

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: **CRISES AND CRISIS GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND
MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS**

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Why do states facing high levels of international threat sometimes have militaries that are heavily involved in politics and at other times relatively apolitical, professional militaries? I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in a state's history of 'acute' international crises rather than its 'chronic' threat environment. Major international crises lead to professionalization and de-politicization of militaries in both the short- and long-term. International crises underscore the need for the military to defend the state and highlight military deficiencies in this regard. Accordingly, major international crises lead to military professionalization and withdrawal from politics in order to increase military effectiveness. This effect persists years, and decades, later due to generational shifts in the officer corps. As the "Crisis Generation" of officers become generals, they bring with them a preference for professionalization and de-politicization. They guide the military towards abstention from politics. I test this theory using a new global dataset on military officers in national governing bodies from 1964-2008 and find strong support for the theory. Major international

crises lead to two waves of military withdrawal from government, years apart. Further statistical analysis finds that this effect is most strongly felt in the non-security areas of governing, while in some cases, international crises may lead to militaries increasing their involvement in security policy-making. Further, international crises that end poorly for a state — i.e., defeats or stalemates — are found to drive more rapid waves of military withdrawal from government. The statistical analysis is supported by a case illustration of civil-military relations in the People's Republic of China, which demonstrates that the crisis of the Korean War (1950-53) led to two waves of military professionalization and de-politicization, decades apart. The first occurred immediately after the war. The second wave, occurring in the 1980s, involved wholesale military withdrawal from governing bodies, which was made possible by the ascent of the "Crisis Generation" of officers in the military, who had served as junior officers in the Korean War, decades prior.

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MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS

by

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Dedication

To my parents, Jane and Robie

To Judith, Nathan, and Callum

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Chapter 1: Introduction

I. Puzzle

"[T]he Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party." In 1929, Mao Tse-Tung wrote this about the role of the armed forces in the nascent Chinese Communist Party (CCP), adding "The Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution" (Mao 1929, emphasis added). This outlined a vision for the future People's Liberation Army (PLA) that was primarily political, not military. However, since that declaration, the "gun" periodically has come dangerously close to commanding the Party, especially during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and its immediate aftermath (e.g., Whitson 1968). From its inception in the 1920s and through the 1970s, the PLA was at times the "gun" of the Party, firmly under the control of the CCP, but at other times, a rival political force to the CCP. With the exception of a brief foray into military professionalism in the 1950s, the experience of the PLA for much of the People's Republic's first 30 years was as a political force as much as a military one (Yu Bin 2015).

Seeing this, then-Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping lamented in 1977 the political "factionalism" that had afflicted the PLA during the 1960s and 1970s and in a speech declared that "We must...admit that our army is not sufficiently capable of conducting modern warfare, and that, although it is numerically strong, it is of relatively poor quality..." (Deng 1977). And in stark contrast to Mao's stress on the primarily political function of the military, he explicitly emphasized the importance of a professional military over a political one, calling for military education to privilege vocational instruction and training over political indoctrination.¹

¹ I.e., "Military schools at various levels may devote 70 per cent of their teaching hours to military subjects and 30 per cent to political subjects. The students should pursue military knowledge earnestly, including knowledge of the

The modernization, professionalization, and de-politicization of the PLA has been a decades-long process that began in earnest with the ascension of Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s as leader of the CCP and the People's Republic of China (Yu Bin 2015; Joffe 1987). Yet, according to Ellis Joffe, sustained professionalization under Deng in the 1980s and 1990s "could not have succeeded without the ascendance of strict professional attitudes throughout the PLA" (1997, 40). Given its inception as a revolutionary and political army and long history of serving in that role, where did the "strict professional attitudes" in the PLA come from? Conventional civil-military relations theory would predict that the overall level of external threats would have led to professionalization inside the PLA. However, with this logic, there were ample opportunities prior to 1977 for the PLA to professionalize, given the PLA's involvement in several conflicts and wars during the 1950's and 60's.² Why did it take until the late 1970s and 1980s for "strict professional attitudes" to rise in the PLA? Further, at the end of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA was arguably the most powerful political institution left standing (Yu Bin 2015). Why would it willingly give up such power?

This behavior points to a more general puzzle that is evident across a range of states. Given relatively consistent international pressures, why do militaries professionalize and withdraw from politics when they do? Why, for example, did South Korea's military become increasingly involved in internal politics in the 1960s and 1970s, shortly after a catastrophic war with its northern neighbor, only to withdraw from politics in the 1980s, when the threat was still present? Why did the threat of Israel contribute to a decreased role for the military in the government in Egypt following the 1967 war, but not the 1948 or 1956 wars? Many existing

types and characteristics of planes and tanks and how to combat them, and how to direct combined operations by the various services and arms" (Deng 1977).

² E.g., the Korean Conflict (1950-53); the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954); the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1958); the Sino-Indian War (1962), and the Sino-Soviet War (1969)

theories predict that international threats should reduce the military's role in politics, reduce the incidence of coups, and lead to better civilian control of the military. Other theories suggest that international threats can create "garrison states" (Laswell 1941) where the military becomes a dominant political force in a country. And yet others predict that the effect of international threats is mediated by civilian institutions, with weak institutions combined with international threats leading to military intrusion into politics. These theories can help us understand cross-country variation in military participation in politics, but are weaker in explaining within-country variation in the military's political role *across time*. Why do we see substantial variation in the military's role in politics within the same states, and even the same regimes, facing international threats across time? Given features of an international threat environment that do not change over time or change very rarely or slowly, such as geography or enduring rivalries, why do militaries sometimes professionalize and leave politics, but at other times remain embroiled in politics? And when there is professionalization and withdrawal from politics, why is there often such a long delay — years and decades — between international conflict and professionalization? What explains the *timing* of military withdrawal from politics in the presence of international threats?

II. Answer

The answer to the puzzle is that specific international crises lead to military professionalization and withdrawal from politics, but this occurs in two distinct waves, years apart. The critical factor is military preferences and how these are changed by international crises *over time*.

Turning away from the literature's focus on the military as a monolithic institution, I focus on the long-term preference shifts inside the military that are caused by war and the threat of war. This approach allows me to explain the broader puzzle of why militaries, with their near-monopoly on

physical coercion in the state, willingly give up political power and influence at some times but not at others.

When international threats rise to the level of a crisis — where there is war or a very real threat of war in the immediate future, there is a preference shift in the military in favor of professionalization and withdrawal from politics. The presence of an acute, immediate threat creates an imperative for the military to increase its effectiveness in defense. The crisis highlights for many military officers that a military that splits its time between politics and defense is a "jack of all trades, but a master of none." This group pushes for an increased institutional focus on defense and urges disengagement from politics. The presence of an acute crisis and the need it creates for effective defense strengthens the hand of the "Professional" faction of officers in the military at the expense of politically-active "Politicians-in-Uniform." In the short-term, the military gives up some political power, particularly in non-security areas, in order to focus on defense. This may be a boon for the non-military leaders of the state as they may pick up the political power that the military now forsakes. But at the same time, the Professional military may become increasingly assertive in defense and security matters and demand a seat at the table when security-related decisions are made.

The second-wave of this trend is felt years — and even decades — after the international crisis, when a new generation of officers, shaped by the previous crisis rises to positions of military leadership. A major international crisis shapes the doctrines, training, and socialization of junior and mid-level officers rising through the ranks. This rising cohort of military leaders is very strongly professional in its outlook, given the formative experience of the international

crisis.³ The theory argues that this group will believe that the military should maximize military effectiveness and competency and forsake political distractions. This outlook corresponds to Samuel Huntington's (1957) traditional concept of professionalism, in which the military devotes itself to repelling and deterring the international enemies of the state and is undistracted by political interference or activities that will detract from this mission. This "Crisis Generation" will, when in positions of military leadership, push for withdrawal from traditionally civilian politics, but will also be assertive in national security decision-making and seek autonomy for the military in this regard. The two-waves of professionalization that follow a major crisis explain why militaries in states with challenging security environments sometimes withdraw from politics, but at other times do not.

III. Contribution

Understanding the sources of variation in military political participation — military involvement in *making* policy and not just implementing it — is vitally important to a range of questions in both international relations and comparative politics. Military withdrawal from politics is a necessary condition for a successful transition from autocracy to democracy (e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). In line with Tilly's (1992) maxim that "war makes the state," understanding how and when politically active militaries professionalize and de-politicize can help us better understand the prospects for democratization and democratic consolidation in a variety of states. Military political participation is also an important factor in explaining conflict. States with high levels of military involvement in politics are more likely to initiate international conflict (Sechser 2004; Weeks 2012, 2014). And states with shared political power between civilians and military officers are known to be plagued by pathologies in

³ As Deng also noted in his 1977 speech: "There are now [in 1977] large numbers of regimental cadres who have had combat experience, having served as squad or platoon leaders or company commanders during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea" (Deng 1977).

"strategic assessment" which can contribute to the escalation of international disputes to war (Brooks 2008). On the domestic side, governments dominated by the military are particularly apt to violently repress political opponents (Stepan 1971; Poe et al. 1999; Davenport 2007). Given that the military's political role is a vital factor in explaining a range of outcomes in domestic politics and conflict behavior, the need for understanding what in a state's international environment explains variation in military political participation is clear.

Given the importance of understanding variation in military participation in politics, this dissertation makes four main contributions. First, it explains temporal variation in military political participation that more cross-sectional theories, which tend to focus on geography and rivalries, cannot. Second, it provides a new way for scholars of democratization and political stability to understand the historical roots of the civilian control and military de-politicization that are necessary ingredients for democratic consolidation. Third, by advancing a generational argument, it provides a new framework for understanding both the short- and long-term impact on domestic politics of such shocks as war and crises. Fourth, with the empirical focus on "military political participation" and the operationalization of this concept using new data, it substantially advances our understanding of variation in civil-military relations beyond a dichotomous focus on coups or regime-type.

IV. Gap in the existing literature

The importance of international threats to the interaction between military and civilian institutions has been a long-standing focus of the civil-military relations literature. Surprisingly, though, the question of the effect of international threats on the military's role in politics specifically, and civilian control over the military more generally, is unsettled in the literature.

Within the civil-military relations literature, there are competing theories about the effect of international conflict on civil-military relations that arrive at very different conclusions. A first group of scholars argues that high levels of external threat should be associated with military withdrawal from politics and greater civilian control, while a second group argues that severe external threats should lead to larger, more autonomous militaries that are able to exert great political influence and eventually take over their states. A third group argues that the effect of international threat environment is conditional on intermediate factors. While each group of theories can find cases in support of their arguments, all leave important variation unexplained. In this section, I explore in more detail this problem in the literature, explain why it exists, and outline how my argument resolves it and provides more explanatory power.

The first group of scholars argues that high levels of external threat should be associated with military withdrawal from politics and greater civilian control. Huntington's (1957) seminal study of civil-military relations in the United States emphasizes the importance of an international focus and hands-off, "objective" government control to both an effective military and harmonious civil-military relations. Desch (1999) also stresses the importance of international threats in keeping the military out of the domestic politics of the state. Desch argues that international threats build military cohesion around a foreign threat and bring to power competent civilian leaders who are better able to control the military. Conversely, internal threats draw the military into the state's internal politics (Desch 1999, Stepan 1971), increase the likelihood of a coup and can force the leader to increase military autonomy (Svolik 2014, 2012). Such threats can also create new internal security-focused ideals of military professionalism, which can lead to militaries being increasingly active in the internal politics and economy of the state (Stepan 1971).

In contrast to the first group, the second argues that severe external threats should lead to larger, more autonomous militaries that are able to exert great political influence. Most recently, Woo (2011) contends that the most severe international threats exert an effect similar to internal threats. They lead to greater military involvement in politics because of the accompanying expansion of the military. In the context of an expanded military, the military becomes more politically influential and comfortable with a political role as civilian authoritarian rulers rely on it for regime security. In this context, the military is in a position to intervene in politics more directly and ultimately create a military regime. This echoes Laswell's (1941) argument regarding the rise of the "garrison state" in response to international threats. This logic also taps into the basic "Civil-Military *Problematique*" outlined by Peter Feaver (1999): the military needs to be powerful to protect the state, but a powerful military can pose a threat to the very state that it is meant to protect.

The third group are scholars that argue that intervening factors mediate the effect of international threat environment on the military's intrusion into politics. Finer (1974) argues that "political culture" — the level of citizen "attachment" to civilian institutions can drive an externally oriented military to intervene in politics, even given a severe external threat environment. What is required for military non-intervention in politics is a "high political culture" that inoculates the state against military intervention. Staniland (2008) echoes this logic, arguing that military intervention in — or abstention from — politics derives from an interaction of organizational culture, threat environment, and civilian politics. Staniland argues that weak civilian institutions and weak government legitimacy will draw militaries into politics, even with substantial external threats.

While admirable for their parsimony, the first two groups of theories,⁴ which emphasize the effect of international threats on civil-military relations without intervening factors, are problematic. This is because each argument — i.e., international threats lead to greater military intrusion into politics *or* they lead to less intrusion — can find a range of cases to support their arguments. Desch focuses on Soviet and American civil-military relations during and after the Cold War to support the 'high international threat-low military political involvement' argument, while Woo does the same with the opposite argument, focusing instead on South Korean and Taiwanese civil-military relations.

In contrast, the third group's argument — that civilian institutions mediate the effect of international threats — is compelling, because it can explain variation in military intrusion into politics, even between states with broadly similar threat environments.⁵ The limitation of these theories, however, is that the historical record shows that militaries can intervene even in the case of relatively well-developed civilian institutions. For example, about the Uruguayan coup in 1973, one American journalist wrote that prior to the coup, Uruguay had a "stable democratic system that was the envy of the rest of the continent."⁶ Similarly, military intervention in civilian politics in states such as Greece, Turkey, France, and Japan, all occurred in the context of relatively mature civilian institutions.⁷ In addition, the "legitimacy" of civilian institutions is also suggested as a possible factor in military intervention (e.g., Belkin and Schoffer 2003; Staniland 2008). Yet, as in the Algerian military intervention of 1991 and Chilean intervention of 1973, politically-active militaries often are known to perpetrate "veto coups" (Huntington 1968) in

⁴ E.g., Desch (1999), Laswell (1941), Huntington (1957), and Woo (2011).

⁵ Indeed, Staniland (2008) tests his argument in a comparative analysis of Indian and Pakistani civil-military relations. These are states that have faced both serious internal and external threats, but have had radically different outcomes in their levels of military involvement in politics.

⁶ Marvine, How. 3/2/1973. "Uruguayans, Their Life Ever More Drab, Are Apathetic After Coup." *New York Times*.

⁷ The Greek coup of 1967; the Turkish coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980; 1958 and 1961 Algiers *putsch* in France; and the attempted military coups in Japan in the early 1930s.

order to counter-act *legitimate* electoral outcomes of which they disapprove. This suggests that the legitimacy of civilian politics is not a prohibitively strong barrier to military intervention

Theories that emphasize variation in governmental institutions as an explanatory factor are also challenged by the reality that there is a range of states that see great variation in the military's relative political power within the same regime and even within the same leader tenure. For example, as noted earlier, the PLA's role in politics has varied dramatically over the course of the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. In the case of Egypt, there was great variation in the political role of the army, not only between the tenures of various different rules, but also within them.⁸ A focus on civilian institutions as conditioning the effect of international threat level, while increasing our understanding, provides an incomplete explanation of variation in military participation in politics, given international threats.

A further limitation of all three sets of theories is that they apply to relatively long periods of time and are accordingly better suited to explaining why State A has been characterized by military intervention in politics over a long period of time, while State B has not, rather than why the military withdrew from politics in State A in year t rather than in year $t-10$.⁹ To be sure, there is some within-case analysis between different time periods, but the time periods examined tend to be quite broad.¹⁰ Generally, the focus of this literature on "threat level" across long time periods does not give significant insight into the effects of more *acute* shocks or crises that occur within the underlying context of the threat environment.

⁸ See, for example, Brooks 2008, Harb 2003.

⁹ This is acknowledged by Staniland (2008, 361), who calls for "more fine-grained explorations of how states react when faced with threats and better explanations of variation in the outcomes of these policies."

¹⁰ For example, Desch (1999) examines variation in Soviet and American civil-military relations between the periods during and after the Cold War. This was a decades-long period of relatively high international threat for both sides within which there was substantial variation in civil-military relations on both the Soviet and American sides. However, within the Cold War, there were distinct crises for each side — short-term escalations of tensions — such as the Cuban Missile Crisis or Korean Conflict.

The recent coup literature has taken steps to address more directly the short-term impact of specific international crises or militarized disputes, moving away from the broad focus on threat level. This group of authors emphasizes the institutional steps that leaders — often autocrats — take to protect themselves from coups through such measures as overlapping command hierarchies (e.g., Quinlivan 1999; Pollack 2004) and the establishment of multiple armed "counter-weights"¹¹ to the regular armed forces (e.g., Belkin and Schoffer 2005). In this context, leaders want to reduce the military's cohesion and exacerbate collective-action problems in order to forestall it from launching a coup. This literature finds that that coup-wary leaders can initiate international conflict in order to reduce military cohesion by exacerbating intra-military rivalries and disagreements and by moving military units away from the centers of power (Belkin and Schoffer 2005; Miller and Elgun 2010; Goemans and Chiozza 2011; Powell 2014; Talmadge and Piplani 2015).¹² Agreeing generally with Desch, this literature finds that international threats can reduce military intervention in politics in the barest sense — by making coups more difficult. However, while an important step forward, this literature does not explain variation in military political participation outside of the particularly extreme outcome of a military coup. Indeed, if we analogize military coups as bargaining failures in civil-military relations — in line with Svobik (2014, 2012) — we are still left without an explanation for the effect of international crises on the plethora of bargained outcomes possible in civil-military relations outside of a coup attempt. Indeed, this focus on coups is a more general weakness in the civil-military relations literature noted by Feaver (1999, 218), who writes:

¹¹ These measures have been shown to both reduce military effectiveness (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011), but also to reduce both the likelihood and success of coups. (Powell 2012).

¹² Other mechanisms by which international conflict reduces the incidence of coups include the fear of would-be putschists that they will inherit the international conflict if they come to power (McMahon and Slantchev 2015), and the ability of leaders to use the prospect of international conflict to credibly commit to resource flows to the military (Arbatli and Arbatli 2014).

[L]ooking only at coups can underestimate military influence. A coup may indicate military strength...But it can also indicate military weakness, reflecting the military's inability to get what it wants through the normal political process....[T]heories explaining the propensity to coup...yield fairly consistent null predictions...missing interesting and important changes in the nature of civil-military relations over time.

In the context of government-military bargaining, as long as an international crisis does not create significant information or commitment problems for either the military or the government, what should result is a government-military agreement without violence. Aside from reducing the likelihood of a bargaining failure (coup), how do international crises affect the civil-military bargain?

This review has outlined a number of related problems in the literature: First, the theoretical literature on international threats and civil-military relations does not agree on the effect of international threat level on military participation in politics. In some cases, the effect is positive, in others, negative, and in others, it is conditional on the effect of civilian institutions. Secondly, while each theory tells a compelling story that describes well some important cases, there are a number of important cases that they cannot explain. Most critically, these theories are weakest when it comes to explaining variation in military participation in politics across time within the same state. Addressing these two problems, my theory's focus on states' histories of specific crises, rather than overall "threat level" can explain why, in the context of a relatively constant high threat level,¹³ there is substantial variation in military political participation across time within states. The recent coup literature does take some steps to address this by examining the effect of specific international crises on coups, but this work does not address how crises will affect the military's relative political power outside of the rare and extreme outcomes of coup attempts and does not address the long-term implications of international crises for civil-military relations.

¹³ Characterized, for example, by the long-term geographic proximity of enduring rivals.

Building on the empirical focus of the coup literature, my argument uses crises as the independent variable and focuses on how crises change the institutional preferences of the military, as made up by individual officers. This reveals a two-wave effect on military preferences regarding political participation. The first wave is an immediate response of the military to the needs of national defense, where professionally-oriented officers in the military exert greater influence on military institutional preferences than Politicians-in-Uniform. The second is a delayed, generational effect that is felt when the junior officers that served during the crisis ascend to command positions in the military, carrying with them a generational-cohort preference for professionalization and withdrawal from politics. These two waves can be expected to occur years — likely a decade or more — apart, given the time required for junior and mid-level officers to ascend to command positions and for the older generation to retire. This explains why a state that faces a challenging security environment — a neighboring rival, for example — may see substantial variation in military political participation over time, even though the presence of the rival does not change. A specific crisis or military confrontation involving the rival exerts an effect on military political participation that changes significantly as time passes, even while the existence of the rivalry is constant.

A major strength of this theory is that it moves away from the extant literature's focus on general "threat environment" to a more specific focus on the constituent events that should make up a state's threat environment: international crises. To use a medical analogy, I move away from a state's "chronic" condition of threat environment and focus on "acute" crises in international relations. This is important because the military's preferences are driven largely by "threat perception"¹⁴ and this collective perception is driven by history of specific events.¹⁵ The

¹⁴ For a discussion of threat perception see, for example, Stepan (1971, 1988); Finer (1974); Staniland (2008).

assumption is that military officers don't conceive of "threat" in the abstract, they recall specific, salient events in the past in which the military confronted or came close to confronting the threat. This focus on specific, highly salient international events that have profound short- and long-term effects on military preferences clarifies why we see variation in military preferences within states that can be regarded as existing in a relatively high threat environment across long periods of time. International crises provide shocks to military threat perception that have clear short- and long-term effects on their involvement in politics. The short-term effect of these shocks is driven by a strengthening of the influence of Professional factions in the officer corps versus those that could be characterized as "Politicians-in-Uniform" in response to the need to mount a credible defense in the face of a crisis. The long-term effect is driven by a generational shift in the military, when the "Crisis Generation" shaped by the shock of the international crisis ascends to predominance in the military hierarchy. Understanding the cumulative history of international crises and how much time has passed since them provides the key to understanding how military preferences change over time and why we see so much variation in military participation in politics within states across time.

V. Outline of dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation consists of five chapters. In Chapter 2, I explain in detail the theory outlined briefly in this chapter, detailing the assumptions and general framework upon which it is built as well as the testable hypotheses it generates. Chapter 2 also extends the main argument to address two related questions: how does the effect of crises change when we consider separately the security- and non-security aspects of military involvement in politics and

¹⁵ For example, with this approach, rather than focusing on the general "threat" that Israel poses to Egypt over a long-period of time and seeing how this affects Egyptian civil-military relations within a long period of time, I focus on specific events — e.g., the 1948, '56, '67, and '73 wars with Israel, etc. — and how they exert an effect on military preferences over time.

what types of international crises exert the greatest impact on military professionalization and withdrawal from politics? The argument put forward for the first extension is that the negative effect of crises on military involvement in politics is strongest for non-security aspects of government, and when we consider aspects of the government that are strictly focused on national defense and the armed forces, the effect reverses. This is because the professionally-oriented officers brought to prominence by the crisis, while abstaining from non-security politics, will demand a "seat at the table" when defense decisions are made. The second extension argues that crises that end in defeat or stalemate should lead to a more rapid two-waved process of professionalization and de-politicization in the military than other types of crises. This is because poor outcomes in crises should most clearly highlight military deficiencies. They should disrupt regular patterns of promotion and attrition in the officer corps as senior officers are purged in the aftermath of a defeat or stalemate and the "Crisis Generation" of junior officers advances more rapidly. Chapter 3 tests hypotheses related to the main theoretical argument on a new dataset of Military Participation in Government (MPG). This global country-year dataset coded from 1964-2008 captures the proportions of officials in cabinets and executive councils that are military officers and also disaggregates these proportions into those pertaining to security or non-security positions. This allows for tests of the hypotheses generated by the theory using measures that capture a broad spectrum of potential military involvement in politics and allows for differentiation between military power in the security and non-security areas of government. Chapter 4 extends the empirical tests to the hypotheses generated by the two extensions of the main argument.

Chapter 5 provides a case illustration of how crisis history affects military involvement in politics over time. Specifically, this chapter examines how Party-Military relations in the

People's Republic of China (PRC) has responded to its conflict history, focusing specifically on how the PLA's relative political participation has responded over time to the Korean Conflict, demonstrating the key role that the rise of the Korean War generation of officers in the PLA in the 1980s contributed to military professionalization and withdrawal from politics in the PRC. Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the broader academic and policy implications generated by the analysis.

Chapter 2: Theory

I. International Threats and Civil-Military Relations

In the previous chapter I outlined the puzzle that this dissertation seeks to address: why do militaries in states facing a severe international threat environment sometimes withdraw from politics, but at other times maintain political participation? My answer to this puzzle focuses on the short- and long-term effects of acute crises in international relations. The effect of international threat environment on military political participation is not constant, but rather it depends on a state's history of international crises. Major international crises lead to two waves of military professionalization and withdrawal from politics, occurring years apart. In the short-term, international crises engender a preference shift in the military in favor of professionalization and withdrawal from politics and a second-wave of this trend is felt years — and even decades — later when a new generation of officers, shaped by the previous crises, rises to positions of military leadership.

In this chapter, I further develop this argument, detailing a theory of international conflict and military political participation, focused on the long-term consequences of major international crises for intra-military factionalism and civil-military relations more broadly. First, I detail the assumptions and overall theoretical framework guiding my argument. Specifically, I focus on a concept of civil-military relations as a bargain between non-military and military leaders over the military's political participation, and on the military preferences that are brought into this bargain. I explain the origin of these preferences as stemming from factionalism in the military between professional war-fighters focused on military effectiveness and "Politicians-in-Uniform." Secondly, I focus on how international conflict affects the interaction between Professionals and "Politicians-in-Uniform" inside the military and how this, in turn, changes the

outcome of government-military bargaining over military political participation. I argue that international conflict will highlight for senior officers the importance of military effectiveness and the danger of the military being a "jack of all trades but master of none" when it becomes involved in non-security areas of politics and national decision-making. This leads to institutional preferences in the military that are closer to the ideal of a professional, apolitical military, which is reflected in the government-military bargain and in a reduction in military participation in non-security areas of government.

Thirdly, I argue that there is a second wave of professionalization and withdrawal from political participation many years after the crisis that engendered the first wave. I develop a generational mechanism that explains the long lag between the first and second wave. When junior officers whose early-career experiences were profoundly shaped by the crisis rise to command positions in the military — sometimes as many as 20 years later — military preferences again shift in favor of the Professional view-point. Again, this engenders increased professionalization and withdrawal from political participation. Both this and the argument regarding the short-term effect of international crises generate several testable hypotheses.

In addition, I develop two extensions of the primary argument. In the first, I examine the effects of crisis history on the military's defense and non-defense involvement in government separately, arguing that the overall trend in military withdrawal from politics is driven largely by its abstention from non-security aspects of government following an international crisis. In contrast, international crises should actually increase military participation in the security sectors of government, given that military professionalization should encourage the military to take an active role in defense decision-making. In the second extension, I examine which types of international crises should have the greatest effect on both short- and long-term

professionalization, and therefore on military withdrawal from political participation. I argue that both military defeats and stalemates should exert the strongest effect. These crisis outcomes highlight most clearly military deficiencies in defense areas and the perils of involvement in politics.

I. Main Argument: International Conflict and Military Political Participation

A. Definitions and Assumptions

The outcome that the theory put forward here seeks to explain is the level of military participation in politics. By participation in politics, I refer to the military's role in national policy decision-making at the highest levels of the central government. If the military has a major role in the process by which major policy decisions for the state are made — and not just an advisory role in the implementation of defense-related directives — this qualifies as political participation. Importantly, I see military political participation as occurring on a spectrum. This draws on Wongseok Joo's (2011) conception of "Military Political Influence" as ranging from "control" to "participation" to "influence" and, finally, to full "subordination" to civilian authority. This approach moves away from much of the literature's dichotomous focus on coups, which captures only extreme outcomes in government-military interactions — outcomes which reflect the failure of a government and its military to reach an agreement on the role of the military in national decision-making. There is a whole range of possible outcomes in government-military relations outside of a coup.

In building the theory, I assume, in line with Svobik (2012, 2013), that government-military relations can be analogized to a bargaining interaction similar to Fearon's (1995) application of bargaining to war. Coups can be understood as bargaining failure, where the military and the government cannot reach a peaceful agreement on the relative distribution of

political power. If a coup is a bargaining failure in civil-military relations, the absence of a coup entails some implicit or explicit bargain between the government and the military regarding its political role. Absent a coup, there is still the potential for broad variation in civil-military relations and relative military political power. (Feaver 1999, Finer 1962) As Samuel Decalo (1989, 550-1) notes, "civil-military relations are...a dynamic continuum...a dynamic tug-of-war between the military and political establishments, with oscillations in the degree of influence wielded by each." It is this variation — outside of coups — that my theory seeks to explain.

I assume that government-military bargaining can occur in all states. While democracies are generally characterized by strong civilian control of the military, there can still be substantial preference divergence between civilian and military leaders in such cases (e.g., Feaver 2005). In transitional democracies especially, norms of civilian control may be weakly established — if at all. Indeed, the histories of Latin American democracies, as well as such states as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, Greece, and South Korea show that government-military contests over the military's relative political power can occur in an (un-consolidated) democratic context. Consolidated democracies with strong civilian control of the military are also relevant, because they represent a relatively stable outcome in government-military bargaining, where the military has forsaken a political role in traditionally civilian spheres. It is important to understand how the government and military have arrived at this bargain, and specifically what in a country's history has contributed to this military abstention from politics. Further, given that democratic consolidation is a decades-long process, long-term historical mechanisms, such as the "Crisis Generational" mechanism can help to explain the process by which democratic militaries decide to abstain from politics and maintain that abstention, thereby contributing to the long-term survival of democracies.

Government-military bargaining is also possible in military regimes. In this context, the interests of the state leader quickly diverge from the institutional interests of the military, despite their common origin (e.g., Stepan 1988; Geddes et al 2014). This extends to both the "strongman" and "junta" types of military regime (Weeks 2012, 2014). In the strongman context, the state leader, even if s/he was once a general, will still want full control over the military, which is a potential threat to her/his rule. Indeed, a great many coups are launched by the military against military leaders (Geddes 1999). Even in the case of "institutional-military" (Geddes et al 2014) or "junta" (Weeks 2012, 2014) regimes, the same divergence of interests between what Alfred Stepan has termed the "military as institution" and the "military as government" will lead to the "military as government" trying to curtail the autonomy of the "military as institution." Indeed, this is precisely what occurred during the latter years of the Brazilian military regime (Stepan 1988, 57-59), where the military as institution became increasingly concerned about the lack of modern arms and the military as government wanted to reduce the size and freedom of the growing military-led security sector.

Regarding the government leadership of the country — hereafter the "leader" — it is assumed that the leader is unitary¹⁶ and wants to establish control over the military and take all the political power for him/herself. The leader's objective is for the military to agree to accept his/her directions on all security and non-security matters (even when they do not accord with the military's preferences — i.e., Feaver 2005) and to give up those portions of state decision-making power that they may have previously held. By "the military," I mean the members of the senior officer corps, who have spent or plan to spend the majority of their professional lives in

¹⁶ Reducing the political leadership of a country — even non-democracies — to a unitary actor is a major simplification, but in civil-military relations it is likely not a heroic assumption that all segments of the political leadership want the military to follow their orders.

the military, and who, I assume, are the primary decision-making body of the military as an institution.

The second assumption is that military involvement in politics occurs at the expense of military effectiveness in defense. This builds on Huntington's (1957) theory of civil-military relations, which holds that "objective" government control of the military, where the military abstains from intervention in government affairs but does not suffer undue government interference, leads to higher levels of professionalism and proficiency. Huntington's assumption is supported by a range of empirical studies that have found that military politicization — both where the military is politicized to be loyal to the government (e.g., Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Talmadge 2013) — and where it is an autonomous political actor in its own right (e.g., Stepan 1988; Brooks 2008) — leads to military weakness.

A military that divides its attention between military affairs and politics is a "jack of all trades, but a master of none." Its resources and institutional bandwidth will be divided between multiple tasks. In some cases, a military that is involved in politics will devote substantial manpower to non-defense activities. Examples include the PLA during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, which had placed more than 24,000 officers in positions of local and regional governance by mid-1968, dominating "Revolutionary Committees" throughout the country (Macfarquhar and Schoenals 2006, 245) or the present-day Sri Lankan military, which has absorbed the Ministry of Urban Development and sent many of its officers to occupy positions in the civil and diplomatic services.¹⁷ Through these types of non-defense activities, the human capital of the officer corps will be diluted and diminished as professional incentives are distorted.

¹⁷Daily FT. 10/17/2011. "Defence Ministry adds UD to its name." <http://www.ft.lk/2011/10/17/defence-ministry-adds-ud-to-its-name/>. Accessed 12/8/2015. Mandana Ismail Abeywickrema. 1/23/2011. "The Militarisation Of Sri Lanka's Diplomatic And Administrative Services." <http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2011/01/23/the-militarisation-of-sri-lanka%E2%80%99s-diplomatic-and-administrative-services/>. Accessed 12/8/2015.

In some contexts, officers may find that demonstrating political orthodoxy is more important than professional competence. This will have very real consequences for military effectiveness, as demonstrated in a speech by Deng Xiaoping to the senior leadership of the PLA in 1977. Deng decried the state of readiness of the PLA, noting that "political ideology" was not sufficient for the military and that officers must "assiduously study modern warfare," adding "[T]o be a company commander nowadays means much more than...shouting: "Charge!" How will you command if you are given tank and artillery support and if ground-to-air and other telecommunications contacts are required?" (Deng 1977).

In other contexts, where militaries hold autonomous political power, they tend to bifurcate into the "military as institution" and the "military as government" (Stepan 1977, 1988). Here professional incentives are also distorted. When the military rules or controls certain ministries of the government, such as in the case of the present-day Sri Lankan military, officers who otherwise would serve as competent commanders in the "military as institution" may see opportunities for advancement in serving in the "military as government" as ministers, functionaries, or bureaucrats. As promising junior officers flow to what are in essence two different militaries, the "institution" and the "government," the effectiveness of the former suffers, as it draws on a smaller group of officers than it could if the military's focus were purely on defense.

