ABSTRACT

Title: PROSECUTORS OFFERING CHARGE REDUCTIONS: RELYING ON FACTS OR STEREOTYPES?

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This research expands attribution theory and focal concerns perspective, usually applied to judicial decision making, to address prosecutorial charging decisions within the Federal Court System. This study investigates whether the extralegal factors of age, gender, race, and ethnicity permeate the decision of prosecutors to offer charge reductions. This research seeks to uncover differential processing through comparisons across sub-samples of individuals in order to see if the influences of these extralegal factors vary through interactions with both legal and extralegal factors. The analyses are conducted on a binary dependent variable representing the decision to offer a reduction and a continuous dependent variable reflecting the magnitude of the charge change. The results find support for differential processing based on extralegal variables, and support for the importance of some interactions. This research lends credence to the use of attribution theory and focal concerns for understanding prosecutorial charging decisions.

PROSECUTORS OFFERING CHARGE REDUCTIONS: RELYING ON FACTS OR STEREOTYPES?

By

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Introduction

Discretion happens at every stage of the criminal justice process: from the police discretion to arrest, to the prosecutors' multiple discretionary decisions throughout a case, to the judges' sentencing discretion. Research on discretionary decisions is widespread, especially when looking at police and judges, but there is much less research evaluating prosecutorial discretion. Although each professional in the criminal justice system uses discretion, it has become apparent that the prosecutor is one of the most influential and powerful persons in the criminal justice system. This is largely because of their involvement in decisions at multiple stages of case processing and the lack of public or judicial review of their decision making processes (Misner, 1996; Kingsnorth et al. 2002; Griffin, 2001; Free, Jr., 2002). Research has shown that the use of prosecutorial discretion is a concern, specifically whether or not abuse of discretion is taking place, and whether or not decisions are being made differentially for different types of individuals.

Thus far, much of the research on prosecutorial discretion is very explanatory and gives an overview of the cautions that need to be taken against abuse of discretion and the need for review of prosecutorial decisions. Very little existing research empirically tests whether this abuse is taking place, and to what extent. Some research on prosecutorial discretion that does attempt to evaluate the status of prosecutorial discretion has been obtained through interviews and observations, and therefore, is highly qualitative (Neubauer, 1974). While this research has provided some insight into the decisions being made, there is a lack of quantitative assessment

of these decision-making processes as well as the implications of prosecutors' choices for the public and individual defendants. In addition, the majority of the research on prosecutorial discretion is in the realm of sentencing recommendations and factors that affect guideline departures, which in some cases, is the stage where there is the least likelihood of abuse of prosecutorial discretion because there is some extent of judicial review. The discretionary decisions of a prosecutor begin much earlier in the timeline of a case, and before the effects on sentencing can be adequately assessed, the decisions preceding sentencing must also be evaluated. The concentration of research on outcome decisions (sentencing) neglects to look at differential treatment during actual processing in the system (Albonetti, 1990). This is important because some research has shown that abuse of discretion is more likely to occur and is less visible during earlier stages of case processing (especially with race) (Free, Jr., 2002; Farnworth and Teske, Jr., 1995).

"Future research should address the importance of decision making at different stages of the criminal justice process to expose areas of potential unwarranted disparity or unfairness so that policy makers can act accordingly." (Wilmot and Spohn, 2004, p. 340). This call for more research is the basis of the current research focusing on prosecutorial discretion within the charging process. This topic has been neglected thus far in the discretion research while its importance has been sufficiently noted, specifically since the implementation of guidelines and the relevant conduct nature of the federal system.

The current study is an attempt to enhance the quantitative body of research in this area. More specifically, this research will evaluate what factors influence a

prosecutor's decision to use charge reductions in a case. Do they follow the guidelines imposed on them by the United States Attorney's Manual, or do they allow themselves to use extralegal factors to differentially use charge reductions for certain individuals? Additionally, are these extralegal factors used differently across different sub-samples of individuals?

Theoretical Perspective

The theory guiding this research is adapted from most sentencing research since the repercussions of charging decisions ultimately affect sentencing outcomes. This research turns to a merging of the focal concerns perspective of sentencing and attribution theory. Attribution theory was linked to uncertainty avoidance by judges and applied to sentencing decisions in the work of Albonetti, but was later expanded into a focal concerns perspective. This theoretical progression has had much support in empirical research, but still is only applied to judicial decision making in sentencing. However, it seems logical and beneficial to the theories and future research to expand its application to earlier stages of processing.

An attribution is an "inference about why an even occurred or about a person's dispositions." (Greenberg & Ruback, 1991, p. 13). This term was incorporated into criminal justice research in 1991 when Albonetti strived to develop a theoretical framework for understanding the inconsistent findings on the influence of certain variables on sentencing severity. The result was an integration of uncertainty avoidance in decision making with causal attributions in punishment used to understand discretionary decision making by judges. Within this framework, Albonetti (1991) acknowledges that in the absence of complete information, judges

seek to reduce uncertainty about a defendant by relying on rationality. Sometimes the result of this rationality is decision making based on past experiences, stereotypes, and prejudices. Attribution theory further explains this decision making process through findings that membership in certain social categories influences case outcomes and that the more stable the attributions, the more likely courtroom decision makers are to perceive an increase in the future risk of offending (Albonetti, 1991). More specifically, Albonetti (1991) comments that judges rely on specific attributes and "link race, gender, and outcomes from earlier processing stages to the likelihood of future criminal activity." (p.250). Albonetti's actual test of this framework finds evidence that blacks receive harsher sentences than whites, females fair better in the system, and that those with prior felony convictions are more severely punished, which are all consistent with the hypothesized stereotypes for recidivating.

Some theorists saw Albonetti's attribution process on the perceived blameworthiness of the defendant as only one piece of the process and expanded her theoretical framework into a focal concerns perspective (Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). This perspective centers on three principles that courtroom actors focus on for decision making: the offenders' blameworthiness (which is in essence Albonetti's framework) and degree of harm caused to the victim, the protection of the community, and practical implications of sentencing decisions (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Steffensmeier and Demuth (2001) show how causal attributions can be used in each of these focal concerns. Judge's views of blameworthiness are influenced mainly by offense severity, prior record, and the offender's role in the crime. Protection of the community draws on attributions that

affect the need to incapacitate the offender and/or the likelihood of recidivating, such as criminal history, the nature of the offense, and sometimes offender characteristics such as education, employment, and community ties, which may act as control over the offender. Practical implications often "include concerns about the offender's ability to do time, the costs to be borne by the correctional system, and the disruption of ties to children or other family members" (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001, p. 151). Offender characteristics regarding the physical stature of an individual and having children may be considered in this causal attribution process.

The basis of these theories suggests that while decisions made are supposed to take these principles into account, courtroom officials (mainly judges) sometimes lack adequate knowledge of a case due to time and information constraints to make these decisions and sometimes turn to stereotypes in decision making processes. Unfortunately, as shown in the literature, these stereotypes often include attributes that are not legally relevant (i.e. race, age, and gender) which may influence decisions alone or through interactions with each other, despite their use being forbidden by guidelines and policies (Albonetti, 1997; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001). Therefore, officials may be relying on their perceptions of who is dangerous to the community or what a violent offender looks like or who they think can physically survive in prison in order to make their sentencing decisions.

Although this theory is usually linked to judicial discretion, more recent research implies that it may be applicable to other courtroom actors by referring to its impact on "judges and other community actors" (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004, p.142) or "judges (and other court actors)" (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001, p.149).

However, none of the empirical research actually investigates this possibility any further than its mention. I argue that this theoretical perspective can also be expanded to prosecutors in charging decisions and plea negotiations. With the quickness that a prosecutor is required to make charging decisions it seems plausible that one may rely on stereotypes and perceptions to decide on charges before adequately assessing the strength of a case. This can further affect charge reduction decisions once the case is more closely evaluated and manifest itself in one of two ways. First, prosecutors may overcharge defendants based on stereotypical perceptions and ultimately give large reductions to those defendants once the case is better assessed. Alternatively, prosecutors may make charging decisions and then use stereotypes to provide sympathetic defendants with large reductions. These sympathetic defendants would be those who go against stereotypes of a typical defendant and lead to the prosecutor wanting to give a less severe penalty (i.e. older, white, females who are educated and have children).

Additionally, prosecutors may have their own focal concerns which influence their decisions during case processing. Just as judges are likely to consider the public's perception/evaluation of their judicial careers (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001), prosecutors may also worry about the appearance of their careers as successful or unsuccessful, based on conviction rates. Also, political forces may influence the focal concerns of prosecutors due to the necessity of being appointed to their position. Finally, a focal concern of prosecutors may be their opinion of the sentencing guidelines. Research by Kramer and Ulmer (2002) suggest that downward departures are most likely when there has been a "mismatch between guideline sentence

recommendations and local courts' 'going rates' and local actors' definitions of offender blameworthiness and dangerousness." (p. 922). Their research showed that judges and prosecutors are most likely to disagree with the punitiveness of the guidelines when dealing with higher severity offenses or those with extensive prior records (Kramer and Ulmer, 2002). Therefore, prosecutors may rely on some attributions (such as community ties) to justify departures in order to escape the harsh penalties dictated by the guidelines.

In recognition of the interaction between judges and prosecutors in conjunction with the focal concerns perspective, prosecutors may realize how the information they allow judges to receive may affect judicial decisions through this attribution process. In turn, prosecutors are able to capitalize on the loopholes that exist within the system to further prevent extreme punishments where they do not see fit. Tonry (1996) states that at least 24-35% of cases involve the circumvention of guidelines through a loophole used by the prosecutor either by changing the charge to one that has a maximum sentence below the minimum sentence of the original charge, making false statements on reports to the judge (i.e. not telling the judge that a gun was involved), or inducing substantial assistance departures when the defendant was not in fact an informant. These loopholes prevent judges from receiving adequate information about a case, which can influence the causal attributions ascribed by judges in later processing. Therefore, the current research seeks to show how prosecutors this causal attribution process in the interest of focal concerns results in the use of extralegal factors to offer charge reductions differentially across different age, gender, racial and ethnic groups.

Existing Research

Because there is very little current research specifically evaluating prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage across different groups, it is necessary to look at three bodies of literature to adequately understand the framework for the current research. First, general prosecutorial discretion research is reviewed in order to show the concern for abuse of discretion and the lack of overview to prevent it from occurring. Next, the charging literature highlights just how much power exists in this early stage of case processing. And finally, sentencing literature shows the ultimate impact abuse of discretion can have in a case and illuminates the importance of focusing on earlier discretionary decisions, especially in the era of sentencing guidelines.

A. Prosecutorial Discretion

Prosecutors exercise discretion over charging in many ways. They decide when a criminal charge will be filed, the level at which an alleged offender will be charged, whether or not a plea bargain will be proffered and when/if there is a reason to discontinue charges (Free, Jr., 2002; Albonetti, 1987). Researchers seek to assess whether or not prosecutors are using legitimate (legal) or illegitimate (extralegal) factors as reasons for charging certain offenses. In order to evaluate this concern, we must first look at what guidelines are put on prosecutors when it comes to making these decisions. Because most charge reductions occur during plea bargains the guidelines for initiating and accepting a plea can be referenced for this information. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize the court to accept a defendant's plea to a certain charge in exchange for the dismissal of others if "the remaining

charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior and accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines." (Campbell and Bemporad, 2003, p.12). However, in their Introduction to Federal Guideline Sentencing Campbell and Bemporad (2003) caution that a charge bargain must be carefully analyzed to determine whether its "supposed benefit is real or illusory" (Campbell and Bemporad, 2003, p.12). It is because of this caution that it is necessary to assess which factors prosecutors are permitted to use in these charging decisions.

For this information we turn to the United States Attorney's Manual (USAM) by the Department of Justice (2000). This manual outlines the principles of federal prosecution including considerations to be weighed in initiating plea agreements and impermissible considerations. Relevant considerations can include:

> "defendant's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others; defendant's history with respect to criminal activity; nature and seriousness of the offense or offenses charged; defendant's remorse or contrition and his/her willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct; the desirability of prompt and certain disposition of the case; the likelihood of obtaining a conviction at trial; the probable effect on witnesses; the probable sentence or other consequences if the defendant is convicted; the public interest in having the case tried rather than disposed of by a guilty plea; the expense of trial and appeal; the need to avoid delay in the disposition of other pending cases; and the effect upon the victim's rights to restitution" (DOJ, 2000, §9-27.420).

The USAM strictly lists which factors are not to weigh in the prosecutors decision to initiate or decline certain charges. These factors include the defendant's "race, religion, sex, national origin, or political association, activites or beliefs; the attorney's own personal feelings concerning the person, the person's associates, or the victim; or the possible affect of the decision on the attorney's own professional circumstances" (DOJ, 2000, §9-27.260). In addition, it is stated in the USAM that

once the decision to prosecute is made, the government attorney should charge the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's acts and that the attorney believes is likely to result in a conviction, and in turn, will yield the highest range under the sentencing guidelines (DOJ, 2000). Attorney General John Ashcroft (2003) expands on this idea by stating that the charges filed should be believed by the prosecutor to be provable at trial. Therefore, charges should not be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea. Guidelines are set forth for federal prosecutors in an attempt to secure consistency within the Department of Justice because the outcome of a defendant's case should not be contingent upon which prosecutor is assigned to handle the case (Ashcroft, 2003).

The American Bar Association (ABA) standards for prosecutorial charging guidelines do not mirror the sentiments of the USAM. While the ABA ethical standards discourage overcharging, they do not prohibit it (Griffin, 2001). This conflict of standards is one reason why the public so heavily scrutinizes prosecutorial discretion. Another is that there is very little review of prosecutorial discretion (Albonetti, 1990). Therefore, people feel that there is a high likelihood that abuse of discretion is happening, but there is no way of catching it. In addition, when there is a way of catching it in theory, it is often avoided. The public concern is nicely illustrated by Misner (1996) who stresses that most of the discretionary decisions made by prosecutors are virtually "unreviewable" and have led to a "hands off" police by the courts (p.725). Most disturbing, Misner highlights numerous oppositions to the broadness of prosecutorial discretion and some of the suggestions for improvement, but repeatedly shows that these pleas and policy reforms have

fallen on deaf ears. "The American criminal justice system does not respond well to suggestions for fundamental change. Even calls for a more active control of prosecutorial discretion through rule-making have made little headway." (Misner, 1996, p.732).

Lupton (2000) illustrates an attempt for control, but does not neglect the fact that they often fail by explaining vindictive prosecution claims that arise when the prosecutor's use of the charging process violates due process. A presumption of vindictiveness usually arises when a defendant is reindicted after being convicted and chooses to file an appeal and the prosecutor then decides to increase the number or severity of the charges. A claim of presumption of vindictiveness can be overcome by objective evidence that the prosecution was proper. However, she then highlights one vindictive prosecution claim that was lost after a defendant was charged with a felony after requesting a jury trial when his original charges were misdemeanors because the prosecutor "stated that his decision to seek a felony indictment was not motivated by the request for a jury trial." (Lupton, 2000, p.1294). If this simply means that all a prosecutor has to do is say his prosecution is proper and does not have to show actual proof, then it seems plausible that abuse of prosecutorial discretion may be widespread. This example certainly lends credence to professional and public concern.

It is necessary to highlight these guidelines in order to assess which situations go against the idea of charge reductions, regardless of whether or not they occur in conjunction with a plea bargain. After all, if a prosecutor is required to file the most serious charge they believe can be proven at trial, and not reflect overcharging in

order to then impose a charge reduction to secure a guilty plea, then in reality, there is no legitimate reason a filing offense should not equal a terminating offense, unless it is one of the legally provided reasons. Even if a prosecutor initiates a plea in order to avoid the costs of trial, the plea agreement should not include a charge reduction because that prevents the plea from reflecting the gravity of the circumstances the prosecutor believes to have been committed by the alleged offender, and the seriousness of what he/she can prove in court. One instance where a charge reduction could still apply would be one that only reduces the number of charges, but the ultimate punishment would not be modified due to the widespread use of consecutive sentences.

It is important to note that Attorney General Ashcroft (2003) does acknowledge that departures from the list of what can be considered in charging decisions do exist, however, the circumstances are rare and so should the likelihood of their use. More importantly, there is no mention that departures from the list of what is *not* to be considered are acceptable. This is crucial because it is these factors that most researchers and the public are interested in examining, believing that they do indeed factor into prosecutors' calculations of what charges to file and ultimately pursue.

B. Charge Reductions/Bargaining

The research that has been conducted on charge reductions is limited in many ways. First of all, the majority of this research is outdated because they were completed prior to the implementation of sentencing guidelines and some of the policies previously described. In addition, most of this type of research is very

specialized and only looks at reductions that occur within cases for a specific criminal charge, most often burglary and robbery cases. More notably, it is the conclusions from this research that are even more interesting. Although most of the available research on charge reductions is in agreement on many of their findings, there are some conclusions that do not concur with others, and more interestingly, a number of the conclusions go against the authors' hypotheses and what the public may expect.

Few quantitative studies have been conducted specifically on charge reductions over the past three decades (Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et al., 1987; Albonetti, 1992; Farnworth and Teske, Jr., 1995). While two of these only look at charge reductions that occur during plea bargains (Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et al., 1987), one looks at charge reductions during the initial case screening (Albonetti, 1992). In addition, none of these studies looked at cases outside of assault, burglary, robbery, larceny, and theft. Lastly, each of these studies looked at cases from specific districts, none of which were duplicates. Considering the majority of their findings were conflicting, this leads to suspicion that perhaps their findings are influenced by certain district characteristics that vary between the studies, and therefore, an overall depiction of discretion is lacking.

The majority of the findings from this research are conflicting despite the similarity of their research designs. Bernstein et al. (1977) analyzed all persons whose most severe charge at first court presentation was second or third degree robbery in a major metropolitan city in New York state in order to assess what degree of the response to criminal is accounted for by factors other than the alleged act. This analysis focused on reductions within the context of a guilty plea. They used a

dependent variable representing the magnitude of the reduction relative to the absolute reduction possible and found that older defendants were more likely to receive reductions. Although they found no main effects for gender, Bernstein et al. (1977) found no significant race effect in their sample of defendants who pled guilty with a charge reduction at their first court presentation, but found negative race effects in their sample of defendants whose cases were not disposed of at their first court presentation. In this situation, blacks were more likely to fare worse in the magnitude of their charge reduction. Bernstein et al. (1977) also found that "defendants with prior arrests and convictions do better than those with no prior arrests, but less well than those with arrests but no convictions." (p.375).

Holmes et al. (1987) focused on burglary and robbery statutes that terminated through guilty pleas in Delaware County and Pima County. In addition to controlling for legally relevant variables, one benefit of this research is that it also controlled for some evidence characteristics such as eyewitness identification and confession. The dependent variable in this research was an interval scale representing no reduction, reduced to lesser felony, or reduced to misdemeanor. In Delaware County the only significant impact by an extralegal variable on charge reduction was being black, but the influence was positive, which went against the authors' hypothesis. In Pima County, none of the extralegal variables had direct effects on charge reduction. Interestingly, prior convictions had no direct effect on charge reductions in either county.

Albonetti (1992) also investigated burglary and robbery cases, but looked at the decision to reduce charges at the initial screening stage in cases from Jacksonville.

Additionally, she used a binary dependent variable representing a reduction from felony to misdemeanor. She was also able to control for the strength of evidence. Albonetti's main effects found that younger defendants were less likely to receive reductions and prior convictions increased the likelihood of charge reductions, however no main effects for race and gender were found. Albonetti (1982) also looked at the interaction of offense with various variables, in which only offense X weapon yielded significant results. However, the only interaction between offense and a defendant characteristic was involved age. No interactions concerning race or gender were investigated.

Farnworth and Teske (1995) looked at interactions more closely among theft and assault cases in California. They found that females with no prior record were more likely than similar males to receive charge reductions and that there was a greater likelihood of charges dropping from assault to non-assault for white female defendants then among minority females. Also, African-American males were seen to be particularly disadvantaged compared to other groups (white and Hispanic males and females) in receiving charge reductions. It is also interesting to note that severity of arrest charge had no impact on charge reduction and that whether or not a charge reduction took place did have a significant impact on the final disposition, but this effect varied by gender.

Despite the fact that there is some agreement among the results of these studies, there is undeniable discord as well. What is hard to figure out is if these differences are due to methodological issues, district/offense specific processes, or

differential processing across groups which may be influencing the overall main effects.

C. Sentencing Literature

Much more recent and methodologically rigorous research exists which analyzes judicial discretion at the sentencing phase of a case and the impact of extralegal factors on sentence severity in a case. This literature can be used as a base model for similar research needed on prosecutorial discretion since the repercussions of prosecutorial discretion are manifested in sentencing decisions. Although there are some inconsistencies, consistently this literature accounts for sentencing guidelines and finds both main effects and interactions among the extralegal factors of age, gender, and race, showing differential treatment of stereotypical criminal offenders (Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Albonetti, 1997; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2001; Spohn & Holleran, 2000). Albonetti (1997) looked at the impact of extralegal factors on sentencing severity under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and found main effects of illegitimate factors. Specifically, she found that females receive less severe sentences than males, non-U.S. citizens receive harsher sentences than U.S. citizens, black and Hispanic defendants receive more stringent sentences than whites, and defendants with a high school education received more lenient sentences than those without. While Albonetti's (1997) research took place after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it only evaluated drug offenses.

