Title of dissertation: THE BROWNING OF THE ALL BLACKS: PACIFIC PEOPLES, RUGBY, AND THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN NEW ZEALAND

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In this dissertation I examine how the complex, and often contradictory, discourses of being a ‘Pacific person’ are played out in, and through, New Zealand rugby. In particular, I interrogate how these discourses—manifest in various forms of public expression—structure, regulate, and, potentially, challenge traditional notions of nationality. In the opening chapters I first explore how liberal values and the goals of inclusion and pluralism have been an important part of defining New Zealand identity. In this regard Pacific peoples are playing an ever-more important role. I suggest, however, that an emergent ‘Pacific multiculturalism’ actually reinforces white cultural power. It also masks the way national belonging has been racialized in New Zealand, and the role rugby has, and continues to, play in inscribing the Otherness of Pacific peoples. What I suggest is needed is alternative or resistant models of ‘culture.’ In the concluding chapters I turn to the notion of diaspora as one potential alternative. Rearticulating the insightful ideas of Paul Gilroy in my penultimate chapter, I argue that diaspora can be productively adapted as a model to comprehend the lives, travels, migrations, and significances of Pacific athletes. I suggest they provide important diasporic resources for rearticulating modes of belonging that exceed national boundaries. Methodologically, this project is a discursive analysis of the public discourses of Pacificness circulating in a diverse range of documentary, literary, and media sources. I suggest that this critical analysis of the performance, practice, and institutions of Pacific/New Zealand rugby provides a unique context within which to examine the ensemble of discourses and forces by which identity is understood and produced, and through which the Pacific subject in constituted. My hope is that, in accord with Gilroy (1993), this analysis both identifies and actively produces alternatives to divisive discourses of national and ethnic absolutism. That is, my goal is to produce a text
which not only critiques, but offers strategies of resistance to, the practices, structures, and ideologies of exclusion.
THE BROWNING OF THE ALL BLACKS: PACIFIC PEOPLES, RUGBY, AND THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN NEW ZEALAND

by

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2008

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DEDICATION

To Dave and Josh. Best friends on the journey.
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At around 2pm on the afternoon of May 29, 2007 a contractor employed on behalf of Mercury Energy arrived at the Mangere Bridge home of Lopaavea and Folole Muliaga. The Muliagas had fallen behind on bill payments, and the contractor’s task that day was to cut off their power. It was only one of a number of disconnections he had carried out that day. Folole, an early childhood teacher, answered the door. What happened next is the subject of debate, but it is known that, after some discussion, the contractor was allowed to enter. He walked through the front door toward the back of the house, out through a rear door, stopping at the power meter attached to an exterior wall. Power to the Muliaga’s house was cut. Within hours Folole Muliaga was dead.

What caused Folole’s death is uncertain. What we do know is that she had been off work since February, and that she had been sent home from nearby Middlemore Hospital only a few weeks earlier. She had been admitted with a cardio-respiratory complaint and was discharged with a mains-powered breathing support device. When the power was cut the device was disabled. According to her eldest son, Iatitaia, 20, within minutes, Folole became faint, complaining also of difficulty breathing and being unable to see. She collapsed.
‘Yeti’, unable to call emergency services because the Muliaga’s phone had also been disconnected, ran crying down the drive to the house of a neighbour. The 72-year-old widow on whom he called, placed the call. After taking instructions from the dispatcher, she went next door to the Muliaga’s and began giving Folole CPR, something she had never done before and which she had only ever seen “done on TV.” She continued her efforts until ambulance officers arrived shortly thereafter. Folole, however, was unable to be revived.

It is not clear as to whether Folole’s breathing machine was keeping her alive. Nor is it clear whether the contractor was informed that the machine required electricity to run. Deference to authority, something entrenched in Samoan society, was cited as a possible reason for Yeti not making stronger objections when the contractor came calling, and for not acting when his mother started to become faint. His mother, he told the press, had asked that he not call an ambulance. “That is a typical Samoan thing,” claimed a family spokesman, “They don’t like their kids to be worried.” There have been subsequent claims that it may not have mattered anyway, that Folole was “already gravely ill” even before her power was cut, that she was “not expected to live much longer” (Fisher, 2007). Other reports stated that Folole had stopped taking life-saving prescription, opting instead for ‘traditional’ healing methods. Blame, it seemed, could not be easily pinned down.
Fault, though, was something New Zealanders seemed eager to find. The media, in turn, was only too happy to oblige. They proposed any number of hypotheses, versions of events differing from one day to the next. By and large, coverage was sympathetic, painting Folole as the human face of ruthless economic ‘reforms.’ The gist was, according to a *New Zealand Herald* editorial, “a company charged with providing an essential service acts according to its commercial remit even when it means someone dies” (*Editorial: Muliaga death*, 2007). That the Prime Minister herself lead calls for tougher regulation of electricity retailers only strengthened this line of reasoning. Those closer to the ‘right’ conversely implied the tragedy was the family’s own fault, dismissing charges from the ‘left’ as an “obscene, liberal gangbang” (Laws, 2007, p. A10). Michael Laws, a former Member of Parliament, rebuffed suggestions that Folole’s death was “an indication of the heartless soul that beats within SOEs.” “That’s the insidious racism of white liberals,” he wrote. “They excuse all manner of actions or inactions because of the ethnicity of the culprit or victim. They claim that ‘cultural differences’ can impede commonsense” (Laws, 2007, p. A10).

No matter what side of the political spectrum though, nor whom they saw as responsible, Folole Muliaga’s death was deeply embarrassing for most New Zealanders. It revealed the poverty that generally goes under the radar of most
Kiwis, and “the heartless image of New Zealand that sped around the world” (O’Sullivan, 2007) made many uncomfortable. “That’s not how we like to think of ourselves here in New Zealand,” wrote Tapu Misa. “We take care of our own. We like to think we care. The idea that a sick woman died because her family couldn’t afford to pay an overdue power bill is unthinkable. It challenges our view of who and what we are, and disturbs our comfortable existences” (Misa, 2007). In New Zealand social welfare and ‘caring’ have been part of the national mythology (McClure, 1998). Welfare state economics may be a thing of the past, but, more so than in many other developed countries, New Zealand still holds an image of itself “as a caring community, the government as benevolent, and the state as a collective responsible for its members from cradle to grave” (Seuffert, 2006, p. 77). Folole’s death betrayed that image.

It made us question too the state of race relations. This was not supposed to happen in a country that is “long touted as having the best race relations in the world” (True, 1996, p. 120). Yet Folole was a consequence that made us confront the cause. Since the mid-1980s New Zealand has experienced the fastest growth in inequality in the OECD, and, according to recent statistics, the earnings of Pacific people, like Folole, remain lower than those of the rest of the population, even allowing for differences in employment, education and age. Pacific people are also more likely to be unemployed, they are under-represented in skilled
occupations, and their lower incomes force them into what the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs politely calls “poor housing outcomes.” The flow-on impacts, in turn, are considerable. Educational results for Pacific peoples remain poor compared with the rest of the population and they are over-represented in the negative statistics for health. Folole’s breathing difficulties were believed to have been related to her obesity, another health problem, along with diabetes, commonly associated with Pacific peoples. The statistics make grim reading, but can be generally avoided, left to the policy wonks and government agencies. Folole’s death, however, put an all too human face to the numbers.

If the ‘enterprise society’ (Kelsey, 1997) wasn’t working for some, and when this ‘some’ are overwhelming ‘brown’, how then to assuage the guilt, the burden of being Pakeha? In the case of Folole Muliaga the response was to reassure the public that the system was working, that this was a sad, but exceptional, case. This was made easier when Social Development Minister David Benson-Pope revealed that, in regard to welfare assistance, the Muliaga’s were receiving “their full and correct entitlement.” If the Muliaga family was struggling to pay their power bill then it wasn’t ‘our’ fault. As one Dominion Post reader put it, “though it would reduce the family’s feeling of guilt to blame someone else, the ultimate responsibility for Mrs Muliaga’s death must lie with them.” “Tragic as it is,” wrote another, “the fact remains— the power bill hadn’t
been paid. The consequences should come as no surprise. It’s basic.” In this way, turning the blame inward, on an individual, on a family, became a way of testifying to the fact that basic equality was preserved. By invoking the liberal-egalitarian principles at the core of the New Zealand imaginary (Consedine, 1989), the speaker appears rational, inequality can be legitimized (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). New Zealanders could continue to pretend that they live in a nation that is cosmopolitan, multicultural, and raceless.

This is not to say that ‘race’ could be avoided entirely. Indeed, accusations of ‘racism’ flew from both sides of the political divide. To hang the tragedy on ‘cultural insensitivity’ was to be pandering to the “covert racism” of “PC liberals.” Conversely, blaming the Muliaga’s was the “ugly” work of “new-right fanatics,” entirely expected from “remorseless capitalists” or those or who frequent “Talkbackland’s intellectual wastedumps.” The right-wing version suggested Folole had died not because the welfare system had let her down, but because these ‘Samoan immigrants’ had been incapable of looking after themselves. We could condemn a ‘culture,’ point the finger at these ‘Pacific peoples’ for letting themselves become the burden of their ‘cultural’ demands. The Muliagas chose to continue paying a tithe to their church instead of their power company; the Samoan Assembly of God Church had failed to return the favour; ‘Samoan pride’ had stopped the family from asking for help; Folole had
wrongly chosen to put her trust in traditional ‘Samoan healing.’ In sum, it was Folole and her family who put ‘tradition’, its laws and its rituals, over and above their welfare. Being ‘Samoan’ was at fault. The liberal version on the other hand shunned reference to intra-community problems. Instead, it stressed how Samoans should be allowed their claims to difference in a multicultural society (Modood, 2007). It declared the police investigation as lacking in “cultural awareness” and condemned “the racist, blame-the-victim views that seem to have gained such a foothold in our communities.” The ‘system’ was flawed, and what was required was ‘ethnic targeting’ of services and resources, all while preserving the right of ‘Samoans’ to ‘their’ ‘culture.’

In this way, Folole’s actualized ‘Samoan-ness’ was as useful to right-wing as to liberal, left-wing agendas. Despite the ideological contestation, both played on a dominant discourse that endorsed the equation between communities and their reified ‘culture’, and between that culture and a ‘social problem’ (Baumann, 1996, p. 24). Race, in effect, was twisted. In the “post-white” (Hill, 2004, p. 11) moment, the language of race was substituted instead with the “euphemism of culture” (Smith, 1992, p. 137). Both the New Right and the anti-racists converged on a “belief in the absolute nature of ethnic categories” (Gilroy, 1992, p. 50), envisioning “cultures supposedly sealed from one another forever by ethnic lines” (Gilroy, 1987, p. 55). Whether left or right, ethnic criteria “were explicitly
used as yardsticks to measure physical and cultural distance from the majority and gauge potentiality for assimilation into the state and nation” (Pearson, 2005, p. 27). In doing so both sides revealed what they considered a ‘New Zealander’ to be—and it was not the Muliagas. Their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness was enough to set them apart from an equally reified ‘New Zealand culture.’ Though the boundaries of defining who is an ‘ordinary New Zealander’ may have “blurred over time” (Ward and Lin, 2005, p. 161), public and political discourse continues to exploit this expression to distinguish Pakeha (and, occasionally Maori) from newer migrants, to celebrate particularity. Rather than questioning the social order by being already ‘inside,’ the Muliagas were pushed rhetorically to the ‘outside’ of this ordinariness. They became members of a disadvantaged community within a community, but never one of ‘us.’ They were, to borrow from Paul Gilroy (2004), “culturally lost souls” adrift between being the aliens they ought to be and the New Zealanders they were unlikely ever to become.

As I write, Folole has not dropped entirely from the headlines. Just this morning the Chief Coroner announced guidelines for the upcoming inquest into her death (interestingly, one of the seven “areas of investigation”: “the level of comprehension and understanding of Mrs Muliaga’s medical condition held by those close to her”). But such stories are unlikely to have much purchase in coming days. Most New Zealanders’s eyes are turned elsewhere. To Europe. To
the rugby fields of France. To rugby’s 6th Coupe Du Monde. Going into the
tournament, New Zealand’s national side, the All Blacks, are—once again—
overwhelming favorites, having “been close to unbeatable in the past three
years” (Kayes, 2007). Their form, coupled with their pedigree, means the
expectations of winning are high. There is the added burden too of the All Blacks
having failed to deliver on the grandest stage since the inaugural tournament
some twenty years ago. And, New Zealanders are nothing if not emphatic in
their passion for rugby. Reporting on the All Blacks departure last week, the
widely-read Planet Rugby described the scene thusly: “The New Zealand
population made it pretty clear what they expected from their rugby
ambassadors…that anything less than a win would be considered as having
failed.” Similarly, of the prospect of the William Webb Ellis trophy eluding the
All Blacks for a fifth time, commentator Graeme Moody predicted New
Zealanders would “act like a pack of psychos.” “I mean, look at last time!”, he
says referring to New Zealand’s unexpected to loss Australia in 2003, “The
country needed general therapy!” Whether or not the All Blacks turn their fancy
into triumph, however, the World Cup will be a privileged site for the playing
out of, the identification of, and the performance of New Zealand’s national
identity. Whereas New Zealanders are generally ambivalent about the idea of
‘nationalism’ and patriotic performances—“acutely self-conscious about their
geographic isolation and prone to almost obsessive public expressions of self-doubt” as Pearson and Kothari (2007, p. 47) put it—when it comes to rugby they seem to feel perfectly free to do so. “Aside perhaps, from Anzac Day,” suggests a recent editorial in the *Sunday Star-Times*, “there’s probably never a time when New Zealand is more united as a country—north and south, urban and rural—than when a rugby international looms” (Cate, 2005, p. B2). It’s as if the black shirt is proof of the existence of the nation; as if rugby pulls this little country out of the shadows of anonymity.

And, if there are few better sites in and through which New Zealanders express their sense of belonging than an All Black test, there is also, in Cate’s opinion, “never a time when we [New Zealanders] are more proudly and un-self-consciously a nation of the ‘Pacific’ either” (Cate, 2005, p. B2). The growing number of Pacific peoples pulling on the All Black jersey in recent years undoubtedly marks a significant symbolic shift in New Zealand’s national imaginary, in the way we, to paraphrase Hamilton (1990), ‘look at ourselves.’ Reflecting on the team during a recent game against England, columnist Finlay Macdonald was “struck by how exotic the All Blacks now appear—tattooed, dread-locked, surnames festooned with apostrophes.” “If these were among our most prominent cultural ambassadors,” he writes, “then we are projecting an ethnographic image somewhat advanced from the dour old verities of yore.”
Such is the “trend” argues the Herald’s Gregor Paul, that “It’s not inconceivable that come the 2011 World Cup, New Zealand as hosts kick-off the first game with a match-day 22 that consists solely of players who come from a Pacific Island background.” However unlikely that prospect, it wouldn’t be contentious to suggest the number of Pacific players today as being a far cry from 1970 when Bryan Williams was the sole All Black of Pacific descent. Indeed, rugby has become the tale of just how far Pacific people have come. Supposedly, we see in rugby evidence of how, in Immigration Minister David Cunliffe’s words, “Pasifika New Zealanders are well-established members of our community—growing in numbers and going from strength to strength.”

Tellingly, in recent speeches both New Zealand’s Minister of Pacific Island Affairs and his Associate also cite rugby as emblematic of New Zealand’s recent (re)emergence as a “Pacific Nation.”

Pace Folole, this too is where the immigrant story went right. Pacific peoples are now an integral part of New Zealand’s resident population, and that they are heavily represented in our most prominent sports team is seeming validation of this point. But, though since the late 1970s natural increase has contributed more than 80 percent of the growth in New Zealand’s Pacific population, the success of Pacific peoples is still largely framed as an immigrant tale. As Bedford (2000, p. 17) notes, “like many groups that are not white or
Maori in New Zealand, [Pacific people] still tend to be stereotyped as immigrants.” When successful Pacific people, and Pacific All Blacks in particular, command the attention of the nation they do so because they reinforce the magnanimous contours of our national identity. They are the comforting versions of what Chock (1991) calls the “myth of opportunity”: typically stories that center on an immigrant (most often male) whose arrival in a new country and “desire for betterment, striving in adversity, and putting down of roots make him a ‘new man’” (p. 282). To tell stories of Pacific peoples’ success is thus to “speak about the nation in all its benevolence and generosity. National ideologies such as…mobility, openness, and inclusiveness come to life any time the nation’s Others claim socioeconomic achievement. Stories of success turn the ethnic into the national as the former partakes of, and legitimizes, narratives of the latter” (Anagnostou, 2003, p. 279).

The telling of such stories, in focussing on individuals, works to mediate between the individual, rugby and the nation. The individual, rugby, and the nation are simultaneously composed on the same terms (Chock, 1991). The narrative of achievement via the metonymy of the ‘hero’, the ‘role model’, buttresses the ideology of New Zealand as an inclusive, egalitarian cultural democracy. The All Blacks and their Pacific stars are, in Laidlaw’s (1999) terms, “a metaphor” for New Zealand society, rugby an “avenue for youngsters from
the wrong side of the tracks”, the All Black fan bearing witness to “the new society at work, and in harmony” (p. 183). Rugby and the All Blacks, Joe Rokocoko, Mils Muliaina, Ma’a Nonu, Isaia Toeva: such is the richness of New Zealand society. In true neo-liberal fashion these “opportunity stories” (Chock, 1991) are habitually reduced to such individuals, to those who make visible and concrete New Zealand’s narrative of itself as open and meritocratic. They embody the ideal of becoming and being a New Zealander, making manifest the “narrative of achievement” (Anagnostou, 2003), rendering the immigrant tale comprehensible.

No-one better grounds the paradigm of opportunity better than Tana Umaga, New Zealand rugby’s first captain of Pacific descent. Following his retirement from international rugby in 2006, Umaga was widely praised not only for his on-field exploits but his impact on New Zealand’s Pacific community. This “husband and hero” has become, according to an editorial in The Dominion Post, “a role model to young Pacific Islanders who straddle two cultures.” Says former (‘Samoa-born’) All Black centre Eroni Clark: “When a young Pacific Islander makes it, every Pacific Islander takes notice. When you see people come through those difficulties like Tana did, it’s important for people to see that and to continue to believe in their dreams” (quoted in Burnes, 2006, p. 16). Though Umaga himself has been somewhat equivocal of taking on such a role—claiming
he is “New Zealander first”—he is indelibly linked to his biography: the classic story of the immigrant made good. According to one tribute, “Tana Umaga could have been just another statistic—the son of immigrant parents born on the wrong side of town with no hope of success, let alone greatness” (Matheson, 2006). Here, then, is New Zealand’s most prominent sign of equal opportunity—“The son of poor immigrants leaps to the top in our open society—from Wainuiomata to the White House” (Hubbard, 2006). New Zealand for many Pacific people is the “land of milk and h(m)oney” (Anae, 2004, p. 96), and Umaga is a brace to such longings, a symbol of promise for those entertaining the dream of making it in Niu Sila. Already this year, some 19,000 Samoans—or 10 percent of Samoa’s population—have applied for one of the 1100 available work visas under the Samoa Quota Scheme. I’m sure that as they wait in the long queues—in the thick, Samoan heat—to pay for the privilege of merely applying, there’s more than one hopeful with thoughts of Umaga in their head.

Though Umaga has now retired (to the ‘richer’ pastures of coaching in Toulon) and Folole has been laid to rest in a Papatoetoe cemetery, I can’t help thinking that their lives somehow meet in those immigration offices and departure lounges, that they are part of the same tale of this World Cup Year. No doubt in the coming days we’ll catch glimpses of Tana, the spectator in the stands. The press will dutifully report on his discreet, and likely ‘inspirational’, 
visits to the All Black camp in Marseilles. Such is the *mana* he still commands. And, of course, if it’s not Tana, then much be will be made of one, or all, of the other ‘brown boys’: of Jerry Collins, or Rodney So’oialo, or Mils Muliaina, or Josevata Rokocoko. The general tenor will be a feelgood tale of “the happy marriage of [Pacific] cultures into the rugby fabric” (Paul, 2007). At the same time, Folole’s story will have an epilogue, albeit quieter than that of the days following her death. It will be replete with hand-wringing and apologia (and little effective change). But I think it will be a muted story. Not only in the sense of being drowned out by more palatable apologues in France, but because it’s a more difficult story to tell, because it gives lie to any notions of cultural unity, to the multicultural (All Black) story we prefer to tell ourselves about ourselves. Folole is a reminder that every culture is riddled with closets—some of them quite capacious. However uncomfortable it may be, though, we need prize the door ajar and peer, even if briefly, into what Himani Bannerji (2000) would call “the dark side of the nation.” We need to bethink the immigrant tale as told through rugby and expose the conceptual feat it performs in emptying difference of its political and cultural content. We need to realize that it takes on “signals of particularized social being or cultural personhood” (Bannerji, 2000, p. 54), and

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1 Below I use the term ‘multicultural narrative’, so it is apposite here to note Geertz’s (1975) famed description how narratives are integral to human culture because culture is constituted through the “ensemble of stories we tell about ourselves.”
the sameness it implies must be questioned. Its discourse of liberal plurality, and the processes of national cultural homogenization that underlie it, are ideological, and must be recognized as such. I only hope that within this dissertation the equality which, in principle, exists within the game, can throw into sharp relief the absence of any, even notional, equality outside it.
INTRODUCTION

The Politics of (Not) Belonging

A few days out from the 2006 Census there it was. The email I had heard so much about. Sitting amongst the other electronic detritus that is my inbox was a message, its subject-line reading, rather vaguely, “Our Heritage.” I knew it wasn’t spam nor virus nor even one of those dubious “pass-on-for-good-luck” missives that you sometimes receive and dismiss, then hastily forward on anyway. This was a message whose contents I was by now well acquainted with. The media had already told me what was in it, and a click of my mouse merely brought up words I had seen before. Yes, this was it; the famed communiqué from some un-sourced fellow Kiwis encouraging me to tick the box marked “Other” for Question 11 of the Census, to dutifully write “New Zealander” in the space beside. There was “no box provided to say ‘Yes, I am a New Zealander and I am proud to be one’” it said, so when I was asked for my ethnicity I should instead “choose the option ‘Other’…and state [my] ethnicity as ‘New Zealander.’” By doing so I would become part of the “fight for our right [and, thus mine included] to be recognised as who we are in this proud and strong country of ours.” If “enough New Zealanders” joined this fight it continued, “then maybe, just maybe, we can get the powers that be to sit up and recognise
that we are proud of who we are and that we want to be recognised as such, not divided into sub-categories and all treated as foreigners in our own country.”

Forward the email on it finished, to “friends, people you work with, Kiwis you know overseas, anyone” (though sadly I wouldn’t “receive amazing good luck by doing so”), then “remember…at census time… ‘Other—New Zealander!’ (and proud of it).”

So much talk of “pride”, “we”, “us” and “our”. It made it seem that in making a political statement I could also find an identity, an ethnic home to call my own. In some ways I didn’t even need to voice my dissent on Census night. Just receiving the email was enough to make me feel part of something bigger, something shared. In a modern-day Benedict-Anderson-kind-of-way I was part of a community, united as we were by broadband or dial-up instead of newspaper or novel (see Anderson, 1983). I was even only a few degrees separated from the hallowed halls of parliament. Gerry Brownlee, deputy-leader of New Zealand’s opposition National party, had also been on the recipients list—and this was a political ball he could run with. As a member of a party to whom the very idea of ‘group’ interests seems anathema (see Pearson, 2005), it wasn’t entirely surprising that Brownlee was soon before the House voicing his support for the campaign, decrying the lack of an option to describe oneself merely as a New Zealander. For Brownlee it was “ridiculous” that he had to
describe himself as a European instead of a New Zealander, “boasting of his multi-generational indigenousness and upholding the rights of his children not to be labelled as anything” (MacDonald, 2006, p. C9). Perhaps it’s time “officials” stopped “perpetuating the myth that we are a country that is ethnically divided” (Census forms, 2006) he suggested. As overly-romantic as they seemed, and not to mention Brownlee’s apparent conflation of ‘ethnicity’ with ‘nationality’ or ‘ancestry’, the remarks received a measure of support. Certainly, Brownlee had tapped into the budding regard of ‘New Zealand European’ as largely meaningless, given it takes in “everyone descended from a former inhabitant of the continent stretching from the Arctic Circle to the Mediterranean Sea, not forgetting the off-shore British Isles” (Rudman, 2006; see also Kan’s [2006] wonderful satiric take on this). Even Race relations conciliator Joris de Bres conceded that “we should be able to identify ourselves as something other than European” (quoted in Schouten, 2006, p. A5). What many overlooked in the midst of the anti-European din, however, was that Statistics New Zealand had already made a subtle step in the pro-New Zealander direction: whereas those who wrote-in “Kiwi” or “New Zealander” during the previous Census in 2001 (some 89,100) had been “unceremoniously tossed back into the European pot anyway” (Rudman, 2006), in 2006 “New Zealander” had become its own
category (It’s official, 2005; ‘Kiwi’ a dinkum response, 2006). Demographers had seemingly discovered an entirely new ethnicity.

Less ‘science’ or utopic, post-racial blindness than a government department’s way of dealing with growing popular disaffection, the advent of New Zealander as an official ethnic category—albeit as a post-analysis ‘Other’—purportedly addressed, according to Statistics New Zealand’s chief demographer Mansoor Khawaja, “the wish of the people” (quoted in ‘Kiwi’ a dinkum response, 2006). New Zealand society was “changing” and the amendment was a nod to “public opinion,” to a “growing trend for people to respond as ‘New Zealander’” (Statistics New Zealand General Manager Dallas Welch, quoted in It’s Official, 2005). Such motivations are far from inconsistent with the notion of ethnicity being “self-defined”, as is Statistics New Zealand’s policy (Statistics New Zealand, 2005). Yet the move to classify New Zealander separately was (and, is) hardly unproblematic. Obviously it didn’t go far enough for those who wanted a simple option-to-tick on the Census forms. It was also at odds with those such as de Bres who preferred the more ‘indigenous’ though equally politically-loaded ‘Pakeha’ (see also Spoonley, 2006). Most significant I would argue however is that the acknowledgment of New Zealander as a distinct, ethnic category is an implicit, nay ‘official,’ endorsement of the parlous ‘one law, one value’ rhetoric of the National party and their ilk (most famously see Brash, 2004). The question
must be asked whether ‘New Zealander’ is a term intended to unite or divide: Does being a “proud” New Zealander come at the expense of particular cultural traditions and communities, and/or risk splitting us into white, “mainstream New Zealand” as promoted by Brownlee (see Brownlee, 2005) “versus the alien others” (Misa, 2006).

What haunts these debates is what Stuart Hall insightfully dubs “The Multicultural Question” (Hall, 2000): while officially bicultural, by fact New Zealand is a multi-cultural society; and, thus by definition is culturally heterogeneous. “It would be fair to say” writes Arvind Zodgekar, “that New Zealand is in the process of becoming a multi-ethnic society and New Zealand’s racial and cultural set-up is certainly becoming more rich and varied” (2005, p. 147). On the face of it, it would also seem fair to concur with Zodgekar’s contention that this increasingly diverse society is precipitating a “growing sense of independence from the colonial past” (p. 140). Yet as Hall reminds us, the multicultural question is in close relationship to the phenomenon of the ‘postcolonial’ (Hall, 2000). Only in the strictest sense, though, does such a term mean we are beyond colonialism. We are in colonialism’s aftermath, far from free of colonialism’s influence. The post-colonial, as Hall remarks elsewhere (Hall, 1996), merely “marks the passage from one historical power-configuration or conjuncture to another...Problems of dependency, underdevelopment and
marginalization, typical of the ‘high’ colonial period, persist into the post-
colonial.” We have to remember too, that ‘colonialism’ was not simply a matter
of territorial conquest or the establishment of imperial/Western institutions.
Rather, colonialism was as much an operation of discourse. It may have been
established by guns, but colonialism’s power was in the discursive operations of
discourse.

As an operation of discourse, colonialism “interpellate[d] colonial subjects
by incorporating them in a system of representation” (Tiffin and Lawson, 1994, p.
3). And, because they are already written in that system of representation they
are not only interpellated, but inscribed. The colonized subject becomes what
Carusi calls “subject-effects,” the “subject as a discursive instance which is the
effect of a variety of structures or discursive practices” (p. 104). Colonialism is
therefore, in essence, an apparatus for constituting subject positions through the
field of representation (Hall, 1997). These representations involve ideological and
rhetorical strategies of classification and control. In particular, as Partha
Chatterjee (1993) describes it in The Nation and its Fragments, the colonial project
aimed to establish “the normalizing rule of colonial difference, namely, the
preservation of the alienness of the ruling group” (p. 10). And by this ‘colonial
difference’ Chatterjee is, of course, referring to the way in which the ‘other’ was
represented “as inferior and radically different, and hence incorrigibly inferior”
Such discourses were not divorced from their material contexts, for representations, images, and stereotypes were productive of colonial ‘violence.’

As Obeyesekere (1992) has observed, a discourse is not just speech; it is imbedded in a historical and cultural context and expresses often in the frame of a scenario or cultural performance. It is about practice...Insofar as the discourse evolves it begins to effect the practice (p. 650).

These representations of the other thus varied according to the urgencies of the colonial context. In the Pacific several distinct themes emerged: Islanders were ‘primitive’—pre-logical and without “intellectual, social political, and religious structures that would allow them to cope with modernity” (Hanlon, 1994); they were indolent; and, they were ruled by their bodies. One of my motivation in this dissertation is to begin to unravel this complex genealogy of the Pacific, to consider how the Pacific and its people have been conceptualized.

This colonial discourse consists, in the first place, of a series of negations (Memmi, 1965). In Memmi’s words, “the colonized is not this, is not that” (Memmi, 1965). That is, colonial discourse participates in a process of ‘othering’ (Spivak, 1988). Derived from the work Hegel, Lacan, Satre, and others, othering “is an ideological process that isolates groups that are seen as different from the norm of the colonizers” (p. 148). Like Memmi, for Spivak (1988), othering is dialectic. Just as it creates the colonized, colonization creates the colonizer (Memmi, 1965). We can see this in the portmanteau figure of the primitive, a
discursive figure endemic within (neo)colonial narratives of the Pacific Islands (Denoon, 1997). The primitive was very much the ideological counterpoint to European modernity, gauged by a lack of progress, his ‘distance’ from civilization. In this way, the primitive was always comparative. ‘They’ were once how ‘we’ had been, locked somewhere in ‘our’ (repressed) past. Yet not only were they different in a temporal sense. Difference was also racialized; the primitive became a *racial* other (Hall, 1997). Originally a nonfigurative category, primitivism, as Mary Brewer notes, “increasingly came to be registered visibly as a physical demarcator: mental and moral differences became linked to physical differences in an updated, color-coded version of the Great Chain of being” (Brewer, 2005, p. 3). Initially idolized, the primitive by the eighteenth-century was identified by their appearance, and thus primitivism was assumed to be biologically-grounded. The presumed ascendant position of white Europeans and the debased condition primitive, the difference between inferior and superior, was thus preordained. In colonial discourse, the recognition of difference was thereby “made innocent, made to appear natural” (Pickering, 2001, p. 71).

Throughout the nineteenth-century this (racialized) colonial discourse was closely associated with the nation-state. Colonialism was penetrated by nationalist rhetoric, forms, and practices and nations and nationalism are
profoundly important in the formation of colonial practice. In a sense, nationalism is always a product of colonialism (Balibar, 1991). As van der Veer (1995) notes, colonialism and nationalism “go hand in hand in both the colonizing and the colonized countries of the world. The colonial project produced reified national cultures both in the colonies and ‘at home’” (p. 3).

Nationalism extended the range and depth of colonialism and “reproduced it in subtle and not so subtle ways” (Dissanayake, 1994, p. ix); if the nation was born in modern Europe then it was spread by colonialism. The establishment of the nation-state was also important for the development of capitalism under modernity. In particular, the Age of Empire, as the age of capitalism, was built on spatial differentiation, on the building of boundaries. Colonial states imposed borders which necessitated the invention of nations with which they were to coincide. The resulting nation-states adhered to the “illusion” (Balibar, 1991) that citizens would share fundamental characteristics, including cultural values and ethnicity. Nationalism was thus a colonizing activity in itself “in erasing local differences in order to create a homogeneous national culture” (Dirlik, 2007, p. 43). Irrespective of deep internal social divisions and inequalities the nation had to “imagined” (Anderson, 1983) as communal, as shared. There was no underlying reality of nationhood to be brought into consciousness (Davidson, 2000). “Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men,” Ernest Gellner
famously wrote, “are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes preexisting
cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often
obliterates preexisting cultures: that is a reality” (Gellner, 2006).

It is important to note that this act of imagining involves a degree of
‘closure.’ Colonialism imposed administrative regimes and national boundaries
that were inorganic and designed to serve the interests of imperial, colonial, and
metropolitan domination. With an obvious nod to Foucault, what emerged is
what Giddens has called a “bordered power-container” which “exists in a
complex of other nation-states” and strives to maintain an “administrative
monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries” (Giddens, 1985, p. 45).

Hence, nations may be imagined, but they are “limited” in that “even the largest
of them…has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations”
(Anderson, 1983). So in this way, the nation is imagined not only in communion,
but in difference, to an ‘outside.’ As Cheah (1999, p. 10) writes, imagining the
nation “is essentially a comparative process in which the nation is always
haunted by something that is at one and the same time both spatially other or
exterior to it.” In like fashion, a national identity presumes an other from whom
is different. As Spencer and Wollman (2002) note

If identity is about sameness, about identifying with those considered
similar, it is also about difference, distinguishing oneself from those who
are dissimilar…Any notion of group identity in particular necessarily
involves some kind of process of categorization in order to distinguish
between those who are similar enough to be included and those who are different and therefore to be excluded (p. 58).

National identity is therefore a divisive process of separating ‘us’ from ‘them’, ‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’ (Billig, 1995).

But if national identity is constructed to differentiate ‘us’ from ‘them’, then it also works to separate those who ‘belong’ from those who do not. The borders of the colonial world placed some ‘within’ and some ‘outside.’ The issue then arises of how such ‘boundaries’ are constructed. We could suggest that who we are not is dependent upon the creation a standard, an unmarked normality against which to discern their deviations. That is, nationalism is a normative evaluation: “a judgement about what ought to be, rather than what the case is” (Pearson, 2003, p. 86). In New Zealand the yardstick was a largely British inflection. The close connections to Empire meant Anglo-Saxon elites became the ‘core ethnie’ (Smith, 1986). While the terminology may have begun as ‘people’ or ‘nation’, it was supplanted by white, nationalist forms of supremacy. Settlers by and large viewed themselves “as part of a transnational British kin group…bound together by ties of ‘race’ and national origin, within and across the metropolis and its colonial outposts” (Pearson, p. 994). What ‘New Zealand’ also shared with Britain was a sense of whiteness, a sense of “sharing the topmost rungs of a world league table of racial types with their British kin” (Pearson, 2003, p. 87). Their self-description of themselves as inheritors on this
Anglo-Saxon lineage justified their status as settlers because it at once named a range of others—especially indigenous Maori—as inferiors. Deviations from whiteness became the predominant form of identifying difference and license; whiteness came to function as both norm and core; and, whiteness became the measure for conferring ownership of a New Zealand citizenship and the privileges and entitlements accrued from that status. So for example, naturalization procedures were established on the basis that New Zealand “was a British country and other people either did not belong or could stay only in sufferance” (McKinnon, 1996, p. 12). There were clear biases too toward the British Isles when it came to migration, producing what McKinnon has coined a nation of (white) “kin-migrants.” A sense of ‘belonging’, of being a New Zealander, then, was tied to whiteness (Murphy, 2003).

This brings to light an interesting paradox. The racialization process in which New Zealand imagined itself as white necessarily involved immigrants and Maori for they aided the establishment of boundaries and categories, as well as the constitution of the white ethno-national core—again, it is important to recall that “to understand the process of inclusion, we must consider it simultaneously as a process of exclusion” (Zolberg, 1996, p. 57). Following the Second World War, however, New Zealand’s ‘colonial subjects’ began ‘arriving’ in ever-greater numbers. Demographically, ideologically and culturally, New
Zealand was “transformed by the post-colonial chickens who came ‘home’ to roost—and in the process remade the metropolitan coop” (Farred, 2004, p. 58). This is the anarchy of empire (Kaplan, 2002). Imperial “aggression abroad” generating would eventually provoke protectionism at “home”:

...underlying the dream of imperial expansion is the nightmare of its own success, a nightmare in which movement outward into the world threatens to incorporate the foreign and dismantle the domestic sphere of the nation (Kaplan, 2002, p. 12).

This is especially true of the special historical and constitutional relationships that exist between New Zealand and many states in the Pacific. With regard to migration from the Pacific, concessionary policies—either *de jure* or *de facto* in nature—have long been in place as result of New Zealand’s colonial connections and also because of what the former Minister for Immigration, Kerry Burke, has described as New Zealand’s close cooperation with South Pacific countries and its “special responsibility to assist with their developmental efforts” (p. 7). In the immediate post-War years most New Zealanders probably gave these policies little notice. Indeed, workers from the Pacific were almost a necessity as New Zealand’s industrial economy flourished. But as economic conditions deteriorated, Pacific Islanders “…being more visible than other groups, became a convenient scapegoat for some of the economic problems facing the country” (Krishnan *et al*, 1994, p. 78). New Zealand was once again forced to confront the
“problem of otherness” (Braudel 1990) and once again it became apparent that whiteness had lingered on as an ideal in the ‘postcolonial’ world.

This problem of otherness is one New Zealanders are still dealing with today. And, if Brownlee and Brash’s comments are anything to go by then it is a problem with which they are not dealing well. White cultural norms and imperatives remain embedded in the postcolonial state and, to borrow from Richard Dyer, white people still “colonize the definition of the normal.”

Following work in whiteness studies, it would be fair to suggest that Pakeha/whiteness still operates as the unmarked norm against which other ‘ethnic’ identities are marked and racialized. This is not to suggest that whiteness is ‘invisible’ as some have suggested (cf. McIntosh, 1998)—some Pakeha are hyper-aware of their whiteness. Rather, belonging in New Zealand cannot be reduced to the conventional analytical framework of ‘race’ and ‘race relations.’ Whiteness in New Zealand must instead be connected to what Ware (2001) describes as “the politics of the geo-body...since ideologies of ‘race’, ethnicity, and belonging are fundamentally bound up with the histories of the nation and how it is defined by competing forces” (p. 185). In this particular case, what I am suggesting is that the category ‘New Zealander’ has been defined over and against the category ‘immigrant’, and Pacific immigrants in particular.

Exclusionary immigrations acts and naturalization laws are not only means by
which to regulate ‘citizens’ or the ‘state’ but also form part of an orientalist
discourse (Said, 1985) of defining the cultural and racial ‘other.’ The Pacific
immigrant acts as something of ‘screen’ (Lowe, 1996) on which the nation
projects its very whiteness.

About this Dissertation

To many what I have argued above may seem remarkable. We—well, we
Pakeha—like to think that we have “no race problem”, and enjoy “the best race
relations in the world” (see Love, 2006; True, 1996). A recent survey sponsored
by New Zealand’s Human Rights Commission has by the same token found that
New Zealanders “were generally more optimistic than in previous years” about
the future of race relations (HRC, 2006). New Zealand is also, for all intents and
purposes, a ‘multicultural society.’ Our Governor General has said as much.
Delivering a speech last year Anand Satyanand suggested that

We are a diverse country...increasingly so...Our country can be said to be
one that gives people a go whatever may have been their background.
New Zealand’s contemporary diversity lies in our multiculturalism...I am
sure the older people here today will agree New Zealand’s identity has
evolved markedly...We now recognise that we are a truly multicultural
country (Satyanand, 2006).

Census data suggests Satyanand may be right. The latest figures saw the number
of New Zealanders identifying themselves as “European”—in New Zealand
generally-accepted as a euphemism for ‘white’—drop to 67.6 per cent from 80
per cent in 2001 (Statistics New Zealand, 2007). Meanwhile the fastest growing populations were ‘Asians’ and ‘Pacific peoples.’ Taking “a peek into the future” one journalist was moved to speculate that while “New Zealand used to be white Europeans, dairy farming, rugby, and a Sunday roast; in 40 years it could be more about taro, curry, Chinese noodles, and conservation” (Ponniah, 2006, p. A8).

It’s not entirely surprising that the author here should choose ‘taro’ as one of the expressions of social and cultural change. New Zealand has, as Pearson and Kothari (2007) have observed, developed something of a penchant for “deploy[ing] food as symbolic of cultural politics, particularly in terms of national identity” (p. 46). And, perhaps there is no better emblem of New Zealand’s “rapidly browning culture” (Perrott, 2007) than this tropical plant. A “Pacific specialty” (as the South Pacific Commission calls it), the taro has become something of a totem of cultural identification. As the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN explains, “People of Pacific Island origin continue to consume taro wherever they may live in the world, not so much because there are no substitute food items, but mainly as a means of maintaining links with their culture.” Put simply, the taro is both an internal and external signifier of the Pacific community. And, it is a community that is growing, its growth rate far outstripping the New Zealand population as a whole (SNZ, 2007). In Race
Relations Commissioner Joris de Bres’s eyes, Pacific people are also “Increasingly accepted as having a prominent and positive role in helping shape New Zealand’s identity” (de Bres, 2005, p. 52); a view shared by the Minister of Pacific Island Affairs, Winnie Laban, who believes “New Zealand’s identity in the twenty-first century [is] as a Pacific nation.” “I feel today,” she continues, “very proud and happy to see the cultures of the Pacific alive, thriving and contributing very positively to New Zealand’s economy and national identity” (Laban, 2006).

It is one thing, however, for a society to be multicultural in the sense of having restaurants that offer ‘ethnic’ foods like “taro, curry and Chinese noodles” or to showcase ‘Polynesian’ music, art, and literature. In such a society “people may appreciate these differences without being deeply affected by them” (Lugones and Price, 1995, p. 103). It is the difference between what Lugones and Price (1995) call structural multiculturalism—wherein multiculturalism “informs the institutional structure of society”—and ornamental multiculturalism—the “reduction of other cultures to ornaments” (p. 103). To rephrase Liu and Sibley’s (2004) take on biculturalism in New Zealand, it is the contrast between multiculturalism in practice and multiculturalism in principle. These are, of course, issues taken up well in Stanley Fish’s provocative essay on “Boutique Multiculturalism” published in the journal Critical Inquiry in 1997.
Others have covered similar ground as well, pointing to superficial (Luckett, 2000), commercialized (Hall, 2000), consumerist, corporate (Chicago Cultural Studies Group, 1992), and Benetton (see Giroux, 1994) multiculturalism (for further discussion, see Hall, 2000). Acknowledging a debt to these scholars, in Chapter 1 I propose the like phenomenon of ‘Pacific multiculturalism.’ My analysis takes off with the All Blacks who in their very make-up suggest that New Zealand arrived in the ‘postcolonial [Pacific] present’ (Pattynama, 2005). On one level my arguments echo those aforementioned in noting the way in which ethnic ‘culture’ can be reduced to set of meaningless signifiers, and how ‘ethnic’ culture, when filtered through the Pakeha imagination, turns cultural practices into ‘ornamental’ culture (Lugones and Price, 1995). However, I also consider the ideological work of Pacific multiculturalism. Obviously, Pacific multiculturalism serves to disguise persistent racial tension within the nation. New Zealand today is still struggling with the legacy of various migrations and the profound impact of the second immigrant generation of ‘native’ citizens who ‘unsettle’ (Pearson, 2000) the nation, dis-placing, in the process, traditional sites of national identity. This is not to suggest that the “fantasy of a white nation” no longer exists, that whiteness does not continue to order relations between different people in the nation (Hage, 2000). Borrowing this notion of a ‘white nation fantasy’ from Hage (2000), I examine how the ideas of cultural and racial difference can be
articulated to the national ‘project.’ In particular, essential to this project in New Zealand are notions of equality and egalitarianism. It therefore necessitates the institutionalization of difference (Asad, 1993) to secure its hegemony. White New Zealanders tolerate difference because anything less would undermine liberal image upon which the national identity has been built. Inclusion and pluralism are evidence that the meritocracy still holds.

I stress the word tolerate here, because tolerance “presupposes that its object is morally repugnant, that it really needs to be reformed, that is, altered” (Goldberg, 1993, p. 7). This is the paradox of Pacific multiculturalism: “the commitment to tolerance turns only on modernity’s ‘natural inclination’ to intolerance: acceptance of otherness presupposes and at once necessitates delegitimation of the other” (p. 7). This is the order of the nation-space. White New Zealanders assume their place at the center or core of the nation, while others exist only on the margins—to be tolerated. To again borrow from Hage, I wish to suggest that the New Zealand nation as a space is “structured around a white culture, where…non-white ‘ethnics’ are merely national objects to be moved or removed according to white national will” (2000, p. 18). Consider Laban’s suggestion that “Our [presumably ‘New Zealand’s’] national identity is being enriched by the contributions of Pacific people right across the board from sports to science. Having our Pacific communities active in their cultures is
something this Labour-led Government strongly supports” (Laban, 2006; emphasis added). This “discourse of enrichment” presupposes a different mode of existence for ethnic cultures (Hage, 2000, p. 121). It places the dominant (white) culture in a more important position because it suggests non-white cultures function only to ‘enrich’ the core”: ‘we’ value ‘their’ contributions—which implies that ‘they’ are not one of ‘us.’ In Ang’s (2001) terms Pacific multiculturalism is a built on the contradictory process of “inclusion by virtue of othering” (p. 139).

At the center of this white nation fantasy is a belief in an insuperable white sovereignty; it is a fantasy of white dominance. Problems arise, however, when anything other than this state of affairs appears on the (ideological) horizon, when the white nation-space is invaded. The Other produces a kind of racio-spatial anxiety among the ‘white-and-very-worries-about-the-nation-subject’ (Hage, 2000, p. 10). It also produces specific type of discourse, what Hage names as “the discourse of white decline” (2000, p. 180). In Chapter 2 I examine how just such a discourse has emerged around the ‘white flight’ of young males from rugby. White boys are apparently being swamped by overgrown Polynesian man-children who represent a psychic and physical threat to the next generation of New Zealand men. I first connect this discourse to the challenge posed by the “multicultural real” (Gilroy, 2005), what Hall (2000) has describes
adjectivally as the multi-cultural, to homogeneous notions of place, identity, and knowledge. Rugby has been marked out as the ‘natural’ domain of white men and different bodies belonging in other places are in a sense ‘out of place’; Polynesian boys are, in essence, what Nirmal Puwar calls “Space Invaders” (Puwar, 2004). They also threaten the proper development of Pakeha boys. If rugby ‘makes men’ (to steal from Nauright and Chandler [1996]), then where do white boys go to learn to ‘be a man.’ In the second part of this chapter I therefore relate white flight to announcements of a current (or at least impending crisis) in Pakeha masculinity, to what one recent local newspaper series dubs simply “The Trouble with Men.”

The white-flight-panic discourse is also notable for the way in which the threat to white power and privilege is played out through the register of bodies. The body substitutes for the political. The (political) trauma of white men losing control finds its metaphorical analog in the traumatized bodies of wounded white boys whose life possibilities are constrained by the ‘natural’ superiority of young Polynesians. The image of white boys “having the daylights knocked out of them” (Romanos, 2002, p. 19) is a symbolic pain, an allegory of white male privilege slipping away. There is also a somatic norm being violated here. Young white males are normal. Young Polynesian males are not only different but a problem. Polynesian vis à vis white bodies are situated in two diametrically
opposed positions. In Chapter 3 I trace the roots of the binarized thinking and the repercussions of this history for contemporary understandings of the athletic Polynesian body. Starting by tracing the genealogy of natural Polynesian athleticism, I go on to argue that Polynesian bodies are discursively bound to an ideological matrix of primitive, instinctive coporeality. Examining media representations of rugby players of Pacific-descent, I offer a contextualized cultural analysis of the present-day perpetuation of these colonial discourses. It is suggested that classic stereotypes of Polynesian physicality, and hence their natural intellectual inferiority, continue to exercise a hegemonic role in the representation of Pacific peoples.

In Chapters 4 and 5 I take up bodily movements of a different kind. In Chapter 4 I examine the physical movement of Pacific (sporting) bodies across boundaries. I initially connect the migration of Pacific athlete/laborers both from and to New Zealand to a wider literature on athletic talent migration. There is room for suggesting that to understand how, why, and where these athletes we need to take account of the traces of colonialism and the way in which new forms of (bodily) (neo)colonization operate in the present. I also examine the paradox of what is perhaps a defining feature of our current ‘Age of Migration’: that while boundaries have become more porous, they have simultaneously become more entrenched. The flows of athletic labor represent the great liberatory potential of
Pacific peoples, a chance to think beyond oppressive nationalism or repressive state structures. Yet in the athletic labor market there are new modes of governmentality that define, discipline, and regulate the migration choices of Pacific athletes. In particular, a series of international and regional organizations and institutions—the International Rugby Board (IRB) first and foremost—mitigate against the more ‘flexible’ (Ong, 1999) practices, strategies, and subjectivities of Pacific rugby players. While ‘sports system’ may indeed be decidedly ‘global’ (Maguire, 1999), their movement is still deeply dependent on a juridico-legal status shaped by ‘nation-based’ thinking and the disciplinary norms of capitalism. They may be freer to “escape localization” (Ong, 1999, p. 19), but these modern-day sporting nomads are never free of the regulations imposed by various outside agencies.

In Chapter 5 I consequently aim to think beyond the reduction of ‘boundary crossing’ to bodily movement. In one sense I am thinking here of ‘virtual migration’ (Aneesh, 2006) and the rise of ‘virtual communities’ in cyberspace (Rheingold, 2000). Bodies increasingly cross borders, but so too do ideas, images and information, and ‘transnational’ activities need not necessarily involve face-to-face contact. The “space-compressing power of modern electronics” (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, 1999, p. 224) allows persons to engage in transnational activities without actually moving and forms of
solidarity no longer “rest on an appropriation of space” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992, p. 9). This reconstitution and redefinition of space and spatial relation for how we conceive ‘identity’ and ‘community’ among Pacific peoples. As such, the chapter begins from the premise that such terms as “conceived within the framework of nations/societies is making place for a post-inter/national sociology of hybrid formations, times and spaces” (1995, p. 63). One example is has been “comeback” (Georgiou, 2006, p. 3) of the notion of diaspora as a way of conceptualising current sociological concerns around ‘the global’ and ‘the local.’ Diaspora, as it has more recently been conceived, implies a decentralized relation to concepts such as ethnicity and community and complicated our understandings of ‘origin’ and ‘destination.’ As Stuart Hall contends:

> From the diaspora perspective, identity has many imagined ‘homes’...it has many different ways of ‘being at home’—since it conceives of individuals as capable of drawing on different maps of meaning and locating them in different geographies at one and the same time—but it is not tied to one, particular place.

It could be suggested that past migrations have more recently born a migrancy of identity. In this chapter I argue that one way to understand this ‘migrancy’ is to see diaspora as a specific mode of articulation in an ongoing process of negotiating, in this case, Pacific, identity. Articulation is, of course, a nod to Stuart Hall’s conception of identity as a political expression through a specific “linkage” that is not “necessary, determined, absolute, and essential for all time,”
but “a form of connection that can make a unity of different elements, under certain conditions” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 141; see Hall, 1990, 1996). I take Hall’s ideas in hand with those of Paul Gilroy who similarly sees diaspora as a mode of linkage that enables us to rethink commonality without falling back on essentialist notions of experience or consciousness. One particular idea of Gilroy’s that I work with in this chapter is his heuristic “black Atlantic” framework (Gilroy, 1993). I problematize the black Atlantic, asking how it can be “fitted to, articulated with” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 262) the unique set of historical forces and practices that compose the social context within which the identities of Pacific peoples are both constituted and negotiated. Extending the work of Ben Carrington, who himself extends Gilroy’s to the realm of sport, I argue that the lives, travels, migrations, and significances (dare I say the ‘movements’) of Polynesian athletes assist in the development of “absent copresences” (Georgiou, 2006) within the Pacific diaspora. They bring together different spaces and provide a means through which to articulate the “conditional” and “conjunctural” (diasporic) allegiances of Pacific peoples (Hall, 1996).

My concluding chapter continues on the theme of movement. It could, however, perhaps be called an extended coda rather than a conclusion in that it is less a summary than a post-ipsa rationale. It is an effort to overcome some of the pessimism which characterizes that which precedes it. It is an attempt to be
sensitive to rugby’s enchanting aspects in light of the attention given to those that are so disenchanting. Appropriating the work of C.L.R. James, I offer a different reading of the cultural politics of rugby. No cultural practice is ever truly autonomous, yet at the same time we cannot reduce all social interaction to the social structure. Like James saw in cricket, perhaps, in some way, rugby can be a resistive cultural act for Pacific peoples. Rugby may be an idiom through which creativity and resilience can flourish in the face of (neo)colonial oppression. To be sure I could easily be accuses of ‘doublethink’, an allusion in George Orwell’s 1984 to “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.” Yet, as James may have warned us, while rugby is never truly free from its social reality, neither can we deny its aesthetic values. I do not even attempt to answer James’ famous question as to what ‘art’ is, but surely rugby has a technical sophistication, a symbolic resonance, and, perhaps, an aesthetic value? (St Louis, 2007). However rule-bound the game, rugby produces creativity; and, maybe these moments of creativity have a wider resonance, a political significance. We would also be wise to remember that rugby has an audience, and as such, to bear in mind that cultural consumption and identification is not merely a matter of complicity or submission to forces of dominance. Perhaps, then, there is (at least some) subversive potential in the sight of say Tana Umaga splitting open defences with
his Jamesian “eye for the line.” Perhaps we can begin think of how to rearticulate the internal racial discourses of rugby in a manner sensitive to its ‘translation’ (Bhabha, 1994) by those who play and those who watch. Maybe, then, in these final pages we actually find a place to start.

As a final word, and as a comment on my theoretical leanings, I wish to suggest that, taken *in toto*, this dissertation can be read as an examination of what could be called *the cultural politics of postcolonial rugby in New Zealand*. More specifically, this dissertation is, in essence, a critical analysis of postcolonial ‘cultural [rugby] discourse.’ In the *Appendix* below I outline what I mean, and how I use, terms such as ‘discourse’ and ‘critical discursive analysis’, but given that it is so central to my analysis and underpins not only my epistemology, but theoretical ontology, it is important to briefly explore my approach to ‘postcolonialism’ and to remark on how ‘postcolonial criticism’ provides a theoretical and political impetus for what follows. To be sure, the legacy of colonialism, and especially the (white) British empire, is immediately visible in contemporary New Zealand, where, according to Statistics New Zealand “the total European grouping, including New Zealand European, has been reducing in size and proportion of the population for some years” (2007, p. 7). In urban centres such as Auckland and Wellington the numbers are even more marked. In Auckland, for instance, less than 50% of residents identified as European at the
last census. By contrast the fastest growing populations were those who identified either as ‘Asian’ or ‘Pacific Islander.’ The growing visibility of Pacific peoples in particular act as a perpetual reminder of the ways in which the once metropolis is intimately connected to the ‘peripheries.’ Biculturalism, multiculturalism, ethnic diversity, and the economic turn to Asia are evaporating New Zealand’s former ties to Britain, severing too the country’s symbolic connections to the old imperium. In a very particular sense of the term, then, New Zealand has become a ‘postcolonial’ nation.

But what do I mean here by my suggestion as to New Zealand’s ‘postcoloniality’? In one sense, ‘post’ as a prefix serves to delimit the scope and chronology of a field of study. So it could be suggested that ‘post’ intimates one set of ideas being supplanted by another (all be they cognate). As a descriptive the post-colonial could thus be (mis)taken as signaling the ‘end’ of colonialism—or the ‘time after’ colonialism—a period in which colonial institutions has been superceded by new (postcolonial) cultural, political, and intellectual practices. To do so, though, would be in Michael Pickering’s words, “quite wrong” (2001, p. 155). The prefix ‘post’, he writes,

observes the continuing processes of neo-colonialism and continuing inequities in global power while also reproducing the paradigm of unilinear developing time on which the Victorian notions of progress and primitivism depended (p. 155).
The implied break between the colonial and the postcolonial belies the persistence of colonialism in the period following formal ‘decolonialization.’ As Stuart Hall (1997) insightfully sums, postcolonialism merely “marks the passage from one historical power-configuration or conjuncture to another…Problems of dependency, underdevelopment and marginalization, typical of the ‘high’ colonial period, persist into the post-colonial.”

Difficult as any definition might be, and acknowledging the “fundamental historical and political predicaments” (Featherstone, 2005, p. 6) of doing so, to suggest this dissertation to be “an examination of the cultural politics of postcolonial rugby” perhaps necessitates that I provide some kind of definition of how I use the term ‘postcolonialism’—however arbitrary such a definition may be. A useful starting point in this regard is Helen Tiffin’s suggestion that postcolonialism can be taken to mean those “writing and reading [and perhaps ‘playing’?] practices grounded in some form of colonial experience occurring outside Europe but as a consequence of European expansion into and exploitation of ‘the other’ worlds” (see also Ashcroft et al, 1989). These ‘practices’ must also be understood as a critique of the historical formations of colonial domination and of colonial legacies. In this respect, I see this dissertation as very much a ‘postcolonial’ text, in that it is a critique of colonialism and assumes that ‘post’ does not mean ‘past.’ I also follow work in/on post-colonial theory over the
last fifteen or twenty years in the way attention is given as much to the colonial past and its deleterious effects as to the issue of how the post-colonial (Pacific) subject has reconstructed the (New Zealand) metropolis. Following Paul Gilroy (2005), I wish to suggest that the political conflicts that characterize today’s ‘multicultural New Zealand’ can only be understood in the context supplied by its imperial and colonial history. As Gilroy writes, the imperial and colonial past “continues to shape political life” in “over-developed-but-no-longer-imperial” countries such as New Zealand. This past also shapes present, emergent multicultural relations. In particular, ideas forged during the colonial enterprise form the backbone of resistance to contemporary multi-culture. The collapse of imperial certainties into a kind of postcolonial cosmopolitanism has stoked a kind of “melancholia” (Gilroy, 2005) among many Pakeha, the result of the profound impact of the second immigrant generation of ‘native’ citizens who, in effect, unsettle the nation and displace, in the process, traditional sites of national identity.

One of the principle outcomes of postcolonial theory is the way it directs our attention to “the many ways in which colonisation was never simply external to the societies of the imperial metropolis” (Hall, 1996, p. 246). In this way, postcolonialism calls into question the clearly demarcated inside/outside of the colonial system. In fact it could even be said that the interactive nature of the
‘post-colonial’ is the defining theme of post-colonialist studies: it is, in Rattansi’s (1997) words, the “investigation of the mutually constitutive role played by colonizer and colonized, centre and periphery, the metropolitan and the ‘native’, in forming, in part, the identities of both the dominant power and the subalterns involved in the imperial and colonial projects of the ‘West’” (Rattansi, 1997, p. 481). Vis-à-vis multiculturalism, postcolonialism also directly confronts the uncomfortable memories of colonialism. It recognizes that both colonizers and colonized are linked through their histories, that the ‘metropolis’ and ‘periphery’ are inter-connected. This means also that debates over who ‘belongs’ to the nation are framed by Empire. The question of national belonging is organized and managed through arguments about idealized characteristics complexly entangled in their colonial pasts. In this way, postcolonialism brings history back in.

Postcolonial studies could, in sum, be described as an interdisciplinary commitment to theorizing the problematics of colonization and decolonization. In Gregory’s (2000) view, postcolonialism is a critical politico-intellectual formation that is centrally concerned with the impact of colonialism and its contestation on the cultures of both colonizing and colonized peoples in the past, and the reproduction and transformation of colonial relations, representations and practices in the present (p. 612).
At the root of post-colonial theory and criticism are questions of power and knowledge, and particularly the power to represent the self and others. Representations and modes of perception have been fundamental weapons of colonial power and rule, and we can perhaps best conceive of colonialism as an operation of discourse. Western/colonial power was exercised through a particular kind, a particular kind of language and we cannot understand how colonialism and imperialism worked (and work still) unless we examine the discursive means through which ‘the West’ claimed the power of representation and reality.

My doorway into understanding ‘colonial discourse’ in this dissertation is through Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism. Though colonial discourse and Orientalism are not necessarily interchangeable, Orientalism captures some of the discursive strategies of cultural projection, incorporation, debasement, and erasure which underpin my understandings of how the Pacific was ‘produced’ in the binary cast of Europe’s (inferior) other. Capturing how ‘Europe’ was defined through a oppositional idea and experience, Said says of ‘the Orient’ that it “has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (Said, 1979). In a process now more commonly referred to as ‘othering’, Said describes how the Orient came to be represented as fundamentally different from ‘the Occident.’ This ‘othering’ of the Orient,
involved the creation of “elaborate theories, epics, novels, social descriptions, and political accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, ‘mind,’ destiny, and so on” (Said, 1979) that worked to secure European superiority by suggesting ‘Orientals’ to be the opposite of the rational, peaceful, liberal Western subject. The Orient was, in essence, the “distorting mirror” (Said, 1979, p. 27) by/in which Europe defined itself and celebrated its superiority. As Said suggests, European culture gained its strength and identity “by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and even underground self” (p. 3), the sum and substance of Orientalism being the “ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority” (p. 42). Though Orientalism is located in a particular cultural and historical space, following Said, I suggest in this dissertation that one of the abiding consequences of [Pacific] Orientalist discourse is the way in which “in this framework the Orient [or, here the Pacific] became the negative imprint of the Occident” (Turner, 1989, p. 633). I believe that we can also extend Said’s theory of a dominant (Orientalist) discourse to the Pacific. Like statements of the Orient, accounts of the Pacific, in vocabulary, imagery, and style, enabled Europe’s imperial powers to successfully appropriate the Pacific as its own. And, again in a nod to Said, we could furthermore suggest that “Pacific Orientalism” (Wilson and Hereniko, 1999) still permeates the Western cultural subconscious.
In exposing the West’s propensity to “demean and dominate the other” Said also demonstrates how representation is never neutral. Drawing on Foucauldian discourse theory Said shows how representations are laden with a “will to power,” a will “to control, manipulate, even to incorporate, what is a manifestly different...world” (p. 12). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Orientalism has become perhaps the central text for practitioners of discourse analysis and postcolonial critics. Following Said, colonialism has increasingly come to be seen “as an ideological production across different kinds of texts produced historically from a wide range of different institutions, disciplines, and geographic areas” (Young, 2001, p. 343; my emphasis). As I intimate above, and as Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson write in the introduction to their recent book The Textuality of Empire, colonialism is now most frequently understood as an “operation of discourse, and as an operation of discourse it interpellates colonial subjects by incorporating them in a system of representation. They are always already written by that system of representation” (Tiffin and Lawson, 1994, p. 3). What this project contributes to this postcolonial literature, however, is the way in which I see postcolonial discourse as not merely ‘a culturalism’ (Dirlik, 1994). The linguistic and literary bias of ‘postcolonial studies’ is not only notable for its relative inattention to popular cultural forms such as sport, but in the way it is conventionally ‘textual.’ In many ways I am attempting to address Dirlik’s
contention that the ‘post-colonial’ grossly underplays “capitalism’s structuring of the modern world” (Dirlik, 1994). It could readily be argued that much postcolonial work is thin on detail, hung up on questions of discourse, and marred by textualism (Clayton, 2003). While I certainly privilege discourse in the present analysis (I describe this dissertation, after all, as a critical textual analysis), I hope to guard against reducing (post)colonialism to matters of discourse. My emphasis here is on how discourse operates in a concrete historical situation (‘postcolonial’ New Zealand) and in actual practice. My interest is not language generally, but rather, “specific languages or meanings, and how they are deployed at particular times, in particular places” (Hall, 1997, p. 6). My aim is place postcolonial theory in an engagement with “material practices, actual spaces, and real politics” (Yeoh, 2001, p. 457). As opposed to being a tale of a generalized condition of colonization and its aftermath, this dissertation is an attempt to engage a specific historical and cultural context.

My underlying premise is that discourse is always in constant production and exists only in as much as it can be connected to determining structures and institutions. As Davis (2004) notes, discourse “does not exist purely in the realm of the symbolic or ideological…Discourses are concrete in so far as they emanate from specific points of view” (p. 165). In Hall’s terms, discursive systems have “‘real’ social, economic, and political conditions of existence and ‘real’ material
and symbolic effects.” In his view ideas only become effective if they do, in the end, connect with a particular constellation of social forces. Taking this notion in hand, I am thus less concerned with the ‘how’ or ‘poetics’ of representation and discourse, than with the “linkage[s] between the articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected” (Hall, 1986, p. 53). On these lines we can suggest that the focus on culture and representation need not necessarily be a diversion from political realities of postcolonial struggle because historical representations of imperialism and colonialism are culturally and historically constructed. On one hand, social and historical processes are textual because they can only be recovered in representation, yet texts, in all their various guises, must be read in fuller, more contextualized ways. Texts do not stand in for social processes, discourse for material reality, for texts cannot be disconnected from context.

According with Hall (1997) I also wish to stress here that as I have taken it herein ‘discourse’ is not simply another word for ‘representation.’ Rather, as Loomba (2005) reminds us, “discourse analysis involves examining the social and historical conditions within which specific representations are generated” (p. 97). Hence, any study of colonial discourse “ought to lead us towards a fuller understanding of colonial institutions rather than direct us away from them” (p. 97).
A further major theoretical and conceptual borrowing from postcolonial studies in this dissertation is its concern with conflicts of identity and cultural belonging, and particularly cultural identity in ‘colonised’ societies. Of specific regard is the way former colonial powers have had to change their self-assessment. Postcolonial theorists alert us to the fact that as much as decolonizing European powers thought they could “[leave] the consequences of imperialism behind them” (Hall, 1992, p. 626), the previously ‘colonized’ are now inside as much as outside of the nation-states of the West, precipitating a pluralization of national cultures and identities. Old certainties and hierarchies of identity have certainly been called into question in the post-colonial moment. In particular, the end of colonialism would at first appear to signal the demise of the unrivaled ascendancy of colonialism’s normative whiteness. As numerous scholars have suggested, whiteness was a tacit norm of the colonial endeavor. Fanon, for instance, has shown how upon arrival whiteness became a kind of universal standard to which colonial subjects are compelled to aspire (Fanon, 1967). For Fanon, (cultural) imperialism constructs an undifferentiated whiteness and a conception of Other only as being defined as ‘non-white.’ The colonized black self, he argues, must continually confront his or own ‘otherness’ in the presence of a normalized culture of whiteness. What I therefore initially draw from scholars such as Fanon and, in particular, Albert Memmi (see Memmi, 1965,
1968, 2000), is the way in which whiteness emerged as an indispensable component of colonialism. From more recent scholarship in the area of postcolonial studies is the way in which whiteness died with the passing of (high) colonialism. As Alfred J. López remarks, as an ideal, the “cultural residues of whiteness linger in the postcolonial world” (2005, p. 1). One of colonialism’s most obvious cultural remnants is what López elsewhere calls “a postcolonial ‘will to whiteness’ that lurks in the burgeoning states national racial unconscious, as an unacknowledged, because unexamined, national aesthetic” (López, 2001, p. 95). Much of the dissertation can be viewed as similarly concerned with the colonial legacies of whiteness. To date there has been little scholarship in postcolonial studies exploring the relationship between whiteness and the consolidation and maintenance of colonial power (López, 2005). In several of the chapters below, however, I attempt to connect studies of whiteness that are more typically concerned with ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ to a specifically colonial or postcolonial context. How, I ask, has the representational power of whiteness operated in the service of colonialism and how does it continue to serve neocolonial regimes? To what extent do “white cultural norms remain embedded in the postcolonial or postindependence state”? (López, 2005, p. 4).

Finally, I take from postcolonial studies its injunction to ‘rethink’ Empire and, in particular, the way “the political and institutional histories of ‘the centre’
and its outer circles may be more mutually constituted than we used to think” (C. Hall, 1996, p. 70). Postcolonial scholarship seeks to expose the way in which the binary thinking of ‘colonizer/colonized’ works to perpetuate the colonial dominance of the West and the subordination of the colonized and once-colonized Other (Spivak, 1988). In doing so postcolonial unmasksthe ‘us’/‘them’ relationship implicit in Othering as inherently unstable. It reveals to us the fact that there is no ‘real’ Other ‘out there’ to be located. Othering instead occurs through language and discourse. What this means is that the self-Other binary is always in flux, and as a consequence opens the space for resistance—something that “lies at the heart of the postcolonial debate” (Michel, 1995, p. 92). In the way it challenges binary oppositions and the “fundamentally static notion of identity” (Said, 1993, p. xxviii), post-colonial theory suggests that there are other narratives, other discourses. Postcolonial theory thus moves us toward more amore ambivalent (Bhabha, 1994), syncretic conceptions of postcolonial identity. Homi Bhabha has been particularly influential in such developments, with his call “to think beyond narratives or originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulations of cultural differences.” In the latter parts of this dissertation I take up the parallel arguments of Paul Gilroy and the way in which his notion of The Black Atlantic attempts to move beyond the colonizer/colonized relationship (Gilroy, 1993).
Finally I heed Hall’s insistence that cultural identities “far from being eternally fixed in some essentialized past” are “subject to the continuous ‘play’ of history, culture, and power” (Hall, 1990, p. 212-213; see also Hall, 1992). For this very reason, I wish to suggest that as much as rugby may still be seen as a symbolic site representing New Zealand’s imperial legacy, it also functions as what Mary Louise Pratt dubs as a postimperial “contact zone” (Pratt, 1992). Like the types of interactive, relational identities theorized by Bhabha, Gilroy, and Hall rugby suggests not only the legacy of past colonial encounter but the ‘transcultural’ (Pratt, 1992) challenges to it. In this way, I take postcolonialism to be a process of disengagement, rather than a break, from colonialism. Postcolonialism as I see it is “an anticipatory discourse” (Quayson, 2000, p. 9), and ongoing process “of anticipating and striving for truly decolonized future realities, identities, relations, freedoms, and spaces” (Ball, 2004, p. 13).
Writers on sport…automatically put what was unpleasant out of sight even if they had to sweep it under the carpet. The impression they created was one of almost perpetual sweetness and light

- C. L. R. James

The problem of the twenty-first century is the problem of the color-blind

- Vijay Prashad

On my last trip to North America, I flew Air New Zealand, New Zealand’s ‘national airline.’ Like most people in those nervous moments before take-off, I rummage through the seat-pocket in front of me, searching for the in-flight magazine. Generally, when I find it, I turn to the back; the audio-visual guide is something of a best friend on a near eleven-hour flight. Today, though, something else caught my interest first. On the cover is a young girl, maybe seven or eight, performing in Auckland’s Pasifika Festival. Her hair is pulled back, colorful feathers flowing from where it is fastened at the top of her head. She is dressed in a jute ‘ie lavalava adorned across the breast with the same kind of feathers that jut from her hair. From the position of her arms and her sway, we can tell she is dancing. I’m not sure what: a siva, a sasa?; I think it’s a taualunga, but can’t be certain. It doesn’t really matter: for the average tourist she could be
easily mistaken for an aspiring ‘Hula girl,’ performing some sort of ‘native’ movement, to ‘island’ music we can’t hear, but somehow know. It’s an interesting image to have on the cover of what is, for all intents and purposes, a marketing brochure for New Zealand Tourism. Interesting in that, this is a country better known for “rugby and Lord of the Rings” (as local comedian Te Radar once drolly put it), with, perhaps, “a bit of Maori stuff on top” (Smith, 2005, p. 22). Air New Zealand, though, was showing/selling us a different picture of New Zealand, and, evidently, New Zealanders; as they put it, this was a different “shade of Kiwi.” Here was an image meant to invoke “a whole new genre of New Zealanders”, one of the “third culture kids” who are “now making their mark felt of the New Zealand mainstream” (Schaer, 2007).

It’s an easy reading to make. If we missed the message, the subtitle makes it clear: this is a piece about “Our Pacific Culture.” Of course, by ‘our’ they mean ‘New Zealand’s.’ The new New Zealand we are told is one that is “fast becoming brown.” And, there are strong grounds too for making their claim. Demographically and culturally, at no time in its history has New Zealand been so self-aware, and so unashamed, of itself as “a Pacific nation.” Among statisticians and demographers ‘browning’ is a reference to the fact that, as an ‘ethnic group’ (to use official parlance), the Pacific population is growing at a rate far in excess of their ‘European’ counterparts. By 2021 the Pacific population
is projected to grow by some 59 percent over 2001, while the proportion of Pacific peoples is estimated to rise from 6 per cent to 9 per cent of all New Zealanders (Statistics New Zealand, 2006). Beyond the numbers and the stats, that New Zealand is “becoming browner” (Macfie, 2005) is also evident in how the country is both defining, as well as projecting, its cultural identity. The recent “‘efflorescence’ of things Pacific” (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005, p. 210) has provided the grounds for what academic Misatau’uveve Melani Anae describes as the “infiltration of a Pacific identity at a national level” (Anae, 2004, 92). This is well reflected in the arts, music, television, film, and literature, all areas where Pacific peoples are making major, and highly visible, contributions (for further discussion see Anae, 2006; Mallon and Pereira, 2002; Pearson, 2004; Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005). The influence of Pacific culture has also “surfaced in institutional contexts” (Anae, 2004) including education, research and government departments and policy. Little wonder, then, that renowned photographer Glenn Jowitt should offer this vision of how New Zealand should promote itself to the world: “I think that representing ‘us’ as Polynesia is the way to go.”

The list of Pacific people who have made a mark at regional, national and international level is indeed extensive. So too are examples of their growing influence on New Zealand social and cultural life. For instance, we could point to Scribe’s seven Tui Awards, Ben Lummis’ crowning as New Zealand Idol, the
wildly successful animated series *bro’Town*, or the fact that a record 210,000 recently turned out for Auckland’s Pasifika Festival. But if Polynesians are, as one recent report suggests (Smith, 2005), “changing the face of New Zealand” then for me there is no better example than the appointment of Ionatana Falefasa ‘Tana’ Umaga as All Black captain. The first Pacific person to be named as such, Umaga was roundly hailed at the time as “a fitting reflection of New Zealand society” (Kayes, 2004, p. 14). Certainly, he was an apt choice given the national game has been dominated in recent years by players of Pacific descent (his role in a team with “a predominantly brown look about it” wrote one columnist, “always seemed to be a logical choice” [Singh, 2006]). Multiculturalism aside, at the same time Umaga neatly symbolized other tenets deeply ingrained in the New Zealand psyche. It is significant in the way it played out the myth of classless egalitarianism which remains one of the core elements of New Zealand’s national identity (Consedine, 1989; Nolan, 2007). Alongside this egalitarian ideal, it has become commonplace to believe that racism has no place in New Zealand, that it applies to other societies, but *not here*. Umaga’s becoming captain was this color-blind, egalitarian narrative writ large: born in the working-class suburb of Wainuiomata to parents who had immigrated from Samoa, he has become, despite the “odd stumble and fall from grace” (Kayes, 2004, p. 14), one of New Zealand’s most recognized and respected sportsmen, attracting “the
same publicity usually afforded the prime minister and other high-powered celebrities” (Rees, 2005, p. 25).

On one level the beatification of Umaga could well be read as a sign that Pacific peoples are no longer marginalized in the New Zealand national space, that they no longer occupy the position of the ‘other.’ More likely, however, it reflects New Zealand’s desire to seen as an inclusive, multicultural nation. That is, it has less to do with celebrating Umaga, than celebrating ourselves. To borrow from Anagnostou (2003), Umaga is an example of how:

To tell stories of ethnic success is to speak about the nation in all its benevolence and generosity. National ideologies such as...mobility, openness, and inclusiveness come to life any time the nation’s Others claim socioeconomic achievement (p. 279).

Umaga, I argue, can be read as an apparent vindication of what Chock (1991) dubs the “myth of opportunity.” And, as an “opportunity story” (Chock, 1991), he serves an important ideological function: first, as a tale of national redemption, a way of forgetting the racially-charged ‘dawn raids’ and expulsions of the past (see de Bres, 2005; and, second, his story represents what Ang (2001, p. 98) calls a “public fiction” that implies New Zealanders “live in a harmonious...and peaceful country where everyone is included and gets along.” That is, through Umaga the national subject can be interpellated as tolerant. There is too a further ideological consequence of this myth. If New Zealand society in the popular imagination provides the unfettered opportunity for
upward mobility, if the barriers once facing ethnic minorities have been removed, then equality of opportunity for all New Zealanders becomes a given. If individual talents, motivations, and morals account for social statuses, then the failings of minorities are purely their own (McNamee and Miller, 2004). This type of liberal individualist myth suggests difference is not an obstacle to achievement, abrogating the real structural constraints that affect minority socioeconomic mobility, and ignoring “current inequalities that fall primarily along racial lines” (Ebert, 2004, p. 174; see also Freeman, 2005). In assuming an open, race-neutral context, the egalitarian narrative reinforces the current racial order, “suppressing a plain dealing and unsentimental consideration of the continuing constitutive role of processes of racialized and ethnicized othering” in contemporary New Zealand (Ang, 2001, p. 139).

