

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: RELIGIOUS BELIEF, RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES, AND SUPPORT FOR
DEMOCRACY

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Over the last two decades, the intersection of religion in politics and democratic backsliding has prompted questions about public support for democracy. This study investigates the link between individual-level religious beliefs, religious minority status, and support for democracy. It presents a modified authoritarian personality theory, proposing that higher religious commitment correlates with stronger support for authoritarianism and weaker support for liberal democracy. This hypothesis is tested using Latent Class Analysis (LCA) and validated through the World Values Survey data. A survey experiment in Indonesia in 2022 examines the impact of minority status on views regarding liberal democracy. The findings indicate that religious commitment is associated with reduced support for liberal democracy, and minority status can affect perspectives on democracy under specific political contexts. Additionally, this research pioneers a large-scale approach to measuring religious experience through clustering analysis. It underscores the need to explore how democracy is perceived differently by diverse segments of the population, adding depth to the study of democratic support.

RELIGIOUS BELIEF, RELIGIOUS MINORITIES, AND SUPPORT FOR
DEMOCRACY

By

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Dedication

To Bean. You're one loud cat.

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This project is the result of years spent asking questions. The dissertation project idea dates to my first semester of graduate school in 2017, working for my eventual advisor, Dr. Jóhanna K. Birnir. Working with Hanna, I realized my own potential as a scholar, and with her support, was able to make it this far. She cheered for my success and pointed me in the right direction whenever I was getting lost. I feel similarly towards all members of my committee, Dr. Ernesto Calvo, Dr. Kathleen Cunningham, Dr. John McCauley, and Dr. Kathleen Stewart. All of them have taught me, supported my work, and encouraged me to push myself as a scholar. I'm grateful for everything they have taught me in graduate school.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Post-secularism and democratic support

Europe can ignore or deny or struggle against its own identity and its Christian roots. But by doing so the society commits suicide...We are very happy that there are a few politicians like Orbán and Trump who really represent those values which we Christians believe to be important. - László Kiss-Rigó, Bishop of Szeged, Hungary¹

In India, the ruling BJP party spreads misinformation online about Muslims, resulting in violence and discrimination against the religious minority group (Badrinathan and Chauchard 2023; Chauchard and Garimella 2022). Meanwhile, in Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has advocated for a departure from liberal democracy, encouraging a shift toward a “Christian democracy” that emphasizes religious and family traditions (Orbán 2018). Over the past two decades, following its democratization, Indonesia has increasingly used anti-blasphemy laws to fine or jail non-Sunni Muslims and other religious minorities (Sumaktoyo, Ottati, and Untoro 2016).

These three anecdotes originate from countries with different histories, demographics, and cultures. Two things they do share, however, is that their respective governments are ostensibly electoral democracies and over the past twenty years, religion has been increasingly used to mobilize the majority religion in electoral politics. Within the last decade, these countries have witnessed a gradual

¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/14/viktor-orban-budapest-hungary-christianity-with-a-twist>

erosion of political freedoms, particularly for minority groups.² The dual trend of religious mobilization and illiberal policy changes in electoral regimes presents puzzles for scholars of, the political sociology of religion, and democracy.

In the wake of the Cold War, a wave of democratization occurred (Huntington 1991), accompanied by the idea that liberal democracy would spread globally. Democracy was thought to be a solution to a variety of global issues, including the persecution of religious minorities. However, democratic backsliding (Bermeo 2016; Foa and Mounk 2016; Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg 2017) over the past two decades, particularly backsliding that appears to be motivated by religion, has demonstrated that not all democracies are created equal. This raises fundamental questions: Do individuals view and support democracy as superior to other regime types? Furthermore, what role does religion play in individuals' support for democracy and how does support vary across majority and minority groups?

For example, if democratically elected governments are found to discriminate against religious minorities, does this lead these marginalized communities to become more skeptical of democracy? Do Muslims in India, or Christians and Ahmadi Muslims in Indonesia, believe that democracy has failed to safeguard their interests?

The relationship between religion and politics

This dissertation explores the relationship between religious belief, religious minority status, and support for democracy. In the past two decades, social scientists

² For evidence and in-depth descriptions documenting these changes in protection of minority rights, see Freedom House's Freedom in the World scores for Hungary, India, and Indonesia. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>

have reexamined the relationship between religion and politics (Kenneth D. Wald and Wilcox 2006), revising previous theories of religion's decline (Berger 1999; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Lately, research has increased focus on the link between religion, democratic politics, and support for far-right, populist movements (Beuter et al. 2023). Most of this work finds that religion is primarily important as an identity marker (Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy 2016), an alternative to ethnic identity as an instrument for group level mobilization (Birbir and Şatana 2022), and as a means for fomenting nationalism (Brubaker 2017). The evidence increasingly suggests that, in many contexts, the importance of religion in politics, particularly democratic politics, is its use as an identity marker which is capable of mobilizing groups for a political cause.

Belief vs belonging

Although the political salience of religion clearly plays a part in modern politics, particularly in countries with clear religious majority groups and minority groups, there are still gaps in the literature. First, most of the literature examines how individuals mobilize for specific parties or politicians in democracies. It is not well-understood whether religion influences how individuals view democracy itself. I examine whether religious belief and practice is related to individual support for democracy. Through a cross-country survey analysis, I find that religious individuals differ from less religious counterparts on how they define democracy. This finding suggests that, in addition to religion being an instrument for group-level mobilization, religious belief is also associated with different policy preferences at the individual level.

To fully address why religious belief and support for liberal democracy are likely related, I revisit the relationship between authoritarian personality and support for democracy. Authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950) is a social-psychological theory that suggests some individuals have higher levels of deference to authority, tradition, and the cultural status quo. I investigate whether religious belief correlates with authoritarian personality traits and whether these traits, in turn, are associated with diminished support for democracy.

Through this study, I find that generally, support for democracy is high across most nations, regardless of whether the country is a democracy. I find instead that individuals disagree on what makes a regime a democracy. Individuals vary in how they define democracy along two factors, *liberal notions of democracy* (LND) and *illiberal notions of democracy* (IND). LND include support for free and fair elections and women's rights. IND includes supporting the army taking over when the government is not functioning well or allowing religious leaders to interpret a country's laws. Additionally, individuals with high religious commitment are, on average, more illiberal in defining democracy. The evidence suggests that both high religiosity and high authoritarian personality traits are associated with lower support for LND. Religiosity and authoritarian personality also have a positive relationship with IND. The evidence also suggests that many individuals across the globe have a fundamentally different view of what they mean when they say democracy is good. These different definitions may play a role in the calculus of illiberal or authoritarian leaders seeking support. By mobilizing groups either through religion or deference to tradition and authority, political entrepreneurs may gain support from followers who

are more tolerant of illiberal views. The findings presented offer valuable insights into the interplay between religion, authoritarian personality, and democratic values.

Minorities, security, and the state

In addition to individual-level beliefs and practices, I return to the group-level, identity theory. Specifically, I assess whether the status of a person's religion as a minority (demographically or politically) in their country has any effect on support for democracy. While much has been written about the mobilizing potential of religion, less work has specifically focused on religious minorities. Within the last decade, both violent and nonviolent mobilization by religious minorities has steadily increased across the world (Basedau et al. 2019). Previously, political theorists pointed to liberal democracy as a political system that protects religious minorities. But even among consolidated democracies that enshrine religious freedom in their constitutions, religious discrimination is possible (Finke, Martin, and Fox 2017; Finke and Mataic 2021). Additionally, in democratic countries such as Indonesia, democratization preceded higher levels of religious discrimination (Sumaktoyo 2020; Sumaktoyo, Ottati, and Untoro 2016). Is it possible that religious minorities who find believe their democracies favor a majority group become less supportive of democracy in general? I theorize that this is the case, arguing that religious minority political preferences in the face of large majorities are defensive, favoring whichever regime best protects their communities.

I also explore whether being a religious minority or facing religious discrimination changes how individuals view democracy. Building on the economics of religion literature that argues religious adherence functions as a market, I theorize

that religious minorities will be less supportive of democracy in general. Evidence suggests that discriminatory practices against religious minority groups *increases* the beliefs and practices of members of those groups (Ridge 2020). If high religiosity affects support for democracy, then it is possible that group status has an indirect effect on the outcomes of interest as well.

Despite these initial theoretical propositions, I find that, globally, there is no relationship between religious minority status, discrimination, and changes in how individuals view and support democracy. I argue that there may be a relationship between the two under certain circumstances but that the relationship is not general across countries. Analyzing a survey experiment in Indonesia provides evidence that, in states that are polarized along religious lines, religious minorities differ from religious majorities in support for liberal democracy. However, the difference, in the case of Indonesia, is in the opposite direction of expectations. I find that non-Muslims in the majority Muslim democracy are more supportive of democracy. Non-Muslims are also less supportive of illiberal notions of democracy including allowing religious leaders to interpret laws or allowing the army to take over the government due to instability. This leads me to suggest that religious minorities have strategic preferences that result from government policy and the salience of religion in politics. Group status can affect who supports democracy and what they consider democracy to mean.

Outline of the dissertation

This dissertation is comprised of six chapters. This chapter has introduced the project. In Chapter 2, I provide a full outline of the theory of religious commitment,

minority status, and democratic support. I discuss four theories from different fields of social science, and I suggest a set of hypotheses which are derived from a revised version of the authoritarian personality theory. Chapter 3 tests whether religion and authoritarian personality traits are related. Using a form of clustering analysis, Latent Class Analysis (LCA), I find that individuals can be grouped into classes based on their religious commitment levels, and that higher religious commitment is associated with higher authoritarian personality traits. Chapter 4 presents the primary large-N analysis using the data introduced in Chapter 3. The primary test of the theory assesses whether group size, discrimination, authoritarian personality traits, and religious commitment are associated with change in support for liberal notions of democracy or illiberal notions of democracy. I find support for the individual-level relationships but not for the group-level hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents the results of a single-case survey conducted in Indonesia in 2022, which re-examines the group-level theory. I find evidence that minority status does results in different views on liberal democracy but not in the hypothesized directions. Chapter 6 concludes the project by summarizing the findings across the main analysis chapters and suggests potential areas for future study with this topic.

Moving forward by looking back

The goal, as with any dissertation, is to contribute to an academic conversation. This work contributes to the conversation about religious minorities and politics but also demonstrates the possible ways actual religious practice interacts with the use of religion as an identity marker. The suggestion that religious belief

affects political opinion is not new but integrating it into the current state of research may provide valuable insights.

As a second contribution, particularly through Chapter 5, I highlight the political agency of religious minorities, who until recently were understudied as actors in political science. Often, religious minorities are viewed as being acted upon by the state or by majority groups and their opinions are not considered. With demographic changes in Europe, Asia, and Africa, new religious minority communities are emerging in democratic and non-democratic regimes. This makes it increasingly important for scholars to comprehend the political behavior and beliefs of religious minorities. Chapter 5 highlights how religious minorities can have different opinions on politics because of religious polarization, which is a useful contribution on its own.

Beyond the theoretical contributions, I also address a methodological issue related to assessing and measuring religiosity. A growing view in the social sciences is that religious experience encompasses a complex mixture of beliefs, practices like worship and prayer, and developing a sense of being in a group. These individual facets of religion may have distinct relationships with political outcomes of interest. As such, some scholars suggest measuring religious commitment as a set of distinct facets. I address these methodological concerns, arguing that these separate facets are intricately related to each other and likely co-vary. I classify individuals based on a combination of stated beliefs and practices, measuring overall religious commitment rather than treating each facet separately. I find that increased overall commitment to religion has a negative relationship with support for liberal democracy. I do find some

evidence in favor of the multi-faceted approach, particularly finding evidence that communal worship may have a distinct relationship to political beliefs that is in the opposite direction of other facets of religious experience. Ultimately, however, I conclude that the sum of a person's religious commitment, rather the measurement of distinct facets of their faith, offer a better image of the relationship between religion and politics.

Finally, in my study of democratic support, I discover that measuring the outcome of interest is a complex and challenging task. On the surface, almost everyone says they like democracy (Inglehart 2003). A more helpful question to ask is, what type of democracy do people support? Using factor analysis on survey questions about what is important for a democracy, I find that individuals vary along two axes - liberal and illiberal (or authoritarian) notions of democracy. In the concluding chapter of the dissertation, I suggest how future research should further explore the impact these different definitions of democracy have on support for far right or authoritarian political parties and leaders.

Chapter 2: Theories of religion and support for democracy

Introduction

Does religiosity affect support for liberal democracy? In this chapter, I introduce a theory of religion, minority status, and support for democracy. Given the growing concern about democratic backsliding and the simultaneous rise of populist authoritarianism, it is imperative to examine the relationship between religion and support for democracy. Many illiberal candidates receive support from a conservative religious base (Basu 2018; Chitwood 2022; Hunter and Power 2019; Olson 2020; Varshney 2014). Similarly, authoritarian countries have co-opted religious organizations to garner support for the regime (J. Anderson 2016; Rowe 2020; Schleutker 2021; Stoeckl 2020). Despite these trends, researchers across different disciplines disagree about the nature of this relationship, especially considering the number of religious groups that took part in pro-democratic movements during the “third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991). As such, there is no clear relationship between religion and support for democracy.

Additionally, it remains uncertain whether opinions towards democracy differ between religious minority and majority groups. Most literature on religion and democracy focuses on religious majorities—those groups that are the largest in a state. Until recently, religious minorities were not studied as political actors. When it comes to how religious minorities view democracy, an apparent assumption is that because liberal democracies protect minority rights (Bloom and Arikan, 2013).

However, recent evidence suggests that minority views of democracy are not as clear-cut (Hoffman 2021; Hoffman and Bagdanov 2020). Further theoretical and empirical work is needed to study religious minority attitudes.

To address these questions, I first define religion in sociological terms, explaining the various ways religion has been studied within the social sciences. I compare four theories of how religion relates to individual support for democracy. The first theory, rooted in psychology, posits that individuals with higher levels of religious adherence may exhibit greater authoritarian tendencies. This hypothesis is grounded in the idea that religious beliefs necessitate trust in an unseen higher power and a commitment to traditional values. The second, emerging from political sociology, suggests that more religious individuals will be more supportive of democracy. The logic in this theory is that religious behavior is pro-social, increases social capital, and ultimately leads believers to be more favorable towards liberal, democratic systems of government. The third theory, referred to as the multifaceted theory of religion, seeks to merge the first two theories together, finding that religiosity is comprised of multiple dimensions that have opposite effects on support for democracy. Finally, the fourth theory, the marketplace of religions theory, suggests that group size, state regulation, and the supply and demand of religion affect how religious groups organize politically. Each theory offers different empirical implications as well as various strategies for measuring individual religiosity. As such, comparing them has often been difficult because of the degree of variance in studies on the subject.

My contribution to the broader theory of religion and politics lies in the synthesis of ideas from these diverse bodies of literature, culminating in a comprehensive theory of religiosity. This theory takes into consideration various aspects related to definition and measurement, providing a more holistic perspective. I suggest that it is more parsimonious and conceptually clearer to consider religiosity as a set of “types” or segments of a population. While religious experience is vast and contains some attributes that are hard to measure (sincerity of belief being chief among them), I argue that patterns of stated religious behavior and beliefs likely correlate with each other. I establish a taxonomy of religious commitment that captures the potential variations in patterns of religious behavior among individuals. The four types I suggest range along a spectrum of *not religious* to *highly religious*. I argue that, while not as fine-grained as the multifaceted theory, observing types rather than individual elements of religious experience provides a greater explanatory power. This is particularly useful when examining trends among national and sub-national populations. I argue that being higher on the spectrum of religious commitment likely has an inverse relationship with support for liberal democracy and a positive relationship with authoritarianism.

Further, I argue that there is also likely a relationship between minority-majority status, religious commitment, and support for democracy. Minority-majority dynamics are an overlooked but important facet of any theory about how religious individuals engage in politics. Additionally, the literature on authoritarianism suggests that perceived threats by outgroups are related to or even cause increased authoritarianism (Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991; Feldman 2003; Feldman and

Stenner 1997). I theorize that members of smaller religious groups will be less supportive of democracy, despite the rights that such regimes may afford them. Belonging to a smaller religious community carries greater social costs, including the possibility of discrimination, while belonging to large religious groups may offer social benefits without requiring much sacrifice on the part of the individual. Members of minority religious communities will likely be more committed to their faith and less trusting of outgroups than the average religious person. Additionally, while being active in religion does likely build social capital, the levels of trust and civic responsibility may only be pointed towards coreligionists, as is the case with coethnics (Habyarimana et al. 2009). Minority religious status may, instead, amplify the perceived differences between minority and majority groups, leading to greater authoritarian tendencies and lower democratic support among members of smaller communities.

I end the chapter by proposing observable implications from my religious types theory, which I test in the next three chapters.

Defining religion

The first problem when studying religions in a rigorous and systematic way is that the term “religion” is vague and imbued with cultural ambiguity. Often, the term is intuited by authors and readers without proper definition, as it may seem self-evident what a religion is. This situation leads to challenges in achieving robust generalizations when discussing the intersection of religion and politics. What might hold true for one religion can vary significantly when the term is employed differently by other researchers. Although achieving a universally accepted definition

may prove elusive, I opt to adhere to the conventions established within the fields of comparative politics and international relations. I acknowledge that the persistent challenges in defining religion may still pose difficulties for interdisciplinary research. Despite this, the definition I have chosen is broad enough to correspond with scholars across several disciplines, although edge cases may differ. I draw on the work of Grzymala-Busse (2012) to define religious groups as social groups that:

1. Make supernatural claims about the nature of the universe.
2. Maintain doctrines that define a set or subset of moral behavior.
3. Institutionalizes the practice of connecting to the supernatural by a form of shared, regulated meditation or worship.

Using these criteria, it is easier to distinguish between religious groups and non-religious groups. Religion as a social phenomenon is often pointing adherents to consider that the world is greater than their material experience would have them believe. However, religion is not merely a belief in supernatural powers. For example, Stark (2001) argues that religion differs from general belief in magic because it “consists of explanations of existence...” whereas magic is simply “efforts to manipulate supernatural forces” (p. 111). There is a component of religion that goes beyond the general belief in the supernatural; it documents, prescribes, explains, and expounds. Religiosity is grounded in organized institutions that are designed to uphold, support, and defend the beliefs and explanations of the supernatural. Moreover, unlike other shared belief structures such as nationalism, religions assert that the world is influenced by or exists alongside a supernatural phenomenon. This assertion entails a requirement of belief in some outside, unseen force. Thus, while

nationalism may project a vision of a shared community, religion differs in its focus on higher, unobservable powers and phenomena.

The definition above is not perfect. For example, certain religions may exist to parody or critique organized religion (Urban 2015, chap. 9) while simultaneously conforming to the organizational structures of traditional religions (Foertsch 2022). Such exceptions are, by and large, rare. These outlier cases, such as the American Church of Satan, in which belief in a deity is not an actual tenet of the religion, do highlight the ways in which organizations adopt religious imagery without constituting a religion. In politics, for example, nationalist movements can get close to developing religious or cult-like practices, and some extreme political movements do adopt an eschatology that mirrors apocalyptic religious teachings (Szakolczai 2008). While such movements may be religion-adjacent, they do not conform to Grzymala-Busse's definition, which is to the researcher's benefit. The exclusion of such fringe groups and outlier cases narrows the scope of study to those spiritual organizations that are most similar. This does not discount the importance of studying fringe religious-adjacent groups. It is simply outside the bounds of this study, as the processes that lead to the creation of such groups likely differ from what fits in the general discussion of religion.

Having defined religion following the work of other social scientists, I now turn to the specific study of religion and democratic politics. I begin with a brief history of attitudes towards the study of religion in the social sciences, noting the resurgence of interest in the subject over the past two decades. I then outline the various theories that tie religion to individual beliefs about democracy and autocracy.

Recent history of the study of religion and democracy

Studying religion in an age of secularization

For a period of about forty years, the issue of religious groups engaging in politics was ignored in scholarship due to the popularity and evidence of world-wide secularization.

The secularization theory suggested that as societies modernized, religious belief would decrease and be replaced with belief in secular liberalism or similar values that were not rooted in theistic doctrine (Bellah 1986; Berger 1967; Lipset 1959, 2018). Berger (1967) argued that religion provided a sense of order in pre-modern society, but with the increased security and personal freedom afforded by liberal societies, religion lost its social function in the public sphere. Berger followed a similar argument to Weber (1976); he asserted that the Protestant Reformation allowed for the separation of church and state and began to move European states down a path of governance without legitimization by the Church. Similarly, Lipset (2018) argued that the development of modern technology, social safety nets, and democracy relegated religion to the private sphere, which would lead to its ultimate decrease in importance.

Religion in the public sphere

Alongside these theories, political philosophy continued to build upon non-religious, normative explanations of democracy. Perhaps most famously, Rawls developed a “thought experiment” related to the Enlightenment-era social contract theories of Locke and Rousseau (Rawls 1999). Rawls referred to the social contract as “the original position.” He argued that individuals aiming to establish the original

position would arrive at the consensus that every person should be treated with equal rights. Additionally, he argued that any social or economic inequalities would be arranged so that even those in lower classes would have equality of opportunity. Most vitally, all these components of democratic justice are created via a constitution that all citizens find acceptable based on “common human reason” (see Rawls 1999, chapter 4). Common reason requires citizens of the state to tolerate views that differ from their own, find areas of agreement with others, and generate consensus.

Religion in the public sphere creates a conundrum for a Rawlsian conception of democracy because it is not a part of “common reason.” Believers buy into the reasoning and logic of their own religion, but it may not be easily applied to all people in a society. Under secularization, however, this is a non-issue as religion becomes relegated to the private sphere. As such, even religious individuals can behave in secular ways by considering the shared views of others who hold different doctrines. Simply put, a Rawlsian conception of liberal democracy assumes some level of secularization through which religion is relegated to the private sphere.

The resurgence of religion following the end of the Cold War

Following the end of the Cold War, however, political, and social events caused researchers and philosophers to doubt some aspects of the secularization theory and the plausibility of Rawlsian democracy. First, it became apparent that religion had not left the public sphere (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Toft et al. 2011). Rather, religion had continued or even grown in importance across the developing world and the United States. Second, certain democratic movements across the developing world and former Soviet states were maintained or aided by religious

groups, priests, and religious communities (Haynes 2004, 2009; Huntington 1991).

The continued importance of belief in the public sphere led Habermas to offer a revision of Rawls' conception of democracy. If the post-Cold War era was to include religion, then democracies would function as "post-Secular" societies, which would have to accommodate religious views alongside "common reason" (Habermas 2006; Portier 2011). Berger (1999) recanted his earlier views on secularization and concluded that the world had become just as religious or more than it was before modernization. This has left the social sciences in a unique situation; old questions about the relationship between religion and politics have returned to mainstream social scientific scholarship.

In particular, the past two decades have seen a dual trend of the resurgence of the "religious" as a political force as well as democratic backsliding among both developed and developing nations (Bermeo 2016; A. Gill 2001; Grzymala-Busse 2012; Haynes 2006; Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg 2017; Norris 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2004). The continued and growing presence of religion in politics has also led to several researchers returning to older theories of religion and politics to explain these trends.

Religion and support for regimes

While it is unclear whether democratic backsliding and religion are related, it is apparent that all regime systems require some amount of mass support.

Democracies require a level of public support to function (Dahl 1971; Lipset 1959).

Recent studies of authoritarianism as the basis of political power have also found that autocrats also rely on support from key groups to maintain political power (Davenport

2007; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010; Mesquita et al. 2005). The difference between democracy and autocracy, regarding political legitimacy, is in both the size of the coalition supporting the regime and how that support is gained (Mesquita et al. 2005). Under democratic systems, citizens participate in the election of representatives or the passing of policies that impact them, ideally incentivizing participation. Autocrats maintain power either through the coopting of key groups or the coercion or repression of possible rivals to power or legitimacy (Davenport 2007). Historically, religious groups have supported both democratic and autocratic regimes (Haynes 2009). As such, it is not clear whether religion itself has any relationship with support for one type of government over another.

Some evidence points in both directions, suggesting that religious support for democracy is contextual. Kalyvas (2000) finds that certain politically active religious groups represented key challengers to the democratic state in Europe. Ziblatt (2017) suggests that while this was true in some states, in countries like Britain it was important that religious voters viewed democracy as a viable means of attaining political power. That religious actors can also be political actors in either representative or autocratic systems of government is not a question. Rather, the point of contention is whether religion predisposes individuals to be more supportive of one regime or the other. It may also be the case that religion has no relationship with support for democracy or autocracy. There are several theories that suggest various ways in which religion and support for regime types are related. These theories

emerged under disparate fields of research asking separate questions, but, I argue, all make claims about how religion and regime type relate.

Religion and the authoritarian personality

Given the observation that many illiberal political leaders receive support from religious groups, does religiosity affect support for liberal democracy? For some, religious ideology appears incompatible with Rawlsian notions of common reason or democratic politics. Ever since Adorno et al. (1950) produced their seminal work, *The Authoritarian Personality*, social scientists have made an association between religiosity and authoritarian tendencies (Allport 1954; Altemeyer 1981; Duck and Hunsberger 1999; Yusuf, Shidiq, and Hariyadi 2020). An important distinction is to be made here. Often, authoritarianism is treated as the opposite of democracy, i.e., authoritarianism is a type of political system comprised of institutions that uphold power via authority. This is not how authoritarianism is treated by the authors. Rather, Adorno et al. define authoritarianism as a personality trait that “renders [the individual] particularly susceptible to anti-democratic propaganda” (p. 1). That is, when addressing individual political, economic, and social views, the question is whether they have the potential to support anti-democratic regimes. This distinction is important because a latent authoritarian personality may not translate immediately into support for autocracy. Many authoritarians likely also say that they support democracy. The authoritarian is quicker to lose pretensions of democratic liberalism when illiberal political movements become socially acceptable.

Considering Adorno et al.'s theory that individuals who hold to tradition may be more susceptible to illiberal beliefs, Adorno et al. studied religion as a potential source of authoritarian support. While the popularization of this work has led to a general understanding that religion and authoritarianism are connected, the actual arguments made by the authors are not as direct. The authors' initial conclusion is that following the religious "status quo" leads to a higher level of authoritarianism (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 220). By status quo, the authors mean belonging to a religion that is the cultural or numerical majority. In the case of their study in the United States, major Protestant groups were considered the majority. The authors also found that complete rejection of religion is associated with lower authoritarian personality scores.

Ultimately, they concluded that it was not religion itself that created authoritarian attitudes, but the individual's psychological disposition in relation to their religion that mattered. Individuals who appeared to be religious not because it was part of the status quo but because it was a genuine belief scored lower on authoritarian and ethnocentric scales (Ibid., 219). Individual aspects of religiosity (examples include prayer, church attendance, and belief in God) did not correlate with authoritarianism. Only when respondents identified with a status quo religion that they shared with their parents did ethnocentric and authoritarian beliefs increase. Since these initial findings, work has been done to investigate, reproduce, and build upon the theory. Generally, such work seems to be in alignment with the Adorno et al. findings. The largely Freudian underpinnings of the original theory have been put into question. Researchers have instead suggested that the mechanism for increased

authoritarian personality is largely tied to perceived threats to social cohesion (Feldman 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997). More recently, Leak and Finken (2011) found that strict religious commitment is positively correlated with homophobia, which is also in line with the findings of Hunsberger, Owusu, and Duck (1999) and Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992). These authors, particularly Altemeyer (1981), make the case that strict adherence to religion directly relates to intolerance of groups perceived as threats or outgroups.

Few works have tied these findings about prejudice directly to changes in support for democracy. One study, (Canetti-Nisim 2004), is an analysis of the mixed effects of religiosity and authoritarian personality on democratic values. The study, conducted among a sample of Israeli college students, found that religiosity did not directly affect democratic values but, rather, mediated the effect of authoritarian personality. Authoritarian personality had a significant, negative impact on democratic values, which was in line with the literature previously stated. This study is not generalizable as a single case but presents promising results that require more validation in other contexts.

Overall, the work on authoritarian personality suggests that being religious is not the direct driver of authoritarian views or intolerance. Rather, it is one's disposition towards religion that drives prejudicial views. More rigid religious views correlate to higher levels of intolerant views as well as perceived threats from outgroups.

But does prejudice inversely correlate with support for democracy? It may be the case that elements of religious belief increase the chances that an individual is

prejudiced towards outgroups. It may even be the case that the religious individual has an authoritarian personality. But it is not clear that such beliefs correspond with less support for democracy. Furthermore, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1995) also note that not *all forms* of religiosity correspond with authoritarian tendencies. They argue that fundamentalism, a specific type of religiosity, correlates with higher authoritarian or ethnocentric personality types.

In summary, the literature in social and political psychology would suggest that it is not religiosity itself that drives authoritarianism but a person's disposition towards their religion. A religious person who perceives outgroups as a threat to social cohesion is likely to also have authoritarian views. There is a possible connection between religiosity and less support for democracy, but it is likely a mediating factor, with authoritarian personality playing a bigger role. This is just one view of many on the relationship between religion and democracy. In the next section, I highlight a theory of religion that suggests the opposite relationship: that religion may increase democratic values.

Religious practice and civic attitudes

While the literature in social psychology relates religion with authoritarianism, sociology and political science provide contrary evidence and opinions that follow a different line of logic. This alternative perspective on religion and attitudes towards democracy is that religious behavior develops greater support for democracy. Beginning with the assumption that democracy is more than a set of formal institutions that dictate the rules of elections and representation, these researchers contend that a second requirement for a functioning democracy is a civic

culture. Almond and Verba (1963) argue that following modernization, societies had to transition the way individuals viewed themselves in the polity by cultivating the concept of citizenship. Citizens are active members of the polity, given responsibilities to act politically, and afforded protections over their rights. Like Rawls' conception of the public sphere and the use of public reason, Almond and Verba suggest that the people acting in public need to have a developed sense of concern for the political community. Prior to the idea of citizenship, cultures were comprised of subjects. In a culture of subjects, the state makes decisions that affect members of society, but the individual members have no rights or say in the decision making. A subject has no sense of political power. Citizen cultures encourage political action on the part of individuals in a community.

This perspective, which asserts that democracy is an outcome of an enhanced civic culture and advocates for a bottom-up approach in the study of regime types, is further elaborated upon in the theory of social capital (Coleman 1988). Coleman (1988) argues that attitudes necessary for developing civic culture emerge due to social capital. Social capital is a theoretical combination of sociological and economic explanations for human behavior. It is a non-physical form of investment that is embedded in a social structure. Repeated interactions between individuals in a social setting help facilitate certain, repeated actions (Coleman, 1988, p. 98). Networks of human relationships help individuals build trust, which in turn makes working together easier. Repeated actions in a social network also create sets of norms around trust that allow for social sanctioning. In game theoretic terms, social capital helps individuals overcome free riding.