B. Military Factions

A third assumption is that militaries contain factions. Unlike the government leadership — which is unitary in the sense that the leadership wants the military to be subordinate to its direction — the officer corps is not. In addition to potential inter-service rivalries (e.g., Belkin and Schoffer 2005) and government-generated fractionalization (e.g., Quinlivan 1999; Lee 2014), there are

preference-driven divisions in the senior officer corps. These revolve around the question of whether the military ought to participate in politics — defined as a role in national decision-making — or whether it should focus on vocational matters, devoting itself to the implementation of the government's defense-related decisions — the Huntingtonian ideal of Professionalism. This division leads to formation of two broad groups of officers: "Professionals" and "Politicians-in-Uniform." Professionals are hostile to the military's resources and attention being diverted away from national defense to politics. While wanting to preserve for the military a consultative role in national security policy in order to ensure that any policy takes into account military capabilities and limitations, they do not want the military to get bogged down in the politics of national decision-making in traditionally civilian areas. The Professionals' ideal division of labor is Huntingtonian (1957): with substantial military advice and input, the government leadership makes decisions regarding national security, and the military then focuses on how to implement these decisions most effectively. The Professionals expect substantial deference and non-interference from the government in security matters — and expect that the civilian leadership will seek some degree of consensus with the military before making a major security-related decision — but do not seek the ultimate decision-making authority for themselves. They do, however, want a "seat at the table" when national security decisions are made. In this paradigm, the military also completely abhors any involvement in non-security decision-making — even in an advisory or implementation capacity. In vocational terms, this category of officers is populated by competent, professional war-fighters. As an example, this would include large portions of the contemporary American officer corps, but this group can also exist in non-democratic contexts, such as with the relatively apolitical Prussian, *Junker* archetype in pre-1945 Germany.

Politicians-in-Uniform are different from the Professionals in that they favor military involvement in non-security decision-making and policy implementation, and in the selection and maintenance of the government leadership, traditionally civilian areas of responsibility. For many of this group, their attention, and even their training, has been divided between two distinct areas of expertise, suggesting that their proficiency at either will suffer. In some cases, this division may be explicit. Indeed, in the 1970s-era PLA, even those military officers whose main responsibility was leading troops were expected to devote 30% of their training to political matters and 70% to vocational issues. For political officers, i.e. commissars, the ratio was 60:40, in favor of political subjects (Deng 1977).

Within the broad grouping of Politicians-in-Uniform, there are those who favor military political participation in support of the leader (Loyalists) and those who favor autonomous military political participation pursuant to the military's institutional interests (Praetorians). Praetorians — borrowing from Huntington's (1968) usage of the term — are military officers who concern themselves with internal politics of the country, protecting and expanding the military's institutional privileges, perquisites, and role in national decision-making, and with resisting attempts by the government to assert control over the military. For these officers, a role in national decision-making is not only an end in and of itself, it is also a way to safeguard the institutional interests of the military. The officer corps of Pakistan's military for much of its history, the Chinese People's Liberation Army in the early 1970s, or the Egyptian military under Field Marshal Hakim 'Amr in the 1950s and 1960s provide strong examples of the Praetorian archetype. In these cases, the military is a potential *rival* to non-military politicians for political power.

While Praetorians are potential rivals to the leader, Loyalists are political *allies*. Like Praetorians, *Loyalists* are also concerned with the internal politics of the country, but rather than seeking to protect and expand the military's power, they seek to do the same for the state leader. Loyalists are often officers who the leader has managed to have elevated as a mechanism of "coup-proofing" (e.g., Quinlivan 1999). They are not rivals to the leader, rather they support the maintenance and expansion of his/her political power. Given their dedication to the preservation of the leader and not just the defense of the state, they cannot be regarded as apolitical like the Professional archetype. An Example of a Loyalist military would be the Iraqi military under Saddam Hussein, where most high level-commanders were elevated based on their personal loyalty to the regime (e.g., Pollack 2004; Kamrava 2000).

Professional, Praetorian, and Loyalist are ideal types. The archetypal Professional wants the military to limit itself politically to a consultative role in national security policy, avoiding any involvement in non-security matters; while in contrast, the archetypal Praetorian wants to maximize autonomous military political power in all areas. The archetypal Loyalist wants to ensure the survival of the leader and seeks military participation in all facets of political life in support of the leader's survival and pursuant to the leader's goals. These are ideal types. In truth, most members of the senior officer corps can be expected to lie somewhere in between the three types, though may tend towards one.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the preferences of the three different types of officers along two dimensions and gives some examples of different militaries that have exemplified each ideal type. The first dimension, "Political participation," pertains to the military's level of involvement in non-security areas of politics. The second dimension, "Level of military autonomy," captures the degree to which the military as an institution operates independently of the non-military

government leadership. The Professionals seek military autonomy, but are uninterested in political participation outside of security areas. In contrast, both the Praetorians and Loyalists want a military that is heavily involved in the non-security areas of government and national decision-making — accordingly both types are "Politicians-in-Uniform." However, the Praetorians want this military involvement in politics to be as an independent political faction, while the Loyalists are guardians of the leader. The typology expressed in Figure 2.1 entails an implicit assumption that there is not a faction in the officer corps that seeks both low autonomy and low involvement in politics; accordingly the "low, low" quadrant is left empty. It is difficult to conceive of a faction in the senior leadership of the military that does not either desire operational autonomy or involvement in politics — either as an autonomous faction or as a guarantor of the leader or regime. Such a hypothetical faction in the military would, for example, seek both onerous and intrusive government interference in the military, but have no political interest in preserving the government.


The composition of the officer corps in terms of this tripartite typology across states will vary significantly, but I assume that all militaries have at least *some* officers tending towards each of the three types. Indeed, the German *Wehrmacht* during World War 2 provides an excellent example of a military containing all three types of officers: with generals like the *Blitzkrieg*-practitioners Irwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian exemplifying the Professional archetype, the "lucky"¹⁸ Wilhelm Keitel the Loyalist, and the July 20th¹⁹ plotters such as General Ludwig Beck — who would have assumed full control over the military *and civilian* aspects of the German government had the assassination attempt on Hitler succeeded — the Praetorian. The

¹⁸ See Knopp (1998).

¹⁹ For more detail, see, for example, Boeslager (2008).


balance of each type over time and how that balance changes in response to international crises is a major focus of the theory.

Figure 2.1: Tripartite military officer typology and preferences on autonomy and political



In addition, if we move from a tripartite (Professional/Praetorian/Loyalist) typology to a dual one, we aggregate Praetorians and Loyalists into "Politicians-in-Uniform," who are characterized by their general desire to have a high level of military involvement in politics — *either* on behalf of the leader or regime or as an autonomous faction. With the comparison now being between Professionals and Politicians-in-Uniform, the two-dimensional issue space can be collapsed into a single-dimension. Here, the key difference between the two factions is over relative levels of military political participation, which is the dependent variable on which this theory focuses. Figure 2.2 illustrates this single-dimension issue space with the positions of the two military factions.

Figure 2.2: Dual military officer typology and preferences on political participation



Given that the military is made up of factions with divergent preferences regarding issues such as relative political participation and autonomy, how do these factions come to an agreement on what will be the overall institutional preferences of the military, which will be the military's "ideal point" in bargaining with the government? A further assumption of the theory is that the overall institutional preference of the military is the outcome of an agreement among the factions in the senior officer corps. While the military is inherently hierarchical, I assume that the military's institutional preferences are formed through some degree of consensus among a group of senior officers of equivalent rank, usually generals. Indeed, this is reflected, for example, in the intra-military deliberations that occurred prior to Pakistan's 1999 coup, which brought General Pervez Musharraf to power. While it was Musharraf who ascended to power, the decision to respond forcefully to the civilian government's attempt to remove him from command of the military — and thereby increase military involvement in government — was the result of an agreement reached in a meeting of Pakistan's nine Corps Commanders. (e.g., Barracca 2007, 147)

In the single-dimension issue space, where the issue of debate is the military's relative political participation (the focus of this dissertation), the interaction between the two primary

factions in this debate (Professionals and Politicians-in-Uniform) can be analogized to a voting model. Here, the "voters" are senior officers of roughly equivalent rank. The application of such a model to decision-making in a hierarchical institution like the military may be counter-intuitive, but the voting analogy is made even more plausible when we consider the example of the Brazilian military. Stepan (1971, 44) notes that the Brazilian military of the mid-20th century "institutionalized military debate over public and political issues." Specifically, the Military Club in Rio de Janeiro not only served as a forum for debate and discussion on political issues for its officer-members, the elections of its the leaders of the club essentially served as an intra-military deliberative process for the officer corps over national political issues. Candidates for office in the club were often elected on the basis of their positions on important national political issues in elections that, at times, involved thousands of officers voting (Stepan 1971, 44-5).

The example of the Brazilian military's voting in the Military Club in Rio de Janeiro, while certainly not universal across different countries, suggests that the insights of theories of voting are apropos, despite the hierarchical nature of the military. Even where thousands of officers do not vote in proxy elections over political issues, as in the Brazilian case, more informal deliberations among a small group of senior officers are likely — such as in the case of the meeting of Pakistan's nine Corps Commanders in 1999. If the military's preference aggregation in this case had been purely hierarchical, no such meeting would have been necessary, the most senior general merely would have declared the institutional preferences of the military by fiat. Whether involving thousands of officers literally voting or a more informal debate among a small number of the most senior generals, the outcome of the deliberations within the senior officer corps regarding institutional preferences on military political

participation should be the preference of the "median officer"²⁰ in line with the classic Median Voter Theorem (e.g., Black 1958; Downs 1957) Applying this framework to the Pakistani example, the decision in 1999 to respond forcefully to the civilian government was the outcome of a deliberative process that ultimately reflected the preference of the "median Corps Commander." In the Brazilian case, where thousands of officers voted for the President of the Military Club, the public position of the elected candidate can be assumed to have reflected the position of the median officer in the officer-electorate. Turning again to Figure 2.2, the preference of all officers in the voting group lie somewhere between the Professional and Politician-in-Uniform ideal types — this includes the "median officer." The preference of the median officer is the institutional preference of the military, which becomes the military's ideal point in government-military bargaining over the military's relative political power.²¹

C. Government-Military Bargaining

In line with Svobik's (2012, 2014) application of the bargaining model to civil-military relations, I assume that the military and the leader are engaged in bargaining over the level of military political participation. As discussed earlier, the military's ideal point in this bargain is the outcome of intra-military deliberations among the senior officer corps, including Professionals and both types of Politicians-in-Uniform, whereby the preference of the "median officer" on military political participation is the military's institutional ideal point. I assume at this juncture,

²⁰ I am indebted to David Prina for suggesting the application of Median Voter Theorem to military preference-formation.

²¹ This dissertation is focused on explaining variation in military political participation, not military autonomy, so the single-dimension issue space is used, with two military factions (i.e., Figure 2.2). Accordingly shifts in military preferences are driven by changes in the views of the "median officer." In two-dimensional context (i.e., Figure 2.1), with three factions, a more complex model would be needed, incorporating insights from two-dimensional theories of voting and preference-formation, such as Veto Players theory. (e.g., Tsebelis 2002). In this context, intra-military deliberations on both autonomy and political participation could be affected through the mechanism of changing the number of factions or by changing the distances between their ideal points in autonomy/political participation issue space.

once the military has settled on its ideal point as an institution through "voting," there are two unitary actors in the bargain — the military and the government.²² The military's ideal point is an input into military-government bargaining. The military will bargain hard to move government-military relations as close as possible to this ideal point.

The actual form and setting of civil-military bargaining over military involvement in political issues can vary substantially across cases. In more institutionalized settings, such as the present-day People's Republic of China (PRC), levels of military participation in such bodies as the Communist Party Politburo or the Central Military Commission,²³ are established by the meetings of formal deliberative bodies, such as the National Party Congress — on which the military has sitting representatives. In other contexts, the interaction may be less dependent on formal deliberative institutions. For example, in the late 1970s in Uruguay major policy decisions on a range of issues in the joint civil-military regime were made at "civil-military conclaves" that occurred in ad hoc conferences at resorts between leading military officers and civilian officials (Gillespie 1991, 56). And in the lead-up to the 1973 coup in that country, military positions communicated to the legislature and the president on a range of issues, including military participation in traditionally civilian sectors of government, were transmitted through public statements to the government and legislature (Rouqie 1987, 248-51).²⁴ In other

²² This is, of course, a simplification of reality. A fuller, more complex, account would allow for factionalism in the military (and the government) to extend into the government-military bargain. I assume, though, that in many cases, the hierarchical nature of the military will lend to it a degree of institutional cohesion and "party discipline" once intra-military deliberations are concluded — to a degree that might not be found in civilian institutions such as political parties. Further, in many cases, military officers will view overt intra-military conflict as the worst possible outcome for the military. (e.g., Geddes 1999) This should deter many of the senior officers from overtly defecting from the military at the government-military bargaining stage. If they were to allow for some officers to defect to the government side — for example, if some, Loyalist-type officers were to do so — they could likely be collapsed into the government's side in the government-military bargain, given their preference for ensuring the leader's survival and further her/his political goals.

²³ The Central Military Commission in the PRC is roughly analogous to the United States' National Security Council in the United States..

²⁴ The Uruguayan case, which features a unified military high command communicated through public statements to the government provides some additional support for the military unitary actor assumption in government-military

cases still, decisions regarding military political participation may be made "behind-closed-doors," with little overt interaction observed. However, in all cases, the two actors, government and military, are negotiating over two divergent ideal levels of military political participation, seeking a compromise in order to avoid a violent confrontation between the military and government.

A coup attempt is always a possibility in this interaction. Government-military bargaining occurs in the shadow of a coup — where the failure to reach a peaceful agreement may lead the military to attempt to resolve it forcefully.²⁵ Svoblik (2012, 2014) and Boix and Svoblik (2013) focus on these failures and how they occur in an authoritarian context. Their findings largely parallel Fearon's (1995) on bargaining failures in the shadow of war, whereby the primary causes of such failures are disagreements over information or the failure to make credible commitments. Svoblik (2012, 2014) finds, in line with the information problems argument, that when an authoritarian government and its military disagree over the severity of domestic threats to the regime, and therefore the leverage that the military has over the government, there is more likely to be bargaining break-downs and coup attempts. Boix and Svoblik (2013) focus on the commitment problems logic: when authoritarian governments cannot make credible promises to other elites in the regime, because of the absence of checks and balances and the secretive nature of the regime, coups are more likely. Here, I do not limit myself to the authoritarian context, and I move beyond explaining bargaining failures to focus on those cases where the government and its military reach an agreement on the distribution of political power between military and civilian elites and so are able to avoid a violent confrontation. As one Zambian general noted

bargaining. A more extensive discussion of government-military bargaining as it applies to the Uruguayan case can be found in Svoblik (2012).

²⁵ On the government's side, bargaining failure may result in an attempt to forcefully change the composition of the military leadership to one more amenable to the government's ideal point, i.e., a purge. This could, however, provoke a coup attempt in retaliation.

about his country's civil-military relations during the Kaunda regime (1964-1991), when the military is peacefully granted political participation as part of such a process, the military realizes that "to arrive in higher office, you do not need to take up arms."²⁶

What explains variation, not in bargaining failure in government-military relations, but in those agreements that do not yield a coup attempt, but lead to a change in relative military political participation? I argue that acute international conflict is a critical factor in this regard. Not only does it substantially reduce the likelihood of a bargaining failure by increasing the costs to both sides for a coup attempt,²⁷ it substantially shifts the ideal point of the military at the military preference-formation stage, so that the military ideal point in government-military bargaining moves in the direction of reduced political participation. Acute international threats, accordingly, can exert an impact on the government-military bargain through their effect on the preferences of military officers. This preference shift among officers towards the different types — Professional, Praetorian, and Loyalist — affects the outcome of intra-military preference formation, which in turn changes the military's institutional ideal point in its interactions with the government.

D. An International Crisis

A major international crisis, one that involves war or the threat of war, means that the military may actually be required to defend the state from an external threat or present a credible deterrent. A coup will be less likely in the context of an international crisis. The military may, for example, be further away from the centers of power, making carrying out a coup functionally more costly and less likely to succeed. (e.g., Talmadge and Piplani; Goemans and Chiozza 2011) Internal disorder at home may adversely affect the state's performance in the international

²⁶ See Lindemann (2011, 26).

²⁷ See, e.g., Goemans and Chiozza (2011) and Talmadge and Piplani (2015) on international conflict's effect on coup propensity.

conflict and may also increase the costs of bargaining failure and a coup for both the government and the military. This should increase the bargaining range between the government and the military and make a "peaceful" agreement between the two sides easier to reach. A coup (bargaining failure) is accordingly much less likely in this context — something well established in the recent empirical literature (e.g., Belkin and Schoffer 2005; Goemans and Chiozza 2004, 2011; Talmadge and Piplani 2015).

However, not only is bargaining failure less likely, the content of the bargained outcome is changed by international conflict. This is through international conflict's affect on military preferences, which are then brought into government-military bargaining as the military's ideal point.²⁸ In a military that is politically active, the prospect of war and/or the observation of actual combat highlights for professionally-oriented officers the degradation of the military's fighting ability due to its pursuit of non-defense functions. This builds on Nathan Toronto's insight in his (2007) dissertation that recent military defeats will engender military "professionalization" as a process of reform and modernization. While Toronto focuses on professionalization as exemplified by modernization in equipment and doctrine, I focus on professionalism as de-politicization of the military. Dividing its attention between politics and defense leads to the military being a "a jack of all trades, but master of none" and degrades its effectiveness in defense. In line with Huntington's (1957) definition of military professionalism, single-minded focus on defense, without undue government interference, breeds competency and military effectiveness. While this problem in military effectiveness will certainly be made evident by military defeat, as Toronto suggests, stalemates, such as that achieved by the PLA in Korea in

²⁸ There is some similarity here to work in the IR literature on "two-level games" (Putnam 1988; Morrow 1991; O'Dell 2000), where domestic-level bargaining can influence international bargaining and vice-versa. In the theory here, the first "game" is the intra-military preference aggregation, while the second is the government-military bargaining.

1953, and even pyrrhic victories, such as the Red Army against Finland in the 1940 "Winter War," can also make painfully clear the deficiencies caused by military politicization.

When the military faces severe international conflict, the senior officer corps will on average become more Professional in its outlook. Officers who are sympathetic to the Professional ideal point will become more hard-line in their views, and those with preferences somewhere in between Professional and Politician-in-Uniform will move closer to the Professional ideal-point. The Politicians-in-Uniform — both Loyalists and Praetorians — will become increasingly marginalized within the military. Professionals also may perceive the threat of war as an opportunity to advance their own parochial interests, as they stand to benefit from an increased organizational focus on defense. In order to preserve their careers, Politicians-in-Uniform are accordingly incentivized to shift their preferences towards the Professional ideal point, given the new necessities of defense. Conflict generates the prospect of career advancement through attrition in battle, military expansion, or merit-based appointments. The officers that will do well in this context will be Professionals. The "median officer" becomes increasingly professionalized and in favor of de-politicization in order to maximize military efficiency and competence. This helps to shift overall military preferences closer to the Professional ideal point.

The theory here focuses on military preferences as an explanation for outcomes in civil military relations, but it is important to address also how international conflict may affect the state *leader's* incentives. Talmadge (2013) finds strong evidence that in personalist dictatorships, severe international threats force a dictator to loosen coup-proofing and controls intended to hamstring any military attempt to threaten the leader. This was how Saddam Hussein's government responded to Iranian victories and advances into Iraqi territory during the Iran-Iraq

War and how Stalin responded to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.²⁹ Such institutional changes would strengthen the military's hand in the bargain, if we assume that the removal of coup-proofing makes the military's launching of a coup less costly and more likely to succeed. This is important, because a coup is the likely consequence of a bargaining failure between the leader and the military (Svolik 2012, 2014). On the other hand, the coup literature (e.g., Talmadge and Piplani 2015; Goemans and Chiozza 2011; Belkin and Schoffer 2005) provides compelling evidence that international conflict can also make leaders more secure from coups. This literature argues that international conflict exacerbates intra-branch rivalries in the military, distracts it from posing a threat to the leader, and moves the military away from the capital and other centers of power, making a coup less likely.

Why does an event that forces the leader to make her/himself more vulnerable to coups also make coups less likely? I argue that the preference shifts that occur inside the military emphasized here help to address this puzzle. International conflict shifts the factional balance in the military in favor of the Professionals over both the Loyalists and Praetorians. With an international conflict, all things being equal, there are fewer Praetorians in the military — the faction that would be most likely to stage a coup or threaten a coup to push the leader for more political concessions. Even if a coup is less costly for the military, this is outweighed by the overall military preference shift in favor of less involvement in politics. In line with Talmadge (2013), the leader may be compelled by the international threat to remove Loyalists from command positions in the military in the interest of military effectiveness, but their likely replacements will be Professionals, not Praetorians. Loyalists and Praetorians, despite their divergent views on military autonomy, are both "Politicians-in-Uniform" and are both poor war-fighters, as compared to Professionals. While Professionals are unlikely to serve as cronies or

²⁹ See, for example, Talmadge 2013; Clark 1966; Taylor 1973.

yes-men to the leader, they are also less likely to threaten the leader through a coup, as they are uninterested in taking the leader's political power for themselves.

The marginalization of the Praetorian type of officer within the military and the overall preference shift inside the military in favor of less involvement in politics contributes to change also in the leader's preferences regarding military involvement in politics, but the key factor allowing this is the change in military preferences that occurs in response to international conflict. Where Praetorians are a powerful faction in the military, the leader may counter by cultivating a Loyalist faction, and advocating for military involvement in politics as a guardian of the regime. However, the dual marginalization of both types of Politicians-in-Uniform (Praetorians and Loyalists) within the military and the pressure of international conflict means that the promotion of Loyalist-type military involvement in politics by the leader is neither as prudent nor as necessary. Military efficacy should also be at least a secondary priority for the leader, shifting the government ideal point in this context also towards less military involvement in politics. Not only is the bargaining range wider for both the government and the military, both ideal points have moved in the direction of less military participation in politics, meaning that the range of possible outcomes is more likely to reflect a reduction in military participation in politics. A bargained outcome is more likely (rather than bargaining failure) and the contents of the successful bargain should involve less military involvement in politics.

The likely outcome of a government-military bargain in the shadow of an international crisis should be an overall reduction in military political participation. While Professionals in the military may want an increased role in the implementation of defense policy, they will be hostile to taking any role in non-security matters, and overall, seek less military participation in politics. Given this preference, government-military bargaining should result in

the military ceding some of its power in national-decision making bodies. Specifically, while there may be an increase in the military's consultative role in some security-related government bodies, at the same time, there will be a wholesale withdrawal from non-security areas. This will lead to a net decrease in the military's overall participation in government. During and shortly after a major crisis, the military's observable role in government should be at substantially lower levels. There should be a notable decrease in the share of government posts that are held by military officers.

Indeed, this overall pattern was reflected in Egypt in the aftermath of the 1967 war with Israel in which Egypt's poor military performance led to massive losses in manpower and material and also the loss of the entire Sinai Peninsula. In this context, not only was President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser able to marginalize or purge political rivals in the armed force, such as Field Marshal Hakim 'Amr, there was also an overall preference shift within the military towards professionalization over politicization. This was due to the realization within the military that the division and dilution of the military's organizational focus — between politics and defense — had contributed to its poor performance on the battlefield (Brooks 2008, 119-21). This corresponded to a dramatic drop in the military's representation in the Egyptian government's national cabinet — though its control over a limited number of exclusively defense-related ministries, such as the Ministry of War and the Ministry of War Production, continued (e.g., Cooper 1982). Certainly, Nasser, as the state leader, was actively pursuing the Egyptian military's marginalization as an autonomous actor in politics, but the necessary ingredient for this marginalization was a preference shift inside the military toward professionalization and away from politics.

- *H1: A major international crisis reduces overall military participation in government in the short-term.*

E. The Second Wave: Generational Shifts

Years — likely decades — after the end of the crisis, there is a second wave of military withdrawal from political participation. During the crisis, by necessity, the training and doctrine of the rising generation of junior officers is oriented towards the international threat, and in this security context, diversion of military resources and attention to non-defense matters may be seen as a wasteful and dangerous distraction. Further, officers who join the military during the threat are selected into the military at a time of severe international threat, and it can be assumed that they have a preference for military effectiveness in combating it. This preference for military effectiveness is likely even greater for those then-junior officers who actually experience combat during the crisis, which likely has a dramatic and long-lasting impact on their military views. Because a military whose attention is divided between defense and politics will not be proficient at the former (e.g., Huntington 1957; Stepan 1988), this group of junior officers will develop a deep aversion to the military becoming involved in civilian politics. It is from this cohort of junior and mid-level officers that generals are drawn in the decades after the threat. Once this "Crisis Generation" is ascendant in the military hierarchy, this again leads to a shift in the preferences of the senior officer corps in the direction of the Professional ideal type. Professionals make up a much greater share of the new generation of officers than the previous one, given the Crisis Generation's formative experience. It is from this cohort of junior and mid-level officers that generals are drawn in the decades after the threat. Once this "Crisis Generation" is ascendant in the military hierarchy, the "median officer" is much more professional in orientation, and this again leads to a shift in the preferences of the senior officer corps, now in the direction of the Professional ideal type. *Ceteris paribus*, even absent a new crisis, this is reflected in the new government-military bargain, as the ideal point of the military

again shifts towards a reduction in military participation in politics. The range of possible outcomes in the government-military interaction contains more options that reflect a reduced military role in politics. The military's relative participation in politics again decreases. This will manifest itself in a second wave of military disengagement from government, especially in non-security areas. In security areas, military participation may increase, as the increasingly Professional military demands a seat at the table when defense decisions are made.

The theory here anticipates that an international crisis has a very long-lasting effect through a generational mechanism. This mechanism requires what might seem at first glance to be a strong assumption that a crisis can exert an effect on preferences decades after the fact. However, despite the long lag between the event and its effect, the expectation that a major international crisis has an effect years and even decades after its conclusion is not implausible. In fact, it is very likely when we consider the evidence of long-lasting generational dynamics at work in military affairs across a range of states and regime-types.

The theory of "Crisis Generations," in general, owes much to Karl Mannheim's (1923) sociological "Theory of Generations," which posits that distinct generational attitudes are formed by the historical events which occur in a generation's youth. This basic insight has been carried into political science as well. In the American politics literature, Gelman and Ghitza (2014) demonstrate that the later voting patterns of the electorate are determined largely by political experiences years and decades *earlier in life* — specifically, who was president and how popular they were. Their model shows that political experiences at age 18 are on average three times as influential on later voting preferences as those at age 40. If who is president and their approval rating at age 18 is salient enough to be a significant predictor of a voter's preferences more than 20 years later, then it seems very plausible that *combat* experiences, or even just living through

period of war or the profound risk of war, would be salient enough to significantly influence the preferences of junior military officers later in their careers. Similarly, Erikson and Stoker (2011) find strong evidence that the assignment of a low draft number has had a decades-long impact on American males' political preferences. If the risk of being called to war had such a long-lasting impact, it seems very likely that actually being at war would have a profound impact on the preferences of those who experienced it. Indeed, Horowitz and Stam (2014) find clear evidence that the youthful military experiences of political leaders can influence their crisis decision-making decades later — a similar delayed effect to that proposed here.

The common truism that "generals always fight the last war" rests on the logic, not that it is the same generals fighting both the current and the "last" war, but that the current generals were heavily influenced by their experience of the last war as more junior officers. In the American military today, there are references to "Gulf War Generals, Bosnia/Kosovo Colonels, and Iraq/Afghanistan Captains" whose views on military doctrine and the use of force are profoundly shaped not just by their broader generational affiliation,³⁰ but by their specific conflict experiences as members of distinct generations of *military officers* (Wilson et al. 2013, 21). As officers, their conflict experiences years and decades prior have a profound effect on their contemporary preferences. Acuff (2011) finds "generationally distinct attitudes" in both democratic and autocratic contexts in examining both the American and German militaries. Specifically, generational attitudes played a critical role in shaping military officer views in the lead-up to the United States' 2003 campaign in Iraq. The older generation of American officers, exemplified by General Eric Shinseki,³¹ had its formative experiences as platoon- and company-

³⁰ Baby Boomer, Generation X, and Millennial, respectively.

³¹ Shinseki famously publically provided estimates of the number of troops required for the occupation of Iraq to Congress that were much higher than those put forward by the Bush Administration. (See Schmitt, Eric. 2/28/2003. "Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force's Size." *New York Times*.)

leaders in Vietnam, and this generation had a skeptical view of the transcendent power of military technology, given the failure of American technology to achieve victory in Vietnam. They were accordingly skeptical of the civilian leadership's goal of a rapid, high-tech campaign fought with a minimal number of troops in Iraq in 2003. In contrast, the younger generation, whose formative experience had been the 100-hour triumph of the first Gulf War, was much more sanguine about the prospects for a quick and sustained victory. And in an analysis of World War II German generals, Acuff finds that those generals who experienced front-line combat in the trenches of World War I as junior officers — such as Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian — were much more likely to be proponents of *Blitzkrieg*-style maneuver warfare as a way to avoid the protracted war of attrition of 1914-1918. This was in contrast to German officers — largely of an older generation — who were in rear or staff positions during the first war, and who tended to favor more traditional tactics in the second war.

It is clear also that generational dynamics play a key role in military officer preferences regarding the military's role in politics and broader society. In his discussion of the Egyptian military's refusal to back Hosni Mubarak with the use of force against protesters during the 2011 Tahrir protests, Taylor (2014) notes the importance of a generational split between older and younger officers, with the older generation prevailing in the decision to abandon Mubarak. The older generation was more wary of involving itself in internal repression in support of an unpopular regime, because of its experience as junior officers taking part in such campaigns in the latter part of Anwar Sadat's reign. The younger generation had no such experience and so favored a crackdown.³² It is important to note also that many members of the older generation of

³² It is telling, perhaps, that the initially accommodating military administration, which agreed to — at least — nominal civilian rule, was headed by an officer of the older generation — Field Marshal Muhammad Tantawi — while the current military government, representing a much stronger involvement of the military in politics, is headed by an officer of the younger generation — General 'Abd al-Fatah al-Sissi. Tantawi was notable for his

Egyptian military officers would have also experienced the disastrous performance of the highly politicized Egyptian army against the Israeli military in 1967, as well as its much stronger performance in 1973 after a period of withdrawal and abstention from politics.³³ And indeed, going back to the period between 1967 and 1973, the presence of a post-Revolutionary "second generation" of officers in the military — i.e., those too young to have participated in and been politicized by the 1952 "Free Officers" coup — seems to have been vital to Nasser and later Sadat's effective side-lining of the military in Egyptian politics in between the '67 and '73 wars. (Harb 2003, 281)

The concept of "military generations" is well-developed in the study of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-People's Liberation Army (PLA) relationship, where it was first put forward by William Whitson (1968), who argues that the ranks of the PLA can be divided into a series of generations that are largely shaped by the "political crises" during which they entered the military. "Political crisis" is a term which encompasses both internal and external conflict. Whitson argues that the generation that served during the Korean War and its immediate successor generation were particularly predisposed to military professionalization, because of their experience in that conflict. The generals who spear-headed programs of military reform and modernization, such as Peng Dehui, were profoundly shaped by their combat experience against the United States in Korea. The "Korean" generation of officers sustained this preference, borne of their conflict experiences in the 1950s, despite the intervening decades, which included the dramatic internal disorder of the Cultural Revolution (Mulvenon 1997). The Chinese leader

extensive combat experience as a junior officer in the '56, '67, and '73 wars against Israel, while al-Sissi has no such experience — having joined the military in 1977. (See Al Jazeera. 6/8/2014. "Profile: Abd al-Fatah al-Sissi." <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/201373112752442652.html>. Accessed 5/7/2015; BBC. 8/12/2012. "Profile: Mohammed Hussein Tantawi." <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12441512>. Accessed 5/7/2015.)

³³ See Brooks (2008) for a detailed discussion of the relative military performances of Egypt in 1967 and 1973 as well as its role in politics.

Deng Xiaoping, in a 1977 speech regarding the need for a reform of the PLA's role in the People's Republic and a de-emphasis on its political involvement, stressed the importance to the eventual professionalization of the PLA of the "large numbers of regimental cadres [likely colonels] who have had combat experience, having served as squad or platoon leaders or company commanders [likely lieutenants and captains] during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea" (Deng 1977). Later literature on the PLA notes that this generation of Chinese generals — the 1977 "regimental cadres" of which Deng spoke — that joined after the Communist victory in the Civil War and experienced the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet Split, and the border clashes with Vietnam, generally were much more predisposed to military de-politicization as part of a process of professionalization (Mulvenon 1997; Swaine n.p; Joffe 1987; Lampton 2001).


In sum, generals who experienced a major crisis during their early military careers will have experienced combat, faced the likelihood of combat, will have spent much of their careers training for combat, or will have joined the military at a time where combat is very possible, if not probable. This increased threat orientation should predispose this cohort of officers to professionalization and de-politicization throughout their careers. When they rise to command, the senior officer corps will have fewer Politicians-in-Uniform and many more Professionals. This will be reflected in the institutional preferences of the military and, ultimately, in the government-military bargaining over the military's political participation.

- *H2: In the long-term aftermath of a major international crisis — when enough time has passed for a generational shift to occur — military participation in government decreases.*

Figure 2.3 provides a summary of the expectations generated by the theory. Following a major international crisis, there should be a short-term decrease in overall military participation in

government. Following this, there should be a stabilization of the government-military balance. However, once sufficient time has passed for the "crisis generation" of officers to rise to leadership positions in the military — approximately 20 years — there will be a second wave of military withdrawal from politics.

Fig 2.3: International crisis and military political participation



II. Extension: Security and Non-security Politics


The central argument is that major international crises will lead to an overall military withdrawal from politics in both the short and long-terms, because of increased professionalism in the officer corps. In two distinct waves this should correspond to an overall reduction in the military's share of political power, as indicated by its share of high-ranking government positions. However, when we examine separately those positions that deal solely with national defense and the armed

forces, the results should be different.

While the Professional faction in the military should forsake all involvement in non-defense politics, they are likely to demand substantial deference from the government when it comes to matters of defense and the armed-forces. As Figures 2.1 and 2.2 indicate, while this group of officers will want to minimize overall military participation in politics, they will also want a high degree of military autonomy in defense matters. They are likely to demand a "seat at the table" when defense decisions are made. Accordingly, for the smaller number of government positions focused solely on national-defense, the anticipated two-waved effect of an international crisis is expected to be *positive* rather than negative.

Figure 2.4 provides a summary of the expectations generated by this extension of the theory. Following a major international crisis, there should be a short-term increase in military power in security areas of the government and a short-term decrease in non-security areas. Later, once sufficient time has passed for the "crisis generation" of officers to rise to leadership positions in the military — approximately 20 years — again, the military's power in security areas will increase while it decreases in the non-security areas of government. On average, twenty years after a major international crisis, a state's government should have a high proportion of its defense-related posts held by military officers, while non-defense posts will be filled by civilians. In this way, the two-waved negative pattern expected to be observed when the *overall* level of military participation in government is the dependent variable should be driven primarily by the effect on the military holding non-security positions in government.