Steffensmeier, Ulmer, & Kramer (1998) added another component to this body of literature by accounting for interactions among extralegal variables, suggesting that defendants that have multiple disadvantages (based on stereotypes) will fare much

worse in the system. While Steffensmeier et al. (1998) found main effects for race, gender, and age, they also found that the magnitude of these effects vary across different age-race-gender groups. For example, age is more influential in the sentencing of male defendants, race is more influential among younger males than older males, and young, black, males receive the most severe sentences compared to all other race-age-gender category (Steffensmeier et. al, 1998). This research suggests that only evaluating main effects masks the variation and impact of these illegitimate factors.

Spohn and Holleran (2000) responded to Steffensmeier et al. (1998) by replicating their study using three jurisdictions (as opposed to one) and expanding the analysis to incorporate Hispanics and employment status as other extralegal factors. Whereas Steffensmeier et al (1998) found consistent results across the dependant variables of an in/out decision for incarceration and sentence length, Spohn and Holleran's (2000) research only coincided with the previous literature for in/out decisions. Their research did find main effects of their extralegal variables, including Hispanic and employment status, along with interactive effects. While the majority of Spohn and Holleran's (2000) findings mirror Steffensmeir et al. (1998), they did find larger age effects among females than males. Additionally, they concluded that Hispanic males, like blacks, are treated more harshly than whites and that this effect is even more substantial among young black and young Hispanic males, suggesting that the attribution process may differ between certain groups. Spohn and Holleran (2000) conclude by stating that in "all three jurisdictions, tests for interactions between our four key variables revealed significant effects that were masked in the additive

models." (p.301). Steffensmeir and Demuth (2001) also investigated the effect of being Hispanic and found that Hispanic defendants are the subgroup most at risk for severe penalties. These findings held true across the in/out decision and length of imprisonment.

While this sentencing research highlights that under sentencing guidelines, which were implemented to reduce judicial discretion, disparities are still widespread, they are still only looking at the final stage of the process. Wilmot and Spohn (2004) recognize that specifically under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines which allow for relevant conduct, the prosecutor's charging decisions can be very influential on sentencing outcomes because they affect the information that gets in the hands of the judge. Despite the fact that all defendants in their sample were only convicted of one offense, they found that those initially charged with more than one count in the original indictment were sentenced more harshly than those only charged with one count. Additionally, they found that blacks, men, and non-citizens, fared worse when observing the odds of a downward departure (Wilmot and Spohn, 2004). Their research lends credence to the idea that prosecutorial decisions are also influential and need to be investigated.

Implications of Charge Reduction Research

Charge reduction research brings a lot of issues forward that need to be continually addressed with updated research, especially in light of the fact that much of the existing research has conflicting findings. In addition, it is important to evaluate this research after new policies and guidelines are implemented, which is one of the primary reasons for the current research. There are two specific

implications that are worth mentioning to highlight the importance of this research; its impact on sentencing decisions and the legitimacy of the system.

A plethora of research has been done on discretion in sentencing decisions. However, this research mainly focuses on judicial discretion because judges have the ultimate say in sentencing decisions. As previously mentioned, it is also necessary to acknowledge the impact that prosecutorial discretion has on the severity of sentencing outcomes. After all, it is the discretionary decision of the prosecutor on top of the discretionary decision of the judge within the sentencing guidelines that produces the final sentence (Free, Jr., 2002; Albonetti, 1990). Since the system allows for discretionary decisions to pile on top of each other, it is plausible to see that the final disposition of a case may not be reflective of the actual crime committed (Griffin, 2001). Collectively, the findings above along with Griffin's (2001) comments referenced earlier make it quite clear that prosecutorial discretion is influential even at the sentencing stage of a case, but in order to truly understand its impact we must uncover what factors influence the original discretionary decisions, specifically beginning with charging.

Another major problem that charge reduction research highlights is a loss of legitimacy within the system. Wright and Miller (2003) highlight this issue through the impact of charge reductions on public perceptions of the system. They stress that the main problem with charge reductions is transparency. During charge reductions the disputed facts are not presented in open court or any public forum, therefore, the quality of the ultimate conviction is hard to determine. This is especially true when dealing with charge reductions in initial charges. When a prosecutor files a charge,

the public and the defense are led to believe, based on charging guidelines, that the charges "reflect the government's reasoned judgment about what the defendant has done, and what social labels and consequences should attach." (Wright and Miller, 2003). However, when these initial filing charges change, after nonpublic negotiations, doubt is created about whether or not the defendant is getting what he/she deserves. This point should be increasingly alarming in light of the above research that shows that often people with prior convictions, who are clearly repeat offenders, often receive downward departures. Therefore, in the eyes of the public, negotiations go on behind closed doors and end with serious offenders being offered charge reductions and in turn receiving more lenient sentencing. These actions go against all the principles of federal prosecution outlined above.

In addition, research highlights even more reasons, conflicting with the principles of federal prosecution, that prosecutors initiate charge reductions that detract from legitimacy within the system. "Prosecutorial success, which is defined in terms of achieving a favorable ratio of convictions to acquittals, is crucial to a prosecutor's prestige, upward mobility within the office, and entrance into the political arena." (Albonetti, 1987). Considering the fact that in 2001, 96.9% of all convictions in the federal system were secured through guilty pleas (Wright and Miller, 2003), it seems likely that charge reductions ending in pleas may be quite an incentive for the professional advancement of prosecutors. It is also possible for the cases that do go to trial that prosecutors are reducing charges to those that will be easier to win (despite the actual crime committed) in order to boost their statistics. This may seem like a

pessimistic point of view, but qualitative research through interviews with prosecutors and judges seems to support this notion (Kingsnorth et al., 2002).

Critics of Wright and Miller's transparency argument state that the reduction is justified because it produces a more certain payoff for the prosecution and the public (Wright and Miller, 2003). However, this is a payoff may not be one the public is willing to accept. This question goes back to Campbell and Bemporad's (2003) caution of whether the benefits of a charge reduction are "real or illusory" (p.12). Research that has been done on prosecutors' decisions to proceed with a case as a violation of probation or to file a new criminal charge (which could be compared to a charge reduction) shows support for Wright and Miller by illustrating that prosecutors are willing to take the easier road. Kingsnorth et al. (2002) interviewed prosecutors about their reasons for only charging a violation of probation versus going after a new criminal charge that would result in a more severe punishment and many of the prosecutors' responses appeared quite selfish. "If you have some factual problem, or something a jury might look askance at, you go PV only. It's hard to lose a PV; It's easier to make our case. It doesn't get me anything going to trial and risking an acquittal." (Kingsnorth et al., 2002, p. 571 and 560). Defense attorneys also state hesitation with this practice because they fear that in some cases prosecutors are using this method to circumvent evidence problems (Kingsnorth et al., 2002). This commentary clearly goes against the USAM principles for federal prosecution guidelines that in no way should "the possible effect of the decision on the attorney's own professional circumstances" (DOJ, 2000, §9-27.260) weigh into their charging decisions.

Conclusion

Reviewing this research has highlighted substantial concerns in the area of prosecutorial discretion, specifically with charge reductions. "Prosecutors mention two factors which most often influence the exercise of discretion: the characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances of the event." (Neubauer, 1974). Unfortunately, some of the factors within these broad areas admitted to by prosecutors are factors that are not supposed to influence the decision (e.g. race). Researchers feel that charge bargaining gives prosecutors too much leniency and allows them to treat similarly situated defendants differently (Wright and Miller, 2003). It seems obvious from the research that there is very little official review of these decisions, despite public concerns. Given this fact, the intentions of a prosecutor can matter more than the facts or law relevant to a case (Wright and Miller, 2003). Wright and Miller (2003) stress that we currently have a system in which guilty pleas represent "prosecutorial domination" and we are in need of a system where prosecutors who depart from the guidelines by overcharging or reducing charges for their own benefit will be sanctioned in some way. They make a plea for a system in which "aggressive prosecutorial screening, including sharp restrictions on charge bargains, improves on the administrative structures now in place. The practice makes prosecutors more accountable, to one another and to all of us." (Wright and Miller, 2003, p.1418). In 1979 Senator Edward T. Kennedy expressed these same sediments by stating a need to establish some guideline system for prosecutors, using sentencing guidelines as a foundation in which to build similar

reforms to curb prosecutorial discretion (Wilmot and Spohn, 2004). Unfortunately, it is quite obvious that his call for reform has still not been sufficiently answered.

The reviewed research should cause concern for all. Overwhelmingly studies have shown that the charging decision has major effects on the criminal justice process. However, much of the research is based on interview and observation data. Although these studies produce valuable information, it is largely "impressionistic" (Neubauer, 1974). In addition, when concrete findings are developed through quantitative research, the findings are often conflicting. In order for review of prosecutorial discretion to take place, the true impact of it on the outcome of cases needs to be determined through more research with conclusive findings. In reality, although the research evaluated here did not replicate findings on specific factors, they all concluded in one way or another that discretion was prevalent in an alarming way. In addition, the research has to have empirical improvements to those that were done prior to policy changes.

The current research is hoping to accomplish this goal by using a large sample of federal data that includes multiple districts, multiple offenses, and investigating differential effects between different groups of individuals. Unfortunately, there is not a lot of overlap in the existing research on prosecutorial discretion and charge reductions because it has not been substantially evaluated. However, similar research that looks at decision making across the system supports some of the findings in the charge reduction literature, and emphasizes the importance of looking at all stages of processing. Specifically LaFree (1985) looked at the effect of race throughout the processing of rape cases and found that the victim-defendant racial composition was

influential across many stages of case processing, including charge seriousness, felony screening, sentence type, place of incarceration, and sentence length. Additionally, death penalty studies also highlight certain aspects of prosecutorial discretion. Paternoster (1984) comments that states regularly pay attention to race in the decision to seek the death penalty. He further comments on the lack of legal checks on this prosecutorial decision and likelihood that this discrimination may be exacerbated at later stages of death penalty decision making. Sorenson and Wallace (1999) find similar results and conclude that "racial disparity exists in the pretrial stages of decision making for potential capital murder cases" even after controlling for legally relevant variables (p. 575). This suggests that the use of race is unwarranted and discriminatory.

While this research focuses specifically on race and specific types of processing (rape and capital cases) it supports the idea that extralegal factors are being utilized in earlier stages of processing and that their effects are influential in later stages. Therefore, they lend credibility to the idea of investigating other irrelevant variables and intermediate processes that occur after the decision to prosecute or seek death-eligible charges, but before seeking specific sentences, that have so far been neglected in the literature, such as charge bargaining. It is plausible to believe that if extralegal factors are being used by prosecutors and other courtroom actors prior to and following the charge bargaining stage of case processing, that they are likely to be influential during that stage as well. Hopefully the current research will help bridge the gap between the stages of processing and add to the methodologically sound and

current research on what factors influence a prosecutor's decision to proceed with charge reductions.

Chapter 2: The Current Research

Collectively, these bodies of literature illuminate a need for updating discretion literature in light of sentencing guidelines while expanding it beyond judicial discretion on sentencing outcomes. I intend to apply the mechanisms of the sentencing literature to the importance of charging literature and the need for review of prosecutorial discretion. I hypothesize that prosecutors allow extralegal factors (age, gender, race and ethnicity) to influence their decision for using charge reductions, net of legally relevant controls. More importantly, based on attribution and focal concerns perspectives, I will test the hypothesis that the effects of these variables vary across different sub-samples and that analyzing all defendants collectively masks inconsistencies in the illegitimate use of these different variables. Looking for differential effects of extralegal factors has been neglected in a lot of the existing research, but their importance is noted (Free, Jr., 2002; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Farnworth and Teske, Jr., 1995; Albonetti, 1990). Based on the previously reviewed literature, one would expect defendants with multiple disadvantages, specifically young, black or Hispanic, males to be least likely to receive reductions if the process guiding charge reductions is similar to that influencing sentencing decisions. Finding that multiple disadvantages are most influential supports the idea that the causal attribution process differs across different groups.

This research is a quantitative assessment of the public and professional suspicions regarding prosecutorial discretion with a large and diverse sample, with meaningful conclusions/implications regardless of the statistical results. If the results show that extralegal factors are influential in the prosecutors' decision-making

process, the public and professional suspicions will be confirmed. In turn, this research will add to the body of evidence supporting stronger policy implementation addressing the abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Oppositely, if the hypothesis is not supported, and null findings result, it will add to the findings that discount abuse of discretion through insignificant effects. Although null findings do not sufficiently disprove the hypotheses, they will add to the literature that does not significantly support them, and therefore, may put the public at ease with their fear that abuse of discretion is widespread. Either way, this research helps to put prosecutorial discretion in the spotlight and make prosecutors publicly accountable for their actions.

The current research seeks to fill a void in the literature by looking at differential processing as well as bring this research topic up to date through reevaluation of main effects. After all, the majority of research looking at charge reductions and the factors influencing the probability of a defendant receiving a charge reduction were conducted in the 1970's and 1980's (Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et at., 1987; Albonetti, 1987). Although there have been a few more recent assessments of this topic, they are offense type specific (Albonetti, 1992), whereas the current research is not. In light of new policies and guidelines that have been implemented since the majority of research on this topic has been done, it is important to update the literature and uncover the current status of prosecutorial discretion.

The biggest improvement upon prior research that the current research will achieve is to assess prosecutorial discretion in charge bargaining within the Federal system after the implementation of sentencing guidelines. While some believe that

using sentencing guidelines inhibits prosecutorial discretion from being abused, the skepticism is growing that the guidelines simply displace discretion from the judges to the prosecutors. The charging research that has been conducted since the implementation of guidelines has been done on a state level and is jurisdiction specific. Alternatively, this research will evaluate the federal system, which has rarely been assessed since the U.S. Sentencing Guideline, except briefly by Nagel and Schulhofer (1992) in their section on plea agreements. This research strives to give an overall picture of the abuse of discretion through the use of extralegal factors across the entire system, which is why it encompasses all jurisdictions and offense types. This research can then serve as a baseline model for the average disparities throughout the Federal system, which is meant to be uniform throughout the country. Although some research suggests that aggregation is problematic (Albonetti, 2003) and that focal concerns are also subject to local levels of interpretation (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004), the USAM strictly lists which factors are not to weigh in the prosecutors decision to initiate or decline certain charges, which is why this research looks at the total system. These factors include the defendant's "race, religion, sex, national origin, or political association, activities or beliefs; the attorney's own personal feelings concerning the person, the person's associates, or the victim; or the possible affect of the decision on the attorney's own professional circumstances" (DOJ, 2000, 9-27.260). Despite the prohibition of these factors on paper, existing research finds otherwise in practice, specifically with the extralegal factors of race and age (Albonetti, 1992; Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et al., 1987).

Doing this evaluation within the Federal system is especially important because it will help to evaluate a policy that is believed to prevent the above practices from occurring (through the guidelines). It is argued that charge bargaining is undertaken to ultimately influence the sentence a person will receive. Some research suggests that whereas guidelines may limit judicial discretion, it increases the power of the prosecutor through charging negotiations, specifically through the loopholes previously mentioned from Tonry (1996). These loopholes are exceptionally important in plea negotiations because they are rarely overseen by judges or supervising prosecutors.

The current research will focus on only plea bargains for two reasons. First, this research uses the change between filing and disposition offenses to represent the amount of leniency a prosecutor is willing to give in ultimate sentencing. Because there would be no way to differentiate whether a plea was offered and rejected in trial cases, only negotiations that took place will be used. In addition, using pleas is a much easier way to isolate the discretion of a prosecutor and the effect on sentencing. Johnson (2003) stresses that the mode of conviction (i.e. trial or plea) in a case determines whose discretion is most prominent; allowing one to evaluate how much prosecutorial discretion is involved. In contrast to jury or bench trials, Johnson (2003) points out that when dealing with negotiated pleas prosecutorial discretion is more prevalent than judicial discretion. "Because prosecutors utilize their own judgment when negotiating sentencing recommendations in exchange for guilty pleas, and because judges almost always adhere to these recommendations, prosecutors exercise more sentencing discretion than judges for these cases." (Johnson, 2003,

p.509). This is crucial to note because often these decisions lead to departures from sentencing guidelines in which judges cite plea bargain as their reason for departure. Johnson's findings showed that negotiating a plea decreased the odds of an upward departure by 20% and increase the odds of a downward departure in sentencing by 12%. Therefore, it becomes quite apparent that the prosecutor's discretion in handling negotiated pleas and charge reductions does have an impact on the final disposition and severity of a case. This sentencing research also found that more criminally experienced offenders are more likely to receive downward departures (Johnson, 2003), which supplements the finding that people with prior convictions are given more favorable charge reductions. These influences are especially important within the Federal system because this system allows people to be sentenced based on relevant conduct, which allows movement within a guideline range based on circumstances not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is these loopholes used by prosecutors that allow movement outside of the guidelines. Therefore, focusing on the Federal system, unlike most prior research, adds something significant to the field.

Chapter 3: Methods

Data

Secondary, archival data will be used for this research. The subjects are taken from the Federal Justice Statistics Program public database for the fiscal year 2001.[1] The subjects for the current analysis were obtained by linking the Administrative Office of the US Courts (AOUSC) database with the US Sentencing Commission (USSC) database. The link took place using identification numbers in the two datasets, but no other identifiers are available in the data. Therefore, there is no way to identify who the specific individuals are. This link provided information on all federal defendants whose cases were terminated in the year 2001, resulting in approximately 77,000 individuals. Because this analysis is focusing on charge reductions resulting from pleas data reduction took place in order to eliminate irrelevant cases. Subjects were dropped whose cases resulted in a dismissal (11%) and those whose cases terminated as a result of a trial (6%). Although some may consider a dismissal of charges the ultimate charge reduction, these cases were not able to be analyzed because they did not exist in the USSC database, which is where the primary independent variables of interest were located. Therefore, none of the defendant characteristics were available for the cases resulting in a dismissal. Another 4% of cases were dropped because they were death penalty cases which go through a very different process than non-death eligible cases, specifically close oversight and

[1] Although the Adminstrative Office of the US Courts is collected by the calendar year, when it is combined with the US Sentencing Commission in the Federal Justice Statistics Program, an adjustment is made to reconcile the difference and uses all cases for the fiscal year from both databases (Adams & Motivans, 2003).

approval by the Attorney General for plea agreements (DOJ, 2000, 9-10.100). Lastly, 18% of the original sample was dropped because of reporting differences between the AOUSC and the USSC. The AOUSC has defendants in their database for each individual case, whereas the USSC only has a defendant listed for each sentencing event (Adams & Motivans, 2003). For example, if an individual was sentenced on more than one case in the same sentencing hearing, that defendant would appear in the USSC database once but the AOUSC more than once. Therefore, to avoid duplicate information, only cases with a USSC ID were used. The sample of relevant cases consists of 47,843 defendants.[2]

Dependent Variables

The outcome of interest in this research is charge reduction. A charge reduction in this study is defined in a very strict manner. Based on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines there are ranges of sentences that can be given based on one's criminal history and the committed offense. However, relevant conduct permits movement within these ranges. Due to the fact that statutory limits trump the guidelines and relevant conduct cannot move a sentence beyond the statutory limit, a charge reduction for this study is defined by the amount of change in the statutory maximum between the filing offenses and the pled offenses. This is used to represent the amount of leniency the prosecutor is willing to give the defendant which can ultimately play out in sentencing.

In computation of the differences between the two groups of charges it was also necessary to account for concurrent versus consecutive sentences. Consecutive

[2] Due to the large sample size, some variables are found to be significant, although their influence is not very large substantively (i.e. odds ratios of 1.00 despite statistical significance).

sentences are rare in the federal system and are only used when mandated by statute (US Sentencing Guidelines §5G.2, 2004). It was necessary to account for them in order to prevent the cases in which prosecutors may increase the number of charges against a defendant, but use less serious charges that would add up to the same punishment from being considered reductions. Therefore, for cases in which consecutive sentences were mandated the maximum sentence of each convicted charge was added together. In cases involving concurrent sentences, the statutory maximum for the most serious charges were used. Also, some may argue that a reduction in the number of charges should constitute a charge reduction because the number of convicted charges can influence one's criminal history category for sentencing and a reduction in the number of convicted charges can be beneficial. Whereas this is true, the influence of the criminal history score is something that would be necessary to evaluate if looking at the final sentences received. In addition, there was no way to determine whether this practice has occurred in a defendant's previous cases, which would also affect the current case. While this could be an area of interest worth investigating, for the purpose of the current research, the immediate effect of a reduction or increase in the number of charges on the potential maximum sentence is captured within the dependant variables by accounting for consecutive and concurrent sentences.

Two dependant variables of interest will be analyzed in this study. First, a binary variable looking at whether or not a charge reduction took place. Second, the magnitude of the charge change will be analyzed. This dependent variable is a continuous variable that represents the difference (in years) between the maximum

potential sentence based on the filing charges and the maximum potential sentence based on the pled charges. Therefore, a positive coefficient would actually represent a disadvantage, corresponding to an increase in the severity difference score which is indicative of less of a reduction in the potential sentence.

Independent Variables

1. Age is used as a continuous variable in all of the statistical models.
2. Gender is incorporated by using a dummy variable for male.
3. Race is operationalized through a series of dummy variables representing Whites, Blacks, and Other Races (encompassing American Indian/Alaskan Natives (36%), Asian/Pacific Islanders (59%), multi-racial (3%), and other (2%)).
4. Ethnicity is operationalized through a dummy variable for Hispanic. Because this is an ethnicity variable, there are members of the sample who are White-Hispanic, Black-Hispanic, and Other-Hispanic.[3]

The above independent variables were chosen as the primary independent variables of interest due to the long legacy of literature that documents their influences on case processing (see literature review). However, some recent research has begun to look at other extralegal variables that may influence courtroom actors' perceptions of defendants, for example, employment status (Spohn and Holleran, 2000). Because these variables are emerging as possible influences the decision was made to included them as variables to control for any possible influence they may

[3] Although it was originally planned to use dummy variables for each of these race/ethnicity combinations, a large amount of missing data on the race variables left a large number of Hispanics that were unable to be classified into a specific race category. Therefore, the decision was made to analyze race and ethnicity separately.

have on the decision process and to better isolate the influence of the independent variables that have been repeatedly shown to have an influence.