And, this, I argue, is where rugby enters the scene. That New Zealanders still hold fast to the illusion of being an democratic, egalitarian society, without hierarchies entrenched in race or inherited privilege, has much to do with the continual invocation of a history of diversity and tolerance—something marred only by ‘exceptional’ events in a less-enlightened past. Such myths are structured and reproduced through variegated and temporally-extended representational strategies, narrated, obscured and embodied in various elements of public culture. The narrative construction of the past can be found in a variety of
materials; in texts, objects, monuments, landscapes and images. And, of course, to this list we should add sport. As Nauright (2003) argues, “the nostalgic use of sport and the history of sport has been one of the most significant areas in the process of sustaining identities and solidarity through shared experiences of heroic deeds in specific societies” (p. 38). Sport is also imbued with a contemporary relevance, in that the sporting past is frequently drawn on to “legitimate a present social order” (Nauright, 2003, p. 35).

Against this symbolic power of the All Blacks, in this chapter I would like to offer a different reading. Rugby, I will argue, for all its cosmopolitanism, often serves to obfuscate deeper ethnic schisms. Beneath the united façade of pakeha men playing side-by-side with their Maori and Pacific Island brethren, rugby is not nearly as inclusive as Kiwis would like to, or have been led to, believe. Though rugby may offer a context where New Zealanders can engage on mutual terms, it gives lie to the fact that the acceptance of Pacific peoples as fully-fledged Kiwis is far from unanimous. And, rugby is neither immune to the discourses of race and nation: they are always there, struggled over and occasionally erupting. In Gilroy’s terms it could be argued that rugby is an “important site on which the limits of the nation as well as its character are routinely established” (1987, p. 62). As such, the ideas of national belonging and ethnicity that it maps out are a window into the “ambivalent kinships” that have marked the Pacific migrant
experience (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005, p. 207). As much as rugby turns “the ethnic into the national” (Anagnostou, 2003, p. 279) it generates messages bearing significant ideological contradictions, creating feelings of both belonging and alienation, and revealing a fundamental unease with the growing cultural prominence of Pacific peoples. However much they may have succeeded in rugby, Pacific peoples remain an ambiguous presence in New Zealand.

Rugby: The Game for All New Zealanders?

To begin, it important to first trace the rise of what could be called ‘the rugby mystique.’ By this I am referring to the way in which rugby has come to be seen, to borrow the title of Peter Bush’s best-selling tribute to the sport, The Game for All New Zealand. In many ways it is remarkable that this is the case. Rugby began, after all, as the sport of an elite. As Dunning and Sheard (2005) have shown, in its distinguishing form, rugby emerged in the milieu of the English Public School System during the early 1800s. Throughout public schools at the time ‘manliness’ emerged as an ideal, supported by the resurrected belief that strength of character could be achieved through sturdiness of the body. These views of the body and mind also had religious motivations stemming from the Protestant élite. Their basic premise—which found its most famed expression in the cult of ‘Muscular Christianity’—was that participation in sport could contribute to the development of not only physical fitness and ‘manly’ character,
but also of Christian morality. As the reformist Charles Kingsley once wrote in *Education and Health*, “games induce not merely to physical but to moral health.”

With new emphasis given to physical activities, sports such as rugby became part-and-parcel of the education of the young men of the British upper (and later, aspiring) classes. Under the guidance of headmasters like Thomas Arnold of Rugby and G.E.L. Cotton of Marlborough, rugby would became an integral part of “the wider reforms that were designed to instil discipline and exert ‘social control’ over the behavior of pupils” (Harvey, 1999, p. 93). To its advocates rugby provided the ideal means through which to enact “a ‘manly’ education tempered by civilizing restraints” (Dunning and Sheard, 2005, p. 74). It would remain a sport played and administered by a relatively homogeneous upper middle class well into the 1870s.

Rugby arrived in New Zealand in the context of these class-bound origins. Here too it began among the elite. As Crawford (1996, p. 151) has argued, the “games cult” and the influence of muscular Christianity was transferred to the prestigious boys schools of New Zealand, in doing so creating a mystique that made the good “games player” a privileged person in society. However, though clearly transported from English public schools by old boys to New Zealand, rugby in the new colony “spread quickly through other social classes” (Phillips, 1987, p. 90). As During (1998) observes, “What in England was mainly an upper-
class game...became in New Zealand a symbol of mateship, intrepidness, coloniser-colonised reconciliation. All this without the game losing its imperialist aura” (p. 35).

Why the exclusive nature of the English game did not reproduce itself in New Zealand has been the subject of some debate (see Ryan, 2004). The reason it spread so quickly, though, has generally been posited as owing to one or a combination of factors. There was certainly an element of pragmatism in that rugby demanded little in the way of equipment, and, unlike cricket, was better suited to New Zealand’s rugged landscape (Phillips, 1987; Ryan, 1993, 2004). Phillips has also argued that the sport was a neat fit with New Zealand’s pioneer culture. Echoing Dunning and Sheard’s contention that “rugby’s great roughness may have made it more appealing to groups among whom traditional concepts of masculinity continued to prevail” (p. 119), Phillips contends that, in New Zealand, “rugby appealed to values already deep rooted among the male community” (p. 92). In Phillips’ view rugby was the epitome of rural, colonial masculinity: “The effort, cooperation and egalitarianism required of pioneers in taming a rugged landscape supposedly produced an especially tough New Zealand male ‘type’ ideally suited to the combative demands of the rugby field” (Ryan, 2004, p. 167).
As much as rugby took root because of a distinctive male culture, a number of authors have additionally suggested that rugby provided an important basis for social integration (Crawford, 1985, 1986; Fougere, 1989; Perry, 1994, 2004). According to Erik Olssen the structure of rugby “allowed ethnic, religious and local loyalties to be expressed yet transcended them.” Geoff Fougere (1989) has similarly written of how “rugby tied together the collection of localities and provinces into a national body” even before New Zealand “had anything resembling a national market, or even a very effective national state” (p. 12). As he writes,

what is achieved through rugby is the symbolic uniting of men over and against all of the differences of background, occupation, education, income, experience and belief that otherwise divide them. This vision of male comradeship is not imposed from above, but built painstakingly from the level of the local club through provincial and national levels...At the peak of this structure, giving final definition to its meaning and purpose...the national team—the All Blacks (Fougere, 1989, p. 116).

Perry (2005) notes that in this way “distinctions between social classes, between town and country, between regions, between colonisers and colonised, were both dramatised and bridged” (p. 158). As New Zealand became increasingly urban during the late 1800s rugby continued to serve a similar integrative role. The enthusiastic following for the sport made possible “a new sense of belonging, a ritualistic involvement in a larger group” (Crawford, 1986) even as New Zealand’s towns and cities expanded. In a society “experiencing rapid urban
development and the growth of civic consciousness” the game became “one answer to the industrial anomie” of the time (Crawford, 1986). As Crawford notes, the rituals surrounding the game drew communities together: “The action, excitement and movement as a team must have served as a strong antidote to the alienation experienced in the work situation by the player who was an unskilled labourer.” Such was rugby’s place that Laidlaw (1999) now laments a time when rugby was once “a cornerstone of every community” (p. 21).

The most popular, and sustaining, myth to explain rugby’s popularity, though, is its purported classlessness; something that fit with New Zealand’s image of itself as ‘a working man’s paradise’ (to use the words of one erstwhile Prime Minister). As True (1996) notes, into the early-twentieth century “it was common for the people of New Zealand to be told by successive governments that they were a ‘classless society’” (p. 112). If England was home to inequality, then in New Zealand it found its counter. And, rugby moved to the centre of this egalitarian myth. Echoing the pioneer community, “rugby was appropriate for, and complimentary to, a New Zealand community forged by a democratic press of ‘mateship’ and familiarity” (Crawford, 1996). The word mateship here is worth noting. Mateship, which Mulgan (2004) defines as “the peculiarly colonial ideal of male solidarity and friendship” (p. 42), is a kind of fraternal egalitarianism deeply invested with connotations of communality. It came to be a
signifier of the ideals shared by men living closely together in the harsh conditions of the frontier. Rugby, like colonial life, appeared hospitable to a rough-and-ready egalitarianism and the pioneer disdain for authority and commitment to pragmatism. As the novelist Lloyd Jones writes,

In New Zealand, the sport reinforced the vision of the classless and inclusive society. And in a society that had still to build its infrastructure, every pair of hands had its use. Much the same applies to the game of rugby (Jones, 2003).

Rugby thus became a way through which (Pakeha) men came to understand themselves as a settler society within a domestic culture grounded in the rigors of the colonial life, rather than as an English satellite.

This image of egalitarian mateship was cemented by the 1905 All Black tour of the United Kingdom. Much has been made of the way the British press were fascinated by the apparent lack of classlessness among the team (Phillips, 1987). One wrote, for instance, of the way:

All grades of opinion from the university professor to the navvy, the socialist, the freethinker, aye, any class of religious thought—Roman Catholic of Protestant—the black man, the brown man, and the white man have all one common place of the football field. What they are doesn’t matter—it’s their abilities as players that count” (cited in Phillips, 1987, p. 116).

Whereas the British were wont to associate rugby with “the aristocratic acts of individual brilliance”, the All Blacks “seemed a new species, an egalitarian band of natural gentlemen” (Phillips, 1987, p. 117). The perception of subsequent
teams over the next 70 or so years reinforced this image of the All Blacks as modest, unassuming, ‘ordinary blokes.’ Phillips notes how even into the 1970s one biographer of the immortal Colin Meads was keen to assure readers that “Meads sees himself as an ordinary bloke with a farm to work, sheep to shear, land to be cleared, a cow to milk. As a bloke who loves a beer with his mates” (p. 118). Today, rugby writers, rugby journalists in particular, have been essential in facilitating and perpetuating the egalitarian myth. In the best-selling book *How to Watch a Game of Rugby* Spiro Zavos reflects on how

Most New Zealand males, from erudite scholars to burly shearers, have experienced the dying fall of the light after a hard match and the linament-scented mateship of the dressing room. It is one of those tribal experiences that has helped to create that unique and underrated species, the New Zealand man (Zavos, 2005).

Elsewhere, Zavos writes of his own experience:

The sports arena was my path, perhaps my only way, to respectability and self-knowledge. Thinking about this, I realized that sporting achievement is—or should be—colour blind, because it is (or should be) focused on what a person does, not his or her background, culture, class, religion or looks. Kids who try to make it in society through sport, know this instinctively (Zavos, 1997).

Chris Laidlaw writes similarly of how “the secret of most of New Zealand’s rugby success this century has been a simplicity of approach; a focus on essentials and an innate self belief by individuals who have had to make it on the basis of their own personal effort” (p. 185).
The power of the rugby myth, though, is ironically best seen among those who lament the fact that the All Blacks are no longer ‘ordinary blokes.’ Romanos (2002), for instance, decries how “in every sense, top players inhabit a different orbit to the man in the street, the butcher, the accountant, the teacher, the plumber” (p. 91). “The All Blacks used to be ordinary New Zealanders” he writes. “Not any more. All Blacks now belong to an exclusive rich people’s club” (p. 69). This nostalgic image of the ‘everyday’ All Black past, is perhaps no better exemplified than in a 2001 editorial in the *New Zealand Herald*:

Time was when we felt very close to the All Blacks. But that was when the country’s finest players downed milking cups, hammer and even the occasional office notebook to don the black jersey. That was when Colins Meads went into town every Friday to get in the weekly supplies, just like farmers in every corner of the land. Then the All Blacks were part of the community, and totally accessible. They enjoyed an elevated status, but not an elevated income…No more…Today’s All Blacks are wealthy professionals.

Speaking of the ills of professionalism the former All Black Andy Haden expresses a similar disquiet, a grieving over more ‘democratic’ days. He remarks that he “naively thought professionalism would be egalitarian…but the players are no longer ordinary blokes.” Writing in the *New Zealand Political Review* the liberal commentator Chris Trotter mourns similarly of the fact that “the professionalization of the All Blacks has fatally undercut the egalitarian ideals which fuelled New Zealand’s abiding rugby legends.”
However, although the myth of rugby as the game of the ‘everyman’ may have died (or at least be on the wane), it has not affected the popular view that the game is nonetheless meritocratic. The perceived virtues of a meritocracy still hold firm sway in New Zealand. Liu (2005) has noted how New Zealand holds liberal-democratic values, anchored in ideals of freedom and equality, as central to nationhood. This has particular salience to race, where the predominant (Pakeha) view has long been that “all New Zealanders were ‘one people’ who enjoyed some of the best race relations in the world” (Macdonald, 2004, p. 218). McCreanor (1993) has referred to this normative account of New Zealand race relations as the “standard story”:

The standard story of Maori/Pakeha relations...says that Maori/Pakeha relations are the best in the world...Mutual respect for each other’s strengths and tolerance for idiosyncrasies has integrated the Maori people into a harmonious, egalitarian relationship with the more recent arrivals, the whole thing working constructively for the common good. This narrative explains Maori failure as due to their inability to cope in the modern world because of inherent flaws in their character or culture (p. 61).

Rugby has played a critical part in sustaining this narrative. Like McCreanor notes more generally, central in this regard to rugby is the role of played by Maori. As MacLean argues, Maori rugby is “at the heart of rugby’s role in New Zealand’s cultural politics” (MacLean, 2005). From the game’s very inception in New Zealand the achievements of Maori rugby players have been “celebrated by Pakeha as solid evidence that the country was indeed a paradise of racial
harmony” (Bellich, 1986). Symbolically, Maori participation in rugby “became proof of assimilation, co-operation and racial harmony” (MacLean, 2005, p. 14), helping to “establish in Pakeha eyes a myth of racial integration” (Phillips, 1987, p. viii). Their participation, especially at the national level, “provided affirmation for the then dominant...belief that race relations in New Zealand were among the best in the world” (Watson, 2007, p. 783).

The received versions of New Zealand history have certainly accorded this integrationist myth great weight. In his widely-read History of New Zealand Michael King has asserted that, while Pakeha and Maori domains remained fundamentally separated until World War II, “the one national activity to which Maori contributed was rugby” (King, 2003, p. 386). He goes on to suggest that success in rugby “equated to greater recognition for Maori and therefore led to the dominant culture granting them a higher standard of citizenship” (Watson, 2007, p. 783). Terry McLean (1975) writes similarly of how “the particular importance of rugby in New Zealand has been both mystical and critical. It was supremely an outstanding catalytic agent in the fusing of races, Polynesian and Caucasian” (McLean, 1975, p. 15). This myth enjoys widespread popularity in New Zealand, perhaps largely because it is a favored narrative of current rugby writing and journalism. As Malcom MacLean notes, popular sports writing continues to “[grant] legitimacy to the all-one-people view of New Zealand”
(2005, p. 19). Contemporary writers, he argues, are “proficient exponent[s] of this hegemonic discourse” (p. 19). By way of examples: Zavos (1997) contends that “rugby in New Zealand, from the 1880s, provided the paradigm for how New Zealand society should have opened up to the Maori community last century and this century”; in Laidlaw’s (2005) view “the All Blacks are infinitely more representative of their various peoples than the Springboks. And for that matter British teams in which black players still remain something of a novelty. In New Zealand it is the opposite (2005, p. 5); Paul (2007) is even more romantic in his suggestion that “rugby actually lead or is better than society...Social barriers and prejudices might have existed in New Zealand’s wider society throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but not in rugby”; finally, the All Blacks have also been described as “a model meeting point for people of any race” (Editorial, 2002), and as “one of our most successful examples of multi-culturalism in practice” (Thomas, 2006, p. A23).

To be sure, the race-rugby-nation homology has been frequently undermined by New Zealand’s problematic relationship with South Africa. The NRFU, for instance, agreed not to select Maori players for tours to South Africa between 1921 and the mid-1960s. Over time, however, many in the New Zealand public became increasingly uncomfortable about rugby’s complicity with an apartheid regime. Richards (1999) suggests that by the 1960s most New
Zealanders had come to accept that any future tours to South Africa could no longer exclude Maori players. The 1967 tour, for instance, was cancelled after the New Zealand government had vehemently voiced its opposition to South Africa’s refusal to allow Maori to tour. This ‘No Maori, No Tour’ (Richards, 1999, 2006) stance was gradually extended to include opposition to all sporting contacts with South Africa. This led to the game becoming a symbol of national division when Anti-apartheid protestors staged a series of demonstrations against the touring Springboks in 1981. Up to 150,000 people were involved in more than 200 demonstrations the length and breadth of the country. The eight weeks that the Springboks spent in New Zealand have been described by one as “the most intense, prolonged civil unrest in New Zealand’s history” (Richards, 2006, p. 16; see also Chapple, 1984). What was notable was that the protests were not just about apartheid, but racism at home. The Maori protest movement had by that time become firmly established and joined the marches against the tour. As Phillips (2006) notes, as they did so “they confronted non-Maori New Zealanders with the searching question: ‘If you campaign against race in South Africa, what about at home’” (p. 19).

However, although rugby went into a period of decline succeeding the “crisis” (Nauright, 2003) provoked by the tour, it was soon to recover following New Zealand’s win in the inaugural Rugby World Cup in 1987. Rugby had also
gone through a period of restructuring in which it moved to extend its appeal beyond those with which it had been traditional identified. Part of this re-imaging was done so as to render it congruent with the interests of advertisers and sponsors. Players were eroticized, game action was increasingly dramatized, and narratives and visual imagery shifted as the game tried to broaden its demographic reach (Perry, 1994, 2004, 2005). Such was the success of the new media-rugby-big business alliance that by the 1990s rugby had all but regained its pre-1981 status (Nauright, 2003). Catalyzed by the national navel-gazing following ‘81 Tour, rugby’s concerted marketing campaign has pitched a new image to the New Zealand populace: the re-made game, so the spiel went, is now a fair, inclusive, family affair.

Aiding and abetting this re-branding was the fact that the rugby had largely moved beyond its foundation in face-to-face relations. Whereas rugby may have once been built on participation—“built painstakingly from the level of the local club through provincial and national levels” as Fougere (1989, p. 116) describes it—we are today more likely to ‘encounter’ our rugby brethren by way of mediation, via “the realm of simulation” (Perry, 2004, p. 297). In this realm rugby’s messages are infinitely more flexible. First, in the sense of being able to reach, or more rightly produce, a large, heterogeneous audience (men, women and children of all ages, classes, levels of education, ethnicities and so on). No
longer is rugby dependent on “the aficionado’s romance with the language and
lore of his sport” (Hendricks, 1991, p. 4). Second, in not being wholly grounded
by experience(/materiality), rugby in its mediated form was a ‘text’ more open to
multiple and contradictory readings. Part of the rugby strategy in particular was
to produce polyvocal texts that were at once specific and national. Administrators
realized that rugby, in essence, could be marketed to a national audience via a
narrative of difference, of ‘multiculturalism.’

As an example, one of the more notable features of the game’s re-branding
has been the prominence, indeed foregrounding, of aspects of tikanga Maori (or,
Maori practices and customs). The haka is particularly significant. According to
Teaiwa and Mallon (2005), it is “a crucial element of the All Blacks’ image and
rugby culture in New Zealand. It has arguably become a symbol of New
Zealand’s shared culture and heritage through sport” (p. 217). Jackson and
Hokowhitu (2002) similarly contend that “inasmuch as identity, particularly
national identity, is constructed out of difference, the haka can be seen to play a
pivotal role in defining New Zealand identity both domestically and abroad.”
Critically, however, as they go on to note, performances of the haka by the
national rugby team are symptomatic of how tikanga Maori has historically been
misappropriated by Pakeha interests—particularly those such as the NZRU—
who have sought to use the haka for commercial gain. Not only does use of the
*haka* raise crucial issues linked about intellectual property rights and the authority of representation, but as Hokowhitu (2004) notes *haka*’s use is disembedded from any meaningful Maori framework and has largely become a nationalistic spectacle in Pakeha terms (see also Perry, 2004). The contemporary haka is thus plagued by the overarching problem of decontextualization, or the “act of detaching objects from their original cultural contexts” (Kreps, 2003, p. 149). In Falcous’ (2007) terms, while the haka provides the “illusion of bicultural unity” and is accentuated “as emblematic of the nation” it is only as an “exoticised spectacle disembedded from depthful engagement with diversity.”

Other academics, and occasionally even members of the mainstream media (see, for example, *Sport a mirror of society*, 2006), have also exposed the rugby myth for what it is: precisely that, a *myth* (Ryan, 2005). Recent scholarship, in particular, has challenged the received understandings of rugby as an agent of national and racial integration. Ryan (2005) is particularly wary of the way rugby was perceived to be a ‘level playing field.’ He notes how the NZRFU distanced itself from fixtures between Maori and touring sides by only according them ‘unofficial status.’ Watson (2007) makes a similar observation, suggesting “the NZRFU was, at best, ambivalent in its attitude towards Maori rugby between 1870 and 1914” (p. 785). Ryan also questions the belief that rugby was even widely-played by Maori in the late-1800s. The majority of Maori players, he
argues, in fact belonged to “an influential elite who were determined to engage with the increasingly dominant Pakeha society” (Ryan, 2005). Finally, while MacLean (1996) suggests that a “crucial element of the relations of symbolic power of a singular New Zealand was the inclusion of Maori as ‘just like us’”, he argues that incorporation has been decidedly ambivalent. For MacLean, the national hegemonic identity “suggests a number of areas of contention centred primarily on the contradiction between hegemonic masculinity as incorporating Maori and colonial relations that exclude Maori” (MacLean, 1996).

Brown Boys in the Back-line: On the Proper Uses of ‘Polynesian’ All Blacks

Often myth is more important than reality. The accuracy of the ‘rugby story’ has obviously mattered less than the way the game functions as a symbolic display of bicultural partnership. As Francis (1997, p. 174) reminds us, when it comes to core national myths, “literal truth” has never been “a measure of their power or their usefulness.” In a Barthesian sense, the myth is more palatable because it does not question the prevailing structures of power. Of course, to mention Barthes is to also recognize the ideological work of ‘myth.’ The myth is posited as the normal state-of-affairs, legitimating the status quo, suppressing difference. In rugby there is a familiarity proceeding from history, in that, for New Zealanders it affirms and promotes the supposed racial democracy in which they live. It should also be mentioned that race relations in New Zealand
have, of late, taken something of a beating. Many were embarrassed by the 2006 report of UN special rapporteur Rodolfo Stavenhagen which concluded that “persistent disparities” continue between Maori and non-Maori, and that many of these were consistent with “a history of discrimination” (Stavenhagen, 2006; for further discussion see Mutu, 2007). The recent arrest of 17 Maori rights activists on weapons and terrorism offences has also “exposed wounds that most people outside New Zealand could be forgiven for assuming had healed long ago” (Henley, 2007). Hence, the ‘rugby myth’ today takes on an added ideological burden: as Francis (1997) notes, even if “the myths we have used to explain our history no longer make much sense”, in an “age of anxiety” we revert to them like something of an “habitual tic”, a “nostalgic hankering for the past rather than an accurate understanding of it” (Francis, 1997, p. 174). Because it is one of the country’s ‘central myths’ — a story that seems to express a fundamental belief that New Zealanders hold about themselves — the deceptive idea of Maori and Pakeha being partners “in the scrum and wider society” (Brabazon, 2006, p. 182) has not died easily. As one reporter for the UK’s Guardian rhetorically (and sardonically) asked: “Maori do very well, don’t they, in all walks of life? And look at the All Blacks! New Zealand and the Maori, they’re pretty much OK, aren’t they? No big issues there” (Henley, 2007).
What critical analysis there has been of the maintenance and perpetuation of this (false) image has largely concerned the deep contradiction between the wholesale (mal)appropriation of *tikanga* Maori and the fact that, in Stavenhagen’s words, the “gap in social and economic conditions is actually growing larger and an increasing proportion of Maori are being left behind” (Stavenhagen, 2006): that is, critics continue to problematize rugby via its complicity in the depoliticization of culture, or what Fish (1997) may have called ‘boutique [bi]culturalism.’ Without wishing to dismiss nor diminish either the relevance or import of such work, the continued focus on the bicultural context of New Zealand identity politics would seem to deny the symbolic and representational rights of other minorities. Can those groups that are neither Pakeha nor Maori continue to be “frozen out of the debate on the identity and future of the country” (Thakur, 1995, p. 272) given the increasing cultural and ethnic diversity of New Zealand’s population? This is a particularly salient question for rugby when Pacific people now account for more than 30 per cent of New Zealand’s professional rugby players. How can a New Zealand of ‘multicultural drift’, the process, as Stuart Hall may have described it, whereby images of Pacific people are “slowly pulled into the mainstream of representation” (Hall, 2000), be reconciled with a New Zealand still struggling with the “unfinished business” of Maori-Pakeha relations? (Kotchari, Pearson, and Zuberi, 2004, p. 139). More
pointedly, does the increasing visibility of Pacific people interrupt the flow of rugby’s dominant narrative discourse as a compact between two ‘founding cultures’?

On these lines, I wish to discuss what I herein call ‘Pacific multiculturalism.’ Best exemplified in rugby, Pacific multiculturalism is first and foremost a form of multiculturalism that softens the otherwise sharp edges of cultural difference. Difference is incorporated into the national imaginary but only in a way which occludes or minimizes specific political activisms and their histories. More pointedly, in drawing on and reinforcing ‘ethnic’ difference it does so in a hierarchical way: while it provides an apparently more inclusionary construction of New Zealand national identity, it mobilizes difference as part of the crisis-management of monoculturalism. In the very celebration of their difference the All Blacks sideline bicultural anxieties and, ironically, perpetuate an unmarked and normative New Zealand (read Pakeha) ethnicity. For all the rhetoric, rugby is as much a conduit of division as an agent of integration and change. Beneath the united, multicultural façade, rugby is not nearly as inclusive as Kiwis would like to, or have been led to, believe. This is especially true with regard to Pacific peoples whose involvement in the national game continues to evoke feelings of ambivalence among both Maori and Pakeha alike (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005).
At this point it is worth noting that Pacific peoples have a long and distinguished history in New Zealand rugby. Their influence in the first half of the twentieth century was obviously by no means great given so few Pacific peoples lived in New Zealand prior to the post-World War Two economic boom (the 1945 Census puts the number at only 2159). However, Pacific peoples have been a feature of the All Blacks since at least 1931 when Pago Pago-born Frank Solomon first appeared in a test against Australia at Eden Park, Auckland. In these early years Pacific peoples were so much a novelty that they were often assumed to be Maori, and Solomon himself played for the New Zealand Maori on their 1927 internal tour. Like Solomon, few Pacific players in the decades preceding the 1960s were recognized as such, either by selectors or the public at large (Schaaf, 2003). By the 1960s, though, as migrants arrived in their thousands, there was a developing sense of a New Zealand-based ‘Pacific Island’ identity forming from community growth and consolidation. During this time rugby was perhaps second only to the church as a mechanism of social support, acting, again like the church, as a means by which to foster and sustain community life in a new location (Spoonley, 2002). ‘Ethnic’ teams also contributed to the building of what Macpherson (2003) has called “moral communities” which helped to preserve traditional social values and practices. The more successful teams, such as those of Auckland’s Ponsonby Club, were an enormous source of
community pride and helped to forge and reinforce collective cultural, ethnic and national identities (Pitt and Macpherson, 1974).

If these teams helped to build self-esteem among Pacific peoples, then, in contrast, *palagi* New Zealanders viewed them with more than a degree of misgiving. As I later discuss in more detail, the attitudes of New Zealanders toward Pacific Island migrants throughout the 1960s and 1970s were less than savory: Pacific Islanders, so the stereotype went, were not only unwilling (or unable) to assimilate, but, worse, had a tendency toward violence, criminal behavior, and immorality (Loto *et al.*, 2006; Mitchell, 2003; Ross, 1992; Spoonley, 1990). Similar sentiments spilled onto the rugby field. Echoing early ideas about Maori (see Hokowhitu, 2004; Star, 1992), Pacific players were dogged by the perception that they were savage, emotionally impulsive, aggressive, and violent. Prior to Bryan Williams star-turn on the 1970 tour of South Africa, Pacific players also remained something of an unknown quantity—at least in terms of their skill. In the early 1970s, the public was more likely to see press reports about on-field brawls between Pacific and Maori players than to hear about the many accomplishments of Pacific players. Even Western Samoa, which is today considered a ‘breeding-ground’ of rugby talent (see Gregory, 2004), was seen at the time as something of a “rugby backwater” (Neazor, 1999, p. 163). Pacific
players were viewed as great ‘athletes’, but lacking both the discipline and rugby acumen to ascend into the national fold.

Williams, however, changed all that. On the 1970 tour, his first, he was an undoubted star, scoring 14 tries in 13 appearances. Playing into his notoriety, 1970 marked the first time non-white players were permitted to tour the Republic. Williams, a part-Samoan, was particularly beloved by black South Africans, and despite the fact that the South African government officially considered him an “honorary white”, he was undeniably not Pakeha. And, Williams was also wildly popular at home. Even among Pakeha fans he was a favorite (though as broadcaster and former politician Willie Jackson has noted, ethnicity is often “conveniently forgotten when the All Blacks [are] winning” [quoted in Romanos, 2002, p. 179]). For Pacific people though Williams was a hugely influential role model, an indication of what could be achieved “against the economic and social odds in New Zealand society” (Te’evale, 2001, p. 220). As former All Black, and current Auckland coach, Pat Lam has said of Williams’ effect on his career:

It meant a lot to my dad and uncles to see Bryan Williams become an All Black. Even now when Samoans do well it gives my family a sense of pride. Parents had an example of someone they could highlight. They could hold up guys like Bryan...as people from a similar background who had been successful (quoted in Paul, 2007).
Few outside the Pacific community probably recognized him as a Samoan or even a ‘Pacific Islander’ as such, but within a decade of Williams hanging up his boots, “the number of Pacific Islanders operating at the top level of the game had increased significantly” (Paul, 2007).

By the mid-1970s rugby had ostensibly opened the door to the possibility of a “broad kinship” among the rapidly diversifying New Zealand populace—all “despite the ‘dawn raids’ and ‘overstayer’ deportations of the same period” (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005, p. 213). Indeed, following Williams, All Blacks of Pacific heritage such as Bernie Fraser (Fijian), John Schuster, Joe Stanley and Michael Jones (all Samoan) all went on to become household names. Williams himself has said of rugby during the divisive years of the 1970s that it

helped break down barriers in [New Zealand] and helped Pacific Islanders gain respect and acceptance. Growing up here at that time we were never encouraged to display our culture. But rugby was a way in which we could express ourselves (quoted in Paul, 2007).

Williams is even more sanguine when asked about the rugby’s racial climate during the era:

I never felt I was subjected to any abuse. Every now and again someone might call me a black so-and-so but it was heat of the moment stuff…That’s the beauty of rugby. It has always been an egalitarian sport, accepting of different physiques, religions, beliefs and races (quoted in Paul, 2007).

Pacific peoples entering rugby in ever greater numbers following Williams have merely fed into this rugby-as-(non racist)-meritocracy ideal.
Arguably, ‘Pacific Island’ All Blacks have become every bit as powerful as Maori once were in projecting an image of acceptance. The successes of Pacific peoples in rugby are appealing in the way they offer faith in the New Zealand way of life, in the myth of egalitarian society. As journalist Gregor Paul describes the Pasifika contribution to New Zealand rugby, “as feelgood stories go, the happy marriage of cultures into the rugby fabric is hard to beat” (Paul, 2007).

A number of North American critics have noted how the sporting successes of African Americans have been used to “reinforce an argument that the US is an open society, and that blacks are improving their economic and social positions” (Wonsek, 1992, p. 457; see also Andrews, 2000; Cole and Andrews, 2001). The high-profile successes are relatively few, but nonetheless they suggest African Americans can, and regularly do, achieve both economic success and upward social mobility. The implication is not only that sport is a space devoid of racial discrimination, but so is society more generally. Such thinking has long been echoed in New Zealand. Hokowhitu (2004b) elaborates on the New Zealand case, with particular regard to Maori:

In a neoracist age, the overriding tenets of positivist discourse are egalitarianism, democracy, and social equality—the predetermined conclusions of an advanced and civilized western world. The successful Māori sportsman…acts as an exemplar of a subject in an egalitarian state who has triumphed over adversity to succeed; combine this with the common notion that sport reflects society, and the essential suggestion is that Māori men are afforded equal opportunities in all walks of life (p. 271).
The situation is little different for Pacific peoples, where those succeeding in the Pakeha world of rugby seem to prove that Pacific people at least have equality of opportunity.

In key socio-demographic indicators, however, and particularly education, occupation and income, there remain significant disparities between Pacific peoples and other New Zealanders (Statistics New Zealand, 2002). These social and structural factors are regularly effaced in favor of emphasizing the individual achievements of a small number of high-profile Pacific athletes. Recently, for example, Tana Umaga was lauded by the popular media as living proof of the mythological Kiwi meritocracy. Much was made of Umaga’s rise to prominence, despite hailing from the “unfashionable” (Kayes, 2006, p. D6), “working class” (Harding, 2006, p. 18) suburb of Wainuiomata. “Tana Umaga” writes Matheson (2004), “could have been just another statistic—the son of immigrant parents born on the wrong side of town with no hope of success, let alone greatness.” “Through nothing but hard work”, Umaga was able to “[turn] his career around to such an extent that his legacy now rests comfortable alongside the likes of Sir Wilson Whineray, Sir Brian Lochore, Graham Mourie and Sean Fitzpatrick—the All Blacks’ greatest ever captains” (Matheson, 2004). The power of Umaga’s image was in its suggestion that anyone in New Zealand could ‘make it’, regardless of class or ethnicity. As Anthony Hubbard notes of
Umaga: “Conservatives can promote him as a sign of equal opportunity. The son of poor immigrants leaps to the top in our open society—from Wainuiomata to the White House” (Hubbard, 2006).

The presence, as well as the success of Pacific peoples in rugby should not, though, be mistaken as evidence of the abatement of racist attitudes toward Pacific peoples in New Zealand during the 1980s and on. This is hardly surprising, for as Grant Jarvie reminds us, “such accounts of sport which make general inferences about the changing nature of racial relations in society based on a consideration of athletic participation rates” are misleading in their tendency to ignore “the broader issues of power and domination within society” (Jarvie, 1991, p. 3). While Pacific peoples may have been breaking into rugby, they continued to be dogged by perceptions that they were “lazy, violent, substance abusing and economically dependent” (Loto et al, 2006, p. 105). They remain too at, or near, the bottom of all socio-economic measures, including education, housing, employment, income, and health (Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, 1999, pp. 8-9; Statistics New Zealand, 2007). Moreover, the greater numerical involvement of Pacific peoples does not mean that rugby itself was non-racist. As Robyn Jones argues, “a situation that results in the presence of significant number of an ethnic minority people in the higher echelons of a sport is as indicative of racist social processes as if they were absent from it” (Jones,
Certainly, akin to the stereotyping of Maori (Hokowhitu, 2003), Pacific players continue to be stigmatized as "savage, emotionally impulsive, aggressive, and violent" (Hokowhitu 2002, p. 266; see also Chapter 3).

A Forgetful Nation?: Whiteness and Pacific Multiculturalism

I remember sharing my outrage with other Samoans. The most appalling thing is the fact that we didn’t know. Here we were learning about the Six Day War and various dukes and kings and there’s our own history, which seemed to have been covered up.

-Oscar Kightly

As in the past when the contributions of Maori to All Blacks successes “provided comforting evidence of New Zealand as a racially integrated society” (Phillips, 1996, p. 286), rugby today works in such a fashion as to sustain its central place in the national imaginary precisely because of its continued efficacy as a symbol of social integration. Today, though, this is increasingly achieved through recourse to a partial history, via excising rugby’s connections to a racist past (we forget, for instance, that Maori were barred from All Black tours to South Africa in 1928, 1949 and 1960). It holds a flattering mirror up to us that erases every distortion. Denuded of the complexities and complications of (real) history, rugby has become the model of a prospective future by way of a retrospective turn. Supposedly in rugby we can see how things have always been
(a space of equal opportunity), how things are (proof of co-operation and racial harmony), and how things could be (a sign of our multicultural future).

Demonstrating such political use of ‘rugby nostalgia’, former Race Relations Conciliator, and one-time All Black, Chris Laidlaw writes:

differences between the races have always been set aside for rugby. It is a fascinating point of convergence for Maori, Pakeha and Pacific Islander; one of the few real bridges between each of the cultures. The romance, the legends, the folklore of the great matches and the great players are not a Pakeha monopoly. They belong to all (1999, p. 22; emphasis my own).

Rugby thus provides a continuity and connection with past achievements, glories, and heroes in national culture—a culture that historically links it to war, mateship and, perhaps most importantly, racial tolerance. Within the national narrative rugby provides a symbolic reassurance that, as in the past, egalitarianism and opportunity are still alive in contemporary New Zealand.

Simultaneously the All Blacks also allow us to forget the past. They engender a kind of cultural amnesia that circumvents the question of history and thus perpetuates contemporary oppression. Behdad (2005) argues of the United States that it is an “amnesiac nation”; a nation built on a “historical amnesia” that enables it “to disavow a past and present built on the exclusion of others.” This echoes Renan’s (1882) famous description of how the political project of founding a nation often entails an act of forgetting, an erasure of those elements that might threaten the coherence of the national narrative. Those things which must be
forgotten are not necessarily confined to the past but exist in the present: forgetting functions in both the diachronic and synchronic sense (Bhabha, 1994). What the All Blacks allow us to forget in the present is perhaps obvious: the real conditions that most Pacific peoples face—that Pacific peoples are, to use the words of the Ministry of Social Development “over-represented in all negative socio-economic statistics.” Understanding what is forgotten in the past perhaps requires some further elaboration—beginning with the first mass migration of Pacific Islanders to New Zealand in the 1950s.

In the post-World War II economic boom, rapid industrialization in New Zealand led to an increasing demand for migrant labor. With low rates of unemployment and a growing industrial sector, the Pacific Islands were coveted by the New Zealand government as a source of “unskilled labor” (see Bedford, 2003; Brosnan, Rea, and Wilson, 1995). The result was that, while there were less than 7,000 Pacific Islanders in New Zealand prior to World War II, by 1971 this had grown to more than 40,000 (Ferguson, 2003). But by the 1970s New Zealanders had become increasingly nervous at the number of immigrants arriving from the Pacific Islands: the economic downturn led many to blame immigrants for the looming recession and, more pointedly, the rising rate of unemployment. ‘Pacific Islanders’—I use scare quotes here because many were in fact New Zealand citizens—were seen to be either taking jobs or merely
‘bludging’\(^2\) off government welfare handouts. The New Zealand government initially responded by introducing “stricter controls over entry” (Bedford, 2003).\(^3\) The rhetoric of ‘immigrant as problem’, also served to pave the way for more extreme measures. Perhaps the most startling of which were the ‘dawn raids’ instigated in 1976 by the National Party Government of Robert Muldoon. On coming to power in 1975 Muldoon had called on ‘overstayers’ to register with the Labour Department during an ‘amnesty’, after which the government would begin a series of ‘random checks’ designed to uncover any remaining illegal immigrants. Yet, while this latter course of action was ostensibly directed at all overstayers, as Bedford (2003) has suggested, it became “much easier to focus attention on potential ‘brown’ overstayers from the Cook Islands, Fiji, Niue, Samoa, and Tonga than to try to find ‘white’ overstayers from the UK and Europe.” Thus, throughout the latter part of the 1970s, the homes of thousands of Pacific Island immigrants and ‘citizens alike were raided in the early hours of the morning by police in search of ‘illegal overstayers.’ Paul Gilroy has noted how, in Britain during the 1970s, “‘immigrant’ became synonymous with the word ‘black’”: in a similar fashion in New Zealand during this same period, ‘immigrant’ became synonymous with ‘Pacific Islander’ (Gilroy, 1987, p. 46). In

\(^2\) A common phrase in New Zealand meaning to live off somebody else’s earnings or on welfare (usually to avoid work and shirk responsibilities).
accord with New Zealand history (see Greif, 1995; Pearson, 2001; Phillips, 2007), “racial and ethnic criteria were explicitly used as yardsticks to measure physical and cultural distance from the majority and gauge potentiality for assimilation into the state and nation” (Pearson, 2005, p. 27). In this case, (white) European workers were viewed as assimilable, whereas Pacific Islanders were less likely to be absorbed into the social body. Irrespective of citizenship or residency status, as Mitchell (2003, p. 139) argues, “there was an implicit assumption of what a New Zealander was and that Pacific Islanders in New Zealand collectively fell outside of this definition.”

Even today something of the social stigma of once being ‘undesirable’ immigrants clearly persists in the discursive framing of Pacific peoples. Though they are clearly ‘at home’ in New Zealand, no longer ‘out there’ in the Pacific, one of the identifiable and recurring themes of dominant “Pakeha discourse” (McCreanor, 2005) is continued allusions to Pacific peoples as ‘foreign’, as the ‘Other. References to Pacific people as ‘overstayers’, ‘coconuts’, ‘bungas’ or ‘FOBs’ (‘fresh off the boat’) may now be a lesser feature of the New Zealand vernacular, yet as Loto et al. (2006) have found, “the legacy of a domineering relationship between the Palagi majority group and Pacific minorities that is captured by such derogatory terms is still evident in public forums such as the

3 In particular, the British Nationality Act was repealed in 1977. The Act had previously
media.” Put simply, citizenship has not been sufficient for Pacific peoples to transcend the prejudices of race.

There is an interesting parallel here to Wu’s (2002) description of Asian Americans in the United as “perpetual foreigners” (p. 79). He notes that while discrimination on the basis of race is increasingly seen as immoral, the lines that distinguish ‘citizens’ from ‘aliens’ are largely considered acceptable. With Asian Americans, however, Wu contends that “it is clear that lines that appear to be based on citizenship can cover up lines that are based on race” (p. 91). By this Wu means to suggest that citizenship is always already defined by race, by whiteness, and that as a consequence it becomes convenient to refer to the innocuous lines based on citizenship in lieu of the odious lines based on race. Non-Asian Americans can discriminate against Asian Americans by turning us into non-citizens, either officially...or informally by casting doubt on our status. Our objection to such discrimination is obviated before it is even made, because the discrimination looks legitimate as having been founded on citizenship rather than race.

Regardless of their citizenship status, Pacific peoples are similarly dogged by such a “perpetual foreigner syndrome.” And, even All Blacks—generally the preeminent national ‘body’—are not immune. In one telling example after the All Black team for the 2003 World Cup was named a caller to a local talk back show aporetically asked, “Why in a country where we have so much rugby talent do

(indirectly at least) granted Samoans New Zealand citizenship.
we have to select four Samoans in the All Blacks?” There is unquestionably a certain contingency to a Pacific person achieving ‘New Zealander’ status. This is true also for Pacific All Blacks. Historically and materially, Pacific peoples have played crucial roles in the building and sustaining of New Zealand identity. In particular, as ‘immigrants’ they have been “fundamental to the construction of the nation as a simulacrum of inclusiveness” (Lowe, 1996, p. 5). Yet this project of imagining the nation is haunted by the fact that Pacific peoples are still seen as “the foreigner within”, even when born in New Zealand and the descendants of generations born here before (Lowe, 1996). They enrich New Zealand culture but are not part of it. They are only ever afforded a kind of “dependent integration” (Hage, 2000) which positions the Pakeha subject as the ‘authentic’ or ‘normal’ New Zealander.

This ‘normal’ New Zealander is, of course, Pakeha. Conceived as it was in the colonial world order, it is hardly surprising that the common narrative of New Zealand identity is peppered with allusions to whiteness. Indeed, for much of its history New Zealandness has been synonymous with whiteness. It is the product of conscious social engineering, via controlled immigration, favoring and encouraging some classes of immigrants over others, and the enactment of policies prejudiced against the alien within (Ip, 2003; Murphy, 2003). That is to say, New Zealand’s ‘borders’, both cultural and symbolic, have historically been
racialised and premised on whiteness, with whiteness providing the parameters of inclusion and exclusion. Following work in whiteness studies, it would be fair to suggest that Pakeha/whiteness operates as the unmarked norm against which other ‘ethnic’ identities are marked and racialized. This is not to suggest that whiteness is ‘invisible’ as some have suggested (cf. McIntosh, 1998)—some Pakeha are hyper-aware of their whiteness—but rather, belonging in New Zealand cannot be reduced to the conventional analytical framework of ‘race’ and ‘race relations.’ Whiteness in New Zealand must instead be connected to what Ware (2001) describes as “the politics of the geo-body...since ideologies of ‘race’, ethnicity, and belonging are fundamentally bound up with the histories of the nation and how it is defined by competing forces” (p. 185). In this particular case, what I am suggesting is that the category ‘New Zealander’ has been defined over and against the category ‘immigrant.’ Exclusionary immigrations acts and naturalization laws are not only means by which to regulate ‘citizens’ or the ‘state’ but also form part of an Orientalist discourse of defining the cultural and racial ‘other.’ The immigrant acts as something of ‘screen’ (Lowe, 1996) on which the nation projects its very whiteness.

Categories of otherness delimit what it means to belong to the nation in that the making of New Zealand is achieved as much through exclusion as by the appeal to unity. This is the doubled-edged character of national identity: its
capacity to define not only who is a member of the national community but also who is not, to define who is a ‘foreigner.’ The demarcation of a national cultural identity “inevitably entails processes of inclusion and exclusion,” on determining “who and what belongs inside and who and what belongs outside” (Tempelman, 1999, p. 17). On a fundamental level, “the very notion of an identity presumes an other from whom one is different. If identity is about sameness, about identifying with those considered similar, it is also about difference, distinguishing oneself from those who are dissimilar” (Spencer and Wollman, 2002, p. 58). In the case of national identity, the rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is predicated on views of who to exclude as much as who to include. As Triandafyllidou (1998) argues, “for the nation to exist, it is presupposed that there is some other community, some other nation, from which it needs to distinguish itself.” Moreover, as she continues, the identity of a nation is defined and/or re-defined through the influence of ‘significant others’, namely other nations or ethnic groups that are perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, authenticity and/or independence...for the nation to exist there must be some outgroup against which the unity and homogeneity of the ingroup is tested (Triandafyllidou, 1998).

Pacific multiculturalism, then, is akin to what Hage (2000) has labeled ‘White multiculturalism.’ For a long time New Zealand had a de facto ‘White New Zealand’ immigration policy whereas today the New Zealand government proudly touts itself as a multicultural Pacific nation. Yet White multiculturalism is a peculiar feature of dominant white groups (in this case Pakeha) that
generously ‘allow’ others to co-exist with them. For Hage, multiculturalism is part of a “white nation fantasy” that works through “New Racist” practices that regulate and manage inclusion as a way of maintaining the white nation. As Hage writes,

White multiculturalists...share in a concept of themselves as nationalists and of the nation as a space structured around a White culture where Aboriginal people and non-White ‘ethnis’ are merely national objects to be moved or removed according to a White national will.

In New Zealand Pakeha ethnicity has underpinned New Zealand culture, its institutions and the nation itself since the beginning of European settlement (Phillips, 1987). It largely still does. As McKinnon (1996, p. 7) observes,

while each post-1840 generation of New Zealanders felt itself less ‘British’ than its predecessors, an outside observer is still...struck by the extent to which ‘New Zealandness’ is shot through with ‘Britishness’ (and not least because it is rarely commented on or analysed).

Migration has undoubtedly changed New Zealand into a post-white society (Hill, 2004). However, the new multicultural representations of nationhood emerging in recent years do not necessary signify a radical break with previous more exclusionary versions of nationhood. Instead Pacific multiculturalism merely reshapes and reinforces older identity discourses through recognizing limited and unthreatening forms of difference, through the containment of the multicultural real (Gilroy, 2005). It further cannot be ignored that “‘Britishness’ — Anglo cultural hegemony — remains an essential part of New Zealand’s national
culture and identity” (Forrest and Dunn, 2006, p. 225). And, perhaps not coincidentally, while official parlance and ceremony has acquired a more “multicultural feel” (Blake, Smith, and Standish, 1998, p. 30), the United Kingdom has once again become the largest source of permanent migrants to New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2007; Walsh, 2006).

Politically, the popular elision of racism from rugby’s past works to maintain this status quo, this Pakeha hegemony. It constitutes what Avril Bell calls “a refusal of discussion” (2004, p. 92). As opposed to any critical reflection on colonial history, rugby draws on those mythological wellsprings of New Zealand’s egalitarian culture—no one is denied a place, success is open to all—as a means to “close off discussion before it can begin” (Bell, 2004, p. 92). That Maori, for instance, were early participants in the game of rugby is taken as evidence that New Zealand was always a racially-integrated society. Similarly, the growing number of ‘Pacific Islanders’ representing New Zealand in recent years becomes proof positive of an open, multiracial society—belying a past in which Pacific communities were subjected to dehumanizing dawn police raids and random street checks of their citizenship. In seeming to rise above the current contingencies of national race relations politics, the All Blacks offer New Zealanders what Bruce and Hallinan (2001) may have dubbed “an easy way out.” Without actually taking any action, without offering any practical
approaches to dealing with *de facto* racial inequality, the continuing significance of race can be explained away and racism denied: *how can we be racist?: just look at the All Blacks!* The issue of history as a site of moral wrong is sidelined in favor of a presentist fallacy of a multicultural unity in difference.

What must be emphasized here is the way difference has long been appropriated as defining characteristic of New Zealand. Like the sanitized forms of nostalgia to which I have already alluded, the discourse of diversity demonstrates how nation-building is not simply a process of erasure. As a ‘project’ the nation is first and foremost a form of categorization premised on the imagining of solidarity. Numerous critics have suggested that this process is generally predicated on the construction of a common national culture, on national cultural homogeneity. That is, national identity must be seen to transcend individual and group differences. As Mike Featherstone (1990) notes, “the image of the culture of a nation-state is one which generally emphasizes cultural homogeneity and integration” (p. 1). Homi Bhabha, has argued that the “nationalist discourse” must therefore suppress certain elements in its effort to construct the “impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force” (1990, p. 3). Linking nationalism to Western modernity and power, Bhabha continues, suggesting that “political supremacy…seeks to obliterate…difference.” As he puts it elsewhere, “the nation must align itself, spiritually as well as physically or
carnally, with the ‘race’...to be protected from all degradation” (Bhabha, 1991). However, pace those critics who see nationalism as nearly always destructive of cultural difference, New Zealand is testament to Eva Mackey’s claim that nationalism, and by implication power and dominance, may “function through more liberal, inclusionary, pluralistic, multiple and fragmented formulations and practices concerning culture and difference” (Mackey, 1999, pp. 4-5). Borrowing from Mackey, it is my contention that the discourses of New Zealand identity make room for both erasures and inclusions—they possess what Asad (1993) would call an “improvisational quality” that may (sometimes simultaneously) subsume, accommodate, or institutionalize difference.

On this latter point, and returning again to rugby, we cannot ignore the political and economic efficacy of difference. Biculturalism, and more latterly, multiculturalism, in New Zealand have “clearly been advantageous in fashioning an acceptable national self-image in a world where colonialism and racism are bad for business” (Williams, 1996, p. 184). The All Blacks, as one of New Zealand’s few global ‘exports’, are entangled, then, not only within how ‘we’ see ourselves, but how the world sees ‘us.’ It should be noted that Pakeha New Zealanders have always been deeply insecure about their national identity. This owes itself partly to “Pakeha New Zealand’s peculiar dependence on the UK” (Bannister, 2005) but also in part to the country’s geographic, political and
military isolation. That is, our ontological insecurity stems from an inferiority complex vis-à-vis Britain as well the self-doubt bred of failing—sometimes literally—to register on the world map. In a Lacanian sense, New Zealanders thus depend on the gaze of others to confirm their own existence. This also explains why New Zealanders are somewhat “obsessed” with the national identity question (Brown, 1997). Who we are bothers (Pakeha) Kiwis because we are always trying to ‘mark our patch.’ Says Avril Bell (2007), “We can’t stop thinking about it. It’s why we always ask tourists if they like New Zealand five minutes after they touch down at the airport.” Some have subsequently been moved to suggest the country as being in the throes of a national identity ‘crisis’ (During, ). This is true only if we take ‘crisis’ to mean in a state of “perpetual crisis” (Seuffert, 2005). Reflection about national identity in New Zealand is wide-ranging, anxiety-ridden and constant. As David Pearson argues, the ‘national identity crisis’ is not simply as case of “the shock of the new”, but a reflection of “historical continuities” that “encompass longstanding tensions” (2000, p. 91). Even today New Zealand still exhibits all the yesteryear symptoms of a small society slowly finding its feet (the love-hate relationship with ‘Mother England’, the stress between ‘settlers’, Maori, and ‘new arrivals, two among many examples). It’s hardly surprising, therefore, that New Zealand clings tightly to the things that make ‘us’ ‘unique’, that we are continually staking our
claim to Russell Crowe, Phar Lap, pavlova, or Crowded House. And, for a country that may not cut much of a dash internationally, our obsessive desire to find what makes ‘us’ us finds a salve in the All Blacks and in the diversity they, quite literally, embody.

Many New Zealanders have also been lead to believe that the All Blacks are one of the few frames of reference that people abroad have of New Zealand. The All Blacks are frequently taken beyond sport to symbolise a country. Describing his arrival at Heathrow on his first tour with the team, Chris Laidlaw writes that “it became apparent that to most people outside New Zealand, the All Blacks were New Zealand and New Zealand were the All Blacks. One and the same; indivisible” (1999, p. 18). This type of metonymy has also been manifest at the current Rugby World Cup in France. Much has been made of the purported French love affair with the All Blacks as well as the coupling of team and country in French minds. Where goes the All Blacks (and their supporters), so goes the country. As New Zealand writer Trevor Richards recounts of Paris during the tournament: “New Zealand is very distant. Now, because of the rugby, it seems much closer.” The perception of rugby-as-country is only bolstered by the rhetoric of marketers and politicians (the two of course often being in collusion). The government has effectively appropriated the marriage to sell their investment in the 2011 World Cup, while a high-profile research firm
tells us that “focus groups from around the world” identify only three New Zealand ‘icons’ of significance: “sheep, green and the All Blacks” (Cumming and Masters, 2007). When we are continually told they are our most important point of difference, is it not little wonder that such significance is attached to the All Blacks? And, of course, this investment in the rugby-country coupling is only heightened by the way it wedds itself so neatly to the myth of racial harmony. The All Blacks in essence put the tolerant nation on display to the world.

But, to return to my suggestion that Pacific multiculturalism may actually promote intolerance. Shifts in immigration policy during the 1990s have promoted greater ethnic heterogeneity and the state has moved to more formally endorse ‘cultural difference’ (Roberts, 1997). It is apparent too in popular culture, which increasingly makes space for what the Labour government labels “the diversity of cultures making up the New Zealand population.” Signs of an emergent ‘multiculture’ (Gilroy, 2005; Hall, 2000) noisily announce themselves in film and literature, television and the visual arts, music and fashion. Whereas the ‘other ethnic minorities’ were once “waiting in the wings in the theatre of local ethnic life” (Pearson, 1996, p. 263), they are now firmly center stage. So if New Zealand is seemingly in the midst of what our Governor General dubs “the process of transitioning to a multicultural nation” (Satyanand, 2007), how, then, can I claim New Zealandness to be still synonymous with whiteness, with
Pakeha culture? My contention is that multiculturalism and Pakeha dominance in New Zealand are not necessarily at odds. Pacific multiculturalism ‘works’ in New Zealand precisely because it contains the increasingly active role of Pacific ‘Others’ in New Zealand’s cultural and political life. Ostensibly multiculturalism is a public good, evidence of a break with a racist past and a mark of growing cultural tolerance. But the celebration of diversity has a dark side.

Multiculturalism in New Zealand is first and foremost what Ghassan Hage has labeled “a discourse of enrichment” (Hage, 2000, p. 132). Minorities have a ‘value’ in terms of what they ‘bring to the table.’ Difference is tolerated precisely because of the way it ‘enriches’ the national space. Such a discourse has the effect of placing limits on inclusion: diversity is acceptable only if it buttresses (i.e., enriches) the project of nation-building and national unity in New Zealand.

Hence, Prime Ministerial challenger Don Brash’s injunction to turn away ‘migrants’ who “don’t share New Zealand’s bedrock values.” “We should not” he offered, “welcome those who want to live in New Zealand reject but reject core aspects of New Zealand culture” (Brash, 2006). Diversity, while celebrated, is thus defined and limited. Frequently lines are drawn at demands for political rights or when difference threatens to disrupt the ‘whole’ New Zealand identity. I borrow this notion of national culture as a ‘whole way of life’ from Eva Mackey’s insightful discussion of multiculturalism in Canada (Mackey, 1999).
Just as in Canada, the idea of a ‘mainstream’ national culture is implicit to the official version of multiculturalism in New Zealand (consider Brownlee’s comments in Chapter 1). This supports the idea of Pakeha as the ‘norm’, in relation to ‘multicultural’ New Zealanders who are merely contributing the whole way of life (Mackey, 1999). Pakeha retain their governmental position via a multicultural fantasy of tamed ethnicities existing around a primary Pakeha cultural core.

Pace those who argue national identity as being “predicated on the elimination of ethnic distinctions” (Lesser, 1999, p. 3), in New Zealand difference has been pressed into the service of nation-building—and Pacific peoples are front and centre in this national project. Yet this Pacific multiculturalism is a carefully-managed form of difference. It appears as a negation of Pakeha ethnocentrism at the same time as it both needs and creates the ‘Pacific other’. That is, Pacific multiculturalism is “itself a vehicle for racialization”: it establishes Pakeha culture as the “ethnic core culture while ‘tolerating’ and arranging others around its ‘multiculture’” (Bannerji, 2000, p. 78). The “ethics and aesthetics” of Pakehaness, with its “colonial imperialist/racist ranking criteria”, define and construct “the ‘multi’ culture” of New Zealand’s Pacific others (p. 78). In other words, New Zealand’s self-identity has been secured partly through the construction of internal Others, whose markedness assures the existence of a national identity that,
remaining invisible or unmarked, is successfully inscribed as the norm...the ethnic identity of the dominant group is privileged as the core of imagined community (Alonso, 1994, p. 390).

Pacific people are perhaps first and foremost among the “necessary ‘others’” who Mackey (1999, p. 16) suggests have become “central pillars” of an ideology of tolerance that expresses itself through the discursivities of ‘difference’ (multi/sub/minority/ethnic culture) and that must name ‘others’, that must mark ‘us’ and ‘them.’

Conclusion: The Contradictions of Inclusion

In my time spent in New Zealand writing this dissertation I have been struck by the sheer ubiquity of a ‘one nation forged on a rugby field’ rhetoric. In real terms there has been a growing disjuncture between rugby’s social base and the characteristics of the society it purportedly represents: the expansion of the urban middle classes, the gains of feminism, the rising visibility of various Polynesian communities and the political resurgence of Maoridom all seem at odds with the traditional marriage of rugby to rural, Pakeha masculinity (Phillips, 1987). Yet somehow rugby, and the national team, the All Blacks, persist as one of the more, if not the most, potent agents and symbols of national identity formation. What I have suggested, however, is that rather than being ‘a game for all New Zealanders’, contemporary rugby in New Zealand can be seen to “serve the functional needs of the dominant national group”
(Triandafyllidou, 2001, p. 4). Rugby, and the All Blacks in particular, are part of the wider discourse of celebration, of claims that New Zealand, as a nation, has embraced the values of cultural pluralism and tolerance. As a narrative of progress, the game purportedly speaks to a “deeper truth about the new New Zealand and its people”, the “exotic” nature of the All Blacks—“tattooed, dreadlocked, surnames festooned with apostrophes” (MacDonald, 2005, p. C11)—patent recognition that Pacific Islanders are officially “an increasingly large part of the New Zealand identity” (Laidlaw, cited in Hubbard, 2006, p. C2).

In reality, however, to take the All Blacks as evidence of a new ‘Pacific’ (or ‘Oceanic’) identity for New Zealanders would be to ignore the liminal world of Pacific peoples: they live in New Zealand, are members of its civil society, yet as ‘ethnics’ they are never able to be fully-incorporated into the social body.

The discourse of Pacific multiculturalism ensures that they will always be different, wherein difference is measured in terms of distance from Pakeha culture. That is, diversity in fact works to sustain to Pakeha power. As Wade (1998, p. 4) argues,

> just as in colonial power relations the coloniser’s sense of domination is fed by a narcissistic desire for the submission of the subordinate other, so the nation-builders define their own superiority in relation to the diversity they observe and construct—and desire.

My argument is that national belonging in New Zealand still functions according to an investment in an ethnonational ‘core’ (Brubaker, 1996; Mackey, 1999)
around which a ‘hierarchy’ of New Zealandness is constructed (Pakeha of course being at the top). New Zealander is a racialized term with nation and race clearly intersecting in the bodies of Pacific peoples. This racialization operates via a model of ‘normal’ New Zealandness that is white and unmarked, and ultimately sustained by the exclusion-yet-retention of the foreigner, the other, within. New Zealand may no longer—if it ever was—be a ‘white nation’ (Hage, 2000) but the self-other divide—which, Ang (2001, p. 142) reminds us, “is the epistemological basis of the very possibility for racism”—is an inherent feature of the new Pacific multiculturalism. Forced into a place-taking politics within the dominant terms of belonging, the “structural hierarchy between majority (singular) and minorities (plural)” (Ang, 2001, p. 142) has not been nullified by the elevation of Pacific people onto the national cultural stage.

However a pretty picture the All Blacks paint, they do not stand outside the dominant hegemonic discourses of race that continue to infuse New Zealand culture. At the level of rhetoric and ideology, they project an image of New Zealand as open to diversity, the personification of the so-called liberal nation-state: rational, reflective, civic, egalitarian. They invite us, via a “discourse of enrichment” that works difference into an over-riding unity, to join in the chorus of “celebrating our national identity” (Hage, 2000). But we cannot ignore how this new Pacific multiculturalism functions as an ideological discourse designed
to, in Ang’s (2001) words, provide New Zealanders “with a favorable, flattering, even triumphant representation of the national self” (p. 98). I emphasize ideological here in that Pacific multiculturalism is “forgetful of many things” (Behdad, 2000, p. 143), presenting the people of New Zealand “with a public fiction that they live in a harmonious, tolerant and peaceful country where everyone is included and gets along” (Ang, 2001, p. 98). Further, Pacific multiculturalism is overlaid with distinctions between Pakeha and non-Pakeha. We may not suppress diversity “to the altar of Anglo-Saxon conformity” (King, 2000), yet whiteness/Pakehaness nonetheless forms, to borrow Haney López (1996), “the linchpin” for all systems of racial and national meaning in New Zealand—it is the “absent centre” (Ang, 2001, p. 101).

The All Blacks’/New Zealand’s (for the “metaphoric relationship…cannot be reduced to simile” [Brabazon, 2006, p. 181]) self-image as a liberal polity open to all-comers irrespective of race or background is also at odds with how the politics of exclusion are still legitimated through the language of race. New Zealand’s immigration policies have, according to Brooking and Rabel (1995), traditionally favored European, particularly British, settlers, often restricting entry to persons from specific source countries in the UK and Western Europe (see also Ward and Lin, 2005). Although this unofficial “white New Zealand policy” (Ongley and Pearson, 1995, p. 773) was abandoned in the 1970s, and
recent tentative moves toward a fully nondiscriminatory policy notwithstanding, the new national narrative of openness and tolerance belies longstanding tensions among Pakeha about the “immigrant minorities in their midst” (Pearson, 2000, p. 91). And, this is not just about contemporary moral panics, about new arrivals. The legacies of the past cannot be simply done away with by invoking a presentist multicultural fantasy (Povinelli, 2002). As Bedford (1997) has argued, “people who are not obviously of Maori or European descent” continue to be stereotyped as ‘immigrants’, “especially when the debate about levels of overseas migration to New Zealand becomes emotion-charged and heated” (or, in the case of the All Blacks, when they start losing [see Chapter, 2]). Bedford highlights here the continued saliency of racial appearance and ‘looks’ “in demarcating the boundaries between those who are unconditionally accepted as ‘real’ [New Zealanders], and those who are constituted as ‘foreign’ and forever cast beyond the pale of the [New Zealand] nation” (Beford, 2000). In New Zealand, who ‘belongs’ is still premised on corporeal difference, or what Barnor Hesse describes as “signifying colonial distinctions between assemblages of ‘Europeanness’ and ‘non-Europeanness’” (Hesse, 1999). Scholars in Asian American studies have suggested that for people of Asian descent living in the United States, “having ‘Asian looks’ (marked by phenotypical features such as skin colour, hair type and eye shape) serves as a ‘cue’ denoting…‘Otherness’ that
precludes their unconditional acceptance as ‘American’” (Yamamoto, 1999). Borrowing an incisive turn of phrase from one of these authors, it could be said that Pacific people in New Zealand are similarly afflicted by “the perpetual foreigner syndrome” (Yu, 2001). The ineradicability of visible ‘racial’ markers carried in the body has been transferred across generations of Pacific people, with the “racialisation of ‘looks’” (Yu, 2001) remaining a key constituent of the discursive boundaries of the New Zealand nation. In Loto et al’s (2006) terms, the legacy of the “domineering relationship between the Palagi majority group and Pacific minorities”, the “exclusion or ‘othering’ of ethnic minorities”, endures in the new multicultural New Zealand.

Openness to cultural difference should therefore be seen as intersecting rather than undermining New Zealand’s national identity. That New Zealand is, in the words of its Minister for Ethnic Affairs, a “multi-ethnic and multicultural society” has become a badge of national identity. As oxymoronic as it sounds, diversity is the means by which New Zealand constructs a unified national culture, differentiated and defined in difference to other settler colonies. The New Zealand twist in this regard is, vis-à-vis Australia or Canada, multiculturalism with a ‘Polynesian’ flavor. Rather than emulating its Pacific Rim counterparts, New Zealand has sought to emphasize what Minister of Pacific Island Affairs Phil Goff describes as “its Pacific character.” “Migration
from the Pacific has shaped and changed our identity as a Pacific nation,” he said in a recent speech. “The strong Pasifika community…gives us a sense of identity.” Like Goff, other members of the Labour government are also increasingly playing up ‘Pacificness’ as part of what “makes us unique” (Laban, 2007). Yet this new form of Pacific multiculturalism and Pakeha dominance in New Zealand are not necessarily at odds. Pacific multiculturalism ‘works’ in New Zealand precisely because it contains the increasingly active role of Pacific Others in New Zealand’s cultural and political life.

Pacific multiculturalism may be something of a paradox in that the discursive uses of it, in Homi Bhabha’s terms, “mark social processes where differentiation and condensation seem to happen almost synchronically” (Bhabha, 1994). Obviously, ‘the nation’, as Benedict Anderson (1983) famously reminds us, needs an ideology of unification and legitimation. At the same time the cultural pluralist discourse of the All Blacks is evidence of how this ideology also needs and creates the Other: in this case, the once undesirable ‘Pacific Islander’ is “discursively inserted into the middle of a dialogue” of multiracial unity (Bannerji, 2000, p. 96). But the introjection of belonging draws on and reinforces racial differences and hierarchies of difference (Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2000). Pacific peoples, even as All Blacks, are never simply New Zealanders. They are, in Bannerji’s (2000) terms, “pasted over with labels” that
provide them with extraneous identities: Samoan, Tongan, Fijian, immigrants, Pacific peoples. For them New Zealand is always a hyphenated space, a space between two identities. The hyphen, as in Samoan-New Zealander, “links two identities together in an attempt to integrate the marginal into the dominant, while at the same time defining each as separate” (2002, p. xviii). The hyphenated identity thus works, as Carrera points out, as a “subordinating term to the dominant culture.” To be a Pacific person, to be a Samoan-, or Tongan-, or Fijian-New Zealander, is to be less than a full New Zealander. And, as Bannerji continues, concomitant with the “mania for the naming of ‘others’ is one for the naming of that which is [New Zealander]” (p. 65). That is, the very act of naming delimits membership. As I have shown in the chapter only Pakeha have the privilege of being simply a ‘New Zealander.’ For Pacific peoples this is the paradox of belonging and not-belonging, of living in the national space while not being ‘New Zealanders.’ No matter how ‘multicultural’, New Zealand national identity still bears the traces of Eurocentric discourse, and of ambivalence toward immigrants. Even in rugby we see evidence of there being a cultural Pakeha core which generates a “coexistence of hostility and hospitality” (Behdad, 2005) that has been, and still is, fundamental to the construction of New Zealand’s national identity.
CHAPTER 2

Where Have All the White Boys Gone? Or, Soccer’s for Sissies: Spatial Anxieties and
The Browning of New Zealand Rugby

With rugby becoming increasingly dominated by Maori and Pacific Islanders, Pakeha men are in search of a new dreaming.

- Tara Brabazon

For a former All Black, Chris Laidlaw has never been afraid to speak his mind—even when it comes to matters rugby. His book Mud in Your Eye, an acerbic overview of the state of the New Zealand game, created something of a “media fuss” when it was released in 1973, its candor upsetting former team-mates and rugby’s administrators alike (Knight, 2007). “It wasn’t appreciated,” he later wrote. “I was published and I was damned” (Laidlaw, 1999, p. 20). Perhaps it wasn’t entirely surprising from a one-time Rhodes Scholar, a man who later went on to become both a Human Rights Commissioner and New Zealand’s Race Relations Conciliator. If Mud in Your Eye wasn’t your typical biography, Laidlaw wasn’t your typical All Black. His current capacity as a prominent radio host, and sometime newspaper columnist, ensures that Laidlaw remains a prominent commentator on New Zealand society generally, and rugby specifically. And, he stills continues to occasionally upset. He certainly rubbed New Zealand rugby’s powers-that-be the wrong way in 2002. In a now infamous Dominion Post
column, Laidlaw suggested New Zealand selectors as favoring Pakeha over Maori and Pacific players. Of the side that played Australia in the Tri-Nations series the week prior, he wrote that “It was as Pakeha in complexion as New Zealand has possibly ever fielded. Setting aside a very tenuous Maori connection or two, this was essentially the All-Whites dressed in black.” “The fact that [team selectors John] Mitchell and [Robbie] Deans have opted overwhelmingly for a Pakeha squad might be an accident and it might not,” he continued. “I think not.”

The comments set off something of a media frenzy. By and large the press rushed to the coaches’ defence. An editorial in the nationally-read New Zealand Herald succinctly captured the tenor: calling racism a “poisonous subject”, the author writes that “it is unfortunate that anyone has seen fit to question the racial make-up of an All Black team. Rugby in this country has never given it a thought. It is…offensive to all New Zealand that the question should even have been raised” (Rugby does not deserve racial slur, 2002). Others looked for support from former players and even the opposition: prominent rugby-writer Jim Kayes quotes erstwhile All Black Frank Bunce as saying that there was “no way you could brand [Mitchell and Deans] or their selection policy as racist” (Kayes, 2002, p. 1); the Dominion Post cited suggestions that an All Black team could be picked on race as being “shocking” to South African manager Gideon Sam (Manager
caught out by race row, 2002, p. C12); and, no doubt many in the media throng were comforted to hear Springbok coach Rudolf Straeuli declare “I know John very well and I know that he is not a racist” (quoted in Colquhoun, 2002, p. 15). More than anything the reaction showed just how much rugby continues to fetishized in New Zealand (MacLean, 1998), the way that New Zealanders continue to see the game as isolated from the profane worlds of politics and race relations. It was also interesting to see the media’s ‘naturalization’ of race-related matters. Mitchell’s decisions were largely rationalized on the basis of ‘natural’ differences in the playing attributes of Pakeha and ‘Polynesians.’ “Flair” wrote a journalist in The Southland Times, “may provide a great spectacle, but it doesn’t put trophies in the cabinet” (Burdon, 2002, p. 24)—‘flair’, of course, standing in here for ‘Pacific Islander’ or ‘Polynesian.’ Even Laidlaw himself played to this biologically-driven discourse. Accusations of racism could just as easily be leveled at his view that “Polynesians” weren’t being picked because of their “tearaway tendencies” (contra, he argues, Mitchell’s conservatism). Laidlaw may be right in suggesting Mitchell to be picking along racial lines, but he is equally guilty of perpetuating deeply-entrenched, racial stereotypes by failing to question them. Ironically, both sides of the fence were reinforcing the myth of non-racialism.
I take up these issues in more detail in the following chapter, but what also interests me about this case is that an ‘All Pakeha’ team even seems plausible. Not in the sense of rugby now being inexorably a ‘multicultural space,’ but, rather, that Laidlaw was writing at a time when Pakeha men were supposed to be fleeing the game in droves. Only a few months earlier, the widely-circulated magazine *New Zealand Rugby World* felt ‘white flight’ to be such a phenomenon that it was moved to ask (on its cover, no less) “Where Have All the White Players Gone?” And, only weeks after Laidlaw’s comments, respected sports journalist Joseph Romanos released the provocatively-titled *The Judas Game* (Romanos, 2002). Subtitled “The Betrayal of New Zealand Rugby”, the book ostensibly outlines how “the traditions, the values and the camaraderie that once made rugby great have all been betrayed.” More pointedly, Romanos considers rugby to be “a game in crisis” (p. 11), with “problems...at every level” (p. 241). One of the biggest issues for rugby as he sees it, though, is that “playing numbers are dropping dramatically” (p. 241)—nowhere more-so than among the young. And the cause? White flight. That Laidlaw had cause to wonder “if some kind of Polynesian purge wasn’t under way”, seemed wholly at odds with what others saw as a “trend”—as Romanos labels it—towards rugby’s “browning.” “This is not supposed to happen” writes a *Southland Times* reporter of Mitchell’s All Black team that played Australia. “Against all predictions, New Zealand’s premier
sporting outfit is not suffering from the ‘white flight’ syndrome which so many have said will be the scourge of the game in this country in the coming decade” (Burdon, 2002, p. 24).

In this chapter I wish to critically examine the twinned discourses of ‘white flight’ and the ‘browning of New Zealand rugby.’ ‘White flight’ has become something of ‘standard story’ (Fish, 1980) of rugby and race in New Zealand. In fact, it has almost gone without question that it is (a), happening, and (b), cause for concern. On one level, white flight could be taken as a mere manifestation of the ‘threat’ posed by soccer, a sport in which, according to Sport and Recreation New Zealand (SPARC), “overall participation has increased significantly” (SPARC, 2003, p. 2). But the unease is more likely about the questions posed by rugby no longer being the exclusive preserve of white males. Firstly, it is an issue of race, and the discomforting prospect of the nation being represented solely by Pacific men. The “tight embrace between rugby and New Zealand identity”, means, as Brabazon (2006) notes, that “its symbolism is intensely political” (p. 180). In what ways, then, are fears over rugby’s browning a reaction to changes in New Zealand’s social and cultural landscape? Borrowing from Ghassan Hage, I make the case that ‘white flight’ forms part of a broader “discourse of Anglo decline” (Hage, 2000, p. 179). This specific genre of White discourse has long historical roots, and reasserts itself in calls for both tighter
controls on immigration, resentment of (so-called) ‘race-based’ political policies, and in attempts to realign New Zealandness with whiteness. I argue further, though, that white flight is not solely an issue of race, about Pakeha *per se* and their desertion of rugby. It is more specifically an exodus of white *boys* and white *men*. The browning of rugby is a disruption not merely of whiteness, but an invasion of Pakeha *masculinity*. In New Zealand the male stereotype remains that most closely identified with the process of national definition. New Zealand, as Jock Phillips once argued, has been, “oppressively ‘a man’s country’” (1987, p. vii). More than twenty years later there remains a “resolute blokiness” (Coleman, 2006) about New Zealand life and cultural expression. The role of rugby in this regard, though often overstated, cannot be easily ignored. Hence, I make the case that the browning of rugby can be read not only as a threat to white power, but, moreover, to the power of white men.

New Racism in an Election Year

…the state of emergency is also always a state of emergence.

- Homi Bhabha

When I first arrived back in New Zealand in 2005, the country was building for a general election. The incumbent Labour government was polling strongly, and
expected to be re-elected for a third term. Prime Minister Helen Clark was by far the preferred leader, and she had already secured assurances of support from the Greens and Progressives in readiness for forming a coalition government. Labour had cause for optimism too in the fact that at the last election, in 2002, they had soundly beaten their main opponents, the National Party; such was their unpopularity, National had slumped to winning only 21 per cent of the vote or 22.5 per cent of seats. But a strange thing happened on the way to the election booth in 2005. On election night no single party or recognized bloc won a majority, and Labour’s advantage over National in the unicameral House of Representatives was only a slim two seats. The newly formed Maori Party won four seats, taking three of the Maori electorates from Labour, and National, in an astonishing turn-around, secured 21 more seats than in 2002. Such was the closeness of the result that it took nearly two weeks, and the counting of special votes, for the Labour-led coalition to finally be declared the winner—but their power had been severely eroded, and they held government by—literally—the most tenuous of margins.

Like all elections, one can only speculate as to the direction of voting that night; and, of course, the press was only too happy to do so. Whether it was Labour’s reticence over tax cuts or the ‘Speedgate’ affair—in which the PM’s motorcade driver and two police officers were found guilty of speeding as they
drove Clark to a rugby game—what was often missed in public commentaries after the election was the fact that “the result did not reflect a significant swing away from Labour” (Miskin, 2005). The difference was actually the resurgence of National. Its 39 per cent of the vote—only 2 per cent below Labour—was a jump of some 18.2 per cent over 2002, and marked the party’s best result since 1990. In his introduction to the revised edition of *New Zealand Government and Politics*, Auckland University professor Raymond Miller argues that “most of the credit for [National’s] recovery was due to the efforts of its new leader and former Reserve Bank governor, Dr Don Brash” (Miller, 2006). An interesting choice for a political leader, Brash was both inexperienced and lacking in charisma, especially in comparison to the savvy, if divisive Clark. On the campaign trail too, he was often in (his own) strife: of his pale showing in a televised leaders’ debate with Clark he suggested that “it’s not entirely appropriate for a man to aggressively attack a woman and I restrained myself for that reason” (NZPA, 2005); he was forced to retract his denial of having any prior knowledge of an anti-Green/anti-Labour pamphlet distributed by members of Exclusive Brethren; and, he was so error-prone in front of the media that even his former chief of staff described him as a “gaffe-prone Mr Magoo” (quoted in Eden, 2006). Yet for all his political naivete and awkwardness, Brash nonetheless managed to woo “mainstream voters with populist solutions to perceived problems in the areas of
race relations, law and order, social welfare, and taxation” (Miller, 2006). Perhaps more than anything, though, it was a speech to Orewa Rotary Club in January 2004 that defined Brash as a political figure, through the election and beyond.

