

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: HOW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
COOPERATE FOR CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT AND ITS OUTCOMES

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This dissertation examines the extent to which international organizations (IOs) cooperate in conflict zones and how such cooperation influences civil conflict outcomes and prospects for peace. Although IOs often share the overarching goal of reducing violence, their levels of cooperation in civil conflicts vary. I argue that conflict complexity and public support are two dimensions that IOs consider when debating the costs and benefits of cooperating for conflict management. Building on these variations, I examine how cooperation among IOs affects conflict outcomes and the durability of peace. Much of the literature on conflict outcomes focuses on the ways increased amounts of resources help reduce violence. However, I suggest that with cooperation between organizations, the resources can be distributed more effectively, reduce redundancies, improve coordination between mediation and peacekeeping, and show the organizations' resolve to solve the conflict. Additionally, the literature has thoroughly examined how international actors promote peace by addressing commitment and information problems. Through cooperation, IOs can amplify their leverage, reinforce agreements, and raise the costs of renewed violence. I argue that cooperation increases both the likelihood and longevity of peace by multiplying resources, strengthening signals of resolve, and forming institutional partnerships that can be mobilized for future conflict management. To test these claims, I developed and employed a novel cooperation score that captures IO cooperation annually across Africa from 1991 to 2018. This dissertation contributes to the literature by conceptualizing cooperation as a scale of activity rather than a dichotomous phenomenon, offering a more nuanced understanding of IO behavior. Ultimately, it highlights IO cooperation as a critical mechanism for reducing violence and fostering sustainable peace.

HOW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS COOPERATE FOR CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT AND ITS OUTCOMES

by

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Dedication

To my dad, who “never gave me any idea that I couldn’t do whatever I wanted to do or be
whomever I wanted to be.”

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Introduction

At his swearing-in ceremony to become the United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres asserted that “the United Nations (UN) cannot succeed alone. Partnership must continue to be at the heart of our strategy” (Guterres 2016). The start of his term marked the beginning of an enhanced focus on the partnerships between regional organizations and the UN, especially in Africa. Particularly for conflict management, Guterres has continually sought and promoted partnerships with regional organizations given their strengths in “proximity, the experience and the knowledge of local dynamics, the flexibility and relationships to engage more rapidly and effectively when situations deteriorate” (Guterres 2018). But despite this enhanced push for cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, there has not been a consistent increase in cooperation in conflict environments.

While the inclusion of regional organizations is not new to the United Nations, regional organizations’ more recent increase in capacity has enhanced their potential for partnership. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter originally outlined the roles of regional organizations in maintaining peace and security. But as Guterres said in 2018, “at that time [of the UN Charter], regional organizations barely existed. Seventy years on, regional and sub-regional organizations are an indispensable part of the rules-based global order.” Now, regional organizations host the majority of peacekeeping missions around the world and have the capacity to respond to numerous conflicts across their regions (Cruz and van der Lijn 2024). The ability of regional organizations to be present in more conflicts creates a greater puzzle. If regional organizations are increasingly available for conflict management, why are there not corresponding higher levels of cooperation between international organizations?

This dissertation, “How International Organizations Cooperate for Conflict Management and its Outcomes”, defines and explores the reasons behind variations in cooperation between international organizations in conflict zones and the subsequent effects of cooperation on conflicts and peace. Given how critical IOs are to supporting conflict management efforts and the UN’s dedicated push for cooperation, it is puzzling that they often operate unilaterally without seeking support from other IOs operating in the same conflict zone. However, cooperation among IOs has not been systematically studied. Cooperation is often overlooked as the literature on conflict management typically focuses on the actions of one organization or one specific tactic of conflict management. This narrow focus misses the complexity of overlapping efforts by multiple IOs and ignores the possibilities for cooperation. I explore cooperation through a novel dataset of cooperation scores in Africa from 1991 to 2018. These cooperation scores are not limited by any IO or tactic and thus collect instances of cooperation that might have been otherwise ignored by traditional literature. Using this score, the dissertation explores why there are variations in cooperation and then what this cooperation means for various facets of civil conflicts in Africa.

In the first paper, “Explaining Variations in Cooperation by International Organizations in Conflict Management”, I explore why there are variations in cooperation. Previous studies found that cooperation is likely when IOs are geopolitically aligned, which would be the case when IOs are trying for peace. However, cooperation is not consistent across or even within conflicts. I argue that this variation is a result of two factors: conflict complexity and IO legitimacy. At any point in time, the IO is balancing its desire to solve the conflict on its own with avoiding the consequences of failure. Conflict complexity and IO legitimacy are two factors that change that calculus and call for more cooperation to avoid failure. When a conflict is more

complex, it requires more resources and power to promote peace that leads to cooperation. And when an IO has low legitimacy, it is unable to gain the credibility to facilitate peace, which encourages it to cooperate with other IOs.

This paper also serves to introduce the cooperation score I created. The score uses United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to identify instances of cooperation, the intensity of that cooperation, and which IOs are cooperating. In this paper, I walk through examples of this coding scheme and discuss the validity of the score. Using Somalia as an example, I see the correlation between the resolutions and cooperation occurring on the ground that verifies the score is capturing cooperation. This paper also discusses what varying levels of cooperation entail, from simply sharing information to actively coordinating on the ground.

This paper is the first of its kind in multiple regards. First, it adds to the IO literature by investigating cooperation that goes beyond basic levels to more intense coordinated activities. Furthermore, the paper treats cooperation as a scale rather than dichotomous, as in past work. Also, this paper adds to the conflict management literature by defining cooperation in conflict zones across organizations and tactics and asserting that IOs are responding to specific conflict issues beyond the length or violence of the conflict.

Building off the first paper, the second paper, “The Impacts of Cooperation on Conflict Outcomes”, explores what variation in IO cooperation in conflict management efforts means for conflict intensity and duration. Previous studies of peacekeeping and mediation both emphasize the importance of resources in their success. More resources allow peacekeepers to be deployed to more places, mediators to increase their leverage against combatants, and shows their resolve toward peace. However, I argue that cooperation is an important missing factor in the literature because, without cooperation, these resources could be redundant or even contradictory.

Cooperation allows IOs to coordinate their resources most effectively to ensure that they are able to promote peace. Additionally, cooperation can use resources across tactics to ensure they are working in tandem. Testing this argument with the cooperation score, I find that cooperation leads to fewer battle deaths and shorter conflicts. This result stands when using a selection model, accounting for the factors that lead to cooperation from Paper 1.

The final paper, “The Impacts of Cooperation on Peace Duration”, continues the exploration of cooperation in the next life cycle stage of a conflict: peace time. A primary issue in ensuring a lasting peace is overcoming commitment issues that face combatants. Especially when disarming, combatants need to be certain that their opponent cannot restart violence when they are weakened, or peace will not last. Cooperation between IOs can help to overcome these commitment issues by increasing the costs of returning to violence through multiple avenues. Also, IOs can signal their resolve to achieve lasting peace. Through cooperation, IOs lose some autonomy, but this choice to lose autonomy for the sake of the conflict can signal the strong commitment they have to peace. Finally, cooperation in peace time creates teams that have divided labor and can easily redeploy to conflict zones in crisis. Empirical tests find that greater cooperation among IOs increases the likelihood of an agreement and leads to a longer period of peace. This paper is the only one from the dissertation to exploit that the cooperation score is not limited to conflict years and collects any instance of cooperation for that country by examining the impact of cooperation on sustaining peace once conflicts have ended.

Both the second and third papers add to the conflict management literature by establishing the importance of cooperation in ending violence and promoting peace. The papers build on the first’s effort to define what cooperation is between IOs in conflict and post-conflict environments. They are unique in the way that they conceptualize cooperation across tactics and

between any organization, which indicates that the singular focus of past work could miss important dynamics.

Together, these papers define cooperation among IOs, present a measurement of that cooperation, and improve our understanding of the conditions under which IOs cooperate in conflicts and the impact that this cooperation has on conflict and post-conflict environments. The dissertation finds that cooperation is not guaranteed, but when employed, it is effective at reducing violence and ensuring peace. While there are other actors beyond IOs in conflict management, this dissertation, in measuring cooperation, models the complexity of conflict zones by including multiple organizations and tactics. These papers have important implications for real-world conflicts. For one, they are able to identify the areas of tension that can prevent cooperation and then encourage its use for violence reduction. Especially as regional organizations take a greater role in conflict management, situations where multiple organizations are working in a conflict zone will increase. As this occurs, organizations should recognize cooperation as an important tool in their arsenal.

Paper 1: Explaining Variations in Cooperation by International Organizations in Conflict Management

Abstract:

What explains variations in cooperation between international organizations in conflict zones? Despite work that suggests that cooperation is likely between IOs that are geopolitically aligned, there are considerable variations in the amount of cooperation in conflicts between IOs with the same goals of reducing violence. In this article, I argue that conflict complexity and public support are two dimensions that IOs consider when debating the costs and benefits to cooperating for conflict management. IOs are consistently balancing their need to stay relevant in the future system with reducing violence in the current environment. This balancing act is shifted by the complexity and public support, which reduces the ability of IOs to reduce violence. Based on these factors, IOs must choose either their preferred outcome of successfully managing the conflict on their own or choosing, if necessary, to cooperate with other IOs to try and secure success. I test this theoretical argument on a novel dataset of cooperation scores in Africa from 1997-2015 and find support for my argument.

Introduction

When multiple international organizations engage in efforts to manage and resolve civil wars, in some cases, they cooperate with each other, and in others, they largely work independently. For example, in Guinea-Bissau in the 2010s, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) led conflict mediation with the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), while being supported on the ground by the United Nations (UN), with political advisement and pressure by the European Union (EU) and African Union (AU) ("UN Security Council calls..." 1999). The IOs in this conflict were highly coordinated, shared information frequently, and divided the responsibilities of conflict management appropriately. But in the same region, in Sierra Leone, the UN often did not go beyond information sharing with only ECOWAS and rarely engaged with other IOs on the ground (Shearer 1997). This variation in cooperation is especially puzzling given the literature on conflict management's emphasis on the positive effect of greater and coordinated resources (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; E. Menninga 2020). Given that coordination seems to improve conflict outcomes, which helps maintain security and achieve their mandates, what explains variations in cooperation between international organizations engaged in conflict management?

The previous literature on IO cooperation has suggested that cooperation, in the form of information sharing and financing, is possible when the geopolitical goals of the member states are aligned (Clark 2021). This approach, however, does not explain why organizations engaged in conflict management, who share the goal of ending conflicts and reducing violence as agreed on by their member states, participate in different levels of cooperation. More specific work looking into the overlap of African security institutions has studied why the overlap has occurred (Haftel and Hofmann 2017) or has continually focused on binary definitions of cooperation

(Brosig 2015; Gelot 2012). These studies of African IOs and other examples of cooperation in conflict management literature focus in specific areas—such as peacekeeping (Bara and Hultman 2020) or mediation (Menninga 2020)—and do not examine cooperation in conflict management more broadly, including cooperation that could occur between groups across strategies. The conflict management literature has begun exploring the intersection of tactics (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2019), and while important, these studies do not examine why this cooperation occurs in some conflicts and not others.

This article is the first work, to my knowledge, to study the level of cooperation between IOs to understand to what degree cooperation occurs and when organizations are more likely to cooperate in conflict zones. Typically, the IO literature has treated cooperation as a binary outcome, which limits insight into the degrees of cooperation. However, this paper defines cooperation as a scale to address these concerns and uncover the importance of more or less cooperation. Additionally, this paper is unique in the fact that it is not limited by a certain type of action or by a certain subset of IOs, which allows us to gain insight into the totality of intricate conflict management regimes.

I argue that IOs, when deciding whether to cooperate, seek to balance their desire to distinguish themselves from other IOs, please their member states, and avoid limiting their powers (Clark 2021) with the need to reduce violence to fulfill their mandates. In this balancing act, the ideal situation for an IO is to resolve the conflict on its own to establish itself as an effective actor in the system that its member states need to support. But often, conflict characteristics on the ground push IOs into cooperation because they are unable to successfully resolve the conflict on their own and do not want to risk any reputational costs from failed management efforts. I further argue that two main factors affect IO calculations of the benefits

and risks of working alone or cooperating—the complexity of the conflict and the IO’s legitimacy to complete the tasks needed. As conflict complexity increases, so will the risks that unilateral management efforts will fail, and thus, greater IO cooperation is called for. Even in cases where the conflict is not very complex, there is still room for failure if the IO legitimacy is not strong. Using public support as a measure of legitimacy (Tallberg and Zürn 2019), I suggest that when IOs lack legitimacy, the quest for greater legitimacy leads to greater amounts of cooperation.

To test this theory of cooperation in conflict zones, I construct a novel dataset of cooperation measures for each conflict year in Africa from 1997-2015, gathered from UN Security Council Resolutions. The cooperation measure scores when IOs are working in coordination with the UN or in joint missions with other IOs. The measure also takes into account the number of IOs participating in the cooperative efforts. Other conflict management datasets list events managed by different actors, like the Managing Intrastate Conflict (MIC) dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) (Croicu et al. 2013). However, these datasets do not distinguish the levels of participation and coordination of co-sponsors during and beyond these events. Due to the limitations of existing data in addressing cooperation, the cooperation measure used in this article is the first of its kind to measure cooperation across conflicts and tactics, such as the interaction of peacekeepers with mediation teams.

Through statistical analyses, I find that conflict complexity and legitimacy do influence an increased cooperation score. I also find some evidence that battle deaths do not have any significant impact on cooperation, contrary to common arguments that organizations react to violence with greater levels of collective effort. Also, I find that longer conflicts are associated with lower cooperation, a counterintuitive finding that could suggest institutions could show

their fatigue in conflict management through cooperation. I probe these findings further with some additional robustness checks where conflict complexity and legitimacy remain important indicators of increased cooperation. This adds to the literature on IO cooperation by suggesting that there are additional variations in cooperation despite the IOs being aligned in their goal of reducing violence. These findings also suggest that IOs interact differently based on factors beyond the level of violence, which could have important implications for the conflict outcomes.

Existing Approaches to Cooperation

Cooperation between IOs is only possible in a situation of regime complexity. Regime complexity, defined by Raustiala and Victor (2004), describes the collection of overlapping institutions governing a particular issue area. The resulting literature on regime complexity has been rich in understanding its impacts (Alter and Raustiala 2018). When multiple IOs are trying to govern the same issue area, there are three likely outcomes. The first and most common conclusion in the literature is that regime complexity leads to competition in the international system as the organizations create confusion over differing rules and regulations (Raustiala and Victor 2004) that change consistently as member states forum shop for their ideal outcome (Busch 2007). Within this competition, IOs pursue their own programs and regulations because they are invested in their survival in the international system and seek to distinguish themselves as focal actors in issue areas.

The other two possible outcomes of regime complexity include coordination efforts and pooling. Coordination describes the adjustment of mandates or activities to reduce the overlap between IOs. The literature suggests that IOs can achieve coordination by creating a division of labor amongst themselves or relying on hierarchies (Faude and Fuss 2020; Pratt 2018) to avoid redundancies. However, these strategies to coordinate mandates and outcomes can come at a cost

to the IOs by reducing their prominence in the overall regime and by limiting their power and future influence. This makes coordination between IOs less attractive as organizations do not want to limit their powers or stature (Clark 2021).

But Clark (2021) finds that cooperation is possible when IO activities are not being threatened. This occurs when IOs pursue pooling instead of divisions of labor or institutional deference. Pooling is defined as sharing financial and information resources, which prevents IOs from having to reduce their organizational mandates to cooperate. This style of cooperation is driven by the leading member states of the IOs and their alignment in geopolitics (Clark 2021). Clark (2021) suggests that while coordination and pooling are often conflated, they are distinct and is the first to empirically test the determinants of pooling.

The literature suggests IOs will submit to cooperation but only to the extent that it does not jeopardize their future power and leadership position. There are fewer limits placed on the IO when they pursue pooling. Coordination is more likely to create restraints for the IO in the future because they submit to other IOs or reduce their activities, but it is still possible to reduce confusion and gain ground on completing their mandate. Thus, IOs, when considering cooperation, are balancing their future power with the accomplishment of their current conflict management goals.

The literature described here focuses on the theoretical expectations of coordination from IOs or empirically focuses on only one aspect of cooperation, like pooling. From the literature, coordination does not necessarily imply that IOs are working together but that they have adjusted their behavior. I use the term here more colloquially to imply that the IOs are adjusting their behavior, as suggested previously, but doing so intentionally and consciously in the conflict zone

together, as referenced in Biermann (2008)¹. This article is the first, to my knowledge, to empirically study all the forms of cooperation as a total score of cooperation rather than a dichotomous outcome. The conflict space is an ideal arena to study because both coordination and pooling can occur simultaneously and have considerable variation over time. This will allow us to better understand the total spectrum of cooperation options and the reasons behind when IOs choose these varying levels. Also, as Clark (2021) has suggested, IOs pursuing conflict management should be consistently pooling their efforts based on their goal to reduce violence. However, there is considerable variation between these IOs' cooperation that needs to be explained.

Given the density of overlapping institutions in Africa, there has been large amounts of work investigating their collaborative efforts in peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Brosig 2015; Gelot 2012; Herpolsheimer 2021; Williams and Boutellis 2014). Much of this work qualitatively describes the overlap but leaves how and to what extent this cooperation varies underdeveloped (Haftel and Hofmann 2017, 2019). Especially in the previous discussions of the African security regimes, the focus is placed in one area, particularly peacekeeping, when in reality, the organizations cooperate for conflict management with many tactics beyond peacekeeping. Most studies point to the reason for peacekeeping cooperation as a larger theory of IO cooperation, resource dependence theory (Drees and Heugens 2013). Resource dependence theory describes the need for cooperation based on the scarcity of resources plaguing IOs that need to be rectified to be successful (Biermann and Harsch 2017). This is largely thought to be physical or material resources, but discussion has begun about the more symbolic or soft power resources (Drees and

¹ Biermann (2008) refers to the same advancing scale of cooperation used here, as information sharing, coordination, and then joint decision-making.

Heugens 2013). One issue with this approach is that it has traditionally treated the need for resources as static across time. Many studies focus on the differences of needs at the conflict or country level when these factors shift throughout the conflict's duration, especially in longer episodes.

Similarly to the African security literature, the conflict management literature broadly focuses on the role of organizations, usually examining one tactic or one organization. The focus on individual tactics has yielded the differences and similarities between UN and RO peacekeeping (Bara and Hultman 2020) and multiparty mediation (E. Menninga 2020). These studies suggest that multiple actors can be beneficial to the conflict but only focus on one conflict management tactic rather than the cross-cutting efforts for peace. Recent work has developed to understand the efforts across conflicts that can lead to violence reductions, primarily focused on the interactive effect of mediation and peacekeeping (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2019; Clayton and Dorussen 2021). These works generally suggest that these strategies used in combination are able to reduce violence but do not suggest when this pattern should occur or if these tactics, led by IOs, are in sync with one another. My research, in contrast, is not limited by tactic or organization and attempts to understand how these varying aspects of conflict management can be coordinated and to what degree.

Costs and Benefits to Cooperation

In building my theoretical argument to explain why IOs cooperate at high levels in some conflict management efforts and at low levels or not at all in others, I begin by assuming that the IOs working in a conflict zone, which have a mandate to support peace and security, share a primary goal of stopping violence. This is a reasonable assumption because the UN Charter suggests that its main mission is to reduce violence and maintain peace, and multiple studies

suggest a violence-reducing effect of UN action (Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2019). This assumption is also sound logic for regional organizations because they have an invested effort in reducing violence that happens within their region. When violence occurs in the region, regional organizations (ROs) are highly aware of possible spillover effects that can impact the RO's integrity by weakening its member states (Braithwaite 2010). This assumption allows us to explore the organizations' motivations and suggests that there is always an option for cooperation, as many organizations want to end violence. This also sets up the motivation for this article—as more resources should be inherently good for conflict management (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; E. Menninga 2020), why would organizations have varying levels of cooperation or no cooperation at all?

