ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the practical effects of international norm construction for social movements attempting to navigate the UN system, specifically UN global conferences. Do norms become ingrained in the practices of intergovernmental organizations to such an extent that they hinder a movement with different norms or help a movement that conforms to them? In studying the UN and especially UN global conferences on issues of social significance, it has been argued that the norms stemming from classic Lockean liberalism, such as emphasis on individual liberties, a rights-based framework for developing policy, and progress through science and reason, are embodied in the procedures and frameworks of UN global conferences.

I compare the strategies and influence of the abortion-rights and anti-abortion movements over time at the UN, particularly through the International Conferences on Population and Development, and trace how each movement has adjusted its strategies to accommodate the normative context it has encountered at the UN. I use a combined structural and agency-oriented framework that identifies the concrete mechanisms and processes through which the interplay of movement ideology and institutional-normative context may constrain or facilitate a social movement’s actions within the UN system.
What I’ve found in my research is that the abortion-rights network has had more success in actually influencing the debate and changing the language of population policy to reflect their goals, whereas the influence of the anti-abortion network can really only be measured by the language that they have blocked. But it is important to note that both the abortion-rights network and the anti-abortion network have adjusted over time to the UN in terms of their strategies, which is interesting because of the more progressive character of one, and the conservative character of the other. However, the progressive and conservative characters of the two movements still affected how easily each movement adapted to these norms at the UN, and the success of their strategies in that forum.
Adapting to Norms at the United Nations: Abortion-Rights and Anti-Abortion Networks

By

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<td>Commission on Population and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>Economic and Social Council</td>
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<td>ERA</td>
<td>Equal Rights Amendment</td>
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<td>FCI</td>
<td>Family Care International</td>
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<td>ICPD</td>
<td>International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994)</td>
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<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental organization</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>INSTRAW</td>
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1 Introduction

Why are conservative organizations much less likely to advocate at the UN, and for those that do focus on the UN, to be less successful in their advocacy? The empirical puzzle that spurs this question is the differential success of the abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks in influencing the debate and language of population policy at the UN. The abortion-rights network has been very successful, changing the language of family planning to reproductive health and rights. The anti-abortion network has not been able to affect any real change in language or policy, although it has succeeded in making reproductive health and rights controversial. Why is this? Is it simply a matter of a winning cause versus a losing cause, or better access to resources, whether those of power, influence, or money? Or might it be the deeper normative fabric of the UN? There have not been many studies of such transnational conservative movements, a gap in the literature all the more apparent given the attention conservative movements are gaining in the media.

Two very different types of theories give us different explanations of why the anti-abortion network is not as successful as the abortion-rights network in influencing the UN: world-polity theory argues that the international system is predicated on liberal norms, which would disadvantage conservative networks and enhance liberal ones. Social movement theories1, on the other hand, argue that the strategies that such networks employ and the political opportunities open to them determine how successful each network is. I believe that both these theories have something to offer, but that each alone

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1 I use the label social movement theories to refer to the emerging strands of theory on transnational activism that are informed by a social movement framework, using the core mechanisms of framing, discourse, and political opportunities.
is inadequate: world-polity theory offers us a systemic understanding of the norms that are embedded in the UN as an international organization, but does not account for the ability of individuals to work around or adjust to those norms. Transnational movement theory specifically does provide specific mechanisms by which networks may create opportunities for themselves and adjust to existing norms, but does not provide a structural, normative understanding of the system in which these networks and movements operate. Thus, I am filling an empirical gap by studying a transnational conservative movement in comparison with a liberal one, and filling a theoretical gap by using a combined structural and agency-oriented framework to do so.

I use world-polity theory’s liberal norms to understand the environment within which abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks operate when lobbying at the UN global conferences, and argue that both movements had to adjust to these liberal norms in order to advocate at the UN. I see the abortion-rights network as more privileged in its ability to influence both UN employees and government delegations, which is a result of its liberal values; I see the anti-abortion network as instrumentally adapting to key liberal norms in order to influence government delegations at UN global conferences, but not able to influence UN employees as a result of its conservative values. Thus, I argue that one needs to understand both the systemic norms and the agency-oriented strategies that individuals may employ to work around or adapt to those norms in order to fully understand why conservative networks are not as successful in lobbying at the UN as liberal networks.
\subsection*{1.1 Research Question}

“You might say we’re the United Nations of the pro-family movement,” said Allan Carlson to the online newspaper, \textit{Christianwire.com}, in reference to the recent international conference for pro-family leaders and NGOs, the World Congress of Families IV (\textit{Christian Newswire} April 24, 2007). He goes on to explain,

“In terms of speakers, organizers and attendees, the Congress spans six continents. This demonstrates the universality of family concerns and the desire of pro-family leaders, scholars and activists to network and develop joint plans of action to address those concerns at the national level as well as in international forums.”

These statements illustrate several interesting characteristics of the anti-abortion network’s advocacy at the international level: it seeks to claim an international audience as well as international advocates for its concerns, and implies that it is the desire of these activists to work together to advocate for their concerns at the international level. Many might be surprised at the first statement; pro-family organizations are part of a conservative movement with a long (and continuing) history of criticizing the United Nations for its inefficiency, its intentions to interfere with state sovereignty, and its support for liberal causes. Why would a pro-family organization that expresses these sentiments put so much effort into organizing a transnational network to advocate for their causes at an international forum like the UN, much less describe themselves as the United Nations of the pro-family movement? I believe that a clear change has occurred within the anti-abortion network’s strategies, including a shift towards the international sphere. That shift has entailed some very specific changes for the network, changes that I believe indicate an adjustment to the norms of the UN.

I am using the issue of abortion to explore the larger questions that these statements provoke: Is there a normative structure to the international system? Is that
normative structure “liberal”? Is it reflected at the UN? How does the normative structure shape the strategies of activists advocating around the UN? Does this differ for liberal versus conservative groups of activists? These questions arise from my interest in the sociological literature’s world-polity theory, which claims that the diffusion of liberal norms constrains actors in the international sphere, and the political-science literature’s social movement theory, which claims that actors choose strategically in order to mobilize and successfully advocate for their cause.

World-polity theory argues that international organizations in general and the UN in particular is embedded in a philosophy that emphasizes individualism, rights, and science and reason as the means to the goals of progress and justice. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to prove the existence of these systemic norms. But as a political scientist, I address the existence of these norms in their implications for and impact on actors. Political science theories dealing with non-state actors tend to emphasize agency, while world-polity theory emphasizes the structure of norms. I intend to combine structure and agency in a theoretical framework that will demonstrate how embedded norms affect the strategies of non-state actors.

I investigate the possible influence of the liberal norms proposed by world-polity theory by comparing non-state actors who seem to operate from a similar philosophy and those that do not. The movements that advocate for and against abortion at the international level, in which I include the women’s reproductive health and rights movement and the pro-family movement, fit these conditions well. The abortion-rights network springs from a liberal philosophy, given its mainly mainstream feminist underpinnings, while the anti-abortion network comes from an opposing philosophy, one
that emphasizes community, duty, and tradition and religion as the means to the goals of stability and prosperity.

These two advocacy networks in the 21st century appear strikingly similar in the way they work: they both lobby within countries and at the UN, they both use non-governmental organizations to do that work of reaching out to grassroots supporters and government delegations at the UN, they are concerned with similar sets of issues involving the role of women and sexuality, with the touchstone issue being abortion. One key difference separates these two movements: their underlying values, leading to the different goals of their advocacy. The abortion-rights network seeks to establish reproductive health and rights, including the right to safe abortion, internationally, from a rights-based, progressive perspective. The anti-abortion network seeks to establish the importance of the natural family, marriage, children, and parental rights, and that life begins at conception in the international system, from a moral, conservative perspective. Does this one difference have an effect on the success of their advocacy at the UN, and on the adjustments they make over time to their strategies of advocacy?

The United Nations is an international institution based on liberal internationalist principles and a prime example of an institution that would demonstrate the liberal characteristics described by the world-polity theorists. It is therefore an excellent environment for investigating the possible influence of diffusing liberal norms on the success of liberal and conservative networks, as well as how activists might work around or adjust to such norms.
The UN is one of the major centers through which non-state activists, organizations and networks advocate for change in language, standards, and policy that affect not only UN agencies, but also those of nation-states. The international conferences held by UN agencies provide important forums for debate of cutting-edge economic and social issues; the negotiated documents that emerge from these conferences set the agenda for UN agencies and set the standard for nation-states. It is therefore not surprising that many non-state activists attempt to influence the debate and documents at these conferences. However, I believe that there are several important practices that actors must take into account when advocating at the UN, practices that arise from the liberal individualist norms that prompted its founding.

Liberal individualism, with its emphasis on the individual, the freedom and equality of each individual, and the use of science and reason as the means to progress, is reflected in several key practices of world culture that grew in importance at the UN, and especially the UN global conferences dealing with social issues: the importance of the individual has led over time from majority-rule voting procedures at UN global conferences to the practice of consensus decision-making; the importance of the freedom and equality of each individual has made a human rights framework increasingly important within the UN; and the importance of science and reason corresponds to the weight placed on scientific research as the rationale for policies. These practices, of consensus decision-making, the human rights framework, and the use of scientific research to justify scientific and social policy at the UN, have become more embedded over time, and so have a greater effect on the strategies of NGOs that began their work at the UN in the last few decades.
1.2 Case Selection

This research asks, at the broadest level, how conservative movements fare in a liberal international system. Narrowing the focus to the international anti-abortion movement and abortion-rights movement allows comparative research around one issue. The anti-abortion movement is particularly interesting as a conservative movement because it occupies a middle ground between the liberal/cosmopolitan internationalism of transnational activism literature and traditional fundamentalism movements that rail against it; the Christian Right and other anti-abortion movement organizations use the methods and mechanisms of the international liberal system, but their actions are based on different norms.

The main research question asks, How do the liberal norms of the international system as described by world polity theory affect a social movement’s success, and its approach to influencing international reproductive issues and family planning policy? In order to explore this question, I compare the activities of the abortion rights and anti-abortion movements over time in the domestic (United States) and international (United Nations) arenas. I see the domestic arena as an important factor in understanding movements in the international arena; it is difficult, especially in this age of advanced communication technology, to understand what happens in the international system without taking into account domestic politics. I chose the United States (U.S.) as the domestic environment in which to study both movements because they have been relatively quite important to American domestic politics, and because changes in American administrations have meant different types of support for this cause in the United Nations (UN). Additionally, many of the key organizations in both movements...
emerged from the U.S., and so the domestic environment in the U.S. is key to understanding the political opportunities of which these organizations were able to take advantage.

The case studies of the anti-abortion and abortion-rights movements can speak to the competing claims in the literature on whether, and how, the normative conditions of the international system are important for movements, and will do so using a combined structural and agency-oriented framework that will identify the concrete mechanisms and processes through which an international set of norms may constrain or facilitate a social movement’s actions. Thus, there are two key debates I am addressing with my research: the need to blend structure with agency in theory to better understand how agents interact with norms, and the need to balance the transnational activism literature with case studies of conservative movements.

1.3 Importance of Research Question

Given that the UN is an important forum for political contestation, it is important to explore how norms affect the success, failure, and strategies of movements that operate within the UN. Often those within a bureaucracy are the last to recognize the structural opportunities and constraints of the culture and norms that have grown up within the organization. Thus, because the UN continues to provide an essential medium for voices that go unheard elsewhere, it is important to understand the opportunities and constraints provided not only by resources and political opportunities, but the intersection of these with culture and norms.

Conservative movements are gaining attention in both the domestic and international realms, sometimes for their violent tactics and sometimes for their effective
use of traditional resources for mobilization, such as lobbying and electoral politics, as well as the newer ones of the Internet, UN conferences, and international coalitions. However, the new body of literature on non-state activists, transnational networks and movements has been skewed towards more liberal issues and movements, such as human rights, women’s rights, and the environment. Although conservative, religious or violent movements may be using the same strategies, opportunities, and organizational structures used by liberal movements, they have been for the most part excluded from this new literature, which limits our understanding of these activists, networks and movements. Thus, this question is important because it begins to fill a need for the study of conservative movements in this nascent literature by comparing the conservative anti-abortion movement’s influence and strategies with those of the abortion-rights movement.

1.4 Brief Discussion of Theory, Definition of Terms and Literature Review

Liberal philosophy is here defined as emphasizing individuals, a rights framework, and progress through science and reason (Boli and Thomas 1999). This philosophy is in direct contradiction with the conservative philosophies that look to tradition rather than reason for guidance, emphasize community rather than individuals, responsibility rather than rights, and do not necessarily prioritize progress (Dunn and Woodard 2003).

Sociological world-polity scholars (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Meyer, Boli et al 1997, Boli and Thomas 1999, Lechner and Boli 2005) posit that a world culture consisting of bureaucratic rationalization, science and reason as the means to secular progress, individualism, and rights is transmitted by international organizations and
technology, causing an unexplained isomorphism in organizations, goals, activities and identities all over the world. Bureaucratic rationalization spread as a result of the drive toward modernization: the way that states and civil groups of people organized themselves to solve problems and meet needs had to conform to a particular set of rules determined as “rational” by those in a field or sector in order to be regarded as legitimate, regardless of whether these rules addressed the specific circumstances found in different parts of the world (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The fact that an institution such as the UN existed for deliberating about problems and devising rational procedures to address them – procedures that apply equally to all – helped diffuse these norms more quickly in the 20th century. The use of science and reason as the means to secular progress is a norm derived from the Enlightenment, and the importance of the individual as autonomous and possessing inherent rights was a radical new idea soon after; both of these norms are now taken for granted (Lechner and Boli 2005). Constructivist political scientists have drawn on this literature to argue that international organizations are constituted by and transmit two basic types of norms, rational and liberal, and that liberal norms are now expanding across the globe in a similar manner to the spread of rationalization. “[A] strong thread running through the ever-expanding world of international organizations (IOs) is their substantively liberal character. Most IOs were founded by Western liberal states and are designed to promote liberal values” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 15).

UN global conferences especially combine rational and liberal norms, combining both the Weberian organizational structure and an individualistic, rights-based framework. I would argue that the UN global conferences and programs (on the social side, under the Economic and Social Council especially) are supported by this
combination of rational and liberal norms; I am particularly interested in exploring how the liberal norms of the importance of the individual, of human rights, and science and reason as the means to progress affect the successes and failures of different movements at the UN conferences, as well as the way they change their strategies over time.

### 1.4.1 Definition of Terms

Generally when I speak of liberal, I am referring to the Lockean or classical liberalism and more specifically the bundle of norms emphasized by world-polity theorists as liberal; conservative refers to Burkean or traditional conservatism, and the bundle of norms coming out of that literature which are relevant to this analysis, including the importance of community, responsibility, and tradition and religion as the means to preserving stability. When I reference the anti-abortion network, there are many organizations that advocate against abortion only, and many that focus on a range of issues including abortion, gay marriage, the decay of marriage, the family, and the role of mother and wife for women, connected by the term “natural family” in the late nineties. I will generally refer to all these organizations as anti-abortion organizations because even when abortion is not their central focus, their activism against abortion plays such a central role in their rhetoric and strategies. In addition, I see the term “pro-family” as part of the framing done by these organizations to position themselves in the global advocacy world and gain allies. As a result, I use that term sparingly and usually in reference to these framing efforts. These organizations are also generally united by a conservative philosophy; however I will try to be conceptually specific and use conservative to indicate a philosophy that includes the elements referred to above, and anti-abortion to indicate the organizations that have become involved in the UN global conferences with
advocacy against abortion as a major goal. There are also organizations that advocate for the right to abortion internationally, but most organizations include this issue as one among many in their focus on reproductive health and rights, which includes women’s empowerment, safe motherhood initiatives, family planning services, and sexual health and rights more recently. I will refer to all these organizations as abortion-rights, again because, although it may not be the only issue on the table, it is difficult to separate the right to abortion from the central concerns in their advocacy. I also see the term “women’s reproductive health and rights” as being part of the framing efforts of these organizations. Since these efforts took place nearly twenty years ago, the term is more entrenched and therefore most of the scholarship on these organizations that I cite will refer to them as reproductive health and rights organizations, part of a transnational network or movement of the same name.

In order to be more conceptually specific concerning the non-governmental organizations, networks and movements referred to in this research, I will define these terms according to the social movement literature, and how I use them in this research. A social movement can be defined as “a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities” by individuals who have a basic collective identity and an established network (Tilly 2004: 3-4). A transnational social movement is defined by its “sustained contentious interaction with power holders” against multiple governments or an international target, including international institutions (Tarrow 2001). The many groups organized both domestically and internationally around the issue of abortion and those related to it (such as women’s rights for the abortion-rights movement and marriage and family for the anti-abortion movement) have mobilized over the past
thirty to forty years to varying extents; I would describe these as social movements, in that they have, in many different countries and especially in the U.S., had a sustained, organized, and public effort in making collective claims on authorities. These social movements have fueled the international level activity I am researching, whether it be national organizations developing international branches, or supporting such organizations and efforts. Several scholars who have researched the women’s rights movement agree on their status as a transnational social movement (Moghadam 2005, Kardam 2004, Friedman 2003, Joachim 2003, Eager 2004); however, there have been comparatively few scholarly studies of the work done by anti-abortion organizations at the international level, and those that exist disagree on the extent to which these organizations have become transnational (Buss and Herman 2003, Butler 2006, Chappell 2006). In the course of my research I have found evidence of the anti-abortion organizations engaging in sustained contentious interaction against an international institution over the past ten years, and therefore define them as a transnational social movement.

The organizations from both movements that have had significant impact at the UN have tended to be those focused on advocacy; the women’s reproductive health and rights movement has tended to include more organizations involved in providing services in multiple countries, but the most influential organizations in both movements tend to be those that devote all or considerable resources to advocacy at the UN. Thus, I also refer to the organizations that lobby particularly at the UN as part of a transnational advocacy network, defined as “the relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of
information and services” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). In addition, the line between government and non-government actors is more blurred in transnational advocacy networks (Tarrow 2001, Keck and Sikkink 1998), whereas social movements are generally seen as working more in opposition to governments (Chappell 2006). The interaction between state and non-governmental actors is a necessary consideration in studying both abortion-rights and anti-abortion organizations at UN global conferences, especially since non-government representatives are included in state delegations to international conferences (Rucht 1999: 210). This distinction in addition to the definition referred to earlier is why I will generally refer to the organizations that lobby at the UN as part of a transnational network.

1.4.2 Empirical Puzzle

The empirical puzzle I explain involves the differences in how the abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks have been able to influence the UN, and the similarities between the two networks’ strategies. The abortion-rights network has had more success in influencing the debate and changing the language of population policy to reflect their goals, whereas the influence of the anti-abortion network can really only be measured by the language that they have blocked. At the 1994 Cairo Conference, the women’s organizations were able to change the language of population policy from family planning to reproductive health and rights, completely shifting the demographic rationale behind family planning for the thirty years prior to this conference to a human rights rationale. The anti-abortion movement has since directed much more effort at the UN and a growing anti-abortion network began lobbying at UN global conferences since the Cairo conference. These organizations have had some success in watering down language
and blocking some language to which they object, and especially in making the term reproductive health and rights controversial as they equate it with abortion. However, they have not been successful so far in actually inserting language they approve of, or changing the terms of the debate on the family, marriage, adolescents, and abortion to those they would prefer. What explains the different levels of success these two networks have had?

The abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks are very similar in their strategies of advocacy at the UN. Both networks use academic research and statistics to support their advocacy, frame their issue in terms of rights, and are building transnational coalitions with similar groups around the world. These changes have happened over time, implemented with different levels of commitment and to different extents for each network. Given the fundamental difference between the two networks in their normative background and goals, what explains these similarities in strategies? I will review the recent literature on the anti-abortion network, and then elaborate on several different theories and their possible explanations for these questions below.

1.4.2.1 Literature on the Anti-Abortion Network

A small but growing literature has begun to examine the anti-abortion movement in the international system in the past three to four years, mainly by feminist scholars seeking to explain what they see as a counter-movement to the women’s rights and reproductive health movements. They do not generally seek to explain the difference in influence between the two movements, instead focusing on what to them is an alarming amount of influence the anti-abortion network has had in the last few years. Some note the similarity in strategy between the two networks, but explain them simply as
successful strategies. Several of these studies have important empirical contributions to make, but I see them as handicapped by their theoretical assumptions into seeing the women’s rights movement as the “good” movement and the anti-abortion movement as working to undermine the gains made by the “good” movement in ways that contradict the prevailing understanding of how global civil society is supposed to work. Elizabeth Friedman argues that women’s rights advocates succeeded in “gendering the agenda” of all the UN global conferences in the 1990s, and in the process, spurred a transnational counter-movement who sought to preserve the status quo of women’s roles to fit their understandings of family, nation, and God (2003: 14). Although Friedman provides some detail on this counter-movement, she mainly focuses on the women’s rights advocates. Dorothy Buss and Didi Herman (2003) examine the influence of the Christian Right at the United Nations, providing detailed accounts of the individual organizations and the theological changes in reasoning that prompted them to lobby at the UN. However, Buss and Herman do not see the links between these organizations and their counter-parts worldwide as evidence for an international or transnational network, and focus mainly on the U.S. based Christian Right organizations.

Jennifer Butler (2006) also examines the Christian Right at the UN, arguing that these organizations have been successful through their excellent movement-building strategies, and are poised to be more successful in the wake of abortion-rights organizations ignoring religion, neglecting their grass-roots supporters, and disregarding the importance of the family in the developing world. Butler’s thorough account provides a goldmine of information concerning the organization and strategies of the Christian Right, including the alliances they are building on the international scale. While Butler contextualizes her
study in the tension between religion and secular theory, she does not make any consistent argument about why Christian Right organizations adopt the particular strategies they do, nor deal with the different levels of influence at the UN – both the government delegations and the UN employees, and why the women’s rights organizations are so much more successful than the Christian Right in persuading those who work for the UN.

Louise Chappell (2006) documents the emergence of a transnational conservative network in response to the women’s rights movement, and extends a domestic-level analysis of counter-movements to the transnational level. Chappell confirms my analysis of the conservative movement as succeeding in watering down language and the way that the women’s movement and the proceedings at the UN have had to adjust to the presence of the conservative movement. However, Chappell’s argument that conservative movements adopt the strategies they do purely in imitation of the successful movement they are trying to counter begs the question of why those strategies are successful in the first place. In addition, she puts too great an emphasis on the Bush administration enabling the conservative movement; many of these organizations began to lobby at the UN prior to Bush being elected, and show themselves to be quite established and proficient in their advocacy at the UN. Neither women’s rights activists nor the conservative activists seem to believe that the conservative network will wither away if an administration is elected that does not support them.
1.4.2.2 Alternative Explanations

Other theories that might be used to explain the similarities in strategy of the abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks as well as the difference in their overall influence include world-polity theory, and several political science theories.

World-polity theory may be considered far too narrow to explain the intensity of conflict and the highly contentious nature of international activism. If there is a world culture in the international system, why does increased interaction only make differences more visible, and conflict over those differences more likely? Coleman and Wayland (2006) thus critique world-polity theory for its inability to explain the differences and contentiousness of global civil society. In one sense, I agree that world-polity theory does not explain the many differences we see in the international system and the contentious politics within global civil society; to explain such interactions requires a more agency-focused approach, which emphasizes the opportunities and spaces individuals make for their different claims. However, world-polity theory does not preclude the possibility of difference and political conflict in the international system. As a theory, it provides us with elements of a common culture that has become so ingrained that many do not question it: an understanding of who humans are and what they need; an emphasis on individuals, which affects the decision-making structure of organizations; legitimacy and authority for organizations arising from the rational, voluntary actions of the individuals that act collectively; the goal of progress achieved by rational procedure and organization; and that all individuals have the same basic rights and duties though they may vary in their resources and capacities. These norms concerning who we are, what we need, and how problems are identified and solved are held to be universally applicable;
however, these norms do not eliminate other norms and cultures that have different answers to these questions. Thus, conflict between world culture and other cultures is eminently possible; however, the means by which people believe they should resolve that conflict is still greatly influenced by this common world culture.

World-polity theory may explain the difference in success between the abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks by reasoning that the conservative network operates from very different norms than those that prevail in world culture, and as a result are not able to influence the UN to the extent that the liberal network does. However, this reasoning does not account for the ability of the anti-abortion network to operate in the international sphere at all, or explain the similarities in movement strategies. World-polity theory in general stresses structure over agency. In order to understand the different ways in which individuals make their claims and work with or around world culture norms, I suggest a theoretical framework that focuses on the micro level, stresses agency, and draws on concepts from social movement theory.

Political science theories that stress agency over structure include resource mobilization. Resource mobilization theorists were among the first to explore the causes of social movement success and failure through organizational resources, organization structure, movement recruitment strategies and the role of leaders (McCarthy and Zald 1977, Zald and McCarthy 1979, 1987). These theorists, instead of focusing on individual grievances (Gurr 1970) or structural pressures (Smelser 1963) to explain the existence of social movements, regarded participants and movements as a whole as rational actors who weighed the costs and benefits of their actions. Resources might be drawn from the social movement itself, from political entrepreneurs hoping to receive some benefit from
the movement, or groups that inadvertently provide resources to the movement. The resource mobilization approach to social movements is powerful, although the definition of resources can be too vague and thus all-encompassing. Resource mobilization theory would explain the difference in success between the two networks as due to their different abilities to command the requisite resources, whether financial or otherwise. I will mainly refer to funding as a key resource, and trace its role as much as possible through my research, but although resources matter, they may only be a means to tell the underlying story. Why are some movements able to garner more resources than others? I believe that norms play a role. Resource mobilization may explain the similarity in strategies between the two movements as a result of the competition for funding; the grants from foundations and governments may depend on the movements displaying certain characteristics, and thus both movements would tend to converge in their strategies. However, I would argue that such a theory does not explain why foundations and governments favor particular strategies or characteristics of NGOs over others, or why certain foundations and governments support abortion-rights networks and why other foundations and governments support anti-abortion networks.

Banaszak (1996) argues that resources are important, and played a part in the success or failure of women’s suffrage movements, but that resource mobilization alone ignores the important role that the beliefs and values of the suffragettes in Switzerland and in the U.S. played in how they perceived available opportunities and appropriate tactics. Similarly, I am arguing that resources matter, and in the course of my research we will see that the funding of different UN agencies and foundations made a significant impact on the ability of NGOs to participate in UN conferences. However, I also argue that
beliefs, values and perceptions of the openness of the international system to certain values greatly affect the flow of resources. Thus, we need to better understand how these value systems work in order to understand the full impact on the flows of resources.

Another key alternative explanation for the success or failure of social movements is political opportunity theory. Political opportunities consist of the constraints and opportunities produced by alliances, state structures, and political processes (McAdam 1982, Tilly 1978, Tarrow 1989, 1994). The political context may alter the costs associated with collective action, or it may alter the benefits of collective action. The historical context that creates “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements, and historical precedents” (Kitschelt 1986: 58), constraining or helping a movement, is similar to the systemic beliefs and values that I draw on from world-polity theory. However, that historical context is much more narrowly conceived for political opportunity theory, and does not capture the values and beliefs elements, the underlying political philosophy that can influence so many aspects of a system over time, which I try to incorporate into my theoretical framework.

A political opportunity explanation would argue that the differential success of the two networks is due to the different constraints and opportunities provided by their alliances with other issue areas, the support of state governments, or the institutional arrangements of the environment in which they are attempting to advocate. While I draw on political opportunities in my research, they do not provide a complete explanation for why some opportunities are available to some groups and not others, or why movements take advantage of some opportunities and not others. For instance, why were UN officials open to advocacy of abortion-rights activists in 1994, and have not been open to the
advocacy of anti-abortion activists subsequently? The ability of the abortion-rights NGOs to access the Secretary-General of the Cairo conference, Nafis Sadik, who then arranged for funding for abortion-rights NGOs around the world to attend the conference as delegates on government delegations as well as the NGO forum, was extraordinary. As a result of their access and ability to influence her, Nafis Sadik also provided the opportunity for abortion-rights NGOs to be involved in the negotiations at the third and final Preparatory Conference, which allowed the draft Program of Action going into the conference to include much of the language desired by the abortion-rights network. I believe that the congruence of underlying philosophies played a part in the ability of abortion-rights activists to access and influence key UN officials prior to Cairo, while anti-abortion activists have a difficult time gaining access to or persuading UN officials because they do not approach the issues from the same philosophical perspective.

A political opportunity explanation also does not account for why some groups take advantage of some opportunities and not others. In 1984, anti-abortion organizations had a political opportunity in the Mexico City Population and Development conference, and did not take advantage of the Reagan administration’s support in the international realm. They were not focused on the UN at all at that point; the change in the U.S. stance was an indirect result of Christian Right organizations pressuring the Reagan administration to act on abortion domestically. Instead, the Reagan administration changed its foreign policy concerning family planning and the funding of organizations that performed or counseled for abortions; the appointment of James Buckley, and his influence on the delegation, also accounts for the marked change in U.S. policy. Why did anti-abortion organizations not care about the UN? Their perception of the UN was greatly influenced
by their theological and conservative views concerning international interference in national matters. Not until the reproductive health and rights network made such an impact at the 1994 Cairo conference did many anti-abortion organizations begin to consider advocacy at the UN. On the other hand, the Clinton administration’s support of the reproductive health and rights organizations prior to and at the Cairo conference did help them influence many other delegations. The support of the Bush administration for anti-abortion organizations has opened political opportunities for that network that had been previously open to reproductive health and rights organizations. As I will elaborate, the opening of political opportunities, such as the ability to be a member of the U.S. delegation to a UN conference, had important effects on those conferences. But the reason that some administrations were open to one group and not another has to do with political beliefs and values, and even that support does not tell the whole story of the ability of these groups to achieve their goals.

Even the literature that focuses on values, beliefs and perceptions in social movement literature tends to focus on an individual view of beliefs, values, and perceptions, suited to the agent-oriented perspective of social movement theory. They also tend to be focused on values and beliefs about politics specifically, and how these might affect frames (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Tarrow 1994), discourses (Jenson 1987; Gamson 1992), or cultures (Swidler 1986; Tarrow 1994). For example, Banaszak’s argument centers on “the elements of politics that are valued, the beliefs about the way that politics can and should be conducted, and the ‘boundaries of political discussion’” (1996: 32). Although I draw heavily on this literature for the concrete mechanisms by which beliefs and values are translated into action for activists, I
also draw on more basic beliefs about the importance of individuals, the guides for
decisions, and the possibility of progress as overarching structural systems that affect
activists. Activists encounter these norms at the UN, a specific environment where these
norms reside.

Although I believe these more systemic, structural elements of political philosophy
have an important impact on the influence of social movements, I also think that activists
can change and adapt their strategies in order to better influence their targets. All changes
are instrumental initially, but may lead to more transformative change within the
organizations and eventually the movement; in addition, there may be beliefs or values
that are too central to a movement’s beliefs to allow change through the adoption of a
particular strategy. I believe a theoretical framework that utilizes more structural
elements of norms and beliefs together with the agency-driven elements of social
movement theory to articulate how those norms and beliefs are translated into practice
will prove useful in the study of social movements’ influence and change over time in the
international system.

1.5 Research Design and Methods

1.5.1 Research Design
I am conducting a comparative case study to answer my questions concerning the
abortion-rights and anti-abortion movements. These two movements are very different in
their philosophies and their goals concerning the issue of abortion, among others; I
compare their advocacy at UN global conferences and special meetings in order to
understand the effect of their different philosophies on their ability to influence policy,
and then trace the change in their strategies over time as they gain more experience in the
UN environment to determine if their strategies fall in line with those encouraged at UN global conferences. The comparative case study allows me to study each movement in depth, and compare the effect of variance in my independent variable, value congruence, on my dependent variables, influence and change in strategy over time. The two movements hold several key conditions constant: they are engaged in advocacy over the same or similar issues, that of abortion and issues related to abortion for each movement; in the same environment, that of UN global conferences and special meetings; whose key organizations tend to come from the U.S. and draw funding from the U.S. government (at different times) and foundations (which subscribe to liberal or conservative philosophies). Thus, the differences in their influence and strategies can be directly related to their different philosophical values.

The independent variable on which the two movements differ is that of political values, constituting their different approaches to the issue of abortion. The congruence of norms between social movement and international system is the independent variable which I hypothesize is responsible for the different outcomes of the efforts of these two movements, and the motivation behind the seeming change in approach of the anti-abortion movement to influencing the debate and policy on abortion in the international system. I have included below the initial hypotheses and variables based on this particular explanation with which I began this research.

However, I would like to caution the reader that these hypotheses were a starting point for my research, and as I investigated my case studies thoroughly, I found that the lines between my independent and dependent variables blurred. The networks and the key UN agencies they interacted with changed each other in the course of their
interactions over forty years; it thus becomes problematic to have a static model of normative congruence as an independent variable and the success and adjustment of the networks as dependent variables, because the networks helped to influence UN agency norms, and the networks’ variable adjustment to the UN’s norms also affected their success. As a result of the in-depth information I was able to gain from my case studies of the two different networks over time, and the analysis I pursue in this dissertation, I elaborate a more dynamic process in the concluding chapter of how UN norms induced adjustments in network strategies, and how networks helped change the agencies of the UN with which they worked closely.

**Hypotheses:**

1. The liberal and rational norms underlying the UN global conferences enhances a liberal movement’s ability to influence the debate and consensus documents, while it hinders a conservative movement’s ability to influence the debate and consensus documents.
2. The liberal and rational norms underlying the UN global conferences affects conservative movements’ strategies for influencing the debate and consensus documents at international conferences.
3. Over time, conservatives will adapt to these norms or be ineffectual.

**Independent variable:** Political philosophy congruence between UN context and activist groups

Indicators: liberal and conservative discourse within the charters, mission statements, and policy documents of UN agencies, *i.e.*, *rational or moral justifications for action, individual equality or collective good orientations to justice*.

**Dependent variables:**

1. Social movement’s ability to influence debate and consensus language;
   Indicators: Institutional access, defined both by presence and influence on policy enacted by institution, measured by discourse of UN conference debates and consensus documents.
   Evidence for indicators: a) language from negotiated conference document, and b) interview and scholarly evidence of access to conference secretariats and country delegations
Interpretation of evidence: a) The use of language consistent with the abortion-rights network’s goals or the anti-abortion network’s goals in the negotiated conference document would indicate successful advocacy. b) If activists themselves, UN officials, or country delegates indicate that the abortion-rights or anti-abortion networks had access to conference secretariats and country delegations, I would interpret such data as evidence of institutional access. I will also depend on scholarly accounts for conferences that my interviews do not pertain to.

2. Social movement’s approach to advocacy (change over time of strategies in approaching the international system for liberal movement and conservative movement).

Indicators:

a) Scale shift
   Evidence for indicator: The number of organizations and amount of resources directed at the UN
   Interpretation of evidence: The increase or decrease in numbers of organizations and amount of resources and attention by each network would demonstrate a shift of scale up to the UN or away from it.

b) Framing of arguments;
   Evidence for indicator: the arguments made by the two networks on websites, in conference debates, newsletters, articles, and interviews;
   Interpretation of evidence: The use of traditional or human rights language in framing their arguments would demonstrate frame change or stability, and their correlation with liberal norms.

c) Information politics, or the use of research and statistics to support arguments;
   Evidence for indicator: the use of academic and scientific data as well as the references in websites, documents, and interviews to research and statistics as important for supporting arguments and in persuading others;
   Interpretation of evidence: Content and frame analysis of websites, documents, and interviews with activists of each movement will demonstrate whether they reference research, statistics, and data analysis to support their arguments/claims.

d) Coalition building
   Evidence for indicators: Interviews, newsletters, articles and websites that link groups together for each movement;
   Interpretation of evidence: Discourse analysis of articles, newsletters, and website content will link one group to another, for both movements, and demonstrate coalition building at the UN.

1.5.2 Methods

Case Study

The case study method appealed to me especially because it “seeks to generate a richly detailed and thick elaboration of the phenomenon studied through the use and triangulation of multiple methods or procedures that include but are not limited to
qualitative techniques” (Snow and Trom 2002: 147). This is especially appropriate for the anti-abortion movement because not much scholarly work has been done on the international advocacy of these organizations, and I believed that close and detailed study of the network would yield valuable observations.

Yin (2003) defines the scope of the case study as one that investigates a phenomenon within its context, specifically because the researcher believes that the contextual conditions might be highly pertinent to the phenomenon. This holds true for my research questions concerning the abortion-rights and anti-abortion movements as liberal and conservative movements at the UN; I began my study by wanting to investigate the effects of the UN context on the movements’ influence and change in strategies over time. The second general set of criteria involves the triangulation of multiple forms of evidence, and the need for theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. For my research design, I formulated one theoretical proposition concerning the liberal and rational norms of the UN Charter based on the world-polity theory, and whether the different values of the abortion-rights and anti-abortion movements would affect their influence at the UN; I also used another theoretical proposition based on social movement theory on the different strategies that the two movements might adjust in order to better influence language and policy at the UN. These guided my data collection and analysis, especially in the realm of documents and written material; I studied the scholarly descriptions and analyses of the UN Population and Development conferences, and collected relevant documents from these conferences. In addition, I collected as much material on the involvement of NGOs at these conferences as I could, especially the accreditation and influence of the women’s
reproductive health and rights movement. I also used the theoretical propositions to loosely guide my interview questions, and begin my analysis of interview data.

Limits of Case Study

Many scholars have enumerated the limitations of the case study, such as the inability to control for variables and the inability to generalize as a result of a small number of cases, selection bias, lack of systematic procedure, and inattention to rival explanations (Lijphart 1971; King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Geddes 1990; Snow and Trom 2002), and many have also recommended solutions to those limitations, such as using within-case variance and cases that differ widely on the independent variable (Van Evera 1997, Gerring 2001, Yin 2003). Case studies by their nature limit generalizability; however, I believe that the rich description that emerges from case studies justifies the use of a comparative case design, given the dearth of information concerning the international advocacy of the anti-abortion movement and the contribution of such description and analysis to theory building. Some authors also argue that the case study offers advantages that outweigh its disadvantages; although a large-n study allows us to know whether or not a theory holds true, a case study with its emphasis on detailed process-tracing allows us to understand why that is the case (Van Evera 1997: 54). Thus, it is difficult to generalize from my research whether the norms of the UN hinder all conservative movements or help all liberal movements, even though these cases seem fairly representative. However, my research does contribute greatly to understanding how such norms embedded in such an institution would cause such movements to adjust or work around them.

