

## **ABSTRACT**

Title of Dissertation:                   MINORITY LANGUAGE POLICY  
AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

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Language is one of the most important cleavages along which ethnic identities are formed and shaped. Yet, in addition to being an identity marker, language is a policy area, in which the state cannot remain impartial toward the interests of the speakers of different languages in a country. The main research questions of my dissertation are how minority language policies are formed and how different policy outcomes affect likelihood of ethnic conflict. Recent empirical evidence suggests that ethnic conflicts are likely to occur along linguistic lines at least as much as religious ones. Despite this finding, the role of language policies in occurrence of conflict remains uncovered. I claim that this is partly due to paying insufficient attention to how minority language policies are formed while explaining the link between language and ethnic conflict. Language policies in multilingual societies are political outcomes that emerge out of the interplay between ethnic competition and rivalry, national cohesion, and ethnolinguistic vitality of linguistic minorities. I argue that these three factors are primarily reflected by relative group size and

interaction of language divide with other social cleavages. Specifically, I contend that these two variables shape language policy outcome by impacting group capability for mobilization and coalition building patterns. In turn, I claim that the most restrictive policy option, defined by exclusion of minority language from public sphere, and the most accommodative policy option, promotion of minority language by state, contribute to outbreak of ethnic conflict along linguistic lines. But middle-ground policies based on toleration of use of minority language in public sphere and providing support for it has the potential to defuse the tensions over language policy and contribute to prevention of conflict breaking out. I test these propositions on a cross-national dataset of minority language policy that covers 424 linguistic minority groups from 50 randomly selected countries. Results provide robust empirical support for the theory.

# **MINORITY LANGUAGE POLICY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT**

by

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To Hülya

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## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

How do minority language policies affect likelihood of ethnic conflict? Language is one of the main cultural divisions along which ethnic identities are formed and shaped (Fearon 2006, Brubaker 2013). Yet, in addition to being an identity marker, language is a policy area, in which the state cannot remain impartial toward the interests of the speakers of different languages in a country because it must choose a language(s) to communicate with the people (Zolberg and Woon 1999). Consequently, many contemporary ethnic conflicts involve some contention over the status of the vernacular language(s) of the minority group(s) in public affairs. Even the states that grant some concessions to minorities in the form of protection of minority languages in education and other public services cannot always avoid such disputes, which occasionally manifest itself in the form of protests or even violent conflict. There is a vast literature on various theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches toward management of societal multilingualism (Haugen 1966, Kloss 1969; 1971, Haarmann 1986, Nelde 1987). Similarly, the role of language in political processes such as identity formation, nation-building, group mobilization and collective contention have been extensively studied by numerous scholars (Barth 1969, Gellner 1983, Smith 1998, Fearon 2006). Nevertheless, a satisfactory answer to the question of whether the state policies for managing societal multilingualism matter for outbreak of ethnic conflict based on a systematic analysis is still missing.

One of the most definite observations in the study of violent conflict is that since 1946, the majority of civil conflicts took place along ethnic divisions (Denny and Walter 2014). As reported by Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the prevalence of civil wars fought between ethnic groups varies over time but has remained the most common form of conflict since the beginning of decolonization in the late 1950s. UCDP data also differentiates civil conflict in terms of their objectives between territorial conflicts involving demands for secession or autonomy and governmental conflicts over political system, replacement of central government, or changing its composition. Naturally, ethnic identity figures most prominently in secessionist conflicts for control of a territory, however, close to half of conflicts over the central power has also broken down along ethnic lines.<sup>1</sup> Ethnicity is one of the multiple social divisions -such as religion, ideology, class, region- along which groups within a society may be mobilized. Yet, when there is an intra-state war, they are most likely to be mobilized along ethnic identities. Thus, the role played by one of the most common and powerful factors that define ethnic identities and disputes over its political management in the outbreak of violent conflict appears as an interesting subject for analysis.

Language is a crucial component of nation-building and the cohesion and efficiency of national communities (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1983, Smith 1998) as well as of the different ethnic identities within a nation-state (Horowitz 1985, Geertz 1994). Scholars who consider ethnic identities from an instrumentalist perspective argue that violent mobilization of ethnic groups depends on incentives and opportunities often independent of disputes and grievances over policy issues. With regard to language and language policy, these arguments follow from the premise that

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<sup>1</sup> The share of ethnic conflicts within each type of civil war varies in different studies depending on operationalization and time frame, though findings are very similar to one another (see Buhaug 2006). Per Denny and Walter (2014), ethnic conflicts form 98 percent of territorial conflicts 45 percent of wars for control of the center.

when state pushes a linguistic minority to use the official language, the individually rational response is to learn the official language rather than to rebel for language rights. Therefore, in this view, occurrence of ethnic conflicts is not related to the content of language laws and policy but rather to the incentives and opportunities for rebellion (Brass 1991, Laitin 2000; 2007, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Theoretically, this view does not consider how language policies are determined but assumes that states generally follow restrictive policies toward minority linguistic groups. Indeed, legal monolingualism and exclusionary policies toward non-dominant languages are widespread but it is hardly the only language policy that is observed empirically. Without conceptualizing and classifying various minority language policy choices in terms of their social and political determinants and implications, any explanation of the role played by language policy in the outbreak of ethnic conflicts would be inadequate.

Moving from this objection, I first investigate how minority language policies are formed before moving on to their effects on likelihood of ethnic conflict. I build on the conceptions of language policy as outcome of a strategic interaction (Laitin 1988; 2007) and as a choice based on group and society level factors (Safran 2005, Liu 2015; 2017) to offer a theory of minority language policy as a political outcome. This theory suggests that relative sizes of the majority and minority linguistic group(s) and the interaction of language with other cleavages explain the variance in minority language policy choices. This argument yields several testable propositions regarding the effects of these two variables on the type of minority language policy. I develop a typology based on conceptualization and classifications within Language Policy and Planning (LPP) literature (Kloss 1971, Fishman 1989, Spolsky 2004) and a newly emerging approach toward language policy as a political and institutional choice (Liu 2015). I posit that larger majority relative size and smaller minority relative size are associated with the policy of *exclusion*, which

is defined by restriction of the minority language's use in the public sphere. Decrease in the majority relative size and increase in the minority relative size lead to a higher prospect for the policy of *promotion*, which is defined by the use of a minority language in the public sphere in roles similar or identical to the official language. Additionally, I propose that cleavage configurations that place the linguistic majority and minority in closer cultural proximity incentivize *exclusion* while overlapping cleavages that increase the cultural distance between groups are related to *promotion*. Finally, I hypothesize that shared identity cleavages, where linguistic majority and minority are different but parts of each belong to same group on a secondary identity, favor the policy of *toleration*, which covers the middle-range policies based on free use of the minority language in the public sphere with assent and/or support of the state.

After I classify and investigate the sources of different types of minority language policy, I develop my argument on how each minority language policy type affects likelihood of ethnic conflict along linguistic lines. I propose that both exclusion and promotion contribute to the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict between linguistic groups. While exclusion increases the salience of language divide by causing material and symbolic grievances and provides a cultural frame for violent mobilization of the minority members; promotion linguistically segregates public sphere, which is conducive to sowing seeds of intergroup animosity, and provides ethnic elites with ground and resources for contentious mobilization. Toleration, however, mitigates the role of language divides in ethnic conflicts by addressing some of the material and symbolic grievances of linguistic minority and decreasing their utility for contentious mobilization.

I test these arguments about how minority language policies are made and the role of chosen policy options in outbreak of ethnic conflict on an original cross-national data on minority language policies. Minority Language Policy Dataset (MLPD) records the type of language policy

toward 424 linguistic minority groups identified within the All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) sample frame from 50 randomly selected countries between 1945 and 2017. Coding is based on the legal regulations and practices toward the use of a minority language in areas of mass communication, education, and public administration. The findings lend support to the propositions regarding the effects of group relative sizes and cleavage interaction on the minority language policy choice. Moreover, the empirical analysis uncovers that the type of cleavage configuration and relative size have an interactive effect on the language policy outcome in some cases. The analysis of the role played by minority language policy in the outbreak ethnic conflict between linguistic groups indicate that the policies of exclusion and promotion are associated with a higher likelihood of conflict onset compared to the policy toleration. The results are robust to use of various alternative measures and model specifications.

Understanding how language policies toward minority languages are shaped and the role they play in outbreak of ethnic conflict have important theoretical and practical implications. Language has a very strong symbolic connection with ethnic identity and is instrumental in the cohesion of a national community. Identifying the factors underlying language policy choices and incentives of majority and minority groups are crucial for understanding why disputes over language policy follow a different path in different situations and the effects of the different language policy choices. Regulations and explicit agreements on the status and use of languages are commonly offered as conflict prevention and peace-building measures (Nelde et. al 1992, Nelde 1997, Ulasiuk et. al 2018). However, the empirical evidence supporting the link between language policy and outbreak of conflict mostly comes from single case studies selected on the dependent variable: violent ethnic conflict (e.g., DeVotta 2004, Uddin 2006, Zeydanlioğlu 2012). Moreover, as even the proponents of utilizing language policy for conflict prevention agree,

language conflicts are usually non-violent and even when language and language policy plays a role in a violent conflict, it generally reflects deeper social and political divisions (Nelde 1997, Ulasiuk et. al 2018). If that is indeed the case, then it is not possible to develop policies conducive to peace without identifying social and political factors that influence language policy and how language policy can influence social and political divisions within a society. The main aim of this dissertation is to fill the gap in this area.

This dissertation contributes to the literature on language policy and ethnic conflict in several ways. Firstly, combining the strategic approaches to language policy with the sociolinguistic observations of different language situations, it contributes to the theoretical approaches that consider language policy as a political choice. There is significant yet still lacking contact and cooperation between political science and sociolinguistics based explanations of language policy. This dissertation is a contribution to this developing partnership. Secondly, Minority Language Policy Dataset (MLPD) provides an important empirical data source that can be utilized for various investigations related to ethnicity and language. Language policy has implications for various social phenomena. Although MLPD currently includes 50 countries, it can be expanded and used to analyze the relationship of language policy with different variables such as economic development, voting behavior, non-violent mobilization, and so on. Thirdly, by starting with an analysis of language policy choices, this dissertation presents a new framework that can explain the empirical puzzle of the effects of language policy on ethnic conflict. The literature generally conceptualizes language policy within a dichotomy between restriction and recognition of linguistic rights. However, I argue that this dichotomy does not capture the available language policy choices and their effects on intergroup relations and group mobilization and this failure leads to neglect of potential problems with promotion and linguistic segregation. To support



this argument, I demonstrate that middle ground policies have a conflict mitigating effect compared to highest and lowest degree of linguistic concessions.

The findings on the effects of language policy on ethnic conflict onset also have policy implications. Language issues, though not necessarily as the most salient one, come forward in many violent and non-violent conflicts. By showing that repressive and segregating policies both provide an opportunity for violent mobilization and conflict, this dissertation seeks to inform policymakers on language policy's role in conflict prevention and peace building in post-conflict contexts.

This dissertation is organized into 6 chapters including this introduction. Chapter 2 presents and discusses the relevant literature on language policy and ethnic conflict. I first shortly demonstrate the link between language and politics and then move to concept and theories of language policy and planning. After introducing the concepts, I review existing theoretical approaches to language policy making and justify the conceptualization of language policy as a political outcome in the dissertation. Then I point out the gaps in the literature about language conflicts that I seek to fill. Chapter 3 starts with a presentation of basic assumptions and summary of the arguments. Next, I develop my theories on language policy choices and the role of language policy in outbreak of ethnic conflict between linguistic groups. Chapter 4 discusses the shortcomings of available language policy classifications and develops a new conceptualization for measurement of language policies adopted toward minority languages. Then I introduce Minority Language Policy Dataset (MLPD) and its operationalization of minority language policy types. Chapter 5 presents and discusses the findings in two parts. The first part tests my arguments on language policy makings and demonstrates the strong association of group relative and cleavage configuration with language policy choices. The second part includes the empirical analysis of my

propositions regarding minority language policy and outbreak of ethnic conflict. I extensively discuss the causal mechanisms I offered in developing my theory throughout the chapter. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing findings, discussing limitations, and considering future research directions.

## **Chapter 2**

### **The Literature**

#### **2.1. Language and Politics**

A distinct language spoken by the group members is one of the most common among the cultural factors that are utilized to define and distinguish ethnic formations. There are various views about the nature of language ranging from the proposition that language springs from an innate ability of human beings for speech and communication (e.g., Chomsky 1972; Pinker 1995) to the idea that language is a cultural construct that informs and is informed by the way its speakers perceive the reality (e.g., Rappaport 1979; Halliday 2001). Even if one adopts the position that language is a natural phenomenon, the multiplicity of languages is not exclusively nature's doing. It is also the result of pressures and conscious efforts for distinguishing one's own group from others. Boundary making through language is generally considered to be a feature of nation states and nationalism, however, language has been a tool of forming and distinguishing social and political groups throughout history. It is the processes of state-building, centralization, and rationalization of authority accompanying nationalism that transformed the relationship between language and politics. As a result of this transformation, language policy, the main concern of this dissertation, emerged not only as an area of ethnic competition nor a purely legal-rational outcome but as a combination of the two. In the rest of this section, I discuss the language-politics relationship

drawing on the linguistic and anthropological approaches to role of language in social relations as well as the literature on political implications of language.

Various legends across cultures bring mythical explanations as to why people speak in different languages (Liu 2015: 9-10). The multiplicity of languages is attributed to Zeus' malevolent son Hermes in the Greek mythology, to Brahma in Hindu cosmology, who struck an arrogant tree that sought to gather all men under its shadow and created an array of beliefs and languages, and to the God who confused the tongues of the people building the Tower of Babel to reach the heavens and scattered them across the world. The myths aside, linguistic and anthropologic evidence suggests that people differentiate their language from the nearby groups to be able to separate the in-group from out-group. While many languages are disappearing due to new language contact situations and their speakers are transitioning to other languages with more utility; plenty of languages have survived despite all pressures for their speakers to simply assimilate to another language. In fact, there are simultaneous pressures for linguistic convergence and divergence, the latter of which derives from the need to form and maintain manageable social groups (Laycock 2001). On the one hand, the ability to communicate with each other easily is a basic mechanism for identifying the ingroup members and excluding the others. Thus, there is a social evolutionary pressure to differentiate the language spoken by the group members from those spoken by outsiders, which might explain the remarkably diverse language ecologies in Austronesia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Americas. On the other hand, throughout history linguistic convergence usually accompanies formation of larger groups from a network of smaller groups in contact due to the benefits of forming a larger group in certain situations (Nettle 1999).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Nettle (1999) offers an elegant explanation for regional variances in linguistic diversity. In tropical climate areas where rainfall is constant and subsistence is more reliable, language ecologies has become more diverse as the pressures for group maintenance has prevailed. However, the risk of starvation due to unpredictable weather or crop

However, following the advent of nationalism and state rationalization, linguistic convergence and divergence has also begun to be shaped by more meso-level factors than these overarching structural pressures. Modern states based on nationalism as well as the challengers against these states have sought to influence linguistic outcomes in a way that enhances the construction of identities in line with their social and political objectives.

Language does not only serve to form groups. It also helps maintain them. The communicative function of language makes it different than other identity markers such as religion and race. Group members need to communicate with one another for the group to function. However, the need for communication is not an intrinsically political question. The primary language spoken at home by individuals (i.e., mother tongue) might differ as long as a common language shared by at least some bilingual individuals enables any kind of exchange within and/or between groups. What turned communication from a matter of practicality into a political question is the emergence of the modern state (Laitin 1988). As centralized administrations claiming authority over culturally and linguistically diverse populations developed, language has become a crucial component of the relationship between the center of political power and those being ruled (Gellner 1983). Consequently, states have become more and more deeply involved with the question of which language is being used within their borders.

The state can assume a neutral role with regard to religion or race of the people living on its soil. For instance, states can -and in many cases do- deal with the multiplicity of religious beliefs on their soils either through a strong separation of the religious institutions and the state, or institutional recognition of major religious traditions. In any case, religion can be excluded as a

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failures in seasonal climates has led to formation of larger networks of exchange, and as a result, to linguistic convergence.

criterion for regulation of any aspect of public life and participation in it. Yet, the state has to make linguistic choices that influence not only preferences of the people speaking different languages regarding the public life but also their actual participation in it (Zolberg and Long 1999). It needs to choose in which language(s) to communicate with the citizens in different spheres of public life and that choice is the main factor that constitutes language policy.

Language has been at the center of national identities, on which the centralized modern states of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century based the legitimacy and efficiency of their rule (Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983). This key role of language carried on into the state building practices in the post-colonial contexts across the world. In this dissertation, I seek to analyze how the policies that regulate language use and practices in multilingual national communities during and after state-building are made and their implications for the relations between ethnic groups and likelihood of violent ethnic conflict. The formation and effects of these policies have long been studied in the scholarly field of Language Policy and Planning (LPP). To lay the foundations of the theory of minority language policy and its effects on ethnic conflict that I develop in the next chapter, I review the existing literature on the language policy and its sources in the next section.

## **2.2. Language Policy and Planning**

### **2.2.1. Basic Concepts and Theoretical Approaches**

There is no shortage of terminology for defining and understanding the ways in which linguistic behavior is regulated at the societal level. Language policy and planning has arisen as a field of enquiry within sociolinguistics research starting in the 1960s (e.g., Haugen 1966, Kloss 1969, Fishman 1972). These early theorists argued that not only explicit rules and their implementation but also the actual practices, perceptions, and attitudes toward languages in society shape linguistic

behavior. Subsequently, language policy has become a rather abstract umbrella term that encompasses various formal and informal mechanisms that influence language use in different contexts. Yet, a myriad of definitions offered for terms such as language policy, language planning, language management, which often coincide or are employed interchangeably coexist within the field.

Seeking to set the scope and boundaries of language policy, one approach emphasizes the intent for changing or maintaining the language situation in a society (Kaplan and Baldauf 1997; Hornberger 2006). This approach conceives language policy as explicit or implicit rules and ideas aimed at regulating language use in the public sphere. Other scholars describe language policy as a cultural construct consisting of not only the rules but also the beliefs, attitudes and practices related to language. According to them, practices and attitudes related to language are forms of language policy in and of themselves (Spolsky 2004) or rather factors underlying the policy as much as products of it (Schiffman 1996). Another influential approach, which has sprung from critical theory, conceptualizes language policy as a mechanism and sociocultural process that reflects and institutionalizes power relations between social groups in a society (Tollefson 1991).

While there seems to be an agreement among the scholars of sociolinguistics that language policy encompasses a wide range of activities, beliefs, and attitudes, such broad definitions involve the risk of stretching the concept to the point that the actual question becomes “What *isn't* language policy?” (Johnson 2013: 9). A significant effort for clarifying the concept has been labeling different aspects of language policy. Spolsky (2004) identifies the main components of language policy as patterns of choice among languages spoken in a community i.e., language practices; beliefs and attitudes about language use i.e., language ideologies; and efforts for influencing or changing language practices i.e., language planning -or management. Although the scholars of

sociolinguistics generally recognize this multifaceted nature of language policy, research has mostly focused on language planning insomuch that the academic field studying language policy has come to be labeled as language policy and planning (LPP).

The LPP research enterprise developed terms for even more specific aspects of language policy, which are highly relevant for the research questions of this study. The main elements of state efforts for shaping language behavior are identified as status, corpus, and acquisition planning. Status planning is concerned with which language is to have official status and be used in public affairs. The official status of languages in a multilingual society is the most evidently contentious aspect of language policy. The question of which language(s) are to be formally recognized lies at the heart of most linguistic conflicts. Corpus planning refers to the efforts for standardizing the grammar and form of a language. These standardization efforts are essential for any language to attain prestige and to be widely used in any area of public life. In addition to these two terms first proposed by Kloss (1969), acquisition planning (Cooper 1989) or language education policy is concerned with the language used for providing education and teaching of language(s). Education is central to any language policy and planning endeavor as schools are the primary venue for acquiring language(s) with associated skills (e.g., reading, writing) necessary for every aspect of life.

Status, corpus, and acquisition planning are carried out through various means. Formal laws and regulations as well as the practices and conventions regarding language(s) and language forms to be used in public sphere is the most tangible aspect of language policy. In this dissertation, the term language policy is employed in reference to explicit and/or implicit rules and societal practices that create norms regulating language use in the public sphere. The adoption of the term and the specific definition can be justified by the convenience and inclusiveness of the term and



the relevance of norm setting aspect of language policy for the main research questions of this study.

As will be thoroughly elaborated in the next chapter on minority language policy data, states do not always regulate language use by active planning. For instance, while an official and/or national language clause is very common in national constitutions, many -including the US Constitution- do not have any article regarding language. Media laws in some countries include elaborate directives regarding which language(s) can or must be used in public media outlets and for how long; others do not mention language at all. Moreover, the implementation of such formal rules is a whole another question. In short, not actively engaging in language planning is in itself a policy. Therefore, terms such as status planning or language management that deal with active planning do not entirely cover the extent of language policy as conceived in this study. Nevertheless, the emphasis is inevitably on the norms that determine the language to be used in public sphere because I am interested in understanding the extent and depth of a minority language's role in public life and how regulation of this role influences inter-ethnic relations and possibility of ethnic conflict. There is no doubt that language attitudes and ideologies shape the norms regarding the language use in public sphere and vice versa. Yet, the norm setting aspect of language policy is more relevant for the relationship between language policy and ethnic conflict because these rules and norms have both material and symbolic consequences -including those on language ideologies and attitudes- for the speakers of different (both majority and minority) languages in a polity.

### **2.2.2. History of Language Policy and Planning**

The concept of language policy and planning has first emerged as an endeavor to advance linguistic theories and understand the connection between language and societies at the time of

decolonization and pervasive state-building in the post-colonial context in the 1960s (Ricento 2000). At this period, linguists and sociolinguists did not only develop a new scholarly field to theorize on language policy, but also often became practitioners of language planning as the newly independent developing countries seeking to emulate the modernization and state-building practices in the West needed experts in this area. Therefore, the field started out focusing on modernization and building of a national identity through language. However, certain aspects of language policy and planning go way back in history and developed throughout a long process that also influenced linguistic landscapes in those new states.

One of the earlier examples of language policy is the replacement of French with English as the language of the aristocracy, clergy, and courts in Kingdom of England over the course of the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries. After the Norman conquest of England, French had become the language of ruling class simply because the Norman aristocracy and clergy replaced their English-speaking counterparts who perished at the Battle of Hastings and following wars of conquest. But the tide started to turn in favor of English as the Anglo-Norman aristocracy of England lost most of their holdings in mainland France in the 13<sup>th</sup> century. After losing their connection with continental Europe, the lords started focusing on the language of their local land. Just as the natural process was going on, the replacement of French with English also gained a deliberate character in some areas as Hundred Years' War progressed and the rising patriotism turned French from the language of nobility, literature, and prestige into language of the enemy. The language of education at the colleges and the language of legal proceedings was changed from French to English during late 14<sup>th</sup> century after several centuries of French dominance (Baugh and Cable 2002: 116-146)

Nevertheless, neither the change from English to French out of necessity nor the partly deliberate return of English concerned the ordinary people much. In Medieval Europe, the choice

of which language to use at what occasions -even when it mattered rarely- mattered only for the nobility and clergy. The rest was a matter of convenience and language use did not intrude much into people's lives (Wright 2004: 20-25). The lower classes who mostly were born and died within the confines of the same village needed only to communicate with other people in their tiny linguistic community. They might be unable to understand the people in the next village and it did not matter in any meaningful way. The need for communication between the lower class and land-owning nobility and that between the nobility could easily be solved with the existence of a few bilingual translators (Laitin 1988). The situation was not much different in the Ottoman Empire, which simply granted a non-territorial autonomy to the various ethnolinguistic groups living within its borders.

As discussed in the first section, language has always been important for formation and maintenance of groups and intergroup relations. However, language has become a policy area with the rise of nationalism and nation-states out of the centralized kingdoms of early modern period (16<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries) that began to fix their borders. The so-called state nations that were constituted in France, Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, and Portugal also started to homogenize their populations once their borders became more or less stable (Hroch 1985). Although this homogenization mostly developed around religion due to the religious wars, the Protestant challenge to exclusive status of Latin as the language of religion made language also a part of this homogenization (Wright 2004: 27-28). The hunger of the print capitalism for large markets also played a crucial role in the standardization of language and turning it into a homogenizing force (Anderson 1983). Simultaneously, the rise of central bureaucracies and the need for standardization for the functioning of the state machinery led to early examples of

language policy documents in these state nations such as the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterêts (1539) in France and Act of Union (1536) in Britain.

Language policy in the contemporary sense began to develop in the 19<sup>th</sup> century with the rise of nationalism and colonialism (Wright 2004: 43-68). States began to define a national identity and engaged in vigorous acquisition planning and corpus planning to develop a standardized national language. Moreover, colonialism led to new venues and questions about language policy as the European powers began to occupy and colonize lands where many different languages are spoken. The current issues and questions regarding language policy are still concerned with nation-building and the effects of colonialism. In the next section, I explore the existing theories of language policy making and point out the inadequacies of some theories that has led the study of language policy for a long time as well as the recently developing approaches that I draw on in my arguments on how minority language policy is made.

### **2.2.3. Existing Theories of Language Policy Making**

I adopt a definition of language policy as explicit and/or implicit rules and societal practices that create norms regulating language use in the public sphere. This definition is based on the observation of how states designate the language(s) or language form(s) to be used in public affairs. Even in polities such as Japan that is uniformly monolingual on the surface, language policy and planning have been crucial for nation-building in early 20<sup>th</sup> century as well as for current linguistic issues such as revitalization of almost extinct indigenous languages and newly emerging immigrant linguistic communities (Fujita-Round and Maher 2017).

While the literature largely agrees on the observation that states actively engage in language planning, even in covert and/or implicit ways, there are diverging views as to how

language policies are determined. One strand in the literature holds that language policies result from the nature of ethnic relations and ethnic competition (Geertz 1994, Horowitz 1985, Simpson 2007). In this view, ethnic politics is determined by attachments of group members to assumed or perceived givens and, as such, language is a ‘symbol of domination’ (Horowitz 1985: 219). In modern nations, efforts to achieve linguistic unity around dominant language as well as claims to official status for minority languages are reflections of primordial rivalries for status and domination. The main limitation of this approach is its failure to consider the malleability ethnic and linguistic identities and the role of elites in mobilization of these identities drawing on material as well as symbolic resources, including language (Hobsbawm 1990, Smith 1998). Moreover, such an approach takes language policy as an area of unavoidable conflict, however, empirically it is simply not the case. There are various cases of official multilingualism, such as in Belgium, or adoption of a colonial or local lingua franca at the expense of the dominant language in a society (Laitin 1992, Liu 2015).

A second set of scholars have linked language policies directly to nation-building (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1983, Wright 2004). In this view, at the eve of modernity, language had been used as an organizing principle and mobilizing force for political unity and social mobility in emerging sovereign states of Europe and the current language policies are largely imitations and/or modifications of those state building efforts. While the efforts to homogenize the population within fixed borders started around 16<sup>th</sup> century in the so-called state nations (Hrosch 1985), those with more or less fixed borders and bureaucratic-absolutist rule by then (e.g. France, Britain, Sweden), with the impact of French Revolution and rise of ethnic nationalism, language has come to be identified as the primary tool of defining the borders of the nation-state as well as defining the nation within those borders. Indeed, the currently dominant language policies such as linguistic

standardization and national official language were born during the nation-state building efforts of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The situation of the Ainu in Japan is a good example of how the era of nation-states changed the way language is managed by the state. While the Ainu were forbidden to speak Japanese and adopt Japanese customs as barbarian savages living under the control of Matsumae clan in pre-modern Japan, in the Meiji period (1868-1912), education in Japanese was made mandatory for them (Gottlieb 2007). Therefore, language is rightly described as one of the main pillars of the formation of nation-states by these scholars, however, they fail to explain divergence in the specific language policies adopted during nation-building (Liu and Ricks 2012). Promotion of monolingualism has been widespread yet is not necessarily the norm for achieving national cohesion. There is no singular strategy of language for nation-building and what kind of language policy is chosen for nation-building needs to be explained.

