

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

INVENTING AND DELIVERING THE
WOMAN CITIZEN: SUSAN B.
ANTHONY'S EXTEMPORANEOUS
SPEAKING AS A PERFORMANCE
OF CITIZENSHIP IN SERVICE OF
WOMAN SUFFRAGE

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Susan B. Anthony became the face of the woman suffrage movement as she traveled across the country speaking and organizing. Anthony began speaking extemporaneously in 1857 and embraced the conversational and immediate performance that remained her dominant practice through her public career. This project examines how Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship in service of her arguments for women's rights and woman suffrage during three periods of the nineteenth century. My research suggests both theoretical and methodological challenges of studying nineteenth-century extemporaneous rhetoric. I also discuss the problems associated with extemporaneous speaking in a movement for social change and engage the theoretical bounds of how citizenship can be performed rhetorically when liberal and republican citizenship status are denied based on an individual's identity.

The first period includes Anthony's extemporaneous speaking within the social and religious upheaval of the Burned-over District of Upstate New York before and

during the Civil War (1849-1864). My analysis suggests that Anthony's extemporaneous speaking used a millennial and prophetic invention and delivery that derived from what I call the genre of Burned-over District rhetorical culture. Drawing upon this tradition allowed Anthony to speak persuasively to Burned-over District audiences but rendered her message inaccessible to the policy makers in Albany and Washington D.C. The second case examines Anthony's extemporaneous speaking during Reconstruction (1865-1874). Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship that both constituted women as equal citizens and provided the impetus for national-level politicians and state legislatures to codify the cultural assumptions of male-gendered citizenship into policy language that excluded women from democratic citizenship rights. The third case examines how Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of "character citizenship" during the final years of her professional career in the context of the Gilded Age (1875-1906). Character citizenship manifested in that era as a way to define who was or could be a good American through the lens of gendered, middle-class, white, Protestant values. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned to frame her as a laudable woman of character who was a respectable authority on the topic of woman suffrage.

**Inventing and Delivering the Woman Citizen:
Susan B. Anthony's Extemporaneous Speaking as a
Performance of Citizenship in Service of Woman Suffrage**

by

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List of Abbreviations

AASS	American Anti-Slavery Society
AERA	American Equal Rights Association
AWSA	American Woman Suffrage Association
NAWSA	National American Woman Suffrage Association
NWSA	National Woman Suffrage Association
WCTU	Women's Christian Temperance Union

Chapter 1

Susan B. Anthony's Extemporaneous Speaking as a Performance of Nineteenth Century Female Citizenship

Susan B. Anthony began working for women's rights in 1852, cemented her role as the marshaling "General"¹ of the woman suffrage movement in the 1870s, and was the namesake of the 1920 Woman Suffrage Amendment. From her 1840s work with the New York State teachers and temperance associations² to her arrest for voting as part of the "new departure" strategy of the 1870s³ to her leadership of the NAWSA,⁴ Anthony used a skillful, immediate, and extemporaneous public discourse. Anthony's speeches drew crowds across the country and institutions where she spoke frequently lauded her as a "Woman of Genius."⁵

Participating in progressive social causes like temperance and woman suffrage propelled Anthony onto the public stage.⁶ Educated in the "Burned-over District"⁷ of Upstate New York, Anthony regularly encountered radical social change advocates like Frederick Douglass and William Lloyd Garrison, and she attempted to emulate them in her work for temperance, abolition, and women's rights.⁸ Throughout her career, Anthony spoke on a range of issues affecting women including the legal rights of female citizens, abolition, temperance, and labor law, as well as "social evils" like poverty, prostitution, education, and domestic abuse.⁹ In spite of her massive popularity during her lifetime and the public recognition for her contributions in recent decades, relatively little rhetorical scholarship has investigated Anthony's public address.

The majority of rhetorical scholarship about Anthony focuses on her anomalous 1873 "Is It a Crime for a U.S. Citizen to Vote?" speech.¹⁰ The speech is Anthony's best-

documented rhetorical performance but is not representative of her rhetorical style.

Karlyn Kohrs Campbell analyzed this inherently deductive and strongly argumentative speech as an exemplar of natural rights arguments in the struggle for woman suffrage.¹¹

Cindy Koenig-Richards argued that Anthony's "Is It a Crime" speech was contextually appropriate for the judicial/political context.¹² "Is It a Crime" was a manuscript speech, delivered at least fifty times by Anthony, printed in local newspapers, and disseminated as a pamphlet before her trial.¹³

Unlike "Is It a Crime," Anthony generally delivered her speeches in an extemporaneous style characterized by a series of anecdotes, arguments, and examples pieced together for specific audiences. In 1857, Anthony embraced extemporaneous speaking. This mode of address remained her dominant practice through the remainder of her public career. Between the 1870s and the 1890s, Anthony often spoke extemporaneously as many as two hundred times per year.¹⁴ She did not keep transcripts or detailed records of these speeches, and her original biographer, Ida Husted Harper, contended that most speeches never existed in manuscript form.¹⁵

In this dissertation, I explore Susan B. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking in support of women's rights and woman suffrage. Focusing specifically on the style of extemporaneous speaking, I investigate: *How did Susan B. Anthony invent and practice extemporaneous speaking in her work with the women's rights and woman suffrage movement?* Following Anthony's life and the development of her public career, I also ask: *How did Anthony's extemporaneous speaking function as a performance of citizenship?* To answer these questions, this chapter establishes a framework for analyzing Anthony's extemporaneous speaking. I begin with a review of scholarly

research on Anthony and a discussion of the archival texts I use for this project. I next address the methodological challenges of dealing with the fragmentary texts of extemporaneous discourse. Then, to establish a theoretical lens for addressing my first research question, I review literature on extemporaneous speaking and nineteenth-century texts that taught and discussed the practice. I then review the literature on citizenship performance to craft a theoretical lens through which to answer my second research question. The final section of this introduction provides an overview of the next chapters in my dissertation.

A Historiography of Susan. B Anthony

Analyzing Anthony's extemporaneous speaking style is complicated by the interests she and later writers had in using her rhetoric and life story as a legitimizing discourse for the suffrage and feminist movements.¹⁶ Anthony and Stanton spearheaded the project of writing the *History of Woman Suffrage* with the goal of recording and preserving the movement's history.¹⁷ In the preface to the first volume, the authors said that "In preparing this work, our object has been to put into permanent shape the few scattered reports of the Woman Suffrage Movement still to be found, and to make it an arsenal of facts for those who are beginning to inquire into the demands and arguments of the leaders of this reform."¹⁸ Anthony also dictated to Harper how her own biography, *The Life and Work of Susan B. Anthony*, should be written.¹⁹ Anthony and Harper were close friends; Harper lived in Anthony's Rochester home for several years while writing the biography.²⁰ Both Harper's biography and the *History* are interested texts constructed to frame their subjects as honorable, intelligent, and tireless movement leaders. Lisa Tetrault argued that the *History* and Harper's biography framed Anthony's life and

rhetoric as a legitimizing discourse upon which future women's rights activists could build.²¹ The framing used in the *History* and Harper's biography also influenced the narratives of the woman suffrage movement recorded by twentieth-century scholars and activists.

Three biographies about Anthony were written between her death in 1906 and the beginning of the feminist movement in the late 1960s, each framing her as an idealized social and moral reformer and exemplar of respectable women's advocacy. Rheta Childe Dorr wrote the first biography in 1928, drawing on Harper's biography, the *History*, and Anthony's scrapbooks in the Library of Congress, and interviews with women who had worked with her. Dorr situated Anthony as the ideal of the suffrage movement, saying that she possessed "that feminine and emotional sense of humanity which transcends class and sex and embraces with love the whole human race."²² Alma Lutz' 1959 biography framed Anthony as an early player in the "recognition of human rights, now expressed in the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights."²³ While still relying primarily on the *History* and Harper for her narrative, Lutz also cited original letters and documents from sources other than Anthony and Stanton. Interestingly, Lutz framed Anthony as a generally conservative reformer who favored human rights from a traditional American position. Finally, Katherine Anthony's biography focused on Anthony as "the woman behind the name," working to "depict her as a human being with arms and legs, impulses and emotions, experiences and reactions; not as the figurehead of the feminist cause."²⁴ Although Katherine Anthony more fully engaged archival texts, she still relied on the Harper biography for a narrative of Anthony's life and portrayed Anthony as a conservative concerned mostly with suffrage.

Eleanor Flexner's *Century of Struggle* was a scholarly history of the woman suffrage movement that was influential in creating the common narrative of nineteenth-century women's work used throughout much of the late twentieth century. Written in 1959 and republished in 1975, Flexner's history provided a narrative of the woman suffrage and women's rights struggle that frequently reflected Anthony and Stanton's framing of the events. A pertinent example of this potential problem is Flexner's account of the split between the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) and the National Woman's Suffrage Association (NWSA).²⁵ Taken almost completely from the *History* and a 1940 book published by the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), Flexner did not consult possible differing stories from the AWSA.²⁶ Although Flexner's book perpetuated some of the problems inherent in the *History*, she also included the most comprehensive archival research of any book addressing Anthony's life before the 1980s.

During the feminist movement of the 1960s and 70s, most work on Anthony came in popular and children's publications where she was frequently invoked as a legitimizing figure for second wave feminist policies.²⁷ In the 1980s and 90s, there was a renaissance in scholarship on Anthony's life, work, and rhetoric.²⁸ Katherine Barry's *Susan B. Anthony: A Biography of a Singular Feminist* from this period is the primary scholarly biography I use in this dissertation. Barry's 1989 biography takes an explicitly radical feminist approach, framing Anthony as "one of the most unconventional women of the nineteenth century" and "the most dramatic and charismatic of feminist rebels."²⁹ Barry also invokes a psychoanalytic perspective that articulates some problematic arguments about Anthony's internal life, motives, and beliefs without reference to supporting

material.³⁰ In spite of these problems, Barry does engage more thoroughly with archival material related to Anthony's life than previous writers. She also works to substantiate stories from the *History* and Harper's biography with primary source material.

The burgeoning interest in women's work during the feminist movement was matched by a growing interest in women's rhetoric from communication scholars, yet little of this work studied Anthony's speeches.³¹ Campbell's *Man Cannot Speak for Her* recovered many women's speeches from the nineteenth century and offered "feminine style" as a theory for analyzing them. Campbell's analysis of "Is It a Crime" highlighted the exceptional forensic style and argumentation in Anthony's speech. Campbell also pointed out that the speech was an anomaly for the suffrage movement; although other speeches included in her recovery work featured forensic elements, "Is It a Crime" differed radically from the feminine style of other speeches.³² Cindy Koenig-Richards extended upon Campbell's work, contextualizing how appropriate Anthony's rhetorical choices were for the forensic nature of arguments in the U.S. legal system.³³ Rhetoricians have yet to publish critical analyses on any of Anthony's other speeches.³⁴ Although both of these works offered more insight into Anthony's rhetoric than the biographies above, both still relied on the *History* and Harper's biography for their history and narrative.

The scant biographical and rhetorical research on Anthony raises questions about why she is such a well-known figure in the collective scholarly zeitgeist. This question is partially answered for me by her prominent place in histories of the women's movement and in biographies of Elizabeth Cady Stanton.³⁵ Histories of the nineteenth-century women's rights and woman suffrage movement also consistently retell Anthony's story.³⁶ Additional scholarly attention to Anthony's life comes from anthologies and readers of

nineteenth-century thought.³⁷ A second explanation comes from what Gordon calls the “appropriations of Anthony as a symbol” in both political and social agendas.³⁸ These appropriations have fostered a plethora of debates and discussions about Anthony outside the realm of scholarly study.³⁹ Two popular documentaries, aired on the Public Broadcasting Service, have also contributed to Anthony’s public renown.⁴⁰

Anthony’s growing popularity in the last thirty years is reflected in recent scholarship. The current research on Anthony’s life and work is more textually grounded and seeks to move beyond the limits imposed by Harper and the *History*. Most important is Ann D. Gordon’s collection of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony’s papers. Gordon’s six-book, forty-six microfilm reel collection includes letters, journals, speeches, newspaper articles, editorials, scrapbook papers, and copies of *The Revolution*. This publication is the foundation for current scholarship on Anthony, including Christine L. Ridarsky and Mary M. Huth’s *Susan B. Anthony and the Struggle for Equal Rights*. The articles in Ridarsky and Huth’s collection each ground their arguments in original texts and not the *History* as they make arguments about Anthony’s work, education, and how she is remembered.⁴¹ N.E.H. Hull’s *The Women Who Dared to Vote* is the first book-length work on the legal dimensions of Anthony’s trial for voting in 1872.⁴² Finally, Wolfgang Mieder’s “*All Men and Women are Created Equal*”: *Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s and Susan B. Anthony’s Proverbial Rhetoric Promoting Women’s Rights* presents a book-length analysis specifically devoted to exploring Anthony and Stanton’s proverb-based rhetoric.⁴³ These studies engage with archival texts from Anthony’s life to provide a more thorough and nuanced picture of Anthony as an activist and rhetor.

The historical record of women's public life and discourse in the nineteenth century is fraught with competing agendas and interests. Susan B. Anthony's history is skewed by her control over the preserved record and the way that record has been uncritically repeated by twentieth-century historians. This problem is by no means unique to women's history.⁴⁴ It does, however, demand that I carefully consider the historiographic work I use in this dissertation. I treat each of these books and documents as an archival text and seek to understand it within its context, not as an unbiased or disinterested source. This approach allows me to utilize Anthony as an exemplary case study of the extemporaneous speaking style in the nineteenth century and draw rhetorical and theoretical resources from her life to analyze that style, without assuming an unbiased or complete record. The interested nature of this record is useful for my project as it highlights the problems with current approaches to rhetorical scholarship that ignore the unique discursive practice of extemporaneous discourse.

Methods to Analyze Extemporaneous Speaking

Recognizing the unique discursive practice of extemporaneous speaking raises a methodological hurdle for my dissertation research. Twentieth and twenty-first-century rhetorical scholarship does not provide a way to analyze extemporaneous discourse that both recognizes its immediate situatedness and acknowledges its social invention and diachronic evolution. In the following paragraphs, I first discuss the paradoxical ways extemporaneous discourse has been analyzed in previous studies of public address and then propose a method for how I will analyze Anthony's extemporaneous rhetorical career.

Current rhetorical scholarship seeks to create functional objects for inquiry from the fragmentary texts recording and reporting nineteenth-century extemporaneous speeches. Robert N. Gaines goes so far as to assert that “historical and critical knowledge claims about rhetorical discourse depend inherently upon the texts employed as objects of scholarly inquiry.”⁴⁵ This focus on objects for inquiry presents a paradox for scholarship on extemporaneous speaking. Speech, especially extemporaneous speech, is an inherently “perishable medium of communication.”⁴⁶ Yet, studying extemporaneous speeches requires the use of enduring texts as a foundation for scholarship. Put simply, scholars must use permanent objects to study ephemeral speeches. Negotiating this methodological paradox should be a central concern of scholars studying nineteenth-century public discourse.

I identify three approaches to negotiating this paradox present in rhetorical literature. The most common approach to extemporaneous speaking in public address studies has been to ignore the possibility of extemporaneous discourse entirely.⁴⁷ The second popular approach to dealing with this type of discourse is to collect various incomplete texts, transcripts, and reports of a discourse and collate them into a facsimile of what the rhetor might have said at a given speaking engagement.⁴⁸ This approach often leaves the written text of nineteenth-century extemporaneous speaking indistinguishable from more scripted and prepared oratorical performances.⁴⁹ The final common method for dealing this textual paradox involves using reporting texts to give a reader the flavor of a speaker’s discourse without pretending to offer manuscripts or “authentic” objects for analysis of what a particular speaker said at a particular place and time. For example, Ronald F. Reid and James F. Klumpp’s *American Rhetorical Discourse* provides students

with a narrative from Davey Crockett's biography to offers readers a sense of his discourse.⁵⁰

Each of the above approaches negotiates the paradox of extemporaneous speaking, but each also falls short of being able to analyze actual extemporaneous speeches. One could argue that the only truly authentic method for analyzing extemporaneous speaking would involve multiple recordings and ethnographic listener accounts, a method obviously impossible with nineteenth century speeches. However, scholars must begin to recognize the unique discursive nature of extemporaneous speech in our historical and critical analyses. I wholly agree with scholars who assert the need for authentic texts as the foundational objects for the rhetorical criticism of public address. However, the "authentic" text of an extemporaneous speech changed from venue to venue, and from listener to listener. Extemporaneous speeches have always been inherently perishable communiqués. Listeners would not remember a fully formed speech, nor would newspapers record and print verbatim transcripts for readers. Extemporaneous speeches were functionally different from manuscripted oratory.

The distinct nature of extemporaneous speaking should change the method by which scholars analyze the rhetorical functions of extemporaneous discourse. The nature of extemporaneous speaking should also encourage a reconsideration of what texts scholars will consider as objects for inquiry when analyzing how extemporaneous speaking functioned in its context. To this end, I address the objects of my analysis as fragmentary and constructed, made up of text, context, revision, and critique. Michael Calvin McGee referred to Edmund Burke's "Speech on the Conciliation with the Colonies" as a text in the sense of a "finished discourse," while noting that, in the "post-

modern condition,” “no texts [of this finished sort] exist.”⁵¹ Instead, McGee argued that “[w]e have instead fragments of ‘information’ that constitute our *context*. The unity and structural integrity we [formerly] put in our texts as they faithfully represented nature is now presumed to be *in us ourselves*.” Although McGee situated the fragmentary text as a distinctly twentieth-century invention, his descriptions are useful for a discussion of women’s nineteenth-century extemporaneous discourse. As a critic, I follow McGee’s lead and “invent a text suitable for criticism” from the records Anthony left about herself, press reports written about her speeches, and various biographies and collections devoted to her life.

Constructing my objects for inquiry from the fragmented record available allows me to use these enduring-but-fragmentary texts as the foundation for my analysis of perishable extemporaneous speeches. I have noted the texts available about Anthony’s life in the historiography section above. With these texts, I study how extemporaneous speaking functioned for Anthony and her audiences across the three major periods of her public life. As I engage in textual analysis, I explicitly acknowledge the constructed natures of my texts and consciously practice what McGee calls collapsing context into text through the concept of fragments.⁵² This approach reads Anthony’s texts as parts of their immediate context, as voices in the larger social and cultural context from which they were shaped, and as flexible rhetorical actions that changed across time.

My dissertation project reads the constructed texts of Anthony’s speeches as immediate responses to their context that were inherently fragmentary in their presentation and reception. Nearly 1,000 newspaper accounts exist of speeches, addresses, and remarks Anthony made throughout her lifetime.⁵³ One of the most

valuable contributions of these accounts is to provide me with a fragmented record of the immediate context into which Anthony spoke and of what listeners and reporters heard, remembered, and cared about during her speeches. These accounts often document interruptions to Anthony's speeches and her responses to those interruptions, as well who was in the crowd and the reactions of those audience members. These accounts also provide a record of how Anthony's performance and content changed based on immediate audience reactions and over the course of time and distance. I augment these newspaper accounts with Anthony's notes, letters, and journal entries on her speaking. Anthony was a prolific writer, and many of her journals and letters to Elizabeth Cady Stanton and other friends remain accessible and legible. Finally, I use the various abstracts and partial transcripts of speeches provided by newspapers, Anthony's notes, and Harper's biography to catalog the stories, arguments, and themes I find in the texts.

Nineteenth Century Extemporaneous Speaking Culture

Most of Anthony's public discourse was delivered extemporaneously. While twentieth-century rhetorical scholars have paid little direct attention to nineteenth-century extemporaneous discourse, nineteenth-century oratory textbooks, biographies, and preaching manuals dealt at length with the practice of extemporaneous speaking. I begin with literature from contemporary rhetorical and forensic scholarship that theorizes extemporaneous speaking as a more immediate and flexible practice of public discourse that connoted authenticity and education to American audiences. This research, however, does not provide adequate theoretical and conceptual resources for my analysis. Therefore, I next examine nineteenth-century textbooks, biographies, and preaching

manuals that provide several valuable conceptual resources for analyzing the invention and delivery of extemporaneous discourse in the nineteenth century.

Extemporaneous Speaking: Immediacy, Flexibility, Authenticity, and Education

Twentieth-century rhetorical studies theorize extemporaneous speaking as an immediate and flexible response to a speaker's perception of an audience's needs.⁵⁴ In a 1923 article on pedagogy in *The Quarterly Journal of Speech Education*, Wayland Maxfield Parrish argued that extemporaneous speaking was a more useful style of discourse to teach in public speaking classes than the more popular declamation and oratory styles of the early twentieth century.⁵⁵ In a rare analysis that dealt explicitly with extemporaneous speaking, Robert Gunderson's 1951 analysis argued that much of Daniel Webster's oratory in support of William Henry Harrison's presidential bid was extemporaneous, a conversational style that was perceived as "crisp and colloquial, rich in homely idioms and humorous turns of phrase" by listeners.⁵⁶ This extemporaneous rhetoric, Gunderson argued, allowed Webster to successfully connect with his more colloquial public audiences on the campaign trail. Although not a main point of his work, David Zarefsky also noted that much of Lincoln's early oratory was extemporaneous and conformed to the colloquial, anecdotal, and narrative content expected of extemporaneous discourse.⁵⁷ The other body of communication literature to address extemporaneous speaking comes from studies devoted to intercollegiate debate and forensics. These studies focus exclusively on the pragmatic and presentational aspects of extemporaneous speech as a forensic competition event.⁵⁸ Taken together, these studies highlight the immediacy and flexibility of extemporaneous speaking as a mode of address.

Two other rhetorical studies have expanded the theoretical and conceptual vocabulary for understanding extemporaneous speaking by highlighting its connection to perceived authenticity and education during the nineteenth century. J. Michael Sproule's 2012 "Inventing Public Speaking" also addressed the flexibility and audience-adaptive capacity of extemporaneous discourse.⁵⁹ Sproule traced the development of extemporaneous speaking as the main denotation of "public speaking" from the more prevalent declamation and oratory meanings of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Sproule asserted that extemporaneous speaking was part of a century-long practical revolution that created a more argument-rich and democratic approach to public affairs. Sproule contextualized extemporaneous speaking as a part of practical democracy and specifically discussed the extemporaneous style as "a more content-rich and situation-adaptive address that more directly informed public deliberation" than the declamation and oratory of previous generations. Emily Murphy Cope's recent work on nineteenth-century extemporaneous speaking used John Albert Broadus' 1870 *A Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons* to convincingly demonstrate that, by 1870, extemporaneous speaking had become a cultural touchstone for American expectations of authenticity.⁶⁰ Cope argued that ongoing invention in extemporaneous speaking functionally synthesized delivery with naturalist elocutionary theory of the earlier nineteenth century. Cope said, "Much more than honesty and lack of pretense, Broadus' conception of authenticity entails complete mental, emotional, and bodily "digestion" of the message—the message must become part of the preacher."⁶¹ These recent twentieth and twenty-first-century studies encourage my turn toward archival texts as the

foundation for understanding women's extemporaneous speaking during the nineteenth century.

Extemporaneous Speaking: Invention and Delivery

Extemporaneous speaking in the nineteenth century was a skill praised by audiences and observers, and informed by educational materials for school children, preachers, and professionals. All the genres of nineteenth-century texts I examine here focused extensively on the invention and delivery of extemporaneous discourse, but each genre approached these topics in different ways. First, I review theoretical and practical texts on extemporaneous preaching designed for those studying to be ministers. These books focused on extemporaneous invention as a thoroughly researched preparation for a discourse that was simply delivered sans manuscript. These texts often defined "extemporaneous" speaking as only a style of delivery. I next examine material from schoolbooks and debate society manuals. These general education texts taught extemporaneous speaking to help young men going into politics, business, or society. These texts trained speakers to know and understand an argument and its context in order to persuade audiences. This genre of texts was also concerned with how well a speaker could respond to arguments and interrogatories from an audience, therefore focusing on a flexible, audience-adaptive delivery that came from consistent practice and perfect familiarity with a topic. Finally, I examine the commentary on extemporaneous speaking from nineteenth-century biographies and biographical sketches of speakers such as Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, and Davey Crocket. In these texts, I find the critique of extemporaneous performance on the stage as it was appreciated in the public

sphere. These texts focused on extemporaneous speaking as a way to exhort and move an audience to action or belief through immediate arguments and emotional appeals.

Preaching Texts

Textbooks and published lectures on extemporaneous preaching dictated that sermons could only be prepared through rigorous research and extensive preparation. In these texts, in fact, the “extemporaneous” designation only referred to a style of delivery or a performance a minister might choose to use to increase his immediacy and energy with an audience. These texts explicitly discouraged extemporaneously inventing arguments. In fact, nineteenth-century texts designed for preachers in ecumenical denominations were at first reluctant to even suggest extemporaneous speech for ministers as a performance style. In his 1810 *Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory* to minister in training at Harvard College, John Quincy Adams admitted that extemporaneous discourse provided “a force, an intent, an energy, ‘warm from the soul and faithful to its fires’ which no degree of meditation can attain.”⁶² However, Adams still dictated that the arguments in any sermon must be previously manuscripted even if delivered extempore.⁶³ On a slightly more encouraging note, Henry J. Ware’s 1842 *Hints on Extemporaneous Preaching* advocated extemporaneous preaching for the ministers as a moving and enticing style for performing sermons.⁶⁴ Although he spent a full chapter elucidating the potential dangers of extemporaneous address for the preacher, Ware still argued that,

There is more nature, more warmth in the declamation, more earnestness in the address, greater animation in the manner, more of the lighting up of the soul in the countenance and whole mien, more freedom and meaning in the gesture; the eye

speaks, and the fingers speak, and when the orator is so excited as to forget every thing but the matter on which his mind and feelings are acting, the whole body is affected, and helps to propagate his emotions to the hearer.⁶⁵

Ware's focus on extemporaneous preaching as a discourse invented before a presentation, but delivered in an extemporaneous style for persuasive effect, became the norm for preachers in the nineteenth century.⁶⁶ Henry J. Ripley's 1849 *Sacred Rhetoric or the Composition and Delivery of Sermons to which are Added Hints on Extemporaneous Preaching* suggested that extemporaneous speaking was "thought out completely" but not presented from a manuscript.⁶⁷ In fact, Ripley was so devoted to the thoughtfully invented sermon that more than 150 pages of his 200-page manuscript focused on how a preacher should invent the content of a sermon before a presentation.⁶⁸ These textbooks from the first half of the nineteenth century preferred a high style of oratory in the pulpit, relying on carefully premeditated invention and a style of extemporaneous immediacy.

It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that preaching texts embraced the persuasive immediacy of extemporaneous speaking as the delivery standard for a preacher's delivery. William Pittenger's 1878 *Oratory Sacred and Secular* exhorted readers that "no excellence can be achieved without great labor," and so the preacher ought to work at extemporaneous speaking in order to "clothe his thoughts at the moment of utterance" and by so doing, bring the gospel before listeners through "the living action of intellect and heart."⁶⁹ Extemporaneous speaking, that is, was the immediate and persuasive performance of carefully crafted and premeditated arguments. Additionally, Joseph Bancroft and Robert Barclay's 1875 Quaker treatise *A Persuasive to Unity* excoriated preaching that did not account for fitting the message to an immediate

audience through the Spirit's guidance.⁷⁰ Despite initial hesitation, educated preachers eventually embraced extemporaneous delivery as long as it was thoroughly augmented by rigorous research and extensive preparation that still embraced the careful argumentation associated with manuscripted pulpit oratory.

School and Debate Textbooks

Nineteenth-century school and debate textbooks on extemporaneous speaking advocated researched-based preparation as the key element of both invention and delivery. In his popular 1813 textbook, *The Art of Extempore Speaking*, John Ripplingham urged that the student, “must be perfectly acquainted with his subject, and be able to examine it in detail, as well as in the aggregate. Whatever can favor his own opinion, or can be urged against it, must be familiar to his mind.”⁷¹ In his 1832 *Letters to a Young Student*, Asa Smith praised extemporaneous speaking, but enjoined his readers to “not speak, if you can avoid it, without thorough preparation. No matter if, without previous thought, you could talk an hour on any given subject, with the utmost volubility. At best, [your talk] would probably be a collection of crude ideas, expressed in a very immethodical way.”⁷² This focus on research and practice as the basis for inventing extemporaneous speaking was present throughout nineteenth-century education.⁷³ For example, even texts that did not teach extemporaneous speaking—like Caleb Bingham's *The Columbian Orator* and the McGuffey readers—taught young speakers the foundational ideas of a democratic society through selections from Washington, Franklin, Paine, and Jefferson, and lessons in morality with selections from the Bible and the *Book of Virtues*.⁷⁴ Ripplingham praised this skill, stating that an excellent speaker was capable of “expressing his ideas orally, in clear, elegant, and unembarrassed terms.”⁷⁵ This ability

to take information from a set of topics and well-known warrants and skillfully present arguments from it to an audience in a manner suited to their needs was a marker of greatness for extemporaneous speakers.

Along with this focus on prepared content, school textbooks on extemporaneous speaking also advocated significant preparation for the art of extemporaneous delivery. Smith advocated joining a debate or extemporaneous speaking society in order to practice elocution, articulation, and delivering speeches.⁷⁶ In another example, M. Bautain's *The Art of Extempore Speaking* gave explicit direction for the voice, utterance, articulation, facial expression, posture, and gesture of the extemporaneous speaker in much the same way an elocution book would teach each distinct trait of the performance.⁷⁷ In a similar vein, Guy Carleton Lee presented more than 30 pages of exercise designed to help the extemporaneous speaker expand vocabulary options and incorporate them more fluently into extempore discourses.⁷⁸

Counterbalancing their focus on preparation, and significantly contrasting texts designed for ministers, school textbooks on extemporaneous speaking taught that immediacy and inspiration were vital elements to both inventing and delivering arguments in public discourse. Discussing the more immediate argumentation of extemporaneous discourse, Bautain noted that,

In speaking from his fulness, [*sic*] therefore, as the saying is, he can speak oftener [*sic*], and produce a greater effect if he speak well. His speaking will also be more lively and brilliant, more real, and more apposite. Originating with the occasion, and at the very moment, it will bear more closely on the subject, and strike with

greater force and precision. His words will be warmer from their freshness, and they will in this manner communicate increased fervour [*sic*] to the audience.”⁷⁹

Both Ripplingham’s school text and Lee’s debate handbook taught speakers that “perfect acquaintance” with the arguments surrounding a topic was required to argue extemporaneously but that this knowledge only provided the foundation for the extemporaneous and immediate performance inspired in the moment.

These textbooks still evidenced a caution about impromptu speaking similar to that of ministry-focused texts, but they were more willing to admit its value for debaters, lawyers, and public speaking professionals. For example, Guy Lee was cautious about impromptu response in debate, but still noted that “sarcasm, invective, and humor undoubtedly are strong weapons in the hands of an experienced debater.”⁸⁰ Additionally, John Witherspoon’s 1805 *Lectures on Eloquence* admonished students that a lawyer’s extemporaneous response was paramount for any courtroom success. No lawyer could fully anticipate the arguments thrown against him in the court and must, therefore, be able to arrange and deliver arguments extemporaneously if he ever hoped to achieve courtroom success.⁸¹ Harnessing what George Kennedy would later call the “romantic” approach to invention, school and debate textbooks on extemporaneous speaking encouraged the well-trained and practiced speaker to embrace immediacy and inspiration of the moment as a useful tool for inventing persuasive arguments.⁸²

Biographies

Nineteenth-century biographies and biographical sketches of extemporaneous speakers focused at length on delivery skills, especially performance, as the important and engaging element of extemporaneous discourse. These texts spent little if any time on

invention, often only attributing it to experience, inspiration, or natural gifting. Speaking of minister Abiel Abbot's extemporaneous speaking, the *American Unitarian Biography* noted that "his habits of mental discipline prepared him for every occasion, and he sometimes most excelled on those for which he had made the least special preparation. He possessed in an uncommon degree the talent of extemporaneous speaking."⁸³ This brief attribution of invention to a general lifestyle of preparation and a giftedness for the art of extemporaneous speaking was nearly universal in biographies of great or famous extemporaneous speakers.

Instead of focusing on how to prepare an extemporaneous speech, biographies focused on how extemporaneous speakers delivered their addresses with greater brilliance, immediacy, and persuasion in both performance and argumentation than did other orators. Speaking of immediacy, Quaker minister Elizabeth Hudson journaled about her prompting by the Spirit to speak directly to the needs of individuals in a given congregation or to remain silent even if asked to speak because the moment was not right.⁸⁴ The focus on immediacy and the rightness of an address for an occasion was central to great extemporaneous speaking for nineteenth-century biographers. For example, during Angelina Grimké's Pennsylvania Hall address a shower of rocks shattered several windows in the hall. Grimké responded to the event and made the violent conduct of her detractors a factor supporting her abolitionist position as the only rational position on slavery, an argumentative turn that made her famous for her poise and extemporaneous responses on the stage.⁸⁵ Immediate response in the public speaking arena was frequently deployed as entertaining repartee and demonstrated the speaker's intelligence and wit through immediate performance. Speaking of Robert Hall, the *New*

Biographies of Illustrious Men, remarked that “His conversation possessed a vivacity, affluence, and elegance very rarely equalled [*sic*]. His repartees were particularly happy, and, as has been well remarked, strongly remind one of the manner of Johnson.”⁸⁶ John Barrows lamented how Henry Ward Beecher’s sermons were misrepresented since his extemporaneous style meant even his “gravest address abounded with so much of wit, grotesque humor, and stinging denunciation’, that it was very easy to compile from his addresses what did not give a fair impression of the general tenor of his speech.”⁸⁷ George Prentice noted that even in Henry Clay’s first extemporaneous speech “he surprised his audience with a beauty and compass of voice, an exuberance of eloquence, and a force of argument, well worthy of a veteran Orator.” This focus on performance typified biographical commentary on extemporaneous speaking and was also prevalent in commentary from newspapers.

The different approaches taken by each of these genres of texts to invention and delivery of extemporaneous public discourse highlights the polysemous nature of “extemporaneous speech” in the nineteenth century. Invention in extemporaneous speaking could be a prepared manuscript or outline, a thorough and careful knowledge of the arguments about a topic, or immediate inspiration drawn from life experience. Delivery also varied; speaking extemporaneously could be a merely entertaining performance technique or a necessary argumentative strategy. A preacher with a manuscript could call his style extemporaneous if he simply avoided reading his manuscript word-for-word during the course of his message. In contrast, a lyceum lecturer or circuit rider might practice extemporaneous speaking as an unpremeditated

stump speech filled with wit, exaggeration, and little if any preparation outside of life experience and passion.

In summary, scholarship from the nineteenth century and from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries recognizes extemporaneous speaking as a unique style and form of discourse. Twentieth and twenty-first-century rhetorical studies agree that extemporaneous speaking was a more immediate form through which a speaker could respond to perceived audience needs and a more flexible and audience-adaptive style of public discourse. Additionally, nineteenth-century speakers and writers suggested different preparation practices for extemporaneous speakers than for those speaking from a manuscript. This different approach to preparation meant that nineteenth-century extemporaneous speaking was a more conversational, immediate, and situation-adaptive way to persuade, exhort, or teach an audience than was prepared oratory. Finally, biographies of great nineteenth-century orators often recognized extemporaneous speaking as a key to the development or style of a given orator.

Theorizing Extemporaneous Speaking: Complications for the Female Speaker

A complicating factor for discussing Susan B. Anthony's discursive practice is that nineteenth-century literature on extemporaneous speaking was written exclusively for male orators. This gendering of extemporaneous speaking reflects the gendering of all public space in the nineteenth century as exclusively and explicitly male. This explicit gendering presents complications for studying female extemporaneous speakers like Anthony. Specifically, the following sections address the complication to both invention and delivery that Anthony faced as a woman in the masculine field of nineteenth-century extemporaneous speaking.

Invention

Exploring women's invention in nineteenth-century extemporaneous speaking means recognizing the different possible conceptions of the term. Building on George Kennedy's work and recent scholarship in composition theory and linguistics, James Jasinski identifies four different conceptions of invention that have permeated rhetorical literature from classical times to the present: the romantic method deals with internal inspiration, the systematic method advocates a formula, the imitative method suggests an imitation of great ideas and speeches, and the social method approaches invention as a process of bricolage.⁸⁸ Classical literature on invention from Isocrates, Plato, and Aristotle to Cicero and Quintilian approached invention through the imitative, romantic, and systematic methods. In the nineteenth-century United States, textbooks on prepared oratory treated invention as prior to delivery and generally favored a systematic approach of memorization and practice.⁸⁹ In a similar but less pedantic approach, extemporaneous speaking textbooks and manuals still employed systematic approaches to assembling and arranging material, but with a recognition that a rhetor could arrange material with romantic invention gained in a moment of immediate inspiration. Extemporaneous textbooks also embraced the romantic idea that invention would eventually come to a speaker through inspiration if he were well prepared. In 1883, Pittenger's *Extempore Speech* specifically reminded the reader to practice, contemplate, and write speeches carefully before extemporizing upon an idea with the inspiration of a moment.⁹⁰ That is, by knowing all the material systematically, and practicing how it would be arranged, the speaker could develop a foundation for eventually speaking "without" preparation.

Extemporaneous speaking textbooks designed for male speakers allowed more flexibility to the orator, but still did not depart from the three classical methods of invention.

Research that recovers nineteenth-century women's rhetoric shows that women's invention differed from the systematic and imitative practice of textbook invention.⁹¹ Women's inventional practice embraced the romantic and social conceptions of invention. The romantic method of invention relied on the individual inspiration of the "isolated writer seeking inspiration within."⁹² This method closely mirrored the Quaker practice of relying on the Inward Light as the source of inspiration and understanding that permeated female speakers' lives.⁹³ The romantic understanding of invention as inspiration was combined with a social method of invention in nineteenth-century women's invention practices. What Jasinski calls social invention does not originate in classical works, but in recent scholarship on intertextuality and bricolage in critical theory. The social approach to invention frames language as the raw material of discourse and understands language to be a "result of ongoing social processes."⁹⁴ A social conception of invention, then, sees discourse as intertextual because it is consistently "shot through with references, quotations, and influences of every kind" that construct the speech as a product of its linguistic, rhetorical, and social milieu.⁹⁵ This intertextual character is obvious in all rhetoric, but it is an explicit part of nineteenth-century women's rhetorical practice.⁹⁶ The following paragraphs trace the recent research on women's inventional practices, specifically highlighting romantic and social approaches to the task.

Campbell's 1989 publication of *Man Cannot Speak for Her* identified the differences between traditional approaches to oratory in the nineteenth century and the

“feminine style” of women’s speech.⁹⁷ Several elements Campbell identifies as central to feminine style are also related to women’s invention. The feminine style relied on inductive reasoning with a special focus on personal anecdotes and stories as evidence. This reasoning based on experience also invited the audience to identify with the rhetor and gain individual empowerment through shared experiences. These elements of feminine style highlight the social nature of women’s invention. In fact, Campbell specifically argued that this feminine style was a natural outgrowth of nineteenth-century women’s experiences.⁹⁸ The centrality of this social invention to feminine style discourse meant that women needed a space in which to practice their inventional work. Campbell articulated the need for women in the nineteenth century to create a special space for their rhetorical work, largely due to the restrictive social norms under which they functioned.⁹⁹ She also argued that the “craft-learning” process by which women “cope[d] with the conflicting demands of the podium” allowed female speakers to be “alert to variations, aware of a host of alternatives, and able to read cues related to specific conditions.”¹⁰⁰

Campbell expanded on her conceptions of feminine style in 1998, specifically focusing on nineteenth-century women’s invention. The article, titled “Inventing Women,” focused on women’s need for a space in which to invent and the power of subversion to create that space.¹⁰¹ Women’s invention, as Campbell discussed it, could not be the discovery of *a priori* truth that classical theorists and nineteenth-century education texts embraced. Instead, women’s invention had to be the social construction and change of ideas over time in order to facilitate women’s empowerment and action for social change. With this definition of invention, Campbell confronted the paradox that “discourse arises out of prior discourse, that rhetoric emerges out of prior rhetoric. The

same resources out of which change can be effected are simultaneously the dead hand of the past. Constraints are resources, resources are constraints.” This paradox means that subversion in all its forms is the key principle of rhetorical invention. The centrality of subversion in Campbell’s conception of women’s invention meant that women’s access to history and grasp of context was essential to the invention process. Given the explicit gendering of education in the nineteenth century, gaining access to women’s history and developing a grasp of context necessitated creating a space for women’s intellectual and rhetorical development. The need for women to develop an inventional space of their own, and the types of invention that occurred there, have been the subject of much rhetorical scholarship.

Several scholars have identified spaces for nineteenth-century women’s invention in the private or semi-private arenas of writing, reading, and conversation. The gendering of public space as male made the more private areas of women’s lives such as reading, writing, and conversation necessary for developing inventional resources and practices. Lucy Hogan and Martha Solomon discussed nineteenth-century women’s “epistemic rhetorical conversations” as one means for female orators to develop rhetorical skills and inventional practices for the public stage.¹⁰² These conversations provided the inventional space for women to sift through ideas from their experience and education while honoring the views of other participants in the conversation. This process involved acknowledging, incorporating, and building on the ideas of other women writers and philosophers, as well as other conversation participants, in the service of personal development and self-determination.¹⁰³ Building upon Hogan and Solomon’s work, Beth Ann Rothermel identified Quaker commonplace books as useful spaces for women’s

rhetorical invention.¹⁰⁴ Rothermel argued that Quaker women understood invention as a social process in which their ideas were shaped as they reflected and understood the arguments of the culture in which they participated. Rothermel summed up her argument by saying that, for Quaker women, “to construct a commonplace book was to learn how to generate personally and publicly transformative discourse.”¹⁰⁵ Along the same lines, Lisa Reid Ricker argued that the autograph albums women kept in the later nineteenth century provided an inventional space by offering the opportunity for transcendence through (re)inscription, or taking ownership of ideas by writing, shaping, and sharing them.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, Lisa Gring-Pemble discussed the private space of personal letters as a means of consciousness raising for Antoinette Brown-Blackwell and Lucy Stone.¹⁰⁷ These writing and discussion-centered forums provided nineteenth-century women with spaces for invention that were protected from public scrutiny in the gendered-male public sphere as well as the inventional resources of history and content that were essential for socially constructing truth.

I draw several important concepts from this research for understanding nineteenth-century women’s invention in extemporaneous speaking. First, the inventional practices women used differed in both approach and space from that practiced by men. The textbooks used to teach male speakers the art of invention relied heavily on systematic invention and imitative invention. Although some texts designed for ministers in the second half of the nineteenth century allowed for the romantic inspiration of spiritual revelation, men’s invention consistently relied on repetition, memorization, and recitation. In contrast, female speakers were excluded from the educational resources necessary for the imitative and systematic approaches to invention. The exclusion from

higher education, debating clubs, public stages, and the pulpit meant that women often found space for invention only through what Shirley Wilson Logan has called the “free floating rhetorical education” of nineteenth-century oratorical culture. Female speakers, therefore, often relied on their shared experiences and informal education as a means of social invention.¹⁰⁸ The rhetorical construction of women as more moral than men also allowed women a special access to the romantic inventional resources of inspiration-based invention that was often associated with Christian spirituality. The differences in both approach and use of space between men’s and women’s extemporaneous invention created a remarkably different discourse for female extemporaneous speakers.

Delivery

The other prominent complication for Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking was the gendered nature of public discourse as an inherently male embodied practice. In fact, newspaper articles about Anthony routinely discussed her body as the central element of her delivery. These discussions ranged from critiques of her bloomer costume in the 1850s, to repudiations of her ideas because of her “shrewishness” in the 1870s, to refusals to cover her speeches unless she wore a specific red shawl in the 1890s. This coverage highlights one of the main complications of being a female speaker—inhabiting a body that was consistently read as female and therefore out of place in any speaking context.

Because public space was gendered male, women speaking in public were inherently abnormal and unruly. In addition to her public speaking in a male-gendered space, Anthony added the non-normative bodily characteristics of remaining unmarried her entire life and refusing to perform or embody cultural norms of female beauty.¹⁰⁹ Although little has been written concerning Anthony’s body, rhetorical scholars have

developed a significant literature on the discursive construction and policing of women's bodies, and therefore their embodied delivery, in the nineteenth century. Discussions in this literature often center on the public/private dichotomy and the regulation and normalization of women's bodies within those spaces.

The rhetorical distinction between the public and private spheres was central to how women's bodies, and therefore their delivery on the public stage, were policed in the nineteenth century. The gendering of public and private space in the nineteenth century has been well documented in rhetorical and historical literature.¹¹⁰ Campbell asserted that during the first half of the nineteenth century in America "femininity and rhetorical action were seen as mutually exclusive" and "no 'true woman' could be a public persuader."¹¹¹ Roxanne Mountford expanded on the concept of gendered space, to note that "rhetorical space" was both a material and a discursive construct that was explicitly gendered male in the nineteenth century.¹¹² A second constraining concept that limited women's access to rhetorical spaces is what twentieth century scholars have called the cult of true womanhood. As the boundaries of feminine domesticity were solidified throughout the nineteenth century, an image of the idea woman emerged in rhetorical discourse; she was the heart of the home, a figure of greater morality than her male counterpart, and the ministering angel in charge of raising and training children.¹¹³ This ideal circumscribed women's rhetorical resources and bound them not to speak out for change publically. The rhetoric of "true womanhood," however, also gave women a platform from which to argue for social reforms. The gendering of public space as male, but morality as female, meant that women had to develop delivery practices that harnessed the morality of "true womanhood" in order to create a place to speak for

change between the silence of true femininity and the masculinized practice of public discourse.

Scholars have analyzed several strategies women developed to negotiate the gendered space of public discourse. Zaeske argued that Angelina Grimké and Abby Kelly used their gendered “female morality” as a foundation for addressing so-called “promiscuous audiences” on behalf of slaves and downtrodden souls.¹¹⁴ This platform of morality provided an explicit warrant for the women to defy the social conventions of female silence. Jason Jones built on the concepts of gendered space to argue that Victoria Woodhull’s speech to the House Judiciary Committee demonstrated her disruptive competence as a speaker. Jones argued that Woodhull embodied a radical subjectivity in her performance and effectively questioned the expectations of her audience.¹¹⁵ The gendering of public space, and the ways that women continued to enter this space, highlight the complications to delivery women faced in their nineteenth-century context.

The gendered construction of public and private space in the nineteenth century facilitated an obvious structure of norms for respectability. This context provided the background for reading women’s bodies as unruly in any public space.¹¹⁶ Discussing perceptions of women’s clothing on the nineteenth-century speaking platform, Carol Mattingly argued that women’s dress was contentious because it consistently reified individual women as female and therefore inherently out of place on the male-gendered stage. Mattingly argued that the body and how that body was dressed were central to any understanding of women in public forums. This centrality persisted whether women were enduring jeers in a Bloomer costume, or indicating class and race status with fashionable attire. Also discussing the constructed norms of women’s public bodies, Kristan Poirot

explored the racial rhetoric Elizabeth Cady Stanton used to argue for an extracorporeal idea of difference.¹¹⁷ Specifically, Poirot argued that “as a participant in a certain production of sex and race, Cady Stanton both reified and resisted prevailing trends in the differentiation of human political subjects.”¹¹⁸ This discussion of the explicit race and class norms that were read onto women’s bodies, and to which they harkened with their choice in dress, is central to understanding how Anthony’s body delivered her extemporaneous public discourse. This context reveals how Anthony was both defiant of some social norms of delivery (being single, speaking publically) and submissive to others (giving up the Bloomer costume, donning the red shawl when asked).

The centrality of the body to issues of women’s delivery highlights what Lindal Buchanan called “distinctive corporeal, ideological, and performance issues” of the fifth rhetorical canon.¹¹⁹ Buchanan argued that delivery is not only material in its focus on voice, gesture, and expression, but also culturally framed and inflected by the social construction of appropriate behavior in its focus on decorum and publicity. As Buchanan phrased it, “when nineteenth-century women delivered rhetoric, they were enmeshed within and cognizant of the discursive ideologies of their day in a way that their masculine counterparts were not.”¹²⁰

The central concepts associated with women’s delivery are the dichotomy between public and private space, the policing of women’s bodies through social and religious ideologies of true womanhood, and competence or mastery in the “male arts” of delivery such as diction, gesture, poise, and performance. Male speakers needed only to master the arts of delivery and performance, and so these are the main topics of delivery discussed in extemporaneous speaking textbooks. However, women needed to master

these skills while also negotiating the gendered space in which they delivered their discourses, the gendered policing of their bodies, and the potential charges of immorality they faced for speaking in public. The explicit ways that female speakers negotiated these gendered constraints on delivery, and the reception their negotiation attempts received, are key factors for understanding Anthony's extemporaneous speaking.

Extemporaneous Speaking and Women's Citizenship

Concepts of citizenship center around the legal status, rights, or responsibilities of citizens; the rights and responsibilities of governments, and how citizens perform citizenship. The questions that motivate research on citizenship are also varied. Discussing these questions, Kristy Maddux has noted that some scholars are concerned with who is allowed to be a citizen, others with what rights and responsibilities a citizen has, and still others with how citizenship is performed in the public or political spheres.¹²¹ I begin with a review of the limitations on citizenship status, rights, and responsibilities within which nineteenth-century women functioned. I next review the literature on citizenship performance generally and on nineteenth-century women's performances of citizenship.

Women in the nineteenth century, along with other identity-based groups, were explicitly excluded from some of the legal rights associated with citizenship as well as some performances of citizenship. Women's legal citizenship status was contested throughout the nineteenth century. Although the US Supreme Court decision in *Minor vs. Happersett* established that women were legal citizens, Rogers Smith has argued that they were still excluded from many of the civil, political, and social rights associated with full liberal citizenship.¹²² Linda Kerber further asserted that women's legal status was

continually subsumed under the common law status of the *fem covert*.¹²³ A woman was technically a citizen, but that legal status was only secondary to her place as a “covered” or hidden woman, rendering her functionally a non-person in the eyes of the law. Put another way, in the nineteenth century, a female person’s primary responsibility was as a woman, not as a citizen. In addition to excluding women from some of the legal rights of liberal citizenship, the *fem covert* status also excluded women from participating in republican forms of citizenship. The republican approach to citizenship, generally traced to Western philosophy in the Greek city-states, defined a citizen as one with political agency such as voting and representation.¹²⁴ This republican ideal of citizenship held participation as the citizen’s primary responsibility, ensuring protection for the individual’s property by the government. Women’s exclusion from voting rights, property ownership, jury service, and other rights severely limited their access to republican forms of performing citizenship.

Performing Citizenship

Nineteenth-century women were explicitly excluded from republican participatory citizenship and the rights of full liberal citizenship, but this exclusion did not prevent them from seeking both by performing other forms of citizenship. Robert Asen has argued that scholars should move from “asking what counts as citizenship,” to questions of “how do people enact citizenship?” Further, he argued that “reorienting our framework from a question of *what* to a question of *how* usefully redirects our attention from acts to action. Inquiring into the *how* of citizenship recognizes citizenship as a process.”¹²⁵ Following Asen’s call, my research investigates how extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship for Anthony.

Asen's discursive approach focused scholarly attention on the process and performance of citizenship. Asen argued that, from a discursive performance perspective, "citizenship does not appear in specific acts per se, but signals a process that may encompass a number of different activities."¹²⁶ That is, instead of centering a specific form of citizenship performance (voting, bowling leagues, prayer breakfasts), the performance perspective focused on how individuals act out their own versions of citizenship.¹²⁷ This performance approach highlighted the "fluid, multimodal, and quotidian enactments of citizenship," and more readily recognized the citizenship performances of those excluded from republican participation or liberal rights.¹²⁸ Asen's approach conceived of citizenship as "a mode" or "manner of doing something, a method of proceeding in any activity."¹²⁹ For Asen, mode distinguished "the manner by which something is done from what is done. Mode highlights agency: someone is doing a deed."¹³⁰ This focus on "mode," or how citizenship gets performed, is especially useful for my project since it centers Anthony's extemporaneous speaking as a way of understanding her citizenship.

Shifts in Performing Nineteenth-Century Citizenship

Michael Schudson argued that public performances of citizenship changed throughout the nineteenth century, often reflecting larger systemic shifts in culture, geography, and political structures. Schudson identified trust, party, and information based voting practices that functioned during the nineteenth century.¹³¹ The "trust-based" approach dominated the Colonial period and the first few decades of the nineteenth century, asking voters (generally white, propertied, men) only to choose the best, most virtuous man to represent them in government affairs. Voters were not involved in public

discussions of governmental policy. Voting was a public activity and no one voted who did not already have a material, and often monetary, stake in the community.¹³² Schudson next proposed that the party-based and information-based systems were in conflict during the later decades of the nineteenth century. The party-based system espoused loyalty to one party, while the information-based system asked individual citizens to make decisions on who best represented their interests. The party-based voter was an illiterate man depositing a ticket to show his affiliation and loyalty while the information-based voter was an educated individual making informed choices about leadership and public policy. In both models, individuals participated in citizenship whether as a newly minted citizen or a stable community businessman. These shifts, Schudson argued, transpired as the country's geography and demographics changed, and often reflected the political machinations of a given historical epoch.

Alexander Keyssar recognized the political, demographic and political shifts that changed citizenship performances, but he also argued that expansion to the franchise came as U.S. wars forced an expansion of who "counted" based on service to their country. Focusing on the period between the Civil War and World War I, Keyssar argued that enfranchisement was offered as a reward to those who served in the military or in other ways during wartime.¹³³ Black men's military service during the Civil War and women's home-front service during World War I are prime examples of Keyssar's evidence. In a more controversial argument, Keyssar also asserted that the main factor in limiting voting privileges was class tension and class conflict. Limitation, that is, followed the dictates of what social class was in power and able to limit access to that power based on fear of monetary repercussions.

Although the various propositions about *why* performances of citizenship changed over the decades of the nineteenth century are contested, the key for my research is the changeable *nature* of these performances. The changeable nature of performing citizenship necessitates directly examining the performances of citizenship with which Anthony engaged. I do much of this work through the contextual study of Anthony's discourse and the popular responses to her performance. However, a useful foundation for my research focuses on how women fought for, and engaged in, performances of citizenship during the nineteenth century.

Performing Female Citizenship

The gendered nature of nineteenth-century American citizenship provides my foundation for discussing how women performed citizenship during the nineteenth century. Rogers Smith specifically highlighted the role of gender in constraining citizenship laws, noting that religious and scientific discourses combined to argue for women's intellectual inferiority as excluding them from citizenship's full rights.¹³⁴ Belinda Stillion Southard connected this exclusion from legal citizenship rights with the Enlightenment assumption that women were not autonomous and rational individuals.¹³⁵ Tracing this inegalitarian gendering of citizenship to the inherited Common Law, Barbara Young Welke argued that women's citizenship was defined "not in terms of individual obligation to the nation (as was men's), but in terms of obligation to one's husband."¹³⁶ This gendering of American citizenship compelled women to create unique performances of citizenship even as they argued for their inclusion in the rights, responsibilities, and status of citizens.

The ways that women negotiated the continuum of discursive citizenship performances closely mirrored the shifts and changes in the dominant cultural performances of citizenship. Carolyn S. Vacca argued that women first found a place to perform citizenship in benevolent associations hosted by churches. Citing the falling birth rates at the beginning of the century, Vacca argued that women began seeking productive, instead of reproductive, roles in their communities and developed a shared identity that relied on these social connections.¹³⁷ Vacca asserted that this shared maternal identity fostered a rhetoric of individual rights while remaining grounded in the goodness and virtue of womanhood. This identity-based foundation influenced arguments for citizenship when anti-suffragists began attacking the women's rights movement. Vacca argued that the women's rights and woman suffrage movement shifted arguments for, and performances of, citizenship to popular ideas about women's identity as inherently pure, passive, pious, and domestic.¹³⁸ This maternal, ascriptive, identity-based limitation on women's performance of citizenship helps explain the resistance to women's public speaking in the nineteenth century and the insidious classism and racism that progressively infiltrated the woman suffrage movement.

Women who performed citizenship through public discourse during the nineteenth century often negotiated the gendered exclusions of their discursive citizenship practice through the content of their discourse. Bonnie Dow argued that Frances Willard used a "womanhood rationale" to speak on women's rights to participate in the elective franchise.¹³⁹ In a similar vein, Tiffany Lewis named the identity of "White western woman" as the foundation for changing, but still maintaining ascriptive elements of the narrative of the mythic West in Abigail Scott Duniway's arguments for suffrage.¹⁴⁰

According to Lewis, Duniway's arguments centered on how western women had "earned" the right to vote by performing to the same level of ability as the men who settled the West. Susan Zaeske also noted rhetorical content as a key factor in the violent reaction of southern Congressmen to the petitions of northern women against slavery. Even though these women enacted a non-public and seemingly maternal form of citizenship, their actions raised questions about the virtue of southern masculinity and femininity in a public forum.¹⁴¹ These changes in how women argued for greater inclusion in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship influenced how those roles could be performed through public speaking, protest, and embodied action.

Women who spoke in public as a performance of citizenship during the nineteenth century also frequently negotiated the gendered double bind of oratory through the style of their discourse. Mari Boor Tonn has asserted that Mary Harris "Mother" Jones employed a militant style of motherhood in her labor organizations.¹⁴² The protectionist style of Jones' discourse centered around the "acute needs" of her audience and grounded her rhetoric in what Boor Tonn labeled the shared characteristics of mother and labor organizer: nurturing and militancy. Angela Ray also highlighted a stylistic mode of negotiating the public discourse double bind in her work on women's voting performances during Reconstruction.¹⁴³ The women's performance of voting functioned as a "rhetorical ritual" that was understood, in the way that stylistic arguments often are, because of the women's social context. Addressing the stylistic shifts in the last ten years of the woman suffrage movement, Jennifer L. Borda argued that the National Women's Party faced significant contextual limitations with their suffrage parade tactic given the context of strong anti-suffrage sentiments in the popular press.¹⁴⁴ The styles

these women embraced allowed them to perform a public citizenship that negotiated the double bind of gendered public discourse.

Scholarship on women's bodies prior to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment has addressed how women embodied arguments for their inclusion in the franchise. E. Michelle Ramsey focused on cartoons from *The Woman Citizen* during the First World War.¹⁴⁵ Ramsey argued that, by portraying women as necessary to the war effort, the cartoons framed them as already embodying citizenship while still being excluded from all the rights and privileges thereof. Borda also discussed how women embodied their arguments for suffrage, arguing that the 1910-1913 suffrage parades in Washington D.C. drew attention to the suffrage cause by highlighting the women's public presence.¹⁴⁶ Borda also noted, however, that women who participated in the parades were read negatively as they embodied a defiant display of traditional gender norms.¹⁴⁷ Also discussing gendered performance in support of suffrage, Angela has Ray argued that women who voted as part of the New Departure strategy embodied their argument that citizenship was profoundly gendered.¹⁴⁸ These articles focus scholarly attention on how women embodied their arguments for inclusion and citizenship, and they provide a vocabulary for discussing how Anthony embodied arguments for women's citizenship and enfranchisement.

Prospectus of Chapters

This dissertation examines how Anthony invented and delivered her extemporaneous discourse and how that discourse functioned as a performance of citizenship. Using the extensive documents made available through *The Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony*, I examine records of Anthony's

extemporaneous speeches, her personal notes and letters relating to her speeches, and commentary on her speeches by the popular press. To analyze these speeches, the following chapter embrace Campbell's exhortation that the job of the critic is to observe, analyze and judge.¹⁴⁹ I also do what Michael Calvin McGee calls collapsing context into text by constructing my objects for analysis from the fragmentary record left of nineteenth-century extemporaneous speaking. Using trained observation, thoughtful analysis, and critical judgment to reconstruct the fragmentary record of Anthony's rhetorical career allows me to analyze the functions of extemporaneous speaking in Anthony's work.

In chapter two I analyze texts from the beginning of Anthony's speaking career through the end of the Civil War. I argue that Anthony performed her citizenship through the role of "entertaining reformer," which was a culturally recognizable performance in the Burned-over District of Upstate New York. Anthony used the recognizably Quaker and millennial voice of the prophetic rhetor as the foundation for her social invention of extemporaneous discourse. To deliver this discourse, she utilized the extemporaneous mode of address that hearkened to both the exhorting calls to repentance familiar in evangelical preaching and the entertaining performance style that was growing in popularity with the economic and cultural growth of the Burned-over District. This performance meant that Anthony enacted her citizenship as a reformer, with little regard to the lack of legal status to which she had access as a woman, by embracing the raced and classed vision of the ideal extemporaneous rhetor. This performance of citizenship was culturally recognizable and generally accepted in the Burned-over District. Anthony's rhetoric, however, failed to transcend the confines of the religious hotbed of

Upstate New York to change public opinion of those outside already-accepting reform communities or to enact lasting change in Albany or Washington. Instead, Anthony's continual speaking served as a raced and classed form of legitimacy that forced listeners to acknowledge her prowess as a speaker even if they rejected her explicit argument.

In my third chapter, I address Anthony's extemporaneous speaking during the Reconstruction Era from 1865 through 1874. In this chapter, I argue that Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship that both constituted women as equal citizens and provided the impetus for national-level politicians and state legislatures to codify the cultural assumptions of male-gendered citizenship into policy language that excluded women from democratic citizenship rights. Specifically, I argue that Anthony embraced an imitative social invention that allowed her to mimic the political, natural rights philosophy, and legal arguments for rights that permeated public discourse throughout Reconstruction. Since Anthony spoke extemporaneously, her imitation and social invention was public, which helped demonstrate her competence in the argument themes she imitated. She coupled this inventional approach with competence in the "male arts" of extemporaneous delivery, which audiences nationwide perceived as an authentic performance of the equality she sought. This competence and perceived authenticity in her delivery allowed her extemporaneous speaking to function as both the personification of women's inequality and as synecdoche for all women who were denied their rights. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking, therefore, functioned as a demonstrably equal performance of citizenship that was unbounded by any national legal proscription. The United States Congress, the federal judiciary, and state legislatures responded to Anthony's

demonstration of equality and authenticity by codifying explicitly gendered laws and interpretations of laws precluding women from equal rights as citizens. Although Anthony was by no means the only woman demonstrating her fitness for citizenship, the competence and perceived authenticity of her extemporaneous speaking was one catalyzing element in the development of laws and policy language excluding women from voting rights.

My fourth chapter explores how Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of "character citizenship" during the final years of her professional career in the context of the Gilded Age. I argue that character citizenship manifested in the Gilded Age as a way to define who was or could be a good American through the lens of gendered, middle-class, white, Protestant values. Specifically, I argue that Anthony used social invention to present herself—through both explicit personal statements and media framing—as a laudable woman of character who was a respectable authority on a variety of topics related to woman suffrage. This foundation of good character allowed Anthony a platform for suffrage as long as she did not stray from her message that women, specifically women of good character, should have voting rights. She coupled this invention with a delivery that embodied middle-class values, thereby allowing her to negotiate gendered public space while maintaining socially-recognizable respectability. Because the context of the Gilded Age allowed some gray space for women to function in public, Anthony's performance of a raced and classed Protestant "good character" allowed her to embody an appropriate way for women to live in public. Anthony, that is, embodied an appropriate way for a woman to function in public by performing a white, middle-class, Protestant version of public feminine virtue. This performance of

citizenship garnered Anthony significant praise at the end of her life and brought what some have called “respectability” to the woman suffrage movement. Anthony’s embrace of cultural norms for a raced and classed religious citizenship, however, also gutted the woman suffrage movement of the radical egalitarianism that had infused the women’s rights activists of earlier decades and created exclusionary problems around the idea of women’s rights that would not be addressed until late in the twentieth century.

In chapter five I address themes from this research that should influence scholarly study of both rhetoric and American history. First, my project recovers documents from the Susan B. Anthony’s life, the documents of a well-known but under-studied American rhetor. This recovery project engages the theoretical and methodological challenges of nineteenth-century extemporaneous rhetoric, specifically suggesting an approach to rhetorical investigation that centers the fragmentary nature of extemporaneous texts as critical to understanding their meaning and function in their context. Second, I discuss the problems associated with extemporaneous speaking in a movement for social change. I address the cultural “failure point” of extemporaneous speaking for change; the social invention, flexibility, and culturally recognizable performance that are necessary for extemporaneous speaking allow the speaker to fall prey to discriminatory, exclusionary, or otherwise harmful social biases that are not directly related to the primary goal of the social change movement. Finally, my research also engages the theoretical bounds of how citizenship can be performed rhetorically when the legal rights and participatory actions of liberal and republican citizenship are denied based on an individual’s identity. Specifically, I argue that identity factors like race, class, religion, and gender, which limited an individual’s access to the rights of liberal citizenship, also circumscribed the

possible performances of citizenship that could be understood by a social movement rhetor. That is, Anthony's arguments for eliminating gender discrimination in voting rights were only rendered legible to American audiences when she enacted socially acceptable performances of middle-class, white, Protestant identity. This chapter demonstrates the limits and possibilities for both rhetorical study of and public performances of extemporaneous speaking.

Notes

- ¹ A favorite “pet name” by which Anthony was known to members of the NWSA during the 1870s and 80s, which was also adopted by the print media in interviews with Anthony and articles about her speeches during the last 20 years of her life.
- ² Susan B. Anthony, “Speech by SBA to the Daughters of Temperance,” in *The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, Volume 1: In the School of Anti-Slavery 1840-1866*, ed. Ann Gordon (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 135.
- ³ Angela G. Ray and Cindy Koenig Richards, “Inventing Citizens, Imagining Gender Justice: The Suffrage Rhetoric of Virginia and Francis Minor,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 93, no. 4 (2007): 380.; Cindy Koenig Richards, “Susan B. Anthony ‘Is It a Crime for a U.S. Citizen to Vote?’ (3 April 1873),” *Voices of Democracy* 2 (2007): 189-209.
- ⁴ Susan B. Anthony and Ida Husted Harper, *The History of Woman Suffrage, Volume IV* (Rochester, NY: Charles Mann Print, 1906), 221.
- ⁵ Holland Union Literary Association, Holland, New York, “Lecture Advertisement for March 30, 1880,” in *The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, Volume 2: National Protection for National Citizens 1873-1880*, ed. Ann D. Gordon (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 286.
- ⁶ Susan B. Anthony, “Susan B. Anthony to Martha Coffin Wright, July 6, 1856,” in *The Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony*, eds. Ann D. Gordon and Patricia G. Holland, Microfilm, reel 12, slide 0597.