Process-Tracing
Stephen van Evera defines process tracing as exploring the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes. “The cause-effect link that connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable evidence of each step” (Van Evera 1997:64). I used process tracing to understand the history of the two movements, their engagement with the UN, and the success they had at different time periods and stages of their development into international networks and movements. In order to evaluate the engagement and success of each movement, I searched for evidence of their attendance at the conference, their ability to gain access to key UN officials and to lobby government delegations, the judgment of scholars on whether the movement’s goals were reflected in the debate and final document emerging from the conference, analysis of the final document, and interview data from the activists. I collected multiple forms of data in order to limit the bias of any one source, including UN procedural documents and political (or negotiated) documents; material distributed, published, or archived on-line by activists’ organizations; in-depth interviews with activists, UN employees, government delegates, and demographers; and scholarly accounts of the conferences when available.

**Textual Analysis (Frame and Discourse)**

Textual analysis, both frame analysis and discourse analysis, are the key methods that I employed within my case studies to analyze the strategies of each movement as they lobbied at the UN. Frames are based on text, either from written material or transcriptions of verbal communications; “frames and framing activities are available to the researcher mostly through written texts or spoken language, and verification of
framing activities or of a frame’s content is based on evidence embodied in what people say or do” (Johnston 2002: 66). Frame analysis was critical to understanding two of the three main strategies by which the two movements attempted to influence the UN and adjust to its environment over time: using a human rights frame, and framing their advocacy as more legitimate because of its base in research statistics.

Discourse is defined as the sum total of written documents, speeches, actions, media-related documents, nearly everything related to a time, a place and a people (Sewell 1980: 8-9). Discourse analysis is broader than frame analysis, and can be used to understand several levels of discourse: I use discourse analysis on the individual and organizational levels in order to understand both the larger philosophies each movement is engaged in, and the awareness of their environment as activists speak of or write about the strategies they as individuals and organizations engage in to influence language and policy at the UN.

Limitations of Frame and Discourse Analysis

Johnston (2002) argues that intensive textual analysis must balance its insights with whether the text is representative enough to generalize about its patterns. “The choice of widely distributed and/or milestone documents… can increase confidence in generalizability” (Johnston 2002: 71). However, Johnston also writes that intensive textual analysis “limits” qualitative discourse analysis to certain kinds of issues, such as relations between movement cultures and broader cultures. “The penetrating gaze this strategy offers is particularly well suited to laying bare the deep structures of ideas and their relations within a movement, and to mapping the ideological processes in movement formation” (71). He sees discourse analysis as useful for suggesting other groups with
which movements might form coalitions, such as those that share discursive repertoires; which movements might be successful, such as those that draw on resonating frames or templates, and what ideologies might mobilize a broader array of actors, such as those that successfully engage the hegemonic discourse (72).

1.5.3 Overview of the Research Process: Data Collection and Analysis

Interviews

I conducted in-depth interviews with former employees of UNFPA and the Population Division, current employees of the UNFPA, former U.S. delegation members, demographers who attended the UN Population and Development conferences, and activists from women’s reproductive health and rights groups as well from anti-abortion groups. I attempted to reach as many activists from the two movements as possible, using information from the different organizations’ websites, as well as documents listing influential leaders of the movement. I also asked each interviewee for any other activists they thought I should speak to about these topics, and in this way built my sample through the “snowball” effect.

Most from the reproductive health and rights groups were forthcoming and passed along information about colleagues freely. However, most of my interviews with anti-abortion activists were quite different; they assumed that I was a feminist because I was a female academic, and that I sympathized with the abortion-rights point of view. Although I did my best to remain neutral in my terminology and my appearance, many were quite closed, and did not pass on information about colleagues freely. Thus, it was more difficult to build up a large number of anti-abortion activists interviews. However, I
verified whether I had identified all the major anti-abortion organizations by asking several activists for their perception of the key organizations involved at the UN. I was able to interview at least one of the key activists and leaders from each of following the major anti-abortion organizations: the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (C-FAM), Concerned Women for America (CWA), Focus on the Family, Family Research Council, the Howard Center, and International Right to Life/Life Issues Institute. I also heard and spoke informally to leaders of several other important anti-abortion organizations at an international conservative NGO conference, the World Congress of Families IV in Warsaw, Poland: Carol Soelberg and Sharon Slater of United Families International, Steve Mosher from Population Research Institute, Peter Smith from Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC), Pat Fagan of the Heritage Foundation, and representatives of Red Familias. I include a full list of my interviewees in Appendix A.

I conducted my interviews in a semi-structured manner, having a general script of questions that I asked each interviewee, but allowing each person to elaborate fully on their particular area of expertise. In this way, I learned a lot about the different types of participants in global conferences, the importance of demographers as a group, and exactly how NGO activists went about participating in and influencing delegates at an intergovernmental conference. I tried to verify and add detail to the accounts I received of the different conferences by comparing them across the different categories of participants; however, most of the currently influential anti-abortion organizations did not begin attending the UN global conferences until after the 1994 Cairo conference, and thus could not contribute an opposing point of view. I found that both anti-abortion activists
and abortion-rights activists would claim that the UN was biased against them; other scholars have found this to be the case as well (Eager 2004), but I believe that interviews with current and former UNFPA employees were the most revealing as far as which activists they were most comfortable with, and who they worked closely with. I analyzed my transcribed interviews by coding them halfway through with themes I gathered from my hypotheses and looking for other themes as they came up. I then went through all my interview data with a revised set of codes and organized relevant information into themed documents, noting information from different categories of participants. In this way, I was able to analyze my interview data as systematically as possible, and cross-check individual accounts or insights.

Documents

I gathered documents and written material from a variety of sources, but mainly the UN document center, scholarly accounts, and activists’ publications, both hard-copy and web-published. I used UN documents to verify scholarly accounts of the conferences, and to check the numbers and names of NGOs that were accredited to attend. Although it is difficult to narrow one’s search at the UN document center, I did my best in order not to be buried under the sheer amount of material that documents each conference by focusing on documents that described the conference process, the involvement of NGOs, the final consensus document, and the implementation of that document. Although I had planned on analyzing the final consensus documents emerging from each conference in detail to determine the influence of the different movements, many of my interviewees made me realize that the influence of the anti-abortion organizations was mainly in watering down the language or blocking advances on existing language. Thus, measuring
their influence by simply analyzing the final document would be slightly misleading, in that it would miss this negating influence. This is not negligible, in that the number and influence of anti-abortion organizations is not yet at a point where they are able to insert language of which they approve into UN consensus documents; however, they do work to block language of which they do not approve.

I used activist accounts of the conferences, from newsletters, web articles, and website information, to supplement interview data in discourse and frame analysis of the two movements, especially their change over time. The newsletters of both movements were quite revealing, in that they were often pointedly directed at a particular audience in a particular time when activists believed they could use grassroots or coalition support in achieving their goals. However, most of this material came from groups that focused on advocacy as a main goal, and some abortion-rights groups did not have as much advocacy material because they were more focused on fieldwork. This was one big difference I noticed between abortion-rights groups; those focused on advocacy knew and felt the effects of the anti-abortion groups a great deal more than those who focused on fieldwork.

1.6 Key findings

Similarities and differences between the two networks

There are several similarities between the abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks besides their focus on a similar set of issues. The abortion-rights movement and the anti-abortion movement both have strong grass-roots support in many different countries. While many of the abortion-rights organizations that advocate at the UN also provide services in different parts of the world, several are solely focused on advocacy at
the UN. Anti-abortion organizations that advocate at the UN tend to be mostly advocacy organizations that do not provide services, but a few Catholic and evangelical organizations that began as service organizations continue to do so. The differences between these networks can be described as arising from their fundamentally different approaches to the issues, defined by their liberal and conservative values. The abortion-rights network has been eager to work at the UN, and although critical of the agencies when they do not match the positions the network wants them to take, they support the cooperative, international norms setting and monitoring work that the UN seeks to accomplish. The anti-abortion network both in the past and currently is critical of the UN, the liberal position it takes on social issues, the inefficiency of its bureaucracy, and its attempt to interfere with state sovereignty by dictating norms and monitoring country compliance. These differences make it much more difficult for the anti-abortion network to adjust to UN norms, and less likely that they will find those sympathetic to their concerns within the UN.

*Change and continuity within each network*

The differences between the two networks suggests that the abortion-rights network would be able to work UN without much change in their strategy, while the anti-abortion network would have significant adjustments to make. However, my research indicates that both the abortion-rights and the anti-abortion networks had to adjust their strategies when they began lobbying at the UN. The similarities between the strategies that the opposing abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks adopted to lobby the UN suggest that both movements are responding to a prevailing set of norms. I use several well-known mechanisms from social movement theory to demonstrate exactly *how* those
adjustments were made in practice: both networks shifted the scale of their advocacy up to the UN, adjusted over time to frame their arguments within a rights framework, built coalitions with similar groups world-wide for the purpose of gaining leverage at the UN, and increased their use of research and statistics to support their advocacy.

The changes that have occurred within each network have not affected the core norms or issues that tie them to their grassroots supporters or define their positions on the key issues, including abortion. This lack of change suggests that there are core norms and issues that neither network can compromise without changing their fundamental character, but there are more peripheral issues and norms that can be manipulated and framed in different ways to give the movement better traction in different venues.

*Influence and success of each network*

The ability of the two movements to change language and policy at the UN global conferences depends on their ability to affect two levels of influence at the UN: that of UN officials and employees, and that of government delegations. While the ability to approve consensus language and support changes in the terms of debate lie with the government delegations, a considerable amount of power to set the agenda, influence the leadership and composition of committees, and determine the involvement of civil society rests with those who work in the UN bureaucracy. Thus, movements’ ability to lobby both levels helps determine their influence.

My research reveals that the abortion-rights network has had the most success in influencing the debate and language of consensus documents because it is able to affect UN officials and employees, as well as government delegations. The anti-abortion network has successfully changed its strategies when advocating at the UN, but these
changes only affect their ability to influence government delegations. Thus, despite the support of the Bush administration, the anti-abortion network has not been successful at inserting language representing their key concerns into consensus documents, only in blocking language they object to or watering down advances that women’s rights activists lobby for.

The fact that liberal and rational norms translate into practices that a conservative movement can adapt without changing its content, and have some limited success in advocacy at the UN, suggests that world culture can be successfully contested by groups that do not hold these norms. Thus, while it is important to take liberal norms into account when trying to understand the success of different networks and movements, they do not eliminate contention at the UN, nor necessarily transform opposition movements into agreement with these norms.

Implications for theory

These liberal and rational norms that prevail in the international sphere currently are not permanent, nor uncontested. However, they have grown in influence in the past fifty years, and do play a role in how the abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks conduct their advocacy at the UN global conferences.

Neither a structural framework nor an agency-oriented framework alone will explain the influence and change over time of liberal and conservative movements at the UN; a structural framework misses the changes that actors make to adjust to or work around prevailing norms in order to be more successful in their advocacy, while an agency-oriented framework misses the norms embedded in the structure and practices of an organization that may dictate actors’ choices.
1.7 Brief summary of following chapters

Chapter Two describes the literature in sociology and political science that I draw on for my theoretical framework, and builds the integrated structural and agency-oriented framework that I propose for studying liberal and conservative movements in the international sphere. In addition, I provide a theoretical background on liberal individualism, the norms of world-polity theory that draw on liberal individualism, and how those norms are translated into practice at the UN.

In Chapter Three, I introduce the history of the UN global conferences on population, and the importance of the “expert” meetings as opposed to the later intergovernmental meetings for establishing the authority of demographers based on their status as scientific experts. The “population control” point of view that most demographers promoted elicited opposition from both feminists and the Holy See, but for completely different reasons. Feminists opposed family planning programs because they did not focus on the health and rights of the women to whom they distributed contraceptives, while the Holy See and other Catholic NGOs opposed family planning as wrong in and of itself. Feminists began organizing at the international level, while the conservative opposition continued to focus on domestic arenas of influence.

I then trace the emergence of the women’s reproductive health and rights movement as it develops in opposition to the population control view of demographers in Chapter Four. The organizations in this movement gained experience in lobbying at the UN over the course of the UN Decade for Women as they attended the three Women’s conferences. A network of NGOs focused on lobbying for reproductive health and rights emerged in the early nineties, and lobbied at these conferences with greater organization.
and influence due to the greater role given to NGOs. During this time, the women’s reproductive health and rights network began to adopt a human rights frame and ally with the environmental and human rights communities. The anti-abortion movement did not at this time direct its attention or resources to the UN.

The culmination of the women’s movement’s influence can be seen at the Cairo conference, explored in detail in Chapter Five, along with the unprecedented activism of the Holy See and its spurring of a greater number of non-governmental organizations against abortion into the international sphere. The women’s reproductive health and rights network helped change the language of family planning from a population control rationale to one that emphasized reproductive health and rights; I trace the importance of the several changes in strategy to the success of the women’s network, including their adoption of a human rights frame, their coalition building with similar groups from the developing world, and the professionalization of their advocacy.

Chapter Six details the development of the anti-abortion network after Cairo, and its growth in expertise and experience throughout the late nineties and into the new century. The network made some clear changes in movement strategies, especially in terms of coalition building and frame change, evident in the five-year reviews of Cairo and Beijing; however, their influence was still limited as a result of their relatively recent efforts at the UN, and their inability to affect a significant number of government delegations. The abortion-rights network continued to advocate for its reproductive health and rights agenda by increasing its coalition building and frame change, successfully adding sexual health to the language of the Cairo +5 negotiated document.
Chapter Seven examines how the two movements had to adjust to each other and continue to adapt their strategies to the UN in order to either maintain their gains or increase their influence in the 2000-2004 time period. The anti-abortion network became much more visible at the UN, although still far smaller as far as numbers of organizations than the abortion-rights network; this was due partly to the support of the Bush administration, and partly to the success of its framing of reproductive health and rights as a controversial issue. As a result, the Millennium Development Goals did not include reproductive health and rights, and the ten-year review of Cairo did not occur as an international conference. The abortion-rights network has spent this time lobbying to have reproductive health and rights included as a Millennium Development Goal, and attempting to supplement decreasing funding for reproductive health and rights by attaching its concerns to the HIV/AIDS issue.

Chapter Eight reflects on the similarities and differences between the two movements and the implications of this research for my larger theoretical concerns and framework. I also describe and analyze two recent conferences that demonstrate the current agenda, problems, and strategies of the two movements, and how they continue to use framing, coalition building, and research to support their advocacy. I also briefly describe some important factors that emerged during my research that should be considered in further study of these activists.
2 Theory

2.1 Literature Review

Several bodies of literature within political science and sociology make the argument that international norms or culture affect both international and domestic politics: international relations constructivists who developed the literature on norms and ideas (Klotz 1995, Finnemore 1996, Adler 1997, Ruggie 1998); world-polity sociologists who argue that a liberal world culture explains liberal trends in international and domestic arenas better than rational choice theory (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Biggart and Hamilton 1988, Boli and Thomas 1999); and critics of the global civil society literature, who argue that a bias exists in the literature towards liberal and progressive issue and causes, and against conservative causes, movement, and actors (Amoore and Langley 2004, Rajagopal 2003, Baker 2002, Tvedt 2002, Thomas 2001). Taken as a whole, these literatures make an argument for the existence of a liberal normative, cultural or ideological fabric in the international realm, affecting domestic and international politics in varying degrees. I detail the claims of these literatures here, and argue that studying the movements around the cause of abortion in the international realm is one way to evaluate these claims: does the allegedly liberal character of the international system, specifically the UN international conferences on population and development, affect the work of the abortion-rights and the anti-abortion movements differently?

First, however, I will address the question of why I use the terms I do, since abortion is a volatile and politically sensitive issue.
2.1.1 Defining Terms

2.1.1.1 Abortion-rights and Anti-abortion

The two sides of the abortion issue have given themselves certain names and have been given other names by opposing sides; the movement associated with liberal political norms (hereafter the liberal movement) has called themselves pro-choice and been called anti-life by the conservative movement, while the movement associated with conservative political norms (hereafter the conservative movement) has called themselves pro-life and been called anti-choice by the abortion rights movement. Many academic works choose to use the terms given by each side to themselves, but I find this confusing and more concerned with political spin than the goal of the movement. Thus, I have chosen to call the conservative movement the anti-abortion movement, because they strive to either limit or curtail the availability of abortion; I have chosen to call the liberal movement the abortion rights movement because they are not pro abortion in that they want to increase abortions but they are committed to abortion being available to women as an inherent right.

The conservative movement in the international system has been fueled in large part by the Vatican, in its role as a special participant in UN conferences, and more recently by NGOs that are part of or supported by the U.S. Christian conservative political movement, often referred to as the Christian Right in American politics. The term “Christian Right” has been used by both the political left as a pejorative term as well as the right as a positive term. Since there is nothing inherently derogatory about the term, and academics studying the movement (Buss and Herman 2003) as well as
organizations within the movement use the term, I will also refer to the Christian conservative political movement as the Christian Right.

2.1.1.2 Liberal Norms and Conservative Norms

My definition of liberal and conservative as two different bundles of norms are not ideal types, and they are not static, but change over time. My definition of liberal is composed from the many definitions of liberal political philosophers and the norms detailed by the world-polity literature. Liberalism is mainly defined as a cluster of values and ideas, including political rationalism; hostility to autocracy; individualism, egalitarianism, universalism; freedom, tolerance, privacy, constitutionalism, rule of law, reason, science, progress, and property. Some philosophers emphasize one value or idea above others, such as individualism, freedom, or reason. The bundle of norms that seem to best describe liberal internationalism, as detailed below in my exploration of the world-polity literature, include bureaucratic rationalism, individualism, and the goals of justice and progress.

It is important to realize that liberalism is not consistent, and that in an institution such as the UN, liberalism includes economic liberalism. The tension between neoliberalism, or economic liberalism, and political liberalism, is one that I see as irreconcilable in terms of norms and ideas – neoliberalism seems to fit in the conservative arena of ideas rather than liberal. This tension between neoliberalism and liberal internationalism has its roots in the tension between elitist and egalitarian strands of liberalism that date back to the first writings of liberal philosophers (Richardson 2001), and I have tried to consider whether an alliance between social conservatism and economic liberalism similar to that in the U.S. exists in the international system.
However, in the practical research of how resources are distributed for the different social programs I am concerned with, and what justifications and pressures are brought to bear in that distribution, economic liberalism seems to be more of a factor at the country level than at the Economic and Social Council.

My definition of conservative is composed from the norms detailed by conservative political philosophers as they seem relevant to the ideological underpinnings of international conservative social movements. Conservatism is defined as “a defense of the political, economic, religious, and social status quo from the forces of abrupt change, that is based on a belief that established customs, laws, and traditions provide continuity and stability in the guidance of society” (Dunn and Woodard 2003:30). Conservatives emphasize a) orthodox and traditional religious values; b) less faith in the goodness, reason, and perfectability of mankind; c) belief in less power for the centralized government; d) the duties of the individual more than his or her rights; e) a trust in the free markets of capitalism; and f) a desire that economic, political, religious, and social stability be maintained through gradual changes within existing institutions (Dunn and Woodard 2003). The elements detailed here that seem most relevant to the conservative movements in the international system are those of orthodox and traditional religious values, the duties of the individual more than his or her rights, and a desire for gradual change within existing institutions.

### 2.1.2 Political Science Constructivists

The constructivist literature on norms in international relations theory has addressed theoretical issues regarding the origins and influence of norms in the
international society, including Audie Klotz (1995), Martha Finnemore (1996), Emanuel Adler (1997), John Ruggie (1998), and the edited volumes by Peter Katzenstein on the culture of national security (1996) and Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) on security communities. Although norms can be defined as either ethically concerned “oughts” defined by the international society, they can also be defined in a more positivist way as simply what is done, what is normal. However, these two definitions of norms are not mutually exclusive, because ethically concerned norms can be introduced and established and become simply normal. The most basic definition of a norm is thus: a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (Klotz 1995, Katzenstein 1996, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

Most norms identified in international relations scholarship have to do with ethical norms, normatively concerned standards that states are to strive for, such as human rights, education, abolition of slavery, but which are not necessarily fully realized by all states all of the time. This does not negate the importance of norms; norms are still important because they set the standard for states and individuals in domestic as well as international interactions, and violations of norms may spur international recrimination. The fact that many norms are established in international laws, treaties, or conventions gives individuals and groups recourse against states in violation of these norms.

International relations scholars have been concerned with determining what a norm is, how norms evolve, and the conditions under which they exercise influence. This is a very agency-oriented view of how the normative fabric of the international system is established: norms have “life cycles” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), domestic norms become international norms because of norm entrepreneurs, such as those that established
women’s suffrage (Dubois and Ruiz 1994), and norms may decay (Kacowicz 2005). However, since constructivists believe that “people and societies construct, or constitute each other” (Onuf 1989:36), and because norms are inherently social and collective, constructivists see norms as constitutive components of both the international system and society. Norms not only constrain states’ actions, but partially define their interests and shape their identities. The content of most international norms are mainly concerned with principles that would be philosophically defined as liberal: the sovereign equality of states, the self-determination of peoples, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, and international cooperation (Kacowicz 2005:9).

Although most scholars concerned with norms do not question why we have the types of norms we have (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999), Barnett and Finnemore in their collaboration on the nature of international organizations (2004) explore the reasons why international organizations act as they do. They note that international organizations claim authority on the basis of how they carry out their missions (rational, technocratic, impartial and nonviolent) and the content of their missions (acting to promote socially valued goals such as protecting human rights, providing development assistance, and brokering peace agreements) (5). Thus, although most international organizations (IOs) were founded by states for specific progressive goals, those same organizations now constrain states to adhere to these progressive goals, demonstrating the ability of institutions to exert power over actors in the international system. Barnett and Finnemore are more specific concerning the nature of the norms underlying and being acted out in international organizations: “a strong thread running through the ever-expanding world of
IOs is their substantively liberal character. Most IOs were founded by Western liberal states and are designed to promote liberal values” (2004:15).

They note that the IMF’s neo-liberal economic policies have unapologetically promoted private property and free markets around the globe; other IOs including the UN and UNHR have slowly come to accept the protection of individual rights, a liberal value, as part of their missions. “The human rights regime that is pushed by a wide variety of IOs and is used to legitimize their activities has a strong liberal cast since it makes individual rights a nonnegotiable trump card in many political situations” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 168).

2.1.3 Sociological World-Polity Theory

Another influence on Barnett and Finnemore’s work is that of sociological institutionalism, which explains the growth of international organizations as the result of two central components of global culture, rationalization and liberalism. Barnett and Finnemore argue that liberal ideas have seen an expansion across the globe similar to the spread of rationalization that Weber saw as a historical process that would come to define all areas of life, including the economy, culture, and the state.

Liberal political ideas about the sanctity and autonomy of the individual and about democracy as the most desirable and just form of government have spread widely… these two cultural strands have constituted IOs in particular ways, and IOs in turn have been important transmitters of global rationalization and global liberalism. (Barnett and Finnemore 2004:166)

This argument of a global culture is based on the world-polity theory developed by Meyer and Rowan (1977), Meyer, Boli et al (1997), Boli and Thomas (1999), and Lechner and Boli (2005). World-polity scholars posit that a world culture is transmitted
by international organizations to all parts of the world, causing an unexplained isomorphism in the organizations, goals, actions and identities; that world culture consists of bureaucratic rationalism, individualism and the goals of justice and progress, defined respectively as equality and wealth accumulation (Finnemore 1996). Unlike political constructivists, world-polity scholars emphasize the structural level of analysis; social structure produces social actors, not the other way around. There is a place for agency, but it is a fairly limited one in comparison with other theories in political science: “actors everywhere defining themselves in similar ways and pursuing similar purposes by similar means, but specific actions in specific contexts vary almost without limit” (Boli and Thomas 1999:18). The world cultural rules constitute actors – including states, organizations, and individuals – and define legitimate or desirable goals for them to pursue.

World cultural norms also produce organizational and behavioral similarities across the globe that are not easily explained by traditional paradigms in political science. Sociological institutionalists explain the spread of bureaucratic organizations not as a result of economic and technological development (bureaucratization was happening much quicker than the development of either) but because the wider environment supports and legitimates rational bureaucracy as a social good (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The social values that support and legitimate some organizational forms and not others, some social activities and not others, are cultural values, which include rationality and individualism.

The increase in numbers and influence of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) on states is explained by world-polity, world culture, and world
authority. In particular, the authority of INGOs is based on a conception of authority called “rational-voluntaristic” authority, articulated by Boli as different from Weber’s because it is not a dominant authority but one of freely exercised reason “in which fundamentally equal individuals reach collective decisions through rational deliberations open to all” (Boli and Thomas 1999:273). Rational voluntarism has emerged in world culture as the morally superior form of authoritative organization, the ideal to which all societies should aspire (Boli and Thomas 1999: 273). Why? The sovereign individual has become “both the primordial building-block of society and the ultimate source of value, meaning and purpose” (274). Individuals have the right to manage their own existence with due respect for the right of other individuals to do the same; the only legitimate collective authority must be built up from the authority that resides in free individuals. Rationality, as noted before, is taken from Weber’s understanding of the increasingly formalized and bureaucratized structures put in place to coordinate complex and specialized interactions. I would argue that the UN conferences and programs (on the social side, under the Economic and Social Council especially) are supported by this rational-voluntaristic authority, and exploring the impact of such authority on organizations and events might help explain the successes and failures of different movements at the UN conferences.

World-polity theory’s structural analysis leaves little room for agency, and does not explain resistance to the content of world culture (Finnemore 1996). With regard to my interests in conservative movements in the international system, world polity theory does not take into account the actors, groups and movements that do not fit in with the liberal (individual and rational) character of world culture. How do they exist at all if the
prominent social values, organizational structures, and knowledge centers of the international system do not support them? Or if they begin, how do they continue? I believe a framework that includes both the insights of a structural perspective such as world-polity theory and an agency-oriented perspective such as transnational social movements theory is needed to understand what constraints are posed by a world culture, and how movements work around them. I would like to note that world-polity theory did take a step toward investigating the agency through which the rules of world culture are constructed and established, and how contestation over the content of world-cultural models is conducted, in the volume edited by Boli and Thomas (1999). For example, Finnemore argues that we cannot understand the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in any self-interested, rational-choice way; the impetus for forming the organization on the part of its founders was personal experience in war, and the arguments used to persuade volunteers and states afterwards were framed, not in terms of competition and advantage but in terms of duties, responsibilities and identity. Finnemore thus reasons that agency in this case is not driven by interest but by a cultural model of Christian charity and humanitarian duty constructed by the founders from existing cultural principles and applied in new ways to the conduct of war. The conflict over the establishment and state approval of the ICRC was not over interests but over appropriateness, and thus a cultural conflict to determine world-cultural rules (Finnemore 1999).

2.1.4 Critics of Global Civil Society
Although critics of global civil society doubt the existence of one monolithic world culture, they point to the importance of the *perception* of such a world culture through their very resistance and criticism of it in the global civil society. Several critics of global civil society problematize the assumptions of a global civil society literature that focuses only on peaceful, liberal causes (Batliwala 2002, Tvedt 2002, Adamson 2003), while others question the usefulness of the major frames in global civil society for truly addressing the development needs of developing states (Ford 2003, Rajagopal 2003).

Global civil society is generally understood as a sphere of voluntary societal association above the individual and below the state, representing a liberal democratic space that complements the states-system and as such constitutes global governance (Falk 1998). Global civil society’s actors include NGOs, social movements, transnational networks and movements. One of the problems identified by resistance scholars is symptomatic of the issues faced by global civil society: many grassroots movements become institutionalized and lose their grassroots character, while newer grassroots movements have fought to balance the power between their constituents and more professional NGO participants. The exponential growth of NGOs in the international system has brought up important questions of accountability and procedures of participation and representation in NGOs and movements as they work within a highly bureaucratized system.

Critics of global civil society have pointed out the literature’s tendency to focus on “good,” “progressive”, and “humanitarian” causes, movements, and NGOs, as well as to only tell success stories; not every author posits a reason for this tendency, but those that do ascribe it to a normative bias in the literature arising from a similar liberal bias in
the international system. The global civil society is predicated on specific assumptions about human nature, the individual, society and history: “built into the discourse and practice [of civil society] are strong assumptions that are anything but neutral: individuals are autonomous, self-interested, rational and moral” (Thomas 2001:517). The liberal international system, focusing on the individual rather than community, allows a human rights discourse but no outlet for economic rights and violence. Rajagopal (2003) argues that the concept of human rights was developed solely in the Western world and yet is increasingly applied in the Third World; human rights requires the state to enforce them, and although it recognizes public violence and private forms of violence, it does not recognize the private violence of the market on individuals and communities (202). His contention is that by making the human rights discourse the only approved discourse of resistance, the Third World’s concerns over developmental violence and rights are made unacceptable.

Another effect of the emphasis on the individual in the international system is that indigenous groups that are struggling for community rights must contend against the international normative consensus that the “self” in self-determination always refers either to a sovereign state or to individuals within sovereign states; what they are instead advocating is a collective, cultural self that has rights to territory and the ability to control their own development (Muehlebach 2003). Liberal analysis does not account for the power relations between global civil society, the inter-state system and the global market. Ford (2003) argues that social movements can be forces for social change, but NGOs from the global civil society that participate in institutions of global governance run the
risk of cooptation because the real power remains within international organizations that pay more attention to the voices of business and industry (130).

George Thomas (2001) explicitly implicates a world culture when evaluating the place of religion in global civil society, arguing that world cultural principles on the one hand allow conversion as an individual right, but on the other hand disallow proselytizing as illegitimate because the need for other-worldly salvation calls into question the collective liberal project of progress in this world (528). A more radical framing of the global civil society would recognize the contradictory and contested nature of what it means to be ‘civil,’ as well as recognize that there are tensions surrounding who is being empowered or what is being resisted (Amoore and Langley 2004:106). Thus, global civil society critics acknowledge the existence of a liberal set of norms that dominates international institutions, but critique it as unrepresentative of much of the developing world.

2.1.5 Social Movement Theory

The history of social movement theory has seen the importance of many different types of approaches, including social psychological and breakdown theories, resource mobilization theory, and political process theory (Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002: ix). Resource mobilization theory critiqued previous theories of social movements, which focused on the question of why people were aggrieved, and changed that question to why aggrieved people protested. Resource mobilization theory also brought a concrete specificity to the factors that affect social movements, focusing on the differential availability, mobilization, and allocation of resources, as well as the costs and benefits of participation in social movements and the professionalization of these movements.
Political process theory critiqued resource mobilization theory for neglecting the fact that social movements develop and act in political environments, which can have a significant influence on their success and direction. Political process theory offered social movement theory the core concept of political opportunities (Eisinger 1973, Kitschelt 1986, McAdam 1999), answering the question of why movements arise or fail with explanations centered on differences in political opportunities, or the various political environments that social movement organizations face. This has led to the stretching of political opportunities to various other types of opportunity structures that have been fruitful in this field, and reflect another new direction for social movement theory, involving a critique of political process as too structural and neglecting factors such as identity, culture, and emotions (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). Klandermans and Staggenborg (2002) in their review of the field have also noted that scholars have been developing methodological approaches more appropriate to studying cultural processes, such as the development of collective identity, the influence of discourse on protest, organizations, and movements, and the interplay between culture and structure (Jasper 1997, Melucci 1996, Steinberg 1999), although they believe that unresolved methodological and measurement problems in studying identity, emotion and culture may slow down this cultural turn in social movement theory.

2.2 Combining Structural with Agent-Oriented Theoretical Framework

Theorists from three bodies of literature, political science constructivism, sociological world polity theory, and critics of global civil society demonstrate a central claim that a normative and ideologically liberal culture of the international system affects
the types of norms established in the international system, the organizational and
behavioral similarities found across the system, and the “civil” focus of global civil
society, respectively. I would like to articulate a theoretical framework that combines
structural and agency analysis as well as some concrete indicators of how such a
normative fabric would affect social movements by adding relevant concepts from social
movement theory.

A top-down approach such as the world-polity lens of sociological institutionalism
helps us understand the structural constraints of the international system by positing that
the content of the social structure of the international system is a liberal Western world
culture (Finnemore 1996). This culture emphasizes rationality and individualism, and
thus movements and organizations that argue from a different set of norms do not find traction.

However, a world-polity lens does not account for how and why a movement with
conservative goals has been able to form or gain strength in a liberal system. This is
where a bottom-up approach such as the social movement perspective injects a more
agentic view, giving us the tools to analyze the nuts and bolts (framing, resources
mobilization and opportunity structures) of this movement and thus expand our
understanding of transnational movements and non-state actors to include those outside
the liberal bias of the existing literature. However, the social movement perspective alone
does not explain the lack of opportunity structures available to these conservative
movements in the international system because it focuses solely on the individual level of
action.
Thus the theoretical framework that seems best suited for this type of research is one that uses both structural and agency-oriented analysis, taking into account both the structural opportunities and constraints as well as the actions and strategies of agents on the ground that take advantage of these opportunities or circumvent these constraints. One example of such a theoretical framework is that of Fiona Adamson’s global structure of political opportunities (2003), which addresses the liberal bias of mainstream social constructivism, in which constructivists have focused on liberal actors promoting liberal norms in the international system, as well as a lack of theorization of the relationship between individual agents and global structures. These two shortcomings are the result, Adamson maintains, of the “ideological structure of global liberalism within which it is embedded” (2003:2). Although global liberalism currently dominates world politics (Hovden and Keene 2002), Adamson argues that multiple macro-level ideological structures exist in the current international system, supplying their own “competing sets of systemic level political opportunities for differently situated norms entrepreneurs” (Adamson 2003:3), and she theorizes these competing political opportunities as an evolving and only partially institutionalized global structure of political opportunities.

Using political opportunities as a means of mapping out changes in the international arena provides social constructivists with a means of integrating the literatures on top-down and bottom-up approaches to normative change in world politics, a key goal of my research. In Adamson’s framework, three types of systemic-level political opportunity structures shape the dynamics of norm promotion in world politics: discursive opportunity structures, institutional opportunity structures, and geopolitical opportunity structures. Discursive opportunity structures have been introduced into the
study of social movements to delineate the symbolic, cultural and ideational resources that exist in a given environment for political actors to draw on when engaging in strategic framing (Ferree et al 2002). Individual political actors do not conjure frames out of thin air, but are influenced by the structures of meaning within which they are embedded; these structures of meaning influence the content and type of claims that are made by actors within a particular political space. The discursive structure of the international system is not consistent, but contains dominant and subordinate discourses, which change over time (Adamson 2003). Institutional resources are distinguished from the ideational resources that political actors may draw upon; institutional opportunity structures in the international system change over time in terms of the number of international organizations and non-governmental organizations that exist and exert influence in the system since the late 19th century. Geopolitical opportunity structures, as described by Adamson, refer to the structure of global power relations and the interests of great powers as they provide structural incentives and constraints to norm entrepreneurs in world politics.

*Processes and mechanisms within opportunity structures*

I believe the concepts of discursive and institutional political opportunity structures are both especially important to studying conservative movements in the international system and geopolitical opportunity structures impact them peripherally; however, Adamson does not provide concrete mechanisms and processes of just how a social movement may be affected by the structures of the international system. For these I turn to Tarrow’s work on transnational contention (2005), and present four processes that
highlight the importance of discursive and institutional opportunity structures for social movements.

**Discursive opportunity structures:** Adamson argues that liberalism is one ideological framework that provides individual norm entrepreneurs with opportunity structures to draw upon for framing their normative claims. Liberalism not only provides a language of rights, equality, rationality and progress for norm entrepreneurs to draw on, but “liberal ideology undergirds the political and legal systems of the major industrial democracies of the world, and also undergirds the legal framework of the United Nations system” (2003:14). However, the liberal ideological framework is not the only one that exists or exerts influence in the international system; other frameworks that have competed with liberal internationalism at particular historical junctions include those of nationalism, socialism, and anarchism. With the end of the Cold War, socialism has lost much of its power as an ideological framework, and many of the claims made in Marxist terms have since been made in human rights terms (Rajagopal 2003). Adamson argues that these changes can be traced to changes in the discursive opportunity structures that exist at the level of the international system (2003:15).

One of the ways in which an international discursive opportunity structure would specifically affect a social movement is the extent to which conservative social movement actors change their frame alignments to match the dominant discursive opportunity of liberalism, whether that involves frame extension, bridging, or transformation (Tarrow 2005). Framing can be defined as the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996); its use
for this analysis is appropriate given the connection of framing to ideological structures as a source of resources and constraints (Snow and Benford 2000:613). I am interested in the way the abortion rights movement and the anti-abortion movement change their frame alignment over time, and especially at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo, the ICPD+5 Review in New York, and the ICPD+10 Review by the UNFPA. This will shed light on whether the dominant international discursive opportunity structure of liberalism affected the framing of their issues.

Information politics, used by activists to diffuse information to sympathetic parties that can then exert pressure on the institution that is the target of the movement (Tarrow 2005:158), is another tactic that anti-abortion organizations may use to circumvent a competing discursive opportunity structure. This would work like a reverse boomerang effect, of Keck and Sikkink fame; the anti-abortion movement may use information politics to bring domestic pressure to bear on international targets. Information politics also depends on a particular norm, the importance of science and reason, which I will explore in more detail.

**Institutional opportunity structures:** International organizations may socialize states into a set of norms, actors may use international organizations as a platform for establishing and diffusing norms, and actors may use international NGOs to exert pressure on their unresponsive domestic regimes, a process Keck and Sikkink refer to as the boomerang pattern (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Thus, international governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations are opportunity structures that can be drawn upon by social movement actors. Adamson makes the important point that political actors wishing to make claims at the level of the international system can use the
platform of international organizations but if they do so they will be constrained to frame their message in ways that fit the institutional culture of the organization. “Political entrepreneurs who promote norms that do not conform with the dominant liberal institutional culture of international organizations will have to adjust their normative claims or draw on other institutional infrastructures…” (Adamson 2003:16). This insight provides the basis for my hypotheses concerning liberal and conservative movements at the UN.