The focus of the speech, as Brash put it, was “the dangerous drift towards racial separatism in New Zealand” (Brash, 2004). Of the Labour government Brash argued that they were steadily moving New Zealand towards becoming a “racially divided nation, with two sets of laws, and two standards of citizenship.” What he called “special privileges for any race”—but, in particular, Maori—came in for the harshest criticism. “In parallel with the Treaty process and the associated grievance industry,” he stated,

there has been a divisive trend to embody racial distinctions into large parts of our legislation, extending recently to local body politics. In both education and healthcare, government funding is now influenced not just by need—as it should be—as it should be—but also by the ethnicity of the recipient.

Citing the controversial income distribution research of sociologist Simon Chapple, he went on to contend that “Maori-ness explains very little about how well one does in life. Ethnicity does not determine one’s destiny.” Brash then concluded with a pledge to end “race-based” legislation and funding, and a promise to “remove the anachronism of the Maori seats in Parliament”:

There can be no basis for special privileges for any race, no basis for government funding based on race, no basis for introducing Maori wards

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4 For further discussion of the controversies over Chapple’s paper on Māori socioeconomic disparities (Chapple, 2000) see Baehler (2002).
in local authority elections, and no obligation for local governments to consult Maori in preference to other New Zealanders.

Prior to the speech polls showed that the National Party “was lagging so far behind the governing Labour Party that electoral success in 2005 seemed remote” (Middleton, 2005, p. 479). Within a month, however, National’s support jumped 17 percentage points; it was, Miller (2006) notes, “the most dramatic rise in the history of polling in New Zealand.”

Up to that point, and socially at least, Brash could have been seen as something of a ‘liberal’: he voted in favour of the Prostitution Reform Act 2003 and is divorced and remarried. Politically, he was more difficult to pin down, glibly claiming when asked of his political leanings to not know, as Macdonald (2003) notes, what ‘right’ or ‘left’ meant. But as a Colin James, a columnist for the New Zealand Herald, put it, with his hard line on ‘race-based funding,’ Brash and his advisors realized that there was “political hay to be made in the suburbs with such a stance” (James, 2004). It was, James elsewhere writes, a “Sir Robert Muldoon-style populist big idea: no special treatment for Maori based on race” (James, 2004). The allusion here is incredibly apposite. As Prime Minister

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5 Elsewhere James defends what he calls Brash’s “values” (James, 2004). He casts Brash as a “newcomer,” suggesting any “wedge politics” to be the province of the “standard-issue politicians” who lie behind him. For his description of wedge politics he cites British journalist Andrew Sullivan’s version in the case of President George W. Bush: “You use a disliked minority—black criminals, gay couples; you get your opponent to defend them; then you get to win over all those offended by the association.”
between 1975 and 1984, Muldoon was, according *The Economist*, “fond of dismissing criticism by claiming he was ‘on the side of the people’” (cited in Moore, 2003, p. 3). Labeling himself an ‘ordinary bloke’, he drew much of his core support from the middle and lower-middle classes by appealing to their social conservatism (Nagel, 1998). As his biographer writes, “Muldoon had an astute political instinct for issues of concern to large sections of the public and the ability and audacity to exploit them…[Muldoon] was not afraid to divide society by playing upon emotion and prejudice” (Gustafson, 2000, p. 150). Shieff (2006) argues that, in similar fashion, with what came to known as the ‘Orewa Speech’, Brash “tapped a well-spring of anxiety in Pakeha who felt that ill-defined Maori entitlements under the Treaty of Waitangi had come to take precedence over Pakeha interests” (p. 100). Middleton (2005) contends likewise, that Brash “merely brought to the surface the subterranean rumblings in bars, kitchens, and workplaces” around New Zealand (2005, p. 479).

Notably, Brash has not been the only New Zealand politician of late to engage in such racially-tinged ‘wedge’ or ‘dog-whistle’ politics. Winston Peters is probably the most well-known in this regard. He has rightly been labeled an “anti-immigration politician” (Ward and Liu, 2005, p. 165). Though he has noticeably toned down his statements since becoming—in one of the great
political ironies—Minister of Foreign Affairs, Peters is (in)famous for attacks on Asian ‘immigrants’, accusing them of everything from driving up the cost of housing to causing traffic problems in Auckland. He has also targeted the Somali community (*Peters speak up*, 2004), and once said of Muslims in New Zealand that the moderate and militant, fit hand and glove. Underneath it all the agenda is to promote fundamentalist Islam. Indeed, these groups are like the mythical Hydra, a serpent underbelly with multiple heads, capable of striking at any time and in any direction (Peters, 2005).

Peters is obviously an extreme case, an example of what one local academic aptly calls an “identikit populist. A man with a ready-made message whose familiarity never seems to dull its appeal to the discontented and disconcerted the world over” (Bale, 2002). Yet, the popularity of the rhetoric of Brash or Peters has obviously played well with voters. Public opinion has also been divided over Algerian asylum seeker Ahmed Zaoui, with one commentator in the UK’s *Guardian* suggesting the case to be “imperiling Kiwis’ reputation for tolerance” (Fickling, 2003). Tolerant or not, there is certainly enough evidence to support population scholar Richard Bedford’s contention that “New Zealanders are quite happy to travel and experience different cultures. But we don’t want them here” (quoted in *Editorial*, 2005).
“They’re Giants. Let’s Find Another Sport”: Wounded White Boys and the Pakeha Game

If we don’t want immigrants ‘here’, neither does it seem do want them on our rugby fields. In recent years there has been a rising chorus of concern about the declining number of Pakeha boys taking up the game (Deaker, 1999; Matheson, 2001; Romanos, 2002; Thomas, 2003; Williams, 2001). What irks these commentators is not so much these boys are going elsewhere, but that they are being replaced by their Maori and Polynesian counterparts. Young white males are represented as dropping out a rapid rate while the number of Maori and Polynesian boys has purportedly undergone a “staggering increase” (Romanos, 2002). According to critics the pool of white players in New Zealand is getting smaller and smaller every year while some schoolboy teams, to borrow a phrase from one administrator, now “read like passenger lists from Polynesian Airlines.” 7 Supposedly young Polynesians are coming to dominate rugby to such an extent “that many curtain-raisers…rarely feature a white player” (Deaker, 1998, p. 162). “When I go to rugby grounds on a Saturday morning” recounts one writer, “the percentage of Polynesian and Maori boys playing is striking. In some teams, the odd white boy stands out as being different” (Romanos, 2002, p. 177). “There’s no doubt about it,” another concurs, “this is a serious problem”

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7 The now defunct international arm of the national airline of Samoa.
(Matheson, 2001). According to Laidlaw (1999, p. 183) “a page in New Zealand’s sporting evolution is being rapidly turned. The 21st century will be an age in which [rugby] will be dominated by young Polynesians.”

The problem for these writers doesn’t end at school- or junior-level. At the professional level here too purportedly a “transformation is well under way” (Laidlaw, 1999, p. 183). Certainly, there has been a noticeable browning of the elite ranks. Little more than 10 years ago there were 25 players of Pacific Island descent contracted to play for New Zealand’s Super 12 franchises. In 2007, 50 of the 162 contracted players could trace their roots to either Fiji, Samoa, or Tonga. Around 9000 of the roughly 21,000 players in Auckland are ‘Polynesian’ making Pacific peoples the most significant ethnic group. Further inspection of the numbers reveals that Pacific peoples account for almost 60 per cent of all players in the region aged 12 and over and almost 70 per cent of those playing senior rugby (Paul, 2007). At least 42 of 91 All Blacks selected in the decade between 1991–2000 were of Maori or Pacific descent (Ryan, 2007). The inevitable question for the anxious is where this all leads, the prospect that there could possibly come a day when the All Blacks “no longer feature a single white face” (Laidlaw, 1999, p. 183). Doubtless the skeptic would find little comfort from one local rugby scribe who recently posited that such is “the growing dominance of Polynesian athletes” that “it’s not inconceivable that come the 2011 World Cup,
New Zealand, as hosts, kick-off the first game with a match-day 22 that consists solely of players who come from a Pacific Island background” (Paul, 2007).

But the roots of that prospect lie back with the schoolboys. This is where the declining position of Pakeha males in rugby begins. What is most interesting in this regard is the way in which Polynesian dominance is rugby enables New Zealand’s racial hierarchy to be turned on its head, “so that [Pakeha] can be positioned as a seemingly legitimate unprivileged subject” (Kusz, 2007, p. 99; emphasis added). In essence, young Pakeha boys are increasingly framed as ‘victims.’ The overwhelming success of Polynesian males in both the junior and senior ranks are framed as an exclusionary force which constrains the possibilities of Pakeha boys. Surveying the junior rugby scene Laidlaw (1999) writes:

All over the country the pattern is repeating itself. More and more school and age group teams are reliant on youthful Polynesian vigour to make the difference. Hulking youngsters dominate the landscape at almost every game. Fifteen year olds weighing a hundred kilos, and playing centre, have become the norm. It is an arresting sight, not least for the modestly proportioned Pakeha lads who get run over every Saturday and wonder how many more times they must be offered up as a human sacrifice. As a parent-spectator I have found myself wincing on the sideline as the footsoldiers of mainly Pakeha teams are comprehensively flattened by the heavy armour of their mainly Polynesian opponents (p. 182).

The image of Pakeha boys, then, is that they are suffering at the hands of the Polynesian counterparts.
This discourse relies first on the obvious stereotype of whites’ athletic or physical inferiority to Polynesians. Polynesian dominance is taken as ‘naturally’ conferred through their advantages in physical development. This is perhaps the most common and widely-promulgated explanation for white flight. As Matheson (2001) confidently asserts, “Without question, the most common reason [for white flight] is that the young white athlete is intimidated by the growing number of Polynesians playing the sport” (p. 21). Demonstrating the degree to which the argument is taken as common-sense, Romanos (2002) suggests that “You do not need to be a scientist to know that an eight-year-old, 12-year-old or 15-year-old Polynesian boy will almost inevitably be much bigger than a white boy the same age” (p. 171). Or as one club coach puts it, “It generally comes back to one thing—the sheer athletic ability of the Polynesian versus the European. A 14-year-old Polynesian will almost always shit all over the white kid” (quoted in Matheson, 2001). It is thus the size of Pacific Islanders that is driving white boys away from the sport.

I take issue with the naturalization of racial athletic aptitudes in the next chapter but for now it is perhaps enough to note that it is for all intents and purposes taken as a truism that Polynesian boys are more physically developed. As the Auckland Rugby CEO David White is quoted as saying, “Whether we like it or not, Polynesian kids mature physically earlier, they’re big and strong and
we can’t hide from that” (quoted in Thomas, 2003, p. 133). The veracity of such contentions is all but assumed—or as one former All Black puts it, “undeniable.” Such views obviously construct a racially-deterministic argument that repeats “assumptions about the violent, powerful, but ‘nobly savage’” Polynesian (Brabazon, 2006, p. 184); a dangerous line of reasoning that, as I say, I wish to pick up in the following chapter. Setting aside momentarily the way the success of Polynesian players is attributed to innate or instinctive ‘qualities’, however, it is interesting to note the way young white males are figured as having their agency constrained. First, this a result of what Hoberman (1997) may have described as a “spreading white inferiority complex.” Apparently, white boys have simply given up. “There are reports,” writes Laidlaw, of some talented, but physically intimidated young Pakeha players growing dispirited by these disparities in size and firepower and giving the game away” (1999, p. 182). According to Romanos they are “sick of having the daylights knocked out of them by boys who have such physical advantages” (2002, p. 19). One coach similarly despairs of the decision facing Pakeha boys: “Look at the choice he has. The young white kid can say to himself, ‘I am a skinny little kid. I am 13 years old. I can go and play with my skateboard or I can go and run against that 80kg Polynesian guy and get absolutely hammered.’ Why would he want to play rugby?” These physical advantages are seen to be exacerbated by a ‘Polynesian
style’ of play that exploits the purported differences in size. According to one-time All Black Norm Hewitt, “the Island boys all look up to [players like] Jonah Lomu\(^8\), and they want to play like him. They get the ball and want to run over their opposition” (the opposition being, in his words, “little white boys, who are about half as big”). Again, this reaffirms the idea of an ‘innate’ style of play, that, like their size, Polynesian boys are handed their abilities on a “genetic plate” (Hokowhitu, 2003, p. 212).

On the surface, then, the white flight crisis appeals to neutrality by rendering Polynesian boys as naturally different, naturally bigger, and thus, naturally a threat to their Pakeha counterparts. That these differences are natural is important because it normalizes the white-flight-panic discourse, permitting statements that could otherwise be interpreted as racially-motivated. One is reminded here of Bonilla-Silva’s implication of such ‘color-blind’ rhetoric in the production and reinforcement of the status quo (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). Of particular note is the way color-blind racism can function through a naturalization “frame of reference”—the “set path for interpreting information”—that Bonilla-Silva suggests as “allowing whites to explain away racial phenomena by suggesting they are natural occurrences” (p. 28). We could perhaps suggest this as typical of (new) racism generally in that it is a process

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\(^8\) A famed All Black of Tongan heritage. Lomu is discussed further in the chapter to follow.
and an ideology of naturalization, of constructing social relations as natural and unchangeable. As Rocchio (2000) contends, appeals to nature, or the natural state of things, are “popular mode[s] of rhetoric for maintaining the status quo of inequality and its modes of categorized oppression” (Rocchio, 2000, p. 75).

Rhetorically, the strategy works by making frequent recourse to phrases such as ‘that’s the way it is’—something that normalizes what is spoken. We see evidence of such techniques in the white-flight-panic discourse. Romanos (2000), for instance, argues racism is a non-factor when it comes to explaining white flight. “[Racism] is not the case at all”, he writes. “What happens is that boys, and their parents, are intimidated by the size of the Maori and, particularly, the Polynesian boys of the same age” (p. 170). Laidlaw (1999) similarly chastises the “dedicated schools of politically correct thought that insist that we are all the same. We aren’t, and it couldn’t be more obvious when an ethnically mixed bunch of early teenagers take the field” (p. 182). Racism is thus disavowed; the fear is based in biology; Polynesian boys are naturally a threat.

Despite these claims to the contrary, race sits at the center of the white-flight discourse—even if it is never acknowledged. However, we can only see this by implicating the white-flight debate in wider discourses about the declining position of white males in New Zealand rugby and sport more generally. To borrow from Thomas (2003) (in one of the more astute analyses of
white flight), it seems reasonable to ask whether “is it just a roundabout, mealy-mouthered way of expressing alarm over the browning of the game and specifically the All Blacks” (p. 135). Palmer (2007) has observed how “there is a common perception among sports followers and sports media that Maori and Polynesian athletes are dominating [New Zealand’s] high-profile and elite sports teams” (p. 311). In addition to a string of articles in the press, two recent documentaries have visited the issue. One, titled The Brown Factor (TVNZ, 2004), is decidedly romantic on the browning of Kiwi sport, with the talking heads heaping praise on sport’s positive impact on race relations. As one puts it, “sport, particularly professional sport, has broken down more racial barriers than anything else put together.” The video is also notable for the way it repeats dominant race ideologies that attribute the success of Polynesians to their inherent physicality. This, though, is even more explicit is the second documentary, Polyunsaturated (TV3 Network, 2003). In brief, the program is remarkably reminiscent of the now infamous 1989 NBC News article Black Athletes—Fact and Fiction in the way it sets out to discover “the physical reasons for the Polynesian superiority in rugby” (emphasis my own; on Black Athletes see Davis, 1990). It states from the outset that Polynesian players “are faster and stronger than Pakeha.” Like The Brown Factor it also takes as given that the “browning of New Zealand rugby” is very real. The ‘proof’ offered is usually
something akin to the statistics I have quoted above: the growing number of Pacific Islanders playing in the Super 14 and that fact at least 42 of 91 All Blacks selected in the decade between 1991–2000 were of Maori or Polynesian descent (NZRU, 2008). More frequently, however, the evidence is anecdotal, the words of coaches or administrators or even casual fans. This is typical of the analysis of white flight generally. Deaker (1998), for instance, considers white flight to be “very real” pointing only to his own observations during “years on the sidelines.” From his vantage he sees “a minute number of Europeans playing senior club rugby and a drop off in the numbers coming in at lower levels”— neither of which he substantiates. Romanos equally alleges “white players” to be “in a small minority in terms of senior rugby” (2002, p. 181). He bases this contention on his observation of senior rugby in Auckland, neatly side-stepping the fact that two-thirds (66.9 percent) of New Zealand’s Pacific peoples live in the Auckland Region. It is hardly, then, a representative sample of ‘New Zealand’ rugby.

My point here is not to enter into the debate about whether or not the browning of New Zealand rugby is actually happening (although it is interesting to note that, by the most recent SPARC figures, there are five times as many Pakeha than Pacific men playing rugby in New Zealand). What is more pertinent is that, happening or not, the browning of New Zealand sport is perceived to be
so. Why this is cause for concern is never clearly articulated in media discourse on the browning of rugby. We can, however, perhaps discern something about the wider disquiet in two comments from Romanos and Deaker, both of which are echoed elsewhere (e.g., Matheson, 2001). Writes Romanos in one telling summation of his argument:

It is easy to listen to this and say, ‘So what? Aren’t there as many people as ever playing rugby?’ But that’s too simplistic. The All Blacks have always represented New Zealand; they are the sports team that New Zealanders have identified with. I wonder if all New Zealanders still feel that the All Blacks are representative of New Zealand in general, when half of them (sometimes more) are brown-skinned. Where are we going with this? Will New Zealand rugby at national and international level comprise of a group of brown-skinned players playing, being cheered on by white spectators and television viewers? That’s certainly been the trend in some of the professional sports in the United States.

Deaker shows a similar uneasiness about the potential for New Zealand rugby to “emulate the United States where so much of their televised sport seems to feature wonderfully skilled black athletes competing while whites make up the bulk of the spectators.” “Somehow young white players have to be encouraged to remain in the game if rugby is to truly remain our national sport” he argues. “Pakeha kids aged fifteen to twenty to twenty must be positively assisted to stick with it at an age where they are getting belted over by more mature Polynesians” (Deaker, 1999).

There is obviously an interesting anti-American slant to both of these statements. Each could be articulated to local fears about the creeping
commercialization of rugby which has accompanied the game’s turn to professionalism in the mid-1990s (see Hope, 2002; Richardson, 2005; Thomas, 2003). After New Zealand’s failures at recent World Cups a number of commentators have argued that “business-men administrators, corporate sponsors, public relations people, and other management types [have] corroded the traditional All Black spirit” (Hope, 2002, p. 235). Elsewhere I have argued that the commercialization of New Zealand sport is frequently framed by local pundits as a portent of the impending ‘Americanization’ of New Zealand sport (Grainger and Jackson, 2005); and in Romanos’ and Deaker’s comments we see how such fears take on a racial slant: the game divided—between brown players and a white audience—is an ‘Americanized’ game, purportedly anathema to All Black history and the team’s role as New Zealand’s most prominent cultural ambassadors. But there is something of a cultural investment in the politics of (racial) memory here too. Concurrent to what some see as the “crass commercialism” (Little, 2003) taking over the game have been the concerns about how professionalism is affecting the players themselves. The modern All Blacks, as Hope (2002) observes, have been “deemed to be professional yet pampered, athleticism skilled yet robotic, individually committed yet passionless as a team” (p. 235). What they lack, according to the nostalgists, is a ‘mongrel element’, the
so-called ‘hard men’ of All Black yore. Amid the post-World Cup scapegoating since rugby became professional many have found solace in memories of a select few high-profile forwards from farming backgrounds such as Colin Meads, Brian Lochore and Ian Kirkpatrick—men who epitomised the qualities of toughness and dedication that the [modern] All Blacks generation of ‘soft’ and ‘pampered’ All Blacks had apparently lost (Ryan, 2005, pp. 151-152).

Ryan (2005) links this regard for history to a "‘rural myth’ whereby the emergence, growth and early success of New Zealand rugby has been attributed to the exploits of pioneer farmers and the fabric of rural society generally” (p. 152). According to this myth rural rugby produced ‘hard men’ in contrast to “the urban environment of softness, easy living and pampered decadence—a world apparently inhabited by contemporary All Blacks” (pp. 154-155). We can build on this argument by suggesting that this longing for the rural ‘heartland’ is a nostalgic longing for the ‘good ol’ days’ when the centrality of Pakeha men was taken for granted. In New Zealand we cannot ignore the interconnection between rurality and whiteness. It is almost as if the ethnic Other is rendered invisible by rurality. This racialized contrast between urban and rural posits the countryside as the site of authentic and healthy national racial production, just as the city is the site of racial degeneration (Bonnett, 1998). It is telling that Ryan’s examples of the idealized, heartland All Black are all Pakeha. And, consider the
comments of one prominent local broadcaster when asked about the state of New Zealand rugby:

I think it’s fantastic that we have this wonderfully athletic group of people [i.e., Pacific people] that can help us develop our sport…But I also want the hard, tough white farmer to be a part of my All Blacks side…[the type of player who is] there for 80 minutes in a ruthless uncompromising way” (quoted in Matheson, 2001, p. 32).

Rugby, then, plays an important role in coding whiteness under the guise of rural nostalgia.

Obviously, it is interesting that the (Pakeha) speaker here also rhetorically creates a distance between Pakeha, who ‘own’ the game (it is “our”, read a Pakeha, game after all) and Pacific people who merely contribute to it. There are distinct echoes of the discourse of cultural enrichment examined in the previous chapter. But I also read such statements as typical of the white-flight-panic discourse generally. The force in the argument, I argue, lies in the cultural ascription of the bodies of the Polynesian other as ‘abject.’ Anxiety is generated because the certainty of boundaries between the (European) subject and (Polynesian) object, between normal and abnormal, are threatened (Kristeva, 1982). In essence, they “threaten to contaminate the body politic, to destroy the very fabric of cultural identity and nationalism” (Smith, subjectivity, p. 143). Pacific bodies challenge the national status quo because their ‘abject’ bodies threaten the symbolic order in which whiteness is taken as the norm. And, as
Mary McDonald proffers, appeals to norms are “infused with modern power whereby failure to refer back to norms renders particular bodies unintelligible and abject” (McDonald, 2006, p. 516).

The Pakeha Game: Polynesian Bodies Out of Place

In making this allusion to abject bodies it important to first point out that rugby is a “racialized space” (Bonnett and Nayak, 2003). Cultural geography has alerted us to how the social construction of race becomes one with the occupation of (sporting) space. In this case, rugby, and the rugby field, have traditionally connoted whiteness via the metonymy of rugby and the Pakeha All Black (Cosgrove and Bruce, 2005; Phillips, 1987). As an Other, Polynesian boys destabilize the social and moral order. Panic arises from the fact that spatial and social boundaries are threatened—something only exacerbated by alarmist media coverage of white flight. Pakeha anxieties, to borrow from Ang (2001), “do not simply revolve around ‘race’, but also, significantly, have to do with land, with territory or more precisely, with claims on land and territory” (p. 127). One of the principle ideas underlying national sovereignty is that “members of a certain cultural group—a nation—have a privileged relationship with a certain territory...The nation’s homeland is the ground, in a near literal sense, of its members’ sense of self” (Poole, 1999, pp. 127-128). This “imagined geography”—to borrow from Said (1978)—which binds place and identity, can provide the
basis for a shared identity, articulated through a shared sense of ‘place’ or ‘home.’ As a structure of feeling that transforms space into a ‘homeplace,’ nationalism also “interpolates individual and collective subjects as embodiers of national character” (Alonso, 1994, p. 386). Arguably, rugby and the All Blacks perform precisely this function. Hence the reason one commentator on the browning of the All Blacks is moved to describe the change as “disturbing” and “something not quite right, something insidious” (Matheson, 2001, p. 21).

One also thinks here of Hall’s (1990) reminder about identity and the way it entails the social, material, and imagined erection of boundaries. Cultural identities, he argues, are “points of identification”, “not essences, but positionings” (p. 226). Identities, in this way, can be understood as constructed by “occupying certain spaces that exclude the Other by creating borders” (Stehle, 2005, p. 47; emphasis added). Identity, as a temporary determination, can be seen as mapped onto places and areas because subjects “achieve and resist their systems of identification in and through social space” (Stehle, 2005). Identities are geographically contingent. Within this process of locating ourselves as social subjects we are also attributing characteristics to places (or, more correctly, space achieves an identity as a place). Particular places take on specific identities. What is at issue here, then, is the manner in which space is conceptualized, organized, and controlled; raising, in turn, questions of the working of power. On this
matter, I start from the presumption that, though never fixed or immutable, “hegemonic cultural practices will always attempt to fix the meaning of space” (Natter and Jones, 1997, p. 150), to “produce a homologous alignment between space and identity.”

Turning to New Zealand, the national spatial epistemology is deeply ensconced in colonial and Eurocentric ways of categorizing the world, it is predicated upon a dominant self-image of itself “as a white European enclave” (Ang, 2001, p. 133). Put differently, New Zealand’s cultural and symbolic borders have historically been racialised and premised on whiteness. This categorization of the national space as white “also relies upon the ability to survey and navigate social space from a position of authority” (Hage, 1998). The cohesion and maintenance of Pakeha identity is predicated on a territorial/spatial power in which they imagine themselves as “guardians of national space” (Hage, 2000). To borrow from Hage (2000), Pakeha have always positioned themselves as “masters of national space, and that it was up to them to decide who stayed in and who ought to be kept out of that space.” As Hage continues, as much as the national space is about defining who is desirable/undesirable, “what is also implicit in this mode of classification is an image of the nationalist as someone with a managerial capacity over this national space” (2000, p. 42). This echoes too, those who have argued that “whiteness is a ‘standpoint’ or place from which
to look at oneself, others and society” (Frankenburg, 1993). The Other (Maori, non-European immigrant) in New Zealand is an “object to be managed”, while the Pakeha self is “spatially empowered to position/remove this other” (Hage, 2000, p. 42). The Other in New Zealand is therefore “wholly and hierarchically different from the white[Pakeha] self” (Fine, 2004, p. 132). Immigration regimes have until only recently assumed a white New Zealand society and are informed by a presumed racial hierarchy of a groups’ relative ‘inferiority’ or ‘undesirability’ (Ip, 2003; Murphy, 2003; Ward and Lin, 2005) The traditional relationship between what Hage dubs the ‘manager’ and the ‘managed’ is, however, being eroded by growing cultural diversity and the call to recognize the entitlements of indigenous Maori. For Pakeha, power and privilege are something of a zero-sum game: “‘their’ gains”, explains Delaney (2002), “must be ‘our’ losses” (p. 11).

In this way, we can read white flight as a moral panic in the sense used by Sibley (1995). Sibley suggests that

moral panics articulate beliefs about belonging and not belonging, about the sanctity of territory and the fear of transgression. Such panics bring boundaries into focus by accentuating the difference between the anxious guardians of mainstream [read Pakeha] values and excluded others (1995, p. 43).

In Kristeva’s terms the Polynesian body is an abject body because it represents a failure to secure boundaries from that which “disturbs identity, system, order”,

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that which “does not respect borders positions, rules” (1982, p. 4). New Zealand’s social policy has been popularly characterized as being increasingly multicultural, yet the fantasy of a white nation still exists and orders relations between different people in the nation (see Chapter 1). The nostalgia which surrounds Pakeha rugby can be seen as a manifestation of the dominant imagining of the New Zealand nation as being a predominantly white space.

Indeed, for Pakeha the national self is a distinctly spatialized self. That is, the national self is built on the premise that there is a stable and fixed correspondence between the (bounded) nation and identity. Such a conception of culture, as Clifford (1988) argues, carries with it “an expectation of roots, of a stable, territorialized existence” (p. 338). Put differently, the link of people to places is achieved through ascriptions of native or ‘indigenous’ status, ‘authenticity’ emerging out of “the interaction between a people and their geographical environment” (Naish, 1997). For Pakeha this creates a kind of ontological unease, their cultural identity problematized because “Pakeha culture is the result of a fairly recent transplantation” (Bell, 2006). It is difficult to make claims to place when history, for Pakeha, provides “a reminder of their ‘uprooted’ and colonizing past” (Bell, 2006). What Grant Farred explains vis-à-vis South Africa is apropos of the case of Pakeha New Zealanders: “to name white [New Zealanders] ‘settlers’ is to mark them as aliens when they present
themselves as unproblematic nationals” (Farred, 1997, p. 72). Bell reminds us too that their “moral uncertainty [as] settler peoples…is heightened by their origin as colonizers. Pakeha are not only the descendants of migrants, they are the descendants of colonizing migrants” (Bell, 2006, emphasis added). And, of course, the recent works of historians such as James Belich, Judith Binney and Anne Salmond tear at the Pakeha conceit that colonialism was in any way a ‘civilizing’ mission: the word itself is now more likely to initiate a certain soul-searching about the reality and history of oppression than it is to invoke any sense of imperial triumphalism or moral virtue.

The problematic articulation of race and space has been further complicated by the erosion of ‘Britishness’ given the way it has historically sustained the white nation fantasy. The British first established settlements in New Zealand in 1788, and with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 British immigrants were granted legal rights as citizens. In the years that followed the sole source of immigrants was subsequently the British Isles. Indeed, from the Treaty’s signing, local and British governing elites worked to ensure New Zealand “was a British country and other people either did not belong or could stay only under sufferance” (McKinnon, 1996, p. 12). As Pearson (2000) describes it, “the New Zealand colony had a civic and ethnic ‘British core’”, with the country remaining “the most British of the offspring of the
‘Mother Country’” (p. 98). Into the late 1800s the effects of the introduction of ‘foreigners’ remained “a constant fear” (Marotta, 2000, p. 179) of the provisional government. Via restrictive immigration policy, New Zealand, like other British settler states, began to erect “Great White Walls” (Price, 1974) intended to “shield them from ‘racial contamination’” (Pearson, 2005, p. 27). Though, unlike Australia, a ‘White New Zealand Policy’ (Murphy, 2003; Ip, 2003; Ip and Pang, 2005; Marotta, 2000) was never explicit, immigration policy was largely enacted through an ethnic preference system that ensured preferential treatment for immigrants from so-called ‘Traditional Source Countries’ and, later, parts of Northern or Western Europe (Scandinavians, for instance, were said to more assimilable into the ‘British way of life’ [Borrie, 1991]). It took until 1987 for the traditional source preference list to be abolished and a fully ‘non-discriminatory’ immigration policy to be adopted.

As a result of the “formal deracialization of entry requirements” (Pearson, 2000, p. 100), by the end of the 1980s the total percentage of migrants from Europe and the United States fell from 54 per cent to 29 per cent (Marotta, 2000). But the myth of a national identity dependent on its British origin was being threatened not only by changing demographics. In the first instance, New Zealand’s economic and political ties to Britain were already weakening by the late 1970s. Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community in 1973, in
particular, undermined the sense that to be a New Zealander was to be nested within a broader British identity. As Britain’s focus shifted to Europe, New Zealand, like other dominions, was “forced and/or wished” to go its own way, to “reformulate [its] own national identity anew” (Pearson, 2000, p. 95).

Further corroding the sense of Britishness was the so-called ‘Maori Renaissance’ (Walker, 1990). The rapid urbanization of Maori during the 1960s was followed in the 1970s by a renewal in Maori activism led by trade unionists and students. Under sustained pressure, the state was forced to address widening ethnic equality and reply to the calls of Maori leaders for greater political and economic autonomy. Their initial response was to officially promote and affirm “aspects of ‘traditional’ Maori culture” in the hope that “ethnic inequalities might be more effectively reduced, and, perhaps, eventually eliminated” (Sissons, 1993, p. 100). When it became apparent during the mid-1980s that this “strategic promotion of Maori culture” had failed in such an objective, the state turned instead in the direction of “Maori self-administration and the securing of state legitimacy” (Sissons, 1993, p. 100). To this end, the newly-elected Labour government of 1984 set about reaffirming biculturalism as part of a new ideological and policy framework. The changes, in brief, included bicultural service delivery, expanding the power of the Waitangi Tribunal (including the recognition of historical Treaty grievances), concessions on land
rights and fishing resources, and the selective incorporation of Maori cultural symbolism within state institutions.

Whether or not 1984 marked the beginning of a “Maori Constitutional Revolution” (as one Pakeha academic has claimed), Maori were undoubtedly “given a level of recognition that had been absent for more than a century” (Patman and Rudd, 2005, p. 101). The shift towards Maori self-administration of education, justice, and social welfare, the airing of Treaty grievances, and the establishment of major Maori industry initiatives including fishing, aquaculture and farming, mark further the “move towards bicultural ‘partnership’” (Pearson, 2000, p. 102). The new bicultural order, though, has raised questions about where power lies and how it is shared in the democratic nation state, and, certainly, not all Pakeha are comfortable with sharing, or even ceding, power to Maori. Populist politics have been want to interpret Maori imperatives—particularly those supported in legislation—as ‘separatist’, frequently invoking a discourse of racial privilege (McCreanor, 2005). To be sure the robust official role for Māori culture in New Zealand is widely accepted, but the notion of “control by minority” to some “implies advantages and special treatment for Maori and invites comparison with the archetypal evil of apartheid” (McCreanor, 2005, p. 58). Such “politics of recognition” (Taylor, 1992) are also seen to be at odds with (Pakeha) New Zealand’s image of itself as a difference-blind democracy (Barclay,
2005). The continuing tension over biculturalism in part reflects an inability on the part of Pakeha to acknowledge that the significance of Maori culture lies not only in “its uniqueness, but its primacy” (Rata, 2005, p. 274), in its position as indigenous. Admitting to what Rata (2005, p. 274) has called the “first arrival status” of Maori carries with it the implication of a “priority status”, affording Maori collective rights “not on the basis of need or disadvantage, nor even on the grounds of compensation, but on the basis of ‘ancestral occupation’” (Fleras, 2000, p. 129). Pakeha have thus been forced not only to accept the significance of a previously obscured history, but to concede that “the conventional explanations of their dominance with which they grew up were fundamentally flawed and that the legitimacy of their political, economic, and social domination is now contested” (Spickard, 2004, p. 235).

If the Maori Renaissance has disrupted “the congruence of the state with the dominant cultural group”, as Paul Spoonley (2003, p. 64) suggests, then alongside such developments the momentum for a “counter revolutionary” backlash also appears to building (Walker, 1990; see also Pearson, 2000, 2005). As Cosgrove and Bruce (2005) note, Pakeha responses have included “anger and refusal to acknowledge the validity of Maori demands, along with assertions that there is no Maori culture worth preserving and no ‘real’ Maori for whom to preserve it” (see also Smith, 1999). Nowhere was this more stark than in the
infamous Orewa Speech of Opposition leader Don Brash which I examined in the previous chapter (Brash, 2004). Recounting the effect of Brash’s speech, Wendy Larner suggests that

almost overnight, practices that were taken for granted in many settings...began to be openly questioned...newspapers and talk back radio were flooded with the complaints of those...who felt they could now publicly attack the politics of biculturalism and accuse the government of racial favoritism (Larner, 2005, p. 133).

What was also apparent from the speech and its aftermath was that it had implications not just for local understandings of biculturalism. It can instead be situated within a more general “politics of rejection” identified by Spoonley (2005, p. 107), and which “articulates and encourages a fear of non-Europeans, thereby ensuring that racial politics define many contemporary political debates.” Brash’s speech is typical of Pakeha calls to “[reject] ‘race-based’ policies in favour of a modified ‘one-nation’ approach”, with this alternative national narrative directed as much toward Maori as “the multiculturalism of a much more diverse immigration policy” (Spoonley, 2005, pp. 107, 108). The National Party’s “one standard of citizenship for all” (The Dominion Post, 2002, p. A7), with its emphasis on one-ness, reflects a “nostalgic desire for national homogeneity” (Ang, p. 2001, 96) clearly at odds with both biculturalism and multiculturalism.

This is not to suggest that there has been any explicit “desire for a return to monocultural harmony” (Ang, 2001, p. 97). Instead Brash and his ilk attempted
to paint the Labour government as “out of step with ‘mainstream’ New Zealand and beholden to a range of minority interests” (Geddis, 2006, p. 810). In contrast, Brash promised “a government of mainstream New Zealanders, for mainstream New Zealanders” (quoted in Watkin 2005, 14), while his deputy Gerry Brownlee similarly proclaimed the National Party a “mainstream political party” which “share[s] the values of mainstream New Zealanders.” What can’t be overlooked is that the ‘mainstream’ to which Brash and company were appealing was, as Watkin (2005) points out, “unsurprisingly, provincial, Pakeha and male.” For Brash too, the indigene and the (non-European) immigrant become one, the ‘other’, ‘outside’ rather than ‘inside’ New Zealand society. The present-day ‘mainstream’ emphasizes “Anglo-conformity” (McLemore and Romo, 2004), ethnicizing Maori and non-English migrants, constructing them as members of ‘ethnic groups’ vis-à-vis the unmarked Pakeha ‘cultural core’ (Forrest and Dunn, 2006). This is typical of the way Pakeha have historically controlled the major institutions of New Zealand society and, consequently, “been able to appropriate the social and cultural ‘mainstream’ and make white understandings and practices normative” (Forrest and Dunn, 2006). Pakeha hegemony has been predicated upon the normalization or “universalization” (Gabriel, 1998, p. 12) of whiteness. Echoing Doane’s description of the United States, it can be argued that, when combined with existing domination, this normalization “enables
‘whiteness’ to be cast—but not named—as the larger society, the cultural
mainstream, and the nation.” Pakeha/white interests can thus masquerade as
those of ‘the mainstream’ or the nation as a whole.

We could, of course, dismiss Brash and others as embodied moments of
blatant right-wing populism, outside the bounds of normal, everyday,
‘respectable’ New Zealand politics. Yet, Pakeha are prone to cycles of xenophobic
backlash—against the ‘Chinese’ in the 1860s (Murphy, 2003), through the ‘anti-
Dallie’ legislation in the 1890s (Božić-Vrbančić, 2005), to more recent
discrimination against ‘Pacific Islanders’ (Spoonley, 1992, 2002), to today’s
growing hostility toward ‘Asian immigrants’ (Ip, 2003). To be clear, I am not
suggesting here that this backlash always manifests itself in such extreme forms
of racism nor the anti-immigrant feeling to be necessarily a significant strand in
contemporary, national popular consciousness. What is more important is the
way the anti-immigration and anti-minority stance of these groups has
influenced ‘mainstream’ parties and politicians to adopt racist viewpoints on
many issues. Par for the course in Western neo-liberal democracies, the left have
attacked more inflammatory racial comments while at the same time
progressively moving to tighten entry procedures for immigrants and seeking to
undermine customary indigenous rights. Thus, the self-described “centre-left”,
“socially liberal” Labour government raised the English-language requirement
after Peters’ sustained attacks on immigration policy gained favor in 2002, and, under similar political pressure, introduced legislation that extinguished Maori customary rights to the foreshore and seabed in 2003 (Young, 2003). As elsewhere, in New Zealand, policing the limits of national inclusiveness is the preserve of middle-of-the-road politicians as much as it is of the radical right. There is too a strong continuity in the way ‘race’ remains an effective marker of the acceptable boundaries of New Zealand culture and identity—‘mainstream’ interests—operationalized as ‘national’ interests—correlate overwhelmingly to those of Pakeha versus ‘minority’ interests that are “so ‘out of the mainstream’ that they are no longer ‘in the national interest’” (Ang, 2001, p. 110).

The roots of this type of particularist, exclusionary, and highly racialized, national cultural politics are obviously multiple and varied, and cannot be reduced to simple accusations of lingering, “differentialist racism”, or ‘fear of the other’ (Taguieff, 1990). To be sure, we cannot dismiss what present events say about symbolic or modern racism: the strong possibility that “New Zealanders are far less racially tolerant than their surface attitudes would lead an outside observer to believe” (Liu and Mills, 2006, p. 91). As political scientist Raymond Miller explains in reference to the public support for Brash’s proposal to remove ‘racial distinctions’ from government services: “There’s this veneer of cohesion in New Zealand and there are things we don’t want to talk about until a populist
politician…comes along and starts saying things, and some people respond, ‘My God, he’s brave enough to say it. He’s right, it’s us versus them.’ It exploits feelings that are there but haven’t been articulated” (quoted in Watkin, 2005). What I want to suggest, however, is that the recent racial malaise is about more than “old bigotries and old hangovers” (Bonilla-Silva, 2002, p. 190). It has a contextual specificity.

And, it is in this context that rugby has become a kind of battleground for Pakeha “who regard themselves in racial and cultural terms to be defending their space against change and transformation” (Hesse et al, 1992, p. 173). As Cosgrove and Bruce (2005, p. 341) have argued, the societal changes which I sketch out above have “resonated strongly in the sports realm” because of sports “key role” in New Zealand in articulating whiteness to national identity. There is a growing sense that Pakeha are losing control over their ability to define “who alone is afforded the will to define who should and should not inhabit the nation space” (Ahmed, 2005). The high visibility of Pacific rugby players has no doubt had a powerful and symbolic effect in challenging common-sense racisms that suggest that people of color “do not quite fully belong to the nation” (Carrington and McDonald, 2001, p. 3).

We therefore need to heed Bonilla-Silva’s explication of contemporary racialization as having its basis in “Whites’ defense of their racial privilege”
(Bonilla-Silva, 2002, p. 191). “Racism in modern society,” Cashmore (1987) accords, “typically arises in defence of the established order of things against perceived challenges…and in this sense, it can be seen as logical response” (p. 2). Certainly, the growing sense of anxiety among many ‘ordinary’ New Zealanders is suggestive of an ontological insecurity, an unwillingness of Pakeha to relinquish their role of ‘speaking for’ New Zealanders. Immigration combined with new ideas about minority rights offer new forms of identity, (bi/multi)culturalism for instance, that wear away at old myths about ethnic and cultural homogeneity. The white-flight-panic discourse can therefore be read as part of the discursive politics of Pakeha backlash, albeit within a guise fit for public consumption, in a way that appears non-racial. As a communication tactic, white flight is a discourse of plausible deniability in which statements about minorities can be defended against accusations of racism. In the terms of Liu and Mills (2006), white flight is “couched in language wherein it is plausible that an alternative besides racism is motivating the speaker’s criticism.” It is constructed in such a way that the speaker can convincingly disavow any racist intent (Reeves, 1983; Van Dijk, 1993). In this approach, Pacific peoples are not directly criticized at all; but are only indirectly “referred to within the context of the well-being of the nation or majority” (Liu and Mills, 2006). Ostensibly motivated by the protection of the young white males, the proponents of white-
flight panic instead deploy a nationalist discourse that affirms and celebrates the values and well-being of the Pakeha majority.

The Wimp Factor: Of White Men and Rugby

In precis, to this point I have suggested some Pakeha are growing anxious at the perceived erosion of their power and privilege, and that this anxiety reveals itself in the symbolic realm of rugby. But it should be noted that white flight panics are merely a matter of ‘race.’ Historical imaginings of whiteness are also centered on the pre-eminence masculinity (see Lopez, 2005). We cannot ignore that white flight is white male flight. The battle to protect rugby is the battle to protect white masculinity. The discussion of whiteness must therefore be located in the specific context of dominant forms of masculinity. While both and women are implicated in white privilege, the normative dominant, subject position in New Zealand rugby—as in New Zealand society—is the white male. Thus, as much as white flight is a ‘crisis of whiteness’, it is a ‘crisis of white masculinity’ (Robinson, 2000). At the same time as the previously invisible social, cultural, and economic privileges of Pakeha (men) in New Zealand have been exposed (precipitating unease), similar conjunctural forces are manifest into relation to patriarchal power. The social institutions which formerly revered men and reproduced their social privilege have been deteriorating at the same time as calls to improve minority rights have become heightened. In the case of race,
anxiety has been turned into a tale of victimization: in the midst of spreading cultural diversity, some Pakeha have attempted to reposition themselves as underprivileged. In the case of Pakeha men they have positioned themselves doubly-marginalized-by race and by gender. What is at stake in the battle over white flight is the power to define the terms of the normative; it is a narrative about the rise of identity politics and the parallel decentering of white masculinity.

To understand Pakeha masculinity, we have to locate Pakeha men’s lives historically. As the first country to grant women the vote in 1893 one could certainly be forgiven for thinking that New Zealanders possess a certain disposition toward social progressivism. Certainly the predominant national discourse has always tended toward a progressive liberalism, to imply “an open space of equality that is transparent and just” (Barclay, 2005, p. 121). And, women winning the vote, as a symbol “of the advanced state of the nation”, has been rightly described “as a foundational event in the construction of [New Zealand’s] national identity” (Dalziel, 2000, p. 88). However, to suggest 1893 as a watershed would be deny to the historicity of gender relations in New Zealand and the way in which past cultural models continue to structure meaning and action. “New Zealand is,” as James and Saville-Smith (1989) put it, a decidedly “gendered culture.” Male-female relationships in New Zealand are still what
might be politely called ‘traditional,’ with males dominating most positions of authority and status. Ideologies of masculinity also dominate gender relations in New Zealand. As Giles and Curreen (2007) note, in New Zealand masculinity “underpin[s] behavioral expectations for both men and women…The rhetoric of many New Zealand men includes fundamental assumptions of male authority, entitlement to power, and dominance over women” (p. 372). In this vein, Jackie True has noted how “the outside projection of ‘real man’ masculine values of war, sports, heroism, and mateship has been constitutive of New Zealand’s nationalism and national identity” (True, 1996, p. 114).

The origins of male dominance in New Zealand are generally traced to nineteenth-century, early-colonial development. Gender myths and stereotypes forged in colonial conditions have been particularly recalcitrant. To some, to even emigrate to New Zealand in the first place “was to throw off effeminate chains and become a man” (Phillips, 1987, p. 4). Once on the frontier men were confronted by a sexual imbalance, which historian Jock Phillips argues to have provided “the demographic basis for a rich male culture, fertile soil for the growth of all-male institutions” (1997, p. 9). It is hardly surprising that the nationalist narratives of this early-colonial period were therefore most “likely to recount the experience of male ‘mateship’ or the ‘man alone’ experience on gold-fields, farming blocks, and new settlements” (True, 1996, p. 114). Beyond sheer
exclusivity or isolation, the very nature of work also engendered certain expectations about male behavior. The settler-pioneer became something of a revered figure, praised for his “rugged individualism” and for his ability to “slave for long hours at back-breaking toil” (Phillips, 1997, p. 15). True (1996) argues this image of the frontier man, in his continual struggle against nature, helped to naturalize the social construction of gender in New Zealand; native/natural masculinity on the frontier provided the stark contrast to the cultured or artificial.

Into the early twentieth-century women’s work would continue to become “identifiably different from that of males” (Simms, 2001, p. 19). Women worked in different industries and struggled for equality in the labor movement. Men may have been no longer have ‘alone’ in the colony, yet they nonetheless maintained their dominance via the growing polarity between home and family and business and factory. To be sure, the Second World War would later raise “a barrage of questions about the role of women in New Zealand society” (Montgomerie, 2001, p. 9). Women’s labour outside the home was, for perhaps the first time, a necessity rather than an anomaly, and women moved into employment roles in both the government and private sector which “challenged the time-honoured notion that a woman’s was in the home” (Montgomerie, 2001, p. 9). However, the consequences of war-time change were largely short-lived,
and as Montogomerie (2001) has shown, rather than being a threat to the social order, the war failed to mark a lasting shift in gender roles in New Zealand. Certainly, there seem sufficient grounds to support Gould’s (1982) contention that even into the 1980s, “of all the advanced capitalist countries, New Zealand had kept its women most rigidly bound to house and to children” (p. 93).


Their effectiveness was further weakened by the neo-liberal programs of the mid-1980s. The great “New Zealand Experiment” (see Kelsey, 1993), as it came to known, of 1984 had an undoubtedly adverse affect on women (Hyman, 1999). Market regulations were largely dismantled, and emphasis moved toward individualism and diversity and away from equal employment opportunity programs. These new neo-liberal programs also undermined many of the earlier gains of New Zealand’s feminist movement. The emergence of second-wave feminism during the early-1970s established gender as an increasingly important base for social organization. New neoliberal policies, however, promoted the privatization of state functions and drastic cuts to social welfare as a means of
making the poor and unemployed more self-sufficient, less dependent upon the state. The shortcomings of these arguments have been well-noted by Kingfisher (2002) in her analysis of the “The Global Feminization of Poverty.” In particular, she points out that neoliberalism is based on a conception of the individual that is not universal, but historically and culturally constructed, and profoundly gendered. The “‘individual’ of liberal theory” she points out, “is not a generic individual, but a specifically male individual, whose independent individuality is predicated on women’s dependence and subservience” (p. 24).

While initially waged work was the preserve of men, the growth of women in the labour-force did not necessarily eradicate preexisting gender divisions given the segregated nature of employment. Because women’s jobs continued to involve supposedly “female attributes”, the position of women in the work force may have actually “serve[d] to reinforce the ideology of domesticity rather than to undermine traditional divisions of labour within the family” (Peake, 1994, p. 16). In privileging labour and economic activity, my reading of gender relations in New Zealand to this point is obviously a very structural one. Yet, the sustained pressure on women to uphold their domestic responsibilities via the engendering of labour cannot wholly explain their absence from national-public space. To be sure, as True (1996) contends, “any move away from domesticity” through work has traditionally been seen to
undermine “feminine identity and power in national space” (p. 117). However, as much as the workplace was socially and spatially separated from the household, the ‘private’ realm of women was equally segregated from other key elements of New Zealand’s (public) male culture.

Gender roles were nowhere more prominent than in times of war. “All wars”, as Kimmel (1996) has noted, “are meditations on masculinity” (p. 72), but in New Zealand war has particular salience given its centrality to the emergence of New Zealand’s very nationhood. Sinclair (1986), for instance, has remarked that war was the first sphere in which New Zealanders became “aware of differences between men from Great Britain and from several colonies. They came to consider their identity self-consciously” (p. 125). Thus, war has been a key site in which the nation has been en-gendered as male. Phillips (1997) has noted how military prowess has been “a central element of the white New Zealand male identity” since the days of the Boer War (p. 152). Of the gendering of war in general, while it obvious that the fighters were usually all male, as traditionally masculine enterprises wars “tend to institutionalize certain hegemonic ideals of masculinity, distinguishing ‘more manly’ from ‘less manly’” (Adams and Coltrane, 2005, p. 239). In like fashion, in New Zealand war became the ‘acid test’ of Pakeha masculinity; it was the ultimate trial of manhood (Phillips, 1987, 1989). Like the frontier it was also a space devoid of women. As a
consequence, war provided a space for the reanimation of mateship and the codes of male camaraderie. And, within this “community of old mates old values resurfaced” (Phillips, 1987, p. 182). Swearing, drinking, gambling, fighting, and other time-worn elements of New Zealand’s male culture began to reappear and carried over once men returned from the field.

These masculine imperatives were further excited by popular writers such as Denis Glover, John Mulgan, and Frank Sargeson, all of whom linked national identity to the soldier and the masculinism of war (Jensen, 1996). The ‘Man Alone’ trope enjoyed particular pride of place. Indeed, as a cultural myth the figure of the Man Alone has come to dominate “New Zealand’s unconscious self-image” over the past century (Schafer, 1998, p. 61). In brief, the Man Alone is New Zealand’s version of Hemingway’s ‘tough guy’ idiom. Born in New Zealand literature during the colonial and late-colonial periods, the Man Alone was something of a “synthesis of Daniel Boone and Paul Bunyan” (Schafer, 1998, p. 62), a man “attached to the indigenous myth of the heroic struggle to transform wild New Zealand into a pastoral paradise” (Jones, 1990, p. 298). The figure is somewhat malleable, though, and has always been conjuncturally-specific. For instance, in the Depression-era 1930s he became a figure of social critique, a way of debunking “New Zealand’s falsely optimistic Myth of Progress”, the idea among early settlers that “everything was going to get better
and better in New Zealand” (Benson, 1996). The term Man Alone was actually coined around this time, referring to the central protagonist of John Mulgan’s 1939 novel, an itinerant drifter and loner, known only as ‘Johnson.’ Johnson as Schaefer (1998) describes him “cannot find a wife and home, cannot imagine a marriage, a partnership beyond work, because the self-protective shield, the armor of his masculine codes is not flexible, will not stretch to cover a social bond beyond the job, the task at hand” (p. 63). Today’s New Zealanders would probably call Johnson ‘staunch,’ a type of “dour, stifling, provincial masculinity, inherited from the hard bastards who colonised this country” (Hume, 2007).

And, though some 70 years have passed since Mulgan’s *Man Alone*, staunch still “set[s] the tone” for many males in New Zealand (Hume, 2007).

Mulgan’s chauvinistic view of the New Zealand male was, and is, by no means an isolated figure. The Man Alone also featured prominently in the works of Frank Sargeson (described in the *Who’s Who of Twentieth Century Novelists* as New Zealand’s “leading New Zealand fiction writer with an international audience” [Woods, 2001, p. 302]), A. P. Gaskell, and later writers such as Robin Hyde and John A. Lee. If anything, Mulgan’s *Man Alone* was to “initiate a trend, if not a ‘genre’, in modern New Zealand fiction” (Harris, 2000). The works of Barry Crump provide examples of some of the more recent versions. “*A Good Keen Man*”, the title of his best-selling 1960 debut is a phrase now cemented in
the New Zealand vernacular, an allusion to men who like to think of themselves as “incredibly tough physically, shockingly crude in their language and behavior, fond of their yarning [story-telling] and boozing, but terrified and contemptuous of urban society and appalling misogynic” (Phillips, 1987, p. 266).

In *Wild Pork and Watercress* (1986) Crump also popularized the “buddy variant” (Schafer, 1998, p. 71) of the Man Alone, a literary kind which had an obvious identification with mateship, close male friendship, male culture and their accompanying ambivalence towards women. It is not insignificant to note that Crump himself was to became a cultural icon (to the extent of featuring on a postage stamp), a “national emblem of the bush hunter, backblock farmer, always-ready adventurer” (Schafer, 1998, p. 71).

If work, drinking, literature, and war have laid the maps of what it means to be a ‘man’ in New Zealand, there remains one more prerequisite of manhood. To play sport; “or at least display a strong interest in it” (Jensen, 1996, p. 20). As feminist author and activist Sandra Coney has commented:

New Zealand has been a called ‘a man’s country’ and nowhere has this been more true than in sport. Sporting contest has been a male proving ground, sport a source of national identity and pride. Traditionally, the nation’s heroes have won their colours either on the battlefield or the sports field (Coney, 1993, p. 238).

In his autobiography, the late historian Michael King writes similarly of how “the college motto, ‘Take courage: be a man’, was presented to us as something
to be proved only on the field of sport” (King, 1999). Historically, sport in New Zealand has been a predominantly male enterprise (Thompson, 2003). While women on the frontier were often involved in physical activity (through sheer necessity), sport remained a “highly valued male terrain”, and, as in other areas of colonial life, were often restricted in such endeavours by family and church (Thompson, 2003, p. 253). Adair, Nauright and Phillips (1996) have also suggested that in New Zealand, as in other parts of the British empire, “organized sport developed as an essentially male reaction to fears of ‘feminization’” during the late-1800s (see also Messner, 1992). Created by men for men, sports became “one of the last bastions of a separate, identifiably male world” (Messner, 1996, p. 81). It was, in other words, unmistakably a masculine space.

More than any other sport rugby exemplifies this homosocial world. In New Zealand rugby is synonymous with men. It is decidedly a man’s game. Phillips (1987) has provided perhaps the most comprehensive overview of the links between rugby and masculinity in New Zealand (see also Phillips, 1984, 1996). In a chapter titled “The Hard Man: Rugby and Formation of Character”, he describes how rugby provided a means to keep alive the “muscular virtues of the pioneer heritage.” (p. 86). As in other settler colonies (see Mangan, 1981), rugby was also championed as necessary training for the manly New Zealand
gentleman. As the game became codified, and consequently more orderly, rugby provided an answer to the growing anxieties about the effeminacy of urban men (but did so within respectable boundaries). As Gray (1983) describes it, rugby was seen as ideal for instilling manliness, developing physical strength, and “providing a suitable channel for (male) adolescent energies” (p. 29). Beyond its moral lessons, however, the adoption of the game in public schools and colleges reflected a desire to ‘build character’; a term, in New Zealand, largely synonymous with ‘manliness.’ Rugby, in Park’s (2000, p. 448) words, was “about suppressing emotions, overcoming pain, taking terrible risks and taking them like a man.” In combining the values of “strength, courage, and mateship” rugby came to embody “much of the ideal New Zealand male character” (Park, 2000).

High schools throughout the country consequently made rugby compulsory, becoming “a core experience of the school curriculum for young New Zealand males” (Phillips, 1987, p. 107). If the “boy of character had to take it like a man” (p. 105), then rugby turned the boy into a man; it tested his ability to both withstand and inflict pain and cemented the equation between masculinity and physical toughness. The costs of rugby’s rise to pre-eminence in New Zealand schools were, of course, high—for both men and women. Boys were taught to conform, to repress their feelings; they were systematically discouraged from displaying emotion or recognizing emotional contact (Crawford, 1985).
And, even if rugby did offer boys and men with a degree of physical or emotional intimacy—when there were few opportunities for them elsewhere—the sport was largely homophobic and frequently misogynic (Park, 2000; Pringle, 2001, 2005, 2007).

Throughout the course of the twentieth-century, rugby also helped to shape a distinctly ‘New Zealand’ national identity. Already by the late-1800s rugby had come to be seen as emblematic of the national character. Whereas in the United Kingdom rugby had been a largely upper-class game, in New Zealand it became a symbol of its (purportedly) egalitarian society. Indeed, it is “the bottom-up nature of rugby organization” that is frequently “singled out as a major feature of its popularity: the kind of social organization which New Zealanders valued most highly” (Park, 2000, p. 448; see also Crawford, 1985; Fougere, 1989). As James and Saville-Smith (1989, p. 41) write, in New Zealand rugby “fostered strong feelings of community and egalitarianism among men of differing social and economic positions.” In essence, the egalitarian practices of rugby “accorded well…with the ideal of an egalitarian society, a hallmark of national ideology then and for many decades thereafter” (Park, 2000, p. 448). New Zealand’s international successes on the rugby field came to be seen as proof of the superiority of this ‘classless’ social model. They also came to epitomize New Zealand’s emergence as an independent nation; victory was a
statement of colonial vitality. A number of authors have pointed to rugby as a significant factor in the emergence of the New Zealand nation from around 1890 onwards (Crawford, 1985, 1986; Phillips, 1984, 1996; Sinclair, 1986). Famed New Zealand historian, Keith Sinclair, for instance, calls the New Zealand’s 1905 test match with Wales “The Gallipoli of New Zealand sport,” referring to the match as a “major episode in the mythology of New Zealandism” (Sinclair, 1986, p. 147). Even by the late 1800s, however, there was an evolution of a second generation of New Zealanders that began to “express feelings of self-respect and growing national pride” via their passion for rugby (Crawford, 1985, p. 84).

As rugby came to form a tight embrace with New Zealand identity, it suggested the nation as decidedly masculine. As much as rugby was a test of the athletic ability of the colony, it was a test of its manhood, of its virility. The popular belief in the early-1900s was that “frontier egalitarianism and the physicality of outdoor life required to tame the land and secure a livelihood…produced a New Zealand male ‘type’ superior to its apparently sedentary urban counterpart in Britain” (Ryan, 2004; emphasis added). The frontier model of nationalism—of pragmatic, physical industry—turned on the discourse of “masculine homosociality, male autonomy and independence from the feminizing influences of domesticity” (Bannister, 2005). New Zealand is, of course, by no means unique in this regard. It is not only here that masculinity
and nationalism articulate well with one another. As Cynthia Enloe observes more generally, “nationalism has typically sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope” (Enloe, 1990, p.45). Nagel (2005) concurs that in nationalist movements and conflicts, “women are relegated to minor, often symbolic roles…the real actors are men who are defending their freedom, their honor, their homeland, and their women” (p. 400). Here in New Zealand, it is the ‘Kiwi bloke’ who has most-clearly come to embody what it means to be a New Zealander. As Cosgrove and Bruce (2005) argue, the bloke—“a working-class, tough, pragmatic, sporty, ‘matey’, anti-intellectual type” (Bannister, 2006, p. xii)—has “come to define the nation and the national character” (p. 340). Phillips likewise observes that

In New Zealand the male stereotype, rather than the female, has been unusually influential upon the lives of both women and men—it has become identified with the process of national identification. There can be few nations which have so single-mindedly defined themselves through male heroes. The national icons…have all been male. In the public perception they ‘personify’ the New Zealander…In this sense New Zealand has been oppressively ‘a man’s country’ (1987, p. vii).

The national archetype, as Phillips describes it, is male, heterosexual, aggressive, stoic, physically strong and skilled, and a good (homosocial) mate. Today, the connection between white masculinity and national identity remains so strong that Cooper (1999) contends that New Zealanders equate “masculinity with New
Zealandness and New Zealandness with masculinity...The heroic...is written in the masculine” (p. 97).

Summing up the image well, Coney (1993) describes how the ideal New Zealand man for much of the past century was therefore

Muscled, sinewy and tough; not effete, weak and bookish. They would be practical men; doers not thinkers. They expressed their culture not in theatres, galleries or pomp, but on the rugby field, in the backblocks, in the great outdoors. It was a culture of the body, rather than the mind (1993, p. 23).

Alternative masculinities have, and do, of course, exist. To think otherwise would be a failure to distinguish between the different experiences of groups of men. However, it could be argued that there nonetheless exists a current ‘gender order’, or ‘patterning’, of gender relations which is structured by a dominant or ‘hegemonic’ form of masculinity (Connell, 1995). Following Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) it important to stress that this form of hegemonic masculinity is not “normal in the statistical sense” as “only a minority of men might enact it” (p. 832). At the same time, though, it is “certainly normative”, embodying “the currently most honored way of being a man” (p. 832). Thus, though ‘multiple masculinities’ may co-exist, some masculinities are privileged over others. As Connell (2000) explains it, the hegemonic form

need not be the most common form of masculinity, let alone the most comfortable. Indeed many men live in a state of some tension with, or distance from, the hegemonic masculinity of their culture or
community...[yet] there are relations of hierarchy, for some masculinities are dominant while others are subordinated or marginalized (pp. 10-11).

Frequently, the “most honored or desired” (p. 10) of these patterns of masculine conduct are embodied in the lives of individuals. For men, “hegemony often involves the creation of models of masculinity which are...fantasy figures” (Connell, 1987, p. 184). These ‘figures’ function as hegemonic devices which perpetuate a gender hierarchy and valorize the dominant masculine qualities they represent. Though the qualities of these figures may actually be possessed by few, they become the ‘ideals’, “and in this way groups perceived to be lacking the admired traits are subordinated or marginalized” (Ferguson, 2004, p. 83). This means that hegemonic masculinity generally involves a large measure of consent or complicity in that “the public face of hegemonic masculinity is not necessarily what powerful men are, but what sustains their power and what large numbers of men are motivated to support...Few men are Bogarts or Stallones, many collaborate in sustaining those images” (Connell, 1987, p. 185). Put differently, “what most men support is not necessarily what they are”, and what most men aspire to be is naturalized in the form of the hero, a figure often “remote from the lives of the unheroic majority” (Donaldson, 1993, p. 646). To be “culturally exalted”, then, the pattern of masculinity “must have exemplars who are celebrated as heroes” (Donaldson, 1993, p. ). If the aforementioned hard-bitten, hyper-masculine Kiwi bloke—an iconic construct endlessly recycled in
popular culture—is an example in more general form, then this “exemplary version of hegemonic masculinity” (Connell, 1987) finds specificity in the All Blacks.

Jock Phillips writes of how the All Blacks have long served to personify and also reinforce the value system of New Zealand men. Even men and boys who managed to avoid playing the game, often came to identify with the All Blacks and experience triumphs and disasters in a vicarious way. The All Blacks provided by far the most significant role model for males in twentieth century New Zealand; and they came to be accepted throughout the society (by some women as well as men) as the purest manifestation of what a New Zealander was (Phillips, 1987, pp. 108-109).

He goes on to trace the rise of the All Blacks to such a status to the 1905 All Black tour of the United Kingdom. It was the 1905 tour he argues that “created idols of the All Blacks and turned them into formal representatives of the nation’s manhood” (p. 109). Sinclair and others have made similar contentions. The team ostensibly validated beliefs in the pioneer traditions of masculinity, with the All Blacks becoming something of an antidote to anxieties about urbanization, “providing a reassuring response to the late-19th-century ‘crisis of masculinity’” (Park, 2000). Future international tours and successes further entrenched the status of the All Blacks begun in 1905. And, as Phillips has elsewhere noted “it was to take another 70 years, until the South African tour of 1981, before rugby’s status came to be questioned” (Phillips, 1996, p. 88).
The All Black is thus the totemic figure of Pakeha masculinity. They are emblematic of, and crafted, from what Berlant (1997), following Lacan, calls “the National Symbolic” that “coordinates political affect” in New Zealand life and privileges whiteness and masculinity in the imaging of New Zealand national identity. That is, they are “traditional icons” that “provide an alphabet for a collective consciousness or national subjectivity; through the National Symbolic the historical nation aspires to achieve the inevitability or status of natural law, a birthright” (Berlant, 1997, p. 20). While the image of New Zealand as a nation of tough, strong, protective white men has been vigorously contested since the 1970s, the All Blacks symbolically link New Zealand’s identity to an imagined past in which it was less complicated to be a Pakeha man. They consequently become increasingly important in a time in which (white) male power has been questioned and masculinity problematized.

The perceived flight of young white men from rugby threatens to decenter the white male body as the marker of national identification, in doing so undermining white male privilege. However, and somewhat paradoxically, the announcement of a crisis of white masculinity embedded in white flight discourse actually serves to recenter white masculinity precisely by highlighting its very decentering (Robinson, 2000). To do so, the white-flight discourse works
through what Robinson (2000) describes as “the logics of victimization” (p. 12).

As she explains:

In order for white masculinity to negotiate its position within the field of identity politics, white men must claim a symbolic disenfranchisement, must compete with various others for cultural authority bestowed upon the authentically disempowered and wounded (p. 12).

The strategies through which this is accomplished are not necessarily deliberative but, as Robinson notes, neither are they “entirely innocent” (p. 12). Either way they must be read as an attempt to mask and disavow the privileges of being white and male in New Zealand society.

Robinson goes on to argue that white masculinity most fully represents itself as victimized by “inhabiting a wounded body”, by drawing on “not only the persuasive force of corporeal pain but also on an identity politics of the dominant” (p. 6). The body, she maintains, acts as a substitute for the political, and the individual for the social and institutional. In similar fashion, the young white rugby player provides a figure around which to build a victimized identity. His body is framed as (literally) under threat, metaphorically wounded and disadvantaged by a historically marginalized subject. Angst thus takes a bodily form.

This humiliation of adolescent masculinity then becomes a prelude to the emasculation of Pakeha men. Not being ‘permitted’ to play rugby, is to not be
allowed to become a ‘real’ man. In New Zealand, rugby is very much a
“masculinizing practice” (Pringle, 2007). As Miranda Devine describes it,

> You can never understand rugby unless you’ve watched it played by six-
year olds on cold winter mornings on hard suburban football grounds...It
is how they [i.e., boys] learn to overcome fear and pain. It is how they learn
to be noble, for the good of the team, to voluntarily subsume raw
individual ambition and submit to the rules of the game. It is how they
learn to be men.

A striking example of how not being able to play rugby affects the masculinity of
New Zealand men and boys is provided in Julie Park’s study of 80 New Zealand
males who suffered from haemophilia (Park, 2000). “Not being able to play
[rugby]”, she writes, “may seem a rather trivial restriction compared with the
other problems which people with haemophilia confront, but it is not” (p. 444).
“The inability to play rugby was the single most pervasive idiom of distress for
men with haemophilia” (p. 446). Park quotes one teenage haemophiliac, for
instance, as saying of being unable to play rugby to his mother “I’d rather have
my legs cut off so people could see it” (quoted in Park, 2000, p. 446). As Park
writes, “he wanted it to be obvious that he could not, rather than would not, play
rugby” (p. 446). Park concludes of rugby that it indicates that a boy is definitely
not a girl, definitely “not a queer or a poofter,” and rugby stands for a
hegemonic masculinity which is recognized by educators as having negative

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9 The New Zealand ‘poofter’ is a variant of the British ‘poof’, a derogatory and usually offensive
term for a ‘homosexual male.’
effects on many New Zealand boys. Nonetheless, its hegemony continues” (p. 450).

Not playing rugby is therefore “viewed as akin to failing to be manly” (Pringle, 2007, p. 361), to flunk the test of (hegemonic) masculinity. This is especially true of boys who choose to play soccer. As an example, sociologist Toni Bruce (2007) says of her male students who played soccer that they had to “negotiate their sense of masculinity because they were not taken seriously because they choose not to play rugby.” Richard Pringle, who has interviewed men about rugby in a series of articles, concurs that being a ‘Kiwi male’ is still linked strongly to playing rugby (Pringle, 2005, 2007). Of the centrality of rugby in shaping dominant understandings of masculinity, Pringle writes that he had “some idea that it was changing because there were more boys playing soccer, but the [boys] I talked to, even at co-ed schools, said that the soccer boys in the first XI were still not as respected as being in the first XV.” Pringle’s observations are germane in that the white flight narrative frequently invokes soccer as evidence of changing (read, feminine) attitudes among white boys. Recounting the shift Romanos remarks on how things have changed since his days in high school:

In my first year at St Patrick’s College in 1970, we fielded 19 rugby teams and five soccer teams. Thirty years later, there were eight rugby teams and six soccer teams...First XV players were the school heroes and were generally prefects. By contrast, the soccer team was like some sort of
mysterious religious cult. Hardly anyone of us knew who was on the team, and no-one really cared...soccer was a minor game at St Pat’s, a traditional boys school were rugby ruled (Romanos, 2002).

Romanos goes on to suggest soccer as rugby’s “greatest threat”, precipitating a “crisis” in New Zealand schools. Presumably this is because soccer is diluting rugby’s once bottomless talent pool. More likely, however, it is indicative of the uneasiness of Pakeha men over any feminization of the body politic.

It would be fair to say that rugby’s association with hegemonic masculinity and national identity has had long-term effects on soccer in New Zealand. Soccer has only ever enjoyed a minority status, and men who played “were collectively labelled ‘wimps’, ‘sissies’ and ‘girls’ on the basis of the belief that to be a man was to be a rugby player” (Cox and Thompson, 2004, p. 207). In Keane’s (2001) view, soccer in New Zealand has very much been “the direct male opposite of rugby union and therefore known in New Zealand sporting culture as the game for ‘poofers’, ‘girls’, or ‘blouses’” (p. 51). “From the perspective of the New Zealand public”, he argues, when contrasted with rugby, “soccer was a less brutal alternative, especially for children” (p. 58). In many ways the perceived threat of soccer among rugby devotees is something of a redux of rugby’s fall from grace following the Springbok Tour of 1981. With rugby’s image as the ‘national game’ tarnished in the wake of the tour, soccer, and the
1982 World Cup-qualifying All Whites team in particular, briefly assumed the status as the country’s most popular sport. That it failed to gain any momentum after 1982, however, is perhaps indicative of rugby’s hold on the New Zealand masculine psyche.

In addition, today’s turn to soccer is less about disillusioned men turning away from rugby. Rather, emasculated boys being pushed. White flight is not just about boys who are “shitting themselves” at the prospect facing a Polynesian opponent. Young Pakeha are not only subjugated by their own fears, but also those of others, and in particular their parents. Parents is perhaps the wrong word here though. More specifically, it is mothers. Mothers certainly get the most of the blame for the drift of white boys away from rugby. Matheson (2001), for instance, singles out mothers as being particularly gripped by anxiety when it comes the prospect of their boys facing “oversized Polynesian players.”

Similarly, according to the coach of the New Zealand under-21 side, Bryce Woodward, it is mothers who “sow the seeds of doubt and then a lot of kids pick up on that and are encouraged to change codes. It’s hurting rugby, and it annoys me because I think the environment has been created where kids who might play and love rugby as pushed quite vigorously towards soccer.” For critics, mothers appear as a danger to a boy’s emerging masculinity. White flight can hence be

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10 A pejorative reference to a male homosexual, gay man, blouse is an idiom meaning “ineffectual
read as the panic of white men, a fear that boys are being made effeminate by their mothers. As Kimmel has written, historically and developmentally, masculinity has been defined as the flight from women, the repudiation of femininity. Masculinity, in his words, can be seen as “defined as the distance between the boy and his mother, between himself and being seen as a ‘Mama’s boy’ or a sissy” (Kimmel, 2000, p. 76). Chodorow has similarly written of how boys often come to define masculinity “in largely negative terms, as that which is not feminine or involved with women.”

There is thus another “femiphobic” (Ducat, 2004) impulse on display within the white flight narrative—the urge to suppress the purported dominance of women. Concurrent with the (perceived) feminization of New Zealand society is the (perceived) “decline of patriarchy” (Ehrenreich, 1995). The formidable social changes in masculine values which such a shift produces lead to decided anxieties about gender. On these lines, white flight can be framed as a loss of familial power; a tale of the slowly vanishing paternal authority of white men over females and younger males. For instance, in an article in Time magazine, Williams (2001) argues that, given “white players at all levels at all levels can’t match the Polynesians’ size and strength”, Pakeha “mothers” are placing their sons in “gentler” sports, and, in particular, soccer (p. 16; emphasis added).
Indeed, the former head of New Zealand Soccer, Bill MacGowan feels too that “mothers have been great friends to soccer.” Within the white flight imaginary both boys and men are the victims. Pakeha men express a desire to ‘save’ boys from a perceived emasculation by women at the same time as regarding themselves as threatened by the power of women. As one coach recounts:

I have mates whose kids play soccer. I can’t believe it. When I ask why, they invariably say it’s their wives. It’s because of the politically correct world we live in. The fathers can’t speak up any more (quoted in Romanos, 2002, p. 178).

Pakeha fathers are thus seen as worried about their sons becoming ‘mama’s boys’, what Ducat (2004) describes as a boy “seen as embedded in a shamefully close and dependent relationship with his mother, one that imperils his masculinity and invites the derision of others” (p. 26).

The fear of white flight must therefore also be understood as a fear of being feminized. As much as the presence of the Polynesian Other (as a bodily entity) disrupts the identity of the body politic, white flight has a gendered subtext. The ‘crisis’ of white flight from rugby has as much to do with Pakeha men lamenting a loss of power over women. While external factors may appear to be that which is most threatening, the actual threat many Pakeha men are experiencing may in fact be an internal one: the sense that they are losing their power, that they, and the next generation, may no longer be ‘real’ men. There can be few nations other than New Zealand “which have so single-mindedly defined
themselves through male heroes” (Phillips, 1987, p. vii). But if the centrality and
pre-eminence of the (Pakeha) male has been taken for granted, then it is now
being publicly challenged. Already disoriented by having ‘their’ space
interrupted by the Polynesian Other, the white male is also losing his hold over
the ability to define the national space as masculine. Nagel (2003) has rightly
pointed out that modern forms of masculinity emerged in tandem with modern
nationalism. In New Zealand rugby has only reinforced this association of white
masculinity with the nation. But, if there are brown bodies where white bodies
are expected to be, where can white men go to play out their anxious efforts to
prove and defend their manhood? If the inscription of whiteness underwrites
whatever it means to be a New Zealander, and if this whiteness extends into
moral qualities of masculinity, and if rugby is where these truths are performed,
where do white men go to recoup their losses?
CHAPTER 3

*Modern Warriors: Polynesian Bodies Past and Present*

At the heart of Pakeha concerns about white flight examined in the previous chapter is fear: about Pacific Islanders emerging in spaces previously occupied by white men; about the sissification (Bederman, 1995) of the next generation; and, ultimately, about the erosion of white male power. What we cannot overlook, though, is that in the white flight panic this fear has an object. That object is the Polynesian body. In the Polynesian body generalized anxiety is condensed into something which is identifiable. Thus, fear does something: it re-establishes distance between bodies whose differences are fixed and read off the surface. That is, racial and ethnic difference is foregrounded via the modality of the body. Size, for instance, is a particular ‘problem.’ In the words of one concerned coach, the size disparity is something that “the authorities must address” (Lane, 2006). Tacitly, within such statements the white body is taken as normative (Mills, 1998). To borrow from Radika Mohanram it could be said that the Polynesian body only comes into being because “it is perceived as being out of place, either from its environment or its national boundaries” (Mohanram, 1999, p. xii). The Polynesian body ‘naturally’ doesn’t belong on a New Zealand
rugby field. This discursive tactic is typical of the way stereotypes operate through a strategy of ‘splitting’ which “divides the normal and the acceptable from the abnormal and the unacceptable” (Hall, 1997, p. 258). That Polynesian boys are assumed to ‘different’—i.e., not ‘normal’—serves to maintain the social and symbolic order, setting up a “symbolic frontier” between insiders and outsiders, between Us and Them (Hall, 1997). In this power/knowledge game the Polynesian body is read as ‘truth’ of absolute otherness.

