

Women In The First Intifada: A New Beginning Or An Inevitable End?

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Today, student protests and political candidates call to “globalize the Intifada” in protest of the current Israeli occupation of Palestine.¹ This slogan references the two segments of Palestinian history from 1987-1993 and 2000-2005 that were characterized by popular uprisings aimed at achieving economic independence and freedom from the Israeli military occupation. The rallying cry is not only aiming to resurrect the era of public protest, but the radical new roles the Intifadas created within Palestinian society. The immense importance of the First Intifada in providing a temporary new and radical role for women, especially, cannot be understated, although the movement failed to create a lasting effect on women’s liberation in Palestine. But why did the Intifada not have a permanent effect?

Women's experiences throughout and directly after the First Intifada were not identical, and this paper will address the ways in which the daughter, mother and wife roles facilitated different experiences and capacities to engage in the Intifada. The goal of this paper is to examine the prominence of these roles throughout the liberating period of the First Intifada and explain why the subsequent lack of radical change to gender roles is not surprising. Mothers and wives continued to experience societal restrictions, illustrating the continuity of rigid gender roles throughout the First Intifada, not their destruction. Drawing on previous scholarship, interviews, memoirs and newspaper articles about the Intifada, this paper aims to analyze the First Intifada and the liberating and restricting aspects through the lens of the mother, daughter and wife roles for women to ultimately explain why the Intifada did not have a lasting impact.

The First Palestinian Intifada was a popular uprising characterized by large-scale Palestinian demonstrations aimed at achieving economic independence and freedom from the

¹ Adrian Florido, “Chants of ‘Intifada’ Ring out from pro-Palestinian Protests. But What’s It Mean?,” NPR, June 4, 2024, <https://www.npr.org/2024/06/04/nx-s1-4958278/intifada-chants-pro-palestinian-protests-israel>; Gregory Svirnovskiy, “Zohran Mamdani declines to condemn ‘globalize the intifada,’” *Politico*, June 29, 2025, <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/06/29/zohran-mamdani-globalize-the-intifada-00432052>.

Israeli military occupation. The Intifada, lasting from 1987 to 1993, grew out of a strong sense of despair, exacerbated by a recession and the absence of peace initiatives from the Israeli government accompanying settler expansions into the West Bank. Palestinian civil society utilized low-level and non-violent tactics to force Israeli settlers out of occupied territories, beginning with men, women, and children striking, throwing rocks and demonstrating. The movement not only revealed the cruelties of occupation, as IDF soldiers responded with violence to civilians, but also highlighted the mutual dependence between Israel and Palestine.² The Intifada gave women a chance to participate; prior to the Intifada, the occupation forced Palestinian women to retreat from public spaces because the psychological damage and material loss forced women to return to charity and social work.³

However, following the First Intifada, the 1993 Oslo Accords marked the beginning of an ultimately unsuccessful diplomatic process. The negotiation negated women, despite their important role in the Intifada. Hanan Ashrawi, a women's activist, stated, "now the fighting and risk-taking was over...so the male system went back into effect."⁴ Another activist, Raja Mustafa emphasizes that, years later, during the Second Intifada, women "lost that during the second Intifada; it was more difficult for women to participate. Because of the militias, [they] weren't really welcome in that fight."⁵ As the Second Intifada was more violent, women were ultimately excluded from the fight. Women, previously vital contributors and political agents in the height

² Lev Luis Grinberg, "1987-1993 — The Intifada: The Palestinian Resistance Mo(ve)Ment," *Mo(ve)Ments of Resistance: Politics, Economy and Society in Israel/Palestine 1931-2013*, (Academic Studies Press, 2014): 217–50, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt21h4xqw.13>.

³ Sherna Berger Gluck, "Palestinian Women: Gender Politics and Nationalism," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 3 (1995): 5–15. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2537876>.

⁴ Lotta Schüllerqvist, "'We Have Opened Doors, Others Have Been Closed': Women under the Oslo Accords," *The Oslo Accords* (American University in Cairo Press, 2017) <https://doi.org/10.5743/cairo/9789774167706.003.0006>.

⁵ Sheren Khalel, 2015, "Women of the Intifadas | Longform." Al Jazeera, October 23, 2015. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2015/10/23/women-of-the-intifadas>.

of the First Intifada, were returned to the sidelines and forgotten in the immediate aftermath and years later.