An example Coleman provides to illustrate social capital is the Kahn El Khalili market in Cairo, Egypt (Coleman, 1988, p. 101). In this market, shop owners specialize in selling specific goods but, when asked, can lead customers to other stores that sell items the customer wants. While shopkeepers are individual sellers, they have developed a system by which cooperating and building relationships increases all their sales. The development of a network that creates channels for reciprocal actions is an example of a form of social capital. By developing an environment that makes transactions easier, individuals improve their own prospects alongside their community members.

Continuing to build on the implications of social capital theory, Putnam (2000) argues that developing social organizations increases civic commitment to the community via social capital. Putnam (1994) contends that the cultivation of social capital is a crucial prerequisite for the functioning of a democracy. His research indicates that local governments in Italy with a history of communal organizations tend to be more democratic because of this social capital development. Fukuyama (2000) similarly insinuates that social capital is a likely precursor to democracy. He suggests that religions transmit the key features of social capital across generations through tradition and shared historical experiences. Hopkins (2011) proposes that religious association has the potential to increase civic behavior. Work over the last four decades has shown that engagement in a religious organization increases civic involvement because religious organizations provide training in specific political skills including mediation, debate, and organizing (Djupe 2009; Djupe and Neiheisel 2019; Leege 1988; Leege and Kellstedt 2016; Kenneth D. Wald, Owen, and Hill

1988). Kenneth D. Wald, Silverman, and Fridy (2005) also says that leaders of such organizations may activate religious identity by teaching believers about the religion's view of certain political issues. Such teaching and practice can lead to greater engagement in the public sphere by religious individuals.

Regarding religion, this theory suggests that group involvement (often measured as attendance at religious ceremonies) should increase the *civic attitudes* of religious individuals. These civic attitudes should, then, correspond to greater support for democracy. This argument runs counter to the earlier psychological literature. The earlier work suggested that religious belief increased a desire for security, a trust or deference in authority, and a desire to hold onto traditional social structures. These two different theories, on their own, run counter to each other. However, recent work has sought to combine both the authoritarian personality and social capital literatures under one large theory of religion and politics.

Synthesizing practice and belief: religion as a multifaceted phenomenon

Recently, scholars of religion and politics have developed a synthesis of the authoritarian personality and social capital branches of literature. Bloom and Arikan (2013b), Bloom and Arikan (2013a), and Bloom, Arikan, and Vishkin (2021) provide evidence that religiosity is a multifaceted phenomenon that encompasses both psychological and sociological elements. This finding, on its own, is not new. Religion has been considered a complex system of beliefs and behaviors throughout the history of social science (Durkheim 1915; Geertz 1966; Weber 1976; Young 1979). Despite this, most theories emphasize one part of religion over others, partially because measuring religiosity is a difficult task (Hackett 2014; Hackett et al. 2018;

Zwingmann, Klein, and Büssing 2011). From this perspective, the religious individual may have simultaneous and separate goals, some psychological and others sociological, that religion helps them attain.

Further, the Bloom and Arikan model implies that different facets have separate and sometimes contradictory effects on political attitudes and behavior. For example, a person may believe in God because such faith provides her with a sense of comfort and safety. This belief may encourage her to hold some authoritarian beliefs, because trusting in a higher power means accepting that a higher power has authority over her life. Simultaneously, she may also engage in social activities like attending worship services, volunteering with other coreligionists, or running a ministry that aids the poor. These activities may provide a sense of belonging and community that is separate from the psychological security provided by her belief in God. Combined, her religious experience provides a sense of both security and community. These two dynamics of religion may be intricately related, but Bloom and Arikan (2012) argue that the effects of these two dynamics are different. The authors argue that the socialization aspect should imply that religious minorities are the most pro-democratic. They write, “Being a minority in democracies, the religious enjoy the fruits of religious freedom and the rights and resources granted to minorities. Often, the religious elites and socialization agents politicize the religious group identity and mobilize the corresponding constituency within the democratic game (p. 254).” It may be the case that both the authoritarian personality literature and the social capital literature are true. The authors argue that scholars must separate these elements to accurately assess their support for democracy. The authors find that belief in God and

personal piety have a negative effect on support for democracy, while social behaviors have a positive relationship with democratic attitudes.

This multifaceted view of religion allows researchers to reexamine the relationship between religion and many previously tested phenomena. Recent work has found that the facets of religious belief and religious social behavior have differing relationships with trust (Livny 2020), protest (Arikan and Bloom 2019), tolerance of out-groups (Bloom, Arikan, and Courtemanche 2015), and support for democracy (Bloom and Arikan 2013b). The results of these studies generally find that piety and belief have a negative effect on civic attitudes, while socialization has a positive effect. These findings trend across religions that vary widely in doctrine, theology, and religious practices and in different countries or cultural contexts. The multifaceted theory of religion addresses old questions in nuanced ways, allowing for a more complex view of the relationship between belief, behavior, and politics.

But while the findings from this literature reveal just how complex religiosity can be, I suggest that breaking down religiosity into component parts is not always a helpful means of studying religion and politics. The multifaceted approach is especially helpful when determining the psychological mechanisms through which religion influences individual attitudes. At the same time, the findings from such studies may offer conceptual insight into observable outcomes. In survey design, separate aspects of a person's religiosity can be isolated and controlled. But individuals likely do not isolate aspects of their own religiosity when considering both their identity within a religious group and their political beliefs. Instead, it is the

confluence of factors that aggregate into religiosity. To illustrate this, I introduce the concept of religious types.

Despite the growth in literature that finds how different facets of religion affect a variety of political beliefs and behaviors, questions still exist. First, does the political and social context of any religious individual impact their political views? Take, for example, two equally pious Sunni Muslim men. They both engage in similar levels of prayer and community engagement. The difference is that one man lives in the suburbs of Paris, while the other lives in Algiers. Recent work has suggested that religion's role in politics is impacted by higher-level factors beyond the individual, including religious culture, church and state relations, and broader demographic trends at the national and international level (Cesari 2005, 2016, 2019; Stonawski et al. 2015). However, most of the research on individual attitudes focuses on the psychological effects of religious belief. These findings have little to say about issues of minority-majority status, regime type, religious regulation, or church-state relations. I now turn to these macro-level issues that may also influence religious support for democracy or autocracy.

Religious markets, group size, and individual beliefs

Unlike the authoritarian personality and social capital theories of religion and politics, which rely heavily on psychological and sociological conceptions of religion, a growing number of scholars have argued for viewing individual and group-level religiosity through the lens of a marketplace of religion (G. Anderson 1988; Finke 1990; Finke and Stark 2005; A. J. Gill 2008; Iannaccone 1991, 1998). Finke and Stark (2005) and Iannaccone, Finke, and Stark (1996) have promoted a “supply side”

theory of religious groups. In this theory, religious groups are treated as firms that produce religion as a product. The population represents potential consumers of the religions. In this market structure, the share of individuals who become religious is a function of market competition.

For example, imagine a country with religions A, B, and C. If religion A dominates a country's share of believers because the government sponsors or supports religion A, then the abundant supply reduces the amount of competition among the three firms. This decreased competition has a secondary effect, which is that it lowers overall commitment to religion A. This lower commitment may be due to the pervasiveness of the majority religion, of which there are social costs to *not being* a member. It also increases the chances of "free riding", whereby members of a majority religion benefit socially from attending religious services or engaging in religious communities without having to be as involved. Alternatively, when there are a number of religions of relatively equal size and power that are competing to gain more followers from the country's population (there is not a clear *status quo* religion), then the religious firms are more motivated to sell their product, and individuals who choose to join a given sect are doing so because they actually "buy" the product—they have genuine belief (Iannaccone 1991). In these ways, the structure of the religious market can affect the religiosity of individuals.

Work on religious markets and individual religiosity suggests an inverse relationship between group size and religiosity (Finke and Stark 2005; Perl and Olson 2000). Members of smaller groups give more to their local religious organization than members of larger groups. Additionally, small religious groups are affected by

government regulation. States often define the ways in which religious organizations can operate (Fox 2016). Greater restrictions on religious freedoms increase the costs for people to engage with their religions, likely lowering the overall numbers of believers (Finke 1990; Fox and Tabory 2008; Iannaccone 1991). Though the total number of individuals who choose to stay within a minority religion is smaller as a result, evidence suggests that these groups will have a generally higher level of devotion to the religion. This is partially explained as a function of the cost of being a member of a minority religion. Choosing to join a minority religion likely has a social cost. Where majority religions have a problem of free riders who gain social benefits from associating with a religion without having to be active, minority religions have a problem of social and/or legal stigma. Choosing to be a member of a group that is socially “other”, or which is legally repressed by the government limits individual opportunities.

Sectarian groups or fundamentalist groups often add even more costs for entry (Berman 2000, 2009; Iannaccone and Berman 2006). Highly selective sectarian religions such as ultra-Orthodox Judaism and fundamentalism among Islamic and Christian groups may require personal sacrifice that goes beyond expected membership costs. As Iannaccone and Berman (2006) explain,

The costs are not the standard costs associated with the production or purchase of secular commodities. Rather, they are apparently gratuitous costs that demand sacrifice and invite stigma: burnt offerings, which destroy valued resources; distinctive dress and grooming that bring ridicule or scorn; dietary and sexual prohibitions that limit opportunities for pleasure; restrictions on the use of modern medicine or technology. The list goes on.

— Iannaccone and Berman, 2006

These high costs, which individuals who join certain religious movements accept, deter free riding. Furthermore, the higher costs mean that the members who remain within such groups are dogmatic, true believers (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Juergensmeyer 2000). This selection effect can also lead to individuals in religious minority groups being more supportive of political violence and more willing to accept losses in conflict (Toft and Zhukov 2015; Toft 2021).

This literature suggests that cultural and political contexts impact how individuals relate to their religion as well as to politics. According to this theory, the level of repression and the minority status of the religious group will create a selection effect on individual religiosity. The reasons why religious group size and repression affect individual views are twofold. First, according to the religious market literature, there is an inverse relationship between religious group size and measures of religiosity, including church attendance, donations to religious organizations, and commitment to orthodoxy. A “demand-side” explanation for this relationship is that individuals who choose to engage with a non-status quo religion will be more likely to have greater belief because the social costs are higher, so less committed individuals will not join. Second, levels of repression affect the ability of religious organizations to develop social capital (Sarkissian 2015). In states where religious groups have limited organizational capacity due to religious regulation or when religious groups are too small, religious individuals may not be politically active.

Summarizing the literature

The work on religion and support for democracy is large and multidisciplinary. This chapter has so far attempted to present the disparate threads of different theories and suggest the observable relationships between religion, authoritarianism, and democratic values for each. Despite the large amount of work on this subject, scholars still have many questions to ask about the nature of the relationship between religion and politics.

Generally, I have outlined four theories that each present different arguments on how religion and support for democracy relate. First, the psychological literature on authoritarianism generally suggests that increased religious adherence leads to increased authoritarian personality traits. Second, the sociological literature based on social capital theory suggests that pro-social religious behavior generates social capital, which in turn generates civic values and democratic support. Third, political scientists and sociologists have attempted to merge the psychological and sociological theories together, arguing that religion is multifaceted, and each facet has a different directional relationship with democratic support. Specifically, pro-social behavior increases support, while beliefs and orthodox values decrease it. Finally, macro-level literature on the marketplace of religion suggests that group dynamics and religion-state relations effect group-level support for democracy, with larger groups likely being more pro-democratic under certain conditions of church-state relations.

Table 1 presents a summary of theoretical expectations between religion and support for democracy or authoritarianism for each of the theories introduced in this chapter. In the next section, I specifically address the multifaceted theory, arguing an

alternative means of measuring religiosity that also accounts for these disparate expectations across different elements of religion. I explain that, while the mechanisms in the theory are likely correct, there will generally be an observed negative relationship between aggregated religiosity and support for democracy and a positive relationship between aggregated religiosity and authoritarianism.

Table 1 Summary table of theories of religion and support for democracy/authoritarianism.

Theory Name	Religious Measure	Expected relationship	
		Democratic Support	Authoritarianism
Authoritarian Personality	Status quo religiosity	(-)	(+)
Authoritarian Personality	Authoritarianism	(-)	(+)
Social Capital	Social religious activity	(+)	NA
Multifaceted Theory	Religious belief	(-)	(+)
Multifaceted Theory	Social religious activity	(+)	(-)
Economics of Religion	Group size	(+)	NA

Note: The two columns on the right side of the table summarize the expected direction of relationship between measures of religion and the two outcomes of interest.

The revised religious authoritarian theory

After surveying the literature, I present a revised theory of religion and support for democracy and authoritarianism. This revised theory draws on the previous work described in this chapter but addresses possible areas where theory has become too abstracted or where literature has not addressed specific concerns raised in other fields. In general, I suggest that the work on authoritarian personalities is closest to being correct, but it neglects the group-level factors that matter, like group size, levels of repression, and national and political stability. Furthermore, I suggest that while the multifaceted theory of religiosity is correct at a mechanistic level, in terms of the observation of individuals within a population, it is hard to predict expected outcomes. Instead, each facet of religion likely clusters with others in predictable ways.

Introducing religious commitment as opposed to religious facets

The multifaceted theory of religiosity suggests that there are at least two or three dimensions to religiosity. These facets are broadly defined as *belief*, *behavior*, and *belonging*. Belief encompasses the individual's theology, their belief in the existence of God, heaven, and hell, and other such elements that comprise faith-based parts of religious experience. Behavior refers to the set of private and social actions individuals undertake to participate in their religion. Private actions may include meditation and prayer, as well as the reading of holy texts. Social actions may include items such as regular corporate worship, group meditation, attending prayer meetings, or volunteering for religious charities. Finally, belonging encompasses elements of self-identification. An individual belongs to a religion if they self-identify with that denomination, as well as if they consider themselves to be religious. All these elements are separate and, as the multifaceted theory has suggested, have separate effects on political outcomes of interest.

While these elements are different facets of religion, I argue that they are not independent of each other. Instead, it is better to consider the ways in which each of the three elements may be related. This is because, in observation, individuals who are described post-hoc as religious have some combination of all these factors.

The idea that multiple aspects of religion are interrelated is not a new one. Early scholars of religion, such as James (1902) and Durkheim (1915) thought that religion was comprised of at least a public and private element, both piety and ceremony. Glock (1962) suggested that religiosity could better be construed as religious commitment and presented five categories that, combined, described the

religious person in relation to others. Those categories, namely ideology, intellect, ritual, experience, and consequence, comprised a measure of general religious commitment. Faulkner and De Jong (1966) demonstrated support for Glock's theory by developing a battery of survey items to capture each dimension. They found moderate to high levels of between-dimension correlation. Davidson (1975) also found cross-dimension correlations but concluded that the relationship between each dimension was not equal, with some relating to others more strongly. Finney (1978) additionally argued that the five items themselves were likely influenced by the other dimensions; specifically, that religious practices socialize individuals first and then lead them to make conclusions about their intellectual and ideological views on religion, hinting at a possible causal relationship between facets. More recently, Huber and Huber (2012) created a measure of the centrality of religion in a person's life. Using Glock's revised five categories, Huber created a set of categories along the dimensions to measure the importance of religion. The categories vary from "non-religious" to "highly religious", with variations of relatively religious individuals falling between the two extremes. The scale has also been shown to be applicable across religions, which was a chief concern with Glock's theory.


I argue that following a similar system to Huber, based on a holistic view of religiosity, is a more empirically valid and theoretically defensible way of studying the relationship between religiosity and support for democracy or authoritarianism. I refer to the holistic combination of the separate facets of religion in a person's life as *religious commitment*. Furthermore, I suggest that it is likely that the multifaceted theory loses explanatory power when the mutual influence of different religious

dimensions is accounted for in this way. If, for example, a person is highly religious on the social dimension and therefore has a higher level of social capital, it is also likely that they have a high degree of in-group commitment to their religious community because the socialization is pointed inward. It is not clear how, in such a case, higher social capital would translate into a commitment to democratic governance, support for liberal values such as tolerance, or elections.

There are likely a few observable clusters of individuals along an axis of “religious commitment,” and, for simplicity and to address ongoing debates within political science on these issues, I accept the possibility that there are really three “primary” facets of religion, the primary facets being belief, belonging, and behavior (both private and social). These terms, used by Bloom and Arikan, can relatively easily be mapped onto the Glock taxonomy of religious commitment. The definition of belief is highly like the Glock categories of intellect and ideology (which were shown in the work of the following scholars, such as Finney (1978), to be related). The first two types I suggest likely exist are the two tails of the religious commitment spectrum, namely the *not religious* and the *highly religious*. These types are self-explanatory, the first being those individuals who have not identified with, believed in, or participated in religion. The second group includes individuals with high orthodoxy, high religious self-identification, and high participation levels. Within these two extremes, there likely exist two to three other levels of religiosity, but for simplicity, they can be considered to hold some moderate level of religious commitment.

Figure 1 uses simulated data points to illustrate the proposed concept of religious commitment in line with the work of Glock and Huber. Point shapes suggest possible religiosity clusters. The values of each simulated latent religious facet are meant only to suggest directionality, with higher values implying a higher level of that latent factor. These clusters are not fixed but are probabilistic in nature. Having high or low levels of one facet of religiosity does not dictate high or low levels across the other facets. The premise of religious commitment is that the observable aspects of religious experience are related to each other in predictable ways, leading to clusters of individuals who share similar characteristics.

Figure 1 Simulated data presenting hypothetical relationship between 3 correlated dimensions of religiosity and clustered religious groups.



Note: The x-axis shows the 'belief' dimension, the y-axis shows the 'behavior' dimension, and colors represent the 'belonging' dimension.

In-group social capital

When considering religious commitment instead of individual facets, it is unlikely that the “social capital” effect will outweigh the “authoritarian personality” effects. Because religiosity is a bundle of beliefs, behaviors, and group-identification, I expect that higher levels of religiosity are negatively correlated with support for democracy. I base this on the idea that increased religiosity implies greater self-identification with one’s religious group, increasing perceptions of out-groups as untrustworthy, and likely increases in orthodoxy/beliefs which are shown to have a negative effect on democratic support (Bloom and Arikan 2013b). I also suggest, in line with the work on authoritarianism, that religiosity positively affects authoritarian personality.

Furthermore, increased group identification and trust-building among coreligionists may lead to increased levels of social capital but it is unclear why this social capital would be generated towards out-groups. Research on the effect of social capital on coethnics suggests that social capital works by increasing the salience of in-group sanctioning of behaviors (Habyarimana et al. 2009). Country-case evidence also suggests that social capital operates within groups. For example, Livny (2020) finds that Islamic parties use religion as an instrument for mobilization because Islam generates in-group trust, but the in-group trust does not translate to general social trust (trusting both in-group and out-group members). Jamal (2007) finds similar results on the effect of group salience among Palestinians. These findings suggest that social capital may not always result in the expected pro-democracy results.

Suggested relationship between religion and democratic values

I suggest, then, that overall levels of religiosity primarily affect support for democracy indirectly, by developing higher levels of authoritarian personality. Religious commitment, because it likely also suggests increased in-group commitment and conservative ideology may lead to a small negative, and direct change in support for democracy. Authoritarian personality traits, however, likely play a more direct role in democratic support, with higher authoritarianism leading to lower democratic values.

However, an additional aspect of the relationship, which has long been missing from the theory of authoritarian personality, is that macro-level and meso-level factors impact religiosity, which likely alters both authoritarianism and democratic values. In the next section, I outline the ways the the marketplace of religion literature leads me to conclude that state-level factors likely influence latent psychological and ideological traits.

Minority vs. majority religion support for democracy


I argue that religious members of minority groups will be more wary of democracy if they face government discrimination. The reason is that discrimination has been shown to increase religious commitment among members of religious minority groups. Since authoritarian personality is tied to perceived threats, I argue that the possibility of religious group conflict is enough to affect authoritarian personality. Members of small religious groups will prioritize the survival and power of their in-group over the potential loss of power to a larger out-group in the democratic game.

Beyond the effect of group dynamics on religious commitment, minorities may not see democracy as the most viable option for protecting themselves and their community from repression, discrimination, or persecution. Minorities may view democracy as a system that favors majority groups. Faced with a losing battle at the polls due to being outnumbered, religious minorities may support democracy less as it is not likely to afford them political power. As an alternative, they may seek either to isolate their communities from society at large or to cooperate with autocratic governments in exchange for less repression or harassment.

Under similar conditions, I predict that members of majority religious groups will be more supportive of democracy due to the similar logic explained above. Seeing democracy as potentially benefiting the majority, members of religious majorities will see the potential benefits of democracy outweighing the costs of power-sharing. This is likely to be exacerbated if the majority religion comprises a large portion of the population.

Figure 2 presents a simplified directional graph of the theorized relationship between religion, authoritarianism, and democratic support.

Figure 2 Diagram of theorized relationship between religion and authoritarianism, religion and democratic support, and authoritarianism and democratic support. Ovals represent latent constructs, while rectangles represent observed, exogenous variables.



Expectations: religious types and minority status

Given the above theory, I suggest a number of potential outcomes. First, if the religious types theory is correct, then religiosity should negatively impact individual support for democracy. Additionally, if the authoritarian personality theory is correct, individuals who are more religious will be more authoritarian as well.

H1: Individuals with higher religious commitment will be less supportive of democracy than less committed individuals.

H2: Individuals with higher religious commitment will be more authoritarian than less committed individuals.

H3: Individuals with higher authoritarianism will be less supportive of democracy.

Second, the expectations from the part of the theory about minority and majority status suggest that the effect of religiosity will be mediated by the size of the individual's religious group and discrimination against minority groups.

H4: As the size of an individual's religious group decreases, support for democracy will decrease.

H5: As the size of an individual's religious group decreases, support for authoritarianism will increase.

The following chapters test these theories in a variety of ways. The next two chapters primarily consist of a cross-national observational study using survey data to assess the relationship between religiosity, group size, and support for democracy and authoritarianism. The third chapter consists of a single-country survey experiment in Indonesia, examining if the theory of religious group size holds in a diverse country with a large religious majority. Additionally, the experiment examines if framing democracy as a majoritarian form of government decreases support among religious minorities for democracy and increases authoritarianism.

Chapter 3: Religious Commitment and Authoritarianism

Assessing the connections between religion and authoritarian personality

The previous chapter outlined a theory of religious commitment, religious group size, and support for democracy. This chapter explores the connections between religious commitment and authoritarian personality. It lends support for a longstanding theory that religiosity is associated with greater authoritarian personality traits. The following chapter will assess whether this relationship has an observable effect on support for democracy.

Specifically, this chapter addresses two claims made in the revised authoritarian personality theory presented in Chapter 2. The first claim addresses the work of religion scholars such as Bloom and Arikan (2013b) who argue that different facets of religion have different directional effects on political beliefs. The multifaceted theory suggests that communal worship is pro-civic while religious orthodox belief is pro-authoritarian. In Chapter 2, I theorized that while these effects may be disparate, high levels of one facet should correlate with high levels of the other facets. I argued that greater overall religious commitment should still negatively affect support for democracy.

The second claim relates to the longstanding literature on right-wing authoritarianism. This literature suggests higher religious commitment should lead to greater levels of right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1981). This theoretical claim was distilled in **H2**:

Individuals with higher religious commitment will be more authoritarian than less committed individuals.

This chapter tests whether facets of religion co-vary as well as tests if there is a positive relationship between religious commitment and authoritarianism (testing **H2**). I conduct an observational analysis using waves 6 and 7 of the *World Values Survey*. Using latent class analysis (LCA), I subset the respondents into distinct classes of religious commitment and authoritarian personality. The latent class analysis provides support in favor of the idea that the multiple facets of religious commitment co-vary in a predictable way. Individuals with higher belief tend to have higher attendance to worship and a greater sense of belonging to their group. A cross-table analysis between the religious and authoritarian classes reveals that individuals with higher religious commitment are also likely to be more authoritarian.

Religiosity and authoritarian personality as types

The theory that religiosity and authoritarian personality traits are interconnected, influencing individual perceptions of democracy, presupposes that individuals can be categorized into observable subgroups based on shared characteristics. In the previous chapter, I outlined the ways that social scientists have conceptualized the distinct aspects of religion that may co-vary among distinct groups in a population. For religion, the three broad categories of variance are belief, behavior and belonging. These three aspects of outward religious commitment are related but separate elements

of what could be described as the religious experience. Together, they can demonstrate the level of commitment to religion an individual has. Even within the same religious population, individuals may vary in their levels of belief, behavior and belonging.

Similarly, psychological theories of authoritarianism suggest that the authoritarian personality is comprised of a set of related beliefs. As early as Adorno et al. (1950), academics began debating methods of capturing authoritarian personality traits via survey questions. Like religion, authoritarianism is a multifaceted set of beliefs that relate but are not strictly identical. For example, Napier and Jost (2008) suggests that authoritarian personalities have at least four characteristics, conventionalism, moral absolutism, obedience to authority, and cynicism. Additionally, work on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) suggests that authoritarian tendencies and out-group intolerance are also related (Altemeyer 1981; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Duckitt 1993; Duckitt et al. 2002; Zakrisson 2005). This has resulted in a long debate within the social psychology literature on how to properly measure authoritarian traits (Martin 2001).

Measures of authoritarian personality

The most-popular means of capturing authoritarian personality in a distinct measure is Altemeyer's Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) index (Altemeyer 1981). Altemeyer's index captures a wide set of beliefs and behaviors in a large index created via factor analysis. The index is comprised of around 30 survey items that ask questions about political beliefs, moral values, views on minorities, and

family roles in the home. The index has proven to be stable over time but has been criticized for being too large (Martin 2001; Zakrisson 2005), as well as being endogenous to issue preferences, making analysis of authoritarian traits on political outcomes difficult.

More recently, Engelhardt, Feldman, and Hetherington (2023) have sought to overcome the issue of political endogeneity by just asking questions about families and childrearing. They find that responses to questions about the home predict authoritarian responses to other questions. Their child-rearing scale captures the elements of authoritarianism related to values of obedience, traditionalism, loyalty, and order. The results suggest that researchers can greatly reduce the number of questions included in an authoritarian measure without losing predictive power. Additionally, making questions in an index exogenous to politics allows for easier causal analysis between authoritarian personality traits and political beliefs and behavior.

Similarly, Napier and Jost (2008) build a measure of authoritarian personality and a separate measure of ethnic intolerance to examine the relationship between the two concepts and “anti-democratic” personality. To measure authoritarianism, the researchers used questions about the importance of obedience as a trait in children, moral standards, the role of women, and whether authority is important. Additionally, they measure out-group intolerance by using questions about specific social groups and whether respondents stated they would not want them to be neighbors.

Religious subgroups relating to authoritarian subgroups

Based on the theory and previous findings on authoritarianism and religion, the two should be correlated. Specifically, higher religious commitment should lead to a greater individual emphasis on defending traditional beliefs and trusting figures in authority. To examine the relationship between religious commitment and authoritarian personality, I cluster survey respondents into distinct subgroups using *Latent Class Analysis* (LCA). LCA is a statistical technique used to identify and separate subgroups in larger populations. While it is related to other forms of cluster analysis, LCA operates under a different set of assumptions. That is, cluster analyses assume that survey respondents with similar answers should be in the same group. LCA assumes, a priori, that some latent subgroups exist, and that it is the subgroups that explain the different answers to the questions in a survey.

This is a useful tool for questions relating to psychographics like religious commitment or authoritarian personality. Researchers assume that among all religious individuals, there are latent classes of individuals who value different parts of religion to a certain extent. The varied survey results highlight the subgroups that already exist. Additionally, results from LCA are probabilistic. LCA models predict individual classification into subgroups based on similar survey response answers.

The potential setbacks to the use of LCA is the higher level of researcher input required to create an accurate and descriptive model.

Researchers must assume, a priori, that subgroups exist. This requires a prior suggestion of what subgroups should exist in the data. Additionally, the LCA results must be named. This means that researchers must analyze LCA model output and examine the conditional probabilities of survey responses given the LCA group assignment. Researchers often name the classes based on these results. However, given the need for descriptive researcher input, there is a chance of “naming error” where a researcher ascribes a name to a class that does not accurately describe the class.

There are visual and statistical tests that are common practice to mitigate these limitations. I follow best practices in creating the LCA models. The results of goodness-of-fit checks and visual comparisons of classes and survey responses demonstrate the credibility of the LCA model results. In the next section, I outline the development of both religious subgroups and authoritarian subgroups using waves 6 and 7 of the *World Values Survey* data set.

Data

Waves 6 and 7 of the *The World Values Survey (WVS)*, are the two most recent waves of the widely used cross-national survey. The *WVS* asks questions about respondents’ personal values and opinions on issues related to social and political life (R. F. Inglehart et al. 2014). The *WVS* data is conducted in waves every 5 years. The data used for this analysis were collected across 76 countries and territories between 2010 and 2020. As a

result, the survey offers rich, cross-national data on individual political and cultural views.

The *WVS* data is particularly useful for cross-national studies of religion and politics. The survey offers a battery of questions about religious experience, belief, and behavior. These are also coupled with batteries of questions related to political preferences, daily social experience, and views on women, child-rearing, and the treatment of minorities. Combined, the data presents a rich set of questions that cover a large temporal and geographic space.

Not all countries contained the necessary survey items to be included within the analysis, but the resulting data set includes over 160,000 individual responses.

I next outline the set of survey items used to generate the latent classes.

Religion items

To develop latent classes based on religiosity, a set of survey questions from *WVS* waves six and seven were chosen that addressed multiple aspects of individual religious experience. The questions include three that address religious self-identification (belonging), two that address belief, and three that address religious behavior.

First, *is religion important* is a question where respondents said whether they thought religion was important in their life; lower numbers on a four-point Likert scale indicate greater importance. Second, *identifies as*

religious asks respondents to identify as either religious, not religious, or a devout atheist, with 1 being religious and 3 being devout atheist. Third, *only acceptable religion is mine* asks respondents whether they consider other religions besides their own to be acceptable.

The two belief questions asked respondents if they believe in God or hell (these were the only two questions about belief in waves 6 and 7). The three behavior questions are *active in religious org*, *frequency of service attendance*, and *frequency of prayer*. The *frequency* questions are ranked as a Likert scale where lower numbers imply greater frequency of attendance/prayer. The *active in religious org* variable asks whether an individual is an active member of a religious organization. Respondents can say they are active, a member but not active, or not a member.

Authoritarian personality items

Like the religion questions, I use a battery of questions to identify latent authoritarian classes. The authoritarian personality items are largely based on the work of Napier and Jost (2008) and Engelhardt, Feldman, and Hetherington (2023). The combination of items used to be used prior by these researchers or fit with the logic of their item choice. Because the *WVS* adjusts its question set every five years, some questions used in prior waves to measure authoritarian personality were removed. The questions used for the LCA address individual attitudes towards obedience, authority, child-rearing, and tolerance of out-groups. While significantly reduced in size from the battery of questions that make up Altemeyer's RWA scale, these questions are largely a-political, which makes the measurement of

authoritarianism exogenous to political questions which will be examined in later sections of the dissertation. The latent classes are assumed to vary along both levels of authoritarianism as well as tolerance towards out-groups. For example, there may be individuals who have a high degree of respect for authority but that have high tolerance of out-groups. There may also be individuals with low respect for authority and low levels of tolerance.