What is apparent is the way this discourse works simply by way of making race meaningful, by constructing the Polynesian body as problematic. The question I wish to ask in this chapter, though, is how did the Polynesian body become a ‘problem’ in the first place? That is, why has the Polynesian body come figuratively to hold the projections of Pakeha fear? To me white flight exists within a racialized circuit of white paranoia that echoes pre-colonial and colonial representations of Polynesian primitive physicality. In the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries the Polynesian body became the focus of specific representations which, when put into practice, formed the basis of its own authority, legitimacy, and control. From the outset racial differences were constructed through the body of the other: the very ‘nakedness’ of Polynesian men taken “as a sign that the ‘wild men’ [Europeans] encountered were not only uncivilized, but at an early stage of human evolution” (Creed and Hoorn, 2002,
p. 50). And, such constructions cannot be separated from colonial agendas. That the Polynesian body was ‘savage’ and ‘uncultured’ was in line with the logic of colonialism as a ‘civilizing’ influence for, as Frantz Fanon has argued, at the heart of empire is the “dehumanization of the native.” Echoing Fanon’s insistence that colonial domination is not just physical or military but deeply cultural and psychological, Said writes similarly of the making of empire:

At the heart of European culture during the many decades of imperial expansion lay an undeterred and unrelenting Eurocentrism. This accumulated experiences, territories, peoples, histories; it studied them, it classified them, it verified them, and...above all, it subordinated them by banishing their identities, except as a lower order of being, from the culture and indeed the very idea of white Christian Europe. This cultural process has to be seen as a vital, informing, and invigorating counterpoint to the economic and political machinery at the material center of imperialism (Said, 1985).

It should be said, however, that these discourses are not a thing of the past. Over the course of the next two centuries Polynesian bodies have become enmeshed in a network of totalizing stereotypes which waver between the exotic and the barbaric—what Terry Goldie describes as “the two poles of attraction and repulsion, temptation by the dusky maiden and fear of the demonic violence of the fiendish warrior” (1989, p. 15). The Polynesian body has essentially functioned as a privileged trope of white fear and desire, at once revered for being closer to nature and feared because to be so was to be part of the world of the bestial.
Below I begin by examining how these representations eventuated before turning to how they “linger on” (as the Samoan writer Albert Wendt puts it ([1995, p. 28])) in contemporary representations of Pacific peoples. What follows is a critical-historical analysis in which I recount the genesis of ‘common-sense’ understandings of the Polynesian body that ‘anthropologize’ and ‘naturalize’ Polynesian physicality. I then show how these “parts of the past” are “still operative in the present” (Niranjana 1992, p. 37)—in this case, within the sport of rugby. My premise is that it is important to engage the historicity of the concept of Polynesian body politics for what it reveals about deeply embedded xenophobic tendencies that are recycled in the popular representation of contemporary rugby. These fictional and scientific discourses have long given rise to the framing of Pacific peoples as Others, by and large confining them to the realm of the physical, whether in sport or in other forms of ‘labor’. Rugby has done little to dispel this divisive construction. Seldom are Pacific players described in terms of their savvy or enterprise with so much instead being made of a ‘Pacific Island style of play’: an ‘unorthodox’ approach to the game that gives preference to ‘running rugby,’ ‘hard hits,’ ‘flair’ and the ‘unpredictable.’ All, of course, are seen as innate as opposed to acquired talents, for the hegemonic discourse pays no heed to the successes of Polynesian peoples in any terms other than ‘natural ability.’
In the final section I link this fetishized Pacific/brown ontology to some of the nefarious neo-liberal discourses I explored in Chapter 1. Reworking Carrington’s (2001/2002) description of the “spectacle of the black body”, I contend that the allure of the brown body has “not only served to obscure the real conditions that many [Pacific] people face, but simultaneously diminished the space for progressive politics itself” (p. 104). There are echoes too of Paul Gilroy’s anxieties about a ‘biopolitics’ of contemporary black culture, which is, he observes, obsessed with the body and its purely physical attributes. Such biopolitics, he argues, “terminates any conception of the mind/body dualism and ends the modernist aspiration towards racial uplift” that once was at the heart of black cultures (Gilroy, 2000). In similar fashion, the prominence afforded Pacific men in rugby is equally double-edged: on the one hand it represents an acceptance of Polynesian success; but, on the other, it is highly limiting, confining the intentions, actions, and potential of Pacific people to the materiality of their bodies, and reinstating the brutal legacies of empire.

‘Scripting’ the Polynesian Body

Before I begin, I would just like to offer a few comments on the relationships between and the social construction of the body and ‘race.’ First, an enormous amount of scholarship has traced the interconnections between racism and the body, showing how the body has been central to the construction of the
concept of race. It is not my intention to revisit this literature here (see instead Jackson, 2006). However, it is perhaps important to highlight that my readings herein take the body as socially understood, with the body treated as a discursive text. This is in keeping with how the body in social theory has come to been seen less as biologically given and fixed than as both culturally and historically specific. The body is no longer considered ‘natural’ or as trans(/a)historical, but rather as “a site where regimes of discourse and power inscribe themselves, a nodal point or nexus for relations of juridical and productive power” (Butler, 1989, p. 601). Within this broad literature, bodily identities are viewed as “inextricable from discourse” (Oates and Durham, 2004, p. 305; see Bordo, 1993; Butler, 1990, 1993; Foucault, 1978, 1980). Through language, image, narrative structure, and other forms of discursive practice, the body is ‘produced’ and human activity actively organized (Smart, 1983). This is not to suggest that the body necessarily lacks ‘physicality’ (that is, an ‘organic’ dimension), that biology is separate to the social, but rather that the body “emerges with the social” (Evers, 2006, p. 233). The body is not ontologically distinct from the process of construction, yet “closer analysis of the way in which individuals and groups manage their bodies, either as sets of social practices or system of signs, or the ways in which states coerce bodies and insert them into relations of power,
leaves little doubt that the body is a socially constructed phenomenon” (Booth and Nauright, 2003). Put differently, in Butler’s (1990) terms:

there is an ‘outside’ to what is constructed by discourse, but this is not an absolute ‘outside’, an ontological thereness that exceeds or counters the boundaries of discourse; as a constitutive ‘outside’, it is that which can only be thought in relation to that discourse, at and as its most tenuous borders. (p. 8).

While we often (mis)take the body as a ‘natural’ phenomenon (or, as prior to discourse), asserting it to be culturally-constructed also means taking it as contingent, learned, and historically malleable. The meanings or attributes the body acquires are, according to Butler (1989, p. 601), “in fact culturally constituted and variable.” As a consequence, and though it may sound tautological, the body can be taken as a kind of embodied history. On one level this means we can ‘read’ or ‘interpret’ the body in much the same way as any historical ‘text.’ Indeed, until recently, the bulk of research within the sociology of the body has concerned representational issues, examining what Turner (1994, p. viii) describes as “the symbolic significance of the body as a metaphor of social relationships.” Research in this regard has been heavily influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, who (arguably [see, Dudrick, 2005]), shifted the focus away from bodies per se to the discourses which shape and give bodies meaning. In his seminal essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” Foucault positions the physical body as a “virtual text” (Adair, 2001, p. 453), labeling the body as an “inscribed
surface of events that are traced by language and dissolved by ideas.” In this, Foucault points toward “a body that is given form through semiotic systems and written on by discourse” (Adair, 2001, p. 453). Foucault elsewhere points to representational aspects, variously describing bodies as “foundations where language leaves its traces” and “the writing pad[s] of the sovereign and the law.” Whereas the body was once thought of as a predetermined, biological fact, Foucault instead gives call to think of and critique the body as it is invested with meaning, to consider, in particular, the way dimensions of social difference, such as class, race and gender, are (as Foucault puts it) ‘inscribed’ on the body. Given impetus from Foucault, the wealth of recent theorizing on the body is devoted to this idea of the body as written on and through discourse (Schildkrout, 2004).

Following Foucault there have been multiple, varied, and often conflicting, definitions and interpretations of what ‘inscription’ and ‘body’ actually mean. Generally though, Foucault’s suggestion that the body is “a text upon which social reality is inscribed” (Schildkrout, 2004, p. 319) is taken in a more metaphorical than literal sense, particularly within poststructuralist scholarship (for an exception, see Fleming, 2001). In explaining this distinction, Brush (1998, p. 28) notes how inscription as a metaphor “is not superficial (despite the fact that [inscription] may be read on the surface of the body).” Foucault, she argues, is instead saying something stronger: that “the constitution
of the body rests in its inscription; the body becomes the text which is written upon it and from which it is indistinguishable” (p. 22). As Grosz (1994, p. 142) explains it, the different procedures of cultural inscription “do not simply adorn or add to a body that is basically given through biology; they help constitute the very biological organization of the subject.” If the body is—metaphorically—a site of inscription to various degrees for various theorists, then it is in the sense that the body “has a determinate form only by being socially inscribed” (Grosz, 1987, p. 2).

These bodily inscriptions serve their most significant purpose in placing the body within a cultural matrix. At the moment at which the body enters culture it becomes implicated in the play of power. Certain identifiable ‘characteristics’ relate directly to power dynamics; as Grosz (1990) puts it, “power produces the body as a determinate type, with particular features, skills, and attributes” (p. 149). In particular, power deploys discourses on and over bodies to constitute them as particular bodies (normal/abnormal, superior/inferior etc); or, to follow from above, bodies are inscribed in diverse, and often contradictory, ways. Otherness therefore emerges from the positioning, interpreting, and conferring of meaning upon bodies. So, in this case, race may appear as an attribute yet it is only when inscribed by discourse that the body’s specific meaning is determined. Obviously, the idea of race was initially founded
upon visible bodily differences, and we have come to regard these forms of observed difference as significant. That it has long since been discovered that there is no biological basis for distinguishing among human groups along the lines of race means that what is critical is understanding how and why these differences have come to matter; how have these “bodily schemas”, to borrow from Fanon, become established and how are they reproduced?

What is most salient in this regard is to acknowledge that ‘race’ “cannot be abstracted from the social and political environment within which it is defined and lived” (Johnston, 2001, p. 72). Races, as Paul Gilroy notes, are not “simply expressions of either biological or cultural sameness. They are imagined—socially and politically constructed” (1993, p. 20). The meanings associated with inscribed bodies “are conditioned by the particular discursive formations in operation” (Tyner, 2004, p. 113). We need, therefore, to contextualize the act of racialization, “the process through which groups come to be designated as different, and on that basis are subjected to differential and unequal treatment” (Dei and Kempf, 2006, p. 9). Race has to be considered as a product of the meanings attributed to physical appearance at particular points in time. As Miles (1993) writes,

The visibility of somatic characteristics is not inherent in the characteristics themselves, but arise from a process of signification by which meaning is attributed to certain of them. In other words, visibility is socially constructed in a wider set of structural constraints (p. 87).
What is perhaps most relevant to our understanding of the Polynesian body is the operation of colonialism, the practices by which bodies are brought under colonial control, and the forms of inscription through which such power relations are established. The colonized body has been governed and controlled through various physical and discursive disciplinary strategies and the native body “bears the imprint of the colonial gaze, its myths and its lies” (see also Pierce and Rao, 2006). The cataloguing or differentiation of bodies was, I argue, critical to the colonial project simply because of the importance given to the body as a marker of character. The physical was conflated with the moral and the intellectual. Such things as dress, dancing, sexuality and nakedness were taken to indicate not only immorality but as a distinctive sign of ‘primitivism.’ In the process the colonized body was targeted for reform. By colonial intervention the colonized body could be freed “from the power of irrational impulses and his dependence on the world and nature” (Weber, 1978, pp. 118-119). But this first required the Polynesian body to cast as a kind of child-like savage, “a pliable state suitable for remodelling, ready ‘raw material’ for the civilizing process” (Eves, 1996, p. 101). Producing the savage was therefore a necessary strategy for continual occupation and exploitation by colonists. And, through setting in place the purportedly bestial nature of Polynesian native it could defer its overt aim.
I wish to now turn to making a closer examination of how these colonial inscriptions were produced before then turning to how the brutal legacies of empire, and the iconography of the savage body, continue to circulate in contemporary physical culture. What I explore below reveals how the politicizing and scripting of the Polynesian body has been a common thread of European life since at least the seventeenth century. My guiding question here is inherently genealogical in asking how the Polynesian subject has been formed. It is also genealogical in the sense of challenging the metaphysics of essence. In Foucault’s terms, I am not looking for the source of meaning in some transcendental subject, but attempting to provide an account of “the constitution of the subject within a historical framework.” This genealogy is admittedly selective, with a particular emphasis on the notion of ‘Noble Savagery’; hence, there are obvious omissions (in particular, those historical images of... exoticized, ‘Dusky maiden’). Others have done more justice to these issues than I could do here (see Keown, 2005; O’Brien, 2006). Nonetheless, within the critical-historical analysis which follows we can at least begin to contextualize the beginnings of Polynesian racial representation and the politics which accompany it.
Savages Noble and Ignoble: Natural Bodies, Island Lives

The Natural (Bodily) Splendor of the Pacific

If Edward Said had been writing of the Pacific as opposed to the Orient he might have concluded that what we delineate as ‘the Pacific’ has been produced, politically, socially, ideologically, and militarily, by ‘Westerners.’ Indeed, Polynesia has been—and still is—defined pace ‘the West.’ If the West was advanced, developed, and industrial, then Polynesia, from its earliest conception in European minds, was its opposite, some sort of lost earthly paradise inhabited by non-white, primitives who were variously “child-like, intuitive and spontaneous” (Kuper, 1988) and/or wild, untamable, savages (Stocking, 1987). For Europeans in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries the Pacific was a kind of remote frontier, waiting to be ‘discovered.’ If they were living under the grey skies of the northern hemisphere, somewhere in the distant, tropical south was an antipodal idyll far-removed from the fast pace of urban life. When the earliest French and English voyages arrived, already soaked in “a very long imaginative tradition” (Howe, 2000, p. 13), they only confirmed the discovery of this heretofore imagined paradise. Their writings seldom strayed from images of the islands as lands of “sweet airs, glorious abundance of flora and fauna, running fresh water, riches, and human inhabitants living in a natural innocence” (Howe, 2000, p. 15). These explorers would be followed by travelers,
both fictional and ‘anthropological’, who continued to portray a world alienated from European experiences and values. Literature from Melville’s *Typee* to Stevenson’s *Treasure Island*, London’s *South Sea Tales* to Michener’s *Tales of the South Pacific* only supplemented images of the islands as carefree, romantic and adventurous. Art too afforded its European audiences with a vision of exotic people in exotic landscapes; Gauguin being probably the most famous exponent.

All of these discursive narratives rested on a kind of primordialist image of the South Pacific: the place and its people were distinguished by a kind of “timelessness which refuse[d] to evolve towards the modern world” (Connell, 1996). As Nordstrom (1991/92) notes, the clichés consistently presented the people of the Pacific as “primitive types inhabiting an unchanging Eden that did not participate in the Western world of technology, progress and time” (p. 15). One of the long-standing conventions in this regard was to see the Pacific in allegorical terms, as a set-in-amber reminder of the European past. Inserted into the history of modern primitivism, Pacific culture was thus likened to that of ancient Greece, a parallel through which to come to know the manners and customs of the ancient world (Smith, 1985). This was hardly surprising given sustained contact with Polynesia in the second half of the eighteenth century coincided with an Enlightenment fascination with the classical past. As O’Brien (2006) argues, “Late eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century colonization in the
Pacific was steeped in classical preoccupations, allusions, and ways of imagining... The Enlightenment voyagers came to the Pacific schooled in classical art, science, and literature. Much of what they rendered and described resonated with this classical education” (pp. 38, 39; see also Smith, 1985, 1992). A recurrent feature of eighteenth-century European was the drawing of comparisons between Pacific Islanders and “ancient Greeks and Romans and their pantheon of gods and goddesses” (Fischer, 2002, p. 110). In this way, the Pacific was imbued with contemporary meanings to render it comprehensible, the classical parallel allowing European outsiders “to accept what was otherwise a wholly inscrutable human experience” (p. 110).

The much mythologized voyages to Tahiti in the 1760s are case in point. Louis-Antoine de Bougainville’s accounts of Tahiti, which colored later thinking about other parts of the Pacific, were heavily influenced by a classical education which “predisposed him to perceive the Tahitians in terms of the classic Greeks, and his ensuing rendering of his and his crew’s experiences on Tahiti is replete with Arcadian imagery” (Bolyanatz, 2004, p. 6). As Bolyanatz continues, Bougainville’s descriptions of the Pacific were swayed by his affection with these colorful analogies: “In many respects, he could only see the Tahitians in such terms, which means he could only represent them in such terms” (p. 6). It is worth noting that the French were not alone in this regard. Bernard Smith, for
instance, has noted of elsewhere in the Pacific during the time “that varied bundle of mental luggage drawn from classical precedent that Europeans brought to their perception and interpretation of Pacific peoples and Pacific things” (1992, p. 213). The English explorer, James Cook, was another obvious example. He and his crew frequently saw in the Pacific that which “supported the well-tested norms of classicism” (Smith, 1992, p. 219). The analogy, or memory of Greece, is perhaps most apparent in visions of the Pacific as a kind of Arcadia; Paradise was a trope that very much dominated early Pacific discourse. Both Bougainville and Cook, as “sons of the Enlightenment”, were fascinated by the prospect of people existing elsewhere “whose lives were uncorrupted by civilization and unencumbered by toil” (Fischer, 2002, p. 109). Cook wrote, for instance, of people living “in a tranquility which is not disturbed by the inequality of condition”, while Bougainville was even more explicit in his use of classical similes: Tahiti, he wrote, was the “New Cythera [in Greek myth, the isle of the celestial Aphrodite]…I thought I was walking in the Garden of Eden” (both cited in Fischer, 2002, p. 109). Likewise, the naturalist on Cook’s first voyage to Tahiti, Joseph Banks, declared the islands to be the “truest picture of Arcadia” (cited in Brown, 1988, p. 12). To be sure, such views were by no means universal, yet it was this romantic image of the Pacific that “would come to predominate in Europe” (Hall, 1998, p. 143).
The wealth of ‘primitive’ cultures suddenly revealed to the world by the likes of Cook and Bougainville would lay the groundwork for anthropologists who came to see these “valuable specimens of the earlier stages of human development” (Howe, 2000, p. 41). The ‘Golden Age’ motif would also heavily their work (Levin, 1969). Yet for anthropologists this wasn’t just a model of what was, but what could be. The fascination with nature, heroic simplicity and fervent landscapes spoke to the dissatisfaction with Europe’s own social and cultural systems. The Pacific was, as Cowell notes, not only one of Europe’s others, “but a seemingly better and more perfect other” (1998, p. 139). Perhaps the most prominent proponent of primitivism as an ideal for human association was the Swiss/French political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Something of pessimist about modern society, Rousseau shared with Enlightenment philosophers a belief in the corrupting influence of civilization and a faith in the existence of a ‘natural state’ of society. In brief, Rousseau believed that ‘man’ was good when in the state of nature, but corrupted by society: as he famously wrote “Man is born free and is everywhere in chains.” Descriptions of the Pacific were thus implicitly a critique of European civilization, or, at the very least, in juxtaposing modernity with the state of nature, they provided for scholars like Rousseau a way of “decentr[ing] and estrang[ing] the social order of [the] time by questioning its doxa, its unexamined assumptions, opinions and norms”
Though Rousseau himself may have viewed Pacific societies as somewhere removed from the original state of nature (Knellwolf, 2004), others, influenced by the idealism and romanticism of his writings, were wont to take the Pacific as an ideal society, “unspoiled by the ravages of civilization” (Knellwolf, 2004). It should be stressed here, that the emphasis in these eighteenth-century travelers tales was not so much the ‘ideal society’ *per se*, but, rather “the man [sic] who inhabits the ideal state” (Cro, 1990, p. 89). Rousseau’s appeal to the natural state came via his ‘natural man’, what would later become the ‘Noble Savage.’

Working in the shadow of Rousseau the Noble Savage became a rhetorical construction through which anthropologists could “write about their contemporary political and social conditions” (Ellingson, 2001, p. 37). The Noble Savage was, firstly, understood as an individual uncorrupted by civilization. The Savage, in Ellingson’s (2001) terms, was “opposed to civilized man, his simple

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11 I am not suggesting here that Rousseau coined the concept (see Ellingson, 2001), but, instead, that his early political writings gave impetus to the “cult of primitivism” which the Noble Savage personified (Knellwolf, ). Indeed, romantic fictions about the noble savage, and the drive towards primitivism, are far older than Rousseau (see Barzun, 2000), “the belief in the actual or possible existence of people living virtuously, happily and simply” being “one of the great continuities of European history” (Campbell, ). Rousseau, too, would probably have denied the *actual* existence of the Noble Savage. He was after all a political philosopher, not an anthropologist, and the Noble Savage for Rousseau was more of an abstract “‘tabula rasa,’ uncorrupted by (decadent) European culture.” The significance of Rousseau, then, is not so much whether the Noble Savage was his invention, but that he helped popularize the term, and, perhaps more significantly, however others appropriated (some may say, bastardized) his work, in Rousseau the Noble Savage “acquired sociological status” (Hall, 1997, p. 218). What is more important are the ideas
virtues to our complicated vices.” Such an idea was readily apparent in Rousseau’s writings. For instance, in the opening sentence of *Emile* (which, interestingly, has as its subtitle “de l’Éducation”, or, “Concerning Education”) Rousseau writes: “Everything is good in leaving the hands of the creator of things; everything degenerates in the hands of man.” Rousseau’s writings were also a spur to the Cult of Nature so en vogue among Renaissance thinkers (Currie, 1994). And, the Noble Savage was the very embodiment of these ideas; in theory the Noble Savage was closer to nature and all its inherent goodness. Similarly, for Rousseau, man in the state of nature was “placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes and the fatal enlightenment of civilized man” (Rousseau, 1755, cited in Ellingson, 2001, p. 82). The savage—though he may never called him ‘noble’—for Rousseau was a critique of society, its laws and customs. Given the Enlightenment’s predilection for cultural self-criticism this is perhaps hardly surprising; the Noble Savage, free from civilization’s corrupting influences offered a counterpoint to civilized decadence. As Steeves (1973) notes, the savage represented a return to nature, a cardinal tenet of the romantic age—a primitive stage of existence from which the world has declined” (p. ).

the Noble Savage represented and the influence they had, and certainly Rousseau undoubtedly gave these ideas weight.
What is perhaps most germane to the critical-history of the Polynesian body is the central part played by nature in the way Europeans conceived difference. This “discourse of naturalism” (Marles, 1996), which Rousseau popularized, is key to understanding European “imaging and imagining” (Smith, 1992, p. 1) of the peoples of the Pacific during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The savage, “the symbol of freedom and simplicity” (Steeves, 1973, p. ) was a convenient metonym for writers, poets and artists of the day. Such works were “hugely popular” during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-centuries (Sayre, 1997, p. 189). The increasing popularity and availability of voyage accounts from the ‘New World’ also contributed to a Noble Savage renaissance, and ‘travel-ethnographic’ literature informed the political and social writing of intellectuals—including Rousseau himself. Reports of explorers in America and the—then so-called—‘South Seas’, according to the famed critic Hoxie N. Fairchild, made the Noble Savage “a popular and social fad” (Fairchild, 1928). In some instances, the vision was made manifest. The visits to Europe of ‘natives’ meant the Savage could sometimes be seen ‘in-the-flesh’ and substance was lent to the myth. Interestingly, the best-known Noble Savage of the day, Omai, was a ‘Polynesian’ from Raiatea (in the Society Islands, west of Tahiti) who returned to Britain with Cook in 1773. There, he become something of a celebrity, “the darling of English society.” (Kahn, 2003), was
discussed by scientists and philosophers, and was written about in everything from poetry to pornography. This then was the context. The (re)discovery of Polynesia happened at precisely the time when enthusiasm for the Noble Savage had reached its peak (Campbell, 1996). And, the resurrection of the neo-classical stereotype would have, in O’Brien’s (2006) words, “a profound impact upon representation of the Pacific” (p. 40). As Campbell (1996) also writes, in the Pacific, the myth of the Noble Savage has “had a lasting—and deeply misleading—influence” on the ways some Europeans saw non-Europeans then, and today.

To return to the pertinence of naturalism, and to the association between the natural and the physical. I have already argued that during the Enlightenment there were dissident voices (Rousseau foremost among them) who “questioned the rational and mechanical foundations of Western ‘civilization’” (Marshall, 1996, p. 235), that resonance of this critique led to a growing interest in primitivism, and that it, in turn, nurtured a fascination with the Pacific and its Noble Savages. One of the more notable features of this chain of discourse was the frequent contrast between the “vigorous and healthy savages in the state of nature and modern man in the ‘civilized’ world” (Marshall, 1996, p. 241). In particular, to society’s critics, men [sic] had become alienated from their physical condition. As Rousseau himself wrote: “The body
of a savage man being the only instrument he understands, he uses it for various purposes, of which ours, for want of practice are incapable.” Following the traditional Cartesian dualism of body and mind, it could be said that the natural world, typified by the Pacific, was a physical world—and, of course, vice versa. And, this relation to the physical environment depended on the constitution of the physical body. Or, to put it differently, the primitive offered an alternative model of social organization which was rooted in the body (Edmond, 1997; Keown, 2005; O’Brien, 2006).

It is important to stress how European romantic ideas were projected onto Polynesian bodies. In the “ersatz exotic, erotic prelapsarian Eden” (Pearson, 2006) of the Pacific, the body became a way of conferring the native-nature coupling. The body was, in essence, a link to nature. As one exponent of the study of primitives claimed, Pacific peoples “offered the best opportunity for European scientists to ‘penetrate nature and determine its laws’” (quoted in O’Brien, 2006, p. 167). What is notable too is the way in which the narratives and perceptions of Europeans came to be embedded in Polynesian bodies. With increasing frequency after the 1770s, “what could be seen was paramount, and what Europeans were looking at above all else were bodies” (Cummings, 2003). As Cummings (2003) notes, by Cook’s third voyage, “visual records increasingly focused on the bodies of islanders.” It could be said that the Polynesian body
came metonymically to stand for all that was healthy, natural, leisured, beautiful, and (sexually) alluring about the Pacific itself. In Teaiwa’s (1999) terms, we could go further in suggesting that the Polynesian body is given the privilege of representing the Pacific as a whole.

Undoubtedly, it was the female body that attracted the most attention from Europeans (Edmond, 1997; O’Brien, 2006). Yet the allure of the Noble Savage myth ensured attention was also paid to male physiques. If Polynesian women were described in terms of the physical attractiveness, then the bodies of men were almost equally as admired among early European visitors to the Pacific. One missionary of the early-1800s, for instance, described Polynesian men as “amongst the finest specimens of the human family…the form of many…exhibits all that is perfect in proportion, and exquisite in symmetry.”

Hokowhitu (2004) shows that such comments are by no means isolated nor atypical. “Many European travelers,” he writes, “romanticized the savage Other as part of a natural physical world” (2004, p. 268). Whether male or female the Polynesian body was valorized because of its purported connection to nature. The native body was a focal point of European fantasy about what Vanessa Smith labels a Polynesian “post-lapsarian paradise” (Buckton, 2007, p. 20). The Polynesian body was the very diagram of the ‘anti-modern.’ On one hand this proximity to nature was something to be praised, a marker of virility and health.
In particular, the natural, Polynesian man supposedly possessed superior health and physical strength. He is raw—“come from the hands of nature” in Rousseau’s terms—his body evolved to fit his environment. “Nature,” wrote Rousseau, “treats them precisely as the law of Sparta treated the children of citizens; it makes strong and robust those with good constitutions and lets all the others perish.” The Polynesian man seemed the very prototype of this mythical savage. As Bougainville observed in 1772, “I never saw men better made, and whose limbs were more proportionate: in order to paint Hercules or a Mars, one could nowhere find such beautiful models.” Elsewhere in the Pacific Cook wrote of how “the natives...are a strong raw boned well made active people rather above than under the common size especially of men” (quoted in Beaglehole, 1968, p. 278). James Erskine remarked similarly of Samoan men that they were “a remarkably fine-looking set of people, and among them were several above six feet high with Herculean proportions.”

From Noble to Ignoble: Rethinking Primitivism and the Colonial Agenda

As much as Europeans revered all that was reputedly ‘instinctive,’ ‘innate’ and ‘essential’ about the man living in nature, it is important to note that “this figure is riddled with ambivalence” (Moscovici, 2001, p. 197). As Moscovici (2001, p. 197) notes of Western representations of ‘savage’ cultures, the “supposed moral innocence” of the Noble Savage is praised at the same time as
his barbarism is feared. The Noble Savage was a contradictory myth: on the one hand embodying the positive virtues of simplicity, beauty, and freedom; on the other, suspect because of the animalistic instincts that motivate him. One is reminded of Homi Bhabha’s reading of colonial discourse which “emphasizes the psychic ambivalence, the fear and fascination, that informs the ‘Manchaean delirium’ of classical regimes of racial representation” (Bhabha, 1983). The Polynesian man was gifted with strength, courage, and pride, but was still, by European standards, an animal; violent and emotional. Thus, as much European curiosity for the exotic peoples of the Pacific was “respectful or prurient”, it was also “highly ambivalent” (Knellwolf, 2004). Torgovnick (1990) insightfully identifies this ambivalence as “the two major stories about primitives” inherited from the Enlightenment and carried forward into the age of imperial exploration and expansion: “primitive peoples as the idealized noble savage, something to be emulated”; and, “primitive peoples as dangerous and irrational, something to be feared” (p. 159). She writes of the image of the primitive as existing “in a cherished series of dichotomies; by turns gentle, in tune with nature, paradisal, ideal—or violent, in need of control…noble savages or cannibals” (Torgovnick, 1990, p. 3). Bernard Smith’s study, European Vision and the South Pacific, germanely traces this split in the Polynesian context, charting “the transition from the European concept of the noble savage to its opposing concept, the
ignoble savage” (p. 123; see also Campbell, 1980). He emphasizes how the “soft primitivism” that initially ennobled Tahitians, for instance, came to be contested and “by the last decade of the eighteenth century [was] largely displaced by evangelical views, that deplored promiscuity, cannibalism and infanticide, and stressed what was base and deceitful in native temperament” (Thomas, 1994, p. 99). Noble savages, then, were “prone to become less noble” (Campbell, 1996).

In the Pacific both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ primitivism “competed for the savant’s attention”—from contact through colonialism to the present. Tropes in the European imaginary of soft primitivism (childlike, libidinous, free, and natural) competed with a hard primitivism that suggested the native to be as much violent, dangerous, irrational, and out of control (Desmond, 1997). We can consider this hard/soft primitivism binary as “another dimension of an attraction/repulsion complex which is manifested in other forms in Pacific history”:

the desire of beachcombers to live in the islands, and their desire to get away again; in the loving way missionaries sought to redeem their people, and in their private remarks about depravity, degeneration, and ‘vile people’; in the desire of administrators to preserve, and their compulsion to eradicate indiscriminately many aspects of indigenous culture.

This dichotomy was/is by no means a contradiction, as both “poles were produced, and nurtured, and flourished within the same cultural matrix.” They belong, in Hall’s terms, to the same “discursive formation.” As Knellwolf (2004)
argues, “the yearning for an original, unspoiled state of existence had as a dark underside a fascination with the brutality of an animalistic existence. Two contrasts to civilization were hence invoked—the lost golden age, or childhood, of mankind and the crude mindlessness of the animal.” Or, as Hall again puts it, “everything Europeans represented as attractive and enticing about the natives could also be used to represent the exact opposite: Their barbarous and depraved character” (1996, p. 213).

Without wishing to deny the continuing presence of the soft noble savage trope, the ‘shift’ to representing Pacific Islanders in ignoble terms echoed changes in the European political climate during the 1800s. In particular, imperial expansion came to be justified by way of ‘civilizing’ or taming ‘native’ populations. Attitudes to Polynesia were merely typical of the way European and Euro-American discourses of primitivism are “infinitely malleable, and respond to the sociopolitical needs of the societies that produce them, not to those they purport to describe” (Desmond, 1996; see also, Torgovnick, 1990). First, the change must be mapped to the rise of science. Empirical research was at the heart of modern science, spurring the collection of data, the examination, description and arrangement of man and nature into categories according to scientific principles. Travel to far-off lands unsurprisingly underwent a process of scientization, linked to the new philosophy of science or what Sorlin describes
as “the empirical knowledge program” (Sorlin, 2004). As (Smedley, 2002, p. 161) demonstrate, late-eighteenth-century ‘science’ “grew in large part out of widening interest in and curiosity about the different kinds of human beings.” In this case, the Pacific was “an ideal locus for science” for it “provided a rich diversity that could be mined for knowledge”, while Europe’s colonial aspirations offered the “infamous ‘elbow room’ for an unhindered pursuit of science” (Prakash, 2007). The Pacific and its people thus became part of the scientific ‘project’, the ‘native’ became an object of scientific discourse.

As a consequence earlier conceptions of the Pacific that idealized or classicized Pacific populations were slowly “eclipsed by scientific concerns with accuracy and with physiological, botanical and zoological detail” (p. 103). The rise of taxonomy, nomenclature, and ‘pure’ systems of classification came to play a “major and important role” in defining peoples of the Pacific and the relationships among them. In particular, such classifications obviously lent themselves to hierarchical structuring. Under the influence of scientists such as Linnaeus, humans were to be placed in a taxonomic order of nature with other animals. This set the terms for early scientific and anthropological inquiry in the Pacific. And, more often that not, these classificatory schemes “were invested with essentialist and universalized ‘biomoral’ assumptions concerning the natural history of human variation.” That is, classification had clear evaluative...
judgements built into it that affirmed the superiority of certain Europeans over others. As Segal (2006, p. 539) explains, science painted the people of the Pacific as ‘primitive’:

arrested in terms of evolution, inferior in terms of a European hierarchy of races, trapped in an environment which resisted the successful impact of European civilization, imprisoned by savage heredity, superstitious as opposed to religious or intellectual, and politically enslaved by the despotism and cynicism of the ‘pre-social’ state rather than enjoying the benefits of liberal democracy.

But, for scientists, it was not only a case of studying those closer to nature. So conceived, the progressive or sequential development of man also produced a search for a ‘lowest type.’ Science in its exploratory zeal gave birth to a kind of contest to “discover, or to appropriate the authority for representing the world’s worst people” (Ellingson, 2001, p. 127), to find the ‘lowest’, ‘most savage’, ‘wildest’, or ‘least evolved’ forms of humanity. This, as Ellingson (2001) points out, meant the link between nobility and savagery became increasingly untenable. The race to the bottom was antithetic to any idealization of the native. Thus, the savage takes an ignoble turn. In the new, less romantic discourse, the primitive became “naked, unpredictably violent and uncultured” (Connell, 1996). Qualities that had earlier set the image of the Noble Savage, such as ‘proud’ aggression, were now re-evaluated to signify instead cruelty and beastliness.
It should not be overlooked that the new, negative valence of the savage trope was as much political as scientific. Numerous scholars have demonstrated the ways in which science was or came to be an instrument in the service of empire, how it was an agent of cultural imperialism (for example see Drayton, 2000; Harrison, 2005; Mardirosian, 1987; Osborne, 2005; Pyenson, 1993, Vlahakis, 2006). As Ellingson (2001) explains in the case of the Noble Savage, the turn to the ignoble

created a point of polarity that enabled manipulative control of any subject to which it was attached in the system of colonial politics...[and] greater negativity called for increasingly severe corrective action against the designated offenders (pp. 217-218).

In the Pacific scientists frequently couched their work in as a kind of ‘interventionism.’ That the native was ‘abnormal’ gave science its justification and vindication: abnormality necessitated correction, an “intervention to hasten the process of natural selection” (Bhabha, 1994). The ascent of hard primitivism in the Pacific thus cannot be divorced from the colonial agenda of the time. As much as scientific expansion was predicated and legitimated “by a set of symbols that placed cultures European humans above wild natures, other animals, and ‘beastlike savages’” (Merchant, 2002), colonialism too had “to construe the colonized as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin in order to justify conquest” (Bhabha 1994, p. 70). In fact, scientific and colonial knowledge worked hand-in-hand. As Sorlin (2002) notes, the history of scientific
travel “abounds with evidence of envoys of European powers that were able to combine the goals of science with those of empire expansion and economic exploitation.” Imperialists could call upon the work of scientists in defense of the subjugation of ‘inferior races’, while science reaped the benefits of the colonies’ resources.

Whereas the Noble Savage was a “more complex imperial device”, the ignoble savage thus “provided an overt rationale for imperial and exploitative activities” (O’Brien, 2006, p. 172). Savages, no longer noble, were now seen as “degenerate offshoots of the human race” who could not be civilized without the services of the colonizer. The first step of colonialism was to make the native ‘more savage’, so to engage the project of civilizing them. The next was to encourage ideas of progress and civilization which relied on the discursive demise of the Noble Savage in favor of its ignoble counterpart. As much as the Noble Savage had earlier provided a critique of eighteenth-century society, a “new theory of the development of society” was embodied in the ignoble savage (Meek, 1976, p. 2). In order to recognize and represent itself “as the summit of human history” (Hall, 1996, p. 221), a form of gold standard against which other societies could be measured, Western Europe had to find its degraded, ‘lower’ stage. Indigenous identities had to be subordinated to that of the white European missionary/scientist. The resulting picture was embodied in
the figure of the ignoble savage, “the lowest rung on the ladder of humanity” (Bullard, 2000, p. 32; see also Smith, 1992). The dramatic ‘failure’ of early missionary endeavors in the Pacific, and the perceived obstinacy of the natives, had already ended European sympathy to the Noble Savage in many quarters. Moreover, the idealized Pacific primitive seemed less defensible in wake of the death and disappearance of the navigator Defresne, the disappearance of De Lange and La Pérouse, and, most famously, the death of Cook in Tahiti in 1779. As Connell (2003, p. 559) notes, after a brief heyday in the late eighteenth century, the Noble Savage soon gave way to the ignoble savage—“naked, unpredictably violent and uncultured—and a new rather less romantic discourse of the ‘primitive savage.’” With the “dramatic decline in the representation of islanders as ‘noble savages’” (Sivasundaram, 2005) scientists and missionaries were able to reposition themselves as “agents of pacification among peoples depicted as wretched, bloodthirsty, and cannibalistic.”

It should be noted that this negative rhetoric was not so much a discovery of type, but a recurrence or reversion of character. The noble and ignoble were always in tension, or “fractured” as Anoop Nayak (2005) puts it. That is to say the stereotype of the Polynesian “noble savage had always contained within it its mirror opposite, the ignoble savage” (Lindenbaum, 2005). On one hand this meant the noble or barbarous/ignoble notions of the savage could be reassigned
as needed by the requirements of the colonists. On the other, however, the fusion of sociability and ferocity was a source of anxiety and ambivalence. The savage, whether noble or ignoble, was haunted by the specter of violence or the potential for revolt. As much as the Noble Savage possessed natural virtues, was more peaceful and selfless than his Western counterparts, he was also the latent savage beast. It is hardly surprising therefore that the increasingly negative depiction of Pacific islanders resorted to “rhetorical images of bestiality” (Ellingson, 2001, p. 126). Science had already established an evolutionary continuity between humans and animals and in descending the ladder of evolution to the ignoble savage, scientific minds had found its “animalistic origins.” Similarly, for Europeans, to be noble was to be peaceful, and thus their recourse to descriptions of ‘animal violence’ among natives. Though perhaps a more diffuse mechanism of the naturalization I describe above, Shohat and Stam (1994) argue that this process of ‘animalization’ was nonetheless a key colonialist trope. Put simply, in yoking the native to the animal European superiority and dominance could be asserted. Fanon, of course, has famously spoken of such an ‘animalizing trope’, “the discursive figure by which the colonizing imaginary rendered the colonized beastlike and animalistic” (Shohat and Stam, 2003, p. 19). In The Wretched of the Earth, for instance, Fanon writes that

Colonialism dehumanises the native, or to speak plainly it turns him into an animal. In fact, the terms the settler uses when he mentions the native
are zoological terms. He speaks of the yellow man’s reptilian motions, of the stink of the native quarter, of breeding swarms, of foulness, of spawn, of gesticulations. When the settler seeks to describe the native filly in exact terms he constantly refers to the bestiary.

Derrida has also written extensively on “the question of the animal,” and, in particular, the phenomenological criteria for distinguishing humans from animals (see esp. Derrida, 1974, 2004). While Derrida himself believed that humans and animals cannot be substantially separated (in his terms, there is no “delimitation between man and animal”), it is perhaps appropriate here to note Derrida’s descriptions of how animality has traditionally functioned “as the imaginary other out of and against which humanity is constituted” (Oliver, 2006, p. 116). He notes, in particular, how, as Judeo-Christian thought came into dominance, the concept of ‘the animal’ came into use as an absolute other, and that this linguistic separation was taken as emblematic of the psychic divide between civility and the dark, mysterious, animal that resides inside us. He also points us to how animalistic allusions sustain the myth of the barbaric, wild other, in its “philosophical fixity.” “Animal language—and animality in general,” he writes in Of Grammatology, represents here the still living myth of fixity, of symbolic incapacity, of nonsupplementarity. If we consider the concept of animality not in its content of understanding or misunderstanding but in its specific function, we shall see that it must locate a moment of life which knows nothing of symbol, substitution, lack and supplementary addition (Derrida, 1974, p. 242).
We can bridge this notion back to Homi Bhabha who has noted also of the reliance of colonial discourse upon such essentialisms, what he labels “the binary oppositions and fixities of imperial ideology” (Bhabha, 1994).

Alongside animalism, the eighteenth-century primitive was also twinned to the child, the two having, in Campbell’s (1980) words, “practically interchangeable imagery and sentimentality” (p. 53). As Ashcroft (2000) makes clear, “child and primitive man [were] explicitly linked.” Rousseau, for instance, saw childhood as the stage of life when man most closely approximates the state of nature. In Rousseau, “the unspoiled child and the natural man come together as interchangeable and mutually supportive concepts” (Ashcroft, 2000, p. 188).

Children, in Rousseau’s conviction, “live like animals.” If we return to the case of the Pacific, it can be argued that talk of the childlike qualities of the (primitive) peoples of the Pacific mirrored the unquestioned hierarchical structures of race and power in imperial Europe. The popular racial theories of the day frequently alluded to the lack of intellectual capability among the “childlike races of the [Pacific] Empire” (p. 186). Dumoutier, for instance, concluded that Marquesans, in short, “are big children”; a term already used by Lesson for Tahitians (Staum, 2000). Cook similarly wrote of Polynesians that they may appear to some to be the most wretched people upon Earth, but in reality they are far more happy than we Europeans; being wholly unacquainted not only with the superfluous but the necessary
conveniencies so much sought after in Europe, they are happy in not knowing the use of them.

To be childish was, of course, to lack intelligence. That childhood and primitivism developed interchangeably only reinforced perceptions about the limited mental faculties of Polynesian men. The “child analogy”, as Cairns (1965) labels it, was a suggestion that Polynesians were distinguished by their “immaturity, lack of responsibility and inability to properly order one’s own affairs” (p. 143). “Apparently trapped in the childhood of the human species”, in the peoples of the Pacific their “intelligence was enslaved to instinct. (Staum, 2000, pp. 223, 232). As the French physician and would-be cultural anthropologist Charles Letourneau put it bluntly: “of all the savage races none are more childish than the Polynesians. Their thoughtlessness and their light-headedness are extraordinary. It is impossible to fix their attention upon anything for two minutes.”

A further corollary of this discourse of the savage-child was that “the child is somehow more natural” (Murray, 2006, p. 811). In line with Romantic primitivism, because he was a child, the Polynesian, as I have argued above, was perceived as closer to nature (Dawson, 2005). To align Polynesians to nature was to not only cast their difference as closer to the animal and child, but also to elevate the mind over the body. What purportedly set Europeans apart was their rationality, and the Polynesian body was used to orientate and ground the
modernity of (so-called) civilized society; physicality acted as the opposite side, or Other, that illuminated European intellect and rationality. The influence of Cartesian dualism was particularly significant in underpinning this conviction. Cartesian dualism is, famously, premised on the belief that the material body is distinct from that which inhabits and motivates it, that the body and mind are exclusive. It is this mind/body opposition, argues St Louis, that “implicitly provides the conceptual basis for the racial distinction between intellectual reason and physical passions” (2005, p. 116). Pertinent to the understanding of race, Descartes concluded that the “great divide” between humans and animals was the conscious soul, that thinking or reflection is the defining essence of ‘humanness. He famously wrote that “The greatest of all prejudices we have retained form our infancy is that of believing that beasts think”. Hence, for Descartes, “reason separates human from beast.” According to these recalcitrant dichotomies of nature/culture, self/other, and mind/body, Polynesians were relegated and confined to a secondary status.

In his now classic “Genealogy of Modern Racism”, Cornell West argues that from its advent Cartesian dualism has transformed the “structure of modern discourse” on race (see West, 1982). Certainly, it directly informed the “codifying and institutionalizing of both the scientific and popular perceptions of the human race” during the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries (Eze,
As St Louis notes, “the analytical distinction between mind and body” directly informed “the speculative racial taxonomies of the human species that understood and explained physical, moral and intellectual characteristics as hereditary racial attributes” (2005, p. 117). The mind-body split was especially critical to the Social Darwinists’ view of race. They took Darwin’s concept of ‘fitness’ (in terms of individual, differential reproduction, or number of offspring) and re-framed it as a matter of moral superiority or physical and intellectual superiority (Ratcliffe, 2004). For Social Darwinists, fitness was less about the number of progeny left behind than “conventional notions of the desirable and valuable” (Jones, 1980, p. 8). In doing so, they gave particular weight to the idea that intellectual ability and physical strength were antithetic traits. Speaking of the “distinction between the mind and the body, and its racial character,” St Louis (2005) notes how, in the Origin of Species, Darwin draws on the “‘law of compensation or balancement of growth’…to observe the development of organisms by natural selection” (p. 118). For Darwin, he explains, “natural selection reduces and eradicates parts of an organism that become superfluous to its operation and concentrates on allocating nutrients where they are most needed” (p. 119). Darwin himself may have rejected it, but, inspired by this line of reasoning, what emerged among his contemporaries was a kind of “zero-sum proposition” that assumed “an inverse relationship between
mind and muscle” a kind of “muscle/mind tradeoff” (Hoberman, 1992, p. 43).

Citing The Descent of Man, Hoberman (1997) explains how

Darwin had compared the respective advantages of a powerful physique and gentler social qualities for human survival and concluded that ‘an animal possessing great size, strength, and ferocity’ would have probably failed to develop the ‘higher mental qualities required for civilized life(p. 209).

To be sure, such a relationship was by no means unanimously accepted by Darwin’s contemporaries. However, we could argue that it was typical of a more widespread Cartesianist framework that distinguished between the intellectual and the physical—and which prioritized mind over body—that was critical to the project of colonialism in the Pacific. The popular stress on animality/physicality in depictions of the Pacific ignored, if not negated, the mental capacities of Pacific peoples. In reducing Pacific people to their physical being, Europeans implied that they were essentially less advanced in evolution, the flip-side of European intellectual development and reason. The difference between intelligent and unintelligent helped to legitimate colonial endeavors through the logic that the ‘superior’ necessarily dominates the ‘inferior.’ To hold the colonial other in a position of mental abjection or stunted intellect was to justify the paternal actions of imperialism: insuring the intellectual inferiority of other ‘races’ “morally justifi[ed] colonial rule as a benevolant gesture towards people supposedly lacking...[the] intelligence and resourcefulness to run their own country (Dimeo,
2002, p. 72). And, one of the ways this was achieved was through a discourse of hyper-physicality that drew on the “racial taxonomies that contrast the primal physicality and sensuality of [Polynesian] bodies, and their infantile minds, with the cultured sociability of white Europeans” (St Louis, p. 85). As Hokowhitu (2003b) concludes, “The embodiment of people of colour as physical beings, as opposed to intellectual and self-actualised beings, was initiated in the grand colonising era of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” (p. 25).

From Savages to Athletes: Rugby and (Neo)colonial Discourse

I don’t think there is such a thing as a born soccer player
- Pele

Colonial Encounters, Western Racism, and the Sporting Body

What we have, then, is the basis for understanding how, in the Pacific, the placement of civilization and the intellectual above the primitive and the physical thereby tacitly reinforced the production of uneven social relationships while articulating the physical with race. The relation of Pacific peoples to primitivism was especially significant in its power to ascribe the ‘European’ and the ‘Polynesian’ to given positions within a human hierarchy. What is also apparent is the way the concepts of ethnicity and race came to be treated as unproblematic categories of difference. The subordinate status was written onto
the Polynesian body itself. If to be primitive was to be lesser it is was also to be natural, to be closer to nature; and in this natural state the body rules predominant. To rework Fanon (1967), the Polynesian is their body; they are circumscribed as inferior prior to any gesture because to be other was to be natural, to be physical. This process of representing Otherness as marked in and on the body “is not peculiar to the colonial period and will not disappear with it” (Edmond, 1997, p. 21). In particular, the “racially ascribed paradigm where one is either physically capable or cognitively endowed” (St Louis, 2005) has important repercussions for our modern understandings or ‘race’ and its relation to sport performance. As St Louis (2005) warns of the zero-sum discourse it “is not simply a historical anomaly of philosophical and scientific knowledge but demonstrates particular racialized narratives that have mutated within our contemporary cultural vocabulary.” What I therefore now wish to consider is how colonial pathologies are manifest within and disseminated through popular understandings of sport, and rugby in particular.

Before doing so I wish to point out that many of my arguments are informed by, and borrow from, an established literature examining the discourses endemic to ‘minorities’ on the sports field generally. My premise is that whether African American or Samoan, Black British of Tongan, such athletes share a historical lineage of physical, physiological and psychological
stereotypes: the use of animalistic similes in describing black/brown athletes; the perception that black/brown athletic success owes itself to ‘innate’ physical ability; this belief having the corollary that White male athletes are intellectually superior and have a better work ethic than do black/brown athletes; the articulation of black/brown athletes to discourses of ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ deviance, crime and/or sexual promiscuity; and, the buttressing of all of these stereotypes via a good black/brown-bad black/brown binary. This catalogue of uninformed stereotypes is united in the way black/brownness becomes synonymous with ‘nature.’ Firstly, in the sense of being ‘naturally born to’ (run, jump, tackle… etc). Secondly, it its implicit allusions to ‘primitivism’ or being ‘closer to nature’ (for instance, being childlike, spontaneous, intuitive, or ‘untamable’). This is achieved firstly via the body. There is a long tradition in social and popular thought of seeing the body as neutral, as ontologically stable. The body is, in many ways, a “totemic object” of nature and the natural (Green, 1984). That black/brown athletic performance is frequently described via recourse to the body has the effect of placing such performances within the ‘state of nature.’ Popular understandings of sport abet this equation of black/brown/Nature/natural. The consequence is that black/brown sporting masculinity is overdetermined from the outside as both physical and natural. The
net effect, is that the racialized—what could be termed, imputed otherness—of athletic ability is seen as so natural that it requires no comment at all (Hall, 1997).

As examples of parallel works, Brendan Hokowhitu has published several papers that trace the “genealogical construction of Maori as inherently physical” (2004, p. 261). He does so through frequent recourse to analogies between tane (Maori men) and African American men. Along similar lines, Farah Palmer argues that the uptake of sport by Maori served to fulfil the stereotype that Maori are a ‘physical’ race. She suggests the perception of Maori as ‘natural’ athletes to be more generally embedded within “dominant race ideologies that attribute the success (or failure) of ethnic minority athletes to innate and instinctive attributes” (Palmer, 2007, p. 311). Finally, Te’evale (2001) makes a similar case for Pacific peoples. The success of Pacific athletes, he argues, are more often than not explained in terms of genetic and biological disposition. Echoing John Hoberman’s notion of a “sports fixation” among African Americans (Hoberman, 1997), Te’evale argues such myths risk becoming part of a self-fulfilling prophecy: there is a danger, he claims, that young Pacific peoples fail to think of possibilities for social mobility beyond the world of sport.

The extent to which these authors’ works are steeped in the broader literature on African American athletes is, I argue, wholly understandable. North America is very much the ‘home’ of scholarship on race and sport, in much the
same way as the sociology of sport generally. The literature has a longer history
and a more extensive corpus. The body of work on Polynesians and racialized
athleticism is, by comparison, both young and yet to be developed. But, the
degree of influence is not solely the consequence of practicality or expedience.
We can, I suggest, justify the mapping of the existing literature onto the Pacific
context if we consider the case of Polynesians and African Americans to be not
merely analogous, but homologous. I make this distinction as a reference to
roots, to the difference between simple similarity and shared origins. Borrowing
from a phrase from Said (1985), it is my contention that the discourse of the
‘sporting other’ in both North America and New Zealand are part of the same
“family of ideas” through which difference is constructed: that is, they draw
from the same “archive.”

In making such claims, I am, of course, drawing here not only from Said,
but also Stuart Hall’s famed notion of ‘the West and the Rest’ (see Hall, 1996) and
Balibar and Wallerstein’s (1991) claim as to the existence of “world-systemic
racialization.” While we cannot necessarily collapse these arguments, I see them
as compatible in as much as they view all racisms (ideologies accompanying
racial structurations) as historically linked to the history and consequences of
colonial encounters. The expansion of Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries was predicated on the development of an idea of ‘the West’ that
assumed Europe as “the most advanced type of society on earth, European man (sic) the pinnacle of achievement” (Hall, 1996, p. 187). But the West’s sense of itself as ‘higher’ was not merely an internal process, being formed as well through Europe’s sense of difference from other worlds, by “how it came to represent itself in relation to these ‘others’” (Hall, 1997, p. 188). It was, in brief, a distinction between Western superiority and non-Western inferiority (Said, 1985). This in turn formed the basis of dominating the New World, a justification for annexing and exploiting their peoples and resources. Linking the idea to Wallerstein’s (1974) world-systems theory, Bonilla-Silva explains that the notion of the West “facilitated racializing the inhabitants of the core as superior and those of the periphery (the ‘others’) as inferior and as filling a subservient role in the world-system’s division of labor” (Bonilla-Silva, 1999, p. 902; see also Chapter 4).

And, this Western discourse was/is by no means endemic to Europeans. The West, as Hall points out, is “a historical, not a geographical construct” (1996, p. 186) with no simple meaning, no easy partitions on a map. The West, as he puts it, is “not only in Europe.” It is instead a reference to a type of society, to a level of development that plays on binary oppositions—between developed/underdeveloped, civilized/barbarian, rational/instinctive and human/subhuman. Such a discourse has been, according to Bonilla-Silva (2000)
“an essential component in the structuration of various kinds of social relations of domination and subordination between ‘Western’ and non-Western peoples, between Whites and non-Whites in the world-system” (p. 192). Thus, while I agree with Hall’s (1980) claim that there are a plurality of racisms in the ‘Western world’, it is fair to speak of the racial ideology of Western nations as being “unified by its common historical ideological root” (Bonilla-Silva, 2000, p. 194).

Although it exists in transformed or reworked forms, I thus concur with Hall’s (1996) contention that the West and the Rest discourse continues to inflect the “languages of racial inferiority and ethnic superiority which still operate so powerfully across the globe today” (p. 225). But I take this further in presuming that “the racism peculiar to all Western nations today exhibits a common macroracial discourse” (Bonilla-Silva, 2000, p. 194). There are, patently, extensive differences that must be borne in mind, and neither the West nor the Rest should be considered unified or homogenous. Yet while the multiplicity of local and national racisms cannot be reduced to a uniform Western racial hegemony, “neither can they be separated from ‘Western cultural influence’” (Harrison, 1995, p. 50). Binding ‘Western’ nations, I argue, is a system of representation that shares common discursive strategies that collapse differences into stereotypes that ‘split’ (Hall, 1996) the West from the Rest, ‘us’ from ‘them’, and civilized from uncivilized.
Of particular note is the way in which colonial subjects were represented in ways intended to justify colonial relations of domination and exploitation. Between North America and the South Pacific it is possible, I argue, to trace a coherence of both stereotypes and effects that result from the implicit assumption of the West as the primary referent in understanding difference. In a similar fashion, sport in the Pacific, as in North America, draws on generalized ideas about the non-Western other. Sport, as a symbolic space, in both instances draws on long-established motifs in Western imperial culture, invoking strikingly similar stereotypes: the biologizing of black/brown performance, plays on black/brown animalism and/or primitivism, the and persistence of white/black/brown], mind/body dualisms. The discursive boundaries within which both the black and the brown athletic subject are framed bear an uncanny resemblance because they operate according to the same conceptual scheme through which they are ‘fixed’ and reliably known. The athletic Other, whether brown or black, to borrow from Carrington (2001/2002, p. 91) remains deeply inscribed into the psychic imaginary of the West.”

Island Magic: The Neo-Savage Hits the Rugby Field

Polynesians are blessed with big, powerful frames and, if you can imagine a coconut falling from a tree onto your head, that’s what it feels like when one tackles you.

-Tea Ropati
In what follows I trace some of the continuities of the past racial ideologies as they are articulated within aspects of contemporary media culture. An obvious starting point is to return briefly to white flight and the panic over the brown athletic body. As I have suggested in Chapter 2, we can begin to see the biologizing/naturalizing of race and performance in rugby at a very young age. Put simply, in schoolboy grades Polynesian boys are said to be dominating because of a genetic advantage—their size. As Romanos (2002) puts it, “you do not need to be a scientist to know that an eight-year-old, 12-year-old or 15-year-old Polynesian boy will almost inevitably be much bigger than a white boy the same age. He has an inherent genetic advantage” (p. 171). Similarly, dismissing the “dedicated schools of politically correct thought that insist that we are all the same”, Laidlaw (1999) contends that weight limits are needed in age-grade rugby because Polynesian boys “quite obviously mature physically much earlier than those of European origin” (p. 182). Concurring on their size, one ‘development officer’ suggests that Polynesian boys possess other ‘gifts’ as well: “Genetically, the Pacific Islanders and Maori kids are built to be very good footballers,” he says. “They’re big, fit, have tremendous hand-eye coordination and they have big hands that allow them to grip the ball” (quoted in Lane, 2006). The achievements of Polynesian boys are therefore framed as lacking moral integrity.
because, in contrast to Pakeha boys whose achievements are attributed to
endeavor, they are successful only because of their *innate* physical attributes.
Criticisms of the 21-year-old Samoan-born centre Isaia Toeava are testament to
this type of racist thinking about Polynesian accomplishment. After missing
two try-scoring opportunities against South Africa in 2006, the widespread
presumption was that Toeava had been “exposed” (*Springboks take aim*, 2007) by
the demands of international rugby (Kayes, 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Paul, 2006). A
star in the junior grades (because of his genetic gifts?), Toeava had apparently
been ‘found out’ when his size was no longer a factor. “There is a sense” writes
Kayes (2006), “that he is a player who might have been sensational in the age
grades, but [is unable] to find his feet with the All Blacks” (p. C14).

The widespread presumption that Polynesian boys are natural sportmen
has numerous repercussions. First and foremost is a worrying trend identified by
Hokowhitu (2004) and Tristram (2002): the channeling of Polynesian boys into
high school ‘sports academies.’ Most of these academies were set up in the wake
of the “marketization of New Zealand schools” (Woodfield and Gunby, 2003)
and are of dubious academic merit. As Hokowhitu alleges, “many of these so-
called ‘academies’ were initiated by individual high schools to relocate ‘trouble’
students out of mainstream classes, for the sole benefit of ‘academic’ students”
(2004, p. 273). For Hokowhitu these academies merely act as “contemporary
educational conduits for Māori and Polynesian boys into a world where making it as a sports star is the only available option.” They are viewed, he contends, “as educational sites that ‘suit’ the ‘natural practicality’ of Māori and Polynesian boys, and as places where they can be groomed for professional sporting careers” (p. 273).

This also raises the difficult question of what one local journalist has dubbed ‘The Jonah Factor.’ Of Tongan parentage, Jonah Lomu made his All Black debut at 18 and went on to become perhaps “the best known rugby player on the planet” (Lewis, 2006, p. 70). At the height of his career Lomu became rugby’s highest-paid player and secured contracts with global sponsors such as adidas and McDonald’s. Romanos (2002) argues that Lomu’s success begat his status as a role model for many Polynesian boys who have come to see “excelling at rugby as a way forward” (p. 180). In a scenario he sees as “comparable to the lure [for “black boys” (p. 180)] of professional sports like boxing and basketball in the United States”, Romanos contends that Polynesian boys “see a player like Lomu, a talented teenaged rugby player with no more than normal qualifications, now earning millions of dollars a year to play sport and wonder why that can’t be them” (p. 182). A near-identical argument is made by Matheson (2001). “The young Polynesian” he suggests, “has become conscious of the fact that professional rugby can offer young Pacific Islanders and their
families hope of a better lifestyle…[it] is reminiscent of the way young black Americans got themselves out of the ghetto” (p. 24). Racial essentialism is, of course, at the root of such commentaries. This is most apparent in Romanos’ suggestion that: “A strong, athletic Pacific Island of Maori boy will find he is able to totally dominate junior rugby players his age. Why not try to turn that situation to his advantage by seeking to play rugby professionally?” (p. 182). Genetic (physical) superiority is thus assumed; players such as Lomu merely become an instantiation of a spurious discourse that reveals itself as ‘truth’ to Polynesian boys, who then seemingly follow blindly in Lomu’s footsteps.

While wishing to problematize the longstanding notions of essential difference which these commentators draw on, there is perhaps some salience in the comparisons they draw to sport in the United States. What interests me is not so much whether or not Polynesian boys actually do see sport as avenue for mobility but rather the potential power of this ‘get-out-of-the-ghetto’ discourse (Sandell, 1995). As analyses in the US context suggest, the media frame sport, and the possibility of a professional sports career for African Americans (and African American boys in particular), as an escape from poverty and a means to circumvent racial discrimination in many other occupations. Hence, as symbols of the ‘American Dream,’ successful black athletes suggest that African Americans can, and regularly do, achieve both economic success and upward
social mobility (Andrews, 1996; Hoberman, 1997; McDonald and Andrews, 2001). The implication is that those who don’t can be explained by individual moral inferiority as opposed to structural or systematic racism or racial prejudice. In displacing social and structural factors, and in emphasizing the efforts and achievements of individual black athletes, the media imply that poverty is a result of “individual shortcoming” (Baker, 2000, p. 227), and “reinforce the view that the failure of the black underclass is their own” (Wilson, 1997, p. 185). Black athletic success stories thus falsely suggest sport to be a viable space for African-American social and economic advancement, and provide African Americans—and African American men in particular—with a “stereotypical representational politics that denies and even disavows the complexities of their cultural situation and the pluralistic nature of the subject positions they currently inhabit” (Lafrance and Rail, 2001, p. 41). Hence, although black athletes often seek “status, respect, empowerment and upward mobility through athletic careers” (Dworkin and Messner, 1999, pp. 4-5) as a means of circumventing racial and class barriers, doing so within the venue of sports may actually reproduce racism and justify a system of racial inequality.

Loto et al (2006) suggest a similar discourse has possibly emerged in New Zealand with regard to rugby and young Polynesian males. In their analysis of Pacific peoples in the New Zealand press they suggest sport to be one of the few
social spaces in which positive portrayals of Pacific peoples are manifest.

However, they contend that these “more positive images” appear to reflect what Cottle (2000) describes as the “enlightened racism” of television characterizations of minority groups. According to Loto et al.,

the focus is on successful individuals but coverage omits mention of structural inequalities and exclusionary practices that prevent more success. In the context of the tendency for print news to focus largely on problems, positive cases can function merely to reinforce the perception that Pacific people have only themselves to blame for not measuring up or taking advantage of their opportunities (Loto et al, 2006).

Moreover, stories about Pacific achievement in rugby tended to “present over-romanticized accounts of the level of understanding and integration between team members or the opportunities that sport provides for Pacific men.” Such views are backed up in Hokowhitu’s (2003b) examination of the racialized bodies of Polynesian athletes. For Hokowhitu,

the image of the successful athlete of colour is absolutely important to this imagined democratic state and the reproduction of power, for revolutions can be kept at bay by constant reifications of hopeless dreams. Furthermore, sport stardom does not offer a particularly effective means for social mobility; focusing on the person of colour as predestined for physical feats denies him or her other avenues which are far more likely to offer improved social and political status (p. 31).

In a similar vein, Hokowhitu has elsewhere (2004a,b) contended that the problem has been compounded by the recruiting tactics of New Zealand high schools. Woodfield and Gunby (2003) have shown how, as New Zealand moved to marked-based, neo-liberal economic system in the mid-1980s, education was
restructured according to the dictates of the market. Like any other business, schools were forced to compete with each other for ‘customers’ (i.e., students).

Within this new model, Hokowhitu contends, successful sports teams, and especially rugby teams, have become one of the “chief marketing tools” for many New Zealand high schools:

Top boys schools employ talent scouts to strengthen their premier rugby teams in the hope of bolstering their schools’ image and reputation through success in sports. Not surprisingly, they often target large Māori and Polynesian boys...[and] the mainstream discourse recognizes this phenomenon as an acceptable alternative to providing Polynesian boys with an education system that caters to their academic needs (2004b, p. 273).

The concern for Hokowhitu is not just that mainstream New Zealand has come to accept the stereotype that Polynesians are mere sportspeople.

“Unfortunately,” he writes, “Māori and other Polynesians also recognize sports as one of the few areas in which their boys can succeed in a larger system contrived to elicit their immanent failure” (2004b, p. 274). Macpherson, Spoonley, and Anae (2001) have similarly observed the dangers of the “double-edged sword” that is the success of Polynesian athletes such as Lomu and more recently Tana Umaga or Jerry Collins. They argue that these “exceptional individuals” (Loto et al, 2006, p. 112) have set the stage for what sociologists call a self-fulfilling prophecy. The arguments of academic and other commentators who explain Pacific athletes’ success in terms of biological and genetic predispositions, may persuade Pacific people to confine themselves to those sports in which
they are supposed to enjoy some ‘natural’ advantage. As more people enter these codes and are successful, the ‘truth’ of the arguments is ‘demonstrated’ (pp. 158-159).

While others such as Te’evale (2001) are similarly concerned about the potential for the notion that sport is a means of social mobility to take root in the Pacific community—“that Pacific people, and particularly young Pacific Island youth, also come to believe it” (p. 222)—there is a danger in over-extending this argument. First, education and religion have historically been more important driving forces in Pacific peoples lives. Indeed, the education of future generations was, and is, a primary motivation for migration to New Zealand from throughout the Pacific. And second, although there is some evidence pointing in this direction in the case young Maori (Palmer, 2000), we currently lack any compelling evidence as to whether physicality is actually taken as an inherent sign of limitation among Pacific boys. Critics should thus approach the argument with due caution given that it runs the risk of substantiating those of Pakeha critics who take as given that sport is more important to most Polynesian men, including the highly educated, than to their white counterparts. This is not, however, to deny the potential efficacy of this discourse. Discourses are ways of producing knowledge that serve to sustain existing social relationships. Stereotypes of Polynesian athletic superiority reign virtually uncontested in the New Zealand media (Hokowhitu, 2003a, b; MacLean, 2005). These
representations circulate through culture and reproduce themselves as sites for the interpellation of individuals into repressive, and highly racialized, subjectivities. The natural Polynesian athlete, veiled in a biological epistemology, has the capacity to function as a named location or identifying category through which Pacific peoples come to know themselves and their placement within dominant society. That is, these cultural discourses are not hermetic or pure; they are linked to wider social forms and power and because they provide the basis in and through which individuals make sense of the world, they have ideological effects. To borrow from Stuart Hall, the meanings embedded in representations “are not only ‘in the head.’ They organize and regulate social practices, influence our conduct and consequently have, real, practical effects” (1997, p. 3). The media’s focus on Polynesian men as athletes, and the disproportionate coverage given to Polynesian athletic achievement, certainly obscures the diversity of everyday successes by Pacific men (Anae, 2004; Misa, 2006). And, the blithe celebration of ‘rags-to-riches’ tales such as Lomu’s, in implying that sport is one of the few potential routes of upward mobility for Polynesian youth, also “works negatively to position Pacific Islanders as ‘exotic others’ who perform creatively on the rugby field, in the arts, or during cultural festivals” (Loto et al, 2006). At the very least the economic successes of high-profile Pacific athletes may give
Polynesian youths a false sense of the very limited career prospects of professional sport.

There is also decided merit in the contention that Polynesian participation in, and dominance of, certain sports can confirm ideas about the ‘natural’ physical talents of Pacific peoples (Hokowhitu, 2004a; Te’vale, 2001). In obscuring the differentiating effects of exclusion, rugby has become a prominent arena of social life in which the idea that Polynesian men are biologically different—in a meaningful way—is encouraged. Already we have seen how the growing success of Polynesian boys in junior rugby is frequently reduced to their precocious physical development and the way this is taken as common sense: as one Wellington high-school coach puts it, “There is no doubting that Polynesians, especially, mature early. They are often wonderful physical specimens” (emphasis added). This pernicious discourse carries through into explanations of Polynesian success in the senior ranks. Perhaps the most explicit example is an article published in New Zealand Fitness magazine titled “Lomu and the Polynesian Power Packs.” Noting the “enormous impact” of Polynesians on New Zealand sport, the author (interestingly herself of Samoan-Maori descent) sets out to “uncover” the basis of “Polynesian people’s obvious assets: natural musculativity, hand to eye co-ordination and sense of rhythm” (Leilua, 1996; emphasis added). Most of the article is based on the “scientific evidence” of
Otago University anatomy professor Phillip Houghton, whose research was later published as the book *People of the Great Ocean: Aspects of Human Biology of the Early Pacific* (Houghton, 1996). In brief, Houghton traces the roots of Polynesian sporting success to the inheritance of body types from “early Polynesian navigators.” As Leilua explains it, “Houghton’s theory is that their [Polynesians’] muscle comes from their ancestors enduring extremely cold temperatures while exploring and settling the Pacific Islands hundreds of years ago.” Houghton suggests that the *type* of muscle fibre—‘fast twitch’ (i.e., those muscles “particularly suitable for sprinting”—is explained by a similar case of evolution pressure: “Their demand was for a muscle fibre type to keep them warm and act as a heat engine and type two, fast twitch was ideal for this.” Suppressing more likely social constraints, Houghton then goes on to attribute the “recent phenomenon of Polynesian prowess in sports” to “the fact that, previously, Polynesians weren’t reaching their genetic potential because of their lifestyle” (emphasis added). He uses Lomu as an example. Because Lomu has “been an active sportsman since school, and because he’s also become more disciplined about his eating and exercise regime with the All Blacks, this has propelled him forward toward his genetic potential.”

Again, it is perhaps useful to segue into discussing the importance of biology to the myth of natural Polynesian athleticism via parallels to black
athletes. Well documented (for review, see Grainger, Newman, and Andrews, 2006), the ‘myth of the natural black athlete’ works to circumscribe the efforts of those who would use athletics as a means to enter the social and cultural mainstream by reducing these successes to biology. One of the more (in)famous examples is the claim by Entine (2000) that “elite black athletes have a phenotypic advantage—a distinctive skeletal system and musculature, metabolic structures, and other characteristics forged over tens of thousands of years of evolution” (p. 18). Echoing Houghton above, Entine, while not wholly dismissing socio-economic environment, cultural modeling, communal norms, or familial expectations, privileges genetics as the basis for black athletic success. Without wishing to step into the polarizing debate over the (un)realities of racial science, am I less interested in the veracity of Entine’s argument than the way it serves as a model for how ‘scientific’ representations of the natural athlete myth continue to act as a diversionary rhetorical strategy. First, by appealing to science, Entine and his ilk are able to attack social constructionist arguments that question the efficacy of genetic racial difference while “plausibly denying” (Liu and Mills, 2006) any racist intent. That is, by suggesting black athletic performance to be biologically-driven the debate can be rationalized as non-racial (Bonilla-Silva, 2006). Further it allows any criticism to be inverted into a discourse on the stifling effects of ‘political correctness’ on ‘objective science’ — witness...
Houghton’s comments above. And, second, the reduction of sporting ability and performance to racial genotypes has the effect of “tilt[ing] the debate towards biological forms of explanation” (St Louis, 2005). While not outrightly dismissing social, cultural, economic, and historical influences as a means to explain racial sporting performance, they can be subordinated to the basic notion of intrinsic biological differences. What we can therefore take away from discussions of the relationship between race, sport, and the black body is the way the appeal to science is able to mutate the preoccupation with difference into an apparently palatable form and how, as St Louis notes, the way

objective scientific analyses of the racial distribution of athletic ability depend on the continual reification of racial biological heredity within a social and cultural hierarchy that is analogous with the standard ideas expressed in the longer tradition of racial science (St Louis, 2005).

Keeping these insights close at hand, we can begin to examine what Donna Haraway (2000) has dubbed the contemporary “pseudo-objectivity” of “genetic fetishism” within the context of New Zealand rugby. In addition to Houghton’s thesis above, biology makes its way into several recent commentaries on Polynesian sporting performance. We can start with the comments from Laidlaw and Romanos above. Yet these comments are merely indicative rather than exhaustive. For instance, we see several examples in the Brown Factor documentary I discussed in Chapter 2 and in a similar 60 Minutes feature which appeared a year earlier. Both take on the guise of popular science
to discuss the social phenomenon of sports, and both reinforce common-sense ideas about innate racial-biological differences. As is the case in these documentaries, all too often the science is made all the more dubious—if it wasn’t already—by the sources of (so-called) evidence—athletic trainers and ex-players. Jim Blair, the All Black fitness trainer, for example, is quoted as saying in a piece on “the growing dominance of Pasifika players” (Paul, 2007) that significant numbers of Pacific Islanders possess fast-twitch muscle which makes them genetically predisposed towards building mass around the critical joints and being quick over short distances. It is an explosive game and the Islands produce huge numbers of explosive athletes.

A ‘rugby trainer’ for the Auckland team makes an all but identical claim in his suggestion that

The Polynesian is basically mesomorphic, tending to be big-boned, muscular, of average height, wide shoulders, thin waist. They have a higher proportion of fast twitch muscle fibre which is the source of their explosive style and the reason they are fast over short distances and the reason you don’t see Polynesian marathon runners (cited in Hyde, 1993, p. 69).

Regardless of the speaker the appeal to science is important here. By making claims to scientific ‘truth’ public attention is deflected away from the whole question of Polynesian achievement in sport. Belief in the value-neutrality of science secures unconditional public support for ‘facts’ which appear to transcend the material conditions of Polynesian lives. Arguably, the myth
becomes more effective because its speakers are able to exploit the public’s belief in the putative objectivity of science (Machamer and Wolters, 2004).

These pseudo-scientific distortions are also significant because of the way in which they are frequently assimilated into common-sense discourse. With specific regard to scientific accounts of the racialized athletic ability of Polynesians, Te’evale (2001) has noted how the “popular media absorb these [scientific] theories quickly and turn these hypotheses into truisms.” One rugby writer, for instance, suggests “Fijians have such an aptitude and flair for playing on the wing” because they have more of “what physiology experts describe as ‘fast twitch fibres’” (Knight, 2007). Many similar stereotype-confirming incidents of Polynesian sporting ability have been incorporated into common rugby lore. Perhaps the most popular rhetorical technique is the recurrent allusion to Polynesians players as ‘gifted.’ Surveying the New Zealand press over the past three years we find a rich number of examples. For instance: Ma’a Nonu is variously described as “naturally gifted” (Paul, 2006, p. 67) and a “sublime natural talent” (Campbell, 2005, p. 21); Viliame Waqaseduadua is a “God-given talent”, a “natural athlete” (Knight, 2006, p. 66); according to All Blacks assistant coach, Isaia Toeva has “all the physical gifts” (Paul, 2006); Rodney So’oialo is “an instinctive player” (Johnstone, 2006, p. 17); and, Sitiveni Sivivatu is cited by Laidlaw (2006) as “another classic example of a completely instinctive,
undisciplined firecracker of a player”; His team-mate Josevata Rokocoko is similarly praised for his “sinuous talents.” “Just where all that leg power and electrifying acceleration come from only a physiologist really knows” he concludes (p. 28). These are, of course, merely a sampling. Nevertheless, and without any direct appeals to science, they clearly demonstrate how a cultural stereotype can be made to look like a natural difference.

One of the corollaries of the myth of athleticism is its implication that Pakeha athletes are “disadvantaged relative to [Polynesian] athletes, who are seen as having superior physiology” (Davis and Harris, 1998, p. 158). In particular, what the myth connotes is that whereas Polynesian players are born, Pakeha players are made. Hokowhitu, for instance, identifies how “in contrast to Päkehä sportsmen, whose achievements are attributed to human endeavor, Mäori men are said to achieve through innate physical attributes” (2004, pp. 271-272). Again, we see obvious parallels to the North American context. There, an analogous stereotype reinforces the assumption that white athletes are more hardworking than black athletes. As Bruce (2004) notes, the suggestion that white athletes are more hardworking has the effect of devaluing the work of black athletes, implying that they are lazy while further naturalizing black athletic skill as being biologically-based. This line of reasoning is certainly patent in New Zealand rugby. Consider, for instance, former All Black Grant Fox’s
suggestion that “Polynesian players were naturally superior to us in talent, but a lot of them aren’t there now because they didn’t have the discipline...They lacked the right kind of mental attitude. They’d just turn up and play” (quoted in Hyde, 1993, p. 67). This is by no means a new stereotype. The Fijian-born winger Bernie Fraser’s frequent non-selection for Wellington during the mid-1970s was widely attributed to coach Ray Dellabarca’s lack of appreciation for Fraser’s “casual attitude to discipline.”

