ABSTRACT

Title of Document: INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS: GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PARTY POLITICS, AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Helma Gerritje Engelien de Vries, Ph.D. 2007

Directed By: Professor Mark Irving Lichbach, Department of Government and Politics

This dissertation explores several dynamics in insider and outsider activism in the anti-war movement: insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in protest coalitions; transnational protest events’ success in uniting insiders and outsiders; and coupling of insider and outsider tactics such as protesting and voting. Insider-outsider cooperation in protest coalitions helps to facilitate successful protest events involving rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders. Such events catalyze future insider-outsider cooperation, illustrate which parties are movement allies, educate parties about protesters’ concerns, educate protesters about coupling insider and outsider tactics, and may help remobilize activists as voters in subsequent elections.

Key rival arguments that are investigated are whether grievances opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, on which there was a strong issue consensus, are as important as Tarrow’s politically opportune domestic targets, such as a government joining the “Coalition of the Willing,” in accounting for dynamics in insider and
outsider activism. Cross-national surveys of protesters are paired with content analysis of news coverage of transnational anti-war protest events and with elite interviews of activists.

While domestic targets appear to exert some centripetal forces facilitating cooperation between insiders and outsiders, issue consensus or issue discord on grievances can create either centripetal forces that unite or centrifugal forces that unleash conflict. Grievances have the power to unite or to divide us, and whether they do depends on the issue consensus in the movement and the public about them. Grievances with issue consensus unite us, exerting centripetal forces on insider and outsider activism, whereas grievances with issue discord divide us, wielding centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders.

Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without the United Nations, on which there is issue consensus, brings together insiders and outsiders in protest coalitions, at protest events, and in protesters’ tactical choices, and thus has the potential to remobilize protesters as voters. Conversely, linking opposition to war in Iraq with other grievances on which there is discord, such as opposition to war in all cases, opposition to globalization, and support of Palestine, divides insiders and outsiders in protest coalitions and at protest events and may lead protesters to expand their globalized protest involvement.
INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS: GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PARTY POLITICS, AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

By

Helma Gerritje Engelien de Vries

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Advisory Committee:
Professor Mark Irving Lichbach, Chair
Professor Ken Conca
Associate Professor Miranda Schreurs
Professor Eric M. Uslaner
Professor Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., Dean’s Representative
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In 2004, Spain’s Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) regained power via unprecedented electoral mobilization following massive demonstrations against the war in Iraq. These record-breaking protests, in which several million people were mobilized, reflected public opposition to the government’s decision to join the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” and in particular, the tremendous opposition to unilateral military intervention in Iraq, without a formal United Nations agreement. This grievance, on which there was a tremendous amount of issue consensus, seems to have exerted a centripetal influence on the anti-war movement, facilitating linkages between insiders and outsiders as well as between insider activism and outsider activism. Insiders in leftist opposition parties like the PSOE had a very direct, cooperative relationship with the anti-war movement, forming coalitions together to help organize multiple protest events. Party insiders were thus given an opportunity to use the protest events to appeal to protesters about these grievances and to encourage them also to leverage insider tactics like voting to effect policy change.

After the Madrid train bombings, the PSOE was able to capitalize on its opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq and its affiliation with the Spanish anti-war movement, as the record-breaking voter turnout in the March 2004 elections culminated in a PSOE electoral victory, an alternation of power in Spain, and a policy shift as the new Prime Minister worked to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq. Many demonstrators were mobilized in global protests, and so too were many voters. Perhaps then the dramatic electoral outcome reveals that demonstrators in Spain’s massive protests paired voting with their participation in the global anti-war protests.
How then do insiders and outsiders relate in different domestic contexts, and what are the implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections?

In this dissertation, I explore the factors driving such cooperation between insiders and outsiders in the anti-war movement, such highly mobilized protests involving insiders and outsiders, and such coupling of protesting and voting. In particular, I investigate whether centripetal or centrifugal forces are exerted on insiders and outsiders by the presence of strong domestic targets such as Spanish government support of the “Coalition of the Willing” or by grievances on which there is an issue consensus such as opposition to U.S. unilateralism. The impact of the party system and electoral context; divergent histories of participation, protest, and civil society; and divergent paths of democratization are also addressed. To begin, I discuss ties between insider activism and outsider activism, and address how three inter-related dependent variables gauge these ties at different levels of analysis.

*Insiders versus Outsiders*

Insider and outsider activism are terms used to demarcate insiders, who are focused on routine political action and effecting change inside political institutions, from outsiders, who specialize in unconventional tactics and work to effect change from outside those institutions. Insiders work to effect social change in political institutions and policy intra-institutionally, either through direct contacts by lobbying or by working to achieve changes in institutions’ internal composition through voter mobilization and pressure politics. Thus, insiders rely heavily on tactics such as lobbying and voter mobilization, and their engagement with political institutions is very participatory and aimed at achieving cooperation. It is thus not uncommon to
see insider activists in liberal social movements establishing good ties with individuals in leftist political parties and parties in the political opposition, and using those ties to help mobilize citizens electorally, with hopes of policy changes ensuing. At the international institutional level, Tarrow indicates that insiders are known for “gravitating to international institutions and taking part in highly institutionalized service and advocacy activities” as well as “lobbying and collaborating with international elites to the point of co-optation” (2005, 29, 45).

Outsiders, in contrast, work to effect social change from outside political institutions, often by challenging these institutions and their policies. Outsiders often use extra-institutional tactics such as protests to call for reforms, and are reluctant to engage in direct contact with institutions because they want to be able to maintain their critical, oppositional role. Generally, outsiders do not want to risk any co-optation that weakens their ability to levy criticism effectively, as they often perceive insiders falling prey to such pressures. At the international level, Tarrow states that outsiders “challenge these institutions and organizations,” “challenge international institutions’ policies and, in some cases, contest their existence” (2005, 29).

However, insiders and outsiders do not function in separate bubbles. As they often are working to draw attention to similar grievances and targeting the same institutions, there are opportunities to form relationships with one another and to evolve in their tactics and in those used by their supporters. In particular, insiders and outsiders in the anti-war movement have sometimes achieved significant cooperation in forming successful coalitions. These cooperative coalitions were instrumental in producing successful protest events that were highly mobilized, connected to leftist
parties or parties in the opposition, and remobilized activists from previous peace
movements and anti-globalization movements. Additionally, they were important in
educating demonstrators about the linkages between insiders and outsiders and the
opportunities at the individual level to link their outsider tactics like protesting with
insider tactics like lobbying and voting. However, in some cases, insiders and
outsiders had relationships fraught with conflict, protest mobilization was less
successful and not as tied to insider allies in political parties, and demonstrators were
specialized in global protesting.

It is also important to point out that these insider and outsider ideal types
represent opposite end points on a broad spectrum of activism, and that many activists
fall somewhere in between. Although some individuals and groups exclusively focus
on being insiders or outsiders, there are many that belong somewhere in the murky
middle between insider and outsider activism. As groups and individuals interact
with others who are poised at other locations on the insider-outsider spectrum,
dynamics in the relations between insiders and outsiders and in the linkages between
insider activism and outsider activism emerge, which need to be accounted for.

In this dissertation, I explore several inter-related dependent variables:
insider-outsider cooperation in protest coalitions; successful transnational protest
joining insiders and outsiders; and protesters’ coupling of outsider and insider
activism. These phenomena correspond to different levels of analysis: the meso- or
organizing-level, the macro- or event-level, and the micro- or individual-level. After
explaining how these dependent variables gauging ties between insider and outsider
activism are interrelated, I briefly discuss each one individually.
Dynamics in relations between insiders and outsiders, both in meso-protest coalitions and at macro-protest events, are intertwined with one other, and have important implications for the linkages between insider activism and outsider activism in participatory choices made by individual protesters. Successfully organizing cooperative protest coalitions of insiders and outsiders is important in driving successful transnational protest events that bring together insiders and outsiders and educate protesters about pairing insider tactics and outsider tactics. Successful protest events are able to bring about more opportunities for cooperation and also for coupling insider and outsider activism. Demonstrators attending transnational protests organized by these coalitions learn about possible insider allies in leftist parties or parties of the opposition as well as about opportunities to pair their protest with insider activism.

Thus, meso-level coalition dynamics influence macro-level protest events that in turn influence prospects for more meso-level coalition building. Moreover, both meso-level coalition dynamics and macro-level protest events influence protesters’ micro-level behavioral decisions on whether to pair insider and outsider tactics, coupling their protesting with voting. Thus, this dissertation also examines how transnational activism has the potential to mobilize demonstrators as voters, with important implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections, such as the historic Spanish election in 2004.

**Insider-Outsider Cooperation in Protest Coalitions (Meso-level)**

First, insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in transnational protest coalitions needs demarcation. Although insiders and outsiders frequently try to form
cooperative coalitions together, many obstacles tend to arise, and in some cases, cooperation has proved elusive and conflict has been the norm. Insider-outsider cooperation is thus defined as a regularized pattern of planning, communication, and teamwork between insiders and outsiders in protest coalitions across multiple protest events. It is characterized by extensive interactions and compromises agreed on and enforced in the planning process and by successful cooperation at the actual protest events. In contrast, insider-outsider conflict occurs over a prolonged time frame between particular insiders and outsiders and across multiple protest events in which there are failed attempts to build coalitions. It is characterized by fractures en route to planning common events, and at the extreme, cooptation and conflict at the few events that actually get off the ground. In some cases, neither cooperation nor conflict is consistently the case, and insiders and outsiders involved in organizing coalitions shift back and forth.

At the meso-level or organizing-level, cooperation between insiders and outsiders is instrumental in achieving successful protest events with insider involvement. It also facilitates the broadening of protesters’ tactical repertoires when they choose to pair tactics like lobbying or voter mobilization with their protest activity. In the process of negotiations between insiders and outsiders who are trying to cooperate, it quickly becomes evident on which grievances there is a broader issue consensus. Grievances with issue consensus can be leveraged when strategically framing protest events so as to enlarge the breadth of the coalition that develops, to maximize the mobilization level, and to include both insiders and outsiders. Finding out which grievances have an issue consensus and which have an issue discord, helps
facilitate the strategic framing of protest events so that more people are mobilized and
the broadest coalitions possible can be formed. This information can, in turn, help
opportunistic parties of the opposition in knowing which issues are better to target in
trying to get potential voters to couple their protesting and voting.

While the British anti-war movement opposing the intervention in Iraq has
been characterized by lots of enduring cooperation, the American anti-war movement
has instead faced much conflict, with episodic bursts of limited cooperation. The
meso-level puzzle that thus needs exploration is: what accounts for the dynamics in
cooperation and conflict between insiders and outsiders in social movements, and
what are the implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections?

**Successful Transnational Protest Joining Insiders and Outsiders (Macro-level)**

Second, I discuss the success of transnational protest events in mobilizing
demonstrators and in joining insiders and outsiders. The objective of insiders and
outsiders who are forming cooperative coalitions is mobilizing the largest number of
protesters, drawing out a rainbow coalition of protesters who range from insiders to
outsiders, making connections between insider activism and outsider activism, and
getting individual protesters remobilized for more demonstrations and also for insider
activism. Thus, successful transnational protest joining insiders and outsiders is
defined as protest with high mobilization levels; involvement by insiders such as
leftist parties or parties of the opposition; involvement by an inclusive, rainbow-like
array of civil society groups; and involvement by activists who have been mobilized
in other social movements.
At the macro-level or event-level, successful protest mobilization that draws in insiders from leftist parties or parties of the opposition, facilitates further cooperation with insiders and does so in ways that can help them gain electoral dividends if coupling happens. In particular, when insiders are present at protest events, it makes clear to protesters and to the public, how they can effectively couple their insider and outsider tactics, if they choose to do so. Likewise, party insiders learn about the grievances of protesters and of the organizers so they can better target these potential constituents in their platforms and remobilize them as voters.

Anti-war protests targeting the military intervention in Iraq mobilized millions of demonstrators in some countries and effectively brought together rainbow coalitions including party insiders and historic outsiders, activists involved in previous protest movements. However, protests in other cases were far less mobilized or less successful in bringing together such rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders. At the macro-level, the puzzle needing investigation is: what accounts for these dynamics in transnational protest events joining insiders and outsiders, and what are the implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections?

_Coupling of Outsider and Insider Activism (Micro-level)_

Third, I discuss the coupling of insider and outsider activism by individual protesters. The aim of insiders and outsiders who ally together in protest coalitions and at protest events is to remobilize their supporters in “coupling,” or pairing outsider tactics such as protesting with insider tactics such as voting. For instance, they may emphasize other planned activities, such as lobbying dates of action paired to protest dates of action. Alternatively, they may emphasize voter mobilization, and
by making linkages to allies in parties on the left or in the opposition, they may work
to elicit and drive the direction of coupling amongst protesters. Coupling involves
engaging in both global protesting and voting, whereas decoupling involves engaging
in global protesting, but not voting. Protesters can also choose to expand their
outsider activism to multiple types of global protest.

Certainly, these protesters are potentially influenced by the kinds of party
insiders they see and the types of coupling they hear about at the macro-protest events
produced through meso-organizing. If and when transnational protesters are indeed
remobilized as voters, coupling their global protesting with prospective voting,
electoral outcomes may therefore shift in favor of opposition parties or leftist parties
linked to the protest movement.

Anti-war protesters in Spain clearly coupled their record-breaking protest
mobilization with massive voter turnout, favoring leftist opposition parties that were
allied with the anti-war movement. Conversely, the same level of coupling did not
occur in other countries. The micro-level puzzle which is therefore explored is: what
accounts for the dynamics in demonstrators’ coupling of protesting and voting, and
what are the implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections?

Overview of the Dissertation

The global anti-war movement against the intervention in Iraq offers a natural
quasi-experiment as many industrialized democracies faced sustained, historic
mobilizations, but differed markedly in terms of the dependent variables: insider-
outsider cooperation or conflict in the anti-war movement; the transnational protest
events that emerged and the insiders and outsiders they involved; and whether
demonstrators coupled outsider tactics like protesting with insider tactics like voting. I now introduce the theoretical framework, the methodology used to explore each of the inter-related dependent variables, and the overall organization of the dissertation.

Tarrow argues that having a strong domestic target, such as a country joining the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing” supporting the intervention in Iraq, is very important in accounting for cooperation between insiders and outsiders in the anti-war movement. He also suggests that having such strong domestic targets helps facilitate highly mobilized anti-war protests involving rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders. Additionally, Tarrow argues that a strong domestic target can help to bring about the coupling of insider and outsider tactics. Although targets are important in accounting for some centripetal forces uniting insiders and outsiders, I suggest they only account for part of the puzzle.

Moreover, we must attend to opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, a movement-related grievance on which there is an issue consensus in the movement and in the public, to fully account for centripetal pulls on insiders and outsiders. Opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq has the potential to bring about insider-outsider cooperation, successful transnational protest involving insiders and outsiders, and the coupling of insider and outsider activism by protesters due to the issue consensus on this grievance. Movement-related grievances on which there is issue discord create obstacles in strategic framing and exert centrifugal forces between insiders and outsiders. Thus, such grievances account for some of the conflict between insiders and outsiders, difficulties mobilizing insiders and outsiders at
protest events, challenges pairing protesting and voting, and impetus for extensive global protest involvement.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework at the heart of the dissertation and broad propositions concerning the observable implications of these arguments. This theoretical framework, in addition to causal factors particular to different levels of analysis, is used to derive propositions concerning the dependent variables in each of the three empirical chapters. These propositions are reexamined as evidence is presented at each level of analysis. When accounting for dynamics in anti-war protest coalitions, the impact of the party system and electoral context is also explored. Further, in accounting for the variance in transnational anti-war protest events in the older and newer member states of the European Union, divergent histories of participation, protest, and civil society as well as divergent paths of democratization are addressed.

The research methodology is presented in Chapter 3, and subsequent chapters explore each of the three dependent variables concerning insiders and outsiders, each of which corresponds to a different level of analysis and different type of empirical evidence. The dependent variables are explored in the following order: insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in protest coalitions (meso-level), transnational protest events mobilizing insiders and outsiders (macro-level), and the coupling and decoupling of protesting and voting (micro-level). Qualitative methods are applied to explore the meso- and macro-level phenomena, and quantitative methods are applied to test rival arguments at the micro-level.
Insider-outsider cooperation and conflict is examined in Chapter 4 by studying dynamics in the relations between actors in anti-war coalitions across multiple global protest events, as efforts are made to organize protest coalitions. Successful, enduring cooperation, mixed cooperation and conflict, and enduring conflict are studied via several comparative case studies. Evidence is collected via content analysis of archival news and Internet coverage of protests, activists’ own written documentation of the anti-war movement, and elite interviews with activists.

Macro-level transnational protest is explored in Chapter 5 by studying how transnational anti-war protest events emerged across different domestic contexts on February 15, 2003, the most globalized date of anti-war protest. Dynamics in mobilization levels, actors, insiders and outsiders, targets, and grievances at the protests are investigated. Qualitative methods such as content analysis of protest news coverage and of online resources are useful in investigating commonalities in transnational protests occurring cross-nationally, and tracing out causal factors.

In chapter 6, micro-level behavioral choices by individual demonstrators, in deciding whether to couple global protesting and voting and whether to extend protest involvement to multiple types of global protest, are investigated. Data collected in cross-national surveys of demonstrators at globalized protests is analyzed using a multinomial logistic regression, to test rival arguments concerning protesters’ decisions to pair types of global protesting and voting.

Chapter 7 reviews the key findings of the research in light of the broad propositions developed in Chapter 2. Domestic targets created when states join the “Coalition of the Willing” certainly exert some centripetal forces on insiders and
outsiders at the macro- and micro-levels. However, the findings also confirm the importance of movement-related grievances, the issue consensus or discord on those grievances, and their strategic framing, in accounting for the dynamics between insider and outsider activism. In particular, opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, a grievance on which there is much consensus, is instrumental in exerting centripetal forces uniting insiders and outsiders, facilitating cooperation in anti-war coalitions, bringing about successful transnational protests involving insiders and outsiders, and eliciting the coupling of protesting and voting. Conversely, grievances with issue discord exert centrifugal forces and unleash conflicts between insiders and outsiders, and may motivate a specialization in global protesting.

Additionally, I turn back to the broader question that underlies the dissertation: how do transnational social movements matter and what are their implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections and for mainstream politics? Understanding dynamics of global protest behavior has important implications for understanding how global protest movements impact mainstream politics, policy outcomes, and political behavior. In particular, I argue that transnational social movements can provide inroads for getting demonstrators in the street remobilized as voters and activists, combining or coupling these tactics.

I conclude the dissertation by examining the implications of the research for the remobilization of activists as voters in post-war elections, in several cross-national cases. Transnational social movements may be able to provide electoral dividends to parties of the opposition which are in tune to protesters’ grievances and which form alliances with movement activists. However, in countries that already joined the
United States in supporting the intervention in Iraq, getting demonstrators to couple their protesting and voting, may be a challenge because protesters are skeptical about how efficacious insider activism may be in effecting change. I suggest that the issue consensus on movement-related grievances and the party system context may be instrumental in determining how optimistic protesters feel about the efficacy of insider activism and how successfully protesters couple insider and outsider activism.
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

The impact of domestic and international targets and of movement-related grievances on insiders and outsiders are juxtaposed in this chapter. First, the centripetal influences of Tarrow’s domestic and international political institutions on insiders and outsiders are explored, followed by several propositions outlining observable implications of these arguments at the meso-, macro-, and micro-levels. Next, I discuss some of the limitations of these targets in accounting for the dynamics between insiders and outsiders, and discuss some evidence that suggests that movement-related grievances concerning war and globalization need to be examined in the study of transnational social movements. Finally, I explore grievances with issue consensus and with issue discord and the centripetal versus centrifugal forces they may exert on insiders and outsiders, developing several propositions of the observable implications of these arguments at the meso-, macro-, and micro-levels.

Domestic and International Targets

Tarrow argues that domestic and international institutions provide targets that exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders, facilitating insider-outsider cooperation, successful transnational protests involving rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders, and the coupling of insider and outsider tactics. He suggests that dynamics in targets created by the international and domestic political opportunity structure explain dynamics in transnational contention in recent global justice and anti-war movements, stating,

February 15 also symbolizes some of the key problems in transnational contention: the wrenching shift of activists from global justice to international
peace protest; the difficulties of maintaining transnational collective action once a temporary focal point has been left behind; and the complexities of forming sustained coalitions among people from different countries with different sets of interests and values (Tarrow 2005, 16).

Tarrow therefore argues that shared targets in the political opportunity space permit transnational cooperation in anti-war coalitions and successful mobilization at transnational protest events, and that expired, outdated or abandoned focal points lead to conflict in anti-war coalitions and demobilization at protest events. Tarrow emphasizes the continued explanatory power of states’ domestic structures in accounting for transnational contention, but also looks at the impact of the international institutions that states have created.

In explaining the historic February 15, 2003 global anti-war protests, which mobilized 16 million demonstrators, Tarrow focuses on the targets presented by the domestic political opportunity structure (2005, 15). Acknowledging that targets in international institutions were lacking since the European Union and the United Nations had taken oppositional stances on the war in Iraq, Tarrow argues that the common presence of domestic targets (domestic governments that took positions supporting the war) were key in eliciting successful global collective action. Tarrow also argues that “the resurgent militarism of a hegemonic state” was an important “internationalist” target shared by transnational protesters during the February 15, 2003 global protests (16). Although Tarrow paints the United States as a hegemonic target, he may in fact be hinting at the impact of grievances concerning global democratic deficits created by U.S. unilateralism in Iraq.

Certainly, the presence of strong domestic targets is successful in accounting for broad dynamics in European protest mobilization against the war in Iraq. Protest
mobilization was much higher in several countries such as Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which combined a strong internationalist target of a hegemonic U.S. government with domestic targets, when these countries’ governments joined the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing” and supported the military intervention in Iraq. However, there are certainly important dynamics of contentious activity in transnational protests against the Iraq war which are not accounted for by the presence of domestic and international targets, and thus rival arguments dealing with the different interests and values of the protesters mobilized, need more exploration.

In accounting for the transnational anti-globalization movement, Tarrow is more focused on the impact of multilateral economic institutions (MEIs) like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and World Trade Organization (WTO), rather than on globalization and patterns of international trade. MEIs provide activists with a “coral reef” where they both lobby and protest, encounter others like themselves, identify friendly states, and from time to time, put together successful global-national coalitions,” organizing transnational protests and transnational advocacy networks (Tarrow 2005, 219). Certainly, the most important meetings of such international institutions as the IMF, WB, WTO, regional development banks, World Economic Forum (WEF), Free Trade Agreements, G8, United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and regional organizations, are periodically targeted for transnational contention concerning global justice. However, transnational contention differs in many ways both within and across international institutions and suggests the need for theoretical refinement.
Tarrow contends that internationalism provides both domestic and international targets that exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders, facilitating insider-outsider cooperation in protest coalitions, successful protests involving both insiders and outsiders, and the coupling of insider and outsider tactics. The meso-level implications of this argument for protest coalitions are first explored, followed by the macro-level implications for transnational protest events and subsequently the micro-level implications for protesters’ coupling of insider and outsider tactics.

At the meso-level, Tarrow argues that internationalism provides structured opportunities for cooperative relations and coalition-building between outsiders and insiders seeking to influence a common target. Internationalism is defined as “a dense, triangular, structure of relations among states, nonstate actors, and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system” (Tarrow 2005, 25). The costs of internationalism elicit oppositional tactics or outsider activism from non-state actors, whereas the opportunities of internationalism elicit participatory tactics or insider activism from non-state actors. Tarrow’s opportunity space inherently structures relations between insiders and outsiders, permitting greater insider-outsider cooperation and coalition-building that transgresses across borders against the common targets posed by internationalism (25). However, it is possible that this rosy lens misses some of the conflicts inside transnational protest coalitions.

The end result of internationalism’s structured opportunities for cooperative insider-outsider relations are the increasingly transnational but still domestically-based actors whom Tarrow describes as rooted cosmopolitans (2005, 43). Tarrow
states, “Through the use of both domestic and international resources and opportunities, domestic-based activists – citizens and others – move outward to form a spectrum of ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ who engage in regular transnational practices” (35). His rooted cosmopolitans are “individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with transnational allies” (29). Despite their transnationalism, they are rooted via continuous domestic linkages “to place, to the social networks that inhabit that space, and to the resources, experiences, and opportunities that place provides them with” (42). Transnational activists, more precisely, are a subset of rooted cosmopolitans, “people and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts but who engage in contentious politics activities that involve them in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts” (29). What distinguishes transnational activists from rooted cosmopolitans is “their ability to shift their activities among levels” and to take “advantage of the expanded nodes of opportunity of a complex international society” (43). Particularly noteworthy is the emphasis on the continued domestication of transnational contention, and the cooperation that is possible due to shared targets.

At the macro-level, the presence of such strong domestic and international targets are said to produce successful transnational protest events, involving high mobilization and broad rainbow coalitions characterized by the involvement of both insiders and outsiders. Tarrow notes the impact of targets on protest mobilization and on bringing insiders and outsiders together at particular protest events (2005). Rainbow coalitions at protests such as the Battle of Seattle often involve cooperation
between insiders and outsiders. However, it is important to acknowledge the diversity of interests and issues brought together by actors in such coalitions. Insiders and outsiders brought into such coalitions include parties on the left or in the opposition; organized labor; global justice, human rights, anti-war, peace, environmental, development, religious, and local organizations; and yet further to the left, anarchists and anti-capitalists.

This diversity of issues and interests is the hallmark of a rainbow coalition, and is very difficult to sustain across multiple protest events. Particularly the question of whether or not insider-oriented organized labor decides to join outsider-oriented diffuse interests that represent various social ideals seems to be important because of the mobilizational power of unions. At several of the largest anti-globalization protests, the majority of protesters in fact hailed from organized labor. Tarrow suggests that the Battle of Seattle rainbow coalition “reveals a combination of a labor-NGO-social movement convergence of interests” against a common target, the WTO (Tarrow 2005, 171).

However, it is possible that we must turn to the diversity of issues and interests to find out which ones have the capability of acting centripetally to pull together successful rainbow coalitions, and conversely which ones act centrifugally and pull them apart. Without grievances concerning neoliberal globalization, global democratic deficits, U.S. hegemonic action, and U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, and debates concerning how these grievances should be framed, the ideals and interests of dissent might be absent. Thus, their influence on insiders and outsiders in protest coalitions, at protest events, and in political behavior needs investigation.
At the micro-level, the cooperation between insiders and outsiders in protest coalitions and at protest events brings about behavioral changes amongst transnational protesters, and in particular, facilitates their coupling or pairing of insider tactics with outsider tactics. Tarrow’s approach is inherently relational, as the political opportunity space structures transnational relations of rooted cosmopolitans in such a way as to change the participatory versus oppositional roles of groups he calls “NGO insiders” and “social movement outsiders” (2005, 29). Meyer and Tarrow had already alluded to the blurred boundaries of insider activism and outsider activism in a “social movement society” (1998). Tarrow now suggests that shared domestic and international targets facilitate the coupling of conventional and unconventional forms of political participation, or of insider and outsider activism (2005). He also suggests, however, that it is possible in the long run that the changing relations between insiders and outsiders could lead insiders to become resocialized as outsiders, decoupling insider and outsider activism and supplanting conventional participation with unconventional participation (2005).

Tarrow accordingly suggests that the line between insider and outsider activism is no longer clearly demarcated, and that insider-outsider relations are increasingly cooperative (2005). Tarrow describes a now fuzzy insider-outsider divide, increasingly frequent and successful insider-outsider coalitions, and the resultant fusion between domestic and transnational contention, stating,

But as in contentious politics in general, the line between NGO ‘insiders’ and social movement ‘outsiders’ is difficult to draw with precision, and coalitions between these two families of activists are increasingly common. Internationalization is producing mechanisms and processes that escape the narrow confines of international institutions and may be leading to an ultimate fusion between domestic and international activism (29).
Moreover, Tarrow also cites the rise in activists who “face both inward and outward,” and as a result he suggests the “distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ may be blurring” (47). Key in Tarrow’s argument is increasing insider-outsider cooperation “around international institutions, conferences, and processes” (48, 211).

The coupling argument that has been put forth thus suggests that the boundaries between these two forms of popular mobilization are fuzzy and permeable, the linkages fluid and dynamic, as insider activism is increasingly coupled, or paired, with outsider activism. The same actors and the same organizations are expected to engage simultaneously in routine and nonroutine politics. In complex repertoires of action, conventional and unconventional activities are expected to be coupled. Political parties, interest groups, and social movements are likely to be mutually dependent, simultaneously cause and effect. And protest politics and conventional politics are expected to be consequences of forms of access and opportunity structures. Meyer and Tarrow have referred to these comingled and overlapping interconnections as the social movement society (1998).

On the other hand, Tarrow’s argument delves further by suggesting that a decoupling can also occur: that in the long-run outsider activism may become the norm if internationalization leads insider participation to be supplanted by outsider opposition (leading activists to decouple or stop pairing insider activism and outsider activism and to even perhaps specialize in outsider activism). He explains that outsiders’ “numbers seem to be increasing” (2005, 45). He argues that internationalism may in the long run be leading insiders to substitute their conventional, institutionalized tactics with a specialization in unconventional,
outsider activism, decoupling the two types of activities due to their new relations and experiences engaging in collective action with outsiders. Tarrow thus focuses on how the targets and focal points of internationalization bring about coupling, but also considers how they could eventually also bring about decoupling and even a specialization in outsider activism (48). However, Tarrow’s discussion of decoupling suggests that it may actually be a radicalization in response to perceptions of ongoing global democratic deficits.

Based on the centripetal structuring influence of Tarrow’s domestic and international targets on linkages between insider activism and outsider activism, several general propositions are developed below. Each of the empirical chapters contains related propositions, particular to each level of analysis. In the concluding chapter, the empirical evidence across three levels of analysis is summarized and analyzed in light of the broader propositions developed here.

2.1. The presence of politically opportune domestic targets, governments that supported the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” in addition to the presence of the internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government, increase the odds of cooperation between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, and cooperation will stem from shared agreement over institutional targets. Countries lacking such strong domestic institutional targets are likely to have more conflict in anti-war coalitions, divides stemming from the lack of agreement over targets.

2.2. Demonstrators at successful transnational protest events are likely to perceive similar domestic and international targets.
2.3. The presence of politically opportune domestic targets, governments that supported the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” in addition to the presence of the internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government, increase the odds of highly mobilized transnational anti-war protest events which involve broad rainbow coalitions and are able to draw in key insiders and remobilize key outsiders. Countries lacking such strong domestic institutional targets are likely to have protest events with less success in mobilization and in drawing in key insiders or outsiders.

2.4. The presence of politically opportune domestic targets, governments that supported the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” in addition to the presence of the internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government, increase the likelihood of coupling protesting and voting. However, in the long-run such targets may lead to decoupling of protesting and voting or even a resocialization of protesters to a new specialization in outsider activism.

2.5. Grievances about war and about globalization, representing different issues, interests, and ideals of activists, are not key in accounting for dynamics in the ties between insider activism and outsider activism: insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions; the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders; and the coupling and decoupling of insider and outsider tactics.

2.6. Domestic targets are more important than international targets in accounting for dynamics in the ties between insider activism and outsider activism: insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions; the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders; and the coupling and decoupling of insider and outsider tactics.
Limitations of Targets and Bringing Grievances Back In

Tarrow’s internationalism seems to be geared at finding the shared elements of insiders and outsiders and may thus be more likely to lead to observations of cooperative coalitions, while missing some of the conflict and sources of contention, such as concerns about how to frame grievances about war and globalization. As a result of his lens, he is likely to observe the set of cases of successful transnational activism, but less likely to observe the set of cases that have more conflict, run into mobilization difficulties, and involve coalitions that are not so rainbow-like, as well as the causal mechanisms that account for these types of cases. The dynamics in insider-outsider relations and changing rainbow coalitions need further exploration.

While some anti-war protest coalitions were characterized by tremendous cooperation and success at bringing together disparate groups into rainbow coalitions, it is also noteworthy that conflicts were rife in coalition-building elsewhere, even if there was an important domestic target. For instance, in the United States, which arguably had the strongest domestic target, two of the most important national coalitions against the war, United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ) and International A.N.S.W.E.R. (ANSWER), have had a divisive relationship, fraught with tensions and in which cooperation or co-endorsement of events was difficult and infrequent, and contentious the few times some headway was made.\(^1\) Disagreements stemmed from differences of opinion regarding movement-related grievances and how to frame those grievances in a way that appeals to both the movement and the public.

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Tarrow argues that internationalism explains the dynamics of transnational contention, but he acknowledges that globalization is a process which influences internationalization and is a source of protesters’ “interest, ideology, and grievances” (2005, 19, 26). He also suggests that there are many other issues that serve as grievances for transnational activists. However, Tarrow argues that the targets of internationalization are more important in accounting for dynamics of contention than are these grievances and related framing issues. In effect, he is reacting to a literature that has put a lot of emphasis on such grievances, especially concerning globalization, and saying that the domestic and international political opportunity structure is most important in accounting for dynamics in transnational activism.

Tarrow suggests that globalization played only a small role in motivating transnational protest against war on February 15, 2003, whereas the presence of domestic and international targets was more important (2005, 17). He states, “The main target was statist militarism, not global neoliberalism; it found objective allies in the form of several European governments; and both the European Union and the United Nations were international fulcrums of opposition to the war.” However, he also acknowledges that the shift to international peace protest accompanied a “wrenching” shift away from global justice activism (16). Tarrow thus bears witness to a controversial framing debate in recent social movements that is tied to issue discord over movement-related grievances: whether globalization is more important to oppose than war, and whether opposition to war should be framed as opposition to globalization. Clearly, more theorizing is needed to investigate the implications of movement-related grievances on insiders and outsiders in the anti-war movement.
Even better documented, in the global justice movement, is the important role that grievances concerning globalization have in explaining conflict and cooperation in transnational anti-globalization coalitions between insiders and outsiders. Several recent studies on transnational coalitions in a volume edited by Bandy and Smith suggest that across several cases, strategic framing decisions concerning grievances about globalization play a key role in accounting for dynamics of cooperation and conflict. This common thread arises in global justice movements involving transnational coalitions, across many different world regions.

Both Macdonald and Cullen observe the effect of grievances concerning globalization in transnational coalitions in industrialized states. For instance, Macdonald observes that the U.S. women’s movement was not receptive to embracing frames that link issues of gender and trade liberalization, and thus has not become an active collaborator with the free trade movement, whereas major organizations in the Canadian women’s movement were much more willing to make this linkage and successfully collaborated on the issue of free trade (2005, 36). Similarly, Cullen finds that significant cooperation and enlargement of the Platform of European Social NGOs was feasible precisely because the organizations involved were able to find “transversal frames” linked to globalization on which they could all agree, committing to “manage and sublimate the more contentious aspects of their disagreements” (2005, 89).

Juska and Edwards observe a parallel pattern in East-West coalition formation, when detailing the efforts to create a U.S.-Poland Coalition against Corporate Pork Production (2005). Cooperation occurred between some groups
because of “the compatibility of their ideological critique of corporate capitalism and agreement about preferred strategies and tactics” because these groups “saw their political activism as moral crusades against the common enemy—transnational corporations,” even though there were clear differences in their “attitudes toward nature and animals” (198). In contrast, conflict occurred with one group which “saw (regulated) international capital as one of the most important factors in the modernization of Polish agriculture” and did not espouse “an anticorporate ideology,” and thus it did not join the transnational coalition (196-7).

Dynamics in contention in transnational alliances between Northern and Southern activists working on global justice issues also seem to be accounted for by strategic framing issues linked to grievances about globalization. According to Foster, a key source of conflict in the Trinational Alliance Against NAFTA was fueled by “the ongoing reluctance or inability … [of other, especially American, alliance partners] to take on … ‘the social agenda,’ which advocated equity and social justice claims that went well beyond trade-related debates” which the Mexican activists advocated (2005, 218). While the presence of a common target (NAFTA) was important in bringing these activists together, distinctive perspectives on globalization also play a role in accounting for some contention. Likewise, Brooks notes the difficulties in forming transnational campaigns on child labor which stem from divides between Northern and Southern prescribed reforms to globalization, due to the “ways that global capitalist development structures the choices of workers and others in poor countries” (2005, 138).
Finally, Waterman discusses the difficulties of bringing in key international union insiders to the World Social Forum and to other discussions with nongovernmental organizations and social movement leaders from the North and South, as divergences stemming in part from “differing postures toward the labor-capital relationship” lead to difficulties building “a common agenda on workers, development, and globalization” (2005, 143). Notwithstanding these differences, the March 2001 International Roundtable of Unions, Social Movements, and Non-Governmental Organizations in Bangkok, Thailand, brought together the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as well as major NGOs and social movement organizations, in an effort to see whether collaboration could be worked out. However, in the discussions at Bangkok, it was evident that unions’ “identification with free trade, growth, and ‘social partnership’ with capital and state” had not adapted to “the new, globalized understandings the global justice movement offers,” but that they were rather sticking to “an increasingly self-limiting or even self-defeating twentieth century labor paternalism” (147, 148). Waterman suggests that unions’ ambiguity stems from the incongruity between their strategies in being careful not to be painted as anti-globalization or anti-capitalist as they are working to combat threats to their partnerships with industry, and their other strategies in forming ties with civil society that is taking action on issues affecting workers and suggesting alternatives to neoliberalism.

Admittedly, the presence of targets in the domestic and international political opportunity structure does account for some mobilization opportunities that permit successful cooperation transnationally as well as some forging of ties between groups
that were previously confined to mutually exclusive activities, such as specializing in lobbying from within or in protesting on the outside. However, taking these targets into account, there may still be other dynamics in such contentious activities which are unaccounted for. Tarrow rightly hints that we need to develop more nuanced understandings of the structuring effect provided by internationalism and to explore rival arguments that may account for transnational contention.

At the macro-level, Tarrow’s story is focused on the success of this global collective action, especially against the war in Iraq, and not on coalition-building problems and divisive issues, and thus, he may not notice the tremendous divides between insiders and outsiders in some coalitions and at some protest events within this global anti-war movement. There are certainly important dynamics of contentious activity in transnational protest events against the Iraq war which are not accounted for by the domestic and international targets of internationalism. Examples include the enormous dynamics in patterns of cooperation and conflict in protest coalitions and in mobilization success of protest events uniting insiders and outsiders. Perhaps, then, movement-related grievances about the war in Iraq and agreements and disagreements about how these grievances should be framed help account for coalition-making dynamics? Although dynamics in anti-war movement mobilization levels in 2003 somewhat correspond to the presence or absence of domestic targets in a country, there are also enough cases that do not fit such generalizations. The United States is a key example of such exceptions, given the presence of such a strong domestic target but such a small proportion of the U.S. population which was
mobilized, relative to the mobilization magnitude of protests in other states in the
“Coalition of the Willing.”

Further, protests targeting international institutions and their meetings vary in
systematic ways, and we need to further theorize to account for the contentious
variation within and across institutions, especially in whether or not rainbow
c coalitions are mobilized successfully. Although many EU Summits have indeed been
targeted for protest involving transnational actors mobilized at the meeting location or
for protests organized simultaneously internationally, there are important differences
across EU Summits, and it is important to note that some very successful protests in
terms of mobilization have not involved rainbow coalitions and have actually been
characterized by conflict. For instance, during on-site protests of the December 2000
EU Summit in Nice, France, trade unionists were not able to cooperate with anti-
globalization and other campaigners because of prognostic differences on what the
Charter of Fundamental Rights for European citizens and on what a European social
agenda should look like.2 The different standpoints and grievances that unions and
other activists have on neoliberal globalization seem to have been the main
contributing factor to the divergent diagnoses, conflicting policy prescriptions, and
different frames that organizers favored, which prevented cooperation.3 Hence, the
actions organized at Nice did not involve cooperative rainbow coalitions. Rather, the
main marches of tens of thousands of trade union activists organized by the European

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Presse*, December

3 Ibid.
Confederation of Unions (CES) and of a few thousand anti-globalization, human rights, and other activists were mobilized separately.4

Moving on to the micro-level, the coupling and decoupling arguments offer rival explanations that are too easily consolidated. For instance a specialization in different types of global protest may be possible, and further, it is perhaps even possible, that coupling and decoupling may vary amongst insiders and outsiders, in response to changes in the political context. For instance, in some sectors of the U.S. anti-war movement, there has been a conclusion that protests alone were ineffective in producing policy change during 2003.5 As a result, a refocusing on both lobbying and civil disobedience, to better target policy makers and produce public consciousness of the anti-war movement, has been a recent priority, as exemplified by the September 2005 weekend of demonstrations, lobbying, and civil disobedience. Clearly, there has been a transition back to some insider activism (and not merely a resocialization to outsider activism) in some sectors of the U.S. anti-war movement.

Tarrow argues that dynamics in transnational contention can be accounted for by domestic and international targets, much more so than by movement-related grievances concerning issues such as war and in particular, globalization. In discussing the alter-globalization movement and the anti-war movement, Tarrow focuses on the role of meetings of international institutions as targets. However, Tarrow’s own examples suggest rival explanations dealing with other interests and values around which theoretical development is needed. Tarrow explains,

4 Ibid.
Participation in international protests may even resocialize insiders into outsiders: many of the protesters who went to Seattle, Genoa, or Quebec City as insiders became outsiders when they were attacked by the water cannon and stun grenades of the police. What insiders and outsiders have most in common is that they gravitate to and mobilize around international regimes, practices, and institutions (2005, 48).

Perhaps in these cases of anti-globalization protest, international institutions may not have been what turned insiders to outsider activism. Rather, what does seem to have been important in leading some in the global justice movement to specialize in outsider activism is grievances concerning a global democratic deficit as states cede sovereignty to international institutions to promote neoliberal globalization and economic integration, especially when this process is also linked to a repression of civil society that is normally fostered in such democracies. As a result of this democratic deficit, a strategic debate has ensued about how to respond to police repression at several summits. These grievances concerning a global democratic deficit may well be important in accounting for ties between insiders and outsiders in anti-war activism, especially given the unilateral approach taken by the United States in its intervention in Iraq.

Just as Tarrow may miss the conflicts between insiders and outsiders in certain contexts, he may also overlook the participatory specialization in insider or outsider activism in other contexts, which may be driven by movement-related grievances and how these grievances are framed. Tarrow, like many on the outside, perceives increasing cooperation between insiders and outsiders at Seattle, Cancun, Genoa, and Quebec City (2005, 48, 211). However, in addition to some cooperation, there is also noteworthy fragmentation, division, and conflict in both the anti-globalization and anti-war movements. Since much of Tarrow’s evidence centers on
transnational activism of the social movement variety, and social movements have an interest in being portrayed as unified successfully, perhaps he is very likely to observe unified coalitions and a lot of successful outsider activism. He may thus be missing some of the insider-outside conflicts as well as the insider or outsider specialization that characterizes activism in some political systems.

Accounting for grievances concerning globalization and war and how they are framed, I suggest, helps to fine-tune our understandings of the coupling argument; namely, some variants of claims, perhaps more palatable to insiders and viewed as more likely to be effectively pursued using insider activism as well as outsider activism, are much more likely to result in coupling, whereas other claims may in fact be perceived as more effectively pursued using just one type of activism. Rival arguments need to be developed concerning the impact of movement-related grievances concerning war and globalization, whether they exert centripetal or centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders and promote coupling, decoupling, or extensive global protesting.

*Movement-Related Grievances and Issue Consensus or Discord*

While shared domestic and international targets play some role in uniting insiders and outsiders, I suggest that movement-related grievances with issue consensus may also be important in eliciting centripetal pulls on insiders and outsiders and on their activism. Moreover, movement-related grievances with issue discord may exert centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders and on their activism.

The impact of movement-related grievances, I suggest, depends on the kind of consensus reached within the social movement and the general population on these
issues. Opposition to unilateral intervention in Iraq, a movement-related grievance that is shared by much of the general public and is agreed on by most activists in the anti-war movement, may thus exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, at protest events, and in protesters’ participatory decisions. In contrast, opposition to military intervention in Iraq in many different scenarios, opposition to globalization, and support for Palestine, are movement-related grievances with more issue discord in movements and in the public, and may exert centrifugal influences on insiders and outsiders. However, support for Palestine, on which there is agreement in certain contexts, may lead to different choices on coupling and decoupling.

Several theories suggest movement-related grievances are important to insiders and outsiders. U.S. hegemony or imperialism theories suggest the importance of opposing military intervention in Iraq for its unilateralism as opposed to other justifications for military intervention (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2003; Lake 2006). Economic and world systems theories suggest the linkages that may be drawn between opposing war and opposing globalization (Chase-Dunn 1989; Friedman 2000; Rodrik 1997, 1999, 2001). Global democratic deficit arguments suggest that movement-related grievances about the war are tied to perceptions of democratic deficits, especially those linked to neoliberalism, because of the constrictions it places on political space, civil society space, and democracy, or those linked to U.S. hegemony, because of the constrictions it places on sovereignty, international law, and democratic principles (Brown 2003; Rodrik 2001; Ruggie 1982, 1991). U.S. foreign policy toward Israel and its implications for Palestine is also likely to be
perceived as a pertinent global democratic deficit. These movement-related grievances, which range from having issue consensus to issue discord, are likely to have robust explanatory value in accounting for links between insiders and outsiders.

Indeed, supporting a particular movement-related grievance seems to predict protest activity, tactical choices, and transnationalism (Bean 1991, 270, 271; Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave 2004; Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005). The degree to which the grievance is agreed on within the social movement and also is shared by the general public, also plays a role in determining the effect of opposing the issue. Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave (2004, 48) find that foreign (transnational) protesters targeting European Union Summits in Belgium are less satisfied with the functioning of democracy in their own country, … agree more with the idea that the political system in general is not very responsive to the needs and demands of citizens, and they endorse more a radical movement strategy, not opposing violence and agreeing with the statement that 'talking is not enough' to reach the movement's goals.

The aforementioned grievances lie outside of both the policy and public opinion mainstream and seem to lead to a specialization in outsider activism rather than leading to the coupling of outsider and insider activism.

Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, without the international community and especially without United Nations involvement, is the key grievance on which there is issue consensus in the anti-war movement and in much of the general public, and which I argue has the potential to centripetally pull insiders and outsiders together in protest coalitions, in successful protest events, and in protesters’ participatory choices in coupling insider and outsider activism. Lake (2006) attends us to the grievances that have arisen in opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, especially in many
industrialized democracies that were former U.S. allies. There are several aspects of these grievances that Lake accentuates which I argue have important implications for the mobilization of transnational activism against the war in Iraq. In particular, he attends us to the opposition that has arisen to the United States’ unilateralism in its approach to militarization in Iraq; to its implicit denial of the legitimacy-conferring authority of the United Nations; to the new authority the U.S. claimed in instituting regime change in a sovereign state; and to the linkages between this unilateralism and a broader project to institute a new world order and U.S. hegemony.

How do grievances concerning U.S. unilateralism in Iraq facilitate cooperation between insiders and outsiders in coalitions and at protest events, and the coupling of insider and outsider tactics? Coalition formation between insiders and outsiders is likely to be facilitated when this grievance leads to the adoption of broad transversal frames that insiders and outsiders can agree upon. Thus, opposition to U.S. unilateralism is likely to be a grievance that pulls together insiders and outsiders at successful transnational protest events. Further, supporting this grievance, on which protesters see an issue consensus and thus perceive a political opportunity to couple their insider and outsider activism successfully, is likely to facilitate protesters’ coupling of protesting and voting. In contrast, grievances on which there is more issue discord, grievances such as opposing war in all cases, linking opposition to war to opposition to globalization, and linking opposition to war in Iraq to the issue of Palestine, will likely account for many of the conflicts between insiders and outsiders in coalition-formation, less mobilized protest events that have difficulties drawing in insiders and outsiders, and the expansion of global protest involvement.
When there is a mixture of discord and consensus across different contexts, such as on Palestine, a mixed effect may emerge.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>For each of the following propositions, tell me if you agree or not?</th>
<th>Agreeing</th>
<th>Disagreeing</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil is the main motivation for which the United States wants to intervene militarily in Iraq (6c)</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States should intervene militarily in Iraq even if the United Nations does not give its formal agreement (6g)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you consider it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq?</td>
<td>Justified</td>
<td>Unjustified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the Iraqi regime does not cooperate with United Nations inspectors (7a)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the United Nations inspectors discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (7b)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Iraq threatens other countries in the region (7c)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the United Nations Security Council decides on a military intervention in Iraq (7d)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the United States intervenes militarily in Iraq without a preliminary decision of the United Nations (7e)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Support of an Intervention in Iraq in the EU-15 (Gallup Europe 2003)

Note: This table presents 2003 percentages in the EU-15 (member states acceding through 1995). Table 5.2 compares these percentages with those in the CC-13 (Central and East European and Mediterranean member states acceding between 2004 and 2007 as well as candidate state Turkey).

