature assumes that women act as anti-status quo political actors due to their gender. Given that women who enter politics represent a select elite that resemble male elites in these institutions - these assumptions seem a bit far-fetched. The most recent manifestation of such assertions is the critical actors' literature that argues that women will necessarily advocate for women when they have access to agenda setting positions. Theoretically, this relies on the notion that women will behave differently than men once they achieve equality on all measurable factors. However, because of instrumental constraints and marginalization, focusing on

gender policy remains a viable legislative activity for women. The question as to how women legislators will behave once they are no longer limited in their legislative activity by party, legislative weakness, and electoral pressures remains. This work aims to shed some light on when institutional conditions play an important role in determining whether women will choose to promote women's issues.

Chapter 6 – Concluding Remarks: The Policy We Can Get Rather than the Policy We Want

6.1 – Long-term Impact of Diversifying Legislatures

As legislatures become increasingly diverse should we expect changes in policy outcomes? Will diversifying legislatures improve the lived experiences of historically marginalized communities? My dissertation looks at this question and finds that although women politicians do advocate for women’s issues, their policy choices are best explained by the institutional constraints and marginalization they experience. This is despite scholars’ assumptions that individual policy preferences inform their choice to engage in the substantive representation of women.

6.1.1 – Women Legislators view policies strategically

In my second chapter “If she is hungry, she will hunt food” interviews with legislative aides confirmed that legislators calculate and strategize their policy objectives. Members of the governing coalition are perceived to have fewer legislative hurdles, and improved ability to promote politically salient policy, whereas members of the opposition felt constrained in their policy area and their ability to effectively pass bills. Because of the high degree of coalition discipline, government bills and private member bills proposed by members of the governing coalition are likely to pass. The governing coalition necessarily holds the majority of seats in the legislature. To increase the likelihood for support from

the coalition, or at the very least diminish the possibility that their bill will be blocked, opposition members try and avoid issues that directly challenge the government or veer into areas of interest for the coalition.

This dynamic is particularly apparent in issue areas that are located at the core of ideological divides in Israel like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although working on foreign affairs and national security policy is the ultimate political goal, only the government is able to pass bills on these issues. Opposition members are only able to engage in position-taking or posturing in these political spheres. At times they submit legislative proposals intended only to gain public attention or get the government on the record regarding their position. However in most cases, opposition members would prefer to be able to implement their desired policy and begrudge these methods of political engagement.

Despite acknowledging the positive attention legislators may get from working on social issues, most of the interviewees identified their focus on such policy as determined by institutional weakness. Working on social benefits, families, minority rights, and more, are a strategic legislative choice. Such issues are not viewed as a threat to the government and are unlikely to receive push back. Dealing with niche and minute issues enables opposition members to develop broader coalitions and become more effective legislators. However, politicians belonging to parties that may conceivably be in the governing coalition lamented their inability to work on high prestige issues like the conflict. National

security was understood as the signifier of status and political clout, a necessary expertise for political advancement.

Aides for women legislators discussed gender in a number of different ways. Firstly, legislative aides identified gender issues as an area of policy expertise for women politicians. Secondly, they considered it a framing device for policy. For example, one interviewee explained that the woman legislator for whom she worked could discuss the army from a human resources perspective. However, she was less able to be effective if she addressed it as a security expert in equal standing to members of the security apparatus. Finally, participants viewed gender policy and their employers' gender (exclusively for women) as potential obstacles for political advancement. For ambitious women politicians, developing a legislative record that has broad constituent appeal was a political necessity. This was true even when the politician's brand was being a feminist and a voice for women.