As I begin my theoretical argument about cooperation, I have assumed that all organizations involved share a primary goal of stopping violence. This means I am theorizing about cooperation with a set of institutions that have entered the conflict on their own prior to the date my cooperation score records. I am not making any claims as to the process by which organizations become involved in the conflict to begin with. Instead, I am focusing on the organizations' choice to cooperate, given that they have entered a conflict zone. As emphasized in Esman and Telhami (2019), much of an IO's decision-making calculus for entering a conflict results from the priorities of its most powerful member states. I agree that the member state's priorities and interests are important, but at the point in time that my theory begins, their interests have already led to the organization's involvement in the conflict.

However, the theory described here does not contradict the influence that cooperation can have on any given IO entering a conflict. Even when an organization enters a conflict with expectations of cooperation, that does not guarantee cooperation will occur. Like in the case of

Sierra Leone, where ECOWAS and the UN had previously cooperated and expected the forthcoming peacekeeping units from each IO to work collaboratively, failed to produce any cooperation when ECOWAS reduced their peacekeeping force against the wishes of the UN (LETTER, 1999). Given this evidence from a variety of cases, there is no reason to assume that the reasonings for IOs entering conflict would necessarily lead to higher or sustained cooperation as the conditions once on the ground change their calculus. Thus, the focus of the theoretical exploration here is on whether IOs cooperate or not given that they are on the ground, rather than an exploration of why IOs enter the conflict.

Given an organization's involvement in the conflict, they must then weigh the costs and benefits associated with working with other organizations in the conflict resolution efforts. There are two main costs that organizations may perceive from cooperation. First, when organizations cooperate, they must then also accommodate more actors in the eventual agreements. This inclusion can inhibit these organizations from achieving their most ideal outcomes. There are multiple areas in which organizations could differ, including the conflict management tactics used. This disagreement is largely led by the desires and interests of the most powerful member states in the organization (Esman and Telhami 2019). For example, in the ECOWAS region, the UN and ECOWAS have disagreed on the implementation of sanctions on conflict actors like in Liberia in the early 2000s. ECOWAS has argued against the UN to delay sanctions in Liberia to allow for other conflict management efforts to take effect, while the UN hopes to curb violence more quickly in the region utilizing sanctions (Breslawski, Cunningham, and Fleishman 2023). These decisions are guided by the organizations' member states and their disagreement can directly impact the future of the IOs.

In our sanctions example, ECOWAS' member states, especially their most powerful ones, will be more likely to argue against the use of sanctions for fear of being treated similarly in the future. This same problem does not face the major decision makers of the UN as the P5 has veto power against sanctions towards themselves in the future. If the most powerful member states of ECOWAS are unhappy with the strategies employed as a result of cooperation with other IOs, then they could reduce their support and look for alternative forums for the future (Busch 2007). This leads ECOWAS to have less support to pursue their mandate in the future. This idea goes beyond the strategy of sanctions as other conflict management activities could similarly create disagreement between IOs based on their future impacts like creating power-sharing agreements or long-term observer missions. In sum, IOs must cater to the desires of their member states to ensure their status in the future and these decisions become constrained by cooperating with other IOs (Esman and Telhami 2019).

Second, another cost of cooperation between IOs in the conflict zones is the sharing of reputational gains and credit that arise from success in the conflict. Despite a focus on ending the conflict, an organization is always eyeing its necessity in the system. Organizations want to ensure their survival by proving their value, and a clear way to do that is by ending the conflict on their own (Gehring and Faude 2014). By working on their own, organizations gain the total reputational gains and secure their necessity in the system. They are then positioned to be able to expand and improve their organization for lasting impact. Thus, a cost of cooperation is sharing the credit with other IOs, which limits the IO's credibility for success in future cases.

These reputational costs and benefits have many possible audiences. The most important audience is their member states, which are needed to support the IO. If member states feel that the IO is not being effective, then they can give their support to another IO. Another possible

audience is the combatants that need conflict management in the future. If combatants perceive an IO as successful or not, it could impact their willingness to work with the IO to reduce violence. This could, in turn, reduce or strengthen the breadth of work the IO can take on in the future. While any success associated with the IO should be positive for the IO's survival, there is no guarantee that the intended audiences can or will recognize the unique contributions of that IO. As an example, if the UN and ECOWAS jointly achieve success, can any member state know that ECOWAS' contributions were critical to the success enough for their continued support? Accomplishing peace on its own is a way for an IO to establish its position in the system without submitting to an IO hierarchy or reducing its mandate (Pratt 2018). The IOs are likely then able to gain invaluable support for their future endeavors.

A benefit of cooperation is that the most difficult conflicts require substantial amounts of resources in different issue areas dealing with economic, military, and political challenges. Some conflicts are unable to be managed by a single organization because of the lack of personnel (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014), incomplete information on the conflict (Fey and Ramsay 2010), or too many divergent needs exist in the conflict between mediation, peacekeeping, and human rights. As the recognized theory of resource dependence establishes, the inclusion of multiple organizations increases the number of resources brought into a conflict and allows the organizations to delegate different aspects of the conflict management effort to appropriately facilitate peace (Biermann and Harsch 2017). This delegation helps to realize the organizations' mandate of ending violence, another critical aspect to their long-term success (Faude and Fuss 2020).

Organizations have incentives to recognize the need for greater resources in a conflict because they do not want to be held responsible for a failed conflict intervention. This failed

intervention would negate any reason the organization chose to manage the conflict solely, especially if its goal is to ensure organizational survival. Additionally, organizations should fear failing in conflict intervention because of its impact on the organizations' reputation for future conflicts (Tingley and Walter 2011; Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015). Failure by an organization reduces combatants' trust in the ability of the organization to yield an agreement in the future, further reducing the organization's influence. Thus, organizations want to avoid failure and losing influence and therefore gaining needed resources through cooperation can be a viable tradeoff for IOs to accept. In the same vein, organizations would avoid cooperation if they felt that they could appropriately manage the conflict because they could then reap all the reputational gains and ensure their organization's survival in the face of other overlapping mandates (Gehring and Faude 2014). If they can successfully navigate the conflict alone, the organization's credibility will increase more so than if they were to share duties and split the credit.

As conflict erupts, organizations that can respond have to balance their need to quell violence with their desire to reap the most rewards for themselves, including member state approval, an expanded mandate, or greater authority in the system (Pratt 2018). This balance requires them to consider working with other organizations that will add to their ability to reduce violence while limiting the ability of the other organization to encroach on their mandate and leadership role.

When considering when and to what extent organizations will cooperate, there are two main dimensions upon which organizations will consider, the conflict complexity and popular support of the organizations. These factors add to the organizational resource dependence that pushes them towards cooperation in both a physical and symbolic sense (Gelot 2012). Conflict

complexity and legitimacy of an organization are the factors that create the greatest challenges for the organization and are very difficult to resolve quickly enough to avoid cooperation. Additionally, these factors can shift over time. Previous explanations of cooperation, especially in resource dependence, are measured as one constant per conflict, where these factors are actually variable and can show shifts in cooperation within the same conflict.

Table 1 displays my theoretical expectations using these explanatory variables. These dimensions display additive effects, meaning that an increase in both variables leads to higher levels of cooperation. But additionally, the additive effects explain the presence of cooperation in conflicts that are either not complex or where the IOs involved have limited legitimacy.

<i>Table 1: Theoretical Expectations</i>	Conflict complexity high	Conflict complexity low
Low legitimacy	Most cooperation	Limited cooperation
High legitimacy	Limited cooperation	Least cooperation

The first dimension is the characteristics of the conflict. The conflict environment determines the actions that are required by conflict management organizations such as the need for peacekeeping or mediation and the intensity of that need. Specifically, conflict complexity indicates a greater need for cooperation. I draw upon the conflict complexity measure from work by Brosché, Nilsson, and Sundberg (2023), which focuses on three major aspects of complexity. This model of complexity focuses on actor, behavior, and issue complexity as interconnected aspects of conflicts that can vary in number and degree. When there are more divergent issues or places where violence is taking place, the need for more resources increases. Because

organizations are committed to reducing violence as conflict complexity increases, the need for cooperation becomes more vital as the needs of the conflict are greater than one organization can likely provide.

The concept of complexity is designed to study conflicts as “interacting parts... rather than a series of simultaneously and independently occurring processes” (Brosché, Nilsson, and Sundberg 2023). Higher levels of complexity lead to greater cooperation because the presence of more types of actors, behaviors, and issues requires a greater commitment by IOs to be successful. Examples for each of these complexity measures can be described for their increased need for additional, coordinated resources. But, across all measures, there is one consistent reason that increased complexity leads to greater cooperation, which is the shrinking of the bargaining range. The number of actors reduces the bargaining range because there are fewer possible agreements acceptable to a greater number of actors (Cunningham 2011). Similarly, as the types and the number of issues in conflict increases, the likelihood of indivisibility also increases, which reduces the possible number of acceptable agreements (Fearon 1995). Behavioral complexity represents the number and type of violent actions taken that change the conflict management strategies that organizations need to use. This can shift the bargaining range as additional cooperation is needed to avoid commitment problems. For example, if a rebel group continually targets civilians, other actors might require peacekeeping to protect civilians in order to confidently pursue a peace agreement (Brosché, Nilsson, and Sundberg 2023). These impacts on the bargaining range reduce the likelihood of settlement and increase the IOs’ need to cooperate. Cooperation is necessary in these instances to avoid failure and to increase the amount of IO resource capabilities and influence in the negotiations.

By focusing on actor, behavior, and issue complexity to describe the intricacy of conflicts that require a greater commitment by organizations to solve, I am distinguishing complexity from the level of violence. While the level of violence does indicate the need for more resources, it does not fully encompass what drives an organization to seek assistance and cooperation. Rather, conflicts that have more actors, with goals farther from each other, indicate a more intricate set of issues to be negotiated around that could take longer and involve greater influence to end the violence. Conflicts with high levels of violence, however, do not necessarily indicate that the issues will be difficult to come to an agreement on and organizations would rather attempt to solve these conflicts singularly. This does not mean that every complex conflict is too involved for one organization to handle, but rather, difficult conflict environments require more resources and coordination on the part of the organizations to try and achieve a reduction in violence. To summarize, organizations do not choose when cooperation is needed solely based on violence but rather choose cooperation when failure is more likely when the conflict is complex in its number of actors, behaviors, and issues.

The second dimension that organizations consider when deciding whether to cooperate is the degree to which the organizations have legitimacy in the conflict zone. The legitimacy of an international organization greatly impacts its ability to achieve its desired goal of ending the conflict at hand. Legitimacy describes the authority given by its member states to act and be obeyed (Hurd 1999). In terms of conflict, an IO's legitimacy indicates that they are endorsed and capable of intervening to promote peace. This legitimacy allows combatants and governments to trust the IO in any given arrangement. Hurd (1999), in his seminal piece about legitimacy in international politics, describes legitimacy as defined by the actor's perception of the institution.

Thus, high levels of legitimacy are created by actors feeling like their compliance is the right path forward.

When applied to conflict management, organizational legitimacy enables organizations to gain better outcomes because actors feel committed to comply. Regarding peacekeeping, legitimacy allows the organization to establish rules that should be followed and the recognition that peacekeepers will enforce these lines. Without this status of legitimacy, peacekeepers could face numerous issues, including being blocked from certain areas and general disregard of their authority. In mediation, legitimacy is an important factor that brings actors to the negotiation table and can predict a higher likelihood of negotiated settlement as actors feel compelled towards compliance (Duursma 2020). If legitimacy induces agreement in multiple aspects of conflict management, then in turn losing legitimacy can create problems for an organization working to manage the conflict as combatants do not feel compelled to comply. Additionally, organizations with low legitimacy cause a commitment problem in conflict management as actors could be concerned that the IO will not be able to maintain any agreement or peace in the future if their legitimacy falters further.

To ensure that their efforts of conflict management are successful, organizations, whose legitimacy has waned, will pursue partnerships with organizations that have legitimacy to bolster the management efforts. This ensures that any side of the conflict feels the innate pressure to fulfill their role in the peace process because of the legitimate power pushing peace (Hurd 1999). Organizations with high levels of legitimacy would also automatically shy away from cooperation with organizations with less legitimacy because they can offer alternative support for the peace process. Thus, an African organization could have higher legitimacy than the UN

during mediation but the UN still offers material and practical resources that are valuable to any participating organization (Duursma 2020).

Following Tallberg and Zürn (2019), I operationalize legitimacy as popular support of the population in the conflict zone. There are significant variations in the popular support organizations have in the contexts they are working. For example, in Somalia in 1993, the UN Secretary-General arrived to begin mediation in the civil war. However, he was met with such intense protests against the UN that the mediations had to be moved. Circumstances pushed the UN to effectively coordinate with organizations that enjoyed greater public support to strengthen their claim to mediation. In this instance, it resulted in a mediation session co-hosted by multiple organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the League of Arab States, with additional military support coordinated by the US. This allowed the UN to secure the reputational gains associated with more popular support, while reducing the negative reputational costs the UN suffered from due to its low popular support. Threats to legitimacy, like the protests the UN faced in Somalia, reduce the effectiveness of mediation by increasing fears of the future as the IO's popularity could further decrease, pushing the IO to withdraw and renege on their commitments (Duursma 2020). But 1993 still resulted in the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement for actors in Somalia, so how does the UN overcome these challenges? They were able to align with actors with more popular support in the area, bolstering their legitimacy. Public support is a crucial variable to understanding cooperation as it helps explain why there are often high levels of cooperation in conflicts that are not very complex. On the other hand, actors with more public support will still choose to cooperate because the level of conflict complexity rises to a level that one organization is unable to handle on its own.

For cooperation generally and this score, the UN is very important. As established in the UN Charter, regional organizations are supposed to petition the Security Council for approval of their uses of force. This makes the UN an arbiter of conflict management action, which could ultimately affect how it interacts with other organizations. If regional organizations pursue enforcement without prior authorization, it could prevent the UN's willingness to cooperate. Beyond its authorization role, the UN is the primary conflict management actor in the world. Because of that important status, it would be easy to assume that conflict management would operate differently when the UN is present. Schumann and Bara (2023) find that non-UN peacekeeping missions are more effective when UN peacekeeping is present because they have different strengths that they can use to their advantage. However, I do not see cooperation or its important implications being contingent on the UN (Schumann and Bara 2023). As capacity of regional organizations increases, the role that the UN plays of the more experienced and equipped leader can be taken on by other actors. As such, I see cooperation as just as likely with or without the UN but the decision of the UN to cooperate can face additional challenges when prior approvals are not followed.

Here I suggest that to balance the organization's desire for survival and solving the conflict, organizations will seek cooperation when their public support is low or when complexity is high. I argue that cooperation is most likely when organizations have low legitimacy, and the conflict is sufficiently complex.

H1: Conflicts with greater complexity will have higher cooperation scores.

H2: Conflicts involving organizations that have low legitimacy will have higher cooperation scores.

Data

To test the reasons behind variations in cooperation, I have developed a novel dataset to measure cooperation. This dataset utilizes UN Security Council resolutions to define two levels of cooperation that then create a composite cooperation score for each country year. To my knowledge, there is no other dataset able to measure cooperation in conflict zones in this way. Clark's dataset on pooling focuses on development issues rather than conflict and does not include coordination activities (Clark 2021). Other works on coordination have relied on case studies from varying issue areas to illustrate their theories. Additionally, conflict management data failed to produce accurate cooperation scores. The closest dataset to what I needed was the Managing Intrastate Conflict Dataset (MIC) from UCDP, but this data only lists events that are co-sponsored (Croicu et al. 2013). This would limit the data to cooperation occurring in the same space, like mediation, which ignores pooling efforts that happen across conflict management tactics like information sharing. Also, using events data could skew the cooperation score for instances when more events are needed to solve the issue. As such, I created a novel dataset to create cooperation scores across all types of cooperation, that can vary over time and across conflict. I describe the process of creating the score here and in more detail in the Appendix.

There is a large literature that addresses the UNSC agenda-setting as a potential barrier to resolutions. Specifically, Binder and Golub (2020) discuss the speed at which civil conflicts can enter the Security Council's agenda. They find that the severity of conflicts and interests of the elected members impact their ability to enter the agenda (Binder and Golub 2020). Even considering these results, the score created here is able to independently measure cooperation. The cooperation score is taken as an average of the number of resolutions, which diminishes the impact of agenda setting by creating scores not influenced by the number of times the conflict is

on the agenda. Additionally, from the coding, the majority of countries in the sample have a resolution during their civil conflict, providing evidence that the barrier to being put on the agenda does not significantly impact the sample.

While there are other potential documents from the UN, like Secretary-General reports or communiques and resolutions from regional organizations, UNSC resolutions are the most useful for this measurement for a variety of reasons. First, resolutions allow for the most reliable interpretation of action. Speeches and other forms of UN documents are more aspirational in their voices for cooperation, which does not necessarily indicate the true nature of action. My investigation finds that UNSC resolutions lead to actual cooperation more than calls for cooperation by officials or in less powerful settings. Second, the prevalence of UNSC resolutions allows for greater variability in the cooperation score, especially further back in time. The African Union, for example, had “decisions and declarations”, which are the most similar to the UNSC resolutions, once a year from its founding as the OAU until 2003. Because of their infrequency, these decisions are not able to reliably pick up shifts in cooperation over time.

The measure is focused only on Africa for a variety of reasons. First, it was chosen for the breadth of conflicts and conflict management occurring over an extended period of time. This allows for a significant amount of variation in conflict characteristics and the types of conflict management occurring. But specifically, when looking at cooperation, I chose to focus on Africa for the number of organizations that could potentially respond to the conflicts. For any given country in Africa, there are at least three and sometimes four organizations that could respond, including the United Nations, the African Union, and the regional organization they belong to. The fourth organization is usually a culturally specific organization like the League of Arab States or the Community of Portuguese Language Speaking Countries. Because of this


prevalence of organizations, it is clear that cooperation is almost always an option between at least two organizations. Other parts of the world could lack cooperation because of a lack of organizations.

The first type of cooperation included in the coding of this dataset is rhetorical cooperation, which indicates information sharing and approval of their partner organizations' actions. This indicates pooling cooperation because the actions of the respective organizations are recognized, which can prevent duplicate or contrasting work. This measure aligns closely with Clark (2021) as actions that are not costly to the organization. An example of this in a UN resolution looks like, "Welcoming the continued commitment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to and the efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict" from a 1992 resolution.

The second measure of cooperation from the UN resolutions is instances of active coordination between organizations. This means that the organizations are working together on the ground for a conflict reduction effort. In the coding process, this can present itself as recognizing past cooperation, such as this excerpt from a UNSC resolution regarding Somalia, "Expressing its appreciation to the regional organizations... for their cooperation with the United Nations in the effort to resolve the Somali problem." Another way active cooperation can be coded is by the resolution demanding future cooperation like when the UNSC "calls upon the Secretary-General to continue, in close cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, his consultations with all Somali parties." From a careful analysis of the Somalian case study, I see the UN resolutions as an indicator of future cooperative events. Generally, the UN bodies have a motivation to follow through on Security Council recommendations in order to maintain funding and leverage in the

future. But this pattern can be shown through real-life events. Based on evidence from coding a case study in Somalia, shown in Figure 1, the mandate for cooperation was directly associated with an increase in meetings and planning with the other IOs by the Secretary-General. Figure 1 is a timeline of UNSC resolutions and the resulting conflict management work being done.

