ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation:  THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S PARTY'S MILITANT CAMPAIGN FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1913-1920: ASSERTING CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS THROUGH POLITICAL MIMESIS

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This project attends to ways in which the National Woman's Party's (NWP) militant woman suffrage campaign empowered U.S. women to assert their political agency and help earn women's fully-enfranchised citizenship rights through rhetorical acts of political mimesis. Specifically, this study examines how the NWP mimicked political rituals and rhetorics to simultaneously earn political legitimacy and expand women's citizenship roles in the nation-state.

To this end, this project examines the NWP's suffrage discourse between 1913 and 1920 to demonstrate the ways in which the group's mimetic strategies both reified and challenged progressive and wartime notions of U.S. nationalism promoted by President Woodrow Wilson and members of Congress. These chapters trace the trajectory of the NWP's campaign as it mimicked inaugural parades, third-party strategies, and congressional and presidential politicking to empower NWP members with the political
authority that rivaled the nation's political leaders. The NWP's mimetic strategies allowed NWP members to constitute their *national* citizenship identities as they accessed reserved political spaces, demanded the attention of President Wilson and members of Congress, engaged the U.S. citizenry as political actors, and suffered severe backlash against their militant acts. In so doing, the NWP helped normalize women's presence in the political sphere, nationalize the suffrage movement, attract national media attention, and ultimately, earn widespread recognition and political legitimacy.

Finally, this study looks at the empowering and disempowering potential of political mimesis as a strategy for social and political change, particularly as the NWP formed alliances and divisions among women in national and international communities. In the process, the project looks at how the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis shaped and was shaped by the democratizing exigencies of President Wilson's nationalist vision; in turn, the NWP's militant campaign helped re-envision the gendered nation.
THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S PARTY'S MILITANT CAMPAIGN FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1913-1920: ASSERTING CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS THROUGH POLITICAL MIMESIS

By

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DEDICATION

To and because of Ella.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEF</td>
<td>American Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AERA</td>
<td>American Equal Rights Association</td>
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<td>AWSA</td>
<td>American Woman Suffrage Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Committee on Public Information</td>
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<td>CUWS</td>
<td>Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERA</td>
<td>Equal Rights Amendment</td>
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<td>GFWC</td>
<td>General Federation of Women's Clubs</td>
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<td>ICW</td>
<td>International Congress of Women</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAACP</td>
<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People</td>
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<td>NACW</td>
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<td>NAOWS</td>
<td>National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage</td>
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<td>NFWC</td>
<td>Northeastern Federation of Women's Clubs</td>
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<td>National Labor Union</td>
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<td>NWP</td>
<td>National Woman's Party</td>
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<td>NWSA</td>
<td>National Woman Suffrage Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>UFSF</td>
<td>Union francais pour le suffrage des femmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>WCTU</td>
<td>Women's Christian Temperance Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFL</td>
<td>Women's Franchise League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP</td>
<td>Woman's Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSPU</td>
<td>Women's Social and Political Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTUL</td>
<td>Women's Trade Union League</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWA</td>
<td>Working Women's Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWCTU</td>
<td>World's Women's Christian Temperance Union</td>
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<td>WWP</td>
<td>World Woman's Party</td>
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INTRODUCTION

On the day of President Woodrow Wilson's second inauguration, marchers sloshed through the soggy streets of Washington, D.C. The daunting weather did not stop the ceremonial pageant nor diminish the growing crowds. According to one report, "In spite of steady and drenching rain[,] thousands of people congregated about the White House" in anticipation of the formal procession. Months of orchestration culminated in "bands playing stirring airs [as] the line of lifted banners swung out down Madison Place, cheered by the spectators, between smiling rows of policemen." The unrelenting weather enhanced the spectacle of the pageant, as the wet pavement "project[ed] the long oscillating reflections of the many banners which the gray day and the steady rain threw into extraordinary brilliancy." Onlookers were so excited by "the gay sight," that many spontaneously joined in. Marchers from every state in the union carried banners bearing President Wilson's name over four miles of unforgiving concrete to participate in the great American tradition of political pomp.¹

Yet these banners, these signposts of democracy and tradition, did not regale the re-elected president. Instead, the marchers insisted, "Mr. President, how long must women wait for liberty?"² The force behind this demonstration was the National Woman's Party (NWP)—an organization determined to direct a stern message to President Wilson: "We demand an amendment to the Constitution of the United States enfranchising women."³ The suffragists' protest exacerbated the "solemn mood" of the inauguration, particularly as Americans anticipated the president's pronouncement of the United States' entrance into World War I. As the New York Times reported of Wilson's
inaugural parade: "It was not a festive occasion, it was not a holiday, it was not a merrymaking."⁴

Not surprisingly, when President Wilson and the first lady returned from the inauguration, neither of them acknowledged any of the four hundred women surrounding the White House.⁵ This clash between the presidential inauguration and the woman suffrage demonstration marked another high point in the NWP's militant campaign for woman suffrage. Consider, for example, that in the months preceding Wilson's second inauguration, the NWP's "Silent Sentinels" stood quietly at the White House gates eight hours a day, six days a week; NWP members heckled Wilson during a Senate speech;⁶ and the group led a national suffrage parade on the day before his first inauguration in 1913. Certainly by his second inaugural, President Wilson had grown weary of the NWP.

Between the group's inception in early 1913 and the conclusion of the suffrage movement in August 1920, the NWP pursued a relentless, militant campaign for woman suffrage. This suffrage parade against President Wilson was only part of the NWP's efforts to gain access to the privileged spaces and rhetorics of politics to expand women's roles in the nation-state. In order to assert their political agency and constitute their citizenship identities, NWP members enacted democratic precepts pertaining to nationalism, citizenship, and social activism.⁷ More specifically, through political mimesis, NWP members adopted the rituals of presidential, congressional, and party politics, allowing them to constitute their citizenship identities, normalize women's presence in the political sphere, nationalize the suffrage movement, expand women's roles in the nation-state and in the international arena, and ultimately, help ratify the Nineteenth Amendment. This study attends to the NWP's militant campaign for woman
suffrage, a campaign that is clearly steeped in the ideological and institutional forces of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.\textsuperscript{8}

THE PRESIDENCY AND CONGRESS, PROGRESSIVE POLITICS, AND WOMAN SUFFRAGE

The dawn of the twentieth century marked a time of great social and political transformation. Not only was the woman suffrage movement re-energized after languishing for a few decades, but the rise of the rhetorical presidency, progressivism, and a host of other social movements took hold. Amidst this climate of social and institutional change, the women of the NWP managed to assert their political agency and political voice from within these restrictive and empowering social and political forces.

President Wilson and the Rhetorical Presidency

Part of the NWP's focus on President Wilson may be owed, in part, to Wilson's enactment of what has come to be known as the "rhetorical presidency." Although many scholars trace the lineage of the rhetorical presidency to the earliest presidents, the emergence of the rhetorical presidency is typically associated with early-twentieth century presidents, particularly as Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson shifted their policy appeals from Congress to the American public.\textsuperscript{9} Within the context of the Progressive Era, the rhetorical presidency helped empower the political voices of the American people as a growing target of presidential discourse. President Wilson in particular transformed his presidential role into a speaker for the people, making it his duty to create a more unified American identity.\textsuperscript{10} Paradoxically, the NWP's widely publicized protests attempted to expose Wilson's hypocritical efforts to unite the nation; yet, the protests also
suggested that Wilson's more direct appeals to the American people invited the NWP's response.

While the scope and character of the rhetorical presidency have been contested, scholars contend that "presidential rhetorical behavior is significant;" as Mary E. Stuckey and Frederick J. Antczak argue, the presidency represents "a symbol of national identity, a voice for our national values," and a defining force of "the American polity." Many associate the modern rhetorical presidency with Theodore Roosevelt's targeting of the American people through the bully pulpit. As Michael Nelson asserts, Roosevelt "believed that the president could do anything that the Constitution or laws did not expressly forbid." Roosevelt explained what he saw as the necessary extension of presidential power: "I acted for the public welfare, I acted for the common well-being of all people, whenever and in whatever manner was necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition." Roosevelt perceived the presidency as a site of activism, which compelled him to appeal directly to the American people. According to Jeffrey K. Tulis, Roosevelt's successful use of popular leadership allowed Wilson to adopt the "second constitution, which puts a premium on active and continuous presidential leadership of popular opinion" more so than conceived in the "first" Constitution.

Like Roosevelt, President Wilson was enamored with the rhetorical power of the presidency. James Andrews argues that Wilson believed such rhetorical leadership "was clearly the president's responsibility, indeed a measure of his fitness to hold office, to grasp 'meaning' of America and to use the rhetorical power of the presidency to fix that meaning in the minds of an American community." Additionally, Wilson's approach
toward Congress and the American public set a few rhetorical precedents. He was the first chief executive since John Adams to deliver his Annual Message before Congress rather than sending a written message, he used the motion picture and the mass media industries for political ends, and he was the first to institute an official wartime propaganda program that targeted domestic audiences in particular (Committee on Public Information).  

Wilson's rhetorical leadership also reshaped the relationship between the branches of government. Scholars have noted Wilson's frustration with the lack of constitutional and legal authority to command congressional action and his desire to centralize governmental power around the presidency. Wilson, however, did not follow an autocratic model of government, but strove to make the executive and legislative branches work together in a more integrated fashion. As Tulis argues, "Rather than merely assail Congress, Wilson would tame, or as it were, domesticate it." Wilson favored "interbranch cooperation" so that he might lead Congress, particularly since his first presidential election coincided with the election of a Democratic Congress.

Given the rhetorical disposition of the presidency and Wilson's desire to enhance presidential power, a particular type of "rhetorical potency" emerged from Wilson's discourse. Integral to Wilson's understanding of the executive and legislative branches was his re-visioning of presidential leadership in relation to Congress and to the people as well. Tulis details Wilson's idea of political representation:

He favored an interplay between representative and constituent that would, in fact, educate the constituent. This process differed, at least in theory, from the older attempts to "form" public opinion: it did not begin in the minds of the elite
but in the hearts of the mass. Wilson called the process of fathoming the people's desires (often only vaguely known to the people until instructed) "interpretation."

Interpretation was the core of leadership for him. As the nation's chief "interpreter," Wilson served as a "lobbyist for the people," where "he alone could hear the 'true' voice of the people; he alone had the ear." As Wilson fashioned himself as a leader of the people—and not above the people—Wilson considered himself and his party the embodiment of American values. As one scholar wrote, "The reign of public opinion through presidential leadership was unquestionably the dream of Woodrow Wilson." Wilson's rhetorical leadership defined himself both as a member and a leader of the American people.

*President Wilson, U.S. Congress, and Progressive-Era Politics*

Wilson's vision of the rhetorical presidency and an American identity was driven in large measure by the politics of the Progressive Era. While most scholars note the complexities of the Progressive Era, most agree that it marks the time between the turn of the century and the beginning of World War I when the American people sought to redress the ills of industrialization and rapid economic growth of the late-nineteenth century. Between 1870 and 1900, the nation's population exploded, the number of farms doubled, urban population tripled, immigration peaked, and railroads networked across the nation. Such "progress" was achieved at great human cost, however; farmers and workers were often powerless against the exploits of mammoth national corporations and corrupt city bosses. Political power became concentrated in the hands of the very wealthy, which fueled those languishing in urban slums and rural wastelands to assert political voice. Agrarian revolt came to a climax in 1896 when William Jennings Bryan
ran on a Populist platform as the Democratic presidential candidate; his defeat left a residual "rebelliousness and suspiciousness" toward governmental abuses of power.\textsuperscript{30}

Efforts for change made during the Progressive Era were undergirded by the ideology of progressivism, adopted by intellectual and political leaders of the time. Progressivism took hold in the White House with President Theodore Roosevelt at the turn of the century and upon President Wilson's 1912 election.\textsuperscript{31} Wilson belonged in what Rogers M. Smith argues was the centrist camp of progressives, which "believed that the U.S. should be a modern democratically and scientifically guided nation that was also culturally ordered, unified, and civilized due to the predominance of northern European elements in its populace and customs."\textsuperscript{32} Wilson believed that key elements of "scientific progressivism," including expertise, efficiency, and organization, would fortify the nation's future.\textsuperscript{33} Wilson's centrist progressivism also included beliefs in cultural homogeneity and the preservation of racial hierarchies. Centrist progressives thought privileging white European peoples and cultural practices was integral toward cultivating a national community in which all could participate as citizens and learn what it meant to be "American."\textsuperscript{34}

Wilson's progressive ideals functioned in tandem with the rhetorical presidency, as both compelled the president to establish an empowering dialogue with the American people. In his first inaugural address, Wilson focused on the "task" of securing the needs of the American people: "We know our task to be no mere task of politics but a task which shall search us through and through, whether we be able to understand our time and the need of our people, whether we be indeed their spokesmen and interpreters, whether we have the pure heart to comprehend and the rectified will to choose our high
course of action." Wilson pursued progressive policy, such as urban sanitation, labor laws, and tariff and commerce reform, to empower the citizenry of "all honest men, all patriotic, [and] all forward-looking men." This progressive vision, then, relied on a renewed understanding of citizenship; one that simultaneously helped empower the American people to effect positive social change, yet perpetuated the construction of the ideal citizen as white, male, and Anglo-Saxon.

The empowering and disempowering progressive ideals of the early-twentieth century also took hold in the U.S. Congress. The legislative branch increased its ability to more directly and expediently represent the demands of the American people by increasing the power of majority rule in the House of Representative. This measure, however, facilitated an autocratic takeover by Speaker of the House, Joe Cannon (R-IL), who aimed to block the passage of progressive legislation. Thus, the same progressive act designed to empower the voices of the American people worked to limit progressive change and the representation of minority voices. However, in 1910, the Democratic Party revolted and unseated Cannon. Led by Speaker Oscar Underwood (D-AL), Democrats "employed the binding caucus as a primary leadership tool," working to build consensus with progressive-minded Republicans and pass multiple pieces of progressive legislation onto the Senate. When President Wilson was elected in 1912, Democrats secured control of both houses of Congress and swiftly implemented many progressive economic policies intended to protect consumers and redistribute wealth.

However, during the Progressive Era, Congress often passed legislation that restricted the citizenship rights of many minority groups. For example, the 1906 Burke Act delayed granting citizenship rights to American Indians. The next year, Congress
empowered the Indian Commissioner to sell land promised to American Indians by the federal government. Regarding the rights of immigrants, Congress renewed Chinese exclusion in 1902, and in 1906, Congress adopted a naturalization act that severely limited the terms upon which the courts could naturalize immigrants. Moreover, as Jim Crow laws continued to exclude African Americans from their constitutional right to vote, Congress resisted upholding the protections guaranteed in the Fifteenth Amendment.40

As progressive trends in the presidential and legislative branches worked to marginalize certain groups from fully participating in the national community, the empowering potential of progressivism motivated a number of discontented groups to demand social change through civic participation. At the core of progressive movements was the belief in activism; that "social progress was not to be realized by sitting and praying, but by using the active powers . . . By a revivification of democracy."41 Oppressed groups including labor activists, woman suffragists, African Americans, immigrants, and American Indians vied for political and human rights.42 The implementation of referendum and recall measures, city reform, and presidential primaries helped shift political power from party bosses to the people.43 Further, "muckrakers" worked to expose the corrupt practices of politics and industry through voluminous journalism.44 This contentiousness fostered a climate of robust civic engagement. As J. Michael Hogan asserts, "ordinary citizens of the Progressive Era gathered in schools, in churches, and even in tents to listen to speakers, to debate among themselves, and to render their judgments on the issues of the day."45 The desire for
change compelled many to raise their voices and participate in the democratic process of
deliberation and debate.

While progressive movements worked to restore power and faith in the American
people, what was considered "American" was challenged by the massive influx of
European immigrants and their pursuit of U.S. citizenship. The diversity of languages,
religious practices, and ethnic traditions confronted the homogeneity of an American
citizenship identity. Further, immigrants' abilities to adopt an American identity were
limited by exclusive citizenship laws and an obligation to city bosses for work.46 Stuckey
argues that Grover Cleveland recognized the importance of integrating immigrants into
the American polity and did so rhetorically through the construction of the "good"
immigrant—an immigrant who quickly assimilated to American culture.47 Theodore
Roosevelt extended this construction rhetorically by identifying the American citizen as
"worker;" as such, it was ideal for an immigrant to become Americanized through
strenuous work.48 Furthermore, Wilson reconciled the potential threat immigrants posed
to a unified American identity by supporting the popular notion that America was a
"melting pot" in which immigrants' identities could be sterilized into a more pure
American citizenship.49 As Stuckey argues, "For Wilson, it became much more important
for groups to lose their sense of ethnic identity, to gain inclusion at the price of
difference."50

America's involvement in World War I compounded Wilson's drive to construct a
united, American identity. In part, Wilson won his presidential re-election in 1916 by
promising to keep America out of war; therefore, it became necessary for Wilson to
justify the United States' subsequent entrance in "American" terms. Recall Wilson's
famously-uttered words in his war address: "The world must be made safe for democracy." In support of America's war efforts, as one scholar puts it, "the nation was whipped into a fever pitch of patriotism"—so much so, voices of dissent were considered disloyal to the Wilson administration and to America's plight to liberate oppressed nations. In fact, Wilson created the Committee on Public Information, a wartime propaganda program designed to help create "a uniform national opinion" in support of the war. Moreover, shortly after Congress declared war on April 6, 1917, the Espionage Act was introduced, which, according to Geoffrey R. Stone, was distorted by the Wilson administration and the federal courts "to suppress a broad range of political dissent." The following May, President Wilson signed the Sedition Act of 1918, which prohibited the willful utterance of disloyal language about the United States; the use of language to bring the United States into disrepute; and the interference of the things necessary to the production of war. Along with a heightened sense of war hysteria, these acts were used to arrest socialists, anarchists, and German immigrants (or those perceived to be so), to say nothing of the abuses inflicted upon these groups by mobs and other "patriotic" citizens. As such, the onset of WWI worked to construct a unified American identity and severely limit the expression of marginalized voices, creating the exigency for these voices to rise up in protest.

Reflecting the general prevailing views of the time, Wilson's sense of progressivism and drive to interpret the will of the people precluded him from giving voice to these marginalized groups. As Stuckey argues, "solidarity requires consubstantiality"—and those who resisted solidarity struggled to participate in Wilson's America. Consequently, Wilson's progressivism seemed to exclude the very groups
seeking "progressive" change, including African Americans, labor unions, immigrants, American Indians, and women.\textsuperscript{59} Thus, Wilson's reluctance to address woman suffrage should not be surprising. Although Wilson said he personally supported the movement, he maintained that he was obligated to his party and to the will of the people to abstain from taking political action toward women's full citizenship rights.\textsuperscript{60} The paradox of Wilson's rhetorical presidency and visions of progressivism, thus, is exposed as he sought to interpret the will of select groups of people while ignoring the voices of others seeking to influence public policy through progressive reforms.

Despite Wilson's hesitancy, however, his second presidential term coincided with the successful conclusion of the woman suffrage movement. The NWP, in particular, managed to voice its demands amidst an oppressive political culture, wartime hysteria, and a climate of social activism in which many other oppressed groups vied for political voice and rights. The NWP waged a highly publicized campaign for woman suffrage that targeted President Wilson and the U.S. Congress in order to attain political power and fully-enfranchised citizenship for American women. In the process, the NWP sought the promise of progressive ideals demonstrating that a social group can empower itself even when working for significant political change within a more restrictive political climate.

\textit{U.S. Woman Suffrage and the National Woman's Party}

By 1913, the U.S. woman's rights movement had been in full swing for many decades. The discussion of woman suffrage in particular emerged as early as the Woman's Rights Convention at Seneca Falls in July 1848.\textsuperscript{61} Yet, the issue of woman suffrage did not become a centerpiece of the woman's rights movement until after 1867 when the movement's leadership split over the question of black male suffrage.\textsuperscript{62} In 1869,
Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton founded the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), while Lucy Stone and Antoinette Brown Blackwell helped found the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA). Despite ideological differences, both organizations pursued woman suffrage. Having made little headway by 1890, these two organizations merged to create the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). Along with other large woman's rights organizations, such as the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), the NAWSA campaigned for woman suffrage primarily on the state level throughout the 1890s and into the early-twentieth century—a period termed "the doldrums" of the woman's rights movement.

In 1912, Alice Paul entered the U.S. woman suffrage scene and eventually founded the NWP in order to propel the U.S. suffrage movement forward. Fresh from fighting in the militant suffrage movement in England, Paul and fellow suffragist Lucy Burns began working in 1912 with the NAWSA, the dominant suffrage organization, to refocus the movement on acquiring a federal amendment. Paul and Burns headed up the NAWSA's Congressional Committee and then formed the Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage (CUWS), which functioned as the NAWSA's Washington, D.C. lobby. Paul and Burns orchestrated a large parade the day before President Wilson's first inauguration ceremony in 1913, much to the disappointment of NAWSA leaders who felt the demonstration alienated Wilson and the general public from the woman suffrage issue. Consequently, the NAWSA severed ties with Paul and Burns for fear that the CUWS thwarted the movement's progress. In March 1917, the CUWS was renamed the NWP when it merged with its western-states' organization, the Woman's Party. Members of the NWP National Advisory Board included prominent women
activists, such as Helen Keller and Harriot Stanton Blatch, daughter of historic woman's rights activist, Elizabeth Cady Stanton.70

Compared to the NAWSA's politically-moderate campaign strategies, which focused on state campaigns, lobbying, and personal relationships with legislators, the NWP executed what its leaders considered a "militant" approach toward social change. According to Linda G. Ford, the NWP embraced a "feminist militancy," which she characterizes as "the readiness to resist governmental authorities and break the law for the cause of women's rights, developed gradually from men's (non)reaction to women's political claims to equal citizenship."71 In order to gain the government's attention, the NWP embraced a theory of agitation wherein political leaders were held responsible for social change. Subsequently, Paul directed the NWP's militant campaign toward President Wilson and members of Congress.

Between early 1913 and 1920, thus, the NWP agitated President Wilson and members of Congress through political mimesis, in which the NWP enacted political rituals such as inaugural parades, third-party strategies, and congressional and presidential politicking. In early 1913, the NWP mimicked Wilson's first inauguration ceremony by recruiting over five thousand women to participate in a national suffrage parade.72 Throughout the 1914 and 1916 election cycles, the NWP adopted third-party strategies and formed a third political party to organize women voters in the western states to vote against non-suffrage supporting Democrats—including President Wilson.73 In 1917, NWP members adopted Wilson's rhetorical authority by fashioning the woman's pulpit through its silent protests in front of the White House. Throughout 1918 and 1919, NWP members mimicked Wilson's international program for democracy through its
statue protests and "Watch Fires of Freedom" conducted in Lafayette Park across the street from the White House.74

Historians and communication scholars have attempted to capture the significance of the NWP's role in the woman suffrage movement. Scholars, for example, have covered in detail the NWP's protest strategies and argued that in conjunction with the NAWSA, the organization was integral to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.75 Historians have similarly been preoccupied with capturing Alice Paul's uncompromising leadership.76 NWP historian, Linda G. Ford, for example, features Paul as a central character in her suffrage drama, Iron-Jawed Angels, which was recently made into an HBO feature film.77 Rhetorical scholar, Jennifer L. Borda, highlights Paul as one of the three most compelling suffrage leaders in the Progressive Era alongside Carrie Chapman Catt and Harriot Stanton Blatch.78

Considering the NWP's preoccupation with President Wilson and the U.S. Congress, the suffrage leaders' move to target the executive and legislative branches in the context of the rhetorical presidency's genesis represents an area of untapped scholarly pursuit.79 If, as Stuckey and Antczak argue, the rhetorical presidency offers the possibility of "studying how the nation chooses among visions of itself," we must also consider that the rhetorical presidency offers the possibility of examining the contestations surrounding these often competing visions of national identity.80 The NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis provides an example of the ways in which particular members of the American public responded to the U.S. government's power to shape a national identity and a vision of citizenship—one in which women could not participate as fully as their white male counterparts. More specifically, as Ford argues, the NWP's
militant mission "evolved as a logical response to the intransigence of male-centered government in the first decades of this century." Hence, the NWP's mimetic campaign emerged as a symbolic response to institutional and ideological resistance to woman suffrage.

This project, thus, examines the NWP's suffrage campaign during a contentious period of American history when the contours of U.S. nationalism were hotly contested. The NWP's protest activities are situated in a time when U.S. nationalism was inflected by the rise of the rhetorical presidency and President Woodrow Wilson's empowered notion of citizenry, the contentious and activist climate of the Progressive Era, the domestic and international turbulence of World War I, and the ongoing debate over woman suffrage. Specifically, this project seeks to answer three research questions regarding the role of power and agency in the NWP's campaign for U.S. woman suffrage. First, this project seeks to understand how the NWP employed political mimesis as a strategy of political change, targeting President Wilson and members of Congress as change-agents for women's full enfranchisement in its efforts to nationalize the suffrage movement and earn political legitimacy. Second, this project seeks to examine how political mimesis empowered NWP members to constitute their citizenship identities and helped re-envision women's roles in the nation-state as they mimicked key political rituals and militantly entered reserved political spaces. Last, this study explores how political mimesis both enhanced and restricted the empowering potential of social change, exhibiting its capabilities to help liberate and to further oppress.

To these ends, NWP suffrage discourse, including all issues of The Suffragist, correspondence, pamphlets, campaign booklets, and ephemera produced between early
1913 and August of 1920, is examined to demonstrate the ways in which the group's rhetoric of political mimesis both reified and challenged progressive notions of U.S. nationalism and citizenship throughout its militant campaign for woman suffrage.82

U.S. NATIONALISM, GENDERED CITIZENSHIP, MILITANT SOCIAL CHANGE, AND POLITICAL MIMESIS: ASSERTING POLITICAL AGENCY AND CONSTITUTING IDENTITIES

The discourse of the NWP will be situated within the history of U.S. nationalism, citizenship, and a militant approach toward social change. In turn, the theories derived from scholarship on nationalism, gendered citizenship, and the mimetic patterns of social change, particularly as they pertain to issues of political agency and identity-formation, will function as the rhetorical lenses through which the NWP's suffrage discourse is examined. In what follows, these theories are discussed, accentuating the ways in which political agency is asserted and identities are formed as institutions and marginalized social groups engage in the mimetic process of contesting and negotiating meanings of nationalism, citizenship, and gender.

Forming a National Identity

Within a larger context of heightened U.S. nationalism, the U.S. woman suffrage movement was not only a movement to enfranchise women, but a movement to access the symbolic strength of what it meant to be an American citizen. As President Wilson worked to shape a national identity, he confronted a changing population and the multiple demands of marginalized groups. As such, questions about the roles that the president and marginalized groups played in shaping a national identity and in determining who participated in the national imaginary became more salient.
Developing a sense of a national identity is a complex process. As Benedict Anderson argues, a nation is "an imagined political community" composed of people who will, for the most part, never know each other but remain connected by the shared "image of their communion." Similarly, Otto Bauer argues that nations are defined less by geography or natural inheritance, and more by what he terms "national character." Such character is formed through shared struggle, shared language and habits, and shared political institutions, all of which create a shared will or the drive to achieve a common destiny. Belonging to a nation, thus, allows one to identify with a large community, which provides "a sense of security, a feeling of belonging, and prestige." A shared sense of belonging fosters feelings of nationalism, which, according to Anthony D. Smith, is more than just pride in one's country, but "an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity."

Within the context of the United States, forming a national identity became significant in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. In fact, the concept of "nationalism" emerged in the United States during this time as part of larger social phenomena, including the onset of modernity, the stratification of classes and subsequent urbanization, the influx of immigration, industrialization, and Reconstruction. Rogan Kersh argues that in response to the massive wave of immigration during the 1880s and 1890s, "virulent antiforeign sentiment," "xenophobia, imperialism, and intolerance" surfaced throughout the nation. The perceived threat that immigrants posed to national unity, coupled with the rise of America as an international power, compelled Americans to embrace a "hyperpatriotic" sense of national identity. President Theodore Roosevelt's treatise, the "New Nationalism," reflected the growing desire to establish a shared,
national identity that eschewed the threat of a diverse national polity and bolstered America's presence in the international arena. Further, as Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny argue, the "triumph of Wilsonian principles" between 1917 and 1919 transformed the meaning of nationalism into "full political sovereignty;" the very thing demanded by "even the smallest national minority."92

Nationalism provides a lens through which the processes of contestation and transformation can be studied discursively. After all, the meanings of nation are symbolic, instantiated through rhetorical transactions among members of the nation-state.93 Specific to the U.S. political context, Kersh argues that "The United States, like all nations, was constructed over time, a process requiring rhetorical affirmation and reproduction"94—a discursive exchange that involved political elites as well as the American people. According to M. Lane Bruner, a national identity is forged through "a never-ending and politically consequential rhetorical struggle," particularly as groups compete for differing "accounts of national character."95 Thus, the rhetorical study of nationalism attends to the discursive negotiations of power between political institutions and social groups. According to Josep R. Llobera, the meaning of nation forms from "a continuously changing discursive formation;" thus, the meaning of nation is not fixed, but undergoes alterations and contestations through an ongoing rhetorical exchange.96

The U.S. president's role in shaping and redefining a national identity is widely accepted. According to Erwin C. Hargrove, the president's "first task is to 'teach reality' to publics and their fellow citizens through rhetoric."97 This rhetorical process helps shape a national identity. Vanessa B. Beasley argues, presidents "promote the idea of an American people to the American people."98 While historically, presidents have always
articulated a vision of American identity, the rise of the rhetorical presidency in the early-twentieth century elevated the president's role in the "national conversation" as "a surrogate of 'the people,' simultaneously enacting and enunciating our national values and national identity." Consequently, a critical examination of presidential discourse provides an institutional perspective on how the nation's identity has been constructed, maintained, and reinterpreted.

Articulations of a unified American identity, however, often represent a deceptively homogenous version of the American people. Given the diversity of the American public along race, class, gender, religious, sexuality, and even national lines, uniting the nation often begets simplification. In Stuckey's words, "Nation building thus inevitably requires reduction." Constructing a unified national identity may eschew the civic participation of groups in American society that do not fit into a particular vision of Americanness. At times, presidential efforts made in the name of U.S. nationalism have encouraged acts of "exclusion, intolerance, and even inhumanity." Further, Katherine Verdery argues that "Nationalism is a quintessentially homogenizing, differentiating, or classifying discourse," thus creating multiple group identities—one composed of those privileged enough to be considered "American," and many groups composed of "others." Prasenjit Dura pointedly argues that exclusion, or the identification of "the Other," is essential to the nation-defining process, in that a nation must define itself in terms of what or who it is not.

Thus, it is necessary to consider the fluid and often contradictory perceptions of a nation's identity. Anderson considers the national community "as indefinitely stretchable nets of kinship," emphasizing the dynamic nature of the American polity.
Bauer argues that a nation should not be considered "a rigid thing," but rather "a process of becoming." The ways in which diverse groups participate in the national imaginary helps ensure that a U.S. national identity is continually reflective. Verdery, for example, argues that in studying nationalism,

[T]he point is to see how a single symbol, nation, takes on multiple meanings. Groups orientating to it all take the nation to be the paramount symbol, but they have different intentions for it. Various things enter into their conflicts—contrasting ideas about authenticity, about the nation's true mission, about cultural patrimony or heritage, about national character, and so forth.

As such, this study recognizes and examines the historical contestation over the meanings of an American identity as groups such as the NWP vied for full citizenship rights in the nation-state after years of exclusion and opposition from the forces of tradition.

*Gendered Citizenship*

One way in which marginalized groups sought access to power was through the pursuit of fully-enfranchised citizenship. The U.S. woman suffrage movement, for example, was waged on the premise that voting rights ensured full citizenship and the promise of a more enhanced civic engagement. Citizenship, thus, offers the means through which one can assert political agency. As Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argues, "rhetorical agency refers to the capacity to act, that is, to have the competence to speak or write in a way that will be recognized or heeded by others in one's community. Such competency permits entry into ongoing cultural conversations and is the sine qua non of public participation." Reviewing theories of citizenship allows us to consider how groups are granted or denied political agency, or participation in these "cultural
conversations. Specifically, these theories highlight the relationship between citizenship and power among those considered and not considered "citizens." As Robert Alejandro explains, citizenship can be viewed as "a fusion between the past and the present; as a web of different vocabularies; and as an interpretive practice against a backdrop of different and conflicting traditions." Nationalism in particular provides one of these "backdrops" as issues of citizenship are highlighted within a nationalist context. Moreover, studying citizenship in a nationalist context sheds light on how citizenship is conceptualized in gendered ways.

Theories of citizenship can be placed into at least three different categories: republican, liberal, and ascriptive inegalitarian. Scholars generally agree that all three of these categories have shaped notions of U.S. citizenship since the nation's founding, and that the first two privileged a distinctly public and "male" form of citizenship because of their emphases on civic participation and individual rights. The third of these categories, however, recognizes the role of difference pertaining to race, sex, class, ethnicity, nationality, religion, and sexuality in the enforcement and enactment of citizenship.

One sense of citizenship stemmed from the republican tradition, which promoted a system of government that rested on the consent of the people and emphasized participation in a civic community. Upon its establishment, the United States was envisioned as a community of people free from tyranny. Subsequently, according to Jurgen Habermas, "citizenship gained the additional political and cultural meaning of an achieved belonging to a community of empowered citizens who actively contribute to its maintenance." As such, concepts of citizenship and nationalism were intimately
related: part of how members of a national community developed a sense of belonging to
one another was through the shared rights conferred through citizenship. Notions of
citizenship also helped create a shared identity for members of a nation as they were
provided the political agency to shape and transform the legal norms of the state. The
right to vote, for example, symbolized the individual's contribution to the state's legal
parameters; on the other hand, when one voted in kind with many members of a
particular community, the vote became the means through which one engaged with the
nation as a whole.

Another sense of citizenship grew from the liberal tradition, which emphasized
the government's protection of individual rights and personal liberties. Alejandro
argues that the influences of liberalism shaped citizenship as "a space in which one
becomes equal to everyone else, not as concrete persons, but as right-bearers." He
continues: "On this account, rights are a passport to enter into an abstract universality in
which the citizen is not primarily a member of an ethnic group, or a religious sect, or a
social class, or a community. The citizen is primarily a right-bearer." Thus, liberalism
emphasized individuality insofar that the individual possesses rights protected by the
nation-state. Further, the notion of universal equality, often aligned with liberalism,
informed the founding principles of the U.S. government and became more prominent as
it motivated many suffrage and social reform movements throughout the early- to mid-
nineteenth century.

Scholars are quick to note the inherent limits of the republican and liberal notions
of citizenship, particularly in terms of their historical conceptions. Evelyn Nakano Glenn
argues, for example, that,
In both traditions independence was a necessary condition for exercising citizenship; independence was established by family headship, ownership of property, and control over wives, slaves, and other dependents. Also in both traditions the public realm of citizenship was defined by bracketing household, domesticity, and "civil society" as outside the domain of equality and rights.120

In light of these inequities, Smith proposes that citizenship can also be understood in ascriptive inegalitarianism terms. He elaborates:

Rather than stressing protection of individual rights for all in liberal fashion, or participation in common civic institutions in republican fashion, American law had long been shot through with forms of second-class citizenship, denying personal liberties and opportunities for political participation to most of the adult population on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and even religion.121

Further, Smith argues that a combination of republican, liberal, and ascriptive forms of citizenship have been used to aid political leaders to create a shared identity of the "people" who can participate in the national imaginary; and further, to convince the "people" that their leadership and vision was necessary and beneficial.122 Thus, just as notions of ascriptive citizenship were inscribed with power, they nevertheless also contained the impetus for social protest. In part, such citizenship rhetoric helped constitute identities of the dominant and subordinate members of a national community, suggesting the hegemonic potential of such identity formations as well as the exigence for political challenge when such identities oppressed the rights of marginalized and socially aware groups.123
Ascriptive inegalitarianism certainly informs how citizenship acquired its gendered meanings. Resonating with Smith's notion of ascriptive citizenship, Pnina Werbner and Nira Yuval-Davis adopt a differentiated notion of citizenship—a notion that views citizenship as "inflected by identity, social positioning, cultural assumptions, institutional practices and a sense of belonging." The authors contend that, given such historical, social, and legal inequities, it is necessary to consider how a group's "gender, nationality, religion, ethnicity, 'race,' ability, age or life cycle stage mediates the construction of their citizenship as 'different' and thus determines their access to entitlements and their capacity to exercise independent agency." Although Robert Asen argues that one can perform citizenship without full citizenship rights, state-recognized citizenship, in many ways, grants political agency. Furthermore, women not historically privileged enough to participate in the public sphere as members of a civic community encountered a restrictive form of citizenship pertaining to their identities as women, not as independent beings deserving of natural rights.

Gendered citizenship highlights the tension between republican, liberal, and ascriptive forms of citizenship. Republicanism and liberalism promised a vision of equality and participation in a larger, national community, which required that one subordinate ties to other communities centered on gender, race, class, or sexuality. Ironically, citizenship was often ascribed to a group based on perceptions of race, class, and gender; in the context of U.S. history; for example, voting rights were typically ascribed to privileged, white males. Specifically, as women attempted to access the privileges bound up in citizenship, they challenged a distinctly masculine realm of power and further, were often positioned as "the Other." Women's identities were thus
subjugated within the masculine spaces of citizenship as they pursued such rights and
privileges.129

Furthermore, when women pursued citizenship, they negotiated their identities
among the public and private, the universal and the particular, and the community and the
individual. Feminist scholars have long noted that the masculine, abstract
conceptualization of citizenship as public, universal egalitarianism runs contrary to the
feminist project of revaluing the public sphere to include "the personal," concrete, lived
experiences of women and women's bodies.130 As such, the pursuit of citizenship forced
women to balance their identities as women and as citizens, forming the "dual nature" of
women's citizenship.131 Yuval-Davis elaborates: "on the one hand [women] are included
in the general body of citizens; on the other hand there are always rules, regulations, and
policies which are specific to them."132 Because women often encountered citizenship in
conflicting and dichotomous ways, it was necessary to challenge traditional meanings of
citizenship. To this end, Werbner and Yuval-Davis conceive of citizenship as "dialogical
and relational, [and] embedded in cultural and associational life."133 This model of
citizenship accounts for the concrete, personal, and even "private" modes of public
engagement that better reflects the ways in which women have encountered
citizenship.134 Contesting and transforming meanings of citizenship allowed women to
assert their political agency, and further, move closer to participating in the national
community.

Notions of citizenship, thus, shape the ways in which people engage in the
national community. Although the predominant notions of citizenship are ascribed to a
more narrow portion of "the people," alternative perspectives on citizenship allow
marginalized groups to challenge liberal, republican, and ascriptive forms of citizenship and to assert political agency. More specifically, recognition of ascriptive inegalitarianism helps us see how difference plays a role in the enforcement and enactment of citizenship. Gendered citizenship, in particular, speaks to the ways in which citizenship has been mediated by sex, and further, how women have transformed meanings of citizenship to include particular and personal understandings of civic engagement.

**Social Movements and Militancy**

Studying the processes through which marginalized groups contest institutional meanings of nation and citizenship is informed by theories of social change. Broadly conceived, the study of social movements typically focuses on how marginalized groups gain access to and transform institutionalized power. More specifically, a rhetorical movement perspective examines the ways in which social change occurs through discourse, which necessitates the interrogation of the "themes, strategies, arguments, ethos, values, [and] rhetorical forms" of social movements. For this study, conceptualizing theories of social change as a rhetorical lens highlights the importance of political agency and identity-formation for militant organizations.

The rhetorical study of social movements has progressed from considering how social movements develop in a linear fashion to considering how social movements use particular symbolic resources throughout a relational process to achieve social and political change. Hogan, for example, argues that a social movement perspective is characterized by a "collective, evolutionary, and dialectical process." Rather than perceiving social change as a top-down, bottom-up, or an outside-in process, this project
considers the process of social change as an ongoing rhetorical exchange of power among those groups conceived of as more powerful or powerless.

In early social movement literature, theorists characterized groups by their use of either moderate or militant reform methods. For example, Herbert W. Simons argues that "The core characteristic of militant strategists is that they seek to change the actions of their primary targets as a precondition for change in attitudes. By means of direct action techniques and verbal polemics, militants threaten, harass, cajole, disrupt, provoke, intimidate, coerce." On the other hand, "the moderate adapts to the listener's needs, wants, and values." Similarly, Robert S. Cathcart distinguishes between "managerial" and "confrontational" rhetorics—the former of which is used to "uphold and re-enforce the established order" and the latter is used to "reject the system, its hierarchies and its values."

This dualistic relationship has been reconsidered in dialectical terms, which more closely reflects the NWP's approach to social change. Charles Conrad, for example, suggests that social movement philosophies lie between the militant/moderate, radical/reformist, or visionary/pragmatic extremes, wherein the polar elements of both are negotiated. Moreover, Mari Boor Tonn argues that effective agitation emerges from negotiating militant appeals with conservative ideologies. As such, militant organizations work in relation to more moderate organizations, as is the case with the NWP and the NAWSA, the latter of which used more reformist methods for change than the NWP, which employed militant methods for change. Despite such commitments to militancy, most militant organizations do not necessarily aim to overthrow the system they protest—often, militancy is the means for policy change, which involves a
dialectical process that threatens institutional power as a means to gain access to the
institution.

Central to a group's ability to mobilize for social change is the constitution of a
group identity. According to Etienne Balibar, producing "the people" is "the basis and
origin of political power." It becomes imperative, therefore, for a politically-powerless
group to constitute its identity as a "people" in order to assert political power. James
Jasinski elaborates on the process of constituting an identity: "Texts invite their audience
to experience the world in certain ways via concrete textual forms; audiences, in turn,
appropriate, articulate, circulate, and/or subvert these textual forms in ways that release
and transform their potential constitutive energy." In part, members of militant
organizations are their own audience of these textual forms. However, as militants
constitute their identities, they in turn, invite other "audience[s] to experience the world
in certain ways." For example, as the NWP constituted its militant identity, it invited U.S.
women to participate in its vision of fully-enfranchised U.S. citizenship, who in turn,
constituted their own citizenship identities. As these groups engage in this constitutive
process, they are called into valuable being and can then assert their political agency.

In the context of a social movement, for example, political agency is asserted
when a group engages institutional powers to impact policy and ideological change. In
this view, public policy reflects dominant and subordinate ideologies insofar that
ideologies shape public policy just as public policy can shape ideologies. Political
agency, however, is not an unmitigated force; "agency is constrained by externals, by the
community that confers identities related to gender, race, class, and the like on its
members and by so doing determines not only what is considered to be 'true,' but also
who can speak and with what force.\textsuperscript{149} Thus, although political agency can be an empowering force that allows groups to pursue institutional and ideological change, it is not beyond the constraints of salient institutional and ideological restrictions. In terms of women's political agency, feminist theorist Arlene Elowe MacLeod argues, "women, even as subordinate players, always play an active part that goes beyond the dichotomy of victimization/acceptance, a dichotomy that flattens out a complex and ambiguous agency in which women accept, accommodate, ignore, resist, or protest—sometimes all at the same time."\textsuperscript{150} Thus, even from a disempowered position, women can assert political agency in the process of vying for political and citizenship rights.\textsuperscript{151}

Asserting political agency and forming an identity is particularly significant for militant groups who resort to nontraditional forms of communication after exhausting traditional means of political persuasion. As Jean L. Cohen asserts, "The process of identity formation, however, involves nonnegotiable demands" made by militant groups, particularly once more moderate modes of negotiation seem futile.\textsuperscript{152} Martin Duberman elaborates:

[M]ilitants are tough-minded realists. Their refusal to place entire faith in an appeal to conscience, or in the benevolent workings of time, separates them from the genteel mainstream of American reform tradition. That tradition has always been grounded in a double optimism—that the world can be made better, and that this can be done through an appeal to "right reason" rather than force and fear. The militants share the belief that the world can be made a better place, but they put their faith for change in power, not goodwill.\textsuperscript{153}
Thus, a militant group asserts political agency and constitutes its identity by engaging in rhetorical acts of confrontation while remaining aware of institutional resistance. The purpose of engaging in these acts is often consummatory as such acts perform the necessary behavior to satisfy a need when no other behavior suffices. As such, a militant group's desire to legitimate its demands often requires the consummatory power offered through the act of confrontation. Put quite simply by Cathcart, "the enactment of confrontation gives a movement its identity, its substance, its form."

Revealing further intricacies involved in identity formation, the identities of groups vying for social change, however, must forge identities with the majority it seeks to join. The NWP, while a self-proclaimed "militant" organization, aimed to make a policy change and to be represented in the U.S. democratic system. Thus, to an extent, the NWP needed to negotiate their militant identity with that of the political mainstream.

Avtar Brah discusses the complexities of the identity-formation process:

All discursive formations are a site of power, but there is no single and overarching locus of power where dominance, subordination, solidarity and affiliation based on egalitarian principles, or the conditions of affinity, conviviality and sociality are produced and secured once and for all. Rather, power is performatively constituted in and through economic, political, and cultural practices. Subjectivities of both the dominant and the dominated are produced in the interstices of these multiple, intersecting loci of power.

Power and identity, thus, are constantly negotiated between those perceived to be the powerful and the oppressed. Given the NWP's militant demands to access institutionalized power through the vote, and, given the resistance of President Wilson
and Congress to the woman suffrage movement, a social movement perspective allows for the interrogation of the ways in which the NWP negotiated political power and constituted a militant identity from a more disempowered position.

Political Mimesis and Social Change

Studying the dialectical relationship between social movement and political discourses invites a look at the extent to which social movement strategies take a mimetic form. In the Aristotelian sense, *mimesis* is the process of imitation or representation. Social movements often adopt or mimic institutional and political discursive strategies as a way to ingratiate themselves into the political institutions they seek to alter. Rhys Williams explains this rhetorical process:

Movements find their niche in the political terrain by tapping into recognizable rhetorics and symbols. This both constrains and enables movement activities. The boundaries of the repertoire limit the range of political discourse; but using clearly recognizable elements gives movements easier entrée into "legitimate" politics. Elements in the established repertoire facilitate the recruitment and retention of allies and are stronger persuasive tools in the political arena. The repertoire is not entirely fixed, of course, and innovations by political movements are often responsible for its flexibility.

In order to better effect change within "the political arena," movements often engage this dual process of invoking symbols from an "established repertoire" of political discourse and expanding upon their meanings as a means to effect political change. This mimetic practice thus provides an "entée" into the otherwise restricted spaces where marginalized groups can then expand upon and revise institutionalized discourses.
The concept of mimesis has been imbued with multiple meanings throughout ancient, medieval, and contemporary rhetorical contexts, wherein discussions pertaining to reality and its representations were shaped by their historical moment.\textsuperscript{160} Introduced by Plato and refined in Aristotle's \textit{Poetics}, the concept of \textit{mimēsis} referred to the art (or \textit{technē}) of imitating or representing nature in paintings, literature, and music.\textsuperscript{161} Recent theoretical developments apply mimesis less so to "naive mirrorings of ‘reality’" and more so "to the \textit{constitution} of reality."\textsuperscript{162} Samuel IJsseling argues that meaning is created through the mimetic processes of "doubling" and "repetition," which in turn creates "the identity and recognizability of beings."\textsuperscript{163}

Most significantly, Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf introduce the concept of \textit{social mimesis} to discuss the processes through which mimetic acts shape and are shaped by our interpersonal and material realities.\textsuperscript{164} They argue: "mimesis itself is inseparable from practical action, from interplay among perception, evaluation, and interpretation between fictional elements and active interventions in worldly events."\textsuperscript{165} Expanding upon this view, Deborah Jensen argues that acts of social mimesis "could include everything from speech systems to the performance of gender norms to religious or philosophical proselytizing to currency exchange . . . any domain of culture is mimetic where likeness is the basis on which we are able to perceive or act within overarching collectivities or systems."\textsuperscript{166} To the extent that the NWP worked to constitute fully-enfranchised citizenship identities, or the \textit{likeness} of other fully-enfranchised citizens, their discursive strategies indeed mimicked those who possessed the institutional power to grant them citizenship rights.
Adding another dimension to the mimetic character of social movements, scholars have also noted that movements themselves are mimetic formations of previous movements. In other words, many recognize how "spin-off movements" are subsequent iterations of what are called "initiator" movements. The women's rights movement, for example, is often considered to be a spin-off of the abolition movement. According to Doug McAdam, it follows that "spin-off movements are conceived of as adopters or, more accurately, adapters of some subset of the innovations associated with the early risers." Not only do social movements mimic the formation and strategies of previous movements, but they then "encourage another round of mimetic mobilization by still more groups."

Emerging from such previous scholarship, this project features the concept of political mimesis, which considers the ways in which the NWP mimicked political discourses and practices as part of their two-pronged strategy of accessing the power of political activity and re-envisioning women's citizenship identities within the nation-state. Political mimesis is particularly amenable to the rhetorical processes inherent to social change through which marginalized groups negotiate power and constitute identities. Gebauer and Wulf argue:

In many usages mimesis entails an identification of one person with another. People identify themselves by means of their mimetic abilities when they see themselves in the Other and perceive a state of mutual equality . . . There is a complementarity of perspectives in mimesis: a person regards the Other as equal and assumes the Other to be doing the same in reverse. Such an act of complementary seeing produces a correspondence between people.
Complementarity is manifest in physical form when one person clings to another; it is a sensuous, bodily act, but it is penetrated by order; the Other is assimilated to the world of the person who is clinging.169

In the context of a social movement, mimetic rhetorics hold the potential to empower a marginalized group to identify and create "a correspondence" with those voicing institutional opposition. While the NWP did not attempt to literally "cling" to President Wilson or members of Congress (although many of their protests involved the "bodily act" of invading male, political spaces), they did insert themselves into the masculine reserved political spaces and physically confronted the public/private boundaries placed on women. Moreover, the NWP's mimetic adoption of political discourses and rituals helped them assert their political authority and force a discursive exchange with those in positions of political power, helping to renegotiate the power relationships embedded in a world "penetrated by order."

Political mimesis also accentuates the NWP's dialectical use of militant and traditional methods to effect social change, which can function to both expand and restrict the potential of such change. As a militant strategy, political mimesis helped U.S. white women assert their political agency in the face of restricting and exclusionary institutional and ideological forces. Gebauer and Wulf discuss the empowering potential of mimetic strategies as they explore the "extent to which the author [of a mimetic act] resists social pressure and produces a counterpressure, [and] whether the author's strategy in relation to the medium generates a codification system through which he or she gains symbolic power."170 Thus, political mimesis can be considered a strategy of resistance to the "social pressure" of accepting and participating in the hegemonic processes of
preserving male dominance. In fact, Teresa L. Ebert argues that in revolutionary contexts, mimesis "has been used to contest and overturn the prevailing common sense valorized in the conventional and oppressive modes of antirepresentationalism that have supported the dominant social relations." 171 In the NWP's case, political mimesis motivated members to militantly interrogate the "conventional and oppressive modes" of power that restricted women's roles in the nation-state.

Political mimesis, however, holds the potential to simultaneously reify the strength of oppressive political and social processes, thus providing groups a more traditional means of effecting change. In attempting to create a likeness in political power between its members and political leaders, protest groups necessarily accept some of the institutional rituals that simultaneously reify their exclusion and the exclusion of others, limiting the liberating potential of their social protest. Consequently, mimesis has been criticized, for example, as a "cultural site for the (re)production of the patriarchal political economy of signification as the 'real' and for perpetuating its hegemony." 172 The acceptance of such rituals, thus, exhibits the ways in which political mimesis can function as a more traditional form of social agitation, which mimics the very oppressive ideological forces that the group often seeks to disrupt. Given the NWP's policy-oriented campaign, however, rhetorical acts of political mimesis allowed the group to participate in the hegemonic "(re)production" of political power in order to contest and challenge these processes and earn women the right to vote.

Taken together, nationalism, citizenship, militant social change, and political mimesis provide critical perspectives that account for the ways in which power is negotiated among dominant and subordinate members of society. More specifically, these
lenses illuminate the ways in which marginalized groups contest and transform prevailing meanings of membership in a national community and assert political agency. Nationalism and gendered citizenship offer both restricting and empowering conceptions of community membership, particularly as oppressed groups engage institutional and ideological forces. Militant groups seek to confront these forces in traditional and nontraditional ways; through political mimesis in particular, militant groups can gain access to reserved political spaces and earn the necessary political legitimacy to ingratiate themselves into institutional and ideological favor of the national polity while reconstituting citizenship identities and re-envisioning the boundaries of the nation-state.

**Outline for Study**

Situated within a larger context of increased presidential power, national and international campaigns for democracy, progressive change, and the renewed scrutiny over notions of U.S. citizenship, this study looks at the rhetorical strategies of the NWP's militant pursuit of the Nineteenth Amendment. To begin with, this project argues that through the rhetoric of political mimesis, the NWP asserted its political agency and constituted women's citizenship identities. As a militant organization representing disenfranchised women, the NWP sought to revise the U.S. government's position on woman suffrage. To this end, the NWP mimicked the political rituals and practices that symbolized fully-enfranchised participation in the national community. While the NWP's seven-year campaign helped enfranchise U.S. white women in 1920, its protest strategies offered U.S. women the opportunity to enact women's citizenship rights and thus, offered a vision of women's expanded roles in the nation-state. Simultaneously, however, the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis reified the strength of U.S. political leaders and
institutions as it vied for institutional legitimacy. Eventually, the viability of political mimesis as a strategy of social change is demonstrated by the ways in which the NWP's rhetoric circulated within the woman suffrage debate and solicited a response from not only political leaders but the U.S. news media and those individuals who became NWP members and opponents. Thus, this study argues that political mimesis offered the NWP the means to achieve both constitutive and political gains.

In addition, the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis empowered its campaign for national suffrage rights in many ways. By mimicking the rituals of politics, such discourse helped the NWP negotiate the gendered boundaries of political participation and assuage the opposition to their actions as such rituals were accepted means of political engagement. Enacting the political legitimacy they sought, NWP members inserted themselves into national and state political spaces, which included the streets of Washington, D.C., the halls of the U.S. Congress and various state capitol buildings, and the presidential spaces of power. This strategy not only provided NWP members access to otherwise unavailable spaces, but it forced political leaders to engage them in a deliberative process over national woman suffrage, ultimately offering them a sense of political authority and legitimacy. However, as others, including the president, attempted to ignore or "silence" the NWP, the militancy of the NWP's assertion of citizenship rights is exposed.

Political mimesis also allowed the NWP to appropriate the rhetorical strategies employed by the political elite to shape a nationalist and internationalist identity and link woman suffrage to the nation's vision of democracy. By appropriating and expanding upon progressive visions of democracy articulated by President Wilson, members of
Congress, and party leaders, the NWP worked to empower their suffrage campaign. Through political mimesis, NWP rhetorically fused woman suffrage to America's democratic program during a time of war. In so doing, the NWP helped expand women's roles in the nation-state beyond more private, domestic concerns.

As a constitutive process, moreover, political mimesis helped empower NWP leaders with a sense of authority and agency to effect political change and allowed women to envision themselves as fully-participating U.S. citizens; such constitutive efforts served as a motivating force throughout their campaign. In terms of the NWP's militancy, constituting themselves as citizens was integral toward helping women realize their citizenship identities and re-envision the gendered nation. However, as a more traditional strategy of social change, political mimesis provided NWP members the necessary political legitimacy and recognition to codify women's national citizenship rights into the U.S. Constitution in ways less threatening to the political establishment. Such inclusion, however, often came with certain costs, considering that their political empowerment was dependent on the ultimate endorsements of male political leaders, which reified the latter's authority. And, the racism of the period was likewise mimicked as the NWP consistently subordinated African American women's rights throughout its campaign. As such, this study demonstrates the potential for political mimesis to expand and restrict citizenship rights.

More specifically, Chapter One first situates the NWP within a larger context of U.S. nationalism, citizenship, and woman suffrage from the seventeenth century through the NWP's genesis in early 1913. This chapter traces gender ideologies embedded in U.S. political culture to demonstrate the ways in which women interacted with constructions
of nationalism and citizenship. Throughout U.S. history, women appropriated nationalist and citizenship ideals to argue for their rights and challenge the public/private doctrine. This chapter also emphasizes the changing political climate of the early twentieth century, which marked a significant shift in the ways women could access political power in the context of the growing alliances between the labor and international women's rights movements.

Chapter Two focuses the formative stages of the NWP, during which Alice Paul and Lucy Burns launched its militant campaign. As a strategy of social change, militancy had yet to enter the U.S. woman suffrage scene in an organized fashion, even after more than sixty years of agitation for enfranchisement. Harriot Stanton Blatch's role in linking the growing international militant labor movement and woman suffrage helped create the opportunity for Paul and Burns to transport their militant training in England to the United States in politically-mimetic ways. Once they were officially part of the NAWSA, Paul and Burns made their first, bold statement as a militant and mimetic force in the woman suffrage movement. This chapter, thus, argues that the NWP's militant underpinnings shaped its first act as an organization—its national suffrage parade held the day before Wilson's first inauguration ceremony on March 3, 1913. By mimicking Wilson's inaugural parade, the NWP's national suffrage parade helped shape woman suffrage as part of America's democratic tradition, as a matter of national rights, and as a force of coalition politics.

Chapter Three focuses on the ways in which the NWP's campaign exploded into the spaces of national politics through the adoption of third party strategies and the ultimate formation of a third political party—the Woman's Party. Once severed from the
NAWSA, the NWP mobilized members into every state and congressional district in the nation in order agitate the U.S. Congress as its primary change-agent for woman suffrage. In the process, the NWP worked to nationalize the suffrage movement while constituting enfranchised and disenfranchised U.S. women as citizens. Accentuating the role of political mimesis, this chapter demonstrates how the NWP worked to nationalize the movement by adopting the strategies of a national, political party. Specifically, between 1914 and 1916, the NWP mobilized western women to vote against the Democratic Party through rhetorics of national sisterhood and solidarity and mobilized women nationwide through sensational acts of citizenship and through the NWP's ultimate formation of the Woman's Party.

Chapter Four turns to the mimetic strategies of the NWP's campaign between 1917 and 1919. Situated within the rise of Wilson's enhanced rhetorical leadership, particularly as the nation moved into WWI, this chapter looks at how the NWP mimicked Wilson's rhetorical campaign for democracy both at home and abroad. By drawing upon theories of gendered nationalism, gendered militarism, and gendered internationalism, this chapter analyzes the mimetic contours of the NWP's silent protest, statue protests, U.S. Senate protests, and Watch Fires. Specifically, the NWP's "Silent Sentinels" fashioned the "woman's pulpit" as it went over Wilson's head and appealed to the American public to empower their fight for woman suffrage. The NWP also exploited the heightened militarism of WWI and thus constituted the Sentinels as soldiers fighting to liberate the oppressed in order to justify their abuses and motivate further action. Last, the NWP mimicked Wilson's internationalist program and rhetorically linked woman
suffrage to his campaign for world democracy through its Lafayette and Rochambeau statue protests, its protests on the Senate, and its "Watch Fires for Freedom."

The Afterword explores this study's historical and theoretical contributions as it deepens the appreciation of the NWP's role in national politics, citizenship discourses, and woman suffrage, as well as the understanding of political mimesis as a strategy of social change. The NWP's militant campaign certainly did more than help enfranchise U.S. white women; significantly, the NWP impacted national politics, internationalist discourse, and multiple communities of women citizens. The force of political mimesis as a strategy for social and political change is also discussed, particularly as it helped the NWP to constitute citizenship identities while reaching its end goal of enfranchising U.S. white women in the process of re-envisioning the gendered nation.

Before turning to the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis and its militant campaign for woman suffrage, this project offers a narrative of how women have asserted their political agency amidst dominant nationalist, citizenship, and gendered ideological forces throughout U.S. history.

End Notes: Introduction

1 "President Asked to Open Second Term with Action on Suffrage," The Suffragist, March 10, 1917, 7.

2 Ibid.

5 *The Suffragist* noted that 1,000 marchers participated, while the *New York Times* reported 400 women. To avoid exaggeration, the author uses the smaller number. See "Suffragists Girdle White House in Rain," *New York Times*, March 5, 1917, 3.

6 In Senate, three NWP members unfurled a banner that read, "Mr. President, what will you do for woman suffrage?" "Report for 1916," January 1917, National Woman's Party Papers, reel 2, 13. (hereafter cited as NWPP).

7 For a complex discussion of agency, see Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "Agency: Promiscuous and Protean," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 2 (2005): 1-19. Also, this paper adopts a constitutive understanding of rhetoric. As James Jasinski has argued, rhetoric should be appreciated for its power to constitute identity. This paper considers the Sentinels' protest a "text" that reflects the symbolic values of the prevailing ideological forces of 1917. James Jasinski, "A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography: Toward an Understanding of the Discursive (Re)Constitution of 'Constitution' in *The Federalist Papers*," in *Doing Rhetorical History: Cases and Concepts*, ed. Kathleen J. Turner (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 74-75. Additionally, this study argues that identity is formed through the intersection of multiple ideological forces. As Nira Yuval-Davis contends, "Studying citizenship, however, can throw light on some of the major issues which are involved in the complex
relationships between individuals, collectivities and the state, and the ways gender relations (as well as other social divisions) affect and are affected by them." Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation* (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 69. Last, this study's use of the term "identity" resists the implication that an identity is a singular, stabilized presentation of self; rather, this study uses the term "identity" to refer to the multiple elements that contribute to the construction of one's overall identity. As Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny argue, "The multiplicity, fluidity, contextual, and contested qualities of identities that studies of gender have highlighted have undermined any notion of a single all-embracing primary identity to which all others must be subordinated at all times and costs." Consequently, this study's use of "identity" does not imply a primary or particularly privileged element of one's identity, but rather a reflection of the composite fragments of one's overall identity. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, "Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation," in *Becoming National: A Reader*, eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 10.

8 "Discourse," for the purpose of this project, reaches beyond the realm of the written or spoken word and encompasses all acts that may be valued for their ability to carry symbolic meaning. These texts include spoken and written discourse, but also symbolic acts such as protesting, parading, chanting, heckling, and passive resistance. Studying these texts will reveal the NWP's ideological standpoint. Maurice Charland argues, "The power of the text is the power of an embodied ideology. The form of an ideological rhetoric is effective because it is within the bodies of those it constitutes as


11 The scholarly debate regarding the rhetorical presidency stems from differing views on the nature of rhetoric. Most significantly, James W. Caesar, Glen E. Thurow, Tulis, and Joseph M. Bessette, present the concept of the rhetorical presidency from a political science perspective in their article, "The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 11 (Spring 1981): 158-71. From a rhetorical perspective,
this conceptualization of the rhetorical presidency operated under some limited assumptions regarding the nature of rhetoric. Martin J. Medhurst, for example, makes the distinction between the rhetorical presidency and presidential rhetoric, arguing that the latter "conceives the principal subject of investigation to be rhetoric rather than the presidency," wherein "one can study the principles and practices of rhetoric, understood what is most likely to be persuasive to a given audience on a given occasion." Martin J. Medhurst, "A Tale of Two Constructs: The Rhetorical Presidency versus Presidential Rhetoric," in Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency, ed. Martin J. Medhurst (College Station, Texas A&M University Press), xii-xiii. Moreover, as Jasinski argues, rhetoric should be appreciated for its power to constitute identity. As such, the rhetorical presidency should be considered for the ways in which it constitutes a shared national identity. Jasinski, "A Constitutive Framework for Rhetorical Historiography." Also see Tulis, "Revising the Rhetorical Presidency," in Beyond the Rhetorical Presidency, 4.


13 Tulis explains that nineteenth-century presidents operated directly within the conditions of the original Constitution until Theodore Roosevelt established himself as "the father of the rhetorical presidency" by securing passage of a railroad bill through a lecture tour of the country, appealing "over the heads" of Congress. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 19.


15 Theodore Roosevelt, "Debate on Proper Scope of Presidential Power and Leadership," in *The Evolving Presidency*, 95. It should also be noted that President McKinley is credited for framing the modern presidency and setting up Theodore Roosevelt's ability to treat the role of president as activist. Gould argues that McKinley's refinements to the presidency "grew from a basic inclination to be an activist president that he had nurtured during his years in Congress and as the governor of Ohio." Additionally, Gould details McKinley's speaking tours, during which the president "welcomed the chance it gave him to personalize the presidency." Gould also credits assistant to McKinley's secretary, George B. Courtelyou, for shaping a strategic relationship between the president and the press for all presidents to follow. Gould, *The Modern American Presidency*, 7-10.


Stuckey, "'The Domain of Public Conscience,'" 1. Also, Wilson was featured in "The President and His Cabinet in Action," a motion picture produced in 1916 by the Democratic National Committee. Further, he "marched in preparedness parades, went to baseball games, and provided ample chances to photographers on his speaking tours."


Medhurst describes the location of the rhetorical potency in "the speaker, the message, the audience, the context, and the medium." Medhurst, "A Tale of Two Constructs," xvi.


Stuckey, "'The Domain of Public Conscience,'" 5.

Ibid., 3.


J. Michael Hogan problematizes the driving forces of the Progressive Era, noting that progressivism was used to justify competing and contradictory social and political goals. "Introduction: Rhetoric and Reform in the Progressive Era," in *Rhetoric*


30 Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 5; Hofstadter notes that the Progressive movement inherited the revolutionary spirit of the Populist movement, which came to a climax with William Jennings Bryan's presidential campaign in 1896, which he lost. Nonetheless, Populism is considered a precursor to progressivism. Hofstadter, The Progressive Movement, 6-7.

31 Many historians eschew the notion that Roosevelt was a "Progressive" president (1901-1904) and agree that he did not adopt a Progressive platform until 1912. Leroy G. Dorsey, however, argues that "in a rhetorical sense, Roosevelt was the consummate Progressive: a reformer with a strong faith in the power of rhetoric to shape public opinion and in the power of public opinion, in turn, to bring about meaningful social reform." Nonetheless, Roosevelt's presidency did not explicitly advocate a Progressive platform. Leroy G. Dorsey, "Preaching Morality in Modern America: Theodore Roosevelt's Rhetorical Progressivism," in Rhetoric and Reform in the Progressive Era, 49. Also see the following historical works regarding President


33 Hogan, "Introduction," xvi.

34 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 413-14. Smith attributes much of Wilson's progressive ideals to Herbert Croly, an intellectual and political figure of the time.

Ibid.


E.g., the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, and the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1913.

Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 441-61.


At this time, political party machines were funded by "big business," such as railroads, utilities, and insurance companies. Referendums allowed state voters to reject state laws. Similarly, recall measures allowed the people to remove public officials from


45 Hogan, "Introduction," xiv.


48 Stuckey, *Defining Americans*, 115. In *The Strenuous Life*, Theodore Roosevelt argued, "No country can long endure if its foundations are not laid deep in the material prosperity which comes from thrift, from business energy and enterprise, from hard, unsparing effort." Roosevelt argued that hard work shapes the unique character of America as a nation and as a race. Theodore Roosevelt, *The Strenuous Life* (New York: The Century Co., 1901), 8. Furthermore, Roosevelt wrote in regard to "True Americanism," "The third sense in which the world 'Americanism' may be employed is
with reference to the Americanizing of the newcomers to our shores. We must Americanize them in every way, in speech, in political ideas and principles, and in their way of looking at the relations between Church and State . . . We have no room for any people who do not act and vote simply as Americans, and as nothing else." Theodore Roosevelt, *American Ideals and Other Essays, Social and Political*, Presidential ed. (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1897), 24-25.

49 In 1908, "The Melting Pot" was a popular play in which a Russian immigrant exalts the cleansing power of assimilating to American identity. Israel Zangwill, "The Melting Pot," in *From the Ghetto to the Melting Pot: Israel Zangwill's Jewish Plays, Three Manuscripts*, ed. Edna Nahshon (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2006); Andrews argues that the melting pot metaphor "undergirded Wilson's vision and maintained rhetorical respectability well into the twentieth century." Andrews, "Presidential Leadership," 137.

50 Stuckey, *Defining Americans*, 153.


54 Stone, *Perilous Times*, 146; Magee, *Freedom of Expression*.

55 Stone, *Perilous Times*, 186.

56 Fear of German immigrants was so strong, that some communities banned German-language teaching and German-language books. Also, Attorney General Gregory
sought the help of volunteer citizen groups, such as the American Protective League, to report suspicious activity on behalf of German Americans. These groups engaged in wiretaps, ransacking of homes, tarring and feathering, and even murder. Stone, *Perilous Times*, 155-57. For a thorough discussion of the court cases brought about under the Espionage Act of 1917, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); Also, for a discussion of the debate surrounding the Sedition Act of 1918, see Stone, *Perilous Times*.

57 Haig A. Bosmajian, "The Abrogation of the Suffragists' First Amendment Rights," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 38 (1974): 218-32. In his extensive account of World War I opponents, Stone lists pacifists and internationalists, such as Jane Addams; socialists, such Eugene V. Debs of The Socialist Party; and anarchists, such as Emma Goldman and Mollie Steimer. Stone, *Perilous Times*, 140-46.

58 Stuckey, "'The Domain of Public Conscience,'" 8.

59 Stuckey, *Defining Americans*, 152.

60 This was Wilson's position until January 10, 1918, when he publicly endorsed the movement. Regarding opposition to the movement, a vociferous anti-suffrage movement emerged in the 1910s, led by men and women alike. More specifically, southern men and women opposed woman suffrage for fear of it weakening Jim Crow restrictions and bringing the vote to African American men and women; brewing interests funded anti-woman suffrage efforts for fear of Prohibition; industrial and big business interests opposed woman suffrage for fear of woman voters pushing labor reform, and further, persuaded immigrant workers to oppose the vote as well. Eleanor Flexner and

61 Elizabeth Cady Stanton argued for the right of woman suffrage at the Woman's Rights Convention at Seneca Falls, however, she was met with great resistance from Lucretia and James Mott among others. The ninth resolution of the Declaration of Sentiments, drafted at the convention, asked for woman's enfranchisement and was the only resolution not passed unanimously.