6.1.2 – Institutional Bias produces Gender Policy Specialization

Even though my qualitative data supported my hypotheses regarding the explanatory variable of legislative agenda setting among legislators, in the analysis of my dataset of Israeli legislation I find that women in the Knesset increase gender-related legislation as they become more senior. In addition, women in the Israeli Knesset do not experience power and authority in the legislature similarly to men. As men gain seniority they become more desirable legislative partners for other Knesset members and their co-sponsorship rates

increase. For women the opposite occurs, as they gain seniority they are less likely to co-sponsor and are not seen as desirable legislative partners. There is one exception to this; senior women in the Knesset are sought after by junior women but only on gender-related legislation. When junior women in the Knesset want to advance non gender-related bills they seek out men as co-sponsors. This pattern establishes women's marginalization within the legislature.

We might assume that under equal conditions we would observe similar or identical patterns of legislative behavior among men and women. By this, I mean that if the primary explanation for legislative content was individual preference, we would observe similar distributions among men and women, with women perhaps working slightly more on women's issues. Instead I find that over time women in Israel legislate almost exclusively on gender-related issues, while men rarely if ever propose gender-related bills. Based on these findings I conclude that the institutional constraints women face determine their legislative agenda and pressure them to advocate for women's issues. Women are not a monolith and while some women might choose to focus on gender policy, party bias dictates a reality in which all women legislators promote gender-related legislation.

Men legislators are unlikely to promote women's issues at any point in their career. As men advance they achieve positions of authority within the legislature and the party. Unlike women their gender does not dictate their committee chairmanship. In my data women are most likely to become chairperson for the Women's Status and Gender Equality committee or a temporary sub-committee

on women's issues. They are severely underrepresented in committees that do not deal with social issues. This gender segregation in committee assignments and positions of authority contributes to the legislative outcomes discussed previously, namely, women's significant increase in gender-related legislation over time.

Despite this process of marginalization, or more accurately because of it, as they gain seniority women become more effective legislators. More specifically, women are very effective legislators on gender-related issues, passing such bills at twice the average rate for the Knesset. Their rates of success on non gender-related legislation are similar to men. Thus women become the sole representatives of women's interests in the Knesset. While the evidence of substantive representation for women in the Israeli Knesset may be encouraging for some, the primary explanation for its existence is bias towards women. Therefore, marginalized and institutionally weak women politicians are most likely to represent women's issues in the legislature. This is contrary to the assumptions in the literature that representation of women indicates greater autonomy and power.

6.1.3 – Normalization produces Conformity

In Argentina I find some evidence of women's institutional marginalization however it is not as extreme as the Israeli case. Women legislators in the Argentine Congress do expand their agenda as they gain seniority. Although they maintain a commitment to gender-related legislation as evidenced by the increase

in bill referrals to the women's issues committee, they simultaneously increase bill referrals to committees focused on labor and industry. Women expand legislative activities to policy areas that their male colleagues are less focused on. Even in Argentina, women legislators avoid policy areas like finance and criminal justice that men appear to dominate. I conclude that unlike in Israel, women legislators in Argentina experience less pressure to work exclusively on women's issues and are therefore able to have more diverse portfolios.

6.2 – Exclusion or Acclamation?

Why do these cases differ? It is because of the normalization of women's presence in the Argentine legislature. As one of the first countries to institute a quota system, the percentage of women legislators in the legislature has exceeded thirty percent for a few decades. Additionally, the establishment of a standard for women's political participation in state institutions may have contributed to some shifts in attitude causing a decrease in bias. Perhaps the lack of an institutionalized mechanism for guaranteed numeric representation enables Israeli parties and men legislators to continue to marginalize their women colleagues without incurring criticism.

This process of normalization may decrease bias and allow women to gain political power similar to men yet it also alters women's calculations regarding gender bills. On the one hand, when women are weak and marginalized they are more likely to promote gender-related legislation. While on the other hand, when they are able to access positions of power within the legislature they become less

likely to consistently promote women's issues. Consequently, strong commitment to women's issues is better explained by institutional weakness than by individual legislator preferences.

