

BLUEPRINT OF THE
VIRGINIA STATE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU
SCHOOL SYSTEM

by
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ABSTRACT

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In the late summer of 1861 the American Missionary Association sent missionaries to teach and distribute relief goods to the contraband Negroes at Fortress Monroe. This effort began missions that eventually grew into successful experiments to settle and educate the thousands of refugee slaves that flocked to the Hampton Roads area during the Civil War. During 1862 the missions underwent a difficult period struggling to progress in the midst of active military campaigns and conservative politics. The ability of the contrabands to overcome the difficulties of this early period to establish homes and schools, and labor peacefully on the farms influenced federal policy to carry out emancipation.

After the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 Norfolk and Portsmouth became the sites of two experiments to discover a workable method of acquainting the newly freed slaves with free labor status in a complex society. The educational aspect of these experiments led to the development of a system of schools encompassing the student population in the Twin Cities, adjoining experimental farms,

the efforts of many benevolent societies, and the army. Two factors set the consistency needed to insure steady progress to develop the schools from infancy. The AMA kept a tight rein on the activities of their missionaries, and the army personnel remained in the system throughout the war period. The resulting systemization of the schools in an urban-rural cross section in the mainstream of the active military conflict cast the mold for a workable system for Postwar Reconstruction. The blueprint became the prototype used to organize the Freedmen's Bureau schools in Virginia. These schools matured into one of the most successful state systems within the Bureau, and made education the most lasting contribution of the Reconstruction era.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
INTRODUCTION.....	1
I. SETTING THE FOUNDATION.....	6
II. STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL.....	32
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BLUEPRINT.....	69
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE BLUEPRINT.....	101
CONCLUSION.....	130
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	139

MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Title	Page
Map of Hampton Roads.....	7
Chesapeake Seminary, Massing of McClellan's Troops and Chart of occupied area expansion, Spring 1862.....	34
General John E. Wool and Major General John A. Dix.....	44
General Benjamin Butler.....	79
Map of contraband districts in the Department of Virginia and North Carolina.	83
Sketch Map of Richmond.....	117

INTRODUCTION

The Virginia Freedmen's school system was one of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands' most successful education efforts in post-war Reconstruction. Of the fourteen states with freedmen's schools in 1865, Virginia, Louisiana, and North Carolina held approximately half of the 575 schools, 1,171 teachers and 71,799 students. The American Missionary Association (AMA) in Virginia which preceded the Bureau system began as early as September 1861, and developed steadily during the whole of wartime Reconstruction.

By 1865 the missions operated successful systems at schools in Norfolk, Portsmouth and Hampton, created a blueprint for systemized education, and served as a training ground for personnel. These personnel generalized their Hampton Roads experience to the state as a whole through the use of the blueprint. By 1869 the system operated many Normal as well as primary schools, erected over 200 schoolhouses and taught over 50,000 Freedmen the primary elements of education. The system largely closed in 1870, when the Bureau ceased operating, but the Virginia educational effort that institutionalized public education in Virginia broke much ground. It became one of the few positive legacies of post-war Reconstruction.

The Hampton Roads area presented an ideal location for the beginning of the contraband missions. It served

as a supply station for the James peninsula campaigns and the naval blockade of confederate ports. The presence of the refugees who flocked to the federal haven forced the army to initiate policies regulating the Negroes' movement and treatment. In the midst of pressures of a main theater of the war these policy changes caused the missions to evolve in the same manner as the wartime reconstruction struggles of the nation itself. In a sense the development of the missions reveal many insights to the development of Federal reconstruction policy.

The development of the missions depended on changes of federal policy in response to a balance between the abolitionist and conservative forces in the North and the fortunes of war. It reflected the growing control of abolitionist forces over public opinion in the North, the development of field evidence that accelerated that process, and the breakthroughs in the contraband community's cultural revolution that resulted from that process. The four-year struggle illuminated the social changes of the contraband and freedmen of the area, the structure and efficiency of the AMA and the dedication of the missionaries and army personnel associated with the project.

Reconstruction policy became increasingly more liberal toward the refugees as the war progressed. When the war continued to be a stalemate in the summer of 1862, the opinion and support of the people of the North became an

increasingly important factor. As the potential of the slaves became known from education and free labor projects, the North became that much more incensed at the idea of suppressing intelligent Negroes in a system of slavery. During the same period of time Congress paved the way for emancipation in a series of measures, and after two years of fighting at best a draw, Lincoln needed the issue of emancipation to unite the North behind the continuing war effort.

The first, largest and best organized of the abolitionist missionary organizations -- the AMA -- had a long and highly sophisticated arm of efficiency. They created resettlement and education experiments in Virginia, North Carolina and the Sea Islands and the Mississippi Valley in conjunction with army superintendents. They reported their efforts and results to each mission and among the member congregations and subscribers in the North. From their audience came contributions of money, labor, materials, time and added teacher's enthusiasm. In addition radical politicians used that information to demand guarantees of freedom, education, land and protection for the slaves from Congress and the Lincoln administration.

The AMA wisely printed letters from the most idealistic and moved workers in their monthly periodical, but the most important mission personnel were the mission organizers or superintendents whose letters contained too many problems

and struggles to be published. These men were the pragmatic idealists who organized and administered the field work for the contrabands, the missionaries and its teachers. They created, organized and controlled the mission-army structure of farms and schools.

As the war progressed after 1863, federal policy drew closer and closer to the aspirations of the Radical Republicans until the two almost coincided. The result was a continually expanding policy that endeavored to provide a new way of life for the contrabands.

As the missions succeeded, William H. Woodbury, a German professor from Massachusetts, and Orlando Brown, a Connecticut surgeon, developed effective resettlement programs on confiscated farms, and a system of schools on these and in the cities. At the end of the war and the beginning of the Freedmen's Bureau, both Woodbury and Brown moved to Assistant Commissioner and Superintendent of Education, respectively, for the State of Virginia. Their educational program at Norfolk and Portsmouth became the model to organize the schools served by many different benevolent organizations on a statewide basis.

The problems of the infant Bureau in that first year were staggering. Orlando Brown concentrated on the land and subsistence problems of the Freedmen while Woodbury who had to return North, left the school problems to his assistant, Ralza M. Manly. The latter garnered authority

among the benevolent societies and instituted the educational blueprint that Woodbury and Brown developed in Norfolk the year before. The result was that many different societies cooperated to provide teachers to the urban areas of south-east Virginia and succeeded in teaching fifty thousand Freedmen over a five-year period.

Primary responsibility for the success of the schools lies with the AMA and dedicated army personnel. After spending years in the Hampton Roads' missions, they generalized the experiences they had gained to the state as a whole through the Norfolk blueprint. The most positive result of Post-war Reconstruction, the education of the Freedmen, was largely due to their efforts.

CHAPTER I


Setting the Foundation

As Abraham Lincoln bent to sign the autograph book that Sojourner Truth carried with her, she said to him, "If I could write my name I might have done something with my life. You wrote yours and you freed a people."¹ This statement indicated the high importance that the slaves and freedom of the 1860's placed on education. Without the ability to read and write black men and women could not communicate over long distances, understand work contracts, negotiate bills of credit, read town laws, or hope for any but the most limited lines of work. They saw education as the key to their integration into a new southern culture after their freedom, and thus a guarantee of that freedom itself.

In the first year of the Civil War, 1861, the American Missionary Association (AMA) began developing a mission system that eventually became a blueprint for the Virginia Freedmen's Bureau school system between 1865 and 1870. The initial stage of the system consisted of laying the foundation for contraband missions at the Hampton Roads area. During this time the relationship between the army and the missionaries supplied the background for the first step of the slave refugees from slavery to freedom. A short period of initial cooperation flourished between the army and the first mission in the Fall of 1861, but soon the necessity to use all resources to prosecute the war, dissident actions of subordinate anti-negro officers and men, and

Lincoln's policy of simply reuniting the Union at any cost caused the army's attitude to gradually degenerate into an ambiguous and niggardly policy toward the contrabands.

The army supplied the contraband population with food, housing, clothing, and protection from their southern masters. In return the slaves worked on fortifications and provided intelligence when they arrived within the military lines. The friends of the contrabands the abolitionists, missionaries, and radical politicians, created a driving force which was a combination of public opinion and practical necessity to convince the army to further help the refugees, and also administered and operated the programs that aided the slaves to become repatriated. The success of the Hampton Roads missions resulted from the gradual overcoming of the many obstacles to lay a base for mission operations after the first year of the war.



Map of Hampton Roads showing its strategic position as guardian of the shipping lanes to Norfolk and Portsmouth and Richmond. Norfolk and Portsmouth are on the southern side of the Roads within easy distance overland of the plantation counties of North Carolina. Refugees could easily slip into these cities and then try to boat across to Fortress Monroe, Hampton, and Mill Creek.

In April of 1861 Hampton Roads was in Union hands. Fortress Monroe furnished a strategic position for the army to prosecute the war against the Confederacy, and an ideal collecting point for runaway slaves. It guarded Old Point Comfort at the confluence of the James River, the Elizabeth River, and the Chesapeake Bay.² Hampton township was three miles west of the Fortress and Newport News was seven miles west of Hampton. Southwest across Hampton Roads, Norfolk and Portsmouth faced each other on the south branch of the Elizabeth River. South of Portsmouth the Gosport Naval Yard provided the majority of employment in Portsmouth and was in a strategic position to service the navy of either side. The Yard built and serviced ships of the fleet, and the Fortress protected the entrance to the Chesapeake Bay, and then to the Atlantic. In late April the Navy Yard, Norfolk, and Portsmouth fell to a great influx of Confederate soldiers, and the Union occupied only the fort.³

Fortress Monroe contained sixty-three acres of walled-in ground on a sandbar separated from the end of the James peninsula by Mill Creek and a small swampy area. It began an eighty-five mile access route to Richmond overland through lowlying farms by way of Yorktown and Williamsburg. After the fall of Fort Sumter, Lincoln rushed reinforcements by boat to the small garrison in the Fort. He felt the Union could afford to lose Norfolk and Portsmouth, but it was necessary to keep Monroe because it served as a supply base for the naval

blockade, and armies that might eventually move up the peninsula.⁴

General Benjamin F. Butler received command of Fortress Monroe on May 22, 1861 in the newly created Department of Virginia. As the first three refugees from Hampton entered his lines he quickly established a guideline to retain the refugees.⁵ Realizing the problem of keeping the slaves without any regulations or direction, needing men to erect fortifications, and wishing to deprive the South of their labor supply, Butler decided to use the runaway slaves and labeled them "contraband of war."⁶ With this designation he could legally keep the Negroes, use them to help build the many redoubts needed, and give them housing and subsistence for their labor.

The general's action resulted from a previous lesson well learned and set a precedent though he dissented from both the administration and the die-hard abolitionists who wanted to simply free all the slaves. A few weeks earlier he put his Massachusetts troops at the disposal of Maryland's Governor Thomas Hicks to put down a potential slave insurrection and received a severe rebuke from Governor Andrew for his effort.⁷ Realizing the current direction of Massachusetts opinion and its possible effect on his political career, he seized the chance to both benefit the slaves and solve his logistic problem at Monroe. Regardless of his motives the order stuck even though Congress and the administration failed to make it official

until months later. It set the precedent of creating contraband policy according to the commander's initiative and the necessity of the situation.

With a close proximity to tidewater Virginia and the northern counties of North Carolina, refugee slaves almost immediately travelled by boat and on foot to seek asylum in the Union stronghold. First just a few came, but as the Union lines expanded and the possibility of sanctuary became known on the spiritual grapevine, the trickle became a flood. At the beginning Butler was simply interested in confiscating slave labor, but as the refugees poured into the lines he realized that he needed to establish some policy for their keep.⁸

Despite the contraband order the Lincoln administration abstained from making an official policy standardizing the treatment of the slaves who poured into the Union lines.⁹ The administration Unionists wished to reunite the Union as quickly as possible, without confronting the thorny issue of freedom of the slaves. The contraband initially were an embarrassment and later a hindrance to their prosecution of a "Gentlemen's War" because the army's protection and assistance alarmed the slaveholders in both the Confederate and border states. It took little foresight to realize that the Confederates would balk at rejoining the Union in the face of a de facto commitment against slavery. The border states straddled the fence, but the balance represented 50,000 men with or against the Union Army,

and possibly the loss of Washington, D.C. In addition the contrabands were a possible encumbrance to their armies. The refugees needed physical and administrative care besides the already extensive needs of the military, they limited the army's capacity to move quickly, and strained the lines of supply. ¹⁰

Radical antislavery political leaders and organizations tried to greatly influence early federal policy toward the contraband. Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens led the House and Senate in a call for freedom for the slaves from before and including the beginning of the war. Six months later, when the administration and the army felt content at conducting a "Gentlemen's War," abolitionist spokesmen demanded not only freedom for the slaves but also constructive programs with the contraband to test reconstruction methods and the integration of runaway slaves into a more sophisticated culture.¹¹ In July Edward Pierce began the first experiment to evaluate the use of contraband labor under a wage rather than slave system at Fortress Monroe. The results were outstandingly successful. The slaves completed a quarter mile of fortifications in a very short time without any physical coercion.

The American Missionary Association was the most successful and organized of the abolitionist organizations that established missions to help the contraband. It represented the oldest and only missionary society dedicated to that goal. In 1846 Arthur and Lewis Tappan and Simeon S. Jocelyn began the AMA

to consummate the end of slavery. The Association originally sent missionaries to Hawaii, China, and the northwest American Indian reservations.¹² Between 1850 and 1860, it moved into the southern states to contribute to the christianization of the poor people, free blacks, and slaves and succeeded in the beginning of a large mission in Kentucky. Realizing the opportunity that the war offered almost at the outset of the conflict in South Carolina, the AMA announced in the American Missionary, "that the war would create in the South one of the grandest fields of missionary labor the world ever furnished." In the summer of 1861 they began to make plans to educate the contraband at Fortress Monroe.¹³

As the only established antislavery missionary society, it is not surprising that the AMA made the first contact to the army at Hampton Roads. Lewis Tappan wrote General Butler regarding the possibility of the organization sending teachers to aid the contrabands and possibly removing some of them to the north where private organizations could more easily resettle and educate them. General Butler responded negatively to the offer of teachers and refused to send the contrabands North, because the contrabands were largely agricultural laborers who would have to adjust to the workshop and trading economy of the North, the climate in the South was more agreeable, and confiscated land was available to accommodate them. Instead the General requested donations of blankets, etc., to aid the

contrabands. Tappan suspected the government's policy toward the contraband was unstable. He notified Butler that, rather than contribute a trickle of clothing or other relief goods, the AMA would wait to see what happened.¹⁴

In August 1861 conditions changed substantially. General John E. Wool succeeded Butler as Commander of the Department of Virginia and 7th Army Corps to release the latter for an expedition against the forts on Pamlico Sound at North Carolina in preparation for a proposed expedition against New Orleans.¹⁵ In late July the House passed a resolution affirming that federal soldiers need not consider it their duty to enforce the fugitive slave law.¹⁶ On August 6, after the battle of Bull Run drove a spike into the North's confidence, Congress passed the first Confiscation Act which allowed local commanders to protect "only those slaves who had directly aided the Confederate military forces."¹⁷ The law technically facilitated the Administration's policy to leave the institution of slavery undisturbed, but in fact aided the prospective contrabands, because the burden of proof as to whether or not a slave actually worked on Confederate fortifications remained the responsibility of the local commander. Without any method to verify the refugee's movement before crossing enemy lines, the commander simply used his own discretion. Thus, despite the official "hands off" policy toward support of the institution of slavery, the Confiscation Act was the Administration's first

practical step toward emancipation, and the temper of the abolitionists in the latter part of August optimistically embraced the hope of eventual emancipation.

At 61 John Street, where the AMA occupied new offices, a timely coincidence influenced Tappan's decision to send teachers to Fortress Monroe. On August 21 a chaplain of the New York Regiment of Volunteers at Camp Butler, Newport News, sent a letter to the Young Men's Christian Association of the City of New York asking for a missionary to help the Virginia contraband. "This letter was brought up to the rooms of the AMA by an ordained minister of the Gospel, who had been employed by the Young Men's Christian Society."¹⁸ Lewis C. Lockwood came well recommended by the YMCA, and, no doubt in the light of a command change at Fort Monroe and support, no matter how limited, for the contraband policy from Congress, Tappan decided to send the young Baptist minister to make an investigation into the possibility of establishing a mission in the Hampton area.

The first and most important link in the chain of the mission organization was the initial missionary or mission organizer. He first dealt with the problems of hunger, nakedness, lack of housing, and abuse of the contraband. At the same time, he had to live on a very tight budget and plan and implement sabbath and regular schools. He reported the progress of his charges optimistically, but also the reality of the problems confronting further progress, and proposed solutions to these problems. It was very trying because the mission

organizer needed the capability of being a pragmatist and an idealist at the same time.

Lockwood visited Washington soon after the appointment and received approval from the Assistant Secretary of State and a recommendation to General Wool. After quickly sailing to Fortress Monroe where the General "heartily approved the plan" and provided quarters and rations, Lockwood began to establish a foothold for the mission.¹⁹

The young missionary barely arrived before the administration and the abolitionists began polarizing on policy affecting contraband rights. A week earlier General John C. Fremont, Union commander in Missouri had proclaimed all the slaves free of those in arms against the Union. For two weeks the abolitionists celebrated Fremont's aid to emancipation until Lincoln wrote him on September 11 and urged him to conform his proclamation to the Confiscation Act.²⁰ Refusing to endorse the general's blanket policy of confiscation, Lincoln revealed the administration's commitment to reuniting the Union even at the cost of retaining the system of slavery. By this action he indicated that even though the onus of confiscation of contrabands was the responsibility of the local commands it was subject to the approval of the administration. The President's order ended the loose armistice that existed between the emancipationists and the administration from the beginning of the war.²¹ Still, Lincoln only meant to deter the threat of Fremont's public challenge to the administration's policy. The

tide of refugee slaves still flowed unhindered into Monroe insuring a willing audience for Lockwood.

From the outset the administration's "hands off" policy caused many problems for the contrabands and the mission. The administration subordinated all efforts of wartime reconstruction to militarily ending hostilities.²² The military constantly overruled and changed orders affecting contraband programs, and to further complicate the problem, regulations differed in each local commanding area. In addition the army chain of command resisted the execution of controversial or low priority orders emanating from headquarters. Recent recruits whose regiments consisted of state militia under one unified command remained loyal to themselves, their prejudices and their regiments rather than to an obscure general. They often ignored orders, interpreted them as they wished, or openly flouted them.²³ After the Fremont affair General Wool cooperated with Lockwood, but only on a very formal basis and his acquiescence for a project was no guarantee that it would succeed. Each agreement Lockwood made with General Wool or his staff demanded an enormous amount of time and patience to see it through the chain of command to practical action.

In early autumn the most pressing problem in the occupied area at Hampton Roads was the squalid living condition of the refugees. About nine hundred contrabands huddled on or around Point Comfort and Hampton.²⁴ Slaves in the surrounding areas knew by "spiritual telegraph" that they could find refuge and

kept arriving at a steady pace. The residents of the town of Hampton had fled from Union occupation in early June, and on August 7 the Confederate commander at Yorktown, Colonel Magruder, ordered the almost deserted town burned.²⁵ The refugees slept in ruins, crude makeshift shacks, barns, tents, and abandoned houses in and around Hampton and on the fortifications, gun emplacements, the parade ground, and any open area at the Fortress. They lived on the remains of salt pork and corn, whatever vegetables they could grow, and had little clothing.

With winter approaching, General Wool endeavored to initiate some concrete policy to arrange for the contraband's keep. He contacted Secretary of War Cameron, but the Secretary only suggested sending the excess contraband to Washington to work on fortifications. Showing the inconsistency and confusion of contraband policy at that early stage, Lincoln changed Cameron's order to suggest sending 1,000 refugees south with General Thomas W. Sherman to Port Royal. Undaunted and experienced in war strategy, Wool determined to keep the contrabands for use in his command and proceeded to create his own policy for their provision.²⁶

The General reviewed the wage scheme that he inherited from Butler's Board of Survey, which was responsible for the care of the refugees during his predecessor's term as commander. The highest category of skilled labor had a rate of pay of twenty dollars per month, which was thirteen dollars higher than an

army private's pay. Wool changed the Board's "rates of pay" and established a system in which men over eighteen received a ceiling of ten dollars per month plus rations and clothing.