Figure 1: Timeline of Somalia's Cooperation Score



Another type of active cooperation that is recorded is cooperation between organizations, not including the UN. One potential misconception of the data strategy is that this would only record cooperation between IOs and the UN. But in reality, the UN often recognizes and promotes cooperation when they are not involved. This is shown in many different resolutions, like this one in Guinea-Bissau, where the UN “welcomes the ECOWAS-CPLP partnership and looks forward to the final endorsement by ECOWAS of the road map developed by the Chiefs of Defense Staff.” Even when the UN is not largely involved on the ground of the conflict, they have an invested interest in supporting the cooperation of other IOs. By mentioning the cooperation efforts between other IOs, the UN can support and recognize successful work to encourage violence reduction with little involvement and cost to themselves. In fact, recognizing cooperation by outside IOs, the UN can support conflict management efforts in which they do not want to become more extensively involved. In Liberia, in 1992, the UN commended the ongoing cooperation between the AU and ECOWAS as a way to boost struggling peace efforts

and buy time to assess the situation. In the next year, ECOWAS subsequently mediated the Accra Peace Agreement to end the Liberian civil war before the UN established its peacekeeping mission. And while this is not entirely the result of the UN's support of their cooperation, the recognition was able to support the legitimacy of their actions. Following this model, the UN is likely to support other ongoing cooperation publicly in UNSC resolutions to encourage successful conflict management and even delay or reduce the UN's own involvement.

For all actions, rhetorical and active, I record the organizations mentioned. To be included in the dataset a specific organization must be referenced in the resolution. This means that general calls for cooperation or of general "efforts" are not included. This coding of UN resolutions is completed for any resolution regarding Africa from 1991 to 2015. I make no distinction in the initial coding regarding whether the country is actively in civil war. Sometimes, multiple countries are included in a single resolution, while rare, I code each country individually for its cooperation efforts. For example, if a resolution speaks to Ethiopia and Eritrea, I ensure that the cooperation score matches the efforts occurring in each particular country. Finally, I code each resolution at the country level rather than the civil war level. Typically, there is only one civil war happening in the country, but when there is more than one civil war as defined by UCDP, it is often impossible to disentangle what actions are for what conflict. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2013, there were two civil wars defined by UCDP, one focused in the Kivus and one in Katanga. The resolutions regarding the DRC at this time do not distinguish between these two and, in fact, mention both throughout. In Resolution 2098, the Security Council "express[es] concern at... the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in South Kivu and Katanga." Or in the case of Mali, the resolutions focus generally on the state of security with phrases like, "emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect


the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure the continued provision of humanitarian assistance” (Resolution 2295 2016). Because of the overwhelming pattern of resolutions focused on the country level rather than on specific conflicts, I follow that model in my own coding. This coding effort results in a list of resolutions, with information on the country targeted, the names of IOs involved, and whether their cooperation occurs rhetorically or is active.

From this collection of resolutions, I make a total cooperation score for each country-year. The cooperation score is created by adding the instances of cooperation, one point each for rhetorical, active with the UN, and active between other organizations. This is then averaged over the number of resolutions regarding that country in a given year. This prevents multiple resolutions from falsely inflating the score. For example, in 2010, Guinea-Bissau was the subject of only one resolution from the Security Council that focused heavily on cooperation, while Chad had three resolutions and only one featured rhetorical support for the African Union. The next challenge is to distinguish cooperation happening between a few organizations or many. As cooperation between many organizations requires greater coordination and information sharing, the cooperation score should be able to distinguish between cooperation with one organization or multiple. To do so, I have multiplied the average score by the average number of organizations mentioned in that country year.

Of the country years that have UN resolutions, the cooperation scale ranges from 0 to 12, with a mean of around 1.5 and is displayed in Figure 2. A zero on this scale means that there was no other organization mentioned for its efforts or cooperation in any resolution in a given year. To guarantee that zero scores are not simply a result of no UN resolution, I investigated each zero individually and found no evidence of cooperation occurring. Scores less than 1 indicate

that there were multiple resolutions in that year for the country but a very small proportion of them mentioned cooperation and even then, the cooperation was only in one category, typically rhetorical. On the other end of the spectrum, the highest-rated cooperation occurred in consecutive years in Guinea-Bissau as the resolutions focused on the accomplishments of an ECOWAS-CPLP mediation partnership leading to the Abuja Agreement in 1998. The high cooperation score also results from the UNSC requesting the Secretary-General to work with these parties, the AU and EU, to assess the needs for the plans to strengthen Guinea-Bissau's institutions to fulfill the goals outlined in the Abuja Agreement. Together, these organizations are able to provide financial, physical, and logistical support to maintain the agreement. This

Figure 2: Histogram of Cooperation Scores



represents high levels of coordination across organizations, with significant information sharing and rhetorical support, with a large number involved.

I analyze the cooperation scores in a number of ways to guarantee that the score is actively capturing cooperation. First, I thoroughly compare my score to the MIC data from

UCDP (Croicu et al. 2013). As previously mentioned, the MIC data records events data on efforts to resolve the conflicts in Africa. The MIC dataset is the most extensive data available for a variety of different conflict management strategies including peacekeeping, talks, fact-finding and observer missions. This data lists the date and type of event, with the names of the third parties involved. If one wanted to understand cooperation from this data, one strategy would be to count the number of events that are co-led by two or more IOs. But there are two main drawbacks to this approach. The first is that the cooperation score would then only count cooperation in the same tactic area. For example, if the AU and UN lead mediation in Somalia that would be counted but any cooperation with an IO outside of the mediation team would be left out. Additionally, as the MIC data is events data, there are increased scores for co-led talks because they can take place through multiple meetings. Each unique meeting would receive an additional mark for cooperation, which on its surface could indicate increased cooperation as they meet more often, but in practice means that there are heavily inflated scores for conflicts that have more news coverage of meetings, meet more often over time despite any outcome, and have more actors in which mediators meet individually. One last consideration of the MIC data is that it does not include low-level information sharing. An important aspect to coordination is sharing information, which is most common amongst IOs because it does not limit future mandates. Information sharing is critical to conflict management because it facilitates coordination that reduces redundancies. The MIC data does not record these instances but only events that come to fruition.

To illustrate the usefulness of a cooperation score as compared to the MIC data, I explore the case of Burundi briefly to show another case example of where cooperation occurs and to explore differences between these two datasets. I chose Burundi because it offered a continuous

time period in which two interesting phenomena occurred. The first is the situation is one where the MIC data, as measured by a count of co-sponsored events, reports cooperation, in some cases high cooperation, and the cooperation score I have created does not report cooperation. And the second situation is the opposite, where the MIC data reports no cooperative events, and the new measure does report a cooperation score. I explore these years of the Burundi conflict using a search string in NexisUni to understand the day-by-day developments through news articles on whether cooperation between IOs occurred.

From 1997 to 1999, the MIC data reports cooperation scores of 3 to 8 events co-sponsored, where the cooperation score does not indicate any cooperation occurred. The events from MIC in this period are mediation events that are labeled as co-sponsored by the UN and AU (the OAU at the time), the scores increase only due to the increase in the number of meetings that the mediation team has in a given year. In my investigation of events during this time period, I find that the mediation team in Burundi was not led by the UN or the OAU but rather by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere. While the two IOs maintained their support of Nyerere as a facilitator in Burundi, they did not actively work together to support him. The UN frequently met individually with Nyerere to assess the status of negotiations, but the OAU was not present. Both organizations were observers to the peace process, but this does not indicate that the two organizations coordinated together specifically for the purpose of reducing violence. These actions continued in this pattern, with the OAU and UN separately supporting Nyerere until his death in 1999. This separation was extra clear when Burundi questioned the Tanzanian influence and suggested that the UN or OAU would be a better alternative.² If using the MIC data in this

² "Burundi accuses Tanzania of wanting to annex it", September 1, 1997.

period in Burundi, coordination would be grossly exaggerated, and the variations would be solely a result of more meetings rather than greater cooperation.

The other situation of note is when the MIC notes no measures of cooperation when my measure picks up cooperation. One example of this is in 2001 in Burundi. With investigation, the score created by the UNSC resolutions is accurate in its assessment of cooperation as 2001 marked the beginning of Burundi's "Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC)" working together.³ This group came to be as a part of the Arusha Agreement, negotiated by Nelson Mandela, at the end of 2000. Their first meeting was in January of 2001, which aligns with the coordination score created here.⁴ This committee was chaired by a UN appointee and included representatives from the OAU, designed to facilitate the peace process in Burundi. The committee took on several important roles including the facilitation of a transitional government with direct involvement through their representatives by the UN and OAU.⁵ The UCDP's MIC fails to consider this committee's actions and does not include any cooperation occurring in this year.

There are also a few key takeaways about what this measure does not include. The most important note about this measure is that it does not allow us to understand the total possible cooperation in the conflict, only the cooperation as it is occurring. It does not include all of the possible organizations available for cooperation in the conflict zone. While this is helpful because it distinguishes our cooperation score from instances where IOs are just crowded in the conflict, it also means that there is no clear understanding of what cooperation could be and

³ Anacleet Rwegayura, Panafrikan News Agency. "Burundi; Burundi Parties Marking Time On Peace Accord". Africa News, September 30, 2000

⁴ "First meeting of Burundi peace monitoring body opens in Arusha". Agence France Presse -- English, January 17, 2001

⁵ Internews. "Burundi; Peace Talks: Implementation Monitoring Committee Starts Six-Day Meeting". Africa News. August 15, 2001 Wednesday.

whether the score is capturing the maximum cooperation possible. Additionally, the score only presents cooperation in a positive sense, as there is no measure of active dis-cooperation. This means that if the score is 0, it could mean that there is simply no cooperation happening or that the organizations are actively competing with one another.

Empirical Analysis

The theoretical argument that I developed leads to the expectation that cooperation will increase when the conflict complexity is high and when public support for an organization is low. To analyze this, I use an OLS model at the conflict-year level. The project is limited to all civil wars, which meet the 25 battle death threshold in the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset in Africa (Davies et al. 2024; N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002). Due to data availability, the sample is limited to 1997 to 2015. In this sample, there are 48 unique conflicts with a total of 258 conflict-years across 32 countries. While the unit of analysis for this model is at the conflict-year level, the cooperation score occurs at the country-year level. This is due to the difficulty in distinguishing between conflict management activities for individual conflicts happening at the same time within a country. To account for this, I include conflict-level fixed effects. This attempts to remove between conflict variations to focus on how cooperation can change based on conflict characteristics over time and controls for the lack of variation in cooperation across conflicts in the same country.

The main dependent variable is the level of cooperation, indicated by the original dataset outlined above. If no UN resolution occurs in that country for the conflict year, then the cooperation score is a zero. This means that a conflict year can receive a zero for cooperation if they have resolutions that do not mention cooperation or if there is no resolution at all. The same

logic applies to both scenarios as the UN has in its best interest to encourage and recognize the work of other IOs and their efforts to reduce violence because it is a low-cost way for the UN to promote peace in the conflict. Investigations of both resulting zeros indicate that they both accurately describe a lack of cooperation.

There are two main categories of independent variables of interest. The first dimension to impact cooperation is the conflict complexity. Drawing on the conflict complexity conceptualization by Brosche, Nilsson, and Sundberg (2023), I measure complexity based on actors, behaviors, and issue complexity. I measure actor complexity with a proxy for the number of veto players in the conflict by counting the number of rebel groups in the conflict. Cunningham (2011) finds that more veto players increase the duration of the conflict because it is harder to find a bargaining range in which they can all agree. With the increase of veto players in a conflict, interests become harder to rectify and may require higher levels of influence and capability in order to push an agreement that reduces violence (Cunningham 2011). In this study, I am not classifying the conflict management organizations as unique veto players because, again, I have assumed that they want to reduce violence and as such they would not veto an agreement that could end the conflict. My conceptualization of veto players, as the number of rebel groups, is directly from the UCDP data as it lists the actors fighting the government. The number of rebel groups in my sample ranges from 1 to 6 (N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002).


To proxy behavioral complexity, I take inspiration from the measurement by Brosche, Nilsson, and Sundberg (2023), which measures the number of violent dyads in a country. I measure behavior using UCDP's Non-State Conflict dataset to measure the number of non-state dyads engaging in violence in a country in a given year (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012). This allows me to understand the impact of complexity as a result of rebel groups fighting one

another. This measure ranges from 0, meaning no rebel groups are fighting other rebels to 11 dyads of rebels using violence against each other. Finally, I measure issue complexity with a count of the number of issues stated by rebel groups. This is taken from the UCDP Issues dataset which focuses on issues between fighting dyads, that I aggregated to the conflict level (Brosché and Sundberg 2023). The number of issues between dyads in a given conflict ranges from 1 to 166 with a mean of 11.47 issues.

Again, I assert that the conflict complexity measure differs from conflict intensity as there are a greater number of interests that need to be included in order to end violence. But when violence is high that does not consistently indicate that there is a highly complex issue to be resolved. As seen in Figure 3, the blue line indicates the conflict intensity in Somalia changing between less than and greater than 1000 battle deaths. As the line changes, it does not correlate to higher levels of coordination, especially as the level of intensity stays consistent from 2008 to 2012. Figure 3 shows that organizations are not drawn only to conflicts with high levels of violence but to a more nuanced understanding of the conflict activity as suggested by conflict complexity.

The emphasis on the conflict complexity by the organizations rules out the possible idea of cooperation, that cooperation increases over time. With the digital age, information and distance problems have been eliminated by modern technology. This leads to the assumption that as time has moved on cooperation would become easier because of modernization but also because once organizations establish relationships then it would be easier to continue them in the future. But, in reality, cooperation between organizations does not happen linearly over time, rejecting this idea, as seen in Figure 3. Understanding the conflict environment replaces any argument of time because organizations' cooperation could vary as a result of the complexities in

Figure 3: Cooperation Over Time in Somalia



each conflict as the conflict ebbs and flows. This helps explain why organizations that have cooperated before are not pursuing the same relationship again, even if cooperation has become easier in the modern era.

The second dimension of interest is the legitimacy that the organizations have in the conflict. As a proxy measure, I am interested in the public support that international organizations have in the country (Tallberg and Zürn 2019). I have taken protest data from ACLED and used their notes regarding each event to parse out protests that are directed at IOs⁶ (Raleigh et al. 2010). This represents a challenge to the authority of the IO in the country that could push the IO to take on partners in the conflict to ensure success. This protest measure indicates the number of protests against any IO in a given year and ranges from 0 to 3 protests.⁷ The greatest number of protests happened in the Central African Republic in 2014 and was

⁶ The IOs being protested are taken from a dictionary of IOs created from the UNSC resolutions.

⁷ The results are similar with a binary measure of protest.

preceded by a year in which the country had 2 other protests. The other countries that had multiple protests in a given year were South Sudan and Somalia, both in 2015. Protests against an IO are not an extremely rare occurrence as 62 conflict-years have a protest, around 24% of our sample. The main drawback of the ACLED data is that the events data is scarce in the early years of its dataset, which could mean that the measure is underestimating legitimacy concerns in the early years of the analysis. There is a pattern of increasing protests in our sample as time goes on and it is difficult to determine if that is a real pattern or due to improvements in the data. The ACLED data also restricts the sample to 1997 to 2015.

I also include numerous controls that could account for higher levels of cooperation in the conflict. The first is the cooperation score from the previous year to take into account the previously established patterns of cooperation. Similarly, it would be easy to conceive that cooperation is easier over time, given that organizations could have already worked together or that technology has improved to enhance communication. In order to control for this phenomenon, I include a year-trend variable. The additional controls are at the conflict-year level. I control for the presence of UN or RO peacekeepers in the conflict in the previous year, as a binary measure, to account for the actions of the IOs previously in the conflict (Bara and Hultman 2020). There would also be a reason to believe that IOs would be more likely to intervene in conflicts with high battle deaths or with longer conflicts, so both controls are included (N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002). One final control is whether there is another civil war happening in the state as it could make the IOs more likely to intervene in multiple conflicts. Battle deaths, the length of the conflict, and whether there is another civil war in the country all originate from the UCDP Armed Conflict dataset (N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002). All variables in

the model (besides the conflict length and year trend) are lagged by one year to account for any endogeneity.

Table 2: OLS Model Estimating Cooperation Scores with Conflict Level Fixed Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Cooperation Score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Protest Against IO	0.508* (0.289)	0.488* (0.276)	0.509* (0.305)
Rebel Group Count	0.336*** (0.129)		
Violent Nonstate Dyads		0.080* (0.045)	
Number of Issues Contested			0.040** (0.017)
Previous Cooperation Score	0.271* (0.157)	0.260* (0.157)	0.236 (0.160)
UN PKO Present	0.200 (0.367)	0.196 (0.360)	0.131 (0.341)
RO PKO Present	-0.536 (0.448)	-0.463 (0.451)	-0.484 (0.440)
Battle Deaths (Logged)	-0.060 (0.086)	0.016 (0.085)	0.001 (0.085)
Conflict Length	-0.059* (0.034)	-0.070** (0.033)	-0.070** (0.032)
Other Civil War in Country	-0.247 (0.548)	-0.159 (0.518)	-0.090 (0.548)
Year Trend	0.065* (0.036)	0.076* (0.040)	0.069* (0.036)
Observations	204	204	204
R ²	0.229	0.218	0.218
Adjusted R ²	0.046	0.032	0.032
F Statistic (df = 9; 164)	5.424***	5.069***	5.086***

Note:

* ** *** p p p<0.01


All variables (except conflict length and year trend) lagged by one year.

The results of the main OLS model are presented in Table 2 with robust standard errors and fixed effects at the conflict level. The main independent variables of interest were the protest variable and the number of rebel groups in the conflict. Hypothesis 1 suggested that higher conflict complexity would lead to more cooperation, this is indicated by three different measurements of complexity being positive and significant. The number of rebel groups in a conflict is highly significant and substantively, an increase in the number of rebel groups from 1 to 2 groups indicates an increase in cooperation score around 0.79, which is around one half of a standard deviation shift in cooperation scores. This could represent the shift to greater numbers of cooperation mandates or an increase in the number of organizations cooperating. The next measure of conflict complexity is the count of nonstate dyads using violence against each other. The results of this model in Table 2, Model 2, show that an increase in the number of nonstate dyads fighting each other increases cooperation but only at a 90% confidence interval. The last of the complexity measures is the number of issues stated by rebel groups in the country. These results should be interpreted with caution as there are discrepancies in the data, which lists some conflicts as having no issues at all but suggests that the more issues in a country at a given time the higher the cooperation between IOs. In all, these three measures provide consistent evidence that the complexity of a conflict leads to an increase in cooperation to varying degrees of substantive significance.

The protest indicator suggests that as more protests against IOs occur in the country, more cooperation is expected as the coefficient is positive. This is in line with Hypothesis 2 that low legitimacy would lead to more cooperation, but the variable is statistically significant at a

90% confidence interval which remains consistent across models. I believe some significance is lost due to the data limitations from ACLED, particularly in the early years of its data collection. Substantively, this is a sizeable effect as one protest in the year prior means the cooperation score will increase by around 0.5. In practice, this could represent the shift from rhetorical cooperation to new mandates of cooperation.