Palestinian historiography reflects the changing political environment. In 1948, following the British Mandate, historiography experienced a major shift. In “Palestinian Historiography: 1900-1948,” Tarif Khalidi explained that “for most Palestinian historians, history was a national legacy to be used for reinforcing the on-going debate with the Zionists and the British over the issue of the right to Palestine.”⁶ However, history was not only used to unearth examples of national legacies; the inquiries sparked an increased interest in cultural history for its own sake, not for politics. Khalidi pointed to examples of past scholars studying folklore in Palestinian villages, classic literature and secular debates. Over time, this field dwindled, as the Mandate and subsequent Israeli repression necessitated scholars to focus on nationalist works. Nationalist works were the primary avenue for scholars because they sought to first and foremost establish Palestinian history and statehood, rather than focus on other, more comprehensive and expansive scholarship as they had in the past. These works surveyed Palestine, highlighting the villages and peasants, opposing Zionist efforts to “highlight Jewish antiquities in Palestine.”⁷ This effort focused on a pre-Hebraic Palestine and highlighted present-day achievements in education and commerce.

This trend only intensified as the Israeli occupation continued accelerating in recent years. Prior to the past decade, trends in Palestinian historiography continued to align with the broader military history trends to include more gender and intersectional analysis. Currently, however, the increasing violence and the existential threat to Palestinian society compelled

⁶ Tarif Khalidi, “Palestinian Historiography: 1900-1948,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 10, no. 3 (1981): 64. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2536460>.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 65.

historians to focus on defending the historical legitimacy of Palestine itself. This shift favored narratives concerned with survival and national justification as opposed to intersectionality. In the 2025 *The Journal of Palestinian Studies*, for example, articles titled, “If You Normalize Genocide, You Will Have Nothing Left,” “Noura Erakat to the UN,” and “What Israel’s Arrest of Palestinian Booksellers in Jerusalem Tells Us About Its Goals” speak to the current genocide, as does the 2022 edition, which includes “Israel’s Apartheid: A Structure of Colonial Domination Since 1948.” These articles stand in contrast with earlier works, exploring a broader realm of history, including, in 2000, articles titled, “Two Journeys to Seventeenth-Century Palestine” and “Voices from the Golan.” The pattern is repeating in the present moment. Though all of these articles reflect a connection between the political battle for statehood and the history of Palestine, over time, history has become more urgent. In response to the trend of defensive historiography, this paper will be a return to the early 2000s gender framework of the conflict. Specifically, intersectionality allows scholarship to move beyond existing narratives solely concerned with legitimizing Palestinian existence.

In the book, *Behind the Lines*, Margaret and Patrice Higonnet addressed a similar issue, looking at the reasons why women's activities in wartime did not permanently improve their social standing. They crafted the metaphor of a double helix: “the female strand on the helix is opposed to the male strand, and position on the female strand is subordinate to position on the male strand.”⁸ As they explained, even as the female strand appears to advance, she remains beneath the male strand, and as such, women in wartime or during tumultuous times—like the First Intifada—appear to progress and take on new roles, but their stagnant position after the conclusion of the war can be explained by the continuous relationship between the strands. The

⁸ Patrice L. R. Higonnet and Margaret R. Higonnet, “The Double Helix,” *Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars*, (Yale University Press, 1987): 34, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1cc2m97>.

First Intifada, which can be understood as a temporary escalation in the broader conflict between Israel and Palestine, created similar conditions as wartime.⁹ Violence prior to and following the Intifada was prevalent: 13,000 Israelis and Palestinians were killed between 1948 and 1996, 41,000 Palestinians sustained injuries and went to health centers as a result of the conflict between 2002 and 2003, and 568 Palestinian children were killed by Israeli security forces and civilians between 1987 and 2002.¹⁰ The continuous backdrop of violence is different from the beginning and end of a war, but a brief escalation in conflict provided a similar experience as women's experiences in wartime. Even as women participate in rebellion against the Israeli occupants, it remains in the broader context of an unequal and unchanged gender dynamic.