The system only served to use the runaway slaves for labor in trade for army rations, clothing, medical supplies, and housing. Of the total pay the men actually received two dollars and the balance went into a Quartermaster's fund for the women and children and those who could not work. A large percentage of the allowance needed to be allotted to those unable to work because 500 of the 800 contrabands in the area were women and children. Wool also provided for boys and sick or infirm men to receive five dollars per month. The total pay was withheld altogether if the worker missed "6 continuously or 10 days altogether in one month," but a bonus of fifty cents or a dollar could be paid for unusually difficult or excessive work. Women received the same pay scale.²⁷ Unfortunately this system was not used carefully, and in six months time the quartermaster's fund built up a reserve of five thousand dollars while many laborers remained unpaid for lack of adequate records.

In return for their salary and rations the refugees performed many important services for General Wool's command. Four hundred contrabands labored in the "quartermaster commissary, medical, ordinance, and other departments" in the occupied area. The army used their services as stevedores, laundresses, cooks, aides, menial labor, blacksmiths, carpenters, and

servants for officers.²⁸ Many of the contrabands were from plantations, but since the area contained shipyards, docks, freight wharves, and a fair amount of light industry, Wool employed more than just a few skilled refugees.

Lockwood began the fall by preparing a foundation for a permanent mission. To establish strong communication with the AMA secretaries he reported every detail of the day's activities, the reactions of the contraband, and actions of the army to Simeon S. Jocelyn, Lewis Tappan, and George M. Whipple,²⁹ receiving advice, hope, power of the abolitionist and independent press, and a direct line to abolitionist political power in return.

Formal primary schools started in Hampton just east of Fortress Monroe, where a large free black population rebuilt their homes and churches. Lockwood helped them to establish their churches. Mrs. Mary Peake, a mulatto from Alexandria, Virginia, ran the most successful one. She received her education in a special school for Negroes in the District of Columbia, but could not teach because of the stringent laws against the education of Negroes in Virginia.

Lockwood authorized Mrs. Peake's school on September 17, 1861. By October 1 she taught forty-five children in the morning, and offered to teach adults in the afternoon. The students learned catechism, singing, spelling, arithmetic, and writing.³⁰ Fortunately, she was a free Negro and could move

about the area with more facility than the contrabands. Of the seventy-three free Negroes in Hampton Roads, many helped Lockwood's church by volunteering to distribute clothes and other donations, by providing housing for the refugees whenever possible, and forming a small intelligent manpower pool with whom Lockwood could work. Several were experienced preachers, and one other, Brother John Herbert, opened a school similar to Mary Peake's school.

The Peake school opened the door to increased Northern aid. It was the first school for the contrabands and the AMA's first inclination that the contrabands wanted to learn and possessed the potential to progress academically. The students enthusiasm convinced the AMA that the contraband represented a "new field of usefulness" for Christian missionaries of the North. The Hampton experiment, though just begun, showed that Negro children could learn the same subjects at the same pace as white children, and possessed almost as much of a yearn for learning as for freedom. As a supplement to its October issue, the AMA ran a several-page article in the American Missionary describing the depth of the missionary efforts, the needs of the field at Hampton, and the possibility of the contraband's first step to emancipation being education.³¹ The article used Lockwood's efforts and the Peake school as evidence that slavery was all the more horrible because it successfully suppressed the ability of the Negro race to learn to the point of causing denial that chattels were human because of their

inability to learn.

The AMA realized early that they would not only have to send relief supplies and educators, but also pressure the administration and the army to adapt existing policy to aid the refugee slaves. Experienced at setting up sabbath schools and regular schools through their missionaries' efforts, the abolitionist organization knew that their main vehicle to influence Union policy and public opinion was the results of their efforts in the field. Thus they published in the American Missionary as much evidence as possible to show that the contraband could learn quickly and easily.

Despite increasingly positive reports in the Missionary Lockwood experienced many difficulties securing more extensive aid than housing, rations, and passes into restricted areas. Typical of his difficulties was an effort to procure a doctor for the refugees. In late November Dr. Rufus Brown, the Brigade Surgeon, realized that he could not provide the necessary services to all the refugees because they were scattered over such a large area that he could not visit them and fulfill his regimental duties at the same time. After discussion with Lockwood, he requested the AMA to send a doctor for the contraband. In early December the AMA showed the letters to President Lincoln, and he referred it back to General Wool.³² Brown then appeared before the General and explained the situation to him.³³ Wool concurred with the need and a physician from New York, Dr. Linson, arrived on December 23.³⁴ This process of securing the

backing of many different agents to implement necessary improvements, and redress grievances concerning the care of the contraband was the unfortunate result of Lincoln's "policy to have no policy." The time it wasted and projects it blocked resulted in much suffering among the refugees and frustration with the missionaries.

Many obstacles besides health in the mission's day-to-day activities caused problems for Lockwood's fledgling mission foundation. To guard against smuggling, infiltration and spying, the army issued passes to move through the lines of defense in the occupied areas, to board the ferries, or to enter or leave the area by steamer. Lockwood and some of the Free Negro teachers held passes but met resistance at checkpoints from pro-slavery officers or overzealous sentries. Since these passes expired quickly, they also encountered resistance when renewing them or acquiring one for a special purpose. They also needed passes for nighttime meetings. The army inspected all the incoming goods for the contrabands in Baltimore, issued passes for them, and shipped them to Fortress Monroe. Lockwood had to justify the contents of every shipment from the AMA or any other benefactors. The process made it difficult to receive donated goods, wasted much valuable time, and many times mis-sent portions of the shipment to the wrong person or command. General Wool found that his simple commitment to provide food and medical services to the contraband became very complex.

Shallow cooperation between Lockwood and the army began to erode in the new year. With January's advent the young idealist had scored a good beginning for the education of the 800 contrabands at and around Old Point Comfort. Unfortunately the army command was not in the practical position to aid the contrabands much beyond the need for labor. The command structure failed to control the prejudices of the soldiers and junior officers, and graft and fraud crept into the financial dealings between the quartermasters and the contraband laborers. That, the lack of a positive policy, a great excess of contraband dependents rather than laborers, and the necessity to use all his resources for active campaigns seriously dampened General Wool's willingness to aid Lockwood beyond this small beginning.

To complicate matters in early January the gradual disappearance of many workers caused problems. The contraband had labored without pay or a clothing issue for many months, and began to feel that they fared better working for themselves, or by drifting to another area north. Soon Quartermaster Talmadge realized that he was issuing rations to women, children, and infirm men without any laborers to "earn" their keep. To force more men to work he changed the ration policy. Instead of distributing rations at various locations, he made the only distribution point the Fortress. This forced many refugees to walk three and a half miles for provisions. In addition, he cut one third to one half of the people off the ration lists.³⁵ Despite the apparent necessity this measure was questionable because during the fall he built up a reserve fund of \$5,000 from

the money that the contrabands should have received.³⁶ Distributing this could have induced the workers to stay.

When the workers applied to General Wool to receive their due, they faced harassment from the proslavery officers issuing rations. In one instance, David Billops, a contraband, labored for five and a half months on fortifications without receiving any money or clothing. He stayed home one day to chop wood and on his return to the Fortress asked General Wool when he could expect some pay. The General wrote him an order for clothing, but the Sergeant in charge put him in the guardhouse because he complained to "Headquarters." After spending one and a half days in the guardhouse Billops again asked General Wool for attention to his case, and then received two dollars and a pair of shoes. He was one of thirty laborers on the gang at the work site north of the Fortress, none of whom received any money or clothing for the duration of their labor in the fall and early winter.³⁷ In addition to these problems the army confiscated the contraband housing at will. One of the contraband, Paul Patrick, who lived with his family near the Fortress told Lockwood that an officer came to his house and "turned the stove out of doors." He then ordered Patrick and his wife, who was sick, to be out of the house by nightfall.³⁸

Lockwood was especially frustrated by the cruel treatment of the refugees because the mission schools progressed well and he planned to expand more in the spring. Brother Herbert and Mrs. Peake's schools showed good progress, and at the beginning of January he established a new day and sabbath school at Mill

Creek Bridge. He also planned to erect a regular day school with quarters for him and his wife near Hampton, and a hospital. He received the approval of General Wool and submitted a plan for the lumber to Captain Burleigh for the school, and Captain Rufus Brown submitted a plan for the hospital. Lockwood notified the AMA that he needed 1500 dollars for construction of the school.³⁹

Looking for solutions to the contrabands' problems, and more aid for his expansion, Lockwood wrote and asked the brethren to use their influence to help solve some of the problems at the Fortress. Through the AMA Lockwood hoped to tap the informal antislavery clearinghouse which was his most powerful tool in the conflict with the army. He felt the newspaper correspondents in Fortress Monroe misrepresented the true facts of the mission because they were "proslavery in sympathy." He asked Jocelyn to help "get the true facts of the mission before the daily and weekly press." He also asked if Lewis Tappan could use his influence with many Congressmen to help solve some of the problems directly, and possibly cause the appointment of an investigating committee to inspect the contraband affairs at the Fortress.⁴⁰

Operating as a de facto information clearinghouse anti-slavery organizations published contraband reports on the front pages of both "in house" and national newspapers. Some of these included the Independent and the New York Herald Tribune, the Boston Commonwealth, and the Evangelist, Advocate, and Journal. Edward Pierce described his July experiment with the contraband in the Atlantic Monthly, and dispelled many images of shiftlessness

and indolence of the Negro race.⁴¹ All the societies continually disseminated propaganda and factual information on the condition and progress of the contraband as a basis for more far-reaching progress. In turn this provided the anti-slavery politicians with information to use in Congress to argue the passage of needed legislation to step up the war effort against the South and slavery. The loose organizational advertising structure passed on the efforts of the contraband programs from the field at Fortress Monroe and other occupied areas to the population of the North, and in large part, made the mission efforts responsible for swaying conservative public opinion in favor of emancipation and reconstruction.⁴² This kind of political advertisement was valuable to the administration because it influenced possible recruits as well as swayed emancipation sentiment.

Jocelyn, Tappan and the abolitionists in general realized the problems that plagued the contrabands. In January John Jay urged Senator Charles Sumner to consider the necessity of an executive bureau to oversee the problem of the runaway slaves. Realizing the overall goal of emancipation for the slaves needed a united abolitionist front, the two largest factions of the movement made an informal truce of their differences.⁴³ Both began to publicly support the goals of emancipation and care and protection of the Freedmen instead of criticizing the other's methods. Many New England abolitionists also visited the Fortress in line with their occupations as steamship captains, merchants, or other supporting capacities with the

army and navy.⁴⁴ These men reported to their respective organizations by letter and on their return. With the capture of Port Royal, South Carolina, and its untouched population of contraband on their home plantations, emancipationists shifted their concentration towards the possibilities of experiments using the ex-slaves as free labor. At this time, 1500 contrabands lived in the Fortress Monroe command, and it too received a fresh look. Subsequently, the AMA secretaries took Lockwood's entreaties seriously and tried to use their influence on his behalf.

Unfortunately, before any relief came from the AMA, the strained relations with General Wool led to an outright break. William L. Coan, a Massachusetts merchant who had helped an ailing Lockwood with labor and donations, wound up a three week visit with the recuperating missionary to go to Boston to report to the AMA. Shortly afterward, Lockwood decided to visit Philadelphia with a refugee, Mr. Davis, to interest congregations in the plight of his mission contrabands. Receiving verbal permission from General Wool, he departed in the second week of January. Returning a short time later, the quartermaster, Captain Talmadge, charged him with trying to "steal" a contraband to the north. He curtailed Lockwood's activities by forcing him to suspend his prayer meetings at the Fortress.⁴⁵ After much persuasion and influence from Jocelyn and Whipple, General Wool agreed to appoint a commission to investigate the complete spectrum of problems concerning the contraband in his command. The commission included Congressmen Wilson and Hale, and a Colonel Cannon. They visited Fortress Monroe in February, listened

to Lockwood's grievances, and investigated the overall situation.

To Lockwood's surprise, the commission supported the rights of the contraband, and vindicated the missionary of all charges by Quartermaster Talmadge.⁴⁶ In their investigation they found that Talmadge and some of his friends defrauded the contrabands by refusing to pay them and failing to keep adequate records. Wool issued a new order directing that the Government pay for contraband's labor immediately, and appointed an agent, Charles B. Wilder, to attend to the affairs of the contraband.⁴⁷ The commission also recommended that the mission make arrangements for private schools and officially appointed Dr. John P. Linson as doctor in charge of the contrabands.⁴⁸

Despite the many difficulties caused by the army's conservative contraband policies, the squalid conditions in the occupied zone, and the slow awakening of Northern opinion Lockwood established a shaky but adequate foundation for the mission in the first year of the war. Through his initiative the Free Negroes of Hampton operated two contraband schools, and more than one sabbath school; and General Wool's investigatory commission committed the army to supplying the needs of the contrabands, and providing somewhat for their future welfare. The mission operated as a distribution point for donations from northern benefactors to the refugees, and represented the rights of the contrabands to the army. In the next spring (1862) Lockwood's foundation would be strained to the limit by the marshalling of the Peninsula Campaign forces, but after many struggles would grow and expand to Norfolk and Portsmouth.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

¹Jacqueline Trescott, "A sense of Truth in a Sojourn Through History," The Washington Post, March 29, 1975, C1.

²Spencer S. Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion, The Union Army in Civil War Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia" (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland, 1973), p. 26.

³Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion", p. 29.

⁴Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion", p. 26, 28.

⁵Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion", p. 142.

⁶Louis S. Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman (Westport, Connecticut: The Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 13.

⁷James M. McPherson, The Struggle for Equality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 69. Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 13.

⁸Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 14.

⁹McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, p. 178.

¹⁰Herman Belz, Reconstructing the Union (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 14. McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, p. 70.

¹¹McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, p. 178.

¹²Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion", p. 182.

¹³McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, p. 158.

¹⁴Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 17, 18.

¹⁵Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 19. Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion", p. 144.

¹⁶Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 16, 17.

¹⁷McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, p. 73.

¹⁸Lewis C. Lockwood, "Contrabands at Fortress Monroe," The American Missionary, V: 10 (1861), 241.

- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Belz, Reconstructing the Union, p. 41.
- 21 McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, p. 74.
- 22 James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press), p. 6.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion", p. 144.
Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 15.
- 25 Edward H. Bonekemper, III, "Negro Ownership of Real Property in Hampton and Elizabeth City County, Virginia, 1860-1870," The Journal of Negro History, LV:3 (July, 1970), 170.
- 26 Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion", p. 145.
- 27 Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion", p. 146-7.
- 28 Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion", p. 147.
- 29 Lockwood, "Contrabands at Fortress Monroe," p. 241.
- 30 Sing-Nan Fen, "Mary S. Peake, 1823-62," Education and Society (April 6, 1963), 171.
- 31 Lockwood, "Contrabands at Fortress Monroe," p. 241.
- 32 Rufus K. Brown, Norfolk, Nov. 22, 1861, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, American Missionary Association Manuscripts, Dillard University, New Orleans, Louisiana. Microfilm, Virginia, Roll #1, at University of Maryland, College Park. Hereinafter referred to as AMAV1. Frame 4339.
- 33 Rufus K. Brown, Norfolk, Dec. 16, 1861, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4341.
- 34 Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, Dec. 23, 1861, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4342.
- 35 Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, January 3, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4347.
- 36 American Missionary Association, "Changes at Fortress Monroe," The American Missionary, VI:5 (1862), 107.
- 37 Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, January 4, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4348.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, p. 156.

⁴²McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, p. 172.

⁴³McPherson, The Struggle for Equality, p. 104.

⁴⁴Many of Lockwood's letters mention visitors of various types at the Fortress Monroe Mission. Specifically: Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, April 15, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4424.

⁴⁵Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, Jan. 25, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4368.

⁴⁶Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, Feb. 5, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4368.

⁴⁷American Missionary Association, "Changes at Fortress Monroe," The American Missionary, VI:5 (1862), 107.

⁴⁸John D. Bancroft, Fortress Monroe, Feb. 13, 1862, letter to George Whipple, New York; Dr. John J. Linson, Fortress Monroe, Feb. 12, 1862, letter to George Whipple, New York, AMAV1, 4372, 4370.

Chapter II

Struggle for Survival


In the second year of the war, 1862, the development of the contraband missions passed through the second and most difficult stage. During the Spring months Fortress Monroe served as the supply base for the Peninsula Campaign. The mobilization of McClellan's army, changes in quartermaster jurisdiction, and added influx of contrabands strained army logistics to the limit. As a result the missions underwent great tribulations trying to stay afloat much less service bulging contraband population.

In February 1862 General John E. Wool's investigatory commission on the condition of the contrabands at Fortress Monroe and Hampton appointed the American Missionary Association's agent, Charles B. Wilder, Superintendent of Contrabands. In Boston Wilder owned a trading business, Messrs. Wilder and Sons. He served the AMA on the Executive Board, and as their Boston collection point for donations.¹ With his business experience he facilitated the transportation of donations to the mission and in January had arrived at Fortress Monroe to look into the conditions there as a special agent for the Association. Unknown to Wilder, his acceptance of the appointment carried the responsibility of mediating conflicts between the missionaries, contrabands, and the army for the next nine months.


Wilder began his new work by trying to implement the recommendations of the Commission. He first revised General Wool's wage plan suggesting that average unskilled laborers receive ten dollars a month, laborers experienced in the use of a trade fifteen dollars a month, and women and children under eighteen five dollars a month. All catagories also included rations and medical aid. Wool approved this plan and Wilder proceeded to implement it. In addition he proposed that those refugees not employed by the government could cultivate confiscated lands adjoining Hampton under the supervision of his office and thereby become self sustaining. Having just accepted 80-100 new laborers he wanted to use them as a core. The General heartily commended the plan and sent Wilder to Secretary of War Stanton to apprise him of its details. To the new Superintendent's surprise Stanton disclosed that the plan reflected his own views, and returned Wilder to Monroe with his sanction.²

For the first few weeks of March the mission worked in the midst of productivity, even though they were pre-occupied with the death of their co-worker Mary Peake.³ The contraband continued to settle in shacks around Hampton, extra space in the cottages of the free negro population, and burnt, confiscated homes abandoned by the townspeople. Lewis Lockwood, the contraband missionary, spent much of the time searching for dwellings and lodgings for new teachers. Hampton and the surrounding area had a scarcity of lumber

and because of the burning of Hampton, the only nearby township, lodgings posed a difficult problem.⁴ His long range plans for the mission included hiring many teachers, expanding Brother Hyde's School and turning their seminary into an industrial school.⁵



The Chesapeake Seminary that Lockwood wished to convert into an industrial school for the contrabands, and the massing of Mc Clellan's Army of the Potomac.



The expansion of the Federally occupied territory in the Spring of 1862.

Unfortunately events of the war intervened to delay the initiation of the Lockwood plans for many months. Near the end of March Lincoln's "Save the Union" policy again clearly showed that reuniting the Union took precedence over the problems of the contrabands. He sanctioned General George McClellan's, Commander of the Army of the Potomac, plan to drive up the peninsula from a marshalling area at Fortress Monroe to try to capture Richmond.

It was solid strategy for the President because if McClellan won the campaign the war would be over and the Union preserved, and if he lost Lincoln would have grounds for replacing a too popular and very insubordinate General. After the stalls and defeats of the Army of the Potomac, the President faced the question of McClellan's competency. He placed the responsibility for victory solely in the General's hands by providing all the support needed to make the campaign a success. In two weeks the army massed over 110,000 men, the largest force ever assembled in modern warfare at Fortress Monroe. Using the James and York Rivers as supply lines they planned to march the eighty-five mile distance up the Peninsula to Richmond. Having all the support he requested the outcome clearly rested in McClellan's hands.

No matter what the outcome of the campaign, the missionaries feared that the army had abandoned them and the refugees. Preserving the Union meant that the contrabands would most probably have to return to their southern masters. If McClellan lost, the marshalling of a huge army threatened to disrupt the gains that the missions already made in establishing services

for the refugees, and displace many of the refugees for labor necessities and movement of supplies and personnel.