My results have ominous implications for a broader discussion of historically marginalized communities entering political institutions and for policy outcomes. Namely, politicians with little clout and fewer resources are more likely to focus on social issues. If social issues remain the exclusive purview of marginal legislators we will see little change to policy hierarchies even as legislatures become more diverse. Furthermore, legislators who are able to gain power will resemble the mainstream model of legislative behavior, i.e. the hegemonic male politician model. Entering positions of power and authority in the legislature allows and encourages legislators to mimic existing leadership.

Finally, politicians who currently enjoy a great deal of power and authority in the legislature are unlikely to change their behavior in any way. They will either pressure historically marginalized legislators to narrow the scope of their political activity, or require them to adapt to existing norms. The options available to women and other minority groups are isolation or acclamation. Regardless, men legislators will pursue their own interests and opt out of representing women.

Social Policy legislation results from institutional weakness rather than legislators policy preferences. Gender-related legislation is a strategic choice that women legislators make when they have few other options. In order to be active and effective legislators they advocate for policies they view as realistic. Due to

marginalization within their parties and the legislature, they are forced to work on women's issues. This is not the narrative of representation that proponents of diversifying legislatures hope for. My contribution to existing gender and politics scholarship is that rather than substantive representation of women resulting from increased empowerment, gender policy is best explained by institutional constraints and sexist bias.

My research has broad implications not only for women but for other minorities as well. The claim that minority representatives must choose between marginalization and acclamation fits in well with recent scholarship on black politicians in the U.S. that argues that to succeed in a national campaign they must deracialize their campaign. Political advancement and increased political participation of minorities is more likely to impact individual legislators than to significantly alter political institutions. Systemic change requires a more radical vision.

Appendices

Appendix 3.2

Gender, Seniority and Gender-related Legislation 14-15 Knesset by sex

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Women	0.2153014	0.2093926	0.304	-0.1951005	0.6257033
Seniority	-0.0716869	0.0328349	0.029	-0.1360421	-0.0073318
Gender*Seniority	0.4926478	0.0838636	0	0.3282782	0.6570174
_cons	-2.121463	0.0891171	0	-2.296129	-1.946796

	Number of observations =
Multinomial logistic regression	6938
Log likelihood = -2429.1051	LR chi2(3) = 282.6
Pseudo R2 = 0.055	Prob > chi2 = 0

Gender, Seniority and Non Gender-Related Legislation 14-15 Knesset by sex

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	-0.0464751	0.1996041	0.816	-0.437692	0.3447417
Seniority	0.0443871	0.028065	0.114	-0.0106193	0.0993935
Gender*Seniority	-0.4758344	0.0804148	0	-0.6334446	-0.3182243
_cons	1.835642	0.0777697	0	1.683216	1.988067

	Number of observations =
Logistic regression	6938
Log likelihood = -2868.873	LR chi2(3) = 235.25
	Prob > chi2 = 0
Pseudo R2 = 0.0394	= 0

Appendix 3.3

Gender, Seniority, and Feminist Bills

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	1.484747	0.3408397	0	0.816713	2.15278
Seniority	-0.0006566	0.0689315	0.992	-0.1357598	0.1344466
Gender*Seniority	0.1057122	0.1351811	0.434	-0.159238	0.3706624
_cons	-4.021463	0.1962752	0	-4.406156	-3.636771

Logistic regression

Number of Observations = 6938

LR chi2(3) =131.03

Prob > chi2=0.0000

Log likelihood = -

858.38853

Pseudo R2 = 0.0709

Gender, Seniority, and Anti-Feminist Bills

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	-1.034999	0.7236823	0.153	-2.453391	0.3833919
Seniority	-0.0044433	0.0494302	0.928	-0.1013247	0.0924382
Gender*Seniority	-0.0158391	0.3105504	0.959	-0.6245066	0.5928284
_cons	-3.306082	0.1403399	0	-3.581143	-3.03102