To bolster my argument about this issue consensus on U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, I present Gallup Europe poll data from the 2003 International Crisis Survey in which respondents were asked about several possible scenarios in which the U.S. could initiate military intervention in Iraq. As Table 2.1 illustrates, throughout the fifteen industrialized democracies that had acceded to the European Union through 1995 (EU-15), there were several grievances about the unilateral military intervention
in Iraq on which the general public reached consensus, and which I therefore argue have the potential to facilitate transnational protest, catalyze cooperation in anti-war coalitions and protest events between insiders and outsiders, and lead to a coupling of insider and outsider activism, or protesting and voting.

The Gallup Europe poll reveals that Lake’s grievances are indeed arising among citizens of countries that used to be U.S. allies. In fact, a sizeable majority of Europeans oppose a military intervention in Iraq that is unilateral, occurring preemptively and without a previous UN decision authorizing the use of force. Many also feel that the militarization in Iraq is motivated by oil interests. However, many Europeans in the EU-15 were more predisposed to permitting an intervention in Iraq under other scenarios, if weapons of mass destruction had been found by UN inspectors, if Iraq had threatened countries in the region, or if the UN Security Council had authorized an intervention. While there is a pan-European issue consensus on grievances concerning U.S. unilateralism in Iraq and the linkage of militarization and oil interests, there is issue discord on whether to oppose war in other circumstances.

Similarly, within the anti-war movement, the one framing of anti-war grievances on which there was much issue consensus was opposing U.S. unilateralism, a military intervention in Iraq without a previous UN decision authorizing action. While some activists felt strongly that the framing of grievances should be expanded to include opposing war in all cases, and that opposition to war should be linked to opposition to globalization as well as to support of Palestine,
these issues were much more divisive. Evidence concerning issue consensus and discord amongst anti-war activists will also be discussed in Chapter 4.

Opposing the war in Iraq in the case of U.S. unilateralism, without the international community and without a preliminary decision by the United Nations, on which there was issue consensus, may have elicited a centripetal pull on insiders and outsiders. Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq may thus facilitate insider-outsider cooperation, successful mobilization of insiders and outsiders at global protest events, and the coupling of protesting and voting. Next, a host of other grievances with some issue discord, including opposing war in other scenarios, all-encompassing opposition to globalization, and supporting Palestine, are addressed. Movement-related grievances with issue discord may have elicited centrifugal pulls on insiders and outsiders, eliciting conflicts in transnational protest coalitions, difficulties successfully organizing protest events involving insiders and outsiders, and expansion of demonstrators’ global protest involvement.

How do divisive movement-related grievances facilitate insider-outsider conflict in protest coalitions, mobilization hurdles uniting insiders and outsiders at protest events, and the expansion of global protest involvement? Conflict is likely to ensue between insiders and outsiders when issue discord regarding movement-related grievances leads to framing disagreements within the movement. Further, conflicts between insiders and outsiders and disagreements over grievances are likely to feed into mobilization challenges at protest events. Finally, grievances with such issue discord are not likely to be viewed as grievances on which the general public and the government will be particularly responsive to insider activism but rather as issues that
can be more effectively pursued via globalized protest, and are likely to facilitate protesters’ expansion of their global protest involvement.

Opposing war in many different scenarios, on which there was much discord, may have exerted centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders, eliciting conflict, mobilization difficulties, and extension of global protest involvement. An influential debate about the justification for war has certainly emerged between insiders who feel that opposition to the war should just focus on its empire-seeking unilateralism and outsiders who feel a broader opposition to war in many different scenarios should be adopted. Many countries politicized the unilateral intervention in Iraq and actively opposed it, but would have supported intervention under a variety of other scenarios. Additionally, much of the global public did not feel that the global democratic system was functioning properly when President Bush proceeded with military intervention in Iraq without the support of the UN, but would have supported military intervention in a host of other scenarios, evident in Table 2.1.

There was also much disagreement within the peace movement about the cases in which intervention could be justified. All-encompassing opposition to military intervention in Iraq seems to characterize outsiders, whereas moderate insiders seem to adopt a particularistic opposition to war. Differences concerning these grievances and disparate viewpoints on the justification for war account for dynamics in insider-outsider coalition-making and behavior. The more outsider ANSWER links an array of scenarios in which intervention is unjustified to U.S. imperialism and globalization, targeting the U.S. policy toward North Korea, Cuba, Haiti, Palestine, and Iraq. In contrast, the more insider UFPJ is also multi-issue
oriented but maintains more focus on opposing and “ending the occupation” of Iraq, “to the exclusion of making some of these links” (Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). Moreover, UFPJ differs from ANSWER because it is not willing to make statements supporting authoritarian regimes that the U.S. government considers to be threats. According to Hany Khalil, Organizing Coordinator of UFPJ, one reason that UFPJ has not been willing to collaborate with ANSWER, is ANSWER’s framing of the Iraqi insurgency as another type of resistance to U.S. imperialism, part of its all-encompassing opposition to war. Thus, insiders and outsiders can cooperate on a grievance with issue consensus, such as opposing war in cases of U.S. unilateralism. In contrast, opposition to war in other scenarios may bring conflict between insiders and outsiders and an extension of global protest involvement because issue discord results in differences over which frames should be adopted and makes global protesting appear a more effective tactic.

Opposition to many facets of globalization, on which there is also more issue discord, may elicit a centrifugal force on insiders and outsiders, increasing the likelihood of conflict between insiders and outsiders and the extension of global protesting. Most advanced industrialized democracies have adopted neoliberal models of globalization. Additionally, the general public tends to see many aspects of globalization positively, although concerns about how globalization affects domestic employment are quite salient in some countries, and many acknowledge that countries in the core benefit from it disproportionately compared to the periphery. Likewise, competing visions of the globalization problematic characterize competing frames used to mobilize the anti-globalization movement. Activists disagree about whether
economic or political targets should be selected; whether a personal, domestic, or global focus should be applied; and whether economic, political, cultural, or multiple frames should be applied (Rosenkrands 2004, 64-5, 70). Many seem to take a broad view of grievances concerning globalization, though economic and political detriments of globalization are prioritized, and cultural issues of homogenization are not (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004, 110-1). Competing explanations of the globalization problematique, therefore, range from those that are focused on a single sphere of globalization-related problems (e.g., economic, cultural, or political; individual, domestic, or global) to those that are more all-encompassing.

All-encompassing opposition to globalization seems to split outsiders from insiders and to protesters’ expansion of their global protest involvement. In contrast, opposing a limited number of aspects of globalization is likely to facilitate cooperation between outsiders and insiders who are more easily able to agree on broad transversal frames. Reforms to the new international economic order are sought by both camps, with some outsiders favoring the abolition of all international institutions and some insiders reorienting (and retreating) to become more reformist (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004, 102). Thus, since the Battle of Seattle, some activists have focused on diagnosing what is harmful about globalization and others have tried to reframe the movement, promoting reforms and a vision of an alternate globalization, resulting in prognostic versus diagnostic framing divides tied to movement-related grievances, and certainly a good share of conflict between insiders and outsiders (Ayres 2004; Buttel and Gould 2004, 50; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004, 113).
Support for Palestine may also touch on perceptions of a global democratic deficit. Although there is much discord on this issue, which results in a predominantly centrifugal pull on insiders and outsiders, there is also some consensus on the issue in certain contexts that may also provide for opportunities to couple insider and outsider activism. Given the historic ties between Israel and the United States, the issue of Palestine is highly politicized in the United States. In terms of public opinion, Americans are much more supportive of the Israeli side than the Palestinian side, whereas Europeans are more supportive of the Palestinian side than the Israeli side.

Within the global anti-war and anti-globalization movements, the issue of Palestine is also far from straight forward. Organizations within the anti-globalization movement that continued to protest in the aftermath of September 11 also held a demonstration during the protests targeting the Spring 2002 WB/IMF meetings, in which they tried to highlight the plight of Palestinians and not the problems of globalization. There was little collaboration between the organizers trying to refocus the protests on the Israeli incursions into Palestine and the organizers focused on Third World debt reduction (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005).

Palestine also became a key issue of contention in the anti-war movement. ANSWER was engaged in an ongoing debate with insider factions in the anti-war movement about whether Palestine should be prioritized as much as the military intervention in Iraq. According to Brian Becker, the National Coordinator of the
ANSWER coalition, Palestine prevented American protest coalitions from successfully collaborating on protests on several occasions (although attempts were continuously made to cooperate). Becker asserts that ANSWER was “demonized for being with the Palestinians.” In the United States, insiders were reluctant to prioritize Palestine as much as Iraq whereas outsiders wanted to attend to both issues and view them as interrelated democratic deficits.

Several general propositions based on the centripetal influence of grievances with issue consensus and on the centrifugal influence of grievances with issue discord on the linkages between insider activism and outsider activism, are developed below. Each of the empirical chapters contains related propositions, particular to each level of analysis. In the concluding chapter, the empirical evidence across three levels of analysis is summarized and analyzed in light of the broader propositions.

2.7. Movement-related grievances with issue consensus within protest coalitions, especially concerning opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without UN involvement, increase the odds of cooperation between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, and insiders and outsiders will be united via shared agreement over these grievances and over how they should be used in framing the movement. Movement-related grievances with issue discord within protest coalitions, especially concerning whether opposition to the war in Iraq should be linked to opposition of all types of war, to opposition to globalization, and to support of Palestine, increase the odds of conflict between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, with divisions between insiders and outsiders stemming from disagreements over these grievances and how they
should be used in framing the movement. Occasionally, in some contexts there is more issue consensus on Palestine and this may facilitate some cooperation.

2.8. Demonstrators at successful transnational protest events are likely to perceive similar domestic and international grievances.

2.9. Issue consensus on movement-related grievances in public opinion, especially opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without UN involvement, increase the odds of highly mobilized transnational anti-war protest events which involve broad rainbow coalitions and are able to draw in key insiders and remobilize key outsiders. Issue discord on movement-related grievances in public opinion increases the odds of protest events with less success in mobilization and drawing in insiders and outsiders.

2.10. Supporting movement-related grievances that have issue consensus in protest coalitions and in the general population, especially opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without UN involvement, increase the likelihood of coupling protesting and voting. Supporting movement-related grievances characterized by issue discord within protest coalitions or in the general population, especially concerning whether opposition to the war in Iraq should be linked to opposition to all types of war and to opposition to globalization, increase the likelihood of extending global protest involvement. Supporting Palestine, on which there is considerable discord but which in some contexts there has been more agreement, increase the likelihood of expansion to multiple global protests and voting.

2.11. Movement-related grievances about war and about globalization are more important than the presence of domestic and international targets in accounting for the dynamics in ties between insider activism and outsider activism: insider-outsider
cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions; the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders; and the coupling and decoupling of insider and outsider tactics. Grievances have the power to unite or to divide us, and whether they do depends on the issue consensus in the movement and in the public about them.

2.12. International grievances are more important than domestic grievances in accounting for dynamics in the ties between insider activism and outsider activism: insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions; the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders; and the coupling and decoupling of insider and outsider tactics. Similarly, internationalist targets trump domestic targets, in exerting influence on insiders and outsiders.

To conclude, this dissertation investigates the impact of domestic and international targets and of movement-related grievances on insiders and outsiders in the transnational anti-war movement. In the theoretical framework, twelve broad propositions were developed concerning the meso-, macro-, and micro- observable implications of these arguments. Next, the research methodology that is used to explore these propositions at different levels of analysis is presented. In each of the empirical chapters, a review of the theoretical framework and of alternate explanations particular to a given level of analysis is first used to develop propositions particular to that level of analysis. Then, these propositions are analyzed in light of empirical evidence. Once the three empirical chapters are presented, the overall findings are reviewed in the concluding chapter and analyzed in light of the broader propositions from Chapter 2.
Chapter 3: Methodological Overview

The following subsections outline the methods used to explore each of the dependent variables. First, the content analysis and elite interviews of activists used to compare several cases of meso-level insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions are discussed, with the empirical results presented in Chapter 4. Second, the content analysis used to compare macro-level protest events is addressed. The resultant data concerning transnational anti-war protest events on February 15, 2003 are presented in Chapter 5. Finally, the sampling and methodology used to conduct the cross-national protester surveys are presented. Chapter 6 presents a multinomial logistic regression to analyze respondents’ micro-level coupling and decoupling of protesting and voting.

Insider–Outsider Cooperation and Conflict (Meso-level)

At the meso-level, targets in the domestic political opportunity structure and different party systems were used in case selection of countries for archival research and interviews. In other words, the dependent variable was left free to vary, and was not involved in case selection. As will be explained in Chapter 4, at the meso-level, I also expected the party system and electoral context to be an important explanatory factor, and thus it was interesting to choose cases that varied along this dimension.

Hence, I decided to hold the targets constant and allow the party system context to vary, selecting countries in the “Coalition of the Willing” which all shared strong domestic targets but had different party systems (the Netherlands with its polarized multi-partyism; the United Kingdom with its moderate multi-partyism, and
the United States with its moderate two-partyism). By holding the targets constant, I examine whether or not cooperation and conflict varied markedly, in juxtaposition to the high cooperation Tarrow would expect. Additionally, I explore whether this variation in conflict and cooperation corresponds to variation in the party system context or in fact to other factors. Archival work and elite interviews with activists were used to investigate dynamics in insider-outsider relations and the factors accounting for insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in these three countries.

Archival work was particularly useful in obtaining information about the coalition formation process and to help sample interviewees (key insiders and outsiders affiliated with key anti-war and global justice organizations). The sources used in the archival research include Lexis Nexis coverage, Google search results, current websites and archived websites available via Archive.org, Indymedia search results and other alternate media websites. I conducted systematic searches for archived materials about the anti-war movement and key protests in each of these cases. These searches enabled me to narrow down key social movement organizations and individuals of interest tied to these organizations.

Table 3.1 displays a timeline of global anti-war protests targeting the intervention in Iraq, on which searches were conducted within each of the three cases. The first global protests against the war in Iraq occurred on October 26, 2002 and on January 18, 2003. Most agree that the most globalized date of protest occurred soon thereafter, on February 15, 2003, involving millions of protesters demonstrating at hundreds of locations, spanning all continents. On March 15, 2003, just before the war commenced, global anti-war protests were held, and likewise, as the war in Iraq
started on March 20, 2003, global emergency response actions were held. Massive protests occurred both in countries that were originally a part of the “Coalition of the Willing,” such as the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as in countries that did not send military support to Iraq, such as Belgium, Canada, France, and Germany. Transnational protests died down in mobilization level and in frequency after the war in Iraq started on March 20, 2003. However, transnational protests against war still continued to occur, occurring simultaneously in several hundred locations and involving hundreds of thousands of protesters. Global protests have occurred on key dates, to commemorate anniversaries of the start of the war in Iraq or after events like shifts in global public opinion of the U.S. in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Main Global Protest</th>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, October 26, 2002</td>
<td>10/25/02-10/26/02</td>
<td>global anti-war protests, as the United States makes the case for an intervention in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, January 18, 2003</td>
<td>1/16/03-1/19/03</td>
<td>global anti-war protests, as the United States makes the case for an intervention in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, February 15, 2003</td>
<td>2/14/03-2/16/03</td>
<td>global anti-war protests, as the United States makes the case for an intervention in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, March 15, 2003</td>
<td>3/15/03-3/19/03</td>
<td>global anti-war protests, in anticipation of the start of the intervention in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday, March 20, 2003</td>
<td>3/20/03-3/30/03</td>
<td>global emergency response actions, at the start of the intervention in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, October 25, 2003</td>
<td>10/25/03</td>
<td>global anti-war protests, on the 6 month anniversary of the intervention in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, March 20, 2004</td>
<td>3/20/04</td>
<td>global anti-war protests, on the 1 year anniversary of the intervention in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, March 19, 2005</td>
<td>3/18/05-3/20/05</td>
<td>global anti-war protests, on the 2 year anniversary of the intervention in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, September 24, 2005</td>
<td>9/24/05-9/26/05</td>
<td>global anti-war protests, after Hurricane Katrina news coverage and shifting public opinion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, March 18, 2006</td>
<td>3/18/06-3/20/06</td>
<td>global anti-war protests, on the 3 year anniversary of the intervention in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, March 17, 2007</td>
<td>3/17/07-3/20/07</td>
<td>global anti-war protests, on the 4 year anniversary of the intervention in Iraq</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Timeline of the Most Globalized Protests Against the War in Iraq
In Lexis Nexis, I conducted full-text searches in World News Regional News coverage as well as in other useful sources such as Foreign Language News. I looked for coverage of protest! and the country name or protest! and the capital city name, in one-week time periods around the dates of the most globalized protests in Table 3.1. When results failed to turn up, I replaced the word “protest” with “demonstration” and ran the searches again. Other search terms such as “anti-war,” “peace rally,” and “global justice” were applied in searches of coverage from 2002 onwards. Using this coverage, I began to construct a timeline to assess which organizations worked together at globalized protests and which were unable to work together.

I conducted similar searches on Google, Indymedia, Protest.net, and other alternate media sources. In addition, I searched for protest, the date of the protest, and if necessary, the country of the protest, to look for competing accounts of the most important transnational or global protest events. I also searched for the websites of social movement organizations and coalitions, collected information from those websites, and gathered information from archived versions of those websites on Archive.org (which was particularly important in tracking changes over time).

Insider-outsider relations were somewhat evident from the presence or absence of joint protest endorsements, whether or not separate events were scheduled, and whether or not the movements tried to coopt particular protest events or denigrate or support one another in open conversations. However, although there is some transparency about these divides, much of the divisiveness is underreported in the media because the movement wants to present a united front and because a lot of
work in forming coalitions occurs privately, out of the public eye. This data primarily helped in interview preparation, and in knowing which events to ask more about.

The sampling of social movement organizations to interview, as well as the sampling of individuals in those groups, was based on the aforementioned archival work and the recommendations of individuals with whom I spoke (snowball strategy), subject to availability constraints. In every case, I made an effort to speak with representatives of the key coalitions responsible for organizing the most transnational protests and to explore the literature they themselves wrote about their activism, which was in some cases rather extensive. In the archival work, I looked especially for the representatives responsible for organizing and for mobilizing protesters into different tactics, as well as finding out more about who was involved in inter- and intra-coalition negotiations.

Interviews were conducted between February 2005 and January 2006, and involved informed consent procedures, protections for anonymity and confidentiality, as specified in the approved IRB proposal. Table 3.2 summarizes the interview respondents, their affiliations, and the dates interviews were conducted. The duration of the interviews ranged from one to four hours, and the interviews were tape-recorded or digitally recorded and later transcribed into notes. Both structured and unstructured questions were used to explore insider-outsider cooperation and conflict and factors accounting for these ties. A list of structured interview prompts is available in Appendix 1. I asked respondents to talk about their organizations; the issues about which they have grievances and the institutions that they target; the variety of tactics that they use; their ties with partner organizations; conflict and
cooperation in coalitions over time; and their ties with parties and with the state.

Besides these prompts, I also inserted many additional unstructured questions that arose during the interview process or during the archival research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliations and Positions</th>
<th>Date of Interview(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soren Ambrose</td>
<td>Senior Policy Analyst at the 50 Years is Enough: U.S. Network for Global Economic Justice</td>
<td>February 16, 2005; March 11, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nihar Bhatt</td>
<td>International Socialist Organization</td>
<td>March 6, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Becker</td>
<td>National Coordinator, International A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition</td>
<td>March 9, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hany Khalil</td>
<td>Organizing Coordinator, United for Peace and Justice Coalition</td>
<td>March 11, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neil Watkins</td>
<td>National Coordinator and Former Outreach Coordinator of Jubilee USA Network</td>
<td>March 17, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Gruiters</td>
<td>Director, Pax Christi; Speaker at February 15, 2003 Amsterdam Protest</td>
<td>December 14, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Schaake</td>
<td>Spokesman of the Platform Against the ‘New War’; Secretary of Kerk en Vrede (Church and Peace); One of the key organizers of the February 15, 2003 Demonstration in Amsterdam; Member of the Board of the GroenLinks party</td>
<td>December 14, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuur Elzinga</td>
<td>Chair, Attac Nederland; Coordinator of XminY (a global justice group)</td>
<td>December 15, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepijn Brandon</td>
<td>Internationale Socialisten; Editor-in-chief of De Socialist</td>
<td>December 15, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rene Danen</td>
<td>One of the initiators of the Dutch Social Forum; Coordinator, Platform Keer Het Tij</td>
<td>December 16, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sylvia Borren</td>
<td>General Director, Novib (Oxfam, Netherlands)</td>
<td>December 16, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans van Heijningen</td>
<td>Key Organizer in Platform Against the ‘New War’; XminY (a global justice group); General Secretary of the Socialist Party</td>
<td>December 19, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mient Jan Faber</td>
<td>Secretary, Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (Inter-Church Peace Council)</td>
<td>December 20, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wytze de Lange</td>
<td>XminY (a global justice group), important in groundwork for Amsterdam protest on February 15, 2003</td>
<td>December 20, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betty Hunter</td>
<td>General Secretary, Palestine Solidarity Campaign</td>
<td>January 4, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claire Poyner</td>
<td>Network for Peace</td>
<td>January 4, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kate Hudson</td>
<td>Chair, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
<td>January 4, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Murray</td>
<td>Chair, Stop the War Coalition; Director of Communications for the Transport and General Workers Union</td>
<td>January 5, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy Taylor</td>
<td>Spokesman, Globalise Resistance</td>
<td>January 5, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trisha Rogers</td>
<td>National Coordinator, the Jubilee Debt Campaign</td>
<td>January 6, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Rees</td>
<td>National Secretary of RESPECT the Unity Coalition, Co-Founder of Stop the War Coalition</td>
<td>January 9, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsey German</td>
<td>Convenor of the Stop the War Coalition</td>
<td>January 9, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Sachs-Eldridge</td>
<td>International Socialist Resistance</td>
<td>January 10, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Russell, MP</td>
<td>MP for Colchester; Spokesman for the Liberal Democrats for Defense Issues</td>
<td>January 10, 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Interview Respondents
Transnational Protests Uniting Insiders and Outsiders (Macro-level)

Transnational protests on February 15, 2003 are examined via content analysis of news coverage and Internet coverage of protest during this time period, across the member states of the EU. Both the member states through the 1995 accessions as well as those states that have joined during the 2004 and 2007 accessions enlarging the EU were included. First, I explain the method by which I collected and analyzed archival news coverage on these protest events using Lexis Nexis and the Internet. Then, I will discuss the case selection, first addressing the EU member states through the 1995 accessions and next delving into the member states that have acceded with the recent enlargement. Transnational protest varied considerably across these EU states as did the presence of domestic targets.

Archival coverage of the February 15, 2003 protests in each of these countries was systematically collected using the following process. The sources used in the archival research includes Lexis Nexis coverage, Google search results, current websites and archived websites available via Archive.org, Indymedia search results and other alternate media websites. In Lexis Nexis, I conducted full-text searches in World News Regional News coverage as well as in other useful sources such as Foreign Language News. I looked for coverage of protest! and the country name or protest! and the capital city name, in one week time periods around February 15, 2003. When results failed to turn up, I replaced the word “protest” with “demonstration” and ran the searches again. Other search terms such as anti-war, peace rally, and global justice were applied as well.
Via a content analysis of this coverage, I began to construct a chronology of February 15, 2003 protests in each of these EU member states. Based on this chronology, I next worked to create tables of mobilization levels; actors; prominent insiders and outsiders; domestic targets and domestic grievances; and international targets and international grievances. I conducted similar searches on Google, Indymedia, Protest.net, and other alternate media sources to supplement the news coverage found using Lexis Nexis and to search for news coverage in a few cases where little turned up in Lexis Nexis.

Now I turn to the case selection, first discussing member states that acceded to the EU through 1995. In 1951, six countries joined together signing a treaty to form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In 1957, these countries signed a new treaty that created a more expansive European Economic Community (EEC) involving additional types of goods and services. In 1973, 1981, and 1986, six countries acceded to the EEC. In 1992, the Treaty on European Union was signed at Maastricht, adding areas of intergovernmental cooperation to the preexisting EEC and thereby creating the European Union (EU). Three more countries acceded to the EU in 1995, bringing the total member states to 15: Austria (1995); Belgium (1951); Denmark (1973); Finland (1995); France (1951); Germany (1951); Greece (1981); Ireland (1973); Italy (1951); Luxembourg (1951); the Netherlands (1951); Portugal (1986); Spain (1986); Sweden (1995); and the United Kingdom (1973).\(^6\)

More recently, the Copenhagen Summit’s conditionality principle has governed the accession criteria used in the enlargement process that has permitted

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several Central and Eastern European states to join the EU. According to Glenn, the first two criteria for EU membership (“fully functioning liberal democratic systems, including respect for human rights and the rule of law,” formally and in practice, as well as “a functioning market-based economy with the capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces in the EU”) are the first hurdle (2003b, 213-9). Having met the former criteria, candidate states move on to working to come into compliance with the third criterion for EU membership that involves adopting “in full the acquis communautaire, or the rights and obligations of membership deriving from the founding treaties and subsequent legislation” (Glenn 2003b, 219). Hence, the EU has focused on how Central and Eastern European countries come into compliance with democratic conditionality, market conditionality, and acquis conditionality, and it has rewarded states with assistance and institutional ties as compliance improves (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 662-3). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier accordingly “define enlargement as a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms,” as “the group of actors whose actions and relations are governed by the organization’s norms becomes larger” (2004, 503).

The hallmark of the recent enlargement phase was the wave of 2004 and 2007 EU accessions, in which several post-communist states have acceded to the EU and enlarged it, upon meeting these criteria for accession. In 2004, eight Central and East European (CEE) states acceded to the EU, followed by the accession of two more CEE states in 2007. Namely, ten CEE states have acceded to the EU: Bulgaria (2007); the Czech Republic (2004); Estonia (2004); Latvia (2004); Lithuania (2004);
Hungary (2004); Poland (2004); Romania (2007); Slovakia (2004); and Slovenia (2004).\(^7\)

Although two Mediterranean states have also acceded and other states are currently considered candidate countries to the EU, Chapter 5 focuses on February 15, 2003 protests in the fifteen member states through 1995 and the ten CEE member states joining in 2004 and 2007. It is however noteworthy that two Mediterranean states recently acceded to the EU: Cyprus (2004) and Malta (2004).\(^8\) Further, several states have been designated candidate states to the EU: Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey.\(^9\) These states will be addressed briefly, but detailed data concerning the protests in these states will not be presented or analyzed.

Of the EU member states and candidate states, eleven of the fifteen older EU states, all ten of the CEE states that recently acceded to the EU, and one of the candidate states (Turkey) are now a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with Canada, Iceland, Norway, and the United States. The outliers are Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden of the older EU states, Cyprus and Malta of the newly acceded Mediterranean states, and Croatia and Macedonia of the other candidate states, all of whom are currently not members of NATO.\(^10\) For some of these states, it should also be noted that NATO membership has likely come in part as an incentive and as a reward in exchange for participation in NATO-led military intervention in Afghanistan.

\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^8\) Ibid.
Coupling or Decoupling of Protesting and Voting (Micro-level)

Protester surveys that I designed and collected during 2003 and 2004 anti-war and anti-globalization protests in Europe and the United States are analyzed in Chapter 6, to investigate linkages between protesting and voting. On February 7 and 8, 2003, protester surveys were conducted at an anti-war demonstration targeting the meeting between U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and N.A.T.O. Prime Ministers in Munich, Germany at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. On February 12, 2003, demonstrators were surveyed at an anti-war protest against the usage of the Antwerp, Belgium harbor for weapons transports. On February 15, 2003, a global date of protest against war, I conducted surveys in Paris, France; Rome, Italy; and Glasgow, Scotland. The Glasgow protest also targeted a Labour Party conference in Glasgow, during which Prime Minister Blair was held accountable for his support of President Bush. On March 15, 2003, another transnational date of protest before the military intervention, anti-war demonstrators in Washington, D.C. were surveyed. Finally, in April 2004, surveys were collected from anti-globalization protesters at the Spring 2004 WB/IMF meetings in Washington, D.C.

In sum, protesters were surveyed at a series of anti-war and anti-globalization demonstrations in Munich, Germany; Antwerp, Belgium; Paris, France; Rome, Italy; Glasgow, Scotland; and Washington, D.C., United States between 2003 and 2004. I was unable to reach and survey protesters at European anti-globalization demonstrations targeting the 2003 G8 Summit in France and Switzerland. Hence, most protesters were surveyed at an anti-war protest, and for many, if a second global protest type was attended, it was an anti-globalization protest.
To assure compatibility with cross-national surveys, pre-existing survey questions were adapted for use in the protester surveys, and survey questionnaires were made available in English, French, Dutch, German, and Italian. Informed consent procedures and protections for anonymity and confidentiality were applied, as specified in the approved IRB proposal. It is noteworthy that included were several survey items assessing support for movement-related grievances, and participants were asked in great detail about their global protest behavior.

Clustered random samples were obtained through a two-fold process. First, I surveyed the protest crowd attending a rally and divided it into sections, which were then assigned to each research assistant. Research assistants were instructed to move vertically and horizontally across the entire section selecting clusters of 9 or 10 respondents. Members on the outer fringe of the cluster are located a distance of at least N people apart from members on the outer fringe of the subsequent cluster. Research assistants started by surveying the person at the center of the cluster, as well as respondents every Nth person away from the central respondent, maintaining an N person distance between respondents. Typically, N was set to five, although occasionally every fourth person was surveyed. When a respondent declined to participate, the research assistant was instructed to move to the next Nth person and to note a non-response. In larger crowds, the distance that the research assistant had to move to obtain a new cluster was increased. The selected protesters were asked to complete a written questionnaire during the demonstration and to return it to an envelope held by the research assistant upon completion.
As shown in Table 3.3, the response rate is quite high, compared to 40% response rates in other studies, and fringe elements seemed pretty willing to participate in anonymous in-person surveys, whereas some colleagues report Black Bloc demonstrators’ reluctance to participate in mail-in questionnaires (Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave, 2004). The sampling of respondents in any study of protesters is of course challenged by the dynamic nature of demonstration crowds and the number of research assistants available at a protest venue, but I suggest the benefits of what information we can glean about the coupling and decoupling of global protesting and voting still makes this research worthwhile, despite sampling limitations.

Next, I discuss the operationalization of the regressand and the regressors used in the multinomial logistic regression analyzing the interaction of voting and global protesting. The dependent variable is the product of the interaction of two dummy variables: recent voting and participation in multiple types of global protests. Recent voting indicates respondents who voted in the most recent parliamentary or presidential election. Multiple global protesting indicates respondents who attended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest Survey Location and Type</th>
<th>Number of Cases Collected Originally</th>
<th>Number of Cases Used in Analyses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA Anti-War</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Anti-Globalization</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium Anti-War</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scotland Anti-War</td>
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<td>Germany Anti-War</td>
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<td>118</td>
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<tr>
<td>France Anti-War</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy Anti-War</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>712</strong></td>
<td><strong>586</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
both anti-globalization and anti-war protests, and not just one of these types of global protests. Hence, there are four unordered categories of the dependent variable:

- **Single protest voting:** A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (voting and one type of global protest).

- **Multiple protest voting:** A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (voting and two types of global protest).

- **Single protest non-voting:** A respondent who has not voted in a recent election but has participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (non-voting and one type of global protest).

- **Multiple protest non-voting:** A respondent who has not voted in a recent election but has participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (non-voting and two types of global protest).

A dummy variable was created to code respondents who had voted in a recent election, since respondents were queried about their party choice in the most recent parliamentary election, and in some forms, about their vote in the most recent Presidential election. In future research, especially as the 2008 U.S. Presidential election is nearing with the fifth anniversary of the start of the war in Iraq, it would be preferable to ask about both retrospective and prospective voting.

Additionally, two survey items per movement queried respondents about their protest activity against globalization and against war, and the type of protest at which a respondent was surveyed was also noted. Respondents were asked how many
demonstrations of each type they had attended, and respondents were also asked to mark the types of demonstrations they had attended using a checklist. Two dummy variables were thus created to indicate respondents’ attendance at anti-globalization and anti-war protests singularly. The interaction of these protest type variables was used to create another dummy variable for attending multiple types of global protest.

The dependent variable is thus the product of the interaction of the recent voting and multiple global protesting dummy variables. It thus has distinct values for each of the four possible outcome combinations of voting versus non-voting and single type of global protest versus multiple types of global protest. The distribution of the respondents across the four participatory outcomes assessed by the dependent variable, from most to least popular, is: multiple protest voting (46%), single protest voting (25%), multiple protest non-voting (16%), and single protest non-voting (13%). It is noteworthy that the majority of protesters are indeed coupling protesting and voting, and many are engaging in multiple types of global protesting. Likelihood Ratio and Wald Tests conducted after the multinomial logistic regression reveal that the four outcome categories are indeed distinguishable and should not be combined. Likelihood Ratio and Wald Tests were also conducted to test whether each variable has a significant effect on the participatory outcomes, and only variables with statistically or marginally significant effects were included in the final analysis.

Targets were coded based on the protesters’ survey location. “Coalition of the Willing” is a dummy variable created to indicate respondents who were surveyed in the United States, United Kingdom, and Italy, countries that took a clearly pro-war stance leading up to the Iraq war and joined the coalition. In contrast, protesters in
Belgium, Germany, and France lacked such a strong domestic target (although some of the latter countries eventually offered some low-level targets by permitting usage of domestic transport networks for weapons shipments and troop transports). “M.E.I. Meeting” is a dummy variable created to indicate respondents who were surveyed at a protest during an international meeting, the Spring 2004 WB/IMF Meeting in Washington, DC or the 2003 Munich Conference on Security Policy which involved N.A.T.O. member-states, and who thus had an internationalist target available.

Opposition to military intervention in Iraq was measured using survey items that were adapted from Gallup Europe questions about 5 scenarios in which military intervention in Iraq could have occurred. One of those scenarios represents the actuality (intervention without a preliminary UN decision). The other four scenarios represent other possible cases for intervention: the Iraqi regime does not cooperate with UN inspectors; the UN discovers weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; Iraq threatens other countries in the region; and the UN Security Council decides on a military intervention. The “Opposing U.S. Unilateralism (Military Intervention without the UN)” dummy variable indicates an “absolutely unjustified” response to the first scenario. The “Number of Scenarios Military Intervention is Unjustified” variable is a count of the number of alternate scenarios a respondent deems military intervention “absolutely unjustified.”

Opposition to globalization was assessed using a survey item adapted from Worldviews, asking respondents to assess globalization’s impact on four spheres: their country's economy; providing jobs and strengthening the economy in poor

\[11\] See q?a-7e.
countries; maintaining cultural diversity in the world; and their own standard of living. As more spheres are perceived as badly impacted, respondents’ grievances about globalization are more all-encompassing. Few perceived negative impacts are indicative of a more delimited framing of the globalization problematique. “Number of Aspects of Globalization that are Bad” is thus a count variable summing the number of spheres a respondent deems globalization to have a “Bad” impact.

Palestinian sympathies were gauged using a question asking respondents whether they sympathized more with Israelis or Palestinians in the current conflict, based on an Anti-Defamation League survey item. The dummy variable “Supporting the Palestinians More” indicates sympathizing more with the Palestinians than with the Israelis, with neither group, or with both groups.

Only the interaction effects between opposing U.S. unilateral intervention and the presence of domestic and international targets were statistically or marginally significant and included in the final analysis. The interaction of opposing U.S. unilateralism and the presence of either type of target was assessed using two dummy variables: “Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and Coalition of the Willing” and “Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and M.E.I. Meeting.”

The country location and type of protest at which respondents were surveyed were not significant, and thus were not included in the final analysis. Factors such as class and income which assess cleavages that used to be important in accounting for routine participation were omitted from the final regression because they were not significant predictors. However, being born 1979 or later (being 24 or younger during the 2003 anti-war movement and 20 or younger during the Battle of Seattle protests
against the W.T.O. in 1999) and having attended some university or completed university with a degree were both statistically significant predictors of participatory choices and were controlled for in the final analysis.

To conclude, qualitative and quantitative methods were used to explore the impact of domestic and international targets and movement-related grievances on insiders and outsiders. In Chapter 4, meso-level insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions are explored using content analysis and elite interviews of activists. In Chapter 5, macro-level protest events on February 15, 2003 are investigated using content analysis. Further, micro-level coupling and decoupling of protesting and voting is studied in Chapter 6, using a quantitative analysis of cross-national protester surveys.
Chapter 4: Meso-level: British, Dutch, and American Anti-War Coalitions

What accounts for the dynamics in cooperation and conflict between insiders and outsiders in social movements, and what are the implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections? In this chapter, I explore dynamics of insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in the British, Dutch, and American anti-war movements via case studies that involve content analysis of archival news coverage and elite interviews. First, I discuss the possible influences of domestic and international targets and movement-related grievances on conflict and cooperation in the anti-war movement, developing meso-level propositions. Next, I develop an alternative meso-level argument dealing with the party system and electoral context, with added meso-level propositions. Finally, I summarize my findings concerning insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in the British, Dutch, and American anti-war movements, and the factors accounting for dynamics in the relations between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, in light of these propositions.

I find that despite the common presence of domestic targets in all three cases, there is considerable variation in the presence of conflict and cooperation in the anti-war movement coalitions, and not the high cooperation that Tarrow would predict. Rather, movement-related grievances and the issue consensus and issue discord on those grievances are important in accounting for the framing agreements and disagreements and accordingly cooperation and conflict in the anti-war movements. Also, I suggest that the party system and electoral context influences cooperation and
conflict. As the party system includes more parties that can be movement allies, possibilities for cooperation increase. However, when there are many possible allies and a period of government formation characterized by uncertainty, conflict can arise, despite the presence of many allies.

**Domestic and International Targets**

Tarrow argues that domestic and international institutions provide targets that exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders, facilitating insider-outsider cooperation. In explaining the historic February 15, 2003 global anti-war protests which mobilized 16 million demonstrators, Tarrow focuses on how targets presented by the domestic political opportunity structure facilitated successful cooperation between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions (2005, 15). In particular, at the meso-level, this causal mechanism works because the pairing of domestic targets with the broad international target of a hegemonic U.S. government provides structured opportunities for cooperative relations and coalition-building between outsiders and insiders seeking to influence a common target, permitting greater insider-outsider cooperation and coalition-building that transgresses across borders against the common targets posed by internationalism (25). He emphasizes the continued domestication of these transnational coalitions, and the cooperation that is possible via shared domestic targets, especially in states whose governments joined the “Coalition of the Willing.” Several meso-level propositions are developed based on the centripetal influence that Tarrow argues domestic targets exert on insiders and outsiders, and the grievances which he argues are not so important.
4.1. The presence of politically opportune domestic targets, governments that supported the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” in addition to the presence of the internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government, increase the odds of cooperation between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, and cooperation will stem from shared agreement over institutional targets. Countries lacking such strong domestic institutional targets are likely to have more conflict in anti-war coalitions, divides stemming from the lack of agreement over targets.

4.2. Grievances about war and about globalization, representing different issues, interests, and ideals of activists, do not account for dynamics in insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions.

4.3. Domestic targets are more important than international targets in accounting for dynamics in insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions.

Movement-Related Grievances

In contrast, I suggest that what really can unite or divide insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions are movement-related grievances. What determines their effect is how the issue consensus or issue discord on these grievances in the movement and in the public is taken into account in the framing of grievances. When movement-related grievances with issue consensus are emphasized and lead to the adoption of transversal frames that many can agree with, they can elicit centripetal pulls on insiders and outsiders and facilitate insider-outsider cooperation. Opposition to unilateral intervention in Iraq, a movement-related grievance that is opposed by much of the general public and is agreed on by many activists in the anti-war movement, may lead to transversal frames that unite insiders and outsiders in protest coalitions.
Conversely, when movement-related grievances with issue discord are emphasized, they can exert centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders and unleash conflict in anti-war coalitions. Opposition to military intervention in Iraq in many different scenarios, opposition to globalization, and support for Palestine, are movement-related grievances with more issue discord in movements and in the public, and may exert centrifugal influences making it impossible to agree on frames leading to conflicts in anti-war coalitions. However, support for Palestine, on which there is agreement in certain contexts, may lead to a mixture of conflict and cooperation. Several meso-level propositions are developed based on the influence that movement-related grievances with issue consensus and issue discord might have on insider-outsider conflict and cooperation in anti-war coalitions.

4.4. Movement-related grievances with issue consensus within protest coalitions, especially concerning opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without UN involvement, increase the odds of cooperation between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, and insiders and outsiders will be united via shared agreement over these grievances and over how they should be used in framing the movement. Movement-related grievances with issue discord within protest coalitions, especially concerning whether opposition to the war in Iraq should be linked to opposition of all types of war, to opposition to globalization, and to support of Palestine, increase the odds of conflict between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, with divisions between insiders and outsiders stemming from disagreements over these grievances and how they should be used in framing the movement. Occasionally, in some contexts there is more issue consensus on Palestine and this may facilitate some cooperation.
4.5. Movement-related grievances about war and about globalization are more important than the presence of domestic and international targets in accounting for the dynamics in insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions. Grievances have the power to unite or to divide us, and whether they do depends on the issue consensus in the movement and in the public about them.

4.6. International grievances are more important than domestic grievances in accounting for dynamics in insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions. Similarly, internationalist targets trump domestic targets, in exerting influence on insiders and outsiders.

*Party System and Electoral Context and Anti-War Protest Coalitions*

I now develop an alternative argument regarding insider-outsider cooperation, focusing on the party system and electoral context in which anti-war coalitions are organizing, which I suggest influences meso-level organizing due to the number of insider party allies that are available and the level of predictability regarding electoral outcomes. I argue that insider-outsider cooperation is most likely in moderate multi-partyism, which offers some possible party allies but also offers a certain level of predictability regarding electoral outcomes. In contrast, insider-outsider conflict is most likely in moderate two-partyism, which offers few party allies. Ironically, under polarized multi-partyism, in which there are the greatest number of parties that can be potential insider allies, a mixture of cooperation and conflict occurs, with the electoral context bringing in considerable uncertainty, especially in stages of coalition formation, that can drive periods of conflict, but with cooperation facilitated by the high number of alliances possible at other times.
In this era in which political parties are less relevant and new values seem more important, other intermediaries like social movements may arise to better articulate these new values to the state. Bale argues, “Certainly interest groups and protest movements may be better at expressing the direct material or identity needs of their participants. … But they cannot fulfill this competitive function” because once they start to focus on “standing candidates in elections, they begin to turn into parties” (2005, 128). While social movements do not directly field candidates, they are often instrumental in mobilizing volunteers for campaigns, donations for candidates, and sometimes new constituents for political parties, as is exemplified by the success of Howard Dean in the early portions of the 2003 primary season in the United States. However, all too often theories do not account for the mutualism of social movements, parties, and constituencies or the ways in which the party system context structures social movements’ activities but also influences their political implications.

In fact, the symbiotic ties between social movements and political parties have more recently been highlighted by Goldstone (2003). He argues that social movements, and not so much traditional cleavages, are increasingly important in structuring politics. While focusing on how social movements matter to institutionalized politics, he also investigates how politics influence social movements. He argues that “social movements constitute an essential element of normal politics in modern societies, and that there is only a fuzzy and permeable boundary between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics” (2). Dynamics in social movements are important explanations of political change, since “social
movements have become part of the environment and social structures that shape and give rise to parties, courts, legislatures, and elections” (2). However, what is also important in Goldstone’s approach is that he acknowledges that the political structure also influences the development of social movements, describing the mutually dependent relationship between social movements and political parties (4). Political dynamics can drive dynamics in social movements, which in turn have political implications.

Goldstone definitely witnesses coupling of insider activism and outsider activism, but he focuses more on the impact of the structural context created by “ongoing symbiosis” between “the triangle of movements, parties, and constituencies” which can open up “with the advance of democratization” and which can influence movement outcomes as well as electoral outcomes (2003, 2, 10, 19, 23). Goldstone argues that protest and conventional participation are not dichotomous but lie along a “continuum of alignment and influence” with some groups more “in” or “aligned and integrated with the institutional authorities,” other groups more “out,” with very little institutionalized access, and many in-between (9). Goldstone argues,

Protest actions have certain advantages over and complementarities with conventional political action that make protest both an alternative and a valuable supplement to the latter. Indeed, one would expect, and we generally find, that as societies gain and extend their institutionalized political participation through parties and voting, they also extend their institutionalized repertoires of, and participation in social movements and political protests (9-10).

He suggests that political parties and social movements have become overlapping, mutually dependent actors in shaping politics, to the point where even long-established political parties welcome movement support and often rely specifically on their association with social movements in order to win elections … (4).
He explains, “It is the role of the movement in the multisided strategic action of state leaders, parties, countermovements, and the public at large, each seeking to use or hinder the others to seek its own ends, that produces the final results” (24).

Goldstone correctly argues that we need to try to understand the dynamics in movement-party coalitions, “social movements’ stance of alliance with, or opposition to, conventional political parties and officials,” and their impact on electoral change via dynamics in constituencies’ attitudes and behaviors (2003, 7, 16, 19). Goldstone suggests that “the role of movements seems to be to raise issues that are potentially valuable to legislators in gaining the support of constituencies, even if the majority of the constituents are not active in the movement” (19). In short, this paradigm would suggest that the party-movement linkages in the global anti-war movement helped parties capitalize on opportunities to promote the coupling of conventional and unconventional participation and of the work by movements to mobilize new constituencies for allied parties. Goldstone accordingly argues that the “shifting orientations and relationships among the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), opposition electoral parties, moderate social movements, and radical guerrilla movements all combined to create a competitive democratic framework” helped lead to the first PRI electoral defeat in 70 years (16).

Goldstone’s argument is an important contribution to the field, broadening our gaze to examine the political consequences of movements via their relations with parties and constituencies. However, there are few aspects of his argument that need further development. First, Goldstone himself acknowledges that “it apparently matters at what level of government allies and antagonists appear, and in what branch
of state government as well” (2003, 20). He bases these assertions on work by Van Dyke which found that Democratic control of the presidency or state governorships decreased the likelihood of student protest whereas Democratic control of the legislature increased the likelihood of student protests (2003). Democrats have traditionally been more willing to forge alliances with leftist movements, and it seems that party-movement ties are facilitated when Democrats are part of the opposition in the legislature, but not when they are in control of the governing executive (Goldstone 2003, 9).

I suggest that one way that Goldstone’s work needs to be developed further is by exploring differences across party systems, in the opportunity structure available for social movements. Party systems differ in terms of the fragmentation and polarization of potential allies they provide in the opposition, with key implications for the type of coalition-formation that is possible. However, as Goldstone suggests, we also need to consider who is in power and who is in the opposition at any point in time. Thus, close to elections or stages of coalition formation, important dynamics in party-movement ties may occur, with implications for social movement organizing.

I argue that when a higher number of ideological diverse potential allies are provided in the opposition, insider-oriented groups are able to forge direct, strong alliances with these political parties, to attract more people to engage in protest, to help constituencies draw connections between the aims linking protest behavior to conventional tactics, and to help parties capitalize on movement-party linkages and new constituencies brought to the ballot box by movements. Conversely, when a small number of ideologically similar allies are presented by the opposition, weak or
indirect party-movement alliances are likely to form, making it more difficult to connect protesters’ demonstration activity to their electoral behavior, and resulting in few new voters for the allied parties. Additionally, as possible allies enter the control of the governing executive, or are trying to enter the control of the governing executive, cooperation amongst different factions within the movement can face new obstacles. Thus, I try to specify which aspects of political systems and political change constrain or empower social movements, and what political changes ensue.

Additionally, Goldstone makes the important suggestion that some groups specialize in insider or outsider activism, although he argues that most groups fall in between and couple both types of tactics. I suggest that he does not adequately account for participatory specialization in party system contexts where decoupling occurs more strongly, nor does he account for the insider-outsider cooperation and conflict between these groups. In the more diverse political spectrum, I argue, insider-oriented groups have less political capital to lose by allying occasionally with outsiders, who lie on the political spectrum, and outsiders feel less excluded and are also more willing to cooperate occasionally with insiders. Hence, insider-outsider cooperation is facilitated, more connections between conventional and unconventional participation are made, and protesters are more likely to turn into constituents combining protest with voting. In contrast, when only a small number of ideologically similar potential allies are in the opposition, insider-outsider conflict is likely to increase, as insiders are moderated and outsiders are radicalized.