The events of late March and April did little to disprove Lockwood's unhappy perception that the army intended to neglect its contraband charges. On March 11, General Wool, at the urging of Dr. Cryler, ordered all the residents of the Seminary to vacate it for a hospital for the incoming soldiers. Four days later Wool issued another order mandating that all the refugees move from Hampton where they worked at oystering and in fisheries, and the Seminary grounds near the Fortress to a swampy area in back of Mill Creek "for their own Protection."⁶ To force Lockwood and Lewis H. Hyde, another teacher, to leave, Dr. Cryler suggested they leave with the other residents to facilitate the evacuation, and return a little later. On their return, though, he refused to allow them entry. General Wool, frustrated with the problems of the missionaries and the contrabands, allowed Lockwood seven days to use the seminary to find a place to stay, but he refused use of the seminary basement for an industrial school at the insistence of Dr. Cryler that the hospital needed it.⁷ These orders forced the contrabands to live in a tent city on a swampy exposed ground near the stormy mouth of the Chesapeake. They left Lockwood without a place to have Sunday services and Hyde without a place to hold school.

During the end of March and beginning of April the mission and contraband housing changed continuously. The missionaries moved from house to house trying to keep the

mission on an operational basis. Lockwood strongly considered lecturing in the North to expose what he believed to be the perfidy of the army's lower echelon officers and to secure public support for the contrabands, but he disliked leaving the people without a champion.⁸ Instead he moved into Brown cottage from the seminary, and some of the contrabands stayed in President Tyler's mansion and Mallery's house near the Fortress even though they had been ordered to leave.⁹ Wool donated lumber to the contrabands in lieu of wages for them to erect their own homes. They reluctantly began to settle the area despite their expectation that whether McClellan won or lost they must leave Hampton, and probably if he won they would be sent back to slavery.¹⁰

The relocation of the missionaries and contrabands caused the final split with General Wool. Some of the mission's friends joined with officers hostile to the contraband's interest in the scramble for housing. Captain Burleigh had to leave the seminary so he joined Dr. Cryler, and tried to force the contraband out of Mallery house because he wanted to move in. In another instance Captain McKaye, a proslavery officer, had one of Lockwood's contraband friends who worked part time at the seminary locked up because he demanded to be paid.¹¹ The army may well have needed the space for the influx of McClellan's army, but the harsh treatment of the missionaries and contraband showed that the space problem provided an excuse for proslavery personnel to

harass them. Lockwood appealed to General Wool on every account, but the General said he was fed up with school teachers and refused to provide quarters for them. As a result Lockwood blamed the General for refusing to take corrective measures and became violently anti-army. He suspected a conspiracy of collusion on the part of junior officers, and passive acquiescence on the part of senior officers to deprive the missionaries and the contrabands of their rights.

Lockwood's uncompromising attitude also caused problems with Wilder. The Superintendent, who was responsible for moving the contraband to the various places of internment, endeavored to maintain some semblance of cooperation between General Wool and the AMA in this disturbing time, but was increasingly vexed because Lockwood continually polarized the situation. In addition the latter began auctioning off donated goods for the contraband which ended up in the "wrong hands."¹² The rash missionary felt that General Wool disliked him because he stated before the commission that Wool gave him verbal permission to take a contraband north, and later denied it which caused his arrest. He also charged that the General evaded his responsibility to the contraband, and blamed Wool for not wanting to help solve the mission problems.¹³ The sale of contraband goods became the last straw in Superintendent Wilder's disillusionment with Lockwood, and he began a campaign of letters to the AMA suggesting the latter's removal.

Wilder was the first of a succession of contraband managers whose duties at Hampton Roads were to successfully integrate the services of the army and the benevolent associations to aid the contrabands. Initially they were AMA people franchised and recognized by the army. Later both the army and AMA fielded their own superintendents who worked together.¹⁴ These men kept the mission on an even keel during this early period. Lockwood performed this service at the beginning of the mission in September 1861, but in the difficult time of the Peninsula Campaign, and later in the summer of 1862, coordination increasingly fell to Wilder.

As Wilder struggled to protect and care for the contrabands and simultaneously accommodate McClellan's army, Lockwood continued on his own path. He illegally moved into Tyler house, vacating it in the rain along with several contrabands there and in White cottage as well.¹⁵ He felt that the mission was in a "floating condition," and realized the uselessness of anti-army feelings, so he concentrated on productively holding the mission together during this difficult period.

Lockwood begged the AMA for more support. The parent association leaned heavily toward helping Port Royal at this time because of its cooperative military, absence from military operations, and home-born plantation population. He angrily wrote the corresponding secretary that the Fortress Monroe contraband should be a "sample people" who could show the gains possible to be made by the black potential to in-

fluence Northern sentiment for emancipation.¹⁶ Maintaining that the many visitors to Fortress Monroe should be shown more results, he proposed that efforts on the part of the missionaries and the Home office should be increased. He asked for more teachers of "good constitution, sound throat and lungs, good singers and good active individuals and Christians."¹⁷ Thinking strategically he requested that they send a female teacher from New England to build up interest in the Fortress Monroe mission from that valuable area, begin women's auxiliaries to inflame interest among women for the contraband problems, and send daily and weekly reports to the major Northern religious newspapers.¹⁸

In spite of their problems and differences Lockwood and Wilder worked together to further the programs of the mission. On April 17 they discussed plans to use the partially burnt Hampton courthouse as a combined school and church. General Wool reluctantly gave them the lumber, and the AMA provided the money needed for the windows, doors, and roof. They began renovations¹⁹ and near the end of the month, even though the building fell short of being ready for use, the mission's first teacher, Charles P. Day, arrived. Being a New England principal with vast primary school experience, Day began to help establish another class immediately.²⁰

By the end of April the mission had gained some relief from the two month plague of mishaps. Much of the great military force moved thirty miles up the peninsula to the siege at

Yorktown and on May 4 McClellan entered the city.²¹ Two days later President Lincoln, Secretary of the Treasury Samuel P. Chase, and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton arrived at Fortress Monroe. Lincoln personally planned a pincer movement against the Twin Cities and saw Norfolk and Portsmouth surrendered without a battle on May 10, 1862.²² The Federals moved out of Hampton and Fortress Monroe to occupy Norfolk and Portsmouth, and Lockwood and Wilder gained space to operate, many new faces to teach, and great hopes for further expansion.

Two weeks after the dust settled, Lockwood realized that Norfolk and Portsmouth harbored very strong secessionist feelings. He wrote the Association offering to take possession of the new field for the AMA, and spent two weeks trying to get a pass to enter Norfolk. But when he entered the city on May 24, all four of the churches he visited reproved him. The pastors of both the colored and white churches held equally pro-slavery sentiments and one even owned a large number of slaves.²³ With his hopes for expansion of the mission seriously dimmed Lockwood wrote to Whipple with vehemence, "God will make them willing in the day of His power, or break them to pieces like a potter's vessel and bring His people out with a high hand and outstretched arms."²⁴

The Twin Cities action gave the Union much needed victory in McClellan's devastated campaign, but it concealed the actual condition of the contrabands and the army's conflict

with the missionaries. The President and his secretaries actually visited the Fortress to supervise the destruction of the Merrimac. The capture of Norfolk and Portsmouth just added the knowledge that another scourge like it would never be built with access to the Capital. Unfortunately these two victories shifted emphasis away from the problems of the contrabands. That, the milder weather, the pullout of the army, and the rapid construction of the schoolhouse temporarily submerged the problem of army cooperation with the mission.

The contrabands still had much to fear from the ambiguities of federal policy. McClellan continued inching up the peninsula and in a few weeks expected to be in Richmond, and the President changed the command at Fortress Monroe. Apparently General Wool, a Presidential appointment, not directly responsible to McClellan refused to send McClellan troops to use in the Peninsula Campaign. Lincoln switched him with the slightly pro-slavery General Dix, who immediately sent ten divisions to McClellan. The politically minded general from the Pennsylvania command,²⁵ followed administration directives to the letter. The President knew that if necessary the command in occupied Hampton Roads could assume a conservative stance on slavery without any special written orders. General Dix's inclinations sufficed to acquiesce to the needs and wants of the rebel population in the absence of policy to the contrary.

The new General felt much more pro-slavery than General

Wool. Through his Pennsylvania command which included Baltimore and the Eastern Shore of Maryland and Virginia, he successfully led the pro-slavery population back into the Union without bloodshed.²⁶ He used an open policy of maintaining the status quo of slavery and rebuilding the economy of that region. He was one of the few commanders in occupied areas that returned escaped slaves to their owners, and barred them from refuge behind Union lines. Even after a resolution passed the House of Representatives encouraging Union officers to avoid enforcing the Fugitive slave law, General Dix pursued a slave he believed hiding in Annapolis in his camp.²⁷ He had saved the Eastern Shore for the Union, and intended to do the same with Norfolk and Portsmouth.

Superintendent Wilder showed justifiable concern soon after Dix took control. He realized that the General held very little actual power and felt indisposed to help the contrabands. The Portsmouth reign of terror continued through June, and spread to Hampton, Camp Hamilton, and Fortress Monroe.²⁸ Refugees poured into the area in "droves of twenty to one hundred." They were so brutally treated that Wilder spent most of his time just reporting crimes against them.

The Superintendent spent so much time arbitrating claims that he had to neglect the farm community plan to resettle the contrabands.²⁹ Without a feasible relocation plan the refugees dispersed throughout the area on their own cognizance.³⁰ They were easy prey for the soldiers who needed little

excuse to rob, murder, rape, or kidnap and then melt into the anonymity of thousands of blue uniforms.



In June, 1862 the Fortress Monroe Command changed from General John E. Wool (left) to Major General John A. Dix. The resulting confusion of a new command continued to stall the mission progress during the summer.

The possibilities of any positive action from Fortress Monroe to alleviate the suffering of the contrabands seemed slim. General McClelland commanded the Quartermaster Department which regulated the rations, housing, pay, clothing allowances, and protection for the contrabands. If he wished to make any changes or in-depth investigations General Dix needed the approval of the staunchly conservative McClellan and also the War Department. Wilder wrote to Whipple in June urging him to use political pressure in Washington to help solve the problems. He suggested combining the forces to the Massachusetts Senators Sumner and Wilson and others, the New

York, Boston and Philadelphia Freedmen associations, the AMA, General Wool, and Colonel Cannon to force changes through the War Department in Washington.

In response to Wilder's entreaties Whipple visited Hampton Roads early in June. He spoke to General Dix, but achieved little. The General verbally took a non-active middle ground stance on the problems. He agreed to issue the workers the pay due them, but presented no plan to do so. He failed to make permanent regulations governing the conduct of the soldiers and the freedmen, and refused to promise to protect them from kidnapping, or crimes against the large family groups in Camp Hamilton and Hampton.³¹ Whipple wrote to Jocelyn on June 11, 1862 that his interview with General Dix was inconclusive, and that he must stay "if not rebuffed" to try to initiate some working in the situation. He also added that if he failed to solve the problems at Monroe then he "must go to Washington."³²

An additional problem at the mission was still the strong idealism of Lewis Lockwood. In a touch and go situation such as Wilder faced with Dix, Lockwood often behaved with great indiscretion.³³ He indiscriminately attacked the Unionists and secessionist residents and the army if they were possibly of proslavery sympathies. He exercised very little care with the Association's funds and the goods received for the benefit of the contrabands. He lacked the sagacity to keep statistics on the kind and value of the goods received for

the contrabands, and records of the recipients of these goods.³⁴ Lockwood found it difficult to adapt to a systematic, organized, patient struggle to expand the mission's base and functions. On June 12 Wilder wrote to the brethren that Lockwood's abuse of the charities "are working great injury to us and your association wherever it is known." On June 20 he notified them of a petition by the people of Hampton and the Fortress to General Dix to remove Lockwood from the area.³⁵

Even though Lockwood's accusations aggravated the delicate situation they accurately pinpointed the worst contraband problem in the new command. Junior officers with pro-slavery sympathies took advantage of the confusion of the Peninsula Campaign and the command change to harass the contrabands, and General Dix refused to take any action to rectify the situation. Wilder spent most of his time at Headquarters trying to mitigate the abuses against the contrabands, and no one seemed disposed, including the AMA, to take overt measures to prosecute the villains.³⁶ Lockwood felt too much concern for the plight of the contrabands, and wounded ego as their champion to realize that an outward attack on President Lincoln's new General may do more harm than good.

Despite Lockwood's shortcomings Whipple realized that the continuing limited success of the mission grew out of his efforts, and that the contraband also knew this and looked to the young missionary as their champion. The work of the mission continued as regularly as possible and on June 2, 1862 a bright spot flickered as the mission realized some success.

The old Hampton Court House was dedicated as the new mission school and church. Charles P. Day took occupancy with his class that previously had been meeting in the Old Woods Mill just north of the Fortress, and separated them into a primary and an advanced section. The schoolhouse was a milestone for the mission because it represented a permanent foundation for AMA commitment to the education of the contraband, and symbolized the hardships that both the contraband and the missionaries underwent to complete its construction. Lockwood was elated, and it provided visible encouragement to the contraband who still were very skeptical of the Union's intentions regarding their rights. Since the contraband identified education with freedom the efforts of the mission to give them education reinforced their expectation of freedom. Lockwood survived as the only leader the contrabands believed in.

At the end of June, the idea of expansion of the mission schools in Hampton or to Norfolk or Portsmouth appeared highly unlikely. Since Norfolk and Portsmouth sentiment was highly "se cesh", Dix's conservative policy necessitated playing down any aid to the contrabands that might contribute to their freedom. The expansion of schools into these cities fell into that category. In this context it is not surprising that General Veile, direct commander of the Twin Cities, refused to allow the missions to expand the schools to Norfolk and Portsmouth on the pretext of fearing a riot. His being a new commander just appointed by Chase added to his timidity, and

he also refused to allow city elections of local officials.³⁷ Instead he placed the cities under a provost marshall. Viele may not have calculatedly initiated these orders to support a conservative policy but they remained consistent with the new attitude of placating the southern people in the occupied areas under Dix's command.³⁸

The corresponding secretary visited Hampton again on July 8, 1862 to make a greater effort to affect some compromise, and to help get the mission on a day to day basis of caring for the contrabands needs, educating, and resettling them. After a month and a half in command Whipple found Dix more relaxed and confident. The General seemed disposed to do all that his power allowed him to do, but Whipple still supposed that if Dix's power failed to achieve the necessary goals then he would go to Washington.³⁹ The secretary remained in Hampton for over one month discussing with General Dix various aspects of the contraband problems. He wanted the government to pay the contrabands for the 20,000 to 30,000 dollars in work they completed for the army, and to pay the Superintendent of the Contraband's a salary with quarters. He requested rooms and usual privileges for educational purposes, reasonable protection for the contrabands, and free transportation and shipping privileges for the Superintendent. In addition Quartermaster Talmadge had removed records and accounts of the contrabands work, pay, rations, etc., when the command changed hands, and Whipple requested that they be

returned in order to assess a proper picture of the payments owed to the contrabands from the spring and winter previous.⁴⁰

As the month progressed General Dix became increasingly difficult to contact. The secretary waited over two days before the general could allow him an interview. At that time Whipple asked for passes for two new teachers, J. Porter Green, and his wife Mary, and informed Dix that many of his orders were being evaded. For instance, an order to erect a building for the women and children contrabands only compelled the Quartermaster to send a man to oversee the construction of the building without the necessary workers, materials, and a refusal of any, from that Quartermaster. Dix promised a new written order for the building's construction, and telegraphed Baltimore to allow the Greens permission to come to the Fortress.⁴¹ Three days later Whipple tried to follow up that interview, but General Dix's orderly asked the secretary to write up a statement of his needs. The next day when the statement was ready, Dix was unavailable for interviews.⁴² Whipple could not wait for another interview, and when Dix returned the secretary was already in New York.⁴³

Again during his visit at the Fortress Whipple tried to relieve Lockwood who felt despondent over the failure to make any concrete gains to aid the contraband's condition. After many suggestions he recommended that Lockwood take a month's vacation.⁴⁴ While waiting for clearance to leave Lockwood visited Norfolk, and experienced a tremendous emotional wel-

come from the black population there. "I was completely thronged--two of the col'd men clasped me in their arms, and men and women strove for the first shake of the hand."⁴⁵ The young missionary returned double determined to help solve their problems, and wrote to Jocelyn that they needed to have "a missionary and teacher constantly engaged with them." Denied clearance to go north he renewed his efforts to open schools in Norfolk and Portsmouth. Veile consented grudgingly to open a school in tents near the navy hospital a mile east of Portsmouth, but a definite refusal to open schools in Norfolk.⁴⁶ When Whipple returned at the end of July the secretary was gratified by the progress Lockwood made and also happy that he stood by him.⁴⁷ Strangely Lockwood's limited success previewed Whipple's new tactics.

Being wary of possible Federal policy changes after the Campaign, the AMA secretary followed a policy of waiting and discussing local level problems with General Dix throughout the early summer. In July Lincoln's policies began to change under fire from the Radical Republicans and urging from Secretary of War Stanton. Congress passed the second Confiscation Act which became law on July 17, under Lincoln's signature. It authorized freedom for slaves already in custody, and encouraged the use of ex-slaves for the overthrow of the rebels.⁴⁸ Stanton felt that the slaves should be used as a military weapon to defeat the South.⁴⁹ In terms of goals he "was in complete sympathy" with the Radicals.⁵⁰ The second

Confiscation Act provided a lawful tool that Stanton and the Radicals could use to persuade the President to use Negroes as troops. Immediately after the signing Stanton encouraged Lincoln to allow General Hunter the liberty of arming negro troops. On July 22, Lincoln read his preliminary Emancipation Proclamation to the cabinet.⁵¹

The possible issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation completely changed Whipple and Dix's strategy. It meant a relaxation of the push for the rights of the contraband to encourage voters in the border states and occupied areas to vote in November elections. According to the proposal all the slaves in the non voting seceded states would be declared free. In New York Whipple apparently received word to tone down the association's demands for contraband rights until after the November elections, and Dix received word from Stanton to stop pushing obvious help to the contraband at Hampton Roads to avoid inflaming the local white population against the plan.

On their return both Whipple and Dix changed their tactics. Dix who had been negotiating with Whipple directly referred him to deal with the quartermasters in authority over the contraband. Instead of persistently dogging Dix with the problems of junior officers in his command, he concentrated on making as many unobtrusive gains for the welfare of the freedmen as possible.

Whipple stayed almost two weeks, waiting for Dix to set

up a meeting with Quartermaster Talmadge. During that time the contraband barbarities continued and the army began impressments again.⁵² Lockwood went north for a vacation, and General Dix took limited action to stop some of the impressments illegally carried out by officers from Newport News in collusion with officers at Fortress Monroe.⁵³

Though he was ill, and taking a chance on malaria by staying during August in the absence of Lockwood and Wilder, Whipple remained almost until Wilder's return to carry the mission through this shakey period.

The most obvious indication that the AMA joined the army to reduce the clamor for contraband rights lies in Wilder's interaction with Whipple and Dix during August. Wilder left for Boston before Whipple got back to Monroe early in the month and therefore remained unaware of Whipple's new direction. In Boston he secured promise of endorsement from influential people on a petition to the Secretary of War about the problems at Monroe. Both Charles Sumner and Governor Andrew promised to sign, but strangely Whipple avoided taking advantage of it.

When Wilder arrived at Monroe he wrote Whipple to draw up the petition as soon as possible but the secretary continued to drag his feet on the issue. Dix who coincidentally returned from Washington on the same boat as Wilder mentioned to Wilder that "he could not always do as he would", that he wanted to get all of the contrabands off Point Comfort, but

that the Quartermasters wanted to get them out of his control altogether. He also mentioned that the old lumber that he gave the contrabands to build a building for the women and children satisfied his responsibility in that matter, and avoided any more conversation.⁵⁴ Three days later on August 26 he refused to write a ration order for Wilder, but added that if the contrabands could not get rations without the order he "would assist".⁵⁵ In keeping with the new policy Dix was understandably reluctant to write orders for rations, but his offer to "assist" indicates that he was in favor of giving the contrabands food.