⁷ The social and religious hot-bed of central New York State. An area best known for religious reformation during the Second Great Awakening and social reform movements in the first half of the nineteenth century. For a more in-depth discussion see chapter two of this dissertation.

⁸ Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, *History of Woman Suffrage in Three Volumes*, Vol. II (New York: Arno Press/New York Times, 1969), 59-61.

⁹ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *Women Public Speakers in the United States, 1925-1993: A Bio-Critical Sourcebook* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 14-16.

¹⁰ Susan B. Anthony, "Is It a Crime for a U.S. Citizen to Vote?" in *Man Cannot Speak for Her*, Vol. 2, ed. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989), 279-316.

¹¹ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *Man Cannot Speak for Her Vol. 2* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1989).

¹² Richards, "Is It a Crime," 189-209.

¹³ Richards, "Is It a Crime," 195.

¹⁴ Ida Husted Harper, *The Life and Work of Susan B. Anthony*, in 2 Volumes (Indianapolis, IN: Hollenbeck Press, 1908), 925.

¹⁵ Harper, *The Life and Work*, 996.

Harper's work is a historic text, directed by Anthony and explicitly designed to further her image. After completing the biography, Harper burned thousands of Anthony's papers so that her work would be the only "Authorized" history of Anthony's life. Copies and/or manuscripts of Anthony's speeches may have existed (though Anthony's never mentions the like is letters we still have through

Elizabeth Cady Stanton's archive), but if they did we no longer have those documents. For more information see: Lynn Sherr, *Failure is Impossible: Susan B. Anthony in Her Own Words* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 287.

¹⁶Ann D. Gordon, "Knowing Susan B. Anthony: The Stories We Tell of a Life," In *Susan B. Anthony and the Struggle for Equal Rights*, eds. Christine L. Ridarsky and Mary Margaret Huth (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012).

¹⁷Tetrault's *The Myth of Seneca Falls* offers an especially thought provoking analysis of the *History*, as well as the larger history of the women's rights movement.

Lisa Tetrault, *The Myth of Seneca Falls: Memory and the Women's Suffrage Movement, 1848-1898* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014).

¹⁸Stanton, Anthony, and Gage, *History, Vol. I*, 8.

¹⁹Harper, *The Life and Work*.

²⁰Surprisingly little research has been done focusing specifically on Ida Husted Harper, especially considering her position as the pen through which we remember so much of the nineteenth-century women's movement. The majority of my information about Harper comes from biographies about Anthony and Stanton and histories of the women's movement more generally such as Flexner's. For more information about Harper specifically, see: Lois Fowler, "Harper, Ida Husted," in *American Women Writers a Critical Reference Guide, From Colonial Times to the Present*, ed. Taryn Benbow-Pfalzgraf (Detroit, MI: St. James Press, 2000), 182-183. Accessed, January 23, 2015, <http://galenet.galegroup.com>.; Nancy Baker Jones, "A Forgotten Feminist: The Early Writings of Ida Husted Harper, 1878-1894," *Indiana Magazine of History* 73, no. 2: (1977), 79-101.;

Clifton J Phillips, "Ida Husted Harper," In *Notable American Women, 1607-1950: A Biographical Dictionary*, eds. Edward T. James, Janet Wilson James, and Paul S. Boyer (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1971), 139-145.

- ²¹ Tetrault, *The Myth of Seneca Falls*, 183.
- ²² Rheta Childe Dorr, Carrie Chapman Catt, and National American Woman Suffrage Association Collection (Library of Congress), *Susan B. Anthony: The Woman Who Changed the Mind of a Nation* (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1928).
- ²³ Alma Lutz, *Susan B. Anthony: Rebel, Crusader, Humanitarian* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1959).
- ²⁴ Katharine Susan Anthony, *Susan B. Anthony: Her Personal History and Her Era*. [1st ed.] (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954), vi.
- ²⁵ Eleanor Flexner, *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975), 152-189.
- ²⁶ National American Woman Suffrage Association, *Victory, How Women Won It: A Centennial Symposium, 1840-1940* (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1940).
- ²⁷ Popular interest in Anthony and other female role models ballooned during the women's rights and women's liberation movements of the 60s and 70s. A full discussion of this popular literature is outside the scope of this prospectus, but should be studied more thoroughly by historical and rhetorical scholars. For examples of the literature from the late 1960s through the 1970s, see: Susan B. Anthony, "Unpublished Works: Susan B. Anthony on Single Women, Marriage & Sexual Attraction," *Ms.*, 8 July 1979. 58.; L. Baranski, "Susan B. Anthony II

Returns to Fight her Suffragist Namesake's Original Cause: Demon Rum," *People Weekly* 11. 1979. 119.; Anne Grant, "125 Years Later: What Do You Know About Seneca Falls?" *Ms.*, July 1973, 99.; Matthew G. Grant, John Keely, and Dick Brude, *Susan B. Anthony, Crusader for Women's Rights* (Mankato, MI: Creative Education; distributed by Children's Press, Chicago, IL: 1974).; Marjory Nelson, "Women's Suffrage and Race," *Off our Backs* 9.10. November 30, 1979. 6.; Iris Noble, *Susan B. Anthony* (New York: J. Messner, 1975).; Helen Stone Peterson and Paul Frame, *Susan B. Anthony, Pioneer in Woman's Rights* (Champaign, IL: Garrard Pub. Co. 1971); Morgan Pitchford, Blake Ariel, "Give Yourself a Susan B. Anthony Birthday Party- I Did!" *Ms.*, February 1979. 67.; Peggy Robbins, "Susan B. Anthony," *American History Illustrated* 6, no. 2, May 1971: 36-43.; "Redstockings Challenge Steinem & Ms.: Redstockings' Statement," *Off our Backs* 5.6, July 31, 1975. 8.; Alice S. Rossi, "A Feminist Friendship," *Ms.*, January 1974. 70-73, 80, 83-84.; Barbara Salsini, *Susan B. Anthony, A Crusader for Women's Rights* (Charlottesville, NY: SamHar Press 1973).; Miriam Schneir, "A Note on the Centennial," *Ms.*, July 1974. 99-100.

Additionally, Sarah T. Partlow-Lefever has published excellent work on the construction of the nineteenth-century movement by popular writers of the 1960s and 70s feminist movement. Sarah T. Partlow-Lefever, "Bridging the First and Second Waves: Rhetorical Constructions of First Wave Feminism in Ms. Magazine, 1972-1980," *Relevant Rhetoric* 3 (2012), 1-14.

²⁸ The website of the National Women's History Month shares that, "As recently as the 1970's, women's history was virtually an unknown topic in the K-12 curriculum

or in general public consciousness. To address this situation, the Education Task Force of the Sonoma County [California] Commission on the Status of Women initiated a “Women’s History Week” celebration for 1978. This celebration was expanded to “Women’s History Month” in 1980 by President Jimmy Carter. The presidential spotlight garnered even more interest in women’s history and Anthony specifically since it necessitated public schools teach the specified group’s history during that particular month.

Jimmy Carter, “President Jimmy Carter’s Message to the nation designating March 2-8, 1980 as National Women’s History Week,” *National Women’s History Project*, Accessed January 14, 2015, <http://www.nwhp.org/womens-history-month/first-presidential-message-1980>.; Molly Murphy MacGregor, “Why March is National Women’s History Month,” *National Women’s History Project*, Accessed April 5, 2017, <http://www.nwhp.org/womens-history-month/womens-history-month-history>.; Sam Wineburg, and Chauncey Monte-Sano, “‘Famous Americans’: The Changing Pantheon of American Heroes,” *Journal of American History* 94, no. 4 (2008): 1186-1202.

²⁹ Kathleen Barry, *Susan B. Anthony: A Biography of a Singular Feminist* (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 235.; Hull, N. E. H. *The Woman Who Dared to Vote: The Trial of Susan B. Anthony* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 4.

³⁰ Barry frequently seems to make claims that are more strongly grounded in the writings of Robin Morgan and Andrea Dworkin (both thanked for their insight in Barry’s acknowledgments), than Susan B. Anthony’s archive. Although I applaud the

bravery of Barry's work and readily acknowledge her writing ability and her research, I do find her biography a bit problematic as a scholarly source; grounding psychological insight in historical documentation would have been immeasurably helpful for this reader.

³¹ Anthony's "Is It a Crime" speech was known to rhetorical scholars and had been analyzed prior to Campbell's recovery effort. Campbell had previously written about "Is It a Crime" in her seminal discussion of genre; an analysis published as part of *The Jensen Lectures*. Harriett Grim also analyzed "Is It a Crime" in her 1938 dissertation. Finally, one transcript of "Is It a Crime" is included in the appendix to the third volume of Harper's biography.

Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Contemporary Rhetorical Criticism: Genres, Analogs, and Susan B. Anthony," In *The Jensen Lectures: Contemporary Communication Studies: University of South Florida, Department of Communication, Tampa, Florida, Spring Semester, 1982*, ed. John I. Sisco (Tampa, FL: The University of Florida Press, 1983), 117-132.; Harriett E. Grim, "Susan B. Anthony: Exponent of Freedom," (*Diss*, The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1938); Harper, *Susan B. Anthony*, 1002.

³² Campbell, *Man*, 117.

³³ Richards, "'Is It a Crime?'" 189-209.

³⁴ Rhetoricians have not published any sustained analyses of Anthony public address beyond "Is It a Crime." However, some scholars have done valuable rhetorical/critical work on other aspects of Anthony's life and career. Linda Brigance has written about the adaptation Anthony and Stanton made in their

rhetorical choices during the Civil War, Donna Harrington-Lueker has written about the advertisements Anthony and Stanton allowed in *The Revolution*, and Grace Farrell has discussed Anthony's autocratic control of the movement's history.

Linda Czuba Brigance, "Ballots and Bullets: Adapting Women's Rights Arguments to the Conditions of War," *Women and Language* 28, no. 1 (2005): 1-7.; Grace Farrell, "Beneath the Suffrage Narrative," *Canadian Review of American Studies* 36, no. 1 (2006): 45-65.; Donna Harrington-Lueker, "Finding a Market for Suffrage: Advertising and The Revolution, 1868-70," *Journalism History* 33, no. 3 (2007): 130-139.

³⁵ Lois W. Banner, *Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a Radical for Woman's Rights* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1980).; Ellen Carol DuBois and Richard Cándida Smith, *Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Feminist As Thinker: A Reader in Documents and Essays* (New York: New York University Press, 2007).; Elisabeth Griffith, *In Her Own Right: The Life of Elizabeth Cady Stanton* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).; Vivian Gornick, *The Solitude of Self: Thinking About Elizabeth Cady Stanton* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Theodore Stanton, and Harriot Stanton Blatch, *Elizabeth Cady Stanton* (New York: Arno, 1969).

³⁶ Constance Buel Burnett, *Five for Freedom: Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone, Susan B. Anthony, Carrie Chapman Catt* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).; Nancy F. Cott, *No Small Courage: A History of Women in the United States* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).; Ellen Carol DuBois,

Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848-1869 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).; Estelle B. Freedman, *No Turning Back: The History of Feminism and the Future of Women* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002).; Elizabeth Frost-Knappman and Kathryn Cullen-DuPont, *Women's Suffrage in America: An Eyewitness History* (New York: Facts on File, 1992).; Miriam Gurko, *The Ladies of Seneca Falls; The Birth of the Woman's Rights Movement* (New York: Macmillan, 1974).; Kathi Kern, *Mrs. Stanton's Bible* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).; Sally G. McMillen, *Seneca Falls and the Origins of the Women's Rights Movement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).; Kathryn Kish Sklar, *Women's Rights Emerges Within the Anti-Slavery Movement, 1830-1870: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2000).

³⁷ Estelle B. Freedman, *The Essential Feminist Reader* (New York: Modern Library, 2007).; Mary D. Pellauer, *Toward a Tradition of Feminist Theology: The Religious Social Thought of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Anna Howard Shaw* (Brooklyn, NY: Carlson, 1991).; Miriam Schneir, *Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings* (New York: Random House, 1972).; Marjorie Julian Spruill, *One Woman, One Vote: Rediscovering the Woman Suffrage Movement* (Troutdale, OR: NewSage Press, 1995).

³⁸ Ann D. Gordon, "Knowing Susan B. Anthony: The Stories We Tell of a Life," in Christine L. Ridarsky and Mary M. Huth, *Susan B. Anthony and the Struggle for Equal Rights* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2012): 201-233.

³⁹ First, Anthony is included in many public school social studies texts as well as children's biographies and story books. Kathleen Connors, *The Life of Susan B. Anthony* (New York: Gareth Stevens Publishing, 2014); Erin Edison, *Susan B. Anthony* (North Mankato, MN: Capstone Press, 2013); "Learn about Susan B. Anthony," *TeacherVision.com*, Accessed February 3, 2015, <https://www.teachervision.com/womens-rights/learn-about-susan-b-anthony.>; Suzanne Slade, *Friends for Freedom: The Story of Susan B. Anthony & Frederick Douglass* (Watertown, MA: Charlesbridge, 2014).; "Susan B. Anthony Lesson Plans and Lesson Ideas," *BrainPOP Educators*, Accessed February 3, 2015, <https://educators.brainpop.com/bp-jr-topic/susan-b-anthony.>; Frieda Wishinsky, *Freedom Heroines: Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Jane Addams, Ida B. Wells, Alice Paul, Rosa Parks* (New York: Scholastic, 2012).

This interest has encouraged popular attention to Anthony in many online communities.

Jessica Misener, "If Rosa Parks And Hillary Clinton Were Disney Princesses," *BuzzFeed.com*, November 4, 2013, Accessed February 3, 2015, https://www.buzzfeed.com/jessicamisener/if-rosa-parks-and-hillary-clinton-were-disney-princesses?utm_term=.inApedObk#.ybOGbD0YO; "Not for Ourselves Alone: The Story of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony," *PBS*, Accessed February 3, 2015; "Susan B. Anthony," *History.com*, Accessed February 3, 2015, <http://www.history.com/topics/womens-history/susan-b-anthony.>; "Susan B. Anthony," *Wikipedia.com*, Accessed February 3, 2015, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susan_B._Anthony.; "Susan Brownell Anthony (1820-1906)," *National Women's History Museum, Education & Resources*,

Accessed February 3, 2015. <https://www.nwhm.org/education-resources/biography/biographies/susan-brownell-anthony.>; Rossalyn Warren, “See The 5 Kick-Ass Women This Mom Dressed Her Daughter As Instead Of A Disney Princess,” *Upworthy.Com*, May 9, 2013, Accessed February 3, 2015. <http://www.upworthy.com/see-the-5-kick-ass-women-this-mom-dressed-her-daughter-as-instead-of-a-disney-princess>.

Additionally, the Susan B. Anthony House Museum is dedicated to Anthony’s memory, as was the Susan B. Anthony dollar coin. She is also a popular topic for politicians and public figures. “Susan B. Anthony House,” The Official Susan B. Anthony House Museum, 2015, Accessed February 3, 2015; “1999 Susan B. Anthony Dollar Coin,” *The United States Mint, About Us*, Accessed April 5, 2017. https://www.usmint.gov/about_the_mint/CoinLibrary/#sb1549.

Finally, Anthony is also the face of the Susan B. Anthony List Candidate Fund and the Susan B. Anthony Birthplace Museum, two organizations devoted to (erroneously) linking Anthony to the pro-life/anti-choice political cause. “The Susan B. Anthony Birthplace Museum, Adams Massachusetts – Exhibits at the Birthplace Museum,” *The Susan B Anthony Birthplace Museum* (2015), Accessed February 3, 2015, <http://www.susanbanthonybirthplace.com/exhibits.html>.; “The Susan B. Anthony List: Advancing Pro Life Leadership,” *SBA-List* (2012), Accessed February 3, 2015, <https://www.sba-list.org>.

⁴⁰ Ken Burns, Paul Barnes, Geoffrey C. Ward, Sally Kellerman, Ronnie Gilbert, Julie Harris, Buddy Squires, and Allen Moore, *Not for Ourselves Alone: The Story of Elizabeth Cady Stanton & Susan B. Anthony*, Alexandria, VA: PBS Home Video

(2004).; Susan Sarandon, Ruth Pollak, and Felicia M. Widmann, *One Woman, One Vote*, Alexandria, VA: PBS Video (1995).

⁴¹ Christine L. Ridarsky and Mary Margaret Huth, *Susan B. Anthony and the Struggle for Equal Rights* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press: 2012).

⁴² Hull, *The Woman Who Dared to Vote*.

⁴³ Wolfgang Mieder, “*All Men and Women Are Created Equal*”: *Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s and Susan B. Anthony’s Proverbial Rhetoric Promoting Women’s Rights* (New York: Peter Lang, 2014).

⁴⁴ Shawn Parry-Giles, “Archival Research and the American Presidency,” 157-183, in, *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address*, eds. Shawn J. Parry-Giles, and J. Michael Hogan (Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

⁴⁵ Robert N. Gaines, “The Process and Challenges of Textual Authentication,” 133-156, in, *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address*, eds. Shawn J. Parry-Giles, and J. Michael Hogan (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).

⁴⁶ Ronald F. Reid and James F. Klumpp, *American Rhetorical Discourse*, 2nd ed. (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1995), 7.

⁴⁷ The examples of extemporaneous, or likely extemporaneous speeches that are generally treated as manuscript discourses is plethoric, spanning both men’s and women’s nineteenth-century discourse. For examples see: Stephen H. Browne, “Reading Public Memory in Daniel Webster’s Plymouth Rock Oration,” *Western Journal of Communication* 57, no. 4 (1993): 464-477.; James Jasinski, “The Forms and Limits of Prudence in Henry Clay’s (1850) Defense of the Compromise Measures,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 81, no. 4 (1995): 454-478.;

Angela G. Ray, *The Lyceum and Public Culture in the Nineteenth-Century United States* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2005).; Richard A. Sinzinger, "Henry Clay, Master Propagandist for the Latin American Revolutionists," *Today's Speech* 18, no. 2 (1970): 27-32.; Craig R. Smith, "The Anti-War Rhetoric of Daniel Webster," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 85, no. 1 (1999): 1-16.; David Zarefsky, "Henry Clay and the Election of 1844: The Limits of a Rhetoric of Compromise," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 6, no. 1 (2003): 79-96.

⁴⁸ Gaines, "The Processes and Challenges," 134.

⁴⁹ For examples see: Ronald K. Burke, *American Public Discourse: A Multicultural Perspective* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992).; James W. Cleary and Herbert W. Hildebrandt, "The Critical Edition in Rhetorical Scholarship: A Guide to Its Preparation," *Speech Monographs* 28, no. 1 (1961): 29-38.; Bernard K. Duffy and Richard W. Leeman, *American Voices: An Encyclopedia of Contemporary Orators* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 2005).; Richard W. Leeman and Bernard K. Duffy, *The Will of a People: A Critical Anthology of Great African American Speeches* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2012).; Marian B. McLeod, *Commonwealth Public Address: Essays in Criticism* (New Delhi, India: Sterling Publishers, 2007).; Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, *Speech Criticism: The Development of Standards for Rhetorical Appraisal* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948), 307.; Kim Marie Vaz, *Black Women in America* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1994).

⁵⁰ Reid and Klumpp, *American Rhetorical Discourse*, 258.

⁵¹ Michael Calvin McGee, "Text, Context, And The Fragmentation Of Contemporary Culture," *Western Journal Of Speech Communication: WJSC* 54, no. 3 (1990): 278.

⁵² I specifically differentiate my textual analysis from what Michael Leff would call close textual analysis or "close reading." As Celest Condit has noted, Leff's close reading specifically differs from that more general practiced in the discipline by engaging the disposition of a single text. The lack of finite speech texts for Anthony's extemporaneous speeches would likely stymie an attempt at Leff's method. However, Condit argued that a more broadly understood textual analysis has been the practice of the discipline since we stepped away from neo-Aristotelian criticism. What Condit called textual analysis meshes well with Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's assertion that the rhetorical critic's job is to observe, analyze, and interpret discursive texts. I find excellent example of textual analysis in Kenneth Burke's "The Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle," Edwin Black's "Gettysburg and Silence," Celeste Condit's *Decoding Abortion Rhetoric*, James Darsey's "Joe McCarthy's Fantastic Moment," and Bonnie Dow's "The Womanhood Rationale."

Edwin Black, "Gettysburg and Silence," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 80, no. 1 (1994): 21-36.; Kenneth Burke, "The Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle," in *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974), 191-220.; Celeste Condit, "Rhetorical Criticism and Audiences: The Extremes of McGee and Leff," *Western Journal Of Speech Communication* 54, no. 3 (1990): 330-345.; Celeste Michelle Condit, *Decoding*

Abortion Rhetoric: Communicating Social Change (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990).; James Darsey, "Joe McCarthy's Fantastic Moment," *Communication Monographs* 62 no. 1 (1995): 65-86.; Bonnie J. Dow, "The 'Womanhood' Rationale in the Woman Suffrage Rhetoric of Frances E. Willard," *Southern Communication Journal* 56, no. 4 (1991): 298-307.

⁵³ These newspaper accounts are both friendly and hostile toward Anthony.

⁵⁴ Fred J. Barton, "The Signification of 'Extempor Speech' in English and American Rhetorics," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 27, no. 1 (1941): 237-251.; Albert T. Martin, "Henry Ware's Apologia for Extempore Speech," *Speech Monographs* 32, no. 1 (1965): 69-73.

⁵⁵ Wayland Maxfield Parrish, "The Style of Extemporaneous Speech," *Quarterly Journal Of Speech Education* 9, no. 4 (1923): 345-357. 346.

⁵⁶ Robert Gray Gunderson, "Webster in Linsey-Woolsey," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 37, no. 1 (1951): 23-30. 25.

⁵⁷ David Zarefsky, *Lincoln, Douglas, and Slavery: In the Crucible of Public Debate* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 35.

⁵⁸ Roger C. Aden, "Making Rhetorical Choices: The Parallel Between Extemporaneous and Presidential Speaking," *Argumentation & Advocacy* 28, no. 4 (1992): 178-185.; Herbert W. Hildebrandt and Walter W. Stevens, "Manuscript and Extemporaneous Delivery in Communicating Information," *Speech Monographs* 30, no. 4 (1963): 369-372.; Brian D. Householder and Allan D. Loudon, "Extemporaneous Speaking Competitions: Investigating the Impact of Conventional Extemporaneous Speech Organization and Judge Experience on

Speaker Ratings,” *Forensic* 98, no. 1 (2013): 17-34.; Pamela S. Joraanstad, “Strategies to Enhance the Use of Documentation in Extemporaneous Speaking,” *North Dakota Journal of Speech & Theatre* 2, no. 1 (1989): 55-57.; Dhillon Kiranjeet and April Larson, “Biological Sex as a Predictor of Competitive Success in Intercollegiate Forensics,” *National Forensic Journal* 29, no. 2 (2011): 117-137.

These studies offer little in the way of theorizing extemporaneous speaking outside of collegiate competition. However, the universal focus in these pieces on the formal stylistic elements of extemporaneous speaking does reinforce my assertion that the rhetorical texture of extemporaneous speaking is significantly different from that of prepared manuscript oratory.

⁵⁹ J. Michael Spruole, “Inventing Public Speaking: Rhetoric and the Speech Book, 1730-1930,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 15, no. 4 (2012): 564.

⁶⁰ Emily M. Cope, “‘Inspiration of Delivery’: John A. Broadus and the Evangelical Underpinnings of Extemporaneous Oratory,” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (2015): 279-299.

⁶¹ Cope, “‘Inspiration of Delivery,’” 293.

⁶² John Quincy Adams, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory* Vol. I (Cambridge, England: 1810), 340-341.

⁶³ Adams, *Lectures*, 161.

⁶⁴ Henry Ware, *Hints on Extemporaneous Preaching* (Boston, MA: Cummings, Hilliard, 1824).

⁶⁵ Ware, *Hints*, 6.

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- ⁶⁶ Martin, “Henry Ware’s Apologia,” 69.
- ⁶⁷ Henry J. Ripley, *Sacred Rhetoric or the Composition and Delivery of Sermons to which are Added Hints on Extemporaneous Preaching* (Boston, MA: 1849), 170.
- ⁶⁸ Ripley, *Sacred Rhetoric*.
- ⁶⁹ William Pittenger, and John Armor Bingham, *Oratory Sacred and Secular; or, The Extemporaneous Speaker, With Sketches of the Most Eminent Speakers of All Ages* (New York: Samuel R. Wells, 1868), xiii.
- ⁷⁰ Joseph Bancroft and Robert Barclay, *A Persuasive to Unity, Setting Forth the Ground of that Source of Comfort in which Ground of a Clean Heart and a Right Spirit Men May Grow in Good and Firmly Support Each Other as Living Stones in the Temple of God* (Philadelphia, PA: T. Stuckey, 1875).
- ⁷¹ Ripplingham, *The Art*, vii.
- ⁷² Asa D. Smith, *Letters to a Young Student, in the First Stage of a Liberal Education* (Boston, MA: Perkins & Marvin, 1832), 105.
- ⁷³ School books, declamation and traditional oratory books, readers, and histories that were used in nineteenth-century education focused on building an informed citizenry who were well versed in the goodness of George Washington, the wisdom and tradition of Western thought, and the morality of protestant Christianity. The examples here are ample, but some would include: Alexander Melville Bell, *A New Elucidation of the Principles of Speech and Elocution a Full Theoretical Development, with Numerous Practical Exercises, for the Correction of Imperfect, or the Relief of Impeded Utterance, and for the General Improvement of Reading and Speaking* (Edinburgh, Scotland: Published by the

Author, 1849).; R. Claggett, *Elocution Made Easy Containing Rules and Selections for Declamation and Reading, with Figures Illustrative of Gesture* (New York: Baine & Burgess, 1845).; Anna Diehl, *Reading and Elocution: Theoretical and Practical* (New York: Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor & Company, 1869).; J. W. Keene, *Selections for Reading and Elocution: A Handbook for Teachers and Students* (Boston, MA: Small, 1879).; Oliver Oldham, *The Humorous Speaker: Being a Choice Collection of Amusing Pieces, Both in Prose and Verse, Original and Selected, Consisting of Dialogues, Soliloquies, Parodies, &c., Designed for the Use of Schools, Literary Societies, Debating Clubs, Social Circles and Domestic Entertainment* (New York: Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor, 1853).; T. S. Pinneo, and Austin Clark. *The Hemans Reader for Female Schools: Containing Extracts in Prose and Poetry Selected from the Writings of More than One Hundred and Thirty Different Authors* (New York: Clark, Austin, and Smith, 1847).; Ebenezer Porter, *Analysis of the Principles of Rhetorical Delivery as Applied in Reading and Speaking* (Andover, MA: M. Newman, 1827).; William Scott, *Lessons in Elocution: Or A Selection of Pieces, in Prose and Verse for the Improvement of Youth in Reading and Speaking*. The 7th American ed. (Wilmington, DE: Printed and Sold by Peter Brynberg, 1797).; James Wright, *The School Orator, or Exercises in Elocution, Theoretically Arranged, from which, Aided by Short Practical Rules to be Committed to Memory and Repeated After the Manner of Reciting the Latin Syntax, Students May Learn to Articulate Every Word with Propriety; Be Assisted In the Removal of minor Impediments; Be taught to moderate the Voice, and to speak with Accuracy of Inflection, from the*

easiest to the most difficult Specimens of English Oratorical Composition, 5th edition, with Additions (London, England: Wittaker, Treacher, & co.; Longman, Rees, Orme, & co.; Simpkin and Marshal; Houlston & Son, and S. Poole, 1833).

⁷⁴ Caleb Bingham, *The Columbian Orator: Containing a Variety of Original and Selected Pieces; Together with Rules, Calculated to Improve Youth and Others in the Ornamental and Useful Art of Eloquence* (Boston, MA: Printed for Caleb Bingham, 1817).; William Holmes McGuffey, *McGuffey's New Sixth Eclectic Reader: Exercises in Rhetorical Reading, with Introductory Rules and Examples* (Cincinnati, OH: Sargent, Wilson & Hinkle, 1857).

⁷⁵ John Ripplingham, *The Art of Extempore Speaking*, (London, England: 1813). x.

⁷⁶ Smith, *Letters*, 107-8.

⁷⁷ M. Bautain, *The Art of Extempore Speaking: Hints for the Pulpit, the Senate, and the Bar* (New York: C. Scribner, 1859), 84-95 and 329, 95-97, 97-100, 100-103, 103, 104-107.

⁷⁸ Guy Clareton Lee, *Principles of Public Speaking, Comprising the Techniques of Articulation, Phrasing, Emphasis; The Cure of Vocal Defects; The Elements of Gesture, A Complete Guide in Public Reading, Extemporaneous Speaking, Debate, and Parliamentary Law, Together with Many Exercises, Forms, and Practice Selections* (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1899), 302-332.

⁷⁹ Bautain, *The Art*. 5.

⁸⁰ Lee, *Principles*, 344.

⁸¹ John Witherspoon, *Essays on Important Subjects Intended to Establish the Doctrine of Salvation by Grace, and to Point out Its Influence on Holiness of Life* (Edinburgh,

Scotland: Printed for Ogle & Aikman, J. Pillans & Sons, J. Ritchie, and J. Turnbull, 1805).

⁸² George Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), 327-331.

⁸³ William Ware, *American Unitarian Biography Memoirs of Individuals Who Have Been Distinguished by Their Writings, Character, and Efforts in the Cause of Liberal Christianity* (Boston, MA: J. Munroe, 1850), 392.

⁸⁴ Margaret Hope Bacon, *Whilt Thou Go On My Errand?: Three 18th Century Journals of Quaker Women Ministers* (Wallingford, PA: Pendel Hill Publications, 1994), 124.

⁸⁵ Anthony and Harper, *The History of Woman Suffrage*, 334.

For more information on Grimké see, Gerda Lerner, *The Grimké Sisters of South Carolina: Rebels Against Slavery* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1967).; Stephen H. Browne, *Angelina Grimké: Rhetoric, Identity, and the Radical Imagination* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1999).

⁸⁶ Thomas Babington Macaulay, *New Biographies of Illustrious Men* (Boston, MA: Whittemore, Niles, and Hall, 1857), 162.

⁸⁷ John Henry Barrows, *Henry Ward Beecher; The Shakespeare of the Pulpit* (New York etc.: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1893), 159.

⁸⁸ James Jasinski identified these four conceptions of invention from George Kennedy and from recent scholarship in composition theory and linguistics on bricolage. Hereafter I will reference these respective scholars when discussing the conceptions individually, and Jasinski when discussing them collectively since he

collated them specifically and other scholars have only dealt with individual concepts.

James Jasinski, "Invention," in, *Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Studies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 327-331.; Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion*, 327-331.

⁸⁹ Ernest Earl Ettlich, "Theories of Invention in Late Nineteenth Century American Rhetoric," *Western Speech Journal* 30 (1966): 234.

⁹⁰ William Pittenger, *Extempore Speech, How to Acquire and Practice It* (Philadelphia, PA: National School of Elocution and Oratory, 1883), 145-150.

⁹¹ I have not located any speaking textbooks designed for or written by women from the nineteenth century. However, scholars in the 1980s began recovering and documenting women's nineteenth-century rhetoric, including women's inventional practices.

⁹² Karen Burke LeFevre, *Invention as a Social Act* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 18.

⁹³ Margaret Hope Bacon, *Mothers of Feminism: The Story of Quaker Women in America* (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1986).

⁹⁴ LeFevre, *Invention*, 96.

⁹⁵ Judith Stills and Michael Worton, "Introduction," In *Intertextuality: Theories and Practices*, eds. Judith Stills and Michael Worton (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990), 1.

⁹⁶ I am resistant to the gendering implied in this statement. The idea that men adhered to a classical invention practice while excluding communal and collaborative work, or

that women completely lacked access to classic-based textbooks seems farfetched. However, the current literature on nineteenth-century invention practices deals almost exclusively with women's work, a work that seemed to value intertextuality and community more overtly than did its masculine counterpart. A notable exception here comes from Angela Ray's work on Lincoln at the Lyceum. Although Ray did not focus specifically on invention, her work highlighted the intertextual inventional practice Lincoln used to craft his 1838 lecture. Her work also demonstrated that the apprenticeship style of invention, or a learning-by-watching-and-doing approach, was common to both Lincoln and other male speakers of the time. Work on men's intertextual invention practices during the nineteenth century offers fertile ground for future research.

Angela G. Ray, "Learning Leadership: Lincoln at the Lyceum, 1838," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 13, no. 3 (2010): 349-388.

⁹⁷ Campbell, *Man*, 13-15.

Extensive work has also been done on feminine style since Campbell first proposed it, much of it concerned with how the feminine style has reappeared and changed in the twentieth century. For further discussions see: Jane Blankenship and Deborah C. Robson, "Feminine Style in Women's Political Discourse: An Exploratory Essay," *Communication Quarterly* 43, no. 3 (1995): 353-378.; Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Discursive Performance of Femininity: Hating Hillary," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 1, no. 1 (1998).; Bonnie J. Dow and Mari Boor Tonn, "Feminine Style and Political Judgment in the Rhetoric of Ann Richards," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 79, no. 3 (1993): 286-302.; Sarah Hayden, "Re-Claiming Bodies of

Knowledge: An Exploration of the Relationship between Feminist Theorizing and Feminine Style in the Rhetoric of the Boston Women's Health Book Collective," *Western Journal of Communication* 61, no. 2 (1997): 127-163.; Shawn J. Parry-Giles and Trevor Parry-Giles, "Gendered Politics and Presidential Image Construction: A Reassessment of the 'Feminine Style,'" *Communication Monographs* 63, no. 4 (1996): 337-353.; Mari Boor Tonn, "Militant Motherhood: Labor's Mary Harris 'Mother' Jones," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 82, no. 1 (1996): 1-21.

⁹⁸ Campbell, *Man*, 13.

⁹⁹ For a thorough discussion of these norms see: Erna Olafson Hellerstein, Leslie Parker Hume, and Karen M. Offen, *Victorian Women: A Documentary Account of Women's Lives in Nineteenth-Century England, France, and the United States* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981).; Barbara Welter, *Dimity Convictions: The American Woman in the Nineteenth Century* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1976).; Josephine Donovan, *Feminist Theory: The Intellectual Traditions*, fourth edition (New York: Continuum, 2012).

¹⁰⁰ Campbell, *Man*, 12-13.

¹⁰¹ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Inventing Women: From Amaterasu to Virginia Woolf," *Women's Studies in Communication* 21, no. 2 (1998): 111-126.

¹⁰² Lucy Hogan and Martha Solomon, "Extending the Conversation: Sharing the Inner Light," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (1995): 32-46.

¹⁰³ Hogan and Solomon, "Extending the Conversation," 33.

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- ¹⁰⁴ Beth Ann Rothermel, "Prophets, Friends, Conversationalists: Quaker Rhetorical Culture, Women's Commonplace Books, and the Art of Invention, 1775–1840," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (2013): 71-94.
- ¹⁰⁵ Rothermel, "Prophets," 91.
- ¹⁰⁶ Lisa Reid Ricker, "(De)Constructing the Praxis of Memory-Keeping: Late Nineteenth-Century Autograph Albums as Sites of Rhetorical Invention," *Rhetoric Review* 29, no. 3 (2010): 239-256.
- ¹⁰⁷ Lisa M. Gring-Pemble, "Writing Themselves into Consciousness: Creating a Rhetorical Bridge Between the Public and Private Spheres," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 84, no. 1 (1998): 41-61.
- ¹⁰⁸ Shirley Wilson Logan, *Liberating Language Sites of Rhetorical Education in Nineteenth Century Black America* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008).
- ¹⁰⁹ Anthony had a "lazy eye" about which she was very self-conscious in her early life. She was also taller than average with a thin and angular frame. In addition to these natural physical characteristics, Anthony also dressed in a somewhat plain style that reflected her Quaker upbringing.
- ¹¹⁰ Catherine Allgor, *Parlor Politics: In Which Ladies of Washington Help Build a City and a Government* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2000).; Campbell, *Man Cannot.*; Flexner, *Century of Struggle.*; Gring-Pemble, "Writing Themselves Into Consciousness,"; Aileen S. Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965); Welter, *Dimity Convictions.*

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- ¹¹¹ Campbell, *Man*, 9.
- ¹¹² Roxanne Mountford, "On Gender and Rhetorical Space," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (2001): 41.
- ¹¹³ Welter, *Dimity Convictions*.
- ¹¹⁴ Susan Zaeske, "The "Promiscuous Audience" Controversy and the Emergence of the Early Woman's Rights Movement," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 81, no. 2 (1995): 204.
- ¹¹⁵ Jason Jones, "Breathing Life into a Public Woman: Victoria Woodhull's Defense of Woman's Suffrage," *Rhetoric Review* 28, no. 4 (2009): 352-369.
- ¹¹⁶ The thorough gendering of space facilitated an explicit structure of norms for "respectable" (white, middle class, married) women. Michel Foucault's work is central to understanding how discourse works to normalize and police the body to adhere to social norms. Foucault highlighted the body's constructed nature in his various works on how the body is policed through the gaze of modern medicine and through panopticonic surveillance instead of physical punishment. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault specifically asserted that power in a democratic society was not a possession but a network of processes that intersected and overlapped to keep the body docile. These processes are inherently rhetorical, using discourse to shape the material conditions of and around the body. Foucault's work on the body as normalized and policed through discourse provided the foundation for further scholarship on how the body is constructed and made meaningful through rhetoric. A major theme in communication scholarship about how bodies are normalized and policed comes from

investigations of unruly or abnormal bodies. Scholars are especially interested in the resistant or transgressive potential of material bodies that do not fit within discursive norms, and the concomitant power of dominant discourses to police these “unruly” bodies back into normative narratives.

This idea of the body as unruly, and the need to create a narrative to normalize that body, provides a foundation for questions about how Anthony’s often-unruly body functioned in her extemporaneous discourse. Paul Achter has argued that “communication about bodies and communication from bodies arises from cultural needs to direct and channel an entity that is by definition not reducible to any one essence.” This irreducibility, Achter argued, was the driving force behind narratives that work to police unruly bodies. John Sloop’s critique of the policing visited upon the gender-diversity of Brandon Teena’s story by media narratives is an especially apt example of this limitation. Despite the discursive potential of Brandon Teena’s body, the narratives into which the body was forced re-constituted “public understandings of the ‘true’ meaning of sex” as knowable, binary, and finite. Also investigating the limits of defiant bodies, Achter argued that the “unruly” bodies of wounded veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq were domesticated into efficient emotional narratives that (1) supported the nation-state at war, (2) symbolized an ability to overcome problems, and (3) framed health as a return to “normalcy.” Shannon Holland also discussed how media outlets used Jessica Lynch’s sexed-female body to counter the transgressive potential of women’s military service. This work on unruly bodies highlighted both the transgressive *potential* of the material body and the incredibly powerful *policing*

exerted to normalize those bodies into dominant discourses. Specifically, a body like Anthony's could violate the norms of its context, either to productively disturb traditionally oppressive structures or to reify those same structures through intractability or lack of narrative.

Paul Achter, "Unruly Bodies: The Rhetorical Domestication of Twenty-First-Century Veterans of War," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 96, no. 1 (2010): 46-68.; Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic; An Archaeology of Medical Perception* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973).; Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).; Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).; Shannon L. Holland, "The Dangers of Playing Dress-Up: Popular Representations of Jessica Lynch and the Controversy Regarding Women in Combat," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 92, no. 1(2006): 27-50.; John M. Sloop, "Disciplining the Transgendered: Brandon Teena, Public Representation, and Normativity," *Western Journal of Communication* 64, no. 2 (2000): 165-89.

¹¹⁷ Kristan Poirot, "(Un)Making Sex, Making Race: Nineteenth-Century Liberalism, Difference, and the Rhetoric of Elizabeth Cady Stanton," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 96, no. 2 (2010): 185-208.

¹¹⁸ Poirot, 202-3.

Recent scholarship on nineteenth-century women's rhetoric has also engaged the regulation of women's bodies, although less directly. Susan Zaeske's "The South Arose as One Man" addressed the constructions of gender for Antebellum Southern men, and the violent reactions when this gendered ideal was threatened

by petition campaigns. Tiffany Lewis also addressed the gendered regulation of women's bodies and how the myths and narratives of frontier life allowed a rhetorical reframing of western women, from homemakers in need of protection into frontier heroes deserving of rights.

Tiffany Lewis, "Winning Woman Suffrage in the Masculine West: Abigail Scott Duniway's Frontier Myth," *Western Journal of Communication* 75, no. 2 (2011): 127-147.; Susan Zaeske, "'The South Arose As One Man': Gender and Sectionalism in Antislavery Petition Debates, 1835-1845," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 12, no. 3 (2009): 341-368.

¹¹⁹ Lindal Buchanan, "Regendering Delivery: The Fifth Cannon and the Maternal Rhetor," *RSQ: Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (2002): 51-73.

¹²⁰ Buchanan, "Regendering Delivery," 69.

¹²¹ Kristy Maddux, "'Without Touching upon Suffrage': Women's Discourses of Economic Citizenship at the World's Columbian Exposition," Paper Presented at the National Communication Association Conference (Washington, DC: November 2013).

¹²² Rogers Smith argued that the legal history of American citizenship is fraught with ascriptive inegalitarian exclusions based on identity categories such as race, class, and gender. The American system individual identity as a marker of who was and was not a citizen. Alessandra Beasley Von Burg argued that many "natives" (white, Western European immigrants) sought to limit access to American rights based who was "in" or "out" of the ever-changing national borders. Another limitation on who was a citizen came from the Enlightenment ideal of a rational

individual as the unit of citizenship. Barbara Welke also highlighted the ableism that pervaded the nature of nineteenth-century citizenship as rights were often restricted to those capable of fulfilling the responsibility of military service or explicitly denied to those perceived as handicapped.

Examples of the racial limits placed on citizenship status and on the rights of citizens are easy to find. The three-fifths compromise in the US constitution, the 1790 Naturalization Act, and the Page Act of 1875 each highlight a different facet of the exclusionary, identity-based limitations placed on who could be a citizen. Complicating this idea of bordered and identity-based citizenship status was the Supreme Court decision in *Minor v. Happersett*, in which the court decided that women were citizens but not entitled to the right to vote. The *Minor* decision highlighted that inclusion in the status of citizenship was still complicated by what rights and responsibilities citizenship entailed.

Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 3.; Alessandra Beasley Von Burg, "Stochastic Citizenship: Toward a Rhetoric of Mobility," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 45, no. 4 (2012): 351-375.; Barbara Young Welke, *Law and the Borders of Belonging in the Long Nineteenth Century United States* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10-11.; U.S. Constitution, article 1, section 2, paragraph 3.; 1790 Naturalization Act, Session II, Chapter 3:1, Statute 103, 1st Congress (March 26, 1790).; 1875 Page Law, Session II, Chapter. 141:18, Statute 477, 43rd Congress (March 3, 1875).; *Virginia L. Minor and Francis Minor, Her Husband, Plaintiffs in Error, vs. Reese Happersett*, 88 U.S. Supreme Court, 162 (1874).

¹²³ Linda K. Kerber, *No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998).

¹²⁴ Aristotle's *Politics*, John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government*, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract* proposed that individuals relinquished some of their total independence in favor of cooperation to ensure protection of their property by a government. In exchange for this limitation on their freedom, citizens could expect participation in the government through avenues like voting, public speech, and serving as representatives, and protection from the government in time of trouble like war.

Aristotle, *The Politics of Aristotle*, trans., ed., E. Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).; John Locke, *Of Civil Government: Second Treatise* (Chicago, IL: H. Regnery Co., 1955).; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (New York: Penguin, 1968).; Michael Walzer, "Citizenship," in *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 211-220.

¹²⁵ Robert Asen, "A Discourse Theory of Citizenship," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 90, no. 2 (2004): 191-210.

¹²⁶ Asen, "A Discourse Theory," 192.

¹²⁷ Robert Putnam's popular *Bowling Alone* usefully highlights the changing nature of civic participation in America.

Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

¹²⁸ Asen, "A Discourse Theory," 192-193.

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- ¹²⁹ Asen, "A Discourse Theory," 193.
- ¹³⁰ Asen, "A Discourse Theory," 194.
- ¹³¹ Michael Schudson, *The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life* (New York: Martin Kessler Books, 1998).
- ¹³² Michael Schudson, "Good Citizens and Bad History: Today's Political Ideals in Historical Perspective," *The Communication Review* 4, no. 1 (2000): 4-5.
- ¹³³ Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States* (New York: Basic Books, 2009).
- ¹³⁴ Smith, *Civil Ideas*, 67, 192-193.
- ¹³⁵ Belinda Stillion Southard, *Militant Citizenship: Rhetorical Strategies of the National Woman's Party, 1913-1920* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2011), 13-14.
- ¹³⁶ Welke, *Law*, 65.
- ¹³⁷ Carolyn S. Vacca, *A Reform against Nature: Woman Suffrage and the Rethinking of American Citizenship, 1840-1920* (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 28-30.
- ¹³⁸ Vacca, *A Reform Against Nature*, 4-5.
- ¹³⁹ Dow, "The 'Womanhood' Rationale."
- ¹⁴⁰ Lewis, "Winning Woman Suffrage."
- ¹⁴¹ Zaeske, "'The South Arose.'"
- ¹⁴² Tonn, "Militant Motherhood," 8.
- ¹⁴³ Angela Ray, "The Rhetorical Ritual of Citizenship: Women's Voting as Public Performance, 1868-1875," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 93, no. 1 (2007): 1-27.

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- ¹⁴⁴ Jennifer L. Borda, "The Woman Suffrage Parades of 1910-1913: Possibilities and Limitations of an Early Feminist Rhetorical Strategy," *Western Journal of Communication* 66, no. 1 (2002): 25–52.
- ¹⁴⁵ E. Michele Ramsey, "Inventing Citizens During World War I: Suffrage Cartoons in 'The Woman Citizen'," *Western Journal of Communication* 64, no. 2 (2000): 113-147.
- ¹⁴⁶ Borda, "The Woman Suffrage Parades."
- ¹⁴⁷ Ramsey, "Inventing Citizens," 42.
- ¹⁴⁸ Ray, "The Rhetorical Ritual of Citizenship."
- ¹⁴⁹ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Rhetorical Criticism 2009," 86-107, in *The Handbook of Rhetoric and Public Address*, eds. Shawn J. Parry-Giles and J. Michael Hogan (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 92.

Chapter 2

Susan B. Anthony's Burned-Over District Rhetoric as a Performance of Citizenship

In January of 1853, Susan B. Anthony undertook her first statewide petition campaign. She became interested in temperance activism five years earlier, after an unpleasant experience with an intoxicated gentleman caller at a party.¹ While running her father's farm in the political hotbed of Rochester, New York, Anthony also embraced abolition and women's rights. Anthony combined these beliefs with the influences of Rochester activists like Frederick Douglass, Parker Pillsbury, William Lloyd Garrison, and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, as she worked to change New York State laws.² Her petition campaign requested that the New York State Legislature pass a version of the "Maine Law," a state prohibition on alcohol. After collecting tens of thousands of verified signatures, Anthony joined a delegation of women who were invited to present a petition for the temperance law before an informal session of the Legislature. The women read their petition, gave speeches in support of temperance laws, spoke out against the wealthy "liquor interests," and presented more than forty-thousand signatures to the legislature; they were dismissed as "Nobody but women and children!" when the legislators voted on the bill.³

Susan B. Anthony's work only dealt tangentially with women's voting rights until near the end of the Civil War. Anthony's work for suffrage grew from the cultural, legal, and ethical challenges she encountered as she fought for temperance, abolition, and equal pay for female teachers. In the same way, Anthony's rhetoric in support of woman suffrage was not the passionate intellectual argumentation in which Stanton excelled or the thorough religious exposition that Mott offered. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking

grew out of the rhetorical milieu in which she first discovered the inequality women suffered. Anthony's 12 years as a teacher were reflected in her early public speaking: inviting listeners to raise their hands after her lectures, she sought to answer her their questions, to engage them in debates, and to joke with them about ill-formed or poorly articulated claims. Anthony also embraced the extemporaneous speaking that was prevalent in her religious and reform communities. This extemporaneous speaking allowed her to perform and argue for her citizenship in the face of those who rejected her as "nobody but a woman."

Anthony's education and first work for suffrage is the least documented period of her life. Whether due to the ravages of time or Harper's aggressive document burning in 1903, little record of Anthony's early life exists outside Harper's biography. The first documents in Anthony's handwriting contained in Gordon's *Collected Papers* are letters between her and her father dated from 1837.⁴ There are also journal entries in her handwriting from the 1840s. Anthony's public career began with a speech for the Canajoharie Daughters of Temperance in 1849, and there are newspaper accounts, personal letters, and convention proceedings that record her public speaking during the 1850s.

In her years of work for woman's rights, abolition, and temperance before the Civil War, Susan B. Anthony performed her citizenship through the role of "entertaining reformer," which was a culturally recognizable performance in the Burned-over District of Upstate New York. Anthony used the recognizably Quaker and millennial voice of the prophetic rhetor as the foundation for her social invention of extemporaneous discourse. To deliver this discourse, she utilized an extemporaneous mode of address that hearkened

to both the exhorting calls to repentance familiar in evangelical preaching and the entertaining performance style that was growing in popularity with the economic and cultural growth of the Burned-over District. This performance meant that Anthony enacted her citizenship as a reformer, with little regard for women's lack of legal status, by embracing the raced and classed vision of the ideal extemporaneous rhetor. This performance of citizenship, I argue, was recognized and accepted in the Burned-over District culture. Anthony's rhetoric, however, failed to transcend the confines of the religious hotbed of Upstate New York to change public opinion of those outside already-accepting reform communities or to enact lasting change in Albany or Washington. Instead, Anthony's continual speaking provided legitimacy based on race and class that forced listeners to acknowledge her prowess as a speaker even if they rejected her explicit argument.

In the following pages, I begin by outlining the genre of Burned-over District rhetoric. I then discuss how Anthony's biographical history intersected with the cultural and geographical forces of the Burned-over District. I next address how Anthony invented and practiced extemporaneous speaking. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of how Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship within the Burned-over District.

Rhetoric of the Burned-Over District: A Generic Overview

The Burned-over District refers to an area that experienced intense spiritual revival during the first 30 years of the nineteenth century, and religious and social reform between 1830 and the beginning of the Civil War. Charles Finney coined the term "Burned-over District" to refer to an area of Western New York state stretching from the

shores of Lake Erie in the West to Syracuse, Utica, Rome, and the foothills of the Appalachian Mountains in the East.⁵ The prevalence of social and religious reform, the rapid change from agrarian communities to industrial towns, the emergence of a middle class, Catholic and Jewish immigration, and an extensive dissemination of education among the people were all defining characteristics of the Burned-over District that I will explore in greater detail below.

Life in the Burned-Over District

Geography, economics, religion, and politics all coalesced to make Rochester the epicenter for social and religious upheaval in New York State in the 1840s and 50s. The above factors combined to make the Burned-over District a place with a distinct rhetorical character that influenced invention and delivery practices and perceptions of citizenship for those within its borders. The Burned-over District, as a place, provided the physical and intellectual space where new ideas and modes of rhetorical performance could be explored, celebrated, concentrated, and intensified into a rhetorical genre. To understand how important Burned-over District rhetoric, as a genre, was to Anthony's rhetorical practice requires a brief exploration of how a place functions as part of its rhetoric. The following sections trace the development of the Burned-over District and discuss how the place shaped the rhetoric and performances of citizenship that occurred within it.

The most important element of Rochester's geography was its proximity to water and rail transportation courtesy of the Erie Canal. Cross noted that, with the construction of the Canal, population in counties across New York State grew from less than 20 people per square mile in most of the state in 1820, to more than 40 people per square

mile throughout the counties boarding the Canal's path by 1835, averaging a very high 4.6 percent economic growth rate yearly.⁶ Running more than 360 miles over the Appalachia mountains to connect the Atlantic Ocean with the great lakes, the Canal was considered an engineering marvel. It served as an important attraction for European tourists, and a testament to the spirit, ingenuity, and ability of the still-new nation. It was also a vital thoroughfare for the previously coast-bound country to expand into western territory colonized by other nations.⁷ The Erie Canal was the main thoroughfare for passenger and product transportation from its completion in 1825 through the completion of cross-state railroads in the 1860s. The Canal also remained the most affordable means of transporting goods across the state well into the 1890s. The Canal allowed Rochester to become an important inland trading port because the city sat at the intersection of the Genesee River and the Erie Canal, with access to the American West, the Atlantic Ocean, and southern New York, and access to Canada via a short boat ride across Lake Ontario. Formerly a small county seat, Rochester's placement along the Canal facilitated exponential growth in the 1820s and 30s.

This geographic windfall also meant that Rochester became an important and increasingly diverse economic center for westward expansion between 1825 and 1860. During the first 25 years of Westward expansion after the completion of the Canal, Rochester became an important flour milling town for those shipping grain to consumption capitals like New York and Boston. The town also housed some of the largest seed production and distribution companies in the world, helping to facilitate the expansion of farming in near-western states like Ohio and Indiana. The early economic importance that the Canal facilitated in Rochester also encouraged railroad construction

for the city, with rail connections from Rochester to other New York towns completed as early as 1840. The economic boom and accessibility Rochester provided also encouraged immigration to the town, which saw an influx of Catholic, Jewish, and ethnically-divided Protestant immigrants between 1830 and 1860. Daniel Anthony was likely seeking to participate in this flourishing economy when he moved the Anthony family, via a trip on the Canal, from Center Falls to Rochester in 1846. In *Wedding the Waters*, Peter Bernstein argued that the Canal functioned as more than transportation, bringing the first harbinger of radical change and increasing diversity to the previously staid expansion of the American frontier.⁸ The comparatively brisk transportation provided by the Erie Canal and the economic bonanza it produced heightened the sense of rapid change that suffused the Burned-over District from its earlier religious revivals of the 1810s.⁹

This sense of change as imminent, unstoppable, and yet somehow still precipitated by human action became the hallmark of religious life in Upstate New York. Writing about the first settlers in Upstate New York, Cross used the term “Yankee” for individuals from western Connecticut and Massachusetts who inherited much of their cultural identity from the Massachusetts Bay Colony Puritans, were part of the enthusiastic congregational church that followed Jonathan Edwards’ revivalist preaching, and most often voted with the Federalist or Whig parties.¹⁰ These settlers brought with them a religious belief in revival and a cultural familiarity with Protestant denominational in-fighting. As Protestant denominations continually fractured during the first 30 years of the nineteenth century, the missionary culture of the evangelical factions and the social-control minded culture of the Calvinist faiths vied to convert, engage, and retain tithing members to their individual church branches. It was this continual cycle of fervent

emotional evangelism that Finney derided in 1830 as “burning over” the hearts of his listeners in western New York.¹¹ The enthusiastic evangelical beliefs that spurred revivals also primed the Burned-over District for a boom in mystical, communal, and cultic religious experiments.

The peculiar mixture of rapid settlement, economic growth, increasing diversity, and religious emotionalism combined to make the Burned-over District a fertile planting ground for new religious movements. Although the various religions founded in the Burned-over District ascribed to diverse interpretations of the Bible, visionary leaders, or action-altering codes of behavior, they shared a common faith in the achievable perfection of humanity. Joseph Smith, of Palmyra, New York, established the Mormon church and published the *Book of Mormon*, a completion of the Protestant Bible, in 1830.¹² At least three Shaker communes functioned in the Burned-over District before the Civil War, encouraging members to seek perfection in their lives and perfect communion with the Spirit.¹³ William Miller, of Low-Hampton, New York, founded the Millerites in the early 1840s with his assertion that the Bible predicted Christ would return to earth on October 22nd, 1844 to establish the “Millennium.”¹⁴ Those disappointed by the failure of Miller’s prediction joined Shaker communes and Quaker meetings, and were also responsible for founding what would eventually become the Seventh-Day Adventist faith with its focus on the correct observance of the Sabbath.¹⁵ The Fox sisters, of Hydesville, New York, promoted their ability to commune with those beyond the grave, and in so doing founded the Spiritualist movement in 1848.¹⁶ Also in 1848, John Humphrey Noyes, of Oneida, New York, founded the Oneida commune on the belief that Christ had already returned and that bringing about the millennium was, therefore, incumbent upon believers

to bring about the perfection of his kingdom.¹⁷ These religions all focused to some extent on the perfection of human action in service of bringing about Christ's Millennial thousand year reign of peace on earth. Importantly, however, this belief was not confined to fringe religious groups but was shared widely within the Protestant denominations and liberal Christian faiths that were most dominant in Upstate New York.

In addition to its function as a major center of trade during the early years of Westward expansion, and its spasmodic millennial religious character, the ideological features of the Rochester community made it an important center for radical political activity during the 25 years before the Civil War. Liberal abolitionist Quakers like the Anthony family, as well as liberal branches of the Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian denominations all gathered in Rochester.¹⁸ One year after the Anthony family moved to Rochester, Frederick Douglass would begin publishing his *North Star* in the town. Rochester was an important stop on one of the "underground railroad" paths for escaped slaves.¹⁹ These geographic, economic, religious, and political factors all combined to influence the Rochester community in which Daniel Anthony settled his family and where Susan Anthony would eventually embrace a life of public social activism.

I argue that fractured enthusiastic religious traditions, combined with the evangelical belief that the Millennium could be brought about by human action, shaped the political culture of the Burned-over District from the 1840s through the beginning of the Civil War. The enthusiastic revival culture of the Burned-over District created an expectation that those who saw sin in a community, or who felt called to share a gospel or "good news" message, should proclaim that message and call out those who ignored their words. This evangelistic mode of public address, which Paul Johnson argued permeated

every aspect of life in places like Rochester, was also combined with the belief in a human-induced Millennium.²⁰ This belief in the power of individual action to radically change the reality of the entire community contributed to the activist political culture that suffused social change in Upstate New York from the late 1830s through the Civil War.

Rhetoric in the Burned-Over District

The geographic, economic, religious, and political character of the Burned-over District coalesced into a distinct rhetorical genre of “Burned-over District rhetoric” that fostered discernable practices of invention, delivery, and citizenship. Discussing the Burned-over District as the founding site of the Mormon faith, Scott Magelssen and Rhona Justice-Malloy argue that the area functioned as what Joseph Roach has termed “a vortex of behavior.”²¹ The Burned-over District was “a place in which everyday practices and attitudes” could be “legitimized, brought into the open, reinforced, celebrated, or intensified.”²² Justifying their use of Roach’s concept, Magelssen and Justice-Malloy argue that Roach’s concept can “elucidate the special meanings of the Burned-over District as a place and a space that allowed for a different, also seemingly transgressive, performance: the performance of the Sacred.”²³ Although Magelssen and Justice-Malloy’s work focuses on the beginning of the Mormon religion, the action they define as performing “the Sacred” are all rhetorical acts.²⁴ The Burned-over District provided the place for a rhetorical genre to emerge and develop.

Burned-over District rhetoric was rooted in the ideological makeup of the place from which it sprung. Ernest Bormann argued that the Burned-over District functioned as the home territory of important but competing fantasies for the young nation. Bormann asserted that, before the Civil War, Americans shared an encompassing rhetorical vision,

what he termed a “fantasy,” of restoration.²⁵ Bormann traced this fantasy of restoration from the New England Puritans toward Lincoln and the Civil War, arguing that this fantasy was created, disseminated, and reified in the Burned-over District by both evangelical preachers and social reformers. Both evangelical preachers and social reformers, Bormann argued, focused on different approaches to the shared fantasy of restoration as “the sacred flowed into and vitalized the secular persuasion for reform.”²⁶ This shared fantasy of reform and restoration was a uniting theme for public rhetorical performances in the Burned-over District.

Invention in Burned-over District rhetoric reflected the rhetorical vision of sin and restoration, embracing prophetic calls for change alongside community-building practices like friendship and conversation that strove to create more perfect communities through shared action. Beth Ann Rothermel named all three of these practices as part of Quaker women’s invention in commonplace books.²⁷ Lucy Hogan and Martha Solomon have also identified conversation and friendship as important elements of women’s inventional practice in the Burned-over District.²⁸ Likewise, Alan DeSantis has identified prophetic rhetoric as central to Frederick Douglass’ most famous speech in the Burned-over District.²⁹ Prophetic discourse, supplemented and encouraged through a shared community of friendship and conversation, allowed the speaker to function as a conduit between God and the audience, identifying with them while still damning their sin or calling them to repentance. The discourse that came from this invention was emotional, fraught with calls to change, melodrama, and an urgency designed to move the audience from complacency to immediate action. Just as this invention fed Finney’s revivals

during the Second Great Awakening and the millennial religious sects of the Burned-over District in the 1830s and 40s, it also propelled the reform rhetoric of the 1840s and 50s.

Delivery in Burned-over District rhetoric was designed to overcome the status quo of any situation and motivate an audience to immediate and often radical action. Two modes of delivery are relevant to this project: the evangelistic reformer and the entertaining orator. Bormann noted that the roots of evangelical preaching came from preachers like Jonathan Edwards who spoke with “more vehemence and directness” than previous speakers because his audience needed to be “struck with awe like thunderbolts, a dull droning from the desk would not serve.”³⁰ This heritage influenced both the evangelistic and reform rhetorics of the Burned-over District. Evangelistic speakers “following the Finney Style were merciless in their attacks on sin and corruption,”³¹ and embraced the extemporaneous mode of speaking because it offered a more rapid, personal, and immediate, or what Finney termed a “natural” delivery than preaching from written sermons.³² This extemporaneous delivery combined “a peculiar mixture of hortatory and solicitous” content and presentation that put the drama of human emotions and experiences on display to the audience.³³ Since evangelistic rhetorics predated reform rhetoric, the influence of the former is evident in the later. Reform presentations also focused on jolting audiences out of accepting the status quo with rapid and emotional content presented in a vehement and even melodramatic style. Reform orators often spoke extemporaneously as well; the extemporaneous mode of address allowed them the same drama and natural presentation it afforded the evangelist, but it also gave them the flexibility to meet the constant interruptions that were common when speaking about reform.³⁴ This active, vehement, and immediate delivery that came with extemporaneous

speaking meant that evangelical and reform rhetors used their delivery to play into the encompassing rhetorical fantasies of the Burned-over District and break up the status quo through emotionalism and a natural rapport with the audience.

The second important mode of delivery in Burned-over District rhetoric was the entertaining orator. Angela Ray noted that many lectures presented on the Lyceum circuit, especially beginning in the 1850s, were cross-over lectures that provided both education and entertainment.³⁵ These entertaining but still nominally educational lectures allowed spectators to spend their disposable income on entertainment, while still participating in morally and religiously acceptable social activities such as temperance work, raising money for foreign missionaries, working for education and poverty reforms, and hearing uplifting stories. Additionally, the growth of lecture-as-entertainment events coincided with the popularity of women in the theater, one of the few venues where women were welcomed to the public stage in the first half of the nineteenth century. Women like Charlotte Cushman, Sarah Bernhardt, Fanny Kemble, and many others graced theater stages in New York and London, as well as places like Boston and Philadelphia. These actresses were lauded by those who appreciated the theater but were still often framed as loose and immoral women by religious or conservative organizations, speakers, ministers, and lecturers.³⁶ The entertaining lecture provided morally unassailable diversions for the devout or image-conscious denizens of the Burned-over District.

The rhetorical visions of the Burned-over District also fed a unique practice of citizenship centered on religious adherence and community involvement. Much like Schudson's "trust-based" voting practices of the late eighteenth century,³⁷ citizenship

practices in the Burned-over District were public and participatory activities that revolved around the community. Bormann argued that the rhetorical fantasy of restoration in the Burned-over District encompassed more than just rhetorical practice, branching out to inflect public practices of religion, reform, politics, and citizenship. Some religious communities—the millennial Oneida Community or the liberal Hicksite Quakers, for example—relied on their religious practice in place of a participating in national citizenship. For them, the second coming of Christ was the fulfillment of the restoration rhetorical vision, and participating in secular politics polluted their faith. For these communities, living out your faith according to the prescriptions of your religion was the highest forms of citizenship. Citizenship in God’s kingdom usurped any practices of local, state, or national citizenship. Other religious organizations, such as the Methodists, asserted that the American Revolution and political democracy meant that “God’s plan had become accessible to all” through the creation of the American nation.³⁸ For adherents of these religions, political decisions like voting reflected their faith in the “restoration” that God would bring about on earth. Performing acts of local, state, or national citizenship were subservient to and directed by the dictates of faith, but participating in performances like voting or running for office were acceptable ways in which to live out your faith publically. In spite of these differences, citizenship was a rhetorical and performed practice—going far beyond the comparative simplicity of legal rights and responsibilities—for everyone in these communities.

Reform organizations in the Burned-over District mirrored the rhetorical approaches to citizenship espoused by religious communities like the Quakers and Methodists. In the Burned-over District, this influence meant that many reform

communities conflated acts of civic participation—public speaking, protest, charity—with performing national citizenship or substituted one for the other. There was little agreement among the reformers on what practices of citizenship were acceptable or desirable. In discussing abolition, William Lloyd Garrison, writing in *The Liberator*, famously urged his fellow abolitionists to abstain, as part of their Christian duty, from voting in national elections.³⁹ In contrast, the American Anti-Slavery Society *Declaration of Sentiments* urged its members to “remove slavery by moral and political actions, as prescribed by the constitution of the United States”: voting, the AASS argued, was a vital mode of political action, although by no means the only one, for its members.⁴⁰ The *Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions* that was adopted by the 1848 Seneca Falls Women’s Rights Convention reflected a similar idea of what actions constituted proper performances of citizenship for members. The adopted resolutions eventually included “That it is the duty of the women of this country to secure to themselves their sacred right to the elective franchise,”⁴¹ but this resolution was not without controversy.⁴² Writing in the *History of Woman Suffrage*, Stanton recalled, “The only resolution that was not unanimously adopted was the ninth,” which urged women to pursue voting. This debate happened because some reformers “feared a demand for the right to vote would defeat others they deemed more rational, and make the whole movement ridiculous.”⁴³ In other words, the women’s rights reformers were not convinced that legal citizenship practices were the best way to promote their desired reforms. The disagreements over proper legal practices of citizenship within reform communities would be repeated during the Civil War as national service and loyalty became important practices of citizenship that often did not align with the intersecting religious views of reformers.