Figure 2.4: International crisis and military participation in security and non-security politics



- *H3a: A major international crisis decreases military participation in non-security aspects of government in the short-term.*
- *H3b: A major international crisis increases military participation in the security aspects of government in the short-term.*
- *H4a: In the long-term aftermath of a major international crisis — when enough time has passed for a generational shift to occur — military participation in non-security aspects of government decreases.*
- *H4b: In the long-term aftermath of a major international crisis — when enough time has passed for a generational shift to occur — military participation in security aspects of government increases.*

III. Extension: The Outcomes of Crises

The central argument of this project is that international conflict contributes to military disengagement from politics in two waves: the first in the initial aftermath of the conflict and the second when the "crisis generation" rises to leadership positions in the military. The theory states

that not all international crises will exert this effect — rather it will be limited to crises that rise to the level of war or carry a real risk of war. In these situations, there is a high likelihood that military competency will be explicitly tested and seen by observers outside and within the military as well. This type of crisis creates professionalization pressures within the military that contribute to its disengagement from politics in two waves.

The second-wave effect of the crisis is driven by the experience of the junior officers who served in the military during the crisis. Accordingly, their experience during the crisis is critical. The pressure for professionalization and withdrawal from politics should be greatest where the experience of the officers was uniformly negative and highlighted deficiencies in the military's readiness for armed conflict. If a junior military officer serves in an armed conflict in a military whose attention is divided between politics and defense, and the military performs well in that conflict, the effect on that officer's long-term preferences for professionalization should not be as great as if the army experienced defeat or stalemate.

This intuition builds on Toronto's (2007) hypothesis that "dire defeat" contributes to professionalism and reform in militaries. However, whereas Toronto focuses on vocational professionalism — as measured by the presence of academies and professional journals in the military — I focus on disengagement from politics, as involvement in politics indicates the division and dilution of the military's institutional focus to the detriment of national defense. Further, I argue that *defeat* alone need not be necessary to exert a formative influence on the long-term preferences of junior officers and to create a short-term pressure within the military for disengagement from politics. Defeat should have a substantial impact on military preferences, but other outcomes short of outright victory can have the same effect.

To take the case of China, the experience of the Korean War generation in the People's

Liberation Army cannot be easily characterized as defeat. The end result in 1953 is best characterized as a stalemate, and there were notable PLA successes during the course of the conflict: the PLA offensive in 1950 drove U.S. forces away from the Chinese border and ultimately preserved North Korea as a viable buffer state. However, despite this initial success, the wartime experience of the PLA soldiers in Korea with the "the unique experience of fighting on foreign soil against the world's technologically most advanced army" (Whitson 1968, 937) was vital to long-term preference shifts inside the Chinese military. It is likely also, that the PLA experience in the Sino-Soviet border clashes exerted a similar effect, despite the limited nature of the conflict. The outcome was not a clear defeat for China, but the actual experience of the military was characterized by the relative superiority of Soviet military technology as compared to Mao's emphasis on revolutionary zeal and raw numbers over modern military equipment (Gerson 2010, 17-8). Even absent one-sided defeats, the experience of participating in or observing human wave attacks against the two most modern, mechanized militaries in the world at that time was likely the critical factor in shaping PLA officer preferences in the long-term.

When the outcomes of crises are disaggregated, poor outcomes in international crises should lead to a *more rapid* reduction in military political participation. First, the short- and long-term preference shift in the military should be greater when the experience of the military has been negative. Officers in a defeated — or at least, un-victorious — military should be determined to win in the next confrontation, which should engender a particularly single-minded focus on national defense. This should be particularly acute among junior officers, whose formative experience is the defeat or stalemate. While there should still be two-waves of professionalization and withdrawal from politics after *all crises*, the second wave should come more rapidly for defeats and stalemates than for other crisis outcomes. This is because the poor

outcome of the crisis should upend normal processes of attrition and advancement in the military hierarchy and accelerate the rise of the Crisis Generation of officers to positions of military leadership. This may be because the military expands in response to the poor outcome, and so there are more high-ranking positions in the military, which are quickly filled by previously junior officers already in the military. Another factor is likely to be the punishment of the military leadership for the defeat, which may result in purges and forced retirements. Much of this may be initiated by the state leader, eager to deflect blame for the crisis outcome, but junior- and mid-level officers are likely to be complicit in the purge, given their anticipated rapid promotion. Indeed, this is what occurred in Syria in 1971, whereby Hafez al-Assad was able to use the failure of the 1970 invasion of Jordan to justify the purging of a large number of politically-active high-ranking officers, a move that was welcomed by the middle and junior ranks of the Syrian officer corps, who would be promoted to the now vacant senior positions.³⁴ A similar pattern was observed in Egypt after the 1967 war with Israel. Even though President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser took responsibility for the military failure and offered his resignation, a large portion of the public resoundingly supported the Egyptian leader, blaming instead the country's generals for the defeat. Nasser was subsequently able to leverage this popular sentiment and purge dozens of high-ranking, politically-active officers throughout the armed forces and rapidly promote a group of more professionally oriented officers.³⁵

This offers an interesting addendum to the "gambling for survival" story told by Goemans and Chiozza (2011), whereby victory in war can increase the leader's political legitimacy in the eyes of domestic audiences. *Defeat* in conflict can be "spun" in such a way as to weaken political rivals of the leader — specifically, the leaders of the military. Given that the

³⁴ See Pollack 2002, Ch.6.

³⁵ See Brooks 2008, Ch. 4.

purported *raison d'être* of the military is to defend the nation, its senior leaders are a logical scapegoat for the leader. In contrast, its junior and mid-level officers — the Crisis Generation — are natural allies of the leader, because they stand to benefit from a purge. While the professionalizing impact of the crisis should make the Crisis Generation officers unlikely political cronies of the leader, their abstention from non-security politics may make them preferable to the incumbent military leadership. This likely purge of the old-guard military leadership, and the resultant rapid promotion of the Crisis Generation should lead to a much more rapid second-wave of professionalization and withdrawal from politics in the aftermath of a crisis with a poor outcome.

- *H5: Crises that end in defeat or stalemate will reduce military participation in government in two waves, but these two waves will be closer together than in other crises.*

Other types of crises may still exert a two-waved negative effect on military political participation, but the time in between the two-waves should be much greater, because the normal patterns of attrition and promotion should not be disrupted by crises that do not lead to a poor outcome. Importantly, even when the outcome is victory, the experience of a crisis should still compel a short-term reduction in the military's role in order to focus on the challenges of the crisis. In the long-term, the crisis generation should still have a preference for military effectiveness and professionalism, given that their formative experience was combat or the high likelihood of combat during a crisis.

IV. Conclusion

In this chapter I have outlined in detail both the main argument of the dissertation as well as several extensions of the theory. The main argument is that military professionalization and withdrawal from politics stem from a state's history of international crises and occurs in two

waves following a major international crisis. This is driven by the effect of a major crisis on the factions within the military. In the short-term, a crisis strengthens the Professional faction over Politicians-in-Uniform, but this effect dissipates. Years later, there is a second wave of professionalization and withdrawal from politics, as the Crisis Generation rises from junior ranks to command positions in the military hierarchy. Because of their formative experience during the crisis, they bring with them a strong preference for military professionalism and abstention from civilian politics. In the first extension of the main argument, I argue that these two waves of military withdrawal from politics are most clearly seen in the non-security functions of the government, but do not extend to the security realm. Indeed, Professional officers seek a "seat at the table" when decision-making regarding national security is made, so that while there are two waves of substantial military withdrawal from traditionally civilian areas of government following a crisis, there may also be an increase in the military's share of security-related positions in the government in such areas as the Ministry of Defense or National Security Council. The second extension is about what types of crises should exert the greatest two-wave effect on the military's role in politics. I argue that poor outcomes in major crises — defeats and stalemates — should lead to more rapid two-waved crisis effects, as these outcomes will disrupt normal patterns of military attrition and advancement, propelling the Crisis Generation to positions of military leadership much earlier than in crises with better outcomes.

In the following chapters, I test the hypotheses outlined in this chapter. On the dependent variable side, to measure such concepts as "military political participation," I use a new dataset of Military Participation in Government (MPG). Unlike previously utilized datasets, which use primarily binary measures of civil-military relations, focusing usually on regime-type or on the incidence of coups, this dataset codes the numbers and types of positions held in national

cabinets and executive councils across all countries from 1964-2008. Also coded in this dataset are the number of positions held by civilians, allowing for comparisons of military political participation relative to civilians across a range of states. A "security" and "non-security" distinction between the positions allows for the different expectations regarding international crises effect on military participation in the security and non-security areas of government to be explicitly tested.

Chapter 3: Main Empirical Analysis

I. Introduction

The previous chapter detailed the central argument of the dissertation: international crises lead to two distinct waves of withdrawal from politics, years apart. Both waves are driven by an institutional preference shift inside the military in favor of professionalization and abstention from politics, which is driven in turn by a desire for increased military effectiveness. The first preference shift stems from the increased strength of the Professional faction of officers over the Politicians-in-Uniform, whose numbers and influence inside the military weaken in the face of an acute international threat. However, this effect dissipates as time passes after the crisis. The second wave is felt years — likely decades — later, when a generational shift occurs inside the military. Junior officers who served during the crisis had that as their formative military experience. This experience creates in them a long-lasting preference for military effectiveness, professionalism, and withdrawal from politics. They carry this preference with them into the senior ranks when, years later, they replace the older generation of military leaders.

In this chapter, I test the main expectations flowing from this theory using a new cross-national time-series dataset on Military Participation in Government (MPG) collected specifically for this project. (The auxiliary hypotheses, regarding conflict outcome and security and non-security sectors of government are considered separately in Chapter 4.) I combine these new data with existing data on international crises to evaluate the core hypotheses generated by the theory. My analysis provides strong support for the main expectations of the theory. Statistical analysis of the long-term effect of international crises on Military Government Share — a proportion measure of the relative number of military officers in national cabinets and state councils — shows two distinct waves of the military's share of government being reduced

following a major international crisis. The first wave follows immediately after a major crisis, while the second follows around 20 years later — in the same timeframe when a generational shift would occur. This effect is stronger and more consistently significant for the second wave. Additional analysis shows that this effect is substantively large, and a battery of additional statistical models and specifications confirms the robustness of the results. In the following sections I first introduce the MPG data, detailing its coding and collection, as well as other aspects of the research design. I then present the results of the statistical analysis as well as number of robustness checks. In the final section, I conclude with a summary of the results and their importance.

II. Data

A. Motivation for data collection

Testing the hypotheses generated by the theory requires data which captures fine-grained variation in military political participation across many years. These hypotheses anticipate both a long-term shift in relative military political participation across a period of years as well as a broad range of possible levels of military participation that lie in between civilian and military dominance of government. Extant data is not suited for this purpose, as it tends to capture only extreme outcomes in civil-military relations. Indeed, much of the recent empirical work on civil-military relations seeks to explain variation in one such extreme outcome — military coups (e.g., Talmadge and Piplani 2015; Arbatli and Arbatli 2014; Powell 2012). Accordingly, there has been substantial progress on cataloging both successful and unsuccessful coups (i.e., Powell and Thyne 2009). However, coups are problematic as a measure of overall military political power, because they tend to capture bargaining failure in civil-military relations (Svolik 2014) and therefore miss a broad spectrum of bargained outcomes on political participation between militaries and their governments.

There are many states where we can assume that the military wants more representation in government, yet we do not see constant coups in such states. Rather, the government and the military reach some agreement on the type and number of positions that the military may hold without the military resorting to a coup. Absent substantial information or commitment problems in civil-military relations,³⁶ the government and the military should be able to recognize each other's relative strength and come to an agreement on the distribution of political power, given each side's preferences. Indeed, coup attempts may not even be a reliable measure of the military's relative power in a state, given that when a military is very powerful relative to the government this is likely obvious to both itself and the government, making a successful bargained outcome *more* likely, since — in line with Fearon (1995) — we can expect two disputants to be able to peacefully resolve their dispute when there is no disagreement about their distribution of relative capabilities.³⁷ How, then, do we measure these bargained outcomes, given that coup data will only capture failures in government-military bargaining?

Regime-type data offers one avenue. In recent years, there have been substantial refinements of the typology of non-democratic regime-types that incorporate several sub-types of military regimes (i.e., Weeks 2014; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). Yet, outcomes such as "military-regime" or even hybrid regime-types such as "military-personal," tend to capture extremely high levels of military political power, even military dominance of politics. Regime-type data is therefore not appropriate for measuring variation in government-military relations, because it misses the many levels of military political participation that are possible in between the military's political neutrality and political dominance. To focus on the Chinese example, we know from the history of the People's Republic that there has been substantial variation in the

³⁶ Building on Fearon's (1995) seminal model of bargaining and war, Svobik (2013, 2014) emphasizes information problems regarding the severity of the internal threats that a state faces as a major cause of coups.

³⁷ In addition to the absence of a commitment problem.

relative power of the PLA in Chinese politics relative to the CCP — from high levels of political participation during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution to a gradual process of professionalization and withdrawal from politics beginning in the late 1970s (e.g., Yu Bin 2015; Joffe 1987). Yet, the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014, hereafter GWF) data — arguably the most refined regime-type data we have on non-democracies — categorizes China as a dominant-party regime for all years from 1950 to 2010, without variation. This is not to criticize the GWF data. It does an excellent job of what it is intended to do: generally classify states according to a holistic understanding of their institutional features and whose interests are represented in the ruling group. Rather, this example is intended to caution against the misuse of aggregated regime-type data to measure fine-grained outcomes that vary significantly over time, such as specific levels of military political participation.

B. Military Participation in Government (MPG)

The Military Participation in Government data (MPG) provides a way to measure fine-grained variation in military participation in government across countries and over time. Specifically, the MPG data provides counts of the total number of members of national cabinets and state councils, as well as counts of their military members. This allows for a straight-forward, but fine-grained, measure of relative military participation in national government: the proportion of a state's cabinet, state council or equivalents that is made up of military officers. The can be further disaggregated into proportions that focus on national-security and non-security politics, respectively. This allows researchers to test arguments regarding the different effects that conflict should have on the military's participation in the security and non-security areas of government.

The MPG is a human-coded dataset. Coders were assigned countries in a random order and instructed to code a series of variables related to the number and type of positions held by active-duty military officers in the government. The scope of the data collection is all states in the international system for the period 1964-2008 as indicated by the list of states put forward by Gleditsch and Ward (1999) and that are contained in the Archigos data on state leaders. (Goemans et al 2009) Coders were instructed to exclusively consult the *Europa World Year Book* (hereafter, *Europa*) which contains yearly rosters of national cabinets, state councils, and other such bodies in the executive branch of all countries from 1964 onwards. (The 1964 start date for the data collection is driven by the coverage of the *Europa World Yearbook* for countries outside of Europe.) Using the information contained in *Europa*, coders collected annual data at the country level.

A number of binary variables were coded based on whether military officers held specific positions — e.g., "Is the minister of defense an active-duty military officer?" — but the data used in this chapter is the proportion of cabinet and state-council positions filled by active-duty military officers — herein referred to as Military Government Share. Accordingly, the focus of the discussion here will be on the count variables from which the proportion was generated. Detailed information on the coding of all variables can be found in the MPG project codebook (see Appendix). From *Europa*, coders were instructed to generate the following counts:

- 1) Number of cabinet/state council members
- 2) Number of active-duty military officers in cabinet/state council
- 3) Number of cabinet/state council members whose portfolios pertain to security- or the armed forces

- 4) Number of active-duty military officers in security-/armed forces subset of the cabinet/state council
- 5) Number of cabinet members whose portfolios do not pertain to security- or the armed forces
- 6) Number of active-duty military officers in the non-security/armed forces subset of the cabinet/state council

Each military count is a subset of its parent variable — e.g., the number of active-duty military officers in a cabinet/state council is a subset of the total number of cabinet/state council members, and the former cannot be greater than the latter.

Coders used the *Europa World Yearbook* to construct each count, considering all individuals except for the state leader.³⁸ The state-leader was not considered in the counts so as to properly measure the military's *institutional* role in national politics. There is a subset of military regimes — "strongman" regimes (e.g., Weeks 2014) — where the leader has a military background, but the military as an institution is not generally involved in non-defense decision-making. There is also the issue of regimes such as North Korea's and Syria's under Bashar al-Assad, where the leader is given a military rank as an honorific after ascending to power as a civilian. MPG's coding scheme focuses on positions held by military officers other than the state leader, thereby avoiding conflating an institutional role for the military with the leader having a military title.

In constructing the counts, coders counted individuals not portfolios.³⁹ So if an individual were both Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior, s/he was only counted once.

³⁸ Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) was used to determine the state leader.

³⁹ To ensure consistency, individuals were counted, not portfolios. So if an individual were both Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior, s/he was only counted once. In many cases, the number of portfolios in a particular minister's brief was ambiguous. For example, while "Minister of Defense and Health Services" clearly entails two

Individuals were counted in the total count and then in *either* the security or non-security count. They were assigned to the security count if any of their listed portfolios pertained to security or the armed forces. For example, if an individual were Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, s/he would be counted in the security count, because of his/her Defense portfolio. In this way, the coding of the non-security count is relatively conservative in that it only counts individuals whose portfolios have no direct relevance to defense or the armed forces. Despite this conservative coding rule, incidences of military officers holding non-security positions occur with relatively high frequency — in 22.23% of country-years coded. (see Table 3.1) Examples in the data of non-security positions held by military officers include various economic ministries, such as the "Minister of Finance and Economic Planning" (e.g., Fiji, 1993-1994) or the "Fifth Minister of Machine-building" (e.g., PRC, 1964-1969), and ministries related to social services such as the Minister of Education (e.g., Bahrain, 1995-1999), Minister of Social Welfare (e.g., Argentina 1971-1983), as well as positions that relate to the general political leadership of the country, such as Vice President (e.g., Zambia 1997-2000).

For the military counts, all active-duty military officers were considered. A member of the cabinet was considered to be part of the military if s/he held a military rank and this was not indicated to be a retired rank.⁴⁰ The underlying assumption is that holding an active military rank indicates membership in a military-type organization, and that these types of organizations monopolize coercive resources in a country and are engaged in bargaining with the state leader over their relative autonomy and their role in the politics of the state. When active-duty military officers lead government ministries or hold other cabinet- or state-council level positions, it is

separate portfolios; "Minister of Health and Social Welfare" could pertain to one or two separate portfolios. Determining cases such as this would require more in-depth country level knowledge, which would be unevenly available across countries, or subjective decisions by individual coders, reducing the reliability of the data. Counting *individuals*, accordingly, presented a much more objective and "cleaner" coding procedure.

⁴⁰ The *Europa World Yearbook* indicates retired military rank by including "ret." next to the rank.

assumed that this is indicative of the military as an institution having a significant role in government and the formation of policy, not just its implementation.

In the coding, all named individuals who were listed as part of the executive branch in *Europa* and were not the state leader were considered in the counts, with the exclusion of political party leadership,⁴¹ the legislature, and agency or ministry-heads noted explicitly to not be a part of the cabinet or state-council equivalent. Functionally, this meant that the coding incorporated a range of executive-level bodies, including cabinets, state councils, "revolutionary command councils," presidiums, and privy councils. Individuals counted included ministers, deputy ministers, state secretaries, and council-members. Vice presidents and deputy prime ministers were also included, as were general leadership positions, such as monarch, prime minister, and president — if they were not held by the "effective state leader" as indicated by the Archigos data. The objective in the coding of the counts was to capture all politically important positions in the government's executive branch, outside of the state leader, and to differentiate them both by their relevance to security and by their armed forces and military affiliation (active-duty military vs. civilian or retired).

The vast majority of coding decisions were mechanical and did not entail subjective decision-making on the part of coders. Rather, coders were simply required to consult established rosters of cabinet and state-council members in a single source, add up the total number of individuals listed, and then add up the total number who had a military rank next to their name. The only subjective component of the coding pertained to determining the number of security/armed forces-related and non-security-related positions in the cabinet/state council. Here coders were aided by a detailed codebook (see Appendix) and common-sense decision rules. To

⁴¹ While this runs the risk of excluding some important leadership figures in one-party states, practically, in the coding it was observed that there is substantial overlap between the leadership of the dominant party in one-party regimes and cabinet-level positions in the government.

quote the codebook, in addition to the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Interior,⁴² Security positions were:

[A]ny position with “security” in the title (except for "Social Security" and "Food Security"), and also positions involving “borders,” “narcotics,” “military production,” specific military branches, and the police/gendarmerie....

Positions that refer to the administration of specific, *named* domestic or international territories/countries/regions also count — e.g., Minister of Chittagong Hill Affairs (Bangladesh) or Minister of Mainland Affairs (Taiwan) or Minister of European Affairs for some EU countries, but NOT unnamed territories — e.g., Minister of Rural Affairs (White 2014, 8).

State/provincial/regional governors were not counted in the coding.⁴³ Rather, positions in the government that focused on specific territories were counted both in the cabinet count and the security-/armed forces-related count. The underlying assumption was that if a specific territory had a cabinet- or state council-level position, it had a special relevance to the state's domestic or international security.⁴⁴

Other positions counted in the coding of security/armed forces positions included positions related to nuclear energy, secondary foreign affairs ministries that did not explicitly pertain to economic matters, development, international aid, and positions pertaining to civil defense or public order. (A detailed account of these can be seen in the codebook in the Appendix.) Coders were also required to list as text the name and position for each role held by a military officer for each country-year.⁴⁵

⁴² As researchers coded each country-year, they would first separately code binary indicators pertaining to whether a military officer headed the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Justice, or Foreign Affairs. Then, they would code an indicator for whether or not military officers headed other security- or armed forces-related ministries other than the four previously enumerated. Finally, they would code an indicator for whether or not a military officer held positions not related to security or the armed forces. These initial, binary coding decisions would then aid in the coders' decisions regarding the coding of the count variables as well as facilitate coding checks by the project lead. For example, if the count variable for "count of military non-security positions" indicated that the military held 1 such position, then the binary indicator for "military hold non-security positions" would also need to be coded as 1.

⁴³ These are listed in a separate section in *Europa*.

⁴⁴ For example, the Chittagong Hills is a region with an active, and at times violent, separatist movement in Bangladesh.

⁴⁵ E.g., corresponding the "Minister of Defense (MOD) is a military officer" indicator, there as a corresponding "MOD name" string variable — with corresponding strings for the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice ministries.

C. Training and supervision of coders

To complete this coding, six coders were hired from September 2014 to August 2015.⁴⁶ Before coding, each coder underwent several hours of in-person training with the project lead (the author). This included reading and answering questions regarding a detailed codebook (see Appendix) and coding country-years collaboratively with the project lead. After each coder finished this initial training, s/he was given ten country-years to code independently. These country-years were selected in order to capture a range of levels of military political participation, including democracies, military regimes, and states in between. After each coder completed this independent coding, s/he returned it to the project lead who reviewed it in-person with the coder in order to address any mistakes in coding.⁴⁷ Once this training was complete, coders were given worksheets for each country assigned that were pre-populated by the project lead with such information as country name, year, country-code (from Gleditsch and Ward 1999), and the state leader's name (from the Archigos data).

As noted previously, the coding decisions were largely mechanical, with the exception of the security/non-security distinction. For this, coders were instructed to contact the project lead (the author) directly whenever they encountered a position not covered in the codebook for a ruling and to err on the side of contacting the project lead whenever a coding decision was not immediately obvious. In practice, this usually led to multiple exchanges on a weekly basis with each coder. Coders also flagged any such cases for later review by the project lead.

Once a worksheet was completed, coders would upload them to a shared folder where they would be reviewed in detail by the project lead. All country-years were checked for

Coders also recorded as a list the "Other security/forces" positions and "Non-security/armed forces" positions held by military officers.

⁴⁶ With the support of a Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation Award SES#1424001.

⁴⁷ At this stage, most mistakes pertained to the coding of leader-held positions in the cabinet, whereby coders would mistakenly count leader-held positions as part of the cabinet.

consistency by the project lead, and flagged cases were reviewed in detail. This was aided by the text variables provided by the coders which recorded the name and positions held by military officers for each country year. Where necessary, minor changes to the coding sheets were made by the project lead.⁴⁸

Given that most of the coding entailed largely mechanical tasks with little in the way of subjective decision-making — aside from the security-/non-security distinction, inter-coder reliability was not a major concern. Nevertheless, one of the six coders was randomly assigned 100 country-years coded by the other five coders and the project lead and the results from this coding were compared with the original coding. Comparing the coding of the 100 duplicated random observations with their counterparts in the main dataset, there is 92.78% agreement on the coding of a binary indicator for whether or not an active military officer holds a non-security position in the government; agreement was 91.75% for a binary indicator related to security positions. Turning to a count of the number of active military officers holding non-security positions, agreement is 84.54%, and 87.63% for a count of security positions held by active military officers. For the binary indicators, it is possible to calculate a Kappa-statistic, which is a more conservative measure of inter-coder reliability than simple agreement, because it takes into account the proportion of agreement that would occur by chance: the Kappa for the military holding security positions indicator is .8292 and for non-security positions, it is .8042. For reference, in the application of disease diagnosis, Landis and Koch (1977, 164-65) suggest that a Kappa statistic between .81 and 1 (the maximum) can be regarded as "almost perfect" inter-coder agreement, while .61-.80 can be regarded as "substantial" agreement.

⁴⁸For example, if a coder mistakenly categorized a military officer that was a "Minister of Social Security" as a military held security-/armed forces position because of the term "Security" in the title.

D. Adjustments to coding

In the process of coding, researchers found cases where military ranks were omitted in the *Europa* government rosters for individuals in cabinets and state councils who had previously or subsequently held active military rank. These cases were relatively rare, but affected a range of countries and years in the data. Since some of these omissions could reflect the retirement of individuals from the military rather than omissions by *Europa*, coders were instructed not to infer an individual's active military status for a given year based on their status in other years, but to flag such cases for later review. After the coding was complete, the project lead reviewed these cases in detail and recoded them according to the following decision-rules: If an individual was recorded in *Europa* government rosters as a civilian in a given year, and this year was both preceded and followed by years in which the individual was recorded as an active-duty military officer, then active-duty military status was inferred for the intervening year and the coding for all relevant variables was adjusted accordingly.⁴⁹ The assumption in this recoding was that it was very unlikely that an individual would retire from the military and then re-enter active-duty within the space of a few years, all the while holding high government office.

After these cases were re-coded, what remained was country-years where an individual was recorded as a civilian and this was either preceded or followed by active-duty military status, but not 'bracketed' on either side by active military rank. Inferring military status was more difficult in these cases, because it is quite plausible that an individual could retire from active-duty status after some time in the government or upon switching positions in the government. Much less likely, though still plausible, is that an individual could join the military after some time inside the government — perhaps being endowed with a military rank commensurate with

⁴⁹ E.g. if John Smith was recorded as an active-duty general in 1964 and 1968, but as a civilian in 1965, 1966, and 1967, John Smith was inferred to have still been an active duty general in 1965-7 and the coding was adjusted accordingly.

his/her position. In these two types of cases, I conducted supplementary searches for the individual's name in *Keesings Record of World Events*, which contains some information on cabinet rosters and government changes. If evidence could not be found in *Keesings*, secondary sources, such as historical dictionaries, gazeteers, and regional almanacs were also searched.⁵⁰ If positive evidence was found to establish that an individual held active-military rank in the period in question⁵¹ the coding was adjusted to reflect their military status. If no positive evidence could be found to support recoding of his/her military status the coding was left as is.

E. Potential limitations of the MPG data

While the MPG data collection was rigorous, systematic, and represents a clear step forward in terms of data collection on government-military relations, there are some limitations of which researchers should be aware.

Firstly, the coding does not make case-specific distinctions on the relative power or relevance of specific positions in government or weight specific positions differently. All listed individuals — with the exceptions noted previously — are included and counted *once* in the count variables. The counts in the data do include a small number of individuals who could likely be characterized as "figure-heads," such as monarchs, presidents in parliamentary systems, and governor-generals in the British Commonwealth. There is an underlying assumption in the data collection that all government positions matter, including supposed "figure-head" positions.⁵² Beyond this theoretical rationale, there is a functional concern: rather than relying on coders' unevenly-distributed, case-specific knowledge, which would tend to be systematically weighted towards larger, often Western countries, the decision was made to develop simple, all-

⁵⁰ Using the "Google Books" search engine.

⁵¹ I.e., they were referred to by their military rank and this was not qualified as being a retired rank.

⁵² An example of the political relevance of such "figure-head" positions is the role of King Juan Carlos in ensuring Spain's transition from autocracy to democracy.

inclusive decision-rules that would be applied equally to all cases in order to avoid hard-wiring bias into the data collection. The *Europa Yearbook* is an excellent resource in this regard, because it provides equivalent information for all countries from 1964 onwards and thus avoids this type of bias.

Secondly, the count of security- and armed forces-related positions includes positions that pertain primarily to international security (e.g., Minister of Foreign Affairs), primarily to domestic security (e.g., Minister of the Interior, Minister of Justice), or to both types (e.g., Minister of Defense). Accordingly, when testing arguments that focus on *either* domestic or international security researchers should consider making use of the binary indicators that pertain to specific positions or reconstructing the security count using the string variables that list the names of the positions held by military officers in order to reflect either domestic *or* international security. The baseline count of security-/armed forces-related positions aggregates individuals holding positions pertaining to both international and domestic security. This issue is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Thirdly, *Europa* does list some retired military officers in their rosters, but this seems to be inconsistently applied and only apply to very high ranks — generals and admirals mostly. The full MPG dataset does provide counts of retired military officers, but researchers are encouraged to use these with caution, given that they seem to undercount the true number of retired military officers present in national governments. While it is certainly very plausible that retired military officers may maintain an institutional affiliation with the military,⁵³ the decision was made to focus this version of the MPG data on active-duty military officers, given the greater reliability of that information.

⁵³ It is, however, likely that, on average, the institutional affiliation of retired military officers is substantially less than that of active-duty officers, particularly for those who retired at a more junior rank.

Fourthly, the counts of the cabinet/state-council members in the MPG data rely on the determinations made by *Europa*. According to correspondence with the *Europa* editorial staff, the determination of what government bodies are included in the government rosters is determined by "local convention" and official government lists. *Europa* conducts subsequent research to confirm the identities of those holding the positions listed in official sources.⁵⁴ There may be some variation across countries in what bodies are reported as being a part of their executive branch. Accordingly, when using the MPG military counts as dependent variables, conscientious researchers are encouraged, as robustness checks to include country-level fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity among countries.

F. Descriptive Statistics and the Distribution of the MPG data

Prior to analysis, it is instructive to examine descriptive statistics derived from the MPG data as well as its distribution across several temporal and geographic dividers. Beginning with binary indicators derived from the MPG data, Table 3.1 shows the distribution of binary indicators capturing military participation in security and non-security roles in government across 165 countries from 1964 to 2008. Percentages are calculated for each cell, so that each cell percentage represents that category's proportion out of the total country-years in the sample.

⁵⁴ Email correspondence with *Europa* editorial staff. 3/27/2015.

Table 3.1: Active military officers in security and non-security roles (1964-2008, cell percentages are proportion of total)

Military officer in security role	Military officer in non-security role		
	No	Yes	Total
No	3,689 56.37%	378 5.78%	4,067 62.15%
Yes	1,380 21.09%	1,097 16.76%	2,477 37.85%
Total	5,069 77.46%	1,475 22.54%	6,544


Here, it is evident that while the absence of active-duty military officers from government is the most common outcome in country-years in the sample — at 56.37% — the remainder of country-years (43.63%), which see active-duty military officers in their governments is certainly a non-trivial amount. While military involvement in security matters is the most common outcome in states with at least one active-duty military officer in government, the involvement of military officers in non-security matters is also strikingly common — 22.54% of country-years in the data have at least one active-duty military officer in their government whose portfolio exclusively pertains to matters unrelated to security or the armed forces.⁵⁵ This is in contrast to military involvement in security affairs, where 37.85% of country-years have at least one active military officer involved in security affairs in the government. 16.76% of country-years see active military involvement in both security and non-security affairs at high levels of government.

While relatively common overall, there is clear variation in military participation in government across years. Figure 3.1 shows the average proportion of states, by year, that have at

⁵⁵ This counts countries that have both security- and non-security-focused military officers in their cabinets (16.76% of total) and countries with only non-security-focused military officers in their cabinets. (5.78%)

least one active-duty military officer in their government from 1964-2008. Here we see a slightly skewed, roughly inverted u-shaped distribution with a peak at slightly more than half in the mid-1980s. This accords with what we know about the rise and fall of military regimes in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the "third-wave" of democratization (e.g., Huntington 1991). What is striking, however, is that the proportion of states with an active-military officer in their government in the late 2000s (~.30) is generally equivalent to that in the mid-1960s, suggesting that despite the noted decrease in the number of military regimes worldwide in the 1980s and 1990s, a baseline level of military involvement in politics has persisted.

Figure 3.1: Yearly proportion of states with active military officer in government, 1964-2008



Year-to-year variation becomes more striking when we focus on the proportion of states with at least one military officer focused on non-security matters (Figure 3.2). Here, while the peak of the 1970s and 1980s remains, the drop-off in the 1990s and 2000s is much more striking.

Critically, though, while there is steep drop off evident with the end of the Cold War, this trend does not appear to continue into the 2000s, with the proportion of states with military involvement in non-security areas stabilizing above 10%. This suggests a substantial group of states — well beyond a few pariah states, such as Myanmar — that have resisted system-wide pressures in the 1990s to reduce the military's role in politics.

Figure 3.2: Yearly proportion of states with active military officer in non-security role in government, 1964-2008





Figure 3.3 reproduces the same plot shown in Figure 2, but also overlays the proportion of states coded as either "military," "military-personal," or "indirect military rule" regimes in the GWF regime-type data. This provides a sense for how the MPG data captures military political participation beyond regime-types. Here, we see that if our objective is to ascertain the military's political role specifically, the MPG data provides a much more complete picture, generally capturing twice as many instances of military involvement in non-defense politics as purely

regime-type data. This is even greater for later years in the sample period, where there appear to be approximately three times as many states coded by the MPG data as having an active military officer in a non-security role in the government as states coded as having a broadly "military" regime-type in the GWF data. This is suggestive of a trend after the Cold War whereby the number of overtly military regimes declined sharply, but militaries in a broad range of other regime types maintained a high level of involvement in politics. This is not to disparage the GWF regime-type data, which provides the most complete and fine-tuned typology of autocratic regime-types to date. Rather, this should caution against misusing regime-type data as a proxy for military-involvement in politics, which — as Figure 3.3 indicates — can extend far beyond military regimes.