Thus, I see the international discursive opportunity structure influencing the institutional opportunity structure; this would have particular relevance in the case of the anti-abortion movement attempting to influence the Program of Action emerging from the ICPD in Cairo and the ICPD+5 in New York, since the goal of their advocacy did not conform to the dominant liberal institutional culture of the UN’s social agencies. One specific mechanism which the social movement organizations could use to overcome the liberal institutional structure is that of building transnational coalitions, complicated by framing, trust, management of difference, and selective incentives (Tarrow 2005:165). For the anti-abortion movement in particular, transnational coalitions are an important factor in gaining leverage in an international arena; however, many scholars studying both conservative movements and transnational movements agree that while instrumental coalitions may succeed in the short run, they are difficult to maintain for long term collaboration (Buss and Herman 2003, Tarrow 2005). But Tarrow argues that coalitions built around campaigns, with their ability to make short-term tactical alliances, minimal institutionalization, and focus on a specific policy issue, may be the most successful strategies for social movements (179). Measuring how closely the coalitions built by the
anti-abortion movement match these characteristics may grant us a better idea of how successful and lasting these coalitions are likely to be. One way in which I measure the success of these movements overall is that of institutional access, measured not solely by the presence of anti-abortion organizations at the UN but also by their influence on the final Program of Action in comparison to abortion-rights advocates.

2.3 How liberal norms are embodied in social practices

This research examines the practical effects of international norm construction for social movements attempting to navigate the UN system, specifically UN global conferences. Do norms become ingrained in the practices of intergovernmental organizations to such an extent that they hinder a movement with different norms or help a movement that conforms to them? In studying the UN and especially UN global conferences on issues of social significance, it has been argued that the norms stemming from classic Lockean liberalism, such as emphasis on individual liberties, a rights-based framework for developing policy, and progress through science and reason, are embodied in the procedures and frameworks of UN global conferences in several ways: first, individuals are so important that collective decisions must be consensus decisions (Boli and Thomas 1999), making coalition-building necessary; second, the rights framework has become so embedded that it is a legitimizing frame for most social issues, especially in the post-Cold War world (Rajagopal 2003); and third, science and reason are seen as the most legitimate methods of justifying policy and action, as opposed to religion and tradition (Thomas 2001). I will first trace the norms posited by world-polity and other approaches to liberal individualism, and then attempt to demonstrate how these norms are
embodied in particular practices at the UN that affect the UN global conferences and meetings where these social movements attempt to exert influence.

2.3.1 Liberal Individualism

Liberal theory and philosophy, as mentioned earlier, has grown over time to include many different positions, and its authors do not often try to summarize the key tenets of the theory of liberalism. So I will not attempt to include all the many different types of liberalism, but focus my attention on the central tenets of liberalism that I believe have been transferred to liberal internationalism.

Most theorists would argue that the central, deepest commitment of liberal political philosophy is to individualism (Waldron 1996: 600); this individualism consists of four elements that have distinct implications. First, the importance of the individual underlies the evaluation of social and political institutions. Early liberal philosophers based the importance of the individual on each person being the workmanship and property of God; however, since John Locke, liberal philosophers have based the importance of the individual on a more secular tradition. Utilitarians based it on the desire and preferences of the individual, while Kant linked individual value to the will, conscience, and sense of duty of each individual. Thus, each person was meant to be regarded as an end in themselves, not just the means to broader social ends, and as such was the key to social and political institutions.

A second key element of liberal individualism is the importance of freedom, defined as the capacity of individuals to direct their actions and live their lives on their own terms. Libertarians focus on a negative conception of freedom, while liberals also include a positive conception of freedom, and spend considerable time balancing between
the two. Most liberal, positive conceptions of liberty allow the state a considerable role in providing and maintaining freedom. Those who argue for an extensive understanding of positive liberty go beyond the bounds of liberalism and enter that of socialism (Waldron 1996). The combination of negative and positive understandings of freedom is the predecessor of the rights framework we are so familiar with today. The third key element of liberal individualism is the commitment to equality; this is not a belief in economic equality, but that all individuals are equal in their basic worth, and as a result are entitled to equal concern for their interests in the design and operation of their social institutions.

A fourth element of liberal individualism involves an insistence on the rights of individual reason – that rules and institutions of social life must be justified by each individual’s reason. The legacy of the Enlightenment can be found in the importance liberalism gives to reason, believing in the ability of man to understand both nature and human nature through his own reason. “The Enlightenment was characterized by a burgeoning confidence in the human ability to make sense of the world, to grasp its regularities and fundamental principles and to manipulate its powers for the benefit of mankind” (Waldron 1987: 134). Philosophers trace liberal normative attitudes toward social and political justification to the legacy of the Enlightenment, which encouraged men and women to believe that they held the key to understanding the world around them; this leads to an impatience with justifying social and political institutions with “tradition, mystery, awe and superstition” as the basis of order (Waldron 1987: 134).

John Rawls revisited liberal theory in his 1972 *A Theory of Justice*, which emphasized the idea of equality and thus the importance of justice, even more than liberty, to the theory of liberalism. He uses Kant’s understanding of human autonomy and
features the concept of a set of basic non-overridable rights within his concept of justice; scholars of liberalism agree “Rawl’s theory of liberalism put the issue of rights back on the agenda and was constructed in individual terms” (Avineri and DeShalit 1992:1). This understanding of human rights as essential to liberalism was articulated after the creation of the UN and the acceptance of the UN Charter, but reflects that institution’s emphasis on the individual, freedom and equality. The application of liberal individualism’s elements to a human rights framework in the international sphere can be traced back to the desperate search for peace in the international sphere, and the belief by many who were instrumental in creating the UN that one of the factors leading to World War II was the failure of states to recognize and respect the human rights of their citizens (Campbell 2006).

2.3.2 World-Polity Theory and liberal and rational norms

World-polity theory, especially in the work of John Boli and George Thomas, describes the culture that permeates world society, including international organizations such as the UN, in terms of liberal and rational norms. These norms include universalism, individualism, rational-voluntaristic authority, human purposes of rationalizing progress, and world citizenship. Individualism, rational-voluntaristic authority, and human purposes of rationalizing progress are especially important for my purposes, as they reflect the liberal norms discussed earlier.

Universalism describes the understanding that human nature, agency, and purpose are universal: “Humans everywhere have similar needs and desires, can act in accordance with common principles of authority and action, and share common goals” (Boli and Thomas 1997). Individuals are accepted as the true or real members of most international
non-governmental organizations (INGOs), with states represented by individuals at international governmental organizations (IGOs). Individualism also affects the structure of such organizations, in that each individual needs to be represented in any group decision; as a result, democratic procedures are generally considered to be the only way to make fair decisions (Boli and Thomas 1997).

Rational-voluntaristic authority is the informal authority of many organizations in the international sphere, especially NGOs because they do not have legal authority or dominance in any conventional sense. Thus rational voluntaristic authority is that which invests organizations in which individuals act collectively through rational procedures. It has its basis, as mentioned before, in freely exercised reason, where “fundamentally equal individuals reach collective decisions through rational deliberations which are open to all” (Boli and Thomas 1999: 273). Individuals are the key: they are free to choose, be and do as they will, and “If there is to be collective authority, it must be built up from the authority that inheres in free, self-directed individuals, with due recognition of the basic equality that reigns among sovereign individuals” (Boli and Thomas 1999: 274). Thus, rational-voluntaristic authority finds its legitimacy in liberal norms, especially the emphasis on the freedom, equality and reason of the individual. Most IGOs are also invested with rational-voluntaristic authority: sovereign states do not have power over each other, and no world government exists, so collective action by states can only proceed by rational voluntarism. Because each individual is equally important, rational-voluntaristic authority also encourages democratic procedures, and refers to the legal-bureaucratic authority of states to enforce these democratic decisions.

World culture approves a very specific modus operandi for achieving goals:
progress through science and reason. A specific purpose, formalized structure, and attention to procedures, are the rational methods by which most organizations achieve their goals, and these are evident in both IGOs and INGOs. Those INGOs that are engaged in technical fields have very clearly rationalized activities; those INGOs that do not engage in technical fields define themselves by their rationalized activities and their commitment to science and reason.

…almost all other INGOs rely on science, expertise, and professionalization in their operations and programs. …The scientific method, technique, monetarization, logical analysis—these are the favored modi operandi. These instruments of progress may often be criticized, but they are built into worldwide institutions and the ideology of development. (Boli and Thomas 1997: 181)

Even when many of these organizations direct themselves towards irrational or nonrational aims, such as organizations that have altruistic aims, desire revolution, believe in the existence of UFOs, or the importance of transcendental meditation, they are channeled into rationalized activities and forms, such as organizing a non-governmental organization, holding meetings, electing officers, and producing research and newsletters (Boli and Thomas 1997: 182).

All these characteristics of world culture inhere in the principle of world citizenship: all human beings are individuals with certain human rights and subject to certain obligations, and “everyone is capable of voluntaristic actions that seek rational solutions to social problems, therefore, everyone is a citizen of the world polity” (Boli and Thomas 1997: 182). Boli and Thomas go on to note that world citizenship is prominently featured in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; however in the absence of a world state, the Declaration puts the burden of enforcing world citizenship, namely human rights, on states.
World culture did not always consist of these norms; in fact, Boli and Thomas
detail three different stages of world culture, during which different norms prevailed,
beginning prior to World War I, the interwar period, and after World War II. After World
War II, when individual choice became the normal discourse, international NGOs
focusing on labor, family, religion, and distinctive cultural identities declined and
constitute the smallest percentage of INGOs. Boli and Thomas argue that “the
individualism of world culture works against collectivist forms of transnational
organizing” and that individualism has become stronger now than in the early part of the
century (1997: 184). They use the issue of population to demonstrate the different types
of discourse that were acceptable during the three periods, arguing that the focus on
individual reproductive rights came about after World War II in accordance with the
victory of liberal nations who then began to concentrate on the international sphere in the
form of the UN. Although I agree that individual choice became very important after
World War II, I think that Boli and Thomas oversimplify the issue by characterizing the
entire period after World War II as the time when individual reproductive choice became
acceptable; they do not tell us how that change came about. They miss the importance of
the interaction of NGOs concerned with advocating individual reproductive choice and
the inertia of the UN in enacting individual reproductive choice in its language and
programs. Although the period after World War II was greatly influenced by the liberal
norms of individualism, the rights framework that ultimately allowed reproductive choice
to become the dominant paradigm of population discourse did not permeate the UN’s
more scientific focus on population until the late nineties, when feminist organizations
advocated strongly for it.
2.3.3 How UN practices reflect liberal and rational norms

Liberal individualism, as described above, is reflected in several key practices of world culture that grew in importance at the UN, and especially the UN global conferences dealing with social issues: the importance of the individual led over time from majority-rule voting procedures at UN global conferences to the practice of consensus decision-making; the importance of freedom and equality of each individual leads to the embeddedness of rights within the UN; and the importance of reason corresponds to the UN emphasizing progress through science and reason as the rationale for policies.

2.3.3.1 Consensus Decision-Making

The importance of the individual is reflected in many different ways in the international sphere, but at the global UN conferences, one of the key practices it is reflected in is the norm of consensus decision-making.

There is agreement among scholars who study the decision-making process at the UN that there has been a gradual shift from majority voting to toward the use of consensus procedures in all the major bodies of the UN (Smith 1999, Kaufmann 1994, Marin-Bosch 1987). At the UN as a whole, majority-voting strategies were used by developing countries prior to and during the 1970s in order to make headway concerning economic concessions they wanted to force on developed countries (Kaufmann 1980). However, consensus decision-making became more the norm as developing countries grew more diverse in their opinions and could no longer count on a voting bloc, but also as they began to realize that forcing decisions on developed countries did not further their cause in the long term (Smith 2004: 10). Even powerful countries with minority
positions, such as the U.S., are much more successful at the UN when they spend time engaging many other countries to support their position and lobbying delegations rather than engaging in heavy-handed techniques of withholding funds or insisting on certain resolutions (Smith 2004: 14). These strategies are the forerunners of coalition building, which allows actors to be successful in consensus decision-making. The end of the Cold War made consensus decision-making even more of a prevalent norm in the 1990s, affecting, arguably, even the Security Council, where vetoes were cast much less often (Luck 2003: 13); seventy-six percent of General Assembly resolutions and eighty-six percent of Security Council resolutions were adopted by consensus in 2000 (Fasulo 2004: 146).

Intergovernmental UN global conferences especially depend on rational-voluntaristic authority; as a result, democratic procedures for making decisions are considered especially important, whether for particular language negotiations or the approval of the final Program of Action. Earlier UN global conferences still saw the practice of voting on measures, with majority rule winning the day. However, as conferences became intergovernmental and the UN sought to include the civil society that worked on these social issues on a global and local scale, consensus decision-making became more and more the norm (Singh 1998). Majority rule is a democratic procedure, but consensus-decision making allows the minority a say in the final product, and I believe that as the UN global conferences continued to be held through the 1990s, the importance of the individual as represented in each government delegation grew to the point where simple majority rule became unacceptable.
Consensus, as opposed to voting, provides more say for the minority, but also provides for the possibility of compromise between positions rather than supporting false dichotomies, and ensures the commitment of all members to the consensus position. “The fact that the U.N. can only make recommendations to governments, and that these recommendations will carry maximum weight if adopted unanimously, constitutes a powerful force toward the negotiation of compromise solutions acceptable to everybody” (Kaufmann 1980: 16). In fact, even though delegations did vote on certain measures during the intergovernmental conferences, the very structure of UN global intergovernmental conferences encouraged consensus decision-making: preparatory committees met to decide on the agenda and the main text of the Program of Action, regional meetings were held to gather information and discuss concerns from all parts of the world, special issue meetings were also held that involved experts on the topics, and the draft Program of Action was revised accordingly. Any unresolved issues were placed in brackets until the actual conference, where negotiations to resolve differences went on into the night, and until delegations could agree on the language, or agree with reservations (Schechter 2005). Most Programs of Action were approved by most delegations, although most also had reservations from individual countries. However, the preparatory process was designed specifically to mobilize support from national delegations on the themes and issues of the conference, to prevent serious conflict, given “the tradition of consensus decision-making at UN global conferences whereby any single delegation might block an agreement or an aspect of a program of action that all of the other delegates support” (Schechter 2005: 10). The shift towards consensus decision
making plays an important part in how social movements and networks of NGOs attempt to influence debate and final consensus documents of UN global conferences.

2.3.3.2 Politics of Rights

The UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights are two key documents that reflect the liberal foundations on which the international organization was created, and especially the underpinnings of the human rights framework that has been the basis of many social movements’ frames. The concept of human rights – the definition of human rights as social and economic as well as civil and political – has been greatly contested by many different nations, and it has been quite a struggle to have states sign onto the covenants that have the legal authority of international treaties. Even in the 1990s, many developing countries argued that they subscribed to relative and cultural understandings of human rights that should be taken into account when discussing human rights. It is not my intention to brush aside these disputes over human rights at the UN, but to incorporate them into a larger observation: human rights has become an important touchstone within the UN, a concept so well accepted as being worthy of action that nearly every nation with any misdeeds on its conscience argues over the definition of human rights or the enforcement of them by the UN.

Many different histories of the UN make note of the major ideas that emerged from the 1945 conference that created the United Nations: peace, independence and the sovereignty of nations, development, and human rights (Shaw 2005: 3).

The new spirit fostered in opposition to the flagrant disregard for human rights during the war also helped reify liberal notions of individualism and national development in the world polity. This liberal model was codified in normative international agreements such as the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. World society valued the sovereignty and development of nation-states and individual citizens. (Boli and Thomas 1999: 207)
The League of Nations, in contrast, did not deal with human rights, reflecting the current understanding that human rights were the concern of individual states. However, the League of Nations did begin important work in the international sphere concerning human rights issues, including the areas of trafficking in women and children, narcotics, slavery, and forced labor. This work was downplayed in the history of the League, but it is among the most remembered of its accomplishments (Green 1956:10).

World War II marked a distinct increase in international concern for human rights. Although they were well established as an issue of national concern in Western nations, the brutal violence and banal efficiency of the Nazis in Germany and the Fascists in Italy shocked policy makers and publics throughout the world (Green 1956: 13). The Dumbarton Proposal for the United Nations had only one sentence in it concerning human rights, which stressed its importance for peace: “With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the Organization should facilitate solutions of international economic, social, and other humanitarian propositions and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Chapter IX, Sec. A (1)). The four sponsoring powers introduced amendments to specifically promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in San Francisco. The U.S. delegation consulted with forty-two American NGOs before agreeing to propose a specific reference to the creation of a commission on human rights under the Economic and Social Council. Many Latin American countries also pushed for further recognition of human rights in the UN Charter (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

As a result, there were seven specific references to human rights incorporated in the Charter of the UN: in the Preamble, delegates agreed to “reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal
rights of men and women, and of nations large and small…” The second mention is in
Article 1, which states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve
international cooperation “in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion…”
Article 13 states that the General Assembly will initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of “assisting in the realization of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”
Article 55 states that the United Nations will promote “universal respect for, and
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion,” and closely related, Article 56, “All Members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.” The Economic and Social Council
specifically is given the power in Article 62 to “make recommendations for the purpose
of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all.” Article 68 provides for the Commission on Human Rights, among others: “The
Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and
for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for
the performance of its functions.” And lastly, Article 76 of the Charter sets forth as one of
the basic goals of the trusteeship system: “to encourage respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion,
and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world.”
The interpretation of these references to human rights and freedoms in the Charter of the UN is made more complicated by the fact that the phrase “human rights and fundamental freedoms” was not defined – thus, countries may understand the phrase to mean both individual and group rights (Green 1956: 18). Also left undefined was the role of the UN in positively guaranteeing rights; the words used in the charter were in the vein of encouraging and promoting rights rather than protecting or guaranteeing rights. Another complicating factor is the inclusion in the Charter of an article (2) specifically guaranteeing that the UN should not interfere with the sovereignty of a state by intervening in matters that are within its domestic jurisdiction. However, the United Nations also defined human rights for its members and the whole world in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The drafting of an International Bill of Rights was moved from the General Assembly to the Economic and Social Council, which then recommended that the Commission of Human Rights, consisting of eighteen members, should draft such a document. The Commission appointed a drafting committee, which at its second session at the end of 1947 considered three proposals: a draft declaration, a draft convention, and measures for implementing human rights (Green 1956: 25). The United States supported a declaration with goals and aspirations rather than a binding legal convention, which would then need Senate approval; it also supported a declaration because most nations would probably support a declaration, which would demonstrate the consensus of the international community on the importance of human rights. The United Kingdom supported a convention on human rights that would be binding on the governments that ratified it, believing that such a convention would be more useful to those members who
accepted it than a general declaration of goals concerning human rights. While the
drafting committee considered both a declaration and a convention, it gradually moved
toward a declaration. The text of that declaration was completed by the Commission on
Human Rights in June 1948, revised painstakingly, and accepted by the General
Assembly on December 10, 1948, by a vote of 48 to 0, with eight abstentions of countries
that objected to certain portions of the Declaration but did not want to cast a negative
vote (Green 1956: 29). The focus on human rights was justified for many in the newly
formed United Nations by considerations of how best to achieve peace in the
international sphere. This sentiment is exemplified in an often-quoted statement by then
United States Secretary of State Marshall:

Systematic and deliberate denials of basic human rights lie at the root of most our troubles and
threaten the work of the United Nations. …Governments which systematically disregard the rights
of their own people are not likely to respect the rights of other nations and other people and are
likely to seek their objectives by coercion and force in the international field. (U.S. Department of
State 1948)

The text of the Universal Declaration recognizes civil, political, economic, social
and cultural rights, as well as the duties of the individual. Several countries objected to
civil rights; the Soviet Union wanted to amend the rights to assemble, the right to perform
religious services, and the right to freedom of speech; Saudi Arabia abstained on the final
vote because of the clause guaranteeing the right to change one’s religion or belief. In
addition, several countries, including South Africa, abstained based on the rationale that
the Declaration would have some force on individual countries because the General
Assembly voted on it and accepted it, even though the Declaration was specifically not a
legally binding document. These are emblematic of the future disagreements many
countries would have on the concept of and the enforcement of human rights. However,
the fact that the Declaration was adopted without a dissenting vote was an important
event in history, and it has become “as it was intended to be, a yardstick for measuring
the progress of governments and peoples toward the full respect for human freedom”
(Green 1956: 35).

Some scholars would argue that human rights has become the only acceptable
way to express claims and resistance. “In this new sensibility, the idea of human rights
has emerged as the language of progressive politics and resistance in the Third World…
No other discourse, except perhaps anti-colonial nationalism, has had such a stranglehold
on both the imagination of progressive intellectuals as well as mass mobilization in the
Third World” (Rajagopal 2003: 171). This has important implications for how social
movements go about framing their arguments on many different issues at the UN; we can
see these effects especially in the framing changes of the abortion-rights and anti-abortion
movements.

2.3.3.3 Science and Reason as Rationale for Policy Change

One of the main functions of special UN agencies is the collection of data, the
analysis of data, and the production of statistics and research on the many issues that
these agencies are established to deal with. The data that the UN collects from its
members, and then standardizes across those countries, is also a crucial resource for
scholars around the world, adding to the scientific research practice that then again
informs policy. The importance placed on science and scientific research as a rationale
for policy and policy change by the UN is also reflected in the adoption of science
bureaucracies by nations around the world as international organizations within and
outside the UN began to emphasize science as central to development (Finnemore 1991,
1993; Jang 2000).
The UN Charter establishes the Economic and Social Council as a body meant to undertake research and produce reports in order to promote the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all:

1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned. 2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. (UN Charter 1954: Article 62)

A key UN agency that established science as an integral function of UN agencies is the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); one of its main goals is the use of the natural sciences to support the work of the United Nations and its specialized services (Florkin 1956). UNESCO oversees the International Center for Theoretical Physics and the International Institute for Education Planning. Since then, the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) was established in 1966, becoming a specialized agency in 1985; its purpose is to help developing countries industrialize by mobilizing knowledge, skills, information and technology. UNIDO undertakes research in eight different areas that support this purpose: industrial governance and statistics, investment and technology, industrial competitiveness, private sector development, agro-industry, sustainable energy and climate change, substances that deplete the ozone layer, and environmental management. UNIDO also oversees the International Centers on Science and High Technology and Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology. These are some examples of the UN organizations focused on science, although most agencies of the UN perform their functions through rational bureaucratic methods and with an emphasis on scientific research and data analysis, regardless of substantive goals.
Many of the agencies within the UN that deal with social issues also have research organizations associated with them. For example, the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) was created in 1976 by ECOSOC on the recommendation of the first World Conference on Women, in 1975. INSTRAW’s purpose is to generate and disseminate research on gender that will be used in development policies, programs and projects, as well as to develop gendered training programs. Its strategic framework demonstrates the key role of research for the organization:

UN-INSTRRAW’s Strategic Framework emphasizes the importance of articulating research, training and information distribution in a continuous cycle of analysis, learning and action, so that research results feed into the distribution of information and the design of training and capacity-building programmes, as well as the formulation of policy. Through its applied research programmes, the Institute aims to make policies and programmes gender-responsive on the basis of concrete research results, the application of lessons learned, and the replication of best practices. (INSTRAW – Who we are)

The Population Division is another organization with a research focus meant to support policy: its purpose is to prepare high-quality documentation and analytical work and facilitate consensus-building and policy development on population issues. It also supports the implementation of the ICPD Program of Action recommendations by “monitoring progress towards the achievement of the goals set out in the Programme of Action, as well as identifying, analyzing and investigating policy issues and salient global trends in the field of population and development” (Population Division http://www.un.org/esa/population/aboutpop.htm). The Commission on Population and Development (CPD) is one of the main organizations that reviews the work of the Population Division and other agencies on population and development issues; it was established by ECOSOC in 1946 as the Population Commission, and renamed in 1994 as the Commission on Population and Development. One of the CPD’s main functions is to
arrange for studies on population issues and trends. The CPD submitted a report in early 1999 on progress in implementation of the ICPD Program of Action and general progress in the field of population, which included a section on the dissemination of information and research studies done by the Population Division to governments around the world and the public at large. In this report, a list of the publications, expert group meetings and other materials prepared by the Population Division is listed for the year 1998: they include thirteen research studies, two periodical issues, one expert group meeting, and seven databases. The databases especially can be noted as key to those in the demographic field, including the “Global Population Policy Database, 1997,” “World Population, 1950-2050,” “Demographic Indicators, 1950-2050,” and “Age Patterns of Fertility, 1995-2050” (Commission on Population and Development 1999). These are some examples of the many different Commissions and Committees and Funds that emphasize a research oriented approach to the issues tackled by the economic and social agencies of the UN, and produces a wealth of statistics and data for research and policy consideration.

Martha Finnemore’s study (1993) on the UN as a diffuser of norms concerning science discusses mainly the influence of the UN on states. I would extend this argument to NGOs that attempt to influence the UN and states at the UN. Finnemore argues that although most political science explanations of the creation of science policy bureaucracies by states all over the world focused on the demand for such ministries by producers or consumers of science, in fact a quantitative study of such demand indicators did not correspond with the emergence of these ministries. She consequently argues instead that in response to a new norm articulated within the international community
concerning the need to coordinate and direct science, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) influenced states to believe the value and utility of science policy organizations, especially for national development. Another, more recent study by Yong Suk Jang (2000) uses both resource-mobilization theory and institutional theory to analyze the same phenomenon, and finds that while resource-mobilization, or factors internal to the state were significant in the early years of states creating science bureaucracies, institutional or factors external to the state, such as cultural rules or discourse, became increasingly significant over time.

I would contrast the emphasis on science and reason as the means to progress with a conservative point of view, which first doubts the prospects of progress in the Enlightenment sense, as embodied in the liberal philosophy. Conservative philosophy also looks to tradition and religion as guides for action. Many conservative NGOs justify their actions or arguments to “insider” audiences, those that already agree with them, by using tradition or religion; however, when addressing “outsider” audience, those they are trying to persuade, they will use arguments based on science and reason. Many of the anti-abortion organizations I am studying are based in the U.S. and began using a rights framework to persuade “outsider” audiences within the U.S. because such a framework was so accepted and easy to turn to their own arguments – thus the right to life. However, most of these organizations did not start to focus on developing research and statistics to provide evidence for their arguments until they began to scale up into the international arena of advocacy.
3 Importance of Demographic Experts and Science: Early UN Population Conferences

3.1 *Introduction*

The early UN population conferences, held in Rome in 1954 and in Belgrade in 1964, were strictly “expert” meetings, rather than intergovernmental meetings, to which population experts and demographers from all over the world were invited to discuss population trends and scientific evidence in the field. As a result, the international discussion on population issues was dominated by demographers and the influence of scientific evidence and quantitative results. The first intergovernmental conference, held in 1974 in Bucharest, marked the beginning of political challenges to the expert point of view; however, the UN agency responsible for the global conference on population, the Population Commission, preferred to keep these conferences limited to scientific experts rather than political representatives lest the usefulness of the conference be derailed. The U.S. representative to the UN Population Council, William H. Draper, Jr., persuaded both the U.S. and the Population Commission to recommend the convening of an intergovernmental conference rather than another “conference of demographers and experts along the lines of the Rome and Belgrade conferences” (Singh 1998: 4). As I will discuss in greater detail in this chapter, the preference for an expert conference was not only because UN officials were aware of the differences in political opinion concerning population issues, but because the UN in addition to most Western industrialized countries put great store in scientific and expert opinion.
The increasingly alarmist literature published by demographers in the U.S. in the late 1960s (Paddock and Paddock 1967, Erhlich 1968) pushed the U.S. government to consider population growth as a security threat and worthy of millions of dollars in foreign aid. As I will show, the political challenges raised at the Bucharest conference marked the opening for other types of challenges to the predominant demographic view on population growth, including the feminist health and rights movement as well as the anti-abortion movement. However, the importance that the UN and Western developed countries place on scientific, expert information continued to influence those who would challenge the prevalent point of view, and thus both feminists and anti-abortion activists would in the future use scientific research to support their points of view.

These early conferences also reveal much about the history of the family planning programs and the movement to reduce population growth; Rome (1954) and Belgrade (1964) bracket the period of time in which the U.S. was very reluctant to become involved in family planning, and the complete turnaround in U.S. policy to actively supporting and promoting family planning programs. Bucharest marks the greater involvement of developing countries in the international discussion on population and development.

### 3.2 1954 Rome Conference and 1964 Belgrade Conference: Expert Meetings

The Population Division of the UN, along with the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, organized the Rome Population conference, held from August 31st – September 10th, 1954, and the Belgrade Population Conference, held from August 30th – September 10th, 1965. These conferences were “designed as scientific
meetings of individual experts (drawn mostly from among the community of demographers),” and as a result, these conferences did not produce any negotiated resolutions or recommendations on population issues (Singh 1998: 2). In both conferences, the sessions reflected the concerns of the individual experts that organized them. The organizers of the conferences specified that it should be a meeting of experts in demography and related disciplines, and not a meeting of representatives of governments. Thus, the participants would not pass resolutions or make recommendations, but the conference would be a “forum for exchange of ideas and information which could contribute to a better understanding of the interrelationships of population trends and economic and social factors and stimulate further scientific research on these subjects” (Adams 1965: 436). In fact, observers believed that the success of these conferences depended on keeping the conference scientific rather than political, with participants invited in their personal capacities as experts rather than representatives of governments or organizations (Notestein 1954: 242). Although these demographic discussions had clear political implications, the UN agencies responsible for these early conferences believed they would be better served by limiting them to expert rather than political conferences. As a result, demographic experts influenced the majority of the international understanding of population issues at this time. Although demographers were regarded as experts in their field, their claims concerning the threat of over-population were disputed by other groups who did not have the legitimacy of scientific authority. As will be later discussed in this paper, developing country governments and communist regimes, among other groups, disagreed with the view held by many demographers at this time that
population increases would be unsustainable, and that these increases also interfered with the ability of countries to develop properly.

In Rome, about 400 participants from over 80 countries and territories presented more than 400 technical papers for discussion in 30 working sessions. The Preparatory Committee appointed individuals to organize the different sessions, each dealing with a specific topic. Proposals made by the organizers were then reviewed by the Preparatory Committee, and then transmitted to the Secretary-General of the Conference (the director of the Population Division). The Secretary-General then issued the invitations to prepare papers and participate in the panel discussions of the meetings, and also gave access to the floor of the conference to representatives of governments, interested specialized agencies, and non-governmental scientific agencies. This was also true of the Belgrade conference, and demonstrates how carefully the UN controlled participation in these population conferences, although the proceedings were open to the public.

The second World Population Conference in Belgrade saw a substantial increase of interest in population issues all over the world, with a doubling of participants in the conference. More than 800 people attended the Belgrade conference, from nearly 90 countries; observers report that organizers made special efforts to encourage experts from developing regions to attend this second conference, and as a result, a higher proportion of the participants came from Africa, Asia, and Latin America in comparison to the Rome conference. By the 1960s, demographers were sounding the alarm about population growth, but it would be 1968 before the Ehrlich’s *Population Bomb* would be published and at that time the U.S. began to financially and rhetorically promote family planning programs all over the world.
The World Population Conference in Rome (1954) was held at the request of the Economic and Social Council; although previous international conferences on population had been held (for example, three sponsored by the Union for the Scientific Study of Population in London (1931), Berlin (1935), and Paris (1937)), these were on a much smaller scale. The 1954 Rome conference was the first international conference to include the participation of experts from nearly every part of the world, the exception being mainland China. This was especially important because very little demographic information was released from the USSR at the time, and so the information presented by experts from that region was of great interest to the other participants; however, there was no way to verify any of the information, which revealed a birth and death rate very close to that of the United States (Notestein 1954). The inclusion of so many participants from different parts of the world was mainly due to the contribution of funds from several different sources, including private foundations such as the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations, which contributed nearly as much as, or more than, some governments (Notestein 1954: 242). The World Population Conference in Rome was thus supported quite widely by several of the largest foundations in the U.S., reflecting the growing interest in population issues among private institutions and individuals (Green 1993: 305), although the U.S. government was at the time opposed to being involved in family planning within the U.S., much less in the developing world (Eager 2004). In 1959, President Eisenhower stated “Birth control is not our business… I cannot imagine anything more emphatically that is not a proper political or governmental activity or function of responsibility” (Green 1993: 303). However, even before 1960, the State Department became interested in population issues, further advanced by the Kennedy
Administration when Secretary of State Dean Rusk named Robert Barnett as Special Assistant to the Secretary for Population (Green 1993: 305).

In the U.S., the rapid increase of interest in population growth as a problem to be solved can be attributed to the quite serious attention paid to the issue by private foundations and individuals, and in turn by U.S. government officials, spurred by publications by demographers. In 1952, delegates from 14 countries attending the World Conference on Planned Parenthood in Bombay founded the International Planned Parenthood Federation as the umbrella organization of private family planning associations all over the world. At the same time, John D. Rockefeller III established the Population Council, separate from his own foundation, dedicated to understanding population problems. The Ford Foundation also began supporting population issues by granting money to the Population Reference Bureau in 1952, but did not support population activities in developing countries until 1959. The Rockefeller Foundation formed its own population program in 1963, delayed by its unease over the issue of promoting birth control. These NGOs and foundations were the main source of financial resources for population programs until governments became more involved in the mid to late sixties.

In the mid-60s, food shortages in developing countries such as India, a result of the lack of monsoon rains, highlighted the population problems of developing countries. This unprecedented opportunity for statisticians to document a ‘genuine Malthusian Crisis’ helped to elevate the population problem on the American political agenda (Schindlmayr 2004: 38). President Johnson in 1965 promised to seek new ways to deal with the “explosion in world population and the growing scarcity of world resources”
(Donaldson 1990: 38), and Senator Ernest Gruening held hearings on every aspect of population growth and family planning from 1965 to early 1968. These hearings “created a new climate of opinion in Washington about birth control, defined a new issue for government responsibility, and set the stage for other actions in Congressional committees that had more direct jurisdiction in matters involved in the subject” (Green 1993: 306).

Shortly thereafter, demographers Paddock and Paddock published a book called *Famine – 1975!*, arguing that population growth and inadequate food production would lead to massive famines, which, in turn, would lead to civil unrest in developing countries beginning in 1975. Such publications gave many in Congress the opportunity and ammunition to advocate for serious governmental intervention on behalf of population programs. Although USAID continued to be reluctant to undertake population assistance, Congress continued to apply pressure and earmark funds for population assistance in the foreign aid budget (Piotrow 1973: 127). A change of attitude in USAID can be marked in September 1967, when the agency issued the following directive: “The desired action [population programs] must be undertaken soon enough and on a broad scale to prevent a food-and-population disaster of sweeping proportions” (USAID 1968:11).

The U.S. government at this time began to see population growth in developing countries as a security threat, as evidenced by the National Security Study Memorandum 200 (NSSM 200), a conception of population issues that continued to be prevalent until the Reagan administration (Green 1993: 310). Just prior to the Bucharest Conference in 1974, President Nixon directed the National Security Council to study how world population growth would affect U.S. security interests over the next 25 years. President
Nixon specifically desired the study to address the following concerns: the corresponding pace of development in poorer countries, the demand for U.S. exports, especially for food; potential trade problems facing the U.S. due to competition for scarce resources; and the likelihood that unchecked world population growth would disrupt foreign policies and international stability (Eager 2004: 72). The memo specifically also stated that population policy is connected to the dignity of the individual, and that the U.S. should strive to work closely with others rather than impose its own view (Eager 2004: 72), indicating that the National Security Council was aware of the negative implications of recommending population control policies for the developing world. However, the majority of the memo dealt with just such policies. The executive summary of NSSM 200 estimates that the world population will reach 6.4 billion in the year 2000, and that the majority of the increase in population will occur in the developing world; the major security concern as a result involved instability in the developing world, and a rejection of U.S. foreign policy. The causes of instability as a result of population growth included high percentages of young people, slow improvement in the standard of living, urban concentration, and pressures for foreign migration to more affluent regions. Rapid population growth was also implicated as a major deterrent to development, which would then widen the gap between rich and poor. NSSM 200 lists “increasing levels of child abandonment, food riots, juvenile delinquency, separatist movements, communal massacres, revolutionary actions and counterrevolutionary coups” as further undesirable effects of the lack of development and widening income gap. This document demonstrates not only the complete turnaround of the U.S. government on the subject of family planning and population issues, but one of the key reasons used to justify such a
turnaround: the security of the U.S. and the world, both in terms of decreasing resources in the face of larger populations, and the political unrest that could result from young, dissatisfied populations in developing countries.

In the early 1970s, there was a great sense of urgency concerning population growth, both for Western governments and international agencies, such as the World Bank. In 1970, the World Bank gave its first population loan to expand maternity facilities in Jamaica. Norwegian and Swedish government officials devoted 9-10% of all development assistance to population activities (Salas 1976), and Canada, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, and West Germany began providing assistance for population programs (Schindlmayr 2004: 40). The creation of the UNFPA as a multilateral agency through which donors could channel funds greatly increased the amount of assistance Western governments could dedicate to population programs without “being accused of conspiring with imperialist ambitions” (Schindlmayr 2004: 40). Such accusations would play an important role in the first intergovernmental population conference held by the UN, the 1974 Bucharest conference.

The United Nations Population Fund, a key player in the future of population policy, began as the UN Fund for Population Activities in 1969, under the administration of the UN Development Program (UNDP). The impetus for the creation of the UNFPA came from both the UN General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant. In 1966, the General Assembly called on all UN agencies to draw up plans for assistance in the population field in training, research, information, and advisory services; in 1967, Secretary-General U Thant proposed an action program and fund that led to the establishment of the UN Trust Fund for Population Activities, which became
the UN Fund for Population Activities in 1969 (Caldwell et al. 2002). Just prior to the Bucharest conference in 1974, the increased interest in population policy and funds directed toward population assistance caused the original mandate of the UNFPA to be augmented: to be active in population planning and programming activities; promoting awareness of the implications of population growth on social and economic development, the environment and human rights; to provide assistance at the request of states in population and family planning activities; and to promote and coordinate these activities within the UN (Ridell 2000).