One of the more famous instances is the case of the Samoan-born winger Va’aiga Tuigamala. He was infamously dubbed ‘Mr. Beep’ after finishing last among 90 All Blacks trialists undertaking a ‘Beep Test’ to measure cardiovascular fitness. The result was put down to Tuigamala’s ‘low key’ approach to training. According to his biographer, for Tuigamala, “low key, read doin’ nuthin’ until the season got serious” (Howitt, 1993, p. 118). Neazor (1999) describes Tuigamala in a similar fashion, claiming he had a penchant “for not doing the hard yards at training” (p. 215), and that it was “not an unknown occurrence” for Tuigamala to “allow the training to slip” (p. 214). Interestingly, Jonah Lomu’s feats at the 1995 World Cup—now played *ad nauseam* on a near-weekly basis—almost didn’t happen after he was left out of early-season All Black games. The most frequently postulated reasons were his fitness and lack of defensive nous. As *The New Zealand Rugby Almanack* described it, “Lomu appeared to lack a willingness
to totally involve himself in a game and maintain concentration for 80 minutes. There was never any doubts about his ability but there were many about his mental application and casual defensive work” (1996, p. 16). Like Tuigamala a few years earlier, Lomu was also publicly chided when he failed selectors’ fitness tests at a summer training camp prior to the World Cup. Finally, a more recent, and certainly more colorful, example was the All Black assistant coach Steve Hansen’s description of Jerry Collins’ training habits: “You’ve heard the saying train like Tarzan, play like Jane. Well he trains like Jane and plays like Tarzan. He’s not a guy who sets the world alight at training” (TV3 News, Thursday June 8, 2007).

If science underpins these (spurious) appeals to the genetic, or gifted, basis of athletic performance, it has the added bonus of appearing non-racist through recourse to racial differences as opposed to racist assertions of superiority and inferiority. Yet if we consider this ‘hard work’ versus ‘natural talent’ discourse more closely it has an implicit hierarchy: it is a discourse of capacity and deficiency. In particular, while the Polynesian may be the better athlete, the Pakeha is the better thinker. Though it is seldom stated as such natural athleticism is also a matter of intellect, of the capacity in this case for ‘rugby nous.’ Intelligence first takes the guise of what Fox calls ‘mental attitude’ above.
His comments are virtually reiterated by Auckland club rugby coach Dale Atken’s suggestion that

the Polynesian boys are athletically explosive and that’s paralleled [by] their concentration as well. When you make the comparison with the white guys, well they are 80-minute toilers. They are the workers (quoted in Matheson, 2001, p. 32).

As a further example broadcaster Murray Deaker, when asked of his opinion on the pitfalls of the browning of rugby, is quoted as saying:

I think it is fantastic that we have this wonderfully athletic group of people [Polynesians] that can help us develop our sport…But I also want the hard, tough white farmer to be a part of my All Black side…[The type of player who is] there for 80 minutes in a ruthless uncompromising way (quoted in Matheson, 2001, p. 32).

Finally, the familiar saying that the exception proves the rule contains a good deal of wisdom in the case of Hinton’s (2005) description of Fijian-born winger Sitiveni Sivivatu:

What is it they say? Great players are born, not made. Certainly in rugby it’s a fact that some of the island boys are exactly the keenest of trainers. Heck, they’re the first to admit it. They love the 80 minutes of explosive outpouring that constitutes a match. It’s the other six days a week they sometimes find hard work. And Smith had no reason to imagine Sivivatu would be any exception…Smith had no inkling he had anything different than the norm on his hands. Wonderful talent, sure…But he would have to be ridden hard to prepare adequately for the cauldron of test rugby at the very highest level. At least that’s what his coaches thought…Sivivatu may be a genius in terms of pure rugby talent but he has a work ethic, too (p. 36).

It is striking how much these comments play on the (tired) cultural stereotype that Pacific people are lazy and have a disregard for time (see Blea,
2003). More recently manifest in the popular perception that Pacific peoples operate ‘on Island time’, this stereotype in fact has a long, ingrained history beginning with colonial and missionary descriptions of Islanders as “ignorant, lazy, and childish” (Gegeo, 2000, p. 76). Interestingly, in his famed portrait of The Colonizer and the Colonized, Albert Memmi suggests the “often-cited trait of laziness” seems to enjoy “unanimous approval of colonizers” the world over (2000, p. 205). Apropos of Polynesian rugby players, Memmi writes that

the accusation has nothing to do with an objective notation...By his accusation the colonizer establishes the colonized as being lazy. He decides that laziness is constitutional in the very nature of the colonized. It becomes obvious that the colonized, whatever he may undertake, whatever zeal he may apply, could never be anything but lazy (p. 207).

Islander indolence, the stereotype of being “incurably lazy” (Kanahele, 1986), is thus another prime example of how a colonial trope is persistently embedded in the present.

As suggested, it is not only a matter of mental attitude, but mental capacity which supposedly explains the differences between Pacific and non-Pacific peoples’ abilities on a rugby field. A lackadaisical attitude merely dovetails into the popular shibboleth that Pacific peoples lack application and are “difficult to coach in more strategic elements of the game” (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005, p. 214).

The idea that Pacific players are short on tactical thinking is based on the widespread assumption that they either have little time for it, or, are simply
incapable of controlled, methodical play. The former is very much seen as a
difference in rugby philosophy. Strategy, safety and efficiency are presupposed
as anathema to Pacific players. Instead, they favor a brazen inventiveness that
privileges display; they possess what is more popularly known as ‘Pacific flair.’
Positing a thesis as to why Fiji has been so successful at the abbreviated seven-a-
side version of rugby (while underachieving in the full-blown game), Chris
Laidlaw’s comments on Fijian sides are indicative of such professed truisms:

The Fijian game was built around dexterity, an eye for a sudden gap and
the ‘hail Mary’ pass which might or might not have come off. The Fijian
sevens team prospered on the back of this inventiveness but the 15-a-side
game languished as more and more positional specialization became
necessary (Laidlaw, 2006, p. 28).

The supposed inability, or unwillingness, of Pacific peoples to play ‘structured’
rugby is again a trope grounded in history. In an immediate sense, Neazor (1990)
provides the example of the popular image of ‘Pacific Island’ players who began
to emerge in New Zealand rugby during the 1970s. He recounts how New
Zealand rugby at the time was “all about forward domination, patterns, few risks
and winning” (p. 162). Pacific Islanders, in contrast, were said to play with a
particular ‘style’ at odds with this ordered approach. Not surprisingly, given the
tendency among Pakeha to make unfounded associations between Pacific
Islanders and Maori (Ross, 1994), these stereotypes mirrored those of Maori
rugby during the same period. In his examination of Maori rugby in New
Zealand, Malcolm MacLean (2005) notes that while All Black rugby through the 1970s and 1980s was criticized for being “dull, staid and rigidly controlled” (p. 14), it found its counter in a “traditional style” of Maori rugby, that was “somehow freer than regular, All Black rugby” (p. 12).

For Pacific Islanders similar descriptions coalesce in the notion of flair (Te’evale, 2001). Flair embodies notions of unpredictability, innovation and unorthodoxy (Schaaf, 2003). For instance, in a press conference prior to the Pacific Islanders inaugural game against Australia, Wallabies coach Eddie Jones expressed his confidence that the game would be a real spectacle [because] The Islanders generally play with a lot of flair and natural talent. They like to throw the ball around and run it from anywhere, which usually makes for a fast, free-flowing match...The great strength of Pacific Island rugby is that it is visually exciting and full of passion and open play (Island debut against Australia, 2004).

Winning for Pacific Islanders is thus allegedly secondary to ‘having a go’, to running with the ball, to spontaneity. As former All Black Frank Brunce once put it, “the brown guy, he likes the free-flowing game, he likes to roam in the wide open spaces” (quoted in Kayes, 2002, p. 1). The (purported) flair of Pacific peoples is viewed with ambivalence among rugby writers and the public (though never actually challenged). Some such as Paul (2007) see it as a boon, the “Pacific influence” bringing “pace, power, [and] flair” to the “happy melting pot” of New Zealand rugby. Others are more circumspect in their suggestion
that there will always be a need for the more methodical (read, intelligent) ‘Pakeha style.’ This is borne out in the ambiguous suggestion of Laidlaw (1999) that, while the “view that Pacific Islanders are not thinkers on the field and that too many of them in a team means a dumbing-down of tactical acumen isn’t a very persuasive argument”, it is nonetheless a factor in some teams because, on balance, Maori and Pacific Islanders tend to be more instinctive than measured in their approach and every team at the top level needs someone who can plot and plan, adjust and adapt. There will always be a place for a Grant Fox [a former Pakeha All Black] and that is what is so appealing about rugby (p. 183).

The exemplary illustration of this type of thinking is the Auckland rugby team. As already noted, Auckland is widely touted as the “largest Polynesian city in the world” (Immigration New Zealand, 2008), and unsurprisingly, its teams through the years have including a large number of Pacific peoples. Though Auckland has won the National Provincial Championship (NPC) a record sixteen times, it has frequently been chided for fielding “too many Polynesians” (Gray, 2004). For instance, after winning the NPC is 2003, Auckland began 2004 with several heavy losses. As they sat near the bottom of points table, one rugby writer was moved to ask “What’s wrong with Auckland?” (Gray, 2004). Replying to his own question, he proffered the high quotient of Pacific players, the coaching
staff (notably all of Pacific-descent), and too many “flash-Harry players”12. In a similar vein, Leggat suggested that while “some of the broken-field running [was] outstanding…when they needed to tighten up, to play percentages, there was reluctance” (p. D4). Seemingly with Auckland in mind, Tea Ropati in an article titled “Island Magic” (Ropati, 2006) sums up this course of reasoning:

The superlatives are endless when it comes to commentary about [“Polynesian”] athletes. However, there are also an endless number of detractors who make assumptions about natural physical strength and superior skill being diluted by lack of discipline and ability to concentrate (p. 20).

As an aside, it is perhaps worth noting that Auckland went on to win the NPC the following year—with the same coaching staff and largely the same playing personnel. The current side, of which nearly two-thirds have Pacific ancestry, is also the reigning NPC champion.

We can situate many of the criticisms against Pacific players in the history of their emergence onto the New Zealand rugby scene in the 1970s and 80s. At this time, the emphasis in the New Zealand game was on results and control—typified by the dour All Black sides of the period (MacLean, 2005). That Pacific peoples ostensibly lacked the ability to play patterned rugby was more or less “the ultimate crime in New Zealand rugby of the time” (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005, p. 214). Borrowing from MacLean (2005), it could easily be said that there is

12 Flash Harry is a British slang reference to “a self-confident, vulgar person” (Rees, 2002; for its
something of “colonialist subtext” to such presentments of the ‘Polynesian
game.’ Just as he puts it of Maori, that Pacific peoples were viewed as free-spirits
on the rugby field had the effect of perpetuating the view that their “happy-go-
lucky relationship with the world determines their performance” (p. 12). Such
stereotypes are also very much in keeping with “continuing Anglo-European
claims that the people of Oceania are premodern, primitive” (Wood, 2003, p.
355). For instance, despite the fact that rugby had been played in the Islands
since at least the late 1800s, Pacific players were widely thought to have a
childlike naïveté when it came to the finer points of the game. Neazor’s account
of one all-‘Samoan’ team is typical of such paternalistic depictions:

It took a bit of getting used to local conditions. The wearing of boots was
not familiar to the players—they were used to playing in bare feet,
strapped with bandages. Only the referee’s insistence they be properly
shod saw them don accepted rugby footwear. They had no uniforms.
They struggled with the cold. They did have plenty of skill and
enthusiasm, enjoyed running with the ball and the physical aspects of the

As suggested earlier, fictional and social scientific—particularly, anthropological
(White and Tengen, 2001)—discourses have long infantilized the Pacific region
(Taouma, 2004). Hardly surprisingly, early migrants were viewed through the
same lens. The worn cliché that Pacific Island society was somehow less—or
un—civilized, that Pacific Islanders were carefree ‘children of nature’ (see

origins see Rees’ Cassell’s Dictionary of Word and Phrases).
Campbell, 1980; Edmond, 1997), no doubt influenced popular perceptions of Pacific players as lacking in rugby nous.

Interestingly, commitment, or a lack thereof, has also been cited as a reason for the relative lack of participation by Pacific Island players within New Zealand cricket. The traditional line of thinking, as sociologist Greg Ryan describes it, was that “Pacific people who played cricket at school turned to softball or rugby or away from sport thereafter as they did not wish to spend the time in training” (Ryan, 2007, p. 81). Sometimes in rugby, though, it was seen not as a matter of choice, but make-up. Simply put, it was not just a case of Pacific Islanders not wanting to play structured rugby, it was that they couldn’t. In his discussion of the pitfalls of sporting ‘success’ for Pacific peoples, Tasileta Te’evale explains how focusing on achievement in sport fed the “popular theory” that Polynesians did not have “the mental faculties and discipline required to succeed in other more serious areas of life” (Te’evale, 2001, p. 222). Despite the emergence of players such as Michael Jones, Graeme Bachop and Walter Little in the 1990s and Tana Umaga or Rodney So’oailo more recently—all players widely-regarded for their on-field intelligence—the assumption that Polynesians have “no ability to concentrate or understand game plans” (Ropati, 2006, p. 20) remains one of “biggest myths in New Zealand sport” (Smith, 2005).
Players and coaches are among those who promulgate this myth—and sometimes even Pacific players themselves seem to have accepted the stereotype. Again, Tuigamala is an illustrative case. His early success was touted as the effect of his natural ‘physical advantages’, as opposed to learned skill. This is certainly intimated in a former coach’s recollection of his first meeting with Tuigamala:

“We broke into groups and discussed tactics. I gave Inga [Tuigamala] a hypothetical situation and asked him where he would stand. ‘I wouldn’t have a clue,’ he replied. ‘No one’s ever told me to stand anywhere. I just like to get the ball and run!’” (quoted in Howitt, 1993, p. 29). Dubbed both ‘the Beast’ and ‘the Big Black Bus’ by the media in his later career with the All Blacks, he was often used as an impact or set-up player, running directly at defenses rather than around them.

Although he is more specifically discussing the “athletic black body”, when Ben Carrington’s notes how black athletes are “invariably described” as lacking “cognitive capabilities—unlike their white peers,” he could just as easily be discussing Pacific players like Tuigamala. Certainly, as Anthony Hubbard points out, “pundits still sometimes claim that Pacific players lack strategic sense or can’t stand much pressure” (Hubbard, 2006). This intelligence myth is compounded by the under-representation of Pacific peoples in positions of

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13 Most (in)famously by former international captain, now broadcaster, Martin Crowe (see Crowe
authority, a fact observed by well-known local radio host Martin Devlin when asked about rugby’s Pacific “success stories.” “It’s a tough subject to get around when you consider the hierarchies” he is quoted as saying. “The coaches, the management, the administration; they’re all white faces and they are continuing to be white faces. You’re allowed to play but you’re not allowed to run the game. I mean how does that work?” (The browning of Kiwi sport, 2004, p. 5). On a related line is the way the accomplishments of Pacific players are frequently put down to the guidance or skill of a white coach or white authority figure. Again, this echoes research on portrayals of African American athletes in the United States, wherein images of successful Black athletes are all too often “mitigated and undercut by the overwhelming predominance of white images… [particularly] individuals in positions of authority” (Wonsek, 1992, p. 454). This not only places the black players “in a secondary and entertainment role”, but may also “serve to reassure the White majority that its dominance is not really being threatened” (Wonsek, 1992, p. 454; see also see Andrews 1996; Robbins, 1997; Thomas, 1996).

The most obvious example in New Zealand rugby is the case of current All Black coach Graham Henry. Henry was coach of the famed Kelston Boys High School First XV during the 1980s and 90s when the school “emerged as a rugby powerhouse, dominating the Auckland Secondary Schools scene, then at
national and international level” (Burnes, 2004, p. 22). The success of teams during his tenure has been largely attributed to the Pacific talent drawn from Auckland’s western suburbs as well as Henry’s ability to “press the right buttons for many of these Pacific players” (Burnes, 2004, p. 23). His later successes with the Auckland Colts, Bs and Auckland A are explained in similar terms. One writer, praising “The Henry Touch”, suggests Henry has “been able to get the best out of [the] raw ability and flair [of Pacific players] and harness it to the team structure within the very best of New Zealand sides” (Burnes, 2004, p. 23). He goes on to compliment Henry’s supposed ability to approach Pacific players in a different manner, particularly as compared to palagi. The rationale, as Henry himself explains it, is that “what motivates Pacific Islanders is quite often different to what motivates a Pakeha boy. They are brought up differently” (quoted in Burnes, 2004, p. 24; cf. Shaaf, 2003). After the 3-0 whitewash of the British and Irish Lions in 2005, followed by the Grand Slam tour of the Home Unions, Henry was voted the IRB’s Coach of the Year. Explaining the All Blacks’ “annus mirabilis” British reporter Brendan Gallagher puts their success down to Henry’s ability to “realise and fully incorporate the massive rugby talent of New Zealand’s ‘island’ [sic] community and, it has to be said, those who started their playing careers on the islands themselves” (p. D5). He goes on:

nobody has a clearer understanding of the islanders rugby-playing potential and mentality…He was brought up, taught and lives in that
multi-racial community and sees diverse types as strength, not a weakness. He has a sure touch in assessing their ability and rather than trying to change and water down their exuberance and physicality, he has allowed them to express themselves fully (p. D5).

In this passage Gallagher reaffirms those stereotypes already mentioned: physicality, flair (in this case “exuberance”), and a different “mentality.” The essentialisms are obvious. First, in affirming that Pacific peoples are “different,” he presents presumed cultural practices as fixed features. Seemingly innocuous, this discourse of cultural difference masks “the repressed history of racism that haunts and permeates it” (Gagnon, 2000, p. 130). Second, the image of Pacific players as innately physical, as lacking the capacity to play ‘traditional’, structured, disciplined rugby, is plain in Gallagher’s choice of language. ‘Diverse types’, ‘mentality’, and the notion of ‘exuberance’, for instance, reek of primitivism, framing as they do Pacific players as “childlike, intuitive, spontaneous” (Kuper, 1988)—which Henry has, wisely, not ‘watered down’—as well as physical; they are ‘modern primitives’ (Torgovnick, 199) of “strong backs and weak minds” (Pickering, 2001, p. 124).

If the spectacle of Polynesian bodies triumphant in rituals of masculine competition reinforces the fixed idea that Pacific men are “all brawn and no brains” (Carrington, 2001), this racialized polarity is therefore also heavily dependent on white paternalism—embodied in a figure like Henry. The Polynesian athlete in essence becomes a kind of raw talent to be honed by white
guile. A good example is the objectification of Toeava. Pitched from relative obscurity into the All Blacks at 18, Toeava was immediately dubbed by the press as a “special project” of the All Blacks coaches (Kayes, 2007, p. 7). Since making his debut he has been dogged by the tag that he has “all the physical skills”, but is prone to lapses in concentration, that he is, in short, “enigmatic” (Kayes, 2007, p. D1). The coaches, however, have countered that Toeava has “unlimited potential”, and is a “calculated development move” (quoted in Hinton, 2007, p. 31). The media have subsequently caught on to this discourse, portraying Toeava as something of an object to be manipulated. In a two-page article in the Weekend Herald, for instance, the author begins by describing Toeava as a player who seems “as if he born to fulfil no other purpose [than play rugby]” (Paul, 2006, p. 68). Noting how rugby has changed in recent years he suggests that “superstars can no longer be plucked off the peg. Instead they have to find raw materials and fashion them into a product that excites” (emphasis added). In this vein, Toeava for the author becomes a testament to the All Black coaches’ “faith in their own ability...[to] polish Toeava into a world sensation” (p. 68; emphasis added).

Notably, Toeava is only the latest in a long line of players of Pacific heritage to be described in such terms. There are, for example, strong echoes of the career of Lomu in Toeava. Both are young Pacific peoples who made their debuts at the age of 18. Both have become known more for their physical talent as opposed to
acumen. We could say also that both are or became physical ‘specimens’ in the literal sense of being typed and circumscribed. This is what I mean by my allusion to objectification. Typical of binary thinking, both players are constructed in terms of their oppositional difference. They become objects to be shaped and controlled. It is in this way a modern repetition of colonial culture/nature opposites: the Polynesian other is denied subjectivity—that is, objectified—while the known (white) self is separated from the known object (Richards, 1980).

Further contributing to this objectification of the Polynesian body is the underlying inversion and juxtaposition of cultured whiteness with Polynesian bodily primitivism. Indeed, much of what I have discussed to this point has its basis in the critique of the distinction between (Polynesian) instinctive corporeality and the expansive (white) mind. The issue here resonates with primitivism/civilization dichotomy outlined in the first sections of this chapter. In particular, it returns us to barbarism and the myth of the savage. As a reminder, the ideal, while extolling the virtues of the primitive, played on a binary which posited Oceanic men as the antithesis of their Western counterparts. Modern, productive intellectualism contrasted a “primitive people who represented a return to a more simple, natural lifestyle” (Green, 2002, p. 222). Polynesians were, in essence, closer to the state of nature (Steinmetz, 2004,
p. 255)—the corollary being that they were inherently physical beings. In the contemporary (sporting) context this is manifest in the widely-circulating preconception that Polynesians embody “a natural ease and athleticism that was not far removed from the supposedly primitive, animalistic world of the pre-European period” (Ryan, 2007, p. 74). Whilst this may seem to be a reiteration of ideas already visited, it moves us further into the connection between the natural body and animalism. In racializing the mind/body distinction, colonial science and its antecedents recast alternative behavioral patterns as an indication of cognitive faculty (St Louis, 2005). Civilized reason was separated from the passions of the body, rationality from pre-rational primitivism. Notably, the latter was linked—both implicitly and explicitly—to the eighteenth and nineteenth-century discourse of the soulless animal (Hokowhitu, 2004a).

An embedded tendency of colonial discourse, animal metaphors have frequently been redistributed and recycled in the world of contemporary sport. As Carrington (2001) has noted with regard to the black athlete, the sports media in particular “have played a central role in biologising black performance via their constant use of animalistic similes to describe black athletes” (p. 94). This colonial discourse certainly has contemporary resonance in framing Polynesian masculinity. Already we have seen how Va’ainga Tuigamala was labeled ‘The Beast.’ Lynne Star has noted how his team-mate, Michael Jones, was described
on more than one occasion as a “black panther” (Star, 1992). In fact, there are several comparable references in Jones’ official biography, *Iceman* (McConnell, 1993). For instance, a former team-mate recalls of playing with Jones: “We used to talk about this panther-like guy advancing, arms out, hands like graceful claws that were so lethal, pouncing on the first-five and then bustling him aside to get to the second-five” (p. 53; emphasis added). Comparing Jones to Waka Nathan—a player in fact known by his nickname ‘The Black Panther’—Fred Allen, the former All Black coach, cites “The same panther-like movements. A tremendous anticipation, that also reminded me of Waka. They both have that natural fluid motion, but are so lethal with it” (p 54; emphasis added). When not been called a “freak” (most famously by the English captain Will Carling), Jonah Lomu was also repeatedly described via animal comparisons. In a recent reflection piece following Lomu’s retirement, for instance, reporter Paul Lewis explains how “around the world spectators marvelled at the power of the man. It was rugby majesty in the same way there is a sense of majesty when a lion brings down a wildebeest—he was a terrible, compulsive sight in full flight” (2006, p. 71).

Similarly, after the 1995 World Cup, Britain’s *Observer* labeled Lomu “a beast”, Australia’s *Telegraph* “a stalking lion”, and the English defense coach, Phil Larder, simply called him “an animal.” Again, this is just a sampling of the way reporters and announcers are fond of making comparisons of Polynesian athletes.
with animals. The underlying implication, of course, is that Polynesian players are not ‘true’ athletes, they are instead “animals of natural ability” (Lees, 1995, p. 245).

If notions of Polynesian athleticism are coded through plays on animalism (a coding, it should be said, in which performance dominates [Carrington, 2001]), Polynesians can also be brought closer to nature through their purported ‘savagery.’ As already discussed, savagery in the (neo)colonial context has a double(d) meaning. First, in the sense of remaining ‘different,’ set apart by a connection to nature. But, second, as the noble savage was transformed into its ignoble counter (as colonialism sought its justification), ‘savagery’, which had been closer in meaning to ‘primitive’ than ‘barbaric’, came to insinuate violence and inhumanity (Bullard, 2000; Ellingson, 2001). These new, violent savages were “a people whose treacherous attacks could never be predicted or fathomed” (Page, 2000). Further to laziness and lack of leadership, intellect, and discipline—attributes embodied by, and implied in, presuppositions of natural athleticism—the media also replay, at the connotative level, the myth of the violent Pacific savage. This stereotype was established early in New Zealand rugby. In the 1960s and 70s a common objection to Pacific Island immigration (among ‘mainstream’/white New Zealanders at least) was that Pacific Islanders were responsible for increasing crime (Mitchell, 2003). For instance, Andrew Trlin, in a
1972 study of Aucklanders’ attitudes to Western Samoan immigrants, found that 83 percent agreed or somewhat agreed that Western Samoans had a reputation for bad behaviour (Trlin, 1972). By the mid-1970s the populist politician Robert Muldoon—who, only weeks later, would become Prime Minister on an anti-immigration ticket—claimed in a newspaper column that he had the support of the “vast majority of New Zealanders” in calling for “criminal Islanders” to be sent home. If, as the stereotype went, Pacific Islanders had a tendency toward violence, criminal behavior, and immorality (Mitchell, 2003; Ross, 1992; Spoonley, 1990), these conceptions then spilled onto the rugby field. Echoing early ideas about Maori (see Hokowhitu, 2004; Star, 1992), Pacific players were dogged by the perception that they were savage, emotionally impulsive, aggressive, and violent. As historian Paul Neazor describes it in the 1970s:

There were suspicions about players from the islands back then. For quite a while it was automatically assumed each tackle would come in hard, at neck level. Some [Pacific Islanders] became highly excited during matches and did silly things. There had been one or two spectacular punch-ups, involving both players and spectators, which had received bad newspaper publicity (1999, p. 162).

Neazor’s language here is itself loaded, yet he rightly identifies the racialization of Pacific players at the time. Just as Pacific peoples were elsewhere defined as “problems in terms of the ‘normal’ functioning of New Zealand society” (Spoonley and Trlin, 2004), the dominant view of the “Pacific island style of
play” (Robson, 2006, p. 12) was that it ran counter to what “New Zealand rugby was all about” (Neazor, 1999, p. 162).

Pacific players subsequently continue to be stigmatized as “savage, emotionally impulsive, aggressive, and violent” (Hokowhitu 2002, p. 266). Press coverage is quick to single out the ‘Pacific Islanders’ or ‘Pacific Island immigrants’ involved in any objectionable on-field acts. Neazor (1999) has noted how Polynesians have had to “not only be as well disciplined” as other players, but have also “to be seen to be immaculate in all areas of performance” (p. 163). To see why we need to consider that wider violence and crime in New Zealand has been shown by a number of scholars to be decidedly racialized (Loto et al, 2006; Mayeda et al, 2001). This is especially true with regard to youth violence and gang affiliation. The media has popularized the suggestion that Pacific children live in “chambers of unrelenting violence”, that “broken bones [are] the norm because [Pacific Island] parents were bashing their kids” (Perese, ?, p. 1; see also Stünzner, 2005). Tapu Misa has likewise noted the way images of Polynesian men are “overshadowed by this one-dimensional image” (Misa, 2006). One infamous example of both the persistence and acceptance of these stereotypes occurred in May 2000 when then Prime Minister Jenny Shipley delivered a speech in parliament warning “decent New Zealanders” of Pacific Islanders “climbing into your back windows” (quoted in Teaiwa and Mallon,
2005, p. 211). The representation of athletes in the media commonly reflects and reinforces this more general portrayal of Polynesian men as deviant, unruly, violent, and animalistic in popular cinema, television, literature, and the print media. In this way Polynesian athletes become context, text, and subtext, as a case study of the larger dynamics of racialized stereotyping.

One of the more obvious ways in which ‘racial’ violence infects and affects the coverage of Polynesian athletes again relates to style of play. While explicit allusions to Polynesian players as violent are now (generally) avoided, there are clear racialized meanings in the supposed penchant among Polynesians for ‘physical play.’ Like that of natural physicality, this myth has also achieved something of the level of common-sense ‘truth.’ As Deaker (1999) states matter-of-factly, “the Polynesian boys...love the physical side of the game, particularly the big hits and crunching tackles” (p. 162). Another memorable example is the media descriptions of the All Blacks’ first test against Samoa in 1993; the majority of these views summed up in Howitt’s (1993) description of the game as “a tough, physical encounter. Indeed, it was branded the ‘battle of the Bandage’ with so many players requiring first aid treatment for cuts and bruises, among them Inga [Tuigamala], who was trampled by giant winger Lolani Koko” (p. 159). Elsewhere he similarly describes how the Samoans “play with hard, physical aggression. Indeed, they are recognised as the hardest-tackling rugby
players in the world, and any side which takes on Manu Samoa knows its physiotherapist will be working overtime afterwards soothing the cuts and bruises” (p. 111). While such statements can perhaps be read as (faint) praise, it is an ambiguous stereotype. On one level it accords with the ‘hard man’ trope which has been central to rugby and the formation of masculine character in New Zealand (Phillips, 1987). In the 1950s and 1960s, in particular, the most celebrated (Pakeha) All Blacks were players like Colin Meads and Fergie McCormick, both of whom personified “the most physical and aggressive elements of masculinity” (Phillips, 1987, p. 121). Yet for Polynesians it is something of a split discourse: it is ambivalent because, for Polynesian athletes, to be ‘aggressive’ is to also be prone to what Carrington (2001) describes as “‘wild’ moments when they supposedly lack the cognitive capabilities—unlike their white peers—to have ‘composure’ at critical moments” (p. 94). Put simply, Polynesians are framed as more likely than white players to cross the line between ‘tough’ and ‘rough’ play.

A good example, is the inaugural tour of the Pacific Islanders rugby side. In their opening game in Australia the Pacific Islanders lost by 15 points to the Wallabies but the home side came out of the game with injuries to star players Joe Roff, George Gregan and Clyde Rathbone. This led Australian coach Eddie Jones to criticize the manner in which the Pacific Islanders played, particularly in
regards to their tackling. “I don’t expect players’ heads to be attacked,” Jones said. “That’s what they did…I don’t know if it was a game of rugby tonight. I’ve got nothing to say about them” (quoted in Growden, 2004). The game against New Zealand a week later was described in one headline as a “Bruising Pacific win for [the] All Blacks” (Budge, 2004). In the text, the article goes on to suggest that the All Blacks were “pleased to get through the match without any apparent injury problems.” Sour comments were also on display after an earlier game against Fiji. In the post-match press conference the All Blacks’ coach, John Mitchell, labeled Fiji’s tackling as “questionable”, while All Black captain Reuben Thorne complained of “repeated offside infringements and late hits.” Such claims are typical of how those singled out as ‘aggressive players’ are increasingly more likely Polynesian. Frequently it is an issue of ‘temperament’—another polite allusion to the intellectual inferiority discourse outlined above. Perhaps the best illustration is the Samoan-born All Black Jerry Collins. Sometimes labeled as a liability after receiving several suspension for high tackles (Johnstone, 2006), Collins has been variously dubbed “scary Jerry” (Ford, 2006, p. B2), “The Intimidator”, “enfant terrible” (Paul, 2006), and a “thug” (Welham, 2006, p. E1). Seldom is it ever mentioned that Collins attented high school on a mathematics scholarship and currently attends Victoria University.
Off the field, the connection between athletes and crime also cannot be comprehended outside the paradigm of race. The media interest in criminality among Polynesian athletes parallels the ideology which naturalizes Polynesian men as criminals in a number of New Zealand institutions. That is, the connection between athletes and crime is informed by the larger discursive framework of racialized body politics. While currently there is no research which explores this criminal-athlete discourse, a number of recent high-profile incidents demonstrate the connection between the frame of athlete-as-criminal and the wider discourse of Polynesian criminality (see Bingham, 2006; Robson, 2006; Watson, 2007). In cases involving Pacific peoples rather minor infractions were turned “into moral dramas...of national import” (King and Springwood, 2001, p. 116). By contrast, those involving Pakeha All Blacks were largely downplayed. For instance, after Fijian-born winger Sitiveni Sivivatu admitted to slapping his wife during an argument, the story led both major television evening news bulletins and was front-page on all of the country’s major daily newspapers the following morning. For many, the incident raised the specter of intimate partner violence and affirmed the popular belief that family violence is considered ‘normal’ or acceptable in Pacific cultures (Paterson et al, 2007). Conversely, when Troy Flavell was charged with assaulting an Auckland bar patron and Norm Maxwell—both players are Pakeha—with assaulting a bar doorman (see All Black
forward to appear in court, 2005), their cases were made light of as minor incidents which had more to do with their drinking than their race. Revolving as it does around racial stereotyping, this coupling of Polynesian athletes and crime is significant in the way it is linked to wider fears about Polynesian violence: the construction of Polynesian athletes as criminals, in essence, provides ‘evidence’ as to the criminal nature of all Polynesian men.

Finally, it perhaps worth commenting on how these ‘moral panics’ can be connected to the forms of ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ racism I have discussed above. In particular, the way in which the interplay between race and criminality become naturalized. Though more directly commenting on African American athletes, Andrews’ (2000) description of new racism is salient here. As he explains it:

The new cultural racism was prefigured on the virulent assumption that these innately physical males would be misbehaving were it not for the involvement of their natural physical attributed in the disciplinary mores and stringencies imposed by the dominant (sporting) culture. According to the spurious logic, within sporting activity African American males have found salvation (if only temporary…) from themselves (p. 182).

Such arguments seem equally applicable in the case of Polynesians in New Zealand sport. For instance, Lomu has made frequent references to the “cauldron of violence” that would have been his life without rugby (Dye, 2004). Similarly, as violence among ‘Polynesian gangs’ grabbed headlines when father of three Faafetai Lafolua was killed during an alleged ‘turf war’ in 2005 (see Welham, 2006), the local press featured several stories of Pacific athletes brought up
around violence and poverty. In one, titled “Sport Gave Joe Way Out of Wild Life”, Joe Galuvao is posed as a shining example of someone who “rose from being a south Auckland street thug to a millionaire star” (Reid, 2005, p. 7). “I have the same background to a lot of these kids” he is quoted as saying. “I’m just lucky I had sport to fall back on and [the] people involved believed in me” (p. 7). He goes on to suggest that “at the end of the day it is up to the kids to make the right choices” (p. 7). In a similar feature, the All Black winger Josevata Rokocoko also testifies to how “it’s easy to drift away at school. I had friends at the local rugby club who directed me through…It could have been a whole different story for me otherwise” (quoted in No Gangs for Stars, 2005, p. 7). The circulation of these types of high-profile success stories are notable in the way in which they obfuscate the deleterious effects of structural racism and late twentieth-century capitalism (Leonard, 2006). As is only too obvious in the comments by Galuvao (“at the end of the day it’s up to the kids”), it further condemns those struggling in the Pacific community for lacking the personal resolution that is required to achieve in New Zealand society. What is also apparent is the way in which, while contemporary New Zealand culture may be dominated by a fascination with the assumed superior physicality of the Polynesian male body, it simultaneously has the capacity to provoke fear because of the ever-present threat it poses. Thus, the Polynesian body is always in need of containment and control.
In a recent article in the *Journal of Sport and Social Issues*, Joseph Maguire suggests research into sport labor migration to be “in its relative infancy” (Maguire, 2004, p. 477). Such a comment may seem somewhat surprising coming from a scholar who has been concerned with the issue for over a decade, and given sports geographers took interest in the migratory flows of athletes as far back as the 1980s (Bale, 1984). Nevertheless, Maguire is wholly correct in his contention that “much more work needs to be done, both at a conceptual level and with regard to empirical inquiry” (p. 477). This is especially true concerning research on sport labor migration to, from, and within the South Pacific. This is somewhat surprising given the extent of what could be called the ‘Pacific sporting diaspora.’ Small in number by comparison to, say, the migration of African footballers to Europe (see Bale, 2004; Darby, 2000, 2002, 2006; Darby *et al*, 2007), the migration of athletes from the Pacific Islands is nonetheless not only far-flung, but worthy of mention in cultural and economic terms. If one were to include sporting ‘nomads’ (Maguire and Bale, 1994) from Australia and New
Zealand even more so. The significance of player migration becomes even more apparent if comparative scale is taken into account. Populations in the Pacific Islands are more likely to range in the tens-of-thousands than millions yet they well and truly ‘punch above their weight’ when it comes to the field(s) of international sport. Players who trace their roots to Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji, for instance, are remaking the sports of rugby and rugby league in Australia and New Zealand (Robson, 2006), and increasingly ply their trades in places much further afield like England and France. Elsewhere, in the United States Pacific Islanders are heavily overrepresented in the National Football League and Division-I college football, with the influence of American Samoa in particular being likened to that of the Dominican Republic in baseball (Garber, 2002).

The “talent pipelines” (Falcous and Maguire, 2005, p. 141) emanating in the Pacific are yet, however, to receive any sustained scholarly analysis. To be fair, the popular media have afforded the subject some attention. Accusing New Zealanders of ‘poaching’ talent from the Pacific is a favorite of the British press, and while the reportage is often less than balanced they have—albeit indirectly—raised the very pertinent issue of just what problems player migration poses for Pacific Island teams like Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. Similarly, and again in the United States, the flow of footballers from American Samoa and Hawaii to the mainland U.S. has been the focus of a popular documentary (Spear and
Pennington, 2005) and made the occasional appearance within the mainstream press—in no instance, however, have the potential cultural and economic pitfalls of this unidirectional migration been seriously questioned. Even if we stretch ‘the Pacific Islands’ to encompass Australia and New Zealand, athletic talent migration has been given scant academic attention within the sociology of sport; the one exception being the work of Camilla Obel on the migration of rugby union players and coaches from, and to, New Zealand14 (see Obel, 2001; Obel and Austrin, 2005). There is a developing literature on sports labour migration among Pacific-rim countries, and especially those centred in Japan (for example, see Chiba, 2001, 2004; Takahashi and Horne, 2004, 2006), but absorbing the Pacific Islands into the ‘Asia-Pacific’ further marginalizes Pacific Islanders—the people with whom the Pacific was initially identified. Doing so is also to risk furthering the rhetoric of international organizations (such as the United Nations) that has, vis-à-vis the so-called ‘Asia-Pacific region’, seen the Pacific Islands effectively subsumed by Asia (Hau’ofa, 1998; Keown, 2005). The aim of this ‘Asia Pacific ideology’ is to bring into alignment “economic and political forces that in and of themselves do not point to a common regional structure” (Dirlik, 1998, p. 16).

Similarly, for whatever productive dialogues there may be between ‘Pacific

14 Admittedly, we could add the work of Romanos (2002) and Howitt and Haworth (1999), and, in the case of Australia, Hall (2000), though these are largely descriptive, in either a polemic (Romanos) or journalistic (Howitt and Haworth, Hall) sense.
Island studies’ and ‘Asia-Pacific studies’, the history and experiences of Pacific Islanders cannot be understood merely as an adjunct of Asia (Diaz, 2004).

Though I am somewhat apprehensive about using such a term (given the extant tendency to view all Pacific Islanders as ‘Polynesian’), this chapter—indeed, like this dissertation—is primarily concerned with the islands of ‘Polynesia’, and Samoa in particular. To these I wish to add both New Zealand and United States, insofar as they constitute a triangulated scape/circuit in the social, cultural and political experiences of what Vincente M. Diaz labels “Diasporic Natives” (2004, p. 186). My allusion to a scape/circuit here is a conscious attempt to underscore how talent migration is not necessarily a singular nor unidirectional process. With regard to rugby and the Pacific Islands, talent migration is generally framed as troublesome, the process seen as benefiting the ‘importer’ (in this case, New Zealand) at the expense of the ‘exporter’ (Tonga, Fiji, Samoa). Yet, the matter is more than simply a Pacific ‘brawn drain’ (Bale, 1991). Certainly, as I have already suggested, “hegemonic [rugby] powers” such as New Zealand or Australia, “exploit other [Pacific] nations” in their search for talent (Maguire, 2004, p. 477), but such a geo-economic hierarchy must be considered as fluid rather than fixed. In the first

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15 Epeli Hau’ofa, and Teresia Teaiwa (among others) have argued to replace the term “Pacific” with “Oceania.” They contend that the term “Oceania” best captures a seafaring heritage that
instance, Pacific rugby players do not adhere easily to the regime of some long-established migratory order. Most difficult to ignore are the ongoing dislocations between ‘home’, citizenship and identity. There has never been a necessary coincidence between family, state and capital accumulation for Pacific people, and athletic migrants are no different in that regard. They shuttle back and forth between multiple sites of business and family—the sojourn is never singular. I argue in this chapter, then, that, to understand the lives and significances of Pacific athletes, ‘migration’ must be imagined beyond linear and clearly defined experiences of subordination and exploitation. Theirs are multispacial and fragmented lives.

Secondly, I wish to consider how mobility asks questions of ‘the nation’s’ demands for singular loyalty. It creates a disharmony in the scheme of national space, and challenges too the imagery articulated with the nation. I examine these emergent affective attachments and new legal definitions of ‘citizenship’ through debates about national player eligibility, professional player labour markets, and rugby nomadism. One the one hand, I consider how the Pacific’s rugby nomads offer a politically and theoretically appealing prospect in the way they unsettle concepts such as nationhood, citizenship, immigration and ethnic identity. This is not to say that the significance of national borders has

wields the potential to disrupt the insularity and essentialisms attached to the term “Pacific”
diminished, but to suggest instead that they offer a potentially more ‘flexible’ (Ong, 1999) understanding of national citizenship. On these lines, I also maintain that the brawn drain has increasingly given way to a process of ‘brawn circulation.’ Labour migration in this sense is not simply a matter of uprooting and restaking. The much more mobile world of rugby is rife with multiple and complex trajectories and returns.

In the second half of the chapter, however, I also consider the dangers of over-extending this discourse of nomadism. There is a particular risk of committing what could be called a metonymic fallacy. Pacific rugby players are, to borrow from Pels (2000), “privileged nomads” and thus by no means representative. As Mitchell (1997) reminds us, it is still unclear that “everyday transnationals” are necessarily empowered by their dislocations and transgressions. The experience of and access to transnationalism also remains differentiated, with sometimes sharp distinctions setting apart cosmopolitan exiles and mass immigrants or refugees. In addition, we need to recognize that, even among the high-flying rugby elite, migration is by no means impedance-free. Obviously, the increasing mobility of rugby professionals stands in stark contrast to tightening strictures on other forms of migration (Mahmoun, 2001), but recent literature also demonstrates how even the highly-skilled “do not live without, as Teresia has theorized, “losing the Native” altogether.
in a ‘frictionless world’” (Willis et al., 2002, p. 506). The migration trajectories of highly skilled migrants, like those of lower-skilled migrants, are mediated by regulations of state power, market operations, and wider schemes of ethnic and racial differentiation (Ong, 1999). Rugby’s powers-that-be have in like fashion not only sought to nurture but regulate mobility. Thus, I also investigate how Pacific rugby players are subject to forms of governmentality within the arrangements and organizations of both the state and transnational networks.

Sport Labour Migration Research: Players on the Move, Nations Under Threat?

The international migration of athletes is by no means a new phenomenon, and we subsequently need to take into account the historical depth of migration viewed in *longue durée*. Certainly, in giving weight to the historical context in which to situate contemporary athletic migration, we need to consider at least the rise of a global sporting system (Maguire, 1999). While we have all but come to accept the global nature of today’s sporting infrastructure (from governing bodies, leagues, tournaments, to teams and individual athletes), sports in their pre-modern form were more likely to be localized pastimes, lacking in any broader coherence and influence. During the nineteenth-century, however, the development from local variation to international standardization “fundamentally transformed sport” (Van Bottenburg, 2001, p. 2). Essentially, the diffusion of a relatively few proto-modern sport forms has steadily replaced a
disparate array of localized sporting practices. Several different lines of influence are behind this shift, and are laid out clearly in works such as Bale (2003), Guttmann (1978) and (1996), Maguire (1999), and Van Bottenburg (2001). What is interesting to note from the these analyses, however, is the part played by, what could be called, ‘athletic mobilities.’ ‘Travel’, in its various forms (people, objects, images and information [Urry, 2000]) is seen not only a result of the global sporting system, but an active constituent of these interconnected practices and institutions.

On a fundamental level, migration has had a significant impact on the establishment and diffusion of modern sport forms. Imperialism, in tandem with the emergence of industrialism during the late 1800s, had the effect of spreading sports like football, rugby, and cricket along the channels of economy and empire. As Van Bottenburg (2001) explains, initially “English and later other Western sailors, merchants, employees, and administrative officials took sports to all parts of the world” (p. 6). Soldiers, teachers and missionaries also introduced many outside Europe and the United States to ‘Western’ sports. There were, of course, differing rates of adoption (according to factors such as local tradition [see Bale, 2003]), yet these groups undoubtedly served as catalysts for the “metamorphosis from sportlike pastimes into standardized and internationally recognized sports” (Van Bottenburg, 2001, p. 2). Though
ultimately it was the rise of Western hegemony generally, and the
standardization, regulation, and codification of sport—what Norbert Elias (1986)
famously coined the “sportization of pastimes”—specifically, that account for the
globalization of modern sport, these early sojourners were crucial to laying the
groundwork for the contemporary movement of athletic labour. Modern
sporting forms may have had their roots in the West, but it is the very hegemony
of Western sport forms that explains why we are now seeing a migration of
athletic labour in the reverse direction(s). The multi-nationalization of player
personnel in the sports leagues of Europe and North America is very much a
case of “‘them’ being here because we were once there” (Gilroy, 2005).

Mobility has been crucial to the development of sport in other ways. The
rapid population growth in the urban industrial ‘core’ states around the late
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries was fuelled by migrant labourers. The
burgeoning, yet highly concentrated, urban populace provided the context for
the professionalization of sport: on one hand, elites popularized (and
rationalized) sports as a means of regulating popular physical culture, fostering
discipline, and, hence, boosting industrial production, all ultimately leading to
the codification and standardization of sport—two key elements aiding the
diffusion of sporting forms (Miller and McHoul, 1998); on the other, and in more
prosaic terms, a large, and by comparison compact, population provided the
willing clientele for the wannabe sporting entrepreneur (Guttmann, 1978). Again, the history of professionalization is discussed in greater detail elsewhere (see esp. Elias and Dunning, 1986) and certainly migration is but one factor. Yet mobility, in all its guises, was crucial to the reworking of local sporting traditions. Coming back to the organizational development sport, as Obel and Austrin (2005, p. 174)—citing the seminal work of Elias (1986)—argue, “teams traveling to play against other teams in geographically distant locations provoke the need for the establishment of uniform rules and autonomous administrative arrangements.” As they elaborate, because teams were “traveling from one place to another, it was necessary to ensure uniformity of the game…the collective travel of teams between places promotes…rationalization of the rules of the game” (p. 174).

If player mobility has been critical to the development of modern, ‘global’ sport, and remains an established feature of sport in the global village, its frequency and extent have grown in recent decades. This is no surprise given that modern sport has been shaped by the same unfolding globalization processes that have radically altered other areas of cultural and economic life. The growing complexity of these migrations is reflected in fact that new patterns have emerged which no longer neatly fit the uni-directional ‘from-and-to’ models, nor the categories of ‘host’ or ‘migrants.’ This mobility is also accelerated.
Critics may be right in suggesting that the age of mobility is nothing new (Favell, 2001; Jordan and Düvell, 2003), yet globalization has generated qualitatively different patterns of migration, in terms of not only geographical reach and character, but also speed and frequency. These sojourns are also characterized by their pervasiveness and their impermanence. We can talk, then, of increases in magnitude and pace. There are far more ‘players’, and they move back and forward at greater velocity.

If the movement of “sports workers” (Sayers and Edwards, 2004) across international boundaries has become one of the more notable characteristics of contemporary global sport, then, for various reasons it has also become one of the more contentious. Once largely demarcated along national boundary lines (the odd sport migrant being the exception that proved the homespun rule), the multinational composition of playing rosters has become a defining feature of many nationally-based professional sport leagues and teams. In some cases these “border crossers” (Maguire and Stead, 1998) have been incorporated, if not exploited, by leagues as part of their efforts to broaden their regional or national bases. A growing number of leagues have recognized the value of ‘foreign’ players in creating an international ‘brand.’ In many cases the proliferation of a class of globally-mobile athletic migrants has led to a re-structuring and/or re-evaluation of local sport cultures in both ‘host’ and ‘donor’ settings. For instance,
the multinationalization of NBA player personnel—during the 2004–5 season, the NBA featured 77 ‘international’ players drawn from 34 different nations—has transformed the manner in which the league presents itself to the global market (Andrews, 2003). Whereas the initial globalizing of the NBA centred on selling the league as an explicitly American entertainment product, with high profile players (mostly African American) being used as the embodiments of what it meant to be ‘American’, prompted by the emergence of players such as Tony Parker (France), Dirk Nowitzki (Germany) and Pau Gasol (Spain), the league began marketing itself differently to those who follow their local NBA heroes from afar (Fisher, 2003). The NBA spectacle now exists and operates in numerous national locations at one and the same time, albeit customized—through media and commercial relationships with locally-based broadcasters and sponsors—according to the player-oriented interests and expectations of local audiences. In this way, the NBA has moved from being an exclusively externalized form of ‘glocal’ strategizing (the selling of the NBA through its explicit Americanness) to one that, in specific settings, additionally engages internalized forms of ‘glocal’ strategizing (the mobilization of local affinity for specific NBA players) (Robertson, 2005).

Other leagues have followed a similar path. Since 1994, Major League Baseball (MLB) has offered Spanish language broadcasts as part of their effort to
cater to fans in Central and South America and the Caribbean who wish to tune in to watch their home-grown heroes. The new crop of talent from Asia has prompted the league to do the same for fans in places such as Japan and South Korea. In some cases teams are even signing players from Asia (Japan in particular) in the hope of luring more players, and thus fans, from the region (for example, see Charlton, 2007). Major League Soccer (MLS) also signs international players as part of their efforts to attract foreign fans (as well as attain a degree of international credibility). MLS Commissioner Don Garber, for instance, has asserted that the success of the league depends on courting the “ethnic fan” both home and abroad. Of other leagues in North America: in 2002, 25 percent of players in the WNBA were born outside the United States, with 23 different nations being represented (Miller et al, 2003); the National Hockey League (NHL) sports players from places like Russia, Sweden, Finland, and Slovakia, and in 2006, 13 of the league’s 30 clubs were captained by foreign-born players; there were 80 foreign-born players, from countries as disparate as Ghana and Ukraine, in NFL training camps last year. In 2004 the League also introduced the NFL International Development Practice Squad Program; and, in NASCAR—“once a bastion for Southern-based drivers” (Coble, 2008)—Dario Franchitti, Jacques Villeneuve and Patrick Carpentier will all be in the running for rookie-of-the-year honors in this year’s Sprint Cup Series. Finally, even the (ostensibly)
amateur NCAA is also in on the act. While college coaches in many sports have been recruiting internationally for decades, the proportion of foreign players in many Division I sports has doubled since the beginning of the decade. In tennis, 30 percent of the male players were from outside the United States in 2005-6, as were 23 percent of male ice-hockey players, 14 percent of female golfers, 13 percent of all skiers, and 10 percent of male soccer players. Numbers are also growing fast in basketball, gymnastics, swimming, and track (Wilson and Wolverton, 2008). Some teams are even made up entirely of foreign players (see, for example, Wilson, 2008).

Players, though, are not just coming to North America. It is important to stress that player movements are multi-directional. For instance, in basketball not only do elite foreign players migrate from lesser leagues to the NBA and its feeder and developmental leagues, American players lacking the ability to play professionally in the USA have the opportunity, depending on their talent level, to make the reverse journey (Maguire, 1994). A similar phenomena is found in baseball and hockey. Japan has been a popular destination for North American baseball players since Don Newcombe became the first MLB player to sign and play with a Japanese team in 1962. Meanwhile Canadian “blade runners” have found homes in hockey leagues across Europe and Japan (Maguire, 1996). This too is to ignore the more ‘nomadic’ of sports on the global circuit. Tennis and
golf, for example, have constantly-shifting ‘workplaces’ which give rise to transitory, interweaving migration patterns among their athletes.

And, of course, North America is not the only sporting ‘hub.’ The global dimensions and routes of athletic migration, for instance, are nowhere more apparent than in the sport of soccer. Undoubtedly, it is also the sport which has received the most sustained critical attention in the sociology of sport (Bromberger, 1994; Darby, Akindes, and Kirwin, 2007; Duke, 1994; Lanfranchi, 1994; Magee and Sugden, 2002; Maguire and Pearton, 2000a, 2000b; Maguire and Stead, 1998, 2002; Moorhouse, 1999; Stead and Maguire, 1998a, 1998b, 2000a, 2000b). This is perhaps hardly surprising given that soccer is, without question, the most popular team game in the world. It is played in more than 100 countries and has approximately 1.5 million teams and 200 million active players worldwide (Morgan and Summers, 2005). Soccer’s governing body, FIFA, also promulgates a decidedly internationalist mission. This has led to “growing ties and relationships between soccer’s national associations, international confederations and the world body” (Darby, 2006, p. 162) and a prodigious growth of the “football business” (Conn, 1997). Many of these developments can be located within the same processes of globalization that have radically reshaped global sports culture over the course of the last century (including developments in technology, communications, transportation, and finance). Of
particular salience is the way new technological and organization innovations have “compressed (Harvey, 1989) the time taken to communicate and travel across large distances. The distances between places and people have been dramatically reduced. Unsurprisingly, this has led to a sharp growth in the organized export of sport workers. Older internal or regional migration networks are also now scaling up and going global.

This globalization has not always been seamless. In part there has been a historic power shift from national sporting organizations to evolving systems of regional and global governance. Yet sports laborers are by no means a “deterritorialized resource” (Ong, 1999, p. 15). As Darby (2006, p. 162) notes, the global sport labor market is “underpinned by the complex and, at times, fractious nature of the processes on which international socio-economic and political relations have been conducted.” This raises a number of pertinent issues. Firstly, labor rights. Labor rights are heavily contingent upon variously situated legal and political institutions. Some have argued that these rights now originate in international organizations like the UN or EU (e.g., Baubock, 1994). However, labor rights by and large still derive from the laws and institutions of the state. These two levels frequently come in conflict, seen, for instance, when the capacity of the state to control immigration is constrained by the wider regional or global laws and institutions. At the very least labor rights vary
markedly cross-nationally and over time. The rights enjoyed by sport migrants likewise vary considerably depending on the sport or country or region. So, for example, athletes in individual sports generally enjoy a greater level of flexibility and mobility than those playing a team sport, while athletes in the EU are relatively freer in their labor than their counterparts in North America where employment rights are generally more restrictive (Maguire and Pearton, 2000a).

The movement of athletic talent across national borders also raises questions about the impact on both host and donor countries. In some cases the influx of offshore talent can engender hostility. As Maguire and Pearton (2000a, p. 180) point out with regard to European football, local labor unions “have sought to protect indigenous players by arguing for quota and qualification thresholds to be applied to potential migrants.” They note how this concern frequently extends to the development of national teams when “the presence of overseas players denies indigenous players access to elite teams and could thus lead to personal and national under-development” (p. 180; see also Maguire and Stead, 2005). Some such as the former AC Milan owner Silvio Berlusconi take the opposite tack arguing that there should be no restrictions on sport migration. For Berlusconi “the concept of the national team will gradually become less and less important. It is the clubs with which the fans associate.” King (2006) concurs that then new dominance of world football’s pre-eminent clubs is “necessitating a
transformation of the national teams...as the transnational regime becomes more established, club football, concentrated at the biggest clubs, will become relatively more important in relation to the international game than it has in the past” (pp. 246-247). In a similar vein, Maguire (2000) suggests that in soccer the international form of the game is “less important than the club form...it has often been more important and more prestigious to play for Manchester United or Liverpool than for England or Wales.” There is obviously some danger in overextending these arguments given that national identity politics continue to underpin soccer’s largest events such as the African Nations, European, and World Cups (Maguire and Pearton, 2000a). Further, Rowe (2003) suggests that “clubs still retain a ‘national’ brand irrespective of the composition of their playing and coaching staff and of their shareholder register, and their players are still expected to return to ‘home base’ in their respective continents for peak international sports tournaments like the World Cup” (p. 286).

The debate does, however, raise interesting questions about national identity and identity politics, particularly those relating to allegiance and self-identity (Maguire et al, 2002). Maguire et al raise the possibility that for some athletes national teams are “‘flags of convenience’ to ensure they are able to display their talents to a worldwide audience on a global stage” (2002, p. 38). Some commentators have been cynical about athletes who adopt to play for
another country when motivated either by money or fame. Describing the
situation in Britain’s Independent newspaper, Corrigan (1995) writes:

If your country doesn’t need you, find one that does. This is the slogan of
the age for the ambitious and nationally mobile sportsman. Patriotism
may well be, as Johnson alleged, the last refuge of the scoundrel, but it is
the first casualty of the shrewd professional who wants to add an extra
dimension to his earning capacity.

Questions over “flexible attitudes toward nationality” (Polley, 2004, p. 25) have
been a particularly prominent theme in English county cricket (Maguire and
Stead, 1996, 2005). Under present regulations, each county is entitled to register
two overseas players. The consequence is that a number of players, clubs, and
agents have sought to utilize British ancestry or residence in order to gain
eligibility for ‘overseas’ players, thus avoiding being counted under the quota.
For some this is cause for concern. As the BBC noted in 2001, “the alarming
number of players born in South Africa and Australia currently on the county
circuit has raised fears that home-grown youngsters are being denied
opportunities.” Player motives have also been questioned, highlighted by the
case of the English-born cricketer Andrews Symonds who has subsequently gone
on to play international cricket for Australia. Symonds now plays as an overseas
player for the English county side Kent, but many were angered by the fact that
he had previously declared his eligibility for England in order to play as a non-
overseas player for Gloucestershire.
In some instances critics have also questioned whether players who become eligible to play for a country by way of ancestry or residence show the same level of commitment to their adopted country (Gilroy, 1991). This is especially true when such a player in turn competes against his or her ‘homeland.’ In a particularly provocative example, in 1995 the magazine *Wisden Cricket Monthly* published an article titled “*Is it in the blood?*” by Robert Henderson which questioned the commitment of foreign born players to English cricket (Henderson, 1995). The cricketers’ associations condemned the article while two players of Caribbean descent, Phillip DeFreitas and Devon Malcolm, filed defamation suits (see Marqusee, 2001). Pertinent to the present analysis is the case of players of Pacific Island heritage who play for the All Blacks. A favorite shibboleth of some media pundits is that these players do not play with the same intensity or commitment when they face Fiji, Tonga, or Samoa. In his autobiography the Samoan-born All Black Vai’inga Tuigamala recounts how he was approached by a coach prior to the All Blacks first test against Samoa in 1993 who asked Tuigamala whether he was even capable of playing in the match (Tuigamala, 1993). In both of these cases suspicion as to the depth of their commitment can be traced to their ‘ethnic’ background, provoking interesting questions about the links between cultural traits, patterns of behavior, and ‘legitimate’ citizenship. In this way sport can be seen as something of
battleground over debates of national identity, of who does/doesn’t belong as a member of the nation. As Houlihan (1997) observes, controversy about the place of sport migrants in national sides “keep questions of citizenship and national identity at the forefront of public debate and provide a surrogate for debates about immigration policy and the granting or refusal of refugee status” (p. 122).

It is likely that much of the discomfort over national eligibility stems from migration’s potential to erode the historical relationship between sport and national identity. As David Rowe (2003) has noted, there are few sports that have not—“either voluntarily or under duress—been aligned with some conception of nation” (p. 285). Hardly surprisingly, the prospect of athletes changing their national affiliations (especially as fortunes change) “is viewed by many to be at odds with all that international sport is taken to represent” (McCutcheon, 2000, p. 129). Yet more and more athletes qualify to represent more than one country and are able to choose their ‘sporting nationality’. The potential exists for athletes to also represent more than one country, or ‘switch’ their allegiance. These multiple or shifting nationalities disclose ambiguities and conflicts in terms of both nation and identity raising the difficult question about what it means to be a ‘New Zealander’ (or British, or American, or so on). The sporting migrant, both embodied and imagined, condenses our concerns with ethnicity, space, time, and the politics of belonging (Westwood and Phizacklea, 2000). In particular, it
challenges the assumed congruence between citizenship and national identity.
The origins and growth of liberal democratic citizenship have historically been closely aligned to the idea of legal membership of a polity or state (Torpey, 2000). In particular, citizenship was defined as the connection between the individual and the state, in as much as citizenship defined the state. However, as Hall et al (1998) have observed, “in the contemporary political and policy arena, much of the rhetoric of citizenship is about citizenship as an identity” (p. 309).

One of the difficulties in this regard is the tendency to conflate citizenship and national identity. That is, the state is frequently conflated with the nation, just as citizenship with nationality (Oommen, 1997). Noting such a tendency, Delanty (p. 160) argues that “the dominant understanding of citizenship in modern times has…been shaped by conceptions of nationality”. The consequence is that debates about citizenship often turn into debates about nationhood, about what it means and what it ought to mean to belong to a nation-state (Brubaker, 1990). One of the central themes is to ask whether taking out citizenship should entail membership in both the state and the nation. This duality is recognized by Hammar (1990) who argues that,

Even if citizenship in a legal sense implies membership of the state, it is often viewed to be just as much membership of a nation, especially in states where nation and state largely coincide…the two forms of membership are often mixed up and it seems to be very hard to distinguish them from each other. As the claim of most nation states is that there is a
congruence between state and nation, membership in one is taken to mean membership in the other as well (p. 37).

Within such a model “there is no clear distinction between citizenship and national patriotism: the citizen is transformed into the patriot” (Delanty, 2000, p. 161).

Migration thus challenges the traditional and restrictive idea of political belonging in that it has become increasingly difficult to define citizenship on the basis of nationality—and, of course, vice versa. But a tension is created because, as Andrews and Cole (2002, p. 123) argue, despite the current “global moment” the “‘nation’ remains a virulent force in everyday lived experience.” As Smith (1999) asserts with specific regard to migration,

The expansion of transnational migration has resulted in outbursts of entrenched, essentialist nationalism in both sending and receiving locales. In receiving cities and states, movements aimed at recuperating and reifying a mythical national identity are expanding as a way to eliminate the penetration of alien ‘others’ (p. 11).

Some of the hostility against, or at least uneasiness about, sporting migrants can be read as embedded in resistance to the ubiquitous discourse about the ‘global cultural economy.’ It represents a (perhaps) less extreme form of the increasingly restrictive immigration policies enacted in many affluent Western states (including New Zealand [see Ward and Lin, 2005]) in recent years (Hampshire, 2005). We need to recognize also the would-be hegemonic narrative in which place of birth and ‘authenticity’ are still accorded great social significance in
defining one’s nationality. In both the debate about and practice of citizenship, “the assumption seems to be that one’s original nationality is more binding and deeply felt and thus less problematic than one’s subsequently acquired nationality” (Shuck, 2002, p. 72). This leads alternative models such as dual, multiple, or flexible nationalities to be viewed in purely utilitarian terms; the greater the level of transnationalism in an individual’s life, the greater the ambivalence, divergence, and perhaps contrariety with the nation. To take up ‘citizenship,’ then, is to not only have to negotiate the structures of state power, but also “new frameworks of social status and organization, with their concomitant cultural ideals and values” (p. 108). And, since borders are used to make difference, those who cross them potentially threaten to undermine and subvert the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As David Rowe (2003) usefully concludes, the “structural importance” of the nation therefore “persists despite the increasing circulation of sportspeople around the globe as part of the new international division of cultural labour.”

The migration of sport laborers therefore raises questions about involvement in ‘home’ and ‘host’ societies and about what it means to cross borders or transgress boundaries. Some are uneasy at the fact that belonging and citizenship have become increasingly contingent. Neither now necessarily follow “a unidirectional, linear progression from nonbelonging to full belonging in a
nation-state over time” (p. 26). On the contrary, citizenship and belonging no longer obey the conventional understanding of migration as singular and implying a severing of ties with the ‘place of origin’ (Lie, 2001). It would therefore be wrong to assume a unidimensionality of athletic labour migrancy.

As Maguire (2004) observes, “there are various iterations of, and motivations for, the sport migrant experience the variations of which depend on the sporting migrant’s range of movement, length of stay in any one given place, and level of remuneration” (p. ?; see also Bale and Sang, 1994; Magee and Sugden, 2002; Maguire 2004; Maguire and Stead, 1998). Most obviously, sports migrants, like migrants generally are no longer simply leaving a ‘place of origin’ for a ‘place of destination’, but are instead moving ‘back-and-forward.’ As a consequence, migration needs also to be conceived in new ways. The traditional, or ‘true’, image of migrants has long been synonymous with settling into a routine, in a particular locale—a kind of arrival-after-departure. The migrant was different to the temporary ‘visitor.’ The expectation that followed was, unlike the visitor, the migrant would gradually adopt a new national identity and transfer their allegiance to their new ‘home.’ Today such distinctions or ideas are not so easy to make or to hold. Such theories obviously cannot account for cases of ‘multiple crossings.’ Neither can they account for what could be termed ‘inter-periphery moves’, migration on the edges, as opposed to towards, the ‘core.’ These are only
two of the issues which have provoked the search for new paradigms with which
to understand migration in the global climate. An important issue in this regard
is not only how people move, but why.

Traditionally, one of two general models has been adopted. First, a
voluntarist push–pull model. According to this model, the primary motive to
move is economic. As Papastergiadis (2000) explains, migration is seen as being
“caused by twin and counterbalancing forces: people are ‘pushed out’ of
stagnant rural peasant economies, and ‘pulled’ up towards industrial urban
centres. This ‘push–pull’ model tended to see migration as being caused by the
individual calculation of economic opportunity” (p. 30). Migration, though, is not
always so logical in its paths it follows. Cultural factors—history, colonial ties,
existing communities, familial ties, for instance—are also at play. The alternative
to the push-pull model is what Papastergiadis (2000) calls the “structuralist
centre–periphery model.” In this case capitalism as the driving force. Informed
by Marxism, the centre-periphery model takes migration as “a link between
industrial capitalist economies, which are at the center of the global economic
system, and the traditional subsistence economies, which are at the periphery of
the system” (The Unsettled Relationship, p. 67). The periphery is therefore
dependent on the center for employment, while the center taps the periphery for
cheap (and dispensable) labor. While this model has been rightly criticized for
over-emphasizing national over class inequalities as well as for failing to explore the creative, and potentially transformative, role of culture at the periphery, I nonetheless wish explore its relevance below. For now it is perhaps enough note that, at least taken in its most vulgar form, the centre-periphery model is guilty of subsuming agency to the structure of international capitalism.

What is clear is that migration cannot be wholly explained in terms of rational choice nor structural determinism. This does not, however, mean that migration is a reflection of individual wish or preference. Instead, as Block (2005) argues, migration is perhaps best conceived as a series of overlapping systems working at three levels: macro, micro and meso:

At the macro level, there is a consideration of the kinds of global forces discussed by the globalization theorists cited above: global politics, global markets, global ideologies, global media and so on. All of these macro-level factors impact on the flow of individuals between and among countries. At the micro level, the human element is introduced in the form of individual values and expectations such as the desire to improve one’s standard of living or gain political autonomy. The meso level refers to the various networks that intercede between the macro and micro levels. These networks include social ties (be these family or occupational), symbolic ties (belonging to a particular ethnic, national, political or religious group) and transactional ties (e.g. reciprocity, solidarity, access to resources) (pp. 12-13).

If we want to explain why people migrate analysis must therefore combine structural and external factors with situational ones that accounts for not only the roles of individuals but the formal and informal social networks that link them across space and time.
Moving into the sport-related literature, Maguire (1999) seems to be making a similar case for looking at political, economic, and social linkages at the micro, through meso, through macro level in his contention that the political, cultural, economic, and geographic issues and pressures that structure migrant lives, “interweave in a fashion where no one ‘factor’ dominates” (p. 104). As he states, “the motivation of [sporting] migrants cannot be reduced to any one cause” (p. 104). Throughout his career Maguire has been sensitive to the issue of connecting the experiential dimensions of sports labor migration to wider sociological issues. Much of his research is based on empirical evidence gathered through interviews with basketball players, cricketers, footballers, rugby players, and officials. From this primary data he has a developed a series of typologies of the sporting migrant. While these typologies have been critiqued by Magee and Sugden (2002) for being overly exclusive, they nevertheless are useful in the way they attempt to place ethnographic description “on a wider conceptual canvas” (Maguire, 1999, p. 104). And, if nothing else, they alert us to a number of the enabling and constraining factors that influence the decisions of the migrant athlete.

Maguire has proposed several iterations of these typologies, in both single and co-authored works (Maguire, 1996, 1999; Maguire, Jarvie, Mansfield, and Bradley, 2002). The differences, though, are negligible, and the same general
categories are retained in each instance. Thus, for consistency, I have chosen to quote below from Maguire (1999). The typologies are as follows. First, ‘pioneers.’ These are migrants who “possess a passion and zeal in promoting the virtues of ‘their’ sport” (p. 105). As he writes elsewhere, “their words and actions can be seen as a form of proselytizing by which they seek to convert the natives to their body habitus and sport culture” (1996, p. 338). Second are ‘settlers,’ “who not only bring their sports with them but are sports migrants who subsequently stay and settle in the city where they ply their labour (1999, p. 105). They are characterized by the fact that they choose to stay within one team, or in one place, for a sustained period of time. A third type of migrants can be called ‘mercenaries’, whom Maguire dubs “hired guns” (Maguire, 1993). He describes them as “motivated more by short-term gains” with “little or no attachment to the local, no sense of place in relation to the space where the currently reside or do their body work” (p. 105). These are players who, above all else, are motivated by financial reward. ‘Nomads’ differ, in contrast, by the fact that they seek a “cosmopolitan engagement with migration”, to be “a stranger in a foreign metropolitan culture” (pp. 105, 106). Of this category he cites the former Manchester United footballer Eric Cantona and one time Chelsea star Ruud Gullit. He also suggests surfers, snowboarders and other ‘extreme sport’ enthusiasts as motivated by a similar desire “to explore the experience of
difference and diversity” (p. 106). His final typology is that of the ‘returnee’ for whom “the lure of ‘home soil’ can prove too strong” (p. 106).

Three of these six categories are paralleled in the work of Magee and Sugden (2002). Dropping the pioneer and returnee, they instead add the ‘ambitionist,’ ‘exile,’ and ‘expelled’ migrant. In short, the ambitionist is variously: the athlete with a strong desire to achieve a “professional…career (anywhere)” (p. 431); the desire to play or compete in a particular place; or, the desire to play in a better quality league or against higher-quality competition. The exile is someone who, “for [sport]-related, personal, or political reasons…opts to leave his country of origin to play abroad” (p. 432). Finally, the expelled is “a player who is, in effect, forced to migrate” due to public, media, or official pressure in their ‘home’ countries (p. 433). Like Maguire, Magee and Sugden stress that these typologies are flexible, not mutually exclusive, and frequently overlap. Neither are they fixed, with players often fitting into two or more of the categories, or slipping in and out according to the stage of their careers. Like Maguire, Magee and Sugden are thus awake to the limitations of typologies. Given that they are intended to help make sense of, or impose order on, a wealth of detailed information, any typology is forced to strike a difficult balance between simplicity and complexity. Hence, they may not do sufficient justice to the phenomenon under study. They can also: distort reality or set up ‘ideal type’
models that differ from the real world in significant aspects; be treated as ends in
themselves, rather than a means to an end; or, may be “descriptive rather than
explanatory or predictive” (Bailey, 1994, p. 34).

This last point perhaps provides an apt segue for what I wish to discuss
below. In particular, I am not concerned here with the consistency nor accuracy
of the typologies the authors above propose. Nor am I interested in the
explanatory significance of the distinctions they make. Instead I wish to use them
as a “symptom of a beginning”—albeit to use this term in a different sense to that
of Maguire and Stead (2005, p. 66). These typologies provide a degree of
conceptual clarity and are useful tools of description, but unlike Maguire and
Magee and Sugden I am not so much interested in the question of why players
move, but a more general set of issues that their movement brings to light. I am
thinking in particular here of both the identity politics which I refer to above and
to issues of power and control in South Pacific, and indeed world, rugby.
Germane to rugby in the Pacific Islands are questions about athletic labor
migration and ‘de-skilling’, that of underdevelopment and/or dependent
development, the rights of players, and the (cultural) politics about how one’s
‘nationality’ is determined. I wish to now take up these issues before then
attempting to provide a more general theory about how the migration of Pacific
rugby players can best be understood.
“Last One on the Plane Turn Off the Lights”: New Zealand Rugby Joins the Global (Labour) Game

In recent years there has been a large, and increasing, number of sportsmen and women who have left New Zealand to take up professional sporting careers. Golfers such as Phil Tautaurangi and Michael Campbell have joined the golfing circuits of North America and Europe. Soccer player Ryan Nelsen has carved a successful professional career, first in the US, and more recently in England. Daniel Vettori (Warwickshire), Craig Spearman and Hamish Marshall (Gloucestershire), Andre Adams (Essex), Stephen Fleming (Nottinghamshire), and Scott Styris (Middlesex) are among the foreign-born players in English county cricket. With an America’s Cup win in 1995, and two defenses in 2000 and 2003, New Zealand sailors have also been highly sought after; culminating with the infamous ‘defection’ of Russell Coutts, Brad Butterworth and six other Team New Zealand crew members to the Swiss syndicate Alinghi in 2003. The latter of these names aside, most of these migrants have been a source of pride for most New Zealanders, a counter to local insecurities about the relative weakness of domestic leagues and competition. Because the athletes concerned have generally left only to further their careers, these flows have been perceived to be to the betterment of New Zealand sport. When it comes to rugby, though, the ‘brawn drain’ (Bale, 1994) has become cause for concern.
The list of New Zealand rugby players who have headed overseas since in the past five years is long, and getting longer. Some 30 All Blacks or senior Super 14 players headed overseas in 2007. Eighteen of these 30 departing ‘expats,’ were All Blacks. What has been most troubling for many New Zealand rugby fans is not so much the quantity of these players, but the quality. In the past, players that headed overseas were generally considered to be in their ‘twilight years.’ Many of the recent departures, however, have been young and at the peak of their careers. As one reporter described it prior to the World Cup:

Just a few years ago, when a rugby player left New Zealand it was because he realised his chances of representing the All Blacks were shot. Dodgy knees, one shoulder reconstruction too many or a lack of faith by the national selectors often persuaded him to head overseas to wring every last dollar out of his body. Times have changed. Now, highly decorated All Blacks are not bothering to wait till their form starts to slide. They are leaving in their prime (Knowler, 2007, p. 2).

Others too have observed the phenomenon. “There is nothing new in All Blacks playing in the northern hemisphere,” writes Paul Lewis in the New Zealand Listener. “[Only] this time it’s different. This time, they are going...as players at the height of their powers, not as fading stars looking for a final payday.” Even the IRB Chairman, Syd Millar, is concerned. “We’ve got to be very careful we don’t upset the balance so they are no longer major countries competing at the top” he recently stated.
Certainly, as the exodus of top All Blacks and Super 14 players to European clubs “turns from a trickle into a flood”, the national game is, as one headline recently put it, “feeling the pain” (Hinton and Ford, 2008). At the top-level, player depth is certainly facing a test, exacerbated by the fact that only players contracted to the NZRU are eligible for All Blacks selection. Millar suggests the combined impact of the signings could be to “decimate” the All Blacks and New Zealand rugby (Foreign influx alarms rugby chief, 2007). And, it is not just the All Blacks who face questions over player quality and experience. Lower tiers are also effected. The player exodus is also “a worry for the Super 14 and provincial coaches” (Knowler, 2007, p. 3). The raison d’etre of the Super 14 is “to generate enough media sponsorship income for the southern hemisphere rugby unions to pay elite players to stay with the local game and thus ensure the game’s continued viability and success” (Obel and Austrin, 2005, p. 183). In recent years, largely because of perceived decline in playing standards, crowd numbers for the Super 14 have been in decline. The five New Zealand franchises recently agreed in a statement that the “present competition is not financially viable and has reached a state where improvements are needed immediately” (quoted in Knight, 2007). The drop in fan interest is even more precipitous at the tier below the Super 14, the Air New Zealand Cup. Provincial unions described the crowd numbers during last year’s competition as “woeful”, calling
attentions at playoff games “a disgrace for the premier provincial competition in the world” (quoted in Knight, 2007). The financial effect of all this, allied to the growing perception that the Super 14 is no longer the pre-eminent club-based competition that it was, is obviously making player retention even more difficult. Departures also seem to likely to increase if a rumored ‘global season’, bring the northern and southern hemisphere together, is introduced, or a proposed Super 14 franchise based in the United States comes to fruition.