Control Variables

The extralegal variables that were included as control variables include some defendant characteristics. Specifically, the defendant's marital status, operationalized by single, living together but not legally married, married, divorced/separated, and widow; dependents which is incorporated as a binary dummy variable[4]; and education level represented in dummy variables for less than HS, HS grad, GED, some college, college grad/graduate school, or other education (trade school or military). Unfortunately, employment variables were not available in the data. There were also control variables included that were case characteristics. One of these variables was whether or not the defendant was a sole defendant. This variable was included because cases involving multiple defendants could be influential in one's plea agreement if they receive a substantial assistance departure. Additionally, the number of filing and final charges were controlled as well as the district in which the case took place, operationalized by a series of dummy variables. There is some debate over the presence of district level variation, but research suggests that case processing does vary significantly by district (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004).[5] It should be noted that type of counsel was intended to be used as a control, as is seen in a lot of charging and sentencing literature. However, the missing data on this variable was so

[4] This variable was modified from its original form which included the number of dependents into a binary variable because there was a substantial amount of defendants who were classified as having dependents, but were unsure of the number.

[5] Analysis of the models without the district variables revealed substantively different results, therefore it was necessary to control for any district variation by incorporating dummy variables.

large (40%) that the decision was made to eliminate the variable in the interest of keeping a large sample size.[6]

In addition to these extralegal factors, it is necessary to note that there are legal factors that prosecutors take into account when assessing a case, therefore, these factors must also be controlled for[7]. Therefore, the legal controls included in this research include: the defendant's criminal history operationalized by levels I through VI based on the USSC guidelines; offense type which is a categorical variable by the Bureau of Justice Statistics encompassing violent, other prisoner, property, drug, weapons, or immigration offenses; and offense operationalized by the Administrative Office of the US Courts' severity codes.

Analytical Framework

Logistic regression will be used in order to test the hypothesis that extralegal factors are influential in prosecutors' decisions for offering charge reductions. This test is necessary for this research due to the binary nature of the dependent variable. In addition to an assessment of the statistical significance of the illegitimate variables, odds ratios will also be obtained and interpreted. Additionally, Ordinary Least Squares regression will be used to analyze the magnitude of change between the filing and plea. Along with running these tests on the entire sample, they will also be run on sub-samples in order to compare the effects of the extralegal variables across different groups. The sub-samples were chosen based on the conflicting findings of

[6] The analysis was run with type of counsel included in the models with a dummy variable for missing and the substantive results of the analysis did not change significantly. However, type of counsel was significant in many of the models, with t-values as large as -4.80.

[7] Steffensmeier and Demuth (2001) discuss the lack of adequate legal controls in prior research which only controls for type of offense or offense severity, and stress that both controls are necessary in conjunction with criminal history.

race, ethnicity, gender, and age main effects in the literature. The models will compare the following samples: Whites, Blacks, and Other; Hispanics and non-Hispanics; males and females; ages 17-29, ages 30-49, and age 50+.[8]

In order to prepare the above variables for inclusion in the regression equation, some of the original formats needed to be altered. Therefore, any categorical variable whose numerical value does not represent rank was turned into a series of binary variables, with a reference group. For example, the race variable was changed into 3 dummy variables with White as the reference group (Black and other races). Criminal history was kept as a rank order variable, age was kept as continuous, and binary variables were retained in their original form. Variables were prepared in this manner so that regression coefficients had meaning.

Reliability and Validity

There are potential problems with reliability in this research due to the use of official data. Because this data is collected from each circuit of the Federal Court system, there is the possibility for a lack of uniformity in recording and reporting practices across courts. Therefore, one potential threat to internal validity may be a slight selection bias based on courts only reporting certain case types. However, document submission rates were obtained for the USSC data and every district had a submission rate of at least 95.5% (USSC, 2001), therefore a strong selection bias is not likely. Unfortunately, there is also no way to unveil selection bias that may have occurred at earlier decision points (e.g. arrests), which could be another form of bias within this sample. Although controls are being used to make the independent

[8] After graphing age against the continuous dependent variable, no visible tipping point was found, therefore the age categories used in previous literature were implemented (Steffensmeier et al., 1998).

variable of interest the only difference between the individuals, if there are omitted variables that affect both the independent and dependent variables (e.g. employment) there will be estimation bias. Other threats to validity are not a problem with this research because there is no pre and post tests, the sample was preexisting, and the causal order would not be in question because the independent variables of interest precede the criminal cases by nature. It is also important to recognize that Federal and State defendants are processed differently; therefore this research can only be generalized to Federal defendants. However, the use of Federal data increases external validity because the sample includes defendants from all circuits, representing all areas of the country.

Chapter 4: Results

Descriptive Statistics

Before analyzing the influences of different variables on the outcomes of interest, it is important to look at the frequencies of the primary variables in order to establish their prevalence within the sample. Table 1 shows the frequencies and percentages for the independent variables, which also indicate the sub-samples of interest, as well as the two dependent variables.[9]

[9] District variation was not a primary interest of this research. The set of dummy variables for each federal district were only included to incorporate fixed-effects. All results reported are net of district fixed effects and the specific coefficients for each district are reported in Appendix A.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable Name		Descriptive Statistics	
Logistic Regression n,%	reduction	5646	11.80
OLS Regression n, M(SD)	severity difference	47843	-2.28(10.45)
Age n, M(SD)	Age	46667	33.98(10.68)
Gender n, %	Male	40909	85.54
	Female*	6915	14.46
Race n, %	white*	31358	68.41
	Black	12834	28.00
	other race	1645	3.59
Ethnicity n,%	hispanic	18294	38.29
	non-hispanic*	29478	61.71
Offense Type n,%	violent offense*	1824	3.81
	prisoner offense	15	0.03
	property offense	11137	23.28
	drug offense	19158	40.04
	public order offense	3314	6.93
	weapon offense	4261	8.91
	immigration offense	8134	17.00
Severity Control n, M(SD)	severity of offense	47843	7.34(3.08)
Criminal History n, M(SD)	criminal history	46522	2.37(1.69)
Sole Defendant Case n,%	sole defendant	33106	69.20
# of Filing Charges n, M(SD)	# of filing charges	47843	1.82(1.14)
# of Final Charges n ,M(SD)	# of final charges	47843	2.02(1.27)
Children n, %	Kids	27027	61.12
Marital Status n, %	Single*	17075	39.11
	married	13989	32.04
	living together	5447	12.47
	divorced/separated	6903	15.81
	Widow	250	0.57
Education n,%	less than HS*	19348	44.46
	HS grad	9037	20.77
	GED	4437	10.20
	some college	7435	17.09
	college grad/grad school	2757	6.34
	other education	501	1.15

* Reference Category

From this table a clearer picture of the sample being analyzed emerges. This shows that the federal defendants utilized for this study are 86% male. It is not surprising to find a comparable amount of individuals between the ages of 17-29 and 30-49 (40% and 48% respectively), but only 12% of the sample over the age of 50, since most people desist from crime. Racially, the majority of the sample is White (68%), followed by 28% Black and only 4% other. Hispanics make up 38% of the

sample. The binary dependent variable shows that 12% of the sample received charge reductions and the continuous dependent variable shows that the average difference between the maximum penalty possible from filing charges versus pled charges is representative of a sentence reduction of about 2 years and three months.[10]

The driving force behind this research is to uncover processing disparities within the Federal system with regards to charge reductions. The statistical analyzes below reveal support for both of the primary research hypotheses. Not only do they show that there is an overall influence of extralegal variables at the charging stage, but they also reveal that the effect of these variables change in significance and magnitude between different sub-samples. These results suggest differential treatment of defendants when offering charge reductions in the Federal system.

Bivariate Correlations

Before beginning to build regression models the bivariate relationships of the independent variables of interest with the dependent variables should be assessed. Table 2 shows the correlation of each independent variable with each of the dependent variables. Similar to other charge reduction literature (Bernstein et al., 1977), these correlations are extremely small. Because there are such inconsistencies in the prior research and because the current study uses data that has not previously been used for this type of analysis, the hypotheses do not include specific directional expectations for these variables. However, looking at these bivariate relationships does highlight some interesting associations. First of all, it is comforting to see that

[10] Tests for normality showed that the dependent variable is slightly left skewed, which is to be expected because the occurrence of charging upgrades (1.4%) is much less likely than reductions (11.8%). However, the analyses were also run using the log values in order to correct for skewness, and the results did not differ, suggesting that skewness was not problematic in the analyses.

the majority of the legal variables such as offense severity and many of the offense type variables are the most highly correlated. This suggests that they are the most influential factors. What is puzzling is that the direction of offense severity is opposite what most would say is intuitively expected. Most would think that as offense severity increases the likelihood of receiving a reduction would lessen because people would want to punish more severe offenses more harshly. However, a correlation of .171 suggests the opposite. This may be the case due to the research on guideline departures which suggest that some courtroom officials are uncomfortable with the punitive sentences mandated by the guidelines for offenses with high severity scores (Kramer and Ulmer, 2002). Therefore, in order to avoid the harsh penalties, prosecutors may reduce charges in order to change the guidelines, whereas, prosecutors are not in conflict with the guidelines for lesser offenses. Also, there are some extralegal variables, specifically male, that have correlations that are stronger than the legal variables, which may be indicative of abuse of discretion. However, this suspicion cannot be confirmed without controlling for other factors.

These simple bivariate relationships are not sufficient, however, especially since some of the contradictory findings. Based on the operationalization of the continuous dependent variable described above, it would be expected that the direction of correlation for the magnitude of charge change would be the opposite of the likelihood of charge reduction. While this is true for most of the variables, it is not for all, suggesting that other factors are affecting these relationships. Therefore, multivariate statistical modeling needs to be used in order to isolate the actual relationship between these independent variables with the dependent variables by

rigorously controlling for the effect of the other independent variables. Therefore, this research turns to more advanced statistical analyses, namely logistic regression for the binary outcome and ordinary least squares regression for the continuous outcome.

Table 2: Bivariate Correlations

	Correlations with Dependent Variables	
Independent Variable	Likelihood of Charge Reduction	Magnitude of Charge Change
Age	0.000	0.025
Male	-0.125	0.023
White	-0.017	0.007
Black	-0.008	-0.006
Other Race	0.133	-0.002
Hispanic	0.031	-0.017
Violent Offense	-0.046	0.020
Prisoner Offense	-1.000	0.005
Property Offense	-0.095	0.073
Drug Offense	0.196	-0.114
Public Order Offense	-0.189	0.035
Weapon Offense	0.185	-0.002
Immigration Offense	-0.297	0.08
Offense Severity	0.171	-0.208
Criminal History	-0.040	0.034
Sole Defendant	-0.200	0.077
# of Filing Charges	0.279	-0.217
# of Final Charges	0.265	-0.182
Kids	0.000	-0.008
Single	0.025	-0.011
Married	0.011	0.011
Living Together	-0.018	-0.013
Divorced/Separated	-0.051	0.014
Widow	0.012	-0.003
Less than HS	-0.024	-0.014
HS Graduate	0.013	0.001
GED	-0.004	0.000
Some College	0.010	0.005
College/Graduate School	0.002	0.020
Other Education	0.198	-0.006

Logistic Regression Results

It seems fitting to begin with the simpler question and investigate what factors influence whether or not a charge reduction is received. The full model uses the entire sample and includes all of the variables previously described, including the independent variables of interest, legally relevant variables, and control variables.[11] Table 3 shows the results from the full logistic regression model.

Table 3: Logistic Regression Results: Full Model

Variable	Coefficient	(z)	Odds Ratio
Age	0.004*	2.40	1.00
Male	-0.377**	-8.19	0.69
Black	-0.012	-0.26	0.99
Other Race	0.371**	4.09	1.45
Hispanic	0.177**	3.57	1.19
Property Offense	0.524**	5.11	1.69
Drug Offense	-0.223*	-2.31	0.80
Public Order Offense	0.321**	2.68	1.38
Weapon Offense	0.521**	5.11	1.68
Immigration Offense	-0.913**	-5.91	0.40
Offense Severity	0.219**	17.95	1.25
Criminal History	-0.027*	-2.23	0.97
Sole Defendant	0.212**	5.53	1.24
# of Filing Charges	0.327**	14.09	1.39
# of Convicted Charges	0.240**	11.03	1.27
Kids	0.019	0.48	1.02
Married	-0.043	-0.87	0.96
Living Together	-0.071	-1.24	0.93
Divorced/Separated	-0.178**	-3.16	0.84
Widow	-0.081	-0.36	0.92
High School	-0.053	-1.15	0.95
GED	-0.056	-0.93	0.95
Some College	-0.069	-1.36	0.93
College Grad	-0.095	-1.22	0.91
Other Education	0.087	0.60	1.09
Constant	-5.077**	-16.96	--
Log likelihood		-12022.478	

*** p< .05, ** p<.01**

[11] Prisoner offense dropped out of the logistic regression models due to a lack of variation in the variable.

This model shows that while being male significantly decreases ones chances of receiving a charge reduction, being a race other than Black or White, and being Hispanic significantly increases the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction. Specifically, only 69 men receive a charge reduction for every 100 women receiving a reduction. Oppositely, for every 100 Whites, 145 Other Race individuals receive a reduction and 119 Hispanics for every 100 Non-Hispanic receiving a reduction. Interestingly, Blacks are no more or less likely than Whites to receive a reduction, which goes against stereotypical thinking. It is also worth noting that as anticipated, allof the legally relevant variables of offense type, offense severity and criminal history are also statistically significant. These results suggest that as one's criminal history increases, the odds of receiving a reduction decrease, but as the severity of the most serious filing charge increases so do the chances of a reduction. This finding compliments the previously provided reason cited from the departure literature. The significantly positive coefficients for the number of filing charges and number of convicted charges may also be explained by the departure literature, considering the fact that these variables can be influential in determining where a defendant falls on the sentencing guideline grid. Therefore, as these numbers increase charge reductions may be more likely in order to avoid overly punitive sentences.

While the overall effects of these variables are interesting alone, the deeper question this research seeks to answer is whether the significance and magnitude of the effects of the extralegal variables differ across different sub-samples. In essence, does lumping the sample together mask the effects that age, gender, race, and ethnicity have on certain groups of individuals? Therefore, the analyses move to

comparisons of the effects of these variables across different groups. This method of analysis was chosen to represent a series of tests for statistical interactions since the charging literature has not previously acknowledged which interactions would be beneficial to specifically test. Hopefully, these analyses will provide some guidance on which interaction terms will be beneficial to include in modeling for future research. Differences across racial groups are the first comparison analyzed. Table 4 compares the effects of age, gender, and ethnicity between Blacks, Whites, and other racial groups and uncovers a lack of uniformity in the results. Hispanic is still included in the models because it is not being considered a race. There are defendants within each model that are also classified as Hispanic.

Table 4: Logistic Regression of Race Sub-samples

	Black (n= 12,155)			White (n= 27,374)			Other Race (n=1,372)		
Variable	**Coefficient**	**(z)**	**Odds Ratio**	**Coefficient**	**(z)**	**Odds Ratio**	**Coefficient**	**(z)**	**Odds Ratio**
Age	0.002	0.52	1.00	0.005*	2.06	1.01	0.011	1.19	1.01
Male	-0.317**	-3.62	0.73	-0.385**	-6.72	0.68	-0.413	-1.80	0.66
Hispanic	-0.100	-0.61	0.90	0.186**	3.32	1.21	-0.122	-0.21	0.89
Property Offense	0.616**	3.28	1.85	0.502**	3.52	1.65	0.690*	2.15	2.00
Drug Offense	-0.139	-0.79	0.87	-0.175	-1.29	0.84	-1.228**	-3.75	0.29
Public Order Offense	0.248	0.98	1.28	0.292	1.83	1.34	0.921*	2.39	2.51
Weapon Offense	0.609**	3.37	1.84	0.501**	3.44	1.65	0.691	1.82	2.00
Immigration Offense	-0.073	-0.17	0.93	-1.021**	-5.43	0.36	-1.477	-1.35	0.23
Offense Severity	0.205**	9.24	1.23	0.211**	13.61	1.24	0.365**	6.93	1.44
Criminal History	-0.039*	-1.97	0.96	-0.007	-0.43	0.99	-0.020	-0.26	0.98
Sole Defendant	0.022	0.31	1.02	0.320**	6.61	1.38	-0.160	-0.77	0.85
# of Filing Charges	0.419**	10.13	1.52	0.292**	9.86	1.34	0.311**	2.72	1.37
# of Final Charges	0.175**	4.55	1.19	0.276**	9.92	1.32	0.331**	3.00	1.39
Kids	-0.058	-0.85	0.94	0.067	1.34	1.07	0.158	0.75	1.17
Married	0.033	0.37	1.03	-0.079	-1.27	0.92	-0.339	-1.26	0.71
Living Together	-0.137	-1.37	0.87	-0.039	-0.52	0.96	-0.383	-1.09	0.68
Divorced/Separated	-0.003	-0.03	1.00	-0.252**	-3.59	0.78	-0.356	-1.17	0.70
Widow	0.142	0.33	1.15	-0.212	-0.74	0.81	0.162	0.13	1.18
High School	0.068	0.85	1.07	-0.128*	-2.13	0.88	0.247	1.01	1.28
GED	0.163	1.55	1.18	-0.168*	-2.15	0.85	-0.076	-0.23	0.93
Some College	0.002	0.02	1.00	-0.115	-1.76	0.89	0.313	1.28	1.37
College Grad	-0.127	-0.72	0.88	-0.056	-0.61	0.95	-0.068	-0.19	0.94
Other Education	0.378	1.32	1.46	0.021	0.12	1.02	-0.062	-0.09	0.94
Constant	-4.807**	-12.10	--	-6.164**	-5.77	--	-5.681**	-3.56	--
Log likelihood	-3643.9248			-7714.3022			-456.62633		

*** p< .05, ** p<.01**

Being male appears to be a significant disadvantage within the Black and White groups. However, this is the only influential extralegal variable for Blacks, decreasing the number of Black males receiving a reduction to 73 compared to 100 Black females and further decreasing the ratio to 68:100 for White males to White females. Oppositely, being Hispanic increases charge reductions for White offenders to 121 charge reductions per 100 for Non-Hispanic. However, the Hispanic influence does not manifest in the Black and Other Race populations. Interestingly, none of the illegitimate factors are influential for members of other minority races. It appears that the effects of these variables are most similar between the White sample and the full sample, but when comparing the overall effects to the Black and other samples the pictures are very different. It is also interesting that while the effect of charge severity is consistent with the full model, criminal history is only significant (marginally) in the processing of Blacks.

These results give the appearance that there are many differences between the influences on charge reductions, both legal and extralegal, between the different race groups and their interactions with other variables. However, due to the varying sample sizes, significance tests were conducted in order to statistically test for a difference between the coefficients across samples for any of the variables of interest that were found to differ in significance across samples.[12] For the race sub-samples the z-tests between the Hispanic coefficients and criminal history coefficients were not significant. This suggests that while their influences may vary within these specific samples, across repeated sampling the coefficients do not differ by more than

[12] All significance tests between samples used the conventional .05 cutoff, comparing z-tests to the critical value of 1.96. All significance tests used the formula: $z= (b_1-b_2) / \sqrt{[(SE_{b1})^2 + (SE_{b2})^2]}$ (Paternoster et al., 1998)

chance. This implies that the interactions between race and ethnicity and race and criminal history are not suggestive of differential processing.

Table 5: Logistic Regression of Hispanic vs. Non-Hispanic

	Hispanic (n= 13,566)			Non-Hispanic (n= 27,388)		
Variable	**Coefficient**	**(z)**	**Odds Ratio**	**Coefficient**	**(z)**	**Odds Ratio**
Age	-0.002	-0.48	1.00	0.006**	2.75	1.01
Male	-0.445**	-5.05	0.64	-0.347**	-6.32	0.72
Black	-0.042	-0.27	0.96	0.032	0.65	1.03
Other Race	0.334	0.64	1.40	0.341**	3.62	1.41
Property Offense	0.275	0.89	1.32	0.582**	5.30	1.79
Drug Offense	0.301	1.05	1.35	-0.441**	-4.23	0.64
Public Order Offense	-0.185	-0.52	0.83	0.404**	3.14	1.50
Weapon Offense	0.269	0.85	1.31	0.544**	5.02	1.72
Immigration Offense	-1.299**	-3.97	0.27	-0.852**	-2.69	0.43
Offense Severity	0.124**	5.09	1.13	0.246**	17.56	1.28
Criminal History	-0.014	-0.57	0.99	-0.025	-1.81	0.98
Sole Defendant	0.738**	10.40	2.09	-0.053	-1.14	0.95
# of Filing Charges	0.236**	5.13	1.27	0.343**	12.54	1.41
# of Final Charges	0.322**	7.67	1.38	0.228**	8.79	1.26
Kids	0.018	0.23	1.02	0.031	0.67	1.03
Married	-0.109	-1.23	0.90	0.012	0.20	1.01
Living Together	-0.042	-0.43	0.96	-0.092	-1.25	0.91
Divorced/Separated	-0.271*	-2.40	0.76	-0.137*	-2.08	0.87
Widow	-0.008	-0.02	0.99	-0.078	-0.30	0.93
High School	-0.184*	-2.07	0.83	0.014	0.26	1.01
GED	-0.182	-1.36	0.83	0.000	0.01	1.00
Some College	-0.056	-0.55	0.95	-0.040	-0.67	0.96
College Grad	-0.030	-0.16	0.97	-0.092	-1.04	0.91
Other Education	0.128	0.45	1.14	0.086	0.50	1.09
Constant	-22.342**	-17.34	--	-5.085**	-16.06	--
Log likelihood		-3678.0215			-8163.0931	

*** p< .05, ** p<.01**

Table 5 above compares the Hispanic sample to the non-Hispanic. Again, being male consistently decreases the likelihood of a reduction for both samples with the ratio for males to females being 64:100 for Hispanics and 72:100 for non-Hispanics. For non-Hispanics, belonging to the other race group is advantageous for receiving charge reductions with an additional 41 charge reductions being awarded compared to Whites receiving reductions, however, statistical tests did not reveal significant

differences between this group and their counterparts in the Hispanic sample. While the effect of offense severity is influential in both samples and consistent with the full model, the effect of criminal history is not influential in either sample. Because this is opposite the impactof criminal history in the full model, it may be concluded that the interaction between criminal history and ethnicity is not influential. One striking difference between the Hispanic sample and the non-Hispanic sample is the influence of sole defendant cases. Significance tests reveal that this difference is very large, with Hispanic sole defendants having a much larger likelihood of receiving a reduction than Hispanics involved in multiple defendant cases, but the impact of a sole defendant in the non-Hispanic sample in not significant. Perhaps this highlights a higher rate of group offending within the Hispanic population than non-Hispanics.