In New York Whipple still avoided preparing a petition for Wilder even after Wilder reported that he received positive endorsements from Sumner and Andrew, and an even more brutal impressment of the contrabands by McClellan's army.⁵⁶ Both Whipple and Dix refused to consider inflammatory changes or aid to the contraband that could serve as evidence for successionists who could sabotage Lincoln's plan. At the same time they sanctioned as many unobtrusive efforts on the behalf of the contrabands as possible.⁵⁷

In late August Whipple publicly supported Dix. He published an account of the rape and impressments that happened while he was in Fortress Monroe, and blamed the violations on the perfidy and rascality of officers subordinate to the General. He maintained that they were too numerous and evasive to be controlled without very tight straight-

forward policy by the army. In the letter he absolved Dix of all blame and gave him credit for endeavoring to punish the officers who were transcending justice.⁵⁸ In this way he avoided haranguing the authorities responsible for making Lincoln's plan work, but at the same time if Dix allowed the depredations to continue past November or a reasonable length of time, Whipple could then charge him with incompetency or silently aiding and abetting the proslavery officers. In effect, Whipple stopped pushing for gains in late August, but set up for a push in November which he knew would come after elections in the occupied areas.

During this period the mission schools more than held their own but expansion ground to a halt. Charles P. Day's school in Hampton ran very smoothly with an average daily attendance of about 200 "ranging in age from six to thirty". He wrote further of the academic progress in spite of the carnage of impressments, etc. "There are many pupils here who now read in primary reading fluently and correctly, . . . who two months ago did not know their A.B.C's."⁵⁹ Lockwood's progress in getting permission for Brother Cook to teach the contrabands quartered near Portsmouth dissappeared when those contrabands were relocated at Fort Norfolk.⁶⁰ Brother Cook went with them to teach, but only temporarily because Fort Norfolk was a temporary stopover. Also Veile refused to answer a petition by the black inhabitants of Portsmouth for sabbath schools. The new policy obviously shelved the question

of expansion to Norfolk and Portsmouth.

The month of September necessitated taking care of the numerous details that attended the opening of the Camp Hamilton and Hampton schools. On August 15, Whipple had written Jocelyn to cut Lockwood's vacation as short as possible because the mission needed him.⁶¹ Lockwood returned on September 8, but he was so disillusioned at the "deplorable condition of the contraband camp" that he requested a transfer to the South Carolina Missions.

The political stall ended after national elections in November and before occupied area elections in December. McClellan became increasingly insubordinate during September and October, and public opinion swung toward emancipation as a war necessity. In the congressional elections of early November the Republicans lost Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, New York, and Pennsylvania and split in Wisconsin. The Democrats increased their "representation in Congress from 44 to 75."⁶³ After the elections Lincoln dismissed McClellan who had publicly rebuked him for issuing the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. In addition Lincoln directed Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, to relax the blockade around Norfolk and Portsmouth in response to General Dix's entreaties for some relief for the economically depressed area.⁶⁴

Wilder quickly took advantage of the shift in public sentiment. An editorial appeared in the New York Tribune on November 12 that charged Dix with neglecting the safety

and well-being of a group of contrabands assigned temporarily to an old barn for quarters.⁶⁵ A few days later the Superintendent presented Dix with a petition consisting of nine claims that heard the AMA requested the government grant in favor of the contrabands. On November 18, the New York Tribune published a letter from Wilder in defense of the General saying that in actuality the army cared for the contrabands to the greatest extent of their means, and that the barn served as only temporary shelter because they just arrived.⁶⁶ Dix, who doubtless also felt the change in public sentiment and relief from the lessening of the blockade, realized the power of the public press and appreciated Wilder's defense. The next day Wilder reported to the brethren at the AMA that "I am making good headway with Dix. In presenting our claims to him, he promises all he can give and will send me to Secretary Stanton for the balance."⁶⁷

December events capped the shift of emphasis toward the contrabands. In the elections that finally took place early in the month in the 2nd Congressional district, including Norfolk and Portsmouth, the voter turnout was much less than the prewar totals. Norfolk showed 23% its 1860 total, while Portsmouth with a larger pro-Union following showed 53% of the 1860 turnout.⁶⁸ The results showed a greater number of Unionists than the other occupied areas, but not enough for state representation. Most of the slaves in the south were obviously subject to Emancipation.

Teachers that Wilder requested in October began arriving at the mission. Palmer Litts, and Thomas Tucker arrived to help an ailing Mr. Day with his school.⁶⁹ Dix moved a large body of the contrabands from Newport News to Craney Island, just at the mouth of the Elizabeth River between Norfolk and Portsmouth, and William O. King arrived with Tucker to teach them on the island. At the end of the month John Oliver who taught the contrabands at Newport News, but left in September because of the difficult conditions, convinced General Veile to allow him to open schools in Portsmouth at the invitation of the Black church congregations there.⁷⁰

In the rush of Emancipation many opportunities began to open. The newly formed Emancipation League moved to lay a foundation for a central agency to deal with the problems of the slaves about to be emancipated. Samuel Gridley Howe suggested that "we must be able to present as early as possible, a general and reliable coup d'oeil of the actual condition of those who are actually out of the house of bondage; their wants and compacities. We must collect facts and use them as ammunition." The League sent out questionnaires to "super-visors and superintendents of the contrabands." They received prompt positive replies from eight superintendents which stressed that the freedmen showed a capability to learn as quickly as "comparable classes of white people", and that a temporary guardianship during a transition period would facilitate their change from slavery to freedom.⁷¹ Later in the

month J. Miller McKim visited Sumner, Congressman John Bingham, and Stanton to urge that an inquiry commission be formed to investigate the situation of the contrabands. All the men favored the idea although Stanton urged caution.⁷² As the month ended they and the whole Union waited to see if Lincoln would withstand the conservative factions of the country and issue the Proclamation without modification.

New Year's Day, 1863 began with a celebration by the contrabands and free Negroes in the streets of Norfolk.⁷³ When President Lincoln announced the Emancipation Proclamation in Washington, 5,000 strong were waiting in Norfolk for the wireless message of the announcement. They greeted it with a tremendous expression of freedom and happiness.⁷⁴ Unfortunately the Proclamation exempted occupied Virginia and other small areas "for the present," but the contrabands, as did many abolitionists, felt that it would apply at Hampton Roads in time.⁷⁵

After the long year of mission struggle the missionaries, superintendents, and contrabands reaped their reward. Even though Lincoln exempted the Hampton Roads area from emancipation, the Proclamation created a demand for many "experiments" to determine the best method of resettling and educating the contrabands. The Hampton Roads area was ideally suited to begin projects of this nature. The mission expanded into resettlement programs, and the schools expanded into Portsmouth during the first month of the year. For the

army Doctor Orlando Brown, a surgeon with the 18th Massachusetts Volunteers, accompanied the Newport News contrabands to Craney Island to help alleviate the suffering conditions. He directed a staff of about sixty workers to help guard the island, provision and feed the people, take care of the sick and bury the dead.⁷⁶ With a philosophy of "help them help themselves" he divided the population into squads with appointed leaders. He directed them to take responsibility for the orderliness and cleanliness of their respective groups, and as soon as the planting season began sent them out to plant gardens on the island.⁷⁷ In Hampton Wilder began the mission's long neglected plan to settle confiscated lands, and looked forward to a productive spring.

John Oliver moved to open Portsmouth schools. He spoke to the Methodist Episcopal Church, and received use of the church basement.⁷⁸ On January 26, in the midst of a large celebration, he commenced school with 130 children to mark a milestone in the long struggle of the mission. By the middle of February the school grew to include more than 172 children, and at the end of the month two more teachers arrived to help.

The August and November decisions by Whipple and Wilder to support General Dix obviously reaped a successful harvest. The political General totally changed with the shift of Administration policy. In early spring he ordered the army to confiscate several rebel plantations and to turn them over to

the contrabands for "occupancy under suitable regulations". The "farming implements, teams, seeds, etc." came from the Government in part, but mostly from the New York and Boston Freedmen's Association. Dr. Brown began planting on Craney Island and expanded to nearby plantations, and Wilder reported that instead of ten or twelve plantations they would need more than fifty before the season finished. He expected to grow "cotton, sweet and Irish potatoes, corn, and garden vegetables", and at the end of the season to have a large surplus of cotton and sweet potatoes.⁷⁹

The enthusiastic acceptance of the schools in Portsmouth almost guaranteed that the mission could duplicate the experiment in Norfolk. On March 26 Wilder received approval from General Dix to begin schools there. The African Methodist Church made available two or three rooms for the contrabands to use as a church and schoolhouse, but the Norfolk public remained hostile and teaching there necessitated constant contact with Government officials for protection. Wilder asked Jocelyn and Whipple for someone who could deal with these problems on a day to day basis, but before an answer arrived the Confederate army attacked Suffolk, twenty miles west. Resulting military action forced many travel and security restrictions on the Twin Cities area and stopped school expansion. Three weeks later, Thomas Tucker, a teacher with Day's school, decided to try to begin a Norfolk school in spite of the danger, and received much popular support from the black population there.⁸⁰ Wilder doubted that Tucker

could make the school succeed under the many restrictions, and again asked Jocelyn to send someone to take charge.

The AMA sent Reverend George N. Green, an experienced missionary, to investigate the possibilities of a Norfolk school. He arrived on April 18, 1863 and began to organize the schools immediately. Speaking to Tucker and Day at Hampton he learned of the strong contraband and free Negro support and available rooms. In Portsmouth Greely and Henry S. Beals told him of the educational enthusiasm of their students and advised him to begin with at least three teachers.⁸¹ Green received Miss Pitts, a newly arrived teacher, as his assistant, and planned to open a day school at the Bute Street Methodist Church and a Sunday School in the African Methodist Church. Finally on May 6 he opened the school with 350 pupils, in the day and 300 in the evening. Green used four assistants, but quickly asked for two more female teachers stating, "Harvest is plenty, laborers are few."⁸²

After the much halted progress during the Peninsula Campaign and the change of command, and the political stall for the last half of 1862, the Emancipation Proclamation paved the way for rapid mission development. The expansion to Norfolk and Portsmouth marked a new era for the contrabands. Wilder expected a great influx of teachers and missionaries, contrabands, and an overall school organizer during the summer. With the need to develop succinct models for the location and acculturation of the mass of emancipated slaves he tried

to mobilize organization and resources as quickly as possible. Little did he realize that the tremendous rise in the number of refugees would severely tax the capability of the AMA, force very tight cooperation with the army, shift program emphasis to Orlando Brown and the new AMA organizer in the more urban Twin Cities, and preview the way for the formation of a government bureau to care for the refugees.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

¹Charles B. Wilder, Business Advertisement, Messrs. Wilder and Son, The American Missionary, V:1; (1861), back cover.

²Louis S. Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 20-1, Wilder dropped the ten dollar ceiling for skilled laborers in Wool's wage system and instituted a standard fifteen dollars a month allotment. This change was the logical step to retain the workers who continually disappeared in search of their own work or drifted North. The women and children's pay scale stayed the same.

³Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, March 6, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4392.

⁴Lewis Hyde, Fortress Monroe, February 26, 1862, letter to William E. Whiting, New York, AMAV1, 4381.

⁵Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, February 27, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York; Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, March 15, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York; AMAV1, 4383, 4398.

⁶Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, March 11, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4394.

⁷Ibid. The loss of the Chesapeake Seminary in East Hampton was difficult to accept because it was in a central location to service the children in Hampton, Mill Creek and other surrounding localities. Earlier in the month, a free Negro house being used for a school was destroyed by arson, so the people naturally were reluctant to allow their homes to serve as schools. Even though Wool promised only one room for a school, the size of the seminary lent to the possibility of further expansion which was also cut off at its loss. Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, February 27, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4383. The loss of the seminary seemed not only an obstacle, but a large step backward.

⁸Lewis C. Lockwood, Brown Cottage, March 18, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4400.

⁹Ibid. Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, March 15, 1862, letter to Brethern, New York, AMAV1, 4398. Mallery's house, Brown cottage, White cottage, and Tyler's house are the four main houses the missionaries used during the time of dislocation. They were abandoned houses that belonged to former confederates.

¹⁰Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, April 7, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4414.

¹¹Lewis C. Lockwood, Brown Cottage, March 18, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4400.

¹²Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, April 22, 1862, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn and George Whipple, New York, AMAV1, 4430. Lockwood was angry at Wool for not investigating the dislocation orders from subordinates which caused havoc among the contrabands and the missionaries. Wool's inaction seemed more chafing in the much publicized light of General Saxton's cooperation at Port Royal. Lockwood refused to consider that Fortress Monroe was the marshalling area for the major campaign of the war to date, and Port Royal was a quiet supply station for the blockade.

¹³Lewis C. Lockwood, Brown Cottage, March 18, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4400.

¹⁴These "middlemen" were responsible for the cooperation between the AMA and the army, and thus for the success of the system during the war.

¹⁵Lewis C. Lockwood, Tyler House, April 11, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4419.

¹⁶Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, April 15, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4424. Again Lockwood wanted the refugees at Monroe to be involved in a project like the experiment at Port Royal.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid. He suggested the Independent, Evangelist, Advocate, and Journal.

¹⁹The American Missionary Association, "The Freedmen at Fortress Monroe", The American Missionary, VI:5; (1862), 108.

²⁰Charles P. Day, Fortress Monroe, April 30, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4441.

²¹Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion . . .," p. 39.

²²Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion..." p. 44.

²³Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, May 24, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4455B.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion....", p. 70.

²⁶Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion....," p. 73

²⁷Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 22.

²⁸Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion...," p. 150-151. On May 28, 1862, the New York 99th Regiment rioted after a fight between a contraband cook and a soldier resulted in the death of the soldier. The riot left three to six refugees dead and many wounded. Six of the leaders were caught and investigated but allowed freedom without punishment. The penalty for insubordination to an officer could be death, but murdering a contraband did not require so much as incarceration. Precedents such as this provided added excuse for crimes against the contraband. The crimes continued in Portsmouth and Norfolk, spread to the other side of the Roads and made the already crowded conditions worse.

²⁹Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion...," p. 152. C.B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, June 3, 1862, letter to George Whipple, New York, AMAV1, 4465.

³⁰Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion....," p. 151.

³¹Ibid.

³²George Whipple, Fortress Monroe, June 11, 1862, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4468.

³³Lockwood often made political sermons and accusations from the pulpit which complicated Wilder's relationship with Dix. This only comes out in the letters after Lockwood accepts a transfer. Charles B. Wilder, Hampton, October 1, 1862, letter to George Whipple, New York, AMAV1, 4557. The immediate excuse for pressuring Lockwood was his misuse of organization funds and donations, poor accounting methods, and unauthorized sale of donated materials. Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, June 12, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4470.

³⁴Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, June 12, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4470.

³⁵Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, June 20, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4473.

³⁶Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, June 3, 1862, letter to George Whipple, New York, AMAV1, 4465.

³⁷Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion....," p. 42.

³⁸One of the most difficult aspects to the problems with the contrabands at Hampton Roads was the area's proximity to Washington. Every move Dix made or refused to make concerning the contrabands was reported to the abolitionist organizations through the mission and the visitors that con-

tinually flocked to the camps. The Unionist residents also watched every move that Veile and Dix made. In this trap, the best move they could make concerning the contrabands was no move.

³⁹George Whipple, Fortress Monroe, July 8 and 12, 1862, letters to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4482, 4483.

⁴⁰As Whipple waited for appointments with General Dix, he helped Lockwood straighten out the financial problems of the mission, supporting him as much as possible.

⁴¹George Whipple, Fortress Monroe, July 12, 1862, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4483.

⁴²George Whipple, Fortress Monroe, July 15 and 18, 1862, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4485, 4491.

⁴³Dix may have avoided Whipple knowing that he was leaving for Washington soon to get more directions from the War Department.

⁴⁴Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, July 17, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4488.

⁴⁵Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, July 22, 1862, Letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4495.

⁴⁶Lewis C. Lockwood, Tyler House, July 25, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4496.

⁴⁷George Whipple, Old Point Comfort, July 31, 1862, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4501.

⁴⁸Benjamin P. Thomas, The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 232.

⁴⁹John G. Sproat, "Blueprint for Radical Reconstruction", The Journal of Southern History, XXIII:1; (1957), 25.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Herman Belz, Reconstructing the Union, p. 103.

⁵²George Whipple, "Letter from George Whipple, August 6, 1862", The American Missionary, VI:9; (1862), 208.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, August 23, 1862, letter to George Whipple, New York, AMAV1, 4516.

⁵⁵Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, August 27, 1862, letter to George Whipple, New York, AMAV1, 4517.

⁵⁶Ibid. Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, September 3, 1862, letter to George Whipple, New York, AMAV1, 4521.

⁵⁷McClellan ordered the impressment to erect a depot to ship contraband from Monroe to his Army of the Potomac. In the face of this, only a very strong reason such as possible emancipation kept Whipple from authorizing Wilder's planned petition.

⁵⁸George Whipple, "Letter from George Whipple, August 6, 1862", The American Missionary, VI:9; (1862), 208.

⁵⁹Charles P. Day, "(Letter) from Charles P. Day, Teacher", The American Missionary, VI:10; (1862), 232.

⁶⁰Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, September 6, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4530.

⁶¹George Whipple, Fortress Monroe, August 5, 1862, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4511.

⁶²Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, September 8, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4524.

⁶³Thomas, Life and Times, p. 249.

⁶⁴Since McClellan carried the standard for a "Gentleman's War", his dismissal was the most obvious indication that Lincoln shifted to a "Freedom for the Slaves" attitude.

⁶⁵Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, November 16, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4593.

⁶⁶Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, November 14, 1862, letter to Editor of the New York Tribune, New York, AMAV1, 4582.

⁶⁷Charles B. Wilder, Fortress Monroe, November 19, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4596.

⁶⁸Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion...", p. 103.

⁶⁹Palmer Litts, Fortress Monroe, December 1, 1862, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York. Thomas Tucker, Fortress Monroe, November 27, 1862, letter to Friends of the Association, New York, AMAV1, 4606, 4603.

⁷⁰John Oliver, Fortress Monroe, December 17, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4624.

⁷¹McPherson, Struggle for Equality, p. 180.

⁷²McPherson, Struggle for Equality, p. 181.

⁷³In expectation of the Emancipation Proclamation, the free Negro leaders planned the successful celebration as early as November. Mr. Peake, Portsmouth, November 23, 1862, letter to George Whipple, New York. John Oliver, Portsmouth, February 18, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1.

⁷⁴John Oliver, Portsmouth, January 14, 1863, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4637.

⁷⁵McPherson, Struggle for Equality, p. 122.

⁷⁶In addition to his staff, Brown had Federal soldiers who guarded the approach to the island from the Portsmouth side to keep the contrabands in, the kidnappers out, and to defend against Confederate guerrillas. Wilson, Experiment, p. 161.

⁷⁷Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 28-9.

⁷⁸John Oliver, Portsmouth, January 14, 1863, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4637.

⁷⁹Captain C. B. Wilder, "(Letter) from Captain C. B. Wilder, 'Superintendent of Contrabands', Fortress Monroe, March 12, 1862", The American Missionary, VIII:3; (1863), 83-84.

⁸⁰Thomas Tucker, Norfolk, April 15, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4721.

⁸¹Greely and Beales succeeded John Oliver in Portsmouth when Oliver became tired of managing the bulging student population. Greely and Beales were experienced New England teachers who could well advise Green. George N. Green, Norfolk, April 18, 1863, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4729.

⁸²George N. Green, Norfolk, May 6, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4755.

CHAPTER III

Development of the Blueprint

In late spring of 1863 Norfolk was a dirty, overcrowded city. Hundreds of refugees and poverty-stricken whites crowded the streets. "Wharves, streets and sidewalks" were battered and in need of repair. General Naglee's Medical director reported in August that local diseases could be prevented only by putting the cities "immediately into a sanitary condition."¹ War casualties included the street lighting system, the fire department and most of the bridges. White poor lined up for federal relief daily and secessionist bankers planned to remove local deposits to Richmond.

For the next year and a half the army and the missionaries developed the contraband schools in Norfolk and Portsmouth and surrounding farms into a school system destined to be the blueprint for the Virginia State Freedmen's Bureau schools. The opening of the Norfolk city missionary schools set the stage for the beginning of this development. The farm labor experiments "presented most of the essential features needed" to help the freedmen gain self sufficiency and provided a setting for the development of the Twin Cities education system.² As the necessary subsistence programs for the contrabands they enabled the schools to develop with a fairly stable student population which was one of the

main ingredients of the system. The farms received the main emphasis from the army and the AMA. The two programs developed congruently but the school system hitch-hiked on the development of the farms because subsistence programs demanded priority. The farms failed to become an important Reconstruction program because President Johnson's Amnesty Proclamation of 1865 returned most of the confiscated lands to their respective confederate owners.