62 In 1865, after women's right leaders, including Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, had forgone national suffrage conventions as well as other campaign efforts in support of the Civil War, abolitionist, William Lloyd Garrison wanted to pursue enfranchisement for black men exclusively. Anthony and Stanton remained firm in their belief of acquiring suffrage for all men and women and thus, formed the American Equal Rights Association (AERA) in May 1866. The AERA's quest for universal suffrage was met in opposition by leaders of the African American community such as Frederick Douglass and Frances Harper, who contended it was the "Negroe's Hour" for Constitutional enfranchisement. In 1867, Anthony campaigned heavily for a Kansas referendum proposing to remove both "negro" and "female" from its state constitution. With little support from African American leaders, the referendum failed, solidifying the adversarial relationship between the Anthony/Stanton partnership and leaders for black male suffrage. Moreover, in 1868, Anthony and Stanton vociferously opposed the Fourteenth Amendment, which would bestow equal rights upon African American males. They accepted the financial backing of eccentric and openly racist George Francis Train to publish *The Revolution* as a forum for their opposition. Their campaign efforts failed
and the amendment passed. Six months later, Anthony and Stanton realized they must pursue a Constitutional amendment for woman suffrage after the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, which gave African American males the right to vote.

63 Following the Civil War, the woman's rights movement split over the question of black male suffrage and by 1869, two organizations emerged toward securing a woman's right to vote. The American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) pursued the amendment from a standpoint of moral superiority and believed state campaigns were most effective. It also embraced a host of other social issues. The National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) pursued the amendment exclusively and insisted on securing a federal amendment. See Chapter 1 for more detail.

64 Flexner, *Century of Struggle*, 241; Prior to the ratifications of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in 1866 and 1870 respectively, the issue of voting rights was largely considered a state issue. Thus, the pursuit of woman suffrage at the state level seemed to be the most fitting course of action. For a history of voting rights in the United States, see *Voting and the Spirit of American Democracy: Essays on the History of Voting and Voting Rights in America*, ed. Donald W. Rogers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990).

65 The NAWSA was established in 1890 as a merger between the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) and the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA), both of which were founded in 1869. The NWSA's leaders included Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton whose philosophy toward woman suffrage was rooted in liberal subjectivity and equal rights. The AWSA's leaders included Lucy Stone
and Antoinette Brown Blackwell whose suffrage philosophy considered women as moral
means in society.

66 Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, "Editor's Introduction" to Linda G. Ford's essay,
"Alice Paul and the Triumph of Militancy," in One Woman, One Vote: Rediscovering the
Woman Suffrage Movement, ed. Marjorie Spruill Wheeler (Troutdale, OR: New Sage
Press, 1995), 278.

67 Linda G. Ford, "Alice Paul and the Triumph of Militancy," in One Woman, One
Vote, 282.

68 Ibid.

69 Wheeler, "Editor's Introduction," 278. From this point forward, this paper will
refer to the National Woman's Party, in all stages of its organization, as the NWP.

70 Rebecca J. Mead, How the Vote was Won: Woman Suffrage in the Western


72 Jennifer L. Borda, "Woman Suffrage in the Progressive Era: A Coming of
Age," in Rhetoric and Reform in the Progressive Era, 358.


75 Histories of the NWP include Sidney Roderick Bland, "Techniques of
Persuasion: The National Woman's Party and Woman Suffrage, 1913-1919," (Ph.D. diss.,
George Washington University, 1972); Linda G. Ford, Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage
Militancy of the National Woman's Party, 1912-1920 (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1991); Sally Hunter Graham, "Woodrow Wilson, Alice Paul, and the Woman


78 Borda, "Woman Suffrage in the Progressive Era."

79 Christine A. Lunardini and Thomas J. Knock suggest a link between the rise of the rhetorical presidency and suffragists' move to target President Wilson as a potential ally in winning woman suffrage. However, their study focuses on the combined efforts of

Additionally, Sally Hunter Graham demonstrates how the NWP's 1917 protests provoked Wilson to censor the suffragists and manipulate the press. Her study, however, focuses on assessing Wilson's motives for his eventual endorsement of the Nineteenth Amendment; not, rather, to discuss the NWP's protest in the context of the rhetorical presidency. Graham, "Woodrow Wilson."

80 Stuckey and Antczak, "The Rhetorical Presidency," 413.


82 Paul and Burns arrived in Washington, D.C. in December of 1912, but were not appointed to work for the NAWSA until early 1913. Although at the time, Paul and Burns worked for the Congressional Committee, March 3, 1913, marked the first of their public protests symbolizing the beginning of the NWP's campaign for woman suffrage. Additionally, this project will pull primarily on correspondence for evidence until November 15, 1913, when *The Suffragist* debuted. Other NWP papers include pamphlets, campaign booklets, financial reports, scrapbooks, newspaper clippings, and ephemera. All NWP papers are compiled under the "National Woman's Party Papers: The Suffrage Years," on microfilm at the University of Maryland McKeldin Library, in College Park. Further, Thomas C. Pardo offers a meticulous guide to the papers: *The National Woman's Party Papers, 1913-1974: A Guide to the Microform Edition* (Sanford, NC: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1979). Last, first-hand accounts of NWP protests also enrich our


85 Ibid.


88 E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 102-109. Hobsbawm identifies two significant eras in the history of nationalism: between 1830 and 1870 and between 1880 and 1914. Within the first era, he argues, a number of European nations were formed following revolutions; the term "nationalism" meant the establishment of a sovereign nation-state. "Nationalism" in the second era took on a more symbolic meaning, wherein "any body of people considering themselves a 'nation' claimed the right to self-determination." Hobsbawm, *Nations*, 102; Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 411.

90 Ibid., 268.


93 Katherine Verdery argues that scholarship on nation "should treat nation as a symbol and any given nationalism as having multiple meanings, offered as alternatives and competed over by different groups manoeuvring to capture the symbol's definition and its legitimizing effects." Katherine Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism'?" in *Mapping the Nation*, 228.

94 Kersh, *Dreams of a More Perfect Union*, 16.


97 Erwin C. Hargrove, *The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), vii. Quotation marks surrounding "teach reality" were part of the original text, added for emphasis.


100 Ibid., 9.
Beasley, *You, the People*, 5.

Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism,'" 227.


Verdery, "Whither 'Nation' and 'Nationalism,'" 230.


Ibid.


The presentation of these categories may appear reductive, but the author recognizes that each of these senses of citizenship involve competing and complicated understandings of citizenship. Further, these categories are thought to overlap and interact with each other. Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 6. Further, Robert Alejandro identifies at least six senses of citizenship: 1. Citizenship as universality and legal construction; 2. Citizenship as neutrality; 3. Citizenship as communality and participation; 4. Citizenship as amelioration of class conflicts; 5. Citizenship as self-sufficiency; 6. Citizenship as hermeneutical endeavor. Alejandro, *Hermeneutics, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere*, 9-38.


112 Smith, Civic Ideals, 2. Full U.S. citizenship has historically been denied based on race and nationality, in addition to sex. This project's focus on the woman suffrage movement limits its discussion of citizenship to its gendered aspects, but remains committed to recognizing how race, nationality, and sex, as a confluence of factors, have been the bases of denying U.S. citizenship rights. Also, see Eithne Luibheid, Entry Denied: Policing Sexuality at the Border (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), and Migrations: Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship, and Border Crossings, eds. Eithne Luibheid and Lionel Cantu (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), for a discussion of the how citizenship rights have been denied to immigrants based on sexuality.


Habermas, "The European Nation-State," 285-86. Nationalism and citizenship should not be conflated, however, as the two concepts involve somewhat contradictory ideas of political participation. Stemming from a Romantic understanding of nationalism, loyalty to a national community requires the denial of individual rights or an individual identity. Gershon Shafir, "Introduction," in The Citizenship Debates: A Reader, ed. Gershon Shafir (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 16-17. On the other hand, citizenship involves the protection and pursuit of one's individual rights afforded by the state. Habermas, "The European Nation-State," 287.


Alejandro, Hermeneutics, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere, 15.

Ibid.
Consider, for example, Thomas Jefferson's phrasing used in the Declaration of Independence: "We find these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal."
Also, Sean Wilentz locates four waves of suffrage reform between 1801 and the 1840s. Sean Wilentz, "Property and Power: Suffrage Reform in the United States, 1787-1860," in Voting and the Spirit of American Democracy, 31-41. See also Smith, Civic Ideals.

Glenn, Unequal Freedom, 21.

Smith, Civic Ideals, 2.

Ibid., 6.

Alejandro, Hermeneutics, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere, 1.


Robert Asen contends that citizenship should be considered as a "mode of public engagement" and not as "as set of rights, condition of membership, or allegiance to a cultural tradition." While this project is somewhat amenable to Asen's discourse theory
of citizenship by considering the ways in which "people enact citizenship through their own agency," regardless of possessing the right to vote, this project also recognizes that the right to vote symbolizes full membership to a political community. NWP members in particular, enacted citizenship as they engaged the political system in its pursuit of enfranchisement, yet they still sought recognition of this citizenship status by the nation-state. Robert Asen, "A Discourse Theory of Citizenship," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 90 (2004): 203; 204.


128 Ibid.

129 Ibid.

130 Shafir, "Introduction," 23.


132 Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation*, 24. For example, "rules, regulations, and policies" pertaining to abortion, maternity leave, right to wages, divorce, and child custody highlight the tension between the particular and the universal nature of women's citizenship.

133 Werbner and Yuval-Davis, "Introduction," 10.

134 Ibid.


136 In a foundational study, for example, Leland M. Griffin identified three phases to a social movement: inception, development, consummation. Leland M. Griffin, "The
Robert S. Cathcart offers a rhetorical definition opposed to Griffin's historical approach: "All discussion about movements centers around the tokens, symbols, and transactions which unite or separate people who organize to produce change. Movements are carried forward through language, both verbal and nonverbal, in strategic forms which brings about identification of the individual with the movement." Robert S. Cathcart, "New Approaches to the Study of Movements," *Western Speech* (1972): 86. Still, Cathcart's view was considered to be too linear, in that he argued a social movement progresses from confrontation to transformation to transcendence. Cathcart, "Movements: Confrontation as Rhetorical Form," *The Southern Speech Communication Journal* 48 (1978): 243. In 1980, Sillars identified four problems with social movement studies: they assume movements are linear phenomena, they focus on a cause-effect process, they stress intent, and they prescribe rigid definitions. Malcolm O. Sillars, "Defining Movements Rhetorically," 19.


139 Ibid.

140 Cathcart, "Movements," 237.

141 Charles Conrad argues, "As an ideology becomes more pragmatic, it becomes less visionary. When visions are modified or abandoned, the ground for unification is
weakened." Charles Conrad, "The Transformation of the 'Old Feminist' Movement,"

142 Mari Boor Tonn, "Militant Motherhood: Labor's Mary Harris 'Mother' Jones,
that Daniel O'Connell's negotiation of militant and moderate strategies were effective
toward coercing Parliament to meet Catholic demands. Leonard B. Wuthman, "The
Militant-Moderate Agitator: Daniel O'Connell and Catholic Emancipation in Ireland,

143 Gail Collins, America's Women: Four Hundred Years of Dolls, Drudges,

144 Etienne Balibar, "The Nation Form: History and Ideology," in Becoming
National, 138. Also, see Michael C. McGee, "In Search of 'The People': A Rhetorical


146 According to Maurice Charland, "These subjects owe their existence to the
discourse that articulates them." Charland, "Constitutive Rhetoric," 143. Similarly, Jean
L. Cohen argues, "The access of interpretation to identity is through the interrogation of
forms of consciousness. This procedure can take the form of an examination so long as
the theories in question are those of the participants, produced for movements and, to an
extent, within movements. While rarely up to the level of systematic social science, such
theories or 'ideologies' receive their importance precisely to the extent to which they help
the crystallization of already-emergent identities." Jean L. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity:
New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements," Social Research 52


148 Kirt Wilson discusses how public policy and ideology are rhetorically enmeshed: "The rhetorical critic sees legislation, the end result of political judgments, as discursive creation. This is not to suggest that material resources, administrations, institutions, and political economies do not matter. Instead, the critic sees these elements as an inextricable part of a symbolic network that defines and describes a political culture." Kirt Wilson, *The Reconstruction Desegregation Debate: The Politics of Equality and the Rhetoric of Place, 1870-1875* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2002), xvi.


151 This notion of political agency is amenable to Robert Asen's discourse theory of citizenship in which women can perform or enact citizenship even without Constitutional voting rights. Asen, "A Discourse Theory of Citizenship."


154 According to Richard B. Gregg, "the ego-function of rhetoric has to do with *constituting* self-hood through expression; that is, with establishing, defining, and


160 For a thorough reading of the evolution of mimesis and its historical contexts, see Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis: *Culture, Art, & Society*, trans. Don Reau (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995). Gebauer and Wulf argue that "mimesis moves with history, coming into expression in forms appropriate to respective historical periods." 5. Also, most theorists point to Auerbach as a starting point for contemporary discussions regarding mimesis.


164 Gebauer and Wulf, Culture, Art, & Society, 21.

165 Ibid., 22.

166 Jensen, Trauma and its Representations, 7.

Ibid., 237.

Gebauer and Wulf, *Culture, Art, & Society*, 5.

Ibid., 24.


Ibid., 107. Ebert discusses the mimetic representation of women in fiction and the extent to which these representations liberate or naturalize women's voices. In her study, she discusses women as the object of mimesis; in this study, I explore women as the subjects of mimetic acts and argue that such participation is a site of empowerment.

CHAPTER ONE

U.S. NATIONALISM, CITIZENSHIP, AND WOMAN SUFFRAGE

Months following the colonies' spirited declaration of independence from Great Britain, the people of New Jersey reached a breaking point. Patriotism wore thin after Lord Cornwallis and his British army set up camp in Elizabethtown, eager to take up General Howe's amnesty proclamation. Late one December night, a group of men gathered in Mr. Arnett's home to deliberate the proposed amnesty and wearily concluded they had no choice but to submit. Having overheard this conversation from an adjacent room, Hannah Arnett burst into the parlor, only to be shooed by her husband: "Hannah, Hannah, this is no place for you, we do not want you here just now . . . Do you not see these are not questions for you? . . . Women do not understand these things." In response, she declared to the crowd, "And you call yourselves men; the sons who gave up homes and fortune and fatherland to make for themselves and for dear liberty a resting-place in the wilderness! Oh, shame upon you, cowards!" She continued, "For me, I stay with my country, and my hand shall never touch the hand, nor my heart cleave to the heart of him who shame her." Turning to her husband, Arnett warned, "Isaac, we have lived together for twenty years and for all of them I have been a true and loving wife to you. But I am the child of God and of my Country, and if you do this shameful thing, I will never again own you for my husband."1

Arnett's declared allegiance to her country over her husband suggested that her identity as citizen of the young nation took precedence over her duties and role as a wife. Moreover, Arnett's ability to assert her political agency and address a room full of men reflected a deep commitment to the growing nationalistic ideology of the early republic.
Considering that between 1776 and 1807, property-owning New Jersey women were provided the right to vote and further, many of these women actively participated in the war and in New Jersey's post-Revolutionary political culture, Arnett's passionate devotion to her country may not be surprising. However, when seen within the larger, nationalistic context of the revolutionary era, particularly in light of issues pertaining to citizenship, suffrage, and gender, Arnett's political consciousness was quite impressive. Most women of this time could not vote, were preoccupied with economic and familial survival, and were not educated enough to comprehend republican conceptualizations of virtue and nation. Thus, while the women of New Jersey could assert their political agency and vote, most women of the time were not afforded such a privilege.

Nonetheless, in the United States, women have often asserted political agency by making arguments rooted in nationalistic, citizenship, and gendered ideologies in opposition to those resisting advances for women's rights. The arguments and strategies employed for the political, social, and legal advancement of women often demanded the realization of the republican and liberal ideals central to the nation's founding. Prior to the emergence of the National Woman's Party (NWP), the women's rights movement developed over four key periods of social change, inflected by intense national activity and altered meanings of citizenship and gender.

This chapter begins with an examination of the colonial and revolutionary eras (1607-1790), tracing the developments of gender ideologies amidst the emergence of American republicanism, which incorporated precepts of liberalism, and consequently shaped competing views of citizenship. Over this period, the notion of republican
motherhood focused on women's relationship to the home and family; this relationship nevertheless acquired political meanings with the rise of the new nation-state.

The second era under discussion, 1790-1840, was marked by a flourish of democratic politics and rights, particularly among white men. Although liberal individualist ideas took hold and the Jacksonian Democracy celebrated the plight of the "common man," citizenship and suffrage rights were systematically denied to racial minorities and women. Nonetheless, the overall increase in political participation encouraged women to engage the political sphere and begin asserting their political agency in gradations of socially-accepted gender norms. By advocating for women's education, organizing benevolent societies, and participating in reform and abolition movements, women began to reconstruct the public/private boundaries of political participation, particularly as citizenship rights became synonymous with voting rights.

The third era centers on the inception of the women's rights movement, marked by the expansion and then sharp restriction of citizenship rights that accompanied the events of the Civil War. This section traces the genesis of the women's rights movement in the 1840s, its conventions in the 1850s, and the ramifications of the Civil War amendments in the 1860s into the 1870s. Following the Civil War period through 1890, this section discusses how the woman suffrage movement took hold on the local, state, national, and international levels, particularly as it aligned itself with the causes of working-class women.

The fourth era spans the latter years of the woman suffrage movement, between 1890 and 1912, just before the inception of the NWP. Despite heightened beliefs in "ascriptive inegalitarian" citizenship and voting rights, the Progressive Era took hold,
which aimed to restore rights and living conditions of the working industrial class, immigrants, and other oppressed groups. Meanwhile, the woman suffrage movement networked among leaders of the Socialist, trade union, and settlement house movements to thrust the issue of woman suffrage into the forefront of politics on the state, national, and international levels.

NATIONALISM, CITIZENSHIP, AND WOMEN, 1620-1790

The ways in which U.S. women have asserted their political agency in the U.S. nation-state takes root in pre-revolutionary times when British rule shaped colonists' civic identities. Specifically, as subjects of the British crown, colonists participated in colonial politics through deference, a system that limited the representation of non-white, land-owning males and relegated women to a dependent status. And although the Revolutionary War offered the promise of individual rights and independence, such rights enhanced women's legal and social status in limited ways. Specifically, women were constructed as carriers of the nation's pre-revolutionary republican ideals—as the nurturers of the nation's citizenry. The Constitution further limited women's rights as it empowered the states with the authority to define parameters of citizenship—parameters that often excluded women from participating in state or national communities. Thus, the following discussion traces women's changing social, political, and economic roles in America's colonial, revolutionary, and post-revolutionary eras.

Colonial America, 1600s-1760s

In British North America, a shared national identity did not begin to emerge until revolutionary times upon great dissatisfaction with the economic and representational constraints of British rule. In colonial America, accordingly, inhabitants were less united
by a strong sense of nationalism than by their common European heritages and their commitments to family and community. Even though many colonists arrived from England, the colonies were also composed of German, French, Scottish, Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese settlers, and all were subject to the rule of Britain's king and to a great extent, parliamentary law. Although colonists interacted with colonial governments, they were not considered independent citizens, but dependent subjects or otherwise aliens. As such, the tension between the reach of British law and colonial politics posed great potential for struggle as colonists worked to establish life in the New World. Nonetheless, inheriting British customs of law and government shaped the politics and identity of colonial life—an identity that was simultaneously mediated by race, class, religion, and sex.

In part, the impending struggle between Britain and colonial America can be traced back to their differing notions of subjectship. Britain's conceptualization of subjectship was shaped by fear of corruption. Thus, the ideal subject was considered to be disinterested, virtuous, and willing to die for the country in a national conflict. Further, subjectship was a birthright, although the crown did adopt subjects through naturalization. While British colonists were considered subjects, they were permitted to naturalize European settlers. Colonists were more eager to naturalize settlers because of their need to build new communities and to inculcate a sense of themselves as a chosen people—mostly people of Anglo-Saxon descent. While colonists were somewhat inclusive about their naturalization practices, they also remained adamant about excluding Catholics, American Indians, and Africans from the privileges conferred through subjectship. As the eighteenth century progressed, British authorities
intervened on naturalization policies. Ultimately, these conflicts helped give rise to the revolution and the demand for new meanings of civic participation.

Colonial government, law, and voting practices reflected the colonists' conflicted meanings of subjectship. Colonial governments, for example, were modeled after England's mixed government, comprised of a governor, an appointed council, and a popular elected assembly. The popularly elected assembly, much like the House of Commons, was intended to represent the interests of the colonists and limit the powers of the aristocracy; the vote was thus vital to political life. Like subjectship, the vote was greatly limited to Protestant, white, and propertied men. It was thought that those who owned and paid taxes on property held a literal "stake-in-society," which freed them from the will and authority of others. Conversely, those without the requisite amount of property (in addition to the appropriate race, religion, and sex), were considered economically dependent and thus, subject to undue influence. While only a narrow portion of colonial society was represented through the vote, a shared adherence to republican ideals, including the British tradition of "deference," was thought to temper any aristocratic tendencies. In practicing deference, members of the middle and lower classes deferred to the social elite—or "gentlemen"—to vote on their behalf and more so, for the common good. Ideally, voting was the manifestation of a mutually-beneficial relationship among the classes in colonial society.

The promise of deference to offer political representation to all colonists was not always fulfilled. The success of deference relied on the more educated, virtuous, and unbiased voting decisions of the upper class. Scholars have noted, however, that those with voting and office-holding power, often acted to protect their own interests. African
Americans, American Indians, men under the age of twenty-one, those without established residency, Catholics, Jews, minority Protestant sects, servants, lower- and middle-class farmers, unnaturalized settlers, and women remained unrepresented at the polls. Thus, in contrast to maintaining a community of shared interests, deference eventually contributed to the growing political system of inclusion and exclusion. By the eve of the revolution, the struggle to define membership in a growing colonial community was defined by sharpened frustrations with the British government over the parameters and subjectship and the limits of deference; simultaneously, this struggle exacerbated the privileging of white Europeans and an insistence on preserving racial and cultural superiority over minorities, the middle- and lower-classes, and of course, women.

Amidst these ongoing and entangled conflicts, the question of women's participation in colonial life seemed of little concern to British and colonial powers. British colonial women were already subjects, so the question of naturalization was arguably irrelevant. The wives and children of men seeking naturalization simply held the status of their husbands and fathers. Only unnaturalized single women needed to seek naturalization. In terms of the vote, with very little exception, women did not vote in colonial times. Almost all colonial charters used male pronouns when discussing suffrage and one even explicitly barred women from the polls. In fact, colonists and British authorities hardly quivered over the questions of women's privileges; under the system of deference, it was simply agreed that women were the dependents of men. Women, however, engaged in colonial political life out of economic necessity and thereby carved out a unique space in which they could assert political agency and help shape colonial identity. To be sure, the parameters of this space were defined by
economic, legal, religious, educational, social, and geographic restraints. Further, the trajectory of women's civic participation and the development of gender ideology in colonial times were shaped by ongoing struggles with Great Britain over the boundaries of subjectship and identity.

Scholars have often argued that women in colonial times were more liberated than their nineteenth-century descendants. Recently, however, scholars have argued that women in colonial times performed the same duties as men out of economic necessity to forge new lives; thus, women were caught between the trappings of subjectship and economic dependence. For example, as subjects, women were entitled to own and convey land; however, as dependents of their husbands and fathers, women had to defer to men in the performance any legal action pertaining to the land. Similarly, widows were at times treated as subjects and at other times, they were relegated to a dependent status; while they inherited their husband's property, the notion of *femme covert* often left widows at the mercy of their male children. Eventually, colonial widows established a critical mass and gained more legal power. Still, in the absence of a will, all property went to the eldest male heir. Additionally, in the eighteenth century, the amount of land a widow was entitled decreased due to land scarcity.

Economically, women were similarly caught between the demands of colonial life and social customs. In some urban and commercial areas, women could work as *feme sole* traders; they were given the right to sue, conduct businesses, enter into contracts, sell property, and function as attorneys-in-fact. While this position granted some economic independence, it was thought that *feme sole* status would prevent single and widowed women from relying on government assistance. Married women were considered "help-
meets" to their husbands or partners in managing the familial and physical demands of frontier and farm life. As the colonial population and prosperity increased and families became less self-sufficient, women began manufacturing goods at home and established female trading networks. Nevertheless, married women were still not entitled to the profits or surplus in goods earned through trading. In seaport towns, spinning factories employed widows and poor white women, while other women became seamstresses and nurses; they also opened shops, inns, and schools. Still, in remote frontier locations, impoverished conditions required that women continue to work the land.

Despite these few economic advances, women's roles became increasingly centered on the home. The notion of women as "help-meets" emphasized women's wifely and domestic duties under what was thought to be the more moral and intellectual guidance of their husbands. Further, the geographic isolation of families in earlier colonial times emphasized the family structure around the home, as opposed to the more extensive webs of kinship found in England. As such, women were expected to be mistresses of the household. Eventually, Puritan and Quaker beliefs focused on the spiritual upbringing of children, narrowed Northeastern women's duties to the home and to child-rearing. Additionally, the Great Awakening of the 1740s shifted religious authority in the household from father to mother, as the movement attracted mostly male converts, constituting women as the majority of church congregations. The Great Awakening stressed private morality over public piety, thus emphasizing the moral and domestic aspects of motherhood. Similarly, with the increased wealth of plantation life, Southern women experienced a shift from managing all domestic work to focusing more on raising children. Of course, the gradual domestication of colonial women did not
affect poor white women or slave women—rather, these religious and social forces worked to divide women along class lines.\textsuperscript{54}

The experiences of colonial women, thus, were often shaped by the gap between the demands of establishing life in the New World and the legacy of English law and customs concerning subjectship and women's dependence. Although mediated by race, class, and geography, the lives of colonial women gravitated toward the home as religious and social forces began shaping a burgeoning gender ideology that centered on virtue and motherhood. In varying degrees, religious and economic factors allowed these women to assert themselves as providers and spiritual leaders. However, in the context of establishing a shared colonial identity, women's rights often fell to the wayside. Rogers M. Smith argues, "The new proto-nationalist political identity that British Americans were forming still largely presumed men's continuing legal right to govern women both in state institutions and in the home." Smith continues, "It is possible, moreover, that male desires to control women were enhanced by the increased emphasis on the racial and ethnic conceptions of their identity that British Americans formed to defend the subjugation of American Indians and African slaves."\textsuperscript{55} Smith suggests that the growing nationalist ideology, which emphasized the superiority of white, Protestant, wealthy men, employed a protection myth, which constructed women as vulnerable and weak and depicted racial minorities as deviant sexual aggressors. This protection myth worked to simultaneously justify women's exclusion from legal or social rights, as women needed to be "spoken for" and protected as property. It also justified the continuing legal and social oppression of American Indians and slaves.

\textit{The Revolutionary Era, 1760s-1776}
Throughout the eighteenth century, the colonists' growing frustrations with deference and the burdens of English subjectship gave rise to a revolutionary philosophy and altered meanings of citizenship. Colonists built upon republican principles, yet eschewed the practice of deference. Parliament's increasing control over trade and taxation compelled colonists to embrace liberal views and consider a revolution. Consequently, the ideal citizen of the young nation retained a republican sense of virtue and duty, but also possessed the right to individual freedom and voluntary citizenship. Paradoxically, the liberal individualist principles of the revolutionary philosophy were not extended to women; rather, women were constructed as pillars of republican virtue and arguably, the means through which republican principles of colonial times could be secured in the citizenry of the new nation.

Revolutionaries turned to John Locke's Enlightenment ideals to justify their denunciation of English subjectship and turn towards voluntary citizenship. Locke argued that men are born free with the divine right to choose national and political membership; in turn, an ideal government rested on the consent of the people. These ideas were blended with elements of classical republicanism. In revolutionary terms, the liberal subject would choose to create a republican assembly that represented all people, offering more legitimate political participation. This revolutionary philosophy retained and elevated the republican notion of a virtuous and engaged citizenry, which included "support for a yeoman agrarian economy, republican iconography and civic celebrations, educational systems fostering virtue, egalitarian republican manners, and thriving state religions." This iteration of republicanism also promoted the belief that the people of the new nation were a chosen people, or in Smith's words, "the sole bearers of the
providentially favored Anglo-Saxon mission to build a realm of enlightenment and spiritual and political liberty." Although this sense of nationalism reflected racial superiority and promoted homogeneity, the promise of individual liberty and choice, coupled with the colonies' relaxed naturalization policies, helped construct the new nation as sanctuary for the oppressed. Thus, this revolutionary philosophy gave rise to an American brand of republicanism, which seemed to reinvent a system of political inclusion and exclusion, however subsumed within an overarching narrative of freedom, liberty, and independence.

Integral to this growing sense of republican nationalism was a reshaped vision of citizenship and consequently, a reevaluation of voting laws. In revolutionary thought, citizens were born with inalienable rights, not privileges; thus, voting was considered a necessary step toward voicing consent or disapproval of government. Consequently, all new state governments were confronted with the question of suffrage, which took many different forms among the colonies. By the time of the revolution, property-owning requirements had weakened considerably, which eased a general shift toward the broadening of suffrage rights. Catholics and Jews were no longer prohibited from voting, free African Americans could vote in many states, Revolutionary soldiers were given the right to vote, and in the state of New Jersey, women with enough property could vote.

However, the legacy of the "stake-in-society" philosophy of voting had not faded. Opponents to expanding suffrage relied on William Blackstone's 1765 *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, which argued that free will stemmed from economic independence and property ownership. Additionally, opponents to suffrage reform feared that the vote
would empower immigrants, paupers, and members of the lower classes to revolt against newly-formed state governments.\textsuperscript{70} As a result, many states maintained property-owning requirements, while many others adopted tax-paying requirements.\textsuperscript{71} The general shift toward tax-paying requirements suggested that the ideal citizen needed to demonstrate interest in state government more so than economic independence.\textsuperscript{72} Overall, voting rights for white men expanded greatly during and after the revolutionary era, and despite small gains for minority groups, property, tax-paying, race, and gender qualifications still kept many from the voting polls.

Considering the pervasiveness of Lockean liberalism as well as a general expansion of suffrage rights, women's rights made small advances following the Revolutionary War.\textsuperscript{73} However, with the rise of nationalistic feelings and altered visions of citizenship came a reshaped vision of women's contributions to the new nation. Thus, the same forces that restricted women's participation in the newly-formed nation—American republicanism, wartime demands, and the onset of republican motherhood—also created small, but distinct openings for women to assert political agency.

Revolutionary thought forced a discussion of women's roles in society.\textsuperscript{74} The basic principles of Lockean liberalism begged the question of women's equality. However, John Adams's famed response to Abigail Adams's warning, "Remember the Ladies,"—that he could only "but laugh"—demonstrated the great resistance to extending equal rights to all individuals.\textsuperscript{75} To an extent, however, notions of political liberty motivated some states to increase rights for widows and offer women the right to divorce.\textsuperscript{76} Additionally, some revolutionary thinkers theoretically conceived of women as their equals.\textsuperscript{77} But, strands of American republicanism were used to argue against gender
equality. For example, republican thought stressed that independence meant economic independence, which not only limited women's ability to vote, but women's ability to be considered "individuals." Those who feared the universal application of equal rights relied on Blackstone's coverture arguments, which reinforced the notion that women were the legal dependents of their fathers and husbands. Immediately following the revolution, questions over loyalties to the new nation forced states to confront women's conflicting identities as dependents and as equal citizens. For example, a colonial woman who allied with the British could be tried for treason and face the same prejudices as a man who rebelled. However, the wife of a man accused of treason could follow him back to England without prosecution; as a dependent, she simply performed her marital duties. Thus, the potential contradictions of America's revolutionary sense of republicanism were exposed in the legal treatment of women following the revolution, forcing the question that would continue to provoke debate over women's rights for the next 150 years—are women citizens?

The question over women's equal rights was also compelled by women's experiences in the war. Some women left their homes and trades to fight and camp alongside their husbands, fathers, and brothers. These women's experiences, however, were mediated by class. Most women campers were poor and even considered prostitutes; however, the more privileged women campers, such as Martha Washington, were considered noble leaders among these women. Economic necessity compelled most of these women to return to their domestic lives following the war; although, widows and poorer women confronted a harsher reality than others. Ironically, men who had fought in the war were rewarded with voting rights, reflecting a link between
war service and citizenship as well as a devaluation of women's roles in military combat. Some women who did not participate in the war showed support by joining patriotic organizations, such as the Daughters of Liberty, or by boycotting English goods and spinning and weaving their own clothes. For wealthier women, this meant participating in an activity often reserved for middle- and lower-class white women, servants, and slaves. Further, wartime inflation limited the extent to which lower-class working women and widows could participate in these patriotic activities; most of these women were preoccupied by providing a living for themselves and their children.

Women's participation in the new nation was also shaped by the gendered implications of American republicanism. In colonial times, virtue and self-sacrifice were often marks of an upright (white male) citizen. While the ideal citizen in the new nation was similarly virtuous (and male and white), the promise of individualism became paramount to acting on behalf of the common good. Thus, the ideal citizen was independent and virtuous. The gradual domestication of women before the war and the limited extension of liberal rights to women after the war helped create a perception of motherhood as the penultimate performance of republican virtue and self-sacrifice. Linda Kerber argues that the emergence of "republican motherhood" was motivated by desires to limit the radical potential of individualist thought and retain the conservative strands of civic republicanism in the new nation. As such, Kerber describes the scope of the republican mother: "[Her] life was dedicated to the service of civic virtue: she educated her sons for it, she condemned and corrected her husband's lapses from it." Ideologically, republican motherhood created a "distinction between feminine virtue and masculine self-interest," enabling a growing distinction between the domain of white
women's work and the world in which men could assert their independence and flourish as political actors. These "separate spheres"—the public and the private—were complementary and in political terms, greatly benefited men. In Joan R. Gundersen's words, men exercised individual freedom "by virtue of women's dependence.

Republican motherhood, however indirectly, carried political import. By securing the virtuous citizenry of the new nation, mothering became linked to national duty. Further, women became empowered as the educational and spiritual authority in the household, compelling many to advocate on behalf of women's education. Moreover, the greater emphasis on women's morality allowed white women to forge relationships and networks through the church, empowering women to participate in semi-public acts of benevolence without transgressing the parameters of their proper sphere. Of course, white women were generally the only ones privileged enough to focus all such energies on mothering. Even for white women, though, their political consciousness during this time cannot be overestimated. Most women were overwhelmed with the demands of survival in the post-Revolutionary war period and did not possess the freeing privileges of education and wealth to consider the implications of republicanism on motherhood. The few women that did contemplate such matters, such as Mercy Otis Warren, Judith Sargent Murray, and Abigail Adams, considered republican motherhood "a stage in the process of women's political socialization" and a concept that "legitimized a minimum of political sophistication and interest." Thus, to an extent, republican motherhood ideologically justified women's political participation, although simultaneously restricted women's participation to the private sphere. Eventually, the tension between women's domestic and civic roles would compel many
women to address the inconsistent use of liberal and republican ideals in forming the new nation. To such ends, republican motherhood, more than anything else, provided the ideological foundation that eventually helped give rise to women's political activism.

Post-Revolutionary War, the Constitution, and Women's Rights, 1776-1787

Following the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and the ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781, the states were considered a friendly league of small republics wherein state citizenship and state identity were central to political life. Furthermore, the egalitarian principles of the revolution flourished. In addition to the general move toward tax-paying suffrage requirements, northeastern states took steps toward abolition and enfranchising American Indians; the Confederation Congress treated American Indian tribes as independent nations, and of course, New Jersey allowed property-owning women to vote. This thrust of republican egalitarianism, however, was tempered by some oppressive legal and political forces at play. As was mentioned before, some states retained property-owning requirements for suffrage. Further, British loyalists were tried for treason, chattel slavery was still enforced, anti-American Indian feelings proliferated, and most women remained disenfranchised. The emerging debate over state and national power, in particular, forced the design of the Constitution, which in all ways, further limited the citizenship and suffrage rights of marginalized groups.

The Constitution's position on citizenship and suffrage was shaped by differing views on the role of government. Supporters of a decentralized nation—the Anti-Federalists—favored the power of small republics and localized control over potentially-corrupt elites. Federalists, on the other hand, took a liberal nationalist view on
government, emphasizing property and personal rights. Ultimately, the delegates decided on a provision that gave states the power to decide who has the right to vote and left the federal government without the means to override state suffrage laws except through a Constitutional amendment. Congress acquired the power to establish naturalization policies, separating the issues of suffrage and citizenship along state and federal lines. While the Constitution remained silent on women's rights, it mostly referred to citizens as "persons" and "inhabitants," thereby not explicitly excluding women from participating in the Constitution's vision of democracy. However, the Constitution used masculine pronouns when referring to presidents, senators, and representatives. Additionally, masculine pronouns were used when discussing citizens' legal rights, implying that ideally, citizens and elected leaders were male.

Although the Constitution was designed to ensure representation of "the people," states retained the power to define who could vote—or to define who constituted "the people." More significantly, though, as Jacob Katz Cogan says, the Constitution left the "nuts and bolts of political participation—suffrage, representation, apportionment, and citizenship itself" to the power of state legislatures and state constitutional conventions. These areas of state power created a tension between federal and states' rights that would greatly limit the ability of marginalized groups to challenge voting laws or other measures that limited their civic participation.

NATIONALISM, CITIZENSHIP, AND WOMEN, 1790-1840

Though the Constitution worked to limit the participation of minority voices in the U.S. nation-state, it gave way to one of the greatest periods of democratic expansion in U.S. history. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, Jefferson's republican...
ideals, the egalitarianism of the Jacksonian era, and the rise of the two-party system all worked to empower the citizenship rights of white men of all classes. This era's focus on educating and empowering "the common man" inspired privileged U.S. women to advocate for enhanced education and to participate in benevolent societies. Simultaneously, the rise of the true woman ideology empowered white women to expand their activities beyond the domestic sphere. Some women more directly confronted these boundaries by participating in moral reform and the abolition movements—and faced severe resistance for stepping outside of what was considered a woman's "proper place."

Elaborating upon these developments in women's rights, the following discusses the expanding and restricting ideological forces of the U.S. nation-state in the early- to mid-nineteenth century.

Democratic Expansion and Restriction

The ratification of the Constitution promoted a sense of U.S. nationalism. John M. Murrin describes this process:

Although everyone soon agreed that the new government was a structural improvement on the Articles, it exercised very few substantive powers in practice that people had not been happy to allocate to the old Congress. In a word, the Constitution became a substitute for any deeper kind of national identity. American nationalism is distinct, because, for nearly its first century, it was narrowly and peculiarly constitutional. People knew that without the Constitution there would be no America . . . Americans had erected their constitutional roof before they put up the national walls.¹¹⁴
Even throughout the 1790s, while the Federalists and Republicans bitterly contested the Constitution's meanings, both groups rallied around the Constitution as a gold standard, upholding its centrality to U.S. national life.\textsuperscript{115}

Nonetheless, differences over a national identity and the role of the newly-designed government spurred conflicts between Hamiltonian Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans, both of which promoted forms of political exclusion. Smith discusses the nuances of these competing positions:

The Federalists became the party of national power and commerce, but also the champions of almost unalterable hereditary allegiances and nativism. The Jeffersonians became the party of state power and agrarian republicanism, but also, in a bitter irony, the defenders of both citizenship based on mutual consent and of aggressive civic racism. Both partisan positions were the results of comprehensible political calculations as well as sincere principles, though in the end the Jeffersonians pursued their vision with greater electoral success.\textsuperscript{116}

With their focus on a common national identity, the Federalists privileged native-birth in their conceptualization of citizenship, although they did value immigration insofar as immigrant workers bolstered the economy in eastern cities. The Jeffersonians' focus on a state-centered agrarian republic initially promoted slavery and domination of American Indians, but this position was somewhat tempered once the group realized that northern- and western-European immigrants favored agrarian life and small farmer markets. Jeffersonians could, in part, identify with these immigrants' "whiteness," and thus, were more inclined to endorse immigration, naturalization, and voting rights—particularly for
French immigrants. Jeffersonians, thus, touted themselves as the party of "the people" who endorsed a more inclusive vision of citizenship.\textsuperscript{117}

Despite these forms of civic and political exclusion throughout the 1790s, Jefferson's presidential election in 1800 marked the beginning of a democratic shift in politics, economy, and social life that expanded civic participation throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. In the early-nineteenth century, lingering beliefs in civic republicanism and deference weakened as liberal principles took hold on American political life. Thus, deferential politics gave way to emphases on individual rights, property rights, and political liberty.\textsuperscript{118}

A confluence of political, economic, and social forces shaped the democratic character of this era. Participation in political parties, particularly with the rise of the two-party system in the 1820s, became a way for white men to link their local interests with national politics.\textsuperscript{119} For white males, party allegiance and activities were central to civic and political participation.\textsuperscript{120} Additionally, political participation was compelled by the commercial revolution and the rise of an industrial working class, shifting economic and political power from property holders to merchants.\textsuperscript{121} Consequently, many states revised their constitutions between the 1820s and 1840s to facilitate a freer, entrepreneurial marketplace.\textsuperscript{122} Changes in many social institutions accompanied and facilitated this democratic shift. In general, parental control and authority weakened as more egalitarian ideas of the family took over. Education became more accessible to the middle and lower classes. Last, the second Great Awakening, lasting from about 1790 to 1845, de-emphasized formal religious authority and facilitated the spread of an informal religious education.\textsuperscript{123}
Along with these democratic shifts came a more egalitarian conceptualization of citizenship and an expansion of voting rights.\textsuperscript{124} The ideal citizen retained republican notions of morality and upright character, but in lieu of demonstrating independence through property-ownership, the ideal citizen was intellectually competent and well-ingratiated into American political life.\textsuperscript{125} Of course, the realm of active citizenship was reserved for white men, whose participation in political parties and activities constituted their identities as citizens. Michael McGerr elaborates on this process:

A man demonstrated his identity and power by wearing a party button, turning out to listen and cheer at rallies, marching in parades, and casting a ballot on election day. By investing the vote with so many meanings, the popular style helped spur consistently high turnouts. It also gave men a sense of their true collective agency. Men of all classes had the experience of organizing publicly to translate their political impulses into political action.\textsuperscript{126}

Thus, it was during this time period that U.S. citizenship and U.S. nationalism became tightly linked—so much so, that by the 1830s, almost all states required voters to be U.S. citizens.\textsuperscript{127}

The right to vote, then, no longer symbolized independent wealth, but it grew to symbolize the right to participate in the U.S. democratic process as a free citizen. Consequently, this time period is marked by the great expansion of suffrage rights to white men of all classes. This democratic spirit was enhanced by Andrew Jackson's presidential election in 1828 and the genesis of the "Jacksonian Democracy," which championed the rights of the "common man."\textsuperscript{128} Realizing the potential strength of party loyalty, parties lobbied many states to remove property qualifications in voting laws.\textsuperscript{129}
The Democratic Party in particular pushed for more lenient citizenship laws in order to mobilize immigrant voters of Anglo-Saxon descent. In fact, between 1790 and the 1850s, every state held a constitutional convention, in part, to address the question of suffrage rights. By the 1840s, almost all states reduced or eliminated property and tax-paying requirements.130

As the vote became more accessible to white men of all classes, it became less attainable to other marginalized groups, including African Americans, American Indians, Catholics, non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants, and women.131 While the principles of liberal individualism were used to justify the expansion of citizenship and voting rights, arguments of natural superiority and competence were used to maintain a link between whiteness and U.S. nationalism and citizenship.132 In Alexander Keyssar's words, "an efflorescence of racism" took hold, compelling members of political parties on both ends of the ideological spectrum to oppose black suffrage on the basis that African Americans were morally and intellectually inferior. Further, many espoused the Blackstonian argument that voting was a privilege, not a right, and should be reserved for the most competent and educated members of American society.133

Thus, between 1800 and 1860, every free state that entered the union limited the vote to white men, while other states eventually prohibited African Americans from voting.134 However, in the 1830s, the Supreme Court forced American Indians to follow naturalization procedures to attain citizenship and the right to vote, while in some states they qualified as "white" and could vote.135 Similarly, many associated immigrants with poverty and criminal activity and thought poorer immigrants, particularly those from southern- and eastern-European countries, were morally unfit to participate in the U.S.
political process. Further, by the 1830s, Catholic immigrants were considered to be part of a papal conspiracy and a threat to a predominantly white, Protestant national identity.\textsuperscript{136} While party competition helped limit residency requirements and helped immigrants expand their voting rights, Congress and many states had strengthened residency requirements and implemented poll taxes, naturalization procedures, literacy tests, and registration laws to inhibit their voting rights.\textsuperscript{137}

Needless to say, by the 1840s, the vote represented "a key symbol of male political privilege."\textsuperscript{138} However, the general move toward recognizing individual rights earned women a few more legal advances than most other minorities. For example, in 1823, Maine granted married women some property rights if they were deserted by their husbands; Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, and Pennsylvania did the same in the following decades.\textsuperscript{139} Also, in 1838, Kentucky allowed propertied widows and unmarried white women to vote in school elections.\textsuperscript{140} Also, many northeastern women went to work in factories, earning wages of their own. However, Sharon Harley maintains that African American were not privileged enough to have the opportunity to earn a working wage in these factories.\textsuperscript{141} Still, Norma Basch argues that these few gains—for white women—were the crucial "first steps toward integrating women into an egalitarian political ethos."\textsuperscript{142} Nonetheless, Blackstonian notions of coverture prevailed in legal decisions regarding women and in early-nineteenth century American culture in general.\textsuperscript{143} Albie Sachs and Joan Hoff Wilson explain the prevailing sentiment: "Unlike the equity procedures which they replaced, these acts did not explicitly classify women with lunatics and infants; but neither did they do anything to alter or reform prevailing gender-based custom and stereotypic attitudes."\textsuperscript{144} Legally speaking, most women were
still denied the right to their wages or to sell, sue, or contract without their husbands' approval.145

Most significantly, the idea that women were dependents prevailed, thus constructing women as incapable of making responsible voting decisions and appreciating the privilege of the vote. As such, women were kept from participating in the U.S. democratic system as fully-enfranchised citizens.146 Even New Jersey revised its constitution to prohibit women from voting in 1807.147 As the public sphere increasingly became a political and male space, the private sphere increasingly became the reign of the republican mother.148 Paradoxically, native-born women were treated as U.S. citizens and were subject to the law while single women had to pay taxes, and mothers were thought to be an integral part of the nation's civic character.149 However, the right to vote remained beyond the purview of women's citizenship rights. Thus, women occupied a unique space in U.S. political culture throughout the early-nineteenth century in which they were still largely recognized first and foremost as women; but within a few legal parameters, often shaped by the democratic thrust of the post-revolutionary era, women were likewise considered *citizens*.150 In Kerber's words, the American woman "was a citizen but not really a constituent."151

*Education, Benevolence, Moral Reform, and Abolition*

Women's ability to assert political agency throughout the early-nineteenth century, however, was not completely determined by state-sanctioned limits on citizenship or societal views regarding a woman's proper sphere. Indeed, women engaged the U.S. political process in ways that both reinforced and defied these limitations, and ultimately, in ways that stretched the legal and social parameters of women's
citizenship. Women pushed for and attained increased access to education, formed religious organizations and performed acts of benevolence, and participated in reform movements and abolition; all activities with political implications that eventually forced the question of women's citizenship rights.

Access to equal education, then, was the first movement toward woman's rights in America. One of the first advocates for women's education was an Englishwoman, Mary Wollstonecraft, who, in the *Vindication of the Rights of Women*, argued that women and men were naturally equals and that boundaries between the public and private spheres should be eliminated. Women's education became more plausible as the demands of republican motherhood led to a female seminary movement. Founders of female seminaries, however, faced many obstacles, including fundraising, developing curriculum, finding trained female teachers, and persuading opponents to support women's education. Even so, Emma Willard opened the first endowed educational institution for young women. After she was denied a formal education, Willard believed her self-taught mathematical and physiological training should be put to use. For two years she privately lobbied New York Governor DeWitt Clinton and many legislators. In 1821, she opened the Troy Female Seminary.

The increased focus on women's morality, enhanced by women's participation in the growing evangelical Protestant movement, provided the rhetorical means for women to gather and organize on behalf of moral causes of the time. Also, the onset of true woman values—piety, purity, domesticity, and submissiveness—motivated these activities as extensions of women's moral and domestic duties. Women developed organizations to train other women to become housekeepers and seamstresses; to aid poor
women, elderly women, orphans, and victims of domestic abuse; to advocate for fair
treatment of women in prisons, dress reform, and health and sex education; and to
marshal support against prostitution, brothels, and alcoholism. These organizations
provided women the opportunity to enact the political rights of their male counterparts.
Ann Boylan details the political characteristics of these organizations: "Every group—no
matter how small or how modest—had a constitution and bylaws, held regular elections,
and followed set agendas, members were able to vote, run for office, hammer out
platforms, and make decisions that affected others directly." She adds that these
women were endowed with more rights as a group than as individuals. For example,
incorporated groups could own substantial amounts of property, invest money, sue and be
sued, and pressure politicians for city funds and favors. One organization mobilized
over 1,400 women to sign an anti-American Indian removal petition, which, according to
Alisse Portnoy, was "the first announced instance of women's federal activism in a space
declared national and political." Furthermore, these organizations fostered a sense of
solidarity and civic identity among members; the anti-Indian removal petitioners, for
example, acted out of "national faith and honor." This sense of a shared identity,
however, was mostly limited to wealthy, white women, whose senses of religious and
moral superiority often translated into a self-righteous and classist attitudes toward the
underprivileged.

Although works of benevolence crossed over into the political sphere, many
benevolent organizations insisted that their work was a function of their religious and
domestic duties. In fact, some benevolent organizations disapproved of actions thought to
be too political. Lori D. Ginzberg writes: "Benevolent women—and men—were quite
prepared to use the ideology of femininity against female organizing that served interests they thought too radical. The language of gender spheres, with its charge of 'straying,' was often used less to describe the boundaries of women's benevolent activity than to assert the unpopularity of a cause.\textsuperscript{166} The rhetorical power of women's inherent religiosity and morality, thus, could also work to restrict women's political agency. Moreover, many of these benevolent organizations relied on the political and economic resources offered by men, thus restricting the extent to which women asserted their political independence through these organizations.

In the 1830s, however, moral reform and abolitionist societies emerged, providing women the opportunity to engage the political sphere in a more ardent, public way. Boylan describes the shift in organizational participation: "Unlike benevolent women who presented to local politicians deferential petitions from prominent individuals for specific favors, antislavery women circulated their petitions to mass audiences . . . Moral reformers in the 1830s shouted their cause from the housetops and invited controversy as a means of publicizing their work.\textsuperscript{167} Female reformers and abolitionists modeled popular political strategies of the Jacksonian era, including the use of the popular press and mass petitioning.\textsuperscript{168} Carroll Smith Rosenberg describes the work of these women: Women advocates of moral reform were among the first American women to challenge their completely passive, home-oriented image. They were among the first to travel throughout the country without male chaperones. They published, financed, even set up type for their own paper and defied a bitter and long-standing male opposition to their cause. They began, in short, to create a broader, less constricted sense of female identity.\textsuperscript{169}
More so than their benevolent counterparts, these organizations pushed the boundaries of women's political and civic participation by assuming the political authority of their male counterparts.

The abolition movement, in particular, challenged codes of womanly behavior by encouraging women to speak publicly. For example, Frances Wright, a Scottish freethinker, was greatly influenced by the Jacksonian workingmen's movement for economic equality. Between 1828 and 1829, she delivered anti-slavery speeches and advocated for gender and racial equality. Many women abolitionists invoked the rhetoric of morality to speak publicly against slavery and further, to construct the bonds of "sisterhood" between themselves and enslaved women. Furthermore, Sarah and Angelina Grimké were compelled by their upbringing on a slave-owning plantation and their Quaker faith to wage a public abolitionist campaign between 1835 and 1838; accordingly, they worked for the American Anti-Slavery Society in Boston, writing editorials, and delivering lectures. Ultimately, the Grimkés advocated a woman's right to speak publicly in order to further the abolitionist cause.

Nonetheless, moral reformers and women abolitionists were met with great resistance—even from within abolitionist circles. Addressing "promiscuous audiences," comprised of both men and women, and publicly deliberating political issues was considered an outrageous violation of gendered codes, both socially and politically. Susan Zaeske, for example, describes the reservations of Catherine Beecher, a notable abolitionist:

Beecher believed that woman must use influence, but never directly exert power.

Asserting power, Beecher thought, would associate woman with self interest and
deprive her of the high moral ground of self-sacrifice, which was based primarily on her office as mother. Beecher abhorred slavery, but she opposed women joining abolitionism because doing so would require them to exert their power directly—as in speaking to "promiscuous audiences"—rather than employing traditional modes of female influence.175

Thus, while some women worked to empower the citizenship rights of others, others insisted on perpetuating conservative notions of a woman's "proper place," limiting their own citizenship rights.

Although many white women were chastised for publicly decrying slavery, many African American women abolitionists were quieted altogether. Four founders of the Female Anti-Slavery Society of Philadelphia were African American women.176 These women attended the first two national anti-slavery conventions, where the question of African American women's involvement was debated. Ultimately, between the 1830s and 1860s, the majority of white women and African American male abolitionists marginalized the participation of African American women abolitionists. Rosalyn Terborg-Penn argues that, although scholars more often note the participation of African American men, "black women were equally involved in the movement."177 Some of these women included Mary Ann Shadd Cary, Josephine S. Pierre Ruffin, and Sojourner Truth. Resisting marginalization in a predominantly white women's movement, Truth delivered her historic "Ar'n't I a Woman" speech at the 1851 Woman's Rights Convention in Akron, Ohio, where, as Carla Peterson argues, Truth "claim[ed] privilege on the basis of neither whiteness nor maleness."178
Despite the marginalization of African American women in the abolition movement, the need for a women's rights movement was growing among both white and African American women. Despite women's slow but steady entrance into political activities, American women still lived with severe economic, legal, and social restrictions—all woven into a seemingly impenetrable web of laws and social customs. A woman had no right to her own wages; upon being widowed, the state took most of her family's possessions, and if she did seek divorce, she forfeited custody of her children.¹⁷⁹ Most women could not challenge these forces, let alone forge their own identities—especially non-white, working-class women. But some women wished to continue expanding the boundaries of women's political and civic participation. Thus, while advocates for women's education and benevolence reified traditional gender ideologies, moral reformers and abolitionists dared to challenge them.¹⁸⁰ It was not lost on early women's rights leaders that the vote had become "a key symbol of male political privilege."¹⁸¹

THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1840-1890

The democratizing forces characteristic of the early- to mid-nineteenth century gave way to an era of more restrictive citizenship rights. Nonetheless, this time period marked the inception of the women's rights movement, particularly as women activists built upon their experiences in the abolition movement. The early women's rights movement, however, struggled to achieve enhanced citizenship rights for women prior to 1890 due to the turbulence of the Civil War, internal strife, and conservative gender ideologies that shaped women's political, social, and economic oppression. Even so, the movement empowered many U.S. women to assert their political agency and vote at the
local, state, and even national levels. Additionally, the movement gained organizational strength through alliances between the labor and international women's rights movements. The following discussion situates the contestations and achievements of the early women's rights movement within the ideological forces shaping nationalist and citizenship identities in the late-nineteenth century.

*Slow Beginnings, 1840-1863*

Despite the relative expansion of citizenship rights in the first half of the nineteenth century, the 1840s marked a shift in this pattern. The issue of the franchise remained in the fore of American politics, but primarily because of the threat posed to the traditional white, male electorate by African Americans, women, Catholics, American Indians, paupers, and immigrants not considered "white" enough. Fears of these groups gaining too much political ground led to a gradual restriction of citizenship and voting rights that, despite the enfranchisement of African American males in 1870, took hold until the early decades of the twentieth century. For example, throughout the 1840s and 1850s, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Oregon voted to prohibit African Americans from entering their territories. Additionally, fears that immigrant votes could easily be bought by promising naturalization, coupled with the increasing perception that Catholic immigrants from Ireland and other European nations were dirty, alcoholics, morally impure, and lawless, led to the political success of the anti-immigrant Know-Nothing Party. The party pushed for a twenty-one-year naturalization period for immigrants (in contrast to the current period of five years). Although the party dissolved shortly after its rise, the Know-Nothings demonstrated the preeminence of the white, male, Protestant, and native-born citizen.
Within this context of restrictive political power, a women's rights movement was underway, providing a small group of women the avenues to assert political agency. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, for example, played a key role in the inception of the women's rights movement. Immediately after marrying a prominent abolitionist in 1840, she and her husband attended the first World Anti-Slavery Convention in London. Many notable abolitionists were in attendance, including Angelina Grimké Weld, Wendell Phillips, and William Lloyd Garrison. Most exciting to Stanton, though, was meeting Lucretia and James Mott. Lucretia Coffin Mott was an ordained Quaker minister, who at 47 years of age became an immediate mentor and confidante to Stanton. The two women bonded through adversity—on the first day of the convention, a vote was held as to whether the American women would be welcome to sit with the men. Out of protest, Garrison joined the women who had been relegated to the periphery of the convention floor. Stanton and Mott boycotted the rest of convention and decided that they needed to hold a convention of their own.186

Before Stanton and Mott could make such plans, eight farm women presented a petition to New York State Constitutional Convention in 1846, arguing for a woman's right to vote. Although they were all but laughed out of the convention, they had introduced the idea of woman suffrage into the political arena—a discussion that would not abate for another seventy years.187 It was perhaps not entirely coincidental that two years later, Stanton helped persuade the New York state legislature to adopt the Married Woman's Property Law, which granted land-owning rights to women.188 A few months later, the historic Seneca Falls Convention took place.189
On July 13, 1848, Stanton, Mott, Martha Coffin Wright, Jane Hunt, and Mary Ann McClintock gathered in Stanton's parlor and drafted an announcement of a two-day "Woman's Rights Convention" that appeared in the *Seneca County Courier* the next day.190 On July 19, 1848, over one hundred men and women filled a small Wesleyan Chapel "to discuss the social, civil, and religious rights of woman" as the announcement promised.191 While the first day of the convention was reserved for women only, over forty men were admitted. McClintock addressed the promiscuous audience on the purpose of the convention, which was followed by a lively debate over the resolutions drafted in the foundational "Declaration of Sentiments."192 The second day, even more men attended, including abolitionist Frederick Douglass. For the first order of business, Stanton presented the revised "Declaration of Sentiments," which to her surprise, was embraced and not ridiculed.193 After debate and discussion, all resolutions of the Sentiments passed unanimously with one exception—the resolution for enfranchisement. Sixty-eight women signed the document as well as 32 men.194

Modeling the Sentiments after the Declaration of Independence was a strategy that, as Ellen Carol DuBois notes, "involved the extension of natural rights egalitarianism from men to women—especially the principles of individualism, the universal capacity for reason, and political democracy."195 Three days before the Seneca Falls Convention, Stanton met with McClintock and her oldest daughters to revise Stanton's draft of what would become the Declaration of Sentiments.196 During this meeting, it was agreed upon that the draft would be "a second Declaration of Independence."197 The Sentiments was so directly modeled after the Declaration that it too began, "When in the course of human events."198 The most obvious revision lay in the opening of the second paragraph, "We
hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal. The Sentiments was structured "in the tradition of declarations as a genre" by listing a host of grievances and then resolutions. Thus, as both an extension and a revision of the Declaration of Independence, the Sentiments offered what Stanton believed to be a statement of natural rights—that women were also human, and that they too were born with the innate right and responsibility to revolt when abused by the government. Moreover, the Sentiments offered an early instantiation of women mimicking a political document in order to expand their citizenship rights.

The Seneca Falls Convention and the signing of the Declaration of Sentiments constituted the beginning of a women's rights movement and the debate over woman suffrage. Before the Civil War, the movement was carried on through a series of conventions held in 1850, 1851, 1852, and 1860. These conventions provided stages for women to argue publicly for women's equal rights. Many of these women, including Stanton, Lucy Stone, and Ernestine Potowski Rose, argued for independence from men, spoke out against laws of coverture, and even breached the contentious issue of divorce. The arguments made during the "divorce debates" of the 1860 convention demonstrated that many were uncomfortable with the full realization of "women's equal rights" and more so, that conservative beliefs regarding a woman's proper place posed the greatest obstacle to women's rights. Nonetheless, in a little over a decade, the women's rights movement provided women a place to assert political agency and make arguments for women's rights, including the right to vote.

The Civil War Amendments and Woman Suffrage, 1865-1872
Much of this momentum, however, slowed down considerably as the Civil War took hold of the nation's attention and resources. Along with the Civil War came the rise of the Radical Republicans, who espoused a theory of impartial and universal rights. Thus, in the wake of the war, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were ratified, as well as the Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871, and 1875, the Expatriation Act of 1868, and the Naturalization Act of 1870—all of which were grounded in arguments of equality. However, the strength of deeply-embedded racist beliefs and an effort to preserve states' rights remained an undercurrent to all of these successes. At the onset of the war, for example, only five states allowed black male suffrage. Between 1863 and 1870, arguments grounded in scientific language regarding the mental and moral capacities of African Americans helped justify the defeat of black male suffrage in 15 states. Nonetheless, the desire to grant citizenship rights to African Americans was motivated by the emancipation of four million slaves, the participation of 200,000 African Americans in the Union army and navy, the growing intensity of the Radical Republicans' belief in universal suffrage, and President Abraham Lincoln's rearticulated faith in the federal government.

In 1865, Congress ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, which was designed to abolish slavery and economic boundaries used to oppress African Americans. Additionally, the Freedman's Bureau was established, which was designed to help African Americans acquire land. The following year, President Andrew Johnson reinstated a few measures that helped empower the southern planter class and subjugated newly-freed blacks to yearly labor contracts with weighty violation codes. However, in
response, the Republican Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which offered in greater detail the specific rights held by freed African Americans. The Act declared:

All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.212

Almost more significantly, states were prohibited from violating the Act. Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided the first constitutional definition of citizenship and introduced equal citizenship rights before the law. Furthermore, these measures reshaped the relationship between the federal and state governments. Up until this time, citizenship rights fell in the purview of state power. While these amendments still allowed for state authority over citizenship matters, it did empower the federal government to intervene in state affairs if individual rights were thought to be violated. Fear for future congressional repeal of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 motivated the Republican Congress to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. The amendment offered more general language regarding the national rights and privileges of U.S. citizens, as a follow-up to the specific language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The first section of the amendment declared, "All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." Moreover, this section prohibited states from abridging citizens' "privileges and immunities" or denying them "equal protection of the laws." The amendment was also considered a repudiation of the 1857 *Dred Scott v. Sandford* Supreme Court ruling that declared African Americans were not citizens. Congress extended the reach of the federal government in March 1867 with the passage of the Reconstruction Act, which required southern state constitutions to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and allow African Americans to vote on the same terms as whites. In light of these measures and a general adherence to radical egalitarian thought, African American political participation in the South flourished. African Americans served as congressmen, legislators, sheriffs, justices of the peace, school board officials, and one person even served as governor of Louisiana. Many African Americans attended political events and up to ninety percent voted in elections. Despite the gains the Radical Republicans made in Congress, they soon lost political ground to white southerners and northern Democrats. Consequently, the Republicans pushed hard for the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1869, which ensured federal protection of African American males' right to vote. The original draft of the amendment, proposed by Senator Henry Wilson (R-MA), offered a broad definition of who was entitled to the right to vote, inspired by the belief in universal and impartial suffrage. After much debate, the final version of the amendment reflected a much more narrow interpretation of who was deserving of that suffrage right. Most significantly, the final version prohibited discrimination on the basis of race and color, but left out the language that prohibited discrimination based on "nativity, property,
education or creed.\textsuperscript{220} Keyssar argues that the elimination of this language left the door open to discrimination based on ethnicity, class, religion, and education levels.\textsuperscript{221} Many feared that Chinese and Irish immigrants, American Indians, and working-class people were unfit to vote, and thus, many racist and classist attitudes prevailed despite the egalitarian language of the Civil War amendments.\textsuperscript{222}

Interestingly, the discussion of women acquiring the right to vote did not seem to concern these legislators. Nevertheless, the promise of equal treatment before the law and the general proliferation of egalitarian language provided the women's rights movement the means to levy arguments for woman suffrage—particularly in light of the Fifteenth Amendment's extension of suffrage to black males. Also, during the Civil War, women asserted their political agency by participating in the war effort. For example, women organized the Sanitary Commission by adopting a more masculine style of leadership, emphasizing "cooperation, prevention, and expertise."\textsuperscript{223} After the Civil War, women's rights leaders took this empowering experience and focused on earning constitutional recognition of women's citizenship and suffrage rights. While women's rights leaders were met with opposition from members of Congress, abolition leaders, and even other women's rights leaders, the fight for equal rights allowed many women to assert political agency.

The promise of the Civil War amendments eventually led to a split between the abolitionist and women's rights movements. In 1865, after women's right leaders, including Susan B. Anthony and Stanton, had forgone national suffrage conventions as well as other campaign efforts in support of the Civil War, abolitionist leader William Lloyd Garrison wanted to disband the American Anti-Slavery Society to pursue
enfranchisement for black men exclusively. Anthony and Stanton remained firm in acquiring suffrage for men and women and subsequently formed the American Equal Rights Association (AERA) in May 1866. Prominent African American women abolitionists held leadership and support roles in the organization, including Frances Ellen Watkins Harper and Harriet and Hattie Purvis. By 1869, however, differences over the proposed language of the Fifteenth Amendment fractured the organization. Some leaders of the abolitionist community, including Frederick Douglass and Frances Harper, left the organization and contended it was the "Negroe's Hour" for Constitutional enfranchisement. Others, including Mary Ann Shadd Cary, agreed that the word "male" should not have been included in the amendment.

The split between the abolition and woman suffrage communities reflected different priorities among women's and African American men's leaders. In 1866, for example, women's rights leaders petitioned Congress to create an amendment that prohibited discrimination based on sex. The push for black male suffrage, however, took precedence; even the Radical Republicans resisted such an amendment. Also, in 1867, Anthony and Stanton campaigned heavily for a Kansas referendum to amend its state constitution to disenfranchise women and African Americans. With little support from African American leadership, the referendum failed, solidifying the adversarial relationship between the woman suffrage and black male suffrage movements. Moreover, in 1868, Anthony and Stanton vociferously opposed the Fourteenth Amendment, which excluded women from the promise of equal citizenship rights before the law. They accepted the financial backing of openly racist George Francis Train to publish The Revolution as a forum for their opposition. After the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified,
Anthony and Stanton realized they must pursue a constitutional amendment for woman suffrage exclusively.

Correspondingly, Anthony and Stanton established the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) in May of 1869 so as to extend their national campaign for women's equal rights. The organization was only open to white women and addressed a host of equal rights issues, including divorce, oppression in the church, and equal wages. In contrast to the NWSA, former abolitionist leaders and other women's rights leaders established the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA) in November 1869. The AWSA focused mostly on securing suffrage for white women on the state level and articulated a more conservative gender ideology toward women's rights. The AWSA's weekly organ, the *Woman's Journal*, is noted for appealing to women's natural morality, and thus, making less overt appeals to gender equality than the NWSA.

As the relationship between women's rights leaders and former abolitionist leaders suffered, new relationships between the women's rights and labor movements were forged. In 1866, Anthony and Stanton attempted to ally with the National Labor Union's (NLU) equal rights platform, which focused primarily on empowering the working class. However, the alliance was fragile due to the disparity between Anthony and Stanton's middle-class position and the working-class roots of the NLU's leaders. Shortly after, in September of 1868, Anthony formed the Working Women's Association (WWA) made up of wage-earning women. The WWA sent a delegation of women to the 1868 National Labor Congress, promising to forge a link between middle-class suffragists and wage-earning women. However, the association between the two movements lasted no longer than a year. In part, male trade unionists remained hostile
toward women, and believed the labor movement should primarily benefit men. DuBois argues that while working women were doubly exploited—on the bases of sex and class—relieving class oppression was paramount to relieving gender oppression. Furthermore, she argues that women's rights leaders took a somewhat patronizing attitude toward wage-earning women, considering them powerless victims. Nonetheless, Anthony and Stanton had established the beginning of a relationship between the woman suffrage and labor movements that would strengthen over time.

Despite the attempt to form an alliance with the labor movement, women's rights leaders continued to fight for woman suffrage. In the wake of the Civil War amendments, woman suffrage leaders embraced a new activist philosophy propelled by Francis and Virginia Minor's New Departure theory. As president of the Missouri Women's Suffrage Association, Virginia presented the strategy at the state's 1869 convention. In light of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which extends citizenship protection and rights to all persons born in the United States, and the Fifteenth Amendment's reaffirmation of suffrage as a citizenship right, Minor argued that women were citizens entitled to the right to vote. As such, Minor's first resolution said, "That the immunities and privileges of American citizenship, however defined, are National in character and paramount to all State authority." The New Departure strategy provoked a series of revolutionary events in the suffrage movement, providing women the opportunity to assert political agency, intrude upon political spaces, and expand their roles in the nation-state. First, after the NWSA embraced the strategy and published its resolutions in The Revolution, Stanton presented its principles to the Congressional Committee on the District of Columbia in January of
1870. She aimed to enfranchise the women of the District, but was blocked by the outcome of Supreme Court case, *Minor v. Happerset* (1875), which was the first case to reach the Court that addressed woman suffrage. Reese Happerset refused to register Virginia Minor to vote in an 1870 election.\(^{240}\) When the court's decision was finally issued in 1874, it argued that first, citizenship did not ensure suffrage and second, states could elect to withhold voting rights from women.\(^{241}\) Also influenced by the New Departure strategy was free-love feminist, Virginia Claflin Woodhull, who delivered a memorial to the House Judiciary Committee in January of 1871, arguing for women's constitutional equality. Although the committee rejected Woodhull's memorial, two members of Congress issued a minority report in support of woman suffrage.\(^{242}\) Additionally, her address coincided with the NWSA's national convention in Washington, D.C., allowing Anthony and Stanton to witness Woodhull's public action and suffrage arguments.\(^{243}\)

As the New Departure strategy provoked debate in Congress and the Supreme Court, it pressed the issue of woman suffrage into the privileged spaces of national politics and created the opportunity for women to enter these spaces and enact the citizenship rights they sought. Most significantly, the New Departure prompted women to leave their homes, walk to voting polls, and cast ballots. Beginning on November 19, 1868, 174 women, four of whom were African American, voted in Vineland, New Jersey. In 1870, forty women, including Angelina Grimké Weld and Sarah Grimké similarly cast ballots in Hyde Park, Massachusetts. Between 1871 and 1872, seventy more women successfully voted across the country, including African American women in South Carolina.\(^{244}\) Voting peaked in November, 1872, during the presidential election. On
November 5, 1872, Anthony led over 50 women in Rochester, New York, to register and vote, leading to her much-famed arrest and subsequent trial.\textsuperscript{245} Similarly, the New Departure theory was used to urge female property owners not to pay taxes on their property.\textsuperscript{246}

Key to this strategy was the understanding that \textit{action} makes social change. Not only did these women make an equal rights argument for the right to vote, but they enacted their equal rights convictions by mimicking the actions of their fully-enfranchised male counterparts.\textsuperscript{247} Further, the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871, which were passed to protect the voting rights of African American males, strengthened the notion that voting was the ultimate act of citizenship to be protected by federal law.\textsuperscript{248} While the ultimate ruling of \textit{Minor v. Happersett} argued that suffrage was not a citizenship right, and further, that states could enforce their own definition of citizenship (one that excluded women), these women constituted themselves as political actors by actively and militantly upholding their interpretation of Constitutional law.