Figure 4: Cooperation Over Time



Another interesting finding is the lack of importance from the other controls in the model. A counterintuitive finding is that as the conflict lengthens, cooperation lessens. This could be the result of fatigue on the part of the organizations or that organizations are able to sense the conflicts nearing an end. As predicted the level of violence, measured by the battle deaths, has no consistent or significant impact to the cooperation score. As expected, the cooperation score from the year prior is a positive indicator of cooperation in the future. There is also significance to the year trend, suggesting that cooperation is increasing over time. Figure 4 shows the mean cooperation per year over all of the conflicts, from 1991 to 2018, with a mean line. This line

shows that the trend over time is actually quite subtle. Over time, the average amount of cooperation has only increased slightly, and this upward trend is heavily driven by high levels of

Table 3: OLS Model Estimating Cooperation Scores with Conflict Level Fixed Effects on Limited Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Cooperation Score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Protest Against IO	1.179 (0.762)	1.133 (0.704)	1.241 (0.793)
Rebel Group Count	0.522*** (0.192)		
Violent Nonstate Dyads		0.347** (0.169)	
Number of Issues Contested			0.056** (0.022)
Previous Cooperation Score	-0.139 (0.240)	-0.188 (0.237)	-0.175 (0.210)
UN PKO Present	0.242 (1.290)	0.745 (1.136)	0.017 (1.271)
RO PKO Present	-0.935 (1.024)	-0.936 (1.064)	-0.879 (1.047)
Battle Deaths (Logged)	0.051 (0.379)	0.437 (0.324)	0.116 (0.375)
Conflict Length	-0.421*** (0.141)	-0.642*** (0.103)	-0.486*** (0.118)
Other Civil War in Country	-2.206*** (0.505)	-2.082** (0.825)	-3.332*** (0.570)
Year Trend	0.223 (0.146)	0.326* (0.167)	0.288** (0.139)
Observations	66	66	66
R ²	0.220	0.255	0.273
Adjusted R ²	-0.237	-0.181	-0.153
F Statistic (df = 9; 41)	1.283	1.557	1.711

Note: * ** *** p < 0.10 p < 0.05 p < 0.01 All variables (except conflict length and year trend) lagged by one year.

cooperation in Mali in 2013. This gives extra credence to the theory derived here that there are factors within the conflict environment that are driving unique decisions to cooperate. It also again shows that despite the Secretary-General's push for cooperation, there has not been a sustained increase in cooperation over time. But beyond these controls, there is no significance related to any other variables in relation to cooperation.

Additional Analyses

In order to further probe these results, I present some additional models that explore further the dynamics of cooperation. A clear dilemma in this cooperation score presented here is the issue of non-cooperation. In this sense, it is difficult to determine if a 0 in the cooperation score indicates that cooperation is not happening between multiple organizations or if a 0 indicates that no conflict management at all is occurring by organizations. To try to mitigate this issue, I run a model that is limited to conflict years in which there is a UN or regional peacekeeping mission present. This presents a model in which organizations are definitely present to then pursue cooperation. Using the same model as Table 2, on this limited sample, the results remain mostly consistent as presented in Table 3. The main difference is that the protest variable is no longer statistically significant, while the direction of the coefficient remains the same. This is somewhat expected as the number of observations used in the model is cut by significantly more than half to only 66 observations.

I include dummy variables for various regional organizations to understand if certain regions are more predisposed to cooperation than others. These variables are included in an OLS model with robust standard errors and conflict-level fixed effects. The regions I focus on include

ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, and the League of Arab States (LAS). This leaves as a baseline mainly the countries of the East African Community. These results are shown in Table 4 and

Table 4: OLS Model Estimating Cooperation with Region			
	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Cooperation Score		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Protest Against IO	0.645* (0.360)	0.619* (0.355)	0.798** (0.363)
Rebel Count	0.507** (0.210)		
Violent Nonstate Dyads		0.117** (0.054)	
Number of Issues Contested			0.035*** (0.010)
ECOWAS	1.549 (3.095)	1.976 (2.964)	2.606 (2.714)
SADC	-2.194 (1.859)	-2.531 (1.815)	-1.612 (1.814)
IGAD	-0.306 (1.826)	-0.664 (1.798)	-0.735 (1.726)
LAS	-3.390** (1.692)	-3.579** (1.698)	-3.833** (1.661)
Constant	1.300 (2.073)	1.098 (2.099)	1.649 (2.015)
Controls Included	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	204	204	204
R ²	0.552	0.544	0.564
Adjusted R ²	0.446	0.435	0.460
Residual Std. Error (df = 164)	1.505	1.519	1.485
F Statistic (df = 39; 164)	5.185***	5.008***	5.438***

Note: All variables (except regions, conflict length, and year trend) lagged by one year

* ** *** p<0.01

continue to find support for the main arguments of legitimacy and complexity. Of the regional variables, only the League of Arab States reaches statistical significance. The model finds that cooperation is less likely in the LAS region, which could be due to a lack of capacity by the organization. Given that largely the regional variables are not significant, these findings suggest that cooperation is not constrained to a specific region as none of the regional variables are statistically significant. This shows that some organizations are not predisposed to cooperation over others.

There are, of course, limitations to this study. First, the number of observations available for testing is limited. This is a result of the legitimacy measure that is limited by ACLED's availability, especially on the starting year. To overcome this issue, it is important to explore alternative measures of legitimacy for IOs. This is not a new concern in the study of organizations (Tallberg and Zürn 2019). However, this study could very much benefit from a more diverse sample of measures of legitimacy to test the robustness of the finding and improve the number of observations. Also, while I try to correct for it in the robustness checks, the study could improve by better eliminating conflicts where no conflict management is happening because there is no possibility of cooperation there.

Conclusion

This paper has explored why there are variations in cooperation between international organizations, despite their united goal of promoting peace. Previous literature on the topic has been limited in a number of ways. First, the types of cooperation, in conflict zones, have been restricted to certain types of conflict management activities, like multi-party mediation or

between peacekeeping units. The literature, within conflict studies and in the IO literature at large, tends to treat cooperation as a dichotomous phenomenon. But in reality, cooperation within these contexts can vary. To address these issues, I have presented a novel cooperation score that measures cooperation with no limit to the tactic, organization, or time period. This score is able to measure cooperation on a scale, with information sharing constituting lower levels of cooperation and active coordination on the ground as higher levels.

To understand how these levels of cooperation shift over time during conflicts, I have suggested that low legitimacy and conflict complexity can push an IO to cooperate more in order to successfully reduce violence. IOs are constantly seeking to secure their place in the international system and as a result, they must weigh the cost and benefits of cooperation with other IOs. Ideally, the IO wants to handle the conflict on its own to show their importance and necessity to their member states. But they then risk failure if they are not able to accomplish their goal. Cooperating is beneficial because they are more confident in their ability to resolve the conflict, especially in scenarios when the IO is losing legitimacy, or the conflict is sufficiently complex.

These findings are confirmed by my empirical analysis, which shows there is an increase in cooperation scores when there is a protest against an IO in the previous year and when there is greater conflict complexity. Conflict complexity is significant in multiple different variations including complexity related to conflict actors, behavior, and issues (Brosché, Nilsson, and Sundberg 2023). These models also produce some counterintuitive results suggesting that conflict length can decrease the amount of cooperation between IOs. I also explore the impacts of regional memberships on cooperation and find that no region is more prone to cooperation than another.

This work has important implications for international organizations' future endeavors as it points to a bias that IOs have when supporting conflict management. In an increasingly globalized world, IOs are still unwilling to cooperate in certain contexts. This reluctance could be prolonging conflicts that could otherwise be resolved. For example, cooperation could have benefited the recently withdrawn UN mission to Mali in their efforts to stabilize the region from coups and increased terrorism. Currently, the region is still grappling with higher levels of violence from extremist groups, and organizations recognizing the complexity of the conflicts spreading across many countries and the waning legitimacy of the UN should pursue cooperation.

There are many avenues available for future research in this area. One adjacent area that requires more investigation is the empirical ways in which we study legitimacy. To test the legitimacy of an IO in any given context, there are limited empirical measures to use. Increasing the tools we have to measure legitimacy will support numerous future projects. Most pressing is the impact that these cooperation scores have on various conflict outcomes, which I explore in forthcoming work (Fleishman n.d.). As much of the conflict management literature suggests, the greater number of resources in a conflict the more likely it is to be a better outcome (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013). If this is the case, are the resources alone enough in the conflict zone or do they require greater levels of cooperation in order to be effective? This has the potential to impact the ways in which IOs operate in conflict zones by emphasizing the need for greater information sharing and active cooperation.

Paper 2: The Impacts of Cooperation on Conflict Outcomes

Abstract:

How does cooperation between international organizations impact conflict outcomes? Much of the literature on conflict outcomes focuses on the ways increased amounts of resources help promote peace. Whether that be additional troops for peacekeeping or shows of hard power by mediators, more resources are associated with less violence and negotiated settlements that reduce conflict. This literature would suggest that the presence of more international organizations, with their associated resources, would lead to peace. However, I suggest that increased resources are not enough and the missing mechanism for securing peace is cooperation. With cooperation between organizations, the resources can be distributed more effectively, reduce redundancies, improve coordination between mediation and peacekeeping, and show the organizations' resolve to solving the conflict. Using a novel dataset on cooperation between international organizations for conflicts in Africa between 1991 to 2016, I find support that cooperation is critical to reducing conflict duration and intensity.

Introduction

The civil conflict in Somalia saw conflict management support from many international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the League of Arab States (LAS). These organizations provided peacekeeping missions, attempted mediation, and worked to influence combatants toward peace. But despite the overwhelming show of interest by the international community in resolving the conflict through various organizations, the conflict has raged for over 30 years. While some could point to the number of organizations creating difficulties, other conflicts, like Guinea-Bissau, with a similar number of international organizations, entered a lasting peace quickly. In Guinea-Bissau, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) mediated, with a UN mission established, all supported by the European Union and AU. This effort resulted in a cessation of violence after two years that culminated in the Abuja Agreement. What explains these differences in conflict outcomes? Why does the increased attention from multiple international organizations not translate to peace?

The current literature on how international organizations (IOs) influence conflict duration or intensity focuses on two areas of conflict management: peacekeeping and mediation. Generally, both areas of study focus on the quantity of the resources provided to conflicts as an important factor in moving towards peace. Previous studies stress the importance of an appropriate number of peacekeepers (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014) and the amount of leverage (Reid 2017) to resolve conflict and reduce violence. With many intergovernmental organizations engaged in conflict management, the current literature would attest that the inclusion of these additional resources from any source would be positive for peace. But

examples like that of Liberia suggest otherwise. In Liberia, both the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sponsored peacekeeping missions during the civil war. These missions, sent independently of one another, added needed resources to the conflict management attempt. However, the two missions were plagued with hostilities to one another (Alao 1998). The peacekeepers caused confusion among the populations where they were both stationed and rebels played these divisions to their advantage to continue violence. Episodes like this call into question whether the resources themselves are sufficient and suggest that a missing component to the effectiveness of many conflict management efforts is the level of coordination of these efforts.

In this paper, I argue that cooperation between international organizations is vital to creating shorter and less violent conflicts because of its implications in resource management within and between conflict management tactics. The theoretical framework presented here describes cooperation as the missing mechanism to make increased resources effective in reducing violence. With cooperation, international organizations can improve their conflict management strategy in a few ways. First, the organizations can ensure that their work is distributed evenly, meaning that the resources can be deployed to where they are most needed (Fortna 2008). This could be geographically most needed, or it could mean dividing skillsets to organizations to generate the desired outcome. Also, cooperation can prevent any duplicating or conflicting work. If multiple organizations are operating in the same space and in the same area, they can repeat the work, which can create confusion. Third, with cooperation, organizations can harness their collective power between tactics to complement each other. When one organization is involved in peacekeeping, and another in mediation, their ability to coordinate these efforts is critical to their success. And finally, cooperation will indicate the resolve of the international

organizations to fully address the conflict at hand because they are willing to give up some of their power and influence to see the violence end.

Using a score of the level of cooperation between inter-government organizations (IGOs) in Africa from 1991 to 2016, I find support for my argument that higher levels of cooperation are associated with shorter conflicts and fewer battle deaths. This has important implications for future conflicts and the literature on conflict management. First, it suggests that resources alone are not enough for improved outcomes and that in a world of increased actors in conflict management, organizations need to dedicate themselves to coordination amongst themselves. But also, this work addresses the complexity of conflict environments previously lacking in the literature. Many studies of conflict management are largely siloed by focusing on one aspect of conflict intervention, like peacekeeping or mediation, and by the actors that they focus on, which is typically the UN. In reality the situation on the ground often consists of many actors, performing many different operations simultaneously. As an example, in 2023, there were 63 total multilateral peace operations around the world, with the UN accounting for 20 and other regional organizations and alliances maintaining 38.⁸ As regional organizations take a larger role in violent contexts, they are more likely to be operating in contexts where organizations are already present, and the ways they work with these organizations will have important consequences for the duration and intensity of conflicts. The study of cooperation by multiple international organizations is especially critical as the diversity of actors in the conflict management space increases.

⁸ Data from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database.

Reducing Violence

To theorize about the ways cooperation can reduce violence, I will first describe the literature on violence reduction generally. Existing explanations of reducing violence and ending civil wars emphasize the added difficulty when combatants are unable to win outright through military force. In these cases, combatants do not come to a negotiated settlement, even when preferable to violence because of commitment and information problems (Fearon 1995, 2004). First, commitment problems prevent combatants from ending a conflict totally out of fear of the other side reneging on the deal. Specifically, when combatants are disarming, they are faced with a difficult decision of leaving themselves unprotected by their enemy (Walter 2014). Additionally, the end of a civil war is plagued by information problems that shadow each side's ability to determine an appropriate range of solutions to the conflict. For example, claims that misrepresent their abilities and resolve can influence the negotiations that do not match combatants' expectations and thus prevent the end of the conflict (Fearon 2004; Walter 2009). However, these challenges can be overcome with third-party interventions like peacekeeping and mediation (A. H. Kydd 2010).

There are multiple ways in which peacekeeping can help resolve conflicts (Kathman and Benson 2019). First, they physically separate combatants, which can prevent violence (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014) but also allow the combatants to credibly disarm (Fortna 2008). By having an increased number of peacekeepers physically in place between combatants, the armed actors face an increased cost of continuing violence. If they were to return to violence, they risk facing peacekeeping defenses and renewed interest and interventions from the international community. With these separations in place, the combatants can disarm with less fear of attack from their opposition, reducing the commitment problem. Because of the security

of the peacekeepers, combatants can put down their arms without fear of ambush and begin to negotiate the core issues of the conflict (Kathman and Benson 2019).

Once physical security is established, the peacekeepers can help with issues of information and misrepresentation that can undermine negotiations. The peacekeepers' work puts them directly in contact with combatants, where they can collect and observe their capabilities and intentions. This can ensure to the opposing side that there are no intentions to reengage in violence. They can also convey verified information about the capabilities of each side that can be reliably trusted because they are a third party without an agenda to misrepresent (Kathman and Benson 2019). This spread of information that can be trusted allows both sides to better approximate the possible bargaining range (Fearon 2004). With these mechanisms, peacekeeping can prevent violence and lead to a shorter civil war (Kathman and Benson 2019).

But peacekeepers alone cannot resolve conflict, especially by negotiated settlement, without mediators to support their efforts. Mediation describes a process of conflict management that is geared toward finding an acceptable solution to a conflict without the use of violence (Beardsley et al. 2006; Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991). There has been a lengthy discussion in the literature about its success with debates over its long-term effectiveness (Beardsley 2008) or its selection effects that disadvantage mediation (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). But largely the literature finds that mediators with leverage, usually equated as the mediators' material power, are more likely to be successful (Beardsley 2008; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Reid 2017).

Leverage can impact the mediation in a number of ways (Beardsley 2009). First, mediators with leverage can increase the costs of conflict by threatening to use their power if there is no agreement. Known as sticks, this type of leverage punishes the actors for their non-

compliance. On the other hand, there are carrots, which can reward the parties on a deal. This is another advantage of leverage that can persuade actors to work together (Beardsley 2009). Third, high leverage assists mediation's prospects by shaping the post-conflict environment through their monitoring and enforcement, allowing the actors to commit to the agreement with the promise of consequences for reneging (Beardsley et al. 2006; Reid 2017). And finally, leverage impacts mediation because with higher leverage mediators are privy to more private information that they can share to overcome the information asymmetries that plague negotiations (Beardsley 2009).

While peacekeeping and mediation on their own can reduce battle deaths and lead to a shorter conflict, they can have a greater effect together. While few studies have looked at the interaction of these tactics, Beardsley, Cunningham, and White (2019) find that the interaction of the two tactics has additive effects on reducing violence because they work at two different levels. Mediation is occurring between the top officials, while peacekeeping is preventing violence at the local level (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2019). Together, these tactics are able to reduce the number of battle deaths in conflicts.

Resources

With an understanding of the mechanisms of how peacekeeping and mediation support conflict reduction, we can turn our attention to the ways these mechanisms are supported with an increase in resources. The importance of resources appears in many places in the wide-ranging literature on conflict management. Sometimes these resources are described as physical resources that include peacekeeping missions on the ground, their numbers, and their materials to maintain their units. But another resource that conflict management actors bring to their efforts for peace is their unique leverage, usually utilized in mediation. This leverage can take different

forms. One form of leverage is credibility leverage, which describes the mediators' soft power in the conflict context, like their understanding of the conflict and its actors. Whereas capability leverage describes the material power that the mediator can use to enforce a potential agreement (Reid 2017). However, in describing these aspects of resources in conflict, the literature is clear that more of any of these resources will be beneficial to improving conflict outcomes.

Peacekeepers help promote peace in a number of ways that are directly benefited by an increased number of troops. Kathman and Benson (2019) directly test this theory by examining the impact of the number of UN peacekeepers committed at the time of a negotiated settlement for the end of a civil war. They find that an increase in peacekeepers does lead to a short civil war because with additional peacekeepers the UN is signaling its resolve to maintain peace (Kathman and Benson 2019). By showing their intention to solve the conflict with a substantial number of peacekeepers, the UN is helping combatants overcome their commitment problems because there is a significant force to ensure any future agreement stands. More peacekeepers also improve the physical boundaries that are crucial to maintaining peace by putting a greater distance between combatants and by being able to cover a larger geographical region of the conflict space. This prevents violence between combatants and protects civilians (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013). Peacekeepers are likely to be deployed to the places that are most impacted by violence, their increased numbers in these areas will increase the cost of violence where it is most likely to occur (Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018). Increased numbers of peacekeepers also help solve information issues because they are able to produce more information for combatants. If a limited number of peacekeepers are in the contested areas, they risk not being able to fully capture the necessary information that assists the negotiations. For

example, if peacekeepers cannot maintain a force in rebel areas, then the information they collect may be called into question (Kathman and Benson 2019).

In mediation, leverage has been shown to be important and increased levels of leverage improve its outcomes (Beardsley 2009). As previously mentioned, leverage is most often considered to be material power (Reid 2017). With increases in material power, like military or economic power, third parties are able to coerce combatants because they offer stronger sticks and carrots. If a third party has a weak military, their threat of enforcement is not as costly as a third party with a strong, large military. But as Reid (2017) indicates, material power is not the only form of leverage. Credibility leverage describes a soft power that mediators bring to the table. With increased levels of soft power like strong diplomatic relationships, mediators can be trusted to know the challenges of the conflict and their interests are not questioned. In a similar sense to physical materials, soft power can increase combatants' trust in the information shared because of the repeated interactions that make them knowledgeable and invested in the solutions (Reid 2017).

Cooperation in Conflict

Cooperation is not a new phenomenon in conflict studies. Numerous studies have studied the ways in which multiple parties can work together in one area of conflict management. Specifically, the case of multiple parties working together in mediation efforts has been found to hinder conflict management because of issues related to forum shopping and mixed signals that result from limited cooperation (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 1999). But more recently, Menninga (2020; 2024) has found that multiparty mediation can be successful in leading to an agreement. These successes are only possible when the multiple mediators coordinate their use

of their leverage between material and soft power (E. Menninga 2020) and when the mediators have bias balanced for each side of the conflict (E. Menninga 2024). In both instances, coordination is the key to peace for mediation with multiple actors.

The investigation of multiparty peacekeeping is much less established due to the overwhelming focus on United Nations peacekeeping. Many projects acknowledge the presence of multiple peacekeeping forces but with limited work looking at how their interactions may affect any given conflict (Bara and Hultman 2020; Schumann and Bara 2023; Welz 2016). Schumman and Bara (2023) find that the UN and regional peacekeeping have an interactive effect but this largely assumes that the simultaneous presence of peacekeeping includes cooperation. Even more limited is the study of the connection between mediation and peacekeeping. One recent study accounts for the conflict-pacifying impact of peacekeeping and mediation in combination but does not theorize when or why these patterns occur (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2019).