Table 6 compares the treatment of males and females with regards to charge reductions and suggests very different influences.

Table 6: Logistic Regression of Males vs. Females

	Male (n= 35,031)			Female (n= 5,954)		
Variable	**Coefficient**	**(z)**	**Odds Ratio**	**Coefficient**	**(z)**	**Odds Ratio**
Age	0.006**	3.04	1.01	-0.004	-0.88	1.00
Black	0.014	0.28	1.01	-0.034	-0.31	0.97
Other Race	0.404**	3.99	1.50	0.274	1.29	1.31
Hispanic	0.223**	4.04	1.25	0.062	0.51	1.06
Property Offense	0.744**	6.69	2.10	-0.445	-1.56	0.64
Drug Offense	-0.189	-1.83	0.83	-0.704*	-2.43	0.49
Public Order Offense	0.445**	3.43	1.56	-0.433	-1.31	0.65
Weapon Offense	0.604**	5.59	1.83	-0.287	-0.77	0.75
Immigration Offense	-0.809**	-4.92	0.45	-1.960**	-3.88	0.14
Offense Severity	0.214**	15.96	1.24	0.261**	8.41	1.30
Criminal History	-0.015	-1.16	0.99	-0.134**	-3.12	0.87
Sole Defendant	0.175**	4.13	1.19	0.408**	4.29	1.50
# of Filing Charges	0.347**	13.52	1.42	0.239**	4.12	1.27
# of Final Charges	0.216**	8.92	1.24	0.367**	6.79	1.44
Kids	-0.001	-0.03	1.00	0.080	0.88	1.08
Married	-0.029	-0.54	0.97	-0.036	-0.30	0.97
Living Together	-0.028	-0.45	0.97	-0.255	-1.72	0.77
Divorced/Separated	-0.190**	-2.94	0.83	-0.162	-1.34	0.85
Widow	-0.124	-0.36	0.88	0.014	0.04	1.01
High School	-0.076	-1.47	0.93	0.040	0.35	1.04
GED	-0.011	-0.16	0.99	-0.391*	-2.45	0.68
Some College	-0.070	-1.22	0.93	-0.056	-0.48	0.95
College Grad	-0.108	-1.27	0.90	-0.164	-0.80	0.85
Other Education	0.108	0.64	1.11	0.027	0.09	1.03
Constant	-5.380**	-17.15	--	-6.153**	-5.35	--
Log likelihood		-9914.3924			-1976.6634	

*** p< .05, ** p<.01**

While being male has consistently been a disadvantage in the previous models these results suggest that certain males have advantages with regard to illegitimate factors altering the odds of receiving a charge reduction. Specifically, Hispanic males appear to receive more charge reductions than non-Hispanic males as illustrated by the odds ratios of 1.25, and minority males (other than Black) are also benefited when receiving reductions with a ratio of 150:100 compared to their white male counterparts.

In a more general picture, this model suggests that net of the legally relevant variables and controls, females are treated consistently within the system and other illegitimate factors do not vary the chances of reduction. However, the large difference in sample sizes leads to differences in the amounts of statistical power to detect differences within the various samples. Whereas, the results show some support in direction that these differences exist, z-tests revealed that the influence of these interactions with gender have not yet met the threshold of statistical significance and need more investigation, with one exception. One very interesting finding is that criminal history is only influential in the treatment of females, whereas severity of offense mirrors the previous results for males and females. This difference in the influence of criminal history on males and females is supported by statistical testing which confirms that the coefficients differ by significantly more than chance. These results support a gender interaction with criminal history on the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction.

Table 7: Logistic Regression of Age Categories

	Age 17-29 (n=16,654)			Age 30-49 (n= 20,323)			Age 50+ (n=4,057)		
Variable	**Coefficient**	**(z)**	**Odds Ratio**	**Coefficient**	**(z)**	**Odds Ratio**	**Coefficient**	**(z)**	**Odds Ratio**
Age	-0.024*	-2.54	0.98	0.011*	2.40	1.01	0.020*	2.18	1.02
Male	-0.495**	-6.76	0.61	-0.360**	-5.46	0.70	-0.008	-0.05	0.99
Black	-0.092	-1.24	0.91	0.072	1.09	1.07	0.059	0.37	1.06
Other Race	0.381*	2.51	1.46	0.497**	3.97	1.64	-0.164	-0.54	0.85
Hispanic	0.277**	3.56	1.32	0.138	1.91	1.15	0.005	0.03	1.01
Property Offense	0.852**	4.92	2.34	0.426**	2.99	1.53	-0.187	-0.60	0.83
Drug Offense	0.096	0.60	1.10	-0.282*	-2.07	0.75	-1.117**	-3.59	0.33
Public Order Offense	0.535*	2.34	1.71	0.273	1.67	1.31	-0.325	-0.97	0.72
Weapon Offense	0.818**	4.95	2.27	0.369*	2.51	1.45	0.116	0.34	1.12
Immigration Offense	-0.997**	-3.68	0.37	-0.883**	-4.25	0.41	-0.701	-1.38	0.50
Offense Severity	0.233**	11.79	1.26	0.196**	11.26	1.22	0.293**	7.89	1.34
Criminal History	-0.003	-0.16	1.00	-0.022	-1.31	0.98	-0.090	-1.87	0.91
Sole Defendant	0.259**	4.39	1.30	0.234**	4.15	1.26	-0.101	-0.80	0.90
# of Filing Charges	0.375**	9.45	1.46	0.319**	9.81	1.38	0.236**	3.53	1.27
# of Final Charges	0.156**	4.19	1.17	0.270**	8.82	1.31	0.420**	6.68	1.52
Kids	-0.011	-0.17	0.99	0.114	1.89	1.12	0.091	0.73	1.10
Married	-0.047	-0.59	0.95	-0.005	-0.07	1.00	0.009	0.05	1.01
Living Together	-0.051	-0.62	0.95	-0.065	-0.73	0.94	-0.048	-0.18	0.95
Divorced/Separated	-0.090	-0.77	0.91	-0.202**	-2.66	0.82	-0.052	-0.25	0.95
Widow	0.866	0.98	2.38	-0.125	-0.37	0.88	0.115	0.29	1.21
High School	0.015	0.21	1.01	-0.085	-1.24	0.92	-0.126	-0.77	0.88
GED	-0.050	-0.55	0.95	-0.033	-0.38	0.97	-0.239	-0.97	0.79
Some College	0.045	0.55	1.05	-0.136	-1.86	0.87	-0.171	-0.99	0.84
College Grad	-0.243	-1.02	0.78	-0.133	-1.27	0.88	-0.023	-0.13	0.98
Other Education	0.253	0.95	1.29	-0.026	-0.13	0.97	0.212	0.49	1.24
Constant	-4.886**	-9.27	--	-5.052**	-11.61	--	-7.037**	-5.10	--
Log likelihood	-4932.4435			-5726.9285			-1166.6399		

*** p< .05, ** p<.01**

The final comparison is among different age groups and the results are shown above in Table 7. A few interesting findings emerge from this analysis. Overall it appears that fewer factors are important in determining charge reduction as an individual gets older. Significance tests across the models show some support for this conclusion. While these tests do not reveal significant differences between the coefficients in the age 19-29 and age 30-49 models, they do support the conclusion that the influence of male and other race diminishes once the age of 50 is reached when compared to the two younger models. Research by Steffensmeier et al. (1995; 1998) finds support for a curvilinear effect of age, which supports that individuals over the age of 50 are treated the most leniently, supporting the advantage of this age group for receiving charge reductions. However, Steffensmeier et al. (1995; 1998) also suggest that extremely young offenders (18-21) may be treated less severely than those aged 21-29. Therefore, combining these two age groups as was done in the above results may contribute to lack of differences between the two younger models. Future research may want to break these age groups down into smaller ranges to see if additional differences emerge.

That being acknowledged, the above models suggest that defendants ages 17-29 and 30-49 are treated relatively similarly with male being a disadvantage (with odds ratios of 61 and .70 respectively) and other minority races as an advantage (increasing the ratio of charge reductions to 146:100 and 164:100 respectively compared to their white counterparts). However, the magnitude of the coefficients lessen with age for male, suggesting that its importance decreases with age. An

additional advantage for the youngest age group appear to be being Hispanic, when compared to the two older age models, but these differences between the models do not hold true when statistically comparing the coefficients. The impact of criminal history is consistently not influential, but the influence of offense severity remains the same as all previous models.

These results reveal some interesting findings and provide many areas of exploration for future research. Whereas the differences in the significance of the key independent variables between the different samples is considerable, the statistical tests across the models do not always meet the threshold of significance. However, there is some evidence of differential processing, both among the main effects in the full model, and some of the interaction effects. Although being male is consistently a disadvantage, there also appears to be an interaction with age suggesting that gender is no longer influential among older defendants (age 50 and above). The variables on race and ethnicity vary on significance in many of the models. The results of the full model do suggest that minorities other than blacks are treated more leniently compared to whites, and Hispanics are slightly advantaged. These results support the hypothesis that extralegal factors are influencing prosecutorial charging decisions. Additionally, the hypothesis of differential influence is also supported by the differences across the age models in which other race is no longer influential among older defendants. Finally, there is also support for differential use of legal factors, specifically, criminal history, with its influence manifesting in the processing of females, but not males.

These comparisons between the sub-sample results and contrasts with the full model illustrate some differences, suggesting that some effects are masked when all individuals are combined into one sample. However, some may feel that the magnitude of these results as reflected in the odds ratios, is not overwhelming. It is possible that some differences are still being overlooked due to the binary nature of the dependent variable. Perhaps the probability of receiving a charge reduction, net of the control variables, does not vary much based on these variables and sub-samples, but the differential processing may lie in the magnitude of the reduction. For example, whereas the difference between getting a reduction for Hispanics and non-Hispanics may not be that substantial (a ratio of 119:100), if Hispanics are consistently getting much larger reductions than non-Hispanics, this would not be captured in the dependent variable above. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the influence of these variables on the magnitude of the charge change to account for the possibility of these differences.

OLS Regression Results

The next question addressed looks at the independent variables more closely and tells us how influential they are in the magnitude of the difference between the maximum penalty possible for filing charges versus final charges. For the most part these results concur with those of the logistic regression when looking at the direction of influence. However, some of the variables significantly contribute to the binary outcome of getting a charge reduction but do not significantly predict the magnitude of change. Table 8 shows the results for the full model which uses the entire sample.

Table 8: OLS Regression: Full Model

Variable	Coefficient	(t)
Age	-0.003	-0.55
Male	0.922**	6.17
Black	0.039	0.28
Other Race	-0.591*	-1.97
Hispanic	-0.615**	-3.95
Prisoner Offense	3.144	1.14
Property Offense	-0.861**	-2.96
Drug Offense	-0.712*	-2.55
Public Order Offense	-1.093**	-3.25
Weapon Offense	-0.813**	-2.67
Immigration Offense	-1.574**	-4.63
Offense Severity	-0.690**	-21.71
Criminal History	0.069*	1.99
Sole Defendant	-0.782**	-6.38
# of Filing Charges	-1.731**	-20.58
# of Final Charges	0.142	1.89
Kids	-0.129	-1.10
Married	0.184	1.26
Living Together	0.009	0.05
Divorced/Separated	0.420*	2.54
Widow	-0.660	-0.96
High School	0.090	0.63
GED	0.168	0.92
Some College	-0.012	-0.08
College Grad	0.051	0.22
Other Education	-0.134	-0.28
Constant	6.475**	6.93
*** p< .05, ** p<.01**		**R-squared=.09**

These results mimic those of the full logistic model with the exception of age. While being male leads to a higher potential sentence than female (a disadvantage of about 11 additional months), being in the other race category and Hispanic both significantly decrease the maximum potential sentence between filing and pleading compared to Whites and non-Hispanics by about 7 months each, which is indicative of a charge reduction. Similar to the logistic regression results, all of the legal variables are influential in the average processing of defendants (and in the same direction as explained in the previous section). One of the most striking results is the R-squared value of .09. This suggests that the model is only explaining 9% of the

variance in the charge reduction outcome. While this value is comparable to those in other charge reduction research (Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et al., 1987) it should be further investigated.

Again, observing these differences within the context of sub-samples to see if something is lost by looking at the entirety of the sample may be beneficial. Because the logistic regression results supported some differential treatment it will be interesting to see not just what factors affect the magnitude of the charge change, but if certain groups are consistently getting larger reductions, or if the same factors are contributing to the magnitude of the change between each group. After all, the full model shows us an average effect, but it is plausible to believe that some groups could be getting very large reductions and others minimal reductions, which gives the appearance of a moderate effect. Uncovering these differences gives a more accurate depiction of how the system is operating, and the following results attempt to do just that. Tables 9-12 below show the results of these analyses, but only the results that do not concur with the previous results in the logistic regression will be discussed.

Table 9: OLS Regression of Race Sub-samples

	Black (n= 12,314)		White (n= 27,386)		Other Race (n=1,559)	
Variable	**Coefficient**	**(t)**	**Coefficient**	**(t)**	**Coefficient**	**(t)**
Age	0.008	0.59	-0.005	-0.79	-0.017	-0.65
Male	0.770*	2.42	1.029**	5.98	0.021	0.03
Hispanic	0.241	0.42	-0.687**	-4.27	-0.422	-0.30
Prisoner Offense	4.218	0.71	2.998	0.89	7.397	1.08
Property Offense	-2.107**	-3.60	-0.384	-1.06	-0.885	-0.98
Drug Offense	-1.764**	-3.21	-0.463	-1.31	1.745	1.89
Public Order Offense	-2.092**	-2.70	-0.655	-1.63	-1.811	-1.64
Weapon Offense	-2.169**	-3.76	-0.258	-0.66	0.311	0.26
Immigration Offense	-3.377**	-3.43	-0.843*	-2.09	-1.046	-0.78
Offense Severity	-0.674**	-10.14	-0.663**	-17.95	-1.134**	-8.67
Criminal History	0.105	1.55	0.024	0.59	-0.001	-0.01
Sole Defendant	-0.326	-1.29	-0.990**	-6.99	-0.390	-0.62
# of Filing Charges	-2.359**	-14.09	-1.366**	-13.79	-1.794**	-4.64
# of Final Charges	0.550**	3.68	-0.101	-1.14	0.178	0.51
Kids	-0.174	-0.73	-0.214	-1.57	0.620	1.04
Married	0.005	0.02	0.230	1.36	0.725	0.96
Living Together	0.279	0.82	-0.145	-0.71	0.694	0.71
Divorced/Separated	-0.175	-0.48	0.600**	3.20	0.756	0.88
Widow	-1.257	-0.78	-0.595	-0.79	1.260	0.38
High School	-0.344	-1.20	0.333*	2.00	-0.036	-0.05
GED	-0.386	-1.06	0.359	1.68	1.573	1.63
Some College	-0.280	-0.89	0.190	1.04	-0.407	-0.57
College Grad	0.088	0.15	0.014	0.06	0.705	0.74
Other Education	-0.145	-0.13	-0.149	-0.28	-0.642	-0.32
Constant	7.354**	5.30	6.556**	3.21	8.232	1.43
*** p< .05, ** p<.01**	**R-squared=.09**		**R-squared=.10**		**R-squared=.17**	

There are no substantive differences between the logistic results and OLS results when comparing the racial sub-samples. What is remarkable is the difference in the magnitude of the effect of male between Blacks and Whites. Being male for a black individual increases the potential sentence by about 9 months compared to females, but for white individuals the difference is a little more than a year. While these results appear substantively significant, the difference between these coefficients does not reach statistical significance. However, it is again consistent that the White sample most closely resembles the results of the full model and the Black and other race groups have much less statistically significant influences. One difference that stands out among these samples is the negative and significant coefficients of the

offense types within the black model compared to the white and other race models. Significance tests confirmed the differences across these models and suggest that violent offenses may be more salient among black defendants and that they overwhelmingly receive smaller reductions when being charged with a violent crime. Again, the criminal history results are consistent across races but are opposite the overall effect found in the full OLS model.

Table 10: OLS Regression of Hispanic vs. Non-Hispanic

	Hispanic (n= 13,851)		Non-Hispanic (n= 27,408)	
Variable	**Coefficient**	**(t)**	**Coefficient**	**(t)**
Age	0.007	0.75	-0.004	-0.59
Male	1.739**	6.19	0.664**	3.73
Black	0.216	0.50	-0.125	-0.81
Other Race	-1.080	-0.80	-0.584	-1.81
Prisoner Offense	2.289	0.24	3.131	1.06
Property Offense	-0.187	-0.21	-1.038**	-3.27
Drug Offense	-1.829*	-2.18	-0.328	-1.07
Public Order Offense	-0.135	-0.14	-1.298**	-3.50
Weapon Offense	-0.683	-0.73	-0.901**	-2.72
Immigration Offense	-1.590	-1.79	-1.130*	-2.05
Offense Severity	-0.614**	-9.78	-0.717**	-19.13
Criminal History	-0.008	-0.14	0.095*	2.21
Sole Defendant	-1.809**	-8.83	-0.318*	-2.08
# of Filing Charges	-1.474**	-9.63	-1.790**	-17.64
# of Final Charges	-0.189	-1.40	0.248**	2.71
Kids	-0.164	-0.80	-0.155	-1.08
Married	0.285	1.21	0.095	0.51
Living Together	0.088	0.33	-0.043	-0.19
Divorced/Separated	0.850**	2.88	0.223	1.11
Widow	-0.102	-0.08	-0.867	-1.07
High School	0.397	1.63	-0.090	-0.50
GED	0.176	0.49	0.119	0.55
Some College	0.129	0.43	-0.111	-0.59
College Grad	0.401	0.71	-0.007	-0.03
Other Education	0.254	0.27	-0.268	-0.47
Constant	8.282**	3.11	6.289**	6.09
*** p< .05, ** p<.01**	**R-squared=.14**		**R-squared=.08**	

For the Hispanic vs. non-Hispanic comparison only male is influential within both groups. While the results are the same in the logistic regression for Hispanics, this differs from the logistic regression results of non-Hispanics where other race was

also advantageous. However, the magnitude of the influence varies between these groups. Where Hispanic males receive almost a year and nine months more than Hispanic females, the disadvantage of being male for non-Hispanic only translates to an additional 8 months over females, which is both a statistical and substantive difference.

Table 11: OLS Regression of Males vs. Females

	Male (n= 35,048)		Female (n= 6,211)	
Variable	**Coefficient**	**(t)**	**Coefficient**	**(t)**
Age	-0.007	-1.11	0.018	1.53
Black	-0.047	-0.30	0.112	0.39
Other Race	-0.760*	-2.21	-0.164	-0.29
Hispanic	-0.639**	-3.68	-0.533	-1.53
Prisoner Offense	3.126	1.07	4.041	0.46
Property Offense	-1.083**	-3.43	-0.851	-1.01
Drug Offense	-0.564	-1.89	-2.093*	-2.44
Public Order Offense	-1.210**	-3.31	-1.029	-1.10
Weapon Offense	-0.762*	-2.37	-2.074	-1.87
Immigration Offense	-1.720**	-4.68	-0.110	-0.11
Offense Severity	-0.683**	-19.14	-0.746**	-11.21
Criminal History	0.049	1.30	0.306**	2.97
Sole Defendant	-0.679**	-4.95	-1.145**	-4.42
# of Filing Charges	-1.890**	-20.26	-0.703**	-3.75
# of Final Charges	0.284**	3.40	-0.709**	-4.21
Kids	-0.056	-0.42	-0.276	-1.14
Married	0.093	0.57	0.349	1.10
Living Together	-0.168	-0.88	0.839*	2.09
Divorced/Separated	0.349	1.85	0.764*	2.36
Widow	-1.393	-1.37	-0.010	-0.01
High School	0.134	0.84	-0.252	-0.80
GED	0.074	0.37	0.868*	2.08
Some College	0.004	0.02	-0.116	-0.37
College Grad	0.019	0.07	0.420	0.80
Other Education	-0.320	-0.56	0.337	0.40
Constant	7.125**	6.88	7.929**	3.94
*** p< .05, ** p<.01**	**R-squared=.09**		**R-squared=.18**	

The results for males and females are almost identical to their counterpart logistic regressions. It is also notable that the results for males are very similar to those of the original model, however the influences for females do not look anything like the full model. Whereas some of the extralegal factors are influential in the OLS

model (other race and Hispanic) looking at just females reveals no significant influence by illegitimate factors, which suggests that the effect of these variables on males is what is driving the overall effects. However, these differences should be further investigated because the differences between the samples do not reach the threshold of statistical significance. Another striking difference is the magnitude of the effect of the number of filing charges. Whereas an increase in the number of filing charges results in a reduction in the potential sentence 23 months for males, it only translates to an 8 month reduction for females, a difference that is statistically significant. Perhaps this is indicative of overcharging by prosecutors for men, leading to greater reductions in order to compensate and provide a more realistic sentences after the initial charging stage, especially since increases in the number of final charges is still a disadvantage for males, but advantageous for females.