\textit{Heightened Oppression and Suffrage Expansion, 1873-1890}

While the New Departure Theory was met with such strong opposition, the woman suffrage movement experienced incremental success throughout the 1870s and 1880s. Given the contested role of the vote in the 1860s, the women's rights movement focused its energies on securing the vote at the international, national, state, and local levels. For example, local suffrage organizations multiplied and forced state referenda and suffrage bills in many states, winning the support of state legislators and droves of male voters.\textsuperscript{249}
However, the ratification of the Civil War amendments also invoked serious opposition to the notion of equality before the law, equal voting rights, and the newly-configured role of the federal government. In the South, this opposition was accompanied by deep-seated feelings of betrayal, compelling some southern Democrats— "Redeemers"—to slowly chip away at Republican control and the voting provisions set forth in the Fifteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act of 1870. To keep African Americans from the polls, Redeemers gerrymandered districts, prevented African Americans from paying taxes, passed vagrancy laws, and tied African Americans to job contracts. Additionally, organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan served as the militant arm of the Democratic Party and terrorized blacks for trying to hold office, among other things. Further, as Republicans lost political control, the Compromise of 1877 was struck, forcing the withdrawal of federal troops from the South. By 1878, Democrats had control of Congress and Redeemers controlled most southern state legislatures. Thus, by 1877, the burst of egalitarianism that followed the Civil War and constituted the Reconstruction Era came to an end. By 1890, the Republican Party's failed attempt to pass the Federal Elections Bill, a measure designed to reinforce the Fifteenth Amendment, signaled a shift in the party's platform and the end of the federal government's attempts to protect black male suffrage.

Beliefs in scientific racism undergirded these political developments. The works of Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin reified the notion that only some were naturally fit to lead society. However, these beliefs promoted the idea that the "unfit" could be educated to participate in a "civilized" and predominantly Christian society. The Office of Indian Affairs, for example, was established shortly after the Civil War to institute
missions and schools in an effort to civilize American Indians by undoing their culture and indoctrinating them into "American" culture. Additionally, the Dawes Act of 1887 allotted land to American Indians, who were promised citizenship for accepting the government's land and forfeiting their own. The push for civic education also inspired the federal government to fund the rebuilding of schools in the South, which encouraged the attendance of women, but instituted the separation of black and white schools.254

The idea that only white, U.S.-born Protestants were "fit" for civic participation was also reinforced by the growing anti-immigrant sentiment. For example, when the Republicans attempted to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which intended to ban discrimination in public places, western Republicans fought for an altered version of the bill, which was inspired by anti-Chinese and anti-Mexican sentiments. Ultimately, the Immigration Act of 1875 was passed, which was the first Congressional act to limit immigration.255 Smith argues that more and more, courts upheld the notion that the ideal citizen was "white"—a construction that excluded Mexicans and the Chinese.256

Ultimately, the 1870s and 1880s saw an increased emphasis on ascriptive notions of citizenship. Ongoing conflicts between Republicans and Democrats and between states' and federal rights loosened national protection of citizenship rights.257 Additionally, class distinctions were reinforced as African Americans were forced to enter labor contracts, European immigrants earned wages for huge corporations, and poor whites were considered similarly uneducated and unfit to participate in an ideal civic nation.258 On one hand, the emphasis on civic participation and education could potentially lend the woman suffrage movement some legitimacy; on the other hand, the
renewed beliefs in white, male, Christian supremacy could greatly thwart the efforts of woman suffrage activists toward the end of the nineteenth century.

However, the woman suffrage movement managed to proliferate throughout these years. McGerr argues that suffrage organizations thrived at the local, state, and national levels because they were modeled after a popular male style of political volunteerism. Organizations such as the AWSA, the NWSA, and Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) mimicked the traditions of national political organizations by conducting regularly-held conventions, publishing pamphlets, petitioning state legislatures and Congress, and lobbying congressmen. Pressing themselves into the spaces of national politics helped elevate woman suffrage as a national issue. In fact, in 1882, the NWSA pushed both houses of Congress to appoint committees on woman suffrage, both of which recommended passage of a federal amendment. In 1886, an amendment came to a vote in the Senate, although it was ultimately defeated in 1887. Congress debated the issue for another six years, although to no avail.

However, the AWSA's focus on acquiring state suffrage amendments, in concert with state suffrage organizations, lent greater success for woman suffrage. Between 1870 and 1910, referenda were held in eleven states; the territory of Wyoming enfranchised women in 1869, followed by the territory of Utah in 1870, the territory of Washington in 1883, Colorado in 1893, and Idaho in 1896. Holly J. McCammon attributes the successful ratification of these state suffrage amendments to many factors. First, she points to the willingness on behalf of state legislatures to grant partial suffrage; Montana's legislature, for example, allowed women to vote for school officials in 1887 and 1889. She also argues that the growing presence of third political parties such as
Populists, Progressives, Prohibitionists, and Socialists increased the opportunity for social change. Last, McCammon links these successes to the overall increased participation of women in organizations, such as the WCTU and the General Federation of Women's Clubs (GFWC). Western states seemed to be more willing to grant women the right to vote, which some scholars attribute to the belief that an agrarian lifestyle promoted more egalitarian roles between men and women. Many suffrage scholars argue that these political successes can also be attributed to women's ability to assert themselves amidst larger cultural and structural forces that favored the blurring of gendered spheres.

The WCTU, founded in 1874, contributed greatly to women's political participation on the local, state, national, and even international levels. Led by the charismatic Frances E. Willard, the WCTU was the largest women's organization in the late-nineteenth century, containing over forty departments aimed at issues regarding labor, peace, social purity, health, and education. Willard used arguments championing women's morality and purity to advocate for woman suffrage, in contrast to the equal rights arguments used by the NWSA. Willard was a Socialist and formed alliances with labor organizations, such as the Knights of Labor and the Populist Party, eventually transforming the WCTU's mission to help redress the excesses of capitalism and male political power. Additionally, in 1884, Willard helped form the World's Women's Christian Temperance Union (WWCTU), taking the WCTU's mission to an international level. WWCTU leaders targeted wage-earning women's issues in Australia, New Zealand, and England. In England, WWCTU leaders formed an alliance with Sylvia Pankhurst and other leaders of the women's trade union and labor organizations. Thus, while the WCTU's position on morality and family were quite conservative, its class and
economic positions were left-leaning. The WWCTU's class consciousness, however, was not unchecked by its racist undercurrents; the organization excluded indigenous Maori women in New Zealand and was criticized for excluding African American women in the United States.270

Similarly, in the late 1880s, Stanton spent a considerable amount of time in England, reconnecting with a network of Quaker friends.271 Stanton helped them found the Women's Franchise League (WFL), a radical suffragist organization with close ties to the labor and socialist movements in England. The organization took a radical approach to women's rights, arguing that all women's work—whether paid or unpaid—was "labor" and was deserving of certain legal protections. The WFL also argued on behalf of wage-earning women and pushed for the eight-hour work day.272 Further, the organization took a militant approach toward woman suffrage. For example, in 1892, when WFL members were unsatisfied with a suffrage bill, they stormed the stage in Parliament.273 Together, Stanton and the WCTU helped establish the foundation for a strong international woman suffrage movement based on the ties between the radical strains of the woman suffrage and labor movements.

Despite making strides and building relationships on the local, state, national, and international levels, woman suffragists faced strong opposition in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Brewers and liquor retailers took a strong anti-suffrage position for fear that women may enact prohibitionary measures.274 As political power shifted to party bosses in urban areas, mostly populated by immigrant workers, party machines opposed woman suffrage for fear of an uncontrollable and uneducated electorate.275 Southern women were particularly fearful of woman suffrage because of more traditional gendered
ideals and for fear of black women attaining the vote. Western states appeared more
eager to grant women the right to vote, but anti-Chinese sentiment kept many from
wanting to extend voting rights. Thus, the more white women asserted their political
agency and expanded gendered boundaries through political participation, the more
resistance these women faced from social and institutional forces. Considering the sharp
restrictions of African Americans' voting rights in the post-Reconstruction Era, it seemed
almost impossible for women to earn a constitutional amendment granting equal voting
rights. However, by 1890, women were working and organizing tirelessly, colluding with
other movements inspired by class and economic oppression, raising awareness, and
altering their movement strategies.

NATIONALISM, CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS, AND WOMEN, 1890-1913

The last thirty years of the women's rights movement centered on earning U.S.
women national voting rights. With the Progressive Era's promise of enhanced
citizenship rights, minority groups asserted their political agency more than ever before,
even amidst a revival of racist and nativist nationalism. Women actively sought political,
economic, and social liberation as they joined reform societies, women's clubs, and local,
state, and national woman suffrage organizations. Moreover, the growing alliances
between the woman suffrage, labor, and settlement house movements empowered women
to assert their citizenship rights in the political sphere. Thus, the following traces the
growing momentum of the woman suffrage movement as it interacted with shifting
nationalist and civic ideals prior to 1913.

1890-1900, Preparation
Between 1890 and the 1910s, citizenship and voting rights became more narrowly defined, while simultaneously, a wave of social and political movements worked to expand these rights. As the excesses of capitalism, industrialization, political corruption, and inflated senses of racial supremacy took its toll on the American people, many groups rose up in protest. Some groups took the form of third political parties—the Progressives, Populists, Socialists, Mugwumps—and some took the form of organized agitators—the Knights of Labor, the American Federation of Labor, the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL). These somewhat contradictory patterns of restricting and expanding citizenship rights created an optimal environment for woman suffrage activists to heighten awareness and increase the movement's momentum.

In the late-nineteenth century, amidst a political environment shaped by corruption, Southern redeemers, and the aftermath of Reconstruction, voter turnout was exceptional.\(^{278}\) Ironically, the American electorate was shrinking, as the institution of Jim Crow laws prevented African Americans from voting; literacy and education tests disenfranchised a new wave of immigrants from Asian and European countries; property and tax requirements limited many working-class and poor white Americans from voting; and strict assimilation laws applied to the voting rights of American Indians.\(^{279}\) Although many whites opposed these restrictions, nationalistic feelings of superiority prevailed. One way late-nineteenth century presidents tried to allay fears of expanding citizenship laws was by rhetorically constructing the "good citizen," whose hard work was the ultimate performance of an American identity. Immigrants, for example, could be "Americanized" by participating in the hard, strenuous labor of building a nation.\(^{280}\) Nonetheless, many resisted an expanded electorate.
Meanwhile, a general shift in the relationship between American politics and people took place. McGerr argues that in the final decades of the nineteenth century, education and advertising replaced the extreme partisanship and party loyalty of the early-nineteenth century. He argues that parties focused on educating the electorate and encouraging independent thought and reason. Also, at the turn of the century, parties adopted a business model of reaching the electorate by pushing candidates to develop a more direct relationship with voters. To this end, candidates took train and automobile tours, worked to drum up publicity, and advertised themselves and their platforms for voters to compare and ultimately, "buy into." Thus, the voting experience became less an act of party loyalty and community belonging, and more an act of choice and independence. This shift can be attributed, in part, to Theodore Roosevelt's innovative use of the presidency to appeal directly to the American people—a phenomenon termed the "rhetorical presidency." Roosevelt's predecessor, William McKinley encouraged this development, as he was one of the first presidents to speak across the country. Additionally, during the 1896 presidential election, William Jennings Bryan spoke to voters on his own behalf during a whistle-stop tour. As presidential candidates shifted toward a more direct relationship with potential voters, the potential for voters to voice their concerns directly to the president increased.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the women's rights movement also experienced a shift in leadership and strategy. In 1890, the NWSA and the AWSA united into one organization, the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA). Originally lead by Anthony and Stanton, the organization was taken up by a younger generation of suffragists with new strategies in mind. By the turn of the century, Carrie
Chapman Catt transformed the NAWSA into an efficient organization with headquarters in each state and with hands in local suffrage campaigns. Focusing on state suffrage, the NAWSA voted to hold annual conventions outside of Washington, D.C. every other year to mobilize different parts of the country. The western states, in particular, enjoyed local and state success during the 1890s. Rebecca Mead argues that the political momentum of the Populist and the People's parties helped win state suffrage in Colorado and Idaho. These mild successes, however, were tempered by prevailing racist and classist attitudes. NAWSA leaders appealed to wealthy white women by assuring them that the vote would prevent the uneducated and ignorant from attaining too much political power. Even Stanton, in her waning years, advocated for literacy tests. Western suffragists, too, are also noted for making arguments grounded in scientific racism, invoking anti-Chinese sentiments, and patronizing American Indian women by promising to "civilize" them through the vote.

Despite the prevalent racism and classism in the woman suffrage movement, African American women managed to assert their political voices throughout the latter decades of the nineteenth century. For example, in 1880, Mary Ann Shadd Cary organized the Colored Women's Progressive Franchise Association, and in 1887, Frances Watkins Harper became the Superintendent of Work Among Colored People for the WCTU. Shirley Wilson Logan argues that Harper was "perhaps the most prominent, active, and productive black woman speaker of the nineteenth century." More specifically, Logan argues that Harper's public oratory worked to "resolve conflicting concerns arising out of race, class, and gender differences." In the early 1890s, another prominent African American woman, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, asserted her political agency
to fight mob violence and lynching. Patricia A. Schechter argues that, through the
distribution of her 1892 pamphlet, *Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All its Phases*, Wells-
Barnett "challenged readers to examine the assumptions that held their personal identities
and sense of the social order together."\(^{293}\) Not all African American women rhetors
worked to radically challenge "the social order;" women such as Fannie Barrier Williams
and Anna Julia Cooper sought to establish identification with white women, while also
forcing white women to recognize black women's relative oppression.\(^{294}\) Thus, African
American women asserted their political voices within the suffrage movement, while also
asserting their voices in their own right, working independently of white suffrage leaders.

African American women also thrived in women's clubs throughout the 1890s. In
1895, for example, fifty-two women founded the National Federation of Afro-American
Women, which, in 1895, merged with the National League of Colored Women to form
the National Association of Colored Women. Well-known African American woman
suffragist, Mary Church Terrell, was elected its first president.\(^{295}\) Despite forming these
nationwide women's organizations, African American women were still slighted within
the woman suffrage movement. Even by 1913, with the inception of the more equal-
rightist National Woman's Party, African American women were subject to the
movement's expedient racism.

Overall, women's participation in club activities flourished throughout the 1890s.
Even the NAWSA, the dominant national suffrage organization, was outnumbered during
this time with only 13,000 members in 1890, compared to the General Federation of
Women's Club's 20,000 members in 1892, and the WCTU's 150,000 members.\(^{296}\) These
clubs promoted the idea that women were a purifying force in American society and
extended the growing progressive faith in activism, bureaucracy, and efficiency. The largest women's club, the GFWC, similarly focused its energies on social and cultural betterment, helping to fund new libraries and trade schools, establishing house-fire inspections, eliminating sweatshops, and electing women to school boards.

Acceleration, 1900-1913

In the early years of the twentieth century, support for woman suffrage grew immensely. Karl-Werner Brand argues that these years were marked by "a regenerative activism in both Europe and America: in the United States to the reform zeal of Progressivism, in Edwardian England to an optimistic, liberal mood of breaking all traditional bonds." Movements in Great Britain and Germany also developed into "true mass movements" during this time as well. In 1912, the Progressive Party endorsed woman suffrage, while the movement grew popular among Republicans. Moreover, in 1910, President Howard Taft attended and addressed the NAWSA's annual convention. In 1914, a draft of a suffrage bill was brought to the Senate floor for the first time since 1893. Suffrage success continued in the West with Washington's enfranchisement of women in 1910, California in 1911, Arizona, Alaska, and Oregon in 1912, and Montana and Nevada in 1914. Support for woman suffrage grew among southern women as a growing class of young, educated women—termed "New Women"—enacted the political independence they sought in the vote. This younger, more charismatic generation of suffrage leaders used innovative strategies to bring visibility to the movement, including suffrage parades, open-air meetings, and soap-box speeches. With increased visibility, however, came increased opposition. Democrats were particularly fearful of expanding
the franchise, along with liquor interests who feared prohibition, and southerners, who still feared racial equality.\textsuperscript{305}

Much of the suffrage success during this time can be attributed to its alliance with the labor movement's many organizations.\textsuperscript{306} Women's participation in the labor movement was greatly encouraged and provided women the opportunity to assert political agency to alter their material realities.\textsuperscript{307} Although shaped by ideological and demographic differences, the American Federation of Labor, the Knights of Labor, the Grange, the Farmer's Alliance, and the Populists encouraged women's membership.\textsuperscript{308} Nonetheless, women tended to be marginalized in the leadership of these organizations, as the focus tended to stay on liberating the male worker.\textsuperscript{309}

While previous efforts to link the woman suffrage and labor movements either failed or remained tentative, Harriot Stanton Blatch, daughter of Elizabeth Cady Stanton, helped organize an enduring relationship between middle- and lower-class women. In the mid-1890s, Blatch and Susan B. Anthony attempted to unite upper-class and working-class women in a political reform movement in New York. Upon her failure, Blatch realized the needs of working-class women were overlooked by upper-class suffragists and she began dedicating her work toward liberating working-class women with the vote.\textsuperscript{310} She felt so strongly about the rights of these women, she engaged in a public debate with her mother, sharply opposing the implementation of literacy tests at the polls.\textsuperscript{311}

Following her mother's death in 1902, Blatch forged an organized link between all classes of women.\textsuperscript{312} Blatch joined the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL), founded in 1902, aiming to work with—not for—working class women.\textsuperscript{313} Blatch believed that all
women's work was valuable, whether in the home or in the factory. She appealed to upper- and middle-class women by arguing that they should use their educations, careers, and the vote for the greater good, and pointing out that their success rested upon the work of their working-class counterparts. To working-class women, the vote represented the promise of changing the material conditions of their lives. To be sure, Blatch's own middle- to upper-class positioning did not go unchecked, as she argued that women worked for psychological reasons—an argument that did not seem to resonate well with working-class women, who worked primarily out of necessity.

Meanwhile, the ties between the woman suffrage and labor movements strengthened with the rise of the settlement house movement. Progressive emphases on expertise and detached observation influenced the settlement house movement, which was less about exerting moral superiority and more about enacting social reform and demanding a voice in urban policy-making. After her experiences as a social worker, for example, Jane Addams became a leader of the settlement house movement, which aimed to provide sanitary living environments for lower-class women, children, and immigrants. Similarly, Florence Kelley's experiences with Chicago's Hull House inspired her to help found the Children's Bureau later in 1912. Addams and Kelley saw the vote as a way to improve the living conditions of working-class women and thus, became vociferous suffrage-supporters.

In 1907, Blatch founded the Equality League of Self-Supporting Women, which adopted a militant philosophy toward enfranchising working white women. She united educated and professional women, who valued the work of working-class women, and industrial working women, who admired the independence of career-women. Working-
class members became articulate in the arguments for enfranchising trade union women, helping refute the anti-suffragists' argument that working-class women were unfit to vote. Blatch arranged for a few trade union women to testify before the New York state legislature in early 1907. Not only were these women the first working-class women to testify in public on behalf of woman suffrage, but their testimonies were thought to be much more striking than those given by members of the more conservative organization, the New York Woman Suffrage Association. Blatch's ongoing alliance with the Pankhurst family in England, leaders of the militant Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), encouraged the Equality League's participation in militant acts. For example, Blatch organized a large crowd—two-thirds of which were trade unionist men—to gather at Cooper Union and hear a WSPU member testify about her protests and imprisonment in England. Blatch also encouraged Equality League members to participate in the first open-air meeting held on behalf of woman suffrage, and many subsequent open-air meetings and trolley campaigns throughout 1907 and 1908. Although WTUL members had been speaking on street corners for years, the Equality League's militancy exhibited an intensified faith in asserting one's own political agency in public spaces reserved primarily for men. Furthermore, these militant acts provided the Equality League with free publicity—an invaluable asset considering that, historically, working-class women could not afford to bring awareness to their issues.321

The growing internationalism of the labor and suffrage movements strengthened this relationship. Between 1907 and 1915, the predominant socialist organization, Second International, led a socialist movement between many western, central, and eastern European nations, Australia, and the United States.322 Soon, as DuBois argues, "militant
suffragism around the world" took hold.\textsuperscript{323} The influence of the WSPU's militancy spread throughout the network of international women's organizations.\textsuperscript{324} The International Woman Suffrage Association's 1906 meeting in Copenhagen reported on the WSPU's success, helping spread news to Hungary and Russia.\textsuperscript{325} In 1909, Sylvia Pankhurst toured Central Europe raising awareness of working-class militant techniques, such as marches, open-air meetings, and civil disobedience.\textsuperscript{326} Militancy fueled women's rights movements in Ireland, China, and Argentina.\textsuperscript{327}

By 1910, the strength of international networks and this heightened sense of militancy cultivated a mass U.S. woman suffrage movement.\textsuperscript{328} The coalition between the woman suffrage and labor movements was so strong that it was difficult to distinguish among trade unionist, socialist, and militant suffragists.\textsuperscript{329} Even the NAWSA reversed its position on literacy tests and began emphasizing the needs of working-class women.\textsuperscript{330} Soon after, in 1912, Alice Paul's work with the WSPU caught the eye of NAWSA's leaders, who employed Paul and Lucy Burns to establish the Washington, D.C., headquarters. Greatly influenced by their international experiences with militant activism, Paul and Burns were determined to ignite the national wing of the U.S. woman suffrage movement and inspire women to assert political agency by introducing new and contentious protest strategies aimed at earning fully-enfranchised citizenship rights.

In all, women have asserted political agency despite restrictive ideological and institutional forces throughout U.S. history. Just as nationalist, citizenship, and gender ideologies worked to limit women's political participation in the national community, such ideologies provided them the resources to challenge and expand upon women's rights. Whether women adopted the equal-rightist arguments informed by Lockean
liberalism or extolled women's natural virtue through republican motherhood, women forced themselves into the public and political spheres to advocate for education, moral reform, abolition, and eventually, a woman's right to vote. Moreover, women asserted their political agency and constituted their citizenship identities by mimicking the political practices of men as they formed organizations, held conferences, petitioned, lobbied, and even voted. By 1913, the growing strength of the woman suffrage movement and the empowering forces of the Progressive Era empowered a group of young suffragists to rise up and demand U.S. women's fully-enfranchised citizenship rights and to re-energize the U.S. woman suffrage movement for the following seven years.
End Notes: Chapter 1

1 According to the *History of Woman Suffrage*, General Howe "issued his celebrated proclamation offering amnesty and protection to all who, within sixty days, should declare themselves peaceable British subjects, and bind themselves to neither take up arms nor encourage others to do so." *History of Woman Suffrage*, eds. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, & Matilda Joslyn Gage (6 vols., New York, 1881-1922), I: 442-44.


3 Mary Beth Norton and Joan Hoff Wilson contend that women's experiences in colonial and revolutionary America are more complicated than previously depicted by

4 The New Jersey State Constitution states, "all inhabitants of this Colony, of full age, who are worth fifty pounds proclamation money, clear estate in the same and have
resided within the county in which they claim their vote, for twelve months immediately preceding the election, shall be entitled to vote for representatives in Council and Assembly, and also for all other public officers that shall be elected by the People of the County at large." Adopted July 2, 1776.


6 This time period covers two eras in U.S. history, commonly referred to as the Jeffersonian Era, 1801-1829, and part of the Age of Jackson, which is thought to span 1829-1856. Because this chapter is punctuated by developments in women's rights, this section stops at 1840. For the dates associated with certain eras of U.S. history, see Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

7 Smith introduces the notion of ascriptive inegalitarianism as a way to consider citizenship as a system of inequities. See Civic Ideals, 6.

8 Ibid., 50-51.

Many conflicts ensued between the British, French, Austrian, and Spanish governments over settlements in the colonies, but ultimately, the British assumed authority over all settlers. Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 52-53.


My use of the concept of a colonial identity is informed by E. J. Hobsbawm's discussion of "proto-nationalism," which he defines as "the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity." He characterizes proto-nationalism as a necessary precursor to the development of a nation and patriotic nationalism, however it is not a determining factor in the establishment of nations or a shared, national identity. E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2d ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 73. Also see pages 73-78.

Schudson argues that these republican ideals romanticized the virtue of yeomen farmers and contributed the fear of a commercial and industrial class of citizens who may lack the hard work ethic of farmers, and thus lack the necessary virtue of a good republic. Michael Schudson, *The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1998), 28. For a discussion of Britain's conceptualization of republicanism, see Kerber, "Republican Ideology," 475-80; Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the*

14 Gundersen, "Independence," 60.


16 Initially, British authorities were more accepting of naturalizing Spanish and French in the colonies as a way to keep them from living in England. Smith, Civic Ideals, 54-55. Both the British and British colonists feared papal conspiracy rooted in ongoing struggles with Spain and France, and thus denied naturalization to Catholic settlers from these and other countries. Ibid., 57. In regards to Europeans, the colonists relaxed suffrage restrictions to white, property-owning, Christian, men; although at times, explicitly restricted suffrage to all other groups. A more relaxed position on including white, Protestant Europeans continued due to the demands of colony-building. Non-Protestant Europeans, such as American Indians, Catholics, and Africans, however, were treated with severe oppression. Spanish and Portugese settlers, however, were more accepting of these groups and often assimilating them into their communities. (Despite the fact that the Spanish and Portugese also treated these groups as inferiors.) Smith hypothesizes many reasons for the difference between the assimilation practices of the British and southern European settlers, including the cultural and ideological isolation of Northern European Protestants, their limited interaction with tribes, and their lack of dependence on these groups for manual labor. Ibid., 58-59. Also, for a summary of the
many conflicts between the colonists and American Indian tribes, as well as the conflicts between colonial and British conflict over the treatment of American Indians, see Ibid., 59-63. For a discussion over the questions of African Americans' subjectship, and again, the British government's greater willingness to treat them as subjects, see Ibid., 63-67.

17 British officials began limiting naturalizations to the colonies in which they were conferred, terminated all group naturalizations, and instituted residency requirements. Also, In 1700, British authorities ruled that one's subject status would only be recognized in the colony subjectship was conferred. This law was modeled after the system Virginia adopted in 1680. Also, throughout the 1680s and 1690s, Britain limited colonial trade to the colony in which one was naturalized. In 1740, Great Britain allowed those living in a colony for seven years to be naturalized; although the rights conferred only applied to the life in the colonies and not in Britain. Ibid., 56.


21 Collier, "The American People, 22-23.


23 Gundersen explains that "dependency" was not considered synonymous with subordination. Rather, dependency as it functioned in the practice of deference was viewed as a "relationship with voluntary features." Dependence did not acquire its pejorative meaning of subordination until revolutionary times. Gundersen, "Independence," 62.


26 Throughout the early eighteenth century, free African Americans with enough property did vote in Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina before it was eventually outlawed out of fear of slave rebellion. Collier, "The American People," 24;
Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, 32-33; Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 65-66. Similarly, American Indians were prohibited from voting out of racist beliefs and because they could not attain subjectship. Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, 32. Age proved to be the most contentious factor in voting requirements because it was assumed that by a certain age, one would be familiar enough with local politics to make informed voting decisions. Most colonies set 21 as the required voting age. Collier, "The American People," 22; Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, 30-31. Further, residency requirements were often imposed for fear of immigrants voting without knowledge of local political culture. Most requirements ranged from six months to two years. Collier, "The American People," 24; Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, 34-35. In regards to religion, fear of Papal conspiracy and in defense of Protestantism, Catholics and Jews were barred from the vote. Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, 31-32. Servants were not considered residents and thus, could not meet residency requirements. Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, 33. Citizenship or naturalization, was often a requirement for fear of foreign corruption. Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, 32-33. Last, what qualified as "property" differed between colonies and over time. Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, 32-40.

27 British law made few distinctions between the rights of male and female subjects, with the exception of voting. So, while women could own or convey property, they were limited in their ability to act on those rights. Gundersen, "Independence," 60.

28 Ibid., 61.

29 In the case of the Huguenot refugees, for example, naturalization was often granted to widowed or single women and established them as heads of the household.
Married refugees whose husbands were naturalized subjects could inherit land upon widowhood, but could not be named in naturalization law. If, however, an unnaturalized woman married a British subject, she was not considered a subject and further, could not inherit her husband's land. Ibid.

30 Records indicate that some Massachusetts widows with significant property voted, as well as New York widows in 1737. Dinkin, Voting in Provincial America, 29-30. Also see Mary S. Benson, Women in Eighteenth Century America: A Study of Opinion and Social Usage (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), 244-49.

31 Also, Delaware, Georgia, and South Carolina specified that voters must be male. Dinkin, Voting in Provincial America, 30. In 1762, a Virginia statute explicitly stated women (among a long list of others) could not vote. Smith, Civic Ideals, 58.


36 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 68-69. In the seventeenth century, Chesapeake area women were often widowed due to the high mortality rate; as such, they were given more legal power than New England widows, who remained married longer and were widowed less often. Chesapeake Bay women married younger and were widowed younger. As such, men in the area left widows more land than in New England. Additionally, widows were granted the right to change their husband's will if they were left less than the stated minimum. Conversely, Northeastern settlers experience low mortality rates and thus, women remained married longer and patriarchy took a stronger hold on society. Wilson, "The Illusion," 598-99.
All colonies except Connecticut and Massachusetts allowed women to have separate estates from husbands so that upon widowhood, women did not lose property to their sons and could exercise economic independence after marriage. Further, in a Maryland county, widows possessed the right to challenge their husbands' wills in court; in South Carolina, forty percent of women with separate estates won sole control of property and twenty-eight percent of wives shared equal power over estates with husbands. Ibid., 605-606.

Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 603. Daughters often received about half as much as sons and what they did receive was in movable goods because it was assumed that they would marry and take their inheritance with them.

Ibid.

Smith, Civic Ideals, 68-69.

Wilson, "The Illusion," 605.


Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 604-605. Women had spinning wheels, cheese molds, butter churns, and looms. More servants did the looming in the Chesapeake area.

Ibid., 605.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Bloch, "American Feminine," 102 or 103?

Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 596.

Ibid., 609.
In Quaker communities, motherhood took on a public concern, women held meetings amongst themselves, and held power in the church by deciding on marriages. Ibid., 607.

In the seventeenth century, male church membership declined in Puritan communities; as such, women became spiritual leaders in families and communities, although still subordinate to the authority of husbands and clergymen. Ibid., 608; Wilson, "The Illusion," 408-409.

Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 609; Wilson, "The Illusion," 408. Also, the Great Awakening loosened the relationship between church and state as religion became more a private matter of spirituality.

Ibid.

Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 607. Also Wilson argues that the social and political forces of the eighteenth century worked to produce "two distinct classes of women in the United States—those who worked to varying degrees exclusively in their homes and those who worked both inside and outside their homes." "The Illusion," 388.

Smith, Civic Ideals, 68.

Ibid., 50-51; 74-85.


60 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 83.

61 Ibid., 85.

62 Ibid., 74.

63 Smith argues that two senses of nationalism accompanied the rise of a revolutionary philosophy; one parochial and one cosmopolitan. The parochial sense of nationalism held that the people of the new nation were divined by a Protestant God to build a land of freedom and liberty. The cosmopolitan sense of nationalism promoted a more inclusive citizenry, inviting all peoples to melt into one American race. Both senses of nationalism rested on some degree of homogeneity. Ibid., 84-85; 74.
Gordon Wood details the influences on the development of American republicanism. He says, "Republicanism meant more for Americans than simply the elimination of a king and the institution of an elective system. It added a moral dimension, a utopian depth, to the political separation from England—a depth that involved the very character of their society" (47). American republicanism was comprised of the following, including elements of English antiquity characteristic of agrarian yeomen, such as "frugality, industry, temperance, and simplicity" (52); a concern for the public good coupled with the right to individual, political liberty (61); "public-spirited" virtue (68); a sense of equality that did not necessarily absolve class distinctions or hierarchies, but that allowed "equality of opportunity" (70-75); deep resentment of the English Crown (75-82); and a belief that "the people" "rightfully had a share in government" (90). Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*, 46-90.

Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 8. Keyssar also explains the difference between considering the vote as a right and a privilege: "Indeed, the early English usage, the word *franchise* referred to a privilege, immunity, or freedom that a state could grant, while the term *suffrage* alluded to intercessory prayers." Ibid., 9. Further, Rosemarie Zagarri explains that revolutionary thought was influenced by two traditions of natural rights; the Lockean tradition that stressed individual liberty, and a Scottish Enlightenment theory that considered rights as benefits. Men benefited from the Lockean tradition, while women were subject to the Scottish tradition. Zagarri, "The Rights of Man and Woman in Post-Revolutionary America," *William and Mary Quarterly* 55 (1998): 204-205.

Keyssar describes the prevalence of the suffrage question: "Arguments for and against a more democratic suffrage were voiced in newspapers, broadsides, provincial
assemblies, town meetings, gatherings of militiamen, and constitutional conventions, as well as taverns, inns, city streets, and private homes." Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 15.

The rise of a commercial merchant class whose "property" was bound up in goods and not land compelled this shift. Also, at the local level, suffrage restrictions were often not enforced. According to Collier: "Indeed, several studies show that voting – at least on the local level – was quite promiscuous in that the legal requirements were often ignored and that just anybody who looked like a voter was permitted to vote if he wanted to." Collier, "The American People," 23. Also see Dinkin, *Voting in Provincial America*, 144-80.

Regarding Catholics and Jews, see Keyssar *The Right to Vote*, 20. Also, free blacks could vote in North Carolina, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Vermont. Ibid. Additionally, the British army offered freedom to slaves who fought with them; thousands of slaves escaped and fought with the American army; by the early nineteenth century, every state from Pennsylvania and north had taken steps to abolish slavery; and many Virginia and Maryland slaveholders voluntarily freed slaves. Still, by the end of the Revolutionary War, the overall number of slaves had increased. Eric Foner, "From Slavery to Citizenship: Blacks and the Right to Vote," in *Voting and the Spirit of American Democracy*, 55-56. Also see, Charles H. Wesley, "Negro Suffrage in the Period of the Constitution," *Journal of Negro History* 32 (1947): 143-68. Regarding women's voting rights in New Jersey, see note 7.


73 Historians generally agree that the revolution offered limited advances for women's rights, if any. Wilson, for example, flatly states that the revolution did not benefit American women in any way. Wilson, "The Illusion," 387. Norton, on the other hand, argues that religion, American republicanism, and women's participation in the war offered new venues for political activity. Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 614-18. Also, rights for women varied greatly by location. New Jersey women could vote, while Virginia women were explicitly barred from voting. Ironically, Suzanne Lebsock's study

Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 617. Also, Zagarri traces "rights talk" from revolutionary through post-revolutionary America and the ways in which differing senses of rights, Lockean liberalism, and republicanism were used to deny women rights. Zagarri, "The Rights of Man."

Abigail Adams to John Adams, March 31, 1776, *Adams Family Correspondence*, ed. L. H. Butterfield (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 1: 369-70; 382. Also, shortly after, John Adams wrote a letter to James Sullivan expressing his fear of women voting: "Depend upon it, Sir, it is dangerous to open so fruitfull a Source of Controversy and altercation; as would be opened by attempting to alter the Qualifications of Voters. There will be no End of it. New Claims will arise. Women will demand a Vote. Lads from 12 to 21 will their Rights not enough attended to, and every Man, who has not a Farthing, will demand an equal Voice with any other in all Acts of State." May 26, 1776, *Papers of John Adams*, ed. Robert J. Taylor et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 4: 208-213.


For example, in 1764, James Otis of Massachusetts asserted that women should possess the right to vote. Otis, "The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved,
150


78 Smith argues, "Rhetorically, revolutionaries were always more willing to grant women a kind of 'equality' than they were either blacks or American Indians. But, ironically, as they provided some benefits to blacks and at least promised some to American Indians, they actually moved women further away from full citizenship." He continues, "republican citizenship, after all, was identified with the material self-reliance and martial virtue that combated political corruption and foreign domination. Custom law made women economically dependent on their husbands, and if that status did not originate in their natural physical or intellectual inferiority, their limited military capacities were thought to justify it." Smith, Civic Ideals, 110-111. Others who have discussed the extent to which liberalism expanded or constrained women's rights, include Melissa A. Butler, "Early Liberal Roots of Feminism: John Locke and the Attack on Patriarchy," American Political Science Review 72 (1978): 135-50; Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989); Hilda L. Smith, Reason's Disciples: Seventeenth Century English Feminists (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 56-59.

79 Gundersen, "Independence," 65-76.


Before the revolution, women in Philadelphia ran shops, inns, and taverns; women were "silversmiths, tinworkers, barbers, bakers, fish picklers, brewers, tanners, ropemakers, lumberjacks, gunsmiths, butchers, milliners, harnessmakers, potash manufacturers, upholsterers, printers, morticians, chandlers, coachmakers, embroiderers, dry cleaners and dyers, woodworkers, staymakers, tailors, flour processors, seamstresses, netmakers, braziers, and founders." Wilson, "The Illusion," 395. Also see Ibid., 396; Dexter, *Colonial Women of Affairs*.

Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 421.

Ibid., 422-23.

Ibid., 424; Wilson, "The Illusion," 396-97.


Wilson, "The Illusion," 397-98.

Ibid., 421-22.

Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 617-18. Also, the Jeffersonian notion of liberalism stressed private property, economic freedom, and free markets. Thus, women were further excluded from constructions of citizenship because of their inability to pursue economic independence. Kerber, "The Republican Ideology," 490.

This gradual domestication of women, as was discussed before, was coupled with a decline in the average number of children per family, further emphasizing the central role of the mother. Also, with the rise of revolutionary thought before the war, young men and women asserted their independence from their parents, resulting in an
increase in premarital sex and premarital pregnancies. This flourish of rebellion was reigned in by the conservative forces of republican motherhood after the war. Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 402; 404-405. Ruth Bloch argues that industrialization removed men from the homes, shifting the majority of domestic duties to the mother; also, an increasing amount of literature on infant childcare and breastfeeding contributed to the notion that women were "naturally" fit to raise children; last, what were thought to be women's typical emotions, such as intuition and sympathy, were revalued. Bloch, "American Feminine Ideals."


95 Gundersen, "Independence," 76.

96 Kerber, Women of the Republic, 229. Also, Jan Lewis argues that the role of republican wife carried political import. The republican marriage, she argues, was a model of republican ideals of citizenship, as the wife was to be virtuous, disinterested, and self-sacrificial. Lewis, "The Republican Wife."


99 These works of benevolence included the development of charitable organizations founded on the maternal notion that women were to care for the weak, ill, and elderly in society, and in doing so, they breeched the patriarchal boundaries of the political sphere. By participating in these organized activities women cultivated a sense of unity. Lori D. Ginzberg, *Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and Class in the 19th-Century United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Norton, "White Women's Experiences," 616.

100 Wilson, "The Illusion," 429-30.

101 Ibid. Wilson's account runs contrary to Kerber's unqualified claim that "Women were left to invent their own political character. They devised their own interpretation of what the Revolution had meant to them as women, and they began to invent an ideology of citizenship that merged the domestic domain of the preindustrial woman with the new public ideology of individual responsibility and civic virtue." Kerber, *Women of the Republic*, 269.


104 Regarding treatment of American Indians, see Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 87-88; Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 106. Regarding New Jersey women voting, see note 7.

105 Wilentz says that states that did not draft a new constitution did not cut the property-owning requirement. Wilentz, "Property and Power," 33.

106 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 102-110.


108 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 123-25. Smith provides a more elaborate description of the Federalists' perspective: They "favored commercial expansion and relatively inclusive

109 Late in the Philadelphia Convention, the issue of suffrage was assigned to a committee of detail, which deliberated on the topic for over a week, while the rest of the exhausted delegates took a much-needed break. After the committee's proposal and a brief debate, the delegates decided on a provision that allowed those who qualified to vote for their lower state house to vote for members of the House of Representatives. Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 22-24. The U.S. Const., art. I, § 2, says: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." Also, the U.S. Const., art. II, § 1, says that each state legislature has the right to determine the "manner" in which presidential electors would be selected; while Article IV says that the federal government must "guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government."

110 The U.S. Constitution mentions citizenship three times as a requirement to hold federal office (see U.S. Const., art I, § 2, § 3; and art. II, § 1). The Constitution also gave Congress the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization" (art. I, § 8), but not explicitly a rule regarding citizenship. The Constitution also referred to citizens when assigning jurisdiction to the federal courts (art. III, § 2), and in a 'Privileges and Immunities cause' pertaining to extradition (art. IV, § 2).

111 Regarding the use of masculine pronouns to refer to presidents, senators, and representatives, see U.S. Const., art. I, § 2, § 3, § 6, and § 7; and art. II, § 1. Regarding the use of masculine pronouns to refer to citizens' legal rights, see U.S. Const., art. IV, § 2; amend. V; and amend VI. On women and the Constitution, see Jan Lewis, "'Of Every Age Sex & Condition': The Representation of Women in the Constitution," Journal of the Early Republic 15 (1995): 359-88; Linda K. Kerber, "'Ourselves and Our Daughters Forever': Women and the Constitution, 1787-1876," in One Woman, One Vote: Rediscovering the Woman Suffrage Movement, Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, ed. (Troutdale, OR: New Sage Press, 1995), 29; and Smith, Civic Ideals, 115.

112 Smith, Civic Ideals, 24. Political agency, as discussed in the introduction, reaches beyond a state-sanctioned right to vote and can be asserted through identification with a group of oppressed people and by confronting political institutions and demanding

Moreover, the issue of slavery empowered state governments to shape the livelihoods of America's largest minority population. As a measure of compromise, the Constitution left slavery in the hands of state governments and even created measures to preserve the South's economic dependence on slavery. The Constitution prohibited the abolition of the African slave trade for at least twenty years; every state was required to return fugitive slaves; and the three-fifths clause gave Southern states more electoral votes in national elections. Foner, "From Slavery to Citizenship," 57. Also, the Constitution mentions "Indians" twice in somewhat insignificant ways: Article 1, Sections 2 excluded "Indians not taxed" as part of the electorate; Article 1, Section 8 says that "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."


115 Ibid., 346.

116 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 138. For more on the differences between Federalists and Jeffersonians, see Ibid., 142-47.


120 Baker, "The Domestication of Politics," 628; Rogers, "Introduction," 9-10; Schudson, The Good Citizen, 94.


123 Schudson, The Good Citizen, 91-93.


New Hampshire was the first state to impose a citizenship requirement in 1814; Connecticut and Virginia did so in 1818; New Jersey in 1820; Massachusetts and New York in 1822; Delaware, North Carolina, and Rhode Island followed in the next two decades; and with the exception of Vermont in 1828, Tennessee in 1834, and Ohio in 1852, all new states that entered the union had a citizenship requirement. Only Georgia and South Carolina did not impose the requirement before 1860. Paul Kleppner, "Defining Citizenship," 45.


Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 40-41; 26-27. By the 1850s, the only property requirements that remained were for foreign-born residents in Rhode Island and African Americans in New York. Between 1830 and 1855, six states dropped tax-paying requirements, while six others reduced them. Ibid., 29. Also, Wilentz outlines four waves of property requirement reform between 1800 and the 1840s. See Wilentz, "Property and Power," 33; 35-36.


133 Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 55; 57.

134 Maine was the only state that entered the union without mentioning race in its voting laws. Although in 1800, blacks weren't explicitly forbidden from voting, most blacks did not meet the property or tax-paying requirements. Even in 1821, when New York removed its property requirements, it upped the requirements for blacks to $250. Anti-African American sentiment grew strong in the 1830s with the rise of the abolition movement; thus prompting Pennsylvania in 1837 to revoke blacks' right to vote completely, despite the presence of many wealthy blacks in Philadelphia. Cogan, "The Look Within," 492; Foner, "From Slavery to Citizenship," 57-58; Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 54-55; also see Ibid., Table A.4, "Race and Citizenship Requirements for Suffrage: 1790-1855," and Table A.5, "Chronology of Race Exclusions: 1790-1855."

135 Chief Justice Marshall's decisions throughout the 1830s defined American Indians as members of dependent nations, thus, if they left their tribes and worked in cities and paid taxes, they were to be treated as immigrants. However, because they were not treated as foreign-born immigrants, they were given a different set of naturalization laws to follow. Congress naturalized some American Indians in lieu of land, but most states disenfranchised "uncivilized" American Indians. Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 59-60.

136 Rogers, "Introduction," 10. Regarding the suffrage restriction on the poor and criminals, see Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 61-64. Also, regarding the rise of anti-Catholic sentiments, see Ibid., 66-67; Kleppner, "Defining Citizenship."
137 See Kleppner, "Defining Citizenship."


140 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 175.


144 Sachs and Wilson, Sexism and the Law, 77-78. Also, Basch agrees that these legal advances were part of an effort to achieve equity among all persons, not equality for women. Basch, "Equity vs. Equality," 299-301. Also, Baker maintains that the expansion of women's property rights was often made to protect male interests. Baker, "The Domestication of Politics," 631.


146 Cogan, "The Look Within"; Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 175.

147 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 54.
148 Baker, "The Domestication of Politics," 631; Smith, Civic Ideals, 146-47.


152 Kerber argues that the definition of citizenship in the early republic should be expanded to recognize the ways in which women were politically engaged: "If we broaden the discussion and recognize that citizenship involves wide-ranging issues of claims and rights and of political behavior, as well as matters of allegiance, support, and analysis, then it is not difficult to find many occasions when women addressed political matters." Kerber, "The Paradox," 354-55.


154 Wollstonecraft advocated for coeducation as a means of enriching women's moral and intellectual development. Ultimately, though, American women resisted embracing Wollstonecraft's radical ideas because of her eccentric personal character. Wollstonecraft's association with the secular radicalism of the French Revolution was considered unfavorable as the ideology became outdated by 1800. Also, she had given birth to a child before marriage and was socially outcast. For a discussion on the impact of Wollstonecraft's Vindication in America, see Zagarri, "The Rights of Man," 205-11.

156 Ibid., 16.


160 The Female Benevolence Society was one of the most prominent of these organizations. Baker, "The Domestication of Politics," 632-34.


162 Ibid., 365-72.


166 Ginzberg, Women and the Work of Benevolence, 25.


169 Smith Rosenberg, "Beauty, the Beast and the Militant Woman," 584.

170 DuBois, "Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers," 837. Further, the labor movement of the 1820s and 1830s did not provide the opportunities or rhetorical resources to argue for women's rights as much as the abolition movement; DuBois attributes this to the more masculinized aspects of class issues. Ibid., 840.

171 Wright had such a profound effect on the role of women in social reform that woman's rights advocates throughout the nineteenth century were often pejoratively labeled, "Fanny Wrightists." Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle, 25-26.


These women were Sarah Mapps Douglass, Sarah Forten, Margareta Forten, and Harriet Forten. Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, "Discrimination Against Afro-American Women in the Woman's Movement, 1830-1920," in *The Afro-American Woman*, 18.

Discrimination against African American women did not stop in the 1860s; however, African American women became a stronger, organized force after that time. Ibid., 20. Also see Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, "African American Women and the Woman Suffrage Movement," in *One Woman, One Vote*, 137-39.


Flexner and Fitzpatrick, *Century of Struggle*, 58.

Ginzberg, *Women and the Work of Benevolence*, 85. Also, Zagarri, argues that discourse on revolutionary and equality ideas about women circulated just as much as republican mother ideals. Further, she claims, "This discourse concerning women's rights
provides a crucial intellectual link between the Revolutionary era and the first feminist movement of the 1830s and 1840s." Zagarri, "The Rights of Man and Woman," 228.


182 The Fifteenth Amendment, which was ratified in 1870, says: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. U.S. Const., amend. XV, § 1. Also see Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 77-80.

183 Foner, "From Slavery to Citizenship," 57.

184 In 1855, the Know-Nothings won control of all New England states except Maine and Vermont; they emerged as the leading opposition to Democrats in the Mid-Atlantic states, California, and slave states; and in 1856, Know-Nothing presidential candidate, Millard Fillmore, polled over 21%, the largest percentage of a third-party candidate with the exception of Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. Kleppner, "Defining Citizenship," 49.


189 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 176.

191 Stanton et al., eds., *HWS*, 1:67; Griffith, *In Her Own Right*, 55.

192 Wellman, *The Road to Seneca Falls*, 195.

193 Ibid., 194-96.


197 Ibid.


199 Ibid., emphasis added.


201 For more on the women's rights conventions of the 1850s, see DuBois, "Outgrowing the Compact of Our Fathers," 841-44; Isenberg, *Sex and Citizenship*, chs. 1-2; Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 176-77.


204 Conrad, "The Transformation."

205 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 286.


209 Rogers, "Introduction," 60.

210 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 298-300.
Rogers, "Introduction," 60; Ultimately, the Freedman's Bureau came to enforce the signing of these labor contracts, which seems counterintuitive to the purpose of its establishment. Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 303.

An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication, ch. 31, sec. 1, *U.S. Statutes at Large* 14 (1866): 27.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment says: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.


Rogers, "Introduction," 62.

Ibid.

Ibid., 63.


Ibid., 95-101.
221 Ibid., 102.

222 Ibid., 102-104.


224 For a history of Anthony and Stanton's friendship, see Alice S. Rossi, "A Feminist Friendship: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony," in *One Woman, One Vote*, 45-60.

225 Terborg-Penn, "African American Women," 139.


228 DuBois, "Taking Law into Their Own Hands," 71.

229 Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 178. With the exception of Radical Republican George Julian, who, in 1869, proposed a federal amendment linking the vote to citizenship rights. Ibid., 185.


231 On the conflicts that lead to the creation of the NWSA and the AWSA, see Andrea Moore Kerr, "White Women's Rights, Black Mens' Wrongs, Free Love, Blackmail, and the Formation of the American Woman Suffrage Association," in *One Woman, One Vote*, 61-80.


233 Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 104.
Ibid.


Ibid., 126.

Ibid., 126-27.

Ibid., 137.

Quoted in Flexner and Fitzpatrick, *Century of Struggle*, 161.


Flexner and Fitzpatrick, *Century of Struggle*, 162.


Flexner and Fitzpatrick, *Century of Struggle*, 147.

Ibid., 157-58; DuBois, "Taking Law into Their Own Hands," 74.

DuBois, "Taking Law into Their Own Hands," 77.


DuBois, "Taking Law into Their Own Hands," 74-76.

250 Ibid., 105-106.

251 Ibid.

252 Ibid., 106; On the four stages of Reconstruction, see Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 289-290. Also see Wilson, *The Reconstruction Desegregation Debate*.


254 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 291-95; 396-402; 318-19; 393; 320-24.

255 Ibid., 326.

256 Ibid., 357-70.

257 Ibid., 402-407.

258 Ibid., 348; 409.


260 Ibid.


262 Ibid.


264 McCammon, "Stirring Up," 456-57; Also, women were granted local or partial state suffrage regarding issues such as schooling, prohibition, and municipal taxes. Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 184-85.


270 Ibid., 259.


272 Holton, "'To Education Women,'" 1132.

273 Holton, "'To Educate Women,'" 1114-1133.


275 Ibid.

276 Ibid., 194-95.

277 Ibid., 195-96.


280 On Grover Cleveland's discussion of immigrants, see Mary E. Stuckey, *Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity* (Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2004), 129. On Theodore Roosevelt's use of the "good citizen"

281 McGerr, 869-70; Also see Schudson, *The Good Citizen*, 173.


287 Mead, *How the Vote was Won*, 2.


292 Shirley Wilson Logan, "We Are Coming": The Persuasive Discourse of Nineteenth-Century Black Women (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999), 44; 47.


294 See Logan, "We Are Coming," 98-126.


296 Smith, Civic Ideals, 387.


300 Ibid., 35.

301 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 206-207.

302 Mead, How the Vote was Won, 2.

303 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 209.


On women in the labor movement, see Nancy Schrom Dye, *As Equals and As Sisters: Feminism, the Labor Movement, and the Women's Trade Union League of New*


314 Ibid., 41.

315 Ibid., 41-42.

316 Ibid., 44.

317 Ibid., 43-44.


322 DuBois, "Woman Suffrage," 260. Also see Marilyn J. Boxer and Jean H. Quataert, *Socialist Women: European Socialist Feminism in the Nineteenth and Early*


326 Ibid., 268.

327 Ibid., 268-69.

328 Keyssar, The Right to Vote, 206.

329 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO
THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE'S NATIONAL WOMAN SUFFRAGE PARADE, 1913: MIMICKING POLITICAL RITUAL IN NATIONALIZED SPACES

By 1913, the woman suffrage movement had gained considerable political strength and social appeal. Many western states had granted woman suffrage, working-class women joined the movement in droves, and the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) had developed strong political ties. However, the movement's leaders were primarily focused on securing woman suffrage at the state level. Even the NAWSA had adopted a more decentralized policy as it loosened its control over state suffrage efforts. This focus on state suffrage was enhanced by the persistent notion that states controlled citizenship and voting laws. Thus, attempting to acquire women's full citizenship rights through a federal amendment meant transcending state lines and uniting the movement across regional, ideological, and racial differences.

These differences were shaped by the restricting and expanding forces of the Progressive Era. Progressivism helped inspire changes that were intended to place political power back in the hands of U.S. citizens, including primary elections, state referenda, and secret ballots. However, progressive efforts to empower and rehabilitate the U.S. citizenry were often influenced by preferences for Anglo-Saxon identity and culture. Discourse from the presidential, judicial, and legislative branches typically perpetuated the ideal U.S. citizen as white, "civilized," and male. Such discourse reflected exclusionary and protectionist attitudes toward African Americans, immigrants, American Indians, and women, ensuring that these groups remained subordinated and
marginalized as U.S. citizens. As Mary E. Stuckey claims, "The American polity was no more unified at the end of the Progressive Era than it had been in the movement's infancy."

Accordingly, by 1913, the discourse of the U.S. woman suffrage movement both reflected and challenged these differentiating progressive ideals. Because U.S. women comprised a significant portion of the population, woman suffragists could potentially shape and benefit from empowering progressive measures. The campaign for woman suffrage culminated in the demand for U.S. citizenship rights. However, because the movement still faced political and social opposition, woman suffrage leaders often adopted more expedient and socially-appealing strategies. These strategies were typically aimed at enhancing the citizenship rights of white, middle- and upper-class women and tended to ignore the rights of African American, working-class, and immigrant women. Thus, the power dynamics of the woman suffrage movement reflected both the empowering and exclusionary tendencies of progressivism.

The discourse of the woman suffrage movement in the early 1910s was also shaped by regional and ideological differences pertaining to states' rights. Voting rights and the power to define citizenship remained within the purview of states' rights—rights that were staunchly defended in southern states, which typically resented the federal reach of the Civil War amendments. Such regional complications explain, in part, why woman suffrage leaders remained preoccupied with winning suffrage at the state level as an incremental, moderate approach toward national-level suffrage. This state-based approach, however, facilitated the racist and nativist suffrage agenda in some southern and western states. Moreover, the success of this state-by-state approach depended on the
efforts of state suffrage organizations to raise support among voters—a more diffuse strategy than raising support among legislators. These state-level constraints made it very difficult for the woman suffrage movement to gain broad, national appeal. Thus, by the end of 1912, the U.S. woman suffrage movement lacked an organized national or militant force directed toward acquiring women's full citizenship rights through a federal amendment. Amidst a time of heightened social and national change, the NWP emerged as such a force.

The Congressional Committee (the NWP's first iteration) instituted a militant campaign for a federal amendment, working to force the issue of woman suffrage into the arena of national politics, while attempting to transcend state and ideological differences in the woman suffrage movement. In support of such ends, the Committee orchestrated its first order of business—a national woman suffrage parade. Held the day before President Woodrow Wilson's first inauguration ceremony, the Committee's parade functioned as an act of political mimesis in which Committee members mimicked the long-held ritual of the president's inauguration celebration to help promote a vision of woman suffrage as a united, national movement and constitute the identities of women as national citizens. The parade inserted women into the reserved spaces of national politics, cast woman suffrage as part of United States's democratic ideals, promoted federal suffrage over state suffrage, and promoted progressive coalition-building.

A number of contextual elements shaped the Committee's strident efforts for social change, including the prevalence of progressivism, the growing collaboration between the labor and woman suffrage movements, and Alice Paul's personal tenacity and militant vision. In what follows, a discussion of these forces will inform a rhetorical
analysis of the Committee's mimetic parade and its overall contribution toward the Committee's militant efforts to nationalize the woman suffrage movement and constitute U.S. women's national citizenship identities. An analysis of photographs, the parade's "Official Program," the "Pageant Outline," and newspaper accounts reveal that the Committee's national parade established woman suffrage as part of the nation's pursuit to fulfill U.S. democratic ideals, portrayed state suffrage as instrumental, but subordinate to federal suffrage, and promoted coalition-building across marginalized groups.

NATIONALISM, PROGRESSIVISM, AND THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

In 1913, President Woodrow Wilson instantiated his "rhetorical presidency" and sought to empower Americans with the ability to approve his policy agenda by championing shared democratic principles and promoting "a fundamental unity of all Americans." Stuckey cautions, however, that Wilson's civic notions of nationalism were often compatible with racialized notions of nationalism, which privileged Anglo-Saxon people and culture as the embodiment of U.S. democratic ideals. Consequently, Wilson's rhetorical efforts to unite and empower the American people also worked to exclude and disempower many groups attempting to participate in a U.S. nationalist identity. American Indians and African Americans in particular were excluded from Wilson's vision of U.S. nationalism, and immigrants confronted the reality of losing their ethnic identity in favor of inclusion and U.S. citizenship.³

The presidency was not the only site of inclusion and exclusion during this time, considering that the courts and Congress also championed progressive ideals that tended to marginalize certain groups. The denial of citizenship and voting rights for African Americans, for example, became more institutionalized. Despite the "separate but equal"
treatment promised through *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1898), unequal racial segregation flourished in southern and western states.\(^4\) Jim Crow laws codified segregation in "factories, hospitals, asylums, prisons, parks, circuses, movie houses, theaters, sports arenas," as well as in schools, public transportation, jury exclusion, and of course, voting booths.\(^5\) In effect, the Civil War amendments were rendered all but obsolete during the Progressive Era. Ian F. Haney López observes that during this time, a White-Black dichotomy dominated discourse pertaining to naturalization and citizenship laws, which helped construct "whiteness" as the preferred racial make-up of American citizenry.\(^6\)

Rogers M. Smith argues that centrist progressives of both the legislative and judicial branches "sought to build both order and national loyalty through civic measures designed to bolster what they took to be traditional national traits, including the organic racial and ethnic character, of the U.S. citizenry."\(^7\)

The desire to preserve whiteness shaped institutional discourse pertaining to immigration as well. Between 1900 and 1910, the United States experienced a highest rate of immigration in its history. Anti-immigrant sentiment flourished following "a marked increase of nativism" in the late-nineteenth century and was enhanced by the Progressive Era's renewed senses of racial and national superiority.\(^8\) This sentiment culminated in more stringent naturalization policies and institutionalized forms of second-, third-, and fourth-class U.S. citizenship.\(^9\) Smith argues that women, Puerto Ricans, blacks, and Native Americans experienced second-class citizenship, where promises for citizenship rights were made, but not fully realized. Those from Guam experienced third-class citizenship, as they were thought to be racially ineligible for
career. Filipinos and Chinese laborers experienced fourth-class citizenship, or the complete lack of citizenship rights due to perceived ethnic and ideological inferiority.\textsuperscript{10}

Along with progressivism and anti-immigration measures came a growing sense of international superiority, which was reflected in the nation's increased militaristic presence around the world. Most visible with President McKinley's leadership during the Spanish-American War in 1898 and President Theodore Roosevelt's subsequent militaristic exploits, the rise of U.S. internationalism shaped the inferior citizenship statuses of those immigrating from the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, Japan, and China. Progressive beliefs in inclusion stressed the "civilization" and the ultimate Americanization of these immigrants and other non-Anglo-Saxon groups.\textsuperscript{11}

The courts demonstrated the most resistance to Chinese and Japanese immigrants. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, for example, prohibited thenaturalization of Chinese persons until the 1940s.\textsuperscript{12} Haney López finds that the courts used arguments based on common knowledge and scientific evidence to determine the scope of whiteness. Regarding Asian immigrants as a whole, Haney López argues that common knowledge arguments prevailed as the measure of whiteness, which, in his opinion, demonstrates "that race is something which must be measured in terms of what people believe."\textsuperscript{13} Anti-Asian sentiment was particularly strong on the west coast, which was most likely due to the high concentration of Asian immigrants. In the early 1900s, for example, San Francisco schools segregated Japanese children from white children.\textsuperscript{14}

Courts were more open to depicting Middle Easterners and Indians as "white," and were particularly lenient toward Russians, Poles, Italians, and Greeks. Some courts defined "white" less by skin color and more by culture, and thus granted citizenship
rights based on the democratic ideals of an immigrant's home country. Many American Indians were granted citizenship rights through progressive and religious reform efforts to "civilize" native tribes; however, citizenship cost American Indians their land, which was often sold and leased beyond their control. A few judges resisted denying rights based on degrees of whiteness, although their voices were few.

As Congress and the courts institutionalized third- and fourth-class forms of citizenship for immigrants, they similarly took a protectionist posture toward the citizenship status of women. For example, in 1904, the Supreme Court ruled that husbands had "certain personal and exclusive" property rights to sexual intercourse with their wives. Further, women did not have the right to sue their husbands for battery or physical abuse, let alone acquire separate state citizenship from husbands. Women's citizenship rights were further abridged by the passage of the 1907 Expatriation Act, which dictated that if a woman married a foreigner, she forfeited her U.S. citizenship. In 1908, the Supreme Court ruling on Muller v. Oregon showed that, with women's expanding roles in the workplace, the courts would extend their impulse to "protect" women by abridging their rights. Justice David Brewer contended that women needed special protections in the workplace because of their motherly duties and physical needs. The ruling may have been considered a victory for wage-earning women, but it also reinforced the notion that women did not share equal rights with men. Thus, by 1913, the U.S. government portended to expand citizenship rights in light of progressive efforts to empower and protect the powerless; however, these efforts placed severe limits on the extent to which certain groups could participate in the much-heralded nationalistic vision of democratic citizenship. Women were no exception.
Woman Suffrage and States’ Rights

By the early 1910s, woman suffrage had made some progress on the national level. The NAWSA had developed relationships with many influential politicians. For example, President Howard Taft addressed the NAWSA’s national convention in 1910. He was very careful not to endorse the movement, but he offered the movement some legitimacy by his presence. In 1910, Congress also received a petition of 400,000 women's signatures, and in 1912, the Progressive Party, what some contend is the strongest third party in history, endorsed the movement. Nonetheless, the NAWSA's primary focus was on securing women's citizenship rights through an incremental, state-by-state campaign strategy. Once granted the right to vote at the state level, women could also vote in presidential elections. Even so, it had been over forty years since states began granting woman suffrage rights and by 1913, only one third of American women possessed these citizenship rights.

The state-by-state strategy embraced by most suffragists in the early-twentieth century was inflected by ideological, regional, and racial tensions. More specifically, ideological differences pertaining to federal rights and states' rights reflected regional differences between the North and the South during this time. The framers of the Constitution granted states the power to write voting and citizenship laws, which established a system that, according to Kirt H. Wilson, "effectively protected state officials from federal intervention." Despite differing interpretations of this system, it was generally agreed that civil matters and the rights of citizens fell within the purview of state power. This precedent was challenged in the 1870s and 1880s, when the Civil War amendments empowered the federal government to define the parameters of U.S.
citizenship and voting rights, which was considered an extension of the North's victory over the Confederate South.

The Fourteenth Amendment, in particular, introduced the notion of equality before the law and rights of national citizenship, particularly in the first section: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." However, following Reconstruction, the federal government lost its ability to enforce the Civil War amendments in southern states, which was considered a victory toward redeeming states' rights. The weakening of the Civil War amendments and the rise of Jim Crow laws entrenched regional tensions between the North and South and ideological contestations between federal and states' rights. Moreover, the South's fear of empowering African Americans' citizenship rights exacerbated its resistance to constitutional actions pertaining to voting rights.

These regional, ideological, and racial differences shaped the way southern women viewed women's citizenship rights. Compared to most northern women, for example, southern women typically were more resistant to a federal amendment. Jacqueline Glass Campbell argues that following the Civil War, southern women helped preserve their southern identity by constructing men of the South as heroes. Southern women, conversely, were depicted as pillars of "sentimentality, patience, and endurance" and as "cultural guardians rather than the makers of nations and nationalisms." Throughout Reconstruction and into the early-twentieth century, southern women transformed their identities as victims of Union soldiers into potential rape victims of African American males, entrenching fears of African American males and encouraging
acts of discrimination and violence.\textsuperscript{29} With racial tensions more pronounced in the South than in the North, many southern women feared that a federal mandate to enhance women's rights would simultaneously enhance African Americans' rights. Additionally, southern women often retained more conservative views of gendered behavior, resisting the image of themselves as political actors.\textsuperscript{30} Acquiring woman suffrage through a constitutional amendment, such logic suggested, represented a direct threat to state power and white privilege.

Reflecting such sentiments, racism in the woman suffrage movement was particularly strong in the South. As support for woman suffrage in the South grew (by 1913, every southern state had an NAWSA organization), southern leaders more ardently pursued suffrage as a right for white women only.\textsuperscript{31} Further, white suffrage leaders staunchly defended states' rights fearing that a federal suffrage amendment could override the power of Jim Crow laws and lead to the enfranchisement of African American men and women. In 1906, for example, Laura Clay of Kentucky and Kate Gordon of Louisiana led state-wide suffrage campaigns promoting a "whites-only" version of the law.\textsuperscript{32} Further, in 1913, Gordon organized the Southern States Woman Suffrage Conference in response to the NAWSA's establishment of a committee designed to pursue a federal amendment exclusively. Gordon, formerly an NAWSA leader, worked to preserve states' rights in order to maintain white supremacy in the woman suffrage movement.\textsuperscript{33}

Regional tensions over federal and states' rights were not unique to the North and South. Although more eager to grant women the right to vote at the state level, the West had its own racially-driven concerns about a federal woman suffrage amendment. More
specifically, western states feared that such an amendment could potentially expand citizenship rights to Chinese, Japanese, and Mexican immigrants, and American Indians. Even western suffragists made racist and nativist arguments by promoting the idea that the vote would empower white women to "civilize" American Indians.

Nonetheless, the woman suffrage movement in western states thrived and had more success winning partial and state suffrage than in the northeastern and the southern states. Scholars argue that western states and municipalities were more willing to grant women citizenship rights due to the egalitarian nature of the region's agricultural society and to the newer states' desire to attract inhabitants and establish a voting population.

*Woman Suffrage, Progressive Racism, and Elitism*

Racism in the woman suffrage movement, however, was not always a regional characteristic. Many woman suffrage leaders embraced philosophies reflective of the racist and exclusionary tendencies of most progressive efforts. For example, in her book, *Women and Economics* (1898), Charlotte Perkins Gilman argues that women had been made economically dependent on men and reduced to mere ornaments and drudges. However, her work privileged the role and power of Anglo-Saxon culture over those of African or Asian descent. When discussing women's citizenship status upon marrying foreigners, Gilman said,

The largest and most radical effect of restoring women to economic independence will be in its result in clarifying and harmonizing the human soul. With a homogenous nature bred of two parents in the same degree of social development, we shall be able to feel simply, to see clearly, to agree with ourselves, to be one person and master of our own lives, instead of wrestling in such hopeless
perplexity with what we have called "man's dual nature." Marry a civilized man to a primitive savage, and their child will have a dual nature. Marry an Anglo-Saxon to an African or Oriental, and their child has dual nature.37

Gilman's vision of women's independence reflected the prevalence of social Darwinism, eugenics, and the move to "civilize" and purify those of non-Anglo-Saxon decent into a "homogenous nature." Thus, the leaders of the woman suffrage movement were not immune to the Americanizing efforts of the Progressive Era.