Logistic regression

Number of Observations = 6938

LR chi2(3) =20.00

Prob > chi2=0.0002

Log likelihood = -

955.44609

Pseudo R2 = 0.0104

Appendix 3.4

Gender, Seniority, Co-Sponsorship and Share of Women

	Coefficient	Standard Error	T	P>t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Seniority	0.0938385	0.0155419	6.04	0	0.0633745	0.1243025
Female Legislator	0.4861359	0.0984011	4.94	0	0.2932583	0.6790136
Gender*Seniority	-0.3192674	0.0475158	-6.72	0	-0.4124039	-0.2261309
Share of Women on Bill	-0.3573654	0.0474786	-7.53	0	-0.4504291	-0.2643018
_cons	1.446379	0.0332303	43.53	0	1.381244	1.511515

Gender, Seniority, Co-Sponsorship and Number of Women in Knesset

	Coefficient	Standard Error	T	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Seniority	-0.0000398	0.0129055	0	0.998	-0.0253361	0.0252565
Female						
Legislator	-0.1483346	0.081209	-1.83	0.068	-0.3075138	0.0108445
Gender*						
Seniority	-0.2328331	0.0393002	-5.92	0	-0.3098662	-0.1558001
Total						
Number						
of Women	0.2171811	0.0025591	84.87	0	0.212165	0.2221973
_cons	1.135095	0.0271386	41.83	0	1.0819	1.18829

Appendix 4.5

Co-Sponsorship and Center-Left Parties

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Seniority	0.1013171	0.0156092	0	0.0707213	0.1319129
Gender	0.4535601	0.0984226	0	0.2606402	0.6464799
Gender*Seniority	-0.3493004	0.0477163	0	-0.4428299	-0.2557708
Center-Left					
Parties	-0.1055709	0.0226832	0	-0.1500327	-0.0611091
_cons	1.4038	0.0326865	0	1.33973	1.467869

Number of Observations = 15400

R-squared = 0.0147

Co-Sponsorship and Left Parties

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Seniority	0.0976597	0.0155685	0	0.0671436	0.1281758
Gender	0.3527719	0.0987307	0	0.159248	0.5462958
Gender*Seniority	-0.2805281	0.0485083	0	-0.3756101	-0.1854462
Leftist Parties	-0.1368727	0.0220608	0	-0.1801145	-0.093631
_cons	1.416	0.0327765	0	1.351754	1.480246

Number of
Observations =
15400

R-squared =
0.014

Co-Sponsorship and Right Parties

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]
Seniority	0.1004233	0.0156305	0	0.0697857 0.131061
Gender	0.4214501	0.0982101	0	0.2289467 0.6139536
Gender*Seniority	-0.3426276	0.0476958	0	-0.4361169 -0.2491382
Rightist Parties	-0.0601479	0.019287	0.002	-0.0979526 -0.0223431
_cons	1.407308	0.0328219	0	1.342973 1.471642

Number of Observations = 15400

R-squared = 0.014

Co-Sponsorship and Center-Right Parties

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>t	[95% Conf. Interval]
Seniority	0.0960282	0.0155769	0	0.0654957 0.1265607
Gender	0.5142626	0.1002684	0	0.3177247 0.7108004
Gender*Seniority	-0.381627	0.0486079	0	-0.4769042 -0.2863499
Center-Right Parties	-0.1300269	0.0283889	0	-0.1856725 -0.0743812
_cons	1.410931	0.0327905	0	1.346658 1.475205

Number of Observations = 15400

R-squared = 0.0147

Appendix 4.6

Share of Male Legislators in Gendered and Non-Gendered Legislation

Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error	P>t	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gendered Legislation	-0.1012943	0.017189	0	-0.1349867	-0.0676018
Seniority (log)	0.0029877	0.002714	0.271	-0.0023321	0.0083075
Gendered Legislation*Seniority	0.0063232	0.0082165	0.442	-0.0097821	0.0224284
Female Legislator	-0.1580657	0.0182739	0	-0.1938848	-0.1222466
Gendered Legislation*Female Legislator	-0.217658	0.0393835	0	-0.2948544	-0.1404616
Female Legislator*Seniority	-0.0455313	0.0088776	0	-0.0629323	-0.0281302
Female Legislator*Seniority	0.0426233	0.0190602	0.025	0.005263	0.0799835
Legislator*Gendered Legislation*Seniority					
_cons	0.8732697	0.0056956	0	0.8621055	0.8844338