As an extension of the nation-building focus, some scholars emphasize the importance of language and language policies of the colonial powers in explaining the language policies in post-colonial context. Rather than refuting the modernist nation-building explanations about importance of language in nation-building, the scholars espousing this view emphasize the role of colonial legacies and the nationalist reactions against the language of the colonial power in the formation of language policies in the post-colonial states (Laitin 1992, Ricento 2000, Wright 2004). Language of the colonial power, in many cases, has served as a unifying factor for linguistically heterogeneous states trying to imitate European nation-state model within their arbitrary borders that reflect not the boundaries of local ethnic groups but the spheres of influence of the former colonial masters. But the role of the colonial language has not been identical across cases. For instance, while English has been the unifying force in post-colonial Nigeria, Dutch never played an important role in Indonesia, where Bahasa Indonesia, the language of small Malay

minority in the archipelago has been successfully promoted as the official language and lingua franca (Liu 2015). The language policy of Philippines, a similarly multilingual polity, diverged from both cases as Tagalog, the mother tongue of around 30 % of the population, competed for the official language status with both English and other local languages. Moreover, this approach does not say much about the varying policies toward different local languages in post-colonial nation-building. Management of multilingualism is not limited to choosing a single national language to achieve unity. In Kenya, for instance, English remains as the language of state and national unity, however, Swahili also holds a similar status as the local lingua franca and many other local languages with relatively larger number of speakers (e.g., Kikuyu, Dholuo, Luhya) are employed in many areas of public life in supplementary roles (Bunyi 1997).

More recently, a new strand in literature investigates the formation of language policy as a political and institutional choice (Liu 2011, Liu and Ricks 2012, Liu 2015). This approach is based on the tradeoff between the advantages of linguistic homogeneity for the state and the costs of trying to achieve this homogeneity. Liu (2011; 2015) emphasizes the importance of primordial bonds and symbolic value of language to ethnic groups as well as the material benefits recognition of a language by the state. Therefore, use of a language in the public sphere at any capacity is not only a matter of practicality for the speakers of that language but also a resource and source of power for that ethnolinguistic group, that is the linguistic power of that group (Liu 2015: 12). Distribution of linguistic power naturally depends on the balance of power among linguistic groups in a polity. The conceptualization of language policy as a political outcome has two main advantages that can address the limitations in the previously discussed approaches. First, by taking into account the structural and institutional factors empowering or disadvantaging linguistic groups in a society, it offers a framework better suited than a focus on a single factor such as nation-

building to explain the empirical variance in language policy outcomes. Second, the focus on power and distribution allows for an explanation that incorporates the role of elites in mobilization of linguistic identities.

I adopt the framework of language policy as a political outcome in order to explain how minority language policy is made and how different policy choices affect likelihood of ethnic conflict along linguistic lines. The focus on the resource and power distribution and its ability to incorporate the role of elites and political entrepreneurs makes it a relevant approach for the questions relating to language conflict. Last but not the least, I also seek to contribute to this newly developing approach by offering refinements to conceptualization and measurement of power balance among linguistic groups as well as to the distributive implications of language policy. To that end, I develop theoretical explanations of minority language policy choices and the effects of different language policy outcome on relations between linguistic groups and possibility of violent ethnic conflict. This part of the chapter has laid the basis for my arguments on language policy choice as a political outcome by introducing the language policy literature and discussing the relevance and shortcomings of existing approaches to language policy making. The next part turns to the question of how language policy choices relate to conflict and presents an overview of the theoretical and empirical approaches to language conflict in the literature.

## **2.3. Language Policy and Conflict**

### **2.3.1. Language Contact and Language Conflict**

Language conflict in situations of societal multilingualism has been analyzed by scholars from various fields and disciplines. Linguists and sociolinguists (Haugen 1966, Calvet 1987, Nelde 1997, Haarmann 1990, Mac Giolla Christ 2003) as well as sociologists and political scientists



(Das Gupta 1970, McRae 1986, Laitin 1988, 2000, 2007; Bormann et. al 2017) have made vast contributions to the theory and investigation of the link between language and conflict. In this section, I first introduce the concept of language contact as used in the field of linguistics, then offer an overview of theoretical approaches to conflict between languages and their speakers in contact, i.e., language conflict.<sup>3</sup>

Language contact widely refers to situations where two or more languages and/or people speaking those languages interact in any way with each other. Given the various ways and levels at which languages might get in contact with one another, substantive differences between being in the same place and being in contact, and the blurred boundaries of concepts such as language, dialect, register; this definition is too wide as an analysis frame. In this dissertation, I am interested in the specific kind of language contact where two or more groups of people in a society speak different languages, that is societal multilingualism.

The literature on the societal level language contact and language conflict investigates various aspects of language conflict including its causes, manifestations, management, and outcomes of its management (Darquennes 2015). One of the central arguments in the contact linguistics about society level language conflict is that it arises in situations of asymmetrical multilingualism, where the languages in contact differ in terms of status, prestige, and use (Haarmann 1990, Mac Giolla Christ 2003). While this proposition seems like a good indicator for where to look for the causes of language conflict, it is quite difficult to point out an example of societal multilingualism where all languages in contact are positioned symmetrically in terms of status, prestige, and use. Indeed, the prominence of language issues in a wide variety of social and

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<sup>3</sup> For a more detailed review and a detailed picture of the field, see Darquennes (2015).

political conflicts has led some scholars to argue that “language contact means language conflict” (Nelde 1987). While useful to refine concepts, such broad frames do not lend themselves to empirical analysis of language conflicts. Firstly, given that a true symmetrical multilingualism is not possible (Nelde 1997), it is crucial to identify the specific ways in which societal multilingualism is managed and investigate their implications on the relations between language-based identity groups. The approach of “ecology of language” (Haugen 1972), which has been very influential in the field of sociolinguistics (Fishman 1989, Haarmann 1990, Hornberger 2002, Mac Giolla Christ 2003), offers a useful framework by focusing on demographic, cultural, sociological, and political environment of the language contact.

As to the type of conflict that language contact produces and how it manifests itself, many scholars agree that disputes over status and use of languages in the public sphere in democratic regimes is usually battled-out within the realm of politics despite sporadic outburst of violence in the examples such as in Belgium and Canada (Chilton 1997, Laitin 2000, Rindler Scherpe 2003). Yet, it is up for debate whether this claim can be extended beyond the scope of democratic and economically developed countries. Other scholars point out that language conflicts are usually manifestations of other deep-running social divisions and conflicts (e.g., economic, political, regional) in the domain of language (Bugarski 1990, Nelde 1997). Clearly, language is not *the* cause of political and/or violent conflicts between ethnolinguistic groups, however, the question of to what extent societal multilingualism and its management matter as *a* cause of conflict is yet to be answered. It is the aim of this dissertation to identify and explain the factors that shape management of societal multilingualism (i.e., language policy) and how important the specific policies toward languages asymmetrically positioned with regard to the dominant language in a society in alleviating or provoking violent ethnic conflict.

### **2.3.2. Minority Language Policy, Language Grievances and Ethnic Conflict**

The literature on the role of language and language policy on ethnic conflict is divided between two approaches based on the two main approaches to civil conflict in general. On the one hand, some scholars consider disputes and grievances over language policy not to be a strong predictor for outbreak of ethnic conflict by itself (Laitin 2000, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004) or in comparison to religious grievances (Reynal-Querol 2002, Fox 2004). On the other hand, some scholars argue that restrictions on minority languages can add up to likelihood of ethnic conflict independently or when coupled with other grievances (Horowitz 1985, Bostock 1997, Bormann et. al 2017). Both viewpoints suffer from several theoretical and methodological shortcomings that I seek to address in developing and testing my argument on the relationship between minority language policy and outbreak of ethnic conflict. In the rest of this section, I summarize these two strands in the literature and point out these weaknesses.

Claims that restrictions on language and language grievances are not an important cause of ethnic conflict stem from two different premises. First line of these arguments is grounded in the opportunity-based explanations of civil conflict, which holds that group level grievances are too commonplace to explain occurrence of intergroup conflict and focuses on incentives for and possibility of waging a successful rebellion. One of the most common problems with empirical analyses based on this premise is their reliance on country-level ethnolinguistic and/or religious heterogeneity measures to discredit the effects of ethnic grievances on civil conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004). These country-level measures fail both to capture group-level dynamics that influence likelihood of violence and to reflect grievances validly. Employing a theoretical and methodological approach more pertinent to the question at hand, Laitin (2000; 2004) tests how level of restrictions on the use of a minority language affects likelihood of that

group involving in a rebellion. He concludes that disputes over language use are not associated with significant guerrilla activity and are mostly confined within the political realm. The apparent lack of association between language restrictions and conflict is explained through the lens of a tipping game (Laitin 2007). The argument is that as long as there is no sign of the official language losing its status as the language of power and dominant medium of communication at the national level, members of the minority are better off becoming bilingual or assimilating than joining a rebellion for language accommodation. This argument theoretically fails to consider the role language can play in mobilization of an identity group as an opportunity structure and a cultural frame (McAdam et. al 1996). Moreover, the empirical tests of this claim (Laitin 2000; 2004) employ the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database, which suffers from a selection bias.

Another approach toward the role of language and disputes over language policy in civil conflict holds that religious cleavages and grievances are more strongly associated with violence than linguistic ones (Reynal-Querol 2002, Fox 2004). Similarly, these findings suffer from the use of country-level fractionalization measures that do not capture grievances or selection problems in the sample. Bormann et. al (2017) demonstrate that civil wars are more likely to occur along linguistic lines than religious ones.

The proponents of the causal link between language grievances and outbreak of ethnic conflict are generally based on social psychological theories of group conflict. One of the seminal arguments in that regard is Gurr's (1970) relative deprivation theory, which maintains that political violence occurs when the disparity between what is expected by a collectivity and what they have becomes unbearable. With a slightly different approach specific to ethnic conflicts, Horowitz (1985) argues that disadvantaged ethnic groups follow leaders that promise retrieving their self-esteem against the dominant ethnic group, linking group grievances to burst of ethnic violence.

Many scholars have also demonstrated the central role of group level perceived grievances and demands relating to language in various violent ethnic conflicts, such as the sparking of Bangladeshi Liberation War by declaration of Urdu as official language in Pakistan (Uddin 2006) or the role of Sinhalese-only Act of 1956 on decades long separatist Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka (DeVotta 2004). Bormann et. al (2017) also emphasize the role of language grievances in civil war, however, their measures essentially rely on linguistic and religious distance rather than what the language policy is.

The problem with such an approach is that it implicitly assumes that whenever there is a linguistic difference between the dominant and minority linguistic groups, there will be a language grievance. However, as the review in the previous part indicates, language policy and planning is a multidimensional process that is influenced by various social and political factors and implemented through various means. As the literature on the language contact establishes, disputes over language are not limited to different languages (Haugen 1966). Further, the conflict between different forms of same language can also sometimes turn violent as it happened during the struggle between supporters of Demotic and Katharevousa in Greece during the 1970s (Jahr and Trudgill 1993: 92). Another issue with assuming language difference means language grievance is the fact that not all linguistic minorities demand promotion and use of their language in education and other public areas (Hornberger 2002). Just as language policy can vary, so do the demands and expectations of linguistic minorities. Therefore, any analysis of the effects of language policy on ethnic conflict will be flawed unless it takes how language policies are made into account.

Finally, the detailed analyses of conflicts where disputes over language policy figure prominently, while very useful otherwise, does not allow us to test whether and under what conditions different language policies may cause ethnic conflict. Language and language policy

can influence relations between ethnolinguistic groups through different means and in different ways. For instance, compare the actual policy in two conflicts where disputes over language policy figured prominently. Bangladeshi Liberation War erupted despite Bengali being recognized as the medium of instruction and the official language of East Pakistan since the independence. However, Kurdish conflict in Turkey was attributed to restrictions on the use of Kurdish in education and media by the leader of PKK, who argued easing those restrictions would resolve the Kurdish issue in his trial. This might be explained by referring to the importance of relative deprivation or the elites' manipulation of linguistic identity to mobilize collective violence, both of which are valid arguments. However, neither of these explanations answer the question of whether different language policies have an impact on ethnic conflict. In order to answer this question and fill the gap in the literature, I develop a two-pronged argument on how language policy is made and how different language policy choices influence likelihood of ethnic violence along linguistic lines. Then, I test these arguments on an original dataset that classifies the types of language policy toward 424 linguistic minority groups from 50 randomly selected countries across the world.

## Chapter 3

### Theory

As one of the most potent markers of group identity and the primary medium of interpersonal communication, language is a key element of peaceful as well as conflictual social interactions. The conflictual facet of language, or to use the common terminology, language conflicts have long attracted attention from both scholars of sociolinguistics (e.g., Haugen 1966, Haarmann 1990, Nelde 1997) and, to a somewhat lesser extent, political scientists (e.g., McRae 1986; Laitin 1988, 2000, 2007; Bormann et. al 2017). Both fields have significantly contributed to the understanding of the relationship between language and societal conflict, but the question of when and how these conflicts turn violent has yet to be answered. A comprehensive and satisfying explanation as to if and under what conditions language contact and its management may breed violent conflict is still lacking.

A valid criticism in that regard has been the fact that while the focus of sociolinguists on language policy and planning usually is not grounded in political theory, political scientists overlook the policy and planning aspects of language (Mac Giolla Christ 2003: 1). On the one hand, even some of the foundational texts of sociolinguistics that has inspired much of the research on the management of multilingualism and the status of minority languages treats language policy making mostly as a linguistic and organizational/bureaucratic exercise (e.g., Fishman 1989). On the other hand, the most authoritative political science approaches to the language-conflict

relationship consider language as just another cleavage within a framework of strategic bargaining between different ethnolinguistic formations and their elites (e.g., Laitin 2007). Yet, firstly, language policy is a political outcome that emerges out of the balance between nation-building, ethnic competition and their corollaries. Thus, any explanation of language conflicts would be inadequate unless it first uncovers the factors underlying specific practices adopted to manage public use of languages across varying linguistic landscapes. For instance, Norway recognizes two written varieties of Norwegian as its official languages, *Bokmål*, meaning ‘literary language’, and *Nynorsk*, meaning ‘new Norwegian’. The main difference between the two varieties concerns mostly writing systems as while the former is based on Danish, which was the language of the urban elite during the Danish rule in Norway, the latter was developed from rural eastern Norwegian dialects in mid-19<sup>th</sup> century after independence. Eventually *Bokmål* has come to be the dominant variety adopted by around 90% of the population and the de facto *Riksmål*, the national language. Yet Norway has retained a policy of official bilingualism since the issue of language first emerged. In this case, language policy, even as it relates to choosing a written form for a single language, was not dictated by linguistic concerns but rather reflected the social divisions (i.e., urban-rural) as well as the concerns over maintaining a distinct and cohesive national identity (Haugen 1966).

Furthermore, the identity marker function of language is but one way how it might relate to conflict. Indeed, language usually serves as a potentially conflictual line along which group identities are defined and redefined in line with the changing interests of ethnic elites and individuals. However, language policy is an essential and complicated tool in dealing with societal multilingualism that may defuse tensions or spark violent conflict through various mechanisms. The crucial role played by language policies both in the formation and dissolution of Yugoslavia



is a perfect example. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the dialect continuum of the Southern Slavic peoples was developed as Serbo-Croatian language with two main varieties: an Eastern one based on Cyrillic alphabet and a Western one based on Latin alphabet -also called Croato-Serbian. Both varieties were adopted as the equally official languages of Tito's federalist Yugoslavia to serve as a unifying factor for the officially multilingual and multiethnic state. But Yugoslavia's descent into war and dissolution was also marked by language, this time as mutually intelligible Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin varieties has become bases of division, in no small part due to federal and sub-national language policies that aimed at dissociating each constituent identity group from one another and emphasizing the differences (Tollefson 2002).

Language policy is an area of political bargaining that involves efforts for national as well as sub-national identity building and is consequential for the management of relations between different linguistic groups living within the same polity. This dissertation is an attempt to develop a general theoretical framework explaining language policy making as a political outcome and the effects of different policy choices toward minority languages on the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict.

The language-conflict link seems puzzling at first sight, not unlike many other societal factors that are associated with the likelihood of ethnic conflict. On the one hand, multilingual societies are abound with disputes over the status and public use of languages, be it between two or more major languages, a dominant and minority language(s), or a foreign and local language(s). So much so that as a prominent sociolinguist puts it, it is possible to say that language contact means language conflict (Nelde 1987). On the other hand, many different linguistic groups live peacefully in the same polity along one another and even if there is a language dispute, it does not usually amount to violent conflict, at least not in the developed world (Laitin 2000). But what

makes this puzzle more complicated and also possibly solvable is the commonsense observation that almost every violent ethnic organization that claims to represent a linguistically defined group has justified its existence and actions at least partly by alluding to grievances over language. The examples include but are not limited to *Front Libération du Québec* (FLQ) in Canada, *Karen National Union* (KNU) and *Shan State Army* (SSA) in Myanmar, *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA) in Spain, *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elaam* (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, *Kurdistan Workers Party* (PKK) in Turkey, and *Donetsk People's Republic* (DPR) and *Luhansk People's Republic* (LPR) in Ukraine. Language is neither the sole cause nor has the same level of significance for these ethnic conflicts with varying degrees of intensity across the world. But all these organizations have argued the language of the group they claim to represent has been repressed and denied the status and prestige it deserves. What is more, language policy has not been uniform among these examples and across time. For instance, while Quebecois in Canada and Tamil in Sri Lanka had long been languages of education and local administration when the violent campaigns of FLQ and LTTE were launched, Karen and Shan in Myanmar and Kurdish in Turkey were denied any public use and status until very recently. In what follows, I develop a theory of language policy making as a political outcome and how different policy choices affect likelihood of violent ethnic conflict to address this puzzle. The next section lays down the basic assumptions I adopt on language and mobilization of linguistic identities.

### **3.1. Basic Assumptions**

To address the link between language policy and ethnic conflict, I make several assumptions regarding the politics of language and ethnicity. Regardless of the position taken on the origins of language, there are two basic observations about language that makes it a subject of politics and a policy area: 1) Humans speak diverse languages that most often serve to separate one social group

from another. 2) Language not only marks social groups but also helps them function as a cohesive social and/or political unit.

I adopt the assumption that due to its potency as an identity marker, language is a valuable tool for political entrepreneurs to mobilize a group defined by linguistic identity (Hobsbawm 1990, Brass 1991, Laitin 2007). I make no assumptions as to the motivation of these entrepreneurs. Regardless of whether they instrumentalize language for attaining political power or genuinely seek to advance the interests of their group, language has the potential to become basis for violent and/or non-violent mobilization of an identity group. I take a constructivist position on the nature of ethnic and linguistic identities. They are malleable, to the extent that both group leaders and individual members highlight language among many potential identity markers as long as it is in their interest (Bates 1974, Posner 2005, Habyarimana et. al 2009). However, at the same time, I acknowledge that these identities are based on enduring symbolic attachments that may actually outlive the language itself and be crucial for mobilization of an identity group (Horowitz 1985, Smith 1986, Kaufmann 1996).

The role of language in modern state-building and nation-building is most clearly evident in rationalization of the state and society. Coined by the sociologist Max Weber (1978), the term state rationalization refers to process of transforming the functioning of a state to be based on order and efficiency rather than tradition and values. A standard language that allows communication across ethnolinguistic and/or dialect groups is crucial for state rationalization as it serves to establish legal and bureaucratic uniformity. Moreover, through enhancing social mobility (Gellner 1983) and creating a sense of unity (Anderson 1983), language has been at the center of national identities, on which the modern states of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as well as the state building practices of the post-colonial period has relied for legitimacy. Therefore, I assume that when deciding on the

language(s) to be used in different areas of public sphere, state building actors prioritize achieving linguistic rationalization.

Finally, I base my argument on the premise that made either as conscious decisions or unconscious choices, enforced by the state authority or arising as an aggregate of individual behaviors, the language(s) used for ingroup and/or intergroup communication has a bearing on the boundaries of identity groups and their relations within the same political community. The main research concern of this dissertation is the policies that regulate language use and practices in societies where multiple languages are spoken by different socially relevant identity groups within the national borders of a state. I argue that how these policies are formed, and their material and symbolic consequences have implications for the relations between ethnic groups and likelihood of violent ethnic conflict along linguistic cleavages.

### **3.2. Summary of the Argument**

As pointed out in the literature, disputes over the public use and status of minority languages are usually contained within the realm of political conflict (e.g., Laitin 2000), but at the same time, many violent organizations that claim to represent a linguistically distinct ethnic group refer to linguistic grievances to legitimize their actions. The first step for solving this puzzle is to conceptualize language policy as a political and institutional choice, not as a given to which non-dominant linguistic groups respond. To that end, I build on the conception of language policy as a strategic interaction (Laitin 1988; 2007) but I follow a more particular approach that focuses on its group and society level roots and consequences (Safran 2005, Liu 2015; 2017). I argue that language policies toward minority (or non-dominant) languages can be classified into three categories based on the laws and practices regulating use of a language in public sphere: (a) *exclusion*, defined as precluding the minority language from being used in the public sphere by

private persons as well as by the state, (b) *toleration*, defined as allowing the use of the minority language in private institutions and/or in secondary roles in public institutions with basic legal guarantees; and (c) *promotion*, defined as use of the minority language by state as or in a similar capacity to the official language in providing some or all public services.<sup>4</sup> States choose among these policies to balance cohesion of national community and ethnic competition, moderated by the capacity and ability of linguistic groups to demand accommodations.

Although admittedly each case of language policy making is unique to some extent, the outcomes, I argue, are generally governed by two main variables: relative size of the linguistic groups and interaction of language with other social cleavages. On average, relatively larger and more distinct linguistic groups are more likely to receive higher levels of accommodation and get their language promoted in the public sphere while a predominant linguistic majority and cultural proximity of linguistic minority(ies) incentivize exclusion. Toleration covers the middle-range policies that acknowledge primacy of an official language(s) as the language of the state but also allow and facilitate the use of non-dominant language(s) in secondary roles and by their speakers in the public sphere. It is a common policy response to various levels of societal multilingualism but especially more likely in contexts where there is no clear linguistic majority and numerous social cleavages cut one another.

These different policy options have implications for managing the relations between the language groups and their speakers, in addition to their linguistic effects. Although as pointed out in the literature, disputes over status and use of a minority language does not necessarily directly translate into violent conflict (Laitin 2000), exclusion of a language from all areas of public sphere

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<sup>4</sup> For the operationalization of the terms and data collection, see Chapter 4.

such as education, media, and public services provide extremist factions with a symbolically very powerful resource for violent mobilization. Thus, exclusion may make language a ‘raw material for ethnic conflict’ (Bostock 1997). Conversely, policies that promote the use of multiple languages in wide areas of public sphere can also contribute to disruption of inter-group relations and likelihood of conflict. Such policies segregate public life along linguistic lines and reinforce divisions, thereby facilitating mobilization of ethnic minorities for secessionist and violent movements. I argue that, although through different mechanisms, the two extremes of language policy spectrum, exclusion and promotion, both increase the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict compared to the policy of toleration, which may defuse the tensions of language contact situations.

### **3.3. Language Policy as a Political Outcome**

#### **3.3.1. Choosing Minority Language Policy: Supply Side**

State policy on the status and use of minority languages in public affairs is a political outcome. Linguistic rationalization is considered as one of the main building blocks of nation-states due to its role in ensuring communication, cultural integration, and socio-economic mobility across ethnolinguistic groups (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1983). But, in the quest for rationalization, the state building elite, who have their own linguistic allegiances and preferences, face a dilemma. On the one hand, as also shown in the literature, a monolingual national community increases efficiency in the economy and provision of public goods (Alesina et. al 2003, Habyarimana et. al 2007). Besides, use of multiple languages in public services both increase the transaction costs and may incur social costs due to segregation of public spaces and an increased number of language-based social networks (Gupta 1997, Liu 2015).

On the other hand, in some cases, advancing rationalization around a single language can marginalize the peripheral peoples and elite both materially and symbolically. Exclusion of a language that is spoken by part of the population of a multilingual and/or multidialectal community from the public sphere has costs as well if the minority(ies) are not willing to adopt and use the official language. When rationalization takes place around the language of the majority linguistic group, as is often but not always the case, language policy making has the potential to be especially contentious. A state that exercises legal monolingualism in the majority's language also provides members of the majority group with priority and advantage in public employment, which is one of the few reliable income sources in less developed countries (Wimmer 1997). Unless there is an effective education system that teaches the official language and necessary linguistic skills to the minority members, monolingualism becomes a basis for exclusion rather than unity. Moreover, as one of the most important markers of identity, total exclusion of a language from the public space may lead the minority members to perceive that language policy as the symbol of domination by the political center (Esman 2004). Such a strong symbol as language is an invaluable resource for ethnic entrepreneurs and radical groups.

This picture represents language policy making as an arena of inevitable ethnic competition and rivalry where majority group pushes for the exclusive use of its language while ethnic minorities demand equal status for their language and seek to launch their own national projects (Horowitz 1985, Esman 2004). Indeed, legal monolingualism in the majority language is a common practice and language policy making may be so contentious that, as it is argued throughout this dissertation, some language policies notably contribute to outbreak of violent ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, both language policies adopted by different states and the nature of demands by linguistic minority groups is much more varied than this simple picture. The range of

observed language policy practices is too wide to explain as a zero-sum game between majority and minority linguistic groups.

There are officially multilingual nation-states such as the classical examples of Switzerland and Belgium, even though, in practice, one language has some precedence in both cases (Schiffman 1996). Furthermore, adoption of a neutral lingua franca as the official language of public life is a very common and apparently efficient policy option for societies with high linguistic fractionalization (Liu 2015). Finally, and most importantly, official status, although the highest level at which language use in a society is regulated, is not necessarily the only language policy tool. Specific policies in areas such as education, media, and government services are typically more crucial to language policy and its effects on the inter-group relations than constitutional clauses setting the official language(s).

### **3.3.2. Seeking Linguistic Accommodation: Demand Side**

Neither is the demand side of minority language policies identical across various settings. Most ethnic movements formed by linguistic minorities incorporate demands of language accommodation into their agendas. However, not only does the level of concessions being demanded greatly vary, but also in some cases, assimilation into the majority and/or a common language has much more widespread popular support among the linguistic minority members. For instance, multilingual education policies in post-Apartheid South Africa or Bolivia's efforts to expand bilingual education in the indigenous populated areas have not initially been a welcome development for the minority language speakers (Hornberger 2002). English and Spanish only education has been much more favored by Black African and Quechua parents respectively, who argue that their children could better integrate into larger society and would have better employment opportunities if they were educated in the dominant language of the country.



Laitin's (2007) application of the 'Tipping Game' to formation of national identities offers a succinct explanation as to the motives of those parents. The game is a theory of binary choice showing how a behavior becomes prevalent in a group if and when a critical mass of individual members chooses to adopt it (Schelling 1978) and its application to the questions of national identity and language policy concerns the choice of parents to invest in their children's skills in the regional language or the language of the center. As long as a critical mass of the parents believe that language of the center is the primary means of social and economic mobility and chooses their children to be educated in it, the parents who would prefer their children to be educated in the regional language are better off coordinating with them and choosing instruction in the national language. But the demand for language accommodation is static only as much as the supply. The efforts of political and ethnic entrepreneurs to increase the salience of national versus linguistic identities as well as the structural, material, and symbolic resources at their disposal play a crucial role in the actual demand for accommodation and the language policy outcome.

In the next section, I first cover the main factors that underlie the language policy choice in a multilingual society, both from the supply side and the demand side. Then I describe the main actors in the strategic interaction of language policy making and their incentives to seek different policy outcomes. Finally, I offer several testable propositions on how relative group size and interaction of linguistic and other cleavages influence language policy outcomes.