Even the NAWSA embraced a progressive sense of expedient racism. For example, in 1895, long after the split between the abolition and suffrage movements in the 1860s, Susan B. Anthony asked Frederick Douglass not to attend an NAWSA convention in Atlanta.38 In 1899, the NAWSA refused to advocate on behalf of Lottie Wilson Jackson against segregated seating on trains. Anthony insisted that woman suffrage and African American woman suffrage were separate causes.39 In 1900, Josephine St. Pierre Ruffin and Mary Church Terrell were ostracized at a General Federation of Women's Clubs meeting in Wisconsin. Later that year, Terrell spoke at the Minneapolis Convention of Women and at an NAWSA convention denouncing white women's prejudices and extolling the needs of black women. Furthermore, in 1903, at an NAWSA convention held in New Orleans, the national board adopted a policy allowing states to develop their own suffrage positions, which gave southern states the freedom to pursue racist suffrage efforts. Prominent suffrage leaders, including Anthony, Carrie Chapman Catt, Anna Howard Shaw, Kate Gordon, and Alice Stone Blackwell signed the statement. In fact, in 1911, Shaw was accused of barring an African American woman
from the NAWSA's Louisville convention and was noted for placating white southern suffragists during her tenure as NAWSA's president between 1910 and 1915.40

Racist and nativist arguments regarding citizenship and voting rights also persisted in the anti-suffragist movement. The National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage (NAOWS), founded in 1911, was particularly strong in the southern states because it relied on conservative arguments regarding a woman's proper place and the rights of African American women. It was thought that black women were more aggressive than black men and would be more difficult to keep from voting polls. The NAOWS's efforts in addition to the strength of such gendered and racist beliefs resulted in many failed attempts at state and local suffrage in the South.41 Deep-seated beliefs in preserving social, cultural, and political modes of power relied on the persistent subordination not only of women, but particularly of non-white women. As such, opposition to woman suffrage on behalf of political machines, liquor interests, and even immigrants (who feared that woman suffrage would result in the loss of their jobs), resulted in multiple failed state suffrage referenda between 1912 and 1914. Throughout these years, more referenda failed than succeeded.42

Reform and "social control" efforts of the Progressive Era also reflected elitist attitudes toward working-class and immigrant women. For example, the Children's Bureau, founded in 1912, was the first all-woman branch of the federal government, which offered professional women a place to push policies on improving infant health care and regulating child labor. However, enforcing these progressive efforts required extending the reach of the federal government into the lives and homes of working-class and immigrant women. According to Molly Ladd-Taylor, this perceived elitist push for
"social control" was met with resistance from "an unreceptive working class."\textsuperscript{43} Thus, as Eileen Boris argues, "social control can therefore be more accurately interpreted as intervention into families on the part of the state and professional experts, mediated by the gender, class, race, and ethnicity of both family members and interveners."\textsuperscript{44}

Despite the racist, classist, and sexist tendencies of progressivism and the woman suffrage movement, minority and working-class women managed to assert their political agency and push forward for full citizenship rights. Nancy A. Hewitt documents the activist efforts on behalf of Tampa's black, Latina, and Anglo women in the first decade of the twentieth century. She argues that elite Anglos and Latinas participated in clubs, social welfare associations, revolutionary organizations, and mutual aid societies, while working-class Latinas and black women "employed domestic resources and skills as instruments of class and racial struggle." These women managed to form their own mutual-aid societies and welfare institutions to resist class-based discrimination.\textsuperscript{45}

Wage-earning black women were typically excluded from efforts of trade unions, and were often shamed within the black community for transgressing their domestic duties and for perpetuating the belief that black males lacked the proper education or inherent ability to provide for their families. While these factors hindered the development of a working-class consciousness among black women, they still managed to establish working-womens' associations, clubs, occupational training, and cooperative daycares. Eventually, the Associations for the Protection of Negro Women was formed in 1905, which became the National League for the Protection of Colored Women in 1909.\textsuperscript{46} Black women in Atlanta—the most segregated city in Georgia at that time—for example, organized the Neighborhood Union in 1908. As part of the Union's efforts, the
Women's Civic and Social Improvement Committee conducted extensive studies of white and black Atlanta schools, documenting the severe disparities in material conditions, hygienic qualities, and teachers' wages. The Committee's relentless petitioning resulted in improved facilities, teachers' salaries, and classroom spaces.\(^47\)

Thus, by 1913, the woman suffrage movement reflected both the empowering and differentiating ideals of the Progressive Era, particularly as they pertained to geographical region, federal and states' rights, race, and class. In light of these differences, and despite the NAWSA's success as a reputable national organization, the woman suffrage movement remained committed to a state-by-state strategy. Additionally, the woman suffrage movement had yet to be considered a legitimate force in politics on the national level. In other words, the majority of leaders in the presidential, legislative, and judicial branches of the U.S. government refused to address the grievances expressed by the national woman suffrage movement. The Senate Woman Suffrage Committee, for example, which had been in existence since 1877, had not formally met since 1878.\(^48\) By 1913, no sitting president had publicly endorsed woman suffrage, despite President Taft's relationship with the NAWSA and former President Roosevelt's endorsement during his campaign as the Progressive Party candidate. As such, although woman suffrage had been part of the political vernacular for some fifty years, the woman suffrage movement had yet to be considered a legitimate force in the arena of national politics.

*The WSPU, Harriot Stanton Blatch, and Militancy in America*

The suffrage movement was strengthened by its alliance with the labor and settlement house movements in the years leading up to 1913. As discussed in Chapter One, Harriot Stanton Blatch founded the Equality League of Self-Supporting Women in
1907, which promoted unity between wage-earning and professional women and enacted a militant approach toward social change. In the 1880s and 1890s, Blatch earned her militant training in England as an apprentice of Ursula Bright—a radical reformer with close ties to Harriot's activist mother. Having also served in an apprenticeship position under Bright, Emmeline Pankhurst founded the militant woman suffrage organization in England, the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU). Working alongside her daughter, Christabel Pankhurst, Emmeline deployed militant tactics that "electrified the country and galvanized the whole of the suffrage movement" between 1903 and 1911.49

In the beginning of their campaign, the WSPU employed nonviolent protest strategies by harassing Members of Parliament, leading marches, and disguising themselves in order to infiltrate and disrupt private Parliamentary meetings.50 However, the proactively violent stages of the WSPU's militant campaign began after Christabel's premeditated arrest on October 13, 1905.51 Andrew Rosen describes the process:

A basic pattern had been established, wherein pre-planned militant tactics led to imprisonment, and thus, martyrdom, which led to newspaper coverage (i.e., free publicity), which led in turn to increased membership and funds for the WSPU. This sequence, repeated again and again, was to form the basis of the militant feminist campaign. It had the double function of both attracting members to the WSPU and attempting to win wide public support for women's suffrage.52

Furthermore, Christabel and fellow suffragette, Annie Kenney, forced their arrests by entering a Free Trade Hall meeting and shouting demands for the vote.53 Even after the women put their question into writing, the chairman and his colleagues refused to answer the question, prompting both women to stand on their chairs and unfurl a banner posing
the same question. While continuing to shout, the women were forcibly removed from the hall and subsequently arrested. Much to the WSPU's leaders' delight, the event got the press's attention.  

In the summer of 1909, WSPU members began launching rocks into crowds of government officials and innocent citizens. While imprisoned, a number of "suffragettes"—as they were called in England—began hunger strikes, demanding to be treated as political prisoners instead of common criminals. Their demands were met with force-feedings—an extremely painful process, which WSPU members often likened to the act of rape. In July of 1910, the Conciliation Bill promising suffrage neared passage, prompting the WSPU to call a truce. However, Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith terminated the bill, after which the WSPU staged an impromptu march to the houses of Parliament, dubbed "Black Friday." Numerous women endured sexual assault, abuse, and forcible arrests by police and bystanders. The women's attackers argued that the protesters invited the violence because of their perverse and unfeminine behavior.  

WSPU protests eventually escalated into acts of terrorism and property destruction as members poured acid, cut telegraph wires, slashed pictures in public galleries, and bombed and set fire to empty churches and homes. WSPU members claimed that they had not declared war on Parliament, but Parliament had declared war on them.  

Ultimately, England's entrance into World War I brought an end to the WSPU's militant campaign efforts, shifting Emmeline and Christabel's efforts toward mobilizing support for the war.  

Having maintained close ties with the Pankhursts and the WSPU, Blatch infused her campaign for working-women's rights and U.S. woman suffrage with similar militant
tactics. Blatch organized women to attend open-air meetings (large public gatherings featuring multiple speakers), deliver soapbox speeches, and wear sandwich boards.58 Most significantly, Blatch introduced the mass suffrage parade as a new tactic in the woman suffrage movement. In 1907, an all-woman suffrage parade was attempted by Bettina Borman Wells, a visiting member of the WSPU. Only twenty-three women marched, however, and the parade received very little public attention.59 Additionally, many state woman suffrage organizations held suffrage parades, beginning in California and Iowa in 1908.60 However, on May 21, 1910, Blatch's Equality League took to the streets of New York in the largest organized woman suffrage parade yet, in which several hundred suffragists marched.61 Blatch organized annual suffrage parades in New York between 1910 and 1913, aiming to push the public/private boundaries imposed upon women. Blatch's most successful parade took place on May 4, 1912, with over 10,000 men and women marching in New York, wearing costumes, holding banners, singing songs, giving speeches, and representing delegations of women suffragists all over the country. Women of diverse races, ages, and classes marched together with prominent suffragist, Inez Milholland, leading the parade on horseback.62

Blatch's innovative tactics held many implications for the woman suffrage movement in the early 1910s. To begin, the suffrage parade managed to force the suffrage question into the minds of many Americans. On one hand, the parade functioned as an exhibition of femininity and celebrated women's traditional gender roles as they provided a spectacle for others to admire or gaze upon. On the other hand, the parade represented the intrusion of women into the public sphere and women's demand for equal rights. Such insistent demands for equal rights were a reflection of Blatch's militant
vision. According to Holly J. McCammon, parades "not only allowed [suffragists] to claim the streets as women's terrain, but the parades also permitted women to lay symbolic claim to the polity as they demanded the right to vote. Their use of the tactic helped the suffragists redefine themselves as men's equals in the public sphere."\(^6^3\)

Blatch's militant strategies also helped foster solidarity with working-class women and the labor movement. Forging a shared identity between elite and working-class women was not without its problems, however; Blatch was aware that an elite woman delivering a soap-box speech garnered more press than a working-class woman doing the same.\(^6^4\) Nonetheless, these militant efforts helped establish a sense of collectivity for suffragists as working- and upper-class women marched side-by-side in Blatch's parades. As Ellen Carol DuBois argues, participating in these public protests "intensified women's commitment to the movement."\(^6^5\) Blatch's efforts also were the result of pursuing a single-issue approach toward woman suffrage. In fact, she had been criticized for ignoring other women-related issues in order to focus solely on attaining women's full citizenship rights.\(^6^6\) Alice Paul would face similar criticism.

**Alice Paul and the NWP**

Alice Paul's entrance into the U.S. woman suffrage scene was motivated by her participation in the WSPU's militant campaign throughout 1909 and 1910. In fact, the NWP attributed its militant campaign to Emmeline Pankhurst's militancy in England.\(^6^7\) Throughout Paul's time with the WSPU, she was arrested five times, and while in prison, she went on hunger strikes, refused clothing, and endured force-feedings—an experience that left an indelible mark on Paul's memory.\(^6^8\) After her turbulent time in England, she returned to the United States ready to thrust the suffrage movement forward. At this
point, Paul was twenty-seven years of age and had earned multiple degrees in higher education, including a B.A., M.A., and Ph.D., in addition to attending the London School of Economics.\textsuperscript{69} Prior to her work with the WSPU, Paul participated in the settlement house movement in England, which instilled in her the notion that social reform and woman suffrage were inextricably linked movements. Thus, upon her return to America, Paul found good company among the settlement house and trade unionist leaders with inroads to the NAWSA's executive board.\textsuperscript{70} In fact, Paul delivered a speech at the 1910 NAWSA convention discussing and defending the WSPU's militant campaign. Her American audience, however, was resistant to such dramatic measures and could not relate to the violent nature of the WSPU's militant campaign.\textsuperscript{71}

Instigating a militant woman suffrage campaign in a U.S. political context required Paul to adjust her sense of militancy. Cheryl R. Jorgensen-Earp argues that, despite the violent outcome of the WSPU's campaign, militancy is the result of an ongoing negotiation between the marginalized and the politically-powerful, and thus, "new protest strategies must be justified in terms that are socially intelligible."\textsuperscript{72} In the context of England's suffrage movement, suffragettes felt they had exhausted tactics of marching and lobbying Parliament, and thus, justified their move to property destruction as a last resort. In the United States, suffragists had yet to reach this point of exhaustion.\textsuperscript{73} This may be so because the movement's decentralized and state-level efforts resulted in small successes, which may have precluded state activists from realizing a collective sense of defeat. Moreover, in England, where political power is bound up in the parliamentary process, suffragettes had agitated Members of Parliament, Cabinet Ministers, and the Prime Minister prior to escalating to acts of violence.\textsuperscript{74} At this point,
U.S. suffragists had yet to agitate those with political power in a collective, organized fashion—let alone militantly protest figures of national political authority, such as members of Congress or the president.

Thus, Paul's militant vision did not take a violent form. Nevertheless, it did adopt many key principles from the WSPU's campaign. First, militancy was viewed as a form of action. As the WSPU's slogan commands, "Deeds Not Words," Paul did not mince words seeking approval from NAWSA leaders or political figures; rather, she made her suffrage demands through a series of sensational, highly-publicized militant acts.75 Next, Paul knew that because militant strategies pushed the boundaries of socially-acceptable behavior, they generated publicity. As Rosen simply declared, "Militancy was news."76

The double-edged sword of publicity created a win-win situation for militant suffragists: at best, it attracted sympathizers and created the exigency for those with political power to acknowledge the movement, and at worst, it increased the likelihood of opposition. Finally, Paul's sense of militancy was driven by the WSPU's theory of agitation, in which those who hold political power were held responsible for social change. Thus, in an effort to secure a federal suffrage amendment, Paul directed her militant efforts toward figures of national political power, including the president and members of Congress. In so doing, Paul's sense of militancy also compelled her to focus on nationalizing the woman suffrage movement and forcing the issue into the fray of national-level politics.

After her return to the United States, Paul's militant training inspired her to spend the summer of 1911 organizing open-air meetings for the Pennsylvania Suffrage Association in Philadelphia, earning her some prominence in the Philadelphia woman suffrage community.77 Then, in 1912, Paul met several times with fellow WSPU activist,
Lucy Burns, to discuss ways to more forcefully implement their militant philosophy of agitation. Paul and Burns were inspired by the state-level enfranchisement of two million American women. Mobilizing these women to vote against non-suffrage supporting legislators would force such political leaders to take woman suffrage seriously, helping to bring woman suffrage to the forefront of electoral politics and constituting these women as citizens with political power.

Paul and Burns decided the NAWSA would allow them the organizational legitimization to put this plan into practice. Fortuitously, the 1912 NAWSA's national convention was to be held in Philadelphia, which prompted Paul to pressure Anna Howard Shaw and Harriot Stanton Blatch—a couple of her reform acquaintances—to move forward her proposal. Paul's Burns's plan was it was rejected outright; openly campaigning against non-suffrage-supporting congressmen was too militant for the NAWSA. Paul and Burns then turned to NAWSA Vice President, Jane Addams, who listened to their case and managed to persuade the NAWSA to accept their proposal. The final proposal, however, was accepted on the condition that Paul and Burns curtail their anti-Congress strategy and instead, orchestrate a parade to be held in Washington, D.C. on the day before President Wilson's first inaugural ceremony. Given Blatch's recent success with suffrage parades, this strategy seemed less offensive to the NAWSA's leaders. As such, the NAWSA's Congressional Committee was established with Paul as president, Burns as vice-chairman, and socialist-feminist radical Crystal Eastman as a committee member at-large.78

Paul began her work immediately. The Committee was promised no financial support from the NAWSA, so Paul raised some funds in Philadelphia before whisking off
to Washington, D.C.—the ideal location for pressing woman suffrage into the national political agenda and to establish headquarters to plan its suffrage parade. Upon her arrival in December of 1912, she found no office space, no active NAWSA members interested in a federal amendment, and an outdated list of potential volunteers. In fact, the NAWSA member previously in charge of pursuing a federal amendment was unable to spend all of her $10 annual budget. Paul managed to secure the basement of a building at 1420 F Street as the official headquarters of the Congressional Committee. Committee members were left with no option but to call upon friends, former classmates, and a larger network of activists for support. They even made unannounced door-to-door calls, asking for volunteer and financial support. On January 2, 1913, the Committee held its first formal meeting, where Paul laid out the plans for the parade on Wilson's inaugural to be held in just two months time.

The Committee distinguished itself from other woman suffrage organizations by adopting a militant, single-issue approach and pursuing the federal amendment exclusively. This approach went hand-in-hand with Paul's "swift, decisive leadership" and her ability to be bold, honest, direct, and to never take "no" for an answer. Paul's militant efforts have also been described as "driven by a fury of speed," her leadership style was often subject to criticism. Paul once wrote to Blatch, "I am not a speaker at all," reinforcing the idea that Paul's strengths lie in her organizing and delegating capabilities. Like Blatch's work with the Equality League, Paul's single-issue approach was considered autocratic and top-down. Furthermore, Paul's militancy faced criticism for facilitating acts of expedient racism, which discouraged alliances with African American suffragists for fear they would slow down the Committee's success.
Nonetheless, Paul's tirelessness and talent for inspiring and directing others immediately attracted many recruits, including elite and working-class white women leaders of the settlement house and labor movements. Among these women were Dora Kelley Lewis, a co-worker of Paul's from Philadelphia, Mary Ritter Beard, a New York writer and reformer, and Lavinia Dock of the Henry Street settlement house. Notable wage-earning women who joined the Committee included Margaret Hinchey of the Women's Trade Union League, Rose Winslow of the National Consumers' League, and Josephine Casey, a Chicago trade unionist. Despite lacking racial diversity, the organization's membership was considered youthful, temperamental, and uncompromising. Even though some members were not technically "young" (such as Harriot Stanton Blatch, who at the time was older than the NAWSA's Carrie Chapman Catt), the Committee's membership promised a fresh and defiant approach to woman suffrage.

These swift developments in early 1913 brought invigorating change to the woman suffrage movement. Strategically, Paul and her fellow suffragists intended to subordinate the state-by-state campaign strategy and focus directly on acquiring a federal amendment to the Constitution. Additionally, their faith in militant tactics stood in sharp relief against the moderate methods of the NAWSA and other woman suffrage organizations. Ideologically, their belief in equal rights posed a threat to many southern suffragists who stuck to a states' rights position and invoked racist fears of expanding citizenship rights to many minority groups. Nonetheless, the newly-formed Congressional Committee thrust itself into the contested arena of national politics, where
it had to negotiate the regional, racial, and ideological differences characteristic of U.S. nationalism and Progressive-Era beliefs.

"INVADING" NATIONAL SPACES AND FULFILLING U.S. DEMOCRATIC IDEALS

The Committee's national suffrage parade functioned as an instance of political mimesis. Toward such ends, it mimicked the ritual of the inaugural parade in a militant effort to agitate President Wilson, insert women into the nationalized spaces of Washington, D.C., and nationalize the suffrage movement, while simultaneously normalizing woman suffrage as part of the nationalistic project to fulfill and uphold democratic ideals. More specifically, the Committee's intrusion into the streets of Washington, D.C. challenged the politicized and gendered spaces of the nation's capital, targeted Wilson as the key change-agent for woman suffrage, and illustrated woman suffrage as the pursuit of freedom, justice, liberty, and equality. By aligning the pursuit of woman suffrage with nationalistic ideals that transcended state differences, the Committee further justified its demands for a suffrage amendment at the federal level and allowed U.S. women to participate in a vision of U.S. democratic citizenship.

The Committee's national parade functioned as a mimetic enactment of the president's first symbolic act as president—the inauguration. As Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson argue, inaugurals "are an essential element in a ritual of transition in which the covenant between the citizenry and their leaders is renewed," and in which "a newly elected president is invested with the office of the presidency." With the rise of the rhetorical presidency and the democratizing wave of Progressive-Era politics, Wilson's presidential inauguration acquired particular significance in reinforcing this covenant. While inaugurations call upon newly-elected presidents to take the oath of
office and deliver an inaugural address, these rituals have come to symbolize a "celebration of democratic change and continuity." Such a celebration often takes the form of an inauguration parade, during which the president is driven through the streets of Washington D.C. as thousands gather to see their newly-elected leader take the oath of office. Inauguration parades, then, shape the inauguration ritual as an occasion in which the U.S. citizenry and the president share a mutual recognition of the duties and responsibilities of the presidency as they participate in the pomp and circumstance within sacred national spaces.

As Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf argue, "mimesis tends toward condensed symbols, for example, toward rituals and images." Thus, as a key political ritual, Wilson's first inauguration parade was an ideal target of the Committee's efforts to nationalize the woman suffrage movement through political mimesis. Moreover, Campbell and Jamieson explain that the presidential inauguration allows the president to demonstrate "an ability to mobilize and unify the citizenry." Likewise, the Committee's national parade offered the potential to attract a national audience to the question of woman suffrage through such symbolism as it mobilized women from all over the nation to provide a vision of national unity. Additionally, mimicking the president's inaugural celebration provided an illustration of Arne Melberg's theory of mimesis as a "meeting-place of two opposing but connected ways of thinking, acting, and making: similarity and difference." Specifically, the Committee's national parade worked to oppose or protest President Wilson's resistance to woman suffrage; however, its members did so by likening themselves to the president, thus constructing U.S. woman suffrage as worthy of a large-scale celebration and of national attention. Moreover, this likeness suggested that
U.S. women were entitled to a stake in the national spaces of the U.S. capitol and were empowered with the authority to engage the U.S. public as political leaders. Melberg's vocabulary of "similarity and difference" also speaks to the ways in which the Committee's rhetoric of political mimesis exuded both traditional and militant approaches to social change. The national parade reflected the traditionally accepted ritual of inaugurating recently-elected presidents while functioning as the vehicle through which women could militant invade the privileged spaces of Washington, D.C., nationalize the woman suffrage movement, and offer a national vision of women's citizenship rights.

To begin, the location of the Committee's national parade symbolized the intrusion of women into national politics, unlike previous militant parades held in individual states. Catherine Allgor argues that, following the War of 1812, Washington, D.C. became "the definitive center of power for the United States, an important player in international politics, and a focus for American nationalism." As the center of national politics, Washington's public spaces were highly politicized, holding significant implications for the roles that women would play in these spaces. Allgor documents how, in the early Republic, Dolley Madison helped fashion Washington into "a third sphere between public and private," where it was common to see white, upper-class women intermingle and mix freely with politicians in public and political spaces. Eventually, with the rise of the Jacksonian Era's emphasis on expanding democratic rights to "the common man," public spaces in Washington became more clearly reserved for men to conduct political affairs. As such, women's political activities were confined to the upbringing of virtuous citizens within the domestic sphere. Thus, in Washington, when a woman transgressed these political boundaries, she often was considered a prostitute.
By the early-twentieth century, however, the boundaries between the public and the private spheres were becoming "slightly less discrete." Nonetheless, a mass woman suffrage parade aimed at agitating the president challenged the masculine preserve of the nation's most preeminent political space.

The Committee's mimetic parade, thus, literally and symbolically forced woman suffrage into the sacred spaces of national politics. Prior to the national suffrage parade, women had testified before Congress, presented petitions in Congress, and even held national conventions in Washington, D.C. However, the Committee's national parade was the first time masses of women descended upon the streets of Washington, D.C., creating a visualization of a collective, national movement. For days prior to the parade, newspapers reported on the arrival of women's delegations by train, car, and even on foot as an "invasion" of suffragists ready to "take the city." The perception that large groups of women intruded upon the politicized spaces of Washington, D.C. suggested that the Committee's mimetic parade held a national audience, which helped legitimize the Committee's efforts to nationalize the suffrage movement.

The Committee further mimicked the ritual of the inaugural parade by casting its militant quest for equal suffrage as a fulfillment of U.S. democratic ideals. Mimicking one of the key epideictic functions of the presidential inaugural, the Committee "rehearse[d] communal values drawn from then past." Drawing upon shared values held by the national community, particularly as they take root in the nation's narrative of democracy, the Committee further helped nationalize the question of woman suffrage. In *The Suffragist*'s second issue, these ideals shone through most vividly: "It is open to all women, who, believing that equal Suffrage is a fundamental of democracy, consider
Woman Suffrage the main issue in national politics." The Committee invoked these "fundamental[s] of democracy" through its parade. For example, one section of the Committee's national parade illustrated the history of the woman suffrage movement through four floats, each representing a stage of the movement between 1840 and 1913. The floats' narration of the woman suffrage movement was framed as a larger story of triumph by its leading two banners: "The 75 Years Struggle for Freedom" and "Justice Conquering Prejudice." Here, "prejudice" was the central obstacle to freedom. The parade's "Official Program" reinforced this narrative of triumph by offering captions to each float. The captions first described the women of 1840 as facing "a black wall of prejudice," which, by 1870, had become "less defiant." By 1890, "prejudice [was] standing aside for progress," which had culminated in an abundance of "advocates of the cause" by 1913. In casting the woman suffrage movement as an ultimately-triumphant battle against prejudice, the Committee elevated the movement as part of the nation's overall commitment to freedom and justice. In so doing, the Committee linked its cause to the nation's revolutionary ideals to break free from tyranny and to pursue individual liberties. Ultimately, rehearsing these democratic values further strengthened the Committee's move to mimic the inauguration ceremony as a national celebration of democracy and to nationalize the suffrage movement as part of the larger pursuit of freedom and justice.

The Committee's mimetic enactment of political ritual took another form in its national parade as it mimicked the nationalistic pursuit of democratic ideals through a tableau staged on the steps of the Treasury Building. The tableau featured the character Columbia, who summoned the characters of Justice, Charity, Liberty, Hope, and Peace to
fight the crusade of women's rights. The narrative structure of the tableau invoked the myths central to the nation's genesis. In the late-eighteenth century, as the new nation struggled to establish a shared sense of nationalism, Christopher Columbus became a celebrated figure of the nation's history. A derivative of Columbus's name, "Columbia," soon came to symbolize British America as a reflection of the colonies' growing separation from Great Britain. Phillis Wheatley personified Columbia through her 1775 poem, "To His Excellency General Washington." Thomas Steele argues that Wheatley's Columbia represented the combination of two mythical characters: the more feminine Phoebus Apollo, "the god of poetry and poets," and the more masculine Pallas Athene, "the goddess of strategy and generals." The tableau reinforced these gendered contours as Columbia, Justice, Charity, Liberty, Hope, and Peace were all performed by women actors, representing the feminization of these nationalistic values. However, these tableau characters united to fight the "crusade" for women's rights, the narrative suggested, with Columbia holding a spear and Justice carrying a sword, reflecting the nation's war-like tendencies to defend nationalistic principles. These gendered principles resonated well with the Committee's militant quest for woman suffrage, as the Committee took a more masculine and thus fearless approach toward the fulfillment of feminized virtues, such as liberty and justice. In the end of the tableau, all of the women actors stood together in a triumphant pose, mimicking the collectivity and strength of the woman suffrage movement, while aligning the movement with the nation's mythic plight to fulfill U.S. democratic ideals.

The Committee's mimetic parade also cast its pursuit of woman suffrage as the fulfillment of the principle of equality as based in conceptions of natural rights. The
notion of natural rights is rooted in eighteenth-century political thought with the rise of Lockean liberalism, embodied in the Declaration of Independence's iconic line: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal." Although most men resisted extending these natural rights principles to women, women's rights activists historically drew upon and challenged this notion of equality by "reaching deeper into the structures of women's subordination, claiming more territory as women's province, [and] going farther in envisioning a totally different sexual order." A more natural rights philosophy toward woman suffrage, of course, was considered more radical—and therefore, less popular—than a more conservative philosophy, which embraced the socially-acceptable notion that men and women were inherently different. Thus, by casting its pursuit of woman suffrage as part of the nation's commitment to equality, the Committee militantly called upon a radical strand of political thought and risked losing broad social appeal.

The Committee's furthered exposed its equal-rightist ideology by illustrating gender equality as part of the everyday experiences known to Americans in general. In particular, the parade's third and fourth sections demonstrated how men and women equally contributed to the nation's economic, religious, social, and militaristic stability. Thus, these sections made an implicit demand for women's equal political rights. Consider, for example, the third section's leading banner: "Man and Woman Make the State, Man Alone Rules the State." While the banner ultimately pointed to the incongruous application of egalitarian underpinnings in the United States, the Committee's logic also was premised on the notion that women already made an equal
contribution to the well-being of the state. Further, the banner suggested the potential correction of this incongruity by earning women an active position in "the State."

In the many floats following this banner, the Committee further visualized the ways in which women already contributed to the nation. For example, the float entitled, "In the Field," featured men and women farmers who demonstrated the equal contribution that women make to the agrarian and economic livelihood of the nation. Scholars have argued that western territories and states were more eager to grant women equal suffrage because agrarian communities were perceived as more egalitarian. Given the recent successes of the woman suffrage movement in western states, the Committee seemingly used the region's more egalitarian politics as a representative example of the positive benefits of woman suffrage. Moreover, as the Progressive Era came off the heels of the Populist movement, this float invoked the glorification of the farmer as the backbone of America's economic livelihood and invoked the principles of community, hard labor, and virtue. This float, then, illustrated women's equal contributions to the fulfillment of these nationalistic principles.

The Committee extended this vision of economic equality by stressing women's successful pursuits in education and in multiple professions by including floats and delegations of women representing college students, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, factory workers, civil servants, business women, teachers, social workers, librarians, writers, artists, actresses, and musicians. Access to equal education was the first movement toward woman's rights in America. In the early-nineteenth century, education was limited to wealthy, white women and focused on enriching their morality instead of their intellect. Pursuing a formal education was certainly beyond the realm of the
womanly sphere. But by the 1910s, more women attended college and aspired to achieve financial independence as wage-earners. The Committee's parade reflected equal access to education, for instance, through its float, "In Education," which featured a man and a woman wearing a "College cap and gown." Over one thousand women marched as college students, offering a presence of women's increased access to a college education and the future promise of women pursuing careers traditionally reserved for men. In the process, these women embodied the actuality of equality and demonstrated a collective demand for equal citizenship rights.

The Committee also stressed women's equal contributions to the nation's social and religious stability through "The Homemakers," a float that depicted a family of three. According to the "Pageant Outline," the man was to be dressed in "Quaker gray"—a reference to a religion commonly known at the time to practice gender equality in the church, home, and politics. Many leading abolitionists and woman's right activists were Quakers, including Alice Paul. Such religious commitments may well have influenced the inclusion of a float featuring "Women of the Bible Lands." The float promoted women's religious equality by representing women from the Old Testament, including Deborah, Miriam, and Huldah, as well as women from the New Testament. Moreover, the program noted that these women were also examples of political equality: "Women in Bible lands who hold property in real estate vote in local affairs." This float provided a visualization of women's religious and political authority and offered further support for women's political equality in the United States.

The "Homemakers" float also made an argument for social and familial equality through the banner: "Women have Free Fathers. Let Men have Free Mothers." Here,
the banner reversed the premise that women were deprived of full citizenship rights and asserted conversely, that men lacked full citizenship rights because of their mothers' disenfranchisement. Although the banner ultimately made an argument for equal citizenship rights, such logic relied on the construction of women primarily as mothers and of men primarily as citizens. Simultaneously, the premise of argument—that women were free because they had free fathers—reified the long-standing policy of coverture, wherein a woman's legal identity was absorbed into her father's or her husband's legal identity. Thus, the banner accentuated the inequities embedded in a traditional family structure to make a more socially-palatable argument for equal rights.

The Committee also argued for women's political equality by demonstrating women's national allegiance through war service. Citizenship rights were often granted to marginalized groups based on their service in war. Ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, for example, was motivated, in part, by the participation of African American males in the Union army. Thus, the float featured both soldiers and nurses, which was then followed by a mass of marching nurses carrying a sign bearing Florence Nightingale's name.\textsuperscript{120} Nightingale, who had died just three years earlier, transformed nursing into a noble career and a higher calling. Further, Nightingale's leadership in the Crimean War forged a link between nursing, war, and national health.\textsuperscript{121} By making visible the equal contribution women made in war service, the Committee intimated that women deserved equal citizenship rights.

By mimicking the political ritual of the presidential inauguration, the Committee's militant parade worked to nationalize the woman suffrage movement by violating Washington's gendered spaces and casting woman suffrage as part of the fulfillment of
U.S. democratic principles, including freedom, justice, liberty, and equality. As a reflection of the Committee's militancy, the Committee resisted making more socially-appealing arguments and challenged the commonly-held assumption that women belonged outside the realm of politics, both literally and symbolically. Moreover, the Committee and protesters asserted their political agency by descending upon the streets of Washington, D.C. and claiming the spaces of national politics. As a rhetorical act of political mimesis, the parade pointed to President Wilson as the necessary change-agent for woman suffrage, which simultaneously reified his position of power in more traditional ways yet also reflected the Committee's militant efforts to agitate those in political power. These militant efforts, nevertheless, were couched in socially-appealing terms, considering, for example, the feminine appearance of the tableau's actors and the Committee's normalization of equality as a part of everyday American life. Ultimately, by mimicking a ritual of national politics, Committee members and U.S. women enacted their participation in the fulfillment of democratic ideals and worked to constitute their identities as U.S. national citizens.

NATIONAL SUFFRAGE OVER STATE SUFFRAGE

Mimicking a political ritual that extolled the fulfillment of democratic principles helped elevate suffrage as an integral part of the nation's identity. One of the key functions of a presidential inaugural is to "unif[ly] the audience by reconstituting its members as 'the people.'" The Committee's national parade similarly functioned to reconstitute its audience and participants as members of a national community—or as the American "people." Specifically, the Committee worked to shape women's enfranchisement as the means to participate in national political culture, beyond the realm
of state-level citizenship. Historically, states retained the power to define citizenship rights. However, with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, the federal government assumed the right to guarantee and protect national citizenship rights, particularly in terms of prohibiting states from abridging "privileges and immunities;" from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;" and from denying "equal protection of the laws." By 1913, the egalitarian thrust of the Fourteenth Amendment had waned significantly, explaining the suffrage movement's preoccupation with state-level enfranchisement. The Committee's national suffrage parade symbolized the organization's focus on citizenship politics at the federal level. More significantly, the national parade allowed women to mimic the national-level citizenship rights held by their male counterparts, and thus, enact their national citizenship rights and constitute themselves as members of a national community beyond a state-wide community.

The Committee's national parade allowed over 5,000 women to collectively demand women's citizenship rights at the federal level. One of the parade's most enduring images was of the famous "Demand" sign, which was carried by a wagon at the front of the parade. It read, "We Demand an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Enfranchising the Women of this Country." The Committee's demand for a constitutional change reified the federal government's power to protect national citizenship rights. More significantly, however, the "Demand" board constituted the marchers' collective identity as suffragists in pursuit of national citizenship rights.

Although suffragists came from forty-eight states and even marched in sections organized by state, they did so as part of the Committee's militant demand for national
citizenship rights. For example, the order of the parade's sections privileged efforts for nationwide suffrage. The first section was dedicated to marching delegations of women from sixteen nations where women possessed full national suffrage, partial suffrage, or were close to acquiring national suffrage.\textsuperscript{126} This first section, then, introduced the notion of woman suffrage as a national right, and further, pointed to the lack of U.S. women's full citizenship rights. The second section of the parade shifted the focus to woman suffrage in the United States by offering a narrative of the U.S. women's rights movement. Considering that the parade did not feature state suffragists until the sixth section of the parade, the way in which the parade unfolded reflected the Committee's militant commitment to national suffrage, which was prioritized above state-level suffrage efforts. Privileging national citizenship rights, particularly at a time when states staunchly defended their powers to define citizenship and voting rights, boldly pronounced the Committee's militant insistence on forcing woman suffrage into the arena of national politics.

Even within the section dedicated to state suffrage, state-level suffrage efforts were symbolically subsumed as an integral part of the Committee's federal-level strategies. For example, the section's first float was a depiction of the first women's rights convention held in Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848.\textsuperscript{127} Scholars point to this event as the genesis of the women's rights movement and the introduction of some of the movement's greatest leaders, including Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott. Depicting this event also invoked the drafting of the Declaration of Sentiments, which mimicked explicitly the Declaration of Independence.\textsuperscript{128} By reaffirming the radical tradition of individual and equal rights in U.S. political thought that helped provoke a revolutionary
war, the Committee framed this section's focus on state suffrage as part of the larger, national project to achieve equal political rights.

The Committee further subsumed state-level suffrage as a part of national suffrage in the next float, which featured a map of the United States, entitled, "9 States of Light Among 39 of Darkness."129 Non-suffrage granting states were colored black, while states considering woman suffrage were shaded gray, and states granting full suffrage rights were left white.130 Using the binary metaphors of light-dark and white-black (despite the use of gray, which appeared almost as dark as the blackened states in parade photographs), the Committee presented the United States as a nation divided and fractured over woman suffrage. Despite this fractured image, the states were depicted as parts of the entire nation. Following this float were nine delegations of women representing "The Equal Suffrage States," which focused on the work of individual state campaigns, but again, reinforced the Committee's primary focus on earning equal suffrage rights for all states.

Importantly, however, these state delegations were followed by a banner which read: "'No Country Can Exist Half Slave and Half Free,' Abraham Lincoln."131 This quotation, although inaccurate, invoked the president's ethos for uniting the nation following the debilitating Civil War, and more significantly, aligned a federal suffrage amendment with a vision of national unity.132 Following the portrayal of a nation split over suffrage, this quotation suggested that like slavery, women's disenfranchisement had divided the nation. Implicit to this analogy was the likening of women to slaves and their oppression to slavery. In this context, the map's use of white-black imagery not only indicated the demarcation of suffrage-granting and non-suffrage-granting states, but of
free and slave states as well. The Committee extended this light-dark/free-slave analogy
as the car following the banner carried women wearing light green and represented states
granting suffrage, while the women marching around the car wore dark green and
represented states denying woman suffrage. Implicit to this dramatization is a hierarchy
of political power, wherein those with equal rights are given a seat of privilege "above"
those without equal rights. As a reflection of their marginalized position in society, those
representing disenfranchised women marched below and beyond the privileged spaces
reserved for voting citizens. Here, political power separated these two groups of women,
not state differences, which reinforced the Committee's militant attempt to transcend state
lines and constitute a larger collectivity of suffragists at the national level.

Moreover, the reference to Lincoln mimicked the ritual of the presidential
inauguration and solidified the Committee's visualization of a national suffrage
movement. Most presidential inaugurals invoke the words and authority of previous
presidents "to affirm that as we overcame difficulties in the past, so will we now; the
venerated past assures us that the nation has a future." Thus, by invoking the words of
president who was remembered for uniting a divided nation, the Committee positioned
itself as the leaders who would similarly unite a county at odds over woman suffrage.

Acquiring a federal amendment to the U.S. Constitution for woman suffrage would, in
part, extend Lincoln's vision of a liberated and united nation. Furthermore, a
constitutional amendment for women's rights would mirror the Fifteenth Amendment to
the Constitution, which empowered the federal government to ensure voting rights for
African American males. With this focus on national unity, the subsequent division of
marchers, featuring delegations of women from the 18 "States Working for Equal Suffrage," symbolized the promise to fulfill this national vision.\textsuperscript{135}

The parade's program also reinforced the Committee's primary commitment to national suffrage. In the "Foreword," Paul and Burns said, "With every extension of suffrage throughout the states, the movement has gained in political strength in the national field. A large proportion of Congressmen are now directly responsible to women as well as to men . . . With this national political strength, the time is at hand when the passage of a National Constitutional Amendment may soon be accomplished."\textsuperscript{136} The Committee posited the effect of state-level enfranchisement in federal terms: ideally, U.S. senators and representatives would be forced to respond to the demands of their women constituents who could use their newly-empowered political voices at the state level to demand woman suffrage at the federal level.

Although the Committee privileged national suffrage over state-level suffrage, it nevertheless remained committed to state-level efforts. For example, the Committee agreed to help Harriot Stanton Blatch organize the "National Division" of the New York Woman Suffrage Parade, to be held after the Committee's national parade on May 3. Blatch suggested they could aptly assemble a national section by advertising the New York parade to the suffragists gathered "from all over the country" for the Washington parade.\textsuperscript{137} Additionally, Blatch's request suggested that in a very short period of time, the Committee had established itself as a force in the national suffrage movement. In fact, in early April, Blatch asked Paul if she would "use [her] kindly offices in persuading" Senator Robert LaFollette (R-WI) to attend a meeting after the New York parade, further reifying the Committee's almost immediate prominence in political circles.\textsuperscript{138} Moreover,
the incorporation of a "National Division" into the New York Woman Suffrage Parade suggested that the planning of the Washington parade intensified the formation of a national identity for woman suffragists.

Thus, the Committee's mimetic parade shaped the pursuit of state-level suffrage as instrumental, but subordinate to its militant pursuit of a federal amendment for woman suffrage. As a mimetic enactment of the inauguration of a national leader, the parade further shaped woman suffrage as an issue of national significance, but with state-level implications. In so doing, the Committee integrated its efforts with those of the greater suffrage movement and avoided isolating itself as radical organization. This approach also allowed the Committee to gather masses of women to march as representatives of their states in its national parade. Together, these women formed a collectivity of women marching in support of a federal amendment. This collectivity supported the Committee's militant goals of mimetically-forming a national movement for woman suffrage, forcing woman suffrage into the fray of national politics, and more importantly, constituting U.S. women as national citizens beyond the parameters of their home states.

PROGRESSIVE COALITION BUILDING

The Committee's parade further established the woman suffrage movement as a force in U.S. national politics through its coalition-building efforts. State and federal measures often treated marginalized groups separately when it came to matters of citizenship rights, codifying laws specific to each group. Thus, as different laws pertained to each group, marginalized groups were often precluded from forming alliances to demand the same policy changes. However, the promotion of certain progressive ideals to heal and empower those who suffered at the hands of an illegitimate political system
rhetorically united marginalized groups in their common state of political oppression. Even while these marginalized groups—including women, American Indians, African Americans, and wage-laborers—occupied different levels of citizenship, they could potentially find commonality in the absence of fully-enfranchised citizenship rights. As Erika A. Kuhlman argues, "[progressive reformers] broadened their base of support by creating alliances among various political-interest groups . . . Progressivism, then, was an ideology, a way of looking at the world, with a corresponding mode of conduct: coalition building." The uniting potential of these progressive ideals nevertheless was constrained by the simultaneous promotion of a homogenous U.S. citizenry, aimed at preserving the notion that the ideal citizen was an Anglo-Saxon male.

To an extent, President Wilson's progressive politics shaped these uniting and dividing trends. As was discussed before, President Wilson was confronted with the task of constituting a unified, nationalist identity, particularly following the economic and social discontent of the late-nineteenth century. Wilson's task was particularly difficult as he faced a diverse nation of people along gender, race, class, and national lines. His empowering progressive ideals were thus amenable to the Progressive-Era trend of coalition-building. Wilson, however, has been noted for excluding minorities of the U.S. polity in order to form a homogenous, nationalistic vision of the U.S. citizenry. The process of forming a nationalist identity often privileged beliefs shared by the whole of the nation, and in turn, overshadowed the particularities of the nation's polity and the discrete disparities experienced by marginalized groups. As nationalistic feelings take hold, regional, state, and racial differences are often diminished in favor of shared beliefs that typically privilege whiteness and elitism. Vanessa B. Beasley further explains this
process: "In a nation whose citizens may have little else in common, focusing on shared beliefs is an efficient way of accommodating other types of differences."\(^{140}\) In light of such differences, many coalitions were formed to challenge presidential, legislative, and judicial power to enhance citizenship rights. Thus, Wilson's first inauguration ceremony represented a site in which the empowering and disempowering forces of Wilson's progressive nationalism were both realized and contested.

The Committee's national parade mimicked these uniting and differentiating trends as its national parade included the participation of women across race, class, and ideological lines, but did so in a way that subordinated these differences to the pursuit of national citizenship rights for white women. The Committee's mimetic efforts to nationalize the woman suffrage movement facilitated this dual process of inclusion and exclusion. Mimicking a national parade drove the Committee's preference for national unity over the particular demands of state, regional, or racial groups. However, the Committee's militancy was greatly influenced by the strong coalition between the labor and woman suffrage movement. Thus, while the Committee was not above the exclusionary tendencies of nation-building, particularly in light of Wilson's progressive racism, the Committee's militancy also motivated it to include the participation of women outside the realms of privilege typically enjoyed by white, wealthy women.

The move toward building coalitions among marginalized groups was quite remarkable considering the isolating and differentiating way in which the U.S. and state governments treated the citizenship rights of African Americans, American Indians, immigrants, wage-laborers, and women. As was discussed in Chapter One, the Constitution left most citizenship and voting matters to the states, which ultimately
facilitated the exclusionary tendencies particular to certain states and regions. Thus, throughout U.S. history, voting rights for African Americans, immigrants, and women varied from state to state. Further, state laws implemented different voting requirements for black men and white men, for women (if at all) and men, and for immigrants and American-born citizens.\textsuperscript{141} The Constitution left citizenship rights for American Indians under the control of the federal government, which, throughout the nineteenth century, treated American Indians as neither immigrants nor citizens. American Indians, thus, occupied a unique space in U.S. citizenship law, and were ultimately offered citizenship rights in lieu of their land.\textsuperscript{142} Upon the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, which granted voting rights for black men and excluded explicit protection of voting rights for women, the federal government further entrenched the separate treatment of minority groups' citizenship rights. Thus, by 1913, marginalized groups possessed varying forms of abridged citizenship rights, which not only limited the full participation of these groups in the national community, but prevented them from collecting and uniting in pursuit of any one particular demand for citizenship rights.\textsuperscript{143}

Nonetheless, non-first-class citizens were gaining ground in national politics by forging coalitions. As was discussed before, the collaboration of the settlement house and trade unionist movements with the woman suffrage movement in the early 1900s helped fashion woman suffrage into a mass movement, which promised to enhance the rights of immigrant and wage-earning women. Since the latter decades of the nineteenth century, labor organizations had endorsed woman suffrage, which helped align the plight of wage-earning men and women. In fact, the parade's program featured the following quotation by Samuel Gompers, historic President of the American Federal Labor Association: "I am
for unqualified woman suffrage as a matter of human justice." And although the woman suffrage movement was not immune to expedient racism, some African American woman suffrage organizations worked alongside white woman suffrage organizations—a considerable development considering the acerbic split between the abolition and woman suffrage movements following the Civil War. The strengthening ties among the immigrant, working-class, African American, and woman suffrage communities offered the promise of greater participation in U.S. national politics and culture.

The Committee's national parade mimicked the president's attempt to unite a diverse nation through its inclusion of labor and trade union organizations, African American women, and state woman suffrage organizations across regional and ideological lines. The participation of labor and trade union organizations was less surprising considering Paul's personal experiences and alliances with the settlement house and labor movements. In fact, Paul originally asked Harriot Stanton Blatch to serve as Chairman of the National Parade Committee. In light of Blatch's recent successes in New York and her ties to the militant branch of the labor movement, this move seemed particularly strategic. Initially, Blatch refused. She said she could not take up the position "when others had been putting their shoulders to the wheel so nobly," and that her work "could not at all correspond with the magnificence of the title," rendering her merely "a useless prop." Nonetheless, Blatch gave the parade her blessing: "I think the idea of having one at the capital is magnificent, and I hope the work of you and Miss Burns will bear rich fruit." Soon after, Blatch agreed to act as a member of the procession committee, to which Lucy Burns wrote: "Miss Paul and I are delighted to have you
officially connected with the parade. We only wish we could have had your help from the very beginning.\textsuperscript{147}

The Committee's incorporation of labor-related organizations in particular promoted a vision of a mass suffrage movement. For example, one group of marchers was led by women upholding a banner, which read: "100,000 Socialists Work and Vote for Woman Suffrage."\textsuperscript{148} According to the available photographs of the parade, this contingent of marchers appeared to be one of the parade's largest, and while they certainly did not amass to 100,000 women, the number on the banner gave the impression of an overwhelming collectivity of women in favor of woman suffrage. Moreover, these socialists both "work[ed]" and "vote[d]" for suffrage, reflecting the growing coalition between working-class and middle-class women and between the socialist and woman suffrage movements.

The parade further illustrated the coalition among classes of women by the participation of wage-earning women who marched alongside the educated and career-oriented women in the parade's third section.\textsuperscript{149} Two large contingents of "Wage Earners" surrounded a float entitled, "A Labor Story" and upheld banners that read: "Woman's Place is in the Home" and "The Sweat-Shop is the Home of Thousands of Women."\textsuperscript{150} Much like the floats promoting women's economic, social, and religious equality, these banners reified traditional notions about women to make a more radical argument for political equality. While the first banner echoed the ideology of gendered spaces at the time, suggesting that women belonged in the domestic sphere, the second banner read as an interrogation of that ideology, suggesting that the experiences of working-class women contradicted the gendered expectations of middle- and upper-class women. Thus,
the banners forced an expansion of the class-based definition of "woman" and implicitly pointed to the obsolescence of the public/private sphere doctrine.

The Women's Trade Union League of Chicago made a more overt appeal to women's equality. Their leading banner demanded "Self Government in the Work Shop."151 As part of a national suffrage parade, the trade union's demand can be understood as part-in-parcel to the vote; once unionized, working-class women could vote, then they could assert their political agency and "self-govern" in the workplace. Both representations of wage-earning women, however, invoked the image of working-class women in a "Sweat-Shop" or "Work Shop"—a stark contrast to the mythic imagery of the tableau or the image of the typical white, upper- or middle-class woman suffragist. As such, the representation of wage-earners and trade unionists challenged the idea that suffrage was primarily a white, middle-class woman's movement and promoted a vision of unity and strength among all classes of women.

The Committee's militant push to nationalize the movement also encouraged the more radical participation of women across race and regional lines. The parade took place less than fifty years after the Civil War, and tensions persisted between the North and South, and between black women and white women in particular. The ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment entrenched the separation of groups pursuing citizenship rights for African American men and white women, and moreover, entrenched the occlusion of African American women from these pursuits altogether. Regional differences exacerbated these tensions as many white southern suffragists pursued a "whites-only" campaign, which was tacitly condoned by national suffrage leaders. Because African American woman suffragists faced resistance from the suffrage movement in all regions
of the country, many were compelled to form their own suffrage organizations. Thus, the
participation of African American women in the national parade, which also featured
white suffragists from all regions of the nation, promoted the notion that fully-
enfranchised national citizenship included women across ideological and racial lines.

Reflective of the Committee's efforts to transcend regional and ideological
differences, the parade included delegations from forty-eight states in the union,
organized into three groups. The first group included the nine suffrage-granting states;
the second featured the states where a suffrage amendment had passed both houses; and
the third was comprised of "Other States" where suffrage movements struggled.152 This
third group was the most regionally and ideologically diverse, as it included northern and
southern states, such as the more ardently racist state delegations from Louisiana and
Kentucky.153 Whether these state delegations liked it or not, they marched alongside the
Illinois delegation, which, contrary to the Committee's wishes, included Ida B. Wells-
Barnett, notable African American women's rights activist. Moreover, in a previous sub-
section, a contingent of African American women from Howard University marched
alongside representatives of the National Men's League for Women Suffrage.154

The Committee's incorporation of African American women in the national
parade mimicked both the empowering and exclusionary tendencies of the president's
progressive efforts to unite the nation. In fact, the contingent of African American college
women was the result of a compromise. Prior to the suffrage parade, Paul was
approached by an African American sorority from Howard University who wished to
march in the section of college women. Prominent African American suffrage leader,
Mary Church Terrell was to lead the group.155 After bringing the question before the
Committee and some NAWSA leaders, Paul was strongly discouraged from allowing the participation of African American women. Alice Stone Blackwell, for example, advised Paul against the formation of a black contingent in the parade. Additionally, white, southern suffragists threatened to withdraw from the parade if black women marched.\textsuperscript{156} Paul was aware the Committee could not afford to lose the support of southern suffragists considering the South was the most resistant region to woman suffrage. On the other hand, Paul realized that advocating for federal voting rights would benefit African American women's voting rights and more so, would force the Committee to formulate a position on African American women's rights.\textsuperscript{157} In the end, Paul arranged for the black women to march in the men's section of the parade, so that the men could act as a "protective wedge" between the women and spectators who may be resistant to African American women marchers.\textsuperscript{158}

Ida B. Wells-Barnett's frustrating experiences with white suffragists compelled her to protest Paul's decision and perform a more inclusive vision of national woman citizenship. Wells-Barnett had often faced racism within the suffrage movement. In 1894, for example, Wells-Barnett's good friend, Terrell, was admitted to the Chicago Woman's Club after fourteen months of debate over whether or not an African American woman should be admitted. In 1900, Wells-Barnett was rejected by the Illinois State Federation of Women's Clubs because she was African American. In 1913, Wells-Barnett organized the Alpha Suffrage Club of African American women, the first African American women's club in Illinois—whose campaign efforts helped elect Oscar DePriest, a black man, to Congress.\textsuperscript{159} One of the club's first activities, however, was to send Wells-Barnett to the national parade as a leader in the Illinois suffrage movement. After learning of the
separate African American women's section, Wells-Barnett and other Illinois suffragists confronted Committee members, who remained intransigent. A reporter from the Chicago Tribune described Wells-Barnett's reaction: "[Her voice] trembled with emotion and two large tears coursed their way down her cheeks before she could raise her veil and wipe them away."  

Despite her tears, Wells-Barnett protested. She waited until the parade was underway, and from the crowded sidewalks full of spectators, she stepped in line with the Illinois delegation, linking arms with white suffragists, Belle Squire and Virginia Brooks. Facing a rowdy, anti-suffragist crowd, Wells-Barnett and her compatriots managed to finish the parade untouched. The Chicago Defender championed Wells-Barnett's radical protest, calling her "The Modern Joan [of] Arc." Moreover, the article echoed Wells-Barnett's universalist approach toward women's citizenship rights, highlighting unity along gender lines rather than differences on racial grounds: "Mrs. Barnett represents the highest type of womanhood in Illinois."  

Thus, Wells-Barnett's act of protest provided a visualization of unity across racial lines, as she marched alongside white women, not behind or separated from them. Further, her protest may have helped promote a greater coalition between white and African American women activists of the time. Wells-Barnett's actions demonstrated that marginalized women possessed the political agency to transform the parade into a site of contestation within which they could protest their oppression within the suffrage movement and U.S. national culture in general. Reflective of the dialectical relationship between the politically-powerful and those with more limited power, Wells-Barnett's protest forced the Committee to negotiate and incorporate the demands of marginalized
voices within the suffrage community. The Committee's inclusion of African American college women also promoted a vision of racial unity and reflected its equal rightist philosophy—so much so, the Committee risked losing support from states already reluctant to grant woman suffrage.

Despite such glimpses of progressiveness on issues of racial inclusion, the Committee's inclusion of African American women mimicked the protectionist posture the federal government had taken toward women throughout U.S. history. Paul argued, for example, that she wished to "protect" and even conceal the participation of African American women in the parade. Neither the "Pageant Outline" nor the parade's "Official Program" identified a contingent of African American women—only the inclusion of the National Men's League. Furthermore, newspaper accounts from the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Daily Picayune omitted any mention of African American marchers. The marginalization of African American women in the "national" parade not only reflected their denigrated social and political position in American culture, but also the tendency for the particularities of American culture to be overlooked and marginalized in favor of sustaining a whole and homogeneous national identity.

The Committee's national parade mimicked progressive efforts to unite the national community and thus, reflected the rise of coalition-building across race, class, and ideological lines. The strength of these coalitions was demonstrated, in part, by the incorporation of Republican, Democratic, and Progressive representatives. Not only did these representatives offer the woman suffrage movement political legitimization, but they also symbolized unified support for woman suffrage across political lines and the increased promise for political representation among marginalized groups. This potential
was enhanced by the rise of third political parties in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries, including the Populists, Socialists, and the Progressives. The
Progressive Party gained significant prominence with former Republican president,
Theodore Roosevelt, as its presidential nominee in the 1912 presidential election.
Roosevelt's platform was the first to endorse woman suffrage, which signaled the
growing popularity of the woman suffrage movement and reflected the growing demand
for diversity among leaders in U.S. national politics. U.S. Senator Miles Poindexter from
Washington State, for example, marched as a recently-converted Progressive. His
Republican ties, however, proved too strong; he went on to serve his remaining four
terms as a Republican. Nonetheless, the strength of the Progressive Party during this time
provided political diversity and greater potential for the representation of marginalized
groups.

Much like the president's attempt to forge a unified, nationalist identity out of a
diverse nation, the Committee worked to forge coalitions across gender, racial, class,
ideological, and party lines. Because the Committee's militancy was grounded in the
coalition between the labor and woman suffrage movement, the parade facilitated the
intersecting demand for citizenship rights among wage-earning and upper-class
suffragists. These coalitions provided a visualization of a mass, suffrage movement and
helped form a collectivity of women marching in favor a federal amendment for national
citizenship rights despite significant differences. However, the Committee also mimicked
exclusionary and racist practices as it promoted the marginalization of African American
women. Thus, the Committee diminished the extent to which African American women
could demand full citizenship rights, as it favored full citizenship rights for the majority
over the minority. Nonetheless, the participation of African Americans in the parade as well as Wells-Barnett's act of protest directly challenged the construction of the ideal, white, male U.S. citizen.

CONCLUSION: NATIONALIZATION, VIOLENT BACKLASH, AND MIMETIC CITIZENSHIP

The Committee's national woman suffrage parade mimicked the political ritual of the presidential inauguration and thus, inserted woman suffrage into the privileged spaces of U.S. national politics, promoted a sense of national unity within the suffrage movement, and helped constitute the identities of women as U.S. citizens. The national parade earned the Committee respect from within suffrage circles. Harriot Stanton Blatch, leader of the New York suffrage movement, wrote Lucy Burns: "The Washington Parade is getting a great deal of notice in the papers here, and we all feel that the work you and Miss Paul are doing is going to be a tremendous boom for suffrage all over the country."\(^{164}\) The Committee's efforts also attracted a larger, national audience. Almost 500,000 people turned out to watch the parade, creating "a solid mass of spectators," according to one report.\(^{165}\) Further, the *New York Times* said, "the capital saw the greatest parade of women in its history," representing "an astonishing demonstration."\(^{166}\)

The Committee's mimetic efforts to effect social change at the national level, however, resulted in social control efforts exacted against the suffragists. In fact, despite the parade's massive scale and impressive turnout, the parade came to a violent close. Paul anticipated the large crowds and requested extra police protection from Superintendent of Police, Major Richard Sylvester. After she was refused the extra support, Paul managed to persuade outgoing Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, to
arrange the Fifteenth Cavalry from Fort Myer, Maryland, to wait on standby. Not long after the parade began, onlookers began insulting the marchers and shoving other bystanders into the procession, inciting a riotous atmosphere. Quickly, the cavalry rode in and restored order. Nonetheless, the incident resulted in 175 ambulance calls and 200 reported injuries.\textsuperscript{167} Marchers, including Senator Poindexter, reported that the police did little, if anything, to control the crowds. One marcher reported that Nora Blatch de Forest, Harriot Stanton Blatch's daughter, "was struck in the face while a policeman was standing near. Some of the women were pinched black and blue."\textsuperscript{168} De Forest herself testified:

"My mother, Mrs. Stanton-Blatch, told an officer he must look out for the crowd there as the women were being crushed, and he replied: 'Oh, you go home!'\textsuperscript{169} One police officer reportedly said to marcher, Genevieve Stone: "If my wife were where you are I'd break her head."\textsuperscript{170}

Resistance to the suffragists' parade demonstrated that the national spaces they invaded were staunchly protected. Everett Pepperrell Wheeler, an anti-suffragist lawyer in New York, suggested that the women initiated the violence response in a letter to \textit{New York Times} editor:

[Women] exposed themselves to the gaze of the crowd which filled the streets of Washington . . . Men with self-restraint in such circumstances would, of course, abstain from violence and keep away. The spectacle to them was disgusting in the main. But all the more the crowd, who had no self restraint, would go and express their disapproval the way that they did . . . [Suffragists'] attempt to bring violence in political warfare with men would break down the protecting barriers which courtesy and chivalry have thrown around women. If women fight men, men will
certainly come to fight back and whether they like it or not the suffragists will find that men despise them if, under the pressure of the fight, they whimper and complain.\textsuperscript{171}

Wheeler accused the women of "bring[ing] violence in political warfare" and thus, provoking men "to break down the protecting barriers" and "fight back." Thus, the militancy of the Committee's mimetic insinuation into political territory was most visible as the marchers demands were perceived as violent threats.

Others denied any violence was done upon the women at all, attempting to discredit the women. General John A. Johnston, D.C. Commissioner, reported, "I myself was at the head of the parade . . . I noticed the faces of the marchers and saw no signs of distress . . . It was a big, typical, good-natured American crowd and I witnessed no rowdyism."\textsuperscript{172} That the Commissioner described the crowd as "good-natured" as evidence of its presumed innocence suggests that any violence that may have ensued was surely not the crowd's fault. Further, that the crowd's good character was aligned with Americanism suggests that many in positions of political power still posited women—or women's efforts for social change—outside the boundaries of a U.S. nationalist identity. As history has shown, and as was demonstrated during the parade, when those who are excluded from a shared U.S. nationalist identity attempt to challenge those in power, they are often punished in either social or violent terms.

The parade's violent turnout, however, fostered greater solidarity in the suffrage movement and attracted national, political attention to the issue. Anna Howard Shaw, president of the NAWSA, said: "Of one thing I am certain, and that is that this made us many friends . . . I never saw an audience so stirred as the one at the mass meeting we
Suffering together created a sense of unity among the suffragists and generated support from within the halls of Congress. Within three days, a special investigation committee was formed in the Senate, soliciting four days of testimony. Senator Poindexter, who marched in the parade, reported the names of twenty-two officers who failed to aid the marchers. The suffragists' testimonies were in part legitimated by the subsequent firing of Police Superintendent Sylvester. This small success demonstrated that although local police condoned violent reactions to the parade, woman suffrage was gaining ground as a national movement and earning national media attention. Wilson's inauguration and the suffrage parade even shared front-page coverage in the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and the *Daily Picayune*.

The Committee's efforts to nationalize woman suffrage also faced some resistance from within the suffrage movement. Soon after the parade, for example, Paul wrote to Blatch, asking that she "institute a vigorous campaign to secure the vote of [New York] Senator James A. O'Gorman for the Federal Amendment." Further, Paul added: "Now is the moment to help the Federal bill and it seems to me that everything else should be subordinated to it at this crisis." Blatch's response matched Paul's militant immediacy, but rejected the premise of Paul's request:

> You know I fully appreciate all that you and Miss Burns are doing in Washington and I appreciate its wide propaganda value, but at the same time, I do not waver for one moment in my conviction that the winning of New York is the great and immediate thing to be accomplished . . . I regret that we have not an ounce of energy nor a postage stamp to devote to Senator O'Gorman. You see in all the suffrage work there is a political side and even if we had time and energy and
money to give to the National work I would not want to approach Senator O'Gorman in the way in which you suggest.178

Blatch's commitment to state-level suffrage revealed that even among the most established innovative suffrage leaders, the Committee's sense of national citizenship and campaign for a federal amendment was considered too militant an approach toward woman suffrage. Clearly, state suffrage was the favored approach among NAWSA leaders and highly-esteem ed state suffrage leaders, such as Blatch. Further, Blatch's more moderate position was revealed as she explained the "political side" to maintaining the support of key political figures. Blatch's unwillingness to agitate Senator O'Gorman stood in contrast to Paul's fearlessness—after all, Paul did ask Blatch to "subordinate" all of her well-known efforts for New York woman suffrage to the task of securing a federal amendment.

Nonetheless, the Committee's rhetoric of political mimesis demonstrated the organization's militancy, as it generated publicity, agitated President Wilson, and most significantly, offered Committee members and U.S. women the means to enact and participate in a vision of U.S. national citizenship. Mimicking the inauguration ritual, thus, helped constitute the citizenship identities of Committee members. As Gebauer and Wulf declare, mimesis is "an actualization, a presentation of what has been mimetically indicated."179 In the case of the Committee's national parade, the Committee actualized women's presence in national, political spaces, positioned themselves as political leaders, and helped shape woman suffrage as a national issue. Specifically, the parade cast the Committee's pursuit of woman suffrage as part of the nation's pursuit to fulfill democratic ideals, constructed state-level suffrage as subordinate to federal-level suffrage, and
promoted coalition politics across race, class, and ideological lines. Although the Committee's militant efforts faced resistance from inside and outside the suffrage community and, to an extent, mimicked the differentiating tendencies of the Progressive Era, Committee members were further motivated to press onward in order fulfill its militant vision of citizenship rights for U.S. women.
End Notes: Chapter 2


3 Ibid., 152-53.

4 *Plessy v. Ferguson* 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

5 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 448-52. Quotation taken from 449.


7 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 428-29.


9 For example, in 1906, Congress adopted a major Naturalization Act intended to severely limit the naturalization of immigrants by establishing standardized procedures and imposing penalties for fraudulent naturalizations. The Act also created a Division of Naturalization, which greatly enhanced federal power in the process of mitigating the extension of citizenship rights to outsiders, with the exception of northern-European immigrants. Additionally, Congress passed the 1907 Immigrant Act, which increased
immigrant head taxes and lead to the creation of the U.S. Immigration Commission, which produced a 42-volume report on the "evils" of immigration. Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 446, 442.

10 Ibid., 429.

The intersection of progressivism and U.S. internationalism resulted in what Smith considers a four-part hierarchical structure of citizenship laws. At the lowest level, immigrants such as Filipinos and Chinese laborers were denied entry or expelled due to ethnicity alone; next, territorial inhabitants considered racially inferior, such as those from Guam, were conferred colonial subjectship, but were ineligible for citizenship; at the next level, women, Puerto Ricans, blacks, and some American Indians were granted second-class citizenship, wherein certain citizenship rights were denied based on perceived incapability; and last, those "white" enough, including nonaboriginal peoples from Hawaii and Alaska, were granted full citizenship rights. Even the Fourteenth Amendment was used to reinforce these citizenship hierarchies when Justice Melville Fuller argued that one's citizenship should remain the nation of birth. Ibid., 429-30, 440.


13 Ibid., 5-9; quotation on 9.

14 Ibid., 4.

For example, Chinese immigration laws were extended to Hawaii upon its annexation in 1898, and following a failed treating with China in 1904, the immigration policy was extended indefinitely. Moreover, in 1907, President Roosevelt struck a Gentleman's Agreement with Japan, ensuring that the Japanese government would not issue passports to the United States unless immigrants were returning to a former
residence. Even Eastern Asians who served in the U.S. military were denied citizenship rights. Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 441-47.

16 Ibid., 459-63. Also see Haney López, *White by Law*, 40-41.

17 In *United States v. Wong Kim Ark*, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), Supreme Court Justice Gray used the Fourteenth Amendment to argue in favor of Ark's U.S. citizenship. Similarly, in 1909, Mass Circuit Judge Francis Cabot Lowell argued race did not exist and ruled in favor of Syrian and Armenian immigrant rights. Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 441, 447.


19 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 457-58.

20 The 1907 Expatriation Act states: "That all children born outside the limits of the United States who are citizens thereof in accordance with the provisions of section nineteen hundred and ninety-three of the Revised Statutes of the United States and who continue to reside outside the United States shall, in order to receive the protection of this Government, be required upon reaching the age of eighteen years to record at an American consulate their intention to become residents and remain citizens of the United States and shall be further required to take the oath of allegiance to the United States upon attaining their majority." 1907 Act of March 2, 1907, Section 6, 34 Stat. 1228, 1229. Having won the vote in 1911, California women were able to push the Act to appeal in 1912, although to no avail. Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 456-57.


25 Ibid. Consider, for example, that despite the Compromise of 1820, Congress did not challenge Missouri's decision to bar the entry of free blacks, thus reinforcing the idea that citizenship rights were left up to the states to define. Additionally, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 gave slaveowners the power to re-enslave blacks who had escaped to other states. Last, the Dred Scott decision, handed down in 1857, ruled that blacks never were and never would be citizens, while reinforcing the notion that slaves belonged to the state from which they were enslaved, ruling out any sense of national belonging. See Evelyn Nakano Glenn, *Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 33-36.

26 U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.

27 For more on the regional and ideological differences between the North and South following the Civil War and the Reconstruction Era, see Monroe Lee Billington, *The Political South in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Scribner, 1975); Thomas D. Clark, *The South since Reconstruction* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobs-Merrill, 1973); Richard N. Current, *Northernizing the South* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1973); John Hope Franklin, *Reconstruction after the Civil War, 2nd ed.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); David M. Potter, *The South and the Sectional Conflict* (Baton Rouge:


29 Campbell, "Seeking a Moral Economy," 95-96.


35 See note 291 in Chapter 1 for readings on how western suffragists employed racist arguments.


41 Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 210; Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 456; On anti-suffrage, see Manuela Thurner, "'Better Citizens Without the Ballot': American Anti-suffrage Women

42 In 1912, referenda failed in Ohio, Wisconsin, and Michigan; in 1913, they failed in North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Mississippi, Ohio, and Michigan; and in 1914, they failed in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. Keyssar, *The Right to Vote*, 208.


44 Eileen Boris, "Reconstructing the 'Family': Women, Progressive Reform, and the Problem of Social Control," in *Gender, Class, Race, and Reform*, 82.


Ibid.


Ibid., 53.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Kent, Sex and Suffrage, 198-200.

Ibid., 199-204.

For a complete analysis of the WSPU's rhetorical strategies and discussion of how the organization segued from leading a campaign for woman suffrage to leading a war support campaign, see Cheryl R. Jorgensen-Earp, "The Transfiguring Sword": The
Just War of the Women's Social and Political Union (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1997).


Paul's first arrest took place in June 1909, after Paul charged police barricades in order to present a petition to Prime Minister Asquith at the House of Commons. The following month she was arrested for raiding a meeting of the Chancellor of Exchequer, only to be arrested again the next month while leading her first demonstration against Winston Churchill. Many other suffragists were arrested, but not brutalized, which was considered a sign of the English government's growing tolerance of woman suffrage.

Another arrest took place on August 21, 1909, the morning after Paul lay all night on the roof of St. Andrews Hall in Glasgow, Scotland, in anticipation of interrupting a Cabinet minister's speech. By December 1910, she had been arrested twice more and engaged in one more hunger strike under WSPU's philosophy of "self-denial." Consequently, she was force-fed as a political prisoner, a sensational event that made headlines in America.

Amy E. Butler maintains that these force-feedings were difficult for Paul to discuss later in life. Amy E. Butler, *Two Paths to Equality: Alice Paul and Ethel M. Smith in the ERA Debate, 1921-1926* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 40-45.