There are four questions that address individual orientations towards authority which are meant to capture facets of authoritarianism. These facets include respect for authority, traditionalism, and cynicism. The first is a binary variable that is a 2 if the respondent said obedience was an important quality in a child and a 1 if obedience was not mentioned. The second question asks respondents if it would be a good thing for their country to have greater respect for authority. The responses to the authority question ranged from 1 to 3 with 1 meaning “a bad thing”, 2 meaning “I don’t mind”, and 3 meaning “a good thing.” The third question relates to traditional views of the household and asks how much the respondent agrees with the statement, “If a woman earns more money than her husband it is almost certain to cause problems.” It also ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 means “disagree” and 3 means “agree.” The fourth question asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement, “Generally, most people can be trusted.” The responses were either “most people can be trusted,” or “you need to be careful with trusting other people.” These questions do not address overt political or religious topics so that the measure can be considered distinct from religious measures.

In addition, there are five questions that address individual levels of tolerance towards out-groups. Four are binary items that ask whether the respondent said they would not want a specific type of person to be their neighbor. The four types of neighbors asked about are people of a different race, a different religion, foreigners, or people who speak a different language. A fifth question asked whether respondents agreed with the statement, “When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to the people of this nation/country over immigrants.” The results ranged from 1 to 3 where higher values implied greater agreement.

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables that comprise both the religious LCA grouping and the authoritarian LCA grouping. The authoritarian variables are first, followed by the religion variables.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics of variables that comprise LCA analysis.

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Authoritarian Variables					
important quality in child: obedience	165,383	1.371	0.483	1	2
most people can be trusted	163,133	1.759	0.428	1	2
country should emph. authority	160,646	1.549	0.728	1	3
jobs prioritize nation	158,240	0.477	0.762	0	2
women earning more is problem	161,916	1.097	0.864	0	2
neighbors: race	164,031	0.178	0.382	0	1
neighbors: foreigners	163,955	0.239	0.426	0	1
neighbors: religion	162,698	0.184	0.387	0	1
neighbors: language	165,522	0.167	0.373	0	1
Religion Variables					
religion important	165,114	3.099	1.090	1	10
identify as religious	161,813	2.621	0.700	1	9
frequency of attend service	161,617	3.910	2.219	1	13
frequency of prayer	160,737	5.339	2.729	1	14
only acceptable religion mine	156,703	2.661	1.369	1	10
believe in God	156,744	0.943	0.777	0	7
believe in hell	154,483	0.755	0.909	0	7
active in religious org.	165,622	0.534	0.807	0	2

Note: Data is from the World Values Survey data set, waves 6 and 7.

Having introduced the two sets of variables for conducting LCA analysis, I next turn to a description of model selection based on goodness-of-fit criteria. Because the classes are assumed latent, researchers must identify the likely number of classes and then use a combination of theorized class numbers and model assessment to choose a final LCA that best explains the latent classes within the data.

LCA goodness of fit statistics

The LCA model classification consists of a sequence of steps. First, researchers determine the set of variables which ought to be used to develop the latent classes. Second, the number of possible latent classes is informed by theoretical expectations. Third, the LCA model chosen is also informed by goodness-of-fit statistics. Common statistics used for LCA include the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), change in log-likelihood, the G-squared test statistic and entropy (Breen 2000; Hooghe, Oser, and Marien 2016; Siegers 2018). An optional step to improve model convergence is to combine LCA with expectation-maximization. Expectation-maximization (EM) is an algorithm that is used to identify maximum-likelihood estimates of latent parameters. When combined with LCA, EM can help identify the maximum-likelihood parameters that predict latent class assignment within a population. In practice, EM involves rerunning the LCA model several times, where the results of the previous run inform the maximum-likelihood estimates of the following run. As the model is rerun, the difference in parameter estimates reduces, leading to a converged final parameter estimate. This can be especially useful in

overcoming issues with missingness within the data. I chose to use EM with the model specification to address the missingness in the survey responses.

Religious class model goodness-of-fit results

After selecting the variables for creating the classes, I estimated the number of classes based on theoretical expectations and compared the expectations with several models run with increasing numbers of latent classes. This was done to assess the number of classes which best fit the data. I estimated that there should be about four groups: the four being *Not religious*, *Moderately religious*, *Religious and an active member*, and *Religious in private*. I considered that it was likely religious behavior would vary more widely than religious self-identification given that self-identifying as religious is “cheaper” than being active and consistent in behaviors. Table 3 presents the expected classes and the strength of each facet of religious commitment.

Table 3 Predicted latent religious classes and their levels of belief, religious behavior, and sense of belonging to a religious community.

Class name	Facet of Religious Commitment		
	Belief	Behavior	Belonging
Not religious	low	low	low
Spiritual	moderate	moderate	moderate
Religious but not a member	high	moderate	high
Religious and practicing	high	high	high

The model results are presented in Table 4. The primary statistics for goodness-of-fit when using an LCA model are the BIC, G^2 test statistic, and

change in log-likelihood for a model with x number of classes compared to the one-class model.

Table 4 Latent class analysis model fit statistics for religious behavior.

Number of Classes	BIC	G ²	Log-Likelihood	Entropy	ΔG^2
1	2026275	307644.25	-1012994.4	6.685284	0.000
2	1815567	96638.41	-907491.4	6.028552	-0.686
3	1765952	46724.36	-882534.4	5.853197	-0.848
4	1753957	34431.56	-876388.0	5.806254	-0.888
5	1744940	25116.14	-871730.3	5.774196	-0.918
6	1736574	16451.76	-867398.1	5.743893	-0.947
7	1732932	12511.92	-865428.2	5.724293	-0.959
8	1730834	10116.08	-864230.3	5.713547	-0.967

Note: Models and test statistics generated in R 4.2.1 using the polCA package. Statistics include BIC, G^2 test statistic, Log-Likelihood, and entropy. The five-class model was selected based on the combination of minimizing the BIC and Log-Likelihood without increasing entropy

Based on the results in Table 4, the preferred model for this classification analysis for the goodness-of-fit statistics, the percentage change in the G^2 test statistic from the contains five classes. Although the models with six or higher classes have lower numbers, changes in the six through eight class models are relatively small compared to the change up to the five-class model. Furthermore, given the relatively small number of items in the classification as well as prior theoretical estimates of the number of classes, five classes appear to show the best results with the most parsimony.

Authoritarian class model goodness-of-fit results

The same logic and statistics were applied when selecting the final authoritarian class models. Based on the assumption that authoritarianism and intolerance are two related but distinct aspects of the right-wing authoritarian personality, I estimated a priori that there would be at least four latent classes, namely

authoritarian/low intolerance, low authoritarian/low intolerance, low authoritarian/intolerant, and authoritarian/intolerant. The four classes were chosen under the assumption that not all authoritarians are intolerant of out-groups and not all intolerant individuals are authoritarian. With these assumptions, I ran 8 separate LCA models that increased in class number by one class. Table 5 presents the expected classes and their levels of respect for authority, value of obedience, and intolerance towards out-groups.

Table 5 Predicted latent authoritarian personality classes and their levels of deference to authority and intolerance towards out-groups.

Class name	Facet of Authoritarian Personality		
	Defers to authority	Values obedience	Intolerance
Low authoritarian, low intolerance	low	low	low
Low authoritarian, high intolerance	low	low	high
Authoritarian, low intolerance	high	high	low
Authoritarian, high intolerance	high	high	high

Table 6 shows the same set of goodness-of-fit statistics as the religious class model. After examining the results for each of the eight models which were produced, I concluded that the model that combined both improved goodness-of-fit statistics as well as the most distinguishable class distributions was the six-class model. The four and five class models resembled each other with a fifth class appearing to be like another in the model. Two of the five classes were essentially the same when it came to the probabilities of variable outcomes. The six-class model had more distinct class differences. As a result of the more intuitive results and the much better goodness-of-fit scores compared to the four or five class results, I deemed it the best model for the data.

Table 6 Latent class analysis model fit statistics for authoritarian personality and intolerance.

Number of Classes	BIC	G ² Statistic	Log-Likelihood	Entropy	ΔG^2
1	1950225	129087.127	-975040.5	6.004586	0.000
2	1837052	29811.757	-918375.8	5.670485	-0.769
3	1823034	16504.587	-911288.6	5.625828	-0.872
4	1817163	10726.524	-908274.7	5.605410	-0.917
5	1814229	7989.313	-906729.7	5.589709	-0.938
6	1812892	6733.915	-905982.9	5.581905	-0.948
7	1811667	5358.291	-905292.7	5.577915	-0.958
8	1811206	4854.894	-904983.7	5.576075	-0.962

Note: Models and test statistics generated in R 4.2.1 using the poLCA package. Statistics include BIC, G^2 test statistic, Log-Likelihood, and entropy. The six-class model was selected based on the combination of minimizing the BIC and Log-Likelihood without increasing entropy

Having outlined the means of running the LCA and selecting the models, I next introduce the results. I outline the probabilistic response patterns of each survey class and use this information to name each distinct class.

LCA model output and class naming

Introducing religious types

To interpret the differences between classes, I examine the probabilities of each response belonging to a specific latent class. Each possible response for all variables included in the model is given a probability that it corresponds to each class. When determining the theoretical meaning behind each class it is helpful to observe which responses are most probable for each latent class. For example, if the response *religion is very important* has a probability of 0.8 of belonging to class 1, then that implies class 1 consists of respondents who likely consider religion to be very important. These class-conditional probabilities for each

response are presented visually in Figures 1 and 2.³ After examining the distribution of these class-conditional probabilities for each response, I provide class names that summarize the religious behavior of respondents in each. The class names are *Active religious*, *Moderately religious*, *Private religious*, *Spiritual non-religious*, and *Not religious*.

For both Figures 3 and 4, the x-axes represent the probability weight that a member of that latent class provides the response. The y-axes represent each possible response for item variable included in the LCA model. Each latent class is represented graphically with a distinct shape. The further dots are to the right on the x-axis, the more likely that response is associated with the latent class.

Figure 3 visualizes the class-conditional probabilities for all religious classes. The *Active religious* class comprises of 23% of the survey respondents. It consists of individuals who had a high probability of saying that religion was very important, that they pray at least twice a week, that they are active members of a religious organization, they likely attend religious services twice a day or twice a week, and they consider themselves religious. Individuals who are members of the *Not religious* class are likely to not believe in God or Hell, consider religion unimportant, and do not belong to a religious organization or practice any religious activity. They

³ For a table displaying all probability results please see the appendix.


comprise 13% of the survey sample. These two classes make up the two polar ends of religious commitment.

Of the other classes that fall between these two in terms of levels of religious commitment, *Moderately religious* and *Private religious*, consider religion an important part of life. The difference between respondents in the *Moderately religious* and *Private religious* classes is that *Moderately religious* respondents have a low likelihood of praying more than a few times a week and they tend to disagree that their religion is the only acceptable one. *Private religious* respondents are not active members of religious organizations and do not regularly attend services. They identify as religious and are likely to pray multiple times a day. Additionally, respondents in this class are likely to say that their religion is the only acceptable one. The last class, *Spiritual non-religious*, is the closest class in the data to *Not religious*. *Spiritual* individuals mirror *Not religious* respondents in almost every way except that they are likely to say they believe in God. In this way, these respondents vary only along one religious facet and not the others.

Table 7 summarizes the classes in relation to the facets of religion. These results generally suggest positive correlation between the three facets of religion. In general, individuals with higher belief are also more frequent attendants of practices such as worship. This is in line with the expected relationship between the facets proposed in Chapter 2. The *Private religious*

class is an exception, including individuals with high belief and belonging but low levels of self-reported communal behaviors.

Figure 3 Dot-plot representing conditional probabilities of each response by latent religious classes.



Note: The x-axis represents the probability of each response conditional on the respondent's class. The y-axis shows each response for all variables included in the LCA model. Point shapes represent distinct classes. The five latent classes are Active religious (31% of respondents), Privately Religious (14% of respondents), Spiritual (14% of respondents), Never Religious (15% of respondents), and Moderately religious (24% of respondents).

Table 7 Observed latent religious classes and their levels of belief, behavior, and belonging.

Class name	Facet of Religious Commitment			
	Belief	Private behavior	Communal behavior	Belonging
Not religious	low	low	low	low
Spiritual non-religious	moderate	low	low	low
Moderately religious	moderate	moderate	low	moderate
Private religious	high	high	low	high
Active religious	high	high	high	high

There was a chance, when conducting the LCA model, that religious denomination would affect the classification of respondents into different groups. For example, depending on how a respondent interprets the meaning of “attending religious services”, certain religious denominations might be more likely to fall into the category. If, for example, certain Muslim or Christian sects do not have a tradition of regular worship, individuals who are actively religious may not attend religious services as that is not a part of their religion. When examining these classes across denominations, however, the results indicate that this was not the case. In most denominations, respondents fall into the classes proportional to the overall population with much of each denomination (about 30%) being *Active religious*. Furthermore, the *Never Religious* type is largely comprised of respondents who said they were non-religious or atheist when asked to identify their denomination, which is further evidence that the results of the classification are in line with expectations.

Because these results are robust, even when comparing across denominations, these classes can reliably be used to assess the effect of different types of religiosity regardless of a specific respondent’s religion. Next, I conduct the same set of

procedures to derive the authoritarian classes. I then examine the relationship between the two sets of latent class results.

Introducing authoritarian types

Returning to the same procedures but with the authoritarian LCA model, I present the response probabilities for each class and use these to name and describe each. The authoritarian model has six classes, which I have named after the varying levels of authoritarian traits and intolerance towards out-groups of each class. For simplicity, I have labelled the classes as either having *low*, *moderate*, or *high* levels of authoritarian traits and intolerance. The groups range from “*low authoritarian, low intolerance*” to “*high authoritarian, high intolerance*”. The authoritarian questions aim to capture how much individuals hold to traditional family values, the importance of obedience and authority, and trust towards strangers. The tolerance questions assess which social and ethnic groups an individual would be willing to associate with, as well as how they value immigrants compared to nationals.


Figure 4 presents the conditional probabilities of responses for all six classes. The “*low authoritarian/low intolerance*” class is highly unlikely to mention any of the four neighbor types as undesirable. Additionally, this class is the least likely to agree (and most likely to disagree) that nationals should be hired more than immigrants. For authoritarian traits, “*low authoritarian/low intolerance*” class members have the lowest probability of agreeing that women earning more causes problems (3.9% probability).

While there is a 41.8% probability that respondents in this category are likely to agree that their country should emphasize authority more in the future, this is still relatively low across all classes. This class is also more likely than others to say that emphasizing authority is a bad thing (24%). This class also has the lowest probability of listing obedience as an important quality in a child (11%). Finally, “*low authoritarian/low intolerance*” members are the least likely out of all groups to say that you must be careful trusting other people (47.8%). As a result, of all six groups, members of this class have the lowest intolerance towards out-groups, and demonstrate low priorities for obedience, authority, and traditional family roles. The next class, “*indifferent authoritarian/low intolerance*” shares similar traits to the “*low authoritarian/low intolerance*” with a few exceptions. They have a similar, low likelihood as “*low authoritarian/low intolerance*” class members to mention not wanting out-groups as neighbors. With most of the authoritarian questions, this class is most likely to provide the neutral answer, having low probabilities of either agreeing or disagreeing with statements about a woman’s income, emphasizing authority, or mentioning obedience. Respondents also have the second lowest probability of saying you need to be careful trusting others, although it is significantly higher than the previous class (68.4%). In general, this class appears somewhat indifferent to questions about authority and shows low levels of intolerance towards out-groups. The third class, “*low authoritarian/moderate intolerance*”, ranks higher on the out-group

neighbor questions than the previous classes. This class appears to be more likely to demonstrate intolerance towards foreigners and immigrants.

Members of this class have a 59% probability of mentioning foreigners as a group they would not want as neighbors. Additionally, they have a 72.6% probability of saying they agree that nationals should be hired over immigrants. The probability of mentioning not wanting members of different races, languages, or religions are all lower than foreigners (all

Figure 4 Dot-plot representing conditional probabilities of each response by latent classes.



Note: The x-axis represents the probability of each response conditional on the respondent's latent class. The y-axis shows each response for all variables included in the LCA model. All latent classes are presented with shapes indicating the different classes. The six latent classes and their percentage of the data are low authoritarian/low intolerance (16%), indifferent/low intolerance (9.2%), low authoritarian/moderate intolerance (7.8%), high authoritarian/low intolerance (48.7%), high authoritarian/moderate intolerance (9.5%), and high authoritarian/high intolerance (8.76%).

are below 25%), but they are still considerably higher than the previous two classes. However, among the remaining authoritarian questions, members of this class share similar probabilities with the previous two classes.

Authoritarian tendencies for this class are low but out-group intolerance, especially towards foreigners or immigrants appears to be higher.

The fourth class, “*high authoritarian/low intolerance*,” demonstrates high importance on obedience and emphasizing authority. However, along the questions related intolerance, the response probabilities are like the first two groups. This class is the most likely to express distrust of other people (87%). Compared to the previous classes, this class shares similar levels of intolerance towards out-groups but has significantly higher response rates agreeing with the statements meant to capture authoritarian tendencies.

The fifth class, “*high authoritarian/moderate intolerance*”, has higher probabilities of mentioning members of a different religion, race, or language as people they wouldn’t want as neighbors than the previous four classes. Additionally, they have the highest probability of agreeing that nationals should be hired over immigrants (85%). They also have the highest probability of suggesting that women earning more than men causes problems (51%). They have the highest probability of mentioning obedience as an important child quality as well (48.4%). Members of this class demonstrate low general trust, high emphasis on obedience, and high emphasis on authority.

The final class, “*high authoritarian/high intolerance*”, are like the previous class in terms of the authoritarian traits. Members of this class demonstrate low general trust and emphasize obedience and authority. What sets this class apart from the others is the significantly higher probability of mentioning certain groups that class members would not like as neighbors. For the four out-groups (different races, religions, languages, or nationalities), the probability of listing a group is the highest, ranging from 88% to 94%. As a result, this class demonstrates not only high authoritarian traits but also a high amount of out-group intolerance and general distrust.

Table 8 presents a summary of these classes as they relate to individual characteristics of authoritarian personality.

Table 8 Observed latent authoritarian personality.

Class name	Facet of Authoritarian Personality				
	Obedience	Authority	Nationalism	Distrust	Intolerance
Low auth/Low intol	low	low	low	low	low
Indifferent/Low intol	low	low	moderate	moderate	low
Low auth/Moderate intol	low	low	moderate	moderate	moderate
High auth/Low intol	high	high	moderate	high	low
High auth/Mod intol	high	high	high	high	moderate
High auth/High intol	high	high	high	high	high

Note: The different facets of authoritarian personality are deference to authority, obedience, distrust of others, nationalist tendencies, and intolerance towards out-groups.

Having introduced and described both religious classes and authoritarian classes in the data, I now turn to an analysis of how the two types of classes relate to each other. Given the theory that religious commitment is correlated with and may even reinforce authoritarian attitudes, I use cross-tabulation and Pearson’s chi-squared test to demonstrate that there is an observable relationship between religiosity and authoritarian tendencies. I note that there is also evidence that supports

the theory that individuals who are committed to their religion but do not attend communal worship services show greater intolerance towards out-groups.

Cross-tabulation of authoritarian and religious types

With the two LCA model results created, I compare the overlap of religious and authoritarian latent classes in the data. Table 9 presents a cross-table with marginal counts. The numbers in parentheses represent the proportion of each authoritarian class made up by the religious class in the column. The cells in bold are the religious class that make up the highest proportion of that row's authoritarian class. The bottom row and furthest right column represent total counts and proportions.

Table 9 Cross-table of authoritarian and religious classes

Authoritarian classes	Religious classes					Total
	Not rel.	Spiritual	Moderately rel.	Private rel.	Active rel.	
low auth/low intl	8223 (0.309)	6971 (0.262)	6182 (0.232)	1391 (0.052)	3875 (0.145)	26642 (0.160)
indifferent/low intl	2466 (0.161)	3990 (0.26)	4448 (0.290)	1776 (0.116)	2680 (0.174)	15360 (0.092)
low auth/mod intl	2008 (0.155)	3230 (0.249)	3616 (0.278)	2042 (0.157)	2094 (0.161)	12990 (0.078)
high auth/low intl	6499 (0.080)	13349 (0.165)	22324 (0.275)	16260 (0.201)	22654 (0.279)	81086 (0.487)
high auth/mod intl	982 (0.062)	1935 (0.122)	3538 (0.224)	5332 (0.337)	4023 (0.254)	15810 (0.95)
high auth/hgh intl	1279 (0.088)	2298 (0.158)	3606 (0.247)	4517 (0.310)	2874 (0.197)	14574 (0.088)
Total	21457	31773	43714	31318	38200	166462

Note: Cells represent counts with row-proportions in parentheses. Bold cells represent the religious class that makes up the majority proportion of each authoritarian class. A Pearson's chi-squared test of independence results in $\chi^2 = 19945$, $df = 20$, $p < 2.2e-16$.

The table suggests that there is an uneven distribution of religious latent classes across the authoritarian classes. Specifically, it appears that higher levels of

authoritarian personality are associated with higher levels of religious commitment. Additionally, levels of intolerance appear to be associated with religious commitment as well. The most common authoritarian class is “*high authoritarian/low intolerance*” (~49% of all observations) and the most common religious class is “*moderately religious*” (~26% of all observations). Despite the counts of these two groups being the largest, the “*moderately religious*” class does not make up the largest proportion of the “*high authoritarian/low intolerance*” class (although “*moderately religious*” do make up about 28 percent of the class, which is still large). Instead, the “*active religious*” class makes up the majority of the “*high authoritarian/low intolerance*” class (~29% of the class, 722 more observations than “*moderately religious*”). These results suggest that some respect for authority and tradition is common but overt intolerance towards out-groups is not common among the whole sample.

The *Private religious* class makes up the majority proportion of both “*high authoritarian/ moderate intolerance*” and “*high authoritarian/high intolerance*” classes. This is in line with expectations about the relationship between the communal nature of religion and social capital. The class whose members are likely to engage actively in religion except for attending services are also the most likely to be both more authoritarian and intolerant towards out-groups. The *Active religious* class is less likely to be intolerant towards out-groups but retains similar authoritarian traits to those of the *Private religious* class.

Moving to the religious classes with lower levels of religious commitment, both authoritarian traits and levels of intolerance appear to drop. It is within expectations, for example, that *Not religious* class membership makes up the largest

proportion of the *low authoritarian/low intolerance* group, followed by the *Spiritual* religious class in number. The *Spiritual* class does not make up much of any authoritarian class.

I conducted a Pearson's chi-squared test to assess whether there is an association between the two LCA class results as the table suggests. The resulting chi-squared statistic is 19945 ($df = 20$, $p < 0.01$). The statistical test results provide evidence against the null hypothesis that the two LCA class variables are not related. Additionally, the Cramer's V statistic of 0.1684 ($df = 4$) suggests a moderate strength relationship between the religious and authoritarian classes for a cross-tabulation with 4 degrees of freedom. These results provide strong cross-country evidence that authoritarian traits, intolerance towards out-groups and religious behavior are correlated.

Minority/majority group differences

It's possible, given the theory in Chapter 2 that selection effects lead minority religion members to generally be more committed to their religious group, that minority groups should see higher proportions of *Active religious* types compared to majority groups. To assess whether this is the case in the data, I separate individuals by minority/majority religion status and observe counts and proportions of religious commitment class membership. In line with the theory, higher proportions of religious minorities fall into the more committed religious types.

To identify minority/majority status of individuals in the data, I use the *Religious Minorities at Risk* (RMAR) data set (Basedau et al. 2019). The

RMAR data identifies religious minority groups across the world and codes for the groups' religious, social, and economic discrimination. Additionally, the data contains variables about the groups' activities and grievances against the state. Using the definition of the Religion and State project for religious minorities as "a religious community that either forms the numerical minority in a given country or is politically or otherwise marginalized," the data set records for 771 minority groups between 2000 and 2014.⁴ Using the data, I identify individuals in the *WVS* who are religious minorities.


Figures 5 and 6 present bar-graphs of the results of this matching. The results show that among religious minorities in the data, *Active religious* types are the most represented (31 percent, n = 2983). Among religious majorities in the data, the most common religious type are *Moderately religious* (37 percent, n = 51967). For both religious minorities and majorities, about half of all respondents fall into one of the two classes with higher religious commitment (*Active religious* and *Private religious*). The difference is that the proportion of *Active religious* and *Private religious* classes among religious majorities is about the same (~24 percent), whereas there are fewer *Private religious* class members among minorities.

⁴ Refer to the appendix for a full explanation on how individuals in the survey were matched to minority status using the RMAR data.

There is not a large difference between majority and minority religious individuals in the distribution of authoritarian classes. Figure 6 shows that, while religious minorities have slightly higher proportions of lower authoritarian classes, in general, the distributions are similar.


These findings suggest that, while authoritarianism follows a similar pattern in the data regardless of minority religion status, individuals who are religious minorities are more likely to be *Active religious*. Individuals in the majority religion are more likely to be *Moderately religious*. This finding is in line with the marketplace of religion theory introduced in Chapter 2.

Figure 5 Proportion of religious commitment types by religious minority status.



Note: Bars represent the proportion of individuals who fall into religious commitment classes along the X-Axis. Numbers above the bars represent proportions, with counts of individuals in parentheses. The left facet shows religious minorities, and the right facet shows religious majorities.

Figure 6 Proportion of authoritarian class types by religious minority status.



Note: Bars represent proportions of individuals who fall into authoritarian classes presented on the X-axis. The numbers above the bars represent proportions with counts in parentheses. The left facet shows religious minorities, and the right facet shows religious majorities.

Another observation to note given these results is that, according to the *WVS* waves 6 and 7, religious belief, even moderate belief, is high. This consistent finding is further evidence against the secularization theory, the expectation that religion would wane as modernization increased. A minority of individuals in the survey are in the *Not religious* class.

Discussion

In this chapter, I provide evidence via Latent Class Analysis that there is a general relationship between religious commitment and authoritarian personality. This finding lends support to **H2**, the hypothesis that religious commitment and authoritarian personality traits are related.

Additionally, this finding lends evidence in favor of the theory that, while there are different facets to religion, in general these facets are positively correlated. One exception is that individuals who are *Private religious* have high levels of belief and belonging while they vary in their religious practices. The *Private religious* class appears more likely to be more intolerant of outgroups, which supports part of the multifaceted theory presented in Chapter 2. Having established the relationship between religion and authoritarian personality traits, the next chapter will assess if and how this relationship affects individual views on democracy.

In this chapter, I generated observable latent classes for both religion and authoritarian personality among the respondents of the *World Values Survey* (waves 6 and 7). The results demonstrate or reconfirm several important findings, some of which have been documented previously in psychology and sociology. First, there are observable differences in religious commitment and authoritarian traits. Additionally, these latent classes of religious commitment and authoritarian personality are related to each other in the expected direction. As religious commitment increases, so does authoritarianism and intolerance towards out-groups.

Evidence in favor of the multifaceted theory

The results also provide evidence for one aspect of the multifaceted theory of religion. Patterns in religious commitment related to communal and social practice and civic attitudes exist in the expected direction. Religious individuals who do not attend communal worship events are more

likely to be intolerant of out-groups compared to religious individuals who are likely to attend communal worship. This relationship falls in line with the theory of social capital and the previous work done on religiosity that suggests socialization is a pro-social aspect of religious experience.

Individuals who are not religious are also more likely to have low authoritarian traits and low intolerance. It makes sense that individuals in this category also are likely to be less concerned about social tradition, obedience to authority, and living alongside people who are different from them. The countries in the data with the highest percentage of low authoritarian and low intolerance respondents are Canada (2808 respondents, 69% of sample), Andorra (523, 2%), New Zealand (860, 45%), Australia (1362, 41%), and Germany (1375, 38%). These countries are also in the top 15 countries in the data with the largest percentage of non-religious class respondents.


Authoritarian personality is widespread

One surprising result from the LCA analysis is that most individuals in the data have a somewhat high level of authoritarian traits. Close to half of all respondents in the data fall into the “*high authoritarian/low intolerance*” class. Breaking the percentage of “*high authoritarian/low intolerance*” class membership up by country reveals a regional pattern exists in the distribution of class members. The results, presented in figure 7, demonstrate that there are a high concentration of “*high authoritarian/low intolerance*” class members in the Caribbean, Central

America and Latin America generally. The country in the data with the highest percentage of “*high authoritarian/low intolerance*” members is Haiti (1648 respondents, 82% of sample), followed by Trinidad & Tobago (822 respondents, 82%), and Bolivia (1595 respondents, 72%). Also in the top ten are Colombia, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru, and Nicaragua. The country with the lowest number of “*high authoritarian/low intolerance*” in the data is Japan (270 respondents, 7.1%). Figure 7 presents the percentage of “*high authoritarian/low intolerance*” by country.

These findings suggest that there are region-level or country-level effects at play in the distribution of the latent classes. There are likely concentrations of individuals with higher respect for obedience, authority, tradition, and lower general trust, in certain regions and countries. Recent political history also shows that democracies themselves may elect leadership that emphasize these same values with popular support.

Figure 7 Frequency of "High Authoritarian/Low Intolerance" class by country.



Conclusion

Religious commitment and authoritarian traits are related. This chapter provides evidence for this via a cross-national study of latent religious and authoritarian classes using observational data. The results of the latent class analysis suggest that more religious commitment is associated with more authoritarian personality traits. Based on the theory of religious commitment and support for democracy, I argue that it is likely that religious commitment affects authoritarian values, which ultimately has a direct effect on how individuals view democracy and whether they support it.

Additionally, I notice differences in the distribution of religious commitment and authoritarian class by country and majority/minority status. First, religious commitment varies between minority and majority religious groups. By matching survey respondents to the Religious Minorities at Risk data, I observe that religious

minorities are more likely to be *Active religious* while majorities are more likely to be *Moderately religious*. Second, when examining the distribution of authoritarian classes across countries I note a large regional variation, suggesting that the class membership is not uniform globally. These two findings will inform the analysis in Chapter 4.