3.3 1974 Bucharest Conference: the first intergovernmental conference

The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted a resolution in 1970 declaring the need for a world population conference to consider basic demographic problems, their relationship with economic and social development, and population policies and action programs needed to promote welfare and development (Johnson 1987: 80). The U.S. and other Western governments mainly pushed for this global conference to be an intergovernmental conference in order to involve government officials from all countries, developing countries in particular, and thus ensure some level of political commitment to population programs, which the expert conferences of earlier decades had been unable to accomplish (Singh 1998, Finkle and McIntosh 2002). However, the U.S. and other Western governments did not anticipate the serious objections that developing countries would raise to the draft World Population Plan of Action: developing countries were determined to make the point that development, not population control, was their overriding objective, and that they would not allow developed countries to infringe on
their national sovereignty, in many cases newly won (Finkle and McIntosh 2002). These challenges to the Western understanding of population issues came as a surprise to the organizers of the conference and to most developed countries; the industrialized nations along with the relevant agencies of the UN that most strongly supported population programs believed that they were simply consolidating a “nearly complete consensus” on the dangers of rapid population growth (Eager 2004: 65). This was a result of the paramount importance given to population experts, demographers, at the early World Population Conferences, and the limitation of international discussion on these issues to scientific experts on population. Demographers from developing countries were being trained at Western institutions on Western grants, and agreed that population growth was a serious detriment to development.\(^2\)

Although population issues had been pushed to include development as an integral component, and developing countries resisted the U.S.’s urging of concrete targets and time periods for fertility rates, the conference adopted a clearly defined goal concerning reducing mortality levels, especially infant and maternal mortality (Recommendation 22), and acknowledged the intimate relationship of education, health and development in reducing fertility (Recommendation 18). “In spite of the real disagreements on substance which existed, the Plan adopted at Bucharest was important in that it set the framework for national action and for international assistance in the field of population” (Johnson 1995: 19).

\(^2\) Since the USAID population assistance program began in 1965 until at least 1978, bilateral agreements and contracts provided for 400 to 500 participants to study in research institutions and demography centers (Eager 2004: 78).
Four symposia and five regional conferences were held to prepare for the Bucharest conference. Three of the symposia were held in 1973, one year prior to the conference, on the subjects of population and development, population and the family, and resources and the environment (Johnson 1987: 86). The fourth symposium, on the subject of population and human rights, was held in 1974. The symposia reflect a significant range of topics considered in relation to population prior to this first intergovernmental conference, most experts on the conferences note that the majority of the preparations for the conference did not involve the political elements of the UN or the member governments (Finkle and Crane 1975: 94). The Population Division, composed mainly of demographic experts, was responsible for the draft World Population Plan of Action (Joseph Chamie Interview 2006).

The regional conferences were meant to allow countries in each region to examine the Draft World Population Plan of Action (WPPA) and voice their concerns in order to prevent significant political and substantive objections at the global conference. Very few countries raised objections at the regional conferences and as a result, the conference Secretariat believed that few divisive issues would arise in Bucharest. However, during the Bucharest conference, four very different positions emerged on population (Singh 1998: 8-9). Asian and European countries, as well as the U.S., argued that rapid population growth intensified problems of economic and social development and required urgent attention. On the other side, many Latin American and African countries expressed the view that population growth was not an important variable in development. Another group of countries argued that population growth was, contrary to the view being popularized at the time, desirable – to defend the country (China), to fill empty land
(Brazil), or to stimulate the economy (France). A fourth group of countries, mainly the USSR and countries in the Soviet bloc, blamed the problems of development on the biased world economic system, which favored developed countries. This fourth group of countries supported overall development goals and the New Economic International Order (NIEO), with no need for specific population policies. Romania, the host of the conference, was part of this group. The Working Group responsible for negotiating the compromise text put together a fragile agreement, although many delegations recorded their reservations, especially on the subject of the NIEO (Singh 1998: 9). This compromise involved considering family planning programs and developmental aid together, rather than presenting developing countries with population programs as an alternative to development.

Several key agreements were made at Bucharest that influenced population policy for the following decade, especially in developing countries (Singh 1998: 10-11). The first is that population and development have a close and mutually reinforcing relationship, not necessarily in one direction or another; however, most countries agreed that population programs should be part of comprehensive social and economic plans (Recommendation 95, WPPA, 1974). A second agreement that helped seal the compromise involved the principle of sovereign decision on the formulation and implementation of population policies (Paragraph 14). Given the different national positions on the population issue, and the sensitivity of developing countries to what seemed like a violation of their sovereignty by developed countries in the funding of a plan to reduce population growth in developing countries, these recommendations made the point that it was up to each individual country to make decisions concerning their
population programs. The third agreement was one on human rights; one of the recommendations asked countries to consider population policies and programs “within the framework of socio-economic development, which are consistent with basic human rights and national goals and values” (Recommendation 17). The WPPA also adopted nearly wholesale the language from the International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran that recognized the basic right of parents to “decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so.” However, the Bucharest Conference made one significant change, substituting “couples and individuals” for “parents” (Paragraph 14). Although several attempts have been made at following conferences to “alter it or water it down,” this wording has remained (Singh 1998: 11).

One of the reasons cited by Finkle and Crane (1975) as to why the regional conferences failed to give a true picture of the objections that many developing countries would have to the WPPA is that the participants at the regional meetings were not as high ranking as those who represented their governments at Bucharest. “Although they were official governmental representatives, they were likely part of the population community and were thus more inclined to compromise and develop a consensus on the content of the Draft WPPA” (Finkle and Crane 1975: 96). Jyoti Singh, at the time an NGO Liaison Officer with UNFPA, also tries to answer this puzzle by noting that the preparatory activities were divided into separate sectors, and that the technical and regional events were “mostly attended by technical and professional participants and focused on demographic issues” (Singh 1998: 7-8). Many years later, Finkle and McIntosh note that population experts and family planning experts played a dominant role in preparing for
the Bucharest conference, and that the preparatory process for the Bucharest conference was fairly closed to “nonscientific influence” (Finkle and McIntosh 2002: 14).

Demographers established “a distinct and academically recognized independent discipline” (Demeny 1988: 477) through the 20th century, and an intellectual community that emphasized empirical research. There has been some difficulty for demographers themselves to define their field because of their strict emphasis on scientific research and statistics, and the acknowledgement of the social sciences applications that have come with the politicization of population change. Some define it as a field because it contains its own body of interrelated concepts, techniques, journals, and professional associations (Stykos 1987). Early demographic journals did exist prior to World War II, such as Population, published by the International Population Union, and Population Literature, now called Population Index, produced by Princeton’s Office of Population Research. However, Population Studies, first published in 1947, “virtually had the field to itself, and this continued to be the case for 16 critical years that moulded [sic] the nature of modern demography, until Demography joined it in 1963, and for another eleven years until Population and Development Review started publication in 1974” (Caldwell 1996: 314). David Glass and E. Grebenik edited the Population Studies journal for decades, and as a result shaped the field of demography greatly. Caldwell in his review of the field determines that the journal began modestly in its social science applications of demography, with 41 per cent of the articles covering social science areas of demography; however, that percentage grew in each subsequent decade until social science articles made up about 76 percent of the articles in 1990s. Caldwell characteristically remarks that Population Studies should be considered to a great extent a
social science journal, “albeit one that leaves its own imprint on the social scientists who write for it in compelling them to take a rather empirical and population-based approach to their subject” (1996: 315).

Other scholars divide demography into formal demography and population studies in order to separate the statistical discipline contributing to social, biological, and health science from the social science aspects contributing descriptive studies of the causes and consequences of population change (Preston 1993). However, according to a demographer reviewing the relationship between demography and the social sciences, a demographer can be characterized by his or her approach to the field: “a belief that the world can be largely defined in empirical terms, and that edifices of theory which are not quantitatively testable are likely to, or indeed often should, collapse” (Caldwell 1996: 328). Thus, I would argue that demographers are an intellectual community with shared principles concerning the importance of empirical, scientific research, professional associations, journals and a discourse of science and reason as the means to progress that lend them expert status. That expert status had an important effect in the ability of demographers to influence the U.S. government and the UN as an international organization, and continues to influence the advocacy around population policy.

Paige Eager argues that the dominance of population experts and demographers at the preparatory events for Cairo is evidence of the degree to which demographic experts permeated countries worldwide, and became part of a transnational population epistemic community.

…scientists from the developing world were often trained in Western research centers and universities, sponsored by Western donor organizations, and attended Western-organized international conferences to discuss the ‘population problem.’ Therefore, those developing countries’ governmental representatives who attended the regional consultations were sufficiently socialized… They had become accustomed to the population control discourse, were convinced by
Eager’s point that a transnational population epistemic community had been socialized by the normative and soft power exerted by the West on behalf of population issues also supports my argument that demographers, as part of an expert, scientific community, had enormous power in both national environments such as the U.S., and the international environment, as seen in the World Population conferences in Rome and Belgrade as well as the lead-up to the Bucharest conference. Only when government officials, who had different political ideologies and were accountable to constituencies, became involved for the first time at Bucharest was the demographic view of population issues challenged.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter, in addition to providing a history of the early UN Population Conferences, also provides a brief look at how demographers influenced Western governments, especially the U.S., to view population growth as a serious security problem, one to which programs and resources must be dedicated in order to alleviate the risk to developed countries and the global environment in general. “Indeed, demographers built up a substantial arsenal of research and activities to intellectually justify the promotion of government-organized family planning programs and to advance this view” (Schindlmayr 2004:36). These Western governments and the U.S. in particular also dedicated resources to convincing developing countries through their own academics and leaders of the need for population programs. “Thus, the United States government was actively trying to counter the resistance population control programs engendered in
the developing world… by effectively socializing leaders from the developing world on the necessity of controlling population growth” (Eager 2004: 78).

The importance and influence of demographers in these early UN Population Conferences, and on the U.S. policy on population and allocation of foreign aid resources also testifies to the importance of the scientific evidence, research and analysis at the time, and the continuing importance of such authority and these methods of generating knowledge in the future of the UN Population agencies and programs. The very definition of population as a technical expertise issue requiring global cooperation reflects the importance of the world-polity culture that has influenced nations and international organizations so much. “What functionalists forget is that technique and the definition of problems as technical are themselves cultural processes” (Boli and Thomas 1997). The core norms of science and reason as the means to progress, the use of empirical research to understand problems and solve them, and the individualist approach are apparent in the shared principles and discourse of demographers as an intellectual community; thus, demographic authority made a serious impact on the UN and the U.S. government. Although demographers included these core norms that I identify as key to the UN environment, they lacked the emphasis on human rights at a time when the importance of human rights at the UN was still being contested. However, as the human rights framework became more embedded, demographers continued to urge the use of policies that would address population growth issues from a bureaucratically efficient point of view. Demographers ultimately had to adjust to the growing importance of the human rights framework, which the abortion-rights network used to their advantage. I will elaborate on this in future chapters.
4 Development of the Women’s Health and Rights Movement: The Women’s Decade through the 1990s

Two groups of particular interest in this project challenged the demographers’ perspective on population policy, which focused mostly on targets and quotas of births: women’s groups that advocated full access to family planning services and abortion, and anti-abortion groups. However, these two groups came from very different starting points and desired very different types of policies instead of those advocated by demographers, and so did not ally with each other. Instead these two groups went on to try and affect population policy in substantially different ways, both in domestic U.S. and international contexts. In this section I will explore the evolution of the abortion-rights movement in response to the demographic perspective on population policy.

4.1 Historical Context

The international movement for women’s health and rights reflects a split between the radical or progressive portion of the women’s movement, and the more pragmatic or mainstream liberal faction that has its roots in the politics of the modern birth control movement (Higer 1999: 124). In the nineteenth century, women’s rights advocates split into radical and reformist factions in response to the issue of voluntary motherhood. The radical faction wanted to transform the socioeconomic order, while the reformers pursued their goals through the narrower means of distributing birth control information and technology. The reformers, led by Margaret Sanger, dominated the movement by advocating family planning. This split between advocates of radical change and those who moderated their approach in order to accomplish their goals still exists within the movement for women’s health and rights. Those who take a radical feminist approach
argue for a restructuring of society’s approach to reproduction and childcare such that women are afforded real choices, rather than simply the one to not have children and work, or have children and not work. The more mainstream, liberal approach to women’s health and rights has dominated the movement, and has taken on the liberal, human rights frame in order to make an impact on specific international institutions, namely, the UN. I argue that the pragmatic, reformist faction of the movement had to take on specific frames for their arguments and ignore the more radical factions of the movement in order to influence the liberal institution of the UN, and that this more pragmatic, mainstream segment of the movement has become defined by its position on abortion. As a result, when referring to this faction of the movement, I call them the abortion-rights movement, in direct contrast to the anti-abortion movement in the international sphere.

**The Effects of Bucharest**

In the mid 1960s, the United States became very involved in using its soft power and resources in establishing family planning and population policies in developing countries. Demographers and feminists were advocating similar goals, programs that distributed contraceptives and abortion services, but for different reasons. Since demographers strongly influenced the U.S. and the U.S. in turn heavily funded the UNFPA, the demographic perspective also influenced UN population programs; however, feminists became disillusioned with target-oriented programs as well as the use of incentives and disincentives advocated by demographers, believing that such an approach took away the proper focus of these programs on women themselves and their need for healthcare that addresses more than contraceptives and sterilization. Feminists began to challenge the rationale on which population policies were based: “that
population control in the social interest has precedence over individual well-being and
individual rights” (Garcia-Moreno and Claro 1994:47).

The first opportunity to challenge the demographers’ stranglehold on population
policy came at the Bucharest conference, where developing countries’ challenge of
population control opened the international forum to different points of view on
population. Feminists took advantage of this opening to highlight concerns about the
abuses of population programs and the lack of attention to the health and well-being of
women (Eager 2004). These abuses range from the blatant violation of human rights,
such as the alleged forced sterilization of the Roma in Eastern Europe, or compulsory
gynecology exams instituted in Romanian workplaces, to more coercive practices within
population programs that used social pressure or less ambiguous means to force women
to become sterilized or have abortions, such as China’s one-child policy or India’s
economic incentives that encouraged sterilization (Sen 1994). In the late 1980s, feminists
have argued that the lack of attention to safety in promoting birth control and the
demographic rationale for population programs inevitably lead to abuses because they do
not address the root causes of inequality or health issues (Hartmann 1987). Paige Eager in
her study of the global women’s health and rights movement (2004) argues that the first
step in normative change is critical debate, and that critical debate was stimulated by the
suspicions of developing countries of developed countries, but also by feminists who
wanted to support birth-control but for very different reasons and in different ways than
demographers.
4.2 The Women’s Decade, 1975-1985

4.2.1 Introduction

Why did the UN declare 1975-1985 the UN Decade for Women? The 1970s began the era of UN global conferences; UN agencies convened conferences to raise consciousness on issues of global reach and significance, including the environment, food security, housing, population, energy, and women. There are several conflicting accounts of what brought about the UN Decade for Women; some give the credit to women’s rights NGO that lobbied for the UN Decade for Women, while others see the main responsibility lying with Secretary General U Thant. The preamble to the UN Charter took an initial step towards equality for women in the statement “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” In 1946, the Economic and Social Council created the Commission on the Status of Women, which was to investigate the causes of inequality and suggest actions to repair such inequalities (Zinsser 2002). However, it was not until 1975 that the first Women’s Conference was held, and at that conference, a large non-governmental forum and a governmental conference put together a comprehensive articulation of the problems facing women all over the world, and a Plan of Action to address these problems. The main problems of women were not, in 1975, expressed in terms of rights; the key themes of the conference reflected the concerns of developing countries at the time: equality, development and peace. Only after the UN Human Rights conference in Vienna, 1993, did human rights become the prevailing means of expressing women’s rights, a development I will explore later in this chapter.
During the UN Decade for Women, three women’s conferences were held: in Mexico City in 1975, in Copenhagen in 1980, and in Nairobi in 1985. Although none of the conferences had an explicit focus on population, international population policy and women’s reproductive autonomy were inevitably addressed at these conferences. These conferences also provided an opportunity for the many activists who attended to network with like-minded women all over the world, and it was at these conferences that a truly global women’s health and rights network began to emerge (Eager 2004:82). In addition, the ability to work through similar issues from a similar perspective over three global conferences also afforded these women the opportunity to become more professional in their advocacy skills and strategize on how to best influence states’ behavior through these UN global conferences and the UN system in general.

As a result of the UN Decade for Women and the three international conferences held during that time, the attention of many women’s groups turned to the international sphere as a focus for their energy and resources. This scale shift happened gradually and many of the groups continued to focus on their domestic environments; some feminists argue that the reason that the women’s movement turned to the UN global conferences as an avenue of activism was the monolithic hold that the population control community had on the attention of government actors, especially in the developed world (Eager 2004). These actors were generally unresponsive to the concerns of the women’s organizations about health and rights, and thus, the women took advantage of an international site of contestation on the topic of population policy, which also had considerable influence on national discourses on population (Eager 2004: 20).
4.2.2 UN Women’s Conferences

In 1975, the first UN’s International Women’s Year conference was held in Mexico City; 6,000 men and women attended, as well as 125 member states of the UN. This was the largest conference held on the concerns of women up to this time, and 70 percent of the delegates were women. The main purpose of the conference was to elevate the status of women in society, and discuss the obstacles to achieving equality in rights, opportunities and responsibilities. However, this conference also displayed the same split between the developed and developing world, with the Group of 77 forming their own working group and drafting a politically charged document that not only supported the principles of the New International Economic Order (NIEO), but also equated Zionism with racism and apartheid. Although industrialized countries strongly opposed it, the final document from the Mexico City conference included these elements.

Women’s groups concerned with health and rights had continued to criticize population control policies throughout the 1970s, and many at the Mexico City conference labeled coercive practices in contraceptive services as human rights abuses (Correa and Reichmann 1994: 57). The World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Objectives of the International Women’s Year echoed the Bucharest document by recognizing the need to achieve equal status for men and women in the family and society; the right to enter into marriage with the free and full consent of both spouses; the right of individuals and couples to freely and responsibly determine the number and spacing of their children; the close interaction of social, economic, and demographic factors; and the legitimacy of including population policies and programs within development plans (Miro 1977: 430). The explicitly stated right of individuals and couples to freely and responsibly determine the number and spacing of their children is
now looked back on as the precursor to reproductive health and rights, and causes some debate between those who believe the Cairo conference helped population programs, and those who believe it hurt them³.

Another significant outcome of the women’s conference in Mexico City was the connections among the many NGOs that attended the NGO forum, called the Mexico City Tribune. As a result of their interactions at this meeting, three international newsletters dedicated to addressing women’s concerns were established, and continue to this day: the Isis (www.isisforwomen.com), WIN News (www.feminist.com/win.htm), and the International Women’s Tribune Center (www.iwtc.org). As one of the early UN global conferences, the NGO forum in Mexico City was still quite separate from the intergovernmental meeting and unmonitored by governments or the press. The NGO forum was just as important as the intergovernmental meeting in helping women’s groups exchange information and experience, and develop international connections with like-minded groups (Fraser 1987: 12).

The second women’s conference was held in 1980 in Copenhagen, with the purpose of reviewing progress made during the Decade for Women. This conference was preceded by five regional conferences, reflecting the growing institutionalization of the UN global conferences and the preparation they now required; at this time, the Women in Development (WID) offices were also established at the UN and at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The document that came out of Copenhagen reiterated the Mexico City Plan of Action and added to it by explicitly addressing domestic and sexual violence, the needs of women refugees, and the dangers of illicit abortions to women’s health (Fraser 1987: 89). By 1980, the UN had also begun

³ I will elaborate on this in the analysis of the 1994 Cairo conference.
to systematically collect data on women around the world through its various offices, and this information was used at Copenhagen in the form of pithy statistics, such as the following: women, constituting half of the world’s population, performed two-thirds of the world’s work, received one-tenth of the world’s income, and owned less than one percent of the world’s property (Fraser 1999:898).

Although women’s groups gained momentum through the conferences of the UN Decade for Women, the political climate at both Mexico City and Copenhagen overshadowed the accomplishments of the women’s movement. The media focused on the political controversy surrounding the equating of Zionism with racism and the end of détente in 1979, with more conservative governments being elected in the U.S., Great Britain, and Germany. Women’s groups realized that the gains made since 1975 were significant but insufficient (Eager 2004: 83).

One of the key gains made since 1975 was the signing of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The draft form of CEDAW was endorsed by the Mexico City Women’s Conference in 1975, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979, and ceremonially re-signed at the Copenhagen Women’s Conference in 1980. CEDAW is the first legally binding treaty under international law to address women’s civil, political, social, and economic rights; however, as a treaty, CEDAW also has the most reservations attached to it, reflecting the unease with which many governments viewed the treaty. The U.S. has still not ratified the treaty. CEDAW is often described as an international bill of rights for women; it defines what constitutes discrimination against women, and actions states may take to end such discrimination. The Convention defines discrimination as
...any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. (CEDAW 1979)

One hundred and eighty-five states have ratified CEDAW as of 2007; these states are required to incorporate the principle of equality of men and women in their legal system, abolish all discriminatory laws and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women. As signatories, states agree to appropriate measures, including legislation, to ensure women can enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms, which in the Convention includes reproductive rights. States also agree to take appropriate measures to halt traffic and exploitation of women (CEDAW 1979). A commission on CEDAW reviews reports from each signatory state every four years and recommends measures to each state to ensure full compliance with the treaty.

One of the reasons that CEDAW is controversial is that it moves away from a sex-neutral norm, which strives to treat men and women equally based on how men are treated, and instead develops a new legal norm which recognizes that discrimination against women is worthy of a legal response, one that is particular to women (Cook 1993: 237). CEDAW signatories must not only provide negative and cost-free rights, as civil and political rights are characterized because governments are only required to abstain from activities which would violate these rights; CEDAW requires governments to provide economic, social, and cultural rights, which entails committing considerable resources and positive action (Eager 2004: 84-85). CEDAW requires states to eliminate discrimination against women in health care and family planning (Cook and Hawes 1986: 49), but does not go much further. It affirms women’s rights to family planning information, counseling, and services, and re-affirms that women have the same right as
men to decide on the number and spacing of their children (Correa and Reichmann 1994:59).

The last global conference of the UN Decade for Women was held in 1985 in Nairobi, Kenya; the purpose of this conference was to formulate strategies and goals for the future. At this conference, women from the developing world were a majority of the participants for the first time (Fraser 1987:6). 159 governmental delegations and many NGOs attended, and the press extensively covered the conference, which conveyed the diversity of the international women’s movement (Fraser 1999:900), and served to confront many critics who accused the movement of being mostly white, Western, and middle class rather than global. The participants at the Nairobi conference were significantly different than those that attended the first conference, although they were the same women; they were “much more pragmatic, professional, and political. Many of them had been through two world conferences [Mexico City and Copenhagen] and knew each other or knew about each other. They knew how to use the UN system to place women’s issues on the agenda of every world meeting” (Fraser 1987: 159).

The issue of violence against women came up for international public debate for the first time at the Nairobi conference. The NGO Forum in particular discussed the links among violence in the home, violence in society and violence between countries (Fraser 1999:901). The NGO Forum at Nairobi was the most well-organized and comprehensive yet, offering over 1,200 workshops and panel discussions (Fraser 1987:200). Several important networks developed out of the Nairobi conference which are generally feminist but engage in advocacy and research around reproductive rights as well. The Ford Foundation sponsored the attendance of a group of developing country experts who then
created Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN); DAWN is now a network of women from the global south who engage in feminist research and analysis of global issues related to economic justice, environmental sustainability, reproductive health and rights, and debt restructuring (Bunch et al. 2001: 224). The International Women’s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW) was also established out of a series of workshops at the Nairobi NGO Forum; the purpose of this group is to monitor, analyze, and encourage law and policy reforms consistent with CEDAW (Fraser 1987:129).

4.2.3 Effects of the UN Decade for Women on Abortion-Rights Movement

The UN Women’s conferences galvanized the women’s health and rights movement because women were able to discuss their concerns about population policy in international terms. As the meetings went on, feminists began to focus attention on issues such as human rights abuses in some population control programs, safety concerns about different contraceptive methods, and the role of women in society. In addition, feminists criticized the top-down nature of family planning programs that also tended to neglect women’s health in general. Although it seemed that feminists were critiquing these programs with a view to removing them, most women’s groups did not want to eliminate women’s access to family planning services, but instead to give family planning a different rationale – one derived from health and human rights as opposed to the demographic rationale that was advocated by the U.S. and other developed countries.

Paige Eager records that U.S. feminists coined the term “reproductive rights” during the 1970s (Eager 2004: 87); one of the earliest public uses of the term is in the name of the U.S. non-profit National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association (NFPRH), founded in 1971. Its mission is to “assure access to
comprehensive and culturally sensitive family planning and reproductive health care services, and to support reproductive freedom for all” (National Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association Mission Statement 2007). However, a basic search of newspaper articles in the U.S. and worldwide reveals that it is not until 1989 that the term reproductive health is used as a term to replace family planning, rather than to refer to the NFPRH. Some believe that the term came from more radical feminists, offering reproductive rights as a counterpoint to abortion rights, meaning an individual’s claim to something positive, whether food, shelter, health care or abortion. Liberal feminists used the term abortion rights from the liberal tradition of rights, meaning an individual’s freedom to act without government restriction; thus, governments had an obligation not to interfere with a woman’s right to seek an abortion. For more radical feminists, governments also had a more positive responsibility to ensure that women had the means to exercise their choice regarding abortion. The term reproductive rights was meant to refer to the need to treat women’s health holistically, to give women decision-making power concerning their health and fertility as a whole, rather than simply trying to control fertility without seeing the woman that control was affecting. “A family planning program designed to improve health and expand women’s control over reproduction looks very different from one whose main concern is to reduce birth rates as fast as possible” (Hartmann 1995:57). Nafis Sadik, former director of the UNFPA, states that she believed that the original purpose of family planning was to improve the health of women, not reduce fertility, but in the hands of governments, family planning programs were subject to coercion and corruption (Nafis Sadik Interview 2006). Thus one of the main goals of the movement was to rethink population policies and programs, and shift
the terms of the debate to reproductive health and rights rather than population control. Barbara Crane articulates this concisely as needing to look at “women’s reproductive needs more comprehensively, that it wasn’t a good idea to just offer a contraceptive method if you weren’t also checking for other conditions, or needs, and also making available access to safe abortion” (Barbara Crane Interview 2006).

The use and spread of the term reflected the growing influence of the global women’s health and rights movement, and it became an umbrella term for women’s groups in the global North and South to refer to local concerns as well as those that spanned cultures and economic situations (Eager 2004). Although the concept of reproductive rights is Western, feminists argue that it is a concept that women from the global South have embraced. A more ambiguous point of view was expressed when Peggy Curlin, former president of CEDPA, commented, “Yes, it is a very Western concept. The language we use can be off-putting, but if you talk to developing world women about safe motherhood, they want it” (Eager 2004:87). In the U.S. especially, reproductive rights is associated with abortion rights; anti-abortion groups have worked to frame reproductive rights as synonymous with abortion rights, and thus make it more controversial. Despite the growing popularity of the term among women’s groups, it did not appear in any of the UN global conference documents until the UN Population and Development conference in Cairo, 1994.

However, the framing of women’s health issues with the rights discourse was not accepted without debate. Within the women’s movement for health and rights, more liberal voices prevailed over radical ones; radical feminists do not approve of the rights discourse because it is based in a liberal understanding of rights, and continue to criticize
the human rights framework (Otto 1999). Whereas liberal feminists use the language and logic of the human rights framework to argue for increased concern for women’s needs, cultural and radical feminists “are convinced that a real inclusion of women in the human rights system requires a transformation of that [human rights] system” (Brem 1997: 138). Cultural feminists critique the human rights framework for not recognizing differences between men and women, and thus the need to revise the catalogue of human rights to include reproductive rights or sexual autonomy rights (Cook 1994). Cultural feminists also critique the public/private dichotomy taken for granted by the liberal human rights framework, arguing that this leads to discrimination against women since many of their concerns are considered to belong to the private sphere. Radical feminists reject theories of equality and difference between men and women as being based on a male yardstick (Brem 1997: 139). Radical feminists critique human rights law especially as perpetuating male dominance (MacKinnon 1989). However, the liberal feminist organizations were able to, through the women’s conferences and the upcoming population and development conferences, overcome the opposition of radical critiques and steer the efforts of the movement in the direction of the human rights framework.

In July 1984, just prior to the Population and Development conference in Mexico City, a large number of women’s health activists attended the first global conference held by the International Campaign on Abortion, Sterilization, and Contraception (ICASC) in Amsterdam (Correa and Reichmann 1994: 61). This conference is often cited as the founding event of the global reproductive health and rights movement; it brought together individuals representing different views from around the world, with the one common theme being condemnation of abusive population control measures and anti-abortion
forces (Eager 2004: 107). It was also at this conference that ICASC officially changed its name to the Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights (WGNRR); many women’s activists from the global South believed that the explicit reference to reproductive rights would more accurately represent their broader health and rights agenda. The Women’s Network links developing country activists with activists in the developed world in order to foster transnational activism on the issue of reproductive health and rights (Dixon-Mueller and Germain 1994). The WGNRR was especially critical of the population control establishment promoted by the global North; women in the developing world also blamed the international donor agencies for disregarding women’s health in general.

4.3 UN Population and Development Conference, Mexico City, 1984

The reversal of U.S. delegation on population policy, due to Reagan and Christian Right, spurred strengthening of the family planning movement (by taking away government funding and forcing them to rely on more private donors and non-profit aid) and laid the foundation for the adoption of the reproductive rights framework by mainstream population programs (by shifting the power from the U.S., effectively challenging the dominant demographic point of view, and giving feminists and neo-Malthusian population experts an incentive to work together.

The Population Commission of the UN recommended preparation for a second intergovernmental population conference by 1981; for the first time, ECOSOC requested that the Executive Director of UNFPA serve as the secretary-general of the conference, with the director of the Population Division to serve as deputy secretary-general. This
request reflects the growing importance of the UNFPA as a source of funding and advocacy for population programs. The Population Division continued to serve as the research arm, responsible for the substantive issues and the draft of the Program of Action (Interview with Joseph Chamie, 2006). In August 1984, 147 country delegations met at Mexico City, where 137 met at Bucharest (Johnson 1987:282). More than one thousand official participants attended, and women headed 22 country delegations. 154 NGOs also attended the conference; sixteen of these NGOs were able to address the plenary sessions and distributed their position and background papers to official delegates (Eager 2004: 104).

The international political climate toward population programs had changed substantially since Bucharest; as discussed previously, developing countries in 1974 had viewed offers of population assistance with suspicion. By 1983, however, two-thirds of all countries indicated that they had formulated an explicit policy with respect to population growth (Johnson 1987:225), including many of the strongest objectors to such policies at Bucharest. In the decade since Bucharest, the annual rate of world population growth had declined from 2 percent to 1.7 percent. In addition to population programs and assistance administered by the UNFPA and the Population Division, the World Bank, under Robert McNamara, became heavily involved in financing population and health projects in developing countries with the explicit goal of improving family planning services (Eager 2004: 101). The developing countries’ acceptance of the importance of reducing population growth through family planning programs can be seen as the success of developed countries and international agencies in socializing these countries into the norm through education and funding (Eager 2004).
The U.S. position at Mexico City surprised developed and developing countries alike, given the U.S.’s decades of financial and research support for population programs. After advocating population programs and control so strongly for so long, to the point where developing countries had nearly universally started supporting the need for reducing population growth in order to develop, the U.S. delegation to Mexico City retracted its position; the first statement by conservative former Senator James Buckley to the Mexico conference was his view that “First and foremost, population growth is, of itself, neither good nor bad. It becomes an asset or a problem in conjunction with other factors such as economic policy, social constraints, and the ability to put additional men and women to useful work” (Singh 1998: 16). In addition, Buckley stated that the U.S. would not allow its financial assistance for population activities to finance or support abortion. This became termed the “Mexico City policy,” and consisted of three parts: U.S. funds would be placed into segregated accounts for those countries that supported abortion with other funds; the U.S. government would no longer contribute to NGOs that performed or actively promoted abortion as a method of family planning in other countries; and the U.S. government would not contribute to the UNFPA unless the UNFPA first proved that it did not engage in, provide funding for, or in any way support abortion or coercive family planning programs (Singh 1998). The reversal of the U.S. position generated a great deal of press coverage for the Mexico Conference, and consternation among developed countries and developing countries, as well as NGOs and UN agencies that promoted family planning programs with abortion services.

Many scholars have attributed the U.S.’s reversal to the Reagan administration’s conservative electoral base, specifically the New Right coalition, which included the
Catholic Church, Protestant evangelicals, and right-to-life advocates. Some changes were made to domestic policy, but not nearly enough for the Christian Right; as a result, one could analyze the appointment of conservative former Senator James Buckley as the head of the U.S. delegation to Mexico City as a concession to the Christian Right by the Reagan administration (Finkle and McIntosh 1995). Anti-abortion advocates did not put many resources toward international policy on abortion at this time; one might infer that the intended effect of this reversal in U.S. funding for family planning was meant to send a signal domestically concerning the Reagan administration’s loyalties. In fact, some experts believe that the Mexico City Policy was meant to influence the Republican National Convention, which was being held a week after the conclusion of the Mexico City Conference (Eager 2004: 105).

Despite the U.S. reversal of policy on population, the conference continued and adopted by consensus a Declaration on Population and Development as well as Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action. The Mexico City Plan of Action continued and strengthened the trend from the Bucharest conference of emphasizing the empowerment of women; in particular, the conference document stressed the importance of enabling women to control their own fertility, as that ability formed the basis for the enjoyment of other rights (Johnson 1995). The Mexico City Declaration also stated “Improving the status of women and enhancing their role is an important goal in itself, and will also influence family life and size in a positive way,” contributing to development (1984, Paragraphs 11 and 12). Dr. Nafis Sadik, then Assistant Executive Director of UNFPA, and several other women from developing countries formed an ad hoc Women’s Caucus at Mexico; this caucus
succeeded in establishing a separate chapter devoted to women’s rights, covering such diverse issues as legal, economic and social equality, access to education and family planning, and the delaying of marriage (Singh 1998: 20).

The declaration reaffirmed and in some cases furthered the main principles adopted at Bucharest: in ensuring the right of couples and individuals to family planning information and services, the Mexico City document emphasized community-based distribution of services and the innovative role of NGOs, in particular women’s organizations in improving the availability and effectiveness of family planning services (UN 1984: Recommendation 28). In addition, the document recommends “suitable family planning information and services should be made available to adolescents within the changing socio-cultural framework of each country,” (Recommendation 29). The issue of abortion came up for discussion at Mexico City, and the document recommended governments “to take appropriate steps to help women avoid abortion, which in no case should be promoted as a method of family planning, and whenever possible provide for the humane treatment and counseling of women who have had recourse to abortion” (Recommendation 18(e)). This final consensus on the issue of abortion was close to the position taken by the Holy See, but its representative did not join the consensus on the grounds that the document had also agreed to support family planning services for adolescents and that insufficient attention had been paid to the concept of the family (Tabah 1984).

The reversal of the U.S. stance on population policy had a significant impact on the abortion-rights movement. First, several of the NGOs that most strongly supported access to abortion and family planning services for adolescents, namely IPPF, were
denied U.S. funding as a result of refusal to comply with the strict anti-abortion policy (Green 1993: 315). In 1985, the U.S. withheld $10 million of the $46 million pledged to the UNFPA because it alleged that the UNFPA was involved in China’s population program, which it declared to be coercive. In 1986, the U.S. withheld $25 million for the same reason.

Second, the reasoning behind the U.S. reversal on population policy definitively challenged the neo-Malthusian population control movement, which continued to advocate reduction of population growth rates in order to sustain the ecological balance of the planet. New Right economists were influenced by the book The Resourceful Earth, and challenged the idea that there were limits to growth, or the “carrying capacity of the earth” philosophy (Hartmann 1995). The “conservative Cornucopians” believed that neoliberal economic policy would best solve the issue of population growth: that free market enterprise, the potential of technology, and sheer human ingenuity could alleviate the ecological demands placed on the earth by a growing population (Hartmann 1995: 35). Hartmann claims that the conservative cornucopians, who were likely to hold anti-abortion views, were able to sway the Reagan White House, whereas women’s groups and NGOs concerned about population control, reproductive rights and health were not able to do so. However, Hartmann also believed that “the Cornucopians performed a great service, by opening up the population debate. After two decades of hegemony, the Malthusian orthodoxy was forced to go on the defensive and cede some ground in order to save the church” (Hartmann 1995: 36). As a result, the crisis mentality and “population time bomb” metaphor began to lose its influence, and other critiques of population programs, including feminist ones, came to the fore (Hodgson and Watkins 1996).
Third, feminists argue that the Mexico City Policy ended up stimulating the global women’s health and rights movement and demographers. It shifted the locus of power in the population field away from the U.S. (Higer 1999), and allowed other developed countries as well as the private sector to help keep family planning programs functioning in developing countries, both through voluntary and for-profit agencies. As a result of being cut off from government-initiated or subsidized family planning services, the women’s movement was forced to become more densely networked and increasingly professionalized, in order to help keep many family planning clinics in developing countries running without U.S. government support. For demographers who sought to preserve family planning programs, the Mexico City Policy “created an incentive to invoke alternative justifications for family planning assistance,” such as improving women’s health (Higer 1999: 128). The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the most influential donor in the population field at this time, began to emphasize how family planning programs helped improve maternal and child health (Higer 1999).

Also, the Mexico City Policy created a strong incentive for cooperation between two groups that wanted to ensure continued provision of family planning services: U.S. feminists and neo-Malthusian population planners, or demographers. Although the alliance between feminists and demographers was not strong, there was enough dialogue between the two movements that cooperative enterprises were begun (Hodgson and Watkins 1997). The Population Crisis Committee gave International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC) a grant to promote menstrual regulation and early-term abortion in developing countries. The International Women’s Health Coalition was a mediator
between the two movements and encouraged a balance between the concerns of population control and women’s health (Hartmann 1995).

4.4 UN Global Conferences of the 1990s

Through the global conferences of the UN Women’s Decade, feminists and especially women’s reproductive health and rights activists were able to gain experience in advocacy at the UN level, and become established and organized in their networks. Most importantly, women’s organizations were able to frame women’s concerns, including access to family planning, as central to development. They were also able to put women’s equality and rights on the UN agenda as important in and of themselves. However, several scholars and activists note that at the beginning of the 1990s, many politically active women, especially those involved in feminist groups, felt that men rather than women were controlling the population debate. Men were determining population policies, working out family planning targets and quotas, devising rewards and penalties for good or bad performance. This did not fit feminists’ perception of population issues as being mainly affected by the decisions of women, and thus needing to be controlled by women. In addition, feminists were growing cynical concerning the rhetoric of women’s rights to family planning; they increasingly believed that other rights were just as, if not more, important than family planning, such as the right to health, education, and jobs (Johnson 1995: 131). The UN global conferences on the environment and human rights became key opportunities for cooperation and alliance for the global women’s health and rights movement; the Vienna conference on Human Rights was especially important because the human rights frame for reproductive health and rights helped the concept become established at the UN.
4.4.1 UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio, 1992

Rio was the first occasion for women’s groups such as WEDO to exercise its influence as a reformist organization that aimed to influence the UN specifically. UNCED also demonstrated the split between women’s groups and environment groups; although there was a strong incentive for an alliance and overlapping interests, the difference in the reasons why they both advocated access to family planning programs ultimately became a problem.