Butler, *Two Paths to Equality*, 40. By 1907, Paul earned her B.A. at Swarthmore, her M.A. and Ph.D. at University of Pennsylvania, had studied at New York
School of Philanthropy graduate (now Columbia School of Social Work); became involved with the Charity Organization Society (COS) and worked for urban poverty issues; was a student at Woodbrooke Settlement for Social Work and University of Birmingham, England, and received training as a social worker; Paul was also a graduate student at London School of Economics.


71 Lunardini, From Equal Suffrage, 18-19.

72 Jorgensen-Earp, The Transfiguring Sword, 10.

73 Ibid., 23-25; Rosen, Rise Up, Women!, 49.

74 Hilary Frances describes this component of militancy, although the WFL was a "non-violent" militant group: "One way of developing non-violent militancy was to choose significant representational targets as focus for action. Thus, the point at which the individual negotiates mechanisms of state, that is, legal, economic, bureaucratic and political institutions, was used to highlight the injustices suffered by woman as citizens without the vote. Lawcourts, the tax system, the census count, the ballot box became sites for symbolic demonstrations which, being neither violent nor destructive, helped increase strategic possibilities." In "Dare to be Free!," 186; Also see Chapter V, "The Law," in Susan Kingsley Kent, Sex and Suffrage in Britain, 1860-1914, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 140-156. Kent catalogues all of the women's reform measures presented in Parliament over the course of the early women's movement in England. She also discusses the ways in which the Pankhurst sisters and other feminist activists targeted Members of Parliament in their militant suffrage campaign.


Borda, "Woman Suffrage in the Progressive Era, 357.


Alice Paul to Harriot Stanton Blatch, March 21, 1914, National Woman's Party Papers, hereafter NWPP, reel 1, University of Maryland, College Park, McKeldin Library.

For a brief history of Paul's relationship with African American suffragists, see Terborg-Penn, "African American Women," 148-151.


While for the most part, women of different classes worked harmoniously for the Committee, class issues did cause some tension in the organization. For example, in
1914, after the Committee's sensational first year as a woman suffrage organization, Alva
(Mrs. O.H.P) Belmont joined the Executive Board. She had suffered a horrendous
divorce from William Vanderbilt, which left her embittered but quite wealthy. Despite
founding the Political Equality League on behalf of garment workers in New York, her
tyannical personality made her more of a liability than an asset. In fact, she was black-
listed among domestic workers in New York. Further, her wealth alone repelled potential
Committee members with labor movement backgrounds. However, Belmont's
connections and resources were too good to pass up. Cott, *The Grounding*, 55-56.


89 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Presidents Creating the

90 Ibid., 30. On presidential oaths, see Matthew A. Pauley, *I Do Solemnly Swear:
The President's Constitutional Oath* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999).


93 Arne Melberg, *Theories of Mimesis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 1.

94 Catherine Allgor, *Parlor Politics: In Which the Ladies of Washington Help
Build a City and a Government* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000), 104.

95 Ibid., 86.

96 Ibid., 119.

97 For a discussion regarding the expansion and restriction of women's
participation in the public sphere during the 1910s, see Vanessa B. Beasley,

98 A group of women marched from New York to Washington, D.C., to participate in the parade. They were led by "General" Rosalie Jones and called themselves "pilgrims." For coverage of these women, as well as coverage on the arrival of marchers by train and automobile, see: "Throngs Greet Pilgrims' Entry," *Washington Post*, March 1, 1913, 1, 3, 12; "Pilgrim Hikers Take City by Storm," *Washington Post*, March 1, 1913, 3; "Suffragists Take City for Pageant," *Washington Post*, March 2, 1913, 1, 3, 6-7; "Five Thousand of Fair Sex Ready to Parade," *Washington Post*, March 3, 1913, 1-2; "Cardinal Scores Women Hikers," *Daily Picayune*, March 2, 1913, 1;


100 *The Suffragist*, November 22, 1913, 15.

101 According to the "Pageant Outline," there were two separate banners. According to the "Official Program of the Woman's Suffrage Procession," this section was entitled, "The Seventy-Five Years' Struggle for Freedom or Justice Conquering Prejudice." Because the outline specifically identifies banners and the program only offers this as a title, I'm treating the discourse as two separate banners. "Pageant Outline,"
The women performing the tableau wore silken, flowing robes as they canvassed the palladium façade of the building, creating a striking and mythical aesthetic. One by one, the characters fled down the first tier of the steps to join Columbia, who held a golden spear in her hand; Justice carried a sword while accompanied by women holding unfurled scrolls; Charity was accompanied by young girls wearing togas, whom she sheltered underneath an umbrella of fabric; Liberty and a group of young girls descended the steps gesturing their arms in celebration; Hope and many young girls ran down the steps carrying golden balloons; and last, after releasing a dove, Peace walked with young girls carrying olive branches and flowers. Much detail regarding the allegory can be ascertained from the "Official Program," 15, 17. Also see "Told the Story of the Ages," *New York Times*, March 4, 1913, 5. Also, the following photos in the NWP digital photo archives depict many scenes of the allegory: 1. "German actress Hedwig Reicher dressed as 'Columbia' standing in front of the Treasury Building during the suffrage tableau held in conjunction with the pre-inaugural suffrage parade in Washington, D.C. on March 3, 1913," Harris and Ewing, March 3, 1913, P1249, Digital ID: SB000559; 2. "German actress Hedwig Reicher dressed as 'Columbia' standing in front of the Treasury Building during the suffrage tableau held in conjunction with the pre-inaugural suffrage parade in Washington, D.C. on March 3, 1913," Harris and Ewing Publication, March 3, 1913, P1221, Digital ID: SB000560; 3. "Charity,' on the steps of the Treasury Building, part of
suffrage tableau held in conjunction with the pre-inaugural suffrage parade in Washington, D.C. on March 3, 1913," Harris and Ewing Publication, March 3, 1913, P1244, Digital ID: SB000568; 11. "The group representing 'Hope' descend the steps of the Treasury Building, part of the suffrage tableau held in conjunction with the pre-inaugural suffrage parade in Washington, D.C. on March 3, 1913," Harris and Ewing Publication Date, March 3, 1913, P1923, Digital ID: SB000569; 12. "'Peace' the final episode of the suffrage tableau held on the steps of the Treasury Building in conjunction with the pre-inaugural suffrage parade held in Washington, D.C. on March 3, 1913," Harris and Ewing Publication , March 3, 1913, P1243 Digital ID: SB000570.


"Pageant Outline," 4. A quotation by Abraham Lincoln in the "Official Program" makes a similar point: "I go for all sharing the privilege of the government who assist in bearing its burdens, by no means excluding women." 3.

See note 33 for sources on the suffrage movement in western states.

Program, 9, 11. These delegations were included in the third and fourth sections of the parade.


See the following photograph: "'Women of the Bible Lands' float in the March 3, 1913 suffrage parade held in Washington, D.C. March 3, 1913, P1226, Digital ID: SB000325.

"Official Program, 7." Neither the parade's program nor the photograph of this float specify which New Testament women were represented.

Ibid., 13.


United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Sec. 1.


Both the Pageant Outline and the Official Program list delegations from sixteen nations in this first section. Pageant Outline, 1-2; Official Program, 5, 7.

"Official Program," 13. The program says that this "first convention" took place in Rochester, New York, which is where the leaders of the convention originally met to plan the convention. The "first convention," held in "1848" was most certainly held in Seneca Falls. The "Pageant Outline" does not include this float, and rather includes two other floats which do not appear on the Official Program. While most of the outline and the program coincide, my assumption is that the published program is the definitive source on which floats appeared in the parade. See "Pageant Outline," 7.


130 See the following photo of the float: "March 3, 1913 suffrage parade held in Washington, D.C., when police failed to keep Pennsylvania Avenue clear for the procession," March 3, 1913, P1147, Digital ID: SB000360.

131 According to the Pageant Outline, the banner appeared as such: "NO COUNTRY CAN EXIST HALF SLAVE AND HALF FREE" Abraham Lincoln. Letters were put into lower case and a comma was added for syntactical clarity. "Pageant Outline," 8.

132 The banner misquotes President Lincoln. In his "House Divided" speech, he says, "I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free." Moreover, this speech was not delivered while he was president, but after he received the Republican nomination for Senator in 1858.

133 Campbell and Jamieson, *Presidents Making the Presidency*, 38.


Harriot Stanton Blatch to Lucy Burns, February 10, 1913, NWPP, reel 1;
Procession Committee to Harriot Stanton Blatch, February 23, 1913, reel 1, NWPP.

Harriot Stanton Blatch to Alice Paul, April 3, 1913, NWPP, reel 1, 1.


Beasley, You, the People, 28.

Alexander Keyssar offers chronologies of these differing citizenship and voting laws and tends to laws which set up property, tax-paying, literacy, and residency requirements, and exclusions based on race, class, criminal offense, and sex. See "Appendix: State Suffrage Laws, 1775-1920," The Right to Vote, 324-90.


See note 11 for a summary of what Smith considers a four-part hierarchy of citizenship.


Harriot Stanton Blatch to Alice Paul, January 31, 1913, NWPP, reel 1.

Ibid.

Procession Committee to Harriot Stanton Blatch, February 8, 1913, NWPP, reel 1.
"Procession battles its way up unpoliced Pennsylvania Avenue during the pre-inaugural suffrage parade in Washington, D.C. on March 3, 1913," P1202, Digital ID: SB000366.

"Official Program," 9, 11.

Ibid, 11.


Regarding the organization of the Illinois, Kentucky, and Louisiana delegations, the Seventh Section of the "Official Program" shows these delegations in very close proximity along the left-side of a cluster of 17 states plus Washington, D.C. 15.

Giddings, *When and Where*, 127.

Kate Gordon and Laura Clay were most resistant to black women marching in the parade and formed the Southern States Woman Suffrage Conference. DuBois, *Harriot Stanton Blatch*, 186. Also see Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage*, 26-27; Giddings, *When and Where*, 128.


Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage*, 27.


See notes 98 and 103 for a sampling of newspaper articles relating to the parade.

Harriot Stanton Blatch to Lucey [sic] Burns, February 17, 1913, NWPP, reel 1.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

"5,000 Women March," 5.


175 Lunardini, From Equal Suffrage, 29-30.

176 The day after the suffrage parade and the day of Wilson's inauguration, the front page of the Washington Post was split between covering these two events. See "Woman's Beauty, Grace, and Art Fill the Capital" and "Woodrow Wilson Arrives to Become Nation's Head Today," Washington Post, March 4, 1913, 1. Also, the front page of The Daily Picayune featured the following two articles: "Woodrow Wilson Grasps Taft Hand in White House" and "Pageant Failure Because Rowdies Assault Women," March 4, 1913, 1. The suffrage parade was reported as part of Wilson's inauguration festivities in the New York Times. See "Wilson Takes Office To-Day as 28th President," March 4, 1913, 1-2. Also see "5,000 Women March," 5.

177 Alice Paul to Harriot Stanton Blatch, August 8, 1913, NWPP, reel 1, 1-2.

178 Harriot Stanton Blatch to Alice Paul, August 26, 1913, NWPP, reel 1, 1-2.

179 Gebauer and Wulf, Mimesis, 5.
CHAPTER THREE

THE CONGRESSIONAL UNION FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1913-1916:
MILITANCY, POLITICAL MIMESIS, AND THIRD PARTY POLITICS

The Congressional Committee's woman suffrage parade of 1913 launched the militant branch of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) into the arena of national politics. By mimicking the ritual of a presidential inauguration celebration, the parade created a vision of a mass movement and worked to empower U.S. women to demand citizenship rights as it cast woman suffrage as a national issue.

Following the parade, the Committee wasted little time expanding the national campaign beyond the streets of Washington, D.C., and into every state and congressional district of the United States. As the Congressional Committee sharpened its focus on agitating members of Congress and furthered its militant philosophy, it sought to mimic third political parties by building a national political party. The Committee itself can be considered a mimetic formation of the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), the suffrage organization in England that provided Alice Paul and Lucy Burns their militant training. With such militancy in mind, Paul and Burns turned toward agitating the Democratic Party, particularly in light of its strength in both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government. Thus, by mimicking third party strategies and eventually forming a third political party, Paul and Burns directed their militant campaign toward agitating Democratic members of Congress between 1913 and 1916. Exhibiting their political motives, one Committee member wrote to another: "If we can but continue a constant agitation which will rivet the eyes of Congressmen upon our measure, there is great hope it may go through this Congress."¹ As such, Paul's and Burns's militant vision
was fixed on positioning suffragists within the spaces of electoral politics in order to threaten the election or re-election of Democratic congressmen.

Committee leaders expedited their militant campaign against members of Congress by forming the Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage (CUWS). Unlike the Committee, which consisted of a few leaders appointed by the NAWSA, the CUWS was an organization open to all women sympathetic to the Committee's militant approach toward acquiring a federal woman suffrage amendment.\textsuperscript{2} The CUWS was the vehicle through which Paul and Burns could mobilize women across the nation to vote against Democratic members of Congress and help secure the support of other congressmen.

The CUWS's militant underpinnings shaped the organization's mimetic campaign. As veterans of the militant movement in England, Paul and Burns attempted to uphold the WSPU's three basic tenets espoused in its constitution: to hold the political party in power accountable, to generate publicity, and to engage in "vigorous agitation upon lines justified by the position of outlawry to which women are presently condemned."\textsuperscript{3} The CUWS's adoption of third party strategies represented an extension of the WSPU's first method of agitating the party in power, particularly since third parties are considered "an explicit and deliberate rejection of the two dominant parties."\textsuperscript{4} In this sense, third party strategies positioned the CUWS in opposition to the Democratic and Republican parties, exhibiting their militancy as these women unabashedly inserted themselves and their own political organization into the masculine world of party politics.

Representing a departure from the WSPU's belief in taking "action \textit{entirely independent of} political parties," however, the CUWS's mimetic adoption of third party strategies also functioned as a more traditional strategy of political change.\textsuperscript{5} The CUWS
aimed to enter the arena of party politics and compete with the Democratic Party while forging alliances with other major parties. Although the differences between the WSPU's and the CUWS's militant campaigns have been attributed to their unique historical and political contexts, they can also be attributed to the WSPU's contingent definition of militancy. Specifically, the WSPU's third militant tenet argued that, so long as women were relegated to subordinate and disenfranchised positions in society, "vigorous agitation" was justified. The CUWS took a more moderate approach when targeting congressional leaders, at least in part, by working with and in opposition to the party apparatus in the United States, and thus agitating within the system as a means to affect political change. Ultimately, the mimicking of third parties allowed the CUWS the political legitimacy to enter party politics in such a way that helped lessen the backlash against their actions; their mere presence in such deliberative spaces combined with their rhetorical tactics, however, likewise reflected the militancy of their strategies of agitation.

Political mimesis helps explain how the CUWS's adoption of third party strategies empowered its national, anti-Democratic campaign. Particularly salient to this study is how mimesis facilitated "the appropriation of another world" and created "a potential [for the] sublation of reality." Political mimesis held the potential to empower CUWS members as they entered the world of electoral politics in order to transform their reality of relative powerlessness into one of greater authority and voice in the woman suffrage debate. Mimesis is also noted for allowing one to "attain an otherwise unattainable proximity to objects" and thus, "gain symbolic power." In the case of the CUWS, the process of mimicking party politics offered members the means to attain close proximity
to legislators within the privileged spaces of electoral politics in order to enact their militant demand for fully-enfranchised citizenship rights.10

By 1913, many women had participated in the U.S. woman suffrage movement and in party politics, thus enhancing the CUWS's opportunity to assert its militant campaign through third party strategies. Moreover, many U.S. women possessed state suffrage and did not occupy a "position of outlawry" to the extent that WSPU members did. And although most CUWS members were disenfranchised at the state level, many enjoyed privilege along race, class, and national lines. Some women participated in and helped form third parties, such as the Socialist Party of America. In the 1860s, the socialist organization, the "First International," attracted "an unusually large number of [American] women" to voice their demands for both class and sex emancipation.11 In 1908, women in the Socialist Party created the Woman's National Committee, an autonomous organization that worked to educate women on socialism and distribute propaganda.12 Moreover, the passage of California's woman suffrage bill in 1911 is attributed, in large part, to the organizing efforts of the Women's Socialist Union and the socialist leaders within the California Equal Suffrage Association.13 Given such precedents, the CUWS was well-positioned to mimic third party strategies and ultimately form a third political party as the means to gain political legitimacy and deploy its militant, anti-Democratic campaign.

Because the CUWS entered third party politics as women, the organization's militant campaign directly challenged the gendered boundaries of political participation thought to be key to the nation's identity. Despite the advances women had made into the masculine, political sphere by the early-twentieth century, nineteenth-century notions of
femininity and a woman's "proper sphere" lingered, allocating domestic concerns to
women and demarcating the public as a space reserved for men.\textsuperscript{14} Even as more and more
women engaged in political activity, they often did so as advocates of health, education,
and child labor policies—issues thought to be more "domestic." Thus, women's political
identities were often cultivated as extensions of their domestic and familial identities.
Tamar Mayer explains how such gendered identities function hegemonically within the
nation:

In determining who belongs to the nation and who does not, elites construct a
code of "proper behavior" for members of the nation which becomes a sort of
national boundary. In each case, the code which the elites promote as essential to
the continuation of the nation also furthers the elite's own interests; thus in the life
of the nation one gender, one sexuality and one national narrative tends to rule.\textsuperscript{15}

Without question, white, wealthier men were still the ideal citizens of the U.S. nation-
state. This hierarchy of gender within the nation-state positioned women's political and
citizenship roles on the periphery of the political sphere and discounted the political
relevance of women's citizenship rights.

The CUWS's militant campaign directly challenged the gendered and nationalistic
codes of the early-twentieth century. By mobilizing U.S. women into the public and
political spheres to demand the defeat of U.S. congressmen, CUWS members asserted
their political agency and worked to constitute U.S. women's citizenship identities
beyond their domestic and familial identities. As Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis
argue, "Women are constituted through the state but are also actively engaged in
countering state processes."\textsuperscript{16} The CUWS countered such processes by mimicking third
party politics and aggressively entering the masculine spaces of politics, thereby
feminizing the male, political sphere. This necessary step helped create the possibility
that women's citizenship rights were legitimate political issues and helped earn the
CUWS the necessary political salience to agitate members of Congress. Finally, these
challenges represented a clear extension of the CUWS's militancy. As Andrew Rosen
argues, in the context of the woman suffrage movement, militant tactics were those "that
conventional society would regard . . . as acts of social and political bellicosity when
employed by women." Asserting that women's rights were political rights threatened the
gendered hierarchy central to the nation's identity.

In addition to these rigid gendered codes, the CUWS's national, militant campaign
faced many challenges. First, many women in western states already possessed state
suffrage and were either ignorant or apathetic to the CUWS's drive to enfranchise all U.S.
women. Next, although the Committee's national parade promoted federal suffrage over
state suffrage, many women remained committed to local and state efforts directed at
passing state referenda. Additionally, as more and more women participated in politics—
albeit in a limited fashion— the CUWS needed to motivate U.S. women to escalate their
demands beyond traditional avenues of political participation, such as petitioning and
lobbying.

To overcome these obstacles, the CUWS drove a militant campaign to agitate
members of Congress and to constitute U.S. women's citizenship identities. The
rhetorical processes through which the CUWS's militant principles guided its mimetic
adoption of third party strategies and formation of a third political party called upon U.S.
women to assert their political agency and expand their roles within the nation-state. To
these ends, the CUWS first sought to unite enfranchised women of the western states with disenfranchised women of other regions through a rhetoric of national solidarity and sisterhood and through the populist agrarian myth. Next, the CUWS worked to mobilize women in each of the 435 U.S. congressional districts by: seeking to constitute white women as part of the American "people," inspiring mostly white women to commit sensational acts of citizenship, and enacting strategies of third party politics even before the organization moved to formalize an official third party. Last, the CUWS formed its third party, the Woman's Party, which simultaneously positioned the CUWS as a militant threat and as a politically-legitimate force. An analysis of discourse pertaining to multiple activist events between 1913 and 1916, including CUWS correspondence and articles of *The Suffragist*, will expose the rhetorical dimensions of the CUWS's militant campaign against members of Congress.

**PROGRESSIVE SHIFTS IN U.S. POLITICS AND THE MILITANT INDEPENDENCE OF THE CUWS**

The CUWS's militant campaign against Democratic members of Congress represented an ongoing negotiation between the suffragists and resistant political institutions. The CUWS negotiated the political terrain of the early-twentieth century in ways that reflected key shifts in presidential, congressional, and party politics. More specifically, the adoption of the primary system, Congress's increased promise to pass progressive legislation, the rising power of the Democratic Party, and the activist and political strategies of third parties inform the CUWS's strategies of militant social change. Finally, the formation of the CUWS and its subsequent split from the NAWSA can be understood in terms of the CUWS's turn toward more militant means of persuasion.
Presidential and Congressional Politics

The formation of the Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage, an organization whose title implies a focus on congressional politics, reflected, in part, progressive shifts in the early-twentieth century. One of the most significant developments in presidential politics was the institution of the presidential primary. Kathleen A. Kendall argues that presidential primaries "were seen by early reformers as a way to take away the power to nominate the president from the party bosses and give it back to the 'the people.'"18 By the 1912 presidential election, as many as twenty-one states had adopted a presidential primary system, and by 1915, only a handful had yet to do so.19 Kendall argues that because these primaries helped free candidates from party control, more candidates could openly compete against one another, thus encouraging them to communicate more directly with potential voters.20 Presidential candidates began targeting the American people in the late-nineteenth century as contenders like William Jennings Bryan and Theodore Roosevelt spoke directly to voters all across the country.21 Ideally, these shifts toward a more democratic relationship between U.S. citizens and presidential candidates worked to empower the political voices of the American people.

Along with the presidency, the U.S. Congress underwent significant progressive reforms during this time. Like the presidential primary, these reforms were aimed at better representing the voices of the American people. For example, the increased power of majority rule in the House of Representatives expedited the passage of progressive legislation. This development was motivated by the "legislative gridlock" that plagued Congress in the 1870s.22 Congressman Thomas Brackett Reed's (R-ME) leadership on the House Rules Committee throughout the 1880s and as Speaker of the House throughout
the 1890s centered on streamlining the passage of laws and minimizing the power of the minority party.\textsuperscript{23} Reflecting on these efforts, Reed declared: "We have set the precedents for another hundred years nobler than the last, wherein the people, with full knowledge that their servants can act, will choose who will worthily carry out their will."\textsuperscript{24} Reed believed increased majority rule would more effectively help the House represent the majority of the American people.

The House's ability to more expediently pass legislation, however, seemed to come at the cost of minimizing the representation of minority voices. In fact, as minority power in the House diminished, African American representation in the House diminished. Following the Radical Republicans' quest to empower the citizenship rights of African American men in the late 1860s, legislators were inspired to give voice to their constituents' many needs. While this helps explain the legislative gridlock of the 1870s, it also helps explain the increased representation of African American men in the House. In fact, in 1868, John W. Menard was the first African American man elected to the House. During Reconstruction, between 1865 and 1877, sixteen African American men were elected to Congress. This rise in African American representation in Congress was stunted with the rise of Jim Crow laws and southern Redeemers; after Blanche K. Bruce of Mississippi left the Senate in 1881, African Americans did not serve in Congress until the 1960s.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, the increased power of majority rule paralleled the restriction of political rights and representation of minority populations in the United States, limiting the ability for such groups to effect policy change on their behalf.

By the early 1900s, the increased power of the House majority worked to almost completely silence the minority party and minority voices within the majority party. In
fact, it became the means through which Speaker of the House, Republican Joe Cannon of Illinois, "gain[ed] near absolute control over his party." Cannon strongly resisted President Roosevelt's activist legislative agenda and often attempted to obstruct the passage of progressive legislation. Cannon's autocratic leadership style, known as "Cannonism," alienated progressive-minded Republicans and led to a revolt against Speaker Cannon in the 61st Congress (1909-1911). Stephen Ansolabehere, Shigeo Hirano, and James M. Snyder, Jr., argue that this revolt was "one of the most dramatic events in the early 20th-century Congress," in part because it reflected how the introduction of the primary system allowed representatives to act independently of their parties and act as "Progressive Insurgents." This revolt helped ensure a Democratic majority in the House.

After the first decade of the twentieth century, the Democratic Party secured control of the executive and legislative branches. The growing faction of Republican Party progressives, along with the failure of the Republican Party to lower tariffs as promised in the 1908 mid-term elections, positioned House Democrats for a takeover in 1910. House Democrats became known as the "King Caucus," who were characterized less by autocratic rule and more by the progressive-friendly trend of consensus-building. Even with the simultaneous rise of the Progressive Party, voters were attracted to the more centrist progressives of the Democratic Party, including presidential candidate Woodrow Wilson. His election in 1912 solidified the strength of the Democratic Party in the U.S. government.

The ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in April 1913, which ensured the direct election of senators, also increased the potential of Congress to represent the
political demands of U.S. citizens. Prior to the amendment, U.S. senators were selected by their state legislatures. Throughout the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the labor and agrarian movements pushed for the direct election of U.S. senators as a way to ensure full representation and to curb the corrupt promotion of certain senators. By 1909, the rise of Progressive Era efforts to empower the voices of the U.S. citizenry helped fuel the movement, as the Democratic, Populist, and Socialist parties endorsed the amendment's passage. After much resistance from the Senate, both houses of Congress passed a version of the amendment, which was ratified by the required number of states in early 1913.\textsuperscript{31} The direct election of senators, along with the solidification of a Democratic majority in Congress, increased the legislative branch's potential to directly represent the voices of the American people and to be more open to the will of those constituents who supported a federal amendment securing women's full citizenship rights.

The CUWS was clearly mindful of the changing power dynamics in the U.S. Congress. Early in its militant campaign against members of Congress, the CUWS noted that "government is tending more and more towards centralization, and the really important questions of law are being dealt with not in State legislatures but in Congress."\textsuperscript{32} As part of its philosophy of agitating the party in power, the CUWS focused on the Democratic Party's strength in Congress. The CUWS explained:

This policy is entirely non-partisan in that it handles all parties with perfect impartiality. If the Republicans were in power we would regard them, in their capacity as head of the Government, as responsible for the enfranchisement of women... Today, the Democrats are in power. They control the Executive offices, the Senate, and the House. They can, if they will, enfranchise women in
the present session; their refusal to do so establishes a record which must 
necessarily be taken into consideration by women when the party seeks the re-
endorsement of the people at the polls.\(^{33}\)

The CUWS considered its campaign against the Democratic Party as a way to keep 
Congress accountable for upholding the promise of representing the American people. 
Consequently, the CUWS cast women as part of "the people at the polls"—recognizing 
the voting power of many U.S. women in western states and further constituting all U.S. 
women as potential members of the electorate to whom Congress was responsible. The 
CUWS's rhetorical efforts between 1913 and 1916 mimicked Congress's enhanced power 
to effect political change.

*Third Party Politics*

In addition to the potentially empowering changes in presidential and legislative 
politics, progressive ideals motivated the formation of prominent third political parties. In 
fact, the years between 1904 and 1924 have been identified as one of the most intense 
periods of third party activity in U.S. history.\(^{34}\) Regarding its anti-Democratic strategy, 
the CUWS once said: "This policy is based upon a recognition of the fact that our 
government is a government by party and that the will of the individual counts for little as 
against the will of his party."\(^{35}\) In light of the considerable power of third parties in the 
early-twentieth century, mimicking third party strategies bolstered the CUWS's 
legitimacy in national politics and helped position the CUWS as a threat to Democrats.

Third parties have been a part of U.S. politics since the rise of the two-party 
system in the late 1820s.\(^{36}\) In their comprehensive study on third political parties, Steven 
Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus argue, "Periods of third party strength
indicate that the major parties are not representing citizens' political demands. Third parties provide alternative political outlets that hold the potential to simultaneously agitate mainstream U.S. politics and to effect policy change. With the rise of Progressive Era demands to empower the rights of marginalized groups, third political parties played a significant role in the political landscape of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.

Third parties can typically be placed into one of two categories: short-lived parties or continuing doctrinal parties. Short-lived parties usually emerge because of a "splinter candidate," or a leader of one of the major parties leaves to establish their own party. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, split from the Republican Party in 1912 after the party nominated William Howard Taft for president. Roosevelt became the presidential candidate of the Progressive "Bull Moose" Party; although he was more popular than Taft, he and Taft split the Republican vote, which allowed Wilson to secure the presidency with only 41.8 percent of the vote. While some splinter candidates have made strong showings in national and local elections, typically, they re-assimilate with one of the major parties and leave their dissolving third party behind.

Some short-lived third parties form out of economic protest to the two dominant political parties. The formation of the People's Party in 1892, for example, was driven by populism, a radical agrarian movement that swept the South, Midwest, and West, and aimed to redress the economic and social exploitation of the rural working classes. Women were particularly vocal in the populist movement, and in 1891, founded the National Woman's Alliance, an autonomous organization committed to many populist causes. In the 1892, the People's Party made a strong showing at the polls as the
Populist presidential nominee, James K. Weaver, earned over one million votes; additionally, the party elected five senators, ten congressmen, three governors, and over 1,500 local and state officials. Part of the party's strength was due to the Democratic Party's appropriation of its agenda, which helped Populists secure complete control of the Kansas state legislature in 1892. The formidable strength of the Democratic Party in the southern states, however, prevented the People's Party from making a significant showing in the region. One way in which the People's Party gained broad appeal in other areas was by joining the Democratic Party to promote a common candidate or to agree not to challenge each other in certain races. This trend, entitled "fusion politics," helped third political parties gain institutional legitimacy, but often forced third political parties to compromise their political agenda.

Additionally, short-lived third parties, such as the People's Party, gained popularity by adopting single-issue platforms. For example, mining communities in Colorado, Nebraska, and Illinois championed the issue of free silver as a Populist cause. In these cases, the People's Party better resembled a single-issue party, which focuses its energies on the passage of one particular policy. Single-issue parties throughout the nineteenth century include the Liberty Party and the Free Soil Party, which were formed by anti-slavery groups. Similarly, the Greenback Party was formed by farmers to fight a weakening currency, and the Prohibition Party was formed to combat rampant alcohol use. Because of their narrow focus, single-issue parties aimed to effect policy change; however, once this change occurred, they had little need to continue. Additionally, single-issue parties typically succeeded at the cost of ignoring other demands for policy change. For example, while the issue of free silver grew out of populism's focus on economic
justice, its prominence eclipsed many other Populist efforts to rehabilitate oppressed workers.  

The eventual fall of the People's Party illustrates the unique position that short-lived third parties hold in electoral politics. In 1896, the Democratic Party's nomination of William Jennings Bryan as its presidential candidate reflected both trends in fusion politics and single-issue politics. Bryan was a prominent champion of the silver issue, but, according to David Reynolds, he "was not a Populist and did not share the movement's commitment to grassroots empowerment and democracy." Those who identified themselves as Populists, who originated in the Farmer's Alliance, refused to support Bryan's candidacy and, following the 1896 election, the People's Party crumbled under split allegiances. Bryan's potential to represent the ideological foundation of the Populist movement was tempered by the paradoxical position of short-lived third parties: as minority parties, they are often driven by more radical platforms; however, as political parties, they aim to gain broad appeal and institutional legitimacy. In so doing, third political parties often dissolve because they are unable to sustain identities as outsider parties. However, as most members of third political parties eventually (re)unite with one of the two major parties, they are able to assimilate their agenda into mainstream U.S. politics. In fact, while the People's Party did not continue past the turn of the century, it is often credited for fueling many progressive efforts in the twentieth century.

In addition to short-lived parties, continuing doctrinal parties have also shaped U.S. party politics. These parties are deeply committed to a re-envisioned social and economic order and are often able to sustain themselves over the course of many decades. For example, in the wake of the People's Party, the Socialist Party of America
was founded. As an amalgam of many socialist and labor organizations, the party united farmers and factory workers against the capitalist elite that often prevented men, women, children, and immigrants from escaping poverty. Women were integral to the rise of the Socialist Party, which spoke to the turmoil of immigrant workingwomen. In New York, for example, Jewish factory women who were organized by the Socialist Party and by trade unions led multiple militant strikes between 1909 and 1913. These garment workers were thrust into political action following the deaths of 146 women in the tragic Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire of 1911. The uprising of the working class helped Eugene V. Debs, the Socialist Party's 1912 presidential candidate, earn six percent of the popular vote. The Socialist Party's platform continued to shape U.S. politics throughout the twentieth century, although it maintained its position as a third party. As David J. Gillespie argues, "continuing doctrinal parties are often alienated from the political and electoral mainstream by the radicalism of their creeds and by their activists' fidelity to creed."

The CUWS's formation of the Woman's Party (WP) expanded upon women's experiences in third party politics and exploited the unique political position of third parties to effect policy change. The WP resembled a short-lived party because of its single-issue platform to defeat Democratic candidates. However, like a continuing doctrinal party, the WP articulated a deep commitment to the party's larger mission to reconfigure women's citizenship identities within the nation-state. Most likely, the WP would dissolve once a federal amendment was secured; but the rhetorical process through which WP members came to identify themselves as citizens and political actors suggests
that the CUWS's adoption of third party strategies performed a constitutive function as well.

The WP held great potential to curb the election or re-election of Democratic candidates considering that party loyalty was not very strong in the twelve suffrage states. For example, in all presidential elections between 1896 and 1912, winning presidential candidates secured the electoral votes of suffrage states by an average of nine percent of the popular vote. Additionally, since 1896, in 223 of the 301 congressional elections, an average sway of ten percent of the vote would have resulted in the election of a different candidate. Thus, in 1916, when women possessed the power to elect a total of twenty-two U.S. senators and forty U.S. representatives, the WP was well-positioned to affect the election or re-election of Democratic candidates.60

Shifts in the U.S. Woman Suffrage Movement

In light of these empowering developments in presidential, legislative, and party politics, the CUWS intensified its focus on agitating Democratic members of Congress through its mimetic adoption of third party strategies. However, the CUWS's ability to forcefully execute its militant campaign was tempered by its affiliation with the more moderate NAWSA. CUWS leaders strayed from their original function as the NAWSA's congressional lobbyists. In fact, the NAWSA initially agreed to the Committee's formation on the condition that the Committee not pursue its plan to agitate members of Congress, and instead, orchestrate the national woman suffrage parade. Following the conclusion of the high-profile parade, the CUWS went back on its word.

The CUWS initiated its anti-Congress campaign by sending suffrage delegates to every member of Congress at the opening of a special session on April 7, 1913.61
Throughout the ensuing summer months, the CUWS orchestrated numerous delegations to Congress. Not surprisingly, the NAWSA considered the CUWS's efforts beyond the scope of its moderate, state-by-state approach to woman suffrage. By February 1914, consequently, the NAWSA and the CUWS severed after a bitter dispute over ideological and financial differences. Harriot Stanton Blatch expressed her dismay with the NAWSA's leadership. She said, "again and again I have seen vigorous young women come forward, only to be rapped on the head by so-called leaders of our movement."\(^{63}\)

Losing its affiliation with the more moderately-minded NAWSA allowed the CUWS to more rigorously pursue its militant campaign. One way the CUWS cultivated its militant identity was through its weekly organ, *The Suffragist*. Launched in late 1913, *The Suffragist* promoted the CUWS's militant campaign to agitate members of Congress through third party strategies. For example, the CUWS was determined "to make this paper a force to be reckoned with in the political life of the United States."\(^{64}\) Moreover, as a reflection of the group's militant goal to generate publicity on a national level, it hoped *The Suffragist* would reach across state lines and appeal to a "national" audience, thereby forcing suffrage into the minds of the "general public."\(^{65}\) Thus, with *The Suffragist*, the CUWS aimed to elevate the issue of woman suffrage beyond state-level politics and potentially constitute women's national citizenship identities. As Paul explained, "*[The Suffragist]* is not issued to appeal to women's clubs or to small suffrage organizations at all . . . Our subscription list is national and our newsstand sales should be national."\(^{66}\) Thus, the creation and circulation of *The Suffragist* enacted the CUWS's militant push to enter the arena of national politics and to generate publicity for a national audience.
*The Suffragist* played a key role throughout the CUWS's campaign to agitate members of Congress and to constitute members as national citizens. *The Suffragist*'s construction of the CUWS reflected not only the political contours of these years, but more importantly, it revealed how CUWS rhetorically shaped its militant campaign and militant identity. While *The Suffragist* was intended for mass circulation, its subscription peaked at just over 20,000 issues in 1917. Further, most copies went to party members, advertisers, branch headquarters, and CUWS organizers, which strongly suggests that the suffragists themselves were a key audience of the publication. In 1914, for example, while working for the CUWS in Colorado, Mabel Vernon wrote, "I devour the news of you all in the Suffragist." In this sense, *The Suffragist* functioned as a movement "handbook" that promoted the CUWS's strategies for mobilization and helped standardize strategies of agitation throughout its national campaign. Thus, in addition to targeting a national audience through *The Suffragist*, the publication also functioned as a means for the CUWS to construct its members as political change-agents.

Along with the inception of *The Suffragist*, the CUWS's militant campaign was strengthened by the growing number of woman voters in the western states. The CUWS considered these voters as key assets in its campaign against members of Congress. In late 1913, Lucy Burns said:

> We have in our hands today not only the weapon of a just cause; we have the support of ten enfranchised States. More than 3,600,000 women have a vote in Presidential elections. It is unthinkable that a national Government which represents women and which appeals periodically to the suffrage of women, should ignore the issue of their right to political freedom.
Given the upcoming mid-term elections in 1914, and the congressional and presidential elections of 1916, the CUWS had their work cut out for them. The CUWS considered the empowered citizenship rights possessed by women in western states the necessary leverage to hold Congress accountable to the demands of its electorate.

The viability of the CUWS's campaign was strengthened by the voting potential of four million, mostly-white western women; however, many African American women asserted their political agency and helped shape the activist climate of the early-twentieth century. One study shows that in 1906, more African American women voted than white women in a Denver, Colorado election. In fact, African American women founded the Colored Women's Republican Club in Denver in 1901. Prominent activists, such as Mary Church Terrell and Ida B. Wells-Barnett, participated in the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1909. Terrell was also a member of the NAACP's first executive committee. Wells-Barnett went on to establish the Alpha Suffrage Club in 1913, the first African American woman's club in Illinois, which she represented in the Congressional Committee's national woman suffrage parade in March of that year. The club enriched the political activities for African Americans in Chicago, "provid[ing] a fresh venue for political gatherings, as it did in the 1914 campaigns for county commissioner, municipal judge, and in the mayor's race." Additionally, Wells-Barnett's club was responsible for sending the first African American delegate to the state Republican convention in 1914.

African American women also participated in the woman suffrage movement during this period. Adella Hunt Logan, for example, was the only Alabama woman listed in the NAWSA's roster as a life member in 1900. Despite the NAWSA's history of
expedient racism, Logan maintained that if white women needed political equality, African American women needed it even more.74 Further asserting their political agency, women leaders within the NAACP established the National Association of Colored Women (NACW) in 1912. Margaret Murray Washington, who was married to Booker T. Washington, served as the NACW’s president between 1912 and 1916; by the end of her term, more than 50,000 women had joined the organization.75 The NACW’s suffrage department represented more than 40,000 African American women, who gathered petitions, educated voters, and voted where they could. Between 1917, when New York ratified a woman suffrage amendment, and 1920, when a federal amendment was ratified, more than 75,000 New York African American women were registered to vote.76

Working-class and immigrant women also asserted their political agency in pursuit of women's political and economic rights. Working-class women have a strong history of organizing to improve their material realities. In the late 1880s, for example, the Illinois Woman's Alliance conducted a massive survey of every women's organization and trade union in Chicago to amass evidence of poor working conditions.77 Throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, Mary Harris "Mother" Jones was a militant champion and vociferous orator on behalf of coal miners and other working-class communities.78 The Women's Trade Union League (WTUL), formed in 1903, was integral toward organizing the New York shirtwaist factory strikes between 1909 and 1913. Four-fifths of the 30,000 picketers were Jewish women, many of whom were also suffragists.79 Also, the epic Lawrence, Massachusetts textile factory strike of 1912 was led mostly by Italian, Polish, Lithuanian, Russian, and Syrian immigrant women.80
Wealthy CUWS member, Alva Belmont, participated in the New York shirtwaist strikes, which fueled her commitment to a federal woman suffrage amendment. Although Belmont was not a factory worker, the WTUL's rhetoric of sisterhood helped to forge unity across class lines. During these strikes, the NAWSA refused to endorse the WTUL, demonstrating its resistance to more militant tactics.81 The likewise militant CUWS, however, recruited many WTUL leaders and working-class protesters, including and Margaret Hinchey, Rose Winslow, and Inez Milholland. Moreover, Harriot Stanton Blatch fused the militant tactics of the labor and woman suffrage movements and helped build cross-class alliances through her campaigns for New York state suffrage.82

Extending this trajectory of women's increased organizational and political activities, the CUWS aimed to enter party politics in order to agitate Democratic members of Congress and recruit western women as party members. The CUWS planned to establish headquarters in each western suffrage state, promote the CUWS in local newspapers, enlist new members, arrange open-air street meetings, and persuade women voters to vote against Democratic congressmen. In early 1914, shortly after her participation in the shirtwaist strikes in New York, Belmont joined the CUWS explicitly to help implement the CUWS's western strategy. Described by The Suffragist as having "remarkable executive and financial ability," Belmont offered the CUWS the means to carry out its extensive campaign on the opposite end of the country.83 Mobilizing the resources to campaign in these western states not only required significant funds, but it required that the CUWS rhetorically unite the enfranchised women of western states with the disenfranchised women represented by the CUWS. The CUWS's rhetorical efforts to
unite the "women of the West" and the "women of the East" exhibited the CUWS's mission to lobby every U.S. and state legislator in each of the 435 congressional districts.

CONSTITUTING UNITY WITH THE ENFRANCHISED WHITE WOMEN OF THE WEST

The CUWS's first challenge in executing its national, anti-Democratic campaign was to persuade the enfranchised women of the West to vote against Democratic congressmen. Through political mimesis, the CUWS adopted the strategies of a political campaign as it targeted particular voters in political regions to achieve the CUWS's electoral ends. While the CUWS worked to thwart the election or re-election of Democratic candidates, its potential to indirectly secure the election of suffrage-supporting candidates mimicked the work of congressional political parties to promote candidates who supported their party's platforms. Additionally, the CUWS's campaign encouraged women to assert their political agency. Such a strategy worked as an act of resistance to male political power as it encouraged women to use their political power for subversive ends. However, the CUWS's campaign could not succeed without the ultimate endorsement of state and U.S. legislators. Thus, the CUWS's militancy and rhetoric of political mimesis also can be understood as acts of negotiation between institutional resistance and assimilation. The CUWS conducted this ongoing negotiation process through a rhetoric of national solidarity and sisterhood and through the agrarian myth, which helped motivate western women to vote against Democratic candidates in the 1914 and 1916 congressional elections.

Considering the CUWS's western campaign as political mimesis points to the ways congressional campaigns appealed to those privileged enough to hold the power of
the ballot. Despite the empowering promise of progressivism, the institutional discourse of the Progressive Era perpetuated the notion that the ideal citizen was white and male. The organizations working to give voice to disenfranchised groups similarly adopted a homogenous view of citizenship rights. The Congressional Committee's national parade, for example, struggled to include a contingent of African American women. It is no surprise, then, that the first women who were enfranchised in the United States were generally white women. As noted previously, most of these western women took nativist and racist attitudes toward their Latina, Asian, and American Indian counterparts. Thus, as the CUWS forged unity with the enfranchised women of the West, it promoted solidarity between mostly white, educated women, thereby occluding southern, African American, and immigrant women from the CUWS's vision of suffrage success. As such, the CUWS's western campaign holds significant implications for the privileged constructions of women's citizenship identities in the early-twentieth century.

A Rhetoric of National Solidarity and Sisterhood

The CUWS employed a rhetoric of national solidarity to form a base of party members by motivating the enfranchised women of the western states to vote against Democratic congressional candidates in the 1914 and 1916 elections. The CUWS's use of this rhetoric aimed to unite women across state lines and power differentiations. One Suffragist article declared:

[The Congressional Union] sweeps away all particularism, and all State divisions. It regards the women of the nation as one great body and works equally for all of them . . . This new solidarity—this final achievement among American women in


organization—shows itself best in the new work that has been put before the enfranchised women of the suffrage States.86

The CUWS aimed to offer women the opportunity to participate as members of "one great body" of suffragists, binding women together beyond the debate over states' rights and racial discrimination. Considering these state-related issues, the CUWS's push to establish a national community of women and to re-establish citizenship as a national right can be considered a reflection of the group's militant goal to agitate political power at the national level. Ideally, this "new solidarity" among U.S. women would motivate "the enfranchised women"—western women—to engage in the "new work" of the CUWS's anti-Democratic campaign. As such, the CUWS constructed U.S. women as an unstoppable, united force committed to agitating Congress by working toward a federal suffrage amendment.

The CUWS's rhetoric of national sisterhood also appealed to enfranchised western women by calling forth a sense of loyalty and reciprocity. Mari Jo Buhle argues that the rhetoric of sisterhood took root in the clubwomen's movement of the late-nineteenth century, as wealthier women attempted to forge links with working-class women.87 As recently as 1913, working- and upper-class women argued that the New York shirtwaist strikes promoted a "magnificent demonstration of sisterhood."88 The CUWS similarly aimed to forge unity between enfranchised and disenfranchised women. For example, following the 1914 mid-term elections, when California, Oregon, and Kansas granted women state suffrage, the CUWS framed these successes as the result of a united, national effort: "The Eastern States, the Middle States—States from all parts of the Union
sent help and workers." In light of this national support, the CUWS called upon the new western voters to join hands and to use their power for their unenfranchised sisters. It is making the women all over the United States one united body, with a unity of purpose that shall override all State and sectional selfishness, and which in its large vision shall embrace the whole field of suffrage work and shall make possible the subordination of local work whenever such subordination shall be helpful to the greater work of the whole.

Here, the CUWS rehearsed its militant vision for the subordination of local and state work to national work as it rhetorically constructed "a unity of purpose" for the "one united body" of U.S. women. By uniting U.S. (white) women as "sisters," this rhetoric allowed women to identify with each other across state lines and transcend differences in political power, thus fostering a collective identity for white women as members of a national community. Moreover, this appeal encouraged western women to assert their political agency and re-envision their ability to participate in and transform the American political process. Thus, the CUWS's rhetoric of national unity and sisterhood promoted its militant agenda of challenging those who traditionally held political power and motivating western women to vote against Democratic members of Congress.

The CUWS furthered a rhetoric of unification between enfranchised and disenfranchised U.S. women by pointing to their common state of national disenfranchisement. Although almost four million women were enfranchised by 1914, they were limited to voting within their home state on state- and local-level policies, reifying the state limits of women's citizenship rights. Because their voting rights were
not protected by the U.S. Constitution, the CUWS argued that state-level citizenship actually limited women's political freedom.91 One Suffragist article said, "A woman fit to vote in the West, loses her right to full citizenship if she crosses a state line. But American men and women do not fall steadily on one spot of ground; they move freely from place to place in pursuit of business and family interests."92 The CUWS thus positioned state-level citizenship as a violation to key American rights, including the pursuits of freedom and happiness. One CUWS member termed this violation "interstate discrimination."93 Making western women voters aware of the limits of their state-level enfranchisement would ideally motivate them to participate in the CUWS's anti-Democratic campaign. In attempt to do just that, prominent CUWS organizer, Gail Laughlin, argued: "Citizenship is not an attribute of the states, but of the United States, and there is no sense or logic in recognizing the right and ability of women to vote on matters of national policy and then denying that suffrage is a national issue."94 Laughlin concluded: "The women of the western states have power. They need only recognize that power."95 Thus, the CUWS attempted to unite U.S. women in a common state of national disenfranchisement by constructing state-level citizenship as a delimitation of national citizenship rights. As such, the CUWS encouraged western women to participate in its anti-Democratic Party campaign to protect their own rights as well as the rights of their disenfranchised counterparts.

The CUWS reinforced its rhetoric of national unity and sisterhood by constructing western women as the empowered benefactors of disenfranchised eastern women. For example, in 1915, Alva Belmont said before a California audience: "The western woman, with the power of her ballot, will give to her enslaved sister justice and freedom . . . The
The union of this sisterhood of woman voters is the power, politically, of the near future. Belmont compared disenfranchisement to slavery as she considered the politically-powerless eastern women, "enslaved sisters," while she posited western women as free women and potential liberators. "Union" and "sisterhood" rhetorically united U.S. women beyond differences of political power, while the slavery metaphor rhetorically separated women as either enslaved or free. This use of the slave/free analogy, however, invited "free" women to liberate "enslaved" women based on their unity. Thus, the use of the slave/free analogy strengthened the CUWS's rhetoric of national unity and sisterhood and helped motivate western women voters to agitate Congress.

Such a national rhetoric of unity and sisterhood created unity based on women as women, since logically, only women would identify themselves as "sisters." While the CUWS did not imply that all U.S. women were biologically linked, it implied that all U.S. women were symbolically linked by a shared experience of oppression. Thus, in contrast to previous appeals made by the CUWS based on natural rights and equality, these appeals to sisterhood celebrated women's innate differences from men. For example, Belmont once argued: "It is in the power of women to free women, the most exalted task the world has ever set; and the achievement will glorify forever the sisterhood of a new era which heralds the complete unity of the women of the future." By calling upon "the power of women," Belmont encouraged women to assert their political agency in order to legitimize their own enfranchisement. Moreover, the free/slave metaphor was invoked again, reconstructing the ability for western women to vote against Democratic congressmen as the ability for "women to free women." Certainly, a constitutional amendment for woman suffrage would parallel the Fifteenth
Amendment—the only federal amendment that guaranteed the citizenship and voting rights of a particular population (African American men). Despite the sharp restriction of these voting rights during the post-Reconstruction Era, women's oppression was often compared to the condition of slavery. In the same way African American men were freed by the post-Civil War amendments, the CUWS argued that disenfranchised women could be freed by enfranchised women asserting their political agency.

When women's familial identities within the nation-state are considered, the limits of the CUWS's rhetoric of national sisterhood are exposed. In a militant sense, this rhetoric fostered female solidarity apart from the patriarchal confines of the home and the masculine spaces of politics, helping to constitute women's citizenship identities as independent political actors. Simultaneously, however, this rhetoric invoked a familial notion of nationalism, which typically normalized patriarchal relationships in the nation-state. Identifying women as sisters harkened to other familial identities, such as wives and mothers, which were often used to restrict women to the domestic sphere in addition to limiting women's political participation to domestic matters. Additionally, women's roles in the nation were restricted because women were thought to literally reproduce the nation's population, and thus, they became signifiers of all things good to a nation, such as purity, modesty, and morality. These glorified familial roles often limited women's participation in the nation-state as citizens. Thus, the CUWS's use of familial rhetoric in some ways worked to temper the CUWS's militant notion of female solidarity and women's identities as national citizens.

*The Agrarian Myth*
In addition to the rhetoric of national solidarity and sisterhood, the CUWS mimicked the rhetoric of the Populist Party by appealing to western women through the agrarian myth. According to Thomas R. Burkholder, Populist rhetors of the 1890s employed the agrarian myth to uphold the yeoman farmer as the ideal citizen because of the farmer's tireless work ethic and virtuous nature.\textsuperscript{100} The myth invoked eighteenth- and nineteenth-century notions of republicanism, wherein those with a stake-in-society as land-owners were more invested and therefore, better-equipped to participate in politics.\textsuperscript{101} Populism, however, eschewed the deferential politics associated with this sense of republicanism. Rather, Populists championed many policies aimed at enhancing the political rights of the oppressed, including woman suffrage. While Populists weren't unanimous in their support of woman suffrage, the two movements similarly needed to mobilize support across regions of the United States and unite a base constituency committed to ameliorating their subordinate positions in society. Thus, as rhetorical movements, populism and woman suffrage displayed striking similarities.

While Burkholder identifies five "traditional American values" that characterize the agrarian myth, the CUWS mimicked two of these values in particular: that nature "rewarded honest labor," and that the West was the "garden of the world" in contrast to the East, which was "probably evil."\textsuperscript{102} The CUWS's rhetoric appropriated the first of these values by invoking the legacies of nineteenth-century suffragists to suggest that their laborious efforts would ultimately be rewarded. The CUWS exploited the second of these mythic values by constructing the West as an ideal place of democratic expansion, which simultaneously positioned western women as actors of democratic precepts and positioned eastern women in need of the West's benevolence.
The notion that nature rewarded hard labor resonated well with CUWS members, whose western campaign required them to tirelessly canvass western states to persuade enfranchised women to fight for women's citizenship rights. Considering that women had been fighting for woman suffrage since the mid-nineteenth century, the promise of eventual reward helped justify the CUWS's campaign as a continuation of previous suffrage work. For example, Harriot Stanton Blatch once described her mother's first trip to the West: "She was the first to come, the first to see that emancipation for women was ready to spring for harvest on the soil of the West. Long, long years, they went to and fro laboriously sowing the seed that others might reap."\textsuperscript{103} Blatch's use of farming metaphors ("harvest on the soil"; "sowing the seed") likened her mother's work to the toilsome work of a farmer, whose manual labor would be rewarded with a harvest. Michael Osborn argues that nature metaphors help express senses of inevitability and determinism; these metaphors, thus, offered western women the promise of eventual reward for contributing to the woman suffrage movement.\textsuperscript{104} Blatch's use of nature metaphors also naturalized the notion of women's citizenship rights much in the same way Lockean liberalism naturalized the notion of political rights. John Locke argued that in nature, people are born free with the right to choose national membership.\textsuperscript{105} Blatch's equal-rightist approach asserted that women were men's natural equals, in contrast to the notion that women were naturally inferior to men. Thus, Blatch's use of the agrarian myth constructed the woman suffrage movement as an inevitable success and naturalized women's citizenship rights as part of the nation's liberal tradition.

Further mimicking Populist rhetoric, the CUWS promoted a dichotomous construction of the West and East. Like Populist rhetors, the CUWS constructed the West
as fertile, open, and inherently good; however, the CUWS revised the Populist construction of the East as evil, and instead construed it as less democratic than its western counterpart. Perceptions of the West as more open and democratic were apparent as the CUWS transferred these characteristics onto its constructions of western women. For example, one Suffragist article said: "The West is quicker than the East to respond to a big idea, to hasten to establish Democracy . . . Western women—free, idealistic, generous as they are." By positioning the West as more democratic and open to social change, the CUWS helped justify its western campaign. Similarly, one CUWS organizer linked these constructions to the openness of political consciousnesses: "The free spirit of the west is apparent in all their thinking, and a clean cut, straight political fight appeals to their wide awake imagination." By linking its construction of the free-spirited West to the women of the region, the CUWS positioned western women and their "wide awake imaginations[s]" as more welcome to the CUWS's campaign; in so doing, the CUWS naturalized its campaign as a "clean cut" demand for citizenship and tempered potential resistance to its militant strategies. Moreover, these appeals assumed a willingness on behalf of western women to join the suffrage fight. One organizer said: "We of the East are confident that the justice-loving women of the West will co-operate in demanding of our Government the political enfranchisement of the women of the United States." Thus, in a sense, the CUWS called upon western women to reverse the course of westward expansion by expanding their democratic rights to the East.

The CUWS's appeals to western women voters as open-minded sisters created a sense of loyalty and unity among eastern and western women. Prominent CUWS organizer, Maud Younger, said, "The struggle of our sisters in other states is our struggle;
that their cause is our cause; and that we cannot rest content in our own enfranchisement until the women of this entire nation shall share it with us." \(^{109}\) In fact, as early as 1914, the CUWS's rhetoric of national unity and sisterhood had taken hold. CUWS member, Dora Phelps Buell, declared: "Sisterhood first, party second." \(^{110}\) The uniting efforts of the CUWS also managed to raise political consciousness among western women. One Utah woman said of eastern suffragists: "[They] have given us now a program. They have told us that the women of the twelve suffrage states can hold the balance of power in a presidential election and that with this great power the women of the west can enfranchise their sisters of the east and south. To us this is a glorious thing." \(^{111}\) Western women credited the CUWS with educating them on woman suffrage; so while western women held the voting power to participate in the CUWS's plan for women's national enfranchisement, eastern women were thought to possess the political consciousness to motivate a national movement. At a CUWS meeting, Rhoda M. White, Dean of Women at Washington State University, reinforced this relationship between eastern and western women as she asked, "Was it not the eastern women who looked far and wide, who saw the western field ripe for woman's enfranchisement?" \(^{112}\)

The CUWS's rhetorical efforts to unite enfranchised and disenfranchised U.S. women were a necessary step in mimetically building a constituency of voters to participate in its anti-Democratic campaign. The CUWS's construction of western women as open and free-spirited treated these women as independent actors capable of enacting their citizenship rights apart from their husbands and, to an extent, subvert the political power of male legislators. These women likewise reflected the agrarian spirit that typified the rhetorical characteristics of the land in which they inhabited—natural embodiments of
freedom and justice. One woman from Portland, Oregon, rehearsed these natural rights arguments and notions of national solidarity: "It is just enlightened self-interest. Women here are finding out that problems are not local at all. They keep trotting back and forth across state lines, and we now realize that we must have the help of women in their states in order to solve what we used to call our problems."113 This realization also reflected the CUWS's efforts to unite women in a common state of national disenfranchisement and motivate them to assert their political agency as a means of bettering their lives. Another Oregon woman expressed the importance of her own political agency and the need to engage the masculine space of congressional politics. She stated, "I am going to take time next winter to read the Congressional Record, and so decide for myself just how important is all the legislation which in the minds of our Congressmen is often of greater importance than the national amendment for woman suffrage."114 Thus, the CUWS's appeals to western women voters worked to unite women as members of a national community, inspired them to engage the political process as independent thinkers, and through a rhetoric dependent on agrarian myths, helped naturalize the fight for woman suffrage.

*The Limits of "National" Citizenship*

Just as political parties strategically targeted certain voters over others, the CUWS's rhetoric of national unity and solidarity expressed a limited and expedient vision of women's unity. Since western women voters generally lacked racial diversity, the CUWS's rhetoric encouraged a unity of white women and perpetuated the notion that the ideal citizen was white. The CUWS's campaign also emphasized a reciprocal relationship between eastern and western women, thereby reducing its woman suffrage campaign to
an East-West coalition as it resisted identification with southern women. A caption of a *Suffragist* photograph summed up the CUWS's suffrage campaign as "The call from the East and the Response from the West."\(^{115}\)

This dualistic construction of the suffrage movement limited the representation of southern and African American women in the CUWS's campaign. The occlusion of southern women may have been strategic, considering the complexities of states' rights and racial issues. When the CUWS did mention the South, it reinforced the tenuous relationship between northern and southern women. Regarding the participation of southern women in the CUWS's 1914 demonstration, for example, *The Suffragist* said: "Especially it is delightful to learn of the enthusiasm shown by Southern women, who are commonly supposed to be more or less indifferent to suffrage."\(^{116}\) Additionally, when CUWS members embarked on its western campaign in 1916, *The Suffragist* reported: "It appears that the west is preparing to establish a precedent in the matter of hospitality, and go to the south one better in genuine cordiality to its visitors."\(^{117}\) Here, the CUWS reinforced its contentious relationship with southern suffragists by creating regional competition between the South, known for its hospitality, and the West, where the CUWS found a home for its anti-Democratic campaign.

Like a political party, however, the CUWS did not wish to completely alienate potential party members, such as southern women. In fact, the CUWS relied on expedient racism to appeal to southern women. In a rare *Suffragist* article that discussed race in the South, the CUWS said, "If the subject is given careful consideration it will become evident that the enfranchising of all women will increase the relative power of the white race in a most remarkable way."\(^{118}\) This explicit appeal to racial superiority showed that
the CUWS privileged white women's citizenship over universal citizenship. Here, the CUWS exposed the limits of its rhetoric of national unity and sisterhood, as well as its efforts to unite U.S. white women in their common state of national disenfranchisement. Like the Congressional Committee's national parade, the CUWS's militant push for immediate agitation excluded a significant portion of U.S. women from participating in its vision of liberation.

Despite such significant limitations, the CUWS nevertheless employed a rhetoric of national unity and sisterhood. Such discourse helped push a militant agenda of agitating members of Congress and mimetically build a base of voters prior to the formation of its political party. Moreover, by exploiting the agrarian myth, the CUWS constructed western women as more open to social reform in such a way that resembled the contours of the land in which they lived; conversely, the CUWS constructed eastern women as the necessary consciousness-raising agents to making western women aware of their national disenfranchisement. Based on their shared identities as sisters, western and eastern women worked together to defeat anti-suffrage Democratic congressmen in the West. In the process, their identities as sisters helped promote female solidarity and motivate western women to use their political rights to subvert male political power. The militancy of their sisterhood, however, was tempered by the subordinate and domesticated roles white women played in the nation-state as members of a larger, national family. Most significantly, the CUWS worked to grow a constituency of white women voters who possessed the political power to pose a legitimate threat to the Democratic Party.

BEYOND THE WEST: MOBILIZING U.S. WHITE WOMEN
TO AGITATE ALL U.S. CONGRESSMEN

At the same time the CUWS encouraged western women to vote against Democratic congressmen, the CUWS worked to expand its militant campaign in order to mobilize U.S. white women throughout the nation to agitate all members of Congress. In addition to the CUWS's focus on defeating members of the Democratic Party, the CUWS also aimed to secure the support of as many congressmen as possible. Prior to officially forming the Woman's Party in 1916, the CUWS mimicked the strategies of a national political party by establishing headquarters in every state, stationing organizers in every congressional district, and launching a number of nationwide campaign strategies. These strategies required the CUWS to move beyond its rhetorical appeals to western women and appeal to all U.S. white women—women with or without the right to vote. Moreover, the CUWS needed to mobilize local- and state-level support while remaining focused on its national campaign.

Thus, between 1913 and 1916, the CUWS mimetic campaign worked to empower U.S. white women to assert their political agency and redefine the limits of their citizenship identities in the nation-state. To these ends, the CUWS constituted U.S. white women as part of the American "people." The CUWS also worked to mobilize such women to commit sensational acts of citizenship, in which they invaded political spaces and created a militant sense of presence and ubiquity. Simultaneously, the CUWS mimicked acts of congressional deliberation by sending locally- and state-appointed representatives to the nation's Capitol Building to voice the demands of women as key constituents of the U.S. electorate. Together, these strategies bolstered the CUWS's
militant commitments to fashioning a woman's political party, agitating members of Congress, and constituting U.S. white women as U.S. citizens.

Constituting U.S. White Women as Part of the American "People"

Mimicking a national campaign, the CUWS rhetorically justified state and local work as subordinate, but necessary to national suffrage goals. For example, Alice Paul once wrote to a state organizer: "As you know, we are an organization formed to do Congressional work and not to win state campaigns. We have, it is true, aided in state work when we realized that if we did not do it[,] it would be left undone." At times, however, Paul sacrificed state and local work for the sake of the national campaign. In the 1914 anti-Democratic campaign, for instance, she wrote to state organizer, Mabel Vernon:

I believe, of course, that the time has now come to do federal work and that we must do it politically even at the risk of alienating individual voters in states where the referendum campaigns are in progress. I think that if we do it with sufficient vigor and determination, we can win this way and that this will overbalance whatever loss may come to the state work.

Like a national political party, the CUWS constructed its move to establish headquarters in every state and send organizers into every U.S. Congressional district as a way to build a national constituency of party members.

The CUWS worked to establish a national base by constituting the citizenship voices of women all over the country as part of a united demand for woman suffrage. Asserting political voice was central to the CUWS's militant philosophy. Just before waging its 1914 campaign, the CUWS said: "A movement is not really alive which does
not ask for immediate action . . . One thing we may be sure of—until we ask for instant action, no one else will ask for it."122 Uniting the voices of U.S. women as a national demand for woman suffrage was motivated by the CUWS's militant pursuit of white female solidarity. Also, uniting U.S. women's voices constituted a national community of white women citizens whose demands militantly expanded women's political identities in the political sphere.

The CUWS harnessed the united voices of U.S. women through its May 2, 1914, nationwide demonstrations, thus constituting a national base of CUWS constituents. On this day, national, state, and local CUWS organizers orchestrated and participated in suffrage demonstrations in more than 1,000 U.S. cities. Many demonstrations included between five and ten thousand marchers.123 The synchronicity of these demonstrations allowed the CUWS to literally and symbolically claim the united voices of U.S. women. For example, The Suffragist described the event as "a whole great country making a simultaneous demand for the complete reform of the electorate."124 Here, these demands paralleled those of a third political party entering the spaces of electoral politics while representing an outside threat to mainstream politics. The CUWS discussed how these local demonstrations were part of a united, national demand:

All over the country, on hundreds of platforms the women's cause is being argued, and that hundreds of people are listening. Tomorrow every newspaper in the United States will rehearse the story of the women's demonstration, thus swelling the audience to millions. Never, in the history of the world, have women been as vocal as they are on this day in May.125
Thus, U.S. women's voices were heard locally through street meetings and parades and heard nationally through newspaper coverage. This local-to-national movement worked to elevate the voices of U.S. white women throughout the country into a single, unified voice demanding woman suffrage at the national level. Additionally, the CUWS's focus on national newspaper coverage reflected its militant goals to generate publicity and push woman suffrage into the arena of national politics.

By uniting the voices of American white women, the CUWS constituted them as part of the American "people" with the political agency to participate in party politics. After the May 2, 1914, demonstrations, the CUWS declared: "We claim that the will of the people has been expressed in favor of nation-wide woman suffrage."\footnote{126} Moreover, when discussing how each member of Congress should receive this demand, the CUWS said: "It comes from his constituents, the people to whom he is responsible, and to whom he must look for re-election."\footnote{127} Thus, not only did the CUWS strive to unite U.S. women's voices into a single demand for national enfranchisement, they also sought to constitute their voices as part of the U.S. electorate. Constituting U.S. white women as part of the U.S. electorate helped naturalize the CUWS's militant demand for woman suffrage as a politically legitimate concern.

**Committing Sensational Acts of Citizenship**

The CUWS's militant campaign to agitate every member of Congress further mimicked the contours of third party politics as it constituted U.S. women's citizenship identities through sensational acts of citizenship. These acts were performed as large numbers of white women mimicked citizenship rituals within local, state, and national political spaces. In so doing, the CUWS functioned as a third party demanding the
attention of the political mainstream while it achieved more political ends (e.g., acquiring national and local support). The CUWS's sensational acts of citizenship, thus, furthered its anti-Democratic campaign as it exhibited both militant and traditional strategies.

As a key tenet of militancy, creating a sensation helped position the CUWS as a militant threat. Rosen argues, "Militant acts were those tactics sufficiently combative as to be widely regarded as shocking, and therefore worthy of comment." Thus, as masses of women invaded male, deliberative spaces, they challenged the gendered limitations of political participation and in many cases, provoked responses from congressmen. Paul considered these acts as part of the CUWS's national anti-Democratic campaign. She said, "But if the party which has it in its power to pass our measure fails to act, then we will send organizers to every State and district where we can do effective work, and do all we can to defeat the representatives of that party." Thus, these sensational acts helped establish the CUWS as a militant threat to "every State and district" and to the public/private limits on political participation.

Throughout the CUWS's 1914 and 1916 anti-Democratic campaigns, these sensational acts allowed U.S. white women to mimic the authority of fully-enfranchised citizens, and thus constitute their citizenship identities. To greet Maryland state congressmen at the opening of the state's legislative session in 1914, for example, at least thirty Maryland suffragists marched from Baltimore to Annapolis, where they presented the legislators with a petition of over 200,000 signatures of Maryland voters. Sensationally, the suffragists physically marched across the state over the course of a day and were escorted to the State Capitol Building by a marching band. By positioning themselves as representatives of Maryland state citizens, the suffragists mimicked the
political authority of elected officials, and thus, constituted themselves as political actors independent of men.\textsuperscript{130}

To an extent, the CUWS's militant commitment to agitate the U.S. government mimicked the ways in which a third party presses its agenda into mainstream party politics from an outside position. The CUWS, thus, mimicked third parties as its members sensationalized these acts of citizenship as invasions of male political spaces.\textsuperscript{131} For example, on April 30, 1915, 200 New York women visited Senator James A. O'Gorman. The meeting was preceded by an open-air meeting and a marching band, "playing national and popular airs [as it] made its own appeal to the rapidly gathering crowd which assembled on the Sub-Treasury steps and packed the sidewalk and all available space within hearing distance of the two automobiles."\textsuperscript{132} Moreover, \textit{The Suffragist} noted that when they arrived to the meeting, the women "filled the spacious outer room" of O'Gorman's private office.\textsuperscript{133} By focusing on the ways in which the suffragists occupied spaces on the street and in spaces reserved for political activity, the CUWS constructed itself as a force breaking down the public/private boundaries placed on women's political participation in the early-twentieth century. Also, the CUWS created an overwhelming sense of presence, mirroring the growing national suffragist movement and promoting the collectivity of U.S. women's political voices. Such activities occupied the pages of \textit{The Suffragist} throughout the CUWS's anti-Democratic campaign between 1913 and 1916; \textit{The Suffragist} reported on at least twenty-four delegations to state congressmen such as these.\textsuperscript{134}

The CUWS's mimetic adoption of third party strategies helped it simultaneously assert its militancy and achieve the more traditional goal of gaining widespread attention.
Specifically, the CUWS's sensational acts allowed U.S. women to assert their citizenship rights in everyday, public spaces, and thus naturalized their demands for woman suffrage. For example, the CUWS's demonstrations on May 2, 1914, inspired U.S. women to participate in suffrage parades, demonstrations, and open-air meetings all over the country on this same day. Regarding the reach of these demonstrations, The Suffragist described women who lived outside of urban areas as "timid about demonstrating their faith" and "afraid to speak, especially on the streets, where all causes must be argued before they can win." Here, the CUWS's militancy shone through as it politicized "the streets" as the ideal place to engage in deliberative acts. This reference to "the streets" enhanced the perception that CUWS members were omnipresent, while it also challenged the perception that women in the streets, particularly women who voiced political demands, openly violated gendered beliefs about a woman's "proper place." During this time period, women who publicly demanded political rights were often the objects of social condemnation. By encouraging women to infiltrate these public spaces, the CUWS inspired women to assert their political agency and redefine the gendered limits of public and political activity. And by expanding the reach of politics into everyday spaces, the CUWS worked to naturalize women's citizenship rights and thus, enhance its appeal to more U.S. women.