This paper builds on these studies by providing theories of cooperation beyond one tactic of conflict management, instead focusing on the totality of cooperation in conflict zones. The theory and cooperation scores presented next are not limited by tactic or organization and, therefore, add to our understanding of cooperation generally across conflict management activities.

Cooperation is the key

Given the importance of resources in facilitating the mechanisms of peacekeeping and mediation for reduced violence, the literature would assume that the increase of resources from multiple sources would lead to a quicker peace. In any given conflict zone, there are multiple

organizations involved in conflict management. The literature focuses largely on the efforts of the UN but more emphasis has recently been placed on regional organizations (Bara and Hultman 2020; Breslawski, Cunningham, and Fleishman 2023). I argue that despite the emphasis on the resources that suggest that multiple actors would add to the likelihood of peace, the key variable for peace and reduced violence is the cooperation of these actors.

There are four main ways in which cooperation facilitates peace. First, cooperation can support peace by using resources most effectively. For peacekeepers, a main mechanism of their success with additional resources is being able to cover a larger geographical space. But if these missions are not working together, they could be in the same places, leaving others unprotected and at risk of returning to violence. When the missions do work together, they can cover more space, learn more information, and provide greater security guarantees (Kathman and Benson 2019). These efforts can be especially tailored to the conflict with cooperation. When there are limited numbers of peacekeepers, choices must be made on where to send them that will make the biggest impact, inevitably leaving some areas unprotected. But with cooperation more areas are covered, and information can be verified through multiple sources, helping combatants overcome their commitment and information problems. The same can be said amongst mediation teams. When coordinating their actions, they can ensure they are using their combined leverage to choose appropriate carrots and sticks that are most beneficial to the effort.

But also, cooperation supports the coordination of actions to prevent redundancies and conflicting activities. With multiple peacekeeping or mediation missions, conflicts will see increased resources that can be used in the ways we have previously discussed. However, without cooperation, these missions could repeat the same work. At best, they will be in the same places, duplicating work, but in some cases, they can hurt one another's efforts. In Liberia, when

peacekeeping missions overlapped, they told combatants conflicting information (Alao 1998). This creates short-term confusion but also prevents the missions from being able to solve important information problems. The same can be said for mediation teams that if they are not working together can use carrots and sticks in ways that counteract previous efforts.

Additionally, cooperation can combine the peacekeeping and mediation's mechanisms for peace. With cooperation, teams that would normally operate independently can use the strength of each tactic to their advantage. For example, the mediation team can use their leverage to push for disarmament they know is safe through their cooperation with peacekeepers. There are countless examples in which mediation actually relies on peacekeeping to fulfill their agreements and this is best secured through cooperation that informs the other of the work needed and coordinates their actions. Mediation efforts lead to multiple outcomes that need to be supported by peacekeeping. From full peace agreements to the simplest ceasefires, peacekeepers are critical to creating the distance for these efforts to be achieved and sharing information on the ground. If these teams do not cooperate, there are mediators who would not have the full set of information needed to support outcomes and to credibly be able to threaten to use their leverage.

Finally, cooperation between conflict management parties shows their resolve to solve the conflict (Kathman and Benson 2019). Through cooperation, organizations give up some of their agency in the international system (Clark 2021). Therefore, if they choose to cooperate, they are ready to lose some agency in order to resolve the conflict. This signals to the combatants that organizations are fully committed to the resolution of the conflict and allows combatants to trust their information, carrots, and sticks, as credible.

H1: Conflicts with greater cooperation between organizations will be shorter.

H2: Conflict with greater cooperation between organizations will see a decrease in battle deaths.

Data

The theory presented here focuses on cooperation's impact on conflict outcomes. For the independent variable of interest, cooperation, I will use a novel dataset that measures cooperation between international organizations in Africa from 1991 to 2018, as described in Fleishman (n.d.). To my knowledge, there is no other dataset that collects cooperation data with no restriction to the tactics, organization, or with any type of cooperation included. This dataset utilized UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions to identify multiple types of cooperation that are transformed into a composite score of cooperation. As a result, this dataset includes information about organizations' efforts across tactics like mediation or peacekeeping between any number of organizations and is able to vary over time (Fleishman n.d.).

The cumulative score is based on the average number of cooperative actions from any resolution regarding a country in a given year. This average is multiplied by the average number of organizations involved to account for difficulties in cooperation that occur with more organizations. The cooperation dataset records 21 countries that have been the focus of UNSC resolutions between 1991 and 2018. The highest cooperation scores occur in Guinea-Bissau, as the organizations reached the highest possible level of cooperation between 5 organizations. The score is recorded at the country-year level, while the subsequent analyses will occur at the conflict-year level. Because the resolutions are focused on conflict management efforts broadly in each country, it is impossible to disentangle the effects of actions on individual conflicts. That said, it is reasonable to believe that the cooperation score at the country level will be positive for

all individual conflicts because the totality of peace efforts will support multiple conflicts.

Peacekeepers can be deployed to places where they are most needed, and mediation efforts can encourage other groups to the negotiation table. Once on the ground, IOs are able to understand the totality of the country-level situation that will lead to violence-reduction action.

Based on the theoretical framework established here, ensuring the data to make sure that it is not systematically missing organizations that could be providing resources to the conflict is especially important. For example, if the cooperation data consistently missed organizations involved in one tactic or another, then we could not reliably infer about cooperation across tactics. Given the novelty of the data, it is difficult to test its external validity. Some data sources, which have previously been used for analyses of conflict outcomes, focus on peacekeeping and its mission mandates, which might include cooperation requests but require a peacekeeping mission to be present. Other sources focus on mediation but are difficult to compare to a cooperation score because of their structure as events data. Event-focused data that captures instances of mediation can make interactions between organizations seem inflated by prolonged mediation that can take longer and require more meetings. However, mediation data, which records the actors involved in mediation, can help to verify the organizations identified by the cooperation score.

This is a far from perfect check of external validity as the two measures were coded for very different purposes, and as such, the mediation data will contain organizations that are not cooperating but are only there to mediate. The cooperation score only includes organizations that are cooperating in the conflict zone, so it will miss organizations operating independently. However, this will check for any extreme outliers or patterns that show significant differences in the cooperation score and known mediation data. To compare the number of organizations

present, I am using Duursma and Gamez's (2023) data on African Peace Processes (APP). This data covers mediation efforts over all conflicts in Africa from 1989 to 2019. The data is also helpful for our purposes because it does not only include the main mediators of any agreement but also prominent observers, which could mean that organizations that are involved in a different aspect of the conflict, like in peacekeeping, could be present as a third party.

The comparison of the cooperation score and the APP dataset is featured in Table 5. Out of a total of 404 conflict-years, 240 years had no organizations present in both datasets. This also gives some additional insight into whether the UN Security Council Resolutions are missing large chunks of data as the majority of zeros are matched by the APP data. The next box in the table is the number of conflict years where the APP data has no organizations engaged in mediation, but the cooperation data does have evidence of organizations working in the conflict zone. In this case, the cooperation data has 78 conflict-years that include conflict management not captured in the mediation data. On the other hand, the opposite scenario, in which the cooperation data does not have organizations cooperating, but the APP data has mediation occurring has about half as many conflict-years at 32 cases. But again, this could be due to the fact that the cooperation data is focused on cooperation and could miss individual mediators. When both the APP and cooperation datasets have multiple organizations present, the cooperation data set reports more organizations present than the APP in 42 conflict-years. These comparisons offer a check on the data collected by the novel cooperation score presented here. This indicates that the cooperation score usually adds information to what we understand about conflict management, and there are no obvious outliers or patterns of inconsistency in the cooperation score. Again, this is not a perfect test of external validity, but given the emphasis of

our theory on the resources brought by organizations, any large discrepancy would indicate a flaw in the cooperation data.


Table 5: Organizations Present in Conflict-Year Compared Between APP and Cooperation

True Zeros	APP = 0 & Cooperation > 0	Cooperation = 0 & APP > 0	Cooperation >	APP >
240	78	32	42	4

Empirical Analysis

Conflict Duration

Figure 5: Histogram of Duration



This project looks at the impact of cooperation on conflict duration and intensity through the measure of battle deaths. Based on their configuration, each dependent variable requires its own specification. First, I will look at conflict duration. For this analysis, I used the UCDP

Armed Conflict dataset for all conflicts in Africa from 1991 to 2016 (Davies et al. 2024; N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002).⁹ Each conflict is marked as ended when violence reaching the 25-battle death threshold has stopped for two years. The largest amount of variation is at the year level, and as such, the dataset is composed of conflict years. In this sample, there are 55 unique conflicts, with the shortest conflicts occurring for 1 month, and the longest conflict that ended in our sample was 27 years between Ethiopia and the EPLF. Figure 5 displays a histogram of the number of months a conflict has lasted in our sample. Seventeen conflicts continue on after our data's endpoint in 2016 and thus are labeled as ongoing. In this specification, the cooperation score ranges from 0 to 12, with a mean score of 0.867.

To analyze conflict duration, I use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the effect of cooperation on the likelihood that conflict ends in the next year. I use a Cox proportional hazard model because there is no predetermined shape of the distribution. A Weibull model assumes that the data follows a parametric distribution, which could not align with the data. The Cox proportional hazard model, instead, fits the hazard ratio to the data. The model works by comparing conflicts, and their associated characteristics and controls, at their points of ending derived from UCDP data (N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002). The unit of analysis for this model specification is at the conflict-year level.

In the model, I control for a number of aspects expected to impact duration and cooperation. I include multiple measures that strive to model the amount of conflict management activity occurring in the country. This is designed to account for the actors in the conflict that are not cooperating so that the cooperation score is not a proxy for conflict management generally. To do this, I include the number of peacekeepers present, deployed by both the United Nations

⁹ Control data regarding number of regional peacekeepers limit the data to 2016.

and regional organizations, as a way to control for the amount of conflict management happening in the country (Bara and Hultman 2020; Kathman 2013). Additionally, I include a measure of the number of mediators from the African Peace Processes dataset explored previously to model the intensity of mediation efforts (Duursma and Gamez 2023). Also, at the country-level I include whether there is another civil war happening in the country. At the conflict-level, I use the number of battle deaths to control for the intensity of the conflict as well as the number of violent dyads, rebel groups, and contested issues to simulate its complexity (Brosché, Nilsson, and Sundberg 2023). Finally, a binary measure of whether the conflict is perpetrated by ISIS or its offshoots controls for the likelihood of these conflicts to receive more international attention. All of these variables are lagged to account for endogeneity. Additionally, robust standard errors, clustered by conflict, are used to account for systemic differences between conflicts.

The results from Table 6 report the log hazard ratio which limits our ability to interpret beyond its direction. A positive coefficient indicates an increase in the likelihood that a conflict ends, whereas a negative coefficient represents the likelihood a conflict continues. To understand the substantive significance, the coefficient must be exponentiated to the hazard ratio. For our cooperation score, the hazard ratio is 1.15, meaning there is a 15% increase in the likelihood of conflict ending when the cooperation score is 1. At our mean score of cooperation, a conflict is 13% more likely to end. This is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. No other variables in this model rise to any level of statistical significance, perhaps due to the limited sample size of focusing only on African conflicts.

Table 6: Cox Proportional Hazard Model of Conflict Duration

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Civil War Duration
Cooperation Score	0.144* (0.080)
Number of UN Peacekeepers	0.0002 (0.0003)
Number of Regional Peacekeepers	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Number of Mediating Organizations	0.271 (0.230)
Other Civil War in Country	-0.351 (0.414)
Battle Deaths (Logged)	-0.096 (0.107)
Number of Violent Non-State Dyads	-0.300 (0.137)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.483 (0.312)
Number of Contested Issues	-0.009 (0.018)
Islamic State Conflict	-1.164 (0.744)
Observations	309
R ²	0.070
Max. Possible R ²	0.739
Log Likelihood	-196.499
Wald Test	23.850** (df = 10)
LR Test	22.418* (df = 10)
Score (Logrank) Test	18.441* (df = 10)

Note: All independent variables lagged by one year. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict.

Battle Deaths

To measure battle deaths in a conflict, I again rely on UCDP data, specifically using their Battle-Related Deaths data (Davies et al. 2024). Because the battle deaths measure is highly skewed, I have log-transformed it as shown in Figure 6. I also include a lagged measure of the logged battle deaths. The scope of this analysis remains the same as with conflict duration, focused on African conflicts from 1991 to 2016, again at the conflict-year unit of analysis. Between the 55 unique conflicts, the conflict in Angola in 1993 had the most battle deaths in a given year, at over 12,000 deaths. The model on conflict duration has more observations because of the rules established to define conflict ending. In that model, a conflict must see a cessation of violence for two years, meaning that conflicts that fall below the 25-battle death threshold for only one year are included in that model but are not included here. The continuous nature of the battle deaths variable here requires an ordinary least squares regression model.


Table 7: OLS Model of Battle Deaths

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Battle Deaths (Logged)
Lagged Battle Deaths	0.661** (0.055)
Cooperation Score	-0.084** (0.024)
Number of UN Peacekeepers	0.0002* (0.0001)
Number of Regional Peacekeepers	0.0002 (0.0002)
Number of Mediating Organizations	-0.044 (0.145)
Years of Conflict	-0.013 (0.012)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.013 (0.097)
Internationalized Conflict	0.438* (0.191)
Constant	1.918** (0.388)
Observations	265
R ²	0.522
Adjusted R ²	0.508
Residual Std. Error	1.110 (df = 256)
F Statistic	35.015** (df = 8; 256)
<i>Note:</i>	All independent variables lagged by one year. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict.

Similarly to the previous analysis, the impact of conflict management is important for battle deaths and the likelihood of cooperation. As such, I control for the number of UN and regional peacekeepers and the number of mediators with the same data from the analysis on

conflict duration. To account for the changes in conflict management and battle deaths over time, I have added a measure for the number of years of a conflict. Also, I include the number of rebel groups because an increase in the number of groups expands the scope of the conflict. The final control variable is the inclusion of internationalized conflict as they are likely to attract more resources that can worsen violence and killing capabilities. All of the independent variables are lagged to account for endogeneity. Again, the robust standard errors are used, clustered by conflict.

Figure 6: Histograms of Battle Deaths



The results of the OLS model are displayed in Table 7. In line with our theoretical expectations, increases in cooperation scores lead to a decrease in battle deaths. With the logged

battle death score, the interpretation is not entirely straightforward but simply requires exponentiating the coefficient. Thus, a cooperation score of 1 leads to an 8.1% decrease in battle deaths. This is statistically significant at 99% confidence level. At this level of statistical significance, no other variable in our model leads to a decrease in battle deaths. However, the number of UN peacekeepers and whether or not it is an internationalized conflict are highly statistically significant in increasing the number of battle deaths. The result for internationalized conflicts is largely expected but the peacekeeping result suggests that cooperation might be influencing its previously understood impact.

Robustness Checks

To further test the relationship between cooperation and conflict duration, I run a Heckman selection model to account for the changes in cooperation based on the conflict duration. A Heckman model accounts for the non-random distribution of cooperation in conflicts that might be harder to solve or closer to finishing. The first model accounts for whether cooperation occurs or not using a logistic regression with a binary variable of whether cooperation occurs or not. In the first stage of the model, I add a measure of whether a protest against an IO occurs in the country. This is in line with expectations detailed in Fleishman (n.d.) of the consequences of low legitimacy for cooperation. Because of the nature of the protest variable, the model is limited to 1997 to 2016.

The second stage of the model measures whether a conflict ends within the group where cooperation is observed. In this configuration, duration is modeled in a logistic regression, where the dependent variable is whether the conflict ends in that year or not. Additionally, to help with endogeneity, all the independent variables are lagged by one year. To ensure that the selection

Table 8: Heckman Selection Model of Cooperation and Duration

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Cooperation (Binary)	Conflict Ends
	Stage 1	Stage 2
Cooperation (Lagged)		0.0294 ⁺ (0.0149)
Months of Conflict		-0.00059 (0.00044)
Number of UN Peacekeepers	0.00117** (0.0002)	-0.0000006 (0.00007)
Number of Regional Peacekeepers	0.0021** (0.0007)	-0.0000066 (0.00001)
Number of Issues	0.0288** (0.011)	-0.00095 (0.0025)
Number of Rebel Groups	0.1109 (0.2086)	0.0239 (0.0534)
Battle Deaths (Logged)		-0.0338 (0.0305)
Other Civil War in Country		-0.2315* (0.1057)
Islamic State Conflict		-0.227 (0.139)
Number of Mediation Orgs	0.1351 (0.1905)	
Number of Violent Dyads	0.055 (0.0408)	
Protests Against IOs	0.375 (0.2593)	
Constant	-1.469** (0.29-5)	0.3112 (0.217)

Note:

All independent variables lagged by one year. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests).

model has an accurate representation of the selection, I use exclusion restrictions to attempt to model two separate processes. Table 8 presents the results of the Heckman model, and the results are consistent with the main analyses, with the cooperation score being statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval. In this model, greater cooperation increases the likelihood that a conflict ends in the next year. Substantively, a cooperation score of 1 means that there is a roughly 50% chance that a conflict will end. Despite the result being consistent with our expectations and a theoretical reason for using the selection model, the diagnostic information given by the model suggests that a selection equation is not necessary.

In a final robustness check, I further verify that it is not only the number of organizations in the conflict that is driving the positive force of cooperation. In the cooperation score, I multiply the average number of cooperation activities by the average number of organizations mentioned. This is designed to increase the cooperation score if the number of organizations is greater because it is more difficult to coordinate amongst a larger number of actors. While this increases the cooperation score, it is not driving the outcome. This check also confirms that it is not merely the number of organizations and their associated resources that is important but the cooperation of these resources that is critical. To test this, I rerun the main analyses using a cooperation score without the number of organizations considered. Without considering the number of organizations, the maximum cooperation score possible is 3. This means that over any number of resolutions, all three types of cooperation are present (Fleishman n.d.). The results are presented in Tables 9 and 10. The main conclusions are consistent with the original models and our theoretical expectations, but the cooperation score is now significant at the 90% confidence level in both analyses. Despite this change in significance, the coefficient has a stronger substantive effect. In the duration model, cooperation, with no consideration for the number of

Table 9: Duration Analysis with Modified Cooperation Score

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Civil War Duration
Cooperation Score (No Organization Weight)	0.423 ⁺ (0.252)
Number of UN Peacekeepers	0.0001 (0.0004)
Number of Regional Peacekeepers	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Number of Mediating Organizations	0.318 (0.230)
Other Civil War in Country	-0.317 (0.410)
Battle Deaths (Logged)	-0.107 (0.107)
Number of Violent Non-State Dyads	-0.303 (0.135)
Number of Rebels	-0.473 (0.315)
Number of Issues	-0.010 (0.018)
Islamic State Conflict	-1.108 (0.744)
Observations	309
R ²	0.069
Max. Possible R ²	0.739
Log Likelihood	-196.608
Wald Test	22.460* (df = 10)
LR Test	22.200* (df = 10)
Score (Logrank) Test	17.764 ⁺ (df = 10)

Note: All independent variables lagged by one year. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict.

organizations, increases the likelihood of conflict ending by 52%. Similarly, in the model on battle deaths, cooperation leads to a 17% decrease in battle deaths.