Feminists formed several new organizations to bridge the gap between women, population and the environment; two different organizations demonstrate the split between the radical and the mainstream factions of the feminist movement. The Committee on Women, Population and the Environment (CWPE), created in the late 1980s, holds a radical position on population policy, calling for a reconfiguration of the international policy agenda to reduce consumption rates in developed countries and redistribute wealth between and within countries. CWPE rejects the argument that population growth is a primary cause of environmental degradation and instead emphasizes the many related causes of environmental problems (Higer 1999: 130). CWPE does not try to engage the UN directly, or orient its activities around UN conferences.

A second group, the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), was created by Bella Abzug in 1990. WEDO had a very similar agenda to CWPE, but it approached that agenda with an insider, reformist perspective, organizing in order to better influence the UN conference process; it created an international network of women’s activists that could then pressure governments to adopt policies that advance women’s interests (Higer 1999: 130).
Prior to the 1992 UNCED meeting in Rio, WEDO helped organize the World Women’s Congress in Miami, Florida in November 1991, which brought together more than 1,500 women from 83 countries to work together on a strategy for UNCED (WEDO 2007). The Congress adopted a Declaration for a Healthy Planet that included broad understandings of the empowerment of women: recognizing women’s role as managers and conservers of natural resources, providing equality for women in political participation and international representation, ensuring access to agricultural credit and loans, and allocating development aid and funding to women’s projects. This broader understanding of the empowerment of women was not successful at Rio, where radical and reformist feminists struggled over how best to frame their advocacy, especially in response to demographers and environmental activists joining forces on a more Malthusian vision of family planning. The difficulties that the feminist groups encountered at UNCED began before the conference and continued throughout.

Although the environmental movement and the women’s reproductive rights movement had many of the same concerns, many tensions existed between the two movements, never more pronounced than at Rio. By this point in the environmental debate, most countries as well as the UN accepted that population was an important factor affecting the environment and development (Cohen 1993: 61). However, some environmental groups leaned in a neo-Malthusian direction, believing that due to the dire ecological situation, world population growth had to decrease (Cohen 1993); some of these environmental groups made strong calls for zero or negative population growth. Their point of view was represented at the first plenary session by the UNCED Secretary-General Maurice Strong, who said, “We are the most successful species ever, but now
we’re a species out of control” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin June 3, 1992). He went on to say that the world’s population had grown by 1.7 billion since 1972, and that 1.5 billion of those live in developing countries that cannot support them; he emphasized that this growth cannot continue, for “if we don’t control it, nature will” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin June 3, 1992). Again, although environmentalists supported the provision of family planning services for women, they supported it for very different reasons than feminists. Feminists were concerned that as long high fertility rates were considered a significant cause of environmental pollution, women would be held responsible for environmental degradation. Adrienne Germain of the International Women’s Health Coalition recalled that coming out of Rio, many held the misperception that women are against family planning. “Coming out of the Earth Summit, there was a lot of concern expressed by women regarding the downside of how population programs had so far been implemented, but it was not a statement against population or contraception” (Eager 2004: 120).

The nineties changed the neo-Malthusian demographic community as well; lacking the security impetus of preventing the spread of communism in developing countries, population programs were not getting as much money from foundations or support from the executive and congressional branches in the United States. Thus, in the post-Cold War world, neo-Malthusian arguments for population control in the global South took on a much more humanitarian tone (Eager 2004: 119). Instead of focusing on the population growth rates in the South as depleting world-wide resources and resulting in poverty, disease, and social unrest, demographers began to argue that population control would help the global South. Lowered fertility rates would enhance rates of
economic growth, reduce emigration pressures on the North, and increase the possibilities of trade between the North and the South (Hodgson and Watkins 1997: 496). Thus, we see that in this time period demographers adjusted to the change in the political situation by changing their rationale for population policy from one that emphasized the harm to the world at large of controlled population growth in the developing world, to a softer and more humanitarian argument that emphasized the benefits to the South of lower population growth rates. The demographic community also sought new allies, and found a natural one in the environmental movement.

The relations between the demographic community, the environmental movement, and the population movement were not always adversarial. There were some groups that included elements of both sides, including the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), and Campaign on Population and the Environment (COPE), a joint effort by the Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the Planned Parenthood Federation of America and several other groups to educate public awareness of the links between population growth, environmental degradation, and the resulting human suffering (Hartmann 1995: 146).

The Rio conference in 1992 signified some serious rifts between the environmental movement and the global women’s health and rights movement as a result of the two different rationales the groups brought to family planning programs. However, after failing to significantly affect the Rio document for the cause of women’s reproductive health and rights, feminist groups determined to find a way to organize themselves and build up other alliances in order to make a more decided impact on future conferences. It took considerable effort on the part of the Clinton administration to bridge...
the divide between the environmental movement and the global women’s health and rights movement prior to Cairo (Eager 2004).

4.4.2 Human Rights Conference, Vienna, 1993

At the UN Human Rights conference in Vienna, feminists built an alliance with the human rights community and used the language of human rights to build support for a General Assembly Resolution on the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women (UN 1993), and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women. Women’s global health and rights organizations followed up on the new alliance and framing of the larger feminist community with the human rights community by beginning to use the language of human rights to combat both population control and anti-abortion groups as they prepared for the Cairo conference.

The UN World Conference on Human Rights was the first intergovernmental meeting held on human rights since the 1968 Tehran conference; at that time women’s activists made an effort to separate human rights from women’s rights, fearful that women’s issues would be marginalized if the two were considered together (Joachim 1999). In fact, when the UN Human Rights Commission was being created in 1946, women’s activists lobbied for a separate Commission on the Status of Women, with the Commission on Human Rights located in Geneva and the Commission on the Status of Women located in New York (Pfeffer 1985: 468). However, at the UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna, feminists made a concerted effort to use media, a global tribunal providing personal testimonies, and technical arguments in order to link women’s rights with human rights (Joachim 2003). I will discuss briefly why women’s groups began to work with the human rights community and use the human rights framework after using
development and critical approaches for so long, and how women’s reproductive health and rights activists used the human rights frame to further their advocacy.

Women’s rights activists and scholars offer many reasons as to why women began to use the human rights framework at this time rather than some other frame, involving the political climate, current events, and the opportunities afforded by the human rights framework at UN global conferences (Eager 2004). A key reason involves understanding the opening of the political climate at this time; the end of the Cold War brought with it an easing of tension between communist and democratic countries concerning the issue of human rights, which many communist countries were unwilling to concede as being universal, the enforcement of which should transcend sovereign borders. However, after the Cold War, there was a sense of optimism concerning the ability of the UN to encourage cooperation among states on a number of global problems (Bunch 1995). In particular, “security within the UN was redefined: in contrast to the security of the state, the well-being and rights of individuals were increasingly emphasized, a frame that was more commensurable with that of women’s rights” (Joachim 2003: 260).

As the conferences of the 1990s got underway, the human rights frame became increasingly important as one of the few frames that drew support from most states. Countries still disagreed on whether human rights should include or be superceded by social and economic rights, reflecting the continuing division between the global North and South, or whether human rights should be tempered by cultural relativism, another argument put forth especially by Asian countries from the South; however, the importance of human rights and whether states were obligated to protect them was increasingly accepted. Activists of that time period also cite the vividness with which
human rights violations came to the fore due to current events as one of the key reasons that the human rights framework became so powerful. Ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda demonstrated not only the responsibility of the international community to protect human rights, but the gendered nature of human rights violations (Joachim 2003).

Another reason that feminists took up the human rights frame was the opportunity it provided to mobilize and gain leverage internationally because human rights were seen to be universal, appealing to the most basic understanding of who a human being is and what they are inherently entitled to. Women’s rights activist Lori Heise explains “The human rights framework speaks to all people, cultures, and religions . . . and beyond these divisions there is a common understanding what is fundamental for the dignity of people and the person” (Joachim 2003: 259). The human rights frame was also perceived to have strategic advantages: “it helped to gain access to institutional resources and win allies because human rights was an already accepted framework (Mary Carrillo in Joachim 2003: 259).

As a result, women’s rights activists began to frame women’s rights as a central component of human rights. They began to pressure human rights NGOs to include information concerning women’s rights violations, and to prepare to participate in the Vienna Conference. Friedman argues that before 1989, major human rights groups did not pay specific attention to women’s human rights (1995). Only in the late 1980s did Amnesty International start to work on women’s human rights when it was brought to their attention that women were systematically underrepresented in their research. In 1989, Amnesty International’s highest executive body passed a resolution stating that the
organization would increase its efforts to protect women’s human rights at every level of its work (Friedman 1995: 26). Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch established Women’s Human Rights Programs in the early 1990s following the pressure exerted by women’s groups (Roth 1994); both these groups investigated and reported on women’s human rights violations. Their reports “enhanced the issue’s legitimacy among states because these organizations were known for credible and reliable information” (Joachim 2003: 259).

Women’s activists participated in the process of the Vienna Conference by using a variety of tactics. They engaged in symbolic actions such as vigils and tribunals throughout the world, linking November 15th, the day commemorating victims of gender violence, with December 10th, the Human Rights Day (Center for Women’s Global Leadership 1993: 39). They also produced articles and technical knowledge to support their advocacy, a tactic that women’s health and rights activists would use effectively in Cairo: “Charlotte Bunch published an article entitled ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights’ in the prestigious journal *Human Rights Quarterly* in 1990, providing a scientifically grounded explanation for why women’s rights were human rights” (Joachim 2003: 258). During the conference, activists demanded that women’s human rights concerns be included at Vienna, and they succeeded in making the rallying slogan for the conference “Women’s rights are human rights” (Bunch and Reilly 1994: 10).

In addition to these explanations from the literature and activists involved, I would argue that the human rights frame is one that fits well with the liberal philosophical framework that is the basis of the UN. This framework, including the norms of rational organization and scientific basis for progress, worked extremely well
for the neo-Malthusian demographic community before it, which lacked only the emphasis on individual human rights. It was difficult to achieve consensus on that emphasis, as mentioned previously, because of the tension between communist and democratic countries within the UN. In the 1990s, however, the emphasis on individual human rights became a key focusing element for the global conferences, and the most accepted framework for making claims in the international sphere. The fact that all members of the UN were also signatories to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights gave them legal precedent and claim as well. As a result, the human rights framework became a rallying point for many organizations within the feminist movement, although as I have discussed before, not without controversy.

The fact that most governments at least nominally accepted political demands framed in the human rights framework helped it gain legitimacy among social movements such as the women’s movement that had previously viewed the human rights framework with suspicion. In addition, the many resources behind mainstream human rights groups and the established credibility of human rights law formed key resources to advance women’s rights. “Therefore the global women’s health and rights movement strategically utilized deepening connections with the organized and professional human rights community. The utilization of a human rights framework was crucial for gaining international acceptance of the reproductive rights argument” (Eager 2004: 116).

The global women’s health and rights movement framed reproductive health and rights as an international human rights norm; they then framed coercive population control programs as unjust and intolerable in that they abused women’s human rights. Since human rights were by this time accepted by more and more states, framing
reproductive rights as human rights “gave women working within their domestic social movements a language to lodge oppositional claims against their governments, public agencies, and even other individuals” (Eager 2004: 114).

4.5 Conclusion
The women’s health and rights movement gained considerable experience and acumen concerning the UN system, and especially the process by which one may influence the UN global conferences, through the three Women’s Conferences that marked the Women’s Decade. In this time, activists for women’s reproductive health and rights formed key NGOs and umbrella organizations for NGOs in different regions that focused their efforts on advocacy in the international sphere, but especially at the UN. This shift in scale reflects the importance of international forums such as the UN for developing norms, and especially the increasing perception of the UN global conferences as key avenues for influencing the international, and over time the national, policies concerning family planning. Feminists were also able to gain an understanding of the lobbying process by which NGOs influenced the country delegations at the global conferences, and form relationships with delegates that have stood them in good stead for many conferences. In the early 90s, women’s health and rights groups made important alliances with environmental and human rights organizations that gave them leverage in terms of numbers and connections with other issues deemed important by a majority of governments. Coalition building with other issue areas was important for these women’s organizations because the environment as an issue area was on the urgent list for many countries, and so connecting it with population issues helped widen their appeal. In addition, the alliance with human rights organizations helped connect reproductive health
and rights to one of the few issues that most countries supported, and that was also intimately connected to the UN charter. This helped change the frame with which feminists pitched their arguments about reproductive health, proposing it as a human right that all women were entitled to.

During this time period, organizations against abortion were also active, but much more locally focused. As evidenced in the 1984 Mexico City Population and Development conference, the Christian Right organizations that sought to influence the national executive they helped bring to power, Ronald Reagan, ended up indirectly influencing international policy when the U.S. instituted the Mexico City policy, taking away U.S. funding for any international programs that supported or performed abortions. However, the Christian Right was not aiming to influence international policy, but rather national policy; thus they had not yet shifted their scale to the international level. The Vatican, which had been operating at the UN since the start of these global conferences, was not instrumental in influencing the U.S. delegation to take its stand against abortion or the neutrality of population growth to economic development. Although the Mexico City policy was a setback for women’s health and rights groups, it was not an action undertaken by the still nascent anti-abortion network.
5 The Influence of the Women’s Health and Rights Movement: The Cairo Conference

5.1 Background
In 1989, ECOSOC designated a third governmental conference on population (UN ECOSOC Resolution 1989/91). The purposes of this conference, to be held in 1994, included assessing the progress made in the last decade on population issues; continuing work on the implementation of prior international agreements; strengthening international awareness of population issues and their linkage to development; making new recommendations for the treatment of population issues in the context of development; and mobilizing the required resources, especially for the developing world, to carry out such recommendations (UN ECOSOC Resolution 1991/93). The meetings held prior to the conference included six expert meetings, several roundtables, three Preparatory Committee meetings (PrepComs), and five regional meetings.

Prior conference history
The controversy sparked by the U.S. position against abortion at the 1984 conference caused the planners of the 1994 Cairo conference to arrange for approximately 35 preparatory meetings on intergovernmental and intraregional levels, to ensure that controversial issues would be aired and resolved before delegates voted final approval on the draft Program of Action in Cairo. Although consensus was achieved on most of the document, several issues caused conflict that needed to be negotiated at the conference itself.

Political background
One of the key political changes that affected the Cairo conference was the end of the Cold War; the collapse of the Soviet Union removed a source of tension that the conference organizers had feared, and replaced it with a willingness to cooperate between members of the former Soviet bloc. The end of the Cold War also meant a change in status for the U.S.; all its economic and diplomatic efforts against the Communist regime were now seen as unnecessary by a government and population that saw greater needs domestically.

Several other potential sources of tension were allayed by political events and circumstances: the conflict over occupied territories that had disrupted the Mexico City conference was allayed when Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed a peace agreement before the Cairo conference. The Group of 77 (G77), which had exerted such influence on behalf of developing countries in the Bucharest conference of 1975, had exerted less influence in Mexico City and did not contribute much of a presence in Cairo; the group itself was no longer a cohesive whole (Finkle and Crane 1985). The developing countries had become much more divided along economic and demographic lines, and they could no longer speak with one voice.

5.2 The International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 1994

Preparation for the Conference

*Expert Meetings*

Six expert meetings were held in preparation for the ICPD, corresponding to the six groups of issues identified by ECOSOC as those requiring the greatest attention during the coming decade: the first meeting, on population, environment and development, was held at UN headquarters from January 20-24 1992; the second, on population policies and
programs, was hosted by the government of Egypt in Cairo from April 12-16, 1992; the third, on population and women, was hosted by the government of Botswana in Gaborone, from June 22-26, 1992; the fourth on family planning, health and family well-being, was hosted by the government of India in Bangalore from October 26-29, 1992. The fifth, on population growth and demographic structure, was hosted by the government of France in Paris from November 16-20, 1992; the sixth, on population distribution and migration, was hosted by the government of Bolivia in Santa Cruz from January 18-23, 1993.

Each expert group meeting included 15 experts along with representatives of relevant bodies and organizations of the United Nations system and selected intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Efforts were made to have a full range of relevant scientific disciplines and geographical regions represented. Each meeting had the benefit of a substantive background paper prepared by the Population Division, technical papers prepared by each of the experts and technical contributions provided by the participating UN and non-governmental organizations. Each meeting concluded by adopting a set of recommendations, to be submitted to the Preparatory Committee of the conference at its second session in May 1993. A total of 162 recommendations were submitted (Johnson 1995).

Regional Meetings

ECOSOC resolution 1991/93 called for regional conferences in preparation for the ICPD in Cairo, to be held in 1992 and 1993. The regional conferences in addition to the preparatory conferences were meant to allow as much discussion as possible of the
controversial issues that the ICPD would be concerned with, and encourage consensus building at these more local levels and on smaller scales, so that the Program of Action in Cairo would have a minimum amount of bracketed or controversial language still to be negotiated. These regional conferences varied on how strongly they advocated family planning services or how strongly they recognized the need to reduce population growth rates. The terms “reproductive health and rights” appears infrequently, and references to abortion as a need or issue is almost non-existent. The contribution of most of the regional conferences was the setting of numerical targets for fertility rates, maternal and infant mortality, and the prevalence of contraception.

**Bali Declaration** The first regional conference was held in Denpasar, Indonesia, from August 19-27th, 1992, and called the Fourth Asian and Pacific Population Conference. The conclusions of that conference are found in the Bali Declaration on Population and Sustainable Development. One of the key statements in the declaration recognized that the average fertility in the Asia and Pacific region was 3.1 per woman; however, this did not reflect the substantial differences between and within sub-regions of Asia and the Pacific. For instance, East Asia had the lowest fertility in the region at that time, at 2.1 per woman; South Asia had the highest fertility at 4.3 per woman. There was a similar disparity when comparing infant mortality rates within sub-regions: infant mortality in South Asia was 90 per 1000 births, more than three times the level of infant mortality in East Asia, where it was 26 per 1000 births. The Bali Declaration set several ambitious goals in the area of population for Asia and the Pacific: to attain replacement level fertility (2.2 children per woman) by the year 2010, to reduce the level of infant mortality
to 40 per 1000 births, and where maternal mortality was high, of reducing it at least by half by the year 2010.

_Dakar/Ngor Declaration_ The second regional conference was held in Dakar from December 7-12\textsuperscript{th}, 1992, and called the Third African Population Conference. The Dakar/Ngor Declaration on Population, Family and Sustainable Development included commitments by participating governments to integrate population policies in development strategies; to work toward resolving population problems by setting quantified national objectives for reduction of population growth from 3\% to 2.5\% by 2000 and 2\% by 2010; and to ensure the availability and promotion of all tested available contraceptive and fertility regulation methods, including traditional and natural family planning methods, in order to double the regional contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) from 10\% to 20\% by 2000, and 40\% by 2010 (Dakar/Ngor Declaration paragraph 1,3). Broader goals on were detailed in the section on Fertility and the Family, including such key ones as setting fertility and family planning targets for all people of reproductive age, implementing legal measures to improve the status of women and their reproductive health, and strengthening information, education and communication in maternal and child health programs and family planning programs.

_Arab Population Conference_ The third regional conference was held in Amman, Jordan, from April 4-8\textsuperscript{th}, 1994. The Arab delegates did not adopt a declaration that mandated the need to lower population growth rates in the region as a whole. However, one of the goals they set was to provide the services needed to attain national policy goals concerning population growth rates. The need for providing family planning services and maternal
and child health care was limited to those countries “wishing to reduce their population
growth rates” (E/CONF.84/PC.16, para.19).

Latin American and Caribbean Consensus  The fourth regional conference was held in
Mexico City from April 29- May 4th, 1993. The conference adopted the Latin American
and Caribbean Consensus, which viewed the issue of population through the broader
perspective of the search for equity. The Latin American Demographic Centre presented
an analysis to the delegates that argued that family planning services were important in
that they presented an opportunity for greater equity within Latin American societies,
rather than perpetuating the old saying of “the rich get richer while the poor get children.”
Latin American countries were also interested in equity between nations. The external
debt of this area accounted for almost a quarter of all Third World debt, a
disproportionate share; the Consensus argued that servicing this debt placed an unduly
heavy burden on Latin American and Caribbean countries that prevents resources being
allocated for development and social programs aimed at such services as family planning.
The Consensus recognized that the pronounced decline in fertility from 6 to 3.5 children
per woman was an important demographic change in the region, and although it further
recognized the need to reduce discrimination against women and high morbidity and
mortality rates associated with childbirth, there were no targets set as a region for
population growth rates.

As a Latin American and Caribbean intergovernmental conference, the issue of
abortion was not addressed as directly as at other conferences. However, Jyoti Singh, as
the Executive Coordinator for ICPD, mentioned the topic directly in his opening speech
at the conference (Johnson 1995:36). The UNFPA had conducted research in the region
and circulated a paper stating that abortion in the region was “pervasive and carried out in vast numbers” (UNFPA paper 1993 – “Experiences in Population in Latin America and the Caribbean: Historical Perspective and Current Challenges”). This resulted in a paragraph reference in the Consensus, accepting that abortion is a major public health issue in the region, and while none of the countries accept abortion as a method of regulating fertility, “it is recommended that governments devote greater attention to the study and follow-up of this issue, with a view to evaluating how prevalent abortion really is and its impact on the health of women and their families…”

*European Conference* The fifth regional conference was held in Geneva, from March 23-26th, 1993, and included the major donor countries of Europe and North America. The focus at this conference was to make a strong case for increased international cooperation in the population field. While developing countries were held to have primary responsibility for their own social and economic development, the 51st recommendation of the document emerging from this conference stressed the need for developed countries to create a favorable environment for increased economic development, and to increase the quantity and quality of their assistance, especially in the area of population issues. Another major area of focus at this conference was the need to provide family planning services to fulfill the growing unmet demand in developing countries for these services; as a result, population growth rates would naturally decline to a more sustainable rate. Along this vein, the influence of the Rio Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) was felt in the recommendations that urged awareness of the close relationship between poverty, population growth and environmental degradation. Developed countries’ patterns of disproportionate production and consumption were also implicated
in the deterioration of the environment; however, nothing concrete was recommended to change those patterns.

**Preparatory Conferences**

*ICPD PrepCom II*

The second PrepCom was noticeable for the strong leadership of the UN conference staff and influential countries such as the U.S. on population issues, especially women’s rights and abortion. The Secretary General spoke up on several key issues, including targets for the total human population, infant and maternal mortality, abortion, and contraceptive prevalence. The U.S. delegation also made a strong stand for family planning and choice in the matter of abortion, in stark contrast to the U.S. position in Mexico City. The Vatican reiterated its position against abortion, but did not make much of an impact.

The second PrepCom began on May 14th, 1993, and in her opening speech, the ICPD’s Secretary General Dr. Nafis Sadik, asked delegates to consider setting quantifiable goals for their countries in such areas as maternal mortality, infant mortality, life expectancy, education especially for women and girls, gender equality and availability of and access to a full range of modern, safe and effective family planning services “to enable the exercise of choice.” In the area of total population size, Dr. Sadik set an ambitious goal for the conference. The Population Division projected three different estimates of the total human population in 2015, based on different assumptions about fertility: a high of 7.92 billion, a medium of 7.61 billion, and a low of 7.27 billion. The difference between the high and the low projections was 660 million people.
Although the initial goal was meant to be the medium projection of 7.61, Dr. Sadik circulated a paper to delegates with goals for 2015 in which she articulated her belief that the low population projection could be reached by 2015 if family planning information and services were provided to all couples and individuals who currently desired them, and if policies were formulated and implemented to empower women to participate fully in socio-economic development. She then urged the conference as a whole to set the goal of attaining the low population projection of 7.27 billion by 2015 (Johnson 1995: 40).

Other specific targets were also proposed by Dr. Sadik, again clearly setting the bar for infant mortality, maternal mortality, life-expectancy and contraceptive prevalence by suggesting that these rates in the developing world be reduced to developed levels by the year 2015. For infant mortality and maternal mortality, these goals were quite ambitious: infant mortality in developing countries from the period 1990-95 was 62/1000 births, while it was 12/1000 in developed countries. Maternal mortality in developing countries was 450/100,000 live births at the time, while it was 30/100,000 in developed countries. Dr. Sadik also exerted her influence briefly but clearly for the issue of abortion, saying that the conference should address it as a health issue rather than a means of family planning, but that they must address it.

The head of the U.S. delegation, former U.S. senator Timothy Wirth, declared the changes in U.S. policy since the change in administrations, and although the former senator’s area of expertise was the environment, the three major concerns mentioned for the U.S. were first, women’s health and status; second, population and the environment; and third migration. In connection to the contested issue of abortion, Wirth stated unequivocally that the U.S. “supported reproductive choice, including access to safe
abortion” (Johnson 1995:43). This generated a round of applause from the audience
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 2 June 1993).

Archbishop Renato Martino, speaking for the Holy See, addressed the issue of abortion also, stating that the Catholic Church views the right to voluntary abortion as violating the most fundamental right of any human being – to life (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, June 2 1993). Although the Catholic Church did not support procreation at any cost, it opposed “demographic policies and family planning that are contrary to the liberty, dignity and conscience of the human being” (Johnson 1995:44). The PrepCom’s Chairman, Dr. Fred Sai, countered the Archbishop’s statement by asking why the Vatican, which supported modern medicine, did not support modern contraceptives. This was followed by several delegations, including Sweden and the U.S., who continued the debate along the lines which Dr. Sai began, urging attention on the issue of abortion especially in a health context. Argentina, alone, expressed its opposition to any mention of abortion in the context of family planning. The “Chairman’s Summary on the Conceptual Framework” included a paragraph on abortion that clearly indicated a need to address abortion as a major public health issue given the number of women who died as a result of unsafe and illegal abortion. However, Dr. Sai also faithfully included the reactions of most delegations to the issue:

“While many delegations suggested that all women should have access to safe abortion, others suggested that the best way to eliminate abortions was provision of effective, modern contraception information and services; a few delegations reiterated that abortion should not be promoted as a method of family planning” (E/CONF.84/PC/L.9 of May 20th, 1993).

ICPD Third PrepCom

The third meeting of ICPD’s preparatory committee was held in April 1994. On January 24th, 1994, the Draft Programme of Action, put together by the ICPD Secretariat, was
circulated to the Preparatory Committee. While the third PrepCom was not bound by the text, this draft document was important as the most comprehensive look at the issues considered to be important in the field of population and development at the time, and what could possibly gain an international consensus based on the previous meetings of the Preparatory Committee.

One of the key issues the Draft tackled was that of population growth; prior to the Cairo draft, no official intergovernmental conference had had the objective of stabilizing the world’s population. The first objective proposed in the Cairo draft’s section on population growth was to achieve stabilization of the world population as soon as possible while respecting individual rights, aspirations and responsibilities. In addition, the draft program also made a clear connection between demographic pressures and problems of environmental degradation; thus another objective was to achieve and maintain a harmonious balance between population, resources, food, the environment, and development, especially by curbing unsustainable population growth.

In addition to population growth, the program of action proposed that the Cairo conference should adopt quantitative goals in three areas seen as integrally connected: education, especially for girls; infant, child, and maternal mortality; and the provision of universal access to family planning and reproductive health services. In this last area, the draft treated the controversial issue of abortion: all participants were urged to deal with unsafe abortion as a major health concern, especially as many of the maternal deaths the participants were concerned with preventing were due to unsafe abortions. The draft urged governments to reduce the need for abortion through expanded and improved family planning services, to “frame abortion laws and policies on the basis of a
commitment to women’s health and well-being rather than on criminal codes and punitive measures” (Paragraph 8.15). Although the language did not call for the right to universal access to abortion, the document did state that women should have access to safe abortion services in the case of rape and incest, and that women who wish to terminate their pregnancies should have ready access to reliable information, compassionate counseling and services for the management of unsafe abortions.

In addition, a basic definition of reproductive health was provided in chapter VII, paragraph 7.4:

Reproductive health care in the context of primary health care should include: family-planning information and services; education and services for prenatal, normal delivery and post-natal care; prevention and treatment of infertility; prevention and treatment of reproductive tract infections and sexually transmitted diseases; prevention and treatment of other reproductive health conditions; and information, education and counseling as appropriate on human sexuality, sexual and reproductive health and responsible parenthood.

Scholars have argued that two main themes were stressed in the Draft Program of Action: the need to integrate population and development issues, and the need to emphasize the “centrality of the individual,” frequently referred to by Dr. Nafis Sadik. The emphasis placed on individual rights and choices, particularly in gender issues, was an increasingly important feature of the Cairo process, and was serving to distinguish the preparations for Cairo, 1994 from the previous world population conferences (Johnson 1995:59). In an environment where precedent and consensus plays a major role in determining the acceptability of language, this draft contained 40 “new issues” and 22 “new specific actions” that had no precedent in the Bucharest or Mexico City documents (Johnson 1995). Most of these new issues dealt with gender issues.

Given the many new issues proposed in the draft program of action, the debate over it during the third PrepCom was mainly positive (Johnson 1995:63). Most countries
accepted the new objectives, and brackets were placed mainly on the extraction of resources for the programs, the achieving of universal primary education for all by the year 2015, and on the terms “reproductive and sexual health,” at the request of the Holy See. The Vatican’s position on the issue of abortion was not surprising, but how vigorously the Vatican defended its position at PrepCom III did surprise many. In a statement issued by the Vatican prior to PrepCom III, the main sticking points seemed to be the possibility of a governmental imposition of limits on family size, sterilization and abortion as methods of family planning, and the total lack of reference to marriage in the context of family planning. The Holy See exerted its influence among as many countries as possible to oppose the language on reproductive health and rights, which it perceived as code for the right to abortion. In this, it was joined by several countries, such as Costa Rica, Argentina, Malta, Venezuela, Morocco and Ecuador, who argued that they could not agree to any terms unless they were clearly defined to exclude abortion (Johnson 1995:69). A secondary issue was that of the phrase “couples and individuals” in the draft program’s recommendation concerning the right to decide the number and spacing of their children. The Vatican and several Catholic countries argued against directing family planning services and sex education at adolescents, while IPPF argued that unmet demand for family planning included adolescents. Although much was accomplished at PrepCom III, including what Jyoti Singh would call the “near universal public acceptance of the integral relationship between reproductive health and the empowerment of women,” the focus of the Vatican and a small number of other countries on abortion-related issues prevented consensus on the reproductive health approach coming out of PrepCom III (Singh 1998:54).
Cairo Conference

Islamic opposition

Opposition to the Cairo program of action was voiced by Islamic countries about two weeks prior the start of the conference. It began with a condemnation of the Program of Action by the Islamic institution at the heart of Egypt’s religious establishment, al-Azhar, for promoting sexual activity by teenagers, legitimizing abortion and protecting homosexual or extramarital sexual relationships. This was countered by the Grand Mufti, who rejected the criticism of al-Azhar theologians as based on a faulty translation of the program of action. Sheikh Mohamed Sayid Tantawi also stated that he found no encouragement for free sexual relations outside of matrimony, nor for abortion as a means of birth control. Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak also criticized al-Azhar for creating a furor over non-existent issues; he argued that the conference was essential for development, providing a proper standard of living for citizens, maintaining stability, and supporting investment. However, this did not stop al-Azhar from calling on all Muslim nations to rally against the conference. As a result, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Khaledi Zia decided not to attend the conference. This was a major blow for conference organizers because Bangladesh, as one of the most densely populated states in the world, had reduced its fertility rate drastically from seven children per woman in 1972 to 4.2 in 1994; the lowered birth rate, from 4% in 1974 to 2.1% in 1994, was attributed to national family planning programs. Thus, Prime Minister Zia, as a woman and a leader of a populous Muslim nation, was to be an influence both in words and in example, and her absence from the conference a serious loss.
At the end of August, Saudi Arabia also issued declarations against the conference, and warned that any Muslim attending would be guilty of violating Sharia. Saudi Arabia then decided not to attend the conference, and Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller also announced that she would be too busy to attend the conference. Sudan announced at the opening of the conference that it would not attend. Pakistan announced that it considered the program a challenge from the West and planned on attending to counter it. One moderate influence came from Iran, which announced that it would attend the conference and hoped to incorporate its religious ethics into the final document. Iran had reduced its own population growth rate drastically with the use of a family planning program, supporting every method of contraception except for abortion.

The media reported extensively on the declarations of Muslim nations, as well as on efforts by the Vatican to reach out to Muslim countries for support against abortion rights or greater sexual freedom at the Cairo conference. The Holy See acknowledged a meeting between the Papal Envoy in Tehran and Iranian officials on the subject of the Cairo Conference, but Iran attended the conference with an critical but essentially pro-family planning perspective. Egypt as a moderate Muslim country was able to do much that other hosts might not have been able to do. Invested as it was in the conference’s success, the Egyptian government did all it could to reassure the Vatican, and was able to mobilize moderate Muslim countries to support the conference and prevent the withdrawal of many Muslim countries. In the end, only Libya and Sudan publicly boycotted the conference; Saudi Arabia and Lebanon simply informed the Conference Secretariat that they were not attending at the last minute. The final count of attendance at Cairo was 179 countries – successful by any standard.
In the U.S., several Catholic organizations mounted a campaign against the U.S. stand on abortion, most probably in response to a cable sent by the U.S. Department of State to its diplomatic and consular posts on March 16, 1994; the cable read in part: “the United States believes that access to safe, legal, and voluntary abortion is a fundamental right of all women” (U.S. Department of State, March 16, 1994). When the Holy See spokesman, Joaquin Navarro-Valls, criticized Vice President Gore for his involvement with the ICPD Program of Action, then Vice President Gore responded by saying that the U.S. had not sought to establish an international right to abortion in the past, present or future (Federal News Service, August 25, 1994). The head of the U.S. delegation, Under-Secretary of State Tim Wirth took a similar tone in explaining the U.S. position on abortion; he clarified his position as seeking access to safe abortion, not a universal human right to abortion. The issue of abortion specifically and reproductive health and rights as an approach in general would continue to be of importance and controversy as the Cairo conference opened.

Role of NGOs

The history of NGOs at UN Population and Development global conferences show that NGOs were considered peripheral in the beginning, especially at the Bucharest conference. Since many were established with the technical and financial assistance of developed countries, developing countries in Asia and Africa regarded them suspiciously. However, after Bucharest, many more NGOs involved with the issue of population were created, receiving funding from both governmental and non-governmental sources (Singh 1998: 124). These NGOs received more recognition and support from the UN. In Bucharest, only NGOs that had consultative status with ECOSOC had official
accreditation at the main Conference. In Mexico, “a broader interpretation of the rules” permitted accreditation not only of the NGOs that had consultative status with ECOSOC but also any NGO that was recognized by a UN agency or organization.

Although there was no parallel NGO forum for the Mexico Conference, NGOs involved in population and development activities organized a Working Group, held a large NGO Conference in 1983 to formulate their recommendations for Mexico, and were represented at the two meetings of the Mexico Preparatory Committee. One hundred and fifty-four NGOs with 367 representatives were accredited by the Conference, and 16 of them had the opportunity to address the Conference; papers prepared by NGOs were distributed as background documents, and the Conference Secretariat gave NGOs daily briefings on the progress of the Conference. The Mexico recommendations reflect the changing attitude of the government and the UN towards NGOs: in Recommendation 84, NGOs were recognized for their pioneering work and urged to continue their work in implementing the Program of Action emerging from the conference.

*Opening Session*

In the opening session, addresses were given by the Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali; the President of Egypt, Muhammad Hosni Mubarak; the Secretary General of the Conference, Dr. Nafis Sadik; the Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland; the Vice President of the U.S., Al Gore; the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto; and the Prime Minister of Swaziland, Prince Mbilini. While the opening addresses supported the draft Program of Action’s use of the term reproductive health and rights, several of the speakers took the time to clarify their understanding of
that term as not referring to abortion, and not supporting abortion as a form of family planning.

Prime Minister Brundtland gave the most explicit justification of reproductive health, arguing that “it therefore seems sensible to combine health concerns that deal with human sexuality under the heading ‘reproductive health care.’ I have tried, in vain, to understand how that term can possibly be read as promoting abortion or qualifying abortion as a means of family planning.” In addition, Brundtland addressed the issue of abortion explicitly, saying “It is encouraging that the Conference will contribute to expanding the focus of family-planning programs to include concern for sexually transmitted diseases, and caring for pregnant, delivering and aborting women.” (UN 1994:171).

Prime Minister Bhutto’s address, from a Muslim head of government, was especially important, given the unexpected withdrawals of Bangladesh and Turkey; while she critiqued some aspects of the Draft Programme, she supported family planning and reproductive health, confirming that the major objective of her government was a commitment to improve the quality of life their people through provision of family planning and health services. She also made a point of supporting the traditional family as the basic unit of society and rejecting abortion as a method of population control.

Vice President Gore’s address also supported in general the goals of the Cairo Conference, and specifically defined the U.S. position on abortion by stating that while the U.S. Constitution guarantees every woman in the U.S. the right to choose and abortion, he reiterated the same point as speakers before him: “let us take a false issue off the table: the U.S. does not seek to establish a new international right to abortion, and we
do not believe that abortion should be encouraged as a method of family planning” (UN 1994b: 177). Gore also detailed his understanding that policy-making in these matters should be the sovereign province of each government; however, with regard to abortion, he condemned coercion relating to abortion, recommended that where abortion is permitted, it should be medically safe, and restated his belief that unsafe abortion is a matter of women’s health that must be addressed.

Prince Mbilini, speaking as a representative of the African continent, was very supportive of the draft Program of Action, declaring that OAU heads of government understood the responsibilities of governments to understand and take action concerning the role of population in development. President Mubarak and Vice President Gore both made strong appeals to delegates to respect differences and to work together, which gave the opening of the conference a much needed boost of optimism (Singh 1998:61).