Further mimicking the ways in which third parties attempt to amass widespread support, the CUWS's sensational acts of citizenship helped naturalize woman suffrage for local audiences. Holding fast to its militant theory of agitation, the CUWS positioned itself as a threat to political and public spaces; however, the CUWS's militant strategies were aimed toward policy change and building support on local levels. To this end, The
*Suffragist* emphatically discussed how the demonstrations on May 2 generated localized suffrage discussion:

> In hundreds of towns and cities great throngs of people will be listening, under the trees of parks, in open square and vacant spaces, to outdoor suffrage oratory. In hundreds of others crowded mass meetings will fill theaters, public halls, schools and other buildings. Everywhere, on the streets, in the street cars, in business offices and stores, in homes, suffrage will be the engrossing topic of conversation.

Today is indeed woman suffrage day the length and the breadth of this well-beloved land.\(^{136}\)

In addition to the fact that, in most cities, thousands of people participated in these events, *The Suffragist's* coverage created an overwhelming sense that suffragists occupied every local corner of the United States, thus weaving woman suffrage into the local, everyday spaces and lives of the American public, helping to naturalize woman suffrage as a salient political issue.\(^{137}\)

Last, these sensational acts mimicked the goals of a single-issue party as it helped normalize the question of woman suffrage and thus, furthered the CUWS's militant campaign to earn the endorsements of Democratic congressmen. *The Suffragist* said, "[The demonstrations] will certainly prove to the Democratic party that there is no section of the country where women are not actively campaigning."\(^ {138}\) Thus, by mimicking third party politics, the CUWS's sensational acts of citizenship allowed the organization to exert its militancy in political spaces while achieving more political goals, such as gaining national and local appeal. As women participated in acts of campaigning, they enacted the citizenship rights they demanded through the framework of a political
party. By doing so on local levels, CUWS members helped create a militant sense of inescapable and threatening presence that simultaneously helped naturalize woman suffrage; as the article concluded, they created an "overwhelming public opinion in favor of real democracy." As these sensational acts elevated the CUWS's local and state efforts into national efforts for woman suffrage, the organization furthered its mimetic adoption of third party strategies.

*Mimicking Acts of Deliberation*

Many parts of the CUWS's militant campaign to agitate members of Congress mimicked acts of deliberation often reserved for popularly-elected officials and party leaders. These mimetic acts of deliberation reflected an assumption of political leadership within legislative arenas and party politics. For instance, exactly one week after the May 2, 1914, nation-wide demonstrations, 531 suffrage "delegates" representing every congressional district in the nation traveled to Washington, D.C. to present suffrage petitions to every member of Congress. Similarly, in 1915, at the conclusion of the first Convention of Women Voters, two CUWS "envoys" embarked on a cross-country road trip to Washington, D.C., where they accumulated more than 500,000 signatures on a single petition more than 18,000 feet in length. As such, chosen CUWS leaders mimetically sought the demands of their constituents and then voiced them in the deliberative spaces of capitol buildings. CUWS leaders presented these petitions as popularly-elected officials representing the demands of their constituents and party members.

On May 9, 1914, as participants gathered in Washington, D.C., from all areas of the country to present U.S. congressional members with their suffrage petitions, CUWS
leaders voiced these demands as though they were the appointed representatives of the U.S. electorate. In a parade much like the one held the year before, thousands of women marched through the streets of Washington, D.C., to the Capitol Building. There, the chosen 531 delegates from all over the nation marched up the capitol steps into the rotunda, where they were enthusiastically received by eleven senators and eleven representatives. From there, the suffragists delivered their petitions to their respective legislators. Of the demonstration, The Suffragist reported:

    It has to inform the Congress of the United States that in every Congressional District in every State in the Union, men and women, their constituents, have met and have bade them pass the suffrage amendment now before Congress, and to do it without unnecessary delay. The really important part of the May 9th procession will be the delegates from the Congressional districts. All the rest of the procession will be merely an escort of those women who go to the Capitol to present the resolutions adopted all over the country on May 2nd.

As "delegates," CUWS members constructed themselves as party officials chosen to carry the demands of U.S. "men and women" and voice them in the deliberative spaces of the U.S. Capitol Building. This rhetorical act of political mimesis endowed these CUWS representatives with political legitimacy, while it also constituted women as members of a new political party complete with delegates and representatives to Congress.

    CUWS leaders further mimicked acts of deliberation and modeled third party strategies through the cross-country journey of two "envoys." The two women, Sara Bard Field and Frances Joliffe, were the elected "delegates" from the first convention held for women voters. Selecting Field and Joliffe as the CUWS's delegates reinforced the
construction of the CUWS as a third political party, particularly in light of the concurrent rise of the primary system, in which candidates were selected at party conventions. Because these representatives were chosen by enfranchised women, the CUWS further positioned the envoys as elected officials. A writer for *The Suffragist* said, "Surely Congress cannot fail to heed the voice of the new power, the woman's vote, which is now sounding its message and sending its messengers 35,000 miles, to bear its demands to Washington."\(^{144}\) The envoys were, thus, empowered by "the woman's vote" as "messengers" chosen to represent the voices of enfranchised women in Washington, D.C. This "new power" also constituted the women's solidarity and shared identities as party members. Demonstrating the strength of the CUWS's constituency during a reception in New York, Alva Belmont noted: "Suffrage petitions have been submitted to Congress from time immemorial, but none that was backed by the strength of four million voters."\(^{145}\)

The CUWS further constructed the envoys as party leaders by charging the envoys with the duty of representing the disenfranchised. For example, at the conclusion of the Convention of Women Voters, 10,000 attendees gathered to bid the envoys farewell. As CUWS organizer Margaret Anglin presented the envoys with the petition, she said, "This is not paper only upon which is written our demands . . . [but] women give their most eager aspiration, their hopes and their hearts to your keeping[;] realizing you are to be the voice crying to Congress to make straight the path of justice for women."\(^{146}\) Like other party representatives, the envoys were charged with representing the "hopes" and "hearts" of those in need. Thus, the envoys' journey to Washington, D.C., not only carried the authority of voting constituents, but was motivated by the American
promise of democratic representation, wherein the voices of those denied political rights could turn to elected officials for political empowerment.

The CUWS further mimicked the deliberative process by constructing the envoys' trip as a series of public meetings with political allies. Considering a recent shift in campaign strategies, which encouraged direct contact between party candidates and their constituents, conceiving of the envoys' trip as a publicity tour was particularly strategic. In Salt Lake City, Utah, for instance, the envoys were greeted on the State Capitol steps by Governor William Spry, Mayor Samuel C. Park, and U.S. Representative Joseph Howell. In Lincoln, Nebraska, Governor John H. Morehead met the envoys as a procession of ten cars carried them to the capitol building. Similarly, in Chicago, Illinois, 1,000 people and fifty cars gathered as Mayor William Hale Thompson and his wife gathered with the women and signed the petition. The envoys enjoyed receptions such as these in at least twenty-three states and forty-two cities. These public greetings and endorsements of local and state politicians offered the envoys and their message political legitimacy and suggested that the envoys also possessed the political authority to engage other elected officials. Moreover, the public setting of these meetings reinforced the CUWS's expansion of women's roles in the public/political sphere.

The CUWS further bolstered the envoys' political legitimacy as these receptions were often construed as stages of public deliberation between political counterparts. Toward such ends, the envoys often met with reluctant senators and representatives who favored a state-by-state approach to woman suffrage or who opposed the initiative altogether. Nonetheless, the willingness on behalf of these officials to engage the envoys in such public and political settings reinforced the strength of the envoys' political
leadership. For example, in Evanston, Wyoming, the envoys met with Republican
Senator Clarence D. Clark in the city's court house, where the Senator stated that he
believed strongly in the state method. According to The Suffragist, Sara Field "told the
Senator and the people present of the untold waste of women's life force which the state
campaigns entailed."151 To this, Senator Clark "listened attentively" and reported that he
"was amazed and interested to learn of the difficulties of that form of work."152 When
Field pressed the Senator to approve a printed statement of his endorsement, he relented:
"Say anything you like and I will stand for it."153 By noting that the Senator listened and
then capitulated to the envoys' case, the CUWS portrayed this event as a deliberative
process in which the envoys stood on equal political ground with other elected officials.
By emphasizing that Field spoke to the Senator as well as to "the people," the CUWS
further constituted the envoys as public officials with the authority to represent the
demands of "the people." While such rhetorical acts of political mimesis reflected the
CUWS's militant assumption of political authority, they also bolstered the CUWS's
political legitimacy as a third party through the endorsements of male political leaders.

The CUWS extended its construction of the envoys as party leaders by
sensationalizing these public meetings as political rallies, where the envoys were received
with the pomp of political celebrities speaking to their constituents. For example, in her
report on their visit to Des Moines, Iowa, Sara Field reported, "we had more people to
talk to than our voices could reach."154 She added:

As our auto procession passed down the street, crowds gathered to see it; and the
windows of every business[,] house[,] and office building were lined with kindly
faces. Often there was applause and cheers; when these were lacking, there was a
peculiar sort of earnest curiosity . . . [At] earnest street meetings afterwards, 
gravely interested crowds attended and the newspapers gave large space. The 
whole city talked national suffrage for at least two days.155

Here, Field constructed herself and the envoys as an irresistible sight, as she enjoyed and 
celebrated the attention of crowds and onlookers. As such, Field portrayed herself and 
Joliffe as political celebrities, who came to Des Moines to inspire and mobilize their 
constituents to support a federal woman suffrage amendment. Field strengthened the 
envoys' celebrity attraction by depicting the audience as willing sympathizers when she 
emphasized their "kindly faces;" by extension, Field carefully avoided noting any 
resistance by interpreting the audience's silence as "earnest curiosity." Field's report 
ultimately reflected the CUWS's militancy as she emphasized the envoys' ability to 
generate publicity and to spur political conversation in public spaces and in the press—
spaces still often reserved for the political activities of men.

The envoys' rhetoric of political mimesis helped achieve the CUWS's goal to 
nationalize local and state efforts as they physically canvassed the United States and 
amassed the collective voices of U.S. citizens. By the end of the envoys' journey, for 
example, the petition bore the signatures of every governor of every state the envoys 
visited (except Nebraska), constructing the women as the entrusted representatives of 
fellow elected politicians.156 Like the CUWS's other rhetorical strategies to constitute a 
national base of party members, the envoys also promoted the notion that woman 
suffrage was a collective, nationwide movement. As part of the CUWS's overall 
campaign to agitate members of Congress and to build a woman's political party, the 
envoys allowed a space for U.S. women to unite as politically-empowered constituents.
In all, the CUWS worked to rhetorically unite all U.S. women by constituting white women, at least, as part of the American people, inspiring them to participate in sensational acts of citizenship, and by mimicking acts of party leadership. These rhetorical strategies reflected the CUWS's militant approach toward social change as it encouraged women to assume citizenship identities and assert their political agency with or without enfranchised citizenship rights. The CUWS further formed these citizenship identities as they constituted U.S. women as political party members whose chosen representatives would voice their demands in local, state, and national deliberative spaces. Moreover, the CUWS's militancy shone through as it encouraged CUWS members to occupy public and political spaces often reserved for men, mimicking the actions of male political leaders while acting independently of men. Ultimately, the CUWS's construction of the envoys as elected officials worked to earn the CUWS a greater sense of political legitimacy, edging closer to securing a federal woman suffrage amendment.

The CUWS's work in every congressional district in the nation enjoyed some political success and reinforced the strength of the CUWS as a national woman suffrage organization. For example, following the CUWS's presentation of suffrage petitions on April 7, 1913, the Senate Woman Suffrage Committee met for the first time since 1878 to introduce Senate Joint Resolution 1.\(^{157}\) On June 13, weeks following the resolution's introduction, the Committee voted unanimously in favor of the amendment. On July 31, twenty-three senators spoke in favor of amendment; only three spoke against it. And, in the House, three resolutions to create a House Woman Suffrage Committee were introduced.\(^{158}\) Moreover, of the forty-three Democrats running for election or re-election
in 1914, twenty-three were defeated. Proudly, the CUWS credited itself with unseating six of those men.\textsuperscript{159}

Equally important, the CUWS's national campaign helped constitute women's citizenship identities. As CUWS members entered the halls of Congress and state capitol buildings, they asserted their political agency and enacted the citizenship rights they demanded. In addition, members redefined the limits of their political participation in the nation-state as they participated in the nationwide suffrage demonstrations of May 2, 1914, cheered on the envoys as they passed through their hometowns, and as members themselves made multiple journeys to Washington D.C. to represent their own congressional districts. These multiple campaign strategies reflected the activities of party membership; women, thus, further constituted their citizenship identities as they turned to CUWS leaders as their elected officials and readied themselves to agitate members of Congress for their fully-enfranchised citizenship rights.

**BECOMING A THIRD PARTY, EARNING POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, AND ESTABLISHING A MILITANT THREAT**

Even though the CUWS's political strategies resembled those of third parties between 1913 and into early 1916, the organization did not officially create a political party until July 1916 when it formed the Woman's Party (WP). Since the CUWS's national parade in 1913, it worked to agitate members of Congress through political mimesis by calling upon the activist and political strategies reflective of third party politics. Forming the WP helped codify such strategies, which posed an even greater threat to members of Congress than before as the WP built upon the strength of its local organizational networks and state headquarters. The party was open to all women voters,
and did not require that members pay dues.\textsuperscript{160} Even the official formation of the WP mimicked typical political party behavior. For example, the WP was launched at a CUWS convention in Chicago, at the same time the Republican and Progressive national conventions took place. Over 1,000 women attended and contributed to the party's platform.\textsuperscript{161} Yet, unlike a typical party, which works to secure the election of party candidates, the WP's primary goal was to defeat Democratic candidates in all twelve suffrage states. Moreover, the WP was careful not to endorse any particular candidate. Paul wrote to one organizer: "It seems to us that [we] gain more publicity by our campaign of opposition than we could by one of support."\textsuperscript{162} Like a third political party, the WP was positioned in "opposition" to one of the mainstream political parties, thus reinforcing the CUWS's militant philosophy of sustained agitation. Simultaneously, positioning the WP as a third party also helped the CUWS achieve its ultimate goal of effecting policy change.

As a reflection of the CUWS's militancy, forming a political party reflected a mimetic assumption of political authority. Although third parties typically possess less political influence than major parties, they are often the result of a split from a major political party and are led by a prominent political figure. Although not rooted in a major political party, the CUWS aimed to enter national politics with the same political authority and forcefulness of a third party. Of the WP, Paul wrote:

We want it to be a new political party which will have the same significance as a factor in the coming election as had the Progressive Party when it was launched four years ago. We hope that if the political leaders see the women voters are
forming an independent party they will regard the suffrage question as a more serious one than they have considered it in the past.  

Clearly influenced by the meteoric success of the Progressive Party, the CUWS's mimetic formation of a third party aimed to transform the question of woman suffrage into a legitimate political issue worthy of legislative attention.

Just as third parties threaten the political viability of major political parties, the WP was considered a weapon against political oppression. One WP leader said that the party was determined to inspire western women voters "to organize their political power and use it for the freedom of all women." The WP's militant underpinnings were further revealed as it constituted itself as a militaristic threat to the Democratic Party while campaigning at the Republican, Progressive, and Democratic national conventions. Here, the CUWS more forcefully employed war-like metaphors than ever before. For example, while at the Progressive and Republican Party conventions, Blatch advocated lobbying "every man on a committee or in a convention" in order to "fight the Democratic Party [from the] ground down." Shortly after, at the Democratic National Convention, WP member, Rheta Childe Dorr, described the WP as a "brigade." She continued: "The siege of St. Louis began on the morning of June tenth . . . We seized, without resistance on the manager's part, a conspicuous corner of the lobby." Constructing themselves as a part of a "siege" on the Democrats, and as soldiers who "seized" part of the Democrats' convention space, WP members constituted the WP as a militant threat to the Democratic Party. In so doing, the WP's political legitimacy as a third party became a vehicle for constituting the CUWS's militant identity and motivating its members to agitate the Democratic Party as though engaged in an all-out war.
The WP further mimicked party politics and bolstered its political legitimacy by forging alliances with other national political parties of the time.\textsuperscript{167} While the formation of the WP reflected the contours of third party politics, it also adopted the focus of single-issue parties; it was solely centered on earning women's national citizenship rights by defeating Democratic candidates. As such, the WP could potentially benefit other parties by driving Democratic voters to endorse other candidates. In fact, the CUWS sought alliances with other non-Democratic parties in order to earn more political legitimacy and further its anti-Democratic agenda. For example, Paul advised one organizer in Phoenix, Arizona to use "Socialist, Progressive, Republican and Prohibition newspapers" in order to get the WP's "press bulletins into nearly every part of the state."\textsuperscript{168} Eventually, former Progressive leader, Theodore Roosevelt, and Republican presidential candidate, Charles Evans Hughes, publicly endorsed the WP. These alliances with other national political parties strengthened the WP's political legitimacy and exerted pressure on the Democratic Party to endorse national woman suffrage.

The WP further mimicked the formation of a third party by drafting Harriot Stanton Blatch to lead the WP's campaign in all twelve suffrage states, much in the same way a splinter candidate is enlisted to head a third party.\textsuperscript{169} Blatch had been a supporter of the CUWS since its inception, but had also expressed disapproval of Paul's and Burns's nationwide campaign, particularly since the CUWS's New York campaign often competed with Blatch's own New York campaign.\textsuperscript{170} Yet, Blatch's invaluable experience with state-level suffrage campaigns and prominence as a political figure in her own right represented an invaluable asset to the CUWS. Her willingness to work with the
organization suggested that the strength of the U.S. suffrage movement was transitioning
toward a national movement—strength that was harnessed in the WP.

Blatch's rhetorical leadership positioned the WP as a politically legitimate force in
electoral politics. Again, while the WP was poised to disrupt mainstream party politics, it
also functioned to effect constitutional change. In an appeal to a leader of the Colorado
Democratic Party, for example, Blatch grounded her argument for a national suffrage
amendment in constitutional terms:

The National Constitution must be made to protect women as it protects men. As
our fundamental law reads today, the political rights of even enfranchised women
are not protected for in the Fourteenth Amendment[,] protection is extended to
male inhabitants only and in the Fifteenth Amendment the word "sex" is
excluded. The demand which the women are making for an amendment to the
United States Constitution, concerns enfranchised women quite as deeply as it
concerns the disenfranchised.171

Blatch's appeal exuded the CUWS's equal rightist philosophy toward woman suffrage,
stemming from the liberal tradition in U.S. politics and assuming that all are born with
the rights to individual freedom and voluntary citizenship.172 These ideals were thought
to motivate the Radical Republicans in their push for the ratification of the Civil War
amendments, which empowered African Americans' citizenship rights. By recalling these
amendments, Blatch relied on the more radical notion of equal rights and compared the
oppression of black men to that of white women in order to make a compelling argument
for a federal woman suffrage amendment. Considering that Blatch's audience was a
white, male politician, such a legal argument buttressed the WP's political goal of altering
the U.S. Constitution, targeting those with the political agency to achieve such constitutional change.

Blatch further revealed her ability to ingratiate the WP into mainstream U.S. electoral politics as she also made arguments for women's rights that reinforced traditional gender roles. For example, after Paul attempted to arrange some CUWS speakers to tour through the western states, Blatch replied, "A tear rolling down a cheek of a Democratic woman with a few words from her, however stumbling, expressing her profound regret at not being able to support her party, would do more to move the political committees and conventions than the most unanswerable logic of the most eloquent woman coming from outside the state." Blatch revealed her nuanced understanding of state-level politics as she preferred that Democratic women spoke within their native states. Perhaps Blatch's long career in New York's state politics made her more sensitive to the strength of state-level loyalties over national-level loyalties. Nonetheless, Blatch also argued that a pathetic appeal would be more forceful than a logical appeal, and in doing so, she tacitly perpetuated the construction of women as more emotional and irrational. By invoking the image of a "tear rolling down a cheek of a Democratic woman," Blatch positioned women in a subordinate and vulnerable position, nearly pleading for support from other political organizations. Thus, Blatch's rhetorical leadership reflected a combination of more radical and traditional gendered appeals; the latter of which potentially undermined the political agency asserted by these Democratic women as they demanded national citizenship rights. Blatch's gendered suggestion, however, also revealed a deeper understanding of the CUWS's male audience, who may have been less threatened by stereotypical womanly behavior than by the CUWS's
militancy. Such beliefs persisted; for example, one Ohio CUWS organizer reported hearing from "Men who don't want to see women in 'Machine politics."\(^{174}\)

Ultimately, the CUWS's participation in U.S. party politics bolstered its political legitimacy in order to agitate the Democratic Party. On one hand, the formation of the WP legitimized the CUWS's campaign and created the perception that the organization was not a militant threat. For example, an article in the *Washington Times* said, "The Woman's Party . . . is not a fantastic dream of sex solidarity, but a practical political influence, a balance of power movement, which is a factor in national politics and must be reckoned with."\(^{175}\) Thus, the creation of the WP eschewed the potential militant threat posed by the CUWS's rhetorical efforts to constitute female "solidarity" and rather, established the CUWS as an authoritative presence in national politics. Even prior to the WP's inception, the CUWS's party-centered strategies were regarded as a reflection of the current political situation. Spencer Miller, Jr., of the *San Francisco Bulletin* wrote:

> Political party pressure, far from being indictable, is highly commendable. It is not an attempt to embarrass a party, but rather to vitalize the contact between the people and the party . . . More and more should government tend to become a barometer to social pressure. Consciously should it address the problems of humanity. Organizations created with this purpose of intelligently directing governmental agencies are distinctly a public asset. These are some of the outstanding facts of contemporary American politics. And this is one of the causes which has brought the Congressional Union into being . . . It is an adaptation of twentieth century political machinery to twentieth century political conditions.\(^{176}\)
Again, the CUWS's political party was regarded as a legitimate force in national politics and an example of ideal citizenship behavior. Moreover, Miller constituted CUWS members as part of the "people" as they attempted to "vitalize" political parties.

The WP's political legitimacy ultimately paid off as the Democratic State Central Committees of Arizona and Idaho endorsed woman suffrage, as did many state Republican committees. The WP's ultimate coup, however, was pressuring the Democratic National Convention to endorse woman suffrage. Section XX of the party's platform said, "We recommend the extension of the franchise to the women of the country by the States upon the same terms as men." Although the plank recommends a state-by-state strategy, it represented the first time the Democratic Party officially endorsed woman suffrage.

The WP promoted the CUWS as a politically-legitimate organization and more significantly helped establish the CUWS as a militant presence. Part of the CUWS's militant campaign to mimic party politics was to empower women to assert their political agency and function as independent political actors. Moreover, the CUWS's militancy worked to politicize everyday spaces of women's lives by encouraging women to demand citizenship rights in public spaces. For example, on the day of the 1916 congressional and presidential elections, the WP organized women to take post at 2,100 polling booths in Chicago alone. Many of these women reported converting 50-100 women voters before they cast their ballots. One WP organizer said that on voting day, "Every available speaker was drawn into service and as many meetings as possible arranged . . . At the same time a large amount of literature was distributed and thousands of posters were sent out and placed on display throughout the suffrage states." Creating this sense of
ubiquity, particularly on such a large scale and in such public spaces, reflected the CUWS's militant commitment to challenging the private/public divide. Moreover, by constructing WP members as insistent and ubiquitous, the CUWS further constituted its identity as a militant force, helping to feminize public, masculine spaces.

The CUWS accentuated its militant philosophy as it considered the WP's campaign a success less so because of the number of defeated Democratic candidates, and more so because it posed a threat to the major political parties and forced discussion of the issue. Of the WP's campaign, The Suffragist said, "It put the Democrats on the defensive. It forced them to declare greater and greater enthusiasm for national woman suffrage. The election ended with Democrats and Republicans vying with each other as to which was more devoted to the enfranchisement of women."

Here, the CUWS credited itself for spurring political debate about woman suffrage and contributing to its prominence as a political issue. Although Democrats lost sixteen House seats and Wilson secured the presidency with 158 fewer electoral votes than he did in his 1912 election, the CUWS ultimately declared: "We did not care who won . . . we were simply pro-woman." One of the three lost Democratic seats in the suffrage states went to Jeannette Rankin of Montana, who secured a Republican seat in the House with 2,000 more votes than her Democratic opponent. To the CUWS, Rankin's election as the first woman elected to the U.S. Congress symbolized the growing success of the woman suffrage movement and a reflection of its efforts to mobilize Montana women to vote.

The CUWS further worked to constitute its militant identity by pointing to its strength and endurance. A writer for The Suffragist argued that "the Woman's Party gave national publicity to the woman's vote, and drove it into the consciousness of the most
unimaginative politician that women did vote . . . with an independence that nothing can shake."\(^{185}\) Again, the CUWS credited itself with promoting woman suffrage in national politics by forcing the issue into the minds of resistant politicians. As such, the CUWS constructed itself as an insistent and powerful force. Additionally, this excerpt emphasized the "independence" of women voters, which constructed women as rational and resilient, and challenged the commonly-held belief that women were incapable of independent political thought.

The successes of the WP must be understood, at least in part, as a derivative of the CUWS members' privileged identities as mostly white, upper- and middle-class women. Considering that most political parties at that time—even parties centered on empowering marginalized groups—were led by white males, the CUWS could more easily transition into U.S. party politics and be received as a legitimate political presence because of the whiteness of its members.\(^{186}\) Although many disempowered and marginalized groups participated in organized movements, many lacked the racial privilege to compete as their own political parties. The perceived racial inferiority of these groups also contributed to their oppressed and marginalized position in U.S. society, which in turn, helps explain why most of them did not possess state-level suffrage at this time. Thus, without the "whiteness" associated with ideal U.S. citizenship, these marginalized groups faced opposition toward earning state- and federal-level suffrage and the authority to enter national party politics.

Due, in part, to the CUWS's somewhat privileged position in U.S. politics, the organization's formation of a political party challenged the limits of women's political participation in the nation-state and represented a legitimate threat to the Democratic
Party. The CUWS's assumption of political power not only motivated the formation of the WP, but inspired women to agitate members of Congress between 1913 and 1916. As a reflection of its militancy, the CUWS aimed to rhetorically unite western white women with disenfranchised women, to mobilize white women in every U.S. congressional district, and to participate as members of a political party. Taken together, these rhetorical strategies worked to empower U.S. women to assert their political agency and redefine their citizenship identities as independent, national citizens.

CONCLUSION: RESISTANCE, MILITANT STRENGTH, AND A TURN TOWARD THE PRESIDENCY

The CUWS's anti-Democratic campaign between 1913 and 1916 helped constitute women's citizenship identities by mobilizing U.S. white women to participate in a national movement through the mimetic adoption of third party politics. While the campaign helped form the group's militant identity, it also worked against such a "militant" label because their members played many of the rituals of party politics. Nonetheless, toward the end of 1916, when the Democratic Party was losing favor in Congress, the CUWS would turn its militant campaign toward the newly re-elected Democratic president.

The CUWS's anti-Democratic campaign shaped its militant identity by casting it as an extension of the militant tradition in the woman suffrage movement. For example, prior to the envoys' dispatch in 1915, Gail Laughlin likened the CUWS's campaign to Susan B. Anthony's militant refusal to pay a $100 fine for voting in the 1872 presidential election. She concluded, "When you hear something called 'militant' condemned, you will remember that nothing worth while has ever been won except by those who are willing to
sacrifice freedom, labor or love for it."187 Laughlin took pride in the organization's militant acts as she considered resistance to the CUWS part of the process toward achieving women's full citizenship rights.

Some suffragists, however, resisted embracing a militant identity. In 1915, Clara Ueland, a Minnesota suffragist, argued: "I do not consider them 'militant.' It is not militant to send delegations to congressmen and to the president. These are entirely legitimate methods."188 Her inclination to eschew a militant label suggested that many, even supporters of the CUWS, considered militancy a more threatening approach toward achieving woman suffrage. Throughout the CUWS's campaign to agitate Congress, it often positioned itself as a non-threatening or "legitimate" organization, which helped broaden the CUWS's social appeal and gain institutional support. The CUWS, however, did not shy away from directly challenging the limits placed on women's political participation, particularly as it committed sensational acts of citizenship and worked to position itself as a threat to the Democratic Party. Thus, the CUWS's militantly-driven campaign encouraged women to participate in the suffrage movement and yet, to resist doing so as self-proclaimed militants. As the CUWS continued its fight for woman suffrage in late 1916 and throughout 1917, this resistance to militancy translated into greater resistance to the organization's more ardently militant protest strategies.

Whether or not the CUWS openly committed acts in the name of militancy, its anti-Democratic campaign faced vociferous opposition from other suffrage leaders. Former NAWSA president, Carrie Chapman Catt, for example, felt the CUWS jeopardized the NAWSA's state-by-state campaigns. She said, "What is good for one part of the country may not be good for the other . . . [The CUWS's] only purpose is to create
a disturbance, [and] it will be absolutely impossible for us to accomplish any good work." Perhaps reflecting the prominence of third party politics in the current political context, Catt compared the CUWS to a group of defective party members. She argued:

The division of a party almost invariably means the victory of the other at election and history has proved this so many times that they know what they are about when they are pleased at the division in the opposing ranks. What is true about political parties is even more true of a reform movement like ours. Our strength lies in a united band of women demanding the same thing.

Catt's opposition showed that the CUWS's identity as a third party did not represent the woman suffrage movement as a whole. Moreover, Catt's criticism reinforced the ideological differences between the CUWS and the NAWSA. The CUWS's militant campaign worked to defeat the election or re-election of congressmen, instead of focusing on the more moderate approach of winning state referenda or electing pro-suffrage candidates. The CUWS's militancy, however, was motivated by the notion that these moderate approaches did not expedite social change.

To an extent, Catt's reservations were justified. Because the CUWS aimed to agitate the Democratic Party as a whole, the CUWS's campaign threatened the election or re-election of many suffrage-supporting Democrats in the 1914 and 1916 congressional elections. Whether or not the CUWS actually affected these elections, their work was considered counterproductive by some opponents. A Colorado suffragist accused the CUWS of being "very hostile" to suffrage-supporting Democrat, U.S. Senator Charles Thomas, and creating "a vicious fight" for his re-election. Harriot Taylor Upton of Ohio argued that the CUWS's 1914 campaign contributed to the defeat of the state's
suffrage referendum. Similarly, Emma Haley Frazelle blamed "the foolishness of the Congressional Union and the Woman's Party" for dividing Oregon women between presidential candidates Hughes and Wilson, and thereby, "deffinately [sic] injuring the cause of suffrage." Considering the CUWS's more militant and less moderate approach toward social change, such backlash was to be expected.

Within suffrage circles, others credited the CUWS's militant campaign for mobilizing and uniting U.S. women toward a federal amendment. For example, a Minnesota suffrage leader wrote about her decision to "co-operate with the Congressional Union" instead of with the NAWSA:

I am bound to say that the young women who are working for the Congressional Union here have done, in a vigorous and direct way, some very effectual suffrage work. In about two weeks they have visited ten counties and more than fifteen towns, holding parlor and street meetings, and have formed deputations to visit three of our Congressmen.

Here, the CUWS's efforts to mobilize U.S. women were perceived as more "effectual" than the NAWSA's. Moreover, these "vigorous and direct" efforts were identified as "parlor and street meetings" and visits with congressmen—all acts that moved masses of women into public and political spaces, thus expanding women's citizenship identities within the nation-state beyond the domestic sphere. This recognition of the CUWS's public tactics helped to feminize these masculine spaces and to push toward the possibility of a national suffrage amendment.

The CUWS's anti-Democratic campaign even managed to convert southern suffragists to support the CUWS. For example, Mrs. Arch Gamel, President of the
Daughters of the Confederacy, led a deputation to a Texas state representative after the failure of its 1914 campaign for state suffrage. She said:

Women, believing in states' rights out of sentiment have worked state by state; but the hard fight in the Texas legislature has shown the women of Texas the difficulties of state work are almost insurmountable . . . Southern women have turned to the federal amendment as the surest and best means of obtaining suffrage quickly. ¹⁹⁵

The participation of these suffragists was particularly remarkable given the CUWS's occlusion of southern women in its rhetorical construction of eastern and western women. Gamel's statement also offered the rhetorical thrust of reluctant testimony considering the ideological conflict between federal and states' rights. Her identity as a southern woman and as a leader of the Daughters of the Confederacy also made her commitment to a national campaign more remarkable. Ultimately, the participation of southern women in the CUWS's campaign suggested that organization's rhetoric of political mimesis motivated women to work independently of, and in opposition to, male political power.

Although the CUWS's militant campaign forced the issue of woman suffrage into the masculine spaces of electoral politics and helped constitute the citizenship identities of U.S. women, the organization's battle for a woman suffrage amendment was not over. The re-election of President Wilson in 1916 represented a large defeat for the CUWS, as he was the only presidential candidate to not publicly endorse national woman suffrage. Wilson won the electoral votes in all but two suffrage states; and more so, these wins were attributed to women's support of Wilson's neutral position on the war.¹⁹⁶ However, the organization was encouraged by the Democrats' loss of the majority in the House and
loss of two Senate seats. Given that the Republicans now represented the majority in the House, the CUWS's focus on agitating Democratic members of Congress almost seemed futile.\textsuperscript{197} The demonstrated strength and influence of President Wilson, however, encouraged the CUWS to direct most of its militant efforts toward the office of the presidency.
1 Mary Morris Lockwood to Mrs. Charles Boughton Wood, 19 July 1913, reel 1, National Woman's Party Papers, hereafter, NWPP, University of Maryland, College Park, McKeldin Library.

2 *The Suffragist* says the CUWS was "formed with the object of assisting the work of the Congressional Committee of the National American Woman Suffrage Association, the committee which is working to secure a Federal suffrage amendment." "The Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage," *The Suffragist*, November, 15, 1913, 2. Also see Inez Haynes Irwin, *The Story of Alice Paul and The National Woman's Party* (Fairfax, VA: Denlinger's Publishers, 1977), 37-38. The organization was officially formed in April 1913, because the Committee's finances were still being handled in tandem with the NAWSA, and the Committee wished to raise funds exclusively for their work. Much detail about the process through which the CUWS established itself as a separate organization than the NAWSA is provided by Lunardini. Christine A. Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman's Party, 1920-1928* (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 32-36.

3 Under "Methods," the WSPU constitution says: "1) Action entirely independent of political parties. 2) Opposition to whatever Government is in power until such time as the franchise is granted. 3) Vigorous agitation upon lines justified by the position of outlawry to which women are presently condemned." Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence, *The Meaning of the Woman's Movement*, Pamphlet, (n.d.), Sophia Smith Collection, Smith College.

5 Pethick-Lawrence, *The Meaning of the Woman's Movement*.

6 More specifically, the WSPU's campaign escalated to acts of terrorism and property destruction, while the CUWS never instigated acts of violence. Jorgensen-Earp attributes the WSPU's "escalation of militant strategies" to "the need to make the movement visible." While the NWP escalated their militant strategies to create visibility, they embraced *antiviolent* strategies. Donna M. Kowal argues that specific political and historical elements made the WSPU's more definitively militant approach and the NWP's more "adjustive" approach appropriate to ingratiating itself into opposing institutions. See Cheryl R. Jorgensen-Earp, "*The Transfiguring Sword*: The Just War of the Women's Social and Political Union" (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1997); Donna M. Kowal, "One Cause, Two Paths: Militant v. Adjustive Strategies in the British and American Women's Suffrage Movements," *Communication Quarterly* 48 (2000): 242.


9 Ibid, 3, 4.

10 Ibid., 3.


19 Kendall, Communication in the Presidential Primary, 6; Stephen Ansolabehere, Shigeo Hirano, and James M. Snyder, Jr., "What Did the Primary Do to Party Loyalty in


22 Donald R. Wolfensberger attributes this gridlock to legislators attempting to represent their constituents' every need, to divided control, and to procedures that allowed for minor-party obstruction. Donald R. Wolfensberger, *Congress and the People: Deliberative Democracy on Trial* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000), 41-42.

23 Ibid., 42-46. Reed was Speaker of the House between 1889 and 1891, and also between 1895 and 1899.


26 Wolfensberger, Congress and the People, 48.

27 Ibid.; Ansolabehere et al., "What Did the Primary Do?" 32.

28 Ansolabehere et al., "What Did the Primary Do?" 32.

29 Wolfensberger, Congress and the People, 48-53. Majority Leader Oscar Underwood of Alabama was careful to consult House Democrats for "maximum party unity, discipline, and success." Ibid., 52.


31 Wolfensberger, Congress and the People, 52-53.


34 Rosenstone et al., Third Parties in America, 6.

35 "The Election Policy," The Suffragist, September 26, 1914, 4.

37 Rosenstone et al., *Third Parties in America*, 4.

38 Ibid., 8-9.


46 For discussions of fusion in the populist movement, see Peffer, *Populism*, 72-89; and Reynolds, *Democracy Unbound*, 16-17.

47 Reynolds, *Democracy Unbound*, 16.


49 Ibid., 1-28.

50 Some of these issues include governmental ownership of the railroads, postal savings banks, gradual income tax, the direct election of senators, and other progressive measures aimed at putting political power back in the hands of "the people." See Frank Smallwood, *The Other Candidates: Third Parties in Presidential Elections* (Hanover, DE: University Press of New England, 1983), 18.

51 Reynolds, *Democracy Unbound*, 17.

52 Gillespie, *Politics at the Periphery*, 11.


61 At this time, April 1913, the CUWS had not officially formed, but for the sake of continuity, "CUWS" will be used to refer to the CUWS and the Congressional Committee.


63 Harriot Stanton Blatch to Lucy Burns, December 22, 1913, NWPP, reel 1, 1.

64 Mary Morris Lockwood, *The Suffragist*, November 15, 1913, 3.

65 Alice Paul to Mr. J.O. Spangler, November 6, 1913, NWPP, reel 1, 2.
According to *The Suffragist*'s financial reports, disbursements of the publication were counted in the following categories: "Addressograph lists," "Advertisers copies," "To branch headquarters," and "To organizers." In December 1917, copies disbursed totaled 20,828. Dorothy Bready, "Report of the Suffragist Office Department, Month of December, 1917," NWPP, reel 26.

Mabel Vernon to Alice Paul, September 11, 1914, NWPP, reel 1.


Giddings, *When and Where*, 103-104; 135.

Ibid., 129-130.


"Our New Committee Member," *The Suffragist*, February 21, 1914, 3.

For a discussion of how presidential discourse promoted a homogenous citizenry, see Mary E. Stuckey, *Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004); for a discussion of how the legislative and judicial branches did so, see, for example, Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).

Most Suffragist articles do not have bylines. The author assumes that the content of The Suffragist represents the opinions of the CUWS.

Buhle, Women and American Socialism, 57.

WTUL member (unnamed); Minutes, Meeting of the Regular Membership, Women's Trade Union League of New York, January 1913, Women's Trade Union League of New York Papers, State Labor Library, New York, N.Y.

"The Nationalizing of Suffrage Work," 5.

Ibid.

See, for example, one of the resolutions adopted at the Salt Lake City convention on May 10, 1916: "Whereas, the women of Utah do not receive the protection of the United States Constitution as regards to their voting rights." Reprinted in "Convention in Salt Lake City Closes Western Trip," The Suffragist, May 20, 1916, 4.

"Why a Woman's Party?" The Suffragist, June 3, 1916, 10.

Ibid.

"Woman Voters' Convention Pledged to Anthony Amendment," The Suffragist, September 25, 1915, 5.

Ibid.

"Woman Voters' Convention Pledged to Anthony Amendment," The Suffragist, September 25, 1915, 5.

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99 Mayer, Gender Ironies, 18.


102 The other American values characteristic of the agrarian myth are: "(1) All people had a natural right to own land; (2) Small landowners, yeomen farmers, were the ideal citizens . . .; (3) Because of its importance in society, agriculture uniquely deserved government protection." Burkholder, "Kansas Populism," 294.

103 Speech by Harriot Stanton Blatch, dated "[Oct. 1916]," NWPP, reel 1.


107 "Congressional Election Campaign," The Suffragist, September 26, 1914, 5.


Quotation by Mrs. Dora Phelps Buell as reported by Miss Doris Stevens, "News from the Field," *The Suffragist*, September 26, 1914, 5.


This woman's name was not provided, either. Ibid.


The CUWS's treasurer said: "We are sending organizers into every part of the United States, working on delegations to call upon the different Congressmen." Acting Treasurer to Constance Drexel, July 31, 1915, NWPP, reel 1; Also, *The Suffragist* said, "Since March 1915, branches of the Congressional Union have been organized in twenty states." Doris Stevens to build up a committee of suffrage workers "in every Congressional district in the United States. There are four hundred and thirty-five

120 Alice Paul to Andreas Ueland, November 30, 1914, NWPP, reel 1.

121 Alice Paul to Mabel Vernon, October 13, 1914, NWPP, reel 1.


123 Chicago's and Philadelphia's demonstration had 5,000 marchers, Chicago; Boston's had 9,000. See "The Greatest Suffrage Day," *The Suffragist*, May 9, 1914, 2-3.


130 No exact number of Maryland delegates was provided, but the photograph provided in *The Suffragist* indicated that there were at least 30 women who participated in the march. "Pilgrimage to the Opening of the Maryland Legislature," *The Suffragist*, January 10, 1914, 7. A group of women from New Jersey participated in a similar pilgrimage to the 1913 national parade. "General" Rosalie Jones and her band of suffrage "pilgrims" marched from New Jersey to Washington, D.C. for the parade, they spoke along the way, and arrived en masse. See the following photos: "Rosalie Jones and her band of suffrage 'pilgrims,' who walked from New Jersey to Washington, D.C., speaking en route, arrive in Washington, D.C. For Pre-Inaugural Suffrage Parade on March 3,

131 The CUWS's theory of agitation was based on the WSPU's method of "Opposition to whatever Government is in power until such time as the franchise is granted." Pethick-Lawrence, *The Meaning of the Woman's Movement*.


133 Ibid.


136 "Nation-Wide Demonstration," *The Suffragist*, May 2, 1914, 5. For months preceding the demonstrations, the CUWS reported on the minute details of events to be held in all regions and states of the nation. For example, see "National Demonstration, May 2d and 9th," *The Suffragist*, February 14, 1914, 3, for details on planning demonstrations in the Midwest, the West, and the South; see "Nation-Wide Demonstration, May 2d," *The Suffragist*, February 21, 1914, 3, for details on demonstrations in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states; and "The Nation-Wide Demonstration," *The Suffragist*, April 11, 1914, 3, for details on demonstrations in Virginia, Maryland, Louisiana, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, New Mexico, Wyoming, and Iowa.

137 Again, Chicago and Philadelphia each had 5,000 participants, while Boston drew 9,000. In New York, the Women's Political Union conducted an automobile procession of 100 cars. See "The Greatest Suffrage Day," 2, 3, 5, and 8.


139 Ibid.

140 "Nation-Wide Demonstration," *The Suffragist*, May 2, 1914, 6. Although the CUWS orchestrated a number of demonstrations to Congress, this section focuses on the two demonstrations that originated in the states and journey toward the nation's capitol. However it is worth noting that the CUWS employed the strategy of sending
representatives from each Congressional district to the Capitol Building prior to the May 9, 1914, demonstration as the 1915 journey of the envoys. For example, on April 7, 1913, the CUWS orchestrated a demonstration on Congress, which took place on the first day of the special session. This demonstration entailed bands, a mass meeting, guest speakers, banners, and culminated in the delivery of resolutions and petitions to every member of the Senate and House of Representatives from women in every district in the nation. See, for example, Chairman Committee on Petitions to Mrs. Harriot Stanton Blatch, March 21, 1913, NWPP, reel 1; Chairman of Congressional Committee to Miss Mary Bentley Thomas, March 24, 1913, NWPP, reel 1. Also Series IV. A. Audits and Treasurer Reports, "Expenditures from December 7th, 1912, to December 31st, 1913," January 31, 1914, NWPP, reel 124, 1. The report specifies that the demonstration cost $674.49 for bands, theater, banners, and speaker. Delegates from each of the 435 Congressional districts marched to the Capitol and were then led into the Rotunda and filed through a receiving line of welcoming Congressmen. The women then sat in the Senate and House galleries where they witnessed the readings of their petitions and the introduction of Senate Joint Resolution 1, a resolution for a federal woman suffrage amendment. See Lunardini, From Equal Suffrage, 36-37. Hearings on the resolution were scheduled for July 31, prompting the CUWS to orchestrate another pilgrimage to the Capitol building comprised of women from all over the country carrying petitions, which had circulated throughout their home states. On July 31, these women gathered outside of Washington, D.C., in Hyattsville, MD, where they were met by CUWS members, and placed into a fleet of automobiles. Members of the Senate Committee led the massive automobile procession, which proceeded to the Capitol building, where the women presented their
petitions of over 250,000 signatures to the Senate. See Irwin, *The Story of Alice Paul*, 39-40; Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage*, 37-38. Also see "Expenditures from December 7th,"

1. This demonstration cost $1028.86 for automobiles for procession, banners, petitions, advertising, printing, and the banquet at Hotel Brighton. Also, during the CUWS's convention on December 3, 1913, more than 500 members attended a hearing before the Rules Committee of House of Representatives "representing Suffrage societies in all parts of the country," while 500 alternates stood by. See "Convention: National American Woman Suffrage Association," *The Suffragist*, November 22, 1913, 10.


144 "From San Francisco to Washington," *The Suffragist*, October 9, 1915, 5.


146 Quoted in paper dated "[Jan. 1916]," NWPP, reel 1, 10. Also see detailed account of the farewell in "The Farewell to the Woman Voters' Envoys," *The Suffragist*, October 2, 1915, 5.


Ibid.

Quoted in Ibid.

Quoted in "Rousing Welcome."

Ibid.


Wolfensberger, *Congress and the People*, 53.

Lunardini, *From Equal Suffrage*, 37.


Alice Paul to Mrs. Robert A. Morton, July 3, 1916, NWPP, reel 1, 2.

This quotation is from a transcription of the Third Conference of the National Advisory Council on April 8th and 9th, 1916. Report by Elizabeth Selden Rogers, "[April 9, 1916]," NWPP, reel 1, 2. This untitled report is dated April 9, 1916, but reports on events that took place after this date in late 1916, particularly Inez Milholland Boissevain's death, which suggests the date is incorrect and the report is on the events of 1916.

The national political parties in 1916 were the Democratic, Prohibition, Republican, Socialist, Socialist Labor parties. For a complete reproduction of these parties' platforms, see National Party Platforms: 1840-1960, Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson, comp. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 194-212.

Blatch rebuked Paul and Burns many times for moving into New York and for competing with her state-level campaign. See, for example, Harriot Stanton Blatch to Lucy Burns, December 22, 1913, NWPP, reel 1, 1; Harriot Stanton Blatch to Alice Paul, October 5, 1914, NWPP, reel 1; Harriot Stanton Blatch to Alice Paul, December 24, 1914, NWPP, reel 1.
Alice Paul that she had written Mr. Gates. See Harriot Stanton Blatch to Alice Paul, March 1, 1916, NWPP, reel 1, 2. Emphasis original.

172 Most ideas pertaining to the liberal tradition in U.S. politics stem from John Locke. See note 5 for sources on Locke.

173 Harriot Stanton Blatch to Alice Paul, March 7, 1916, NWPP, reel 1, 2.

174 Quotation taken from letter, Harriot Taylor Upton to Alice Paul, October 2, 1914, NWPP, reel 1.

175 "Putting Their Issue First."


177 See "Political Leaders of West Urge Congress to Pass Amendment," The Suffragist, March 18, 1916, 8.


179 "Last Minute Activities of the Woman's Party," The Suffragist, November 11, 1916, 4.

180 Ibid.


182 Ibid. The article found that in Illinois, which was the only state where the women's vote was counted separately, 70,000 more women voted against President Wilson than for him. They couldn't separate out votes in the 11 other states, however, 10 of them went to Wilson by "narrow margins." For statistics on the 1914 and 1916 congressional elections, see Michael J. Dubin, United States Congressional Elections,
1788-1997: The Official Results of the Elections of the 1st through 105th Congress


184 Ibid.


186 The Socialist Party, for example, has been noted for taking racist positions. See Race, Ethnicity, and Gender in Early Twentieth-Century American Socialism, ed. Sally M. Miller (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996).


188 Clara Ueland to Mrs. Orton H. Clark, August 8, 1915, NWPP, reel 1, 2.

189 Carrie Chapman Catt to Mrs. Ellen Douglas Hope, April 11, 1914, NWPP, reel 1, 2-3.

190 Carrie Chapman Catt to Harriot Taylor Upton, April 19, 1915, NWPP, reel 1.


192 Harriot Taylor Upton of Ohio wrote: "The action of the Congressional Union nearly broke my heart because I knew that we could win if we had no special set backs and I knew that the Democratic people would be cross about this, and I doubt whether the defeating of one or two candidates was worth defeating a whole state." See Harriot Taylor Upton to Alice Paul, October 6, 1914, NWPP, reel 1; Upton also wrote, "I understand that Nebraska in its report will say that it was the action of the Congressional
Union which lost them the state." See Harriot Taylor Upton to Alice Paul, February 15, 1915, NWPP, reel 1, 1.


194 Clara Ueland to Henry Wade Rogers, August 3, 1915, NWPP, reel 1.


197 Republicans held 215 seats, while the Democrats held 214. Dubin, United States Congressional Elections, 418.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S PARTY TARGETS PRESIDENT WILSON, 1917-1919: MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY AND WOMAN SUFFRAGE

The Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage (CUWS) waged a militant campaign against Democratic members of Congress between 1913 and 1916 in a national effort to pressure Democrats to support a federal woman suffrage amendment. Through its mimetic adoption of third party strategies and the subsequent formation of the Woman's Party, the CUWS worked to constitute U.S. women as political actors and motivate them to re-envision women's roles in the nation-state; in the case of enfranchised western women, they mobilized to vote against Democratic candidates as an act of sisterly solidarity.

Following the 1916 election cycle, the suffragists celebrated the return of a Republican majority to the House of Representatives, but faced the intransigence of the Democratic Party in the U.S. Senate and of the re-elected president. President Woodrow Wilson demonstrated the leader's strength over his party. Wilfred E. Binkley explains the political situation of the period:

In 1916 it had been a personal victory for the President and a defeat for Democracy as a party. Though Wilson's margin over [Republican candidate, Charles] Hughes had been 582,000, the Republican candidates for Congress, as a whole, had received several hundred thousands more votes than their opponents. Thus hundreds of thousands of Republicans and Progressives might vote for a
Democratic candidate for President at the same time that they would not support the Democratic Party as such.\(^1\)

The simultaneous re-election of Wilson, sixteen new Republican representatives, and two new Republican senators suggested that Wilson was able to engage the U.S. electorate in a way that defied party loyalties. While many attribute Wilson's re-election to his promise to keep the United States out of World War I, it could also be attributed to the enhanced dialogue initiated by Wilson as he helped transition the presidency from a constitutional office to a more rhetorical one.

Wilson's "rhetorical presidency" emerged as presidents, more so than their nineteenth-century counterparts, began going over the heads of Congress and targeting the American people with their persuasive appeals in the process of promoting their own political agenda.\(^2\) Within the context of the Progressive Era, the rhetorical presidency, in part, empowered and constituted the political voice of the American people. James Andrews, for example, argues: "Wilson was convinced that leadership was, in part, the articulation of the nation's ideals."\(^3\) As such, President Wilson transformed his presidential role into a speaker and activist for the people as he also worked to craft a unified nationalist identity. Wilson's efforts were undergirded by his progressive beliefs; he sought to undo the abuses sustained by industrialization and political machinery by regenerating participatory democracy and Anglo-Saxon culture.\(^4\) In the process, Wilson ushered forth a more empowering model of U.S. citizenship.

Scholars have well-documented Wilson's paradoxical promotion of a unified nationalist identity while simultaneously restricting the citizenship rights of women, African Americans, American Indians, and immigrants. Wilson's centrist progressivism
perpetuated a homogenous construction of the ideal citizen as white (preferably of western or northern European descent) and of course male. Following Theodore Roosevelt’s invention of the label "hyphenates" to characterize those who were only part American, Wilson agreed to the restricted employment of African Americans in the federal government, banned Chinese and Japanese immigrants from the "Asiatic Barred Zone" during WWI, and once argued that immigrants "poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life . . . [and] must be crushed out." Addressing the "threat" posed by immigrants, who represented one-third of the nation's 100 million inhabitants, Wilson promoted educational programs that "Americanized" and disciplined immigrants to abandon their national and cultural heritages. Despite Wilson's continued resistance to endorsing a federal woman suffrage amendment, suffragists—particularly white activists—began to see the political potential for expanding Wilson's empowered and homogenous construction of citizenship to include women.

Wilson's dialogic model of the presidency and his nativist nationalism shaped his internationalist discourse as well. On May 24, 1915, at the Pan-American Financial Conference, for example, Wilson addressed "the bonds between the Americas," arguing: "We cannot know each other unless we see each other; we cannot deal with each other unless we communicate with each other. So soon as we communicate and are upon a familiar footing of intercourse with one another, we shall understand one another." Wilson's insistence on communicating with and understanding foreign countries was, in part, driven by the rise of U.S. internationalism, wherein America grew as a symbol of military and democratic strength. The expansion of American influence in foreign affairs can be traced back to the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. At the turn of the twentieth century,
however, President William McKinley promoted the nation's participation in the Spanish-American War and President Roosevelt's "Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine positioned the United States as an "international police power."9

President Wilson's citizenship ideals helped justify the nation's expansion into the international arena. As Andrews argued, "Wilson's rhetorical restructuring had transformed the long-held vision of America as a shining example of liberty for the world to emulate to its embodiment as the self-sacrificing defender of liberty."10 Part of this sacrificial character led to America's participation in WWI. Although Wilson was criticized both for entering the war and for not entering it soon enough, Wilson justified America's entrance in part by saying, "The world must be made safe for democracy" by fighting "for the rights and liberties of small nations."11 Expanding Wilson's model of empowered U.S. citizenship into the international arena constructed such "small nations" as dependent citizens of Wilson's envisioned worldwide democracy. Like Wilson's progressive efforts to "civilize" immigrants in the United States, America's role in the war could also be understood as the perpetuation of "the 'manifest destiny' of Americans to spread white civilization to more barbaric races around the globe by ruling them as subjects in tutelage, not citizens."12 Thus, Wilson fashioned an international model of citizenship in which the president and the United States enacted ideal citizenship behavior by spreading democracy throughout the world. As Wilson declared in his second inaugural address, Americans were now "citizens of the world."13

As Wilson promoted himself as the leader of his party and the United States as a leader of world democracy, the CUWS began shifting its energies toward agitating the president. In the later stages of the 1916 presidential and congressional elections, the
CUWS and the Woman's Party began transforming their anti-Democratic stance into an anti-Wilson campaign. In September, for instance, Alva Belmont twice referred to the Democrats as "Mr. Wilson and his party" in a letter to a fellow-CUWS member. Similarly, *The Suffragist* declared that "the effort of the Woman's Party will be directed toward the defeat of Mr. Wilson and the national Democratic ticket." The CUWS's pressure on Wilson was motivated partly by Charles Evans Hughes's endorsement of woman suffrage in the 1916 election. The Republican Party's presidential candidate was the first major party's candidate to endorse the measure (former President Roosevelt endorsed a federal suffrage amendment as the Progressive Party's candidate in 1912). Hughes's support then compelled Alice Paul to instigate "an equally vigorous [campaign] upon the President and the democratic leaders" to endorse woman suffrage. Thus, the CUWS's turn toward agitating the president could be considered a reflection of the increased viability of presidential support, as well as a response to the rise of the rhetorical presidency under Wilson. Consequently, in early 1917, the CUWS symbolically shifted away from agitating members of Congress and initiated an intensified anti-Wilson campaign by merging with its Woman's Party, which collectively became the National Woman's Party (NWP).

This chapter traces how the NWP agitated President Wilson and constituted women's citizenship identities in the nation-state through its mimetic adoption of Wilson's rhetorical and internationalist authority. More specifically, between 1917 and 1919, NWP mimicked the president's appeals to the U.S. public by first, instantiating the "woman's pulpit" through silent protest; second, modeling ideal citizenship behavior as soldiers liberating the oppressed; and last, adopting Wilson's international authority
throughout its statue protests, Senate protests, and "Watch Fires for Freedom." This exploration of the formation of women's citizenship identities is guided by the theoretical and historical underpinnings of gendered nationalism, gendered militarism, and gendered internationalism. Situated during the years of WWI, the NWP fought to make the world safe for woman suffrage.

GENDERED NATIONALISM, MILITARISM, AND INTERNATIONALISM

As the president worked to shape a nationalist identity, particularly during a time of heightened U.S. internationalism, he conceptualized the nation in gendered terms. From the time of the Revolutionary War, nationalist ideals have been sustained by gender ideologies that simultaneously constrained women's contributions to the nation-state from within the domestic sphere and conflated ideal citizenship behavior with men's participation in the public/political sphere. Moreover, women were the legal and social dependents of men, thus restricting their abilities to assert their citizenship rights in order to fully contribute to the nation. Thus, maleness and masculinity were associated with democracy, strength, and independence while femaleness and femininity were typically associated with weakness and dependence. While such gendered associations were loosening by the early-twentieth century, particularly as women's political participation increased and expanded women's contributions to the nation-state beyond "feminine" concerns, the Progressive-Era's revival of Anglo-Saxon ideals reified the white male as the model citizen. Wilson's tasks of (re)uniting the nation after a period of significant political and social discontent and addressing the threat of an almost-inescapable international conflict, helped shape the gendered ways in which he constructed the nation.

*Wilson's Gendered Nationalism*
As Wilson sought to empower the U.S. citizenry to assert their economic and political freedom in his nationalist treatise, *The New Freedom*, he relied on a gendered understanding of independence and dependence. He wrote:

> If any part of our people want to be wards, if they want to have guardians put over them, if they want to be taken care of, if they want to be children, patronized by the government, why, I am sorry, because it will sap the manhood of America. But I don't believe they do. I believe they want to stand on the firm foundation of law and right and take care of themselves. I, for my part, don't want to belong to a nation, I believe that I do not belong to a nation, that needs to be taken care of by guardians. I want to belong to a nation, and I am proud that I do belong to a nation, that knows how to take care of itself.19

Wilson promoted his vision of a decentralized government by suggesting that a more centralized government would threaten "the manhood of America," aligned here with "law and right" and independence, or the ability "to take care of itself." Following Wilson's logic, the citizens of such an overbearing government would be treated as "wards" and "children"—those in society who held the same dependent and disempowered status as women. Such a gendered framework provided Wilson the vocabulary to articulate his economic policy as part of America's project to sustain its independence.

Rhetorically, such gendered principles help shape nationalist discourse, particularly as leaders of the nation need to promote measures to "protect" the nation or vilify others as a "threat" to the nation. Often, nations are given a gendered identity, most significantly as a woman—as something pure to be cherished and loved. Seeing the
nation as "mother" positions the nation's people as children, who, in times of danger, need to be protected at all costs. The nation can also be constructed as a male—"as a father who is virile and represents authority, and must be obeyed even to the point of sacrificing one's life." Such gendering helps justify protective measures, including violence and war, as duty and honor to one's family. Considering the nation in familial and specifically gendered terms is of course nothing new. As Jean Bethke Elshtain and others have noted, citizenship offers membership to a national community or family. In fact, contrary to modern theories of the nation as a cultural community, scholars have argued that nations are primordial communities comprised of the descendents of peoples historically bound to the nation's geographical location. While this conceptualization of "nation" does not pertain to the United States, the idea that the nation is an extended family is a key rhetorical construct in nationalist discourse.

Gendering the nation as such often naturalizes women's subordinated and disenfranchised status. Because women biologically reproduce the nation, they come to symbolize a nation's culture, or "as carriers of the collectivity's 'honour' and as its intergenerational reproducers of culture." When women's roles as mothers become glorified, their bodies come to signify their reproductive abilities; thus, an attack on a woman is equated to an attack on a nation. In this sense, women become like the nation—the protected property of men. Further, once these properties have been trespassed or violated, violence and aggression in response are justified. The irony here, however, is that while women are considered sacred to a nation and worthy of defense at all costs, they are not necessarily considered worthy of the citizenship rights to defend themselves. Furthermore, considering women only for their ability to reproduce a nation
highlights a fundamental belief that poses the greatest challenge to acquiring women's full citizenship rights: "Women are determined by biology, men by their free wills."26

**Gendered Militarism and World War I**

The gendered dimensions of nation and citizenship become most prominent in the context of war. First, war is a highly masculine concept. In his discussion of how an individual's identity is bound to national identity, Otto Bauer said, "the idea of nation is bound up with the idea of my ego."27 Since citizenship has primarily been defined in male terms, limiting the participation in a national community mostly to men, this "ego" is similarly masculine. Tamar Mayer argues, "It is men who are generally expected to defend the 'moral consciousness' and the 'ego' of the nation . . . their own 'ego' becomes at stake in national conflicts."28 As such, war becomes an arena in which men can exercise their masculinity as it is intimately tied to their national identities. The military, as Betty A. Reardon argues, legitimizes of the patriarchal character of nationalism. She says, "the militarization of society is the unchecked manifestation of patriarchy as the overt and explicit mode of governance."29 The military is the means through which a nation maintains and exerts control over others, preserving the male "ego" and further, the gendered division of American society.30

In times of war, preserving traditional gender roles becomes linked to preserving the nation's security. Erika A. Kuhlman argues that during WWI, "conventional images of weak, vulnerable femininity and strong, protective masculinity reverberated throughout all levels of American society . . . in the halls of Congress, within the pages of the press, among circles of progressive reformers, and even among pacifists who earlier had recorded their fundamental opposition to war."31 These gendered ideals were
subsequently visible during the Spanish-American War, which, according to Kristin L. Hoganson, solidified the construction of the soldier as the embodiment of male physical prowess.\textsuperscript{32} War, however, is often a time when gender roles are in flux; women often take up jobs in the absence of men and are often mobilized to contribute to the domestic war effort as though they were soldiers. Women's enhanced social and political participation during the Progressive Era exacerbated this fluctuation in traditional gender roles. Such gender complexities were reflected in WWI propaganda posters, which "depicted women as ethereal angels of liberty or as mothers sacrificing for their sons" while they also "showed uniformed women as active participants in war (although, significantly, never in combat)."\textsuperscript{33} These shifting gendered identities "produced widespread anxiety among men and women" as the nation geared up for war.\textsuperscript{34}

This complex gendered context also facilitated the expansion and restriction of Latina and African American women's rights. For example, during the Spanish-American War, when Tampa, Florida became the entry point for U.S. soldiers to enter Cuba, "the city experienced a burst of cross-class and interethnic cooperation, especially among women . . . for Anglos and Latinos, it allowed, even encouraged, a fluidity of boundaries between private and public domains, immigrant and native-born neighborhoods, and men's and women's spheres."\textsuperscript{35} Similarly, Nikki Brown argues that WWI "created an unusual political space, where, for the first time in the twentieth century, middle-class African American women combined prowar sentiments and antiracist protests for the purpose of elevating African Americans to first-class citizenship."\textsuperscript{36} Specifically, Brown notes that African American women, such as Mary B. Talbert, president of the National Association of Colored Women between 1916 and 1920, supported the participation of
African American men in the war because it would provide evidence for citizenship rights in the long-term. Despite the political leadership of many African American women during the war, Brown suggests that the war had an "effect of masculinizing gender relations within the African American middle class." Thus, even among minority groups, war provided the necessary social conditions to simultaneously expand and restrict gender roles.

Despite the complexities of wartime gender roles, soldiers remained the embodiment of "military manhood" or "heroic masculinity" and were thus, constructed in opposition to womanhood and femininity. Such dichotomous logic promoted the use of the "protection myth" or the notion that the man-soldier must protect women and children from "the Other." Ironically, as J. Ann Tickner argues, ninety percent of war casualties are women and children. Moreover, as the protection myth relies on the construction of weak women, the act of rape comes to symbolize the violation of a nation's purity. The threat of such a violation can also be used to vilify an enemy. In WWI, reports of German soldiers mutilating, raping, and killing Belgian and French civilians circulated throughout the United States; eventually, the German army's invasion was described as "the rape of Belgium" and depicted through posters of German soldiers dragging women out of burning villages by their hair. While such discourse functioned as a way to demonize Germany, it reified the masculinity of war by conflating women and nations as the weak and vulnerable properties of men.

Despite such disempowering constructions, women have engaged in combat and served integral roles in the military for centuries. Women's military duties were often limited to those of nurses, laundresses, and cooks—occupations which were considered
in line with feminine roles. Beliefs in women's natural mothering abilities often provided women the means to enter the hypermasculine sphere of war and the military as mothers protecting their children. In many U.S. wars, however, women fought alongside their male family members or even passed as male soldiers. In WWI, 25,000 American women participated as members of the Navy (as "Yeomanettes"), the Marines, and in numerous relief capacities. These women performed more duties than women in previous wars—as physicians, nurses, dentists, therapists, interpreters, translators, decoders, and statisticians. Although most women remained stateside, 10,000 nurses served in England and France, while others traveled to the Balkans, Russia, and the Near East.

In light of the ties between the masculinity of war and the masculinity of citizenship, it should not be surprising that when President Wilson finally endorsed federal woman suffrage, he framed the amendment as a reward for women's contributions to the war. Historically, proving national loyalty through war accentuated the strength of the relationship between nationalism and citizenship. Revolutionary War veterans who were otherwise ineligible to vote were granted the franchise; similarly, arguments for the Fifteenth Amendment were motivated by the soldiering efforts of African American men. Such precedents also empowered women to assert their citizenship rights through war service. In her study of women in WWI, Kimberly Jensen argues that women-at-arms "claimed fuller female citizenship" and "challenged the traditional gender bargain of men as the Protectors and women as the Protected: women armed to defend the state could defend themselves against the violence of invasion and also domestic violence." Women physicians and nurses also made arguments for equal citizenship rights in order
to challenge the masculine hostility of the military and to foster solidarity with female war victims abroad. Specifically, they "supported all-female medical units in France to provide direct medical relief to women civilians who suffered rape, dislocation, disease, and poverty in the war's wake." 

Women also made arguments for fully-enfranchised citizenship rights based on their domestic war efforts. Most of these efforts were extensions of women's increased participation in the political, social, and reform movements of the Progressive Era, which, as Jensen argues, "provided strong credentialing for the participatory thread of citizenship." Hundreds of thousands of working-class women took factory jobs to produce war supplies and munitions, enduring long hours, accidents, and even deathly explosions. The sharp increase in women factory workers motivated the creation of the Women's Division of the U.S. Department of Labor, which functioned to protect women from poor working conditions. Middle- and upper-class women formed relief organizations, such as the Vacation War Relief Committee, the Surgical Dressings Committee, the National Patriotic Relief Society, and the National League for Women's Service. The government formed the Committee on Women's Defense Work as part of the Council of National Defense, which in part, worked to recruit southern African American women into the war trades and to help replace some of the jobs left by the 368,000 African American men serving in the war. African American women ran multiple volunteer organizations to support the war including the Women's Volunteer Aid Society, the African American YWCA, the Woman's Loyal Union, and booster clubs throughout the nation.
Thus, while the war invoked and challenged traditional gender roles and identities, it also provided U.S. women the grounds to demand equal citizenship rights. Women's domestic war service could easily be justified as extensions of women's domesticity or as a temporary, wartime necessity. Women's participation on the front lines, however, represented a gender paradox that often resulted in hostility and resistance. As women asserted their identities as soldiers, they obfuscated the premise upon which men took to battle. If women could defend themselves, why did men need to fight? Resistance to soldiering women in WWI resulted in men "challenging, denigrating, and demonizing the woman warrior." The woman soldier identity was not contained to the front lines, however; thousands of American women at home joined defense clubs, such as the Women's Defense Club of Maine, and trained as soldiers "to shoot, and shoot straight." Although these women never engaged in combat, a "grassroots movement to promote the female use of guns during the First World War" took hold as gun manufacturers and rifle associations argued that "self-defense is part of national defense." As such, the empowering forces of the Progressive Era, the liberating potential of wartime gender roles, and the onset of war hysteria offered the NWP the rhetorical resources to assert their citizenship rights and to mimic war discourses that glorified the male soldier's fight for democracy abroad.

**Gendered Internationalism and World War I**

The wartime expansion of women's roles took place amidst a climate in which Wilson promoted "a nationalism of internationalism." In so doing, Wilson fashioned a model of international citizenship, in which the peoples of the world could unite around the pursuit of democracy. Such a citizenship ideal, however, assumed that U.S. citizens
were the natural leaders of democratic expansion, ultimately exporting America's citizenship hierarchies into the international arena. Wilson's progressive glorification of Western European cultures resounded with the nation's wartime alliances linked to France and England. Fostering solidarity with these nations and their heritages also helped mobilize an international war effort. As U.S. women continued the fight for full citizenship rights, Wilson's international model of citizenship and wartime alliances intensified the growing internationalism of the woman suffrage movement and provided the means for the NWP to assert woman suffrage as a right of international citizenship.

Wilson's model of international citizenship resonated well with woman suffragists, as they saw the liberating potential of establishing a community that transcended national citizenship. The words of author and noted feminist, Virginia Woolf, best capture the sentiment: "I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world." This international consciousness was shaped by the explosion of women's rights movements in North America, South America, Europe, Australia, Asia, and Africa. Kumari Jayawardena and Ida Blom tie many of these movements to revolutionary overthrows or postcolonial nation-building projects in which women were empowered by wartime necessity or by participating in the establishment of new governments. Thus, as women worldwide worked to constitute their national citizenship identities, their political consciousnesses acquired a heightened sense of internationalism.