### **3.3.3. Language Policy Setting**

Language policy outcomes emerge out of the equilibrium between preferences of different linguistic groups in a society and their capabilities to press those preferences on. The factors that have commonly been pointed out in the literature as underlying the language policy choices are ethnic competition (e.g., Geertz 1994, Horowitz 1985), national cohesion (Gellner 1983, Wright

2004), or a combination of the two (Laitin 1992, Liu 2015). I argue that there is a third factor that shapes the language policy outcomes in conjunction with ethnic competition and national cohesion: ethnolinguistic vitality. Defined as a characteristic that allows a group to ‘behave as a distinctive and collective entity in intergroup situations’ (Giles, Bourhis, and Taylor 1977: 308), ethnolinguistic vitality influences both the minority ability and willingness to seek linguistic recognition and the state incentives to tolerate and/or promote the use of minority language(s) in the public sphere. The concept has been offered as a useful tool for explaining the likelihood a minority group survives as a distinct collective entity and widely employed to explain language maintenance and language shift among linguistic minority groups (Giles and Johnson 1987, Hogg and Rigoli 1996, Yagmur 2011, Ehala and Zabrodskaia 2013). While language policy is one of the main factors underlying ethnolinguistic vitality of minority groups, the structural aspects of group vitality such as demographics, cleavage structure, and geographical concentration play a crucial role in shaping language policy outcomes in the first place. I start the discussion of these three factors in the context of rationalization around the language of the majority. But a language policy may also afford official status and use to a foreign and supposedly neutral language, to a local common language natively spoken by only a small community or to multiple local languages. I assume that policy toward minority/non-dominant languages would regardless be shaped by these three factors.

### ***3.3.3.1 Ethnic Competition and Rivalry***

The first factor underlying the language policy setting is ethnic competition and rivalry. While linguistic rationalization is fundamental for the functioning of a modern state and the cohesion of a national community, the specific rules and practices regulating language use (i.e., language

policy) is a distribution mechanism that allocates certain material and symbolic benefits to the speakers of the language(s) with official status.

The foremost material benefit to the speakers of the majority language when state and society rationalization takes place exclusively in that language is the opening of jobs and positions in the government. In a multilingual society where only the majority language has official status, speakers of the minority languages are excluded from these opportunities. Since language rationalization involves teaching of the national language to all citizens, this exclusion is not necessarily a permanent one. Yet, firstly, official use and status afforded to a second language would open opportunities reserved for the speakers of the minority language(s) without the need to learn the majority language. Therefore, such a policy also precludes the minority from accessing resources that otherwise would be reserved for its members. Moreover, the official use of a minority language in public life renders knowing that language a useful skill in general, not only for public employment but also generally in the job market. Secondly, an at least equally important aspect of official recognition of a language is its symbolic significance. Language is one of the most essential markers of a distinct cultural identity. Public use of a language is a symbol of social prestige (Horowitz 1985) and political entitlement (Tollefson 2003) for its speakers. Members of a linguistic group perceive the group's worth and standing in society through the use of its language in the daily dealings of public life as well as in more prestigious and high-status roles. Symbolic value of a language is derived from various sources ranging from use of a language in street signs to public education in the language to making laws in it. Total exclusion of a language from these areas diminishes the prestige of the group speaking that language.

### ***3.3.3.2 National Cohesion and Efficiency***

The second factor shaping the language policy setting is national cohesion and efficiency. A common language that binds groups of people speaking a continuum of related speech forms and/or disparate languages is the foundation of modern societies and nation-states. The national language allows people(s) living on a predefined land both to “imagine” themselves as a politically coherent community (Anderson 1983) and function as a socially and economically efficient one (Gellner 1983). Like ethnic competition and rivalry, national cohesion also has both material and symbolic aspects. Use of a single language in the public sphere and for official affairs greatly diminishes the transaction costs and facilitates collective action (Habyarimana et al. 2007). Relatedly, as shown in Eugen Weber’s classical work (1976), common language has played a crucial role in transforming peasants into countrymen in the late 19th century Europe. Whereas, use of multiple languages in the same functions both increase transaction costs and incur social costs by increasing the number of social networks defined by language (Liu 2015: 63). These networks grow larger and more distant as language accommodation is substantively extended to different areas of public life. The more public and official roles assigned to different languages the higher the social and economic costs of intergroup communication.

Conversely, complete exclusion of minority languages from the public sphere can also be detrimental to national cohesion. Exclusion might not be a threat to national cohesion as long as the minority group is willing to adopt the dominant language in the public sphere or even in their private lives. But when a minority group demands linguistic accommodation, the majority has to choose between the benefits and costs of rationalization in single language versus those of offering accommodations for the minority language(s) and also decide on the degree of the accommodation for (each) minority language.

### ***3.3.3.3 Ethnolinguistic Vitality***

While ethnic competition and rivalry incentivizes the dominant and minority linguistic groups to adopt maximalist positions in the making of language policy in a multilingual society, the mechanism of national cohesion and efficiency points out the society level benefits of abandoning those positions. I argue that the third factor, ethnolinguistic vitality, determines which of these mechanisms predominate. One of the central hypotheses of the ethnolinguistic vitality literature is that overall vitality of a group depends on objective structural factors such as demographics, prestige of the group, and institutional support as well as the group members' subjective perception of group vitality (Hogg and Rigoli 1996). Some of these essential components of group vitality, namely institutional support and subjective assessments of vitality, are largely influenced by the content of language policy. A policy of promotion, for instance, provides a very strong institutional support for the ethnic group to sustain itself as a distinct collective entity., ethnolinguistic vitality of a minority group plays a very important role in shaping language policy outcomes in the first place.

By definition, ethnolinguistic vitality is the measure of a group's willingness and ability to maintain its language, identity, and culture. Members of a group with low ethnolinguistic vitality might simply prefer to assimilate into the dominant culture and accept to learn and use the language of the majority. Even if the group elites seek to launch a movement to revive the group identity and culture, mobilizing the masses is difficult for demographically disadvantaged, low-prestige groups that lack institutional support mechanisms and subjective perceptions of vitality. In such a case, per the logic of ethnic competition and the advantages of national cohesion, the majority

group has no incentive to share the benefits of official language and the state is not likely to extend linguistic accommodation.<sup>5</sup>

But mobilization of an observably low vitality group, spontaneously as well as during state-building processes, is not uncommon and language is a valuable tool for political entrepreneurs to mobilize an identity group. The distinction between subjective and objective vitality is especially relevant at this point. The objective vitality factors, also formulated as group strength (Ehala 2010), provide the basic -but not necessarily sufficient- resources and incentive for minority groups to seek concessions in language policy. The logic of ethnic competition asserts that while the linguistic majority prefers to withhold the linguistic power for itself, minority groups seek recognition and accommodation in as many areas as possible. But even if there are political entrepreneurs seeking to mobilize a linguistic group for demanding concessions, as demonstrated in the ethnic voting literature, individual minority members support such movements only when they believe it is likely to succeed and benefit them (Chandra 2004, Birnir 2007). Therefore, competition and rivalry over language policy also depends on the capabilities of the majority and minority group(s) to realize their preferences. Minority groups with high objective vitality possess the resources to bid for linguistic accommodations. Then the state, i.e., majority or dominant group that controls it, needs to decide on whether to accommodate and to what extent. The next section fleshes out the preferences and incentives of the majority and minority linguistic groups in this setting.

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<sup>5</sup> Over the last few decades, there has been an explosion of revitalization programs toward endangered languages, many of which enjoyed at least some state support (see Grenoble and Whaley 2005). These cases present a different setting of language policy making where the shift to dominant language has already largely happened and the aim is to prevent the death of a cultural heritage. As it will be discussed later on, revitalization policies usually do not involve extensive accommodations.

### 3.3.4. Actors and Preferences

The majority linguistic group in a country, which I assume to have control on the state's language policy, prefers to achieve language rationalization around its own language (Horowitz 1985, Laitin 1988), while also maximizing national cohesion (Gellner 1983) and preventing non-dominant language groups from mobilizing and/or rebelling due to language grievances. As long as the minority(ies) do(es) not demand official status and/or use of their language(s), the state building elite of the majority does not have any incentive to adopt a policy of promotion. Only when faced with the likelihood of an organized demand for language concessions and political instability (Liu 2015), the majority will have an incentive to share its linguistic power.

Linguistic minority groups prefer language policies that afford their language at least some status in the public sphere (Horowitz 1985, Esman 2004). But organizing and demanding language accommodation is costly for the minority language speakers. Unless the benefits and likelihood of achieving promotion is high, they are better off adopting the majority language, to replace or in addition to their own language. Therefore, the minority elite needs to solve the collective action problem to organize a movement to demand linguistic accommodation.

The prevailing preference and strategy of the majority and minority depends on the motivation and ability of the minority to collectively demand promotion of its language. I identify relative group size and interaction of language with other cleavages as the two variables that shape the preferences and influence the language policy outcome. The incentive of the individual minority group members to support a collective movement that demands linguistic accommodation will be limited for relatively smaller groups. For relatively smaller groups, inter-ethnic contacts and transactions are both more likely and have higher returns (Blau 1994, Esser 2010). Members of the larger minorities, however, have more incentive to organize for demanding recognition for

the same structural reasons. Secondly, when a linguistic minority is different from the majority on other identity aspects, collective action is facilitated (Gubler and Selway 2012, Basedau et al. 2016). Conversely, when other dimensions of group identity crosscut the linguistic divide, the collective action problems faced by minority ethnic entrepreneurs will be more severe and the majority is better able to coopt parts of the minority. For the majority, similarity across multiple dimensions of ethnicity can motivate a more exclusionary approach toward minority groups as they will be considered to be contenders for state resources (Adida 2011). The next two sections discuss these two variables and develop an argument of language policy making as a political outcome.

### **3.3.5. Numbers Game: Relative Size of Linguistic Majority and Minority**

Although the most preferred language policy for the majority is linguistic rationalization around its language, when it faces an organized demand for linguistic accommodation from a minority, which may involve a potential threat of rebellion (Liu 2015), this preference might change. Smaller and more divided minorities increase incentive for restrictive policies toward minority languages, because they are less able and/or willing to raise an organized challenge for accommodation. Whereas a linguistic minority with relatively larger size is most likely to get highest level of linguistic concessions as a larger relative size makes mobilization of the minority group more likely (Birbir and Satana 2022).

To make the logic more concrete, Table 3.1 shows some possible demographics in a country with a numerical majority and a single minority linguistic group. Even though the size differentials are assigned arbitrarily, they are aimed to represent changing incentives to either recognize or repress a minority language, as also illustrated with real-world examples.



*Table 3.1 – Hypothetical Countries with Two Linguistic Groups*

	Country 1	Country 2	Country 3
<i>Language A</i>	95 %	85 %	70 %
<i>Language B</i>	5 %	15 %	30 %
<i>Total</i>	100 %	100 %	100 %

The ethnic minority group defined by *Language B* forms 5, 15, and 30 percent of Country 1,2,3 respectively. In Country 1, the linguistic minority has the lowest level of capacity and willingness to demand linguistic concessions. In this case, the incentive of the majority, *Language A* speakers, to share the benefits of having one's mother tongue as the state language is lowest. As the relative size of the majority increases and that of majority decreases, both the minority group's desire and ability demand linguistic concession and the majority group's likelihood of accepting those demands increases.<sup>6</sup> In country 2, however, the decrease in the relative size of the majority and increase in the relative size of the minority makes promotion more likely.

Proposition 1: The greater the size margin of the majority group, the more likely exclusion is adopted as language policy for all minority groups.

As the numerical superiority of the majority further dwindles, the willingness and ability of the minority to credibly demand concessions increases (Country 3). Accordingly, the incentive

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<sup>6</sup> For the sake of simplicity, I assume the effects of minority size increase and majority size decrease are linear. However, even when the numerical superiority of the majority is contested, a slightly larger minority, as in Country 2 compared to Country 1, might not make exclusion more likely. First, a relatively larger minority also means a larger contender for the benefits of linguistic power. As a result, when the size differential is large enough despite the minority group having enough size to threaten with rebellion, majority group will prefer a rebellion that it can contain rather than sharing linguistic power. Moreover, exclusion can lead to gradual assimilation, thus removing the linguistic divide that causes the conflict not by sharing linguistic power but through out-group members becoming in-group members over generations. Gradual assimilation, although decreases individual shares of majority members from benefits of language rationalization, is a more preferred alternative than sharing benefits through promotion or a recurrent conflict (Gradstein and Schiff 2006).

to exclude will decrease and promotion will become more likely since the linguistic minority structurally has a high potential for acting as a distinct collective entity (i.e., has high vitality) and even rebellion and secession become possible outcomes unless the large minority is coopted. Gradual assimilation also becomes more difficult as the size of the minority increases. For instance, in Macedonia, ethnic Macedonians constitute around 65 % of population. Macedonia recognizes official use of the language of large Albanian majority (around 25 %) as well as that of the smaller Turkish minority as languages of instruction and language of the local government in municipalities with large minority population. The Serbian and Romani languages are also taught in education system as subjects and second language.

***Table 3.2 - High Linguistic Heterogeneity with and without a Large Minority***

	<b>Country 4</b>	<b>Country 5</b>
<i>Language A</i>	70 %	50 %
<i>Language B</i>	17 %	8 %
<i>Language C</i>	7 %	8 %
<i>Language D</i>	3 %	7 %
<i>Language E</i>	2 %	5 %
<i>Language F</i>	-	4 %
<i>Smaller Languages</i>	1 %	18 %
<i>Total</i>	100 %	100 %

Even though, as in case of Macedonia, promotion being extended to the largest minority increases the likelihood of deeper language accommodation for smaller minorities as well (Liu et. al 2018), it might not always be the case. In addition to the relative size of each minority group, the size margin of the majority relative to the largest minority will also be important for language policy since multiple small groups will not have the same level of objective vitality and capacity

to mobilize as a single group of their combined size (Country 4). As noted before, larger relative size of a minority group increases incentives of its members to organize for demanding language rights by increasing returns to in-group transactions and making mobilization more viable for ethnic entrepreneurs. But the same mechanism might not work for multiple relatively smaller groups. Further, the state can use smaller concessions and/or pit groups against one another to deal with potentially troublesome minorities rather than paying the resource and efficiency costs of promoting multiple minority languages. In Myanmar, for instance, the majority Burmans form around 70 % of the population, but the state denied any official use to the languages of its restless minorities, largest of which (Shans) constitutes around 7 % of country's population. Surely it is possible for multiple small groups to coordinate and extract linguistic concessions, with or without violent rebellion, however, the incentive of the state to extend linguistic accommodations will be stronger when there a large minority group that can effectively mobilize for concessions. This suggests that while numerical domination of majority makes exclusion more likely, the motivation for promotion depends more on the relative size of the linguistic minority.

Proposition 2: Relatively larger minority groups are more likely to receive the policy of promotion.

Finally, Country 5 is an example of extreme linguistic heterogeneity. Adopting a single official language is a necessity for such atomized language communities to function. Most commonly, an inter-regional lingua franca, as in Indonesia or Tanzania, or the language of the former colonial power, as in most sub-Saharan Africa, is chosen to serve as the unifying language (Laitin 1992, Liu 2015). Language is not a strong basis for mobilization in these societies because of the high levels of fractionalization. Therefore, even if some large languages are given some concessions, most of those languages are used only in an auxiliary role in public to facilitate

communication while the language of the state remains the only official language in the public sphere. Under those circumstances, promoting a minority language can increase the demands for promotion by other groups and giving status to all languages will multiply the economic and social costs and highly damage the national cohesion. Most of the numerous non-dominant languages might receive either the policy of exclusion or toleration depending on their importance as a regional common language and/or prestige of the group (Laitin 1992), but promotion is possible only if there is (a) language spoken by a considerably large share of the population.

Corollary: Majority relative size has a substantively larger impact on the policy of exclusion than minority relative size and minority relative size has a substantively larger impact on the policy promotion than majority relative size.

### **3.3.6. Difference Game: Interaction of Linguistic and Other Cleavages**

Cleavage configuration is one of the crucial variables for both violent and non-violent group mobilization (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Selway 2010, Birnir and Satana 2022). There is evidence in the literature that reinforcing identity cleavages can increase likelihood of violent as well as non-violent mobilization of identity groups by strengthening group cohesion and enhancing incongruent preferences (Østby 2008, Gubler and Selway 2012) or due to ethnic outbidding (Horowitz 1985). For instance, in the case of Sri Lankan civil war, both mechanisms have been suggested to be at play as the predominantly Buddhist Sinhalese and predominantly Hindu Tamils are segmented on both ethnolinguistic and religious dimensions of identity (i.e., ethnicity and religion are reinforcing cleavages).<sup>7</sup> Whereas, cross-cutting cleavage configurations, where

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<sup>7</sup> Various terms have been used to describe this specific cleavage configuration, including reinforcing, overlapping, segmented etc. I adopt the term reinforcing cleavages to describe the situation where the groups do not have a common identity across the relevant identity dimensions.

identity groups separated on one dimension has at least one shared identity is theorized to enhance political stability (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Lijphart 1999) and reduce likelihood of conflict (Selway 2010). At the same time, shared cleavage has also been shown to incentivize mobilization of minority identities in contentious politics in certain contexts (Birbir and Satana 2022). Language policy outcomes can also be influenced by non-linguistic identities and their relation to linguistic cleavages in different ways and through different mechanisms.

For instance, when a second identity reinforces the linguistic cleavage between a majority and minority, the cohesion, and thus the ethnolinguistic vitality of the minority is expected to increase (Ehala 2010). Moreover, ethnic/cultural distance between groups, which is largely product of interaction of cleavages, influences the majority incentives for exclusionary versus inclusionary policies toward minority groups (Gardstein and Stiff 2006, Adida 2011). Below, I develop a proposition as to how a second identity reinforcing a linguistic division influences language policy outcomes over hypothetical cases. Although identity dimensions such as race, class, or region would also be expected to play a similar role, I develop my argument -and later empirically test it over religious cleavages. Religious cleavages, together with linguistic ones, are one of the most important group identity markers due to symbolic power of the religion (Brubaker 2013). But in this case, as I develop my arguments, I consider religion only as a secondary identity dimension and focus on its potential effects similar to any other cleavage dimension.

*Table 3.3 - Interaction of Religion with Linguistic Cleavage*

	Country 2a		Country 2b		Country 2c	
	<i>Religion X</i>	<i>Religion Y</i>	<i>Religion X</i>	<i>Religion Y</i>	<i>Religion X</i>	<i>Religion Y</i>
<i>Language A</i>	85 %	-	70 %	-	60 %	5 %
<i>Language B</i>	15 %	-	-	30 %	25 %	10 %
<i>Total</i>	100 %	-	70 %	30 %	85 %	15 %

In Country 2a, religious similarity increases incentives for the language policy of exclusion for two main reasons. First, as noted before, one of the objectives of exclusion is to preclude minority language speakers from benefits of public use of one's own tongue as the state language. Adida (2011) argues that similarity between groups motivates political exclusion in general since minority ethnic entrepreneurs' incentive to highlight group boundaries is higher and majority group feels threatened being unable to identify out-group members. In a hypothetical society with only these two cleavages, religious similarity increases the incentive of the majority to adopt exclusion because language becomes the only vehicle of excluding minority members from state power for the majority. Secondly, a more primordialist approach to ethnic identities holds that shared cultural characteristics decreases social cost of inclusion, in this case, linguistic assimilation, for both the majority and minority. It makes gradual assimilation, which is usually a result of exclusion, more desirable for the minority and attainable for the majority.<sup>8</sup>

When religious differences reinforce linguistic cleavages as in Country 2b, however, willingness and ability of the minority group increases since reinforcing cleavages reinforce the

<sup>8</sup> While the two mechanisms are seemingly at odds in terms of majority incentives, initial linguistic exclusion and gradual assimilation of the minority over time can be complementary to one another. Through exclusion, the majority gains a head start in terms of material and symbolic benefits of having their language the only language of public sphere but as I also argue later, exclusion also has the potential risk of inciting conflict. Thus, gradual assimilation benefits the majority in the long run (Gradstein and Schiff 2006).

group cohesion and facilitates collective action (Gubler and Selway 2012). Moreover, religious difference increases the ethnic distance between the majority and minority linguistic group, thereby making gradual assimilation a less likely outcome and more costly for the majority. As I indicated before, in the literature, overlapping cleavages are generally expected to increase the likelihood of conflict. However, the elevated vitality of minority ethnic group(s) and the lower prospect of long-term assimilation can actually encourage linguistic concessions to appease a likely conflict.

In Sri Lanka, the Hindu-Buddhist cleavage overlapping with the Sinhala-Tamil language divide has been a factor reinforcing the cohesion of the linguistic groups. While the infamous Sinhalese Only Act of 1956 had sparked the deterioration of the inter-ethnic relations between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, the state also kept extending linguistic concessions over time as a response to recurrent ethnic riots and inter-communal violence. The Tamil Language Act of 1958 provided for the official use of Tamil in education and by public officials in Northern and Eastern Provinces. Then, in 1978, Tamil was accepted as an official language in addition to Sinhalese (Leclerc 2019). Exclusionary policies toward Tamils in Sri Lanka starting in the 1950s and particularly the Sinhalese Only Act is usually cited as a classic example of ethnic outbidding by majority groups (Horowitz 1985, DeVotta 2004). Indeed, language policy was an area where ethnic outbidding by Sinhalese politicians was very clear as both the ruling United National Party and the opposition Sri Lanka United Freedom Party shifted from advocating linguistic parity at the time of independence to Sinhala Only in 1956. However, the subsequent language policy concessions do not necessarily preclude ethnic outbidding by majority Sinhalese political parties. Tamil has remained the language of instruction for Tamil pupils and used in state owned media and regional administration in Eastern and Northern provinces up to and even after the outbreak

of the civil war (Coperahewa 2009: 118-123), just as successive governments continued a policy of discrimination against Tamils in many areas (DeVotta 2004: 150-154). In that regard, language policy concessions were later complimentary to outbidding, as a response to frequent protests by Tamils against discrimination and problems with implementation of language policy. Based on this argument and examples, following two propositions emerge:

Proposition 3: Unity with the linguistic majority on a secondary identity dimension is associated with higher likelihood of exclusion policy for the minority language.

Proposition 4: Division on a second identity dimension overlapping with language cleavage is associated with higher likelihood of promotion policy for the minority language.

Country 2a and Country 2b represent ideal-type examples where two linguistic groups in the country are perfectly united and perfectly divided on the second identity dimension respectively. Country 2c is an example of a cleavage configuration where the linguistic majority and minority have sub-groups that are same on the second identity but are not identical on the second dimension. The literature on the role of crosscutting identities considers both Country 2a and Country 2c as a crosscutting cleavage structure (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Lijphart 1977). However, the cleavage interaction in Country 2c, which I will call *shared*, has different implications for patterns of coalition building and identity mobilization (Birbir and Satana 2022). Firstly, while the language group A already has a population share that allows the establishment of a Minimum Willing Coalition (MWC) from within the group A in Country 2a, such a coalition might be more difficult to form in Country 2c, paving the way for a religion-based XAB coalition (85 percent) rather than a language-based AXY coalition (65 percent). In that case, group XA might be willing to extend linguistic concessions to group XB to coopt them. Secondly, any elite formation seeking to mobilize group B for language concessions will have a more difficult time



than in Country 2b, where group B is religiously united and completely different than Group A. The potential for a cross-language religious coalition and difficulty of mobilizing a linguistic minority with a subgroup that shares religion with the linguistic majority, incentives for linguistic concessions is higher. However, the concessions are less likely to be as deep as we would expect in Country 2b due to the same reasons.

Proposition 4: Cleavage configurations that involve a secondary *shared identity* dimension, are associated with a higher likelihood of toleration policy for the minority language.

### **3.4. From Minority Language Policy to Violent Conflict**

Language policies have material as well as symbolic/psychological impacts, both of which might contribute to the risk of violent conflict between linguistic majority and minority. The previous section discussed the incentives of the majority and minority groups in the decision of language policy and spelled out how changes in the relative size of the minority and interaction of cleavages change these incentives and shape the language policy outcome. In this section, I argue that both policies of exclusion, which is aimed at ensuring the exclusive use of the majority language in public affairs, and promotion, which intends to appease ethnolinguistically vital (i.e., large and ethnically different) minority groups, increase likelihood of violence along linguistic lines.

On the one hand, exclusion of minority languages, though might be conducive to national cohesion, may also increase the salience of language division as well and turn it into a symbolic rally point of a disgruntled minority for not only political but also violent mobilization. On the other hand, policy of promotion can serve to streamline efforts of radicals for violent mobilization by socially and politically segregating linguistic communities and likely creating minorities within minorities. However, toleration policies, which I argue will most commonly be observed in highly

fractionalized linguistic landscapes but can also be adopted elsewhere, avert increasing salience of language divisions while framing decisions on language use as being about communication of national community rather than group identities and decrease the likelihood of conflict.

In the remainder of this section, I consider how policies of exclusion and promotion increase likelihood of conflict relative to toleration policies through different mechanisms. Then I raise the point that even if language policies are conceptualized not as discrete choices but as a continuous spectrum, both more restrictive and more accommodative policies will be highly associated with conflict compared to middle-ground policies.

### **3.4.1. Exclusion: Language Grievance and Conflict**

In the case of a minority group facing the policy of exclusion, the loss of group prestige (Young 1976, Horowitz 1985) due to the inferior status of the minority language will have both symbolic importance and material consequences. Exclusion of a language from public affairs can make accessing education and public services more difficult for its speakers (Esman 2004, Smirnova and Iliev 2017). Moreover, the relatively better-off sections within the linguistic minority (i.e., middle and upper classes) can more easily adopt the majority language, however, individuals with limited resources cannot readily assimilate into the majority language (Caselli and Coleman 2013). Difficulty of assimilation might be more acute, as in the case of Russian-speakers required to take language tests to be able to get Estonian citizenship (Laitin 1998), or more indirect as in the case of children that cannot get public education in state language because they need to work to contribute the livelihood of the household.<sup>9</sup> Not having skills in the official language of the state limits upward mobility, which would be exacerbated if the state fails to provide same quality of

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<sup>9</sup> I will add references for this.

education to all parts of the population. This will likely lead the economically disadvantaged parts of the minority to identify their grievances with linguistic exclusion. In many cases, geographically concentrated peripheral minorities are also relatively poorer compared to dominant groups on average (Cederman et. al 2013). Ethnic entrepreneurs can more easily draw on language when material grievances come to be identified with symbolic attachments to language identity. As a result, the policy of exclusion will increase the salience of the linguistic division and facilitate mobilization and recruitment linguistic minority members for violent ends.

Laitin (2000), even as he argues that language restrictions do not cause conflict, recognizes that language is ‘intimately connected’ to group identity and is therefore a strong basis for group mobilization. But he holds that ‘relative ease’ of linguistic assimilation as opposed to personal costs of supporting a rebellion exacerbates the collective action problems inhibiting violent rebellion and confines the language conflict within the political sphere. However, as noted above, restricting the use of a language in public sphere also has some aspects that pave the way for violent mobilization of minority members by potential rebel leaders.

Moreover, one of the main arguments of this dissertation about the relationship between language policy and ethnic conflict is that language policies of both exclusion and promotion facilitate violent mobilization of linguistic groups through different mechanisms. Even though the exclusion of a minority language can facilitate mobilization of minority members by violent extremist groups in general, I expect that the effect of exclusion on the likelihood of conflict will be more emphasized when compared to toleration. The policy of toleration will not eliminate all potential linguistic grievances associated with policy of exclusion, especially the relative deprivation suffered by groups which feel entitled to promotion of their language. But its impact on group prestige and associated symbolic grievances will be less severe compared to exclusion

since the language can be used in the public sphere even if not on par with the official language. Further, policies such as classes teaching mother tongue in primary schools or providing translations at public offices, which constitute auxiliary use of minority languages and are considered as toleration-based policies in this dissertation, address some of the material challenges of minority language speakers.

Proposition 5: Policy of exclusion will increase likelihood of conflict onset relative to the policy of toleration.

### **3.4.2. Promotion: Shooting Oneself in the Foot**

The policy of promotion will also have the impact of facilitating violent mobilization compared to toleration, but through a different mechanism. Promotion results in compartmentalization of especially education and public administration on the basis of language. This compartmentalization is likely to be reflected in other areas such as media consumption, civil society, and political participation. There is a large literature pointing out the negative impacts of administrative decentralization, which is a similarly compartmentalizing policy, on inter-group relations. Some of the mechanisms through which decentralization increases inter-group tensions are the creation of minorities within minorities (Lijphart et. al 1993), supplying sub-national groups with resources necessary for conflict (Kymlicka 1998, Snyder 2000), reinforcement of divisive identities (Kymlicka 1998), and rise of ethnically and/or regionally based political parties (Brancati 2006).

The policy of promotion necessarily divides the linguistic communities within a country in certain areas of public life. The pupils and the teachers in the schools, the judges in the courts, the public servants at the local government or all of these might be divided in terms of language

depending on the specific provisions of the policy of promotion. Education is usually the policy area where these divisions are most visible and consequential (Liu 2015), however, other areas of public life are also affected.