The globally mobile athlete is, of course, nothing new in professional sport, nor even rugby itself. But for Kiwis the issue is particularly pressing. In New Zealand “the spectre of our top players leaving our salary-capped competitions to play for vast sums in Europe” (Cumming and Masters, 2007) is seen as a threat to not only the All Black ‘brand’, but the national identity itself. These anxieties can therefore be linked to the current discourse on the ‘demise’ of New Zealand rugby discussed in Chapter 2. Whereas young Polynesians are taking over the game from below, European and Japanese leagues are taking players from the top. This hasn’t been a great concern in the past, largely because of the depth of New Zealand rugby. A deep and well-developed playing structure has largely meant any player that left could be easily replaced by a talented youngster coming up through the production-line. Many of these younger, ‘second tier’ players, though, are also heading abroad. It is little wonder
given that New Zealand rugby cannot match the money on offer from European clubs. A top All Black is widely-believed to earn around NZ$400,000 a year before endorsements (Paul, 2008). Prop Carl Hayman’s recent deal with English club Newcastle on the other hand is worth a reported NZ$1 million annually. The situation is compounded by the relatively weak New Zealand dollar: the Euro is worth close to two New Zealand dollars, while the pound is worth over two-and-a-half. In addition, the NZRU, who pays player salaries under a central-contracting system, recorded a NZ$15 million loss in 2007, following on from a loss of almost NZ$5 million in 2006 (Paul, 2007). What reserves it does have are earmarked for the 2011 World Cup to be staged in New Zealand, so there few funds available for retaining even the best players.

The potential for player mobility is thus the milieu of higher salaries as well as the context for crisis and doubt. Put simply, the view is that if the NZRU fails to come up with the money, players look overseas, the quality of the game declines, fans turn away, and sponsors, in turn, go with them (Hope, 2002). Rugby’s traditionalists have long-decried the external loss of players and the threat mobility poses to the New Zealand game. In 2000, for instance, the editor of New Zealand Rugby World, John Matheson, blamed player losses to overseas clubs for the All Blacks’ shock loss to France at the 1999 World Cup. “Rugby’s player drain is an insidious blight on our game,” he wrote. “We are losing talent
hand over fist and the hole is getting bigger and blacker”. Romanos (2002) also bemoans that “over the past ten or fifteen years, thousands of good players...have headed overseas.” Mobility for these critics is not something to be celebrated. It simply undermines the integrity of the national—‘our’—game. Part of the mystic of the New Zealand game is the consistency of the All Blacks and the country’s reputation for churning out world-class players with regularity (the latter evident in the extent of New Zealand’s ‘rugby diaspora’ [see Obel and Austrin, 2005]). Player mobility is seen as an endangerment to New Zealand’s position at the top of a world rugby hierarchy.

“Island Raiding”? Poaching, Pinching, Piracy, and the Predicament of Samoan Rugby

The supposed turmoil into which New Zealand rugby has purportedly been thrown is more than a little ironic given that New Zealand has more frequently been a beneficiary of imported talent. As of 2007, seventy-six players selected for the All Blacks in the past 115 years have been born overseas. While they have come from places as far-flung as Scotland and India, the vast majority have come from the Pacific Islands. Including Samoa, American Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga, 30 All Blacks have been born in the Pacific Islands. Of these 13 were or have been born in Samoa. Unsurprisingly, there has been a long-standing debate as to whether the NZRU “have plundered the Pacific playing stocks while
offering little in return” (New era dawning in Pacific, 2006, p. 4). The accusation is a particular favorite of the British press. For instance, after the All Blacks Grand Slam-winning tour of the United Kingdom and Ireland in 2005, Brendan Gallagher was wont to put their success down to “Island raiding” (Gallagher, 2005). Others similarly felt the All Blacks’ playing depth owed itself entirely to the “pseudo-Kiwis” (Laidlaw, 2005, p. 2) “snatched” (Morgan, 2005, p. 20) from New Zealand’s Pacific neighbours Tonga, Samoa, and Fiji (see for example, Butler, 2005; Salmon, 2005; Slot, 2005). The All Blacks may have had “a formidable squad,” perhaps “the richest and deepest pool of talent the game has ever known” (Butler, 2005, p. 12), but, so the general tenor went, it was only achieved via a “morally bereft recruitment policy” (Paul, 2005), by “cherry-picking the best of [New Zealand’s] Pacific Island cousins” (Slot, 2005, p. 73).

Truth be told such allegations are not completely new (they have long been de rigueur among the UK rugby media) nor exclusive to Northern Hemisphere journalists (there is a similar critical inclination among the Australian media for instance [see for example, Morgan, 2005; Reilly, 2003; Zavos, 2005]). Neither too is the accusation that New Zealand is guilty of the “blatant poaching of Island talent” (Rees, 2005) wholly without credence: rugby scouts are a familiar sight in the Islands, with one former administrator so moved as to describe Pacific rugby as “like a supermarket” (quoted in Slot, 2005).
On a certain level, there is a veracity to the “chorus from the north bemoaning New Zealand’s supposed pillaging of South Seas rugby talent” (MacGibbon, 2007). The make-up of the All Blacks, whether they have an unfair advantage by way of New Zealand being as one scribe put it, “the nearest country of any commercial strength to the most remarkable rugby nursery in the world, bar none” (Jones, 2007), is, however, of lesser importance than the causes, consequences, and possible legacies of this process. There are wider issues beyond fairness and the balance of power within world rugby. In particular, we can draw distinct analogies between neocolonialism and rugby migration, with rugby’s traditional powers contributing, in varying degrees, to the neocolonial impoverishment and exploitation of Pacific rugby. That is, the issue far exceeds New Zealand’s Island “piracy” (Butler, 2005), with this being only one story in the ‘dependent underdevelopment’ (Frank, 1969) of Pacific rugby.

A useful place to begin to consider the impact of migration on the so-called ‘development’ of rugby in Samoa is the pioneering work of John Bale (Bale, 1989, 1991; Bale and Maguire, 1994; Bale and Sang, 1996). Locating sport and leisure practices within a broader global framework, Bale notes how countries once considered marginal to the “global system” have come to play an ever-more central role through their involvement in sport. Of particular relevance is the evolution of what Bale describes as the “global athletic system.”
Migration plays an important part of this evolution in that, with increasing frequency around the 1960s athletes began to move across national boundaries not only to play, but to train (Bale, 1991). Bale argues that as a consequence “the major organizations involved in the international dimensions of athletics were not state agencies”, but organizations such as the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) and the International Olympic Committee (Bale, 1994, p.74). New forms of travel and communication only exacerbated the trend. Noting the significance of the entrenchment of international sports federations Bale has elsewhere noted how they were emblematic of the way in which “the sports system, like the economic system, had become a global system...What differences did exist in sport increasingly came to result, not from local idiosyncrasies in the nature of sport-like activities, but from national differences in sports ideology” (2002, p. 45). Bale’s emphasis on the word system here is an intended stress on the fact that, though a collection of discrete elements, each “are linked in such a away that no one element is altogether independent of all other elements” (1991, p. 7). Secondly, in noting the decline of local sporting “idiosyncrasies”, Bale draws out attention to the fact that “irrespective of global location, and in order for the global sports system to function, particular sports, at a basis level, must be the same the world over” (1991, p. 7). I have summarized (with David L. Andrews) that this does not necessarily mean sport should be
taken as a virulent agent of global cultural homogenization (see Andrews and Grainger, 2008). However, insofar as there is a global sports system whose organisations “transcend political boundaries and permit international cooperation” (Bale, 1991, p. 8), then there are grounds for the international movement and migration of athletic labor.

The changing composition in international teams is a good indicator of the increasing impact of labour migration in recent decades. For instance, Samoa’s emergence onto the world rugby stage has been predicated upon the ability of its players to ply their trades outside this small island nation. The most recent Samoan lineup at the Rugby World Cup featured only 6 Samoan-based players out of a squad of 34. The rest play in either the Europe-wide Heineken Cup, the Super 14, or other smaller competitions in Europe and Japan. Fourteen members of the Samoan squad were also born not in Samoa, but New Zealand. The only team with more foreign born players in their squad was Italy who had 15. The ‘development’ of rugby in Samoa therefore requires consideration of the wider global system. To what extent, for instance, has the migration of talent actually contributed to Samoa’s reputation as the so-called “most remarkable rugby nursery in the world, bar none”? (Jones, 2007). Or, is the fact that more than 80% of the Samoan national team are currently playing outside Samoa, evidence of the growing underdevelopment of local sporting resources?
It may be useful to consider exactly what I mean here by development. As regards athletics, on one level development can be taken to mean a high level of “athletic output” in relation to a global per capita level (Bale and Sang, 1994, p. 207). In this case the question is to what degree a nation ‘produces’ athletic talent. On the other hand, development could also refer to the progress or growth of Samoan rugby and the local Samoan economy. Thus, migration to leagues in New Zealand, Australia, or Europe may help to improve the level and abilities of young Samoan players. The national team is further boosted when young Samoan players sign for overseas-based clubs; it is somewhat of a truism in Samoan rugby circles that their advance on the world stage has been largely contingent on the apparently more efficient, organized, and professional approach that the Island’s players experience while playing overseas (Gregory, 2004). Given the important role of remittances in the Samoan economy (remittances have exceeded exports since the mid-1970s) it seems likely too that the salaries of overseas-based players provide a boost to the Samoan economy (Bedford, 2000). As the secretary of the Samoan Rugby Football Union (SRFU), Harry Schuster, contends, “rugby skills are seen as a ticket out of a subsistence lifestyle for players and their relatives and the player is not just earning money for himself but is taking it for the whole family” (quoted in Gregory, 2004).
Before moving on, it is perhaps important to discuss the political economy of Samoan rugby in a little more detail. First and foremost we need to consider the history of Samoan relations with New Zealand. In many ways, Samoa’s relationship with New Zealand has underpinned the economic development of Samoa since the 1960s. Though New Zealand’s relationship with Samoa is actually much older, the mass migration of Samoans to New Zealand began during this period of rapid industrial and economic development. Migrants were initially attracted by economic opportunities including higher wages, a greater range of consumer goods, superior medical services, and a higher quality of education (generally at no cost). It was also especially attractive for many Samoans given that, in comparison to Japan, Australia, and the USA, New Zealand had few restrictions on entry for Pacific Island migrants (Spoonley, 1981). Eventually, as Pacific communities in New Zealand matured economic motives became secondary to social factors such as chain migration through an established network of family members, relatives, and friends (Lucas and Meyer, 1994).

The New Zealand government policy at this time generally saw the Pacific Islands, including Samoa, as a source of unskilled workers as opposed to the skilled workers it sought from the United Kingdom and northern Europe. Temporary migration from the Pacific, in particular, was promoted. Temporary
workers were perceived to more highly motivated, and had the added bonus for employers of not requiring service pay or holidays (Brosnan, Rea and Wilson, 1995). Indeed, “from the perspective of capital, the more temporary the immigrants, the more focused they are on short term money and large remittances, and consequently the more pliable, eager and exploitable workforce” (Gibson, 1983, p. 39). Demand for immigrants remained high during the 1960s and by 1970 labor shortages were acute, especially in the manufacturing sector (Krishnan et al, 1994, p. 13). However, the impact of the so-called ‘OPEC Crisis’ was as severe in New Zealand as many other countries. High unemployment and worsening terms of trade led the government to greatly restrict immigration. As the economic downturn bit, ‘Pacific Islanders’ were frequently singled out as scapegoats, becoming targets of blame for rises in crime, inflation, housing shortages and unemployment (see Mitchell, 2003; Ross, 1992; see also Chapter 1).

Fuelling the resentment was the regular association of Pacific peoples with ‘overstayers’, or what Spoonley, Bedford and Macpherson (2003, p. 32) describe as “someone who stays on in New Zealand after they are legally required to have left.” The link offered a “pseudo-legal justification” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 273) for public hostility toward Pacific people, and also provided “an excuse for the police and immigration authorities to harass these newly resident communities”
(Spoonley, Bedford and Macpherson, 2003, p. 32). The latter reached its nadir with the infamous police ‘dawn raids’ of Pacific peoples’ homes in the 1970s. As Worner (1986) notes, while these raids were not new “the scale and single-mindedness of the project was, indicating both a sense of desperation on the part of the government and the impotence of the existing immigration system” (Worner, 1986, pp. 8–9). Despite the fact that Pacific Islanders made up only a minority of all migrants to New Zealand during the 1970s (Ross, 1992; Spoonley, 1990), that they were “more visible” (Krishnan, Schaeffel and Warren, 1994, p. 78) than those from the United Kingdom and Australia thus meant Pacific peoples were more likely to suffer from the anti-immigration backlash. Such discrimination was, of course, also steeped in a discourse of nationalism. Much in accord with New Zealand history (see Greif, 1995; Pearson, 2001; Phillips, 2007), “racial and ethnic criteria were explicitly used as yardsticks to measure physical and cultural distance from the majority and gauge potentiality for assimilation into the state and nation” (Pearson, 2005, p. 27). In this case, (white) European workers were viewed as assimilable, whereas Pacific Islanders were less likely to be absorbed into the social body. Irrespective of citizenship or residency status, as Mitchell (2003, p. 139) argues, “there was an implicit assumption of what a New Zealander was and that Pacific Islanders in New Zealand collectively fell outside of this definition.”
How Pacific migrants were perceived *vis-à-vis* their European counterparts also differed in one further, and fundamental, way. Unlike the British in particular, Pacific Island migrants were seldom considered settlers, and were instead seen largely as ‘guestworkers’ or ‘sojourners,’ as a temporary source of labour who would “return home eventually” (Dunstall, 1981, p. 403). Many of those who originally arrived from the Islands in the 1950s and 60s had indeed anticipated returning in time to their Island ‘homes’, but by the 1970s they were “increasingly committed to the distinctive society which they were building for themselves, their children and grandchildren in Aotearoa” (Macpherson, Spoonley and Anae, 2001, p. 12). Despite the fact that most Pacific migrants had settled, married and started to form more permanent settlements, the image thus persisted that Pacific peoples were nevertheless “not New Zealanders” (Anae, 2006): not only did they look ‘different,’ but their legal status granted them citizenship in name only, for they seldom enjoyed the political, social and economic benefits of ‘real’ New Zealanders.

By the 1990s Pacific populations, once comprised largely of new migrants, had matured into second and third generation communities (Spoonley, Macpherson, and Pearson, 2004). It subsequently became increasingly difficult—not to mention inappropriate—to talk of New Zealand’s ‘Pacific Islanders’ as ‘immigrants’ (Bedford and Lamer, 1992). Today, too, growth in New Zealand’s
Pacific communities is largely internal as opposed to owing to migration (SNZ, 2007). In a strictly legal and political sense, then, the vast majority of Pacific peoples in New Zealand can be considered New Zealand ‘citizens.’ However, as Paul Gilroy (1991) reminds us, there is more to ‘citizenship’ than a passport (see also Pearson, 2005). The degree to which Pacific people have been integrated into New Zealand society at the ideo-cultural level, for instance, belies the national statistics that show “Pacific people are the most unemployable, most uneducated, poorest, most likely to be criminals, most state-dependent (even more so than Maori), most unwanted sector of the New Zealand population” (Anae, 2004, p. 94; see also MINIPAC, 2007). Not only are Pacific people socially marginalized. Something of the social stigma that comes with once being ‘undesirable’ immigrants clearly persists in discourse. Though they are clearly ‘at home’ in New Zealand, no longer ‘out there’ in the Pacific, one of the identifiable and recurring themes of dominant “Pakeha discourse” (McCreanor, 2005) is continued allusions to Pacific peoples as ‘foreign’, as the ‘Other. References to Pacific people as ‘overstayers’, ‘coconuts’, ‘bungas’ or ‘FOBs’ (‘fresh off the boat’) may now be a lesser feature of the “New Zealand vernacular”, yet as Loto et al (2006) have found, “the legacy of a domineering relationship between the Palagi [Pakeha/white] majority group and Pacific minorities that is captured by such derogatory terms is still evident in public forums such as the media.” To these
‘public forums’, and in a country where it is “a central element of national culture and identity” (Macpherson, Spoonley, and Anae, 2001, p. 158), we should also add the sport of rugby.

Regardless of the attitudes of Pakeha New Zealanders the Samoan community has “evolved from one that was essentially seen as transient and temporarily opportunistic, the result of ‘circulation’, to a community that was willing to lay down more roots in order to create and sustain a diasporic population” (Gough, 2006). This is not to deny the way in which mobility remains central to the endurance of Samoan culture. There are also strong incentives for Samoans to migrate. These go beyond the purely economic with chain migration, in particular, continuing to be a major driver. In addition, a special quota scheme was established by agreement between the governments of Samoa and New Zealand in 1970. Under the scheme, up to 1100 Samoan citizens may be granted residence each year (Voigt-Graf, 2006). Explaining the reasons for such concessionary migration policies, Appleyard and Stahl (1995) contend that the New Zealand government was motivated by the belief that by alleviating demographic pressures it would improve opportunities for economic development which would be further assisted by remittances sent home by [Samoan] migrants working in New Zealand. Remittances, it was believed, would maintain and perhaps improve living standards and development prospects through higher consumption and investment (p. 25).
This view has particular pertinence to Samoa given that, like other nearby micro-
states, it is frequently characterized as a MIRAB society (Bertram and Watters,
1985). According to the MIRAB model “Migration leads to remittances, and the
other principle income source Aid, has contributed to the establishment of
government Bureaucracy” (Connell, 1995, p. 264). In Samoa, migration has
become of enormous social and political, as well as economic, importance. While
the Samoan government has been more circumspect, the majority of individual
Samoans also view migration favorably (Muliaina, 2003). A lot of this is due to
the fact that remittances in Samoa are not just about financial standing but social
status and are important to the processes of cultural reciprocation.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Samoan government has made few attempts
to intervene in what is for all intents and purposes a laissez-faire labour structure.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that the effects of the out-migration
of labor are not entirely clear (Voigt-Graf, 2006; Wickramasekera, 2003).
Questions as to whether increased mobility reflects a ‘drain’ on developing
countries or whether labour movement should be completely left to market
forces or if intervention is required remain outstanding. It is well established that
remittances constitute an important part of the Samoan economy: between 1997
and 2007 remittances accounted for more than 20% of Samoa’s Gross Domestic
Produce (GDP). Recent income and GNP growth in Samoa has also been
relatively weak and job growth lags behind the number of entrants into the workforce (Chand, 2006). Most scholars, however, have argued that labor migration does little to solve Samoa’s development dilemmas (Papademetriou and Martin, 1991). The theory is that recruitment, returns, and remittances will provoke economic development, in turn creating an economic situation in which emigration becomes unnecessary (Martin, 1991, p. 28). However, labour movement schemes are presently largely unmanaged and as a consequence the social impact of migration in Samoa has been largely negative (Voigt-Graf, 2006).

The same could arguably be said of Samoan rugby. Possibly influenced by Manu Samoa’s success at the 1991 World Cup, when the team made up of mainly New Zealand-based players beat Wales en route to the quarterfinals, even Samoa’s national coaches were initially prepared to accept, and even encourage, their best players to move overseas to gain experience. The strongest proponents of the migration of rugby talent from Samoa, though, have generally been from Australia, New Zealand or Europe. While recognizing that playing numbers in Samoa have been depleted, they generally see it as having a positive impact: international competitions such as the Heineken Cup or Super 14 are seen to be more efficient, organized and professional, and hence young Samoans are thought to be gaining experience which they eventually pass back to compatriots back home. As NZRU chief executive Steve Tew recently stated, while there is a
long-standing debate about whether New Zealand has plundered Pacific playing stocks (while offering little in return), “It’s also a two way bridge. There are at least 40 players who have progressed through our system and our A-grade group who have gone on to represent Samoa alone, let alone adding the Fijians and Tongans” (quoted in New era dawning, 2006, p. 4). The 1991 World Cup side could again be seen as giving weight to such an impression. That history-making team featured players such as Pat Lam, Peter Fatialofa, Frank Bunce, and Stephen Bachop, all of whom played their rugby in New Zealand. Experience has also been brought back to the Islands through coaches. Now Samoan coach Lam is a good example. A one-time All Black himself, Lam came up through the coaching ranks with the Auckland provincial union and later the Auckland Blues Super 14 franchise.

The Pacific Island Unions themselves have argued more frequently, however, that rather than contributing to the development of Pacific rugby, the migration of elite playing talent is contributing to the underdevelopment of the game in the region. According to both members of the Samoan Rugby Football Union (SRFU) and the Samoan media, the standard of play, crowd attendance, gate receipts and media interest have all declined as a result of the player exodus occurring at both the schoolboy and elite level. Alan Grey, a former player and coach for Samoa, suggests the problems are considerable. In his words, he is
“very concerned about Manu Samoa’s future.” Lance Polu, editor of the weekly newspaper *Le Samoa*, sees “the All Blacks benefiting at Samoa’s expense…Samoan players have no option but to take up offers from overseas. Rugby has deteriorated so much here, so if they want money and opportunities they have to go.” Certainly, schoolboy rugby has been eviscerated in recent years. The former Manu Samoa coach Michael Jones estimates that, enticed by education scholarships or other, less licit incentives, Samoa loses approximately 100 of its top schoolboys to New Zealand each year (ref). Similarly, Logan (2006) sees “pillaging from the islands” as an accurate description of the situation given “the number of scholarships offered to promising Samoan players” (p. 16). It is perhaps important to note that these scholarships are nothing new. Pacific players have been coming to New Zealand expressly for rugby for the better part of 30 years. As an example Scots College near Wellington has been recruiting players from Fiji since the mid-1980s. Keith Laws, the principal of Scots College at the time, notes that “Scots had traditionally been rugby minnows, and the recruitment scheme made such a difference that we began to be a real rugby power” (quoted in Romanos, 2002, p. 230). Kelston Boys High School in Auckland has enjoyed a similar relationship with Samoa over the same period (see ).
The Samoan Minister of Sport, Fiame Naomi Mata’afa accurately notes, however, that “recruitment is starting earlier and earlier” (quoted in Gregory, 2004). It is also more crowded. John Boe, the former Manu Samoa coach, describes Samoa as “a really active market.” “There are scouts up there all the time. The islands are really on the slide, the player pool is drying up” (quoted in Slot, 2005). Rees (2005) concurs in his description of scouts and recruiting as “the biggest threat to Pacific rugby.” “Disguised as scholarships,” he continues, “this blatant poaching of island talent has depleted the player bases of the Samoan union more than anything else.” Prominent Pacific-based journalist Michael Field has gone as far as comparing the recruitment of Samoan schoolboys to the practice of ‘blackbirding.’ Blackbirding was the euphemism given to the slave-trading that occurred in the Pacific from the mid-1800s through to the early-1900s\textsuperscript{16}. According to one study, blackbirding, “the practice of luring Melanesians and Polynesians to toil for next to nothing was called”, involved upwards of 60,000 people between 1863 and 1904 (Horne, 2007, p. 2). As Field describes the comparison:

Blackbirders used to slip into harbours and lagoons with promises of good things over the horizon. Men like Bully Hayes or the more anonymous Peruvian captains would lure people aboard ships, seize them and sail them off into a life of slavery. These days the techniques are different, but

\textsuperscript{16} The term ‘blackbirding’ was said to derive from the custom of opportunistic navigators and raiders dressing entirely in black going as the went ashore at night to snatch unsuspecting victims (Horne, 2007).
the outcome is the same: white men are grabbing Pacific Islanders, not for the sugar cane fields of Queensland, or the mines of Peru, but for the rugby grounds of the old colonialists.

The Australian Rugby Union chief executive John O’Neill uses similarly emotive terms in his recent reference to the “systematic raping” of Pacific Islands rugby (O’Neill: Stop “raping” islands, 2003). Countries such as Samoa, he argues, “face eradication from the global game unless the richer countries agree to help them out and stop poaching their best players” (O’Neill, 2003).

“The Samoans didn’t even get lunch money”: Labour Migration and the Underdevelopment of Samoan Rugby

While the language is emotive, both O’Neill and Field accurately identify a definite imbalance of power in South Pacific rugby. Looking at sport migration more generally, the migration situation is considerably more exploitative in cases where the balance, in economic and political as much as sporting terms, between the donor and host countries is more unequal (Maguire, 1999). This is frequently the case where developed nations mine developing or under-developed nations for their athletic talent, with little or no interest in the sporting and, more importantly, the social and economic consequences of such actions. Indeed, in football this problem is so significant that in December 2003, FIFA President Sepp Blatter, not renowned for his political incisiveness, made the following statement in a column that appeared in the Financial Times:
I find it unhealthy, if not despicable, for rich clubs to send scouts shopping in Africa, South America and Asia to ‘buy’ the most promising players there…This leaves those who trained them in their early years with nothing but cash for their trouble…Dignity and integrity tend to fall by the wayside in what has become a glorified body market…Europe’s leading clubs conduct themselves increasingly as neo-colonialists who don’t give a damn about heritage and culture, but engage in social and economic rape by robbing the developing world of its best players (quoted in Anon, 2003).

While the ‘host’ European football clubs—and, for that matter, Major League Baseball teams (Arbena, 1994; Klein, 1991) and National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sport programmes (Bale and Sang, 1996)—benefit from this form of corporeal neo-colonialism in their ability to draw from a larger talent pool, and even market their sporting products to local diasporic communities, the situation in the donor countries is less positive. The exploitation of athletic talent by sporting institutions from the ‘developed’ world hinders the growth of national communities in sporting, social and economic terms. In the first instance, such drains on athletic talent lead to the ‘de-skilling’ of the sport in the donor countries (Maguire et al, 2002) leads to “a sense of loss, a feeling that the home country is being robbed of its own human and recreational resources” (Arbena, 1994, p. 103). Moreover, among many individuals and families within donor countries, such sporting neo-colonialism creates a sense of unrealistic opportunity through professional sport, and an ultimately unfulfilled dependency on the host nation, which, when magnified across the local
populace, can seriously impinge upon social and economic development in the local setting. In this way, the broader economic relations and inequities between the ‘West and the Rest’ (Hall 1992) are replicated within the sporting context.

The relatively recent professionalization of rugby exacerbates the problems faced by Samoan rugby. In fact, it could readily be argued that the most problematic issue for Samoans is that, once they leave, there is usually nothing the Samoan union can do to ensure younger players return to represent the Samoan national side. Jones says of young players moving to New Zealand, that “once in the New Zealand system, it’s hard to lure them back, especially when they weigh up the dream to play for the All Blacks—and earn good money while doing so—or play for Manu Samoa for love” (quoted in Logan, 2006, p. 16).

The rugby infrastructure in Samoa is certainly far from ‘developed.’ More importantly, as one British scribe dryly observed “the islanders may be talent-rich, but [they are] cash-poor, [they] have no economic muscle.” In the world of professional sport this is something of an understatement. As evidence, consider the following example. According to most reports, the International Rugby Board (IRB) made an estimated $175 million profit from the 2003 Rugby World Cup. The hosts, Australia, banked nearly $70 from the same event. New Zealand, losers in the semi-final, still had a good year as well with the New Zealand Rugby Union (NZRU) posting a near-$10 million profit. Samoa, though, was an
altogether different story. Its commercial arm, Manu Samoa Rugby Ltd (MSRL), announced that it had spent its entire budget on getting Samoa to the World Cup and now faced the embarrassing prospect of putting the team up for sale. At this year’s World Cup it was a similar story for rugby’s have-nots. The All Blacks’ campaign was estimated to have cost around NZ$50 million. The coach, Graham Henry, was afforded the luxury of being able to withdraw 22 of New Zealand’s best players from club competitions prior to the tournament, placing them instead on a ‘reconditioning program.’ The players flew to France first-class, took charters to games in Scotland and Wales, stayed at a luxury hotel in Marseille’s most salubrious suburb, and got to enjoy the beaches of Corsica during a stop-over *en route*. This is not to mention the near four-and-a-half tonnes of excess baggage the team traveled with. Samoa, on the other hand, arrived in Paris a week prior to kick-off to find they didn’t even have the money to pay their players’ expenses. They were saved only when residents from Haute de Seine volunteered to take care of them, taking players to restaurants, paying for their drinks, and arranging post-training outings to the city’s famous landmarks. “It was good to be able to show our guests at this World Cup that the spirit remains in rugby” remarked one local.

Though it seems an extraordinary episode for a national sporting side, Samoa’s experience in France was hardly atypical for teams from the Pacific.
Money is the most obvious root. Take 2005, the year I started writing this dissertation. The Fijian Rugby Union (FRU) was about F$4 million short of its budget, even after a six-figure injection from the Fijian government. Tonga, A$300,000 in the red, was forced to take out a A$150,000 bank loan after exhausting its annual budget on World Cup qualifiers and participation in IRB World Sevens Series. And, things were not much better in Samoa where the secretary of the SRFU described the organization as “barely in the black.” The IRB has ostensibly been sympathetic to the issue. They recently endorsed a £30 million fund, drawn from World Cup profits, with most of the money going to the so-called ‘tier two’ nations such as Canada, Japan and the Pacific Islands. The IRB has also bankrolled two new Pacific-based tournaments: the Pacific Rugby Cup (PRC), a cross-border league between the Pacific Unions, with two teams based in each country; and, the Pacific Rim Six Nations which includes the three Pacific national sides, Japan and ‘A’ sides from Australia and New Zealand. All well and good. That is, until you consider the wider, more pressing, problems facing Pacific rugby.

First, the IRB grants were intended to fund the set-up of ‘high-performance units’ (“be it coaching or administrative assistance”) and ‘infrastructure’ (“player identification programmes and specialist staffing”). As Pacific-based reporter Tuifa’asisina Peter Rees notes, for Unions such as Tonga,
“paying off...debts was the more immediate priority” (Rees, 2005, p. 18). Second, the grants do little to address an enormous power gap in the IRB. Consider that: of the twenty teams that played in the 2007 World Cup, eight were non-voting members of the IRB; while 95 unions are affiliated with the IRB, only 13 of them have voting powers on the IRB Council; the eight founding unions of the IRB have two votes each on this Council; and, that while Fiji, Tonga, and Samoa attend the Council’s meetings, they do so only as observers. “It has become a pretty exclusive lot,” Pacific Islanders Rugby Alliance (PIRA) chief executive Charlie Charters suggests, “and the sad thing is, there’s no sign of this changing” (quoted in Pareti, 2005). The arch, high-handedness of the IRB apropos of the Pacific was also apparent in the glaring omission of any Pacific representatives on the ‘special committee’ appointed to investigate the plight of Pacific rugby.

Third, the two new competitions belie the fact that teams from the Pacific have been continually denied the opportunity to join either the Super 14 or Tri Nations by SANZAR (the joint organization of the South African, New Zealand, and Australian Rugby Unions). Most in the Pacific believe this to be the superior option for strengthening rugby in the Pacific. According to former Samoan coach Jones “Our [Samoan’s] best opportunity to develop was probably missed when the SANZAR unions expanded to Super 14 and left us out...Being out of these financially lucrative tournaments means the Island unions’ survival is a battle in
itself” (quoted in Logan and Rees, 2006, p. 14). This is on top of the fact that as the SANZAR competitions have expanded, fewer opportunities become available for Pacific nations to play top-level rugby as the ‘test-window’ narrows.

It seems somewhat spurious, then, that the IRB’s chair, Syd Millar, has said of their recent investments that they will make “a real difference for the Tier 2 Unions in terms of increasing their competitiveness”, and “ensur[ing] that more Unions can challenge for and potentially win the Rugby World Cup.” To be fair, that Fiji and Tonga both made the second round of this year’s World Cup would seem to provide some support for such a contention. However, any benefit that may have been accrued from the IRB’s so-called “Strategic Plan” was surely undercut by the World Cup draw. The new competitions already mentioned, along with the ‘North America 4’ championship were purportedly developed with the “express purpose” of preparing the countries involved for the 2007 World Cup. Yet as English (2007) observes, “having shelled out serious coin in trying to get them up to speed and thereby sparing them the 100-point shellackings we have seen all too often in previous World Cups, the IRB then abandoned them.” Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa all had demanding four-day turnarounds at the tournament. In stark contrast, a team like New Zealand had a seven-day gap between their first and second games and eight days before playing their third. Millar has been candid on World Cup draws, admitting that
games were scheduled to deliberately benefit the “bigger nations”: “We have to generate money for rugby in general and, of course, TV requires top matches at certain times so we have to be aware of that. The format and structure of the tournament sometimes has to reflect that” (quoted in Pareti, 2004). Yet recent rumblings from the IRB further contradict Millar’s claims that the IRB is “committed to developing the Game.” Plans are afoot to cut the World Cup tournament to 16 teams, with a second level tournament for so-called “minnows.” The IRB’s argument is that new format could increase World Cup revenue, with the money eventually put back into the growth of the sport worldwide. “Traditionalists will want the so-called minnows in the tournament,” claimed IRB head of communications Greg Thomas, “but we also understand how important the World Cup is and that it continues to drive us commercially. That will ensure that we have money to give to the likes of Georgia, Fiji, Tonga, Madagascar, Ukraine, Ghana, Senegal and wherever else.” Already, Fiji, Samoa and Tonga have struggled to attract games against top opponents because they are not seen as “commercially viable” (Logan and Rees, 2006, p. 16) (remarkably, the All Blacks have played only 11 Test matches against Fiji, Samoa and Tonga combined). For some teams, their only chance to play against tier-one opposition is every four years at the World Cup, and if these new plans come to fruition even this will disappear.
I do not wish to debate the relative merits of the IRB’s top-down economic policies (other than to suggest them as being indicative of the IRB’s long-practiced paternalism). Further, it could be argued that the IRB is only responding logically according to the dictates of modern, corporate sport (for which the “cardinal objective” has become the delivery of “entertaining products designed to maximise profit margins” [Andrews, 1999, p. ]). What I am merely pointing to here is the decided imbalance of power in world rugby as well as the (corporate) double-speak of the IRB as concerns rugby in the Pacific. There is a sustained pattern of the IRB’s ‘core’ Unions blocking any proposals that may undermine their hegemony. Tonga, Fiji, and Samoa, for instance, have all expressed interest in becoming a voting member of the IRB, but nothing has eventuated—nor looks likely to in the near future. In the words of Charters, when it comes to the place of Pacific nations in the IRB, “you speak only when you are spoken to” (quoted in Pareti, 2004). It may seem more difficult to denounce the IRB’s cash injection into the three Pacific Unions as well as the new championships the world body has put in place. The result though is hardly growing parity, but further division. Driven by economic imperatives, world rugby is increasingly turning into a series of segregated, graded ‘circuits.’ However much the IRB’s stated goal “to improve the competitiveness of rugby worldwide”, the opportunities for nations like Fiji, Samoa and Tonga to play
against higher tier nations is rapidly declining: a protracted Super 14 cuts into the international calendar, while there is little interest in letting a Pacific nation into the Tri Nations.

Perhaps the most problematic issue for Samoan rugby is that there is usually nothing the Samoan union can do to ensure younger players return to represent the national side. Money, as Jones alludes to above, is obviously a factor here too. Match payments are a telling example. Samoan players were once rumored to be being paid £12-a-day when on tour. Conversely, at the 2007 Rugby World Cup, members of the All Blacks were paid NZ$7500 per week and were eligible for a $100,000 bonus; $35,000 for winning a semifinal, and $65,000 if New Zealand won the tournament. This is not just a disparity between national sides. Since rugby went professional in 1995 there have been a growing number of ‘club versus country’ disputes. The problem for the Samoan national team is that, when it comes to picking a side for international test matches, players are now frequently opting to “remain with overseas club sides for financial reasons” (IRB admits club problem, 2003)—something that further dilutes an already weakened Manu Samoa talent pool. While the IRB has recently instigated a series of measures designed to ensure “that every country is able to select their best team, that they are not forced to leave players behind because those players may
be threatened with the loss of their contract”\(^\text{17}\) (ARU wants to stop club pressure, 2003), the measures seem to have had little effect. Most notably, though clubs in member unions of the IRB are “duty bound” to release players for the World Cup they are not obliged to carry on paying them. The result is that internationals from some of the poorer Pacific unions “feel trapped between taking a pay cut or playing in the World Cup” (Raiwalui rejects Fiji appeal, 2003).

For instance, at the 2003 World Cup, Samoa, Fiji, and Georgia, who could not afford to make up the difference in lost wages, “[were] hit by players opting to stay with their clubs rather than play in Australia”\(^\text{18}\) (IRB should pay players, 2003). Hardest hit were Samoa who lost key forwards Trevor Leota and Henry Tuilagi. The rationale for Leota, who pulled out of the World Cup in order to continue playing for English Premiership side Wasps, was simple:

> I worked out that I would lose more than $NZ70,270 in earnings if I went to Australia [to play in the World Cup]...All the Samoan players get is $NZ561 a week when the competition starts and that did not begin to compare with what Wasps pay me. I had to think of my wife and kids, and they will always come first (quoted in Raiwalui rejects Fiji appeal, 2003).

He suggested the problem could be easily remedied by the IRB spending some of the World Cup’s projected $NZ269 million profit on the players:

\[^{17}\] For instance, fining or sanctioning any club who either refuse to release a player, or field a player who opts to stay with the club when named in an international side.

\[^{18}\] In addition, in order to circumvent the IRB regulations noted above, some players choose to “retire” from international rugby in order stay with their club sides without punishment to either the player or the club—a course of action which further weakens the available talent pool for Pacific Island representative teams.
The IRB talk about whoever goes to the World Cup not losing out on wages but they are all talk but no action. I’ve not seen anything at all from them…It would be nice if the IRB could help unions like Samoa field their strongest sides. The danger is that come the next World Cup some countries decide not to take part because they cannot afford to (quoted in *Is rugby going global?*, 2003).

The issue of club/money over country has been a particularly pertinent, and increasingly common, one for Samoan players who have chosen to take up contracts in New Zealand (often forsaking more lucrative offers in Europe, for the added assurance of extended family networks (or *aiga* in New Zealand)\(^{19}\).

Yet though New Zealand rugby has without doubt benefited from Samoan talent at both the domestic (the strengthening of club and provincial rugby) and international level (a number of current and former All Blacks made their test debuts for Samoa prior to the new IRB eligibility regulations), they seem hesitant about giving anything back to Samoan rugby\(^{20}\). Most notably, New Zealand provinces have done little to ameliorate the “cash or country dilemma” (*Is rugby going global?*, 2003). Samoa has often been unable to call on the talent of New Zealand-based players because they are locked into contracts that give provinces

\(^{19}\) Commenting on the Leota’s case, Samoan coach John Boe remarked: “We’ve [Samoa] lost about four or five players from Britain but to be honest the situation is far worse in New Zealand…Almost all of our players play in New Zealand but have to sign contracts saying they won’t play for us” (*NZ in middle of country row*, 2003).

\(^{20}\) Another example of the way in which New Zealand rugby, and the NZRU in particular, has gained much but given little in return, is the fact that, though it would doubtless be a sellout, the All Blacks have *never* played in Apia. Conversely, Samoa is a regular opponent for early season games against the *All Blacks in New Zealand* (where the NZRU keeps the profits from ticket sales). Notably, a number of international teams *have* played in Samoa while on tour in the South
first call on their services—something which goes against the intent, if not always the letter, of IRB laws. According to Michael Jones: “Some players are contracted in New Zealand and clauses in their contracts claim they cannot represent Samoa”21 (quoted in Jones hits NZRFU, 2003). He points to Waikato fullback Loki Crichton as a prime example of the problems facing Samoan rugby. According to one report Crichton has a “specific clause in his contract which prevents him playing international rugby” (IRB admits club problem, 2003). Jones asserted, Crichton “wants to play. He wants to play for the Manu [Manu Samoa], but we were actually stopped from having him...We asked to have him [for the World Cup] but they [Waikato] said no, he had to play NPC [National Provincial Championship] rugby” (quoted in Iceman, 2003).

New Zealand clubs are not the only culprits. Given the strength of the Euro and English Pound relative to the New Zealand dollar, a growing number of young Samoans are choosing to play rugby in more lucrative European competitions. Traditionally, Europe hasn’t been a major destination for Samoan players, given the relatively small size of their Pacific Islands communities; and, family as much as money has long-been a deciding factor when Samoans weigh up their migration choices (Bedford, 2000; Macpherson, 1997). However, two-

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21 Jones has gone as far as calling the NZRU policies “shameful” (Jones hits NZRFU, 2003).
thirds of the most recent Manu Samoa squad now play professional rugby in Great Britain or France. In both of these countries club versus country disputes are already well-established. The issue stems from the fact that, as club competitions have “internationalized” (Greenfield and Osborn, 2001), in the Northern Hemisphere clubs have become economically and politically stronger in relation to their respective governing bodies. The result, as Hayward (1999) sees it, is that “the major clubs believe more and more that the world’s top players belong to them and them alone.” Ostensibly, the Samoan team is protected by Articles 9.1 and 9.2 of the IRB’s “regulations of the Game” which state that

(a) A [national] Union has first and last call upon the availability of a Player for selection and appearances for a National Representative Team or National Squad of that Union and all attendances associated therewith, including training sessions.

And,

(b) No Union, Association, Rugby Body or Club whether by contract or otherwise may inhibit, prevent or render unavailable any player from selection, attendance and appearance in a National Representative Team or National Squad, including training sessions, and any Player must be released upon request by his Union.

The reality, however, is that the rule has only ever been loosely enforced—particularly with regard to Samoan players. For instance, the Samoan coach, Pat Lam, suggested that he had to fight “tooth and nail” (quoted in European clubs pressured Islanders players, 2006) to get European clubs to release players for the
Pacific Islanders recent tour of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. Lam is quoted as saying that “a lot of pressure was put on some of the boys to pull out of the tour, especially from English clubs and some French ones” (quoted in Singh, 2006). As a consequence, Samoa went into three tests undermanned—and under-prepared when a warm-up game against the English club side Harlequins had to be canceled because English clubs would not release their players (Edwards, 2006). In addition, to avoid eligibility problems, some top-flight Samoan players have ‘retired’ from the international game (by declaring themselves unavailable for international selection) after having to choose between playing for their club or representing their country (Island unions hope for better deal, 2004).

For Samoa the unwillingness of both Australasian and European clubs to release their players was recently highlighted by the revised start date Pacific Six Nations tournament between Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Japan, Australia A, and the Junior All Blacks. With the IRB pulling the start forward to May 19, the Six Nations now clashes with the Super 14 and European club games. While supposedly part of the IRB’s attempts to “increasing the competitiveness of the game” in the Pacific (Thomas, 2006, p. 24) the first two rounds of the Six Nations fall outside the IRB ‘test window’ (the period during which a club must release their players for national selection). Considered to be “critical preparation time of the World Cup” (Paul, 2007), the tournament started without its best players.
Further, some players suggested that British clubs threatened Samoan players with severe financial penalties, or their contracts terminated, if they chose to play for their country ahead of their club (Paul, 2007). This is, though, by no means an isolated instance (see ). In many cases it also difficult to prove, making IRB rules largely irrelevant. As the former Chair of the Pacific Islands Rugby Alliance (PIRA) contends,

The International Rugby Board has a role as the custodian of the world game, and there are rules and regulations which apply not just to the national unions, but to the clubs and therefore to all of the officials within each national union’s jurisdiction. The problem that we face is that a lot of the pressure that’s put on the players is done specifically to avoid a paper trail. It’s a discussion with a coach outside a dressing room, or after practice on a Friday night. It’s like a sort of police gang trying to beat up somebody and leave no bruises for the follow-up investigation. There is a particular style in which this can be done, in which the pressure can be exerted, but not in a way in which there’s any sort of forensic evidence that we can put up to the International Rugby Board. And that’s the frustration. We take the opinion that some things you can see with your eyes, and some things we can see with your heart, and in this particular case, to have so many players opting out of the Rugby World Cup, it’s inconceivable that it was anything other than pressure exerted by the clubs on the players (ABC National Radio, 2003).

John Boe, recalls similarly of coaching Samoa in 2003 that four English-based players withdrew from the national team “because of club contracts,” with the “biggest dilemma” being New Zealand where most of [Samoa’s] players are unavailable because they know if they play for Manu Samoa they won’t get a Super 12 contract. You can’t blame them of course, because they need to get the Super 12 contracts to get the money to feed their families. So they are put in a very difficult situation (ABC National Radio, 2003).
Samoa’s access to top players has been further hampered by recent changes to the IRB’s national eligibility laws. The issue of the impact of these laws on Samoan players has long been a talking point in World Rugby. However, rules which now bar players from representing more than one country in their careers become particularly troublesome in and around the quadrennial cycle of the World Cup. In 2003, Samoa’s then assistant coach, Michael Jones\(^{22}\), frequently used press conferences at the World Cup as an “opportunity to highlight the very real issues that [Samoan] are facing” (quoted in *Iceman highlights Pacific plight*, 2003). At one press conference prior to Samoa’s Pool C game against England, Jones suggested that IRB regulations regarding nationality “stack up against Pacific Islanders,” and that as a consequence nations like Samoa are “struggling to survive” (*Iceman highlights Pacific plight*, 2003). To understand the basis of Jones’ argument, it is perhaps important to take a brief moment here to ground the debate in some historical context. Though it doubtlessly oversimplifies the issue, in simple terms, the IRB introduced tough new eligibility regulations in 2000 which now mean a player can only represent one country at international level:

A Player who has played for the senior fifteen-a-side National Representative Team or the next senior fifteen-a-side National

\(^{22}\) Interestingly, Jones is commonly described as one of the greats of New Zealand rugby, as one journalist puts it, an “All Blacks legend” (see *Jones hits NZRFU*, 2003).
Representative Team or the senior National Representative Sevens Team of a Union is not eligible to play for the senior fifteen-a-side National Representative Team or the next senior fifteen-a-side National Representative Team or the senior National Representative Sevens Team of another Union (Section 8.2 from the IRB’s Regulation 8: Eligibility to Play for National Representative Teams).

While the code was only amended in the wake of the ‘Grannygate Affair’ surrounding former All Black Shane Howarth’s (in)eligibility to play for his adopted country of Wales (see Hewett, 2000)\(^2\), it has actually had the effect of “impacting negatively on weaker rugby nations such as the Pacific Islands” (Former All Blacks challenge IRB, 2002), rather than stronger nations such as New Zealand, or those in the British Isles. Given the unique nature of the relationship between Samoa and New Zealand (and the emigrant flows therein), as well as the long history of player exchanges between both countries, it is perhaps hardly surprising that Samoa has been especially affected. As Souster (2001) has argued:

> While laudatory in intent, [Regulation 8.2] has hamstrung the likes of Samoa, many of whose talented players head to New Zealand at an early age to chase the All Black dream and the Kiwi dollar...When their dreams collapse they find themselves in international limbo for the rest of their careers. Players who might have played only ten minutes for the New Zealand Sevens side but who will never become regulars are effectively stymied. [There are players] whom Samoa would welcome back with open arms, who want to play, and who would strengthen their hand immeasurably.

\(^2\) While a player is permitted to play for a nation in which one of their grandparents were born, Howarth, as well fellow New Zealander Brett Sinkinson, were both found to playing for Wales under pretenses which were tenuous at best. Though a player may still represent the country of a grandparent’s birth his eligibility is now subject to Regulation 8.2 listed above.
As Souster alludes to, the regulation’s primary consequence has been to slash the pool of players available to Samoa. As Jones has elsewhere noted:

There are Samoan players who could play a vital role for us but because they’ve played 30 minutes in a New Zealand jersey, even if it’s New Zealand A or even a sevens team, we can’t touch them…These guys are left floundering, playing provincial rugby for the rest of their lives when they could be playing in a World Cup for Samoa, the ultimate (quoted in Woollard, 2001).

Paul (2004) concludes that though “for years, New Zealand rugby officials have talked a great game about helping Pacific island rugby…the reality is…that they have tended to steal the best bits, then chuck the islanders the scraps” (Paul, 2004).

The NZRU has further contributed to the “marginalization” (Jones hits NZRFU, 2003) of Samoan rugby by purposefully holding young Samoan players in the New Zealand system. In the first instance, the unwritten rule in New Zealand is that anyone seeking a Super 14—the preeminent professional competition in the Southern Hemisphere—contract must first commit to the All Blacks24. The NZRU’s justification is that having too many players ineligible to play for New Zealand “will limit selection choices for the All Blacks…which is the NZRU’s number one priority” (Logan, 2006, p. 16). However, there has been a growing number of cases which are testament to Michael Jones’ claim that “the

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24 The same rule holds in Australia, where players must declare their eligibility for Australia’s national side, the Wallabies.
NZRFU deliberately selected Samoan players to represent a sevens team, or the New Zealand A team [the next-senior fifteen-a-side team below the All Blacks], thus disqualifying them from ever representing their country of origin” (Jones hits NZRFU, 2003). Many in Samoan administrators believe one reason why the All Blacks and New Zealand age-group selectors pick so many Samoan players is to ensure they are eligible to play for the All Blacks (see Gregory, 2004; Hewett, 2005). Yet while this may increase the playing depth in New Zealand, it has left Samoa to watch the All Blacks “use and then discard players who would be good enough for the Test team but who cannot play for [Samo] because of the one country law” (Island unions hope for better deal, 2004). Dylan Mika, Alama Ieremia, Andrew Blowers, and Ofisa Tonu’u are just a few of the many recent examples. While these players appealed to the IRB on the grounds that “they have a special case that has to include consideration of the historical and economic relationship that exists between Samoa and New Zealand” (Souster, 2002), there case was dismissed. A recent proposal that the eligibility rules be relaxed so players who represent ‘Tier 1’ nations (such as New Zealand) could back to play for ‘Tier 2’ nations such as Samoa was also rejected at a recent IRB Full Council meeting (IRB, 2005).

Adding to the frustration of Samoan rugby officials is the inconsistent manner in which the IRB has enforced eligibility rules. Perhaps the most famous
case was that of ‘Australian’ half-back Steve Devine. In 2003 Devine was selected for the All Blacks’ end-of-year tour to Britain. However, while on tour Devine’s previous links to the Australian national sevens team surfaced. The NZRU rushed through a request to the IRB to have Devine cleared to represent the All Blacks on the basis that at the time Devine played for Australia “[sevens] did not have the sort of international standing it does now.” The IRB agreed, and Devine went on to play 10 test matches for the All Blacks before being dropped in 2003. Referring to the Devine case, Romanos (2003) notes how it opens the IRB to charges of favoritism “when it so willingly bends its rules to accommodate a powerful rugby country such as New Zealand.”

Theorizing Rugby’s ‘Muscle Trade’: Samoans and the Sporting World-System

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion, then, that the relationship between rugby’s ‘first world’ and ‘third world’ soccer nations is lopsided and nowhere is this more apparent that in the migration of Samoan rugby players. The ‘trading partners’ in this relationship are far from equal, with Samoa, like other nations in the Pacific Islands, obviously ‘dependent’ on those in rugby’s core. Arguably too, despite the IRB’s statements to the contrary, world rugby is set-up in such a way as to only contribute to the underdevelopment of Pacific rugby. This ‘underdevelopment’ of Samoa rugby is not, it should be noted, an endogenous process. We need to be cognizant of the external determinants of
underdevelopment and locate these migrations within an analytical framework that articulates with critical global conditions. How then can we think about the migration of Pacific rugby players throughout the South Pacific and beyond? What structures these labour flows? And, how can we make sense of the migration processes I have described above?

First, it is important to remember what Maguire et al (2002) describe as the “residual impact of colonial links” (p. 34). The export of Pacific Island rugby labour cannot be described as a recent phenomenon in light of Samoa’s colonial ties in the Pacific. It is hardly surprising that New Zealand and Australia have been the most popular destination of rugby’s Pacific migrants. Similar to the exploitation of unskilled workers during the 1950s and 60s, athletic talent migration could be read as an extension of a form of neo-liberal capitalism which proclaims fairness and opportunity for all while attempting to ‘manage’ migration according to the dictates of those in power. We cannot ignore either the idea of a ‘metropolitan New Zealand’ persisting beyond the colonial era.

Stuart Hall has captured the ongoing weight of colonialism on the process of migration in his description of the post-War influx of people from the British Commonwealth into Great Britain. He notes how Jamaicans knew British culture intimately as a result of their colonial education and that they had always sensed London to be a place to which they would eventually travel:
As they hauled down the flag, the former colonized peoples got on the banana boat and sailed right to London...they had always said that this was really home, that the streets were paved with gold, and, bloody hell, the people from the margins decided to check out whether that was so or not (Hall, 1997).

Like Jamaica’s migrants to Britain, many Samoan rugby players see New Zealand, and Auckland in particular, as the “land of milk and h(m)oney” (Anae, 2004, p. 96; see also Wall, 2007). They are further attracted by the prospect of playing in leagues where there are likely to be fewer cultural and linguistic barriers or in places where there are large pre-existing Samoan and/or Island communities. Therefore New Zealand is the beneficiary of Pacific talent not merely because of money. Historical and colonial links are significant factors in the migrations of Samoan players inasmuch as they play an important determining in the destination of these players.

On a more conceptual level we could also say that more generally these immigration flows take place within a broader ‘global system.’ There is certainly evidence to suggest that these migrations are facilitated by “the organizational and technical infrastructure of the global economy” (Sassen, 2007, p. 151)—in particular, the emergence of a global market for athletic labour. Player migration from Samoa, like any other sport, must be seen as “bound up in a complex political economy that is itself embedded in a series of power struggles characterizing the global sports system” (Maguire et al, 2002, p. 32). Following
the work of Paul Darby (Darby, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2006), one way we can think about how these migration flows are conditioned by broader politico-economic dynamics is through the world-systems analysis of Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein’s ideas have been adapted to the study of athletic migration by a number of scholars in the sociology of sport (see Darby, Bale 2004; Darby 2000, 2002, 2005a, 2006, 2007; Lanfranchi and Taylor, 2001; Magee and Sugden, 2002; Poli 2002, 2005, 2006). In brief, world-system theory emerged in the mid-to-late-1970s, notably in the writings of Wallerstein, André Gunder Frank, and Samir Amin, as a response to ‘dualistic’—modern/traditional—notions “which informed most of the development theory of the period following World War II” (Worsley, ?, p. 298). As opposed to distinct economic sectors, modern/traditional, world-system theorists argued that both were merely parts of a wider whole, a kind of global, or ‘world’, capitalist economic system. The basic premise of world systems theory was that no nation in the world could be seen in isolation. Economies were tied by way of the fact that individual countries or groups of countries were part of a single unit. Ties between countries are multiple, but primacy is given to economic connections through world markets in goods, capital, and labour. Of course, these were not equal partnerships. The global system is stratified, or, in Wallerstein’s words, ‘tiered’, wherein “some countries
are able to use their advantage to create and maintain wealth, whereas

Wallerstein explains this hierarchy by sorting nations into three areas, or
zones, with their core, semi-periphery, and periphery status based on the nature
of their relationship (their degree of development or incorporation) to the
expanding capitalist system. According to Wallerstein, “These zones,
distinguished by their different economic functions within the world-economic
division of labor...structure the assemblage of productive processes that
constitute the capitalist world-economy” (). The division of labour was not
merely just a functional division, but also “a relationship of exploitation”
(Worsley, 301). The core regions that are, or become, economically diversified,
rich and autonomous, “can enforce unequal exchange relations favourable to
themselves; they appropriate surplus value from the periphery” (Harrison, 1988,
p. 71). These rich, power, industrialized countries of the core control the system.
Conversely, the countries at the periphery are poor, not industrialized, and
largely agricultural. They are “subject to direct intervention and manipulation by
the core” and are dependent on the export of labour and low-wage products
(Watson, 2004, p. 13). *Semi*-peripheral countries which “are at the middle level of
income and partly industrialized, extract profits from the peripheral countries
and pass the profits on to the core countries” (Andersen and Taylor, 2008, p. 254).
To these we could also add the ‘external arena.’ This included much of Asia and Africa, and existed as a kind of separate world-economy. Gradually these areas became incorporated into the periphery as colonial, and more recently transnational corporate, expansion took place. As Darby points out, “this has been achieved through the core nations’ capacity to organize world trade to favor their economic interests” (p. 243). Essentially, states in the advanced industrial core areas could expand into external arenas without competing directly with other industrializing areas, thus enlarging the periphery.

World systems theory provides a useful starting point for understanding the growth in international labor migration, both within sport, and more generally. In simple terms, the international division of labor means that the need for cheap labor in some industrial and developing nations draws workers from poorer parts of the globe” (Andersen and Thomas, 2008, p. 255). In world systems theory capitalism tends to expand outward from the core. As market penetration occurs

labour in non-capitalist countries gets displaced, population gets mobilized and international migration becomes fuelled by an ever increasing spatial, economic and social polarization of the globalizing market economy (Geyer, 2002, p. 23).

Migration, in sum, originates in the social, economic, political and cultural transformations that accompany the “penetration of capitalist markets into non-market or premarket societies” (Wallerstein, ). In essence, the main feature of the
world system is, as Berberoglu (2005) explains, “the transfer of surplus from the periphery to the core of the system.” In this way migration cannot be attributed solely to economic factors, but rather, the driving force of migration is the actions carried out capitalists and states who seek “to take advantage of land, materials, labor, and consumer markets in peripheral countries” ( ). Within world-systems analysis emphasis is placed in the exploitative nature of the relationships between sending and receiving countries in international migration and, in particular, differences between wage rates and employment. Wallerstein describes the movement between the periphery and the core as being an “unequal exchange”—something made possible by the domination of peripheral states by those at the core. Unequal exchange is “enforced by strong states on weak ones, by core states on peripheral areas. Thus capitalism involves not only appropriation of surplus value by an owner from a labor, but an appropriation of surplus of the whole-world-economy by core areas” (Wallerstein, ).

It should be noted that world-systems analysis has come under heavy criticism. In particular, some critics have suggested that it does not take account for changes in the positions of countries in the world system. On one hand, some countries are no longer as powerful, or as ‘central’, as they once were. England is perhaps the most obvious example but we could also include nations such as Holland, Italy and France. On the other, Evans (1995), for instance, has argued
that “the structure of the global division of labor offers opportunities, enabling developing nations to transform themselves and change their positions in the global economy” (Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy, p. 18). On a similar line, Firebaugh suggests that foreign investment seems to stimulate growth, to improve national welfare, and benefit the masses and not just the elites (Firebaugh, 1992). Thus, for some critics, the world economic system “does not always work to the detriment of the peripheral countries and to the benefit of the core countries” (Andersen and Thomas, 2008, p. 256).

With more specific regard to the migration process, critics have suggested that while world-systems analysis provides a framework to understand the conditions by which migration begins, it does not address the question as to how it is sustained. In this vein, world-systems analysis has been criticized for being too structural, in particular discounting the role of politics and the state in social and economic change (Brettell and Hollifield, ). More generally, it could be said that most criticisms of the world-system model “concern its overly global, detached from the reality on the ground and, thus, much too simplified explanatory approach to the international movement of people” (Morawska, ). Thuno (Internal and International Migration), for instance, is critical of the way in which world-systems analysis “suggests that only macro-level analysis of the capitalist world market structure can explain international migration.” Ulin
also suggests that world systems theory “glosses over subjectivity and intersubjectivity.” “To grasp the complexities of peoples on the move and the ever-shifting terrain of local and transnational identities,” he argues, “it is necessary to focus on engaged human subjects” (2004, p. 160). Other critics have asked where too are the ‘meso-level’ institutions? (Faist, in International Migration, Immobility and Development). Social networks, private institutions and voluntary organizations mediate and assist the migration process. As they become known or ‘institutionalized’, they accumulate a degree of social capital in the eyes of aspiring migrants, becoming a node through which migrations are channeled or mapped. As Faist () explains, once ‘pioneer’ migrants have moved abroad, “relatives, friends, and acquaintances can draw upon social capital and process of ‘chain migration’ develop.” What both of these types of criticisms share is a concern with the level of analysis, highlighting that many causal explanations for migration that may operate simultaneously.

I share Andersen and Thomas’ view that, despite these criticisms, “world systems theory has provided a powerful tool for understanding global inequality” (2008, p. 256). In particular, it provides a conceptual language through which to describe the relationship between donor and recipient countries. The essence of Wallerstein’s argument, the notion of a core-periphery impetus, seems especially germane. Certainly, since rugby went professional in
1995 a ‘world system’ of sorts has been developing: the ‘core’ states (England, France, Australia, New Zealand, and, perhaps, South Africa) set the rules for—and derive wealth from—the flows of athletic labor. The Pacific Islands, by contrast, can generally be categorized as peripheral. It would also be fair to suggest that the peripheral nations of the Pacific are deeply entangled in an unequal, arguably dependent, relationship with the core countries. Recent decisions by the IRB imply that, like Wallerstein’s core areas of the world economy, rugby’s core similarly organize the trade in athletic labour to favor their own interests. Critics in Samoa argue that the outflow of players is impoverishing or “de-skilling” (Jarvie and Maguire, 1994) the Samoan game (ref) and that the core nations dictate the terms of this trade, setting the rules of trade, and providing no compensation to Samoan rugby.

As Paul Darby has noted, it is difficult to assess the impact of sports migration on donor countries (Darby, 2001). This certainly appears to be apropos of Samoan rugby. Some have argued that talent migration has contributed to the development of Pacific rugby (refs). There are some indications that this could be the case. Samoa’s national side has undoubtedly benefited from its players choosing to play in professional competitions off-shore than in amateur competitions at home. But this view of the impact of labour migration is strongly contested in Samoa. Local pundits seem to be in agreement that out-migration
has seriously deskill the local game and undermined the development of Pacific Islands rugby. One witness to the growth of player recruitment in Samoa suggests that scouts for teams from Australia and New Zealand “have very little interest in the player’s future. They’re just looking for the buck. I wouldn’t say it’s an epidemic, but yes, the islands have been raped and pillaged, agents have come in and thrown players to the four corners, regardless of the huge social adjustment necessary” (quoted in Slot, 2005).

In addition, while rugby certainly provides a (small) number of Samoan boys with the opportunity to further their education, they seldom return to Samoa, choosing instead to declare themselves eligible for the country in which they ply their trade (Gregory, 2004; Slot, 2005). As the Samoan-based journalist Peter Rees suggests, Island unions such as Samoa have become “no more than feeders for the Wallabies and All Blacks, a production line guaranteed to keep them strong” (Rees, 2005). There is cause to wonder too about the inflexibility of the IRB’s eligibility laws when, given deeply-involved history with New Zealand, Samoa would seem to provide an exceptional case. Arguably, relaxing these laws for players from Samoa would do more for the strength of Samoan rugby than their current strategy of cash-injections. Beyond mere economics it would lead to greater parity in world rugby. As Kayes (2004) notes, currently “the sad fact for rugby is that no team outside the top six [sides]...has a realistic
hope of winning anything meaningful.” While the IRB has recently implemented what it calls an “unprecedented three-year global strategic investment programme aimed at driving the competitiveness of the global game” (IRB, 2008), one wonders whether nations such as Samoa may improve even quicker if they were accorded greater flexibility in choosing qualified players. While Samoa are currently 12th on the IRB’s world rankings, it is interesting to ask, as does the British rugby-writer Stephen Jones (2007), “Just how great would Samoa be if they had ever been allowed to choose all their eligible players?…they could well by now, tiny islands or not, have become world champions.”

While it therefore possible to interpret the migration of rugby players from Samoa as contributing to both the development and under-development of the Samoan game, the loss of Samoan players can “clearly be interpreted as an extension of broader neo-imperialist exploitation of the developing world by the developed world” (Darby, Akindes, and Kirwin, 2007, p. 157). The fact that New Zealand remains the most popular destination of Samoan migrant rugby players also says much about the strength of the link between migration in rugby and the broader socio-economic impact of colonialism. Despite the fact that Samoa gained independence in 1962 the exodus of Samoan players continues to follow a pattern which, at a superficial level, appears to have its roots in imperialists connections. There is also some license to suggest that Samoan talent migration
to New Zealand can be interpreted as a form of ‘cultural imperialism’
(Tomlinson, 2001). New Zealand’s exploitation of labour power and material
resources is clear. But New Zealand rugby could also be charged with producing
a malign cultural effect. In particular, there appears to be a growing devaluation
of Samoan rugby. Competing for New Zealand, or now even a professional club
side, has increasingly become more important that representing one’s own
country. Even the SRFU Chairman has suggested that Samoa can now only hope
to get New Zealand’s “discards” given that the All Blacks, as opposed to Samoa,
has become the ultimate goal of most Samoan players (). For instance, in a recent
piece on the difficulties facing Samoan rugby, New Zealand Herald quotes one
New Zealand-bound schoolboy player as admitting to the fact that, “of course”,
he would rather play for the All Blacks than Manu Samoa. As Rees (2005)
suggests, increasingly “to aspiring young rugby players in the Pacific Islands, the
lure of fame and fortune located right on their doorstep can be overwhelming.”

Many young Samoans also appear to be being exploited, being seen as a
source of labor rather than human beings, and subjected to forms of
discrimination. Here it is possible to posit an analogy between rugby’s migration
system and the economic system in the South Pacific. Like the easily expendable
(returnable) immigrants who came to New Zealand to fill the industrial work
demands of the 1950s and 60s, Samoan rugby players have seemingly become
New Zealand’s new labor mercenaries. We can draw here on what Maguire and Bale (1994) see as the ancillary trading in sporting bodies: with the athletic labor of the peripheries being “the equivalent of the cash crops which they sell in other sectors of the world economy” (p. 16). In many ways the analogy is constructive. Arguably, in the context of sports labor migration, the athlete is reduced to a body, the body to a commodity: and, as such, the athlete becomes dehumanized, quantifiable, absorbed into the world of markets of productive exchange (Maguire, 1999; Maguire and Bale, 1994). This ‘commodification’ of the body can be seen to have added significance in relation to the bodies of ‘Others.’ As I have argued in Chapter 2, and as Carrington (2001) notes, historically, “one of the central components to the emasculating discourses of white racism” (p. 107) has been the dehumanization of the Other body (see also Gilroy, 2000; Hall, 1997; Mercer, 1989; St Louis, 2005). Carrington’s analysis of the black athletic body seems equally applicable to the Polynesian body when he notes how “forms of bio-political governance of the (black) population during the eras preceding decolonisation, that sought to supervise, regulate and discipline black bodies through various repressive mechanisms” (p. 106) find their contemporary parallel in the commodification, and subsequent regulation, of the black athletic migrant. In a similar fashion, a long tradition of reducing racial Otherness to the body, to the physical (Gilroy, 2000; Hall, 1997), arguably provides the context
within which the exploitation of Samoan (rugby) labor can be understood. In rugby, as elsewhere, the Samoan body is a source of physical labor, a commodity to be bought and sold to the highest, or most prestigious, bidder. While the movements of (sporting) capital may provide new strategies of, and possibilities for, immigrant mobility, these logics and practices are produced within particular structures of meaning about race, gender, class, nationality, and social power: regimes of rights and administration may not necessarily follow political borders, yet, there is nonetheless a distinct racial and class stratification inherent in global systems of production, exchange, and governance. As Carrington (2001) has suggested, “the commodification of the black [Samoan?] athletic body is in many ways the cultural logic of post/colonial [rugby?] racism” (p. 109).

There is also a *symbolic* significance of the Samoan body in this transnational, sporting ethno-racial order. As Stuart Hall notes, the meanings embedded within cultural representations organize and regulate social practices, and consequently provide sites for the interpellation of individuals into specific gendered, classed, and racialized subjectivities (Hall, 1997a). Thus, just as *political-economic structures* govern and discipline the flows of Samoan athletic bodies, the *cultural representation* of these bodies “operate[s] to sustain specific power relationships between groups and therefore influence lived cultures” (Hall, 1997a). If representation is a site for the construction and constitution of
identities, collective and individual, then of specific relevance to the social identities of Samoans is the way in which Western culture has long traded in images of Polynesian Otherness (again, see Chapter 3). Moreover, the conspicuous contemporary success of Samoans in cultural arenas such as music, television, the arts, and sport may arguably play into the stereotypes of imperial encounter—a ‘Pacifica exotica’ of the friendly savage, the native entertainer, the physically gifted athlete/body. Critical analysis of such conventional conceptions of Polynesian-ness is crucial given that “we can understand stereotyping as an effect of power—as a discursive strategy that attempts to establish particular subject positions as fixed...as a way of legitimating social hierarchies and inequalities” (Carrington, 2001, p. 92).
CHAPTER 5

Pacific Peoples and the Diasporic Sporting Imaginary

Uplift the standard 2 worldwide, way past local

- King Kapisi

In October of 2004 the University of Auckland opened its new US$4 million Pacific Studies Centre. Its centrepiece, a modern Fale Pasifika, was hailed by one reporter as “a working tribute to achievements behind half a century of migration from the South Pacific to New Zealand” (Field, 2004). In her opening speech, Dr Melani Anae, director of the Centre for Pacific Studies, echoed the sentiment: the fale, she said, fulfilled the dreams of “parents and grandparents who came to Aotearoa so that their children and their children’s children would have a better education.” “My parents, like many other migrants,” she continued, “worked on factory floors, but they had dreams for us, their children, that New Zealand would be a better place for succeeding generations.” Certainly, the New Zealand of 2004 seemed like a ‘better place’ for Pacific people than in years past. Whereas, Pacific Islanders in New Zealanders during the 1970s were frequently stereotyped as having a proclivity toward “criminal behaviour, drunkenness, immorality, fecundity, disease and ghettoism” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 150), such was
the change by 2004 that Tongan Publisher Kalafi Moala was so moved as to declare it “the year of Pasifika in Aotearoa” (Moala, 2004). As evidence, he cited examples from the worlds of hip-hop, opera, television, film and drama, fashion, and business. Summing up the year he wrote: “From the entertainment stage to the rugby field, from the halls of wisdom to the corridors of business, Pacific Islanders have been stamping their mark in the Land of the Long White Cloud.” Once accused of being unable or unwilling to integrate (Macpherson, 1996), by 2004 Pacific people were “making their mark in the mainstream” (Schaer, 2007, p. 54).

As I have already argued, this mark in the mainstream is, however, decidedly uneven. On the one hand, popular ‘ethnic practices’ such as drama, dance and music have been successfully turned into highly visible national spectacles. On the other, this success comes with a price. In engaging with the nation’s politics of recognition, Pacific people, like other ‘ethnics’, are forced “to perform in a way that is recognizable”, to “constantly and repetitively demonstrate the already agreed upon markers of their ethnicity” (Gershon, 2007, p. ?). As Loto et al (2006) have noted, representations of Pacific people “have notoriously been confined to tourist adverts, sports sections or Crimewatch.” The success stories also tend to reflect an enrichment discourse whereby Pacific people are embraced only “if they conform to Palangi norms, or if their creativity
can be assimilated into the dominant culture” (Loto at al, 2006). This celebration of particular forms of diversity is also connected to the subtle power of liberalism, wherein tolerance is mobilized to manage. The apparently more inclusive constructions of ‘the nation’ belie the fact that ‘difference’ becomes institutionalized and hierarchized, thus reinforcing Pakeha cultural hegemony. Pacific multiculturalism’s focus on culture can also occlude or minimize important economic and material questions, ignoring too specific political activisms and their histories. ‘Multiculturalism’ as embodied in costumes, cooking, and concerts, fails to foreground power and privilege, consumption “function[ing] as a substitute for actual social relations or the continuing work of desegregation and antiracism” (Gunew, 1997, pp. 25-26; for further discussion see Chapter 1). While recognizing the ubiquity of the Pacific diaspora, Pacific multiculturalism takes place at a level of abstraction that evades a more profound engagement with the possibilities of cultural transformation.

To this point, then, I have suggested Pacific multiculturalism as amounting to little more than a rhetorical reworking of the assimilation game that underwrites the processes of European imperialism and colonisation. Via an ideological sleight of hand, Pacific multiculturalism regraphs the centre and the margins of New Zealand society, representing ethnicity as a supplement to an unmarked dominant Pakeha culture. Ostensibly committed to the liberal
principles of tolerance, so-called ‘ethnic’ cultures are marginalized as objects of
tolerance. We could ask, as does David Bennett (1998), “in what sense can a
minoritized culture be asked to ‘tolerate’ the majority or ‘national’ culture that
assigns it the marginal status of a minority?” (p. 6). To rework the words of Hage
(2000), I have suggested that “the popular language of acceptance…reinforces the
placing of [Pakeha] in the position of power within the discourse of tolerance”
(1994, p. 23). This is all to say that Pacific multiculturalism grants Pacific people
subjectivity without granting them agency (Kamboureli, 1998)—hence, my
question as to whether the All Blacks are in fact the embodiment of a redefined
ethnic landscape, or merely a multicultural ‘tool’ at the disposal of the dominant
Pakeha majority. While I lean toward the latter, we cannot, however, wholly
dismiss the transformative possibilities afforded by the increased visibility of
Pacific peoples. Rugby, in particular, may offer a site for political contestation.
Even as Pakeha power is being consolidated in everyday economic and political
life, rugby offers a symbolic space for Pacific peoples to challenge dominant
projections of New Zealand culture. In this chapter I suggest that, however much
rugby remains a ‘white man’s game’, it also constitutes in Avtar Brah’s terms, a
type of “diaspora-space”, “a point of confluence of economic, political, cultural
and psychic processes…where multiple subject positions are juxtaposed,
contested, proclaimed or disavowed” (1996, p. 208). That is, rugby functions as a
space through which national, ethnic, and diasporic identities are articulated and played out.

My premise in this chapter borrows from Paul Gilroy’s take on “black expressive culture” and the way it functions as a site of investigation, reworking and transformation” (Gilroy, 1993). Any analysis of the political dimensions of Pacific rugby, as a form of expressive culture, must reckon with the position of Pacific athletes within a wider Pacific diaspora. Like those of Gilroy’s “syncretic cultures of black Britain”, rugby is a cultural practice that Pacific peoples have been able to detach from its origin and use to “found and extend the new patterns of metacommunication which give their community substance and collective identity” (Gilroy, 1991, p. 217). Players such as Tana Umaga, or Bryan Williams, or Michael Jones, for instance, form part of the cultural resources through which Pacific peoples express diasporic affiliation. They represent, perhaps not equally but still in a significant way, multiple locations, loyalties, and identities. As Paul Spoonley writes, “the activities and perceptions of New Zealand-born and based Pacific peoples creates new identity positions and options for diasporic communities—wherever they are located” (2001, pp. 92-93).

There exists in Pacific rugby performative elements that lie beyond the official discourses of nationalism. Rugby, though it mobilizes national sentiment, as I
argue in this chapter, also functions as a “a situational context or space in which
diasporic agendas and coalition politics are articulated” (Madan, 2000, p. 29).

Oceans and Islands: Pacific Paradigms

In the nineteenth-century the Pacific was carved up into what Barclay
(1978) calls “The Colonial Ocean.” A new world order was established in which
Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the
Netherlands laid claim to territories, annexed lands, and put in place colonial
administrations. Between traders, sailors, missionaries, and settlers, the Pacific
was transformed from a region “into fragments of empires annexed or
‘protected’ by powerful European nation-states.” These imperialist maps not
only described the new colonies: the colonies could also be disciplined through
the mapping of these “discursive grids of Western power/knowledge” (p. 15). In
Trinh Minh-ha’s terms, claiming and renaming the Pacific secured for Europeans
“a position of mastery.” For the Western speaker, the I, “I am in the midst of a
knowing, acquiring, deploying world—I appropriate, own and demarcate my
sovereign territory as I advance.” Dividing the Pacific was thus a means of
control. In particular, the referent of history became not the ocean but the nation
and this new cartography demanded allegiances which cut across other
affiliations and networks. As Hau’ofa (1993) notes, “people were confined to
their tiny spaces, isolated from each other. No longer could they travel freely to
do what they had done for centuries” (see also Hau’ofa, 1998). Maps and borders took with them many long-running maritime systems of trade and exchange, they severed inter-island connections that in some cases had existed for centuries. The Pacific came to be defined not by its connections but its insularity: they were ‘islands’ not only in the geographic sense, as an objective reality, but as a state-of-mind. That is, islands and insularity led to “enclosed thinking” (Bongie, 1998). The sense of belonging in the Pacific incorporated this insularity and identities became fixed in isolation, insular discourses, and reductionist legacies. As Beer contends, and as became apparent in the Pacific, islands bring with them “at once the notion of solitude and of a founding population” (p. 32).

We could say of the Pacific, then, that insularity came to have both a topographic and figurative significance. Obviously an island is a space unto itself. But as a consequence it becomes “an ideal metaphor for a traditionally conceived, unified and unitary identity” (Bongie, 1998, p. 18). Identity is, in essence, rendered secure by insularity: ‘islands’ structure certain beliefs about national character and destiny. These prevailing notions of the Pacific since European ‘discovery’ have painted a picture of a series of islands limited by their absolute size and by their isolation. Colonial paradigms have in this way held back the construction of a regional identity because they recourse to cleavage and division. The apparent insularity of Pacific peoples appears less significant than
the connections between people. Yet in recent decades something has been changing. Borders are becoming increasingly permeable and loyalties multiple. Through waves of migration large numbers of people have left the Islands to seek new opportunities in places like New Zealand, Australia and the United States. These drifts have produced significant migrant communities in the metropolitan center. For groups such as Cook Islanders, Niueans and Tokalauans the numbers resident ‘offshore’ now far exceed those ‘at home.’ In the case of Samoans ....were resident in New Zealand, ......in Australia, and another ... in the United States. Meanwhile, the population of Samoa is estimated to be.... In part the “social gravity” (Macpherson and Macpherson, 1999, p. 277) of the islands has also shifted to the city. With numbers in cities larger than ‘origin’ societies the nature of the relationship between ‘home’ and ‘abroad’ has changed. New human and capital resources have been built as new generations have been born and raised in new homes.