Table 12: OLS Regression of Age Categories

Variable	Age 17-29 (n= 16,745) Coefficient	(t)	Age 30-49 (n= 20,338) Coefficient	(t)	Age 50+ (n=4,176) Coefficient	(t)
Age	0.076*	2.42	-0.027*	-2.02	-0.045*	-2.07
Male	1.564**	5.92	0.665**	3.29	-0.045	-0.12
Black	-0.102	-0.42	-0.049	-0.26	0.344	0.96
Other Race	-1.052*	-1.97	-0.464	-1.13	-0.165	-0.25
Hispanic	-1.281**	-4.74	-0.129	-0.61	-0.514	-1.26
Prisoner Offense	1.871	0.29	2.926	0.93	6.615	0.82
Property Offense	-1.705**	-3.35	-0.503	-1.28	0.693	0.94
Drug Offense	-1.739**	-3.67	-0.328	-0.86	1.741*	2.32
Public Order Offense	-2.331**	-3.52	-0.590	-1.31	0.530	0.68
Weapon Offense	-1.870**	-3.68	-0.018	-0.04	0.694	0.82
Immigration Offense	-2.445**	-4.18	-1.314**	-2.85	0.006	0.01
Offense Severity	-0.693**	-12.81	-0.674**	-15.26	-0.871**	-11.24
Criminal History	-0.065	-1.03	0.100*	2.16	0.117	1.15
Sole Defendant	-1.003**	-4.93	-0.882**	-5.11	0.536	1.74
# of Filing Charges	-2.287**	-15.04	-1.546**	-13.62	-0.683**	-3.68
# of Final Charges	0.341*	2.47	0.104	1.03	-0.365*	-2.23
Kids	0.118	0.58	-0.568**	-3.35	0.017	0.06
Married	-0.287	-1.11	0.370	1.86	0.229	0.53
Living Together	0.112	0.42	-0.074	-0.29	-0.674	-1.09
Divorced/Separated	0.132	0.35	0.555**	2.62	0.194	0.44
Widow	-0.118	-0.03	-1.049	-1.12	-0.259	-0.30
High School	-0.001	0.00	0.153	0.77	0.042	0.11
GED	-0.117	-0.39	0.377	1.49	0.448	0.85
Some College	-0.447	-1.62	0.148	0.69	0.392	1.01
College Grad	0.021	0.03	0.173	0.57	0.087	0.22
Other Education	-0.257	-0.26	0.292	0.47	-2.173*	-2.11
Constant	5.623**	3.27	7.538**	5.56	6.274*	2.39
*** p< .05, ** p<.01**	**R-squared=.10**		**R-squared=.09**		**R-squared=.14**	

The OLS results for the age categories are similar to those of the logistic regression with the exception of the other race and Hispanic variables that were significant for determining the likelihood of a reduction but do not appear to matter in the magnitude of the change for individuals aged 30-49. What is interesting is how strong the influences are of all of the significant variables among the age 17-29 group, where being male translates into a year and a half increase in potential punishment compared to their female counterparts and being in the other race category and Hispanic are the equivalent of a little over a year less than Whites and non-Hispanics. Whereas significance tests found no differences across the models

with respect to the other race variable, influence of Hispanic does reach statistical significance, supporting the idea that it is influential in the processing of defendants ages 17-29 but not 30-49. The magnitude of the male effect is statistically significant across all three age categories, suggesting a significant interaction between age and gender.

Also noteworthy is the effect of age. Although in the full OLS model the age variable was not significant this could be due to the directional differences among the different age groups, which may be supportive of the curvilinear effect of age discussed in the logistic results. In the 17-29 age group, increasing in age each year translates into about an additional month per year whereas in the 30-49 and 50+ categories increasing in age each year returns only minute decreases in potential sentences. Statistical tests reveal that the influence of age within the age 17-29 category is significantly larger than the other two age groups. Whereas the magnitude of these changes may appear inconsequential, the potential increase in punishment between the ages of 17-29 can add up to be substantially more than their counterparts in the other age categories. Again, it appears that the older a defendant is the less important factors other than age become in influencing their possible punishment.

Lastly, while the influence of the legally relevant variable of offense severity is consistent throughout these models and with the logistic regression models, the criminal history variable is very inconsistent. This variable is only a disadvantage in the processing of females and individuals age 30-49.

Chapter 5: Conclusions

The above results indicate support for both of the research hypotheses. Prosecutors are allowing illegitimate factors to influence their decisions to offer charge reductions, the size of the reductions, and, more importantly there is some evidence that they are using these decisions differentially across different groups of individuals and in varying magnitudes. There are a few main findings that emerged from this research that are worth mentioning, some of which concur with prior research and some of which do not. The most consistent result from these analyses reveals that being male is a disadvantage for receiving a charge reduction and for the amount of the reduction, both in the general models and across most of the sub-samples. This finding is contrary to the majority of charge reduction research which has found no main effect for gender. A surprising result that emerged was that models in which Hispanic was influential it was actually beneficial in the charge reductions. Although this finding may be unanticipated, it is not unfounded within the literature. Within the charging and sentencing realms the conclusions on being Hispanic are varied, with many studies finding no significance (Bernstein et al., 1977 Holmes et al., 1987; chart in Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001) and when significance was found the magnitude of the effect was small (see chart in Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001). One of the reasons for this inconsistency could be the way in which Hispanic is being used in regression models. This is the first study within the charging literature that separated Hispanic out as an ethnicity variable and did not combine it with the other races. This was because there were members of each race category that were also identified as Hispanic. Therefore, this study can be viewed as the first to look at the

effect of being Hispanic independent of one's race. Perhaps this result ensued because the Hispanic variable is confounded by the race variable and perhaps the advantage is actually tied to being White.

It is noteworthy to mention that one of the most consistent findings was that charge severity matters significantly in all of the models and stands out as one of the most influential factors. This is promising in a broader sense because it supports that legal factors are the most influential in decision making. What may be surprising is the direction of the effect, with the likelihood of charge reductions increasing as offense severity increases. However, I suggest that this could be due to the fact that the more serious the original charge the more room there is for movement, whereas being originally charged with a crime that has a maximum of one year leaves many fewer crimes to be pled down to. The departure literature points to another possible explanation in which the prosecutors could offer large reductions for more severe offenses in order to avoid overly punitive punishments (Kramer & Ulmer, 2002). On the other hand, whereas the legal factor of criminal history was significant in the overall models its significance was very inconsistent across sub-samples, which should probably be further investigated.

Anyone can look at the previous results section and uncover what the numbers mean for these specific statistical models, but what is more important is what they mean in the grand scheme of things. Why is this research important and how does it influence future research and policy? These areas are where I believe the strength of this research lies. After looking at the magnitude of the effects found, one may begin to question the substantive importance of this research. Additionally, since the

magnitudes do not differ much from the other research in this area, the question could be asked if this area of research is important to investigate. I believe that the answer is yes, mainly because while this research has highlighted many problems and voids in this charging research, it has also showed support for the hypotheses and suggests direction for future research.

First of all, it seems from comparisons between this research and the previous literature that using a continuous dependent variable representing the magnitude of change is most beneficial. When comparing the logistic results to the OLS results this point becomes much clearer. There is not much difference in the significance and/or direction of the effects between the two types of analyses. However, the OLS results present a more substantive difference. Whereas the dichotomized dependent variable shows some variation between sub-samples, the OLS results show greater differences and allow more tangible differences to be uncovered by looking at the specific size of the effects. For example, whereas about 119 Hispanics receive charge reductions per 100 non-Hispanic reductions, on average the reductions of Hispanics are also 7 months more than the reductions of non-Hispanics. The benefit of the continuous dependent variable is also seen in the many more significant interactions that emerge in the OLS results compared to the logistic results. Using a continuous dependent variable allows differential processing to be captured through magnitude even when similarly situated individuals are being treated the same in direction.

The illumination of differential processing is a major accomplishment from this research. Although the specific differences of individual variables between sub-samples has already been discussed, there is another way to highlight this problem

that may be more telling. Despite the fact that the same model was used in each analysis, there is a wide range of R-squared values between sub-samples. This suggests that different factors are predicting the behavior of prosecutors towards different individuals. For example, the variables that only predict 9% of the variance for males predict twice that (18%) for females. Additionally, it appears that these models are predicting less of the variance for the groups that are stereotypically thought to be disadvantaged (i.e. males and blacks) suggesting that we may not be capturing the variables in which the stereotypes are manifesting. Therefore, not only are these variables predicting outcomes in very inconsistent patterns, they show that we know much less about certain groups which points to huge need for more research.

In the larger picture, the R-square values in charge reduction research, including the current analysis, is very telling about the direction of future research. Overall, charge reduction research is explaining very little variance in the dependent variable (ranging from .09 to .24) (Bernstein et al., 1977; Holmes et al., 1987). In the current research, some of this is presumed to be due to the lack of evidence variables. However, even research that does include some evidence controls is still not producing large R-squares (Holmes et al., 1987). Therefore, perhaps charge reduction research efforts need concentrate on developing better models to uncover what is driving these decisions. When compared to sentencing models using many of the same models the R-square values appear lower in the charging literature (Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2001; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Albonetti, 1997),

suggesting that different factors are influential at the charging stage of case processing.

In addition to finding better models, this research did highlight some other avenues for future research. Although jurisdictional differences were not a focus in this research, the models suggest that it should be. There was a lot of variation in the significance of the district variables and the magnitude of the coefficients. This suggests that decision making processes may vary greatly by jurisdiction, which should not be the case within the Federal system, and also may help explain the inconsistent conclusions among charging literature since most have been district specific. Most importantly, future research should seek to substantiate these findings. As previously mentioned, charging research within the Federal system, using all offenses and jurisdictions, and separating race and ethnicity has not been done prior to the current project. Therefore, before any of the results can be used for policy changes the results must be replicated. Additionally, it is no secret that the ultimate interest in charging research is how it is going to affect the ultimate sentence of an individual. While this research highlights the amount of change a prosecutor is willing to allow, future research should use the benefits of this data and continue to follow these cases through sentencing to see how these charging decisions ultimately play out. Finally, this research helps to highlight some possible interactions that may be worth investigating. Specifically, interactions between criminal history and gender, gender and age, ethnicity and age, ethnicity and race, and criminal history and age appear to have some merit based on the above results. Investigating these

influences with interaction regression modeling can add to another void in the literature.

Theoretically, this research lends credence to attribution theory and the focal concerns perspective. Although each of the avenues of potential differential processing were not found to be significant, there is still substantial support. Specifically, the full sample models show that some race, ethnicity, and gender effects are influential in the decision making process. In addition, some of the interactions suggest that the use of both the extralegal variables and legal variables vary by sub-group, and even when their use is consistent across samples, the magnitude of the influence fluctuates. These results are supportive of the theories because some of the influential factors are those that are not permitted for use in decision making processes, but clearly are being used. In addition, some of the effects are found to support stereotypes, specifically young, males receiving less charge reductions. However, it should be noted that other stereotypes, specifically regarding blacks, are not supported. Findings supportive of stereotypes confirm the literature on the causal attribution process, but some of the results appear to point toward some focal concerns outside of offender blameworthiness, which support the development of attribution theory into the focal concerns perspective. Specifically, some defendant characteristics are likely to speak to perceptions of the offenders' likelihood of surviving in prison (i.e. gender), which may be directly linked to charge reductions in this research that specifically lower the potential maximum sentences.

It is also worth noting that there was very little consistent significant effects among the other control variables (namely education, marital status, etc.). This

suggests that the causal attributions most often cited in these theories (gender, race, and age), and which are consistently found to be influential in the research, are likely to be those operating in decision making most often. Lastly, some of the interaction effects supported in this research, specifically those between criminal history and the extralegal variables, in conjunction with the departure literature addressed, show some support for a focal concern of prosecutors that may not influence other courtroom actors. These interactions could be indicative of prosecutors trying to adjust sentences that they believe would be overly punitive if reductions were not awarded. Having additional variables measuring that would show the lack of knowledge available to the prosecutor (such as strength of evidence), which would further contribute to reliance on these attributions, would be more beneficial in testing these theoretical ideas, but they seem to have merit.

It appears by comparing the results of this research to the results of previous literature that extralegal factors are operating within the system and that their influences are expanding beyond the decision making of judges. Therefore, it seems plausible that the theoretical justifications of judges' decision making through attribution theory and focal concerns can also be expanded to prosecutorial decisions. This theoretical expansion will be beneficial in helping to understand the processes operating early on in case processing and the influence of these decisions on later processing. Finding support for theories are applicable across stages of case processing is beneficial to the field, and the current research has contributed to this expansion.

Just like all research, the current research has some limitations. The biggest problem is the potential for omitted variable bias. As already noted there is a lack of evidence variables, which one would like to believe would be very influential in the plea bargaining/charge reduction process. Also, this data lacked employment variables which have been used in some of the other charge reduction literature as controls. Finally, as previously discussed, this research intended to use a control for the type of legal counsel, but was unable.

Although the conclusions of this research are not yet corroborated to make drastic changes to the current system, they do suggest policy implications. The public wants prosecutors to be held accountable for their decisions. This research helps to do that and does support the public suspicion that defendant characteristics may influence prosecutorial decision making, although not always in the expected direction. However, this research also shows that the legal factors in a case are the most influential and that perhaps the abuse of discretion is not as severe as some think. This is not to say that the conclusions regarding differential processing and the use of illegitimate factors should not result in policy change. These findings suggest that prosecutors are clearly going against the current policies which specifically state which factors can and cannot be used in charging and plea bargaining decisions. Equally as important is the need for policies that prevent differential processing and allow similarly situated defendants on legal factors to be similarly treated. Therefore, more scrutiny and overseeing of prosecutorial charging decisions is necessary. Whereas the magnitude of these results may not affect the legitimacy of the system from the public perspective as much as originally anticipated, from an offender's

point of view these results can significantly impact perceptions of legitimacy. This is especially true because these findings show offenders that some of the processing decisions made in their cases are based on their appearances and the stereotypes that the system allows to prevail. Therefore, policies are needed to curb this problem.

The current research paints a general picture of how extralegal factors are being used within the Federal system. It suggests that illegitimate factors are influential in the charging decisions of prosecutors and, more disturbingly, are being used differentially among certain groups of individuals. While some may question the substantive importance of the magnitude of these findings I am sure any offender that was asked whether they would rather spend 8 months in jail versus a year and nine months the response would be the former. And unfortunately, in some instances this difference is influenced by defendant characteristics as opposed to legal case characteristics. As telling as this research has been in uncovering the current injustices within the system, it also uncovered weaknesses in charging research in general and highlights areas for improvement and the need for future research.

Appendices

Appendix A: Results for District Variables

Logistic Regression: Full Model

District	Coefficient	z
Maine	-.822882	-1.75
Mass	-.6856757	-1.99
Newhamp	-1.058996	-2.00
Rhodeisl	-2.301736	-2.19
P_rico	-.6830494	-2.13
Conn	-.1964606	-0.55
ny_n	-1.917414	-3.93
ny_e	.8648851	3.32
ny_s	-.4169548	-1.53
ny_w	.1905853	0.64
vermont	.3675414	1.01
del	.1211593	0.27
jersey	-.5513037	-1.76
penn_e	-1.000291	-3.36
penn_m	.2613651	0.87
penn_w	-.4055324	-1.17
maryland	-.3759838	-1.25
ncar_e	-.6792377	-2.17
ncar_m	-.3156732	-1.02
ncar_w	-.4888906	-1.61
scar	.2471721	0.90
virg_e	-.7044995	-2.59
virg_w	-.5931588	-1.84
wvirg_n	-.5736351	-1.56
wvirg_s	.0200785	0.07
alab_n	-1.472241	-3.59
alab_m	-.2475494	-0.65
alab_s	.6554987	2.19
flor_n	-1.067044	-2.74
flor_m	-.5567078	-2.01
flor_s	.5144023	2.00
georg_n	-.0261632	-0.09
georg_m	-.0522192	-0.17
georg_s	-.3822988	-1.11
louis_e	-.1267731	-0.41
louis_w	.068406	0.21
miss_n	-.6836212	-1.61
miss_s	-.0785009	-0.26
texas_n	.1310295	0.49

District	Coefficient	z
texas_e	.2537788	0.90
texas_s	-.113589	-0.44
texas_w	.6569666	2.57
kent_e	-.9646599	-3.15
kent_w	-1.555495	-3.48
mich_e	-.1158261	-0.41
mich_w	.340455	1.10
ohio_n	-.1396467	-0.51
ohio_s	-.335709	-1.03
tenn_e	-.6497232	-2.15
tenn_m	-.6565701	-1.89
tenn_w	.1086938	0.35
illin_n	.4209794	1.53
illin_c	-1.220046	-3.08
illin_s	-2.903407	-3.85
indi_n	-.3715592	-1.10
indi_s	-.8043543	-1.80
wisc_e	.2729579	0.87
wisc_w	-.5853533	-1.30
ark_e	.4571894	1.43
ark_w	-1.03116	-1.79
iowa_n	-.6053897	-1.70
iowa_s	-1.29802	-3.43
minn	.5178675	1.76
misso_e	-.4738798	-1.53
misso_w	-.2875344	-1.00
nebraska	-.8725427	-2.69
ndakota	.0848292	0.22
sdakota	.7780531	2.49
arizona	-.2127826	-0.79
cali_n	.8233541	2.97
cali_e	.761109	2.69
cali_c	-.1827483	-0.68
cali_s	.1773394	0.64
hawaii	-.4120495	-1.27
idaho	.0823394	0.19
montana	.0834239	0.25
nevada	-.5745518	-1.70
oregon	.7355245	2.39
wash_e	.1208528	0.36
wash_w	-.6586741	-2.14
colorado	-.2641851	-0.87
kansas	-.0045874	-0.02
newmex	-.7683773	-2.63
okla_n	.0517369	0.12

District	Coefficient	z
okla_e	-.0597299	-0.14
okla_w	.0183979	0.05
utah	-.0764252	-0.22
wyoming	.1032933	0.26
virg_isl	-.760547	-0.95
guam	-.41143	-0.74
alaska	-.4040998	-1.03
louis_m	-.315164	-0.75

Logistic Regression: Black Model

District	Coefficient	z
Mass	-.9961368	-1.82
p_rico	.0598227	0.13
Conn	-.5335219	-1.14
ny_n	-1.667923	-2.53
ny_e	1.497301	5.13
ny_s	-.3018811	-0.93
ny_w	.0974149	0.28
Vermont	.5355887	0.54
Del	.2431307	0.49
Jersey	-.5490955	-1.36
penn_e	-1.079907	-3.10
penn_m	.3639097	0.95
penn_w	-.7729737	-1.71
Maryland	-.3602156	-1.10
ncar_e	-1.177304	-2.83
ncar_m	-.2923266	-0.81
ncar_w	-.4787389	-1.40
Scar	.0189802	0.06
virg_e	-1.114732	-3.73
virg_w	-1.229729	-2.66
wvirg_n	-2.002476	-2.54
wvirg_s	-.3879302	-0.95
alab_n	-1.712839	-3.21
alab_m	-.474483	-0.91
alab_s	.6366792	1.89
flor_n	-.8836236	-1.75
flor_m	-.5791494	-1.70
flor_s	.5310313	1.84
georg_n	-.5988826	-1.75
georg_m	-.6061147	-1.59
georg_s	-.2446696	-0.66
louis_e	-.544355	-1.52
louis_w	.166126	0.46

District	Coefficient	z
miss_n	-.7576677	-1.47
miss_s	-.1352653	-0.38
texas_n	-.3485611	-1.02
texas_e	-.0648526	-0.20
texas_s	-.8158025	-2.38
texas_w	-.0423433	-0.12
kent_e	-1.828696	-3.12
kent_w	-1.913013	-2.88
mich_e	-.5480882	-1.67
mich_w	-.0061504	-0.01
ohio_n	-.4520614	-1.39
ohio_s	-.4757799	-1.14
tenn_e	-.6589946	-1.59
tenn_m	-.7367123	-1.76
tenn_w	.0092739	0.03
illin_n	.2144818	0.66
illin_c	-1.722187	-2.92
illin_s	-3.122925	-3.00
indi_n	-.528085	-1.37
indi_s	-.5546831	-0.93
wisc_e	-.509005	-1.19
wisc_w	-.3147447	-0.39
ark_e	.5985077	1.54
ark_w	-1.918958	-1.79
Minn	.2361859	0.60
misso_e	-.4595102	-1.29
misso_w	-1.103174	-2.48
Nebraska	-1.19046	-2.01
Ndakota	.5897331	0.63
Sdakota	.3121843	0.25
Arizona	.4109479	0.86
cali_n	.9003791	2.62
cali_e	.8061137	1.63
cali_c	-.2402056	-0.72
cali_s	.6224187	1.36
Idaho	2.258675	1.56
Montana	-.3303363	-0.30
Nevada	-.3980357	-0.60
Oregon	.3209475	0.52
wash_e	-.2003286	-0.24
wash_w	-1.317079	-1.97
Colorado	-1.035916	-1.89
Kansas	.1854038	0.48
Newmex	-.7104818	-1.01
okla_e	.8189589	1.06