The social, political, and religious upheaval of the Burned-over District, and the distinct rhetorical character that developed there, were central to Susan B. Anthony's early life and rhetorical career. These rhetorical practices also shaped Anthony's personal and public performances of citizenship in her first work for women's rights. Anthony's first public speaking was in service of the temperance cause, and her career of speaking for abolition and woman suffrage would follow the rhetorical traditions of her adopted home. The following section traces Anthony's early life and the first years of her rhetorical career. This section pays special attention to how Anthony's life intersected with the rhetoric, religion, and reform of the Burned-over District.

Anthony's Early Life: In the Whirlwind of Reform

Anthony's early life was shaped by both evangelistic and millennial strands of Burned-over District religious life. Her paternal family consisted of staunch Quakers, her maternal family, liberal Baptists. Because of these religious backgrounds, Anthony's family believed in education for both boys and girls. Her father, Daniel Anthony, was educated at a prominent Quaker school in New York and returned to Adams to teach, where he eventually married one of his pupils, Lucy Read. Susan B. Anthony learned to read when she was only three years old at the knee of her liberal Baptist maternal grandmother. Both sets of grandparents encouraged Anthony to pursue reading and education that interested her, even in subjects not generally thought appropriate for girls.⁴⁴ Daniel Anthony sent all of his children to a small and poorly-staffed common school in Battenville until, like many well-off Quakers, he established a home school for his children in a well-furnished room above his prosperous general store. Education, especially moral and practical education, was an important practice in the Quaker faith.⁴⁵

The equal education afforded to both male and female children within Quaker practice also helped support the ideals of equality before God and equal access to the inward light that grounded the religious doctrines of the Quaker church.⁴⁶ To facilitate his children's education, Daniel Anthony hired teachers trained at the best teacher's colleges.⁴⁷ Susan B. Anthony worked as a summer teacher for younger children in her home school when she was 15, before attending boarding school at Moulson's Female Seminary for one term in 1837.⁴⁸

While Anthony was away at school in the fall of 1837, her father's business fell on hard times that would drive the family toward a life of social activism in Rochester. Many economic and political factors participated in the 1837 American economic depression including banking and speculation practices, as well as falling values for American cotton and a speculation-induced near-West land bubble.⁴⁹ New York manufacturing was devastated due to the devaluation of paper currency, the lack of loan capital, and the demands of a paid workforce.⁵⁰ Susan Anthony and her sister Guelma were called home from school after their father lost everything to bank foreclosures.⁵¹ In the spring of 1839, the family moved to Hardscrabble (eventually renamed Center Falls), NY, and Anthony and her sisters were required to find teaching positions to provide support for the family.⁵²

Embracing Equality

Anthony began teaching at Eunice Keyton's Quaker boarding school where she increasingly espoused progressive views on human equality that would blend well with the ideological make-up of the Burned-over District. Barry argued that it was here, more than 100 miles from home, earning an independent living, where Anthony began to

develop, “her growing sense of self-determination and personal autonomy.”⁵³ This period was also when Anthony began expressing opinions on social issues. Harper recorded several letters and journal entries in which Anthony wrote about abolition and women’s equality. In one letter, Anthony reflected on a Quaker Friends Meeting where she noted,

The people about here are anti-Abolitionist and anti-everything else that's good. The Friends raised quite a fuss about a colored man sitting in the meeting-house, and some left on account of it. The man was rich, well-dressed and very polite, but still the pretended meek followers of Christ could not worship their God and have this sable companion with them. What a lack of Christianity is this!⁵⁴

Although Anthony’s ideas were by no means progressive by current standards—she remarked in one journal entry “O, what a happy state of things is this, to see these poor, degraded sons of Afric [*sic*] privileged to walk by our side”—her early writing still evidenced a respect for human equality and an indignation at those who ignored or disrespected other people.⁵⁵

Anthony’s interest in equality continued to grow as she taught across the Burned-over District from 1840 until 1846. As she experienced the inequalities between herself and her fellow male teachers, she began to express views on women’s equal pay that would eventually inform her early political actions. These pay inequalities were especially irksome to Anthony because this period of Anthony’s life revolved around hard work and supporting her family through her father’s financial troubles.⁵⁶ Due to the shared work of several family members, many debts associated with the 1837-38 financial crisis had been paid off by 1846. This financial freedom allowed Daniel

Anthony to make a final geographical move, to a farm in the abolition and social change hotbed of Rochester, NY.

Final Year of Teaching and Beginning of Public Life

In the spring of 1846, shortly after the Anthony family resettled in Rochester, Susan Anthony was offered a position as headmistress of the female department at the Canajoharie Academy.⁵⁷ Anthony's letters reveal a woman who was slowly abandoning the most conservative traditions of her Quaker faith in a move toward embracing the liberal focus on equality and social change that was central to Hicksite Quakers and the Universalist Church.⁵⁸ Anthony's letters from this time also begin to forgo the conventions of Quaker "plain" language for more standard English grammar.⁵⁹

While teaching in Canajoharie, Anthony's willingness to work for equality and social reform grew as she encountered the problems induced by excessive alcohol consumption and the solutions offered by social activism.⁶⁰ According to her letters, Anthony spent more time in social settings while in Canajoharie, allowing greater exposure to the excesses of intemperance.⁶¹ While in Canajoharie, Anthony also joined the newly formed Daughters of Temperance. On March 1st, 1849 Anthony gave the first speech of her career at a local village supper held by the Daughters.⁶² Anthony received acclaim from the town's people for her speech; Barry marks this occasion as the first real flowering of Anthony's political consciousness.⁶³ The Canajoharie Academy was closed in the spring of 1849, and by that fall Anthony returned to her family's home, now on a farm in Rochester, NY. Anthony ran the farm for her father from the fall of 1849 through the winter of 1852 when she returned to teaching and found that it no longer inspired her.⁶⁴

Anthony's time on the family farm, so close to the Burned-over District political hotbed of Rochester, also marked the beginning of her entrance into public speaking.⁶⁵ Anthony's biographers have contested the reasons for her entrance into public life. Barry contended that it was a move away from religion and stringent morality, while Harper cited the move toward spirituality and the Unitarian church as central.⁶⁶ Harper provided an alternate explanation, however, in her recounting of the many reformers and revolutionaries who frequently visited the Anthony farm. I quote Harper at length, here, to provide a flavor of the centrality of activism to Anthony's experience on her father's farm. Harper said,

The Anthony homestead was a favorite meeting place for liberal-spirited men and women. On Sunday especially, when the father could be at home, the house was filled and fifteen or twenty people used to gather around the hospitable board. Susan always superintended these Sunday dinners, and was divided between her anxiety to sustain her reputation as a superior cook and her desire not to lose a word of the conversation in the parlor. Garrison, Pillsbury, Phillips, Channing and other great reformers visited at this home, and many a Sunday the big wagon would be sent to the city for Frederick Douglass and his family to come out and spend the day. Here were gathered many times the Posts, Hallowells, DeGarmos, Willises, Burtises, Kedzies, Fishes, Curtises, Stebbins, Asa Anthonys, all Quakers who had left the society on account of their anti-slavery principles and were leaders in the abolition and woman's rights movements. Every one of these Sunday meetings was equal to a convention. The leading events of the day were

discussed in no uncertain tones. All were Garrisonians and believed in “immediate and unconditional emancipation.”⁶⁷

Anthony’s actions to this point in her life were logical for a woman in her context and were pragmatic regarding earning a living. Anthony was uninterested in marriage, motherhood, or teaching, so working as a social reformer, as so many family friends did, offered a plausible opportunity for in meaningful and gainful work.

It was also during this time at the farm that Anthony began organizing social change efforts, with a focus on social action. While working with the Daughters of Temperance, Anthony founded sister chapters in several towns surrounding Rochester and organized community events to encourage temperance and laws against liquor.⁶⁸ In 1851, Anthony’s work expanded beyond temperance into active support for Anti-Slavery reforms. Anthony attended an anti-slavery meeting in Rochester held by Stephen and Abby Kelly Foster. Anthony decided to accompany the Fosters on a week-long trip to surrounding county meetings; this trip cemented her role as an advocate for the anti-slavery cause and fed her burgeoning interest in women’s rights.⁶⁹ Anthony attended an abolition meeting in Syracuse and stopped in Seneca Falls to hear William Lloyd Garrison and George Thompson speak.⁷⁰ There, Bloomer introduced Anthony to Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Stanton recalled the meeting in her autobiography:

Walking home, after the adjournment, we met Mrs. Bloomer and Miss Anthony on the corner of the street, waiting to greet us. There she stood, with her good, earnest face and genial smile, dressed in gray delaine, hat and all the same color, relieved with pale blue ribbons, the perfection of neatness and sobriety. I liked her

thoroughly, and why I did not at once invite her home with me to dinner, I do not know.⁷¹

In the course of the next two years, the women developed a friendship that would help direct Anthony onto center stage in the struggle for woman suffrage.

Stanton and Anthony's friendship was a key factor shaping the fight for women's equality during the nineteenth century. Eleanor Flexner asserted that it was the unique mix of Stanton's philosophical acumen and Anthony's organizational prowess and unflagging energy that gave direction to the suffrage and equality cause throughout the last 50 years of the nineteenth century.⁷² Barry argued that the differing directions of the women's lives when they met—Anthony was actively avoiding marriage and family life to pursue a public career in social reform while Stanton was fleeing her popularity in social reform circles to immerse herself in her children and family life—made them ideal companions. Relying on her extensive work with the *Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony*, Ann Gordon asserted that scholars cannot understand Stanton or Anthony's lives, much less their work for women's rights, except in the context of their life-long friendship.⁷³

Anthony's work for woman's rights and woman suffrage began in earnest in 1852 as she encountered lingering disregard for women even among progressive reformers in the Burned-over District. Her shift in focus was due in part to the treatment of women by the New York State Sons of Temperance. In March, Anthony was sent as the delegate from the Rochester Daughters of Temperance to the statewide meeting of the Sons of Temperance in Albany. When attempting to introduce a resolution, Anthony and the other "Daughters" were informed that they had been invited to the meeting as courtesy

and “only to listen and learn,” not to participate. Anthony and several other women left the meeting and, at Lydia Mott’s urging,⁷⁴ held their own meeting in a nearby church.⁷⁵ Returning to Rochester, Anthony formed the first statewide association for the Daughters of Temperance and wrangled an invitation to another statewide temperance convention held in June. At the meeting, the female delegates received even more vitriolic treatment; an officious reverend present at the meeting publically asserted that any woman engaged in public work was “a hybrid species, half man and half woman, belonging to neither sex.”⁷⁶ This experience spurred Anthony’s belief that women’s equality was central to all social change.

The Early Fight for Equal Rights

The fall of 1852 marked the moment when Anthony’s character, motivations, friendships, and location coalesced into active work for a women’s rights cause. Anthony attended her first woman’s rights convention in Syracuse, NY, on September 8th, 1852.⁷⁷ Harper asserted that Anthony “had read with avidity the accounts of the Ohio, Massachusetts, Indiana and Pennsylvania conventions, but this was her first opportunity of attending one.”⁷⁸ Anthony was appointed as one of the secretaries for the meeting. Most of the discussion at the Syracuse convention revolved around specific rights that were denied to women based on the so-called “common law” that governed property and the relations of husbands and wives.⁷⁹ In spite of this focus on legal arguments, discussions at the 1852 convention did not build primarily on the foundation of natural rights, or what Kraditor would later refer to as arguments based on justice.⁸⁰ Instead, a woman’s character and greater morality were the main warrants for argumentation at the convention, with equality arguments made only by the true “radicals” like Elizabeth Cady

Stanton. After the 1852 convention, Anthony began to embrace the need for women to have legal rights, specifically the right to vote and own property, as central to the arguments she wanted to make.⁸¹

Anthony maintained a strenuous schedule in 1853; she attended a World's Temperance Convention, a World's Anti-Slavery Convention, and two Woman's Rights conventions. Anthony repeatedly witnessed how the most intelligent, articulate, and gifted women were maligned, silenced, and ignored by men based only on their sex. Anthony ended the year with a speaking tour through the towns in which she had previously established local chapters of temperance societies. Anthony wrote in her journal that only one society she had helped to found was still functioning. All the others had disbanded because women could not use money from their inheritances, dowries, or jobs to contribute to the society's functions without a man's permission. Anthony's eventual single-minded focus on suffrage as the key to women's rights has its roots in this tour and her early failures to gain legal or social change with only women's voices.

Speaking for Equality

In the years leading up to the Civil War, Anthony began spending more time with Elizabeth Cady Stanton, frequently traveling across the Burned-over District to Seneca Falls to work with Stanton on petitions, speeches, and newspaper articles. Stanton and Anthony worked together on divorce reform, equal pay for equal work, abolition, and temperance.⁸² Stanton often remained at home with her small children, but Anthony traveled across the country. She also organized all the women's rights conventions from 1853 until the beginning of the Civil War.⁸³ Anthony continued her traveling and organizing activity and, with Stanton's help, became a more adept and frequent speaker.

Harper summarizes Anthony's work during the years before the Civil War saying, "for many years thereafter she canvassed the State annually; held meetings, organized societies and secured thousands of signatures" for petitions to the state legislature.⁸⁴

Between 1854 and 1860 Anthony presented ten petitions of more than 5,000 signatures to the New York State legislature. She also organized dozens of woman's rights meetings each year, attended conventions of the teachers' association and the abolition societies, and traveled across much of the east coast. During her petition campaigns Anthony often attracted potential signatories by offering the popular entertainment of a lecture. Anthony had one fully manuscripted speech at the beginning of her work, and read this manuscript in each town where she held a meeting. By 1855 she had written two additional speech manuscripts on temperance and abolition for these tours.⁸⁵ Anthony also spoke extemporaneously on a consistent basis as she organized meetings across the state and participated in local, state, and national conventions.

Anthony maintained a rigid manuscript speaking style during her tours, legislative petitions, and lectures, but this tactic changed in 1857. In 1855, Anthony had been hired as an agent for the well-funded American Anti-Slavery Society (AASS). However, the financial crash, political turmoil, and abnormally harsh winter of 1856-57 had strained the resources of the AASS. Additionally, the public who usually frequented reform lectures and events were disenchanted with the continued work of the reform cause.⁸⁶ Harper recorded "on this great tour Miss Anthony became so thoroughly aroused that she could no longer confine herself to written addresses, which seemed cold and formal and utterly unresponsive to the inspiration of the moment. She threw them aside and used

them thereafter only on rare occasions.”⁸⁷ By 1857 she had fully embraced the extemporaneous approach to discourse as her main mode of public address.

Radicalization Before the Civil War

Anthony became progressively more radical after her shift to extemporaneous speaking. Due to the number of activists who were either expecting or had just welcomed new children, Anthony could not organize a National Woman’s Rights convention in 1857. Additionally, her work with the AASS did not pay well in early 1858 due to nationwide financial troubles. The physical toll of the constant travel and work exacerbated a minor back injury Anthony had sustained earlier in the decade and she was ordered by her doctor to cease travel and stress until the problem abated. While confined to her home in 1859, Anthony continued her organizational work through an extensive correspondence with activists around the state and participated in arguably her first act of civil disobedience in the service of woman’s rights. A woman who was being abused by her husband, a state senator, had escaped her marriage but had illegally brought her daughter with her. Since state law gave the father full custody of all children and full control of all finances, the mother’s actions were illegal, and her powerful husband was pursuing her with the intent of putting her in an insane asylum. Anthony took charge of the woman’s escape and helped her find shelter and employment in New York City. Several of Anthony’s fellow reformers wrote scathing letters condemning her illegal action.⁸⁸ In a letter to her father, Anthony expressed her outrage at the other reformers’ inability to recognize the moral good of breaking a law that so violently oppressed women while they willingly disobeyed federal runaway slave laws.⁸⁹

Anthony's militant streak, exhibited so clearly on behalf of the unnamed abused woman, was also evident as she worked with Stanton to finally bring the divorce question to debate at the 1860 Woman's Rights Convention.⁹⁰ There was robust discussion after Stanton's speech, including Wendell Phillips' strenuous objection to even recording Stanton's resolutions on the liberalizing of divorce laws in the meeting minutes. Stanton's resolutions occupied the New York press for weeks, and both reform-minded and anti-reform papers lambasted Stanton, Anthony, and the reform movement in general as false, immoral, reprehensible and unwomanly.⁹¹ Although liberalization of divorce laws would not begin until well into the Gilded Age, and would not reach anything resembling equality for another century, Stanton's 1860 resolutions marked the reform movement's first sustained work on the question of marriage equality and divorce reform.

Anthony's more militant action in 1859 and 1860 operated in concert with intensifying conflict throughout the nation including John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry and the presidential race that would elect Abraham Lincoln. Anthony's abolition meetings were frequently mobbed by angry opponents who disrupted meetings and often threatened violence against Anthony and the other speakers. Harper described Anthony's abolition tour of New York State in the winter of 1860 as her first experience with "mob rule." Abolition speakers were met with a muted reception in small Burned-over District towns, but in urbanized cities with an organized Democratic political presence, the speakers were consistently met by organized mobs. Although a vocal group of pro-slavery New York Democrats was at the heart of the mob action, Anthony opined that "The Republican paper called us pestiferous fanatics and infidels, and advised every decent man to stay away. Were the Republicans true at this crisis, we not only should be

heard quietly, as in past years, but should have far larger audiences.”⁹² Harper reflects on the months before the Civil War saying, “the Republicans at this time were panic-stricken and staggering under the weight of responsibility suddenly laid upon them; and the Abolitionists, by their radical demands and scathing criticism, were adding to their difficulties.”⁹³ The resistance to abolition on the part of Republicans did not soothe the pro-slavery Democrats in the American South. In December of 1860, led by South Carolina, southern states began seceding from the United States of America.

Seeking Equality During the Civil War

When Fort Sumter fell in April of 1861, reformers across the northern states began withdrawing from their active work for their chosen causes in favor of supporting the Union. Although Anthony persisted in her goal of holding a woman’s rights convention in May in 1861, as she had every other year, other progressive reformers refused to speak or declined to attend the meeting. Anthony finally gave up the plan when the AASS yearly celebration, normally held the week before the woman’s rights convention, was canceled. Several historians of woman’s rights have argued that “with the coming of the Civil War, all woman's rights activities stopped,” or omit any rhetorical work during the inter-war years from anthologies of the woman’s movement.⁹⁴ In contrast to these scholars, Linda Czuba Brigance has argued that Stanton and Anthony pursued a threefold rhetorical strategy of linking women’s and African Americans’ rights, positioning women as vital to victory, and constructing women as independent political actors during the war years.⁹⁵ Brigance, however, relied on Stanton’s 1898 biography and the *History of Woman Suffrage* to support her claims. Documents from Gordon’s

collection reflect that, during the war, Anthony and Stanton were neither as silent as some scholars claim nor as carefully fashioned and active as Brigance claims.

Anthony's letters to Stanton and other reformers between the beginning of the war in April of 1861 and February of 1862 provide evidence of little political action in the cause of woman's rights. Anthony returned home to her family's farm in Rochester and supervised all the operations through the summer of 1861. Few of Anthony's letters or journal entries from this period record any political activity, noting only a meeting with the "Friends of Human Progress" in May of 1861 and an anti-slavery meeting in February of 1862.⁹⁶ This shocking lack of action, especially when contrasted with Anthony's frenetic pace throughout the 1850s, supports the claims that events of the Civil War almost totally halted the reform work for woman's equality.

In contrast, the years from 1863 through the end of the war provide more evidence to support Brigance's claims of an integrated push for woman's rights within the war effort. In April of 1862 the New York State legislature passed resolutions repealing parts of the Married Woman's Property Act of 1860 that had granted women equal guardianship of children and equal rights in property management.⁹⁷ In a letter to Lydia Mott, Anthony bemoaned the "young devils" who were more than willing to work at rolling back the steps made toward women's equality while the women silently served the nation in crisis.⁹⁸ In response to this role-back of women's rights, Anthony and Stanton formed the Women's National Loyal League. The call, meeting, resolutions, and speeches of Anthony and Stanton's League followed the familiar forms of reform organizing from the 1850s but included concerns for freeing the slaves with obtaining political rights for freed slaves and women. The arguments also liked proposed reforms to

the central cause of restoring the Union and winning the war. Gordon noted that “Loyal” was an identifier with significant political implications in the winter of 1863. While so-called “Peace Democrats” were trying to create terms for reconciliation with the states in the Confederacy in the hopes of defeating Lincoln and the Republicans, “loyalty connoted patriotism over partisanship, unqualified condemnation of northern traitors, and... unconditional support of the union.”⁹⁹ The Loyal League provided the foundation upon which Stanton and Anthony could advance the still-radical agenda of equality on the basis of natural rights for all people regardless of race or sex.

In her years of work for woman’s rights, abolition, and temperance before the Civil War, Anthony performed her citizenship through the culturally recognizable role of “reformer” that was prevalent in the Burned-over District of Upstate New York. Through a process of social invention, Anthony used her friendships and conversations with other Burned-over District reformers as the foundation for her prophetic extemporaneous discourse. The content she produced reflected the urgent, emotional, and melodramatic norms of evangelistic and millennial religious sects. Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship that performed the race and class expectations her audience held for speakers, even while she violated the norms ascribed to her gender. I argue that this performance of citizenship was culturally recognizable and acceptable in the Burned-over District of Upstate New York, but failed to transcend the confines of the religious hotbed to change public opinion of those outside the already-accepting Burned-over District reform communities or to enact lasting change in Albany or Washington. This performance also met the raced and classed criteria of citizenship in such a way that even those who never gave credence to Anthony’s arguments were forced to

acknowledge her presence and acuity as a speaker. The following pages first analyze Anthony's early work as a public speaker with a focus on her invention and delivery and then explain how these public actions functioned as performance of citizenship.

Invention in Extemporaneous Speaking

The rhetorical culture of the Burned-over District was ever-present in Anthony's early invention practices. As I have noted in the biography section of this chapter, Anthony embraced friendships with Elizabeth Cady Stanton and other Burned-over District reformers. These friendships and the conversations they fostered provided the foundation for Anthony's social invention. The arguments in Anthony's early work reflected Burned-over District practices of invention; she evoked the emotionalism and prophetic calls for change of an evangelist or millennial preacher. Anthony's discourse also reflected the Quaker influence of her family in her focus on building God's kingdom of peace, equality, and community on earth.

Prophetic Invention in Anthony's Discourse

Prophecy, friendship, and conversation are all parts of Anthony's inventional practice in her early work for reform and woman's rights and are tied to the rhetorical traditions of the Burned-over District. Prophecy, in the Quaker parlance, referred to any form of religious speech that was inspired by the Spirit of God or "inward light." More specifically, however, Quakers speaking prophetically cast themselves as messengers of God, using vivid and emotional imagery to "command the people to use their senses" and change their incorrect visions and conceptions of the world.¹⁰⁰ Prophetic preaching was emblematic of the reform communities in which so many Quakers participated, as well as other apocalyptic and evangelical religious communities through the Burned-over

District.¹⁰¹ The focus on vivid illustration and correction that characterized prophetic preaching is apparent from Anthony's very first public speech. In a speech to celebrate the one year anniversary of the Canajoharie Daughters of Temperance and encourage more women to join the cause, Anthony mourned the "thoughtless female friends whirling through the giddy dance, with an intoxicated partner at her sides, and... accompanying her to secluded nook to quaff with him from that virtue destroying cup" of alcohol.¹⁰² She noted that some gainsayers saw their organization as a "sacrifice for naught," but Anthony countered with a vision that "intemperance is the blighted mildew of all our social connexions [*sic*]" and through the labors of the Daughters in her organization, they "hasten the day when no mother shall have to mourn over a darling son, as she sees him launch his bark on the circling wave of this mighty whirlpool." In a truly prophetic tradition, Anthony then exhorted her listeners,

Ladies! there is no neutral position for us to assume. If we avow not our desire to promote this noble enterprise, both by precept and example then is our influence on the side of Intemperance. If we say we love the cause and then sit down at our ease, surely do our action speak the lie. And now permit me once again to beg of you to lend your aid to this great Cause, the Cause of God and all mankind.¹⁰³

Anthony's exhortation embraced the prophetic tradition of Quaker preaching and the restoration rhetorical fantasy of Burned-over District evangelism and reform by encouraging women to match their actions to their purported faith and transform their communities with a salvific love. This early speech also exemplified the role of prophetic rhetoric in social invention as Anthony described her own experiences with drinking and dancing.

The function of prophetic invention in Anthony's public discourse is also obvious in her speeches during the 1850s New York State Teacher's conventions. At the 1852 teacher's convention, in likely her first extemporaneous speech, Anthony stood before the crowd of teachers and exhorted them to see more clearly the reason teaching was not respected as a profession. In classically prophetic phrasing, Anthony highlighted the defective vision of her listeners, setting the stage to point them toward greater righteousness, "you fail to comprehend the cause of the disrespect of which you complain." After alerting her listeners to the defect in their vision, she then commanded them to use their senses and "see that so long as society says woman has not brains enough to be a doctor, lawyer or minister, but has plenty to be a teacher, every man of you who condescends to teach, tacitly admits before all Israel and the sun that he has no more brains than a woman?"¹⁰⁴ At another teachers convention in 1857, during a speech on co-education for boys and girls, Anthony envisioned a more equal world filled with "no fundamental difference between the soul of man and woman," a world where "boys and girls labor and sport together" and observers could readily see "girls assisting boys in their algebra, grammar... or rubbing their faces in the snow." Anthony exhorted her audience that "the life purposes and destiny of man and woman are the same," and the education that each received must be amended to better reflect the God-given equality of the individuals.

The most potent examples of prophetic rhetoric in Anthony's first years of reform work came whenever she was faced with the complacent Christian preachers and speakers who refused to fight against or acknowledge the evils of slavery or women's inequality. In a letter from her 1895 American Anti-Slavery Society speaking tour,

Anthony recounted an example of her prophetic rhetoric. She attended a Friends meeting in Easton, New York, where “A young Quaker preacher from Virginia” was attending and speaking. The young man preached that “Christ was no agitator, but a peacemaker; George Fox was no agitator; the Friends at the South follow these examples and are never disturbed by fanaticism.” Anthony recalled that,

This was more than I could bear; I sprung to my feet and quoted: “I came into the world not to bring peace but a sword.... Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites that devour widow’s houses!” Read the New Testament, and say if Christ was not an agitator. Who is this among us crying “peace, peace, when there is no peace?”—and sat down.¹⁰⁵

Anthony here paraphrased one of Jesus condemnatory prophecies to the Pharisees—a powerful group of religious leaders who performed outward piety while neglecting their responsibilities of caring for the poor—to condemn those who sought earthly unity at the expense of equality.

Friendship and Conversation in Anthony’s Discourse

Friendship and conversation were also key practices in Quaker invention that also suffused inventional practices in the Burned-over District. For Quaker women, friendship implied more than mere interaction and acquaintance, it focused on a shared work of moving toward the “ideal community of friends [and] Friends;” friendship was the key to the Quaker rhetorical vision of restoration.¹⁰⁶ Conversation—a practice of speaking truth inspired by inspiration, experience, and education—was integral to this notion of friendship. Rothermel noted that “conversation provided members with a chance to ‘test’ and develop their ideas and beliefs” within their group of Friends.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore,

Richard Bauman noted that “any conversation in which the truth was spoken could serve the religious ends of Quakerism, whether or not it dealt with specifically religious matters.... speech of whatever nature [was] essentially a kind of action, to be considered for rhetorical purposes together with every other living act.”¹⁰⁸ Essentially, Quaker friendship was a shaping together, through friendship and rhetorical work, of the ideal community of peace, love, and unity on earth. Hogan and Solomon have called this practice “epistemic rhetorical conversation,” while Gring-Pemle has noted that letter writing in this conversation style functioned as a form of consciousness raising for women in the nineteenth century.¹⁰⁹

Anthony’s religious background is a vital factor in my explanation of her development as an extemporaneous speaker, but, if left without nuance, that narrative could obscure the complex and multifaceted religious and spiritual development that inflected Anthony’s life in the Burned-over District. An excellent example of this nuance, and a useful demonstration of Anthony’s social invention, comes in her infatuation with Spiritualism between 1857 and the beginning of the Civil War. In a letter to Stephen Foster and Abigail Kelley Foster in April of 1857, Anthony wrote with rapture about her experiences with two of the Fox sisters in the small Dutchess County town of Clinton’s Corners. Anthony noted that her traveling companion said she was “drawn on the anxious seat of Spiritualism” while she believed she had gone “as far forward as the foot of the Altar” because “there surely is intelligence not of the minds present in the body” and “if it be not of the disembodied spirits, as it purports, whence is it?”¹¹⁰ This brief passage highlights the complexity of discussing Anthony’s religious life. First, the focus on the spirit as an internal guiding voice echoes the Quaker belief in the “Inward Light,” while

contradicting the doctrinal belief that the inward light had to come from God or God's "Holy Spirit." Anthony then used a metaphor from the evangelical movement of the Second Great Awakening to describe her interaction with the practice of and belief in Spiritualism. The "anxious seat" was a row of seats reserved at the front of camp meetings and revivals for those who wished to receive prayer, while coming to the altar was a public declaration of one's repentance, belief, and subsequent salvation.¹¹¹ At the end of the same letter, Anthony declared that all her work for woman's rights and Temperance had only been valuable because it had led her more fully into the cause of abolition.¹¹² Anthony's relationship with religion, as demonstrated in this letter, is polysemous and defies simple analysis. Much like the rhetorical context of the Burned-over District, Anthony's rhetoric is influenced by Quaker, Evangelical, Ecumenical, and mystical religious elements, consistently shot through with social and political reforms ideals.

Anthony's constant travel and statewide efforts for temperance, abolition, and women's rights meant that many of the conversations that influenced Anthony's development as a speaker came about through letters, many of which have been preserved. An illustration is provided by several texts from the winter of 1853-54. On December 8th, 1853, Elizabeth Cay Stanton—then a frazzled mother at home with 5 children under ten years old, including thirteen-month-old Margaret—wrote to Anthony with a request: "Dear Susan, - Can you get any acute lawyer—perhaps Judge Hay is the man—sufficiently interested in our movement to look up just eight laws concerning us—the very worst in all the code?" Eight laws might seem like a strange request, but Stanton had a specific plan. "You see, while I am about the house," she writes, "I can think up

many points, but I cannot search books, for my hands as well as my brains would be necessary for that work.”¹¹³ Anthony’s speeches before this time had generally centered on moral arguments for women’s rights as an antidote to intemperance, but by March of the same year a new set of arguments was being set before the press. In her remarks to a session of the New York State Legislature, the *Albany Argus* noted that “Miss A. read a statement of reference to the Constitution and laws which it was necessary to revise.”¹¹⁴ It becomes even more obvious that Stanton and Anthony worked on a lecture specifically addressing legal concerns for women in a March 14 article in the *New York Daily Tribune*.¹¹⁵ Anthony, it noted, read an “abstract of women’s rights” and presented competent arguments about the laws pertaining to women. Finally, we can see the evolution of Anthony’s legal arguments in a speech transcript dated to the summer of 1854 wherein Anthony presented a full lecture titled “On The Rights and Wrongs of Woman” on her tour as an agent for the American Anti-Slavery Society.¹¹⁶ This kind of friendship-based development was both typical of Quaker discourse, and, as Rothermel noted, important in the epistemic development of the arguments for woman’s rights.

Quaker practices and theology were central to Anthony’s rhetorical invention during her work as a woman’s rights, education, and abolition reformer before the Civil War. Quaker prophetic inspiration, combined with the friendship Anthony formed and the conversations she had with friends in the reform community provided the foundation for her to create clear, persuasive, and engaging arguments in her extemporaneous speaking. These inventional practices coincided with the vision of reform that prevailed in Burned-over District rhetoric and allowed Anthony to harness the familiar strains of a

unique rhetorical vision and genre to create and convey ideas that many of her listeners would immediately and intuitively understand.

Delivery in Extemporaneous Speaking

The rhetorical culture of the Burned-over District was also central to how Anthony delivered extemporaneous discourse; she blended both the evangelistic and entertaining delivery styles. I argue that blending these styles was vital to Anthony's career and performance of citizenship because it provided a way for her to negotiate the social conventions of women's silence without relying on motherhood as her platform for legitimacy. As a teacher and as an attendee at reform conventions in the 1850s, Anthony demonstrated mastery of delivery. Three things were important to Anthony being accepted as a public speaker in the Burned-over District. First, she had to meet the socially constructed expectations of competent delivery. Second, she had to develop an argument for her right to speak that did not rely on tropes of motherhood for legitimacy. Finally, she had to harness a speaking style that moved her audience to act on her calls for greater equality. In the following pages, I first outline the socially constructed expectations for delivery within the Burned-over District and how Anthony met or violated those norms. I then discuss how Anthony's combination of the evangelistic-reformer and entertaining-orator styles of delivery functioned in their context.

Socially Constructed Delivery in the 1850s

Delivery is a socially constructed process that consistently re-inscribes cultural understandings of gender, race, and class.¹¹⁷ Within the Burned-over District this cultural inscription meant that, even while competently delivering speeches, Anthony still had to negotiate being an "unruly" female body in a public space. The cultural norms of public

space as a male domain—with women relegated to the private space of the home—were so ingrained into cultural understandings of right and wrong that even reform-oriented meetings were often hostile to women’s public speaking.¹¹⁸ The negative public reactions to women’s speaking, even in reform-oriented groups, highlights that expectations for delivery in public speaking are socially constructed and constantly shot-through with race, class, and gender implications. Studies of delivery before feminist scholarship, Buchanan noted, “conventionally addressed vocal and physical aspects of oratory, examining how the rhetor communicates *his* message in terms of volume and tone, rhythm and speech, gesture, movement, and expression.”¹¹⁹ This list is often associated with the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century work in the elocutionary movement by writers like John Walker and Gilbert Austin, who paid attention to the precise physical movements of the (white, male, educated) body.¹²⁰ Buchanan demonstrates, however, that delivery is not only material in its focus, but also culturally framed and inflected by the social construction of appropriate behavior for the bodies delivering the oratory.¹²¹

Delivery is always inflected by the cultural conceptions that inscribe meaning onto the body of the rhetor and, in the Burned-over District, these expectations reflected the social and economic development of the white, educated, middle class. The economic expansion that occurred between 1825 and the beginning of the Civil War facilitated an expanding middle-class of business owners, educators, landowners, and clergy.¹²² Mary Ryan has provided a useful definition of this class in the Burned-over District as “neither industrialists nor proletarians but occupants of intermediate, middle-level social ranks located somewhere in the vast undifferentiated status category Americans call the middle class.”¹²³ Further, Ryan argued, members of this class were the driving force behind the

moral and religious reforms in the Burned-over District, their greatest concern being what Curtis Johnson called work to “purify and redeem society.”¹²⁴ These identity factors and values were reflected in the cultural prescriptions for delivery in the Burned-over District. A speaker should be educated, but not speak in a high style. The speaker should be male or have a reason rooted in the norms of Republican Motherhood (namely care for her children) if she was female. The speaker also had to demonstrate the moral and religious character to deserve respect from the audience.¹²⁵

Newspaper reports from the 1850s suggest that Anthony mastered the elements of delivery that indicated education, correct style, and middle-class status before she began working as a reformer. In the first newspaper report I have found dealing with Anthony’s public career, the writer noted that Anthony “made some appropriate remarks, after which she shared a sentiment which was very apt for the occasion, and highly credible to her, and which was greatly applauded by the assemblage.”¹²⁶ Although the comment about apt sentiments likely referenced the content of her message, the note that her remarks were “credible to her” likely indicated that both her content and delivery matched the raced, classed, and gendered expectations of the auditor. An 1852 article in Amelia Bloomer’s *The Lilly*, a publication that frequently praised or critiqued female speakers’ delivery skills,¹²⁷ noted that Anthony “addressed the meeting in a clear and forcible manner.”¹²⁸ Discussing Anthony’s travel in 1857 with the radical Garrisonian abolitionists, Harper noted that “with Miss Anthony’s strong, rich voice, her powerful command of language and her intensity of feeling in regard to her subject, it may be imagined that her speeches were eloquent appeals and roused to action both her friends and her enemies.”¹²⁹ Newspaper reports on Anthony’s public speaking and notes from

fellow reformers support Harper's claims about Anthony's performance on the public stage. The Binghamton Daily Republican noted that "Miss Anthony vindicated her resolutions with eloquence, force, spirit and dignity, and showed herself a match, at least, in debate for any member of the convention. She was equal if not identical."¹³⁰ The Ellsworth American said: "Her enunciation is very clear and remarkably distinct, yet there is nothing in it of the unfeminine character and tone which people had been led to expect."¹³¹ Papers like the *New York Daily Times* that were generally opposed to woman's rights reforms also granted that Anthony was a competent speaker.¹³² Even papers that were openly hostile to reform speakers noted her delivery skills; the Lowville New York *Northern Journal* noted that "while we differ widely with Miss Anthony, both as regards the propriety of the calling she has announced and the notions of which she is advocate, we cheerfully accord to her credit as a public speaker, much above mediocrity, expressing herself with clearness, at many times with elegance and force."¹³³ Although this praise is rather tepid compared to the laudatory articles on Anthony near the end of her life, it does highlight her competence in delivering public speeches.

Anthony also wrote letters that testified to her competence in the basic elements of appropriate delivery for the Burned-over District. Harper noted that Anthony began using Standard English instead of Quaker "plain speech" in 1849 while teaching at Canajoharie.¹³⁴ Writing to Elizabeth Cady Stanton in 1856, shortly before she embraced the extemporaneous mode of speaking full time, Anthony complained about almost every part of her public speaking career. She bemoaned her inability to write competent lectures or to memorize addresses. She lamented her inability to convince others of the equality of the sexes or to invent competent and compelling arguments for suffrage. She even

critiqued the continual child-bearing of her fellow suffrage advocates. She did not, however, bemoan her performance-based delivery skills.¹³⁵ In fact, Anthony showed little patience for female speakers who had not mastered the basics of rate, volume, and poise on the stage. In 1852, at the New York State Women's Rights conventions in Syracuse, Harper recorded that Anthony became so irritated with the "weak, piping voices" of some of the speakers that she said "Mrs. President, I move that hereafter the papers shall be given to some one [*sic*] to read who can be heard. It is an imposition on an audience to have to sit quietly through a long speech of which they can not [*sic*] hear a word."¹³⁶ Furthermore, Lucy Stone, in a letter responding to Anthony's laments about her lack of delivery skills, calls Anthony a "real liar" and "very wicked" for saying she had no speaking ability when "you know you never made a speech that was not well listened to."¹³⁷ These letters and the newspaper reports on her first years of speaking demonstrate Anthony's competence in the fundamentals of raced, classed, and gendered delivery. Yet, Anthony's speaking was still rejected, maligned, and ignored by much of her audience due to her explicit violation of the norms for women's silence.

In spite of mastering the correctly classed elements of delivery, Anthony was still considered out of place for being a female speaker in public, especially since she was not a mother. As Buchanan has argued, the ideal for female rhetors in the nineteenth century was a godly and humble mother, fighting for the safety of her children. In the tradition of Republican Motherhood, the maternal rhetor was the physical embodiment of female citizen, bringing forth children to strengthen the country and only leaving her well-tended and exemplary private sphere of the home to rectify problems in the public sphere that would harm her children. Remarking on how Anthony's appearance impacted her public

speaking, Stanton wrote “Miss Anthony, though not beautiful, has a fine figure and a large, well-shaped head. The world calls her sharp, angular, cross-grained. She has indeed, her faults and angles, but they are all outside.”¹³⁸ Although conventionally pretty women were still faced with derision when they spoke in public, Nan Johnson has argued that Anthony endured “far more ridicule and rejection in the press than the conventionally pretty [Anna] Dickinson or the matronly Stanton and [Mary] Livermore.” Anthony, Johnson argued “frustrated the public’s desire for soft-spoken, lovely, or motherly woman orators who inspired worship and devotion.”¹³⁹ That is, even though Anthony could perform competently as an orator, her violation of gender norms rendered her speeches ignorable because she did not conform to the acceptably conservative role of mother or potential bride as justifications for her public speaking.

Finally, Anthony’s unmarried status and unattractive appearance provided an opportunity for those who wished to ignore her to do so based on the assumptions that she did not meet the standards of moral and religious character that were cultural requirements for a Burned-over District speaker. Dismissive comments often hinted that Anthony’s unmarried status was related to her physical characteristics, her manners, or alleged sexual promiscuity.¹⁴⁰ An 1853 article in the conservative *Utica Evening Telegraph* provides insight into the centrality of marriage—and marriageability—to the public perceptions of female rhetors.¹⁴¹ The article began, “We conceived a very unfavorable opinion of this *miss* Anthony when she performed on a former occasion, but, we must confess that after listening attentively to her discourse last evening, we were inexpressibly disgusted with the impudence and impiety evidenced in her lecture.” The writer then specified the specific impiety that was so disgusting, “this shrewish *maiden*

counseled the numerous wives and mothers present to separate from their husbands whenever they became intemperate, *and particularly not to allow the said husbands to add another child to the family*” and that “She announced quite confidently that wives don't de facto love their husbands if they are dissipated.” “No *married* advocate of Women’s Rights,” the writer jibes, “would have made this remark.” This writer’s derision gave even greater insight into the centrality of marriage in the comments made about the as-yet-unmarried Antoinette Brown. The lecherous writer began, “We fancied her appearance very much, and if were a marrying man—but to the subject. She is a modest young lady with that genteel and rather refined deportment which so becomes the sex.”

The appearance and marital status based character attacks on Anthony’s delivery skills in the press were exacerbated by her attempt to adopt the so-called “Bloomer Costume” in 1853 and 1854. The Bloomer costume was a rejection of race, class, and gender identifiers and was Anthony’s most radical effort at social change. The radicalism of this action, however, was rejected by both popular and reform audiences. An unidentified, but demonstrably anti-suffrage newspaper clipping that Anthony kept in her scrapbook, dated in her handwriting to corresponding meetings she spoke at in Buffalo New York, gave an excellent example of the impact the Bloomer costume had on popular perceptions of delivery.¹⁴² The writer began with Antoinette Brown’s extemporaneous speech, noting that “Her address was extremely spirited, her language being fitly chosen and forcible. She is a very good orator, is of rather prepossessing appearance, and unlike Mrs. Bloomer and Miss Anthony, was dressed in becoming female garb.” In letters from this period of her life, Anthony indicated that this vitriol and vulgarity was a common

occurrence during the years she wore the Bloomer costume. When Anthony eventually gave up the shorter skirts of the Bloomer costume in favor of more conventional fashion choices for the time, some, although by no means all, of the vitriol disappeared from the commentary on her delivery style.

Entertainment, and Extempore Delivery in Burned-over District Speaking

Anthony embraced a contextual performance that combined two of the most popular public speaking delivery styles in the Burned-over District: the evangelist reformer and the entertaining orator. Anthony was able to find a place and performance style for public speaking that both entertained those “unconverted” to the Women’s Rights or Abolition causes, and moved them toward the rhetorical fantasy of restoration through equal rights that she espoused as a movement rhetor. This style also provided a means for her to negotiate the raced, classed, and gendered norms of delivery without the foundation of motherhood as a justification for speaking; humor, merciless attacks on corruption, calls for reform, and extemporaneous speaking were all characteristics of a culturally recognizable Burned-over District delivery style. These elements of delivery provided a way for Anthony to negotiate her unruly female body in the public space by subsuming her female-ness, if only partially and imperfectly, beneath the guise of the culturally recognizable entertaining reformer.

Entertainment in Anthony’s Delivery

Anthony did not readily embrace the entertainment delivery style in her early speaking career, focusing instead on an evangelistic reform style of delivery. Attending the 1852 Temperance Convention in Syracuse, Anthony upbraided the Christianity of the men present, saying:

Now, gentlemen, we will excuse you from ever opening your lips for us on salt, canals, banks, and tariff, if you will but accrue to us the Maine Law at the coming session of our State Legislature. . . . Introduce a Christianity of temperance into the United States and then put down heathenism in the Sandwich Islands. Let us feed the hungry and clothe the naked in our own streets—protect the wretched wife and hapless child of the drunkard from the merciless avarice of the rum-seller. . . and then send our fat agents in fine broad cloth and gloves to carry bibles to the benighted Hindoos [sic].¹⁴³

The plethora of negative adjectives Anthony used in this passage reflected the emotional content that would be common in Finney’s sermons, but it also gestured to the part-pleading, part-exhorting tone, which Browne termed “the peculiar mixture of hortatory and solicitous,” that characterized evangelical preaching in the Burned-over District.¹⁴⁴ Anthony mixed a Quaker understanding of being called to speak with an evangelical approach to sharing her message. She was “evangelizing” audience members “into the fold” by exhorting them to “be saved” from their “sins” of social evils.

In contrast to this evangelistic presentation, audience perceptions of Anthony’s public speaking consistently framed her as either an entertainer or as entertainment. Anthony’s choice to wear the bloomer “costume” contributed to the popular perception that she was speaking as an entertainer; the popular perception was that a woman, in costume, on stage, could not possibly exist except for men’s entertainment. For instance, an unidentified newspaper clipping, dated in Anthony’s handwriting to March 28th, 1853 and therefore likely from the *Buffalo Daily Courier*, remarked that:

Miss Susan B. Anthony, a Rochester girl, closed the exercise of the evening by reading her address, which was not, however, listened to with very great attention, as the novelty of the performance had worn off and the audience had already listened to considerable temperance talk from far better looking woman.

Meanwhile, an opinion article in the same paper on the same day was less subtle in its comparison between the temperance speakers and entertainment performers. The article began by making a comparison between the crowd in attendance for the rally and the crowd that had attended the “Swedish Nightingale”—Jenny Lind’s performance under the direction of P.T. Barnum.¹⁴⁵ The article continued in this vein, and I quote the author at length below to give a flavor of the coverage Anthony received.

The meeting, which purported to be a temperance meeting, was opened with a prayer by the “Rev.” Antoinette L. Brown, her speech, and bearing and manner, were pleasing and showed her to be a *gentleman*. She confined herself to the great subject of temperance, and her address was well received. Although she sports the title of “Rev.” she was dressed like a woman—and, on the whole, did credit to her sex by not so far overstepping conventional boundaries as to make herself obnoxious or ridiculous, while she exhibited a higher order of talents, and a comprehensive grasp of mind. Mrs. Bloomer and Miss Anthony were *dressed in costume* and the *addresses*, and especially that of Miss A. had much of the vinegar in it, and was devoted mainly to “Woman’s Rights.”

The focus on costume, performance, and appearance in these passages continues throughout the early years of Anthony’s career, but it was especially vitriolic when she did not dress in conventional middle-class white women’s fashions.

As Anthony became one of the most prolific speakers working for the abolition, suffrage, and temperance causes, she began to finesse a middle path between the reform and entertainer styles of delivery. Returning to normal dress in 1854, Anthony received less public criticism for her “spectacle” of speaking in public. Instead, observers began to provide more thorough summaries of Anthony’s speeches; much of the commentary about Anthony’s mastery of basic delivery skills also came from the period between 1854 and 1858. For instance, in what was likely one of Anthony’s first extemporaneous speaking endeavors, she stood at the 1854 New York State Teacher’s Convention to propose that a group made up of three-fourths women should not have had an all-male board. The published convention proceedings did not offer a transcript of Anthony’s remarks but they did provide a summary devoid of the sneering tone used in the previous year’s proceedings.¹⁴⁶ An opinion article in the *Oswego Times and Journal* on the same event noted that Anthony “made quite a speech” and that “her arguments were good; her speaking talents are firstrate [*sic*], and we hope that when men answer such please she made, they will do it in a manly and generous spirit, and not attempt to turn off the argument with a sneer.”¹⁴⁷ In another article about the same speaking tour, this time from January 10, 1855 in Bath, New York, the editor wrote an opinion article titled “Go It Sally!” which maintained that Anthony was, “The agent of the State Society, and a very fine looking and intelligent lady” but still asserted that the article should be of interest because “a large proportion of our readers have never ‘seen the elephant.’”¹⁴⁸ These examples are representative of the commentary on Anthony’s public speaking after she forswore the Bloomer costume. Although the focus on women’s speaking as a form of entertainment never went away, it did abate as Anthony moved towards the more

culturally acceptable choices in her dress. This choice reinforced Anthony's femininity, but it also marked her body as part of the burgeoning Burned-over District middle class.

Anthony's Extemporaneous Delivery

Anthony's extemporaneous speaking was the final tool needed to move her rhetoric into the Burned-over District delivery style of public speaking. She combined the emotionalism demonstrated in her early manuscript speeches with the natural presentation, connection, and flexibility of the extemporaneous mode of address. The combination of connection, flexibility, and emotionalism was foundational to what Bormann calls the "Finney style" of extemporaneous evangelistic preaching,¹⁴⁹ and by the time Anthony entered the Burned-over District reform community in the 1850s, the style had also become a hallmark of the abolition reform rhetors. This approach to delivery also allowed Anthony to harness the titillating, amusing, and entertaining "education" of the middle-class lyceum and lecture culture that flourished in Upstate New York.

Anthony's extemporaneous speaking style, which she fully embraced in 1857, was a mode of delivery that was culturally acceptable in the Burned-over District, allowing her to perfectly fulfill the role of entertaining social reformer. Anthony's shift to extemporaneous public speaking meant that she no longer recited or read long, moralistic, and often boring and overwrought sentences constructed around a stiff and turgid prose. Her speeches begin to revolve around stories, anecdotes, and humor. Anthony's more entertaining extemporaneous speeches are reflected in the notes Harper shares from 1857. One theme dealt with the difference between reformers and politicians.

The politician talks of slavery as he does of United States banks, tariff or any other commercial question. We demand the abolition of slavery because the slave is a human being, and because man should not hold property in his fellowman. The politician demands it because its existence produces poverty and discord in the nation and imposes taxes on free labor for its support, since the government is dominated by southern rule.... We preach revolution; the politicians reform. We say disobey every unjust law; the politician says obey them.¹⁵⁰

If we imagine Anthony presenting this rant against political inaction with her accustomed and often maligned “vinegar” of humor and expression, this series of comparisons would easily have been engaging and compelling. Other themes in these notes deal with the humanity of people held in slavery: “We demand the abolition of slavery because the slave is a human being, and because man should not hold property in his fellowman,” and the feigned ignorance of those who held slaves, “Our mission is to deepen sympathy and convert it into right action; to show that the men and women of the North are slave-holders, those of the South slave-owners. The guilt rests on the North equally with the South, therefore our work is to rouse the sleeping consciences of the North.... No one is ignorant now.”¹⁵¹ Harper asserted that these notes came about because “Miss Anthony became so thoroughly aroused that she could no longer confine herself to written addresses, which seemed cold and formal and utterly unresponsive to the inspiration of the moment.” Commenting on Anthony’s new-found speaking style, Harper noted that, “Accompanying [*sic*] these notes are many special incidents illustrating the evils of slavery. With Miss Anthony’s strong, rich voice, her powerful command of language and her intensity of feeling in regard to her subject, it may be imagined that her speeches

were eloquent appeals and roused to action both her friends and her enemies.”¹⁵²

Anthony’s newly passionate extemporaneous speaking style was praised by her admirers and even the often-critical *New York Times* wrote, “The convention ought to thank Miss Anthony for infusing a little healthful agitation among the body.”¹⁵³

Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking was more entertaining, engaging, and more natural, but it was also important because it allowed her the flexibility to deal with the increasingly agitated and even hostile crowds who frequented public meetings before the Civil War. During what Harper termed the “mob tour” of 1860, the *Utica Morning Herald and Daily Gazette* wrote about “Miss Anthony’s Convention.”¹⁵⁴ Although Anthony was touring with Parker Pillsbury and Aaron Powell, both failed to arrive on time for the meeting due to transportation delays. Further, when Anthony sought to have a woman from Utica appointed as the president of the convention, none would agree to serve, nor would any local men. Anthony finally appointed Ezra Thompson in absentia. These formalities ended and Pillsbury and Powell had still not arrived, so Anthony began filling time by reading articles from the local newspaper, and providing commentary on their coverage of her events. She even rebutted the Republican paper’s suggestion that people stay away from the proceedings given the tension in the country, and then introduced resolutions for debate and opened the platform “even to the most violent apologist for slavery if he were decent and respectful in urging his views.” By the time the other speakers finally arrived, the crowd gave them a warm reception and the paper provided largely positive commentary.

The flexibility of speaking extemporaneously also allowed Anthony to embrace the public expectation that a woman on the stage would provide entertainment.

Anthony's witty and sometimes biting sense of sarcastic humor was evident even before she entered public life. Newspaper reports of Anthony's speeches noted that she was a humorous speaker even before she fully embraced extempore speaking, with one unidentified writer saying, "There are many absurd laws standing upon the statute book which furnished a fine opportunity for ridicule and sarcasm and Susan made a good deal of fun of them."¹⁵⁵ But Anthony's prowess with humor flourished when combined with the extemporaneous mode of speaking. In one illustrative example, Anthony made use of a witty quip with some undertones of her typical evangelistic exhortation to defuse tensions of her equality arguments at the 1858 New York State Teacher's Convention in Lockport. During the four-day meeting, Anthony was the center of constantly increasing tensions. She used the strict parliamentary procedures followed by the organization to push for greater inclusion of women in the meeting.¹⁵⁶ She introduced resolutions proposing that all girls in New York state be "required" to learn declamation and discussion along with their male peers and that all "colored" schools should be abolished in favor of fully integrated schools.¹⁵⁷ Anthony was also the only woman who participated heavily in the event, rising to nominate speakers and committee members, making and seconding motions, and reading resolutions.¹⁵⁸ By the end of the convention, Anthony's actions had incited significant tensions around propriety, order, and social change through the schools. During the morning meeting of the final day "Miss Anthony commenced a speech on 'an important matter' but objection was made, at which she said she was not surprised. (Laughter)."¹⁵⁹ Even such a small bit of humor seems to have worked to Anthony's advantage, as one of her most aggressive interlocutors throughout the meeting, a "Mr. Clark" ended the session saying, "he was not a women's rights man

in the ordinary sense, but he thought Miss Anthony had said more good things than anybody here.”¹⁶⁰ This extemporaneous humor helped Anthony defuse the tensions she encountered as she fought for increasingly radical equality for women, while still adhering more and more rigorously to the conservative norms of the Burned-over District style of speaking.

Anthony’s letters indicate that she was aware of her humorous delivery style and that she used it intentionally in service to arguments for change. During a meeting of the teachers’ convention in 1858, Anthony wrote to Lucy Stone about several men in the convention who refused to acknowledge any arguments for a woman’s right to equal pay, or the negative effects low pay had on women. Anthony told Stone “Oh, how I did wish that you were there to dress him down—but I did the best I could.”¹⁶¹ The *Liberator* and the *New York Times* both reported that Anthony’s reply was both biting and quite funny.¹⁶² Later that evening, when the president threw a “roast” of sorts for the meeting’s final evening social, he invited “if there is any lady present who has any thing [*sic*] to say she can now come forward & do so.” In her letter to Stone, however, Anthony wrote, “I suppose he thought Miss Anthony would sprint for the floor—but there he missed—the house rung with ‘Miss Anthony Miss Anthony’ I simply stated that I had nothing to say—the fact was, I did not care to lash the Pres. & Old Foggy brethren any more [*sic*] and would not speak merely to amuse.”¹⁶³ Anthony’s intentional use of humor not just to amuse but to agitate for great equality for women demonstrates her competence on blending the various styles of Burned-over District rhetoric.

The rhetorical culture of the Burned-over District was central to Anthony’s public career before the Civil War and it directly informed the kinds of performances and

content she offered on the public stage. Within the confines of the raced, classed, and gendered expectations for a public speaker in the 1850s, Anthony was always unruly because of her female body. However, her embrace of the “appropriate” norms for Burned-over District rhetoric—the correctly raced (white) and classed (educated) expectations of her audiences—she was able to negotiate a space for herself on the public stage that partially subsumed her identity as a woman. The extemporaneous mode of public speaking that she used to do this, however, sometimes worked to subvert the radical messages she presented in her speeches. That is, while she was offering radical messages about property rights, divorce reform, co-education, integration, or even voting rights, her embrace of the Burned-over District practice of extemporaneous speaking and the Burned-over District rhetorical vision of reformation functioned as an inherently conservative platform for her discourse.

Extemporaneous Speaking as a Performance of Citizenship

Anthony’s public speaking set the stage for her to perform a recognizable form of citizenship that her audiences were forced to acknowledge even if they discounted her explicit arguments for women’s rights. Anthony’s invention and delivery practices allowed her to negotiate the gendered nature of citizenship by competently performing the correctly raced and classed picture of a reformer, while partially eliding her unruliness as a female body. This performance, while violating the gendered norms of the 1850s, re-inscribed the racial and class borders of behavior that dictated who was considered a citizen. By embracing and excelling in the performance of white, educated citizenship, Anthony gained grudging acceptance from those who refused to acknowledge her explicit arguments for women’s rights. Even though Anthony violated

the silence prescribed for women, she did so in such a way that her listeners could still be comfortable in their racist and classist notion about who counted as a citizen. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking, therefore, can be read as a radical performance of citizenship that still re-inscribed conservative notions of exclusionary liberal approaches to legal citizenship rights. In the following section, I discuss the culture of citizenship in which Anthony lived, and how her extemporaneous speaking functioned to allow her a voice in the Burned-over District.

The Culture of Burned-over District Citizenship

In the Burned-over District, citizenship was inextricably enmeshed with the rhetorical fantasy of restoration and was often closely tied to religion, local community, or social action. The Quaker, Universalist, and Unitarian reform communities that flourished in the Burned-over District before the Civil War offered an alternative to the militant/maternal binary for women's citizenship. Of special interest to me is how these religious communities rejected traditional republican and liberal rights and responsibilities of citizenship, instead relying on citizenship performances to convey their membership in the nation, and more importantly, in the body of Christ. As I have previously noted, these religious groups believed that the formation of the United States and the evils of their cause de jure signaled that the Kingdom of God was near.¹⁶⁴ Since they believed the Millennium was so close, reform communities relied on performing their religious fervor through reform efforts and evangelism instead of traditional performances of legal citizenship rights like voting or running for elected office. Many members of Anthony's Quaker community, including her father, abstained from voting altogether.¹⁶⁵ Their practice of citizenship was, instead, to encourage all members,

including women, to speak in all levels of internal meetings and to outside audiences if the speaker had received a “word” from the Lord. All members were also encouraged to learn, teach, lead, and otherwise perform membership in the community via actions that were closed to them in the rest of antebellum society. Although these reform communities started as isolated, fringe, and sometimes cultic social/religious organizations, the cultural practices of participatory citizenship in these religious organizations slowly migrated into the practice of popular culture due to their astounding growth, popularity, membership, and influence in the Burned-over District in the years before the Civil War.

The importance of religious communities in shaping citizenship practices in the Burned-over District was evident in the social actions which formed the basis of citizenship in a local community. Robert Krapohl and Charles Lippy have argued that, in evangelicalism, the salvific experience of conversion and the public declaration of that experience served not just as a marker of eternal salvation, but also “as a badge of trustworthiness and responsible citizenship here and now.”¹⁶⁶ It was this focus on salvation into citizenship that most carried into reform communities. Robert Handy has called this slippage between revival and reform the “Protestant Quest for Christian America.”¹⁶⁷ In the Burned-over District, this quest was central to the temperance, abolition, and women’s rights reform communities.

Perhaps the most obvious example of the slippage between religious and reform performances of citizenship was the American Anti-Slavery Society’s *Declaration of Sentiments*. The authors first rejected the violence of the American Revolution based on religious ideals saying that their principles “forbid the doing of evil that good may

come,” and that they instead relied “solely upon those [weapons] which are spiritual, and mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds.” This reference to Second Corinthians 10:4 was followed by an evangelistic framing of non-violent protest. “Our [means of resistance] shall be such only as the opposition of moral purity to moral corruption—the destruction of error by the potency of truth—the overthrow of prejudice by the power of love—and the abolition of slavery by the spirit of repentance.” Finally, the authors turned to slaves for whom they claimed to fight. Here it was not primarily religious or moral wrongs that they addressed, but unconstitutional practices.

But those, for whose emancipation we are striving—constituting at the present time at least one-sixth part of our countrymen—are recognized by law, and treated by their fellow-beings, as marketable commodities, as goods and chattels, as brute beasts; are plundered daily of the fruits of their toil without redress; really enjoy no constitutional nor legal protection from licentious and murderous outrages upon their persons.

The *Declaration* continued to intertwine religious and civic actions throughout the document; the churches should be purified of pro-slavery sentiments, the organization would employ speakers to tour with lectures against slavery, God alone was trusted for victory, but petitions must be sent to Congress calling for the instant abolition of slavery. In both the Anti-Slavery Society and the religious communities that shaped it, citizenship was a performance of moral and religious life.

One of the important actions of citizenship in the Burned-over District was public discourse and discussion. Public speaking, as a number of scholars have shown, was an important marker of being an appropriately educated member of the social order and of

demonstrating a fitness for republican citizenship.¹⁶⁸ Mark Longaker argued that education in the early American republic was a vital source for spreading the “common republican vocabulary” through which the denizens of a place could participate in the citizenship of their imagined republic.¹⁶⁹ Public speaking, therefore, was a way for women to demonstrate that they had obtained the education of a middle-class citizen, while also establishing their fitness for participation in the ideal imagined republic. As P. Joy Rouse noted, “although women were not legally considered citizens, this ideal [of Republican Motherhood] led them to revise notions of citizenship that ‘merged the domestic domain of the preindustrial woman with the new public ideology of individual responsibility and civic virtue.’”¹⁷⁰ The flexibility of Longaker and Rouse’s concepts points to the value to treating extemporaneous speaking in the Burned-over District as what Asen would call a “quotidian enactment of citizenship.”

Anthony’s Performance of Burned-over District Citizenship

The continually-performed nature of citizenship for reformers in the Burned-over District was evident in the recognizable idiom of republican participatory citizenship that Stanton and Anthony used in their discourse. In the newspapers I have examined from the years before the Civil War, the word “citizen” was almost always used as a synonym for “denizen” or “resident.” However, Anthony and other reformers often discussed meetings, tours, and petition campaigns as a way to show the legislatures of the state what “the people” desired. With this framing, Anthony and Stanton used a recognizable idiom of republican participatory citizenship to engage their listeners and readers in reform-oriented works of civic participation. In an “Appeal to the Readers of the *Anti-Slavery Standard*,” Anthony called on “Women” “Mothers!” “Daughters” to “devote the

present hour, day and week” to circulating and signing a petition to the New York State Legislature urging “Personal Liberty Bill” that would prevent the re-capture of fugitive slaves within the State.¹⁷¹ The italics Anthony used in the original publication, which I have used below, encouraged the perspective that actions of civic participation were a performance of citizenship. Combining the idiom of participatory republican citizenship with the Burned-over District language of acting out your faith, Anthony wrote “If you *profess* your love for the slave, make it manifest *now* in your *actions*,” actions, which would, she argued “contribute your mite toward making the Legislature feel that *the people* demand the New York shall be free.”¹⁷² Anthony implied that it was the actions people performed that demonstrated their place as citizens of their communities. The legislature was merely a body to represent the collective will of the people, a collective will made known by the actions of petitioning and public speaking, not simply through voting.

The impact of Burned-over District citizenship on Anthony’s arguments about appropriate citizen activism in light of slavery were especially evident in a seemingly out-of-place article Anthony wrote for the *American Anti-Slavery Standard* in 1860. In April of 1860, after the “mob tour” in the winter of 1859-60 had ended, Anthony wrote about her experiences with “The Disunion Anti-Slavery Work in New York State.”¹⁷³ Coming only months before a war to maintain the Union began, Anthony’s call for a dissolution of any ties with slave-holding states seems awkward. In one particularly malapropos passage, Anthony called on good citizens to forgo all their legal rights of citizenship in protest of the heinous crimes of slavery. I quote this passage in full, below,

as it reflects much of the prophetic and millennial voice of a Burned-over District religious approach to citizenship.

The listening everywhere has been attentive and earnest. There is, in the hearts of the men and the women who have the moral courage, the heroism to attend our meetings, a strong desire to do something to rid the country of slavery. And thought, when their inquiry “What shall we do?” is answered, as it only can be, “Go, put away your allegiances to this slaveholding Government and Union; refuse to swear to keep inviolate the wicked compact between the free and the slave states; vote for no man with no party except ‘FREEDOM NATIONAL and SLAVERY NOWHERE’ shall be inscribed on the banner; be separated from all the popular Churches which fellowship the slaveholder as a Christian, cease to give your influence, your votes, or your money for the support of a pro-slavery Government or Church” very many of them, like the young man of old, “turn away *sorrowful*,” the sacrifice being greater than they can bear; still, none of them can ever settle back into their creeds and politics with the same unconsciousness of the wrongfulness of their positions. The trouble with genuine Anti-Slavery, genuine Religion, is that it costs too much.

This seemingly out-of-place passage illustrates the centrality of citizenship actions to Anthony’s ideas of citizenship. It was not the legal rights like voting, but republican participatory actions, that truly created restorative change in a society. The reference to those who “turn away sorrowful,” taken from the parable of the rich young ruler, was an obvious reference to religious practices of citizenship from the Burned-over District.¹⁷⁴ The story Anthony referenced is repeated in three of the four gospels of Christ, and tells

of a “certain ruler” who was “very rich” asking Jesus “what shall I do to inherit eternal life?” The ruler elaborates all the laws he obeys, and Jesus responds: “Yet lackest thou one thing: sell all thou hast, and distribute unto the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, follow me.” Much like the millennial religious sects that flourished in the Burned-over District, the ruler had to give up everything to inherit salvation.

Anthony extended the analogy of the un-saved young ruler into citizenship practices, arguing that the only acceptable action for a responsible citizen, when faced with the evils of American slavery, was a radical rejection of the evil governing authority. Liberal citizenship rights were the baggage of the “very rich” that kept them, like the rich man, from passing through the “eye of the needle.” For a truly Christian citizen, Anthony argued, voting for “Republicanism and Sewardism,” with their compromise positions on the evil of slavery, was tantamount to supporting the slavery of your fellowman. A government that supported such evil could not be “inviolable” and was, she implied, subject to just overthrow by the moral people of the nation.