Number of Observations
= 15283
R-squared = 0.3456

Appendix 4.7

Foreign Affairs

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	0.3158021	0.2776358	0.255	0.2283541	0.8599583
Seniority	0.0280076	0.027729	0.312	0.0263402	0.0823555
Gender*Seniority	0.2894548	0.1255461	0.021	0.5355205	-0.043389
_cons	-2.089999	0.0804099	0	-2.247599	-1.932398

Logistic regression Number of Observations = 6938

LR chi2(3) = 13.19

Prob > chi2 = 0.0042

Log likelihood = -2434.554

Pseudo R2 = 0.0027

Economic Affairs

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]
Gender	0.2087977	0.2102062	0.321	0.6207942 0.2031988
Seniority	0.0058859	0.0206744	0.776	0.0346353 0.046407
Gender*Seniority	0.1112963	0.090893	0.221	0.2894434 0.0668508
_cons	-1.07481	0.0590428	0	-1.190531 0.9590877

Logistic regression Number of Observations = 6937
LR chi2(3) = 32.92
Prob > chi2 = 0
Log likelihood = -3844.1253 Pseudo R2 = 0.0043

Social
Issues

Variables	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]
Gender	0.1926113	0.1711258	0.26	0.5280117 0.1427891
Seniority	0.0843918	0.0182327	0	0.1201272 0.0486563
Gender*Seniority	0.3060553	0.0737742	0	0.1614605 0.4506501
_cons	0.2808367	0.0518916	0	0.179131 0.3825425

Logistic regression Number of Observations=6937
LR chi2(3)=
85.61
Prob > chi2=0
Pseudo R2=0.0089
Log likelihood = -4745.6701

Bureaucratic Issues

Variables	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	0.4034126	0.1688852	0.017	0.0724037	0.7344216
Seniority	0.0227989	0.0183787	0.215	0.0132226	0.0588205
Gender*Seniority	-0.1867822	0.0708856	0.008	0.3257154	-0.047849
_cons	0.2478609	0.0522023	0	0.1455463	0.3501754

Logistic regression Number of Observations=6937

LR chi2(3)=7.32

Prob >

chi2=0.0623 Logistic regression

Pseudo R2=0.0008

Log likelihood = -4726.2955

Appendix 4.8

Rates of Bill Passage Success by Content and Legislator Sex

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	-0.1861204	0.4039499	0.645	-0.9778477	0.6056069
Seniority	0.1174212	0.0378691	0.002	0.0431991	0.1916432
Gender*Seniority	0.0945348	0.1583525	0.551	-0.2158305	0.4049
Gender-related Bill	0.6719254	0.3179381	0.035	0.0487781	1.295073
Gender*Gender*related Bill	-1.058072	0.8560111	0.216	-2.735823	0.6196789
Gender-related Bill*Seniority	-0.1844877	0.1219453	0.13	-0.4234961	0.0545206
Gender*Gender-related Bill*Seniority	0.4913982	0.3148181	0.119	-0.1256339	1.10843
Committee Chair	-0.0646447	0.1165424	0.579	-0.2930636	0.1637742
Leftist Parties	-0.2787104	0.1673	0.096	-0.6066123	0.0491915
Center-Left Parties	-0.2748607	0.1484381	0.064	-0.565794	0.0160726
Center-Right Parties	-0.3455934	0.2184371	0.114	-0.7737222	0.0825354
Rightist Parties	-0.1602475	0.1404115	0.254	-0.4354489	0.1149539
_cons	-2.565901	0.134534	0	-2.829583	-2.302219