This chapter identified that a relationship exists between religious commitment and authoritarian personality traits, supporting a long-standing theory in political psychology. It is unknown if this relationship has any observable impact on political outcomes such as support for democracy. Additionally, it is unknown whether this relationship holds when accounting for country-year and religious minority/majority variance. The following chapter tests the impact of religious commitment and authoritarian personality on support for democracy as well as whether religious minority status has any observable affect. The next chapter will use this same data to examine the direction and relationship of religious commitment and minority group status on support for democracy

Chapter 4: Cross-country analysis of religion and support for democracy

Assessing democratic support

This chapter tests the theory presented in Chapter 2, that religious commitment, authoritarian personality, and minority religious group status negatively affects support for democracy. The previous chapter provided evidence that individuals with high religious commitment also tend to have higher levels of authoritarian personality traits. Using a large, cross-national survey data set introduced in Chapter 3, the *World Values Survey* (waves 6 and 7), I test the effect of religious commitment, authoritarian personality traits, and religious group size on democratic support.

I find that support for democracy is high among the entire sample, but individuals differ in how they define democracy. Using factor analysis, I identify two factors that individuals vary along when defining democracy, liberal notions of democracy and illiberal notions of democracy. I use these factors as dependent variables in a statistical analysis. I theorize that higher religious commitment and authoritarian personality should be associated with greater support for illiberal notions of democracy, and less support for liberal democracy. The results from this analysis, using linear regression with random country-year intercepts, supports the theory that higher levels of religiosity have a negative relationship with liberal democratic support and a positive relationship with illiberal notions of democracy. Additionally, I find evidence that authoritarian personality traits have a negative

relationship with democratic support. The strength of the relationship between authoritarian personality traits and support for democracy is diminished when religious commitment is high. I find that, when controlling for authoritarian personality traits and religiosity, intolerance towards out-groups has a more overt and negative relationship with liberal notions of democracy, and a positive relationship with illiberal notions of democracy. The model results hold generally across several alternative specifications.


Additionally, I find limited evidence that supports the theory that religious minority status or discrimination has an impact on individual-level support for democracy. I also test whether group size or political grievances alter levels of individual support for democracy and find that the relationship is null. I discuss the likely reasons for this result. First, I suggest that group-level variables may have limited impact on questions related to general support for democracy. Second, I argue that, rather than being evidence for a universal trend that minority status has no effect on support for democracy, the null results suggest that the relationship between religious minorities and the state is likely path-dependent and not generalizable to all cases. I suggest that certain historical conditions may lead to varied outcomes in minority religious support for liberal democracy.

Reviewing the theory

I first summarize the theory presented in Chapter 2 - focusing mainly on the direct and testable implications of the theory. I argue that an individual's religious

commitment increases personality traits and beliefs that are associated with authoritarianism, including trust in authority figures and a personal focus on holding to traditional and conservative social values. Consequently, I expect religious commitment and authoritarian personality traits lower support for liberal, democratic values. As a secondary argument, I also theorize that group-level dynamics among religions affect individual perceptions of democracy as well. Specifically, I suggest that members of smaller religious groups in non-democratic countries will be less supportive of democracy than members of larger groups. This is because members of religious minorities under non-democratic regimes will likely associate democracy with majoritarian political power and will increase individual perceived threat. Figure 8 is a directional graph of the theorized relationships between the religious, and authoritarian factors on support for democracy. Formally, this theory suggests several testable hypotheses:

Figure 8 Diagram of theorized relationship between religion and authoritarianism, religion and democratic support, and authoritarianism and democratic support. Ovals represent latent constructs, while rectangles represent observed, exogenous variables.



This chapter presents a test of the theory using a large, cross-national survey data set. The following section outlines the data set and methodological considerations taken to create measures of democratic support.

Data and methods

To test the effect of religious commitment and group size on democratic support, I turn to *The World Values Survey (WVS)*, the same data used in the previous chapter to introduce religious and authoritarian types.

Not all countries or individual observations contained the necessary survey items to be included within the analysis. Even with the dropped country cases, the resulting data set includes over 60,000 individual responses. Additionally, several country-level factors are added as higher-level controls.

The primary models used to assess the relationship between the variables of interest are linear regression with random intercepts for each country-year (Beck 2005; Hox, Moerbeek, and van de Schoot 2017). This model was chosen due to the cross-national and time-variant nature of the data - which solves for issues related to endogeneity and ease of interpreting results (Bell and Jones 2015). Models were generated in the *R* statistical programming language. Given that multilevel modeling using frequentist methods can produce imprecise parameter estimates, the models with all control variables are run using Bayesian analysis (Gelman et al. 2013). I conducted Bayesian, multi-level, linear regression via the Stan modeling software using the *rstanarm* (version 2.21.3) package (Goodrich et al. 2022) and the *stan_lmer* function. I describe the means of running these models further in the analysis section.

In the next sections I introduce the primary outcome and predictor variables of interest and how the data for both were generated. I also explain the various control variables included in the models to account for other factors that may impact democratic and authoritarian values.

Dependent variable

Upon inspection of the data, almost the entire data set supports democracy. Of the 166,462 observations in the data, 136,022 respondents agreed with the statement that having a democracy was good. Only 6210 respondents said that democracy was very bad. This finding is in line with previous work that finds democracy has almost universal support in surveys (R. Inglehart 2003). Further inspection of the data reveals, however, that when asked to define democracy along a set of possible attributes, there is wider variation. Rather than assessing direct support for democracy, which has been found to have low variation and provides little insight into respondent's beliefs about government, I measure notions of democracy. I argue that measuring notions of what democracy means to individuals provides richer insight into the political beliefs of individuals.

In this section I explain how I create the dependent variables that measure support for democracy. Most work that assesses these topics uses some form of factor analysis or an index of survey items to assess relationships between exogenous factors and political beliefs (R. Inglehart 2003). Specifically, the *World Values Survey* contains a battery of items about defining democracy. These questions ask respondents to rate how *vital* something is to democracy on a scale of 1-10, where 10 implies that the stated aspect of governance is *vital*. To generate the dependent

variables, I pull a set of questions to create an index of support for democracy that includes the following questions:

- On a scale of 1-10, how important is it for you to live in a country that is a democracy?
- Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy.”
- Free and fair elections
- The government supports civil rights.
- Women have the same rights as men.
- People obey their rulers.
- Religious leaders interpret the laws.
- The army takes over when the government is incompetent.

It has been shown that this set of questions, while they address individual values of democracy, contain multiple factors that are separate. Kirsch and Welzel (2019) finds that there are two factors present within the survey responses. The first are illiberal (or authoritarian) notions of democracy (IND) and the second are liberal notions of democracy (LND). The first factor is comprised of the questions about “religious leaders”, “the army”, and “people obey their rulers”. These items present separate latent concepts from the questions about free and fair elections, civil rights, and women’s rights. I next explain the meaning and importance of these two factors and their implications for studying support for democracy.

Liberal and illiberal notions of democracy

What does it mean to support democracy? In most of the world, most individuals, when asked, say that they support liberal democracy (Dalton, Shin, and Jou 2007). At the same time, there is a paradoxical finding that individuals will support both liberal and illiberal notions of governance, creating an overall deficit of support for democracy that upholds the values of rule of law, civil rights, and the


limiting of elite/military power (Kirsch and Welzel 2019; Norris 2011). Shin and Kim (2018) find that there is overwhelming global support for democracy, but the definition of democracy is context dependent, with some regions and countries allowing for more illiberal or autocratic tendencies in governance. Shin and Cho (2011) for example note that in China support for democracy is almost universal. Simultaneously, support for the one-party system is also high. In essence, Chinese citizens consider their system to be a democracy. Norris (2011) similarly notes this and suggests that the distinction between support for liberal notions of democracy are only consolidated in those countries that have developed into full, liberal democracies already. Thus, the democratic West tends to be less supportive of illiberal concepts such as allowing the military to take over when the government is inefficient. When measuring support for democracy at a global level, a more nuanced metric is required than simply asking for one's level of support for democracy. Researchers must consider how respondents define democracy itself.

Figure 9 visualizes the results of a confirmatory factor analysis on the battery of questions about democracy.⁵ The circles represent latent concepts (the two separate factors) while the squares represent variables coded in the data (the variables that comprise the latent concept). Straight arrows show the relationship between a latent concept and specific variables. The numbers along the straight arrows are the

⁵ For a table displaying all t-test results, including results which were not statistically significant, please see the appendix.

standardized parameter estimates from the factor analysis model. The numbers along rounded arrows represent the item-level variance.

Figure 9 Visualization of factor analysis results on democracy survey items.



Note: The factor on the left of the graph represents liberal notions of democracy while the factor on the right represents illiberal notions of democracy. Data used was World Values Survey waves 6 and 7. Numbers on arrows represent standardized parameter estimates. Numbers on circular arrows represent item and factor variance.

The results of this factor analysis suggests that support for democracy is comprised not only of support for specific democratic institutions, but also the liberal notions of human and civil rights that are often associated with modern democracy.

Because there is a possibility that the two concepts have different relationships with religious commitment, authoritarian personality, and intolerance towards out-groups, I separate the factors into two indices, a *liberal notions of democracy* (LND) index, and an *illiberal notions of democracy* (IND) index. These indices are used as the dependent variables for the analysis.⁶

Table presents descriptive statistics for all survey items that comprise the indices as well as the descriptive statistics for each index. Indices were created by adding the scores of each item in the factor together for each respondent. Scores were then centered and normalized to fit between 0 and 1. For visual ease of interpreting model results, the indices were multiplied by 100. The mean LND index response is 76.59 (sd = 20.87), while the mean IND index response is 46.26 (sd = 23.86).


Assessing whether dependent variables relate with country-level factors

Additionally, it is likely that country-specific effects and path-dependence have some effect on individual responses, as shown by R. Inglehart (2003) and Welzel (2007). Figure 10 visualizes the mean index response in each country plotted against country polity scores. As the plots demonstrate, there is a possible relationship

⁶ To check the internal validity of these indices, I conduct both exploratory analysis and then confirmatory factor analysis on the survey items. Using *Chronbach's Alpha* (α), which is a measure of item correlation with the resulting index, I assess the internal validity of the items. The resulting α statistic falls between 0 and 1, where 1 implies that all items are highly correlated with the full index and therefore is internally consistent. Higher α scores imply that the items all co-vary in the expected direction. The benchmark is soft, but research suggests that .6 or higher implies good internal validity (Nunnally 1978). The α for the liberal democracy index is 0.7. This indicates higher internal validity among the individual items. The second component, the IND index, has an α of 0.6, which suggests good internal validity.

between country-level differences in regime type that play into some variance in the individual response.

Figure 10 Average index scores by country across polity scores.



Note: The x-axis represents polity scores where higher numbers imply greater democracy and lower numbers imply less democracy and greater autocracy. Dots represent individual countries in the data. Lines represent the estimated linear relationship between polity scores and average country-level index response. Points and line colors represent different indices. Both indices vary from 0-100.

This provides further evidence that the modeling process should account for between-country variance that likely also factors into expected outcomes.

Expected outcomes

Having introduced the two indices, I turn to how I expect variance in the indices relates back to the theory of religious commitment and authoritarian personality. Illiberal notions of democracy and authoritarian personality should be positively related. Most of the questions related to IND are directly about the role of various authority figures in politics. Additionally, intolerance towards out-groups and illiberal notions of democracy should be positively related for similar reasons.

Religious commitment, primarily having high levels of religious commitment, should

be associated with higher on average support for illiberal notions of democracy as well due to the expectation that religious commitment increases authoritarian personality traits and may induce distrust towards non-coreligionists. It is possible that the effects of all three of these factors are also related, such that high religious commitment increases the effect of both authoritarian personality traits and intolerance towards out-groups.

Additionally, based on the group-level aspects of the theory, I expect that smaller religious groups will be less supportive of liberal notions of democracy. As explained in Chapter 2 and explored in Chapter 3, religious minorities tend to have more highly committed adherents than religious majorities. This should, in turn, lead to religious minorities expressing greater respect for authority, leading to greater support for illiberal notions of democracy. These expectations are formally represented via the following hypotheses:

H1: Higher levels of religious commitment are associated with lower support for liberal notions of democracy and higher support for illiberal notions of democracy.

H2: Higher levels of authoritarian personality traits are associated with lower support for liberal notions of democracy and higher support for illiberal notions of democracy.

H3: Higher levels of out-group intolerance are associated with lower support for liberal notions of democracy and higher support for illiberal notions of democracy.

H4: Members of minority religious groups on average have lower support for liberal notions of democracy compared to religious majorities.

Explanatory variables

There are two sets of explanatory variables in the analysis, individual-level, and group-level variables. The individual-level variables address the hypotheses

related to levels of religious commitment, authoritarian personality, and intolerance towards out-groups. The group-level variables address the hypotheses related to minority religion status. I explain these variables and then introduce additional controls used in the final model specification.

Individual-level explanatory variables

The main explanatory variables for religious commitment are the religious classes introduced in the previous chapter. Table 10 presents the religious classes generated in Chapter 3. Membership in the classes is based on respondent's answers to a battery of questions about religious experience in WVS waves 6 and 7. Using non-religious class members as the baseline, I examine the average association of class membership on the value of both indices.

Table 10 Observed latent religious classes and their levels of belief, behavior, and belonging.

Class name	Facet of Religious Commitment			
	Belief	Private behavior	Communal behavior	Belonging
Not religious	low	low	low	low
Spiritual non-religious	moderate	low	low	low
Moderately religious	moderate	moderate	low	moderate
Private religious	high	high	low	high
Active religious	high	high	high	high

The second set of explanatory variables were also introduced in the previous chapter, namely authoritarian personality, and intolerance towards out-groups. Instead of using latent classes generated in Chapter 3, I create two indices using the variables from the authoritarian latent class model. The first, an authoritarian personality index, combines the questions related to an individual's views on obedience, authority, and moral order into a simple sum index. The second, an intolerance index, combines the

questions related to which out-groups a respondent would not want as neighbors. For both indices, increases in the index implies greater levels of either authoritarian personality or intolerance towards out-groups respectively. Table 11 presents descriptive statistics for the variables that comprise the two indices.

Table 11 Descriptive statistics of variables that comprise LCA analysis.

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Authoritarian Variables</i>					
important quality in child: obedience	165,383	1.371	0.483	1	2
most people can be trusted	163,133	1.759	0.428	1	2
country should emph. authority	160,646	1.549	0.728	1	3
jobs prioritize nation	158,240	0.477	0.762	0	2
women earning more is problem	161,916	1.097	0.864	0	2
<i>Intolerance Variables</i>					
neighbors: race	164,031	0.178	0.382	0	1
neighbors: foreigners	163,955	0.239	0.426	0	1
neighbors: religion	162,698	0.184	0.387	0	1
neighbors: language	165,522	0.167	0.373	0	1
<i>Indices</i>					
authoritarian index	153,659	3.493	1.452	0	6
intolerance index	154,093	2.265	1.485	0	6

Note: Data is from the World Values Survey data set, waves 6 and 7.

Group-level explanatory variables

While the three sets of variables related to religious commitment, authoritarian personality, and intolerance are the individual-level, explanatory variables, there are an additional set of group-level variables that test minority status' effect on support for democracy. To test whether minority status is associated with varied support for democracy, I use two primary measures, the first is relative group size and the second is religious minority discrimination.

The relative group size variable measures the difference in population size of the individual's religious group as a percentage of the population. The variable was generated using the Religious Characteristics of States data set, which contains group-

level demographics for religions across country-years (Brown and James 2018). The data was matched to the country-year of the survey responses.⁷ If the individual is a member of the majority religious group, the variable is 0. The smaller a religious group is relative to the size of the majority group, the higher the value of the measure increases.

The religious minority discrimination variable is a country-level variable taken from the Religion and State (RAS) data set. This variable is an index of overall government discrimination against religious minorities. Higher levels of this index indicate more government discrimination including restricting worship, committing acts of violence, or making religious affiliation with certain groups illegal. The variable is lagged by 1 year, measuring the previous year's discrimination level.

Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics for these two variables. In the data, the average difference between an individual's group size and the size of the majority group as a percentage of the population is 19.4 (sd = 26.3). This implies that the average individual in the data is in a religious group that is 20 percentage points smaller than the majority religion (as a percentage of the overall population). The average level of religious minority discrimination is 18.5 (sd = 17.1). Because the scale ranges from 0 to 71, with higher numbers indicating greater religious discrimination, the average state-level religious discrimination is on the lower bounds of the index.

⁷ For a full description of how the matching was conducted as well as how the variable was generated, see the appendix for this chapter.

Table 12 Descriptive statistics of group-level explanatory variables.

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Relative group size	116,933	19.391	26.268	0.000	99.190
Discrimination (1-year lag)	159,191	18.522	17.097	0	71

In addition to the primary independent variables, I also include several controls in line with previous research on democratic support and authoritarianism. These variables are a mix of individual level survey responses as well as country-level factors that have been shown to affect the variance in democratic support and political beliefs.

Control variables

The control variables included in the model specification account for individual-level and country-level factors that may impact an individual's views on democracy. These variables are listed in this section alongside brief descriptions of each.

sex: This is a binary indicator for a respondent's sex, where a 1 indicates female.

age: This is a continuous indicator of the respondent's age.

educational level: This is an ordinal variable that identifies the highest level of education that a respondent has obtained. The levels are none/*primary*, *secondary*, and *tertiary*.

political interest: This is a binary indicator based on a four-response survey question "How interested would you say you are in politics?" The four responses rank from high interest, interest, little interest, and no interest. For the model, the four responses have been recoded so that high interest and general interest are one category, while little to no interest are the second. A 1 denotes little to no interest in politics.

political ideology (self-placement): This is a 10-point thermometer self-placement item. Respondents located their political ideology on a 10-point scale, where 1 indicates being very left, and 10 indicates being very right.

polity score: This is a country-year level variable that uses the polity2 variable from the *Polity IV* data set. It rates the authoritarian-democratic level of the country's government each year from -10 (strict authoritarian) to 10 (full democracy).

GDP per capita (purchasing power parity): This is a country-year level indicator of gross domestic product per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity). The data is from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators* API.

Analysis

I run two primary models, one with the LND index as the dependent variable and the other using the IND index. I also run models with different specifications for measuring religious commitment and minority status. Primary models were created using the STAN statistical programming software in R 4.2.1. The models are Bayesian, hierarchical, multi-variate OLS regressions. As is common practice with estimating such models, all variables and intercepts were given weak, uninformed prior estimates (normal distributions with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1).⁸ Additionally, models were run in R using frequentist methods. The results from both frequentist and Bayesian sets of models are similar. For additional models used in robustness checks, I estimated non-Bayesian versions of the models.⁹

⁸ Models were generated using the “stan_lmer” function, which uses similar syntax to the lmer function for hierarchical modeling from the lme4 package. Models were both run with 6 chains at 3000 iterations each. No issues with model convergence were identified and no divergent transitions were present in any model run.

⁹ Additional models were run using subsamples of states with similar polity scores and using country-level population weights. Results were largely unaffected. While the primary models described in this chapter used indices and religious class membership as explanatory variables, I ran additional models which used each individual item in the indices as separate variables. These model results are available in tables within the appendix for this chapter.

Assessing coefficient significance with the region of practical equivalence

Bayesian model estimation cannot provide p-values which are commonly used in frequentist hypothesis testing. There are multiple analogous methods in Bayesian analysis that can be used for hypothesis testing. In this paper I use one of the most intuitive methods, ROPE testing, which uses two values called the region of practical equivalence (ROPE) and the high density interval (HDI) [see chapter 12 in (Kruschke 2015) for a more detailed description of this process]. I briefly describe the ROPE test before moving to a full analysis of the model results.

The ROPE test is a method for identifying if a parameter (coefficient) estimate is equivalent to or different from a researcher-set value. In regression estimation, researchers are usually interested in whether a coefficient value suggests that two variables are related. As such, researchers set a null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the variables, and test if there is a statistically significant difference between the estimated coefficient and zero. Researchers cannot generate p-values for significance testing using Bayesian methods, however, the ROPE test works for a similar type of hypothesis test.

The ROPE is the area around a null value that is considered practically equivalent to that null value. For example, if a researcher is interested in whether a coin is fair when flipped, in practical terms a heads/tails ratio of either 0.49 or 0.51 are equivalent to 0.5. If a coin is tossed and most of the coefficient estimated posterior distribution falls entirely between 0.49 and 0.51, then the researcher *cannot reject* the null hypothesis that their coin is unbiased. If, on the other hand, most of the

distribution for the coin toss falls entirely out of this range, the researcher *rejects* the null hypothesis that the heads/tails ratio is practically equivalent to 0.5.

Researchers use a part of the estimated posterior distribution, called the high density interval (HDI) to conduct the ROPE test. The HDI of a parameter estimate is the span of values that are most credible parameter estimates and which cover 95% of the posterior distribution of the estimate. Values within the HDI are more credible parameter estimates than values outside the HDI.

For the sake of this analysis, the ROPE falls between -0.05 and +0.05 for the models. If the majority of a coefficient's HDI falls in between this region, it is likely that the coefficient is practically equivalent to 0. In such a case I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no observed relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables. If an HDI passes through the ROPE but extends beyond the ROPE in both directions, then I can assume a relationship between the variables exists but that the direction of that relationship is uncertain. If the HDI extends outside of the ROPE in one direction, I can conclude that two variables have a relationship and a likely direction.


Primary model results

Figure 11 presents the posterior coefficient estimates of the two primary models. The left facet of the figure shows coefficient estimates for the model that used the LND index as an outcome variable while the right facet provides estimates

for the IND outcome variable.¹⁰ Black points and numbers indicate the median posterior coefficient estimate, with lines extending out representing 80% credible intervals. In each facet, a gray line intersects 0.

¹⁰ A table version of model results, along with credible intervals and country-year intercept plots are available in the appendix for this chapter. Additionally, a table of coefficient estimates with percentages of the high density intervals that are within the region of practical equivalence (ROPE) are also present.

Figure 11 Dot-plots of coefficient estimates from Bayesian OLS models with country-year random intercepts.



Note: Black points and numbers indicate mean posterior coefficient estimate. Bars represent 89% credible intervals. Models run using stan and stanarm packages in the R statistical programming language (version 4.2.1). Red coefficients indicate an estimated negative posterior coefficient while blue indicates a positive coefficient. Dependent variables are indices on 0-100 scale.

Liberal notions of democracy results

First, when examining the relationship between religious class and liberal notions of democracy, the results provide evidence that greater religious commitment has negative relationship with liberal democratic support. The four coefficients at the top of Figure 11 present coefficient estimates for the religious classes, with *Not religious* as a baseline. A shift from not being religious to any other class has an average negative relationship with the outcome variable, with the *Active religious* class having the lowest median coefficient estimate of the four. A change from a respondent being *Not religious* to being *Active religious*, on average, and all else equal, leads to a predicted decrease in the LND score by 3.0 points.

The *Private religious* class coefficient has a median posterior coefficient of -0.2, but the HDI crosses the (ROPE). This result suggests that the direction of the relationship between this class and the liberal notions of democracy index is uncertain. The majority of the HDI extends to the left of the ROPE making a negative relationship appear more credible.

The authoritarian personality and intolerance indices both have negative posterior coefficient estimates with HDIs outside the ROPE. The median authoritarian personality index coefficient is -0.34 (sd = 0.1). The median intolerance index posterior coefficient is -0.47 (sd = 1). These results indicate that it is credible, on average, all else equal, that an increase in either measure by 1-point results in a decrease in the liberal notions of democracy index.

The last explanatory variable, *relative religious group size*, has a median posterior coefficient of -0.01. This result suggests that the impact of relative religious group size, all else equal, is practically equivalent to zero. Results from the model suggest that 92% of the variables' high density interval (HDI) is within the ROPE. The fixed effect of relative group size has no observable relationship with the LND index.

The model results for the rest of the coefficient estimates fall in line with general expectations. Higher education is related to a general increase in LND index scores. Higher levels of income are associated with a general decrease in LND index scores. Being uninterested in politics is associated with an average decrease in the LND score by 2 points, all else equal.

These results suggest that increases in religious commitment, as well as increases in authoritarian personality or intolerance towards out-groups are associated, on average, all else equal, with a decrease in support for liberal notions of democracy. The higher-level variables, including religious demographics, polity scores, and state discrimination of minorities, do not appear to have effects easily discernible from zero. GDP per capita (ppp) has an HDI that largely extends outside of the ROPE but a portion of the left-tail of the distribution passes through it. This suggests that while there is a likely positive relationship with the dependent variable, there is some uncertainty about the direction of this relationship.

Illiberal notions of democracy results

Turning to the IND index and the results on the right side of Figure 11, the relationship between religious commitment and authoritarian tendencies appears

strong and in the expected direction. First, when examining the association of religious classes and the IND index, increasing religious commitment is associated with higher levels on the IND index scores. The median expected change in IND score between *Not religious* and *Active religious* types is 6.02 points (sd = 0.4), on average and all else equal. The level of predicted change in IND scores across all classes increases as the level of religious commitment increases. Additionally, *Private religious* types have a slightly higher estimated, median posterior index score compared to *Not religious* types, with an average change in index score of 7.71 (sd = 0.4), all else equal.

Again, the authoritarian personality and intolerance indices are estimated to relate to the outcome variable in the expected direction. A 1-point increase in authoritarian personality index score is estimated to lead to a 1.03-point (sd = 0.1) increase in the IND score, all else equal. A 1-point increase in the intolerance index is estimated to associate with a 0.86 (sd = 0.1) point increase in the IND index score.

The results also show that, again, the relative group size variable is almost entirely within the ROPE, and it is estimated that the posterior coefficient is practically equivalent to zero. As such, there is no indication from the model that relative group size has a direct relationship with the IND index.

Among the control variables, the results for education, income, and political interest are in the expected directions. Education has a negative relationship with IND scores, where higher levels of education show an estimated decrease in the index score. For income, a change from low income to middle income has an estimated distribution that largely falls within the ROPE, implying practical equivalence with

zero. However, a change from low income to high income levels is associated with a discernible positive increase in the IND score by a median estimate of 1.69 points ($sd = 0.2$). The estimated effect of increasing conservatism on the left-right scale is associated with higher levels of the illiberal notions of democracy score as well, with a 1 unit increase in the left-right ideology scale (moving more conservative or politically right) associating with a 0.55 ($sd = 0.01$) point increase on the IND index.

While the association between religious discrimination, polity score, and the IND index are still practically equivalent with zero, the observed relationship between GDP per capita is stronger for the IND index than it was for the LND index. The credible interval for the coefficient estimate is outside of the ROPE, and in the negative direction, implying that percentage increases in GDP per capita (ppp) are associated with decreases in the IND score. This finding, in combination with the income finding, presents an interesting result. Individual levels of income, as they increase to high levels, appear to have a positive relationship with the illiberal notions of democracy. However, when considering overall, per capita wealth, it appears that such relationship is in the opposite direction. This suggests that national-level issues related to economic inequality may play a role in how individuals view the role of democracy as well as their willingness to support illiberal policies or leaders.

Interaction of religion, authoritarian personality, and out-group intolerance

Given the theory that religious commitment and authoritarian personality are likely related and impact support for democracy, I run an additional model that uses an interaction between the main individual-level explanatory variables (religious

class, authoritarian personality, and intolerance). For this model, all specifications are the same as the primary models with the addition of an interaction term for religious class, authoritarian personality, and intolerance. For ease of interpretation, I only use two of the religious classes, *Active religious* and *Private religious*, as they are the two classes with highest religious commitment. Thus, the fixed effects for both classes can be interpreted as the effect of switching from any of the three lower religious commitment classes to one of the two higher level classes. Table results of these models are provided in the chapter appendix.

The results of these models suggest that intolerance and authoritarian personality both have observable interactions with the higher classes of religious commitment but that there is not credible evidence of a three-way interaction between the terms. I will describe the results for the *Active religious* and *Private religious* classes separately.


Active religious interaction on liberal notions of democracy

The median posterior coefficient for *Active religious* is -4.4 (sd = 1), and the median fixed effect estimate for the authoritarian personality index is -1.1 (sd = 0.1). The interaction term between the *Active religious* and authoritarian personality index is positive, 0.8 (sd = 0.2). The interaction term between this religious class and the intolerance index is 0.3 (sd = 0.4), but crosses the ROPE, implying that the effect is not discernible from zero. These results suggest that, while religious commitment and authoritarian personality each have independent negative relationships with liberal democracy, higher religiosity reduces the impact of higher authoritarian personality scores. Among respondents who fall into one of the three categories of religious

commitment that range from *Not religious* to *Moderately religious*, the authoritarian personality index has a discernible, negative association with the LND score. Among respondents who are *Active religious*, however, the overall LND score is lower compared to the other religious classes, but the effect of the authoritarian personality index becomes negligible.

To demonstrate this relationship, Figure 12 presents predicted LND index scores by holding all variables at their mean or median while shifting the values of the *Active religious* class variables and the authoritarian personality index variable.

Figure 12 Average predicted liberal democracy score by marginal effect of active religious class membership and authoritarian personality index.



Note: The y-axis is predicted liberal notions index scores, and the x-axis is the range of authoritarian personality index scores. Lines represent the predicted outcome across levels of authoritarian personality and active religious class membership. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.


Figure 12 demonstrates that, when a respondent is not in the *Active religious* class, the predicted LND score decreases as the authoritarian personality index increases. However, the difference in estimated average outcome scores is negligible if the respondent is of the *Active religious* class. This suggests that the observed

relationship between LND and authoritarian personality is nullified by high religious commitment.

Private religious interaction on liberal notions of democracy

The results of the *Private religious* interaction suggest that a similar but less pronounced relationship exists between the religious class membership and authoritarian personality and intolerance. The estimated, posterior fixed effect coefficient for *Private religious* class membership is - 3.5 (sd = 1.5). The credible interval is wider and closer to zero than the *Active class* membership coefficient. Results suggest that *Private religious* class membership has a similar interaction with authoritarian personality and intolerance index variables to that of the *Active religious* class, but due to the size of the credible interval around the *Private religious* class, the predicted difference in the LND index is less pronounced. Figure 13 presents a similar graph to Figure 12 but for the interaction between the authoritarian index and *Private religious* class membership.

Figure 13 Average predicted liberal democracy score by marginal effect of private religious class membership and authoritarian personality index.




Note: The y-axis is predicted liberal notions index scores, and the x-axis is the range of authoritarian personality index scores. Lines represent the predicted outcome across levels of authoritarian personality and private religious class membership. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

Interaction and illiberal notions of democracy

The results of the model that uses the IND variable as the outcome variable suggests a similar marginal effect from the interaction of religious class and authoritarian personality. Figures 14 and 15 present the predicted illiberal notions index scores while holding predictors as mean and median values but adjusting for religious class and authoritarian personality.


Figure 14 Average predicted illiberal notions score by active religious class membership and authoritarian personality index scores.



Note: The y-axis shows predicted illiberal notions index scores, and the x-axis shows different values of authoritarian personality index scores. Line colors indicate active religious class membership. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

The results indicate that while the marginal effect of authoritarian personality decreases when an individual is in the *Active religious* class, *Private religious* class membership lowers the marginal effect of authoritarian personality by a significant amount. These results suggest, like the previous models which used the LND index, that religious class membership lowers the predicted effect of increased authoritarian personality. When individuals are in one of the classes associated with lower religious commitment or no religious commitment, the marginal effect of authoritarian personality on support for democracy appears more pronounced.