Figure 3.3: Yearly proportion of states with active military officer in non-security role in government overlaid with GWF military regime indicator, 1964-2008



Moving beyond dichotomous measures of military participation in government, the MPG data provides proportions of the military's share of cabinet- and state council-level positions, in addition to disaggregated measures of its share of security-/armed forces-related portfolios as well as non-security portfolios. (Table 3.2 provides the mean and standard deviation of each of these three proportions.) For all of these ratios, the minimum is 0 — no active military officers in government — and the maximum is 1 — all members of the government are active military officers.

Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for Military Government Share and security/non-security subsets, 1964-2008

Variable	Average	Standard Deviation	Obs ⁵⁶
Military government share	0.062	0.134	6544
Military security government share	0.144	0.221	6533
Military non-security government share	0.042	0.130	6543

Here we see that across the data, the average percentage of a government that is made up of active military officers is relatively low — 6.2%. Military participation in roles related to the armed forces or security matters has a much higher average level (14.4%) — more than twice that of the overall measure. Active military security government share is also more than three times that of the non-security measure (4.2%). Some of this, however, may be driven by the much smaller size of the "Security Governments" as coded in the MPG data. The average size of

⁵⁶ There are a few missing values for Military Security Government Share, because there are a small number of country-years (e.g., Swaziland-1968) that have no government positions that meet the MPG's criteria for security-related — e.g., they have no ministry of defense, interior, foreign affairs, etc.

the overall government in the MPG data is 22.889 individuals,⁵⁷ while the average size of the security-related governments is 4.276 individuals.⁵⁸ This is unsurprising given that the modal arrangement of a country's Security Government in the MPG data is four individuals: the ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, it is still generally much more common for military officers in government to hold security portfolios rather than non-security portfolios (see Table 3.1).

Turning to the geographic distribution of the data. Figures 3.4-3.8 show the country-level values for the Military's Share of Government for 1965, 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005. The countries are shaded in according to their values for Military Government Share in that year — with darker colors indicating higher proportions of active-duty military officers in government.

Figure 3.4: Military Government Share (1965)




⁵⁷ The maximum size of the overall government in the data is 141 individuals (The Soviet Union in 1984, 1988, and 1989) and the minimum size is 0 (Ethiopia in 1974, when the sole recorded government was King Haile Selassie without any accompanying ministers or deputies).

⁵⁸ The maximum size of the Security Government in the data is 19 (Cambodia in 1991 and 1992) and the minimum is 0 (Swaziland 1968-71; Bhutan 1964-8; Pakistan 1968; Bangladesh 1976-7, and Singapore 1964). In some cases, there was no Security Government because the positions did not exist, and in others, the positions were vacant or held by the leader (e.g., Bangladesh 1976-7). In Pakistan-1968, the government consisted of a three-person junta of "Martial Law Administrators," who were coded as focused on the overall administration of the government rather than its security functions.

The overall variation from map to map confirms the broader temporal trends suggested by Figure 3.1 — with the 1975 and 1985 maps showing generally higher levels of military involvement in politics globally. This appears to be driven by a sharp increase in military participation in government in South America — the rise of military regimes in the 1970s.⁵⁹ The 1970s and 1980s also see sharp increases in Military Government Share in a number of African countries, such as Niger and the Central African Republic — reflecting successful military coups in those countries.

Figure 3.5: Military Government Share (1975)



There is also important regional variation evident. Unsurprisingly, Western Europe and the United States and Canada see very low levels throughout the sample period.⁶⁰ Eastern Europe and the Soviet Bloc to see some values for Military Government Share above 0 — this is largely limited to a few defense intelligence-related posts and reflects a relatively common organization of government throughout the Warsaw Pact. Libya, Egypt, and Sudan persist in having moderate

⁵⁹ The apparently low levels for Argentina in the maps are due to the fact that the Argentine military junta ruled from 1976 to 1983 and so this period is not reflected in the 1975 and 1985 maps.

⁶⁰ In a few years, the Canadian Governor-General is a military officer and the position of Director of National Intelligence in the U.S. Cabinet is held by an active-duty military officer.

levels of military participation in government throughout the sample period, though these are notably lower in the latter years of the sample.

Figure 3.6: Military Government Share (1985)





Figure 3.7: Military Government Share (1995)



A persistent regional grouping of states with relatively high values for Military Government Share is found in South-East Asia. This is not surprising in the case of the long-lived military regimes in Myanmar (Burma) and Indonesia, but it is striking that we also see relatively persistent military participation in government in a number of one-party states, such as

Laos and Cambodia. We also see substantial military involvement in government in the People's Republic of China.

Figure 3.8: Military Government Share (2005)



In sum, we can see from the preceding section that: 1) military participation in government is relatively common; 2) this participation extends to both the security and non-security realms; 3) the MPG data collection captures many more instances of military political participation than extant regime-type data; 4) there is a high degree of variation in military participation in government across both time and space. Having established the utility and value-added of the MPG data, in the following section, I detail an empirical strategy for testing the central expectations generated by the theory: that international crises lead to two distinct waves of withdrawal from politics which are years apart.

III. Research Design

The theory anticipates that military withdrawal from government will be driven by major international crises in two waves. In terms of the independent variable, to capture major international crises, I used both the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset and the Correlates

of War (COW) data on inter-state wars.⁶¹ To capture crises that are severe enough to affect military preferences in both the short- and long-term, I coded a "Major International Crisis" variable as 1 if, in a given year between 1918 and 2007,⁶² a country experienced an international crisis where the "Intensity of violence" rose to the level of "Serious clashes" or "Full-scale war."⁶³ The indicator was also coded as 1 if, absent large-scale violence, the state nevertheless experienced a crisis in a given year categorized as being perceived by the state's leadership as threatening "grave damage" — defined as having a risk of mass casualties — or a "threat to existence" for the state — including genocide, occupation, or the end of the state.⁶⁴ Since the ICB data does not code all years of ongoing inter-state war as crises — coding only sharp divergences from the regular pattern of violence in such wars as "inter-war crises," I also coded the Major International Crisis variable as 1 if the COW data indicated that a state was a participant in an inter-state war in a given year. Table 3.3 shows the distribution of major international crises in the sample

Table 3.3: Occurrence of major international crises (1964-2008)

Major international crisis		
No	6,113	93.36%
Yes	435	6.64%
Total	6,548	

From this variable, I generated a series of indicators to capture a state's past crisis-history in order to capture potential short- and long-term effects. These indicators were coded at five-

⁶¹ Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000.

⁶² In line with the ICB data, this indicator begins in 1918, but does not include World War I.

⁶³ This is the SEVVIO variable.

⁶⁴ This is the GRAVITY variable.

year intervals.⁶⁵ The first was coded as 1 if the state had experienced a major crisis within the previous five years. The second was coded as 1 if there was a crisis that ended within the previous six-ten years and so forth, through a crisis that ended 46-50 years ago, for a total of ten indicators taking into account 50 years of history. To take the Cuban Missile crisis, which ended in 1962, as an example, this crisis would lead to a 1 code on the first indicator from 1962 to 1966 for the USSR, a 1 code on the second indicator from 1967-1971, and so forth. Hypothetically, if the USSR experienced no crises subsequent to the first crisis, in 1967 the first indicator would "switch off" and be coded as 0.⁶⁶ This approach takes into account a state's cumulative conflict history, since it is possible for a particularly conflict-prone state to have 1 codes on all ten indicators. It also allows for states that never experienced such a crisis in the previous 50 years to have their own category, which is the base category (when all ten indicators are "0").⁶⁷ The coding of the crisis-history indicators took into account a state's conflict history back to 1918.

In order to control for other aspects of a state's threat environment, I included indicators for whether a state experienced a severe *internal* conflict, which has been shown to increase military involvement in domestic politics (e.g., Stepan 1971, Desch 1999) and to be associated with greater international conflict propensity (e.g., Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008). This indicator was coded as 1 if the state was experiencing an intra-state armed conflict at the 25 battle-deaths in a year threshold within its own borders,⁶⁸ as indicated by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002; Thenmer and Wallensteen 2014). Given the

⁶⁵ Coding these indicators at different intervals is explored in robustness checks below — with no changes to the results.

⁶⁶ Intra-war crises were not considered in this coding.

⁶⁷ In this way, the crisis-indicators approach is superior to simply calculating "peace-years" — i.e., a counter of the number of years since a crisis that resets after every crisis. Such a counter would not account for cumulative crisis history and, for conflict-prone states, would wash out any long-term effects by constantly resetting with every new crisis. Further, as noted by Dafoe (n.p), the peace-years approach is problematic, because it does not distinguish between country-years that have low values on the counter because they have recently experienced conflict, have recently entered the data, or have recently become independent.

⁶⁸ This excludes extra-systemic conflicts or civil wars outside of the state's borders in which it was a participant.

potential for economic development to exert a substantial effect on a state's propensity for international conflict (e.g., Gartzke 2007) and since less-developed states may be more likely to have military officers involved in politics (e.g., Huntington 1968), I included the natural log of the country's GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002). I also included an indicator for whether or not a state experienced an international crisis that did not rise to a high level of violence or "gravity" in the ICB data. Further, it is important to demonstrate that the effect of international threats on military political participation is not an artifact of leadership changes and the government reshuffles that may accompany them. Accordingly, I included a binary variable coded as 1 if the Archigos dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009)⁶⁹ indicated that there was a leader change in that year. And while evidence for a general monadic democratic peace is mixed (e.g., Quackenbush and Rudy 2009), there is evidence that democracies are less likely to be the targets of military action (e.g., Pickering 2002), which would correspond to an overall lower democratic propensity to be involved in major international crises at the country-year level. This and the well-accepted assumption that civilian control of the military is a prerequisite for democratic consolidation, suggests that democracy represents a potential confounding variable and should be controlled for to ascertain the true relationship between crisis history and military participation in government. Accordingly, I included an indicator for whether a state was a democracy — coded as one if the state had a combined Polity score greater than six.⁷⁰

As discussed previously, much of the current literature on international threat and civil-military relations conceives of "threat environment" broadly and on aspects of it — such as geography or enduring rivalries — that do not change over time or change very slowly or rarely. In order to set the time-varying crisis-history indicators apart from aspects of a state's threat

⁶⁹ I am grateful to Kristian Gleditsch for sharing the latest update of the Archigos data.

⁷⁰ Using Kristian Gleditsch's expanded polity score (Gleditsch 2013).

environment that change rarely or slowly, I included in all models an indicator for whether a state was currently involved in a "strategic rivalry" as measured by Thompson and Dreyer (2011). Thompson and Dreyer conceive of a strategic rivalry as existing for a given state when a state sees another state as a "peer competitor" with the potential to engage in military hostilities. And in order to ensure that the crisis-history indicators were not just capturing the additive effect of multiple crises over a state's history, I included a count of the number of major crises that a state had experienced since 1918. Also, an "Ongoing" crisis indicator was included to capture the effect of an ongoing, multi-year crisis or war⁷¹ whose outcome had not yet been determined — i.e., in those country-years where the crisis was ongoing but had not ended.

In addition, given that the theory being tested is about very long-term effects, it is vital to control for other long-term historical processes that may also drive changes in states' civil-military relations. Accordingly, I included in the analysis a counter for the number of years since a state's independence — or 1918, whichever is later. 1918 was chosen as the cutoff year, because that is the historical range upon which the crisis-history indicators draw. Also included were a squared and cubed term for this time counter in order to control for the possible non-monotonic effects of historical processes.

Given that superpower competition during the Cold War systematically affected the ability of autocracies to survive (Levitsky and Way 2002) and that this extended to military regimes, I included an indicator for the Cold War (1947-1991). Finally, a one-year lag of the dependent variable was included to control for initial/starting levels of military involvement, as well as to correct for likely serial correlation on the dependent variable. Table 3.4 displays

⁷¹ The ICB data does not code all years of ongoing inter-state war as crises — coding only sharp divergences from the regular pattern of violence in such war as "intra-war crises." Accordingly, for the Ongoing indicator, I relied on the COW data to code ongoing inter-state wars.

descriptive statistics for these control variables. For those variables that are dichotomous, the average can be interpreted as the proportion of observations in the data that are coded as 1.

Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics for control variables (1964-2008)

Variable	Average	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Obs
Military Government Share (MPG)	0.062	0.134	0	1	6544
Ongoing major int'l crisis (ICB, COW)	0.033	0.180	0	1	6544
Count of major int'l crises (ICB, COW)	2.136	3.067	0	17	6544
Rivalry (Thompson & Dryer)	0.427	0.495	0	1	6544
Civil War (UCDP)	0.169	0.375	0	1	6542
GDP per capita (log)	8.272	1.227	4.896	13.357	6540
Democracy (Polity)	0.340	0.474	0	1	6382
New leader (Archigos)	0.164	0.370	0	1	6544

Given the continuous dependent variable, combined with the panel nature of the data, I used both Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with country-level random effects estimators and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with country-level fixed effects. There are other models that can be used with a continuous dependent variable and panel data. In particular, there is the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). GMM is intended to correct for the bias and inefficiency that may affect coefficient estimates in models that employ both fixed effects and lagged dependent variables for small panels — i.e., "the small T, large N" problem (e.g., Judson and Owen 1999). I use GLS/OLS over GMM for several reasons: GMM is particularly appropriate for panels with a small temporal range, and its utility diminishes as the length of panels (T) increases. Judson and Owen (1999, 30) suggest that GMM is appropriate for panels

less than 30 years long. They observe that when $T=30$, a "least squares dummy variable" approach — similar to the OLS/GLS model proposed here — "performs just as well or better than the viable alternative [GMM]." Another concern is that the GMM method is particularly computationally intensive, using the lagged first differences as instruments for the different independent variables as well as a bootstrapping process to provide reliable estimates of standard errors. Roodman (2009) observes that aside from GMM being primarily intended for smaller panels, "the number of instruments in difference and system GMM tends to explode with [increasing] T ." The modal panel length in the MPG data used here is 43 years (1964-2007) with an average panel length of 38.3, suggesting that not only is the GMM approach not necessary, it will be problematic given the number of panel years, as well as the large number of right-hand side variables that will need to be instrumented for.

Most critically, GMM requires the assumption that the lagged differences used in GMM are uncorrelated with unobserved country-fixed effects. Standard GMM packages build into their programming diagnostic tests to address the validity of this assumption. In exploratory analysis, models run using GMM produced nonsensically small p-values for almost every right-hand side variable, as well as strong rejections of the validity of the lagged-first difference instruments in Sargon tests, indicating serious omitted variable bias, because of the omission of country-level fixed effects. Put differently, using the GMM approach here over fixed effects is inappropriate for the analysis, because it does not adequately address unobserved country-level heterogeneity in the dependent variable — Military Government Share.

Another possible approach is to use a Generalized Linear Model (GLM). While Military Government Share is continuous in the sense that it can take a theoretically infinite range of values, these are bounded by 0 and 1 — because it is a proportion. Papke and Woolridge (1996)

suggest that the appropriate model choice for proportions is a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) with a Logit link function and binomial distribution specified for the dependent variable — to account for the bounding of the DV at 0 and 1. In the main analysis I pursue GLS/OLS over GLM because Military Government Share is not binomially distributed, which would require a "two-horned" distribution of the data near the extreme values of 0 and 1. GLS/OLS has the added benefits of providing coefficients that can be interpreted directly and the relatively straightforward calculation of fixed- and random-effects. Fixed effects are particularly important for testing the theory put forward here, which proposes that a state's history of crises exerts an effect that changes over time. This time-variable effect provides important explanatory power that time-invariant aspects of threat environment do not. To be sure of keeping crisis history's effect separate from country-specific time-invariant factors of the threat environment, it is important to include fixed effects, which control for time-invariant unobserved factors at the country level. Nevertheless, in the Appendix, I report results using a GLM approach without fixed effects and these are essentially the same as those reported below using the GLS/OLS approach.

In the following analysis, I run OLS with a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects. I also provide estimates that use GLS and a random- rather than fixed-effects estimator for added confidence in the main results. Additionally all variables on the right hand side of the model were lagged by one-year to address potential simultaneity bias — with the exception of the Cold War indicator and the cubic polynomial of time since independence/1918. To further address the non-independence of observations within the country-panels, robust standard errors were calculated by clustering on country. I use this model specification to test the main argument of the theory: that major international crises will lead to two waves of military withdrawal from

government, years apart. For the theory to be supported there should be two distinct waves of negative effect on Military Government Share in the crisis history indicators. Specifically, there should be both an early indicator and a latter indicator that are negative and significant, with at least one indicator in between the two waves where the coefficient is not negative and significant.

IV. Main Results

Table 3.5 shows the results from the main empirical models and demonstrates strong support for the theory. Each model includes a one-year lag of the dependent variable to control for initial levels of Military Government Share as well as account for autocorrelation. For each model specification, the analysis is run with both a random- and fixed-effects estimator and these results are reported side-by-side. The first specification includes just the indicators for international crisis history, the second adds the additional international threat variables, while the third and fourth specifications add, respectively, the controls for domestic factors and state characteristics, and the cubic time polynomial.

Table 3.5: Historical effect of major international crises on Military Government Share

	Basic	Basic- FE	Int'l	Int'l-FE	Domestic	Domestic- FE	Time	Time- FE
Major crisis 1-5 yrs ago	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.007+ (0.004)
➤ 6-10 yrs ago	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 11-15 yrs ago	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
➤ 16-20 yrs ago	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.008** (0.003)
➤ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.005+ (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.010** (0.003)
➤ 26-30 yrs ago	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
➤ 31-35 yrs ago	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
➤ 36-40 yrs ago	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)
➤ 41-45 yrs ago	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)
➤ 46-50 yrs ago	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Ongoing major crisis			-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)
Cold War			0.009** (0.002)	0.013** (0.003)	0.008** (0.002)	0.010** (0.002)	0.009** (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)
Rivalry			0.003 (0.003)	0.006+ (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)
Cumulative crises			-0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.003** (0.001)
Civil War					0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Democracy					-0.011** (0.002)	-0.030** (0.007)	-0.011** (0.002)	-0.028** (0.006)
GDP per capita					-0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002** (0.001)	0.003 (0.003)
New Leader					0.007* (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)	0.007* (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)
Time since independence							0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Time since independence ²							-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Time since independence ³							0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Lag of Military Government Share	0.851** (0.022)	0.770** (0.021)	0.844** (0.025)	0.757** (0.022)	0.832** (0.025)	0.742** (0.023)	0.832** (0.025)	0.741** (0.024)
Constant	0.010** (0.002)	0.016** (0.003)	0.004** (0.001)	0.004 (0.004)	0.024** (0.007)	0.008 (0.022)	0.023** (0.008)	0.010 (0.022)
Observations	6,371	6,371	6,371	6,371	6,366	6,366	6,366	6,366
Countries	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Each of the model specifications, using both random and fixed effects, shows strong, consistent support for the expectation that there is a delayed, long-term effect on Military Government Share for major international crises. However, there is weaker evidence of an initial effect. The strongest evidence for the "second-wave" effect is most clearly evident around crises that ended 21-25 years ago. The coefficient is consistently negative and significant in all specifications. There is also substantial evidence that the second-wave effect extends to the previous crisis-history indicator, with the coefficients on the 16-20 years indicator significant in many specifications. In each model, the "short-term" indicator for whether a state experienced a major crisis in the previous year is negative, though it only approaches conventional levels of statistical significance in the final model, which includes all controls and fixed effects ($p=.084$, two-tailed). Taken together, these models provide somewhat mixed evidence of a short-term wave of military withdrawal in the year after a major crisis, but very strong evidence of a second-wave effect between 16 and 25 years after the crisis ended.

Figure 3.9: Historical effect of major international crises on Military Government Share (1964-2008)




Figure 3.9 plots the crisis history coefficients for the model which includes all control variables, as well as country fixed effects. A reference line is drawn at "no effect" for ease of interpretation. Here, the two-waved negative pattern anticipated by the theory is clearly evident. A major international crisis seems to lead to an immediate-short-term decrease in the Military's Share of Government — though the confidence interval indicates there is some uncertainty surrounding this effect. As anticipated, this effect rapidly dissipates as time passes since the end of the crisis — with there being no statistically significant effect until 16-20 years after the end of the crisis, and this effect extends to 21-25 years after the crisis. Importantly, the location of this effect in time is right where it is expected in the theory, given the anticipated generational mechanism behind the second-wave effect. In most militaries, a junior officer (Lieutenant or Captain) would be between 20 and 25 years old at the time of the crisis. Twenty years later, s/he would be between 40 and 45 years old and be beginning to enter the more senior ranks of the military. (Colonels and Generals) As anticipated, beyond 25 years, the effect of crisis history quickly dissipates again.

Turning to substantive interpretation, given that the model used is a linear regression, the effect of the coefficients can be interpreted directly. Using the coefficients from the model, which includes all control variables and country-fixed effects, provides us with the coefficient of .007 for the short-term effect. This tells us that on average, and holding other factors constant, for a given country, experiencing a major crisis in the previous year corresponds to a .7 percentage point reduction in the proportion of the government that is made up of active military officers. However, the lack of precision surrounding this coefficient estimate ($p=.084$) means we should use caution when interpreting this coefficient. There is more certainty surrounding the second-wave effects at the 16-20 years and 21-25 years coefficients ($p=.006$ and $.003$,

respectively) Here, experiencing a major crisis that ended between 16-20 years ago corresponds to a .8 percentage point reduction, while at the 21-25 years mark, it corresponds to a one percentage point reduction.

While, at first glance, these effects may seem small, it is instructive to compare them to other significant variables in the model. Here, we see that both of the second-wave effects for a major crisis are greater than that of a state having a new leader in the previous year (.008). Further, the coefficient values for crisis history also do not necessarily reflect the full cumulative effect of crisis-history, given that the effect of each crisis-history coefficient is felt across five-years of a state's history. As the analysis with the five-year indicator suggests, the generational mechanism in a state should exert its effect across a period of multiple years. Thus we can anticipate that a state entering a period of generational transition in military politics will experience a downward trend in Military Government Share reflected across several years. Indeed, predictions produced from the model suggest a greater effect than that suggested by direct interpretation of the regression coefficients, which focus on the effect for a particular country-year. These predictions show that the average predicted level of Military Government Share among countries that have experienced a major crisis between 21 and 25 years ago is 4.43%, while it increases to 6.54% for states that did not experience a major crisis at that point in their history — a 32.26% decrease in military participation in government.⁷²

In terms of the other variables in the model, the effect of a state experiencing an ongoing major crisis — i.e., a multi-year crisis that has not ended — is consistently negative, but not significant in any of the models. Despite the weak statistical significance, the consistent negative sign on the coefficient provides some added support for the expectation that the short-term effect

⁷² The 95% confidence intervals around these predictions are (2.73%, 6.12%) and (5.05 %, 8.03%), respectively. Predictions *do* take into account country-level fixed effects.

of a major crisis is a reduction in military participation in government. In contrast, the effect of the Cold War (1947-1991) is consistently positive. This effect is significant at the .01 (two-tailed) level in all models except with the inclusion of both country-level fixed effects and the cubic time polynomial. The effect of having a strategic rivalry is consistently positive across the different models, but only approaches conventional levels of statistical significance in one specification. This suggests that focusing on a state's history of major international crises and the effect of this history across time provides more explanatory power than focusing on aspects of threat environment, such as rivalries that change rarely over time. Similarly, the cumulative effect of major crises — i.e., the number of major crises a state has experienced at a particular point in history — exerts neither a significant nor consistent effect across the models.

The effect of civil war is inconsistent and not statistically significant. This is somewhat surprising given the long-standing literature on the role that perceived internal threats can play in driving a new domestically-focused ethos in the military that leads to increased military involvement in domestic politics (e.g., Stepan 1971, 1988; Desch 1999). The effect of domestic threats is explored in more detail in robustness checks, but what this null result may reflect is that it is the *perception* of domestic threats that drives initial military intrusion into politics before those threats rise to high levels of violence. The coding of the domestic threats indicator reflects violent anti-government domestic mobilization that has risen to the level of at least 25 battle-deaths in a year. (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset) Low-level insurgency or opposition activity — that is not captured in the data used here — may be what drives initial military intrusion into high levels of government. Future work should examine the effect of low-level domestic threats on the military's share of government positions.

Turning to other domestic features of states, democracies see substantially lower levels of military involvement in government. Looking at the full model, on average and holding other factors constant, Military Government Share is 2.8 percentage-points lower in democracies than in non-democracies. If a state has a new leader in the previous year, its military government share is on average .8 percentage-points higher. This suggests that in a range of contexts, new leaders are likely to include military officers as part of their ruling coalition and incorporate them in high-level decision-making. The effect of economic development (GDP per capita) is inconsistent between the random- and fixed-effects models. In the random-effects GLS (Model 5), the effect of economic development is negative and significant, suggesting that wealthier states tend to have lower levels of military involvement in government. However, this effect experiences a sign-flip and loses its significance when fixed-effects are incorporated. It is likely that the inclusion of fixed effects washes out much of the significance of economic development given the slow rate at which it tends to change.

V. Robustness Checks and Additional Specifications

The findings presented here are robust to several different model specifications building off of the full model presented in Table 3.5. First, in order to provide additional confidence that the results are not driven by other long-term historical processes, in an additional specification I also included a counter for the duration of the political regime, as indicated by the GWF autocratic regime-type dataset. I included a squared term for this as well. The purpose of this battery of temporal controls is to provide additional confidence that any long-term effect observed for international crises is distinct from other long-term historical processes in the state. Second, I re-estimated the full model with yearly fixed effects.

Table 3.6: Additional historical-temporal controls

VARIABLES	Year FEs			
	Regime duration	Regime duration-FE	Year FEs	Country FEs
Major crisis 1-5 yrs ago	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.004)
➤ 6-10 yrs ago	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 11-15 yrs ago	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 16-20 yrs ago	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.007* (0.003)
➤ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.003)
➤ 26-30 yrs ago	0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)
➤ 31-35 yrs ago	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)
➤ 36-40 yrs ago	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)
➤ 41-45 yrs ago	0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
➤ 46-50 yrs ago	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Ongoing major crisis	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)
Cold War	0.009** (0.002)	0.009** (0.003)	0.013 (0.010)	0.015 (0.011)
Rivalry	-0.000 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.000 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)
Cumulative crises	0.001 (0.000)	0.002 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.003* (0.001)
Civil War	0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)
Democracy	-0.010** (0.002)	-0.033** (0.008)	-0.011** (0.002)	-0.029** (0.006)
GDP per capita	-0.001 (0.001)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)
New Leader	0.006* (0.003)	0.006+ (0.004)	0.008* (0.003)	0.008* (0.004)
Regime age	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)		
Regime age ²	0.000* (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)		
Lag of military government share	0.832** (0.026)	0.742** (0.024)	0.832** (0.025)	0.741** (0.024)
Constant	0.020** (0.008)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.021** (0.007)	-0.006 (0.025)
Observations	5,830	5,830	6,366	6,366
Countries	151	151	166	166

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
 Year fixed effects not shown

As Table 3.6 indicates, the main findings are generally robust to the inclusion of the additional temporal-historical controls. Though there is a further loss of significance for the 1-5 years coefficients, the "second wave" coefficients at 16-20 and 21-25 years remain significant at conventional levels.

Table 3.7: Additional model specifications

	No consolidated democracies	No major powers	Military regimes	More regime types	Coups
Major crisis 1-5 yrs ago	-0.008+ (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.007+ (0.004)	-0.007+ (0.004)	-0.007+ (0.004)
➤ 6-10 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 11-15 yrs ago	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
➤ 16-20 yrs ago	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)
➤ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.011* (0.004)	-0.009** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.003)	-0.009** (0.003)
➤ 26-30 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)
➤ 31-35 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 36-40 yrs ago	0.003 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
➤ 41-45 yrs ago	0.002 (0.004)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
➤ 46-50 yrs ago	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Ongoing major crisis	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)
Cold War	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Rivalry	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)
Cumulative crises	0.004* (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003* (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)	0.003* (0.001)
Civil War	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)
Democracy	-0.027** (0.006)	-0.029** (0.006)	-0.029** (0.007)	-0.028** (0.008)	-0.025** (0.006)
GDP per capita	0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
New Leader	0.010* (0.005)	0.008* (0.004)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.007+ (0.004)	-0.008* (0.004)
Time	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Time ²	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Time ³	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military regime			-0.006 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.008)	
Personal regime				0.002 (0.009)	
Party regime				-0.000 (0.006)	
Successful coup					0.101** (0.022)
Failed coup					0.000 (0.009)
Lag of Military Government Share	0.736**	0.740**	0.748**	0.747**	0.729**
	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Constant	0.024 (0.022)	0.007 (0.022)	0.008 (0.024)	0.007 (0.023)	0.010 (0.024)
Observations	5,230	6,148	5,824	5,824	5,891
Countries	154	161	151	151	166

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

In addition to the first set of robustness checks for temporal-historical covariates, I ran a number of additional checks (Table 3.7) adding variables to the full, fixed-effects specification that may be correlated with both military participation in government and international crisis history. First, there are findings in the conflict literature that military regimes are particularly apt to initiate international disputes.⁷³ In order to ensure that the findings were not just capturing a relationship between severe threats and regimes characterized by military *dominance* of politics, I re-estimated the full model with a control for "military regimes" from the GWF regime data.⁷⁴ In addition, in order to provide a further accounting of the potential idiosyncrasies in regime type across particular regime types, I ran a second model with additional controls for other non-democratic regime types, including indicators for one-party and personalist regimes. Third, to

⁷³ E.g., Sechser 2004; Weeks 2012, 2014.

⁷⁴ This raises the potential issue of multi-causality — i.e., the military in politics affecting crisis propensity and not vice-versa. This is not a major concern with the results presented here, because the broad consensus in the literature (e.g., Sechser 2004; Weeks 2012, 2014) is that the effect of military regime on conflict initiation is *positive*, so that if there is multi-causality affecting the results here, it is such that it would *understate* the negative effect that I find here. Put differently, the finding in the literature that military regimes are more likely to initiate international conflict makes it harder to find a *negative* association between a past crisis and Military Government Share; it sets a higher bar for finding negative effects. Further, it is unlikely that multi-causality in any direction should extend to the longer-term second-wave effect found here. I.e., it is unclear how a state's military government share in the present day could affect the occurrence of a crisis 16-25 years in the past.

ensure that the results are not being driven by the relatively frequent crisis-involvement of a small number of major powers, I estimated a model that excludes major powers (i.e., China, France, Russia/USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Fourth, I estimated a model with indicators for whether or not a state experienced a successful coup attempt and one for failed coup attempts as coded in the Powell and Thyne (2009) dataset. This was done in order to provide added confidence that the results presented here are not capturing "reshuffling" dynamics following a leadership change and that the results are driven by government-military bargaining and not bargaining *failures*. Fifth, while the scope conditions include all types of states, I re-estimated the full model excluding all democracies that had been consistently democratic for at least 20 years⁷⁵ in order to address the possible concern that government-military bargaining is not applicable in consolidated democracies. In all of these specifications, the results are consistent with those presented in the main analysis (Table 3.5) — with the significance of the short-term indicator actually increasing in most cases.

A further battery of robustness checks takes into account additional model specification issues. As an added check that the results are not an artifact of the selection of five-years as the break between the different crisis-history indicators, I re-estimated the main analysis, but with the breaks at four and six years respectively. The full output from these analyses is available in the Appendix while Figures 3.10 & 3.11 below plot the coefficients for the four- and six-year indicators, respectively. In both cases, the same pattern as in the initial analysis is observed: a short-term decrease, driven by the "crisis in previous year" indicator followed by a dissipation of the effect, followed by the emergence of the second wave at around 16-20 years.

⁷⁵ Svobik (2008) notes that authoritarian reversals are most likely to occur in the first 20 years of a democracy's life.

Figure 3.10: Analysis with 4-year crisis history indicators





Figure 3.11: Analysis with 6-year crisis history indicators



Finally, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, Generalized Linear Models provide another way to model the effect of different independent variables on a proportion. While GLS/OLS was chosen for the relative simplicity with which fixed effects are included and for ease of interpreting the results, I did rerun the main analysis using a Generalized Linear Model with a logit link and binomial distribution. These results are reported in the Appendix and do not show any meaningful divergence from the main findings — there is a modestly significant negative short-term effect followed by a strongly significant second-wave effect that begins at the 21-25 years indicator and continues with the "26-30 years ago" and "31-35 years ago" indicator.

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented new data on relative military political participation — the Military Participation in Government (MPG) data — and specified a research design strategy using this data to test the main expectations of the theory discussed in Chapter 2. Using a measure of the Military's Government Share combined with extant data on inter-state war and international crises, I find strong and robust evidence that major international crises contribute to military withdrawal from government in both the long- and the short-term, though the statistical evidence is stronger for the long-term effect. The timing of the long-term effect accords with the expectation of the theory, that the latter wave is driven by a generational shift in the military. The direction of the effect — negative — supports the expectation that the "Crisis Generation," which ascends in the military approximately two decades after the crisis, has a preference for military professionalism and abstention from politics. These results are robust to the inclusion of a broad range of additional covariates and model specifications.

These findings provide a much fuller picture of the relationship between international

threats and government-military relations. This analysis provides a framework for tracing the impact of specific crises across time in a broad range of states, uncovering a long-term, generational effect for international crises. These findings build on what is already known about the negative effect of international crises on coup propensity (e.g., McMahon and Slantchev 2015; Arbatli and Arbatli 2014; Piplani and Talmadge 2015; Elgun and Miller 2010). While this literature does an admirable job of explaining variation in bargaining failures (coups) in civil-military relations, it does not explain variation in bargained outcomes. Here I address this gap and demonstrate how international crises can affect military political power, even absent a coup.⁷⁶

In the next chapter (Chapter 4), I explore in more detail the main findings presented here. I begin by disaggregating the government positions covered in the MPG data into both security- and non-security portions. This allows me to test the theory's secondary hypotheses: 1) that the two-waves of withdrawal from government are driven primarily by military abstention from non-security positions; 2) that the opposite two-wave effect is observable for positions strictly related to security — international crises increase military participation in the security aspects of government. To preview these results: I find strong support for the hypothesis that the two-waves of military withdrawal are most evident in non-security areas of government, but I do not find strong evidence that the opposite effect is observable for security positions. Analysis using the proportion of active-duty military officers holding security-related positions in the government as the dependent variable actually shows a long-term *negative* trend, in line with the analysis of overall Military Government Share. However, when the analysis is focused on military control of the Ministry of Defense (or its equivalent), and not security-related positions generally, the

⁷⁶ Importantly, as discussed in the previous section, the results presented here are robust to the inclusion of an indicator of a successful coup as a control.

anticipated effect is observed: in two waves, major international crises make it more likely that an active military officer will control the Ministry of Defense — as opposed to either a civilian minister or the state leader. Taken together, these results provide some support for the expectation of the theory that while major international crises compel general military withdrawal from government in two-waves, the ascendant Professional group of officers will also demand a "seat at the table" for the military when decisions pertaining to national defense are made.