Logistic regression Number of Observations=5779

LR chi2(12)=25.47

Prob > chi2=0.0127

Pseudo R2=0.0079

Log likelihood = -1609.6761

Appendix 5.2

Number of Bills Submitted by Gender in Argentine Congress

Variables	Coefficient	OIM Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	-0.0672026	0.0228135	0.003	-0.1119162	-0.022489
Seniority	0.0302978	0.0033087	0	0.0238129	0.0367827
Gender*Seniority	0.0811936	0.0073142	0	0.066858	0.0955292
Committee Chair	0.0520295	0.0166157	0.002	0.0194634	0.0845955
Gender*Committee Chair	0.0670997	0.0335492	0.045	0.0013445	0.1328548
Peronist	-0.2468804	0.0136603	0	-0.2736541	-0.2201067
UCR	-0.3137852	0.0154593	0	-0.3440848	-0.2834856
Congress					
2	0.0878964	0.0391003	0.025	0.0112612	0.1645317
3	-0.0733346	0.0383038	0.056	-0.1484087	0.0017395
4	0.0127182	0.0374797	0.734	-0.0607407	0.0861771
5	0.0117571	0.0372174	0.752	-0.0611878	0.0847019
6	-0.1009955	0.0373372	0.007	-0.1741751	-0.027816
7	0.0076192	0.0366053	0.835	-0.0641258	0.0793642
8	0.0809958	0.0358203	0.024	0.0107893	0.1512023
9	0.1839061	0.0354377	0	0.1144495	0.2533627
10	0.1937278	0.0351682	0	0.1247994	0.2626563
11	0.145179	0.0358099	0	0.0749928	0.2153651
12	0.264148	0.0351905	0	0.1951759	0.3331201
_cons	2.61785	0.0323317	0	2.554481	2.681219

Generalized Linear Models Number of Observations 2241

Optimization : ML

Residual df 2222

Scale Parameter 1

Deviance = 25972.19509 (1/df) Deviance 11.68866

AIC 15.64058

Pearson = 38576.94887 (1/df) Pearson 17.36136

BIC 8830.182

Variance function: $V(u) = u$ [Poisson]

Log likelihood = -17506.26448

Link function : $g(u) = \ln(u)$ [Log]

Difference in Success Rate of Female Legislators in Argentine Congress

Variables	Coefficient	OIM Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]
Gender	0.041181	0.1646483	0.802	-0.2815237 0.3638857
Seniority	-0.0158444	0.0230914	0.493	-0.0611027 0.0294139
Gender*Seniority	-0.1107538	0.0648535	0.088	-0.2378642 0.0163567
Committee Chair	0.489446	0.0817578	0	0.3292037 0.6496884
Gender*Committee Chair	0.1582268	0.1945212	0.416	-0.2230277 0.5394813
Peronist	0.7989159	0.0928467	0	0.6169398 0.980892
UCR	0.5640985	0.101469	0	0.365223 0.762974
Congress				
2	-0.2576497	0.2011752	0.2	-0.6519458 0.1366465
3	0.2850169	0.1812486	0.116	-0.0702238 0.6402575
4	0.187279	0.1819467	0.303	-0.1693301 0.5438881
5	-0.1624241	0.1904199	0.394	-0.5356401 0.210792
6	0.3146728	0.1757874	0.073	-0.0298642 0.6592098
7	0.1179827	0.1803541	0.513	-0.2355049 0.4714703
8	0.0408921	0.1801495	0.82	-0.3121943 0.3939786
9	-0.0494185	0.180149	0.784	-0.402504 0.3036671
10	-0.7367497	0.1967743	0	-1.12242 -0.3510791
11	-1.06752	0.2163068	0	-1.491474 -0.6435668
12	-1.441155	0.226815	0	-1.885704 -0.9966055
_cons	-3.804685	0.1692656	0	-4.13644 -3.472931