Table 10: OLS Model of Battle Deaths with Modified Cooperation Score


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Battle Deaths (Logged)
Lagged Battle Deaths	0.666** (0.055)
Cooperation Score (No Organization Weight)	-0.158+ (0.086)
Number of UN Peacekeepers	0.0002+ (0.0001)
Number of Regional Peacekeepers	0.0003 (0.0002)
Number of Mediating Organizations	-0.058 (0.150)
Years of Conflict	-0.012 (0.012)
Number of Rebel Groups	-0.023 (0.102)
Internationalized Conflict	0.383* (0.191)
Constant	1.909** (0.385)
Observations	265
R ²	0.518
Adjusted R ²	0.503
Residual Std. Error	1.115 (df = 256)
F Statistic	34.345** (df = 8; 256)

Note: All independent variables lagged by one year. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict.

Case Study: Sierra Leone

Despite the overwhelming evidence of cooperation's impact on conflict outcomes by the statistical tests, the mechanisms of how cooperation leads to improved resource management are unable to be fleshed out. Additionally, the variation of cooperation at the year level can miss important nuisances of conflict progressions. The civil war in Sierra Leone offers additional insight into the process that supports peace as a result of cooperation because of its within-case variation. I will focus on two consecutive years in the conflict as a way to control for temporal features of the conflict, but one year has a high level of cooperation and the next does not. In this section, I will describe the conflict, the involvement of international organizations, and their subsequent impact on the outcome of the conflict. Figure 7 displays the trends over time in the

Figure 7: Representation of Sierra Leone Case Study



Sierra Leonean civil war that we will discuss, including the number of battle deaths and level of cooperation. The dotted red lines bracket the period of time we will discuss.

Conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched an attack on the government of Sierra Leone, which had been in power since 1967. The RUF accused the government of corruption related to the riches of the country's natural resources like diamonds and gold. Each successive government was overthrown by the RUF until 1996 when elections resulted in Ahmad Tejan Kabbah becoming President of Sierra Leone. Kabbah brought the RUF to the negotiating table, which resulted in the 1996 Abidjan Accord. However, in early 1997, the accord was broken and Kabbah was overthrown by another group, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC suspended the constitution and ruled by military decree before inviting the RUF to join them in their new government. This coup prompted a swift international response, calling for Kabbah to be reinstated. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) already had troops constituting the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in nearby Liberia, which they were able to deploy quickly to Sierra Leone. The next few years consisted of back-and-forth land transfers between ECOMOG and the RUF. Mostly, ECOMOG maintained control of the country, instating a Kabbah government in Freetown. In 1998, the UN established its observer mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) after ECOMOG reinstated Kabbah with a mandate to monitor the disarmament of combatants.

The first year I will investigate here is 1999, which began with an RUF offensive on Freetown that resulted in their brief control before ECOMOG regained the city. This was a year of high cooperation for the international organizations working together in Sierra Leone, but the impact on conflict duration and battle deaths is not entirely obvious without further investigation.

The amount of violence in 1999 was extremely high due to the large offensive started by the RUF in January. According to the UCDP, casualties in January as a result of this push were around 2000 battle deaths, two-thirds of the yearly total (Davies et al. 2024). So, when looking beyond January, we can more clearly see the impact of cooperation on the behavior of the combatants.

The United Nations, at the time of the 1999 attack on Freetown, had established an observer mission that was protected by ECOMOG, but they were quickly evacuated once the violence began. This limited cooperation for a couple of months as Sierra Leone operated without a UN presence in the aftermath of one of the most devastating attacks on civilians of the war. A presidential spokesperson at the time said, “With the evacuation of U.N. humanitarian staff in the first week of January, humanitarian assistance and operations in the country almost collapsed” (Sierra Leone News: March 1999). Their return in March marked the start of high levels of cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS, as noted in a UN Security Council resolution (R/1231). In the resolution, the Security Council approves the re-establishment of the UN observer mission and specifically requests the Secretary-General “consider, in coordination with... ECOWAS,” their deployment along the Liberian border as opposed to Freetown. This direct call indicates the coordination of the two organizations that continues beyond their peacekeeping missions. After the redeployment, the UN’s Special Representative and Chief of Mission, chairs a mediation session with ECOWAS, the African Union, and Reverend Jesse Jackson that ended in a ceasefire and eventual agreement, happening between May and July. The organizations working in collaboration for mediation showed their resolve to find peace and gave the opportunity to plan for an effective disarmament strategy. Within the ceasefire agreement, both sides requested the UN send troops to help maintain compliance on both sides ("LETTER "

1999), which was addressed by the Secretary-General expanding its military observer mission in August of 1999.

At this point, cooperation between ECOWAS and the UN is very high. They have mediated a ceasefire and agreement in coordination with one another and now have increasing missions working together for peaceful disarmament. As a result, the battle deaths in this time of the conflict remained extremely low, with less than 50 deaths between July and December. This pattern was expected to continue. In October, the UN approved a significantly larger peacekeeping mission to replace its original observers with 6,000 troops to ensure compliance with the peace agreement. This was met with extreme fanfare as people took to the streets to celebrate the decision of the UN to “work alongside” ECOMOG to disarm combatants (“Sierra Leone government” 1999). Plans are made to integrate the two peacekeeping missions to enhance their combined capabilities.

However, abruptly in December of 1999, ECOWAS, and more specifically their major contributor, Nigeria, announced their plans to withdraw ECOMOG in 2000, citing their desire to not have two differently led missions in the same country. This quick reversal of plans forced the Secretary-General to quickly request more troops to cover for the ECOMOG troops that would be leaving. According to archives of UN coordination meetings, Nigeria agreed to a 90-day interim period to secure the transition to end April 30, 2000. This meant that starting the day the Security Council agreed to an increase in troops the time was ticking for ECOMOG to go home. The struggles were evident as civilians in Sierra Leone worried for their safety in such a quick turnover. Even Kabbah, the leader ECOMOG defended, begged for their return to cooperation saying, “ECOMOG still has a job to do in Sierra Leone...it should work in partnership for peace and security,” speaking of UNAMSIL (Vanguard Daily 2000). But, critical to our argument here

is that ECOWAS was still attempting to contribute to the peace effort in different ways. They continued to send mediation teams to Sierra Leone throughout 2000, but it was their lack of coordination with UN peacekeeping that continued to plague their efforts. These teams stopped meeting regularly with the UN and did not advise the UN mission on best practices for ensuring peace, as evidenced by historical records. There were still resources from ECOWAS being sent, especially their political leverage, but their leverage was not used in combination with the UN peacekeeping and their united front had been extinguished. Sensing this confusion to uphold its agreement, the RUF kidnapped UN troops in May, reigniting the conflict and returning to violence that would last until an agreement in January of 2002.

Conclusion

Generally, the conflict management literature has asserted that more is better. With more peacekeepers or leverage, actors can influence a conflict towards peace. However, when multiple organizations are working in the same space, the resources alone are not enough. In these cases, coordination is important to making these resources productive. Without cooperation, conflict management organizations run the risk of contradictory or repetitive work and can ensure that the resources are appropriately dispersed. This paper has presented a theoretical framework of cooperation across a variety of conflict management tactics, focused on the importance of effectively using resources. Cooperation can provide additional assurances to combatants, guaranteeing their issues touched on in mediation are taken care of by peacekeepers, and vice versa.

These empirical findings suggest the importance of organizations working together in conflict management and highlight that despite popular belief, there are issues of redundancies

and confusion when multiple actors are working in the same space. This research uses a novel dataset of cooperation scores in Africa, which is not bound by any tactic, organization, or conflict. As a result, this is the first work, to my knowledge, to study cooperation across areas of conflict management. However, the main limitation of this study is the lack of testing of the main mechanisms. The theoretical argument is that resources are most effective when cooperating because they can be used most effectively, but the data to test the totality and disbursement of resources in a conflict is not yet available.

There are several important implications for this work. Most pressing is the need for international organizations to work together more consistently in conflict zones. International politics create barriers that can prevent cooperation (Fleishman n.d.), but by overcoming these issues, countless lives can be saved. Another important aspect of this work is the reckoning with the totality of conflict management actors and tactics. As a result, past literature that focuses only on the UN or the effectiveness of one tactic could miss the whole picture of conflict management. Especially the secondary results seen here regarding peacekeepers, which do not show a significant effect on peace, emphasize the importance of cooperation to our previously held beliefs.

But as trends in conflicts change, with an increase in Islamic extremism and a push away from the West, organizations will face a new environment in which they need to cooperate. In Mali, conflicts against IS-Sahel and JNIM will require international support to find peace. But, in 2023, Mali forced out the UN mission stationed there (Gowan and Forti 2023). Future research should investigate both changes in cooperation given intense shocks and the impact of cooperation in irregular conflicts. Initial hypothesizing would suggest that shocks to cooperation could actually lead to more cooperation as organizations attempt to fill in the suddenly left gaps.

Additionally, in further research, more investigation of the cooperation score's impact on lasting peace is needed. Because many of these conflict management interventions happen in the wake of a ceasefire or agreement, there is a large portion of cooperation that this analysis leaves out. Looking at the cooperation score as the key to a lasting peace will incorporate these missing components.

Paper 3: The Impacts of Cooperation on Peace Duration

Abstract:

The literature has thoroughly explored the ways that international actors can promote peace by overcoming commitment and information problems. Actors can use their leverage to push agreements and increase the costs of combatants returning following them. However, these studies usually have a singular focus in either a tactic or by organization. I argue that cooperation is a critical aspect to increasing the likelihood and duration of peace because it includes the totality of actors and tactics involved in the peace making process. Cooperation can increase the likelihood and duration of peace by multiplying resources used in mediation and post-conflict to incentivize combatants, signaling the resolve of the organizations involved, and creating teams that can be used for future conflict management needs. I test these arguments in two ways across conflicts in Africa from 1991-2018. First, I find that cooperation increases the likelihood of a peace agreement from a round of negotiations. And second, I find that cooperation, in multiple forms, leads to longer periods of peace.

Introduction

What creates a durable peace? The literature has emphasized the importance of third parties in creating lasting peace. Third parties can help combatants overcome their commitment problems by ensuring there are consequences for any violations and guaranteeing credible information is shared. But in a conflict zone, there are typically many actors attempting to support peace times that the current approach does not consider. The multiplicity of actors can undermine these efforts if they contradict one another, like in Liberia, where two peacekeeping missions contradicted one another. Missions sent by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations (UN) were at odds with one another, ultimately creating confusion and mistrust between combatants that enabled a return to violence (Alao 1998). Or organizations can coordinate these efforts to create even stronger commitments and signal their resolve for peace, like when ECOWAS, the African Union, the UN, and the European Union organized themselves to combine their resources for peace in Mali.

In this paper, I explore the ways that cooperation between international organizations can contribute to a lasting peace. I argue that cooperation supports peace by pushing combatants towards agreements and ensuring their implementation. The literature establishes that agreements between combatants are plagued with greater issues of commitment and information problems than other conflict outcomes (Mattes and Savun 2009, 2010; Quackenbush and Venteicher 2008). As opposed to military victories where one side's capabilities are diminished, agreements need to ensure that combatants can safely disarm and that no return to violence could accomplish more. Third parties can push for agreements with their leverage and provide security guarantees by punishing violations and raising the costs of renegeing (Walter 1997). Cooperation allows organizations to increase their impact by adding to their leverage.

I argue that cooperation can support combatants in agreements and their implementation in three main ways. First, it multiplies the resources that can be leveraged for agreements or that can increase the costs of returning to violence. And with cooperation, these resources are not limited to parties present at mediation and can be quantified between any number of organizations. In this sense, combatants can face costs across mediation or peacekeeping or even in the development sector because cooperation brings these organizations together. Cooperation also supports peace because of the signal it sends to combatants about organizations' resolve to ensuring peace. For organizations, cooperation requires them to give up some of their autonomy in order to coordinate activities. Thus, when organizations are willing to face this cost, their commitment to the conflict is evident to combatants and can help them overcome their fear of the future. Finally, cooperation creates teams amongst organizations that can divide labor and resources to be redeployed in times of crisis to support peace and remind combatants of the continued costs.

Using a score of cooperation for each peaceful year following civil conflict in Africa from 1991 to 2018, I find support for my argument. I test cooperation's impact on peace in two ways. In one model, I look at the likelihood of a peace agreement when cooperation is present during a round of negotiations. I find that peace agreements are more likely to result from negotiations when there is cooperation. Then, I explore the duration of peace and find that cooperation in conflicts that end with peace agreements leads to an increased period of peace. In a final test, I adjust the cooperation score to account for extended periods of peace and still find support.

This paper is the first work, to my knowledge, to study cooperation in peace times. It adds to the literature by expanding the set of actors that can affect peace. Previous work has

focused solely on mediation or peacekeeping, and this work studies cooperation between all of these tactics with no limit to the organizations that can be involved. This includes conflict management that happens by organizations not explicitly leading mediation or peacekeeping and estimates the associated leverage and costs that these organizations also bring. This has important implications for the ways international organizations approach peace. In 2023, it was estimated that \$34.1 billion was spent on peacebuilding efforts (Schmidt 2023). However, this work suggests that this expenditure is moot without an explicit effort to coordinate these actions.

Creating a durable peace

The “best” ways to achieve a durable peace are routinely and extensively tested in the conflict management literature. The foundations of this literature studies how wars end in order to understand when peace persists. There is a general consensus that wars that finish with an outright victory by one party are less likely to see violence again (Toft 2010). In these cases, the victor leads the construction of the post-conflict environment as the losing faction has lost their bargaining power via military defeat (Wagner 2000). In practice, the victors use their status to further dismantle their opponent’s ability to revert to violence, allowing for a stronger period of peace. Furthermore, the information needed to find this bargaining range has been revealed either on the battlefield or in the subsequent disarmament, which ensures that both sides see the true bargaining range (Fearon 1995, 1998; Toft 2010).

In contrast, negotiated settlements are used to end a conflict prior to a military victory. Negotiated settlements attempt to end a conflict through compromise when both sides have military capabilities to continue and there is further information that could be revealed (Werner and Yuen 2005). Without credible information, combatants can continue to misrepresent the

bargaining range to gain the best settlement possible (Fearon 1995; Mattes and Savun 2010). Combined with the combatant's ability to continue to wage war, negotiations and agreements are fraught with additional challenges. If the agreement is not in line with their expectations, or security challenges plague disarmament, or combatants feel that returning to violence will provide them with a better settlement, then agreements will fail. As a result, negotiated settlements are more difficult to guarantee and require specific strategies to uphold.

And in these cases, the international community heavily influences the processes and outcomes. First, they act as mediators to bring together combatants to negotiate a settlement. As mediators, they utilize their material and political power as leverage to push for an agreement (Beardsley et al. 2006). This leverage allows the mediators a toolbox of rewards (carrots) and punishments (sticks) that can entice and punish both sides to agree to a settlement (Reid 2017). While the focus of the literature has been on the impact of material power, multiple studies emphasize the impact of soft power in these environments. Mediators with political, historical, or cultural ties can be just as effective in promoting peace. Here, mediators from the international community can exploit an informational advantage about the parties that can focus the mediation on the key underlying issues (Reid 2017). One example is seen through the success of African mediators in establishing agreements for African conflicts (Duursma 2020). Mediators are able to draw on their shared regional history to make credible claims and target the appropriate issues. These studies introduce an important factor of the international community influencing the outcome of conflict by pushing combatants towards settlement instead of military victory (Quackenbush and Venteicher 2008).

However, this approach comes with challenges, mainly assuring combatants that the agreement offers the best outcome that is worthy of not reneging on (Fortna 2003). One of the

most pressing issues is establishing security for the combatants. Especially in regard to disarming following the agreement, groups risk being attacked by their opponent when they are weakened (Walter 1997). In a military victory, one side is weakened by violence and is unable to continue fighting, so their disarmament has already begun. But in environments designed by negotiated settlements, combatants still have the capabilities to continue their fight. So, if they believe that they could attain better results from a return to violence, they will be especially inclined to strike when their adversary is weakened. As such, agreements need to increase the cost of attacking in order to overcome these commitment problems and prevent these relapses in violence (Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Mattes and Savun 2009; Walter 1997).

There are multiple ways to raise the costs of returning to violence for combatants. One part of the literature focuses heavily on the ways the design of agreements can increase costs and, therefore, establish peace. This is largely regarding the inclusion of power-sharing provisions in agreements. Power-sharing agreements can occur across multiple sectors and give both sides a piece of the governing power in that sector (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). However, these agreements allow combatants to overcome commitment problems by giving combatants invested interests in peace surviving and assurances that peace is committed to because they share power (Mattes and Savun 2009). Additionally, these power-sharing agreements can provide information critical to understanding the status of the bargaining range, given the conflict was not fully decided (Mattes and Savun 2010).

Despite the importance of agreement design, it is only one aspect of a lasting peace. Again, the importance of the international community comes in as it is widely believed that third-party guarantees are needed to ensure peace. Walter (2002), in her seminal work on the durability of peace, establishes that third-party guarantees are critical for peace as combatants are

unable to provide for their own security in a post-conflict environment. Third parties are thus able to create real costs for reneging on agreements because they signal their willingness to intervene when violations occur. The durability of peace increases as the third parties' resolve to show force and uphold peace increases. This forces combatants into a situation where the costs of falling back to violence are much greater than the benefits of any gains that could be achieved from returning to war. Mediators are also considered third parties with control over a lasting peace. They are able to use their leverage, most often described as military or economic power, to impose costs (Beardsley et al. 2006). But, again, this power is not limited to only material enforcement (E. Menninga 2020; Reid 2017). Third-party mediators are able to use their capability leverage, which describes the mediator's cultural and historical ties to the combatants, to uphold peace. This type of leverage signals a commitment to the agreement that can replace material power. They are also able to better utilize information in the peace process to advise combatants (Beardsley 2009; Reid 2017).

In Walter's investigations peacekeeping is only as effective as its resolve to intervene but the role of peacekeepers has been thoroughly vetted as a critical factor of a durable peace. Besides being positioned to punish violations, peacekeepers create physical barriers that allow disarmament and prevent accidents from spiraling into violence (Fortna 2008). The wide-reaching of peacekeeping missions is to increase the trust between combatants to disarm with the added pressure of punishment (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Peacekeepers can also be used as assurances in mediation because of the tangible assistance that they provide in implementation (Beardsley 2009).

Once initial threats from combatants have been overcome, the ability of the country to economically recover serves as an indicator of stability. This is often associated with aid from

the international community (Collier et al. 2013). Largely, economic resources are thought to “break the conflict trap” by allowing states to rebuild their infrastructure, improve governance, and allow for better reintegration of combatants (Collier et al. 2013). And these benefits can only occur with investment from the international community. Others find evidence of the international community promoting peace through democratic promotion either with specified aid (Savun and Tirone 2011) or with continued interaction through election monitoring (Matanock 2017). In these cases, the international community is supporting governments in their legitimacy and preventing violence that could relapse around elections. While there are numerous ways the international community can improve peace duration, Mross et. al. (2022) finds that peace is most likely in cases when the international supports the totality of these endeavors. They find that peacekeeping is critical to peacebuilding, but the focus on only peacekeeping and not economic development could prevent progress (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Mross, Fiedler, and Grävingholt 2022).

Theory of cooperation in peace times

It has been established the important role that the international community plays in promoting peace. First, they serve as mediators to secure peace agreements, and then they support their implementation through peacekeeping and economic and political development. In these roles, their main objective is to provide information and incentives to overcome any commitment issue that plagues the conflict. Cooperation between international organizations can add to the ways international actors are effective by adding to and diversifying the costs associated with reneging, signaling the greatest commitment to the peace process, and establishing teams for continued interest in the country.

An important assumption that I am making is that organizations involved in the peace efforts are dedicated to continuing peace. This is a reasonable assumption given the mandates of international organizations collectively, especially the UN charter that states its mission as reducing violence and promoting peace. Regional organizations have styled their own mandates in a similar vein and have an added vested interest in preventing violence from spilling over in their regions (Braithwaite 2010; Gartner 2011). There is an extensive literature on the question of bias in peace efforts (Beber 2012; A. Kydd 2003; E. J. Menninga 2024). This assumption does not deny the existence of bias by international organizations but qualifies it by understanding that the most important preference of an organization is to find peace. The implication of this assumption on cooperation means that together organizations are moving towards a singular goal, despite any individual aims. Especially if organizations are cooperating, we are assuming that they have overcome any biases and are in agreement on the direction toward peace.