Figure 15 Average predicted illiberal notions score by private religious class membership and authoritarian personality index scores.



Note: The y-axis shows predicted illiberal notions index scores, and the x-axis shows different values of the authoritarian personality index. Lines indicate private religious class membership. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.

These results indicate that there is an observable interaction between religious commitment and authoritarian personality, and it is in the expected direction if the theory that religious commitment and authoritarian personality traits are related holds true. These results imply that at lower levels of religious commitment, the relationship between the authoritarian personality scores and the democracy indices is more pronounced. Higher levels of authoritarian personality are associated with decreases in agreement with concepts related to liberal democracy such as civil rights and free and fair elections. Higher levels of authoritarian personality are also associated with greater levels of agreement with concepts such as the ability for the military to take over the government, or for religious leadership to interpret a country's laws. Religious commitment appears to mute the marginal effect of authoritarian personality. Intolerance towards out-groups does not have an observed

three-way interaction with these two variables but does appear to have a similar relationship with the outcome variables as authoritarian personality.

Additional sensitivity analysis

Testing individual religious variables instead of classes

Given that the religious class results are probabilistic classes it is possible that results differ when examining the variables that were used in generating class membership individually. This provides an additional benefit of assessing whether the multifaceted theory of religious commitment is observed in the data. The multifaceted theory suggests that religious *belief*, *behavior*, and *sense of belonging* are separate facets of religious experience and their relationship to social outcomes occur in different directions. Belief and private religious practice are predicted to positively relate to IND and negatively relate to LND. Conversely, communal practices such as group worship are predicted to increase social capital and improve individual levels of LND. I specify additional models that include each item used to identify religious class membership. Table results of the full model specification are available in this chapter's appendix.

Results from this sensitivity analysis are predominantly within expectations of the multifaceted theory, with three exceptions. First, identifying religion as important in one's life is associated with increased scores on both outcome index variables. Additionally, increased prayer is found to be in the opposite direction of expectations based on previous findings. Given the multifaceted theory of religious commitment and views of democracy, increased frequency of prayer should be associated with negative support for liberal democracy, all else equal. More communal worship

should be associated with increased support for liberal democracy and decreased support for illiberal notions of democracy, but the opposite is true in the model results. Communal worship has a statistically significant and positive relationship with the IND, all else equal, and a similarly negative coefficient estimate for the LND index.

Table 13 presents coefficient estimates and standard errors for variables related to religion. The results of these models suggest that different facets of religious commitment (belief, behavior, and belonging) may have a small, individual impact on support for liberal democracy.

Table 13 Coefficient estimates of religious survey items on notions of democracy indices.

	Outcome variable:	
	LND Index (1)	IND Index (2)
Belonging		
Religion Important	0.584*** (0.119)	1.051*** (0.115)
Identifies as religious	-0.267 (0.209)	0.320 (0.202)
Only my rel acceptable	-1.363*** (0.098)	2.054*** (0.095)
Behavior		
Active in religion	-0.807*** (0.127)	0.145 (0.123)
Attend worship	-0.304*** (0.055)	0.146*** (0.054)
Prays	0.244*** (0.051)	-0.063 (0.050)
Belief		
Belief: God	-0.484 (0.366)	0.265 (0.354)
Belief: Hell	-0.611*** (0.206)	0.754*** (0.199)
Constant	61.376*** (12.715)	88.020*** (12.619)
Observations	58,551	58,551

Note: * = $p < 0.1$; ** = $p < 0.05$; *** = $p < 0.01$. Standard errors in parentheses. Both models included all control variables and random country-year intercepts.

The models do suggest that of the different facets of religious commitment, it is likely that some elements of belonging, and belief have more pronounced, individual effects on support for democracy in the expected direction. Believing that the only religion which is acceptable is one's own has a coefficient of 2.05 (sd = 0.09) when the IND index is the outcome variable and a coefficient of -1.36 (sd = 0.1) for the LND index. Additionally, while stating belief in God is not statistically significant in either model, stating belief in hell is significant, with coefficient estimates of 0.75

(sd = 0.2) for the IND index and -0.61 (sd = 0.2) for the LND index. These variables are the most likely to be associated with authoritarian personality and intolerance as they are related to out-group distrust and belief in divine punishment in the afterlife.

Group-level grievance and political outcomes

Returning to the null results around the group-level variables, I test whether an alternative metric captures the mechanism of majority-minority politics better than group size. The results of the model suggest group size, or a history of discrimination are not related in any meaningful way with either LND or IND scores.

While it may be the case that there is no relationship between an individual's religious group and their support for liberal notions of democracy, the results could also imply misspecification of the minority/majority variable. An alternative specification may be rooted in the concept of relative deprivation (Gurr 2015). Gurr (2015) argues that a driving mechanism for contentious political outcomes including violent mobilization and civil war is that one group in a country expresses a grievance of deprivation relative to another group. Through this theoretical lens, it is not the size of the religious group, nor the groups' religious practices that influence political outcomes. The mechanism that connects a group-level dynamic to individual outcomes is whether the member of the religious group believes that the group has a grievance towards the majority or the state.

In this theory, an individuals' religious group matters in explaining support for democracy if they are a religious minority that has a grievance or that is discriminated against. To test whether grievance better explains group-level effects and their relationship with support for democracy, I use the *Religious Minorities at Risk*

(RMAR) data to identify religious minorities and grievances (Basedau et al. 2019).

Also used in Chapter 3 to identify religious minorities, the RMAR data codes for for religious, social, and economic discrimination of religious minority groups across the world. The data also contains variables about the groups' political activities and grievances against the state.

I rerun the primary models but exchange the relative group size variable with a measure indicating if the individual's religious affiliation is a minority group in their country. I also add a variable that codes for whether the group has a stated grievance against the state or another religious group. In all models, these variables are also null, with the majority of the posterior HDIs for both falling into the ROPE. This suggests that group-level measures may have no observable effect on individual levels of support for democracy. I discuss the implications for this and future work to test this finding in the discussion section.

Discussion

The analyses support the individual-level hypotheses presented earlier in the chapter but not the group-level hypotheses. These findings also hold under various alternative specifications. In this section I further outline the implications of these results

Support for liberal democracy decreases as religious commitment increases

The results from the primary models testing religious commitment on liberal and illiberal notions of democracy are in line with hypothesized expectations. In general, the analysis suggests that there is an observable difference in liberal

democratic support as individuals become more religious. However, the results that test the relationship between group-level variables and the indices are null. This suggests that, at the very least, there is no cross-country pattern of religious minorities having different views on democracy. Grievances, discrimination, and group size also appear to have no observable impact on notions of democracy scores.

The results from the IND index models suggest that illiberal notions of democracy increase as individuals become more religious. Moving from classes that are less committed to religion to a more committed class has an increased average IND score. This is not the same observed relationship between levels of religious commitment and liberal notions of democracy. In the case of LND support, the HDIs for *Moderately religious* and *Active religious* overlap. This suggests a weaker direct relationship between higher levels of religious commitment and liberal notions of democracy compared with the relationship between religious commitment and illiberal notions of democracy. Higher religious commitment increases acceptance of illiberal views of government while any level of religious commitment lowers acceptance of liberal notions of democracy.

The stronger relationship between religion and illiberal notions of democracy is in line with expectations. As explained in the previous chapter, I argue that it is possible that religiosity is related to authoritarian personality traits, both of which impact support for liberal notions of democracy. The results of the interaction model also attest to this. It appears that, separately, religious commitment and authoritarian personality both have a negative impact on support for liberal democracy, but the

observable effect of authoritarian personality is negligible if a respondent is highly religious.

The model results imply that individuals who are less religious, more educated, less authoritarian, and more tolerant of outgroups should be the most supportive of liberal democracy, in general. While this finding is mostly confirmatory, backing up a wide set of findings across the social sciences, these results are the most recent and largest analysis of this phenomenon. These findings suggest that many individuals across most of the world tend to be at least moderately religious and that religious commitment has a negative relationship with support for liberal notions of democracy. In general, not being religious is associated with higher levels of liberal notions of democracy.

Further sensitivity analysis suggests that while different facets of religious commitment (belief, behavior and belonging) may have different individual effects on support for democracy, the differences between facets is likely small. Furthermore, when controlling for other factors, the facets estimated to have the highest individual effect on the index scores, all else equal, are the facets most associated with authoritarian personality traits and intolerance towards out-groups. It may be the case, then, that the mechanism by which religion affects individual views towards the type of ideology of the government are driven by the authoritarian factors that are associated with higher levels of religiosity. For example, belief in hell lowers support for LND and increases support for IND. This suggests that belief in divine punishment does have a negative relationship with support for democracy.

The results of the analysis in Chapter 3, paired with these findings demonstrate that high religious commitment and authoritarian personality are related and have similar relationships with support for liberal democracy. They provide evidence for hypotheses **H1** through **H3** presented earlier in the chapter.

Does the religious group dynamic not matter in explaining support for democracy?

While the theory presented in Chapter 2 suggested that religious group-level demographics should affect individual-level views of the state, the results do not provide evidence in support of this. Rather, the primary model results suggest that an individual's religious group-size relative to the largest religious group in their country has no observable relationship with notions of democratic support. Additional models that test for the effect of grievance or political discrimination present similar findings.

While the null finding about relative group-size may suggest that group dynamics do not matter in developing individual political preferences, it is also possible that the measure itself is not capturing observable effects that vary by country. The specific size of a group may not capture the historical relationship between minority religious respondents and the state. Better measures may be required to assess whether the theory is correct. For example, it may be the case that measures related to economics and income levels are explaining some variance in group-level dynamics if they are correlated with groups of different sizes. If a religious minority is largely affluent compared to the rest of the country, then the results suggest that individuals in that group would likely be less supportive of democracy, all else equal. Similarly, higher levels of education are associated with

greater general support for liberal democracy, so that groups which have higher education levels compared to the rest of the country would likely be more supportive of liberal democracy.

In this view, it is not the group dynamics themselves that explain variation in support but the outcome of historical differences in access to education and income because of group membership that explain differences in political views. This would also differ from the grievance theory as the variation in support for democracy would be based on observed socio-economic and political differences rather than perceived deprivation.

Alternatively, it may be the case that respondents, when asked general questions about democracy, do not connect their responses to their specific context. For example, a member of a discriminated group may respond via the survey that they generally like liberal concepts such as protection of minority rights or free and fair elections, and that they dislike, in general, the army being in control of the state. But, when asked specifically about their country's government, respondents may be primed to respond more specifically about their context. This is a question for future work. By creating more targeted questions about democracy that speak to a specific country's context, the results may present different outcomes.

General implications from the analysis

This study is not a controlled experiment and therefore the relationship between the explanatory and outcome variables cannot fully explain causal paths between the variables. In the description of results, I have outlined how the model results provide evidence that there are causal relationships between religion,

authoritarian personality traits, and out-group intolerance. These should not be interpreted as explanations of causal relationships in and of themselves. While they provide evidence in support of the direction of the relationship between the variables of interest, further controlled studies are required to directly assess the mechanisms that tie religious commitment to support for democracy.

The implications of this analysis are that there is a broad relationship between religious commitment, authoritarian personality traits, and support for democracy. While not causal in nature, this empirical observation is valuable on its own. It demonstrates that researchers can expect religious individuals to support illiberal notions of democracy more than non-religious individuals. Conversely, less religious individuals should, on average, be more supportive of liberal notions of democracy.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a large-n, cross-country study of the relationship between religious commitment, authoritarian personality, religious group dynamics and support for democracy. The results of this study provide general evidence that religious commitment, authoritarian personality, and intolerance towards out-groups are associated with lower support for liberal democracy and higher levels of support for illiberal notions of democracy, such as allowing for the involvement of the army in politics and allowing religious leaders to interpret a country's laws.

These findings also suggest that *Private religious* individuals, those individuals with high levels of religious commitment but who do not attend communal worship, are less supportive of liberal democracy on average.

Additionally, the effect of intolerance towards out-groups increases among privately

religious individuals compared to those who are likely to attend communal worship. This finding supports the multi-faceted and social capital theories of religion. According to this theory, some of the negative effects of religiosity are negated by the positive effects of socialization through communal worship. The findings of this chapter are in line with this theory. Even when measuring overall religious commitment, there appears to be a difference in response by individuals who are not involved in their religious communities.

This cross-country study provides evidence generally in favor of the theory presented in Chapter 2, apart from the religious group theory. Models suggest that there are no observable relationships between the treatment of minorities, and a respondent's minority status and their views towards democracy in general. This does not mean that such group dynamics are unimportant, but it may be the case that the measures used in this study did not accurately capture the dynamics at play. It may also be the case that group dynamics do not have a fixed effect, but they are more dependent on country-level factors. Future work will be required to further examine this relationship.

The next chapter reexamines the group-level theory using Indonesia as a single-country case. Through a survey experiment that was designed to prime respondents to consider group-level dynamics in democratic politics, I find evidence that there are distinct differences between religious minorities and majorities in the Indonesian case. I then revise my theory and discuss the implications of these findings.

Chapter 5: Indonesia and illiberal democracy

Introduction

In the last two chapters, I demonstrated that, on average, more religious individuals are less supportive of liberal notions of democracy such as holding free and fair elections or supporting civil rights. Additionally, I found evidence that higher religious commitment is associated with more support for illiberal or authoritarian notions of democracy, including allowing for religious or military elites to have a say in governance. Despite finding evidence that individual religious attitudes associate with changes in attitudes about democracy, I found no support to suggest that religious minority status or state-level discrimination against religious minorities had any effect on individual support for liberal democracy.

In the following chapter, I return to the group-level explanatory variables and directly assess whether religious minority status has any effect on individual attitudes about democracy. I test whether viewing democracy as a struggle between majority and minority groups affects religious minority attitudes about democracy. To conduct this test, I use new data from a framing survey experiment conducted in Indonesia. Indonesia was chosen as a country case-study because it is simultaneously a democracy with free and fair elections and a society that faces widely publicized religious polarization. Indonesia is a majority Muslim country. I examine whether members of the Christian minority lower support for liberal notions of democracy and

increase support for illiberal notions of democracy when prompted to consider democracy as favoring majority groups over minorities.

The results of this experiment reveal that, while priming respondents to consider pro-majoritarian aspects of democracy does alter support for illiberal and liberal notions of democracy, the direction is the reverse of expectations. When Muslim respondents are prompted to consider the ways democracy favors the majority, they become more likely to support illiberal notions of governance, including suggesting that sometimes a non-democratic system is necessary to restore order. Being in the majority group, Muslim respondents who received the framing prompt may have viewed minorities as the likely perpetrators of any action that would require a restoration of order. Additionally, being in the majority group and believing that the government favors their group may make respondents less risk-averse to accepting autocratic government policy.

In general, the majority-minority prompt has little effect on religious minority responses. Religious minorities are far less likely to support illiberal notions of governance and are also more likely to support liberal democracy. Further inspection of the data suggests that the prompt may not have an observable effect on religious minorities because they already frame Indonesian democracy as a majority-minority struggle. When comparing open responses to what the biggest problem in the country is, non-Muslims are more likely to mention ethno-religious polarization than Muslim respondents. Muslim respondents are more likely to instead discuss elite corruption. This suggests that, independent of the prompt, religious minorities view politics as an identitarian struggle.

I conclude the chapter by suggesting the results may be unique to country cases like Indonesia. This is because Indonesia faces high religious polarization, making the religious differences politically salient. I suggest that in other political environments such as consolidated liberal democracies or countries with less religious polarization, the points of contention between religious minorities and majorities may take different forms. In cases where non-democratic governments have co-opted religious minorities, for example, minority groups may generally favor non-democracy more (Hultquist, Birnir, and Asal 2021). Or in countries where most citizens are non-religious or nominally religious, religious coalitions with more illiberal notions of governance may form in opposition to the secular majority. I suggest a revision to the theory presented in Chapter 2, that majority/minority dynamics will only affect attitudes towards democracy under conditions where group membership is politicized. I further suggest that in such cases, the groups will favor whatever form of government best protects their group from discrimination. I offer ways to test this revision through future research.

Indonesia, Religion and Democracy

Few countries are as diverse and populous as Indonesia. Comprising over 17,000 islands, the country is home to hundreds of distinct ethnic groups and every major religion. It is also the world's largest majority Muslim country (Sunni Muslims make up 87% of the population) and the third largest democracy in the world.

The democratization of Indonesia is recent, beginning in the late 1990s following the end of the authoritarian *New Order* regime run by Suharto and his family. While democratic consolidation steadily increased from 1998 onward, with

multiple peaceful transitions of power between different parties and elected leaders, the country also saw a sharp rise in ethnic violence and religious violence (Bertrand 2008). While inter-ethnic conflict has subsided, religious violence has steadily increased over the past two decades, despite the country gaining democratic and economic stability (Birbir and Şatana 2022; Spencer 2000).

Reformasi and the rise in political violence

Scholars have debated the reasons why religious violence increased in the years following the government reform period (referred to as *reformasi*) in 1998. Bouchier (2014) argues that the repressive *New Order* regime suppressed identity politics in the name of rapid, violent development and nepotism-based corruption. Bouchier describes the *New Order* regime that preceded *reformasi* as a system designed to “keep Soeharto and his group in power for the long term and subordinate societal forces and interests to the imperative of state-directed capitalist development (pg. 230).” The *New Order* regime concentrated all political power in one family and the military, based in the capital of Jakarta. Violence repressed alternative voices. Economic growth kept potential elite challengers at bay from overturning the regime through corporate favoritism and government payouts.

Ultimately the slowing of economic growth, partially due to Suharto’s nepotism and widespread corruption, led to the downfall of the system, the weakening of political elites and the development of rapid, top-down democratization (Birbir and Şatana 2022; Bouchier 2014). This rapid change led elites to concede power via political reform quickly, through a decentralization of state power to provinces (Horowitz 2012; Wilson 2015). This quick shift in the process and location of

political power created opportunities for local elites to gain access to state and natural resources previously kept only for the military and Suharto family. Almost overnight the *New Order* regime and its centralized control of the state was no longer a viable option for governance.

Clashes between local ethnic groups, religious organizations, police, and other security forces rose in the aftermath of Suharto's fall. Wilson (2015) notes that the path-dependence of democratic reforms likely played a role in the rise of violence across Indonesia. The first major reform was decentralization. Judicial reform was slow. The order of reforms was likely not random and appear to occur as a function of the political crises that occurred immediately following the end of the *New Order* regime. The *reformasi* period was a top-down process, with many of Suharto's former supporters integrating themselves into the new system of government.

Decentralization allowed various oligarchs and military leaders to enmesh themselves in the local politics of specific regions, where they maintained personal economic interests. Wilson (2015) notes that the large presence of security forces in certain regions was also not random - that these forces also had vested interests in the economic output of certain regions and that they were willing to protect these interests through violent means.

Despite this rise in violence, the *reformasi* period also saw local and national elites coordinate on running elections with newly formed parties. The new party system institutionalized the new means of attaining political power. As the state attained greater control over the actions of elites and security forces through party

politics, political violence became more targeted towards separatist groups in more remote regions of the country.

Indonesia and religious discrimination post-democratization

Today, overall political violence (particularly inter-ethnic violence) in Indonesia has decreased in comparison to the early 2000s, but violence and discrimination against religious minorities has increased. Sumaktoyo, Ottati, and Untoro (2016) finds that Indonesia is more discriminatory against religious minorities than most other majority-Muslim countries, including many non-democracies. Furthermore, Sumaktoyo observes an increase in the use of discriminatory blasphemy laws against non-conforming Muslims and other religious minorities after the fall of Suharto. Blasphemy laws have more regularly been used to detain and arrest individuals for defying Islamic religious laws (for recent examples see Putra 2023; Lee, Iskandar, and Islam 2023). This result appears to be a paradox, that democratization would precede greater amounts of discrimination.

While it appears puzzling theoretically that a democracy would increase the use of discriminatory laws after a successful transition from autocracy, Indonesia's recent history helps to illuminate how this occurred. As previously stated, Suharto's regime suppressed the Islamic majority from political participation for decades and, following the *reformasi* period, political mobilization of Muslims quickly gained mainstream traction. While scholars note that there are no mainstream, radical Islamist parties in Indonesian elections, Mietzner and Muhtadi (2018) argue this is a function of Indonesia's electoral system which makes creating parties that run on anti-pluralist platforms difficult. All political parties must include acceptance of a

pluralism as a part of their party platforms. Rather than operating as official parties, political, civic organizations run by Islamic legal scholars, such as the *Indonesian Council of Islamic Scholars* (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI) or *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU) often speak on political issues. While generally moderate-conservative, Menchik (2019) finds that these types of organizations maintain a hierarchy of values that differ from the pluralist values of the Indonesian state. Islamic civic organizations often simultaneously uphold democratic principles such as support for free and fair elections while also placing higher emphasis on defending orthodox Islam. By using the country's blasphemy laws to target religious minorities, particularly syncretic Muslim groups such as the Ahmadi, leaders of these civic groups have used the country's legal system to promote illiberal policies in the name of defending Islam. For example, in 2005, the MUI issued a *fatwa* against pluralism and secularism (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018). These non-governmental civic organizations have a lot of power through their mobilization potential. They sometimes refer police to specific individuals for breaking blasphemy laws (Lee, Iskandar, and Islam 2023). Indonesia is unique in its position as a large democracy with a large amount of religious involvement in judicial issues and government policies. Thus, it can be a democracy with no radical Islamic parties that also pursues legal action against minorities for breaking Islamic law.

The state also tends to uphold other discriminatory practices in line with the thinking of Islamic civic organizations. Religious minorities face problems registering new houses of worship with the government and sometimes houses of worship are destroyed or shut down by local Muslim militias with little consequence (Ali-Fauzi

and Mada 2011; Hefner 2017). Blasphemy is illegal in Indonesia and has been used primarily to jail non-Muslim or syncretic Muslim Indonesians. A recent example of major use of the blasphemy law occurred in 2017, when an ethnically Chinese and Christian candidate for the Governor of Jakarta, Ahok, was sentenced and jailed for 2 years (Marshall 2018; Tyson 2021). Ahok had said that certain verses in Muslim scripture were being used out of context to justify not voting for him because of his faith. The result of this event caused massive outbreaks in protests and political violence. He went from being the most likely candidate to win the election with a 70% approval rating in polls to being imprisoned a few months later.

The combination of institutionalized elections and civil rights issues have led scholars to describe Indonesia as an “illiberal democracy” (Aspinall and Mietzner 2019; Bouchier 2014; Wilson 2015); a democratic state that functions on civic participation but that does not generally support individual rights equally (Plattner 2019). Indonesia has free and fair elections, separation of powers and a functioning legal system. It also enforces policies that disparately affect members of religious and ethnic minority groups.

Minorities under illiberal democracy

It has become increasingly clear within the last decade that not all democracies are created equal. Indonesia represents a type of democracy that maintains both democratic and illiberal policies. While conceptually like the concept of competitive authoritarianism introduced by Levitsky and Way (2010), illiberal democracies have free and fair elections and largely maintain rule of law. Instead, the laws enacted discriminate against specific groups in ways that may violate civic and

human rights. In this illiberal democratic political environment, how do religious minorities view democracy? Does framing democracy as a struggle between majority and minority groups alter support for democracy among majority and minority groups? Returning to the theory of minority status and support for democracy, I argue that minority status does affect the views of minority group members towards government.

Most current studies on religious minority political beliefs focus on the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), with specific focuses on minority Christian attitudes towards their respective regimes. Belge and Karakoç (2015) find evidence across four MENA countries (Turkey, Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan) that religious minorities are slightly more favorable of authoritarianism than the majority group in each country. The authors find evidence that minorities who feel threatened by a transition to democracy due to the overwhelming size and power of the Muslim majority become more favorable towards authoritarianism. Haddad (2001), conducting a survey of Maronite Christians in Lebanon finds evidence that, although they are divided on support for specific leaders, Maronites express levels of distrust towards other groups, particularly Muslims. Hoffman and Bagdanov (2020) similarly finds that Lebanese Christians are wary of democracy when prompted to frame democracy as a pro-majority system of government.

These results suggest that, beyond the levels of religious commitment, members of religious minorities also consider democratic support strategically, depending on whether it will likely benefit their group. Hoffman refers to this perspective, specifically in Lebanon, as “defensive minoritarianism,” because the

minority Christians appear to support whatever policies or system would help them shore up and secure their political and economic interests.

A question remains as to whether such defensive minoritarianism exists in non-MENA contexts. Using the case of Indonesia contributes to the question of religious minority political preferences by focusing on another world region that still shares a strong Islamic culture while also being a democratic country.

Expectations

Given the historical background of Indonesia and the general theory presented in the dissertation, I expect that prompting respondents to consider the conflict-prone nature of democracy will alter general responses at the majority/minority group level. In Indonesia, one of the largest divides that affects politics is religion. This difference is felt both between Muslims and religious minorities as well as between different Muslim sects who vary in theological and social beliefs from the Sunni majority. I expect that Muslims who frame democracy as a majority-minority conflict that favors majorities will show increased support for democracy. I also expect religious minorities, when they frame democracy in the same way, will decrease support for democracy. These expectations are like the findings in the literature of religious minorities in MENA countries.

Formally, the hypotheses I propose are:

H1: Religious minorities will decrease support for democracy when religion is framed as a majority-minority struggle that favors the majority.

H2: Religious majorities in Indonesia will increase support for democracy when religion is framed as a majority-minority struggle that favors the majority.

H3: Religious majorities in Indonesia will have higher average support for democracy than religious minorities.

Data and Methods

I test these expectations using survey data and a framing experiment. In the following section I outline the data collection effort, describe the survey design and the dependent variables used to test the theory. The data are results from a national survey of Indonesians, which was collected through Jakpat, an Indonesian survey company. Data collection took place in November 2022 and a total of 1289 individuals were surveyed.

Jakpat is a trusted survey group, known primarily for market-based research on products and web/phone applications. The company also partners with academics for surveys on issues relating to the social sciences.¹¹ Jakpat uses an app to present users with surveys. Users on the app are compensated with two types of compensation. First, the app is designed as a game that provides users with progress bars and achievement scores for answering questions. Additionally, as participants answer questions, they receive points (10 points/question). These points may then be exchanged in the app for money. 10,000 points is equivalent to 0.65 Us dollars.

The respondents get notification (bar notification or in-apps notification) about the surveys they need to work, and they can choose whether they work one survey or all surveys. The survey was designed to take no more than 30 minutes but likely took most participants significantly less. Because much of the demographic

¹¹ <https://jakpat.net/for-student> lists several partner universities where students have used Jakpat for research purposes.

information was already recorded for participants, they were only asked about their ethnicity (which is not a sensitive question in Indonesia and does not likely affect questions specifically about religion). They were then asked substantive questions about a variety of topics in the following order:

- questions about gender norms
- questions about political views (including questions on democracy)
- questions on political behavior and participation
- questions on religious practice

Users had provided demographic information and verification of Indonesian citizenship prior to receiving the survey. Jakpat requires users to sign up by providing their ID card number. In Indonesia, 17-year-old citizens must apply for an ID Card (“KTP”) which records their legal identity. Included on the card information is the individual’s religion. They then use this id card to vote, get a driver’s license etc. When users install the Jakpat app they submit their ID number to verify that they are of legal age. If they submit an invalid number, they are excluded from participation. Anyone without an Indonesian ID number and a valid Indonesian phone number is excluded from participation in the survey. Only Indonesians over the age of 17 with an Indonesian identity card and an Indonesian phone number (tied to their identity card) were eligible to participate and when registering for the app the user were taken through the consent process.} across the archipelago. Because users had provided demographic and religion information prior to taking the survey, there is no evidence that the structure and design of the survey primed users to consider their religion or their majority-minority status before answering questions about democracy. The data

was sampled to be representative of the national demographics of Indonesia (within 3% margin of error) except for religious demographics. Because the research question is especially focused on the nature of religious minorities, non-Muslim respondents were over-sampled. Indonesian census data suggests that the percentage of Muslims in the country is close to 87 percent of the population. Protestants and Catholics make up 10 percent and the remaining 3 percent are primarily indigenous religions, Hindus, and Buddhists. The sample strategy resulted in a survey that is 71.3 percent Muslim and 28.7 percent other religions. Besides this over-sampling design, other demographic variables including gender, age, socio-economic status, and education are within expectations based on Indonesian census data.

Framing democracy as a pro-majority system

The methodology used to test the effect of minority-majority priming was a randomly assigned prompt. In the survey, half of respondents received a set of questions about their opinion on democracy with the following prompt before the questions,

“Some scholars believe that democracy means that the largest groups in society control the government, and that smaller groups might be left out.”

This prompt was chosen to mirror the work of Hoffman and Bagdanov (2020) which asked a similar question about minority support for democracy but in Lebanon. The other half of respondents did not receive the prompt.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables are five survey items related to opinions about democracy. Like the previous chapter, each item asks the respondent if how much they agree with

a statement. The responses are a 5-point Likert scale that ranges from 1 to 5, where 5 implies high agreement and 1 means high disagreement. The five items are split into two subgroups, with two questions asking about general belief that democracy is good and three asking about illiberal notions of democracy. The questions are largely based on the items used in the *World Values Survey*. The difference is that instead of providing questions that address liberal notions of democracy, I focus on general support for democracy as a system as well as support for illiberal notions of democracy. The five statements are:

- Democracy is the best form of government. (general support for democracy)
- Democracy is the best form of government for combating inequality. (general support for democracy)
- It is important for religious leaders to interpret the country's laws. (illiberal notions of democracy)
- When the government is not functioning well, the army should step in and restore order. (illiberal notions of democracy)
- A non-democratic government is sometimes necessary for establishing stability. (illiberal notions of democracy)

Table 14 Descriptive statistics of dependent variables. The first five variables in the table are individual survey items. The last two are the combined index variables.

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Dem best	1,289	3.700	0.884	1	5
Dem best inequality	1,289	3.664	0.877	1	5
Religious leaders	1,289	3.673	1.016	1	5
Army controls unrest	1,289	3.521	1.021	1	5
Non-dem sometimes necessary	1,289	3.296	0.969	1	5
Dem support index	1,289	7.364	1.627	2	10
Authoritarian index	1,289	10.490	2.145	3	15

The first two variables are combined into a numeric, 10-point index of democratic support. The last three are also combined into a similar 15-point index of illiberal notions of democracy. Descriptive statistics for the five items and the two index variables are presented in Table 14. All survey items are normally distributed with average responses generally centered on the middle response (neutral) but skewed towards the higher end of the Likert scale (4 implies some level of agreement). The means for the two indices are the sums of the means of the individual items that comprise the index.