This passage encapsulates the complexity of Anthony’s arguments about and performances of citizenship in the years before the Civil War. She called for radical action through religiously-inflected actions of civic engagement. She asked men, along with women who were already barred from voting, to choose to abstain from this legal right as a protest against half-way measures and compromises. The arguments she presented were religious, yet she offered them from the public stage, often fighting to be heard over the jeers and insults of a mob crowd. Anthony’s arguments reflected inventional practices of religious study; an embrace of the prophetic calls for immediate change characteristic of the Quaker faith. Her call to action was also a call to inaction and

abstention in service of God's restoration. This complexity reflects Anthony's personal development toward an embrace of legal citizenship rights during Reconstruction.

Anthony's inventional practices and her middle-class performance strategies allowed her the "cover," that is, rhetorical and moral legitimacy, to make radical arguments for women's equality on the public stage. The prophetic voice allowed Anthony to tap into a specific justification that reflected a calling to serve God and was therefore deemed by many in the Burned-over District as an appropriate platform for women's speaking. During the 1852 Temperance convention in Syracuse, Anthony used the prophetic rhetorical voice of her culture to call out the ministers who would dare to suggest forging missions when they neglected to care for the wives and children of drunkards in their communities.¹⁷⁵ This invention strategy also reflected the cultural values of the restoration rhetorical vision in Anthony's culture, allowing her to perform a specific picture of godliness. Commenting on her speech at a local women's rights convention in Lockport in 1859, the *New York Times* presented Anthony as a proper lady: "Miss Susan B. Anthony delivered an address setting forth the claims of her class of progressionists [*sic*]. It was well written, and delivered in an admirable style, and was comparatively free from extreme radicalism." Anthony's blending of conservative and radical invention practices as a foundation for performing godly citizenship meant that the extemporaneous mode of delivery was the way Anthony conformed her godly citizenship performance to the raced and classed expectations of her culture.

The presentation practices Anthony used allowed her to negotiate the gendered nature of citizenship by performing the correctly raced and classed picture of a female reformer while partially eliding her unruliness as a female body. In a common critique

during the earliest years of Anthony's speaking, especially when she was wearing a Bloomer costume, an article in the *Utica Evening Telegraph* vigorously derides Anthony's public speaking, specifically taking on her class status: "Think of such advice given in public by one who claims to be a maiden lady. Miss Anthony may be a very respectable lady, but such conversation is certainly not calculated to enhance public regard for her."¹⁷⁶ Anthony was so far in violation of the norms of middle-class womanhood that she was unfathomable to her auditors and absolutely ignorable in her arguments; the paper recorded only enough of her speech to support its claims that she was not a lady. In contrast, however, was the description of Anthony as a proper lady—even amid the spectacle of her speaking in public—offered by the *Farmer's Advocate and Steuben Advertiser* in 1855. As she engaged in discussing with women in the county and then presented a paid lecture, Anthony was "The agent of the State Society, and a very fine looking and intelligent lady." As long as she was a "lady" Anthony was allowed to make arguments and mount the stage. The paper then recorded the major arguments she presented without refutation. When Anthony disregarded the expectations for being a middle-class speaker she was derided and ignored, but when she conformed to middle-class expectations, she was given a more respectful hearing.

Anthony's performance of citizenship through extemporaneous speaking, while violating the gender expectations of some in her Burned-over District audience, re-inscribed the racial and class borders of who could be considered a citizen. Although Anthony was continually "unruly" because of her female body, she benefitted from being a member of the "default" white race and speaking in a way that reflected her middle-class education. First, race was one of the most important elements re-inscribed by

Anthony's extemporaneous speaking performance because it was completely unacknowledged in reactions to her discourse. Newspapers did not mention Anthony's race.¹⁷⁷ She spoke about abolition and temperance without ever traveling in the American South or having a family member addicted to alcohol, yet she was given the credence afforded to white people courtesy of white supremacy. Race would become a much more explicit question in the fight for women's citizenship during Reconstruction, but it still informed Anthony's work for temperance, abolition, and women's equality before the Civil War. In the Burned-over District, the black slave stood as the silent foil to Anthony's white speaking woman. The caricature of the illiterate, degraded, un-washed and un-saved "sons of Afric,"¹⁷⁸ held in bondage to the cruel southern master, provided a background against which Anthony's properly invented and competently delivered extemporaneous messages could demonstrate her fitness for public life. This demonstration, then, functioned as an implicit race-based argument that Anthony fulfilled the ideals of whiteness that allowed a person to claim the full rights of liberal citizenship.

Anthony's status as a recognizably educated middle-class white woman was also central to overcoming her unruly body because it because reified the norms of liberal citizenship. The ideals of liberal citizenship rights inscribed exclusionary performance norms around what "class" of people were allowed to be citizens; norms that Anthony continually re-inscribed in her extemporaneous speaking.¹⁷⁹ An article about the 1858 New York State Teacher's Convention in the *Lockport Daily Courier* noted, after presenting a summary of a debate between Anthony and a man with very poor delivery skills, "Miss Anthony has gained in the estimation of the convention, and is now listened to with great attention."¹⁸⁰ In the context of the Teacher's convention, Anthony had

enough recognizable status among the members, and enough skill as a public speaker, to command their attention and respect even while debating idea and critiquing a male teacher. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking used the "middling style" of presentation, situating her within the norms of the educated republican ideal citizen.¹⁸¹ This use of an implicit class status allowed Anthony to perform a citizenship, through her speaking, that was not directly tied to motherhood, but which still did not so flout the social norms of acceptability as to label her simply a "militant" activist who could be ignored. A letter to the editor of the *Liberator* exemplifies the import of correctly classed behavior to Anthony's performance, especially in the face of explicit opposition. Lucy N. Coleman, the letter writer, discussed the meeting and offered details of Anthony being booed and hissed at by a crowd, yet, "with quiet dignity, Miss Anthony went through the ordeal."¹⁸² Extemporaneous speaking allowed Anthony to demonstrate her fitness for the public speaking that Stillion Southard has argued was an important part of republican participatory citizenship.¹⁸³

By embracing and excelling in the performance of white, middle-class citizenship, Anthony gained grudging acceptance from those who refused to acknowledge her explicit arguments for women's citizenship, autonomy, or rights. No better example of this acceptance exists than the grudging acknowledgement from one newspaper that outright rejected Anthony's arguments for equality and women's rights. The Lowville *Northern Journal* noted that "while we differ widely with Miss Anthony, both as regards the propriety of the calling she has announced and the notions of which she is advocate, we cheerfully accord to her credit as a public speaker, much above mediocrity, expressing herself with clearness, at many times with elegance and force."¹⁸⁴ The *Journal* then went

on to offer rebuttals of Anthony's ideas, focused explicitly on the typical class markers for white women: virtue, modesty, piety, and beauty. Yet, in rejecting Anthony's argument, they were explicitly acknowledging her right to present arguments. Near the end of her first decade of public life, the impact of the extemporaneous speaking mode began to make Anthony seem more like the properly educated white middle-class citizen she argued she was. An article in the *Elizabethtown Post* from 1858 said, "she addressed the audiences with ability; during all of which time they listened with great attention and delight. Her language was well chosen, her voice collected and [*unreadable*], and her arguments cool and persuasive. If this is a fair specimen, we assure the lords of creation that their supremacy is in some danger."¹⁸⁵ Anthony was able to gain a hearing and participate in public discourse, even with those who explicitly denied her right to do so, through her prowess as a speaker in reifying the class and racial norms of the culture in which she spoke.

Anthony's extemporaneous speaking was a radical performance of citizenship that still re-inscribed conservative notions of exclusionary liberal approaches to legal citizenship. This performance meant that Anthony could perform her citizenship as a reformer with little regard to the lack of legal status to which she had access as a woman. This performance of citizenship was culturally recognizable and acceptable in the Burned-over District of Upstate New York but failed to transcend the confines of the religious hotbed to change public opinion of those outside the already-accepting Burned-over District reform communities or to enact lasting change in Albany or Washington. Yet, this performance also met the raced and classed criteria of citizenship in such a way that even those who never gave credence to Anthony's arguments were forced to

acknowledge her presence and acuity as a speaker. Anthony was able, by her untiring, continual speaking, to gain legitimacy, albeit a raced and classed legitimacy that was rejected by many, which at times subsumed her female body-in-violation, the entertaining reformer persona she created. Her constant speaking forced audiences to grant her credit as a speaker, even while they explicitly rejected her speech or right to speak. Anthony's speaking acuity and her tenacity of continual performance meant that people had to acknowledge her humanity and personhood even if they refused to change their ideological or conceptual stances. It was a culture-embracing and culture-changing performance.

Conclusion

Anthony and Stanton's "Call for a Meeting of the Loyal Women of the Nation" began with the following sentence: "In this crisis of our Country's destiny, it is the duty of every citizen to consider the peculiar blessings of a republican form of government and decide what sacrifices of wealth and life are demanded for its defense and preservation."¹⁸⁶ The war condensed all their confused work—all their previous attempts to radical reformation of the country, attestations of citizenship as practice, and prophetic calls for millennial perfection—into the single goal of eradicating slavery in a protected Union. The contestations of correct religious practices of citizenship were foresworn in favor of an absolute adherence to the legal rights and duties of a people to their government. "No mere party or sectional cry" they averred, "no technicalities of Constitution or military law, no mottoes of craft or policy are big enough to touch the great heart of a nation in the midst of revolutions.... At this hour, the best word and work of every man and woman are imperatively demanded."¹⁸⁷ The war provided a rallying

cry that Anthony could not subsume to the demands of her regional and religious rhetoric.

As the Civil War progressed, Anthony's "entertaining orator" extemporaneous speaking, previously the touchstone of her heritage and training in the Burned-over District, gave way to a more national and nationalistic idiom of citizenship. Women were loyal to the nation. It was the legal responsibility of every loyal citizen to aid and support the nation in the heroic fight against a tyrannical evil. The responsibilities of citizens were the paramount concern. "Woman" Anthony and Stanton wrote, "is equally interested and responsible with man in the final settlement of this problem of self-government; therefore let none stand idle spectators now."¹⁸⁸ At the first meeting of the Loyal League, held in New York City on May 14th, 1863, Anthony's former rhetoric of civic engagement and religious practices of citizenship were gone. Instead, Anthony introduced resolutions demanding that self-government was the inalienable right of the people; that all people, both former slaves and women, should have a voice in their government; that women's enthusiasm in support of the war and work in service to the revolution should be immediately rewarded with the "final and complete concertation to freedom" of all their legal rights as citizens.¹⁸⁹ Anthony did not begin offering fully-formed legal arguments for women's citizenship rights until after the war, but her complex, radical-yet-conservative arguments for civic participation through her extemporaneous speaking were effectively gone.

In her years of work for woman's rights, abolition, and temperance before the Civil War, Susan B. Anthony's citizenship performance as an "entertaining reform" orator functioned as a culturally recognizable middle-class, white citizenship in the

Burned-over District. Anthony's Quaker and millennial invention as a prophetic rhetor provided arguments that meshed with the restoration rhetorical vision of her culture. Her extemporaneous mode of address, a presentation style that hearkened to both the exhorting calls to repentance familiar in evangelical preaching, and the entertaining performance style that was growing in popularity with the economic and cultural growth of the Burned-over District, functioned as a correctly raced and classed performance of citizenship. This performance meant that Anthony was able to enact her citizenship as a reformer with little regard to the lack of legal status to which she had access as a woman by embracing the raced and classed vision of the ideal extemporaneous rhetor. This performance of citizenship was culturally recognizable and generally accepted in the Burned-over District. Anthony's performance, however, ultimately failed to transcend the confines of the culture out of which it was born. As much as her work may have contributed to the gradual acceptance of women in public, she failed to enact any lasting legal change in Albany or Washington.

Anthony's continual speaking served as a raced and classed legitimacy that forced listeners to acknowledge her prowess as a speaker even if they rejected her explicit argument, but it did not create the kind of enforceable equality she sought. During the war, members of the New York State Legislature—many of them long-term members who had dismissed Anthony's first legislative petition as "Nothing but women and Children"—overturned most of the enforceable protections Anthony had fought to add to the Married Women's Property Act. This failure was the driving force behind Stanton and Anthony's formation of the Loyal League during the war, and likely provided the

impetus for Anthony's move to explicitly legal arguments and actions for women's rights during Reconstruction.

Notes

- ¹ “SBA to Parents, February 20, 1849,” in *The Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony*, eds. Ann D. Gordon and Patricia G. Holland, Microfilm Edition (Wilmington, DE.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1991), reel 6, slides 857-65.
- ² Ida Husted Harper, *The Life and Work of Susan B. Anthony, Volume 1* (Indianapolis, IN: Hollenbeck Press, 1908), 60-61.
- ³ Ann D. Gordon, “Editorial note, Address by ECS to the Legislature of New York,” *The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, Volume I: In the School of Anti-Slavery 1840-1866*, ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 240.

Harper recorded that Anthony and the other women were the first to speak before a New York State legislature. According to Gordon, however, Stanton actually gave the speech, and it was given at the Young Men’s Temperance Hall in Albany, NY (the seat of the Legislature) and only a printed pamphlet was presented to the legislature. According to Gordon, Anthony’s role in this event is unclear from the available archival materials.

- ⁴ *The Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony*, eds. Ann D. Gordon and Patricia G. Holland, Microfilm, reel 6, slides 0084, 0098, 0100, 0102.

These documents, all dated from the fall of 1837, are, respectively, an inscription to Anthony in what appears to be a Quaker commonplace book, a letter from Guelma Anthony to her Father, sister, and brother, a letter from Susan B. Anthony to her Father, and a letter from Guelma and Susan to their family.

⁵ Glen C. Altschuler and Jan M. Saltzgeber, *Revivalism, Social Conscience, and Community in the Burned-Over District: The Trial of Rhoda Bement* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 32.; Whitney R. Cross, *The Burned-Over District: The Social and Intellectual History of Enthusiastic Religion in Western New York, 1800-1850* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), 55.

⁶ Cross, *The Burned-over District*, 57-58.

⁷ Peter L. Bernstein, *Wedding of the Waters: The Erie Canal and the Making of a Great Nation* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), Introduction.

It should be noted here that the territory made accessible by the Canal was already held by native nations, and in some cases, it was also claimed by European governments. The Canal provided a highly accessible route for citizens of the newly-formed United States to invade these territories and claim them, by right of conquest, due to the sheer volume of inhabitants who could occupy a given area. In this way, the Canal explicitly served the expansionist and genocidal goals of the United States.

⁸ Bernstein, *Wedding of the Waters*, 356.

⁹ Cross dates beginning of revivals in what Charles Grandison Finney would eventually call the “Burned-over District” to the late 1790s. Settlers moving west from Massachusetts brought their various religious practices, as well as their competition for paying members, with them as they settled in New York. Cross provides documentation for revivals occurring across the state, associated with denominations from the Congregationalists to the Universalists, throughout the first 40 years of settlement. Cross also intimates that the very prevalence of

revivals was what drove Finney to lament that no soul could be saved in the region because it had already been “burned over” by so many other preachers (*The Burned-over District*, 6-10).

¹⁰ Cross, *The Burned-over District*, 5-7.

¹¹ It is important to note here that Finney’s assertions, and those of other evangelistic ministers about the hard-heartedness of Upstate New York settlers, was likely rooted in their beliefs that only their specific denomination held the keys to godliness.

¹² Leonard J. Arrington, “Mormonism: From Its New York Beginnings,” *New York History* 61, no. 4. New York State Historical Association (1980): 387–410.; Brian J. L. Berry, *America’s Utopian Experiments: Communal Havens from Long-Wave Crises* (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College, 1992).; Matthew Burton Bowman, *The Mormon People: The Making of an American Faith, First edition* (New York: Random House, 2012).; Richard L. Bushman, *Joseph Smith and the Beginnings of Mormonism* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984).; Lawrence Foster, *Religion and Sexuality: Three American Communal Experiments of the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).; Lawrence Foster, *Women, Family, and Utopia: Communal Experiments of the Shakers, the Oneida Community, and the Mormons* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991).; Paul C. Gutjahr, *The Book of Mormon: A Biography* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).; Marvin S. Hill, “The Rise of Mormonism in the Burned-over District: Another View,” *New York History* 61, no 4. *New York State Historical Association* (1980): 411–430.; Richard Allen Landes, and Berkshire

Reference Works, *Encyclopedia of Millennialism and Millennial Movements* (New York: Routledge, 2000).; William Alexander Linn, *The Story of the Mormons: From the Date of Their Origin to the Year 1901* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1963).; Thomas F. O'Dea, *The Mormons* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

- ¹³ Ann Richard Francis, *The Word: The Story of Ann Lee, Female Messiah, Mother of the Shakers, the Woman Clothed with the Sun* (New York: Arcade Publishers, 2001).; Foster, *Religion and Sexuality*.; Shakers, and Shaker Collection (Library of Congress), *A Brief Exposition of the Established Principles and Regulations of the United Society of Believers Called Shakers* (New York: E.S. Dodge Print. Co., 1879).; Stephen C. Taysom, *Shakers, Mormons, and Religious Worlds: Conflicting Visions, Contested Boundaries* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011).
- ¹⁴ John Richard Barnard, *The Millerite Movement and American Millennial Culture, 1830-1845* (PhD diss., Southern Illinois University, 2012).; Landes, *Encyclopedia*.; Francis D. Nichol, *The Midnight Cry, a Defense of William Miller and the Millerites* (Washington, DC: Review and Herald Publishers Association, 1944).; Ronald L. Numbers, and Jonathan M. Butler, *The Disappointed: Millerism and Millenarianism in the Nineteenth Century* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987).; David L. Rowe, "A New Perspective on the Burned-over District: The Millerites in Upstate New York," *Church History* 47, no 4. *American Society of Church History, Cambridge University Press* (1978): 408–20.

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- ¹⁵ Jonathan Butler, “From Millerism to Seventh-Day Adventism: ‘Boundlessness to Consolidation,’” *Church History* 55, no. 1. (1986): 50–64.; Olsen M. Ellsworth, *A History of the Origin and Progress of Seventh-Day Adventists* (New York: AMS Press, 1972).; Landes, *Encyclopedia.*; J. N. Loughborough, *The Great Second Advent Movement, Its Rise and Progress* (New York: Arno Press, 1972).; Robin Theobald, “From Rural Populism to Practical Christianity: The Modernisation of the Seventh-day Adventist Movement,” *Archives De Sciences Sociales Des Religions* 30, no. 60.1. (1985): 109–30.
- ¹⁶ Ruth Brandon, *The Spiritualists: The Passion for the Occult in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York: K. Bullough 1983).; Slater Brown, *The Heyday of Spiritualism* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1970).; Davis Bitton, “Mormonism’s Encounter with Spiritualism,” *Journal of Mormon History* 1. (1974): 39–50.; D. M. Dewey, *History of the Strange Sounds or Rappings, Heard in Rochester and Western New-York, and Usually Called the Mysterious Noises! Which Are Supposed by Many to Be Communications from the Spirit World, Together with All the Explanation That Can As yet Be Given of the Matter* (Rochester: D.M. Dewey, 1850).
- ¹⁷ Lawrence Foster, “The Psychology of Free Love in the Oneida Community,” *Australasian Journal of American Studies* 5. no. 2. (1986): 14–26.; Foster, *Religion and Sexuality.*; Foster, *Women, Family, and Utopia.*; Spencer Klaw, *Without Sin: The Life and Death of the Oneida Community* (New York: Allen Lane, 1993).; R. Laurence Moore, “Spiritualism and Science: Reflections on the First Decade of the Spirit Rappings,” *American Quarterly* 24, no. 4.

(1972): 474–500.; George Wallingford Noyes and Lawrence Foster, *Free Love in Utopia: John Humphrey Noyes and the Origin of the Oneida Community* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001).; “Oneida Commune,” Landes, *Encyclopedia.*; Michel P. Richard and Albert Adato, “The Medium and Her Message: A Study of Spiritualism at Lily Dale, New York,” *Review of Religious Research* 22, no. 2. (1980): 186–197.; Constance Noyes Robertson, “The Oneida Community,” *New York History* 30, no. 2. (1949): 131–150.

¹⁸ In a letter to his daughter dated July 16, 1848, Daniel Anthony recorded the split of an important Quaker organization at the yearly Friends meeting in Farmville, NY, one a few miles from Rochester. Although all members of the Farmville yearly meeting were liberal Hicksite Quakers, the organization fractured as some sought to keep the harsh rules of Quaker discipline practiced in Friends circles. Some members sought to punish individual Friends who participated in secular abolition organizations, while another faction argued that no organization had the ability to override an individual’s conscience and directing Inner Light. The meeting eventually split over these disciplinary issues, which were precipitated by the strong abolitionist faction within the Rochester friends.

“Daniel Anthony to SBA, Rochester, July 16, 1848,” in *The Collected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 21.

¹⁹ The growth of train travel across New York State also helped escaped slaves reach the northern border. Escapees from Virginia, western Maryland, Kentucky, and Tennessee who crossed the Ohio river or western Pennsylvania border often moved north to Rochester, while those escaping from East Coast areas often came

West to Rochester via Eire Canal boats with sympathetic captains. As a former-slave kidnapping industry grew in the years before the Civil War, escapees were especially interested in Rochester as an exit point from the US to Canada where slavery was illegal.

²⁰ Paul E. Johnson, *A Shopkeeper's Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815-1837* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 15.

²¹ Scott Magelssen, and Rhona Justice-Malloy, *Enacting History* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press), 25.

²² Joseph Roach, *Cities of the Dead: Circum-Atlantic Performance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 28.

²³ Magelssen, and Justice-Malloy, *Enacting History*, 25.

²⁴ Magelssen and Justice-Malloy discuss “the young boy saw angles, received revelation, and brought fourth new scripture” and “the everyday practice of communicating with God was brought into the open and intensified” as well as telling and retelling the stories of the Church’s founding myth within the space where the events took place (26-27).

²⁵ Ernest Bormann, *The Force of Fantasy: Restoring the American Dream* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), Vii.

²⁶ Bormann, *The Force*, 2.

²⁷ Beth Ann Rothermel, “Prophets, Friends, Conversationalists: Quaker Rhetorical Culture, Women’s Commonplace Books, and the Art of Invention, 1775–1840,” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (2013): 74.

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- ²⁸ Lucy Hogan and Martha Solomon, "Extending the Conversation: Sharing the Inner Light," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (1995): 32-46.
- ²⁹ Alan D. DeSantis, "Amostic Prophecy: Fredrick Douglass' *The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro*," *Journal of Communication and Religion*, 22, no. 1. (1999): 65-92. 70.
- ³⁰ Bormann, *The Force*, 39.
- ³¹ Bormann, *The Force*, 169.
- ³² David B. Chesebrough, *Charles G. Finney: Revivalistic Rhetoric* (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 2002), 108.
- ³³ Stephen H. Browne, *Angelina Grimké: Rhetoric, Identity, and the Radical Imagination* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1999), 12
- ³⁴ Raymond H. Banard, "Wendell Phillips' Adaptability as a Speaker," *Western Speech* 5, no. 2 (January 1941): 6.
- ³⁵ Angela G. Ray, *The Lyceum and Public Culture in the Nineteenth-Century United States* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2005), 41-43.
- ³⁶ David Deirdre, *Fanny Kemble: A Performed Life* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).; Faye E. Dudden, *Women in the American Theatre: Actresses and Audiences, 1790-1870* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).; Joseph Leach, *Bright Particular Star: The Life & Times of Charlotte Cushman* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).; Sandra Richards, *The Rise of the English Actress* (New York: St. Martin's Press: 1993).; Joanna Richardson, *Sarah Bernhardt and Her World* (New York: Putnam, 1977).; Harold Simpson

and Charles Braun, *A Century of Famous Actresses, 1750-1850* (New York: B. Blom, 1971).

³⁷ For a discussion of this concept reference the “Shifts in Performing Nineteenth Century Citizenship” section on page 35 in Chapter One of this Dissertation. Schudson, “Good Citizens,” 4-5.

³⁸ Rachel Cope, “From Smoldering Fires to Revitalizing Showers: A Historiographical Overview of Revivalism in Nineteenth Century New York,” *Wesley and Methodist Studies*, 4, no. 25. (2012): 25-49. 38.

³⁹ Ronald Osborn, “William Lloyd Garrison and the United States Constitution: The Political Evolution of an American Radical,” *Journal of Law and Religion* 24, no. 1. (2008-2009): 65-88. 66.

⁴⁰ “Declaration of Sentiment of the American Anti-Slavery Society (1833),” in, Ronald F. Reid and James F. Klumpp, *American Rhetorical Discourse*, 2nd ed. (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1995), 309-313.

⁴¹ “Report of the Woman’s Rights Convention, Held at Seneca Falls, N.Y., July 19th and 20th, 1848,” in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 75-88. 77.

⁴² Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, Matilda Joslyn Gage, and Ida Husted Harper, *History of Woman Suffrage* (New York: Arno Press York Times, 1969), 73.

⁴³ Stanton, Anthony, Gage, and Harper, *History of Woman Suffrage*, 73.

⁴⁴ Harper, *The Life*, 14.

⁴⁵ Thomas Woody, *Early Quaker Education in Pennsylvania* (Teachers College, Columbia University, 1920).; Margaret Fell, and David J. Latt, *Women’s*

Speaking Justified (William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California, 1979).

⁴⁶ Harper noted some of the schools from which teachers were recruited included Miss Grant's seminary at Ipswich, MA, Rensselaer Quaker boarding-school, and Mount Holyoke Female Seminary. For a discussion about the role of seminaries like these, as well as more famous schools like the Troy Female Seminary, see: Anne Firor Scott, "The Ever Widening Circle: The Diffusion of Feminist Values from the Troy Female Seminary 1822-1872," *History of Education Quarterly* 19.1 (1979): 3-25.; Kristen Welch, and Abraham Antonio Ruelas, *The Role of Female Seminaries on the Road to Social Justice for Women* (Eugene, OR: WIPF & Stock, 2015).

⁴⁷ Kathleen Barry, *Susan B. Anthony: A Biography of a Singular Feminist* (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 235; N. E. H. Hull, *The Woman Who Dared to Vote: The Trial of Susan B. Anthony* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 25, 29.

⁴⁸ During her time at Moulson's Female Seminary, Anthony became very homesick and began a lifelong habit of hard work, study, and correspondence with family and friends through letter writing. Kathleen Barry has argued that Anthony's experience at boarding school was the beginning of a coping mechanism she used throughout her career in dealing with the loneliness occasioned by a life on the road. This time at Moulson's was also the first time Anthony came into contact with controversial Quaker abolitionist Lucretia Mott who spoke at the school on the necessity for the young women to improve their minds.

⁴⁹ Richard H. Timberlake, Jr., "Panic of 1837," In *Business Cycles and Depressions: An Encyclopedia*, David Glasner, and Thomas F. Cooley, eds. (New York: Garland Pub., 1997), 514-516.

⁵⁰ A full discussion of Jacksonian banking practices and trans-Atlantic speculation is beyond the scope of this project. For a full discussion of these issues see: Edward J. Balleisen, *Navigating Failure: Bankruptcy and Commercial Society in Antebellum America*, (University of North Carolina Press, 2001). Jessica M. Lepler, *The Many Panics of 1837: People, Politics, and the Creation of a Transatlantic Financial Crisis*, (Cambridge University Press; 2013).; Reginald Charles McGrane, *The Panic of 1837: Some Financial Problems of the Jacksonian Era*, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965).; Peter L. Rousseau, "Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, and the Panic of 1837," *The Journal of Economic History* 62.2 (2002).

⁵¹ Harper, *The Life*, 35.

Harper recorded this time for the family, saying:

In the summer of 1838 the factory, store, home and much of the furniture had to be given up to the creditors. Not an article was spared from the inventory. All the mother's wedding presents, the furniture and the silver spoons given her by her parents, the wearing apparel of the family, even the flour, tea, coffee and sugar, the children's school books, the Bible and the dictionary, were carefully noted. On this list, still in existence, are "underclothes of wife and daughters," "spectacles of Mr. and Mrs. Anthony," "pocket-knives of boys," "scraps of old iron"—and the law took all except the bare necessities. In this hour of extremity the guardian angel

appeared in the person of Joshua Read, a brother of Mrs. Anthony, from Palatine Bridge, N.Y., who bid in all which the family desired to keep and restored to them their possessions, making himself their lenient creditor.

⁵² Barry, Susan B. Anthony, 31-31.

Stephen H. Browne, *Angelina Grimké: Rhetoric, Identity, and the Radical Imagination* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1999), 12.

⁵³ Barry, Susan B. Anthony, 39.

⁵⁴ Harper, *The Life*, 39.

⁵⁵ Harper, *The Life*, 39.

It is interesting to note the intense white privilege that is evident in many of Anthony's letters and journal entries prior to 1850. These sentiments, however, are blunted significantly after Anthony begins living at her father's farm in Rochester. Anthony had little interaction with people of color before she began spending time with the Rochester abolitionists, escapees on the underground railroad, and activists of color like Frederic Douglas. Anthony's discussions of African Americans become much more nuanced and humanized in the decade of activism after her time at her Father's home in Rochester.

Raymond H. Banard, "Wendell Phillips' Adaptability as a Speaker," *Western Speech* 5, no. 2 (January 1941): 6.

⁵⁵ Angela G. Ray, *The Lyceum and Public Culture in the Nineteenth-Century United States* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2005), 41-43.

⁵⁵ David Deirdre, *Fanny Kemble: A Performed Life* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007).; Faye E. Dudden, *Women in the American Theatre:*

Actresses and Audiences, 1790-1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).; Joseph Leach, *Bright Particular Star: The Life & Times of Charlotte Cushman* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).; Sandra Richards, *The Rise of the English Actress* (New York: St. Martin's Press: 1993).; Joanna Richardson, *Sarah Bernhardt and Her World* (New York: Putnam, 1977).; Harold Simpson and Charles Braun, *A Century of Famous Actresses, 1750-1850* (New York: B. Blom, 1971).

⁵⁶ Harper, *The Life*, 45.; "SBA to Aaron R. Vail, Center Falls, Oct 22, 1843," in *The Collected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, Volume I: In the School of Ant-Slavery 1840-1866*, Ann D. Gordon, Ed. (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ: 1997). 45-47.

Harper recorded that, "From 1840 to 1845 Susan and [her sister] Hannah taught almost continuously, receiving only \$2 or \$2.50 a week and board, but living with most rigid economy and giving the father all they could spare to help pay interest on the mortgage which rested on factory, mills and home. It was in these early days of teaching that Miss Anthony saw with indignation the injustice practiced towards women."

⁵⁷ Barry, Susan B. Anthony, 43.

⁵⁸ The Quaker faith began as a dissenting Christian group after the English Civil War of the 1640s. The founder of the faith, George Fox, believed that individuals could have direct contact with Christ without an intermediary in the form of a priest. The faith faced persecution from the Church of England, and formed separatist sects focused on holy living in community. The Quakers focused their religious

praxis on what they called holy conversation; unadorned clothing and “plain” speech that did not use markers of class, piety and simplicity in daily life, and seeking to live holy lives. Quaker women were considered absolute equals to male members.

Quakers began immigrating to North America in the 1650, where they clashed with the rival Puritan separatist sect. Seeking peace, some Quaker groups developed communities of holy conversation in places like the Delaware Valley, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. Unlike their Puritan neighbors, Quakers did not experience any schisms until the nineteenth century.

The “Hicksite” split within the Quaker faith developed out of ideological, socio-economic, and theological tension within and between American and British branches of the faith. Ideological rifts arose over social activism, proper behavior, and political involvement. Poorer members of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting held different values than the wealthier Orthodox branches. And the leaders within different yearly meetings could not agree theologically on the significance of scripture versus the importance of individual revelation. The “Hicksites,” who followed the more liberal universalist teachings of John Hicks, split from the orthodox Quakers during the Great Separation of 1827.

For further readings on Quaker history, practice, theology, and rhetoric, please see:

Margaret Hope Bacon, *The Quiet Rebels: The Story of the Quakers in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1969).; Hugh Barbour, *The Quakers in Puritan England* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964).; William C. Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*. 2nd ed. rev. (Cambridge, England: University

Press, 1955).; Bill J. Brent, *Holy Silence: The Gift of Quaker Spirituality* (Brewster, MA.: Paraclete Press, 2005).; Robert W. Doherty, *The Hicksite Separation: A Sociological Analysis of Religious Schism in Early Nineteenth Century America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967).; Margaret Fell, and David J. Latt, *Women's Speaking Justified* (William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California, 1979).; George Fox, *The Journal of George Fox* (Cambridge England: University Press, 1952).; William J. Frost, "The Origins of the Quaker Crusade against Slavery: A Review of Recent Literature," *Quaker History* 67 no. 1 (1978): 42-58.; H. Larry Ingle, *Quakers in Conflict: The Hicksite Reformation* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1986).; Bonnelyn Young Kunze, *Margaret Fell and the Rise of Quakerism* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994).; Isabel Ross, *Margaret Fell: Mother of Quakerism* (London: Longmans, Green, 1949).; Jessamyn West, *The Quaker Reader* (New York: Viking Press, 1962).;

⁵⁹ Anthony did not forego "plain" English lightly, but it was a requirement for effectively teaching at non-Quaker schools. In a journal entry from April of 1837, Anthony dithers between maintaining her plain speech with her family and continuing the English speech she had cultivated for teaching school.

Harper, *The Life*, 50; "SBA Journal Entry," April 1837, Microfilm, reel 6, slide 162.

"Plain" speech was a part of the testimony of simplicity. This testimony, or article of the faith, encouraged believers to pay attention to the inner condition of a person instead of their outward appearance. This included avoiding any fancy dress, "honesty" such as refusing to use titles when addressing individuals of a higher

class and using numbers instead of the Roman names for days of the week (Fifth Day instead of Thursday, named after Thor, the Norse god of thunder, Seventh Month instead of July, named after Roman Emperor Julius). Quakers also used the singular forms “thee” and “thou” instead of “you,” which was considered “fancy” in sixteenth century England.

For more information, see: Charles E. Fager, “The Quaker Testimony of Simplicity,” *Quaker Religious Thought*, 14, no. 1. (1972): 46-59.; Richard J. Foster, *Freedom of Simplicity* (New York: Harper Paperbacks, 1998).; William Smith, “A Short Testimony on the Behalf of Truths Innocency: Declared in Plainness and Simplicity: Being Done at the Command of the Lord God That All Out of the Truth May See Their Way and Proceed No Further: With a Discovery of the National Ministry, Whose Time Now Is, and Is No More,” *Early English books, 1641-1700*, Microform, reel 802, slide 14 (1660).

⁶⁰ Barry, *Susan B. Anthony*, 47.

⁶¹ The day after a dance in the fall of 1847, Anthony wrote a deprecation of the entire event because her escort allowed her to witness “Brandy sipping!” by the supposedly upright men of the village. She disparaged “rum, horrid rum!” and vowed that only fully temperate men would ever again accompany her to social events.

“SBA to Parents, February 20, 1849,” Microfilm, reel 6, slide 857-65.

⁶² Harper recorded that Anthony read this speech from a manuscript (*The Life*, 53).

“Speech by SBA to the Daughters of Temperance, 2 March 1849,” in *The Collected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 135-142.

⁶³ Barry, *Susan B. Anthony*, 53.

⁶⁴ Harper, *The Life*, 55-56.

⁶⁵ Harper titled the period between 1850 and 1852 as the “Entrance into Public Life.”

Harper, *The Life*, Chapter V.

⁶⁶ Barry, *Susan B. Anthony*, 57-61; Harper, *The Life*, 59-61.

⁶⁷ Harper, *The Life*, 60-61.

⁶⁸ Harper, *The Life*, 63.

⁶⁹ Harper, *The Life*, 63.

⁷⁰ Barry, *Susan B. Anthony*, 63.

⁷¹ Elizabeth Cady Stanton, *Eighty Years and More: Reminiscences, 1815-1897* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1898), Chapter X.

Other accounts of this meeting also appear in *The History of Woman Suffrage* (457), and Amelia Bloomer’s Autobiography, *The Life and Writings of Amelia Bloomer* (Boston, MA: Arena Publishing Company, 1895), 54-55 and Harper’s biography of Anthony (64-65).

Gordon has noted that the story recorded by Anthony, Stanton, and Bloomer is more “slippery” than it would at first appear. Each of the women places the meeting in either 1850 or 1851, and all fix the meeting around a lecture by George Thompson. One of Thompson’s fellow travelers kept precise and exhaustive accounts of who they met, lodged with, traveled with, ate with, and even who met their trains and provided them with transportation. Stanton’s account of her meeting with Anthony asserts that it occurred while Thompson and William Lloyd Garrison stayed with the Stanton family. However, the accounts kept by

Thompson's aid make no mention of Stanton. Gordon concluded that, although Stanton and Anthony were undoubtedly working together before January of 1852, the meeting recorded above may not have happened, or may have happened in another way or at another time.

Although this story is likely apocryphal, I include it in my historical narrative of Anthony's life because it was a part of the mythos Anthony and Stanton invented for themselves. This mythos was an important part of how their friendship functioned rhetorically during their lives and as their stories were used to warrant arguments about female friendship, collaboration, sisterhood after their deaths.

Gordon, *The Collected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 182-184.

⁷² Eleanor Flexner, *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975), 84.

⁷³ Patricia G. Holland and Ann D. Gordon, *The Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony: Guide and Index to the Microfilm Edition* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1992), 2.

⁷⁴ Lydia Mott (not to be confused with Lucretia Mott, likely a distant cousin) was a little-known abolition activist from Albany, New York, who worked with Anthony, Stanton, Lucy Stone, Ernestine Rose, Sarah Pugh, and others in the Burned-over District before the Civil War. Relatively little has been written about Mott or her sister Abigale, but she is one of the people to whom the *History of Woman Suffrage* is dedicated, and appears as a member of Women's Rights Convention Committees throughout the 1850s and was a frequent correspondent of Anthony's.

Mary Ellen Snodgrass, *The Underground Railroad: An Encyclopedia of People, Places, and Operations* (New York, Sharpe, 2008), 375-376.; Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, Matilda Joselyn Gage, and Ida Husted Harper, 1969. *History of Woman Suffrage* (New York: Arno Press, New York Times, 1969), Frontispiece and dedication, 376, 411, 425, 469, 592, 623, 631, 688, 744, 749.

⁷⁵ Harper, *The Life*, 66.

⁷⁶ Harper, *The Life*, 70-71.

⁷⁷ Harper, *The Life*, 72.

⁷⁸ Harper, *The Life*, 72.

⁷⁹ "Proceedings of the Woman's Rights Convention, Held at Syracuse, September 8th, 9th, & 10th, 1852," Microfilm, 7:323-419.

Lucy Stone (slide 340) thoroughly summarized the arguments of the convention.

"The claims we make at these conventions are self-evident truths. The second resolution affirms the right of human beings to their persons and earnings.

Is not that self-evident? Yet the common law, which regulates the relation of husband and wife, and is modified only in a few instances by the statutes, gives the "custody" of the wife's person to the husband, so that he has a right to her even against herself. It gives him her earnings, no matter with what weariness they have been acquired, or how greatly she may need them for herself or her children. It gives him a right to her personal property, which he may will entirely away from her, also the use of her real estate, and in some of the States married women, insane persons and idiots are ranked together as not fit to make a will; so that she is left with only one right, which she enjoys in common with the pauper,

the right of maintenance. Indeed, when she has taken the sacred marriage vows, her legal existence ceases. And what is our position politically? The foreigner, the negro, the drunkard, all are entrusted with the ballot, all placed by men politically higher than their own mothers, wives, sisters and daughters!”

⁸⁰ Aileen S. Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).

⁸¹ Harper, *The Life*, 81.

Harper may be imposing her 1890s perspective on Anthony’s life story, but it is useful to note her assertion that “Miss Anthony came away from the Syracuse convention thoroughly convinced that the right which woman needed above every other, the one indeed which would secure to her all others, was the right of suffrage.”

⁸² For an example of how the women worked together see “SBA to ECS, with Enclosure, Private, Home, getting along toward 12 Oclock, Thursday evening 5th June, 1856” in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 321-324.

⁸³ Judith Wellman, *The Road to Seneca Falls: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the First Woman’s Rights Convention* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004).

⁸⁴ Harper, *The Life*, 111.

⁸⁵ Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0221-33, 0238-48, 0273-97, 0645-83.

⁸⁶ The political and financial upheaval in the winter of 1856-57 drove many changes in the reform movements with which Anthony was involved. Additionally, the failure of the Republican, Know Nothing, and Whig parties to defeat the pro-slavery Democrat, James Buchanan, for the presidency, the Supreme Court decision in *Dred Scott v. Stanford*, and the overturn of the “Missouri

Compromise” had even more thoroughly entrenched the battle lines between reformers and conservatives. Additionally, political rhetoric of the time blamed much of the troubles faced by the country on the most vocal progressives linked to woman’s rights, abolition, and temperance activities.

For more information, please see: Tyler Anbinder, *Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of the 1850’s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).; Michael J. Birkner, *James Buchanan and the Political Crisis of the 1850s* (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1996).; Charles W. Calomiris, and Larry Schweikart, “The Panic of 1857: Origins, Transmission, and Containment,” *The Journal of Economic History* 51 no. 4. (1991): 807-834.; Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).; Michael F. Holt, *The Political Crisis of the 1850s* (New York: Wiley, 1978).; James L. Huston, *The Panic of 1857 and the Coming of the Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987).; Kenneth M. Stampp, *America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

⁸⁷ Harper, *The Life*, 153.

The papers which Harper burned after finishing her biography of Anthony apparently included some of the notes Anthony used during her first year of extemporaneous speaking.

⁸⁸ Harper recorded Anthony’s interactions with William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips (*The Life*, 203-204).

“[B]oth Garrison and Phillips wrote that she had abducted a man’s child and must surrender it! Mr. Phillips remonstrated: “Let us urge you, therefore, at once to advise and insist upon this woman’s returning to her relatives. Garrison concurs with me fully and earnestly in this opinion, thinking that our movement’s repute for good sense should not be compromised by any such mistake.” In a letter from Mr. Garrison covering six pages of foolscap, he argued: “Our identification with the woman’s rights movement and the anti-slavery cause is such that we ought not unnecessarily involve them in any hasty and ill-judged, no matter how well-meant, efforts of our own. We, at least, owe to them this—that if for any act of ours we are dragged before courts we ought to be able to show that we acted discreetly as well as with good intentions.” Both men spoke kindly and affectionately but they were unable to view the question from a mother’s or even from a woman’s standpoint. Miss Anthony replied to them:

I can not give you a satisfactory statement on paper, but I feel the strongest assurance that all I have done is wholly right. Had I turned my back upon her I should have scorned myself. In all those hours of aid and sympathy for that outraged woman I remembered only that I was a human being. That 204I should stop to ask if my act would injure the reputation of any movement never crossed my mind, nor will I now allow such a fear to stifle my sympathies or tempt me to expose her to the cruel, inhuman treatment of her own household. Trust me that as I ignore all law to help the slave, so will I ignore it all to protect an enslaved woman.

At the anti-slavery convention in Albany Mr. Garrison pleaded with her to give up the child and insisted that she was entirely in the wrong. He said: "Don't you know the law of Massachusetts gives the father the entire guardianship and control of the children?" "Yes, I know it," she replied, "and does not the law of the United States give the slaveholder the ownership of the slave? And don't you break it every time you help a slave to Canada?" "Yes, I do." "Well, the law which gives the father the sole ownership of the children is just as wicked and I'll break it just as quickly. You would die before you would deliver a slave to his master, and I will die before I will give up that child to its father." It was impossible for even such great men as Garrison and Phillips to feel for a wronged and outraged woman as they could for a wronged and outraged black man.

⁸⁹ Harper, *The Life*, 204.

⁹⁰ No analysis of the 1860 Woman's Rights convention rhetoric has as yet been published. For a preliminary discussion of Stanton's rhetoric on issues of marriage and divorce, see Lisa Hogan's excellent work from the 2008 National Communication Association conference:

Lisa Hogan, "Marriage, Divorce, and Sexual Domination in the Rhetoric of Elizabeth Cady Stanton," *Conference Papers -- National Communication Association* (January 2008).

⁹¹ Gordon provides an excellent summary of these newspaper articles in the *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 431.

⁹² Harper, *The Life*, 210.

⁹³ Harper, *The Life*, 212.

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- ⁹⁴ Miriam Gurko, *Ladies of Seneca Falls: The Birth of the Woman's Rights Movement* (New York: Schocken, 1974), 208. See also; Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *Man Cannot Speak for Her: Key Texts of the Early Feminists* (New York: Praeger, 1989).
- ⁹⁵ Linda Czuba Brigance, "Ballots and Bullets: Adapting Women's Rights Arguments to the Conditions of War," *Women and Language* 28, no. 1. 1-7.
- ⁹⁶ "SBA to Martha Coffin Wright, Rochester, May 28/61," in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 467-68.; "SBA and ECS to Martha Coffin Wright, Seneca Falls, Jan. 30, 1862," in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 472-73.
- ⁹⁷ Gordon, *The Selected Papers*, 467.
- ⁹⁸ "SBA to Lydia Mott [*Rochester? After 10 April 1862*]," in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 475-76. (emphasis by editor).
- ⁹⁹ Gordon, *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 480.
- ¹⁰⁰ James Darsey, *The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America* (New York: NYU Press, 1997), 19.
- ¹⁰¹ In *Moralists and Modernizers: America's Pre-Civil War Reformers*, Steven Mintz argued that millennialist sentiments in both religious and secular circles greatly increased after the United States of America was established in 1776; the country was seen as the harbinger of a new era in world history that would usher in a kingdom of peace and prosperity on earth. This sentiment was encouraged in religious communities by the evangelical fervor of the Second Great Awakening, the rapid growth of church membership, and the increasing pace of scientific and

intellectual growth at the beginning of the nineteenth century. This focus on progress towards God's kingdom being realized on earth in the form of the United States fostered an explicitly hope-filled millennialist sentiment that fueled Antebellum reformers.

Steven Mintz, *Moralists and Modernizers: America's Pre-Civil War Reformers*

(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 16-20.

¹⁰² "Speech by SBA to the Daughters of Temperance, 2, March, 1849," in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 137.

¹⁰³ "Speech by SBA to the Daughters of Temperance, 2, March, 1849," *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 139.

¹⁰⁴ Harper, *The Life*, 99.

¹⁰⁵ Harper, *The Life*, 177.

Matthew 10:34, "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword."

Matthew 23:14, "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye devour widows' houses, and for a pretence [*sic*] make long prayer: therefore ye shall receive the greater damnation."

Jeremiah 6:14 "They have healed the brokenness of My people superficially, Saying, 'Peace, peace,' But there is no peace."

¹⁰⁶ Albrecht Classen and Marilyn Sandidge, "Friendship in the Middle Ages and Early Modern Age: Explorations of a Fundamental Ethical Discourse," eds. Albrecht Classen, and Marilyn Sandidge (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 110.

¹⁰⁷ Rothermel, "Prophets," 84.

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- ¹⁰⁸ Richard Bauman, "Aspects of 17th Century Quaker Rhetoric," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 56, no. 1 (February 1970): 74.
- ¹⁰⁹ Lisa M. Gring-Pemble, "Writing Themselves into Consciousness: Creating a Rhetorical Bridge Between the Public and Private Spheres," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 84, no. 1 (1998): 42.; Lucy Hogan and Martha Solomon, "Extending the Conversation: Sharing the Inner Light," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (1995): 33.
- ¹¹⁰ "SBA to Stephen S. Foster and Abigail Kelley Foster, Rochester, Apr. 20/57," in *The Selected Paper: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 339.
- ¹¹¹ Ann D. Gordon, *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 341, endnote 6.
- ¹¹² "SBA to Stephen S. Foster and Abigail Kelley Foster, Rochester, Apr. 20/57," in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 340.
- ¹¹³ "1853 Dec 1 [1854 Jan 16?] ECS to SBA, Seneca Falls, NY" Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0944.
- ¹¹⁴ "1854 Mar 2, SBA Albany, NY, Hearing before the New York Assembly, Select Committee," Microfilm, reel 7, slide 1013.
- ¹¹⁵ Microfilm, reel 7, slide 1014.
- ¹¹⁶ Microfilm, reel 8, slides 0001-0059.
- ¹¹⁷ Angela Ray, "Learning Leadership: Lincoln at the Lyceum 1838," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 13, no. 3 (2010): 349–388.
- ¹¹⁸ Stanton, *Eighty Years*, Chapter V.

The 1840 World's Anti-Slavery Convention serves as a prime example, since Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott credited the exclusion of the female delegates

from the Burned-over District as an inciting cause in their eventual formation of the first Woman's Rights convention in 1848. In *Eighty Years and More*, Stanton share her memory of the 1840 convention in London in the following way. "As the convention adjourned, the remark was heard on all sides, "It is about time some demand was made for new liberties for women." As Mrs. Mott and I walked home, arm in arm, commenting on the incidents of the day, we resolved to hold a convention as soon as we returned home, and form a society to advocate the rights of women."

¹¹⁹ Lindal Buchannan, "Regendering Delivery: The Fifth Cannon and the Maternal Rhetor," *RSQ: Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (Fall 2002): 52. Emphasis added.

¹²⁰ Gilbert Austin, *Chironomia, or a Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery*, Facsimile edition, eds. M. Robb and L. Thonssen (Carbondale, IL.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1966).; John Walker, *Elements of Elocution (1781)*, Facsimile edition (Menston: Scholars' Press, 1969).; John Walker, *Melody of Speaking (1787)*, Facsimile edition (Menston, England: Scholars' Press, 1970).

¹²¹ Buchannan, "Regendering Delivery," 53-55.

¹²² Johnson, *A Shopkeeper's Millennium*, 20.

¹²³ Mary P. Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class: The Family in Oneida County, New York 1780-1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 59.

¹²⁴ Curtis Johnson, *Islands of Holiness: Rural Religion in Upstate New York 1790-1860* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), 29.

¹²⁵ Altschuler and Saltzgeber, *Revivalism, Social Conscience, and Community*,

Introduction.

Altschuler and Saltzgeber's work on the Rhoda Bement trial goes into great detail on the implications of moral and religious character for a speaker to be given a hearing within Burned-over District communities.

¹²⁶ "Feb 28, 1851, Rochester Herald, Rochester Daughters of Temperance," Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0050.

¹²⁷ Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0437-39.

This article contains several instances of the writer for *The Lilly* calling out a speaker by name for being too quiet or overly long-winded or unclear in a speech.

¹²⁸ "The Lilly (Seneca Falls, NY), 1852," Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0195,

¹²⁹ Harper, *The Life*, 153-54.

¹³⁰ Bingham Daily Republican, August 6, 1857, Microfilm, 8:977-980.

¹³¹ Harper, *the Life*, 166.

¹³² "New York Daily Tribune, Feb 8th, 1853" Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0529.

An article in the New York Daily Tribune, a pro temperance paper that often condemned women's public speaking, noted that "The speaking of the ladies, although not loud, was distinct in enunciation, and owing to the good order observed, they were easily heard throughout the Hall."

"New York Daily Times, February 8, 1853," Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0530.

An article in the New York Daily Times from February 8th, 1853 titled "Temperance and Woman's Rights" a reporter recorded that the speakers "were received with loud demonstrations of applause – a tribute of gallantry on the part of a New York

audience which is not to be taken for any endorsement of their sentiments.” The paper recorded that Anthony wore a bloomer costume of black silk. The article also noted what kind of performance its writer preferred, stating that “Mrs. N. L. Fowler” who was voted as the president “came forward with a pleasing, girlish manner, became flushed, and was evidently not so well trained to self command as her more ‘strong minded’ companion. She, however, acquitted herself very credibly in repeating a pretty little set speech which, were it not for the lady’s declaration of being ‘entirely unprepared to take part in the proceedings’, we would have supposed was committed to memory for the occasion.” The paper offered no direct praise or indictment of Anthony’s speaking so we can assume that she was one of the more “strong minded” colleagues.

¹³³ “Northern Journal (Lowville, NY) n.d.,” Microfilm, reel 8, slide 0154.

Gordon’s editorial note dates this text to March 7th, 1855 during Anthony’s tour around New York as a speaker and organizer to set up local Woman’s Rights conventions. The article notes that Anthony was speaking at the Court House in Martinsburg and this event corresponds with the editorial date.

¹³⁴ Harper, *The Life*, 50.

¹³⁵ “SBA to ECS, with Enclosure,” June 5th, 1856. in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 322-325.

¹³⁶ Harper, *The Life*, 80.

Anthony’s chutzpah in this situation is emphasized by the reaction by the equality-minded attendees at the meeting. “Then there was a protest. Mrs. Davis said she wished it understood that ‘ladies did not come there to screech; they came to

behave like ladies and to speak like ladies.’ Miss Anthony held her ground, declaring that the question of being ladylike had nothing to do with it; the business of any one who read a paper was to be heard. Mr. May, always the peacemaker, said Miss Anthony was right; there was not a woman that had spoken in the convention who if she had been in her own home would not have adjusted her voice to the occasion. If your boy were across the street you would not go to the door, put your head down and say in a little, weak voice, ‘Jim, come home;’ but you would fix your eye on him and shout, ‘Jim, come home!’ If the ladies, instead of looking down and talking to those on the front seats, would address their remarks to the farthest persons in the house, all between would hear.”

¹³⁷ “Lucy Stone to SBA, Viroqua – Bad Ax Co. Wis. July 22, 1856,” in the *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 327-330. 328.

¹³⁸ Elizabeth Cady Stanton, “Susan B. Anthony,” *Eminent Women of the Age: Being Narratives of the Lives and Deeds of the Most Prominent Women of the Present Generation*, James Parton, ed. (Hartford, CT.: S.M. Betts, 1868).

¹³⁹ Nan Johnson, *Gender and Rhetorical Space in American Life, 1866-1910*, *Studies in Rhetorics and Feminisms* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2002), 138.

¹⁴⁰ The popularity of phrenology during the 1850s made asserting a connection between unattractiveness and character a perfectly normal conclusion for nineteenth century auditors to draw.

For more see: Cara Finnegan, "Recognizing Lincoln: Image Vernaculars in Nineteenth-Century Visual Culture," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 8, no. 1 (2005): 31-57.; Lucy Hartley, *Physiognomy and the Meaning of Expression in Nineteenth-Century Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2005).; Stephen Tomlinson, *Head Masters: Phrenology, Secular Education, and Nineteenth-Century Social Thought* (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2005).

¹⁴¹ "Utica Evening Telegraph, April 28th, 1853," Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0684.

All italicized words indicate emphasis in the original document.

¹⁴² "Unidentified clipping, n.d. from SBA Scrapbook. Buffalo, NY, March 28, 1853," Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0586.

¹⁴³ "Miss Anthony's Address to the State Temperance Convention," *The Lilly* (Seneca Falls, NY), July 1852, Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0270.

¹⁴⁴ Browne is specifically referring to Angeline Grimké's rhetoric in this passage. I find significant evidence in Banard, Bormann, Chesebrough, DeSantis, and my own reading of Anthony's and other women's speeches to extend this claim to Burned-over District rhetoric. For more detail please see the "Burned-over District Rhetoric: A Generic Overview" section of this chapter.

Browne, *Angelina Grimké*, 12.

¹⁴⁵ Jenny Lind was a Swedish opera singer who was popular in Europe in the 1840s. In 1850, circus founder P. T. Barnum invited Lind to tour the United States. Lind was immensely popular and drew crowds so large that Barnum sometimes sold tickets by auction to gain the greatest profit. The tour brought in more than \$850,000, much of which was donated to charities Lind selected. US papers used

the term “Lind mania” to describe the public’s obsession with the tour. For more information, see:

Bernardine Kielty, *Jenny Lind Sang Here* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1959).;

Sherry Lee Linkon, “Reading Lind Mania: Print Culture and the Construction of Nineteenth-Century Audiences,” *Book History* 1 (1998): 94-106.; Francis Rogers, “Jenny Lind,” *The Musical Quarterly* 32, no. 3 (1946): 437-48.; Gladys Denny Shultz, *Jenny Lind: The Swedish Nightingale* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1962).; Steve Waksman, “Selling the Nightingale: P.T. Barnum, Jenny Lind, and the Management of the American Crowd,” *Arts Marketing: An International Journal* 1 no. 2 (2011): 108-120.; Nathaniel Parker Willis, *Memoranda of the Life of Jenny Lind* (Philadelphia: Robert E. Peter, 1851).

¹⁴⁶ “Proceedings of the New York State Teacher’s Convention, Oswego, NY, August 3, 1854,” Microfilm, reel 7, slide 1063.

¹⁴⁷ “Miss Anthony’s Speech,” *Oswego Times and Journal*, August 3, 1854, Microfilm, reel 7, slide 1074.

¹⁴⁸ “Go It Sally!” *Bath Experiment*, January 5, 1855,” Microfilm, reel 8, slide 0118.

¹⁴⁹ Bormann, *The Force of Fantasy*, 169.

¹⁵⁰ Harper, *The Life*, 153.

¹⁵¹ Harper, *The Life*, 153.

¹⁵² Harper, *The Life*, 153-54.

¹⁵³ *New York Times*, August 8, 1857, in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 351, note 1.

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- ¹⁵⁴ *Utica Morning Herald and Daily Gazette*, January 17, 1860, Microfilm, reel 9, slide 0517.
- ¹⁵⁵ “Unidentified clipping, n.d. from SBA Scrapbook, January 26th, 1855,” Microfilm, reel8, slide 0128.
- ¹⁵⁶ *New York Teacher*, 7, “Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting, First Day (Tuesday), September 1858,” Microfilm, reel 9, slide 0037.
- ¹⁵⁷ *New York Teacher*, 7, “Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting, Third Day (Thursday) September 1858,” Microfilm, reel 9, slide 0042.
- ¹⁵⁸ *New York Teacher*, 7, “Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting, September 1858,” Microfilm, reel 9, slide 0035.
- ¹⁵⁹ “New York State Teachers Association, 13th Annual Convention,” *Lockport Daily Advertiser and Democrat*, August 6, 1859, Microfilm reel, 9, slide 0049.
- ¹⁶⁰ New York State Teachers Association, 13th Annual Convention,” *Lockport Daily Advertiser and Democrat*, August 6, 1859, Microfilm reel, 9, slide 0049.
- ¹⁶¹ “SBA to Lucy Stone, Rochester Aug 2, 1857,” in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 346-351, 347.
- ¹⁶² “SBA to Lucy Stone, Rochester Aug 2, 1857,” in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 350. Note 6.
- ¹⁶³ “SBA to Lucy Stone, Rochester Aug 2, 1857,” in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 348.
- ¹⁶⁴ This concept is covered in greater depth in the “*Life in the Burned-Over District*” section of this chapter, beginning on **page 2**.
- ¹⁶⁵ Discussing this seeming oddity, Harper writes,

“She [Susan Anthony] sympathized fully with the demand for equal rights for women, but was not yet quite convinced that these included the suffrage. This, no doubt, was largely because Quaker men did not vote, thinking it wrong to support a government which believed in war. Even so progressive and public-spirited a man as Daniel Anthony, much as he was interested in all national affairs, never voted until 1860, when he became convinced it was only by force of arms that the question of slavery could be settled.

Harper, *The Life*, 61. See also: James M. DeGarmo, *The Hicksite Quakers and Their Doctrines* (New York: Christian Literature Co., 1897).; Thomas D. Hamm, “Hicksite Quakers and the Antebellum Nonresistance Movement,” *Church History* 63 no. 4 (1994.): 557-569.

¹⁶⁶ Robert H. Krapohl, and Charles H. Lippy, *The Evangelicals: A Historical, Thematic, and Biographical Guide* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1999), 20-21.

¹⁶⁷ Robert T. Handy, “The Protestant Quest for a Christian America 1830-1930,” *Church History* 22, no. 1 (1953): 8-20.

¹⁶⁸ Schudson discussed the centrality of speaking and its relation to education and social class especially clearly, as have Angela Ray’s articles “The Permeable Public” and “The Rhetorical Rituals of Citizenship.” Belinda Stillion Southard’s “A Rhetoric of Inclusion and the Expansion of Movement Constituencies” also presented a clear discussion of the boundaries of class-based inclusion and exclusion in public movement rhetorics focused on citizenship rights.

Angela G. Ray, “The Permeable Public: Rituals of Citizenship in Antebellum Men’s Debating Clubs,” *Argumentation & Advocacy* 41, no. 1 (2004): 1-16.; Angela G.

Ray, "The Rhetorical Ritual of Citizenship: Women's Voting as Public Performance, 1868-1875," *Quarterly Journal Of Speech* 93, no. 1 (February 2007): 1-26.; Michael Schudson, *The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life* (New York: Martin Kessler Books, 1998).; Belinda A. Stillion Southard, "A Rhetoric of Inclusion and the Expansion of Movement Constituencies: Harriot Stanton Blatch and the Classed Politics of Woman Suffrage," *RSQ: Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (March 2014): 129-147.

¹⁶⁹ Mark Longaker, *Rhetoric and the Republic: Politics, Civic Discourse, and Education in Early America* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2007), 1.

¹⁷⁰ P. Joy Rouse, "Margaret Fuller: A Rhetoric of Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century America," in *Oratorical Culture in Nineteenth-Century America: Transformations in the Theory and Practice of Rhetoric*, Gregory Clark, and S. Michael Halloran eds. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993), 110-136. 112.

¹⁷¹ "Appeal by SBA, Albany, Feb, 22d, 1859," in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 385-87, 385. All italics in original.

¹⁷² "Appeal by SBA, Albany, Feb, 22d, 1859," in in *The Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 385-87, 386. All italics in original.

¹⁷³ *National Anti-Slavery Standard*, April 14, 1860, Microfilm, reel 9, slide 0557.

¹⁷⁴ The Bible, King James Version. Matthew 19:16-22, Mark 10:17-30, Luke 10:25-28, Luke 18:18-30

¹⁷⁵ *The Lilly* (Seneca Falls, NY) July 1852, "Miss Anthony Address to the State Temperance Convention," Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0290.

¹⁷⁶ *Utica Evening Telegraph*, April 28, 1853, Microfilm, reel 7, slide 0684.

¹⁷⁷ None of the newspaper clippings contained in the collected papers microfilm edition between Anthony's birth and 1864 make mention of her race.

¹⁷⁸ Harper, *The Life*, 39.

This quotation, from one of Anthony's letters to her father in 1839, is addressed in greater detail on pg. 16 of this chapter.

¹⁷⁹ Kerber's discussion of vagrancy laws as they pertained to women makes this point clear. Beginning in sixteenth century England, throughout the early British colonies and until the late nineteenth century in the United States, vagrancy laws were especially harsh to women because they were still considered *femme covert*, and under the assumed protections of a husband. A woman, no matter her circumstances, could not claim dependency of charity. The class assumptions that a man would provide for a family, and that a woman was not responsible for her own life, were legally binding until the vast expansions of the Married Woman's Property Acts in the late nineteenth century.

Linda K. Kerber, *No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 54-61.

¹⁸⁰ *Lockport Daily Courier*, August 4, 1858, Microfilm, reel 9, slide 0044-45.

¹⁸¹ Kenneth Cmiel offers an excellent discussion of how the middling style came to denote the ideal republican citizen in the American republic during the nineteenth century.

Kenneth Cmiel, *Democratic Eloquence: The Fight Over Popular Speech in Nineteenth-Century America* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1990).

¹⁸² *The Liberator*, October 8, 1858, Microfilm, reel 9, slide 0115.

¹⁸³ Stillion Southard, *Militant Citizenship*, 13-14

¹⁸⁴ *Northern Journal* (Lowville, NY) n.d., Microfilm, reel 8, slide 0154.

Gordon's editorial note dates this text to March 7th, 1855 during Anthony's tour around New York as a speaker and organizer to set up local Woman's Rights conventions. The article notes that Anthony was speaking at the Court House in Martinsburg and this event corresponds with the editorial date.

¹⁸⁵ *Elizabethtown Post*, February 23, 1858, Microfilm, reel 8, slide 0150.

¹⁸⁶ "Call for a Meeting of the Loyal Women of the Nation," April 13, 1863, Microfilm, reel 10, slide 0419.

¹⁸⁷ "Call for a Meeting of the Loyal Women of the Nation," April 13, 1863, Microfilm, reel 10, slide 0419.

¹⁸⁸ "Call for a Meeting of the Loyal Women of the Nation," April 13, 1863, Microfilm, reel 10, slide 0419.

¹⁸⁹ *New York Times*, May 15, 1963, Microfilm, reel 10, slide 0478-79.

Chapter 3

Susan B. Anthony's Reconstruction Extemporaneous Speaking as a Constitutive Performance of National Citizens and a Catalyst for Gendered Exclusion

Historical studies of Susan B. Anthony during Reconstruction consistently refer to her as “Stanton and Anthony.” In *Century of Struggle*, Eleanor Flexner combines Stanton and Anthony in her discussion of their tour with George Francis Train, the fracturing of the American Equal Rights Association, and the rhetorical strategies used by the National Woman Suffrage Association.¹ Fey Dudden’s work on woman suffrage during Reconstruction is vital to my arguments in this chapter, but it nonetheless elides the significant rhetorical differences between Anthony’s extemporaneous discourse and Stanton’s speaking during this era.² Lori Ginzburg’s biography of Stanton treats the two women as a single racist entity in their interactions with Train, while managing to focus on Stanton as a unique entity for the rest of the book.³ Likewise, in a chapter on the fight for women’s voting rights during Reconstruction, Laura Free elides differences between Stanton and Anthony to portray them as equal purveyors of a univocal racist rhetoric.⁴ In a more nuanced but still potentially occluding argument, Anna Gordon has asserted that scholars cannot understand Stanton or Anthony’s work for women’s rights, except in the context of their life-long friendship.⁵

This elision of identity causes two major problems for rhetorical scholarship on Anthony’s life. First, guilt-by-association often allows authors to frame Anthony as a racist, or racially-insensitive elitist, who sought women’s enfranchisement at the expense of black men and women. Although Anthony participated in a campaign where Stanton and George Francis Train made explicit racist arguments for woman suffrage, and no

records show that Anthony contradicted or critiqued this racism, I have not found records of Anthony making arguments based on race. Second, Anthony's individual rhetorical work during Reconstruction has often been reduced to her 1872 arrest for voting and her protest at the 1876 Centennial Celebration. Although these stages and manuscripted events were important to Anthony's popularity and renown during the Gilded Age and after her death, her rhetoric during Reconstruction was consistently extemporaneous. To remedy this elision, this chapter examines Anthony's extemporaneous speaking during Reconstruction.