There are several factors that make promotion potentially disruptive to peace. Firstly, since it is costly to afford national status to a minority language and states wish to share as little linguistic power as possible, they tend to follow a policy of gradual change even if decision to officially recognize the minority language is taken. Promotion is often first adopted in limited geographical and/or policy areas with the hope that a level of accommodation more limited than warranted by the minority group's demands and capabilities can be sufficient to reduce tensions. But the result is usually increasing intergroup tension enhanced by incongruence between expectations and reality. In Algeria, for instance, the state first responded to demands for language recognition from large Berber minority in 1987 following serious street protests by establishing a government agency for improvement of Amazigh language and culture and a promise of optional Amazigh language classes in primary schools. The promise of language classes had not been followed through until 1995, when another string of violent protests led to introduction of Amazigh classes to curriculum. Within a protest-concession cycle that has been going on, Algerian state finally recognized Amazigh as an official language in 2016 (Leclerc 2019). We are yet to see how the implementation of official language status will work and what will be the effects on the likelihood of a future secessionist conflict, but it is clear that the protest-concession cycle did not improve relations between the Berber speakers and the proponents of Arabization.

Even if the extent of accommodation meets the demands of the minority, it can lead to grievances from the parts of the majority. Promotion policies are usually applied in territorial units where the national minority forms a local majority. But unless the local population is perfectly

homogenous, which is rarely the case, members of the national majority living in that locality will lack the advantages enjoyed by their co-ethnics in other regions or even become disadvantaged. The interethnic relations in such a locality can harbor the stirrings of communal violence.

Not necessarily the effects of linguistic segregation will only be felt in areas where the minority is concentrated. In ethnically mixed areas such as big cities, having parallel structures of schooling, communication, public service etc. divided by language is likely to lead to ghettoization within these urban areas. It will also increase distrust and enmity between members of different groups since groups will be in physical contact, but their communication will be limited due to segregated public spaces. Indeed, there is evidence of the negative impact of segregated schooling on inter-ethnic relations in both post-conflict contexts (Krstevska-Papic and Zekolli 2013, Barbieri et. al 2013) and cases with no record of prior ethnic conflict (Gupta 1997). Finally, ghettoization is also likely to shift patterns of political identification from national to ethnic parties as groups become more and more internally cohesive. Political parties formed around linguistic identification will be conducive to emergence of secessionist movements, just as Brancati's (2006) argument on regional parties suggest. All these factors make promotion a policy potentially conducive to conflict.

Finally, while the mechanisms through which the policy of promotion influences violent mobilization work to increase linguistic segregation in general, I expect the effects of promotion on ethnic conflict to be stronger when compared to the policy of toleration. As noted before, as a middle ground policy, toleration can mitigate both the negative effects of exclusion and those of promotion such as linguistic ghettoization and segregation of public services.

Proposition 6: Policy of promotion will increase likelihood of conflict onset relative to the policy of toleration.

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The argument about the relationship between language policy and likelihood of ethnic conflict onset is developed based on a discrete classification of language policies. But as discussed in Chapter 2 (See Section 2.2.1.), it is possible to argue that such a classification cannot adequately capture the variation in language policies. Indeed, the purpose of the classification offered here is exactly to argue that language policies are not limited to two alternatives: repress or promote the minority language. The argument is essentially based on different incentive structures for different types of policy rather than a linear increase in incentive to share linguistic power. Yet, it does not necessarily preclude an ordinal measurement of language accommodation, ranging from most restrictive to most accommodative, with toleration-based policies forming the middle-ground. To that end, I consider the measurement of minority language policy with an index ranging from most exclusionary to most promotion based. Such a conceptualization suggests the following:

Proposition 7: As the level of linguistic concession moves from most restrictive to most accommodating, likelihood of conflict onset first decreases and then increases.

The tradeoff is that the measure of language policy loses conciseness. Yet, it also has the advantage of being able to accommodate more dimensions of language policy. The trichotomous classification of minority language policy is based on language use in public spheres. However, the legal status of a minority language is also important since it both improves implementation of language accommodations and improves the prestige of the minority language. For instance, in Sri Lanka, the difference between “Tamil is an official language” and “Tamil is *also* an official language” has been a source of disagreement (Leclerc 2019). The operationalizations of both measures are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Last but not the least, my theory of language policy making explicitly acknowledges that perceived threat of rebellion by a linguistic minority and conflict is endogenous to the adopted minority language policy. Specifically, I argue that the state is more likely to extend the policy of promotion to a linguistic minority with the capacity to rebel. It is possible that such groups rebel because they have the capability, regardless of the content of the language policy. However, I argue that promotion has an independent effect on the likelihood of ethnic conflict along linguistic lines. Moreover, when promotion is adopted in order to soothe a minority group with secessionist dispositions, the impact of linguistic segregation might be even more destructive for inter-ethnic relations. I discuss the concerns over endogeneity as I present the results of my empirical analysis in Chapter 5.



## Chapter 4

### Minority Language Policy Dataset

Various policy responses adopted toward linguistic minority groups in a multilingual country emerge as a political outcome. Both linguistic majorities and minorities have preferences over which language(s) are to be used in which role(s) in the public sphere. As a result, the choice of language policy is subject to an implicit or explicit bargaining between these contrasting preferences. The outcome of the bargaining has implications for the management of ethnic relations and likelihood of ethnic conflict. To analyze how this bargaining unfolds and its effects on ethnic conflict, I offer a new classification and measurement of minority language policies. Although there are various conceptualizations offered to analyze the situation of a language within its ‘ecology’ in the sociolinguistics literature (Haugen 1972, Haarmann 1990, Fishman 1991), their primary concern is whether a language is being transferred intergenerationally. Clearly language policy is related with vitality of a language (See Section 3.3.3), however, none of the approaches based on ecology of language offer an applicable measure to analyze language policy formation and its consequences within a bargaining framework as theorized in the previous chapter. In order to address this gap in the literature, I develop a minority language policy type measurement based on the emerging literature that conceptualizes language policy as a political and institutional choice (Liu 2015, Liu et. al 2018).

Language policy is defined as explicit and/or implicit rules and societal practices that create norms regulating language use in the public sphere. Defined as such, I move on to distinguish different types of language policy in this chapter to empirically analyze how they are formed and how they relate to various social phenomena, particularly ethnic conflicts. Language policies can be classified in terms of many factors such as their aims, means, sources, level of institutionalization, and so on. While all these mostly intersecting factors and relevant dichotomies have been analyzed and described in the literature, the overarching aspect of language policy for scholars and decision makers alike is the management of societal multilingualism within the borders of a modern state (Schiffman 1996: 28). By setting the rules for the language(s) to be used in -specific areas of- the public sphere, language policy does not only shape language practices but also the relations between speakers of different languages within a society.

When a language is ascribed or denied role in such areas as politics, education, business, mass media, or public services, it has both material (Gellner 1983, Wimmer 1997) and symbolic consequences (Horowitz 1985, Bourdieu 1991) for the speakers of that and the other languages in the polity. Use of a language in government services, for instance, is first and foremost a convenience for its speakers. If the language were not used in public services, its speakers would need to learn the language those services were provided in, (one of) the official language(s). Moreover, when the state uses a language in public services, proficiency in that language is a requirement and/or advantage for public employment. Finally, a language being used in official documents, court proceedings, or even street signs is a source of prestige for the language. As a language is used in more areas of public life, the benefits to speakers of that language increase. But at the same time, expanding the number of languages to be used in more and more areas of

public sphere increases transaction costs and may lead to segregation and hostile attitudes among the speakers of different languages.

More often than not, the mother tongue of the largest linguistic group in a society is the primary language in all areas of the public sphere. But both the sociolinguistic conditions and the language policy can be much more complex. Languages with a small number of native speakers can be used in one or more areas of the public sphere. For instance, since its independence, Swedes have formed around 5 to 10 percent of Finland's population, however, Swedish has been recognized as a national language and is legally used as a language of the parliament as well as the language of public administration and education in numerous municipalities with large ethnic Swedish population.

While the language policy toward Swedish in Finland is an outlier in terms of national status afforded to the language of a relatively small ethnic minority, policies such as mother tongue education, public media in minority languages, or bilingual public services can be observed in many countries with a linguistic majority and minority(ies). Yet, even more common policy responses toward languages spoken by ethnic minorities are limited public use or sometimes confinement of these languages to the private sphere. In Bulgaria, for instance, the language of Turkish minority was completely repressed in the 1970s and the 1980s to the point that ethnic Turks were being forced to take up names in Bulgarian language. Language policy of Bulgaria has shifted to a more accommodative approach after the fall of communism and Turkish is now used in privately owned media outlets and is taught as a subject in public primary schools. While the language is not excluded from the public sphere, its role is much more restricted compared to that of Swedish in Finland.

Lastly, colonial languages or regional lingua franca commonly acquire national status and are used officially in many linguistically fractionalized nation-states, further complicating the question of language policy. Such a policy has the potential to moderate ethnic competition over language policy and increase efficiency (Liu 2015), however, the status and protection of vernacular languages spoken by various sub-national groups remains relevant even under a ‘neutral’ national language.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The first section presents a brief overview of the typologies of language policy in the literature. Next, I discuss how the conditions and level of use of a minority language in three main areas of public life, education, mass media, and public administration captures the policy toward a minority language in a country. Then I offer a trichotomous measure of minority language policy types based on language use in these three areas. The subsequent section explains operationalization of the concepts and data collection. Finally, I present the general characteristics of Minority Language Policy Dataset.

#### **4.1. Existing Language Policy Typologies and Measurements**

Scholars of language policy have offered numerous classifications of language policy types in order to explain main characteristics of these policies, how they are formed, which ones prevail and how they influence the linguistic landscape of respective communities. Most of these typologies dichotomize language policy choices in terms of their source, means, documentation, and legality (Johnson 2013: 9-11).

Top-down versus bottom-up distinction identifies the institutional level at which the language policy is developed. While a language policy enacted by a national government through constitutional and/or legal regulations is considered top-down, micro-level arrangements to

address the needs of a district or a small community is an example of bottom-up policy. Overt/covert and explicit/implicit dichotomies usually refer to the same or a slightly nuanced aspect of a language policy. An overt or explicit policy is openly declared and/or documented, while implicit or covert policy is like a silent agreement. The federal official language policy of the United States, for instance, is an example of implicit or covert policy, as opposed to that of many countries with an explicit official language clause in their constitutions. Another similar dimension of language policy is the *de jure/de facto* distinction. While it is also related to whether or not the language policy is legally documented, the emphasis is on the implementation of official provisions. *De facto* language policy emerges as the written policy is implemented (or not) through language ideology and attitudes. All these categorizations overlap within and across as they attempt to conceptualize particular relevant aspects of language policy rather than being a comprehensive classification of such a complex phenomenon. Language policy can be bottom-up and implicit or top-down and explicit. *De jure* and *de facto* policy can be the same or *de facto* policy can be implicit and differ from the explicit *de jure* policy.

One of the most important dimensions of language policy that cuts across these language policy typologies and the main concern of this dissertation is the monolingual versus multilingual language policy divide. These two terms are highly controversial even when they are applied to describe the sociolinguistic profile of a society. Diglossia, where two dialects of the same language or two different languages are used at the same time by a speech community, individual and communal bilingualism, the role of dialects or languages used for religious purposes are just some factors that complicate defining the monolingual and multilingual contexts. Classifying and measuring language policies on this dimension, as they ‘regulate language use in the public sphere,’ is an even more daunting task. There have been vigorous attempts by sociolinguists to

categorize monolingual and multilingual policies taking into account the language use patterns in the community, relative and/or absolute size of the speakers of a language, possible diglossia, prestige of the relevant languages, role of colonial/international languages and regional lingua franca (see Schiffman 1996: 30-40 for an account).

But not only even the most comprehensive typologies of language policy are criticized for failing to capture the complex and gradient nature of societal multilingualism, they also do not lend themselves to a systematic analysis of how language policy influences the relations of linguistic groups in a society with each other and the state. In a way, they are too abstract both in terms of conceptualization and operationalization. For instance, Kloss (1966) offers ten variables to describe the types of multilingual communities.<sup>10</sup> While this conceptualization is criticized for failing to consider factors such as the degree of standardization of each language or the level of competence of multilingual individuals in each language (e.g., Fasold 1984), it also lacks a standardized framework for the measurement of what is already a high number of variables across various multilingual contexts. Indeed, even ten variables can fall short on characterizing language policy in multilingual societies, but there is a tradeoff between inclusiveness of a measure and its feasibility and reliability. Moreover, language policy has as many implications and potential effects as its sources and dimensions. Sociolinguists mostly aim to describe the linguistic situation in a speech community and investigate linguistic outcomes, not to answer the questions related to the effects of language policy on political outcomes (Laitin 1992: 5). Therefore, as in other fields of

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<sup>10</sup> 1) Types of speech communities, 2) Number of languages used by individuals, 3) Types of personal and impersonal bilingualism, 4) Legal status, 5) Segments involved (in multilingualism), 6) Type and degree of individual bilingualism, 7) Prestige of languages involved, 8) Degree of distance (between the languages involved), 9) Indigeneness of speech communities, 10) Attitude toward linguistic stability

social science research, any measure of language policy should be tailored or appropriate for the specific research tasks.

One of the more systematic measures of language policy on the regulation of societal multilingualism focusing on political and institutional sources and implications of language policy is based on the use of a language in the public education system (Liu 2015, 2017; Liu et al. 2016). Liu (2015: 4) defines language regimes as “the rules that delineate which languages can be used when and where.” Language regimes are characterized by the number of languages recognized by the state as a medium-of-instruction and which language(s) are recognized (e.g., only majority language, multiple local languages, colonial/regional lingua franca). Then, she classifies language regimes into four categories: power-concentrating, power-sharing, power-neutralizing, and neutralized sharing. The same framework is used for classifying language policy toward politically relevant linguistic minorities as recognition, partial recognition, and non-recognition (Liu 2017, Liu et al. 2018). The choice of language use in education, specifically the medium-of-instruction in public schools, as the indicator of language policy is justified on the grounds of the significance of education policy in any government planning, the primacy of acquisition planning in any language policy and planning enterprise, the potential role of education in managing inter-ethnic relations, and the importance of education in developmental and economic outcomes.

Indeed language-in-education is one of the most important aspects of language policy and even just by creating a measure of language policy that goes beyond comparing official status of languages or vague concepts such as language restrictions, Liu offers a compelling operationalization for measuring language policy. However, in order to understand the relationship between language policy and ethnic conflict, a more comprehensive measure that considers language use not only in the field of education but also in other areas of public life is necessary.

Even though education is the most vital part of language policy, the material and symbolic consequences of language policy for speakers of different languages also transpire in other areas of public life such as business and trade, government services, or media. In the next two sections, I discuss how the norms and rules for which language(s) to be used in different domains of public sphere constitutes “Minority Language Policy” and offer an expanded measure that considers three areas of public life where language use is most clearly regulated by policy (Fishman 1989: 373).

#### **4.2. Language Use in the Public Sphere and Minority Language Policy**

There are two main functions of language that make it a subject matter of politics and a policy area: boundary-making and communication. Language policy is concerned with both of these aspects, yet it takes form through regulation of the latter. Linguistic rationalization has been one of the core tenets of state-building in Europe since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, a pattern that has been imitated by the state builders in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century as well (Laitin 1988). While the pre-modern society could and often did operate as a collection of people groups with various speech forms -usually but not always on a continuum of dialects- that may differ from the language of political center (Wright 2004: 20-25), the modern nation-states are based on the use of one or few legally designated standard language(s) in all public affairs from education to providing public services and information to dispensing justice (See Argument Chapter).

When the state faces the question of language policy, language stops being only an identity marker and the content of the identity becomes subject of a dispute. Language choice does not automatically translate into an institution for the distribution of prestige and resources; however, it both serves as a strong symbolic basis for the mobilization and maintenance of national and/or ethnic identities and favors speakers of the chosen language in the distribution of power and



resources. The state, therefore, manages and sometimes directly controls language use in various areas of public life.

Which language(s) are to be used in which area(s) of the public sphere is not merely a question of bureaucratic and administrative efficiency. Even in a largely monolingual polity on the surface such as Norway, language policy on the two written standards of Norwegian, *Bokmål* and *Nynorsk*, have been contentious (Haugen 1966). Moreover, the choice for the language of public life can still have material and symbolic implications, even when linguistic rationalization did not take place around the mother tongue of one of the constituent groups. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the well-known linguistic conflict was initially about the role of English as much as that of Sinhalese and Tamil. At the time of Sri Lankan independence, Tamils were highly overrepresented in the public sector jobs, in the judiciary, and universities, where the only valid language was English. This was mostly due to the success of American missionary schools in the Tamil populated northeast and higher incentive of Tamils to learn English and gain social mobility in the rigid caste system of the Tamil society. Therefore, the *swabasha* movement, which emerged in the 1930s and was aimed to replace English with the vernaculars as the official language lacked support among the Tamil elite and was dominated by the Sinhalese (DeVotta 2004: 45-48). Regardless, *swabasha* movement originally advocated the use of both Sinhala and Tamil for official purposes. But the perceptions of being denied a fair share of public jobs and the low prestige of the Sinhala language despite being the numerical majority led Sinhalese leaders of the movement to support the short-lived yet infamous ‘Sinhalese only’ policy in 1956.

In addition to the material benefits such as better employment opportunities, foregoing or limiting the costs of learning another language, or signaling co-ethnicity (Wimmer 1997, Habyarimana et al. 2009), use of a language in the public sphere empowers the speakers of that

language and increases the ‘group worth’ (Horowitz 1985). As a matter of fact, the symbolic aspect of a language being recognized and used for official purposes and mass communication can be more important than the short-term individual benefits (Safran and Liu 2012). Above all, use of a language outside private conversations and at the communal level is essential for the maintenance of the ethnic identity formed around that language. Ethnic identities can survive without the language marking that identity being actively used, as in the case of many Jewish communities around the world before the establishment of Israel. Religion and/or other durable markers can sustain the identity, but the language is such an emotionally and symbolically strong force that revival of the group language is always central to ethnic re-awakening.<sup>11</sup> The survival and maintenance of the language that can maintain or revive the ethnic identity depends on the use of the language in the public sphere and higher status roles. In his influential study on language shift and its reversal, Joshua Fishman (1991: 87-109) offers a measure to assess how much a language is threatened based on the level and areas of use and the institutional support for the use of language (See Table 1). In this 8-scale measure, a language is considered more threatened as it is used only in the private sphere and even more so as the use of the language in daily life diminishes among younger generations. However, the language is more strengthened as it is used more commonly and at higher status roles in a standardized form, starting with but not limited to education.

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<sup>11</sup> In fact, the historical examples such as the Jewish or the Irish identities surviving despite near-death of Hebrew and Gaelic in respective communities might be overemphasized in the literature. Examples of language death and identity shift is much more common, for instance in sub-Saharan Africa (see Batibo 2005).

**Table 4.1 – Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (Fishman 1991)**

STAGE	Language use patterns and areas of use
1	Language is used nationally at the highest levels of education, media, administration etc.
2	Language is used in lower-level government services and local/regional mass media
3	Language is used in inter-group communication in trade, business etc.
4	Literacy in the language is transmitted through compulsory education
5	Literacy in the language is common and it is used in written form
6	Language is the medium of communication in informal daily life and is taught to children
7	Language knowledge and use is common among adults but not transmitted to the younger
8	Language is only known and used by few members of the older generations

Fishman's classification was intended as a guideline for the language revitalization efforts of the ethnic entrepreneurs seeking greater cultural autonomy for linguistic minority groups. It has been the basis for plenty of scholarly work on language revitalization and been expanded to better represent the areas of use and status of languages that are non-dominant in the country they are spoken (Lewis and Simmons 2010). Its relevance for measuring and classifying minority language policy derives from demonstrating the importance of the public use of language not only for the language itself, not only for its speakers but for both. Languages can survive within the private sphere and through transmission within family and indeed most of the world's languages do (Fishman 1991:92). However, by allowing or instead limiting the use of a language in the public sphere, language policy influences the social and political relevance of a minority language and the group identity.

While regulating the language use in the public sphere, language policy assigns various roles to one or several languages. The official language status -or national language status in some cases- is the most straightforward manifestation of these roles. However, it falls short of revealing the

full extent of language policy by itself. One or multiple languages might be official in a country. Multiple official languages might be on equal footing or there might be a hierarchy between regional and national official languages. The national level official language can be the mother tongue of the predominant ethnic group in the country, a regional language of wider communication spoken natively by only a small population, or a completely foreign language -a legacy of colonialism. Most importantly, language use can be tolerated or promoted by the state in some areas without granting official language status. The policy toward a minority language is related but not limited to official status of languages in a country. What really reflects the language policy is the scope and the depth of the use of a language in higher status roles in the public sphere as the material and symbolic benefits that have been discussed are distributed according to these two factors: in which areas and to what extent a language is used. But what are the most relevant areas of the public sphere that we should look at for measuring minority language policy? The next section offers an answer to that question.

#### **4.3. Language Policy Areas: Education, Mass Media, Public Administration**

As noted in Chapter 2, acquisition planning or language-in-education policy is the most vigorous and well-developed sub-field of language policy and planning research. Centrality of education in government planning and policy in general as well as in managing ethnic and linguistic diversity makes education the most important area of language policy. Education policy is considered as the main indicator of language policy both by sociolinguists (e.g., Cooper 1989, Hornberger 2006) and political scientists and scholars of ethnic politics (e.g., Laitin 2007, Minorities at Risk Project 2009, Liu 2015). However, there are at least two major reasons for inclusion of other areas of public life in a language policy measure.

Firstly, use of multiple languages in education system can be aimed at different society level linguistic outcomes and have different implications for management of inter-ethnic relations. For instance, both in Ethiopia and Kenya, two highly linguistically fractionalized sub-Saharan African nations, more than ten local languages are used as languages of instruction in primary education as of 2020, however, the objectives of this policy are remarkably different in each country. In Kenya, the stated goal of the mother tongue education in primary schools is to facilitate teaching of literacy to ensure that pupils can transition to education in English as quickly and as smoothly as possible (Bunyi 1997). The national language Swahili, which is also the medium of instruction in primary schools in ethnically heterogeneous regions, and English, the only medium of instruction starting from the second cycle of primary schools are compulsory subjects from the first grade. In this framework, local languages are legally recognized as a cultural value but are utilized in the education system for the development of a national linguistic community around Swahili and English. Yet, in Ethiopia, mother tongue education in primary school is one of the main pillars of the ethnic federalism policy since 1991 (Smith 2008). Despite not being an official language, just like in Kenya, English is the language of education at the secondary and higher levels in Ethiopia. But all the ‘peoples, nations, and nationalities’ that are assigned to ethnically defined regions, zones, and woredas according to their size and geographical concentration are entitled to receive primary education in their languages. While Amharic remains the working language of the federal government, languages of non-dominant ethnic groups are used in education system to promote and increase the prestige of these linguistically defined identities, not just to acknowledge cultural differences and facilitate teaching literacy.

Secondly, education in or teaching of a language is the first step in providing for its use beyond the private sphere; however, unless there are more avenues for the use of the language,

even its native speakers would not have incentive to learn a minority language in schools. Education and language skills are crucial for social mobility. Learning in or of the mother tongue is in itself a source of ethnic pride and cultural development, yet the need for developing relevant skills and social capital in the job market and social life usually outweighs cultural and identity related concerns (Laitin 2007: 36-40). Returning to the example of Kenya; even a mother tongue education policy explicitly aimed at improving the learning in the official languages have been difficult to implement because parents want their children to be taught only in English and Swahili, the languages that will get them better jobs (Trudell and Piper 2014). Being a language of education does not provide by itself the material and symbolic benefits that have been discussed.

In order to better measure minority language policy, I offer to analyze rules, norms, and practices of language use in three areas of public sphere: education, mass media, and public administration. Fishman (1989) argues that these three are the areas where language choices are most political and largely controlled by governments. Admittedly, language policy affects linguistic behavior in other areas such as workplaces, markets, business, and trade. However, language norms and practices in these areas are usually shaped by explicit and implicit policies in education, media, and government. As it has been demonstrated throughout the discussion so far, importance of language-in-education policy is firmly established in the literature. Use of a minority language in administrative services is, in and of itself, benefits its speakers by providing public employment opportunities and increasing the prestige of the group identity. Finally, mass media is not only an important avenue for standardization and literary development of a language, but it also expands use of the language in all areas of life by contributing to its development as a medium of communication. Because of this important role of media in language standardization and development, governments commonly regulate which language(s) and/or language forms can be

used in newspapers, radios, and TVs via explicit or implicit language policy tools. Together, rules and practices regulating language use in these three areas of public sphere characterize the language policy.

#### **4.4 Operationalization of Minority Language Policy**

##### **4.4.1 Defining Linguistic Majority and Minority Groups**

Minority Language Policy Dataset is based on All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) Project's list of socially relevant ethnic groups. Numerous languages can be spoken by various groups in a society. However, for any implication of language policy that has been discussed so far to be relevant, there should be a relevant group identity defined at least in part by language. Based on robust criteria for definition of social relevance, AMAR lists around 1,200 ethnic groups across the world (Birbir et al. 2015). For each country covered in AMAR's frame, I coded a single linguistic majority group and linguistic minority groups in countries with at least one non-majority ethnic group distinguished by language from the majority. Then, language policy toward each minority group in a country is coded as exclusion, toleration, or promotion based on the criteria described in the following subsections.

In the most straightforward case, linguistic majority is defined as the numerically largest ethnic group distinguished by linguistic difference from other groups in the country. The definition is actually based on plurality, as the largest group is considered to have the largest vote in a hypothetical voting on language policy. The term majority is used across all cases to avoid confusion. In countries where linguistic majority is divided along other lines (e.g., Sunni Arab/Shia Arab division in Iraq), the combined largest linguistic group is considered the majority.

Exceptions to this definition emerge when the language of the largest group is not (one of) the national official language(s) of the country. These cases fall into two categories. In the first category, there are countries where the official language is the language of the former colonial power, even if the colonial language is not the mother tongue of any group in the country. Most of the sub-Saharan Africa and some countries in the Antilles and the Pacific fall into this category. The second category contains the cases where a language natively spoken by a numerical minority is adopted as the national official language. Examples include Swahili in Tanzania, Urdu in Pakistan, and Malay -renamed as Bahasa Indonesia- in Indonesia, where a minority language with high prestige and lingua franca status is adopted as the national language. However, a non-majority language may also be official as a result of the political dominance of the group speaking that language, as in the case of Afrikaans and English in Apartheid era South Africa or Amharic in Ethiopia. In these cases, the majority/minority status is decided based on the political dominance of the groups concerned.

In most of the cases where a colonial language is adopted as the official language, the largest group is still considered the linguistic majority as it has the largest vote in the hypothetical voting on language policy, regardless of the motivations behind the officialization of a language with no native speakers. In cases with a local minority language adopted as the official language, the largest group is coded as majority if it is the major actor in politics. In Pakistan, for instance, even though the minority Mohajirs, whose mother tongue Urdu is the national language, are represented in the politics as well, political center has been dominated by the majority Punjabi elite since the formation of the country (Wright 1991). Therefore, Punjabi is considered the linguistic majority and minority language policy is coded for Mohajirs, in addition to the other linguistic minorities in the country. Finally, a non-plurality group is coded as linguistic majority only if its



language is adopted as the official language and the group holds hegemonic or disproportionate political power. One example would be the case of Amhara in Ethiopia. The Oromo is the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, however, Amhara, the second largest group is considered to be the linguistic majority. Amhara ethnic identity and Amharic language have been the hegemonic aspects of Ethiopian nationalism during the Haile Selassie's reign (1930-1974) and the military Derg regime between 1974 and 1991 (Young 1996). Amhara lost its hegemony when a multiethnic coalition of opposition forces that also includes Amhara elements, Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), overthrew the Derg. However, Amharic is still the working language of the ethno-federalist state and the intellectuals and political and bureaucratic elite of the center has retained the Ethiopian national identity based on Amharic (Young 1998, Gudina 2003).

Finally, linguistic minority groups are identified as the AMAR groups whose vernacular language is different than that of the identified linguistic majority. Languages natively spoken by each group are confirmed in the Ethnologue (Eberhard et al. 2021) and country specific sources. This operationalization excludes the immigrant groups aggregated by country/region of origin (e.g., South Asian, Middle Eastern and East Asian groups in the US or Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia) or by a non-linguistic cleavage (e.g., Muslims in France, caste groups in India) in AMAR. Even though AMAR has listed sub-groups for some of these categories, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to disaggregate these categories by language.