Despite the city's deplorable conditions the contrabands enthusiastically attended the new missionary schools. After three days of classes more than one thousand students strained the facilities of the school. Reverend George Green, head teacher in Norfolk, was a missionary rather than a teacher or supervisor. Both he and his teachers realized they needed a superintendent to oversee the student population. On May 12 a teacher wrote to the secretaries of the AMA, "We need a superintendent of the whole. Mr. Green does not expect to or intend to confine himself to it." Late in the month Captain Wilder wrote the AMA to send a competent man or the schools would suffer.³ Anticipating the need for a coordinator for the schools' opening in the two cities, Whipple had been looking for the right person for months. In June he sent William H. Woodbury to Norfolk as Supervisor.

Woodbury, a professor of German and Primary Education from Holyoke, Massachusetts, realized the problems demanded radical, and in some cases, delicate solutions. The refugees

needed to be housed, clothed, fed, schooled, and employed. In the past the Army often refused to put a priority on the problems of the refugees. Woodbury knew he needed to keep the cooperation of General John Dix and local commanders to give them necessary logistic support to employ, house and feed 12,000 people.⁴ The missionary teachers also presented problems. Many of the preachers tried to halfway fill in as teachers. Some capable teachers were doing supervisory jobs that wasted their teaching skills. To complicate the problem new teachers needed to possess the ability to communicate effectively with the ex-slaves in the way that the preachers did. Woodbury wanted to keep the missionaries who communicated well with the people but taught poorly, but at the same time needed capable men and women to teach. He suspected that the situation demanded a large shakeup of mission personnel.

Instead of trying to solve this problem, the new superintendent concentrated on cooperating with Dr. Brown because he understood that developing a strong working relationship with Brown provided the key to AMA-Army coordination. The military provided buildings and rations for the teachers' homes, schools and subsistence, as well as the contrabands' homes and subsistence, and its need for labor and increasing number of refugees continually overloaded or depleted the school population. The summer campaigns produced a severe shortage of manpower in the army.⁵ On June 22 Secre-

tary of War Edwin Stanton ordered the recruitment of colored troops at Norfolk,⁶ and soon after the Army tried to raise 1,000 men by collecting them after church without allowing them to go home. As a result the refugees avoided regularly scheduled activities such as school and church, and many hid in the fields not far from the camps.⁷ When Woodbury first arrived in June, the city of Portsmouth overflowed with refugees from the military action in Suffolk. Brown, with a small staff, welcomed Woodbury's assistance processing the new refugees.

In turn, Captain Brown wished to cooperate with Woodbury. Regarding the impressment, Captain Brown wrote to Jocelyn, "I think it very unfortunate to be compelled to impress them as it creates distrust that should if possible be avoided."⁸ Brown realized that the AMA needed a capable person to handle the mission personnel, administrate the mushrooming schools in the Twin Cities, and continue smooth relations with the army. Throughout the spring Brown asked Whipple for someone capable of cooperating with the Army.⁹

Whipple sent Woodbury mainly to fulfill an administrative and diplomatic function. Helping Brown to locate the still great influx of new refugees around Portsmouth gave the new superintendent an over-view of the problems of the refugees in the overcrowded cities, and allowed him to observe the workings of the school system and scrutinize the mission personnel unobtrusively. In early July Woodbury went back

to New York to plan the coming year with Whipple and to prepare to move his family and belongings to Norfolk.

Both Brown and Charles Wilder, superintendent of the contraband at Fort Monroe, felt charity was damaging to the refugees, and endeavored to develop a reliable method for the contrabands to use to support themselves.¹⁰ As early as 1862 Wilder received permission from General Wool and Secretary of War Stanton to allow the refugees to settle on abandoned lands. Stanton hoped this type of experiment would solve the refugee problem.¹¹ In the spring General John Dix issued confiscation orders for abandoned plantations and those of disloyal southerners for Brown and Wilder to use to establish refugee families on small parcels two to ten acres in size. In a central section he located unattached Negroes and used them in labor gangs. They were fed and paid when the crop came in. The tenants signed contracts for one year with terms depending on the soil quality and buildings on the plots.¹²

The farm programs showed tremendous success. The government provided necessary tools, teams and seeds on loan until the crops were harvested and the dues paid. It also loaned subsistence supplies instead of rations with a lien on the crops. In addition to corn and sweet potatoes, the new farmers produced milk and lumber. Brown's supervisors visited the farms regularly and lived on some of them. The schools closely followed as itinerant teachers visited the farms and

dispensed relief supplies among the farmers regardless of the danger from confederate guerillas. In late spring the military removed their forces from Suffolk twenty miles west to a line directly through the farms. This reduced the size of the available land and brought the war much closer to the inhabitants. Despite this, by August, Brown reported that 903 people occupied places on the farms.¹³

These experiments produced a great impact on efforts to help the refugee by influencing the American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission (AFIC). At the suggestion of Charles Sumner and the radical leaders of Congress, Edwin Stanton established the AFIC in March, 1863 "to investigate the condition of the colored population emancipated by acts of Congress and the President's proclamation of January 1, 1863, and to report what measures will best contribute to their protection and improvement, so that they may defend and support themselves."¹⁴ Samuel Gridley Howe, Colonel James McKaye, and Robert Dale Owen, all friends of Charles Sumner, constituted the Commission. They visited Virginia and many other contraband locations in the South, and received testimony from the superintendents in each area. In June of 1863 the Commission issued a report which agreed with the farm policies of Brown and the education policies of the AMA, and encouraged further development. The Commission recommended that contraband camps serve only as collection and distribution points for the incoming refugees on the way to farm settlement, and that

education was vital to long-term planning of the integration of the freedmen into society. The commissioners recommended systematic division of the contraband population under capable superintendents and steps for immediate provision of carefully administered school facilities.¹⁵

As the summer progressed, the contrabands themselves reinforced the findings of the Commission. Letters of the missionaries showed that their charges wanted more teachers. The teachers did the work among the people themselves. They taught them and their children in school, and visited them to encourage them to come to school and to do their homework. They distributed clothing and sometimes rations and medicine to them to enable them to come to school. After the July 6 impressment with half the black population gone or scattered in the woods, Charles P. Day wrote that the only way to overcome the people's mistrust was "by a missionary effort from door to door."¹⁶ In addition the contraband's own preachers also doubled as community leaders so the congregations naturally felt some antipathy toward missionaries who preached a different philosophy of life. They had suffered under white preachers appointed by their owners in slavery, and wanted to hear their own leaders.¹⁷ On August 8, Reverend Steven Bell, a preaching missionary and recent arrival in Hampton, wrote to Jocelyn, "As to preaching, they seem to prefer their own colored ministers to us."¹⁸ A week later, he wrote again, "The work of teaching will be the work among this people for some time."¹⁹

During the last two months of summer, events began to change the character of the mission. The July impressment made the contrabands wary of the missionaries, and a zealous thirst for education caused them to obviously favor the teachers. The Norfolk school success led to infighting among the missionaries and in late July Green experienced a rebellion of his monitors who wanted monetary payment per week instead of rations and housing. A week later the congregation of the Bute Street Baptist Church rebuked him for approving the ordination of an unpopular minister for their congregation. Green lost support from the people and had to agree to allow a black minister, Brother Henderson, to lead the congregation where he previously held support.²⁰

In Hampton the missionaries began arguing among themselves. Brother James P. Stone and the other residents of the teachers' home asked the AMA secretaries to remove Mrs. William S. Coan, the housekeeper. She was the wife of one of the Norfolk teachers, the second most experienced missionary in Hampton. The group charged that her management of the household affairs wasted too much money, and that she treated the black people with reproach. Whipple and Jocelyn were skeptical, but reluctantly removed her from the position. Stone, a pioneer missionary who could not teach effectively, realized that he must consolidate his administrative authority to balance the growing lack of support for non-teachers.²¹

In September Professor Woodbury returned to prepare the

opening of the schools. He began by requesting qualified teachers instead of churchmen. On September 7 he wrote Jocelyn asking for a woman to replace Miss R. G. Patton at the orphanage at Ferry's Point. He wanted "an educated woman who can read and write and spell correctly, and who can listen patiently, speak calmly and quietly and decidedly, and express her mind in clear intelligible English."²² His wife, Louisa A. Woodbury, also wrote Whipple that "music and inspiration" were the most successful qualities for a teacher. She stressed that teachers must possess energy and zest for activity to inspire their pupils "who are passive until acted upon."²³

Fortunately, Reverend George Green, like most of the other teachers, had gone home for the summer vacation. Woodbury capitalized on this to help rearrange the personnel. He wrote Whipple and asked him to place Green in a non-teaching field.²⁴ He depended on William S. Coan to continue as a head teacher in Norfolk, H. S. Beals and Jonathan Greely in Portsmouth, and Charles P. Day in Hampton. In the cases of Reverend Green and other preachers that he wanted to dismiss, he sent Whipple the information and let the latter make the decision.

In a controversial decision the new AMA Superintendent chose to concentrate on the Norfolk missions. Technically Woodbury supervised the schools in Norfolk, Portsmouth, Hampton, and Yorktown, and on September 9 Captain Wilder

charged that with this decision Woodbury failed to fulfill all of his duties. He wrote the AMA that the Norfolk schools advanced rapidly, but Portsmouth and Hampton schools lagged behind.²⁵ Woodbury, on the other hand, felt Norfolk constituted the most important work. The Portsmouth schools remained closed because of a late summer vacation, and the supervision of Yorktown demanded thirty miles of land and water travel. In Hampton, James P. Stone considered himself the AMA superintendent, and the Baptist congregation charged that Mr. Day favored the white children.²⁶ With a rebellious leader in Hampton, a major congregational problem, and Mr. Day's school progressing well in spite of it, Woodbury thought it best not to interfere, and concentrate on Norfolk instead. The city schools opened during the months of October and November, and the new superintendent spent the first of these months supplying and administering them.

On November 2, 1863 the experiments at Norfolk received national support. President Lincoln appointed General Benjamin F. Butler Commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. The man who in 1861 refused missionaries from the AMA for the contrabands by 1863 had become too radical for the establishment of a loyalist government in Louisiana.²⁷



Massachusetts volunteer Benjamin Butler assumed command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina on November 4, 1863.

In January Lincoln relieved a very unhappy Butler from the Louisiana command, and conditions developed that led the new radical to Virginia. In November of 1863 the Radical Republicans needed a constitutional amendment to solidify the Emancipation Proclamation. The General led the cause for radical Congressional reconstruction along with Sumner, Boutwell, Davis and Whiting.²⁸ Apparently the Radicals wanted to invest Butler as the Commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina to help develop a blueprint for the solution of the Negro question to help support the 13th Amendment. Earlier in 1863 Francis C. Bird originator of the "Bird Club," the caucus organization for Massachusetts Radicals, visited the farm experiments in the area, declared

that they "seemed to lay the foundation for an industrious and self-supporting peasantry," and gave the plan his enthusiastic support.²⁹ Both Butler and Sumner enjoyed confidential membership in the "Bird Club,"³⁰ and doubtless heard the report from Bird.

Butler wanted a command with political potential, and after Gettysburg and Vicksburg reconstruction was the foremost political subject. Lincoln, although he dispossessed Butler of the Department of the Gulf, actually favored him as a capable administrator.³¹ Feeling Senate pressure to appoint Butler to a post, and needing a cooperative liberal administrator in Virginia, along with the possibility of developing a solution to the refugee problem the President easily saw the November 2nd appointment as the ideal solution.

Butler warmed to the idea of providing a plan for the problem of "what to do with the ex-slave." Recent military victories at Chattanooga and Vicksburg cleared the Mississippi Valley and split the Confederacy. With the possibility of the war ending and new masses of slaves in Union hands, the question of reconstruction became the major issue in Congress. The Department of Virginia and North Carolina held no prospect of military action, and only little glory from successful prisoner exchange.³² The General wholeheartedly supported the AFIC recommendations to expand to the farms to find a permanent solution to the Negro problem.


The preparation for sweeping changes in the Norfolk experiment began in September. Brown and Woodbury suspected that Butler might come as Commander of the Department one month early and began to prepare for his arrival. General Barnes, a long time friend of Butler, replaced General Naglee as Commander of Norfolk,³³ and on October 17 Woodbury wrote Whipple that his time consisted of many extensive discussions with General Barnes on a matter which he must not reveal until November 4, 1863.³⁴ On October 13 the War Department promoted Surgeon Brown to the rank of Captain and Assistant Quartermaster of Volunteers.³⁵ In this position he could control the payments for the contraband, and requisition supplies for the farms himself rather than using the regular army quartermaster. Moreover Woodbury wrote Whipple asking for six new overseers to manage farms.³⁶

On November 3, 1863, S. C. Pomeroy, a Congressman from Ohio, wrote Butler that the President wanted to appoint him Commander of the 1st Department of Virginia and North Carolina "if he would accept." He urged Butler to accept because the post possessed advantages "in a political sense."³⁷ Realizing this Butler had already accepted the command before Pomeroy's letter. The appointment came the same day, and he prepared to travel to Norfolk.

Unlike Dix, Butler came prepared to deal with the contraband problem. His experience in Louisiana, a thorough briefing on the current conditions at Monroe, and an accurate

knowledge of the problem nationwide gave him ample fuel to prepare a cohesive program. Despite the radical General's reputation Woodbury underestimated his intentions. On December 2 the professor requested black teachers from Whipple to help "make his race the occupant and ultimate owner of the broad acres of the South."³⁸ A week later he asked the Secretary to come to Norfolk to help influence Butler's cooperation, but the following day General Order #46 detailed a comprehensive new plan of reconstruction for the contrabands. To Woodbury's happy surprise Butler came prepared to deal with the refugees' problems.

General Order #46 precisely followed the recommendations of the AFIC. It separated the Virginia-North Carolina Department into three areas. Captain Wilder supervised the area north of the James River; Captain Orlando Brown controlled the area south of the James River in Virginia; and Reverend Horace James directed the District of North Carolina. Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Burnham Kinsman, a long time adjutant of General Butler's, accepted the detail of the general superintendency of the Department. The orders provided specific rules for the enlistment of colored soldiers with pay and subsistence for their families, promptness of payment for labor including back money owed to the contrabands, regulations against idleness and impressment for private profit, and active aid to refugees trying to escape Confederate territory. The superintendent's duties included protecting



Historian Tinsley L. Spraggins illustrates the three contraband areas that General Order # 46 created in a map from his article, "Mobilization of Negro Labor for the Department of Virginia and North Carolina." The farms in Area II, Orlando Brown's jurisdiction, extended north, west, and south from the city limits of Portsmouth, and north, east, and south from the city limits of Norfolk.

the refugee population, providing food, shelter, clothing, medicine, and employment including contracts. Furthermore, the orders specifically protected and aided the missionaries.³⁹

The order attracted national response. Robert Dale Owen wrote on behalf of Dr. Samuel Gridley Howe and the American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission that the order "will contribute more than any other similar document issued since the commencement of the war to the solution of one of the hardest problems . . ."⁴⁰ Regarding the order, Butler wrote to Lewis Tappan in New York, "I trust it will be the framework around which free colored labor may be organized in the future."⁴¹

Butler's support brought changes to the AMA organization. During the fall, Woodbury had formed a new attitude toward the contrabands' education. He agreed with Brown that they needed more guidance in the practical necessities of life.⁴² When Butler put his weight behind settling the farms, the professor felt he needed to expand his function as AMA superintendent along those lines. On December 9 he asked Whipple to release him from service because Brown offered him a position with greater opportunity to organize the farms. Three days later he wrote again that he accepted the position with Captain Brown as overall superintendent of the City of Norfolk, but decided to remain in his AMA function until Whipple found someone to fill his post, and recommended William L. Coan for the position.⁴³

The Superintendent realized that a tight city system and good city leadership constituted the essential ingredients of a foundation for movement out to the farms. The city system of schools provided the headquarters and supply depot for the farms, and the farm settlements hinted at the possibility of solving a national problem. Woodbury wrote, "Given the soil, with the schools, meeting houses and markets, and you have the solution of the problem "what to do with the negro!"⁴⁴ To lighten his mission responsibilities he determined to place the city mission "on such a basis as will require the least possible outside superintendency."

The new expansion as with all phases of the contraband community's development began with many obstacles. W. L. Coan was dissatisfied with his position. He became so estranged from Woodbury that the latter could no longer recommend him to take over the mission work. Brown moved Coan to Portsmouth and the superintendent temporarily took over supervision of both teacher houses in Norfolk. During the month of January the two co-workers became increasingly distant. Coan charged Woodbury with tampering with his mail and asked the AMA to direct it straight to Portsmouth.⁴⁵ He refused a commission from Brown, who unknown to Coan reneged on it after talking with Whipple.⁴⁶

Coan accepted the AMA superintendency of Portsmouth, but refused to accept any direction from Woodbury, the overall Superintendent.⁴⁷ Brown and Whipple worked together to solve

the problem. On February 15 Brown defined Woodbury's duties as the General Superintendent of Norfolk and Portsmouth, while Whipple made Coan the supervisor of all the primary schools under AMA authority. If Woodbury needed Coan's acquiescence on a major issue he contacted Whipple who ordered Coan to comply with the superintendent. With this system Coan was independent, but not enough to cause problems with major policies.

In accordance with AFIC recommendations, as the farms expanded, Brown separated his area into districts and appointed assistant superintendents. He needed someone to work personally with the farms and people in the area to find out what land was abandoned and which residents were in the rebel army or had family in the army. With this information, Brown began proceedings to confiscate the land for Department use. In addition the assistant supervisors helped locate the refugees, supervised the overseers, procured implements for farm use and drafted contracts.

Brown also needed a supervisor to develop the lumber business that became strong on the farms during the winter and spring. A good amount of land had stands of white oak and pine, which Brown planned to clear for farming. One farm included a sawmill, and all the others possessed access to the rivers. Moving the uncut lumber to the sawmill and then distributing it to the cities by barge eliminated the use of horses and wagons that the army needed at the front. The

mill supplied the Navy yard, the schools, the other Quartermaster Departments, local buyers, and the farms themselves in an ever-increasing volume. Early in the summer of 1864 the Army alone requested 100,000 feet for building purposes.⁴⁸ During that spring and the next summer the farm system expanded rapidly.

Problems continued arising throughout the spring months. The doublebladed plows that the previous owners left on the farms required a strong man to operate. With mostly women and young boys to cultivate the refugee corn crop, Thomas Jackson, a Subdistrict Superintendent, requested sixty-six single blade plows for all his farms, but the Quartermaster Department refused to supply an item different from their regular inventory. Jackson wasted over a month of plowing time trying to secure them through channels.⁴⁹ In spite of problems such as this, the corn crop yielded enough for the needs of the farms and more to offer for sale. Since corn was the staple food for the poor people, there was a large market for what the refugees produced.

The farm schools followed the progress of the community expansion. Late in February General Butler suggested that Brown place the most experienced teachers on the farms to begin the schools on a sound footing even though the farms were not quite ready.⁵⁰ Problems developed because of the condition of the refugees and farms. H. S. Beals, who began and operated a successful multi-graded school in Portsmouth,

moved to Taylor Farm where seven hundred refugees waited for his arrival on April 1. They had suffered a high mortality rate from living in a common room in Norfolk, where they contracted diseases such as fever, measles, small pox, dysentery and whooping cough. On the farm half the buildings needed finishing, so the refugees were little better off.⁵¹ Mr. Beals possessed excellent qualities for school leadership but lacked the business acumen to run a farm.⁵²

The teachers who filled the old guards' places sometimes failed to keep up the high quality of instruction. Some new candidates went straight to farms and bent under the weight of the undertaking. Gradually students dropped off and lost enthusiasm but the city and farm school populations increased as refugees continually arrived.

Brown's settlement system became more organized as the contraband populations swelled and Woodbury's school system kept pace. In April the Twin Cities held fourteen classes in various churches and unused public school buildings. Grades ranged from low primary (ignorant of the alphabet) to advanced (reading the New Testament).⁵³ The students progressed rapidly, but sometimes necessitated a sound disciplinary policy of neck-twisting, choking, arm pinching or use of the rod. The teachers lived mainly in three mission houses--two in Norfolk and one in Portsmouth.⁵⁴

As the growing, efficient refugee experiment began to receive national interest, the last stage in development of

a blueprint for the schools began to take shape. Recognizing a fertile area for proselytization, many societies began to apply for permission to teach the refugees in the area. Butler forwarded these to Brown. Moreover some city congregations demanded teachers of their denomination, contacted appropriate societies and pressured both Brown and Woodbury for their admittance. Both superintendents recognized that denominational competition threatened the experiment with more problems. Since the AMA had sole authorization from the War Department to operate in the Hampton Roads area, Brown refused the other societies, but at the same time asked Whipple to sponsor individual teachers to stave off conflict.