Using the term "Reconstruction" to label this chapter is fraught with potential problems, but is also a functional term for identifying both the time period and the rhetoric/political/social milieu into which Anthony spoke. The era of Reconstruction in the United States is generally dated from the end of the Civil War in 1865 through the "compromise of 77" that awarded Rutherford B. Hayes the contested 1876 presidential election on the condition that northern troops would no longer prevent violence against blacks who attempted to vote in the South.⁶ This date, however, only correlates with federal military policy in some southern states. My work in this chapter requires dating that better reflects the social, political, policy, and cultural changes of the period.⁷ For the purposes of this chapter, Anthony's rhetorical practices give an obvious, although still permeable, boundary to the span of Reconstruction. Anthony made an observable shift toward work for policy changes that would implement universal suffrage in her rhetorical practices as news of Lincoln's death spread across the country in 1865. Anthony would continue this focus on universal suffrage until 1874. Although some of Anthony's rhetorical work for universal suffrage would stretch into 1876 with her protest of the

American Centennial, her extemporaneous speaking after the explosion of the Beecher-Tilton affair in 1874 would largely be focused on creating cultural and social change to support the passage of a specific woman suffrage amendment. In this chapter, I address Anthony's rhetorical work between 1865 and 1874. This dating of the "Reconstruction Era" is based on how Anthony's rhetorical practice reflected and intersected with the social upheaval and political machinations over policy change that encompassed the nation during this time.

Anthony's extemporaneous speaking after the Civil War reflected the explosive, unstable, and historically promising "moment of political opportunity" for policy change known as Reconstruction. Like Reconstruction, Anthony's cause would fail in the face of the entrenched racism and sexism of American culture and the overwhelming political and monetary power available to those seeking power regardless of the oppression it caused. Anthony's story between the end of the Civil War and the beginning of the Gilded Era is one of trying to navigate the violent political storms and malignant interpersonal feuds of the Reconstruction era and facing instrumental failure at every turn. Yet, Anthony's story during Reconstruction is also a story of remarkable long-term success in what Campbell has termed the "rhetorical movement" for women's equality.⁸ Before the Civil War, the movement for women's equality was largely limited to a few radical organizations centered in Boston, Philadelphia, and the Burned-over District. By the end of Reconstruction, the movement encompassed two nationwide organizations, had garnered support in state and national legislatures, was supported by a women's newspaper, and had coalesced around the tangible goal of assuring access to voting rights for female citizens.

In this chapter, I argue that Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship that both constituted women as equal citizens and provided the impetus for national-level politicians and state legislatures to codify the cultural assumptions of male-gendered citizenship into policy language that excluded women from democratic citizenship rights. Specifically, I argue that Anthony embraced an imitative and social invention that allowed her to mimic the political, natural rights philosophy, and legal arguments for rights that permeated public discourse throughout Reconstruction. Since Anthony spoke extemporaneously, her imitative and social invention was more public than that of manuscript oratory and helped demonstrate her competence in the argument themes she imitated. She coupled this inventional approach with competence in the "male arts" of extemporaneous delivery, which audiences nationwide perceived as an authentic performance of the equality she sought. This competence and perceived authenticity in her delivery allowed her extemporaneous speaking to function as both the personification of women's inequality and as synecdoche for all women who were denied their rights. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking, therefore, functioned as a demonstrably equal performance of citizenship that was unbounded by any national legal proscription. The federal government, federal laws, and state legislatures responded to Anthony's demonstration of equality and authenticity by codifying explicitly gendered laws precluding women from equal rights as citizens. Although Anthony was by no means the only woman demonstrating her fitness for citizenship, the competence and perceived authenticity of her extemporaneous speaking was one catalyzing element in the laws and policy language excluding women from voting rights.

Women's Rights During Reconstruction: A Fighting Chance

As Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil War ended, Anthony began to focus on gaining governmental protections for women's legal rights. Although the abolitionists had celebrated the 1863 Emancipation Proclamation, they were under no delusion that the slaves in Confederate states would be freed if that side won the war. The congressional passage of the Thirteenth Amendment on January 31, 1865 buoyed the reformers' hopes and spurred them toward the political work it would take to ratify the amendment and make slavery illegal in the reunified nation. While visiting her brother in Leavenworth, Kansas, Anthony wrote to Stanton demonstrating her growing understanding of national policy discussions.⁹ She offered brief comments on General William Tecumseh Sherman's plan to distribute forty-acre parcels of land to freed former slaves in Georgia, and General Nathaniel Banks's competing plan for former slaves to return to plantations or public works jobs in New Orleans. She also lamented the failure of a bill in the Kansas senate that would have opened voting rights beyond white men. As Abraham Lincoln and then Andrew Johnson wrangled with state legislatures to create a passage-way for the final abolition of slavery, Anthony and the reformers traveled across the country supporting the amendment.

The Moment of Opportunity

Anthony suggested that Lincoln's death offered a seemingly God-ordained opportunity for the reformers to create new national protections for human and legal rights. In a letter to Stanton three days after she learned of Lincoln's death, Anthony noted "the terrible blow came—the office was vacant—Johnson takes it—and the people already feel he is the chosen of God to end the war."¹⁰ Anthony was expectant, in fact,

that Lincoln's death would be a positive change for the radical reformers because he had proposed a comparatively conservative plan for readmitting the seceded states into the Union, and she hoped Johnson would provide more support for the radical cause of human rights.¹¹ Anthony's seemingly out-of-place hope at Lincoln's death was not merely confined to her letters to Stanton. In remarks at a memorial service for the murdered president, Anthony defied convention by criticizing Lincoln saying, "my soul was sad and sick at what seemed his settled purpose—to consign the ex-slaves back to the tender mercies of the disappointed, desperate, sullen, revengeful ex-lords of the lash." Anthony believed, and stated both in public and private, that Lincoln's death provided a moment of opportunity for the radical expansion of human right that she sought. Dudden noted that Anthony's political work—that is, her work to implement policy changes that would enfranchise women nationally—did not seem as doomed at the time as it does to historians' eyes.¹² The confluence of events, Dudden argued, around the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, the end of the war, the president's death, and the ratification of the amendment by the states provided Anthony a "fighting chance" to "reach out and snatch the brass ring of history" and finally see national protections for the human rights of both black people and women.¹³

Anthony's public speaking between 1865 and the infamous schism among reformers over the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869 should all be understood as seeking policy changes on the national and state levels to gain universal suffrage. As early as August of 1865, Anthony wrote in her diary that a friend, the lawyer Sydney Clark, had asked her to keep women's right out of the discussion of Reconstruction but Anthony said "I showed I had done so only by [way] of illustrating the point that no class can be

trusted to legislate for another.”¹⁴ In December of the same year, still six months before the carefully negotiated compromise that would eventually become the Fourteenth Amendment was voted on in Congress, Anthony, in a letter to Caroline Healey Dall, wrote about a petition she was circulating. “The petition assumes that Congress will move to amend the Constitution to prohibit negro disenfranchisement—and then to admit women is to give Universal Suffrage—to me the broad ground of republicanism is the one true place for all advanced minds to occupy.”¹⁵ Dudden has argued that the end of the Civil War precipitated what Stanton and Anthony perceived as “a social and political landscape in which black and women’s rights would be more and more intermingled, to the benefit of both.”¹⁶ Stanton had been calling for an expanded idea of women’s full civil, political, and human rights from the later years of the 1850s. Anthony, however, only embraced the idea of universal suffrage and human rights after the war as she spoke, wrote, and organized to spur the nation toward the utopian representative republic she envisioned as the goal of Reconstruction.

The possibility of national protection for civil and citizenship rights was in conflict throughout Reconstruction with a pervasive fear that greater federal governance would lead to tyranny. While Republicans in Congress sought to protect the free market opportunities and voting rights of former slaves, both southern whites and northern Democrats feared the expansion of the federal government would mean greater oppression for all citizens, or at least all white citizens.¹⁷ The debates over dual versus cooperative federalism are not the project of this dissertation as significant research has already been published on the topic.¹⁸ Debates about federalism, however, did impact how Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship.

The Fourteenth Amendment created national citizens whose rights the individual states could not abridge, but public sentiment, especially in the South, still strongly resisted the constitutionality of this action; even the Republican Senate and House were hesitant to exercise the newly created national rights without evidence of a direct violation on the parts of the states.¹⁹ The resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment was even greater, with some Democrats calling it “the most revolutionary measure ever to receive Congressional sanction.”²⁰ Foner has noted that “as late as 1868, only eight northern states allowed blacks to vote, and Republicans had shied away from the issue at their national convention.”²¹ These sweeping federal changes to national citizenship fostered intense anxiety over the potential for a tyranny of federal governance and oppression.²²

The summer of 1865 is one of the most contested, debated, analyzed, maligned, and mourned periods in histories of women’s and African-Americans’ rights. The *History of Woman Suffrage* whitewashed the fraught moments with the phrase:

“Liberty victorious over slavery on the battle-field had now more powerful enemies to encounter at Washington.”²³ Harper’s *Biography* made no mention of the contentious months, while Stanton’s *Eighty Years and More* only repeated paragraphs from the *History*.²⁴ Later historians offered more detailed explorations of these months. Flexner claimed that the summer saw personal strife, previously kept at bay by the war, come to fruition.²⁵ Hull linked the push for black male suffrage at the expense of women to the turmoil of William Lloyd Garrison’s failed petition to dissolve the American Anti-Slavery Society and Wendell Phillips’s election to the presidency of the organization. Hull specifically argued that Phillips’s push for black male suffrage at the expense of women ignited a racist response from Stanton. Lisa Tetrault argued that the battle began

in earnest when Radical Republican politicians, especially Charles Sumner, began treating suffrage as the great and only sufficient guarantee of freedom for the freedmen.²⁶ Dudden claimed that the strife began when Phillips, the trustee of an endowment meant to fund radical work for equal rights, cut off Stanton and Anthony's financial backing when they refused to give up their women's rights work to support black male suffrage.²⁷ Whatever the reason, by the end of the summer, the lines of a new political battle had been drawn.

The wording of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment for the first time placed the adjective "male" as a modifier to those protected as voting citizens of the United States and spurred Anthony's focus on women's legal rights. Harper recorded that, while Anthony was visiting her brother in Kansas, she learned about the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A few days afterwards Miss Anthony was seated in her brother's office reading the papers when she learned to her amazement that several resolutions had been offered in the House of Representatives sanctioning disfranchisement on account of sex. Up to this time the Constitution of the United States never had been desecrated by the word "male," and she saw instantly that such action would create a more formidable barrier than any now existing against the enfranchisement of women.²⁸

The lines of dissention between those who supported only black male suffrage and those argued for universal suffrage were obvious in letters, opinion articles, and discussions in reform meetings. Anthony, however, sought to overcome these dividing lines and led a charge in 1866 to unite the Radical Republican politicians, the former abolitionists, the

women's rights activists, and any other factions who offered her aid behind the cause of equal access to voting for all people. Dudden summarizes the fights, saying:

Wendell Phillips' patrician self-confidence was such that he felt justified in telling activist women what to do, and when Stanton and Anthony refused to defer, he used the underhanded methods and denied them funds to which they were entitled. By the middle of 1866, Stanton and Anthony had been forced to create a new organization devoted to the simultaneous agitation of black and women's rights, the American Equal Rights Association (AERA).²⁹

In spite of Anthony's efforts, complications of the previous summer continued as Stanton and Phillips fought covertly about money and organizational control. These fights would eventually cause the dissolution of the AERA.

Anthony's goal of a united movement for universal suffrage was doomed to failure because, although voting rights were being extended during Reconstruction, there was still little political will or public support for universal suffrage as an independent goal. Heather Cox Richardson recounts that, under Andrew Johnson's devotion to limited federal government, there was little political will to guarantee any rights to former slaves.³⁰ Southern white intransigence about allowing blacks into the free labor market, however, spurred the Republican Congress to craft what Richardson called "a vague and complicated amendment" to the constitution that would protect the minimum rights that white northerners though were necessary to maintain a free-labor society and, more importantly, Republican control of the state and federal governments.³¹ The protection for voting rights in the Fourteenth Amendment was only created because the three-fifth compromise had been struck from the constitution with the ratification of the Thirteenth

Amendment, and southern whites were planning to use their greater population numbers to regain power under a limited suffrage system.³² Although a few activist politicians like Charles Sumner nominally supported universal suffrage as a principle, a belief in perfect human equality or equal political rights was still restricted to the radical reformers. Put another way, although many progressive steps toward greater political and social equality came about during Reconstruction, it was not because there was national, social, or political support for the causes, but because various parties sought to maintain or regain their power by exploiting the desires of the oppressed populations. In fact, the political will to achieve universal suffrage and full equality in human rights was not even shared by all the radical reformers. It was during the final meeting of the American Anti-Slavery Society that Wendell Phillips first offered his argument that Reconstruction should be “the negro’s hour,” but his trite sentiments still reflected greater commitment to universal suffrage and equal rights than was held by elected politicians.

In the face of a potential Constitutional exclusion from voting rights for all women, Anthony worked with Stanton to harness their previous techniques of petitioning, canvassing, and lecturing to create a state-by-state path to universal suffrage, beginning in the bellwether state of Kansas. Anthony had spent almost a year in Kansas with her brother and his family during the war. He was a local legend,³³ and, along with other Radical Republicans in the state government, worked to bring petitions to the legislature to remove the adjectives “white” and “male” from section 1, article 5 of the state’s Constitution defining voting and citizenship rights. As had happened in Congress around the creation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Republican politicians in New York had abandoned the ideals of universal suffrage in favor of cementing their party hold on

power. Samuel Newitt Wood, an ousted Radical Republican from New York, moved to Kansas and proposed the bills removing the words “male” and “white” from the constitution. Due to Phillips’s financial withholding, Stanton and Anthony needed money to participate in the Kansas work. With no help from the increasingly conservative Republican party or their incrementalism reform colleagues, Anthony and Stanton made the mistake of aligning themselves with the racist Democrat George Francis Train. Train supported suffrage for white women for explicitly racist reasons that he shared loudly in lectures and in any opinion article he wrote. These racist beliefs, combined with the crushing defeat of the equal rights ballot measures in Kansas, led Stanton toward increasingly racist arguments. Anthony still refrained from explicitly racist appeals though she stopped short of critiquing the racism that Train and Stanton spewed.

Racism, Sexism, and Organizational Infighting

Stanton’s racist rhetoric helped create a schism among the reformers. After the failed Kansas campaign, Train offered to finance a women’s rights newspaper as part of his financial appeal to Stanton and Anthony. *The Revolution*, which Anthony edited, freely published Train’s racist tirades.³⁴ As an editor, Stanton also wrote several articles using the same racist tone, famously lamenting, “Think of Patrick and Sambo and Hans and Yung Tung who do not know the difference between a Monarchy and a Republic, who never read the Declaration of Independence... making laws for Lydia Maria Child, Lucretia Mott, or Fanny Kemble.”³⁵ This racism both responded to and exasperated the sexism of national politics. The Fourteenth Amendment had passed and had been ratified by the states, officially adding the word “male” to the constitution, in the summer of 1868. In February of 1869, a Fifteenth Amendment to the constitution was passed by

Congress, again offering no protection for discrimination based on sex. Women would not be enfranchised by either Constitutional Amendment.

With Stanton and Anthony's *Revolution* frequently spouting explicit racism and Phillips preaching that Reconstruction was "the negro's hour," the battle lines were clearly drawn around the one-time ideal of equal rights. Frederick Douglass referenced Stanton's racist remarks in her *Revolution* articles at what would become the final meeting of the AERA, as incrementalist white men, black men, and a faction of relatively conservative women from Boston headed by Lucy Stone, rejected Stanton's, and by association Anthony's, racism and fully supported the Fifteenth Amendment. In a hotly debated move after the final AERA meeting, Stanton and Anthony broke ranks with their former colleagues to found the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA). Lucy Stone and Wendell Phillips founded their American Women's Suffrage Association (AWSA) shortly thereafter. After a brief attempt by William Lloyd Garrison at uniting the two organizations, the women would remain personally antagonistic and organizationally uncooperative for more than 25 years.

Anthony and Stanton's NWSA embraced a national approach to voting rights, arguing for the passage of a sixteenth amendment enfranchising women as the primary goal of the organization. The NWSA, unfortunately, was in dire financial straits. Train's promised funding had not materialized and Phillips had dedicated all the funds of the women's rights endowment to the AWSA. *The Revolution* soon failed as its popular circulation dropped in comparison to the more moderate AWSA *Women's Journal*. Without funding, Anthony assumed thousands of dollars in debts from the failed newspaper, and Anthony and Stanton both undertook lecture tours and petition

campaigns trying to raise money, and, in Anthony's case, earn a living.³⁶ The NWSA's brief alignment with free-love advocate Victoria Woodhull cost the organization popular support as the cultural fears of women leaving the home and disrupting traditional notions of marriage were manifested in Woodhull's paper and her 1872 run for president.

Amidst this conflict, the NWSA refocused on the idea of a potential judicial route to nationwide suffrage for women. Although it is not the project of this dissertation to repeat Ray and Richards' excellent work³⁷ on the rhetoric of the "new departure strategy,"³⁸ a brief overview of its impact on women's rights organizing after the NWSA/AWSA split is valuable for understanding Anthony's extemporaneous speaking as a performance of citizenship. After the racially charged fights of the late 1860's, the new departure strategy of inventing "the gender-neutral, race-neutral citizen" provided an avenue for the suffrage advocate to refocus their message.³⁹ Anthony replaced the vitriolic racism that had disgraced the pages of *The Revolution* with calls for women to assert their constitutional right to voting under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The racism of the late 1860s was also obscured for a time by Victoria Woodhull's 1871 memorial to Congress arguing that women already possessed the right to vote and asking Congress to make laws that would enforce that right as the Fifteenth Amendment had done for male former slaves.⁴⁰ Anthony readily embraced Woodhull, in spite of warnings about the political ambitions Woodhull harbored, and "saw to it that Woodhull was seated on the platform between Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, giving her full legitimization" and allowed her to give the keynote address of the 1871 NWSA meeting.⁴¹ The meeting "was a smashing success and became known as the "Woodhull Convention." But the NWSA refocusing on strategies for gaining

women's voting rights would soon falter under continued interpersonal fighting and organizational power struggles.

Even this refocusing on suffrage, however, could not extricate Anthony from the violent political storms and malignant interpersonal feuds of the Reconstruction Era. Stanton, during the 1871 NWSA convention, gave “an educational speech on election politics and government... a populist appeal for the direct election of senators and the president, term limitation, and a candid speech on the corruption of the Grant administration.”⁴² The obvious but unspoken appeal of Stanton's speech was for a third party presidential bid, spearheaded by women and supporting Victoria Woodhull. Stanton also offered resolutions calling for the liberalizing of divorce laws, a still-radical proposition for most suffrage advocates. During her keynote at the 1871 NWSA convention, Woodhull declared her campaign for the presidency and linked the suffrage cause with her bid for power. This convention's radical ambitions would be exacerbated by Woodhull's reputation; unsubstantiated rumors circulated widely that Woodhull lived in a single home with her husband, ex-husband, her lover, and their various children.⁴³ Woodhull also caused additional tension within the NWSA when she published a call for the organization's May Meeting as a platform meeting for her “People's Party” using Anthony's (unauthorized) signature. Anthony and Stanton fought about the wisdom of such a radical move. Barry recorded that “Anthony was furious” about Stanton's support for Woodhull and lamented in her diary, “Never did Mrs. Stanton do so foolish a thing.”⁴⁴ Although Stanton and Anthony made up before the convention, Anthony's fears materialized as Woodhull attempted to co-opt the convention to have a People's Party convention. In a fit of pique and an attempt to maintain control of the NWSA, Anthony

used the platform and her position as President (as well as her financial control of the hall in which they were meeting) to dismiss Woodhull and ask any attendees who were there for the People's Party meeting to leave the hall.⁴⁵ When, later that evening, Woodhull returned to announce a meeting of her party the next day, she called for the NWSA meeting to be adjourned, and when Anthony refused to put the call to a vote, Woodhull hijacked the meeting platform to talk about the party's goals. Anthony angrily left the stage and, in a few minutes, the light went out as Anthony paid the janitor to close the hall early. Woodhull responded by printing vicious character attacks on Anthony and Stanton in her weekly paper, *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*. The racism, sexism, and interpersonal infighting of the first seven years of Reconstruction had sapped the movement of its vitality.

Breaking the Law

The racist, socially-radical, interpersonally-motivated organizational failures of Anthony's work after the Civil War might have been the death knell to her career if a remedy for reframing the problems had not materialized in her new departure strategy actions. Hull has argued that, "Susan B. Anthony's leadership in the movement had been marginalized by both Lucy Stone and Victoria Woodhull, as well as overshadowed by her good friend Elizabeth Cady Stanton. Anthony desperately needed something to refocus the attention of the public at large and the movement's grassroots supporters."⁴⁶ In short, the woman suffrage movement needed a public relations master stroke. Anthony's spectacle of voting in the 1872 presidential election, and the trial and conviction that followed, provided the perfect drama to regain the ground the movement had lost.

A brief review of how Anthony's new departure strategy actions shaped her rhetorical practices and how the public reacted to her is vital to my analysis. In her seminal work on Anthony's "Is it a Crime" speech, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argued that Anthony's "persuasive masterpiece" was an oddity because it was "a forensic speech that was never given in a courtroom."⁴⁷ Even though Anthony was tried and found guilty, Campbell highlighted that,

Her persuasive success remains noteworthy. The prosecutor's request for a change of venue demonstrated her effect on potential jurors in Monroe County. The judge's refusal to allow her to testify in her own behalf was further evidence of the power of her arguments. Moreover, the judge's refusal to allow the jury to deliberate or vote, and his decision to direct a guilty verdict, implied his fear of her persuasive impact on jurors in Ontario County.⁴⁸

The *History of Woman Suffrage* offered one anecdote suggesting that the judge's fears were well founded, noting, "The jury with freedom now to use their tongues, when too late, also canvassed the trial and the injury done. 'The verdict of guilty would not have been mine, could I have spoken,' said one, 'nor should I have been alone. There were others who thought as I did, but we could not speak.'"⁴⁹ It was Judge Hunt's directed verdict of guilty and his application of the fine to Anthony's property, effectively circumventing her ability to appeal her case to the Supreme Court, that eventually propelled Anthony back to a place of respect and the center of the women's rights cause.

Anthony's trial and conviction, but more importantly the popular outrage at her seemingly unfair trial, catapulted her back to a position of national attention and respect that finally provided the platform for her to effectively blend the legal and social

arguments that had so complicated her Reconstruction work for suffrage. The Supreme Court decision in *Minor vs. Happersett* would be the final word on the new departure strategy for a judicial route to suffrage. Anthony, however, had already gained the public prominence to speak to issues of women's social and moral place in the growing country with her trial.

For Anthony, the period of Reconstruction effectively ended as she shifted her rhetorical strategies to respond to public outcry over the salacious Beecher-Tilton affair in 1874. The affair actually occurred in the late 1860s, but Henry Beecher's public rants against Victoria Woodhull's free love positions during her 1872 run for the presidency doomed the preacher to become a public spectacle.⁵⁰ In 1872, Woodhull published an article in *Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly* telling a story of Beecher, then preaching at the fashionable Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, New York, continuing a long-standing affair with Elizabeth Tilton. Woodhull, already in the public eye because of her run for the presidency, exposed the details of the affair to national attention. The scandal would remain in the public eye until late in 1875 as a series of church and civil trials were brought by the various men involved.⁵¹ In spite of her reticence to discuss the issues, Anthony was eventually drawn into the fray when, in July of 1874, Stanton gave an interview to the *Brooklyn Daily Argus*, alleging that Elizabeth Tilton had told Anthony all the details of the affair, and that Anthony had also discussed the same subject with Beecher.⁵² The pages from this week are missing from Anthony's diary, and her letters to Stanton from this time are also missing.⁵³ A letter from Stanton remains in which she said, "Offended Susan,—Come right down and pull my ears. I shall not attempt a defense. Of course I admit I have made an awful blunder in not keeping silent so far as

you were concerned on this terrible Beecher-Tilton scandal.”⁵⁴ Stanton’s belated contrition, however, could not reverse the damage she had done, Anthony was implicated in a sex scandal.

Anthony’s reputation for political action on policy issues and thoughtful lecturing had grown with her arrest and trial, but her connection to the sensational scandal was far more interesting to the public. In the midst of the Beecher-Tilton affair, Anthony turned the majority of her rhetorical efforts toward speaking on cultural topics like drinking, women’s working conditions, and morality, and how these issues connected to suffrage. Prominent among examples of this shift are Anthony’s two most famous extemporaneous speeches, both of which she began presenting in 1875, “Social Purity” and “Woman Wants Bread, Not the Ballot.” Although Anthony was never reticent to speak to political audiences or seek changes in policy, she never again focused on political and legal arguments for policy change as she had during Reconstruction.

Reconstruction, as a period of possibility and a chance for change, effectively ended for Anthony with her implication in the 1874 Beecher-Tilton scandal and pivot to social change arguments. The promise of greater freedom—based either on the sentiments of freedom and equal rights held by individual men and voted into law in state referendums, or legislated by an expanding federal government that would protect the rights of national citizens—had not been realized. The coalition between the various radical Burned-over District reform communities had shattered on the rocks of interpersonal conflict. Anthony’s radical newspaper supporting women’s rights had died at the hands of the more conservative *Women’s Journal*. But amidst these setbacks, Anthony had emerged as a gifted organizer, a sought-after lecturer, and a respected voice

for women's legal rights as national citizens. Although her goals of women's enfranchisement would not be realized for decades and her ideals of women's equal status in the country remains elusive even into the twenty-first century, the national conversation had begun to recognize the issue of women's rights.

Inventing the Woman Citizen

During Reconstruction, Anthony still used a social approach to invention, but she no longer relied on the romantic invention she used during the first years of her career. Instead, Anthony switched to an imitative approach to developing ideas. Anthony used three major argument themes that reflected the discourse contexts into which she spoke. Imitating the content of her male politicians, she privileged one of these argument themes over the others based on the events shaping public debate at the time. Between 1865 and 1868, Anthony privileged political arguments for policy changes that would instantiate universal suffrage. This argument theme mirrored the arguments being used by male politicians on both state and national levels. During the fracturing of the AERA between 1868 and 1871, Anthony pivoted to philosophical arguments for suffrage as the key to achieving equal rights. These argument themes based in the philosophy of natural rights imitated more radical women's rights activists like Stanton and Woodhull and were often derided as seeking to overthrow the social order not simply to gain equal suffrage for women. Finally, between 1872 and 1876, Anthony relied on legal arguments for voting as a national constitutional right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although each of these themes was present throughout Anthony's Reconstruction rhetoric, the practice of extemporaneous invention allowed her to imitate the rhetorical practices of her male

peers to meet the demands of her situation so that her arguments consistently reflected whichever theme was prominent in the contexts into which she spoke.

Anthony's imitative invention during Reconstruction publically demonstrated her competence in legal, political, and philosophical argumentation in a way that manuscript oratory could not match. As Jasinski has noted, imitative invention suggested a speaker would imitate the great ideas and great speeches of her time.⁵⁵ A speaker's ability to imitate great arguments demonstrated competence in the speaking cultures of her context. Anthony combined this imitation, and the competence it indicated, with a social approach to invention-as-bricolage. Social invention, as Stills and Warton have noted, demonstrates the speaker's suitability for her context by connecting the speaker's language and argument with the audience to whom she speaks.⁵⁶ This social and imitative approach to invention was especially important in Anthony's performance of citizenship because she combined it with extemporaneous speaking. Hogan and Solomon, Rothermel, Reid Ricker, and Gring-Pemble⁵⁷ have all noted that women's invention throughout much of the nineteenth century was limited to the woman-centered spaces of private homes, letters, commonplace books, and autograph albums. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking, however, brought the act of invention into the male-gendered arena of the public sphere. I argue that this extemporaneous imitative practice, and the argumentative shifts it facilitated, allowed Anthony to demonstrate competence in the political, social, and legal arenas. Anthony's competence then functioned as an argument for her inclusion in the voting rights granted to a male United States citizen.

Politics and Women's Rights

During the first four years of Reconstruction, Anthony imitated the political and party concerns of her audiences to support her arguments for women's voting rights. As early as April 1865, at a gathering in Kansas to mourn Lincoln's assassination, Anthony defied the convention of praising the slain President, and instead blamed him for how Republicans had resorted to party politics instead of supporting full equality for freed slaves. She mourned that Lincoln seemed ready to forego equality for freed slaves in favor of re-building the Union without reforming it: "My soul was sad and sick at what seemed his settled purpose—to consign the ex-slaves back to the tender mercies of the disappointed, desperate, sullen, revengeful ex-lords of the lash."⁵⁸ Speaking of the president's death, she also said: "To me it looked the crime of crimes, and hence my first thought was that God had spoken to the nation in His thunder tone to '*Stand still and know that I am God,*'"⁵⁹ She further maligned the political climate saying, "not one leading influential voice has yet cried out against the awful crime of building up the Union on the Disenfranchisement of a whole loyal race."⁶⁰ The very next day she lamented in her diary, "it is perfectly shocking how few of the Republicans are ready to give equal rights to black men."⁶¹ By the end of the same year, Anthony wrote to a friend, "to me, the broad ground of republicanism is the one true place for all advanced minds to occupy."⁶² The end of the Civil War seemed to offer a possibility for Republican support for universal suffrage through state and national laws. Anthony, therefore, began imitating the political arguments about policy that Republican politicians used as she fought for universal suffrage policies.

Anthony's political arguments in service of universal suffrage, however, would quickly garner significant pushback from Republican politicians with whom she worked.

State and national Republican leaders, interested primarily in maintaining their power and reasserting control of the newly re-formed Union, did not relish a political challenge from the woman suffragists any more than they welcomed the New Departure of the Peace Democrats from the northern states. Anthony's imitation of political arguments in her work for universal suffrage suggested she might be a threat to party unity, as her allegiance was to her own cause, not the Republican party. During the summer of 1865, while working in Kansas as an editor for her brother's Leavenworth *Evening Bulletin*, Anthony wrote articles about the need for truly universal suffrage rights in order to ensure protection for all citizens.⁶³ Her arguments for universal suffrage, however, still rankled some of the politicians around her. Sidney Clarke, the Congressman from Lawrence, Kansas, came to dinner at Anthony's brother's house in August of 1865 and chided her for bringing up the women's rights question while everyone else was concerned with the Fourteenth Amendment. In her diary, Anthony reported that "I showed I had not done so only by illustrating the point that no class can be trusted to legislate for another though that other be wife, daughter, mother, etc."⁶⁴ This pushback was exacerbated when, at the Eleventh National Women's Rights Convention, Anthony ended her resolutions by asserting that the women's goal for the New York State constitutional convention was to "send genuine Democrats and Republicans to that Convention who shall strike out from our constitution the two adjectives "*white male*" giving to every citizen, over twenty-one, the right to vote."⁶⁵ With this statement, Anthony asserted that women would not unequivocally support the Republican party candidates to the constitutional convention. The assertion established the women's movement as a political force, and as a potential political pawn. Whether Anthony

realized it or not, imitating political tactics and arguments in her extemporaneous speeches, and using those tactics to build political clout for universal suffrage made the women as much a danger to Republican party stability as they had been allies to party unity during the war.

Fallout from the battles of 1865 quickly infiltrated Anthony's inventional resources, and the infighting, selfishness, and political machinations of Reconstruction began to appear in her letters and journals. In a letter to Edwin Studwell, a Quaker, Republican politician, AERA committee member, and friend in New York City,⁶⁶ Anthony lamented,

Mrs. Stanton's letter to Gerritt Smith—sent to the Standard two weeks ago, does not appear—hence I suppose it is rejected—The gate is shut, wholly, it would seem against any question of the present position of Gerritt Smith, Wende[ll] Phillips and the American Anti Slavery [*sic*] Society—Wel[l] all there is to be said is "it an't as it used to was"—Time was when we professed to have a free platform but surely those proud days are not now.⁶⁷

Anthony was right, of course. When there had been no power to share and no gains to be lost, the temperance, abolition, and women's rights reformers had gladly shared their goals, but the sudden glut of possibility and power overwhelmed the careful and open approaches to invention from the previous decade. Speaking at a December 1866 meeting of the AERA, Anthony effectively summarized the state of political will to enfranchise women and former slaves. She said "The Republican party, at the close of this second revolution, proposed to establish so much of the Republican idea as should enable them to maintain the unity of the nation—some believed to establish the unity of the party."⁶⁸

Although Anthony contended, later in the speech, that “This association is for the express purpose of reminding the American nation that women form a part of the people,” imitating political action and party politics became the central inventional resources for her arguments.

During the Kansas campaign to remove “white male” from the state constitution, Anthony angered many of her former allies in the Republican party when she welcomed George Francis Train to their campaign. Train joined Anthony and Stanton in Kansas in 1867, and Stanton quickly embraced his racist arguments for white women as more rightly entitled to the franchise than black men. In a letter to Anna E. Dickinson from September of 1867, Anthony expressed her anger that the Kansas Republican party refused to take a stand on woman suffrage, “saying each speaker is left free to express his individual opinion on all ‘side issues’—calling Woman suffrage a—side issue—.”⁶⁹ Anthony expressed disgust with the politicians, and maligned their approach as likely to kill the temperance, liquor license, and black men’s suffrage questions that also appeared on the Kansas referendum campaign. She was, however, still sanguine about the potential for woman suffrage because Train, the former “Copperhead” and Democratic presidential hopeful, had agreed to come to Kansas and speak on behalf of the women’s vote. Anthony’s political involvement, especially her imitation of Train’s Democratic rhetoric condemning Republican party politics, drew the ire of many staunchly Republican former-abolitionists.

As the congressional passage of the Fourteenth Amendment enshrined the word “male” in the constitution, and as the New York and Kansas constitutional campaigns failed, Anthony’s imitation of political argument themes would cause even greater

problems for woman suffrage. Although Anthony did not embrace the racist arguments Train spouted and Stanton parroted, she did make political arguments that marked her as a traitor to Republican politicians. Beyond accepting Train's money, or even campaigning with him, Anthony repeatedly defended her involvement with Train—despite his racist rhetoric—while maligning Republican politicians as weak, unmanly, and traitorous. Anthony's speeches after the failure of the Kansas referenda are the best example of how she engaged with national party politics to argue for women's rights. The lengthy quotations below are taken from a report in the *Daily Missouri Democrat* that provides a nearly full transcript of Anthony and Train's speeches on their return trip to the east coast after the failures in Kansas.⁷⁰

Anthony began her speech by decrying all the Union Republican politicians whom she had asked to support women's voting rights in New York and who had turned her down.

The politicians in the state of New York assembled in our New York State constitutional convention and they said, it was not quite wise for the Republican party to shoulder this great question; that the great necessity was to make sure of gaining the ascendancy in the coming Presidential election, and that it would be a very great risk indeed for the Republican party to take on the additional load of woman suffrage at this critical moment of the Republican party.⁷¹

Anthony mocked this temerity in her former Republican allies, arguing that the riskiness of women suffrage “was a plank in their platform, and they felt that they could not take on the additional load of woman's suffrage. They were timid, they said, with negro suffrage.” Anthony's allusion to the Republican party's desire to win the presidential

election of 1868 points to the internal fighting that marked politics of Reconstruction. Anthony's comments, in fact, previewed some of the fights over Reconstruction policies and party unity that would lead the Republicans to drop the "Union" party label at their 1868 convention and nominate the political neophyte Ulysses S. Grant based solely on his status as a national hero. Further mocking the politicians who turned their backs on her for party power reasons, Anthony then explicitly attacked Horace Greeley, "who had stood by us for twenty years as a champion of woman's suffrage."⁷² Yet Greeley, "acting as chairman of the committee on Suffrage in the constitutional convention, reported adversely to any [woman suffrage] measures, and when we knocked at the door for admission there were only nineteen votes in favor, and 250 against us in that convection." Anthony methodically led her audience to conclude that Republican politicians, even those who had supported radical policies like abolition and women's rights before the Civil War, were no longer trustworthy.

Decrying Republican politicians, however, was not Anthony's only task. She also provided reasoning for why she had abandoned her former abolitionist allies.

We would have accepted the services as gladly of the most radical Republican, and been happy to have had his services..... We begged Theodore Tilton, Wendell Phillips, Henry Ward Beecher, Horace Greeley, and every man in all the East who has ever spoken in behalf of woman suffrage, as they had any regard for this movement, that they should come to Kansas in person and lecture on our behalf..... You remember that in a certain case the book tells us about sending a messenger out to bring in the people to the feast, but some were doing one sort of

work and some another; and so it was with our Eastern friends.... Not a single man from the East came.⁷³

Although not mentioning it specifically, Anthony tied her former abolitionist allies to the political power of the Republican party and, therefore, framed them as part of the problem of women's continued, and now explicit, exclusion from the franchise.

To forward her point about eastern party politics robbing women of their rights, Anthony also employed tropes of eastern men as ineffective, fearful, and effeminate in her address to a western audience.

Just imagine a constitutional convention afraid to submit a question to the people or to propose it as an amendment to the constitution. The Timid Eastern politicians traveled to Kansas and by the time that the Radical campaign opened on the first of September, the Kansas politicians and editors were all afraid that if they voted for woman's suffrage then negro suffrage would be killed.⁷⁴

This discourse played to the ideals of western masculinity her audience held, again reifying the raced and classed norms of citizenship, but also exciting the regional biases that created animosity between eastern politicians and the explosively expanding western frontier. In addition to their lack of trustworthiness on issues of women's rights, Anthony also portrayed Republican politicians as weak and not worthy of the privileges of true masculinity. "The politicians were saying either publically or privately to the Republican party 'beware how you take on this extra load of woman suffrage. It will damage the party—destroy it—break it down.'"⁷⁵ This attack on both the character and masculinity of Republican politicians then served as a justification for Anthony and Stanton's willingness to work with Train in their Kansas campaign.

After imitating the Democrat Train's arguments for why the Republican party had failed the cause of universal suffrage, Anthony then offered an explicit explanation for why she and Stanton had welcomed Train to their campaign.

Well, finding the Republican party thus slow in coming to our assistance, pleasant words came to us one day in the shape of a telegraphic dispatch, and a letter from a woman of your own city of St. Louis, saying that she had communication with George Francis Train, and if we would like to have his services he would come to the state, the last of the month before the election, and canvas the state for woman suffrage.⁷⁶

And, finally, she took on the Republican party directly, and imitated Democratic party arguments as she blamed them for the failure of both the black male and the woman suffrage questions in Kansas.

My friends, it was not the woman suffrage question that killed the negro question; it was the Republican leaders—the Republican party leaders, who killed the negro suffrage and the woman suffrage too. Had these men been true and brave, had they been willing to have carried out their principles, and made an application of these principles to women as well as to black men in the State of Kansas, neither the blacks man's question nor the woman's question would have been defeated. Both would have triumphed most assuredly. But they were afraid—every one of these Republicans—that every argument made against woman suffrage was a triple argument against the enfranchisement of the black man. No person can make an argument against another person's right, with equal intelligence, to vote,

and expect that it will not rebound against himself. Therefore they killed it themselves.⁷⁷

This passage epitomizes Anthony's imitation of national and party politics in her extemporaneous speaking during the first six years of Reconstruction and demonstrates the problems this strategy caused.

Anthony's speech after the defeat in Kansas illustrated the potential for abject failure that her imitation of party politics occasioned. By imitating the political arguments that shaped the era, Anthony harnessed her cause to the destructive power politics that would lead to the failure of Reconstruction. She also embroiled women's rights, a cause that had previously been the purview of morality, proper theology, equality, and other ideas of an Idealized America, in the contentious power-mongering traditions of partisan politics. Although Dudden has argued that the alliance with Train was a final effort to achieve the seemingly-possible goal of suffrage during an era of change, Anthony's political rhetoric instead surrendered the high ground of human equality in favor of political expediency. Coupled with Stanton and Train's explicitly racist rhetoric, Anthony's political approach to the fight for women's rights was doomed.

After the failures in New York and Kansas, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the congressional passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, Anthony faced the likelihood of a failure to gain any rights for women in the aftermath of the Civil War. This failure was compounded by the vitriolic accusations of anti-black racism that many of the sexist reformers leveled indiscriminately against Anthony, Stanton, and Train. In spite of Anthony's non-racist arguments during and after the Kansas campaign, she received a letter from the continually sexist William Lloyd Garrison condemning that she

“had taken such leave of good sense, and departed so far from true self-respect, as to be traveling companions and associated lecturers with that crack-brained harlequin and semi-lunatic, George Francis Train.” Not content to condemn her, Garrison also threatened repercussions from the AERA and the public at large. “You may, if you choose, denounce Henry Ward Beecher and Wendell Phillips (the two ablest advocates of Woman’s Rights on this side of the Atlantic), and choose the nondescript Train; but, in thus doing, you will only subject yourself to the merited ridicule and condemnation, and turn the movement which you aim to promote into unnecessary contempt.” Garrison was blatantly sexist in his assertion that Beecher (already rumored to be a philandered and possibly a rapist) and Phillips (who had originally introduced the “negro’s hour” proposition) were better advocates of women’s equality than Anthony herself. His threat of “merited ridicule and condemnation” from inside the ranks of the AERA was then followed with an assertion of the inherent goodness of the Republican party. “It seems you are looking to the Democratic party, and not to the Republicans, to give success politically to your movement! I should as soon think of looking to the Great Adversary to espouse the cause of righteousness.” Even here Garrison did not stop, ending his letter with the assertion that “Everything that has been done, politically, for the cause of impartial freedom has been done by the Republican party. And yet your reliance is upon the former rather than upon the latter party! This is infatuation.” Garrison’s indiscriminant praise for the Republican party, condemnation of Anthony, and overt sexism portended the detrimental consequences of Anthony’s imitation of political strategy in her extemporaneous speaking.

Anthony's hope for creating policy that would implement universal suffrage through the avenue of party politics would be disappointed during the 1868 election season. The Republican party's platform featured a minor concession to the cause of full equality asserting that "This Convention declares its sympathy with all the oppressed people which are struggling for their rights."⁷⁸ Disappointed in the Republican party, Anthony hoped that the Democrats would seize the opportunity of her work and Train's fame to do what the Republicans had not. In a letter to Anna E. Dickinson⁷⁹ five days before the Democratic national convention of 1868, Anthony was sanguine about the possibility of woman's suffrage reaching the national stage. "I tell you Anna—if some party would put a woman's suffrage plank—a universal suffrage plank—in their platform—wouldn't that party gather to itself all the enthusiasm of the nation & sweep over the course like a wildfire."⁸⁰ But her hopes would, again, be disappointed. The Democrats' platform had explicit planks calling for state-administered voting rights, an end to Reconstruction work, and decrying "negro supremacy" in any form. On July 10th, six days after the convention began, Anthony again wrote to Dickinson, this time lamenting "could you have believed it possible for Tammany to have made such a stupid nomination."⁸¹ The political work had failed, leaving Anthony estranged from many of her former friends and allies and in a precarious financial position.⁸²

Natural Rights Philosophy and Universal Suffrage Arguments

As Anthony's imitation of political arguments for rights failed, she switched to imitating the natural rights arguments of more radical reformers in her fight for a sixteenth amendment that would enfranchise women. Due to the tense relationships between woman suffrage supporters and those who fought only for the "negro's hour,"

the AERA coalition now spent time fighting each other over the specific implementations of expanded rights instead of encouraging outside populations to support a sixteenth amendment. Anthony's invention during this period relied on the philosophy on natural rights to frame her arguments for universal suffrage as the only sure foundation for full human equality among all people. To make these arguments, Anthony relied on social invention to fit the supporting data for each of her natural rights arguments to the needs and desires of her immediate audience.

Anthony's social invention was evident in her involvement with workers' rights organizations as she offered evidence to support natural rights arguments. Speaking to a gathering of the Working Women's Association of New York in 1868, Anthony focused on natural rights as the best argument for the ballot and the ballot as the best guarantee of equal treatment for all workers.⁸³ At the meeting, she asserted that what working women wanted was "a chance to earn a livelihood on precisely the same terms that men did; and we can never get that until we have the ballot."⁸⁴ At a meeting of the National Labor Union later that month, Anthony framed the centrality of women's equality for male members, arguing that "We cannot elevate the men until the women are brought up also. To do this the ballot must be given them. The greatest enemies to laboring men are the working women."⁸⁵ Anthony supported her assertion of natural rights philosophy by offering evidence of the inequality men faced as workers because female workers were paid less, saying "You know well that the wages of the working women are less than those of the men, therefore your wages are kept at low rates by this class of operatives."⁸⁶ Anthony encouraged both male and female workers to see the vote as the primary means

of full equality before the law and therefore being able to alter their financial position in relation to the oppressive system of capital.

In a letter to the New York State Colored Men's Convention in October of 1868, Anthony imitated the more intersectional approach of black female activists to support her natural rights arguments. Anthony began by framing her arguments in the context of the laws of the state, specifically highlighting the inequality in tax law that women were taxed if they owned as little as \$50 of property while black men, who were not allowed to vote in New York unless they owned property worth \$250 or more, were not taxed for any property valued at less than that threshold.⁸⁷ She said, "the colored man to-day is worth \$200, and is exempt, he dies to-morrow, and his widow is immediately assessed as a tax-payer."⁸⁸ With this foundation of financial and legal inequality, Anthony then made an intersectional argument for black men to seek the ballot on behalf of black women that imitated the intersectional rhetoric offered by activists like Sojourner Truth.⁸⁹ Anthony said, "In all the trades and professions your sisters and daughters have not only the obstacles that are everywhere thrown in your way, but also the prejudices and impediments everywhere thrown in the woman's way, in addition."⁹⁰ She encouraged the men to "remember the woman by your side" and to seek the ballot on their behalf as well as for the colored men of the state. "Now is the time" she closed, "to establish the government of our state, as well as the nation, on the *one Democratic Republican principle—the consent of the whole people.*"⁹¹ Anthony's rhetoric in this letter imitated the principles of intersectional rhetorical appeals as she asked black men to seek equality for black women on the basis of both race and gender.

Anthony also sought to frame suffrage as an important tool for enacting the natural rights goals of equal rights, regardless of race or gender, in her discussions with fellow members of the AERA. At the final meeting of the AERA in 1869 Frederick Douglass triggered an explosion of the underlying discontent within the organization by arguing “black men first & white women afterwards” in response to Stanton’s racist article using the term “Sambo” in *The Revolution*.⁹² In attempting to repair the gaping wound, Anthony stood to speak about the necessity of the ballot for human equality. Women, she said, “feel with Alexander Hamilton, ‘Give a man power over my substance, & he has power over my whole being.’ There is not a woman born, whose bread is earned by another, it does not matter whether that other is husband, brother, father, or friend, not one who consents to eat the bread earned by other hands, but her whole moral being is in the power of that person. (Applause).”⁹³ Douglass interrupted Anthony with a question about the difference the ballot would make for these women, saying “I want to inquire whether granting to woman the right of suffrage will change anything in respect to the nature of our sexes.”⁹⁴ Shifting her arguments to speak more directly about how the ballot would function as a tool for generating equal rights, Anthony responded, “It will change the nature of one thing very much, & that is the pecuniary position of woman. It will place her in a position in which she can go out into the world an equal competitor in the struggle for life; so that she shall not be compelled to take such positions as men choose to accord to her and then take such pay as men choose to give her.”⁹⁵ Anthony framed her arguments as transcending the interpersonal feuds that were dividing the AERA by using extemporaneous invention to build on the understood social inequality of women and to answer Douglass with an imitation of his own call for positions of social equality.

Even Anthony's practice of fitting the support for her natural rights arguments to the desires of her audience, however, was not flexible enough to gain traction in the fraught political climate of Reconstruction. The AERA would fracture as factions each foreswore that ostensible goals of full equal rights for all humans to assert that their own identity category must be enfranchised first. At the 1869 AERA meeting, Anthony was faced with scurrilous charges of fraud from Steven Foster, criticism of the *Revolution* based on Stanton's racist rhetoric, and Frederick Douglass asserting that black men were a more important constituency to protect with voting rights than women. Anthony replied to this criticism, saying "The question of precedence has no place on an equal rights platform. The only reason why it ever found a place here was that there were some who insisted that women must stand back and wait until another class should be enfranchised."⁹⁶ Anthony's statement, although factually accurate, did nothing to smooth over the differences occasioned by power and money struggles and interpersonal fighting among the leaders. The AERA dissolved over the question of the Fifteenth Amendment. Anthony continued the turn away from politics and toward a rhetoric of full equality in her call for the NWSA. Yet Lucy Stone, by this time a personal and financial enemy of Anthony and Stanton, still construed Anthony's arguments as pushing for the Democratic party. Anthony countered that, "The question before these conventions was *Woman Suffrage* and *Woman Suffrage alone*. Any person, no matter what they were, Democrats or Republicans, Greeks or Jews, Methodists or vagabonds, Baptists or virtuous high-minded persons, no matter who or what, were entitled to be woman suffragists."⁹⁷ Her arguments, she contested, were explicitly against supporting any political party that would not fully support women's rights: "She would let the parties entirely alone, only to

lash them most unmercifully until they did something.”⁹⁸ Staunch Republicans like Stone, Phillips, and Blackwell in the reform ranks, however, were not placated by Anthony’s focus on rights if it meant questioning allegiance to the still powerful national Republican party. Anthony’s efforts at centralizing arguments for suffrage as the route to equality would fail to stave off the AWSA’s founding in 1869, or to reunite the two rival organizations in 1870.

Anthony continued to rely on social invention to shape her natural rights arguments for suffrage as she traveled around the rapidly expanding country to argue for women’s rights. Anthony’s social and imitative invention in her presentation of arguments for suffrage was best demonstrated in her lectures on women and work and to women in western states. In the spring of 1870, Anthony began delivering a speech titled “Work, Wages, and the Ballot.”⁹⁹ The *Lansing State Republican* reported that Anthony began by framing her speech as an endeavor to help women: “She did not regard herself as an orator, but her mission was to do woman good and aid her in acquiring such power as would make her appeals heard and respected.” The ballot, Anthony argued, would alleviate women’s pay inequality and would, therefore, eliminate love-less marriages, prostitution and poverty, and would help men see all women as equals, not simply their sisters, mothers, and daughters needing protection.¹⁰⁰ Anthony then began offering anecdotes of former slaves and free black men who had been turned away from work and lodging before the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment. These men, however, were now respected in the same towns and by the same white men who had maligned them only two years before. The ballot, Anthony encouraged her audience, would help women “become equal and independent of man in all the relations of life,” would “give her an

identity, and, when married,” would make her “the equal owner of their united accumulations.”¹⁰¹ Respect for women’s work, both outside and within the home, was a new topic for the lecture stage. The *Daily Pittsburg Gazette* noted that Anthony’s lecture “was attended by a large number of the most intelligent and influential citizens. That audience gave it great attention.”¹⁰² Although Anthony’s speech was specifically addressing work and wages, she so formed her arguments to the audiences that papers in non-industrial towns with a small female working population still shared the sentiments offered by the *Chicago Republican* that “Susan B. Anthony had started a woman suffrage movement in this place, which may create considerable of a stir one of these days.”¹⁰³ This imitative and social invention allowed Anthony to frame her arguments to the specific audience she addressed.

Anthony’s second popular lecture between 1869 and 1872 was titled “The False Theory” and offered many of the same anecdotes and arguments as “Work.” Anthony used this title more frequently from November of 1870 through the late spring of 1871 while touring the Northeast, especially with audiences who might already be familiar with the philosophical arguments for natural rights. “False Theory” framed the ballot as necessary tool in assuring women access to equal treatment before the law and equal respect as humans with God-given rights. In the 1870s, for instance, Binghamton, New York, drew increasing numbers of immigrants to work in the shoe manufacturing plants and serve its famed “water cure” tourism industry.¹⁰⁴ The *Binghamton Daily Republican* commented that “The ‘False Theory’ of course, was explained as the prevalent notion that woman is not an individual, should not be an equal partner with her husband in family and property matters, and above all that she should not vote.”¹⁰⁵ Further

illustrating her natural rights arguments in this speech, the paper continued “She took the proper ground that girls should be educated for women, and not as grown up separately for wives; also that women have as good a right to the trades and professions as men.”¹⁰⁶ In nearby Elmira, New York—an important transportation hub in the 1870s between New York City and the coal, food, and resource production centers of the West—Anthony’s lecture was again met with acclaim. The *Elmira Advertiser* lauded that “Of course, Miss Anthony could not have selected a more interesting subject than ‘Woman’ upon which to talk, and no person could have talked upon the subject more interestingly than did she. The wrongs which her sex now suffer, and the right which she is laboring to secure for them, were set forth in touching tones and in glowing terms.”¹⁰⁷ “The power of the ballot,” the laudatory writer continued, “was never more ably illustrated, and the right of women to enjoy it never more fully established. It must be that there are many more advocates for ‘women’s rights’ in this city to-day than there were yesterday.”¹⁰⁸ These increasingly philosophical arguments, however, were not popular and did little to draw new adherents to the suffrage cause given the political upheaval and scandalous infighting that also plagued the movement.

A Legal Case for Suffrage and a Turn toward the Public

In 1871 Anthony began to face the reality that both her political and natural rights philosophy invention strategies had largely failed. Her popularity was decreasing, the national political climate was rapidly becoming inhospitable to progressive causes, and the entire woman suffrage movement was facing a public relations crisis due to its interpersonal squabbles. Faced with this failure, and sensing that the window of opportunity was quickly closing, Anthony, in what Campbell has called “an act of

desperation,” shifted to a focus on legal arguments for suffrage as a right guaranteed to women by the Fourteenth Amendment.¹⁰⁹ Anthony is, of course, best known for these legal arguments for suffrage as a protection guaranteed to women by the Fourteenth Amendment; Campbell has called her “Is It a Crime for a U.S. Citizen to Vote” speech a “forensic masterpiece.”¹¹⁰ Legal arguments, however, were not merely reserved for Anthony’s manuscript oratory, they also permeated her extemporaneous speaking between 1871 and 1874. Anthony’s legal invention strategies as they relate to “Is It a Crime” have been thoroughly documented by both Campbell¹¹¹ and Hull,¹¹² so this section focuses only on how these inventions strategies affected Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking.

The first inventional explorations of legal arguments for suffrage as a protected right for all citizens came about in the pages of the *Revolution*. The third issue of the newspaper, dated January 22, 1868, published Francis Minor’s report on woman suffrage in St. Louis, Missouri, which argued that women had been enfranchised by the “equal protection” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.¹¹³ Minor again appeared in the paper in October of 1869, this time praising the resolutions of the Woman’s Suffrage Association of Missouri.¹¹⁴ The Missouri resolutions, also printed in the *Revolution*, claimed “That, as the Constitution of the United States expressly declares that ‘no state shall make or enforce any laws that shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,’ those provisions of the several state constitutions that exclude women from franchise on account of sex, are violations alike of the spirit and letter of the Federal Constitution.”¹¹⁵ These arguments for suffrage as a right guaranteed to all citizens,

regardless of gender, by the Fourteenth Amendment would become more common in 1871.

The acclamatory reception garnered by Victoria Woodhull's memorial on suffrage to Congress in 1871 encouraged Anthony to continue pursuing a legal route toward woman suffrage. Anthony began incorporating arguments for legal suffrage into her extemporaneous speeches while touring the American West in the summer and fall of 1871. She was invited to present remarks to the legislature of Washington Territory. According to an article in the *Washington Standard*, Anthony "appeared as the advocate of woman suffrage under the guarantees of the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution. Governments, she held, were instituted not to establish rights but to secure them to their possessors."¹¹⁶ Anthony also extended these legal arguments to encourage women in the western states and territories to vote in their upcoming election based on this doctrine. At a meeting of the Washington Territory Women's Suffrage Association in November of 1871, Anthony encouraged women to vote in the next territorial election and to keep records of their success or failure to send to the eastern associations.¹¹⁷ Anthony's arguments based on the legality of woman suffrage were both novel for her audiences and provided logical evidence for the equality claims she made. In addition, these arguments demonstrated Anthony's competence as a thoughtful rhetor, effectively arguing for her equality as a citizen even if the explicit arguments for new departure suffrage actions were rejected by her audience.

During Reconstruction, Anthony's social and imitative approach to invention reflected the context into which she spoke and served as a continual demonstration of her fitness and competence to hold the citizenship rights she sought. By imitating the

political, philosophical, and legal arguments of male public figures, and interweaving these arguments in her extemporaneous speaking, Anthony's invention allowed both explicit and implicit arguments for women's equality. Furthermore, the practice of extemporaneous invention as a foundation for extemporaneous delivery allowed Anthony to imitate the rhetorical strategies of her situation so that her arguments consistently reflected whichever argumentative theme was prominent in her situation. This imitative practice, and the argumentative shifts it facilitated, allowed Anthony to demonstrate competence in the political, social, and legal arenas. Anthony's competence then functioned as an argument for her inclusion in the equal voting rights granted to a male United States Citizen.

Delivery: Creating the Competent and Authentic Female Citizen

During Reconstruction, newspaper reports were far more circumspect in their commentary on Anthony's delivery than those of the previous decade of her public life. This change was likely connected to the fact that women on the stage had become less of a spectacle and a more common norm during and after the war. Angela Ray has noted that many female lecturers had become famous for their reform work while speaking on the lecture circuit by 1859.¹¹⁸ The Civil War had also propelled women into more public roles as nurses and as laborers in manufacturing. It had also highlighted how many women worked in farm labor, as partners in western settlements, and as fund raisers and in other support roles for the war effort in the East. Anthony's body was no longer the primary spectacle of interest to audiences; her arguments had become more mainstream and her fame had grown so that her public speaking was not a great diversion from the norm.

Due to this shift in her context, Anthony's body was read in two ways that are important for understanding how her extemporaneous discourse functioned as a performance of citizenship. First, she competently performed the "male arts" of delivery. Second, this competence provided the foundation for her to then be read as the performative ideal of the equal citizenship rights she claimed. Instead of speaking about her body as out of place, or as a spectacle on the stage, newspapers discussed Anthony as an obvious and authentic example of the equality she requested.

The Art of Speaking Competently

Newspaper commentary on Anthony's speaking during Reconstruction reflects how well she had mastered the various elements of delivery that were expected of nineteenth-century extemporaneous orators. Perfect familiarity with a topic and the ability to create and present arguments with little direct preparation were the hallmark of good extemporaneous speaking for educated professionals. As John Ripplingham phrased it in his 1831 *Art of Extempore Speaking*, the student "must be perfectly acquainted with his subject, and be able to examine it in detail, as well as in the aggregate. Whatever can favor his own opinion, or can be urged against it, must be familiar to his mind."¹¹⁹

Speaking directly to this requirement for speakers, the Leavenworth, Kansas, *Evening Bulletin*, described Anthony in the following way.

Her voice is not loud, but so distinct as to be heard without difficulty, in a much larger room than the church. Her appearance lady-like, and she had a perfect command of her subject and of herself. She stood up before the audience as if having a perfect right there. Her gestures were good, and not a word was spoken,

or a movement made, that was not in good taste, and appropriate to her address, and the place.¹²⁰

This passage, written by a paper that was a rival to that owned by Anthony's brother, clearly asserted that Anthony was, in Ripplingham's words, "perfectly acquainted with [her] subject," but it also touched on some of the other characteristics textbooks noted as key to an ideal extemporaneous speaker. Like Asa Smith's ideal speaker, Anthony's speech was clearly and logically organized. The same article continues, "She exhibited a logical mind, following each branch of the subject till it was exhausted and never rambling or losing the thread of her argument,"¹²¹ demonstrating how she avoided the "collection of crude ideas, expressed in a very immethodical way" that Smith decried as the trap of the unprepared speaker.¹²² These passages also demonstrate that Anthony used appropriate voice, articulation, facial expression, posture, and gesture in the way M. Bautain's *The Art of Extempore Speaking* or Guy Carleton Lee's *Principles of Public Speaking* dictated as important measures of competence.¹²³

In addition to her obvious comfort with her topic, Anthony was also able to use extemporaneous speaking to highlight her immediacy and flexibility on the lecture stage. During a hearing before the New York State Constitutional Convention Suffrage Committee in June of 1867, Anthony participated in a question and answer session on the theory and practicality of woman suffrage. The committee had secretly written a statement opposing any change in legislation to allow women access to voting rights, but had professed to the rest of the convention that they would hear the advocates before deciding. Horace Greeley introduced Anthony to the likely-hostile committee, and she began with advocating for women on juries. A committee member from Broome County,

New York, a conservative industrial area, pressed Anthony about equality in the face of a military draft. Anthony answered “unhesitatingly,” according to a *New York Tribune* article, “‘Yes!’ She did not believe in war, but they would fight if necessary.”¹²⁴ Anthony then answered a series of questions that had been raised before her interview began. “The ballot will dignify woman and elevate her. It has done it already for the Negroes in Washington City and in Kansas. The ballot will extort from the legislators justice and right. You say that women don’t want the ballot. Even if true, this is not reason why they should not have what is their right.”¹²⁵ Having failed to trap Anthony with these practical questions, Greeley then tried a more theoretical attack by asking “When does this inalienable right commence for young men and foreigners? Have we the right to say when it commences?” Undeterred, Anthony parried “My right as a human being is as good as any other human being. If you have the right to vote at 21 years then I have. All we ask is that you should let down the bar, and let us women and negroes in, and then we will sit down and talk the matter over. [Loud and prolonged applause].”¹²⁶ Greeley then attempted to counter Anthony’s unassailable logic with contextual critiques, asking if many women in New York were actually interested in voting and if the ballot would really impact income inequality. “Miss Anthony said the number of petitions already presented would prove that women have awoke to the importance of the subject.” And on the question of pay she replied, “It would. In the country only women and negroes are the degraded classes who cannot get the same wages as others.”¹²⁷ Anthony ended her question and answer session to loud applause from the galleries and committee members. This flexibility may seem modest, but it is more impressive given that Anthony expected Greeley to be a firm supporter of the argument for woman suffrage. Anthony had likely

prepared for a pro-suffrage audience of reformers, but easily shifted her arguments to respond to a hostile interrogator.

This flexibility also allowed Anthony to alter her performance to match the persona an audience desired. This flexibility in her performance meant that Anthony was better able to shift her arguments with the constantly-changing political and social climate of Reconstruction. An illustrative example of this flexibility came at the 1875 NWSA convention in Washington, DC. Political sentiments in the United States were quickly approaching the conservatism that would end Reconstruction, and the radical political, social, and legal arguments Anthony had embraced in previous decades were falling out of favor. At this convention, Anthony interacted with Mary Edwards Walker, a female doctor and radical social reformer.¹²⁸ Walker had not been invited to speak, but she took the stage to give a lecture without invitation. The Washington, D.C. *Evening Star* reported that:

Here the indomitable Susan came to the fore to Mrs. Stanton's apparent relief, and explained that while they believed in freedom of speech they also believed they had a right to select their own speakers. "Dr. Walker has attended our meetings for several years past"—Dr. Walker — "I wasn't here last year"—Miss Anthony — "She was not here last year"—Dr. Walker, to the audience — "No; and why? Because that woman (pointing to Miss A.) insulted me, and"—Here the hall resounded with groans and hisses mingled with a few cries of "Let's hear the Doctor." Miss Anthony here put the question as to whether the Doctor should speak, and it was decided in the negative by a large majority.¹²⁹

Anthony's exclusionary work in this passage is telling because of the continued conservative stance she took during the meeting and the specifically radical appearance Walker presented. First, Walker came to the meeting dressed in trousers, a frock coat, and top hat—typical men's clothing of the 1870s—what the newspaper called “her bifurcated garment.”¹³⁰ Anthony took a seemingly respectful position by noting that Walker was a frequent participant in the NWSA meetings, but still effectively silenced her participation in the event. In this way, Anthony created an environment that welcomed the conservative message of incremental social and cultural change that would be her foundation for suffrage arguments during the end of Reconstruction and throughout the Gilded Age. Anthony's action also set the stage for her address later in the meeting premised on the expediency argument that “man, though the natural protector of woman, does not protect her.”¹³¹ The flexibility and poise demonstrated in this incident were central to Anthony's mastery of the arts of delivery.

Anthony's mastery of the male arts of delivery was so noticeable that newspaper editors often specifically commented on her performances with positive comparisons to other speakers, often to male lecturers. In an article from the generally anti-suffrage *Troy Daily Times*, the reporter commented that Anthony was “very choice in the selection of words and phrases—unlike many female performers— [she] speaks in an earnest, attractive monotone, and yesterday really made one of the most eloquent and the only sensible speech for female suffrage, by a female, to which we had then ever listened.”¹³² The Leavenworth *Evening Bulletin* said that “The manner with which she handled her subject might have put to blush many of the ‘Lords of Creation,’”¹³³ not only offering a comparison between Anthony and male speakers, but framing her male competitors in an

unfavorable, feminized light. Speaking about an 1865 lecture Anthony gave on Reconstruction, the *Chicago Tribune* compared Anthony favorably to male speakers, saying, “Few men in this or any other city could more ably present the subject, or more closely charm the audience that listened to her noble utterances, and one could not but wish that she has spoken to thousands rather than hundreds.”¹³⁴ Anthony’s delivery provided such a demonstrable equality with her male peers that she was no longer considered an outsider or a staged spectacle. Her performance, in fact, raised questions about how her continued inequity before the law could be justified.

This shift in focus to Anthony as a laudable speaker, however, does not mean that her physical appearance was completely ignored. Writers still attempted to describe Anthony and often to frame her as a prim maiden aunt. This commentary, however, demonstrated significantly less spite and vitriol than commentary from the decade before the Civil War. Descriptions of Anthony during her tour with Train were often long and detailed, but did not vary significantly in tone from those of her male counterpart. Since this tour was a staged spectacle and Train was a renowned spectacle in his own right, newspaper commentary from these three months was more colorful and descriptive than the rest of that published during the Reconstruction Era when Anthony’s work was generally covered as news. In November of 1867, the *Chicago Tribune* described each of the speakers, yet the commentary on Anthony was rather brief in comparison to that of Stanton and Train. The writer describes Anthony as, “This lady, tall, spectacles, thin, like the maiden aunt who made us learn texts and persuaded us to give up butter for the benefit of the equinox.”¹³⁵ The most colorful description of Anthony, although still not vitriolic compared to pre-war coverage, was from the *Cleveland Daily Leader*. The paper

offered more than 1,000 words on the three speakers' appearance in a 2,000-word article, and said the following about Anthony.