In additional analysis in the following chapter, I also disaggregate the measure of major international crises in order to explore what types of major crisis drive the effects shown in this chapter. Specifically, I examine the effect of crises that end in defeat and stalemate relative to other crisis outcomes (i.e., victories and ties). In support of the theory's expectation, I find strong evidence that defeats and stalemates lead to both short- and long-term military withdrawal from government, but the onset of the second wave is much more rapid in the case of defeats and stalemates. This is in line with the argument put forward in the theory extension in Chapter 2 that poor outcomes in international crises will lead to a more rapid rise of the professionally-oriented Crisis Generation. This is because defeat or stalemates will disrupt the normal avenues of military promotion and attrition as senior military leaders are punished and purged for the poor crisis outcome and younger officers rise to replace them. I also find some mixed evidence that the effect at 20-30 years observed in this chapter remains for all types of crises, including victories and ties, suggesting that regardless of outcome, the experience of a major international crisis engenders professional attitudes in the military and a period of military disengagement from politics once the Crisis Generation rises to positions of military leadership.

Chapter 4: Additional Analyses

I. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I tested the primary central argument of the theory — that military participation in government is reduced in two waves following an international crisis — using new data on relative military political participation — the Military Participation in Government (MPG) data. Using Military Government Share (the proportion of a state's cabinet or state council equivalent that is made up of active-duty military officers), combined with extant data on inter-state war and international crises, I found strong evidence that major international crises contribute to military withdrawal from government in two distinct waves, roughly two decades apart. This accords with the expectation of the theory, that the latter wave is driven by a generational shift in the military. The direction of the effect — negative — supports the expectation that the "Crisis Generation," which ascends in the military two decades after the crisis, has a preference for military professionalism and abstention from politics. These results were robust to the inclusion of a broad range of additional covariates and model specifications.

In this chapter, I first expand the analysis of the previous chapter to test secondary hypotheses related to government sector: 1) that the two-waves of withdrawal from government are driven by military abstention from non-security positions, and 2) that the opposite two-wave effect is observable for positions strictly related to security — international crises *increase* military participation in the security aspects of government. In sum, the analysis in this chapter provides strong evidence that the two-waved negative effect following a crisis occurs more quickly and is strongest for non-security aspects of government, but provides much weaker evidence that this effect reverses for security positions. Indeed, for many security positions, the two-waved negative effect is still evident — though this effect is weaker than that for non-

security positions. However, in support of the second expectation, when the analysis is limited to whether or not a military officer is the Minister of Defense, there is some mixed statistical evidence of a positive two-waved effect in line with the expectations laid out in Chapter 2.

In line with the extensions of the theory outlined in Chapter 2, I also explore how the outcome of major crises affects military participation in government. In this vein, I test the additional secondary hypothesis that poor crisis outcomes (defeats or stalemates) will lead to a two-waved effect, but the onset of the second wave will be more rapid as the current crop of military leaders is punished for military failure and the ascent of a new generation of officers is accelerated. In support of this hypothesis, I find strong evidence that defeats and stalemates lead to both short- and long-term military withdrawal from government, but that the onset of the second wave is much more rapid in the case of defeats and stalemates — at around ten years after the end of the crisis. Indeed, the analysis shows that rather than there being two distinct waves of military withdrawal from government, there is a sustained pattern of withdrawal that begins immediately after the crisis ends and is evident for at least 20 years. This is in line with the argument put forward in the theory extension in Chapter 2 that poor outcomes in international crises will lead to a more rapid rise of the professionally-oriented Crisis Generation. With regards to other outcomes (e.g., ties and victories), there is consistent evidence that the long-term negative effect at 21-25 years after the crisis ends which was observed in the previous chapter remains for all types of crises. However, in most models, this fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

II. The effect of major crises, conditional on government sector

The expectations outlined in the theoretical extension in Chapter 2 are that the two-waved, negative effect of a major international crisis in a country's history will be negative for non-

security positions in government (H3a and H4a) and positive for positions in government related to national security or the armed forces (H3b and H4b). The rationale for this expectation is that while the Professional faction in the military should forsake all involvement in non-defense politics, they are likely to demand substantial deference from the government when it comes to matters of defense and the armed-forces. For example, while this group of officers should have little interest in the military becoming involved in the general process of setting budgetary priorities, they will want to ensure a sizeable military budget and discretion in how this is spent. For this reason, they are likely to demand a "seat at the table" when defense decisions are made.

To test these divergent expectations, I again used the Military Participation in Government (MPG) data discussed in the previous chapter. As noted previously, in addition to counting the total number of individuals in a government, the MPG data also assigns an individual to either the "security" or "non-security" counts. This distinction is discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, but to summarize, individuals were assigned to the security count if any of their listed portfolios pertained to national security or the armed forces, while they were assigned to the non-security count if none of their stated portfolios had a security element. In this way, the coding of the security/non-security distinction is conservative in the direction of categorizing military officers as having a security role, given that it would, for example, categorize a General holding the positions of both Minister of Defense and Deputy Prime Minister as having a "security" role. Table 4.1 (which also appears in Chapter 3) summarizes the distribution of two binary indicators capturing whether or not there is an active military officer in a government with a security or non-security role, respectively. The two variables are not mutually exclusive. The top left cell ("No, No") captures the number of cases (country-years) in

the data where there is no active-duty military officer in government in either a security or non-security role.

Table 4.1: Active military officers in security and non-security roles (1964-2008, cell percentages are proportion of total)

Military officer in security role	Military officer in non-security role		
	No	Yes	Total
No	3,689 56.37%	378 5.78%	4,067 62.15%
Yes	1,380 21.09%	1,097 16.76%	2,477 37.85%
Total	5,069 77.46%	1,475 22.54%	6,544 100.00%

Here, it is evident that while military involvement in security matters is the most common outcome in states with at least one active-duty military officer in government, the involvement of military officers in non-security matters is also strikingly common — 22.54% of country-years in the data have at least one active-duty military officer in their government whose portfolio exclusively pertains to matters unrelated to security or the armed forces.⁷⁷ Indeed, it is likely that the involvement of military officers in non-security aspects of government may be under-stated here, as it categorizes dual-portfolio officers (security and non-security) as belonging to the security group.

Figure 4.1 overlays distribution across years in the data (1964-2008) of binary indicators for whether or not a state has an active-duty military officer in its government in a security or non-security role, respectively. As discussed in Chapter 3, this figure suggests a trend of military involvement in government generally increasing from the 1960s into the 1970s and 1980s and

⁷⁷ This counts countries that have both security- and non-security-focused military officers in their cabinets (16.76% of total) and countries with only non-security-focused military officers in their cabinets. (5.78%)

then markedly decreasing with the end of the Cold War, but stabilizing quickly thereafter, with no system-wide decrease clearly evident since the early 1990s. Also notable is that throughout the sample period, there is a substantial proportion of states that have active-duty military officers in the security aspects of government (e.g., the ministries of defense and interior), but have no active-duty military officer involved only in the non-security aspects of government. At no point in this time period are there more states with military officers in non-security roles than there are with officers in security roles, which suggests that, as we might expect, when the military is involved in government, it is more likely to be involved in matters pertaining to national security or the armed forces.

Figure 4.1: Yearly proportion of states with active military officer in non-security role in government, overlaid with proportion of states with officers in a security role, 1964-2008




Table 4.2 (also in Chapter 3) shows descriptive statistics for overall Military Government Share, the proportion of a state's government made up of active military officers — i.e., the dependent variable used in the main analysis in Chapter 3 — as well as its sub-components,

Military Security Share and Military Non-Security Share. The proportion for Military Security Share is more than three times as high as that for Military Non-Security Share,⁷⁸ supporting the intuition suggested by Figure 4.1 — that, generally, where the military is involved in government, it is more likely to be involved in its security aspects.

Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for Military Government Share and security/non-security subsets, 1964-2008

Variable	Average	Standard Deviation	Obs ⁷⁹
Military government share	0.062	0.134	6544
Military security share	0.144	0.221	6533
Military non-security share	0.042	0.130	6543

Whereas Military Government Share was the dependent variable in the analysis in Chapter 3, the dependent variables used in the analysis here are Military Security Share and Military Non-Security Share.

The research design strategy follows that used in Chapter 3 — i.e., both Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with country-level random effects estimators and Ordinary Least Squares with country-level fixed effects. The right-hand variables and controls are the same — i.e., the five-year crisis-history indicators combined with suitable country-level controls for other aspects

⁷⁸ As noted in Chapter 3, the divergence between Military Security Government Share and Military Non-Security Government Share may stem from the fact that, as coded in the MPG data, there are generally far fewer security positions in the government than non-security positions, regardless of whether they are held by military officers or civilians. Indeed, the modal number of security positions in government as coded in the MPG data is four — the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, interior, and justice. In the relatively common case where the Minister of Defense is an active-duty military officer and the other three security ministers are civilians, this would lead to a value for Military Security Government Share of .25. More detail on the coding of the security/non-security distinction can be found in Chapter 3 or in the codebook in the Appendix.

⁷⁹ There are a few missing values for Military Security Government Share, because there are a small number of country-years (e.g., Swaziland-1968) that have no government positions that meet the MPG's criteria for security-related — e.g., they have no ministry of defense, interior, foreign affairs, etc. This explains why there are fewer observations for Military Security Share than the overall Military Government Share.

of the international and domestic threat environment and state-level characteristics. The difference is in the dependent variables — with the analysis being run on Military Security Share and Military Non-Security Share, respectively, rather than the overall Military Government Share. I first present the results from the analysis of both side-by-side for comparison. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the results from the analysis of the non-security and security proportions, respectively, while Figures 4.2A-4.2C plot the coefficients from the full model (with all control variables and country-level fixed effects) for each dependent variable, with overall Military Government Share included for comparison.

Here it is evident, in line with the theory's expectations, that the pattern observed in the main analysis — on overall Military Government Share (Figure 4.2C) — is most clearly reflected in the effect of crisis history on Military Non-Security Share (Figure 4.2A), with the strongest negative effect felt 21-25 years after the crisis has ended for both analyses. As discussed in the previous chapter, the finding at 21-25 years is particularly important, because it likely reflects the ascent of the Crisis Generation in the military. (i.e., 25 years after the crisis, an officer who had been a 25 year-old junior officer during the crisis — and remained in the military — will be 50 and will likely be a much higher ranked officer.) However, contrary to the expectations of the theory, a *negative* long-term effect is still evident for *Security* share (Figure 4.2B), though the effect of crisis history is much less consistent across the different model specifications in the Security share analysis, as compared to Non-security. (Tables 4.3 & 4.4) Also, there is a much greater degree of uncertainty surrounding the long-term negative effect observable in the case of Military Security Share, as evidenced by the comparatively wide confidence intervals surrounding the effect of the 16-20 years coefficient in Figure 4.2B.

In summary, the analysis here demonstrates that the overall pattern of the effect of crisis history on military participation in government (Figure 4.2C) is most clearly reflected in the pattern of the effect on military participation in the non-security aspects of government. This is in line with the theoretical expectations put forward in Chapter 2. However, contrary to the expectations, there is no two-waved *positive* effect for the effect of crisis history on military participation in the security sector. Rather, there is a long-term negative effect that may contribute, in part, to the overall two-waved negative pattern observed in the main analysis (4.2C).⁸⁰

⁸⁰ The analysis presented here uses a proportion of high-level government positions calculated using *active-duty* military officers in the numerator. It is conceivable that some of the patterns shown here may differ when both retired and active-duty military officers are considered together. This may be particularly true with regards to the Security Share, where international crises may lead to the appointment of both retired and active-duty officers (rather than civilians) to security-related positions. To address these possible concerns, I generated new proportions of military officers in government that take into account retired officers in addition to active-duty (as indicated in *Europa World Yearbook*). These analyses produced results that were essentially the same for all three versions of Military Government Share shown in Figure 2. The coefficient plots from these analyses can be found in the Appendix. However, as noted in Chapter 3, the listing of retired officers in *Europa* seems to be inconsistently applied and to be only applied to very high ranks — e.g., generals and admiral. Any proportion calculated using the retired counts should be used cautiously as *Europa* likely undercounts the true number of retired military officers present in national governments. Future data collection should attempt to gather more reliable counts of the representation of retired military officers in government.

Figure 4.2: Historical effect of major international crises on military participation in government (1964-2008)




Table 4.3: Historical effect of major international crises on Military *Non-security* Share (1964-2008)

	Basic	Basic-FE	Int'l environment	Int'l environment-FE	Domestic factors	Domestic factors-FE	Time	Time-FE
Major crisis 1-5 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.006+ (0.004)
➤ 6-10 yrs ago	0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 11-15 yrs ago	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)
➤ 16-20 yrs ago	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.006* (0.002)
➤ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.007** (0.002)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.009** (0.003)
➤ 26-30 yrs ago	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)
➤ 31-35 yrs ago	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 36-40 yrs ago	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
➤ 41-45 yrs ago	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)
➤ 46-50 yrs ago	-0.004 (0.002)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Lag of DV	0.834** (0.026)	0.757** (0.025)	0.828** (0.029)	0.748** (0.026)	0.820** (0.029)	0.736** (0.027)	0.820** (0.029)	0.736** (0.027)
Constant	0.007** (0.001)	0.012** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003 (0.003)	0.021** (0.006)	-0.001 (0.026)	0.019** (0.007)	0.005 (0.025)
Observations	6,369	6,369	6,369	6,369	6,364	6,364	6,364	6,364
Countries	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
 (control variables not shown)

Table 4.4: Historical effect of major international crises on Military Security Share (1964-2008)

	Basic	Basic-FE	Int'l environment	Int'l environment-FE	Domestic factors	Domestic factors-FE	Time	Time-FE
Major crisis 1-5 yrs ago	0.006 (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.004)	0.000 (0.006)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.006)
➤ 6-10 yrs ago	0.004 (0.004)	0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)	0.003 (0.007)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.007)
➤ 11-15 yrs ago	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.008+ (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.013* (0.005)
➤ 16-20 yrs ago	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.007+ (0.004)	-0.011+ (0.006)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.015* (0.006)
➤ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.010+ (0.005)
➤ 26-30 yrs ago	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.010* (0.005)
➤ 31-35 yrs ago	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)
➤ 36-40 yrs ago	0.004 (0.003)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.008 (0.005)	0.007+ (0.004)	0.006 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)
➤ 41-45 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.005)
➤ 46-50 yrs ago	-0.006+ (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.006)
Lag of Military Security Share	0.836** (0.014)	0.714** (0.016)	0.827** (0.014)	0.698** (0.016)	0.807** (0.015)	0.682** (0.016)	0.803** (0.015)	0.678** (0.016)
Constant	0.023** (0.003)	0.042** (0.005)	0.014** (0.003)	0.020** (0.007)	0.056** (0.014)	0.064 (0.042)	0.055** (0.017)	0.034 (0.043)
Observations	6,357	6,357	6,357	6,357	6,353	6,353	6,353	6,353
Countries	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
 (control variables not shown)

While the effect observed for Non-security Share is as expected, given the expected aversion of the "Crisis Generation" of officers to military participation in those aspects of government that have little to do with defense, the seemingly negative long-term effect of crisis history on military participation in the security sector is somewhat puzzling. Such positions in the government are likely to have great relevance to the military as an institution and to the individual preferences of professionally-oriented military officers. Such officers should want the military to control those positions, and when Professionals are ascendant in the military, military control over security-related positions should increase. The analysis does not bear this out, however. This may stem, in part, from the coding of security positions in the MPG data. Counted as security positions in the MPG data are the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Interior in addition to:

[A]ny position with "security" in the title (except for "Social Security" and "Food Security"), and also positions involving "borders," "narcotics," "military production," specific military branches, and the police/gendarmerie...[and]Positions that refer to the administration of specific, *named* domestic or international territories/countries/regions... (White 2014, 8).

The coding of "security" positions therefore includes a broad range of positions, such as the heads of the Justice and Interior ministries and cabinet-level positions related to specific territories,⁸¹ that pertain to *internal* rather than external security. The theory anticipates that international crises will engender both short- and long-term trends of professionalization and withdrawal from politics. However, as noted by Alfred Stepan (1971), the "new professionalism" related to domestic security actively seeks military involvement in domestic politics, the economy, and internal administration, and is, accordingly, very different from the traditional

⁸¹ State/provincial/regional governors were not counted in this coding. Rather, cabinet and state-council level positions in the government that focused on specific territories were counted both in the cabinet count and the security-/armed forces-related count. The underlying assumption was that if a specific territory had a cabinet- or state council-level position, it had a special relevance to the state's domestic or international security.

Huntingtonian professionalism, which is focused on external threats, and to which my theory's concept of military "Professionals" owes a great deal. International crises should engender the latter form of professionalism (Huntingtonian) to the detriment to the former type (Stepan's "new" professionalism). Inherent in this shift should be a hostility in the officer corps to anything that detracts from the military's readiness to combat external threats — including a role in internal security and territorial administration. Accordingly, if we further separated the analysis of crisis history's long-term effect on military participation in government into *different* security sectors — internal and external — we would expect to see a two-waved *negative* effect for the internal security sector and a two-waved *positive* effect for external security.

While the MPG data does not currently disaggregate the security sector counts of government members into internal and external security components, it is possible to conduct some analysis of specific positions closely related to internal and external security respectively. The MPG data includes separate indicators for whether or not an active duty military officer is Minister of Defense or Minister of Interior. The latter position should be closely associated with internal security and territorial administration. The former, while certainly including elements of internal security, focuses on defense in general and so can be assumed to be the primary cabinet-level position dealing with external defense.

Table 4.5 shows the results of analysis of these binary indicators. The dependent variables are incidence of an active duty military officer holding the Minister of Defense (MOD) position and the Minister of Interior (MOI) position, respectively. These indicators are coded as "0" when the position is held by a civilian, the state leader, or a retired military officer. Each model includes the same group of control variables used in the main analysis, along with a cubic polynomial of the time since an active duty military officer held the respective government

position, in line with Carter and Signorino's (2010) recommendation for addressing issues of temporal dependence in binary response models. For each dependent variable, I ran a pooled logit with clustered standard errors, a random effects logit, and a conditional fixed-effects logit. The latter drops from the analysis those countries that do not have variation across time in the dependent variable — e.g., those countries that have an active-duty military officer as MOD for all years in the analysis, or those that have a civilian for all years.

Table 4.5: Logit Models of Military Control of the Ministries of Defense (MOD) and Interior (MOI), 1964-2008 (incidence)

	MOD-pooled	MOD-RE	MOD-FE	MOI-pooled	MOI-RE	MOI-FE
Maj. crisis 1-5 yrs ago	0.304 (0.199)	0.412* (0.186)	0.379* (0.191)	0.061 (0.180)	-0.195 (0.190)	-0.470* (0.203)
➤ 6-10 yrs ago	0.151 (0.185)	0.088 (0.192)	0.008 (0.197)	0.308 (0.201)	0.046 (0.193)	-0.291 (0.204)
➤ 11-15 yrs ago	-0.056 (0.176)	-0.205 (0.193)	-0.271 (0.198)	-0.098 (0.183)	-0.385* (0.195)	-0.707** (0.212)
➤ 16-20 yrs ago	-0.024 (0.193)	-0.028 (0.200)	-0.075 (0.206)	-0.476+ (0.249)	-0.748** (0.204)	-0.988** (0.219)
➤ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.226 (0.163)	-0.243 (0.200)	-0.338 (0.210)	-0.165 (0.217)	-0.343+ (0.201)	-0.554* (0.219)
➤ 26-30 yrs ago	0.047 (0.162)	-0.166 (0.200)	-0.291 (0.209)	-0.188 (0.220)	-0.456* (0.207)	-0.664** (0.225)
➤ 31-35 yrs ago	0.471* (0.211)	0.431* (0.215)	0.298 (0.222)	0.390* (0.187)	0.082 (0.214)	-0.197 (0.229)
➤ 36-40 yrs ago	0.619** (0.190)	0.586* (0.231)	0.480* (0.237)	0.295 (0.208)	-0.055 (0.230)	-0.425+ (0.241)
➤ 41-45 yrs ago	0.200 (0.202)	0.420+ (0.222)	0.408+ (0.230)	0.291 (0.223)	0.136 (0.232)	-0.083 (0.247)
➤ 46-50 yrs ago	0.169 (0.261)	0.217 (0.226)	0.146 (0.233)	0.516* (0.228)	0.442+ (0.262)	0.308 (0.286)
Constant	0.688 (0.711)	0.711 (0.961)		0.168 (0.699)	0.137 (0.848)	
Observations	5,844	5,844	3,913	6,009	6,009	3,573
Countries	164	164	104	164	164	92

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)
 (control variables not shown)

The results for the logit analysis of incidence of an active-duty military officer as MOD are more consistent with the theory's expectations than the OLS analysis of Security Government Share. Here, the results of both the random- and fixed-effects models show a positive effect for

major international crises in two distinct waves — at 1-5 years after the crisis has ended and again beginning from 31-35 years after the crisis. The second wave effect is statistically significant also in the pooled logit analysis, while the 1-5 indicator is not significant at conventional levels. The presence of two distinct waves of positive effect is consistent with the expectations of theory that there is an initial wave of professionalization stemming from international conflict and, after an interim, this is followed by a second wave, driven by a generational mechanism. Here, the effect is positive, because the Professional class of officers should want a "seat at the table" when defense-related decisions are made — while, at the same time, forsaking military involvement in non-defense decision-making. As one of the foremost defense-related positions in the state, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is a very important "seat at the table" for a professionally-oriented officer corps.

However, when the analysis is duplicated so that the dependent variable is *change of control* of the MOD from civilian to military hands (see Appendix), what is observed is a weakly significant short-term increase in the likelihood of a military takeover, followed by a long-term *decrease* in the likelihood of a change in MOD control. Taken together with the results for *incidence* of military control of the MOD, this suggests that a major international crisis makes it more likely that the military takes over the MOD in the short-term and then increases the likelihood that it *holds on to* that ministry in the long-term. It is likely that there is no statistically significant long-term, positive, effect on change from a civilian to military MOD because, for that to be observed, there would have to be an interim reversion to civilian control. Indeed, a separate analysis of change *from military to civilian* control of the MOD (in Appendix) shows that while there is broad variation in the significance of the crisis-history indicators, the coefficient signs are almost always negative. From this it is evident that, at any point in history

following a major international crisis, shifting from *military to civilian* control of the MOD is extremely unlikely.

The results for the parallel analysis of military control of the MOI (see Table 4.5) also reflect some elements of the theory. Here, we would expect to see two-waves of negative effect, given that international conflict should engender *externally-oriented* professionalism. As with a non-security role, an externally-oriented, professional officer corps should forsake an internal security, gendarmerie function. The results from the logit analysis show weak evidence of an initial negative effect from a major international crisis, and there is a stronger, second negative wave observable 16-20 years after the crisis has ended. And the same effect is observed when the logit analysis is focused on *changes* from civilian to military control of the MOI (see Appendix). Such changes are much less likely 16-20 years after a major crisis has ended. However, this pattern does not extend to changes from *military to civilian control* of the MOI. Here we would expect the effect to be positive in the short- and long-term: international conflict should compel military withdrawal from domestic security functions (and concurrent civilian intrusion into those functions). In this regard, the evidence is mixed: the effect is generally not significant in pooled and random effects models, but is significantly positive with the conditional fixed effects. From this, we can conclude that when it comes to the military's role in domestic security, a history of major international crises makes it substantially less likely that the military will either take over or maintain a major role, but it is unclear whether the military will go so far as to actively withdraw from its domestic security function in either the short- or long-term in response to a major crisis.

In sum, while the analysis of overall Military Security Share conflates both the external and internal aspects of the security sector, the separate logit analyses provide a more nuanced

view. It is expected that major international crises should increase military participation in those aspects of government that deal with external security and decrease it in domestic security areas. From the logit analysis of incidence of military control of the ministries of defense and interior (Table 4.5), this expectation is largely supported. In addition, when we consider changes to and from military control of the MOD, we see some weaker evidence that major crises correspond to both a military takeover of the MOD in the short-term and the maintenance of that control in the long-term. This is consistent with the theoretical expectations. However, the evidence is more mixed with respect to military withdrawal from and takeover of the ministry of the interior (MOI). Military takeovers are made less likely in the long-term by major international crises. And while there is some evidence that civilian takeovers are made more likely in the long-term, this effect is inconsistent across the three types of logit models. (pooled, random effects, and conditional fixed effects)

III. Crisis Outcomes

A further extension of the theory outlined in Chapter 2 anticipates that the two-waved effect observed in the main analysis will be present for both good and poor outcomes in major crises, but the onset of the second-wave of military professionalization and de-politicization will be more rapid in the case of poor outcomes. The reason that the second wave is more rapid in the case of poor crisis outcomes is because, with a poor outcome, the contemporaneous crop of military leaders is punished for military failure and the ascent of a new generation of officers is accelerated. Without a poor outcome, normal patterns of military promotion and attrition hold. In both cases, the incoming cohort of officers — the Crisis Generation — has a strong preference for military professionalization and withdrawal from politics, though their ascent is more rapid in the case of poor crisis outcomes.

To test this extension, I conducted a similar analysis to that in Chapter 3, but recoded the crisis-history indicators so that they only reflect major international crises that ended in defeat or stalemate — as opposed to victory or compromise/tie according to the COW or ICB data.⁸² Also included was a binary indicator for whether or not a state had experienced a major crisis ending in an outcome other than defeat or stalemate within the previous five years.⁸³ (The potential long-term effects of such outcomes are explored in additional specifications.) And in order to ensure that the crisis-history indicators were not just capturing the additive effect of multiple defeats/stalemates in crises over a state's history, I included a count of the number of defeats or stalemates that a state had experienced since 1918.

The first analysis shows long-term crisis-history indicators for poor outcomes in major international crises and tests the expectation that there will be two-waves of military withdrawal from government, but that the second wave will occur more rapidly than when all major crises are considered in the history indicators. Table 4.6 shows the results from this analysis and demonstrates strong support for this expectation. In each of the models, there is an initial wave in the short-term aftermath of the crisis (1-5 years after a defeat or stalemate) and the second wave is observable 11-15 years later, whereas the second wave is observable at 21-25 years later when major crises are aggregated without regard to outcome.

⁸² In the ICB data, a crisis is coded as ending in "compromise" for a state when that state gains "partial achievement of its basic goal(s)" in that crisis. In contrast, a "stalemate" is coded when the crisis has no clear outcome and the state does not accomplish their goals for the crisis (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). Similarly, COW defines a tie/compromise as a war ending in "a solution...in which both sides gain something," whereas a "stalemate" is defined as "fighting ceases without a satisfactory agreement" (Meredith Reid Sarkees, "The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of the Data)," 32).

⁸³ "Victory," "compromise/tie" or "other outcome" in the COW and ICB coding.

Table 4.6: Effect of defeat/stalemate in international crises on Military Government Share (1964-2008)

	Basic	Int'l environment	Domestic factors	Time
Defeat/stalemate 1-5 yrs ago	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.013** (0.004)	-0.013** (0.004)	-0.014** (0.004)
▶ 6-10 yrs ago	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)
▶ 11-15 yrs ago	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.009** (0.003)
▶ 16-20 yrs ago	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.006+ (0.003)
▶ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.006+ (0.003)	-0.006+ (0.003)	-0.007* (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)
▶ 26-30 yrs ago	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
▶ 31-35 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
▶ 36-40 yrs ago	0.000 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)
▶ 41-45 yrs ago	-0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
▶ 46-50 yrs ago	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Other outcome 1-5 yrs ago	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)
Ongoing int'l conflict		-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)
Cold War		0.013** (0.003)	0.010** (0.002)	0.004 (0.003)
Rivalry		0.007* (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
Sum of defeats/stalemates		0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Civil war			-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)
Democracy			-0.029** (0.007)	-0.028** (0.006)
GDP per capita			0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
New leader			0.008* (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)
Time since 1918				0.000 (0.000)
Time since 1918 ²				-0.000 (0.000)
Time since 1918 ³				0.000 (0.000)
Military Government Share (lag)	0.770** (0.020)	0.756** (0.021)	0.740** (0.023)	0.739** (0.023)
Constant	0.016** (0.002)	0.006+ (0.003)	0.014 (0.022)	0.014 (0.022)
Observations	6,371	6,371	6,366	6,366
Countries	166	166	166	166

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

In each of the models, the coefficient for three indicators for whether or not a state has experienced defeat or stalemate in a major crisis in its past is negative and significant for multiple periods: 1-5 years, 11-15 years, and 21-25 years after the end of the crisis. This demonstrates strong evidence that the effect of a poor outcome in a major international crisis can be felt in a state's civil-military relations both in the short-term and also more than 20 years after the crisis has ended. It is striking that the effect for the "1-5 years" indicator is statistically significant at at least the .05 level in all model specifications, while in the models that aggregate crises regardless of outcome (see Chapter 3), it struggles to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. The reasons for this are discussed in more detail below.

Figure 4.3 plots each of the defeat/stalemate crisis-history coefficients from the full model while Figure 4.4 plots the crisis-history coefficients from the original analysis, which aggregates major crises regardless of outcome for comparison. The analysis of the effect of poor outcomes (defeats/stalemates) demonstrates a long-lasting negative effect that appears to dissipate in significance and magnitude with time, but which is still clearly evident at least 21 years after the crisis has ended. The significant coefficients at 11-15 years and 21-25 years suggest, in line with the theory's expectations, that poor outcomes in crises accelerate generational turnover in the officer corps. However, there is still a negative effect felt at 21-25 years, which is consistent with the results from the main analysis, where crisis history is aggregated regardless of outcome. This further suggests that not only is there an earlier onset of the second-wave of professionalization, but that this effect is sustained until at least 20 years after the end of the crisis. What is it about poor outcomes in international crises that might engender not only an early onset of the second-wave effect, but also the persistence of that effect for many years after the onset of the second wave?

Figure 4.3: Coefficient plot of defeat/stalemate crisis-history indicators





Figure 4.4: Coefficient plot of crisis-history indicators (w/out regard to outcome)



When the analysis is focused on poor outcomes (Figure 4.3), the first wave of military withdrawal from government, 1-5 years after the end of the crisis — which is not statistically

significant in the original analysis, and which does not distinguish crises by outcome (Figure 4.4) — can be explained by purges. In the aftermath of a defeat or stalemate, there may be a purge of the officer corps. With this purge, a new group of generals will take over military leadership. It is unlikely that this new group of generals will be drawn from very junior ranks of the officer corps. No matter how professionally competent, a lieutenant or captain, experienced in commanding 20-100 soldiers will not easily acclimate to commanding 10,000. Rather, the new generals should be drawn from among the more competent *mid-career* officers — e.g., colonels or majors. The poor outcome should engender a selection process whereby the new crop of generals is likely to be chosen based on their professional competence in military affairs. This group of generals is much more likely to cleave to the Professional ideal type and accordingly to be hostile to the military being involved in government outside of some portions of the defense sector. This reflects, for example, what occurred in Egypt following the 1967 war. In the aftermath of defeat, Nasser purged dozens of high-ranking, politically active and professionally incompetent officers throughout the armed forces and rapidly promoted a group of more professionally oriented and (relatively) apolitical officers.⁸⁴ The analysis that pools crisis outcomes (Figure 4.4) includes outcomes like victories and ties, which shouldn't lead to merit-based purges of the military. This may explain why the "1-5 years ago" indicator is not significant in that analysis, but is significant when the analysis is focused on poor outcomes.

The analysis of the long-term effect of poor outcomes, rather than demonstrating two-distinct waves approximately 20 years apart (e.g., Figure 4.4), shows a sustained negative effect beginning right after the crisis and continuing for more than 20 years after the end of the crisis. (Figure 4.3) This sustained effect that begins 1-5 years after the crisis and continues its effect at statistically significant levels at 6-10 and 11-15 years after the crisis ends (in addition to 21-25

⁸⁴ See Brooks 2008, Ch. 4.

years after, as in the pooled analysis) can be explained by how poor outcomes in international crises, and the purges they lead to, alter the normal patterns of attrition and advancement in the military. This serves to accelerate the rise of some portion of the Crisis Generation of officers. The accelerated elevation of the mid-career professionals to general officer ranks following defeat or stalemate should leave vacancies in the colonel and major billets that they left behind, which are filled by some of the lieutenants and captains of the Crisis Generation, whose formative experience was the defeat or stalemate. Given, however, the overall pyramid structure of the officer corps, not all members of the Crisis Generation will be able to ascend to middle ranks at this time, and many will remain in their junior officer billets. This shift, of mid-career professionals to command positions and of some members of the junior officer Crisis Generation to middle-ranking positions, should occur in the short-term aftermath of the crisis. At 11-15 years, some of the first-wave of the Crisis Generation, who ascended to major and colonel positions shortly after the crisis, will be advancing into the more senior command positions and replacing the mid-career professionals who took over from the purged Generals. Essentially, a poor outcome should accelerate the promotion of some portion of the Crisis Generation beyond the normal process of attrition and advancement that occurs in the officer corps. This and the purges that accelerate the advancement of mid-career professionals explain why we observe a significant, negative effect at 1-5, 6-10, and 11-15 years after defeat or stalemate.

As in the pooled analysis of crises, there is still a significant effect at 21-25 years after the defeat or stalemate. At the 21-25 year mark, the regular process of military attrition is in effect — whereby the lieutenants and captains of the Crisis Generation are ascending to command positions in the military. Their ascent reinforces the preference shifts brought about both right


after the crisis and with the ascent of mid-career officers into command positions in the earlier wave.