Thus, I advance a new argument, building on Goldstone’s work, specifying how party systems and electoral dynamics concerning the control of the executive can
influence insider-outsider conflict or cooperation. At the crux of my structural argument is the notion that certain party systems better equip opportunistic parties of the opposition to strategically adapt to global social movements, and thus to benefit from a successful mobilization of protesters seeking to cast protest votes. Pulzer (1987, 379) also suggests that parties’ adaptability in the face of change, is a key determinant of their survival, stating,

There are all sorts of institutional reasons that enable political parties to survive the social cleavages and issue conflicts that gave rise to them: superior resources, organizational skill, … One other condition needs to be satisfied: adaptability. Adaptability in policy, in organizational structure, in social appeal … [Adaptability] will, in the end, determine whether a party founded to further the social and political emancipation of the proletariat can survive in a progressively post-industrial climate.”

In particular, Pulzer argues that parties differ in their adaptability to “a changed relationship between the citizen and the State,” “a changed attitude toward collective action” or a “close relationship, in strategy and tactics, between trade unions and parties,” and adaptation to “new politics” (the changing social structure and their increasing focus on single issue lobbying and grass-roots activism brought by global social movements) (1987, 379-83). Adaptable parties can take advantage of movements’ ability to mobilize new constituencies. For instance, Blühdorn argues that inclusion of Green parties moderates policy-making in coalition governments and helps mobilize new electoral constituencies (2004). Kitschelt also discusses the adaptability of political parties in the new values era:

First, party leaders are not divorced from their members and voting constituencies, but become ever more sensitive to their preferences. Second, inter-party cooperation generates a prisoner’s dilemma in the competitive arena that ultimately prevents the emergence of cartels. Ideological convergence of rival parties has causes external to the competitive arena, not internal to it. Third, conventional parties cannot marginalize or coopt new
challengers, but must adjust to their demands and electoral appeals (2000, 149).

Kitschelt argues that public opinion and outside actors like social movements are increasingly important in influencing parties, suggesting,

Instead of being increasingly anchored in the ‘state’, parties are more at the mercy of exogenous political preferences, whether emerging spontaneously in the electorate or manufactured by autonomous mass media and political entrepreneurs situated outside the arena of party competition (2000, 164).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fragmentation</th>
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<th>Polarized Pluralism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Moderate Pluralism</td>
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<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate Two-Partyism</td>
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**Table 4.1: Sartori Typology of Party Systems**

I argue that Sartori’s classification of party systems offers insight into the process by which the party system context can structure movements and can influence the political outcomes that movements are able to help bring about. Sartori’s classification accounts for two dimensions that distinguish most party systems: fragmentation and polarization. Table 4.1 summarizes Sartori’s typology.

For Sartori (1976), fragmentation is the number of “relevant” political parties in a party system, with some systems characterized by a very high number of relevant parties and others by a very low number of relevant parties. Laakso and Taagepera developed an indicator for fragmentation which accounts for both the number and the relative strength of parties, measuring the “effective number of parties” in the party system (1979). In Western Europe, fragmentation appears to have increased between
the 1960s and 1990s, during the era when these new cleavages have arisen (Webb 2002, 127-9). The Green party has established itself in many countries, and new regionalist and extreme right parties have formed in some countries.

One method used to assess polarization or parties’ ideological locations are expert-judgment scales, which ask experts to rank parties ideologically (Webb 2002, 129). However, another means of measuring polarization in individual parties, the Comparative Manifestos Project, has systematically analyzed official statements of party platforms using the same criteria, across several decades (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). The availability of such data permitted Caul and Grey to examine the ideological dispersion of parties in party systems over time, observing a general trend of ideological convergence during the era in which traditional cleavages have been in decline (2000).

Polarized pluralism, Sartori’s highly fragmented, highly polarized party system, involves at least five or six relevant parties and at least one anti-system party. These systems tend to have governments involving coalitions between several parties in the center, and opposition parties are located ideologically to the right and to the left of the governing parties. The ideological dispersion of the parties makes it difficult for other parties to reach agreement and thus coalitions tend not to change very much from government to government, limiting the alternation of power and the degree to which incumbent governments are held accountable. These systems are also characterized by centrifugal pulls by anti-system parties on the extreme left and right which influence governing coalition parties to take more extreme positions, to keep from losing constituents to extremist parties. The ideological dispersion of
parties tends to make governing coalitions unstable, Sartori has therefore argued (1976).

Next, I discuss the two types of party systems that are moderately polarized but differ in their fragmentation. Moderate pluralism, or moderately fragmented, moderately polarized systems, involve three to five relevant parties and usually lack anti-system parties. The government tends to involve alternation in power between blocs of parties, with opposition to the left or to the right. Further, these party systems are characterized by centripetal forces, meaning that there is more of a push to take moderate positions created by the more moderate positions of the included parties and the absence of extremist parties.

Finally, moderate two-partyism, or a system with low fragmentation and moderate polarization, is similar to moderate pluralism. However, it involves two relevant parties alternating in the government, even if a weak or almost irrelevant third party is present. Sartori argued that such governments tend to be more stable (Sartori 1976; Webb 2002).

I suggest that the party systems in Sartori’s typology might in fact provide the structuring influence on social movements to which Goldstone’s work has alluded. However, there are certain caveats regarding what happens when a party has an opportunity to control the executive, close to elections, as Goldstone also suggested. In the following paragraphs, I describe the typology I advance for each party system.

First, polarized multi-partyism is a structural setting in which there are too many parties that can potentially form alliances with movements (and gain from these alliances). I suggest that the defining features of this system in the presence of five to
eight parties spread from left to right, and the formation of coalition governments, which often include 3 or 4 political parties. The presence of allies that are uncoalitionable (unlikely capable of joining the coalition government), delegitimizes movements that appear too allied with the uncoalitionable extremes and leads to divides within movements when other factions feel it is a better strategy to focus on coalitionable parties (likely capable of joining the coalition government). Factions focused on uncoalitionable parties that are more representative of the movement, appear more extreme in this context at the fringes of the centrifugal political spectrum, and thus fewer people may be drawn into movements.

The political spectrum is more confusing to navigate, with uncertainty regarding coalition outcomes at the end of intense periods of negotiation during coalition formation. Governments resulting from coalition formation processes are difficult for parties outside the center to enter into and do not usually involve much alternation of power for the most coalitionable parties. There is an increased cost of appearing too extreme and uncoalitionable (the political capital lost by insiders for allying with outsiders) resulting in more conflict in the movement between insiders, who are oriented intra-institutionally, and outsiders, who are oriented extra-institutionally. Outsiders feel more excluded by coalitionable parties located largely at the center and less so by uncoalitionable parties. Thus, outsiders are less willing to ally with insiders at times of government transition, unwilling to sacrifice representation for governmental inclusion. As a result, insiders-outsider conflict can emerge, with outsiders less willing to focus on insider strategies, especially close to elections and times of coalition formation.
Hence, social movements in polarized multi-partyism may have a harder time convincing constituencies to link unconventional and outsider strategies with conventional and insider strategies. They mobilize fewer people to protest, and the voters they mobilize to cast protest votes are divided in their voting, with moderates focusing on coalitionable parties that allied with the movement, but may be more distant from the ideals the movement cares about, and with radicals focusing on uncoalitionable party allies whose platforms are more representative of movement ideals. Hence, opportunistic parties of the opposition which forge party-movement ties are moderately successful in turning these ties into electoral gains.

Like Sartori, Lijphart (1999) also observed the short-term duration of governments and uncertainty regarding the outcomes of coalition formation in polarized pluralism party systems. High levels of fragmentation and polarization can make a very confusing system in which to cast a protest vote, because it is unclear how the protest vote will relate to the eventual coalition which will form. In coalition governments, winning an election does not necessarily explain which parties are coalitionable and enter the government, but avoiding the loss of seats is important, as a matter of course, according to Mattila and Raunio (2004). Further, Ezrow (2005) suggests that moderate parties tend to be rewarded in multi-party systems, and thus in the face of extreme uncertainty in the most multi-party systems, we might expect moderate voters to cast protest votes for the most moderate parties allied with the anti-war movement, and not for the parties that are less proximate to the center of the voter distribution. Luebbert explains that oversize coalitions which often form in polarized pluralism minimize the risk of governmental collapse in high polarization.
(1986). According to Webb, these “‘surplus’ or ‘oversize’ cabinets – that is, coalition governments which contact more parties than are strictly necessary in order to control a parliamentary majority” are exemplified by consociational democracies like Belgium and Switzerland (2002, 129).

Hence, I suggest that contexts in which coalition formation consistently requires several or more parties to ally, such as in the Netherlands, lead voters to consider parties’ likelihood of entering the government during coalition formation, when casting their ballots. I suggest that the electorate has come to expect uncertainty regarding coalitions between several parties resulting from coalition formation in highly fragmented, polarized political systems, and accordingly, they are more uncertain about how to cast protest votes. Hence, I expect more disagreement about how to cast protest votes, with moderates selecting parties that are coalitionable and radicals selecting parties that will not sell-out their agendas by joining governing coalitions. Overall, I expect a net electoral volatility that favors parties allied with movements that are more likely to be coalitionable and that hurts parties allied with movements which are less likely to be coalitionable. Ironically, in systems designed to represent the greatest number of people in government, this structure may discourage mainstream voters from voting for parties that best represent them, and rather be forced to choose the most coalitionable parties.

To summarize, polarized pluralism leads movements to face more challenges in using movement-party ties to create cooperative movements and to be less successful in getting new constituencies to combine protest with effective protest voting, with conflicts ensuing close to elections and coalition formation. Rather, the
anarchical political spectrum and uncertainty lead moderates to ally with and vote for parties that do not necessarily represent them as well but are more coalitionable, resulting in moderate electoral changes favorable to the movement despite the fact that the electoral systems in these contexts are supposed to facilitate the accurate representation of societal interests.

The polarized pluralism structural context is thus likely to have a mixture of cooperation and division between insiders and outsiders regarding strategy, leading to intermediate movement-party cooperation; intermediate insider-outsider conflict and cooperation; ineffective combining of unconventional and conventional tactics; and smaller electoral gains for parties allied with the movement. However, I argue that movement-related grievances can interact with this structural influence: as public opinion concerning these grievances changes, then this relation may be modified, with increasing public support of movement-related grievances increasing the likelihood of movement-party cooperation, insider-outsider cooperation, linkage of unconventional and conventional tactics, and electoral gains for allied parties where it was not possible earlier.

Second, moderate multi-partyism is a structural setting in which there are also some parties that can potentially form alliances with movements (and gain from these alliances). However, there is far less uncertainty about the outcomes of coalition formation because one party usually enters the government and the other parties usually take the role of the opposition. The ideologically centripetal political spectrum and the availability of at least one political party ally legitimizes the
movements, making them appear included within a not-too-extreme political spectrum, helping to draw new people into movements.

The political spectrum is narrower but not too narrow (the ideological spectrum is moderately disperse) so the cost of appearing too left (the political capital lost by insiders for allying with outsiders) does not act so much as a barrier preventing cooperation in the movement. The lack of parties at the extremes, but the availability of at least one representative party ally, leads outsiders and insiders alike to feel more included by a party ally at the centre. Outsiders may still feel somewhat alienated by the system which lacks more extreme views, but they are more willing to ally with insiders because there is a clear alternative on which both groups can agree. This stands in stark contrast with both the polarized multi-partyism that offers many alternatives, as well as the moderate two-partyism I discuss next, which is characterized by the lack of alternatives for which protesters can cast protest ballots.

There is less disagreement about coalitionability and the representativeness of party views in this system. Cooperation results more often, as outsiders are more willing to include insider tactics. Since greater insider-outsider cooperation ensues, movements appear less divided and less anti-systemic. Movements are better able to forge a connection between unconventional or outsider strategies and conventional or insider strategies, mobilizing more people to protest and effectively mobilizing more voters for parties allied with the movements. Opportunistic parties of the opposition that forge party-movement ties are highly successful in turning these ties into electoral gains.
In moderate multi-partyism, we often see a single party forming the government, even if the government that results is a minority government and even though coalitions could potentially form. Minority governments consist of “representatives of parties that collectively control fewer than half the seats in parliament (or the parliamentary chamber(s) endowed with the power to dismiss the cabinet)” (Strøm 1997, 54). Minority governments form because other parties may decide not to join, considering difficulties in mobilizing their constituencies in future elections due to the kinds of compromises that coalition participation may require.

Minority governments were not exceptional but accounted for more than one in three governments of 15 parliamentary democracies Strøm analyzed between 1945 and 1987, and these governments are the norm in some cases, as 22 out of 25 governments in Denmark were in fact minority governments (1997, 54). Although conventionally regarded as being unstable and associated with “political crises, cabinet instability, fragmented party systems, polarization, and profound cleavage conflict,” Strøm disagrees and argues that “the formation of minority cabinets reflects the anticipation of electoral accountability” (54). Strøm argues

Compared to their natural alternative, majority coalitions of two or more parties, minority governments form in less fragmented and polarized party systems. They do not seem to be solutions of last resort that emerge from particularly difficult and protracted bargaining episodes. Finally, the great majority are not simply majority governments in disguise: cabinets with an equally solid commitment from support parties that happen not to take portfolios in the cabinet. Instead, the typical minority government is a single-party government, like the Norwegian Labour cabinet, which may have to look for legislative support from issue to issue on an ad hoc basis. Clearly, minority governments are not pathological phenomena (56).
Strøm suggests that in coalition formation, “the broader the coalition, the more explicit compromises its participants have to make, and the more flagrantly they may have to renege on their promises to the voters” (57).

Thus, in these settings, movements are better able to use movement-party ties to create cooperative movements and to convince new constituencies to combine protest with effective protest voting, resulting in high electoral change for certain parties allied with the social movement. The moderate multi-party structural context is best suited to elicit insider-outsider cooperation, the combination of unconventional and conventional tactics, and therefore dramatic electoral gains for parties allied with the movement. However, dynamics in support for movement-related grievances can also moderate this structural influence.

Third, I argue that moderate two-partyism is a structural setting in which the connections between parties and movements, insiders and outsiders, unconventional and conventional behavior, and the political structure and electoral gains for parties allied with movements are weakest. This context involves two effective parties competing for power, and thus there are far fewer parties that can potentially form alliances with movements (and gain from these alliances). The lack of elite allies delegitimizes the movements, making them appear more extreme and outside of the political spectrum and drawing fewer people into movements.

The political spectrum is narrower (more exclusive) so the cost of appearing too far left (the political capital lost by insiders for allying with outsiders) increases, resulting in more conflict in the movement as insiders form alliances with parties that are not so representative of their views, to stay anchored within the political
spectrum. Outsiders feel more excluded by parties located largely at the center which are not representative of their views and more alienated by the system which lacks parties at the extremes (more anti-systemic). Hence, outsiders are less willing to ally with insiders or advocate insider tactics, leading to insider-outsider conflict.

Thus, in moderate two-partyism, movements appear more divided, and some factions are more anti-systemic. Movements have a harder time forging a connection between unconventional or outsider tactics and conventional or insider tactics. Hence, they mobilize a lower percentage of protesters, as well as mobilizing fewer voters to cast protest votes for parties allied with the movements. In these settings, movements face more challenges in using movement-party ties to create cooperative movements and are less successful in getting new constituencies to combine protest with different types of voting, resulting in less electoral change that favors parties linked to movements. Therefore, opportunistic parties of the opposition that forge party-movement ties are largely unsuccessful in turning these ties into electoral gains.

My argument hinges on the uncertainties of coalition formation, the high number of candidates for protest votes, and divergent representativeness of party allies of the ideologically disperse polarized pluralism. Likewise, it emphasizes the lack of representative candidates for protest votes in the ideologically narrow moderate two-partyism. Direct party-movement linkages, insider-outsider cooperation, linkages between conventional and unconventional participation, and electoral gains for parties allied with movements may be most possible in moderate multi-partyism. Conversely, the most indirect party-movement linkages, insider-outsider conflict, specialization in conventional or unconventional participation, and
electoral losses for parties allied with movements may be more likely in moderate
two-partyism.

Ironically, polarized multi-partyism seems to fall in between the other
systems, despite its tendency to include more parties representative of disparate
societal viewpoints. In this context, conflict seems more likely close to elections and
periods of government formation, but cooperation is also feasible at other times.
Several meso-level propositions are developed concerning the influence that the party
system and electoral context have on insider-outsider cooperation and conflict.

4.7. In moderate multi-party systems such as in the United Kingdom, much
insider-outsider cooperation ensues. Coalitions are characterized by alliances with a
moderate number of political insiders and by little fluctuation in insider-outsider ties
close to elections.

4.8. In polarized multi-party systems such as in the Netherlands, an intermediate
level of insider-outsider cooperation ensues. Coalitions are characterized by alliances
with several political parties of the left or in the opposition and consensus-seeking as
actors seek to find a middle ground. However, periods of conflict are unleashed,
especially occurring during times of uncertainty related to government formation and
elections due to concerns about entering the government.

4.9. In moderate two-party systems such as in the United States, much insider-
outsider conflict ensues. Outsiders feel marginalized by the narrow political spectrum
and are unwilling to focus on tactics involving coupling insider and outsider activism.
Outsiders also prioritize selecting frames that reflect all movement-related grievances,
even if they are characterized by issue discord. In contrast, insiders very concerned
about trying to effect intra-institutional changes, cultivating what insider alliances they can in the narrow political spectrum, and choosing their framing of grievances in such a way that they are not portrayed as too radical and costly in terms of insider alliances. Thus, disagreements between insiders and outsiders are very common.

**Insider–Outsider Cooperation and Conflict**

Despite sharing domestic targets, the British, Dutch, and American anti-war movements varied considerably in the level of cooperation and conflict between insiders and outsiders. Results from these cases are summarized in Table 4.2. Cooperation was the norm in the recent British anti-war movement, although in previous anti-war movements that was not always the case (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, January 5, 2006). In the Netherlands, cooperation was possible during the time that the anti-war movement was mobilized, but conflict emerged at the height of the anti-war movement due to a new period of government formation in which one of the parties allied with the anti-war movement was trying to join the governing coalition (Jan Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005; Hans van Heijningen, personal communication, December 19, 2005). Finally, in the United States, conflict has been the norm, with very few successful attempts at bringing together key insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, and co-optation and conflict characterizing the few collaborative events that actually occurred (Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).
Table 4.2: Results of Elite Interviews of Anti-War Organizers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Insider-Outsider Ties in Anti-War Coalition</th>
<th>Presence of Strong Domestic Targets (Joining the U.S. “Coalition of the Willing”)</th>
<th>Salient Grievances Concerning the War in Iraq</th>
<th>Party System and Electoral Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>High cooperation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq</td>
<td>Moderate Multi-partyism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Opposing War in Iraq in Many Scenarios</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Linking Opposition to War to Opposition to Globalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Linking Opposition to War to Support of Palestine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Mixture</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq</td>
<td>Polarized Multi-partyism with uncertainty regarding elections and government coalition formation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Opposing War in Iraq in Many Scenarios</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Linking Opposition to War to Opposition to Globalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>High conflict</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq</td>
<td>Moderate Two-partyism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Opposing War in Iraq in Many Scenarios</td>
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<td>• Linking Opposition to War to Opposition to Globalization</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Linking Opposition to War to Support of Palestine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3 summarizes the findings pertinent to each of the propositions developed in the theoretical framework, which are discussed as the evidence is presented. The presence of domestic targets do not account for the considerable conflicts in the American anti-war movement and the mixture of cooperation and conflict in the Dutch anti-war movement, as these countries, like the United Kingdom, joined the “Coalition of the Willing” and thus had a strong domestic target.
Moreover, activists do not cite targets when discussing successful or failed cooperation. Disconfirmatory evidence of proposition 4.1 is thus observed.

Rather, movement-related grievances, and agreements or disagreements about framing those grievances, given issue consensus and issue discord, appear to be important in accounting for dynamics of cooperation and conflict in these cases, disconfirming proposition 4.2 and offering support of proposition 4.5. Domestic targets seem to be at least equally important as international targets, but not in promoting cooperation per se, disconfirming proposition 4.3. International grievances may be more important than particularistic domestic ones, as international grievances were frequently cited by activists in accounting for failed or successful cooperation. Hence, some confirmatory evidence regarding proposition 4.6 is found.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Causal Factor</th>
<th>Expected Pattern in Outcomes</th>
<th>Confirmed?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Domestic Target</td>
<td>Insider-Outsider Cooperation</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Movement-Related Grievances</td>
<td>No Effect</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Primacy of Domestic over International Targets</td>
<td>Insider-Outsider Cooperation</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Movement-Related Grievances</td>
<td>Insider-Outsider Cooperation and Conflict</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Primacy of Grievances over Targets</td>
<td>Insider-Outsider Cooperation and Conflict</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Primacy of International over Domestic</td>
<td>Insider-Outsider Cooperation and Conflict</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>Moderate Multi-Party Systems</td>
<td>Insider-Outsider Cooperation</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Polarized Multi-Party Systems and Electoral Uncertainty During Government Formation</td>
<td>Mixture of Cooperation and Conflict</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Moderate Two-Party Systems</td>
<td>Insider-Outsider Conflict</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.3:** Trends in Insider-Outsider Cooperation and Conflict
I briefly provide examples of how movement-related grievances and the party system and electoral context are related to conflict and cooperation in coalitions. First, I discuss several movement-related grievances that seem to be important in accounting for the dynamics in cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States. The evidence that I present offers considerable support for proposition 4.4. Next, I discuss the party system and electoral context in these three cases.

In the United Kingdom, activists made a decision to select transversal frames linked to movement-related grievances on which there was more issue consensus, especially because many of the activists had worked together before and understood sources of issue discord and were committed to avoiding the conflict that discord can drive (Lindsey German, January 9, 2006; Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006; Sarah Sachs-Eldridge, personal communication, January 10, 2006). Thus, they decided to select transversal frames focused on opposing unilateralism in Iraq, and agree to respect but not necessarily emphasize the diversity of perspectives in the movement related to all-encompassing opposition to war, tying opposition to war to opposition to globalization, and supporting Palestine (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, January 5, 2006).

In the British anti-war movement, there was some measured issue consensus on opposing war in a variety of cases, and this was important in remobilizing activists from previous peace movements, especially the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, that decided to get re-mobilized due to the nuclearization that was used to justify
preemptive intervention in Iraq (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006). Additionally, activists agreed to make linkages between the war in Iraq and globalization, which helped to bring on board activists involved in global justice, although they agreed not to focus on these linkages too much (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, January 5, 2006; Guy Taylor, personal communication, January 5, 2006).

However, there were some initial disagreements when the Stop the War Coalition and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament tried to bring on board the Muslim Association of Britain (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006). Eventually this conflict was mitigated and consistent cooperation between these groups was secured, after there was an agreement to tie in the question of Palestine, to a limited degree, although some groups are unwilling to take an official stance on that issue (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006).

In the Netherlands, a focus on opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq made it easy for a variety of groups to cooperate in the “Platform Against the War” (Platform Tegen de Oorlog), also known as the Platform Against the New War (Jan Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005; Hans van Heijningen, personal communication, December 19, 2005). As many of these groups were also involved in global justice activism and had interacted at social forums, and because of the Dutch political context in which consensus-seeking is expected, it was not very hard to come to this agreement, nor was it difficult for the activists to acknowledge and respect a variety of perspectives (Sylvia Borren, personal communication, December 16, 2005; Rene Danen, personal communication, December 16, 2005).
In the Netherlands, the movement-related grievance concerning all-encompassing opposition to war was important in accounting for one element of conflict in the anti-war coalition, as some of the key groups and activists who were instrumental in the peace movement against nuclearization in the 1980s were unwilling to cooperate this time around (Mient Jan Faber, personal communication, December 20, 2005; Jan Gruiters, personal communication, December 14, 2005; Jan Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005). Some of these groups were religious organizations that had ties to Kurds in Iraq and felt that the war could be important in ending the violent repression committed by the Hussein regime, and there was thus a limited mobilization of religious organizations (Mient Jan Faber, personal communication, December 20, 2005; Jan Gruiters, personal communication, December 14, 2005; Jan Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005). The question of opposition to globalization played some role in derailing the movement altogether after the war started, because global justice activists felt it was important to return to their other activities (Rene Danen, personal communication, December 16, 2005; Wytze de Lange, personal communication, December 20, 2005; Tuur Elzinga, personal communication, December 15, 2005; Jan Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005).

Further, the demobilization of the Dutch anti-war movement is also very much tied to the political crisis that started with the assassination of politician Pim Fortuyn and the center-right coalition that was selected soon after his death in May 2002. In the aftermath of this crisis, many of the global justice activists that had been mobilized against the war were very concerned by a move rightward regarding
immigrants, xenophobic crimes such as fires set to Islamic schools, and the poor
treatment of asylum-seekers after a fire at the Schiphol airport detention facility, and
decided that they had to fill the vacuum on these issues and could not remain
mobilized on a war that had already started and which their protest had not averted in
the first place (Rene Danen, personal communication, December 16, 2005; Wytze de
Lange, personal communication, December 20, 2005; Tuur Elzinga, personal
communication, December 15, 2005). The question of Palestine was not such an
important issue in the Dutch context.

The United States anti-war movement has successfully allied many disparate
organizations, but cooperation between two of the most important coalitions, UFPJ
and ANSWER, has remained elusive (Brian Becker, personal communication, March
9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). Repeatedly, on
protest event after protest event, these coalitions have unsuccessfully tried to ally
together, and what few collaborative events have occurred, have been characterized
by conflict and efforts to coopt one another (Brian Becker, personal communication,
March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).

The conflicts have stemmed from framing disagreements because UFPJ is
focused on mobilizing protesters using frames reflecting movement-related
grievances on which there is issue consensus, while ANSWER is focused on
mobilizing protesters using frames reflecting movement-related grievances on which
there is issue discord (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 2005
and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany
Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). UFPJ tries to focus on what
member groups and the population agree on, such as opposing U.S. unilateralism and bringing the international community and United Nations back in to policy-making on Iraq (Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).

Linking opposition to the war in Iraq to an all-encompassing opposition of war has been one important source of conflict in the American anti-war coalition (Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). Namely, ANSWER uses an anti-imperialism frame to link together many different issues on which UFPJ and the general public disagree, as part of its all-encompassing opposition to war (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). As this includes supporting some regimes viewed as authoritarian or even supporting the insurgency against the U.S. troops, this has produced many disagreements (Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).

Additionally, the linkage between opposing war and opposing globalization, which most of the groups agree is present, has also produced conflict in the American anti-war movement, because groups like ANSWER link it to imperialism and groups like UFPJ are concerned about avoiding a radical image that could alienate supporters (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). One of the debates that has arisen in global justice groups at various points in time is whether activism about the war should take priority
over activism on global justice, and also whether with the heightened protests of the war and new political climate after September 11, insider tactics should be used instead of outsider tactics (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Neil Watkins, personal communication, March 17, 2005).

One of the most persistent sources of conflict in the American anti-war movement was the issue of Palestine, as was already mentioned. ANSWER’s focus on bringing Palestine into the frames used for particular demonstrations prevented cooperation on numerous global protests (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).

Although movement-related grievances and their strategic framing account for much of the conflict and cooperation in the anti-war movements in these cases, I suggest that the party-system and electoral context is also important. Moderate multi-partyism in the United Kingdom may have facilitated cooperation. Some confirmatory evidence of proposition 4.7 is presented regarding the United Kingdom. Further, polarized multi-partyism in the Netherlands provided many opportunities for cooperation, but the uncertainty surrounding elections and coalition negotiation resulted in conflicts. Substantial confirmatory evidence of proposition 4.8 is offered in the Netherlands. Finally, moderate two-partyism in the United States seems to account for insider-outsider conflict, and evidence regarding the American anti-war movement offers considerable support for proposition 4.9.
In the United Kingdom, the anti-war movement was characterized by a variety of groups, some more allied with the Labour Party, others with the Liberal Democrats, and yet others with regional parties or with the Respect Coalition that broke away from the Labour Party when it supported the war in Iraq (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, January 5, 2006; John Rees, personal communication, January 9, 2006). However, even close to election times, the cooperation between the different groups remained steadfast, and no conflicts tied to their insider allegiances cropped up (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, January 5, 2006).

Although the Liberal Democrats took an anti-war stance, and had a presence at demonstrations, their relationship with the anti-war movement was quite limited (Bob Russell, personal communication, January 10, 2006). Rather, the Respect Coalition and key representatives such as Jeremy Corbyn, from Labour, had very good relationships with the anti-war movement (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006; John Rees, personal communication, January 9, 2006). In the British context, with a number of insider allies, the anti-war movement was open to using a variety of insider and outsider tactics to try to influence a variety of allies, and the general sense that Labour would stay in control of the government helped facilitate an agreement to maximize insider connections and leverage all sorts of tactics (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, January 5, 2006).
The Dutch anti-war movement also found numerous party allies in the Socialist Party, Green Party, and Labor Party (Pepijn Brandon, personal communication, December 15, 2005; Jan Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005; Hans van Heijningen, personal communication, December 19, 2005). In fact, the linkages between the parties and the social movements were so strong that Hans van Heijningen, a key activist in the global justice movement who was an important organizer in the Platform against the War and who helped mobilize the February 15, 2003 protests, subsequently became the general secretary of the Socialist Party, and I interviewed him in parliament (Hans van Heijningen, personal communication, December 19, 2005). In general, the breadth of the political spectrum in the Netherlands, and the variety of ties to the anti-war movement, led to a commitment to seek consensus and to cooperate in whatever way possible (Sylvia Borren, personal communication, December 16, 2005; Hans van Heijningen, personal communication, December 19, 2005).

However, some conflict was unleashed in the Dutch anti-war movement due to coalition negotiations that occurred at the height of the anti-war movement in January, February, and March 2003 (Jan Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005; Hans van Heijningen, personal communication, December 19, 2005). After the May 2002 election which resulted in a coalition between the Christian Democrats and Pim Fortuyn’s populist and anti-immigrant party, it soon became clear that this coalition was untenable and in October 2002 Prime Minister Balkenende’s cabinet resigned. New elections were held in January 2003, with negotiations following between parties that were trying to join the Christian
Democrats in a coalition government. During the run-up to the election, groups tied
to the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid) were already being pressured to hold off on
outsider tactics (Jan Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005; Hans
van Heijningen, personal communication, December 19, 2005).

Further, as the coalition negotiations started, the Labour party was being
pressured to soften its opposition to the war so that it could enter into a coalition with
the center-right party that supported the war. As anti-war protests became more
mobilized in the lead up to the war, conflicts occurred within the anti-war protest
collegation because some groups were more reluctant to turn out and because there was
much controversy over whether the leader of the Labour Party should be invited to
speak at protests, given his softened anti-war stance (Jan Schaake, personal
communication, December 14, 2005).

The American anti-war movement found few insider allies in the two main
parties, certainly few who were willing to oppose the war in Iraq in its entirety.
Exceptions include Dennis Kucinich and Howard Dean. However, because of the
narrow political spectrum, insider-oriented groups in the movement were still willing
to ally with the Democrats and were very focused on mobilizing voters close to the
2004 election (Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). This voter
mobilization received much priority in the April 2004 March for Women’s Lives,
where Hillary Clinton spoke, and the August 2004 protests at the Republican National
Convention (Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). UFPJ was
very concerned about not being painted as too radical, and interested in finding ways
to pair insider tactics like lobbying with protesting, especially since the war started (Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).

In contrast, outsider groups such as ANSWER feel so alienated by the political system that they see no difference between the Republican and Democratic Party and see no point to coupling protesting with lobbying or voting (Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005). In fact, outsiders are trying to build support for a more revolutionary change to the political system (Nihar Bhatt, personal communication, March 6, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005). ANSWER, thus, is not willing to alter its framing of movement-related grievances to fit the political context, and tactically is not interested in lobbying or voter mobilization (Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005).

These very different orientations have led to many conflicts between ANSWER and a host of groups, including UFPJ (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). These cooperative failures may have inhibited protest mobilization domestically, linkages between insider activism and outsider activism domestically, and cooperation with other activists transnationally. However, a shift in public opinion on movement-related grievances, such as following Hurricane Katrina, can mitigate the difficulties of cooperating in the United States anti-war movement, and on September 24, 2005, UFPJ and ANSWER did collaborate somewhat successfully.
Contrary to Tarrow’s expectations, several countries that shared strong domestic targets had anti-war movements that varied considerably in insider-outsider conflict and cooperation. Rather, movement-related grievances and the party system and electoral context seem to account for the dynamics in cooperation and conflict of anti-war organizers across these cases. Movement-related grievances and the issue consensus and issue discord on those grievances are important in accounting for the framing agreements and disagreements that arise. Also, as the party system includes more parties that can be movement allies, possibilities for cooperation increase. However, when there are many possible allies and a period of uncertainty starts due to new elections or government formation, conflict can arise despite the presence of many allies. It seems likely that movement-related grievances with issue consensus and a party-system context that affords potential insider allies may be important in remobilizing activists as voters in elections.
Chapter 5: Macro-level: February 15, 2003 Protests in the European Union

Are dynamics in transnational peace protests in an enlarging European Union accounted for by internationalist and domestic targets, movement-related grievances such as opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, dynamics in the emergence of civil society and its linkages to global civil society, or divergent paths of democratization? Transnational protests against war on February 15, 2003 are well-documented by Tarrow and della Porta (2005), but as yet unexplored are comparisons of protest events in the older EU member states and in the newly acceding CEE states. Thus, in this chapter I explore how successful EU protest events were in mobilizing large numbers of demonstrators and in drawing out broad rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders, and which factors account for the variation across the protests.

I argue that the relative success in mobilizing high numbers of protesters and in drawing out insiders and outsiders in rainbow coalitions, in the EU-15, compared to the CEE states, is indicative of the centripetal influences on insiders and outsiders of movement-related grievances and of a longer history of participation, protest, and civil society, while targets seem to lack explanatory power. Successful protest events linking insiders and outsiders in the EU-15 catalyze possibilities for future cooperation, illustrate to protesters the parties that are movement allies, educate parties about protesters’ concerns, and educate protesters about coupling insider and outsider tactics, helping remobilize activists as voters in subsequent elections.
Much of the research on transnational protests in the EU was conducted before the height of the anti-globalization and anti-war movements, in Western European contexts, and before the enlargement process was proceeding at full-throttle. The bulk of this research on transnational protest events, including scholarship on a few events that became pan-European, has suggested the continued domestication of conflict as well as a limited transnationalism overall. The recent anti-war movement provides an interesting test of both the degree of transnationalism as well as the impact of both institutional targets and movement-related grievances, domestically and internationally, on transnational activism.

Using content analysis of protest news coverage, I have developed a chronology of transnational anti-war protests in older EU member states and in newly acceding EU member states on the February 15, 2003 date of global protest. My research reveals that transnational peace protest is indeed spreading to CEE states, but that some patterns of protest are rather different in these newer states. I explore factors that may account for the similarities and differences in mobilization levels, agents, targets, and grievances in anti-war protests in the older versus newer EU states. In addition to domestic and international targets, we must attend to the role of movement-related grievances, especially about U.S. unilateralism; divergent histories of participation, protest, and civil society; and divergent democratization pathways.

*Europeanization of Protest and EU Enlargement*

Though the transnationalism of anti-war protests on February 15, 2003 is well documented (Tarrow and della Porta 2005), as yet unmentioned and unexplored in the history of recent global protest movements (GPMs), is the degree to which protests
were truly globalized and occurred outside advanced industrialized democracies, especially in the newly democratized and transitioning post-communist states (CEE or Central and East European states) that have recently joined the European Union (EU). Thus, in this chapter, I explore the dynamics of contention in an enlarging European Union, especially comparing the older EU states that acceded up to 1995 with the CEE states that acceded in 2004 and 2007.

Previous research on transnational European contention has found a limited transnationalism and continued domestication of protest, although transnational protest is spreading and some of it has spread from West to East. Early research by Imig and Tarrow concluded that, through 1998, Europeans increasingly targeted the EU, but that such protests were still a minority of contentious events (2000, 84). Although many scholars continue to observe the domestication of protest in Europe, transnational protest has increased over time and has spread to some degree from Western Europe to Eastern Europe, reflecting changes in Europeanization with the recent enlargement process (Imig 2004). In fact, the September 2000 transnational protests against fuel prices in Europe spanned both Western and Eastern Europe, including actions in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark in the west as well as in the future EU member states of Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary in the east (Imig 2004, 217-20).

Although transnational forms of protest have spread eastward, even in the CEE states, there appears to be a limited transnationalism. Indeed, transnational protests for global justice have occurred in Eastern Europe, albeit to a lesser degree and with considerable variation between countries. Arguably, the best-known global
justice demonstrations that occurred in a future CEE member state are the protests that targeted the September 2000 IMF/WB meetings in Prague, in the aftermath of the Battle of Seattle demonstrations which had targeted the meeting of the WTO Ministerial Conference in November 1999 (Rootes 2002, 425). There is tremendous variation in the degree to which transnationalism has manifested itself in CEE protests. Szabó finds roughly 15 percent of Hungarian protest events targeting international organizations and 15 percent targeting “other actors in international politics,” whereas the internationalization of protest seems far lower in Slovakia and Slovenia (1996, 1176).

Much transnational contention remains very domesticated. Even the transnational protest events that have been pan-European and studied in detail, involved largely domestic political actors, following a “national pattern of organization,” taking “action in opposition to – rather than in accord with – protesters from other nations, demanding that their governments act to level the playing field with foreign counterparts,” allying with domestic rather than European targets (Imig 2004, 217-20). Hence, Imig finds a continued domestication of protest in Europe between 1984 and 1997, and most of the protests that target the EU directly are carried out by occupational interest groups organized domestically.

In many European social movements, such as environmentalism, transnationalism has not been the dominant trend. There is still limited evidence of the contentious impact of Europeanization on social movements, compared to its influence on “bigger, more organized lobby groups and ‘protest businesses’” (Bale 2005, 202). In the environmental movement, for example, Europeanization has not
been very successful in producing transnational contention. Rootes has observed that “despite the development and increasing powers of EU institutions, especially with regard to environmental policy, their impact upon national environmental movements has been less substantial than we might have expected,” and “the transnationalization of environmentalism is at best limited, even within the EU” (2005, 22). In fact, most environmental protests are not targeting the EU (Rootes 2002).

This limited Europeanization of the environmental movement seems to be exacerbated with the recent enlargement. Hallstrom argues that “the evolution of informal policymaking at the EU level, combined with the technical and informational preferences of actors in institutions such as the European Commission” creates constraints for new non-governmental actors seeking to influence environmental policy (2004, 176). While the recent European enlargement has on the one hand increased EU “influence over environmental policy in CEE countries,” it has also occurred in a way such that “the influence and access of NGOs in CEE states is limited” (176).

Similarly, Hicks suggests new asymmetries may be present in the EU, granting better channels of access to established Western interests than to newer Eastern interests, and with more emphasis on influencing the emergence of Eastern civil society than on being responsive to the interests it articulates (2004). Hicks argues that environmentalists in CEE countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are increasingly being influenced by the EU, especially via agenda-setting, pressure to improve democratic deficits and entrench democratic accountability, funding, and emphasis on fostering participation (224-6). However, EU receptivity to
CEE environmental concerns and thus their transnational impact has varied considerably, there are asymmetric channels of access in the EU favoring non-CEE interests, and there has clearly been a focus within the EU on meeting conditionality and not so much on debating EU policy with CEE interest groups (229-30). Thus, it is important that we begin to explore whether North-South asymmetries that have been much debated in global civil society are manifesting themselves as East-West asymmetries in EU transnationalism.

Although most scholars witness limited Europeanization, issue areas vary in the degree to which Europeanization impacts transnational activism. According to Hilson (2002), the EU is to some degree creating new political opportunities for new social movement actors to become part of the policy process, including opportunities and concessions for “those previously excluded such as the lesbian and gay and animal welfare movements.” However, these international political opportunities have not increased uniformly across issue areas, and on certain areas like genetically modified crops, a constrained opportunity structure leads outsider tactics like protest to be more common (Hilson 2002). Similarly, Geddes (2000) finds that for migrant inclusion issues, corporatist insider strategies like lobbying have been favored and outsider activism has been avoided.

Indeed, there is certainly some Europeanization in the transnational composition of protesters at demonstrations. Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave (2004) observe some transnationalism of protesters at an anti-globalization protest targeting the 2001 EU Summit in Brussels, with roughly 38% of the protesters non-Belgian, but their transnationalism is not predicted by factors linked to
Europeanization: their sense of European identity, views on EU membership, or trust of international institutions. Rather, factors linked to their tactical repertoires and movement-related grievances (e.g., dissatisfaction with democracy) seem to account for their transnationalism (Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave 2004).

Much research on protests targeting the EU was conducted before the height of the anti-globalization and anti-war movements, in Western European contexts, and before the enlargement process was proceeding at full-throttle, fostering further European integration (Imig and Tarrow 2001). Hence, empirical work must be conducted using data collected in the time period following the Battle of Seattle protests, especially during the historic, highly transnational anti-war movement opposing U.S. military intervention in Iraq. Additionally, data must be collected on transnational contention in both the older EU states and in the newly acceding EU states to examine in what fashion transnational contention is emerging in an era of European enlargement. If protests have become more transnational, especially in response to European enlargement, then the post 9/11 era provides the time frame in which it should be observable.

In this chapter, I explore rival factors that may account for the dynamics of transnational protest against the war in Iraq in this enlarging EU, focusing in particular on the success of transnational protest events in mobilizing protesters and in drawing out rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders. I compare anti-war protests on February 15, 2003 in the member states up to the 1995 accessions with the anti-war protests that were mobilized in post-communist CEE states that acceded to the EU during 2004 and 2007.
First, I delve into Tarrow’s argument that “Coalition of the Willing” membership accounts for the dynamics in the mobilization of the global anti-war movement. Then, I examine the presence of similar grievances about U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, the history of participation, protest, and civil society as well as the complex democratization experiences of these states to see how they might account for the dynamics of transnational anti-war protest. After presenting the theoretical framework at the macro-level, I present an overview of February 15, 2003 anti-war protests across the EU, based on archival research of media coverage of the protests available via Lexis Nexis and via the Internet, and discuss my observations in light of the propositions developed in the theoretical framework.

**Domestic and International Targets**

Tarrow focuses on targets presented by the domestic and international political opportunity structure in explaining the dynamics in the historic February 15, 2003 global anti-war protests (2005, 15). Though he acknowledges that targets in international institutions were lacking since the EU and the UN had taken oppositional stances on the war in Iraq, Tarrow argues that the common presence of domestic targets (executive and legislative branches of the domestic government responsible for official stances such as joining the “Coalition of the Willing” and responsible for policymaking relevant to the war in Iraq) was key in eliciting global collective action that was successful and mobilized rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders. Additionally, Tarrow argues that the U.S. government was an important target shared by transnational protesters due its “resurgent militarism” as “a hegemonic state” (16).
According to Tarrow, the pairing of such politically opportune domestic and international targets provide structured opportunities for relations between “social movement” outsiders and “NGO insiders” seeking to influence a common target. These relations spurn greater insider-outsider cooperation which is able to elicit successful, highly mobilized transnational protest events and draw out rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders at these events. Thus, the dynamics across anti-war protest events, especially in their mobilization levels and success in centripetally drawing out rainbow coalitions of insider and outsiders, may be accounted for by examining a country’s stance on the war in Iraq, especially whether a country joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” provided a strong domestic target. Macro-level propositions based on this argument are listed below.

5.1. Demonstrators at successful transnational protest events are likely to perceive similar domestic and international targets.

5.2. The presence of politically opportune domestic targets, governments that supported the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” in addition to the presence of the internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government, increase the odds of highly mobilized transnational anti-war protest events which involve broad rainbow coalitions and are able to drawn in key insiders and remobilize key outsiders. Countries lacking such strong domestic institutional targets are likely to have protest events with less success in mobilization and in drawing in key insiders or outsiders.

5.3. Grievances about war and about globalization, representing different issues, interests, and ideals of activists, do not account for dynamics in the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders.
5.4. Domestic targets are more important than international targets in accounting for dynamics in the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders.

Taken at face value, in Western Europe, the targets presented by “Coalition of the Willing” membership may have exerted a centripetal force on insiders and outsiders by facilitating the mobilization of masses of protesters and drawing out broad rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders. Indeed, protest mobilizations in “Coalition of the Willing” states like Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom contrast markedly with anti-war protests that occurred in West European states outside the “Coalition of the Willing.”

However, even in Western Europe, there were some “Coalition of the Willing” states with very low protest mobilizations and some non-“Coalition of the Willing” states with relatively high turnouts of protesters. The variance in mobilization levels in the older EU member states may be accounted for by exploring other factors. Moreover, in post-Communist Europe, strong domestic targets were present across the board but transnational anti-war protest varied markedly. I suggest that causal factors other than the presence of strong domestic targets may be more important in accounting for dynamics of transnational protests.

Several divides have emerged within the broad EU, on the issue of the U.S. military intervention in Iraq. On February 17, 2003, the 15 nations in the EU prior to the 2004 accessions met and issued a statement on Iraq “far closer to the German-French position than the American, reflecting the antiwar nations’ economic clout as well as the response of some prowar political leaders to the massive antiwar demonstrations that have taken place in Italy, Spain, Britain and the rest of Europe”
The East European states, in contrast, were much closer to Washington’s stance on Iraq, joining the United States as well as some West European states in the so-called “Coalition of the Willing,” supporting the U.S. military intervention in Iraq (297-8). The refusal of France, Germany, and Russia to join this coalition prompted Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to ridicule the “Old Europe” and herald the coming of the “New Europe” (297-8). Some West European states like Britain, Spain, and Italy indicated support for Washington, and most CEE states like Hungary, Czech Republic, “Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic Republics [e.g., Latvia, Lithuania] called military intervention a regrettable but inevitable measure in the best interests of international security.” These pre-accession states were later ridiculed by French President Jacques Chirac, when he lashed out at “the Central Europeans as ‘infantile’ and insinuated that they had damaged their chances of joining the EU.”

To what degree were strong domestic targets present via “Coalition of the Willing” membership? In fact, most of the CEE states formally joined the “Coalition of the Willing” at the onset. Condoleezza Rice, at the time President Bush’s National Security Adviser, describes the coalition as one of “nearly 50 nations” “from every continent on the globe,” some of whom “have only recently emerged from

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14 Secor, Laura. 2003. The anti-Americans: Central Europeans may be wary of the Bush administration's war plans, but they're not at all wary of the United States. The Boston Globe, Ideas, E1.
“tyrannies” which she claims could have been thwarted had the world appropriately addressed the threats their regimes posed.”

However, some regions (like Eastern Europe) are disproportionately represented, and others (like Western Europe) were much more divided. According to MacLeod, one motivation that led Central European states to support the coalition en masse, was their aspiration for acceptance into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Václav Havel and Adam Michnik, prominent dissidents, also supported the U.S (Krastev 2004, 9).

In Table 5.1, I summarize the standpoints of the EU member states on the military intervention in Iraq, although I add the caveat in advance that these standpoints are very much in flux, with several countries having since withdrawn or planning to withdraw troops from Iraq. Thus, it summarizes whether there is a strong domestic target based on a country’s standpoint on the military intervention in Iraq, at the height of the anti-war movement in February 2003. A detailed chronology of each country’s evolving standpoint on the intervention is available in Appendix 2.

Six of the older EU states that acceded up to 1995 joined the “Coalition of the Willing” and provided strong domestic targets around which the anti-war movement could mobilize, while nine other states provided weaker domestic targets concerning the military intervention in Iraq. Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom all provided strong domestic targets that could have exerted centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders. Of the EU-15, Denmark and the United Kingdom are the only two states that joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” supporting

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17 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The ‘coalition of the willing:’ 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. *The Ottawa Citizen*, March 26, A4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Status</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Joined the Coalition of the Willing?</th>
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<td>Older EU States (up to 1995 Accessions)</td>
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<td>1. Austria</td>
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<td>7. Greece</td>
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<td>9. Italy</td>
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<td>10. Luxembourg</td>
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<td>11. Netherlands</td>
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<td>12. Portugal</td>
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<td>13. Spain</td>
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<td>14. Sweden</td>
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<td>15. United Kingdom</td>
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<td>CEE States Accessing to the EU, 2004-2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Bulgaria</td>
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<td>5. Latvia</td>
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<td>7. Poland</td>
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<td>10. Slovenia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mediterranean States Accessing to the EU, 2004</td>
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<td>1. Cyprus</td>
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<td>2. Malta</td>
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**Table 5.1:** Presence of Domestic Targets (Stance on the Intervention in Iraq)

the war in Iraq, which have maintained their troops in Iraq and thus have maintained the strongest domestic target for activists to organize against. However, both Denmark and the United Kingdom are currently debating a timeline for the withdrawal of their troops from Iraq. Four other older EU states originally joined the “Coalition of the Willing” and deployed troops to Iraq, but have since withdrawn troops: Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The other EU-15 states did not join the “Coalition of the Willing:” Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden. Additionally, all of the EU-15 states other than Austria (due to its historical neutrality) have supported the intervention in
Afghanistan, providing troops and other support; Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all provided troops there.