District	Coefficient	z
okla_w	-.3630707	-0.73
Utah	.7503487	1.03
virg_isl	-.7941327	-0.74
Alaska	-1.113939	-1.37
louis_m	-.8244113	-1.40

Logistic Regression: White Model

District	Coefficient	z
maine	.3165429	0.28
mass	.3201167	0.29
newhamp	.1344563	0.12
rhodeisl	-.9025725	-0.61
p_rico	.0885661	0.08
conn	1.051024	0.95
ny_n	-1.123086	-0.94
ny_e	1.476007	1.40
ny_s	.6032092	0.57
ny_w	1.154707	1.08
vermont	1.389616	1.28
del	.218012	0.15
jersey	.4827392	0.45
penn_e	.0208508	0.02
penn_m	1.105184	1.03
penn_w	.8352621	0.76
maryland	.1962447	0.18
ncar_e	.7529425	0.70
ncar_m	.5738425	0.53
ncar_w	.2814264	0.26
scar	1.420446	1.34
virg_e	.8490826	0.80
virg_w	.7268457	0.68
wvirg_n	.8489351	0.78
wvirg_s	1.189552	1.11
alab_n	-.2826403	-0.25
alab_m	.8680465	0.78
alab_s	1.406686	1.29
flor_n	-.2059746	-0.18
flor_m	.4615431	0.44
flor_s	1.517186	1.45
georg_n	1.232857	1.16
georg_m	1.508728	1.39
georg_s	-.6959349	-0.55
louis_e	1.552962	1.43
louis_w	.5539173	0.49

District	Coefficient	z
miss_n	.246939	0.21
miss_s	.967575	0.89
texas_n	1.306568	1.24
texas_e	1.493256	1.40
texas_s	1.001878	0.96
texas_w	1.721545	1.64
kent_e	.2321742	0.22
kent_w	-.4156575	-0.36
mich_e	1.188421	1.12
mich_w	1.422455	1.33
ohio_n	1.045766	0.99
ohio_s	.7827164	0.72
tenn_e	.3293224	0.31
tenn_m	.2185797	0.20
tenn_w	1.021086	0.94
illin_n	1.487675	1.41
illin_c	.1141382	0.10
illin_s	-1.758991	-1.21
indi_n	.82449	0.74
indi_s	-.0426964	-0.04
wisc_e	1.703936	1.58
wisc_w	.3158169	0.28
ark_e	1.315022	1.21
ark_w	.3142722	0.26
iowa_n	.5266114	0.49
iowa_s	-.0614389	-0.06
minn	1.104391	1.03
misso_e	.4228721	0.39
misso_w	.976952	0.92
nebraska	.2383805	0.22
ndakota	1.118642	1.00
sdakota	2.171191	2.02
arizona	.7964237	0.76
cali_n	1.834996	1.73
cali_e	1.796386	1.70
cali_c	.7702981	0.73
cali_s	1.111877	1.06
hawaii	.630234	0.57
idaho	1.008623	0.90
montana	1.157826	1.07
nevada	.4935364	0.46
oregon	1.865375	1.75
wash_e	.880476	0.81
wash_w	.462036	0.43
colorado	.827156	0.78

District	Coefficient	z
kansas	.8359283	0.79
newmex	.1520513	0.14
okla_n	1.502993	1.35
okla_e	.9444542	0.84
okla_w	1.223607	1.13
utah	.7615473	0.70
wyoming	1.207606	1.10
virg_isl	.4903643	0.32
alaska	.8757093	0.79
louis_m	1.154448	1.01

Logistic Regression: Other Race Model

District	Coefficient	z
mass	.2568372	0.15
ny_e	-.5209223	-0.33
ny_s	-1.70762	-1.13
vermont	.7806353	0.36
penn_m	.1907365	0.12
ncar_e	-1.801035	-1.00
virg_e	-1.218025	-0.76
alab_s	-.0258622	-0.01
flor_s	-.8581716	-0.53
georg_n	1.481371	0.89
louis_e	.0245248	0.01
texas_n	-.4940778	-0.30
texas_e	-.2353257	-0.14
texas_s	-.7744687	-0.49
mich_e	.787307	0.44
mich_w	1.158019	0.71
illin_n	.1052103	0.07
wisc_e	.640624	0.40
wisc_w	-.7826304	-0.44
minn	2.105418	1.39
ndakota	-.3259658	-0.21
sdakota	.2632669	0.18
arizona	-.6558929	-0.44
cali_n	-.0395926	-0.03
cali_e	.2435194	0.16
cali_c	-.3768629	-0.26
cali_s	.8856583	0.57
hawaii	-.8684855	-0.60
idaho	-.1545284	-0.09
montana	-.1276174	-0.09
nevada	-1.383723	-0.78
oregon	-.2851613	-0.15

District	Coefficient	z
wash_e	1.460298	0.90
wash_w	-.9088139	-0.59
colorado	.9242981	0.57
kansas	.6369278	0.41
newmex	-.1948769	-0.13
okla_n	.2786078	0.17
okla_w	-1.071395	-0.59
utah	-.3463482	-0.22
wyoming	-.4314575	-0.23
guam	-.6062647	-0.39
alaska	-1.206406	-0.67

Logistic Regression: Hispanic Model

District	Coefficient	z
mass	16.88158	11.77
newhamp	16.4677	10.29
p_rico	17.2523	13.86
conn	18.56793	14.14
ny_n	16.74157	11.69
ny_e	18.97136	15.41
ny_s	17.51513	14.16
ny_w	18.16856	14.05
vermont	17.99024	10.70
jersey	17.60118	13.87
penn_e	16.45662	12.55
penn_m	17.6003	12.76
penn_w	17.55423	10.81
maryland	16.79682	11.72
ncar_e	17.29566	12.91
ncar_m	17.67104	13.67
ncar_w	17.65698	13.39
scar	19.00283	13.65
virg_e	17.41426	13.39
virg_w	16.5722	10.36
wvirg_n	21.16393	9.46
wvirg_s	19.67305	13.99
alab_s	18.88127	13.79
flor_m	16.87436	13.39
flor_s	18.65609	15.19
georg_n	18.54835	14.83
georg_s	17.929	10.95
louis_e	16.73839	10.44
texas_n	18.21312	14.69
texas_e	18.63157	14.66
texas_s	17.86228	14.56

District	Coefficient	z
texas_w	18.64566	15.22
mich_e	17.80819	13.65
mich_w	18.48351	14.22
ohio_n	18.81235	14.91
tenn_e	15.71551	9.81
tenn_w	18.01094	12.53
illin_n	18.83717	15.14
illin_c	16.98982	10.43
wisc_e	18.47677	14.31
ark_e	19.09523	13.52
ark_w	18.96079	13.64
iowa_n	17.71646	13.42
iowa_s	16.42855	12.04
minn	17.89897	13.78
misso_e	16.57651	10.38
misso_w	17.81268	13.85
nebraska	16.92717	13.27
ndakota	17.77357	10.94
sdakota	19.81793	13.75
arizona	17.68988	14.38
cali_n	18.99719	15.26
cali_e	19.2598	15.52
cali_c	17.58581	14.20
cali_s	18.25064	14.79
hawaii	17.61091	13.31
idaho	18.5666	13.96
montana	17.33907	10.46
nevada	17.33802	13.22
oregon	19.50432	15.26
wash_e	17.56108	13.56
wash_w	16.94082	13.26
colorado	17.69022	14.02
kansas	17.92268	14.09
newmex	16.73463	13.46
okla_w	17.28212	11.85
utah	17.96082	13.09
wyoming	18.69606	13.89
virg_isl	17.91279	10.81
alaska	18.18275	13.08
louis_m	17.97686	10.62

Logistic Regression: Non-Hispanic

District	Coefficient	z
maine	-.8614186	-1.81
mass	-.7698745	-2.15

District	Coefficient	z
newhamp	-1.100464	-1.88
rhodeisl	-1.833833	-1.74
p_rico	.1440039	0.29
conn	-.6079889	-1.49
ny_n	-2.215166	-3.87
ny_e	.6785019	2.49
ny_s	-.5479262	-1.89
ny_w	.0499778	0.16
vermont	.2614616	0.70
del	.0410783	0.09
jersey	-.7649502	-2.22
penn_e	-1.097274	-3.55
penn_m	.1690821	0.54
penn_w	-.5822034	-1.63
maryland	-.4738386	-1.54
ncar_e	-.842197	-2.58
ncar_m	-.4580227	-1.40
ncar_w	-.7253963	-2.29
scar	.0171143	0.06
virg_e	-.9181566	-3.30
virg_w	-.7178969	-2.18
wvirg_n	-.8318269	-2.20
wvirg_s	-.2327983	-0.73
alab_n	-1.600732	-3.87
alab_m	-.4344058	-1.12
alab_s	.4232337	1.37
flor_n	-1.179369	-2.99
flor_m	-.5547588	-1.92
flor_s	.3237776	1.20
georg_n	-.3970921	-1.31
georg_m	-.1841301	-0.58
georg_s	-.6166476	-1.75
louis_e	-.2417998	-0.77
louis_w	-.0680564	-0.21
miss_n	-.8446883	-1.98
miss_s	-.2091623	-0.67
texas_n	-.0628372	-0.22
texas_e	.024083	0.08
texas_s	-.411932	-1.43
texas_w	.1292107	0.46
kent_e	-1.105107	-3.54
kent_w	-1.693404	-3.74
mich_e	-.3184301	-1.10
mich_w	.1744092	0.54
ohio_n	-.4794306	-1.67

District	Coefficient	z
ohio_s	-.4287042	-1.29
tenn_e	-.7238967	-2.34
tenn_m	-.7389646	-2.08
tenn_w	-.0909604	-0.29
illin_n	.0738047	0.25
illin_c	-1.407386	-3.41
illin_s	-3.028159	-4.00
indi_n	-.42764	-1.25
indi_s	-.9269877	-2.04
wisc_e	.1226294	0.37
wisc_w	-.565515	-1.25
ark_e	.2235516	0.68
ark_w	-2.486461	-2.38
iowa_n	-.8067889	-2.05
iowa_s	-1.309437	-3.18
minn	.4755292	1.55
misso_e	-.5595086	-1.77
misso_w	-.4581295	-1.54
nebraska	-.8930982	-2.48
ndakota	.0104493	0.03
sdakota	.6062302	1.88
arizona	-.1584472	-0.53
cali_n	.6047728	2.06
cali_e	.2974605	0.95
cali_c	-.2256059	-0.81
cali_s	.0092174	0.03
hawaii	-.5835721	-1.69
idaho	-.3680045	-0.65
montana	.009144	0.03
nevada	-.7501164	-2.06
oregon	.3862331	1.16
wash_e	.1630747	0.43
wash_w	-.6582038	-2.00
colorado	-.3858025	-1.16
kansas	-.1276353	-0.42
newmex	-.1393054	-0.42
okla_n	-.0713698	-0.17
okla_e	-.2623832	-0.61
okla_w	-.065121	-0.19
utah	-.2043924	-0.57
wyoming	-.2645217	-0.57
virg_isl	-1.167576	-1.08
guam	-.536992	-0.95
alaska	-.6780878	-1.58
louis_m	-.5250894	-1.20

Logistic Regression: Male Model

District	Coefficient	z
maine	-.8872729	-1.85
mass	-.7038725	-1.97
newhamp	-.8995517	-1.68
rhodeisl	-2.390899	-2.27
p_rico	-.8142773	-2.39
conn	-.6782591	-1.66
ny_n	-1.980635	-3.75
ny_e	.5393863	1.98
ny_s	-.6630176	-2.33
ny_w	-.0579543	-0.18
vermont	.3153678	0.81
del	.1816862	0.37
jersey	-.8374689	-2.44
penn_e	-1.140033	-3.69
penn_m	.0689591	0.21
penn_w	-.394838	-1.10
maryland	-.4781459	-1.54
ncar_e	-.7580905	-2.30
ncar_m	-.4490558	-1.39
ncar_w	-.5150297	-1.65
scar	.023375	0.08
virg_e	-.9364807	-3.30
virg_w	-.6788446	-2.01
wvirg_n	-.7507398	-1.80
wvirg_s	-.0902429	-0.28
alab_n	-1.851109	-3.97
alab_m	-.420386	-1.00
alab_s	.6208535	1.96
flor_n	-1.518009	-3.40
flor_m	-.8292067	-2.84
flor_s	.258677	0.96
georg_n	-.1088688	-0.37
georg_m	-.1520331	-0.46
georg_s	-.4605516	-1.30
louis_e	-.6450242	-1.88
louis_w	-.070842	-0.21
miss_n	-.8785228	-1.91
miss_s	-.2299389	-0.72
texas_n	-.0719749	-0.26
texas_e	.0112313	0.04
texas_s	-.2644606	-0.98
texas_w	.5018437	1.89
kent_e	-1.048216	-3.24

District	Coefficient	z
kent_w	-1.535434	-3.36
mich_e	-.3374506	-1.12
mich_w	.0958156	0.28
ohio_n	-.3148576	-1.09
ohio_s	-.3738596	-1.09
tenn_e	-.8018986	-2.54
tenn_m	-1.117195	-2.87
tenn_w	.0301696	0.09
illin_n	.258826	0.90
illin_c	-1.584878	-3.50
illin_s	-2.878635	-3.79
indi_n	-.7725804	-2.09
indi_s	-.8758441	-1.85
wisc_e	.1022195	0.31
wisc_w	-.5961679	-1.31
ark_e	.3650557	1.09
ark_w	-.9826262	-1.68
iowa_n	-.6560176	-1.75
iowa_s	-1.494419	-3.64
minn	.2599145	0.84
misso_e	-.6855374	-2.09
misso_w	-.4909249	-1.61
nebraska	-1.194918	-3.32
ndakota	-.0482781	-0.12
sdakota	.5564123	1.63
arizona	-.4116902	-1.47
cali_n	.5826824	2.00
cali_e	.5736967	1.93
cali_c	-.3621094	-1.30
cali_s	-.0354964	-0.12
hawaii	-.54797	-1.54
idaho	.1808133	0.40
montana	-.0078754	-0.02
nevada	-.8123597	-2.26
oregon	.6374714	1.97
wash_e	-.1772605	-0.47
wash_w	-.7672261	-2.38
colorado	-.5264109	-1.62
kansas	-.2449521	-0.80
newmex	-1.048923	-3.35
okla_n	.2803924	0.65
okla_e	-.0305776	-0.07
okla_w	-.1927918	-0.52
utah	-.301603	-0.82
wyoming	.3063783	0.72

District	Coefficient	z
virg_isl	-.8394404	-1.03
guam	-.9761952	-1.23
alaska	-.4480339	-1.09
louis_m	-.3699605	-0.84

Logistic Regression: Female Model

District	Coefficient	z
mass	-.5286358	-0.35
p_rico	.658011	0.56
conn	2.443725	2.08
ny_n	-.7092049	-0.48
ny_e	2.922088	2.69
ny_s	1.52415	1.37
ny_w	2.117689	1.87
vermont	1.193353	0.92
del	1.003381	0.67
jersey	1.330443	1.18
penn_e	.0336546	0.03
penn_m	1.870283	1.65
penn_w	-.3855988	-0.26
maryland	.2753224	0.21
ncar_e	.376602	0.31
ncar_m	1.063325	0.89
scar	2.020744	1.84
virg_e	1.239862	1.12
virg_w	.4627469	0.37
wvirg_n	1.026231	0.87
wvirg_s	1.237318	1.05
alab_n	.9910952	0.81
alab_m	1.348382	1.11
alab_s	1.958877	1.71
flor_n	1.527473	1.27
flor_m	1.411433	1.27
flor_s	2.333378	2.16
georg_n	.7633955	0.64
georg_m	1.340274	1.14
georg_s	.0603064	0.04
louis_e	2.744569	2.43
louis_w	1.581448	1.34
miss_n	1.16081	0.87
miss_s	1.512516	1.25
texas_n	1.933776	1.77
texas_e	2.095694	1.89
texas_s	1.296834	1.19
texas_w	2.092191	1.94

District	Coefficient	z
kent_e	.2037121	0.18
mich_e	1.571757	1.42
mich_w	2.173226	1.92
ohio_n	1.595502	1.44
ohio_s	.4743205	0.36
tenn_e	.8847606	0.75
tenn_m	2.03813	1.72
tenn_w	1.543555	1.33
illin_n	2.015006	1.81
illin_c	1.054881	0.87
indi_n	2.413786	2.08
indi_s	.277757	0.19
wisc_e	2.049361	1.77
ark_e	1.824682	1.52
iowa_n	.231722	0.18
iowa_s	.3207547	0.26
minn	2.58308	2.26
misso_e	1.441947	1.24
misso_w	1.346196	1.20
nebraska	1.112309	0.98
ndakota	1.345385	1.00
sdakota	2.642447	2.33
arizona	1.529429	1.39
cali_n	2.816017	2.53
cali_e	2.537728	2.24
cali_c	1.392966	1.27
cali_s	1.935904	1.74
hawaii	1.152472	1.00
idaho	.2926893	0.19
montana	1.232064	1.01
nevada	1.270412	1.06
oregon	2.082707	1.76
wash_e	2.063847	1.78
wash_w	.516343	0.43
colorado	1.637913	1.44
kansas	1.840496	1.64
newmex	1.117278	1.00
okla_e	1.035663	0.77
okla_w	1.738406	1.49
utah	1.925756	1.59
wyoming	.0490274	0.03
guam	1.8867	1.48
alaska	.3472228	0.23
louis_m	.636396	0.42

Logistic Regression: Ages 17-29

District	Coefficient	z
maine	-.27451	-0.37
mass	-.2486428	-0.43
newhamp	-1.900937	-1.72
p_rico	-1.011211	-1.82
conn	.1331298	0.22
ny_n	-2.067388	-2.48
ny_e	1.216779	2.80
ny_s	.1718985	0.38
ny_w	.3026746	0.60
vermont	.6508461	1.18
del	.5681355	0.83
jersey	-.433073	-0.82
penn_e	-.115229	-0.25
penn_m	.5177782	1.06
penn_w	.4703519	0.92
maryland	-.0028177	-0.01
ncar_e	-.8840862	-1.69
ncar_m	-.3886111	-0.79
ncar_w	-.2202686	-0.45
scar	.4925105	1.10
virg_e	-.4394046	-0.99
virg_w	-.3941523	-0.76
wvirg_n	-1.519597	-1.80
wvirg_s	.0106421	0.02
alab_n	-1.216921	-1.83
alab_m	-.5607859	-0.83
alab_s	.5575266	1.16
flor_n	-.8403625	-1.35
flor_m	-.8255284	-1.73
flor_s	.9187075	2.14
georg_n	.5071855	1.09
georg_m	.3821275	0.76
georg_s	-.095529	-0.18
louis_e	-.4236866	-0.80
louis_w	-.3285833	-0.58
miss_n	-.6811667	-1.01
miss_s	.2102541	0.43
texas_n	.1876816	0.42
texas_e	.5037348	1.10
texas_s	.1682872	0.39
texas_w	.7949722	1.88
kent_e	-.9061562	-1.69
kent_w	-1.290267	-1.76

District	Coefficient	z
mich_e	.2432478	0.52
mich_w	-.0000515	-0.00
ohio_n	.4390182	0.98
ohio_s	-.2544998	-0.47
tenn_e	-.8560598	-1.65
tenn_m	-.3283673	-0.57
tenn_w	.4800196	0.98
illin_n	.6731608	1.44
illin_c	-.9866861	-1.57
illin_s	-2.460829	-2.26
indi_n	-.17693	-0.33
indi_s	-.8880481	-1.06
wisc_e	.6882647	1.39
wisc_w	-.215088	-0.29
ark_e	1.086032	2.06
iowa_n	-.1961553	-0.34
iowa_s	-1.641548	-2.25
minn	.6008914	1.25
misso_e	-.3869571	-0.75
misso_w	-.3461501	-0.70
nebraska	-.5001797	-1.00
ndakota	-.4625426	-0.67
sdakota	.6567389	1.26
arizona	-.2927657	-0.66
cali_n	.751407	1.58
cali_e	1.167632	2.52
cali_c	.2214625	0.50
cali_s	.6432594	1.41
hawaii	-.7885003	-1.28
idaho	.0089326	0.01
montana	.4710665	0.92
nevada	-.6546436	-1.04
oregon	.6885901	1.27
wash_e	.1739112	0.32
wash_w	-.5478739	-1.08
colorado	.1093043	0.23
kansas	.2981418	0.63
newmex	-.9902812	-2.05
okla_n	.0832831	0.11
okla_e	-.4126891	-0.47
okla_w	-.8209073	-1.29
utah	.3290075	0.61
wyoming	.3291583	0.52
virg_isl	-.7223999	-0.62
alaska	-.4187322	-0.65