Analysis

I test the hypotheses using three methods: two-way t-tests, multivariate ordinary least squares regression, and multivariate logistic regression. First, using two-way t-tests, I compare the mean responses to the democracy variables with and without the framing prompt (assessing **H1** and **H2**) as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims (**H3**). When comparing between religious groups, the t-tests are weighted to adjust for the oversampling of religious minorities and under-sampling of Muslims. T-tests are conducted both for the index variables and their composite items. In total a set of 21 t-tests were performed.

Additionally, I use multivariate ordinary least squares regression to assess the relationship between the democracy index and both treatment and minority status. Because **H1** and **H2** are in-group hypotheses (comparing Muslims to other Muslims but examining the effect of the treatment), I model the treatment as an interaction term. The primary model, therefore, contains the interaction of religious minority status with the treatment and several control variables which may also independently

influence an individuals' view of democracy. Finally, I conduct multivariate logistic regression for each individual item related to views on democracy, using the same set of variables as the full models.

The control variables used in the regression models includes demographic data and responses to other survey questions. The demographic control variables are gender, age, education level, and socioeconomic status. The survey response controls include whether the individual voted in the last election, the individual's religious behavior (amount the person prays, attends worship services, reads religious texts, and listens to religious radio/tv shows), and news consumption patterns.

T-Tests

Table 15 presents the statistically significant t-tests results.¹² The table shows which variable-group was used for each test, the t-statistic and p-value and the difference in mean response based on the grouping variable. Table results are listed in order by the size of the difference in means. Overall, these results suggest that there are statistically significant differences in both the democratic and illiberal survey item responses based on treatment and minority religious status. Some of the results are not in line with hypothesized expectations.

Differences by treatment


First, when assessing the difference in means by receiving the prompt, the results suggest that individuals who receive the prompt have a slightly higher illiberal

¹² For a table displaying all t-test results, including results which were not statistically significant, please see the appendix.

notions index score, on average (0.238). Further inspection suggests that this positive increase in response is driven almost entirely by Muslim respondents. When comparing the difference in means of the treatment between non-Muslim respondents, the treatment shows no statistically significant difference in mean response. Comparing between only Muslim respondents, the difference in means is statistically significant (0.275).

It appears that the item in the authoritarian index that is likely changing the mean response based on receiving the treatment is whether respondents agree that “non-democracy is sometimes necessary to restore order.” Again, when examining the difference in means for this response by minority status, it appears that the difference in means is only statistically significant between Muslims. When shown the prompt that suggests majority groups benefit from democracy, the difference in means among Muslim respondents for “non-democracy is sometimes necessary” is 0.164 points higher.

Figure 16 Bar graph of counts by response to item ‘non-democracy is sometimes necessary for restoring order.’



Note: Data is Muslim respondents from Indonesia Jakpat survey data. The y-axis represents response counts, and the x-axis represents responses. Colors indicate counts based on whether respondents received the treatment prompt.

Figure 16 is a bar graph that presents the counts of responses for the “non-democracy is sometimes necessary” item by treatment, among Muslim survey respondents. Of the sample of Muslim respondents (n=919), 398 agreed or strongly agreed that sometimes a non-democratic country is necessary to restore order. Of these 398 respondents, 57 percent who agreed were given the prompt about majority and minority groups (228). When not provided with the prompt, the most common response was to be neutral (n=219).

Differences by religious minority status

The other t-tests with statistically significant results are comparisons in mean response between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents. The general finding among this set of responses is that non-Muslim respondents have a higher mean score on the pro-democratic index (0.225), and a lower mean score on the illiberal notions index compared to Muslim respondents (-0.997). The single component of the indices with the largest mean difference between Muslims and non-Muslim respondents is the question of whether religious leaders should interpret a country's laws, with non-Muslims having a mean response 15.8 percentage points lower on average than Muslim respondents (-0.769).

Table 15 Table of statistically significant t-test results using Indonesian survey data.

Variables in test	Data sample	T score	P-value	Diff in Mean
Authoritarian idx X treatment	Muslims	-2.106	0.035.	0.275
Authoritarian idx X treatment	Full	2.009	0.044.	0.238
Dem support idx X Minority status	Full	2.227	0.026.	0.225
Non-dem necessary X treatment	Muslims	-2.677	0.007.	0.164
Non-dem necessary X treatment	Full	2.782	0.005.	0.153
Dem best form X Minority status	Full	2.513	0.012.	0.136
Authoritarian idx X Minority status	Full	-7.183	0.000.	-0.997
Religious leaders interpret law X Minority status	Full	-11.633	0.000.	-0.769
Army steps in when unrest X Minority status	Full	-2.612	0.009.	-0.170

Note: The leftmost column displays the variables used in the test. The right-most column indicates the difference in mean response. Variables are ordinal, varying from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating more agreement with the statement. Index variables are the sum of the individual responses for variables.

While these results provide evidence that the treatment has an observable effect on Muslim responses to certain items, the tests provide no evidence that religious minorities had any change in response when shown the prompt compared to

those not shown the prompt. It does appear, however, that there are statistically significant, observable differences in mean response for several of the democracy questions based only on the individual's religious minority status. Religious minorities have lower mean responses on the authoritarian index (mean difference - 0.997) and the religious leader and army questions. Religious minorities also have a statistically significant higher average response on whether they agree that democracy is the best form of government.

These initial findings suggest that there is an observable difference in opinion, especially around questions of authoritarian notions of democracy but in the opposite expected direction (**H3**). Religious minorities appear to be less supportive of illiberal notions of democracy regardless of whether they receive a prompt on minority-majority contention. Additionally, Muslims appear to become more supportive of illiberal notions of democracy when given the prompt about contention.

To further assess these results, I conduct additional analysis via multivariate OLS and logistic regression. The next section describes the results of modeling these outcomes while controlling for various demographic and public opinion variables that may independently affect notions of democracy.

Ordinary least squares regression on indices

In addition to the main two independent variables, minority status and the treatment (seeing the prompt), I include several control variables in the model based on the same theory as the previous large-N models. Additionally, I include several variables that account for religious commitment and variables that address previous political activity and political opinion. The model also includes sample weights for

religious minority status, to account for the higher religious minority sample rate in the data. The final model with all control variables and sample weights contains the following additional variables:

Gender: A binary variable indicating whether the respondent is male or female.

Age: A numeric variable indicating the respondent's age

Socio-Economic Status: An ordinal variable with three categories that places individuals in either "low", "middle", or "high" categories based on self-reported income levels.

Education: A binary variable that indicates whether a respondent has received a high school diploma or higher (college education).

Voted for president: A binary variable that indicates whether a respondent voted in the last presidential election. A respondent who is politically engaged enough to vote is more likely to be aware of politics in general.

Ran for office: A binary variable that indicates whether a respondent has ever run for public office in an election. It is likely that individuals who run for office have a higher level of political knowledge and experience that may influence their views on democracy.

Violence acceptable in politics: A binary variable that indicates whether a respondent agreed that violence is at least sometimes acceptable to achieve political goals. It is possible that supporting violence may impact an individual's views on authority and politics.

Religious commitment: A battery of binary variables that indicate whether an individual said they regularly participate in activities related to their religion. The activities include prayer, attending worship services, reading religious books, and watching religious shows.


To assess if the treatment effect on support for democracy is mitigated by religious status, I model OLS regressions that contains an interaction term between the treatment and minority status.

Figure 17 is a dot-line graph presenting the coefficients for each term as a point with lines representing 95% confidence intervals, faceted by dependent

variable. The results of the primary models suggest that the treatment has no statistically significant effect on either the democracy or illiberal notions index. Neither the interaction term nor the treatment fixed effect term is statistically significant. However, the results do provide evidence that minority status does have a statistically significant effect on both index scores but in the opposite of expected directions. Religious minority group members have an average decrease in their illiberal index score by 0.91 points, all else equal. On the democratic index, religious minorities have an average increase in their score of 0.53 points, all else equal.

The model also suggests that the coefficient for the illiberal index variable is positive for the democratic index model. The results of this model indicate that a one unit increase in the illiberal index is associated with a 0.22-point increase on the democratic support index, on average and all else equal.

Figure 17 Dot and line plots with coefficient estimates for multivariate OLS models using democratic and illiberal indices as dependent variables.



Note: Dots and numbers represent coefficient point estimates and lines represent

95% confidence intervals. Stars represent *p*-value significance levels. $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Additionally, religious commitment variables suggest that prayer has a statistically significant and positive relationship with the democracy index, but most religious behavior variables are not statistically significant. However, the results do suggest that, for the illiberal index, watching religious television shows regularly increases the average index score by 0.8 points, all else equal.

The remaining control variables are generally within expectations or have no statistically significant effect on the democracy index. Believing that violence in politics is even sometimes justified leads to an average decrease in the democratic index score of 0.26 points, all else equal. Voting in an election has a positive effect on both indices, although the results are not statistically significant for the democratic index. Higher levels of socio-economic status have a negative effect on the democracy index as well, which is within expectations. Gender does not have a statistically significant coefficient estimate.

Given that the dependent variables are indices, it is worth examining the five questions individually. To assess if there are specific aspects of democratic support or illiberal notions of democracy that the treatment and minority status affect, I examine each separately.

Logistic regression models

In addition to the main index models, I run a separate logistic regression for each of the five democracy questions. For each model, the dependent variable is a binary indicator that is a 1 if a respondent agreed with the statement (4 or 5 on the

Likert scale). For the two liberal notions of democracy variables, I add the illiberal index as an independent variable, given the results from the previous models indicating that it has an observable relationship with the democratic support variables.

Table 16 Results from multivariate logistic regressions estimating the probability of respondent agreement with the five democratic and regime survey items.

	Dem best	Dem reduces inequality	Religious authorities	Army	Non-dem
Intercept	0.046 (0.098)	-0.090 (0.098)	0.451*** (0.071)	0.363*** (0.076)	0.282*** (0.075)
Treatment	0.001 (0.032)	0.027 (0.032)	0.063* (0.031)	0.021 (0.033)	0.133*** (0.032)
Religious Minority	0.091+ (0.048)	0.092+ (0.048)	-0.325*** (0.045)	-0.086+ (0.048)	0.049 (0.048)
Authoritarian Index	0.036*** (0.007)	0.041*** (0.007)			
Age	0.004* (0.002)	0.003+ (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Male	-0.009 (0.029)	-0.009 (0.029)	0.046+ (0.027)	0.034 (0.029)	0.029 (0.029)
SES Mid	-0.112* (0.051)	-0.021 (0.051)	0.031 (0.049)	0.096+ (0.052)	-0.011 (0.051)
SES Upper	-0.098* (0.049)	-0.018 (0.049)	0.005 (0.047)	0.059 (0.051)	0.000 (0.050)
Diploma or College	-0.041 (0.030)	0.014 (0.030)	0.049+ (0.028)	-0.038 (0.030)	0.015 (0.030)
Opinions not allowed	-0.024 (0.058)	-0.034 (0.058)	-0.009 (0.055)	-0.059 (0.059)	-0.117* (0.058)
Voted	0.059 (0.044)	0.086* (0.044)	0.067 (0.042)	0.009 (0.045)	0.132** (0.044)
Ran for office	0.036 (0.070)	0.015 (0.070)	0.021 (0.067)	0.055 (0.072)	0.095 (0.071)
Prays	0.114** (0.038)	0.126*** (0.038)	0.068+ (0.037)	-0.008 (0.039)	-0.017 (0.039)
Reads relig books	-0.025 (0.032)	-0.028 (0.032)	0.004 (0.031)	-0.065+ (0.033)	0.002 (0.033)
Attend Service	-0.061+ (0.033)	-0.054 (0.033)	0.007 (0.032)	0.038 (0.034)	0.037 (0.034)

Watches relig shows	0.100*	0.084*	0.098*	0.168***	0.151***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Treatment*Minority	0.032	-0.046	0.007	-0.035	-0.099
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Num.Obs.	1289	1289	1289	1289	1289
AIC	1787.9	1786.6	1682.3	1856.0	1819.9
BIC	1880.8	1879.5	1770.0	1943.7	1907.6
Log.Lik.	-875.937	-875.309	-824.133	-910.985	-892.926
RMSE	0.48	0.48	0.46	0.49	0.48

Note: $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; Results from multivariate logistic regressions estimating the probability of respondent agreement with the five democratic and regime survey items. Columns represent results for models on each item as a dependent variable. Standard errors are in parentheses.

The result from the individual models highlights important differences in the relationships between each of the indicators and the key variables of interest. Model results are presented in Table 16. The top line indicates the dependent variable that corresponds with each model. In all the models, the interaction between the treatment and minority status is not statistically significant. Additionally, the treatment has no fixed effect on the two indicators that suggest democratic support (models 1 and 2). Additionally, religious minority status is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level in the same models. Minority status is statistically significant at the 0.001 level, with a coefficient of -0.325 (SE=0.045), for the dependent variable *religious authorities should interpret a country's laws*. All else equal, the probability that a respondent agrees that religious leaders should interpret a country's laws decreases by 32 percentage points if the respondent is a religious minority.

The one model where the treatment does appear to have an effect is the model that tests the probability of agreement with the statement *non-democracy is sometimes necessary to restore stability*. The results indicate that the fixed effect of

the prompt has a statistically significant, positive effect on the likelihood that a respondent agrees with the statement. On average, the results indicate that seeing the prompt increased the probability of agreeing with the statement by 14 percentage points, all else equal.

Other variables that returned statistically significant results include prayer and watching religious shows. Watching religious television has a statistically significant, positive effect across every model. Prayer has a statistically significant, and positive effect across the two democratic support models (1 and 2). The illiberal notions index coefficient is also statistically significant for models 1 and 2, suggesting that increases in the illiberal index has a positive effect on the likelihood of agreeing that democracy is the best form of government and that it combats inequality. Most other control variables are not statistically significant from zero.

Discussion

After assessing the relationship between minority status, religiosity, and the framing of democracy as a majority-minority contest, the results are not in line with expectations. Furthermore, the interaction between the prompt (treatment) and minority status has no effect across the models that treat the indices as dependent variables, suggesting that the prompt only had a limited effect on specific items in the survey, namely the *religious authorities* and *non-democracy necessary* items. I discuss several specific results below.

Illiberal notions of democracy and Democratic Support

First, the illiberal notions index, and all three items within it, are associated with an increase in the likelihood of agreement with the first two items that comprise

the democracy index based on the results of the regression models. Even when considering other factors, on average, higher levels of agreement with the illiberal items also leads to an increased probability of agreement with the democracy items. These results suggest that, at least with this survey sample, the democratic support and illiberal notions items are positively related.

When considering how this could be the case, consider that, according to the previous chapters' results using the World Values Survey data set, most individuals across the world agree that democracy is the best form of government. Even in authoritarian countries, democratic support is high. This may partially be due to the vague and personal notion of what democracy means in political context. While many people would agree with each other that they like democracy, they may not all be thinking of the same thing. In the case of Indonesia, it appears that for many individuals, being a democracy is not incompatible with the army or religious leaders playing an active role in politics. This role of religious leaders in politics is less accepted by religious minorities in the country (non-Muslims). But among Muslims, a large number in the data agree that religious leaders should interpret a country's laws *and* agree that democracy is the best form of government.

The path dependence of democratization may matter in affecting how individual citizens define and view democracy itself. In the case of Indonesia, for example, the last half of the twentieth century was marked by repression, political violence, and forced separation of religion and state. It was during the period of reforming the government into a democracy that religious parties were allowed to compete in elections and that religious leaders were able to speak without fear of

retaliation. Similarly, the process of democratization in Indonesia was not a bottom-up approach. Following a series of corruption scandals that destroyed the credibility of the New Order regime even within the political elite, leaders of the regime convened to reform the government, beginning a process of institutional change that continued from 1998 to 2012. This change began from the top-down, and former members of the New Order regime were involved in discussions with opposition leaders and the military. Many religious groups which are not part of a political party were also supportive of democratization, working to mobilize Indonesian Muslims during the *reformasi* period.

In this context, religious leaders participating emerged as an outcome from democratization after a period of repressed political speech. It may be the case that respondents consider the relationship between religion and democracy to be a positive one where democracy allows for involvement of religious elites rather than stymies it. This is observed overtly by the rising number of Islamic civic organizations that actively mobilize and participate in national politics.

Minority-Majority Prompt

The second result that is surprising is that the prompt treatment has little observable effect on many of the outcome variables when controlling for other factors. In the multivariate OLS models, the treatment effect is not statistically significant. For three of the five items, the estimated average effect of the treatment, all else equal, is not statistically significant on the likelihood of agreement with the item. The only models that suggest the treatment has a statistically significant effect are the religious leadership and non-democracy logistic regressions. Additionally,

across the models, the interaction effect between minority religion status and the treatment is also not statistically significant.

There are a few possible reasons for these results. The first possibility is theory related. It may be the case that the theoretical justification for such expectations is incorrect. In this case, both considering democracy as a minority-majority political battle and religious minority status would have no effect on views towards democracy and authoritarian notions of governance. This seems unlikely given the context of Indonesia's history or religious polarization as well as further evidence in the study itself.

Qualitative evidence from the survey data suggests that religious polarization and group-based politics are a concern for many Indonesians. One of the questions in the survey was an open-ended response question that asked, "*What is the biggest problem in the country today?*" Respondents could reply in text with any possible answer.

[illegible]

Of the words used in the responses to the question, the top three terms used in the answers were *corruption* (315 observations), politics (135 observations) and *religion/religious* (133 observations). Examples of some of the answers that included the word religion describe the biggest crisis in the country as “*Ethnicity, race and religion*,” “*Being obsessive towards religion, correlating everything to religion*,” “*Tribe and religion*,” “*Radical groups and inter-religious divisions*,” and “*Lack of tolerance towards other religions*.” Most other responses that mention religion

present similar issues. Furthermore, 56 percent of respondents who mentioned religion in their description of the biggest crisis were not Muslim but were one of the minority religions in the data. Figure 18 is a word cloud which presents the top 60 terms used by respondents to describe the biggest crisis in the country. The light blue (top half of the cloud) words are the top words used by Muslim respondents while the darker blue (bottom half) are answers from religious minorities. The most frequent term among non-Muslim respondents was *religion*. Additionally, many of the words that are frequent in the non-Muslim category are related to ethno-religious identity. Words including *ethnicity*, *race/racism*, and *identity* are frequently used by non-Muslims.


While most respondents in the entire data set did not mention race, religion, or discrimination (again, corruption was the highest concern), the evidence suggests that religious polarization is a continuing concern in the country.

It may be the case that religious polarization only affects a portion of an individual's views of democracy. Of the five democracy indicators, minority status had little to no effect on the likelihood a respondent agreed with them with one exception. Minority status had a negative effect on whether a respondent agreed that religious leaders should interpret a country's laws.

Figure 19 is a dot-plot presenting the marginal effect of minority status and receiving the treatment on the likelihood of agreeing that religious leaders should interpret a country's laws, while holding all other variables at their median or mean response. The probability that a religious minority agrees that religious leaders should interpret a country's laws is 32 percentage points lower, on average, than Muslim

respondents. In this way, it appears that overt religious interaction in politics may be affected by this polarization.

Figure 19 Marginal effect of religious minority status on the probability that respondent agrees with the statement.



Note: The x-axis indicates whether the respondent received the treatment, and the y-axis indicates the probability of agreement. Dots represent estimated marginal effects and lines are 95% confidence intervals.


Non-Democracy

Besides the *religious leaders* item, the only other item that was affected by the prompt, all else equal, was *non-democracy is sometimes necessary to restore order*.

When shown the prompt, respondents became more likely to agree. The difference appears to be driven primarily by Muslim respondents. Figure 5 presents the marginal

effect of seeing the prompt on agreeing that non-democracy is sometimes necessary, holding other variables at their median and mean response. On average, Muslim respondents have a 37 percent probability of agreeing with the statement when not shown the prompt. The probability increases by 13 percentage points when they are shown the prompt. The probability increases by 13 percentage points when they are shown the prompt. The difference in response between religious minorities when shown the prompt is not statistically significant and substantively much smaller, at 2 percentage points.

Figure 20 Marginal effect of religious minority status on the probability that respondent agrees with the statement.



Note: The x-axis indicates whether the respondent received the treatment, and the y-axis indicates the probability of agreement. Dots represent estimated marginal effects and lines are 95% confidence intervals.

It appears that the prompt influences how Muslims view non-democracy. When Muslim respondents consider the majority-minority conflict that may exist under democracy, they become more likely to agree that non-democracy could be helpful in restoring political order. This finding is not intuitive but its reasoning may be like the logic behind why illiberal notions of democracy increase overt support for democracy in the data. When Muslims are prompted to consider that their government favors their group over minorities, it may be the case that they become less risk-averse to non-democratic changes. A government restoring order that also favors the majority group will not be as dangerous to the majority. An alternative explanation that requires further testing to establish is that the question and prompt may prime Muslims to consider the source of instability as emerging from minority political behavior. In either explanation, the respondents believe that the governing authorities are acting in the majority group's interests.

Conclusion

How do the results square with the general theory of religiosity, religious group dynamics and support for democracy? The original theory, based largely on evidence from MENA countries, suggested that religious minorities should be less supportive of democracy instead of more supportive. In the case of Indonesia, however, the results point in the opposite direction of expectations. Evidence from OLS and logistic regression models suggests that religious minorities are, on average, more supportive for democracy in general, and less supportive of illiberal notions of democracy. Framing democracy in minority-majority terms does not seem to affect religious minority response. In the case of Indonesia, I suggest that the results make

sense in context. Indonesian democracy is stratified by race, ethnicity, and religion. The country is already a democracy with long-standing religious tension. As a result, it is possible that non-Muslims are aware of the majority-minority dynamic in Indonesian democracy. Prompting them has no effect on responses because the religious minority groups already frame democracy in line with the prompt.

Once a country has become a democracy and institutions are created that protect the rights of individuals, regardless of religion, minorities may come to see the benefits of a regime that protects human rights. For most of modern Indonesia's history, the state accepted the presence of multiple religious groups and, through authoritarian management, enforced the image of Indonesia as a unified nation. The authoritarian regimes of Sukarno and Soeharto both suppressed dissident and identitarian voices in politics. Under the banner of the state's motto *Pancasila*, the government ruled the country under five principles. These principles are:

1. Belief in one and only God
2. Just and civilized humanity
3. The unity of Indonesia
4. Democracy guided by unanimity arising out of deliberation of representatives
5. Social justice for the people of Indonesia

Despite these principles being a holdover from authoritarian regimes, support for *Pancasila* is high among the population (Greenwalt 2021). *Pancasila* is an inherently vague set of doctrines, which prior authoritarian leaders used to their advantage to eliminate political threats as being against the national unity of Indonesia. Because of this vagueness, the first point, belief in one God, can be interpreted as either an

acceptance of all monotheistic religions or as a defense of Islam as the only truly Indonesian religion.

Unlike the countries examined in previous research on religious minorities, Indonesia's recent history demonstrates a sudden shift in ideology around the separation of church and state. Previous, authoritarian regimes used the principles of national unity to suppress alternative voices, particularly religious groups. This means that Indonesia, under authoritarianism, had a system that, at least in practice, separated religious leaders from politics. Following the collapse of the *New Order* regime and the rapid decentralization, the policies that limited religious engagement in politics were lifted. Even so, most Indonesians still support the concept of *Pancasila*, but it is likely how they interpret the first part of the principles that matters most for understanding the results of this paper.

Religious minorities may be more supportive of a state that is both democratic and that separates religious activity in politics, at least to an extent. Simultaneously, Sunni Muslims may consider religious activity in politics to be tied directly to the concept of *Pancasila*. This explains why religious minorities are far less likely than Muslims to agree that religious leaders should be involved in interpreting the country's laws. Within the past decade, religious leaders in Indonesia have influenced the outcome of legal proceedings which have led to the fining and even jailing of non-Muslims and non-Sunni Muslims based on blasphemy laws. In other words, religious minorities are already aware of the minority-majority dynamics, and they are concerned that non-democracy would not protect them even when, in the current democratic situation, they face potential discrimination. Rather than wanting to support non-democracy in

the hopes that a stronger government will protect them, religious minorities seek to eliminate the role of religion in politics. This unique context may explain why findings were divergent from the original theory.

Muslim respondents, however, when shown the prompt, do become more likely to agree that non-democracy may be necessary to restore order. This result suggests that the prompt has a greater effect on Muslim respondents in general. Muslim respondents are less likely to consider religious polarization the biggest crisis in the country - instead pointing to economic issues and corruption. But, when they are primed to consider democracy in group terms, they are more likely to agree that non-democracy could be needed to restore order. It is unclear whether the prompt is causing Muslim respondents to frame minority-majority tension in terms of religious polarization. Based on the open-ended responses, it appears that Muslims are far more concerned about corruption. As such, it is possible that the prompt caused Muslims to frame polarization along economic lines or ethnic lines. Further study is required to assess this result. Currently, based on the qualitative evidence in the data I suggest that the Muslim respondents, being more concerned about corruption, see non-democracy as a means of rooting out corruption.

These results introduce nuance to the general theory of religious commitment, group size, and support for democracy discussed in Chapter 2. Indonesia is a unique case, a functioning democracy that has a history of religious polarization. Furthermore, the country is highly decentralized, which allows for alternative local coalitions to form around alternative identity cleavages depending on demographics (Birbir and Şatana 2022). Unlike previous studies which occurred in countries with

either weaker democratic electoral institutions (Belge 2016) or demographic uncertainty (Hoffman and Bagdanov 2020), Indonesia has elections at local and national levels, as well as clear demographic data, providing open information on which religious groups are majorities.

Revising the theory of religious minorities and democratic support

While Indonesia may be a unique case in some historical respects, I also suggest that it elucidates possible, generalizable expectations. In countries with high religious polarization, religious minorities should favor whichever type of regime will offer them the best protection. In the case of Indonesia, religious minorities appear to favor democracy and are more disapproving of religious leaders interpreting a country's laws. In this case, Indonesia is an illiberal democracy that favors the Muslim majority through the enforcement of blasphemy laws and other, similar laws. It is not democracy that is the problem for the religious minorities but the illiberal laws being enforced by the state.

It may be that it is only in cases where religion is politicized that religious minorities will differ from the religious majority in terms of support for democracy. Specifically, they will differ on whether they support illiberal notions of democracy such as allowing religious leaders to interpret a country's laws or allowing a non-democratic government to step in and restore order. It depends entirely on whether the state supports religious minorities or majorities, which way they will turn. For many of the countries which have previously been studied on similar issues, secular authoritarian governments protected religious minorities from large religious

majorities. This path-dependent difference may explain why the expected outcomes were not met.

To revise the theory, I suggest that in countries with religious polarization, religious minorities are faced with political choices to ensure their groups' security. Religious minorities will tend to support whichever system of government is most likely to offer them protection from out-groups, including the religious majority. In the case of Indonesia, religious minorities want *more* liberal democracy in the form of separating religion and politics as opposed to not wanting democracy at all.

Conversely, religious majorities in countries with religious polarization will also support whichever system offers the group the most security and freedom. Again, in the case of Indonesia, the democratic system has allowed Muslims more political power. In this context, the majority is more favorable of *illiberal* democracy that serves the majority better over the minority.

This outcome would not be the case in other contexts. For example, in countries with little to no religious polarization, there may be no difference in support for democracy, either liberal or illiberal, segmented by religious groups. In countries with a high number of secular or non-religious citizens, religious groups may choose to form coalitions to combat any policies seen as overstepping any religion's ability to practice their faith.

Further analysis is needed to assess if this revision holds. Future studies may choose to pick a handful of countries that have high religious polarization but that vary in terms of religious demographics and assess whether minorities vary in support for democracy across these countries. Alternatively, this study could be replicated in a

country where the government has a history of favoring a religious minority to assess whether the outcome is different.

Religious minorities and majorities differ in democratic support

The previous chapter presented strong evidence that individual religious commitment has a relationship with support for liberal democracy. It provided no evidence that majority/minority religious groups associated with different views on democracy. This chapter addressed the group-level parts of the theory and found that, in Indonesia, religious groups *do* differ in their support for democracy. The difference was not in the expected direction, leading to a discussion of whether Indonesia is a unique country-case, the theory is incorrect, or both. I concluded that while Indonesia may be unique in terms of how religion has been politicized, the theory should only apply in countries with high religious polarization. Furthermore, I suggest that the direction of support will vary depending on what the government's relationship is with minority groups. When governments favor the majority, minorities will support an alternative that may offer greater security. When governments protect the minority from majority religious groups, the religious minorities may support whatever type of regime the government is.

The important distinction between this conclusion and the original theory is *what* the regime types are. In the original formulation, the two alternatives theorized were democracy and autocracy. If the government is a democracy that discriminates against the minority, then as originally formulated, the expectation would be that minorities favor autocracy or authoritarianism over democracy. What the previous

chapter and this chapter elucidates is that almost everyone says they like democracy.

The question is *what* kind of democracy they like.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Faith in God, faith in the government?

Despite the long-standing belief that religion would dissipate as a part of politics due to the twin-trends of secularization and modernization, religion, particularly the use of religious identity as a marker of political affiliation, has become a regular part of politics across the globe (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Simultaneously, scholars have debated whether the world has been undergoing a period of democratic backsliding (Bermeo 2016; Norris 2011). As secularization has not occurred in a uniform fashion, mostly concentrating in Western Europe and related states, questions about the nature of the relationship between religion and politics have reemerged. This dissertation reexamines the relationship between religious commitment, religious group dynamics, and individual level support for democracy.

the question as to whether religious commitment affects support for liberalism and democracy has resurfaced. This dissertation re-examined the relationship between religious identity and support for democracy. I asked whether religious commitment, the holistic number of individual beliefs, behaviors, and sense of belonging towards one's faith, altered beliefs about political regimes. Through a thorough review of the literature on religion and politics, a cross-country analysis of religious commitment, and a single-country case study, I demonstrated that religion and support for democracy do have a general negative relationship. I also found evidence that religious commitment leads to average higher support for non-democratic or illiberal

regimes. While these findings are backed by previous research, I offer the largest, most recent cross-country study on the subject. Additionally, many questions remain as to the overall political effect of this association between religion and democracy.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first ask why the question of religious support for democracy still matters at all. Second, I summarize the major findings across the chapters of the dissertation. Third, I draw general conclusions about the nature of the relationship between religious commitment, religious minority status, and support for democracy. Fourth, I suggest future research that should be done to elaborate on these findings as well as expand the scope of the research agenda.