Denominational strife actually began two years before the success of the farm experiments. The American Missionary Association informally represented both the Congregationalists and the Free Will Baptists. The first missionary in 1861, Lewis C. Lockwood, was Baptist. He communicated with the refugees easily because most of the contrabands embraced the more emotional aspects of religion as Baptists rather than the strict, reserved demeanor of the Congregationalists. Still, a large gap existed between him and the congregation in his vicinity. He made progress with the religious life of the people very slowly. After nine long months he could only report that he had just succeeded in winning their confidence.⁵⁵ In September, 1862, he transferred to South Carolina

and his successor, James P. Stone, began experiencing problems also.

In the two years that elapsed between Lockwood leaving Hampton and Green coming to Norfolk, many problems arose because the Hampton Baptist congregation demanded someone of their denomination as a missionary. The news easily spread to Norfolk so when Green established schools, even though the native congregation invited him, they only allowed him to lead the congregation because he brought the schools with him. In the summer Woodbury began supervising the schools and removed all the missionary preachers. Still, the Baptist congregation asked him for Baptist teachers because they believed that the teachers favored children of their own denomination.⁵⁶

Woodbury recognized that the potential for confusion and competition among benevolent societies in Norfolk and Portsmouth was much greater than in Hampton. In 1863 the Baptist denomination began the American Baptist Home Mission Society. Reverend Theodore Parker, agent for the society, visited Woodbury in Norfolk and arranged to send Baptist teachers to the city through AMA sponsorship. The AMA declined to pressure individual teachers to report to the AMA Superintendent on a day to day basis so the success of the arrangements depended solely on the individuals involved. Susan A. Walker, of the Baptist Home Missionary Association, successfully operated one of the two AMA mission houses in

Norfolk and received pay from both societies.⁵⁷ Reverend John Abbey, though, a member of a different organization, took over a farm in Hampton and became involved in a scandal with his female teachers. In such a case as this the AMA removed their sponsorship.⁵⁸

During the year the emergence of many national relief organizations made the use of technical AMA sponsorship unwieldy, and the different societies slowly crept into the area.⁵⁹ They included the Pennsylvania Freedmen's Relief Association, the National Freedmen's Relief Association, the New England Freedmen's Aid Society, the Philadelphia Friends of the Freedmen's Relief Association, and the Baptist Home Mission Society. One teacher came, established a school and sent for others. They came, established more schools, and changed the curriculum to inculcate their own views. The government soon provided more than fifty teachers with food, fuel and quarters.

Without a system the students moved from one school to another and then only attended irregularly. Captain Brown suggested to Colonel Josiah B. Kinsman, the Director of the Department of Negro Affairs, that he appoint an overall supervisor and sanction some plan to prevent the problems. Kinsman left the appointment up to Brown who persuaded Woodbury to finally leave the AMA and superintend all the societies' efforts in the area.⁶⁰ The professor, as well as his mentor, felt responsible for finding a working system.

In the summer of 1864 Woodbury, in his new function, went on an extended trip north to arrange a conference between himself, Brown, and the various associations to discuss a system for multi-society schools in Norfolk. They felt that since the government partially supported the teachers it should be able to control the organization. The superintendent wanted to use teachers from other societies in the system without allowing them too much power to cause conflicts. Woodbury emphasized to Whipple in several letters that he should come.⁶¹ He also invited George Hawkins of the National Freedmen's Relief Association.

Possibly Brown and Woodbury gerrymandered the conference representation to retain the majority decision. The other associations either failed to receive notification or refused to come except for the New England Relief Association (NERA). Brown asked their only teacher in Norfolk, Hamma Stevenson, whom to invite as a representative. She answered that she was the agent for her society, but he refused to recognize her as the official agent for her society. Brown apologized to her for not believing her when the NERA failed to send another representative, but conveniently after the conference.⁶² With just George Hawkins to negotiate against Whipple, Brown and Woodbury, the resulting agreement reflected the latter's goals.

The conference created the blueprint for the Norfolk and Portsmouth schools. A superintending committee consisting

of Brown and Woodbury controlled the missionary efforts in the city. Approved by Butler in General Order #30, the committee decided on all matters relating to the acceptance or discharge of teachers, the "custody and repair of school houses, and all other appertaining to the education of the colored children." Their duties included selecting teachers from applicants of the various freedmen's relief societies, and furnishing fuel, housing and rations to them. The orders charged them with creating districts of an equal number of scholars within the cities, and arranging for the societies to provide the necessary number of teachers.⁶³

Woodbury immediately began to use a system of districts to prevent competition among the benevolent societies. He began to organize the multi-society system of schools in early fall. On the 28th of September, he wrote Whipple and requested that the Secretary invite the other associations into the agreement of the conference with him and Hawkins as their representatives. Woodbury also requested that the Secretary send an agent to take over the AMA affairs he formerly served. On Brown's approval he published General Order #30 in the Independent, initiated a census, and split the cities into districts.⁶⁴

Unable to place teachers on the farms because of the high incidence of malaria in the country, Woodbury concentrated on the city system. He expanded the teachers' homes from two to four.⁶⁵ Since the AMA supported most of the teachers, separating the districts according to one society

for each district was unrealistic. Instead, Woodbury instituted three sections, two in Norfolk and one in Portsmouth.⁶⁶ The new AMA superintendent, H. C. Percy, and Reverend Nathan Coleman, from the National Freedmen's Relief Association, supervised the two sections in Norfolk,⁶⁷ and Reverend Steven Bell of the AMA directed the effort in Portsmouth.⁶⁸

The schools moved smoothly. Percy opened them in November with eight schools and nine teachers. These only held an average attendance of 362 pupils, but his night school added 500 more. Early in the month Percy reported that the districts, with graded schools, were a "great advantage to teachers and scholars." He estimated that they could handle 500 more pupils under that system.⁶⁹

The schools progressed well through the end of the year. In early 1865 General Butler left command of the Department, the war ended, and Congress finally provided for a Freedmen's Bureau. Captain Brown became a Colonel and Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau for the state of Virginia, and William H. Woodbury, soon to be succeeded by Ralza Morse Manly, became the Virginia Superintendent of Education for the Bureau.

In the summer of 1865 President Andrew Johnson issued the Amnesty Proclamation that returned most of the confiscated land to the original confederate owners. The farm experiment evolved into the contract labor system, and the

freedmen became tenants and contract workers rather than semi-independent farmers. The Norfolk blueprint survived the reconstruction charges at the end of the war and became a total success in the Freedmen's Bureau. Under Orlando Brown's direction, Manly instituted it on a state-wide basis during 1865 and 1866.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion....," p. 190.
- ²Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion....," p.182.
- ³Charles B. Wilder, Norfolk, May 21, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4787. Norfolk and Portsmouth became the site of the development of the blue-print instead of Hampton because the Twin Cities have a large enough population to use more than one society and Woodbury, at the beginning of his Superintendency, decided to concentrate on Norfolk.
- ⁴Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion....," p.163.
- ⁵Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion....," p.172.
- ⁶Charles W. Foster, Ass't. Adj. General, Norfolk, June 22, 1863, letter to Maj. General John A. Dix, Dept. of Va., N. C. Letters Received by the Headquarters of the 7th Army Corps, 1863-1866, Record Group 393, Inventory #1628, Vol. 2, United States Army Continental Commands, National Archives.
- ⁷Charles P. Day, Hampton, July 8, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4851.
- ⁸Captain Orlando Brown, Norfolk, July 11, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4855.
- ⁹Charles B. Wilder, May 21, 1863, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV1, 4787.
- ¹⁰Sproat, "Blueprint for Radical Reconstruction," p. 35.
- ¹¹Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 36.
- ¹²Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion....," p. 167.
- ¹³Ibid. Wilder used many more farms around Hampton because it was a more rural area, and the army occupied more land. He used more individual leases, and less community pool labor, but attained the same excellent results.
- ¹⁴Sproat, "Blueprint for Radical Reconstruction," p. 34.
- ¹⁵Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 35.
- ¹⁶Charles P. Day, Hampton, July 13, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4858. Only the teaching missionaries visited the people on a regular basis. The

preachers like Green fell into an administrative Sunday morning routine. The really competent preaching missionaries that communicated with the people adapted to teaching; e.g., Beales, Greely, Coan.

¹⁷Louisa A. Woodbury, Norfolk, September 7, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV2, 4976A.

¹⁸Reverend H. S. Bell, Portsmouth, August 8, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4912.

¹⁹Reverend H. S. Bell, Portsmouth, August 16, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4928.

²⁰George N. Green, Norfolk, July 21, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV1, 4869.

²¹Palmer Litts, Lucy Martindale, James P. Stone, Nancy Stone, Eliza Yates, Charles P. Day, Hampton, July 22, 1863, petition to Executive Committee of AMA, New York, AMAV1, 4872. This is a judgment based on his push for the Superintendency of Hampton over the next year which he finally attained, switched to the Freedmen's Bureau, and held until 1870.

²²William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, September 7, 1863, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV2, 4976.

²³Louisa A. Woodbury, Norfolk, September 7, 1863, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV2, 4976A.

²⁴William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, September 2, 1863, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV2, 4959.

²⁵Charles B. Wilder, September 9, 1863, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV2, 4980.

²⁶Reverend M. R. Thornton, Hampton, September 14, 1863, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV2, 4989.

²⁷Benjamin F. Butler, Fortress Monroe, August 10, 1861, letter to Louis Tappan, New York, AMAV1, 4336, 4337, 4338.

²⁸Belz, Reconstructing the Union, p. 138.

²⁹Gerteis, From Contraband to Freedman, p. 40.

³⁰McPherson, Struggle for Equality, p. 84.

³¹Charles H. McCarthy, Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction (New York: AMA Press, 1966), p. 39.

³²Hans L. Trefousse, Ben Butler, The South Called Him Beast! (New York: Twayne Publisher, 1957), p. 64.

³³Wilson, "Experiment in Reunion....," p. 192.

³⁴William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, October 17, 1863, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV2, 5064.

³⁵Orlando Brown, Ass't. Surgeon, 18th Regiment, Mass. Vol. Infantry, Appointments, Commissions, and Personnel File, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, War Dept., National Archives, Washington, D.C.

³⁶William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, November 4, 1863, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV2, 5088.

³⁷Jessie A. Marshall, ed., Private and Official Correspondence of General Benjamin F. Butler (Volume 3, Norwood, Massachusetts: The Princeton Press, 1917), p. 136.

³⁸William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, December 2, 1863, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV2, 5150.

³⁹Butler Correspondence, p. 88. The term "impressment for private profit" refers to kidnapping and selling contrabands or exploiting the use of their labor.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 196.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 237.

⁴²William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, November 19 and 22, 1863, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV2, 5124, 5125.

⁴³William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, December 9 and 12, 1863, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV2, 5165, 5177.

⁴⁴William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, December 19, 1863, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV2, 5181.

⁴⁵William S. Coan, Portsmouth, December 14, 1863, letter to S. K. Whiting, New York, AMAV2, 5178.

⁴⁶Orlando Brown, Norfolk, January 2, 1864, letter to Simeon S. Jocelyn, New York, AMAV2, 5216.

⁴⁷William S. Coan, Portsmouth, February 16, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV2, 5321.

⁴⁸Orlando Brown, Norfolk, April 11, 1864, letter to Josiah B. Kinsman, Superintendent of the Department of Negro Affairs, Fortress Monroe, Letters Received 1863-1865, Department of Negro Affairs, Fortress Monroe, Virginia, Record Group 105, Inventory Number 4108, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, National Archives, hereafter referred to as BRFAL #4108.

⁴⁹Colonel Dickinson, Norfolk, May 21, 1864, letter to Josiah B. Kinsman, Fortress Monroe, BRFAL #4108.

⁵⁰William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, February 26, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV2, 5361.

⁵¹Henry S. Beals, "Letter to George Whipple", The American Missionary, 5;8;(May, 1864). Letter dated April 1, 1864.

⁵²William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, October 7, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 6181.

⁵³Monthly School Reports, April, 1864, AMAV3, 5669, 5673-76, 5680-82, 5686, 5689, 5694.

⁵⁴Mary E. Burdick, Norfolk, June 26, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 5872.

⁵⁵Lewis C. Lockwood, Fortress Monroe, May 24, 1862, letter to Brethren, New York, AMAV2, 4455B.

⁵⁶William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, September 15, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 6099.

⁵⁷Susan A. Walker, Norfolk, June 20, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 5853.

⁵⁸Charles B. Wilder, Hampton, October 4, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 6165.

⁵⁹Henry L. Swint, Northern Teacher in the South (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1941), p. 14. The many societies included the AMA, the Pennsylvania Freedmen's Relief Association, the National Freedmen's Relief Association, the New England Freedmen's Aid Society, the Philadelphia Friends of the Freedmen's Relief Association, and the Baptist Home Mission Society.

⁶⁰Orlando Brown, Norfolk, June 26, 1864, letter to Josiah B. Kinsman, Fortress Monroe, BRFAL #4108.

⁶¹William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, September 3, 5, 9, and 15, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 6063, 6066, 6089, 6099.

⁶²Orlando Brown, Norfolk, September 28, 1864, letter to Hanna E. Stevenson, Norfolk, AMAV3, 6137. Brown and Woodbury's main fear was that new experienced societies would cause havoc with the stable school conditions they had worked so hard to create. They knew the AMA possessed competent agents and administrators, and favored a non-sectarian education policy.

Being a Surgeon and educator rather than missionaries it is doubtful that they wanted to reserve the Twin Cities for any special society. If they did Gerrymander the conference representation so they held the majority results indicate that they were justified.

⁶³"General Order #30", Headquarters, District of Eastern Virginia, Brigadier General George F. Shepley, September 21, 1864, AMAV3, 6115.

⁶⁴William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, September 28, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 6136. Captain Brown wanted the order published to notify all the societies publically of the military approval, and the system itself.

⁶⁵William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, September 23, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 6125.

⁶⁶Henry C. Percy, Norfolk, October 14, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 6198.

⁶⁷William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, October 31, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 6267.

⁶⁸Steven S. Bell, Norfolk, November 8, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 6308.

⁶⁹William H. Woodbury, Norfolk, October 31, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York; Henry C. Percy, Norfolk, November 24, 1864, letter to George M. Whipple, New York, AMAV3, 6267, 6355.

Chapter IV

Implementing the Blueprint

In March 1865 Congress created the Bureau of Freedmen Refugees and Abandoned Lands to acculturate and protect the newly liberated slaves. Many changes affected the missionaries and contraband since the first Virginia mission in 1861. In Virginia, Assistant Commissioner Brown brought to his new position the experience of supervising a multisociety system of schools in Norfolk and Portsmouth. The Twin Cities model was simply the separation of an area into districts supervised by subordinates, but it was a proven system to begin the foundation for statewide schools.

Instead of a pioneer missionary society, the AMA found itself in the midst of several strong benevolent societies determined to slice a share of the market of Freedmen's souls. Each one maintained a separate structure of agents, inspectors, head teachers, assistants, school houses, supplies, and local contracts. In the 1864-65 school year, 250 teachers in Virginia operated solely through the efforts of the societies.¹

Applying a districted system to organize the efforts of many benevolent societies in one city or state was a simple concept. The occupying army and the Bureau both used district organization, but implementing the Twin Cities

blueprint demanded the cooperation of many competing factions, juggling of scarcely available resources, and the stabilization of a statewide student population. Orlando Brown brought with him the experience and authority to deal with the benevolent societies but his overall responsibility as Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau in Virginia precluded him from directly using his experience on a day to day basis. Woodbury, the first appointed Superintendent of Education, early had to retire to the North to take care of personal business. Subsequently, the difficult task of implementing the blueprint fell to Woodbury's assistant, Ralza M. Manly, an unknown bereft of extensive experience with the districting system.

Attaining a position of authority with the associations was a difficult task. The superintendency was potentially a weak rather than a strong position. In spite of Brown's and Woodbury's three year experience in Norfolk, the Bureau was an interloper in the mission societies' field of labor. Jealous of their own prerogatives and programs, the societies assumed responsibility for only their part of the system and responded primarily to their sources of income rather than the Bureau. In addition, many strong members in the societies officiated in the Bureau as district superintendents, inspectors, and agents, many with more field experience than Manly.

Ralza M. Manly was a Methodist Episcopal minister in 1863.² He served as principal of the Troy Conference Academy

in Poultney, Vermont, and of the New Hampshire Conference Seminary in Northfield, New Hampshire, both of the Methodist Episcopal Church.³ He joined the United States First Colored Cavalry on December 22, 1863 and one month later, on January 14, 1864, the Company Commander and field officers elected him Chaplain.⁴ He served diligently at Fortress Monroe and the surrounding area for the rest of the war, and worked as a head teacher of a night school with his wife and daughter in late 1864.

When the Freedmen's Bureau began its work in Virginia in May, 1865, Manly sought a transfer from his regiment to a Bureau position in some educational capacity.⁵ On May 18 he requested a twenty day leave of absence to move his family from New Hampshire to Vermont.⁶ Using his vacation time shrewdly, Manly visited Washington with a note from Assistant Commissioner Brown to inquire about his appointment with the Bureau. General Howard's adjutant recommended that he make an immediate application and push it through channels as quickly as possible.⁷ He complied, and on June 10, 1865, the War Department ordered him to report for duty to Brown as soon as possible.⁸

Filling the state superintendency posed a problem for Brown. He needed a person he trusted, and one whom the benevolent societies respected because they both submitted to his authority and paid his salary. Brown nominated Woodbury, and General Otis O. Howard, Commissioner of the

Bureau, approved his appointment on June 16. On the same day Brown received a letter from the National Freedmen's Relief Association refusing to pay the salary of "a general superintendent picked by the Commissioner."⁹ After committing the position to Woodbury (who was in the North on private business), and possessing no provision for money for the Superintendent's salary, Brown decided to use Chaplain Manly to run the Office of Superintendent with his authority and Woodbury's advice.

When the Bureau entered into the societies' educational "sphere of influence" in the summer of 1865, it was obvious that only a good system and strong superintendent could solve the many problems. The five main societies all wished to proselytize the same southeast section of the state, because one-eighth of the Negro population resided in the urban areas of Norfolk, Fortress Monroe, Petersburg, and Richmond.¹⁰ This produced a high population density that enabled the societies to reach a large number of people with one or two school houses, and just a few teachers in each city. One-half of all the Virginia teachers and pupils were concentrated in this area. Richmond with five percent of the population held twenty-five percent of the schools.¹¹ In addition, the military concentrated their forces at these four points. They furnished protection for the teachers and students from belligerent Virginians,¹² and provided housing for teachers and schools in the homes of loyal Unionists, unused military buildings or confiscated structures.

Every society shared a desire to educate the freedmen, but none wanted the others to gain a better portion of the spiritual market.¹³ The NFRA participated in Richmond and Norfolk, and the AMA taught in Richmond, Norfolk, Hampton, Portsmouth and Fortress Monroe. The American Baptist Home Mission Society (BHMS) supported schools in Lynchburg and they, along with the Pennsylvania Friends of the Freedmen's Aid Society (PFFAS) and the New England Freedmen's Aid Society (NEFAS), wanted to extend their schools into other areas.¹⁴ Each missionary society looked for the most advantageous area.