All ten of the CEE states acceding to the EU between 2004 and 2007 joined the “Coalition of the Willing” early on and thus all provided strong domestic targets around which anti-war movements could mobilize insiders and outsiders at transnational protest events. Six CEE states that joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” supporting the war in Iraq, have maintained their troops in Iraq and thus have continued to provide strong domestic targets for anti-war activists: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. Slovenia is the only CEE state that joined the “Coalition of the Willing” but did not deploy troops in Iraq for military tasks, and rather deployed them for peace-building tasks. The three other CEE States, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia, all originally joined the “Coalition of the Willing” and deployed troops to Iraq, but have since withdrawn troops, though they have not necessarily withdrawn non-military support of the intervention in Iraq. Furthermore, all ten of the CEE states acceding to the EU between 2004 and 2007 have supported the intervention in Afghanistan, providing troops and other support; Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia have all contributed troops to the intervention in Afghanistan.

Neither Mediterranean state that acceded to the EU in 2004 provided a strong domestic target against which the anti-war movement could mobilize. Cyprus was clearly opposed to the intervention in Iraq, but neither Cyprus nor Malta joined the “Coalition of the Willing” in 2003. Nevertheless, Cyprus has allowed its air space to
be used for purposes related to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, Malta has helped some British troops train for the military roles in Afghanistan or Iraq. Neither Cyprus nor Malta provided troops to the intervention in Afghanistan.

Of the three EU Candidate States, all eventually joined the “Coalition of the Willing” and provided a domestic target around which anti-war activists could mobilize, but their commitments to the war in Iraq (and accordingly, the degree to which they present a domestic target) have varied. Croatia joined the “Coalition of the Willing” but did not deploy troops in Iraq for military tasks, and rather offered other assistance there. Macedonia joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” supporting the war in Iraq, and maintained troops in Iraq. Turkey joined the “Coalition of the Willing” but only after initially opposing the war in Iraq, and its’ military deployment in Iraq has not always taken action in accordance with Coalition-led approval. Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey have all supported the intervention in Afghanistan, providing troops and other support there.

To conclude, strong domestic targets were present in some of the older EU states and all of the newly acceded CEE EU states, and weak domestic targets were present in some of the older EU states. In particular, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, and Sweden did not join the “Coalition of the Willing” and thus provided weaker domestic targets to mobilize against. The other old EU states, all the newly acceded CEE EU states, and the three candidate states all joined the “Coalition of the Willing” and thus provided strong domestic targets around which anti-war movements could mobilize insiders.
and outsiders. Additionally, most of the states sent troops to Afghanistan, with the exception of Austria, Cyprus, and Malta.

Although dynamics in older European Union members states’ anti-war movement mobilization levels in 2003 somewhat correspond to the presence or absence of domestic targets in a country, there are also several cases that do not fit such generalizations. Despite the presence of strong domestic targets, CEE states were far less mobilized against the war in Iraq than long-time EU member states, including states that opposed the war. Despite sharing such strong domestic targets, there is considerable variance in CEE protests left to account for.

Thus, I examine whether Tarrow’s domestic targets via “Coalition of the Willing” membership predict high mobilization levels and protest events that successfully mobilize rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders. Perhaps Tarrow’s argument works better in the West European context, and East European protests were rather different and certainly far less mobilized for other reasons stemming from movement-related grievances and divergences in civil society and democratization.

In the next sections, I explore several alternative factors that may impact the dynamics of transnational contention in an enlarging EU: grievances concerning U.S. unilateralism in Iraq; divergent histories of participation, protest, and civil society; and divergent paths of democratization. Finally, I will explore the dynamics of transnational contention in these states on February 15, 2003, the most globalized anti-war protest, in light of the propositions developed in the theoretical framework.
**Movement-Related Grievances Opposing U.S. Unilateralism in Iraq**

Across the older and newer member states of the EU, there were several grievances about the military intervention in Iraq that were shared by the general public that have the potential to catalyze transnational coalitions of insiders and outsiders and facilitate highly mobilized transnational protest events involving rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders. As is evident in Table 5.2, a sizeable majority of Europeans oppose a military intervention in Iraq that is unilateral, occurring preemptively and without a previous UN decision authorizing the use of force. This grievance about the military intervention is strongly perceived by Europeans in both the 15 states acceding to the EU up to 1995 (EU-15) as well as in the 12 states acceding in 2004 and 2007 and Turkey (CC-13). Many in both regions also feel that the militarization in Iraq is motivated by oil interests.

However, many Europeans in the EU-15 were more predisposed to permitting an intervention in Iraq under other scenarios, if weapons of mass destruction had been found by UN inspectors, if Iraq had threatened countries in the region, or if the UN Security Council had authorized an intervention. In the CC-13, there was much less support for a military intervention under other scenarios than in the EU-15. Thus, while there is a pan-European issue consensus on grievances concerning U.S. unilateralism in Iraq and the linkage of militarization and oil interests, there is also an issue divide on whether to oppose war in other circumstances.

The European issue consensus on grievances opposing U.S. unilateralism (an intervention without a previous UN decision authorizing the use of force) is thus the key issue, I argue, that facilitated transnational coalition formation and successful
mobilization of insiders and outsiders, cross-nationally. It is also these shared grievances opposing U.S. unilateralism and linking militarization to corporate and oil interests that I expect transnational protesters to share.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For each of the following propositions, tell me if you agree or not?</th>
<th>Agreeing</th>
<th>Disagreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>CC-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil is the main motivation for which the United States wants to intervene militarily in Iraq (6c)</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The United States should intervene militarily in Iraq even if the United Nations does not give its formal agreement (6g)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you consider it would be justified or not that our country participates in a military intervention in Iraq?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>CC-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the Iraqi regime does not cooperate with United Nations inspectors (7a)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the United Nations inspectors discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (7b)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If Iraq threatens other countries in the region (7c)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the United Nations Security Council decides on a military intervention in Iraq (7d)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the United States intervenes militarily in Iraq without a preliminary decision of the United Nations (7e)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.2:** Support of an Intervention in Iraq in the EU (Gallup Europe 2003)

Note: This table compares the 2003 percentages in the EU-15 (member states acceding through 1995) and in the CC-13 (Central and East European and Mediterranean member states acceding between 2004 and 2007 as well as candidate state Turkey).

Macro-level propositions based on this argument are listed below.

5.5. Demonstrators at successful transnational protest events are likely to perceive similar domestic and international grievances.

5.6. Issue consensus on movement-related grievances in public opinion, especially opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without UN involvement, increase the odds of
highly mobilized transnational anti-war protest events which involve broad rainbow coalitions and are able to draw in key insiders and remobilize key outsiders. Issue discord on movement-related grievances in public opinion increases the odds of protest events with less success in mobilization and in drawing in key insiders or outsiders.

5.7. Movement-related grievances about war and about globalization are more important than the presence of domestic and international targets in accounting for the dynamics in the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders. Grievances have the power to unite or to divide us, and whether they do depends on the issue consensus in the movement and in the public about them.

5.8. International grievances are more important than domestic grievances in accounting for dynamics in the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders. Similarly, internationalist targets trump domestic targets, in exerting influence on insiders and outsiders.

Two other causal factors may be important in accounting for variance in protest events within and between older and newer EU member states. States that have newly acceded to the EU are characterized by divergences in histories of participation, protest, and civil society and in paths of democratization. These factors and their implications for the emergence of transnational protest are explored next.

Divergent Histories of Participation, Protest, and Civil Society

The dynamics of transnational protest might also be accounted for by divergent histories of participation, protest, and civil society within the CEE states as well as overall, in comparison to the EU-15. First, the role of civil society and mass
protest mobilizations in the transitions to democracy of the CEE states, is explored, especially focusing on the relative strength of civil society in East-Central Europe, or the Czech Republic, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Next, the disparities in civil society and participation between the CEE states and the EU-15 are investigated. Additionally, the discussion of the limited Europeanization of civil society in the CEE states, started earlier in this chapter, is reinvigorated by looking at limited CEE involvement in European Social Forums that facilitated anti-war organizing, especially for the global protests on February 15, 2003.

These arguments are then used to develop several propositions about anti-war protests in the CEE states. The relative newness of civil society in the CEE states and its asymmetric ties to European civil society would thus likely limit the mobilization potential of the anti-war protests in CEE states compared to the EU-15. However, the strength of protest and of civil society, especially in the transitions to democracy of certain countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, might have facilitated the emergence of transnational protest against the war in Iraq, in these countries that is more mobilized, involves many civic associations, and brings together a rainbow coalition of insiders and outsiders of diverse interests and ideals that is more akin to protest events in the older EU member states.

There is significant cross-national variation in the role that protests played in the transitions to democracy in CEE countries. Protests in the fall of 1989 were met by some repression, but mobilization actually “increased dramatically” afterwards and was instrumental in creating pressure for negotiations (Karklins and Petersen 1993, 598). In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), protest mobilizations had
reached between several hundred thousand and one million in early November 1989 (Karklins and Petersen 1993, 608). Similarly, on November 20, 1989, protest mobilization in Czechoslovakia had built up to 200,000 and by November 25 it had reached half a million demonstrators (Karklins and Petersen 1993, 606). In contrast to largely peaceful mobilization in the former states, violent repression at Romanian anti-regime protests against some demonstrators and against regime-insiders viewed as turncoats, resulted in about 1,100 deaths (Hall 2000, 1088).

There may also have been some diffusion within Eastern Europe, a spillover or “demonstration effect.” Kramer suggests this effect was particularly salient in the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) where massively mobilized and nonviolent East German and Czechoslovak protests were viewed as prototypes for independence (2004, 46). Similarly, Francisco argues “the ossified regimes of Eastern Europe toppled like so many dominoes in the autumn of 1989,” noting that “one of the best single predictors of Czechoslovak protest is the amount of East German protest four weeks earlier,” and thus he too suggests diffusion (1993, 678).

Tismaneanu argues that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the former GDR (East-Central Europe) soon got much further along “on the road to an open society” than countries like Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia, due to pre-existing differences in civil society (1992, xii). Tismaneanu finds that the more successful democratization experience in East-Central Europe compared to the rest of Eastern Europe is accounted for by pre-existing differences in civil society, especially evident in the role of “Poland’s Solidarity, Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77, and Hungary’s Democratic Opposition” (1992, xii-xiii, xv). Likewise, Michnik suggests
that though Poland’s democratization involved the round table agreement negotiated “between the ruling communists and the anticommmunist opposition,” it had been foreshadowed by the strikes and mobilization of the Solidarity union under the leadership of Lech Walesa (2000, 83-4, 86-7). According to Palouš, Charter 77 had already existed in Czechoslovakia for over a decade, and it was instrumental in the relatively smooth, peaceful, bottom-up velvet revolution (2000, 105, 107, 110).

Tismaneanu therefore suggests that these pre-existing disparities in civil society have translated into post-communist democratization differences. Within East-Central Europe, countries “changed not only names but also habits and appeared to have converted to the values of social democracy,” but elsewhere, countries like Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria had a more difficult time breaking with the communist system and sometimes former communist parties governed (Tismaneanu 1992, 3). Tismaneanu argues, “Indeed, in countries like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, where the civil society had developed to a greater extent, the disintegration of the communist state proceeded in a smoother way than in Bulgaria and Romania, with their periodic flare-ups of violence …” (174).

Tismaneanu argues that where civil society has blossomed, anti-politics was able to become a legitimate force, changing the polity and introducing the politics of the opposition. He observes that in East-Central Europe, “the civil society was thus a first step in the reinvention of politics outside the existing matrix of power, that is, explicitly outside and implicitly against the communist party” (Tismaneanu 1992, xiv.z). In contrast, in other parts of Eastern Europe “civil society was underdeveloped and extremely fragile” (Tismaneanu 1992, 2). However, that is not
to say that a liberal society has always since flourished unchallenged in East-Central Europe, as “even there one can see the rise of anti-democratic and anti-Western forces” (Tismaneanu 1998, 5).

Scholars like Saxonberg do not dispute the strength of civil society in East-Central Europe, but suggests that in some of these countries, the impetus for change was elite-driven and not via popular mobilization, with elite-driven reforms preceding popular mobilization (2001). Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria are typically characterized as cases of “bargaining followed by mobilization” and Czechoslovakia and GDR as cases of “mobilization followed by bargaining” (Glenn 2003a, 105). Saxonberg contrasts Poland and Hungary’s “negotiated ‘institutional compromise’ with the opposition” to the GDR and Czechoslovakia’s “non-violent revolution” (2001, 4). In Poland, Solidarity had a long history of mobilizing and organized strikes in 1988, which helped to pressure the interior minister into proposing round table talks to get Lech Walesa, a Solidarity leader, to end the strikes, and these talks culminated in semi-free elections (Saxonberg 2001, 6). Saxonberg argues that Solidarity “was much weaker” than it had been in 1980-1981 when it organized mass mobilizations and membership peaked at 10 million, and that “the leaders of the regime did not decide to meet with the opposition because a revolutionary, mass-based social movement forced them to” but rather because “they actually wanted a negotiating partner” to help bear the accountability for necessary economic reforms (2001, 5-7). Similarly, Saxonberg argues that “like their Polish counterparts, the Hungarian rulers took the initiative for negotiations over an institutional
compromise,” and not the “small opposition groups formed during the late 1980s” nor strikes or demonstrations which were notably absent in Hungary (2001, 8).

Additionally, Saxonberg agrees with Tismaneanu that civil society played a primary role in initiating the revolutions in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. In the GDR, the “turning point” came during October and November 1989, with tens of thousands of protesters mobilizing in ever more expansive demonstrations demanding glasnost and a “mass exodus” with large groups of East Germans crossing the border (Saxonberg 2001, 10). In Czechoslovakia, the fall of the Berlin wall was met with a series of increasingly mobilized demonstrations and strikes, in part organized by dissidents in the Charter 77 network like Václav Havel, which played a key role in starting negotiations between Havel and Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, and which led to Adamec’s resignation (12-13). Saxonberg argues that the impetus for change in these countries stemmed from popular mobilization. For instance, “The general secretary of the Communist Party in each country resigned after hundreds of thousands of citizens had taken to the streets to protest against the regime” (13).

How might the strength of civil society in East-Central Europe, especially in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, have affected anti-war organizing in the global protest movement focused on the war in Iraq? Perhaps these countries are more likely to have successful protest events that involve many civic associations, and bring together a rainbow coalition of disparate interests and ideals more similar to the protests in the older EU states. Further, in Germany as well as in these countries, were pro-democracy activists of this former era re-mobilized? Perhaps protests in other CEE states were less mobilized and involved narrower coalitions.
Next, the lower levels of civic engagement and political participation in CEE states and the limited Europeanization of civil society in CEE states, especially in European Social Forums used to organize anti-war protests transnationally, is discussed. Perhaps, then, anti-war protest events in CEE states as a whole are likely to be less mobilized than in the EU-15, despite the strong targets present in CEE states that joined the “Coalition of the Willing”?

In the post-communist era tremendous disparities in voter turnout and civic engagement exist between the original EU member states and the newer CEE member states, but also within the CEE countries. In the new CEE member states of the EU, turnout in the European Parliamentary (EP) elections, for example, is “very low” (Bale 2005, 151). Similarly, civic engagement, especially the willingness to join associations, is higher in most of Western Europe than it is in either Eastern Europe or Southern Europe (Bale 2005, 195-6). In the post-communist era, protest events have been far more common in Poland and the GDR than in Hungary or Slovakia (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 553). Many of these protests were organized by “labor unions, political parties, interests groups, and social movements,” but, overall, social movements were much less active in organizing demonstrations in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 559). Perhaps these participatory disparities may also translate into CEE difficulties mobilizing anti-war protesters on the February 15, 2003 global protests against the Iraq war?

Glenn argues that in post-communist states, the boundaries between social movements and institutionalized politics have in many cases been blurred, with some coupling of insider and outsider activism occurring, as “successful challengers often
find themselves occupying positions of authority in the states that had excluded them until recently” (2003a, 116). Though acknowledging the institutional successes of movement actors in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Kamenitsa counters that in cases like the former GDR, the East German citizens’ movements which played a central role in bringing down the wall were soon politically marginalized (1998, 329-30).

Besides the pre- and post-democratization variance in the civil societies of CEE states, there are also important differences between the CEE states and the EU-15 in terms of how successfully they have integrated into European civil society networks, as aforementioned. Going further, the limited CEE involvement in European Social Forums is now discussed, with important implications for anti-war organizing. In particular, there has been very little participation by Eastern Europeans in European Social Forums, including the 2002 forum in Florence which was essential in planning the February 15, 2003 cross-national protests in Europe.\footnote{Kennedy, Dominic. 2003. Protests will reach every continent. \textit{Times Newspapers Limited}, February 14, 13.}

To conclude, the nascent Europeanization of civil society in the CEE states and disparities in civil society and participation between the older and newer EU states, would suggest that transnational protest against the Iraq war throughout this region would likely be substantially less-mobilized than in the EU-15, despite the presence of strong domestic targets around which activists were organizing. The stronger history of civil society in East-Central Europe, especially in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, in particular, might have facilitated the emergence of transnational protest against the war in Iraq that involves many civic associations, and brings together a rainbow coalition of disparate interests and ideals more similar to the protests in the older EU states. Further, in Germany as well as in these countries, pro-democracy activists may be re-mobilized. Elsewhere in the CEE states, I expect to see lower mobilization and fewer associations in narrow rainbow coalitions.

Macro-level propositions based on this argument are listed below.

5.9. Given the divergent history of participation, protest, and civil society in CEE states, CEE anti-war protests are likely to be less mobilized than those in the EU-15.

5.10. Given the stronger history of civil society in East-Central Europe, protests in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are more likely to be highly mobilized and to draw in broader rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders. In these countries as well as Germany, noteworthy pro-democracy outsiders may be remobilized.

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Divergent Paths of Democratization

The dynamics of transnational protest in an enlarging EU might also be accounted for by divergent democratization pathways taken by newly acceded states. States with more challenging democratization experiences may have mobilizational difficulties, and open the door to limited mobilization by groups who feel marginalized and use protests as a venue to build support for their own grievances, such as Russian-language minorities and Communists. Central-Eastern Europe, with both civil society advantages and economic and political advantages in their democratic transitions, may have an easier time mobilizing anti-war protest, but economic concerns particular to all the CEE states may make anti-war protesters more likely to focus grievances on the economic ties to the call for war in Iraq. Economic and political difficulties in transitions to democracy, especially outside Central-Eastern Europe, may have limited the mobilization potential of the population, which has other basic needs taking primacy.

A broad scope of post-socialist regimes have emerged which range tremendously in democratic quality (Bunce 2000, 124). In some states, the consolidation of parliamentary democracy has indeed made progress due to the creation of democratic institutions, the establishment of a market economy, and the emergence of civil society (Rupnik 2001, 327-8). Despite the relatively “smooth alternation in power—everywhere in Central Europe,” which involved the emergence of civil society and political and economic reforms, transitions elsewhere were quite different, with some even becoming “derailments” given rise to “illiberal democracies” (Rupnik 2000, 15-16; 2001, 328). According to Rupnik, Bulgaria,
Romania, and Slovakia are certainly in an intermediate position, compared to countries more successfully consolidating democracy (2000, 16). Difficulties in the transition process may limit the emergence of global anti-war protests in such states.

Linz and Stepan (1996) compare democratization experiences, emphasizing the qualitative and temporal lags in some post-communist transitions to democracy. Romania’s transition was delayed and violent, and “it was the only country where the successor regime committed the most egregious violations of human rights” and where “a former high Communist official was not only elected to the presidency in the first free election, but reelected” (344). In Russia, economic reform was prioritized over political reform, and elsewhere in many new states of the former USSR, the lack of democratic institutions has endangered democratization. Limited political reforms may limit the mobilization potential of anti-war organizing.

Even in some states that made political reforms, they were sometimes accompanied by policies marginalizing Russian speaking minorities. For instance, in the Baltic states, having “had the most substantial prior experience of democratic politics of any of the Soviet republics,” Estonian and Latvian Communist parties started splitting into competing factions, with reformists declaring sovereignty and loyalists opposing reform, and fielding competing candidates in new elections (402-3, 407). However, despite the pace of the transition, even here there were democratic problems when new exclusionary citizenship policies were applied to many Russian-speakers who had been born in the Baltics (409-10). Such exclusion might lead Russian nationalists to use anti-war protests as a forum to express their grievances and might limit protest mobilization.
Efforts by Communists to remobilize the masses and moderate support by the population for a reversion to authoritarianism may also have implications for anti-war organizing. Although there was much optimism in the revolutions of 1989, many post-communist regimes (including Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania) were characterized by the “return of former communists to government positions” (Ishiyama 1995, 147; Tismaneanu 2000, 157). Linz and Stepan accentuate Bulgaria’s Communist-controlled transition, emphasizing the qualitative lagging and Communist dominance in post-transition Bulgaria (1996, 295). Bulgarians’ support for a reversion to authoritarianism has also remained relatively high, whereas it is markedly lower in countries like Hungary and the Czech Republic (Linz and Stepan 1996, 343). Thus, Communists may use anti-war protests as a forum to build support for their political agenda and to appeal to a public less committed to democracy and might limit protest mobilization.

In some states, overlapping and persistent economic disadvantages may coincide with civil society disadvantages, making it difficult to mobilize the general population, which is pre-occupied with more basic material needs, and not so much broader ideals concerning the war in Iraq. As aforementioned, in the pre-communist era, there were already important disparities in economic development and economic reform in CEE states, and these disparities have been exacerbated with the paths of economic liberalization pursued by these states (Rupnik 2000, 17). There were huge gaps in the GDP per capita, with some economies highly agricultural (e.g., Albania) and others not (e.g., Slovenia) (Bunce 2000, 124). Czechoslovakia was ahead economically, and Hungary and Poland were ahead in terms of economic reform,
while Bulgaria and Romania chose “gradualism or simply the postponement of market reforms and privatization” (Rupnik 2000, 17). Accordingly, most of the foreign direct investment that has ensued has occurred in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, furthering the pre-existing economic disparities (Rupnik 2000, 18). Clearly, civil society and economic disparities tend to persist and overlap especially in East-Central Europe, and in states with persistent, overlapping economic and civil society disadvantages, the people may have more important basic needs that take priority and make it difficult to mobilize collective action about the war in Iraq.

That is not to say that economic and political reforms occurred uniformly within the advantaged states, nor to deny the many problems that accompanied economic liberalization and privatization and may also be prioritized by the public instead of concerns about the war in Iraq (Poznanski 2000, 229). Economic liberalization varied significantly, ranging from Poland’s “shock therapy” to the Czech Republic’s gradualist privatization (Glenn 2003b, 217). Poznanski describes the token successful economic transition in the GDR: “Of all the cases [of reform economies], East Germany is among the most radical—if not the most radical—with an instant opening of trade and a two-year complete privatization program that no other country has matched so far” (2000, 232). In Hungary, privatization has occurred later than in East Germany, more in the 1996-1998 time frame, and although “privatization has not yet come to a close, nonetheless foreigners already control seventy percent of Hungary’s industry and banking” (Poznanski 2000, 235). Poland, though having protectionist tendencies, had a “very bold and articulated reform program from the start, while Bulgaria has not, allowing instead for indecisiveness
and the implementation of confused reform measures” (Poznanski 2000, 217, 232). In the Czech Republic, “privatization has been much faster than in Poland” and involved a “voucher, free-of-charge distribution of assets to citizens” (Poznanski 2000, 235). It is noteworthy that Bulgaria and Romania have very high inflation, and the Czech Republic had a brief recession in 1998 (Kaminski 2000, 322-4). However, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have all improved their exports tremendously (Kaminski 2000, 325). The variation in economic reforms and problems may differentiate the mobilization potential of anti-war protest, and certainly may lead protesters to focus on the linkages between economic interests and the war in Iraq.

Economic problems as well as crime (e.g., cronyism, corruption, and international trafficking) persist throughout the region, but even concerning these issues disparities between East-Central Europe and the other regimes also remain, and may thus differentiate protests in these regions. Even the token transition in what is now Eastern Germany, continues “to have a dramatically lower standard of living than West Germany,” “despite impressive economic assistance,” “a shared language and history” (Glenn 2003b, 217). Likewise, Glenn acknowledges the problems of “corruption and cronyism that accompanied both the opportunities and the uncertainties of economic and political transformation” (217). Economic and political problems may be more important to citizens in the CEE states, though perhaps less in East-Central Europe, and may account for mobilizational difficulties.

Thus, difficulties in the pathways leading to democratization may have limited the breadth of opposition to the war in Iraq that was mobilized. Bulgaria, Romania,
and Slovakia’s challenging democratization experiences may make it difficult to mobilize anti-war protest, especially for civic groups oriented to Western liberal values, but it may open the door for mobilization opportunities for groups who feel marginalized. Exclusionary policies targeting Russian-language minorities, as in the Baltic region, may lead to protests being used as a venue to express nationalistic grievances, and it may limit protest mobilization. Further, Communist efforts to regain support, especially in countries such as Bulgaria with less support of democracy, may lead Communists to use protests as a venue to build support for their own causes, and it may limit protest mobilization. Overlapping civil society and economic advantages in East-Central Europe, may have facilitated mobilization in these states, and as a whole economic concerns in CEE states may have led grievances to draw out linkages between economic interests and the war in Iraq. Economic and political problems, especially outside East-Central Europe, may have made it difficult to mobilize citizens who have problems regarding basic needs that take priority. Macro-level propositions based on these arguments are listed below.

5.11. Given the divergences in the quality of democracy, anti-war protests are likely to be less mobilized in countries with democratization difficulties such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia.

5.12. Exclusionary policies toward Russian-language minority groups may lead Russian nationalists to use anti-war protests as a venue for nationalist grievances, especially in the Baltic states, and may have limited protest mobilization.

5.13. Communist efforts to regain popular support, especially in states such as Bulgaria where there is more support for a reversion to authoritarianism, may lead
Communists to use these anti-war protests as an opportunity to build support for their causes, and may have limited protest mobilization.

5.14. Overlapping civil society and economic advantages in East-Central Europe (especially the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) may have facilitated higher mobilization at anti-war protests.

5.15. Economic concerns throughout the CEE states may lead protesters who are mobilized to emphasize grievances that link together economic interests, especially neoliberal interests dominating Western democracies, and the war in Iraq.

5.16. Economic and political problems in CEE states, especially outside East-Central Europe, may have made it difficult to mobilize anti-war protesters when other unfulfilled basic needs take priority for the general population.

Anti-War Protests on February 15, 2003

The February 15, 2003 date of global protest was agreed on by European anti-war activists at the European Social Forum in Florence, Italy in November 2002. Protests occurred in all the EU member states, other than Estonia, which banned the protest due to security concerns relating to possibilities of nationalist violence, and Malta, which had no news coverage of protests. It is very important to note that transnational anti-war protest has indeed spread throughout the European Union, and may be evidence that civil society on this issue has become more Europeanized.

The detailed chronology of the protests in the European Union member states on February 15, 2003 is presented in Appendix 3, while in this chapter the focus is on

exploring the overall trends in the results in the EU-15 versus CEE states, in light of the propositions developed earlier. It is noteworthy that several tables in Appendix 4 summarize, in detail, cross-national trends in the protest chronology that are summarized more concisely by the tables in this chapter. Notes are available in the appendix concerning the cases on which too little information was available to categorize actors, targets, or grievances.

Table 5.3 condenses the trends in mobilization levels at the February 15, 2003 protests across the EU member states as they vary in their domestic targets, and Table 5.4 compares protest mobilization levels across EU member states, taking into account public opinion concerning key movement-related grievances about U.S. unilateralism in Iraq. In Table 5.5, actors at the February 15, 2003 protests are summarized, including noteworthy insiders and outsiders. Domestic targets and grievances at the February 15, 2003 protests are presented in Table 5.6, while international targets and grievances are presented in Table 5.7, and overall trends are recapped in Table 5.8.

Indeed, February 15, 2003 anti-war protests occurred in all of EU-15 states. Although there are many commonalities in the agents, targets, and grievances seen across these protests, there are tremendous variations in the mobilization levels across these protests which are not accounted for solely by “Coalition of the Willing” membership, as is evident in Table 5.3. Protesters turned out en masse in several countries that did not join the “Coalition of the Willing,” such as France (200,000) and Germany (500,000). Additionally, a relatively low turnout occurred in some countries that did join the “Coalition of the Willing,” such as Denmark (25,000).
However, the three largest protest mobilizations occurred in EU states that did share Tarrow’s domestic targets: Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, with roughly 2 million, 1.5 million, and 1 million protesters mobilized at each country’s largest protest on February 15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Strong domestic and international target?</th>
<th>Estimate of Largest Protest Mobilization on February 15, 2003?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovenia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, Germany</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Hundreds of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy, Spain, United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Millions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.3: Estimates of February 15 Protest Mobilizations**

Note: An Estonian protest was banned by authorities, and there was no coverage of protest in Malta.

Similarly, anti-war protests also occurred in all the CEE states, with the exception of Estonia. Protest in the EU-15 included tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of protesters, whereas in CEE states nearly all the protests were typically smaller.  

Nonetheless, small protests of several hundred or several thousand were mobilized everywhere, with the exception of Hungary, where a surprising 50,000 turned out to demonstrate. Despite the low level of mobilization, civic organizations

---

participating in the protests of many CEE states of the EU increasingly represent the smorgasbord of interests and ideals seen in the EU-15.

Protests also emerged in Cyprus and in all the candidate states to the EU, but no protest events emerged in Malta. It is also noteworthy that Cypriot protest successfully brought together Greek and Turkish Cypriots, despite many historic conflicts, and involved a very transnational set of activists. This protest targeted the government’s willingness to permit the usage of British bases on Cyprus for the war as well as the Bush administration in the United States, with grievances concerning Americans’ unilateralism and oil motivations. The protests in the candidate countries mobilized 10,000 in Zagreb, Croatia; undisclosed numbers of participants in Skopje, Macedonia; and 5,000 or thousands in Istanbul, Turkey. It is worth considering which factors might account for the emergence of transnational protest in these regions, but I have focused on the EU-15 and CEE member states in this chapter.

As evident in Table 5.4, it is also interesting to examine public opinion concerning key movement-related grievances about U.S. unilateralism in Iraq in relation to protest mobilization in these states. Although there may be some association between the level of public support of movement-related grievances and protest mobilization level, there are also other very important factors, especially being a CEE state, with a divergent history of civil society. Clearly, some of the variation in the protest mobilization levels in the EU-15 and CEE states may be accounted for by the levels of support of movement-related grievances and being a CEE states, and not just by the presence of domestic targets. Further, there may be an interaction between being a country that supported the war and support of movement-related
grievances. Eventually, if data is available across multiple dates of protests, for a larger sample of cases, and including other predictors, an ordered probit of protest mobilization may be feasible, to test the theoretical propositions systematically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coalition of the Willing?</th>
<th>% Considering it Unjustified that their country participates in a military intervention in Iraq if the United States intervenes militarily in Iraq without a preliminary decision of the United Nations (Gallup Europe 2003, q7e)</th>
<th>% Disagreeing that the United States should intervene militarily in Iraq even if the United Nations does not give its formal agreement (Gallup Europe 2003, q6g)</th>
<th>% Agreeing that oil is the main motivation for which the United States wants to intervene militarily in Iraq (Gallup Europe 2003, q6c)</th>
<th>Estimate of Largest Protest Mobilization on February 15, 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Austria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Belgium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Denmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Finland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 France</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>Hundreds of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Germany</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>Hundreds of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Greece</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Ireland</td>
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<td>81%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Italy</td>
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<td>81%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>Mills</td>
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<tr>
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<td>No</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
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<tr>
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<td>84%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Portugal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Spain</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>Millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Sweden</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>Millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Bulgaria</td>
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<td>81%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Czech Republic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>61%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>Thousands</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Estonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Hungary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>Tens of Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Latvia</td>
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<td>85%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>Hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Lithuania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>Hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Poland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Romania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Slovakia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>Hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>Thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Cyprus</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>Hundreds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Malta</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.4:** Targets, Grievances, and February 15 Protest Mobilizations
Table 5.5: Key Actors, Insiders, and Outsiders at the February 15 Protests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coalition of the Willing?</th>
<th>Leftist parties and/or political opposition?</th>
<th>Unions?</th>
<th>Broad array of civil society groups?</th>
<th>Protesters from other countries or from domestic diaspora groups?</th>
<th>Previous peace, pro-democracy, or anti-globalization movements remobilized?</th>
<th>Communist or nationalist overtones?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Austria***</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Belgium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Denmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Finland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 France</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Germany</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Greece</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Ireland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Italy</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Luxembourg***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Netherlands</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Portugal***</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Spain</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Sweden***</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Bulgaria</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Czech Republic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Estonia*</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Hungary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Latvia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Lithuania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Poland***</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Slovakia</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Slovenia</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Cyprus</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Malta**</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * = Protest banned by authorities. ** = No coverage of a protest. *** = Not enough information available in the coverage.

Table 5.5 illustrates that protests across the older EU states were extremely similar, in terms of the successful mobilization of insiders and outsiders at protest events. Protests in the EU-15 states typically involved platforms consisting of many different civic organizations, often including leftist parties, unions, church groups, human rights groups, environmental groups, peace groups, anti-globalization activists, and anarchists. Many of these protests attracted a multi-generational, multi-
national citizenry. Exiled Iraqis, Arabs, and Muslims were mobilized in many places, as were Americans in the diaspora, and transnational protesters turned up in many countries. Actors involved in protests were remarkably similar across the EU-15. Also of interest is the noteworthy re-mobilization of veteran outsiders or activists from the anti-war demonstrations at the European Social Forum; from previous peace movements (Vietnam; anti-nuclearization; and pro-democracy); from protests targeting Europeanization; and from protests targeting Le Pen. Another commonality across the EU-15 is the frequency with which insiders (representatives of political parties on the left or in the opposition as well as organized labor) were willing to make linkages with the anti-war movement.

Rainbow-like coalitions are beginning to emerge in the CEE states, although insiders seem to be less present in this region and less mention is made of the remobilization of outsider-oriented activists previously focused on peace, pro-democracy, or anti-globalization issues. Here again, targets do not distinguish the participation of insiders or outsiders, but the level of issue consensus on movement-related grievances may account for some of the variation, as well as the newness and asymmetric emergence of civil society in the CEE states. A noteworthy exception is the Hungarian protest that involved a variety of civic associations, mobilized by the Civilians for Peace. Much like the original EU member states, these Hungarian organizations include church groups, human rights groups, environmental groups, peace groups, and anti-globalization activists, and Iraqis were also represented here. Other countries in the CEE are beginning to have more rainbow-like coalitions albeit
in a much more limited fashion, and there are certainly transnational protesters or protesters from domestic diaspora groups at these protests, much like the EU-15.

Key insiders and outsiders seem to be less drawn to these CEE protests, and nationalist and Communist actors seem to dominate certain protests. In the CEE states overall, there was less mention of insiders (of parties or politicians on the left or in the opposition or of organized labor) attending the demonstrations, unlike the protests in the EU-15. Further, only protests in Hungary and Slovenia mentioned activists from previous peace, pro-democracy, and anti-globalization movements being remobilized. Nationalist and Communist concerns seem to distinguish several protests, all with low level protest mobilization. Noteworthy are the Communist overtones and nostalgia for Stalin at the Bulgarian demonstration and the isolated protest of the Communists in the Czech Republic. Also, the Estonian protest was cancelled due to concerns about the possibility Russian nationalists would seize on an opportunity for violence, and nationalists protested the war in Latvia and Slovakia.

As evident in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, protesters in the older EU member states usually had both domestic and international targets and grievances. However, the protests often seemed to give primacy to the international grievances and targets, over the domestic ones. First, the domestic targets and grievances which were similar cross-nationally, but which were not emphasized as much, are discussed. Next, the international targets and grievances, which were similar cross-nationally and which seemed to be emphasized at protest events, are addressed.

Table 5.6 illustrates that even the countries that did not join the “Coalition of the Willing” still sometimes had domestic targets (the executive and legislative
branches) and domestic grievances (opposing the usage of transport networks or airspace for the war and supporting a different stance on the war). However, in some such countries (especially Belgium, France, and Germany) protesters were clearly supporting the government’s standpoint at national protests on February 15, 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coalition of the Willing?</th>
<th>Key Domestic Target at Protest? (government, Prime Minister or President, executive branch, legislature)</th>
<th>Key Domestic Grievances at Protest?</th>
<th>Oppose usage of domestic transport networks for U.S. military transports (e.g., train lines, ports, or airports)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Austria ***</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Call for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</td>
<td>Supporting the domestic foreign policy stance supporting the war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Belgium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Denmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Finland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 France</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>6 Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Greece</td>
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<td>9 Italy</td>
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<td>10 Luxembourg</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>11 Netherlands</td>
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<td>12 Portugal ***</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1 Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Estonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Hungary</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>8 Romania ***</td>
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<td>10 Slovenia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Cyprus</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Malta **</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.6: Key Domestic Targets and Grievances at the February 15 Protests**

Note: *=Protest banned by authorities. **=No coverage of a protest. ***=Not enough information available in the coverage.
Conversely, other protest actions taken close to the global protest were more focused domestically on policymaking that supports the war in Iraq. For instance, a protest in the Belgian port of Antwerp, a few days prior to February 15, 2003, concerned military transports passing through Belgium and the usage of Belgian transport networks and ports for those military transports. In general, the domestic targets were not emphasized at the February 15, 2003 protests, and rather international targets, especially President Bush and the U.S. government, were focused on.

In the CEE member states of the EU it was clear that much like the EU-15, most protests also had strong domestic targets in the legislative or executive branch, and here too, domestic grievances often related to domestic policy-making concerning the war in Iraq. In Bulgaria, protesters were concerned about potential economic impacts of the war and called for the government’s resignation. The Hungarian organizers, who earlier had met with the Prime Minister to discuss ways to achieve peace, targeted all government representatives, calling for them to oppose the usage of Hungarian transport networks for the war and to have a public roll-call vote so citizens can hold legislators accountable for their decisions concerning the war. In several states, protesters opposed the domestic government’s policies on the war.

Table 5.7 shows tremendous similarities in international targets and grievances selected in the EU-15 and CEE states, which appear to have been prioritized. Many of the EU-15 states have remarkably similar international targets (especially the U.S. government and President Bush, but also the United Kingdom government and Prime Minister Blair). In CEE states, the U.S. government and Bush administration were also central targets. In the EU-15, key international grievances
Table 5.7: Key International Targets and Grievances at the February 15 Protests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coalition of the Willing?</th>
<th>Key International Targets at Protest? United States (government and President)</th>
<th>United Kingdom (government and Prime Minister)</th>
<th>Key International Grievances at Protest? Oppose war in Iraq</th>
<th>Oppose U.S. unilateralism in Iraq that does not involve the international community</th>
<th>Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and the U.S. pursuit of hegemony and imperialism</th>
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Note: * = Protest banned by authorities. ** = No coverage of a protest. *** = Not enough information available in the coverage.

included opposing the war in Iraq; opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without the United Nations and the disregard for the legitimacy-conferring power of the United Nations; opposing the linkage between the war and oil and corporate interests; and opposing war that aims to promote U.S. hegemony and imperialism. International
grievances that the protesters in the CEE states attended to were very similar to those of protesters in the older EU states: calling on the United States to shift their standpoint on the war in Iraq; supporting a peaceful resolution to the conflict via the United Nations and in accordance with international law; opposing a war they perceive as being instigated for the benefit of oil interests and corporate interests; and opposing the linkage between the war and the U.S. pursuit of hegemony.

Thus, transnational protest against the war in Iraq has indeed spread throughout the European Union during the era of enlargement, and the protests in many of the newly acceded CEE countries have remarkable similarities in the agents involved, domestic targets and grievances, and international targets and grievances, when compared to the protests in the EU-15. However, there are important differences concerning mobilization levels, linkages to insiders and outsiders, and the central role of Communism and nationalism in some protest events. Relatively high protest mobilization and success in uniting insiders and outsiders in rainbow coalitions at protest events in the EU-15, compared to the CEE states, seems to suggest the centripetal influences of movement-related grievances and of a longer history of participation, protest, and civil society in the EU-15 states and the reduced explanatory power of targets in accounting for these results. Thus, in the EU-15, parties of the opposition and on the left have had more opportunities to learn about movement-related grievances in their interactions with protesters and with organizers and thus may shift their platforms to target more constituents, and protesters have learned about insider and outsider tactics they can leverage and what insider allies that they might vote for if they choose to couple protesting and voting.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Causal Factor</th>
<th>Expected Pattern in Outcomes Observed</th>
<th>Confirmed?</th>
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<td>Domestic and International Targets</td>
<td>Perceptions of Similar Domestic and International Targets at Protests</td>
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<td>Primacy of Domestic over International Targets</td>
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<td>Primacy of Grievances over Targets</td>
<td>Successful Mobilization and Insiders and Outsiders at Protests</td>
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<td>5.8</td>
<td>Primacy of International over Domestic (in Grievances and in Targets)</td>
<td>Successful Mobilization and Insiders and Outsiders at Protests</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>Longer History of Participation, Protest, and Civil society and more Europeanized Civil Society in the EU-15 compared to the CEE</td>
<td>Successful Mobilization</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>5.10</td>
<td>Stronger Civil Society in East-Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) over the rest of the CEE</td>
<td>Successful Mobilization and Insiders and Outsiders at Protests</td>
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<td>5.11</td>
<td>Democratization Difficulties in Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia</td>
<td>Difficult Mobilization</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>5.12</td>
<td>Exclusionary Policies Toward Russian Language Minorities, Especially in the Baltic States</td>
<td>Russian Nationalists use Protests as a Venue and Difficult Mobilization</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>5.13</td>
<td>Communist Efforts to Regain Support, Especially in States with More Support for a Reversion to Authoritarianism, such as Bulgaria</td>
<td>Communists use Protests as a Venue and Difficult Mobilization</td>
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<td>5.14</td>
<td>East-Central European Overlap in Civil Society and in Economic Advantages</td>
<td>Successful Mobilization</td>
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<td>5.15</td>
<td>Economic Concerns in the CEE</td>
<td>Focus on Linking Economic Interests, Especially Neoliberal Interests of Western Democracies, and the War in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>Economic and Political Problems in the CEE outside East-Central Europe</td>
<td>Difficult Mobilization</td>
<td>Y</td>
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Table 5.8: Trends in the Transnational February 15 Protest Events in the EU
As is summarized in Table 5.8, the results confirm most of the propositions derived in the theoretical framework. Rather, most of the propositions find supportive evidence or mixed supportive evidence. Although Tarrow’s targets account for some variance in transnational anti-war protests in the EU-15, it is clear that other factors such as movement-related grievances and divergent histories of civil society and democratization may also account for variation between the EU-15 and the CEE states, disconfirming proposition 5.3. The results call into question the primacy of domestic over international causal factors, offering some disconfirmation of proposition 5.4.

The most striking similarities between the protests throughout the EU are in their shared targets and grievances, both domestically and internationally. Certainly, similar perceptions of domestic and international targets as well as similar domestic and international grievances are evident at protest events across the EU, offering confirmatory evidence of propositions 5.1 and 5.5. Both thus appear to be important factors in successful transnational protests. However, grievances may outperform targets in accounting for variance between the CEE states and the EU-15.

While the presence of domestic targets and the degree of movement-related grievances in public opinion both appear to account for some of the variation in protest mobilization, neither argument necessarily differentiates the presence of insiders and outsiders at protest events, which is generally far higher across the EU-15 than it is in the CEE states, confirming propositions 5.2 and 5.6. The presence of movement-related grievances seems to do a better job of accounting for protest mobilization across the EU overall than do the presence of domestic targets, which
only account for mobilization levels of some states within the EU-15, offering some confirmation of proposition 5.7. Further, international targets such as the United States government and President Bush and international grievances such as the shared opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq and to the linkages being made between the war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests, appear to have primacy, or certainly equal importance compared to domestic targets and grievances, confirming proposition 5.8.

Although Tarrow correctly predicts the tremendous mobilizations in Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” he does not correctly predict the low turnout at the CEE protests and in Denmark nor the high turnouts in France and Germany, offering some disconfirmatory evidence of proposition 5.2. Nor do protests lacking a domestic target in the EU-15 seem to vary in their ability to draw in insiders and outsiders, offering further disconfirmatory evidence of proposition 5.2. Mobilization in the CEE states is far lower than mobilization in the older EU states, and even lower than Western European states that lacked a strong domestic target. Thus, Tarrow’s domestic targets via “Coalition of the Willing” membership do not account for some of the key dynamics in transnational mobilization in CEE versus EU-15 states.

Some of the variance in protest mobilization, including in the CEE states, appears to be captured by movement-related grievances and some of it seems to be captured by the longer history of participation, protest, and civil society and the more Europeanized civil society in the EU-15 compared to the CEE states, offering some confirmation of propositions 5.6 and 5.9. Clearly, when there is more issue consensus in the public about movement-related grievances, mobilization seems to be
higher, and in the less-mobilized CEE states, there seems to be less support for these grievances, so this argument accounts for variation in the CEE relative to the EU-15, offering some support of proposition 5.6. Overall, the newness of civil society and its asymmetric ties with civil society in Europe and the European Social Forum, may have limited mobilization in CEE states, supporting proposition 5.9.

However, there are indications of changes in CEE states. Hungary’s 50,000 strong demonstration was far more mobilized than protests elsewhere in the newly acceded CEE states, although it is noteworthy that protest mobilization was relatively low elsewhere in East-Central Europe, in the Czech Republic and Poland, offering some confirmation of propositions 5.10 and 5.14. These three countries shared a stronger history of participation, protest, and civil society. One factor that may account for this difference are Gallup Europe (2003) poll results which suggest Hungarians were more opposed to the war than Czechs and Poles, offering additional support of proposition 5.6.

The nascent rainbow coalitions of CEE protesters, especially in Hungary, affirm that a vibrant civil society, ironically one quite similar to the public sphere in the original EU states, is targeting the Iraq war, offering some support of propositions 5.10 and 5.14. However, the lack of linkages between CEE peace movements and politicians and parties of the opposition as well as organized labor, and difficulties re-mobilizing outsiders involved in historic peace and global justice movements, suggest that historic disparities in civil society, protest, and participation in the CEE states have limited mobilization and especially limited insider-outsider ties, confirming proposition 5.10.
Democratization difficulties, exclusionary practices toward Russian-language minorities, Communist efforts to appeal to anti-regime sentiments, economic concerns in CEE states, and economic and political difficulties outside of East-Central Europe may play a role, as evident in the communist and nationalist overtones and low-level mobilization in countries like Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia; the lack of coverage of protest in Romania; and in the emphasis on the linkages between oil and the war in Iraq. This evidence offers some confirmation of propositions 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, 5.15, and 5.16.

Both Tarrow’s domestic and international targets as well as similarities in domestic and international grievances, especially grievances concerning U.S. unilateralism, seem to be factors that account for the similarities in the transnational anti-war protest that is clearly emerging in the European Union. However, in accounting for the dynamics in mobilization of insiders and outsiders across the EU, Tarrow’s domestic and international political opportunities lack some explanatory power. Rather, the issue consensus on movement-related grievances, especially opposing U.S. unilateralism, and the asymmetric development of civil society in the CEE states vis-à-vis the EU-15 seem to account for the lower protest mobilization and lower participation of insiders and outsiders in the CEE states compared to the EU-15. Further, the strength of civil society in the East-Central European states and democratization difficulties elsewhere seem to distinguish some anti-war protests.

To conclude, movement related grievances and a longer history of civil society, protest, and participation may exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders at transnational protest events, facilitating protest mobilization and rainbow
coalitions drawing in insiders and outsiders. Targets are not as important in accounting for the differences in protest events between the CEE states and the EU-15. Highly mobilized protests joining rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders in the EU-15 teach parties of the opposition or the left about protesters’ grievances and teach protesters about the possibilities to couple their outsider activism with insider activism, helping re-mobilize activists as voters in subsequent elections.

It should also not be overlooked that transnational protest has clearly emerged in the enlarging European Union, and that these CEE protests are in many ways very similar to the protests in older EU states, especially in their targets and grievances, both domestically and internationally. These similarities challenge the assumptions of earlier research that suggested only very limited, domestically differentiated transnational protest and looked largely within Western Europe for such transnationalism, and therefore suggest the importance of exploring more data on transnational protests in this new context.
Chapter 6: Micro-level: Demonstrators’ Coupling of Protesting and Voting

Since the onset of Spain’s democratization, there have been two alternations of power, first in 1996 when the conservative Partido Popular (PP) took the reins from the long-ruling social-democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), and more recently in 2004, when PSOE regained power via unprecedented electoral mobilization, following massive demonstrations. In the interim, PP electoral success in 2000 boosted government confidence, and the government joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” even though Spaniards were extremely opposed to unilateral military intervention in Iraq without formal United Nations agreement or Iraqi aggression violating international law. The issue consensus on this opposition to U.S. unilateralism may have exerted a centripetal force on insiders and outsiders in the anti-war movement, permitting successful collaboration in protest coalitions and at protest events and the coupling of insider activism and outsider activism.