To the pessimistic this is cause for concern. The combination of remittances and aid inflows from abroad have arguably become so important to a number of the smaller islands that they are now MIRAB economies; dependent on migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy (Bertram and Watters, 1985). The view is that countries in the South Pacific region consequently have limited development potential (see Poirine, 1998). For others, however, the cities are just
part of the process of what Hau’ofa (1993) calls “world enlargement” (p. 90). As Hau’ofa writes, the resources of the Pacific Islands

are no longer confined to their national boundaries; they are located wherever these people are living permanently or otherwise... Islanders have broken out of their confinement... They are once again enlarging their world, establishing new resources bases and expanded networks for circulation (p. 94).

And, circulation is certainly the right word here. While we in the West have tended to think of migration as a unilinear process (Lie, 2001), a one-way ticket so to speak, the Islands are increasingly built on reciprocity; of goods, of capital, of ideas, and of people. Consider Paul Spickard’s portrait of life in the Pacific diaspora:

One family migrates from Samoa to the North Shore of the island of Oahu... their son goes to Harvard, works in business and state government, runs for Congress, and serves on the Honolulu city council. Another family leaves Tonga in the 1970s and establishes outposts in Auckland, Sydney, Inglewood, and Salt Lake City. They work in construction, small businesses, and tending children. Their second generation forms churches and gangs and goes to college. For a quarter century they remain in weekly contact with one another by mail, then by phone and jumbo jet, and finally by e-mail and the World Wide Web.

New identities have sprung up within these circuits. Islanders are increasingly drawing on multiple heritages (Anae, 2004; Nero, 1997; Spoonley, 2001). These draw as well on external links and movement. This is particularly apparent in New Zealand, and especially in Auckland, where New Zealand-born Pacific peoples are taking elements of the cultures of ‘home’ and “filtering them
through their own experiences and building them into a new distinctive identity” (Macpherson, 1998, p. 92). Among younger Pacific peoples one of the more popular identities is that of the acronymous ‘PI’ (short for Pacific Islander) which plays on the theme of commonality between the islands. Explaining its appeal Anae (2001) suggests that PI offers an identification that is “broader and less specific” than ‘Samoan’ or ‘Tongan’ or ‘Niuean’ and “a much larger peer group” (p. 111). It is important to note, however, that even as they seek to link to a higher level identity, Pacific peoples are not necessarily denying their connections to a particular place in Polynesia. Rather, various forms of Samoan or Tongan or Cook Island identity may be seen as nested within this emerging diasporic identity. The result is a complex articulation of coalitional politics based on both diasporic nationalism and an affinity with ‘homeland.’ That PI oscillates between ethnic and diasporic consciousness is not to overlook that choosing PI as identity can be viewed as a political act, a signal of the fact that “large, globally connected, migrant communities are shifting away from the ethnic and national subjectification into postmodern spaces that are beyond the National ideal” (Madan, 2000, p. 34). In Hall’s (1990) terms, PI can be considered as a ‘positioning’, a conjunctural or conditional play on identity in which different ethnic groups merge and adopt a common identity in specific contexts (Gillespie, 1995; Spivak, 1988).
Defining (?) Diaspora

I wish to elaborate further on how these new ways of identifying have challenged the forms of traditional sets of relations such as those around ethnicity or nation. I also aim to explore the growth of both “‘transnational corporations of kin’ and ‘transnational island societies’, which include people who have never been out of the home islands and others who have never been in them” (Anae, 2001). First, however, I wish to develop a framework within which to understand how the political identities and practices of Pacific peoples are shaped between and within contexts of both migrant homelands and host societies. As the title of this chapter suggests, I have increasingly come to favor the notion of ‘diaspora’ as a way of understanding the processes “whereby disconnected people can communicate ideas and shared interests, and (re)establish relations and identities (real and imagined)” (Carrington, 2000, p. 265). Diaspora, I argue, is a politically and intellectually useful tool. Unlike the nation which boxes us in to Manichean terms of inclusion and exclusion, “diaspora makes clear that identities are formed across territorial boundaries and that structures of domination—be they cultural, social, political, or economic—are never simply co-extensive with national borders” (King, 2006, p. 99). I want to suggest that the notion of diaspora can also be productively adapted as a model to comprehend the lives, travels, migrations and significances of
Polynesian athletes. By performing on an international stage that is largely unattainable for Pacific peoples in other cultural spheres, their sporting activities have acquired a political significance that transcends the sporting arena. In particular, the sports arena operates as an important symbolic space through which national, ethnic, and diasporic identities are articulated and played out.

But what exactly is a ‘diaspora’ and what does it mean to be ‘diasporic’? Traditionally, the term diaspora has been used to refer to the dispersion of the Jews among the gentiles and their belief in an eventual return to the lost homeland. In recent cultural theory, however, ‘diaspora’ has been “freed from its restriction to Jewish history and experience”, and frequently comes into use as a reference to “any processes of dispersion and to relate to countless so-called dislocated, de-territorialized communities” (Baumann, 2000, p. 314). In North America, it is now “a term of choice to express the links and commonalities among groups of African descent throughout the world” (Edwards, 2001, p. 45). There have also been extensive historiographies of Armenian (Aghanian, 2007), Greek (Clogg, 1999; Kaloudis, 2006), Italian (Gabaccia, 2000), and Irish (Bielenberg, 2000) ‘diasporas.’ This is to ignore studies of ‘diasporic’ Kurd, Palestinian, Chinese, Tamil, Indian “and many more nationally, culturally or religiously constituted communities” (for review see, Cohen 1997, Safran, 1991). Such is its influence that, in many ways, diaspora has become, as Phil Cohen
observes, “one of the buzz words of the post modern age” (Cohen, 1998, p. 1). Certainly the term has enjoyed something of a renaissance when it comes to debates around ethnicity, nationality and nationhood, boundaries and identity. Indeed, according to Butler (2001), there has been an exponential increase in scholarship in ‘diaspora studies’ in recent years.

The rise of a new ‘diaspora discourse’ (Lie, 1995), though, has not been matched by any clear consensus in terminology. “The referent,” writes Fludernik (2003), “seems to resist precise definition” (p. xii). Butler too goes on explain that, while scholarship flourishes, “we have actually become less clear about what defines diasporas and makes them a distinct category” (p. 189). Even Steven Vertovec, one of the area’s more prominent scholars, has been moved to note that “in a burgeoning body of literature, academics across the humanities and social sciences often disagree on contemporary definitions of ‘diaspora,’ its typical reference points, characteristic features, limits, and social dynamics.” Simply put, we could say the idea of diaspora, as Robin Cohen remarks, “varies greatly” (Cohen, 1997). Thus, it is wholly appropriate to begin this section with a caveat: while diaspora is a concept widely applied, its definition is the subject of ongoing debate. This is not to dismiss the incisive definitions offered by scholars such as James Clifford, William Safran or Robin Cohen (Clifford, 1997; Cohen, 1997; Safran, 1991). Instead, it is a remark on the very fluidity of the term, embracing as
it does anything from the violence of ‘victim’ diasporas to the high-flying worlds of cultural and political elites.

That diaspora is a ‘traveling’ term is, on one hand, cause for concern. Some suggest it risks losing its analytic purchase when applied indiscriminately. What is unique about ‘diaspora’ when it seems to refer to any number of ‘deterritorialized identities’? What are its advantages over cognate phenomenon?

Below I wish to briefly consider how theorists have responded to such concerns, giving preference to those works that are mentioned with regularity and/or that highlight the recurrent features of the ‘diaspora debate.’ My goal here is not to provide a comprehensive survey of the field, but rather to outline what Sudesh Mishra (2006) might term “scenes of exemplification…within the larger scene of the genre” (p. 173). Wishing to avoid generalizations or impose a false continuity, I suggest that attempting to arrive at any defining characteristics or endemic attributes is, however, counter-intuitive (and, perhaps even counter-productive). Diapora

s are precisely that: plural in number and nature. They are complexly unique events characterized by contrary and anomalous effects that defy easy classification. The nature of diasporic politics (see Laguerre, 2006) is equally manifold and case specific. For instance, ‘diaspora’ may variously encompass cosmopolitan anti-nationalists or reactionary ethno-nationalists (see Kaldor, 1996), ‘primordialists’ (for critique, see Falzon, 2003) or those who see in it the
evolution of a hybrid, ‘thirdspace’ (Bhabha, 1994). Ironically, then, while some profiles ostensibly capture the “full scope, diversity and complexity” of “existing diasporas” (Sheffer, 2003, p. 76), such frameworks may in fact not be universal enough. As a consequence, my way through this definitional mire is to avoid any attempts to ‘pin diaspora down.’ Instead I focus on what animates the dynamics of ‘diasporic’ groups. I prefer to see diaspora as defined by disposition as opposed character, distinguished by fluid “elective affinities” (Hess, 1999) rather than attributes. It is this structure of diasporic dispositions, I argue, that “underlies the transmission and reinvention of distinctive cultural forms and practices” (Parker, 2000, p. 84) that some see as endemic to diasporic life.

Though I begin from the premise, then, that “nobody’s diaspora looks wholly like their neighbour’s” (Fludernik, 2003, p. xi), there is no lack for scholars who have attempted to define the term. One of the earliest, and most cited, reviews is William Safran’s “Diasporas in Modern Societies” which appeared in the inaugural issue of the journal *Diaspora* in 1991 (Safran, 1991). In brief, Safran considers the defining characteristics of diasporas to be “expatriate minority communities” who: (1) are dispersed to two or more locations, from an original “center” to at least two “peripheral” locations; (2) maintain, and are bound by, a collective mythology of homeland, a “memory” or “vision” of origin; (3) are alienated from their hostland (they believe, writes Safran, that
“they are not—and perhaps cannot be—fully accepted by their host country”); (4) idealize “return”, who believe their ‘ancestral home’ to be a place of eventual return; and, (5) and (6) maintain an ongoing relationship with their homeland, firstly by way of a commitment to “restoration”, to its independence, safety, and prosperity, and, secondly through a group consciousness and solidarity defined by this commitment (Safran, 1991, pp. 83-84). In a later review of literature Cohen (1998) offers a very similar set of attributes. He sees “an implicit rule of thumb at work” in which “the basic assumption” seems be that diaspora refers to:

a) A large scale physical dispersal of supposedly homogeneous populations (viz. the Armenians, the Sikhs) from a single originating point in time and space due to some catastrophic event.

b) Simultaneous or successive re-settlement over long distances at multiple and heterogeneous foreign locations in which populations make themselves a (temporary or permanent) home from home.

c) A strong sense of being displaced from ethnic/national territories and a desire to return or to claim entitlements to them (Cohen, 1998, p. 5).

Butler (2001), like Cohen, identifies three features to which most diaspora scholars “seem to agree.” Again, dispersal to “a minimum of two destinations.” Secondly, a relationship “to an actual or imagined homeland.” And, finally, Butler emphasizes the notion of ‘group consciousness’ identified by both Cohen
and Safran: “There must be,” she argues, “self-awareness of the group’s identity. Diasporan communities are *consciously* part of an ethnonational group” (p. 192; original emphasis). To these categories, Butler adds temporal-historical dimension: “its [diaspora] existence over at least two generations” (p. 192).

Of these types of ‘working lists’, Safran (2005) rather wisely recognizes that no diaspora “conforms completely” (p. 39). Nor could it, argues Clifford (1994). As he suggests, “no society can be expected to qualify on all counts, throughout its history” (p. 306). Taking this into account, Vertovec (1997) turns instead to various typologies, or what he calls “meanings”, of diaspora. Rather than identifying an ‘ideal type’, or a range of phenomena that we could call ‘diasporic’, Vertovec (1997) recognizes three current approaches to diaspora. He argues diaspora has been taken variously as: (1) a social form; (2) a type of consciousness; and, (3) as a mode of cultural production (interestingly, these mirror the first three conceptual premises he elsewhere identifies of transnationalism [see Vertovec, 1999]). In the first instance, Vertovec sees a diaspora as a group “characterised by their relationship-despite-dispersal” (p. ?). Diasporas are social formations spanning the traditional borders of the ‘nation-state’, they are “transnational communities in the sense identified by Guarnizo and Smith (1998). As Vertovec argues elsewhere, one of the hallmarks of diaspora as a social form is the “triadic relationship” (see also Safran, 1991)
between: “(a) globally dispersed yet collectively self-identified ethnic groups, (b) the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside, and (c) the homeland states and contexts whence they or their forebears came” (Vertovec, 1999, p. 449).

As a type of consciousness, ‘diaspora’ “puts greater emphasis on describing a variety of experience, a state of mind and a sense of identity.” Diaspora consciousness is akin to Safran’s “ethnocommunal consciousness” (1991, pp. 84-85), and is marked by acuity to border-spanning, interconnection, and to “decentred attachments” (Vertovec, 1999, p. 450). It is a consciousness of “being different from surrounding society, and ‘an awareness of multilocality’” (Safran, 2005, p. 50). Finally, diaspora as a mode of cultural production can be seen, argues Vertovec, in the “world-wide flow of cultural objects, images and meanings resulting in variegated processes of creolisation, back-and-forth transferences, mutual influences, new contestations, negotiations and constant transformations” (1997, p. ?). Diaspora in this way involves the production and reproduction of transnational, constructed styles and identities which other authors have variously described in terms of syncretism (Gilroy, 1993; Stewart, 1999), creolization (Hannerz, 1987, 1992), bricolage (Hebdige, 1979), cultural translation (Hall, 1992), and hybridity (Nederveen Pieterse, 1994).

Significantly, in his overview Vertovec also identifies the political qualities of contemporary diasporas. As he contends:
Individual immigrants may be significant actors, or collective associations may be powerful pressure groups, in the domestic politics of their host countries as well as in the international political arena, usually prompted by their interest in the political plight of a country of origin.

Politics are important too for Bruneau (1995). He labels “political diasporas” as the third of his typologies of “diasporic organization”—the political dimension of diaspora only too obvious in the fact he cites the Palestinian and Tibetan ‘diasporas’ as exemplars of this category. It should be noted that there is a degree of debate about the nature of ‘diasporic politics’ however. On one hand scholars such as Stuart Hall, Homi Bhabha, Paul Gilroy and James Clifford see ‘diaspora’ as contrary to the hegemonic narratives of ‘ethnicity’, ‘race’, and ‘nation. Others such as Mitchell (1997) have questioned whether diasporic politics, in the sense used by these scholars, are necessarily anti-essentialist. Mary Kaldor (1996) and Makarand Paranjape (2003) are two another examples. Kaldor points to the presence of both cosmopolitan anti-nationalists and reactionary ethno-nationalists within diasporas, while Paranjape refers to the fact that “diasporic communities are known, at times, to support the most rapidly violent and fanatical of causes” (p. 238). In this school of thought what is critical to diaspora is the acknowledgment of both a ‘source’ and ‘target’ country. The diasporic is engendered through displacement. That is, to be diasporic is to articulate oneself to a collective in which members see themselves as linked through common
heritage; it reflects a disinclination to relinquish one’s connection to a ‘homeland.’

It is important therefore to draw a distinction between could be called ‘ethno-national diasporas’ and diaspora as I wish to use it herein. In brief, the term ‘ethno-national diaspora’ is a relatively specific category of social and political formation. As used by scholars such as Sheffer (2003) this hyphenated term places stress on “the politics of dispersed groups whose members regard themselves as being participants in nations that have common ethnic and national traits, identities, and affinities” (p. 11). In most those who belong believe that they have “a collective history closely connected to a specific homeland…and that they owe a degree of loyalty to their nation” (p. 11). The identities of members of such groups Sheffer thus describes as based on “primordial, instrumental, and mythical/psychological elements” (p. 11). I wish to suggest, however, that this autochthonous view of national history is problematic; in the least because, as I have argued above, popular national identity in the Pacific is only a belated achievement of European colonialism. The nation itself is only an eighteenth-century ‘invention.’ ‘Race’ and ‘culture’ are equally the products of Western scholarly and popular thought. Most modern scholars agree that the cultural boundaries of the Pacific have similarly “always been dynamically changing an permeable” (Linnekin, 1997, p. 9). We may be
better to think in terms of not ‘Samoans’, ‘Tongans’, ‘Cook Islanders’ and the like, but of “People of the sea” (D’Arcy, 1997, p. 74), a community of islands connected “in a wider social world of moving items and ideas” (Irwin, 1992, p. 204). In the words of Lie (2001), national history is not endogenous, and the “vision of the homogenous nation dispersing people at the margins fundamentally distorts the past and present” (p. 359). We must, as he warns, guard against viewing “diasporic outflow” as merely “a dispersal of a marginal minority outside of the national borders” (p. 359).

To paraphrase Zenner (1983), I therefore take diasporic communities to have no necessary hinterland; there is no inevitable land ‘left behind.’ Following Gilroy (1992, 1993, 1994), I am weary of equating nation with culture, race, and ethnicity because in the Pacific people have no necessary origins from which they are ‘transmitted’ nor do they have a territorial end. The circulation of ideas, politics, commodities, iconographies and peoples of the Pacific are non-linear, and as a consequence the “dual territorial schema” of diaspora (Mishra, 2006, p. 53) seems wholly inadequate. I am also want to suggest that the exponents of this dual territorial approach merely repeat what Sudesh Mishra describes as “an ideological ploy in representing diasporas as self-marking ethnic minorities sundered from a homeland entity and residing in a host territory belonging self-evidently to a dominant ethno-national entity” (2006, p. 55; original emphasis).
Space in the Pacific is perhaps best understood not as an allusion to fixity or place but “more in terms of the ex-centric communicative circuitry that has enabled dispersed populations to converse, interact and even synchronise significant elements of their social and cultural lives” (Gilroy, 1994, p. 211).

Pacific space so conceived means terms such as Pacific Islander, PI, or Polynesian are less ethno-national or ethno-regional categories than political categories which reference “common experience…among groups and communities with, in fact, very different histories, traditions, and ethnic identities” (Hall, 1988, p. 27). Diaspora in this sense is a means of disrupting traditional notions of space and belonging, a way of introducing “new intermediate concepts, between the local and the global” (Gilroy, 1992, p. 188). I take, therefore, ‘diaspora in a metaphoric, rather than ‘literal’ sense. To borrow from Hall (1990), I see diaspora not as a reference to those scattered tribes whose identity can only be secured in relation to some sacred homeland to which they must at all costs return…The diaspora experience as I intend it here is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity. Diaspora identities are those which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference (p. 235).

Hall’s definition of diaspora gives prominence to an anti-essentialist notion of identity that privileges journey over arrival and mobility over fixity. It puts into tension the notion of national identity as “something pure, self-
contained and unified” (Procter, 2003, p. 131). The whole concept of Hall’s notion of diasporic identity is, as he puts it (Hall, 1994), necessarily a “production” always in process as opposed to a fixed essence or origin. Diasporic identity is “always constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative and myth” (1994, p. 395). Hall’s conception of diaspora is also coexistent if not coterminous with hybridity in that “both denote an important reconfiguration of ‘ethnic’ boundaries and bonds and posit the growth of transnationalism” (Anthias, 2002).

Diaspora for Hall is a collective space in which hybrid social forms flourish. Or, as Boyarin and Boyarin (1993) put it, diasporic cultures survive through mixing.

A Brown Pacific?

These cultures also survive by moving. Diaspora is less about here or there than about a circuit. This critical shift away from ideas of cultural origins and rooted-ness to cultural movement and travel is nowhere better exemplified than in the work of Paul Gilroy. Drawing on the ‘rhizomatic’ metaphors of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1998), in the Black Atlantic Gilroy proposes diaspora as “a more complex, ecologically sophisticated and organic concept of identity than offered by the contending by the contending options of genealogy and geography.” For Gilroy, diasporic identities challenge the connection between the modern nation-state and identity because it opens up
a “historical and experiential rift between the locations of residence and the locations of belonging” (2000, p. 124). In his view diaspora

disrupts the fundamental power of territory to determine identity by breaking the simple sequence of explanatory links between place, location and consciousness. It destroys the naïve invocations of common memory as the basis for particularity by drawing attention to the dynamics of commemoration (1997, p. 328).

In *The Black Atlantic*, Gilroy’s far-reaching critique of ethnic absolutism, he foregrounds histories of crossing, migration, exploration, interconnection and travel. He is particularly fond of using the images of ships and sea voyages to emphasize the “flows, exchanges, and in-between elements” (p. 190) that permit us to move beyond “the dogmatic focus on discrete national dynamics” (p. 6). Like scholars such as Hall and Kobena Mercer (Mercer, 1994), Gilroy is an advocate of reorienting analyses around “hybrid formations, times and spaces”—thus turning our gaze to “social networks (rather than “societies”), border zones, boundary crossing and global society” (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995, p. 63). For Gilroy, diaspora “stands opposed to the distinctively modern structures and modes of power orchestrated by the institutional complexity of nation-states.” Diasporic reflection, he suggests, acknowledges historically-produced difference without imputing a hierarchy of value based on racial identities; at the same time requiring the necessary reconsideration of global cultural formations beyond their mere relation to the national:
Identity conceived diasporically resists reification in petrified forms even if they are indubitably authentic. The tensions around origin and essence that the diaspora brings into view allow us to perceive that identity should not be fossilized in keeping with the holy spirit of ethnic absolutism. Identity, too becomes a noun of process. Its openness provides a timely alternative to the clockwork solidarity based on outmoded notions of ‘race’ and disputed ideas of national belonging (Gilroy, 2000, p. 252).

This notion of identity as a “noun of process” is crucial to the way in which Gilroy conceives the relationship between culture, community, and place as being beyond geography or territory. For Gilroy, identity, as understood diasporically, is based upon shared beliefs and the transnational communication (and consumption) of products, practices, and ideas, rather than the specificities of national cultural boundaries. Thus, diasporic space “operates between and within the outer-national, national, regional and local—occupying all of these spaces at once” (Carrington, 2001, p. 265). Gilroy argues therefore that identity should be defined less through outmoded notions of fixity and place and more in terms of the ex-centric communicative circuitry that has enabled dispersed populations to converse, interact and even synchronise significant elements of their social and cultural lives (1994, p. 211).

Gilroy’s notion of diaspora builds on the ideas of Hall which are discussed in brief above. Indeed, they are both explicitly transnational perspectives which differ markedly from the classic model of diaspora that is “strongly associated with the principles of territory and memory—what James Clifford calls the
“centered model” (Clifford, 1994). What emerges for both authors is a profoundly ‘intercultural’ culture. The move away from nationalistic and essentialist models of cultural production for Gilroy, though, is perhaps best exemplified again in the Black Atlantic. The Black Atlantic is in many ways Gilroy’s idea of diaspora enacted. In this case, Gilroy argues that it is Black identities that cannot be understood in terms of being American, British or West Indian; each can only be understood relationally in the context of the Black diaspora of the Atlantic. Gilroy has particular misgivings about the compartmentalization of black cultural studies into African American, Caribbean, Black British or African studies. He contends that “national units are not the most appropriate basis for studying this history for the African diaspora’s consciousness of itself has been defined in and against constricting national boundaries.” What he wishes to highlight is cross-fertilization taking place between diverse black cultural elements in the “single and complex” unit of the Black Atlantic world. As Lopez-Ropero (2005) explains, identity for members of the Black diaspora is about “coming to terms with the routes they have taken in a journey whose first leg was the middle passage…[they are] in constant dialogue with the imaginary homeland of Africa, their actual European homes, and other places such as the Caribbean” (p. 167).
Gilroy has been attacked by some scholars for paying too little attention to Africa itself. Some have questioned also the utility of the Black Atlantic framework given it fails to account for those syncretisms occurring within national boundaries (see Clifford, 1994). One of the more trenchant critiques, however, is that it leaves little scope for disjunctions and regional differences. As Clifford (1994) notes, “it is important to specify that black South America and the hybrid Hispanic/black cultures of the Caribbean and Latin America are not, for the moment, included in Gilroy’s projections. He writes from a North Atlantic/European location” (p. 320). Certainly, Clifford is right to point to the dangers of conflating diaspora and its particular history of usage in black cultural politics within the Black Atlantic. We should be cautious about using the term Black Atlantic to refer to diaspora studies generally (Edwards, 2001). These are all valid criticisms but, as Gilroy himself notes, the Black Atlantic is intended to be a “provisional” or “heuristic” term of analysis (Gilroy, 1993). Gilroy’s allusions to rhizomes is also, I believe, a conscious attempt to highlight that the Atlantic is an imaginative space of contestation rather than some type of conventional geography. For Gilroy, the Black Atlantic is a formation which transcends ethnic and national paradigms, and is in no way moored to those intercultural exchanges occurring between, and within, those countries whose shores adjoin the eponymous ocean. As …notes, “it is clear from [Gilroy’s]
narrative that the emerging ‘politics of transfiguration’ he describes is not the monopoly of the black Atlantic even if that remains its most insurgent instantiation” (Hitchcock, 1999, p. 102). The Black Atlantic should consequently been seen as more generally “a deterritorialised, multiplex, and anti-national basis for the affinity or ‘identity of passions’ between diverse black populations” (1996, p. 18). The Black Atlantic allows us to conceptualize “versions of solidarity that do not need to repress the differences between one ‘essential community and others’” (Gilroy, 2000, p. 252).

While it seemingly intimates a specific territoriality, the concept therefore does not deny the efficacy of diasporic identification in expressing unique cultural and political agendas; the Black Atlantic is, instead, a metaphor for more general “intermediate” spaces within which local political struggle may be articulated through affiliation to the wider political struggles of the diasporic community(ies). To paraphrase Clifford (1994), the black Atlantic is more than just a signifier of Atlantic cultural exchange, of “transnationality and movement”, but more broadly describes “political struggles to define the local, as distinctive community, in historical contexts of displacement” (p. 308). It is thus a metaphor which is relevant to diasporic transcultural identity generally because it invites moves:

into the contested spaces between the local and the global in ways that do not privilege the modern nation state and its institutional order over the
sub-national and supra-national networks and patterns of power, communication and conflict that they work to discipline, regulate and govern (Gilroy, 1996, p. 22).

The work, then, that diaspora does within the Black Atlantic is to address the “place of betweenness” (to borrow a phrase from Clifford), the “neither/nor situation.” In the Black Atlantic diaspora becomes a marker for a cosmopolitan hybridity in which identities are constructed from “the debris of historical and future possibilities” (Clifford, 1994). It usefulness lies in its ability to link new and diversely peopled communities through conditions of migrancy and transit rather than modernist exile formations that reproduce colonial binaries.

Diasporic subjects are *always* in transit, existing within a ‘travelling culture’, a *mobile* network of affinities.

I have already made intimations above about the diasporic nature of the cultures of Pacific peoples. In the remainder of this section I wish to begin by problematizing the Black Atlantic as it pertains to the context of the Pacific; to ask how the black Atlantic be can “fitted to, articulated with” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 262) the unique set of historical forces and practices that compose the social context within which the identity of Pacific peoples is constituted and negotiated.

In what ways can we talk about a potential ‘Black Pacific’? Gilroy’s Black Atlantic is a continent-oriented theory of postcolonialism infused by the enduring “memory” — as Gilroy puts it—of Black Atlantic slavery. How relevant is such an
‘heuristic’ to a “Sea of Islands” (Hau’ofa, 1993) in which the long and tragic history of slavery, though present, has not cast as long a shadow nor had the same enduring effects on the contemporary consciousness of its people? Is the racism of the Black Atlantic—which so relied on images of Black populations as workers or labourers—akin to the South Pacific’s exotic primitivism—something that qualitatively differs in its relationship to modernity? What else besides the continuity of the experience of slavery or the geographic continuity of the Atlantic are inapplicable to the Pacific?

A useful starting point in beginning to examine these questions is Rod Edmond and Vanessa Smith’s introduction to the edited volume *Islands in History and Representation* (Edmond and Smith, 2003). Between ‘Oceania’ and the Black Pacific they suggest that there are obvious “points of comparison” (p. 11). In particular, what we can take from Gilroy is the way he opposes “a monolithic continental father/motherland” (p. 11). In like fashion the Pacific as conceived diaporically “offers a myriad of homelands scattered across different island groups” (p. 11). There are also parallels in the way in which ‘traditional’ cultures—‘Africanisms’ for Gilroy, ‘Pacificisms’ here perhaps—though they “have survived into modernity their significance and meaning is irrevocably sundered from their origins” (p. 11). Gilroy’s understanding of tradition as “the living memory of the changing same” (1993, p. 198) certainly seems to be
germane to the Pacific context. For Edmond and Smith there are, however, important parts of Gilroy’s argument that are less fitting to studying the Pacific. They include the questions of geography and history intimated above and especially the “absence of systematic racial slavery and the more voluntary nature of its diasporas” (p. 12). Despite these misgivings there are obvious parallels between Gilroy’s account of the Black Atlantic and Edmond and Smith’s description of the “hybrid worlds” of the Pacific as encompassing both a sense of “loss and displacement as well as new geographical and cultural configurations” (p. 10) seems to suggest distinct echoes.

Where Gilroy’s model can most obviously be translated to the Pacific context is in the way it brings our attention back to the ocean. For Gilroy the ocean is a space of connection and transnational exchange. Similarly, in the Pacific identity formation is an ongoing process of travel and exchange across oceans. Apropos of the current study, then, is Gilroy’s attack on the bounded spatial imagination that is common to thinking about culture. The idea of a fixed identity unambiguously belonging to one group—in a ‘contained’ space—is replaced by “notions of more fluid identities belonging to particular subject positions which can vary in intensity and can be combined in many different ways, so challenging homologous explanations” (Anderson et al, 2003, p. 7). Second, in its emphasis on hybridity, Gilroy’s Black Atlantic must be seen as an
imaginative geography of *resistance*. Diasporas challenge ethnicity and ethnic absolutism. Ethnicity is replaced by hybridity, certainty is replaced by critique. A diasporic space also transgresses the boundaries of nationalism. Gilroy stresses a performative element that exists outside of official discourses of nationalism. Put simply, the nation state is subverted by diasporic attachments which construct allegiances elsewhere. We could some up this second point by saying that ‘in-between-ness’ is a productive position. In the space between ‘origin’ and ‘destination’ new forms of culture emerge, what Ang aptly describes as “hybrid cultural forms born out of a productive, creative syncretism” (2001, p. 35). Thus, Polynesian, Pacific Islander, PI become open signifiers “invested with resource potential, the raw material for the construction of syncretic identities suitable for living ‘where you’re at’” (Ang, 2001, p. 35).

‘Grounding’ the Brown Pacific

Extending Gilroy’s metaphor I wish to suggest that, for Pacific people, the Pacific ocean—as a shifting, mobile space of possibility and interconnection between peoples—is a counter force to the rooted territorialities, bounded demarcations and sovereignty claims that organise dry land. The Black Pacific, as we could call it, is a return to the sea as opposed to islands (Hau’ofa, 1993). Ironically, in the Pacific diaspora the Pacific ocean is beginning to resemble the way it was before Europeans, when it had no exclusionary laws, fences, or
border patrols or imaginary cartographic lines, “but rather points of entry that were constantly negotiated and even contested. The sea was open to anyone who could navigate a way through” (Hau’ofa, 1993; see also Hau’ofa, 1998). What we can take from Gilroy is the Black Atlantic’s most central element: “its rejection of classic diasporic center (homeland) and periphery (those longing to return) structures in favor of a decentered geography of postnational, multidirectional cultural flow” (Feldman, 2006, p. 8). But, where we can actually see indications of an emergent ‘Brown Pacific’? It is important here to note that The Black Atlantic is a particular type of diaspora whereby Black Britons look across the Atlantic and elsewhere in order to appropriate the “raw materials for creative purposes which redefine what it means to be black, adapting it to distinctly British experiences and meanings” (Gilroy, 1987, p. 154). Interestingly, we even in the Pacific we can see direct borrowings from the Black Atlantic itself. I read these as examples of the way in which Pacific peoples have entered into a dialogue with international critiques of capitalism and oppression while at the same time critiquing the structures of racial politics in local and national contexts. Arguably, these intellectual and aesthetic appropriations have provided models for the struggle against local discrimination and inequality.

One obvious example is the Polynesian Panthers. Inspired by the Black Panther movement in the United States, the Polynesian Panther Party (PPP) was
formed by a group of inner city Pacific Island and Maori youth in 1971. As one account of the group's history describes it, they were brought together through the “shared experience of racism”. The parents of PPP members were generally among the first wave of Pacific Island people to migrate to New Zealand in the 1950s and 1960s, a group which often bore racism and social injustice in silence. Galvanized by other global protest movements during the late 1960s and early 1970s, their children formed the PPP as an attempt “to alleviate the subordinate position of Pacific peoples in New Zealand”. The Panthers set up homework centres for local children, organised senior citizens’ outings and community food programmes, marched against South African apartheid and the Vietnam war, and advised Pacific Islanders on legal rights.

While for many members the movement was an expression of local identity issues—particularly the tension between first generation Pacific-New Zealanders and their parents and the place of Pacific culture in new urban environments—according to one of its founders it was also an identification with “the sacrifice and struggle by our American brothers.” However, though their political inspiration came from the Black Panther Movement of the US, it is important to stress that it was modified to suit local realities. As one member recalls, “challenging society and the community attitudes and beliefs in regard to the Pacific is what I remember about my time in the PPP.” Notably, the Panthers
were also strong supporters of Māori political initiatives such as the Bastion Point occupation and Waitangi Day protests. One of the PPP’s stated missions was to establish a pan-ethnic grouping of both Maori and Pacific Islanders (Polynesian Panther Party, 1975: 225-226). In 1972, the PPP worked with Nga Tamatoa (a group of young Maori activists) and the Stormtrooper and Headhunter gangs to form a “loose Polynesian Front”; and in 1974 the PPP participated in a meeting “amongst all Maori and Polynesian progressive organisations to form a united front.” In mid-1972, PPP leader Will ‘Ilolahia also toured Australia where he met Aboriginal Black Power groups. On his return he announced plans for “solidarity and co-operation” between the PPP, Aboriginal groups and black power supporters in Papua-New Guinea.

Sujatha Fernandes has noted how minorities in Cuba have “appropriate[d] transnational imaginaries in order to frame local political demands and strategies” (2003, p. 575). Similarly, the PPP is an example of the ways in young Pacific peoples have sought to (re)articulate global flows of African-American culture as a “means for contestation over local discourses of power and race” (Fernandes, 2003, p. 576). Evidence of this “diaspora aesthetic” (Hall, 1990, p. 236) is also apparent in music; hip hop culture in particular, but also in the strong Maori and Polynesian embrace of reggae and soul. Roy Shuker argues that this support “is hardly surprising, since these categories...have
become virtually synonymous with ‘black music.’” Of reggae, in particular, he writes that it
does not simply describe an experience, but it politicizes it through creating symbols for listeners to identify with. Many Maori and Polynesian youth are knowledgable about rasta, and familiar with some of the metaphors in the music (Babylonm Jah, etc) They regard reggae as relevant to the structural location of Maori and Polynesian as a major part of New Zealand’s socially dispossed working class.

The local hip-hop scene is similarly characterized by a “sycretic dynamic” (Mercer, 1988, p. 57) in which young PI cultural practitioners and critics draw upon transnational flows of African-American culture (and diasporic affiliations more generally) as part of local cultural politics and practices which strive to articulate themselves to wider global political struggles. Of rap’s appeal Shuker argues that its adherents are “frequently conscious” of the “politicized nature” of a lot of this work. These issues have been explored in far greater detail than I could do justice to here by Kirsten Zemke-White (Zemke-White, 2002, 2004). Over the purview of her work, perhaps the most salient issue she draws out is how Maori and Polynesian youth have been drawn to hip hop because they see themselves as being in a similar socio-economic situation. Secondly, she identifies how international ‘backyard dialogues’ between global indigenous and hip hop communities has been reinforced by hip hop’s ‘localisation’ and idiosyncratic Pacific expression. Reflecting Chuck D’s contention that “hip hop and rap have opened a space for dialogue between marginalised peoples, from
the Pacific to Black America and back again” (Chuck D, 1999), Zemke-White observes “that while hip hop expression and culture in Aotearoa has been commercially successful and manifests initially as a commodified American cultural product, hip hop has also managed to maintain cooperative and community-based exchanges and relationships, argued by its local proponents to be a means of indigenous interpretation, transformation, and power” (2004, p. 205). As she likewise writes elsewhere, “it is evident that Pacific people have not only embraced and adapted [hip hop] music forms; they are also using them to celebrate indigenous and unique Pacific cultures, whether overtly through lyrics or merely by personae and images” (Zemke-White, 2002, p. 128). Ironically, a genre once criticized “for being a clone of US rap” (Shute, 2004, p. 163) has now come to exemplify what Elam and Jackson (2005) have described as a “connective cultural aesthetic” that is appropriated and adapted to particular (Pacific) circumstances (see also, Mitchell, 2001).

It is important to note, however, the Pacific diaspora is not defined solely by its relation to the expressive cultures of the Black diaspora; it is more about “hemispherically displacing” (Maxwell, 2003, p. 44) Gilroy’s metaphor. What is central is not the specifics of the cultures themselves but the diasporic imaginary which reflects on communal dispersal and the extraterritorial orientation toward the Pacific. It is useful perhaps to consider Hall’s two-fold conception or identity
here. The first in terms of “one shared culture” held common, an identity that searches for images which impose “an imaginary coherence on the experience of dispersal and fragmentation” (1990, p. 224). Images of a shared ‘Pacific-ness’ provide just such a coherence. His second view of identity explores the condition of “constant transformation…[the] names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past” (p. 225). What Hall is arguing for is a notion of life and identity as a process rather than a fixed and essentialized set of conditions that governs and shapes a way of life. In Arjun Appadurai’s view, what this means is that

the invention of tradition (and of ethnicity, kinship, and other identity-markers) can become slippery…Culture becomes less what Bourdieu would have called a habitus…and more an arena for conscious choice, justification, and representation.

What I am suggesting then is that the Black Pacific is characterized by a material and imaginative compulsion toward mobility and adaptation that creates the conditions for progressive politics that reject narrowly parochial nationalist positions. The concept of imaginaries is particularly important because it conveys the agency of diaspora subjects who, while being made by state and capitalist regimes of truth, can play with different cultural fragments in a way that allows them to segue from one discourse to another, experiment with alternative forms of identification, shrug in and out of identities, or evade imposed forms of identification (Nonini and Ong, 1997, p. 26).
Going online is the most obvious place to see how the lives of Pacific peoples in and beyond the Pacific Islands are (re)articulating a uniquely diasporic politics of representation. Obviously, as Tyner and Olaf Kuhlke (2000) note, growing telecommunications technology “enables spatially separated communities to use increasingly more sophisticated techniques to maintain social, economic, and political ties with their homeland.” In this case the sheer “geographical fluidity” (p. 128) of the internet means that the information exchanged online can incorporate dispersed populations throughout the Pacific. Marianne Franklin’s examination of how Internet technologies create new spatial linkages in the Pacific is easily the most developed work on this issue (Franklin, 2005). She focuses on the internet discussion forums, the Kava Bowl and the Kamehameha Roundtable, to explore the “everyday life of postcolonial Pacific Island communities and their diasporic populations” living in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Her particular interest is ‘race’ and ‘culture’ and “what these terms (should) mean at any given time, how they relate to extended-family networks and obligations for Tongan and Samoan communities overseas vis-à-vis those ‘back home’ in the Pacific Islands and society at large” (). She suggests that in these online discussions new spaces of expression are created that challenges “old and new sociocultural and political pressures emanating from both their ‘original’ and diasporic cultural contexts. Perhaps even more
pertinent is Franklin’s contention that in these discussions “race’ (and, by implication, ethnicity) and ‘culture’ can be seen to be operating as self-conscious tropes for a polyglot and polyvalent ‘identity’ for postcolonial and diasporic contexts.”

Paul Spoonley has also noted how the internet is reconfiguring “Pacific ethnicity.” Like Franklin he suggests the web has become an increasingly important technology of self-representation. Borrowing Poster’s (1998) notion of virtual community, Spoonley (2001) notes how computer-mediated communication has “provided new options for maintaining links and contributing to new forms of community” in Pacific communities. Interestingly, he notes that most of the users of the sites live outside the Pacific Islands themselves. Though he is somewhat wary of new technologies given their potential to create links that “might erode traditional institutions and beliefs”, he ultimately holds that the Internet “may provide the most effective vehicle in the long term” (p. 90). A similar conclusion is reached by Howard (2000) in his study of the Pacific-based virtual communities of Rotumans (see also Howard, 1999). Of the Rotuman community he writes of how, while once it may have been “confined to the island of Rotuma, it now transcends national boundaries and has become increasingly diffuse” (p. 414).
It should be noted that these virtual Pacific communities have not necessarily supplanted ‘social’ communities. To be sure the Pacific diaspora is in part ‘virtual’ (via interactions involving international calls, faxes, emails, satellite TV broadcasting, simultaneous media access through the Internet) but there is also a ‘real’ or ‘social’ side to the Black Pacific. It is a concept which engages with the imagination—an ‘imagined community’ in Anderson’s terms—as well as social interaction. In Laguerre’s (2002) terms, the ‘virtual diaspora’ is merely the “cyberexpansion of real diaspora.” He goes even further in suggesting that “no virtual diaspora can be sustained without real life diasporas and in this sense, it is not a separate entity, but rather a pole of a continuum” (in Transborder Lives). This is readily apparent in the Pacific. Movement back and forward and between the Islands is a prominent feature of Pacific lives. The “international population circulation” in Bedford’s terms, is “a very common process” (p. 117).

The Brown (Sporting) Pacific

And, this brings us to athletes. For Pacific audiences the professional rugby player embodies a sense of agency which transcends their sporting significance. It is perhaps productive here to draw parallels with Ben Carrington’s notion of the black sporting Atlantic, a term he adapts from Gilroy to serve “as a model to comprehend the lives, travels, migrations, and significances of black athletes within the black Atlantic” (Carrington, 2000).
contends that black athletes have formed a central part of black Atlantic communities. In particular, Carrington submits that sport within black communities has “long been a crucial site for black political mobilisation, at both the local level…to the international level” (Carrington, 2000). By way of some specific examples Carrington cites how, when exported from their countries of origin black Atlantic athletes such as Jesse Owens, Arthur Ashe, Althea Gibson, Muhammad Ali, Viv Richards, Pele, Jackie Joyner Kerse, Brian Lara and Ronaldo have become important “signifiers of expressive black physicality…form[ing] part of the cultural resources of black Britons” (Carrington, 2000). The crux of his argument is that diasporic identifications with such transnational sporting stars “challenges narrow prescriptive accounts of national identity, and rearticulates the elements of the black Atlantic cultural world for a specifically black British sensibility.” Without question the context of the black British diaspora is unique and it is not my intention to suggest that direct comparisons could or should be made with New Zealand. However, in New Zealand, as in Britain, athletes form, to rework Gilroy (1987, p. 154), an important part of the raw materials for creative purposes which redefine what it means to be Polynesian, adapting them to local experiences and meanings.

It is perhaps important to first point out that sport and other forms of physical culture have always occupied a central position in cultures throughout
the Pacific. Much of this has to do with the place of the body and its considerable symbolic functions for Pacific peoples. In various parts from New Guinea to Rapa Nui, practices such as fattening the body, lightening of the skin, tattooing, ear elongation, blackening of the teeth, and other forms of bodily modification are cultural processes of social value. But the moving body, in particular, has a special place in most cultures of the Pacific. Bodily movement frequently accompanies dance songs, funeral dirges, songs of praise, and ritual songs. For early missionaries the import placed on the body was the source of consternation. Indeed, the very deployment of colonial evangelism hinged on the coupling of corporeality and character; to instill morality, the body needed to be refashioned and controlled (Eves, 1996). Sport was a critical part of this project. However, as in so many other cultural contexts, as much as Pacific sporting culture was molded ‘from above,’ it also stimulated responses ‘from below’ (St Pierre, 1990). In some cases the result was syncretism, an altering of form to suit traditional cultural premises. Trobriand cricket and Samoan kirikiti are two of the more famous examples (see Haviland, Prins, Walrath, and McBride, 2005). In others the sports arena became an important symbolic space of anti-colonial struggle, a site of resistance or transgression in which excelling in ‘colonial’ games became a means of inverting (at least momentarily) the relations of power (Bale, 2000).
In increasingly dispersed Pacific communities sport has a similar cultural resonance. For Pacific Island migrants in the 1950s and 60s sport was an especially important means for fostering social solidarity in new, ‘foreign’ contexts. Albert Wendt has shown how, along with religion, sport provided a linchpin for tightly-knit migrant enclaves. Often these two arenas overlapped. Many Pacific Islands sports teams and clubs grew out of church groups. The pan-Pacific Protestant church, the Pacific Islands Congregational (PIC) Church, which established congregations in Auckland, Tokoroa, Wellington, and Christchurch from 1946 on (Anae 1992, 2002), was remarkably influential. A number of teams which originated at PIC social gatherings evolved into fully-professional clubs, many of which still exist today. In more established communities sport remains an important aspect of cultural identity for Pacific peoples (Te’evale, 2001). Like other cultural functions and festivals (such as Auckland’s *Pasifika* Festival), sporting events have become traditional rituals of encounter, cultural performance, and communal celebration. Auckland’s Vaka Cup Kirikiti Tournament, for example, is the largest tournament of its kind drawing teams from throughout the Pacific. Such types of tournaments have become a significant means for the maintenance and construction of local as well as diasporic Pacific communities and for the expression of a distinctly pan-Pacific identity.
On this latter point, in a piece on “Diasporic Tongans”, Morton (2002) has noted how young Pacific peoples’ “increasing identification as Polynesians and Islanders”—as opposed to specifically Tongan—has been animated by their “positive identification” with “sports stars” of Polynesian background (Morton, 2002, p. 147). She argues that this “broader identification as Islanders can be appealing [for young Pacific peoples], insofar as it greatly expands the scope of their affective and symbolic ties” (p. 147). Further, she suggests that identification as an Islander can be politically instrumental in that it shows how a “complex cultural identity that can be forged in the context of migration and postcolonialism can overcome the false dichotomy of ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’” (p. 148). We could also suggest, following Vasili (1998), that the successes of Pacific athletes provide points of “collective confidence and spiritual sustenance” (p. 185) within the Pacific diaspora. As Te’evale (2001) points out:

The international success of a Pacific athlete is often an occasion for immense pride and celebration for the Pacific community, pride in the achievement against the economic and social odds in New Zealand society. Sporting success is perhaps the one domain where Pacific peoples find success in Papalagi-dominated society (p. 220).

In the Pacific diaspora sport therefore becomes an important space in which diasporic identity is articulated. In essence, athletes become part of performative discourses or practices in which ‘Polynesian’ identity is constituted. To rework Manu Madan’s analysis of cricket in the Indian diaspora, the significance sport to
diasporic Pacific identity is that in “talking sport”, “in articulating allegiances
and negotiating hybrid space, these subjects actually speak their identity as
[Polynesians] into existence” (2000, p. 29). Noting how rugby in particular has
become a “situational context or space in which diasporic agendas and
coalitional politics are articulated” (Madan, 2000, p. 29), Spoonley (2001) suggests
how Pacific communities are multiply placed and multiply linked:

The relationship with the communities of the South Pacific is also being
altered. Those involved in national sports teams such as rugby have
become increasingly interchangeable, so that individuals might play for
Samoa or Tonga as well as for New Zealand. The national teams of the
Pacific states are often made up of New Zealand-based players, either
those who were born and grew up in New Zealand or those who have
been recruited from the islands to play sport in a professional capacity.
Jonah Lomu is not simply an icon for New Zealand and global rugby; he
is also a symbol and icon of Tongan rugby. Here is one example of a
transnational community with an individual who represents, perhaps not
equally but still in a significant way, two locations, two loyalties, and two
identities. Success within New Zealand and internationally for New
Zealand also reflects upon and influences the origin Pacific states. The
activities and perceptions of New Zealand-born and based Pacific peoples
creates new identity positions and options for diasporic communities—
wherever they are located (pp. 92-93).

As further demonstration of how sporting contexts become spaces
through which diasporic identity is discursivized and negotiated, consider the
magazine PolyNation which invites readers “to see what the rest of Pacific
Islanders and Polynesians are doing around the world!” Published in Las Vegas,
Nevada, most of its column inches are devoted to the performances of
Polynesian athletes throughout the Pacific diaspora. Published monthly,
PolyNation, in reflecting the doubled meaning of its title (pollination/Poly-nation), juxtaposes profiles of rugby and rugby league players in Australia and New Zealand with those of star players of Pacific descent in America’s NFL. It also makes interesting links to the wider Black diasporic politics I mention above with features on Polynesian rap and recording artists, and stories on the place of hip-hop within diasporic Pacific culture. By and large, however its primary focus is sport. A recent end-of-year issue provides a telling example of its diasporic approach to the subject. Spread over a near-dozen pages the magazine salutes the “PolyNation All Stars.” Essentially, the feature is just a series of player-in-action photos accompanied by lists of players, where they are currently playing, and their country of birth (and in some cases affiliated village). Among others, it lists the “Polynesian and Pacific Island” athletes on active NFL rosters, playing NCAA Division I football, and playing professional rugby both in the Super 14 and in Europe. Between these multiply-situated sporting worlds we can see the emergence of what Grewal (1994) calls the “coalitional politics” of identity (p. 235); a “self-othering” strategy of communalism that Spivak suggests may be “viewed as typical of a ‘subaltern’ culture seeking a public platform in a national and transnational context” (Spivak, 1988). It also highlights the “historical and experiential rift between the place of residence and place of belonging” and how
sporting allegiances can disrupt the harmony of people and places as well as “the political forms and codes of modern citizenship” (Gilroy, 1997, pp. 329, 331).

A similarly-themed magazine is Spacifik, produced in Auckland, New Zealand. Again, the choice of name itself is interesting in the way it plays on the notion of the Pacific as a space of affiliation—what Avtar Brah may have called a “diaspora-space”, a space “of confluence of economic, political, cultural, and psychic processes…where multiple subject positions are juxtaposed [and] proclaimed” (Brah, 1996, p. 208). The magazine is more broad in scope than Polynation, covering sport, music, fashion, and politics, as well as tackling “some of the problems of Maori and Pacific Islanders in education, health, and living standards.” Its approach to “Pacific peoples” is also more broad, explicitly incorporating Maori into their definition of ‘Polynesian’ and ‘brown’, highlighting their “shared history as a part of Polynesia as the first true maritime explorers” and drawing attention to “those ties between Maori and Pacific Islanders that were re-established a half century ago in New Zealand.” As an indication of its intended audience, each issue opens with a “Pacific Greetings” box below the editorial; essentially, ‘hello’ as spoken in Maori, Cook Islands Maori, Tahitian, Niuean, Tongan, Samoan, Tuvaluan, Hawaiian, Tokelauan, Solomans, and Fijian. The monthly letters to the editor, or “Feedback”, also shows the dispersed nature of its readers. Letters in recent issues have come from
Auckland, Japan (from a “Maori/Samoan” stationed on a US Naval Base), Gloucester (“My husband plays rugby here and we tend to miss what’s going on back home” writes its author), New York, and San Diego. Spacifik also has monthly columns from reporters in Samoa, Fiji, the Cook Islands, Australia, and the United States. To give some idea of the content, its most recent issue features pieces on: the Pacific Islands Trade and Investment Commission’s attempts to “encourage successful Pacific business people in New Zealand to look at the islands for investment”; the contentious debate about new traffic laws in Samoa; birthrights in Tahiti; “the increasing number of Maori and Pacific people who choose to make Europe and Britain their home”; and a commentary on Christianity among Pacific peoples in the United States. And, of course there’s sport, with features on: Tonga’s recent rugby success; Karmichael Hunt, “the first Cook Islander to represent Australia in rugby league”; the growing influence of Pacific peoples on New Zealand volleyball; and, the eligibility debates about the New Zealand Maori rugby team.

Two of the more telling pieces on the place of Pacific athletes within the wider Pacific diaspora, though, are the recent profiles on Tana Umaga and Dwayne ‘The Rock’ Johnson. Using these two pieces as a starting point I briefly wish to examine how these two figures reflect the prominence of athletes within the outer-national diasporic identifications of Pacific peoples. In particular, they
suggest how images of Pacific athletes travel across and among nations, while their significance transcends national borders. It is important to remember that Pacific peoples do not have diasporic identities. Instead, a sense of belonging is constantly renewed and performed; it is performed or enunciated in discourse at particular conjunctural moments. The diasporic sporting celebrity thus becomes a significant “nodal point of articulation” (Rojek, p. 16) between the personal and the (diasporic) social. For those seeking points of identification with the ‘Polynesia’, they can re-imagine their sense of belonging through these “diasporic [sporting] heroes” (Urry, 2000, p. 155).

The piece on Johnson covers his “return” to Samoa, the birthplace of his mother and grandfather. He had come to Samoa to be bestowed with Matai (or ‘chiefly’) title of Seiuli. At the ceremony Johnson announced to members of the audience that: “I want you to know, from one Samoan to another, that I will carry the Samoan tradition fa’a Samoa all around the world with honour and pride.” The story goes on to note how Johnson’s visit to Samoa “took precedence over the Pacific Forum meeting in the Samoan press—as it did in New Zealand where his visit preceded coverage of the Forum on both of the country’s major evening news bulletins.” It was also widely rumored that Government Ministers and others excused themselves early from Forum functions to slip away to events Johnson was attending. And, as further indication of his appeal, *The Samoa*
Observer carried front page stories for seven straight days prior to his arrival. Among the headlines: “Finally The Rock Has Come Back To Samoa” and “Rock Shock” (the latter, a reference to Johnson reportedly being shocked by the size and emotion of his welcome). While Johnson’s background is decidedly polyglot he can certainly be located within Pacific consciousness. However problematic, he provides an image of an assertive Polynesian masculinity that resonates with the hegemonic ideals of the Polynesian male (Tengan, 2002). Secondly, Johnson is at once ambiguously hybrid/multiracial (Beltrán, 2005) and distinctly ‘Polynesian.’ Johnson recently had his family history tattooed in a traditional Samoan style (in two eighteen-hour sessions) over his left shoulder and arm, and when asked about how close he is to his Polynesian roots he has claimed to be “A hundred percent…as you know in the Polynesian islands it’s all about family.” Part of Johnson’s appeal therefore stems from the fact that he is emblematic of the kind of cultural hybridity that characterizes diasporic experience. He is “in but not of the West” (Gilroy, 1993, p. 127). He disrupts the fixity of binaries such as self/other, marginal/dominant, and inside/outside that generally characterize the imagining of national identities. And to finally emphasize the truly unstable/heterogeneous nature of Johnson’s identity, it is interesting to note that his next stop after Samoa was a “journey to rediscover his roots in New Zealand.” Prior to his arrival there, the New Zealand Sunday News
prominently featured a photo of Johnson on its cover proudly sporting an All Black jersey. Inside the story quotes Johnson as saying that “I have to support the All Blacks. I lived in New Zealand for a little while and I still have some family there.”

As a second example, in a tribute to the now-retired Umaga, the author of one piece, Campbell Burns, continually refers to Umaga—though Umaga describes himself as a “New Zealander”—as a “Pacific Islander” and to his influence on “the Pacific community.” This is not to say that Umaga distances himself from such labels. Indeed, the headline in Wellington’s Dominion Post on the morning of Umaga’s announcement as All Black captain in 2004 read: “I am a Proud Samoan.” Umaga has made other similar public declarations and endorsements of his Pacific heritage. His impassioned speech before the IRB’s World Cup selection people was said to have won New Zealand the right to host the 2011 World Cup because it “evoked his Polynesian roots and what hosting rights would mean to players [from the Pacific Islands]” (A husband and a hero, 2006, p. B4). Typical of identity-construction within diasporic communities, Umaga’s specific origins do not necessarily undermine his projection into multilocality or transnational connections. He shows how Pacific peoples’ emotional and cultural attachments to an imagined community spread beyond national boundaries.
Take the fact that his naming as All Black captain is frequently cited as a moment of recognition not just for Samoan-New Zealanders, but Pacific peoples more generally. *PolyNation*, writes of how after his appointment Umaga “became an overnight hero for young Pacific Islanders in New Zealand and many more over in Samoa.” Elsewhere, in August of 2005, Umaga told *Rugby News* that: “I know a lot of people who are very proud of having a Samoan captain. It’s meant a lot to them and my parents are very proud, they’ve told me the impact it’s had on the Samoan community. That’s something I don’t take for granted, and I feel where they’re coming from…It’s great if people see a role model.” To verify this point, Samoa’s Deputy Prime Minister Misa Telefoni has called Umaga’s appointment to the All Black captaincy “The best thing for Samoa this century…Everyone in Samoa gets goose bumps when they see Tana Umaga run on to the field with the All Blacks.” More generally, in noting the significance of the successes of players of Pacific heritage such as Umaga, the former Samoan-born All Black Eroni Clark contends that “when a young Pacific Islander makes it, every Pacific Islander takes notice.” Partly this is to do with the high-esteem with which the All Blacks are held in the Islands. As one journalist notes, the All Blacks are “a team embraced in [Samoa’s capital] Apia as fervently as the Manu Samoa due to the high percentage of Samoans in the New Zealand team.” Because of their hybridity, diasporic Pacific peoples can therefore claim an
affinity with many communities and nations and different aspects of their identity can be prioritized at different times according to situational context. They may, for instance, link themselves to the All Blacks at the very same time they rework themselves as Polynesian in response to more exclusive (white) imaginings of the New Zealand nation. Or, as one headline put it, Umaga can at once be “All Black, All Samoan” (Rees, 2005).

What is also apparent is the way in which locality and ethnicity are no longer the necessary basis upon which ideas of Pacific community rely. To be sure, Pacific communities are positioned in local contexts (see Macpherson, 2002), yet as conceptualized as an imagining, it exceeds the national in that there is no ‘originary’ point as they are always in perpetual emergence. Grappling with divided loyalties and ambivalent longings, diasporic Pacific peoples thus put into question issues of ‘belonging,’ ‘identity’, ‘community’, and ‘nation.’ As Paul Spoonley (2001) notes, Pacific diasporic communities by their very nature contribute to what some interpret as the destabilization of the nation and the state. They transcend national boundaries by their activities, and their members typically have divided loyalties between their country of residence and their ethnic community, or between countries of origin and current location. The movement of people and goods across borders, especially when those movements are undocumented and part of informal networks, confirm the increasing permeability of borders and emphasise the significance of multiple loyalties—to place of residence, place and culture of origin, to diasporic communities, and to evolving identities...These communities, made up of New Zealand-born Pacific peoples, are developing new cultural forms and identities which are challenging both the origin communities (or ‘homelands’) and cultural
traditions, and the institutions and beliefs of the society of residence. They are renegotiating the rules of entitlement and belonging, coming as they do from a position of multiple loyalties and identities (pp. 84, 95).

To see how life for Pacific peoples is characterised by shifting territorial and cultural boundaries, and to see how their ethnic identity has become increasingly transient, we need only to look a game between the All Blacks and Samoa at North Harbour Stadium in 1999. Playing that day was Umaga and his brother Mike. Yet they were facing each other, across the field, Tana representing New Zealand, Mike Samoa. Such moments indicate that notions of identity are no longer grounded so firmly in ideas of family descent and place of birth, and they remind us that any analysis of Pacific communities must, to use the words of Gilroy, “reckon with their position within international frameworks” (Gilroy, 1987, p. 157). As Gilroy may have concluded, “national units” may not be the most appropriate basis for studying the Pacific diaspora, for its consciousness of itself “has been defined in and against constricting national boundaries” (p. 158).
CONCLUSION

Rugby and the ‘Art’ of Resistance

So much of this dissertation has been concerned with the ‘place’ of Pacific bodies:
in the national imaginary; on the rugby field; in history; moving from place to
place; and, as a diasporic resource. Some might say, however, that to study
‘Pacific’ culture(s) through sport it to risk “trivializing the often brutal legacies of
empire and the body, even if it does not actively reinstate their conclusions”
(Featherstone, 2005, p. 66). To rework Chris Barker’s take on studying
‘postcoloniality’ through sport, perhaps it risks representing Pacific athletes “as
primarily physical rather than mental beings.” It may also reaffirm the belief that
hegemonic sporting forms are exclusively male preserves. Writers such as bell
hooks, Hazel Carby, Paul Gilroy, and more pertinently, Ben Carrington, have
alerted us too to reducing political agency to the bodies of individual athletes.
Perhaps, to adapt the words of Carrington (2001), the growth in the visual
spectacularization of the Polynesian male body precipitates “the diminution of
politics and the reconfiguration of the subaltern public sphere” (p. 104). Yet, even
as Carrington would perhaps himself admit, this should not necessarily be taken
as a suggestion that there is no ‘space’ left for alternative readings of the Pacific
body. Any consideration of Pacific body cultures necessarily engages the reductionist character of the history of racial representation, but dismissing outright the expressive social body has its own political risks. The sporting body may be a complex means of engagement, expression and development. Noting the complex and often contradictory processes involved in reading the sporting body, Mike Marqusee has noted that,

On sport’s level playing field, it is possible to challenge and overturn the dominant hierarchies of nation, race, and class. The reversal may be limited and transient, but it is nonetheless real. It is, therefore, wrong to see black [equally, Pacific] sporting achievement merely as an index of oppression; it is equally an index of creativity and resistance, collective and individual (1995, p. 5).

If the body is the strategic target of systems of codification, supervision and constraint, the site of what Foucault dubbed “knowledge-power”, the body is thus also a site of resistance, “for it exerts a recalcitrance, and always entails the possibility of a counter-strategic reinscription, for it is capable of being self-marked, self-represented in alternative ways” (Grosz, 1990, p. 64).

Like C. L. R James famous descriptions of cricket in the Caribbean, rugby in New Zealand may therefore be a cultural text that works not only with, but against other social texts, and the rugby-playing (Pacific) body may be at once constitutive and dynamic, a potential instrumental is provoking social change. We need to remember too that Pacific participation in rugby is not only a physical, but rational act. There is a clear danger in overly-deterministic accounts
of the bio-political governance of the brown athletic body in the way they fail to make room for the possibility that, as played by Pacific people, rugby’s aesthetics enact a stylization of social resistance against colonialism. To twist C.L.R. James’ famous description of West Indian cricket, the rugby field in New Zealand is “a stage on which selected individuals [play] representative roles which [are] charged with social significance” (James, 1993, p. 66).

As much as rugby can be critiqued as a pedagogical tool of empire or an idealized model of liberal democracy (again, see Chapter 1), in this concluding chapter I wish to suggest that the homology might also be turned, as it were, against itself. Even though I am well aware of the pernicious politics that encircle rugby, we cannot write it off as a progressive ideological instrument. In this chapter I thus hope to offer a more optimistic reading of Pacific rugby. Echoing Said’s (1993) notion of ‘contrapuntalism’, I argue that rugby can be taken as an instrument of power, political ideology, and social transformation. Said’s concept, which holds discrepant experiences in mutual consideration, offers a method of reading the Eurocentrism of rugby to elicit “alternate or new narratives” (p. 51) by recognizing the narrative presence of Pacific peoples. As much as the athletic brown body is a repository of colonial myth, rugby is a field on which to stage “a form of symbolic revenge whose repercussions [resound] far beyond its boundaries” (Smith, 2006, p. 103).
The Sporting Body: Power and Resistance

It is well acknowledged in the literature that sport is a key symbolic site through which social identity is (re)produced. This is particularly apparent with regard to the political significance of national sporting sides. One need only think of the infamous ‘Tebbit test’ (see Cameron, 2002; Marqusee, 1994), or perhaps its Australian counterpart—with its now notorious question on ‘The Don’—to realize how sport is used to mark the boundaries of national identity or how it is used as a measure of national loyalty. In New Zealand, rugby certainly serves such a function, the All Blacks frequently standing in for a particular image of the nation. Traditionally, this image, as I have suggested, has been racially-coded as white: the All Black, read New Zealander, is Pakeha. Such an image has more recently become increasingly implausible. How can the All Blacks stand metonymically as ‘white New Zealander’ when contradicted by the sheer corporeal symbolism of Maori and Pacific men?

We could argue that the All Blacks now represent fraternal possibilities of a new, multicultural New Zealand, an emblem of a cohesive, heterogeneous people. But, mere presence does not indicate acceptance. Nor does it belie the way racial considerations still shade rugby in New Zealand. Race remains relevant. In liberal–democratic societies it just takes new forms. ‘New’ (Barker, 1981; Collins, 2004), ‘symbolic’ (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988), ‘cultural’
(Fanon, 1967), or ‘modern’ (McConahay, 1986) racism is the new modality through which racist expressions are articulated. This is a type of racism that has, Paul Gilroy writes, “taken a necessary distance from crude ideas of biological inferiority and superiority and now seeks to present an imaginary definition of the nation as a unified cultural community” (1992, p. 53). The belated recognition of the cultural/ethnic other, though, has become an unstinting gaze, a singular focus that legitimates their ‘difference’ from the (pakeha) norm. The multicultural sports team should not be taken as sign of (genuine) national tolerance. Far from a celebration of diversity, the All Blacks could in fact be read as a celebration of a White nation fantasy through which pakeha New Zealanders enact their capacity to ‘manage’ diversity. This is multiculturalism only in as far as it is productive. In Hage’s (2000) terms, we could say that Pacific peoples have ‘enriched’ our rugby(/national) culture, but they are not ‘part’ of it: their manner of inclusion is regulated, limited according to their value, and bound by the strictures of commitment to the nation first-and-foremost.

This is to sound all rather pessimistic. Indeed, it could well be said that this dissertation as a whole paints a rather sad picture of the state of rugby and the cultural politics of identity in New Zealand. To be sure, there is a lot to be negative about. As I hope I have by now made clear, rugby in New Zealand, like David Rowe’s description of sport more generally, has, as an important arena of
social life, (sadly) played a crucial role in “the reproduction of various forms of social inequality” (Rowe, 1998, p. 242). It is evidence of Sage’s (1990) contention that sport is “one of various cultural settings in which the hegemonic structure of power and privilege in capitalist societies is continually fortified” (p. 209). As an image of what New Zealand’s cultural identity should look like, the All Blacks suggest the relatively straightforward sense of belonging of years past has been replaced by something more diffuse. A dilution of pakeha-ness, the rise of diversity — “Diversity is our new national identity” as one past Governor General once put it. Taken on aesthetic, the All Blacks do suggest rugby as one of the most positive signs that New Zealand’s national identity has shifted to be more inclusive. However, there are clearly complexities of identity to be considered. One is reminded in particular of DuBois and ‘double-consciousness’: “One ever feels his two-ness” he wrote of the black experience in America. “Two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.” The same peculiar form of double-consciousness is surely relevant to Pacific peoples in New Zealand. To be a ‘Pacific person’ and a ‘New Zealander’ is to not only be ‘Pacific’ and ‘New Zealander’, but to be, too, and simultaneously, neither simply a ‘Pacific person’ nor simply just a ‘New Zealander.’ They belong, but, to borrow from Stuart Hall, only in a ‘hyphenated sense.’
These shifts over the meanings of ‘New Zealandness’ also remain contingent, partial and temporally specific. To be sure the discourses of ‘race’ and nation within sport are not always constructed negatively. Writing of Tana Umaga, Anthony Hubbard suggests that the former All Blacks captain has “helped to change the face of New Zealand rugby and even New Zealand society” (Hubbard, 2006, p. C2). “When a Samoan with dreadlocks got the national game’s top job,” he continues, “something clearly was changing in New Zealand” (p. C1). Certainly, Umaga has put paid to some prevalent myths about Pacific Island rugby players—and his appointment as All Black captain may have some potential to destabilize wider socio-cultural stereotypes. The message he sends about multiculturalism in New Zealand is also ostensibly a positive one. As former Race Relations Conciliator and one time All Black Chris Laidlaw puts it, whereas they have traditionally been regarded as misbegotten Kiwis, Umaga shows that the Pacific Island community “is now part of mainstream New Zealand” (quoted in Hubbard, 2006, p. C1). Against the symbolic power of Umaga’s body, however, we cannot overlook the fact that he was a successful captain. In his final season he led the All Blacks to a whitewash of the British and Irish Lions, retained the Bledisloe Cup, and regained the Tri-Nations trophy. He then retired following the All Blacks’ historic Grand Slam against Wales, Ireland,
England, Scotland. Had they lost, I am not so sure that Umaga would have been viewed in quite the same way.

For evidence we need only look back one season earlier when New Zealand finished last in the Tri-Nations championship. Throughout the series Umaga found himself desperate to hold on to his place in the team, let alone preserve his captaincy. As one reporter describes it, there was a “furious” (Rees, 2005, p. 27) public campaign mounted at the time to have Umaga removed and replaced as captain by the pakeha flanker Richie McCaw. The All Black failures were attributed to an inchoate team (read too many ‘Polynesians’), lacking solidity and in need of the ‘hard men’ (read pakeha men) of teams past. Umaga was the ‘Polynesian’ leader unable to guide and around which the team had failed to congeal. Umaga’s case is perhaps emblematic of Willie Jackson’s—an outspoken local political commentator—colorful but astute assessment of the duplicity of the rugby-as-social-transformation discourse:

This is what happens...When the All Blacks start losing, they start blaming all the darkies [Maori and Pacific peoples]. Listen to talkback...the callers want to know why there aren’t more Canterbury farmers in the team. They say things like, ‘We need more Pakeha players in the side.’ I can’t believe the crap I hear, but if you listen, you’ll hear them blaming the pollywollies [Polynesians]...What’s wrong with these people? Have they got amnesia? Think back to the [1995 and 1996 All Black] teams. Can’t they remember the teams were stacked with pollywollies? That’s what irritates me about the attitude against darkies. We will get blamed because the All Blacks are going through a rough patch, but at the same time it seems to have been conveniently forgotten.
that when the All Blacks were winning, the majority of the team were Polynesian (quoted in Matheson, 2001).

It is entirely possible that sporting success has led to greater recognition of the role played by Pacific peoples in New Zealand society. But, if rugby fosters a ‘kinship’ between Pacific peoples and other (pakeha) New Zealanders, then this kinship is certainly ambivalent (Teaiwa and Mallon, 2005).

This is a recurring theme in New Zealand history. Pakeha New Zealanders have been happy to hold aloft the new Pacific Island stars of rugby as their own, even if this did not always reflect a more general tolerance of the world from which players sprang. As the former Minister of Pacific Island Affairs, Taito Phillip Field, observes:

Yes, we all took pride in what Jonah Lomu and players like him achieved at the world level, but then we share the prejudice toward Pacific Island communities and areas like Otara and Mangere [suburbs in which nearly 70% of residents identify themselves as Pacific peoples] where people rang Telecom to complain about the fact that their real estate was going to be affected by having the same prefix telephone numbers as Otara… [even though] it’s these rugby stars who come from places like Otara and Mangere (quoted in Macdonald, 1995, p. 121).

In this statement Field rightly identifies the difference between multiculturalism in principle and multiculturalism in practice, or in this case between Pacific peoples on our rugby fields and in our communities. Sadly, there remains a yawning chasm between the two. For Pakeha, their All Black fandom necessitates they not only acknowledge, but actively embrace, the Pacific Other. Yet such
accommodations are symbolic rather than real. Rugby allows Pakeha audiences to recognize themselves as benevolent, ethical subjects, or what Cole and Andrews (2001, p. 78) might call “compassionate, informed citizens.” Pakeha demonstrate their colourblindness via reverence of Pacific All Blacks, the black jersey; the national cultural uniform is purportedly all that matters. Sports are, as David J. Leonard (2004) notes, “one of the most powerful discursive spaces in which colorblindness is employed and deployed” (p. 287). Though he may be discussing the adoration of Black athletes and entertainers in North America, the parallels in the New Zealand context are striking. In the same way “love toward the Kobes and Denzels demonstrates the supposed insignificance of race”, cheering for Tana or watching bro’Town “further legitimizes claims of colorblindness” (p. 286).

Pakeha also embrace Pacific All Blacks as representatives of what all Pacific peoples could achieve—the only difference being motivation and desire. Their success allows Pakeha to believe that racism has been dealt with, that it is consigned to the past. That the All Blacks project “an ethnographic image somewhat advanced from the dour verities of yore” (Macdonald, 2005, p. C11) provides a defense against accusations of racism, and allows Pakeha to believe. However, King et al (2007) alert us to the fact that “the most common expressions of White power remain hidden, emerging in what we call veiled White power”
In the “post-white” (Hill, 2004, p. 11) moment, racial inequality “is no longer fundamentally centered around the formal exclusion of racial minorities”, overt racism being abandoned in favour of “a series of practices that are mostly covert, informal, and yet institutional” (Bonilla-Silva, 2000, p. 204). One of the more salient examples is sport, wherein the increased number and visibility of people of color “make it easier to use narratives of sport to advance new racist formulations of racial progress while making it increasingly difficult to see the operation of White power in this new racism” (King et al, 2007, p. 7). Sport, in this case rugby, presents itself as devoid of racism via the hypervisibility of the Pacific Other. Pakeha privilege is in this way defended not by exclusion, but “by claiming to be for ‘equality’ and ‘fairness’ for everybody in the face of massive racial inequality” (Bonilla-Silva, 2000, pp. 189-190). That the All Blacks are browning becomes proof positive that the desired goal of racial equality has been addressed and achieved. This type of liberal, individualist ideology discourages critical reflection on racial politics and minimizes the continued existence of racism within rugby and without. It also disguises the material and ideological effects of racial inequality and discrimination. To paraphrase Carrington (2001), the allure of the spectacle of the brown body has served to “obscure the real conditions that many [Pacific] people face.”
At the same time the question should also be asked as to whether images of sporting success offer up new discursive spaces for the construction of Pacific identities, or whether they merely end up replicating pre-existing discourses of power. In some way, Pacific All Blacks have become central icons in publicly symbolizing the transition of Pacific peoples from itinerant labourers, ‘guestworkers’, to public citizens. Yet in rugby, citizenship, belonging, is read not off the body, but the All Black shirt, eviscerating Otherness and reifying the black jersey, the ‘national’ uniform. The All Black jersey, like the body politic, has been stretched—like other shared symbols it is being “altered and renegotiated to make space for Pacific peoples” (Pearson, 1999, p. 361). But this is success and accommodation on Pakeha terms. Confined to sport and light entertainment, success stories tend “to reflect processes of cultural assimilation, where Pacific people can be reported as successful if they conform to Palangi norms, or if their creativity can be assimilated into the dominant culture” (Loto et al, 2006, p. 115).

The taken-for-granted status of rugby as the national game is important in this regard. By way of a non-culturally specific rhetoric, rugby’s claims to being the ‘national’ sport have the effect of naturalizing cultural values to suit Pakeha. In claiming a pakeha view of the world as universal (Bell, 1995), rugby can only ever be appropriated as an act of mimicry by the Pacific Other; as All Blacks, they are “honorary Pakeha” (Star, 1999, p. 241). Though she is at pains to point out that it
may be only one "reception possibility" (or "reading") of Pacific rugby players, Lynne Star (1999) makes precisely this point in her contention that ‘white’ New Zealanders (“assumed to be colonisers”) and the few ‘brown’ people trying to succeed materially in the ‘white’ system “monopolise representational and identity possibilities, causing ‘black’ peoples to be irretrievably alienated from an authentic cultural identity uncontaminated by colonisers” (p. 241). Rugby, however egalitarian its making, cannot not be entirely uncoupled from its colonial past: it is after all, a ‘colonial’ sport linked, through myth and nostalgia, to the public expression of whiteness.

It would, though, be a mistake to dismiss the All Blacks outright. Like any ‘text’ they are open to multiple readings. In particular, as Messner (year) has rightly suggested, sport can be used as a means of resistance; and, even if that resistance may be symbolic, it provides signs of potentiality, it “operates as an important symbolic space in the struggles of black peoples against the ideologies and practices of white supremacy” (p. 270). Sport, Messner argues, “must thus be viewed as an institution through which domination is not only imposed, but also contested; an institution within which power is constantly at play.” Rugby in New Zealand may similarly provide a means by which Pacific peoples are able to subvert the racist stereotypes left over from not only early colonial encounters, but from a more immediate history. It offers the possibility of representing Pacificness in a more
favorable light when Pacific people “are predominantly portrayed as unmotivated, unhealthy and criminal others who are overly dependent on Palagi support” (Loto et al., 2006, p. 100). As Te’evale (2001) contends, “in a society in which Pacific people are routinely featured in crime figures and negative social statistics, achievements in sport provides a positive image for both individual and collective identities” (p. 221). And, argue Macpherson, Spoonley and Anae (2001, p. 158), sporting success has not only affected “the ways in which Pacific peoples identify themselves”, but, moreover, has changed the way “Pacific peoples are perceived by dominant ethnic groups.” Even if this may sound overly-optimistic, images of successful Pacific athletes offer a counter to the more frequent representation of Pacific people as dependent, deviant, or incompetent. However limiting these images may be, in this context it is important to acknowledge

the new forms of subjectivity and types of cultural capital this situation creates for [Pacific] men who suddenly find themselves with a degree of public visibility and (symbolically at least) with a sense of empowerment and increased visual prestige in otherwise marginalised circumstances (Carrington, 2001).