Miss Anthony is Mrs. Stanton's opposite in many particulars of form and face, she is rather tall and commanding in appearance, walks with a firm tread, and is as straight as an arrow. She is rather thin in face and person, with dark complexion, square cast of features, firm set mouth, rows of regular and handsome straight white teeth, straight nose and ample forehead. Her black hair not yet touched with gray by times, is parted smooth and brought down straight over the ears, in the old style. Her eyes are rather deep set apart and she wears glasses. At times, while speaking, she clasps her hands behind her back, and frequently, to emphasize her words, she taps the floor with her right foot, and sways her hand to and fro. Her voice is pleasant to hear at times, and then it becomes monotonous. She needs more inflection than does Mrs. Stanton, but does not, probably, make herself quite as distinctly heard. She sometimes trips over her words, she always corrects herself immediately. She commands the close attention of an audience.¹³⁶

In this passage, Anthony was framed as a clear and compelling speaker, and the judgments made against her were not based on her sex. She was not a spectacle that would draw attention by her physical abnormality or by being an out-of-place woman on a man's stage. The shift away from writing about Anthony's body as a staged spectacle allowed audiences reading accounts of her extemporaneous speech to engage her as a rhetor, and therefore as someone worthy of both notice and respect.

Constituting Female Citizenship through Delivery

Resting upon a foundation of competence, Anthony's extemporaneous speeches during Reconstruction were rendered comprehensible even to audiences who did not share her cultural, social, and political beliefs. That is, unlike her speeches before the Civil War that relied on a cultural rhetoric that was localized to the Burned-over District, Anthony's extemporaneous speaking during Reconstruction crossed the cultural barriers of regionalism with a widely recognizable competent delivery. Anthony's delivery provided a foundation that was necessary for her extemporaneous speaking to be heard and respected by audiences nationwide. Jacqueline Jones Royster has argued that nineteenth-century female speakers had to demonstrate a foundation of rhetorical and social competence to be acknowledged and respected on the stage.¹³⁷ Anthony's competence in extemporaneous delivery allowed her to constitute a recognizable paradox for her audiences: she was obviously equal with male speakers, but she was still disenfranchised. The paradox of apparent competence but continued inequality provided the warrant from which Anthony's delivery could function to constitute her as an unfairly excluded citizen. In this section I specifically address how Anthony's competent delivery allowed her to function as both the personification of women's inequality and as synecdoche for all women who were denied their rights.

Newspaper articles about her speeches often interpreted Anthony's delivery as a personification of the problems she discussed. During the 1867 tour with Train, the *Buffalo Commercial Advertiser* made the following comments about Anthony: "Miss Anthony is, of course, a maiden lady, of uncertain age, with spectacles. She spoke in a calm, earnest way, and had on a dark frock. She evidently feels deeply the injustices to which her sex have been obliged to submit, and is tall and thin."¹³⁸ Within this wandering

commentary, the author positioned Anthony as the embodied representation of the “injustices to which her sex have been obliged to submit.” Jason Jones argued that Victoria Woodhull’s competence as a speaker was disruptive to the U.S. Senate Judiciary because it demonstrated her reality as a subject.¹³⁹ In much the same way, Anthony’s tall and thin body and her ability to speak calmly and earnestly about her own oppression, embodied the paradox of her unjustifiable inequality. She personified someone who seemed to deserve rights, but her arguments from the stage concomitantly demonstrated that the equality she deserved was still withheld from her.

Anthony personified the equal rhetor being treated unequally and in so doing she both explicitly and implicitly contradicted the notion that legal inequality was harmless. Anthony’s delivery as an equal citizen who was still consistently mistreated by the national and state powers supported her proposition that women’s exclusion from the rights of citizenship was by no means harmless. In a speech on temperance, for example, Anthony noted that “A great change in public sentiment had been brought about [on the temperance issue] by the persistent efforts of women. Now, there was no difference of opinion, except in regard to the ballot.”¹⁴⁰ Women performed important work for social change on the temperance issue, but had little impact on the laws because, Anthony said, “While every whisky maker, seller, and drinker had a voice in the question of the traffic, not one of the dependent wives or mother is permitted to vote. Though we [are] taxed equally with men to support pauperism and crime, nine-tenths of which grew out of liquor, no woman is allowed a voice in saying whether the traffic shall be changed.”¹⁴¹ Since Anthony was well recognized for her life-long work for temperance, she was able to deliver commentary on the problem from a position the audience recognized as filled

with ethos. This ethos allowed her to make arguments about how she was excluded from the decision-making process of the law while those causing the problem were still allowed to participate.

Anthony's delivery allowed her to personify the plight of all women who were treated unequally. Specifically, she embodied narratives of inequality that she delivered extemporaneously. For example, Anthony spoke extemporaneously at an 1870 meeting of the New York State Woman Suffrage Association and spent much of her time sharing stories of working women's low wages and failed strikes. These anecdotes would eventually be the main fodder for "Woman Wants Bread, Not the Ballot," but in 1870 the *New York Times* reported that "Susan B. Anthony presented numerous examples showing the difference in the results of bodies of men and women striking for wages. Men succeeded because they had votes. Women had not votes and failed."¹⁴² Putting the same point more explicitly, the *New York Tribune* reported Anthony's remarks as "The session was closed with a plea for working-women by Miss Anthony, who said that nine out of every ten of the strikes originated by men accomplished their object, while women never did; and this was because women had no vote to give them assistance."¹⁴³ The stories of working women who made little money and worked in deplorable conditions, but could not escape their plight because they lacked a political voice were told by a woman with almost no industrial experience.¹⁴⁴ By sharing these stories, however, Anthony was able to harness the experiences of poor working women to summarize the problem of political exclusion and to simultaneously make herself the personification of the trials women faced due to inequality.

Anthony was also able, through her delivery, to embody the possibility women voters would have for greater equality if they could gain the ballot. Speaking in Binghamton in 1874, Anthony delivered “The Power of the Ballot.” The *Binghamton Daily Republican* provided this summary, highlighting the potential that voting-citizens had for equality in the marketplace. “She showed that the ballot is of great import to men of all description, from the capitalist who uses it to protect his riches, the artisan and laborer who establish a certain equality with the capitalists by it, and the Negroes in America who by its aid have become politically equal to their former masters.”¹⁴⁵ She then argued that the same equality would be granted in the home to female voting citizens. “If women had the power of voting, she argued, it would make them the political equal of their husbands, and—in some manner, not clearly explained—there would be a check upon family broils and troubles, and the dependence of women upon men would cease.” Although Anthony’s analogic reasoning between the marketplace and the home was lost on the Binghamton newspaperman, her argument that working women would only gain market equality as they gained access to the ballot was more readily received. The writer editorialized, “Miss Anthony did show, with some degree of clearness, theories upon which working women, spinsters, etc., may be benefitted, by overawing politicians into talking for them when they want their votes, and working for them for party reasons.” Anthony, as the epitome of the “spinster” discussed in the article, brought the spectacle of the competent, self-reliant woman worker before the audience, while illustrating the inequality to which even an accomplished woman was subjected. As a long-time fighter for temperance who was still excluded from voting against liquor

trafficking, Anthony personified the harm that women's unequal status perpetuated in her society.

In addition to personifying the problem of exclusion, Anthony also served as the synecdoche for all women given unequal status by an unfair system. The best and most obvious example of Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioning in this way comes from her extemporaneous response to the judge in her trial for voting. The following is taken from the brief account offered in the *Rochester Democrat and Chronicle* the day after Anthony's conviction on an ordered verdict of guilty.

The court made the usual inquiry of Miss Anthony if she had anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced. Miss Anthony answered she had a great many things to say, and declared that in her trial every principle of justice had been violated; that every right had been denied; that she had had no trial by her peers; that the court and jurors were her political superiors and not her peers, and announced her determination to continue her labors until equality was obtained and was proceeding to discuss the questions involved in the case when she was interrupted by the court.¹⁴⁶

Anthony here articulated the rich hypocrisy of being "tried" by the courts when every right of citizenship that the courts were designed to enforce and protect were withheld if the person on trial was female. Reporting the next day in an article for the *Leavenworth Times*, Matilda Joslyn Gage put a slightly sharper point on the synecdochic critique of female citizenship Anthony had offered.

Court—"You have been tried, Miss Anthony, by the forms of law, and my decision has been rendered by law."

Miss Anthony—“Yes, but laws made by men, under a government of men, interpreted by men and for the benefit of men. The only chance women have for justice in this country is to violate the law, as I have done, and as I shall *continue* to do,” and she struck her hand heavily on the table in emphasis of what she said. “Does your honor suppose that we obeyed the infamous fugitive slave law which forbade to give a cup of cold water to a slave fleeing from his master? I tell you we did not obey it; we fed him and clothed him, and sent him on his way to Canada. *So shall we trample all unjust laws under foot.*”¹⁴⁷

Anthony here explicitly articulated the embodied difference between the law as applied to men and to women. Women, whom Anthony synecdochically represented, had no more justice under the law than did a runaway slave before the war. Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking demonstrated the paradox of her equal competence with, but continued legal inequality beside, the men who made the laws and ran the government.

The slightly more nuanced and circumspect newspaper coverage of Anthony’s speaking during Reconstruction, especially the less vitriolic commentary on her physical appearance, demonstrates significant social change in her national audience. Anthony’s body was no longer the primary spectacle of interest to audiences; her arguments had become more mainstream, and her lecture career had grown to national renown. This shift in context meant that Anthony’s body was read first as a competent speaker and then as an example of the equality she sought.

Constituting Equal Female Citizenship, Catalyzing Unequal Laws

Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of political, legal, and social equality. However, this performance came about within a culture where

social norms of gendered exclusion were central to the definition of citizenship. That is, while legal definitions of who could be a voting citizen in the United States had always been explicitly raced and explicitly classed, there had not been explicit national proscriptions on a voter's gender until Reconstruction. Since the proscriptions on class and race had been made explicit previous to Reconstruction, those who argued for expanded suffrage on these grounds had explicit, finite, and codified exclusions against which to set arguments for full equality in suffrage rights. Since the proscriptions on a voting citizen's gender had not been made explicit on the national level, Anthony's performance of female citizenship as politically, legally, and socially equal violated assumed norms of her society. Anthony was read as attacking the very fabric of American social life, instead of attacking poorly constructed laws or compromises of the founders. Since Anthony was not fighting against a set of texts, she was publically constructed not as seeking to change unfair laws, but as seeking to overthrow the social order. In this section, therefore, I argue that Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship that both constituted women as equal voting citizens and embodied a specter of social change that impelled national-level politicians and state legislatures to codify the cultural assumptions of male-gendered citizenship into laws that excluded women from voting rights.

Extemporaneous Speaking and Competence as a Citizen

Anthony performed competence in such a way that she could not be ignored or laughed off, and she therefore embodied the imperative for those in power to actually construct specific texts that disempowered women. Jason Jones, in his work on Victoria Woodhull's 1871 memorial to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, argued that,

Woodhull's physical presence in what was perceived to be a male rhetorical space, combined with her rhetorical competence, enabled her to make salient the unnatural character of the divide between the public and women. If "the Minors' arguments," as Angela Ray and Cindy Koenig Richards observe, "constituted a political subjectivity that women could imagine and actively perform" (378)—the woman as citizen—Woodhull breathed life into that subjectivity as she embodied it before both those who attended the address and her extended audience who learned of it in the press.¹⁴⁸

Jones' insights can be extrapolated to Anthony's imitative and social invention and her personified and synecdochic extemporaneous speaking during Reconstruction. Anthony's unassailable competence as an extemporaneous speaker embodied the reality of woman as an equal-yet-excluded citizen/subject within the ostensibly-representative democratic government of the United States. Unlike Woodhull's performance, however, Anthony's embodiment of the citizenship/subject was not confined to the halls of political leadership. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking, and the coverage she received from newspapers, allowed her to bring the embodied reality of the female citizen/subject to audience of non-political individuals across the country. In front of these audiences, Anthony performed all the necessary action to be a full citizen, and yet was excluded from her full rights; Anthony as an extemporaneous speaker was the visible critique of baseless and paradoxical gender bias in the law and government.

Anthony's imitative invention allowed her to engage with political, philosophical, and legal discourse to demonstrate that she was competent to be a voting citizen, and yet still paradoxically excluded from equal voting rights of citizenship. In an 1871 speech in

Washington D.C. at a meeting of the education committee of the NWSA, Anthony spoke about the political ramification of women's enfranchisement. She said "every vital question that concerned the government should be considered by the women of the republic. The Republican party had enfranchised the Negroes and had made for itself four million voters that can not [*sic*] be alienated from that party. There was another class to be enfranchised and it was a question of who bids first."¹⁴⁹ By imitating the political maneuvering of Republican politicians and dangling the potential for an unbeatable coalition of women voters as a prize, Anthony demonstrated her competence as a political subject. Anthony did not merely understand the political potential of women's enfranchisement, she embraced it as an inducement for those holding the power to pass a sixteenth amendment to do so. Furthermore, having organized the meeting and invited the members of the press who were covering it, Anthony also demonstrated that she could be an asset in creating public engagement with and support for whichever party offered her the prize of equality.

Anthony's competence in the political rhetoric that characterized the "male" space of political campaigns also demonstrated her equality as a citizen with male speakers. The most obvious example of this performed political equality was Anthony's tour with Train. In coverage that was typical of her tour, the New York State *Sunday Mercury* said that Anthony "blessed the Republican party of the West and the Radicals of the East with a blessing which needed only a slight degree of profanity to make it a curse."¹⁵⁰ Anthony's engagement with party politics was especially important to the performance of equality because, as Schudson has argued, "the parties were a fourth branch of government, responsible more than any other institution for political education and

mobilization” during Reconstruction and the ensuing Gilded Age.¹⁵¹ The role of the parties in political education was something Anthony critiqued especially clearly in her push for suffrage. An article in the *Leavenworth Commercial*, a Democrat-affiliated paper, reported that Anthony:

denounced the ‘mean, low sneaking editor’ of the Republican press of Leavenworth, and laid at their door the cause of the defeat of the measures, if defeat should come. She upbraided them and the Republican party generally with being reticent to their professed principles and unworthy the confidence of the advocates of human rights. Reformers must stand alone and on their own merits. The Republican party is too rotten.¹⁵²

Although Anthony would eventually reject the idea of a third political party dedicated explicitly to women’s rights, the implicit threats in her comments—to head and support a third political party—constituted a direct attack on the system of party politics. This attack embodied her competence. It also demonstrated how she threatened the stability and control the Republican party exerted over reformers and post-war national politics by rejecting party loyalty norms.

Extemporaneous speaking was an especially effective mode for Anthony’s performance of citizenship because of its cultural ties to honesty and authenticity. Emily Murphy Cope has used John Albert Broadus’ 1870 *A Treatise on the Preparation and Delivery of Sermons* to convincingly demonstrate that, by 1870, extemporaneous speaking had become a cultural touchstone for American expectations of authenticity. Cope said, “Much more than honesty and lack of pretense, Broadus’ conception of authenticity entails complete mental, emotional, and bodily ‘digestion’ of the message—

the message must become part of the preacher.”¹⁵³ The fully digested message, and therefore the authenticity of the speaker presenting it as truth, was best shared without the “art” or “acting” that a manuscript would allow. Further reiterating the connection between extemporaneous speaking and public perceptions of authenticity and honesty, Sandra Gustaferson argued that “claims to authenticity and relations of power were given form and meaning through the reliance on or freedom from text in oral performance.”¹⁵⁴ The scholarly claims that extemporaneous speaking was a cultural touchstone for authenticity and honesty are also supported by the textbooks, preaching manuals, and biographies that have framed the discussion of extemporaneous invention and delivery in this dissertation. Adams noted that extemporaneous speaking brought “a force, an intent, an energy, ‘warm from the soul and faithful to its fires’ which no degree of meditation can attain” to a sermon.¹⁵⁵ Ware identified extemporaneous speaking as more natural, warm, and earnest than reading from a manuscript,¹⁵⁶ while Pittenger asserted that the style could more effectively bring the gospel to the listeners than could a manuscript sermon.¹⁵⁷ Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking not only demonstrated her competence as a citizen, but also fostered the perception that she was authentically and honestly seeking her rights, not performing a role or trying to dupe her audiences.

Anthony embodied equal female citizenship, but the perceived authenticity of her performance also worked to demonstrate that the women who came to hear her speak were also competent to exercise voting rights. As Campbell has argued, encouraging audience participation was an important element of the craft-learning process through which women learned to participate in public speaking and therefore an important part of feminine style.¹⁵⁸ Anthony used a strategy of encouraging those in her audience,

especially women, to vote in a poll on the suffrage question at the end of her speech; she encouraged women to literally raise their hands in favor of suffrage and demonstrate that they could, in fact, vote. During a speaking tour in 1874, the New York State *Sherburne News* said the following about Anthony's speaking. "It was a masterly, logical and unanswerable argument in favor of conferring the right of suffrage upon women, vividly illustrated with facts and statistics that could not fail of convincing thinking men and women that the power of the ballot is *the* power, and the *only* power, that can elevate womanhood to its proper dignity and appreciation."¹⁵⁹ The paper also commented on Anthony's custom of practice voting at the end of each lecture.

When she asked the ladies who did not wish the elective franchise to say No, not a voice was heard, the question was reversed, those desiring enfranchisement being requested to vote 'I,' and the response was nearly unanimous. ... We think this vote showed something of the power of the lecturer's effort, and doubt whether a single person left the house without a more exalted estimate of the power of the ballot.¹⁶⁰

The paper, however, did not stop with a mere recognition of Anthony's authenticity and equality, but made an explicit connection to the political power of her participatory citizenship strategy by connecting it with the action of political candidates. The writer said, "Don't be surprised to see either the Republicans or Democrats taking the 'wind from her sails' or 'stealing her thunder.' She is doing a good work." In these lines the paper recognized Anthony's obvious fitness for full citizenship rights and highlighted the power of voting, even in a simple post-lecture poll, to connect civic participation to party-held political power.

Finally, Anthony's use of legal arguments and her unfair trial for voting demonstrated that she was capable of performing her civic duty while questioning the suitability of the men charged with upholding the law. Trial by jury had been implemented as a national constitutional protection specifically because of the corruption of the British court system during colonial rule. An editorial in the *Leavenworth Times*, edited by Anthony's brother Daniel Reed Anthony, is representative of the outrage that followed the directed verdict of guilty.¹⁶¹ "With this snap judgment I could neither believe my eyes nor my ears. I had not heard a word from the honorable twelve, who were supposed to be sitting in the jury-box as a protection against tyranny of the court. I had not seen a movement of the lips or a motion of the head to signify their assent, or dissent to the court's verdict."¹⁶² The outrage expressed in this editorial is indicative not only of the perceived injustice of Anthony's trial, but also of the fear of creeping tyranny that permeated Reconstruction. Not only did Susan B. Anthony's legal expertise demonstrate her ability to hold the rights of citizenship, but judge Hunt's unconstitutional direction to bring in a verdict of guilty undermined his credibility as an able enforcer of those same rights. The editorial reiterated this allusion to judicial tyranny saying, "I never had expected in this boasted land of every man as good as his neighbor, that I should ever see a dozen men overawed by one man. ... When too late I heard a juror declare 'guilty was *not his verdict*,' neither was it the verdict of the entire other eleven. 'Could I have spoken,' said he, 'I should have answered not guilty and men in that jury-box would have sustained me.'¹⁶³ In case the point had not been put clearly enough, the paper then editorialized, "'Could he have spoken!' Why did he not speak? What was he there for? Does the Inquisition rule in the United States Court room? See to it, people of the United

States, your liberties are fast going from you.”¹⁶⁴ Anthony’s unjust trial embodied the fear of tyranny that plagued Reconstruction politics; a competent citizen, even a male citizen serving on a jury, could be made the subject of unjust rulers if equality in citizenship was not restored.

Voting as a Male Citizen’s Right and the Specter of Social Change

Anthony’s embodied representation of the excluded citizen subject helped create a political climate in which cultural norms were no longer sufficient to exclude women from the population of voting citizens. Anthony’s performance, therefore, helped set the stage for the creation of explicit exclusions of women from the voting rights granted to male citizens. In order for a greatly expanding federal government to maintain even the façade of lawful republican democracy, new laws had to be created that explicitly named the populations to be included in and excluded from government-protected rights. In an interview about the 1872 Republican national convention, Anthony explicitly outlined the problem of women’s place in the political patronage system. In answer to a question about Theodore Tilton’s potential support for the woman suffrage cause, Anthony said, “No: I reckon he comes in the interest of Horace Greeley. You see our cause is just as the anti-slavery cause was for a long time. It had plenty of friends and supporters three years out of four, but every fourth year when a President was to be elected, it was lost sight of; then the nation must be saved and the slave must be sacrificed. So it is with us women.”¹⁶⁵ Although politicians were often willing to support women’s rights in an abstract sense, when the challenge for change began to threaten the culturally assumed norm of men as agents and women as ignorable subjects, the call for women’s inclusions ceased.

Anthony's obvious competence and performance of equality was often read as a call for overthrowing the social order. This red herring argument obscured the paradox of excluding obviously competent citizens from the voting rights of citizenship based simply on sex. A representative sample of this red herring argument comes from her tour of the northwestern territories in 1871, in the *Territorial Dispatch and Alaska Times* of Seattle, Washington. The paper begins by praising Anthony as a "distinguished spinster" who brings "much more than ordinary ability" to the lecture platform in a speech of "impressive facts and irreproachable logic."¹⁶⁶ Yet the paper did not provide a summary of her speech, instead saying, "She did not directly and positively address the licentious social theories which she is known to entertain because she well knew that they would shock the sensibilities of her audience, but confined herself to the one subject of woman suffrage as a means to attain equality of competitive labor."¹⁶⁷ Ignoring the content of Anthony's speech on labor and the ballot, the paper offered the following tirade accusing her of seeking to destroy virtue, marriage, and conservative values.

Our sole purpose now is to enter our protest against the inclusion of doctrines which we believe are calculated to degrade and debauch society by demolishing the dividing lines between virtue and vice. It is true that Miss Anthony did not openly advocate free love and disregard for the sanctity of the marriage relation, but she did worse—under the guise of defending woman against manifest wrongs, she attempts to instill into their minds an utter disregard for all that is right and conservative in the present order of society.

Anthony's speech was the same content as her other conservative "Work, Wages, and the Ballot" speeches. Ignoring her actual arguments, however, allowed the paper to frame

Anthony as a radical social revolutionary seeking to destroy the ideals of American society. Since the proscriptions on a citizen's rights based on gender had not been made explicit in national political and legal language, Anthony's performance of female citizenship as politically, legally, and socially equal, violated assumed norms of her society but did not violate a national law. As such, her violation could easily be extrapolated, by those seeking to discredit her, to an assault on the moral fabric and social virtue that made up the gendered norms of the nation.

Anthony tried to clearly articulate that her work was only for the greatest good represented by protecting a right to suffrage for all people, but her work was still consistently maligned as an attempt to overthrow either society or government. In an 1869 article in *The Revolution*, Anthony printed a letter that had accused her of a "course opposing the Fifteenth Amendment and Political (combined with moral) Temperance action" as "absolutely suicidal."¹⁶⁸ Anthony responded, "*The Revolution*, criticizes, 'opposes,' the Fifteenth Amendment not for what it is, but for what it is not. Not because it enfranchises black men, but because it does not enfranchise all women, black and white....Do you think women should vote?" she said, "is the one and only question in our catechism."¹⁶⁹ Within the context of Reconstruction, Anthony's request for equality, even in the limited space of nationally protected rights, was considered a great social evil.

Anthony's performance of political, legal, and social equality through extemporaneous speaking violated the social norms of gender that defined suffrage as a male citizen's privilege. Since the gendered definition of American citizenship and the rights it guaranteed had never been explicitly named in the governing documents of the country, Anthony's performance of equality violated social norms. By asking for equal

treatment as a citizen, without the explicit exclusionary laws against which black men and poor white men fought, Anthony was read as attacking the very fabric of American social life, instead of as seeking legal protection for an expanded idea of who deserved rights. Since Anthony was not fighting against a set of texts, she was publically constructed not as seeking to change unfair laws, but as seeking to overthrow the social order. Therefore, her extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship that both constituted women as equal citizens and embodied a specter of social change that impelled national-level politicians and state legislatures to codify the cultural assumptions of male-gendered citizenship into laws that excluded women from democratic citizenship rights.

Conclusions and Implications

Reconstruction was a cycle of perpetual loss for Anthony's cause. Anthony ascribed to a more incremental approach to gaining women's rights than did Stanton or Woodhull. At the same time, she also refused to believe, as Phillips or Douglass argued, that women could be ignored during Reconstruction without negative consequences to the cause of human rights. Instead, Anthony's work focused on ensuring women the right to vote so that the legal mechanism by which they were governed would be opened to them. Unlike the radical social change work that Stanton pursued—reforming divorce law, child custody law, changing women's relative social position—Anthony sought to open a few select legal doors so that women could, incrementally and as it reflected their own desires, seek the changes they wanted.

This elision of identity causes two major problems for rhetorical scholarship on Anthony's life: guilt-by-association accusations of racism and erasure of Anthony's

extemporaneous speaking. In contrast to rhetorical or historical scholarship based on the elision of difference between Anthony and Stanton, my research demonstrates that Anthony's extemporaneous speaking imitated the arguments of her culture and presented a picture of competent female citizenship to a national audience. It should be noted here that Anthony's lack of explicitly racist arguments is no excuse for her silence on issues of inequality. Her reticence to admonish Stanton or Train, even in the face of sexism from Douglass or Phillips, was a failure of the Quaker principles of equality that helped shape her rhetoric before the Civil War. There is no excuse, either contemporaneously or through the lens of history, for her betrayal of human equality. Yet, reducing her Reconstruction rhetorical work to racism and one great speech on suffrage is a false judgment.

This chapter has argued that Anthony's extemporaneous speaking during Reconstruction functioned as a performance of citizenship that both constituted women as equal citizens and provided the impetus for national-level politicians and state legislatures to codify the cultural assumptions of male-gendered citizenship into laws that excluded women from democratic citizenship rights. When both state and national legislatures created and enforced legal interpretations designed to exclude women from the franchise, and when the Supreme Court ruled that the franchise was not a privilege of citizenship, Anthony's battle for women's recognition as citizens failed. This failure, however, should not be read as an inherently negative outcome for what Campbell calls the unified "rhetorical movement" of feminism.¹⁷⁰ Anthony's extemporaneous speaking helped force lawmakers to explicitly disenfranchise women, in spite of the obvious equality Anthony demonstrated. The inclusion of the word "male" as a modifier to

citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment and the lack of protection for female voters in the Fifteenth Amendment provided explicit texts against which women could argue. The rights of democratic citizenship were being explicitly denied to women, while they were still forced to perform the responsibilities of citizens. These legal precedents and laws provided the text on which feminist rhetors could build their arguments for equal rights well beyond Anthony's life.

Finally, Anthony's imitative approach to invention and competent delivery also set a precedent that would be used with even greater effect by suffrage leaders in the nineteen-teens. Kirt Wilson has demonstrated that white women were not the originators of a strategy of mimesis-as-reform; the strategy was prominent among nineteenth century African American reformers.¹⁷¹ For the white woman's suffrage movements, however, Belinda Stillion Southard has argued that mimesis was a primary tool used by the suffrage leaders in the decade before passage of the Nineteenth Amendment to demonstrate the competence of women to hold the rights of voting citizens.¹⁷² From imitating the parades of a newly inaugurated president to representing women as political actors in the formation of the Women's Party, enacting equality through imitation was a key strategy in women's work for equal voting rights. Anthony's demonstration of competence as a citizen through imitation of political, philosophical, and legal arguments, and through the competent performance of extemporaneous speech would provide a roadmap for those who followed her to seek social change through rhetorical imitation.

Notes

- ¹ Eleanor Flexner, *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975), 143, 145, 167.
- ² Dudden consistently uses Stanton and Anthony as a single figure in history throughout her book. Since this conflation occurs throughout the book, I have not listed specific page numbers.
- Faye E. Dudden, *Fighting Chance: The Struggle Over Woman Suffrage and Black Suffrage in Reconstruction America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
- ³ Lori D. Ginzberg, *Elizabeth Cady Stanton: An American Life* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2009), 123.
- ⁴ Laura E. Free, *Suffrage Reconstructed: Gender, Race, and Voting Rights in the Civil War Era* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 135.
- ⁵ Patricia G. Holland and Ann D. Gordon, *The Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony: Guide and Index to the Microfilm Edition* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1992), 2.
- ⁶ C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1951).
- ⁷ In the American West, for example, women were granted the right to vote in Wyoming in 1869 and in Utah in 1870, while the rise of the Klu Klux Klan between 1865 and 1871 functionally eliminated black male suffrage in some areas of the South even while federal troops continued to back Republican governments in the state capitals. In relation to Anthony's work, Dudden has dated the "moment of

political opportunity” from 1864 through 1869. This political opportunity is the timeframe Dudden has named as “Reconstruction” and correlates with the policy arguments surrounding the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Flexner, *Century of Struggle*, 156.; David Mark Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism: The First Century of the Ku Klux Klan, 1865-1965* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1965).; J. Michael Martinez, *Carpetbaggers, Cavalry, and the Ku Klux Klan: Exposing the Invisible Empire during Reconstruction* (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).; Dudden, *Fighting Chance*, 11-12.

⁸ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “Femininity and Feminism: To Be or Not To Be a Woman,” *Communication Quarterly*, 31, no. 2 (1983): 101-108.

⁹ SBA to ECS, Leavenworth [Kan.] Apr. 19/65,” *Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, Volume 1: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, eds. Ann D. Gordon and Patricia G. Holland (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 543.

¹⁰ SBA to ECS, Leavenworth [Kan.] Apr. 19/65,” *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 543.

¹¹ SBA to ECS, Leavenworth [Kan.] Apr. 19/65,” *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 545.

¹² Dudden, *Fighting Chance*, 11-12.

¹³ Dudden, *Fighting Chance*, 12.

¹⁴ “From the Diary of SBA, Friday, August 4, 1865,” in *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 552.

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- ¹⁵ “SBA to Carline Healey Dale, Standard Office—48 Beekman st. New York Dec. 26, 1865,” in *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 562.
- ¹⁶ Dudden, *Fighting Chance*, 60.
- ¹⁷ Michael Les Benedict, “Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court,” *The Supreme Court Review* (1978): 39-79.
- ¹⁸ William Eskridge, and John Ferejohn, “The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism,” *Vanderbilt Law Review* 47, No. 5 (1994): 1355-1398.; Gary Gerstle, *Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding to the Present* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015).; William James Hoffer, *To Enlarge the Machinery of Government: Congressional Debates and the Growth of the American State, 1858-1891* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).; Kurt T. Lash, *The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American Citizenship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).; Forrest McDonald, *States' Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 1776-1876* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000).; Michael J. Steudeman, “The Educational Imaginary in Radical Reconstruction: Congressional Public Polity Rhetoric and American Federalism, 1862-1872,” (PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland, 2016).
- ¹⁹ Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877* (New York: Harper Collins, 2011), 259.
- ²⁰ Foner, *Reconstruction*, 446-449.
- ²¹ Foner, *Reconstruction*, 446.

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- ²² Mark G. Schmeller, *Invisible Sovereign: Imagining Public Opinion from the Revolution to Reconstruction* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016).
- ²³ Anthony, Stanton, and Gage, *History of Woman Suffrage*, 90.
- ²⁴ Harper, *The Life*, 243; Stanton, *Eighty Years*, Chapter XV.
- ²⁵ Flexner, *Century of Struggle*, 135-139.
- ²⁶ Lisa Tetrault, *The Myth of Seneca Falls: Memory and the Women's Suffrage Movement, 1848-1898* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 20.
- ²⁷ Dudden, *Fighting Chance*, 22.
- ²⁸ Harper, *The Life*, 248.
- ²⁹ Dudden, *Fighting Chance*, 62.
- ³⁰ Heather Cox Richardson, *The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 1865-1901* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
- ³¹ Richardson, *The Death of Reconstruction*, 31-32.
- ³² Richardson, *The Death of Reconstruction*, 32-34.
- ³³ Gordon recorded in a footnote that Daniel was a lieutenant colonel in the Seventh Kansas Volunteer Calvary, but resigned his commission after he refused to order his men to return fugitive slaves. Upon his return home Leavenworth, Daniel Anthony was lauded as a hero of the antislavery town and was elected mayor the next year. He also bought the Leavenworth *Evening Bulletin* newspaper where his sister sometimes worked as an editor.

Gordon, *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 536, note 1.

³⁴ Articles by George Francis Train, *The Revolution*, Microfilm, reel 1, slides 0141, 0461, 0480-01, 0485.

³⁵ “Article by ECS, ‘Manhood Suffrage,’ *The Revolution*, December 24, 1865,” in *The Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 194-200.

³⁶ Harper, *The Life*, 350-360.

³⁷ Angela Ray and Cindy Koenig Richards, “Inventing Citizens, Imagining Gender Justice: The Suffrage Rhetoric of Virginia and Francis Minor,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 93, no. 4 (2007): 375-402.

³⁸ My capitalization and usage of the phrase “new departure strategy” is not in keeping with other scholars of the 1870s women’s rights movement because the most recent scholarship and primary texts suggest my phrasing is more accurate to the period. Hull thoroughly discussed this phrase. Calling women’s judicial work for suffrage as a right guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment the New Departure strategy (using capital letters) was popularized by Ellen Carrol DuBois. DuBois based her usage on the title of a chapter in the *History of Woman Suffrage*. In 1872, however, the New Departure strategy was a political tactic used by the Democratic party in northern states to reject the anti-Reconstruction platform of the 1868 election and try to win voters from the conservative Republicans. The only use of “new departure” Hull located contemporaneous to the women’s actions in the 1870s was a convention call published in the *New York Times* on January 8, 1872, inviting “all those interested in woman’s enfranchisement.... to consider the ‘new departure,’ women already citizens, and

their rights as such secured by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.” Uses of the phrase New Departure strategy do appear in Gordon’s collection of Anthony’s papers, but in reference to the strategy of the 1872 Democratic party, not women’s voting actions.

For more information on the Democratic party platform in 1872 called the New Departure strategy, see: Vincent P. De Santis, *Republicans Face the Southern Question: The New Departure Years, 1877-1897* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959).; Edward L. Gambill, *Conservative Ordeal: Northern Democrats and Reconstruction, 1865–1868* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1981).; Lawrence Grossman, *The Democratic Party and the Negro: Northern and National Politics, 1868-92* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1976).; Ward McAfee, *Religion, Race and Reconstruction* (Albany, NY: SUNY University Press, 1998).

For Hull’s full discussion of the “new departure strategy” see: Hull, *The Woman*, 49.

³⁹ Angela G. Ray, and Cindy Koenig Richards, “Inventing Citizens, Imagining Gender Justice: The Suffrage Rhetoric of Virginia and Francis Minor,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 93, no. 4 (2007): 375, 379-380.

⁴⁰ Hull, *The Woman*, 39-40.

⁴¹ Kathleen Barry, *Susan B. Anthony: A Biography of a Singular Feminist* (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 235; Hull, *The Woman*, 46.

⁴² Hull, *The Woman*, 47.

⁴³ A full discussion of Victoria Woodhull’s intriguing and barrier-breaking life is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a thorough discussion of Woodhull’s life, see:

Barbara Goldsmith, and Paul Avrich, *Other Powers: The Age of Suffrage, Spiritualism, and the Scandalous Victoria Woodhull* (New York: A.A.K, 1998).; Mary Gabriel and Paul Avrich, *Notorious Victoria: The Life of Victoria Woodhull, Uncensored* (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, 1998).; Lois Beachy Underhill, *The Woman Who Ran for President: The Many Lives of Victoria Woodhull* (Bridgehampton, NY: Bridge Works Publishers, 1995).; Victoria C. Woodhull, and Paul Avrich, *The Victoria Woodhull Reader* (Weston, MA: M & S Press, 1974).

For discussions of Victoria Woodhull's rhetorical career, see:

Wendy Hayden, "'Audacia Dangyereyes': Appropriate Speech and the 'Immodest' Woman Speaker of the Comstock Era," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 42 no. 5 (2012): 450-471.; Wendy Hayden, "(R)Evolutionary Rhetorics: Science and Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century Free-Love Discourse," *Rhetoric Review* 29, no. 2 (2010): 111-128.; Jason Jones, "Breathing Life into a Public Woman: Victoria Woodhull's Defense of Woman's Suffrage," *Rhetoric Review* 28, no. 4 (2009): 352-369.; Kate Zittlow Rogness, and Christina Foust, "Beyond Rights and Virtues As Foundation for Women's Agency: Emma Goldman's Rhetoric of Free Love," *Western Journal of Communication* 75, no. 2 (2011): 148-167.

⁴⁴ Barry, *Susan B. Anthony*, 244.

⁴⁵ Barry, *Susan B. Anthony*, 245-46.

⁴⁶ Hull, *The Woman*, 58.

⁴⁷ Campbell, *Man Cannot*, 108-116.

⁴⁸ Campbell, *Man Cannot*, 116.

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- ⁴⁹ Anthony, Stanton, and Gage, *The History*, 689.
- ⁵⁰ Richard Wightman Fox, *Trials of Intimacy: Love and Loss in the Beecher-Tilton Scandal* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
- ⁵¹ “Interview with ECS at Tenaflly, July 27, 1874,” *Selected Papers: National Protection for National Citizens*, 97-98, note 2.
- ⁵² “Interview with ECS at Tenaflly, July 27, 1874,” *Selected Papers: National Protection for National Citizens*, 95-99.
- ⁵³ “ECS to SBA, Tenaflly, July 30, 1874,” *Selected Papers: National Protection for National Citizens*, Editor’s note, 99.
- ⁵⁴ “ECS to SBA, Tenaflly, July 30, 1874,” *Selected Papers: National Protection for National Citizens*, 99-100.
- ⁵⁵ James Jasinski, “Invention,” In, *Sourcebook on Rhetoric: Key Concepts in Contemporary Rhetorical Studies* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2001), 327-331.
- ⁵⁶ Judith Stills and Michael Worton, “Introduction,” In *Intertextuality: Theories and Practices*, eds. Judith Stills and Michael Worton (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990), 1.
- ⁵⁷ Each of these texts has been discussed at greater length in the introduction to this dissertation. Lucy Hogan and Martha Solomon, “Extending the Conversation: Sharing the Inner Light,” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (1995): 32-46.; Beth Ann Rothermel, “Prophets, Friends, Conversationalists: Quaker Rhetorical Culture, Women’s Commonplace Books, and the Art of Invention, 1775–1840,” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (2013): 71-94.; Lisa Reid Ricker,

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- “(De)Constructing the Praxis of Memory-Keeping: Late Nineteenth-Century Autograph Albums as Sites of Rhetorical Invention,” *Rhetoric Review* 29, no. 3 (2010): 239–256.; Lisa M. Gring-Pemle, “Writing Themselves into Consciousness: Creating a Rhetorical Bridge Between the Public and Private Spheres,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 84, no. 1 (1998): 41-61.
- ⁵⁸ “Remarks by SBA at Memorial Service for Lincoln, April 23, 1865,” in *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 545.
- ⁵⁹ “Remarks by SBA at Memorial Service for Lincoln, April 23, 1865,” in *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 546.
- ⁶⁰ “Remarks by SBA at Memorial Service for Lincoln, April 23, 1865,” in *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 546.
- ⁶¹ “From the Diary of SBA, Monday, April 24, 1865,” in *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 547.
- ⁶² “SBA to Caroline Healey Dale, Standard Office—48 Beekmand st. New York Dec. 26, 1865,” in *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 563.
- ⁶³ Harper, *The Life*, 245-50.
- ⁶⁴ “From the Diary of SBA, Friday, August 4, 1865,” in *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 552.
- ⁶⁵ “Eleventh National Women’s Rights Convention, May 10, 1866,” in *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 585.
- ⁶⁶ Gordon, *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 591, footnote 1.
- ⁶⁷ “SBA to Edwin A. Studwell, Rochester, Aug. 20, 186[6],” in *Selected Papers: In the School of Anti-Slavery*, 590.

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- ⁶⁸ “Speech by SBA to the Equal Rights Convention in New York City, 6 December 1866,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 1.
- ⁶⁹ “SBA to Anna E. Dickinson, Lawrence, Kan. Spet [sic]. 23/67,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 92-94.
- ⁷⁰ “Speech by SBA in St. Louis, Missouri, November 25, 1867,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 104-113.
- ⁷¹ “Speech by SBA in St. Louis, Missouri, November 25, 1867,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 105.
- ⁷² “Speech by SBA in St. Louis, Missouri, November 25, 1867,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 105.
- ⁷³ “Speech by SBA in St. Louis, Missouri, November 25, 1867,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 106.
- ⁷⁴ “Speech by SBA in St. Louis, Missouri, November 25, 1867,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 104.
- ⁷⁵ “Speech by SBA in St. Louis, Missouri, November 25, 1867,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 104.
- ⁷⁶ “Speech by SBA in St. Louis, Missouri, November 25, 1867,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 107.
- ⁷⁷ “Speech by SBA in St. Louis, Missouri, November 25, 1867,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 109.
- ⁷⁸ Republican Party Platforms: “Republican Party Platform of 1868,” May 20, 1868. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency*

Project, The University of California.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29622>.

⁷⁹ The letter begins by greeting Dickinson as “My Darling Dicky Dick.”

⁸⁰ “SBA to Anne E Dickinson, New York, June 29, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 150-52.

⁸¹ “SBA to Anne E Dickinson, New York, July 10, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 152.

⁸² In the same letter to Dickinson, Anthony noted that Lucy Stone and Wendell Phillips had decided to not refund the \$400 she had laid out for the Kansas campaign for women’s rights, and had further decided to withhold her promised salary of \$600. Further, Train never made good on his promised funding for the *Revolution* and the Kansas campaign.

⁸³ “Meeting of the Working Woman’s Association in New York, September 17, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 162-168.

⁸⁴ “Meeting of the Working Woman’s Association in New York, September 17, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 164.

⁸⁵ “Remarks by SBA to the National Labor Union in New York, September 22, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 170.

⁸⁶ “Remarks by SBA to the National Labor Union in New York, September 22, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 170.

⁸⁷ “SBA to the New York State Colored Men’s Convention, New-York, October 1, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 183-184.

⁸⁸ “SBA to the New York State Colored Men’s Convention, New-York, October 1, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 183.

⁸⁹ Patricia Hill Collins, *Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).; Cathy N. Davidson and Linda Wagner-Martin, *The Oxford Book of Women’s Writing in the United States* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995).; Angela G. Dorenkamp et al., *Images of Women in American Popular Culture* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995).; Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, *Within the Plantation Household: Black and White Women of the Old South* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988).; bell hooks, *Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1981).; Shirley Logan, “*We Are Coming*”: *The Persuasive Discourse of Nineteenth-Century Black Women* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999).; Miriam Schneir, *Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings* (New York: Vintage, 1972).

⁹⁰ “SBA to the New York State Colored Men’s Convention, New-York, October 1, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 183.

⁹¹ “SBA to the New York State Colored Men’s Convention, New-York, October 1, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 184.

⁹² In an editorial note on the text, Gordon noted that more than one thousand people had come to participate in the AERA. The original disruption occurred when Stephen Foster, without any proof, accused Anthony and Stanton of embezzling funds from the organization. Henry Blackwell and Frederick Douglass both defended

the women, but Douglass included “a little good natured criticism” of Stanton’s racist rhetoric in the revolution.

“Remarks by SBA to the American Equal Rights Association in New York, May 12, 1869,—Editorial Note,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 238.

⁹³ “Remarks by SBA to the American Equal Rights Association in New York, May 12, 1869,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 238-241.

⁹⁴ “Remarks by SBA to the American Equal Rights Association in New York, May 12, 1869,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 239.

⁹⁵ “Remarks by SBA to the American Equal Rights Association in New York, May 12, 1869,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 239-340.

⁹⁶ “Remarks by SBA to the American Equal Rights Association in New York, May 12, 1869,” *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 239-340.

⁹⁷ “Remarks by SBA to the American Equal Rights Association in New York, May 12, 1869,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 266.

⁹⁸ “Remarks by SBA to the American Equal Rights Association in New York, May 12, 1869,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 266.

⁹⁹ ““Work, Wages, and the Ballot’: Lecture by SBA in Lansing, Michigan, April 15, 1870,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 321-331.

This speech was the foundation her most famous Gilded Age lecture, “Woman Wants Bread, Not the Ballot.”

¹⁰⁰ ““Work, Wages, and the Ballot’: Lecture by SBA in Lansing, Michigan, April 15, 1870,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 323.

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- ¹⁰¹ “‘Work, Wages, and the Ballot’: Lecture by SBA in Lansing, Michigan, April 15, 1870,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 327.
- ¹⁰² “Work, Wages, and the Ballot,” *Daily Pittsburg Gazette*, March 3, 1870, Microfilm, reel 14, slide 0626.
- ¹⁰³ “Woman Suffrage in Peoria,” *Chicago Republican*, March 6, 1870, Microfilm, reel 14, slide 0630.
- ¹⁰⁴ William S. Lawyer, ed. *Binghamton: Its Settlement, Growth and Development and the Factors in Its History, 1800-1900* (Binghamton, NY: Century Memorial Publishing Co., 1900).
- ¹⁰⁵ “False Theory Lecture,” *Binghamton Daily Republican*, November 16, 1870, Microfilm, reel 14, slide 1062.
- ¹⁰⁶ “False Theory Lecture,” *Binghamton Daily Republican*, November 16, 1870, Microfilm, reel 14, slide 1062.
- ¹⁰⁷ “Lecture by SBA and ECS,” *Elmira Advertiser*, November 17, 1870, Microfilm, reel 14, slide 1062.
- ¹⁰⁸ “Lecture by SBA and ECS,” *Elmira Advertiser*, November 17, 1870, Microfilm, reel 14, slide 1062.
- ¹⁰⁹ Campbell, *Mann Cannot*, 106.
- ¹¹⁰ Campbell, *Mann Cannot*, 117.
- ¹¹¹ Campbell, *Mann Cannot*, 106-108.
- ¹¹² Hull, *The Woman*, 42-50, 53-57.
- ¹¹³ “Editorial from the *Revolution*, ‘Salutatory,’ January 8, 1868,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 125-126, footnote 1.

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- ¹¹⁴ “Francis Minor to the Revolution, St. Louis Missouri, October 14, 1869,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 273-275.
- ¹¹⁵ “Francis Minor to the Revolution, St. Louis Missouri, October 14, 1869,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 274.
- ¹¹⁶ “The Power of the Ballot” Lecture,” *Washington Standard* (Olympia), October 21, 1871, Microfilm, reel 15, slide 0785.
- ¹¹⁷ “Washington Territory WSA, Founding Convention,” *New Northwest*, November 17, 1871, Microfilm, reel 15, slide 0813.
- ¹¹⁸ Ray, *The Lyceum*, 37-38, 197-202.
- ¹¹⁹ Ripplingham, *The Art*, vii.
- ¹²⁰ “Lecture on Reconstruction Printed,” *Evening Bulletin* (Leavenworth, KS), July 8, 1865, Microfilm, reel 11, slide 0189.
- ¹²¹ “Lecture on Reconstruction Printed,” *Evening Bulletin* (Leavenworth, KS), July 8, 1865, Microfilm, reel 11, slide 0189.
- ¹²² Asa D. Smith, *Letters to a Young Student, in the First Stage of a Liberal Education* (Boston, MA: Perkins & Marvin, 1832), 105.
- ¹²³ M. Bautain, *The Art of Extempore Speaking: Hints for the Pulpit, the Senate, and the Bar* (New York: C. Scribner, 1859), 84-95 and 329, 95-97, 97-100, 100-103, 103, 104-107.; Lee, *Principles of Public Speaking*, 302-332.
- ¹²⁴ “Hearing before the New York State Constitutional Convention Suffrage Committee,” *New York Tribune*, June 28, 1867, Microfilm, reel 12, slide 0263.
- ¹²⁵ “Hearing before the New York State Constitutional Convention Suffrage Committee,” *New York Tribune*, June 28, 1867, Microfilm, reel 12, slide 0263.

¹²⁶ “Hearing before the New York State Constitutional Convention Suffrage Committee,”

New York Tribune, June 28, 1867, Microfilm, reel 12, slide 0263.

¹²⁷ “Hearing before the New York State Constitutional Convention Suffrage Committee,”

New York Tribune, June 28, 1867, Microfilm, reel 12, slide 0263.

¹²⁸ Mary Walker was born in the Burned-over District in Oswego, New York to

progressive parents who encouraged her education and desire for a medical career. She attended the Syracuse Medical college and graduated with a medical degree in 1855. Walker served as a doctor in Washington DC during the Civil War, was captured by the Confederates while providing medical care to southern soldiers, across the front lines, and was awarded the Medal of Honor for her service. Walker was a radical abolitionist, women’s rights activist, and hygiene activist. She was arrested frequently for wearing “men’s” clothes.

Marjory Hall, *Quite Contrary: Dr. Mary Edwards Walker* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls,

1970).; Stephanie Fitzgerald, *Mary Walker: Civil War Surgeon and*

Feminist (Minneapolis, MN: Compass Point Books, 2009).; Bonnie

Zucker Goldsmith, *Dr. Mary Edwards Walker: Civil War Surgeon & Medal of*

Honor Recipient (Edina, MN: ABDO Publishing, 2010).; Charles McCool

Snyder, *Dr. Mary Walker: The Little Lady in Pants* (New York: Arno Press,

1974).

¹²⁹ “NWSA 7th Washington Convention,” *Evening Star* (Washington, DC), January 15,

1875, Microfilm, reel 18, slide 0273.

¹³⁰ “NWSA 7th Washington Convention,” *Evening Star* (Washington, DC), January 15,

1875, Microfilm, reel 18, slide 0273.

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- ¹³¹ “NWSA 7th Washington Convention,” *Evening Star* (Washington, DC), January 15, 1875, Microfilm, reel 18, slide 0273.
- ¹³² “Tour of the State of New York,” *Troy Daily Times* (NY), February 19, 1867, Microfilm, reel 11, slide 1059.
- ¹³³ “Lecture on Reconstruction Printed,” *Evening Bulletin* (Leavenworth, KS), July 8, 1865, Microfilm, reel 11, slide 0189.
- ¹³⁴ “Lecture on Universal Suffrage,” *Chicago Tribune*, August 29, 1865, SBA Chicago, IL, Microfilm, reel 11, slide 0211.
- ¹³⁵ “Chicago Tour with George Francis Train,” *Chicago Tribune*, November 22, 1867, Microfilm, reel 12, slide 0590.
- ¹³⁶ “Tour with George Francis Train,” *Cleveland Daily Leader*, November 30, 1867, Microfilm, reel 12, 0609.
- ¹³⁷ Jacqueline Jones Royster, *Traces of a Stream: Literacy and Social Change Among African American Women* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 48.
- ¹³⁸ “SBA and ESC Tour with George Francis Train, *Buffalo Commercial Advertiser*, November 30- December 1, 1867, Microfilm, reel 12, slide 0615.
- ¹³⁹ Jones, “Breathing Life into a Public Woman, 354.
- ¹⁴⁰ *Evening Express* (Rochester, NY), December 13, 1866, Microfilm, reel 11, slide 0792.
- ¹⁴¹ *Evening Express* (Rochester, NY), December 13, 1866, Microfilm, reel 11, slide 0792.
- ¹⁴² “New York State WSA, Annual Meeting,” *New York Times*, July 29, 1870, Microfilm, reel 14, slide 0891.
- ¹⁴³ “New York State WSA, Annual Meeting,” *New York Tribune*, July 29, 1870, Microfilm, reel 14, slide 0892.

¹⁴⁴ Anthony's only experience with industrial factory work had been as a child in the 1820s when her father ran a textile mill. Anthony had substituted as for one of the "spoolers" on the production line when the worker was taken sick. Anthony's father's factory had generous sick and family leave policies and safe working conditions, as mandated by his Quaker faith.

Harper, *The Life*, 19-20.

¹⁴⁵ "The Power of the Ballot," *Binghamton Daily Republican* (NY), November 25, 1874, Microfilm, reel 17, slide 0211.

¹⁴⁶ "Remarks by SBA in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York – Article from the Rochester *Democrat and Chronicle*, June 20, 1873," in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 612.

¹⁴⁷ "Remarks by SBA in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York – Matilda Joslyn Gage to Editor, Kansas *Leavenworth Times*, July 3, 1873," in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 612-13.

¹⁴⁸ Jones, "Breathing Life into a Public Woman," 354.

¹⁴⁹ "National Woman Suffrage and Education Committee, National Woman Suffrage Convention," *Daily Morning Chronicle* (Washington, DC), January 12, 1871, Microfilm, reel 15, slide 0327.

¹⁵⁰ *Sunday Mercury* (NY), December 15, 1867, Microfilm, reel 12, slide 0645.

¹⁵¹ Schudson, *The Good Citizen*, 132.

¹⁵² *Leavenworth Commercial*, "Speech on Woman Suffrage Laing's Hall – Geo Francis Train. Immense gathering—How Train Captured the Democratic Party and

Forced them to Surrender—unbounded Enthusiasm—much wit and some Logic,”
October 21, 1867, Microfilm, reel 12, slide 0570.

- ¹⁵³ Emily M. Cope, “‘Inspiration of Delivery’: John A. Broadus and the Evangelical Underpinnings of Extemporaneous Oratory,” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 45, no. 4 (2015): 293.
- ¹⁵⁴ Sandra M. Gustafson, *Eloquence is Power: Oratory and Performance in Early America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), xvi.
- ¹⁵⁵ John Quincy Adams, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory* Vol. I (Cambridge, 1810), 340-41.
- ¹⁵⁶ Ware, *Hints*, 6.
- ¹⁵⁷ William Pittenger, and John Armor Bingham, *Oratory Sacred and Secular; or, The Extemporaneous Speaker, With Sketches of the Most Eminent Speakers of All Ages* (New York: Samuel R. Wells, 1868), xiii.
- ¹⁵⁸ Campbell, *Man*, 13.
- ¹⁵⁹ “The Power of the Ballot,” *Sherburne News* (NY), November 21, 1874, Microfilm, reel 18, slide 0207.
- ¹⁶⁰ “The Power of the Ballot,” *Sherburne News* (NY), November 21, 1874, Microfilm, reel 18, slide 0207.
- ¹⁶¹ Hull offers an extensive discussion to the popular outcry at Hunt’s unconstitutional directed verdict, and Harper also includes a number of newspaper articles and letters decrying the decision and its negative effects of the Republican principles of democracy that it seemed to threaten.

Hull, *The Woman*, 179-185.; Harper, *The Life*, 443-446.

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- ¹⁶² “Susan B. Anthony’s Case,” *Leavenworth Times* (KS), July 3, 1873, Microfilm, reel 17, slide 0100.
- ¹⁶³ “Susan B. Anthony’s Case,” *Leavenworth Times* (KS), July 3, 1873, Microfilm, reel 17, slide 0100.
- ¹⁶⁴ “Susan B. Anthony’s Case,” *Leavenworth Times* (KS), July 3, 1873, Microfilm, reel 17, slide 0100.
- ¹⁶⁵ “Interview on Liberal Republican Party,” *Cincinnati Times and Chronicle*, Cincinnati, OH, May 1872, Microfilm, reel 16, slide 0094-0094A.
- ¹⁶⁶ “Lectures,” *Territorial Dispatch and Alaska Times* (Seattle), November 6, 1871, Microfilm, reel 15, slide 0810.
- ¹⁶⁷ To be clear, I have found no evidence that Anthony ever ascribed to Stanton and Woodhull’s arguments for free love privately, much less in any of her public speeches.
- ¹⁶⁸ “Article by BSA, October 7, 1869,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 272-273.
- ¹⁶⁹ “Article by BSA, October 7, 1869,” in *Selected Papers: Against an Aristocracy of Sex*, 272-273.
- ¹⁷⁰ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “Femininity and Feminism: To Be or Not To Be a Woman,” *Communication Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (1983): 101.
- ¹⁷¹ Kirt Wilson, “The Racial Politics of Imitation in the Nineteenth Century,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 89, no. 2 (2001): 89-108.

¹⁷² Belinda Stillion Southard, *Militant Citizenship: Rhetorical Strategies of the National Woman's Party, 1913-1920* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 2011), 13-14.

Chapter 4

Susan B. Anthony's Gilded Age Extemporaneous Speaking as a Performance of Character Citizenship

After more than fifty-five years of public speaking on behalf of women's rights, Susan Brownell Anthony died on March 13, 1906, at the age of 86. That evening, the Rochester *Evening Times* eulogized the fearless suffrage leader in as a woman of unimpeachable biblical character.

Women well may mourn. The soul of a system and a creed left the world last night when Susan B. Anthony crossed the Great Divide. The dominant mind that guided the destinies of the greatest women's movement of the century is stilled. A soul, the greatness of which it remains for posterity to discover, shook off its fettering clay and soared to its place in the empyrean. Women well may mourn. In the greatness of her thought there was no blemish. She was an apostle as truly as the men who followed the Nazarene; a patriot as truly as the leaders who fought for the freedom of a nation... a martyr as truly as those sainted ones who gave their lives for a principle.¹

Picking up on the theme of Anthony's awesomeness and similarity to figures of biblical proportions, the New York *Sun* said of her life's work, "If we survey Miss Anthony's life as a whole we must recognize that she accomplished a vast amount of solid, durable and beneficent work. She may be looked upon as the Moses of the movement for Woman's rights."² The New York *Evening Post* also agreed and summarized its comments on her life saying "Whatever may be the fate of the woman suffrage movement, one thing is certain: Susan B. Anthony will always be remembered as one of its patron saints, with

about all the attributes which should make for canonization.”³ The praise that permeated these eulogies and the laudatory picture they painted of Anthony illustrate the importance of having a good public character to her extemporaneous speaking during the Gilded Age.

Anthony’s work during the Gilded Age⁴ included organizing, writing, speaking, and serving as a figurehead for the woman suffrage movement. Anthony was a prolific rhetor and a popular public figure during the Gilded Age. She led a protest at the 1876 Centennial Celebration in Philadelphia. She spearheaded the compilation, writing, and editing of four-volumes of the history of the women’s rights movement, *The History of Woman Suffrage*. Anthony sat for more than two-hundred interviews on topics ranging from her speaking tours to the legacy she hoped other women would carry on after her death. She wrote dozens of editorials for newspapers around the country. She fostered the reconciliation of the National and American Woman Suffrage Associations. Anthony toured every state in the still-expanding United States and visited nearly a dozen different countries in Europe. She also mentored dozens of younger women to follow in her footsteps as future leaders of the movement. Although important to the broad picture of Anthony’s life and her long-term fame as the face of woman suffrage, these events involved little or no extemporaneous speaking and are, therefore, not a primary concern of this chapter.

Anthony’s approach to and use of extemporaneous speaking became relatively settled during the last thirty years of her life. Therefore, this chapter addresses a much longer period than the previous chapters. The breadth of content in this chapter usefully demonstrates the stability of Anthony’s appeals to character during the era, but it also

presents a problem for the textual evidence I will use: there are more than 25 microfilm reels of documents covering this period of Anthony's life.⁵ To maintain relative brevity and to facilitate deeper textual analysis, I limited the texts for this chapter to representative samples from Anthony's Gilded Age speaking tours. I use the texts from four speaking tours where Anthony spoke primarily extempore: (1) In 1881 Anthony presided over the first NWSA convention in Boston and then went on a lecture tour through New Hampshire. (2) In 1886 Anthony spoke at a state suffrage meeting in Kansas and then went on a tour around the state. (3) That same year she spent one month in Wisconsin promoting that state's Congressional Campaign for suffrage. (4) Finally, Anthony also went on a Southern California tour to support a woman suffrage ballot measure in 1896. These tours represent different approaches to gaining enfranchisement for women, different regions of the country, and different slices of time during Anthony's Gilded Age career.

In this chapter I explore how Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of "character citizenship." Character citizenship, I argue, manifested in the Gilded Age as a way to define who was or could be a good American through the lens of gendered, middle-class, white, Protestant values. Specifically, I argue that Anthony used the bricolage practices of social invention to present herself—through both explicit personal statements and media framing—as a laudable woman of character who was a respectable authority on a variety of topics related to woman suffrage. She coupled this invention with a delivery that embodied middle-class values, thereby allowing her to negotiate gendered public space while maintaining socially-recognizable respectability. Because the context of the Gilded Age allowed some gray space for women to function in

public, Anthony's performance of a raced and classed Protestant "good character" allowed her to embody an appropriate way for women to live in public. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking, therefore, embodied an appropriate way for a woman to function in public by performing a white, middle-class, Protestant version of public feminine virtue which I call "character citizenship." This performance of citizenship garnered Anthony significant praise at the end of her life and brought an impression of "respectability" to the woman suffrage movement. Anthony's embrace of cultural norms for a raced and classed religious citizenship, however, also gutted the woman suffrage movement of the radical egalitarianism that had infused the women's rights activists of earlier decades and created exclusionary problems around the idea of women's rights that would not be addressed until late in the twentieth century.

Gilded Age Rhetoric: Character, Capital, and Citizenship

Given Anthony's increasing fame and popularity during the Gilded Age, any analysis of her extemporaneous speaking must begin with how she shaped and was shaped by the culture into which she spoke. Summarizing Anthony's life during the Gilded Age, Kathleen Barry said "Susan B. Anthony's charismatic authority had spread far beyond her influence and leadership of the woman's rights movement. She had captured the imagination of the American public."⁶ Anthony had become famous for her seemingly-tireless public work and was frequently framed as the face of woman suffrage. She was also an increasingly popular speaker; she was far less frequently framed as an unwomanly pariah or shrill spinster. Anthony's popularity has two implications for this study. First, because she was seen as the face of the woman suffrage movement, much of the newspaper coverage of her speeches offers commentaries about Anthony as a rhetor,

followed by summaries of her address. A second implication is that Anthony's rhetoric and her public persona came to represent the woman suffrage movement to the world. The primary concern of this chapter is to discuss how Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship. This project, however, is complicated during the last years of Anthony's life because of her fame. Anthony's public work had, in Kathleen Barry's words, "become synonymous with her personal life."⁷ Practically, this means that any analysis of Anthony's rhetoric during the Gilded Age must seek to understand her through the lens of the cultural rhetorics into and through which she spoke. To this end, the following pages address the culture of ethos during the Gilded Age.

Ethos of the Gilded Age: Character is Capital

Mark Twain coined the phrase the "Gilded Age" to connote the glittering golden veneer of American society that covered the rotting degradation of social problems faced by many of the country's denizens. Identifying one of the underlying causes of this inequality, Eleanor Flexner noted, "The rapid development of a predominantly industrial society brought about, not only an immense increase in productivity and wealth but heightened poverty and social tension."⁸ The Republican Party's emphasis on free labor—at least partially a remnant of the Civil War and Reconstruction political and economic calculus the party used to defeat the Southern Agrarian Democrats—spurred a distrust of unionization and a strong support for capital. Increasing immigration brought an influx of both skilled and unskilled labor into the country, which fueled Westward expansion and the already-booming industrial revolution. Immigration rates, and business owners who saw cheap and exploitive "free" labor as a key to their pyramiding wealth,

combined to further depress wages well below those that could sustain life for a family. The political support for capital built into a “free labor” ideology also contributed to several economic recessions and a four-year depression, as well as increasing interest rates and falling prices for agricultural products. The crushing poverty faced by many, and the prevalence of poverty in both rural and urban life, meant that most American workers were now wage earners. Faced with the crushing poverty of wage-based living and the inability to sustain a family on the wage-work of a single person, women began entering the workforce in factories and in middle- and upper-class homes as servants.⁹

The vast changes in economic conditions during the Gilded Age undercut many of the cultural touchstones of “American” ethos from the previous century and necessitated a new ethos for defining the ideal American citizen. Dana Elder has argued that a vast commercial enterprise during the Gilded Age was dedicated to compiling, writing, printing, and selling books that taught the education and manners of the True American to readers.¹⁰ Judy Hilkey’s *Character is Capital*, speaking about this genre of educational books during the Gilded Age, said that traveling salesmen pedaled “Bibles and devotional books, one-volume encyclopedias and dictionaries; collected biographies, histories, and travel accounts that focused on sensational events; and practical treatises on housekeeping, gardening, livestock, medical care, legal transactions and letter writing.”¹¹ Augmented by the public address of the Chautauqua movement and the later years of the Lyceum,¹² as well as a growing culture of education and reform societies like the Grangers,¹³ these books became the foundation for a robust rhetoric of American ethos based on raced, classed, and gendered ideals brought together under the amorphous term “character.”

The ethos of the Gilded Age was epitomized by a devotion to the ideals of “character.” Hilkey investigated the phenomenon of “success manuals,” one of the popular types of books from the educational genre, which, she argued, were artifacts of a compelling cultural motive from the Gilded Age. Success manuals “were didactic, book-length works of non-fiction literature that promised to show men how to find success in life.”¹⁴ These manuals used an “expansive definition” of success that encouraged men to find success in whatever they undertook. “Given this expansive definition of success,” Hilkey argued, “it was clear that every man—every man of true character, at least—could indeed discover a calling in which he might find success.”¹⁵ The manuals argued that the key to this success was character. Hilkey also argued that the manuals taught that greed was inimical to good character, that democracy was the best policy, and that personal habits needed to be governed by moderation and respectability. Within the changing economic conditions of the Gilded Age, focusing on character as the key to success in American life supported business interests and provided a description of what it meant to be an Ideal American.