#### **4.4.2. Operationalization: Promotion, Toleration, Exclusion**

I code a number of variables for the status of a minority language in a country and language policy in the three areas. Language policies are coded as promotion/recognition, toleration, or repression/limitation in the areas of education, media, and public administration.

Promotion of a minority language occurs when the state uses that language as or in similar capacity to the official language in some areas of public services and/or some level of government, if not all. In the field of education, recognition is operationalized as the use of the minority language as the primary medium of education in public schools at any level of basic and secondary education. In mass media policy area, exclusive or predominant use of the minority language in a publicly funded media outlet is considered as promotion. In public administration, minority language is promoted if the language is used officially by the state authorities at any level for providing public services ranging from national legislation to official documents at the level of local governance.

Toleration is the policy of allowing the use of the minority language in private institutions and/or in secondary status in public institutions with basic legal guarantees. In the field of education, instruction in or teaching of a minority language in only private schools is considered as toleration. Teaching of the minority language or bilingual education that involves some use of the minority language in public schools is also regarded as toleration. Bilingual education can have various types of implementations; however, it usually gives an auxiliary role to the vernacular language even as it endorses multilingualism and protection of the minority culture (Hornberger 2000). Therefore, it falls short of what policy of promotion entails. Toleration in mass media is operationalized as the availability of access to minority language content in private media outlets and/or through periodic publications or broadcasts in publicly funded media. In the area of public administration, toleration entails legal guarantees for publicly funded translation of documents and services such as court proceedings, legal notices, petitions etc. In this case, the state does not commit to use the minority language in its routine operations but allows access to public services using the minority language.

Exclusion entails precluding the minority language from use in public affairs by private persons and the state. It is simply operationalized as the lack of any legally guaranteed use of a minority language in a language policy area. Evidence for any policy type in any area is assessed based on both legal rules and de facto policy. Remember that language policy is defined as a set of rules and social practices that creates norms for language use in the public. It is not just rules but both the rules and practices that make up the language policy. A legal guarantee for the use of a minority language in a certain role that is not implemented does not reflect the actual language policy. For instance, a directive by Pakistan's Ministry of Education in 1952 describes Pashtun as the medium of instruction for the first cycle of primary schools in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region; however, until 1984, no public school provided Pashtun-medium instruction in Pakistan (Rahman 1996: 148-149). Lack of implementation in language policy is far too common to rely solely on legal documents for measurement. Therefore, if any legal regulation is not implemented in a language policy area, the policy is coded as exclusion. Yet, legal rules and norms are still the basis of minority language policy measurement. Informal use of a minority language in any of the policy areas is not considered as evidence of a policy type since lack of legal guarantees mean that the language use can be rescinded arbitrarily.

#### **4.4.3. Data Collection and Coding of Language Policy Areas**

In order to code language policies on these definitions, I collect information on three areas: education, mass media, and public administration. The sources for information include Ethnologue (Eberhard et al. 2021), Jacques Leclerc's (2019) online language policy database *L'aménagement linguistique dans le monde*, encyclopedic sources on language use in education, media, and government services, as well as hundreds of country-specific primary sources such as pieces of legislation on use of language(s) in country and secondary sources documenting implementation

of language policy and planning. Based on the information I gather, I score each of the three policy areas (0) for exclusion, (1) for toleration, and (2) for promotion. Each policy area has component variables that detail the extent and depth of language use (For detailed description of coding process, see the codebook in the appendix).

To illustrate the coding process, we can look at the language policy in area of mass media toward Kurdish language in Turkey. The language policy in this area is coded 0 up to 1991. Until 1983, there was no explicit law preventing the use of Kurdish in media outlets in Turkey. However, there were no Kurdish language media before the 1960s, and a few publications in the 1960s and 1970s were short-lived due to political pressures. After the 1980 coup, the military regime established a ban on non-Turkish publications that had stayed in force between 1983 and 1991. For the period 1991-2009, the score is 1 since private publications in Kurdish were officially allowed and freely circulating even though some outlets were closed down for their links with terrorist groups. In 2009, Turkey's state-funded TV and radio broadcaster TRT launched a TV channel -TRT Kurdî- that broadcasts exclusively in Kurdish language. Moreover, other policies such as publishing of Kurdish translation of Quran by Turkey's Official Directorate of Religious affairs have also started in the same year. Since Kurdish language is exclusively used by state-owned media outlets since 2009, media component of the language policy toward Kurdish in Turkey is scored 2 after 2009.

#### **4.4.4. Discrete and Continuous Measurements of Minority Language Policy**

It is possible to conceptualize the language policy types as both discrete options and relative positions on a continuum from most limiting to most promotive policy. On the one hand, the three policy options have distinct incentive structures and objectives rather than representing a difference of degree for the preferences over restrictions on minority languages. On the other hand,

some of the fine-grained differences in language policy can be overlooked by a categorical variable. Therefore, I offer two different measurements of minority language policy.

The trichotomous measure is based on the scoring scheme in the previous section applied on the three policy areas. If a language takes 0 on two or more areas, the policy is coded repression/limitation. If a language takes 2 in two or more areas, the policy is coded as recognition/promotion. Anything in between is considered toleration. The logic behind is that when a policy is adopted in the majority of these policy areas, only then that option describes the policy. As discussed in detail before, a policy of promotion only in education, or any other area, does not necessarily provide material and symbolic benefits to a minority language. Similarly, limitations or the lack of promotion in one area can be counterbalanced in other policy areas.

The continuous measure of language policy is an index based on the degree of language use in each area and official status of languages (See the codebook in the appendix). It factors in toleration-based and promotion-based use of language in education, mass media, and government services as well as the legal protections and official status provided to a minority language.<sup>12</sup> Legal protection and official status of languages are included in the index as they both improve the implementation of toleration and recognition/promotion and have a symbolic importance by themselves. For instance, in Sri Lanka, the difference between “Tamil is an official language” and “Tamil is *also* an official language” had been a source of disagreement in the 1980s (Leclerc 2020).

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<sup>12</sup> In line with the agreement in the literature that education is the most important area of language policy and planning, education policy has a higher weight in the index.

## **Chapter 5**

### **Empirical Analysis**

This chapter presents and discusses the results of quantitative analysis of language policy making as a political outcome and the role of language policy choice in outbreak of ethnic conflict along linguistic divides. Each set of propositions raised in Chapter 3 are first investigated through descriptive statistics and then tested using appropriate multivariate regression analysis methods.

The first dependent variable is minority language policy. The data on minority language policy is coded in the Minority Language Policy Dataset as described in Chapter 4. The main explanatory variables for minority language policy type are relative group size and cleavage configuration. There are various available data sources for the relative group size, such as CIA World Factbook, Ethnologue, Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, and AMAR. Since the census data from many countries does not include information on ethnicity and/or language, these data sources rely on estimations, which sometimes considerably diverge from one another. As my theory suggests group relative size and its variance over time is crucial for language policy choices, I relied on census results as data source whenever possible. If there is no census data reflecting ethnolinguistic distribution of a country's population, I reviewed case-specific studies on that country's demography to reach a reliable estimation. I used AMAR data when neither is available.

The data on cleavage configuration comes from A-Religion dataset (Birbir and Satana 2022), which includes information on the religion of 1202 socially relevant ethnic groups from

AMAR. It codes every religious sub-group that forms larger than 10 % of each AMAR group's population down to the level of denominations of a religion based on countless encyclopedic and case-specific sources. Each majority-minority pair coded for three mutually exclusive categories of cleavage configuration: *unity*, *shared*, and *reinforcing*.

The second dependent variable is the outbreak of an ethnic conflict along linguistic lines. Ethnic conflict onset variable is based on the ACD2EPR dataset (Vogt et. al 2015), which matches the conflicts recorded in Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dyadic data to an EPR group for each conflict episode that group is involved in. The explanatory variable in this case is minority language policy.

I control for commonly referred predictors of language policy and empirically established correlates of civil conflict in my multivariate analyses. Data on political exclusion and regional autonomy comes from EPR. Geographical concentration of the linguistic minorities is based on GeoEPR. Finally, the data on opportunity-based correlates of civil war, country population and GDP per capita, are drawn from United Nations (UN) population statistics and Penn World Tables.

The first part of this chapter is allotted to presenting the empirical evidence that provides support for the proposed relationship between relative group size, religious configuration, and minority language policy outcome. The first section shows the relationship between the relative group size and cleavage interaction and the minority language policy outcomes by drawing on the correlation between these variables in the Minority Language Policy Dataset. In the second section, I provide a number of multivariate regression models to test the proposed role of relative group size in minority language policy outcomes and discuss the implications of the findings. The third section tests the relationship between cleavage interactions and minority language policy outcomes. Then, the fourth section includes models with alternative measurements and

specifications as well as qualitative evidence from various language policy making situations to establish the robustness of the findings.

The organization of the second part mirrors the first part. The first section includes the descriptive statistics on the ethnic conflict episodes that involve the linguistic minority groups covered in Minority Language Policy Dataset and the relationship of them with language policy. The second section presents the results and discussion of multivariate regression models testing my hypotheses on the minority language policy-ethnic conflict relationship. The third section conducts tests based on a continuous measurement of minority language policy accommodations. The last section discusses and addresses the potential endogeneity of the results.

### **5.1. Predicting Minority Language Policy**

This dissertation argues that the policy on the use and status of minority languages in public affairs is a political outcome. Linguistic rationalization in multilingual societies involves -sometimes implicitly- a process of bargaining between the linguistic majority and the minority(ies). The factors underlying this bargaining are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and the relative sizes of the linguistic groups and the interaction of other social cleavages with language are identified as the two main variables that explain minority language policy outcomes.

In particular, I offer two propositions regarding the relationship between relative group size and the language policy outcomes. First, I propose that policy of exclusion becomes more likely to be adopted toward all minority languages as the relative size of the majority linguistic group increases. Second, I predict that relatively larger linguistic groups are more likely to receive a policy of promotion. Then, I offer a tripartite hypothesis regarding the effects of a secondary cleavage on minority language policy: If the linguistic majority and minority are identical on a



secondary identity dimension, I expect the policy of exclusion to become more likely. If the majority and minority are completely different on a secondary identity (i.e., reinforcing cleavage), I predict that the policy of promotion becomes more likely to be adopted. Finally, if the majority and minority share but are not identical on a secondary identity dimension, the policy of toleration is incentivized.

### 5.1.1. Descriptive Evidence

Descriptive inference is an essential part of social science analysis (KKV 1994: 34-74). Even though causal explanations ultimately depend on rigorous testing, describing the relationship between the studied phenomena is a crucial building block for developing adequate explanations. Based on this premise, I present some descriptive statistics from Minority Language Policy Dataset to provide a first glance at the relationship between the relative group size and cleavage interaction and the minority language policy.

**Table 5.1 - Minority Language Policy by the Relative Size of Minority Groups**

	Exclusion	Toleration	Promotion	Total
Entire Sample	49.71 %	38.19 %	12.11 %	100 % (n=12,950)
Minority Relative Size below median	60.62 %	34.77 %	4.60 %	100 % (n=6326)
Minority Relative Size between median and 3 <sup>rd</sup> quantile	50.39 %	35.68 %	13.92 %	100 % (n=2794)
Minority Relative Size above 3 <sup>rd</sup> quantile	30.95 %	45.78 %	23.25 %	100 % (n=3818)

\*: Unit of analysis is minority group/year.

Table 1 shows the percentage distribution of each policy type in the entire sample of the Minority Language Policy Dataset compared to three categories of the minority relative size. The

first row clearly shows that exclusion is the most common policy type while promotion, the costliest option, is quite rare. Out of nearly 13,000 observations across 50 countries and 235 linguistic minorities, policy of promotion is adopted only 12 percent of the time. Frequency of promotion is markedly lower among the minorities whose relative population size is below the sample median of the minority relative size (3.4%) and progressively increases in the middle and top categories. The reverse trend applies to the frequency of the policy of exclusion. Obviously, there are many other factors that may affect the minority language policy, but this picture indicates strong correlations between minority relative size and the prevalence of exclusion and promotion. These correlations are in line with the ‘Numbers Game’ discussed in Chapter 3.

*Table 5.2 - Minority Language Policy by the Relative Size of Minority and Majority Groups*

	Majority < 45 %				Majority > 45 %			
	Exclusion	Toleration	Promotion	Total	Exclusion	Toleration	Promotion	Total
Entire Sample	55.20 %	32.98 %	11.81 %	100 % (n=6965)	43.15 %	44.29 %	12.54 %	100 % (n=5978)
Minority Relative Size below median	66.45 %	26.44 %	7.09 %	100 % (n=3437)	53.68 %	44.68 %	1.62 %	100 % (n=2889)
Minority Relative Size btw median and 3 <sup>rd</sup> quantile	59.30 %	29.53 %	11.16 %	100 % (n=1774)	34.73 %	46.14 %	19.12 %	100 % (n=1025)
Minority Relative Size above 3 <sup>rd</sup> quantile	29.01 %	49.25 %	21.72 %	100 % (n=1754)	32.60 %	42.82 %	24.56 %	100 % (n=2064)

\*: Unit of analysis is minority group/year.

The argument of ‘Numbers Game’ is not solely based on the relative size of linguistic minority groups. I also propose that the majority relative size will be highly relevant, especially in the adoption of the policies of exclusion and toleration. Table 2 demonstrates the relationship between minority relative size and the policy outcome separately for cases where the majority

relative size is below and above the sample median (45 %). Contrary to the predictions in Chapter 3, exclusion generally seems to be more commonly adopted toward minority groups in countries where the relative size of the majority group -defined as the largest linguistic group for the purposes of this dissertation- is below 45 percent. Similarly, toleration is more common when the majority relative size is larger in contrast to the numbers game argument.

However, relative group sizes are not the sole predictors of minority language policy. A quick survey of the data indicates that most of the cases where majority relative size is below median comes from the sub-Saharan Africa, where economy is weak and linguistic landscape is extremely fractionalized.<sup>13</sup> I identify ethnic competition and rivalry, national cohesion and efficiency, and ethnolinguistic vitality as the main factors that comprise the minority language policy setting. Second of these factors emphasizes the material and social costs of any linguistic accommodation toward minorities, while the third one highlights that members of the particularly small and low-prestige groups might simply prefer to assimilate into the national language and culture. While relative size of the groups largely captures these effects, sub-Saharan Africa is quite distinct from the rest of the world in terms of both poverty and level of linguistic fractionalization. Moreover, this picture is in line with the existing literature on language policy choices in case of high heterogeneity (Liu 2015) and the  $3\pm 1$  language formula offered for sub-Saharan Africa (Laitin 1992). In almost all sub-Saharan countries, language policy is premised on the valorization of the supposedly neutral colonial and/or regional lingua franca to enhance national cohesion and efficiency, sometimes to the extent of completely ignoring local languages. Members of minority groups in those contexts are also likely to prefer exclusive use of official languages in public education in the hopes that it will provide better economic opportunities for them (Hornberger

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<sup>13</sup> To be exact, 84 % of these observations come from the 11 Sub-Saharan African countries in the sample.

2002). Finally, predominance of toleration toward the languages of the minorities in the top quantile of relative size scale (49.25 %) confirms the auxiliary role provided to relatively large minority languages in Laitin's (1992)  $3 \pm 1$  formula for African language landscapes. I test the role of majority relative size on the minority language policy controlling for regional and socio-economic factors in the following sections.

Before moving on to the multivariate analyses, I take a first look at the 'Difference Game' argument proposed in Chapter 3. I argue that cleavage configuration plays a crucial role in the minority language outcome by influencing the incentives and mobilization patterns of the linguistic groups. I expect that when the majority and minority linguistic groups are identical on a second identity dimension (i.e., unity), the policy of exclusion becomes more likely. On the other hand, when the groups do not share at all on the second identity dimension (i.e., reinforcing), promotion is more likely to be adopted. Lastly, when groups have differences in the second identity dimension but have at least one shared identity (i.e., shared), the policy of toleration is more likely. In this dissertation, I use the data on group religions as the second identity dimension.

Table 3 depicts the distribution of the minority language policy outcomes by the cleavage interactions for the entire sample as well as for each category of minority relative size separately. The suggested relationship between reinforcing cleavages and policy of promotion seems to hold in the entire sample (17.03 %). However, according to the first part of the Table 3, reinforcing cleavages are also associated with a higher frequency of the policy of exclusion (60 %) and the frequency of toleration is not much different for the linguistic minorities religiously united with the majority compared to those just partly share in religion (40.84 % - 43.98%). When the relative size of the minority linguistic groups is added to the comparison, a somewhat different picture emerges. While reinforcing cleavages still seem to have a positive correlation with the policy of

**Table 5.3 - Minority Language Policy by the Relative Size of Minority and Cleavage Interaction**

		<b>Exclusion</b>	<b>Toleration</b>	<b>Promotion</b>	<b>Total</b>
Entire Sample	<i>Unity</i>	46.24 %	40.84 %	12.90 %	100 % (n=3611)
	<i>Shared</i>	46.28 %	43.98 %	9.73 %	100 % (n=6430)
	<i>Reinforcing</i>	60 %	22.97 %	17.03 %	100 % (n=2795)
Minority Relative Size below median	<i>Unity</i>	55.08 %	43.43 %	1.47 %	100 % (n=1623)
	<i>Shared</i>	58.11 %	34.82 %	7.06 %	100 % (n=2932)
	<i>Reinforcing</i>	68.84 %	27.66 %	3.50 %	100 % (n=1714)
Minority Relative Size btw median and 3 <sup>rd</sup> quantile	<i>Unity</i>	31.74 %	35.40 %	32.84 %	100 % (n=819)
	<i>Shared</i>	50.47 %	45.50 %	4.03 %	100 % (n=1389)
	<i>Reinforcing</i>	73.72 %	14.18 %	12.10 %	100 % (n=529)
Minority Relative Size above 3 <sup>rd</sup> quantile	<i>Unity</i>	43.56 %	41.48 %	14.96 %	100 % (n=1157)
	<i>Shared</i>	27.08 %	55.71 %	17.21 %	100 % (n=2109)
	<i>Reinforcing</i>	19.38 %	16.84 %	63.76 %	100 % (n=552)

\*: Unit of analysis is minority group/year.

exclusion for the first two minority relative size categories, for relatively larger minorities, the policy of exclusion is markedly less common (19.38 %) and the policy of promotion is extremely common (63.76 %) compared to the rest of the sample. Moreover, the relationship between shared cleavage structure and frequency of toleration policy seems rather weak and mixed.

Table 3 may suggest a more nuanced relationship between cleavage interaction and minority language policy than initially proposed in Chapter 3. It indicates that group relative size and cleavage structure can have an interactive effect on language policy outcomes, specifically when it comes to policy of promotion. This finding gives an opportunity to test Birnir and Satana's

(2022) argument that relative group size and interaction of cleavages can together influence coalition formation. Moreover, it suggests that the effect of sharing on a second cleavage may be more complicated than simply encouraging toleration. I test my initial arguments about the relationship between group relative and cleavage interaction and the different language policy outcomes as well as these potential theoretical extensions in the next section.

### **5.1.2. Relative Group Size and Minority Language Policy Outcome**

Minority Language Policy emerges as a balance between three factors: ethnic competition and rivalry, national cohesion and efficiency, and ethnolinguistic vitality. First of all, language is a material and symbolic resource for both majority and minority linguistic groups in a society. Official use of a language in the public sphere provides its speakers with material benefits including but not limited to public employment opportunities (Wimmer 1997) as well as social prestige and political entitlement (Horowitz 1985, Tollefson 2003). While the benefits of the public use of language encourage both majority and minority groups to push for highest possible status and utilization of their languages, the need for national cohesion and efficiency puts a limit to this competition. Just as a unifying national language with the highest status serves as an attestation of social cohesion and efficiency (Gellner 1983), total exclusion of a socially relevant minority language from the public sphere in favor of the unifying language -usually that of the majority- endangers the very same cohesion. But when a non-dominant language in a society is socially relevant to the degree that its speakers are likely to demand its use in the public sphere instead of or at least together with the dominant language? When it is not possible for the dominant linguistic group to ignore these demands and what degree of accommodation it is ready to offer? I argue that the answer to these questions depend on the tendency of the minority group to sustain itself as a


**Table 5.4 – Logit Models of the Effect of Majority and Minority Relative Size on the Policies of Exclusion and Promotion**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Exclusion		Promotion	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Majority Relative Size (Pr.)	3.982*** (1.333)	6.875*** (1.881)	-4.930*** (1.848)	-8.964*** (2.346)
Minority Relative Size (Pr.)			8.868*** (2.293)	10.158*** (2.575)
Excluded	0.833** (0.335)	1.224*** (0.384)	-0.522 (0.537)	-0.869 (0.560)
Autonomy	-2.103*** (0.361)	-2.218*** (0.126)	3.302*** (0.576)	3.403*** (0.542)
Geographically Concentrated	1.426** (0.628)	1.701** (0.675)	-1.456 (0.979)	-1.436 (0.878)
Democracy	-1.247*** (0.336)	-1.253*** (0.320)	0.620 (0.382)	0.340 (0.355)
Number of Linguistic Minorities (log)	0.756* (0.448)	0.678 (0.552)	-0.933** (0.490)	-0.751 (0.610)
Country Population (log)	-0.258 (0.174)	-0.162 (0.181)	0.122 (0.233)	0.109 (0.219)
GDP per Capita (log)	-0.466** (0.236)	-0.393 (0.239)	0.411* (0.239)	0.334 (0.238)
Europe		-0.850 (0.548)		2.136*** (0.765)
MENA		0.259 (0.967)		0.808 (0.997)
Americas		-0.700 (0.666)		
sub-Saharan Africa		1.767*** (0.559)		-1.752* (0.970)
Constant	1.003 (1.915)	-3.058 (2.150)	-2.388 (2.662)	0.575 (2.867)
Observations	10,387	10,387	10,387	10,387
Log Likelihood	-5,528.049	-5,232.599	-2,672.941	-2,490.827
AIC	11,074.100	10,491.200	5,365.882	5,007.653

*Note:* Unit of analysis is minority group/year. Majority relative size and minority relative size are measured as proportions [0-1]. The baseline of regional controls is Asia/Pacific. Americas is excluded from Model 4 because it predicts failure perfectly. Robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. \* p \*\* p \*\*\* p<0.01

distinct language community, i.e., its ethnolinguistic vitality (Giles and Johnson 1987) and one of its most important dimensions, relative group size.


Table 4 reports multivariate logistic regression models with the language policies of Exclusion (Models 1,2) and Promotion (Models 3,4) as the dependent variables. Models 1 & 2 show that just as *Proposition 1* in Chapter 3 suggests, the policy of exclusion becomes much more likely for all linguistic minority groups as the relative size of the majority group increases. This effect is much more emphasized once the regional controls are included in the model. When the largest linguistic group in a multilingual society has a clear size advantage, the likelihood of any minority language being used in the public spheres of media, education, and public services dramatically falls. Models 3 & 4, however, show that even controlling for the majority relative size, as the relative size of a linguistic minority increases, it becomes significantly more likely to receive the policy of promotion. The finding is in line with *Proposition 2* in Chapter 3. This effect is again stronger when regional effects are controlled for.



**Figure 5.1 - Substantive Effect of Majority Relative Size on the Policy of Exclusion**




Figure 1 shows the substantive effect of majority relative size on the policy of exclusion with 95 % confidence interval as it moves from the lowest value in the sample (35 %) to a hypothetical case of perfect linguistic homogeneity. Following Hanmer and Kalkan (2013), I estimate the predicted probability of exclusion setting the control variables to their observed values. As it was also shown in Table 1, the policy of exclusion has a high baseline probability. Even when the linguistically dominant group does not form a numerical majority, any linguistic minority is more than 60 % likely to receive a policy of exclusion. This baseline probability steadily increases as the numerical edge of the majority becomes clearer. Both mechanisms of ethnic competition and national cohesion are clearly at play here. The dominant linguistic group's incentive to share material and/or symbolic benefits of public use and status of the group language dwindles as its size margin increases. Moreover, as the relative size of the largest group increases, likelihood and expected returns from contacts and transactions with linguistic majority increases for the members of the minority (Blau 1994). Given the advantages of adopting the majority



**Figure 5.2 - Substantive Effect of Minority Relative Size on the Policy of Promotion**

language in such a case, the minority has less incentive to reject the policy of exclusion and mobilize for linguistic accommodation.

Figure 2 presents the substantive effect of minority relative size on the policy of promotion as it moves from 1 to 35 percent, the highest value in the sample. Diametrically opposed to the policy of exclusion, promotion has a very low baseline probability. Holding all the control variables at their observed values, the average predicted probability of promotion being adopted toward a minority group that forms 1 % of the population is about 10 percent. The average predicted probability increases to around 0.12 for the median (3.4%) and to 0.58 for the highest (34.8%) value of the minority relative size in the sample. This effect can be explained by a combination of ethnic competition and ethnolinguistic vitality mechanisms. Relatively larger linguistic minorities both have more to gain by promotion of their languages in the public sphere and are better able to mobilize to demand linguistic accommodations.



**Figure 5.3 - Substantive Effects of Minority and Majority Relative Size on the Policy of Promotion**

The association of the majority relative size with the predicted probability of promotion is also significant and substantial. Figure 3 presents the effects of majority and minority relative size

on promotion in the same graph. On average, the probability of promotion being adopted toward any linguistic minority is around 10 % when the majority linguistic group comprises half of the population. This probability steadily decreases as the numerical advantage of the majority increases, however, as Figure 3 shows, minority relative size has a stronger association with the policy of promotion. As also discussed in Chapter 3, larger minority relative size, rather than a smaller majority relative size drives the incentive for promotion. While a relatively smaller majority may discourage exclusion, it does not necessarily make promotion more likely to be adopted toward all linguistic minorities. Take, for instance, the case of Kurdish and Turkmen minorities in Iraq. Shia and Sunni Arabs have formed around 75 % of Iraq's population since its independence while the share of Kurds have been around 15-20 % and the Turkmens have been less than 10 % and their share decreased even more over time due to emigration. Although Iraq's minority language policy has changed several times in practice as the regime and powerholders altered, Kurdish have always held a high status as either regional or even second national language but the policy toward Turkmen has never moved beyond toleration.

Turning to the control variables, all group-level controls have a statistically significant effect in Models 1 & 2. When a member of linguistic minority group is not part of the executive at the national level, exclusion becomes a more likely policy option. Minority representation in the national level politics is shown to be an important factor in the language policy outcomes even in non-democratic contexts (Liu et. al 2018). When a minority identity is not part of a ruling coalition, any form of linguistic accommodation is less likely. Territorial autonomy is strongly and negatively associated with the policy of exclusion. Since such arrangements are aimed at devolving power to the local authorities in areas such as education and public services, this is an expected effect. The positive impact of geographical concentration on policy of exclusion is more controversial.

Geographical concentration may generally be expected to increase objective ethnolinguistic vitality; however, such an effect would depend on factors such as immigration to and emigration from the minority area and the efforts of the central government to integrate geographically isolated minorities (Ehala 2010). The population movements can even be a result of government policy. For instance, one explicit aim of Indonesia's transmigration policy through which Javanese from the overcrowded Java is encouraged to migrate across the archipelago is 'integration of all ethnic groups into the Indonesian nation' (Elmhirst 1999). The association of geographical concentration with the policy of exclusion is likely a result of the efforts of governments to integrate unruly peripheral minorities through linguistic assimilation. Democracy is negatively and strongly associated with the policy of exclusion. GDP per capita is also negatively associated with policy of exclusion even though its significance disappears once regional controls are included. The effects of the cost of extending any kind of linguistic accommodation to minorities, which further rises as linguistic fractionalization increases, is likely captured by the regional dummy for sub-Saharan Africa in Model 2 (See Section 1.1).