In summary, the near-constant pattern of military withdrawal from politics following a poor outcome in a major international crisis from 1-5 to 21-25 years after the crisis end can be explained by: 1) The purge of the officer corps following the crisis and the elevation of more professionally oriented officers from the extant pool of mid-career officers; 2) the accelerated ascent of some portion of the Crisis Generation into the vacant middle ranks and their resultant more rapid ascent into command positions; and 3) the normal process of attrition and turnover in the military whereby the second portion of the Crisis Generation ascends to command positions 21-25 years after the crisis ends. Poor outcomes in international crises disrupt the regular patterns of attrition and turnover in the officer corps and this leads to the ascent of three different groups of officers at different times. Each of these groups has a strong preference for military professionalization and withdrawal from politics. Each time one of these groups ascends into command positions in the military, institutional preferences are again shifted in the direction of professionalization and de-politicization, which contributes to the sustained negative effect in the analysis.

In order to address the long term impact of other crisis outcomes, I reran the analysis for the full model, but with the same series of crisis-history indicators coded also for crisis outcomes other than defeat or stalemate. The regression table from this analysis can be seen in the Appendix while an overlapping plot of both the defeat/stalemate and "other outcome" coefficients can be seen in Figure 4.5 (with the confidence intervals for "other outcome" [i.e., ties and victories] indicators in dashes). Critically, the results from the main analysis for defeat/stalemate do not substantively change — with the same coefficients maintaining their sign

and significance, while none of the other outcome indicators are significant at conventional levels. In support of the theory, there is some weaker evidence that crises with outcomes other than defeat/stalemate (i.e., victories or draws) that ended 21-25 years ago also exert a negative effect on Military Government Share ($p=.152$, two-tailed). This suggests that, consistent with the theory expressed in Chapter 2, even absent a poor outcome, the experience of combat or being in the military at a time of crisis still exerts a long-term professionalizing impact on the preferences of the Crisis Generation of officers.

Figure 4.5: Coefficient plot of poor and "other outcome" crisis-history indicators (solid confidence intervals are for poor outcomes)



It is also striking that the crisis-history indicators for a crisis ending in an outcome other than defeat or stalemate are consistently positive at 1-5, 6-10, and 11-15 years after such a crisis has ended — though in no case are these indicators significant at conventional levels. This may reflect the reality that in some cases, good outcomes in international crises lead to the military increasing its political power, as it enjoys increased resources and prestige. This was what

occurred with the Soviet Red Army after World War II. While politically weak after the "Great Purge" of the late 1930s, the victorious postwar Red Army enjoyed renewed political clout that led to the elevation of leading officers to positions of power not only in the military but also in the Communist Party. In the years following the war, the foremost general in the Red Army, Georgi Zhukov, was made a member of the Central Committee and finally a member of the Politburo of the Party — the first active-duty Soviet military officer to do so.

Taken together, these analyses suggest that the pattern observed in the main analysis — where crisis outcomes are pooled — are driven largely by the professionalizing effect of poor outcomes in international crises. However, as Figure 4.5 shows, and in line with the theoretical expectations expressed in Chapter 2, there is some evidence that even good outcomes in international crises engender a long-term shift towards military withdrawal from government.

IV. Conclusion

This chapter was built on the main analysis presented in Chapter 3 to test several extensions of the theory: 1) The two-waved pattern observed for the negative effect of crisis-history on military participation in government is strongest for the non-security aspect of government. 2) The opposite — a positive — trend is observed when military participation in the security sector of government is considered. 3) Poor outcomes in international crises lead to a more rapid onset of the second wave of military professionalization and withdrawal from government.

I find strong evidence in support of the first and third expectations. The short- and long-term patterns of military withdrawal from government are most clearly evident in the non-security sector of government, and when defeats and stalemates in crises are considered separately, the onset of the long-term effect is much more rapid than when crisis outcomes are pooled. Indeed, the analysis suggests a sustained pattern of withdrawal that begins immediately

after a defeat or stalemate and is sustained consistently for at least 20 years, rather than in two distinct waves. Critically, with this specification, the "1-5 years after crisis" indicator easily achieves statistical significance, whereas it only achieved weak levels of significance in the analysis with pooled crisis outcomes.

In contrast, there is much more mixed evidence in support of the second and fourth expectations. The short- and long-term effect of crisis-history on military participation in the security sector of government appears to be *negative* (rather than positive, as anticipated). However, this finding may be, in part, an artifact of how the MPG data conceives of the security sector of government, where both the domestic (e.g., the Ministry of the Interior) and international (e.g., the Ministry of Defense) aspects of security are conflated. More fine-tuned logit analysis of control over the ministries of defense and interior, respectively, provides some evidence that a past history of international conflict makes military control over international security more likely and domestic security less likely. To provide more conclusive evidence regarding the impact of international conflict on military participation in the external and domestic aspects of security, future research should seek to further disaggregate the "Military Security Share" proportion into domestic and external components. There was also mixed evidence regarding the impact of crises other than defeat and stalemate — e.g., ties and victories — on military involvement in government. There was consistent evidence of a negative long term effect, but this effect failed to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. ($p < .20$, two-tailed) Further, the short-term effect of such crises, while not reaching conventional levels of statistical significance, appears to be *positive* rather than negative.

Taken together with the main findings of the previous chapter, these results provide a much fuller picture of the effect of international conflict on military participation in government

and politics. International conflict is a shock that leads to short and long-term de-politicization and professionalization of the military, and this corresponds to long-lasting patterns of military withdrawal from government. Such patterns are most clearly evident in the non-security aspects of government and in crises that end poorly for the state. While these patterns have thus far been explored using statistical methods, in the next chapter I elucidate these patterns in more detail with a case illustration of government-military relations in the People's Republic of China. The story of party-military relations in China has been one of several waves of de-politicization and professionalization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in response to international crises that have ended poorly for China. In Chapter 5, I focus on the Korean War. In both the short- and long-term, this crisis have led the PLA to periods of "soul-searching," reform, and professionalization. In the 1980s and 1990s, in particular, this led the PLA to reduce its participation in governing bodies concerned with the non-security aspects of government, such as in the Politburo of the Communist Party, but also to maintain and even increase its participation in security bodies, such as the Central Military Commission. These patterns were driven largely by generational turnover, which brought to the forefront military leaders shaped more by international conflict with strong international opponents than by revolutionary struggles against domestic political rivals

Chapter 5: Case Illustration — The PLA and the Korean War

I. Introduction

In the previous two chapters (3 & 4), I conducted a series of statistical tests using new data on military involvement in national governing bodies in order to demonstrate the long-term impact that international crises have on military participation in politics. In Chapter 3, statistical analysis demonstrated that major international crises reduce military participation in government in two waves — approximately 20 years apart. The timing of the second wave suggested strong support for the generational argument advanced in the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2) — that the second wave of professionalization and de-politicization following an international crisis is driven by generational shifts in the officer corps. These findings were robust to a number of control variables and a battery of different model specifications.

In Chapter 4, I built on this analysis to show that the short- and long-term reductions in military participation in government are most strongly felt in the areas of government that do not pertain to security or the armed forces. I also found that when crises are disaggregated by outcome, a more rapid onset of the second wave and an almost continuous trend of de-politicization is evident following crises that end poorly (i.e., in defeat or stalemate). I found more mixed evidence to support the expectations that international crises increase military participation in the security sector of government and that "good" outcomes in international crises (i.e., ties or victories) also lead to decreases in military participation in government.

These statistical tests using new, fine-grained data on military involvement in government, provide a rich and nuanced picture of the clear association between a history of international crises and reductions in military participation in politics. The theory developed in Chapter 2 explains that the reason for this relationship is professionalization in the officer corps,

and that the mechanism behind the observed long-term effect — one that persists for more than 20 years — is generational change, specifically the rise of a "Crisis Generation." The Crisis Generation is a group of officers whose formative experience in their early military careers was the international crisis. The experience of this acute international threat should correspond to a strong preference for military professionalism in this group. This is because military professionalism breeds military effectiveness. The experience of the crisis should drive home this lesson for junior officers who may have seen combat (or faced a real threat of combat) during the crisis. When this group rises to senior ranks in the officer corps, their preference for professionalism and de-politicization should be reflected in the military's institutional preferences. This should lead to reductions in military participation in politics, and these should be most clearly evident in those aspects of government without direct relevance to security or the armed forces.

While providing strong evidence of the connection between international crises and military political participation, the previous statistical tests do not provide any direct confirmation of the veracity of the proposed *mechanism* between international crisis history and military withdrawal from government. However, in this chapter I provide more direct confirmation through a clear illustration of this mechanism at work: how the Chinese experience in the Korean War exerted a dramatic short- and long-term effect on military involvement in government in the People's Republic of China (PRC), leading to two distinct periods of military professionalization and de-politicization — with the second wave clearly leading to large-scale withdrawal from government.

The PRC is an important case illustration for several reasons: First, in its almost 70-year history, the PRC has experienced a range of international crises ranging in severity from inter-

state war (e.g., the Korean War [1950-51], the Sino-Indian War (1962); the Sino-Vietnamese War [1979]) to smaller border skirmishes (e.g., the 1969 Sino-Soviet confrontations on the Ussuri River). These crises have ranged in outcome from victory (Sino-Indian War), to stalemate (Korean War, Ussuri River), to defeat (Sino-Vietnamese War). Second, these crises — "acute" threats — have occurred in an environment of near-constant "chronic" international threats from international rivals, allowing the effect of crises on military involvement in government to be separated from the overarching, relatively constant, effect of China's challenging security environment. Third, within the history of the PRC, the political and governmental role of its armed forces — the People's Liberation Army (PLA) — has varied considerably: beginning as a highly politicized force in 1949, embarking on a brief period of professionalization and modernization in the 1950s, becoming a major, even near-dominant force in government during the Cultural Revolution (~1967-1975) and its aftermath, and moving to sustained professionalization and de-politicization from the mid-1980s onwards. And finally, China is an important case to understand — it is home to 20% of the world's population, is a rising economic power, and represents one of the foremost potential adversaries to the United States and its allies. Accordingly, understanding Chinese government-military relations and how they have responded to the PRC's history of international crises is of great relevance to a general as well as a scholarly audience.

It is important to stress, however, that this case illustration is not intended as a true "test" of the theory. I use the PRC case to illustrate the proposed mechanism at work — i.e., how a history of international crises drives short- and long-term trends of professionalization in the armed forces, which in turn drives military withdrawal from government. I do not, however, compare the PRC with another similar case without such a history in order to demonstrate that,

when holding other factors constant, the absence of a history of international crises did not lead to a reduction in military involvement in government. This is what Lijphart (1971) has termed the "comparative method," and this chapter does not claim to achieve this ideal of causal leverage in qualitative methods. Rather, the statistical evidence presented in chapters 3 and 4 provides cross-case national comparisons over time for a broad range of countries, while this chapter is intended to add confidence that the mechanism behind the quantitative results is that put forward by the theory.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that the PLA's experience in the Korean War led to two waves of professionalization and de-politicization, decades apart, and that the second wave was made possible by the rise in the 1980s of the "Crisis Generation" of officers who had served in a junior capacity in Korea from 1950-1953. In the following narrative, I first discuss PRC intervention in the Korean War in 1950 and how the experience of this conflict exerted a strong short-term influence on the PLA. In the Korean War, the heavily politicized PLA — geared towards guerilla war — fought the heavily mechanized United Nations force in Korea to a stalemate, but at an enormous human cost. As anticipated by the theory put forward in Chapter 2, in the aftermath of this conflict, the PLA embarked on a period of reform, professionalization, and de-politicization. However, this move towards a professional, relatively de-politicized military was opposed by "Politicians-in-Uniform" in the PLA, as well as their allies among the civilian elites of the Chinese Communist Party. (CCP) In a development not anticipated by the theory, this opposition, and the internal disorder of the Cultural Revolution, led to an unraveling of many of the professionalizing reforms of the 1950s, drawing the PLA further into domestic politics than at any time in its history. What is striking, however, is that this backlash by "Politicians-in-Uniform" was eventually undone by the reform programs of the new Chinese

leadership. Beginning in the 1980s, with the support of the PRC's leader Deng Xiaoping, the PLA engaged in a renewed program of professionalization, de-politicization, and ultimately withdrawal from those aspects of government in the PRC not pertaining to security policy. This program was made possible by an institutional preference shift in the PLA, which was driven by generational turnover in the officer corps — the ascendance of the Crisis Generation of the Korean War.

II. The Korean War

In November 1950, fearing that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, i.e., North Korea) would be overrun by United Nations (UN) forces led by the United States (who were counter-attacking following the DPRK's attempt to forcefully reunite the Korean Peninsula), the "People's Volunteer Army" (PVA), a 400,000-strong detachment from the PLA, crossed the China/DPRK border and began attacking UN forces. There are several reasons given for the Chinese decision to intervene: among them are pressure from their then-patron, the Soviet Union, but also very real fears that the fall of the North Korean regime would presage incursions into China by the United States, which would pose an existential threat to the then one year-old regime in Beijing (Peng 1984; Domes 1985).

The initial PVA assault was dramatically successful. Four-hundred thousand soldiers drove the UN/US force back over the 38th parallel, dividing North from South Korea, and even briefly captured the southern capital of Seoul. However, a concerted American counter-attack, which brought to bear the full UN/US advantage in mechanization and air power, repulsed the PVA incursion into the south, driving it back to the 38th parallel where a stalemate ensued until an armistice was signed in July 1953. While the PVA failed to achieve victory in the sense that the South remained an independent country and American forces remained on the Peninsula, the

Chinese intervention likely saved the DPRK from destruction and prevented any future (however unlikely) American incursion into China from an occupied North Korea — the concerns which drove the initial PRC decision to intervene (Domes 1985).

Despite this arguably favorable strategic outcome for the PRC, the actual conduct of the war had a decidedly unfavorable impact on the PVA officers on the ground. The initial successes that drove UN/US forces from the North were bought at an enormous human cost. The near-constant use of "human sea" attacks, which in some cases consisted of bayonet charges by soldiers deliberately made drunk beforehand, led to massive casualties (Domes 1985). The cost of these anachronistic tactics, part of a doctrine of "People's War" developed during the Chinese Civil War, was exacerbated by the huge advantage that the American forces enjoyed in terms of artillery, airpower, and mechanization. The costs were so great, that the PVA was on the "brink of disaster" in early 1951, with only the rushed delivery of Soviet equipment and supplies staving off total defeat (Joffe 1965, 11-12). Indeed, the lopsided distribution of casualties during the war reflect this reality, with American sources estimating that the PVA suffered more than ten times as many casualties as the United States.⁸⁵

The PVA suffered not only because of the qualitative advantages that the United States enjoyed in terms of firepower and mobility, but the PVA's lack of a modern logistics apparatus — a hallmark of a modern, professional military — also exacted enormous costs on its soldiers and officers. For example, in the winter of 1951, 45,000 soldiers of the PVA *froze to death* (Domes 1985, 62) — a likely avoidable outcome with suitable clothing and supplies. And while the Soviet re-supply effort may have saved the PVA from destruction in 1951 (Joffe 1965), it was delivered on the backs of 700,000 *porters traveling on foot* from the Chinese

⁸⁵ According to American government sources, nearly 40,000 U.S. soldiers died, while more than 400,000 Chinese soldiers were killed. (Michael Hickey. 3/21/2011. "The Korean War: An Overview." www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_hickey_01.shtml. Accessed 6/2/2016.

border without the benefit of air cover or modern transportation (Domes 1985, 61-2). The situation on the front in 1951 was put succinctly by the PVA commander on-the-ground in Korea, Peng Dehui, who lectured the political leadership in Beijing on the conditions facing the Chinese soldiers and officers along the 38th parallel:

You should go to the front and see with your own eyes what food and clothing the soldiers have! Not to speak of the casualties! For what are they giving their lives? We have no aircraft. We have only a few guns. Transports are not protected. More and more soldiers are dying of starvation. Can't you overcome some of your difficulties? (Barnouin and Changgen 2006, 149).

Despite the arguably favorable outcome for China in the conflict, the actual conduct of the war has been described as "traumatic" for the officers of the PVA and that it "hammered home the fact that their army would have to undergo a sweeping technological and organizational transformation before it could lock horns with a modern military force..." (Joffe 1965, 12). This experience would have a lasting impact on the officer corps as the PVA officers returned to the peacetime PLA.

III. Professionalization following the Korean War

Following the Korean armistice of 1953, the defining experience of much of the PLA's officer corps was not victory over the Nationalists in the civil war or fighting the Japanese occupation, it was "the unique experience of fighting on foreign soil against the world's technologically most advanced army" (Whitson 1968, 937). Stemming from this experience was a reform and modernization program that began after the end of the Korean War and continued until the late 1950s (Joffe 1965, 12-13).

Critically, much of this reform effort seems to have come from within the PLA rather than being imposed by the Communist Party Leadership. This effort was spear-headed by the wartime commander of the PVA — Peng Dehui — who was elevated to Vice-Chairmanship of

the Communist Party's Central Military Commission (the Chairmanship being held by Mao) and made Minister of Defense — de-facto commander of the postwar PLA. In the words of his biographer, Jurgen Domes, from this position, and reflecting upon the PLA's Korean experience, Peng, "realized...with deepened conviction...that military training of the troops should never be reduced in favor of political indoctrination, that professional commanders would have to take priority over commissars, and that the PRC needed armed forces prepared for modern technical warfare..." (Domes 1985, 65).

Prior to the Korean War armistice in 1953, the PLA had had a major role in non-security related governance in the nascent PRC, being heavily involved in regional administration in concert with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Domes 1985, 54-5). This not only likely contributed to the increased politicization of the PLA, it likely also exacerbated factionalism within the armed forces as units became increasingly tied to specific regions and further entrenched in those regions' politics and administration. Perhaps to combat this trend, Peng stressed "regularization" in a 1956 address to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress:

We need a regularized military system...A regularized military system is an important condition for a modern army. In particular, because in the past our army was spread over many different areas, the military system of all the different units was not unified. For this reason, in the course of modernization, it is of extreme importance that we stress regularization! (Domes 1985, 68).

In pursuit of professionalism and "regularization," Peng, and his allies, sought to emulate the Soviet example — the only ideologically acceptable object of emulation for the PLA (Domes 1985, 65). While often thought of in the popular imagination as being intensely politicized, the Soviet Red Army of the 1950s had been radically changed by the crisis of World War II. The initial, catastrophic, setbacks during the German invasion had compelled a crash program of professionalization, a loosening of the grip of political officers on the chain of command, and a

restoration of a degree of autonomy to local commanders. The result was that the Red Army of 1945 (and the 1950s) was radically different from that of 1941 (e.g., Taylor 1973). Peng's "Order Number 1" of October 1954, promulgated in the PLA's official newspaper, stressed that: "The whole army must sincerely study the advanced experience of the Soviet army, grasp the art of modern warfare, bring to the fore revolutionary heroism, strictly obey orders, and honour discipline. Struggle to grasp and guarantee the victorious conclusion of each and every military task!"(Domes 1985, 66).⁸⁶

Judging from the public pronouncements of the de-facto commander of the PLA, the institutional goal and preference of the PLA following the Korean War was professionalization in the Soviet model (Domes 1985, 66). Peng followed up Order Number 1 with the introduction of a modern system of ranks, conscription, regular pay, and a system of military decorations and orders of merit — all trappings of a modern, professional military of the mid-20th century, and very much against the "revolutionary" traditions of the PLA and CCP (Domes 1985, 67). Reform efforts went well beyond the mere trappings of professionalism. Great efforts were made by Peng and likeminded officers in the PLA to end the "democratic" practices of the early PLA — with its vague rank distinctions and loose command and control (Joffe 1965, ch. 1). This was combined also with concurrent efforts to recruit officers into the PLA based on educational and technical background rather than political and ideological enthusiasm (Joffe 1965, 18-19).

While Peng had many professionally-oriented allies in the upper echelons of the PLA's officer corps who supported his goal of "Army Building," there was a group of "Politicians-in-Uniform" who objected strenuously to the PLA's de-politicization and copying of the Soviet model. Beginning in the late 1950s, this faction of officers, led by Marshall Lin Biao began agitating against Peng and his allies, promoting the doctrine of Maoist "People's War," which

⁸⁶ From *Liberation Army Daily*, 10/1/1954.

stressed ideological constancy, mass enthusiasm, and the guidance of political officers as a substitute for modernization and professionalism in the PLA, in direct opposition to the doctrine of "Army Building" (Domes 1985, 68; Joffe 1965, Ch. 1).

This faction in the PLA was joined by many in the CCP who, in the climate of the Sino-Soviet split, distrusted the PLA's emulation of the Red Army, and accordingly the professionalization drive came to a halt in the late 1950s (Joffe 1987, 72). Following an ill-fated attempt in 1959 to openly challenge Mao over the mass famine that resulted from the failures of the "Great Leap Forward" industrialization campaign, Peng was purged from political and military life. Gradually, many of his reform programs in the PLA were rolled back, even before the onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966/67. Contemporary news accounts report of tensions between the CCP and the PLA, as the role of the "General Political Department" and its commissars was reasserted in the 1960s.⁸⁷ Marshall Lin Biao, Peng's rival and successor to the position of Minister of Defense, pushed aggressively for the increased politicization of the PLA, issuing public instructions to the PLA in early 1965, which stand in stark contrast to Peng's Order Number 1 of 1954:

If [the PLA] is in a total mess politically, and retreats once the enemy comes, then even the best military and technical skills will be of no use!...While a definite amount of time must be set aside for military training, production, etc., these activities should not be permitted to assault politics. Politics on the other hand, may be permitted to assault other activities (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 21).

Some of the more professionally oriented generals, such as Chief of Staff, General Luo Ruiqing, attempted to "water down" these directives — at great personal risk, given Mao's approval of them — in order to preserve some semblance of professionalism in the PLA (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 21). But this was not enough to prevent the overall reversal of Peng's reforms. Lin Biao not only stressed the increased politicization of the PLA, as part of the all

⁸⁷ *New York Times*. 8/13/1961. "Red Army Pushes Control of Army."

encompassing doctrine of "People's War," he stressed the importance of the PLA participating in non-defense-related labor and industrial activity.⁸⁸ This was pursued to the extent that one Western observer remarked in 1963 that: "Any day in Peking uniformed soldiers can be seen at all kinds of work, ranging from truck driving, garbage collecting, and pushing pedicarts to building houses and painting stores."⁸⁹ By the mid-1960s, Marshall Lin Biao, the quintessential "Politician-in-Uniform" had gone to great lengths to undo many of the reforms of the archetypal "Professional" Peng Dehui. However, the Cultural Revolution, particularly the events of 1967, would draw the PLA into politics and the business of governing even more than it had been before the Korean War.

IV. The Cultural Revolution

During the Cultural Revolution, when Mao encouraged thousands of enthusiastic "Red Guards" to challenge the old order and bring down "revisionists" wherever they could find them, the PLA became increasingly involved in government. The overzealousness of the Red Guards led to their seizure of a number of government ministries as well as industries and commercial enterprises. The CCP leadership, fearful of the complete chaos that this would engender, ordered the military to seize control of the Red Guard-held institutions to restore order. At the end of this process in May 1967, the PLA was running the Ministries of Finance, Communications, Posts, and Railways, while the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Foreign Trade, the Bank of China, and the State Planning Commission were led by joint military-civilian committees — a process that some authors have termed "the militarization of the Chinese government" (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 159-160).

⁸⁸ *New York Times*. 8/13/1961. "Red Army Pushes Control of Army."

⁸⁹ *Christian Science Monitor*. 12/21/1963. "Red China Soldier: Jack-of-All Trades."

In addition to instructions to restore order and purge Red Guards from various ministries and industries, the PLA was also given conflicting orders to "support the Left" during the Cultural Revolution (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 1975-6).⁹⁰ Put differently, the PLA was supposed to support the Mao-inspired radicals in their efforts to reform society and purge the government of "revisionists," but to also evict them from government where they went too far. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006, 174-7) note that these vague and conflicting orders led to individual PLA commanders exercising broad discretion in various regions of China, so that the PLA had a huge role in regional and provincial administration in the late 1960s and early 1970s that paralleled (and likely exceeded) their role prior to the 1953 Korean Armistice. Ultimately by August 1972, an estimated 2.8 million PLA officers and soldiers had been involved in regional and central government administration, rather than professional military activities (Johnson 1987).

Further, the Peng-era reforms, already weakened under Lin Biao in the early 1960s, were completely done away with during the Cultural Revolution. Military ranks were abolished — with some observers believing this was done to suppress the emergence of a professional officer class.⁹¹ Peng Dehui, himself was a victim of persecution during the Cultural Revolution, condemned for opposing the "People's War" doctrine, with his reforms castigated publicly as "copying...the Soviet revisionists...abolishing the system of Party committees...to substitute it with the single-commander system [where regular officers commanded their units without interference from commissars]...abolish the political commissars...straight against Chairman Mao's line" (Domes 1985, 69).

⁹⁰ In the course of "supporting the Left," the PLA was involved in the violent suppression of "counter-revolutionaries. While not well-documented, there are numerous reports of PLA units firing on demonstrations and involved in other mass violence—actions that MacFarquhar and Schoenhals describe as "traumatic" for many PLA soldiers (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006, 179-180).

⁹¹ Keesings. 1988. China. "Military appointments- Re-introduction of military ranks."

At the end of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA held enormous political power, but was in a sad state of affairs in terms of military readiness and overall professionalism. For soldiers and officers, training and military exercises were entirely neglected in favor of political instruction, work in administering the central and regional government, and working in agriculture and heavy industry (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006). Indeed, during this period, some PLA soldiers went their entire terms of service without ever handling a gun (O'Dowd 2007). And perhaps partly out of neglect and partly out of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the military education system, expanded and emphasized under Peng's stewardship, had almost collapsed — with the number of military academies and service schools dropping from 140 in 1966 to 40 a decade later — a more than 70% reduction (Joffe 1987, 122). In addition to the losses in the military education system, the officer corps became bloated and overaged (Joffe 1987, ch. 6).

The damage done to the PLA during the Cultural Revolution seems to have had an effect on PLA performance during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War — largely regarded as a disaster for the PLA (O'Dowd 2007). The conflict was characterized by the PLA essentially recycling human wave tactics from the Korean War to poor effect against the highly motivated and battle-hardened People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). Historian Edward O'Dowd (2007) attributes this failure of strategy and tactics to the re-politicization of the PLA and the undoing of Peng Dehui's "Army Building" by Lin Biao during the 1960s, who stressed "political work" over practical training. In O'dowd's estimation: "The political work system led to the human wave, and the human wave led to defeat (O'Dowd 2007, 155).⁹²

⁹² The PLA experience during the 1969 Sino-Soviet split also likely exhibited similar deficiencies in the PLA. While the scale of the conflict did not approach that of the Korean conflict, the conflict was similar to the Korean War due to the relative superiority the adversary's military technology as compared to the PLA's People's War doctrine's emphasis on revolutionary zeal and raw numbers over modern military equipment (Gerson 2010, 17-8). Following this conflict, it became clear that any Soviet attack would likely take the form of limited incursions or strikes by air, missile, and mobile forces—rather than full scale invasion and occupation—and that the utility of the "People's War" doctrine, which emphasized guerilla war and "human sea" attacks was severely limited as a counter-measure

Even before the 1979 disaster, Deng Xiaoping, Mao's ultimate successor as leader of the CCP and the PRC, reflected on the sad state of affairs in the PLA in a speech to the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC) in 1975:

[T]he army has been in considerable disarray. Today, numerous fine traditions have been lost, and the army has become cumbersome....More important, the army has become bloated, and is not a crack outfit that will make a good showing in combat...the overall size of the army is to be reduced, and the overly large numbers of cadres...removed. Fine traditions are to be revived... (Dreyer 1996, 315).

In a follow-on address to the CMC in 1977, Deng added:

Because of the past period of chaos [the Cultural Revolution], discipline in much of the army is lax and the work style poor, and this has partly lowered its prestige among the people....We should not close our eyes to the fact that our cadres at various levels are deficient in the ability to direct modern warfare....We must also admit that our army is not sufficiently capable of conducting modern warfare, and that although it is numerically strong, it is of relatively poor quality....the quality of our army just isn't as good as before... (Deng 1977).

Beginning the late 1970s, Deng pursued a program of modernizing and reforming the PLA, becoming the PLA's first civilian Chief of Staff — made possible, perhaps, by the fact, as a civil war-era veteran of the PLA, he was well-liked in the officer corps.⁹³ This process, ongoing at the time of the Sino-Vietnamese War, continued into the 1980s and 1990s and only really took hold during those decades. And while instigated by Deng, the process was made possible through "the ascendance of strict professional attitudes throughout the PLA" in the years following the Cultural Revolution (Joffe 1997, 40). Critical to the rise of "strict professional attitudes, was generational turnover, which brought the Korean War-era "Crisis Generation" to positions of leadership in the PLA.

towards these types of threats (Joffe 1987, ch. 2). Accordingly the crisis of 1969 and the PLA's experience in it may have also contributed to the development of the doctrine of "limited war under high technology conditions" in the 1980s and 1990s.

⁹³ *New York Times*. 1/30/1975. "Teng Heads China's Army; 3d Major Role in Regime."

V. Generational Turnover in the PLA

In his 1977, address Deng emphasized the importance of a new generation of officers to improving the efficacy of the PLA to an audience of older generals and civilian CCP leaders:

None of us, including the veteran comrades, is sufficiently capable of directing modern wars. We must recognize this fact...[the] creation of a generally better and more capable cadre corps which is also younger in average age — especially in the combat forces — all of whom will have mastered some knowledge of modern warfare....In general, military commanders should be a little younger... (Deng 1977).

However, the rise of a younger generation of officers proceeded slowly, due to the "political longevity of Long March [i.e., Civil War] generation" (Paltiel 1995, 784). In 1982, one Western observer noted that the military leadership of the PRC was essentially a gerontocracy: "The Politburo looks like a reunion of Army veterans from the historic long march of 1934-35. No less than 12 of its 28 members actually participated in the guerilla-war [in the civil war against the Nationalists]...including three marshalls in their 80s."⁹⁴ However, throughout the 1980s there was a concerted effort to alter the generational make-up of the military (Dryer 1996, 316) — and push forward the natural attrition of the aging "Long March generation." Policies were instituted to both speed up the retirement of older officers and accelerate the promotion of the younger generation, with more than 100,000 PLA officers who had joined the PLA prior to 1949 being retired in the 1980s (Joffe 1987, ch. 6). The result of this accelerated generational turnover was a dramatic drop in the average age of the military leadership of the PLA: turnover in the PLA General Staff in 1985 led to the average age of that body being lowered to 56.7 from 64.9 (Joffe 1987, 130). This turnover was reflected lower down the military hierarchy, with the average age of PLA corps commanders — U.S. three-star general equivalents — dropping more than seven years after a wave of retirements and promotions in 1983 (Joffe 1987, 130). Ultimately, the process of generational turnover in the PLA's higher ranks is estimated to have lasted until 1994.

⁹⁴ *Washington Post*. 10/18/1982. "China's Army, Party Keep Uneasy Truce."

(Domes 1997) By the mid-1990s, the "Long March generation" was largely retired or deceased while, according to Jurgen Domes, "The generation of PLA platoon leaders in the Korean War [were] in active command" (Domes 1997, 271).

What was important to the professionalization of the PLA in the 1980s and 1990s was not just accelerating the rise of a new generation of officers, it was that the new generation had military experience in Korea. Even before the beginning of the effort to accelerate generational turnover in the 1980s, Deng noted the importance of the combat experience of the rising generation to increasing the competence of the PLA: "There are now large numbers of regimental cadres who have had combat experience, having served as squad or platoon leaders or company commanders during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea" (Deng 1977).

The scholarly literature on the PLA notes a number of attributes of this Crisis Generation in the officer corps: they were better educated (Domes 1997, 271) and more specialized in their career focus (Swaine 1992), but, critically, many of them had extensive combat experience (Shambaugh 1999). A cursory examination of the biographies of highest-ranking officers in the PLA in the late 1990s demonstrates that many of them had joined the PLA either after 1949 or in the latter stages of the civil war, and many, such as Central Military Commission (CMC)⁹⁵ members Generals Chi Haotian, Fu Quanyou, and Yu Yongbo had served in the Korean War (China Vitae;⁹⁶ Shambaugh 1999). The officers immediately below the CMC — in the General Staff Department — Generals Kui Fulin, Qian Shugen, Wu Quanzu, and Xiong Guangkai, had all joined the PLA between 1954 and 1956, in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War and during the Peng Dehui era of reform and professionalization. Below the General Staff

⁹⁵ Roughly equivalent to the U.S. National Security Council.

⁹⁶ China Vitae is an online directory of Chinese public figures containing brief biographical sketches of important figures in Chinese politics, business, and the military. (China Vitae. <http://www.chinavitae.com/>. Accessed 6/5/2016.

Department, four out of seven of the heads of regional commands — Generals Li Xinliang (Beijing region), Guo Boxiong (Lanzhou region), Liao Xilong (Chengdu region), Liang Guiagnlie (Shenyang region) — while too young to have served in Korea, served in front-line positions as junior and mid-range officers in the disastrous 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War (Shambaugh 1999; China Vitae). As previously noted, in many ways, this war duplicated many of the pathologies evident in the Korean conflict — the PLA, still heavily politicized from the Cultural Revolution, employed "People's War"-type, human wave attacks against the competent Vietnamese defenders, leading to mass casualties and poor results on the battlefield (O'Dowd 2007).

This cohort of military leaders was unhappy with the PLA being involved in politics (Whitson 1968; Swaine 1992; Domes 1997). Based in part on their combat experience (largely in Korea), this generation of officers favored the military doctrine of "limited war under high technology conditions" (Shambaugh 1999, 14). This doctrine focused on "active defense," taking offensive action across China's borders in response to threats, and embracing the high-technology battlefield (Kanwal 2007). This was in marked contrast to the "People's War" doctrine, which emphasized defense in depth, total war mobilization of the population, and reliance on ideological zeal and political will over technology and training in the armed forces (Kanwal 2007).

Generational turnover in the 1980s and 1990s led to the gradual replacement of the "Long March Generation" with the Crisis Generation of the Korean War. This affected not only the age of the senior officer corps, but also its preferences regarding professionalization and the military's role in politics. This shift in the preferences of the most senior generals of the PLA was also reflected military-wide. The academy system was rebuilt following the depredations of the

Cultural Revolution: the number of military academies and service schools in the PRC had more than doubled to 103 by 1986, from 43 in 1969 (Dreyer 1997, 57). This rebuilt academy and service-school system would be used as the basis for promotion decisions in the reformed PLA (Joffe 1987, Ch. 6). Formal military ranks were reintroduced in 1988,⁹⁷ likely increasing the efficiency of the PLA's chain of command. This general focus on military efficiency and professionalism was stressed in instructions to the PLA laid out in its official newspaper in a 1983 issue:

Officers should be younger, better educated and more competent professionally. Army systems must be streamlined to eliminate organizational overlapping and overstaffing and to increase the Army's capacity for co-ordinated operations involving all services and arms...Modernization of weaponry must be accelerated...Education and training of officers and troops must be upgraded, and all soldiers promoted to officer rank must receive training in a military academy....⁹⁸

Critically, these instructions begin by urging the soldiers and officers of the PLA to "liquidate" the "influence of 'leftist' ideas." A striking departure from the PLA's orders during the Cultural Revolution to "support the leftists," and unthinkable even before the start of the Cultural Revolution.