District	Coefficient	z
louis_m	-.0642859	-0.10

Logistic Regression: Ages 30-49

District	Coefficient	z
maine	-1.715581	-2.15
mass	-1.431124	-2.79
newhamp	-.6184479	-0.99
rhodeisl	-1.868514	-1.72
p_rico	-.6077163	-1.44
conn	-.6193841	-1.24
ny_n	-1.585955	-2.58
ny_e	.5277764	1.53
ny_s	-.9095853	-2.48
ny_w	.0655451	0.17
vermont	-.2270581	-0.39
del	-.0651975	-0.10
jersey	-.534381	-1.31
penn_e	-1.905488	-4.22
penn_m	-.0483843	-0.11
penn_w	-1.852569	-2.72
maryland	-.6618965	-1.58
ncar_e	-.6456973	-1.51
ncar_m	-.2183747	-0.51
ncar_w	-.7444007	-1.80
scar	-.0522345	-0.14
virg_e	-.9230243	-2.53
virg_w	-.9049741	-1.97
wvirg_n	-.488023	-1.04
wvirg_s	-.0766674	-0.18
alab_n	-2.178501	-3.24
alab_m	-.0812568	-0.17
alab_s	.7907615	1.94
flor_n	-1.081193	-2.01
flor_m	-.6562897	-1.77
flor_s	.2235045	0.66
georg_n	-.4701676	-1.22
georg_m	-.3936142	-0.91
georg_s	-.6527824	-1.34
louis_e	.0349972	0.09
louis_w	.1029349	0.24
miss_n	-.6398402	-1.08
miss_s	-.2266051	-0.53
texas_n	-.1778349	-0.50
texas_e	.0703073	0.18
texas_s	-.5197892	-1.50

District	Coefficient	z
texas_w	.4221999	1.25
kent_e	-1.194646	-2.90
kent_w	-1.564413	-2.71
mich_e	-.3653563	-0.97
mich_w	.2982339	0.72
ohio_n	-.6544064	-1.72
ohio_s	-.4517296	-1.03
tenn_e	-.4530661	-1.15
tenn_m	-.972318	-2.07
tenn_w	-.1171054	-0.27
illin_n	.4054956	1.13
illin_c	-1.561036	-2.71
illin_s	-3.124491	-2.95
indi_n	-.6645143	-1.39
indi_s	-1.188909	-1.76
wisc_e	-.0406121	-0.09
wisc_w	-.6880268	-1.10
ark_e	-.1499257	-0.34
ark_w	-.4188613	-0.67
iowa_n	-1.206168	-2.33
iowa_s	-1.31985	-2.72
minn	.3734255	0.94
misso_e	-.4838079	-1.20
misso_w	-.2715205	-0.73
nebraska	-1.180877	-2.55
ndakota	.433195	0.87
sdakota	.8349306	1.98
arizona	-.2541099	-0.72
cali_n	.7347074	2.04
cali_e	.4409054	1.15
cali_c	-.5071376	-1.42
cali_s	-.097494	-0.26
hawaii	-.5450975	-1.28
idaho	.1146012	0.18
montana	-.2796929	-0.59
nevada	-.4788313	-1.13
oregon	.855362	2.14
wash_e	-.1704238	-0.37
wash_w	-.8802998	-2.11
colorado	-.6234958	-1.48
kansas	-.1323694	-0.34
newmex	-.645623	-1.67
okla_n	-.1376441	-0.25
okla_e	-.1072765	-0.19
okla_w	.4148627	0.96

District	Coefficient	z
utah	-.3656231	-0.78
wyoming	-.5070367	-0.81
virg_isl	-.3231532	-0.29
guam	-.0919458	-0.15
alaska	-.4272136	-0.81
louis_m	-1.92499	-1.80

Logistic Regression: Ages 50+

District	Coefficient	z
maine	1.125719	0.78
mass	1.320657	1.08
p_rico	.624451	0.50
conn	1.157227	0.90
ny_e	1.821759	1.60
ny_s	.348077	0.30
ny_w	.9060633	0.74
vermont	1.736148	1.24
jersey	-.6323409	-0.47
penn_e	-.6215918	-0.50
penn_m	1.302175	1.08
penn_w	.6190067	0.48
maryland	.2378727	0.19
ncar_e	1.116319	0.89
ncar_m	.8929653	0.70
ncar_w	1.007644	0.73
scar	1.314378	1.12
virg_e	-.1546181	-0.13
virg_w	.6190936	0.50
wvirg_n	1.119327	0.83
wvirg_s	1.119716	0.93
alab_n	.399154	0.31
alab_m	.7428615	0.48
alab_s	2.018001	1.58
flor_n	-1.006198	-0.66
flor_m	.9931697	0.86
flor_s	1.142467	1.00
georg_n	.6238696	0.51
georg_m	.7993213	0.62
georg_s	.476487	0.31
louis_e	.965807	0.73
louis_w	1.720412	1.40
miss_n	.6899518	0.44
miss_s	.3211486	0.25
texas_n	1.692342	1.47
texas_e	1.070189	0.88

District	Coefficient	z
texas_s	1.03047	0.90
texas_w	1.588057	1.38
kent_e	.0622974	0.05
mich_e	.4065968	0.34
mich_w	1.952015	1.62
ohio_n	.2209467	0.19
ohio_s	.621001	0.48
tenn_e	-.3798964	-0.30
tenn_m	.7041901	0.51
tenn_w	.3860008	0.30
illin_n	.2560894	0.22
illin_c	-.1449006	-0.10
indi_n	1.344868	1.00
indi_s	.6800659	0.51
wisc_e	.7934453	0.58
wisc_w	-.0920766	-0.06
ark_e	1.736955	1.40
iowa_n	1.63865	1.21
iowa_s	.2312847	0.17
minn	1.413999	1.13
misso_e	-.8159354	-0.54
misso_w	.0058277	0.00
nebraska	-1.008761	-0.66
ndakota	.5881441	0.36
sdakota	1.955555	1.56
arizona	.8139855	0.70
cali_n	1.774213	1.48
cali_e	1.333323	1.10
cali_c	.5980916	0.52
cali_s	.3170641	0.26
hawaii	1.039194	0.84
idaho	2.221705	1.37
montana	.3839969	0.28
nevada	-.9123007	-0.60
oregon	1.078653	0.86
wash_e	1.868523	1.40
wash_w	.446769	0.36
colorado	.1667385	0.13
kansas	.0646076	0.05
newmex	.1503485	0.12
okla_n	1.584479	1.12
okla_e	.9385818	0.70
okla_w	.9432448	0.67
utah	.2693779	0.18
wyoming	2.094562	1.52

District	Coefficient	z
alaska	.088456	0.06
louis_m	1.809846	1.40

OLS Regression: Full Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	.9945715	0.85
mass	1.517492	1.51
newhamp	1.558182	1.24
rhodeisl	2.30747	1.64
p_rico	1.852123	1.95
conn	.3455112	0.32
ny_n	2.303181	2.26
ny_e	-2.848569	-3.24
ny_s	.0834912	0.10
ny_w	-1.701285	-1.76
vermont	-2.599251	-1.93
del	-.4732509	-0.31
jersey	.3371202	0.37
penn_e	2.141664	2.37
penn_m	-1.652875	-1.64
penn_w	1.151252	1.11
maryland	1.090087	1.16
ncar_e	1.294808	1.36
ncar_m	2.208643	2.26
ncar_w	.6493709	0.67
scar	-.8147837	-0.90
virg_e	1.599979	1.84
virg_w	1.444758	1.44
wvirg_n	1.861515	1.57
wvirg_s	-1.639177	-1.62
alab_n	2.187494	2.21
alab_m	.507152	0.43
alab_s	-2.503715	-2.38
flor_n	1.373889	1.34
flor_m	1.695876	1.94
flor_s	-.5109643	-0.60
georg_n	.7096846	0.77
georg_m	-.2299827	-0.23
georg_s	1.191384	1.09
louis_e	.2864118	0.30
louis_w	-2.071596	-1.92
miss_n	1.26021	1.04
miss_s	.4726562	0.48
texas_n	-.6378763	-0.73

District	Coefficient	t
texas_e	-1.722407	-1.84
texas_s	.4637742	0.55
texas_w	-1.648681	-1.96
kent_e	1.2463	1.33
kent_w	1.147897	1.10
mich_e	.2342991	0.26
mich_w	-1.306713	-1.28
ohio_n	.0332294	0.04
ohio_s	-.3078462	-0.30
tenn_e	1.089366	1.15
tenn_m	1.015861	0.92
tenn_w	-.9054117	-0.90
illin_n	-1.806043	-2.00
illin_c	1.65946	1.61
illin_s	2.708288	2.70
indi_n	-.562476	-0.54
indi_s	1.551602	1.37
wisc_e	-4.186684	-3.94
wisc_w	1.010651	0.83
ark_e	-3.400389	-3.06
ark_w	1.385389	1.10
iowa_n	1.577409	1.53
iowa_s	1.548982	1.49
minn	-.7638975	-0.76
misso_e	.9903363	1.06
misso_w	.1348274	0.15
nebraska	1.463715	1.52
ndakota	-.0234016	-0.02
sdakota	-.9808702	-0.89
arizona	-.0084167	-0.01
cali_n	-3.598829	-3.81
cali_e	-4.959709	-5.02
cali_c	.2338238	0.27
cali_s	.6985893	0.79
hawaii	.9369695	0.90
idaho	1.000611	0.71
montana	.2908496	0.26
nevada	.506584	0.53
oregon	.1393031	0.13
wash_e	-.4125774	-0.39
wash_w	.7143488	0.74
colorado	-.1903236	-0.20
kansas	-1.577609	-1.62
newmex	.8057914	0.91
okla_n	-2.217855	-1.65

District	Coefficient	t
okla_e	-.6168475	-0.43
okla_w	-1.700616	-1.49
utah	-.0764437	-0.07
wyoming	-2.875071	-2.20
virg_isl	1.162176	0.61
guam	.6821887	0.43
mari_isl	3.22156	0.81
alaska	.0830149	0.07
louis_m	-.0170338	-0.01

OLS Regression: Black Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	3.665547	0.74
mass	1.406228	0.86
newhamp	2.065747	0.72
rhodeisl	3.6909	1.42
p_rico	.4191985	0.26
conn	1.195603	0.76
ny_n	2.235989	1.34
ny_e	-6.302544	-5.14
ny_s	-.2378126	-0.20
ny_w	-2.299369	-1.67
vermont	-3.316033	-0.77
del	-.7828999	-0.38
jersey	-.0434555	-0.03
penn_e	1.820035	1.49
penn_m	-3.474634	-2.15
penn_w	2.388499	1.59
maryland	1.113906	0.91
ncar_e	1.742788	1.32
ncar_m	3.030044	2.23
ncar_w	.7393526	0.57
scar	-.481468	-0.40
virg_e	2.583302	2.30
virg_w	2.173501	1.45
wvirg_n	6.99061	3.23
wvirg_s	-2.191415	-1.37
alab_n	3.280461	2.37
alab_m	.1279951	0.07
alab_s	-2.481347	-1.73
flor_n	1.360614	0.86
flor_m	1.659655	1.35
flor_s	-.6318224	-0.55
georg_n	1.957786	1.57
georg_m	.2536392	0.18

District	Coefficient	t
georg_s	1.43284	0.96
louis_e	1.23579	0.97
louis_w	-3.46945	-2.31
miss_n	1.388813	0.81
miss_s	.5924555	0.44
texas_n	.149631	0.12
texas_e	-1.500665	-1.16
texas_s	1.060409	0.89
texas_w	-1.083169	-0.83
kent_e	2.162593	1.40
kent_w	1.580317	0.98
mich_e	.8915013	0.73
mich_w	-1.428236	-0.82
ohio_n	1.234497	1.00
ohio_s	-.15371	-0.10
tenn_e	.0943601	0.06
tenn_m	.6886952	0.42
tenn_w	-.6540053	-0.47
illin_n	-1.80631	-1.42
illin_c	1.793507	1.20
illin_s	2.87189	2.07
indi_n	-1.09437	-0.79
indi_s	2.678291	1.39
wisc_e	1.3432	0.88
wisc_w	1.077664	0.38
ark_e	-7.166401	-4.31
ark_w	2.94758	1.30
iowa_n	2.531749	1.01
iowa_s	4.565809	2.09
minn	-1.075573	-0.65
misso_e	.9521727	0.75
misso_w	1.509133	1.10
nebraska	1.191461	0.69
ndakota	1.668178	0.36
sdakota	1.783401	0.36
arizona	-.2369978	-0.12
cali_n	-4.331816	-2.93
cali_e	-1.356879	-0.60
cali_c	.043179	0.03
cali_s	-3.01069	-1.63
hawaii	3.863132	1.16
idaho	-.2578119	-0.03
montana	1.170364	0.31
nevada	.7833803	0.38
oregon	-1.179514	-0.48

District	Coefficient	t
wash_e	-.2582978	-0.09
wash_w	.9920026	0.56
colorado	1.599819	0.93
kansas	-4.164718	-2.56
newmex	.3779018	0.16
okla_n	2.53146	0.92
okla_e	-13.62096	-3.50
okla_w	-5.003083	-2.44
utah	-4.196142	-1.30
wyoming	3.721438	0.54
virg_isl	2.042142	0.72
alaska	-.3901727	-0.15
louis_m	.3392842	0.20

OLS Regression: White Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	.0978509	0.05
mass	.9413774	0.45
newhamp	.8166519	0.37
rhodeisl	.9084611	0.39
p_rico	1.495363	0.73
conn	-.954752	-0.44
ny_n	1.673855	0.80
ny_e	-1.767125	-0.88
ny_s	-.4542673	-0.23
ny_w	-1.749192	-0.84
vermont	-3.548361	-1.59
del	.1084496	0.04
jersey	-.1963009	-0.10
penn_e	1.891411	0.93
penn_m	-1.538598	-0.74
penn_w	-.6077768	-0.28
maryland	.6053137	0.28
ncar_e	.0010289	0.00
ncar_m	.6707805	0.32
ncar_w	.0084332	0.00
scar	-1.842397	-0.90
virg_e	-.3017129	-0.15
virg_w	.3392504	0.16
wvirg_n	-.8129614	-0.37
wvirg_s	-1.945965	-0.93
alab_n	.4983212	0.24
alab_m	.2603528	0.12
alab_s	-3.147186	-1.42

District	Coefficient	t
flor_n	.6516318	0.31
flor_m	1.017947	0.51
flor_s	-1.192274	-0.60
georg_n	-.8933814	-0.44
georg_m	-1.500532	-0.69
georg_s	.733249	0.32
louis_e	-2.227449	-1.03
louis_w	-.529178	-0.24
miss_n	.5521538	0.24
miss_s	-.3531801	-0.17
texas_n	-1.510599	-0.75
texas_e	-2.386657	-1.16
texas_s	-.2298648	-0.12
texas_w	-2.298494	-1.16
kent_e	.2365897	0.12
kent_w	.4256833	0.20
mich_e	-1.091477	-0.53
mich_w	-1.854081	-0.89
ohio_n	-1.505512	-0.74
ohio_s	-1.133494	-0.54
tenn_e	.6911874	0.34
tenn_m	.8998981	0.41
tenn_w	-1.629864	-0.76
illin_n	-2.566315	-1.27
illin_c	.7740635	0.36
illin_s	1.872359	0.88
indi_n	-.0651309	-0.03
indi_s	.4163519	0.19
wisc_e	-10.88924	-4.99
wisc_w	.5713067	0.26
ark_e	-.9571251	-0.44
ark_w	.215007	0.10
iowa_n	.7733763	0.37
iowa_s	.2157363	0.10
minn	-.6329901	-0.30
misso_e	.4156044	0.20
misso_w	-1.235437	-0.61
nebraska	.7872722	0.39
ndakota	-.6705627	-0.29
sdakota	-2.052887	-0.93
arizona	-.6693849	-0.34
cali_n	-4.026023	-1.96
cali_e	-6.037546	-2.95
cali_c	-.3307249	-0.17
cali_s	.2692885	0.13

District	Coefficient	t
hawaii	-.4092874	-0.19
idaho	.2306305	0.10
montana	-1.471435	-0.68
nevada	-.2636806	-0.13
oregon	-.6578556	-0.32
wash_e	-.41497	-0.20
wash_w	-.0081179	-0.00
colorado	-1.10151	-0.54
kansas	-1.004315	-0.49
newmex	.3422902	0.17
okla_n	-4.532296	-1.96
okla_e	-.324838	-0.14
okla_w	-.9380379	-0.43
utah	-.3303842	-0.16
wyoming	-3.932858	-1.78
virg_isl	-1.229193	-0.37
guam	.3985882	0.07
mari_isl	-2.134667	-0.22
alaska	-.7128976	-0.33
louis_m	-1.06773	-0.46

OLS Regression: Other Race Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	3.522393	0.46
mass	.5154112	0.08
newhamp	2.746141	0.25
rhodeisl	3.417104	0.39
p_rico	3.448353	0.31
conn	5.211954	0.47
ny_n	1.059754	0.17
ny_e	-.0403819	-0.01
ny_s	.5148827	0.09
ny_w	1.476831	0.22
vermont	3.051039	0.35
del	-4.662378	-0.43
jersey	2.156093	0.36
penn_e	3.457145	0.56
penn_m	.6129985	0.10
maryland	1.354913	0.19
ncar_e	3.086933	0.52
ncar_m	1.564205	0.23
ncar_w	3.939027	0.54
scar	2.900753	0.40
virg_e	1.113546	0.19
virg_w	5.572555	0.72

District	Coefficient	t
wvirg_n	2.886088	0.26
wvirg_s	.5815219	0.08
alab_s	7.474851	1.03
flor_n	3.817341	0.49
flor_m	2.702473	0.45
flor_s	2.887618	0.49
georg_n	1.294312	0.21
georg_m	-3.763536	-0.35
louis_e	-1.582712	-0.25
louis_w	4.819245	0.56
miss_n	.6194791	0.06
miss_s	1.767845	0.29
texas_n	-.3890235	-0.07
texas_e	-4.013338	-0.63
texas_s	2.153866	0.37
texas_w	2.840051	0.43
kent_e	3.633831	0.50
kent_w	-3.469127	-0.48
mich_e	.7866424	0.13
mich_w	-1.860075	-0.30
ohio_n	3.082643	0.46
ohio_s	3.585992	0.50
tenn_e	8.134027	0.74
tenn_m	4.042143	0.47
illin_n	1.276325	0.22
indi_n	5.683033	0.66
indi_s	.5801848	0.05
wisc_e	-.663187	-0.11
wisc_w	-.5017115	-0.08
ark_e	2.981455	0.39
iowa_n	6.746883	0.62
iowa_s	4.308743	0.50
minn	-3.596729	-0.62
misso_e	1.375792	0.20
misso_w	2.567246	0.33
nebraska	2.715768	0.44
ndakota	-.1142834	-0.02
sdakota	-.4371996	-0.08
arizona	.6140497	0.11
cali_n	-2.178431	-0.39
cali_e	-5.611929	-0.96
cali_c	.3479938	0.06
cali_s	-2.909682	-0.48
hawaii	1.601303	0.29
idaho	1.804761	0.30

District	Coefficient	t
montana	2.202677	0.39
nevada	1.073008	0.19
oregon	4.245675	0.64
wash_e	-9.931646	-1.60
wash_w	.5053595	0.09
colorado	-5.516065	-0.90
kansas	-6.872797	-1.15
newmex	-2.026128	-0.36
okla_n	-2.406986	-0.39
okla_e	8.005182	1.26
okla_w	-1.248026	-0.20
utah	-.3309497	-0.06
wyoming	-1.496084	-0.23
virg_isl	1.070871	0.14
guam	.7208941	0.13
mari_isl	4.418788	0.66
alaska	1.2579	0.21
louis_m	2.157565	0.25

OLS Regression: Hispanic Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	.0865225	0.02
mass	.4320721	0.15
newhamp	.3558391	0.12
rhodeisl	-1.076134	-0.37
p_rico	-.8167173	-0.33
conn	-3.413917	-1.16
ny_n	-1.631373	-0.60
ny_e	-5.536187	-2.21
ny_s	-2.242207	-0.90
ny_w	-4.074638	-1.47
vermont	-2.879105	-0.69
del	-.9383443	-0.13
jersey	-1.945526	-0.76
penn_e	1.142378	0.44
penn_m	-5.187953	-1.76
penn_w	-2.188463	-0.65
maryland	-2.746743	-0.94
ncar_e	-1.867292	-0.67
ncar_m	-1.609931	-0.61
ncar_w	-2.295758	-0.81
scar	-6.980308	-1.98
virg_e	-1.151105	-0.43
virg_w	.9446131	0.30
wvirg_n	-17.83675	-2.50

District	Coefficient	t
wvirg_s	-7.19622	-1.91
alab_n	3.711767	1.03
alab_m	-8.358822	-1.57
alab_s	-8.48645	-2.45
flor_n	.3096889	0.10
flor_m	-.5421894	-0.22
flor_s	-3.875113	-1.56
georg_n	-3.339906	-1.30
georg_m	-1.474486	-0.43
georg_s	-4.850211	-1.32
louis_e	-1.924817	-0.64
louis_w	-.5189907	-0.13
miss_n	-3.392131	-0.35
miss_s	-.6603303	-0.19
texas_n	-3.286819	-1.31
texas_e	-5.817915	-2.19
texas_s	-2.177545	-0.88
texas_w	-4.296575	-1.75
kent_e	-.0154901	-0.01
kent_w	-2.743374	-0.83
mich_e	-1.259181	-0.45
mich_w	-2.20876	-0.81
ohio_n	-5.217533	-1.94
ohio_s	-.0217023	-0.01
tenn_e	-.3211555	-0.11
tenn_m	.2979112	0.10
tenn_w	-1.7766	-0.59
illin_n	-6.229575	-2.44
illin_c	-3.015153	-0.96
illin_s	1.226548	0.36
indi_n	.5701988	0.17
indi_s	.0238871	0.01
wisc_e	-19.12094	-6.61
wisc_w	.6975897	0.20
ark_e	-4.290716	-1.17
ark_w	-2.725668	-0.90
iowa_n	-2.630641	-0.98
iowa_s	-.4971235	-0.19
minn	-2.622402	-0.96
misso_e	-.3204255	-0.11
misso_w	-2.709055	-1.01
nebraska	-.8332899	-0.32
ndakota	-2.575077	-0.74
sdakota	-3.399758	-0.88
arizona	-2.572945	-1.04