In Model 3, only the number of linguistic minorities and GDP per capita seem to have a significant relationship with the policy of promotion. Both effects are likely driven by the social and economic costs of the policy of promotion. As expected, increased number of linguistic minorities makes promotion less likely to be adopted toward any group. Promotion is a costly policy option and the more minority languages are promoted the higher the costs. Liu, Gandhi, and Bell (2018) show that once a minority gets linguistic concessions, the likelihood of other minorities receiving similar concessions increases markedly. In Macedonia, for instance, at the time of independence in 1991, highest level of linguistic accommodations such as official status at regional level was codified to be accorded in local areas with more than 50 % minority population, which

would only apply to Albanian, the largest minority language spoken by around 25 percent of country's population. But in a few years, following mobilization of the Turkish minority, the requirement for regional status was lowered to 20 % and Turkish, which is spoken by around 3-4 % of the population gained official status in numerous municipalities. Therefore, as the number of linguistic minorities increases, promotion might become less likely to be extended even to relatively larger minorities so as not to set an example. The positive association between GDP per capita and the policy of promotion also reflects the costly nature of promotion policy. Providing education, mass communication, and public services in more than one language requires considerable resources and poorer nations are less likely to be able to afford that cost. Once the regional variables are introduced in Model 4, the significance of these variables disappears. However, the regional effects also likely reflect similar mechanisms. Promotion is much more likely in Europe, where economic development is higher and linguistic heterogeneity is relatively lower, and less likely in sub-Saharan Africa, where levels of poverty and linguistic fractionalization are very high.

In summary, models 1 through 4 provide strong support for the proposed relationships between group relative size and language policy outcomes. Increase in the relative size of the linguistic majority significantly and substantially raise the likelihood of exclusion policy being adopted toward all minority languages. I argue that this relationship exists because predominant majorities do not have a strong incentive to give concessions in areas of ethnic competition or national cohesion and the minorities in such societies do not have the willingness and/or capacity to mobilize for language accommodations. Secondly, a linguistic minority with a larger relative size is significantly and substantially more likely to get its language promoted by the state in the public sphere. A decrease in the majority relative size is also associated with higher likelihood of

promotion but the effect of minority relative size is much stronger. I explain this relationship as a result of the higher capacity and/or willingness of a relatively larger minority to demand linguistic concessions as well as the risk for the majority and cohesion of the national community if such a demand by a large minority is not accommodated.

### **5.1.3. Cleavage Interaction and Minority Language Policy Outcome**

As the numbers game argument and the findings in the previous section illustrate, mechanisms of ethnic competition and rivalry, national cohesion and efficiency, and ethnolinguistic vitality work through ethnolinguistic demography to shape the minority language policy outcomes. In addition to relative group size, the cleavage configuration of the linguistic majority and minority groups play a central role in language policy making. Cleavage structures not only influence the ability and capacity of the ethnolinguistic minorities to mobilize (Satana and Birnir 2022) but also shape the incentives for majority outbidding and ethnic rivalry (Horowitz 1985). The more recent literature on cleavage structures and identity mobilization goes beyond the classical logic of Minimum Winning Coalition (MWC) and investigate the role of cleavage structures, specifically of shared identities, on the incentives of majority and minority to form inter-ethnic coalitions (Bormann 2019, Satana and Birnir 2022). Following the same objective, I seek to address the understudied role of cleavage interactions on language policy and offer testable hypotheses on the role of three different cleavage configurations on minority language policy outcome (See Chapter 3). First, I argue that when the linguistic majority and minority are identical in the second identity dimension, policy of exclusion becomes more likely. Second, when the groups are segmented on the second identity dimension (i.e., reinforcing cleavage), the policy of promotion is incentivized. Third, when the majority and minority share on the second identity dimension but

**Table 5.5 – Logit Models of the Effect of Cleavage Interactions on Minority Language Policy**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Exclusion (5)	Promotion (6)	Promotion (7)	Toleration (8)	Exclusion (9)
Religious Unity	1.091** (0.512)	0.381 (0.682)	0.274 (0.660)		
Reinforcing Religious Cleavage	0.479 (0.344)	2.039*** (0.608)	0.495 (0.768)		
Shared Religion				0.752* (0.422)	-0.848** (0.384)
Large Minority			-0.536 (1.082)		
Reinforcing Religion * Large Minority			3.058** (1.117)		
Majority Relative Size (Pr.)	6.123*** (1.589)	-10.125*** (2.735)	-10.388 (2.947)	-0.490 (1.344)	5.732*** (1.603)
Minority Relative Size (Pr.)	-11.641*** (2.513)	9.804*** (2.992)	9.388 (3.665)	2.314 (1.852)	-11.408*** (2.586)
Excluded	1.133*** (0.430)	-1.087* (0.579)	-1.114 (0.669)	-0.594* (0.305)	1.102*** (0.417)
Autonomy	-2.258*** (0.639)	3.332*** (0.507)	3.413 (0.569)	-1.095* (0.639)	-2.398*** (0.682)
Democracy	-1.428*** (0.342)	0.283 (0.322)	0.320 (0.329)	0.684** (0.272)	-1.408*** (0.336)
Geographically Concentrated	2.007*** (0.668)	-1.600* (0.960)	-1.851 (0.980)	-0.840 (0.689)	1.984*** (0.674)
Number of Linguistic Minorities (log)	-0.059 (0.529)	-0.951 (0.621)	-0.765 (0.657)	0.772 (0.475)	-0.061 (0.533)
Country Population (log)	-0.207 (0.185)	0.178 (0.230)	0.226 (0.225)	0.048 (0.166)	-0.197 (0.178)
GDP per Capita (log)	-0.486** (0.235)	0.505** (0.238)	0.433 (0.258)	0.180 (0.179)	-0.452** (0.227)
Constant	-0.160 (2.019)	-0.897 (3.351)	-0.372 (3.472)	-2.777 (1.956)	0.614 (2.102)
Observations	10,330	10,330	10,330	10,330	10,330
Log Likelihood	-4,729.791	-2,310.546	-2,196.042	-6,213.083	-4,757.280
AIC	9,491.581	4,651.092	4,426.084	12,456.170	9,544.560

*Note:* Unit of analysis is minority group/year. Majority relative size and minority relative size are measured as proportions [0-1]. Regional controls are included but not reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. \*p<0.1 \*\*p<0.05 \*\*\*p<0.01

are not identical, toleration becomes the most likely policy. Finally, I test the conditional effect of segmented identities on policy of promotion as revealed in section 1.1.

Table 5 reports the results of multivariate logistic regression models testing the effects of cleavage structures on the policies of exclusion, promotion and toleration. Model 5 shows that as suggested by *Proposition 3* in Chapter 3, when the linguistic majority and minority are identical on the second identity (i.e., religion), the policy of exclusion becomes more likely to be adopted toward the minority language. Model 6 shows that reinforcing cleavages are strongly and positively associated with policy of promotion as offered in *Proposition 4*. Model 7 tests the interactive relationship of reinforcing religion and minority relative size with the policy of promotion and provides evidence that the result of Model 6 is largely driven by relatively larger linguistic minorities. Model 8 shows the relationship between shared religion and toleration policy, but the result is statistically significant only at 90 % confidence level. Finally, model 9 investigates an alternative hypothesis to *Proposition 5* and tests the relationship between shared religion and policy of exclusion demonstrating that exclusion becomes less likely when the majority and minority linguistic groups share on a secondary identity dimension.<sup>14</sup> The substantive effects and their implications are discussed below.


Figure 4 presents the marginal effect of religious unity on the probability of exclusion policy being adopted toward a minority language.<sup>15</sup> Setting all controls at their mean/median values, the average predicted probability of exclusion increases from 0.36 to 0.63 when the linguistic majority and minority are identical on religion compared to no religious unity category. The mechanisms of

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<sup>14</sup> I ran a model that includes reinforcing religious cleavage so that the effect of shared religion would be compared to religious unity group (not reported here). The relationship was again significant and even stronger.

<sup>15</sup> I had the same issue with error margins when I used observed values to get predicted probabilities. The confidence intervals were so tiny it was not even possible to put them in the graph. So, I set controls to their mod/mean/median for the graph here.





**Figure 5.4 - Substantive Effect of Religious Unity on Policy of Exclusion**

ethnic competition, national cohesion, and ethnolinguistic vitality may all be at play in the effects of identity configurations on minority language policy outcomes.


Cultural similarity in general and unity on a secondary identity in case of language policy making may lead to exclusionary policies when they become a source of perceived or real threat toward the dominant group. Based on Realistic Conflict Theory (LeVine and Campbell 1972), the literature on intergroup attitudes and relations clearly demonstrates that negative attitudes and hostility toward outgroup is exacerbated if groups are in a real or perceived competition over resources and/or political power (Quillian 1995, Brewer 1999). Adida's (2011) comparative study on the integration of Yoruba and Hausa immigrants in different host societies in West Africa illustrates how cultural similarity translates into such a threat for indigenous benefits and leads the host society leaders to adopt exclusionary policies toward the immigrant groups. In a similar vein, being identical on a second identity dimension may incentivize the policy of exclusion since cultural proximity could make minority members contenders for the state resources. If we consider the example of linguistic groups that have the same single religious identity, policy of exclusion

would be the tool for preventing the minority members from accessing power and resources as co-religionists.

Cultural similarity can also incentivize the policy of exclusion through the mechanism of national cohesion, working in the opposite direction of ethnic competition mechanism. Less cultural distinctiveness can make assimilation of an ethnic group into the dominant culture of the country easier and more desired by the minority as well as more accepted by the majority (Hornsey and Hogg 2000, Alba 2005, Friberg 2021). As also discussed in Chapter 3, even though linguistic assimilation means including the minority members in the benefits of language policy, in the long run, it may also inhibit the risk of societal conflict between majority and minority (Gradstein and Stiff 2006) and benefit both majority and minority by increasing the income level for both groups in general (Dasgupta 2017). As cultural proximity makes linguistic assimilation more attainable and acceptable, having the same identity on a second identity dimension incentivizes the policy of exclusion.

Lastly, being identical on the second identity dimension would impede any organized demand for linguistic concessions by reducing the ethnolinguistic vitality of the minority group. Although ethnolinguistic vitality is essentially based on perceived differences between the groups, these perceptions are clearly influenced by apparent differences, including demographic factors and cleavage interactions (Ehala 2010). At the individual level, not all the identity categories would have the same effect on the perception of difference since, for instance, religion is less visible and easier to change than attributes such as skin color. However, similarity at the group level would facilitate intergroup contact and network, thereby reducing vitality of linguistic minority groups (Landry et. al 1996, Milroy 2001). As has been pointed out several times previously, when the

majority does not face an organized demand, its incentive to extend any linguistic accommodation is diminished.



**Figure 5.5 - Substantive Effect of Reinforcing Religious Cleavage on Policy of Promotion**

Figure 5 illustrates the marginal effect of a reinforcing religious cleavage on the probability of promotion being adopted toward a minority language. Setting all controls at their mean/median values, when the linguistic majority and minority has a crosscutting religious cleavage, the average predicted probability of promotion is about 0.01. To reiterate, the crosscutting religion category includes both the groups that have a single shared religious identity and those that share at least one religious identity even if they have other subgroups with different religious identities. When we consider the marginal effect of reinforcing religion on promotion, the average predicted probability increases to 0.1 with a tenfold increase. Moreover, Model 7 provided evidence for a larger effect of reinforcing religion on probability of promotion among relatively larger minority groups. Following Ai and Norton's (2003) difference-in-differences estimation method, I also computed interactive effects of minority relative size and reinforcing religion on promotion. On average, reinforcing religion increases probability of promotion by 0.34 for relatively larger

minorities. However, for the relatively smaller minorities, the effect of reinforcing religion is a mere average increase of 0.03 in the probability of promotion. In a similar vein, all three factors underlying language policy making may contribute to this impact.


Firstly, interaction of religion with linguistic cleavage would influence both the likelihood of minority demanding linguistic concessions through its effect on ethnolinguistic vitality and willingness of the majority to accept these demands by changing the power balance in the ethnic competition. The positive impact of reinforcing cleavage on ethnolinguistic vitality is well documented (Edwards 1992, Ehala 2010, Yagmur 2011, Ehala and Zabrodskaja 2013). As the perception of distinctiveness increases so does ethnolinguistic vitality.

Moreover, reinforcing cleavages are largely accepted to facilitate contentious mobilization of ethnic groups through easing collective action problems (Stewart 2008, Selway 2010, Basedau et. al 2016) as well as ethnic outbidding by majority and minority political groups (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, Horowitz 1985). Faced with elevated mobilization of the linguistic minority and risk of political and/or violent challenges, majority group would be more likely to extend promotion. Such a concession may stem from a willingness to enhance national cohesion to and/or to avoid conflict. As discussed in Chapter 3, even in the case of Sri Lanka, which literature agrees to be a canonical example of majority outbidding toward a segmented minority leading to conflict (Horowitz 1985, DeVotta 2004), language policy toward Tamil has been one of promotion before and after outbreak of the deadly civil war in 1984. While indeed the ethnic outbidding by Sinhalese political parties has enhanced the salience and mobilization of Tamil identity, Tamil has been a language of education since before Sri Lankan independence, employed as a language of communication in state-owned media, and was declared regional official language in Eastern and Northern provinces in 1958 (Coperahewa 2009, Leclerc 2019). The concessions in terms of the

official status of Tamil language generally followed periods of heightened mobilization of Tamils for language parity, such as the regulations to implement regional status of Tamil in the 1960s and the constitutional change making Tamil “also an official language” in 1978, which conspicuously accompanied another change making Buddhism the state religion (Coperahewa 2009).

Finally, the substantial interactive effect of the minority relative size and reinforcing cleavages deserves special emphasis. The literature on identity mobilization and inter-ethnic relations largely focuses on either relative and/or absolute group size (Posner 2005; 2017, Goldstone et. al 2011) or the cleavage configuration (Selway 2010, Basedau et. al 2016). My findings indicate that policy of promotion becomes much more likely as the relative size of a minority group that is segmented from the majority both on religion and language increases. This provides further evidence to a more recent strand in the literature that relative size of the groups *and* cleavage configuration influence group mobilization patterns and inter-ethnic relations in tandem (Birbir and Satana 2022).

In Chapter 3, I proposed that when the linguistic majority and minority share in at least one religious identification even though they are not in religious unity, the policy of toleration would become more likely to be adopted. Model 8 provides limited support for this hypothesis as the positive coefficient on shared religion is significant only at 90 % confidence level. Substantively, the probability of toleration increases from 0.26 to 0.43 on average in majority-minority pairs with shared religion compared to others. I also tested a possible extension of *Proposition 5*, which holds linguistic minority groups in shared religion cleavage structure would be less likely to receive exclusion. Figure 6 shows the marginal effect of shared religion cleavage structure on the probability of exclusion being adopted toward a minority language. Shared religion reduces the probability of exclusion from 0.57 to 0.36 on average.



**Figure 5.6 - Substantive Effect of Shared Religion on Policy of Exclusion**

Slightly diverging from the established literature about the role of crosscutting cleavages on enhancing political stability (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Lijphart 1977) and curtailing violent mobilization (Selway 2010), I make a distinction between two different kinds of crosscutting cleavage structures. I adopt Birnir and Satana's (2022) definition of *shared religious identity* and distinguish the type of cleavage intersection where two linguistic groups belong to same single religious identity category, which I call religious unity, and the case where one or both linguistic groups belong to two or more religious identity sub-groups, at least one of which is shared between the two.<sup>16</sup>

As discussed in Chapter 3, the definition of shared identity I adopt is different from the prevailing definition of crosscutting cleavages in the literature and I argue that the two different types of crosscutting cleavage structure to have different effects on language policy outcomes. While religious unity between the majority and minority linguistic group, as shown in Figure 4,

<sup>16</sup> This part will go to theory chapter with a table showing the two different situations. I just realized as I was discussing the results that I did not describe this well enough in the theory chapter. I put it in here for now to get your feedback.

nearly doubles the probability of the policy of exclusion, shared religion makes exclusion less likely and toleration -possibly- more likely. This effect of a secondary identity in which the linguistic majority and minority share primarily works through changing the incentives and payoffs of ethnic competition in the field of language policy. The fact that the majority and minority linguistic groups are not identical on the second identity dimension impedes, not necessarily removes, the threat perceived by the majority for access to state resources. At least part of the linguistic minority is already outgroup members due to their religious affiliation. Moreover, language concessions might serve as a platform for the factions within the majority to co-opt their co-religionists into a political coalition. But at the same time, the identity divisions within the linguistic minority could hamper the ability of the group to mobilize for more extensive concessions (i.e., promotion). Therefore, the effect of shared religion would have the commonly theorized effect of reducing the zero-sum issues while the case of only language crosscutting religion (i.e., religious unity) would actually increase competition over language status and make policy of exclusion more likely.

To sum up, models 5 through 9 generally support the propositions I made about the relationship between cleavage interactions and language policy outcomes. Religious unity between the linguistic majority and minority is strongly associated with a higher likelihood of exclusion toward the minority language. This relationship between being identical on a second identity dimension and policy of exclusion, I argue, is driven by heightened competition between culturally similar groups for power and state resources, ease and long-term benefits of linguistic assimilation, and lower ethnolinguistic vitality of less culturally distinct groups. Reinforcing religious cleavage, however, strongly increases the likelihood of promotion. This effect is mostly driven by higher likelihood of promotion toward the language of relatively larger minorities. I contend that a

reinforcing cleavage makes promotion more likely by increasing the ethnolinguistic vitality and mobilization potential of the minority. These effects are even more magnified for relatively larger minority groups. Lastly, shared religion is associated with a lower likelihood of exclusion and potentially a higher likelihood of toleration. I argue that this impact of shared religion is due to its complementary role in reducing zero-sum issues and encouraging cross-group coalitions. The finding that relationship between shared religion and toleration is significant only at 90 % confidence level might be due to the increased adoption of international treaties such as European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages or Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights in the 1990s. These documents generally stipulate policies for revitalization of endangered languages, which usually fall into the category of toleration-based policies and are mostly ratified by members of Council of Europe, where most linguistic minorities have the same religious identity as the majority. Clearly such institutions have an impact as well, but the findings clearly suggest that group relative size and cleavage configuration are one of the most fundamental predictors of minority language policy outcomes.

#### **5.1.4. Robustness Checks**

The previous two sections discussed the results of the multivariate analyses that provided strong support to my arguments regarding the effects of the relative size of linguistic groups and cleavage interactions on minority language policy outcomes. In this section, I address some potential methodological and theoretical considerations as to the robustness of the empirical findings presented in sections 1.2 and 1.3.

First, following Liu and her co-authors (2018), I run all baseline models with lagged dependent variable as an additional control to address possible temporal autocorrelation. Although a lagged dependent variable has the risk of suppressing the predictive power of other independent



**Table 5.6 – Logit Models of the Effects of Relative Size and Cleavage Interaction on Minority Language Policy with Lagged DV**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Exclusion (2a)	Promotion (4a)	Exclusion (5a)	Promotion (6a)	Toleration (8a)	Exclusion (9a)
Majority Relative Size (Pr.)	2.642** (1.068)	-9.576*** (3.045)	2.982*** (1.110)	-10.142*** (2.392)	0.504 (1.106)	2.948*** (1.088)
Minority Relative Size (Pr.)		7.656*** (2.074)	-9.250*** (1.582)	8.205*** (2.334)	1.231 (1.290)	-9.191*** (1.562)
Religious Unity			0.641** (0.329)	-0.322 (0.918)		
Reinforcing Religion			0.575 (0.354)	0.339 (1.152)		
Shared Religion					0.454 (0.330)	-0.617** (0.310)
Excluded	1.018** (0.467)	-0.805** (0.380)	0.956** (0.456)	-1.105** (0.521)	-0.330 (0.276)	0.958** (0.455)
Autonomy	-2.874*** (0.424)	4.884*** (0.576)	-3.029*** (0.499)	4.887*** (0.627)	-1.038 (1.202)	-3.044*** (0.495)
Democracy	-1.080** (0.470)	0.250 (0.433)	-1.264*** (0.401)	0.060 (0.466)	0.577 (0.437)	-1.262*** (0.406)
Geographically Concentrated	1.157** (0.537)	-2.273** (1.009)	1.456** (0.584)	-2.501** (1.193)	-0.303 (0.510)	1.454** (0.581)
N Groups (log)	0.063 (0.583)	-1.481** (0.658)	-0.236 (0.542)	-1.133* (0.592)	0.758* (0.428)	-0.234 (0.541)
Population (log)	-0.207 (0.191)	0.498 (0.320)	-0.303* (0.166)	0.543 (0.349)	0.010 (0.111)	-0.301* (0.166)
GDP per Capita (log)	-0.477* (0.281)	0.070 (0.231)	-0.572** (0.281)	0.135 (0.265)	0.194 (0.264)	-0.566** (0.273)
Lagged DV	9.770*** (0.500)	12.710*** (0.984)	9.681*** (0.521)	12.977*** (1.013)	8.894*** (0.410)	9.683*** (0.521)
Constant	-2.623 (3.180)	-4.138 (4.325)	-0.580 (3.359)	-5.334 (3.963)	-7.500*** (2.565)	-0.009 (3.121)
Observations	10,151	10,151	10,095	10,095	10,095	10,095
Log Likelihood	-471.148	-102.774	-454.634	-103.440	-637.294	-454.648
AIC	970.296	235.547	943.268	238.879	1,306.589	941.296

*Note:* Unit of analysis is minority group/year. Majority relative size and minority relative size are measured as proportions [0-1]. Regional controls are included but not reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. \*p<0.1 \*\*p<0.05 \*\*\*p<0.01

variables that are theoretically relevant (Achen 2000), language policy is usually sticky and takes time to change, thus, the language policy at  $t-1$  is generally highly correlated with the language policy at  $t$ . Models 2a, 4a, 5a, 6a, 8a, and 9a address the possibility of autocorrelation. Then I discuss the effect of clustering standard errors at the level of minority/country. Finally, I consider treating minority language policy choice not as a binary one for each policy option but as a single decision between three alternative choices. To that end, I run a multinomial logit model that includes all explanatory and control variables.

Table 6 reports the results of multivariate logistic regression analyses, which are alternatives of the baseline models with lagged dependent variable as an additional control. In models 2a and 4a, the effects of the majority and minority relative size on the policies of exclusion and promotion remain statistically significant. The coefficient on the effects of majority relative size on exclusion and that of minority relative size's effects on promotion are slightly smaller, as some of the variation is now captured by lagged dependent variables. In model 5a, the relationship between religious unity and the policy of exclusion is substantively a little weaker but still statistically significant. Model 6a shows that the association between reinforcing religious cleavage and promotion is not statistically significant once the lagged dependent variable is included in the model. This might be explained by the structure of the sample. As can be seen in Table 3, the positive relationship between reinforcing religious cleavage and policy of promotion is mostly driven by the relatively larger linguistic minorities. However, relatively larger minority groups with a reinforcing religious cleavage with the majority amount to only around 4 percent of the entire sample. Due to the low number of the relevant groups in the sample, once the lagged dependent variable is included in the model, the test for statistical significance becomes steeply

**Table 5.7 – Multinomial Logit Model Predicting Exclusion and Promotion Relative to Toleration**

	<i>Baseline: Toleration</i>	
	Exclusion	Promotion
Majority Relative Size (Pr.)	5.116*** (1.587)	-11.886*** (2.600)
Minority Relative Size (Pr.)	-9.845*** (3.603)	8.137** (3.534)
Religious Unity	1.065** (0.517)	0.381 (0.686)
Reinforcing Religion	0.730 (0.466)	0.740 (0.845)
Large Minority	-0.113 (0.616)	-0.957 (1.012)
Reinforcing Religion* Large Minority	-0.338 (0.818)	2.441** (1.144)
Excluded	1.114*** (0.430)	-0.520 (0.547)
Autonomy	-1.689*** (0.463)	3.075*** (0.573)
Democracy	-1.390*** (0.342)	0.428 (0.367)
Geographically Concentrated	1.998*** (0.682)	-0.691 (0.986)
N Groups (log)	-0.338 (0.551)	-1.884*** (0.722)
Population (log)	-0.165 (0.192)	0.221 (0.207)
GDP per Capita (log)	-0.451* (0.244)	0.349 (0.229)
Constant	0.312 (2.081)	2.745 (3.418)
Observations	10,330	
Log Likelihood	-6447.976	
AIC	12967.95	

*Note:* Unit of analysis is minority group/year. Majority relative size and minority relative size are measured as proportions [0-1]. Regional controls are included but not reported in the table. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. \* p < 0.1 \*\* p < 0.05 \*\*\* p < 0.01

more difficult. The statistical significance of the effect of shared religion on likelihood of toleration disappears once lagged dependent variable is included in Model 8a. However, its negative association with the policy of exclusion is still substantively and statistically significant in Model 9a. In short, the results of the logistic regression models that include lagged dependent variable as a control are generally in line with the findings in the baseline models in Sections 1.2 and 1.3.

Another potential methodological issue over the robustness of the baseline models concerns the method applied to deal with correlated error terms within cluster. The unit of analysis in the regression models computed in this section is minority group-year and the models include both group level and country level independent variables. Therefore, the individual observations are clustered both at the minority group level and country level. Following the conventional approach to nested clustering (Pepper 2002), I cluster standard errors for baseline models at the most aggregate level, country. But error terms may be correlated at the minority group level or at both minority group and country levels. To address this, I run models with standard errors clustered at the minority-group level and with multiway clustering (Cameron et. al 2011) at minority-group and country levels. Results are not reported as none of the main explanatory variables loses its statistical significance. On the contrary, the positive association of shared religion with the policy of toleration passes the 95% confidence interval threshold under multiway clustering.

Finally, I address a potential theoretical concern over the specification of baseline models. In models 1 through 9, minority language policy outcome is conceptualized as a binary choice between adopting a type of policy and not adopting it. Alternatively, it might be argued that when making the minority language policy, the majority linguistic group (or the state) considers all three policy options together. Since the theory offered in this dissertation considers the policies of exclusion, toleration, and promotion as discrete choices with different incentive structures and

payoffs, the most appropriate statistical method to analyze minority language policy as a multiple choice is multinomial logistic regression.

Table 7 reports the results of a multinomial logistic regression model where base outcome is the policy of toleration. The results provide support to the hypotheses regarding the effects of group relative size on minority language policy outcomes. An increase in majority relative size is associated with higher likelihood of policy of exclusion and lower likelihood of policy of promotion, both relative to policy of toleration. In addition, higher relative size of a linguistic minority has a negative relationship with exclusion and a positive relationship with promotion, again compared to the policy of toleration. Moreover, just as in the baseline models, religious unity is positively associated with the policy of exclusion. Reinforcing religious cleavage and relatively large minority size similarly have an interactive effect on the likelihood of promotion. All these relationships are statistically highly significant.

This section has demonstrated that the findings of this dissertation on how minority language policy outcomes are shaped are robust to various alternative model specifications and statistical testing methods. These robustness checks conclude the presentation of empirical findings on minority language policy as a political outcome. In the next part of this chapter, I turn to testing the hypotheses I raised in Chapter 3 regarding the role of different minority language policy types in onset of ethnic conflict between linguistic majority and minority groups.

## 5.2. Minority Language Policy and Ethnic Conflict

The scholarship of sociolinguistics as well as the literature on ethnic politics have studied the link between language policy and (violent and/or non-violent) societal conflict from various perspectives and contradictory explanations and findings (See Chapter 2). In this dissertation, I seek to contribute to the literature by analyzing that relationship through a novel conceptualization and measurement of minority language policies. As demonstrated in the first part of this chapter, minority language policy is mainly shaped by relative group sizes and cleavage interactions, which shapes the incentives and capabilities of the majority and minority linguistic groups in the bargaining for the language policy. In turn, I argue, the choice of which language(s) are to be used in the public sphere and to what extent has a bearing on the inter-ethnic relations and likelihood of ethnic conflict.

I argue that the conflicting theories and findings on the relationship between minority language policy and violent ethnic conflict is caused by several theoretical and methodological shortcomings. First of all, as I previously discussed in Chapter 4, sociolinguists and political scientists focus on different aspects of language policy without much cooperation. As a result, while sociolinguists try to describe language situations that are prone to cause conflict without paying attention to political underpinnings of such conflicts or lack thereof, political scientists mostly treat language only as an identity marker that might cause conflict, rather indifferent to social implications of language policy. Secondly, these two approaches also define the existing description and measurements of language policy. Therefore, despite recent valuable contributions in the area of language policy data (Liu 2015, Liu 2017) most analyses of violent conflict between linguistic groups are case-specific (e.g., DeVotta 2004, Uddin 2006, Benrabah 2013) and systematic empirical cross-country analyses are still missing. Lastly, and connected to the previous

point, the existing empirical political science accounts of language and conflict link either have methodological issues (Laitin 2000) or focus on language only as a cleavage rather than a policy area (Fox 2004, Bormann et. al 2017).