The religious question in an age of democratic backsliding

In November 2021, Anne Applebaum of the Atlantic published a cover story title *The Bad Guys are Winning* (Applebaum 2021). The cover image depicts the political leaders of Venezuela, Belarus, Russia, China, and Turkey, walking in step over a stark, red background. The implication - these are the bad guys, and they are on the move. In her article, Applebaum makes the argument that illiberal leaders have hijacked the institutions and tools of democracy to undermine it. She is not alone. While the definition and observation of democratic backsliding in recent years has been debated (Foa and Mounk 2016; Norris 2011, 2017), there is no doubt that, among democracies, the populist parties with authoritarian tendencies have grown in popularity and strength across a varied set of countries (Hunter and Power 2019; Reynié 2016; G.-W. Shin 2020; Wilkin 2016). In many of these cases, the threat to democracy appears to occur from within its own house, as illiberal or authoritarian candidates win elections by popular vote. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue that this

is the most common means of democratic decay - that an autocrat wins support through democratic institutions and then demolishes them once in power so that the political game is rigged in the leaders' favor (see Levitsky and Way (2002) and Levitsky and Way (2020) for more evidence of this theory).

For a number of these leaders, a large portion of their base is religious or identifies as religious. This has led researchers to ask what, if any, relationship exists between religion and support for illiberal politicians. Recent work on support for far-right political movements in Western Europe suggests that religious individuals tend to support center-right parties and not the far-right (Arzheimer and Carter 2009; Montgomery and Winter 2015). Brubaker (2017) argues that religion, in particular Christianity, is used symbolically by far-right parties to signal Islamophobic policy stances as a defense of national culture. Evidence across Europe specifically suggests that support for the far-right is largely tied to immigration policy or out-group distrust, particularly against Muslim immigrants (Fitzgerald 2018; Gravelle, Medeiros, and Nai 2021; Overos and Sauer 2023; Weitzel 2020). In the United States, recent research has suggested that partisanship drives religious commitment such that conservatives are more likely to be religious (Margolis 2017). Other research has found that it is nationalist beliefs that tie the nation-state to a specific religion that drive far-right support in the United States (Perry, Whitehead, and Grubbs 2020; Whitehead and Perry 2020). By these accounts, religious commitment does not appear to be the driving illiberal or far-right support, it is the political signal of cultural hegemony that the majority religion represents.

In other parts of the world, religious dynamics reflect similar tendencies, with majority religious affiliation providing political advantages. Religious signaling in MENA countries provides even relatively secular parties an electoral advantage (Livny 2020). As discussed in the previous chapter on Indonesia, religion can become a quick way for parties to mobilize a large section of the population. This forces religious minorities to make political decisions regarding how they choose to either play the democratic game or oppose the majority (Birbir and Şatana 2022). All this work demonstrates the reality that, at the very least, religious identity plays a significant role in many of the world's consolidated or emerging democracies.

But a question unanswered by these recent studies goes beyond support for politicians and parties. Rather than finding a trend in whether religious commitment affects support for far-right candidates who mobilize individuals under certain policy platforms, another more basic question is - does religion affect support for the regime type itself? Does a more religious individual care whether they live under a democracy? This question is broader but has important implications related to the literature presented above.

Theory of religious commitment and support for democracy

In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I conducted a thorough review of four previous theories about the relationship between religion and support for democracy. The first theory suggests religious commitment is associated with personality traits conducive to authoritarianism such as valuing tradition and trusting authority. The second focuses on the importance of religious behavior and argues some religious practices are pro-social and promote civic traits important to democracy such as

community outreach and debate. The third theory fused these first two together, arguing that religion has disparate effects depending on which ‘facet’ of religion (the beliefs, behaviors, or sense of belonging) was being discussed. And a fourth, structural theory suggested that religious identity can become an instrument for mobilization and therefore the majority/minority status of religious groups could affect individual political beliefs and behaviors. All four of these theories suggest several various hypothetical outcomes and I formulated them at the end of the chapter. I present summaries of these theories in Table 17.

Table 17 Summary of theorized relationships between religious measures, democratic support, and authoritarianism.

Theory Name	Religious Measure	Expected relationship	
		Democratic Support	Authoritarianism
Authoritarian Personality	Status quo religiosity	(-)	(+)
Authoritarian Personality	Authoritarianism	(-)	(+)
Social Capital	Social religious activity	(+)	NA
Multifaceted Theory	Religious belief	(-)	(+)
Multifaceted Theory	Social religious activity	(+)	(-)
Economics of Religion	Group size	(+)	NA

After outlining these theories, I then offered a revised version of the authoritarian personality theory which incorporated the work done across the literature. Acknowledging that religion could have disparate effects depending on which aspect of religion was measured, I still argued that the *overall* relationship between higher religious commitment and support for democracy would be negative because all facets of religion likely co-vary. As such, while there is likely some variation where individuals believe in their faith but do not practice communal worship while others may practice worship but have low levels of belief, the general

trend should be that higher belief associates with higher practice and a greater sense of belonging to the group.

In addition to this, I argued that the demographic effects and mobilizing power of religious identity would also play a role in support for democracy. I suggested that religious minorities would not be as supportive of democracy despite the benefits it could provide in terms of political rights and representation. While democracy can protect minorities, the choice set that minorities have matters. When facing a potential democracy where a large religious majority is in control of the state, minorities may support non-democracy as an expedient alternative to protect their community from larger groups.

Based on this revised theory I suggested the following hypotheses:

H1: Individuals with higher religious commitment will be less supportive of democracy than less committed individuals.

H2: Individuals with higher religious commitment will be more authoritarian than less committed individuals.

H3: Individuals with higher authoritarianism will be less supportive of democracy.

H4: As the size of an individual's religious group decreases, support for democracy will decrease.

H5: As the size of a religious individual's religious group decreases, support for authoritarianism increases.

I next review the results of Chapters 3-5, where I used quantitative survey methodology to test these hypotheses.

Religious commitment and authoritarian personality

In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that individuals can be grouped together based on common religious characteristics. Using latent class analysis, I found evidence that

individuals can be grouped into classes that vary by overall religious commitment. Furthermore, I find that the different facets of religious commitment tend to co-vary, such that individuals with higher belief tend to also worship and pray more and are more likely to identify as religious.

In addition to finding that individuals can be categorized based on religious commitment, I also demonstrate that there is a relationship between religious commitment and authoritarian personality traits. More religious individuals are more likely to have higher religious commitment.

In Chapter 4, I further examine religious commitment and authoritarian personality, but I test the relationship both have with support for democracy. Using the *World Values Survey* as a means of testing cross-national support for democracy over time, I make two important contributions. First, because democracy is not a well-defined concept, many people support democracy but differ in what they think they are supporting. I follow a growing trend in the literature on democratic support by measuring *notions of democracy* rather than overt democratic support. I create two indices, a *liberal notions of democracy* index and an *illiberal notions of democracy* index. The first measures support for governments that protect minority rights and hold free and fair elections. The second measures support for authoritarian policies including allowing un-elected elites including the military and religious leaders to play a role in democratic governance. The second contribution I make is that I find support that religious commitment is associated with less support for liberal notions of democracy and more support for illiberal notions of democracy. Authoritarian

personality and intolerance towards out-groups are also similarly related to the indices.

Further analysis reveals that being a highly religious individual has a similar association with support for democracy, all else equal, with being a highly authoritarian individual. At lower levels of religious commitment, authoritarian personality has a strong, negative association with support for liberal notions of democracy and a positive association with support for illiberal notions of democracy. At higher levels of religious commitment, the observed relationship between authoritarian personality and both indices drops significantly.

The results of this individual-level analysis reveal that an observed, negative relationship does exist between levels of support for liberal democracy and religious commitment. This relationship appears to exist across most world-regions in a variety of political contexts. I conclude that, on average, religious individuals will be more tolerant of authoritarian or illiberal government policies than less religious individuals.

Does religious facet theory hold?

The findings in chapters 3 and 4 also speak to a theory in the religion and politics literature, which suggests that different “facets” of religious experience affect political beliefs differently. Specifically, the theory suggests that beliefs are negatively associated with support for democracy while communal practices have a positive relationship. I find that, generally, this is true. It appears that individuals who share high levels of religious commitment but differ in communal worship practices do vary in support for democracy. Those who are highly religious but not communal,

the *Private religious* types introduced in Chapter 3, are generally less supportive of liberal notions of democracy and more supportive of illiberal notions of democracy than the *Active religious* types. However, as I noted in Chapter 2, the different facets of religious commitment co-vary such that individuals who have high levels of belief also tend to have higher frequency of prayer, attendance, and self-identification with their religious group. The net result of increased religious commitment then, is an overall negative relationship with liberal notions of democracy. Thus, while the multi-faceted theory is true, the overall relationship between religion and democratic support is negative.

I argue that because religion is such a complex social and psychological system of beliefs and behaviors, it is more useful to observe the net outcomes of increased religious commitment rather than focusing on differences across facets of religion.

Religious demographics, choice set and minority support for democracy

While Chapters 3 and 4 provide evidence that religious commitment is related to lower support for liberal democracy and higher support for illiberal or authoritarian notions of democracy, they demonstrate limited support that religious minority status has a relationship with the same outcomes. Chapter 3 does show that a higher concentration of religious minorities are *Active religious* or *Private religious* than religious majorities. But Chapter 4, using multiple varied measures of minority status and discrimination of religious minorities, presents a null finding. There is no observable relationship between individual-level support for democracy and group-level status or discrimination.

This finding goes against theoretical expectations. The results can be interpreted in at least three ways. First and simplest, they can be interpreted as evidence that group-level religious dynamics play no role in individual-level attitudes about democracy. Second, the results could be the result of the ecological nature of the group-level variables. It may be the case that group-level variables do not capture the majority/minority dynamics in an appropriate way, leading to a null finding. The third interpretation, which is related to the second, is that group-level items such as religious discrimination affects other items directly which in turn affect support for democracy. For example, if discrimination against a religious minority results in that minority having a lower, on average, income level, then the results of the group-level dynamics may be captured by an income variable rather than an overt discrimination variable.

To further assess whether the null result is emblematic of there being no relationship between minority status and support for democracy, I pick one country where I expect religious demographics and religious identity to play a role in politics. For additional testing, I chose to research Indonesia as a case study on religious groups and democratic support.

Indonesia, illiberal democracy, and religious minority support for democracy

The group-level results in Chapter 4 led me to re-test the group-level hypotheses using a single country as a case study. I chose Indonesia, a diverse democratic country with clear religious and ethnic divisions. Using the results of a new survey data set, I tested the effect of priming individuals to consider majority-

minority dynamics on support for democracy. The results suggested that there were clear differences in response based on religious minority status and receiving the prompt. However, the results show that the religious minority respondents were unaffected by the prompt, and they had higher support for democracy on average compared to members of the majority religion.

These results provide evidence in one case that minority group status does appear to have a relationship with levels of support for democracy. However, the results are in the opposite direction of expectations given the original theory presented in Chapter 2. The results lead me to revise both the scope and expectations of the original theory. First, I suggest that the scope of the group-level theory should only be limited to those states where religious identity is a salient political marker. Thus, a country like Indonesia or previously studied countries in the MENA region should be considered. In countries where religion is not a salient identity marker, it may be the case that some other majority-minority dynamic affects support for democracy, but religion should not. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship between minority status and support for democracy will be context dependent. If the state favors the minority group politically over the majority, then religious minorities may be more favorable to authoritarian notions of democracy. If the opposite is true, that the state favors majority religious individuals, then religious minorities will become more critical of illiberal notions of democracy and more supportive of liberal notions of democracy.

In the revised theory, religious minorities have political agency and given their current political circumstances, favor whichever type of government they

believe is most likely to offer them security. In some cases, this may mean supporting more illiberal governments but in the case of Indonesia, the results show that non-Muslims are less supportive of illiberal notions of democracy. This theory is like other, rational-choice theories of political behavior where individuals or groups behave in ways that maximize their desired outcomes. In the case of religious minorities in a polarized environment, I expect the first aim of the group is security.

What we talk about when we talk about democracy

Although this dissertation was largely concerned with one specific type of identity, religion, and the relationship religious identity has with support for democracy, I make several general conclusions about democracy in general. First, most people support democracy. Evidence in Chapter 4 suggests that most individuals surveyed across dozens of countries between 2015 and 2020 are in support of democracy. This is in line with past research on earlier time periods using similar data (R. Inglehart 2003; Norris 2011). Second, despite this high support, most individuals define democracy differently. As a result, simply asking if someone likes democracy will provide an unhelpful answer. Asking whether a person thinks that protecting women's rights, free and fair elections, or allowing the military to control the government are important aspects of democracy reveals an array of answers that vary widely by context. Through these questions it is revealed that a segment of the world population is supportive of democracy that upholds illiberal policy positions.

The implications of these findings are important for scholars of democracy. First, from a theoretical perspective, this finding raises important questions about the role of civic culture and "key citizens" in democratic society (Almond and Verba

1963; Norris 2011). If most citizens in a country support democracy but then disagree about key elements of what defines a democracy, how does this disagreement play out politically? Do parties form based on these varied definitions of democracy and then seek to alter democratic institutions through legislation? Do individuals act on their beliefs about how a democracy should function, or are these variations in definition largely unimportant in explaining political behavior? These are just a few of the potential research trajectories related to this overall finding.

Authoritarian personality

In addition to finding that there is a variation in how individuals define democracy, I also find that apolitical beliefs related to authority, gender roles, and child rearing are associated with individuals holding illiberal views of democracy. While this finding may sound tautological at first (authoritarians like authoritarian government), this finding is itself an important, logical one. Individuals may have different reasons for having high respect for authority, valuing obedience, or promoting traditional family and gender roles, but these beliefs are associated with changes in what democracy means to them. By appealing to concepts about how children should be raised or how families should operate, political parties or political entrepreneurs may also tap into these larger questions about how democracy should operate.

The same is likely true with appealing to elements of religion. Given that high religiosity and high authoritarian personality traits both have similar relationships with support for illiberal notions of democracy, it is possible that appealing to coreligionists may have similar effects.

Directions for future work

This study revealed associations between religion, authoritarian personality, and notions of democracy. However, these findings raise more questions which require further research. I outline two paths of research that result from these findings.

How do religious minorities engage politically?

The hypotheses related to religious minorities in Chapter 4 do not suggest that minority religious status has any relationship with individual-level support for democracy. However, the results of Chapter 5 and previous literature suggest that religious minorities *can* differ in their beliefs from religious majorities. These results suggest that more work is needed to explore the nature of religious minority support for democracy.

There are two missing pieces to the subject of religious minority politics. First, how do differences in opinion between religious minorities and majorities emerge? Does the path-dependence of nation-building, for example, lead to these divergences? In the case of Indonesia, a national debate around the role of Islam, Christianity, and the state existed at the very beginning of the modern nations' founding. Were the religious differences not present at the beginning of the country's founding or if the demographics of the country were different, would the beliefs of Muslims and non-Muslims also change? Second, do these differences in beliefs influence political behavior? It is possible that individuals vary in belief about abstract concepts like democracy without feeling the need to act on these beliefs. It is also unknown if more practical concerns like community safety or fear of violent

threats are the immediate concerns that drive action, rather than support for abstract notions of democracy.

Future work will require examining the causal path that leads to group-level divergence in belief and then to possible political action (voting patterns, protests, legal action) by religious minorities.

Are authoritarians gaining popularity because of religious commitment?

Returning to the article in the Atlantic, as Anne Applebaum argues, there is a concerning trend where authoritarian leaders seem to be gaining support both domestically and internationally. The question arises: are these authoritarians garnering support from individuals with high authoritarian personality traits or those with strong religious commitments? While there may be surface-level correlations, it is essential to exercise caution in drawing direct connections. Leaders like Viktor Orban, for instance, often appeal to religious bases and traditional family values, potentially attracting individuals with authoritarian tendencies. However, without further research, we cannot definitively establish causality or determine the extent of this relationship.

To address this, future research could focus on identifying individuals with high authoritarian personality traits and assessing their support for specific leaders. Additionally, experiments could be designed to examine whether appeals to religious commitment or traditional family values, such as gender roles and obedience, influence political support. Another avenue worth exploring is the potential correlation between the prevalence of high authoritarian personality traits within a population and established democracy measures, such as Freedom House, Polity, or

V-dem scores. It's possible that the causal relationship between individual authoritarian traits and political beliefs may run in the opposite direction - strong, liberal democratic institutions could shape individual beliefs.

In summary, whether the relationship is causal or reciprocal, there is a clear need for further research in this area. Investigating the dynamics between authoritarian personality traits, religious commitment, and political support is essential for a more comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing the rise of authoritarianism in contemporary politics. This research can contribute valuable insights to address the complex challenges posed by such trends.

Conclusion: Religion and democracy in the 21st century

This dissertation explored how religion may shape individual views of democracy. The results of this study confirm that religious commitment at the individual level is associated with changes in how individuals view democracy. This confirmed a long-standing theory and demonstrated that, while support for democracy appears high across the globe, the results are more complicated. When examining what individuals mean when they say they support democracy, the results indicate that more religious and more authoritarian individuals define democracy in illiberal ways. Further research is required to explore the effects of this observation.

Moreover, a unique and compelling insight emerged from an examination of religion in Indonesia. Religious minorities exhibited a higher inclination toward democratic values compared to the Muslim majority. Intriguingly, within the Muslim majority, there is a tendency toward endorsing illiberal interpretations of democracy. This exploration of majority-minority dynamics was extended by demonstrating that

religious minority groups in Indonesia are concerned about religious polarization, with many calling it the biggest problem in the country. This novel discovery highlights the heightened awareness among religious minorities regarding their marginalized status and their perception of the intricate interplay between religion and politics as a significant issue in the Indonesian political landscape.

In essence, the findings of this study reaffirm the enduring connection of religion and politics on a global scale. Religion, as a deeply personal and influential aspect of individuals' lives, continues to shape their understanding of politics and the nature of democracy. The dissertation has not only confirmed established theories but also unearthed fresh insights into the diverse ways in which religion intersects with democratic values. This research encourages further exploration into the multifaceted relationship between religion, politics, and democracy, paving the way for a more comprehensive understanding of this critical nexus.

Appendices

Chapter 3 appendix

LCA Results Tables

The appendix presents two tables with the probabilities for each response. This data was used to generate Figure 1 and Figure 2 in the chapter.

Table 18 Table of probability of response for each variable given an individual's authoritarian class.

	low auth, low intol	indifferent, low intol	low auth, mod intol	high auth, low intol	high auth, mod intol	high auth, high intol
Can people be trusted? Most people can be	0.52	0.32	0.30	0.12	0.17	0.20
Can people be trusted? Need to be careful	0.48	0.68	0.70	0.88	0.83	0.80
Country should emphasize authority in future: Bad thing	0.24	0.16	0.28	0.09	0.05	0.15
Country should emphasize authority in future: Don't mind	0.34	0.42	0.41	0.19	0.17	0.25
Country should emphasize authority in future: Good thing	0.42	0.42	0.31	0.73	0.78	0.60
Jobs scarce, hire nationals over immigrants: Agree	0.36	0.60	0.73	0.78	0.85	0.76
Jobs scarce, hire nationals over immigrants: Disagree	0.46	0.03	0.10	0.14	0.08	0.11
Jobs scarce, hire nationals over immigrants: Neither	0.18	0.37	0.18	0.08	0.06	0.13
Obedience important child quality: Listed	0.11	0.29	0.24	0.48	0.48	0.44
Woman earns more than man causes problems: Agree	0.04	0.23	0.26	0.42	0.51	0.41
Woman earns more than man causes problems: Disagree	0.84	0.13	0.36	0.42	0.30	0.34
Woman earns more than man causes problems: Neither	0.12	0.63	0.39	0.16	0.19	0.25
Wouldn't like foreign neighbor: Mentioned	0.03	0.09	0.59	0.09	0.43	0.91
Wouldn't like neighbor diff language: Mentioned	0.02	0.04	0.23	0.04	0.37	0.89
Wouldn't like neighbor diff race: Mentioned	0.01	0.03	0.36	0.02	0.41	0.94
Wouldn't like neighbor diff religion: Mentioned	0.02	0.05	0.28	0.04	0.44	0.93

Note: Columns represent the class label and rows are the variable followed by the response. Cells are conditional probabilities of response given class.

Table 19 Table of probability of response for each variable given an individual's religion class.

	Moderately relig	Active relig	Not relig	Private relig	Spiritual nonrelig
believe_god: No	0.03	0.01	0.92	0.00	0.15
believe_god: Yes	0.97	0.99	0.08	1.00	0.85
believe_hell: No	0.35	0.22	0.97	0.05	0.53
believe_hell: Yes	0.65	0.78	0.03	0.95	0.47
only_religion_mine: Agree	0.28	0.27	0.08	0.21	0.18
only_religion_mine: Disagree	0.44	0.32	0.30	0.07	0.44
only_religion_mine: Strongly Agree	0.11	0.29	0.04	0.70	0.07
only_religion_mine: Strongly Disagree	0.18	0.13	0.58	0.02	0.31
relig_active: Active Member	0.14	0.59	0.01	0.04	0.03
relig_active: Don't Belong	0.58	0.22	0.95	0.90	0.81
relig_active: Inactive Member	0.28	0.19	0.04	0.06	0.16
relig_attend: 1x/month	0.23	0.09	0.00	0.08	0.03
relig_attend: 1x/week	0.21	0.44	0.00	0.14	0.00
relig_attend: 1x/year	0.06	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.11
relig_attend: Less than 1x/year	0.12	0.03	0.08	0.07	0.26
relig_attend: More than 1x/week	0.02	0.40	0.00	0.22	0.00
relig_attend: Never	0.05	0.00	0.85	0.24	0.38
relig_attend: Only on holy days	0.30	0.02	0.03	0.21	0.21
relig_ident: Atheist	0.01	0.00	0.46	0.00	0.06
relig_ident: Not religious	0.20	0.06	0.53	0.14	0.56
relig_ident: Religious	0.79	0.94	0.01	0.86	0.38
relig_important: Not important	0.02	0.01	0.62	0.00	0.16
relig_important: Not very important	0.14	0.02	0.32	0.01	0.46
relig_important: Rather important	0.45	0.14	0.04	0.08	0.27
relig_important: Very important	0.39	0.84	0.02	0.91	0.12
relig_prayer: 1x/day	0.32	0.25	0.00	0.08	0.06
relig_prayer: 1x/year	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.06
relig_prayer: 2+ times/day	0.11	0.64	0.00	0.70	0.04
relig_prayer: 2+ times/week	0.24	0.09	0.00	0.06	0.07
relig_prayer: Less than 1x/year	0.05	0.00	0.09	0.02	0.26
relig_prayer: Never	0.00	0.00	0.86	0.08	0.28
relig_prayer: Only at religious service	0.16	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.07
relig_prayer: Only on holy days	0.10	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.14

Note: Columns represent the class label and rows are the variable followed by the response. Cells are conditional probabilities of response given class.

Matching RMAR and WVS

The RMAR data is a data set that records country-group-year observations of minority religious group discrimination and political activity. I match the RMAR data to individual WVS responses to identify if a survey respondent is a religious minority in their country. RMAR defines religious minorities as religious groups that are either a numerical minority of the country's population or that are politically marginalized. The RMAR data observes 771 religious minorities across every country from 2000 to 2014. The WVS data extends past 2014. However, religious demographics do not change drastically in small year increments. It is a safe assumption that religious minorities in 2014 are still minorities in their country six years later. I tested if this was the case by examining changes in demographic data for religious groups via the Religious Characteristics of States (RCS) data (Brown and James 2018). Results suggest that there are no significant differences in religious demographics that would dramatically alter the minority status of a group in such a short period of time. Therefore, I consider it safe to identify religious minorities using the list of religious minorities in 2014. In future studies, this extrapolation may not be as valid and so I expect that manual checking of minority status would be required.

RMAR and WVS data sets use separate numerical codes for religious groups. The RMAR uses the RCS coding schema for religious groups (Brown and James 2018). To address this issue, I create a conversion table that matches WVS religious group codes to RCS religious group codes. The conversion table is available in the replication materials for this chapter. To create the conversion table, I identified all distinct religious groups observed in waves 6 and 7 of the WVS data. I then identified the RCS codes for the same groups. These codes also work for RMAR data as well.

To connect the data, I match rows in RMAR to WVS respondents by country and year. I then keep observations where the individual's religious affiliation id in the survey data matches the group in the row of the RMAR data. Each observation in RMAR identifies a single religious minority group for each country-year but also contains a variable that identifies the religious majorities in that country-year. If the individual's religion does not match the religious minority group, I then check if their religion matches the majority group. Thus, all observations where an individual is either a religious majority or minority are kept.

Chapter 4 appendix

Primary models

Table 20 Primary model with liberal notions of democracy index as the dependent variable

Variable	Mean	SD	10%	50%	90%
(Intercept)	61.2	12.9	44.4	61.2	77.7
Spiritual non-religious	-1.7	0.3	-2.2	-1.7	-1.3
Moderately religious	-2.4	0.3	-2.8	-2.4	-1.9
Private religious	-0.2	0.4	-0.7	-0.2	0.4
Active religious	-3.0	0.4	-3.5	-3.0	-2.5
Auth pers. index	-0.3	0.1	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3
Intoler. index	-0.5	0.1	-0.6	-0.5	-0.4
Relative group size	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Female	-0.3	0.2	-0.5	-0.3	-0.1
Age	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Secondary ed.	1.8	0.2	1.5	1.8	2.1
Tertiary ed.	5.4	0.3	5.0	5.4	5.7
High income	-0.4	0.2	-0.7	-0.4	0.0
Middle income	-0.8	0.2	-1.1	-0.8	-0.6
Pol. uninterested	-2.0	0.2	-2.2	-2.0	-1.8
Left-right placement	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Discrimination (1-yr lag)	0.0	0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.1
Polity2	0.0	0.2	-0.3	0.1	0.3
Log(GDP_pc_ppp)	1.8	1.4	0.0	1.8	3.5
Observations-	65514				
Country-years-	58				
Mean ppd-	76.5	0.1	76.4	76.5	76.6

Note: Results present mean estimated posterior coefficients for each variable in the model alongside standard deviations. The three rightmost columns present estimated posterior coefficient values at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.

Table 21 Country-year intercepts for primary model that uses liberal notions of democracy index as the dependent variable.

Variable	Mean	SD	10%	50%	90%
Argentina-2013	3.0	1.4	1.2	3.0	4.9
Argentina-2017	4.1	1.4	2.2	4.1	5.9
Armenia-2011	2.6	3.4	-1.7	2.6	7.0
Australia-2012	5.3	1.9	2.9	5.3	7.8
Australia-2018	2.3	1.9	-0.1	2.2	4.7
Azerbaijan-2011	-3.3	3.0	-7.0	-3.3	0.5
Bangladesh-2018	16.2	3.1	12.3	16.1	20.2
Belarus-2011	-1.0	3.8	-5.9	-1.0	3.9
Bolivia-2017	-0.2	1.6	-2.3	-0.2	1.9
Brazil-2014	3.1	1.4	1.3	3.1	4.8
Brazil-2018	0.7	1.4	-1.2	0.7	2.5
Chile-2012	0.6	1.5	-1.4	0.6	2.5
Chile-2018	-7.4	1.6	-9.3	-7.4	-5.4
Colombia-2012	-5.2	1.5	-7.2	-5.2	-3.3
Colombia-2018	-10.1	1.5	-12.0	-10.1	-8.2
Cyprus-2011	-1.2	1.6	-3.3	-1.3	0.9
Ecuador-2013	-2.3	1.6	-4.4	-2.3	-0.2
Ecuador-2018	-7.2	1.7	-9.4	-7.2	-5.1
Estonia-2011	4.3	1.6	2.2	4.3	6.4
Georgia-2014	-4.5	1.9	-6.9	-4.5	-2.1
Germany-2013	8.7	2.3	5.8	8.6	11.6
Germany-2018	9.9	2.5	6.7	9.8	13.0
Ghana-2012	4.4	2.4	1.3	4.4	7.5
Greece-2017	11.5	1.8	9.3	11.5	13.8
Haiti-2016	-6.4	2.6	-9.7	-6.4	-3.1
India-2012	4.3	3.0	0.5	4.3	8.0
Japan-2010	-6.7	1.7	-8.9	-6.7	-4.5
Kazakhstan-2011	2.7	3.1	-1.2	2.7	6.7
Kyrgyzstan-2011	-7.3	2.6	-10.7	-7.3	-3.9
Libya-2014	-7.8	1.8	-10.2	-7.8	-5.4
Malaysia-2012	1.1	2.5	-2.2	1.0	4.2
Malaysia-2018	-29.5	2.7	-32.9	-29.5	-26.0
Mexico-2012	-2.2	1.2	-3.7	-2.1	-0.6
Mexico-2018	-12.7	1.2	-14.3	-12.7	-11.2
Morocco-2011	-0.1	2.6	-3.4	-0.2	3.2
Pakistan-2012	2.1	3.5	-2.4	2.2	6.4
Peru-2012	-1.0	1.6	-3.1	-1.0	1.0
Peru-2018	-2.1	1.5	-4.1	-2.1	-0.2
Philippines-2012	-3.0	2.1	-5.7	-3.0	-0.3

Poland-2012	7.3	1.6	5.4	7.3	9.3
Romania-2012	7.2	1.7	5.0	7.2	9.3
Romania-2018	3.8	1.8	1.5	3.7	6.1
Rwanda-2012	2.1	3.4	-2.2	2.1	6.4
Slovenia-2011	1.6	1.7	-0.6	1.6	3.8
South Africa-2013	-7.0	1.5	-9.1	-7.0	-5.1
Spain-2011	6.2	1.6	4.1	6.2	8.3
Sweden-2011	8.3	1.8	6.0	8.3	10.6
Thailand-2013	0.6	1.3	-1.1	0.6	2.2
Thailand-2018	-17.9	2.5	-21.1	-17.9	-14.7
Trinidad and Tobago-2010	0.8	1.7	-1.4	0.8	3.1
Turkey-2011	1.7	1.7	-0.5	1.7	3.8
Turkey-2018	-0.8	2.8	-4.5	-0.8	2.7
Ukraine-2011	6.8	1.3	5.1	6.8	8.4
United States-2011	-1.1	1.9	-3.5	-1.1	1.4
United States-2017	1.1	2.1	-1.6	1.1	3.8
Uruguay-2011	0.2	1.7	-2.0	0.2	2.3
Uzbekistan-2011	10.3	3.4	6.0	10.3	14.6
Zimbabwe-2012	6.5	2.9	2.9	6.5	10.2

Note: Results present mean estimated posterior country-year intercepts for each variable in the model alongside standard deviations. The three rightmost columns present estimated posterior coefficient values at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.

Table 22 Primary model with illiberal notions of democracy index as the dependent variable.