Cooperation can describe a scale of activities between international organizations that range from sharing information to coordinating actions on the ground. Information sharing describes organizations that are in communication with one another but do not have activities that require their dual participation. Sharing information allows organizations to be aware of the efforts that other organizations are undertaking. With the information, the organizations can then choose how to adjust their own efforts but are not required to make any changes to their actions for their partner. Moving beyond information sharing entails undertaking joint activities on the ground. This could look like co-mediated sessions, joint peacekeeping missions, or even a coordination of activities across conflict management tactics. These efforts require increased communication and coordination to ensure their success and often require the organization to give up some of their autonomy in order to work with their partners. To whatever degree,

cooperation indicates that organizations are cognizant of the others that are in the country and trying to coordinate their responses for peace.

One way that cooperation can support the peace process is by increasing and diversifying the costs of returning to violence. As Menninga (2020) asserts, mediators who can coordinate their collective strengths will be more successful. Strengths of mediators could include their material power or soft, relational power. Different organizations will bring different strengths to the negotiations and coordination can ensure that all of them are leveraged appropriately. For instance, if African mediators have more credibility leverage in African mediation, then they should lead communication among combatants to eliminate additional information problems (Duursma 2020). Specifically focusing on this phenomenon with African and non-African mediation teams, Duursma finds that coordinated mediation efforts are more likely to lead to a peace agreement because they use their strengths accordingly (Duursma 2017). The mechanisms established here will be confirmed with cooperation between organizations. Using cooperation, organizations can best delegate the roles of mediation to appropriately weigh their unique leverage over combatants.

But these studies focus on leverage derived from only mediators and miss explicitly studying coordination between other conflict management tactic areas, specifically mediation and peacekeeping. Promises of peacekeeping support have been theorized to support mediation efforts but are not explicitly tested (Beardsley 2009). If peacekeeping is operated by another organization, increased trust in the mediator is required to be an effective promise. With cooperation, the relationship between peacekeeping and mediation can be defined and subsequently more evident to the combatants. This offers an assurance that promises of

peacekeeping and physical support will be fulfilled because there is already evidence of coordination to realize these requests.

This division of labor across tactics can continue to be effective after the agreement is signed. Cooperation allows organizations to use their most productive skill sets to keep combatants dedicated to peace. Organizations that are able to support development projects can work with peacekeeping missions to provide both carrots and sticks (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Without cooperation, organizations are operating independently and do not have to respond to the same issues, so violations could result in not only punishment by peacekeepers but also the continuation of development aid. But with coordinated efforts, organizations act in unison to make the largest impact against combatants wanting to renege. This can happen across any number of tactics, not just aid and peacekeeping, and can add greater incentives for continued peace.

Not only does cooperation allow for a division of labor with additional assurances of action, but it also indicates greater leverage generally. While the multiparty mediation literature is mixed on its success, more mediators are generally associated with bringing more leverage to the negotiations (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 1999; E. Menninga 2020). Cooperation can add leverage to the negotiations or implementation without the official inclusion of organizations as mediators. Mediators could lobby their partners to create incentives for combatants to sign agreements. Peacekeeping is one example of added leverage but additional sanctions or removals from an organization are requests mediators could make to their allies to add leverage. This can also diversify the threats. When it is one actor, it is easy to measure the costs and benefits of renegeing on not signing an agreement or renegeing but with additional actors in a variety of sectors, the costs become increasingly difficult to quantify. In Mali, the variety of actors creates a

difficult web of costs for returning to violence. The UN hosted a peacekeeping mission, the EU was one of their biggest trading partners, and ECOWAS represented their regional partners and also authorized a peacebuilding mission (Resolution 2100 2013). These organizations operated with high levels of cooperation that ensured that these numerous costs would act unilaterally. If there was a violation, then there would be coordinated action between the partners that would create costs in a variety of ways. The added complexity of costs set by cooperating organizations affects signing agreements and lasting peace in the same way. With cooperation, combatants can expect greater costs that impact a variety of different facets of their country and will operate in unison to punish violations.

Another way that cooperation creates a lasting peace is because cooperation signals a greater resolve to peace. With cooperation, especially high levels of cooperation that require action on the ground, organizations must sacrifice their own autonomy to work with another (Biermann 2008; Clark 2021; Fleishman n.d.). Their preferred outcome or reputation gains are limited in service of adding additional resources and support to create peace (Fleishman n.d.). Combatants can interpret this loss of autonomy with an increase in resolve to find a solution and maintain it. Relatedly, when organizations make commitments, cooperation adds an enforcement to uphold them. This is because the organization risks losing that cooperation in this conflict and future endeavors if they do not fulfill their end. Losing cooperative relationships and support from other organizations could jeopardize the peace process further. So, when organizations make claims, they are enforced not only by their desire for peace but also by the threat of losing their partners in making peace occur. Combatants gain confidence by knowing a larger enforcement mechanism is at play that can help alleviate commitment issues.

The final way cooperation establishes long-term peace is through its ability to establish teams to follow the lifespan of peace. Organizations that have previously cooperated return to these countries in times of particular stress, like prior to elections or in times of growing tensions. In Sierra Leone, cooperation between ECOWAS and the AU reemerges prior to elections that occur years apart. As discussed previously, cooperation creates partnerships, which coordinate their actions and are able to impact multiple sectors of peace. By establishing the roles that organizations can best support and their commitment to peace, it is easier for the organizations to reenter the country to prevent reescalation. Organizations know which areas will need their specific attention and will be able to redeploy to that area. In line with Fleishman (n.d.), cooperation does not happen linearly and will ebb and flow over time. But established cooperation in the early peace process will create teams that are more easily deployed when difficulties occur. This also serves as a continued reminder of the agreements forged after the conflict that remind combatants of the continued cost.

Cooperation allows organizations to divide the labor of peace, add increased leverage to the post-conflict environment, signal a strong resolve for peace, and create teams for revisiting the country. Using this theoretical framework, I have developed two hypotheses to test cooperation's impact on peace.

H1: Cooperation between international organizations will increase the likelihood of a peace agreement from negotiations.

H2: In conflicts that have ended with agreements, cooperation between international organizations will increase the likelihood that peace survives.

Data

Dependent Variables

I conceptualize peace in two ways. First, I look at the likelihood of a peace agreement during mediation episodes. To test the ways cooperation can lead to an agreement, I use the African Peace Processes (APP) dataset (Duursma and Gamez 2023). This dataset records rounds of negotiations for civil conflicts in Africa. While this dataset has many unique variations, I focus on the mediated rounds of negotiations for civil conflicts, specifically from 1991 to 2018. Each round is linked to a conflict, but rounds included in this data can occur outside of active conflict years. In this sample, there are 762 unique rounds of negotiations. Our main variable of interest is whether a peace agreement can be reached in these rounds of negotiation. Each round of negotiations included in the APP has an indicator of whether a peace agreement or ceasefire is reached. The APP's definition of a peace agreement follows UCDP's definition and asserts that an agreement is "between warring parties, [and] addresses the disputed incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility" (Davies et al. 2024; Duursma and Gamez 2023). I use this measure over a measure of ceasefire to test cooperation on the most stringent outcome of negotiations. Of the 762 rounds of negotiations included, 166 ended in a peace agreement.

Then, I look at the duration of peace following a civil war. Using the UCDP's Conflict Termination dataset, which details how conflict episodes end, I construct a measure of peace duration (Kreutz 2010). The dataset defines conflict episodes ending when they fail to reach the standard threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in a year. A period of peace begins on the date listed as the last day of a conflict episode and ends on the date of the start of the next episode, as defined by the termination dataset. Each period of peace is connected with a particular conflict

identifier, which means the analysis is at the conflict level rather than dyad or country level. In this sample, there are peace periods associated with 69 unique conflicts. Of these conflicts, the majority stay peaceful once they enter a time of peace. Precisely, 41 conflicts never relapse to violence. Though, 28 of these conflicts face a recurrence of violence. Over these 69 conflicts, there were 116 periods of peace. These periods of peace vary from 1 month to 673 months, with a mean of 169 months. The periods of peace are skewed towards 0, indicating that peace is likely to end earlier.

The argument presented here specifically relates to when commitment problems are at their highest, which is when conflicts end in negotiated settlements. The Termination dataset indicates for each conflict how the conflict was terminated. Using this data, I divide the conflicts into three categories: conflicts that are ended by an agreement, a military victory, or conflicts that end due to low activity. Because conflicts could have multiple endpoints, it is possible that a conflict can have multiple different reasons for peace. Despite that, there are 21 conflicts that have a cessation in violence due to an agreement.


Explanatory Variables

To understand the impact of cooperation on peace, I use a score of cooperation, described in Fleishman (n.d.). The score tallies instances of three types of cooperation from UN Security Council resolutions. The focus of the score is on intergovernmental organizations and their cooperation, ranging from information sharing to active cooperation between them and the UN or any other organization. Then the tallies are averaged over the number of resolutions for any given country and multiplied by the average number of organizations included in this cooperation (Fleishman n.d.). Previous work featuring this score has focused on the score during

conflicts, but the score is not bound by conflict timing. Instead, the cooperation score was coded for any year and any country in Africa from 1991 to 2018. This means that the score can vary in peace times and often does, despite popular belief that international attention would be focused on violence rather than peacetimes. Figure 8 shows the cooperation scores of Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2013, with the points in red indicating cooperation during peace. This serves as an example of the richness of the cooperation data in peace times as cooperation actually peaks 7 years following the end of their civil war.

The score is not limited by any tactic or organization. In the coding of the cooperation score, there is no exclusion to the organizations included. This means that an organization involved in almost anything in the country could be included. For our purposes, this specifically references international organizations that might be giving aid to post-conflict states that would be typically disregarded in the previous literature. For example, in Guinea-Bissau, beyond its

Figure 8: Scatterplot of Cooperation
Cooperation Scores Over Times in Sierra Leone



role as a partner to other organizations, the EU is primarily financially involved (Guinea-Bissau 2024). The ability to measure cooperation, not defined by any single activity, is the novelty and adds to the analysis by expanding the universe of organizations included in conflict management. While Figure 1 indicates that cooperation does happen in peace times, it is a rare event in our sample. Cooperation only occurs in 234 peace years out of 1383 possible peace years. This is likely due to the length of peace periods, which has a mean of around 13 years. Cooperation is not consistently needed or sustained in such prolonged periods, but as indicated in the theoretical framework, it should be able to reoccur when needed. In this sample, the mean cooperation score is 0.47.

Control Variables

Hypothesis 1 regards the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. For this analysis, I control for both conflict level and negotiation level variables. At the conflict level, I include the number of battle deaths, logged to account for a significant skew. This data originates from the UCDP data but was modified by the APP data for each negotiation (Duursma and Gamez 2023). The rounds of negotiations are not bound by active conflict years so there are negotiation rounds that see zero battle-related deaths. From the UCDP Armed Conflict dataset, I include the incompatibility metric of the conflict and the number of rebel groups in the conflict to assess the difficulty of the negotiation at hand (Davies et al. 2024; N. P. Gleditsch et al. 2002). For rounds that happen outside of active conflicts, the value for the year prior is used to fill in missing data for incompatibilities and the number of rebel groups that are typically only recorded during conflict years. Finally, at the conflict level, I include the number of years the conflict has been ongoing. At the negotiation level, I control for the number of mediators present to help isolate the number of organizations from the cooperation score (Duursma and Gamez 2023). By doing

so, the cooperation score can be interpreted as not only a product of a number of organizations, but truly the amount of cooperation occurring.

For the duration of peace following civil war, many of the controls remain the same as the conflict activity will impact the return to violence. At the conflict level, I include the number of years the conflict was waged and the number of battle deaths logged that were previously used from the UCDP data (Davies et al. 2024). New to this analysis are variables that indicate the post-conflict development of a state, including the gross domestic product per capita from the World Bank and a measure of the regime type, using the Polity2 score (Marshall and Gurr 2020). As previously discussed, the number of peacekeepers is vital to the establishment of peace and thus I include the number of UN peacekeepers deployed to the conflict (Kathman 2013). Finally, I add a measure of whether there has been a return to violence previously in this conflict as a control for additional commitment issues in the conflict.

Empirical Analysis

The first model focuses on the likelihood of a peace agreement during a round of mediated negotiations. The unit of analysis is the round of negotiations. While this does not match the cooperation score, which is at the country-year, I expect that, especially when negotiations are occurring, peace efforts across the country will support the negotiations. The variable is a binary indicator of whether a peace agreement occurs and, therefore, necessitates a logistic regression. For this model, I use the standard cooperation score, lagged by one year to account for endogeneity. I also employ robust standard errors, clustered at the conflict level. The results are presented in Table 11 and are consistent with our theoretical expectations that

cooperation is associated with a higher likelihood of a peace agreement. This is statistically significant at the

Table 11: Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Peace Agreement

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Peace Agreement
Cooperation Score	0.098* (0.042)
Battle Deaths (Logged)	-0.027 (0.038)
Incompatibility	0.379 (0.342)
Rebel Count	-0.138 (0.142)
Conflict Duration	0.015 (0.014)
Number of Mediating Organizations	-0.011 (0.129)
Constant	-1.985** (0.669)
Observations	673
Log Likelihood	-351.793
Akaike Inf. Crit.	717.586


Note: **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict.

standard 95% confidence interval. This is the only statistically significant predictor of a peace agreement. Substantively, cooperation has an average marginal effect, which increases the probability by 1.6%. These marginal effects are visualized over the entire spectrum of cooperation scores in Figure 9. The baseline probability of a peace agreement, when all other data is held at its mean, is 19%. A cooperation score of 2 increases the likelihood of a peace

agreement to around 23%. The x-axis also indicates the frequency of cooperation scores, which indicate a clustering between 0 and 1. At the higher ends of cooperation, like a cooperation score of 6, the likelihood of an agreement rises to 30%.

The second hypothesis regards the duration of peace. I test the likelihood of peace failing by using a Cox proportional hazard model. I chose the Cox model because it does not assume anything about the shape of the hazard parameter and adjusts based on the data. The Cox model operates by comparing the end of peaceful periods to other periods at the same duration. As I

Figure 9: Predicted Probability of Peace Agreement



indicated previously, peace is measured in months with data varying at the year level and is listed as finished at the date indicated by the UCDP Termination dataset (Kreutz 2010). The subsequent unit of analysis is peace-year. The variables included in the Cox model are lagged to account for any endogeneity with robust standard errors clustered by conflict. The theoretical

Table 12: Cox Proportional Hazard Model of Conflict Duration


	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Civil War Duration
Cooperation Score	-0.222 (0.455)
Ended by Agreement	-1.101* (0.420)
Ended by Victory	-2.911** (0.566)
Cooperation X Agreement	-6.921* (8.605)
Cooperation X Victory	0.452+ (0.459)
Conflict Duration	0.042 (0.017)
Battle Deaths (Logged)	0.375* (0.094)
GDP Per Capita (Logged)	-0.334 (0.163)
Democracy	0.038 (0.042)
Number of UN Peacekeepers	0.0004 (0.0003)
Previous Peace Failure	0.879+ (0.402)
Observations	1,267
R ²	0.102
Max. Possible R ²	0.397
Log Likelihood	-252.371
Wald Test	96.520** (df = 11)
LR Test	136.352** (df = 11)
Score (Logrank) Test	172.677** (df = 11)

Note: All independent variables lagged by one year. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict.

expectations for cooperation are contingent on whether the conflict has ended in an agreement or not, when commitment problems are the highest. Therefore, in the model the cooperation score is interacted with an indicator of how the conflict ended. The baseline is a conflict that was ended due to low activity.

The results of the Cox model are presented in Table 12 and confirm Hypothesis 2. The model predicts the likelihood of peace ending, so negative coefficients indicate that peace ending is less likely. The results show that cooperation following conflicts that were concluded with an agreement is associated with longer episodes of peace. Table 12 presents the hazard ratios of the Cox model and to understand the probability of peace ending, it is necessary to exponentiate the coefficient. As a result, this model finds that mean levels of cooperation, in conflicts ended by an agreement, will decrease the likelihood of peace ending by 96.3%. With a cooperation score of 2, the likelihood of peace ending decreases by 99%. This is statistically significant at the 95%

Figure 10: Visualizing the Interaction



confidence interval. Interestingly, in conflicts that are terminated due to military victory on either side, cooperation actually leads to an increased likelihood that peace will end. In these cases, cooperation, at its mean value, can increase the probability of peace ending by 24%. This is statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval. This could indicate that the international community can unintentionally shift combatant expectations or prevent the victor from establishing power in the reformed society. In conflicts that end with low activity, indicated by the cooperation score with no interaction term, have no statistically significant effect.

The results in Table 12 indicate a positive relationship between cooperation and longer peace when the conflicts end in agreements. Figure 10 presents a visualization of this relationship. Holding all other data at its mean, Figure 10 shows the survival curves of conflicts that end in agreements. The red line indicates conflicts with cooperation, and conflicts with cooperation are indicated by the blue line. A survival curve represents the changes in the probability of peace ending over time. The change between the two survival lines is evident. Conflicts which are ended by agreement are more likely to end when there is no cooperation. This effect becomes more pronounced over time.

The literature also suggests that the design of the agreement is critical to lasting peace, which is missing from the previous analysis (Mattes and Savun 2009). To account for agreement-specific information, I run an additional model limited to only conflicts ended in agreements to add a control variable of whether any power-sharing arrangements are included in the agreement. I also added the number of mediators associated with the agreement to account for the international influence involved in the agreement. Like the previous model on agreements, this also helps to isolate cooperation as the cause of lasting peace instead of a result of more actors. By focusing only on conflicts with agreements, the sample is severely limited in

the number of peace periods ending from 48 instances of peace ending to only 12. The results are presented in Table 13.

Table 13: Cox Proportional Hazard Model of Peace Duration with Agreement Controls

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Civil War Duration
Cooperation	-7.891** (4.989)
Conflict Duration	-0.035 (0.030)
Battle Deaths (Logged)	0.637** (0.185)
GDP Per Capita (Logged)	-1.998** (0.389)
Democracy	-0.184** (0.078)
Number of UN Peacekeepers	0.001* (0.0005)
Previous Peace Failure	1.738* (0.713)
Power Sharing Agreement	20.428** (5,508.295)
Number of Mediating Orgs	-16.194** (16,043.530)
Observations	303
R ²	0.138
Max. Possible R ²	0.336
Log Likelihood	-39.523
Wald Test	4,466.810** (df = 9)
LR Test	45.090** (df = 9)
Score (Logrank) Test	42.408** (df = 9)


Note: All independent variables lagged by one year. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict.

The alternative model presented in Table 13 further supports my theoretical expectations. In this model, a mean cooperation score reduces the likelihood of peace ending by 95%. This is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. However, as evident from the standard errors in this model, the rarity of events has impacted the model. While this model is important to establish the consequences of power-sharing agreements to cooperation, the substantive significance should be interpreted with some hesitancy.

Robustness Checks

In testing the likelihood of peace agreements, there were 166 peace agreements from 762 rounds of negotiations across 38 conflicts. Given this distribution, there are conflicts that will experience multiple agreements, either between different dyads or sequential peace agreements that lead to the culmination of conflict. In Figure 11, I show the rounds of negotiations for the conflict in Burundi. Each circle in Figure 11 represents a round of negotiations and some appear at the top if the negotiation ended in a peace agreement. In this conflict, there are four different

Figure 11: Timing of Peace Agreements



fighting dyads, between the government and Palipehutu, the National Council for Defense of

Democracy (CNDD), Frolina, and Palipehutu-FNL (Davies et al. 2024). As such, Figure 10 shows that multiple peace agreements happen over time. This introduces an element of bias, where later peace agreements might be signed because of previous rounds of negotiations and not necessarily on factors from that specific negotiation.