The issue of abortion and reproductive health and rights are intimately connected but placed in different chapters due to the emphasis on abortion as a health issue. The very important issue of defining reproductive health and reproductive rights in Chapter VII could not be resolved until the Conference had debated and negotiated the issue of abortion (Singh 1998:61). On September 6th, Ambassador Biegman opened the discussion on the text of Paragraph 8.25; he asked delegates not to delay the resolution of the issue, to demonstrate that the conference was truly about population rather than abortion. Again, to speed that resolution, the emphasis was put explicitly on the medical implications of unsafe abortion: “The purpose here, he said, is not to delve on the ethical or moral dimension of the question but, rather, to concentrate on the medical aspects of unsafe abortion” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, September 7th, 1994).
However, negotiations still lasted for next four days. Two versions of the text on abortion were on the table; both described unsafe abortion as a major health concern and supported the provision of services for the management of complications of unsafe abortion. The significant differences between the two texts lay mainly in one urging governments to evaluate their abortion-related laws and perhaps change abortion-related laws and policies from a criminal perspective to one that focuses on women’s health, and the other not including such proposals but including a statement preferred by the Holy See and some other countries: “in no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning.”

The first day of discussion was inconclusive, with many of the 85 delegations who spoke in the Main Committee supporting the more inclusive text, while the Holy See supported the second text with reservations about some parts. Chairman Biegman proposed a compromise text that included the phrase supported by the Holy See and emphasized the need to prevent unwanted pregnancies, eliminate the need for abortion, and where abortion is legal, have it be safe. This compromise text had the support of most delegates, but the Holy See still had reservations about it. On the morning of the seventh, Chairman Biegman suggested setting up a smaller group chaired by Muzzafar Quereshi from Pakistan to negotiate a compromise; this group included a representation of the many views on abortion, such as Iran, Egypt, the U.S., Norway, Indonesia, the EU, the Russian Federation, Barbados, South Africa, Nicaragua, Trinidad and Tobago, El Salvador, Benin and Malta. This small group negotiated through September 8th, and provided the Chairman with a consensus text that evening; this text began with the sentence, “In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family planning,”
included recommendations to prevent unwanted pregnancies by expanding family-planning services, and stipulated that where abortion is legal, it should be safe. One notable addition is the caveat that “Any measures or changes related to abortion within the health system can only be determined at the national or local level according to the national legislative process” (UN, 1994).

This caveat of the sovereign right of each country to implement the recommendations of the Program of Action became part of the umbrella paragraph in the Principles chapter (II):

“the implementation of the recommendations contained in the Program of Action is the sovereign right of each country, consistent with national laws and development priorities, with full respect for the various religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds of its people, and in conformity with universally recognized international human rights.” (UN,1994:11)

This understanding of the sovereign right of each country to decide how the Program of Action would be implemented greatly facilitated the adoption of the consensus texts on abortion, reproductive health and rights (Singh 1998:69).

When the delegates at large discussed the consensus text, most of the delegates accepted it, while Egypt and Bahrain accepted the text but said it would be interpreted according to national and religious laws. Those who did not accept the text included Argentina, Peru, Malta, the Dominican Republic, and the Holy See; the representative of the Holy See stated that while they were very concerned about maternal mortality and willing to endorse the parts of Paragraph 8.25 that addressed women’s health issues, they could not endorse legal abortion for moral reasons, and would withhold consent until the end of discussions on chapters VII and VIII (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, September 10th, 1994).
The paragraph defining reproductive health was adopted on September 9th by the Main Committee; it defined the term as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being in all matters relating to the reproductive system and to its functions and processes. Paragraph 7.2 stated that men and women have the right to be informed and have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of family planning of their choice, as well as other methods of their choice for regulation of fertility which are not against the law. Paragraph 7.3 includes the Bucharest formulation of right to family planning services, recognizing the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children, but adding “the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health” (UN 1994).

The consensus on the language on abortion and on reproductive health and rights reflected the support of most of the countries at the Conference. However, several countries recorded reservations on specific terms in the language. Afghanistan and Libya objected to the use of individuals in the phrase individuals and couples. Jordan and Kuwait stated that the Program of Action would be applied in accordance with Islamic laws and moral values. Many Latin American countries affirmed that life begins at conception and recorded their reservations or clarifications on various words or concepts in the approved text (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru). For the first time, the Holy See joined the consensus on parts of the Program of Action, and expressing its reservations on others; the Holy See especially noted the affirmations against all forms of coercion in population policies and the improvement of women’s status through education and better health-care services; it also recognized the importance of the family as a basic unit of society, and the need for greater respect for
religious and cultural beliefs of persons and communities (UN 1995:143). The Holy See also expressed its concerns on abortion and adolescent health issues, noting that it regarded the terms ‘sexual health,’ ‘sexual rights,’ and ‘reproductive health,’ and ‘reproductive rights,’ as applying to a holistic concept of health, but did not consider abortion or access to abortion as a dimension of these terms.

With reference to the issues of reproductive health and rights and specifically the issue of abortion, the Cairo document was significant because it defined reproductive rights, going beyond the Bucharest formulation on the rights of couples and individuals: the inclusion of the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health was significant because it recognized that sexual relations are not solely for procreation (Singh 1998:74). In addition, while the Conference confirmed Mexico City’s consensus that abortion should not be a method of family planning, the Cairo Conference elaborated on it by giving unsafe abortion high priority as a major health concern.

Paragraph 7.6 listed reproductive health service to be provided in the context of primary health care, including “abortion as specified in paragraph 8.25;” this has been interpreted to mean that services and facilities would be improved to ensure safe abortion in countries where it is permitted by law (Singh 1998:75).

5.3 Analysis of Cairo

5.3.1 Abortion-rights movement

The abortion-rights movement took advantage of several key openings in the political opportunity structure as well as the accumulation of the previous twenty years of experience with the UN conference process and in advocacy to change the language of population policy from family planning and population control to reproductive health and
rights at the UN Population and Development Conference in Cairo. The movement used a human rights frame to advance the language of reproductive health and rights; science and research to support their advocacy; and alliances with both the environmental and human rights communities to better connect their cause to UN agencies, and women’s health and rights organizations from the global South to ensure greater representation with developing country delegations.

Several feminist organizations concerned with population issues were key players during the preparation for and process of the Cairo conference, including the International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC); the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), founded and led by Bella Abzug; and the Center for Development and Population Activities (CEDPA). The Women’s Caucus was created by Bella Abzug of WEDO to bring together influential female government officials and activists for the purpose of influencing the Rio conference. The organization became a professional and highly organized force at Cairo, inviting government delegates to hear their views on the Program of Action, and influencing governmental delegations to take into account their “Women’s Declaration on Population Policies.” One of the key ways in which women’s health and rights organizations such as WEDO helped lobby for women’s interests at Cairo was through the Women’s Caucus, which simultaneously mobilized women outside official processes by distributing insider information to women’s networks and producing independent data on relevant issues. The Women’s Caucus also coordinated lobbying efforts inside the UN by holding NGO strategy meetings and NGO press conferences, and distributing information on relevant issues to delegates at conferences.
The strategies of feminist NGOs over the UN Decade for Women show awareness of and adjustment to the environment of the UN, in that they adjusted their arguments to purposefully use human rights frames, they aligned their advocacy with research which supported their goals, they formed alliances with the human rights and environment communities in order to present a more united front, and developed connections with local groups in developing countries order to build a broader consensus among women’s health and rights groups and lobby developing country delegations more effectively.

5.3.1.1 Framing

Feminists shifted population policy language to reproductive health and rights at Cairo using a human rights frame. As discussed previously, human rights was embedded in the UN charter and agencies nearly since its inception, but was more accepted now that the Cold War had ended,

Throughout the early nineties, feminist NGOs had participated in UN international conferences, on such subjects as human rights and the environment. During those conferences, they built important connections and alliances with these groups, and attempted to put their concerns about population programs and the need for reproductive health and rights on the table at these conferences. Although they had better success at the Human Rights Conference in Vienna, the Environmental Conference in Rio was a great disappointment as many environment groups tended to either shy away from reproductive health and rights, or to agree with the neo-Malthusian population control groups that given the dire ecological situation, world population growth had to decrease (Cohen 1993). Although feminists were able to prevent references to rapid population growth as a legitimate environmental concern from being part of Agenda 21, these two
earlier conferences emphasized the importance of framing the argument for reproductive health and rights in such a persuasive way as to unite the different portions of the women’s movement, unite the allies of the women’s movement, and to head off arguments from the anti-abortion groups. As a result of decreased tensions between formerly communist states and democratic states, as well as the connections made during the Human Rights conference in Vienna, “… the global women’s health and rights movement was strategic in utilizing the human rights discourse as a political language” (Eager 2004: 113).

Women’s rights activists would say that the “international women’s movement drew upon human rights principles to remove women’s reproduction from its isolation, placing it in the larger context of equitable development policies to provide for basic social and material needs…” (Correa and Reichmann 1994: 92). Feminists interested in women’s rights in general urged women to use human rights discourse and norms to frame issues such as reproductive health and rights because they were not separate but “crucial to the future of human rights” (Correa and Reichmann 1994: 107). This transition had been taking place for some time; Charlotte Bunch of the Center for Women’s Global Leadership at Rutgers University noted that “in the late 1980s and early 1990s, women in diverse countries took up the human rights framework and began developing the analytic and political tools that together constitute the ideas and practices of women’s human rights” (Bunch and Frost 2000: 2). Not only was the human rights framework more universal in its appeal to member countries, but it was also a key part of the UN’s charter and justification for intervention in many countries. However, if human rights had always been a part of the UN culture, why did it take so long for other organizations and activists
to draw on it as a framework? Human rights became the dominant framework for many NGOs involved with many different issues in the early 1990s – but not earlier. The most proximate reason, besides the time it took for women’s health and rights activists to network with the human rights community, is I believe the opening of discursive space for new rights claims that was brought about by the end of the Cold War (Eager 2004: 115); women were able to exchange ideas and experiences more freely around the world, and to strategize on how best to use human rights (Bunch and Frost 2000).

All groups within the women’s health and rights movement did not immediately accept the human rights framework. The global women’s health and rights movement was composed of many different groups: radical versus more liberal, mainstream feminists; groups that focused on lobbying and policy-making versus those that focused on fieldwork and programs; developed, Northern/Western hemisphere groups versus developing, Southern/Eastern hemisphere groups. This diversity and the problems that it spurred for the women’s movement can be seen in the splits within the movement prior to the Cairo conference, and especially in two meetings held by the IWHC in preparation for Cairo.

As a result of women’s rights hardly being mentioned at the first Preparatory Committee for the ICPD, the IWHC organized a meeting of an international group from other women’s health organizations in 1992. They formed the Women’s Alliance and adopted Women’s Voices ’94: The Women’s Declaration on Population Policies (IWHC 1994). The declaration defined women’s ability to control their fertility as a human right and specified seven ethical principles that population programs should adhere to in order to uphold women’s well-being (Antrobus et al. 1993). The Women’s Declaration proved
to be a focus of criticism within the women’s movement and from a conservative alliance formed by the Vatican with other Catholic countries and fundamentalist Islamic countries. The Vatican saw reproductive rights and health as threatening the family and violating the rights of the unborn and the dignity of women by standing for the unrestricted right to abortion. Throughout the preparatory conferences and at the ICPD, this conservative alliance blocked discussion on the issue of women’s reproductive rights and health by making frequent oral interventions and demanding brackets. The media highlighted this controversy and focused on the issue of abortion during the preparation for Cairo.

The more radical of the progressive women’s organizations were also critical of the Declaration because of its narrow interpretation of reproduction as abortion rights (Joachim 2003). Other women’s health and rights organizations that disagreed with the Women’s Declaration were the WGNRR (established at the Tribunal), the Boston Women’s Health Book Collective, the Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering in Hamburg, Germany, and the Committee on Women, Population, and Environment in Amherst, Mass. They critiqued Women’s Voices ’94 for procedural and substantive reasons. Gisela Dutting of the WGNRR saw the Declaration as drafted by an exclusive group of women who represented only the pragmatic wing of the women’s movement, or those who were willing to work with UN agencies and conform to the UN norms in order to make a difference on this international stage. In addition, the Declaration and Women’s Voices were critiqued for joining the general consensus that population policies would solve problems like poverty and environmental degradation, without addressing the underlying causes of these problems.
As a result of this opposition from radical progressive women’s organizations and the conservative alliance, the Women’s Alliance altered its strategy in order to unite the different women’s health and rights organizations and present a stronger movement with language that the different sides could agree on. They believed a movement that included the different radical organizations, many of which came from developing countries, would be able to lobby a greater number of delegations successfully.

The IWHC organized another event shortly before the ICPD, in Rio de Janeiro in the spring of 1994, a conference entitled “Reproductive Health and Justice.” Learning from its mistakes, the IWHC invited more than two hundred participants from seventy-nine countries, selected to include a diversity of nationalities, cultures, ages, sexual orientations, income levels, profession and philosophies (Joachim 2003). The location of this meeting made it much more accessible for Southern women. Although the diversity slowed down and complicated the decision-making process, it elicited a more inclusive agenda. Including the radical women’s organizations in the Alliance did not erase the differences between the radical and pragmatic points of view, but used them as a strength in their strategy: the pragmatic organizations relied on their connections within the population establishment to push for a reproductive rights and health agenda inside the UN while radical organizations continued to work outside established institutions. “They [radical activists] mobilized political pressure, maintained a critical voice in the process, and held those working inside the UN accountable” (Joachim 2003: 266).

In addition, these radical groups prompted the more moderate ones to adopt more extreme positions. At the Rio conference, the delegates agreed on a twenty-one point statement that voiced strong opposition to population policies that sought only to control
the fertility of women and did not provide for such basic rights as a secure livelihood or freedom from poverty and oppression. Whereas the Women’s Declaration had justified women’s reproductive rights and health solely in terms of human rights, the twenty-one point statement also placed the issue in the development framework, claiming inequitable development models and strategies were responsible for existing problems with population (Joachim 2003: 266). This twenty-one point statement was much more critical of the population establishment than the Women’s Declaration, and the Women’s Alliance began to gain leverage at the ICPD following the Rio Conference.

The Rio statement did include more development framing, but a close study of several of the points reveals that a focus on abortion and a human rights frame had become embedded in the arguments made for women’s rights, and these elements were uppermost in the rhetoric of the feminist groups at Cairo. Under the “Sexual and Reproductive Rights and Health” section in the Rio Statement, the document states that women’s right to safe, legal, accessible, and affordable abortion is non-negotiable and should be inserted in the final document adopted by governments at Cairo. Under the advocacy section, the document asserts that one tool the women’s network would use to accomplish their goal would be “the human rights framework to advance reproductive health and justice and to hold governments and international organizations accountable” (Rio Statement 1994). Point 14 of the 21-point summary at the beginning of the statement reads as follows:

Reproductive rights are inalienable human rights that are inseparable from other basic rights to health, security, livelihood, education, and political empowerment. Therefore, the design and implementation of the policies affecting reproductive rights should conform to international human rights standards” (Rio Statement 1994, emphasis added).
The pragmatic women’s groups that gathered in preparation for Cairo understood the need to strategically frame reproductive health and rights in terms of human rights in order to make sure this language was included in the Cairo Program of Action. Paige Eager in her study of the global health and rights movement observes that the women’s groups made “an explicit strategic decision … to utilize the human rights framework and methodology,” and that “the framing of reproductive rights and health as an international human rights issue was key to the GWHRM’s ultimate victory in gaining codification of reproductive rights and health” (Eager 2004:137). One of the activists from the abortion-rights network emphasized the importance of the human rights framework at the UN, and how that helped their advocacy.

Obviously it helps that human rights is the core foundation of the UN, and obviously it helps that in working in social development issues, there is a tremendous push on human rights discussion. And so it’s easy to hook onto that prevalence… It offers a lot of entry points, the fact that human rights is the crux of everybody’s mandate within the UN system, because we can link the reproductive rights issues to its founding rights, to liberty, right to freedom, right to choose marriage, right to health. So that well-developed human-rights system and the UN agencies within that permits us to be able to hook onto that discussion and terminology. (Confidential Interview 2006)

At the third preparatory meeting for the Cairo Conference (PrepCom III), delegates tried to reach agreement on as much of the final draft of the program of Action as possible. One of the most divisive issues was the entire chapter dealing with reproductive health and rights, Chapter VII; although the Holy See and its allies opposed any language pertaining to reproductive health and rights, by the third PrepCom, a shift in language had occurred from family planning to reproductive health (Eager 2004: 143). Many different activists recalled one of the key moments of the third PrepCom that led to that shift in language as when the women’s NGOs were allowed onto the meeting floor to participate in negotiating the language of the Program of Action.
The human rights frame allowed the women’s groups to “take the high moral ground” by putting the issue of reproductive health and rights in terms of the human right to life and control of the body (Eager 2004: 144).

The determined opposition of the Holy See and its allies to reproductive health and rights also helped bring together the disparate factions of the women’s movement; a woman’s rights activist and scholar argues that many women’s NGOs began shifting their discourse from a health paradigm to a human rights frame out of practical considerations; they sought to counter the vocal opposition of the Vatican (Petchesky 1997:576) at the Cairo conference. The audience of their framing efforts at this point were other state delegations, to appeal to a more universal paradigm than that of health in response to the Vatican’s appeal to conservative religious tradition, and to UN officials, in order to present an established basis for their advocacy.

5.3.1.2 Information Politics
   The feminist groups also changed their lobbying strategy to use more scientific data and provide expert information and well-written documents for the many delegates that came to the Cairo conference with small delegations and less than expert information. More scientific data was available to them as a result of the UN Decade for Women, in which many UN agencies began to collect systematic information on women all over the world for the first time. By the late 1980s, this information had been collected for nearly 20 years, and was significant in the arguments and information presented to the UNFPA and country delegates in preparation for Cairo and at the Cairo conference. Although this may seem more of a logical choice than a deliberate strategy, I would argue that the environment of the UN conferences and the agencies which the feminist NGOs
were trying to influence came very specifically from a bureaucratic rationalization point of view that emphasizes scientific research to support change in procedure and policy, and that a shift in lobbying strategy from more symbolic activities to the distribution of scientific information was an effective strategy. It was both an unconscious adjustment to the culture of the UN given the acclimatization of the women’s groups to the UN conferences during the Women’s Decade, and a conscious adjustment to the need for expert, scientifically based information in written form for the Cairo conference.

The background document on the Population Program issued by the UNFPA in 1994 emphasizes the “data collection, research, analysis, training, dissemination of information” done by UN agencies before the provision of financial assistance or monitoring and evaluation of population projects and programs. The document goes on to state:

In spite of the highly sensitive and controversial character of population issues, the United Nations has served as a neutral forum to debate openly such issues and to negotiate common strategies. Through its program of research and analysis, it has accomplished pioneering work in the development of new methodologies for demographic analysis, and particularly, in creating awareness of the key role that population variables play in social and economic development. (ICPD Secretariat 1994)

Clearly, the underlying assumption of this document, and its writers, was that research and analysis are the only reasonable methods of establishing progress in the field. This research and analysis was also the method by which the more subjective process of “creating awareness” was accomplished. This document is one example illustrating the existence of the norm at the UN that science and reason are the means to progress. These rational methods also contribute to the belief that the results of research are neutral, and that the UN is truly a neutral forum, with no bias in terms of its underlying philosophies.
One of the delegates from the U.S. to the Cairo conference recalled clearly that one of the factors in the success of the women’s organizations shifting the terms of the debate from population control to reproductive health and rights was the social science that emerged at that time, and how activists parlayed that research to support their goals (Confidential Interview II 2006). A research document by John Bongaarts and Judith Bruce, working at the Population Council, came out just prior to the Cairo conference; this research split up the elements that were going to drive demographic growth and cited unmet need for contraception as one of those elements. For this particular delegate, this research document presented “a very vivid picture of why family planning only wasn’t going to get to the demographic goals some were seeking, and why a broader approach needed to be undertaken” (Confidential Interview II 2006, emphasis in original). This delegate felt that Bongaarts and Bruce’s research was a very useful tool because it helped bridge the divide between demographers and women’s health and rights activists; it moved past making a “numbers only” argument, and instead tried to “understand what the numbers are, and the quality of life that people were going to have was going to have an impact, and the quality of life they were having was going to have an impact in terms of demographics” (Confidential Interview II 2006, emphasis in original). The delegate describes the shift from a demographic goal of reducing numbers to a reproductive health and rights goal of access to health services including contraception in the following way:

I don’t think population as an argument is even much of an argument anymore. But still then – there were a lot of people that were very concerned about numbers. They thought achieving the rights numbers was the goal. And this was sort of a shift to – well, the way to achieve the right numbers is by taking the quote unquote right, correct, broader approach. (Confidential Interview II 2006, emphasis in original)

An activist at the time of the conference working at the Alan Guttmacher Institute also stressed the importance of evidence and research supporting the advocacy of
women’s health and rights groups at Cairo, stating that the Guttmacher Institute was “very pivotal in putting a factual floor, or an evidence floor, underneath some of the advocacy debates” (Confidential Interview III 2006). The Guttmacher Institute put out research with a clear reproductive health and rights vision, but the evidence couldn’t be criticized. The methodology was really transparent, it could have been replicated by anybody and they would have found the same things. *That* turned out to be very influential in terms of policy-making, and helping to shore up the advocates’ conversations during those conferences. (Confidential Interview III 2006, emphasis in the original)

The evidence not only supported the advocacy of the women’s health and rights organizations, it did so in a way that was accepted as objective and true, and this was what made the use of science and research really powerful in supporting advocacy. This activist felt that research and evidence were key to the success of women’s health and rights groups in Cairo; in addition, the way the Guttmacher Institute coordinated the distribution of this evidence with the advocacy groups such as International Women’s Health Coalition, Population Crisis Committee (now Population Action International), and International Planned Parenthood helped make the advocacy messages consistent.

Part of that consistency was aligning advocacy messages with research. “…when you have an evidence base, advocacy messages have to follow the evidence. So it’s almost like a natural consistency and added strength. Even the pro-life or anti-groups have to react to the same piece of data” (Confidential Interview III 2006).

This activist also related one dramatic example of how the research produced by the Guttmacher Institute was used directly to affect the debate at the Cairo conference. This activist worked very closely with the lead representative, Judith Hellner, of International Planned Parenthood Federation, Western Hemisphere region on the research the Institute was conducting in Latin America; Hellner called the activist from the floor
of the UN and asked for the statistics on the levels of abortion in six Latin American
countries that the Institute had not released yet.

She said, “I need them now, because Brazil is ready to take on the Vatican.” And so I
gave her the go-ahead to give them the statistics. And the guy from Brazil stood up to the
Vatican after the Vatican said, “There is no support for abortion in Latin America,” he
got up and said, “Wait a minute, there may not be any support according to you, but there
are abortions, and I have new statistics.” …It was thrilling, because for the Brazilians to
say that our Catholic country is not going to be falling in line with your rhetoric was
pretty, pretty amazing. (Confidential Interview III 2006)

Activists from women’s health and rights organizations also made a particular
point of mentioning that their ability to provide government delegations with information
relevant to the debates, and clear, concise language concerning the issues of reproductive
health, maternal mortality, and adolescent rights among others was a distinct advantage in
their advocacy. Barbara Crane of IPAS indicated that her organization tries to combat
anti-abortion organizations by assembling public health data on the impact of unsafe
abortion, and its links to other issues delegates are concerned about such as sexual
violence and HIV/AIDS (Barbara Crane Interview 2006). Stirling Scruggs, then Director
of Information and External Relations at UNFPA, also confirmed that one of the key
means of influence women’s health and rights NGOs used at the PrepComs and at the
Cairo conference was the information and organized material they provided to
delegations. In fact, he noted that at the Cairo conference, even well-prepared delegations
such as those from Europe would approach the health and rights NGOs and say “How do
we frame this and how do we do that?” and the women’s organizations had the
opportunity to directly influence the language by helping them write text (Stirling
Scruggs Interview 2006).

The process by which women’s organizations were able to disseminate
information to delegations and influence the actual document itself depended on the
openness of the Secretariat of the conference as well as the U.S. government to these NGOs. In addition to using a human rights frame and research-based evidence to support their advocacy, the women’s health and rights activists took advantage of their connections to UN officials, especially in the UNFPA, and strategic lobbying techniques. During the preparation for Cairo, Tim Wirth’s office requested NGOs to contribute to the U.S. position; one women’s health and rights activist prepared ten to fifteen pages of text, half of which was adopted into the U.S. official position before the third PrepCom (Confidential Interview 2006). Steven Sinding also related how he worked closely with Nafis Sadik at UNFPA when he was the director of the Office of Population at USAID, and his close relationship continued when he worked at the Rockefeller Foundation afterward. He was able to arrange a key meeting between Nafis Sadik and the leaders of women’s health and rights NGOs with the help of Carmen Barroso at the MacArthur Foundation, a meeting which caused Dr. Sadik to change her position to involve NGOs very closely in the process of the Cairo conference (Steven Sinding Interview 2006, Nafis Sadik Interview 2006, Carmen Barroso Interview 2006). Steven Sinding also relates how a working committee of employees from the Population Division and UNFPA prepared the first draft of the Program of Action, the results of which deeply disappointed Nafis Sadik. Sinding was able to hire Sharon Camp, who had then just stepped down as the legislative director of Population Crisis Committee and is now the president of the Alan Guttmacher Institute, to re-write the draft; it was then reviewed by policy experts in the field of population from around the world, but remained mostly intact as the draft that went to the Third PrepCom, and then became the Program of Action (Steven Sinding Interview 2006). Sharon Camp was active on behalf of reproductive health and rights,
and these connections with UNFPA allowed women’s health and rights activists to greatly influence the draft Program of Action for Cairo.

Women’s health and rights activists were also able to influence the delegations by providing them with organized and relevant information. An activist noted that after she talked to members of UN missions,

I started realizing a lot of the people who would be negotiating really didn’t know the substance, and didn’t have time. Basically I realized there was a huge opportunity to give them, tailored to what a negotiator would need, … the argumentation, the international conventions, the laws and the scientific basics they needed to argue the proposals we were developing. (Confidential Interview 2006)

This was a very standard and pragmatic approach to lobbying, but this activist highlights several elements that fit the science and reason norm I believe is important at the UN: the precedents developed in previous international conventions and laws and the scientific basis of the arguments of these women’s rights lobbyists were both necessary components of the information that these activists distributed to delegations. In addition, this activist also detailed the process by which the women’s health and rights network was able to produce a document that so many women’s organizations endorsed from all over the world, and how the network was able to target many different delegations. The activist orchestrated a strategy that involved creating alliances with over a thousand different organizations in over one hundred countries; using their input and the draft Program of Action, she created a proposal with consensus language on all the different controversial issues. The activist noted that she consulted the experts in the field for each topic to make sure the language was as precise and correct as possible; she also used prior conventions to ground the document legally for delegates. “A lot of research went into regional conventions and international conventions to give the delegates a juridical basis
for what they would fight for and have to argue for as well” (Confidential Interview 2006).

The strategy of the women’s organizations was two-fold: they produced a consensus document that pushed the language the utmost level that most governments and civil society organizations could agree on; several of the more influential reproductive health and rights organizations then went on to try and push the language past that consensus level to see how far they could get. One activist stated, “The consensus document was forged with politics in mind, meaning it should represent where we knew the majority of governments could agree by pushing the envelope to that progressive level, but not provoking it so that it would undermine the 80 and 90% of what we wanted” (Confidential Interview 2006). Although most of these organizations wanted to push for legal abortion and sexual rights, “those were the two things everybody in the coalition was hoping for but we knew would be breaking points, so we didn’t make it part of the quorum platform of consensus” (Confidential Interview 2006). However, the women’s health and rights activists that did push for more were able to include safe, legal abortion in the final Program of Action in Cairo, although in the minds of the women’s health and rights activists, this was limited by the fact that the document did not propose that abortion should be legal, but that where it was legal, it should be safe, based on national laws of each country.

The consensus document that the activists put together was sought after and well distributed to both agencies and delegations because of the work and expertise put into it, and the connections that the women’s health and rights organizations had developed. The UNFPA invited the activists to share the document, and shipped it to all their field offices
and representatives, where many activists mobilized behind the scenes to work with official delegates on supporting the language. The consensus document was so widely distributed and respected by the time of the third PrepCom that this activist and her colleagues were asked to prepare the delegates and ministers of different countries for the conference negotiations. For example, the delegates of the Caribbean countries asked the coordinators of the consensus document to brief them and help them prepare for the conference; this group of delegates then broke with the Vatican’s position during the conference negotiations on abortion and reproductive health (Confidential Interview 2006).

Through contacts in developing countries, this activist and her colleagues were also able to find out who was being recruited for official delegations, and targeted their distribution and approach at the country level to those who would be key lobbyists or friendly to the position in the official delegations. “We also targeted all the friendly UN missions, so that we made sure they received the documentation they needed to negotiate” (Confidential Interview 2006). The “friendly” missions were known well ahead of time by the country positions on these controversial issues, and the activist mentioned that “there was a good mapping going on by the coalition of NGOs of who was going to be problematic and who would be supportive” (Confidential Interview 2006).

5.3.1.3 Coalition Building

*Why alliances are an important means of adjustment to the UN environment:*

From the 1970s to the 1990s, UN global conferences changed in several important ways. First, they became more inclusive of the many NGOs that were experts in the field with
which the conference was concerned, rather than simply treating these NGOs as an important avenue through which services should be delivered. The Cairo conference in 1994 was the most inclusive of any conference before or since: a large parallel NGO forum, held in the same location as the intergovernmental conference, allowed NGO members important lobbying access to country delegates; NGO delegates were allowed to attend many negotiation sessions, where they were able to lobby and provide language amendments to delegates; and Dr. Nafis Sadik urged many country delegations to include NGO members in their delegations to the Cairo conference (Steve Sinding Interview 2006), which gave NGOs unprecedented access and influence over the language of the final Program of Action. As a result, the NGOs themselves had to work together and build coalitions in order to make sure they did not waste their resources or work against each other.

Another important change that occurred over three decades of UN global conferences was that, procedurally, they became much more consensus-based than majority-vote based (Singh 1998, Joseph Chamie Interview 2006). As discussed in the theory chapter, studies of decision-making at the UN have noted that consensus-based decision-making has become more of a norm for all bodies of the UN, including the Security Council (Fasulo 2004). Majority-based strategies were used by the Group of 77 countries throughout the 1970s to exert their power over the developed world; however, the increasing diversity of views within the Group of 77 made it difficult to maintain a common position from which to negotiate, and just as importantly, developing states realized that if their goals was to legitimize actions and bring together strong opinions on an issue or situation, consensus-based strategies served their interests better (Smith
Thus, consensus decision-making became more of a norm throughout the UN, but especially at UN global conferences, where the goal was to bring together international opinion on a topic of concern and decide on a plan of action to address that concern. Without consensus, the plan of action, which sets a standard for policy but cannot be enforced except by public opinion, is of little value. The very nature of UN global conferences and the growing understanding by developing and developed countries alike of the limits of majority and minority-based strategies of decision-making made consensus decision-making more common, and as time went on, also prescriptive.

As a result of the growing use of consensus decision-making, even large blocks of countries, no matter how powerful, could not carry off a major change in policy. It became much more important to appeal to a very large audience, and gain widespread support for any change. Thus, the need for widespread agreement across issue areas and regions of the world encouraged women’s groups to build coalitions with the environmental and human rights communities, as well as to focus their efforts on building connections and consensus with developing country groups from across the world.

As described in the previous chapter, the women’s movement began to try to find common cause on the topic of population with the environmental movement and the human rights community in the early nineties in order to further the cause of reproductive health and rights. They were more successful with the human rights community than with environmental groups because many environmental groups agreed with population control groups on the need for widespread family planning programs; in fact, during the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, the women’s groups were greatly frustrated with the many environmental groups for allying with family planning and demographic groups.
Although Paul Ehrlich made the connection between population issues and environmental degradation in the early 1970s, this connection began to fade in the mid-1980s as issues of sustainability rose to prominence. It was at this time that the rationale for demographic concerns moved away from traditional economic development arguments to softer, more benefits-based rationales, such as a case for environmental balance (Correa and Rechmann 1994: 13). Feminists argued that demographers made this connection to plug into the environmental movement that at the time commanded respect, and which some demographers argue also helped mobilize new sources of funding (Furedi 1997: 144). However, both demographers and feminists have argued that there is very little empirical data supporting the causal connection between larger populations and environmental degradation, and that this connection has taken on more of the character of an ideological assumption (Furedi 1997: 145).

During the Cairo conference, both environmental and human rights NGOs allied with the women’s health and rights groups. This was due to the efforts of many different groups, including the efforts of the Clinton administration to bring together the population control or demographers, the environmentalists, and the reproductive rights activists for Cairo (Eager 2004: 120). Head of the U.S. delegation Tim Wirth, as a politician, consulted with many different NGOs around the country prior to the Cairo conference, and this brought together U.S. NGOs that had not been talking to each other up to that point: the environmental groups, the women’s groups, and health groups (Barbara Crane Interview, June 2006). Some feminist NGOs, such as WEDO, worked to reconcile their position with the environmentalists; in addition, private groups and foundations worked to bring together the environmental movement and the women’s
groups. Soon after the Rio Earth Summit, the Pew Charitable Trusts encouraged environmental groups and feminist groups to “engage in dialogue around the issues of population control, the environment, and reproductive rights” (Eager 2004: 124). In July 1993, the Public Conversations Project also sponsored a meeting to facilitate dialogue between the population control establishment, environmentalists, and reproductive health activists. This meeting put together several steps to “articulate a new set of values, goals, and objectives with the intent of influencing the conversation or discourse at ICPD,” including educating environmental groups interested in population so that they would be less inclined to oversimplify the problem (Eager 2004: 125).

In addition, the women’s groups articulated a very pointed critique of the population and demographic community, who they perceived as coercing women into complying with family planning quotas in order to reach population growth reduction rates. Many in the demographic and family planning community resented this characterization of their work during the 20th century, because most of them were sympathetic to and worked toward a greater focus on the needs of women (Steve Sinding Interview 2006). Even for many demographers that did not necessarily agree with the reproductive health and rights groups, their success in capturing the attention and language of the Cairo conference caused family planning groups and demographers to move into a tentative alliance with the feminists rather than be marginalized (Eager 2004: 144). However, after the conference, many demographers and family planning experts criticized the feminists for vilifying the family planning community in order to gain acceptance for the “new” language of reproductive health and rights, and also for taking away any urgency connected with family planning programs by re-framing the basis for
these programs as human rights issue rather than a security issue (Richard Cincotta Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006). Steven Sinding, a member of the U.S. delegation who had been involved in population programs with USAID, spoke quite strongly on both the attack on family planning and the subsequent effect on funding for such programs:

You don’t have to attack family planning programs in order to make the case that they need to be more focused on women’s health and women’s rights... And, you know, the fact that population and family planning became dirty words after Cairo, and that one could only talk about reproductive rights and health, and subsequently sexual and reproductive health and rights, I thought was an unnecessarily negative approach. I mean, I thought that the fact that the women’s groups felt that in order to build support for their approach, they had to trash the history -- which I thought was in fact quite a noble history -- was deeply unfortunate and inaccurate.

By removing, in effect, concern about population growth or high fertility as a rationale for public action, the Cairo conference I think undermined the strong funding base that had existed to support programs around the world. I think that the biggest impact of Cairo was to shift population programs from being -- from an imperative to being a nice thing to do. (Steven Sinding Interview 2006, emphasis added)

Another aspect of coalition building for the women’s health and rights organizations included the widening of their network to include domestic developing women’s groups; by representing developing countries in their network, they hoped to include their language, issues, and very importantly, gain their endorsement.

The Women’s Declaration from 1992 and the 21-point agenda from the Rio conference in January 1994 included the language and concerns of developing country groups such as Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) and Isis International. The feminist groups involved at ICPD understood the power of widespread agreement among the NGO community in helping to pressure delegates at the actual conference. The “Women’s Declaration on Population Policies” in September 1992 was reviewed, modified and finalized by over 100 women’s organizations across the world. It was then circulated to health advocates, health professionals and experts, networks,
organizations, governments, and individuals for signatures and endorsements (Sen, Germain and Chen 1994). In their plenary speeches, four country delegations indicated that the “Women’s Declaration on Population Policies” should be considered in the Cairo deliberations, including Canada, Sweden, Norway, and the United States (Eager 2004: 129). In addition, the Rio Statement, which emerged from the preparatory conference that women’s groups held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1994, included precise language on the many issues with which the Cairo conference would deal, and much of this language was imported into the draft Program of Action by the Secretary-General, Dr. Nafis Sadik (Steven Sinding Interview 2006; Eager 2004).

Jill Sheffield of Family Care International elaborated on the process by which she and her colleagues also reached out to developing country women’s rights NGOs in order to get their suggestions and revisions of the proposed language for the draft Program of Action. “We would then go to friends on government delegations and say, ‘You’ll be working on these paragraphs today, could you please use this modified language.’ Roughly eighty percent of everything we suggested was agreed. It was monumental” (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). The fact that quite a few government delegations included members of the consortium from whom Family Care International had solicited suggestions on the Cairo document was immensely helpful; those relationships with developing country government delegates paid dividends for the women’s groups as they tried to influence the wording of the Program of Action during the conference as well (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006).

As mentioned in the previous section, individuals from the key developed country groups such as IWHC and the Women’s Coalition were able to meet with Dr. Nafis Sadik
in the preparatory stages of Cairo and ask her to encourage the involvement of NGOs in the conference. One of the most important ways in which Dr. Sadik did this was to write letters to country delegation heads and urge them to consider adding NGO members onto their delegations. Many developing countries did in fact add many NGO members, most of them women’s health and rights NGOs, to their delegations, their incentives increased when the UNFPA, NGOs such as IPPF, and foundations such as MacArthur and Ford provided funds to pay the way of those NGO delegates (Steve Sinding Interview 2006, Stirling Scruggs Interview 2006, Carmen Barroso Interview 2006). As a result of the endorsement of the developing country NGOs from around the world on the language they proposed, and especially the support of women’s health and rights NGOs on many developing country delegations, the women’s health and rights groups were able to claim widespread support from both developed and developing country groups.