Furthermore, Farhad Kazemi, utilizing past feminist scholarship, argued that patriarchy exists as a different structure in the Middle East, citing the existence of neo-patriarchy, continuing patriarchal trends no longer associated with high wealth and increased national income elsewhere. Kazemi, arguing both that patriarchy is necessary to understand Islam and the Middle East, and that a Western framework is not sufficient to understand the Middle East, proposed a modified approach. He cited Deniz Kandiyoti, suggesting that "a better way to examine systems of male dominance is perhaps "through analyses of women's strategies of dealing with them."¹¹ Thus, women, in their multiple roles in the First Intifada, utilized different strategies to reject systems of male domination.

All Palestinian women saw their rights improved by the Intifada. A prominent organization throughout the Intifada, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) in *bayan* #43 stated that, "woman as we perceive her, besides being a mother, daughter, sister or

⁹ "Human Rights Index," *The Iowa Review* 33, no. 2 (2003): v-182. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20155256>.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Farhad Kazemi, "Gender, Islam, and Politics," *Social Research* 67, no. 2 (2000): 453-74. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40971480>.

wife, is an effective human being and full citizen with all rights and responsibilities.”¹² The UNLU played an important role in organizing the uprising, and thus its statement was effectively speaking on behalf of the Intifada against the hijab campaign. However, this statement shows that not only was “being a mother, daughter, sister or wife” not equivalent to a human being or citizen for the UNLU, it was also the primary categorization and division of women in Palestinian society during the First Intifada, even at the height of radical change.

Furthermore, women, in their assigned roles as mothers, daughters or wives experienced different extents of liberation under the First Intifada. Though women identified with several of these roles at once, each role came to light in a unique circumstance. For example, a woman seeking the permission of her husband to participate in the Intifada was identified with the “wife” role, though she may or may not have children. Or, in another example, a woman, of course, was once a daughter before becoming a mother or a wife. These roles are not concrete characterizations of women, rather, they serve to show how a woman can identify with patriarchal norms and expectations at different times in her life. A woman becoming married or choosing to have children assumes new responsibilities and is subject to new perceptions about her identity. Thus, this paper seeks to examine these three roles separately, though they are fluid and often intersect.

Women in the daughter role were most able to experience liberation as a result of the First Intifada. This can be seen in the institutions active during the Intifada as well as lived experiences. For example, a newspaper clipping from *The Jerusalem Post* titled, “Two Killed On Second Anniversary of Intifada,” written in 1989, described the experience of Sara Manasra, a student and daughter. She was killed in a student protest that stoned an IDF patrol. The IDF

¹² Rema Hammami, “Women, the Hijab and the Intifada,” *Middle East Report*, no. 164/165 (1990): 24–78, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3012687>.

responded by tear gassing the crowd and killed two activists: Sara Manasra and a deaf and mute young man.¹³ Her participation in the protest is indicative of the ways in which daughters were most able to participate in the public sphere of the Intifada and though it seems contradictory, the fact that the daughter was subjected to the same political violence as the man indicates that they suffered the same fate. Even so, slight divisions still persist as the article begins as follows: “troops shot and killed two Palestinians, one of them a woman.”¹⁴ Though Manasra assumes the role of person in the protest, her identity as a woman is not fully forgotten and she is distinguished from the other individual on the basis of her gender.

Furthermore, this can be seen in a 1991 statistical compilation of Intifada fatalities by gender.¹⁵ A graph titled the “Distribution of fatalities by age, gender, refugee camp status and region” illustrates that, for women, fatalities are much higher for the youngest age group. The table shows that women 16 and under make up 40.8% of overall fatalities for women. This is the highest out of any age group shown; the next highest component is 28.9% for ages 17-25. Men, on the other hand, experience the highest percentage in the age group 17-25. Thus, women under 16, unlike men, are most involved in violent conflict when they are young, or as daughters.