Table 14: Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of 1st Peace Agreement

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Peace Agreement
Cooperation Score	0.141* (0.066)
Battle Deaths (Logged)	-0.041 (0.063)
Incompatibility	0.568 (0.656)
Rebel Count	-0.005 (0.221)
Conflict Duration	0.026 (0.021)
Number of Mediating Organizations	0.012 (0.174)
Constant	-2.904* (1.288)
Observations	302
Log Likelihood	-136.612
Akaike Inf. Crit.	287.224
<i>Note:</i>	**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict.

To account for this bias, I run another model with a variation of the data. I run a model limited to only rounds of negotiation leading to the first agreement in a dyad. While there is an


additional level of bias that agreements between one dyad might impact another, I argue that each dyad faces unique commitment issues that require a level of involvement unique to their dyad despite other agreements. By limiting the rounds of negotiations to those before and after the first agreement, the model will only test the impact of cooperation on the first peace agreement being signed with no influence from other previous agreements. As a result, the number of negotiations is reduced from 762 to 340. The results, presented in Table 14, remain in line with my theoretical expectations that cooperation will increase the likelihood of a peace agreement, at the 95% confidence interval. Substantively, the results are similar to the original model. In this sample, the baseline probability of a peace agreement is 15% and when cooperation rises to 1, this increases to 17%.

To further explore the results on peace duration, I look at a variation of the cooperation score. Given the length of episodes of peace, sustained levels of cooperation are not likely over the entire period. However, this does not diminish the effects of previous cooperation, especially given our theoretical framework of the threatened costs of cooperation. To model this lasting impact, I have modified the cooperation score to decay during peaceful episodes. The cooperation score decays at a rate of 1.75.¹⁰ In practice, a cooperation score of 2 in one year will become nearly 0 after 6 years, which is roughly one-half of a standard deviation of peace years in our sample. Figure 12 represents this decay function in a peaceful period in the DRC. For easier viewing, the beginning years of peace where cooperation was 0 for an extended period are removed. The points represent the recorded cooperation score from Fleishman (n.d.), whereas the red line represents the cooperation score that decays over time. As the cooperation score decays, when new cooperation occurs, there is a cumulative effect. This strategy creates two outliers that

¹⁰ Results remain consistent with a variety of decay function rates.

highly exaggerate cooperation. These outliers are Guinea Bissau and Mali, which record cooperation scores greater than 16 and with a maximum of almost 30. Because the rest of the

Figure 12: Plot of Decayed Cooperation



data has a mean decayed cooperation score of 0.8, an additional model is run without these cases as a robustness check in Table A1 of the Appendix.

Replicating Table 12 with the decayed cooperation score produces similar results that are statistically and substantively stronger. These results are presented in Table 15. At the mean score of decayed cooperation after agreements, the probability of peace ending decreases by 87%. When the cooperation score reaches 2, the likelihood of peace ending decreases by 99%. This result is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. However, conflicts that end in victory without cooperation are very unlikely to return to violence. The decayed cooperation score with no interaction term represents cooperation when the conflict has ended due to low activity. In these cases, cooperation has a pacifying impact but with a smaller substantive effect

Table 15: Cox Proportional Hazard Model of Peace Duration with Decay

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Peace Duration
Cooperation Score (Decayed)	-0.200 ⁺ (0.244)
Ended by Agreement	-1.064 ⁺ (0.423)
Ended by Victory	-2.984** (0.573)
Cooperation X Agreement	-2.348** (2.007)
Cooperation X Victory	0.294* (0.247)
Conflict Duration	0.039 (0.017)
Battle Deaths (Logged)	0.387* (0.094)
GDP Per Capita (Logged)	-0.357 (0.163)
Democracy	0.049 (0.042)
Number of UN Peacekeepers	0.0004 (0.0003)
Previous Peace Failure	0.855 (0.401)
Observations	1,267
R ²	0.102
Max. Possible R ²	0.397
Log Likelihood	-252.355
Wald Test	85.170** (df = 11)
LR Test	136.385** (df = 11)
Score (Logrank) Test	172.549** (df = 11)

Note: All independent variables lagged by one year. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict.

than in agreement environments. While this is statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval, it could suggest that there are still unresolved commitment issues in conflicts that finish because of low activity.

Conclusion

Lasting peace, especially in light of agreements that strain commitment problems, can be ensured through the efforts of third parties. However, these efforts are more likely to promote peace when they are coordinated across organizations. When organizations cooperate, they are coordinating their actions on the ground to be in line with one another, serving the same goal. As a result, organizations are able to increase their leverage to push agreements and prevent combatants from returning to violence. Cooperation is also not limited to one area and can occur between organizations in many areas of the conflict, like peacekeeping and mediation. This allows the costs associated with returning to violence to be greater and impact a variety of contexts. Not only does cooperation provide additional resources for leverage and punishment, but it signals to combatants the commitment of the organizations involved. Cooperation comes with costs and being willing to pay them for peace indicates that the organizations are going to uphold their responsibilities. And finally, cooperation encourages long-term peace by creating teams of organizations that can appropriately divide labor for quick deployment and continued support.

While previous literature has studied the ways that different types of leverage from a variety of actors can promote agreements, they have failed to understand the possible influence from the totality of actors involved (Duursma 2017; E. Menninga 2020; Reid 2017). By studying cooperation, we are able to understand how the coordination of efforts across peacekeeping,

mediation, and even aid can add to long-lasting peace. This paper questions the mediation literature's singular focus and suggests that other actors not officially mediating can impact peace. This paper also adds to the literature by testing a mechanism of successful mediation that suggests that mediators can offer peacekeeping as a leverage tool (Beardsley 2009). I test this by looking at cases where mediators are working with peacekeeping organizations, such that these claims are the most credible.

I test the theoretical framework of cooperation's impact on peace in two ways. First, I look at the likelihood of a peace agreement when there is cooperation during a round of negotiation. In this model, I find that cooperation significantly increases the likelihood of a peace agreement being signed. Then, I test the impact of cooperation on the duration of peace, especially when following a peace agreement. Again, I find support for my argument that cooperation between international organizations in situations where there was a negotiated settlement will lead to longer periods of peace. And to further test this, I subset my sample to only conflicts that were concluded with agreements and add factors of the agreement design to the model. There is still support for the argument, but the reduced sample makes substantive interpretations difficult. One limitation of this study is testing the specific mechanisms, especially in regard to the analysis of rounds of negotiations. Ideally, the cooperation score could tell us how much cooperation is happening between the negotiators and outside conflict management efforts to investigate that mechanism further.

This work has important implications for organizations operating in post-conflict environments. First, it emphasizes a previously understudied phenomenon that cooperating in peace times is critical to mediation and lasting peace. And while this has been studied in mediation, I find that cooperation across tactics is able to enhance this effect. Also, this work

suggests that there are additional opportunities for cooperation for peace with international organizations not directly active in managing the conflict. By incorporating these organizations into their coordinated efforts, IOs can add to the costs associated with returning to violence and prevent it.

There are many avenues for future research, including investigating in the mechanisms described here. There is a pattern of cooperation reoccurring between teams of organizations that did not occur in an active conflict that is worth further investigation. What factors encourage these partners to revisit countries and how do they sustain their cooperation in the face of the costs associated with it? Additionally, the empirical finding that cooperation in conflicts that have experienced military victory should be explored. Is the international community undermining peace processes that are not plagued with as many commitment problems as other conflicts? I would hypothesize that the international community could be effective if their efforts were coordinated towards rebuilding infrastructure rather than solving security issues that could be controlled by the victor. In all, the future of research regarding cooperation in peace is ripe for exploration and indicates a path toward more sustainable peace.

Conclusion

Civil conflicts are complex, and they can contain a wide range of actors, both domestic and international, fighting to accomplish different objectives. Conflict management efforts can also be complex, as a variety of international actors work to resolve conflicts, reduce violence, and promote stable peace agreements. As regional organizations continue to respond to a greater number of conflicts, the chances of multiple IOs being present in a conflict increases. And with more organizations comes the opportunity for cooperation. However, despite the increased opportunity and evidence that cooperation would be helpful, we do not always see an increase in cooperation on the ground. Still, these trends are not reflected in the conflict management literature. Previous studies have focused on the effects of single tactics or a single organization and have overlooked the impacts of cooperation. This dissertation has filled that gap by defining cooperation and understanding its effect on conflict and peace.

In the first paper, I explored why there are variations in cooperation. I argued that increased conflict complexity and decreased IO legitimacy are likely to lead to greater levels of cooperation. I confirmed this using a novel score of cooperation, created from UN Security Council resolutions and found empirical support for my argument. I also find that, contrary to popular belief, cooperation is not a result of higher levels of violence or a trend that continues to increase. This paper was the first of its kind to conceptualize cooperation in conflict zones and, in the greater literature, to define cooperation as more than a dichotomous event.

Next, I investigated what these variations mean for conflict intensity and duration. Given the literature's insistence on the importance of resources, I put forward an argument about the ways cooperation can improve the ways resources support peace. With cooperation, IOs are able to more effectively deploy their resources to avoid redundancies and improve coordination

across tactics. I tested this theory empirically and found that cooperation led to a decrease in battle deaths and shorter periods of violence.

Finally, I tested cooperation's impact on peace. The theoretical framework suggested that cooperation can support combatants in overcoming their commitment issues to establish peace. Cooperation can do that by increasing the costs of returning to violence for combatants across a variety of sectors. Additionally, cooperation signals the organization's resolve to establish peace and creates teams that are ready to deploy if a crisis emerges. I verified this by testing cooperation's impact on the likelihood of a peace agreement and the length of peace periods, especially following peace agreements.

Together, these final two papers show the positive impact of cooperation. Cooperation is able to reduce violence and maintain peace. These are the first papers, to my knowledge, to test the impact of cooperation, which is not limited in any way, on conflict outcomes. Previous work has looked at how mediators could work together or how peacekeeping missions can engage but work occurring between these tactics has been largely ignored. This work suggests that cooperation is a critical component to conflicts and their lasting peace.

From the whole dissertation, we have learned that cooperation is a dynamic endeavor. It does not increase linearly or respond to specific events of violence. Instead, cooperation occurs when IOs need partners to respond to increasingly complex challenges from the conflict environment or their own standing. And even when cooperation is chosen, it occurs along a scale to match IOs' needs. As a result, conflicts can benefit from increased pressure from the international community, which can reduce violence and support peace. In the future, IOs should prioritize overcoming their individual hesitations for cooperation and pursue cooperation with

greater vigor. Established policies of cooperation will support less violence and quicker transitions to peace.

There are a few limitations to the dissertation that could be improved upon in future work. One area that could be improved on is the geographical limitations of the cooperation score. While I believe that Africa was a reasonable starting point, the score should be expanded to other regions to better test the expectations of cooperation. Another limitation is that the score does not include information about what types of activities are being cooperated on. A main contribution of the score is that it is not limited by one tactic of conflict management, but it also does not define in which tactics this cooperation is occurring. This can be improved upon for the next iterations and will lead to better testing, specifically when the cooperation is occurring across tactics. A final limitation is that the score is at the country year and not the conflict level. While this is unavoidable in its current iteration, future endeavors should attempt to disentangle the cooperation score when there are multiple conflicts present.

There are multiple avenues for future research that can be developed from this line of inquiry. First, it has been established that past work has not fully modeled the complex environment in which conflict management actors act. While this score attempts to address this, there are still more actors that could be cooperating that are not included here and offer the chance for greater theoretical development. One example is the impact of individual states. Individual states are often involved in conflict management like South Africa in the cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Burundi and the United States in Ethiopia or Sudan. Often, their involvement includes mediation, but individual states can support the conflict in a number of ways. In Burundi, South Africa led mediation that ended in the Arusha Accords (Duursma and Gamez 2023). But they also utilized their own peacekeeping mission, the South African

Protection Service Detachment (South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Burundi n.d.). And while the peacekeeping mission faced operational challenges, their proximity supported a quick deployment. Later, the African Union set up their own peacekeeping mission to Burundi, that South Africa contributed troops to (South Africa's Peacekeeping Role in Burundi n.d.). This example introduces the numerous ways that individual states can choose to involve themselves in conflict management.

Future iterations of the cooperation scores should include states that are also working towards peace, with consideration for the variety of tools they can deploy. But including these actors will require more nuanced theories of why cooperation occurs as they consider the dynamics between states and organizations that they are members of. Questions like whether the member state is obligated to cooperate with the international organization it is a part of will further advance our understanding of cooperation and contribute to important IO literatures regarding their relationships with member states (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2003).

Second, while in this dissertation I focus on the effect of cooperation on conflict-related outcomes such as intensity, termination, peace agreements, and the duration of post-conflict peace, cooperation among IOs can impact a variety of other subjects. One area that is particularly suited to being impacted by cooperation is democratic transitions. Does cooperation support transitions to democracy? IOs are generally predisposed towards democracy but when they act together does that ensure a more stable transition? ECOWAS has clearly had mixed results in its efforts to prevent democratic backsliding, with recent failures in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger (Lawal 2024). But each country had varying levels of other IO involvement. In Mali, a UN peacekeeping mission was present at the time of the coup but was unable to prevent the military

coup. And while Mali's case is exacerbated by conflicts against Islamic extremists, it offers an insight into the ways that cooperation could support democracy (A Course Correction for Mali's Sovereign Turn 2024). Cooperation can help to support democracy by dividing labor and creating partnerships that respond to challenges. With cooperation, a variety of organizations can respond to issues that they are most capable of handling. In Mali's case because cooperation was limited, ECOWAS focused on establishing a peacekeeping mission, when their efforts could have been more effective if focused on economic development and regional integration (K. S. Gleditsch and Ward 2006). In this sense, cooperation can more effectively deploy to handle the wide range of issues that lead to backsliding (Levitsky and Way 2006; Waldner and Lust 2018).

International organizations, in previous studies, have been found to positively support the peace process through mediation (Duursma 2020) and peacekeeping (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013) to make conflicts shorter, less violent, and to make peace last longer (Fortna 2008; Mross, Fiedler, and Grävingholt 2022; Walter 1997). And while these offer insight into the achievements of international organizations, they fail to take into account the power of all the organizations present. In this dissertation, I have shown that, while varied, cooperation between IOs in conflict environments can make their efforts even more effective. With cooperation, organizations are able to effectively harness the power of multiple organizations to reduce violence, end conflict, and ensure a durable peace.

Appendices

Creating the Cooperation Score

The cooperation score created here relies on UN Security Council Resolutions to extract multiple pieces of information, primarily the types of cooperation and the actors involved. The score is created by reading each UN resolution specified to a country in Africa from 1991-2018. To illustrate the process of coding the cooperation score, I will provide examples from a single resolution here. There are three types of cooperation to be tallied from any given resolution. The first is rhetorical cooperation. This describes information sharing between multiple organizations, which indicates that they are aware of each other's actions on the ground. Information sharing is an important step to reducing redundancies between organizations because it indicates an awareness of the actions of other IOs. Verbs that usually indicate information sharing include “welcoming”, “commending”, “recognizing”, and “noting”. The next two tallies are related instances of active cooperation. This type of cooperation indicates that two organizations are actively working on the ground together. The key to this type of cooperation is looking for indication of actions undertaken together like working together to implement a peace agreement or having troops working in the same units. For active cooperation, I also consider requests made by the Security Council, in addition to recognition of actions that have already happened. Coding of active cooperation includes whether the cooperation is occurring between the UN and another IO or whether it is between two organizations outside of the UN. In total, each resolution can receive 3 tallies, one for rhetorical cooperation, one for active cooperation with the UN, and one for active cooperation between two other organizations. This allows for a slight weight to active cooperation. For each of these tallies, the organization discussed is recorded. If multiple lines mention rhetorical or active communication, only a single tally is possible, but it is important to make sure that any organization associated with cooperation is recorded. To illustrate, I will walk through lines of Resolution 866 regarding Liberia in September 1993.

Rhetorical Cooperation

Commending ECOWAS for its continuing efforts to restore peace, security and stability in Liberia,

Commending also the efforts of the Organization of African Unity in support of the peace process in Liberia,

The above excerpt from the resolution describes the UNSC recognizing the efforts of ECOWAS and the OAU. These two lines will be coded as one tally for rhetorical cooperation and the organizations involved will be listed as ECOWAS and OAU. The coding is conducted entirely based on the information provided in the resolution. So, for example, an expert in the Liberian conflict might understand that the “peace process” mentioned in connection to the OAU is

facilitated by ECOWAS. However, to avoid mistakes in interpretation, this line is coded only as rhetorical cooperation and not as active cooperation between two organizations.

Active Cooperation

Stressing the importance of full cooperation and close coordination between UNOMIL and ECOMOG in the implementation of their respective mandates,

Taking note of the deployment of an advance team of United Nations military observers to Liberia as authorized under resolution 856 (1993),

Welcoming the establishment of the Joint Cease-Fire Monitoring Committee (JCMC) composed of the three Liberian parties, ECOMOG and the United Nations,

From the same resolution, the lines above represent active cooperation. In the first line, the verbs that indicate it is active cooperation include “coordination” and “implementation”. This line describes the cooperation of two peacekeeping missions that would occur simultaneously between the UN and ECOWAS. Given that the cooperation is to happen between the UN and ECOWAS, this line represents a tally for active cooperation with the UN. There is only one possible tally for this type of cooperation, so it is not impacted by the 3rd line, which also indicates cooperation. However, these lines indicate two ways in which the tally for cooperation can be reached. The 1st line indicates future cooperation due to the fact UNOMIL was established in this resolution and the 3rd line indicates cooperation that has occurred as the JCMC was established in the peace accord already assigned.

5. Encourages African States to provide the additional troops requested from them by ECOWAS for ECOMOG;

I include this line as an example of what could be cooperation, but it does not fit our coding definitions. Here, the UN is encouraging states to support ECOMOG with troops. However, the line does not list any other specific organization, and we cannot assume that the UN is speaking to any sort of IO. In this resolution, R 866, ECOWAS is never mentioned in combination with another IO, so the resolution does not meet the threshold for the final tally of cooperation between two organizations excluding the UN. So, in total, this resolution includes two tallies, one for rhetorical and one for active cooperation, with both ECOWAS and OAU listed as included here.

15. Urges the Organization of African Unity to continue its collaboration with ECOWAS in promoting the cause of peace in Liberia;

In contrast, this line comes from R 1001, also regarding Liberia. This is an example of what would constitute as active cooperation between two organizations other than the UN. Here, the UN is acknowledging cooperation between the OAU and ECOWAS without any indication that they are involved in the partnership.

Table A1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model without Outliers

Table A1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model of Peace Duration (without Outliers)	
	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Civil War Duration
Cooperation (Decayed)	-0.152 (0.224)
Conflict Ended by Agreement	-0.824 (0.442)
Conflict Ended by Victory	-2.847** (0.613)
Cooperation X Agreement	-2.164* (1.986)
Cooperation X Victory	0.329 (0.254)
Conflict Duration	0.044 (0.018)
Battle Deaths (Logged)	0.361* (0.097)
GDP Per Capita (Logged)	-0.381 (0.173)
Democracy	0.022 (0.045)
Number of UN Peacekeepers	0.0003 (0.0004)
Previous Peace Failure	0.903 (0.426)
Observations	1,217
R ²	0.100
Max. Possible R ²	0.381
Log Likelihood	-227.502
Wald Test	64.830** (df = 11)
LR Test	128.663** (df = 11)
Score (Logrank) Test	170.004** (df = 11)

Note: All independent variables lagged by one year. **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1 (two-tailed tests); robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict.

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