5.3.1.4 Institutional Access and Influence

The women’s organizations were quite successful in influencing the agenda and program of Action in Cairo, which can be attributed to several factors. One was certainly the opening in the domestic opportunity structure afforded by the election of the Clinton administration in the U.S., which was quite active in its support for abortion rights, as opposed to the Reagan and Bush administrations that preceded it. “It is no secret that the Clinton administration selected delegates who were pro-choice and pro-reproductive rights to join the official governmental delegation” (Eager 2004: 125), as many former delegates were able to attest (Confidential Interview II 2006). “The pro-life and religious groups were probably equally powerful in their organizational efforts [at the prepcoms], but the Clinton administration was able to tilt the scales so that the NGOs more aligned
with its views got on the delegation and had their comments make more of a difference” (Lori Ashford in Eager 2004:125). This was an important factor at the Cairo conference because of the power and influence of the U.S. at the UN; even though it could not shift the debate or change policy by itself, the hegemonic power of the U.S. gives its delegation great influence when it speaks at the UN. A delegate for the U.S. recalls that the “willingness and the different position that the U.S. held at the time was extremely helpful” for the change in language and policy at Cairo. “I mean when Tim [Wirth] gave his first speech at the second PrepCom, he got a standing ovation, which is pretty unusual at the UN. But people were really happy to have the U.S. on board in a widely agreed approach, and not being a naysayer” (Confidential Interview II 2006). Another activist adds, “…the other key factor for Cairo… is the difference between Reagan and Clinton. The Clinton administration, Al Gore in particular, Tim Wirth – I mean it was a different time. Our government, which for better or worse is always going to be a key player, was in the vanguard” (Confidential Interview III 2006).

Another factor was the opening of the international opportunity structure to the greater participation of NGOs. The Rio conference had large numbers of NGOs attending the NGO forum, but Cairo was the first conference at which NGO members were encouraged to be part of government delegations and many NGOs were involved in the PrepCom process. Five hundred observers from 185 national, regional and international NGOs attended PrepCom II, including representatives from developing countries whose travel costs were subsidized by bilateral agencies, private foundations and the UNFPA field offices. “Many of these representatives, including leaders of women’s groups, were also included in national delegations appointed by the governments” (Singh 1998: 46).
addition, the NGOs that participated in the Women’s Caucus were pro-choice and pro-family planning. “This became clear when at one of the informal sessions a representative of the Women’s Caucus commented that ‘women have the right to decide when and how to have children free from coercion and with universal access to safe abortion services’” (Singh 1998: 47). The Women’s Caucus greatly influenced PrepCom II by persuading governmental delegations to address reproductive health and rights, access to safe abortion, sexuality, and a broader vision of socioeconomic development (Garcia-Moreno and Claro 1994: 55-56).

At the third preparatory meeting for the Cairo Conference (PrepCom III), delegates tried to reach agreement on as much of the final draft of the Program of Action as possible. By the third PrepCom, a shift in language had occurred from family planning to reproductive health, a change this is especially significant when considering that the initial outline of the program of Action, written almost two years before by the ICPD Secretariat, was written almost entirely within the context of a traditional demographic rationale (Sen 1994: 1). In the intervening two years, the global health and rights movement had successfully advocated for substantial changes in the language of the Program of Action, to the point where reproductive health and rights was the dominant theme rather than family planning (Eager 2004: 143). “Explicitly or implicitly, attempts were made throughout the Document to show the interrelationship between the concepts of freedom of choice, particularly for women, and the continuing importance of family planning in the broader framework of reproductive health” (Singh 1998: 53).

More recently, individuals from both the family planning and UN spheres have articulated skeptical viewpoints concerning the importance and “newness” of Cairo.
These individuals tend to be demographers or long-time family planning experts in the
field who see the importance of Cairo as inflated, and they emphasize that the Cairo
conference did not generate anything new because the 1974 Bucharest conference first
instituted the language concerning the basic right of individuals and couples “to decide
freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the
information, education, and means to do so” (Plan of Action, Paragraph 14f). However,
both the abortion-rights and anti-abortion movements recognize Cairo as a historical
benchmark, and therefore it is difficult to make the argument that the ICPD was not really
new, or simply cheap talk (Eager 2004: 150-151). In addition, changes to population
programs in countries all over the world have been documented (UNFPA 1998). One
example is that of the U.S.: visible changes in U.S. policy in response to the Cairo
Program of Action included policy changes reflected in official statements, the
incorporation of conference recommendations into U.S. foreign aid programs, and
commitment of financial resources to achieve Cairo goals (Lasher 1998: 18). The U.S.
certainly financially supported the Cairo agenda for the first two years following it,
providing more than $600 million in both 1995 and 1996, which led the donor
community and represented nearly half of all international population assistance for these
two years (Jacobsen 2000: 254).

On the other hand, their very success has also been a problem for the women’s
network; the pervasive inclusion of reproductive rights and health language in the Cairo
Program of Action has reopened and exacerbated divisions within the women’s health
movement. One scholar notes:

Contrary to pragmatic organizations which perceive and celebrate the ICPD as a success,
radical women’s organizations feel that their concerns, in particular the linkage of
reproductive rights and health to development, have been left off the agenda. According
to these organizations, the reproductive rights and health rhetoric has been adopted by the population establishment, but nothing has changed in practice. (Joachim 2003: 268)

5.3.2 Anti-Abortion movement

Anti-abortion organizations at this time focused on the domestic environment.

International anti-abortion organizations (many of them Catholic) established a domestic presence in different countries, but their numbers and resources for work at the UN was small. Anti-abortion organizations in the U.S. were quite active in domestic mobilization and advocacy; most evangelical Protestant organizations did not view the UN favorably as a result of one pre-dominant interpretation of the second coming of Christ, in which an influential world organization such as the UN becomes an instrument of the anti-Christ. Their support for the Reagan administration, especially that of the Christian Right, was rewarded by the Reagan in 1984 with the Mexico City Policy. The anti-abortion Christian organizations in the U.S. had used that opportunity with Reagan administration to influence how U.S. resources were used abroad but primarily to make a statement domestically. These, among other reasons, explain why anti-abortion organizations at Cairo were few: International Right to Life Federation was one of the few organizations present, but had few delegates. However, the Holy See, as a Special Observer at the Population and Development conferences since Bucharest, acted as an influential anti-abortion presence at the Cairo conference. Thus, the Holy See’s activism at Cairo offers a baseline from which to compare future activism by the Holy See and other anti-abortion organizations.

The Holy See

The Vatican has been an international presence and activist for many years; its status as a special observer at the UN attests to its power and respect for the international
sphere. Beginning with the appointment of John Paul II as Pope, the Vatican has also become a significant international actor (Hanson 1987), using its diplomatic service and staff as the Secretariat of State to focus on the issues of human rights, economic justice, and peace (Reese 1996:231). While the Vatican has been noted for its involvement in gender and family issues, it is also intensely interested in international development and peace. Thus, while the Vatican strongly opposed an international right to abortion, which they saw encoded in the framework of reproductive health and rights at Cairo, it has also been a strong advocate of addressing global inequality and ending poverty through developmental work. Although the Vatican is most well known for its strong stand against the right to abortion, at each global conference it has attended, issues of poverty and peace have also been part of its agenda. The Vatican is a conservative actor that has seen the international arena as important and legitimate, and it has directed its efforts and resources at the UN for some time. The attendance and involvement of the Vatican at the Cairo conference does not show any serious change or adjustment, but the degree to which it was involved and the effort that it put into opposing the reproductive health and rights consensus does acknowledge the increased influence and efforts of the women’s health and rights organizations. “While the Vatican has played an active international role in the United Nations since its inception, the Cairo conference was something of a catalyst for this current phase of Vatican international activism” (Buss and Herman 2003:105).

The Holy See recognized the efforts of the U.S. delegation and women’s organizations to influence the direction of the Cairo conference, and made an effort to

\footnote{The U.S. delegation to Cairo consisted of a broad cross-section of people, representing public sector, private, NGO, academic, and activist perspectives on the topic of population and development; however}
counter that influence. Specifically, the Vatican was worried that the language of reproductive health and rights would create an international right to abortion. In response, the Holy See called for Catholic organizations to mobilize in opposition to the Cairo Program of Action. American Catholic conservative organizations became involved, including the Catholic Campaign for America (CCA), which worked as an NGO at Cairo to oppose aspects of the program (Buss and Herman 2003:106). Jyoti Singh, the ICPD Executive Coordinator, notes in his book on the Cairo conference that many U.S. anti-abortion organizations may have been helped along in their mobilization against the U.S. position on abortion at Cairo because of a State Department cable sent to all the diplomatic and consular posts of the U.S. on March 16, 1994, and which became available to many participants at PrepCom III. The cable in part read, “the United States believes that access to safe, legal and voluntary abortion is a fundamental right of all women” (Singh 1998: 192). This may have fueled the fire of the Vatican’s argument that the U.S. and other countries were attempting to include an international right to abortion in the Cairo Program of Action.

The Vatican itself launched an unexpectedly vigorous response within the conference preparations, lobbying state governments directly and asking bishop’s conferences around the world to pressure their governments to oppose pro-abortion language in the Cairo Program of Action. During PrepCom III, the Holy See along with Argentina, Guatemala, Venezuela, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Malta disagreed that cross-section did not include those who were against abortion or reproductive health and rights. Several key members of the delegation were leaders of the women’s health and rights organizations, including Bella Abzug, of the Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO), Adrienne Germain of the International Women’s Health Coalition (IWHC), and Peggy Curlin of the Center for Development and Population Activities (CEDPA). Interviewees from both abortion-rights and anti-abortion organizations confirmed this process of appointing to the delegation those that reflect the agenda of the current U.S. administration, especially NGO members and activists.
with the majority of the delegates on how to address abortion in the chapter on Health and Mortality. Although many of the delegates agreed on shifting from family planning to a broader reproductive health approach, the objections from the Holy See and other countries against abortion blocked agreement on the definition of reproductive health. The Vatican refused to remove its brackets around the phrases, “unsafe abortion” and “reproductive health services;” the phrase “safe motherhood” was also bracketed because of the emphasis on abortion as a health and mortality issue. In fact, the Holy See called for written assurance in the document that safe motherhood programs would not include abortion (*Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, April 22, 1994).

The words used by the Vatican after PrepCom III in preparation for and leading up to the Cairo conference show a greater willingness to use the language of rights to express their point of view, but this use seems overpowered by the traditional language of moral outrage against abortion as murder. For example, Archbishop Renato Martino, addressing the issue of abortion during PrepCom II, stated that the Catholic Church views the right to voluntary abortion as violating the most fundamental right of any human being – to life (*Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, June 2 1993). He continued to say that although the Catholic Church did not support procreation at any cost, it opposed “demographic policies and family planning that are contrary to the liberty, dignity and conscience of the human being” (Johnson 1995:44). These statements show a growing awareness of the rights-dominated environment in which the Vatican was contending, and an attempt to connect its point of view with that of an individualist rather than traditional outlook on life and morality. In addition, the Vatican argued against abortion as detrimental to women’s health; maternal health and mortality was one of the issues
concerning the Vatican, and coincided with the increased emphasis on women’s health by feminist organizations at Cairo. However, even to the extent that the Vatican used rights language to describe their position, arguing that abortion violated the most basic human right to life and that abortion hurts women’s health, it is not seen as legitimate as progressive organizations that use the rights language (Stan Bernstein Interview 2006, Barbara Crane Interview 2006). Although anti-abortion organizations may have similar goals and express them in rights or health language, this language is usually reserved for the persuasive arguments directed at the UN or outside their own organizations (Jack Willke Interview 2006).

Prior to the start of the ICPD in Cairo, the Vatican continued to try to fight the new consensus on reproductive health and rights by allying with other countries that had similar convictions on the family for religious or cultural reasons. This included much publicized efforts by the Vatican to reach out to Muslim countries for support against abortion rights or greater sexual freedom at the Cairo conference. Libya and Sudan boycotted the conference altogether, while Saudi Arabia and Lebanon informed the Conference Secretariat at the last minute that they were not coming. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Egypt made a determined effort to counteract the spiraling opposition of several other Muslim countries to the Cairo conference, and as a result of their efforts, most of them attended the conference. However, the Muslim heads of state from Bangladesh and from Turkey did not attend.

Much has been made of this tentative alliance between the Vatican and the Muslim countries to oppose abortion, as well as sex education for adolescents. It is one of the mechanisms of a social movement to seek allies to further the cause of a particular
issue, and one can see that the Vatican made use of it, although many speculate that as an alliance, it is a quite tenuous one, based at as it is on a few issues. However, this tentative alliance has been cultivated in the present by anti-abortion NGOs, in that they have continued to seek allies in the Muslim world around the theme of the “natural family,” a development I will elaborate on later.

Institutional access is generally one of the indicators by which the success of a movement’s framing, scale shifting and coalition formation can be measured. The organizations and individuals against abortion were not truly international at this point, and therefore did not have much institutional access. However the Vatican, as a special observer, did have significant access to the negotiations in that it was able to voice its objections at the PrepComs and at the actual conference. Continuing the tradition of respect to the Vatican, the Secretary General of the Cairo conference, Dr. Nafis Sadik, met with the Pope at the Vatican prior to the conference, and discussed the issue of reproductive health and rights. The Vatican’s ability to lobby individual governments through domestic Bishop’s Councils throughout the world also shows a form of institutional access that is not international but transnational. Thus, one could argue that the institutional access of the Vatican was significant, and could have resulted in substantive gains for its objectives. Indeed, the Vatican was successful at the Cairo conference in making its objections to the proposed Program of Action public, and also in voicing such strong objections to the concept of legal abortion or abortion as an option in family planning that the consensus language of the document had to either specify against it (in the case of abortion as a method of family planning) or hold their peace (as in the case of legal abortion). However, the Vatican’s influence on the Cairo Program of Action
is mostly measured by what is not in the document than what is; the document articulates very little of the conservative point of view on reproductive health and rights, except for the paragraph that says that each country will implement the recommendations with respect to its individual religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds. “While maintaining the concept of national sovereignty, Cairo provided strong momentum to the efforts to apply internationally recognized human rights in the formulation and implementation of population policies and programs. Freedom of choice and reproductive rights are strongly emphasized throughout the Program of Action” (Singh 1998:105).

5.4 Conclusion

The ICPD in Cairo was a landmark conference for the women’s health and rights movement, in that their experience at the UN, their efforts to reach out to developing countries, and their relationships with country delegates and UN officials all combined to give them a great deal of influence over the wording of the final Program of Action. The Cairo conference displayed the ability of the women’s health and rights movement to take advantage of key political opportunities, such as the opening of the UN global conference system to NGO involvement and the Clinton administration’s sympathy with the women’s health and rights arguments, to negotiate a significant change in the population policy paradigm, as well as their ability to create important opportunities for themselves by lobbying delegates of governments across the world. This conference also was a signal to anti-abortion organizations that the international sphere was an important policy realm, and one that was open to the influence of NGOs and INGOs, given the right circumstances and strategies.
5.4.1 Findings

The women’s health and rights movement were able to change the prevailing language of population policy from family planning or population control to reproductive health and rights. They did this as a result of their involvement in the preparatory phases of the ICPD, which were open to NGOs as a result of their access to important UN officials such as Dr. Nafis Sadik. However, the success that the women’s health and rights movement had in lobbying for the involvement of NGOs in the process of the conference, and in persuading key UN officials to include their concerns in the language of the draft document, would not have been possible without the recognition by important members of the movement that they would better influence the UN system by adapting their strategies to the environment of the UN, specifically accommodating practices such as consensus decision-making, the politics of rights, and the use of science and reason to justify policy.

The women’s health and rights movement was made up of many different factions, many from the more radical side of the spectrum, which were more inclined towards redistributive solutions to reproductive health issues. However, the women’s health and rights movement emphasized the more mainstream, rights understanding of reproductive health in an effort to swing the language used at the international level from population control to reproductive health and rights.

They also reached out to the environmental and human rights communities in an effort to build cross-issue coalitions, and to grass-roots feminist organizations in developing countries in an effort to build more transnational coalitions; these alliances helped the reproductive health and rights network influence many more delegations than
they would have been able to do by themselves. Their outreach to developing country feminist organizations was especially fruitful because many of these NGO members were then funded as members of their own country delegations, able to directly influence their country’s position on the language of the final document.

Another key element of the women’s movement’s success was their ability to utilize information politics to influence both UN officials and government delegations. The organizations were able to use data collected by UN agencies and their own organizations around the world in order to support their advocacy for policy and language change, from population targets to a more holistic focus women’s health, citing the abuses found within these programs in some developing countries and the inability of women to get health care connected to reproductive needs. In addition, women’s organizations were able to put together and distribute language already written to fit the needs of the Program of Action; as a result, many government delegations that did not have extensive resources or members were happy to support language that was already written and which fit the standards of professional advocacy, utilized scientific research, and which could also be proved to be supported by many developing country NGOs.

The anti-abortion movement was not well organized or focused on the international sphere in 1994, leaving much of the opposition to women’s organizations to the Holy See; however, the success of the feminist organizations at the ICPD spurred many anti-abortion organizations to subsequently focus their resources on the UN, both Catholic and several Protestant organizations.
5.4.2 Comparison of the two movements

As a result of the early expert population conferences, feminist groups concerned with access to birth control and abortion began to emphasize the international sphere in their advocacy. They were able to take advantage of the Women’s Decade to understand the UN system better, and work the international conferences to a greater degree. A large number of feminist organizations attended the ICPD for the purpose of advocating reproductive health and rights at the international policy level. As a result of their shift of scale up to the UN, these organizations also then had to take into account some practices at the UN in order to better influence it. For the most part, these adjustments came naturally to a movement that was based on very similar principles as those underlying the UN Charter; they too were founded on the importance of the individual and especially the woman, and the rights of women. As a result, the women’s movement was inclined to be more inclusive, organizing the many different types of feminist organizations concerned with the issues of reproductive health, and promoting dialogue between the developed and developing country organizations. They also built coalitions across issues, with a very successful ally in the human rights community. Although they had been framing family planning as reproductive health and rights for years at that point, the emphasis on the framework of human rights and the support of the human rights community made the language more visible and convincing. In addition, the adjustment of several other strategies, such as coalition-building, framing family planning as coercive rather than respecting of human rights, and distributing professional, organized, and research-supported written materials to delegations helped the reproductive health and rights frame prevail at the time that it did.
Although the Vatican was and is a transnational institution with a presence at the UN that it used during the ICPD to advocate against the right to abortion and reproductive health, there were very few NGOs advocating against the right to abortion. These organizations that did attend, such as International Right to Life, Human Life International, and the Rockford Center, were not nearly as well organized as the feminist organizations, did not have any access to influence the draft documents, and did not have good relationships with delegations in order to influence the final Program of Action (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). These conservative organizations did focus on the UN, although anti-abortion NGOs in general did not focus on the international level. Since many of the prominent anti-abortion NGOs were Christian Right organizations from the U.S. that had a marked distrust of the UN, this is not surprising. However, the success of the feminist organizations at the ICPD was a decided catalyst for many Christian Right organizations that did not previously lobby at the UN to start putting resources towards advocacy at the UN, as revealed by interviews with key personnel within these organizations. In fact, Catholic Institute for Family and Human Rights was created after Cairo for the express purpose of NGO advocacy at the UN level (Austin Ruse Interview 2006). The anti-abortion organizations would make their adjustments as they first attended, gained more experience with, and then prepared for advocacy at the UN at subsequent conferences.

The women’s health and rights movement used their experience at the UN during the Women’s Decade to adjust their strategies to the consensus decision-making that became more widespread in the 1980s and 1990s; consensus-building rather than voting at the conferences meant that it was important to appeal to many delegations in order to
get approval on language. In order to appeal to many different delegations, these feminist groups allied themselves with the environmental and human rights communities, other issue areas that were considered important in that day. Although there were important disagreements with the environmental movement, the feminist alliance with the human rights community was a key partnership, both for coalition building and the use of human rights language in the framing of reproductive health concerns. The importance of coalition building across issues was reflected in the fact that human rights groups would eventually take on abortion as an issue they would advocate for (Barbara Crane Interview 2006).

The anti-abortion NGOs that attended the ICPD did not make strategic alliances with any other issue groups or delegations from developing countries. However, the Holy See did attempt to create an alliance with Muslim countries based on their common opposition to liberal views on adolescent sex education, abortion, and alternative conceptions of the family. This alliance caused some problems for the Cairo conference in that a few of these Muslim countries were going to back out of the conference, but the host country of Egypt was able to prevent that. In addition, these Muslim countries also joined the Holy See in objecting to the more liberal language concerning reproductive health and rights, but their opposition did not last throughout the entire conference. Thus, most women’s groups considered this attempted alliance a failure; however, I would consider this a strong first attempt at a cross-faith alliance by an institution not much used to or inclined to such alliances. Clearly, this quite conservative Catholic institution recognized the need for support from many different delegations in order to influence the negotiations of language in a consensus decision-making environment; it initiated such
outreach, which encouraged Catholic NGOs also to lead the way in forming cross-sect and cross-faith coalitions at subsequent conferences.

Women’s health and rights groups had begun framing reproductive health in a rights framework in the late 1970s, in the process of the Women’s Decade. However, due to the splits in the movement between more left-leaning groups and those that took a more mainstream liberal approach, the language of reproductive health and rights did not become widespread within the movement until the 1980s. By the late 1980s, several of the progressive foundations that had become involved in population issues early instituted Reproductive Health and Rights programs, many of which employed women’s activists (Steven Sinding Interview 2006, Carmen Barroso Interview 2006). However, the language of reproductive health and rights did not permeate UN policy until the Cairo conference, when the women’s health and rights movement had unprecedented access to the preparatory process, country delegations, and most importantly to UN officials such as Nafis Sadik (Nafis Sadik Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006). Thus, the success of the human rights framing of reproductive health was not because of the human rights frame alone – women’s rights groups had framed family planning in reproductive rights terms since the 1970s. It was the combination of adjustments in strategy, including the scale shift, coalition building and information politics, which allowed this frame of reproductive health and rights to prevail.

Although human rights were embedded in the UN Charter and included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and became part of the environment of the UN as human rights became more important to Western liberal countries as a result of the horrors of World War II, there were still many disputes between developed and
developing countries as to the definition of human rights and the responsibility of an international organization in promoting versus protecting such rights. As a result, although human rights was a convincing call to arms in terms of violations of negative human rights (such as failure of states to not interfere with the right to life, freedom, the pursuit of happiness), it was much harder to rally member states or convince UN officials of positive human rights violations, such as the failure to provide economic equality, the right to work in safe conditions for adequate pay, or the right of women to reproductive health care.

After the Cold War, the human rights framework was much less disputed, and that political opportunity allowed more claims based on human rights to find currency at the UN. Positive rights, including economic rights, had become more accepted. There were still disputes by some developing countries that one universal standard of human rights would be difficult to define because of cultural exceptions (one controversial issue that embodied this dispute was that of female genital mutilation). However, the Vienna Conference on Human Rights effectively attacked the cultural argument as a cowardly evasion by countries that repeatedly violated the human rights of their citizens.

In addition, the use of a human rights frame alone was not enough to carry the reproductive health and rights paradigm; although it was a key component, it was the combination of several different adjustments in strategy made by the movement that allowed the reproductive health and rights frame to succeed. Other contextual factors should also be taken into account, which opened up political opportunities that did not exist prior to the Cairo conference.
The Holy See also employed framing as a strategy, most effectively to depict reproductive health and rights as including the right to abortion. This caused several key speakers at the conference, including Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Brundtland, to specify that abortion was not to be considered a method of family planning. It also caused Vice-President Al Gore to follow a similar route and pacify any fears that the conference was trying to create an international right to abortion. As such, the Holy See was successful. However, in trying to frame the right to abortion as violating the right to life of a baby, the Holy See was much less successful. In addition to the rights frame being out of sync with the Holy See’s conservative stance on women’s roles and adolescent rights, the Holy See was also not successful in its coalition building, and did not reach out to many different types of delegations. Information politics did not play into its strategy for the 1994 Cairo conference at all.

The importance of science and research as the basis of policy, not only at the UN but also in nearly any rational bureaucratic organization, very subtly informed the tactics of the women’s health and rights movement. As rational organizations founded on liberal principles, they already conformed to the norm of progress, pursued through reason and science. Professionalization of their advocacy, made easier by their many years of experience with the UN global Women’s conferences, helped their cause in that the women’s movement appeared knowledgeable, organized, and as a result, to be trusted. The women’s organizations spent a great deal of time gathering research and putting it together in palatable ways for government delegations, in particular organizing information by subject and key issues; this is why Jill Sheffield of Family Care International could say that women’s NGOs made themselves invaluable to government
delegations at Cairo and beyond (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). In addition, they
provided delegations with language already written on key controversial issues, which
many sought out and used (Sterling Scruggs Interview 2006).
6 The Development of the Anti-Abortion Network: After Cairo

6.1 Background

6.1.1 1999 Five-Year Review of Cairo

The five-year review of Cairo was held as a special session of the General Assembly, from June 30-July 2, 1999, in which an evaluation of the implementation of the Cairo Program of Action would be conducted, with the explicit provision that “there will be no renegotiation of the existing agreements” (UN 1997). Although it was not to be an elaborate international conference, the preparations for the five-year review were nearly as extensive as those for the original ICPD conference, reflecting the momentum gained in that conference for the issues of reproductive health and rights (Sinding Interview 2006). The UNFPA organized four round-table and three technical meetings in 1998, focused on the key themes of the Program of Action. The round-table topics included adolescent sexual and reproductive health, reproductive rights and implementation, international migration and development and partnership with civil society; the technical meeting topics included population ageing, population change and economic development, and reproductive health services in crisis. In addition, the UNFPA and the UN Regional Commissions held regional reviews on population and development for Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Asia, Africa, and Europe, all in 1998.

A series of international meetings were held at The Hague in February 1999 to draft reports on the successes and shortcomings of the implementation of the ICPD Program of Action. These meetings did not result in negotiated documents, but in
inventories of lessons learned and actions needed. These were to then provide the basis of a draft Program of Action written by the Conference Secretariat, which would then be negotiated by the Commission on Population and Development prior to presenting it as a final report to the special session of the General Assembly. The Hague Forum meetings, including the NGO Forum and the Youth Forum, emphasized shortfall in resources as one of the most serious obstacles to implementing the ICPD; governments generally failed to meet the levels of funding that they pledged at Cairo. Another theme was the significance of youth, given that young people aged 15-24 then made up about one-fifth of the population. The discussions at the Hague were centered on five topic areas: creating an environment that would allow implementation of ICPD goals; enhancing gender equality and equity and empowering women; promoting reproductive health; strengthening partnerships with civil society; and mobilizing resources. The titles of these topic areas demonstrate how much the terms of debate had changed – family planning no longer appeared on the agenda.

In preparation for the conference, the UNFPA compiled a report on the changes in national policies in response to the ICPD Program of Action (POA), specifically for the Round Table meeting on Ensuring Reproductive Rights and Implementing Reproductive Health. The highlights of this document will demonstrate the importance of the UN document in beginning to change the way many countries viewed family planning, and the concrete changes in programs that resulted.

The report first confirms that the POA “defines reproductive health as a human right,” and that women “have the right to access sexual and reproductive health services” (UNFPA 1998: 3). It also states that although many countries have changed their
policies to include or further implement reproductive health and rights, there have been pockets of resistance, especially in some countries in Latin America where the Catholic Church promoted such resistance. However, this initial resistance was overcome by “national stakeholders, primarily NGOs,” after which reproductive health policy could be formulated (UNFPA 1998:5). In Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, and Mexico, government programs recognized the importance of reproductive health to development goals, and have established policies that implement reproductive health changes (UNFPA 1998:10).

Countries in Asia moved toward reproductive health policies without losing their family planning services. However, both Thailand and India abandoned demographic targets as a rationale for family planning programs. Thailand endorsed a broad reproductive health policy, which included adolescents in a life-cycle approach; India, which announced a “target-free” approach in 1996, showed through two pilot programs with integrated reproductive health and family planning services that without targets, contraceptive prevalence increased by 50%. However, some states continued to set targets. Some countries with very few resources or experience in previous family planning service programs also adopted the reproductive health concept: Cambodia implemented a new policy to support “the rights of couples and individuals to choose freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children,” and adopted a “minimum service package” which “conforms to the broader principles of reproductive health” (UNFPA 1998: 8).

Countries in Africa were reported to have different reactions to the ICPD Program of Action: some revised population policies adopted prior to 1994 to be more in line with the ICPD Program of Action, such as Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, while others
developed new policies in line with the ICPD, such as Mauritania, Uganda, Chad and the Central African Republic. Other countries have not made any changes in relation to the ICPD, while others continue to set fertility rate goals (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe) (UNFPA 1998: 9).

Countries such as Peru, Bangladesh and Ghana have recognized abortion as a public health problem, as the ICPD Program of Action recommends (UNFPA 1998: 7). The report cites an Alan Guttmacher survey that reported 61% of the world’s population lives in countries where induced abortion is permitted for a wide range of reasons or without any restrictions at all. 14% of the population lives where abortion is permitted to protect the physical or mental health of a woman, and 25% live where abortion is generally prohibited (Rahman, Katzive and Henshaw 1998). Since 1985, 19 countries liberalized their abortion laws, three since 1994, and only one, Poland, moved into a more restrictive category. Thus, the trend towards liberalization of abortion laws and policies continued after the Cairo conference.

6.2 Analysis

6.2.1 Abortion-rights movement

Despite the success of the new paradigm of reproductive health and rights at Cairo, the very next UN conference, the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, showed the women’s groups that the paradigm was more fragile than the success at Cairo might lead them to believe. The same feminist groups that were active at ICPD, such as the IWHC and WEDO and the Women’s Health Coalition, hoped to build on the gains of Cairo and address even more controversial issues, such as sexual health, at Beijing. They were indeed able to do so, but also had to spend considerable time and
effort to consolidate a consensus on the Cairo language at Beijing in the face of the doubled efforts of the Vatican and representatives of anti-abortion NGOs to roll it back (Eager 2004).

In terms of its focus on the UN, its alliances with the human rights community and other women’s health and rights groups from developing countries, and its framing of arguments in a human rights frame, women’s reproductive health and rights groups continued what it had begun prior to the Cairo conference, and worked to advance the language of sexual health and rights (Eager 2004).

In preparation for five-year review of Cairo (Cairo +5), a group of 24 women from around the world formed a coalition called Health, Empowerment, Rights and Accountability (HERA), through which they continued the coalition building and consensus building they had begun for the Cairo conference. These women conferred with women’s organizations worldwide to form a more formal coalition in order to more visibly and strategically affect the intergovernmental negotiations (Center for Reproductive Rights 1999: 2). As a result of their outreach, HERA was able to form the Women’s Coalition for ICPD before the March 1999 PrepCom; by the end of the review process in June 1999, more than 100 organizations joined the coalition from every region of the world. “The Women’s Coalition developed detailed proposals for changes and analysis of the ICPD +5 Key Action Document and conferred with government delegates and UN officials concerning their experiences and viewpoints” (Center for Reproductive Rights 1999:2). The consensus building the women’s groups performed prior to the review paid off in the access the coalition was able to have to government delegations
and UN officials during the review, demonstrating a continuation and strengthening of the tactics these groups had used so successfully in Cairo.

The Association for Women in Development is one of many organizations that demonstrate how the advocacy in Cairo and Beijing continued to affect women’s reproductive health and rights groups. Instead of focusing narrowly on women in development, around the time of Cairo +5 and Beijing +5, this organization changed its name to the Association for Women’s Rights in Development, reflecting the broader focus on all individuals and organizations for women’s rights, and the importance of the rights framework to advocacy for women at this time: “more than half of our members identify themselves as working in human rights” (Leigh 2001:1). In addition, the organization signaled that it saw rights as growing in importance for the field of gender and development by its intention to take advantage of the strengths of the women’s rights framework. “Women’s rights provides the powerful language and monitoring system to assert that women’s rights are an inherent part of all women’s lives, and gender and development is an enabling tool for overcoming the social realities that violate those rights. We hope that this change in language will help catalyze changes in gender and development…” (Leigh 2001:1).

The organization announced its name change in its newsletter with the headline, “AWID Goes Global”; the article went on to say that the headquarters of the organization would shift every two years to a new country, in order to better understand and reflect its membership, and “gain new insight into the many different concerns of women around the world” (Leigh 2001:1). The association itself already had ties to many members in developing countries, but it made those ties much deeper by committing to moving its
Secretariat to a different country every two years. It also printed a Spanish version of the main article side by side with the English version, and highlights of other articles in Spanish.

Information Politics: Women’s health and rights NGOs continued to work to make the gains established at Cairo well-publicized, and the foundation of further meetings on similar topics. One way that they did this was to publish a book on the gains of Cairo and distribute them to universities all over the world. “After it was over, we published a good looking book that summarized the gains of Cairo, it made it easier to access. And we got thousands of them around to universities, libraries, governments. And that set the stage for the next meeting, Beijing was soon after” (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006).

In preparation for the five-year review of Cairo, NGOs such as Family Care International (FCI) coordinated with other NGOs in the women’s movement as well as others to agree on their goals for Cairo +5. FCI then produced a set of briefing cards that were color-coded to each issue, translated them into French, Spanish, and distributed them to all the NGOs they had previously coordinated with; these NGOs took the briefing cards to the government delegations they had good relations with. These cards included the language from the Cairo Program of Action on the issue, and also what the women’s groups believed needed to be done, in terms of further language or action on that issue.

Jill Sheffield remembers that

One of the things that we did for Plus Five, which was really successful, was we assumed that most of the delegates had not been to Cairo. So we put together a set of briefing cards, quoting what Cairo said, what we needed to do, and why… The day they were discussing young people, I was up in the balcony, and I could see two-thirds of the delegates had the briefing card we prepared on adolescents. The fact that people are still using those cards is pretty wonderful. That was one of the things we did to help delegates catch up and make informed decisions. (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006)
Success: The five-year review of Cairo was not anticipated to be a very large or representative conference, but the momentum from Cairo caused the five-year review of Cairo to be more extensive than anticipated. Stirling Scruggs, working at UNFPA at the time as Director of Information and External Relations, was fundraising for the conference, and he described it as “People were so enthusiastic in 1999… people were almost throwing money at me. It was supposed to be a selection of 50 countries, but we ended up having huge delegations from 178 countries. We couldn’t put on the brakes, it ended up being a very large conference, several million dollars” (Stirling Scruggs Interview 2006). Duff Gillespie, who attended the five-year review as an NGO representative, remembers that “Well, five years was very celebratory, and naively so. I mean, most of the meeting at the Hague was pushing the envelope a little bit more and showing great appreciation for the importance of HIV/AIDS, which wasn’t really appreciated at Cairo. … But mostly… everybody’s patting everybody else on the back” (Duff Gillespie Interview 2006).

However, there was tension over the lack of international contributions for reproductive health programs and the Holy See’s objection to any inclusion of language referring to emergency contraception. Duff Gillespie again recalls that despite the celebratory atmosphere, some attendees of the review conference brought up concerns about the shortfall in funding promised at Cairo; however, it was not much debated at the conference. Instead, there were “a couple of just really powerful speeches about safe abortion not being given enough emphasis” (Duff Gillespie Interview 2006). Abortion was one of the issues that women’s groups tried to push further at the review conference, as well as the wording of “sexual and reproductive health and rights.” The UN General
Assembly adopted the “Key actions for the further implementation of the Program of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development” by consensus, which identified strategies “to address the sexual and reproductive health needs of adolescents as well as the need to take additional steps to reduce maternal mortality and morbidity” (Eager 2004: 168).

One of the key changes in the discourse of the abortion-rights organizations during the Cairo+5 and Beijing +5 conferences was the increasing awareness of anti-abortion organizations and activists. Many women’s rights interviewees noted the increase of “anti-choice” activists, especially youth trying to take over the youth caucuses (Leigh 2001:7). Several news outlets at the time also reported on the opposition of Catholic and Muslim countries to sexual and reproductive rights at the Beijing +5 conference, and the uphill battle women waged to advance the agenda of Beijing (Cabatu and Bonk 2000, NPR June 9, 2000). Some news organizations and women’s publications identified Austin Ruse of C-FAM as a key organizer of the “anti-choice” network, and “suspected” him of being supported by the Vatican (Leigh 2001:6, Cabatu and Bonk 2000). A Center for Reproductive Rights briefing paper on the Cairo Review noted that NGOs were much more tightly controlled during the General Assembly Special Session, having to stand in line for special passes to attend the plenary session, and that although they were certainly outnumbered by progressive NGOs, conservative NGOs “secured a disproportionate number of speaking slots” (Center for Reproductive Rights 1999: 6). This paper also noted that conservative NGOs disobeyed the rules concerning handing out materials to delegates on the floor, and that conservative activism provided countries with an excuse to limit NGO participation and access to the conference (7).
Women’s groups also reported on the coalition building and change in framing of the anti-abortion organizations at the Beijing +5 conference. Specifically, the Association for Women in Development’s newsletter reported how the religious right began to search for allies among other conservative, religious right countries such as Algeria, Sudan and Iran “to strengthen their voice,” and that the “language of human rights has been appropriated by many in the anti-choice movement, even though their belief system is truly anti-feminist and anti-choice” (Leigh 2001:6). The fact that women’s organizations became more aware of anti-abortion organizations, their activism at the UN, and their changes in strategies, specifically in their coalition building and framing, is evidence of the scale shift that occurred for anti-abortion organizations between Cairo and the five-year reviews of Cairo and Beijing. Fairly soon after, many of individual feminist activists and organizations began researching their opposition and brainstorming ways to adjust their tactics to the presence of these conservative NGOs at the UN.

6.2.2 Anti-abortion movement

Cairo was claimed as a huge victory for the feminist women’s health organizations by both women’s organizations and anti-abortion organizations. The change in language from family planning/population control to reproductive health and rights was a watershed accomplishment. Mr. Jyoti Singh reports that the change in language also resulted in the UNPFA reorienting its program priorities with the approval of its Executive Board in 1995 to focus on three main areas: reproductive health, population and development strategies, and advocacy, maintaining that reproductive health includes family planning and sexual health. A UN report in 1996 makes it clear
how the Program of Action changed the operations and allocation of resources at the UNPFA: “UNPFA has reviewed and adjusted all its operational guidelines to align them with the recommendations of the ICPD Program of Action. … country programs are being designed or re-oriented to reflect the priorities and commitments emerging from ICPD” (Singh 1998:171). This UN report also notes the shift in emphasis toward new objectives laid out in the ICPD Program of Action, including that of reproductive health and services, and directing such services toward adolescents.