Children, however, are exempt from a strong gender distinction, and more generally, their participation in the Intifada is collective of youths as a group. For example, “Israeli vehicles on roads in the occupied territories were subjected to constant harassment by youths throwing stones and Molotov cocktails,” indicating the violent protest enacted by youths prevails as the

¹³ Joel Greenberg and Sela Michal, "Two Killed on Second Anniversary of Intifada," *The Jerusalem Post* December 10, 1989. <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/two-killed-on-second-anniversary-intifada/docview/1446475244/se-2>.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁵ Elia Zureik, Tim Graff, Farid Ohan, and Jim Graff, “Two Years of the Intifadah: A Statistical Profile of Palestinian Victims,” *Third World Quarterly* 12, no. 3/4 (1990); 97–123. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992535>.

primary category above gender.¹⁶ In “From the First Intifada to the “March of Return,”” Yohanan Tzoreff, depicted a mass Palestinian demonstration years after the First Intifada, explaining that “old men, women, and children” were brought back into the streets. Children, or youths, in the March of Return and throughout the First Intifada are exempt from gendered distinctions; they do not yet fit into the category of man or woman yet. Daughters were able to utilize this categorization of ‘youth’ to experience broader freedoms.

Additionally, even daughters that lived outside of Palestine experienced this identity as a form of liberation. In her memoir titled *The Wind In My Hair*, Salwa Salem, a Palestinian refugee living in Italy described her experience with Palestinian identity away from her homeland. During the First Intifada, Salem explained how her daughter, Ruba, first encouraged her to become involved in activism.¹⁷ Ruba, chose to undertake an “active role in political life” during the Intifada. Salem explains the difficulties her daughter faced as an Italian, but that “her sensibilities were Palestinian and she was nostalgic for Palestine.”¹⁸ Ruba was most able to take on the active role, indicating the ways in which marriage and childbearing limited the capacity for women to participate in the Intifada.

Daughters, like Ruba, could encourage mothers to participate in the political activism of the First Intifada. However, as a broader group, mothers experienced a narrower scope of liberation than daughters. This does not mean that women as a group did not experience significant changes in the definition of their social role. However, these changes did not last and were applied differently to women in different categories. This can be seen through the limited channels available for mothers and wives in Intifada activity. Women, as melanie

¹⁶ Ian S. Lustick, Review of *Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories*, by Rex Brynen, Joost R. Hiltermann, Michael C. Hudson, F. Robert Hunter, Zachary Lockman, Joel Beinin, David McDowall, et al. *World Politics* 45, no. 4 (1993): 560–94. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2950709>.

¹⁷ Salwa Salem, *The Wind in My Hair* (Interlink Books, 2007).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 64.

kaye/kantrowitz, a part of the Middle East Peace Delegation of 1988, explained, “challenge the power dynamics between men and women, though not responsibility for housework or childcare, still considered women's work.”¹⁹

Women in the mother role were able to experience liberation as a result of the First Intifada to a lesser extent. Mothers were limited in their capacity in participating in the public sphere of the Intifada. Mothers were primarily responsible for the domestic front, participating in economic boycotts and commercial strikes. Hiltermann explains that, “keeping with the UNLU's calls, women were prominent in efforts to monitor prices charged by merchants and to ensure compliance during commercial strikes and boycotts of Israeli goods, and especially in providing alternative education to children.”²⁰ These actions, though important in maintaining a sense of normalcy, sought to maintain previous remnants of society affected by “Israeli dusk-to-dawn curfews and the 24-hour closures of businesses, shops, and schools” which “brought Palestinian cities, towns, and villages to a complete halt,” indicating that women’s activism was not tied to visions of a brighter future, but holding on to and upholding aspects of the community that were disrupted by the escalations in the Intifada.²¹ melanie kaye/kantrowitz explained that women “plant the victory gardens, organize boycotts, manage all sorts of prisoner relief.”²² In economic boycotts and educational matters, women were still confined to the domestic sphere, limited in their capacity to truly and freely participate in the struggle. Not only is there evidence that the economic boycott was not extremely successful, but these exact limitations illustrate, underline and emphasize the reasons why women did not experience permanent liberation: the double helix

¹⁹ melanie kaye/kantrowitz, “Women and the Intifada,” *Off Our Backs* 19, no. 6 (1989); 1–20. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25796846>.

²⁰ Joost R. Hiltermann, “The Women’s Movement during the Uprising,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 20, no. 3 (1991): 51, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2537545>.

²¹ Thomas M. Ricks, “In Their Own Voices: Palestinian High School Girls and Their Memories of the Intifadas and Nonviolent Resistance to Israeli Occupation, 1987 to 2004.” *NWSA Journal* 18, no. 3 (2006): 89. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40071183>.