Generalized Linear Models Number of Observations = 2241

Optimization : ML	Residual df = 2222	AIC 1.772743
Scale parameter 1		BIC -14545.85
Deviance = 2596.166169 (1/df) Deviance 1.168392		Log likelihood = -1967.358469
Pearson = 4276.609053 (1/df) Pearson 1.924667		
Variance function: $V(u) = u*(1-u/nBills)$ [Binomial]		
Link function : $g(u) = \ln(u/(nBills-u))$ [Logit]		

Appendix 5.3

<u>Bill Referrals to Women's Issues Committee</u>					
Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P> z	95% Confidence Intervals	
Gender	0.7848906	0.150346	0	0.4902179	1.079563
Seniority	0.0319779	0.0252952	0.206	-0.0175997	0.0815556
Gender*Seniority	0.0102148	0.0432381	0.813	-0.0745304	0.0949599
_cons	-3.980672	0.0995763	0	-4.175838	-3.785506

Logistic regression Number of observations = 17232

LR chi2(3) = 77.18 Pseudo R2 = 0.0175

Prob > chi2 =

0.0000

Log likelihood = -2160.5153

Bill Referrals to Family Committee

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	0.7848906	0.150346	0	0.4902179	1.079563
Seniority	0.0319779	0.0252952	0.206	-0.0175997	0.0815556
Gender*Seniority	0.0102148	0.0432381	0.813	-0.0745304	0.0949599
_cons	-3.980672	0.0995763	0	-4.175838	-3.785506

Logistic Regression Number of observations = 17232
LR chi2(3) = 77.18 Log likelihood = -2160.5153
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Pseudo R2 = 0.0175

Bill Referrals to Culture Committee

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	0.7469001	0.1322665	0	0.4876624	1.006138
-	-	-	-	-	-
Seniority	0.0103721	0.0182178	0.569	-0.0460783	0.0253341
-	-	-	-	-	-
Gender*Seniority	0.2888279	0.0536007	0	-0.3938832	-0.1837725
_cons	-2.917834	0.0649045	0	-3.045044	-2.790623

Logistic Regression Number of observations = 17232
LR chi2(3) = 48.88 Log likelihood = -3488.2357
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Pseudo R2 = 0.0070

Bill Referrals To Education Committee

Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	0.5310043	0.1424836	0	0.2517415	0.810267
Seniority	-0.0138612	0.0214581	0.518	-0.0559182	0.0281958
Gender*Seniority	-0.1388337	0.0515085	0.007	-0.2397885	-0.0378789
_cons	-3.244427	0.0757998	0	-3.392992	-3.095863

Logistic Regression Number of observations = 17232
LR chi2(3) = 19.49 Log likelihood = -2825.9204
Prob > chi2 = 0.0002 Pseudo R2 = 0.0034

Appendix 5.4

<u>Bill Referrals to Justice Committee</u>					
Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	0.35647	0.1605378	0.026	0.0418217	0.6711183
Seniority	0.1198676	0.0176416	0	0.0852908	0.1544444
Gender*Seniority	-0.0815772	0.0459163	0.076	-0.1715714	0.0084171
_cons	-3.94245	0.0857496	0	-4.110516	-3.774384
Logistic Regression					
Number of observation = 17232					
LR chi2(3) = 40.29					
Pseudo R2 = 0.0091					
Prob > chi2 = 0					
Log likelihood = -2193.1369					

<u>Bill Referrals to Petitions Committee</u>					
Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	0.2916698	0.250183	0.244	0.1986799	0.7820194
Seniority	0.1393182	0.023661	0	0.0929434	0.185693
Gender*Seniority	-0.1375848	0.0752744	0.068	0.2851199	0.0099502
_cons	-4.744816	0.1224911	0	-4.984894	-4.504737
Logistic Regression					
Number of observations = 17232					
LR chi2(3) = 29.45					
Pseudo R2 = 0.0125					
Prob > chi2 = 0					
Log likelihood = -1167.6065					