Variable	Mean	SD	10%	50%	90%
(Intercept)	96.32	13.01	79.83	96.34	112.86
Spiritual non-religious	2.71	0.33	2.28	2.71	3.13
Moderately religious	4.88	0.33	4.44	4.88	5.29
Private religious	7.71	0.41	7.18	7.71	8.25
Active religious	6.02	0.36	5.56	6.02	6.48
Auth pers. index	1.03	0.06	0.94	1.03	1.11
Intol. index	0.86	0.06	0.78	0.86	0.94
Rel. group size	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01
Female	-0.52	0.16	-0.72	-0.52	-0.32
Age	-0.03	0.01	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02
Secondary	-1.25	0.22	-1.53	-1.25	-0.96
Tertiary	-4.60	0.26	-4.93	-4.60	-4.26
High	1.69	0.23	1.39	1.69	1.99
Middle	-0.09	0.19	-0.33	-0.09	0.16
Pol. uninterested	0.28	0.16	0.07	0.29	0.49
Left-right placement	0.55	0.03	0.51	0.55	0.59
Discrimination (1-year lag)	0.07	0.08	-0.04	0.07	0.18
Polity2	-0.17	0.24	-0.47	-0.17	0.13
Log(GDP_pc_ppp)	-6.23	1.39	-8.02	-6.23	-4.47
Observations-	65514				
Country-years-	58				
Mean ppd	46.61	0.11	46.47	46.61	46.75

Note: Results present mean estimated posterior coefficients for each variable in the model alongside standard deviations. The three rightmost columns present estimated posterior coefficient values at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.

Table 23 Country-year intercepts for primary model that uses illiberal notions of democracy index as the dependent variable.

Variable	Mean	SD	10%	50%	90%
Argentina-2013	1.50	1.43	-0.35	1.50	3.32
Argentina-2017	6.75	1.47	4.88	6.75	8.62
Armenia-2011	-4.46	3.31	-8.75	-4.42	-0.25
Australia-2012	0.42	1.95	-2.06	0.42	2.91
Australia-2018	-0.35	1.96	-2.84	-0.36	2.22
Azerbaijan-2011	-4.88	2.98	-8.71	-4.82	-1.12
Bangladesh-2018	14.45	3.07	10.52	14.50	18.27
Belarus-2011	-3.27	3.87	-8.15	-3.26	1.64
Bolivia-2017	1.45	1.70	-0.72	1.43	3.63
Brazil-2014	-2.24	1.43	-4.03	-2.25	-0.40
Brazil-2018	-2.78	1.49	-4.67	-2.77	-0.86
Chile-2012	5.84	1.57	3.86	5.82	7.85
Chile-2018	5.51	1.58	3.50	5.51	7.54
Colombia-2012	1.04	1.57	-0.99	1.05	3.07
Colombia-2018	-2.77	1.53	-4.74	-2.77	-0.83
Cyprus-2011	2.41	1.65	0.27	2.41	4.51
Ecuador-2013	3.86	1.70	1.67	3.89	6.02
Ecuador-2018	1.83	1.72	-0.38	1.87	4.01
Estonia-2011	-0.15	1.68	-2.31	-0.16	2.02
Georgia-2014	-7.90	1.79	-10.17	-7.91	-5.57
Germany-2013	-13.28	2.19	-16.08	-13.25	-10.52
Germany-2018	-14.93	2.36	-17.90	-14.92	-11.97
Ghana-2012	-5.97	2.49	-9.12	-5.99	-2.76
Greece-2017	-5.90	1.74	-8.13	-5.88	-3.69
Haiti-2016	-17.60	2.63	-20.93	-17.61	-14.26
India-2012	-3.54	2.91	-7.21	-3.56	0.21
Japan-2010	-16.15	1.75	-18.39	-16.15	-13.92
Kazakhstan-2011	5.95	3.07	1.98	6.02	9.79
Kyrgyzstan-2011	-4.08	2.61	-7.38	-4.11	-0.73
Libya-2014	7.23	1.82	4.91	7.25	9.54
Malaysia-2012	12.93	2.44	9.79	12.95	16.04
Malaysia-2018	11.11	2.59	7.81	11.10	14.38
Mexico-2012	5.32	1.24	3.76	5.30	6.91
Mexico-2018	2.19	1.24	0.62	2.18	3.80
Morocco-2011	-0.46	2.66	-3.84	-0.46	2.90
Pakistan-2012	9.35	3.40	5.04	9.30	13.69
Peru-2012	-0.31	1.63	-2.35	-0.36	1.79
Peru-2018	4.54	1.55	2.59	4.52	6.51

Philippines-2012	4.33	2.18	1.56	4.31	7.12
Poland-2012	-5.34	1.60	-7.40	-5.36	-3.27
Romania-2012	0.89	1.63	-1.20	0.91	2.98
Romania-2018	4.89	1.70	2.74	4.90	7.05
Rwanda-2012	-1.22	3.41	-5.52	-1.22	2.98
Slovenia-2011	-3.34	1.77	-5.61	-3.35	-1.08
South Africa-2013	17.88	1.64	15.77	17.88	20.01
Spain-2011	2.75	1.64	0.65	2.75	4.83
Sweden-2011	-6.21	1.82	-8.50	-6.21	-3.87
Thailand-2013	8.96	1.28	7.32	8.96	10.61
Thailand-2018	-5.44	2.54	-8.69	-5.41	-2.26
Trinidad & Tobago-2010	-1.67	1.81	-3.91	-1.70	0.68
Turkey-2011	2.37	1.61	0.33	2.36	4.39
Turkey-2018	-17.33	2.80	-20.92	-17.26	-13.82
Ukraine-2011	1.27	1.27	-0.35	1.27	2.92
United States-2011	4.97	1.99	2.46	4.94	7.52
United States-2017	6.00	2.14	3.29	5.97	8.75
Uruguay-2011	-1.44	1.76	-3.69	-1.45	0.83
Uzbekistan-2011	4.22	3.43	-0.13	4.23	8.61
Zimbabwe-2012	-10.34	2.91	-14.01	-10.29	-6.71

Note: Results present mean estimated posterior country-year intercepts for each variable in the model alongside standard deviations. The three rightmost columns present estimated posterior coefficient values at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.

Frequentist results for primary models

Table 24 Frequentist results from primary OLS models. The dependent variable in models 1 and 2 is the LND index. The dependent variable in models 3 and 4 is the IND index.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	81.292*** (0.864)	60.737*** (12.555)	35.451*** (1.233)	96.209*** (12.731)
Spiritual non-religious	-2.008*** (0.313)	-1.746*** (0.339)	3.084*** (0.293)	2.699*** (0.326)
Moderately religious	-2.839*** (0.316)	-2.385*** (0.342)	5.169*** (0.296)	4.871*** (0.329)
Private religious	-1.207** (0.368)	-0.190 (0.429)	8.026*** (0.345)	7.707*** (0.413)
Active religious	-2.999*** (0.336)	-2.993*** (0.370)	6.541*** (0.314)	6.012*** (0.356)
Auth. pers. index	-0.517*** (0.057)	-0.343*** (0.066)	1.330*** (0.053)	1.028*** (0.064)
Intol index	-0.661*** (0.052)	-0.475*** (0.061)	0.851*** (0.049)	0.859*** (0.059)
Relative group size	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Female		-0.331* (0.161)		-0.521*** (0.155)
Age		0.045*** (0.005)		-0.031*** (0.005)
Secondary ed.		1.788*** (0.231)		-1.248*** (0.222)
Tertiary ed.		5.347*** (0.275)		-4.597*** (0.264)
High income		-0.351 (0.244)		1.689*** (0.235)
Middle income		-0.816*** (0.200)		-0.087 (0.193)
Pol. uninterested		-2.011*** (0.167)		0.286+ (0.161)
Left-right placement		0.008 (0.035)		0.547*** (0.033)
Discrimination (1-yr lag)		-0.012		0.071

		(0.080)		(0.081)
Polity2		0.055		-0.170
		(0.225)		(0.228)
Log(GDP_pc_ppp)		1.833		-6.222***
		(1.351)		(1.370)
Num.Obs.	99386	65514	99386	65514
R2 Marg.	0.005	0.032	0.028	0.158
R2 Cond.	0.100	0.151	0.238	0.271
AIC	892694.6	579877.9	879445.7	574880.6
BIC	892789.6	580068.8	879540.8	575071.5
RMSE	21.53	20.15	20.14	19.40

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Interaction Model Tables

Table 25 Results for interaction model that uses liberal notions of democracy index as the dependent variable.

Variable	Mean	SD	10%	50%	90%
(Intercept)	60.76	12.77	44.50	60.45	76.89
act rel1	-4.37	0.97	-5.63	-4.37	-3.10
pri rel1	-3.55	1.53	-5.49	-3.55	-1.58
Auth. pers. index	-1.10	0.13	-1.26	-1.10	-0.93
Intol index	-1.31	0.18	-1.55	-1.31	-1.08
Relative group size	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	0.00
Female	-0.42	0.16	-0.62	-0.42	-0.21
Age	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.05
Secondary ed.	1.85	0.23	1.55	1.85	2.15
Tertiary ed.	5.36	0.28	5.00	5.36	5.72
High income	-0.40	0.25	-0.71	-0.40	-0.08
Middle income	-0.83	0.20	-1.09	-0.83	-0.57
Pol. uninterested	-1.96	0.17	-2.18	-1.96	-1.75
Left-right placement	0.00	0.04	-0.04	0.00	0.05
Discrimination (1-yr lag)	-0.01	0.08	-0.11	-0.01	0.10
Polity2	0.06	0.23	-0.24	0.06	0.36
Log(GDP_pc_ppp)	1.90	1.37	0.17	1.94	3.62
act rel1-Auth. pers. index	0.83	0.25	0.51	0.83	1.14
act rel1-Intol index	0.27	0.40	-0.25	0.26	0.78
Auth. pers. index-Intol index	0.21	0.05	0.15	0.21	0.28
pri rel1-Auth. pers. index	1.22	0.38	0.73	1.22	1.71
pri rel1-Intol index	0.95	0.49	0.32	0.95	1.57
act rel1-Auth. pers. index-Intol index	-0.03	0.10	-0.16	-0.03	0.10
pri rel1-Auth. pers. index-Intol index	-0.17	0.12	-0.32	-0.17	-0.01
Observations-	65514				
Country-years-	58				
Mean ppd	76.50	0.11	76.36	76.50	76.65

Note: Results present mean estimated posterior coefficients for each variable in the model alongside standard deviations. The three rightmost columns present estimated posterior coefficient values at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.

Table 26 Country-year intercepts for interaction model that uses liberal notions of democracy index as the dependent variable.

Variable	Mean	SD	10%	50%	90%
Argentina-2013	2.96	1.40	1.20	2.95	4.74
Argentina-2017	4.06	1.43	2.23	4.07	5.88
Armenia-2011	2.84	3.33	-1.39	2.82	7.16
Australia-2012	5.43	1.91	3.01	5.43	7.85
Australia-2018	2.46	1.91	0.06	2.46	4.87
Azerbaijan-2011	-3.10	2.94	-6.89	-3.07	0.69
Bangladesh-2018	16.08	3.08	12.14	16.10	19.99
Belarus-2011	-0.98	3.82	-5.86	-0.95	3.81
Bolivia-2017	-0.23	1.61	-2.28	-0.22	1.80
Brazil-2014	3.01	1.35	1.30	3.01	4.71
Brazil-2018	0.60	1.44	-1.24	0.62	2.42
Chile-2012	0.67	1.52	-1.28	0.68	2.62
Chile-2018	-7.24	1.53	-9.21	-7.20	-5.31
Colombia-2012	-5.25	1.49	-7.15	-5.23	-3.38
Colombia-2018	-10.18	1.45	-12.06	-10.17	-8.34
Cyprus-2011	-1.30	1.62	-3.38	-1.30	0.72
Ecuador-2013	-2.41	1.64	-4.48	-2.42	-0.36
Ecuador-2018	-7.27	1.66	-9.40	-7.25	-5.15
Estonia-2011	5.21	1.61	3.17	5.21	7.27

Georgia-2014	-4.54	1.83	-6.82	-4.58	-2.16
Germany-2013	8.82	2.25	5.99	8.78	11.67
Germany-2018	9.70	2.44	6.66	9.65	12.82
Ghana-2012	4.01	2.38	0.99	4.02	6.97
Greece-2017	11.15	1.77	8.93	11.12	13.43
Haiti-2016	-6.13	2.55	-9.34	-6.13	-2.95
India-2012	4.10	2.90	0.43	4.08	7.77
Japan-2010	-6.64	1.68	-8.76	-6.62	-4.53
Kazakhstan-2011	2.89	3.06	-1.12	2.89	6.81
Kyrgyzstan-2011	-7.25	2.61	-10.61	-7.23	-3.92
Libya-2014	-8.45	1.84	-10.84	-8.44	-6.10
Malaysia-2012	0.78	2.52	-2.43	0.74	4.02
Malaysia-2018	-29.64	2.67	-32.97	-29.68	-26.20
Mexico-2012	-2.25	1.19	-3.79	-2.22	-0.76
Mexico-2018	-12.84	1.22	-14.40	-12.82	-11.31
Morocco-2011	0.01	2.67	-3.41	0.01	3.40
Pakistan-2012	2.28	3.44	-2.12	2.27	6.68
Peru-2012	-1.04	1.56	-3.04	-1.06	0.95
Peru-2018	-2.16	1.46	-4.01	-2.15	-0.32
Philippines-2012	-2.93	2.07	-5.58	-2.92	-0.36
Poland-2012	7.14	1.55	5.19	7.15	9.08

Romania -2012	6.98	1.67	4.89	6.94	9.16
Romania -2018	3.51	1.74	1.32	3.49	5.78
Rwanda- 2012	2.36	3.39	-1.98	2.41	6.63
Slovenia -2011	1.85	1.70	-0.32	1.85	4.01
South Africa- 2013	-7.15	1.52	-9.10	-7.14	-5.26
Spain- 2011	6.47	1.62	4.41	6.49	8.53
Sweden- 2011	7.75	1.82	5.45	7.74	10.06
Thailand -2013	0.55	1.24	-1.06	0.57	2.11
Thailand -2018	-17.94	2.52	-21.18	-17.92	-14.67
Trinidad & Tobago- 2010	0.55	1.72	-1.64	0.56	2.72
Turkey- 2011	1.50	1.64	-0.58	1.48	3.64
Turkey- 2018	-1.15	2.77	-4.75	-1.13	2.40
Ukraine- 2011	6.86	1.24	5.29	6.88	8.45
United States- 2011	-1.19	1.94	-3.64	-1.19	1.26
United States- 2017	0.92	2.10	-1.74	0.88	3.58
Uruguay -2011	0.59	1.66	-1.51	0.57	2.69
Uzbekist an-2011	10.69	3.41	6.38	10.74	15.06
Zimbab we-2012	6.56	2.85	2.88	6.57	10.14

Note: Results present mean estimated posterior country-year intercepts for each variable in the model alongside standard deviations. The three rightmost

columns present estimated posterior intercept values at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.

Table 27 Results for interaction model that uses illiberal notions of democracy index as the dependent variable.

Variable	Mean	SD	10%	50%	90%
(Intercept)	101.73	13.05	85.12	102.05	118.06
act rel1	5.60	0.96	4.37	5.59	6.83
pri rel1	7.59	1.49	5.65	7.60	9.47
Auth. pers. index	1.85	0.12	1.69	1.85	2.00
Intol index	1.56	0.18	1.33	1.56	1.79
Relative group size	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00
Female	-0.32	0.16	-0.52	-0.33	-0.12
Age	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
Secondary ed.	-1.30	0.22	-1.58	-1.30	-1.01
Tertiary ed.	-4.66	0.26	-4.99	-4.66	-4.32
High income	1.75	0.24	1.44	1.75	2.04
Middle income	-0.04	0.19	-0.30	-0.05	0.21
Pol. uninterested	0.22	0.16	0.02	0.22	0.42
Left-right placement	0.57	0.03	0.53	0.57	0.62
Discrimination (1-yr lag)	0.07	0.08	-0.04	0.07	0.17
Polity2	-0.16	0.23	-0.45	-0.17	0.12
Log(GDP_pc_ppp)	-6.69	1.40	-8.47	-6.72	-4.93
act rel1-Auth. pers. index	-1.11	0.24	-1.42	-1.11	-0.79
act rel1-Intol index	-0.67	0.40	-1.17	-0.67	-0.17
Auth. pers. index-Intol index	-0.25	0.05	-0.31	-0.25	-0.18
pri rel1-Auth. pers. index	-1.50	0.37	-1.97	-1.50	-1.01
pri rel1-Intol index	-0.41	0.48	-1.02	-0.42	0.22
act rel1-Auth. pers. index-Intol index	0.24	0.10	0.12	0.25	0.37
pri rel1-Auth. pers. index-Intol index	0.28	0.12	0.12	0.28	0.43
Observations-	65514				
Country-years-	58				
Mean ppd	46.61	0.11	46.47	46.61	46.75

Note: Results present mean estimated posterior coefficients for each variable in the model alongside standard deviations. The three rightmost columns present estimated posterior coefficient values at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.

Table 28 Country-year intercepts for interaction model that uses illiberal notions of democracy index as the dependent variable.

Variable	Mean	SD	10%	50%	90%
Argentina-2013	1.37	1.47	-0.53	1.37	3.22
Argentina-2017	6.55	1.51	4.64	6.54	8.50
Armenia-2011	-5.01	3.31	-9.24	-4.96	-0.79
Australia-2012	-0.11	2.02	-2.66	-0.11	2.48
Australia-2018	-1.08	2.04	-3.64	-1.08	1.52
Azerbaijan-2011	-4.89	2.88	-8.57	-4.93	-1.22
Bangladesh-2018	14.35	3.01	10.46	14.33	18.23
Belarus-2011	-3.27	3.81	-8.13	-3.27	1.55
Bolivia-2017	1.62	1.67	-0.49	1.60	3.71
Brazil-2014	-1.94	1.44	-3.75	-1.97	-0.09
Brazil-2018	-2.62	1.51	-4.51	-2.63	-0.69
Chile-2012	5.68	1.58	3.70	5.66	7.74
Chile-2018	5.16	1.60	3.16	5.15	7.21
Colombia-2012	1.33	1.58	-0.63	1.30	3.34
Colombia-2018	-2.37	1.54	-4.33	-2.39	-0.40
Cyprus-2011	2.81	1.71	0.66	2.79	5.01
Ecuador-2013	4.32	1.70	2.14	4.29	6.50
Ecuador-2018	2.18	1.72	0.01	2.14	4.39
Estonia-2011	-1.73	1.72	-3.87	-1.77	0.50

Georgia -2014	-7.57	1.83	-9.89	-7.54	-5.26
German y-2013	-13.95	2.24	-16.82	-13.91	-11.12
German y-2018	-15.41	2.42	-18.56	-15.36	-12.38
Ghana- 2012	-5.87	2.44	-8.92	-5.92	-2.82
Greece- 2017	-5.30	1.77	-7.62	-5.25	-3.08
Haiti- 2016	-17.85	2.60	-21.10	-17.89	-14.55
India- 2012	-3.48	2.93	-7.12	-3.51	0.25
Japan- 2010	-16.44	1.79	-18.72	-16.46	-14.12
Kazakhs tan- 2011	5.91	3.01	2.06	5.89	9.67
Kyrgyzs tan- 2011	-4.34	2.64	-7.64	-4.38	-1.01
Libya- 2014	7.50	1.82	5.19	7.50	9.84
Malaysi a-2012	13.26	2.49	10.15	13.26	16.46
Malaysi a-2018	11.68	2.65	8.36	11.69	15.07
Mexico- 2012	5.68	1.26	4.07	5.68	7.29
Mexico- 2018	2.49	1.28	0.85	2.49	4.14
Morocc o-2011	-0.29	2.58	-3.57	-0.32	3.04
Pakistan -2012	9.12	3.48	4.83	9.08	13.62
Peru- 2012	-0.08	1.62	-2.11	-0.11	1.98
Peru- 2018	4.78	1.53	2.87	4.74	6.75
Philippi nes- 2012	4.33	2.14	1.68	4.29	7.04

Poland- 2012	-4.81	1.63	-6.86	-4.84	-2.71
Romani a-2012	1.38	1.68	-0.77	1.40	3.49
Romani a-2018	5.47	1.75	3.22	5.49	7.70
Rwanda -2012	-1.67	3.36	-5.91	-1.75	2.64
Sloveni a-2011	-3.93	1.82	-6.21	-3.96	-1.62
South Africa- 2013	18.35	1.61	16.33	18.32	20.45
Spain- 2011	1.82	1.71	-0.32	1.80	4.03
Sweden -2011	-6.70	1.88	-9.08	-6.71	-4.31
Thailan d-2013	9.11	1.31	7.42	9.09	10.81
Thailan d-2018	-5.14	2.51	-8.35	-5.12	-1.92
Trinidad & Tobago- 2010	-0.86	1.83	-3.12	-0.93	1.52
Turkey- 2011	2.85	1.66	0.72	2.89	4.93
Turkey- 2018	-16.77	2.76	-20.23	-16.78	-13.28
Ukraine -2011	1.17	1.30	-0.47	1.16	2.82
United States- 2011	5.45	2.06	2.87	5.46	8.08
United States- 2017	6.32	2.24	3.48	6.32	9.14
Urugua y-2011	-2.42	1.77	-4.62	-2.45	-0.09
Uzbekis tan- 2011	3.59	3.38	-0.70	3.53	7.94

Zimbab	-10.66	2.88	-14.29	-10.69	-6.99
we-					
2012					

Note: Results present mean estimated posterior country-year intercepts for each variable in the model alongside standard deviations. The three rightmost columns present estimated posterior intercept values at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile of the posterior distribution.

Sensitivity analysis
All religion variables separate

Table 29 OLS coefficient estimates on both notions of democracy indices while controlling for all religion variables separately.

Variable	LND	IND
(Intercept)	61.376*** (12.715)	88.020*** (12.619)
Religion important	0.584*** (0.119)	1.051*** (0.115)
Auth. pers. index	-0.233*** (0.070)	0.900*** (0.067)
Intol index	-0.402*** (0.065)	0.725*** (0.063)
Active in religious org.	-0.807*** (0.127)	0.145 (0.123)
Freq: attends	-0.304*** (0.055)	0.146** (0.054)
Freq: prayer	0.244*** (0.051)	-0.063 (0.050)
Identifies as religious	-0.267 (0.209)	0.320 (0.202)
Belief: god	-0.484 (0.366)	0.265 (0.354)
Belief: hell	-0.611** (0.206)	0.754*** (0.199)
Only my religion acceptable	-1.363*** (0.098)	2.054*** (0.095)
Relative group size	-0.006+ (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
Female	-0.437** (0.169)	-0.331* (0.164)
Age	0.043*** (0.006)	-0.030*** (0.006)
Secondary ed.	1.473*** (0.241)	-0.947*** (0.233)
Tertiary ed.	4.833*** (0.289)	-4.083*** (0.279)
High income	-0.330 (0.257)	1.710*** (0.248)

Middle income	-0.893*** (0.211)	-0.017 (0.204)
Pol. uninterested	-2.055*** (0.175)	0.189 (0.170)
Left-right placement	0.054 (0.036)	0.529*** (0.035)
Discrimination (1-yr lag)	0.016 (0.081)	0.056 (0.080)
Polity2	0.034 (0.230)	-0.135 (0.228)
Log(GDP_pc_ppp)	1.992 (1.364)	-5.971*** (1.354)
Num.Obs.	58551	58551
R2 Marg.	0.037	0.160
R2 Cond.	0.159	0.271
AIC	517250.8	513301.4
BIC	517475.2	513525.9
RMSE	19.97	19.31

*Notes: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; The left column are coefficient estimates for the model that uses liberal notions of democracy as the dependent variable while the right column are estimates when the dependent variable is illiberal notions of democracy. Standard errors in parentheses*

RMAR group variable models

Table 30 OLS coefficient estimates on both notions of democracy indices using grievance and minority status variables from the RMAR data set.

	LND	IND
(Intercept)	62.812** (21.430)	131.289*** (17.275)
Spiritual non-religious	-0.172 (0.681)	3.321*** (0.650)
Moderately religious	-1.794** (0.677)	3.331*** (0.646)
Private religious	-1.171 (0.717)	6.677*** (0.685)
Active religious	- 3.409*** (0.690)	3.755*** (0.659)
Grievance	-0.075 (0.175)	0.007 (0.167)
Minority	1.816* (0.798)	-0.570 (0.755)
Female	0.075 (0.145)	-0.267+ (0.139)
Age	0.049*** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)
Secondary ed.	3.037*** (0.179)	-1.676*** (0.171)
Tertiary ed.	5.852*** (0.231)	-4.240*** (0.220)
High income	-0.072 (0.220)	2.481*** (0.210)
Middle income	- 0.849*** (0.176)	-0.329+ (0.168)
Pol. uninterested	-0.121 (0.151)	-0.716*** (0.144)
Left-right placement	0.153*** (0.031)	0.567*** (0.030)
people_trusted2Most people can be trusted	- 1.340*** (0.193)	0.216 (0.184)
Polity2	1.012*** (0.239)	0.638** (0.200)

Log(GDP_pc_ppp)	-0.089 (2.220)	-9.612*** (1.797)
Num.Obs.	91685	91685
R2 Marg.	0.036	0.130
R2 Cond.	0.353	0.318
AIC	823236.7	814746.3
BIC	823434.6	814944.2
RMSE	21.51	20.54

Notes: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; The left column are coefficient estimates for the model that uses liberal notions of democracy as the dependent variable while the right column are estimates when the dependent variable is illiberal notions of democracy. Standard errors in parentheses

Chapter 5 appendix

Table 31 Full OLS output for chapter 5 primary models.

	Dem Idx	Illib Idx
(Intercept)	4.827	10.050
	(0.369)	(0.339)
treatment1	-0.026	0.232
	(0.101)	(0.128)
islam_dummyNon-Islamic	0.526	-0.914
	(0.158)	(0.210)
dem_auth_idx	0.218	
	(0.028)	
violence_dummy	-0.263	-0.009
	(0.092)	(0.118)
genderMale	-0.051	0.283
	(0.099)	(0.133)
age	0.007	-0.003
	(0.006)	(0.007)
ses_groupingMiddle	-0.304	0.166
	(0.149)	(0.232)
ses_groupingUpper	-0.261	0.077
	(0.148)	(0.228)
edu_dip_or_coll_dummy	-0.160	-0.201
	(0.100)	(0.122)
prayer_dummy	0.291	-0.103
	(0.123)	(0.162)
read_relig_book_dummy	-0.203	-0.096

	Dem Idx	Illib Idx
	(0.109)	(0.139)
service_attend_dummy	-0.069	0.280
	(0.112)	(0.146)
watch_relig_show_dummy	0.231	0.799
	(0.144)	(0.194)
people_allowed_opinionsDisagree	-0.298	-0.683
	(0.222)	(0.321)
vote_presYes	0.272	0.488
	(0.157)	(0.208)
run_officeYes, I have	0.262	0.217
	(0.206)	(0.339)
treatment1 × islam_dummyNon-Islamic	-0.126	-0.185
	(0.197)	(0.275)
Num.Obs.	1289	1289
R2	0.109	0.082
R2 Adj.	0.097	0.071
AIC	2073.2	1423.4
BIC	5404.2	6465.7
Log.Lik.	-2634.049	-3168.403
F	7.862	6.976
RMSE	1.54	2.04

All T-Tests

Table of t-test results using Indonesian survey data.

Variables	Data	T test	P value	Difference
dem_lib_idx ~islam_dummy	Full	2.2274577	0.0260891	0.2250860
dem_best ~islam_dummy	Full	2.5134049	0.0120785	0.1367968

dem_auth_idx ~islam_dummy	Full	-7.1837621	0.0000000	-0.9974649
dem_relig_leaders ~islam_dummy	Full	-11.6339832	0.0000000	-0.7690380
army_unrest ~islam_dummy	Full	-2.6123460	0.0090970	-0.1701850
non_dem_necessary ~treatment	Muslims	-2.6773805	0.0075547	0.1647543
dem_army_unrest ~islam_dummy	Full	-2.6123460	0.0090970	-0.1701850
dem_auth_idx ~treatment	Muslims	-2.1064907	0.0354384	0.2756722
dem_auth_idx ~treatment	Full	2.0090311	0.0447423	0.2387574
non_dem_necessary ~treatment	Full	2.7823393	0.0054757	0.1538381
dem_lib_idx ~islam_dummy	Full	2.2274577	0.0260891	0.2250860
dem_best ~islam_dummy	Full	2.5134049	0.0120785	0.1367968
dem_relig_leaders ~treatment	Muslims	-1.6176199	0.1060890	0.0922997
dem_best_inequality ~islam_dummy	Full	1.6207397	0.1053184	0.0882893
dem_auth_idx ~islam_dummy	Full	-7.1837621	0.0000000	-0.9974649
dem_relig_leaders ~islam_dummy	Full	-11.6339832	0.0000000	-0.7690380
dem_army_unrest ~islam_dummy	Full	-2.6123460	0.0090970	-0.1701850
non_dem_necessary ~islam_dummy	Full	-0.9304203	0.3523280	-0.0582419
non_dem_necessary ~islam_dummy	Full	-0.9304203	0.3523280	-0.0582419
dem_best ~treatment	Muslims	-0.0339433	0.9729298	0.0019755
dem_lib_idx ~treatment	Muslims	-0.3576651	0.7206765	0.0380702
dem_best_inequality ~treatment	Minorities	0.7604636	0.4474673	-0.0704903
non_dem_necessary ~treatment	Muslims	-2.6773805	0.0075547	0.1647543
non_dem_necessary ~treatment	Minorities	-0.8138294	0.4162777	0.0890218
dem_army_unrest ~islam_dummy	Full	-2.6123460	0.0090970	-0.1701850
dem_auth_idx ~treatment	Muslim	-2.1064907	0.0354384	0.2756722

dem_relig_leaders ~treatment	Minorities	-0.9679098	0.3337276	0.1153530
dem_army_unrest ~treatment	Muslim	-0.2846876	0.7759483	0.0186182
dem_lib_idx ~treatment	Minorities	0.6180227	0.5369428	-0.1059700
dem_army_unrest ~treatment	Minorities	0.7117878	0.4770492	-0.0802838
dem_best ~treatment	Minorities	0.3864981	0.6993512	-0.0354797
dem_lib_idx ~treatment	Full	0.2441219	0.8071753	0.0232442
dem_best ~treatment	Full	-0.0102489	0.9918243	-0.0005329
dem_best_inequality ~treatment	Full	0.4631551	0.6433315	0.0237771
dem_auth_idx ~treatment	Full	2.0090311	0.0447423	0.2387574
dem_auth_idx ~treatment	Minorities	-0.5078749	0.6118454	0.1240910
dem_relig_leaders ~treatment	Full	1.5462055	0.1223008	0.0820430
dem_best_inequality ~treatment	Minorities	-0.6288369	0.5296127	0.0360946
dem_army_unrest ~treatment	Full	0.0489820	0.9609412	0.0028763
non_dem_necessary ~treatment	Full	2.7823393	0.0054757	0.1538381

Note: The leftmost column displays the variables used in the test. The rightmost column indicates the difference in mean response. Variables are ordinal, varying from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating more agreement with the statement. Index variables are the sum of the individual responses for variables.

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