Possessing character, however, was not enough to create stability in the shifting economics of the Gilded Age; being an ideal American meant correctly performing that character in the public sphere. In the 1891 success manual, *The Way to Win, Showing How to Succeed in Life*, John T. Dale noted that “A man can never do more, or better, than deliver, or embody, that which is characteristic of himself.”¹⁶ Dale demonstrated the inherent paradox of character during the Gilded Age; character was both inherent and yet only provable through public performance. First, character was a moral absolute, designated at birth, that was inherent to a person. Second, however, audiences insisted

that ethos or character should be performed in socially-acceptable ways to demonstrate a person's internal character. Nineteenth-century audiences, Ben Railton has argued, simultaneously insisted on a Cartesian understanding of character as inherent and a post-modern demand for proof of character through rhetoric.¹⁷ That is, a person's rhetoric demonstrated, through artistic means, the inartistic or intrinsic character that the speaker possessed. Interestingly, while cultural discourses maintained that character was indelible and intrinsic to an individual—possessed like a family heirloom—the rhetorical culture of the period insisted on producing copious volumes to educate, train, and shape the character of its citizens. In the 1890s you could, without a hint of irony, *buy* a textbook that would *teach* you how to have an *intrinsically* good character!

Defining “Character” During the Gilded Age

Performing character was both expected and required during the Gilded Age, but defining the actions that made up this required “character” was fraught with problems; the definition of character was situation and contextual and it was also dependent on factors of race, class, gender, and religion. In *Bodies of Reform*, Salazar explicitly identified the rhetoric of character as similar to the rhetoric of election that dominated Puritan discourse in seventeenth century New England.

Like the Calvinist theologians of the colonial period, who vested political authority in the “invisible” character of an “elect” that was, however, only indirectly discernable through the unreliable expressions of its “visible” character, nineteenth-century Americans defined character within an expressivist theory of the self, wherein the public signs or representations of character were taken to

have an indexical, yet frequently illegible, relationship to the private, inner self that was their source and origin.¹⁸

Defining character as observable actions that were somehow indexical to the inherent character of an individual had several impacts on Gilded Age ideas of ethos. First, if character was only observable through action, it was vulnerable to manipulation by skilled con artists. To ameliorate this possible manipulation, “character building” became a foundational element of creating ethos. Salazar argued that “character building” became the *sine qua non* of ethos because it denoted a person who had self-consciously taken possession of the goodness within himself.¹⁹ A second impact of defining character as observable evidence of inherent traits was that immutable identity factors—such as race or gender in the Gilded Age understanding of the terms—offered a siren’s song of certainty to observers. Ethos was inextricably linked with the bodies that possessed good character. A rhetor like Anthony could use this linkage to challenge the exclusions that kept women with good character from participating in the public sphere, but could just as easily use the same logics to suggest new or continuing oppressions for other identity groups, like immigrants, by arguing that they failed the same tests of character. This is what Salazar has called the “politics of embodiment” at the heart of character discourse in the nineteenth century.²⁰ The politics of embodied character allowed “character” to become an important discourse for both regulating individuals in a democratic and capitalist system and for challenging the race, class, gender, and religious exclusions that lay at the heart of that system in the United States. The definition of “character” was the key to these rhetorical moves.

One way to define character during the gilded age was through traits that would make individuals valuable workers in the industrial capitalist economy. Hilkey argued that character manuals “took the idea that opportunity for the poor boy was curtailed in the new industrial order and turned it on its head.” Since poverty was the likely state in which most of their readers would live, character manuals created scenarios where, “poverty was a ‘priceless spur,’ the worker was the winner, and the mediocre triumphed. These conclusions did more than add a happy ending. They rationalized economic hard times by making a virtue out of poverty and the hard work that for many was a grim necessity.”²¹ Hilkey noted that, within this framing, the primary theme taught in character manuals was to “cultivate the tried and true economic virtues of preindustrial America.”²² The character manuals, not wanting to leave any definition to chance with something as central to their purpose as making good workers for the industrial capitalist system, then laid out chapters that defined and illustrated the correct virtues of hard work. Hilkey said:

They addressed entire chapters to themes that recalled Benjamin Franklin and Cotton Mather, themes such as honesty, frugality, diligence, and duty. To these the manuals added decisiveness, perseverance, aim, economy, tact, concentration, application, energy, method, accuracy, common sense, thoroughness, enthusiasm, nerve, courage, and motive. Put another way, the careful success manual reader learned that it was important to be a good worker.²³

These values are reminiscent of the themes in Horatio Alger’s famous novels wherein a young man from a rural community would come to a city and eventually, by his hard work and by avoiding charlatans, end up in a white-collar job with a modest but comfortable salary.²⁴ Character manuals also framed abstaining from greed or the selfish

pursuit of wealth as the second vital definition of the term. Extravagance, ostentation, greed, and haste were all character flaws, the manuals argued, that would keep a man from success.²⁵ The good worker could seek wealth, so long as it did not come at the expense of maintaining the “honesty, frugality, diligence,” and such that were central to maintaining the capitalist industrial system.

Character was also defined by traits that would make individuals good democratically self-governing citizens. One of the driving themes that motivated character rhetoric during the Gilded Age was a persistent fear of change that persisted after the Civil War. In *The Search for Order*, Robert Huddleston Wiebe argued that the rapid expansion of railroad transit and the communication systems it facilitated meant that small communities run by local leaders had to be re-ordered into the larger “society” that facilitated more rapid social change. These social changes included an expanding communication system, rapid immigration, free-for-all capitalism, and government restructuring.²⁶ The rhetoric of character offered a means of defining individuality in such a way as to support the continuation of the American government. Hilkey identified the third important theme in success manuals as “democracy is the best policy.”²⁷ Salazar furthered this argument, asserting that good character was seen as the answer to how a democratic citizen was to be governed; citizenship was increasingly seen as the cultivation of the forms of self-governance and socially calibrated self-interest that defined “character.”²⁸ Although I have not found a list of specific virtues of democratic citizenship character as I listed for worker character above, this research demonstrates that character was defined, tautologically, as being a good citizen so that being a good citizen could be defined through having good character.

Finally, the definition of character was also limited by gender; good character as I have defined it above was exclusively male. Hilkey noted that:

The words ‘manhood,’ ‘manliness,’ and ‘manly’ recurred with frequency in success manuals. Authors rhapsodized about ‘manly qualities,’ ‘manly vigor,’ ‘manly character,’ ‘manly self-assertion,’ and the ‘layers of metal that makes manhood.’ Success manual writers sometimes capitalized the letters in ‘man’ or ‘manhood’ for further emphasis.”

She also noted that some manuals used the words “character” and “manhood” interchangeably.²⁹ Manliness was defined by willpower; the internal drive to overcome, strive, persist, or otherwise “do” something was the central tenet of manly character. This gendering of character meant that women had to define their own way to enact and embody character if they wished to enter the public sphere with ethos to their rhetoric.

The definition of good female character, like the manliness-based character defined above, was rooted in the necessity of women’s free or under paid labor to perpetuating the capitalist industrial system. In *Cradle of the Middle Class*, Mary Ryan argued that the so-called “self-made men” who obtained a status in the middle class did so based on the intensified free labor of families that supported them through an extended adolescence. Women’s work, such as mothers taking in boarders or sisters entering factory or service work, was especially vital in providing the safety net for young men to “make it” based on “nothing but character and willpower.”³⁰ This meant that women’s character was still primarily understood as “good” when it facilitated staying in the home and providing for husbands, brothers, and fathers who entered the capitalist marketplace. That

is, good female character necessitated that women not enter the public sphere and refrain from being in public whenever possible.

Good female character was consistently defined by working at home throughout the Gilded Age, but women's worlds were no longer confined to the private sphere. Women entered public space—as workers, but also as tourists, consumers, philanthropists, or simply as individuals—in constantly increasing numbers throughout the Gilded Age.³¹ This difference between the material realities and idealized narratives of women in “men's world” meant that late-nineteenth-century women had to define their character in different ways for both the private and public spheres. Gilded Age female “good character” was constrained by the essential contextual trait of being in a domestic setting; defining a “good public character” for Gilded Age women required negotiating around this contextual contradiction.

The boundaries of good female character in the private sphere remained fairly settled throughout the nineteenth century. What Barbara Welter has called “the cult of true womanhood” was the primary definition of women's private character. Women were to be submissive, pious, pure, and domestic.³² Hilkey delved into how these conventions of “true womanhood” were defined and translated into character traits in success manuals with a representative quotation from *The Royal Path in Life*.

Man is bold — woman is beautiful. Man is courageous — woman is timid. Man labors in the field — woman at home. Man talks to persuade — woman to please. Man had a daring heart — woman a tender, loving one. Man has power — woman taste. Man has justice — woman mercy. Man has strength — woman love; while man combats with the enemy, struggles with the world, woman is

waiting to prepare his repast and sweeten his existence. He has crosses, and the partner of his couch is there to soften them; his day may be sad and troubled, but in the chaste arms of his white he finds comfort and repose.³³

This passage highlighted two especially useful ideas for understanding the definition of women's private character: (1) woman's character was defined only in direct relation to a man and (2) women's character was specifically defined to prevent participation in public discourse. Man was the beginning of woman's character; sentences were even structured so that "Man" was capitalized while "woman" remains in lowercase letters. Within this passage, the definitional traits of woman's character only existed in relation to man's; woman's character was often written without an action verb, leaving her able to act only when man and his action verbs exist. A second important part of the traits outlined in this definition of woman's character was that she was explicitly prohibited from participating in public discourse. She was "timid" and "at home" where she "is waiting to prepare his repast and sweeten his existence." Even if she overcame her fear to leave the house, she only spoke "to please" and could not seek "to persuade" others through public discourse as a man would. This definition of women's good character as rigidly home-bound, however, clashed with the reality of poor or working-class women who needed to work to support themselves or their male relatives, and with wealthier women who wanted to engage in the exciting and challenging realms of public life.

The disconnect between the exclusively home-bound definitions of good female character and women's presence in public meant that women had to establish different ways to perform character when they entered the public sphere. The new definition of good character for women in public relied heavily on traits accessible only to upper-

middle-class and wealthy women and on performing the traits of home-bound character as a justification for seeking redress in public. Benevolence and charity work, especially on moral and reform causes, was at the heart of defining good public character for women through arguments scholars have called the “womanhood rational” or “expediency arguments” for suffrage.³⁴ Susan Zaeske noted that a gendered female morality was a frequent justification for women in public during the first decades of the nineteenth century.³⁵ Addressing the decades after the Civil War, Bonnie Dow argued that Frances Willard used women’s good character in the home—what the passage above would call the “beautiful” nature, pleasing speech, “tender and loving” heart, “sweet” and “comforting” presence, and “chaste arms”—as a foundation to argue that women should be involved in public life to bring greater temperance, morality, and decency to the public sphere.³⁶ Additionally, Carolyn S. Vacca noted that women began entering the public sphere at the beginning of the nineteenth century through church and benevolent societies and Fey Dudden noted that, by the end of the century, wealthy and upper-middle-class women were participating in charity organizations largely because they could hire “help” to do the drudge work of housekeeping.³⁷ Women with leisure time, then, could use their moral standing as women to participate in public life by performing public domesticity. Creating a good character in public provided both invention and delivery resources for women; dressing correctly, abstaining from alcohol and tobacco, demonstrating a good education, and referring to your family were all traits of good female character in public.

Extemporaneous speaking also served an important role in defining women’s public character by tying the speaker to ideas of morality, authenticity, and woman’s inherently “tender” and “pleasing” nature. First, as I noted in my chapter on rhetoric in

the Burned-over District, extemporaneous speaking was intimately linked to the evangelical tradition of revival preaching and the “vehemence and directness” that typified preachers from the Great Awakening.³⁸ Speaking extemporaneously allowed a female rhetor to link her public speaking with the morality associated with Protestant Christianity. Second, Emily Murphy Cope has argued that extemporaneous speaking, especially in the latter half of the nineteenth century, was perceived within American culture as proof of a speaker’s authenticity.³⁹ A woman speaking extemporaneously in public demonstrated good character through her honesty and lack of pretense. Finally, as I demonstrated in the introduction to his dissertation, extemporaneous speaking was also considered an inherently audience-focused mode of communication.⁴⁰ For a woman in the public sphere, the extemporaneous mode of speaking connected her public speaking to the core ideas of female morality that grounded women’s good character. The connections between extemporaneous speaking and positive perceptions of a speaker’s character were not limited to women, but the mode of address was especially useful for women who sought to define a good public female character.

Rhetoric in the Gilded Age was permeated with the ethos of character. The idea of “character is capital” offered a way for those who were excluded from the vast wealth of the upper classes to define success for themselves and define a type of self-respect. An ethos of character had to be displayed in actions that supported the growing capitalist economic system, provided stability for industrial capitalism, legitimized ascriptive notions of legal citizenship, and sustained cultural touchstones like gender and Protestant Christianity. The rhetoric of character created a foundation for the performance of

citizenship during the Gilded Age that stabilized a democratic citizenry while supporting the ascriptive exclusions of unwanted others from the American Dream.

Character Citizenship: Eliding the Reality of Race, Religion, Class, and Gender

Being a citizen amidst the frenzy of the Gilded Age was easy; be a wealthy, white, Protestant man. If an individual did not meet the major criteria above, he or she then had to negotiate how to fit within the paradigms of who a citizen was based on acceptable performances of the race, class, gender, and religious norms of “character.” I call this negotiation “character citizenship.” Character citizenship functioned on two levels during the Gilded Age. First, it was a discourse identifying white, middle-class, Protestant values, often inflected with explicit gender norms, as the defining factor of being “American” in order to elide the exclusions based on race, class, gender, and religion that actually defined legal citizenship rights in the United States.⁴¹ Character citizenship was also a rhetorical practice of performing raced, classed, and gendered Protestant values in the public sphere to argue for one’s inclusion in the “American” identity. The following paragraphs outline both the discourses and practices of character citizenship during the Gilded Age.

Character Citizenship Rhetoric

Character citizenship was an exercise in performing the correct class, gender, race, and religious markers to demonstrate that a rhetor was, in fact, a good American. Character citizenship rhetoric allowed a rhetor to perform recognizable markers of the “good character” described above as a foundation on which to build ethos and make connections with audiences around the country. The following pages address both invention within the rhetoric of character citizenship and the important elements of

delivery as a citizen of good character. Character citizenship was a powerful rhetorical practice that allowed rhetors to both create and perform ethos grounded in character to argue for their goals.

For a speaker, inventing yourself as a citizen of character began with the explicit statement of your goodness. Ethos, as the artistic expression of a person's character, was central to rhetorical invention during the Gilded Age because it was considered the expression of innate personality. Discussing ethos in the *Sourcebook on Rhetoric*, James Jasinski noted that the nature of ethos could be understood in two different ways: as an individual's inherent character (a Cartesian understanding of self as finite, independent, and intrinsic) or as the custom or habit of a culture or community (a post-Cartesian or post-modern approach that understands the self as a "shifting array of social roles, conventions, customs, and habits").⁴² Using school textbooks on character, Salazar demonstrated that, during the Gilded Age, these approaches to ethos were combined into the notion of character as inherent goodness, artistically conveyed.⁴³ Robert Dinkin offered the additional example of the founding statement of the "Ladies' Garfield and Arthur Club" of Cincinnati, Ohio, which read "We, as women, who do have political opinions and partisan preferences and desire to manifest them in every manner compatible with womanly modesty, honor, integrity and our limited rights, have organized ourselves into a club" to elect Garfield as president.⁴⁴ The women explicitly stated their "modesty, honor and integrity" as key factors in their club's founding, even using these elements of "womanly" character to modify their political ambitions. Character during the Gilded Age was thought of as something that an individual possessed as an inherent trait that still had to be conveyed through artistic presentation.

Invention within the rhetoric of character citizenship also necessitated building and maintaining a public reputation that supported the rhetor's claims to possessing the white, Protestant, middle-class values they had explicitly claimed. Discussing the ethos needed in later-nineteenth century preaching, Russell Hirst argued that audiences and ministers both expected a preacher's ethos to range far beyond his persona during the sermon; being a preacher of character also included "the reputation brought with him to the pulpit and the bonds of trust and love generated by his personal ministrations to his flock."⁴⁵ Character needed to be legible, preferably visible, because material wealth, position, and power were all related to having good character. The need for legible understanding of character, then, birthed a class and race-based understanding of character as having a good public reputation. As a Gilded Age speaker, you needed to be known as a person of good character to prove that you were a person of good character.

Inventing a rhetoric of character citizenship and maintaining a good public reputation also necessitated dealing effectively with print media. Prior to the Gilded Age, Ted Curtis Smythe has argued, newspapers had primarily been organs of the various political parties they served and had primarily covered political topics from the perspective of a party's stance.⁴⁶ During the decades between 1870 and 1900, however, the press began to take on a greater role in shaping public opinion. For instance, Troy Rondinone argued persuasively that national print media like *Harpers Weekly*, *The New York Times*, *New York World*, *Chicago Tribune*, and the *Nation* provided a nationalist frame through which Americans came to understand the 1894 Pullman Strike. Within this framing, Rondinone argued, the workers striking for fair wages and safer working conditions were represented as violent, low-class immigrants who sought to overthrow an

American way of life through the corruption of good moral character.⁴⁷ Dealing with print media effectively was so vital that much of the explicit assertion of ethos and reputation creation and maintenance work of being a speaker within the character citizenship framework was done through managing your reputation in the print media.

Finally, invention in character citizenship rhetoric meant laying the blame for problems you sought to address at the feet of those who did not have “good character,” that is, minorities, immigrants, the uneducated, the poor, those of Catholic or Jewish faith, and especially African Americans. “Good character” became the reason excluded others could argue for their own inclusion as “Americans” and the reason for excluding those others in the first place. Character or lack of character served to both elide racial, class, religion, and national origin differences, and to legitimize exclusions based on those categories. Rondinone, for instance, noted that the national press emphasized the “immorality” and “low-class” behavior of the Pullman strikers as a form of “un-Americanness.” This character failing was then connected to the race, religion, and national origin of the workers with some commentators editorializing that the workers were mainly “people such as the ‘nasty’ Jews, the ‘stinking’ Russians, the ‘injuns,’ and the ‘Polacks.’”⁴⁸ This racist and anti-immigrant theme was prevalent throughout the rhetoric of character citizenship. Josiah Strong’s 1885 best seller, *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis*, referred to immigration from undesirable populations, Catholicism, socialism, and drunkenness as some of the “perils” faced by the American people—“American” people who were necessarily white and therefore could not possibly be immigrants, Catholics, socialists, or drunks.⁴⁹ Defining character through the lens of race, class, religion, and nationality, and then people by way of character

instead of acknowledging the race, class, gender, and religious exclusions that actually defined the legal boundaries of American citizenship served two purposes. First, this elision allowed the American people to be, rhetorically, a moral people of good character, fulfilling the great calling of American exceptionalism. Second, it justified the exclusions of identity-based groups as a moral and social good. Speakers within the framework of character citizenship could argue for change based on seemingly inclusive standards of “good character” while placing the blame for the problems to be changed at the feet of unwanted others.

Turning to delivery, the rhetoric of character citizenship necessitated channeling the elements of character to ameliorate as many differences as possible between the rhetor and the idealized white male speaker. For white, middle-class, Protestant female speakers, who already met many of the criteria for good public character, one important element of delivery in the rhetoric of character citizenship was to make audience members comfortable with the blurring boundaries between gendered public and private spaces. Although the liberalization of private/public gender separation was by no means a completed during the Gilded Age, violations of the norm became more common throughout the era. Jeanne Halgren Kilde argued that one such space of violations was in the Chautauqua community.⁵⁰ Rapid growth and a devotion to Evangelical pursuits—including everything from camp-style revival meetings to educating Sunday school teachers—meant that Chautauqua residents often mixed private and public activities, male and female spaces, in a way that discomfited outside visitors to the city.⁵¹ In another example Amy Richter argued that railroad cars, by offering the opportunity for travel to “respectable” women, provided a liminal space between the home and the public sphere

in which women were able to present a more public image of the private sphere.⁵² While violations of male/female dichotomy between public/private space were still frowned upon, the rapidly changing economic realities of the Gilded Age, combined with the increasing speed of communication through print media, meant the development of some rhetorical space in which a woman could be respectable and still speak in the public sphere.

A vital way in which white, middle-class, Protestant women could use delivery to ameliorate the public discomfort with blurring gender space was by performing public morality as a form of character citizenship. For many women, this performance came through participation in explicitly Protestant-associated causes like the WCTU's temperance activism or the Grange's moral education lyceums. Because women's public good character was largely justified by the morality of motherhood and homemaking, women speaking in public were more readily understood as seeking to perform their moral duties if they were associated with moral causes. In addition to the spaces in which they presented their bodies, the standards for women's public morality were wide ranging: dresses had to be fashionable but not ostentatious, the speaker had to be conventionally attractive but not overly beautiful, and family, home, children and husband all had to be cared for prior to any social engagement. This left some room for speakers like Anthony or Frances Willard to speak as moral public figures despite their consistent requests for change in the status quo because they framed their arguments as remedies for social immorality. Barring any violation of propriety—an almost completely undefinable term that shifted constantly based on the whims of culture and the media—

these women could even lend additional respectability and therefore credibility to their causes through their performance of “good character” and public morality.

The intimate connections between class and character meant that all speakers within the framework of character citizenship had to demonstrate their membership in the middle or wealthy classes through dress, education, property, and time spent on charity, benevolence, or leisure. In *Serving Women*, Fey Dudden argued that, during the Gilded Age, a class-based shift occurred in women’s work. Specifically, middle and upper class women began hiring poor and working class women as “domestic help;” prior female hired help had generally been local girls from the same class status as their employers, referred to as “hired girls” and welcomed into the family structure.⁵³ The shift to “domestic help” occurred as middle and upper class women began devoting more of their time to leisure, education, charity, and other non-housekeeping related activities. This shift in women’s work also shifted fashions as wealthy women had time for elaborate formal dresses, multiple clothing changes each day, and leisure activities that required specialized clothing.⁵⁴ That is, women with enough wealth to hire someone for the “drudge” work of housekeeping had enough time to exhibit the actions and fashions that served as the “evidence” of good character required for their class status in life. This division of labor—poor women working in the drudges of housekeeping while wealthy women did the “moral” work of charity and benevolence—reified the rhetoric that tied character to class. As Salazar phrases it, “charity and benevolence-society workers, in their ‘friendly visits’ to the poor, for example, frequently sought to distribute to the poor not cash but the more ameliorative ‘coin of character’ through the sterling example of their own exemplary middle-class character.”⁵⁵ The performance of non-housekeeping

activity for women, and other leisure activities for men, was a key factor in performing the class-associated actions of “good character” that were expected of a speaker’s delivery in the framework of character citizenship.

Education, as an important marker of class, was also a vital part of performing a demonstrably-classed delivery in character citizenship rhetoric. Education texts that taught young men how to have a good character were the most obvious element that connected education to character. Public speaking education, however, was more directly tied to the exhibition of class upon which good delivery depended. Emily Cope argued that, by the 1870s, extemporaneous speaking was perceived within American culture as a touchstone of evangelical religion, and therefore as a link between the extemporaneous speaker and the morals of white, Protestant, Christianity.⁵⁶ Additionally, Kenneth Cmiel argued that public speaking during the late nineteenth century embraced a “middling style” of rhetoric to disseminate a democratic idiom through the country. This middling style was intimately linked to ideas of morality, class, and education.⁵⁷ In sum, speaking in a correct style and idiom of democracy, especially when using an extemporaneous delivery, indicated the speaker’s good character through association with the “right” race, class, gender, and religious ideals for citizenship.

In the following pages, I examine how Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking allowed her to become a lauded hero at her death. The following pages demonstrate that Anthony largely abandoned the rhetoric of universal human equality that typified her earlier extemporaneous speaking in favor of a rhetoric of character citizenship that was often classist and racist. Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking embraced the class-based rhetoric of good citizenship that permeated her Gilded Age culture. Although this

rhetorical tactic helped make woman suffrage a respectable social reform for women of “good character,” it also increasingly excluded any allies who did not meet the white-washed, capitalist version of “real America” during the Gilded Age.

Invention: Creating a Speaker of Character

Anthony stopped using both romantic and imitative strategies for invention during the Gilded Age, instead relying on her extensive experience to support a purely social invention strategy. Anthony relied on social invention because she could use her public character as ethos for any arguments she made. Using the Gilded Age paradigm of character as a visible performance of inherent goodness, Anthony used social invention strategies to craft a public persona that could connect with a variety of audiences nationwide. This circular process was the key to her popularity and fame within the Gilded Age culture of character citizenship rhetoric. This combination of character and social invention, however, also spelled doom for the radical women’s rights movement. Using social invention to reflect the culture into which she spoke, Anthony’s Gilded Age invention embraced the worst facets of Gilded Age citizenship rhetorics: racism, ethnocentrism, and the “middle-class values” of an increasingly classist and economically unequal nation. This strategy meant that Anthony’s rhetoric of woman suffrage abandoned the Quaker ideals of full human equality under a philosophy of natural rights in favor of a narrow focus on obtaining voting rights for women. Even “women” was too broad a label for Anthony’s primary audience by the end of her life because the “women” for whom she sought rights increasingly had to fit the mold of white, Protestant, middle-class “character” to be included in Anthony’s dreams of equality.

Inventing Character During the Gilded Age

A speaker's character, especially her public character as conveyed by the press, was the central tenant of invention during the Gilded Age. For Anthony's extemporaneous speaking, this meant filtering the entire message of woman suffrage through a funnel of her own race- and class-based traits that defined acceptable character for a public speaker. The primacy of character in arguments for enfranchisement was evident in how work for woman suffrage was discussed by texts from that period. For instance, In Harper's second volume of *The Life and Work of Susan B. Anthony*, she discussed the 1896 campaign in California. Speaking about the women who joined Anthony for the work, Harper introduced them in the following way:

The State Board and committees were composed of women of fine character and social standing, who commanded the highest of respect; and during the long campaign they put aside every other duty and pleasure and devoted themselves, mind and body, to the success of the amendment.⁵⁸

Harper's writing also provided insight into the centrality of the press in creating the character that was so central to invention in the period. Harper devoted ten paragraphs to detailing how each paper in the State of California covered the woman suffrage amendment, the women who advocated for it, what editorials each paper offered on the topic, and how much editorial space they gave to female writers, as well as how each paper used its cartoon illustrators to support or lampoon the movement.⁵⁹

Anthony relied on social invention to demonstrate her inherent good character as a woman and a speaker. In *Invention as a Social Act*, Karen Burke LeFevre argued that social invention was intimately linked to the artistic creation of a public character that would be respected and valued within a specific context. LeFevre argued that "ethos

refers not to the idiosyncrasies of an individual, and not the personal and private construct such as is often meant by ‘personality’; rather, ethos arises from the relationship between the individual and the community.” Quoting Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, LeFevre then explains that “Ethos... does not refer to your peculiarities as an individual, but the qualities that are valued by your culture or group.”⁶⁰ Anthony’s social invention, therefore, was an excellent rhetorical technique for the Gilded Age because it bolstered her assertions of good character. Anthony’s value to her culture was increasingly recognized in the later years of her life, first within reform circles and then, gradually, nationwide. During the first National Women’s Suffrage Association meeting to be held in Boston, in 1881, Anthony was presented with a gold cross necklace as a gift from the Philadelphia Citizens’ Suffrage Association and was feted as a leader of the movement for woman suffrage.⁶¹ Anthony was also recognized by the broader national culture as a woman of character and a leader of principle. While attending the California Women’s Congress on Housekeeping the convention devoted on full day to discussing the Homemakers’ place in politics. The *San Francisco Chronicle* reported that “Not more than a year ago there were not a hundred women in San Francisco who should have been dragged to a woman’s suffrage meeting but yesterday twenty-five times that number struggled and tore their clothing in their determination to hear Miss Anthony and Miss [Anna Howard] Shaw.”⁶² The *Chronicle* article noted that, even though Anthony was still presenting the same message of woman suffrage, she had become such a cultural icon that even those who had previously been opposed to her message wanted to hear it when she was the presenter. The Gilded Age marked a moment in Anthony’s life when her

extemporaneous speaking was widely recognized within her culture as valuable to the community writ large and was praised as a laudable feature of the good American citizen.

Anthony's ethos creation during the Gilded Age was not just her own work; the participating audiences, the press, and other popular speakers around the country also contributed to her public reputation for good character. In practice, this meant that because Anthony was well respected, she became increasingly well-known, and because she was well known, she was increasingly respected. This interconnected system of ethos made up "the social matrix of necessary others who form[ed the] community and audience" into which Anthony spoke.⁶³ Newspaper articles frequently provided the "social matrix" and frame of reference with which audiences should interpret Anthony's ethos. During a lecture tour before the 1881 NWSA convention, Anthony gave her famous "Woman Wants Bread, Not the Ballot" speech in Reading, Pennsylvania. The paper introduced her speech saying, "The burden of her plea was in behalf of female suffrage. This question has no abler advocate than Miss Anthony, who has devoted her whole life to its solution. No woman in the country possessed a better knowledge of politics and the influences brought to bear in determining questions pertaining to State and national government." This introduction served to both situate Anthony within the context of her female peers, but also within the political matrix of necessary other among whom "no one possessed better knowledge" than she. These introductory remarks and framing comments helped establish Anthony's good character as a woman in public with reading audiences, an ethos which was only strengthened by Anthony's actual speeches.

A second way that Anthony invented her ethos through explicit presentation was by sharing stories of the history of the United States that demonstrated her competence

and education. Speaking about the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments at a meeting in Wisconsin in 1886, Anthony recalled that,

The negro was thoroughly under the control of capital until freed by a military necessity and enfranchised through a political necessity. Were not the negro enfranchised he would command no more respect than the Chinaman or get better protection by law. The negro is not more acceptable to the whites than when held in bondage, but his power as a voter makes it possible for even a democrat to see a negro.⁶⁴

Here Anthony framed the laws and facts of American history after the Civil War in such a way as to argue for the value of suffrage in creating greater equality, even while some groups of people maintained racist prejudices that could have perpetuated the inequality of the slave system. Anthony's ability to frame history to support her arguments for equality was also on display during her 1895 tour of southern cities. She frequently noted that "Our fathers established a white, male oligarchy founded on the aristocracy of wealth" that has slowly been opened to white men who did not own property, then black men, and now it should be opened to women.⁶⁵ Additionally, the *Weekly Mercury* of Huntsville, Alabama, noted that the speech Anthony gave during her tour "was not only a discussion of the right of woman to participate by her ballot in the political government of the country, in all of its departments, but a history of the inception and progress of this movement in the United States for the past fifty years, in which she had an active participation for the last forty years."⁶⁶ Demonstrating her grasp of American history, and using a specific retelling of that history to argue for woman suffrage, bolstered Anthony's credibility as both an activist and an educated woman.

Anthony substantiated her explicit assertions of ethos with testimonials to her good character that came from the various local leaders and newspaper writers who introduced her across the country. Introductions of Anthony were always laudatory, even when offered by those who disagreed with some of her positions. Perhaps the most common form of introduction was to offer a comparison between Anthony and biblical figures. In Memphis, Tennessee, for instance,

Mrs. Merriweather compared [Anthony] to Moses in a very appropriate and interesting manner. After the children of Israel, she said, had spent years in slavery and degradation, a great leader was born among them, who broke the fetters of Egyptian slavery and led “God’s chosen people” beyond the great desert of Shamar... and finally to the border of the “Promised land.” Almost 40 years ago, she continued, there came another Moses for half the human race.⁶⁷

Although this was one of the most explicit assertions of Anthony’s similarity to biblical leaders, the comparisons were frequent introductory tactics on all her tours. Less obvious references, like that of the New Orleans *Daily Picayune*—which said, “Miss Susan B. Anthony, who for over half a century has been an apostle of woman’s suffrage and equal rights everywhere for women, arrived in New Orleans yesterday morning”⁶⁸—suffused any venue where Anthony spoke. Framing Anthony as a biblical figure or apostle of a movement lent ethos to her cause and gave her a platform of recognizable good character from which to present arguments for suffrage.

While social invention allowed Anthony to invent a personal ethos of credibility and respectability, it also fostered an exclusionary rhetoric of blaming minorities, immigrants, the uneducated, the poor, those of Catholic or Jewish faith, and African

Americans for social problems. In one example from her Wisconsin tour, Anthony invented an “ignorant” other as the foil for the degraded and disenfranchised white woman of character.

Susan B. Anthony made a brief address on the power of the ballot, declaring that the disenfranchisement of women was not only a political disgrace to women, but a social, moral, and educational disgrace as well. She reviewed the history of the woman suffrage movement in this country, illustrating how both of the dominant parties have refused to take up the issue and carry it to success. She attacked the inconsistency of protecting the negro by the civil rights bill, while no such bill could be found for the protection of Chinamen. She illustrated how all rights were conferred upon the negro with all his ignorances, while woman with her intelligence is denied the same privileges.⁶⁹

This passage demonstrates the paradoxical nature of arguing for change through a rhetoric of character citizenship; Anthony derided those who had rights in order to frame a better, more “intelligent” class—namely women—as more deserving. Given the fact that rights such as suffrage are not a finite resource under the American Constitution, this strategy served only to create a legitimizing discourse for the continued disenfranchisement of African Americans and Chinese workers. This exclusionary rhetoric served to bolster Anthony’s status as a woman of character within the paradigms of character citizenship and supported her argument for a change in voting laws. Enfranchised women would lead the country to increasing greatness because they possessed the character of good American citizens.

Anthony often invented the “woman of character” through straw-man arguments that attacked men as a group who lacked character. Speaking in New Haven, Connecticut, Anthony attacked students at Yale college who represented the failure of young male character. “Miss Anthony wound up the convention by returning thanks to the people of New Haven for their hospitable reception, and telling how she was affected by seeing the Yale college students sitting on the fence with cigars in their mouths.”⁷⁰ Not content to merely point out poor character, Anthony also offered the promise of a better society if women were given the opportunity to command their son’s respect. “She hoped the day would come when the college boys could be educated under the benign influences of their mothers.”⁷¹ Mothers, Anthony implied, as pillars of virtue, temperance, and Christian morality, would obviously teach their sons to behave if only the poor excluded women were given the respect they deserved from their government. At a meeting in nearby Providence, Rhode Island, Anthony outlined how unfair it was to subject the women of character she lauded to the vagaries of men’s uneducated and prejudiced whims. I quote at length from a *Providence Daily Press* report on her speech to demonstrate her invention of gendered character as an argument for suffrage.

I believe that women have a right to vote under the fourteenth amendment [*sic*], and I was one of the persons who, upon the adoption of that amendment, went to the polls and voted in the city of Rochester. I was arrested by the United States authorities, and dragged to the same dingy hole of a prison where many a negro had, under the old regime, been incarcerated. The course pursued at my trial was a foreshadowing of the course to be pursued by the republican party, and the course pursued by the republican party was a foreshadowing of the course to be pursued

by the supreme court, which is become a mere political machine to register the desires of the party in power.

The question of the enfranchisement of women is one of education. Those people who have not thought upon the subject will naturally shrink from it. All the traditions and prejudices of centuries have to be overcome before men will vote for woman's suffrage. Foreigners vote against it because coming from the monarchies of the old world, they are unused to the liberty themselves and opposed to granting it to others.

In Anthony's framing, men were unconstitutional authorities, former slave-catchers, corrupt politicians, unprincipled judges, uneducated cowards, and toadies to the monarchies of the Old World. In fact, some men actively "pursued" a course that would disenfranchise the educated women who only sought to do their duty under the constitution. Anthony's framing did not differentiate between supportive and unsupportive men, or even men with or without character, "men" were a class of people without character who, through cowardice, ignorance, or avarice, kept the moral "woman of character" from her constitutional rights.

Anthony's extemporaneous speaking invented white, middle class women as virtuous citizens of "good character" who were prevented from improving the nature of their society by their exclusion from the franchise. The rhetoric of character citizenship derided the already enfranchised white male population as not meeting the standards of good character that would be instituted by enfranchising the moral white Protestant women of the nation. In a second speech at the same venue as the one quoted above, Anthony spoke about women's "moral power" being hampered by disenfranchisement.

She said that at the present stage of society young women were told not to have anything to do with the young man who drinks or chews. She asked what the young girl of our age would do if she followed out that theory. The fact is, the girls have to take the young men just as they are or else go without them. In this respect the young men are masters of the situation. She thought the present marital relation was based upon the theory that the young man can manage the girl. However, soon after the marriage a divorce results, and the cause is that the young man can't manage the wife and the young women can't endure the husband. All this, she declared, could be remedied by making the woman in every respect the equal of man.⁷²

In this speech, Anthony used social invention to build on the popularity of the WCTU and the Protestant hatred for alcohol to argue that women could not even exercise their good character in their private spheres of the home when they were excluded from the franchise. Reflecting the social fears that women would not marry, or that men would become drunkards after marriage, Anthony argued that the only remedy was to enfranchise women so that they could force greater equality between themselves and their husbands the thereby perform their duties as moral mothers and homemakers of character. Anthony built on ideas of Protestant morality to argue that even seemingly good men could not be trusted with voting rights if women were oppressed; only the moral Christian woman could be trusted to save the nation and fulfill the ideal of good character at home and in the public sphere.

Managing Mediated Character in Extemporaneous Speaking

Anthony's social approach to invention while speaking extempore was a boon during the Gilded Age because it allowed her to reflect the idealized version of herself created by reporters back to them when she spoke. Already in her 70s, Anthony embodied an idealized version of a life-long moral reformer on her tour of southern California. For example, the *San Francisco Call* covered Anthony's first speaking day at the California Women's Housekeeping Congress in the following way.⁷³ "Miss Susan B. Anthony, the famous woman's rights champion, was speaking of the far-away days of her youth." The *Call* here framed Anthony as an elderly woman, but one of notable respect. The paper continued, "Twenty-four years ago when Miss Anthony was last in California she was struggling to obtain believers in the mission. People listened with half contemptuous wonder and the majority looked upon her as a crank." But, the paper made clear, Anthony was not the radical or "crank" that people had previously believed. "She did not begin to talk at once of her mission, as a fanatic would have done; on the contrary, just like any well-bred society woman Miss Anthony began to chat about indifferent subjects." Anthony was well-bred, experienced, and on a mission. In case the framing of Anthony as an ideal reformer and woman of character was not clear enough from the above introduction, the paper then commented, after relaying a brief description of her remarks, "It was not in any spirit of reproach that Miss Anthony recalled these souvenirs of oppression, but rather with a genteel satisfaction." The framing in the *Call* illustrated the importance of the print media in forwarding Anthony's rhetoric of character citizenship as an argument for woman suffrage. Not only was Anthony famous, she was also a long-time servant of her cause who had not fallen into the trap of radicalism that someone without a "genteel" character might; she was a "well-bred

society woman.” The paper even went so far as to note that the oppressions faced by women were “souvenirs” of Anthony’s past work, framing them as issues of a bygone era not current situations in need of change. Like an evangelical missionary, Anthony was bringing the gospel of woman suffrage to the people, not to condemn any current sins, but to gentrify and civilize the previously wild populations. Weaving together themes of religion, education, and morality, the paper framed Anthony as a woman of character seeking only to solidify the good character of her listeners.

Anthony was adept at demonstrating the various understandable elements of middle-class status and education that newspapers then interpreted as good character. During an 1884 tour of New England, the *Hartford Daily Times* framed Anthony as impeccably hardworking, a characteristic of Protestant good character that was especially important to New England communities.⁷⁴ “Miss Susan B. Anthony, the central light of the suffrage movement, and somewhat pale and worn from overwork, made the closing address of the evening,” the paper continued, “Anthony’s speech was made in her own imitable manner, and was, of course, applauded throughout.”⁷⁵ The paper noted Anthony’s pallor and directly tied it to hard work. It also insinuated that she had a longer history of hard work by mentioning that she brought an “imitable manner” of speaking to the stage, and noting that it was good enough to garner applause from the gathered crowds. Similarly, the New Orleans *Daily Picayune* told its readers,

So much has been written and so much has been said about miss Anthony that she needs no introduction to the readers of the Picayune. For fifty years miss Anthony has stood up for a principle, a principle which lay so near her heart that, though naturally a home loving woman, she has broken those ties and gone forth, as the

warriors of old, to battle for what she holds to be right—the equality of women with men.⁷⁶

In both of these newspaper introductions Anthony was adept at inventing a rhetoric of character that made her legible to the national press. She was hard working in Puritan New England and a home-loving woman in the American South. In both cases, she was recognized and praised by the audiences who came to hear her. Due to this legibility, she was welcomed among those who wanted to maintain a gendered rhetoric of character citizenship.

The symbiotic relationship between Anthony's social invention practices and the media that reported on her extemporaneous speaking helped solidify her reputation as a trustworthy authority on woman suffrage and as a woman of character. The *San Francisco Chronicle* addressed Anthony's reception from the audience and included commentary that explicitly denoted respectability.⁷⁷ A local leader began by saying, "I have the very great honor and pleasure of presenting to this assembly one who had done more than any other one woman. I have the honor of presenting to you Miss Susan B. Anthony." "Then the audience" the paper continued, "made still further demonstrations. They clapped and cheered and waved, and some of the gray-haired women wiped their eyes because it is so seldom that people live to be appreciated." Illustratively, this passage even went so far as to offer links between Anthony's respectability, her work for suffrage, and the class status she occupied. After mentioning the ovation Anthony received, the paper said, "But Susan B. stood like a princess of the blood royal. Very erect of head and clear of voice she began her little speech. It was full of reminiscences, because some few people have the privilege of telling recollections without any fear of

ever boring anyone. Miss Anthony is one of these.” Introductions like these served to frame Anthony as an authority on her topic. She had spoken about issues of equality for decades and she brought respectability, devotion, and character to her efforts to change American society. While Anthony had been derided for seeking radical overthrow of American culture during Reconstruction, her social invention of character citizenship as an argument for suffrage had made the ideas of woman suffrage palatable to a general audience. This framing also spoke directly to Anthony’s character. She was a woman who followed her principles, but also a respectable embodiment of womanliness. Anthony embodied the Protestant ideals of both moral and gendered character, and so became a darling of the national print media.

Speaker Character, Audience Character

This section has primarily addressed how Anthony invented herself as a person of character to argue for woman suffrage and has not addressed how she directed character arguments toward her audiences. Although this approach differs from that of other chapters in this dissertation, it reflects the culture into which Anthony spoke. By the 1880s Anthony had largely confined her speaking tours to “respectable” audiences of white men and women.⁷⁸ Invention during the Gilded Age focused directly on the speaker; as long as Anthony did not radically stray from her message of “votes for women,” her personal character was of primary interest to her audiences. Some arguments, however, did use an ethos of good character, applied to audience members or imagined others, to argue for the value of suffrage.

Anthony focused on the connection between voting rights and having good character in her most famous extemporaneous speech topic from the Gilded Age,

“Woman Wants Bread, Not the Ballot.” The backbone of Anthony’s “Bread” speech was the argument that any class of people without the right to vote was also always a degraded class in the labor force. Anthony consistently illustrated this argument with the story of British labor leader, John Bright, saying, “workingmen, what you need to bring to you cheap bread and plenty of it, is the franchise.”⁷⁹ The speech also included a litany of interchangeable stories about how the franchise empowered black men or poor white men in the United States and raised them up from the classes of degradation to being recognized and respected by their communities. The story of a free black minister who could not obtain service in Kansas until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment was a common example.⁸⁰ At the end of her speech, Anthony framed the ballot as the remedy for more violent and destructive social reform tactics; people of character would not resort to violence if they were not degraded by disenfranchisement. “Insurrectionary and revolutionary methods of righting wrongs, imaginary or real, are pardonable only in the enslaved and disfranchised. The moment any class of men possesses the ballot, it is their weapon and their shield. Men with a vote have no valid excuse for resorting to the use of illegal means to fight their battles.”⁸¹ In this speech Anthony used the ethos of good character to argue that anyone could rise to the level of good character if given access to the great equalizing force of the ballot.

Within the Gilded Age paradigm of character as a visible performance of inherent goodness, Anthony used social invention strategies to craft a public persona that could connect with a variety of audiences nationwide. This combination of character and social invention, however, also spelled doom for the radical women’s rights movement. Using social invention to reflect the culture into which she spoke, Anthony’s Gilded Age

invention embraced the worst facets of Gilded Age citizenship rhetorics: racism, ethnocentrism, and the “middle-class values” of a classist and economically unequal nation. This strategy meant that Anthony’s rhetoric of woman suffrage abandoned the natural rights philosophy of human equality that had animated earlier efforts for suffrage in favor of a narrow focus on obtaining voting rights for women who embodied the white, Protestant, middle-class ideal of good character.

Extemporaneous Delivery: Creating the Public Woman of Character

The Gilded Age was the easiest time for Anthony to deliver extemporaneous public speeches. In addition to the greater physical comfort that was available through train travel, communication through the mail and via telegraph had also drastically improved. Social changes also contributed to this increased ease. Anthony held the privilege of a white, Protestant, middle-class woman; her age further protected her from some of the harsher critiques leveled against younger women. This ease, however, hid a darker side of Gilded Age delivery. Anthony’s correctly-classed behavior offered restrictive, racist, and exclusionary boundaries for how a woman could perform in the public sphere. That is, even as Anthony garnered greater support and even accolades from the public, the restrictive boundaries of her performance became the standard by which other women were judged and excluded from the public sphere. The following pages examine how Anthony used delivery to negotiate a space for herself within the blurring boundaries of a still-gendered public sphere and then how she performed the norms of middle-class respectability in service of offering a respectable picture of woman suffrage that meshed with the rhetoric of character citizenship.

Gendered Geography in the Gilded Age

During the Gilded Age, the boundaries of gendered geography began to blur, and, especially for an older woman like Anthony, this blurring allowed her to maintain a reputation for “good character” while occupying the “male sphere” of public space. Trains, as Richter argued, helped bridge the gap between public and private space; women on trains were “in public” and were still being lady-like and maintaining the “morality” of their private spheres.⁸² Richter also extended her argument to point out how class and social status aided women like Anthony in maintaining a “good character” while in the public sphere. Richter noted that,

Victorian Americans’ reliance on gender difference to mask the often-discomforting divisions of class and race (that were even then obviously antithetical to the idealized American republic they fantasized about) fueled the emergence of a mixed-sex public in which both women and men bought goods and services to insulate themselves from the experiences of true social diversity.⁸³

The wealth inequality of the Gilded Age, that is, helped uncomfortable wealthy people mask the race and class inequality from which they benefitted. The WCTU, alongside other religious and progressive reform societies, also created a “moral public sphere” from which women could participate in public discourse while maintaining a good character. Many of these opportunities were reserved for middle-class women who lived in towns and cities and who had the financial ability to hire “domestic help.” There were also some organizations, such as the Grangers, that used traditional Protestant morals, mixed with a Puritan-esque devotion to “hard work” to provide rural women access to an acceptable public sphere.⁸⁴ Within this fluctuating gendered public sphere, Anthony used

the tools of extemporaneous delivery, as well as the privileges of her race, religion, and class, to craft a space for herself to perform good public female character.

Even given her privileges of race, class, and religion, Anthony still had to negotiate some of the gendered assumptions that limited what could be considered “women’s public sphere.” Amanda Anderson has argued that the term “fallen woman,” used to designate a woman as a prostitute, was often used interchangeably with the term “public woman,” a ubiquitous term for someone exhibiting “tabooed behaviors and degraded conditions,” during the Victorian era.⁸⁵ This conflation indicated the malleable state of not behaving appropriately according to middle-class white standards. For Anthony, this malleable state of public womanhood meant navigating a performance of acceptable femininity that would constitute the spaces in which she spoke as acceptable spaces for women.

Anthony managed this constitutive delivery by surrounding herself with the individuals and trappings that connoted respectability in any given city. For instance, while in Boston Anthony gave an interview from her parlor at the famous Winthrop House hotel.⁸⁶ In New Orleans, she stayed at the home of a prominent state Judge, and the *Times Democrat* spent a full column of print noting that she was welcomed by members of the Portia Club, a local self-improvement women’s club whose members were wives of prominent local Democratic politicians.⁸⁷ In another example, when Anthony arrived in California the *San Francisco Chronicle* made special note that she was welcomed by members of the Women’s Housekeeping Congress as well as the “Rev. Dr. McLean of Oakland” whose titles were all included with his name along with a biography of his work in the community. The paper then spent several paragraphs noting all the

important politicians and religious leaders Anthony had spoken with on her cross-country train trip.⁸⁸ Being connected to these places and people lent Anthony a form of classed respectability that forced newspapers to either frame her as a respectable woman or to question the respectability of the powerful local leaders with whom she interacted.

Performing Class in Service of “Equality”

The blurry boundaries of gendered space provided some access to the public sphere for women, but this benefit was largely limited to white women who could demonstrate their membership in the middle and upper classes of society. Hence, delivery was vital to being accepted into the “woman’s public sphere.” Delivery, as this dissertation has consistently argued, was the most consistently and obviously raced, classed, and gendered element of public speaking. During the Gilded Age, the performance of class surged to the forefront of audiences concerns about delivery, and, therefore, Anthony’s performance of middle-class respectability and education was the central feature of her growing popularity on the national stage.

One vital element for a woman performing a correctly classed identity during the Gilded Age was meeting the cultural ideals of feminine beauty. Louis Banner’s *American Beauty* argued that there was a push toward a more natural beauty during the end of the Gilded Age. This push began with makeup and hair design, but it also encompassed body shape and athleticism.⁸⁹ Anthony was still not considered an ideal beauty,⁹⁰ but her “gaunt” or “lean” body type was increasingly associated with health and a level of attractiveness. For instance, an unidentified clipping from Anthony’s speaking stop in South Carolina, which was derisive of Anthony’s suffrage arguments, still spoke not unkindly about her appearance. “A tall gaunt woman, prominent cheek bones and deep

sunken eyes, thin face and [unreadable] gray hair smoothly parted from the center of her high narrow forehead, her person slightly bent and very angular.”⁹¹ The paper noted further that Anthony was “not unprepossessing” even as it insulted her ideas and intelligence because her speech “offended Southern prejudices.”⁹² The *San Francisco Chronicle*, a more sympathetic paper to the suffrage cause, noted Anthony’s healthy look as an important part of its assessment.

Miss Anthony looks like her pictures. She is tall, rather broad-shouldered, of erect carriage and very good figure. She is as sprightly as any woman of twenty in spite of her 76 years. Well preserved in every way, she is a living refutation of the bogle that hard work will ruin a woman’s face and physique. She is a great deal better preserved than the ordinary grandma of 76 who darns stocking and sits in the corner, as domestic as any fire-side cat.⁹³

While Anthony would never be considered a “beauty” by the cultural standards of her time, the shift in cultural beauty standards to appreciate athleticism in women’s bodies helped Anthony’s image. She was obviously healthy because she and had withstood the trials of travel for so many decades. Her tall and slim “physique” also became a symbol of health. Anthony may not have represented the highest ideals of beauty on stage but she did provide a picture of health that was respectable for a middle-class woman in public.

Wearing the correct clothing was also a vital part of performing a correctly classed delivery in the public sphere. Clothing choice during the Gilded Age was complicated by the increasing speed of change in women’s fashion. The widening gaps between working-class and wealthy women’s fashions and between rural and urban adherence to trends also contributed to the speed of fashion change. At the beginning of

the nineteenth century a dress would remain fashionable for five to ten years no matter the wearer's class or location. By the 1890's, however, dress shapes, cuts, and materials, even for working-class women, could change every year and could be radically different between large urban centers, small interior cities, and rural farming communities. For Anthony, the differences between wealthy and working-class fashion and the rapid changes in style meant finding a "uniform" for public speaking that did not detract from her credibility or respectability with middle-class and wealthy audiences but also did not offend the more moderate sensibilities of working-class or rural audiences. Harper explained how Anthony managed the changing fashion-associated class dynamics of the Gilded Age in her public speeches.

In dress Miss Anthony is extremely particular. She considers it poor economy to wear cheap material, always buys the best fabrics, linings and trimmings, and employs a competent dressmaker. She has one gown a year and often this is a present from some loving friend. While she wears only black silk or satin in public, she loves color and her house dress is usually maroon or soft cardinal.⁹⁴

Anthony's fastidious wardrobe included a new gown each year to match the changing fashions expected by wealthy women in large urban centers. These dresses, however, were often gifts from friends, suggesting the kindness, gentility, and respect that Anthony garnered among other women. Although Anthony followed the fashion conventions of each year, she also did so in such a way as to demonstrate good thrift and "economy" in her spending. Furthermore, although Anthony "loved color" she always dressed in black when speaking in public. This color choice referenced, in the minds of her nostalgic nineteenth-century audience, the thrift, modesty, virtue of the imagined communities of

Puritans and Quakers who had founded the nation. Although Harper made these statements explicit only in her 1898 biography of Anthony, newspaper reports on Anthony's speeches droned the same themes throughout the Gilded Age. The *Memphis Commercial Advertiser* noted that Anthony's dress was "thoroughly womanly" and followed the current fashion for 1895 with "big sleeves" and a "close bodice."⁹⁵ An unidentified clipping for Anthony's speech in South Carolina also commented on her attire, noting "a red shawl about her shoulders and skirts of some plain dark stuff—that is Miss Anthony or as the copied papers call her 'Aunt Susan.'"⁹⁶ Anthony was well aware of the impact her fashion choices had on her extemporaneous delivery. Harper recorded that interviewers often asked Anthony about women's dress as "bloomers" were becoming popular for female bicycle riders and that Anthony often responded "My opinion about 'bloomers' and dress generally for both men and women is that people should dress to accommodate whatever business or pastime they pursue."⁹⁷ For the pastime of supporting woman suffrage, Anna Howard Shaw effectively summarized the importance of dress when she accompanied Anthony on the tour of California saying, "If Miss Anthony and I did not wear the same clothes other women do we would not be listened to."⁹⁸ Wearing the right clothing, and using those sartorial choices to demonstrate the correct social class while delivering a speech, was central to Anthony's acceptance as a woman of character.

A third important part of performing class in her delivery came as Anthony demonstrated her education through the "middling style" of her extemporaneous speaking. Using a middling style of popular discourse, as Cmiel noted, was also vital to an appropriately classed delivery. While she was touring Wisconsin, the *La Cross*

Morning Chronicle said, “Miss Anthony spoke without particular oratorical advantage and her speaking compels attention chiefly through the earnestness of the speaker and the clear, well directed style of her propositions to the one central theme.” Anthony’s earnestness did not rise to the level of oratory that might be understood as ostentatious by working-class audiences, but still maintained the clarity and style of a speaker trained by a thoroughly middle-class education in argument and delivery.

Finally, Anthony’s education in history, and her ability to harness that history as a foundation for her arguments through extemporaneous invention, was also vital to delivering a correctly-classed performance of education within the framework of character citizenship. Nineteenth-century general education texts on extemporaneous speaking encouraged the practice as an audience-adaptive and flexible speaking style—which came from consistent practice and perfect familiarity with a topic—and which demonstrated a rhetors education and competence.⁹⁹ The cultural prevalence of this interpretation of extemporaneous speaking meant that Anthony’s speaking style helped demonstrate her middle-class education. The *Owensboro Daily Messenger* of Kentucky told its readers that “Miss Anthony has a fine presence and ‘speaks right on’ as she herself laughingly said. She is the product of the old time, while her companion, Mrs. Catt has all the grace of the orator. Her voice is clear and resonant, and with a magnetic quality that took hold on her audience from the first sentence.”¹⁰⁰ The *Women’s Tribune* noted that on a lecture tour in Kansas Anthony gave a “most masterly” speech on American history that demonstrated a “knowledge of political history and social economy that any statesman might envy.”¹⁰¹ Anthony’s educated delivery established her credibility with upper-class audiences through her grasp of history but also used the

middling style and extemporaneous mode of address that connoted an educated speaker to popular culture during the Gilded Age.

Anthony's Gilded Age delivery demonstrated a mastery of the gendered geography in which she spoke and the class-based cultural norms that influenced how she was perceived by audiences. Anthony's mastery of delivery, however, helped create a new norm of exclusionary practice that limited women's ability to participate in the public sphere. It was class and race privilege that allowed Anthony to negotiate a stable public identity within the blurry boundaries between public and private space. Anthony's class status, performed through beauty, dress, and education, allowed her the respectability and status to present arguments for equality because they signaled to her audience that she would not seek radical changes that would destabilize their worlds. The Gilded Age was the easiest time for Anthony to deliver extemporaneous public speeches, but by embracing the race, class, and gender norms of her culture, Anthony's extemporaneous speaking also reified the boundaries of gender, race, class and religious exclusion that would hamper progressive reforms for decades.

Character Citizenship: Abandoning Equality on the Altar of Character

Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a performance of "character citizenship" that employed the appropriate performances of race and class to argue for white women's inclusion in the franchise. Using the discourses of ethos and performing an implicitly classed "good character," Anthony's extemporaneous speaking embodied an appropriate way for a woman to function in public by performing a white, middle-class, Protestant version of public feminine virtue. This performance of citizenship garnered Anthony significant praise at the end of her life and brought a form of classed

“respectability” to the formerly-radical woman suffrage movement. Anthony’s embrace of character citizenship, however, abandoned the radical egalitarianism that had motivated prior work for woman suffrage. Instead of arguing for full human equality before God and under the law, as she had while working for abolition and during much of Reconstruction, Anthony instead began allowing reasons why voting rights might be limited to “others” in favor of enfranchising white, educated, Protestant women. Sadly, this strategy of exclusive citizenship—as long as “undesirable others” were the ones being excluded from voting rights—fed the instrumental success of what was now an explicitly white-woman suffrage movement. More white, middle-class and wealthy women were drawn into the suffrage movement and other civic participation causes. Abandoning the principles of natural rights in her citizenship performance, Anthony opened the door to inegalitarian exclusions based on race, class, sexuality, religion, morality, ability, language, national origin, and a plethora of additional categories.

Anthony’s performance of character citizenship—especially when framed against the Gilded Age bogeyman of an ignorant, evil, uncivil populace—was a persuasive argument for white women’s inclusion in the franchise. To a country plagued by trepidation about corruption and change, Anthony’s performance of character citizenship presented an ideal female citizen as the culturally recognizable remedy for many problems of the time. Salazar has argued persuasively that, from the very beginning of the United States government, good character was seen as the answer to how a democratic citizenry was to be governed. “Citizenship,” Salazar said, “was thus formally equated with the cultivation of the forms of self-governance and socially calibrated self-interest that distinguished ‘having’ character from merely ‘being’ a particular type of

character in the republican framework.”¹⁰² During the Gilded Age, this exclusionary foundation of “good character” in American law was exacerbated by the elision of “character” into visible factors of identity. Those who had a “good character” were identified by their wealth, popularity, religion, and skin color. Anthony’s performance of appropriately classed “character citizenship” offered up an idealized white, middle-class, Protestant woman who already possessed the “self-governance” necessary to be a governable democratic citizen.

Gilded Age newspapers treated Anthony as the embodiment of women’s appropriate behavior in public and framed her as an ideal woman of character arguing against the ignorance and evil of an unsavory and undemocratic crowd. The *San Francisco Chronicle*, for instance, framed one instance of Anthony’s speaking in the following way:

Then Miss Anthony, who had come in to the accompaniment of a triumphal march of handclapping, told the audience about the invention of the Borden horse-shoe nail; which was invented by Mrs. Borden and patented by her husband. He made several millions out of it, and when he died she, under the laws of New York, could only hold a life interest in one-third of the money that had been coined out of her brain. Miss Anthony’s little story was eloquent. It had a moral as her little stories always have, and she made no comments but left the audience to draw their own conclusions.¹⁰³

The evil and ignorant laws of New York provided the backdrop for Anthony’s story of a brilliant inventor. Not only was Anthony’s story framed to highlight women’s intelligence and character—the brilliant inventor married and was modest enough to use

her husband's name and have him take charge of the money—but Anthony herself was framed as a woman of character. She told a “little story” but did not lecture or preach to the gathered crowds, she used her speaking to teach a moral lesson but was not vain enough to scold or cajole her audience. She was the epitome of a woman of good character seeking to bring her greater morality to the public sphere through the pleasing speech and winning ways that defined women's good character in private. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking served as a demonstration of ideal character citizenship that was recognizable to her audiences because of the correctly classed performance of feminine virtue she offered.

Newspaper reports also made explicit connections between Anthony's speaking and the ideal performance of class and character it offered by discussing the audiences who came to her events. The New Orleans *Daily Picayune* gave the following extensive description of the audience for one of Anthony's speeches as a demonstration of how respectable her speaking and her movement had become.

If anyone ever doubted the interest that southern women feel in the all-absorbing question of the day, “woman and her rights” that idea would have forever been disbursed by a glance at the splendid audience that assembled at Assembly Hall last night to hear Miss Susan B. Anthony, the world famed apostle of woman suffrage... The hall was literally packed to overflowing, not only with women, but with men, prominent representatives in every walk of life, standing room was at a premium, corridors and windows were filled with a sea of earnest, interests faces, the name of Miss Anthony was on every lip. And all eyes were directed

towards the platform, which was beautifully decorated with palms and potted plants, the suffrage color, yellow, predominating among the verdant foliage.¹⁰⁴

The “splendid audience” filled with “prominent representatives” from the community was earnestly interested in Anthony’s speech on the question of “woman and her rights.” The implication of this passage was that the best and most respectable people of the city came to hear one of the most respected and respectable advocates of their time. A woman of poor character or questionable virtue could not possibly draw such a respectable audience. The *Chicago Union Signal*, reporting on Anthony’s tour of Kansas and Wisconsin, also used the ideal woman of character framing to explain why suffrage for women was not yet the law of the land. In the following signed opinion article, the “Honorable J. G. Malcolm, M.D.” framed Anthony’s arguments as something that leaders of character would, of course, embrace, but that lower classes of voters could not fathom, implying that suffrage measures failed on the Kansas ballot because not enough people of character and class lived in the state.

The convention has done much to popularize the woman suffrage movement here. Of course, there are a good many people in every community who never find out that any measure is right until it is carried, and then they wish it to be understood that they were its greatest advocates. There are thousands of people all over the country who are just beginning to find out that slavery was wrong and that the world is round. I often think that there are thousands of good church members, who, if they had lived when Christ did, and had been in the crowd at his trial, would have voted for His crucifixion. This class will oppose woman suffrage. There are others who cannot be converted to any cause until a majority are in

favor of it, and still more who cannot be converted until a respectable minority are in favor of it. There are very few people who will stand up alone for what is right. Anthony stood not only as the ideal woman of good character but as a suffering Christ figure, condemned by the (uneducated) “crowd” who could not even fathom that the world was round. The derisive tones applied to those who did not support Anthony’s message set up a boundary between the educated, moral, respectable, suffrage-supporting leaders, and the ignorant, evil, populace who lacked the character to know or do the right thing.

Extemporaneous speaking was especially useful in Anthony’s performance of character citizenship because of its implicit ties to both democratic education and Protestant morality. Although Anthony increasingly spoke to middle-class and wealthy audiences, she was not completely isolated from the income inequality of the Gilded Age. Speaking extemporaneously demonstrated education to the more financially stable members of her audience but it also alluded to the evangelical preaching and Protestant morality that suffused working-class and rural audiences. While speaking on the last day of the California Women’s Congress on Housekeeping, when the convention addressed “women and politics,” Anthony’s speech demonstrated the importance of the extemporaneous speaking mode to her performance of character citizenship. On previous days of the convention, Anthony had spoken about suffrage only as it related to other “moral” issues of homemaking. On the final day, she spoke explicitly about disenfranchisement as moral, social, and political degradation, her most controversial and explicitly political remarks. But even this argument was framed within a call for national housekeeping, a theme that was not normally part of Anthony’s argumentation. She

prefaced her arguments by framing them as a religious duty. The *San Francisco Chronicle* reported, “Said Miss Anthony ‘my Quaker spirit moves me to speak.’” Using extemporaneous speaking allowed Anthony to present her remarks as a religious duty, and to frame her arguments within the theme of the conference and the other speakers of the day.

By embracing the arguments and performances of character citizenship, Anthony brought respectability to the movement for woman suffrage, but only at the cost of constituting a class of undesirable others who could be framed as not deserving of the rights of citizens. Discussing the reunification of the AWSA and NWSA, Barry noted that Anthony rejected any explicit statements that she had given up the radical ideals of full human equality that had originally motivated her work for abolition, temperance, and suffrage. This explicit rejection, however, was countered by Anthony’s action. As Barry phrases it, “the fact remains that even though Anthony’s commitment to suffrage was for the radical reasons Engles articulated for the working classes, her shift in the women’s rights platform to suffrage opened the doors to the American’s making the first overtures toward unity and to its highly conservative influences on the movement.”¹⁰⁵ These “conservative influences” were the ideas of character citizenship, ideas that would allow Anthony’s performance and arguments to function as a constitutive force for unequal citizenship regardless of her intentions.

Anthony’s arguments for woman suffrage presented the ballot as a great equalizing force, which, she implied, treated the wrong people as equals. Speaking in Concord, New Hampshire, Anthony said, “she wished that women could be treated as respectfully as the Irishmen, Germans, Bohemians, Swedes, and Negros are for a few

days before election day.”¹⁰⁶ This statement explicitly ignored the poverty and discrimination that plagued these communities whenever election day was not approaching, instead focusing on the equality and “respect” that was shown to men in these communities when politicians sought their votes. An unidentified newspaper that covered the same speech provided more clarity on what Anthony meant by “respect.” Anthony argued that women’s character would be the groundwork for equality, “As slavery was abolished from a military necessity, as negro suffrage was abolished from a political necessity, so a moral necessity exists for the enfranchisement of women.”¹⁰⁷ This moral necessity existed because the men from the previously mentioned communities could not be counted on to uphold the standards of good character that women would offer. The unidentified clipping then said,

Some statistics were given bearing upon the magnitude of the liquor traffic in the nation, and especially in the cities of New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago. The misery, expense, and crime caused by it was contrasted with the immunity enjoyed in those sections where the principle of prohibition is in force. *Women of property* are called upon to bear their portion of the public expense caused by the traffic, and yet they have no voice in the Government.”¹⁰⁸

In this passage, Anthony’s arguments further defined the limit of good character by focusing on the consequences to “women of property.” Thus, Anthony’s performance of character citizenship tied the woman suffrage movement to the respectability of property-owning women at the expense of poor, minority, black, and immigrant communities. Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking effectively constituted an audience of property-

owning women as deserving of citizenship while ignoring the variety of experiences of women outside the white, middle-class, Protestant identity category.