<u>Bill Referrals to Environmental Protection Committee</u>					
Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	-0.5056417	0.2072018	0.015	-0.9117497	-0.0995336
Seniority	-0.0425819	0.0292505	0.145	-0.0999118	0.014748
Gender*Seniority	0.0651342	0.0652975	0.319	-0.0628465	0.1931149
_cons	-3.657324	0.0967675	0	-3.846985	-3.467663
Logistic Regression					
Number of Observations = 17232					
LR chi2(3) = 10.49					
Log likelihood = -1712.7301					
Prob > chi2 = 0.0148					
Pseudo R2 = 0.0031					

Appendix 5.5

Bill Referrals to Agriculture Committee

Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	-1.156425	0.1277166	0	-1.406745	-0.9061053
Seniority	-0.1980606	0.027048	0	-0.2510736	-0.1450475
Gender*Seniority	0.3462698	0.0398242	0	0.2682157	0.4243239
_cons	-2.284888	0.0683026	0	-2.418759	-2.151017

Logistic Regression Number of Observations = 17232

LR chi2(3) =

115.03

Pseudo R2 = 0.0156

Prob > chi2 = 0

Log likelihood = -3630.318

Bill Referrals to Labor Legislation Committee

Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	-0.5083186	0.1620494	0.002	-0.8259296	-0.1907076
Seniority	0.0162423	0.0202192	0.422	-0.0233867	0.0558712
Gender*Seniority	0.0777611	0.045955	0.091	-0.0123091	0.1678313
_cons	-3.370165	0.0765159	0	-3.520134	-3.220197

Logistic Regression Number of Observations = 17232

LR chi2(3) =

15.43

Pseudo R2 = 0.0032

Prob > chi2 =

0.0015

Log likelihood = -2417.6988

Bill Referrals to Industry Committee

Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	-0.7594488	0.2609278	0.004	-1.270858	-0.2480398
Seniority	-0.0093281	0.0332446	0.779	-0.0744862	0.0558301
Gender*Seniority	0.1238827	0.0727023	0.088	-0.0186111	0.2663765
_cons	-4.198776	0.118527	0	-4.431085	-3.966468

Logistic Regression Number of Observations = 17232

LR chi2(3) =

10.67

Pseudo R2 = 0.0045

Prob > chi2 =

0.0137

Log likelihood = -1172.6518

Bill Referrals to Energy Committee

Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	-0.6976138	0.1894552	0	-1.068939	-0.3262884
Seniority	-0.07083	0.0286548	0.013	-0.1269924	-0.0146677
Gender*Seniority	0.1264361	0.0583909	0.03	0.011992	0.2408803
_cons	-3.38324	0.0893536	0	-3.55837	-3.208111

Logistic Regression Number of Observations = 17232

LR chi2(3) =

19.85

Pseudo R2 = 0.005

Prob > chi2 =

0.0002

Log likelihood = -1987.0009

Bill Referrals to Economic Affairs Committee

Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	-1.11387	0.3494768	0.001	-1.798832	-0.4289084
Seniority	0.0592417	0.0320081	0.064	-0.0034931	0.1219764
Gender*Seniority	0.1134047	0.0873408	0.194	-0.0577801	0.2845895
_cons	-4.702359	0.1352502	0	-4.967444	-4.437273

Logistic Regression Number of Observations = 17232

LR chi2(3) = 23.6

Pseudo R2 = 0.0137

Prob > chi2 = 0

Log likelihood = -849.12803

Bill Referrals to Cultural and Foreign Affairs Committee

Variables	Coefficients	Standard Error	P>z	[95% Conf.	Interval]
Gender	0.2585096	0.1791333	0.149	-0.0925852	0.6096044
Seniority	0.1170367	0.0161356	0	0.0854114	0.148662
Gender*Seniority	-0.2313968	0.0627248	0	-0.3543351	-0.1084585
_cons	-3.715657	0.0774374	0	-3.867431	-3.563882

Logistic Regression Number of Observations = 17232

LR chi2(3) = 63.28

Pseudo R2 = 0.0135

Prob > chi2 = 0

Log likelihood = -2311.1975

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