The PLA of the 1980s and 1990s, led by a new generation of officers whose formative experience had been the Korean war, certainly did seek to purge "leftist" ideas from the PLA and embrace professionalism. By the late 1980s, the commissar system and the power of the GPD over the PLA had been significantly reduced, and the "single commander" system — whereby the regular PLA officer had total control over his unit, rather than the "dual" leadership of an officer and a commissar from the GPD, was dominant (Joffe 1987, 166). In 1993, there were reports of complaints from the General Political Department (GPD) — the body which oversaw the activities of political officers (commissars) in the PLA — that regular military units showed

⁹⁷ Keesings. 1988. China. "Military appointments- Re-introduction of military ranks."

⁹⁸ Keesings. China. 1983. "Developments inside Communist Party."

little interest in the political instruction offered by the GPD, and focused instead on conventional military training and other professional activities. Further, in the 1990s, GPD officers within the PLA became increasingly marginalized, holding fewer and fewer high ranking positions (Shambaugh 1999, 14).

By the latter part of the 1990s, it was clear to outside observers that the PLA's senior leadership was actively avoiding both autonomous involvement in politics and intensive political control by the CCP (Shambaugh 1999, 14). The 1980s and 1990s saw military-wide de-politicization not only in the sense that political indoctrination was made secondary to practical instruction in military matters and that the commissars were increasingly marginalized in the PLA, but also in the sense that the PLA's involvement in government was substantially reduced. In 1983, the internal security and administrative functions of the PLA were transferred to a separate body, the Public Security Bureau (Joffe 1987, Ch. 7). And while the PLA maintained a role in national-policy making bodies longer than it did regional administration (Joffe 1987), since the 1980s the PLA's role in national decision-making bodies, such as the Politburo of the Communist Party, has been dramatically curtailed. This is part of a process, which Alice Miller has termed the "bifurcation" of policy-making in the PRC, where the PLA has largely abstained from general policy-making bodies like the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP, but has maintained, and even expanded, its positions in purely security decision-making bodies, such as the Central Military Commission (Miller 2015).

VI. PLA Participation in Government in the PRC following Generational Turnover

An examination of the PLA's representation in various governing bodies of the PRC generally confirms Miller's analysis regarding the "bifurcation" of policy-making in the PRC, as well as the general trends in military professionalization and de-politicization suggested by the

preceding narrative. In particular, patterns of PLA withdrawal from major CCP decision-making bodies in the 1980s and 1990s confirms the understanding of that period as a time of transition towards renewed professionalism and de-politicization, driven by the rise of the Korean War generation over the "Long March" generation. Figure 5.1 shows the proportion of CCP Politburo and high-ranking Central Committee positions held by PLA officers from 1964-2006.⁹⁹ While this date range does not include the Peng Dehui era (the mid-late 1950s), this figure demonstrates that the PLA did not hold positions in the CCP's highest bodies from 1964 until 1972, which may reflect the continuation of trends from the Peng-era. And Shih et al's (2008, 33) work on CCP Central Committee membership shows that PLA representation in this lower-level deliberative body dropped modestly in the immediate aftermath of the Korean War (1954-55) — though this quickly recovered to pre-war levels.


From 1972 until 1979 — where it peaks at more than 36% (12 out of 33 positions) — PLA representation in higher-level bodies of the CCP increased sharply,¹⁰⁰ likely reflecting the growing political power of the PLA following its takeover of many administrative functions and government ministries during the height of the Cultural Revolution. Beginning in 1982, however, a marked decrease in military representation in high-level CCP bodies is observable, with a particularly sharp drop occurring between 1985 and 1986. In this year, PLA representation in the Politburo and the highest-ranking Central Committee positions dropped from 20.51% to 2.85% — or from eight out of 39 positions to one out of 35. Critically, this 1985/1986 shift coincides with the onset of the generational shift inside the PLA (Domes 1997). 1985 was the year in which a number of high-profile retirements in the upper ranks of the PLA occurred, and in which

⁹⁹ This date range is due to the coverage of the *Europa World Yearbook* almanac, which covers non-European countries' governments only starting in 1964.

¹⁰⁰ Shih et al (2008) show that this trend is also reflected in PLA Central Committee membership.

the average age of the PLA General Staff dropped slightly more than eight years — from 64.9 to 56.7 (Joffe 1987, 130-3).

Figure 5.1: Proportion of High-ranking CCP Positions Held by PLA Officers (1964-2006)




However, somewhat different trends are observable when a security-focused decision-making body is considered. Figure 5.2 plots the yearly proportion of the CCP's Central Military Commission (CMC)¹⁰¹ that is made up of PLA officers from the beginning of the People's Republic in 1949 to 2014. As opposed to the general policy-making responsibilities of the Politburo and Central Committee of the CCP, the CMC is focused on security decision-making for the PRC. Here, the trends for PLA representation are somewhat different from the trend observed for representation in the general decision-making bodies of the CCP. Here, PLA representation is at its lowest point from 1949 to 1954 — ranging from 62.96% (17 out of 26 positions) to 69.23% (18 out of 26 positions) — and begins to sharply increase during the period of Peng Dehui's post-Korea campaign of "Army Building" and professionalization — eventually

¹⁰¹ The data on PLA representation in the CMC was collected using Mulvenon, James C. and Andrew N.D. Yang., eds., 2002. "The People's Liberation Army as Organization. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, Bartke, Wolfgang. 1997. "Who was Who in the People's Republic of China." Munich: K.G. Saur, and Keesings Record of World Events.

rising to 91.30% in 1959 (21 out of 22), a level which is generally sustained until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. During the Cultural Revolution, PLA representation in the CMC reaches a nadir of 61.11% in 1973 (11 out of 18). Thereafter, between 1974 and 1978, the beginning of the Deng era, PLA representation recovers to its pre-Cultural Revolution levels, only to drop again to a two-thirds share (six out of nine positions) between 1982 and 1988. Between 1989 and 1992, PLA representation recovers to 85.71% (six out of seven), and thereafter (through 2014), PLA representation in the CMC ranges from 80% (four out of five) to 90.90% (ten out of 11) — with much of the variation in that proportion being driven by the number of total CMC members rather than the number of PLA members.¹⁰²

Figure 5.2: PLA Representation in the Central Military Commission (CMC, 1949-2014)



Here, it is evident that PLA representation in the CMC rises with the professionalization drive of the 1950s, suggesting that the PLA under Peng Dehui, while seeking de-politicization in general, sought an increased role in security decision-making. PLA representation in the CMC drops as the Cultural Revolution begins, but sharply increases near the end of the Cultural Revolution.

¹⁰² During this period, the one civilian member is the Chairman of the Communist Party—the state leader.

Examining trends in PLA CMC representation alongside PLA representation in general decision-making bodies (Figure 5.3), it is evident that the increase in CMC representation near the end of the Cultural Revolution is concurrent with the increase observed in the PLA's share of general positions in the CCP. (Figure 5.1) PLA representation decreases in both the CMC and the general bodies in the early 1980s, but the decrease is neither as sharp nor as sustained in the CMC as it is in the Politburo and Central Committee leadership. The particularly striking drop in PLA representation in the general CCP leadership observed with the generational turnover of 1985 is not evident in the case of the CMC — PLA representation is sustained at the same level from 1982 to 1988 (two-thirds of CMC positions). This suggests that the turnover between the Long March generation and the Korean War generation that began in 1985 corresponded to a wholesale PLA withdrawal from general policy-making but *not* from security policy-making.

Figure 5.3: PLA Representation in general CCP leadership and in the Central Military Commission (1964-2008 and 1949-2014, respectively)



PLA representation in both bodies increases in the early 1990s, the tail-end of the period of generational turnover (Domes 1997). However, while PLA representation in the general CCP leadership rises only to 10%, with overall PLA representation in the CCP leadership holding at a

maximum of two Politburo members since 1992 (Miller 2015, 73), PLA representation in the CMC quickly recovers to 1950s-era levels in the eighty-to-ninety percent range — with PLA officers generally holding every seat on the CMC save the chairmanship held by the (civilian) Chairman of the Communist Party.

VII. Discussion

In the preceding narrative, I outlined the history of the PLA-CCP relations from the Korean War to the generational turnover in the PLA in the 1980s and 1990s. In the historical discussion, I demonstrated that the Korean War had a profound impact on the PLA. The conflict, while not an outright defeat, made clear deficiencies in PLA doctrine and readiness for conflict with a heavily mechanized and technically sophisticated opponent. These deficiencies were internalized by the PLA leadership, exemplified by the archetypal "Professional," Peng Dehui. In line with the expectations of the theory, Peng and like-minded officers in the PLA embarked on a massive program of military reform and de-politicization in the mid-late 1950s — dubbed “Army Building.” This campaign began to transition the PLA away from a highly politicized role in the state and towards the Soviet ideal of relatively high professionalization and less intrusive controls. However, the evidence that this corresponded to a wholesale withdrawal from domestic governance in this period is weaker. At the end of the Korean War in 1953, the PLA did disengage from many administrative functions and hand those over to civilian functionaries. (Domes 1985, 54-5). However, it is unclear whether this stemmed from the after-shocks of the Korean War (as the theory would anticipate) or was part of the normal process of state-building and institutional consolidation following the CCP's seizure of power in 1949. However, in line with the expectations of the theory, the PLA's representation in the security-focused CMC was increased following the Korean War.

Peng's professionalizing campaign met with resistance from both the CCP and "Politicians-in-Uniform" in the officer corps. This faction rolled back many of Peng's reforms during the 1960s, and oversaw a dramatic increase in the PLA's role in government and politics during the Cultural Revolution, which ended with the PLA in control of much of the provincial administration, many government ministries, and a large number of seats, not only in the security-focused CMC, but also in the general leadership of the CCP. This backlash to professionalization and de-politicization in the 1960s and 1970s provides an additional layer to the CCP-PLA story — one that was not anticipated in the theory put forward in Chapter 2. This backlash, however, may be specific to the Chinese case, given that Mao's fears of an increasingly professional and autonomous PLA and his decision to launch the Cultural Revolution were driven by idiosyncratic factors such as the disastrous failure of the Great Leap Forward (and the resultant mass famine) and the Sino-Soviet split, which made military professionalization along the Soviet model politically anathema (e.g., MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006).

Critically, despite the backlash of the 1960s and 1970s, the process of professionalization, reform, and de-politicization in the PLA continued in the long-term, with increased professionalization, easing of political controls, and general PLA withdrawal from government positions evident in the 1980s and 1990s. Further, since the most striking phase of this withdrawal from government occurred more than a decade after the end of the Cultural Revolution and occurred quite sharply in a single year (1985/1986), this shift cannot merely be regarded as a gradual "regression to the mean" following the shock of the Cultural Revolution. And in line with the theory advanced in Chapter 2, PLA withdrawal from government during this

period did not extend to the primary security-focused organ in the CCP — the Central Military Commission (CMC).

The literature on the PLA-CCP relationship is clear that the civilian PRC leader, Deng Xiaoping, was a critical factor in reforming the PLA and its relationship with the party and state, but the literature is also very clear that the success of Deng's reforms was contingent on a preference shift inside the PLA. The PLA had to *want* to give up the political power that it had accrued at the end of the Cultural Revolution. Why did the PLA want to give up its political power? The answer is generational change in the officer corps. It is striking that the most dramatic reduction in the PLA's role in the highest bodies of the CCP and the PRC government occurred during a period of generational turnover, when the generation of officers who were small unit leaders during the Korean war took over from the "Long March" generation, which had been shaped by the Chinese civil war. The literature agrees that this group had been profoundly shaped by their experience in Korea and had a general distaste for military involvement in politics — though, as evident in PLA representation in the CMC, this distaste did not extend to security policy-making.

Certainly, civilian reformers, led by Deng Xiaoping, sought to accelerate generational turnover in the PLA — as shown the waves of mass retirement in the 1980s — and so some of the impetus for renewed professionalization and politicization must be attributed to them. However, their efforts to accelerate generational turnover were almost certainly contingent on the preferences of the rising generation of officers. To turn to the counter-factual, would Deng Xiaoping have pursued the mass retirement of his Long March cohorts in the 1980s if the younger generation of officers did not have a distaste for military politicization and involvement in government? And would the new generation of PLA leaders have had this preference for de-

politicization, absent their early career experience in Korea? The answers to both of these questions are almost certainly no. The historical roots of the PLA's professionalization and withdrawal from government are found in the Korean War.

VIII. Assessing the Theory

While not intended as a "test" of the theory, the preceding narrative should provide confidence that the statistical relationships observed between international crises and military participation in government in the statistical analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 are driven by military professionalization and de-politicization. The experience of the Korean War contributed to two distinct periods of professionalization and de-politicization roughly three decades apart in the Chinese military. In the first, professionally-oriented PLA leaders — analogous to the "Professional" ideal-type described in the theory — sought to learn from the lessons of Korea: that the PLA needed to de-politicized and professionalize in order to increase its effectiveness. It is unclear if the resultant period of professionalization led the PLA to begin wholesale withdrawal from government — indeed the backlash against professionalization, led by "Politicians-in-Uniform" may have precluded such a step in the process of professionalization. However, the second-wave of professionalization that resulted from the Korean War in the 1980s *did* certainly contribute to the PLA disengaging from higher-level decision-making bodies in the CCP's leadership. This episode was very much driven by generational shifts in the PLA, when the much more politically-inclined Long March Generation was replaced by the generation of Korean War veterans, who were enthusiastic proponents of military professionalism and wary of military involvement in government. Certainly, the efforts of civilian leadership, namely Deng Xiaoping, were also important in effecting this shift in the PLA's preferences and activity, but the mechanism by which this was achieved — accelerated turnover in the officer corps through

retirements and promotions — was contingent on the new generation of military leaders being professionally (and not politically) oriented. This provides support for the key theoretical contentions advanced in Chapter 2: that military preferences are key to understanding episodes of military reform and professionalization, that generational preferences play a key role in explaining how generational shifts affect military preferences, and generational preferences among military officers are driven by crisis experiences as junior officers. That the key conflict experiences of the Crisis Generation of officers in the Chinese case were in conflicts that either had negative outcomes (e.g., the Sino-Vietnamese War) or that highlighted deficiencies in military readiness or efficiency (e.g., the Korean War) provides additional support for the theory. The same is true for the finding that the large shifts in PLA political participation in the 1980s were most clearly evident in the non-security aspects of government, while not in security policy-making bodies, such as the CMC.

Some questions do remain: for example, if the PLA was in the process of professionalization and de-politicization, why did it intervene on behalf of the CCP during the Tiananman Square protests of 1989, violently repressing pro-democracy protesters? Some scholars actually interpret the PLA's violent suppression of the pro-democracy protests in 1989 as indicative of a type of "professionalism," whereby the PLA intervened in order to avoid a political free-for-all that would result from the protests continuing and would ultimately embroil the PLA in politics and exacerbate factionalism in the armed forces (e.g., Jencks 1991). Nevertheless, this suggests that while the professionalization and de-politicization of the 1980s radically transformed the PLA, it did not go so far as to preclude it from intervening to support the CCP. The PLA was more "professional" than at any time in the PRC's history, but not

"professional" in the American or Western sense of civil-military relations, where the military is explicitly *neutral* in political disputes.

However, it is important to note that the PLA intervention in Tiananmen in 1989 took place in the context of a high level of discontent among the officer corps, with many professionally oriented officers objecting strenuously to the actions taken. Observers estimate that at least 3,500 officers disobeyed orders to fire on protesters. Dissent in the officer corps was evident in the highest ranks — with General Xu Qinxian, a Korean War veteran who was the commander of the 38th Army, stationed in Beijing, refusing his orders to enforce martial law in the city.¹⁰³ The months after the Tiananmen protests saw a massive purge and reshuffle of PLA leadership down to the Division-level (U.S. two-star general equivalent).¹⁰⁴ In addition to these changes in the PLA hierarchy, the early 1990s saw attempts by the CCP to aggressively re-assert party control of the PLA via the General Political Department (GPD) and its commissars (Paltiel 1995). And as noted previously, these efforts by the GPD were stubbornly resisted by many regular PLA units which showed little enthusiasm for political instruction or indoctrination. Some authors suggest that the post-Tiananmen period also saw the rise in popularity in the officer corps of a Western-style doctrine of "political neutrality" for the armed forces, fears of which were a major driver of the GPD/CCP decision to seek to re-assert political control (Paltiel 1995, 793).

However, despite the post-Tiananmen crackdown on "excessive" professionalism in the PLA, since then the PRC's military seems to have become less involved in politics, not more so.

¹⁰³ See Lin Chong-Pin. 10/9/1991. Wall Street Journal. "China's Restive Army.;" Kevin Tang. 2013. "Chinese Netizens Remember General Who Refused to Deploy Against Protesters." BuzzFeed News. https://www.buzzfeed.com/kevintang/the-general-who-refused-to-fire-on-tiananmen-protestors?utm_term=.pr27ra5Ao#.paRv1wWGy. Accessed 6/5/2016.

¹⁰⁴ Lin Chong-Pin. 10/9/1991. Wall Street Journal. "China's Restive Army."

Trends in PLA participation in high-level CCP decision-making (see Figure 5.3) seem to have stabilized since the early 1990s into a dominant role in security policy-making and a very weak role in non-security decision-making, in line with Alice Miller's (2015) analysis of the "bifurcation" of the PRC's government. Further, since 1998, the PLA has explicitly renounced its once expansive involvement in the Chinese economy. Prior to the 1998 "divestiture" from the economy, the PLA supplemented its regular budget with numerous commercial ventures — with income from this activity being equivalent to two-thirds of the regular defense budget in 1990 (Paltiel 1995, 797). This, however, contributed to endemic corruption and hurt military readiness in the 1980s and early 1990s. (Dryer 1996) It was the lopsided outcome of the 1991 Gulf War — in which the Iraqi military, similarly trained and equipped to the PLA, was completely outclassed by the United States and its allies — that convinced professionally-oriented officers in the PLA to withdraw not only from government, but also from the economy (e.g., Saunders and Kiselyznych 2010; Finkelstein 2007). While not a "crisis" in the sense described in Chapter 2, the Gulf War can be understood to be a "crisis by proxy," where the Iraqi military stood in for the PLA in an example of how a confrontation between the PLA and the United States, perhaps over Taiwan, would likely proceed. Such a confrontation was made more probable by the 1995 Taiwan Straits Crisis. This episode provides further support for the general logic advanced by the theory that "acute" crises in international relations engender professionalizing impulses in the military, which lead the military to disengage from non-defense related activity.

The next, and final, chapter summarizes the findings presented in this dissertation, assessing the support for the various hypotheses advanced in Chapter 2. This chapter also explores some of the broader scholarly and policy implications suggested by this research, as well as directions for future research.

Chapter 6: Conclusion


The Puzzle Revisited

I began this dissertation with a puzzle: why do militaries professionalize and withdraw from politics when they do? The current literature on civil-military relations emphasizes the role that international threats play, but lacks an answer to this question, because it tends to focus on elements of international threat, such as rivalries or geography, that change very rarely over time. Accordingly, while well-equipped to address broad cross-sectional variation in military involvement in politics, such theories struggle to explain variation in military political participation over *time*. Why, for example, did South Korea's military become increasingly involved in internal politics in the 1960s and 1970s, shortly after a catastrophic war with its northern neighbor, only to withdraw from politics in the 1980s, when the threat was still present[?] Why did the threat of Israel contribute to a decreased role for the military in the government in Egypt following the 1967 war, but not the 1948 or 1956 wars? Theories which emphasize the role of political institutions in mediating the effect of international threats also struggle to explain variation in military political participation across time. There are many cases, such as China and Egypt, where the military's political role varies substantially within the same regime, and even within the same leader tenure. This suggests that another element, other than general threat level or institutions, is key to explaining the variation in military political participation we see in a broad range of states and regimes, and especially in those facing challenging international threat environments.

The answer that I propose is that rather than being driven by general international threat environment or other slow-moving factors, military professionalism and withdrawal from politics is driven by military reactions to international crises — specific events that lead to war or

a very real threat of war. With such events, the military's ability to defend the state or deter threats to the state will be tested. Critically, this distinguishes between a state's "acute" and "chronic" threat environments — where the "acute" threat environment constitutes specific shocks or challenges to the military that may occur in the context of a state's relatively constant (or slowly changing) "chronic" threat environment, comprised of rivalries or geography.

Figure 6.1: Military Factions




The presence of an acute, immediate threat creates an imperative for the military to increase its effectiveness in defense. The crisis highlights for many military officers the strong sense that that a military that splits its time between politics — defined as an active role in government policy formation (not just implementation) — and defense is a "jack of all trades, but a master of none." This group pushes for an increased institutional focus on defense and urges disengagement from politics. The presence of an acute crisis and the need it creates for effective defense strengthens the hand of this "Professional" faction of officers in the military at

the expense of politically-active "Politicians-in-Uniform" — those that support military involvement in government either on behalf of the military as an autonomous political faction (Praetorians) or as guarantors of the civilian politicians' tenure (Loyalists, see Figure 6.1). With Professionals ascendant, the military gives up some political power, particularly in non-security areas, in order to focus on defense. This may be a boon for the non-military leaders of the state as they may pick up the political power that the military now forsakes. But at the same time, the Professional military may become increasingly assertive in defense areas, seeking autonomy in defense matters, and may demand a seat at the table when security-related decisions are made.

In the theoretical chapter, I also argued that there are both short- and long-term effects from acute international threats, i.e., the effect of a major international crisis on military professionalization and political participation is felt in two waves. The second-wave is felt years — and even decades — after the international crisis, when a new generation of officers, shaped by the previous crisis rises to positions of military leadership. A major international crisis shapes the doctrines, training, and socialization of junior and mid-level officers rising through the ranks. This rising cohort of military leaders is very strongly Professional in its outlook, given the formative experience of the international crisis. This group will believe that the military should maximize military effectiveness and competency and forsake political distractions. This outlook corresponds to Samuel Huntington's (1957) traditional concept of professionalism, in which the military devotes itself to repelling and deterring the international enemies of the state and is undistracted by political interference or activities that will detract from this mission. This "Crisis Generation" will, when in positions of leadership, push for withdrawal from traditionally civilian areas of politics, but will also be assertive in national security decision-making and seek autonomy for the military in this regard. The two-waves of professionalization that follow a

major crisis explain why militaries in states with challenging security environments sometimes withdraw from politics, but at other times do not. Figure 6.2 summarizes the expectations derived from the main argument.


Figure 6.2: International crisis and military political participation



In addition to advancing the general argument, I also put forward several extensions of the theory. In the first extension, I argued that the pattern of two-waves of decreases in military political participation following a major international crisis is driven primarily by military abstention from the non-security aspects of government. In contrast, major international crises should provoke *increases* in military participation in the security sector of the government. This is because the Professional faction in the military should be particularly hostile to military involvement in politics that are not relevant to security or the armed forces. However, such

officers are likely to demand a "seat at the table" when defense decisions are made. Accordingly, as Figure 6.3 shows, major international crises should lead to decreases in military participation in the non-security aspects of government, but increases in areas related to security or the armed forces.

Figure 6.3: International crisis and military participation in security and non-security politics



In the second extension of the theory, I argued that that major international crises that ended poorly — i.e., in defeat or stalemate — lead to a greater and more rapid onset of the second wave of professionalization and de-politicization than other types of crises. Officers in a defeated — or at least, un-victorious — military should be determined to win in the next confrontation, which should engender a particularly single-minded focus on national defense. This should be particularly acute among junior officers, whose formative experience is the defeat or stalemate. Further, the poor outcome of the crisis should upend normal processes of attrition and advancement in the military hierarchy and accelerate the rise of the Crisis Generation of

officers to positions of military leadership. In addition, the Crisis Generation should advance through the ranks more quickly due to the punishment of the military leadership for the defeat, which may result in purges and forced retirements.

Empirical Findings

To test the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I used a new dataset consisting of the number of military officers in cabinets, state councils, and other high-level executive bodies in national governments from 1964-2008 — the Military Participation in Government (MPG) data. These data represent a massive improvement over extant cross-national data on civil military relations, which tend to measure only extreme outcomes, such as coups or the occurrence of military regimes. Using Military Government Share — the proportion of high-level government positions controlled by active-duty military officers, generated from the MPG data — combined with extant data on inter-state war and international crises, I found strong and robust evidence that major international crises contribute to military withdrawal from government in both the long- and the short-term, though the statistical evidence was stronger for the long-term effect. Critically, long-term effect was found between 16 and 25 years after the end of the crisis. This timing accords with the expectation of the theory, that the latter wave is driven by a generational shift in the military. In that time-frame, junior officers at the time of the crisis would be advancing into the higher ranks of the military and thereby be in a position to affect its institutional preferences.

In Chapter 4, I tested the auxiliary hypotheses presented in the theoretical chapter: 1) The two-waved pattern observed for the negative effect of crisis-history on military participation in government is strongest for the non-security aspect of government. 2) The opposite — a positive — trend is observed when military participation in the security sector of government is

considered. 3) Poor outcomes in international crises lead to a more rapid onset of the second wave of military professionalization and withdrawal from government, and the two-waved negative effect should still be observable for other types of crises — i.e., crises that don't end in defeat or stalemate. In analysis using a modified Military Government Share which takes into account only non-security-related government positions, I found strong evidence that short- and long-term patterns of military withdrawal from government are most clearly evident in the non-security sector of government. And in analysis that disaggregated major crises according to outcome, I found that when defeats and stalemates in crises are considered separately from other outcomes, the onset of the long-term effect is much more rapid than when crisis outcomes are pooled.

There was more mixed evidence in support of the expectations that the effect of crises on military participation in the security sector is positive and that crises other than defeats or stalemates also exert a two-waved negative effect on military participation in government. When the analysis is duplicated on a construction of Military Government Share focused on security-related positions, the short- and long-term effect of crisis-history on military participation in the security sector of government appears to be *negative* (rather than positive, as anticipated). However, this may be due to the conflation of positions related to internal and external security in the MPG data. More fine-tuned logit analysis of control over the ministries of defense (MOD) and interior (MOI), respectively, suggested that a past history of international crises makes military involvement in international security decision-making (MOD) more likely and domestic security decision-making (MOI) less likely. There was also mixed evidence regarding the impact of crises other than defeat and stalemate — e.g., ties and victories — on military involvement in government. There was consistent evidence of a negative long term effect. And while this effect

failed to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance. ($p < .20$, two-tailed), it is suggestive of a pattern whereby major international crises, regardless of outcome exert a strong, professionalizing generational effect on the officer corps — though there is much more certainty regarding this effect for crises that end poorly.

In sum, the statistical analyses provide a rich and nuanced picture of international conflict's effect on military participation in government. Major international crises are a shock that leads to short and long-term de-politicization and professionalization of the military, and this corresponds to long-lasting patterns of military withdrawal from government that are driven by the rise of generations of officers shaped by the crisis experience. While likely applicable to all crises that involve war, major combat, or a real risk of war, such patterns are most clearly evident in crises that end poorly for the state. Further, the military withdrawal from politics that is the result of international crises is most evident in the aspects of government that are traditional civilian areas of responsibility — e.g., the economy, domestic administration, health and social services. There is some evidence that the military abstains from security governance in response to international crises, but it is likely that this only extends to areas of domestic security, while international crises may correspond to the military taking a more assertive role in security-related positions focused on international security.

Case Illustration: The Korean War, the PLA, and Chinese Civil-Military Relations

In Chapter 5, I presented a case illustration of the proposed mechanism at work in the People's Republic of China (PRC). In the discussion of this case, I argued that the roots of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) professionalization and disengagement from politics in the 1980s and 1990s lay in the Korean War (1950-53).

The Korean War, while far from a defeat for the PRC, had a dramatic short- and long-term effect on the preferences of the PLA. Fresh from victory in a long-running civil war, the PLA applied the "People's War" tactics that had won the civil war against the Nationalists to armed conflict with the American-led United Nations force in Korea. Repeated human-wave attacks against the highly mechanized UN forces led to a stalemate in the conflict at the cost of hundreds of thousands of PLA casualties. In response to this, and as anticipated by the theory, the PLA, led by reform-minded "Professionals" in the officer corps, began a process of professionalization and de-politicization in order to learn from the lessons of Korea and ready the PLA for confrontations with modern, professional armies. This process dramatically curtailed the role of commissars and reduced the level of political instruction in training PLA soldiers and officers. This process began immediately after the Korean armistice in 1953 and continued into the late 1950s. It is unclear, however, if the professionalization and de-politicization included large-scale military withdrawal from government at this time.

The reform campaign of the PLA Professionals provoked a backlash by Politicians-in-Uniform in the officer corps, as well as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), alarmed at the increased autonomy and decreased Loyalist inclinations of the officer corps. This backlash was compounded by the events of the Cultural Revolution, which drew the PLA increasingly into politics, as it was called upon to staff many government departments and regional administrations, and curtail the greatest excesses of the revolutionaries. This pattern extended from the mid-1960s into the 1970s. This backlash in the PRC case was not anticipated by the theory. However, rather than being an unanticipated consequence of international conflict, this backlash seems to be particular to the idiosyncracies of the PRC in the late 1950s and 1960s. Specifically, Mao's perceived weakness after the disastrous failure of the Great Leap Forward

(and the resultant mass famine) and the Sino-Soviet split were likely key factors in the backlash against PLA professionalism (e.g., MacFarquhard and Schoenals 2006).

Critically, though, the backlash and the Cultural Revolution did not persist into the 1980s. Reformers in the CCP and PLA pursued a renewed program of professionalization and de-politicization, which included large-scale withdrawal of PLA officers from high-level government offices, with the exception of those pertaining to security matters (i.e., the Central Military Commission). An examination of the secondary literature on PLA-CCP affairs, quotes by the PRC's leader at the time — Deng Xiaoping, and the timing of reductions in PLA representation in high-level CCP bodies all strongly suggest that a necessary ingredient for the PLA's professionalization and withdrawal from politics in the 1980s was generational turnover. Specifically, the replacement of the old guard "Long Marchers" by the Korean War Crisis Generation, which was profoundly Professional in outlook, given their formative experience in the Korean conflict. This generational shift allowed the de-politicization and professionalization to proceed in the PLA. Certainly, civilian leaders like Deng were key players in the reform effort, but the reform could not have succeeded without the PLA's acquiescence, which was achieved through the replacement of Politicians-in-Uniform by Professionals at the top of the PLA hierarchy. The Professionals predominated in the rising generation because of the Korean War experience.

While not intended as a true *test* of the theory, the case illustration in Chapter 5 should provide added confidence that the mechanism behind the quantitative results in Chapters 3 and 4 is that put forward by the theory: short- and long-term preference shifts in the military driven by the military's crisis experience — with the rise of a "Crisis Generation" of officers driving the long-term effect.

Implications and Future Research

These findings provide a much fuller picture of the relationship between international conflict and government-military relations than currently exists in the literature. This dissertation provides a framework for tracing the impact of specific crises across time in a broad range of states, uncovering the long-term, generational effect of international crises. In addition to moving forward the literature on international conflict and civil-military relations, this approach provides a way for policy-makers to understand the long-term trajectories of civil-military relations in foreign countries based on past conflict history. By focusing on crises, this dissertation advances our understanding of international conflict and civil-military relations beyond theories that focus on relatively static measures of international threat. These theories are largely limited to cross-national, rather than more dynamic comparisons which take into account changes across *time*. Put differently, the theory and empirics of this dissertation explain variation in military political participation both across time and place, rather than just place. Further, the use of novel data on military participation in government moves forward our empirical understanding of civil-military relations far beyond extant binary measures of coups and regime-type, opening up a path for future research on civil-military relations as a more dynamic and continuous dependent variable.

The theory and results of this dissertation also have a range of more general implications for researchers international relations and comparative politics. In particular, the results presented here should also be of great interest to scholars of democratization. Given that civilian control of the military is necessary for a democracy to consolidate, a professionalized, politically neutral officer corps is likewise essential. International conflict may actually contribute to democracy in the long-term. The most promising candidates for successful democratization may not be those states which have always been at peace, but rather those states that have some

history of poor performance in international conflict. In such states, a professionally-oriented generation of officers may be ascendant and will be unlikely to involve themselves in internal politics. While this may run counter to the substantial literature on the clear association between peace and democracy (e.g., Maoz and Russett 1993; Gibler and Tir 2010), it is in line with recent work that finds that the absence of a risk of international conflict corresponds to weaker institutions and even failed states (e.g., Fazal 2007; Atzili 2010). This intuition is also in line with Charles Tilly's logic that "war makes the state" (Tilly 1998). Here, poor outcomes in international conflict stimulate the creation of a professional officer corps, which leaves politics to the civilians. This corresponds to the emergence of a stronger — possibly democratic — state. At the same time, however, military professionalism in countries such as China has contributed to autocratic consolidation. Further research should seek to identify why professionalism in the officer corps sometimes contributes to democratization, but at other times to autocratic consolidation.

Scholars of military effectiveness have focused a great deal on regime-type (e.g., Reiter and Stam 2002); wealth and power (e.g., Desch 2008), and coup-proofing (e.g., Talmadge 2013) as explanatory factors. The results presented here suggest that scholars should also consider military effectiveness as proceeding from a long-term process of professionalization and de-politicization, which in turn stems from the institutional learning that occurs after a crisis. More specifically, the results suggest that defeat and other poor outcomes are associated most strongly with military withdrawal from government. In line with Huntington's (1957) ideal of professionalism, this is expected to be associated with increased military effectiveness. This suggests that states with militaries that are involved in government and that have experienced defeat in international conflict may be more successful in subsequent conflicts because of an

intervening period of professionalization and de-politicization. This was certainly the experience of the Egyptian military in between the 1967 and 1973 wars, and future work should explore if this dynamic applies to a broader range of cases. Are states able to "learn" from defeat, reform and professionalize their possibly politicized militaries, and then succeed in future confrontations?