To address these shortcomings, I developed a theory of how minority language policy affects the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict. Specifically, I argue that policies of exclusion and promotion both make ethnic conflict between linguistic groups more likely through different mechanisms, while the policy of toleration has a conflict mitigating effect. I then extend this theory to an ordinal conceptualization and measurement of language policy concessions and propose that the lowest and highest levels linguistic accommodations toward minority groups will be associated with increased likelihood of conflict compared to mid-range accommodations.

### 5.2.1. Descriptive Evidence

Minority Language Policy Dataset (MLPD) includes language policy toward 424 linguistic minority groups from 50 countries across the world and other group level information for the 1945-2017 period.<sup>17</sup> Based on ACD2EPR dataset (Vogt et. al 2015), I identified 94 conflict episodes where a linguistic minority group is involved in an armed conflict. In total, 47 linguistic minority groups from 20 countries were involved in such a conflict during the covered time period.


**Table 5.8 - Ethnic Conflict Episodes by the Minority Language Policy at the Time of Conflict Onset**

	<b>Exclusion</b>	<b>Toleration</b>	<b>Promotion</b>	<b>Total</b>
Ethnic Conflict Onset	55.68 % (n=49)	14.77 % (n=13)	29.55 % (n=26)	100 % (n=88)

*Note: The total does not add up to 94 due to missing data on Language Policy.*

<sup>17</sup> See Chapter 4 for the definitions and operationalization.

Table 8 shows the policy toward the minority language at the time of each ethnic conflict onset recorded in the dataset. The distribution clearly suggests that linguistic minorities involve in ethnic conflicts most commonly when a policy of exclusion is in place, followed by policy of promotion. Toleration, however, is the least commonly observed minority language policy at the time of conflict onset. Given the high frequency of conflict episodes that involves minorities whose



*Figure 5.7 - Minority Group Size and Cleavage Interaction in the Entire Sample vs. at Each Conflict Episode*



languages are promoted despite how uncommon the policy of promotion is in the sample (12.9 %, See Table 1), the table gives some credence to the proposition that the policy of promotion is associated with higher likelihood of conflict.

The two main explanatory variables of minority language policy in this dissertation, group relative size and cleavage interaction are commonly cited as important predictors of ethnic conflict (Esteban and Ray 2011, Caselli and Coleman 2013, Selway 2011, Basedau et. al 2016). Figure 7 shows the distribution of these two variables in the entire sample versus at the onset of each ethnic conflict episode. As in the first part of this chapter, a large minority is operationalized as any group whose relative size is above the 3<sup>rd</sup> percentile of minority relative size in the sample. Although group size variable is not fixed over time for all groups, there is no group that has moved from one category to the other during the period covered in MLPD. Looking at the first part of the figure, large minority groups seem to have been involved in ethnic conflicts with a slightly higher frequency. This trend is in line with the literature that considers relative group size as a predictor of ethnic conflict onset (Cederman et. al 2010, Esteban and Ray 2011). However, smaller relative size is, as demonstrated in the previous part, associated with higher likelihood of policy of exclusion being adopted toward a minority language, which I argue is associated with higher likelihood of ethnic conflict onset.

The distribution of cleavage interactions of the linguistic minority groups across conflict episodes compared to the entire MLPD sample also seem to confirm the literature on the effects of cleavage configurations on ethnic conflict (Selway 2011, Basedau et. al 2016). The linguistic minorities involved in a conflict episode more commonly (38 %) have a reinforcing religious cleavage that divides them from the majority compared to the entire sample (22 %). Yet, the combined share of cleavage configurations associated with the policies of exclusion and promotion




Figure 5.8 - Conflict Episodes by Regional Concentration, Access to Power, Regime Type, and Region

-unity and reinforcing respectively- is also higher among the groups involved in conflict (61 %) than the entire sample (50 %). Minority relative size and cleavage configurations seem to be correlated with both language policy and ethnic conflict. In the next section, I test the relationship between minority language policy type and ethnic conflict onset with multivariate models that control for relative group size and cleavage interaction in addition to other relevant variables.

Before moving on to the multivariate analyses, in Figure 8, I present the distribution of some commonly employed variables in ethnic conflict analysis in the MLPD sample and across conflict episodes. While democracy does not seem to have a clear association with ethnic conflict onset, the literature on the effects of territorial concentration (Toft 2002) and access to central power (Cederman et. al 2010) seems to have been supported. Minority groups that are territorially concentrated and those excluded from access to central power are more commonly involved in episodes of ethnic conflict. The regional distribution of the minority groups involved in ethnic conflict also shows some patterns. Although almost half of the linguistic minority groups identified in MLPD are from Sub-Saharan African countries, their share among groups that experienced ethnic conflict is one-third. Moreover, while groups from Asia & Pacific are overrepresented in the conflict group, no linguistic minority from Americas seems to have had any ethnic conflict episodes. In the next section, I include controls for each of these factors in the multivariate regression models.

### **5.2.2. The Road to Conflict: Exclusion and Promotion**

Language, as one of the most potent sources of identity mobilization (Brubaker 2013) and the basis of ingroup as well as intergroup communication, has a crucial role in the relations between different linguistic groups in a nation. It serves as a symbol of attachment to an ethnic identity (Geertz 1994, Horowitz 1985), a tool for unity and efficiency of national identities

**Table 5.9 – Logit Models of the Effects of Minority Language Policy on Ethnic Conflict Onset**

	Ethnic Conflict Onset			
	<i>Logistic</i>		<i>Multilevel</i>	
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
Exclusion	0.521* (0.304)		0.928** (0.385)	0.873** (0.369)
Promotion		0.971** (0.434)	1.397*** (0.457)	1.350*** (0.428)
Majority Relative Size	-1.149 (1.115)	0.110 (1.092)	-0.521 (1.128)	-0.943 (1.321)
Minority Relative Size	3.275*** (1.160)	1.108 (1.389)	1.646 (1.408)	1.781 (1.479)
Excluded	1.834*** (0.503)	1.868*** (0.522)	1.859*** (0.518)	1.768*** (0.515)
Reinforcing Religious Cleavage	0.532 (0.375)	0.369 (0.380)	0.392 (0.367)	0.490* (0.284)
Autonomy	1.440*** (0.467)	0.867* (0.465)	1.110** (0.483)	1.104*** (0.370)
Democracy	0.203 (0.419)	0.048 (0.396)	0.211 (0.409)	0.130 (0.343)
Geographically Concentrated	0.811 (1.038)	1.131 (0.927)	0.972 (0.922)	0.807 (0.798)
Country Population (log)	0.192* (0.116)	0.149 (0.117)	0.150 (0.115)	0.220 (0.143)
GDP per Capita (log)	-0.329* (0.179)	-0.441** (0.196)	-0.400** (0.195)	-0.377** (0.180)
War History	0.506*** (0.110)	0.537*** (0.103)	0.505*** (0.116)	0.411*** (0.112)
Europe	-0.323 (0.598)	-0.639 (0.579)	-0.636 (0.571)	-0.360 (0.666)
MENA	0.784 (0.584)	0.603 (0.536)	0.561 (0.540)	0.940 (0.606)
sub-Saharan Africa	-0.225 (0.539)	0.013 (0.551)	-0.228 (0.596)	-0.154 (0.571)
Constant	-5.196** (2.177)	-4.543** (2.116)	-5.012** (2.191)	-5.619** (2.431)
Observations	9,613	9,613	9,613	9,613
Log Likelihood	-386.297	-384.325	-380.474	-379.098
Akaike Inf. Crit.	808.593	804.650	798.948	798.195
Bayesian Inf. Crit.				941.612


*Note:* Unit of analysis is minority group/year. The baseline of regional controls is Asia/Pacific. Americas is excluded because it predicts failure perfectly. Three cubic splines of peace years included but not reported. Robust/bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the minority group/country level. \* p \*\* p \*\*\* p<0.01

(Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983), and a basis of maintaining and sustaining a collective group identity (Giles et. al 1977). Language policy is the manifestation of which language(s) and/or language form(s) are to be used in the public sphere to fulfill these functions. The specific policy adopted toward a language spoken by a non-dominant identity group in a society has a bearing on the violent as well as peaceful mobilization of that identity and likelihood of conflict along ethnolinguistic lines.

I argue that the minority language policies of exclusion and promotion are associated with higher likelihood of ethnic conflict onset through two different mechanisms. Exclusion will facilitate violent mobilization of a linguistic identity by increasing the salience of linguistic identity. Promotion, however, makes ethnic conflict along linguistic lines more likely by linguistic segregation and providing resources to ethnic entrepreneurs and potential rebel leaders for mobilization of the language identity.

Table 9 reports the results of multivariate logistic regression models testing the relationship between minority language policy and ethnic conflict onset. Model 10 shows that policy of exclusion is positively associated with ethnic conflict onset. However, this relationship is statistically significant at 90 % confidence level. The coefficient on the policy of promotion is also positive and statistically significant in Model 11. Model 12 includes both the policy of exclusion and promotion so that their association with ethnic conflict onset is tested relative to that of the policy of toleration. As suggested in *Proposition 6* and *Proposition 7*, when considered relative to toleration, both policies of exclusion and promotion is positively associated with ethnic conflict onset and both relationships are stronger than when policy types are included in models separately. In Model 14, I relax the assumption of unobserved randomness occurring within the minority

group-country clusters and estimate a multi-level model to check the robustness of the findings (Woolridge 2003). The substantive effects and their implications are discussed below.



**Figure 5.9 - Substantive Effect of Exclusion on Ethnic Conflict Onset Relative to Toleration**

Figure 9 shows the marginal effect of the policy of exclusion on ethnic conflict onset relative to toleration. Setting all controls at their mean/median values, the average predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset is 0.004 when minority language policy is exclusion compared to the baseline probability of 0.0016 under toleration policy. On average, when minority language policy is exclusion in a given year, ethnic conflict onset is 2.5 times more likely than toleration policy. Policy of exclusion might make conflict onset more likely by increasing the salience of linguistic identities and facilitating violent mobilization of minority members by potential rebel groups.

Exclusion has both material and symbolic implications that can provide minority ethnic group leaders with an opportunity to mobilize the group identity, including mobilization for violence. Opportunity-based explanations of ethnic conflict refuse the role of group level grievances caused by restriction of an ethnic language in outbreak of conflict (Laitin 2000, Fearon

and Laitin 2003). However, such an approach fails to consider the role of what the social movement scholars call “insurgent consciousness” (McAdam 1982) or “cultural framing” (McAdam et. al 1996) in mobilization of linguistic identity groups. Grievances over language are not necessarily the most compelling or a sufficient cause of ethnic conflict by itself, yet they can provide raw material for violent mobilization (Bostock 1997).

One such mechanism through which the policy of exclusion and the grievance it causes might be converted into raw material for mobilization is the loss of opportunities for public employment for minority language speakers (Wimmer 1997). The most obvious manifestation of this happens at the designation of the official language. For instance, the continuation of the official status of colonial languages has been a tool for the elites in Sub-Saharan Africa, who mostly come from ethnic groups that had been favored by the colonial administration, to maintain the privileged position of themselves and their groups in state structures.<sup>18</sup> But exclusion causes grievances at more subtle levels as well. For instance, Serbia’s denial of diplomas obtained from University of Pristina, which taught in Albanian and was designated as the university of Albanian nationality under Yugoslav federalism, even before the breakup of Yugoslavia led to loss of the opportunity to be employed as Albanian language teachers or public servants for many Kosovar Albanians (Duncan 2016).

The policy of exclusion may also turn language into a rallying flag for ethnic groups that perceive themselves to be otherwise disadvantaged. Language is intrinsically linked to belonging to and perception of an ethnic identity (Horowitz 1985, Kauffman 2001). Even in a case such as the Northern Ireland conflict where the minority language had practically disappeared, both IRA


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<sup>18</sup> See Harlech-Jones (1995) for an account of how the official status of English used by the state elite to their advantage.

and other Irish nationalists have commonly invoked the non-recognition of Gaelic language by the British to amass support among the already disgruntled Catholics (Bostock 1997). Sure enough, group belonging and grievances do not spontaneously turn into ethnic violence (Brass 1991), however, ethnic elites can easily instrumentalize these grievances for mobilization, including the grievances over language use (Nelde 1997: 292). Langer (2005), for instance, demonstrates how the ethnic elite, who were previously included in the state elite framed the socio-economic inequalities between the northern and southern regions of Côte d'Ivoire within an ethnicity frame once they began to be excluded from the ruling coalition in the early 1990s. Ethnicity and language are important cultural frames (McAdam et. al 1996) to turn grievances into mobilization and collective violence.

In comparison, policy of toleration can serve to mitigate both material and symbolic grievances over the status and use of a minority language. It is definitely not a panacea for language based ethnic conflicts as violent mobilization largely depends on relative rather than absolute deprivation (Gurr 1970). However, policies of toleration, namely sanctioning and/or partially supporting the use of a minority language in media, education, and access to public services might still help discourage contentious mobilization of the minority group. Increased visibility and acceptance of the minority language can both provide its speakers with avenues for material benefits such as employment opportunities and enhance the prestige of the language and the identity.





**Figure 5.10 - Substantive Effect of Promotion on Ethnic Conflict Onset Relative to Toleration**

Figure 10 presents the marginal effect of the policy of promotion on ethnic conflict onset relative to toleration. Setting all controls at their mean/median values, the average predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset is 0.0064 when minority language policy is promotion. On average, an ethnic conflict is 4 times more likely to break out in a given year if minority language policy is promotion compared to when it is toleration. The policy of promotion might make ethnic conflict onset more likely by segregating the public sphere along linguistic lines and providing ethnic leaders with opportunity and resources to mobilize linguistic minority members for secessionist and/or violent goals.

The potential effects of the policy of promotion on the relations between linguistic groups and contentious mobilization of linguistic identities can be analyzed under two main categories. First, the policy of promotion leads to separation of the public areas along linguistic lines. This might turn into a linguistic segregation as different language groups engage with different media markets, attend different schools and receive public services in different languages and through different offices. Although intergroup contact theory emphasizes that only positive contact

between groups improves the intergroup relations (Pettigrew 1998), there is plethora of empirical evidence showing that the lack of contact and intergroup networks is associated with more prejudice and negative attitudes toward outgroup members in conjunction with personal characteristics (Munniksma et. al 2013, Gundelach 2014, Zhou et. al 2018).

Consider, for instance, when and how linguistically separated media markets would contribute to negative intergroup attitudes. Reading, listening, or watching the news in different languages does not necessarily lead to animosity. Yet, if the media is ethnically and linguistically divided into polarizing and exclusively ethnicity-based outlets, it reinforces prejudice and othering. Skjerdal and Moges (2020) demonstrate how ethnic segregation of private media outlets and divisions within supposedly national public media along linguistic/regional lines in Ethiopia have contributed to intergroup tensions and violence.

Similarly, linguistic segregation in the education system is prone to lead to adverse intergroup relations. Although instituted as a measure of conflict prevention, ethnically divided education systems in Bosnia and Macedonia have been shown to inhibit integration of different linguistic groups into a common civic identity (Krstevska-Papic and Zekolli 2013, Barbieri et. al 2013). Moreover, under segregated education of linguistic groups, the elites can easily access the language(s) of power and privilege regardless of their ethnicity, but the already disadvantaged segments of the minority would lack those resources. In that way, promotion policy can help the social and economic discrimination against large parts of the minority. Apartheid-era language policy of promoting local languages along the Bantustan system was a tool for excluding Blacks from attaining prestigious jobs and positions. Finally, another potentially problematic effect of linguistic segregation is the creation of minorities within minorities as policies of promotion are usually employed on a territorial basis (Lijphart et. al 1993), yet territories are rarely as ethnically

homogeneous as shown on a colored linguistic map. Most ethnic minority homelands are also the homeland of many from the national majority. In that regard, the language in education policy of Catalonia has led to a lot of controversy and legal/political battles between the regional and national governments and publics. The 1983 linguistic normalization law passed by the regional government provided for Spanish medium education while making Catalan the main medium of instruction in the school system. However, unlike other regions of Spain, Catalonia has gradually developed a policy that made Catalan the only legal medium of instruction in the region and Spanish a school subject (Leclerc 2019). The Catalan medium education policy came to being gradually as Catalonia solved the need for qualified staff that can teach in Catalan over the 1990s. This policy has led once and again to widespread debates and reciprocal legal regulations and court decisions by regional and national governments that seek to override one another. The Spanish medium education for children whose mother tongue is Spanish in Catalonia is still an ongoing debate and legal issue.

It is essential to underline that neither the link between lack of contact and prejudice nor the association I propose that exists between negative intergroup attitudes and ethnic violence develops spontaneously. Negative attitudes toward members of non-familiar outgroups are usually invoked and inflamed by political entrepreneurs through rhetoric and media to consolidate their influence over their potential support base (Brader 2005, Schemer 2014). Similarly, grievance does not translate into collective violence and conflict unless the leader(s) solve the collective action problem (Lichbach 1995). The second aspect of the promotion's effects on likelihood of ethnic conflict along linguistic lines works through the instruments and resources it provides to ethnic leaders for contentious mobilization of linguistic identities. The literature on the negative impacts of decentralization is greatly informative in that regard. One of the central arguments of this

literature is that under certain conditions, decentralization supplies the extremist groups at the sub-national level with resources to engage in secessionism and conflict (Kymlicka 1998, Snyder 2000, Brancati 2006). As the policy of promotion divides the public sphere into linguistically separated areas, it might also serve as resource for mobilization of disgruntled linguistic minority members for collective violence. For example, Tamil medium schools both in the LTTE controlled and government-controlled areas have been used by the Tigers as recruitment grounds for the rebellion (Lilja 2009). Moreover, ethnic divisions and decentralization is used as a resource for mobilization not only by rebel groups but also political parties claiming to advocate for an ethnic group. Brancati (2006) demonstrates how strong regional parties can manipulate decentralization and patterns of political participation for mobilizing the ethnic groups they claim to represent for secessionist goals. In a similar vein, focusing on the role of language in political incorporation, Liu (2022) shows how the type of language network that Chinese immigrants are located in effects their political incorporation in Europe. Members of the more ethnically diverse networks integrated by use of Mandarin by all groups are better incorporated in the political system of the host country than those involved in monolingual networks in one ethnic language. The language networks created by policy of promotion can also influence patterns of political participation and incorporation and thereby interethnic relations.

Next, I turn to the control variables. At the minority group-country level, only the variables excluded, regional autonomy, and war history consistently have a statistically significant effect across all models. Excluded ethnic groups are defined by whether the representatives of an ethnic group are excluded from central executive power and empirical evidence indicates that excluded groups are more likely to be involved in ethnonationalist conflicts (Cederman et. al 2010, 2013). Results in Table 9 support this hypothesis. However, access to central executive power is only one

way through which non-dominant ethnic groups can be politically incorporated. Power-sharing through decentralization, regional autonomy, is also positively and consistently associated with ethnic conflict onset. Although power-sharing is widely advocated as a way of dampening ethnic conflict and secessionism by giving non-dominant ethnic groups control over their political, economic, and social affairs (Lijphart 1977; 1996), the available empirical evidence indicates regional autonomy is associated with higher likelihood of ethnic conflict in general (Brancati 2006) or specifically at post-conflict settings (Cederman et. al 2015). Models 10 through 13 suggest that regional autonomy is positively associated with conflict onset, just like the policy of promotion is. The findings on past conflict are in line with the general agreement in literature. Lastly, note that minority relative size, as a measure of group capacity for mobilization, has a significant positive coefficient only in Model 10. Once the policy of promotion is included in the model, the significance of minority relative size disappears.

At the country level, GDP per capita is the only control variable consistently significant across all model specifications. In line with the predictions of greed/opportunity camp in the civil conflict literature (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004), higher levels of economic development make the ethnic conflict outbreak less likely. Another indicator of opportunity argument, country population is significant only in Model 10.

In summary, models 10 through 13 provides strong empirical support to the proposition that the minority language policies of exclusion and promotion are associated with a higher likelihood of ethnic conflict along linguistic lines compared to the policy of toleration. Relative to toleration, outbreak of an ethnic conflict between linguistic groups is 2.5 times more likely under exclusion and 4 times more likely under promotion. Through several examples, I discussed how exclusion can increase likelihood of violent language conflict by creating material and emotional

grievances among the linguistic minority members. Such grievances enhance the salience of language as a symbolically powerful identity dimension and facilitates mobilization and recruitment for potential rebel leaders. Then, drawing on the intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954, Pettigrew 1998) and the empirical evidence showing the negative effects of ethnified media markets (Skjerdal and Modes 2020) and linguistically segregated schooling (Krstevska-Papic and Zekolli 2013) on interethnic relations, I explained how policy of promotion can create a fertile ground for violent mobilization. Finally, I emphasized the crucial role played by political entrepreneurs in order to turn both the grievances created by exclusion and mechanisms and resources provided by promotion into collective action and violent conflict.

### 5.2.3. Minority Language Policy Index and Ethnic Conflict

The previous section demonstrated the relationship between the policies of exclusion and promotion with outbreak of ethnic conflict between linguistic minority and majority groups. As discussed in Chapter 4, an alternative measurement for minority language policy is to position the policy toward a minority language on a scale ranging from most restrictive/exclusionary to most accommodating/promotive. Indeed Liu (2017) offers such a distinction between minority language recognition and the level of that recognition. To check for the robustness of the findings in section 2.2, I create a minority language policy index and test its relationship with ethnic conflict onset.

*Table 5.10 - Coding of Minority Language Policy Index*

	Mass Communication	Education	Public Services	Legal	Official Status	Minority Language Policy Index
Minority Language Access	0-1	0-2	0-1	0-1	0-4	0-13
Minority Language Use by State	0-1	0-2	0-1			

Table 10 shows the coding scheme for the minority language policy index. It is primarily based on coding of the trichotomous measure of exclusion, toleration, and promotion (See Appendix for definitions and coding sheet). In order to create the index, I first look at the component variables of the three minority language policy areas: media, education, and public services. Each component of mass communication and public services areas are coded as binary outcome variables. I add 1 point to the minority language policy index for each component coded positive in these areas. In the field of education, I distinguish whether access/use of the language is provided in private or public educational institutions. I add 1 point each for teaching and instruction in private schools and 2 points each for public schools to the minority language policy index. Education is largely considered to be the main area where states engage in language policy and planning (Fishman 1989, Hornberger 2006, Liu 2015). Moreover, MLPD shows considerable variation in terms of access/use of minority languages in private versus public educational institutions. Thus, this coding scheme both reflects the variation of the policies in the field of education and assigns a heavier weight to education policy in the index. Finally, I consider the legal provisions for use and protection of a minority language and its *de jure* official status. Much of the ethnic competition over language policy concerns the status and perceived prestige of languages (Horowitz 1985, Tollefson 2003). Indeed, in many disputes over language policy, legal recognition or even mention of the minority language policy figures more prominently than the actual policy. Following this coding scheme, I created a minority language policy index bound between 0-13 to test its relationship with outbreak of ethnic conflict. Based on the theory I offered in Chapter 3; I expect this variable to have a non-linear relationship with ethnic conflict onset, where lowest and highest values of the minority language policy index are associated with higher and middle values are associated with lower likelihood of conflict.


**Table 5.11 – Logit Models of the Effects of Minority Language Policy Index on Ethnic Conflict Onset**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Ethnic Conflict Onset	
	(14)	(15)
Minority Language Policy Index	0.105** (0.050)	0.898*** (0.329)
Minority Language Policy Index 2 <sup>nd</sup> Knot		-3.584*** (1.097)
Minority Language Policy Index 3 <sup>rd</sup> Knot		6.745*** (1.976)
Majority Relative Size	0.222 (1.170)	0.032 (1.542)
Minority Relative Size	1.437 (1.351)	1.503 (1.617)
Excluded	1.947*** (0.532)	2.166*** (0.573)
Reinforcing Religious Cleavage	0.385 (0.387)	0.461 (0.410)
Autonomy	0.807* (0.488)	1.080** (0.435)
Democracy	-0.017 (0.393)	0.383 (0.372)
Geographically Concentrated	1.174 (0.933)	0.765 (0.815)
Country Population (log)	0.164 (0.125)	0.028 (0.134)
GDP per Capita (log)	-0.448** (0.193)	-0.702** (0.217)
War History	0.533*** (0.099)	0.528*** (0.099)
Peace Years Splines	yes	No
Regional Controls	yes	Yes
Constant	-5.186** (2.029)	-4.846** (2.087)
Observations	9,612	9,612
Log Likelihood	-384.539	-398.538
Akaike Inf. Crit.	805.079	831.076

*Note:* Unit of analysis is minority group/year. The baseline of regional controls is Asia/Pacific. Americas is excluded because it predicts failure perfectly. Robust standard errors are clustered at the minority group/country level. \* p < 0.1 \*\* p < 0.05 \*\*\* p < 0.01




Table 11 reports the results of multivariate logistic regression models testing the relationship between minority language policy index and ethnic conflict onset. Minority Language Policy Index has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in Model 14. This effect is probably driven by the high frequency of relatively very small linguistic minority groups in the sample and the extremely low likelihood of linguistic accommodation being extended to these groups. The median of minority relative size in the sample is 3.4 % and around 50 of the 424 minority groups in the sample form even less than 1 percent of the population of their country. These groups presumably also lack the material capacity for rebellion.



*Figure 5.11 - Fitted Values of MLP Index on Predicted Probability of Ethnic Conflict Onset*

Figure 11 visualizes the fitted values of Minority Language Policy Index on the predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset. The graph suggests a potentially non-linear relationship between the two, albeit not a very strong one due to the effects of outliers. Model 15 tests the possibility of a curvilinear relationship by including a restricted cubic spline of minority language policy index. The result suggests a curvilinear relationship with two bends.



**Figure 5.12 - Substantive Effect of Minority Language Policy Index on Ethnic Conflict Onset**

Figure 12 plots the predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset over the values of minority language policy index. The gray shaded area represents the 95 % confidence interval of the predictions. The predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset is very slim at the lower end of the index, even though the confidence interval partly passes through zero. Ethnic conflict onset becomes more likely as the minority language policy index slightly increases and then starts to get less likely around the middle values of the index. The trend of initial increase is again likely driven by the effect of minority groups with an extremely low relative size. Then, as value of the index moves above around 8, the predicted probability of ethnic conflict onset begins to rise again.

A quick overview of the MLPD reveals that there are 87 groups below the first quantile of the minority relative in the sample (1.2 %). In line with the findings on the role of group relative size on minority language policy, around 60 % of the observations on these groups are coded for the policy of exclusion. As a category of relatively very small groups that has low material capacity, these groups have been involved in only 5 episodes of ethnic conflict out of the 94 total in the sample. Whereas, among the groups in the second quantile (1.2 % - 3.4 %) the frequency of

exclusion is not very different with 52 % but these groups were involved in 12 episodes of ethnic conflict. This clearly indicates that exclusionary policies are not associated with a high likelihood of conflict for very small minorities. But slightly larger groups, which similarly receive exclusionary policies are likely to be involved in an ethnic conflict.

In sum, the results of Model 15 suggest that the hypothesized positive effect of exclusion and promotion on ethnic conflict onset is largely robust to alternative and more well-grained measurement of the minority language policy. As predicted, conflict is least likely at the medium level of accommodations toward a minority language and gets more likely as the minority language policy becomes more restrictive or more concessionary. Moreover, the cubic splines uncover potentially a more nuanced effect of exclusion on conflict. The lowest levels of linguistic concessions are associated with a very low likelihood of conflict, but a slight increase still at the lower end of minority language policy index makes it more likely. An examination of the data indicates that this is likely caused by relatively very small linguistic minorities being less likely both to get linguistic concessions and have the capacity to engage in a conflict against the majority. Yet, the linguistic minority groups that receive a very low level of linguistic accommodation despite some small concessions and are more likely to be slightly larger have a higher chance of being involved in conflict.