On February 15, 2003, 2-3 million people (5.0-7.5% of the Spanish population) demonstrated against the anticipated war in Iraq. Opposition parties in Spain had a very direct, cooperative relationship with this historic anti-war movement. Included amongst organizers of the Spanish demonstrations was PSOE, the leading opposition party, as well as the Communist-led Izquierda Unida (IU) coalition. Thus, insiders from opportunistic parties of the opposition and of the left were given an opportunity to use the protest events to learn about movement-related
grievances they could use to mobilize more constituents, and protesters learned about party allies they could reward if they decided to couple their protesting with voting.

After the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, popular displeasure about the war grew into outrage when the government persisted in alleging Basque nationalist culpability despite evidence suggesting Al-Qaeda involvement. Ramoneda describes anti-war demonstrations’ evolution into record-breaking protest mobilizations and unprecedented voter turnout, culminating in PSOE’s victory. Electoral turnout increased dramatically, from 68.7% in the 2000 Congress of Deputies’ elections to 75.7% in 2004. PSOE turnout increased exponentially, by about 3,107,000 votes, while PP and IU turnout decreased by 686,000 and 135,000 votes, respectively.

Many global protesters were mobilized, and so too were many additional voters. Ramoneda suggests Spaniards’ participatory choices were most strongly influenced by opposition to the war although other salient factors included the government’s response to the train bombings and a domestic oil spill. As a result of these competing influences, PSOE received a tremendous amount of non-traditional support and regained control of the government, changing the government’s policy on Iraq but maintaining involvement in Afghanistan. Perhaps then, the dramatic electoral outcome reveals that issue consensus in the public on opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq drove protesters in Spain’s massive demonstrations to couple or pair their participation in the global anti-war movement with voting in the record-breaking general election.

25 Ibid.
Although the Spanish election saw a huge change in pre- and post-war voter turnout which coincided with massive demonstrations that were a part of the global anti-war movement, neither protest mobilization nor voter mobilization changed as much in the United Kingdom or in the Netherlands, countries which also joined the “Coalition of the Willing.” In both countries, protests were less mobilized, and despite alliances with some parties of the opposition, the ties forged with the main opposition parties in both countries were either nonexistent or indirect and far less substantive electoral change occurred. Between 2001 and 2005 in the United Kingdom, the anti-war Liberal Democrats gained roughly 1,168,000 votes and the pro-war Conservative Party gained about 415,000 votes, while the governing pro-war Labour Party lost roughly 1,177,000 votes, but the overall results still enabled the Labour Party to govern. In the Netherlands, the biggest change in parties’ turnout between 2002 and 2003 was observed between the indirectly anti-war, social-democratic, Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.) or Labor Party with a gain of roughly 1,195,000 votes and the pro-intervention Lijst Pim Fortuyn, a right-wing populist party with a loss of about 1,065,000 votes, but P.v.d.A. was not invited to join the governing coalition, despite extensive negotiations in early 2003.

In sum, protesting and voting do not seem to be paired together as strongly in either the Netherlands or the United Kingdom. Like Spain, both these countries shared a common domestic target around which voters and protesters could mobilize. However, unlike in Spain, the public here was more supportive of a military intervention in Iraq in a variety of circumstances, especially in the United Kingdom. In Spain, the issue consensus in the public on opposing U.S. unilateralism was
certainly higher than it was in the United Kingdom, and may have made coupling
protesting and voting appear more likely to be efficacious as a tactic. Further, in the
Spanish party-system context, protesters may have expected the odds of PSOE
electoral success, and thus the efficacy of insider activism in producing a change in
the government, to be higher. I return to this question at the end of the chapter.

Are “Coalition of the Willing” member-states’ citizens who disagree with
U.S. unilateralism turning toward voting as well as global protesting? The dynamics
in voting behavior or in protest behavior have previously been examined, but as yet
unexplored is their interaction, the coupling and decoupling of protesting and voting.
In this chapter, a multinomial logistic regression is used to analyze evidence from
cross-national surveys collected at global protests against war and against
globalization during 2003-2004. The methodology of these surveys was already
presented in Chapter 3. This chapter explores whether targets in the domestic and
international political opportunity structure or support of movement-related
grievances account for linkages between global protesting and voting.

Various scholars have suggested that protesting and voting are increasingly
being coupled. Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst (2005) have theorized that the well-
being of liberal democracies has provided a context in which protest and voting are
increasingly combined. Dahl details the stellar records of these polyarchical
democracies in their provision of both procedural requirements of electoral
democracy and social and political rights, providing a climate in which certain
contentious activities may become coupled with more conventional participatory
activities (1998, 90). The well-being of democracy may facilitate the coupling of
global protests and local votes, especially, Tarrow suggests, when domestic or international targets help insider and outsider activists cooperate tactically (2005).

However, others have suggested that protesting and voting are increasingly being decoupled, with protest being used as a substitute for voting. Some argue that such decoupling is occurring in advanced industrialized democracies because they face threats to state sovereignty or to civil society’s channels of access. These obstacles are often linked to grievances about globalization and the hegemonic aspirations of the United States. Grievances concerning global democratic deficits in liberal democracies may lead individuals to express their aversion to the status quo by replacing voting with protest behavior. According to Brown’s (2003) critique of liberal democracies, their neoliberal governmentality and imperial quest for hegemony, especially after September 11, 2001, may drive decoupling.

Another group of scholars has emphasized a new participatory trend in industrialized democracies, as engaging in multiple types of global protest is increasingly popular and global protest movements are tied together. Tarrow (2005) discusses the linkages between global justice and anti-war activism, and the shift from anti-globalization protesting to anti-war protesting that occurred in some countries. Globalized social movements often see the interconnectedness of their grievances and attempt to collaborate, mobilizing participants for protest events in other domains (Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). Further, Goldstone acknowledges that some are specializing in outsider activity like protesting, although he also asserts that most are pairing insider and outsider activism (2003, 9).
The dependent variable in this chapter thus gauges the interaction of two factors: whether protesters voted in a recent election and whether they attended multiple types of global protest (anti-war and anti-globalization), with four possible outcomes. The four categories of the dependent variable are listed below:

- **Single protest voting:** A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (voting and one type of global protest).

- **Multiple protest voting:** A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (voting and two types of global protest).

- **Single protest non-voting:** A respondent who has not voted in a recent election but has participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (non-voting and one type of global protest).

- **Multiple protest non-voting:** A respondent who has not voted in a recent election but has participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (non-voting and two types of global protest).

Comparing the predicted probabilities of voting outcomes (single protest voting and multiple protest voting) to non-voting outcomes (single protest non-voting and multiple protest non-voting) helps us assess the coupling and decoupling of protesting and voting, respectively. Protesters are not only faced with the choice to pair protesting and voting, but also with a choice to extend their involvement in global protest from one domain (just anti-war or just anti-globalization) to both domains (both anti-war and anti-globalization protest). Comparing the predicted
probabilities of the multiple protest outcomes (multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting) to single protest outcomes (single protest voting and single protest non-voting) enables us to compare the degree to which protesters are extending involvement from single to multiple types of global protest.

In this chapter, I first present key arguments about the coupling of protesting and voting. Next, I explore arguments about the decoupling of protesting and voting and the extension of global protest involvement. Next, theoretical explanations accounting for individuals’ participatory choices in deciding whether or not to pair global protesting and voting and whether to extend global protest involvement are explored. These explanations are used to derive rival hypotheses focused on domestic and international targets as well as support of movement-related values. The findings are presented in the results section and are interpreted in the conclusion.

While the presence of domestic targets (“Coalition of the Willing” membership) that Tarrow points to are indeed important in accounting for the coupling of protesting and voting, several other factors are also important in accounting for protesters’ participatory choices. The most important finding relates to how issue consensus on movement-related grievances exerts centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders and creates political opportunities for the coupling of protesting and voting. More specifically, opposing U.S. unilateral intervention in Iraq (on which much overlapping consensus has been reached in the public and in the anti-war movement) facilitates the coupling of protesting and voting. Also, opposing U.S. unilateralism when a country has already taking a stance supporting the “Coalition of the Willing,” increases the likelihood of decoupling protesting and voting.
In contrast, opposition to military intervention in other scenarios and all-encompassing opposition to globalization (on which there has been much more disagreement within movements and in the general population) seems to exert a centrifugal force on insider and outsider activism, increasing the likelihood of extending protest activity to multiple social movements, and not the pairing of protesting and voting. Supporting movement-related grievances, therefore, does not turn protesters away from voting per se. Supporting the Palestinians more (on which there is a mix of consensus and discord within movements, the population, and the polity) and opposing U.S. unilateralism when an internationalist target is present, increase the likelihood of pairing voting with participation in multiple global protests.

In sum, participatory opportunities for pairing global protesting and voting are created when issue consensus on movement-related grievances has been reached within movements and the general public, leading individuals to expect both protesting and voting to be effective tactics and to couple the two. Likewise, on movement-related grievances on which there is issue discord within movements and the public, support of these grievances can create participatory opportunities for increasing global protest activity, because it appears that only global protesting will be an effective tactic on these issues in such contexts. However, support of these grievances does not necessarily exact a cost in terms of voting engagement because other issues that participants support are issues on which voting is expected to be an effective tactic. Finally, on movement-related grievances on which there is a mixture of consensus or discord, both voting and global protesting are expected to be effective, creating participatory opportunities for multiple protest voting.
**Coupling Protesting and Voting**

Is the influx of new PSOE voters in 2004 indicative of a trend in which people are increasingly pairing voting with protesting? In contentious politics, Meyer and Tarrow argue that the social movement may be “moving from the edges of political legitimacy” to “become something more akin to interest groups and political parties” occurring “within the realm of conventional politics” (1998, 4). As social movements become institutionalized and professionalized, movement activists often are equally adept at using both institutionalized repertoires of contention and noninstitutional tactics (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 5).

Similarly, Goldstone (2003) suggests that scholars attend to the dynamic, reciprocal relations between political parties and social movements and between protest behavior and routine political behavior like voting. He argues that “social movements constitute an essential element of normal politics in modern societies, and that there is only a fuzzy and permeable boundary between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics” (Goldstone 2003, 2). Goldstone focuses on the “ongoing symbiosis” between “the triangle of movements, parties, and constituencies” which can open up “with the advance of democratization” and which can influence movement outcomes as well as electoral outcomes (2003, 2, 10, 19, 23). He argues that protest and conventional participation are not dichotomous but lie along a “continuum of alignment and influence” (Goldstone 2003, 9). Goldstone argues protest is “both an alternative and a valuable supplement” to conventional political action (2003, 9-10). He suggests that like the PSOE, “long-established political parties welcome movement support and often rely specifically on their association
with social movements in order to win elections” (Goldstone 2003, 4). Protest has thus become mainstreamed in our “social movement society,” and we should expect protesters' participation in conventional politics via voting to be linked to their engagement in global protest (Meyer and Tarrow 1998).

In political behavior, Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst argue that the new popularity of protest and its conventionalized usage by mainstream citizens is an indicator of the quality of democracy, suggesting a “far healthier state of democracy” (2005, 203). Similarly, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady observe that protesters are highly engaged conventionally: “The vast majority of [protesters] (93 percent) engage in some other activity beyond voting” (1995, 66). Bean also argues that “conventional participation is quite closely related to low-level protest but only distantly related to radical protest” (1991, 272). Some social movement organizations are membership-driven, and according to Rosenstone and Hansen, such associational involvement is key in driving political engagement (2003, 84).

Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst (2005) find evidence suggesting that protest is indeed an increasingly mainstream political activity, used alongside many conventional tactics to effect political change, and argue that Belgian protesters are not radicals with militant, anti-systemic grievances. Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst conclude that the level of global protest indicates the health of representative democracy in Belgium, as “a growing channel of political expression used for the legitimate articulation of demands in a democratic state and a form of activism that has evolved and expanded over the years to supplement existing organizations in
civic society” (203). The following proposition about the dependent variable is thus put forth:

6.1. Single protest voting and multiple protest voting are increasingly common, while single protest non-voting and multiple protest non-voting are on the decline. According to this approach, increases in the coupling or pairing of protesting and voting are a product of the well-being of democracy. Such social movement societies characterized by coupling are healthy and positive developments.

Decoupling Protesting and Voting or Expansion to Multiple Global Protests

Unlike Spaniards, British and Dutch citizens seemed more reluctant to couple global protesting with voting. Similar evidence has led other scholars to ask whether protest is instead replacing conventional forms of participation like voting, or even whether individuals are beginning to specialize in multiple forms of global protest. This line of research finds that much of the recent decline in voting participation and correspondent increase in activities such as protest is explained by changes in attitudes toward the state and toward political participation, such as reduced party identification and lowered perceptions of government responsiveness.

Declining voter turnout in Western Europe and North America has been a concern to many scholars (Blais, Gidengil, Nevitte, and Nadeau 2004; Mackie 1995; Putnam 2000). Although some optimists (Inglehart 1997; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) interpret concurrent increases in unconventional participation as reassuring or have questioned just how integral routine participation is to the well-being of democracy, others are more pessimistic about the well-being of democracy and have suggested that it is leading to a broad substitution of conventional activities
such as voting by less conventional ones such as protesting. Dealignment theorists attribute the downturn of insider activism to the declining importance of traditional cleavages like class, religion, and region in structuring political behavior and their role in accounting for changes in voter apathy (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Pulzer 1987, 378; Van Deth and Elff 2004, 491). Further, Dalton (2000) and Pulzer (1987) observed declines in partisanship with dealignment, as voters are less willing to identify or engage with parties.

The decline of political parties may drive citizens to look to non-traditional actors in civil society and social movements, as alternate sources of information and providers of interest articulation. Kitschelt argues that in the era of post-industrial capitalism, parties are facing obstacles in representing old-time cleavages whose preferences have changed and this has led to difficulties in mobilizing their electoral constituencies (2000, 164). Political parties have a difficult time responding to the added complexities and difficulties of mobilizing voters now that traditional cleavages are less important, and their adaptive focus on appealing to the average voter has facilitated a depolarization of the party system. As voters turn away from parties and traditional interest groups, they may turn toward social movements and the media to articulate their interests and provide them with information (Ezrow 2005). Dalton (2000) argues that voters’ education, free time, and information access has increased, so that dealigning voters are more likely to look for independent, non-party sources of political information.

Some scholars of political behavior have argued that the reduced popularity of institutionalized politics in postindustrial societies has driven a more generalized
substitution of conventional participation by unconventional participation, as citizens rely on certain types of civil society and social movements instead of political parties and traditional interest groups. Inglehart observes decreased respect for political authority in postmodern societies, as well as increases in individuals' interest in politics and their participation in “more active and issue-specific forms of mass participation” (e.g., signing of petitions; boycotting; demonstrating) (1997, 10, 14, 43, 308). Likewise, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady notice an increase in “public cynicism toward the major institutions of American life, especially government,” accompanied by declining voter turnout and an intensification in other forms of voluntary political participation (1995, 25, 26).

Along similar lines, Tarrow (2005) observes the linkages between anti-globalization protest and anti-war protest and Goldstone (2003) observes that some are becoming specialized in outsider activism. Likewise, Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave observe unconventional specialization amongst radicals (2004). In their research, prior unconventional participation (attending previous demonstrations abroad and supporting radical movement strategies such as not opposing violence and taking action besides talking) predicts being a more transnational protester (Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave 2004). These findings suggest that protest might supplant conventional participation in liberal democracies. The following propositions about the dependent variable are thus put forth:

6.2. Single protest non-voting and multiple protest non-voting are increasingly common, while single protest voting and multiple protest voting are on the decline. These trends toward the decoupling of protesting and voting are viewed as a product
of dealignment, as dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy, depolarization, increased distrust of authority increase the popularity of action in the streets. Decoupling is leading us toward protest in lieu of conventional participation, and is taken by some as a sign of malignance in today’s industrialized democracies.

6.3. Multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting are increasingly common, while single protest voting and single protest non-voting are on the decline. Trends toward the expansion of multiple global protests are a product of the linkages between global protest movements and the increased appeal of global protesting.

*Domestic and International Targets*

Sidney Tarrow (2005) suggests that the targets presented in the domestic and international political opportunity structure account for dynamics in the pairing of insider activism such as lobbying and voting with outsider activism such as transnational protesting, more than movement-related grievances do. According to Tarrow (2005), targets in the international and domestic political opportunity space provide structured opportunities for relations between outsiders and insiders seeking to influence a common target, leading to insider-outsider cooperation and connections between insider activism and outsider activism. In turning to global and internationalist targets, Tarrow does not forego the explanatory power of domestic and local influences on contention. Rather, he suggests the continued primacy of targets in the domestic political opportunity structure in accounting for the dynamics of linkages between insider and outsider activism (Imig 2004; Imig and Tarrow 2000, 2001).
According to Tarrow, the presence of domestic and international targets exerts centripetal forces on the participatory versus oppositional roles of NGO insiders and social movement outsiders, and facilitate the coupling of insider activism and outsider activism (2005, 29). Tarrow suggests that the line between insider and outsider activism is blurring, and that insider-outsider relations are increasingly cooperative (29, 47, 48, 211). Since much of Tarrow’s evidence centers on transnational activism of the social movement variety, Tarrow may be very likely to join many on the outside in observing such coupling of insider and outsider tactics. Conversely, there is also noteworthy fragmentation, tactical specialization, and conflict in both the anti-globalization and anti-war movements, which needs to be accounted for. Although Tarrow expects domestic and internationalist targets to lead to the generalized coupling of insider and outsider activism, he also suggests that in the long run, this interaction may drive insiders to become outsiders, supplanting insider activism with outsider activism or even specializing in global protest (45).

Indeed, the most important meetings of international institutions are periodically targeted for transnational protest as well as insider activities like lobbying. Similarly, in Western Europe, high anti-war protest mobilization characterized countries with both domestic and internationalist targets by joining the “Coalition of the Willing.” Moreover, the aforementioned Spanish case, which coupled massive demonstrations and voter mobilization, also offers confirmatory evidence that coupling may have occurred.

On the other hand, disconfirmatory evidence of Tarrow’s internationalism is provided by the lower rate at which protesting and voting seem to have been paired in
“Coalition of the Willing” countries like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which shared similar targets but had a public more supportive of intervention in Iraq in a variety of circumstances. Moreover, the key exception is the United States, which had an anti-war movement rife with conflict, a small proportion of the population mobilized into protest, and relatively low-level post-war electoral change, despite having an important domestic target.

As aforementioned, two of the most important U.S. coalitions against the war, UFPJ and ANSWER, had a divisive relationship. While ANSWER is more “radical,” grouping many grievances together under an anti-imperialism frame opposing U.S. hegemony and taking an approach that is not as tenable for groups such as organized labor or mainstream clergy, the more “mainstream” UFPJ, in contrast, tries to draw in such moderate bases of popular support which can also easily be mobilized in elections. Issue consensus or discord concerning movement-related grievances about global democratic deficits concerning the war in Iraq and concerning globalization may account for the coupling or decoupling of protesting and voting within the U.S. anti-war movement.

In explaining the historic February 15, 2003 global anti-war protests which mobilized 16 million demonstrators, Tarrow focuses on domestic targets created by countries joining the “Coalition of the Willing” in addition to the internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government (2005, 15). Though he acknowledges that targets in international institutions were lacking since the European Union and United Nations had taken oppositional stances on the war in Iraq, Tarrow argues that the common presence of domestic targets (domestic government positions supporting
the war and policymaking relevant to the war) were key in eliciting global collective action and insider-outsider cooperation (17). Moreover, Tarrow argues that “the resurgent militarism of a hegemonic state” was an important “internationalist” target shared by demonstrators transnationally during the February 15, 2003 protests (16).

I suggest that Tarrow is in fact hinting to movement-related grievances concerning global democratic deficits and U.S. hegemony (i.e., not international institutions or targets) which sometimes are characterized by issue discord between insiders and outsiders in the global anti-war movement: whether military intervention should be opposed in all cases or just without a mandate from the United Nations and whether military intervention by a hegemon should be framed as imperialism. Tarrow’s story is focused on the success of this global collective action, the linkages between insiders and outsiders, and the coupling of insider and outsider tactics, via shared domestic targets. He downplays the role of movement-related grievances and of outcomes like insider-outsider conflict and decoupling of protesting and voting.

Understanding movement-related grievances about the war in Iraq and about globalization may help account for dynamics in the linkages between protesting and voting. In other words, issue consensus or issue discord on movement-related grievances can either create centripetal forces that unite insider and outsider activism or centrifugal forces that divide insider and outsider activism. Namely, movement-related grievances with issue consensus are perhaps more palatable to insiders and to outsiders, and are more likely to create political opportunities for effectively coupling protesting and voting. Movement-related grievances with issue discord are likely to
be viewed as issues that can more effectively be pursued through global protesting and create opportunities for decoupling protesting and voting.

Next, several propositions based on the structuring influence of Tarrow’s domestic and international targets on linkages between insider activism and outsider activism, are presented.

6.4. Politically opportune domestic targets increase the probability of single protest voting and multiple protest voting (coupling of protesting and voting), and decrease the likelihood of single protest non-voting and multiple protest non-voting. This mechanism works because such targets exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders and opportunities to increasingly adopt one another’s tactics. In the long run, Tarrow suggests these targets may increase the probability of decoupling outcomes or of multiple protest outcomes, if insiders are resocialized to become outsiders because they are radicalized by their shared activism experiences.

6.5. Using a similar causal mechanism, politically opportune international targets increase the probability of single protest voting and multiple protest voting (coupling of protesting and voting), and decrease the likelihood of single protest non-voting and multiple protest non-voting. Such targets again provide opportunities for insider-outsider cooperation and tactical interchange. Again, Tarrow suggests that in the long run, these targets may increase the probability of decoupling outcomes or of multiple protest outcomes, if insiders are resocialized to become outsiders via a shared radicalization experience.
6.6. Globalization and related grievances do not increase or decrease the likelihood of these four participatory choices. What really drives these tactical choices is the presence of targets in the domestic and international opportunity space.

6.7. Domestic targets remain equally, if not more, important than international targets in accounting for the coupling of protesting and voting.

The following propositions are based on my critiques of Tarrow’s internationalism.

6.8. Domestic targets may not be as important as internationalist targets in affecting participatory choices.

6.9. Targets are important in affecting participatory choices, but individuals’ support of movement-related grievances is equally if not more important.

6.10. Supporting movement-related grievances when domestic and international targets are present (an interaction effect already alluded to in Chapter 5), may lead to tactical choices running counter to Tarrow’s model (the decoupling of protesting and voting).

6.11. Having a politically opportune strong domestic target increases the probability of multiple protest voting and single protest voting (coupling outcomes), and decreases that of multiple protest non-voting and single protest non-voting.

Having a strong domestic target (a government which has been actively supporting the U.S. stance on the War on Iraq), is likely to have provided an incentive to change state policy using electoral means.

6.12. Having a politically opportune strong internationalist target increases the probability of multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting (expansion to multiple global protests), and decreases that of single protest voting and single protest
non-voting. Counter to Tarrow’s expectations, I suggest that the likelihood of multiple protest outcomes (not voting outcomes) will increase when strong internationalist targets are present. This effect occurs because an entire social movement (global justice/anti-globalization/alternate Europeanization) has emerged which is specialized in searching for internationalist targets such as MEI meetings, which they repeatedly target. In the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Seattle, international institutions whose meetings have been targeted by protesters include the ADB; EU; FTAA; G8; IMF; UN; WB; WEF; and WTO (Ayres 2004, 23; Buttel and Gould 2004, 49). Such targets draw a crowd of protesters who attend multiple protests and see multiple types of protest as interrelated. However, despite their identification of strong internationalist targets that lack electoral channels of accountability and thus merit protest, these individuals may have important domestic grievances and domestic targets which they address using conventional means, and thus the likelihood of voting (which is domestically focused) is not altered.

Support of Movement-Related Grievances

Several theories suggest that movement-related grievances are likely to be influential in individuals’ decision-making to pair protesting and voting or to combine multiple types of global protest. U.S. hegemony or imperialism theories suggest that participatory choices may be distinguished by opposing military intervention in Iraq for its unilateralism as opposed to other scenarios that an intervention could have occurred (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2003; Lake 2006). Economic and world systems theories suggest the importance of linking opposition to war to opposition to globalization (Chase-Dunn 1989; Friedman 2000; Rodrik 1997, 1999, 2001). Global
democratic deficit arguments suggest that participatory patterns are strongly influenced by movement-related grievances concerning global democratic deficits, especially those linked to neoliberalism, because of the constrictions it places on political space, civil society space, and democracy, or those linked to U.S. hegemony, because of the constrictions it places on sovereignty, international law, and democratic principles (Brown 2003; Rodrik 2001; Ruggie 1982, 1991). The issue of Palestine, and its linkage to U.S. foreign policy, is also likely to be perceived as a pertinent global democratic deficit.

Hence, I suggest that protesters’ support of movement-related grievances linked to the justification for the war in Iraq, globalization, U.S. hegemony, and perceptions of global democratic deficits are also likely to have robust explanatory value in accounting for the linkages between protesting and voting, and that their interaction with domestic and international targets should also be explored. Indeed, supporting a particular movement-related grievance seems, at times, to predict protest activity, tactical choices, and transnationalism (Bean 1991, 270, 271; Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave 2004; Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005). The issue consensus on the movement-related grievance, the degree to which the issue has been agreed on by the movement and by the general public, also plays a role in determining the effect of having a grievance. Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave (2004, 48) find that foreign (transnational) demonstrators at protests targeting European Union Summits in Belgium differed in their support of movement-related grievances, especially those that had more issue discord.
I thus argue that the participatory effect of individual level support of movement-related grievances depends on the level of issue consensus reached within the social movement, the general population, and the polity on these issues. Opposition to unilateral intervention in Iraq, on which there is more issue consensus, can facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting. Opposition to military intervention in Iraq in many different scenarios and all-encompassing opposition to globalization are grievances with more issue discord and can lead to extensive global protesting. Finally, supporting Palestine, on which there is a mixture of consensus and discord, can facilitate involvement in multiple protests and voting.

An influential debate about the justification for war has emerged between insiders who feel that opposition to the war should just focus on its empire-seeking unilateralism and outsiders who feel a broader opposition to war in many different scenarios should be adopted. Many countries politicized the unilateral intervention in Iraq and actively opposed it, but would have supported intervention under a variety of other scenarios. Additionally, much of the global public did not feel that the global democratic system was functioning properly when President Bush proceeded with military intervention in Iraq without the support of the UN, but would have supported military intervention in a host of other scenarios. The issue consensus on opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq may have exerted centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders, facilitating the coupling of protesting and voting.

There was much disagreement within the peace movement about the other cases in which intervention could be justified. All-encompassing opposition to military intervention in Iraq, in most other scenarios, seems to characterize outsiders,
whereas moderate insiders seem to adopt a particularistic opposition to war, and viewpoints on the justification for war account for dynamics in insider-outsider coalition-making and behavior. The more outsider ANSWER links an array of scenarios in which intervention is unjustified to U.S. imperialism and globalization, targeting the U.S. policy toward North Korea, Cuba, Haiti, Palestine, and Iraq. In contrast, the more insider UFPJ is also multi-issue oriented but maintains more focus on opposing and “ending the occupation” of Iraq, “to the exclusion of making some of these links” (Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). Moreover, UFPJ differs from ANSWER because it is not willing to make statements supporting authoritarian regimes that the U.S. government considers to be threats. According to Hany Khalil, Organizing Coordinator of UFPJ, one reason that UFPJ has not been willing to collaborate with ANSWER, is ANSWER’s framing of the Iraqi insurgency as another type of resistance to U.S. imperialism, part of its all-encompassing opposition to war.

Thus, like the public and many governments, insiders and outsiders can agree on opposing war in cases of U.S. unilateralism without the UN, leading support for this movement standpoint to facilitate the pairing of protesting and voting. In contrast, opposition to war given other justifications for military intervention facilitates the extension of global protest, because of the issue discord on these grievances. Thus, several propositions follow:

**6.13.** Opposing a unilateral military intervention in Iraq without the UN, on which there is more issue consensus, increases the probability of multiple protest voting and single protest voting (coupling protesting and voting), and decreases that of multiple
protest non-voting and single protest non-voting. This effect occurs because the issue consensus on this movement-related grievance creates a political opportunity to effectively pair insider and outsider activism. Hence, this issue leads people to see linkages between effecting social change via protesting and via mainstream political behavior such as voting. However, it does not necessarily turn protesters away from demonstrating either, because other movement-related grievances are only pursued on the streets. Hence, the likelihood of voting outcomes increases.

6.14. Opposing movement-related grievances such as military intervention in Iraq under other circumstances, on which there is more issue discord, increases the probability of multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting (expansion to multiple global protests), and decreases that of single protest voting and single protest non-voting. This effect occurs because the issue discord on such grievances creates political opportunities for effecting change via global protesting, as the level of issue discord makes it unlikely that insider activism will be effective. However, such grievances do not necessarily turn protesters away from insider activism, because there are other issues that movements support which have more issue consensus and do make their way through conventional channels of access and thus merit political engagement. Thus, the likelihood of multiple protest outcomes increases.

The degree to which opposition to globalization is all-encompassing or particularistic may also account for the coupling or decoupling of protest and voting. Most advanced industrialized democracies have adopted neoliberal models of globalization. Additionally, the general public tends to see many aspects of globalization positively, although concerns about how globalization affects domestic
employment are quite salient in some countries, and many acknowledge that countries in the core benefit from it disproportionately compared to the periphery. Likewise, competing visions of the globalization problematique characterize competing frames used to mobilize the anti-globalization movement. Activists disagree about whether economic or political targets should be selected; whether a personal, domestic, or global focus should be applied; and whether economic, political, cultural, or multiple frames should be applied (Rosenkranz 2004, 64-5, 70). Many seem to take a broad view of grievances concerning globalization, though economic and political detriments of globalization are prioritized, and cultural issues of homogenization are not (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004, 110-1). Competing explanations of the globalization problematique, therefore, range from those that are focused on a single sphere of globalization-related problems (e.g., economic, cultural, or political; individual, domestic, or global) to those that are more paradigmatic and all-encompassing.

All-encompassing opposition to globalization seems to be characterized by an issue discord which splits outsiders from insiders and predicts the decoupling of protesting and voting. In contrast, opposing a limited number of aspects of globalization is likely to facilitate cooperation between outsiders and insiders who are thus able to agree on broad transversal frames. Reforms to the new international economic order are sought by both camps, with some outsiders favoring the abolition of all international institutions and some insiders reorienting (and retreating) to become more reformist (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004, 102). Thus, since the Battle of Seattle, some activists have focused on diagnosing what is harmful about
globalization and others have tried to reframe the movement, promoting reforms and
a vision of an alternate globalization, resulting in prognostic versus diagnostic
framing divides, and certainly a good share of conflict (Ayres 2004; Buttel and Gould

6.15. Opposing many facets of globalization, a movement-related grievance on
which there is issue discord, increases the probability of multiple protest voting and
multiple protest non-voting (expansion to multiple global protests), and decreases that
of single protest voting and single protest non-voting. This effect occurs because the
issue discord on such grievances creates political opportunities for effecting change
via global protesting, as the level of issue discord makes it unlikely that insider
activism will be effective. However, such grievances do not necessarily turn
protesters away from insider activism, because there are other issues that movements
support which have more issue consensus and do make their way through
conventional channels of access, and thus merit political engagement. Thus, the
likelihood of multiple protest outcomes increases.

Support for Palestine may also touch on perceptions of a global democratic
deficit and distinguish participatory choices of protesters. Given the historic ties
between Israel and the United States, the issue of Palestine is highly politicized in the
United States. In terms of public opinion, Americans are much more supportive of
the Israelis than the Palestinians, whereas Europeans tend to be more supportive of
the Palestinians than the Israelis.

Within the global anti-war and anti-globalization movements, the issue of
Palestine is also far from straightforward. Organizations within the anti-
globalization movement that continued to protest in the aftermath of September 11 also held a demonstration during the protests targeting the Spring 2002 WB/IMF meetings, in which they tried to highlight the plight of Palestinians and not the problems of globalization. There was little collaboration between the organizers trying to refocus the protests on the Israeli incursions into Palestine and the organizers focused on Third World debt reduction (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005).

Palestine also became a key issue of contention in the anti-war movement. ANSWER was engaged in an ongoing debate with insider factions in the anti-war movement about whether Palestine should be prioritized as much as the military intervention in Iraq. According to Brian Becker, the National Coordinator of the ANSWER coalition, Palestine prevented American protest coalitions from successfully collaborating on protests on several occasions (although attempts were continuously made to cooperate). Becker asserts that ANSWER was “demonized for being with the Palestinians.” In the United States, insiders were reluctant to prioritize Palestine as much as Iraq, whereas outsiders wanted to attend to both issues equally and view them as interrelated democratic deficits.

6.16. Supporting Palestine, on which there is much discord but on which in some contexts there is more consensus, increases the probability of multiple protest voting. The issue of Palestine is a bit different than the other movement-related grievances mentioned earlier. It is very strongly politicized in the United States, where the Israeli side of the conflict tends to be favored in public opinion. And in Europe, there is
more support for the Palestinian side. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 4, political contexts vary in terms of how divisive the issue of Palestine has been in the anti-war movement. Hence, in both Europe and the United States, there is a mix of consensus and discord and a varied politicization of the issue of Palestine. Supporting Palestine may thus increase the likelihood of multiple protest voting.

Additionally, I suggest the following interaction effects between opposing U.S. unilateralism and the presence of domestic and international targets.

6.17. Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq in “Coalition of the Willing” states that have clearly endorsed such unilateralism, increases the probability of multiple protest non-voting and single protest non-voting (decoupling of protesting and voting), and decreases that of multiple protest voting and single protest voting, since protest appears more likely than voting to yield substantive policy change and policy change abroad is perceived as a more feasible goal.

6.18. Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq in places where additional internationalist targets are provided by MEI meetings, increases the probability of multiple protest voting, heightening the effect of each factor alone.

Results

A multinomial logistic regression model was applied in analyzing the interaction of voting and global protesting. The dependent variable is the product of the interaction of two dummy variables: recent voting and participation in multiple types of global protests. Recent voting indicates respondents who voted in the most recent parliamentary or presidential election. Multiple global protesting indicates respondents who attended both anti-globalization and anti-war protests, and not just
one of these types of global protests. Hence, there are four categories of the dependent variable, which are not ordered:

- **Single protest voting**: A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (voting and one type of global protest).

- **Multiple protest voting**: A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (voting and two types of global protest).

- **Single protest non-voting**: A respondent who has not voted in a recent election but has participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (non-voting and one type of global protest).

- **Multiple protest non-voting**: A respondent who has not voted in a recent election but has participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (non-voting and two types of global protest).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attending Both Anti-Globalization and Anti-War Protests</th>
<th>Attending Just Anti-Globalization or Just Anti-War Protests</th>
<th>Trends in Coupling of Protesting and Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Not Having Voted in a Recent Election</td>
<td>Multiple Protest Non-Voting (16%)</td>
<td>Single Protest Non-Voting (13%)</td>
<td>Decoupling of Protesting and Voting (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having Voted in a Recent Election</td>
<td>Multiple Protest Voting (46%)</td>
<td>Single Protest Voting (25%)</td>
<td>Coupling of Protesting and Voting (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trends in Expansion to Multiple Global Protests</td>
<td>Expansion to Multiple Types of Global Protests (62%)</td>
<td>Involvement in Single Types of Global Protests (38%)</td>
<td>Total (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Participatory Outcomes in the Multinomial Logistic Regression
Table 6.1 shows that the distribution of the respondents across the four participatory outcomes assessed by the dependent variable, from most to least popular, is: multiple protest voting (46%), single protest voting (25%), multiple protest non-voting (16%), and single protest non-voting (13%). It is noteworthy that the majority of protesters are indeed coupling protesting and voting (multiple protest voting and single protest voting). Far fewer are decoupling protesting and voting (multiple protest non-voting and single protest non-voting). It is also striking that many are involved in multiple types of global protesting (multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting).

A multinomial model is appropriate as the categories are unordered for this dependent variable. Likelihood Ratio and Wald Tests conducted after the multinomial logistic regression reveal that the four outcome categories are indeed distinguishable and should not be combined. Further, the Hausman test of the interdependence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) suggests that the IIA assumption is not violated. Thus, the multinomial logistic regression model is preferable to multinomial probit. Likelihood Ratio and Wald Tests were conducted to test whether each variable has a significant effect on the participatory outcomes, and only variables with statistically significant or marginally significant effects were included in the final analysis.

The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the multinomial logit model of the interaction of voting and global protesting are presented in Table 6.2. Because I estimate a multinomial logit model, I can consider only three of the four categories. The omitted base category is single protest non-voting. I selected this
base category because I am more concerned with why people couple protesting and voting and why people expand their involvement to multiple types of global protests. Using multinomial logit, equations are estimated for three of the four participatory outcomes, using a common set of explanatory factors. Comparisons of the coefficients and effects of the regressors are indicative of differences between one of the participatory outcomes and the base category (single protest non-voting). One-tailed tests of significance are used because directional hypotheses about the interaction of global protesting and voting are being tested.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Single Protest</th>
<th>Multiple Protest</th>
<th>Multiple Protest</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of the Willing Protest Location</td>
<td>1.636***</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>1.233**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.E.I. Meeting Protest Location</td>
<td>1.629**</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>1.948***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing U.S. Unilateralism (Military Intervention without the UN)</td>
<td>2.824****</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td>2.441****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Scenarios Military Intervention is Unjustified</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.314***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Aspects of Globalization that are Bad</td>
<td>0.328***</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.531****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting the Palestinians More</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.862***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and Coalition of the Willing</td>
<td>-1.839**</td>
<td>0.859</td>
<td>-1.769**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and M.E.I. Meeting</td>
<td>-1.002</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>0.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being born 1979 or Later (Youth During Battle of Seattle and Anti-War Movement)</td>
<td>-0.574*</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some University Education or Completed University Education</td>
<td>1.343****</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>1.708****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.806****</td>
<td>0.652</td>
<td>-3.482****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( n = 586 \)
\(-2 * \text{Log Likelihood} = 1136.168 \)
Model \( \chi^2 = 342.90**** \)

**Table 6.2:** Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients (and Standard Errors)

Note: Coefficients are maximum likelihood estimates. Base category for the analysis is single protest non-voting. * \( p<.10 \), ** \( p<.05 \), *** \( p<.01 \), **** \( p<.001 \). All one-tailed tests.
Since multinomial logit coefficients cannot be directly interpreted, Table 6.3 presents additional results concerning the discrete changes in predicted probabilities that are easier to interpret. The discrete changes in the predicted probabilities of the four participatory outcomes are reported, as each independent variable changes from its minimum to its maximum and other variables are held constant at their means.

The results of Likelihood Ratio and Wald Tests of the effects of each variable are also presented, most of which were marginally or statistically significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Tests of the effects of each variable, which test the hypothesis that all coefficients associated with a particular variable are simultaneously equal to 0.</th>
<th>Discrete Changes in the Predicted Probability as each Regressor Changes from its Minimum to Its Maximum, Holding Other Variables Constant at their Means.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of the Willing Protest Location</td>
<td><em>Chi-Squared (Likelihood Ratio Tests)</em></td>
<td><em>Chi-Squared (Wald Tests)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.E.I. Meeting Protest Location</td>
<td>6.797*</td>
<td>6.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing U.S. Unilateralism (Military Intervention without the UN)</td>
<td>11.904***</td>
<td>9.875**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Scenarios Military Intervention is Unjustified</td>
<td>15.375***</td>
<td>13.735***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Aspects of Globalization that are Bad</td>
<td>27.321****</td>
<td>25.411****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting the Palestinians More</td>
<td>18.751****</td>
<td>17.405****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and Coalition of the Willing</td>
<td>7.668*</td>
<td>7.545*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and M.E.I. Meeting</td>
<td>6.931*</td>
<td>6.555*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being born 1979 or Later (Youth During Battle of Seattle and Anti-War Movement)</td>
<td>8.421**</td>
<td>8.119**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being born 1979 or Later (Youth During Battle of Seattle and Anti-War Movement)</td>
<td>48.322****</td>
<td>42.555****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some University Education or Completed University Education</td>
<td>37.046****</td>
<td>35.469****</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.3:** Discrete Changes in Predicted Probabilities Over Range of a Variable

Note: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01, **** p<.001
In the following subsections, I present the findings for each of the independent variables. Variables assessing targets and grievances are explored first, followed by variables assessing the interaction of targets and grievances. After briefly reviewing the operationalization of explanatory factors, I explain their strength as predictors across the three equations in the multinomial logistic regression. Next, I explain how they are associated with trends in the predicted probabilities of the four participatory outcomes. Each section concludes with graphs that plot changes in the predicted probabilities of each of the regressand’s outcomes, for the key regressors.

The results confirm the importance of both strong domestic targets (“Coalition of the Willing” states) and opposing U.S. unilateralism in accounting for an increase in the predicted probabilities of both “coupling” outcomes pairing protesting and voting. However, opposing U.S. unilateralism in countries that joined the “Coalition of the Willing” seems to facilitate an increase in the predicted probabilities of both “decoupling” outcomes. These results suggest that Spanish success in getting protesters to couple their protesting and voting is the exception and not the rule in “Coalition of the Willing” countries. In the conclusion, I will discuss the results in light of the divergent post-war electoral changes presented at the beginning of the chapter. I also suggest that more research exploring demonstrators’ prospective voting and protesting is needed to test the impact of targets and grievances.

*Domestic and International Targets*

First, the impact of domestic versus international targets is explored. “Coalition of the Willing Protest Location” is a dummy variable that indicates protesters who were surveyed in the United States, United Kingdom, and Italy. These
countries all had a strong domestic target due to their pro-war stance. In contrast, protesters surveyed in Belgium, Germany, and France lacked such a strong domestic target. In the multinomial logistic regression, being surveyed at a “Coalition of the Willing” protest location is a strong predictor in the equations for single protest voting and multiple protest voting. It is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of both of the coupling outcomes that pair protesting and voting. The predicted probability of single protest voting is 0.118 higher and the predicted probability of multiple protest voting is 0.022 higher, for protesters surveyed at a “Coalition of the Willing” protest location.

“M.E.I. Meeting Protest Location” is a dummy variable created to indicate respondents who were surveyed at a protest during an international institutional meeting. These meetings include the Spring 2004 WB/IMF Meeting in Washington, DC and the 2003 Munich Conference on Security Policy involving N.A.T.O. member states. Protesters surveyed at a M.E.I. meeting had an additional international target available. Protesting at a M.E.I. Meeting was a strong predictor across all three equations and is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of both of the multiple protest outcomes. Protesting at a M.E.I. Meeting, the predicted probability of multiple protest voting increases by 0.043 and the predicted probability of multiple protest non-voting increases by 0.124.

Figure 6.1 summarizes these trends in the predicted probabilities of domestic and international targets. Having a politically opportune domestic target (“Coalition of the Willing” membership) increases the probability of multiple protest voting and single protest voting (the coupling of protesting and voting). Having another
politically opportune international target (a M.E.I. meeting) increases the probability of multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting (extending global protest involvement). While domestic targets indeed appear to facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting, internationalist targets facilitate the expansion to multiple forms of global protest.

Figure 6.1: Targets

Movement-Related Grievances

Next, the impact of movement-related grievances is investigated. “Opposing U.S. Unilateralism (Military Intervention without the UN)” is a dummy variable created to indicate respondents who classify intervention in Iraq without the UN as “absolutely unjustified.” In the multinomial logistic regression, opposing U.S. unilateralism is a strong predictor across all three equations and is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of coupling outcomes (pairing protesting and voting). Opposing U.S.unilateralism, the predicted probability of single protest voting increases by 0.166 and the predicted probability of multiple protest voting increases by 0.171.
“Number of Scenarios Military Intervention is Unjustified” is a count of the number of other scenarios in which a respondent classifies intervention in Iraq as “absolutely unjustified.” The alternate four scenarios represent other possible cases for intervention: the Iraqi regime does not cooperate with UN inspectors; the UN discovers weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; Iraq threatens other countries in the region; and the UN Security Council decides on a military intervention. The number of scenarios in which respondents classify intervention as absolutely unjustified, is a strong predictor in the equations for multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting. All-encompassing opposition to war is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of multiple protest outcomes (extending global protest involvement). The predicted probability of multiple protest voting is 0.063 higher and the predicted probability of multiple protest non-voting is 0.184 higher, for protesters who classified military intervention in all four other scenarios as absolutely unjustified than for those who classify none as absolutely unjustified.

“Number of aspects of globalization that are bad” is a count variable summing the number of spheres a respondent deems globalization to have a “bad” impact. Four areas impacted by globalization are assessed: their country's economy; providing jobs and strengthening the economy in poor countries; maintaining cultural diversity in the world; and their own standard of living. The number of aspects of globalization that respondents classify as bad was a strong predictor across all three equations in the multinomial logistic regression. All-encompassing opposition to globalization is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of multiple protest outcomes (extending global protest involvement). The predicted probability
of multiple protest voting is 0.182 higher and the predicted probability of multiple protest non-voting is 0.053 higher, for protesters who classify all four aspects of globalization as bad than for those who classify none as bad.

“Supporting the Palestinians more” is a dummy variable which indicates sympathizing more with the Palestinians than with the Israelis, with neither group, or with both groups. In the multinomial logistic regression, supporting the Palestinians more is a strong predictor in the equation for multiple protest voting and is associated with increases in the predicted probability of the multiple protest voting outcome. The predicted probability of multiple protest voting is 0.126 higher for protesters who support the Palestinians more.

Figure 6.2 sums up these trends. Opposing unilateral military intervention in Iraq without the UN, on which there is more issue consensus, increases the probability of multiple protest voting and single protest voting (the coupling of protesting and voting). In contrast, movement-related grievances with more issue discord seem to be associated with an expansion to multiple global protest involvement. Opposing military intervention in Iraq under other circumstances increases the probability of multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting (extending global protest involvement). Likewise, opposing many facets of globalization increases the probability of multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting (extending global protest involvement). Finally, supporting the Palestinians, a grievance with mixed consensus and discord, increases the probability of multiple protest voting. Supporting movement-related grievances clearly seems tied to participatory choices concerning global protesting and voting.
**Figure 6.2:** Support for Movement-Related Grievances

*Interactions of Targets and Grievances*

Next, the impact of interactions between targets and grievances are explored. Only the interaction effects between opposing U.S. unilateral intervention and the presence of domestic and international targets were statistically or marginally significant and included in the final analysis. Interaction effects including other movement-related grievances were thus dropped from the final analysis.
“Interaction of opposing U.S. unilateralism and Coalition of the Willing” is a dummy variable indicating a respondent deems U.S. unilateralism in Iraq “absolutely unjustified” and was also surveyed in a “Coalition of the Willing” country. In other words, it assesses having grievances about U.S. unilateralism while facing a domestic government that is already endorsing such unilateralism. In the multinomial logistic regression, opposing U.S. unilateralism in “Coalition of the Willing” states is a strong predictor in the equations for single protest voting and multiple protest voting. It is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of decoupling outcomes (not pairing protesting with voting). Classifying U.S. unilateralism as absolutely unjustified in a “Coalition of the Willing” protest venue, the predicted probability of multiple protest non-voting increases by 0.126 and the predicted probability of single protest non-voting increases by 0.097.

“Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and M.E.I. Meeting” is a dummy variable indicating a respondent deems U.S. unilateralism in Iraq “absolutely unjustified” and was surveyed at a protest where a M.E.I. Meeting was being held. In other words, it assesses having grievances about U.S. unilateralism while facing an additional institutional target that is often perceived as tied to such unilateralism. Opposing U.S. unilateralism at M.E.I. Meeting protest locations was a strong predictor in the equation for multiple protest non-voting. It is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of multiple protest voting and to a lesser degree, of single protest non-voting. Classifying U.S. unilateralism as absolutely unjustified at a M.E.I. Meeting protest location, the predicted probability of multiple protest voting increases by 0.311 and the predicted probability of single protest non-
voting increases by 0.021. The relatively small increase in the discrete change of single protest non-voting is unexpected.