²² kaye/kantrowitz, “Women and the Intifada,” 1.

still remains. The economic and domestic activity improved the situation for women, but their strand remained beneath protests and uprising activity in the public sphere. The hierarchy between the two strands remains.

Joost Hiltermann points to the exact limitations of women's liberation. He explains that the First Intifada is unique in "the fact that it is not just students and long-time activists who participate in direct confrontations with soldiers, but women of all ages and from all sectors of society."²³ On one hand, the text indicates that women of all ages—meaning older, married and childbearing women—were able to increase political activism during the Intifada. On the other hand, however, this speaks to both the limitations women experienced prior to the Intifada and the limited manner in which women could participate. Together, the minimal increase in participation in the public sphere—protesting, confrontation and violence—and the primary focus on the domestic sphere illustrate the small provisions of liberation mothers gained. The prominent female activist Umm Khalil stated in an interview that "I...encourage women to have more children. I once advertised that the society will give away 200 prizes to people with the most number of children."²⁴ Women as activists could not separate from their capacity to be mothers.

In her personal experience in *The Wind In My Hair*, Salwa Salem explains that her maternal identity was deeply intertwined in her increased participation in the movement.²⁵ Motherhood, in close proximity to the daughter, allows for some capacity for participation that would otherwise be more limited by the wife role. For example, her daughter "began to rely on

²³ Hiltermann, "The Women's Movement," 50.

²⁴ Philippe Fargues, "Protracted National Conflict and Fertility Change: Palestinians and Israelis in the Twentieth Century," *Population and Development Review* 26, no. 3 (2000): 441–82, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/172315>.

²⁵ Salwa Salem, *The Wind in My Hair* (Interlink Books, 2007).

me and once more I found myself involved in political work.”²⁶ Thus, even though Salem had left Palestine, her heritage remained a core part of her identity and took root in her experience as a mother. This speaks to the ways in which motherhood facilitates cultural memory and identity, which is further seen in the women martyrs.

Furthermore, as women were present in the public sphere of protest, the arrested women and martyrs were limited in their participation by their role. In “Palestinian Women in the ‘Intifada’: Fighting On Two Fronts” Eileen Kuttab explained that, “women martyrs were either under eighteen years of age when shot in the streets, or above fifty years old when attempting to rescue children.”²⁷ Children, including daughters, were susceptible to violence undefined by their gender, like “being beaten, arrested or tear-gassed in their homes by Israeli military authorities.”²⁸ Different forms of violence capture the exact situation of women in the First Intifada: their participation was increased in their proximity to the daughter; it was socially acceptable for women to participate in the violent uprisings of the Intifada when it related to their children. This dynamic allows for present gender dynamics to continue, with one helix strand remaining above the other, while the nationalist movement benefits from increased participation without fighting for true liberation. Kuttab also writes, “Israeli authorities were always careful not to widen the scope of female arrests due to the anticipated outrage on the part of male Palestinians.”²⁹ This represents a similar, continuous restriction of female liberation throughout the Intifada. Gender hierarchies remained entrenched while the exact plasticity of each gender role changed. In other words, women were able to engage in new activities outside of the usual

²⁶ Ibid., 195.

²⁷ Eileen S. Kuttab, “Palestinian Women in the ‘Intifada’: Fighting On Two Fronts,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 15, no. 2 (1993): 78, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41858974>.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

range associated with the female role, but these activities and the women themselves remained subjugated by patriarchal oppression.

Moreover, even the positive roles ascribed to womanhood specific to the Intifada supported and upheld the previous restrictions of the mother, daughter and wife roles. Rabab Abdulhadi explained Palestinian leadership in 1990 constructed three images of womanhood, including a “superwoman” which supported images of nurturing women and martyrdom. A leader of the General Union of Palestinian Women and Fatah directly responded to this: “No image was constructed for the man who is accepted as an activist... We are expected to be perfect in everything; a woman has to be a good mother, a good wife, and at the same time a good activist, a hard worker, and a militant; her home must be well-tended, her social standing good; and her appearance presentable.”³⁰ This quote highlights a similar distinction between the roles. It also illustrates how the “superwoman” role connected women to the domestic sphere. Additionally, in this “superwoman” role a nurturing quality is assigned, typically associated with motherhood, indicating that this woman is more likely to be a mother, not just a wife. Even so, the domestic limitations defined women’s ability to participate in political struggle because domestic expectations did not falter to allow for less labor or a capacity to focus time and energy elsewhere. Thus, women involved in the Intifada had to maintain their previous duties, too, which can be understood as the second front.