#### **5.2.4. Endogeneity of Minority Language Policy to Ethnic Conflict**

The biggest challenge of making causal inferences in social sciences is the issue of endogeneity. The interdependence of social phenomena presents a challenge even for some of the most commonly asked and studied research questions. Does democracy cause economic growth or does economic growth trigger democratization? Do bilateral trade ties prevent international conflict or do the states are more likely to establish trade ties with other states that they want to

avoid conflict? The possibility of reverse and/or circular causation complicates causal inference in almost all areas of social science and the research questions of this dissertation is no exception. I argue that minority language policies of exclusion and promotion are likely to cause ethnic conflict between linguistic groups in a country. An alternative to this argument stems from the possibility that majority linguistic groups or states are more likely to adopt the policies of exclusion and promotion toward the linguistic minorities with whom they expect to experience a violence conflict. In this section, I first shortly overview the potential methodological and theoretical strategies that can be adopted to overcome the problem of endogeneity. Then I discuss how can the endogenous relationship between minority language policy and ethnic conflict be addressed theoretically and empirically.

Endogeneity is an ontological question as much as it is a methodological issue that needs to be overcome. On the one hand, if one considers endogeneity as an integral part of the process that creates the phenomenon we observe, it does not appear as a problem but rather a necessarily integral part of theory as well. On the other hand, if it is perceived as an unobserved process that clouds inferences made from observable information, it arises as a problem that the researchers should solve methodologically. The methodological approach offers the use of instrumental variables (IV) as a useful tool to deal with endogeneity (Heckman 1996). In order to surmount the endogeneity between an explanatory factor and the outcome being investigated, IV approach prescribes employing a third variable that is correlated with the explanatory factor but not with the outcome of interest. The ontological approach, however, assumes the existence of latent factors before the analysis and with a focus on mechanisms, gravitate toward qualitative and/or case study research in general (Ragin and Becker 1992) and specifically toward methods such as process tracing, ethnography etc.

Both approaches offer valid and useful strategies to address endogeneity. Given the structure of the MLPD that focuses on group level outcomes and the challenge of identifying a group level variable that conforms to the instrumental variable criteria with available data for 424 linguistic groups across the world, IV approach does not easily lend itself to my analysis. Clearly would be possible to implement the IV strategy to a subset of the data or at a different level of analysis. However, the tradeoff would be loss of explanatory power and potentially a statistical analysis that is not a valid test for the theoretical propositions raised in this dissertation. Therefore, at the outset, I incorporate the endogeneity between minority language policy and ethnic conflict into the theory I developed on their relationship.

I argue that exclusion policy is more likely to be adopted toward the linguistic minorities that are relatively smaller and culturally closer to the majority, therefore less able to mount a *successful* challenge against the majority/state. As I discussed in the previous part of this chapter, the mechanisms of ethnic competition, national cohesion, and ethnolinguistic vitality are all based on mobilization and collective action capacity of the linguistic minority and the utility maximization strategies of both groups. This framework depicts exclusion as a policy that is adopted if the costs of linguistic accommodation is higher than the cost and likelihood of success of a challenge by the minority group. Liu (2015) also incorporates this into her theory of language regime choice as “threat of state instability.” The issue of endogeneity arises because the state can still choose exclusion specifically against an unruly group if it perceives this challenge as one it can contain with a lower cost than that of linguistic concessions. I have sought to address this possibility by concentrating on the mechanisms through which exclusion can increase salience of the linguistic identity and lead other group grievances to be identified with the language grievance, which has a higher symbolic and moral value (See section 2.2). I have discussed how these

mechanisms work to create an effect of the exclusion policy on ethnic conflict in addition to the initial calculations of the majority/state about a conflict that would be less costly than linguistic concessions.

The relationship I propose between the policy of promotion and ethnic conflict also explicitly incorporates the endogeneity between the policy choice and likelihood of conflict. Again, as an outcome based on the mechanisms of ethnic competition, national cohesion, and ethnolinguistic vitality; I argue that policy of promotion is more likely to be adopted toward the minority groups with higher capacity for collective mobilization and can raise a costly challenge against the majority/state if their demands for language accommodation is not fulfilled. To show that promotion has an effect on likelihood of conflict independent of the initial expectation for a language conflict, I again focus on the causal mechanisms that might link promotion to ethnic conflict. First, drawing on the intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954, Pettigrew 1998) and empirical findings that demonstrate disruptive effects of linguistic segregation in various cases across the world, I aim to show promotion can have a negative impact on intergroup relations. Second, I focus on the role of the ethnic leaders and political entrepreneurs and discuss how they can more easily mobilize their language group both by amplifying divisions and distrust caused by linguistic segregation and taking advantage of the opportunities and resources provided by it (See Section 2.2).

I have sought to demonstrate the causal mechanisms by referring to the real-world examples and empirical findings from different parts of the world. These examples can be multiplied. However, in order to clearly flesh out the causal mechanisms and sufficiently address the endogeneity of minority language policy to likelihood of ethnic conflict, (a) detailed case study(ies) that employs qualitative strategies such as process tracing is necessary. The next

direction my research will take is the identification of relevant cases and developing appropriate research strategies for in-depth analysis.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Conclusion**

Disputes over the use and status of minority languages are usually fought out in the realm of politics. But at the same time, most violent ethnic organizations that have a claim to represent a linguistically defined ethnic identity assert that the language of the group is denied the use and prestige it deserves. Moreover, quarrels over language policy are not limited to cases where minority languages are repressed but also occur in contexts where minority languages are accorded considerable accommodations. What role, then, do the policies adopted toward minority languages play in outbreak of ethnic conflict between linguistic groups? How is the choice of minority language policy made in the first place? These are the main research questions that this dissertation aimed to answer.

Chapter 2 locates these questions within the relevant literature of language policy and language conflict. First, it points out the incompatibility of most existing theories of language policy making for developing a theory of the effects of language policy on conflict. Although both are very relevant factors, explanations that exclusively emphasize ethnic competition or nation-building processes fail to explain the variance in language policy choices with their political implications. Focusing on the structural and political factors, including ethnic competition and nation-building, that influence language policy making, explanation of language policy choices as a political outcome is warranted by the main research question of the dissertation. The second part



of Chapter 2 turns to the literature on management of societal multilingualism and language conflict. Most theoretical explanations of language conflict focus on the unavoidable asymmetry between the status and prestige of the dominant and non-dominant languages in a society. Instead, I offer focusing on the mechanisms through which different minority language policy choices might impact the relations between language groups hindering or facilitating violent identity mobilization.

Based on these points, Chapter 3 develops a theory of minority language policy as a political outcome and how different outcomes relate to violent conflict occurring along linguistic divisions. First, I discuss the preferences as well as incentives and capabilities of the dominant (i.e., majority) and non-dominant (i.e., minority) groups in the process of language policy making. I identify ethnic competition and rivalry, national cohesion and efficiency, and ethnolinguistic vitality as the main factors underlying minority language policy choices. Then I focus on the two ethno-demographic variables that determine which factor matters to what degree in each case of choice: relative sizes of the groups and interaction of other cleavages with language. This approach yields several testable implications for language policy making. Relative group size shapes the language policy outcomes by affecting capability and willingness of the majority and minority in the bargaining for the status of minority language. In general, a greater size margin of the linguistic majority incentivizes the policy of exclusion while a relatively larger minority is more likely to receive the policy of promotion. The effects of cleavage configurations on language policy outcomes work through its impact on coalition building and group mobilization. Cleavage interactions that unite the majority and minority on a second identity dimension motivate exclusion of the minority language from public sphere. This argument is based on the exclusionary consequences of cultural proximity (Adida 2011) and ease and long-term benefits of the

assimilation of culturally similar groups (Gradstein and Schiff 2006). Reinforcing cleavages, however, are expected to encourage promotion, the highest level of language accommodations as it increases the capacity of the minority to mobilize for concessions. Lastly, shared identities, which may influence coalition building patterns and contentious mobilization of minority groups (Birbir and Satana 2022), incentivizes the middle ground policy of toleration.

Based on classification of policy types and their sources, the second part of Chapter 2 develops a theory of the effects of minority language policy on outbreak of ethnolinguistic conflict. Policy of exclusion contribute to occurrence of conflict between language groups by causing material and symbolic grievances over language use and increasing the salience of language identity. The argument does not imply that exclusion directly causes conflict but rather contributes to violent mobilization of the linguistic identity by providing a cultural frame and rally flag for the ethnic elite to utilize in mobilization. Similarly, the policy of promotion is expected to increase likelihood of conflict between linguistic groups by disrupting the intergroup relations due to linguistic segregation and providing minority ethnic elite with venues and resources for contentious identity mobilization. Finally, the policy of toleration, though not a panacea for language identity based conflicts, has the potential to mitigate conflict over language policy by addressing the material and symbolic grievances of the minority to a certain degree without separating public sphere along language divisions.

Chapter 5 tests these hypotheses over a cross-national data of minority language policies toward 424 groups from 50 randomly selected countries. The findings provide substantial support to the arguments raised in Chapter 3. Larger majority relative size and smaller minority relative size are associated with the policy of exclusion, while a decrease in the majority size and increase in the minority size makes promotion more likely. One important distinction in terms of the effects

of group size is majority size seems more important for the choice of exclusion whereas promotion depends more on minority relative size substantively. The effects of cleavage configurations also appear to be in line with the hypotheses raised in this dissertation. Religious unity of the majority and minority linguistic groups and reinforcing religious cleavages are associated with policies of exclusion and promotion respectively. Further, description of data suggests an interactive effect of group relative size and reinforcing religious cleavages on the policy of promotion, which indicates that reinforcing cleavages incentivize promotion more strongly when the relative group size larger. This relationship is supported by empirical testing. Lastly, shared religious identity between linguistic groups is revealed to be associated with lower likelihood of exclusion and higher likelihood of toleration, though the level of statistical significance of the second claim depends on model specification.

In the second part of Chapter 5, the relationship between minority language policy types and outbreak of ethnic conflict is tested with multivariate regression models that predict probability of ethnic conflict onset in a given year. While the policy of toleration is related to a very low probability of conflict onset, relative to toleration, exclusion and promotion makes it 2.5 times and 4 times more likely respectively. Moreover, I conduct the same empirical tests using an ordinal measurements of minority language policy accommodation based on MLPD coding and find that as the level of accommodations increase, the probability of conflict onset first decreases and starts to increase past the middle values of the minority language policy index. I discuss these findings and the causal mechanisms I suggested in Chapter 3 referring to numerous examples of language policy and conflict from Western Europe, the Balkans, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.

This dissertation and its empirical findings make important theoretical and methodological contributions. Firstly, it develops a new theoretical framework and methodological approach to

analyses of language policy making and the relationship between language policy and ethnic conflict. Moreover, Minority Language Policy Dataset (MLPD) provides a useful data source that may be expanded and utilized in testing various identity and language related theories. Lastly, the findings have practical implications as well. This dissertation shows that toleration based on middle ground policies such as bilingual education, teaching of minority languages, freedom and support to minority language media has the potential to make disputes over the status of minority languages less contentious and mitigate the risk of language-based conflict.

Nevertheless, the findings and their implications are not without certain limitations. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 2, language policy is a fluid concept with a wide range of dimensions. By focusing on regulations and norms on language use, this dissertation is able to offer a general framework that can be largely applied to language policy making and language conflict cases cross-nationally. However, the parsimony and generalizability of the theory comes at the expense of simplifying language policy to some extent. Although the findings support the proposed role of relative group size and cleavage interaction on minority language outcomes and the effects of policy type on outbreak of ethnic conflict, in addition to these important general factors, there are many particularities specific to each case of societal multilingualism. This dissertation offers a general framework for analyzing the link between language policy and ethnic conflict; however, a full understanding of an observed language conflict would take into account these case-specific factors as well.

Secondly, one of the greatest challenges of this study has been the data collection process. The operationalization of minority language policy in this dissertation is based on rules and norms of language use in mass communication, education, and public services. This approach provides more explanatory power over language policy choices as language policies in education may be

rendered trivial or reinforced in other areas. However, information on the language use rules and practices for each minority language is not easy to come by. This is especially true for relatively smaller linguistic minorities. Data limitations and missing data are unavoidable, but if these limitations were correlated with group size, the empirical tests and findings would be biased. Fortunately, in MLPD, data on language policy is missing for only 9 out of 424 linguistic minority groups included, with considerable variance in the relative size of the groups. However, the challenging nature of data collection made the building of a dataset with global coverage of linguistic minority groups untenable. Instead of focusing on a region, I chose to create a random sample to be able to make more generalizable claims. Even though, in addition to randomization, I control for various factors that can impact language policy making and language based ethnic conflicts, generalizability of the findings should be assessed based taking the sample of cases included into account (See Appendix B).

Lastly, endogeneity of minority language policy choices to likelihood of ethnic conflict casts a shadow on causal inference. I explicitly incorporate this endogeneity in my theory by basing my arguments on group capabilities for mobilization in addition to other factors. Therefore, I acknowledge the empirical findings might be driven not only by exclusion policies being applied in conflict-prone areas, but also adoption of promotion toward particularly stronger groups with already a higher capacity for mobilization and rebellion. Among the possible methods for addressing this endogeneity, use of an instrumental variable was not possible due to the difficulty of identifying an instrument at the level of minority linguistic minority without losing considerable number of observations. Instead, I focused on the mechanisms through which exclusion and promotion may contribute to outbreak of ethnic conflict in developing my theory and discussing the empirical findings. I provided examples of these mechanisms at work across different regions

of the world and contexts. Nevertheless, qualitative analyses of selected cases relevant to the theory that employ methods such as process tracing or ethnography would provide a much stronger demonstration of the mechanisms.

The future directions of research paved by this dissertation are primarily derived from the above-mentioned limitations. Expansion of the MLPD would both support generalizability of the findings and allow further theory building and testing on the role of language policy in ethnic politics, group mobilization, and so on. More importantly, the most proximate extension of this dissertation will include qualitative analyses of selected relevant cases to demonstrate the causal mechanisms through which minority language policy affects ethnic conflict.

## Appendices

### Appendix A: Minority Language Policy Dataset (MLPD) Coding Sheet

#### Language Policy Data Codebook v2.0

##### Country Identification Variables

**1. Name of the Country [cname]**

**2. Country ID [countryid]**

COW code of the country

##### Majority Group Identification Variables

**3. Name of the majority ethnic group [majorityg]**

**4. ID of the majority ethnic group [majoritygid]**

AMAR code of the majority ethnic group

**5. Language of the majority ethnic group [majlang]**

**6. ID of the majority language [majlangid]**

*Ethnologue language code*

##### Official Language Variables

**7. Number of official languages [nofficial]**

**8. Official language 1 [olang1, olang1id]**

**9. Official language 2 [olang2, olang2id]**

**10. Official language 3 [olang3, olang3id]****11. Is the language of majority an official language? [officialmaj]**

0 No

1 Yes

**12. Is the colonial language an official language? [officialcolony]**

0 No

1 Yes

**Minority Group Identification Variables: Group 1****1. Name of the minority ethnic group [gname]****2. ID of the minority group [groupid]****3. Language of the minority group [glang]****4. ID of the minority group language [glangid]****Minority Language Summary Status Variables****5. Is the minority language official at the regional level? [regional]**

*Is the language used by the state as an official language at the regional level? De jure officialization that is not implemented (implementation: language used officially by institutions of at least one sub-national administrative unit) is not coded in this variable.*

0 No

1 Yes

**6. Is the minority language official at the national level? [official]**

*Is the language used by the state as an official language at the national level? De jure officialization that is not implemented (implementation: language used officially by state institutions at national level) is not coded in this variable.*



- 0 No
- 1 Yes

**7. Is the language legally protected as a minority or heritage/national language? [legal]**

*Is there any legal document (i.e., constitutional provision, law, regulation) that explicitly recognizes the minority language AND provides basis for its use in at least one of the language policy areas? Linguistic non-discrimination clauses or de facto use of language outside legal guarantees is not included.*

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

**8. Language status [status]**

*De jure status of the language. Municipal and regional status are coded when a language is made official in at least one specific sub-state administrative unit.*

- 0 Legally repressed
- 1 No official status
- 2 Municipal official status
- 3 Regional official status
- 4 National official status

**Minority Language Policy Variables**

**Media**

**9. Is content in minority language accessible in mass communication (e.g., publishing, newspapers, radio, tv)? [access\_media]**

*Media access comprises of minority language publications/broadcasts in private media AND/OR public policies such as occasional radio/tv broadcasting in the minority language by state funded media.*

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

**10. Is the minority language extensively used by state funded media (e.g. publishing, newspapers, radio, tv)? [use\_media]**

*Is the minority language extensively used in state funded publications, radio stations, tv channels etc.? Extensive use refers to completely state funded media outlets that publishes or broadcasts exclusively or predominantly in a single minority language.*

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

#### **11. Summary variable for media dimension [media]**

*Code 0 if; access\_media is coded 0*

*Code 1 if; access media is coded 1*

*Code 2 if; use\_media is coded 1*

- 0 Use of the minority language in mass communication is limited
- 1 Use of the minority language in mass communication is free/tolerated
- 2 Use of the minority language in mass communication is promoted

#### **Education**

#### **12. Is the use of minority language in the education system in any capacity allowed? [allow\_education]**

*Allowing use of the minority language refers to elective and/or compulsory courses teaching the minority language OR bilingual education at any level of basic and secondary education (K-12). Tertiary level courses and programs are not included.*

- 0 No
- 1 Taught as a subject or used in bilingual education only in (some) private schools
- 2 Taught as a subject or used in bilingual education in (some) public schools

#### **13. Is the minority language used as the language of instruction in primary education? [use\_education]**

*Is the minority language legally the primary language of instruction in any private or public school at any level of basic and secondary education (K-12)? Bilingual education is not considered as the use of the language for instruction.*

- 0 No
- 1 Primary language of instruction only in (some) private schools
- 2 Primary language of instruction in (some) public schools

**14. Is the minority language used as the language of instruction in post-secondary levels? [use\_higher\_education]**

- 0 No
- 1 Primary language of instruction only in (some) private schools
- 2 Primary language of instruction in (some) public schools

**15. Summary variable for education dimension [education]**

*Code 0 if; allow\_education is coded 0*

*Code 1 if; allow\_education is not coded 0 and/or use\_primary\_education is coded 1*

*Code 2 if; use\_primary\_education is coded 2*

- 0 Use of minority language in education is limited
- 1 Use of minority language in education is free/tolerated
- 2 Use of minority language in education is promoted

**Public Service**

**16. Is the access to public services using the minority language guaranteed (e.g., courts, local administration)? [access\_public]**

*Only legal guarantees explicitly referring to the right to use the mother tongue / a regional language / a minority language etc. with or without the help of translation services counts as allowing the use of minority language. Informal access (e.g., some clerks know the minority language) or a general clause for right to translation in case of force majeure does not count as allowing access to public services using the minority language.*

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

**17. Is the minority language used by the state in public services? [use\_public]**

*Is the minority language used BY the state officials while providing public services? Use of the language can range from practices such as providing legal documents in minority language to granting official status to the language at any level of government and/or associated practices such as employment quotas/conditions for minority language speakers.*

- 0 No
- 1 Yes

### 18. Summary variable for public service [public]

*Code 0; if access\_public is coded 0*

*Code 1; if access\_public is coded 1*

*Code 2; if use\_public is coded 1*

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 0 | Use of the minority language in public service is limited    |
| 1 | Use of minority language in public service is free/tolerated |
| 2 | Use of minority language in public services is promoted      |

### Summary: Minority Language Policy

### 19. Minority Language Policy Index [policy\_index]

*Summary policy score is bound between (0) and (13) and is computed as follows:*

$[legal] + [status] + [access\_media] + [use\_media] + [allow\_education] + [use\_education] + [access\_public] + [use\_public]$

### 20. Summary variable for minority language policy [policy]

*Code 0 if; at least two of [media], [public], and [education] are coded 0*

*Code 2 if; at least two of [media], [public], and [education] are coded 2*

*Code 1 if; no more than one of [media], [public], and [education] are coded 0 or 2*

- |   |            |
|---|------------|
| 0 | Exclusion  |
| 1 | Toleration |
| 2 | Promotion  |

## Appendix B: Minority Language Policy Dataset (MLPD) Sample

Country	Majority Linguistic Group	Minority Linguistic Groups
Albania	<i>Albanians</i>	<i>Greeks</i> <i>Vlachs</i>
Algeria	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Berbers</i>
Angola	<i>Ovimbundu-Ovambo</i>	<i>Bakongo</i> <i>Cabindans</i> <i>Europeans/Mestico</i> <i>Lunda- Chokwe</i> <i>Mbundu/Kimbundu</i> <i>Nganguela</i> <i>Nkumbi</i> <i>Nyaneka-Humbe</i>
Bangladesh	<i>Bengali Muslims</i>	<i>Biharis</i> <i>Chittagong Hill Tribes</i> <i>Garo</i> <i>Santal</i>
Bhutan	<i>Bhote/Ngalop</i>	<i>Sharchops</i> <i>Lhotshampas</i>
Bolivia	<i>Mestizo/White</i>	<i>Aymara</i> <i>Lowland Indigenous</i> <i>Quechua</i>
Brazil	<i>White/Mestizo</i> <i>and Afro-Brazilian</i>	<i>Amazonian Indians</i> <i>Roma</i>
Bulgaria	<i>Bulgarians</i>	<i>Turks</i> <i>Roma</i>
Central African Republic	<i>Gbaya/Baja/Baya</i>	<i>Banda</i> <i>Fulani/Fulbe</i> <i>Kare/Kari</i> <i>Mbaka (Bwaka)/Ngbaga/Ngaka</i> <i>Mbum(Bum)</i> <i>Riverene-Sango</i> <i>Sara</i> <i>Yakoma</i>

Chad	<i>Southerners</i>	<i>Arabs</i> <i>Beri</i> <i>Fulani</i> <i>Hadjarai</i> <i>Kanembu/Kanuri</i> <i>Maba</i> <i>Mubi/Karbo</i> <i>Naba</i> <i>Tangale</i> <i>Toubou</i>
Chile	<i>White/Mestizos</i>	<i>Indigenous Peoples</i>
Ecuador	<i>Mestizo/White</i>	<i>Highland (Andean) Indigenous Peoples</i> <i>Lowland (Amazonian) Indigenous Peoples</i>
Estonia	<i>Estonian</i>	<i>Russian-Speakers</i>
Ethiopia	<i>Amhara</i>	<i>Afar</i> <i>Oromo</i> <i>Somali (Ogaden)</i> <i>Tigreans</i> <i>Awgni/Agau/Awi</i> <i>Bench</i> <i>Berta</i> <i>Gambella</i> <i>Gedeo</i> <i>Gumuz</i> <i>Gurage</i> <i>Konso</i> <i>Sadama</i> <i>Walayita</i> <i>Yemsa</i>
Fiji	<i>Fijian</i>	<i>Indian</i> <i>Rotuman</i> <i>European-Mixed</i> <i>Pacific Islander</i>
Finland	<i>Finns</i>	<i>Swedes</i>
France	<i>French</i>	<i>Basques</i> <i>Bretons</i> <i>Catalans</i>

France	<i>French</i>	<i>Corsicans</i> <i>Alsaticans</i> <i>Occitan-Speakers</i>
Gabon	<i>Fang-Pahouin</i>	<i>Kota</i> <i>Eshira</i> <i>Massangons</i> <i>M'Bete</i> <i>Mpongwe</i> <i>Njebi</i> <i>Nkomi</i> <i>Orungou</i> <i>Teke</i> <i>Tsogo</i>
Gambia	<i>Mandingo</i>	<i>Fulani</i> <i>Diola-Jola</i> <i>Mandjak</i> <i>Serahuli</i> <i>Serer</i> <i>Wolof</i>
Georgia	<i>Georgian</i>	<i>Abkhazians</i> <i>Armenians</i> <i>Azeri</i> <i>Ossetians (South)</i> <i>Russians</i>
Greece	<i>Greeks</i>	<i>Thracian Muslims</i> <i>Slavs/Macedonians</i> <i>Albanians</i>
Guinea	<i>Fulani</i>	<i>Malinke</i> <i>Susu</i> <i>Guerze (Kpelle)</i> <i>Kissi</i> <i>Toma</i>
Indonesia	<i>Javanese</i>	<i>Aceh</i> <i>Ambonese</i> <i>Balinese</i> <i>Batak</i> <i>Chinese</i> <i>East Timorese</i> <i>Gorontalo</i> <i>Madura</i> <i>Bugis-Makassar</i> <i>Minangkabau-Rejang</i> <i>Papuans</i>

Indonesia	<i>Javanese</i>	<i>Sunda Banjar Dayak Malays</i>
Iraq	<i>Shia Arab and Sunni Arab</i>	<i>Kurds Turkmen</i>
Israel	<i>Jewish</i>	<i>Palestinians – Israeli Arabs Russian (Jewish)</i>
Japan	<i>Japanese</i>	<i>Ryukyuan Koreans Chinese</i>
Kazakhstan	<i>Kazakh</i>	<i>Russian Speakers German Tatar Uyghur Uzbek</i>
Kenya	<i>Kikuyu</i>	<i>Luo Masai Somali Kalenjin Luhya Gusii-Kisii Turkana Boran Idakho-Isukha-Tirki Kamba Kuria Mijikenda Samburu Taita Teso</i>
Laos	<i>Lao Loum</i>	<i>Lao Sung/Soung Lao Theung</i>
Lebanon	<i>Arabic Speaking</i>	<i>Armenian</i>
Libya	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Berbers</i>
Lithuania	<i>Lithuanian</i>	<i>Poles Russian Speakers</i>



Macedonia	<i>Macedonians</i>	<i>Albanians</i> <i>Turks</i> <i>Serbs</i> <i>Roma</i>
Malawi	<i>Chewa, Mananja-Nyanja and Ngoni</i>	<i>Lomwe (Nguru)</i> <i>Yao</i> <i>Northerner (Nkonde-Tonga- Tumbuka)</i> <i>Sena</i>
Moldova	<i>Moldovan</i>	<i>Russian Speakers</i> <i>Bulgarians</i> <i>Gagauz</i>
Morocco	<i>Arabs</i>	<i>Berbers</i>
Myanmar	<i>Burman</i>	<i>Arakanese/Rohingya</i> <i>Karens</i> <i>Mons</i> <i>Chinese</i> <i>Kachins</i> <i>Karenni</i> <i>Lahu</i> <i>Palaung</i> <i>Shan</i> <i>Wa</i> <i>Zomis/Chins</i>
New Zealand	<i>Europeans</i>	<i>Maori</i>
Pakistan	<i>Punjabi</i>	<i>Bengali</i> <i>Mohajirs</i> <i>Sindhis</i> <i>Pashtuns</i> <i>Seraiki</i> <i>Baluchis</i>
Peru	<i>Mestizo/White</i>	<i>Highland Indigenous</i> <i>Lowland Indigenous</i>
Republic of Congo	<i>Kongo</i>	<i>Lari/Lali</i> <i>Mbosi</i> <i>Mbete/Mbeti</i> <i>Sanga</i> <i>Teke</i> <i>Vili</i>

Romania	<i>Romanians</i>	<i>Hungarians</i> <i>Roma</i>
		<i>Limba</i> <i>Temne</i> <i>Kissi</i> <i>Kono</i> <i>Koranko</i> <i>Loko</i> <i>Sherbro</i> <i>Susu</i> <i>Mandingo/Mandinka</i> <i>Creole</i>
Sierra Leone	<i>Mende</i>	
		<i>English-Speaking/European and</i> <i>Colored</i> <i>Zulu (1946-1995)</i> <i>Xhosa</i> <i>Ndebele</i> <i>Sotho-Tswana</i> <i>Swazi</i> <i>Tsonga</i> <i>Venda</i> <i>Afrikaner (1996-2017)</i>
South Africa	<i>Afrikaner (1946-1995)</i> <i>Zulu (1996-2017)</i>	
		<i>Basques</i> <i>Catalans</i> <i>Valencian</i> <i>Galician</i>
Spain	<i>Castilian Speakers</i>	
		<i>Tamils</i> <i>(Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Tamils,</i> <i>and Moors)</i>
Sri Lanka	<i>Sinhalese</i>	
		<i>Chinese</i> <i>Malay-Muslims</i> <i>Shan</i> <i>Lao</i> <i>Hill Tribes</i> <i>Mon-Khmer</i>
Thailand	<i>Thai</i>	
		<i>Akposso</i> <i>Gurma</i> <i>Kabiye</i> <i>Kotocoli</i>
Togo	<i>Ewe</i>	
		<i>Kurds</i> <i>Arabs</i>
Turkey	<i>Turkish</i>	

USA

*English Speaking*

*Hispanic*  
*Native American*  
*Native Hawaiian*

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