Figure 6.3 illustrates these trends. Opposing U.S. unilateralism in countries that joined the “Coalition of the Willing” may lead to tactical choices that run counter to Tarrow’s model, increasing the probability of multiple protest non-voting and single protest non-voting (decoupling protest and voting). Opposing U.S. unilateralism, paired with the presence of a MEI meeting, increases the probability of multiple protest voting and to a small degree the probability of single protest non-voting.

**Figure 6.3:** Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and Targets

**Demographics**

The country location and type of protest at which respondents were surveyed were not significant, and thus were not included in the final analysis. Factors such as class and income that are often important participatory predictors were omitted from the final regression because they were not significant predictors.
However, being born in 1979 or later (being 24 or younger during the 2003 anti-war movement and 20 or younger during the Battle of Seattle protests against the W.T.O. in 1999) was a significant predictor and was included in the final analysis. In the multinomial logistic regression, being born in 1979 or later is a strong predictor in the equation for multiple protest non-voting. It is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of decoupling outcomes (not pairing protesting with voting). Being born 1979 or later, the predicted probability of multiple protest non-voting increases by 0.239 and the predicted probability of single protest non-voting increases by 0.001.

Likewise, having attended some university or completed university with a degree was a statistically significant predictor of participatory choices and was controlled for in the final analysis. In the multinomial logistic regression, having some university education or having completed university education is a strong predictor in the equations for single protest voting and multiple protest voting. It is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of coupling outcomes (pairing protesting and voting). The predicted probability of single protest voting is 0.021 higher and the predicted probability of multiple protest voting is 0.212 higher, for protesters who had some university education or completed university education. Table 6.4 summarizes the results obtained regarding each of the propositions. Most protesters are indeed coupling protesting and voting, confirming proposition 6.1. Very few are in fact decoupling protesting and voting, disconfirming proposition 6.2. Additionally, many protesters are expanding their involvement in global protests to multiple types of global protest, confirming proposition 6.3. Both Tarrow’s domestic
targets and movement-related grievances concerning U.S. unilateralism seem to drive the coupling of protesting and voting. Conversely, the interaction of these factors is what appears to elicit the decoupling of protesting and voting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Expected Pattern in Outcomes Observed</th>
<th>Confirmed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Coupling of Protesting and Voting</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Decoupling of Protesting and Voting</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Expansion to Multiple Global Protests</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Coalition of the Willing</td>
<td>Coupling of Protesting and Voting</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>M.E.I. Meeting</td>
<td>Coupling of Protesting and Voting</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Globalization and related grievances</td>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>Primacy of Coalition of the Willing over M.E.I. Meeting</td>
<td>Coupling of Protesting and Voting</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>Primacy of M.E.I. Meeting over Coalition of the Willing</td>
<td>Participatory choices</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>Support of movement-related grievances</td>
<td>Participatory choices</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>Interaction of support of movement-related grievances the presence of a target</td>
<td>Tactical Choices Counter to Tarrow’s Model (i.e., Decoupling of Protesting and Voting)</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>Coalition of the Willing</td>
<td>Coupling of Protesting and Voting</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.12</td>
<td>M.E.I. Meeting</td>
<td>Expansion to Multiple Global Protests</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>Opposing U.S. Unilateralism (Military Intervention in Iraq without UN)</td>
<td>Coupling of Protesting and Voting</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>Number of Scenarios Military Intervention is Unjustified</td>
<td>Expansion to Multiple Global Protests</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>Number of Aspects of Globalization that are Bad</td>
<td>Expansion to Multiple Global Protests</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>Supporting the Palestinians more</td>
<td>Multiple Protest Voting</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and M.E.I. Meeting</td>
<td>Multiple Protest Voting</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4: Trends in the Predicted Probabilities of the Participatory Outcomes
Domestic and international targets seem to exert distinct participatory effects. The presence of domestic targets in “Coalition of the Willing” states does indeed appear to elicit the coupling of protesting and voting, confirming propositions 6.4 and 6.11. However, international targets such as a M.E.I. Meeting do not appear to facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting, disconfirming proposition 6.5. Rather, the evidence suggests that international targets elicit involvement in multiple types of global protests, confirming proposition 6.12. Domestic targets appear to be more important than international targets in accounting for the coupling of protesting and voting, but both factors are important in accounting for participatory choices, confirming proposition 6.7 but disconfirming proposition 6.8.

Moreover, the results confirm that movement-related grievances also are important in accounting for participatory choices, disconfirming proposition 6.6 and confirming proposition 6.9. Opposing U.S. unilateralism, a grievance on which there is more issue consensus, appears to facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting, confirming proposition 6.13. Grievances with more issue discord, such as opposing military intervention in many scenarios and opposing many aspects of globalization, appear to elicit involvement in multiple types of global protest, confirming propositions 6.14 and 6.15. Finally, supporting the Palestinians more, on which there is a mixture of consensus and discord in different contexts, appears to facilitate multiple protest voting, confirming proposition 6.16.

The interactions between targets and movement-related grievances exert distinct effects. The only key variable that appears to facilitate the decoupling of protesting and voting is when protesters are very opposed to U.S. unilateralism but
are protesting in a country that has already supported the “Coalition of the Willing,” confirming propositions 6.10 and 6.17. Opposing U.S. unilateralism at protest venues where M.E.I. Meetings were occurring has mixed results. There is a slight increase in the predicted probability of single protest non-voting. However, the biggest effect seen is on the increased predicted probability of multiple protest voting, offering some confirmation of proposition 6.18.

Which factors account for the coupling and decoupling of protesting and voting? Both domestic targets and support of movement-related grievances with issue consensus seem to have the power to unite insider activism and outsider activism. The domestic targets in “Coalition of the Willing” states indeed facilitate linkages between voting and global protesting. Likewise, opposing U.S. military intervention in Iraq without the UN, on which there is issue consensus, seems to facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting. However, opposing U.S. unilateralism in “Coalition of the Willing” states that have already taken a stance supporting such unilateralism may in fact lead to the decoupling of protesting and voting. Demographically, we also see that education is associated with coupling and youth is associated with decoupling.

Further, several factors appear to bring about an expansion to multiple types of global protest. The presence of international targets via international institution meetings may elicit involvement in multiple types of global protests. Opposition to war in many scenarios and all-encompassing opposition to globalization, on which there is more issue discord, also appear to lead to extensive global protesting.
Two key factors appear to be associated with multiple protest voting. Supporting Palestine, which has a mixture of issue consensus and discord in different contexts, facilitates multiple protest voting. Also, opposing U.S. unilateralism in protests at M.E.I. Meetings especially facilitates multiple protest voting.

What do these findings tell us about the coupling of voting and protesting, and the extension of global protest today? Overall, they suggest some optimism is warranted about changes in participatory democracy. Most global protesters are pairing global protests with voting, and many are active in multiple forms of global protests. Both domestic targets and movement-related grievances with issue consensus appear to facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting, while their interaction appears tied to the decoupling of protesting and voting. The effect of supporting movement-related grievances depends on the issue consensus or discord on the issue. Issue consensus may create an opportunity structure in which protesters expect insider activism to be efficacious and choose to couple protesting with voting. Issue discord may create an opportunity structure in which protesters expect multiple types of global protesting to be more efficacious.

However, there may be limitations to the generalizability of these findings because respondents were asked retrospectively about their voting and their protesting. Additional research is needed about demonstrators’ prospective voting and protesting. It is important that this research is sensitive to domestic targets and movement-related grievances, as well as to dynamics in these factors. Further, it is worthwhile investigating whether states in the “Coalition of the Willing” vary in how strongly they provide a strong domestic target and how that influences activism.
At the beginning of this chapter, post-war electoral changes in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Spain were compared. Domestic targets are present in all three cases, with the domestic government indicating its support of U.S. unilateralism. As this chapter indicated, opposing U.S. unilateralism in “Coalition of the Willing” states can in fact lead to the decoupling of protesting and voting.

Of these cases, Spain is the outlier, as protesters there decided to couple their protesting and voting, with tremendous success. What distinguishes Spain is the tremendous issue consensus in the public and in the anti-war movement on opposing unilateralism in Iraq. Also, in Spain, there was a leftist opposition party allied with the anti-war movement. The PSOE was responsive to grievances about the intervention, and stood a chance of mobilizing enough electoral support to result in a change in the government. Thus, issue consensus and expectations regarding the feasibility of electoral change may have created an opportunity structure in which protesters expected insider activism to be efficacious. Opposing U.S. unilateralism in this context may have encouraged them to couple protesting and voting successfully.

In contrast, in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there was more public support for a military intervention in Iraq across a host of scenarios. Thus, there was more issue discord between the movement and the public. There were some parties with movement-ties that were responsive to movement-related grievances. However, these parties did not stand much of a chance of mobilizing enough support to result in a change of government and a shift in policy-making. Opposing U.S. unilateralism in a country that has already joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” may thus deter protesters from coupling protesting and voting successfully.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

In this dissertation, I contrast the impact of domestic and international targets and of movement-related grievances on insiders and outsiders and on insider activism and outsider activism in the transnational protest movement opposing the war in Iraq. Tarrow’s domestic and international targets seem to exert some centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders. Further, I suggest movement-related grievances exert both centripetal and centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders. Whether there is issue consensus or discord on these grievances in the movement and in the public, determines the type of impact they have on insiders and outsiders.

Opposing U.S. unilaterialism in Iraq in defiance of the United Nations, on which there is issue consensus, exerts a centripetal force on insiders and outsiders, facilitating insider-outsider cooperation in anti-war coalitions, successful transnational protest events drawing in both insiders and outsiders, and the coupling of insider tactics such as voting and outsider tactics such as protesting. By uniting insiders and outsiders, opportunistic parties of the opposition and of the left can learn how to appeal to shared grievances, and protesters are given opportunities to learn about the possibilities to pair insider and outsider activism and which parties to reward if they do decide to couple protesting and voting. In contrast, opposing war in all cases, opposition to globalization, and support of Palestine are movement-related grievances with more issue discord, and thus these grievances facilitate insider-outsider conflict and participatory choices favoring an expansion to multiple forms of global protest. After exploring the meso-, macro-, and micro-level results, and how they relate to the broad propositions introduced in Chapter 2, I conclude by exploring
the implications for the remobilization of transnational protesters as voters in post-war elections.

At the meso-organizing level, insider-outsider cooperation varied tremendously across the three cases, which all shared strong domestic targets but varied in the party-system and electoral context. Cooperation was strongest in the United Kingdom, and conflict was the strongest in the United States, while the Netherlands fluctuated between conflict and cooperation. The dynamics in cooperation and conflict were not accounted for by the presence of domestic targets, which were held constant across the cases and which organizers did not indicate was a source of the variation. Hence, this evidence disconfirms proposition 2.1, suggesting targets are not as important in accounting for insider-outsider cooperation.

Rather, what seems to have been important in accounting for instances of cooperation and conflict were movement-related grievances and debates about how to frame them, given issue consensus or discord. The evidence confirms proposition 2.7, suggesting that movement-related grievances are important in accounting for insider-outsider cooperation and conflict. Additionally, the party-system and electoral context may also play some role in accounting for insider-outsider conflict and cooperation, with cooperation characterizing moderate multi-partyism and conflict differentiating moderate two-partyism. A mixture of conflict and cooperation seems to be facilitated by polarized multi-partyism, with conflict particularly likely close to elections and coalition negotiations, and cooperation assisted by the large number of parties potentially allied to the movement at other times.
At the macro-event level, transnational protest events occurred throughout the European Union, but the most mobilized protests and the protests involving rainbow coalitions that drew in important insiders and outsiders, seem to have been more common in the EU-15 than in the CEE states. However, there were many commonalities in the protests across the EU, especially in the perceptions of similar domestic and international targets as well as in the perceptions of similar domestic and international grievances, confirming propositions 2.2 and 2.8.

Although protest mobilization in the EU-15 is somewhat accounted for by the presence of domestic targets, there are many exceptions. The high mobilization and success in mobilizing insiders and outsiders in the EU-15 vis-à-vis CEE protests are certainly not accounted for by targets, which were present throughout the CEE states but not in many EU-15 states. However, the most mobilized protests in the EU-15 had strong domestic targets. Mixed evidence is thus found regarding proposition 2.3, suggesting that targets may have limited influence on the successful mobilization of transnational protesters into broad rainbow coalitions.

Movement-related grievances may do a better job in accounting for some of the mobilization differences between the EU-15 and the CEE states. Some weak supportive evidence is found concerning proposition 2.9, that issue consensus on movement-related grievances is tied to movement success in mobilizing transnational protesters into broad rainbow coalitions. Additionally, divergences in the history of participation, protest, and civil society and in the Europeanization of civil society in the CEE states relative to the EU-15; historic advantages in the emergence of civil society within the East-Central CEE states; and divergences in the democratization
pathways of CEE states outside East-Central Europe, appear to be very important in accounting for the variation within and between the CEE states and the EU-15.

At the micro-individual level, the coupling of protesting and voting is the norm, but participation in multiple types of global protesting is also very popular. Hence, more exploration is warranted concerning the factors that exert centripetal and centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders as well as concerning the implications of linkages between insider and outsider activism for remobilizing activists in subsequent elections. Having a politically opportune domestic target indeed increases the probability of coupling protesting and voting, confirming proposition 2.4. However, opposing U.S. unilateralism, a movement-related grievance with issue consensus, also increases the probability of coupling protesting and voting, confirming proposition 2.10. However, opposing U.S. unilateralism in a country that joined the “Coalition of the Willing” increases the probability of decoupling protesting and voting. Also noteworthy are the centrifugal impacts that movement-related grievances with issue discord, all-encompassing opposition to war and to globalization, can exert on insider and outsider activism, increasing the probability of expansion to multiple global protests, confirming proposition 2.10.

Thus, overall, targets found no support at the meso-organizing level, some support at the macro-event level, and strong support at the micro-individual level. However, movement-related grievances found considerable support at the meso-organizing level, weak support at the macro-event level, and substantial support at the micro-individual level. This evidence suggests that movement-related grievances are at least as important as targets in effecting ties between insiders and outsiders.
Hence, it disconfirms proposition 2.5 which suggests that grievances are not important in accounting for ties between insider and outsider activism. Rather, the results offer some support for proposition 2.11, suggesting that movement-related grievances are more important than the presence of domestic and international targets in accounting for the dynamics between insiders and outsiders.

Additionally, domestic targets do not appear to trump international targets, but rather may yield different participatory effects, as was seen very clearly at the micro-individual level. However, in accounting for coupling of protesting and voting, domestic targets are indeed more important. Mixed evidence is thus found concerning proposition 2.6, which suggests the primacy of domestic over international targets. International grievances and targets appear to be equally if not more important than domestic grievances and targets, in accounting for dynamics between insiders and outsiders at the meso-organizing level and macro-event level. However, at the micro-level, domestic targets and international grievances are both important in accounting for the coupling of insider activism and outsider activism. Hence, there is some limited confirmation concerning proposition 2.12 which suggests that international targets and grievances have primacy over domestic ones.

These findings suggest that transnational anti-war protest is becoming more globalized and is no longer as domesticated. Movement-related grievances with issue consensus thus have the potential to remobilize protesters who are partaking in increasingly globalized collective action as voters in national elections, a question to which I now turn. How well do transnational social movements provide inroads for getting demonstrators in the street remobilized as voters and activists, combining or
coupling these tactics, and providing electoral dividends to parties of the opposition in tune to protesters’ grievances and allied with movement activists?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimated Number of Protesters on February 15, 2003</th>
<th>Population (July 2003 estimate)</th>
<th>% of Population Mobilized During February 15, 2003 Global Protests</th>
<th>Ratio of Post-War to Pre-War Votes for the Party Allied with the Anti-War Movement, with the Highest % Vote Change in Pre-Post War Elections</th>
<th>Opposition Party Allied with the Anti-War Movement with the Largest Gains in Votes (in #’s)</th>
<th>Interesting Vote Gains:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2.3 million</td>
<td>40,217,413</td>
<td>5%-7.5%</td>
<td>139% (PSOE)</td>
<td>3,107,411 (PSOE)</td>
<td>139% (PSOE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>150,000-200,000</td>
<td>32,207,113</td>
<td>0.5%-0.6%</td>
<td>558% (GPC)</td>
<td>1,033,535 (NDP)</td>
<td>194% (NDP) 122% (BQ) 558% (GPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1-1.5 million</td>
<td>60,094,648</td>
<td>1.7%-2.5%</td>
<td>155% (Greens)</td>
<td>1,195,340 (LibDem)</td>
<td>124% (LibDem) 155% (Greens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>16,150,511</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>183% (PvdA)</td>
<td>1,195,340 (PvdA)</td>
<td>183% (PvdA) 108% (SP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>600,000-700,000</td>
<td>290,342,554</td>
<td>0.2%-0.25%</td>
<td>116% (Dem)</td>
<td>8,028,547 (Dem)</td>
<td>116% (Dem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>10,289,088</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>136% (PS)</td>
<td>242,110 (SP.A, Spirit, N.F.A.)</td>
<td>136% (PS) 126% (SP.A, Spirit, N.F.A.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Protest Mobilization and Post-War Electoral Outcomes

Note: This table compiles information from two dozen sources.26

Countries vary significantly in the extent to which opposition parties linked to the anti-war movement succeeded in achieving turnout increases. Table 7.1 summarizes post-movement electoral effects for parties allied to the anti-war movement in six countries. How well these parties are able to appeal to voters seeking to cast protest votes, may perhaps be tied to factors such as the party-system and electoral context. I next discuss electoral results in Spain, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States, and Belgium.

Opposition parties in Spain had a very direct, cooperative relationship with the global social movement opposing the war, and the PSOE may have benefitted tremendously in subsequent elections. Indeed, the PSOE may have hoped to make

electoral gains via its opposition to U.S. unilateralism and ties to the anti-war movement, which resonated well in Spain.\textsuperscript{27} In a press interview, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the secretary-general of the PSOE, links his party’s standpoint to the high domestic opposition to the war.\textsuperscript{28} The main opposition party, PSOE, and the Communist-led IU were direct allies of the global anti-war movement in Spain. As aforementioned, the first Spanish post-war election saw a huge change in pre- and post-war voter turnout which led to PSOE electoral success.

In Canada, the main governing party, the Liberal Party (LPC), opposed the war, but it did not form alliances with the anti-war movement. The main opposition party, the Conservative Party (CPC), also did not form alliances with the anti-war movement. However, several other smaller opposition parties did form direct alliances with the anti-war movement and saw increases in electoral turnout in subsequent elections. Jack Layton, leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP), attended and spoke at the Toronto protest on February 15, 2003.\textsuperscript{29} Similarly, the Bloc Québécois (BQ) leader, Gilles Duceppe, attended and spoke at the Montreal protest on February 15, 2003.\textsuperscript{30} The Green Party of Canada (GPC) was also “prominent in the popular mobilization to the U.S. war against Afghanistan and Iraq.”\textsuperscript{31} Thus, although the government took a stance on which the activists agreed, the LPC and

\textsuperscript{28} Financial Times Information. 2003. Spanish socialist leader interviewed on Iraq, relations with USA, UK. April 20.
\textsuperscript{29} Dabrowski, Wojtek. 2003. Protesters in cities across Canada take to the streets against war in Iraq. Sun Media Corporation Portage Daily Graphic, February 17.
\textsuperscript{31} Wamock, John W. 2004. The evolution of green parties around the world. Canadian Dimension, November 1.
CPC were not allied with the global anti-war movement, and the NDP, BQ, and GPC were direct allies of the anti-war movement in Canada and saw some electoral gains.

In the United Kingdom, several opposition parties formed direct alliances with the anti-war movement, although the main opposition party, the Conservative Party (Cons), joined the governing party, the social-democratic Labour Party (Lab), in supporting the war, and only small factions in Labour were indirectly tied to the anti-war movement. Charles Kennedy, the leader of the other key opposition party, the social-liberal Liberal Democrats (LibDem) which saw post-war electoral gains, was a speaker at the February 15, 2003 protest in London. Included amongst the United Kingdom’s opposition political parties opposed to the war, according to the Stop the War Coalition website, are the LibDem, the ecologist Green Party (Greens), RESPECT – The Unity Coalition (an anti-war coalition formed in 2004), the Socialist Alliance (SA), the separatist Scottish National Party (SNP), Welsh regionalist Plaid Cymru (PC), and the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP). Some members of the Labour Party were indirectly linked to the anti-war movement, including former Labor Party leader Michael Foot and former Labor stalwart Tony Benn, who spoke at the February 15, 2003 protest in London. The LibDem secondary opposition party as well as the Greens saw increases in electoral turnout in post-war elections that may have been linked to their opposition to the war.

In the Netherlands, several opposition parties formed direct alliances with the anti-war movement, but the main opposition party, the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) or

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Labour Party, switched from having more direct to more indirect ties with the anti-war movement in the run-up to the Dutch election in January 2003, at the height of the anti-war movement. Given the unexpected gains of Fortuyn’s populist party in the May 2002 elections which had resulted from a decline in support for parties like the PvdA, the public was interested in electoral results guaranteeing a coalition that did not include a right-wing populist party. The electoral results favored the PvdA and not the parties more directly tied to the anti-war movement. In the aftermath of the election, the PvdA continued to maintain indirect ties with the anti-war movement in January, February, and March, as it negotiated to join the governing coalition with other parties that were previously committed to joining the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq. In contrast, several other opposition parties and factions of the PvdA forged direct movement alliances. The Socialistische Partij (SP) or Socialist Party, the ecologist and socialist GroenLinks (GL) or Green Left, the Young Socialists in the PvdA, and particular departments of the PvdA were all included among the organizers of the “Platform Tegen de ‘Nieuwe Oorlog’” (Platform Against the New War) which organized the February 15, 2003 protests in Amsterdam.\footnote{De Vredessite. 2003. Anti-oorlogsdeemonstratie onderdeel wereldwijd protest. February 12. http://vredessite.nl/nieuwoorlog2003/platform1202.html (accessed October 13, 2005); Socialistische Partij. 2001. Manifest tegen de nieuwe oorlog. September 25. http://www.sp.nl/bijdeagenda/manifesttegenoorlog.stm (accessed October 13, 2005).} Wouter Bos (leader of the PvdA) failed to show at the February 15, 2003 protests where he had been invited to speak, and although he was originally invited to participate in March 2003 protests and spoke favorably of them, the PvdA was later disininvited from the March 2003 protests because of their participation in negotiations with the pro-war
Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA) party or Christian Democratic Appeal.\(^{36}\) Since the negotiations were ultimately blocked by the Iraq issue, the PvdA ended up banding with SP and GL in the platform “Keer het tij” to advocate for “a different Netherlands” and serve as the opposition against the new coalition parties.\(^{37}\) In the Netherlands, the SP and GL were direct allies and the main opposition party, the PvdA, was an indirect ally of the global anti-war movement. However, electoral gains favored the PvdA, and not the more direct party allies which were viewed as less coalitionable but more representative of anti-war movement grievances.

The main American opposition party, the Democratic Party (Dem), supported the pro-war governing party, the Republican Party (Rep), in policy on the Iraq war. Any direct connections with the Democratic Party have involved particular candidates such as Dennis Kucinich and Howard Dean, or were indirect.\(^{38}\) Small gains in voter turnout for the Democrats in 2004 were part of broader gains in turnout that actually disproportionately favored the Republicans in the Presidential election. Compared to the Democrats’ indirect alliances with the anti-war movement, the Green Party (GPUS) has clearly opposed the U.S. war in Iraq since the height of the anti-war


movement. Further, the Green Party is a member group of the United for Peace and Justice anti-war coalition, which organized the February 15, 2003 protest in New York. Many progressives who were involved in anti-war organizing focused on linking insider activism to outsider activism and are said to have focused on supporting the Democratic Party in the 2004 election, even though the final candidate selected to represent the party was, in their view, not adequately opposed to the war.

To sum, U.S. party connections between the leading opposition party and the anti-war movement were indirect and narrow and post-war electoral changes limited. Rather, the main opposition party linked with the American anti-war movement does not ordinarily gain representation in the national government. Moreover, the Democratic Party was not very successful in mobilizing voters in this party system context lacking relevant parties allied to the anti-war movement.

In Belgium, although several leftist governing parties and several opposition parties are signatories to the Platform Against War on Iraq which organized the February 15, 2003 protests, electoral gains for these parties were mixed. Included amongst parties that allied to the anti-war movement were parties that were part of the government at the time, the Socialist Partij Anders and Spirit (SP.A-SPIRIT), the


Flemish social-democratic Socialist Party Differently and the Flemish progressive Spirit, and the Parti Socialiste (PS), the Francophone social-democratic Socialist Party.\textsuperscript{43} Other parties that were allies included two parties that were a part of the governing coalition during the beginning of the war, but which were removed and became part of the opposition as a result of the May 2003 elections: the Francophone ecologist party, Ecolo, and the Flemish ecologist party, Agalev.\textsuperscript{44} Finally, two opposition parties were also included in the list of signatories, the Nieuw-Vlaams Alliantie (N-VA), separatist New Flemish Alliance, and Flemish liberal Vivant.\textsuperscript{45} The governing parties’ acquiescence to weapons transports was controversial, and thus on February 15, 2003, when the PS and Ecolo (at the time members of the governing coalition) participated in the protest under their own names, their representatives were targeted by protesters who threw eggs.\textsuperscript{46} In Belgium, party-movement alliances thus included ties with several governing parties (SP.A-Spirit and PS), several governing parties that subsequently lost their inclusion in the governing coalition due to electoral shifts (Ecolo and Agalev), and two opposition parties (N-VA and Vivant). Mixed results were obtained by different parties allied to the movement, perhaps also a reflection of the complicated party system context in which Belgian protesters can couple their protesting and voting.

It appears that in certain contexts, when parties of the opposition ally with social movements in tune to the issue consensus on grievances of the bulk of the

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
population, social movement mobilization can feed into voter mobilization and
electoral winnings, even in elections in industrialized democracies that have recently
been plagued by voter apathy. Although support for movement-related grievances or
common targets may account for some coupling, it seems that the party system and
electoral context serves as a lens through which the impact of targets and grievances
is refracted. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the number of party allies to choose from
and the certainty with which a vote for a party translates into a party entering a
governing coalition, may influence voters interested in casting a protest vote.

Ironically, both the United States, with the limited electoral choices its
moderate two-party system provides for activists seeking to cast protest votes, and
consociational democracies like the Netherlands and Belgium, with the high number
of electoral choices and high uncertainty regarding the formation of governing
coalitions that their polarized multi-party system provides for activists seeking to cast
protest votes, appear to be the contexts within which casting protest votes is most
difficult. Dutch and Belgian voters may disagree over which parties to vote for
because some are interested in seeing gains for parties that are coalitionable and
others care more about seeing gains for parties best articulating their grievances.
Further, in the United States, voters considering casting protest votes may disagree
over whether it is important to vote at all or whether they should settle for voting for a
party that is electable but in many ways unresponsive to movement-related
grievances. In contrast, Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom, which provided
some party allies in the left or in the opposition and which are characterized by less
uncertainty regarding government formation, appear to be contexts in which it is easier to cast protest votes.

However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the issue consensus concerning movement-related grievances in “Coalition of the Willing” countries may also play a role in determining how successfully protest votes are cast and result in electoral change. Opposing U.S. unilateralism in a country that has already taken a stance supporting such unilateralism creates an opportunity structure in which protesters may not feel that their protest vote is likely to be efficacious. Perhaps it even leads them to decouple their protesting and voting. However, when there is an issue consensus on movement-related grievances creating a different opportunity structure, in which voting appears more likely to be efficacious, coupling can occur. This possibility for coupling may be even more likely when the party system and electoral context also make protest voting appear likely to be efficacious. While the Spanish success in coupling in the 2004 election may be exceptional, it is certainly replicable and thus the possibilities for coupling are worth exploring further.

Therefore, issue consensus concerning movement-related grievances such as opposing U.S. unilateralism, may exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders, facilitating the coupling of protesting and voting. However, the mobilizational potential for parties allied with the anti-war movement who are using these grievances to try to recruit potential voters, may be refracted through the lens of the party system and electoral context. Linkages between global social movements and voter mobilization are not merely possible because of the well-being of democracy in industrialized democracies. Rather, such insider-outsider ties may be driven by
movement-related grievances concerning global democratic deficits. In the case of the anti-war movement, rising opposition to U.S. unilateralism and its denial of the legitimacy-conferring authority of the United Nations may drive ties between insiders and outsiders and between insider activism and outsider activism.

To conclude, there are several directions in which I would like to develop my research. It is clear that insider and outsider activism fall along a spectrum of activism, a continuum which in and of itself needs more exploration. In examining this spectrum and exploring the grey areas in between insider and outsider activism, a broader range of tactics should be measured and analyzed. Further, there are important variations in the relations between insiders and outsiders and in the pairing of insider and outsider activism, which need to be accounted for. I intend to conduct additional interviews with activists to investigate insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in the anti-war movement and in the global justice movement, cross-nationally. Likewise, the dynamic linkages between insiders in political parties and labor unions and outsiders in global social movements need a lot more attention, especially because of their implications in terms of high protest mobilization and success in getting politicians to attend to protest actions.

Since most are indeed coupling protesting and voting and many are engaging in multiple forms of global protests, the interaction between global protesting and voting needs additional exploration as well. Hence, as the war in Iraq progresses and the fifth anniversary of the war arrives just prior to the 2008 Presidential election, I intend to conduct new protester surveys. To improve the operationalization, I will ask in detail about both retrospective and prospective global protesting and voting.
As aforementioned, it would also be very beneficial to expand the macro-level analysis of February 15, 2003 protests in the European Union to multiple dates of global protests. To improve the coding of protest mobilization level and of insiders and outsiders’ participation in these protests, I hope to supplement the content analysis of news coverage of the protests with elite interviews of activists. I am thus currently in the process of developing panel data of transnational anti-war protests in the EU on the dates of global protest mentioned in Chapter 3. In doing this additional research, I plan to focus especially on comparing transnational protests in the CEE states with transnational protests in the EU-15.

The impact of targets on transnational activism needs to be examined further. First, as Tarrow suggests, international institutions that are more clearly affiliated with the Washington consensus on neoliberalism may provide activists with stronger targets. Likewise, domestic governments that provided more troops to the “Coalition of the Willing” may also pose stronger targets. It is essential to gather time series data on protests targeting different types of domestic and international institutions, in order to piece out these types of effects particular to the opportunity structure.

Further, activists in other issue areas have encountered different domestic opportunity structures, and thus other issue areas provide new opportunities to see whether strong domestic targets elicit insider-outsider cooperation and a blurring of the divides between insider and outsider activism. For instance, in Canada, the Netherlands, the United States, and France, very different opportunity structures have emerged concerning same-sex marriage. I aim to explore how these divergent domestic opportunity structures impact insiders and outsiders.
As I conduct additional research on the anti-war and anti-globalization movements, as well as on other forms of activism, I will also examine the impact of movement-related grievances in more detail. The level of issue consensus and issue discord on these grievances within movements and in public opinion needs more exploration empirically, to account for variation cross-nationally and temporally. As I examine other forms of activism, key movement-related grievances and the issue consensus and issue discord on these grievances need investigation, to see how well the arguments developed in this dissertation generalize to other movements.

Finally, several additional factors were raised in the dissertation, which merit further exploration. The party system and electoral context needs additional investigation at the meso-level, in accounting for insider-outsider cooperation and conflict. Divergent histories of civil society, protest and participation and divergent democratization pathways also merit further exploration, especially in accounting for macro-level dynamics in protests occurring in the EU-15 and the CEE states.
Appendix 1: Structured Interview Questions for Activists

Note: Questions are supplemented with unstructured, largely open-ended questions.

- Introduction:
  - Can you begin by briefly introducing your group?

- Grievances and targets:
  - What are issues that your group focuses on? Please rank them in importance. If these issues have changed over time, why so?

- Insider- Outsider Relations:
  - What are the most important organizations that you work with on a regular basis, and which organizations is it difficult to partner with?
    - For each organization discussed:
      - Is this organization more focused on influencing the government via lobbying, voting, or campaign connections or via protest, strikes, public pressure, etc.?
      - Why is it easy to cooperate with these groups, or why is it difficult to collaborate?
      - On which protest events, have you collaborated or failed to collaborate? Why?

- Party-Movement Ties:
  - Which political parties have you worked with?
  - How and why have those ties changed?

- Insider or Outsider Focus:
  - Which types of tactics does your organization use to advance the issues that you care about? (Use prompts if necessary.)
    - lobby for or against legislation
    - volunteering for a political party
    - voter registration
    - voter education or public education
    - organize conferences
    - endorse political candidates
    - sponsor petitions
    - participate in government hearings
    - sponsor letter-writing campaigns
    - contacting elected officials
    - organize boycotts
    - organize demonstrations, marches, or rallies
    - organize sit-ins
    - organize the occupation of buildings or factories
    - organize civil disobedience
  - How has your tactical focus changed? Why?

- Ties with the State: Inclusion/Exclusion, Repression/Accommodation
  - Do you feel that in your activities you are included and represented in the government? Has your group had hostile relationships with the government or police? How so?
Appendix 2: Chronology of Domestic Targets in the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Targets in Older EU Member States, Through the 1995 Accessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Austria did not commit troops to the interventions in Iraq or in Afghanistan, and it did not permit Iraq-related over-flights. According to Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel, Austria was unwilling to join the “Coalition of the Willing” without a preliminary decision by the United Nations. The Austrian position stems in part from its commitment to neutrality, “by the 1955 State Treaty and its constitution, which prohibits membership of military alliances and the establishment of foreign military bases on its territory.” However, Austria did commit to finance reconstruction efforts in Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Belgium was unwilling to join the “Coalition of the Willing” intervention in Iraq, but has provided military support in Afghanistan. In an interview during the run up to the war in Iraq, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt stated that “If the war is conducted within the framework of the United Nations, we will examine how we might contribute.” After U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the U.S. case for a military intervention in Iraq to the United Nations, Belgium maintained its opposition to an intervention. Although U.S. forces began to transit via Belgian ports and airspace, Belgium declared that these transit rights would no longer be given, if the U.S. intervened in Iraq without UN backing. According to MacLeod, Belgium has allowed over-flights. Belgium has committed troops to Afghanistan and Kosovo, but continued its reluctance to send troops to Iraq, as the war progressed. However, Belgium did contribute significant funding for humanitarian aid in post-war Iraq.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Denmark | Denmark officially joined the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq and also supported the intervention in Afghanistan militarily. Early on, it officially supported the U.S. war plans, but decided against deploying “an elite ground force.” Danish Prime Minister, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, was a signatory to the


54 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing:' 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. The Ottawa Citizen, March 26, A4.


“letter of Eight,” supporting the U.S. Despite its early reluctance to contribute a ground force, Denmark contributed a “submarine, warship and a medical team” and assisted in intelligence gathering and “providing early warning.” Additionally, since then, several hundred Danish soldiers have been deployed to the Southwest of Iraq, under British command. The mandate for Danish troops to be in Iraq has been extended several times since 2003, most recently via a May 2006 parliamentary vote that extended the mandate to July 1, 2007. Although “two opposition parties, the Radicals and Social Democrats, have withdrawn their support for a Danish presence in Iraq,” the centre-right government of Prime Minister Rasmussen has maintained some support for Danish involvement. However, Denmark is currently considering at least partial troop withdrawal in the spring of 2007. Denmark also has deployed troops to Afghanistan, under British command, and the government has been criticized for Danish troops’ role in turning over prisoners to U.S. forces who were then allegedly beaten and mistreated.

### 4 Finland

Finland did not join the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq, but did deploy some troops in Afghanistan. Finland opposed a military intervention in Iraq without a preliminary UN decision. Finland took this standpoint, in part, due to a historical neutrality that started via “a non-aggression pact it signed with the Soviet Union in 1948,” a stance it has since moderated by entering into EU (but not NATO) military structures. Finland's prime minister Paavo Lipponen joined in calls to permit UN Weapons inspectors to continue their work in Iraq. In an election that occurred just as the war in Iraq started in March 2003, the opposition party won enough votes to put a new Prime Minister, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, into office, but she submitted her resignation within months over allegations that secret documents were illicitly leaked during the electoral campaign, which had suggested Lipponen supported the U.S. intervention in Iraq, in defiance of Finnish neutrality and which had proven costly in the election. Although Finland has not contributed troops to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq, it has provided financial backing for humanitarian relief efforts there. In contrast, Finland did back “the sending of Finnish peacekeeper forces to Afghanistan for crisis management.

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61 Agence France Presse. 2006. Denmark to keep forces in Iraq for 12 more months. May 5.
62 Ibid.
63 Agence France Presse. 2007. Denmark considers partial withdrawal from Iraq this spring. January 3.
64 Agence France Presse. 2006. Danish PM in hot water over claims of troops’ wrongdoings in Afghanistan. December 5.
66 Ibid.
5 France

Similarly, France did not join the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq, but has supported the intervention in Afghanistan. As President Jacques Chirac stated as the U.S. was making the case for the war in Iraq, “war is always the proof of failure and the worst of solutions, so everything must be done to avoid it;” “Our aim is to put the power of Europe at the service of peace. That underlines our actions in Afghanistan and in the Iraq crisis.” France argued in favor of more time for UN Weapons Inspectors and opposed unilateral U.S. action in Iraq in defiance of international law. After the military intervention in Iraq started, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld persisted in asking France as well as Germany to provide financial and military support, but Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin made clear that France would not participate without a preliminary UN decision and a UN-based peacekeeping force. Although France did send troops to Afghanistan, it has withdrawn elite Special Forces there that are not so well-equipped for the continued fighting on the ground, in response to an increasingly violent insurgency there.

6 Germany

Germany joined the French opposition to the War in Iraq, but has supported the intervention in Afghanistan. At the onset to the war in Iraq, Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder stated, “In the crises involving terrorism, Iraq and North Korea, our peoples can count on the governments of Germany and France to join forces to preserve peace, avoid war and ensure people's security;” “Don't expect Germany to approve a resolution legitimizing war …” After German Chancellor Angela Merkel, from the opposition, came to power, Germany’s stance changed somewhat, although fundamentally Germany has continued its policy of not deploying troops in Iraq. Germany has, however, assisted in the reconstruction effort in Iraq, as recognized by Merkel: “In spite of the fact that we don't have troops on the ground there, stability there is in our very own vested interest, and we've shown that through commitments that we've entered on in other areas.” Although Germany has sent troops to Afghanistan, especially in the more peaceful northern region, focused on security and reconstruction, Germany has also been reluctant to provide troop deployments in the South where combat with resurgent Taliban fighters has been more dangerous.

7 Greece

Greece opposed the military intervention in Iraq, but has provided some troops in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Costas Simitis stated that Greece was “against this war, which could have been avoided,” and that “there should have

| 72 Ibid. |
| 77 Ibid. |

222
been clear instructions from the United Nations on military intervention, and only once all other possibilities had been exhausted.”

However, Greece also worked with the U.S., prolonging U.S. rights to military bases in Greece. According to MacLeod, the “U.S. naval base in Crete serves U.S. 6th Fleet and supports navy and air force intelligence-gathering planes.” While Greece has also allowed “use of airspace under NATO and bilateral defense agreements,” it has continued to oppose sending troops to Iraq. Its reluctance on Iraq notwithstanding, Greece has indeed deployed troops to Afghanistan, though it has been reluctant to increase deployments.

| 8 Ireland | Ireland did not join the “Coalition of the Willing,” opposing the military intervention in Iraq, but it did offer some support in Afghanistan. In fact, Prime Minister Bertie Ahern offered words of support to the anti-war demonstrators on February 15, 2003, and stated that the Irish government would “stick with the Security Council: ‘If they (Iraq) do not comply with the Security Council it will have to face up to its responsibility and then the situation will have to be discussed.’” Ireland ruled out sending troops to Iraq. However, despite not being “supportive” of the war, Ireland did support “the humanitarian relief effort” and provided overflight facilities. Additionally, Ireland has sent some troops to Afghanistan. |
| 9 Italy | Italy joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” and has sent troops to both Iraq and Afghanistan, but it has pulled its ground troops out of Iraq after the 2006 electoral outcome which led to a power shift in the government. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi had rather quickly indicated support of the military intervention in Iraq, as “The Italian government signed the famous ‘letter of Eight’ at the end of January, along with Spain, with the United Kingdom, and with a number of central and East European countries, in order to voice support for the U.S. position.” In fact, he “had already and quite explicitly made a commitment to granting the use of bases in Italy and of overflight permission to the U.S. armed forces in the event of a war.” However, facing the opposition parties, massive anti-war movement, and the Pope’s outcry at home, he began to “loosen up his stance and to make his first ‘pacifist’ remarks, even going as far as to define unilateral action on the United States’ part as ‘wrong.’” Less than a month after the war started, he announced that Italy was sending peacekeepers to Iraq. When it was clear that his |

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80 Ibid.
81 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing:' 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. The Ottawa Citizen, March 26, A4.
82 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
conservative stance could stand to hurt him during upcoming April 2006 elections, especially with popular center-left opposition candidate Romano Prodi making the campaign promise to “bring Italian troops home and replace the contingent with a civilian force,” Berlusconi announced that troop withdrawals would begin in June. After Prime Minister Berlusconi faced electoral defeat, the new Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, made good on his campaign promise to withdraw Italian troops in Iraq, and as of December 2006, the last troops were set to return to Italy. Italy also has sent troops to Afghanistan and recently reaffirmed its commitment there as part of the ISAF.

Luxembourg did not join the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq, but has supported the intervention in Afghanistan. Luxembourg opposed the war in Iraq, and Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker has called for a prominent UN role in reconstruction efforts. Luxembourg also has contributed troops to the ISAF in Afghanistan.

The Netherlands supported the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq as well as the intervention in Afghanistan, but withdrew Dutch troops from Iraq during 2005. The Netherlands quickly authorized the U.S. to use “Amsterdam's Schiphol airport, Rotterdam port and the railways” for “the transport of U.S. military materials and personnel.” According to MacLeod, the Dutch also “contributed three Patriot missile batteries and 360 soldiers to help defend Turkey against any Iraqi counterattack.” A new coalition government that was installed just as the war in Iraq was starting, quickly authorized deployment of Dutch troops to Iraq, expanding its support of the war from political and back-up support to material support. The new Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, stated, “The Dutch government feels it is of utmost importance to help secure the safety, stability and recovery of Iraq.” The Netherlands decided to withdraw their troops in Iraq by March 2005, at the end of Dutch troops’ mandate, turning down requests for an extension. However, the Dutch have maintained troops as part of the ISAF in Afghanistan, expanding deployment in 2006.

Portugal joined the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq and also sent troops to Afghanistan, but has since withdrawn its troops from Iraq, following the Iraqi

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92 Sanminiatelli, Maria. 2006. Italy to pull 1,100 troops from Iraq. Associated Press, May 27.
94 Agence France Presse. 2007. Italy will ‘hold firmly’ to Afghanistan commitments; Prodi. February 16.
99 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The ‘coalition of the willing:’ 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. The Ottawa Citizen, March 26, A4.
101 Ibid.
elections. Conservative Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso was a signatory to the “letter of Eight,” supporting the U.S. He stated that Portugal must “side with the U.S.,” their ally, in the case of a conflict with Iraq, even without a preliminary UN decision, and argued, “It would be a great mistake if the U.S. were ignored while building the future EU. It would be a mistake if the importance of the Euro-Atlantic partnership were overlooked.” Portugal quickly permitted the U.S. to refuel on an airbase in their territory, and signed a “letter supporting U.S. policy.” In May 2003, it deployed 120 military policemen to Iraq, to “carry out tasks on ensuring law and order in the country.” In February 2005, after the Iraqi elections occurred on January 31, Portugal began to withdraw its troops from Iraq. Portugal has maintained a small contingent of troops in Afghanistan.

13 Spain

Spain quickly joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” and has sent troops to both Iraq and Afghanistan, but after an electoral defeat in March 2004, it withdrew its troops from Iraq. Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar (of the conservative Popular Party) was a signatory to the “letter of Eight,” supporting the U.S. According to MacLeod, Spain “committed about 900 military personnel to man a medical support vessel equipped with nuclear, biological and chemical treatment facilities” and “opened NATO bases to use.” After the Madrid train bombings and resounding public protest in opposition to the Spanish involvement in the war in Iraq, the government faced a stunning electoral defeat in March 2004. The new Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, of the center-left Socialist party ordered Spanish troops to be withdrawn from Iraq, the day after he was sworn in, alleging “they should have never been sent there,” a withdrawal that was quickly completed during the spring of 2004. He critiqued the war in Iraq for its unilateralism, disregard for international law, and preemptive rationale, stating, “The mission in Iraq, which is showing itself every day to be a failure, should serve as a lesson to the international community: preemptive wars, never again; violations of international law, never again.” Although Spain has deployed several hundred troops to Afghanistan, it is resolute not to increase its deployment there.


105 Agence France Presse. 2003. Portugal says it has to support US over Iraq. March 11.

106 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing': 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. The Ottawa Citizen, March 26, A4.


109 Agence France Presse. 2006. Portugal rules out sending more troops to Afghanistan. September 27.


111 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing': 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. The Ottawa Citizen, March 26, A4.


113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Targets in CEE States Acceding to the EU, 2004-2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Bulgaria</td>
<td>Bulgaria joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” sending troops to Iraq, and also has provided military support in Afghanistan, but it has withdrawn combat troops from Iraq in 2005, maintaining a small number of other personnel there since. Early on, in March 2003, Bulgaria, whose NATO membership was pending.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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117 Ibid.
121 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing': 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. The Ottawa Citizen, March 26, A4.
“offered use of airspace, bases and refueling for U.S. warplanes and use of its Black Sea port;” planned to send “up to 150 biological, chemical, nuclear warfare specialists to Kuwait;” and signed a “letter supporting U.S. policy in Iraq.” According to MacLeod, “Bulgaria is reportedly owed $1.7 billion U.S. by Iraq and Mr. Bush has promised that a post-war Iraq will repay its debts. Bulgarian companies also are hoping to land some of the engineering and construction contracts for rebuilding Iraq.” Bulgaria maintained troops in Iraq for more than two years, but withdrew its military troops from Iraq by the end of December 2005, maintaining only a limited number of other personnel for non-military tasks. Bulgaria has also contributed troops to the intervention in Afghanistan.

| 2 Czech Republic | The Czech Republic joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” supporting the intervention in Iraq, as well as supporting the intervention in Afghanistan. Czech President Vaclav Havel was a signatory to the “letter of Eight,” supportive of the U.S. As of March 2003, the Czech Republic allowed “overflights of coalition warplanes,” planned to send a “small team of biological, chemical, nuclear decontamination experts to the Persian Gulf,” and also signed a letter supporting U.S. policy. According to Rice, Czech “special chemical- and biological-weapon response forces” were already “in Kuwait, ready to act to a potential Iraqi WMD attack anywhere in the theater.” Since 2003, the Czech republic provided staffing for a military hospital, assisted in training of the police, and as of December 2006 deployed troops to “an international base in Basra in southern Iraq.” The Czech Republic has also contributed troops to the intervention in Afghanistan.

| 3 Estonia | Estonia joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” and it has sent troops to the interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In March 2003, Estonia, another country trying to get NATO membership, had also signed a letter supporting U.S. policy and was “considering post-war mine clearing and refugee aid.” In fact, according to Rice, “months ago, the prime minister of Estonia told President Bush that he did not need an explanation of the need to confront Iraq. Because the great democracies failed to act in the 1930s, his people lived in slavery for 50 years.” As part of Estonia’s support of the “Coalition of the Willing,” several dozen Estonian troops have been deployed in Iraq since 2003. Additionally, Estonia has also contributed troops...