Anthony's invention of the "woman of character" functioned as an attack on the concepts of manhood and manliness that lay at the core of character citizenship. Speaking at a temperance meeting during her tour of New England, Anthony lamented the failures of voting men to achieve success—a key term that Hilkey has argued was closely associated with manliness—in their anti-alcohol efforts. "For the last 50 years the temperance movement has been conducted by men. Women have been allowed to aid it by their prayers and their tears. There was something more for them to do, and they should be permitted to work in the most effective way."¹⁰⁹ Anthony then presented statistical data and anecdotal stories to illustrate not only how badly the men's efforts at temperance had failed, but the degradation and immorality their failure had caused. Then Anthony offered her most cutting indictment of manhood and manly character; men of the temperance movement were seeking women's help to achieve their goals.

Woman's efforts in the work of temperance are ignored by those in office because they represent no constituency, and the methods of a disenfranchised class are regarded as revolutionary. The woman suffrage movement was one in favor of temperance. Every mother should have a voice in the making of the laws. The key to the whole question is the ballot. Just as long as only one half of the people who have a voice in this matter, so long will intemperance hold its sway. A man who loves his whiskey doesn't want the women to have the right to vote. We should study and defeat the purposes of the enemy in this regard. Women are needed upon juries, then you should have a voice in the shutting up on the liquor shops

and the brothels. Men who have been active in the temperance cause for years stand today appalled, and many of them say there is no help save the enfranchisement of women.¹¹⁰

Anthony opined that the moral work that women of character could do for the temperance movement was ignored by those with power. Even more disturbing, however, to Gilded Age notions of character and manhood, men in the temperance movement needed women's help to achieve their goals. The moral men—the men of character who had “been active in the temperance cause for years”—recognized that they could not achieve success without resorting to help from women. In her closing lines of the speech Anthony summarized the failure of manliness as a failure of morality and manly character: “As slavery was abolished from a military necessity, as negro suffrage was adopted from a political necessity, so a moral necessity exists for the enfranchisement of women.”¹¹¹

Anthony also tied women's voting to correct performances of feminine citizenship by arguing that women could not perform their “sacred” duty as homemakers, wives, or mothers while excluded from the ballot. Speaking Kansas in 1886, Anthony bemoaned the small progress women had made in the temperance cause without access to the ballot.

We have made some progress but do not yet enjoy the beauties of the ballot.

Women influence men to quit drinking often, but they cannot vote to make them quit, and the whisky ticket is therefore in the ascendant. The power of the liquor traffic when wielded by mad men cannot be mentioned or measured, and will remain until the women whose husbands spend their wages in saloons are allowed to vote against the traffic, and have their votes counted.¹¹²

Anthony's framing of women's citizenship as rooted in the home but hindered by the lack of a ballot alluded to the increasing publicity of women's good character. Women's good character in their home lives as mother, sisters, and wives was, as I noted above, an important legitimizing discourse for their entrance into the public sphere. Anthony here argued that women could not fulfill their duties of good character—as wives, mothers, daughters, sisters—because they lacked the ballot to enforce their will outside the home. This framing reflected the increasing publicness of women's sphere during the Gilded Age, but also the importance of home-centered notions of women's character to Anthony's argument for the ballot. Anthony made the connection between home-based duties that defined women's good character and their treatment in the public sphere even more clear in a speech in California in 1895.

It is impossible to teach a small boy that the reason why he can vote while his sister cannot, is not because of some innate superiority of intellect in himself. The mother teaches her boy that if he is to be respected he must not drink, smoke, or chew or live an impure life. But the boy sees the misters call with a cigar in his fingers, and the judge with a half-brushed spittoon at his side, well filled. The teacher with a wad of tobacco in his cheek, and knows that his father breaks every one of these laws. He soon has no more respect for his mother's opinion than his father has. He soon says, 'O Mother, you don't know anything, Your [*sic*] only a woman.'"¹¹³

As Hilkey has noted, motherhood was at the heart of Gilded Age definitions of women's good character. In this passage, Anthony used the anecdote of a young boy and his mother to demonstrate that, without the political "capital" provided by voting, a woman

could not exert her “character” to do her duty towards her wayward son. Even more distressing, Anthony suggested that all the men surrounding the boy were lacking in good character to such an extent that they would passively undermine the mother’s good character by their very presence. Women’s exclusion from the franchise, this story implied, was detrimental to women, children, men, and society; the only way to bring character to the nation was to enfranchise the “women of character” who would bring about the change.

Anthony also had to perform as a woman of character on the stage to be respected and listened to in the public sphere. Performing culturally recognizable iterations of beauty, dress, and education allowed Anthony to create a space within the blurring lines of gendered public geography in which she could be both a public woman and a woman of character. As a performance of citizenship, however, Anthony’s extemporaneous delivery helped to reify and justify the race, class, gender, and religious exclusions within American law and culture. Anthony’s performance embodied a type of progressive agenda for change that still allowed for exclusionary and discriminatory discourses of disenfranchising unwanted others. Anthony emulated the wealthy and “respectable” audience to which she spoke in dress, manners, race, and religion. Those who failed to meet the ideals established by Anthony’s delivery could then be framed as failing the standards of good character. Put simply, Anthony’s delivery allowed “good people” who were concerned with “progress” to still embrace the worst demons of racism, classism, and discrimination that haunted the United States in the name of preserving “character” as a qualifier for citizenship.

Conclusions and Implications

The Gilded Age was a time of mingled success and failure for the suffrage cause. Women won the right to vote in school election in Michigan and Minnesota in 1875 and in New York in 1880. Women also gained full suffrage rights in Washington territory in 1883, Colorado in 1893, and Utah and Idaho in 1896. At the same time, white supremacist Democrats regained control of southern state legislatures and passed discriminatory Jim Crow laws that almost totally disenfranchised black voters as well as many poor white voters. Participation in elections by white men rose to an all-time high, but only on the promises of patronage and payola offered by competing party machines. Woman suffrage gained support from alliances with the temperance cause, but alienated women of color, immigrants, poor women, working women, and unions with a rhetoric of classist and racist “respectability.” Amid the chaos and stability of the Gilded Age, Anthony invented a disenfranchised woman who, if enfranchised, offered the stability that her audiences longed for amid the rapidly changing culture. Performing the correct class markers of respectability allowed Anthony to offer an ideal of character citizenship in which her audience could find stability even as she argued for change.

Anthony’s rhetoric of character citizenship was the key to her eventual embrace by the popular press. In contrast to coverage from previous decades, Anthony’s speaking during the Gilded Age was lauded by the press and greeted with respect and admiration by prominent and powerful citizens in the communities where she spoke. Although she continued to argue for woman suffrage throughout her life, Anthony’s rhetorical shift away from the ideals of natural rights helped to mainstream the idea of suffrage as a right that women, as least some women, ought to have. Taking character as the key theme of her rhetorical practices allowed Anthony to define which women deserved the rights to

the franchise; the respectable “mothers, daughters, sisters, aunts” of the voting men deserved the right to vote, the ignorant “others” who populated the voter rolls had voting rights but squandered them. Anthony’s arguments for suffrage using the idiom of character citizenship foreswore arguing for universal suffrage in favor of defining suffrage as a right for deserving women of character.

It is this definition of “deserving women” that demands scrutiny. The ethos of character citizenship, and how you presented that character publically, infiltrated the rhetoric of the formerly-radical leaders of the women’s rights movement. The long-time leaders like Anthony had almost all achieved a level of wealth and “respectability” after their years of largely unpaid work and their cause, and the movement soon came to reflect respectability more than it reflected the varied experiences of women. These gains in respectability, while useful for making the character arguments of the period, came at a cost. Anthony and other movement leaders were no longer interacting on a day-to-day basis with the working women, black women, and immigrants who did not have the independent wealth to work full time on reform causes. Flexner has argued that, “The growth of organizations such as the International Council of Women and the Women’s Congress of the Chicago Colombian Exposition were other factors which tended to strengthen the leadership of women with independent incomes or professional prestige.”¹¹⁴ This change in “respectability” within the ranks of the NAWSA leadership had a negative impact on the movement’s inclusiveness as white, middle-class women began to exclude immigrants, black women, and more radical reformers.

This exclusion set the stage for themes of white supremacy and classicism that would plague generations of what Campbell has called the “rhetorical movement of

feminism” for generations.¹¹⁵ The best and most enduring critique of the racist and classist problems that plague the feminist movement comes from bell hooks’ *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center*.¹¹⁶ hooks offers a concise, biting, and incisive critique of Betty Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique*, which highlights the raced and classed ideas of “woman” to whom Friedan speaks.¹¹⁷ Friedan’s “problem that has no name” was “the plight of a select group of college-educated, middle- and upper-class, married white women—housewives bored with leisure, with home, with children, with buying products, who wanted more out of life.”¹¹⁸ Friedan’s formulation of “women” bears a striking resemblance to the picture Anthony offered in the 1890s. hooks’ words could easily be applied to Anthony: “She did not speak of the needs of women without men, without children, without homes. She ignored the existence of all non-white women and poor white women. She did not tell readers whether it was more fulfilling to be a maid, a babysitter, a factory worker, a clerk, or a prostitute than to be a leisure-class housewife.”¹¹⁹ This critique of racism and classism names the problems Anthony’s rhetoric of character citizenship helped to create during the Gilded Age.

This chapter has demonstrated that Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking during the Gilded Age used a performance of character citizenship to argue for changes to women’s voting. Anthony’s invention and delivery practices created an idealized white woman voter, devoted to morality, social uplift, and the good of the nation. Harper and Barry both argue that Anthony always adhered to the principled stance of universal suffrage and equal human rights for all women, but the rhetoric of character citizenship helped to excluded poor women, women of color, immigrant women, “fallen” women, and others who did not meet the standards of “character.” While Anthony continued to

plead for full human equality and universal suffrage as principles under God and under the law, her rhetoric of character citizenship allowed a place for arguments of educated suffrage and other exclusionary practices within the woman suffrage movement.

Notes

¹ Harper, *The Life*, 1425-26.

² Harper, *The Life*, 1526.

³ Harper, *the Life*, 1526.

⁴ Scholars do not agree on the specific dates of the Gilded Age. Even the authors I reference in this chapter cannot agree on specific dates; Rebecca Edwards uses 1865-1905, Robert Wiebe includes the Progressive Era in his treatise and dates the periods from 1877-1920, Jack Beatty calls the Gilded Age the *Age of Betrayal* and dates the period from 1865-1900. Furthermore, the term “The Gilded Age” did not come into popular usage until the 1920s but Mark Twain originally penned his novel of the same name in 1873. The dates become even more varied considering that the term “Victorian Era” is sometimes used synonymously or interchangeably with Gilded Age, but can refer to any time between the 1840s and 1900 (See: Hellerstein, Hume, and Offen, Thompson, Anderson). As these terms relate to Anthony’s life, I argued in the previous chapter that Anthony shifted away from legal strategies after her preposterous trial for voting in 1873 and the popular attention she gleaned for her involvement in the Beecher-Tilton sex scandal in 1874-75. Therefore, I use the term Gilded Age to reference the final years of Anthony’s speaking career from 1875 through her death in 1906. These dates fall well within the broad range of dates most commonly used to identify the period of the Gilded Age.

Rebecca Edwards, *New Spirits: Americans in the Gilded Age, 1865-1905* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).; Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order, 1877-*

1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967).; Jack Beatty, *Age of Betrayal: The Triumph of Money in America, 1865-1900* (New York: Alfred A. K, 2007).; Mark Twain, *The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today* (New York: Harper, 1901). For the original 1873 printing see: Mark Twain, and Charles Dudley Warner, *The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 1873).; Erna Olafson Hellerstein, Leslie Parker Hume, and Karen M. Offen, *Victorian Women: A Documentary Account of Women's Lives in Nineteenth-Century England, France, and the United States* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1981).; Nicola Diane Thompson, *Victorian Women Writers and the Woman Question* (Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press, 1999).; Amanda Anderson, *Tainted Souls and Painted Faces: The Rhetoric of Fallenness in Victorian Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1993).

⁵ For reference, the previous two chapters have, combined, only covered 21 reels of microfilm documents.

⁶ Kathleen L. Barry, *Susan B. Anthony: A Biography of a Singular Feminist* (New York: New York University Press, 1988), 276.

⁷ Kathleen L. Barry, "Susan B. Anthony: (1820-1906), Radical Egalitarian of Women's Rights," In *Women Public Speakers in the United States, 1800-1925: A Bio-Critical Sourcebook*. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, Ed. (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1993), 22.

⁸ Flexner, *Century of Struggle*, 203.

⁹ Flexner, *Century of Struggle*, 131.

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- ¹⁰ Dana C. Elder, "A Rhetoric of Etiquette for the 'Ture Man' of the Gilded Age," *Rhetoric Review* 21, no. 2 (2002): 152.
- ¹¹ Judy Hilkey, *Character is Capital: Success Manuals and Manhood in Gilded Age America* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 16-17.
- ¹² Angela G. Ray, *The Lyceum and Public Culture in the Nineteenth-Century United States* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2005), 44-46.
- ¹³ Kirt E. Montgomery, "Speaking in the Oregon Grange -- 1873-1900," *Western Speech* 16, no. 2 (1952): 107-112.
- ¹⁴ Hilkey, *Character is Capital*, 1.
- ¹⁵ Hilkey, *Character is Capital*, 125.
- ¹⁶ Hilkey, *Character is Capital*, 126.
- ¹⁷ Ben Railton, *Contesting the Past, Reconstructing the Nation: American Literature and Culture in the Gilded Age, 1876-1893* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2007).
- ¹⁸ James B. Salazar, *Bodies of Reform: The Rhetoric of Character in Gilded Age America* (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 18.
- ¹⁹ Salazar, *Bodies of Reform*, 19.
- ²⁰ Salazar, *Bodies of Reform*, 3
- ²¹ Hilkey, *Character is Capital*, 131.
- ²² Hilkey, *Character is Capital*, 132.
- ²³ Hilkey, *Character is Capital*, 132.

²⁴ Salazar, *Bodies of Reform*, 72.; Carol Nackenoff, *The Fictional Republic: Horatio Alger and American Political Discourse* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

²⁵ Hilkey, *Character is Capital*, 134.

²⁶ Wiebe, *The Search for Order*.

Wiebe's work leaves much to be desired from a critical or feminist scholarly perspective.

His writing made uncritical use of the Lost Cause myth perpetuated for racist reasons after the Civil War. He disregarded any religious experience outside of Protestantism. He did not include any discussion of the gender and race politics that shaped the ideas of community during the period addressed. Wiebe's argument, however, still proves compelling even amidst the failures of his analysis. In a useful summary and critique of the book, Samuel Hays has said that, "Pre-urban, industrial social organization, so Wiebe's argument goes, rested on community, in which the focal point was a set of face-to-face primary group relationships through which life was understood, values generated, and economic and political institutions developed. But urban industrial society created a new set of relationships, above and beyond community, linking people over far broader geographical areas.... Social change in America... involved the decline of community and the rise of society" and thereby necessitating new means of creating order in the larger and more diverse context.

Samuel P. Hays, "Book Review: *The Search for Order, 1877-1920*," *The American Historical Review* 73, no. 4, (1968): 1248-1249.

²⁷ Hilkey, *Character is Capital*, 135.

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- ²⁸ Salazar, *Bodies of Reform*, 14.
- ²⁹ Hilkey, *Character is Capital*, 144.
- ³⁰ Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class*, 145-185.
- ³¹ Amy G. Richter, *Home on the Rails: Women, the Railroad, and the Rise of Public Domesticity* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).
- ³² Barbara Welter, *Dimity Convictions: The American Woman in the Nineteenth Century* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1976).
- ³³ T. L. Haines and Levi W. Yaggy, *The Royal Path of Life: Or, Aims, and Aids to Success and Happiness* (Chicago, IL: Westerb House Pub., 1881), 14.
- ³⁴ Bonnie J. Dow, "The 'Womanhood' Rationale in the Woman Suffrage Rhetoric of Frances E. Willard," *Southern Communication Journal* 56, no. 4 (1991): 298-307.
- ³⁵ Susan Zaeske, "The 'Promiscuous Audience' Controversy and the Emergence of the Early Woman's Rights Movement," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 81, no. 2 (1995): 191-207.
- ³⁶ Bonnie J. Dow, "The 'Womanhood' Rationale in the Woman Suffrage Rhetoric of Frances E. Willard," *Southern Communication Journal* 56, no. 4 (1991): 298-307.; Aileen S. Kraditor, *The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 1890-1920* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965).
- ³⁷ Carolyn S. Vacca, *A Reform against Nature: Woman Suffrage and the Rethinking of American Citizenship, 1840-1920* (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 28-30.; Faye E. Dudden, *Serving Women: Household Service in Nineteenth-Century America* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1983).

³⁸ Ernest Bormann, *The Force of Fantasy: Restoring the American Dream* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 39.

³⁹ Emily M. Cope, “‘Inspiration of Delivery’: John A. Broadus and the Evangelical Underpinnings of Extemporaneous Oratory” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 45, no. 4. (2015): 293.

⁴⁰ See discussion of “Extemporaneous Speaking: Invention and Delivery” beginning on page 15 of this dissertation.

⁴¹ The Gilded Age witnessed Supreme Court rulings and the passage of laws barring individuals from the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizenship based on a variety of exclusionary identity factors. The Supreme Court, in the 1875 *Minor v. Happersett* decision, ruled that voting was not an inherent right of citizenship. The majority opinion, in fact, defined citizenship as “membership of a nation, and nothing more.” Ray and Richards further argue that by “separating citizenship from voting and authorizing state control of the federal franchise, the *Minor* decision not only affected women as potential voters but also was used as precedent for Jim Crow laws and the disenfranchisement of African American men, despite the legal protection of the Fifteenth Amendment.” The “Jim Crow” laws or “black codes” which disenfranchised, segregated, and degraded African Americans were also enacted during the Gilded Age. Segregation was not limited to black Americans. The Naturalization act of 1870 had extended citizenship rights, for a time, to black people, but had specifically excluded those of Asian descent from naturalization. The Page Act of 1875, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and its extension through the Geary Act of 1892, as well as “alien land

laws” in numerous states created explicit exclusion for Asian individuals from the rights of American citizenship. The Geary Act was challenged in court in 1893, but the Supreme Court once again ruled to limit citizenship rights based on identity categories. In addition to these laws and judicial rulings, the United States federal government deployed forces from the US Army to carry out a war of genocide against the native peoples. Seeking to acquire and exploit the lands which belonged to native populations, the Dawes Act of 1877 authorized allotment and portioning of native lands by means of violence if necessary. It also forbade native peoples from becoming American citizens unless they accepted their land allotment and maintained a lifestyle considered appropriate—by white, middle-class, Protestant standards—for farmers. These laws and judicial rulings cemented the reality that America was a land where freedom and opportunity were reserved for white Protestant men.

At the same time that all of these exclusions were being created or cemented into American law, the national discourse of American exceptionalism was perpetuating a story of unbounded opportunity and democratic equality. In the post-Reconstruction South, this narrative of exceptionalism had to address the rampant racism of Jim Crow laws and so took the flavor of the New South and Lost Cause mythologies. These stories told a history in which southern whiteness was treated as a bastion of valor, decency, and morality, populated by “Cavaliers” and “ladies” who were served by happy “darkies” where everyone was content. In the rapidly urbanizing Northeast and growing cities around the country, the narrative of exceptionalism had to deal with vast economic inequality and

industrialization. Reid and Klumpp have argued that “transforming visions of wealth and well-being from farming to industry demanded a redefinition of such terms as ‘success,’ ‘individual initiative,’ even ‘work’”; the rhetoric for this redefinition was epitomized by Russell Conwell’s “Acres of Diamonds” speech and the character manuals addressed above. Using a narrative that ignored native nations who owned the land, stories of the American West still held the promise of opportunity and equality guaranteed by individual effort throughout much of the Gilded Age. The expansion of railroads, homesteading, and transcontinental communication, however, meant that the “Frontier” could be declared “closed” by 1893, again leaving a rhetorical problem for those who connected American exceptionalism to “good character” shaped by individualism. The narrative of American exceptionalism assumed that all people in the nation were free and had access to the opportunity that fueled the country’s “greatness.” The reality of discrimination, legal exclusions, genocide, and inequality presented a paradox for the country’s burgeoning imperial nationalism.

Virginia L. Minor and Francis Minor, Her Husband, Plaintiffs in Error, vs. Reese Happersett, 88 U.S. Supreme Court, 162 (1874), 165, 166.; Ray and Richards, *Inventing Citizenship*, 392, 393, 401[74].; Joan Hoff, *Law, Gender, and Injustice: A Legal History of U.S. Women* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), 50, 79.; 1875 Page Law (*An act supplementary to the acts in relation to immigration*), Sess. II, Chap. 141; 18 Stat. 477. 43rd Congress; March 3, 1875.; “An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to the Chinese, May 6, 1882,” *Enrolled Acts and Resolutions of Congress, 1789-1996* (General Records

of the United States Government Record Group 11, National Archives).

<https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=47>.; “An Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States.”; *Fong Yue Ting v. United States*, 149 U.S. 698, 13 Supreme Court. 1016. 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893).; Jessica Enoch, *Refiguring Rhetorical Education: Women Teaching African American, Native American, and Chicano/a Students, 1865-1911* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2008), 76-78.; Ronald F. Reid and James F. Klumpp. *American Rhetorical Discourse*, 2nd edition, (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1995), 501, 520, 567, 492-499, 637-678.

⁴² Jasinski, “Ethos,” *Sourcebook on Rhetoric*, 231.

⁴³ Salazar, *Bodies of Reform*, 15.

⁴⁴ Robert J. Dinkin, *Before Equal Suffrage: Women in Partisan Politics from Colonial Times to 1920* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1995), 76.

⁴⁵ Russell Hirst, “Ethos in the Conservative Tradition in Nineteenth-Century American Protestant Homiletics,” in *Ethos: New Essays in Rhetorical and Critical Theory*, James S. Baumlin and Tita French Baumlin, Eds. (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1994), 299.

⁴⁶ Ted Curtis Smythe, *The Gilded Age Press, 1865-1900* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), ix.

⁴⁷ Rondinone, “Guarding the Switch,” 85.

⁴⁸ Rondinone, “Guarding the Switch,” 89.

⁴⁹ Josiah Strong, *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis* (New York, 1885).

⁵⁰ Jeanne Halgren Kilde, "The 'Predominance of the Feminine' at Chautauqua:

Rethinking the Gender-Space Relationship in Victorian America," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 24, no. 2 (1999): 449-486.

⁵¹ Kilde, "The 'Predominance of the Feminine,'" 460.

⁵² Richter, *Home on the Rails*.

⁵³ Dudden has noted that her generalization only applied to white domestic help. A second form of household labor came from Black slaves. Future analyses would do well to examine the shift in rhetorical framing as it relates to the suppression of African American rights under Jim Crow and Black Code laws, and in relation to the growing prevalence of the Lost Cause myth of the Civil War during the Gilded Age.

Dudden, *Serving Women*, 2.

⁵⁴ Lois W. Banner, *American Beauty* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983), 132.

⁵⁵ Salazar, *Bodies of Reform*, 16.

⁵⁶ Cope, "'Inspiration of Delivery,'" 296.

⁵⁷ Kenneth Cmiel, *Democratic Eloquence: The Fight Over Popular Speech in Nineteenth-Century America*, (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1990), 17-18, 177, 236-37.

⁵⁸ Harper, *The Life*, 865.

⁵⁹ Harper, *The Life*, 866-869.

⁶⁰ Karen Burke LeFevre, *Invention as a Social Act* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 45.

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- ⁶¹ “Our Boston Convention,” *National Citizen and Ballot Box*, May 27-28, 1881,
Microfilm, reel 21, slide 1046.
- ⁶² “Woman Suffragists were Rampant,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 1895.
Microfilm, reel 34, slide 0052.
- ⁶³ LeFevre, *Invention as a Social Act*, 45.
- ⁶⁴ “Capital and Labor,” *Eau Claire Free Press* (WI), November 22-23, 1886. Microfilm,
reel 25, slide 0084.
- ⁶⁵ “Suffrage for Women,” *Owensboro Daily Messenger* (KY), January 15, 1895.
Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0531.
- ⁶⁶ “Woman Suffrage. Miss Anthony and Mrs. Catt Heard on the Subject,” *Weekly
Mercury* (Huntsville, AL), January 30, 1895. Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0547.
- ⁶⁷ “Two Woman Suffragists Speak,” *Memphis Avalanche* (TN), January 20, 1895.
Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0534
- ⁶⁸ “Lady Leaders in the Woman’s World,” *Daily Picayune* (New Orleans, LA), January
22, 1895. Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0537.
- ⁶⁹ “Woman suffrage convention,” *Milwaukee Sentinel* (WI), December 2, 1866.
Microfilm, reel 25, slide 0101.
- ⁷⁰ *Unidentified Clipping*, New Haven, CT, June 18, 1881. Microfilm reel 21, slide 1108.
- ⁷¹ *Unidentified Clipping*, New Haven, CT, June 18, 1881. Microfilm reel 21, slide 1108.
- ⁷² “Moral Influence vs. Political Power,” *Milwaukee Sentinel* (WI), December 2, 1866.
Microfilm, reel 25, slide 0102.
- ⁷³ “Miss Anthony’s views,” *San Francisco Call*, May 20, 1895. Microfilm, reel 34, slide
0037.

⁷⁴ Hilkey, *Character is Capital*, 133.

⁷⁵ “The Woman Suffrage Movement,” *Hartford Daily Times* (CT), June 18, 1881.

Microfilm, reel 21, slide 1091.

⁷⁶ “Lady Leaders in the Woman’s World,” *Daily Picayune* (New Orleans, LA), January 22, 1895. Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0537.

⁷⁷ “Women the Speakers, Home the Theme,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 21, 1895.

Microfilm, reel 34, slide 0046.

⁷⁸ There are no records in the four tours I examine here of Anthony speaking to working-class or labor organization audiences and there is only one record of her speaking to a black audience, at an African-American AME church during her California tour.

⁷⁹ Harper, *The Life*, 996.

⁸⁰ “Susan B. Anthony, She Draws a Good Crowd, Gives a Good Lecture,” *Missouri Weekly Patriot*, April 15, 1875. Microfilm, reel 18 slides 366-67.; “Bread and Ballot What Miss Anthony had to say of Woman’s Wants, Female Suffrage as Viewed from a Practical Standpoint - England’s Labor Troubles Compared with those in this Country,” *Philadelphia Press*, January 19, 1880. Microfilm, reel 21 slide 50.

⁸¹ Harper, *The Life*, 1002.

⁸² Richter, *Home on the Rails*, Introduction.

⁸³ Richter, *Home on the Rails*, 7.

⁸⁴ Montgomery, “Speaking in the Oregon,” 107-112.

The granger movement represented a strong recruiting base for woman suffrage. The organization included men and women who banded together to fight the grain transport prices instituted by monopoly rail organization. The organization was largely successful and demonstrated the power of local organization working together to make significant nationwide change. Frequently, the organization also provided educational and social opportunities for its members

⁸⁵ Anderson, *Tainted Souls*, 2.

⁸⁶ “Susan B. Anthony. The Coming Gathering of Woman Suffragists. A Talk with the Eminent Lady Reformer,” *Daily Evening Traveler*, (Boston, MA), May 23, 1881. Microfilm, reel 21, slide 0989.

The Winthrop Hotel, named after the founding governor of Massachusetts, John Winthrop, by one of his decedents, was opened in 1850 and rebuilt in 1864 after the great fire of Boston. The hotel dining room was a frequent venue for Harvard’s Hasty Pudding Club and the *Boston Transcript* and *New York Times* named it a “first-class public house.”

“The Great Fire in Boston; Destruction of the Winthrop House and Freemason’s Hall” April 10, 1864, From the *Boston Transcript*, April 4, 1864. *New York Times Website*, <http://www.nytimes.com/1864/04/10/news/the-great-fire-in-boston-destruction-of-the-winthrop-house-and-freemason-s-hall.html?pagewanted=all>.

⁸⁷ “Woman Suffragists,” *Times Democrat* (New Orleans, LA) January 22, 1895. Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0535.

The Portia Club was started in 1895 and their goal was to “read and discuss books and follow the line of self-improvement” as well as urge social improvement in their city.

Friends of the Portia Club, “A Brief History of the ‘Portia Club’ by Mrs. D.C. Chase,” <http://www.portiaclub.com/history/chase.html>.

⁸⁸ “Crossed the Continent in Triumph,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 20, 1895. Microfilm, reel 34, slide 0036.

⁸⁹ Banner, *American Beauty*, 131.

⁹⁰ Banner noted that Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s rather short and stout body shape was cited as an ideal figure of health and body shape in an 1885 medical text called the *Phrenological Journal of Science and Health*.

Banner, *American Beauty*, 129.

⁹¹ “‘Sister’ Sue Tells Her Little Tale of Women’s Woe,” *Unidentified Clipping*, (Columbia, SC), February 13, 1895. Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0647.

⁹² “‘Sister’ Sue Tells Her Little Tale of Women’s Woe,” *Unidentified Clipping*, (Columbia, SC), February 13, 1895. Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0647.

⁹³ “Crossed the Continent in Triumph,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 20, 1895. Microfilm, reel 34, slide 0036.

⁹⁴ Harper, *The Life*, 932.

⁹⁵ “How Famous Battles were Won,” *Memphis Commercial Appeal* (TN), January 18, 1895. Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0533.

⁹⁶ “‘Sister’ Sue Tells Her Little Tale of Women’s Woe,” *Unidentified Clipping*, (Columbia, SC), February 13, 1895. Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0647.

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- ⁹⁷ Harper, *The Life*, 844.
- ⁹⁸ “The New Woman Rose to the Occasion,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 23, 1895.
Microfilm, reel 34, slide 0050-51.
- ⁹⁹ John Ripplingham, *The Art of Extempore Speaking*, (London: 1813), v.; Asa D. Smith, *Letters to a Young Student, in the First Stage of a Liberal Education*, (Boston, MA: Perkins & Marvin, 1832), 105.
- ¹⁰⁰ “Suffrage for Women,” *Owensboro Daily Messenger* (KY), January 15, 1895.
Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0531.
- ¹⁰¹ *Women’s Tribune*, (Leavenworth and Abilene, KS), October 4-5 and 6-7, 1886.
Microfilm, reel 25, slide 0018.
- ¹⁰² Salazar, *Bodies of Reform*, 36.
- ¹⁰³ “The New Woman Rose to the Occasion,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 23, 1895.
Microfilm, reel 34 slide 0050.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Daily Picayune* (NOLA) January 23, 1895 “Women Raise their Own Fair Standard,”
Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0539.
- ¹⁰⁵ Barry, *Biography*, 288.
- ¹⁰⁶ “Local Affairs — Woman Suffrage,” *Concord Daily Monitor*, (NH), June 10, 1881.
Microfilm, reel 21, slide 1077.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Unidentified Clipping* (Concord, NH), Microfilm, reel 21, slide 1088.
- ¹⁰⁸ Emphasis added.
- ¹⁰⁹ “Temperance Meeting” *Unidentified Clipping*, n.d. (likely June 12, 1881), Microfilm, reel 21, slide 1088.

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- ¹¹⁰ “Temperance Meeting” *Unidentified Clipping*, n.d. (likely June 12, 1881), Microfilm, reel 21, slide 1088.
- ¹¹¹ “Temperance Meeting” *Unidentified Clipping*, n.d. (likely June 12, 1881), Microfilm, reel 21, slide 1088.
- ¹¹² “Woman Suffrage,” *Leavenworth Times*, (KS), October 4-5, 1866, Microfilm, reel 25, slide 0019.
- ¹¹³ “The Pulpit Listens,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, July 2, 1895, Microfilm, reel 34, slide 0209.
- ¹¹⁴ Flexner, *Century of Struggle*, 218.
- ¹¹⁵ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “Femininity and Feminism: To Be or Not To Be a Woman,” *Communication Quarterly* 31, No. 2 (1983): 101-108. 101.
- ¹¹⁶ bell hooks, *Feminist Theory: from Margin to Center* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1984), 1-2.
- ¹¹⁷ Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: Dell Pub. Co., 1963).
- ¹¹⁸ hooks, *Feminist Theory*, 1.
- ¹¹⁹ hooks, *Feminist Theory*, 2.

Chapter 5

Theoretical and Methodological Considerations for Studying Extemporaneous Speaking as a Performance of Nineteenth Century Women's Citizenship

One of the most illuminating glimpses of Anthony's extemporaneous speaking comes from a full transcript of an 1880 speech she gave to the United States Congress Committee on the Judiciary while petitioning for hearings on a sixteenth amendment enfranchising women.¹ In this speech, Anthony combined parts of both her "Woman Wants Bread, Not the Ballot" and "Social Purity" speeches in an address that exemplified the immediacy, flexibility, and authenticity of her extemporaneous speaking for suffrage. Anthony began by offering the arguments from her "Bread" speech about the degradation of women's labor and working conditions. She then told the story of how a strike by female factory workers failed while their male counterparts' strike achieved all its goals, an outcome she attributed directly to women's disenfranchisement. Anthony next explained the judicial rulings from the past 20 years that necessitated hearings on a woman suffrage Constitutional Amendment. Senators had been interrupting Anthony in a jocular and conversational way throughout her speech but when a senator interrupted after her arguments about the need for a constitutional amendment, Anthony used the intrusion to shift her arguments. She pointed out that there was a petition being heard by the Judiciary to have the president elected "by the vote of the people direct. Of course, women are not people."² Senator Edmunds interrupted to interject that women were "Angels." Anthony responded, "Yes angels up in heaven, or devils down here." In reply, the senator said, "I have never known any of the kind." To which Anthony retorted, "I wish you, gentlemen, would look down there and see the myriads that are there. We want

to help them and lift them up.” Anthony used this interruption women’s “angelic” nature to pivot from legal arguments for suffrage into arguments about suffrage as a tool for moral uplift for the country. Anthony then concluded her speech with a ringing tribute to the virtue of womanhood as a force for moral and social housekeeping in society if only good women could be given the vote.

This speech demonstrates the possibilities and pitfalls of extemporaneous speaking, but also highlights some of the complications that come with studying extemporaneous speech. Methodologically, this speech is illuminating specifically because, unlike most of Anthony’s speeches, it was transcribed. In this conclusion, I discuss three themes from my research that, I argue, should influence how scholars study extemporaneous speaking, social change rhetoric, and the modes of citizenship performance. First, my project recovers a fragmentary archive of documents from the life of Susan B. Anthony, a famous but understudied American rhetor. I argue that rhetorical scholars should center the fragmentary nature of extemporaneous texts as critical to understanding their meaning and function in their context. Second, I examine the problems associated with extemporaneous speaking in a movement for social change. I argue that the social invention, flexibility, and culturally recognizable delivery required for speaking extempore create what I call a “failure point” when the mode of address is used in the service of social change. Specifically, extemporaneous speaking makes the speaker vulnerable to discriminatory, exclusionary, or otherwise harmful social biases that are not directly related to the primary goal of the social change movement. Finally, I engage the theoretical bounds of how citizenship can be performed rhetorically when the legal rights and participatory actions of liberal and republican citizenship are denied

based on an individual's identity. I argue that identity factors like race, class, religion, and gender, which limited an individual's access to the rights of liberal citizenship, also circumscribed the possible performances of citizenship that rendered an activist rhetor comprehensible in her society. This chapter demonstrates the limits and possibilities for both the scholarship and practice of extemporaneous speaking.

Extemporaneous Rhetoric: Locating Meaning in Ephemeral Texts

Rhetorical scholarship has a problem with nineteenth-century extemporaneous speaking, a problem that should be addressed by a shift in the methods we use to study extemporaneous speaking texts. Our methods require that we, paradoxically, create functional objects for inquiry from the ephemeral texts recording and reporting nineteenth-century extemporaneous speeches. I argue that scholars can somewhat ameliorate this paradox if we acknowledge extemporaneous speeches as the fragmentary texts that they are. Given Anthony's extemporaneous style, it is helpful to think of these titles not as discrete speeches, but as skeletons. One main argument about the necessity and value of voting formed the backbone of each speech. This backbone provided the center-point around which Anthony could marshal various supporting anecdotes, arguments, warrants, and data points to make up the "skeleton" of the address. Anthony then built upon this stable skeletal structure to craft the contextually unique body of an address for a given speaking occasion. As scholars, we must recognize that we are investigating not the speeches themselves, but the remains of these extemporaneous speeches. Sometimes we have a full skeleton from one speaking occasion, sometimes only fragments. Sometimes the speeches become fossilized so that we only recognize the bones and would not know the speech if it were fully clothed again. Sometimes we are

left with only the clothing. If we study these extemporaneous speeches as remains *in situ*, they allow us to glimpse how Anthony's speeches were presented and interpreted within her context and culture.

In this dissertation, I have treated extemporaneous speeches as inherently perishable, even to their immediate audiences. This approach challenges Michael Calvin McGee's ideas of fragmentation. McGee explicitly identifies the nineteenth century as a time when "finished discourse[s]" existed. A speech like Edmund Burke's "Speech on the Conciliation with the Colonies" was a "finished discourse" but in the "post-modern condition," of the twentieth century "no texts [of this finished sort] exist."³ Contrary to McGee's assertion, I argue that the very idea of a "finished discourse" is a convenient scholarly fiction. Listeners would not remember a fully formed speech, nor did newspapers record and print verbatim transcripts for readers. When we shift the focus of our scholarship from recreating a seemingly finished speech "body" to understanding our work as archeological investigation of textual fragments *in situ*, we open the possibility for encountering women's voices that have previously been considered lost.

Nineteenth century texts are as fragmentary as later texts, and scholars of the period should adjust their methods accordingly. I turn to McGee's work on fragmentary texts to situate the changes I suggest in rhetorical scholarship on extemporaneous discourse. Juxtaposing finished discourses with mediated texts from the twentieth century, McGee argues that "[w]e have instead fragments of 'information' that constitute our *context*. The unity and structural integrity we [formerly] put in our texts as they faithfully represented nature is now presumed to be *in us ourselves*."⁴ I argue that we must understand extemporaneous speeches, especially those given by women or members of

other excluded groups, through the same lens. I assert that the rhetorical critic's job when examining an extemporaneous speech is to recover the remains of a speech and read those remains *in situ* to understand the contextual work done by the rhetor.

Studying extemporaneous speeches as remains read *in situ* requires a self-conscious approach to the archives of extemporaneous speaking as an archeological construction project. The preserved body of an extemporaneous speech, even if it seems complete, has none of the life of the things itself. The only truly authentic method for analyzing extemporaneous speaking would involve multiple recordings and ethnographic listener accounts, a method obviously impossible with nineteenth century speeches. Therefore, I ask, how shall the critic examine the remains to which we have access? If the remains have been fossilized, the critic must seek to understand both the remains and the state in which they have been found. If the remains leave behind only fragments of their existence, the critic should attend to those fragments that endure as both evidence of their own existence and of how they were valued by their context. In this project, I have embraced contextual explorations of the culture of extemporaneous speaking during the nineteenth century to shed light on how Susan B. Anthony's career can be understood as more than the fossilized text of her most famous address. More than a mere speaking technique, Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned as a totem of citizenship, allowing her to signal her fitness to be accepted within the democratic polis despite her gender.

This approach to the archives of extemporaneous speaking builds on the work of scholars in cultural studies and women's studies who have engaged the archive as a constitutive and constructed site of scholarly creation. Writing about how the archive can

and should be refigured in the scholarly imaginary, Achille Mbembe argues that the archive is a site defined by co-ownership of debris or remains between the original actors and scholars who seek to imagine the dead past in the life of the present.⁵ For Mbembe, the archive is a constant collaboration between the structure of the archive building, the remains the building contains, and the scholars who go there to “worship” in the recreation and co-ownership of the past. That is, the archive allows those working within it to rebuild and reanimate the remains of the “dead past.” We, as scholars, breathe life into the remains held in the archive in such a way as to reconstitute and resuscitate the remains to use them for our own purposes. Applying this paradigm in my approach to Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking gestures to the possibility of re-building other nineteenth century speakers, especially those from minority and oppressed groups, as inherently extemporaneous orators. That is, we can rebuild a co-ownership of their voices as they functioned in their context, even if they were not carefully or faithfully recorded at the moment of their original presentation.

The historic lack of attention paid to female speakers makes this methodological intervention especially useful for work on women’s discourse. Attending to the partial and palimpsestic records of women’s extemporaneous speaking answers José Muñoz’s call to attend to the “ephemera” as evidence, “a kind of evidence of what has transpired but certainly not the thing itself.”⁶ Just as Muñoz argues that attending to ephemera can allow for queer possibility in the archive, so to can attending to the remains of ephemeral extemporaneous speeches allow for the possibility of recovering women’s rhetoric when “texts” and “objects for inquiry” have not been preserved. This paradigm shift toward an archeological approach to investigating the remains of extemporaneous speeches helps

alleviate the paradox of studying constructed objects to answer questions about ephemeral texts. Scholarship within this paradigm does not claim to have access to authenticity or accuracy, but to the partial, ephemeral, and palimpsestic remains of a rhetor seeking to engage her world. I suggest that the possibility of seeing texts and the archives that contain them as ephemeral can lead to more nuanced critical renderings of not just the texts we examine, but the silences and exclusions that shaped the words on the page.

Recognizing the ephemeral nature of extemporaneous speech texts should encourage rhetorical scholars to reconsider and revise our approach to archival texts in order to better understand the silenced and palimpsestic voices from history. Collapsing text into its context, to borrow McGee's phrasing, allows the critic to read the evidence of what has transpired, even when the thing itself is inaccessible. While the desire for authentic texts upon which to build our analyses is understandable and laudable, we should not allow that desire to prevent recovery and analysis of fragmentary texts. Specifically addressing Anthony's extemporaneous speaking career, extemporaneous speeches have always been inherently perishable communiqués. As archivists, or archival archeologists, rhetorical critics should embrace the duty to reconstruct objects for inquiry—to “invent texts suitable for criticism”⁷—as a means of recovering the voices of forgotten or understudied extemporaneous speakers.

“Culture”: The Failure Point of Extemporaneous Speaking

Extemporaneous speaking is a unique mode of engaging in public discourse that offers the rhetor both possibilities and problems to overcome. As I addressed in the first chapter of this dissertation, twentieth and twenty-first-century scholarship on

extemporaneous speaking theorizes the practice as a more immediate and flexible practice of public discourse that connoted authenticity and education to American audiences. Texts from the nineteenth century discussed extemporaneous speaking in greater detail, offering advice and instruction on the invention and delivery of this type of speech. The invention could be imitative or romantic but was always inflected with the immediacy of social invention to fit the language, organization, or ideas the rhetor presented to the audience to which he spoke. Delivery was more stringently regulated but was designed to entertain, engage, and move the audience. These texts, however, do not address when extemporaneous speaking is a poor choice; when, why, and how does extemporaneous speaking fail? This section addresses what I call the “failure points” of extemporaneous speaking as they have become apparent in my research on Anthony’s speaking career.

Extemporaneous speaking is always bound by the limitations of social invention. Specifically, extemporaneous speaking works by using the boundaries, norms, ideas, and verbal and non-verbal vocabulary of a situation to engage a variety of audiences in the rhetor’s vision for change. The problem arises when the rhetor’s vision of society, or the changes society should undergo, is antithetical to some element of the society that already exists. This is especially true when some segment of the audience believes that whatever the rhetor is seeking to change is inherently a good or necessary part of their lives. The limitations of social invention place limits around extemporaneous speaking that can hamper its utility in situations of social change. In Anthony’s rhetoric, the limitations of these boundaries are visible when we compare her most famous extemporaneous speech

“Woman Wants Bread, Not the Ballot” with Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s most famous manuscript speech “The Solitude of Self.”

Stanton’s “Solitude” speech is a philosophical masterwork that lays out the intellectual foundations for why all people, regardless of gender or sex, must be treated as equals in rights and humanity, while Anthony’s “Bread” speech offers anecdotes and contextual arguments for women’s voting rights. Anthony’s “Bread” speech offers a variety of arguments about how ensuring voting rights for women would equalize the relationship between labor and capital, and ensure greater quality of life for women, families, and men. In contrast, Stanton’s speech is an extraordinary dissertation on the ideals of the feminist movement, a treatise which rings as true and pertinent in the twenty-first century as it did in 1892. Offering a fitting summary, Campbell says:

The address is extraordinary because it is a philosophical statement of the principles and values underlying the struggle for woman’s right in the United States. It is also extraordinary because it is a social reformer’s defense of humanistic individualism and because it is a rhetorical statement of the limits of those things which can be altered by words.⁸

Put succinctly, Anthony’s speech was immediate, and Stanton’s was transcendent. Anthony’s speech spoke to the immediate felt needs of her audiences, and was therefore drawn inexorably into the morasses of their contexts. Anthony’s speeches reflected the culture of the Gilded Age and the exclusionary rhetorics of class, morality, and racial superiority that permeated the culture.

The most obvious failure point of extemporaneous speaking is its dependence on social invention, coupled with social invention’s tendency to placate the audience.

Nineteenth-century textbooks and preaching manuals that taught extemporaneous speaking, such as Pittenger's 1883 *Extempore Speech*, specifically reminded the reader to practice, contemplate, and write speeches carefully before extemporizing upon a point with the inspiration of a moment.⁹ Extemporizing without the proper preparation, these teachers worried, would lead the speaker into the vagaries of immediacy if he was unmoored from the stability of intellectual preparation. The vagaries of immediacy were, perhaps, even more acute for female speakers. Campbell's ideas of the "feminine style" depend upon a social approach to invention, but also the craft-learning approach to coping with the demands of speaking in public. The process of craft-learning, Campbell says, helped female speakers be more "alert to variations, aware of a host of alternatives, and able to read cues related to specific conditions" while in public.¹⁰ This alertness could, however, also lead to speakers responding more to the needs of the audience than leading the audience toward a better understand of necessary social changes. Alertness could easily stray into capitulation; immediacy could easily become pandering.

The second pitfall of extemporaneous speaking that is especially applicable to Anthony's career is the assumption of a shared experience of "womanhood" that pervades feminine style rhetoric of the nineteenth century. Campbell's theory of feminine style assumes a basis of shared experiences for female speakers and the female members of their audiences, even arguing that feminine style was itself an outgrowth of "women's" experiences.¹¹ This reasoning elides the variety of individual experiences for those in the "women" category; that is, while every woman shared the exclusion from property rights in New York State before the Civil War, no white woman ever feared that she or her family would be kidnapped and sold into slavery. Any reasoning that relies on experience

as the primary criteria for invention can effectively exclude those who do not share the same experiences. In a discussion of extemporaneous speaking, the reliance on social invention built on the foundation of gender essentialism served to exclude large numbers of women from Anthony's discourses of woman suffrage.

Another failure point of extemporaneous speaking, especially Anthony's use of the mode to argue for a significant change in how her society viewed women, was the embodied nature of the practice. Discussing the constructed norms of women's bodies in public, Kristan Poirot explored the racial rhetoric Elizabeth Cady Stanton used to argue for an extracorporeal idea of difference.¹² Specifically, Poirot suggested that, "as a participant in a certain production of sex and race, Cady Stanton both reified and resisted prevailing trends in the differentiation of human political subjects."¹³ Poirot's discussion of the raced norms of bodily subjectivity is especially telling for a discussion of extemporaneous speaking. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking, I have argued, functioned as both an immediate embodiment of her competence as a citizen and a reification of the norms of raced and class citizenship. That is, even as she violated the norms of gender that limited who could be a citizen, Anthony's extemporaneous speaking worked to argue for her citizenship by building on her acceptability within other exclusionary standards. Anthony's body in the act of extemporaneous speaking functioned to recreate and reify the raced and classed norms of who could be a political subject.

The problems I have addressed that inhere in extemporaneous speaking functioned to, borrowing John Murphy's phrasing, "domesticate the dissent" of the movement for woman suffrage. Murphy argues that, within the context of social

movement action, the interaction between social controls and the activists seeking to change society allows for the development of “symbolic strategies” that “accommodate dissent while making it compatible with ‘dominant systems of meaning.’”¹⁴ Examining the 1961 Freedom Rides, Murphy identifies four strategies by which the Kennedy administration worked to domesticate the dissent of the civil rights activists: naming, contextualization, legal sanction, and diversion. Each of these domesticating functions also played out in Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking.

Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking functioned to “domesticate” or tame her arguments for women’s equality by characterizing her actions as appropriate within a specific cultural or social practice that was acceptable to mainstream audiences. Naming, Murphy says, functions to domesticate dissent by “providing an audience with an orientation to a phenomenon by naming that object.”¹⁵ Anthony’s speaking in the Burned-over District exemplifies this process of naming-as-domestication because extemporaneous delivery was a touchstone of respectability, religious fervor, and goodness—what Bormann terms the “fantasy of restoration”—within her community.¹⁶ To use Murphy’s framework, the mode of extemporaneous speech provided audiences with a reference point or “orientation” from which to understand the radical “phenomenon” of Anthony’s speaking for women’s equality by “naming” her actions as prophetic rhetoric in service of religious citizenship practices. This reading stretches the word “naming” but it clearly meets Murphy’s definition of the term in that extemporaneous speech offered Anthony’s audiences a lens through which they could understand her radical arguments for women’s rights as part of the coherent rhetorical fantasy that shaped Burned-over District culture.

Extemporaneous speaking served to further domesticate Anthony's radical arguments for women's rights and suffrage by contextualizing them as part of a hegemonic performance of respectability during the Gilded Age. Contextualization is a domesticating response to social movements, Murphy says, that "transforms the context from one that is favorable to the agitators to one that limits them."¹⁷ This form of domestication is most obvious in the coverage of Anthony's tour of the American South during the Gilded Age. Anthony's message of full equality for women was made even more radical by her refusal to identify black citizens as ineligible for the rights she sought.¹⁸ Yet, Anthony was generally received with great praise by her audiences in the South as the coverage contextualized her radical calls for change within a purely domestic sphere. Newspaper coverage made clear that Anthony's reception was directly tied to her representing the respectability and domesticity of "good women" seeking rights that are related to their roles in the home or domestic settings. Newspaper articles frequently described Anthony within explicit domestic situations or domesticated her speeches by reframing the lecture stage as an extension of the domestic sphere. If she was being interviewed, the paper noted it was in a hotel sitting room or luncheon that was "strictly first class."¹⁹ If she was speaking from a stage, the papers spent full paragraphs describing the platform as "beautifully decorated with palms and potted plants, the suffrage color, yellow, predominating among the verdant foliage."²⁰ This contextualization transformed the context of Anthony's extemporaneous speaking from radical calls for change into pleas for a mild alteration in how women pursued their work in the explicitly domestic sphere of home and family life. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking, which relied on social invention to shape arguments for the contexts into which

she spoke, was especially susceptible to this type of domestication through contextualization.

A third way that Anthony's extemporaneous speaking functioned to domesticate her dissent was by embracing the cultural rhetoric of character citizenship when she lost the legal justification for her cause. Murphy relies on MeKerrow to define how legal sanction domesticates dissent, saying "within Western democracies, there is a discourse of power that relies on the judiciary. It speaks in terms of rights, obligations, and of the possibility of exchanging power through the legal mediation of conflicting interests."²¹ Legal sanction for a social movement, Murphy argues, can sustain the claims made by movement actors, but a loss of that sanction can sap the movement of the legitimacy and right-ness that are central to public opinion about a cause. Anthony's extemporaneous speaking during Reconstruction functioned as a performance of citizenship that both constituted women as equal citizens and provided the impetus for national-level politicians and state legislatures to codify the cultural assumptions of male-gendered citizenship into policy language that excluded women from democratic citizenship rights. The legal justification of voting was a right inherent in citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment was nullified by the 1876 Supreme Court decision in *Minor vs. Happersett*. This loss of legal justification—and the legitimacy it offered—forced Anthony to adopt a new and ultimately domesticating justification for her cause: good character. Anthony's rhetoric of character citizenship, facilitated by the flexibility of her extemporaneous mode of address, became an inextricable part of domesticating the suffrage movement. Women's rights and obligations were confined by the definition of good character and they lost the justification of being a population treated unfairly by unjust powers.

Finally, Anthony's extemporaneous speaking helped domesticate the movement for woman suffrage by diverting attention away from the core problems of what Rogers Smith calls "ascriptive citizenship" in the United States. Describing diversion, Murphy says that, "from the perspective of hegemony, conflicts are not necessarily eliminated. Instead, they are domesticated within the culture's dominant system of meaning."²² The core problem that the movement for suffrage sought to address was that citizenship rights in the United States were limited instead of universal. Yet, throughout her career, Anthony's extemporaneous speaking used social invention to build arguments for suffrage from lesser fodder. Temperance, morality, and entertainment were all diversionary themes when Anthony spoke in the Burned-over District. Politics, legal rulings, interpersonal conflict, and racism all diverted Anthony's arguments away from the core principles of voting as a right of citizenship during Reconstruction. During the Gilded Age, arguments of class and respectability diverted Anthony's arguments away from the core principles of human equality that otherwise could have driven her rhetoric. These diversionary tactics—especially when presented through an immediately invented extemporaneous speech without the careful working possible in manuscript oratory—domesticated Anthony's radical message of perfect human equality for all into a small step within the hegemonic narratives that touted American greatness.

Domesticating the radical message of human equality was the primary failure point of extemporaneous speaking, but it was also partly responsible for the instrumental successes the movement achieved. The weakest point of extemporaneous speaking is, perhaps, also its strongest; extemporaneous speaking requires social invention. That is, extemporaneous speaking will likely never rise to the level of philosophically brilliant

oratory that a manuscript speech like “The Solitude of Self” can achieve. It can, however, speak a philosophical truth in a language that is authentic, comprehensible, and engaging to an audience. Extemporaneous speaking can problematically domesticate a radical message into a tepid plea, but it can also bring the philosophy of a radical movement to the attention and comprehension of a lay audience. Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking fostered exclusionary responses both from the state and federal governments she petitioned and from other actors within the movement for suffrage, but it also helped women around the country see the value of suffrage for addressing their daily struggles and facilitated enfranchisement for white women in some communities.

Inventing and Delivering the Woman Citizen

Anthony was acutely aware that, no matter how much women were granted additional freedom of civic participation, exclusion from the rights of liberal citizenship would still force women into a second-class version of citizenship. Speaking at the World’s Congress of Representative Women, Anthony discussed women’s increasing participation in the public sphere and bemoaned how far they were still excluded from the full rights of American citizens. She began by addressing the huge numbers of women’s clubs that had come to the Congress and how each one believed the ballot would assist in their efforts.

[I]t doesn’t matter whether an organization is called the King’s Daughters, the partisan, or non-partisan Woman’s Christian Temperance Union; whether it is called a Portia club, a sorosis, or a federation of clubs; a missionary society to reclaim the heathen of the Fiji Islands or an educational association; whether it is of the Jewish, of the Catholic, of the Protestant, of the Liberal, or the other sort of

religion; somehow or other, everybody and every association that has spoken or reported has closed up with the statement that what they are waiting for is the ballot.²³

Anthony's insinuation in this passage, that women all wanted the right to vote but had devoted their time, money, and energy to other causes, became explicit later in her speech. She opined that she could, "run through with all the organizations of the Old and the New worlds that have reported here, and I will venture to say that there is scarcely one of them that does not report a larger number than the Woman's Suffrage Association of the United States."²⁴ The various causes women supported and the clubs they joined, Anthony argued, all knew the value of voting rights, but the women themselves refused to agitate for it. Anthony keenly identified the cultural challenge underpinning the problem of women not seeking the basic legal right of suffrage.

I would philosophize on the reason why. It is because women have been taught always to work for something else than their own personal freedom; and the hardest thing in the world is to organize women for the one purpose of securing their political liberty and political equality. It is easy to congregate thousands and hundreds of thousands of women to try to stay the tide of intemperance; to try to elevate the morals of a community; to try to educate the masses of people; to try to relieve the poverty of the miserable.²⁵

To use the language of this dissertation, Anthony posited that women sought to perform their citizenship but refused to be bothered with fighting for their liberal citizenship rights.

In this final section, I engage the theoretical bounds of how citizenship can be performed rhetorically when the legal rights and participatory actions of liberal and republican citizenship are denied based on an individual's identity. As Anthony opined in her speech above, each organization came to the Congress with individual goals but each had "been compelled to climax its report with the statement that they are without the ballot, and with the assertion that they need only the ballot to help them carry their work on to greater success."²⁶ Women in each organization, that is, sought to perform their citizenship through acts of civic participation but were stymied in reaching their goals because they lacked the political power to shape their worlds. I argue that identity factors like race, class, religion, and gender, which limited an individual's access to the rights of liberal citizenship, also circumscribed the possible performances of citizenship that rendered a social movement rhetor legible in her society. That is, Anthony's arguments for eliminating gender discrimination in voting rights were only rendered legible to American audiences when she enacted socially acceptable performances of middle-class, white, Protestant identity.

A focus on discourse as a key facet of citizenship performance is useful for our scholarly understandings of citizenship, but it can also obscure the potential futility of performance as a means of arguing for citizenship when one is excluded from concrete citizenship rights like voting. Asen's discursive theory of citizenship performance argues that, as scholars, we should reorient our framework of analysis from a question of *what* constitutes citizenship to a question of *how* people perform citizenship. Focusing on how people perform citizenship, especially the communication processes that individuals use to engage with others, directs scholarly attention to focus on the modes of public

engagement through which people perform their citizenship. “A discourse theory of citizenship,” Asen says, “may offer one way to articulate public subjectivity affirmatively. Attention to modalities of citizenship distinguishes acts from enactment, thereby recognizing that practices may express different meanings and significance for agents and audiences in different situations.” While true, recognizing modalities of citizenship in the public sphere from a scholarly perspective does not necessarily change the legal strictures, identity-based exclusions, or ascriptive practices that regulate the rights and responsibilities of liberal citizenship.

The scholarly conceptualization of citizenship can focus on modalities, performances, or discourses, but “citizenship” is also a term of great power in regulating the material realities of individuals. Anthony performed her citizenship through her extemporaneous speaking. This mode of citizenship performance meshed with the genre of Burned-over District rhetoric, it was constitutive of legal exclusions around women’s voting rights during Reconstruction, it embraced the rhetoric of character citizenship during the Gilded Age. Yet, Anthony’s extemporaneous speaking never gleaned her a citizen’s right to vote. I argue that we cannot forget what Kenneth Burke calls the “recalcitrance” of citizenship’s material exclusions as we study the performances with which people enact citizenship. My research on how Anthony performed extemporaneous speaking could be characterized as what Burke calls a “pseudo-statement,” the type of remarks that engage in “ethical universe building,” or define an “attitude” or positioning of the speaker.²⁷ There is the potential to read my research on how social change actors performed citizenship to argue for citizenship rights as an elision of the material recalcitrance of ascriptive citizenship laws. While a scholarly pseudo-statement is fine,

we must not lose sight of the “revisions made necessary by the recalcitrance of the materials employed for embodying this attitude” that make pseudo-statements into statements.²⁸ The statement of Anthony’s citizenship was that Anthony was a citizen in all responsibilities, but without the concomitant rights of the title. Anthony may have performed citizenship through her extemporaneous speaking, but she did not, by that performance, make herself a voting citizen.

Anthony’s speech to the World’s Congress of Representative Women made clear that performing citizenship could never replace the ability to exercise the rights of liberal citizenship. Summarizing what she understood from the various speeches by reform women from around the country, Anthony said, “somehow or other, everybody and every association that has spoken or reported has closed up with the statement that what they are waiting for is the ballot.”²⁹ Each of the organizations Anthony references here was the kind of civic participation group that Robert Putnam lauded as keys to citizenship.³⁰ And yet, while these associations saw membership from thousands of women, the members did not have the political power to enact the social changes they sought. They participated in citizenship but were still excluded from the powerhouse of representative American citizenship, the ballot. As I have demonstrated in this dissertation, Anthony’s discursive citizenship performance was vital to her popularity, renown, and life’s work, but it did not give her the full voting rights of a citizen. Seen from the perspective of social change efforts, then, citizenship performance is an excellent stop-gap procedure to argue for rights when they are denied to you, but it does not ameliorate the underlying problem of exclusion. If a rhetor has all the responsibilities of a citizen but not the rights,

she will not win full equality by performing the limited responsibilities allowed to her identity category.

Conclusion

Susan B. Anthony was known as “Aunt Susan” to the young women she mentored in the edicts of suffrage agitation and as “Napoleon” or “The General” or to those who fought for suffrage by her side. While most scholarship on Anthony’s public speaking has focused on her “Is It a Crime” speech, her extemporaneous speaking was the primary means by which she addressed audiences across the country for more than 50 years. To engage this mode of Anthony’s speaking, I have investigated how she invented and delivered extemporaneous speeches and how that mode of public speaking functioned as a performance of citizenship. Speaking extemporaneously allowed Anthony to engage with and respond to the motivating ideas of her context to argue that women’s citizenship could not be equal without the power of the ballot.

In her 1880 speech to the United States Congress Committee on the Judiciary, Anthony made clear that citizenship without the power of the ballot was nothing but an insult to women. Petitioning the committee to bring a sixteenth amendment enfranchising women before the full body of the Senate, Anthony encountered frequent resistance that voting should be a state issue. She argued,

You ask us why we do not get this right to vote first in the school districts, and on school questions, or the questions of liquor license. It has been show very clearly why we need something more than that. You have good enough laws today in every state in this Union for the suppression of what are termed the social vices.”

But these laws, she pointed out, had not served their purpose. “Why is the government, why are the states and the cities, unable to execute those laws? Simply because there is a large balance of power in every city that does not want those laws executed.

Consequently, both parties must alike cater to that balance of political power.” Pointing out the realities of political power was not, however, Anthony’s only goal. She then went on to say, “What we ask of you is that you will make the women of the cities a balance of political power... We want to make ourselves the balance of political power. What we need is the power to execute the laws.” Anthony understood the relationship between citizenship and power. Even if she could perform her citizenship through her competent extemporaneous speaking, she was still excluded from the power if she was denied the vote.

Notes

- ¹ United States Congress, Senate Committee on Judiciary; Select Committee on Woman Suffrage, *Arguments of Woman-suffrage Delegates before Committee on Judiciary of Senate*, 47 Cong., 1st sess. S. Rept. S.misd.74, January 23, 1880. 1-26.
- ² United States Congress, *Arguments*, 23.
- ³ Michael Calvin McGee, "Text, Context, And The Fragmentation Of Contemporary Culture," *Western Journal Of Speech Communication: WJSC* 54, no. 3 (1990): 274-289. 278.
- ⁴ McGee, "Text," 287.
- ⁵ Achille Mbembe, "The Power of the Archives," In *Refiguring the Archive*, Carolyn Hamilton, Ed., (Cape Town, South Africa: David Philip, 2002). 22.
- ⁶ José Esteban Muñoz, "Ephemera As Evidence: Introductory Notes to Queer Acts," *Women & Performance: A Journal of Feminist Theory* 8, no. 2 (1996): 5-16, 10.
- ⁷ McGee, "Text," 278.
- ⁸ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Stanton's 'The Solitude of Self': A Rationale for Feminism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 66, no. 3 (1980): 304-12.
- ⁹ William Pittenger, *Extempore Speech, How to Acquire and Practice It* (Philadelphia, PA: National School of Elocution and Oratory, 1883), 145-150.
- ¹⁰ Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, *Man Cannot Speak for Her: Key Texts of the Early Feminists*, (New York: Praeger, 1989). 13.
- ¹¹ Campbell, *Man*, 13.

¹² Kristan Poirot, "(Un)Making Sex, Making Race: Nineteenth-Century Liberalism, Difference, and the Rhetoric of Elizabeth Cady Stanton," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 96, no. 2 (2010): 185-208.

¹³ Poirot, 202-3.

¹⁴ John M. Murphy, "Domesticating Dissent: The Kennedys and the Freedom Rides." *Communication Monographs* 59, no. 1 (1992): 61-78. 65.

¹⁵ Murphy, "Domesticating Dissent," 67.

¹⁶ Ernest Bormann, *The Force of Fantasy: Restoring the American Dream*, (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985). Vii.

¹⁷ Murphy, "Domesticating Dissent," 70.

¹⁸ Newspaper in South Carolina were especially offended by Anthony's insistence on using black men's rights after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as examples of the power of the ballot. An unidentified clipping from a Columbia, South Carolina newspaper said:

"Miss Susan B. Anthony lectured in the Opera House last night. As everybody know Miss Anthony is an exponent of woman suffrage and she has the subject at her finger's ends, but to a southern audience, especially a Columbia one, Miss Anthon's illustrations were not happily taken. While the general tendency of her argument was to prove that the women of the country had as much right to vote as the Irishman fresh from the Cork, or a German just from Hamburg or a Frenchman, an Italian or any other foreigner ignorant of our land and institutions, it appeared that she was entirely too fond of praising the negro, describing his conditions

under slavery according to Northern ideas and trying to show how he had risen to an alleged high plane by being enfranchised, She is old enough to know, or ought to know, that what suits a Northern audience in this respect doesn't suit a southern one even though the war had been over these thirty odd years."

Unidentified Clipping, "Susan B. Anthony, The Woman Suffragist and her Disappointing Talk," Columbia, SC. February 12, 1895, Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0673.

¹⁹ "N. A. W. S. A. Convention – February 4," *Woman's Tribune* (Washington, D.C.), February 16, 1895, Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0638.; "Woman Suffragists" *Times Democrat* (New Orleans, LA), January 22, 1895, Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0535.

²⁰ "Women Raise their Own Fair Standard," *Daily Picayune* (New Orleans, LA), January 23, 1895, Microfilm, reel 33, slide 0539.

²¹ Murphy, "Domesticating Dissent," 71.

²² Murphy, "Domesticating Dissent," 72.

²³ Susan B. Anthony, "'Organization Among Women as an Instrument in Promoting the Interests of Political Liberty': Speech by SBA to the World's Congress of Representative Women," in *The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony: Their Place Inside the Body-Public, 1887-1895*, Anna Gordon, ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 509-512, 510.

²⁴ Anthony, "Organization Among Women," 510.

²⁵ Anthony, "Organization Among Women," 511.

²⁶ Anthony, "Organization Among Women," 511.

²⁷ Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose*, Third edition, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 322-23.

²⁸ Burke, *Permanence and Change*, 328.

²⁹ Anthony, "Organization Among Women," 510.

³⁰ Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 45.

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