The associations understood little of the Bureau's role and intent concerning their work.¹⁵ They only accepted the idea of an organizer because of the obvious efficiency of an impartial coordinator.¹⁶ Also, as the official agent of the government, the Bureau represented a channel to revenue received from the sale of abandoned and confiscated lands and the benefits of the military occupation. The societies wanted to know whether Howard planned to supply transportation, rations, housing, or school buildings, whether they kept the prerogative to direct their own spiritual activities in or around, or in conjunction with their schools, or even whether the freedmen possessed a free choice of religion.¹⁷

From the outset the benevolent societies competed voraciously. At the beginning of the summer the societies refused to decide on a field to work. Each wanted more time to solidify its occupancy and each waited for the other to make the first

move. They all coveted part of Richmond. It contained such a large population in a small area, any one society dominating it held a large advantage over the others. Reverend W. L. Coan, the supervisor of the AMA schools, tried but failed to organize the associations in Richmond in early June.¹⁸ He also experienced many problems with the military authorities which he referred to as "copperheads," and advised Whipple to concentrate on Norfolk and Hampton.¹⁹ Two weeks later, General Alfred Terry, a friend of Colonel Brown, took over the military authority of the city, and Whipple along with the rest of the societies' officers waited to see how his demeanor and that of the Bureau would affect the Richmond field.²⁰

In Hampton the AMA hoped to make good a bid for sole control of the area by furnishing teachers for the large government school there.²¹ In early June Brown gave them a confidential commitment to allow them to take possession of it. He said that General O. O. Howard planned to make a general application for all the government property in that area, and in two or three weeks the Bureau could allow them to run the school.²² Reverend E. Knowlton, however, suspected that the principal, Charles P. Raymond, wanted to retain possession of the school under auspices of the Bureau. In that case the AMA, which taught all the schools in Hampton from 1861 to 1865, would lose the possible use of the 600 pupil school house. This, and the detrimental effects of Raymond's "experiment" on his former pupils, prompted him to push Howard for possession of the property.

Charles A. Raymond, the principal of the school, presented a good argument to Howard for retention of the school,²³ and General Butler supported him. Howard decided to wait until after the vacation to turn the property over to the AMA. Knowlton balked at the decision, but having faith in Brown's integrity he finally agreed after the latter reassured him on Howard's behalf.²⁴ Still, after failing to obtain further entrenchment in Hampton, the AMA waited during July for the Bureau to make the next move.

The Bureau's first effort to organize the societies met with failure. In early July Brown directed Professor Woodbury to call a representative from each society to attend a conference on July 20, where they could divide the field of labor amicably.²⁵ The AMA opposed a free discussion which might require revealing their goal of control of the Hampton-Norfolk area. The Secretary of the NFRA, Reverend William George Hawkins, wrote Brown that the field entailed a large enough area to accommodate all the individual efforts without a conference.²⁶ The NEFAS supported the idea, but lacked the opportunity to send a delegate,²⁷ and the BHMS failed to reply to the invitation. The Philadelphia and Pennsylvania Friends of the Freedmen's Aid Society were the only associations that favored the idea and planned to participate,²⁸ but they represented a minority of the associations. Brown cancelled the conference.

The failure of the conference left the Bureau's infant educational effort in confusion. The Brown, Woodbury and Manly

combination lacked the authority and means to administer the field without adequate input and cooperation from the societies. Business progressed very slowly within the office because Manly and Brown often found it necessary to consult Woodbury by mail for a concensus.²⁹ Even the practical aspects of the Bureau support lacked cohesiveness. Manly held authorization through Brown to provide transportation for teachers from their homes in the North to the field and to repair buildings already in use, but he operated with very meager resources. President Andrew Johnson declared amnesty in early June for most of the land owners, so Manly's usable revenue from the sale of confiscated lands never materialized. In some cases he used help from the military in the form of rations for the teachers, but only on a very limited and unpredictable basis. Brown and Woodbury even held slightly different ideas about the function of the Bureau in relation to the societies. Brown knew Howard wished them to superintend the activities of the societies and to make all the preparations for the coming year during the summer,³⁰ but Woodbury dissented, feeling the Bureau existed to aid and support the societies in whatever direction the latter deemed best.³¹

In late July of 1865 the process of organizing the education field made it obvious that the superintendency needed a firmer policy with more independent authority than Brown, Woodbury, or Manly previously anticipated. Brown's intention of aiding the societies lay in assuming the burden of organizing the total effort, and then providing the necessary practical

necessities available to help the system.³² Unfortunately the relief associations owned their individual school networks and favored that prerogative too much to release control of their work.³³ They firmly established this position by refusing to attend Brown's conference and pay the salary of the state superintendent. In the face of this, the main task for a new superintendent became impressing upon the societies that they and the freedmen profited by the Bureau's coordination.

Out of necessity Manly gradually became Acting Superintendent. Manly became Acting Superintendent only by proving his worth through the summer. When he originally began work as Assistant Superintendent in mid-June, Brown sought an experienced, salaried superintendent. For the month of July Manly served simply as a communication link between Brown, Woodbury and the officers of the benevolent societies. As late as August 17 the Corresponding Secretary of the NFRA, Reverend William George Hawkins, felt obliged to question Manly's position of authority in the Bureau.³⁴ Manly notified Hawkins that he held the position of Assistant Superintendent, and in doing so realized that he needed to take the reins of the superintendency more actively to demand cooperation from the societies.

The added aspect of impartiality of the superintendency placed Manly in a prime position to assume the Acting Superintendency in the absense of Woodbury. The line of authority and decision in the Bureau passed from Howard to Brown. Since

the latter held direct responsibility from Howard, he needed a loyal, autonomous superintendent. Woodbury failed to meet these qualifications because of his previous AMA connections. The other societies expected him to make concessions to the AMA and wanted the same treatment. In addition, private business demanded his presence in the North, and he still held the position without a salary. Manly, as a Chaplain of the Methodist Episcopal Church, drew salary from the Government, and belonged to a non-sectarian congregation with few teachers in Virginia. He willingly conformed to Army chain of command procedures, and his creed considered loyalty to the Union almost sacred.³⁵ What Manly lacked in missionary experience served to his benefit rather than his detriment.

In the two months of August and September, Woodbury gradually left all the duties of the superintendency to Manly.³⁶ He had to stay in the North, so it was necessary to post communications between him and his home office. The necessity for speed in solving the societies' problems before autumn, and the lack of a thorough knowledge of the problems because of his isolation, made it increasingly impossible for Woodbury to perform his function even in crucial matters requiring his experience. Subsequently, by mid-August Woodbury referred everything he received to Manly except materials that dealt exclusively with the AMA.

The problem that tested and proved Manly's ability to coordinate the benevolent associations materialized in August. The AMA and the NFRA refused to consolidate their teachers in

Richmond and Norfolk. The Congregationalists held almost sole control over Norfolk-Hampton, with some schools still in Richmond, while the NFRA provided teachers in both Norfolk and Richmond.³⁷ Manly wanted to consolidate the different societies' efforts in the Freedmen's Bureau districts,³⁸ in the same manner Woodbury and Brown districted Norfolk in 1864. Since the Bureau was an Army function part of the basic organization separated the state into districts. Manly gave the Butler property to the AMA in line with Brown's commitment to allow them to have all of the Norfolk-Hampton field. In this regard he also negotiated with George Whipple to let the Free Presbyterians of Virginia have the AMA schools in Richmond.³⁹ The latter feared that Raymond, backed by General Butler, might still regain the Butler school house for a private school,⁴⁰ and felt reluctant to release their claim in Richmond before they secured the property. In mid-August Reverend George William Hawkins, Corresponding Secretary for the NFRA, inquired about a home for his teachers in Richmond and Norfolk.⁴¹ He still felt that the field constituted sufficient area and population for everyone to labor where they wished.⁴² Manly expected the AMA to keep teachers in Richmond if he allowed Hawkins to hold a school in Norfolk because this action would negate Brown's commitment to the AMA. In this case, these two societies would crowd the Presbyterians out of the Richmond district and split their teachers between two cities.

On August 30 Manly moved to break the stalemate. Defiantly he bypassed Hawkins' society in Richmond and proposed to give all

of the Richmond, Church Hill area to the General Association for the Care of the Freedmen.⁴³ This proposal included buildings previously promised to the NFRA.⁴⁴ At about the same time, Captain Wilder, Bureau Superintendent of the Hampton District, advised Whipple to get hold of the Butler School House or he might lose much of the property that went with the house.⁴⁵ On September 8 Manly forwarded papers for the house to Whipple.⁴⁶ Realizing possession of the Butler property, the AMA released their claim on the Second Baptist Church in Richmond and promised to support Manly in whatever function he desired.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, faced with the possibility of losing most of their proposed Richmond field, and watching the AMA further entrench themselves at Norfolk and Hampton, the NFRA quickly accepted another Manly offer to supply teachers solely to the Chimborazo refugee camp on the outskirts of Richmond⁴⁸ and the Second Baptist Church in Richmond proper. The resulting plan left all the societies fairly centralized with an equal amount of urban territory.

In October Manly became Acting Superintendent and proceeded to further implement the blueprint. Efforts to work out the practical details populated the districts in a more dispersed pattern than expected. Some societies carried schools through the summer so instead of trying to relocate they stayed in their established locations. The difficulties of switching buildings, rental agreements, agents, teacher-field relationships, the lack of teachers, and the capacity of each society

to adequately support its field necessitated many changes. By this time, however, all the societies cooperated fully with Manly to serve the needs of the field of labor.

The AMA waited too late to mobilize their teachers, and other societies took a share of Norfolk to help cover the field. The AMA clustered their schools in Norfolk proper and directly across the mouth of the James River at Hampton, Fortress Monroe and Camp Hamilton. The NFRA and the New England Freedmen's Aid Association (NEFAA) both helped support schools in and around Norfolk. The Philadelphia Friends of the Freedmen's Relief Association, the Free Will Baptists, and the Free Presbyterians of Virginia filled in the area from Hampton north along the James River. The rest of Manly's efforts worked successfully. The NFRA, the American Baptist Home Mission Society and the NEFAA based in and around Richmond and Petersburg, and the Pennsylvania Friends of the Freedmen Associated worked the Lynchburg field with their associates, the Philadelphia Friends of the Freedmen's Relief Association.⁴⁹

By December Manly had achieved his goal of centralization. Through his coordination the main societies enlarged and centralized their power bases. The AMA concentrated over thirty teachers to service the 1st District, the Hampton-Norfolk area and obtained sole control of the 6th District in the Shenandoah Valley. The NFRA and the BHMS split Petersburg and Richmond respectively, the Pennsylvania and Philadelphia Friends of the Freedmen's Societies settled more extensively in Lynchburg, the 7th District. The NEFAA supported the 4th

District including Charlottesville, Louisa, and Gardensville. The concentrated areas provided a base for each society to direct school activities, in the cities and outlying areas, to receive supplies and to centralize religious activities. The District Superintendents received monthly reports from each school and forwarded them to Manly's office where he consolidated and forwarded them to Washington. The society agents in each field usually doubled as the District Superintendent, Assistant Superintendent, or both, and kept in constant contact with Manly by mail.

The Acting Superintendent's real obstacle was yet to come. On January 21, 1866, the Army mustered his regiment out of service⁵⁰ and notified him in late February that he no longer received Army pay or privileges. Assistant Commissioner Brown wrote to Howard on February 28, asking for an order to allow Manly to remain in the service.⁵¹ Howard endorsed it on March 3, and sent it to the Adjutant General's office which refused the request on March 5.⁵² Faced with the possibility of losing his Superintendent, Brown wrote another letter to Howard on March 9, asking that the Army revoke Chaplain Manly's muster out. He further asked that the Adjutant General date it retroactively from the date of his muster out because Manly stayed on duty consistently through the period of uncertainty. Brown stated that relieving Manly from duty "would be most injurious to the interests of the Freedmen."⁵³ Howard again endorsed the letter, and for-

warded it to the Adjutant General's office, only to receive the reply that the request "cannot be favorably considered there being no precedent for such action."⁵⁴ Even though the Adjutant General refused to revoke Manly's muster out, Brown's and Howard's efforts credit the valuable work of their Acting Superintendent. Faced with no financial support, and only a slim possibility of being hired as a civilian due to the Bureau's lack of funds, Manly decided to stay as Acting Superintendent without pay to complete the school year.

With a foundation established Manly moved to expand the schools. He realized that a good system needed consistency of personnel, facilities, and upward mobility. With determination he pushed to improve the system for the future. In March, 1866, Manly's system needed buildings. He understood that if he provided the buildings, the societies would make strenuous efforts to fill them. At the same time, Howard urged that the state superintendents investigate and report the physical conditions under which the schools operated. Manly received Charles A. Raymond on his staff as inspector of schools, and on March 3, 1866, he ordered Raymond to visit the schools of the 1st District, Norfolk and Portsmouth, and report upon the conditions and usefulness of each city's schools.⁵⁵


Raymond's report detailed the inadequacy of the rooms used for schools. "Eighty students crammed into church basements, upper rooms, parlors, and chambers in teachers' homes,

each of which were constructed to hold twenty-five persons at best." He went further to say that "the damp rooms, torturing seats, crowded inmates, and general aspects of nakedness and discomfit" compared unfavorably with the contemporary northern public schools.⁵⁶ On April 8th Manly ordered him to inspect the 2nd District.⁵⁷

Looking to the future, the Superintendent planned to use the blueprint to plan occupancy of the buildings for an even city distribution and equal society districting of schools in Richmond for the next year, but the Bureau lost the use of many buildings. Arsonists destroyed the Second Baptist Church, the building owned by a free black congregation, because they allowed the NFRA to operate a school there.⁵⁸ Unfortunately all Manly could do in the way of repair consisted of asking different societies to help donate money for a re-erection of the building.⁵⁹ Meanwhile the black congregation met elsewhere. This created a reluctance on the part of the black churches to use their buildings as schools.

As spring moved into April, the military evacuation caused a general shakeup of the Reconstruction areas. As a result, Manly gained and lost various buildings in the city. At the same time Colonel Brown requested that the military turn over to the Bureau the unoccupied portion of Camp Winder, a military installation near Richmond.⁶⁰ In late March they planned to evacuate and sell the refugee camp at Chimborazo in the western end of the city.⁶¹ Faced with losing the bulk

of the NFRA's field, Manly planned to retain three of the Chimborazo buildings and the one from Camp Winder, and more them to respective lots in the city.⁶² In addition the Boston Branch of the American Freedmen's Union Commission (AFUC) which was formerly the NEFAA bought an old Confederate bakery with four good buildings that would provide many classrooms and teacher accommodations.⁶³



Manly's sketched map of Richmond to illustrate the districting plan to William George Hawkins. The numerals represent the schools and teacher homes: #1 "Ebenezer Church" Baptist Home Mission School; #2 "Duval Street Church" Boston Society; #3 "Bakery," Boston Society; #4 2nd Baptist Church, New York National Freedmen's Relief Association; #5 Methodist Church, Boston Society; #6 St. Philips Church, Episcopal Mission Society; #7 Baptist Normal School; #8 1st African Church, Baptist Home Mission Society; #9 Chimborazo.

Manly again used a strict districting system to arrange the buildings, vis-a-vis, the societies. The breadth of Richmond went from 1st to 32nd Street with Chimborazo west of 32nd Street. Six of the societies' school accommodations lay between 1st and 6th Streets including the Second Baptist Church and the bakery. A normal school and a primary school existed at 12th and 14th Streets, but no schools serviced the area between 14th Street and Chimborazo. If the Boston Branch took the Camp Winder building, the city would have facilities for 2,000 pupils saturating the area from 1st to 6th Streets with almost nothing in the rest of the city. The Winder and Chimborazo buildings comprised enough space to serve the empty area. Manly proposed that the NFRA which became the New York Branch of the AFUC take the Winder Building and situate it nearer the empty end of the city to provide a more even distribution.⁶⁴

Negotiations between the military, the Bureau and the societies finally took shape. On April 13th the military evacuated Chimborazo except for the women and children, and sold half of the camp at auction. Manly urged the New York Branch to make an application for retention of the three buildings they used.⁶⁵ He hoped to keep the property with one of them, thereby keeping one building at Chimborazo and the other two in needed areas of the city.⁶⁶ He urged Hawkins to locate the Winder Building west of 10th Street to help balance out the city network.⁶⁷

Writing to Hawkins to place the Winder Building in a specific location constituted a last resort. At the combination of the NFRA and the NEFAS into the American Freedmen's Union Commission, the two branches began to work through two Corresponding Secretaries, Reverend Thurston Chase and Hawkins, and one agent in Richmond, Reverend Andrew Washburn. When Manly originally asked to move the Winder Building, he conferred with Chase who notified Washburn to purchase a site.⁶⁸ He asked Chase to try to situate the building between 10th and 32nd Streets so the New York Branch could use it to serve that area. Both Chase and Washburn belonged to the Boston Branch and wanted the building for extra accommodations for their teachers near 1st Street so the latter began appraising sites near there. Manly realized this, and wrote an angry letter to Hawkins. In this letter he stated the problem, included a map of the city schools and asked what was the Commission's purpose if not to aid in cooperation and communication.

Manly achieved an even distribution by June, but not in the way he expected. Hawkins' New York Branch purchased the Winder Building and found a site at 6th and Duval Streets.⁶⁹ Meanwhile, Manly picked up two new locations around 23rd and 24th Streets and kept one building at Chimborazo. The BHMS decided not to send teachers into their primary school at 14th Street for the next year,⁷⁰ but Manly asked the New York Friends of the Freedmen's Aid Society to support it.⁷¹ In the resulting configuration, the Boston and New York Branches

of the AFUC worked three districts in the city, while the NYFFAS took one district which comprised the west end of the city.

The Freedmen's Bureau and the Army Appropriations Bill that Congress passed in early June greatly helped to investigate and prepare buildings and their sites. The education provision of the Bureau Bill directed Commissioner Howard to provide school houses to benevolent societies who supported teachers. The Army Appropriations Bill gave the Bureau \$500,000 to spend on renting and repairing school buildings.⁷² Almost simultaneously, Manly ordered Inspector Raymond to inspect the schools in the Charlottesville, Shenandoah, Lynchburg, and Alexandria districts.⁷³ The bill also authorized the Secretary of War to retain in service, at the pay of their rank, Army officers on Bureau duty even after their regiment mustered out. It authorized payment of civilian agents and clerks out of \$230,000 set aside from Army Appropriations.⁷⁴ With this new authority, Brown appointed Manly Superintendent of Education in a civilian capacity on July 6, 1866,⁷⁵ and arranged salary payment retroactive to February.

The same day Manly received and forwarded the Raymond reports for Lynchburg and the Shenandoah Valley to Howard.⁷⁶ By August he completed organization of the societies' commitments to the field and the buildings to house them.

With a basic system established and the support of Orlando Brown, Manly used the next five years to develop and continue the system. As a principal he understood the necessities of a good school system. He perceived problems of returning teachers and operating schoolhouses on a year to year basis, juggled financial resources to ensure necessary revenue and social intervention to provide a learning atmosphere, communicated results to Bureau Headquarters, and anticipated the future of the effort in light of the conditions of the time.

In order to continue an efficiently working system, the Superintendent enforced a reporting system on all the schools in the system. Each school made a complete report to his office, and then to the Bureau Commissioner, General O. O. Howard's office in Washington. They included students enrolled by race, attendance, classes, buildings and owners, and enrollment in each of the seven subjects and in "high school."⁷⁷ His staff of assistant superintendents, inspectors and local superintendents insured the reliability and punctuality of the reports. Manly provided both the Bureau office in Washington and the benevolent organizations with minute information on the progress of every Bureau associated school in Virginia.

The Superintendent took quick action to solve any problems that came to light. Six months after Inspector Charles Raymond's report on the cramped school conditions in Norfolk

in March, 1866, Manly tripled the usable space for the student population.⁷⁸ He often went into the various local districts by train and by horse to lecture on the various school problems and initiate new schools. In one instance, a free Black community refused to allow their children to learn under a Freedman unless he was "light complected." Manly advised them that they would not have one, and reassigned the teacher. Later, a leader of the community asked for the teacher back.⁷⁹ Manly also travelled to Washington often to personally push monetary appropriations.

The Superintendent's most pressing problems were fiscal, but his efficiency and resourcefulness produced the best results on the Bureau's small appropriations, the benevolent organization's resources, and the Freedmen's donations. In October, 1867, many of the (AMA) teachers came late to begin the fall session because of a shortage of money.⁸⁰ Manly attacked the problem immediately by trying to enlist more support from the Freedmen. Even though the donations depended on crop yield, the Superintendent estimated that perhaps one fourth of the needed money could be obtained from the Freedmen with good management. During the period from 1867 to 1870, he continually juggled the resources to obtain the best possible result.