Rugby should therefore be considered a contested space. To be sure, as I suggest above there are risks in studying Pacific peoples through rugby. But physical expressivity is both constitutive and dynamic: it possesses a historical and cultural agency which generates, shapes, and interprets changing meanings within sporting space. The body (and thus the sporting body), as Foucault has
famously argued, is produced in discourses and in the everyday practices that
structure the way experiences of the body of organized. It is thus always in a
political field where “power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they
invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, for it to carry out tasks, to perform
ceremonies, to emit signs” (Foucault, 1991, p. 173). Yet, for Foucault, such a body
“also produces power that facilitates resistance, rebellion, evasions, and
disruptions” (Feminist Theory and the Body, p. 313). In other words, “where
there is power, there is resistance” (ibid).

The use of the work of Foucault in relation to the body, power, and
difference has implications for the critical analysis of the use of the body in
exercise, sport, and leisure spaces. Generally, we tend to think of sport as an
“ideologically conservative phenomenon” (Bale, 2004, p. 151) because it provides
little or no scope for improvisation among athletes when they are bound by
strict, standardized rules and regulations. As a consequence, it could be argued
that “whereas forms of representation such as literature, drama and dance
provide a site of resistance for colonised peoples, the protocols of achievement
sport prevented analogous forms of resistance from taking place” (Bale, 2004, p.
151). As Jean Marie Brohm once put it, “sport is a positivist system and as such
always plays an integration and never oppositional role” (1978, p. 178; emphasis
added). Yet Foucault opens up possibilities for understanding power dynamics
in sport as having an ebb and flow, for us to see sport cultures as possessing what Stuart Hall (1981, p. 228) calls a “double stake…the double movement of containment and resistance, which is always inevitably inside it.”

In order to grasp this interplay of power and resistance, it should be pointed out that power in this model “is not a thing, is not imposed from outside its subjects, but is rather a process, the outcome of a series of interacting and potentially contradictory relations in which [subjects] are necessarily involved” (Writing on the Body, p. 204). Resistance becomes an integral part of the processes of power because power does not cohere into organized ‘blocs’, it is not a coercive force which subordinates one group to another, but ‘circulates’ through in all social relationships, in all “processes that generate and enable any form of action, relationship or social order” (Barker, 2002, p. 177). In the introduction to *Power Games*, John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson criticize recent theorizations of power locate power in “one source or another,” or confuse power itself with of its particular forms (Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002, p. 8). They suggest several “key works on the sociology of sport” (p. 8) as having tended to fall into this trap. Tomlinson elsewhere makes a similar critique in his introduction to a special issue of the *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* on ‘Power’ (Tomlinson, 1998). In both instances, the authors are critical of those works that offer an all-too-simplistic approach to power, an “all-or-nothing model of
resistance, which separates the process of resistance from the power dynamic itself” (Tomlinson, 1998, p. 237; see also, Sugden and Tomlinson, 2002, p. 5). In his piece, Tomlinson cites Lukes (1974) as offering an alternative, more relational definition of power as “The capacity to produce, or contribute to, outcomes—to make a difference to the world. In social life we may say power is the capacity to this through social relationships: it is the capacity to produce, or contribute to, outcomes by significantly affecting another of others” (cited in Tomlinson, 1998, p. 237). By such a definition, argues Tomlinson, “resistance to domination—as in the refusal to comply—must itself be seen as a form of power” (p. 237).

This surely echoes Foucault famous contention that “Power is not simply repressive; it is also productive.” As he explains,

Power subjects bodies not to render them passive, but to render them active. The forces of the body are trained and developed with a view to making them productive. The power of the body corresponds to the exercise of power over it. Hence the possibility of a reversal of that power.

Foucault in this way rejects a simple, hierarchical approach to power, suggesting instead that power is never an absolute. Power, he argues,

comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix—no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body.

On one level, this could be read as rather foreboding, in that power for Foucault is dispersed through the network of relationships which make up society; if
power is not localized it becomes ubiquitous, diffuse and circulating, it poses difficulties for the issue of resistance. Foucault certainly leaves himself open to the charge of proposing a totalizing system in which there are no actors or spaces for resistance. Yet as Foucault is at pains to stress, power and resistance are ontologically inseparable, they exist as conditions of possibility each for the other. Power, in his terms, creates the conditions for counter-flows of resistance to emerge, and where there is power there is resistance; they are symbiotic or agonistic. Indeed, for Foucault, it is, as Nash points out, “only where there is the possibility of resistance, where subjects are not fully determined but may realise different possibilities from the range with which they are faced, that it is meaningful to think in terms of power.”

Resistance, like power, is also diffuse. Thus, there are certain elements that escape power, “if only momentarily, and these elements give rise to resistance” (Newman, 2007, p. 89). Foucault’s portrayal of power relations, however constrained, therefore implicitly includes a vision of political agency (Johnson, 1997). Indeed, unlike the ‘strategic’ conception of power he offers in earlier works such as *Discipline and Punish*, in later works freedom and autonomy are central components of Foucault’s critical project. In particular, he proposes that “opposing to categories of the ‘law’ and of ‘prohibition’ those of the ‘art of living,’ ‘techniques of self,’ and ‘stylization of existence.’” In these “practices of
creativity”, he argues, are the grounds for resistance. In a more specific sense, Foucault speaks of the “tactical reversal” of the “various mechanisms” of power relations. By tactical reversal Foucault means to suggest that “conflicts that are necessarily intrinsic to all power relations” and thus particular arrangements of such relations could be thwarted through its own techniques” (Thompson, 2003, p. 114).

In some ways, rugby, to borrow from the great Trinidadian cricketer and scholar Learie Constantine, “is the most obvious and some would say glaring example of the black [Polynesian] man being kept in his place” (quoted in Searle, 1990, p. 35). Rugby is an arena in which the success of Polynesian men does not contradict the representational genealogy of them as inherently ‘physical warriors’ that has pervaded the New Zealand social narrative (Hokowhitu, 2003, 2004). Yet although rugby may have served as the Pakeha game in New Zealand, it nonetheless possesses an explicit political significance because the body in movement can itself assume a deeper symbolic significance. In Performance as a Political Act (1990), for instance, Randy Martin argues that the performing body—for which we could substitute the sporting body, for as Rinehart (1998) notes, “sport is a performance” (p. 4)—is by its nature involved in resistance to the “symbolic”, or that which “attempts to limit the meanings of action and the body, to channel the flows of desire” (Carlson, 2004, p. 154). The performing, and
especially the kinetic, body, says Martin, can “instigate a tension in the social body”, with individual performances create the spaces of “interventions, ruptures in the conditions of reproduction of dominance.” The creative of Polynesian men on a rugby field are thus moments of aesthetic expression and political claim.

Stuart Hall’s notion of articulation seems germane here. Of the construction of discursive formations Hall contends that there is “no necessary or essential correspondence of anything with anything.” According to Hall the strength of the concept of articulation is that it signifies not only “to express” but “to connect”:

Thus, a theory of articulation is both a way of understanding how ideological elements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a discourse, and a way of asking how they do or do not become articulated, at specific conjunctures, to certain political subjects (Hall, 1986, p. 53).

Articulation thus complicates the relationship between individual action and the broader social structure. If, as Hall suggests, the subject is related to discursive formations through the process of articulation, then it allows us a means of explaining “how individuals within a particular society at a specific historical moment wrest control away from the dominant forces in a culture and attain authority over their lives” (Means Coleman, 2002, p. 221). Material conditions matter, but they do not ‘determine’ in the traditional sense: articulation describes
the means by which cultural elements can be joined together as well as the contingent nature of those linkages. Coming back to rugby, we could say, following St Louis (2000), that its internal discourses, via performativity, can be articulated in different ways. This is the “syncretic dynamic” of the Pacific rugby player, his potential to “critically appropriate elements from the master-codes of the dominant culture and ‘creolise’ them, disarticulating given signs and re-articulating their symbolic meaning” (Hall, 1990).

(Re)reading Rugby Through C. L. R. James

C.L.R. James provides perhaps the best illustration of the political role of sporting performativity in re-articulating this discourses of sport regarding ‘race’ and ‘nation.’ His body of work, and in particular the seminal work Beyond a Boundary, “illustrates how the political and artistic engagements of a decolonizing subject can refunct the master discourse of ‘dialectic materialism’ without being complicit in restoring or recuperating domination” (Beyond postcolonial theory, p. 228). What has perhaps the most important repercussions for the study of sport is the way James calls attention to the arena of cultural politics—the social and political struggles waged through culture. As Grant Farred reminds us, James points to the way in which:

The cultural is not only insistently political, particularly within the context of colonization (and postcolonialism), but frequently the most complex, unrecognized (by the colonizer and the colonized elite), ideologically
embattled mode of politics in a society in which repression is rife in all other forms of human activity (2003, p. 135).

_Beyond a Boundary_, James’ brilliant examination of the relationship between cricket and anti-colonial struggle in the West Indies, is perhaps the most vivid example of this ideological commitment. Here James also provides us with a powerful model by which to conceive of athletes as agents and not merely ‘victims.’ In brief, James argues that cricket was central in shaping a politicized sense of ‘West Indian’ identity during colonial rule by the British. In particular, for James cricket was the idiom through which both creativity and resistance flourished in the face of colonial subjugation. Paradoxically, to do so, cricket, as a cultural practice, had first to be learned and assimilated according to the terms of the dominant colonial order; only then could the game become a stage for subversive anti-colonial performance. As Farred has elsewhere noted “Precisely because the colonized were immersed in and observant of the codes of the native British game they were able to transform the sport into a vehicle for Caribbean resistance” (Farred, 1996, pp. 170-171). Cricket, perhaps the English game, could therefore be mobilized in the interests of West Indian self-determination: “the sport through which the English sought to define a distinctively English ethos and identity was appropriated and turned against them to embody the colonized peoples’ aspirations and self-definitions” (Needham, 2000, p. 32).
To me there is a decided resonance here with Homi Bhabha’s reading of the Foucauldian model of power as productivity as described above. Undoubtedly, cricket is grounded in a social reality and the play of colonized West Indians is grounded in terms selected by the dominant class (the ‘codes’ of cricket); but there are points of “cultural openness” (Kim, 2000) which allow for the possibility of subversion and “the twisting of meaning away from an out of the hands of the colonizer” (p. 98). We can take cricket as an example of Bhabha’s ‘colonial discourse’, being as it is an “apparatus of power.” Yet for Bhabha any colonial discourse can be “harnessed to sharpen the critical edge of a truly post-colonial discursive practice” (George, 2003, p. 58). The important concept here is the ambivalence of colonial discourse. Neither positive nor negative, colonial discourse “being two places at once”—the colonizer and the colonized, the self and the Other—is therefore susceptible to subversion, to being politically transformed. It becomes part of a subversive strategy, “for if the ambivalences of colonial discourse were deployed for the exercise of colonial power, those very contradictions limit colonial power from within, thereby making it possible for an anticolonial articulation” (George, 2003, p. 58). One of the interesting repercussions is that oppositional actions need not be intentional because “colonialist representations are always overdeterminations, and are always ambivalent” (Slemon, 1994, p. 24). Between James and Bhabha what we have,
then, is a basis for resistance to the oppressive structures and ideologies of colonialism that “proceeds from a strategy that inhabits some of those very (metropolitan/colonial) concepts and beliefs through which the colonized peoples’ subjugation was secured” (Needham, 2000, p. 30).

From Benjamin’s (1973) essay *The Task of the Translator*, Bhabha derives the notion of “cultural translation” to describe these new enunciations, or rearrangements, of colonial discourse. The metaphor is telling because it brings our attention to the fact that, with regard to colonial discourse, “any change in the statement’s conditions of use and reinvestment, any alteration in its field of experience or verification, or indeed an difference in the problems to be solved, can lead to the emergence of a new statement.” In the colonized’s translation of colonial discourse what we get is the “emergence of a new statement.” Coming back to James and West Indian cricket we can see how a symbol of ‘Englishness’ (cricket) was seized upon to represent West Indian (colonized) nationalism; it became a ‘new statement’ that “destabilize[d] cricket’s ability to represent only the self-definitions of English national character” (Needham, 2000, p. 34).

Translation is thus the ‘performative’ nature of cultural communication; it is the mode by which colonized subjectivity is effected.

Implicitly translation takes on many connotations that recent work on performativity has developed in other areas. I am thinking here in particular of
Judith Butler’s (1990) insistence on the transgressive potential of embodied acts. Following Foucault, Butler’s theory of performativity has opened the way for ‘agency’ in post-structuralist formulations of ‘productive power.’ In explaining how gender binaries come to be subverted, Butler also provides a way to understand a similar subversion of the colonizer/colonized binary via the (re)articulation of colonial discourse:

The subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the productions of substantializing effects. In a sense, all signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat; ‘agency’, then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition. If the rules governing signification not only restrict, but enable the assertion of...new possibilities for gender that contest the rigid codes of hierarchical binarisms...[I]t is only within the practices of repetitive signifying that a subversion of identity become possible (1990, p. 145).

In Butler’s estimation racialized, gendered, and/or sexualized identities are to be understood as “performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be [their] results” (1993, p. 25). She is careful to emphasize the instability, “the deconstituting possibility” in this process of ‘citation’ or ‘repetition’:

[I]t is by virtue of this reiteration that gaps and fissures are opened up as the constitutive instabilities in such constructions, as that which escapes of exceeds the norm, as that which cannot be wholly defined or fixed by the repetitive labor of that norm.

Mirón and Inda (2000) refer similarly to the “deconstituting potentiality in the process of reiteration, making the subject the site for the perpetual possibility of a
certain resignifying process, the site for the proliferation of certain effects that undermine the power of normalization” (p. 95). Performativity thus “calls attention to those constitutive instabilities that contest the naturalizing effects of discourse” (Mirón and Inda, 2000, p. 95).

It is important to understand that ‘performativity’ is not the same as ‘performance’: if performativity is the process through which the subject emerges, performance is something the subject does (Butler, 1993). As () explains, “if performativity is bringing into existence a state of being through an act, whether linguistic or a subversion of gender, performance is precisely the act: the doing that enacts signification.” Performance can therefore be seen as “the site in which performativity materializes in concentrated form, where the concealed or dissimulated conventions of which acts are mere repetitions might be investigate and reimagined” (Diamond, 1997, p. 47). Because it functions as a medium through which cultural practices are reinscribed or reinvented, the body becomes a multiple and major source of signification in performance. That is, performance positions the (postcolonial) body as a particularly charged site of cultural contestation. Yet, as Victor Turner points out, when taken as a cultural ‘performance’ we can begin to see that physical displays

Are not simple reflectors or expressions of culture or even of changing culture but may themselves be active agencies of change, representing the eye by which culture sees itself and the drawing board on which creative
actors sketch out what they believe to be more apt or interesting ‘designs for living.’

The performance of the sporting body therefore has a profound social resonance. As James reminds us sports such as cricket are political theatres of movement, and in the body there is capacity for expression and resistance in those moments when “statements from one institution [are] transcribed in the discourse of another” (Bhabha, 1994).

James also reminds us that as much as we can take sport as a performance, it is a performance equal to those of ‘arts’ such as dance or theatre. That is, James alerts us to the artistic quality human movement and sporting ‘performance.’ In the chapter “What is Art?” in Beyond a Boundary James explicitly makes the case for cricket being a worthy end of inquiry, on a par with the visual or performing arts. For James cricket is “not an instance of ‘light’ art, which he happens to find stimulating, nor an instance of ‘popular’ culture, although it is certainly popular” (Lazarus, 1992, p. 95) On the contrary, “cricket,” he writes, “is first and foremost a dramatic spectacle. It belongs with theatre, ballet, opera and the dance” (p. 196). I am not so much interested in whether cricket, or in this case rugby, fits the true definition of art—indeed, if it could even be said that such a definition exists. However, I do wish draw attention to a critical feature of James’s use of the term: its relative autonomy (St Louis, 2007).
James is concerned with aestheticism, with cricket’s “beguiling characteristics” (St Louis, 2007, p. 165), but he does not wholly divorce them from content, and, in particular, the material inequalities of colonialism. For Adorno, modern art is critical of, and relatively autonomous from, the current political and socio-economical system. In his view, modern art is relatively free from the dominant ideology, pace the cultural industries in which “art and ideology are becoming one and the same thing.” Marcuse likewise stresses the necessity of art’s autonomy, derived, in part, from it ability to stand in opposition to society (Marcuse, 1978). James, on the other hand, was dialectic in his thinking of art and social reality:

On the one hand, the aesthetic lexis and technical sophistication of cricket enables it to express social complexities, and on the other, social complexities inform and reproduce the representative sophistication of cricket.

For Lazarus (1992) and St Louis (2000, 2007) James is thus offering a “a sociopoetics of cricket, an approach to the game that will make neither the mistake of supposing it to be less than a form of art, nor the mistake of supposing it, as a form of art, to be autonomous” (Lazarus, 1992, p. 98).

In making the equation of cricket and art, James also strives to upset “established cultural hierarchies and categories” (p. 125). This is especially evident in a passage in which James admonishes the famous commentator
Neville Cardus for not recognizing democratic implications of cricket’s “aesthetic appeal.” Cardus, he writes, is a victim of
categorization and specialization, that division of the human personality, which is the greatest curse of our time…The aestheticians have scorned to take notice of popular sports and games—to their own detriment. The aridity and confusion of which they so mournfully complain will continue until the include organized games and the people who watch them as an integral part of their data (pp. 191-192).

For James the audience is inseparable from cricket’s aesthetic dimension, and vice-versa. As Featherstone (2005) notes, as “the great sportsman performs minutely and extravagantly the complexities and contradictions of his time and place…the spectators are not passive consumers, but constituents of what is always in some sense a culturally meaningful drama” (p. 78). This is one of James’ key ideas about the notion of cricket-as-art: not so much its content, but its structure. For James, it is “the spectator’s appreciation of and position within the structure of cricket [that] makes it an art” (King, 2001, p. 122). As he writes, “What matters in cricket, as in all the arts, is not finer points but what everyone with some knowledge of the elements can see and feel. It is only within such a rigid structural frame that the individuality so characteristic of cricket can flourish” (pp. 197-198). In this passage James’ dialectic appreciation of the colonial project—as embodied in cricket—is apparent. Though cricket may have been a site of indoctrination, it is also the vehicle through which minor acts of resistance are instigated.
To be sure, James’s belief in sport as a “legitimate” art-form has been widely-criticized (see for example, Hartmann 2003; Surin, 1995; Tiffin, 1995). Hartmann (2003), for instance, accuses James of failing to adequately problematize his obvious affection for cricket’s “moral-democratic value and make-up” (p. 473). He is blind too, Hartmann continues, in his “faith in the democratic ideology he believes is contained, cultivated and conveyed in sport culture”; especially, given recent scholarship that attests to democratic discourse and ideology themselves as inherently racialized. James he contends, fails to recognize the “comfortable homology” between sport culture and liberal democratic ideologies (p. 474). As a consequence James he fails to identify cricket’s import as a “pedagogical tool” of colonialism (Baucom, 1999). Certainly, in his support for this most imperial of sports, James could well be accused of what Allen Guttmann calls “a typically liberal fixation on the rules of play” (1994, p. 27). Cricket, according to Young (1999) was one of those “English achievements” about which James was always “somewhat romantic”, an example of how he “never succeeded in throwing off the cultural imperialism to which he had been subjected during his formative years” (p. 301). But James to me is patently aware of these contradictions, and Beyond a Boundary must be understood as his attempt to find a “resistant strain” within a game that “represented so much of what he wanted to eliminate” (Stoddart, 1998, p. 84).
For instance, James seems acutely alive to the strictures of race and class in the game. In the chapter on the black Trinidadian batsman Wilton St. Hill James clearly concedes race to be a factor in Hill’s non-selection for the 1923 tour to England (seen more generally in the often fierce debates over other selections that persisted well into the 1920s that he documents in the chapter “Patient Merit” [see also Malcolm, 2001]). More than this, Hill’s failures on the subsequent tour of 1928 were, according to James, not just a matter of skill. As Smith explains, by James’ account “St. Hill’s underachievement as a batsman...has to be understood in terms of his social origins and a resultant lack of self-assurance...the ante on cricketing success was the chance to transcend his origins in the black lower-middle-classes” (p. 99). For James “St. Hill’s failure was not his alone, but a representative failure reflecting a certain prematurity, a certain lack of cohesion in the social consciousness of the classes whose aspirations were expressed in St Hill’s batting” (Lazarus, 1992, p. 105). The high expectations of black Trinidadians simply proved too much for St. Hill. There are other parts, too, of Beyond a Boundary where James could hardly be accused of idealism. As Smith notes, for instance, James “account of the class rivalries that structured the formation of different black clubs on the island...makes absolutely clear his awareness of the game’s relationship to hierarchies of social power, and the presence within cricket of discrimination and overt prejudice.” James, argues
Smith, “knew very well that this cultural game was not ‘fair.’” Cognizant of the way West Indians have internalized the ambivalent history of cricket, James understood that artistic/sporting production is (re)articulated in an externally-regulated space.

Bringing these arguments back to the sporting body, it could be said that James’ reading of cricket as a performance was contingent upon understanding bodily production as (conjuncturally) specific inflections of performativity (St Louis, 2000). That is, James is interested in the aesthetics of bodily response at particular historical moments (Featherstone, 2005). He inserts the cricketing body into the heart of systems of society, of metaphor, and of identity in the West Indies. Thus, as much as giving us pause to consider sport as art, James considered the body to be central to the definition of the possibilities of colonized West Indians. The body for James became a legitimate and proper tool for examining and understanding West Indian society. It is important to stress here that sport is a physical act. In the case of James it is movement—the aesthetics—of cricket which are the “essential components” he attributes to the political power of the sport (King, 2001, p. 132). It is the batsman’s posture or stroke-making that become the mode of social representation. Witness James’ famed description of Arthur Jones’ ‘cut shot’:

The crowd was waiting for it, I at my window was waiting…[Jones] walked with quick steps and active shoulders. He had a pair of restless,
aggressive eyes, talked quickly and even stammered a little. He wore a white cloth hat when batting, and he used to cut. How he used to cut! I have watched county cricket for weeks on end and seen whole Test matches without seeing one cut such as Jones used to make, and for years whenever I saw one I murmured to myself, ‘Arthur Jones!’ (p. 5).

Over the near-two pages that follow, James’ focus is upon what is happening on the field, on the technique and styles of play; it is the aesthetics of bodily movement which he uses as a basis for examining the changing relationship between art and society, between cricket and popular democracy. He is even more explicit in the (post)colonial implications of the sporting body in a later essay on the great Barbadian cricketer Garfield Sobers: “his command of the rising ball in the drive, his close fielding and his hurling himself into his fast bowling are a living embodiment of centuries of a tortured history” (James, 1989, p. 232).

As I outlined in Chapter 3, the body has certainly been at the centre of justifications of colonialism as well as the processes through which the colonial project was enacted. On one hand, the body was, in the Foucauldian sense, an object of discipline, something to be corrected and constrained. This line of thinking takes the body as a site for discursive control. On the other, scholars such as Said have revealed how the representation of the non-Western body has also served to legitimate colonial invasion and rule. In either case such scholarship tends to present the other as a particular kind of ‘victim.’ But the
body is not simply an object of discursive processes nor a passive object of arrangement. Though it has become a “staple critique”, St Louis (2007) is critical of the way in which “the dialectical existence of resistance within oppression” within cultural studies is all-too-frequently located within discursive formations, “making the physical apparatuses of social control less amenable to subversive de- or re-signification” (p. 169). Sport, he argues, has been systematically misunderstood as a site of physical domination and ideological manipulation by logocentric social and cultural critics. This critical orthodoxy has effectively suspended its own sophisticated analyses of the complex negotiations and concessions within cultural reproduction, and didactically dismissed the existence of any counter-hegemonic capacity with the lower-order sensory repertoires of sport (pp. 169-170).

For James, however, “the individual agent within society is not disembodied consciousness, but instead a vital individual whose conscious and socially meaningful activity is articulated through their eloquent body” (pp. 170-171). James therefore “accords the body a historical and cultural agency in generating, shaping and interpreting changing meanings within the contested spaces of postcolonial societies” (Featherstone, 2005, pp. 69-70). Hence, and in sum, we could suggest that, as a cultural practice, sport, and the sporting body, must therefore be understood as “neither total domination nor pure resistance” (St Louis, 2007, p. 167). To be sure, in thinking through James, there is the issue of the contemporary relevance of his work in a world of globalized, media-
controlled sport. Surin (1995, 1996) poses precisely this question, suggesting that while James’ work may have been pertinent to the anti-colonial struggles of the 1930s through 1960s, it is “too compact and unified to account plausibly for developments in the game after the 1960s” (1996, p. 194). McCarthy (2007) similarly cautions us against “overstating the radical potential in contemporary cricket given its corporatization.” Finally, Featherstone (2005), echoes both Surin and McCarthy when asks “how transferable James’ analysis of body culture can be to the more recent circumstances of sport” (p. 85). However, unlike Surin or McCarthy, Featherstone goes on to suggest that James’ insights have lost little of their cogency. His argument is worth examining at because it provides a useful summary of how the Pacific body ‘performing’ on a rugby field may provide an opportunity for ‘artistic’ resistance to racialized imaginings of New Zealand national identity.

To show how the sporting body continues to possess a radical potential despite the more recent circumstances of sport, Featherstone takes up the unlikely figure of Australian leg-spin bowler Shane Warne: a bleach-blonde, “brutally sunblocked”, “barbecue-tubby”, Anglo-Australian. He points, in particular, to Warne’s dismissal of the England batsman Mike Gatting in 1993 with a delivery now commonly referred to as ‘The Ball of the Century.’ For the
uninitiated it is perhaps worth quoting a description from Sydney’s *Daily Telegraph*:

Warne began his run-up—just a few casual steps—before releasing the ball with an almighty flick of the wrist. The ball continued straight for three quarters of its flight, until the viciously spinning ball swerved wildly to the leg side. The ball pitched well outside the leg stump, gripping viciously, turning past Gatting’s outside edge to just clip off stump…the bemused Englishman [trudged] back to the pavilion, still trying to work out what had just happened.

“Does James’ sense of body culture have any relevance to such moments?” asks Featherstone. While Warne’s ball only emerges within the context of what “is an imperial game that necessarily contains and retains the contradictions of the imperialism that made it” (p. 86), Warne’s performance nevertheless suggested the potential for the body culture of cricket to develop and startle. Its compelling theatre demonstrated the capacity…in play to embody and dramatize cultural contradictions. Those contradictions were displayed in the material and physical movements of play that adjusted historical expectations and assumptions embedded in the sport and made them new…In a startling way, [Warne’s ball] marked a change within the postcolonial theatre of sport, even as that sport appeared to be becoming a formalized, globalized performance devoid of history (p. 87).

Whilst “sport’s more visible and commodified body cultures are in some ways limited in their social narratives” (Featherstone, 2005, p. 95), Warne’s ‘Ball of the Bentury’ reminds us that “the body is always simultaneously inscribed in both the economy of pleasure and desire and the economy of discourse, domination and power” (Bhabha, 1989).
Following Featherstone, I wish to conclude by suggesting that the body in rugby is similarly “a historical and cultural body, and its ‘texts’ are both rich and complex” (Featherstone, 2005, p. 95). Recent critical discussion of the body in post-colonial spaces, in particular, has stressed the complexity of the ways in which the body can be constructed, and “has elaborated its ambivalent role in the maintenance of, and resistance to, colonizing power” (p. 152; Post-Colonial Studies). While rugby can certainly be oppressive, so too it has its expressive aspects. That is, as much the rugby field is underpinned by a white, colonial imperative, as a social space it may also provide expressive opportunities for Pacific peoples. We cannot deny the political resonance of seeing Pacific people attain a status routinely denied them in other walks of life. As Carrington (2002) has argued what we might term “the racial signification of sport”

Means that sports contests are more than just significant events, in and of themselves important, but rather that they act as a key signifier for wider questions about identity within racially demarcated societies in which racial narratives about the self and society are read both into and from sporting contests that are imbued with racial meanings...sports can be seen at one level as a transgressive liminal space where Black men can attempt, quite legitimately, to (re)impose their subordinated masculine identity through the symbolic, and sometimes literal ‘beating’ of the other, that is, White men.

Finally, because the ‘rugby body’ “is never simply a passive object upon which regimes of power are played out” (Gilbert and Tompkins, 1996, p. 204), the on-field movement and stylings of Pacific players articulate a certain politics of
diasporic nationhood and social struggle. For instance, there may actually be something in the Pacific ‘style-of-play.’ Whereas the predominant characteristics of the Pakeha game have been orderliness, discipline and resolution, the Pacific game reflects a different rationality. As opposed to excess or irresponsibility, ‘Island magic’ may represent a rejection of the coercive moral and ethical codes of colonial/Pakeha rugby. It may very well subvert the cultural subjugation of the Pacific body and transform it textually into a discursive vehicle of affirmation and power.
In a few months New Zealanders will go to the polls to decide their next
government. As always in New Zealand, one election issue already doing the
rounds is the issue of race relations. One matter proving divisive in this regard is
the question of whether to abolish the Maori seats in Parliament that were
established in 1867. Those who favor the move have become increasingly loud in
recent years. As has their philosophy: ‘one law for all’, that New Zealanders ‘One
People.’ This One People argument has long been one of the “identifiable and
recurring themes in Pakeha talk about Maori and Maori/Pakeha relations”
(McCreanor, 2005, p. 55; see also Abel, 1997; Bell, 1996, 2004). Now it appears to
be also becoming a more powerful part of the wider “standard story” (Fish, 2005)
that frames race relations in New Zealand, part of a commonly recognisable
dominant discourse that reproduces the status quo (Levine, 2005; McCreanor,
2005). There is reason to be concerned, or at the very least suspicious, about the
rise to prominence of such a discourse. The notion that New Zealanders are or
could be—so to speak—‘ethnically-unmarked’ buries diversity and suggests a
unity which simply does not exist. As Rudman (2006) reminds us, it is naïve “to
think we can all become one big happy family if we pretend we don’t come from different ethnic or racial backgrounds.”

The idea of one people denies individuals the possibilities of membership in communities that provide meaning and certainty, that may have great personal and psychic import, and that form the myriad layers of a person’s sense of self. Potentially too, it undermines a group’s claims to self-determination as well as proscribing any pretense it may have to collective political rights (Murphy, 2001). I say all this because, although it appeals to some sort of colour-blind neutrality, the One People rhetoric effectively consolidates New Zealandness as synonymous with Anglo-Celtism, albeit without acknowledging it. Allusions to one’s status as an ‘ordinary New Zealander’ has the effect of redefining citizenship and naturalizing exclusion without any direct reference to culture or race, yet undoubtedly the state of being unmarked is the privilege of white/Pakeha New Zealanders: only they have the privilege of being just New Zealanders (cf. Dyer, 1997).

That the ‘We are all New Zealanders’—or ‘We are all Kiwis’—rhetoric naturalizes cultural values to suit those in positions of power—working as it does to exclude any resistant group (Bell, 1995)—is behind my preference for using instead ‘Pakeha’ over terms such as ‘white’, ‘European’ or simply ‘New Zealander’ when referring to people and influences ‘from Europe.’ Doing so is a
politicized choice that requires some discussion. First, what exactly is meant—or, more properly, do I mean—by ‘Pakeha’?

It is important to acknowledge at the outset that Pakeha is, as sociologist Avril Bell (2004, p. 122) notes, “a contested term without one clear meaning” (so, of course, it must be said is ‘Maori’ [see Cunningham and Stanley, 2003; Durie, 1998]). Larner (1995) has similarly noted how, as an identity, it “is not fixed, nor is it self-evident, and it can mean different things in different contexts” (see also Spoonley, 1991). So while Hokowhitu (2004) takes Pakeha as “the common name for New Zealanders who identify predominantly with a European genealogy” (p. 278) this glosses over the political ramifications of its use. Given the tenor of his work, this is likely a preclusion of space rather than a failure of acknowledgment on Hokowhitu’s part. In fact, it is clear that notions of power and dominance are assumed in his use here of the term ‘European.’ He is wholly correct in doing so: few could possibly deny that those of ‘European descent’ are not the dominant cultural group within New Zealand society. My preference for Pakeha is by no means an attempt to distance myself from this fact, to commit and act of presentism which confines European dominance to the past. Completely the opposite. Following, Spoonley (1988), Pakeha must be understood as a reference to those “whose cultural values and behaviour have been primarily formed from the experience of being a member of the dominant group of New Zealand.” I see
this as inherent to defining Pakeha, immediately positioning it in terms of contemporary power relations (‘the dominant group of New Zealand’). This is precisely why talk of ‘mainstream New Zealand’ cannot be pared from ‘non-Maori’ or ‘non-ethnic.’

It is hardly surprising that the successors of European settlers should want to continue the practice of calling themselves merely New Zealanders or Kiwis. All sorts of mundane but pervasive symbols reinforce the notion that New Zealandness is synonymous with whiteness. Biculturalism aside, New Zealand’s sense of itself as ‘unique’ is largely predicated upon banal vernaculars such as rugby, farming, and beer, or forms of parochial post-War-era kitsch which locals know more popularly as ‘Kiwiana’ (see Barnett and Wolfe, 1989). But as a recent New Zealand Post stamp series demonstrates, “the items that are affectionately regarded by New Zealanders themselves as important and familiar parts of their national culture” (New Zealand Post, 2007) frequently draw from a exclusively-Pakeha iconography. The formation of national identity is also dependent on the acceptance of certain myths pertaining to the ‘unique qualities’ possessed by Kiwis, and, again, these are fastidious in their ties to white-settler pioneerism and Pakeha mastery over nature (A. Bell, 2006; Bell, 1995). Formative in most New Zealanders’ sense of their national identity are the ideas of a ‘pastoral paradise’ that is clean and green (Conrich and Woods, 2000), an enterprise
culture that favours a ‘have-a-go’ spirit (Seuffert, 2006), a view of ourselves as ‘do-it-yourselfers’, for whom anything is possible using a bit of ‘Kiwi ingenuity’ (Brown, 1997)—all are arguably nostalgic renderings of a vanished pioneer society, undue in their focus on “settler whiteness” (Ingram, 2001), the nineteenth century, and in particular on the valorisation of Eurocentric notions of settlement and growth (Henry and Berg, 2006). These public displays and discourses blur the lines between nationality and ethnicity, they confuse ‘New Zealand-ness’ with ‘Pakeha-ness.’ For those in the majority (Pakeha), their national identity thus neatly complements, and often outweighs, their sense of being ethnically distinctive within New Zealand. All those who are marked as Other by this hegemonic ‘national’ subject position—whether indigenous or immigrant—tend to be marginalised (Berg & Kearns, 1996; Henry and Berg, 2006). As Pearson (2003) explains, for these ‘ethnic minorities’ “the language and culture they use and experience within their private lives is less likely to match that used in public space. Consequently, they are far more likely to have an ethnic sense of themselves that is not framed by ‘the nation’ and the state” (p. 89). In both historical and contemporary senses, then, for most New Zealanders a sense of ‘belonging’ has been tied to whiteness (Murphy, 2003).

I am not wishing to suggest here that the boundaries of defining who is an ‘ordinary New Zealander’ have not blurred over time. Rather, I am trying to
stress how political rhetoric “routinely exploits this expression” (Ward and Lin, 2005, p. 161) to distinguish those of European descent from Maori and ‘migrants’. That is, ‘ordinary New Zealanders’ are most often white. It is also interesting to note of the relation between ethnic identity and national identity in New Zealand that for Pakeha their sense of the former is considerably weaker than the latter. As Ward and Lin (2005, p. 162) have found, “many New Zealanders of European descent deny, disregard and avoid their ethnicity or conflate it with nationality…there is an ambivalence about ethnic heritage and identification in many Pakeha and a preference to concentrate on national level identification” (hence, the desire of the aforementioned Census-takers wishing to identify simply as ‘New Zealander’).

This sense of Pakeha as being the natural, inevitable, ordinary way of being a New Zealander is, of course, endemic to whiteness generally rather than being a distinctly Antipodean character trait. It is well-documented that members of dominant groups in society have a weaker sense of ethnic identity than their ‘minority’ counterparts (Aanerud, 1997; Dyer, 1997; Frankenberg, 1997; Giroux, 1997). This captures a key aspect of what Maher and Tetreault (1998) describe as the “pervasive power of whiteness” (p. 155): its ability to remain unmarked, unnamed, and invisible. Implicitly, the dominant group (in this case Pakeha) becomes the norm with which others are compared. As Cosgrove and
Bruce (2005) note, “whiteness works by representing itself as normal and universal at the same time that it racially marks those who are ‘non-White’ and ‘other’” (p. 337). Or, as Richard Dyer has famously put it, “white power secures its dominance by seeming not to be anything in particular.”

With “whiteness masquerading as universal” (Frankenberg, 1997, p. 3) most Pakeha New Zealanders do not see themselves as having an ‘ethnicity’, which is instead “only a problem for minorities” (Mansfield, 2000, p. 119). Indeed, in a recent survey of New Zealand adults, only 35 per cent European-New Zealanders agreed that there was even such a thing as a ‘Pakeha identity’ (Liu, 2005). Alluding to a chimerical ‘real New Zealand’ or ‘real New Zealander’ thus masks a discursive investment in whiteness on the part of Pakeha. To borrow from bell hooks, we could say it reveals how Pakeha “have a deep emotional investment in the myth of ‘sameness’ even as their actions reflect the primacy of whiteness as a sign informing who they are and how they think” (1997, pp. 167–168).

If New Zealand is typical of other settler colonies of the British Empire in that “the dominant Anglo Saxon group is usually not seen as an ethnic group because its ethnicity has constructed the mythology of national identity” (Ashcroft, Ashcroft, and Tiffen, 1998, p. 82), then what also hinders the recognition of whiteness in New Zealand is a lack of consensus among the
majority as to what, if anything, they should call themselves. A plurality still prefer the term ‘European New Zealander’, while a growing number refuse ethnic labels, referring to themselves as ‘New Zealanders’ or ‘just Kiwis’ (Liu, 1999). Other studies have also found a resistance to acknowledging an ethnic identity or, again, a tendency to emphasize national heritage over ethnic background (Liu, 2005; Thomas and Nikora, 1994; Ward and Lin, 2005).

I see the rejection of Pakeha as particularly troubling. A tick-box option “NZ European or Pakeha” was used in the 1996 Census, but it was subsequently dropped because, according to Statistics New Zealand, “it did not provide a good measure of ethnicity.” In 2006, while “New Zealander” was a separate category for the first time (forming part of the “Other Ethnicity” category in calculations), anyone who wrote Pākehā in the space marked “other” was “coded” as “New Zealand European” (Statistics New Zealand, 2007). Statistics New Zealand’s guide to collecting Census ethnicity data, “Statistical Standard for Ethnicity 2005”, tellingly makes no mention of Pakeha as a category (in fact, they no longer use the term in any of their public documents). It is not entirely clear as to why Pakeha has fallen from grace in the eyes of New Zealand’s data gatherers. Partly, it is a move to shy from controversy: Statistics New Zealand have themselves described Pākehā as a “problematic term” (Statistics New Zealand, 2005). However, more likely it reflects the way “some European New Zealanders
won’t have a bar of the Pakeha label because it is a Maori term they see as ‘foreign’ and possibly derogatory” (Pearson, 2003, p. 90). For instance, a Human Rights Commission Review of Ethnicity Statistics in 2001 found that one of the most common complaints to the former Race Relations Office was from people objecting to being labelled “Pakeha” (Barnard, 2001). Many still see Pakeha as pejorative, erroneously believing it to be a disparaging reference meaning ‘white rabbit’ or ‘white pig’—despite the fact that such myths have been long been (see, for instance, Bayard [1995]).

The anxiety over ‘Pakeha’ among some European New Zealanders may also have to do with the implications it carries of being an outsider. It is, after all, an ethnic label originally coined by Maori to refer to British settlers, who they saw as ‘foreigners’ (Hokowhitu, 2004). ‘Pakeha’ intuitively challenges the traditional power dynamic because it is an ethnicity that could be seen as ascribed as opposed to claimed. As Worby (1994) fittingly notes, “whatever else it may be, ethnicity, conceived as a practice, is fundamentally about the power to name others” (p. 371; original emphasis). In the South Pacific the power to name and represent is usually the privilege of the colonizing West. Further, this power to name was, to borrow again from Worby, “increasingly bound up with an imaginary knowledge of the relationship between ethnic identities and socio-

25 In this way, European misunderstandings of Pakeha mirror the misconceptions which swirl
geographic space” (1994, p. 371). That is to say, ethnicity was (and is) ineluctably linked to place: or, as Bell (2006, p. 254) succinctly puts it, “claims to peoplehood and territorial belonging are inseparable.” For successive generations of white settlers, the right to claim their status as ‘New Zealanders’ has been predicated on establishing links to the land. For European New Zealanders their connection to the landscape is a means by which to construct their indigeneity. In voicing a sense of belonging to the land—what O’Connor (1989, p. 101) terms “landship”—they have attempted to assert not only their difference from an inherited tradition (see Phillips, 1987), but establish their ‘authenticity’ (Dominy, 1995). Place is thus fundamental to the establishment of personal and group identities and the formation of biographies (see King, 1991, 1999).

Place in New Zealand must therefore be seen as “as something other than a physical setting, or as passive target for primordial sentiments of attachment” (Rodman, 1992, p. 641) as it is highly politicized, a means by which European New Zealanders cement their political and cultural foundations. It has been a means too through which to exercise colonial power. As Simon Featherstone argues, land “was both the material and ideological base of colonialism” (2005, p. 201). In claiming rights to the land, white New Zealanders have been able to (re)imagine themselves as ‘hosts’ rather than ‘immigrants’, in doing so around its Samoan equivalents ‘palagi’ and ‘papalagi’ (see Tent and Geraghty, 2001).
establishing their right to script the nation (who belongs, who doesn’t, on what terms?). It has in turn aided the naturalization of whiteness as the mainstream, European New Zealanders becoming the unreflexive “managers” of the “managed” (Hage, 1998). In New Zealand, as elsewhere in the British colonies, narratives of the relation between people and place have consolidated the rights of settlers to belong and to rule. Thus, in reminding European-New Zealanders of their own status as ‘migrants’, ‘Pakeha’ may stir a sense of ontological unease. On this issue, Avril Bell has described New Zealand’s settler culture as “fragile” because, as migrants, they lack “roots” (Bell, 2006). The relationship between people and place, she argues, has “‘shaky’ foundations…when those claims are made by settler peoples” (p. 255).

Bell goes on to point out that Pakeha “are not only the descendants of migrants, they are the descendants of colonizing migrants” (p. 255; emphasis added). Up until the 1980s, ‘colonization’ was a term largely unproblematized among European New Zealanders. The term was used uncritically to celebrate the exploits of British settlers toiling in a strange and hostile land. “It was a commonplace of early New Zealand history and literature” writes Romaine (p. ), “that the country had no past before Europeans arrived.” The land in these nostalgic renditions was, in essence, empty, and only cursory reference was made to the impact of settlement on the indigenous population. This
foreshadowed emotional attachments to the land among Pakeha that were largely unencumbered by the presence and connections of Maori.

The late 1960s, however, witnessed what Pearson (2000) describes as “the renewed, strengthening and more expansive politicisation of aboriginal peoples” (p. 95). During this time ‘colonization’ came to mean something entirely different, attention was turned to the ‘impact’ of the colonial encounter on Maori. In the context of the Maori cultural renaissance of the 1970s—in which vocal protests and demands about land rights and ownership eventually forced a ‘full’ recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi as the ‘founding document’ of the nation—being a ‘colonizer’ became “a morally doubtful occupation” (Bell, 2006, p. 256). For many ‘colonialism’ is now the ultimate term by which to characterize the ‘damage’ inflicted by Europeans upon Maori, either individually or institutionally, symbolically or materially. Like Frykenberg’s (2003) description of the terms in South Asia, in New Zealand ‘colonial’, ‘colonialism’ and ‘colonialist’ “have now become the pejorative devices or epithets of choice” (p. 7).

The history of Pakeha settlement has thus become, as Bell contends, “an increasingly problematic ground on which to assert a sense of cultural identity” (p. 256). As a consequence ‘Pakeha’ as term for European New Zealanders could be seen not only as a reminder that their culture is the result of recent
transportation, but, further, highlights “the immorality of that transplantation” (Bell, 2006, p. 256).

This is, of course, only one reading as to the reasons why some Europeans resist(resent) being called ‘Pakeha.’ In reality, there are multiple, and often complex, reasons for individuals choosing to accept or reject Pakeha as an ethnic label. Some are even quite prosaic on the matter, seeing it less as “a term of abuse” than

simply a descriptive word applied to non-Polynesian people and things in New Zealand that derive originally from outside New Zealand—most often from Europe, and even more specifically, because of the nature of our history, from the United Kingdom (King, 1991, pp. 15-16).

Historian Judith Binney, for instance, calls herself a Pākehā saying, “I think it is the most simple and practical term. It is a name given to us by Māori. It has no pejorative associations like people think it does—it’s a descriptive term” (quoted in Barton, 2005). Urry (1990) takes this argument further, calling Pakeha “an empty category as it does not represent an identity but merely means non-Maori” (p. 20).

I believe that Urry is half right. He is correct in that, with regard to the relationship between Maori and non-Maori, “anything in New Zealand that is not specifically Maori would, in the Maori language, be identified as Pakeha” (King, 2004). Historian Michael King has persuasively argued that Pakeha is not necessarily a reference merely to whiteness (cf. O’Connor, 1990). In his 1985
“ethnic autobiography”, Being Pakeha, King simply defines Pakeha as “denoting non-Maori New Zealanders” (1985, p. 12). This omission of ‘color’ is a conscious act on King’s part. Urry’s insinuation that Pakeha as a category is constituted solely by absence is, however, more problematic. The idea that Pakeha “have no culture” (as once famously suggested by British author and MP Austin Mitchell [Mitchell, 1972]) suggests the Pakeha power is in no way cultural. It would, to borrow from, Rasmussen et al. (2001, p. 10), “seem to rule out approaches to understanding how [Pakeha] hegemony is built through cultural praxis as well as inquiries into the symbolic dimensions of racial domination.” Secondly, the romanticized, and inherently oppositional, view of ‘Maori culture’ privileges ‘Maori-ness’ as “the authentically liberatory counterpoint” (p. 11) to ‘Pakeha-ness.’ Neither are there clear and identifiable lines that separate ‘Pakeha’ from ‘Maori’: among both Pakeha and Maori, ethnic subjects are variously positioned, viewing and living ‘Maori-ness’ or ‘Pakeha-ness’ in a heterogenous manner.

‘Pakeha’, as I see it, is a term that is neither vacuous nor apolitical. First, New Zealand’s links with Britain have become steadily more attenuated. What some have dubbed ‘white New Zealand culture’ now differs significantly from the European roots whence they came. If Pakeha implies things that are ‘non-

26 My own definition of ‘Pakeha’ is influenced by Ross Himona’s definition. Himona states that linguistically it just means “a New Zealander of non-Maori and non-Polynesian heritage without
Maori’ then it equally denotes “things that are no longer simply
European…people and things that derive from abroad but that, through the
transformations of history and geography, through their new characteristics and
combinations, are now unlike their sources and antecedents” (King, 1991, p. 16).
As Paul Spoonley notes of his preference for the term, “Why do I call myself a
Pakeha? First of all, it clearly says what I am not. I am not European or even a
European New Zealander. I am a product of New Zealand, not of Europe. I am
not English, despite immediate family connections with that country. Nor am I
Maori or one of the other ethnic groups that exist here” (Spoonley, 1991, p. 146).
Michèle Dominy adds that “we cannot assume that settler cultures are merely
derivative” (1995, p. 359), and as W. H. Oliver (1991) has noted of nineteenth-
century attempts to “replicate either the essence or an aspect of British society” in
New Zealand: “[they] did not work. New Zealand is not at all like the society
from which my father escaped” (p. 97).

Admittedly, New Zealanders once thought of themselves as ‘British’—
albeit ‘Better Britons’ (Phillips, 2007). But, this sense of belonging to the British
Empire has faded throughout the course of the previous century. As King notes:

A huge change has taken place in my lifetime. When I was a child in the
1940s and early 1950s, my parents and grandparents spoke of Britain as home, and New Zealand had this strong sense of identity and coherence

any connotations.” He considers that ‘Pakeha’ “is most used to describe white non-Maori, as they were the original colonists, but it can apply equally to Asian, etc.”
as being part of the commonwealth and a the identity of its people as being British. That of course has changed. I doubt if you’d find anybody now who would see the New Zealand identity in that way.

“There is amply sufficiency of cultural features and products”, King writes elsewhere, “that have been so transformed in New Zealand as to be distinguishable from their origins” (1991, p. 17).

Interestingly, King has gone as far as suggesting ‘Pakeha’ to be a “second indigenous New Zealand culture” (1991, p. 19; see also Mulgan, 1989). For King, being Pakeha is to be both not British and ‘native’ (the latter being a term he chooses to use in an updated edition of his autobiography [King, 1999]). In an interview shortly before his death in 2004, he argues that the term ‘European’ is “no longer accurate or appropriate”:

Maori came to New Zealand from Eastern Polynesia. We don’t know how long it took to actually turn their backs on their culture of origin and decide they were Maori, but it was probably only three or four generations. The point at which it happened was when they stopped looking over their shoulder to the home culture and just got on with being the people they were in a new country. My view is that Pakeha have been here long enough now to have done the same thing and are ‘a second indigenous culture’. And I don’t think that’s a particularly provocative thing to say. Like most Pakeha, I’ve been to Europe and felt that sense of affinity—but I am not European (quoted in Butcher, 2003, p. 44).

Pryor et al (1992) would probably suggest this as being typical of how, as colonial societies mature, there is an increasing tendency for settler-descended populations to see themselves as ‘indigenous.’ And, as they note, this desire to move beyond colonization and Empire must be approached with caution. First,
as I have already suggested, the act of ‘becoming indigenous’ frequently makes recourse to narratives of belonging based on ‘a oneness with the land’ (for parallels in Australia and Canada see Hage [1998], O’Dowd [2006], and Mackey [1999]). In this case King stresses that “in identifying my own culture as Pakeha, I do so as one who has always taken it for granted that I belonged in this land” (quoted in Locke, ?, italics my own). King is not the only one to question who is part of the indigenous group and to stamp his sense of belonging via the landscape. Charles Royal, for instance, has suggested “the concept of ‘tangata whenua’ [literally, ‘people of the land’ in Maori] should no longer be exclusive to Maori but be part of a new language to include all those who share and are committed to a spiritual relationship with the natural environment” (Royal, 2007; see also Rosier, 1991; Spoonley, 1991, 1995). The longing for ontological footing, though, is also an expression of a desire to sever the ties to British ancestry, and the cultural baggage such ties bring with them. As Pearson (2000) explains, claims to being a ‘nativity’ among Pakeha are not only a declaration of the “right to be ‘in place’”, but a “wish to distance oneself from the alleged or acknowledged past misdeeds of the British” (p. 103). In asserting their attachment to place, Pakeha often forget how “the history of how that attachment was secured” (Bell, 2006, p. 256). As Mark Williams reminds us, to claim that one is ‘home’ by turning to the land and away from Europe is
therefore in the “interests of the claimants more than it is in those of the native peoples themselves” (1990, p. 213).

It should also be remembered that evasion and denial have become the hallmarks of contemporary settler societies. Renan (1990) has famously pointed out how the grand stories of nation suppress the brutality of their construction. Hobsbawm (1983) and Anderson (1991) have likewise argued that the ongoing imagination of nations must forget the modernity of their emergence. In similar fashion, in New Zealand it could be argued that the emergence of Pakeha/white nationalism represents how European New Zealanders are remaking themselves by deliberately forgetting their history. As Bruce Jesson writes in response to the publication of King’s Being Pakeha:

Racial conflict was one of the formative experiences of New Zealand society. Pakeha New Zealanders are the products of an invading culture. As individuals we can be magnanimous or guilt-stricken, according to our inclination. But as a society we have this amazing capacity for self-deception. For more than a century we smugly believed that this country was a model of racial harmony, that we were one people. Maori radicalism has put an end to that particular delusion, and we are now in the process of putting down new layers of hypocrisy.

Ani Mikaere (Mikaere, 2004) and Avril Bell (e.g., Bell, 2006) have been equally as suspicious of Pakeha claims to indigeneity, suggesting it fails to acknowledge how Pakeha have benefited from their ancestors’ injustice. Mikaere, for instance, argues that there is little difference between talk of Pakeha indigeneity and the ‘We’re all New Zealanders now’ rhetoric of Brash that attempts to “deny
personal responsibility for the detrimental impact on Māori of colonisation”: “A commitment to forget is clearly something that the asserters of Pākehā indigeneity share” (Mikaere, 2004). Bell makes similar claims, but is also concerned about the political impacts of European-New Zealanders claiming indigeneity. She notes how indigeneity has a very specific meaning in international law, and argues that, as a consequence, “to claim Pakeha indigeneity is to deny the difference between the Pakeha relationship to this place [New Zealand] and the Maori relationship” (quoted in Corballis, 2007).

In large part I agree with these criticisms, and, like McCreanor (2005), I reject uses of the term Pakeha that have sought to undermine the status of Maori as tangata whenua “by claming an equivalent indigeneity” (p. 53). I nonetheless choose to position myself as Pakeha. On some level, I call myself Pakeha because, to quote Hutchinson (1991, p. 130), it just “feels right.” First, it is ‘of New Zealand’ and my ethnic identity is certainly a product of being born and raised there. At the same time, the term does not confuse or conflate this ethnicity with nationality (as do Brownlee, Brash, and their ilk). Beyond the fact that “strictly speaking, New Zealander is a nationality not an ethnicity” (Robson and Reid, 2001, p. 13), when nationality replaces ethnicity it legitimizes the “exploitation and even oppression” of minority groups—whether ‘national’ or ‘ethnic’—within the territorial bounds of the state (Oommen, 1997). Subsuming one within
the other effectively obscures the inequality of ethnic experience. In Stuart Hall’s
terms the “brutal” collapsing of nationality and ethnicity is “a way of warding
off or refusing to live with difference” (Hall, 2000).

The implicit expectation that nationality and ethnicity should coincide
should thus be seen as evidence of what Gilroy (1987, p. 50) has called a “cultural
racism” which displaces and dominates “equally lived and formed” identities.
As Spoonley writes of the New Zealand context, the appeal to an idea ‘we are all
New Zealanders’ is a “particular form of nationalism [that] is often contradicted
by the racism of its adherents” (1993, p. 6). Or in Ansley’s (2003) more pointed
terms, it could be said that the notion “‘we are all New Zealanders’ stands for
intolerance” (p. 19). The inherent racism of the call to make New Zealander an
ethnic group perhaps comes into sharper relief if we consider its backers. As
writer and social commentator Tze Ming Mok drolly observes:

Is it just me, or is the email urging you to write ‘New Zealander’ in the
ethnicity box for the Census circulating primarily amongst...Pakeha New
Zealanders? Quelle surprise. I guess people who have a burning need to
deny their ethnicity are predominantly white, and they know it.

Of the people who consider their ethnicity as “New Zealander”, she writes that
“I think we can be pretty safe in assuming that the market for this muddy
thinking is nearly entirely Pakeha.”

If the call to recognize New Zealander as an ethnicity is ignorant of the
fact that New Zealandness as a category “has always been racialized through
and through” (when, as Hall [2000, p. 222] may have asked, “has it connoted anything but ‘whiteness’?”), then to insist that we should be only New Zealanders is also to deny the importance of ethnicity. Ethnicity, for instance, has been shown to perform deep psychological functions. As an example, it has been argued that individuals need a firm sense of group identification in order to maintain a sense of well-being, and that ethnicity provides individuals with a sense of belonging that contributes to a positive self-concept (Phinney, 1990). Obviously, too, there are significant political and economic ramifications in failing to recognize ethnic identities. Numerous authors have shown how ethnicity can “serve as a basis for group solidarity, combine into symbolic systems for defining grievances and setting agendas for collective action, and provide a blueprint or repertoire of tactics” (Nagel, 1994, p. 163). Claiming ethnicity may be variously a strategy to gain personal or collective political or economic advantage, to dramatize injustice, or to animate grievances or movement objectives.

Not just at the local level: ethnicity frequently forms the basis of transnational alliances. As Davis and Moore contend, “ethnic affinity” can “serve as a conduit for the exchange of information and as a potential motivation for action” (p. 173). Regional- and national-level ethnic rights organizations oftentimes provide the ‘building blocks’ that link state agencies, national and
international NGOs, and multi-lateral development agencies within wider transnational networks. What Kearney (1991) dubs “transnational ethnicity” also challenges established understandings of governance, citizenship rights, and political participation that are too frequently allied to the state. These are not the ‘ethnic groups’ of traditional sociological representation, instead they are communities rooted in local places but simultaneously global in nature. They are, in Swyngedouw (1997) terms, ‘glocalized’ communities. Though they may hinge on ethnic identity or identity politics, they in fact provide alternative forms of political and cultural organizing that are “rooted in local places (communities, territories), and that are simultaneously global in nature (i.e., represented through, and in part forged by, national and transnational networks) (Perreault, 2003, p. 70). Ethnicity so conceived, may thus be seen as a “process of ethnic recovery based not so much on collective memory or shared experience, but on networks of indigenous political leaders, national intellectuals, and foreign researchers” (p. 79). We must therefore remember that one’s ethnic identity is situational and changeable, “constantly undergoing redefinition and reconstruction” (Nagel, 1994, p. ). The desire to claim New Zealander as an ethnicity.
(Stuart Hall) On Theory

In the introduction I have suggested that I have attempted in this dissertation to theorize the ‘postcolonial moment’ of New Zealand rugby. I then went on to suggest how ‘postcolonialism’ and ‘postcolonial theory’, while not always explicit, form the (‘ontological’) theoretical underpinnings of my analysis in this dissertation. However, it perhaps important here to offer a few brief words of how I ‘approach’ theory, and in the ‘process’ of ‘theorizing.’ In line with the cultural studies tradition (see Hartley, 2003), I see ‘theory construction’ as a self-reflexive discursive endeavor which seeks to interpret and intervene in the world (Barker, 2002). I see theorizing as less a drive for purity or fluency, than as an attempt to construct narratives which seek to describe, define, and explain particular empirical phenomena at particular (conjunctural) moments. That is, the meaning and effects of any concrete practice—its conjunctural identity—are always over determined by the network of relations with which it is articulated (Andrews, 2002; see also Hall, 1996).

It is important to note, however, that what is theoretical stable throughout this dissertation is a Gramscian understanding of “conjunctural knowledge”, or
what Simon During describes as “knowledge situated in, and applicable to, specific and immediate political or historical circumstances” (During, 1993, 97). Thus, while Stuart Hall’s famed metaphor of theoretical, that of “wrestling with the angels” is wholly appropriate to the present analysis, it should also be recognized that at the conceptual core of my contextual analysis is a Gramscian-informed “Marxism without guarantees” (Hall, 1996). I discuss this notion in greater detail below, but my nod to Gramsci here is indicative of a particular strand of cultural Marxism that ultimately informs my thinking throughout the course of this dissertation. It is Marxian in the sense that I take ‘the social’ as ‘determined.’ However, following Stuart Hall (see esp. Hall, ), I assume, a different conception of ‘determinancy’ from that which is entailed by the normal sense of ‘economic determinism’, or by the expressive totality way of conceiving the relations between the different practices in a social formation. The relations between these different levels are, indeed, determinate: i.e. mutually determining. The structure of social practices - the ensemble - is therefore neither free-floating nor immaterial. But neither is it a transitive structure, in which its intelligibility lies exclusively in the one-way transmission of effects from base upwards.

Put differently I assume, as Hall, that there is no necessary correspondence between the various elements of society and the overbearing economic realm, and reject vulgar Marxism’s claims as to “political outcomes and the consequences of the conduct of political struggles [being] foreordained in the economic stars.”
This type of contextual cultural studies requires a critical engagement with theory. Here I again see the work of Stuart Hall as emblematic. For Hall theory is always a “detour” (Hall, 1986; see also Grossberg, 1992; Slack, 1986). It is not something to be applied formulaically, deployed without reflection or criticism. Rather, it a strategic resource, something engaged in response to a particular politically-defined question (Grossberg, 2001). It is specific to context, always in accord with the demands of conjuncture. As Slack (1996) explains, cultural studies works with the notion of theory as a conceptual tool to help “ground our engagement with what newly confronts us and to let that engagement provide the ground for retheorizing” (p. 113); it is always “developing in relation to changing epistemological positions and political conditions” (p. 112). Such a critical engagement with theory is perhaps nowhere more succinctly captured than in Hall’s oft cited (1992) metaphor of “wrestling with the angels”: as he suggests, “the only theory worth having is that which you have to fight off, not that which you speak with profound fluency” (Hall, 1992, p. 280). To borrow from Lawrence Grossberg (1997), particular theories pull you in specific directions, they lead you to ask certain questions, to make certain observations: it is not an issue of theoretical fit, but rather, a case of critically examining what is useful and appropriate within a particular empirical context.
Perhaps the most famous example of the way Hall approaches (and certainly one of the more significant contributions to cultural studies)—and the way those of us in cultural studies should approach—theory is in his offering of a “marxism without final guarantees” (Hall, 1983, 1986, 1996); a new interpretive strategy, first outlined in the 1970s, and which has very much paved the direction for cultural studies. Contextually, there were (at least) two significant (and interrelated) factors in which Hall’s analysis was grounded. Firstly, and with regard to theory, by the 1970s cultural theorists “were explicitly engaged in critiques of ‘classical’ or ‘orthodox’ marxism and its reliance on two related forms of reductionism: economic reductionism, which relies on a limited reading of Marx’s notion of the relationship between base and superstructure; and class reductionism, which relies on a limited reading of Marx’s notion of class” (Slack, 1996, p. 116). Secondly, closely related to the latter and with regard to historical conjuncture, was the emergence of the New Right within British politics during this period; and, significantly, cultural studies lacked the “interpretive tools needed to explain the working class popularity of a political ideology which did not seem to represent the interests of the working class” (Andrews and Loy, 1993). As Hall has described it, cultural studies was a “two paradigm” (see Hall, 1980) affair—divided between the ahistorical determinism of structuralism (exemplified by the work of Louis Althusser) and the romanticized humanism of
culturalism (best embodied in the work of E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams)—neither of which could account for the popularity of Thatcherism among Britain’s working classes.

However, for Hall, Althusser’s work on ideology was significant because it “reasserted the conception of ideologies as practices rather than as systems of ideas…ideologies were materially located” (Hall, 1980, pp. 32-33). Conversely, Hall also believed popular culture to be a site of ideological contestation (see Hall, 1981), and therefore that “the human agent is not structurally positioned within an ideological field, rather it actively produces meanings of social experience which explore, reproduce, contest, and hence create, the world in which it lives” (Andrews and Loy, 1993). As Hall argues, “if the function of ideology is to ‘reproduce’ capitalist social relations according to the ‘requirements’ of the system, how does one account…for ideological struggle?” (Hall, 1996, p. 30). Yet, Hall did not dismiss Althusser’s work outright. Instead he sought retain its theoretical relevance while expanding it using more recent theories on ideology (Hall, 1986). In particular, Hall turned to Antonio Gramsci whose work he saw as rejecting “any form of reductionism—especially that of ‘economism’” (Hall, 1980, p. 35). Central to Hall’s theorizing was Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, what Hall has described as the “winning and shaping consent so that the power of the dominant classes appears both legitimate and
natural” (Hall, 1977). Through Gramsci, Hall argued that popular culture was not merely a site in which ruling-class ideology was simply imposed, but rather it should be conceived as a social “zone of contestation” (Hall, 1981), the ground in and over which different interest struggle for hegemony. Hall thus sought to analyze “hegemonic,” or ruling, social and cultural forces of domination and to seek “counter-hegemonic” forces of resistance and struggle. This means studying “not how people are in a passively inherited culture but what we do with the cultural commodities that we encounter and use in daily life (“practice”) and thus we make as “culture”” (Frow and Morris, 2000, p. 331).

On Articulation

Via a complex synthesis of Althusser and Gramsci—what Andrews and Loy (1993) describe as a “grafting” of the former’s “structurally overdetermined conception of ideology” onto the latter’s “conjunctural understanding of the relationship between hegemony and national popular consciousness”—Hall was thus able “to develop a materialist definition of culture” (Hall, 1980, p. 27), which related the “cultural” to the economic, the political, and the ideological. In Hall’s marxism without guarantees, however, materialist was deployed in a more limited sense: grounded in historical conditions, determinacy “had to be thought not as emanating from one level of the social totality—for example, ‘the base’—in unilinear fashion but as an ‘over-determination.’” (Hall, 1980, p. 29). As Andrews
and Loy (1993) explain, “within Hall’s conjunctural framework, meanings and identities are continually contested, there being no guaranteed essence to any manifestation of cultural existence. There is in fact no necessary correspondence or no necessary non-correspondence between specific meanings and identities, and particular cultural practices” (see also Hall, 1985, 1986). As Hall puts it:

ideas do arise from and may reflect the material conditions in which social groups and classes exist. In that sense—i.e., historically—there may well be certain tendential alignments...[but] the tendential lines of forces define only the givenness of the historical terrain...ideas only become effective if they do, in the end, connect with a particular constellation of social forces. In that sense, ideological struggle is part of the general social struggle for mastery and leadership—in short for hegemony (Hall, 1996, pp. 42-43).

Reconceptualized by Hall, the problematic of cultural studies thus became closely identified with the problem of the “‘relative autonomy’ of cultural practices” (Hall, 1980, p. 29): that is, the “linkage between the articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected” (Hall, 1986, p. 53). Implicit in this framework is the concept of articulation, what Hall describes as “the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions...The so-called ‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary ‘belongingness’”(Hall, 1986, p. 53). Thus, “unity is the ‘result of many determinations,’ the product of a particular articulation of
distinctions and differences rather than of similarity and correspondence” (Hall, 1980, p. 29). Both methodologically and theoretically, articulation is “perhaps one of the most generative concepts in contemporary cultural studies” (Slack, 1996, p. 112). Methodologically, it serves as a “framework for understanding what a cultural study does” (Slack, 1996, p. 112), while theoretically it is neither reductionist nor essentialist. Further, through articulation Hall emphasizes that theory and method must be understood—as they have been in cultural studies—as developing in relation to changing epistemological positions and political conditions: articulation is grounded in historical context, it is a contextually-specific map of the social formation—thus, Grossberg’s (1997) description of cultural studies as a “contextual theory of contexts.”

Notably, however, articulation should be seen as merely a process of description, but, rather, the mapping of the conjunctural relation between an ensemble of particular practices and forces, is a necessarily counter-hegemonic practice. Articulation is a theoretically-informed political practice, a process of re-articulating contexts. It is a project of social transformation in which the researcher aims to “specify forces of domination and resistance in order to aid the process of political struggle” (Kellner, 1997, p. 19). Indeed, for Hall, articulation was an interventionist strategy:

The aim of a theoretically-informed political practice must surely be to bring about or construct the articulation between social or economic forces
and those forms of politics and ideology which might lead them in practice to intervene in history in a progressive way—an articulation which has to be constructed through practice precisely because it is not guaranteed by how those forces are constituted in the first place (Hall, 1985, p. 123).

On Articulation and ‘Method’

With regard to the relation between articulation and method, on one level, unearthing this socially and historically contingent matrix of social, economic, political, and technological ‘articulations’ arguably “represents the primary method of contextual cultural studies” (Andrews, 2002, p. 114). Indeed, the process of “articulation” has been described by Lawrence Grossberg (1997) as the “methodological face” of cultural studies. In brief, articulation can perhaps be best understood as the active creation of context by “forging connections between practices and effects” (Grossberg, 1992, p. 54); or, to quote Stuart Hall, an articulation is:

the form of the connection that can make a unity of two different elements, under certain conditions. It is a linkage which is not necessary, determined, absolute and essential for all time. You have to ask, under what circumstances can a connection be forged or made? The so-called ‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct elements which can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary ‘belongingness.’ The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage between the articulated discourse and the social forces with which it can, under certain historical conditions, but need not necessarily, be connected (Hall, 1986, p. 53).

On a practical level—and, acknowledging the danger that my portrayal intimates articulation to have “formal, eminently transferable properties” (Slack,
1996, p. 113)—this means systematically identifying “what, if any, social forces are interacting with one’s object of analysis, what, if any, political forces are interacting with one’s object of study, and so on” (King, 2005). Having completed this task, “it will be necessary to think about how these specific forces, which are at present inserted into the artificially discrete analytical categories of the “social,” “political” and so on, intersect with one another. These overarching categories will thus fall away, and one will be left with a complex web of particular forces” (King, 2005).

On Discourse and Discourse Analysis

At various junctures throughout this dissertation I have discussed how I understand ‘discourse’ as a particular way of representing ‘New Zealanders’ and ‘Pacific peoples’, ‘we’ and ‘they’, and the relations between them. Discourse in this sense is a group of statements that provide a framework, or language, for talking about, or representing, knowledge about Pacific peoples and ‘European’ New Zealanders. While I am more generally concerned with ‘mapping’ the “discursive formation” (Foucault, 1972; see also Foucault, 1980), the web of relationships between discursive practices and the contexts in which they occur, it is perhaps worth making a few comments on the “textual orientation” (Fairclough, 1992) of discourse analysis. That is, my arguments herein are based on a close analysis of discourse within ‘texts’, whether written, spoken or visual.
My interest here is in the strategic workings of these texts in contributing to a particular construction of the ‘Pacific Other.’ My approach may be best described, after Fairclough (1989, 1992, 2003), as a textually-oriented discourse analysis (see also Barker and Galasinski, 2001). It is difficult to formalize and standard approach to discourse analysis and, as a perspective, discourse analysis “does not have a rigorously defined theoretical or methodological structure” (Adams, 2003, p. 233). As Jane Adams notes, scholars working within this tradition “tend to borrow rather eclectically from a wide variety of leading scholars, including theorists who are epistemologically opposed on key issues” (p. 233). Methodologically, discourse analysis is equally diverse. This makes describing ‘rules’ of method a decidedly complicated task. Because the process tends to be ‘data-driven’, even formulating a traditional ‘research problem’ belies ‘normal’ conventions. Rather than looking for answers to a specific problem, what the research is ‘about’ emerges in, rather than prior to, the analysis: it is less about resolution per se than about how a problem may itself be constructed. On these lines, I began this dissertation only with a broad interest in rugby, Pacific peoples, and the cultural politics of identity. I then drew on a wide range of ‘data’ including, but not necessarily limited to, political speeches, policy documents, press and television reports, popular non-fiction and literature. My primary consideration in selecting these texts was, to borrow from Tonkiss
(2004), in their “relevance to the research problem, rather than simply the number of texts analyzed” (p. 376).

This does not mean, again to quote Tonkiss, that “one simply ‘selects out’ the data extracts that support the argument, while ignoring more troubling or ill-fitting sections of the text. Contradictions within a text...can often be productive for the analysis” (p. 377). To be sure, in generating and analyzing a series of texts, a discourse ‘analyst’ will always be open to claims about partiality in the selection of these texts, given that “only a small amount of discourse can be studied effectively in any detail” (Marston, 2004, p. 8). For this reason, any results, conclusions and interpretations ensuing from the analysis are inevitably tentative and qualified (Litosseliti and Sunderland, 2002). Discourse analysis always remains a matter of interpretation. As there is no hard data provided through discourse analysis, the reliability and the validity of one’s research/findings depends on the force of the argument. However, we would be wise to remember here that, while it is often tempting to impose interpretation on a text, it is difficult to do so when such interpretations are not supported by the data (Booth, 2006). We cannot, as Tonkiss writes, “make the data ‘say’ what is simply not there” (p. 377; original emphasis). In this dissertation I work from the assumption that media discourse encourages dominant readings, whilst still acknowledging the potential for resistant readings and textual ambiguity. My
analysis is premised on a lengthy and involved engagement with a large corpus of publicly available texts/data. The benefit of this longer acquaintance with these texts, as well as the socio-cultural context within which they are produced, is the ability to discern ‘telling illustrations’ of the dominant discourse. By dominant discourse here I am referring to a discourse that “serves as a matrix for its members’ discussions on various issues” (Karim, 2003, p. 5). In Stuart Hall’s terms, that dominant discourses embody

the dominant definitions of the situation, and represent or refract the existing structures of power, wealth and domination, hence that they structure every event they signify, and accent them in a manner which reproduces the given ideological structures—this process has become unconscious (Hall, 1997).

As Hall intimates, dominant discourses are widely accepted as self-evident. They therefore constrain and enable the personal construction of meaning in particular, predictable ways. The dominant discourse in essence provides a common field of meaning, and my aim herein is to study how certain types of media discourses manage, despite competition from other discourses, to remain dominant (Karim, 2003). In this way dominant discourses can be taken as the ‘hegemonic’ discourses that delineate the common sense of a culture. It should be noted that my purpose is to set out the ways in which dominant discourses of Pacific-New Zealand culture, not to establish what this culture ‘is.’ Raymond Williams has spoken of “cultural formations” as
effective movements and tendencies, in intellectual and artistic life, which have significant and sometimes decisive influence on the active development of a culture, and which have variable and often oblique relation to formal institutions” (1977, p. 117).

Such cultural formations help to set the framework within which matters are discussed (McCrone, 2001). Following Williams, my interest in this dissertation is with the dominant social discourses of ‘Pacific peoples’, ‘Pacific Islanders’, and ‘New Zealanders’: with their normative character, with how they reproduce the status quo, and with how they continue to shape the ‘social imaginary.’

On the Politics of Cultural Studies

As Grossberg (1997) maintains, articulation calls for both deconstruction and reconstruction, it “attempts, temporarily and locally, to place theory in between in order to enable people to act more strategically in ways that may change their context” (p. 261). It is the intervention into contexts; “it is about the possibilities for remaking the context where context is always understood as a structure of power. But the very structure of the context is precisely where one must go to relocate the power that is operating, since contexts do not exist independently of power” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 261). However, as Hall (1980, p. 69) has warned, “articulation contains the danger of high formalism.” Given the “corporatization of university life and its rationalization across national borders toward an increasing similarity at the level of institutional values and
procedures” (Frow and Morris, 2000, p. 319), there is a chance that, “as it becomes a more institutionally acceptable academic practice, the ‘problem’ of articulation will be cast more as a theoretical, methodological and epistemological one than a political and strategic one” (Slack, 1996, p. 125). This is true perhaps of not only articulation, but cultural studies itself. For instance, Hall, perhaps typical of his disdain for all things “academic”27, has been wary of the “disciplinization” of cultural studies (see Hall, 1992, 1996), suggesting its growing popularity has sometimes led to the formalization of its practices (particularly by those universities aiming to capitalize on its “success.” Similarly, Handel Kashope Wright has suggested that, “at various sites [cultural studies] appears to have become a largely academic exercise, abandoning its praxis roots, its characteristic of being at once an academic (anti)discipline and a political project, a theory-informed discourse and a community-based practice” (Wright, 2001, p. 133).

With regard to the veracity of Wright’s allegation, in the first instance, Hall (2001) has also argued that the dissemination of cultural studies (in both a geographic and disciplinary sense) has meant a “pluralisation of what cultural studies was,” which in turn has—in some places—led to “a weakening of its

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27 As Hall describes himself: “I don’t know whether even now I would call myself an academic. I’m an intellectual…I’m a public intellectual and I’m committed to ideas, and to serious work of
critical and political impulse.” In particular, he has been especially critical of the
de-politicization of cultural studies work in the United States, and has elsewhere
lamented the demise of the Gramscian organic in favor of the career intellectual
(see Hall, 1992). Similarly, Lawrence Grossberg in Bringing it All Back Home
(Grossberg, 1997) has claimed that the Left in America has “retreated from the
politics of policy and public debate into the politics of theory and the theory of
politics.” Though I would Rojek and Turner’s (2000) assessment that criticism
has been more important than political strategy in cultural studies (for, as I have
suggested, articulation is itself an interventionist political act), I would concur
with Grossberg (1997, pp. 268-269) in his assessment that the second of Gramsci’s
goals for the organic “has yet to be realized: to share that knowledge with people
who want to do something with it. That, it seems to me, is the problem facing
cultural studies—as well as many other forms of intellectual discourse.”

Despite these reservations, we should not forget that from the very
beginning cultural studies has always been political in nature, “firmly anchored
in a strategy of political struggle” (Davies, 1990, p. 2). Cultural studies is always
interventionist in the sense that it “attempts to use the best intellectual resources
available to gain a better understanding of the relations of power (as the state of
play of balance in a field of forces) in a particular context, believing that such

the mind, but academia, it's not for me, I didn't want a career in academia. I went to cultural
knowledge will better enable people to change the context and hence the 
relations of power” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 253). Further, while its project is always 
political, always partisan, “its politics are always contextually defined” 
(Grossberg, 1997, p. 253). For cultural studies, theory and method always 
understood as “developing in relation to changing epistemological positions and 
political conditions” (Slack, 1996, p. 112). Thus, cultural studies is “always 
open—not just with regard to disciplines, traditions, and genealogies; not just 
with regard to objects, methods, theories, and politics—because culture, power, 
and the relations between them are always changing” (Grossberg, 1997, p. 252). 
Moreover, cultural studies shares with other forms of qualitative inquiry “a 
strong interest in the use of dialogic, collaborative, and composite modes of 
writing and research to foster more open and responsive relations between 
academics and the communities with whom they work” (Frow and Morris, 2000, 
p. 330): the “intellectual project of cultural studies is always at some level 
marked, we would argue, by a discourse of social involvement” (Frow and Morris, 


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