Women in their role as mothers were able to be closer to the typical male role in the Intifada, still, however, falling short of the capacity of daughters or men. Their proximity to children allowed them to find unique avenues of participation, while wives were more proximal

³⁰ Rabab Abdulhadi, “The Palestinian Women’s Autonomous Movement: Emergence, Dynamics, and Challenges,” *Gender and Society* 12, no. 6 (1998): 649–73, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/190511>.

to and contrasted with their husbands, pulling them further into the domestic sphere and away from the Intifada.

Women as wives were most limited in their participation in the Intifada. Though women were capable of participation and activism in the Intifada outside of the domestic sphere, their ties to the home and husband were especially limiting factors. In “Palestinian Women: Identity and Experience” Ebba Augustin explained that the Union of Palestinian Working Women's Committee (UPWWC) was an organization dedicated to uplifting women founded in 1980 and central to women’s participation in the Intifada. In 1989, in the beginning of the Intifada, an activist from the UPWWC expressed a typical sentiment that “we active women must be out in the streets” which shows the ways women created organizations and civil society to participate in the Intifada.³¹ However, even in the UPWWC, activists pointed to domestic limitations: women “can’t struggle against the occupation if I need so much strength in my struggle with men.”³² Their relationship with their husbands determined the amount of free time and capacity they held to participate in the Intifada, even during its peak.

The wife role provided not only a limitation in childcare and housework, but economic dependence, too. This culminated in the highest level of distance from the liberating effects of the Intifada. In “Palestinian Women: Gender Politics and Nationalism,” Sherna Berger Gluck wrote that “it was not until the founding of several independent women's centers and women's studies committees in 1990 that women had a space where culturally sensitive issues, including wife battering, could be explored.”³³ Women’s spaces away from the home created a space for women to discuss gendered issues, especially those they experienced as wives, like wife

³¹ Ebba Augustin, *Palestinian Women : Identity and Experience* (London : Zed Books, 1993), 35.

³² Ibid.

³³ Sherna Berger Gluck, “Palestinian Women: Gender Politics and Nationalism,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 3 (1995): 10, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2537876>.

battering. Furthermore, as the Intifada progressed and following the progression of activists, they became limited in their participation the moment they became wives. Gluck explained that “they all complained that there were no options for them outside the home anymore.”³⁴ The home, which women become connected to as they adopt mother and wife roles, became a limiting factor.

This points to the same two trends: first, women, tied in financial dependence to their husbands, experienced free spaces away from this dependence through organizations created during the Intifada and second, after their participation in the Intifada, women who “settled down” and became wives and mothers experienced greater limitations on their freedom. Gluck, following the progression of activists post-Intifada, found that “cooperative projects in which many women participated at the height of the intifada provided them some income” and that “the significance of these projects lay more in the free spaces they created for women”³⁵ The wife role provided not only a limitation in the realm of childcare and housework, but economic dependence, too. The post-Intifada shift reflected the greatest distancing from the liberating effects.

Although women as a broader group experienced liberating effects during the Intifada, they were conditional on existing and unchanging gender dynamics. The Intifada only went as far as providing some liberation to women, the extent depending on their role as either daughter, mother or wife. Daughters received the most liberation, while mothers received less and wives were the most stifled of the three.

The continuing strength of the daughter, mother and wife roles throughout the Intifada illustrate the limitations of national liberation. These roles also showcase the variability of

³⁴ Ibid., 13.

³⁵ Ibid.

subjugation, and the hegemonic relationship between Palestinian women and men during the Intifada. Women, necessary for the Intifada as a popular struggle, were able to negotiate the terms of their subordination: emerging with a temporary ability to organize in free spaces outside of the domestic sphere and widen the scope of previously established gender roles. But, the hierarchy between men and women still existed, both during the liberating period of the First Intifada and in its aftermath. Thus, the First Intifada, though a freeing period, experienced limitations which resulted in a return to previous, stricter gender norms after the Intifada ended. Further research should investigate the development of these roles in the Second Intifada and how lingering effects of more expansive rights for women continue into the present moment.

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