By the early-twentieth century, women's rights movements had established international ties and formed international organizations, such as the International Woman Suffrage Association (IWSA) founded in 1902 and the International Congress of
Women (ICW) founded in 1904. In the 1910s, England's militant suffrage organization, the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU), had established strong ties to the international socialist movement, which helped inspire women's militancy throughout much of the world. In Ireland, for example, Hanna Sheehy-Skeffington organized the Irish Women's Franchise League, which heckled politicians and broke windows to ultimately gain the support of the Irish Labour Party. In Nanking, China, members of the Woman Suffrage Alliance, a socialist organization, stormed parliament three days in a row, demanding that woman suffrage be taken seriously. Moreover, in Argentina, suffragists organized the Partido Feminista Nacional, a militant organization modeled after the WSPU, determined to expand upon women's limited suffrage rights. Women across nations even joined together to organize national-level movements. In 1917, for example, the Women's Indian Association was formed in India by Margaret Cousins, a leader in the Irish suffrage movement, Annie Besant, an English activist, and by Dorothy Jinarajadasa, a Hindu leader from India.

International suffrage alliances were reinforced by the internationalism of the peace and settlement-house movements. Women's demands for peace were typically perceived as less-threatening than women's demands for equal rights because of the gendered construction of war; in other words, it was thought that war represented the domain of men and that peace functioned as the sphere of influence for women. Nonetheless, women's participation in international peace movements empowered women to demand woman suffrage in order to spread peace beyond the "domestic" borders of the nation. In 1914, Rosika Schwimmer, a working-class Hungarian immigrant, became a leading figure in the anti-war movement, centered at Lillian Wald's
Henry Street Settlement House in New York City. She helped form the Woman's Peace Party alongside Jane Addams in 1915 and also served as the IWSA's secretary. 69

International women's rights and peace-keeping movements, however, were not necessarily motivated by egalitarian notions of citizenship. Just as Wilson fashioned a model of international superiority, the white women leaders of these international movements purported to enlighten, civilize, and democratize women of "uncivilized" nations. Kuhlman links this superiority to progressivism:

[Progressive reformers] broadened their base of support by creating alliances among various political-interest groups. Within the progressive class, progressive pacifists developed an ideology of apparent internationalism, that in fact rested on the assumed superiority of American democracy relative to other nations, and a code of behavior, the building of coalitions among groups with diverse interests, with which they attempted to control American society.70

To illustrate, white Australian women, who were enfranchised in 1902, constructed themselves as pioneers of women's national suffrage and addressed American audiences regularly on how to win woman suffrage. Marilyn Lake argues that these white women "saw themselves as members of the same (extended) family as white British and American women: their sense of themselves was constituted in these years around the turn of the century within an imperialist framework, in terms of the dichotomies drawn between the 'civilised' and 'primitive.'"71 Like Wilson, these suffragists' progressive efforts worked to revitalize racist and nativist constructions of citizenship as they also expanded the suffrage movement across national boundaries. Moreover, many of these white suffragists referred to each other as family members and as "sisters," thereby
naturalizing white women's superiority and excluding non-white women from their vision of woman citizenship.\textsuperscript{72} Many feminist scholars argue that assuming such international solidarity erased women's local and national identities and undermined the overall feminist project of recognizing and understanding the complexities of women's identities.\textsuperscript{73} As such, the international woman suffrage movement mimicked the empowering and disempowering contours of Wilson's move to spread democracy throughout the world.

\textit{President Wilson and the NWP}

On March 4, 1917, the NWP protested President Wilson on the day of his second inauguration ceremony. Unlike the NWP's 1913 parade held the day before Wilson's first inauguration ceremony, this year, the parade's marchers concluded by circling the White House ten times over.\textsuperscript{74} Despite the freezing rain and the high winds, the marchers included "business women, labor women, socialist women, and many professions, trades and orders," who did not relent; the president, however, refused to acknowledge the women at his gates.\textsuperscript{75} Perhaps the re-elected president had grown weary of the NWP's pointed protests. Four months earlier, on December 4, 1916, a few NWP members disrupted Wilson's annual message to Congress. A yearly report described the scene: "At the last moment in President Wilson's speech when he was discussing the rights of the Philippines and the Porto [sic] Ricans, [we] dropped over the rail a gleaming yellow banner bearing the words: 'Mr. President, what will you do for woman suffrage?'\textsuperscript{76} Heckling the president within the deliberative, masculine spaces of U.S. politics marked a new chapter in the NWP's militant campaign for woman suffrage.\textsuperscript{77}
Since 1913, Alice Paul and Lucy Burns recognized President Wilson's potential to command the Democratic Party's support of the suffrage movement. An article in The Suffragist argued, "The President has demonstrated that he is more than a 'titular' leader of his party. The party responds to his leadership." By 1915, members of Congress similarly recognized this power. Senator Asle J. Gronna (R-ND) instructed the NWP to "Turn your guns on President Wilson. He is the real center of power." In fact, the president had established a reputation for being able to push his progressive legislative agenda through Congress with great authority. In 1914, for example, after the passage of the Underwood Tariff Act, the Federal Reserve Act, and the Panama tolls repeal bill, the NWP argued that Wilson not only initiated legislation, but has actually forced it through when it was in actual contradiction to a plank in the Democratic platform . . . What the President has done in all these matters, he can do with regard to Suffrage. He has greater power than any other person or group of persons to secure the passage of the Suffrage amendment.

Similarly, during the 1916 presidential election, when Wilson expanded his progressive agenda to appeal to a broader constituency, his push for the Adamson eight-hour workday, the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act, the Rural Credits Act, and a federal workingmen's compensation act, compelled the NWP to assert that woman suffrage was consistent with Wilson's legislative program.

But, despite the empowering potential of Wilson's rhetorical and progressive leadership, he remained ambivalent about endorsing a federal woman suffrage amendment. Such ambivalence could be informed by Wilson's personal dispositions
toward women. NWP members may have been shocked to learn that in 1884, Wilson attended a Woman's Congress meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Women in Baltimore and reported the following to his wife: "Barring the chilled, scandalized feeling that always overcomes me when I see and hear women speak in public, I derived a good deal of whimsical delight . . . from the proceedings." Here, Wilson voiced the commonly-held notion that when women spoke in public, they violated their duties binding them to private sphere. The following year, Wilson voiced similarly traditional views in another letter to his wife; he argued that if a woman "cannot preserve her individuality in the family . . . she simply has no individuality worth preserving." Thus, in Wilson's view, a woman best flourished and asserted her "individuality" in a familial context.

Scholars have attributed Wilson's early views on women to his adoption of the "the culture and mores of the South," since he was born in Staunton, Virginia, and was raised in Augusta, Georgia. He married Ellen Axson on June 24, 1885, with whom he had three daughters, Jessie, Eleanor (Nell), and Margaret. While he spoke highly of his wife and loved his children, Wilson biographer, Arthur S. Link, writes that at home, "Wilson was unquestionably lord and master, but he ruled with love, and his family literally worshipped him." Outside of the home, Wilson developed a close relationship with Mary Peck, whom he met in the late 1890s, while vacationing without his family in Bermuda. Wilson repeatedly visited Peck, sparking rumors of an affair, although the extent of their relationship is not clear.

As a professor, Wilson was also surrounded by women as he first taught at Bryn Mawr College, an all-women's school. He went on to teach at Wesleyan University in
Middletown, Connecticut, before he landed at Princeton University in 1890 as a "leader of professors."88 Wilson served as the university's president between 1902 and 1910, when he left after an administrative fallout. Wilson was elected Governor of New Jersey in November 1910 and to the presidency in November 1912.89 Sadly, Ellen enjoyed only a brief stint as first lady before she died of kidney failure in August 1914. Ellen's death was considered "the greatest blow of Wilson's first term," as many close friends and political allies observed Wilson's deep grief.90 In March of the next year, however, Wilson became enamored with Edith Bolling, a wealthy and independent D.C. socialite. The two were married in December, despite concerns from within Wilson's political inner circles that a hasty remarriage may negatively impact his re-election.91

Edith played an active role in Wilson's presidential affairs. Her assertive personality shone through as she drove her own car and "prided herself on being the first Washington woman to indulge such a daring."92 Such independence challenged Wilson's previously-articulated gender beliefs. Wilson's love for Edith was so strong that some thought that his desire to write her multiple letters a day interfered with his presidential correspondence.93 Moreover, Wilson sought Edith's input on policy matters as he often sent her copies of official correspondence. And, throughout 1919, after Wilson suffered a stroke, Edith functioned as Wilson's surrogate or "the sole conduit between the president and the rest of the world."94 Considering Edith's acute political abilities, she remained a staunch opponent to woman suffrage. On September 8, 1916, regarding a speech Wilson delivered at a suffrage meeting in Atlantic City, she wrote: "The only speech of my Precious One that I ever failed to enjoy, but I hated the subject so it was acute agony."95 Edith's biographer, Alden Hatch, attributes this "violent opposition" to her identity as a
southern woman. Nonetheless, Edith's active role in her husband's political life suggested that Wilson personally believed in women's political abilities.96

Similarly, Wilson's daughter, Margaret, became increasingly involved in women's rights activism. In 1913, as a member of the General Federation of Women's Clubs (GFWC) and as Vice Chairman of the National Social Centre Legislative Committee, she worked to turn public schools into centers for political meetings.97 Regarding her efforts to facilitate political deliberation in public spaces, Margaret said, "the matter of first importance is to see to it that the citizens' forum is properly constituted."98 Much later, in 1921, Margaret spoke at an NWP national convention.99 Wilson often claimed that he personally believed in woman suffrage, but was constrained by party politics. Thus, it seemed that Wilson upheld the public/private sphere doctrine he espoused early in his career as his political decisions seemed unaffected by the marked examples of empowered women in his personal life.

While the NWP was not privy to Wilson's personal beliefs regarding women's citizenship rights, he nevertheless demonstrated an ability to codify progressive legislation; his reshaped role as an engaged leader of the American people prompted the NWP to send multiple delegations of women to meet with the president between 1913 and 1916. However, NWP members and other women found that Wilson's willingness to listen functioned as a substitute for political action. In November 1913, for example, seventy-three New Jersey women who had supported Wilson's 1912 presidential election gathered in Washington, D.C. to call upon the president.100 When the women gathered at NWP headquarters in preparation to march to the White House, however, they found their meeting with President Wilson "without date."101 According to The Suffragist,
Representative McCoy of New Jersey failed to arrange the meeting as he had promised. Nonetheless, Paul phoned the president's office and requested a meeting. After a White House secretary denied the request, Paul replied: "Very well, the deputation is starting immediately for the White House . . . The women have come prepared to stay a month if necessary, but they intend to see the President." Upon their arrival, the women were met at the White House gates and led to an office, where President Wilson awaited them. Leaders of the delegation pled their case to the president, who promised to give it his "earnest attention."

Shortly thereafter, the president addressed Congress and failed to mention the woman suffrage amendment. NWP and NAWSA members were infuriated—so much so, that the president's omission was the focus of the NAWSA's national convention, hosted by the NWP in Washington D.C. At the close of the convention, Paul organized a deputation of fifty-five women, led by Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, to march to the White House. In her remarks to the president, Shaw appealed to his empowering ideals. She said, "Recognizing your splendid stand on the liberties and rights of the people, we appeal to you because we believe you will bring to our question that same spirit of justice which you have manifested toward all other great questions." The president admitted that he personally believed in woman suffrage, but that he could only endorse legislation based on the will of his party, "for whom," he said, "I am a spokesman."

Two years later, in December 1915, the NWP's cross-country envoys, Sara Bard Field and Francis Joliffe, concluded their reception at the Capitol Building by marching with at least 300 women to the White House where the president awaited their arrival. Field's address to the president asked that woman suffrage "be made a national matter"
and be included as part of his upcoming message to Congress. Wilson rehearsed the argument that he was "always restrained . . . by the consciousness that [he] must speak for others," and added the particularly condescending claim that woman suffrage crowded his congressional agenda. He said, "I have the habit—perhaps the habit of a teacher—of confining my utterances to one subject at a time, for fear that two subjects might compete with one another for prominence."  

The NWP inspired and mobilized other groups of women to direct their grievances to the president. In February 1914, the NWP hosted the first group of wage-earning women to meet with the president. Margaret Hinchey, a member of Laundry-workers Union of New York City, Rose Winslow, a former factory worker, and Rose Sneidernann, Vice President of the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL), led "laundresses, seamstresses, corset-makers, factory girls, business women, storekeepers, office women, stenographers, and printers" in a silent march to the White House. A few months later, prominent NWP member and noted journalist, Rheta Childe Dorr, led 500 members of the GFWC to meet with Wilson. She asked Wilson to use his "powerful influence with Congress to have the Bristow-Mondell Suffrage amendment passed in this session." This time the president made a states' rights argument regarding voting laws and reiterated his duties as party leader. Wilson maintained these lines of argument as other delegations of women continued to meet with him throughout 1915 and 1916.  

Although Wilson once argued that universal suffrage lay "at the foundation of every evil in this country," he began to show signs of support for woman suffrage in late 1916. In addition to voting for the New Jersey state measure in 1915, many members of Wilson's cabinet voted for woman suffrage at the state level. Moreover, in
September 1916, Wilson stood on stage next to Carrie Chapman Catt and Anna Howard Shaw at a NAWSA convention and said, "I have not come to fight anybody, but with somebody. We feel the tide; we rejoice in the strength of it; and we shall not quarrel in the long run as to the method of it."\(^{114}\) Here, Wilson refrained from upholding the state-by-state "method" of achieving woman suffrage, suggesting he was open to a federal amendment.

Such progress, however, was not enough for the NWP, particularly since the president was re-elected without putting a federal woman suffrage amendment on his platform. Thus, the NWP aimed to press woman suffrage into Wilson's consciousness, by first heckling him during his initial address to Congress in the aftermath of his re-election. According to *The Suffragist*, after the NWP members unfurled the banner, "The President looked up, hesitated a moment, then went on," while members of Congress "were turning wildly in every direction, and a buzz of whispered comment swept the floor." The women made no comment, nor did they protest when a page secured the banner or when they were escorted out of the gallery. They believed "a comment was not needed; the yellow banner had raised the suffrage issue in Congress."\(^{115}\) This marked the first instance that the NWP felt their demands were best made through silence.

The fall of 1916 proved pivotal for the NWP, particularly as members grieved the loss of Inez Milholland Boissevain, prominent suffragist, lawyer, and international activist. Although she was deathly ill, she spent her final days speaking for the NWP's anti-Democratic campaign throughout the fall of 1916. Paul arranged to hold a memorial service for Milholland on Christmas Day in the Capitol rotunda—the first ever held for a non-member of Congress.\(^{116}\) Fellow-NWP members considered Milholland a martyr, "a
crusader," and "a torch that illuminated the rank and file and had the rare power of
dramatizing a cause to the multitude."\textsuperscript{117} Milholland best personified these characteristics
as she led the 1913 national suffrage parade wearing a flowing white gown, riding atop a
white horse, and carrying a golden bugle. Milholland's death helped galvanize NWP
members for its anti-Wilson campaign; they argued that Milholland "symbolized the
whole daily sacrifice that hundreds of women have made and are making for the sake of
political freedom."\textsuperscript{118}

Milholland offered the NWP a symbol of suffrage martyrdom and motivated the
NWP to acquire a federal amendment at all costs. Shortly after the suffragists heckled
Wilson's address to Congress, \textit{The Suffragist} said:

\begin{quote}
But it is warfare in which women will not be worsted. If the President is
determined to ignore women suffrage, women are equally determined that it will
not be ignored; and that the attention of the Congress, of the press and of the
people of the United States will be perpetually directed to the fact that woman
suffrage is an issue clamoring for attention.\textsuperscript{119}
\end{quote}

Just as the United States prepared to enter World War I, the NWP prepared to declare war
on President Wilson.

\textbf{THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SILENT SENTINELS}

On January 9, 1917, members of the NWP departed the White House after a
disheartening meeting with President Wilson. One member recalled his parting words:
"Ladies, concert public opinion on behalf of woman suffrage."\textsuperscript{120} After crossing Lafayette
Square to their headquarters, the dejected NWP members brainstormed their next move.
Harriot Stanton Blatch hatched a plan. Her words were recorded in the *The Suffragist*. She declared:

We must go to him every day, we must have a continuous delegation to the President of the United States, if he is to realize the never-ceasing, insistent demand of women that he take action where he is responsible. We may not be admitted within the doors, but we can at least stand at the gates. We may not be allowed to raise our voices and speak to the President, but we can address him just the same, because our message to him will be inscribed upon the banners which we will carry in our hands. Let us post our silent sentinels at the gates of the White House.121

The following day at 10:00 a.m., a dozen women planted themselves before the White House gates, stood silently, and upheld banners, which asked, "MR. PRESIDENT, WHAT WILL YOU DO FOR WOMAN SUFFRAGE?" and "MR. PRESIDENT, HOW LONG MUST WOMEN WAIT FOR LIBERTY?"122 After years of tireless protests, the NWP emerged with silent strength to bolster the fight for woman suffrage.

The "Silent Sentinels," as the protesters were christened by the NWP, stood firmly day after day throughout 1917.123 While most protesters were dressed in proper ladies' attire—long sleeves, long skirts, and hats—they all wore sashes bearing the party's colors of purple, gold, and white.124 NWP delegations of about twelve to fifteen protesters took turns at the picket line, representing different states and different professions, such as teachers and factory workers.125 Some women held flag-like banners with stripes of the NWP's colors, and others held banners with messages to President Wilson, which read: "MR PRESIDENT, YOU SAY LIBERTY IS THE FUNDAMENTAL DEMAND OF
THE HUMAN SPIRIT and "MR PRESIDENT, YOU SAY WE ARE INTERESTED IN THE UNITED STATES, POLITICALLY SPEAKING, IN NOTHING BUT HUMAN LIBERTY." Thus, while the protesters stood in silence, their critiques of President Wilson and demands for liberty were clearly displayed.

The rhetorical presidency allowed the Sentinels' protest to function as a symbolic response to Wilson's refashioning of presidential leadership. As citizens answering their leader's call, the Sentinels identified themselves as politically competent members of Wilson's democracy. At the same time, the rhetorical presidency functioned as a model of direct communication with the American public. In fact, the Sentinels credited Wilson for the strategy: "The President asked us to concert public opinion before we could expect anything of him; we are concerting it." Thus, the Sentinels made complex rhetorical appeals to President Wilson as worthy citizens with political voices to the American public as they mimicked Wilson's move to appeal directly to public opinion. The rhetorical presidency, therefore, not only facilitated the Sentinels' development of direct and indirect appeals to President Wilson, but it also allowed them to assert political voice and realize their citizenship identities.

Reflecting Wilson's vision of the presidency that hailed the American people as principal actors in the enactment of democratic precepts, the NWP responded by mimicking ideal citizenship behavior and addressed their concerns to their president. The Suffragist stated, "the women of the nation are holding [President Wilson] responsible for the non-passage of the federal suffrage amendment," which clearly shows that the Sentinels considered the protest a legitimate call for dialogue with their nation's leader. The Sentinels' banners directly asked Wilson, "HOW LONG MUST WOMEN WAIT
FOR LIBERTY?,” which simultaneously recognized the power of the president to grant liberty while empowering the Sentinels the political voice to question the president.

Moreover, as a way to put President Wilson's proverbial foot in his mouth, *The Suffragist* published an excerpt of the former professor's work, *Constitutional Government*, entitled, "A Word to Agitators." The passage read: "Agitation is certainly of the essence of a constitutional system."129 Here, the Sentinels legitimized their protest as the constitutional behavior Wilson valued.

The Sentinels also empowered themselves by mimetically framing their protest as an appeal to the public, developed on cue from President Wilson's advice. Mimicking the rhetorical presidency empowered the NWP as leaders of their fellow-citizens. In her theory of mimesis, Teresa L. Ebert argues, "Representation is always inscribed in the political, economic, and ideological practices within any given social formation and functions to legitimate the validity, unavoidability, and historical necessity of those practices."130 As the Sentinels mimicked Wilson's "ideological practices" of presidential authority, they reified "the validity, unavoidability, and historical necessity" of Wilson's appeals to the U.S. public. Moreover, the Sentinels' mimetic assumption of presidential authority reinforced the progressive ideology undergirding Wilson's leadership. As such, NWP members tapped into the empowering progressive forces of their time in order to earn the public's support for women's full citizenship rights.

While the Sentinels stood at Wilson's door, their protest was intended for mass appeal. For example, the NWP hoped its parade, held on the day of Wilson's second inauguration, would "visualize to the President and to men and women from many states the nation-wide demand for the passage of the federal suffrage amendment."131 Though
the issue of woman suffrage received very little press coverage before 1912, the Silent Sentinels garnered weekly coverage from publications such as the *Philadelphia Press*, the *Chicago Evening Post*, the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*, and the *New York Evening Post*, demonstrating that news of the Sentinels circulated throughout the United States. While the NWP's previous protests were similarly designed to stimulate the suffrage discussion in the public arena, the Sentinels' protest addressed the public with presidential authority. Through political mimesis, the Sentinels reinscribed the power relationships embedded in Wilson's rhetorical presidency by assuming a leadership role of their own with American citizens and thereby creating their own pulpit of public influence—the "woman's pulpit"—in the suffrage drama. As Ebert theorizes, mimetic representations can be used "by opposing classes, marginalized races, and the 'second sex' in order to transform the agenda of the real"—or in this case, the hegemonic forces of Wilson's presidency.

From the woman's pulpit, the Sentinels' hailed forth an empowered political response from the public, which, in turn, further constituted American women as citizens. One NWP supporter wrote,

> I believe the work you women are doing down in Washington is the best "bit" of real advance work being done in the country. You can never know the joy it is to me to have this share in this special moment . . . I believe that each day those banners are unfolded visualizing woman's demand for "liberty" there is being released through that simple act great spiritual forces which are sweeping our country from coast to coast.
The Sentinels managed to turn the president's penchant for consulting public opinion into a source of power as they carried on as leaders of the American public and established political voice for American women. In this mimetic appeal to their fellow citizens, the Sentinels further legitimated their presence in the public spaces of politics.

Part of what strengthened the Sentinels' appeal to the public was their mimetic and inventive use of silence.\textsuperscript{135} The Sentinels' silent resistance to Wilson's rhetorical leadership mimicked Wilson's silent resistance to woman suffrage, particularly as the NWP perceived Wilson's reticence as "silence." Following his December 1916 address to Congress, for example, the NWP concluded: "President Wilson is clinging desperately to the most effective weapon of the politician—the weapon of silence."\textsuperscript{136} The Sentinels' use of silence, then, worked as a strategy of confrontation as their mimetic adoption of the rhetorical presidency helped target Wilson as the nation's leader.

In addition to these mimetic qualities, the Sentinels' silence was particularly strategic because it represented a dynamic rhetorical shift in the woman suffrage movement. Certainly the Sentinels maintained the NWP's tradition of creating a spectacle to attract attention and publicity.\textsuperscript{137} Yet, the shift was marked by the Sentinels' move toward silence as the primary strategy of suffrage agitation. For almost seventy years prior to the Sentinels, numerous suffrage leaders and organizations garnered public attention by literally raising their voices through conventions, petitions, parades, lobbying, soapbox speeches, and weekly organs. In 1916, for instance, Carrie Chapman Catt, president of the NAWSA, pledged "to keep so much 'suffrage noise' going on all over the country" by lobbying at state and federal levels.\textsuperscript{138} Other suffrage and anti-suffrage organizations raised their voices within the suffrage drama of 1917.\textsuperscript{139} The shift
to silence proved politically strategic, however, because as Barry Brummett maintains, "the expectations it violates are strongly established and rigidly upheld." Thus, such silence helped drum up publicity as a new rhetorical strategy in the national suffrage movement and drew attention to the NWP's fashioning of the woman's pulpit to sway public opinion as a means to influence Wilson's response to the NWP's campaign.

The Sentinels, representing politically voiceless women, strategically mimicked the rhetorical presidency to appeal to both Wilson and the American public. As one *Suffragist* article reported, "Pickets dramatized for the country from coast to coast the truth that women . . . are waiting upon a reactionary President for democracy." Here, "the country" was the Sentinels' audience, but ultimately, it was the President's attention they demanded. The Sentinels' White House location, banners addressed to "Mr. President," and philosophy of agitation all functioned as direct appeals to presidential power. While Wilson seemed to be the Sentinels' greatest opponent, he was also their greatest potential ally. As such, the rhetorical presidency facilitated the generation of direct and indirect appeals to President Wilson.

More significantly, the Silent Sentinels' negotiation of Wilson's rhetorical presidency strengthened their militant identity as empowered U.S. citizens. The Sentinels demonstrated their rhetorical acuity by challenging presidential power and appealing to the public's political influence through the woman's pulpit. These appeals revealed a complex understanding of power relationships. Although the presidency shaped the NWP's militant philosophies and tactics, the Sentinels demonstrated they were not victims of structural forces—they summoned the agency to join the president on the public platform as a means to empower their own rhetorical campaign for woman
suffrage. The Sentinels, thus, shaped and were shaped by the structural power of the presidency as the protesters both agitated and reinforced Wilson's authority over the suffrage issue. Ultimately, the ideological potency of the rhetorical presidency allowed the Sentinels to act as citizens influencing their leader, and as leaders joining forces with their fellow citizens to alter national policy. This layered appeal facilitated an exchange of power that strengthened the Sentinel's militant identity as woman citizens and further constituted their political voice.

U.S. MILITARISM AND THE SILENT SENTINELS

The Sentinels strengthened their identity and justified sacrifice through America's wartime ideology. The protesters most obviously mimicked U.S. militarism by identifying themselves as sentinels—those who keep watch or stand guard. However, this sense of vigilance was not fully realized until the more violent chapters of the Sentinels' protest began. Shortly after the United States entered WWI, onlookers, police, and soldiers did not take the Sentinels' protests on President Wilson lightly. In fact, between June and November of 1917, the Sentinels endured physical and psychological harm, such as beatings, arrests, imprisonment, and force-feedings, creating the exigency to harden their militant identity and remain steadfast in the fight for woman suffrage. As George Lakey argued, "One way in which the militants set themselves off from the larger suffrage movement was by pointing to their strength."143 Often, this strength was conceived in militaristic terms. As one protester said, "This sense of comradeship always comes from suffering and toiling together."144 Thus, Wilson's militaristic ideology provided the Sentinels with the necessary rhetorical resources to mimetically construct themselves as soldiers joining the fight for democracy.
By the spring of 1917, the United States's entrance into WWI seemed inevitable. Following the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915, which caused the deaths of 128 Americans, Wilson embarked on a preparedness campaign, during which he maintained that the United States would not enter the war, but would need to be prepared if attacked by enemy nations. However, in the early months of 1917, the threat of attack became more imminent with the Zimmerman letter's proposal to bring German forces to the Mexican-American border and the monthly destruction of more than 600,000 tons of Allied and neutral goods by German submarines. Wilson delivered his war message on April 2, followed by the passage of the war resolution on April 4. Wilson signed a draft bill on May 18, initiated the training of approximately two million soldiers to serve as the American Expeditionary Force and to help—in Wilson's words—secure "a universal domination of right." 

Wilson's rhetorical leadership shone as he became a commander-in-chief. Binkley argues: "During the war years President Wilson produced an almost hypnotic effect by his felicitous phrasing of the ideological common denominators of the Great Crusade, and he obtained hitherto unknown unity that transcended party and became national." Wilson's remarkable ability to solidify a unified national identity by constructing the war as part of the American project to bring democracy to the world magnified Wilson's potential as the NWP's greatest ally. The NWP argued that woman suffrage strengthened Wilson's democratic program by empowering women to help with the war effort. As the NWP declared: "American women ask to be enrolled in the citizenry of the United States so that they may do their utmost in the service of their country." Additionally, Wilson's
war ethos provided a model for the NWP to mimic as the Sentinels' repeated abuses were endured as soldiers sacrificing in the service of liberation.

The Sentinels' heightened militarism also reflected a wartime shift in gender ideology. As Nira Yuval-Davis argues, "Personal identities and modes of interpersonal and intergendered behaviour cannot but spill over into the civil society once the military gains prominence in society." The prominence of U.S. militarism, particularly as the country began its participation in WWI, expanded women's participation in the public sphere through national service. The Sentinels' campaign for woman suffrage incorporated this ideological expansion into their rhetoric of just cause. An article in *The Suffragist* said, "The conviction spreads that it is irrational to keep women disenfranchised when their work has grown more obviously necessary than ever before to the continued existence of the nation." Part of this "work" included cultivating families with great civic virtue as a way of making a political contribution to America's democratic society. As Miriam Cooke and Angela Woollacott argue, "War transforms motherhood from a social to a political factor." While the NWP never supported the war effort, in part because of many members' participation in the peace movement, it argued that if women were considered an integral part to the nation's unity and democratic identity, then they should be given true democratic power.

The Sentinels' banners most prominently mimicked Wilson's militarism and exploited the empowering potential of wartime gender roles. For example, after four months of protesting without incident and shortly after the United States entered WWI in early April 1917, the Sentinels upheld an inflammatory banner that read:
TO THE ENVOYS OF RUSSIA. President Wilson and Envoy Root are deceiving Russia. They say, "We are a democracy. Help us win a world war so that democracies may survive." We, the Women of America, tell you that America is not a democracy. Twenty million American Women are denied the right to vote. President Wilson is the chief opponent of their national enfranchisement. Help us make this nation really free. Tell our government that it must liberate its people before it can claim free Russia as an ally.  

Empowered by wartime necessity, the Sentinels adopted Wilson's authority as commander-in-chief to reverse the assumption that "the Women of America" were examples of liberty. The Sentinels called upon Russian women just as Wilson called upon Russian allies. The Sentinels further identified themselves as an army twenty million strong, positioned to fight Wilson as America fought the enemies of democracy. Moreover, the Sentinels' banner created an alliance with Russian women, who had recently been granted the right to vote. As this alliance mimicked the United States' wartime alliance with Russia, it suggested that the disenfranchisement of American women was inconsistent with Wilson's democratic values. Reflecting such sentiments, another banner read:

"WE SHALL FIGHT FOR THE THINGS WHICH WE HAVE ALWAYS HELD DEAR TO OUR HEARTS- FOR DEMOCRACY, FOR THE RIGHT OF THOSE WHO SUBMIT TO AUTHORITY TO HAVE A VOICE IN THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS." PRESIDENT WILSON'S WAR MESSAGE, APRIL 2nd 1917.
The Sentinels' mimetic use of Wilson's war message attempted to expose the hypocrisy of Wilson's call to uplift politically voiceless people in other nations. In addition, the banner functioned as a pronouncement of the NWP's own militaristic philosophy toward securing political voice for American women.

Appropriating the contours of U.S. militarism became more necessary as violence against the protesters peaked. First, it is noteworthy that the Sentinels maintained the protest over the course of a year with delegations of women standing in winter snow or summer heat or "in the face of bitter wind and driving rain." Many women fell ill, acquired frost-bite, and found "the sockets of their arms aching from the strain" of holding banners for hours on end. The real wounds, however, were not sustained because of the weather or exhaustion, but because of the attacks of police and bystanders. As arrests increased and the Sentinels remained at the White House gates, passersby began to expect confrontation: "The police made no attempt to disperse the crowd, but directed their attack upon the women marching, . . . the majority, taking their attitude from the police, also attacked the women, snatching their flags." By November, a total of 218 women were arrested, often for "obstructing traffic," ninety-seven of whom went to the District prison or to the Occoquan workhouse, incurring notable abuses from the wardens. NWP leader Lucy Burns' hands were shackled above her head one night. Mobs and sailors attacked returning Sentinels by throwing eggs and tomatoes at them, and worse, hitting, choking, and dragging them. Those who remained imprisoned endured smothering temperatures in the sewing rooms and freezing temperatures into the winter months. Alice Paul, after being dragged for a block by a sailor, was sentenced to seven months in solitary confinement.
As the violent stages of the protest continued, the Sentinels' militant identity mimicked those of soldiers engaged in battle. The Suffragist's construction of the Sentinels was shaped by military metaphors, identifying the women as "chivalrous," aligned in "squads," and "comrades patrolling the same beat." Following the first six arrests for "inciting to unlawful assembly and riot," The Suffragist reported that these women remained in a "spirit of revolt, of rebellion." By late August after many more arrests, The Suffragist constructed the Sentinels as soldiers maintaining their post, and standing "brave in the sunshine, flanked by the worn standards that have become the battle flags of suffrage." By mid-October, eighteen Sentinels were imprisoned in the District jail, where they mimicked the survival techniques of Allied soldiers: "In spite of the dampness and chill of the old stone building, which forces the women to wrap themselves in newspapers, a practice borrowed from the trenches in Europe, their spirit is undaunted." Paul embodied the sacrificial character of a soldier as she defiantly broke a window with a book of Elizabeth Browning's poems to save the lives of a few elderly women by restoring air ventilation. Paul was ultimately placed in the psychopathic ward, where she endured force-feedings—and subsequent vomiting and dizziness—three times daily.

Although wartime necessity allowed for some transgression of gender identities, the NWP's mimetic battle-stance was perceived as too great a violation of typical womanly behavior and of wartime allegiance to the president. Those most interested in preserving the U.S. government's control over discontented groups—particularly in a time of war—attempted to recover social control of the Sentinels through censorship, political maneuvering, and physical domination. As early as July, the unjust conditions of
the women's imprisonment were brought to Wilson's attention. Gilson Gardner, a
journalist whose wife was placed in the Occoquan workhouse, warned Wilson that
arresting "women of prominence and refinement like Charles A. Dana'[s] daughter, and
the daughter of former Senator and secretary of State Bayard" was a sign of "political
unwisdom." That same month, Dudley Field Malone, whom Wilson had appointed as
Collector of the Port of New York, presented the president with a well-documented case
of the suffragists' abuses. Perhaps these appeals worked, as Wilson pardoned eleven
suffragists on July 20. Christine A. Lunardini and Thomas J. Knock argue that the
pardons were motivated less by sympathy and more by Wilson's fear of controversy.
Either way, the suffragists considered the pardons an empty gesture. One of the pardoned
picketers, Alison Turnbull Hopkins, wife of the chairman of the New Jersey Progressive
Party, wrote Wilson: "[I] do not desire your presidential benevolence, but American
justice." Wilson's personal dislike of the Sentinels strongly suggested that the pardons
were acts of political appeasement. That month, he wrote that the Sentinels were "doing a
great deal of damage to the cause they are trying to promote" and, in a letter to his
daughter Jessie, he described the picketers as "obnoxious." Moreover, Edith Wilson
was repulsed by the Sentinels, referring to them as "disgusting creatures" and "those
detestable suffragists." Edith and Wilson's personal secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, felt her
husband's pardoning of "those devils in the workhouse" was "a mistake." On July 17,
when Edith learned that Malone supported the protesters, she wrote, "My Precious One
did not come home from the office until six-thirty and was so weary it broke my heart to
look at him. He loved Dudley and said he felt like someone had died." As though a
traitor, Malone became the subject of a Secret Service investigation for the following six weeks, during which his suffrage activities "abruptly ended."

Later, Malone resigned his position and became counsel to the NWP.

By August, the Sentinels' rhetorical acts of political mimesis pushed the president beyond his willingness to appease and pardon the women; as though engaged in war, Wilson began to fight back. Ironically, Wilson attempted to silence the protesters. Wilson and Arthur Brisbane, editor of the *Washington Times*, agreed to limit newspaper coverage of the protests as a way to cut off the NWP's lifeline—national publicity. Wilson wrote to Brisbane, "My own suggestion would be that nothing that they do should be featured with headlines or put on the front page but that a bare colorless chronicle of what they do should be all that was printed."

Brisbane agreed, although Lunardini and Knock conducted a check of newspaper headlines and concluded that "editors were loathe to pass up a good story," and that "the Wilson administration openly or covertly approved of purposeful distortion of news that concerned the militant suffragists."

Considering Wilson's continued correspondence and support of the NAWSA's suffrage efforts, it seemed that Wilson's attempts to silence the Sentinels were motivated less so by his resistance to woman suffrage and more so by his rejection of NWP's militant methods. For instance, Helen Hamilton Gardener of the NAWSA, successfully persuaded Wilson to help create a House Committee on Woman Suffrage in September. That same month, Wilson publicly supported state suffrage campaigns and pledged to urge Democrats to support them as well. In fact, in October, Wilson extended his support to the NAWSA's New York suffrage campaign. His dislike of the NWP shone through in a letter to the NAWSA's Carrie Chapman Catt: "I hope that no
[New York] voter will be influenced in his decision with regard to this great matter by anything the so-called pickets may have done here in Washington?"180

As the NWP's militaristic campaign persisted, Wilson was nearly forced to address the question of the prison abuses, particularly as reports circulated of Alice Paul's and Rose Winslow's daily force-feedings. Instead, however, this exigency gave Wilson the opportunity to escalate institutional efforts of social control. In early November, Wilson sent Dr. William Alanson White and William Gwynn Gardiner, a Commissioner of the District of Columbia, to assess "the exact conditions at the District Jail" and to "examine if necessary Miss Paul and Miss Winslow." Gardiner's subsequent report to Wilson stood in sharp contrast to the suffragists' personal testimonies regarding their treatment in the prison and reflected the impulse to maintain institutional control over those battling for political power. The report, thus, functioned as a tool of bureaucratic corroboration as it helped justify the continued physical domination over the imprisoned women. To begin, the report noted that the food and service were "all that could be expected;" that the picketers' quarters were in "sanitary condition;" and that the broken windows and peeling paint were the suffragists' own doing. In opposition to Paul's testimony, the doctors who performed the force-feedings described them as "an every-day occurrence" without "ill effect." Similarly, Dr. James Alonzo Gannon said that Paul and Winslow "took the tube" and "swallowed willingly, there being no force or persuasion used upon either of them." Reinforcing Wilson's previous attempts to quash the controversy, Gardiner advised Wilson to "remain silent" on the question of the women's imprisonment. He argued that the "guards and matrons" behaved in "good order and discipline" and warned that the suffragists "plan[ed] to violate every rule" of these
institutions," thus attempting to vilify the women.\textsuperscript{181} Despite these multiple efforts to smother the women's demands for citizenship rights, Representative John Baer (R-ND) launched a congressional investigation of the women's treatment. Before the investigation was underway, Wilson commuted Paul's and the other prisoners' sentences in late November; with Gardiner's report in-hand, Wilson denied ever knowing of the abuses.\textsuperscript{182}

Although the Sentinels endured violent reactions to their demands, the protesters' femininity and whiteness may have protected them from more severe abuses during a time of war hysteria. According to Haig A. Bosmajian, "it cannot be ignored that it was the practice of selective enforcement which resulted in the Espionage Act never being applied to the women pickets . . . Socialists, anarchists, were being sentenced to ten- and fifteen-year prison sentences for saying less."\textsuperscript{183} Linda J. Lumdsen argues that the Sentinels' femininity and whiteness protected them from more extreme punishment.\textsuperscript{184} To an extent, the NWP mimicked Wilson's progressive senses of homogeneity and racial exclusion as African American women were notably absent throughout the Sentinels' year-long protest.\textsuperscript{185} The Sentinels' white identities may also have worked in conjunction with the complexities of wartime gender roles to protect the women. As traditional constructions of white woman-as-mother were glorified, the idea of physically violating these women's bodies seemed like a violation of the nation's purity. Moreover, women's increased political and social participation in the domestic war effort may have helped justify the white women's demands as a way to prove their national allegiance.

The NWP considered the Silent Sentinels' protest integral toward agitating Wilson and toward constituting their citizenship identities. At an NWP conference held in late 1917, party member Mabel Vernon identified four effects of the picketing. First, it
generated publicity. Of the Sentinels' debut appearance, Vernon argued: "If our pickets had not done anything more, ... through the press millions and millions of people were reached on that one day to think of national woman suffrage." Second, the Sentinels forced woman suffrage into Wilson's consciousness. Vernon asked, "Was it not worth even going to prison for, to have national woman suffrage daily in the mind of the President?" Third, the picketing and banners "kept alive the woman suffrage question in the war session of Congress." Last, the NWP believed the Sentinels allowed them to enact their rights as citizens. Vernon concluded: "certainly we can go on demonstrating, giving right here in Washington the visualization of all this sentiment which does exist, we know it exists, in all parts of our country." Vernon pointed out that, through the act of protest, the Sentinels realized their militant strength and "sentiment"—the basis of their shared identities as national citizens and their instigation of the woman's pulpit.

In the same way the Sentinels mimicked Wilson's rhetorical presidency, the Sentinels adopted the president's wartime ethos and fought for suffrage as liberators of oppressed citizens. With this key turn, the militaristic, nationalist, and gender ideological forces specific to wartime America collided to empower the Sentinels' during their most trying episodes. Marc W. Steinberg argues that marginalized groups will often "seize upon silences and contradictions in moral justifications of domination and negate or reverse those points in the dominant discourse." Through political mimesis, the Sentinels mimicked Wilson's symbolic silence and militaristic ideology "to legitimize their claims within the existing ideology of domination and to subvert some of the powerholders' justifications." The NWP's woman's pulpit may have resonated with Wilson's "ideology of domination" and worked to expose the inconsistencies in his war ethos; so
much so, that bystanders, police, the press, bureaucrats, and Wilson himself sought to engage in acts of social and physical control as a means to combat their militaristic actions. Just as soldiers engaged in battle, the Sentinels' abuses worked to strengthen a unifying, militant identity that further motivated their campaign for women's full citizenship rights.

SPREADING DEMOCRACY AND SUFFRAGE AROUND THE WORLD

On January 9, 1918, less than two months after the Sentinels were released from prison, President Wilson advised a Committee of Democrats to vote for the federal woman suffrage amendment "as an act of right and justice."188 The following day, two key deliberative moments took place: first, the House of Representatives passed the woman suffrage amendment; and second, Wilson delivered "Conditions of Peace" to a joint session of Congress. The speech outlined his Fourteen Points and advocated for "a general association of nations."189 The coupling of these events—one initiating the legislative journey to women's full citizenship rights and the other specifying Wilson's "programme of the world's peace"—cannot be separated from the democratizing exigencies of the war.190 Certainly, the Sentinels' militaristic protests mimicked the soldiering efforts of U.S. troops and may well have provided Wilson with the exigency to pressure fellow Democrats to endorse the amendment. The war similarly provided Wilson the rhetorical resources to press his internationalist agenda, in which the United States would rally non-Imperialist nations to "fight and continue to fight" until "open covenants of peace" were established.191 Thus, it is not surprising that as Wilson shifted his support toward federal woman suffrage, he linked the issue to his international agenda. In doing so, Wilson preserved his war ethos, yet offered the NWP extended
leverage for holding the president and Democrats accountable for actualizing America's democratization project. Throughout the later months of 1918 and into the spring of 1919, the NWP mimicked the U.S. efforts to spread democracy throughout the world by forging alliances with French revolutionaries and French suffragists, by holding the U.S. Senate and Wilson accountable to Wilson's program of democracy, and by spreading democracy through "Watch Fires for Freedom."

*Suffrage Internationalism and France*

Following Wilson's endorsement of federal woman suffrage in January 1918, he began pressuring senators to support woman suffrage as part of the war effort. In May 1918, for instance, he appealed to Senator Josiah Wolcott's (D-DE) sense of national and Democratic loyalty:

> Will you forgive the leader of your party if he begs that you will vote for the suffrage amendment? . . . A crisis has come such as the world never faced before. In that crisis the world depends upon the United States. Unless the Administration is sustained throughout the war by real friends it cannot meet that responsibility successfully. The next Congress must be controlled by genuine dependable friends; and we may lose it,—I fear we shall lose it,—if we do not satisfy the opinion of the country on this matter now.^{192}

Wilson's appeal relied on his position as leader of his party and worked to position himself as a leader of world democracy. Wilson also voiced his fear of a Republican takeover in the upcoming mid-term elections; thus, while Wilson's endorsement helped elevate woman suffrage to levels of international, national, and party politics, it also served as an expedient strategy toward enhancing the nation's international prominence.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1918, Wilson exerted his influence on both Democratic and Republican senators—although, he had had yet to do so in a formal address the Senate. Perhaps more significantly, Wilson had yet to effectively convert any one senator's position on the suffrage controversy. Additionally, as the president secured other pieces of legislation related to the war (e.g., the Wire Control Bill on July 13), the NWP wondered why Wilson did "nothing effective to insure victory for the suffrage amendment." The NWP's patience grew thin as the exigencies of war intensified throughout the rest of the summer, particularly after the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) arrived in France. Rhetorically, however, by working to link woman suffrage to the war effort, Wilson offered woman suffrage a degree of international significance as he linked it to his democratizing efforts abroad. As such, the NWP mimicked the country's wartime alliance with France by seeking unity with French revolutionaries and suffragists.

In early August, the NWP launched its last chapter of militant protest by invoking the collective memories of French revolutionaries, Marquis de Lafayette and Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau. Lafayette and Rochambeau were respected military leaders in France and served under General George Washington in the American Revolution. The two united with Washington for the ultimate defeat of Lord Cornwallis in 1781 and returned home as heroes. In light of the growing internationalism of the United States in the early twentieth century, Lafayette's and Rochambeau's international military leadership helped legitimate efforts to spread democracy abroad. Shortly after the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1902, for example, Theodore Roosevelt unveiled Rochambeau's statue in Lafayette Square,
across the street from the White House. In early September 1918, Wilson attended a
ceremony at Lafayette's statue in the Square to honor the 161st anniversary of the
general's birth, and the following December, during a trip to France, Wilson laid a wreath
upon Lafayette's grave as "a fellow servant of liberty." The NWP similarly tapped into
Lafayette's and Rochambeau's collective memories as they marched in line to the
generals' statues in Lafayette Square, where members upheld banners, climbed the
statues, and delivered speeches.

The NWP held protests at the Lafayette and Rochambeau statues in order to align
the woman's suffrage campaign with America's revolutionary legacy. For the NWP,
Lafayette and Rochambeau embodied the nation's revolutionary principles yet also
offered the NWP's campaign international legitimacy. Regarding the NWP's first statue
protest, held on August 8, the NWP aimed to "come into living contact with the best
traditions of their country's past . . . to ask for the thing these men fought for—freedom in
the United States." As integral leaders in America's struggle for independence and
"freedom," the generals were also conflated with the birth of American democracy. As
such, the NWP appealed to the Lafayette and Rochambeau as "women, who need the
weapon of democracy to help win a war for democracy." Here, the NWP placed
Lafayette's and Rochambeau's historical legacies in their arsenal to help win their "war
for democracy" through a federal suffrage amendment. This appeal mimicked Wilson's
war program; it could be said that he, too, used "the weapon of democracy to help win a
war for democracy" abroad. By tapping into the collective memories of Lafayette and
Rochambeau, the NWP mimicked Wilson's rhetorical strategies to enhance public
opinion for the suffrage amendment and to place added pressure on Wilson to instill his
democratic commitments at home.

Through political mimesis, the NWP adopted Lafayette's and Rochambeau's
revolutionary motives to help legitimize their protest against the U.S. government. In The
Suffragist's description of "these two heroic Frenchmen," the NWP noted their "unselfish
idealism, their distinguished rank, and their impetuous courage," which helped the United
States "become a strong and just republic."²⁰² By likening themselves to Lafayette and
Rochambeau, NWP inherited the "idealism" and "courage" necessary to fortify the
nation's democratic principles. The NWP's mimetic assumption of Lafayette's and
Rochambeau's revolutionary spirit also constructed their protests as acts of rebellion, in
which sacrifice was justified. The Suffragist noted that "Lafayette defied his King and his
government to put his sword at the service of the young republic," while Rochambeau
"trained French battalions to the aid of the hard-pressed American colonies, battling for
independence."²⁰³ Like Lafayette's defiance, the NWP' justified their protests against
President Wilson as acts of allegiance to "the young republic." The NWP also used
Rochambeau's selflessness as a means to accentuate their sacrifice to liberate American
women as they "battl[ed] for independence." Inheriting Lafayette's and Rochambeau's
senses of self-sacrifice helped construct the suffrage protesters as revolutionary martyrs.
The NWP invoked the memory of its own martyr, Inez Milholland, to help forge a
symbolic alliance with the generals. In fact, the NWP's first statue protest was conducted
in honor of Milholland's spirit of "rebellion against injustice."²⁰⁴
Drawing on the collective memories of Lafayette and Rochambeau helped the NWP levy its criticism of Wilson's resistance as a betrayal of the generals' revolutionary vision. Recalling their Sentinels' protests, the NWP said,

The women, who for long months of the past year stood with their golden suffrage banners before the gates of the White House, silently appealing for the right of self-government, thought often, as they looked across at the soldierly bronze figures facing them, what these pure-hearted lovers of liberty would have thought the refusal of America to deal generously with the liberties of its own people.205

Similarly, the cover of the August 10 issue of *The Suffragist* featured a cartoon of Lafayette asking Rochambeau, "Does the Republic we fought for deny liberty to its own citizens?" In both instances, the NWP insinuated that Wilson obstructed the same "liberties" for which the generals fought and the nation seemingly symbolized. Moreover, the NWP drew a comparison between Lafayette and Rochambeau's military ethos and Wilson's role as commander-in-chief, and thus, indirectly criticized Wilson's abilities to lead the nation in war. Such a critique was particularly salient considering Wilson's reluctance to enter the war in the first place.

The NWP's invocation of Lafayette's and Rochambeau's legacies also mimicked the wartime alliances between France and the United States, particularly with the AEF's concurrent battles in France. The NWP argued that, just as "Rochambeau was commissioned by France" to fight in the American Revolution, American troops were sent to France to help defeat Germany. In turn, the NWP called upon Lafayette to help
the suffragists' campaign for democracy. In a September protest, NWP member, Bertha Arnold, addressed the general:

Will you ask the great leader of democracy to look upon the failure of our beloved country[?] . . . Let that outstretched hand of your pointing to the White House, recall to him his words and promises, his trumpet call for all of us, to see that the world is made safe for democracy. As our army now in France spoke to you there, saying, "Here we are to help your country fight for liberty," will you not speak here and now for us, a little band with no army, no power but justice and right, no strength but in our Constitution and in the Declaration of Independence. Arnold called upon Lafayette not to fight, but to "speak" on behalf of the suffragists and to "ask" President Wilson why he has not yet granted woman suffrage. Through its representation of Lafayette, the NWP attempted to trap Wilson in his democratic promises and magnify the inconsistencies of his internationalist ideology. Thus, this instance of political mimesis helped the NWP to tie woman suffrage to this ideology.

 Invoking Lafayette's and Rochambeau's collective memories, however, pointed to complexities of asserting political agency when challenging institutional forces. For example, mimicking Lafayette and Rochambeau worked to extend key democratic principles to the NWP; however, such principles have historically been the foundation for the exclusion and restriction of citizenship rights. The NWP's appeals to Lafayette, for instance, as "a little band with no army, no power" reified U.S. women's disempowered citizenship status and rehearsed the process through which women have appealed to privileged, white men throughout U.S. history for their rights. Lafayette's statue, in fact, features a partially-robed woman at its base lifting a sword up to the general. Addressing
Lafayette, Bertha Arnold said that NWP members were "condemned like the bronze woman at your feet, to a silent appeal. She offers you a sword. Will you not use the sword of the spirit, mightier far than the sword she holds out to you." In this scene, the NWP members placed themselves below Lafayette, in a position of powerlessness, from which they symbolically extended to him a weapon to help fight for woman suffrage. However, from this subordinate position, this woman—or the NWP—authorized the use of the weapon. Thus, this representation of Lafayette symbolized the power struggle between the NWP and President Wilson in which the NWP positioned Wilson as the primary change-agent for woman suffrage, yet asserted its political agency in the process of targeting his presidential authority.

While the NWP's statue protests may have invoked the paternalistic relationship between the U.S. government and disenfranchised women, the NWP also sought solidarity with French suffragists who demanded equal citizenship rights in their own country. In 1918, both the U.S. and French suffrage movements were endorsed by their presidents, but faced resistance from their legislative bodies. An alliance between French and U.S. women mimicked Wilson's international efforts to "liberate" oppressed nations as the growing internationalism of the woman suffrage movement aimed to liberate women worldwide. Ironically, as the NWP's international alliance with France attempted to increase pressure on President Wilson, it also worked to reify Wilson's growing role as the leader of world democracy. The reach of Wilson's rhetorical leadership extended beyond national borders and eventually influenced the French government's position on suffrage, which in turn, subverted the NWP's efforts to unite with French women in a common state of disenfranchisement. Nonetheless, the NWP re-
envisioned the national limits of U.S. women's citizenship rights by mimicking Wilson's international campaign and forging unity with French suffragists.

As early as 1913, the NWP recognized the international character of the movement; its national parade featured a section representing nations that had already granted women fully-enfranchised citizenship rights. In its 1916 anti-Democratic campaign, the NWP declared, for example, that "This is the century of the awakening consciousness of women. In every nation of the earth, women are sacrificing for the advancement of other women."210 In fact, throughout 1917 and 1918, *The Suffragist* provided weekly reports on the women's rights movements in countries such as Great Britain, Italy, Denmark, France, Hungary, Switzerland, Turkey, India, Sweden, Norway, Canada, Russia, Austria, Uruguay, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Austria, Jamaica, and Ireland.211 This growing awareness motivated the NWP's campaign for U.S. women's rights, while it also helped construct the vote as a way to empower women in other nations. In 1915, for example, Madam Maria Montessori of Italy, Italian physician and educator, addressed the NWP's Convention for Women Voters. *The Suffragist* reported, "she made her hearers feel with her that the ballot in the hands of all women of every nation would be the beginning of peace on earth."212 Moreover, after Representative Jeannette Rankin (R-MT) introduced a resolution to support Ireland's independence in 1918, one New York woman said, "Now that we have been enfranchised, I feel that I can help Ireland more than ever."213

In the context of suffragism's growing internationalism, the NWP constructed itself as a key player in the movement; *The Suffragist* reported regularly on how women in other nations looked to the U.S. suffragists. For example, *The Suffragist* reported that
Japanese feminist, Komako Kimara, called upon "the sisters in the United States, the sisters in Japan and the sisters in the international suffrage movement" to support her activism.\textsuperscript{214} Regarding the intransigence of the U.S. Senate, the International Suffrage Alliance said, "All who know the spirit of the American suffragists will know that their struggle will only be intensified by this temporary setback."\textsuperscript{215}

The NWP's interest in forging unity with French suffragists was not only motivated by shared revolutionary histories and their current wartime alliance, but by the shared experiences of U.S. and French women in wartime service. Thousands of American nurses served in French hospitals, while both American and French women replaced men in jobs left behind.\textsuperscript{216} The NWP once praised French women for "harvest[ing] crops in the fields by the men who were called to the colors," and thus helping refute "the last vestige of the old romantic theory of the helplessness, the uselessness of women in war."\textsuperscript{217}

In light of the Progressive Era's reprisal of U.S. nationalism and nativism, the NWP's efforts to form an alliance with French suffragists also reflected the need to establish dominance over other nations. Thus, after Germany enfranchised women in late 1918, the NWP said, "the United States of America is put in the humiliating position of lagging behind Germany."\textsuperscript{218} However, the NWP also positioned itself as the leader of the woman suffrage movement among Allied nations. In early 1918, the NWP said of the French government's resistance to enfranchising women: "For a progressive and enlightened democracy, such a record on a 'fundamental' question is almost disconcerting as was the studious neglect of politicians in this country, so recently forced to a position more in keeping with its war for democracy abroad."\textsuperscript{219} In light of the timing, it can be
inferred that the NWP considered itself the driving force behind Wilson's shift toward supporting a federal woman suffrage amendment in January 1918. Moreover, the NWP placed itself in a superior position as it constructed the French woman suffrage movement as a lesser challenge. As such, the NWP positioned itself as a leader in the worldwide woman suffrage movement, just as Wilson did in the international movement for democracy.

Through *The Suffragist's* coverage of the French woman suffrage movement, the NWP worked to create alliances with French women and reify its position as leaders in the international suffrage movement. In May 1918, Jeanne Mélin, leader of her newly-formed French militant organization, Comité d'action, wrote to Pierre-Etienne Flandin, leader of the Commission of Universal Suffrage, in protest of his recent revisions to the suffrage bill. The amendments specified that French women could not vote until they were twenty-five, unlike men who could vote at twenty-one, and that women elected at the municipal level could not help elect senators.220 Regarding this development, the NWP wrote:

> Just as in England and in this country, there have been groups of suffragists who have become impatient of the old slow methods of suffrage propaganda and have insisted upon immediate recognition, the same sort of group has arisen in France. . . [Comité d'action's] letter sounds like a protest from the National Woman's Party to the Senate. The dissatisfaction of women with conservative government is not, however, confined to this country and is finding expression in other countries in the same way as in this country.221
Here, the NWP worked to create a sense of solidarity with England's suffrage movement, where Paul and Burns earned their militant experience. Moreover, the NWP constructed Comité d'action as a mimetic formation of itself—as "the same sort of group [which] has arisen in France." Specifically, the NWP inferred that the Comité d'action's letter of protest mimicked the NWP's rhetoric of protest. The NWP, however, elided any reference to itself as a mimetic formation of England's Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU). The WSPU is often credited for disseminating militant suffragism all over the world. Additionally, the NWP's rendition of the French suffrage movement suggested that militancy had just taken hold in France, when an organized militant movement had been active since January 1914. In fact, Mélin's Comité d'action only represented about 150 women, who worked in concert with the dominant militant suffrage organization, the Ligue francaise pour le droit des femmes. Thus, the NWP's strategic construction of the French suffrage organization as a mimetic formation of itself helped elevate the NWP as a leader in the international suffrage movement, while it worked to forge a sense of unity among British, American, and French suffragists.

Just as the NWP worked to position itself as a leader of the international suffrage movement, Wilson's support of French suffragists worked to position the United States as a leader in world democracy. In fact, while touring Europe in June 1918, President Wilson addressed France's more moderate suffrage organization, the Union francaise pour le suffrage des femmes (UFSF). Like the NWP's report on the militant suffrage organization, Wilson's support of French national suffrage helped reify the United States as the leader of world democracy. Relayed to the UFSF through Carrie Chapman Catt, Wilson said of French women:
The war could not have been fought without them, or its sacrifices endured. It is high time that some part of our debt of gratitude to them should be acknowledged and paid, and the only acknowledgement they ask is their admission to suffrage. Can we justly refuse it? As for America, it is my earnest hope that the Senate of the United States will give an unmistakable answer to this question by passing the suffrage amendment to our federal constitution before the end of this session.224

Like his arguments for U.S. woman suffrage, the president supported French woman suffrage as a debt to war service. Moreover, as Wilson took the opportunity to pressure the U.S. Senate to pass the amendment, he implied that French leaders should model his democratic efforts, thereby positioning the United States as the premier example of democratic policy. It should be noted, however, that most prominent politicians in France supported woman suffrage, including the leaders of France's two major parties and France's wartime president, Raymond Poincaré.225 Their support, thus, suggested that Wilson's endorsement was motivated perhaps less by his concern for French women and more by his efforts to bolster America's international standing, particularly as U.S. woman suffrage potentially offered the president greater political capital as he sought to implement his postwar peace plan.

Wilson's address to the UFSF also represented an extension of the rhetorical presidency, particularly as Wilson worked to establish an international alliance of nations. In this expansion of the rhetorical presidency, Wilson appealed to the people of another nation in such a way that reified his international and national agenda. Shortly after Wilson addressed the UFSF, the NWP reported that "wide publicity has been given [in Paris] to President Wilson's statement in favor of woman suffrage . . . As a result, the
Socialist group in the French Chamber of Deputies will ask for the appointment of a committee to consider the question and make a report. The UFSF happily wrote Wilson: "As we hoped, your opinion on woman suffrage has made a deep impression in France and has exercised a favorable influence on our deputies." Embittered by the successful reach of Wilson's rhetorical presidency, The Suffragist said: "We are glad to hear that the expressions of the President's opinion has had so beneficial an effect upon the French deputies. Up to the present it has not [had] any visible effect on any American Senator." While the NWP pointed to Wilson's unwillingness to support U.S. woman suffrage, Wilson's endorsement of French suffrage worked as part of his internationalist program, which held the potential to bolster U.S. woman suffrage. Ideally, Wilson's efforts would help compel U.S. senators to endorse woman suffrage in order to further establish the United States as a democratizing force in the international arena. Typical of the NWP's militant sense of immediacy, the group wasted no time adopting Wilson's international ethos and putting pressure on U.S. senators to support America's democratic efforts abroad.

Suffrage as a Measure for International Democracy

The NWP's efforts to forge an international alliance with French revolutionaries and suffragists mimicked and helped reify President Wilson's international leadership. Strengthening Wilson's leadership was crucial in the fall of 1918 as the war neared its conclusion and Wilson prepared to shape a peacetime alliance of nations. Despite Wilson's public support for the UFSF, he had yet to make a public appeal to the U.S. Senate to pass the suffrage measure. The NWP's continued statue protests throughout September and October also only intensified after Wilson's rhetorical leadership bolstered
woman suffrage in France. In light of these exigencies, Wilson made a formal address to the U.S. Senate on September 30, 1918, in which he argued for woman suffrage as part of his international agenda.

In this address to the Senate, Wilson not only argued that woman suffrage was "vitally essential to the successful prosecution of the great war of humanity in which we are engaged," but he linked woman suffrage to U.S. internationalism. He said, "We cannot isolate our thought or our action in such a matter from the thought of the rest of the world. We must either conform or deliberately reject what they propose and resign the leadership of liberal minds to others." Wilson seemed most concerned with preserving the nation's emerging role as the leader of world democracy as he began supporting women's fully-enfranchised political rights. Not surprisingly, then, when Wilson further argued for woman suffrage, he rehearsed the traditional construction of women as morally superior beings rather than grounding his argument in equal rights ideologies. Regarding women's roles in postwar reconstruction, he said, "we shall need . . . the sympathy and the insight and clear moral instinct of the women of the world." Although Wilson promoted woman suffrage for women worldwide, he did so in such a way that de-emphasized women's political participation.

With Wilson's support of woman suffrage throughout 1918, particularly as part of his war program, the NWP expected the president to flex his rhetorical leadership and effectively sway the Democratic vote in the Senate. By early fall, however, such hopes were not actualized. Earlier, on May 10, the Senate failed to pass the amendment by three votes, and on June 27, the measure failed by two votes, to which the NWP argued that "the President could have won [these votes] if he had put forth a fraction of his
strength."231 And even after Wilson's September 30 address, the Senate was still two votes shy of passing the amendment. Shifting away from the president, the NWP vowed to "make it so uncomfortable for the Senate that they will be glad to have [woman suffrage] out of the way," promising that their "demonstrations will go on at whatever cost of humiliation, pain, even life to these women."232 Thus, throughout October and November 1918, after the NWP had finally pressed Wilson to publicly promote suffrage, the NWP turned their attention back to the Senate as the chief opponent to woman suffrage.

Consistent with the NWP's previous mimetic strategies, the militant women adopted the president's wartime authority and pressured the Senate to pass the woman suffrage amendment as a necessary war measure. Moreover, the NWP's protest against Democratic Senators fashioned a wartime alliance with the president while it also positioned the women as loyal citizens of Wilson's America. As such, the NWP's appeals constructed the thirty-four "wilful [sic] senators" as disloyal opponents to the war. Similar to the Silent Sentinels, delegations of women took to the steps of the Capitol and to the entrance of the Senate Office Building and stood silently with banners in hand. One banner declared that the senators "have obstructed the war program of the President. They have lined up the Senate with Prussia by denying self government to the people."233 Like the provocative "Kaiser Wilson" banner, this banner compared the Senate to an anti-democratic imperialist government. However, armed with Wilson's explicit endorsement, the NWP's accusation mimicked Wilson's own efforts to pressure contrary senators and worked to legitimize the women's protest as part of their wartime allegiance.
The NWP's mimetic alliance with the president was strengthened by many of the
protesters' demonstrated loyalties to the nation. For example, munition factory workers
participated in the NWP's line-up.\textsuperscript{234} Earlier that year, munition workers pled for suffrage
rights in a testimony to Congress. They argued: "we face the risk of injury and death as
soldiers face it . . . we will be recognized as citizens of the government we are working to
defend and equals of the men who fight with the arms we make for them."\textsuperscript{235} Similar to
the Sentinels, these women identified themselves as soldiers, reflecting the growing
recognition that citizenship rights were earned through war service. Red Cross workers
also joined the NWP that fall after 106 Red Cross women protested against the president
in May.\textsuperscript{236} Some NWP protesters declared that they were mothers and sisters of soldiers
fighting overseas.\textsuperscript{237} Reifying the protesters' patriotism, \textit{The Suffragist} reported that
"sailors on Pennsylvania Avenue gravely salut[ed] the [American] flag at the head of the
[NWP's] line."\textsuperscript{238} Unlike the Sentinels, who protested well before the AEF landed in
France, many of these women possessed the necessary war ethos to help legitimize their
protest as part of the war effort.

NWP members also mimicked the president's role of commander-in-chief as they
assumed the authority to question the senators' patriotism. The NWP assailed the war
ethos of Senator James W. Wadsworth, Jr. (R-NY), who served in the Spanish-American
War. With their mimetic adoption of Wilson's war authority and as loyal U.S. citizens,
the protesters demanded that the senator consistently participate in Wilson's international
and domestic war efforts. The NWP's banner said: "Senator Wadsworth's Regiment is
Fighting for Democracy Abroad; Senator Wadsworth left his Regiment and is Fighting
against Democracy in the Senate; Senator Wadsworth could serve his country better by
fighting with his regiment abroad than by fighting women."239 Wadsworth's war experience allowed the NWP to constitute the deliberative space of the U.S. Senate as an arena of war in which senators must fight for woman suffrage as soldiers fought for democracy abroad to exhibit their patriotism. In declaring the Senate a battlefield, the NWP symbolically expanded the reach of the war and thus, worked to extend women's participation and authority in the nation-state. Cooke and Woollacott explain: "To the extent that boundaries between home and front can be deconstructed, unprecedented modes of gendered thinking become possible."240 By re-constituting the wartime battlefield, the NWP created even greater exigency for expanding wartime gender roles, making the enhancement of women's citizenship rights more necessary than ever.

Despite the pressing exigencies of the war, the endorsement of the president, and the NWP's continued agitation, the war ended and the Senate adjourned on November 21 without passing the woman suffrage amendment. When the armistice was signed on November 11, signaling the war's end, the NWP lost the symbolic force of Wilson's war rhetoric and thus, construed the president as a traitor to his own war program and democratic mission. Even though the NWP felt particularly betrayed as the president campaigned for the re-election of Democratic senators,241 they were heartened by the defeat of many of those same Democratic senators.242 Moreover, the NWP considered Wilson's campaign to form a peacetime alliance at the upcoming Peace Conference in Paris the necessary leverage to hold the president accountable for extending citizenship rights at home. Thus, in late November, the NWP prepared to hold President Wilson's feet to the fire.

Watch Fires of Freedom
Before Congress reconvened in December and before Wilson jettisoned to Europe to promote the League of Nations, the NWP announced:

We demand that the President put all his strength into seeing that when Congress meets in December, this measure is passed before any other is considered. We demand that before the President leaves to promote democracy for Europe at the peace table, he devote all his power to establishing self-government for the people at home. Until the Senate passes this measure, America must . . . enter the Peace Conference with unclean hands.\textsuperscript{243}

In his December 2 address to Congress, Wilson placed woman suffrage on his legislative program; unfortunately, the Democratic Chairman of the Rules Committee did not put the measure on the docket.\textsuperscript{244} Enraged, the NWP argued that Wilson "had so long formulated, defended, and thus encouraged and solidified" the Senate's opposition.\textsuperscript{245} In December, the NWP regrouped during its Conference of the National Advisory Council, and devised a strategy to force a vote on woman suffrage in the Senate before it adjourned on March 4, 1919. The conference boasted attendance from enfranchised women all over the world and women from every congressional district in the nation. As the NWP had done many times before, the women marched to the Senate and presented each senator with suffrage resolutions.\textsuperscript{246} However, the conference concluded with the introduction of a new protest strategy; 300 NWP members marched to Lafayette's statue with an urn and copies of Wilson's speeches that promoted democracy in Europe. Page by page, the women consigned Wilson's words to the flames.\textsuperscript{247}

The NWP officially activated the "perpetual Watch Fire of Freedom" on January 1, 1919, intending to burn Wilson's speeches as he delivered them in Europe.\textsuperscript{248} As soon
as reports of a speech reached the women, they rang a "liberty bell" at the NWP headquarters and marched to the park to set fire to the text.\textsuperscript{249} NWP member, Lucy Branham, attributed the practice to "the ancient fights for liberty [when] the crusaders for freedom symbolized their protest against those responsible for injustice by consigning their hollow phrases to the flames."\textsuperscript{250} Like the NWP's Sentinels protests, these women identified themselves as "crusaders of freedom;" however, by extinguishing Wilson's words in a live flame, the NWP intensified its attack on Wilson by symbolically reducing his words to ashes, further accentuating the hypocrisy between his words and actions abroad and at home. Thus, through the Watch Fires, the NWP attempted to pressure Wilson to actualize his democratic commitments at home.

The NWP's Watch Fires mimicked the ways in which Wilson's war discourse drew upon the naturalizing power of fire metaphors. Jason C. Flanagan argues that fire metaphors helped Wilson transition the nation into war.\textsuperscript{251} Wilson often constructed Europe as site of eminent threat, or a place "ablaze with terrible war."\textsuperscript{252} During his preparedness campaign in 1916, the president said, "The world is on fire and there is tinder everywhere. The sparks are liable to drop anywhere, and somewhere there may be material which we can not prevent from bursting into flame."\textsuperscript{253} Shortly before the United States entered the war, Wilson transformed fire from a threatening agent to a purifying and regenerative agent:

We are being forged into a new unity amidst the fires that now blaze throughout the world. In their ardent heat we shall, in God's providence, let us hope, be purged of faction and division, purified of the errant humours of party and of
private interest, and shall stand forth in the days to come with a new dignity of national pride and spirit.\textsuperscript{254}

The malleability of fire metaphors helped Wilson justify the country's belated entrance into the war as a natural and necessary step toward freedom.