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126 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing:' 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. *The Ottawa Citizen*, March 26, A4.
127 Ibid.
131 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing:' 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. *The Ottawa Citizen*, March 26, A4.
135 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing:' 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. *The Ottawa Citizen*, March 26, A4.
138 Ibid.
to the intervention in Afghanistan since 2003, with a mandate through December 2007.\(^{139}\)

| 4 Hungary | Like Bulgaria, Hungary joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” sent troops to the interventions in Iraq and in Afghanistan, but has since withdrawn its troops from Iraq. Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy was a signatory to the “letter of Eight,” supporting the U.S.\(^{140}\) As of March 2003, Hungary was hosting “a U.S. base where Iraqi exiles have been trained for possible post-war administrative roles,” allowed “coalition overflights,” and signed a letter supporting U.S. policy, allegedly “hoping for U.S. arms deals.”\(^{141}\) Hungary contributed several hundred troops to Iraq.\(^{142}\) After a change in power following elections, and in the face of high public opposition to Hungarian involvement in Iraq, the new Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, announced that Hungarian troops would be withdrawn by March 2005, after the Iraqi elections.\(^{143}\) Additionally, Prime Minister Gyurcsány stated that he did not agree with the justification for war, “Personally, as the father of four children, as a young man, as a working Hungarian who trusts in the future, and as head of government, I believe not in preventive war but in policies which prevent conflicts.”\(^{144}\) Hungary has also contributed troops to the intervention in Afghanistan since 2003.\(^{145}\) |
| 5 Latvia | Like the Czech Republic and Estonia, Latvia joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” and has sent troops to the interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Latvia, in March 2003, also aspired to join NATO.\(^{146}\) It also has been very supportive of the United States, since it broke away from the former Soviet Union.\(^{147}\) These factors may have played a role in its decision to support the U.S.-led military intervention. From 2003 to the present, just over a hundred troops have been deployed by Latvia to Iraq, where they are under the Polish command.\(^{148}\) Latvia has also deployed troops to Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.\(^{149}\) |
| 6 Lithuania | Lithuania also joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” sending troops to Iraq as well as Afghanistan. As of March 2003, Lithuania, another state trying to join NATO, allowed “overflights of coalition warplanes” and signed a letter supporting U.S. policy.\(^{150}\) Lithuania has sent roughly one hundred troops to both Iraq and to Afghanistan, and although there has been some debate in parliament concerning the possibility of withdrawal from Iraq, Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas |
has emphasized that Lithuania is not considering a withdrawal of troops from Iraq.\textsuperscript{151}

| 7 Poland | Early on, Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller was a signatory to the “letter of Eight,” supporting the U.S.\textsuperscript{152} Poland had decided, by March 2003, to deploy “up to 200 troops in non-combat role.”\textsuperscript{153} According the MacLeod, “Poland is also reportedly being courted by the U.S. to host a new U.S. military base,” and “recently received [a] $3.8-billion U.S. loan to purchase U.S. F16 combat jets.”\textsuperscript{154} Since its initial deployment, Poland has increased the number of troops in Iraq, and as a close ally to the U.S., had “been entrusted with the command of the 7,000-strong multinational force in south-central Iraq.”\textsuperscript{155} In 2005, after the Pope died, the Polish parliament voted to withdraw its troops by the end of 2005, and in fact began to reduce troop numbers in Iraq.\textsuperscript{156} However, after ousting the leftist government in the September 2005 elections, one of the first actions taken by the new right-wing President Lech Kaczyński, once taking office in December 2005, was to extend the Polish involvement in Iraq.\textsuperscript{157} Poland has not only extended its involvement in Iraq until at least the end of 2007, but it has also committed roughly a thousand troops to the intervention in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{158} However, this commitment by the President has been challenged by the co-ruling party, the League of Polish families, which has called for a national referendum to be held “on Poland's participation in military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan” in spring 2007.\textsuperscript{159} |

| 8 Romania | Romania joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” and has deployed troops to the interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan. As of March 2003, Romania, which also was waiting to join NATO, had decided to have their “airspace and a base open to U.S. warplanes,” to send “non-combat specialists in chemical decontamination,” and to sign a letter supporting U.S. policy.\textsuperscript{160} Since then, Romania has deployed roughly 2,000 troops to both Iraq and to Afghanistan, and it is expected to maintain this role in 2007.\textsuperscript{161} |

| 9 Slovakia | Like Bulgaria and Hungary, Slovakia joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” sending troops to Iraq and to Afghanistan, but it has since begun a withdrawal of troops deployed to Iraq. Slovakia, with pending NATO membership, also had “committed non-combat troops specializing in chemical warfare decontamination” as of March 2003.\textsuperscript{162} According to Rice, Slovak “special chemical-and biological- |

\textsuperscript{151} Agence France Presse. 2005. Lithuania will not recall its troops from Iraq: PM. August 30.
\textsuperscript{152} BBC News. 2003. The leaders of eight European states have issued a joint declaration of solidarity with the United States in its campaign to disarm Saddam Hussein. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2708023.stm (accessed February 18, 2007).
\textsuperscript{153} MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing': 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. The Ottawa Citizen, March 26, A4.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{160} MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing': 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. The Ottawa Citizen, March 26, A4.
\textsuperscript{161} Agence France Presse. 2006. Romania to maintain its troops in Iraq, Afghanistan in 2007. December 17.
\textsuperscript{162} MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing': 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. The Ottawa Citizen, March 26, A4.
weapon response forces” were already “in Kuwait, ready to act to a potential Iraqi WMD attack anywhere in the theater.” Since 2002, Slovakia has deployed several dozen troops to Afghanistan, and since 2003, roughly 100 troops have been deployed to Iraq. Leading into the June 2006 parliamentary elections, the leader of the main opposition party, Robert Fico of the Smer-Social Democracy party, announced that his party is opposed to the intervention in Iraq as a violation of international law and “will make a decision on the withdrawal of the Slovak military mission from Iraq immediately after it enters the new government.” As of January 2007, Slovakia began its withdrawal of troops from Iraq, to be completed by the end of February 2007.

10 Slovenia

Slovenia joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” but has not deployed troops to Iraq. Also, it has supported the intervention in Afghanistan, via troop deployments. As of March 2003, Slovenia, another state trying to join NATO, had “quietly indicated a willingness to offer help,” as it also signed a letter supporting U.S. policy in Iraq. However, Slovenia has not deployed troops to Iraq for military purposes, but has deployed 4 officers as part of a “peace mission” to Iraq to aid NATO training of Iraqi security officers. Slovenia has deployed roughly 5 dozen soldiers to Afghanistan and is considering other types of aid to Afghanistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Targets in Mediterranean States Acceding to the EU, 2004</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Cyprus</td>
<td>Cyprus did not join the “Coalition of the Willing,” but the “Cypriot cabinet … granted the U.S. access to Cyprus' airspace, hours after the United States and Britain launched military offensive against Iraq.” Additionally, Cyprus also did not take a role in the intervention in Afghanistan, but British bases in Cyprus have supplied troops to Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Malta</td>
<td>Malta did not join the “Coalition of the Willing,” or supply troops to Iraq or Afghanistan, but Maltese troops have helped train British troops, in preparation for deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.1: Targets in the European Union

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167 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The ‘coalition of the willing:’ 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of the others will expect payback. The Ottawa Citizen, March 26, A4.
### Appendix 3: Chronology of February 15, 2003 Protests in the European Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Protests in Older EU Member States, Through the 1995 Accessions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Austria</td>
<td>In Austria, more than 23,000 people protested in Vienna, Salzburg, and Klagenfurt, Austria. One journalist cites 15,000 demonstrators in Vienna while another cites 3,000. There was not much news coverage of these protests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Belgium</td>
<td>According to Barr, police estimated 50,000 protesters turned out in Brussels, Belgium on February 15. Other protest figures cite 20,000 or 100,000 demonstrators in Brussels, but 50,000 seems to be the number most commonly reported. Despite “helicopters flying over head and a heavy, but fairly discreet, police presence,” this massive protest occurred peacefully. In Brussels, a multi-generational group of protesters was mobilized, with some demonstrators who had protested in historic movements reactivated, along with their children and grandchildren. Many organized interests were represented, as “many marched behind the scarlet banners of the parties of the left, others walked with trade unions and church groups.” According to one journalist, the protesters “were a diverse lot, reflecting the ethnic, national and social mix in this most cosmopolitan of cities.” There were many Iraqi flags and “a group of Turks carried their own national flag - even though Ankara is expected tomorrow to approve the use of its territory for a U.S.-led assault on Iraq.” According to Mahony, slogans on protesters’ signs included “non à la guerre” (no to war in French); “geen oorlog” (no war in Dutch); and “no to war.” Mahony explains that many of the protesters framed the war as indelibly intertwined with the pursuit of oil. Protesters’ messages targeted both U.S. President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Blair. Protesters were generally marching in support of their government, since Belgium did not join the “Coalition of the Willing” and was reluctant to give NATO guarantees of protection to Turkey, in case of a potential spillover of the war in Iraq. Mahony states, ‘Vive les fritkots et la biere, merci Louis!’ read one placard referring to the national gastronomic pleasures (chips and beer) and the Belgian foreign minister, Louis Michel. Belgium along with France and Germany caused a rift in NATO, when it last Monday refused American requests for the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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178 Ibid.
179 Staunton, Denis. 2003. 50,000 marchers transform grey streets. *The Irish Times*, February 17, 11.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 Staunton, Denis. 2003. 50,000 marchers transform grey streets. *The Irish Times*, February 17, 11.
Alliance to protect Turkey in the event of a war - fearing this amounted to admitting that diplomatic efforts had been abandoned. Indeed, one journalist argues that the massive public protest against the war in Brussels led Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt to feel pressure not to go along with other NATO states rallying to support the war. However, some domestic targets related to the war in Iraq do remain present for Belgian anti-war protesters. On Friday February 14, Greenpeace activists protested Belgian government decisions to permit U.S. military transports and usage of ports, by blockading a supply ship chartered by the U.S. Army in the Belgian port of Antwerp, in what Greenpeace spokesman Jan Van de Putte called a “floating peace camp.” Similarly, on Sunday, February 16, the Belgian Forum for Peace Action mobilized about 15 protesters in Antwerp, where they blocked a cargo train that they claimed was part of a U.S. military transport, and also claimed they were targeting the Belgian government for silently supporting the war.

3 Denmark

According to Barr, 25,000 demonstrators turned out on February 15 in Copenhagen, Denmark. According to another article, the police estimated a protest mobilization in Copenhagen of 12,000 to 14,000, but “demonstrators, speakers, and experienced demonstration participants estimated that the figure was closer to 20,000-30,000” and protests also occurred in 10 other Danish cities. Several young protesters were arrested, for allegedly having distributed spray paint that was used to paint graffiti on the Admiralty and Commerce Courts along the protest route, but the Deputy Police Inspector Flemming Steen Munch, the Copenhagen police press spokesman, stated the protest occurred peacefully besides these arrests.

The “No War With Iraq” initiative organized the February 15 protest in Copenhagen, and endorsers included more than 100 organizations such as the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC) and the Hotel and Restaurant Workers Trade Union in Copenhagen. Like the protesters in Belgium, protesters in Denmark also made the linkage between militarization and oil interests. Speaker Holger K. Nielsen from the Socialist People's Party SF stated,

The only thing that can explain the war is that the United States wants to have power over oil. The American economy desperately needs cheap oil, and the United States’ policy in the entire Middle East cannot be separated from that need. But why should we support a war for which there are such poor reasons? Why should we contribute to thousands of Iraqi civilians getting killed?

Unlike the protesters in Brussels on February 15, the Danish demonstrators clearly targeted their domestic government and Prime Minister Rasmussen’s support of the war, bringing signs asking, “Berlin, Paris, Brussels - where is Copenhagen?” Since the protest started at the American embassy and passed by the

186 Tassier, Manu. 2003. Report says Belgium 'carried the day' at NATO meeting on Turkey's defense. Financial Times Information, February 17.
191 Ibid.
According to police estimates, around 15,000 protesters attended the Finnish protest in Helsinki, Finland on February 15, making it one of Finland’s biggest demonstrations. The protest and march to the U.S. embassy occurred peacefully, and the mobilization exceeded organizers’ expectations. Additionally, there were also other Finnish protests in Turku, Tampere, Nokia, Jyväskyla, Oulu, Rovaniemi, Savonlinna, Joensuu, Seinajoki, Kuopio, Kemi, Tornio, and Maarianhamina. The Finnish protest was organized by almost 40 civic organizations. Associations involved included “leftist parties, peace organizations, college students and people from all walks of life.” Iraqis and arabs living in Finland also participated. Some Estonians who were not permitted to demonstrate at home, traveled to Helsinki in order to protest there, opposing the Estonian government’s support of the war. The protest and march to the U.S. embassy occurred peacefully, and the mobilization exceeded organizers’ expectations. Additionally, there were also other Finnish protests in Turku, Tampere, Nokia, Jyväskyla, Oulu, Rovaniemi, Savonlinna, Joensuu, Seinajoki, Kuopio, Kemi, Tornio, and Maarianhamina. The Finnish protest was organized by almost 40 civic organizations. Associations involved included “leftist parties, peace organizations, college students and people from all walks of life.” Iraqis and arabs living in Finland also participated. Some Estonians who were not permitted to demonstrate at home, traveled to Helsinki in order to protest there, opposing the Estonian government’s support of the war. The demonstrators demanded continued weapons inspections in Iraq and opposed acts of war. The banners bore slogans which accused the United States of imperialism and compared President George W. Bush to a dictator. One organizer, Eetu Komsi, of the Left Federation Youth League, indicated that the protesters were opposed to the U.S.-led war and were targeting the Finnish leadership who would decide Finnish policy on the war, stating, “This is a message to our foreign policy leadership that the people do not approve of the United States' war plans.” Protesters shared an opposition to the war in Iraq, but represented different viewpoints on why the war was unjustified. One speaker, Matti Wuori, Member of the European Parliament (Greens), argued, The issue is not only the choice between war and peace. We are falling into an era that is shadowed by an atmosphere of violence, greed and fear. We would like to have a world where humanity, cooperation and justice prevail. This war will not be supported in our names. Another speaker, Omar Bahaaldin, spoke on behalf of Iraqi refugees in Finland, stating, “An attack on Iraq will only make the situation worse. The United States is only thinking of its own interests.” Eetu Komsi stated, “A bomb is a bomb whether or not the United States or the UN is behind it,” suggesting he, in turn, opposes war in all cases.

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192 Ibid.  
194 Ibid.  
197 Xinhua News Agency. 2003. Anti-war protests held in Finland. February 15.  
198 Ibid.  
200 Ibid.  
201 Ibid.  
204 Ibid.
According to Barr, an estimated 100,000 protesters turned out in Paris, France on February 15. Other articles state that 200,000 protesters turned out in Paris, and that overall 300,000 to 500,000 demonstrators were mobilized in France, at 60 different protest locations. Other journalists agree that the Parisian mobilization certainly exceeded 150,000 and cite over 70 French protest venues. These numbers were surprising to organizers such as Arielle Denis, the joint president of the Peace Movement which coordinated the French protests, who had expected closer to 50,000 protesters in Paris.

The Parisian protest stood out because it was very multi-generational and because of the number of every-day people, not affiliated with particular organizations, who turned out. Protesters from many different countries attended the Parisian demonstration, including Americans opposed to U.S. unilateralism. Many opposed the war because of the lack of evidence concerning weapons of mass destruction or links with terrorists, in Iraq, and would not necessarily oppose war in other cases. Signs at this protest indicated support for French opposition to the war, and opposition to the U.S. standpoint. According to one of the main organizers, Christian Picquet, “This demonstration is an alarm to all governments. The people do not want the war.” Several collaborating journalists describe many protesters “carrying posters that denounced President Bush as a ‘warmonger’ and chanting anti-American slogans.” Some signs said “we are all Iraqis,” pledged solidarity with other Arabs, or supported Palestine.

Key organizers included many leftist organizations, which marched at the front and were sponsors (and signatories) of the announcement to protest, entitled “Non à la Guerre, Oui a un Monde de Paix, de Justice et de Démocratie” (no to war, yes to a world of peace, of justice, and of democracy). Political parties, unions, anarchists, and many kinds of associations were present, but notably absent were...
far right radicals from the Front National (National Front) and Action Française (French Action). There were also many Muslims at the protest, some of whom were part of the more militant Muslim organizations in France, the Mouvement immigration-banlieue (MIB), and many who were not at the protest with an organization. In fact, some of the protesters had previously been part of the massive protests against the National Front and Le Pen in the spring of 2002. Prominent marchers at the Paris demonstration which supported President Chirac’s opposition to a war in Iraq included the anti-globalisation activist José Bové; Bernard Thibault of the Confédération Générale du Travail trade union; and some of Chirac’s “most bitter political opponents:” Communist leader Marie-George Buffet; Jean-Pierre Chevènement; Noël Mamère of the Verts (Greens); François Hollande and Régis Passerieux of the Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party); Alain Krivine of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League); and Arlette Laguiller of the Lutte Ouvrière (Worker’s Struggle).

### 6 Germany

Berlin had “up to half-a-million” protesters, with police estimates of 300,000-500,000. Several journalists report 500,000 protesters in Berlin, while others report 350,000. According to Koney, this protest mobilization set a new record in German, as the largest German demonstration heretofore had occurred in the early 1980s, “when 250,000 people protested in Bonn against stationing U.S. missiles in the country.” Buses from more than 300 cities and towns were to travel to Berlin. There were many other protests in Germany, including 20,000 who mobilized in Stuttgart.

Like the demonstration in Paris, a very multi-generational set of protesters were mobilized in Berlin. According to organizer Malte Keutzseldt of Attac, Germany, “Opposition is broader than at any time in the past. The peace movement is getting older now, but a new generation of young people is deeply concerned.

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217 Ibid.
218 Ibid.
220 Ibid.

235
The churches and unions have linked to make the coalition far broader than even the anti-nuclear missile marches in the 1980s.227 Associations involved in organizing the demonstration included “unions, rights groups, and political associations.”228

Demonstrators in Berlin supported the German government’s opposition to the war in Iraq and the maintenance of this standpoint, American pressures notwithstanding.229 German protesters also made the linkage between economic interests, especially oil interests, and the militarization in Iraq, carrying signs like, “No Blood for Oil.”230 Further, some protesters carried signs accusing the U.S. of imperialist and hegemonic militaristic motivations, such as “The axis of evil runs through the Pentagon.” 231 Other protesters’ signs indicated support of the “Old Europe” that had been used derisively by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, against the countries that were not joining the “Coalition of the Willing.”232

Participants included politicians and former pro-democracy activists.233 There were many symbolic allusions to the recent civil society-led democratization in Germany, just over a decade prior. Cowell states, “In Berlin, protesters from the eastern and western parts of the city met at the Brandenburg Gate, once a symbol of the city’s cold war division.”234 According several journalists (2003), “Three members of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's centre-left cabinet defied his express wishes and joined the march.”235 The following cabinet ministers decided to participate in the protest as members of parliament, not as cabinet ministers: Economic Cooperation Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul; Environment Minister Juergen Trittin; and Agriculture Minister Renate Kuenast.236

7 Greece Although one source cited 200,000 protesters in Athens and 100,000 protesters in other Greek cities on February 15, most articles cited lower protest mobilizations.237 Another source said 20,000 people were mobilized at the main protest at Syntagma Square in Athens, Greece, before the march to the U.S. Embassy.238 A third source cites 30,000 people mobilized in Athens as well as the

228 Agence France Presse. 2003. One million on the march as global anti-war protests kick off. February 15.
The discrepancy in these protest numbers may be due to the fact that several protests rallies occurred before the joint march. For instance, in a smaller protest action in Athens, “Several thousand protesters in Athens, Greece, unfurled a giant banner across the wall of the Acropolis – “NATO, U.S. and EU equals War” - before heading toward the U.S. Embassy.” A protest of about 10,000 participants was mobilized in the port city of Thessaloniki. The city of Hania on Crete also had a protest of about 90,000. Protests also occurred in Patras, Kavala, Iraklio, Hania, Trikala, and Karditsa.

Several hundred anarchists smashed windows, burned cars, and attacked the offices of the Athens daily Ta Nea. As a result, there were “scuffles” between some anarchists and police in Athens that garnered a lot of media coverage. Although most of the protest was orderly and peaceful, teargas was used to disperse the trouble-makers, many cars were destroyed and a guard hurt. The main opposition party, New Democracy, condemned the violence. Additionally, Christos Protopappas, a government spokesman, spoke to condone the trouble-makers and support the message of many peaceful protesters: “The people who inspired these attacks and carried them out, who tried to stir up trouble, will not succeeding overshadowing the magnificent, anti-war message sent out by today's rally.”

Greek protests were endorsed by “the country's largest labour union and Greece's governing Socialist party.” Participants at the protest included representatives of political parties, trade unions and peace groups, political leaders, political refugees, public figures and citizens, spanning children to pensioners. Action Thessaloniki 2003, which would eventually be active in the protest and counter-summit targeting the E.U. Summit in June 2003, was already mobilized at this protest, on February 15.

Many politicians in the government were supportive of the protesters’ grievances. A statement put out by parliament speaker Apostolos Kaklamanis in support of the protest maintained, “We refuse the United States the right, in the name of its military and political power, to ignore the will of the international community.” Several political parties participated in the protest, including key figures within these parties. For instance, Costas Laliotis, the leader of the ruling PASOK party's central committee, participated, and told reporters,

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242 People’s Press Printing Society Ltd. 2003. The world speaks out: Millions take to the streets in global protest. February 17, 2.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
We have joined forces to say yes to peace and no to war... We want to besiege (U.S. president George) Bush and (Iraqi president) Saddam Hussein. Bush should not embark on unilateral military initiatives and intervention. We are saying no to the war. ... In addition, Saddam Hussein must respect UN resolutions and decisions, and proceed to disarm Iraq in terms of weapons of mass destruction. Other participants in the protest who opposed the war included Aleka Papariga, the chief of the Communist Party; Nikos Constantoulous, the head of the Coalition for the Left and Progress, and Dimitris Tsovolas, the leader of the Democratic Social Movement. Support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict via the United Nations was also voiced by Evangelos Meimarakis, the secretary of the New Democracy party's central committee.

Both the British government and U.S. government were targeted, with flags burned at their embassy or consulate en route. The Greek government was also targeted, with the call to stay out of a war in Iraq. Chants such as “Down with the United States,” “Americans are murderers,” and “War is not the only answer” and the many Iraqi flags that were visible revealed that protesters were largely targeting the United States, opposed to militarization as a solution to the conflict, and felt solidarity with the Iraqi people. Many posters read “No to War,” “Imperialism is the enemy,” and “No bloodshed for war.” Similarly, speeches at the protest reiterated the protesters’ demands for stopping the war; for working within the framework of international law, via the United Nations, to peacefully resolve the conflict; and for banning weapons of mass destruction.

According to one journalist, 80,000 protesters attended the February 15 demonstration in Dublin, Ireland, whereas another journalist cites 100,000 protesters. Other figures cited include 90,000. According to Pat Rabbitte, Labour leader, the most noteworthy feature of the protest was not its scope, but rather the diversity and run-of-the-mill character of the citizens who were mobilized: “This wasn't the professional protesters…. This wasn't the round-up of the usual suspects or the usual political leadership or whatever…. This was comprised of a great diversity of ordinary people of all classes.” The protest occurred peacefully, with a minimal “Garda” presence.

The Irish Anti-War Movement, the Non-Governmental Organization Peace Alliance, and the Peace and Neutrality Alliance organized the protest. Both the Irish government and the supporters of the U.S. led war in Iraq were targeted, and

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255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 De Bredun, Deaglan. 2003. 100,000 people march in Dublin to say ‘no’ to war. Irish Times, February 17, 8.
268 Ibid.
although protesters agreed that they opposed war, a variety of grievances were elucidated, as is evident from the comments made by different organizers.

Several organizers focused on opposing all kinds of war. Richard Boyd Barrett, one of the main organizers, said “The only thing that is important is that we are part of the human race and we stand in solidarity with any part of the human race that is threatened with war.” \[267\] Brendan Butler of the NGO Peace Alliance called on the Government to oppose war under all circumstances. \[268\]

Protesters also had grievances particular to the Irish involvement in the war in Iraq, targeting the domestic government for its willingness to permit the Shannon airport’s usage in refueling of American military planes. \[269\] According to De Breathn, speaker after speaker sharply criticised the Government for failing to take an unequivocal stance against military action in Iraq and some accused the Taoiseach, Mr. Ahern, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cowen, of complicity in the war-plans of President Bush and the British Prime Minister, Mr. Blair. \[270\]

Along these lines, Carol Fox, of the Peace and Neutrality Alliance, argued that Irish historic neutrality is threatened by the government’s tacit support of the war, stating “Bertie Ahern is now in charge of a war cabinet, facilitating an illegal and immoral war. Our neutrality is in bits, we are now a colony once again, a military outpost for the U.S. superpower.” \[271\]

The linkages between oil and the war and between imperialism and war were also attended to in Ireland. Although acknowledging the brutality of Hussein’s authoritarian regimes, Fox argued that “the Blair-Bush project” was not about improving human rights, but rather “it is about oil rights.” \[272\] Additionally, the linkage between imperialism and the cause for war was attended to by speakers such as Roger Cole, also of the Peace and Neutrality Alliance, who said Taoiseach Bertie Ahern was the “first leader of this country to lead us into an imperial war since John Redmond.” \[273\]

Many politicians from the opposition parties attended protest rallies, and so too has there been notable labor and religious opposition of the war. Politicians attending the demonstration included Michael D. Higgins (Labour), Aengus O. Snodaigh (Sinn Fein), and Patricia McKenna (Green, Member of the European Parliament). \[274\] Politicians speaking at the rallies targeted both the Irish government’s standpoint on the war as well as the “Coalition of the Willing.” Michael D. Higgins, the Labour Party spokesman, spoke at the demonstration, advocating that the government “break its silence now” and oppose the war. \[275\] Assembly Delegate (TD) Joe Higgins (Socialist Party), said of the global protests, “Humanity itself directs that you (President Bush and his allies) do not unleash your weapons of mass destruction on the heads of the Iraqi people.”

\[267\] Ibid.

\[268\] Ibid.


\[270\] De Breathn, Deaglan. 2003. 100,000 people march in Dublin to say ‘no’ to war. Irish Times, February 17, 8.

\[271\] Ibid.

\[272\] Ibid.

\[273\] Ibid.


\[275\] De Breathn, Deaglan. 2003. 100,000 people march in Dublin to say ‘no’ to war. Irish Times, February 17, 8.
Key union leaders also took standpoints opposing the war, basing their criticism on the likely aftermath of the war, criticizing the policy-making of the Bush administration, but taking care to clarify that they are not opposed to Americans per se and do not align themselves with Hussein. Des Geraghty, the president of SIPTU, Ireland's largest trade union, said at the protest, “We are ‘pro’ the American people but we will not tolerate the warmongers.”

David Begg, the general secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, discussed the likely aftermath of the war, and the possibility of unrest, instability, and humanitarian crisis in a post-war Iraq.

Churches and religious organizations also organized demonstrators. Dr. John Kirby, the Bishop of Clonfert, spoke representing Trocaire (the Third World development agency) and the Catholic Church declaring, “we are totally against this war.”

In Rome, Italy, the protest mobilization estimates for February 15 range from police claims of 650,000 or 1 million protesters to activist claims of 3 million protesters. The volume is evident by the transport choices made by demonstrators; several thousand buses were parked on city limits after dropping off passengers, and 28 additional trains had to be added to the transport schedule to compensate for the additional demand. In fact, the protest march had to start two hours early because of police concerns that the sheer volume of protesters could otherwise lead to a mass trampling. Protests also occurred in cities such as Florence, Turin, Milan, Naples and Palermo in Sicily.

A peaceful precedent for February 15 had already set by the massive anti-war protest at the European Social Forum in Florence, Italy in November 2002.

Over 500 organizations were involved in calling for the protest in Rome. It involved “almost all of Italy’s leftist parties, unions, pacifist groups and environmental organizations.” Marks, Popham, and Gumbel state, Those in charge of the march said 450 organisations had signed up for the protest, a broad coalition similar to that in Florence, including unions, church groups, left and centre-left parties and anarchist groups such as the Disobbedienti. Five thousand coaches were expected to arrive in the capital.

According to others, “leftwing opposition politicians, film stars, Catholic church

| 276 | Ibid. |
| 277 | Ibid. |
| 278 | Ibid. |
| 281 | Ibid. |
representatives, human rights groups and Iraqi exiles” were participants in the protest in Rome. What was striking at the Roman protest was the juxtaposition of the religious community (priests, monks, nuns, and Catholic organizations) hitting the pavement alongside of protesters from the anti-globalization movement and leftist unions, according to Rouard, Silber, and Marion. Additionally, organizers allowed “representatives of the ‘oppressed’ including Kurds and Palestinians” to join organizations in the march, “balanced, it is intended, by an Israeli and an American.” However, statements by the Jewish community suggest that their involvement would be contingent on the messaging concerning Israel at the protest, as they would refrain from protesting if Israel was criticized.

The focus in Rome was supporting peace and opposing war, and both the Italian and American government’s policy-making was targeted. The overwhelming symbolism at the Italian protest were the reported 800,000 rainbow colored flags with “Pace” or peace written on them that were sold and then displayed everywhere and even used as cloaks by protesters. Organized called for protesters to refrain from making posters with anti-American or “harsh slogans.” The focus at the protest was on protesting against war, and also against the foreign policy of the United States and Italy via caricatures of U.S. President Bush and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, but not on protesting Americans in Rome or against the protests in the United States (images of which were transmitted via a giant television screen as a show of solidarity). Some Italian protesters called for Prime Minister Berlusconi to resign. Many protesters supported the actions of Belgium, France, and Germany in opposing war in Iraq.

| 10 Luxembourg | There was only one article discussing the protest against the war in Luxembourg, which mobilized over 10,000 demonstrators on February 15. According to the report, the protest was the largest one in eight years. Protesters carried posters with slogans such as “No to blood for oil” and called for “the government to give up its neutrality and oppose the intervention.” |

288 Rouard, Daniele, Martine Silber, and Georges Marion. 2003. L'Europe en masse dans la rue pour dire non a la guerre; Des manifestations sans precedent ont eu lieu d'un bout a l'autre du vieux continent. Le Monde, February 18.
290 Ibid.
291 Rouard, Daniele, Martine Silber, and Georges Marion. 2003. L'Europe en masse dans la rue pour dire non a la guerre; Des manifestations sans precedent ont eu lieu d'un bout a l'autre du vieux continent. Le Monde, February 18.
293 Rouard, Daniele, Martine Silber, and Georges Marion. 2003. L'Europe en masse dans la rue pour dire non a la guerre; Des manifestations sans precedent ont eu lieu d'un bout a l'autre du vieux continent. Le Monde, February 18.
295 Rouard, Daniele, Martine Silber, and Georges Marion. 2003. L'Europe en masse dans la rue pour dire non a la guerre; Des manifestations sans precedent ont eu lieu d'un bout a l'autre du vieux continent. Le Monde, February 18.
Barr states, “More than 70,000 people marched in Amsterdam in the largest Netherlands demonstration since anti-nuclear rallies of the 1980s.”297 Cowell confirms that the Dutch police estimates 70,000 protesters were mobilized in Amsterdam.298 Other articles cite lower protest numbers such as 10,000 or 20,000, but the notably higher police estimates suggest those numbers are undercounts.299 The main demonstration on February 15 was known as “Stop de oorlog tegen Irak” (Stop the war against Iraq).300 At least 60 buses from all over the Netherlands were scheduled to attend the demonstration, as well as several hundred Germans who reside in the border region.301 In Den Haag, a small protest of a dozen Iraqis occurred, targeting the Hussein regime.302

The national demonstration was also followed by a small protest in the Rotterdam port on Monday, February 17, when the “first guarded armed train carrying U.S. military equipment arrived in the Netherlands for shipment to the Persian Gulf region in preparation for a possible war in Iraq.”303 The Dutch Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, has just “reaffirmed his approval for the U.S. to use Holland's harbours, airstrips and trains to ship troops and equipment.”304 Wouter Bos, the leader of the Labour party (PvdA) which had been in the opposition and had suggested they would not approve of Dutch cooperation on the war, complained that Balkenende had not informed the legislature of these shipments but “gave his tacit agreement to the shipments,” perhaps because Labour was trying to negotiate its entry in a new center-left coalition government.305 On February 15, Dutch foreign affairs minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer responded to the inconclusive report delivered by Hans Blix, head weapons inspector, the day prior, by adopting a moderating standpoint, calling for Iraq to be given a few more weeks to comply with the United Nations.306 These comments may have also been made to placate the Labour party with whom the ruling Christian Democrats were trying to form a coalition government.307

The “Platform Against the War” (het Platform tegen de Oorlog) organized the national demonstration in Amsterdam, a coalition that was joined by more than 200 organizations.308 Sometimes it is also called the “Platform Against a New

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302 Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2003. Some 20,000 demonstrate in Amsterdam against war in Iraq. February 15.
304 Ibid.
305 Ibid.
307 Ibid.
War” (het Platform tegen de Nieuwe Oorlog). Hennink states, “‘Not in my name’ (the war should not be carried out in my name) was the main message protesters, including the elderly, young people, children and immigrants.” A very diverse crowd turned out, with groups representing Americans, exiled Iraqis, Tibetans, Germans, and Japanese, all present (Henrik 2003). Some protesters had last protested during the anti-nuclear protests of the 1980s or even earlier, in opposition to the Vietnam War.

The political parties GroenLinks (the Green Left), and the Socialistische Partij (Socialists) joined the Platform. Platform organizer H. van Heijningen stated that they hoped to get the Labour party (Partij van de Arbeid) and the labor movement to join in as well. He stated that he had spoken with members of the Christian Democrats (CDA) opposed to the war, but that CDA participation in the protest was not a possibility. Adherents of political parties like the Socialists (SP) and Green Left (GroenLinks) joined the demonstration although many PvdA adherents refrained from turning out, in respect of a Bos request. According to Hennink, “The speakers, including Jan Marijnes of the Socialist party (SP) and Femke Halsema of left-leaning greens (GroenLinks) made it clear they were against Saddam Hussein’s regime but didn't want the Iraqi people to suffer a war.”

Very few Protestant or Catholic churches and religious organizations officially sponsored or sent key representatives to attend the Dutch protest. Only one Catholic bishop from Haarlem, J.L. Wirix, was scheduled to attend, and secretary general, father E. Kimman, was scheduled to represent the Catholic bishops. M. Bosman-Huizinga, the general secretary of the Reformed “Remonstrantse Broederschap, was scheduled to attend the protest as a representative of the Raad van Kerken (Council of Churches) which supports the demonstration.” However, she explains that she is actually not representing her church community because the protest invitation was not deliberated in the administration. The Raad van Kerken, which is a council of both Protestant and Catholic churches, had asked local churches to attend members to the protest, and in a variety of ways has opposed an attack on Iraq. J. Gruiters of Pax Christi was scheduled to speak at the protest as a representative of the Raad van Kerken. Also set to attend the protest were quakers from “Het Genootschap ter Vrienden,”

314 Ibid.
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
321 Ibid.
322 Ibid.
which has no hierarchical administration and thus no official representation at the demonstration.\textsuperscript{323}

Notably absent was Mient Jan Faber, a key activist in the 1980s peace movement against nuclearization and previously part of Pax Christi, he chose not to join the demonstration and to support the war because it will liberate repressed Iraqis.\textsuperscript{324} Now Secretary of the Interkerkelijk vredesberaad (IKV or Inter-church peace council), Faber was meeting partners in Iran and Northern Iraq as the protest occurred.\textsuperscript{325} Jan ter Laak, Faber’s one-time colleague at Pax Christi, also was notably absent, as he was attending a conference of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a representative of the Nederlands Helsinki Comite working for the recognition of human rights.\textsuperscript{326}

The protesters clearly supported a peaceful resolution to the conflict via international law, and called for a change in U.S. policy-making and Dutch policy-making in support of the war. Linkages between oil and militarization, and the conflicts in Iraq and other Middle-eastern conflicts were also made. For some protesters, the Blix report was the last straw, instrumental in their decision to demonstrate.\textsuperscript{327} Protesters in Amsterdam wanted to clarify that they supported seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict via the United Nations and in respect of international law but were certainly not supporting the Hussein regime.\textsuperscript{328} Protesters like Ruth Oldenziel in Amsterdam stated they were “against the Bush government and its foreign policy,” and not opposed to Americans.\textsuperscript{329} The Dutch also clearly targeted the domestic government’s policy-making in support of the American call to war and called for the government not to blindly follow the Americans into war.\textsuperscript{330} Like protesters in many other countries, Dutch protesters also recognized a linkage between oil interests and the call to war.\textsuperscript{331} Linkages between Iraq and other conflicts in the Middle East were also made: “Several speakers also warned against a conflict spreading across the Middle East and used the platform to condemn Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories.”\textsuperscript{332}

| 12 Portugal | The Lisbon, Portugal protest drew about 80,000 participants.\textsuperscript{333} Organizers of the protest said 80,000 to 100,000 demonstrators were mobilized in Lisbon, as well as 10,000 protesters in Porto, and mentioned protests in other cities.\textsuperscript{334} There was not much coverage of this protest. Included amongst the speakers at the protest were “former President Mario Soares, members of the Socialist Party and the leaders of the Communists and the Left Bloc.”\textsuperscript{335} Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, who has supported the war in Iraq, called a meeting to |

\textsuperscript{323} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{324} Dagblad Rivierenland. 2003. In lange onderbroek naar demonstratie. February 17.
\textsuperscript{326} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{327} Dagblad Rivierenland. 2003. In lange onderbroek naar demonstratie. February 17.
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{335} Ibid.
discuss Iraq with the leader of the key political parties, as the demonstration was occurring, prior to the EU Summit on February 17. However, because of the scheduling conflict with the protest, “the leaders of the Communists and the Left Bloc refused to attend the meeting personally.” The government’s response came via Antonio Pires de Lima (CDS-PP leader) who represents part of the center-right coalition with the Social Democrats and who stated,

we will not let ourselves be impressed by the demonstrations of pacifists who, united by a feeling which is, allow me to call it, a pretty basic feeling of anti-Americanism, allow and condescend to an armed Iraq, and subsequently an Iraq that constitutes a threat.

13 Spain

According to one source, the overall protest mobilization in Spain on February 15 ranges from 2 to 3 million demonstrators, and thus “as many as one in 15 Spaniards marched.” Others cite 1.9 million in Madrid and Barcelona. Police estimates of at least 1 million demonstrators in Barcelona were later updated by estimates made by the Barcelona City Council based on police data as well as pictures of the demonstration that suggested roughly 1,300,000 were mobilized in Barcelona. Organizers from the “Let us Stop the War platform” suggested a higher number of 1,500,000. Other protest numbers cited by authorities include “nearly 1 million people participated in the Madrid demonstration, 1.5 million in Barcelona and more than 150,000 in Seville.” Police estimates of the Madrid mobilization were somewhat lower, at 660,000. According to some journalists, these protests represent, “the biggest outpouring of popular political sentiment - with the possible exception of some anti-Eta marches - since Spaniards took to the streets to protect their fragile young democracy after a coup attempt in 1981.”

At least 60 different marches were planned in Spain. The mobilization at Seville ranged between 200,000 (police estimates) and 250,000 (organizer estimates). Mobilization estimates for Cadiz are around 70,000 protesters. The protest in Oviedo mobilized 70,000 to 80,000 participants. A protest in Santa Cruz (Tenerife Canary Islands) mobilized more than 50,000 demonstrators, according to police estimates. Further, other protest events occurred in Spain.

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336 Ibid.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
348 Ibid.
349 Ibid.
350 Ibid.
during the days preceding and the days ensuing February 15. For instance, on Thursday, February 13, tens of thousands of students protested against the war in both Madrid and Barcelona. Additionally, another protest in Rota, Spain targeted an American airbase. The students’ union organized these protests using the slogan: “Not a soldier, not a euro, not a bullet for an imperialist war.” In Spain, linkages between militarization and the pursuit of hegemony were also recognized. The Let us Stop the War platform was involved in mobilizing the largest Spanish demonstrations. Some sources suggest that roughly forty organizations were responsible for calling for the Spanish demonstrations. However, other sources suggest that there were far more sponsors, including “virtually every organization outside of Mr. Aznar’s Popular party.” The Socialist Party (PSOE) of the opposition was one of the organizers of the February 15 protests. In the week prior to the global protests, they had called on Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar to follow France and Germany in supporting peaceful resolution to the conflict. In response to the anticipated grievances that protesters would elucidate, “Spain’s ruling Popular Party, under fire at home for its support for the hawkish U.S. line on Iraq, began circulating three million copies of a pamphlet defending the government’s position ahead of Saturday’s protests.”

In protests elsewhere, opposition political parties, trade unions, and NGOs all played a major role in organizing platforms. The groups involved in the Cadiz “No to the War platform” included “NGOs, associations, trade unions and opposition political parties.” Similarly, in Oviedo, the protest was “called by political parties, NGOs, neighbourhood and social organizations, and the major trade unions: UGT General Workers’ Union, Workers’ Commissions, and USO Workers’ Syndical Union” and involved representatives of the regional government.

Although Spain’s student protesters clearly targeted the U.S. and its imperialistic aims, a main target on February 15th was the Spanish government. According to several journalists, “The protest was not directed so much at George Bush as at his ally, the Spanish prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar. ‘The Pope says no to war, the People's party says yes’, and ‘Aznar, Bush's doormat’ were among the slogans on display.” In fact, some protesters called for Prime Minister Jose

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359 Ibid.
Maria Aznar to resign. In Seville, posters and chants included, “No to the War,” “Not in our name,” and “Not with our silence,” insinuating that protesters did not want the government to join the war on their behalf. Another emphasis in the protests was merely on opposing war, especially one that was justified as a “preventive war.” Additionally, considerations for the Iraqi people were also voiced. In Santa Cruz, Tenerife, the issues focused on by demonstrators, included opposing war in Iraq, supporting peace, respecting “the ideologies and the national and cultural identities of peoples.”

Protest mobilization estimates for the February 15 protest in Sweden also vary considerably, including two different estimates released by police: 35,000 initially vis-à-vis more than 100,000 retrospectively; 60,000; and 130,000-150,000 estimated by organizers. The main rally occurred in front of the U.S. embassy in Stockholm and mobilized about 35,000, and another protest in the city of Gothenburg mobilized 25,000 demonstrators. Another source cites 35,000 in Stockholm and 20,000-30,000 in Gothenberg. Protests in at least 25 locales mobilized 500 to 4,000 demonstrators. Other demonstrators were mobilized in venues such as Joenkoeping (2,000); Malmoe (3,000); Umeaa (4,000); Vaxjoe (over 1,500). Overall, these protest mobilizations exceeded the 1969-1970 demonstrations against the Vietnam War, according to some observers. In any case, demonstration activity of this magnitude had not occurred for over three decades in Sweden. These demonstrations were largely peaceful, and in Vaxjoe, when “some local Nazis tried to disrupt the march, … the police stepped in.”

Several politicians or former politicians spoke at rallies in Sweden, targeting the United States and the Swedish government, and calling for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In Stockholm, the Environment Party’s spokesperson, allegedly critiqued the United States and American President Bush for trivializing war and treating it like a game of computer chess, stating, “If something goes

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372 Ibid.
wrong, you just push delete and all the peasants live again. But it is real children who will lose their parents and there is no restart button and just one life.”

Further, Maj Britt Theorin, former social democratic member of the European Parliament, critiqued the Swedish government for not trying to take a stronger oppositional stance on the war, stating, “We demand that Sweden’s government do everything to stop a war. Support Olof Palme’s policy and say ‘no’ to war.” In Gothenburg, Anja Karlsson (Party of the Left) emphasized that a peaceful resolution could be found, saying, “We refuse to let the rhetoric of war govern our thoughts and we refuse to believe that the only road to peace and democracy is missiles and bombs.”

Protesters at the demonstrations were very opposed to preemptive, unilateral military intervention in Iraq by Americans, which they perceive as motivated by economic interests and threatening international law and stability. Many protest participants’ signs suggest a linkage between American economic interests and the true reasons the Americans were pursuing a war in Iraq. Additionally, many demonstrators were concerned about the precedent that could be set with such preemptive, unilateral warfare with the potential for huge gleanings in oil revenues, asking which country would be attacked next.

A speaker at one protest wanted to make clear that he did not sympathize for Hussein, but was even more opposed to the behavior of the United States, which he labeled a rogue in its own turn: “I shed no tears for Saddam. He is a rogue, but the United States is an even greater rogue.” Other issues raised by protesters, included the issue of Palestine, which was salient in Gothenberg, where Palestinian flags were at the front of the march.

According to several journalists, 750,000 demonstrators turned out in London. Organizers estimated closer to 1 million protesters in London turned out. According to Kononczuk, in London, “the rallies were organised by the Stop the War Coalition, the veteran peace group Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the Muslim Association of Britain.” The Stop the War Coalition had expected in advance that the London crowd could ultimately reach 1-2 million. According to one journalist, “The Stop The War Coalition filled more than 1000 buses with supporters. CND and the Muslim Association of Britain - the two other organisers - filled hundreds more.” Barr states that police called it “the city's largest demonstration ever.” According to Kononczuk, the London demonstration was certainly the biggest protest there since World War II, as

15 United Kingdom

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373 Ibid.
374 Ibid.
375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid.
385 Barr, Robert. 2003. One, two, three, four we don’t want your bloody war (we’d rather have a nice cup of tea); London protests. Scottish Daily Record & Sunday Mail Ltd, February 16, 5.
protests in the 1970s targeting the Vietnam War had mobilized roughly 400,000 participants.\textsuperscript{386} The London protest occurred peacefully, with only three arrests and a police presence of about 4,500.\textsuperscript{387}

Key protests also occurred elsewhere in the United Kingdom, and other key British demonstrations had in fact preceded this global protest. According to one source, “A Stop The War protest five months ago, attracted 100,000 but with conflict looming closer, 10 times as many felt compelled to make their voices heard.”\textsuperscript{388} Protesters also turned out in Glasgow, Scotland, where Prime Minister Tony Blair was speaking to a Labour Party Conference (estimates ranging from 30,000 to 61,000 protesters in Glasgow), and a demonstration also occurred in Belfast, Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{389}

What was unique about the turnout in London was the juxtaposition of such a multi-generational, diverse crowd, of old and new activists alike (Suroor 2003). According to Kononczuk, “In London, alongside veteran peace campaigners and anti-globalisation activists were pensioners, lawyers, bankers and middle-class housewives with their children.”\textsuperscript{390} Suroor (2003) mentions that those attending “cut across party and group labels,” and even included some Iraqis.

Key politicians from various parties turned out in support of the demonstrators and their qualms about a possible war in Iraq. According to Suroor, Noted playwright, Harold Pinter, human rights campaigner, Bianca Jagger, Labour veterans, Michael Foot and Tony Benn, the Liberal Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy, and the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, were also slated to speak at the rally … (2003).

Another journalist adds that left Labour MP George Galloway made a comment to the effect that the Prime Minister is changing the Labour party in undesirable ways that need remedying.\textsuperscript{391} Another Labour MP, Alice Mahon, warned about the cycle of violence that could be instigated by “the drive to war.”\textsuperscript{392} Former Labour politician Mo Mowlam critiqued the rationale of the government, stating, “There is a position now that, if a country has a lot of people killed from poverty and military dictatorship, if that number is smaller than that killed by war, then the war is OK. That to me is totally illogical.”\textsuperscript{393}

Many labor unions also joined in opposing the war, with representatives of several unions making speeches at the demonstration. Billy Hayes, the general secretary of the Communication Workers Union (CWU), highlighted the newly mobilized trade union protesters in his comments.\textsuperscript{394} The general secretary of the University and College Lecturers’ Union (NATFHE), Paul Mackney, noted the issues in Iraq and Palestine but also domestically that should be attended to, stating.

\textsuperscript{386} Kononczuk, Peter. 2003. Anti-war marchers stage London's biggest protest since World War II. \textit{Agence France Presse}, February 15.
\textsuperscript{387} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{388} Roberts, Lesley. 2003. One, two, three, four we don't want your bloody war (we'd rather have a nice cup of tea); London protests. \textit{Scottish Daily Record & Sunday Mail Ltd}, February 16, 5.
\textsuperscript{390} Kononczuk, Peter. 2003. Anti-war marchers stage London's biggest protest since World War II. \textit{Agence France Presse}, February 15.
\textsuperscript{391} Roberts, Adrian. 2003. Mowlam brands Blair's war plans as 'illogical'; Politicians and union leaders queue up to attack Prime Minister. \textit{Morning Star}, February 17, 4.
\textsuperscript{392} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{393} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{394} Ibid.
“We're here for peace in Iraq and justice in Palestine, but we're also here to build a better world in Britain.”

Mick Rix, general secretary of the train drivers’ union (ASLEF), called for Blair’s ouster and an end to his right-wing policy-making.

Finally, the general secretary of the transport workers’ union (RMT), Bob Crow, alluded that the government’s selective hearing of the popular will and its unwillingness to listen to the demonstrators suggests a democratic deficit in Britain, not much unlike the democratic deficits that the British policy-makers have critiqued in authoritarian regimes, stating, “I don't know what the difference is between a Romanian leader not listening to his people and Mr. Blair not listening to his.”

According to one source, protesters targeted the Prime Minister, physically passing by his Downing Street office and verbally opposing his government’s policy-making and the direction that the Labour party’s foreign policy-making has taken.

One of the marches also passed by the British Houses of Parliament at Westminster. Riddell spoke to demonstrators in London and writes,

What unites them is anger against Bush and Blair, but mainly Blair.

Everyone I talk to says that he will not have their vote again….These are organised people with clear aims. They want a peaceful solution for Iraq. If that is not forthcoming, Blair will be punished accordingly.

Prime Minister Tony Blair responded to the protesters, saying that he respected their democratic right to protest peacefully but was resolved in his standpoint on the war, which might be costly in terms of popular support but was a decision that he made because of his convictions and leadership responsibilities.