The results of this dissertation also point to several puzzles regarding the behavior and incentives of state leaders in domestic and international armed conflict. In terms of international conflict, some leaders may face punishment for poor international conflict outcomes (e.g., Goemans 2000; Croco 2011), but there are other leaders, such as Nasser in 1967, who are able to successfully scapegoat the military for a poor conflict outcome and actually emerge stronger from the defeat. Why are some leaders able to divert responsibility for bad conflict outcomes to their militaries, while others bear the costs of defeat?

The findings related to generational effects also have clear relevance in the area of security sector reform (SSR).¹⁰⁵ SSR efforts aimed at professionalizing and depoliticizing militaries may be most effective in states that have recently experienced a set-back in an international confrontation. SSR may be increasingly effective many years after the crisis as the Crisis Generation succeeds the previous generation of military leadership. In this context, SSR programs may reinforce the professionalizing impulse of this cohort of officers. Further research should seek to identify whether past crisis history can condition the efficacy of SSR.

Finally, and more generally, the theory of Crisis Generations and the results supporting it should encourage scholars studying the domestic political consequences of international shocks to consider the long-term effects that those shocks may have, particularly how generational dynamics may exert a long-term effect. Rather than exerting an initial shock and then decaying

¹⁰⁵ I am indebted to Theo McLauchlin for suggesting this possible implication.

over time, events like war or economic crisis may have a pronounced two-waved effect as the generation that came of age during the shock age comes into positions of leadership. Moving beyond international conflict, how, for example, will the economic and trade policies of countries like Greece and Spain — with massive unemployment among young people stemming from the 2008 international economic crisis — change in 20-30 years, when the younger cohort ages into positions of political leadership? How will the domestic politics of countries like Iraq and Syria change in the coming decades, even in peace, as the generation whose youth has been devoid of education and opportunity and characterized by near constant intra-state war, age into leadership positions as well? Future research should seek to apply the concept of "Crisis Generations" to a much broader range of questions.

Appendices

Appendix A: Military Participation in Government (MPG) codebook

Military Participation in Government (MPG) Codebook¹⁰⁶

The purpose of this data collection project is to develop quantitative indicators of militaries' political power and their relative autonomy in a broad range of countries. Importantly, this project focuses on cabinet and executive council positions held by current and former military officers. This approach allows for the development of relatively continuous indicators of military intrusion into politics, rather than dichotomous indicators—e.g., whether or not there was a coup, whether or not a state is ruled by a "military" regime. This new empirical approach pairs well with theories that treat such concepts as "civilian control of the military" and "military intrusion into politics" as occurring on a continuum rather than as dichotomous phenomena.

Scope and Structure

The scope of this project is all states in the international system from 1964-2008¹⁰⁷ as indicated by the list of states put forward by Gleditsch and Ward (1999) and that are contained in the Archigos project (Goemmans et al 2009).

The project's unit of analysis is country-year. So, coders will be collecting annual observations for each country, e.g., Algeria-1967, Bahrain-1967...Algeria-1968, Bahrain-1968. Coders will be assigned whole countries to code and will code all years (1964-2006). Coders will also code "test cases" in order to ensure inter-coder reliability.

Sources

Coders should consult the *Europa World Year Book*. (JN1 .E85 1964) in McKeldin Library). Each of these sources is organized by year and has entries for each country that contain a roster of each countries' national cabinet/government. These rosters also indicate through abbreviation (e.g., "Gen." for "General") where a cabinet/government member is a military officer.

At this stage of the project, coders should only consult this source. In order to make sure that the same criteria are used for each case, coders should not rely on extraneous Google searches, etc. Any questions about specific cases should be directed to Peter (the project lead).

¹⁰⁶ This project is funded through a Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation. (Award Number: 1424001). The content of this project is the author's own and does not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the U.S. Government.

¹⁰⁷ The selection of this date range for the project is driven by the publication dates of the *Europa World Yearbook* for countries outside of Europe.

Definitions

Military

For purposes of this project, a member of the cabinet/government is considered to be part of the military if they hold a military rank—either active duty or retired. The underlying rationale is that holding a military rank indicates membership in a military-type organization, and these types of organizations monopolize coercive resources in a country and are engaged in bargaining with the state leader over their relative autonomy and their role in the politics of the state.

Leader:

The leader of the state is whomever Archigos lists as the state's "effective leader." Coders will be provided with this list.

In some years, there are multiple leaders for a country. (for example, in an election year) When this is the case, coders will be provided with separate rows in the spreadsheet for each country-leader (e.g., US-2009-Bush, US-2009-Obama). To determine which leader is the relevant one, coders should simply refer to the *Europa World Year Book* and see which leader is referenced in the cabinet/government section or right under the country name—where the executive positions are listed. If they cannot find the leader, coders should email Peter.

Note that spellings may be slightly different between the names provided on the spreadsheet and the names that appear in the Handbook—this will often be the case with non-Western leaders. Email Peter when unsure about matching a particular leader in the spreadsheet with their counterpart in the Handbook.

A great way to address specific questions is to snap a picture of the relevant page(s) in the *Year Book* and email the picture to Peter with your question.

Cabinet:

"Cabinet positions" are ALL of the OCCUPIED positions listed under "Cabinet" or "National Cabinet" or "The Government" in the *Europa World Year Book*, but NOT including all those OCCUPIED BY THE LEADER (for example the Ministry of Defense, if it is held by the leader, would not be counted as a Cabinet position and neither would the prime minister position, if it were occupied by the leader). Also to be EXCLUDED should be any Ambassador positions listed (sometimes the state's Ambassador to U.S. or U.K. is listed).

All positions should be included unless they are explicitly described as not being in the cabinet/government—e.g., "ministers not in the government."

Political parties—e.g., the Communist Party—may be listed under "The Government," but should not be counted as part of the cabinet—though, members of the party who occupy cabinet positions should be. **This can sometimes be tricky. Again, the best thing to do is often to take a picture of the relevant entry with your camera phone and email Peter for clarification.**

Sometimes the positions are under separate sub-headings, such as "Ministers," "Secretaries," and "Ministers Delegate." **All positions under all headings should be considered to be cabinet positions aside from those exceptions noted above.**

Note also that Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister positions should also be included as should Prime Minister, President, Premier positions when they are NOT occupied by the leader. When in doubt, email Peter.

Military:

A military officer is anyone who has a military rank next to their name, e.g., Gen., Capt., Col., Adm., in the sources listed above. This includes BOTH retired and active-duty. So "Gen. John Smith" and "Gen. (ret.) John Smith" are both considered to be "military." Note: the ranks in bold are considered to be "junior" (for the "Junior" variable).

Coders should pay attention to any abbreviated title before a cabinet name—it is likely a military rank. If unsure, consult with Peter.

List of Military Officer Ranks from Junior to Senior

- **Lieutenant (Lt.)**
- **Captain (Cpt.)**
- **Major (Maj)**
- **Lieutenant Colonel (LTC)/Commander (Com.)**
- Colonel (Col.)
- Commodore/Cmdr.
- Brigadier General (Brig. Gen.)/Rear Admiral (Adm.)
- Major General (Maj. Gen.)/Vice Admiral (Adm.)
- Lieutenant General (Lt. General)/Admiral (Adm.)
- Colonel General (Col. General)/Fleet Admiral (Adm.)
- General (Gen.)
- Vice Marshall (Vice Mar. or V. Mar.)
- Marshall (Mar.)/Air Marshall

Some other ranks may come up—e.g., "Wing Commander"—if so, just email Peter for clarification.

Retired:

A military officer is considered to be retired if the source indicates that they are—usually with a “ret” next to their military rank. Refer to the discussion of “Military” immediately above “Retired” is a subset of “Military.”

Variables to be coded:

General Notes:

- Dichotomous/binary variables should be coded with a 1 to mean “yes” or a 0 to mean “no.” Uncertain cases—where the coder is not sure how to code a variable—should be marked with a “?”, and cases where the position in question does not exist—i.e., where the variable pertains to the Ministry of Defense and there is no such ministry in the state—cases should be marked as missing with a period—“.”
- Where there are multiple positions contained in a single title—e.g., "Minster of Defense and Foreign Affairs"—**the positions should be considered separate for the dichotomous variables—e.g., Mil_MOD and Mil_MOFA—but only counted as one positions when cabinet positions are tallied in the count variables, e.g., Cab_Count. The objective of the *count* variables are to get sense of the "bodies" in a cabinet meeting and how many of them are wearing a uniform, even if one of those "bodies" holds multiple positions.** Another example would be when the leader was "Minister of Defense and Development"—both Leader_MOD and Leader_OTHER would be coded as 1 (and MIL_MOD would be coded as missing, because the position is occupied by the leader and not a cabinet member).
- **For the count variables, with a position like "Minister of Defense and Development"—there is one cabinet-member, but they have both security and non-security responsibilities. In this case, security trumps non-security and it would be counted as a security position in the "count" variables. However, in the binary variables, we would consider each portfolio separately—e.g., if a general were "Minister of Defense and Development," we would code as 1 the Mil_MOD and Mil_Nonsec. However, please flag these cases and indicate the relevant position in "Notes." If a military officer was "Minister of Defense, Development, and Borders," then mil_MOD, mil_nonsec, and mil_sec_other would all be coded as 1.**
- Variables referring to retired military officers, i.e. with the text "_ret" in the variable name are a subset of their parent variable—e.g., they are only coded as either 0 or 1 when their parent variable=1. When their parent variable=0, then they are coded as missing (with ".") Example: mil_MOD=1, then mil_MOD_ret is coded as 0 or 1, when mil_MOD=0, then mil_MOD_ret is always coded as "."

Leader_NAME:

As recorded in Archigos. This will be provided to the coder. See the discussion above for cases in which there may be multiple state leaders in a given year.

Leader_ID:

As recorded in Archigos. This will be provided to the coder.

Binary Variables

These variables pertain to institutions and positions rather than the count of "bodies" in the cabinet. Here I am interested in the portfolios that the leader or military hold, even if multiple portfolios are held by one individual. For example, if the state leader is "Minister of Defense and Development," then both Leader_MOD and Leader_OTHER should be coded as 1. If a General is "Minister of Defense, Borders, and Housing." Mil_MOD, Mil_Sec_other and Mil_non_sec should be coded as 1.

Leader_MIL

Coders should refer to the leader listed under Leader_NAME. Is the leader of the state a military officer according to the sources provided? This includes retired or active-duty.

Leader_MIL_RET

(Coded only if Leader_MIL=1, otherwise code as missing) Is the leader of the state a retired military officer?

Leader_CAB

Does the leader hold a cabinet position other than president, prime minister, etc?

Leader_MOD

Is the leader also the minister of defense (MOD)? The following positions are also considered Minister of Defense: "Secretary of Defense," "Minister/Secretary of National Defense," "Minister of War." If none of the aforementioned positions exist, the following shall be considered MOD in the following order: Defense Affairs, National Security, National Security Affairs, Armed Forces, Security (e.g., if all five existed in the cabinet, only Defense Affairs would be considered MOD while the other four would be considered to be "other security.")

If Leader_MOD=1, then Leader_CAB=1 also.

Leader_INT

Is the leader also the Minister of Interior (MOI)? In the absence of an "Interior" position, the following can be considered MOI: Home Affairs, Internal Affairs, Public Security/People's Security, Security, Police, Gendarmerie, Internal Administration, Territorial Administration, Regional Administration, State Administration. Where there is no "Interior" position, but are multiple positions that could be considered to be the MOI, refer to the order of the above list for

which should be considered MOI—i.e., Home Affairs should be considered to be MOI over Internal Affairs, etc. When there is no position literally called “Minister of the Interior” pay close attention to the cabinet list for positions that could be considered to be substitutes for the Minister of the Interior—use the above criteria and email Peter if in any doubt.

If Minister of Defense and Interior are the same position—i.e., "Minister of Defense and Interior," then they should be considered separate for the `_MOD` and `_MOJ` variables, but counted as a single security position in the count variables.

If `Leader_INT=1`, then `Leader_CAB=1` also.

Leader_MOFA

Is the leader also the minister of foreign affairs? (MOFA) In the absence of a “Foreign Affairs” position—“external affairs,” “Secretary of State” (in the case of the U.S.), “international cooperation,” or “foreign relations” can be considered to be MOFA.

If `Leader_MOFA=1`, then `Leader_CAB=1` also.

Leader_MOJ

Is the leader, the minister of justice (MOJ)? In the absence of a “Justice” minister, “Legal Affairs,” “Law,” or “Attorney General” can be considered MOJ. If MOI and MOJ are explicitly the same position, e.g., “Minister of Justice and Interior”, they should be considered separate positions for the `_MOI` and `_MOJ` variables, but only counted as 1—security—position in the count variables.

If `Leader_MOJ=1`, then `Leader_CAB=1` also.

Leader_OTHER

Does the leader hold any cabinet positions other than MOI, MOD, MOJ, or MOFA?

If `Leader_OTHER=1`, then `Leader_CAB=1` also.

Mil_CAB

Aside from the leader (if s/he is a military officer), are any cabinet positions held by military officers?

Mil_CAB_ret

(Coded only if `Mil_CAB=1`, otherwise as missing) Aside from the leader, are any cabinet positions held by retired military officers?

Mil_MOD

(Coded only if leader_MOD=0) Does a military officer—other than the state leader—hold the position of Minister of Defense (MOD). The following positions are also considered Minister of Defense: “Secretary of Defense,” “Minister/Secretary of National Defense,” “Minister of War.”

When there is more than one of the preceding positions and the state leader is one of them, then the position held by the state leader should be considered MOD and the second position should be considered "other security."

If none of the aforementioned positions exist, the following shall be considered MOD in the following order: Defense Affairs, National Security, National Security Affairs, Armed Forces. (e.g., if all four existed in the cabinet, only Defense Affairs would be considered MOD while the other three would be considered to be "other security.")

Mil_MOD_ret

(Coded only if Mil_MOD=1, otherwise as missing) Is the Minister of Defense a retired military officer?

MOD_name

Write the full name—as written in the sources—of the Minister of Defense. This includes both military officers and civilians. Include rank for military officers. If mil_MOD is missing, then this variable should be recorded as missing.

Mil_INT

(Coded only if leader_INT=0) Does a military officer—other than the state leader—hold the position of Minister of Interior (MOI)? In the absence of an “Interior” position, the following can be considered MOI: Home Affairs, Internal Affairs, Public Security/People's Security, Security, Police, Gendarmerie, Internal Administration, Territorial Administration, Regional Administration, State Administration. Where there is no "Interior" position, but are multiple positions that could be considered to be the MOI, refer to the order of the above list for which should be considered MOI—i.e., Home Affairs should be considered to be MOI over Internal Affairs, etc.

When there is no position literally called “Minister of the Interior” pay close attention to the cabinet list for positions that could be considered to be substitutes for the Minister of the Interior—use the above criteria and email Peter if in any doubt.

Mil_INT_ret

(Coded only if Mil_INT=1, otherwise as missing) Is the Minister of Interior a retired military officer?

INT_name

Write the full name—as written in the sources—of the Minister of Interior. This includes both military officers and civilians. Include rank for military officers. If mil_MOI is missing, then this variable should be recorded as “missing”—“.”

Mil_MOJ

(Coded only if leader_MOJ=0) Is the minister of justice (MOJ) a military officer? In the absence of a “Justice” minister, “Legal Affairs,” "Law," or “Attorney General” can be considered MOJ. If MOI and MOJ are explicitly the same position, e.g., “Minister of Justice and

Interior”, they should be considered separate positions for the `_MOI` and `_MOJ` variables, but not for the count variables below.

Mil_MOJ_ret

(Coded only if `Mil_MOJ=1`, otherwise as missing) Is the minister of justice a retired military officer?

MOJ_name

Record the full name of the MOJ.

Mil_MOFA

(Coded only if `leader_MOFA=0`) Is a military officer the minister of foreign affairs? (MOFA) In the absence of a “Foreign Affairs” position—“external affairs,” “Secretary of State” (in the case of the U.S.), “international cooperation,” or “foreign relations” can be considered to be MOFA.

Mil_MOFA_ret

(Coded only if `Mil_MOFA=1`, otherwise as missing) Is a retired military officer the minister of foreign affairs? (MOFA)

MOFA_name

Record the full name—without rank—of the MOFA.

Sec_other

This is probably the trickiest part of the coding, and so I anticipate that you will have a lot of questions/emails about this—which is a good thing. Do not hesitate to email with questions.

Are there security-related positions other than MOI, MOD, MOFA, and MOJ?

These would include any position with “security” in the title (except for “Social Security” and “Food Security”), and also positions involving “borders,” “narcotics,” “military production,” specific military branches, and the police/gendarmerie (when these are separate from the MOI and MOJ).

Positions that refer to the administration of specific, *named* domestic or international territories/countries/regions also count—e.g., Minister of Chittagong Hill Affairs (Bangladesh) or Minister of Mainland Affairs (Taiwan) or Minister of European Affairs for some EU countries, but NOT unnamed territories—e.g., Minister of Rural Affairs. But, the case should be flagged under the “flag” variable where this is the case and an explanation of the relevant position should be put in “Notes.” These will be reviewed later to ensure there is a security-connection.

Specific clarifications on “other security”:

- “Strategic Affairs” SHOULD be considered security, but NOT “Strategic Planning,” which is likely an economic position.

- "Atomic/Nuclear Energy" SHOULD be considered security, but NOT "Energy."
- Secondary MOFA positions, e.g., "International/European Cooperation" SHOULD also be considered security-related. Attorney General or Law or Legal Affairs does NOT count as other security.
- "Territorial/Regional Administration" does NOT count (though it may serve as MOI).
- By itself, "Corrections" or "Prisons" does NOT count as security.

Note that here we are concerned with the portfolios held by individuals rather than the "bodies" in the cabinet. So, if there is an individual that holds multiple security portfolios, like "Minister of Interior, Defense, and Border Security"—then this variable should be coded as 1 because of "Border Security." However, there may be some positions like "Minister of the Interior and Police" where, really there is just one position—an MOI equivalent. This cases will be rare, but you should email Peter to address the specific case when they pop up.

Mil_SEC_other

(Code only if Sec_other=1) Does a military officer—**other than the state leader**—hold any security-related positions other than those designated MOD, MOI, MOFA, or MOJ? (Again, this does not count positions held by the state leader)

If there are no security-related positions other than MOD, MOI, MOJ, or MOFA in the cabinet, this should be coded as “missing”—“.”

If there is a single military officer who is "Minister of Defense and Border Security," this variable should be coded as 1, because not only is MOD held by a military officer, an "other" security portfolio, Border Security, is also held—even if it is by the same officer.

Mil_SEC_other_list

Please list the names, as written in the sources consulted, of the security cabinet *positions* considered for a code of 1 under MIL_SEC_other; separate these by semi-colon with no spaces. In parentheses, next to each position, write the full name (without rank) of the military officer holding this position. E.g., Minister of Land Forces (John Doe);Minister of Sea Forces(Jane Doe) Where there is a single military officer who holds both MOD, MOI, MOFA, or MOJ *AND* an "other security" position—list them here also—e.g., "Minister of Defense, Border Security."

Mil_SEC_other_ret

(Coded only if Mil_SEC_other=1, otherwise as missing) Does a retired military officer—other than the state leader—hold any security-related positions coded under MIL_SEC_other?

Mil_SEC_other_ret_list

Please list the names, as written in the sources consulted, of the security cabinet *positions* considered for a code of 1 under MIL_SEC_other_ret; separate these by semi-colon with no spaces.

Mil_NonSec

Aside from the leader, does a military officer hold any non-security positions in the cabinet? I.e., any positions not covered by Mil_INT, Mil_MOD, Mil_MOJ, Mil_MOFA, or Mil_SEC_other? Note again, that it is possible that there is a single individual officer that holds multiple portfolios. Here, this variable is coded as 1, if at least one portfolio of a military officer is non-security related. For example, if General John Doe is "Minister of Defense and Construction," both Mil_MOD and Mil_NonSec are coded as 1, because of the "Defense" and "Construction" portfolios.

Mil_NonSec_ret

(Coded only if Mil_NonSec=1, otherwise as missing) Does a retired military officer hold any non-security positions in the cabinet?

Mil_NonSec_list

Please list the names, as written in the sources consulted, of the non-security cabinet *positions* held by military officers, separate these by semi-colon with no spaces. In parentheses, next to each position, write the full name) of the military officer holding this position. E.g., Minister of Development (General John Doe);Minister of Health(Admiral Jane Doe)

Where a single military officer holds a security and non-security position—list the non-security position here. I.e., if we have Admiral Jane Doe-Minister of Public Security, Health—list Minister of Heath (Admiral Jane Doe) and list Minister of Public Security (Admiral Jane Doe) under Mil_SEC_other_list.

Mil_NonSec_ret_list

Please list the names, as written in the sources consulted, of the non-security cabinet *positions* (not the names of the individuals, rather, their *offices*) held by retired military officers, separate these by semi-colon with no spaces.

Count Variables

NOTE: positions held by the leader are not considered in any of these counts. So, for example, if there are four security-related positions in a state listed in the sources: MOJ, MOI, MOD, and MOFA, and the state leader is MOD, then there are only 3 security-related positions as far as the counts are concerned.

Here it is also important to clarify that what is being coded for the count variables is the balance of *individuals* in the cabinet/government, whereas the binary variables are concerned with the positions/portfolios held. In the binary variables, if a single military officer is "Minister of Defense, Border Security, and Economic Development," then we code three different variables as "1"—Mil_MOD, Mil_sec_other, and Mil_nonsec.

However, in the count variables, we are concerned only with how many individuals would be at a cabinet/government meeting and how many of them are military officers. So, the individual would be counted once in those counts. Further, given that the individual is only counted once, it is necessary to make a decision about whether this individual is categorized as security or non security for the "COUNT_sec" and "COUNT_nonsec" variables. In this

case, if an individual's portfolios include any security functions, then they are categorized as "security" and so would be counted under the "COUNT_sec" variables. (Note: that all individuals are counted under the generic Cab_COUNT variables, regardless of whether they are security or non-security.)

Note that this means that the binary and count variables won't always match up—and that's ok. For example, if General John Doe is the "Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense," then Mil_Nonsec and Mil_MOD will be coded as 1, but he will only be counted as a security position in the count variables. So, it is possible that Mil_Nonsec is 1, but Cab_COUNT_nonsec_mil is 0. That is fine—this coding scheme gives us two ways to approach the question of military representation in the government—looking at portfolios/positions, and also individuals.

Cab_COUNT

Other than those held by the leader, how many people are in the cabinet, i.e., do not count vacant positions and those occupied by the leader. This counts positions occupied by both civilians and military. Do not count positions held by the leader.

Cab_COUNT_mil

Other than those held by the leader—if s/he is a military officer—how many of those in the cabinet are military officers? Do not count positions held by the leader.

Cab_COUNT_mil_ret

(Coded only if Cab_COUNT_mil>0, otherwise as missing) Other than those held by the leader—if s/he is a retired military officer—how many of those in the cabinet are retired military officers? Do not count the leader.

Cab_COUNT_sec

Other than the leader, how many security-related cabinet members are there? These would be MOD, MOI, MOJ, MOFA, and all others who have some portfolio considered under _SEC_other variables. Do not count positions held by the leader.

As stated above, positions that have two portfolios—one security and one non-security (e.g., "Police, Economic Development") are counted here as a security position, not a non-security position. For the count variables, security trumps non-security.

Cab_COUNT_sec_mil

Other than the leader—if s/he is a military officer, how many of those in security-related cabinet positions are military officers?

Cab_COUNT_sec_ret

(Coded only if Cab_COUNT_sec_mil>0, otherwise as missing) Other than the leader, how many security-related cabinet members are retired military officers?

Cab_COUNT_nonsec

Other than the leader, how many non-security-related cabinet members are there? These are any members without positions such as MOD, MOI, MOJ or anything counted under _SEC_other. This counts both positions held by military officers and civilians.

Cab_COUNT_nonsec_mil

How many non-security-related cabinet members are military officers? Do not count positions held by the leader.

Cab_COUNT_nonsec_mil_ret

(Coded only if Cab_COUNT_nonsec_mil>0, otherwise as missing) Other than the leader, how many non-security-related cabinet members are retired military officers?

Other

Junior

Code this as 1 if any of the military officers in this country's cabinet are below the rank of Colonel. If there are no military officers, code this as missing. Refer to the rank list at the beginning of the codebook to determine ranks below Colonel. If no military officers in the cabinet, this is coded as missing.

Junior_ret

Code this as 1 if any of the retired military officers in this country's cabinet are below the rank of Colonel. If no retired military officers in the cabinet, this is coded as missing.

Date_current

Both sources, for each country, should indicate a date at which the information for a cabinet is current, e.g., for some countries the cabinet info in the Handbook of World Politics 2014 is current as of "August 15, 2013." Record this data in MM/DD/YYYY format.

Notes

Any notes or general comments/questions. (This will usually be blank)

Flag

Put a 1 here to mark cases for further review. Any case with Flag=1 should have a detailed explanation under Notes. When in doubt, always flag a case for review. Any time Flag=1, there should be brief explanatory notes under "Notes"

Initials

Put your initials here.

Date Complete

Put the date the coding was completed here.

Appendix B: Generalized Linear Models

VARIABLES	GLM
Major crisis 1-5 yrs ago	-0.117 (0.083)
➤ 6-10 yrs ago	-0.061 (0.077)
➤ 11-15 yrs ago	-0.045 (0.068)
➤ 16-20 yrs ago	-0.141+ (0.073)
➤ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.193* (0.087)
➤ 26-30 yrs ago	-0.155* (0.078)
➤ 31-35 yrs ago	-0.177* (0.071)
➤ 36-40 yrs ago	-0.085 (0.082)
➤ 41-45 yrs ago	-0.072 (0.074)
➤ 46-50 yrs ago	-0.016 (0.071)
Ongoing major crisis	-0.197* (0.090)
Cold War	0.358** (0.065)
Rivalry	0.002 (0.075)
Cumulative crises	0.032 (0.031)
Civil War	0.081 (0.069)
Democracy	-0.746** (0.154)
GDP per capita	-0.098* (0.049)
New Leader	0.172* (0.068)
Time since independence	0.023+ (0.013)
Time since independence ²	-0.000 (0.000)
Time since independence ³	0.000 (0.000)
Lag of Military Government Share	4.836** (0.243)
Constant	-2.741** (0.436)
Observations	6,366
Countries	166

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Appendix C: Four-year crisis-history indicators

	4 years
Major crisis 1-4 yrs ago	-0.005 (0.004)
➤ 5-8 yrs ago	-0.005 (0.003)
➤ 9-12 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 13-16 yrs ago	-0.005+ (0.003)
➤ 17-20 yrs ago	-0.007* (0.003)
➤ 21-24 yrs ago	-0.009** (0.003)
➤ 25-28 yrs ago	-0.006* (0.003)
➤ 29-32 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 33-36 yrs ago	0.000 (0.004)
➤ 37-40 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 41-44 yrs ago	0.002 (0.003)
➤ 45-48 yrs ago	-0.003+ (0.002)
Ongoing major crisis	-0.003 (0.005)
Cold War	0.002 (0.003)
Rivalry	0.003 (0.004)
Cumulative crises	0.003** (0.001)
Civil War	-0.002 (0.004)
Democracy	-0.028** (0.006)
GDP per capita	0.003 (0.003)
New Leader	0.008* (0.004)
Time since independence	0.000 (0.000)
Time since independence ²	-0.000 (0.000)
Time since independence ³	0.000 (0.000)
Lag of Military Government Share	0.741** (0.024)
Constant	0.010 (0.021)
Observations	6,366
Countries	166

Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Appendix D: Six year crisis-history indicators

	Six years crisis history
Major crisis 1-6 yrs ago	-0.007* (0.003)
➤ 7-12 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.003)
➤ 13-18 yrs ago	-0.005 (0.003)
➤ 19-24 yrs ago	-0.009** (0.003)
➤ 25-30 yrs ago	-0.004 (0.003)
➤ 31-36 yrs ago	-0.001 (0.004)
➤ 37-42 yrs ago	-0.001 (0.003)
➤ 43-48 yrs ago	-0.001 (0.002)
Ongoing major crisis	-0.003 (0.005)
Cold War	0.002 (0.003)
Rivalry	0.004 (0.004)
Cumulative crises	0.003* (0.001)
Civil War	-0.002 (0.004)
Democracy	-0.028** (0.006)
GDP per capita	0.003 (0.003)
New Leader	0.008* (0.004)
Time	0.000 (0.000)
Time ²	-0.000 (0.000)
Time ³	0.000 (0.000)
Lag of Military Government Share	0.741** (0.024)
Constant	0.008 (0.021)
Observations	6,366
Countries	166

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Appendix E: Expanded MOD/MOI analysis (incidence and onset of military/civilian control)

VARIABLES	(1) Mil MOD incidence	(2) Mil MOD onset	(3) Civ MOD onset	(4) Mil MOI incidence	(5) Mil MOI onset	(6) Civ MOI onset
Major crisis 1-5 yrs ago	0.167	0.296	-0.375	0.004	-0.040	-0.154
	(0.200)	(0.255)	(0.271)	(0.182)	(0.268)	(0.206)
➤ 6-10 yrs ago	0.155	-0.430	-0.282	0.402+	0.116	-0.265
	(0.177)	(0.360)	(0.290)	(0.210)	(0.341)	(0.225)
➤ 11-15 yrs ago	-0.039	-0.411	-0.313	-0.001	-0.148	0.073
	(0.173)	(0.296)	(0.302)	(0.185)	(0.246)	(0.197)
➤ 16-20 yrs ago	0.007	-0.079	-0.150	-0.343	-0.383	0.339
	(0.188)	(0.269)	(0.257)	(0.253)	(0.377)	(0.272)
➤ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.148	-0.242	-0.129	0.016	0.364	-0.172
	(0.155)	(0.322)	(0.255)	(0.199)	(0.272)	(0.229)
➤ 26-30 yrs ago	0.163	0.023	-0.220	-0.031	0.178	0.017
	(0.156)	(0.231)	(0.243)	(0.226)	(0.374)	(0.242)
➤ 31-35 yrs ago	0.617**	0.273	-0.558+	0.497**	0.106	-0.419+
	(0.195)	(0.352)	(0.307)	(0.186)	(0.270)	(0.226)
➤ 36-40 yrs ago	0.756**	0.443	-0.655**	0.382+	0.080	-0.204
	(0.174)	(0.307)	(0.230)	(0.209)	(0.369)	(0.219)
➤ 41-45 yrs ago	0.364+	0.064	-0.295	0.344	0.440	-0.159
	(0.195)	(0.369)	(0.320)	(0.209)	(0.331)	(0.244)
➤ 46-50 yrs ago	0.336	0.226	0.105	0.561*	0.392	-0.745**
	(0.244)	(0.462)	(0.343)	(0.219)	(0.376)	(0.278)
Ongoing major crisis	0.144	0.162	0.117	-0.116	-0.667	0.345
	(0.273)	(0.453)	(0.386)	(0.311)	(0.410)	(0.362)
Cold War	-0.264*	0.018	-0.221	-0.139	0.236	0.028
	(0.123)	(0.165)	(0.180)	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.162)
Rivalry	0.174	0.609**	0.322+	-0.043	0.012	0.067
	(0.175)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.162)	(0.169)	(0.153)
Cumulative crises	-0.070	0.039	0.125+	-0.050	-0.070	0.050
	(0.056)	(0.080)	(0.065)	(0.081)	(0.155)	(0.066)
Civil War	0.211	0.239	-0.051	0.305	0.435*	-0.382*
	(0.165)	(0.229)	(0.194)	(0.192)	(0.181)	(0.190)
Democracy	-0.946**	-1.372**	0.499*	-1.647**	-1.521**	1.397**
	(0.203)	(0.303)	(0.218)	(0.260)	(0.283)	(0.266)
GDP per capita	-0.018	-0.190*	-0.066	-0.188*	-0.315**	0.112
	(0.086)	(0.079)	(0.106)	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.079)
New Leader	-0.501**	0.585**	1.228**	-0.295+	0.960**	0.655**
	(0.124)	(0.214)	(0.208)	(0.161)	(0.162)	(0.164)
Risk time	-1.507**	-0.298**	-0.186**	-1.038**	-0.065	-0.348**
	(0.092)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.044)	(0.073)
Risk time ²	0.116**	0.019**	0.007	0.070**	0.000	0.027*
	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.012)
Risk time ³	-0.003**	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.001**	0.000	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.637*	-0.486	-1.037	2.124**	-0.172	-1.395*
	(0.692)	(0.618)	(0.844)	(0.622)	(0.629)	(0.644)
Observations	5,844	3,861	1,741	6,009	5,092	1,395

Robust standard errors in parentheses
 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Appendix F: Analysis with poor and "other outcome" crisis-history indicators concurrently


VARIABLES	(1) All outcomes
Defeat/Stalemate 1-5 yrs ago	-0.014** (0.004)
➤ 6-10 yrs ago	-0.008* (0.003)
➤ 11-15 yrs ago	-0.010** (0.003)
➤ 16-20 yrs ago	-0.006+ (0.003)
➤ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.008* (0.003)
➤ 26-30 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.004)
➤ 31-35 yrs ago	-0.003 (0.003)
➤ 36-40 yrs ago	0.001 (0.005)
➤ 41-45 yrs ago	0.002 (0.003)
➤ 46-50 yrs ago	-0.001 (0.003)
Other outcome (Victory/Tie) 1-5 yrs ago	0.004 (0.003)
➤ 6-10 yrs ago	0.005 (0.003)
➤ 11-15 yrs ago	0.006+ (0.004)
➤ 16-20 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.004)
➤ 21-25 yrs ago	-0.003 (0.003)
➤ 26-30 yrs ago	-0.001 (0.004)
➤ 31-35 yrs ago	0.001 (0.003)
➤ 36-40 yrs ago	-0.001 (0.003)
➤ 41-45 yrs ago	-0.002 (0.002)
➤ 46-50 yrs ago	-0.000 (0.002)
Ongoing major crisis	-0.004 (0.005)
Cold War	0.003 (0.003)
Rivalry	0.004 (0.004)
Cumulative crises	0.002 (0.002)
Civil War	-0.002 (0.004)

Democracy	-0.028**
	(0.006)
GDP per capita	0.002
	(0.003)
New Leader	0.008*
	(0.004)
Time since independence	0.000
	(0.000)
Time since independence ²	-0.000
	(0.000)
Time since independence ³	0.000
	(0.000)
Lag of Military Security Share	0.738**
	(0.024)
Constant	0.015
	(0.022)
<hr/>	
Observations	6,366
Countries	166
<hr/>	


Robust standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 (two-tailed)

Appendix G: Coefficient plots from analyses using Military Government Share calculated with both retired and active-duty officers


A) Non-security share



B) Security share



C) Overall share



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