District	Coefficient	t
cali_n	-6.796944	-2.65
cali_e	-12.8476	-4.93
cali_c	-1.786271	-0.72
cali_s	-1.504859	-0.61
hawaii	-2.257016	-0.79
idaho	-1.752977	-0.58
montana	-2.199013	-0.58
nevada	-2.540492	-0.99
oregon	-1.190954	-0.43
wash_e	-2.915067	-1.12
wash_w	-.1100969	-0.04
colorado	-2.561824	-0.99
kansas	-3.120722	-1.18
newmex	-1.398355	-0.56
okla_n	2.275532	0.23
okla_w	-1.506213	-0.47
utah	-3.060723	-1.14
wyoming	-14.80487	-4.78
virg_isl	-3.185963	-0.82
alaska	-2.676534	-0.84
louis_m	-4.026245	-0.88

OLS Regression: Non-Hispanic Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	1.113962	0.88
mass	1.560376	1.42
newhamp	1.412257	0.99
rhodeisl	3.080748	1.70
p_rico	-.3994224	-0.23
conn	.8832882	0.74
ny_n	2.549147	2.22
ny_e	-2.601098	-2.65
ny_s	.2108592	0.22
ny_w	-1.47	-1.39
vermont	-2.648326	-1.81
del	-.2142815	-0.13
jersey	.412865	0.41
penn_e	2.193278	2.22
penn_m	-1.241996	-1.13
penn_w	1.545851	1.37
maryland	1.516504	1.49
ncar_e	1.643998	1.58
ncar_m	2.841564	2.61
ncar_w	1.023542	0.98
scar	-.3453341	-0.35

District	Coefficient	t
virg_e	1.916546	2.04
virg_w	1.557793	1.44
wvirg_n	2.364607	1.87
wvirg_s	-1.29384	-1.19
alab_n	2.395846	2.25
alab_m	.9723597	0.77
alab_s	-1.857776	-1.64
flor_n	1.503474	1.35
flor_m	1.701594	1.77
flor_s	-.0160715	-0.02
georg_n	1.591959	1.56
georg_m	-.043191	-0.04
georg_s	1.778224	1.51
louis_e	.5607269	0.53
louis_w	-1.953495	-1.69
miss_n	1.628553	1.27
miss_s	.7636026	0.73
texas_n	-.2720878	-0.28
texas_e	-1.124697	-1.10
texas_s	.9610354	1.00
texas_w	-.7080098	-0.73
kent_e	1.410544	1.40
kent_w	1.526905	1.35
mich_e	.507234	0.51
mich_w	-1.490177	-1.31
ohio_n	.6839067	0.70
ohio_s	-.2109326	-0.19
tenn_e	1.203463	1.16
tenn_m	1.008201	0.83
tenn_w	-.7118039	-0.65
illin_n	-.8195262	-0.82
illin_c	2.104899	1.89
illin_s	2.888463	2.67
indi_n	-.6118489	-0.55
indi_s	1.837801	1.49
wisc_e	-1.402154	-1.19
wisc_w	1.045719	0.78
ark_e	-3.156613	-2.63
ark_w	2.090066	1.45
iowa_n	2.365959	2.02
iowa_s	1.483753	1.23
minn	-.6657756	-0.59
misso_e	1.159383	1.15
misso_w	.4402508	0.44
nebraska	1.552188	1.41

District	Coefficient	t
ndakota	.1344489	0.10
sdakota	-.720022	-0.61
arizona	-.0322158	-0.03
cali_n	-2.932031	-2.74
cali_e	-1.915419	-1.69
cali_c	.0886845	0.09
cali_s	-.0642291	-0.06
hawaii	1.329589	1.15
idaho	1.430869	0.82
montana	.4952376	0.41
nevada	1.132723	1.03
oregon	.0541538	0.05
wash_e	-.0622572	-0.05
wash_w	.4551269	0.42
colorado	-.0915824	-0.08
kansas	-1.688771	-1.54
newmex	-.5276508	-0.46
okla_n	-2.016795	-1.42
okla_e	-.2444847	-0.16
okla_w	-1.856582	-1.48
utah	.3092114	0.27
wyoming	.4334364	0.29
virg_isl	2.07696	0.91
guam	.9143725	0.55
mari_isl	3.370813	0.82
alaska	.3248324	0.25
louis_m	.4398436	0.35

OLS Regression: Male Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	1.343204	1.03
mass	1.87653	1.67
newhamp	1.518211	1.08
rhodeisl	2.67364	1.77
p_rico	2.204517	2.07
conn	1.022234	0.85
ny_n	2.610429	2.27
ny_e	-1.956974	-1.99
ny_s	.5842852	0.60
ny_w	-.9531178	-0.88
vermont	-2.866943	-1.90
del	-.4453871	-0.25
jersey	.8029812	0.78
penn_e	2.528119	2.51
penn_m	-1.203847	-1.06

District	Coefficient	t
penn_w	1.460972	1.25
maryland	1.389836	1.33
ncar_e	1.717416	1.60
ncar_m	2.615486	2.41
ncar_w	.6307561	0.59
scar	-.6158415	-0.61
virg_e	2.191427	2.26
virg_w	1.69494	1.51
wvirg_n	2.39436	1.76
wvirg_s	-1.64817	-1.45
alab_n	2.836791	2.55
alab_m	1.229709	0.90
alab_s	-2.58192	-2.17
flor_n	2.059536	1.80
flor_m	2.12157	2.18
flor_s	.1887249	0.20
georg_n	1.15323	1.12
georg_m	.1608699	0.14
georg_s	1.423862	1.18
louis_e	1.260247	1.17
louis_w	-1.915356	-1.57
miss_n	1.67612	1.25
miss_s	.9146122	0.84
texas_n	-.2483692	-0.25
texas_e	-.8285214	-0.79
texas_s	.7839654	0.84
texas_w	-1.06381	-1.13
kent_e	1.369233	1.30
kent_w	1.741323	1.47
mich_e	.5600698	0.54
mich_w	-.0154728	-0.01
ohio_n	.4316307	0.43
ohio_s	-.3254853	-0.28
tenn_e	1.37326	1.30
tenn_m	2.223125	1.81
tenn_w	-.6179354	-0.54
illin_n	-1.538019	-1.52
illin_c	2.192922	1.89
illin_s	2.625852	2.36
indi_n	-.3114236	-0.27
indi_s	2.029398	1.59
wisc_e	-4.816891	-4.02
wisc_w	1.395036	1.02
ark_e	-3.25653	-2.61
ark_w	1.782472	1.25

District	Coefficient	t
iowa_n	1.775908	1.55
iowa_s	1.726676	1.49
minn	-.3590482	-0.32
misso_e	1.437289	1.38
misso_w	.4898595	0.48
nebraska	1.795011	1.67
ndakota	.0349488	0.02
sdakota	-.9487925	-0.75
arizona	.3737867	0.39
cali_n	-3.578429	-3.39
cali_e	-4.884123	-4.43
cali_c	.5148751	0.53
cali_s	1.203886	1.22
hawaii	1.223637	1.04
idaho	1.340908	0.85
montana	.4863437	0.39
nevada	.9835471	0.92
oregon	.4861266	0.41
wash_e	.0630347	0.05
wash_w	1.182757	1.10
colorado	.2498731	0.23
kansas	-1.15043	-1.05
newmex	1.292032	1.31
okla_n	-3.15744	-1.99
okla_e	-1.129298	-0.67
okla_w	-1.625116	-1.25
utah	.3266932	0.29
wyoming	-4.443515	-2.94
virg_isl	1.523636	0.72
guam	.8208241	0.43
mari_isl	4.290446	0.80
alaska	.1621363	0.12
louis_m	.1522459	0.11

OLS Regression: Female Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	-.8357	-0.31
mass	.1619362	0.08
newhamp	1.664725	0.65
rhodeisl	1.234049	0.27
p_rico	.8102424	0.41
conn	-2.944116	-1.26
ny_n	.6297877	0.31
ny_e	-6.83155	-3.74
ny_s	-2.516581	-1.35

District	Coefficient	t
ny_w	-5.387003	-2.68
vermont	-.2062018	-0.07
del	-1.648672	-0.63
jersey	-1.39072	-0.75
penn_e	1.036592	0.54
penn_m	-3.317655	-1.63
penn_w	.4367085	0.20
maryland	.0962135	0.05
ncar_e	-.7842847	-0.40
ncar_m	.386879	0.18
ncar_w	1.822688	0.88
scar	-1.513398	-0.82
virg_e	-1.310894	-0.72
virg_w	.3360437	0.16
wvirg_n	-.5484142	-0.24
wvirg_s	-1.225868	-0.59
alab_n	-.7897321	-0.39
alab_m	-2.033595	-0.89
alab_s	-3.06536	-1.47
flor_n	-2.260746	-1.02
flor_m	-.2146406	-0.12
flor_s	-3.60021	-2.04
georg_n	-1.155595	-0.60
georg_m	-2.156246	-1.04
georg_s	1.167421	0.47
louis_e	-5.015695	-2.41
louis_w	-3.143819	-1.47
miss_n	-.9099501	-0.34
miss_s	-1.726553	-0.81
texas_n	-2.382987	-1.33
texas_e	-6.200746	-3.17
texas_s	-.661749	-0.37
texas_w	-4.243327	-2.43
kent_e	1.004695	0.53
kent_w	-1.492992	-0.72
mich_e	-.8173419	-0.44
mich_w	-6.654054	-3.24
ohio_n	-1.864819	-1.01
ohio_s	-.593218	-0.29
tenn_e	.0816899	0.04
tenn_m	-6.102041	-2.52
tenn_w	-2.544861	-1.27
illin_n	-2.998902	-1.60
illin_c	-.8941173	-0.43
illin_s	4.549244	2.04

District	Coefficient	t
indi_n	-2.020022	-0.92
indi_s	-.2377211	-0.11
wisc_e	-1.748635	-0.81
wisc_w	-.8456732	-0.32
ark_e	-4.214287	-1.85
ark_w	-.5596673	-0.22
iowa_n	1.110276	0.49
iowa_s	1.370439	0.60
minn	-2.625711	-1.18
misso_e	-1.289423	-0.66
misso_w	-1.171705	-0.61
nebraska	-.0460143	-0.02
ndakota	-.0823939	-0.03
sdakota	-1.723104	-0.82
arizona	-1.851828	-1.02
cali_n	-3.331766	-1.69
cali_e	-5.391745	-2.59
cali_c	-.918766	-0.51
cali_s	-2.298661	-1.23
hawaii	-.4264686	-0.21
idaho	-.1833183	-0.06
montana	-.6476625	-0.28
nevada	-1.434679	-0.70
oregon	-1.853257	-0.84
wash_e	-2.102613	-0.91
wash_w	-1.537911	-0.78
colorado	-1.943408	-0.95
kansas	-3.286525	-1.62
newmex	-1.525402	-0.81
okla_n	-1.116901	-0.47
okla_e	-.1911633	-0.08
okla_w	-2.260283	-1.02
utah	-1.698341	-0.73
wyoming	1.493307	0.62
virg_isl	-.8178376	-0.19
guam	-1.424532	-0.55
mari_isl	.3783761	0.07
alaska	-.3775247	-0.17
louis_m	-.8792391	-0.37

OLS Regression: Ages 17-29 Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	1.176045	0.56
mass	1.749134	0.94
newhamp	3.501964	1.63

District	Coefficient	t
rhodeisl	4.60454	1.82
p_rico	3.792183	2.33
conn	.8882408	0.44
ny_n	3.322138	1.92
ny_e	-2.582589	-1.68
ny_s	-.6309683	-0.41
ny_w	-.5081157	-0.30
vermont	-.6134499	-0.28
del	-.0116114	-0.00
jersey	1.100918	0.69
penn_e	1.609738	1.02
penn_m	-1.707728	-0.98
penn_w	1.022714	0.56
maryland	1.449064	0.90
ncar_e	2.919537	1.82
ncar_m	3.695844	2.28
ncar_w	1.854382	1.13
scar	-1.129722	-0.73
virg_e	3.104741	2.08
virg_w	1.511259	0.88
wvirg_n	5.73822	2.70
wvirg_s	-.4725544	-0.27
alab_n	4.516897	2.52
alab_m	2.731841	1.34
alab_s	-.7366972	-0.43
flor_n	1.613585	0.92
flor_m	3.181256	2.10
flor_s	-.4221572	-0.28
georg_n	-.2125651	-0.13
georg_m	.1688412	0.10
georg_s	2.3771	1.31
louis_e	1.873911	1.13
louis_w	-.3269185	-0.18
miss_n	2.902752	1.47
miss_s	1.290343	0.77
texas_n	.3947161	0.26
texas_e	-.7320478	-0.46
texas_s	1.189009	0.82
texas_w	-.8544515	-0.59
kent_e	1.500029	0.90
kent_w	.647669	0.37
mich_e	.9160156	0.57
mich_w	.3683515	0.21
ohio_n	.4675731	0.30
ohio_s	.4669228	0.27

District	Coefficient	t
tenn_e	3.261438	1.98
tenn_m	1.634516	0.85
tenn_w	-1.107183	-0.65
illin_n	-.8327678	-0.52
illin_c	2.019124	1.16
illin_s	3.285891	1.90
indi_n	-.0640031	-0.04
indi_s	2.55288	1.25
wisc_e	-7.499767	-4.19
wisc_w	2.178728	0.99
ark_e	-4.600396	-2.27
ark_w	2.952629	1.35
iowa_n	2.403596	1.34
iowa_s	2.938672	1.63
minn	-.6665578	-0.38
misso_e	1.779899	1.09
misso_w	1.460381	0.92
nebraska	2.202648	1.34
ndakota	.4718962	0.22
sdakota	-.3751024	-0.20
arizona	1.052398	0.71
cali_n	-5.18048	-3.06
cali_e	-7.082412	-4.15
cali_c	.6966893	0.46
cali_s	1.243015	0.81
hawaii	2.833173	1.48
idaho	1.405745	0.61
montana	.1772141	0.10
nevada	1.298998	0.76
oregon	2.281536	1.19
wash_e	.8260367	0.45
wash_w	2.177883	1.31
colorado	.0003479	0.00
kansas	-1.820187	-1.09
newmex	2.179504	1.44
okla_n	-1.986527	-0.80
okla_e	-.3091862	-0.11
okla_w	2.48789	1.27
utah	.1145816	0.06
wyoming	-7.008395	-3.03
virg_isl	2.101854	0.68
guam	1.306253	0.39
mari_isl	7.511006	0.94
alaska	.3438962	0.17
louis_m	.3691601	0.19

OLS Regression: Ages 30-49 Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	.6809266	0.43
mass	1.292014	0.97
newhamp	.0775843	0.05
rhodeisl	.6966225	0.38
p_rico	-.0495424	-0.04
conn	.3966135	0.27
ny_n	1.106478	0.79
ny_e	-2.952232	-2.48
ny_s	.2429569	0.21
ny_w	-2.721834	-2.09
vermont	-4.461196	-2.24
del	-1.181311	-0.58
jersey	-.4729636	-0.38
penn_e	2.230097	1.83
penn_m	-1.775015	-1.27
penn_w	1.715649	1.19
maryland	.8209031	0.64
ncar_e	-.0828641	-0.06
ncar_m	.5462983	0.40
ncar_w	-.1447399	-0.11
scar	-.3342947	-0.27
virg_e	.5423875	0.46
virg_w	1.816676	1.31
wvirg_n	-.1536778	-0.10
wvirg_s	-2.744856	-1.96
alab_n	1.049226	0.79
alab_m	-1.038613	-0.64
alab_s	-4.805222	-3.21
flor_n	.6918346	0.48
flor_m	.765914	0.64
flor_s	-.8473646	-0.73
georg_n	1.178184	0.96
georg_m	-.7171714	-0.52
georg_s	.5012846	0.33
louis_e	-1.05268	-0.80
louis_w	-2.895785	-1.94
miss_n	-.5779656	-0.34
miss_s	-.270744	-0.20
texas_n	-1.441474	-1.22
texas_e	-2.912354	-2.26
texas_s	-.1261985	-0.11
texas_w	-2.315486	-2.03
kent_e	.9484768	0.75

District	Coefficient	t
kent_w	1.548613	1.07
mich_e	-.352011	-0.29
mich_w	-2.817918	-2.03
ohio_n	-.308649	-0.25
ohio_s	-1.06065	-0.77
tenn_e	-.8486273	-0.65
tenn_m	.5908738	0.40
tenn_w	-1.022986	-0.73
illin_n	-3.395664	-2.79
illin_c	1.404567	0.99
illin_s	2.520848	1.84
indi_n	-1.202916	-0.83
indi_s	.9231345	0.61
wisc_e	-2.079418	-1.40
wisc_w	.172594	0.10
ark_e	-3.263426	-2.17
ark_w	.3029454	0.18
iowa_n	1.049346	0.77
iowa_s	.2383821	0.17
minn	-.9922327	-0.72
misso_e	.2388359	0.19
misso_w	-1.319744	-1.06
nebraska	.7340562	0.55
ndakota	-.6207789	-0.35
sdakota	-1.853159	-1.21
arizona	-.8811035	-0.76
cali_n	-2.972934	-2.37
cali_e	-3.232049	-2.39
cali_c	-.4295151	-0.37
cali_s	.035826	0.03
hawaii	-.0155393	-0.01
idaho	.7562262	0.38
montana	.3618077	0.23
nevada	-.2582847	-0.20
oregon	-1.489344	-1.06
wash_e	-1.10238	-0.79
wash_w	-.1851315	-0.14
colorado	-.2910333	-0.22
kansas	-2.203564	-1.66
newmex	-.4884445	-0.41
okla_n	-2.612248	-1.45
okla_e	-1.329158	-0.70
okla_w	-5.529358	-3.57
utah	-.5264246	-0.38
wyoming	-.7285672	-0.42

District	Coefficient	t
virg_isl	.1170732	0.04
guam	-.7408904	-0.37
mari_isl	1.388443	0.30
alaska	-.4184911	-0.26
louis_m	-.4141658	-0.24

OLS Regression: Ages 50+ Model

District	Coefficient	t
maine	.738728	0.26
mass	1.097517	0.48
newhamp	1.448498	0.44
rhodeisl	3.894492	0.97
p_rico	2.865371	1.21
conn	-.0387192	-0.02
ny_n	3.408843	1.37
ny_e	-2.965412	-1.42
ny_s	1.035081	0.50
ny_w	-1.118099	-0.49
vermont	-2.176499	-0.69
del	2.295986	0.61
jersey	1.598765	0.75
penn_e	3.154445	1.48
penn_m	-.4742586	-0.21
penn_w	.1589002	0.07
maryland	1.496052	0.66
ncar_e	.098282	0.04
ncar_m	3.228865	1.32
ncar_w	-.6672347	-0.26
scar	-.7259157	-0.33
virg_e	.9406788	0.44
virg_w	.2903891	0.12
wvirg_n	-1.348455	-0.47
wvirg_s	-.9578935	-0.41
alab_n	1.520271	0.67
alab_m	-.5239849	-0.18
alab_s	-1.145546	-0.43
flor_n	3.276907	1.41
flor_m	1.200757	0.58
flor_s	.3296834	0.16
georg_n	1.482693	0.66
georg_m	-.0341127	-0.01
georg_s	-.5647549	-0.18
louis_e	-.4650245	-0.18
louis_w	-3.59588	-1.47
miss_n	1.089658	0.36

District	Coefficient	t
miss_s	1.120655	0.49
texas_n	-.6783285	-0.32
texas_e	-.3177394	-0.14
texas_s	1.084171	0.53
texas_w	-.514295	-0.25
kent_e	1.590687	0.74
kent_w	2.418506	0.91
mich_e	.5073664	0.23
mich_w	-.3712496	-0.16
ohio_n	.8135191	0.38
ohio_s	.7132847	0.30
tenn_e	2.51559	1.12
tenn_m	-.1467927	-0.05
tenn_w	.9363732	0.40
illin_n	1.501742	0.71
illin_c	1.797984	0.71
illin_s	1.420514	0.59
indi_n	.2714836	0.10
indi_s	.5980914	0.23
wisc_e	1.338448	0.53
wisc_w	.7364379	0.29
ark_e	-2.074813	-0.86
ark_w	1.016536	0.33
iowa_n	-1.630264	-0.53
iowa_s	3.013034	1.15
minn	1.006604	0.41
misso_e	1.687705	0.75
misso_w	2.41364	1.06
nebraska	2.553374	1.08
ndakota	1.100371	0.34
sdakota	.3531468	0.14
arizona	.4414999	0.21
cali_n	-3.393818	-1.49
cali_e	-3.947115	-1.71
cali_c	1.227904	0.60
cali_s	1.892918	0.88
hawaii	.6106062	0.26
idaho	1.017648	0.25
montana	1.168049	0.44
nevada	1.519595	0.68
oregon	.9752324	0.41
wash_e	-.842449	-0.29
wash_w	-.4499163	-0.19
colorado	.3212224	0.13
kansas	2.985485	1.24

District	Coefficient	t
newmex	1.100926	0.49
okla_n	-2.472761	-0.85
okla_e	.865951	0.31
okla_w	1.083523	0.39
utah	1.177782	0.46
wyoming	.3586372	0.11
virg_isl	5.766577	0.99
guam	3.580839	1.08
alaska	2.059119	0.73
louis_m	.6016837	0.22

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