Although protesters were very focused on opposing the war via slogans such as “No War on Iraq,” organizers also highlighted linkages between the war and U.S. material and political interests. Anas Altikriti, spokesman of the Muslim Association of Britain, stated, “We believe this war is primarily aimed at serving the interests of the current U.S. administration. Neither the U.S. nor the British public stand to benefit from it.”

Former MP and activist Tony Benn accused the U.S. of applying a double-standard in its dealings with Iraq, vis-à-vis its relations with other countries.

The British anti-war movement was critiqued by Cohen for the “domination” of the Socialist Workers Party in the Stop the War Coalition; for its alliance with the “reactionary British Association of Muslims;” and for their demonization of “American and British power.”

Along similar lines, Labour

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395 Ibid.
396 Ibid.
397 Ibid.
398 Roberts, Lesley. 2003. One, two, three, four we don’t want your bloody war (we’d rather have a nice cup of tea); London protests. Scottish Daily Record & Sunday Mail Ltd, February 16, 5.
402 Ibid.
403 Roberts, Adrian. 2003. Mowlam brands Blair's war plans as 'illogical'; Politicians and union leaders queue up to attack Prime Minister. Morning Star, February 17, 4.
404 Ibid.
405 Cohen, Nick. 2003. Comment: Without prejudice: The left isn’t listening: The stop the war coalition is the greatest threat to any hope for a democratic Iraq. Observer, February 16, 31.
Party chairman John Reid accused the protesters of supporting the repression and human rights violations that the Hussein regime embodied.\textsuperscript{406} However, many protesters emphasized that they were not supporting Hussein and not anti-government as they have sometimes been branded, but rather oppose going to war and resorting to violence to solve the conflict and support finding a peaceful resolution.\textsuperscript{407} Suroor (2003) also emphasizes that at the London demonstration, “Most people made clear that their opposition to a war did not mean that they supported Saddam Hussein. They felt that a military conflict was not the way to deal with him, and wanted to speak up and be counted.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Protests in CEE States Acceding to the EU, 2004-2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Bulgaria</td>
<td>Bulgaria’s anti-war demonstration involved about 3,000 protesters in Sofia.\textsuperscript{408} A second source says over 2,000 demonstrators were involved.\textsuperscript{409} Another source claims only 1,500 were mobilized and 10 were arrested in Sofia.\textsuperscript{410} Other Bulgarian protests were mobilized in Plovdiv (200 protesters) and Sliven.\textsuperscript{411} According to one source, “the march was organized by For Peace, Against War Citizens Committee which comprises some 30 parties and NGOs.”\textsuperscript{412} Another source confirmed the main organizer was the “Citizens Committee for Peace and against War,” and stated that some Iraqis living in Bulgaria were also involved in the demonstration.\textsuperscript{413} A declaration was issued by the demonstrators, “calling upon the U.S. government to give up its war plans” and arguing that “a war will have a far-reaching economic impact which will inevitably hit Bulgaria too.”\textsuperscript{414} Some of the protesters demanded that the government resign and the Parliament be disbanded “for what the protesters say was betrayal of the national interests by granting the U.S. request for support in a possible war.”\textsuperscript{415} Protesters’ placards included such mottos as, “For peace, against war,” “For peace through talks,” “Mothers, let's stand together and defend peace,” “Let's put end to unjust war,” and “Don't kill innocent people.”\textsuperscript{416} This protest reportedly had “communist overtones, with some of the protesters waving red banners and carrying posters of former Soviet dictator Josef Stalin.”\textsuperscript{417}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Czech Republic</td>
<td>Czech Republic’s anti-war protest in Prague involved two separate demonstrations.\textsuperscript{418} One of the protests was mobilized by Communists, and the</td>
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</table>

\textsuperscript{406} Midland Independent Newspapers Birmingham Post. 2003. Comments: Marchers seek better way than Iraq war; the peace process: Millions send a message to Blair and Bush. February 17, 1.
\textsuperscript{407} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{408} Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2003. 3,000 Bulgarians in anti-war protest. February 15.
\textsuperscript{412} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{413} Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2003. 3,000 Bulgarians in anti-war protest. February 15.
\textsuperscript{417} Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2003. 3,000 Bulgarians in anti-war protest. February 15.
other by the Group Against War (also known as the Initiative Against War) and by foreigners living in Prague.\footnote{Scally, Derek. 2003. We want to say that any war means destruction. \textit{Irish Times}, February 15, 8.} According to Scally, “few people besides the old hardliners want to be associated with the Communists’ march,” and thus two separate rallies emerged.\footnote{Ibid.} A police spokesperson emphasized police preparedness for the rallies, but also on the importance of using peaceful tactics when protesting for peace.\footnote{Ibid.} According to Scally, the choice of the protest venue for the Communist rally is ironic, leading history “to be turned on its head today.”\footnote{Ibid.} Namely, “Fourteen years ago, huge peaceful demonstrations in Prague's Wenceslas Square hastened the resignation of the Communist authorities in Czechoslovakia.”\footnote{Ibid.}

The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) was involved in organizing one demonstration, calling for international law and the UN Charter to be upheld.\footnote{British Broadcasting Corporation. 2003. Czech communists demonstrate against war in Iraq. February 15.} This peaceful protest occurred at Wenceslas Square, and although one journalist reported roughly 500 participants another source reported 1,000.\footnote{Barr, Robert. 2003. Mass marches in London, Rome, Berlin and Damascus, clashes in Athens on day of global protest. \textit{Associated Press}, February 15.; Czech News Agency. 2003. Communists stage protest against U.S. policy in Iraq. February 15.} Miroslav Grebenicek, leader of KSCM, spoke against the war and against Czech involvement in the war.\footnote{Czech News Agency. 2003. Communists stage protest against U.S. policy in Iraq. February 15.} At this rally, there were signs such as “No to war in Iraq, no to U.S. aggression;” “Democracy is not born of bombs;” and “Let's hang U.S. pirates.”\footnote{Ibid.} After the rally, demonstrators marched to the U.S. embassy, where it was reported “The Communists want to give the U.S. embassy a resolution calling on the U.S. government not to make the planned aggression.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Another demonstration was mobilized in the Palachovo namesti by a different organization, the Group Against War or the Initiative Against War.\footnote{Ibid.} Although one journalist reported 500 mobilized at this protest, other sources report 300 demonstrators.\footnote{Ibid.} Foreigners living in Prague, including several Americans, worked with the Initiative Against War to call for the protest, and it was also attended by Greenpeace activists.\footnote{Ibid.} Slogans on banners included “No Blood for Petrol” and “God said: you will not kill.”\footnote{Ibid.} Erazim Kohak, a philosopher who addressed the protesters, had lived under exile in the United States during the Communist period, and he highlighted the linkages between oil interests and the war, suggested that human rights would be waylaid in the process, and
recommended conflict resolution via the diplomacy that France and Germany prefer, and not via warfare.\textsuperscript{433} The Americans opposing the war in Iraq from Prague focused on the likely loss of human life; the negative effects America is likely to feel domestically, including increasing poverty and security threats; and the oil interests that are the likely motivations behind the war.\textsuperscript{434} By launching this protest, they hoped to get the Czech public to turn their disapproval of the war into concrete actions indicating their sentiments that the government may attend to.\textsuperscript{435} Several other protests also occurred in the Czech Republic. A Communist-led protest of around 300 was mobilized in Ostrava, and here some signed the “Not in our Name” petition against the war.\textsuperscript{436} Some signs at this protest included, “Bush = Hitler” and “We want peace, not NATO, inciting wars across the globe.”\textsuperscript{437} At a peaceful protest in Brno, about 200 people signed an anti-war protest.\textsuperscript{438}

3 Estonia

Estonia’s anti-war demonstration scheduled to occur in Tallinn was apparently banned by authorities, leading some protesters to cross by boat and attend the largest Finnish demonstration in Helsinki.\textsuperscript{439} The protest was apparently cancelled because “the country's security police dissuaded organizers for fear of disturbances,” especially by Russian nationalists seeing to cause problems.\textsuperscript{440} Estonian protesters at the Helsinki demonstration targeted both U.S. policy as well as Estonian policy on the war.\textsuperscript{441} One such protester, Oliver Loode, stated “Estonians are a peaceful people and most Estonians are against a war. We want to create a counterweight to our government, which supports the United States’ line.”\textsuperscript{442}

4 Hungary

Organizers (Civilians for Peace) and other sources claim that more than 50,000 people were mobilized in Budapest on February 15, 2003.\textsuperscript{443} Hungary’s anti-war protest in Budapest was organized by Civilians for Peace, also known as Civilians’ Movement for Peace.\textsuperscript{444} Several dozen non-profit organizations were involved in this alliance.\textsuperscript{445} Some organizations involved in mobilizing the Budapest anti-war protest on February 15 include the Humanist Movement; the Solidarity Youth Alternative; the Green Youths organizations; the Hungarian Iraqi Opposition; Greenpeace Hungary; the Left-Wing Alternative Union; the Children


\textsuperscript{435} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{437} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{438} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{441} Financial Times Information. 2003. Finnish anti-war demonstration attracts 15,000. February 17.

\textsuperscript{442} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{445} Ibid.
of the Earth; the Air Work Group; the Energy Club; and the Five Bread Christian Community. Initial attempts by Hungarian authorities to prevent the “Stop the War” demonstration from conducting a march on “Budapest's main thoroughfare” were rebuked by “the sheer weight of public opinion” which “forced them to do a U-turn.” Although initial protest plans were turned down, the police later agreed to a revised proposal for a rally in a square.

Civilians Movement for Peace was especially focused on targeting the domestic government in Hungary and its policy-making regarding the war. On February 17, Civilians for Peace held a press conference “at which they expounded their open letter to the government and Parliament” in which they argue that Hungary should refuse to permit its transport network to be used for American military transports. At the press conference, Civilians for Peace argued that the government’s support of the United States rather right-wing, hegemonic war-making is antithetical to its mandate as a supposedly leftist government. Annamaria Artner, Chair of the ATTAC Hungary and one of the leaders of the Civilians for Peace, emphasized that demonstrations are an excellent way that civil society can make its concerns heard and protests would continue to occur if the government did not take heed. Mark Bati, executive of the Alba Group, said the organizers were targeting all government representatives, regardless of their political party, to oppose permitting Hungarian transport networks’ usage in the war, and to hold a public roll-call vote on the policy, permitting voters to hold MPs accountable.

However, the organizations involved also had grievances concerning the Bush administration’s policy-making and pursuit of hegemony via warfare. Protest organizers were quick to emphasize that they are not anti-American. Protest organizers also wanted to distinguish themselves from outsider-oriented activists and “said their anti-war demonstration rejects all forms of violence and expresses they do not accept any sort of solidarity with the cruel dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.”

Prior to the protest on February 15, Civilians’ Movement for Peace had in fact met with Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy, a meeting that he initiated himself and in which he made clear that the Hungarian government shares their commitment to peace and hopes for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, but explained that part of that commitment to peace also is driving its concerns about Hungarian security, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Medgyessey

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450 Ibid.
451 Ibid.
452 Ibid.
453 Ibid.
454 Ibid.
455 Ibid.
addressed the problems that organizers had had in getting police approval of their protest, and reaffirmed “that the right to demonstrate and express opinions on fundamental issues are among basic democratic rights,” especially for peace.458 Annamaria Artner was at this meeting with Medgyessey, representing the Civilian Movement for Peace, and she states that while their desired endpoints may be similar, they cannot agree with the means that the government aims to arrive at peace. She states,  

It became clear that we agreed on three points. One is the rejection of terrorism, two, the rejection of Saddam Husayn's regime and, three, the striving for a peaceful solution. We failed to reach agreement on one point: the means of guarding peace.459 Thus, the Civilian Movement for Peace asked Medgyessey to consider changing his standpoint and to work for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and it was this domestic focus that was maintained at the actual demonstration and ensuing press conference.460  

Another, much smaller, protest was held by Greenpeace demonstrators at Budapest’s Chain Bridge on Tuesday, February 18. Spontaneously, a very transnational group of 15 activists from Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria, protested against war by mounting a “No War” sign by a tunnel that leads to the bridge. According to Roland Csaki, Greenpeace campaign staffer for Hungary, the group was targeting the Hungarian parliament, opposing weapons transfers in case of a war. After police ordered the protest to end, the activists pulled down the sign, and no demonstrators were arrested and none would be charged, but the police did collect personal data from the protesters.461

Latvia  

Latvian anti-war protests occurred on several consecutive days in Riga.462 The main protest on February 15, 2003, was organized by Movement for Neutrality and mobilized “hundreds” or “several hundred” demonstrators.463 Protesters mobilized at the demonstration included Latvians, ethnic Russians, and also Lithuanians.464  

Aleksandrs Bartusevics, a deputy of the Alliance For Human Rights in a United Latvia in the Saeima parliament, is the leader of the Movement for Neutrality and as such has targeted the Latvian government, asking it to end its support of a possible war in Iraq and support a peaceful resolution to the conflict.465 In Latvia, the President and defense minister supported the war, even though the legislative (Saeima) Foreign Affairs Commission supported disarming in Iraq via the United Nations and in agreement with the principles of international law.466  

Thus, the legislative and executive branches have both been targeted by demonstrators. Along the February 15 protest march route, the protesters stopped at the presidential palace, where “they expressed their disagreement with a
statement by Latvian's President Vaira Vike-Freiberga on Latvia's readiness to support U.S. military plans, although more than 80 per cent of the country's population, as polls have shown, are against war in Iraq.\footnote{467} Several protests occurred at the Saeima building prior to the February 15 demonstration.\footnote{468} Normunds Grostins, an activist who leads the Movement for Independence, participated in a protest outside the Saeima, stating,  

we believe that in fact this war ... is one where America wants to use military force to gain control over Iraq's oil resources, and it needs evidence to do this, with the Americans mentioning that there are weapons of mass destruction and so on there. This evidence has not convinced such serious NATO member states as France and Germany, which object to an attack on Iraq at this stage and they believe that diplomatic means must be used. We also believe that diplomatic means must be used - violence and the annihilation of the civilian population will lead to nothing good.\footnote{469}  

Besides targeting the Latvian leadership, protesters also targeted U.S. policy on the war and the economic interests propelling the U.S. drive to war.\footnote{470} Part of the February 15 protest occurred in front of the American Embassy, where candles placed to form the words “no to war” were lit.\footnote{471} Other protests have also targeted the U.S. Embassy.\footnote{472} Protesters chanted “No to war!” in Latvian, focusing on opposing the war in and of itself not just Latvian support of the war.\footnote{473} In Latvia, protesters also see linkages between American economic interests and the call to war, with one protester stating, “After World War II all of Europe was in ruins - only the Americans, for some reason, got richer. What do they need now? Soon they will burst with their spitefulness. Latvia must remain a neutral country.”\footnote{474}  

In Latvia, concerns about nationalism and remnants of communism are clearly driving actors in the anti-war movement, and so too their critics. Some of the youth organizations that announced earlier anti-war protests by the American embassy (Everything for Latvia, the Social Democratic Youth Association and Club 415) have been criticized for being unpatriotic and for being “defenders” of Hussein, with their objectives in opposing the war called into question.\footnote{475} Everything for Latvia is criticized as having objectives other than Latvian patriotism, and in fact for allying with groups like “the left-wing political movement PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia” which has opposed “plans to shift Russian schools toward classes taught in Latvian.”\footnote{476} Additionally,  

these remnants of the past are evident in the work of “the popular and public organization Intelligence Intelligentsia,” that was involved in mobilizing several protests in Latvia.477

6 Lithuania

| 6 Lithuania | Lithuanian anti-war protest that occurred in Vilnius was organized “by several pacifist organizations.”478 Although there is not much coverage of Lithuanian protests, there is coverage that suggests “people have even been protesting in Lithuania”479 According to Dudikova, activists, opposition parties and newspapers in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have lashed out at their leaders for backing the United States. Polls say more than two-thirds of Baltic residents oppose war in Iraq. Small protest demonstrations have been held across the region.480 Additionally, some Lithuanians residing in Vilnius who wanted to demonstrate traveled to the protest in Riga, Latvia, on February 15, where they “held posters that criticized Lithuanian authorities for supporting the U.S. policy with regard to Iraq.”481 |

7 Poland

| 7 Poland | Poland’s anti-war demonstrations involved thousands of demonstrators in several cities, with about 2,500 protesters in Warsaw and other protests in Gdansk and Poznan.482 Although Clark suggests that it was expected that half a million protesters would turn out in Warsaw “despite the incessant pro-government, pro-war propaganda pumped out by the state-owned television channel,” Scally claims that police only expected several thousand demonstrators.483 In fact, several articles suggest just 2,500 protesters indeed turned out on February 15.484 Protesters targeted both U.S. President Bush as well as Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller and President Aleksander Kwasniewski. The Warsaw protest occurred in the Castle Square which is next to Polish President Alexsander Kwasniewski’s residence who was targeted for his support of the Bush policy on Iraq.485 Protesters also rallied in front of the U.S. embassy, targeting the American policy directly.486 In Poland, the economic ties to militarization and the desire for diplomacy with Iraq were resounding themes. An organizer discussed the linkage between the war and oil interests as well as the likely benefit to U.S. companies from the war.487 Protesters also perceived an underlying economic motivation behind the war.488 |

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477 Financial Times Information. 2003. Antiwar march held in Latvian capital; Poll shows majority opposed to war. February 15.
485 Scally, Derek. 2003. We want to say that any war means destruction. Irish Times, February 15, 8.
487 Ibid.
Instead of resorting to violence, the demonstrators demanded a peaceful resolution, calling the U.S. to “solve the problem not bomb it.”

| Romania | Romania’s anti-war protest in Bucharest involved thousands of demonstrators. There is very little coverage of the protest, other than one news report that discusses why there was so little debate and so little protest about the war in Iraq, in Romania. The journalist argues that Romanians are overwhelmed with more immediate and basic problems, “the dozens of wars that we fight every day against poverty, stupidity, bureaucracy and corruption,” and thus have almost disregarded the “shadow of the war hawk darkening our sky.” Although global protest has been mobilized throughout Europe, he states, “in Romania you can hardly notice the existence of a public debate regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the position our country chose to adopt in relation to this conflict” and out of a “lazy neutrality” people have failed to organize or participate in demonstrations in the same way. Thus, the author argues that although the Iraqi people have been oppressed and Romanians “have not yet forgotten how we hated Ceausescu and how much we dreamt of living in a democratic society,” that Romanians should ask themselves honestly if in the 1980s they would “have agreed to pay for their freedom with the price of having hundreds of thousands of American soldiers and a huge military force in their country, and thousands, dozens or hundreds of thousands of their own people killed”? |

| Slovakia | Slovakia’s February 15 protest were held in Bratislava and involved just over 1,000 people. Another source lists several hundred protesters. The Slovak protest was organized by Eduard Chmelar of the Slovak Governance Institute. Speakers included a Catholic priest and a representative of the Palestinian community in Slovakia. Jan Solciansky, the Catholic priest who spoke, described the Church’s unified standpoint on the war: “No to war, no to aggression - but yes to negotiations about peace.” According to one article, “Opposition to the war united the followers of Communists, nationalists, left-wing parties and anarchists, environmentalists and some religious groups. The crowd included some opposition politicians and trade union head Ivan Saktor.” The protest occurred after 11 MPs from “Slovakia's strongest opposition Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)” left the parliamentary caucus in a protest stemming from disagreements (and indeed a split vote) between HZDS MPs over whether Slovakia should send troops to support the war in Iraq, and after the HZDS |

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492 Ibid.
493 Ibid.
494 Ibid.
495 Financial Times Information. 2003. Slovak anti-war demonstrators call on premier not to drag them into war. February 15.
497 Financial Times Information. 2003. Slovak anti-war demonstrators call on premier not to drag them into war. February 15.
498 Ibid.
499 British Broadcasting Corporation. 2003. Slovak anti-war demonstrators call on premier not to drag them into war. February 15.
Deputy Chairman, Rudolf Ziaľ, who left the parliamentary caucus, resigned his post on February 14.501

Both the United States government and Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda were targeted.502 The protest started in front of the Slovak government office.503 Demonstrators sent an “open letter” to Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda asking him to keep Slovakia out of the war and not to send Slovaks to Iraq.504 According to one report, protesters “waved Slovak and Iraqi flags and chanted anti-government and anti-American slogans,” and some demonstrators “compared U.S. President George Bush and Premier Mikulas Dzurinda’ with Hitler.505

Protesters in Slovakia focused on opposing a war that they see being fought for oil interests and being used to formalize a new East European servitude to a hawkish United States. Protest slogans at the Slovak protest included “Blood is not Petrol,” “No to war in Iraq,” “Not in Our Name,” “Stop War!,” “Shame on USA!,” and “Stop Aggression.”506 One protester stated, “All that matters is petrol. Bush absolutely does not care about any democracy or ordinary Iraqis. I feel shame for the current government. The other day we were servile to Russians, but now to Americans.”507

Frantisek Sebej, former Chairman of the Parliament’s Committee for European integration, was asked by the press to analyze the low Slovakian protest mobilization on the global date of protest against war.508 In Sebej’s analysis, he mentions that the peace protests targeting the Vietnam war and supporting de-nuclearization, which occurred in Western Europe, were not permitted in Eastern Europe by the communist regimes.509 Thus, the history of peace protest and the duration of the tradition of criticizing the government via demonstrations may account for some of the dynamics of mobilization from West to East. Sebej states that ordinarily many of the groups protesting would have conflicts with one another, but the war has oddly enough provided them a “common enemy,” and he criticizes human rights organizations for behaving hypocritically by opposing the war and joining the protests, when the Hussein regime has been such a violator of human rights.509

10 Slovakia

Slovenia’s major anti-war protests occurred in Ljubljana and Maribor. Different numbers are cited for the Ljubljana protest: over 2,000; several thousand; and nearly 5,000.511 Maribor was said to have mobilized 500 demonstrators.512

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504 British Broadcasting Corporation. 2003. Slovak anti-war demonstrators call on premier not to drag them into war. February 15.
509 Ibid.
510 Ibid.
Protesters targeted both the American decision-making concerning a war in Iraq as well as the domestic government’s possible involvement and decision-making concerning the war. 

Demonstrators in Ljubljana were “from all generations: partisans, prisoners of war, revolutionaries of the 1960s, peace activists of the 1980s and social movements’ activists.” Mayor Danica Simsic spoke at this protest, emphasizing that Slovenians had never before taken such an offensive standpoint, only fighting “for their motherland,” and urged decision-makers to listen to protesters’ concerns. Dominik Cernjak, Slovenia's opposition Youth Party leader, opposed joining sides with the Americans, “against the efforts of the largest EU members, Germany and France, which strive to solve the Iraqi crisis by diplomatic means.” Thus in Slovenia, the emphasis was also on finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict via diplomacy and international law.

Protesters in Slovenia focused on opposing American and Slovenian government standpoint on the war in and of itself, but also opposed the justification for war (including oil interests) and the likely character of the war for the Iraqi people. Slogans at this protest included “No War,” “Peace,” “Blood Is not Oil,” “War = Crime, America Wake up,” “Make Love, Not Bush,” and “Imagine All the People, Living Life in Peace.” Protesters interviewed at the rally on Congress Square stated they were opposing the war for a variety of reasons: “Because I disagree with the U.S. policy to kill millions of people in order to convince them that they have some kind of hidden weapons;” “Because I am always against war, against any kind of aggression. Because this does not solve anything;” and because “I believe that this is the least I can do. But I am also a wife of a man who comes from Iraq.”

The Maribor protest was organized “by the civil society Maribor for Peace” and occurred peacefully. Protesters used candles to write the Slovene word for peace (mir) in the Castle Square. Here, it is reported that “protesters demanded that Slovenia backs down from the Vilnius declaration in which ten east European states declared their support for U.S. policy.” Two protesters interviewed by the press at the Maribor demonstration supported resolving the conflict with Iraq via the United Nations, diplomacy, and in accordance with international law, and opposed the Slovenian government committing to join the U.S. war in Iraq. One
protester stated, “A war of aggression against a sovereign country is a violation of international law and we cannot allow this.”  

The other protester had a message for the Slovenian government: “…we would like to tell our government, our party LDS Liberal Democracy of Slovenia which rules our country, not to push us into a war and to withdraw from the Vilnius Group signature…”  

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Protests in Mediterranean States Acceding to the EU, 2004</th>
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| 1 Cyprus         | According to Barr, “In divided Cyprus, about 500 Greeks and Turks braved heavy rain to briefly block a British air base runway.” Mita suggests that this protest (in Dhekelia) actually involved “Around 700 demonstrators from Cyprus, France, Belgium, Spain and the U.S.,” and it was followed by a peaceful march to Pyla. Conradi reports that the Greek and Turkish presence at the protest is evidence that “opposition to war also helped bridge bitter ethnic rivalries” otherwise salient in Cyprus.  

According to Efi Xanthou, representing the Co-ordinating Committee of the “Stop the War Alliance,” people in Cyprus “are against the war on Iraq and are not only concerned with the Cyprus problem and the upcoming elections.” Xanthou explains why the helicopter runway of the British Bases were chosen as a protest venue in part because activists oppose “the use of the bases as a launch pad for this attack.” Thus, protesters had clear domestic grievances concerning the possible usage of Cyprus “as a launch facility for a war on Iraq” which they emphasized.  

Protesters were also opposed to the unilateralism of the Bush policy and its disregard for international law, and perceived connections between oil interests and the militarization.  

Slogans at this demonstration included “One, two, three, four, we don't want your ****ing war,” “Bush, Blair, Sharon -- murderers of the people,” and “No more blood for oil.” Slogans were chanted in several languages, including Greek, Turkish, English, and Arabic.  

---

| 2 Malta          | No protest events were reported in Malta. |

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Protests in Mediterranean States Acceding to the EU, 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 Cyprus         | According to Barr, “In divided Cyprus, about 500 Greeks and Turks braved heavy rain to briefly block a British air base runway.” Mita suggests that this protest (in Dhekelia) actually involved “Around 700 demonstrators from Cyprus, France, Belgium, Spain and the U.S.,” and it was followed by a peaceful march to Pyla. Conradi reports that the Greek and Turkish presence at the protest is evidence that “opposition to war also helped bridge bitter ethnic rivalries” otherwise salient in Cyprus.  

According to Efi Xanthou, representing the Co-ordinating Committee of the “Stop the War Alliance,” people in Cyprus “are against the war on Iraq and are not only concerned with the Cyprus problem and the upcoming elections.” Xanthou explains why the helicopter runway of the British Bases were chosen as a protest venue in part because activists oppose “the use of the bases as a launch pad for this attack.” Thus, protesters had clear domestic grievances concerning the possible usage of Cyprus “as a launch facility for a war on Iraq” which they emphasized.  

Protesters were also opposed to the unilateralism of the Bush policy and its disregard for international law, and perceived connections between oil interests and the militarization.  

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---

| 2 Malta          | No protest events were reported in Malta. |

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Table 8.2: February 15, 2003 Protests

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523 Ibid.  
524 Ibid.  
531 Ibid.  
Appendix 4: Actors, Targets, and Grievances at February 15, 2003 Protests

Note: Tables 8.3-8.5 present the Actors, Insiders, and Outsiders; Domestic Targets and Grievances; and International Targets and Grievances at the February 15, 2003 Protests in the European Union Member States.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coalition of the Willing?</th>
<th>Actors?</th>
<th>Insiders or Outsiders?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Austria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>*** parties of the left, trade unions, church groups, Greenpeace, Iraqis, Turks</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Belgium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>• more than 100 organizations such as the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC), Hotel and Restaurant Workers Trade Union in Copenhagen</td>
<td>Speaker Holger K. Nielsen, Socialist People's Party SF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Denmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• diverse, almost 40 civic organizations such as the Left Federation Youth League, leftist parties, peace organizations, college students, Iraqis, Arabs living in Finland, Estonians</td>
<td>Matti Wuori, Member of the European Parliament (Greens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Finland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>• organized by the Peace Movement, multi-generational, multinational, many unaffiliated, many Muslims, Political parties, unions, anarchists, and many kinds of associations; many leftist organizations, which marched at the front and were sponsors (and signatories) of the announcement to protest, entitled “Non à la Guerre, Oui a un Monde de Paix, de Justice et de Démocratie” (no to war, yes to a world of peace, of justice, and of democracy), notably absent were far right radicals from the Front National (National Front) and Action Française (French Action), previous protesters who targeted the National Front and Le Pen</td>
<td>José Bové, anti-globalisation activist; Bernard Thibault, Confédération Générale du Travail trade union; Marie-George Buffet, Communist leader; Jean-Pierre Chevènement; Noël Mamère of the Verts (Greens); François Hollande and Régis Passerieux of the Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party); Alain Krivine of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League); Arlette Laguiller of the Lutte Ouvrière (Worker’s Struggle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 France</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>• multi-generational, politicians, political associations, unions, churches, rights groups, groups such as Attac Germany</td>
<td>Three members of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's centre-left cabinet defied his express wishes and joined the march:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Germany</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 7 Greece | No | • former pro-democracy activists  
• endorsed by the country's largest labour union and Greece's governing Socialist party  
• representatives of political parties, trade unions and peace groups, political leaders, political refugees, public figures and citizens, spanning children to pensioners  
• several hundred anarchists involved in violence in Athens  
• groups like Action Thessaloniki 2003 (which was already planning June 2003 protests of the EU Summit)  
• Statements from the government: Christos Protopappas, a government spokesman, spoke to condone trouble-makers and support the message of many peaceful protesters; a supportive statement put out by parliament speaker Apostolos Kaklamanis  
• Protest participation: Costas Laliotis, the leader of the ruling PASOK party's central committee; Aleka Papariga, the chief of the Communist Party; Nikos Constantoulos, the head of the Coalition for the Left and Progress; Dimitris Tsomvas, the leader of the Democratic Social Movement | Economic Cooperation Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul; Environment Minister Juergen Trittin; and Agriculture Minister Renate Kuenast |
|---|---|---|
| 8 Ireland | No | • organized by Irish Anti-War Movement, the Non-Governmental Organization Peace Alliance, and the Peace and Neutrality Alliance  
• diversity, notable labor and political opposition, churches and religious organizations | Michael D. Higgins (Labour); Aengus O. Snodaigh (Sinn Fein); Patricia McKenna (Green, Member of the European Parliament); Assembly Delegate (TD) Joe Higgins (Socialist Party); Des Geraghty, the president of SIPTU, Ireland's largest trade union; David Begg, the general secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions |
| 9 Italy | Yes | • Over 500 organizations: *** |
almost all of Italy’s leftist parties (left and centre-left), unions, Catholic church representatives, pacifist groups, human rights groups, environmental organizations, anarchists such as the Disobedienti, anti-globalization activists,
- Iraqi exiles, representatives of the ‘oppressed’ including Kurds and Palestinians
- Previous protesters of European Social Forum (November 2002) protest in Florence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Luxembourg</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>***</th>
<th>***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Netherlands | Yes | • “Platform Against the War” (het Platform tegen de Oorlog) or Platform Against the New War” (het Platform tegen de Nieuwe Oorlog) was joined by more than 200 organizations
- groups representing Americans, exiled Iraqis, Tibetans, Germans, and Japanese
- Some protesters had last protested during the anti-nuclear protests of the 1980s or even earlier, in opposition to the Vietnam War.
- The political parties GroenLinks (the Green Left), and the Socialistische Partij (Socialists) joined the Platform. Platform organizer H. van Heijningen stated that they hoped to get the Labour party (Partij van de Arbeid) and the labor movement to join in as well. He stated that he had spoken with members of the Christian Democrats (CDA) opposed to the war, but that CDA participation in the protest was not a possibility.
- speakers, including Jan Marijnessen of the Socialist party (SP) and Femke Halsema of left-leaning greens (GroenLinks)
- Only one Catholic bishop from Haarlem, J.L. Wirix, was scheduled to attend, and father E. Kimman, was scheduled to represent the Catholic bishops.
- M. Bosman-Huizinga, the general secretary of the Reformed “Remonstrantse Broederschap, was scheduled to attend the protest as a representative of the Raad van Kerken (Council of Churches)
- J. Gruiters of Pax Christi speaking for the Raad van Kerken
- Notably absent was Mient Jan Faber, a key activist in the 1980s peace movement against nuclearization and previously part of Pax
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Opponents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>former President Mario Soares, members of the Socialist Party and the leaders of the Communists and the Left Bloc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>“Let us Stop the War platform:” opposition political parties (especially the Socialist Party or PSOE), trade unions, NGOs, students</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>Maj Britt Theorin, former social democratic member of the European Parliament; Anja Karlsson (Party of the Left); the Environment Party’s spokesperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Stop the War Coalition (STWC), the veteran peace group Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the Muslim Association of Britain. alongside veteran peace campaigners and anti-globalisation activists were every-day citizens the biggest protest there since World War II, as protests in the 1970s targeting the Vietnam War had mobilized roughly 400,000 participants</td>
<td>Labour veterans, Michael Foot and Tony Benn; Labour MP George Galloway; Labour MP Alice Mahon; Former Labour politician Mo Mowlam; the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone; the Liberal Democrat leader, Charles Kennedy Billy Hayes, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1 Bulgaria</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• For Peace, Against War Citizens Committee which comprises some 30 parties and NGOs • Iraqis • The protest reportedly had Communist overtones, with some of the protesters waving red banners and carrying posters of former Soviet dictator Josef Stalin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2 Czech Republic</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• one protest organized by the Group Against War (also known as the Initiative Against War), by foreigners living in Prague, and Greenpeace • another protest: The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3 Estonia</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4 Hungary</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Organizers (Civilians for Peace) also known as Civilians’ Movement for Peace: several dozen non-profit organizations, including ATTAC Hungary; the Alba Group; the Humanist Movement; the Solidarity Youth Alternative; the Green Youths organizations; the Hungarian Iraqi Opposition; Greenpeace Hungary; the Left-Wing Alternative Union;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 5 Latvia  | Yes    | - Main protest organized by Movement for Neutrality  
- Latvians, ethnic Russians, Lithuanians  
- At other protests: concerns about nationalism and remnants of communism are clearly driving actors in the anti-war movement (groups involved: Everything for Latvia, the Social Democratic Youth Association, Club 415, Intelligence Intelligentsia)  |
| 6 Lithuania | Yes    | - organized by several pacifist organizations, opposition parties, and newspapers  
- some Lithuanians went to Latvia to protest  |
| 7 Poland  | Yes    | ***                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 8 Romania | Yes    | ***                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| 9 Slovakia | Yes    | - organized by Eduard Chmelar of the Slovak Governance Institute  
- Communists, nationalists, opposition politicians, left-wing parties, representatives of trade unions, anarchists, religious groups, environmentalists, and human rights organizations (who have been critiqued for opposing war against a regime known for its rights violations)  
- Palestinian representation  |
| 10 Slovenia | Yes    | - from all generations  
- partisans, prisoners of war, revolutionaries of the 1960s, peace activists of the 1980s and social movements’ activists  |
| 1 Cyprus  | No     | - Committee of the “Stop the War Alliance!” has brought together Greek and Turkish Cypriots whose “opposition to war also helped bridge bitter ethnic rivalries”  
- Protesters from Cyprus, France, Belgium, Spain and the US  |

268
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No</th>
<th>**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Malta</td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 8.3:** Actors, Insiders, and Outsiders at the February 15 Protests

Note: *=Protest banned by authorities. **=No coverage of a protest. ***=Not enough information available in the coverage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Austria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Support government stance on war in Iraq and oppose usage of domestic transport networks for U.S. military transports (e.g., train lines, ports, or airports)</td>
<td>not so much, generally marching in support of their government and in another protest, oppose Belgian government decisions to permit U.S. military transports and usage of ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Belgium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq and opposing the domestic foreign policy stance supporting the war</td>
<td>clearly targeted their domestic government and Prime Minister Rasmussen’s support of the war, bringing signs asking, “Berlin, Paris, Brussels -where is Copenhagen?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Denmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq and opposing the domestic foreign policy stance supporting the war</td>
<td>were targeting the Finnish leadership who would decide Finnish policy on the war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Finland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</td>
<td>not so much, indicated support for French opposition to the war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 France</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Support government stance on war in Iraq</td>
<td>supported the German government’s opposition to the war in Iraq and the maintenance of this standpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Germany</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Support government stance on war in Iraq</td>
<td>the Greek government was also targeted, with the call to stay out of a war in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Greece</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</td>
<td>had grievances particular to the Irish involvement in the war in Iraq, targeting the domestic government for its willingness to permit the Shannon airport’s usage in refueling of American military planes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Ireland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq and oppose usage of domestic transport networks for U.S. military transports (e.g., train lines, ports, or airports)</td>
<td>stated “our neutrality is in bits, we are now a colony once again, a military outpost for the US superpower,” advocating that the government “break its silence now” and oppose the war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Support to Oppose the War</td>
<td>Support to Oppose Domestic Policy</td>
<td>Comment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Opposing the domestic foreign policy stance against the war of Italy via caricatures of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, some called for him to resign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq; called for “the government to give up its neutrality and oppose the intervention”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq; Opposing the domestic foreign policy stance supporting the war; ‘Not in my name’ (the war should not be carried out in my name) was the main message, called for a change in Dutch policy-making in support of the war, not blindly following US.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Called on Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar to follow France and Germany in supporting peaceful resolution to the conflict; protest was not directed so much at George Bush as at Aznar, whom some protesters called to resign; slogans such as “The Pope says no to war, the People's party says yes;” “Aznar, Bush's doormat”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq; Opposing the domestic foreign policy stance supporting the war; What unites them is anger against President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, but mainly Blair; thus targeted the Prime Minister, passing by his Downing Street office and opposing his government’s policy-making and the direction that the Labour party’s foreign policy-making has taken. One of the marches also passed by the British Houses of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq; targeting the Swedish government, demand Sweden does everything to stop a war, calling for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, “Support Olof Palme’s policy and say ‘no’ to war”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Yes</td>
<td><strong>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arguing that “a war will have a far-reaching economic impact which will inevitably hit Bulgaria too</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Yes</td>
<td><strong>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arguing that “a war will have a far-reaching economic impact which will inevitably hit Bulgaria too</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arguing that “a war will have a far-reaching economic impact which will inevitably hit Bulgaria too</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Yes</td>
<td><strong>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arguing that “a war will have a far-reaching economic impact which will inevitably hit Bulgaria too</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Yes</td>
<td><strong>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arguing that “a war will have a far-reaching economic impact which will inevitably hit Bulgaria too</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Yes</td>
<td><strong>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arguing that “a war will have a far-reaching economic impact which will inevitably hit Bulgaria too</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Yes</td>
<td><strong>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arguing that “a war will have a far-reaching economic impact which will inevitably hit Bulgaria too</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>• Yes</td>
<td><strong>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arguing that “a war will have a far-reaching economic impact which will inevitably hit Bulgaria too</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Call for Government to Join Countries Opposing the War in Iraq</td>
<td>Call for Government to Join Countries Opposing the War in Iraq</td>
<td>Other Actions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>protest started in front of the Slovak government office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Called for the government to join countries opposing the war in Iraq</td>
<td>sent an “open letter” to Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda asking him to keep Slovakia out of the war and not to send Slovaks to Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>anti-government slogans, some demonstrators compared Premier Mikulas Dzurinda with Hitler</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>targeted the domestic government’s possible involvement and decision-making concerning the war; protestors demanded that Slovenia backs down from the Vilnius declaration in which ten east European states declared their support for U.S. policy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>oppose the use of the British bases on Cyprus as a launch pad for the attack on Iraq</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>**=No coverage of a protest. ***=Not enough information available in the coverage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.4: Domestic Targets and Grievances at the February 15 Protests

Note: *=Protest banned by authorities. **=No coverage of a protest. ***=Not enough information available in the coverage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td>** ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>US, UK</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq; Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests</td>
<td>framed the war as indelibly intertwined with the pursuit of oil; targeted both U.S. President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Blair; slogans like “non à la guerre” (no to war in French); “geen oorlog” (no war in Dutch); “no to war.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>US, UK</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq; Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests</td>
<td>make the linkage between militarization and oil interests; protest started at the American embassy and passed by the English embassy, targeting both countries’ policies; a slogan: “No War With Iraq”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq; Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community; Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests; Link U.S. pursuit of hegemony and imperialism to the war in Iraq</td>
<td>linked their opposition of the war to the imperialistic, self-interest of the United States; called for the international community to continue weapons inspections and not turn to a unilateral war; represented different viewpoints on why the war was unjustified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq; Link U.S. pursuit of hegemony and imperialism to the war in Iraq</td>
<td>carrying posters that denounced President Bush as a ‘warmonger’ and chanting anti-American slogans. Some signs said “we are all Iraqis,” pledged solidarity with other Arabs, or supported Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq; Opposing</td>
<td>made the linkage between economic interests, especially oil interests, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Participated</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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**Linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests**
- Link U.S. pursuit of hegemony and imperialism to the war in Iraq

**The militarization in Iraq, carrying signs like, “No Blood for Oil;” carried signs accusing the U.S. of imperialistic and hegemonic militaristic motivations, such as “The axis of evil runs through the Pentagon;” also signs supporting “Old Europe”**

- Both the British and U.S. government were targeted, with flags burned at their embassy or consulate en route
- Speeches at the protest reiterated the protesters’ demands for stopping the war; for working within the framework of international law, via the United Nations, to peacefully resolve the conflict; and for banning weapons of mass destruction
- “NATO, U.S. and EU equals War” banner placed Acropolis
- Chants such as “Down with the United States,” “Americans are murderers,” and “War is not the only answer;” Slogans such as “No to War;” “Imperialism is the enemy;” “No bloodshed for war;” many Iraqi flags that were visible

- Several organizers focused on opposing all kinds of war
- The linkages between oil and the war and between imperialism and war were also attended to in Ireland
- Opposing the war, basing their criticism on the likely aftermath of the war, criticizing the policy-making of the Bush administration, but taking care to clarify that they are not opposed to Americans per se and do not align themselves with Hussein.

- Supporting peace and opposing war
- 800,000 rainbow colored
flags with “Pace” or peace
• Organized called for protesters to refrain from making posters with anti-American or “harsh slogans”
• against the foreign policy of the United States and Italy via caricatures of U.S. President Bush and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi,
• Some Italian protesters called for Prime Minister Berlusconi to resign
• against the foreign policy of the United States … caricatures of U.S. President Bush and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Aligning Power</th>
<th>Demands</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Luxembourg  | No            | US             | Oppose war in Iraq
Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests | slogans such as “No to blood for oil”                                    |
| Netherlands | Yes           | US             | Oppose war in Iraq
Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community
Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests | called for a change in U.S. policy-making: seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict via the UN and international law, but certainly were not supporting the Hussein regime.
Linkages between oil and militarization, and the conflicts in Iraq and other Middle-eastern conflicts were also made |
| Portugal    | Yes           | ***            |                                                                  |                                                                         |
| Spain       | Yes           | US             | Oppose war in Iraq
Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community
Link U.S. pursuit of hegemony and imperialism to the war in Iraq | clearly targeted the U.S. and its imperialistic aims
another emphasis in the protests was merely on opposing war, especially one that was justified as a “preventive war”
argued that the Iraqi people should be considered
slogans such as “No to the War,” “Not in our name,” and “Not with our silence” |
| Sweden      | No            | US             | Oppose war in Iraq | targeting the US |
Iraq
- Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community
- Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests
government, and calling for a peaceful resolution to the conflict
- suggest a linkage between American economic interests and the true reasons the Americans were pursuing a war in Iraq
- protesters at the demonstrations were very opposed to preemptive, unilateral military intervention in Iraq by Americans, which they perceive as motivated by economic interests and threatening international law and stability.
- concerned about the precedent that could be set with such preemptive, unilateral warfare with the potential for huge gleanings in oil revenues, asking which country would be attacked next
- speaker claimed “the United States is an even greater rogue” than Iraq
- the issue of Palestine was raised

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15 United Kingdom</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>US</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Link U.S. pursuit of hegemony and imperialism to the war in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>highlighted linkages between the war and U.S. material and political interests</td>
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<td>accused the U.S. of applying a double-standard in its dealings with Iraq</td>
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<td>many protesters emphasized that they were not supporting Hussein and not anti-government as they have sometimes been branded, but rather oppose going to war and resorting to violence and support finding a peaceful resolution</td>
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<td>slogans such as “No War on Iraq”</td>
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<tr>
<th>1 Bulgaria</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>US</th>
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<tr>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>calling upon the US government to give up its war plans</td>
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</table>
| Protesters’ placards included such mottos as, “For peace, against war,” “For peace
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Supports Iraq War</th>
<th>U.S. Support</th>
<th>Opposed War in Iraq</th>
<th>Opposed Unilateral War in Iraq</th>
<th>Opposed Linkage between War in Iraq and Oil and Corporate Interests</th>
<th>Events/Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Czech Republic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>US, NATO</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq</td>
<td>Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community</td>
<td>Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests</td>
<td>• Highlighted the linkages between oil interests and the war, suggested that human rights would be waylaid in the process, and recommended conflict resolution via the diplomacy that France and Germany prefer, not via warfare incited by NATO. • Signs such as “No Blood for Petrol;” “God said: you will not kill;” “No to war in Iraq, no to U.S. aggression;” “Democracy is not born of bombs;” “Let's hang U.S. pirates.”</td>
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<td>3 Estonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq</td>
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<td>Target U.S. support for a war in Iraq</td>
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<td>4 Hungary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq</td>
<td>Link U.S. pursuit of hegemony and imperialism to the war in Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td>Had grievances concerning the Bush administration’s policy-making and pursuit of hegemony via warfare. Emphasize that they are not anti-American and do not support Hussein.</td>
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<td>5 Latvia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq</td>
<td>Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests</td>
<td></td>
<td>Protesters targeted U.S. policy on the war and the economic interests propelling the U.S. drive to war; linkages between the war and oil were raised. A slogan: “no to war.”</td>
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<td>6 Lithuania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq</td>
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<td>Oppose U.S. policy on Iraq</td>
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<td>7 Poland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Oppose war in Iraq</td>
<td>Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community</td>
<td>Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests</td>
<td>Targeted U.S. President Bush at U.S. Embassy. The economic ties to militarization and the desire for diplomacy with Iraq were resounding themes: discussed the linkage between the war and oil interests as well as the likely benefit to U.S. companies from the war. Called for a peaceful solution: “solve the problem not bomb it.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Opposers</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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| Romania     | Yes      | US       | • Oppose war in Iraq  
• Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests  
• Link U.S. pursuit of hegemony and imperialism to the war in Iraq  
• focused on opposing a war that they see being fought for oil interests and being used to formalize a new East European servitude to a hawkish United States  
• Slogans like “No to war, no to aggression - but yes to negotiations about peace,” “Blood is not Petrol,” “No to war in Iraq,” “Not in Our Name,” “Stop War!,” “Shame on USA!,” and “Stop Aggression.”  
• some demonstrators compared President Bush with Hitler |
| Slovakia    | Yes      | US       | • Oppose war in Iraq  
• Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community  
• Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests  
• targeted the American decision-making concerning a war in Iraq  
• support resolving the conflict with Iraq via the United Nations, diplomacy, and in accordance with international law  
• opposed the justification for war (including oil interests) and the likely character of the war for the Iraqi people  
• Slogans like “No War,” “Peace,” “Blood Is not Oil,” “War = Crime, America Wake up,” “Make Love, Not Bush,” “Imagine All the People, Living Life in Peace.” |
| Slovenia    | Yes      | US       | • Oppose war in Iraq  
• Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community  
• Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests  
• opposed to the unilateralism of the Bush policy and its disregard for international law  
• perceived connections between oil interests and the militarization  
• Slogans like “One, two, three, four, we don't want your ****ing war,” “Bush, Blair, Sharon -- murderers of the people,” “No more blood for oil” |
| Cyprus      | No       | US, UK, Israel | • Oppose war in Iraq  
• Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community  
• Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests  
• opposed the justification for war (including oil interests) and the likely character of the war for the Iraqi people  
• Slogans like “No War,” “Peace,” “Blood Is not Oil,” “War = Crime, America Wake up,” “Make Love, Not Bush,” “Imagine All the People, Living Life in Peace.” |
| Malta       | No       | **       | • Oppose war in Iraq  
• Oppose unilateral war in Iraq that does not involve the international community  
• Opposing linkage between war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests  
• opposed to the unilateralism of the Bush policy and its disregard for international law  
• perceived connections between oil interests and the militarization  
• Slogans like “One, two, three, four, we don't want your ****ing war,” “Bush, Blair, Sharon -- murderers of the people,” “No more blood for oil” |

**Table 8.5: International Targets and Grievances at the February 15 Protests**

Note: * = Protest banned by authorities. ** = No coverage of a protest. *** = Not enough information available in the coverage.
References