Similarly, the NWP mimetically naturalized their attacks on the president through the literal and symbolic meanings of fire. The NWP's use of fire helped construct woman suffrage as an inevitable victory, as it perceived of fire as an invincible and relentless force. For instance, not only did the flames survive the law enforcement's fire extinguisher, but they resisted the extinguishing power of another natural force—the rain. Mildred Morris wrote: "Rain falls and the flames dance as full and red as ever! Indomitable flames—as indomitable as the women who guard them! All night the rain falls but the watchfire of freedom keeps burning on!"\textsuperscript{255} Although Rose Conlan, Alice Paul, Julia Emory, and Edith Ainge were arrested for attempting to light another fire, the fire continued to burn all day and night. Elizabeth Kalb linked the fire's endurance to that of the suffragists: "That watch fire, which, however many times it be extinguished, always flames up again, lit by the unfailing hope and determination in women's hearts."\textsuperscript{256} So long as the women remained as extraordinarily steadfast as the flames, they would win the fight for woman suffrage.

Additionally, the fires symbolized the ubiquitous threat of woman suffrage. Just like the expanding reach of the war, the Watch Fires of Freedom would bring woman suffrage to U.S. women. For example, on January 7, when the NWP attempted to burn a speech Wilson had just delivered in Turin, Italy, the police attempted to put out the NWP's fire. \textit{The Suffragist} reported:
Suddenly from the mysterious darkness came the order to stop the fire, which the police did very effectively. No sooner was the fire quite dead, however, till they awakened to the fact that a second fire was flaming all about the base of Lafayette statue . . . Here, there, everywhere the flames arose; the whole District seemed to be burning with indignation against the President who has so completely forgot the demands of his own country.\textsuperscript{257}

Here, the NWP translated the ubiquity and resilience of the fire to the suffragists' themselves, thus creating the sense that NWP members, who were "burning with indignation," were agents of fire consuming "the whole District." Matilda Young reinforced the NWP's threat by promising, "The women of the country will keep the flame of liberty ablaze until complete victory is assured and the words of the President are translated into reality."\textsuperscript{258} Mimetically, the NWP used fire to symbolize the natural spread of democracy.

The NWP reinforced the ubiquity of the woman suffrage movement by conducting Watch Fire protests in Boston and New York, within close proximity to events where the president promoted the League of Nations. On February 24, NWP members created a Watch Fire on the Boston Common to greet the president upon his return from Europe. Shortly after the Boston protest, NWP members headed to New York and created a Watch Fire in front of the Metropolitan Opera House. Inside the Met, one member recorded Wilson's words as he said them and then sneaked her notes outside to Elsie Hill, who burned them with her torch.\textsuperscript{259} Both of these Watch Fires took place in close proximity to the president while Wilson was stateside, emphasizing the spontaneous and unpredictable characteristics of fire. Moreover, with the New York incident, the fire
illustrated an instantaneous destruction of Wilson's ideological program, as NWP members attempted to suck the life out of his words before they had a chance to circulate and gain momentum.

Thus, as a ubiquitous and immediate threat, the fire functioned as another strategy for exerting control over the president. Burning the president's words visualized their emptiness and to an extent, rendered the president silent and powerless. The NWP most forcefully employed this strategy of control on February 9, when the women burned the president in effigy. The Suffragist described it as "a final protest against the threatened shame and disgrace to the Administration and to America." About 2,000 people gathered to witness the 100 women protest in "a drama of freedom."\textsuperscript{260} By burning the effigy, the Watch Fire was like a crucible purifying the NWP's campaign of the "shame and disgrace" obstructing the women's freedom. Moreover, the Watch Fire created a site of power where the NWP controlled the president's fate and symbolically killed the opposition in this wartime context. The women empowered themselves as they mimicked the president's actions to silence U.S. women and to deny them their full citizenship rights. At the same time, burning the president's words and the president in effigy worked to delegitimize his peacetime campaign and draw attention to his hypocrisy. Attempting to unnerve Wilson in this way reinforced his role as the key change-agent for woman suffrage and helped keep woman suffrage at the forefront of U.S. politics.

The NWP continued its Watch Fire protests through May, though burning Wilson in effigy was its most volatile and direct form of attack on the president. The women never took to initiating physical violence or destroying public property, but their symbolic execution of the president represented the height of the NWP's militancy and its
final mimetic performance of Wilson's resistance to woman suffrage. Through months of protesting at the base of Lafayette and Rochambeau statues and the Capitol building, and by extending such protests to include the Watch Fires, the NWP worked to mimic and expose the hypocrisy of Wilson's international and wartime authority in order to empower women's full citizenship rights in the national and international arenas. These protest strategies also positioned the NWP in close proximity to the president in an attempt to force him to debate the issue, while also elevating their own political authority. In light of the Senate's passage of the amendment in early June 1919, the NWP's last chapter of militant protest must be considered a key factor in securing woman suffrage.

**SUFFRAGE SUCCESS, BACKLASH, AND EXCLUSION**

In May 1919, Senator Harris (D-GA) declared his intent to support the woman suffrage amendment, providing the measure its sixty-fourth vote and the necessary two-thirds majority to submit it to states for ratification. By this time, Congress had adjourned, thus prompting the NWP to hold daily protests at the Lafayette statue demanding a special session. The special session met on May 19, and on June 4 at 5:15 p.m., House Joint Resolution 1 passed through the Senate.

The Senate's ultimate passage of the federal woman suffrage amendment can be partly attributed to Wilson's expedient endorsement of woman suffrage. When he called upon the special session of Congress to pass the woman suffrage amendment, he said, "I, for one, covet for our country the distinction of being among the first to act in a great reform." Although many other countries had granted women national voting rights by this time, Wilson's support for the measure worked to promote the United States as a leader among democratic nations. In fact, Wilson persuaded Senator Harris to support the
movement at a meeting in Paris, where the president was engaged in forming the League of Nations. Thus, the exigencies of postwar international relations and party loyalty cannot be separated from the amendment's success. So while Harris's support signaled a victory for the suffragists, it can also be considered a victory for Wilson's League.

The NWP's protests between 1917 and 1919 mimicked Wilson's rhetorical leadership and his capacity as a wartime president, which helped reify his political role and power in the woman suffrage debate. More significantly, the NWP's rhetorical acts of political mimesis empowered U.S. women to assert their political agency and redefine their roles in the nation-state. In the process, they positioned themselves in the spaces of the presidency, exerting their own authority and creating their own woman's pulpit to bring public opinion to the side of suffrage.

To an extent, however, the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis was perceived as a threat to presidential and congressional power. Specifically, the NWP's statue protests, Senate protests, and Watch Fires provoked significant backlash similar to the acts of social control exacted against the Silent Sentinels. The statue protests resulted in particularly brutal arrests. The Suffragist noted, "When released [from police headquarters] the women appeared with tears streaming down their faces, bruised throats, swollen, twisted wrists, and sprained fingers." Other women testified to being "thrown upon the tables and choked" while detained. The women who were imprisoned suffered nauseating odors and stifled air. The NWP's protests on the Senate provoked the U.S. Capitol Police to tear and retrieve the women's banners, detain them in the Capitol's guard room for hours, and throw the women down the front steps of the building, knocking one protester, Annie Arneil, unconscious. At the Watch Fires, NWP
members were mobbed and arrested daily. For example, shortly after Sue White and Gabrielle Harris dropped Wilson's effigy into the flames, thirty-nine women were arrested.²⁶⁸ Moreover, the NWP members who protested Wilson in New York "were beaten and dragged and trampled under foot by the police, aided by a mob of soldiers and sailors."²⁶⁹

While these acts of physical domination often worked to render the women physically powerless, such acts of institutional resistance most significantly attempted to thwart the women's citizenship identities. For example, the sixteen women arrested at the Boston Watch Fire endured little physical abuse, but they were symbolically rendered powerless as their individual identities were erased in the court hearings. The judge argued that their names "were of no consequence," and as documented in The Suffragist, "Some of the [women's] names were known. Some were not. Some were tried under wrong names, some were tried several times under different names, some were tried under the name of Jane Doe; in fact there was quite a family of Jane Does in the Boston Court that morning."²⁷⁰ Clearly, the women were being tried as women who overstepped the boundaries of appropriate citizenship behavior by entering the spaces of politics, particularly the spaces of the presidency. Yet, the NWP members forged a shared identity as members of "a family of Jane Does," creating their site of oppression into a site of empowerment. The use of the family metaphor reified the naturalizing construction of women as domestic beings, but it also created a sense of interconnectedness in the face of physical and symbolic oppression.

Unlike the Sentinels' protests in 1917, however, the protests between 1918 and 1919 were protected by greater institutional legitimacy. During the Senate protests, the
NWP’s lawyer appealed to Judge Frederick L. Siddons, who determined that holding the women inside the Capitol building and seizing the women's banners was unlawful. The protesters received further support from Judge Benjamin Barr Lindsey, who had recently returned from a six-month visit in Europe as a member of the Committee on Public Information—the propaganda arm of the Wilson presidency. Concerned with how the nation was perceived by other nations, Lindsey argued, "the authorities responsible for the arrest of the women ought to be indicted for aiding German propaganda against our country." Moreover, the day after the New York protests, "sailors, privates, and officers both military and naval, continued to come into the office of Suffrage Headquarters to apologize for the conduct of men in uniform." By May 1919, when the NWP protested at the Lafayette statue in demand of a special session of Congress, civil and military police stood guard to protect them from attack. Thus, the NWP helped expand the citizenship rights of women by expanding the boundaries of social change.

Like the Sentinels, NWP members were protected by their privileged identities as mostly white women. During the statue protests, for example, Matthew O'Brien, counsel to NWP refuted the charges against women for "climbing upon the monument," by arguing: "It cannot be that well-dressed, well-educated, well-conducted women could be regarded as a disfigurement to a monument." More significantly, as the exigencies of war were replaced by the exigencies of peace, the women's protests seemed to resonate with the international push for women's national rights. Once Wilson returned from the Peace Conference in Paris, the women's protests for a special session of Congress incurred little institutional and social resistance.
Throughout this latter chapter of the NWP's militant protests, the NWP helped fashion an international model of woman citizenship that reinforced the growing internationalism of the movement. However, this model also perpetuated an Anglo-Saxon citizenship ideal reflective of Wilson's progressive program of nativist nationalism. The NWP forged alliances with the predominantly white leaders of Great Britain's and France's suffragist movements. And although *The Suffragist* featured weekly reports on suffrage movements led by non-Anglo-Saxon women in Asia, South America, and Africa, the NWP rarely sought to create solidarity with any women of color. African American women were particularly absent from the NWP's protests and discursive constructions of suffrage unity. Indicative of the NWP's latent racism, Maud Younger delivered a speech in late 1918 and referred to resistant senators as the "Ten Little Nigger Boys"—the subjects of a children's nursery rhyme that depicted ten African American boys who one-by-one were indisposed of through their own mischievous behavior. The reference demonstrated that the NWP promoted the same exclusionary ideologies that worked against women, thus exposing the limits of the NWP's campaign for equal rights.

As such, the NWP's rhetorical acts of political mimesis between 1917 and 1919 can be considered artifacts of the Progressive Era's empowering and disempowering potential. Wilson's fashioning of the rhetorical presidency and the rise of U.S. internationalism similarly shaped the NWP's final stage of militancy in its fight for a federal woman suffrage amendment. Through mimesis, the NWP adopted Wilson's rhetorical leadership as a way to engage the U.S. public, to put pressure on the president, and to constitute themselves as U.S. citizens. The climate of intensified militarism, coupled with shifting gender roles, allowed the NWP to assert themselves as soldiers in
America's war to liberate the oppressed. And finally, the NWP mimicked Wilson's internationalist strides by aligning woman suffrage with America's democratizing efforts worldwide. By June 1919, the NWP had helped make the world safe for woman suffrage and thus, shifted its energies toward securing the ratification of the thirty-six states needed to write the amendment into the U.S. Constitution.
End Notes: Chapter 4


12 Smith, Civic Ideals, 430.


14 Alva I. Belmont to Fellow-member, Correspondence, September 13, 1916, reel 1, National Woman's Party Papers: The Suffrage Years, University of Maryland Library, College. Hereafter, noted as NWPP; "Policy of the National Woman's Party," The Suffragist, September 30, 1916, 6.

15 Alice Paul [Chairman] to Mrs. Morton, August 7, 1916, NWPP, reel 1.

16 For simplicity, this chapter refers to all previous iterations of the organization, such as the Congressional Committee or the CUWS, as the NWP. On March 2, 1917, at the CUWS's National Convention, the organization announced, "At a time of national instability, it promises well for the future of the fight for women's political liberty in this
country that these two organizations are now coming together to deliberate on the most
vigorous means of carrying on the battle for the enfranchisement of women in spite of the
distracted state of the public mind." "National Conventions," The Suffragist, March 3,
1917, 12.

17 See Linda Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in

18 A good starting point for this discussion is Joan R. Gundersen, "Independence,
Citizenship, and the American Revolution," Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and

19 Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the

20 Josep R. Llobera, Foundations of National Identity: From Catalonia to Europe
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 47; Tamar Mayer, "Gender Ironies of Nationalism:
Setting the Stage," in Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing the Nation, ed. Tamar
Mayer (London: Routledge, 2000), 10; Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias,
"Introduction," in Woman – Nation – State, eds. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias

21 Llobera, Foundations of National Identity, 47.

22 Jean Bethke Elshtain, "Antigone's Daughters," in Feminism and Politics, ed.
Anne Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 371; Benedict Anderson,
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London:


34 Ibid., 2.


37 Ibid., 3-6.


39 Ibid., 51.

40 Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation*, 107-111.


42 Tickner, *Gendering World Politics*, 57; Kimberly Jensen discusses the extent to which such discourse functioned as part of World War I propaganda to construct the opponent as "the Other" and concludes, "After a century of additional evidence, we can see that many of the characteristics that scholars and policy makers identify as being conducive to wartime rape apply to the conditions and beliefs of European and Western society at the time of the First World War." *Mobilizing Minerva*, 32. For more on rape in war, see Cynthia Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), chapter, "When Soldiers Rape," 108-52; *Mass Rape: The War against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, ed. Alexandria Stiglmayer (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Susan Brownmiller, *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1993).


44 Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation*, 112.

46 Jensen, Mobilizing Minerva, vii, ix; Schneider and Schneider, Into the Breach, 8-13.


49 Jensen, Mobilizing Minerva, ix.

50 Ellen Newbold La Motte published a memoir of her time as a Red Cross nurse in a French military hospital in Belgium and discussed how ill and injured soldiers attempted to accosted, insulted, and harassed women. Ellen Newbold La Motte, The Backwash of War: The Human Wreckage of the Battlefield as Witnessed by an American Hospital Nurse (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1934).

51 Jensen, Mobilizing Minerva, ix.
52 Ibid., x.


54 Schneider and Schneider, *Into the Breach*, 8.


57 Jensen, *Mobilizing Minerva*, x.

58 Ibid., 41-45.

59 Ibid., 47, 48.

60 Smith, *Civic Ideals*, 421-22.


The organization was formed in 1917; also, in 1916, Indian women formed the All-India Muslim Women's Conference, and in 1918, women formed the Indian National Conference. Rowbotham, *Women in Movement*, 199-200.

Francis A. Beer and Laura Brunell, "Women's Words: Gender and Rhetoric in the Gulf War Debate," in *Meanings of War & Peace*, ed. Francis A. Beer (College


71 Marilyn Lake, "Between Old Worlds and New: Feminist Citizenship, Nation and Race, the Destabilisation of Identity," in *Suffrage and Beyond*, 280.


74 "President Asked to Open Second Term with Action on Suffrage," *The Suffragist*, March 10, 1917, 7.

75 "National Conventions."

76 "Report for 1916," January 1917, NWPP, reel 2, 13. Also see Report by Elizabeth Selden Rogers, "[April 9, 1916]," NWPP, reel 1, 2. This untitled report is dated April 9, 1916, but reports on events that took place after this date in late 1916, particularly Inez Milholland Boissevain's death, which suggests the date is incorrect and the report is on the events of 1916.

77 In 1915, a group of New York women linked to the CUWS were accused of heckling President Wilson as they waiting in a lobby to request that he receive a deputation of New York women. Alice Paul and Alva Belmont denied that it was heckling. See the following correspondence for a discussion of the event between Carrie Chapman Catt, New York Board Members, and Alice Paul: To Alice Paul and Members of the Board of the Congressional Union from Carrie Chapman Catt, May 26, 1915, NWPP, reel 1; To Members of the Executive Committee and Advisory Council of the Congressional Union from Eunice Dana Brannan and Elizabeth Selden Rogers, June 16,
1915, NWPP, reel 1; Alice Paul to Carrie Chapman Catt, June 24, 1915, NWPP, reel 1.

Also see the account of the incident in *The Suffragist*: "'Heckling' the President," *The Suffragist*, May 22, 1915, 4; "President Wilson and New York Women," *The Suffragist*, May 29, 1914, 3.

78 *The Suffragist*, December 6, 1913, 28.


81 Ibid.


84 Wilson to Ellen Axson, March 1, 1885, *PWW*, 4: 316-17.


89 Ibid., 28-61.


93 Ibid., 66.

94 Ibid., 67, 126.


96 Ibid., 79-80.


Ibid. Also see Irwin, *The Story of Alice Paul*, 41-42.


Anna Howard Shaw, quoted in "A Suffrage Delegation to the President," *The Suffragist*, December 13, 1913, 37.

Woodrow Wilson, quoted in "A Suffrage Delegation to the President," 37.


"President Refuses to Aid in Deputation," *The Suffragist*, July 4, 1914, 4-5.


Diary entry, June 19, 1876, *PWW*, 3: 143.

In 1915, Joseph P. Tumulty, his private secretary, and Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison voted for woman suffrage in state referenda. Additionally, Treasury Secretary, William Gibbs McAdoo, Wilson's son-in-law, and Secretary of Commerce,


116 Alice Paul to Harriot Stanton Blatch, December 16, 1916, reel 1, NWPP. Also see Alice Paul [National Chairman] to Mrs. Blatch, December 18, 1916, 2, NWPP, reel 1.


121 Ibid., 9.

122 "Suffragists Wait at the White House for Action," *The Suffragist*, January 17, 1917, 7. Commas were added to the text of the banners for syntactical clarity.

123 The Sentinels' picket line stopped at brief intervals when arrests began in June 1917, but continued throughout the summer months and into fall of 1917. The pickets
stopped shortly after prisoners were freed in November 1917 and began again in spring of 1918 when NWP members felt President Wilson did not pressure the Senate to pass the federal amendment.

124 The protesters' appearance is described based on the photos of the Sentinels provided in 1917 issues of The Suffragist.

125 The NWP had a chairman and a delegation of members in each state at the time. Within the first two weeks of the pickets, for example, delegations from Maryland, the District of Columbia, New York, and Virginia protested Wilson. The Suffragist lists names of NWP members participating in the pickets, which range from about 12-15 women per day, although the photos of these delegations suggest more women participated. See "State Delegations Join the Picket Line at the White House," The Suffragist, January 31, 1917, 4; "Suffrage Sentinels Still Wait at the White House," The Suffragist, January 24, 1917, 4. For a sense of the different professions represented, see "Silent Watch at the White House Continues," The Suffragist, February 17, 1917, 5 and "Labor Day on the Picket Line," The Suffragist, February 24, 1917, 5.

126 "State Delegations," 4. Commas were added to the text of the banners for syntactical clarity.


"National Conventions."


Ebert, "Gender and the Everyday," 106.

V. Grice, February 8, 1917, NWPP, reel 2. Emphasis original.

The NWP reported on the experimental use of the "voiceless speech" in late 1913, but the strategy did not translate into an organized form of protest until 1917.
"Washington had its first appearance of the voiceless speech, when Mrs. Martha P. Tagg and Mrs. Jessie Hardy Stubbs, using the show window of the Tea Cup Inn, turned the pages of the voiceless speech for the benefit of the throngs of shoppers who were passing by. At times the sidewalks threatened to become blocked, so great was the interest in the novel device." "Congressional Union Campaign: Propaganda Work," *The Suffragist*, November 22, 1913, 10.


141 According to Eleanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, "The technique of the 'Silent Sentinels' had been employed by the Women's Political Union in Albany in attempting to get a suffrage referendum bill before the New York legislature in 1912. However, picketing the White House was novel." Eleanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States*, enlarged ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996), 275.


Binkley, *American Political Parties*, 70.

"Stop Hoping, Mr. President, and Act," *The Suffragist*, July 6, 1918, 4.

Yuval-Davis, *Gender & Nation*, 106.


After Tzar Nicholas II was forced to abdicate, Russian women were granted the right to vote four days later on March 13, 1917.


Quotation marks are part of the original banner.

"President Asked to Open Second Term."


Prior to this, the NWP occasionally used militaristic metaphors throughout its anti-Democratic campaigns, but never to this degree. See "Pilgrimage to the Opening of the Maryland Legislature," *The Suffragist*, January 10, 1914, 7; "The Nation-Wide Demonstration," *The Suffragist*, April 11, 1914, 3; and "The Next Move on the West," *The Suffragist*, March 18, 1916, 7.


"Seven Months," 4.

168 Ibid.


175 Malone was a vocal supporter of the NWP. In April 1918, he traveled with NWP leaders to Boston, Massachusetts and Portland, Maine to raise money for the organization. He openly criticized anti-suffrage senators. See "Rousing Boston Meeting Voices Demand for Senate Action on Suffrage," *The Suffragist*, April 6, 1918, 6-7; "Mr. Malone Not Defender in Victorica Case," *The Suffragist*, June 15, 1918, 5.


177 Brisbane instructed staff to "have nothing of the picketers or what they do in prison or anything else on the front page of the paper. Tell the news in two sticks . . . never display a head." Arthur Brisbane to Joseph P. Tumulty, November 9, 1917. Case file 1215, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Library of Congress; Lunardini and Knock, "Woodrow Wilson," 672, 675-76.


Representative John Baer of North Dakota witnessed first-hand the attacks upon the Sentinels in front of the White House and sponsored a congressional investigation of the abuses and introduced the "Baer resolution" on August 17, 1917. The full text of the resolution is reprinted in "A Congressional Investigation," 5. Lunardini and Knock speculate that during a late-night visit from David Lawrence, a journalist with ties to the Wilson administration, Wilson's plans for the suffrage amendment were relayed to Paul and perhaps, motivated her to withdraw the picketing. That same week, the suffragists were released. "Woodrow Wilson," 677-78; also see "The Government Releases Suffrage Prisoners," *The Suffragist*, December 1, 1917, 9.


*The Suffragist*'s coverage of the protests throughout 1917 and 1918 make no mention of any African American women's participation.


Ibid., 536.


In July 1918, Wilson made a similar appeal to Senator David Baird (R-NJ). He said, "The whole subject of woman suffrage has been very much in my mind of late and has come to seem to me part of the international situation as well as a question of capital importance to the United States. I believe our present position as champions of democracy throughout the world would be greatly strengthened if the Senate would follow the example of the House of Representatives in passing the pending amendment."


In fact, by March 1918, Allied forces reached a breaking point. The rise of Bolsheviks in the wake of the Russian revolution signaled the defeat and withdrawal of
Russian troops. Thus, as Germany redeployed half a million troops to the Western front, France faced almost certain defeat, particularly after the Germans initiated the highly-effective strategy of infiltration. The American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), led by General John Pershing, finally arrived in France in June 1918. By no means did the AEF secure a swift victory, but they helped win key battles at Aisne-Marne, St. Mihiel, and the epic battle at Meuse-Argonne, which lasted from September 26 until early November when Americans finally reached Sedan and blasted the railroad that supplied German troops. Ferrell, *Woodrow Wilson and World War I*, 65-83.


The NWP had appealed to the legacies of French revolutionaries before. The March 14, 1914 cover of *The Suffragist* featured a cartoon of Lafayette and Friedrich Wilhelm Ludolf Gerhard Augustin von Steuben, a Prussian officer in the American Revolution, sitting upon a cloud looking down on the United States. In response to a sign posted on the United States that said "No Admission to Revolution," Lafayette said to Von Steuben, "That would have kept us out, old boy."


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


"Lafayette and Rochambeau," 4.

Cover of *The Suffragist*, August 10, 1918.


Wainwright, "An Appeal," 4. Quotation marks were added for clarity.

France's president at the time was socialist, Alexandre Varenne. For a discussion of woman suffrage in France in 1918, see Steven C. Hause with Anne R. Kenney, *Women's Suffrage and Social Politics in the French Third Republic* (Princeton,


"By Komako Kimara," June 1, 1918, reprinted in *The Suffragist*, June 29, 1918, 11.


"Germany Outdistances the United States Senate," *The Suffragist*, November 16, 1918, 6.


Single quotation marks used in original.


"French Women Beginning to Demand."

The Ligue nationale pour le vote des femmes (LNVF) was formed in response to the more moderate methods of the Union francais pour le suffrage des femmes (UFSF). Hause and Kenney, *Women's Suffrage and Social Politics*, 172, 210.


Irvine, "Women's Right," 46-47.

"Suffrage Moves Forward in France," July 13, 1918, 3.


Ibid., 159.

Ibid., 160.


"Germany Outdistances the United States Senate," 6; "Miss Paul Speaks at National Headquarters," *The Suffragist*, November 16, 1918, 4.


"Women's Protest Against Disenfranchisement Broken Up by Federal Police," *The Suffragist*, August 17, 1918, 5

Mary Columbus Akers, Bertha Williams, Hazel Le Brun, Alice De Ment, Ruth Creighton, Theresa Rehak, Lottie Rohr, Louise Batman, "The Appeal of a Munition
Worker," Congressional Record, June 6, 1918. Reprinted in *The Suffragist*, June 8, 1918, 7.


238 "Women's Protest Against Disenfranchisement," 5.

239 "Picketing Thirty-four Wilful Senators," *The Suffragist*, October 26, 1918, 8.

240 Cooke and Woollacott, "Introduction," in *Gendering War Talk*, xii.


244 "We Turn to the President," *The Suffragist*, December 21, 1918, 4.


"President's Words Burned," 8.


"While Women Go to Jail," *The Suffragist*, January 18, 1919, 4.

Ibid.


"The Later Demonstrations," 5.


For reports on the NWP's experiences protesting the Senate, see "Preserving the Peace and Order of the Capitol," *The Suffragist*, October 19, 1918, 8; "Woman's Party Protests Against Wilful Senators," *The Suffragist*, October 19, 1918, 6-7; "Picketing on the Eve of Election," *The Suffragist*, November 9, 1918, 7; "Picketing Continued," *The Suffragist*, November 2, 1918, 8.


274 "Protected," 8.


AFTERWORD

By August 1920, Tennessee and North Carolina were the suffragists' last hopes for ratification—and a majority of North Carolina's representatives stood in opposition to the woman suffrage amendment. A Supreme Court decision allowed Tennessee's Democratic Governor, Albert H. Roberts, to call a special legislative session on August 9. Not long after, on the morning of August 18, after last-minute shifts in suffrage allegiances, legislators voted upon a motion to table the woman suffrage amendment, which resulted in a tie. Following a tie, members had to vote on the woman suffrage measure itself. All eyes turned to twenty-four year-old Representative Harry Burn. As a junior member of the House from an anti-suffrage district, many expected Burn to oppose the amendment. But a message from his suffrage-supporting mother that morning said: "Don't forget to be a good boy and help Mrs. [Carrie Chapman] Catt put 'Rat' in Ratification." Burn voted in the affirmative. Similarly, last-minute supporter, Representative Banks Turner cast his vote in support of the measure, ratifying the amendment, 49 to 47, and signaling the success of woman suffrage.

Upon Tennessee's ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, National Woman's Party Political Chairman, Abby Scott Baker, and Democratic presidential nominee, Governor James A. Cox, posed for a celebratory photograph. When a reporter asked Baker whom she credited for the suffrage success, Baker recognized the strength of key political endorsements. She said, "Individual men have helped splendidly and we thank them heartily." Baker's assertion of her political agency shone through, however, when she added: "But the American women can take to themselves the happy assurance that it was the women themselves who won their enfranchisement." Baker's statement
encapsulated the empowering thrust of the National Woman's Party's seven-year fight for woman suffrage: women constituted their citizenship identities and asserted their political agency through the process of mimicking the rituals of male, political power.

This project's focus on how the National Woman's Party's (NWP) rhetoric of political mimesis helped effect the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment offers multiple historical and theoretical implications. Historically, the impact of the NWP's mimetic adoption of political strategies is most visible when considering how the organization's militant campaign helped it secure a prominent place in national politics; how the NWP's rhetorical strategies linked woman suffrage to President Woodrow Wilson's international ideology; and how the NWP helped unite and divide women before and after ratification. The NWP's campaign also exhibits the theoretical contributions of political mimesis as it empowered the NWP and U.S. women to constitute their citizenship identities and assert political agency as they engaged in the rituals of politics. Consequently, the NWP's campaign contributed to the normalization of women's presence in political spaces and helped nationalize the suffrage movement. Political mimesis also provided an entrée into privileged political spaces and contributed to the re-envisioning of the gendered nation-state. Such mimetic rhetorics, thus, facilitated the performance of both traditional and militant acts of political protest—the latter of which engendered severe backlash. In the end, the rhetoric of political mimesis both enhanced and limited the political power and agency of NWP leaders and U.S. women in the nation-state.

THE NWP AND THE FINAL DAYS OF THE RATIFICATION CAMPAIGN

Most scholars agree that the combination of the NWP's militant campaign and the National American Woman Suffrage Association's (NAWSA) more moderate campaign
helped effect the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. This study, however, deepens our appreciation of the NWP's contribution to woman suffrage by demonstrating that the NWP's mimetic campaign earned the organization a prominent position in national politics and in the mediated spotlight. Moreover, this study shows that the NWP's militant targeting of President Wilson and other legislators to support woman suffrage helped to rhetorically bind Wilson's brand of democracy and woman suffrage together. Such unique rhetorical acts by the NWP complicate the assumption that social movements are typically driven by two "factions"—one militant and one moderate. Rather than simply working at odds with other suffrage organizations, the NWP worked to unite women along international, labor, and regional lines even as it divided women along race lines. Such unity and disunity shaped the ways in which women asserted their political agency after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.

"Suffrage Leaders"

The NWP's efforts to insert itself into national politics, normalize women's presence in politics, and promote a rhetorical exchange with key political leaders represented their key contributions during its state ratification campaign. After the Senate passed House Joint Resolution 1 on June 4, 1919, Alice Paul expressed certainty that the necessary thirty-six out of fifty states would ratify the measure. She said, "There is no doubt of immediate ratification. We enter upon this final stage of the campaign joyously, knowing that women will be enfranchised citizens of this great democracy within a year." On the other hand, the NWP leader knew all too well that suffrage success would not easily be won. Paul's strategy reflected the NWP's national focus: "Ratification work is not to take the form of numerous independent state campaigns, but of a great national
movement receiving support from every state, including those that have already ratified, and serving to intensify special work in those particular states that may present difficulties. In order to "intensify special work" in individual states while maintaining focus on national politics and generating national media attention, the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis performed both militant and traditional functions in its campaign for ratification.

Reflecting the NWP's militant demands for citizenship rights, the NWP challenged states to call special sessions for woman suffrage just as many did to enfranchise U.S. soldiers in 1916. Typical of the NWP's work to expose the hypocrisy of democratic efforts, The Suffragist said:

In 1916 when the men of the National Guard units were concentrated on the Mexican Border, and later when a draft and the volunteer service took men overseas to fight in France—even when only a small proportion of the male voting strength of the United States was as yet thus threatened and these men deprived for the time being of their right of franchise—did we hear any objections raised to the haste with which provisions were made for their participation in the elections "back home?"

Comparing U.S. women to the National Guard extended the NWP's mimetic adoption of the soldier identity; moreover, such constructions entrenched the link between war service and citizenship rights, established throughout the history of U.S. wars. In addition, the NWP pointed to the voting potential of U.S. women in the upcoming presidential and congressional elections by comparing U.S. women to the few soldiers unable to vote in the 1916 elections. Thus, just as the NWP did with its Silent Sentinels,
its statue protests, and its Watch Fires, the NWP tapped into the democratizing exigencies of wartime America during its final push for suffrage.

The NWP further adapted its repertoire of militant strategies by targeting political parties as the key change-agents in the final months of the ratification campaign. By July 1920, the NWP had—in Paul's words—conducted a "campaign of unparalleled intensity," helping to earn the ratification of thirty-five states. Although twenty-nine of the thirty-five states were Republican, the Republican Party had not effectively pressured Governors Percival Clement of Vermont and Marcus Holcomb of Connecticut to call special sessions. Such resistance prompted 200 NWP members to stage a silent protest at the Republican National Convention in Chicago reminiscent of the Sentinels' protests staged outside the White House throughout 1917. On the third day of the convention, prominent Republican women unfurled a banner over a balcony ledge, which asked, "Why does the Republican Party Block Suffrage? We do not want planks. We demand the 36th state." Just as the NWP had previously intruded into the halls of the U.S. Capitol and state capitol buildings, group members inserted themselves within the deliberative spaces of national politics to engage Republican Party leaders, assert their citizenship rights, and help generate national attention to the suffrage cause.

The NWP also exploited the political contours of the presidential campaigns. By 1920, targeting presidential nominees such as Governor Cox and Senator Warren G. Harding was nothing new, particularly in light of the NWP's 1916 anti-Wilson campaign. Although the NWP maintained working relationships with both Cox and Harding, the NWP sent a telegram to Winfield Jones, Chairman of the Harding-Coolidge campaign, attempting to play the candidates off of each other: "Democrats intend to put amendment
through and then claim credit for it with the women all over the United States and will attempt to put the Republicans in a bad light politically. We think it absolutely imperative that you vote for amendment and urge others to do so."\textsuperscript{10} Though the NWP needed the endorsements of both nominees, it demonstrated its political savvy as it exploited the Republicans' attempt to take back the presidency. In another use of the political situation, Paul positioned U.S. women as potential supporters of the presidential nominees. She said, "It is not too much to say that whether or not women vote next November rests with the Presidential nominees and their efforts for ratification."\textsuperscript{11} The NWP's many years of targeting President Wilson as the leader and speaker of his party prepared the organization to target Cox and Harding as leaders of their parties in 1920. Wilson's eventual response to the woman suffrage question also paved the way for future presidents to be targeted as agents of social and political change. Pursuing Cox and Harding of course reflected the NWP's earlier efforts to mimic the rise of the rhetorical presidency and cultivate the woman's pulpit.

The NWP's previous years of insistent demands on the president as well as its insinuation into the privileged spaces of national politics helped the NWP gain intimate access to the presidential nominees and thus, positioned the NWP as powerful political leaders in their own right. Most prominently, Abby Scott Baker, Political Chairman of the NWP, developed close relationships with Cox and Harding by maintaining a grueling travel schedule between Tennessee and Ohio, where both candidates' headquarters were located.\textsuperscript{12} On August 5, for example, Baker held a conference with Senator Harding before whisking off to a dinner with Governor Cox.\textsuperscript{13} Much like the NWP's sensational acts of citizenship, in which women canvassed the United States to agitate members of
Congress, Baker's tireless travels attracted priceless press attention and helped normalize women's presence in political spaces. A front-page article of the *Washington Post*, for instance, noted that Baker was "in constant touch with Gov. Cox on the Tennessee situation." The *New York Times* credited Baker with persuading Cox and Harding to send telegrams to resistant Tennessee legislators. Another *Post* article depicted Baker's last-ditch efforts as revolutionary heroism by reporting that Baker "made a sort of midnight ride of Paul Revere to Marion last night to make a last minute plea to Senator Harding." Baker's popular press coverage demonstrated the NWP's successful ingratiation into national politics; and compared to Wilson's severe resistance to the NWP, Cox's and Harding's willingness to engage Baker signaled a shift toward the acceptance of women in party politics and political spaces.

The NWP's development of close relationships with such high-profile politicians not only bolstered the NWP's prominence in the national political scene but such mimetic strategies enhanced its mobilization efforts in the last stage of the ratification campaign. Baker's close relationships with Cox and Harding, for example, can be attributed to the NWP's history of mimetically inserting itself into the spaces of national politics and engaging legislators on the question of woman suffrage. During the ratification campaign, the NWP did the same on the state level. NWP scholar, Christine A. Lunardini, notes that the NWP relied on its "excellent state organizations . . . Their lobbying techniques, honed to razor-sharpness on the national legislators, were now applied with equal vigor and results to the state legislators." Specifically, when the Tennessee legislature was called into special session, the NWP immediately set up six different headquarters in Nashville. From these locations, the NWP dispatched
members to visit almost every Tennessee legislator in their homes. Additionally, Paul called in political favors to pressure other politicians. For example, Edgar B. Stewart, a state Senator from West Virginia (the thirty-fourth state to ratify), arranged a meeting between Paul and Cox "through a close friend," Judge Ansbery. Demonstrating the effectiveness of these networks, Stewart then told Paul, "[Ansbery] told my friend in a telephone conversation had from my office, that he had taken up the matter two or three days before with Governor Cox and had his assurances that he would leave nothing undone to swing Tennessee into line for ratification . . . It would seem, therefore, that such pressure as can be had from that source will be made." Paul and Stewart, thus, were keenly aware that applying "such pressure" from a key "source" would help effect positive change for woman suffrage. Not unlike the NWP's militant demands on the president, congressmen, and political parties, this strategy also worked to pressure those with political power over the final ratification votes.

The NWP's use of such militant strategies helped positioned the organization as the leading force behind the ratification campaign. The New York Times reported exclusively on Paul's and Baker's campaign efforts when reporting on the "suffrage leaders" in Tennessee. As such, the NWP was often constructed as the change-agent for woman suffrage. One New York Times article, for instance, exclusively noted the NWP's efforts: "With just one week ahead of the Tennessee Legislature's convening in special session to act on the Federal suffrage amendment, the National Woman's Party is making a strong drive to capture the ten votes needed in the House and the six votes they are short in the Senate." In fact, the headline of the Times's front-page article announcing the official proclamation of the amendment's ratification reported: "Woman's
Party Jubilant." Once the amendment was officially codified, the NWP's forward-looking politics earned the organization continued press coverage as Paul and the NWP immediately coordinated with the attorneys general of each suffrage-supporting state to ensure that ratification was not overturned.

While the NAWSA and other suffrage-supporting organizations also earned national press coverage, the NWP swiftly secured a prominent position in national politics through its militant campaign for woman suffrage. Since its inception in 1913, the organization grew from three to 50,000 members and raised enough funds to spend $150,000 on the ratification campaign alone. While The Suffragist's circulation dwindled from 20,000 copies in 1917 to 2,800 copies in 1920, one quarter of these remaining subscribers were "news agents," thus demonstrating the NWP's focus on generating national-level attention. In light of its historical impact, the success of the NWP's campaign can be attributed, at least in part, to its rhetoric of political mimesis, which helped insert NWP members within the privileged spaces of politics, normalize women's presence in national politics, and keep the suffrage conversation going through national media attention.

World Democracy, the Rhetorical Presidency, and Woman Suffrage

The NWP's prominent role in the woman suffrage movement can also be attributed to its rhetorical campaign to link woman suffrage to President Wilson's international ideology. As the nation slowly shifted away from the democratic optimism of the Progressive Era into postwar discontent, the NWP's efforts to keep woman suffrage at the forefront of U.S. politics paid off as Wilson eventually came to actively support the amendment. Mimicking Wilson's rhetorical presidency by fashioning the woman's pulpit
helped incorporate woman suffrage into the nation's democratic program. The NWP's Silent Sentinels, statue protests, and Watch Fires proved so strong that even as Wilson's League of Nations failed, both presidential candidates, Cox and Harding, sought women voters as key supporters of their internationalist programs.

Despite the strength of Wilson's rhetorical leadership, his war rhetoric, and his internationalist ideology, when he returned from signing the Treaty of Versailles in Paris, he returned to a nation of growing discontent. Postwar inflation took hold and disempowered laborers went on strike. Additionally, the Red Scare prompted some vigilante groups to terrorize those thought to exhibit communist commitments while the Justice Department and the Attorney General detained and deported some 4,000 immigrants by 1920. Similarly, President Wilson exacerbated racial tensions by tacitly supporting Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson's segregationist policies. Moreover, following the St. Louis riots in 1917, Chicago witnessed two-weeks of racially-motivated riots leaving thirty-eight dead and others injured and homeless.30

Many Americans were simply dissatisfied with the Treaty of Versailles and accused "the Big Four" of attempting to solidify power among the United States, France, Italy, and England over enemy nations. Opponents thought that the League "promised merely more of the same old politics that had produced the war in the first place," thus fostering a revival of isolationism.31 The treaty was formally presented to the Senate on July 10, 1919, prompting long hearings and debates throughout the summer. Simultaneously, Wilson welcomed Republican senators and members of the Foreign Relations Committee to the White House, pushing the proposed League of Nations as a corrective to World War I and as a way to prevent future conflicts of such magnitude.
The majority of the Senate was prepared to ratify the treaty, but only with amendments to Article X, which would guarantee "the political independence and territorial integrity of member nations."\(^{32}\)

But by mid-August, Wilson recognized that his best chance of codifying the League would result from mobilizing the forces of public opinion. Thus, in early September, he embarked upon an intense train tour throughout the mid-western and western states. Wilson historian, Arthur S. Link, describes Wilson's efforts as "matchless oratory, and Westerners had never seen such an outpouring of approval for a public leader."\(^{33}\) This stunning enactment of the rhetorical presidency, however, took its toll on the president. Because of blinding headaches, Wilson had to cut the tour short, arriving back in Washington, D.C. on September 28 and suffering a stroke on October 2. The next month, the Senate voted against the treaty.\(^ {34}\)

Even with the left side of his brain paralyzed, Wilson regained strength by January 1920 and he continued to marshal support for his international policies. Wilson believed so strongly in the League that he schemed to force all opposing senators to run for re-election and if the majority of the senators won, Wilson vowed that he would resign as president. When Wilson's advisors diffused that plan, Wilson then aimed to secure the Democratic nomination for a third presidential term, hoping to resign once the treaty was ratified. When it was clear he would not be his party's nominee, he took his last stand with the Republican opposition, led by Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), and wrote a letter on March 8, 1920, pleading his case for the League. The letter failed and the treaty was again defeated on March 19, 1920. By the end of that summer, however, the Democratic ticket, comprised of Governor Cox and a young Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
vowed to carry out Wilson's plans for the League. The Democratic Party's vision of the nation and its international philosophies were soundly defeated. The nation voted largely Republican, electing Senator Harding as president—the candidate that supported a more "purified League." Wilson ended his presidency quietly and even won a Nobel Peace Prize in December 1920. Wilson's health never recovered fully and he subsequently died in February 1924.35

Amidst Wilson's political and physiological turmoil, the NWP's exploitation of his hypocritical stance on woman suffrage had taken hold and in part, motivated Wilson to pressure reluctant governors and legislators to support woman suffrage. For example, in August 1918, the New Republic reported that "English French, German, and Russian radicals" questioned if a "nation capable of such flagrant hypocrisy could not be equally capable of arming to safeguard the world for democracy and then using the resulting increase of power . . . for America über alles."36 The NWP's mimetic adoption of Wilson's war and peace rhetorics magnified the hypocritical proliferation of Wilson's democratic ideals, creating an exigency for Wilson to adopt woman suffrage as part of his internationalist peace program. Lunardini argues that, throughout his campaign for the League of Nations, Wilson needed to help pass woman suffrage "in order to maintain public trust in the integrity of the United States both home and abroad."37 In light of such exigencies, Wilson sent messages to the Kentucky, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Louisiana, Delaware, North Carolina, and Tennessee legislatures, urging them to call special sessions. He also sent telegrams to every southern governor.38

The rhetorics of democratic proliferation and woman suffrage were so inextricably fused that even after Wilson's League of Nations failed to pass muster with
the Senate, both Governor Cox and Senator Harding addressed newly-enfranchised U.S. women as key supporters of their international planks. Shortly after news of Tennessee's ratification reached Democratic headquarters, the Woman's Bureau of the Democratic National Committee wrote to Wilson: "The women of the Democratic Party are proud of their political relationship with you, and will go confidently forward into a campaign in which their ideals for world peace may at last find full expression." Similarly, Senator Key Pittman (D-NV) claimed, "An overwhelming majority of the women of this country are going to vote the Democratic ticket in the fall, because they want to see the League of Nations ratified and [see] this country join with the other nations to prevent a recurrence of war." The Republican Party made similar appeals to women. Mrs. Charles H. Sabin, wife of the Vice-Chairman of the Republican Ways and Means Committee in New York, called women voters to "band together in a mighty effort" and help the Republican Party bring "pre-war order out of post-war chaos."

The NWP's campaign for woman suffrage as part of America's democratic ethos demonstrated the NWP's mimetic fashioning of the woman's pulpit, which helped empower U.S. women as a force in the U.S. electorate. Link reminds us of Wilson's faith in the rhetorical presidency as he nearly died appealing to the U.S. public to help codify the League of Nations: "[Wilson] knew the massive power of public opinion in a democracy. He had seen it force a reluctant Senate to consent to tariff and banking reform years before. The people had never failed to respond in crises in the past." The NWP's work to elevate the "massive power" of U.S. women through the woman's pulpit helped women see themselves as empowered political agents, particularly as they participated in the NWP's suffrage parades, cheered on the NWP's cross-country envoys, voted in their
own states against Democratic candidates, or supported the NWP's multiple anti-Wilson demonstrations in Washington, D.C. As such, U.S. women were better able to envision themselves as participating members of the nation-state even before citizenship rights were conferred through the Nineteenth Amendment. Likewise, U.S. women were better able to be recognized as political agents once they were granted the right to vote.

Reflecting the legacy of such political and rhetorical power, Will Hays, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, said the following on the day of ratification: "With the constitutional right given to the millions of American women, we will liberate a body of public opinion upon the campaign and its issues which will prove itself one of our greatest national assets."43

Unity and Disunity among American Women

The impact of the NWP's campaign for woman suffrage can also be explored by looking at the ways in which it fostered unity along international, class, and regional lines, yet simultaneously reified the otherization of African American women. Moreover, the NWP's impact on solidifying a community of empowered American women voters is exposed by looking at the ways in which the NWP members asserted themselves in U.S. politics after 1920.

The NWP played a key role in establishing a growing community of politically-empowered women worldwide. The NWP itself was a mimetic formation of England's militant organization, and was then in turn mimicked by militant suffragists in other countries, such as France. In the decades following WWI, nation-building projects helped enfranchise women in many nations, such as those in Germany, Austria, Great Britain, and the United States. Ellen Carol DuBois argues, however, that the war actually delayed
woman suffrage in France, Italy, Denmark, and Iceland. She adds that neutral nations, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, enfranchised women for reasons unrelated to the war. Paul played an increasingly prominent role in the women's rights movements worldwide. Throughout the 1920s, for example, Paul worked with Japan's leading suffragist, Ichikawa Fusae, to help enfranchise women in Japan. Paul has also been noted for inspiring suffrage movements in China and the Philippines. Also, in 1938, Paul founded the World Woman's Party (WWP), which focused on equal rights for women around the globe.

The NWP's participation in the international women's rights movement was also a reflection of the group's alliance with the labor movement. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, national suffrage movements were more successful in South American, Middle Eastern, and Asian nations; a trend that has been attributed to the simultaneous working-class movements in these countries. The NWP helped solidify the alliance between the international women's rights and labor movements by building upon the emerging worldwide militant socialist movement and uniting working-class and upper-class white women. Specifically, the NWP's close relationship with Harriot Stanton Blatch helped its 1913 national parade represent socialist women, working-class women, and women from multiple nations. The NWP maintained these associations throughout its campaign for woman suffrage. In the July 1920 issue of The Suffragist, for example, the NWP reported on the "First International Congress of Working Women" and "Women in Industry" worldwide. After the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, most women who remained in politics fought for the rights of working-class women and children, reinforcing the link between the woman suffrage and labor movements.
In addition to helping unite white working-class women nationally and internationally, the NWP's campaign for woman suffrage helped unite women across regions of the United States. Most remarkably, many southern women became ardent suffrage supporters, despite explicit racist fears of empowering African Americans' voting rights. *The Suffragist* reported that in the final stages of the suffrage campaign, southern women underwent an "overnight transformation," as evidenced by the public support of southern newspapers in Kentucky, Florida, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia.\(^{50}\) Marjorie Spruill Wheeler, however, notes that southern suffragists "shared many of the ideas of Southerners of their race and class . . . Even the most progressive believed that white political supremacy was necessary, at least until African-Americans 'advanced' and were more 'qualified' for the vote."\(^{51}\) In light of the NWP's history of expedient racism, its coalition with white, southern women was viewed by its members as a welcome boost in the ratification campaign.

The NWP, thus, continued to embrace a racist position toward African American women's rights. In fact, as the Nineteenth Amendment neared ratification, the NWP became more poignantly focused on enhancing white women's rights. In 1919, Paul told the *New York World*: "Negro men cannot vote in South Carolina and therefore negro women could not if women were to vote in the nation. We are organizing white women in the South." Paul added defensively, that the NWP had "heard of no activity or anxiety among the negresses."\(^{52}\) In response, African American women allied with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and passed a resolution against Paul's statement in the NAACP's *Branch Bulletin*. Paul's responded that she felt "a sincere regret" for being criticized by "the negro, whose enfranchisement women
helped to win."53 Walter White of the NAACP then met with Paul and reported back to Mary Church Terrell: "Just as you say . . . all of them are mortally afraid of the South and if they could get the Suffrage Amendment through without enfranchising colored women, they would do it in a moment."54

The NWP's expedient racism was shared by the NAWSA. In 1919, Senator Andrieus Aristieus Jones (D-NM) proposed a states' rights amendment to the suffrage resolution; consequently, African American women felt it would be used to exclude them from national suffrage rights. Though the amendment did not pass, some women of the Northeastern Federation of Women's Clubs (NFWC) of the National Association of Colored Women applied for cooperative membership in the NAWSA to force the organization to take a stand on African American women's voting rights. Carrie Chapman Catt implored Ida Husted Harper to discourage the NFWC's president, Elizabeth C. Carter, as well as Terrell from implementing this plan. In response to the NAWSA's similarly expedient arguments, Paula Giddings argues: "White women simply were willing to let Black women go down the proverbial drain to get the vote for themselves."55

Expedient racism in the suffrage movement proved to be costly for the NWP. During the final days of ratification in Tennessee, Paul appealed to the NAACP for help. NAACP president, Mary White Ovington wrote Paul that white women have "ruined any chance for their receiving support from the colored people in the suffrage fight. I know it has been the determined policy of the suffragists to ignore the colored question in the South."56 Even at the NWP's February 1921 meeting to launch a campaign for women's equality, Paul refused to place African American women's rights on the agenda. After
leaders of the NAACP and the NACW protested, Paul allowed their resolution to be heard, although it was ultimately voted down. Addie Hunton of the NAACP, however, celebrated their efforts to "get the resolution on the floor" and to send "a large deputation of colored women [to] prove that they were alert to the situation," which exhibits the enhanced political agency of African American women during this period as well.57

The NWP's racist attitude toward African American women was first exposed in its 1913 national suffrage parade, when it harnessed the support of southern white suffragists and relegated a contingent of women from Howard University to the back of the parade. Such racism also pervaded the Senate's debate over the amendment in June 1919. For example, Senator Byron Patton Harrison (D-MS) made a motion to restrict the vote to white women. Senators Ellison Smith (D-SC) and James A. Reed (D-MO) also made explicitly racist arguments; Reed conceded that he only endorsed the measure to maintain the Democratic Party's power.58 Nonetheless, African American women continued to assert their political agency, particularly within the rise of the Harlem Renaissance in the 1920s. Nikki Brown and Giddings maintain that during this decade, African American women increasingly participated in national party politics and helped promote interracial cooperation, even in the South.59

Despite the NWP's efforts to forge unity among international, working-class, and southern women, many white women actually resisted asserting their right to vote throughout the 1920s. Consequently, women were typically relegated to minority roles in party politics. Suffrage scholars explain, however, that prior to enfranchisement, women held diverse political views, but united temporarily to pursue the Nineteenth Amendment.
Once women were enfranchised, women more freely pursued their own political interests and actually increased their volunteer activities.\footnote{60}

To an extent, the NWP helped women explore their political and social independence after 1920. In fact, before the 1920 elections, NWP adviser, Dudley Field Malone, presciently told the \textit{New York Times}, "the militant spirit of the women alone has won the victory and this same spirit will prevent them from being herded into any party."\footnote{61} As Paula Baker argues, the 1920s "represented the endpoint of nineteenth-century womanhood," and thus, women "rejected domesticity as an ideal."\footnote{62} Asserting such political independence, the NWP held a small conference to discuss the future of the organization immediately following ratification.\footnote{63} While many NWP members retired and many others declared their utter exhaustion, the NWP's rank-and-file leaders entertained the idea of becoming a third political party. Instead, they elected to pursue a program of women's constitutional equality. The NWP first proposed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in 1923, hoping to amend the Constitution to ensure women's full legal equality beyond the right to vote.

The NWP's ERA campaign similarly worked to divide and unite the women's rights community. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, for example, the ERA faced colossal opposition from the well-established women's labor movement, which argued that the ERA would nullify state-level protections for working-class women. However, upon the emergence of the women's rights movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the ERA came to symbolize women's social, political, and economic equality. By the time the ERA passed through both houses of Congress in 1972, the amendment was supported by organizations representing women across race and class lines. Nonetheless, the ERA
expired in 1982 without the required thirty-six states' ratification. In the case of NWP's woman suffrage campaign, however, the NWP helped solidify national and international alliances between white working-class and upper-class women; in the process of building such alliances, however, it publicly and privately excluded African American women from its vision of women's equality—a pattern that likewise re-emerged in subsequent campaigns for equality as well. Thus, just as the NWP mimicked the political activities of the British suffragists in 1913, the aftermath of such mimetic activities continued to circulate well beyond the commencement of the woman suffrage debate.

POLITICAL MIMESIS

In addition to considering the strength of the NWP's campaign within its historical context, this study invites a look at how political mimesis helps effect social and political change as strategies of militancy and tradition. More specifically, this study points to how the rhetoric of political mimesis empowered the NWP and U.S. women to constitute citizenship identities and expand their roles in the nation-state as it simultaneously limited the potential of women's political equality.

*Political Mimesis, Enacting Citizenship Rights, and Nationalizing the Suffrage Movement*

Through its rhetoric of political mimesis, the NWP helped U.S. women enact full citizenship rights as they asserted their political agency and envisioned themselves as participating members in the nation-state. By mimicking the more traditional and mundane rituals of politics—marching in national parades, petitioning Congress, lobbying legislators, holding conventions, engaging in campaign politics, meeting with political leaders, fashioning a political party, and appealing to the U.S. public—NWP members transformed themselves into political change-agents with an authority that
sought to rival that of the nation's top political leaders. In so doing, the NWP helped legitimate women's presence in the political sphere. Significantly, politicians validated the NWP's mimetic efforts to normalize women's political agency—not simply by supporting woman suffrage, but by adopting the NWP's rhetorical strategies that linked woman suffrage and U.S. democracy. Such political legitimacy demonstrated that the NWP helped U.S. women see themselves as political change-agents, which represented a key constitutive process that enhanced the ability of others to see them full-fledged members of the nation-state.

Thus, the process of mimicking the rhetorical strategies of party politics and political activism was just as important as the NWP's end goal of enfranchising U.S. white women. Throughout its seven-year militant campaign, the NWP constituted its members' identities as fully-capable members of the U.S. citizenry. In fact, on the day of the Nineteenth Amendment's ratification, NWP secretary, Emma Wold wrote: "We hope that the Woman's Party will continue as an agency for removing discriminations that still exist against women—a group of the sort of awakened women that our social structure so sorely needs." Such constitutive efforts are also visible in the 1920 elections during which time six NWP members sought seats in the U.S. Congress. Thus, white women had to be envisioned as political leaders with full agency and as fully contributing citizens before they could be granted the same civic rights as the male citizenry.

This mimetic process of social and political change begs the questions of agent and agency, particularly since the NWP's militant campaign targeted President Wilson and members of Congress in a dialectical exchange over woman suffrage. Most certainly, these men functioned as gate-keepers of the institutional legitimacy sought by the NWP.
But it was the women themselves who initiated the necessary rhetorical dialogue toward acquiring fully-enfranchised citizenship rights. NWP members did not wait on the due process of political change to take effect; rather, they mimicked the rituals of politics as though they already possessed fully-enfranchised citizenship rights. They entered the restricted spaces of political activity and consulted the U.S. citizenry as if they held the same presidential and congressional authority as their political rivals. Without such a strong sense of empowerment, NWP members would not have enacted their citizenship rights and would not have inspired those with political power to recognize and legitimize women's political rights.

The NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis also helped nationalize the suffrage movement and force a national debate on woman suffrage. By mimicking rituals of national politics, the NWP worked to elevate suffrage as a nationwide issue and compelled national political leaders to respond to their grievances, which sustained discussion of the issue even during the contestations of war. More specifically, the NWP's forced a nationwide debate on woman suffrage by sending mass delegations of women and its cross-country envoys to meet with U.S. and state congressmen, by dispatching its Silent Sentinels to the White House gates, and by inspiring women in other nations to protest President Wilson. The more the NWP engaged political leaders on the issue of woman suffrage, the more political legitimacy members earned as participatory citizens in the nation-state. Through political mimesis, thus, these militant women refused to be ignored and persisted in keeping the issue of suffrage among the nation's most pressing public issues.
Similarly, the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis helped the NWP earn national press attention, which represented another key component in nationalizing the suffrage debate. Adopting the ethos of the nation's political leaders often violated the gendered boundaries of citizenship and thus, worked to sensationalize the woman suffrage movement and earn front-page headlines. Additionally, enacting citizenship rights in national spaces, such as the streets of Washington, D.C., the Capitol Building, and in front of the White House, attracted attention from national media outlets. Thus, the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis held a national audience, which consequently helped shape woman suffrage as a national issue. In so doing, the NWP elevated questions of citizenship rights beyond state-level politics, countering the states' rights backlash of the Fifteenth Amendment. By helping to turn suffrage into a political issue with national consequences, the NWP helped force Congress and the president to take a stand on woman suffrage and to debate the issue in the formal deliberative spaces of the nation-state.

**Political Mimesis, Militancy, and Re-Gendering the Nation-State**

In light of the masculine construction of the U.S. nation-state and of U.S. citizenship, the NWP's mimetic assumption of citizenship rights helped re-envision the gendered imagination of the nation-state and allowed women to participate more fully in national politics from that point forward. The NWP's enactment of women's citizenship rights and the ultimate passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, thus, helped erode the construction of the ideal U.S. citizen as male and helped disrupt the masculine vision of the nation. The flux in wartime gender roles further allowed U.S. women and the NWP to participate in and contribute to the nation in ways traditionally reserved for men. This
participation not only allowed women to demand citizenship rights based on an expanded notion of wartime service, but it also offered the NWP the rhetorical resources to demand the right to vote as part of the nation's and President Wilson's internationalization of democracy. This rhetorical strategy took hold as Wilson and other prominent politicians rehearsed the same argument as they campaigned for the League of Nations. Reflecting women's expanded roles in political and public matters, Governor Cox said: "[Women] helped win the war, and they are entitled to a voice in the readjustment now at hand . . . their unquestioned progressive spirit will be helpful in problems that require public judgment."67

In addition to rhetorically assimilating women into the national imaginary in more empowered ways, the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis helped enhance women's roles in the nation-state as they situated themselves in the political spaces of masculine power. By parading down the streets of Washington, D.C. and cities all over America, sending delegations of women to state capitols, silently protesting in front of the White House, and burning speeches in Lafayette Square, NWP members helped normalize women in the national/political sphere and helped break down the assumption that public women were immoral. Moreover, asserting themselves in these public spaces allowed them to target the U.S. public as political officials while debating woman suffrage with state leaders, U.S. congressional leaders, and the president. As the NWP's campaign progressed and woman suffrage gained more and more public support, the NWP's assumption of political power within these spaces grew more politically-legitimate. Reflecting the ways in which political mimesis helped the NWP normalize women's presence in the spaces of national politics, the New York Times once reported: "Mrs.
Abby Scott Baker, Political Chairman of the National Woman's Party, will remain in Ohio working with the national leaders."

Intruding upon political spaces reflects the ways in which political mimesis facilitated the dialectical process of social change. Mimicking political rituals reified the more traditional means of effecting change, such as campaigning, lobbying, petitioning, debating, and protesting. These practices helped buffer the NWP from critique as its members played by the accepted rules of political engagement. At the same time, however, such actions declared the NWP's militancy, which attracted increase scorn and consternation as they carried on as political leaders. The NWP's assertion of political authority in spaces where they debated elected officials represented a militant act given women's historical exclusion from the public sphere and the restrictions against women's public speech. Thus, these women asserted their political agency and reconstituted their identities as fully-enfranchised members of the nation, which in turn, helped re-envision the gendered nation in ways that exhibited a more inclusive citizenry. Ultimately, political mimesis enhanced the NWP's authority as national political leaders through traditional and militant means.

Asserting citizenship rights in political spaces through mimesis, however, engendered severe backlash, which suggested just how militant such acts were often perceived and just how entrenched such masculine authority had become. Certainly, as its campaign evolved, the NWP increased in militancy, particularly with the more threatening acts of burning Wilson's speeches and his image in effigy. Even during their state ratification campaign, the NWP admitted they pressured legislators "by putting fear into the hearts of old party leaders." The militancy of such political mimesis was most
evident by the acts of social control that such intrusions precipitated, including the forcible removal from public spaces, force feedings, beatings, and restrictions from international travel. Thus, the nation-state responded to such mimicking of political rituals with force and violence as a means to control these women's voices, their bodies, and their actions, and ultimately to restrict women's citizenship rights.

The NWP's militancy becomes most vivid in comparison to the protest strategies of the NAWSA members. Much like the NWP, the NAWSA appealed to Wilson's international ideology. Helen Hamilton Gardener of the NAWSA wrote to Wilson: "It is unthinkable that the United States Senate can now vote to range itself on the side of Germany and Hungary, who, alone of all the warring countries, have denied to women the ballot since this [war] began." Gardener continued to advise Wilson to "appeal to the Senate . . . and handle [suffrage] as a vital war measure." Much like the NWP, Gardener and the NAWSA appealed to Wilson's refashioned role as the leader of world democracy, particularly as she flattered Wilson, "to whom," she said, "the world is looking for leadership in a matter of self-determination of the nations." Accentuating the different strategies between the NAWSA and the NWP, the NAWSA made such arguments in personal appeals to Wilson—not through protests that intruded upon reserved political spaces or deliberately exposed his hypocritical promotion of democracy. Moreover, Gardener deferred to Wilson's authority as she said: "I have always believed that it was only a question of the right time to do it when you would make the country understand clearly that a fight for democracy did not, and could not, exclude women." Militants, however, refused to wait on "the right time" for woman suffrage to come around; through their mimetic assertion of citizenship rights in the political sphere, the NWP worked to
both expand women's roles in the nation-state and consequently made itself the target of social control, which attracted significant news media attention to the violation of these women's civil rights and the salient issue of woman suffrage.

Efforts to physically and symbolically control the NWP's transgression into the political sphere can also be explained as an inherent reaction to their mimetic appropriation of power. Matthew Potolsky argues that "mimetic desire invites rivalry, and rivalry leads to conflict and strife." Moreover, Rene Girard argues that "when two or more partners try to prevent one another from appropriating the object they all desire," violence typically ensues. Potolsky also explains that such acts of social control produced by governments and other institutions help relieve "the community of the angst produced by mimetic rivalries." In the gendered context of Wilson's rhetorical presidency and WWI, the nation was certainly uneasy with the NWP's assertion of citizenship rights, particularly in such politicized spaces. Forcibly removing these women from such spaces offered the masculinized national (and international) community relief from such public wranglings of power.

Although the NWP mimetic assertion of political power generated such backlash, NWP's rhetorical agency as political leaders in their own right helped redefine the spaces of national politics, generate national media attention to woman suffrage, force leaders to debate the issue, and earn them the right to vote. Unlike other suffrage organizations, the NWP engaged the president and other politicians as empowered political leaders through the mimetic adoption of political authority and the intrusion into the spaces of politics. In so doing, NWP members helped re-envision the political roles that women would serve in the nation-state and legitimized woman suffrage and political leadership.
The Limitations of Political Mimesis

Despite its empowering potential, political mimesis can also work to limit the egalitarian promise of political and social change. First, the NWP's assumption of equal political power with President Wilson and members of Congress did not mean they were equals—even though the NWP ultimately helped facilitate the achievement of women's equal voting rights. In a study on "egalitarian mimesis," where homosexual men earned equal political rights with heterosexual men in France, Marie-Jo Bonnet argues that mimesis actually prevented "any debate on equality between the sexes." She admits that by performing the rituals of heterosexual men, homosexual men earned some degree of "equal" rights, but she contends that it pre-empted the necessary dialogue regarding the basis of their perceived inequality. As Bonnet says, such "institutional logic" "implies a recognition of the other as Other, and not merely as an equal."76 Similarly, while the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis helped force the U.S. government to recognize women's equal voting rights, it did not engender substantive discussion regarding women's social inequality and further magnified their potential contributions to the nation-state as gendered citizens, not as citizens proper.

The NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis also worked to liken the mostly-white NWP constituency to white males of political privilege, thus excluding African American and non-Anglo-Saxon women from its vision of political equality. Moreover, because the NWP's campaign successfully helped enfranchise U.S. white women, the NWP contributed to the notion that white women were the ideal woman-citizens. Thus, just as mimetic strategies can liberate, they can simultaneously serve a discriminatory function by reifying the oppressive ideologies of the nation-state, drawing attention away from the
ongoing feminist project of liberating all women from patriarchy. For some, mimesis as a social and political strategy of acquiring equal rights has been criticized as "a strategy of avoidance" that can result in greater resistance and backlash; it both fails to address the roots of inequality and it continues to oppress and exclude certain groups from participating in its liberatory potential. To a large extent, the NWP's rhetoric of political mimesis encouraged members to overstate the NWP's contributions to equal citizenship rights. As early as 1915, Annie G. Porritt declared: "It is one of the most obvious aspects of the suffrage movement, that it has broken down class and race distinctions and has brought women together in a manner that was unprecedented in human history." As the NWP's history of expedient racism demonstrated, however, political mimesis actually encouraged identification with those of racial privilege—mirroring the racism and nativism that still gripped the nation in the first decades of the new century.

In all, the NWP's brief but intense militant campaign for woman suffrage offers a study in the ways in which a disempowered group asserted its citizenship rights through a rhetoric of political mimesis. While the NWP's campaign was crucial toward securing the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, it also provided the means through which U.S. women could empower themselves as political change-agents, earn political legitimacy, and re-envision white women's roles the nation-state. The NWP's campaign also offers political mimesis as a vocabulary for understanding how a disempowered group can rhetorically insinuate itself into the privileged rhetorics and spaces of political power to constitute citizenship identities and enhance citizenship rights. Consider the following letter to Alice Paul from Mrs. C. L. Roberts, a Texas woman, written two days after U.S. women were enfranchised:
I can smile, and smile now, when some "moss-back" of a man attempts to point out to me why women should not vote. [I] have just been asked by one, "what would a woman congress do, should they become 'pregnant' about the time of some important issue." It was too disgusting to answer, and I was glad I could smile in the knowledge that we can vote – and are no longer under hateful domineering males such as he.79
End Notes: Afterword

1 By August 1920, the non-ratifying states were those led by governors who refused to call special sessions (e.g., Vermont and Connecticut), those that defeated the measure, or those whose constitutions specified that state assemblies could not vote on a constitutional amendment unless state legislators had been elected after the amendment was submitted for ratification. On June 1, 1920, the United States Supreme Court overruled an Ohio Supreme Court ruling that validated referenda on constitutional amendments. This ruling abrogated a clause in the Tennessee state constitution that prohibited its legislature from voting on a constitutional amendment submitted before the election of its legislators. For a summary of the ratification process, see Eleanor Flexner and Ellen Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States (Cambridge, M.A.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), 308-17. On the suffragists' and anti-suffragists' campaigns in Tennessee, see Anastasia Sims, "Armageddon in Tennessee: The Final Battle over the Nineteenth Amendment," in One Woman, One Vote: Rediscovering the Woman Suffrage Movement (Troutdale, O.R.: New Sage Press, 1995), 333-52.


4 See, for example, Flexner and Fitzpatrick, Century of Struggle, 276; Linda J. Lumsden, Rampant Women: Suffragists and the Right of Assembly (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1997), 139.


Miss Frega to Winfield Jones, August 3, 1920, National Woman's Party Papers, hereafter NWPP, University of Maryland, College Park, reel 4.


"National Woman's Party Is Active in Tennessee."


18 Lunardini, From Equal Suffrage, 148.

19 "Tennessee Session to Begin Tomorrow," 3.

20 NWP headquarters secretary to Miss Marion McG. Noyes, August 7, 1920, NWPP, reel 4.

21 Edgar B. Stewart to Alice Paul, July 16, 1920, NWPP, reel 4.

22 "Tennessee Delays Vote on Suffrage," 1, 3.

23 For instance, when Hal H. Clements, Chairman of the Republican Committee of Tennessee, advised all Tennessee Republicans to support suffrage, the New York Times exclusively credited the NWP and quoted The Suffragist. "Urges Republicans to Ratify Suffrage," 3.


25 "Colby to Proclaim Suffrage Promptly." For other headlines featuring the NWP, see "Colby Proclaims Woman Suffrage," New York Times, August 27, 1920, 1, 3.
The article later noted that Carrie Chapman Catt was similarly disappointed; "Laud Women Voters," *Washington Post*, August 27, 1920, 1.


33 Ibid., 165.
34 Ibid., 166-68.


36 *New Republic*, 16, August 10, 1918, 33-35.


Addie Hunton to Maggie Walker, February 23, 1921 (NAACP files, Suffrage, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.); For more on African American women after the vote was secured, see Giddings, *When and Where*, 164-170.


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"Threaten Delay." Emphasis added.
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"From Helen Hamilton Gardener," June 17, 1918.


Potolsky, *Mimesis*, 149.


Mrs. C. L. Roberts to Alice Paul, August 20, 1920, NWPP, reel 4. Emphasis original.
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---. Harriot Stanton Blatch to Alice Paul, 24 December 1914. NWPP, reel 1.

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