In the summer of 1869 aid from the societies diminished because of the advent of a state free school system, and a drought blighted the Freedmen's crops. In spite of this

Manly reported an increase in attendance for the first part of the following school year of a twenty-two percent average.⁸¹ He ascribed the unexpected increase to a last ditch interest by the people and a rigid application of a new rule not to furnish rental money to a proposed school unless it secured an average attendance of thirty pupils.⁸² Efforts such as this continued a static environment for the growth of the state schools.

Over the five year period between 1865 and 1870, using the system based on the Norfolk blueprint, the Bureau taught 50,000 previously ignorant slaves the elements of a primary education. It erected over two hundred schoolhouses including Normal Institutes in Richmond, Hampton, Charlottesville, and Petersburg, and trained scores of teachers.⁸³ The first small mission at Hampton had grown until its blossom was the most extensive Freedmen's education system in the Post Civil War South.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

¹Ministry Certification Letter from John C. Merrill, D. P. Leavitt, Jacob Sonborn, James Thurston, and E. Marriner to Commanding Officer of the First United States Colored Cavalry, U. S. Army, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, Ralza Morse Manly Personal Records File; National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereinafter referred to as Personal Records File.

²William Thomas Alderson, The Influence of Military Rule and The Freedmen's Bureau on Reconstruction in Virginia, 1865-1970 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1952), p. 102, 104.

³Alderson, Military Rule, p. 104.

⁴Meeting of the 1st Regiment, U.S.S.C. Report, Personal Records File.

⁵R. M. Manly, Norfolk, June 2, 1865, letter to Captain O. Brown, Richmond, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, Record Group 105, Virginia, Unregistered Letters and Telegrams Received by the Assistant Commissioner, Box 3, National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereinafter referred to as Unregistered Letters and Telegrams Received, Brown.

⁶R. M. Manly request for leave, May 18, 1865, Personal Records File.

⁷R. M. Manly, Norfolk, June 2, 1865, letter to Captain O. Brown, Richmond, Unregistered Letters and Telegrams Received, Brown, Box 3.

⁸Special Order #294, June 10, 1865, Personal Records File.

⁹Reverend William George Hawkins, New York, July 14, 1865, letter to Captain O. Brown, Richmond, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, Record Group 105, Virginia, Letter Received by the Superintendent of Education, Hereinafter referred to as Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 106.

¹¹Ibid., p. 106.

¹³George R. Bentley, A History of the Freedmen's Bureau (Geoffrey Cumberlege: Oxford University Press, London), 1955, p. 64.

¹⁴James E. Rhodes, July 14, 1865, letter to E. Woodbury, Richmond; E. D. Cheney, Boston, July 15, 1865, letter to O. Brown, Richmond; J. W. Parker, New York, July 26, 1865, letter to O. Brown, Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.

¹⁵J. W. Parker, New York, July 26, 1865, letter to O. Brown, Richmond, Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.

¹⁶R. M. Manly, Richmond, Jan. 23, 1867, letter to Ada W. Smith, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, Record Group 105, Virginia, Letters Sent by the Superintendent of Education, Vol. 51, p. 157, National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereinafter referred to as Letters Sent, Manly.

¹⁷J. W. Parker, New York, July 26, 1865, letter to O. Brown, Richmond, supra, p. 15.

¹⁸W. L. Coan, Richmond, June 1, 1865, letter to O. Brown, Richmond, June 1, 1865, Unregistered Letters and Telegrams Received, Brown, Box 3 Northern Charities Section.

¹⁹W. L. Coan, Richmond, July 5, 1865, letter to Whipple, New York, AMAV5, 7372.

²⁰W. D. Harris, Portsmouth, June 29, 1865, letter to Whipple, New York, AMAV5, 7348.

²¹G. M. Whipple, New York, May 16, 1865, letter to O. O. Howard, Washington, D. C., copy sent to O. Brown, Richmond, June 8, 1865, Unregistered Letters and Telegrams Received, Brown, Box 3, Northern Charities Section.

²²E. Knowlton, Fort Monroe, May 31, 1865, letter to Whipple, New York, May 31, 1865, AMAV5, 7218.

²³E. Knowlton, Fort Monroe, June 5, 1865, letter to Whipple, New York, AMAV5, 7255.

²⁴William W. Sweet, "Methodist Church Influence in Southern Politics," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, I, (1915), 552.

²⁵O. Brown, Richmond, July 3, 1866, letter to W. E. Woodbury, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, Record Group 105, Va, Letters Sent by the Assistant Commissioner, Vol. 12, p. 28, #88, National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereinafter referred to as Letters Sent, Brown.

- ²⁶W. G. Hawkins, New York, July 14, 1865, letter to Captain O. Brown, Richmond, supra, p. 5.
- ²⁷E. D. Cheney, Boston, July 15, 1865, letter to O. Brown, Richmond, Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.
- ²⁸P. C. Garretto, July 17, 1865, letter to O. Brown, Richmond, Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.
- ²⁹W. E. Woodbury, Massachusetts, July 28 and Aug. 30, 1865, letters to R. M. Manly, Richmond; F. W. Bird, Massachusetts, September 12, 1865, letter to Colonel O. Brown, (Endorsement by R. M. Manly), Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.
- ³⁰Bentley, Freedmen's Bureau, p. 64.
- ³¹W. E. Woodbury to Reverend E. Hunt, June 19, 1865, AMAV5, 7313.
- ³²Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, Record Group 105, Monthly Statistical School Reports, Report for the year ending October 31, 1866, Microfilm Roll #803-32, National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereinafter referred to as Monthly Statistical School Reports.
- ³³Bentley, Freedmen's Bureau, p. 64.
- ³⁴W. G. Hawkins, New York, Aug. 17, 1865, letter to R. M. Manly, Richmond, Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.
- ³⁵Sweet, supra, p. 8.
- ³⁶S. C. Sojan, Aug., 30, 1865, letter to W. E. Woodbury, Richmond (referred to as R. M. Manly), Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.
- ³⁷W. G. Hawkins, New York, Aug. 10 and 16, 1865, letter to R. M. Manly, Richmond, Letters Received, Supt. Ed., Box 1.
- ³⁸R. M. Manly, Richmond, Jan. 25, 1867, letter to Ada W. Smith, supra, p. 6.
- ³⁹G. M. Whipple, New York, Sept. 25, 1865, letter to R. M. Manly, Richmond, Letters Received, Supt. Ed., Box 1.
- ⁴⁰C. B. Wilder, Hampton, Sept. 2, 1865, letter to Whipple, New York, AMAV5, 7458.
- ⁴¹W. G. Hawkins, New York, Aug. 10, 1865, letter to R. M. Manly, Richmond, supra, p. 11.

⁴²W. G. Hawkins, New York, July 14, 1865, letter to O. Brown, Richmond, supra, p. 5.

⁴³S. C. Sojan, Aug. 30, 1865, letter to W. E. Woodbury, Richmond, supra, p. 11.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵C. B. Wilder, Hampton, Sept. 2, 1865, letter to Whipple, New York, supra, p. 12.

⁴⁶R. M. Manly, Richmond, Sept. 8, 1865, letter to Whipple, New York, AMAV, 7466; W. G. Hawkins, New York, Sept. 23, 1865, letter to R. M. Manly, Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.

⁴⁷G. M. Whipple, New York, Sept. 25, 1865, letter to R. M. Manly, Richmond, Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.

⁴⁸W. G. Hawkins New York, Sept. 23, 1865, letter to R. M. Manly, Richmond, Letters Received, Supt. of Ed., Box 1.

⁴⁹Manly Report for the Month of October, November 15, 1865, Monthly Statistical School Reports.

⁵⁰Information Letter from the Treasury Department, March 23, 1868, Personal Records File.

⁵¹O. Brown, Richmond, Feb. 28, 1866, letter to O. O. Howard, Washington, D. C., Letters Sent, Brown, Vol. 18, p. 170.

⁵²C. W. Foster, Washington, D. C., March 5 1865, letter to O. O. Howard, Washington, D. C., Personal Records File.

⁵³O. Brown, Richmond, March 9, 1866, letter to O. O. Howard, Washington, D. C., Letters Sent, Brown, Vol. 18, p. 174, #56.

⁵⁴C. W. Foster, Washington, D. C., March 14, 1866, letter to O. O. Howard, Washington, D. C., Personal Records File.

⁵⁵R. M. Manly, Richmond, March 3, 1866, letter to C. A. Raymond, Norfolk, Letters Sent, Manly.

⁵⁶C. A. Raymond, Morfolk, March, letter to R. M. Manly, Richmond, Special Report of School Houses in Norfolk and Portsmouth, AMAV7, 8453.

- ⁵⁷R. M. Manly, Richmond, April 8, 1866, letter to C. A. Raymond, Norfolk, Letters Sent, Manly, Vol. 51, p. 24.
- ⁵⁸R. M. Manly, Richmond, April 4, 1866, letter to W. C. Hawkins, New York, Letters Sent, Manly, Vol. 51, p. 22.
- ⁵⁹R. M. Manly, Richmond, July 21, 1866, letter to Dr. Hicox, Letters Sent, Manly, Vol. 51, p. 58.
- ⁶⁰O. Brown, Richmond, March 26, 1866, letter to P. A. Dair, Letters Sent, Brown, Vol. 13.
- ⁶¹R. M. Manly, Richmond, April 13, 1866, letter to W. G. Hawkins, Letters Sent, Manly, Vol. 51, p. 25.
- ⁶²Ibid.
- ⁶³R. M. Manly, Richmond, April 14, 1866, letter to W. G. Hawkins, New York, Letters Sent, Manly, Vol. 51, p. 27.
- ⁶⁴Ibid.
- ⁶⁵R. M. Manly, Richmond, April 13, 1866, letter to W. G. Hawkins, New York, supra, p. 17.
- ⁶⁶R. M. Manly, Richmond, April 14, 1866, letter to W. G. Hawkins, New York, supra, p. 17.
- ⁶⁷Ibid.
- ⁶⁸Ibid.
- ⁶⁹Ibid.
- ⁷⁰R. M. Manly, Richmond, June 23, 1866, letter to W. G. Hawkins, New York, Letters Sent, Manly, Vol. 51, p. 43.
- ⁷¹R. M. Manly, Richmond, July 26, 1866, letter to J. J. Woolsey, Boston, Letters Sent, Manly, Vol. 51, p. 62.
- ⁷²R. M. Manly, Richmond, Aug. 2, 1866, letter to Mrs. S. P. Smiley, Letters Sent, Manly, Vol. 51, p. 65.
- ⁷³Bentley, Freedmen's Bureau, p. 89.
- ⁷⁴R. M. Manly, Richmond, June 4, 1866, letter to C. A. Raymond, Letters Sent, Manly, Vol. 51, p. 39.
- ⁷⁵Bentley, Freedmen's Bureau, p. 89.

⁷⁶Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, Record Group 105, Virginia, Station Books of Officers and Civilians on Duty in the District of Virginia, Vol. 40, July 6, 1866.

⁷⁷Ralza M. Manly, "Monthly School Report for October, 1866," Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, Education Division, Monthly School Reports, Record Group #105, Microfilm #803-32, National Archives, Washington, D. C. Hereinafter referred to as School Reports.

⁷⁸C. A. Raymond, Norfolk, March 1866, letter to R. M. Manly, Richmond, Special Report of School Houses in Norfolk and Portsmouth, AMAV7, 8453. School Reports, March 1866. Ibid., November 1867. In November Manly reports three times as many buildings in use as the previous March. Over the summer General Howard pressed a successful campaign for more money for the Bureau because of the cramped conditions of the pupils.

⁷⁹R. M. Manly, Richmond, January 1, 1870, letter to General O. O. Howard, Washington, D. C., Semi-Annual School Report, School Reports.

⁸⁰R. M. Manly, "Monthly School Report for October, 1867," School Reports.

⁸¹R. M. Manly, Richmond, January 1, 1879, letter to General O. O. Howard, Washington, D. C., Semi-Annual School Reports, School Reports.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³R. M. Manly, Richmond, January 1, 1870, letter to General O. O. Howard, Washington, D. C., Semi-Annual School Report, School Reports.

CONCLUSION

The AMA and army personnel were primarily responsible for the tremendous success of the Freedmen's Bureau system in Virginia. Through the development and implementation of the Norfolk blueprint, they developed many of the main factors needed to insure a good school system. The blueprint generalized the experience of the Hampton Roads missions to the state as a whole, and the dedication of the personnel involved enabled them to overcome the many obstacles that they faced educating a large illiterate population with meager resources.

The efforts of the AMA to develop the schools in Hampton Roads created the proper conditions to develop the blueprint. In 1861, Lockwood's imagination encompassed the possibility of educated slaves. Six months later he envisioned a successful mission complex to impress visiting politicians with the evils of slavery, and thereby contribute to the liberation of the slaves. The struggles with Wool and Dix gave the AMA undisputed voice in the control of the Hampton Roads mission field which they developed for the entire decade.

Developing and expanding in the face of tremendous obstacles earned them experienced personnel, cooperation of the army, and support of the people. The struggle

to build along side the free Negro's of Hampton and the contrabands who endured the rigors of camp life in the midst of active war campaigns welded the hope of the contrabands to the efforts of the purveyors of education. It established the foundation for the missions in the area and a base from which to expand into Norfolk and Portsmouth.

After the occupation of Norfolk and Portsmouth, Hampton served as the base for preparation to move into the Twin Cities. The hardships the missionaries endured during the summer and fall before emancipation insured that the foundation remained secure and the missions consolidated for the time when expansion to the Twin Cities was possible.

The Norfolk and Portsmouth farms supplied the stability for a constant school contraband population. Up to that time, the main ingredients which kept the contraband population stable were the constant influx of refugees and the fact that women and children made up most of the population. Butler's General Order #64 led the way for expansion by allowing the missionaries and superintendents to progress with ideas they had nurtured and developed for over a year. Woodbury's coordination of the missions with Brown's efforts to organize and care for the refugees, and the late summer '63 reorganization reaped rewards when the

order came because the missions had the capability to expand from a solid base.

Being an urban area of high population density, the Twin Cities area attracted many different societies whose goals were to proselytize and teach. In 1864 it was also a good base to move into other areas of the state and North Carolina. Fearing the disruption of their system, Woodbury and Brown created the blueprint plan to district the cities according to population vis-a-vis the societies. The highly successful system allowed the societies to reach one third more children with their resources, and controlled the movement of the student population to achieve static attendance.

The implementation of the blueprint in the Freedmen's Bureau solved many problems. The disruption caused by the end of the war and the infusion of many new societies into the state threatened to hopelessly cast the state into a disorganized hodge-podge of small competitive school complexes. After a society inhabited buildings and garnered a student population changing to another area was virtually impossible. Instituting a state system needed to be done at the outset. The job fell to Manly largely by coincidence, but he was well-suited to administer a large system. Having administered a seminary in Vermont he understood the intricacies of educating many students on meager resources,

and was familiar with the Norfolk system. He recognized early that the Norfolk blueprint was the key to organizing the state system, and from that point concentrated on implementing it with hard work and persistence.

The single most important factor in the success of the blueprint and the schools was the continuity of personnel. To insure mission progress during the war years, Whipple and Jocelyn endeavored to make smooth personnel transitions. Close communications, sometimes as much as a letter a day, and never over three or four day intervals, characterized the relationship between the corresponding secretaries and the supervisors at Hampton Roads. Each time a new supervisor arrived or the leadership of the mission changed hands, the new supervisor studied the mission for many weeks before he assumed an active leadership role, and then always made decisions with the thorough approval of Whipple and Jocelyn.

Working hand in hand with Whipple and Jocelyn, Brown was necessarily close to this process and adopted it to administering the Bureau. He kept Manly under his wing for the year of the latter's Acting Superintendency. Working in the same building as Manly he directed him closely, endorsed all of the first school reports to Howard, and in the beginning all the crucial letters.

The AMA gave much thought to placing their leaders.

There were four types of mission personnel: teachers, preachers, pioneer missionaries, and administrators. In addition some worked under particular conditions, and others under any conditions. Whipple and Jocelyn tried to match their strengths with the work needed to be done. They searched all spring for Woodbury to run the Norfolk system.

One other factor important to continuity of personnel was the dedication of the workers themselves. The individual sacrifices of the many missionaries, and administrators served to reduce the many obstacles and keep the missions moving at an ever progressing pace. The AMA looked especially for dedicated competent men. After they changed their policy to primarily education in 1863 they began to look for competent educators. Subsequently most of their people were dedicated to educating the contraband as well or more so than proselytizing them. In the case of Brown and Manly, their personal dedication saw them through the long time period. Between these two people and the AMA three of the most important ingredients for a successful school system were met: strong leadership, consistency and support of a stable student population. In this sense the leadership of the AMA, Brown and Manly were primarily responsible for the successful results.

Three secondary themes ran through the account of the mission's growth that shed light on possible missions influence on national policies. To a large degree the

Hampton missions led to the creation of Freedmen's Bureau. The missions dealt the last blow at slavery from a well established abolitionist movement, and the coincidence of events at the missions and changes of federal policy revealed a very strong influence on federal policy on the whole.

The Freedmen's Bureau evolved from a series of efforts beginning in 1862, and the Hampton Roads Missions influenced these efforts at many points. The American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission almost exactly resembled General Wool's Investigatory Commission of one year earlier, which was called due to the complaints of Lockwood, and recommended all his suggestions in their report. The AFIC investigated the contraband situation in many occupied areas, but came out with the same general conclusions as Wool's Investigatory Commission. The resulting experiments followed exactly as the AFIC recommended through Butler's General Order #64, and the plan of the Bureau for the leasing of the farms was identical to the one used in the Hampton Roads experiments.

The Hampton Roads area itself lent to the influence of the Freedmen's Bureau. Its proximity to Washington allowed many legislators to visit and view first hand the results of the experiments, and its location in

an active theater of war increased the dependability of systems deemed successful in the midst of much consternation. In addition the Hampton Roads area was dear to Stanton, who authorized the first farm experiments, and the Radical Republicans who pushed the appointment of Butler. These were precisely the people who envisioned and implemented the Bureau. After 1863 the Hampton Roads missions became a proving ground for possible Bureau programs, and a successful prototype for the Bureau.

The missions dealt the last blow at slavery by the well established abolitionist movement. Endeavoring to prove the potential of the Negro to the North and the South for many years every scrap of evidence of the Negro's ability to learn and self subsist at Hampton Roads was published by the AMA and other represented periodicals at Fortress Monroe. The first effort was a supplement on Fortress Monroe and Lockwood in October 1861. From then on letters from the teachers, Superintendents, and missionaries inundated the northern population with the evils of slavery, made all the more horrible because of the newly proven potential of the "African" race. Lectures to the North, visitors to Monroe, teacher's letters home, articles in magazines and all the major newspapers harped on the new found results of the Black man to labor and learn in a free society. Many new

societies to help the freedmen, and contributions to aid in the work found their way back to the missions in all the occupied areas. This propaganda greatly helped to change the emphasis of the Union toward emancipation.

The close coincidence of Federal Policy and the changes in the Fortress Monroe Missions showed the mission's growth influencing federal policy. From the first cooperation of Lockwood and Wool in 1861 Federal Policy had a great effect on the establishment of the rights of the contraband, and vice versa. Lockwood's problems and the AMA push for General Wool's Investigatory Commission in February 1862 committed the government to a policy of aiding the contraband very early in the war. The organization of the contrabands and establishment of schools at the missions forced the army to initiate some policy. The AMA's continual badgering of Dix during the summer and fall of 1862 insured a continuation of that policy. At the same time Whipple's strategy with the General rewarded the effort in the months after emancipation. Finally, influencing public opinion through the mission results the missions helped Lincoln realize that more support for the war would come from freeing the slaves than simply reuniting the Union.

One of the most valuable evidences produced by the

missions was the ability of the contraband to peacefully work and learn in the midst of the chaos of the Peninsula campaign. This dispelled many visions of disruption after emancipation, mass insurrection, and inability of the freedmen to cope with an independent society.

The most obvious contribution was through education. The Freedmen's Schools of Virginia educated over 50,000 freedmen between 1865 and 1870. Due to the persistence of Manly and the development of the Norfolk blueprint as a foundation, the system largely contributed to a first and most successful state school system in the Southern states. The Virginia State Public School System began on the heels of the Freedmen's system, and borrowed much from it. It was this system that actually changed Virginians' minds to the necessity of educating the black population, and public education in general. The education legacy from Reconstruction owed much to the Virginia State Freedmen's system.

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