“Thus increased emphasis is being placed on the following themes and issues: adopting a reproductive health approach; increasing the role and responsibility of men in reproductive health and family life; expanding reproductive health services and information for youth and adolescents; ensuring women’s empowerment and the gender perspective; and expanding partnerships with non-governmental organizations” (UN 1996).

Subsequently, many anti-abortion organizations began considering focusing their attention and resources on the UN, and how they could more effectively work in the international sphere. This began with attendance, however small and ineffective, at the Beijing Women’s Conference.

For the first time, many organizations involved in conservative family advocacy in the U.S. attended a UN global conference; this was in large part due to the high-profile position of the Vatican at Cairo and the Program of Action that emerged from the Cairo conference, which was described by scholars as well as progressive activists as a “notable departure from its predecessors in its emphasis on a rights framework as central to any policy on population” (Buss and Herman 2003:106). In addition, that rights framework included a strong commitment to the empowerment of women in all aspects of their lives. Thus, many individuals and organizations from the Christian Right in the U.S. attended the Beijing Women’s Conference, and this generally negative experience prompted some to move regularly into the international system, but turned other completely off to it.
When Susan Roylance, the founder of the Mormon anti-abortion NGO United Families of America, attended the Beijing NGO Forum and introduced herself during a strategy session, “the participants laughed and jeered at the name of her organization” (Butler 2006). Roylance further recalls that conference leaders marginalized a Nigerian speaker, Carol Ugochukwu, who planned to critique the conference position on family life. Roylance’s activism from that point on focused on the international system, and particularly on the UN. However, when several staff from Focus on the Family, an evangelical anti-abortion NGO, attended the Beijing Women’s conference, including Tom Minnery, the Vice President of Public Policy, they were concerned about the “anti-family, anti-life” tone they found there. Although Minnery and others with him were able to encourage some Latin American delegates to speak forthrightly about their convictions on family, Minnery had a very negative reaction to the forum of UN global conferences because he saw how the Latin American delegates were intimidated to voice a more traditional anti-abortion position (Butler 2006:111). Focus on the Family did not employ a full-time UN representative until 2001.

The number of anti-abortion NGOs that attended the Beijing conference were still a small minority of the hundreds of NGOs that took part at that conference, and the anti-abortion NGOs were not organized in a substantive way to influence the proceedings, much less the Platform of Action. However, the Holy See did take part, and in a significant fashion.

At the Beijing Women’s Conference, the Vatican seemed to substantially change the way it approached the negotiation process in response to the outcome of the Cairo PrepComs and Conference. The Vatican specifically changed the image of its delegation,
the emphasis given to women’s roles and rights, and the way it critiqued feminism, in order to modify its reputation as being against women’s rights.

The Vatican appointed Mary Ann Glendon, a Harvard law professor, as the head of its Beijing delegation, sending the message that it approached the issue of family planning, women’s rights and abortion in an academic, professional and sophisticated manner. This moved signaled quite a change from its previous efforts at the Cairo conference, where the Vatican did not bend to the professional and activist atmosphere of the UN agencies and women’s health and rights organizations. In the preparations for Cairo, the Vatican had worked back channels with Muslim countries to put together an alliance that depended on religious views on the role of women and the family in society, and on a traditional, moral understanding of abortion as murder of children. The appointment of Glendon as the Vatican’s Beijing delegation was one indication that the Vatican had learned from its experience in Cairo that it needed to come to the UN with leadership and advocacy strategies similar to the feminist NGOs it was attempting to oppose.

John Paul II also issued several statements on the topic of women in which he made a concerted effort to explain his views as responsive to the needs of women, rather than simply anti-abortion or anti-woman. He addressed a public “Letter to Women” and a statement to the Secretary General of the conference, Mrs. Gertrude Mongella, in which he detailed a coherent policy on women, family, and human rights, which is subsequently echoed by many Catholic anti-abortion organizations as well as Protestant anti-abortion organizations. He began his statement by thanking women for their contribution to humanity and apologizing for their historical oppression. He called for equality for
women, defined as equal pay for equal work, protection of working mothers, fairness in career advancements, equality of spouses with regard to family rights. This diverse recognition of the many roles women play is balanced by the Vatican’s definition of what true womanhood means, the conservative definition of the family, and women’s roles within the family as mother and helpmate (Buss and Herman 2003:109). This change in the rhetoric of the Vatican concerning the rights and roles of women can be viewed as a response to the increased emphasis placed by the Cairo conference on the empowerment of women and on women’s rights.

In addition, the Vatican critiqued feminism and particularly feminists who advocated for reproductive health and rights in ways that showed they had learned from their experience at Cairo. Instead of simply criticizing feminists for being anti-family or being radical, the Vatican framed them advocating a western-dominated agenda that did not represent women from the economic south, and that this feminism was “relying on a mainstream and limited rights discourse that is of little value to women” (Buss and Herman 2003: 114). Dr. Joaquin Navarro-Valls, director of the Holy See’s press office, alerted the conference attendees that they were being imposed on by “a Western product, a socially reductive philosophy” which is seen in the “disproportionate attention to sexual and reproductive health” (Navarro-Valls 1995:4). In particular, the Vatican criticized the Beijing Platform of Action for giving preference to sexually transmitted diseases or those that refer to reproduction, and ignoring tropical diseases that are more contagious and cause more deaths than sexually-transmitted diseases. The Holy See interpreted this as being biased against women from the south, for who tropical disease is more relevant (Navarro-Valls 1995).
The Vatican’s second critique of feminism was for being limited in its view of women and rights. It characterized the “old” feminism as desiring an “undifferentiated leveling… of the two sexes” while the “new” feminism has “a growing sensitivity to the right to be different… in other words, the right to be a woman” (Holy See 1995). The Holy See had constructed a view of feminism that it was much more comfortable with, because it fit with the Catholic doctrine concerning women and their different but complementary roles; it is nonetheless, called feminism, and advocated by the Vatican. At the end of the Beijing conference, the Vatican also critiqued the “old” feminism as not being able to see beyond individualism to what women really need. In the Vatican’s reservations to the Beijing Platform for Action, it accuses the final document of an exaggerated individualism in which key, relevant, provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are slighted – for example, the obligation to provide “special care and assistance” to motherhood. This selectivity thus marks another step in the colonization of the broad and rich discourse of universal rights by an impoverished, libertarian rights dialect. Surely this international gathering could have done more for women and girls than to leave them alone with their rights! (Paragraph II).

Buss and Herman (2003) argue that the Holy See’s statement takes the idea of rights and uses it to criticize feminists by characterizing them as focusing on rights without actually helping women and girls; the Holy See itself also adopted the idea of human rights and characterizes itself as focusing on the human rights of women and girls, and especially those of mothers. Robert Moynihan, writing for Inside the Vatican, detailed the double strategy of the Vatican: “to ally with progressive forces to increase women’s role in society… but at the same time to build an ‘anti-radical’ alliance against the proponents of radical feminism” (1995). The emergence of this alliance against feminism can be seen in the conservative organizations that have become active at the UN, but a key finding here is that the Vatican found it important to present itself as more progressive than it did
before, through its language and in support of human rights and health for women.

However, the Holy See did not influence the final document emerging from Beijing in a significant way, due both to the fact that its main goals had to do with blocking language and also because it was outnumbered.

Beyond the Vatican: the response of anti-abortion organizations

Scale shift  Several important anti-abortion organizations that currently oppose abortion in the international and domestic contexts became active in the aftermath of the Cairo and Beijing conferences. Individuals who attended Cairo and Beijing started NGOs to more effectively work at the international level; one of the most influential and well known of these is Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (C-FAM). Austin Ruse, C-FAM’s president, is an active speaker and writer, distributing the “Friday Fax,” a weekly e-mail bulletin that details issues at the UN of importance to a conservative audience, and mobilizing them into action. He attended the Beijing conference and was asked to head C-FAM in 1997; the organization has its headquarters in New York City in order to monitor and lobby the UN on behalf of natural family issues. He asserts that the impetus to form C-FAM came from the Cairo Conference and the Vatican’s subsequent call for aid in the international sphere on behalf of the family (Austin Ruse interview 2006).

Concerned Women for America (CWA) is a member of the Protestant Right; it was established in the 1980s by Beverly LaHaye in the 1980s, but did not participate in international politics until the 1990s. Wendy Wright, the president of CWA, came to the organization in 1999, and says that the 1994 Cairo conference on Population and Development was a “wake-up call for many of us that were in the pro-life movement”
(Wendy Wright interview 2006). She was not at the conference herself, but she noted that because of Cairo many pro-life activists realized that these issues were being debated internationally, and that it was the intent “of this conference… particularly from the Clinton administration to create an international, global right to abortion” (Wendy Wright interview 2006). Her own first experience at the UN was not until 1997. This is true for many of the current leaders of anti-abortion organizations: most did not get involved internationally until after the Cairo conference, and most cite the Cairo conference as the direct impetus for that involvement. Many of the most active anti-abortion organizations (C-FAM, CWA, Howard Center, Focus on the Family) cite this same reason for their involvement – to halt the liberal organizations and governments from instituting an international right to abortion, first threatened at the Cairo conference (Interviews with Austin Ruse, Wendy Wright, Allan Carlson 2006; Thomas Jacobson 2007). These organizations eventually applied for NGO accreditation with ECOSOC in order to attend the UN global conferences and be able to lobby at the UN.

6.2.2.1 Coalition Building

Although Protestant organizations have historically viewed the Catholic Church and the Pope with suspicion and distrust, the mid 1990s saw the start of a political alliance between the Catholic Church and the Christian Right in the U.S. and in the international sphere. Many religious conservatives began to recognize that they had more in common with other orthodox believers than with the more liberal members of their own faith (Butler 2000). While the differences between the Catholic Church and evangelical Protestantism have not disappeared and may be an issue in domestic contexts, Catholic, Protestant and Mormon anti-abortion organizations work together in their
efforts at the UN and UN global conferences. This alliance is a result of work by different conservative leaders both historically and more recently; Phyllis Schlafly worked to defeat the Equal Rights Amendment by bringing together activists from evangelical circles, Catholic churches, and Mormons, and this was the first time such an alliance had been successful. Despite uneasiness on all sides, Catholic, Protestant and Mormon groups worked together to defeat the ERA (Butler 2006: 98)). More recently, Austin Ruse from Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute has worked to bring together evangelical and Mormon organizations to work together at the UN (Butler 2006: 99).

Another way in which anti-abortion organizations began adjusting to the international environment was to engage in coalition building across faiths; finding allies to block objectionable language is necessary in the consensus-based negotiation process of the UN. The Vatican made the first overtures towards Muslim countries at the Cairo conference in 1994, and conservative Protestant and Catholic organizations in the late nineties continued the trend by reaching out to the major orthodox monotheistic faiths of the world, including Muslims and Jews. The World Congress of Families is an international conference organized by the Howard Center, a research organization focused on family, religion and society; it was first held in Prague from March 19-22, 1997, with the initial goal of helping Eastern European countries who were struggling with population issues. Scholars and demographers had invited Allan Carlson, the head of the Howard Center and a conservative demographic scholar, to speak at Moscow University, and he organized the first World Congress of Families to “compare and contrast the problems taking place in the developed Western world with those happening to the post-Communist nations” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). However, even at that
first conference, the issue of increasing the “conservative, pro-life, pro-family presence at the United Nations” gained increasing attention, and the second World Congress of Families conference clearly had that as the principal focus (Allan Carlson Interview 2006).

The World Congress of Families is meant to bring together scholarship that supports the pro-family, anti-abortion stance, as well as allies from all over the world that belong to one of the three monotheistic religions. The World Congress of Families imitates UN global conferences, for at the end of each conference, participants endorse a declaration, although that declaration is not very contested. These international gatherings have increased in size since the first in 1997, which attracted over 700 delegates, representing 145 pro-family organizations from 45 nations. The second World Congress of Families was held in Geneva from November 14-17, 1999; 1,600 delegates attended, representing 275 secular and religious organizations from 65 countries (World Congress of Families, Geneva Background 1999). These conferences brought together many scholars as well as activists. Each conference focused not only on the importance of the family as the fundamental unit of society and the implications of its decline, but also on the importance of UN rhetoric and actions on the family (Holmes 1997, Landolt 1999). The World Congress of Families II had an important role in articulating the “natural family” view on marriage, children, sexuality, the sanctity of human life, economics and government (World Congress of Families, Geneva Declaration 1999). This conference not only brought together conservative activists from around the world in order to build an anti-abortion coalition, it helped this coalition find a voice in framing their arguments based on the natural family, educated many of the attendees on the process of an
international conference, and mobilized these organizations for the UN conferences and meetings that dealt with the issues of abortion, women’s rights and health, sexuality and adolescents (Buss and Herman 2003: 80-81). Allan Carlson, the president of the Howard Center and the founder of the World Congress of Families conferences, describes the World Congress of Families II as trying to “bring more intellectual coherence and direction to the work we were doing,” trying to put together a coherent world view and an agenda” for the many different groups that had come together for the conference (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). He felt that the most important thing the anti-abortion organizations did at the time was to define the natural family as a term around which the many groups could rally (Allan Carlson Interview 2006).

Other meetings during this time period demonstrate the increasing ties between the anti-abortion organizations and the organizations of other faiths they were building alliances with. In 1995, a Catholic-Muslim commission was created to allow organizations and individuals from both faiths to take part in an interfaith dialogue. This commission met on three occasions between 1995 and 1997; its third meeting in Morocco in 1997 had two themes, that of “how Muslims and Christians can talk with each other,” and “the rights of minorities” (Catholic World News June 28th, 1997). In 1999, just prior to the five-year review of Beijing, the anti-abortion network held a pro-family seminar at UN headquarters entitled “Church, Synagogue, Mosque: Solutions for the Modern Family.” This seminar was co-sponsored by Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the governments of Argentina and Nicaragua (Religion Counts 2002: 9). These meetings demonstrate the efforts made during this time period between Muslim and Catholic organizations to establish ties in
order to create a stronger coalition on behalf of conservative issues both were interested in lobbying for at the UN. The strength of the ties between Muslim organizations and the anti-abortion network are not as strong as the ties between the three Christian sects, however, and have recently shown some signs of breaking down, as I will discuss in Chapter 7.

6.2.2.2 Framing

The ability to create alliances among organizations advocating against abortion from different theological convictions within Christianity, and different faiths and cultures all over the world, was enhanced by the innovative framing of these issues as pertaining to the “natural family.” Allan Carlson of the Howard Center explained that the family had become a deconstructed word, defined to mean different things according to the agendas of those who were defining it. He saw the deconstruction as “without question purposeful. People had other agendas,” including the population control movement and the feminist movement (Interview 2006). He believed that the word family described an entity “rooted in history, rooted in natural law, rooted in human nature;” when he and his colleagues put together a definition of the natural family, they do not view themselves as imposing an ideological meaning, but a valid understanding “viewed historically but also viewed relative to human biology and what we know from the social sciences. …I think it’s actually reflective of reality.” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006).

The World Congress of Families II in Geneva (1999) boosted interest in the “natural family” a phrase that signified interest in several related issues, including motherhood, abortion, homosexual marriage, and adolescent rights and sex education.
The Howard Center’s definition does not refer to God by a name that might exclude any of the monotheistic religions, instead using the more neutral phrase “Creator.”

We affirm that the natural human family is established by the Creator and essential to good society. We address ourselves to all people of good will who, with the majority of the world's people, value the natural family. Ideologies of statism, individualism and sexual revolution, today challenge the family's very legitimacy as an institution. … To defend the family and to guide public policy and cultural norms, this Declaration asserts principles that respect and uphold the vital roles that the family plays in society. (Howard Center Principles)

The phrase “natural family” allowed activists from all over the world and from different faiths to focus on their agreement on these issues of policy rather than the different ways they arrived at this agreement. However, is important to realize that even the Christian organizations come from three theologically different standpoints, the coalition is not uniform, and particularly between faiths, it is fairly fragile (Allan Carlson Interview 2006).

Rights language also permeated the anti-abortion arguments, but any change in the framing of their arguments in terms of rights was much more subtle than those observed with the Holy See. Many of these organizations, as a result of their domestic work in the U.S., had experience in framing their arguments in terms of human rights and the rights of the individual; to them, the human right they were most concerned with was the right to life, and the individual they were concerned with was the child rather than the mother. These frames transferred fairly easily to the UN, but they did not play as large a role in the adjustment of these organizations to advocacy at the UN. Instead, many anti-abortion organizations have focused on the wrong premises of UN population programs in the first place; they have turned around the problem identified by demographers and the rationale behind family planning and abortion prior to the reproductive health change in paradigm by arguing that the real problem is ageing populations in developed
countries, and that was the result of population control measures (Population Research Institute 1999). Although they have adopted rights language, they have never truly used the human rights framework to mean the right of the individual involves choice concerning reproduction, especially abortion; I believe this frame is too close to heart of the issue for the anti-abortion network, and it would undermine their grass-roots support.

However, a greater adjustment has been visible in the framing of anti-abortion arguments by Catholic organizations, which supports an understanding of group rights rather than individual rights. This more conservative understanding of rights has been linked to the cultural, traditional and religious values of developing countries that are under attack by Western values, or lack thereof. The Holy See began to frame its arguments against the “cultural imperialism” of developed countries beginning with the Beijing Women’s conference, and subsequently, the International Right to Life Federation and Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute have positioned themselves as friends of developing countries who were being coerced by Western countries into accepting liberal rights that were against their cultures, religions, and traditions.

Throughout Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute’s newsletters and the International Right to Life newsletters, and the publications and articles put out by closely allied organizations, the opposition is labeled as “Western” countries or organizations, who have lost their moral compass and are attempting to coerce developing countries into abandoning their traditions and religious morals with their undue influence in the international sphere (International Right to Life Newsletter March/April 2000, Friday Fax 2000).
As many anti-abortion organizations use this frame of Western imperialism to denounce the UN setting standards and monitoring on issues of sexual and reproductive health, they also support state sovereignty as a bulwark against the expansion of international norms that are seen to conflict with traditional cultural and religious practices. Most anti-abortion organizations, Catholic and evangelical, use arguments that emphasize the sovereignty of states, referring back to the Charter of the UN and arguing that the UN should not interfere with states’ abilities to make their own rules and enforce them (Concerned Women for America 1999, Austin Ruse Interview 2006). This has continued to be a major theme for most anti-abortion organizations when speaking of the UN; their arguments center on the lack of accountability of many monitoring commissions, who interpret language to mean abortion rights and request countries to liberalize abortion laws (UN Human Rights Commission, International Right to Life Newsletter).

Interestingly, most anti-abortion organizations do not direct their framing strategies at UN employees because they do not believe they can influence them; they do not directly targeted the UN because they believe these men and women are so liberal that they will not hear them (Jack Willke Interview 2006, Austin Ruse Interview 2006). For instance, Austin Ruse stated that “I think that the UN bureaucrats are our opponents on these issues. … There’s no question about it that we’re not wanted by the powers that be” (Austin Ruse Interview 2006). He went on to argue that everyone at the UN, but especially at the UNFPA, would be sympathetic to abortion-rights organizations and activists, and hostile to anti-abortion activists (Austin Ruse Interview 2006). Allan Carlson, a former neo-Malthusian demographer, now sees the anti-abortion network
working against “a fairly aggressive, radical secular individualism which has been the
dominant force in the UN for several decades now” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). He
traced the roots of this secular individualism in population policy at the UN to Alva
Myrdal, a Swedish feminist and population scholar who, along with her husband, had a
lot of influence in the 1930s in Sweden, and again in the 1960s. Carlson describes her as
a “bright, creative person, and when she got involved in population policy, …her agenda
was very much secular, individualist, … socialist, building a post-family order where the
state essentially had replaced the family as the organizing principle of society. She was
open and clear about this” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). In the 1940s, she was the
highest-ranking woman in the UN, and she oversaw social and population policy, and
Carlson believes that “certainly her vision, her ideology… has had a long and strong
legacy” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). In addition, he sees this mindset – “the modern
European mindset, which is secular, individualistic, focused heavily on the self” as
widespread within Europe, and as a result, has greatly shaped the UN and its policies due
to the many Western European individuals that “have disproportionately peopled the
social policies offices” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). “By and large Europe itself
became heavily secularized, and it’s a wealthy place with a heavy influence at the United
Nations. And it’s a place that takes the U.N. much more seriously than the United States
does” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006).

These interviews demonstrate the prevalent view among anti-abortion activists
that the UN is a hostile place for them to work, one dominated by a secular and
individualist culture. However, these organizations continue to adjust their strategies to
lobby at the UN, illustrating that even the mainly “friendly” government delegations that
they target require them to shift their language to fit the environment they are working within.

6.2.2.3 Information Politics

Anti-abortion organizations used moral and traditional arguments for preserving the natural family and against abortion in their newsletters and literature to their constituents. However, as they became more involved in the international sphere, anti-abortion organizations have begun to use more research based arguments to persuade government delegations at the UN of their positions on abortion and the natural family. The use of scientific research in the initial stages of their advocacy at the UN was negligible, but as they became more committed to the international sphere, anti-abortion organizations began to utilize research from several conservative organizations that took on the role of providing evidence to support conservative advocacy on these and other issues.

Several organizations, such as the Howard Center and the Population Research Institute, have taken on the role of producing research and statistics to support the advocacy of anti-abortion organizations. The Howard Center labels itself a non-profit research center that believes the natural family is the fundamental unit of society and offers research and analysis on how the erosion of the family has affected key areas of society, including education, child abuse, and the economy. The president of the Howard Center, Allan Carlson, described his organization as trying to support anti-abortion advocacy with “some intellectual ammunition, and also mobilizing what we know about the social sciences behind that” (Allan Carlson Interview 2006). One of the Howard Center’s publications, *The Family in America*, “analyzes the status of the family in this
nation and time” (Howard Center, *The Family in America*). The Howard Center also publishes a supplement to *The Family in America* called *New Research*, featuring ten to twelve “readable abstracts” from professional journals in the fields of sociology, psychology, medicine, law, anthropology, and history that “cast light on the vital importance of the natural family and the serious consequences that derive from its decline” (Howard Center, *New Research*). This is especially revealing because this research is not produced by the Howard Center, but derives greater legitimacy because they have been published in professional journals.

The Population Research Institute (PRI), presided over by Steve Mosher, describes itself as a “non-profit research and educational organization dedicated to objectively presenting the truth about population–related issues” (Population Research Institute [http://www.pop.org](http://www.pop.org)). Steve Mosher a vocal critic of the “myth of overpopulation” and a prolific writer who has published articles throughout the years in newspapers and journals. PRI’s publications include a weekly briefing newsletter that provides information concerning population policy, including abortion policies, in countries around the world. PRI’s Research and Education webpage includes articles and information concerning U.S. documents that support population control, and “Web Watch,” which analyzes demographic and abortion-rights websites for “the distortions and poor logic that often characterize these organizations” (PRI Web Watch). PRI also includes an “In-Depth Reports” page, which includes research papers on abortion policy in the U.S. and abroad, especially the connection between U.S. funding and the UN. In 2003, Mosher published a paper on the integration of HIV/AIDS programs and Sexual Health and Rights programs in Africa and why such programs would not alleviate the
HIV/AIDS epidemic; in 1999, a report called “Money for Nothing” on “Why the U.S. Should Not Resume UNFPA Funding” based on the use of UNFPA funding to support coercive population programs; and in 1996, a report on the “Demographic, Social, and Human Rights Consequences of U.S. Cuts in Population Control Funding,” which argued that such cuts in funding would decrease human rights abuses associated with coercive population programs.

At the World Congress of Families II in Geneva, the inclusion of secular speakers and scholars also showed that the organizers of the conference were aware of the need to persuade on the basis of science and reason rather than the mainstays of religion and traditional values. Twenty-five of the seventy-five speakers on the program in 1999 were university scholars and current or former government officials or diplomats, up from about fifteen in 1997. Several speakers used a scientific and research-based approach in their speeches supporting the natural family, including references to how the natural family supports the economy, how strong marriages helps reduce the incidence of crime by teenagers, and how the natural family reduces the tax on society of divorce and child abuse.

The newsletters of two active anti-abortion organizations, International Right to Life and Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, both began to use research put out by the UN Population Division concerning world population estimates and projections to claim that the true problem the world was dealing with was population ageing, or de-population, rather than over-population. In 1999, Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute stated, based on UN research, that

The most alarming statistic of the 1998 revision is the number of countries who have reached what is known as ‘below replacement fertility’, a condition where the citizens of a country no longer replace themselves. In order to replace itself, a country must have at
least 2.1 children per couple. Two years ago, 51 countries had fallen below that number. The number of countries now in low replacement fertility is 61. Experts fear these countries are in demographic free fall, with no end in sight. (Friday Fax March 1999)

The International Right to Life newsletter stated that

Pro-lifers who wish to inform their fellow citizens of the truth about world de-population, as supposed to the mythical propaganda being employed by U.N. population imperialists, can now begin to cite figures from this official U.N. population report. These figures are authoritative and should be widely disseminated. (International Right to Life Newsletter Feb/March 1999)

When anti-abortion organizations felt that they could use UN data to support their claim that declining fertility rates rather than rising fertility rates was the true population problem, they credited UN data about world population projections as authoritative and began to support using that data for wide dissemination. However, these same newsletters reported on the status of abortions and abortion laws in many other countries around the world, and used mostly anecdotal evidence to support their position. Thus, the use of science and reason to support their advocacy claims can be seen mainly in arguments presented to more hostile audiences, or “outsiders” while arguments or information directed at “insiders” continued to use more traditional supports such as anecdotes or referrals to moral codes.

These were distinct changes in strategy for conservatives, and demonstrated not only an adjustment in moving from the domestic to the international, but the way in which they moved into the international space. The World Congress of Family conferences imitated UN conferences in substance, organization and procedure, and provided conservative activists with a change in mindset as well as tools; as such, they were better prepared to enter that international stage and influence international debate and policy on a par with the women’s organizations which had more than a decade of experience advocating at the UN.
Cairo+5

Cairo+5 was another triumph for the women’s organizations that advocated reproductive health and rights, as discussed previously; these organizations had the momentum from the Cairo conference success and the continued support of the Clinton administration, and pushed the language in the final declaration to include sexual health as well as reproductive health and rights (Sinding Interview 2006). However, the Cairo +5 conference also demonstrated the scale shift of the anti-abortion network up to the international sphere, and the adjustments they made in order to better advocate at the UN. The Holy See and anti-abortion organizations that had developed in the time since Cairo attended the five-year review and were organized and vocal in their opposition to the expansion in reproductive health and rights language.

Although the negotiations on the review document were not meant to re-negotiate the agreements from Cairo, those who advocated for reproductive health and rights tried to address new issues and include new language, while those against reproductive health and rights argued against both new and old language that they opposed. The issues of abortion, sexual health, and adolescent rights were high on the reproductive health network’s agenda; reproductive health and rights activists, along with the EU and U.S. delegations, tried to include references to emergency contraception, with the most visible and vocal objectors to otherwise accepted language being a coalition of Catholic and Muslim states including Algeria, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Nicaragua (Fahey 1999). The Vatican’s delegation raised opposition to mentions of emergency contraception, arguing that it is an abortifacient rather than a
contraceptive, and objected to the term “safe motherhood,” arguing that it was a code word for abortion legalization (Klitsch 1999: 197). The language referring to emergency contraception was as a result much more vague than women’s rights advocates wanted.

Another issue that created a lot of friction was parents’ rights to supervise their children, with the Holy See and anti-abortion NGO members seeking to add the phrase “the rights, duties and responsibilities of parents” in providing children with guidance in sexual and reproductive matters. One introductory paragraph in the section on adolescents quoted from the Cairo Program of Action and referred to the rights, duties and responsibilities of parents. In the substantive sections on adolescents, a compromise text read “with the active support and participation, as appropriate, of parents, families, communities, NGOs and the private sector” (UN General Assembly Report 1999: paragraph 21b). In another instance, when a section called for “effective referral mechanisms across services and levels of care,” the Holy See asked for an explicit conscience clause that would allow providers to refuse to refer. Some countries objected to this by arguing that the Holy See in turn was trying to include new language; in the end, the compromise text read “taking care that services are offered in conformity with human rights and with ethical and professional standards,” which did not include a conscience clause.

More anti-abortion NGOs activists attended the negotiations for the five-year review of Cairo than attended either Cairo or the Beijing conference; organizations including International Right to Life Federation, Opus Dei, Human Life International, and the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute brought around 100 representatives. Many progressive activists noted with dismay the greater ranks and increased boldness of
these anti-abortion organizations, and especially their role in stalling the negotiations on the review document so much that even after the negotiations had been extended an extra day, a consensus document could not be produced, and another session had to be scheduled just prior to the time the document was to be presented at the General Assembly meeting in June. Joseph Fahey, a delegate for the American Humanist Association, noted that the anti-abortion organization delegates numbered more than a hundred and “lobbied government delegates in an effort to derail the Program of Action” (Fahey 1999). Kathy Hall Martinez, a representative for the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, also remarked, “I was amazed at how much more organized and sophisticated the Holy See and its allies were as compared to Cairo in 1994. They are better organized now than the women’s movement because they are very focused on a small number of issues. And they have a lot of folks who will volunteer their own time and use their own money to attend these meetings” (Eager 2004).

In addition, Fahey (1999) notes that the progressive NGO representatives took part in three actions as the conference went on that displayed their frustration with the anti-abortion side, especially the Holy See. First, as a result of the delays due to contentious debate, the General Assembly had decided to cancel the five presentations from NGOs scheduled for that day. They sent a unanimous resolution to the president of the special session, Didier Opertti, to reinstate the NGO presentations, and three were. Second, a progressive Catholic professor of theology delivered a confrontational speech accusing the Holy See of not representing the diversity of views on abortion and contraception among Catholics, and urging the Vatican to step down from its privileged Observer Status, which was met with much applause. Third, an open letter to the Vatican
was released by women’s NGOs from Latin America and supported by over eighty international NGOs from the women’s coalition, which asked several pointed questions meant to expose apparent discrepancies between the Holy See’s discourse on life and their actions against the Program of Action, and to again ask why the Vatican, as a male establishment, was concerned with contraception, sexual education and women’s health services.

Scholars and activists from both sides agree that although anti-abortion delegations and NGOs contested the review process much more successfully, the review of Cairo was a progressive success because it re-affirmed the language and core principles of the Cairo Program of Action and offered concrete proposals to help governments further implement the goals of Cairo, especially in the area of improving contraceptive practice, lessening illiteracy among women and girls, reducing maternal mortality, and preventing and treating HIV and AIDS in young people.

### 6.3 Conclusion

The time period between Cairo and the five-year review of Cairo was one of intense learning for anti-abortion organizations, some of which were created as a result of Cairo. Many Christian Right organizations in the U.S. felt that they had to respond to the impact of the women’s health and rights movement at Cairo by attending and advocating against abortion at subsequent UN global conferences that referenced population issues, and although many did attend the Beijing Women’s conference, they were not prepared for advocacy at the UN level and were discouraged by their cold reception in an environment that was primarily the sphere of progressive organizations with progressive causes and methods. However, the Holy See had begun to change their tactics at this
point, and many of the anti-abortion organizations used the time from 1995 to 1999 to change their approach to the UN. As a result, anti-abortion organizations created a space for their advocacy at the Cairo +5 conference, which mainly reflected their influence in a negating sense, in that women’s health and rights activists were not able to further the language on the issues of abortion and emergency contraception as far as they would have liked.

The impact of the state continued to play out in this time period, but with mixed results in the case of the U.S. The Clinton administration continued to appoint delegates sympathetic to reproductive health and rights, as well as abortion, but was wary of appearing too sympathetic to the issue of abortion in the international sphere because of the Republican Congress that was elected in 1994 (Barbara Crossette 2004). European delegations, however, continued to strongly support reproductive health and rights, and increased their spending for population programs in response to the decrease in U.S. spending, again a result of the Republican Congress; this allowed the Cairo +5 conference to be quite extensive, and population programs to continue without much loss of functionality.

6.3.1 Findings

The women’s health and rights movement in the years from the Beijing conference to the five-year review of Cairo seemed to move forward in their use of science and reason to support their advocacy, and to find more effective ways of reaching government delegations. They were able to maintain the relationships they built with UN employees, especially within the UNFPA, and build on them to further the language of Cairo at the Beijing Women’s Conference and at Cairo +5.
The conservative activists of the anti-abortion movement used the time after Cairo to scale up their advocacy to the international level, especially at the UN. Many Christian Right organizations involved in domestic anti-abortion lobbying began attending UN global conferences, especially Protestant or Mormon organizations that did not formerly engage the UN (Focus on the Family, United Families International, Howard Center). Human Life International created and funded an entire new organization, Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, to lobby against abortion at the UN. As these anti-abortion organizations moved into the international sphere, they felt the same pressures as any other group to conform to their environment in order to better influence it. At the UN, this was a little harder for anti-abortion groups to do, given their central theme against abortion; such a position is perceived as a conservative, traditional, religious position, in an environment that valued consensus, rights, and progress through science and reason. In the 1995-2000 period, anti-abortion organizations began to build coalitions across faiths and across borders. Their attempts were fairly tentative, and struggled to walk the line between speaking to insiders in a language they were comfortable with, that of traditions and religiously-based morals, and making that language palatable in an environment such as the UN global conferences, where such rationales were not the norm. As a result, science and research became more visible as tools that anti-abortion organizations tried to use in lobbying at the UN. Key organizations such as the Howard Center also framed their arguments in the more neutral terms of the natural family so that groups of many different faiths would be comfortable joining the network.
6.3.2 Comparison of the two movements

Women’s rights organizations, building on their success at Cairo, attempted to push the language on reproductive health and rights to include sexual health and rights at the Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995 and at the five-year review of Cairo. These organizations continued to strengthen their ties with the human rights community, in order to have human rights organizations working with them on the issue of reproductive health and rights, and also continued to frame reproductive health as a human right. Having adjusted their international focus to include many developing country organizations for the Cairo conference, they continued to work with these organizations at Beijing and Cairo +5. They were more aware of the presence of anti-abortion activists at these two conferences, and had to work harder to preserve the previously agreed-upon language from Cairo than they had anticipated as a result, but continued to push successfully for sexual health and rights, greater focus on adolescents, and abortion rights.

Anti-abortion activists attended Beijing in much greater numbers in response to the change in language to reproductive health and rights and the call by the Holy See to advocate against an international right to abortion, with mixed results because many of these activists were not organized or allied, and felt outnumbered and belittled. The main change and influence by conservative actors at the Beijing conference came from the Holy See; Vatican delegates changed their framing in order to portray themselves as more progressive and concerned with women’s health and rights. The fact that the Holy See felt the need to portray itself as more progressive is a telling sign of the extent to
which religious actors at the UN feel the need to conform to the cultural environment that emphasizes the individual, and especially the rights framework.

Prior to Cairo +5, the World Congress of Families, an international conference organized by the Howard Center, continued the Holy See’s attempts to reach out to other monotheistic faiths; it also built ties between sects of the Christian Right in the U.S., between Catholic, Protestant, and Mormon organizations. This was helped by the framing of conservative issues as “natural family” issues, which included many concerns, including abortion, the role of marriage and husbands and wives in strengthening society, and to some extent gay marriage and rights. The World Congress of families also emphasized research-based evidence for positions on the natural family, with many academic speakers. Both the coalition-building and the information politics that took place at the World Congress of Families, and its superficial similarities to UN global conferences, provide evidence that the anti-abortion organizations were aware of that they had to make adjustments in order to work at the UN, specifically to have more international allies and an evidence-base that would be better accepted in the UN environment.

At Cairo +5, conservative activists were more organized and able to affect the proceedings of the NGO Forum. They also lobbied country delegations more effectively, to oppose emergency contraception and to introduce language concerning parents’ responsibilities for adolescents. I would argue that as a whole, the anti-abortion organizations did not utilize framing, coalition-building, and the use of science and reason in combination, and so had quite a limited influence on the conference. They were
not able to introduce any language concerning the rights of parents over adolescents, but were able to water down language concerning emergency contraception.
7 The Adjustment of the Movements to Each Other: 2000-2004

7.1 Background
The ten-year review of Cairo did not occur as a global conference, but regional meetings reviewing the progress towards meeting the goals set out in the Cairo Program of Action took place in Bangkok on December 11-17, 2002 for Asia and the Pacific; in Port-of-Spain on November 11-12, 2003 for Latin America and the Caribbean; in Geneva on January 12-14, 2004 for Europe; in Dakar on June 7-10, 2004 for Africa; and in Beirut on November 19-21, 2004 for the Arab region. The General Assembly in New York commemorated the 10th anniversary of the ICPD, at which time member states made statements and reaffirmed their commitment to the Cairo Program of Action. The 37th session of the Commission on Population and Development (CPD) met on March 22-26, 2004 to review the progress made in implementing the ICPD Program of Action. Countries reported to the CPD at this time on country-level progress, but at least two regional meetings had not as yet taken place. The negotiations on the draft resolution on the Follow-up of the Program of Action of the ICPD took place at that time, and the resolution was adopted at the reconvening of the commission on May 6th.

Regional reviews of the implementation of ICPD ten years later took place beginning in 2002 and continuing through 2004. In December 2002, the Fifth Asia and Pacific Population Conference was held on the theme of “Population and Poverty.” On November 11-12, 2003, twenty Caribbean countries and territories reaffirmed their commitment to the ICPD; Latin American countries also reaffirmed their commitment to the ICPD in June 2004, and adopted a resolution that urges countries in the region to
intensify their efforts to continue implementing the Cairo Program of Action. The Economic Commission for Europe and UNFPA convened the European Population Forum in Geneva on January 12-14, 2004. The Forum brought together experts from executive and legislative branches of government, academia, research, intergovernmental organizations and institutions, non-governmental organizations, youth and the private sector. The Forum emphasized the pertinence of the ICPD to the European region and called for greater attention on how best to further implement the Program of Action in the region as well as worldwide. In June 2004, the Economic Commission for Africa convened an expert meeting followed by a ministerial level meeting; both endorsed the Africa Regional Report and a Declaration that reaffirms Africa’s commitment to the ICPD goals and their importance in achieving the MDGs. The Arab Population Forum review took place in November 2004; it focused on population, poverty and development, and how best to overcome high maternal mortality, especially barriers to the enforcement of reproductive rights and gender equality.

Internationally, the General Assembly commemorated the Tenth Anniversary of the ICPD on October 14th, 2004. The Commission on Population and Development used its 37th session on March 22-26, 2004, to review and appraise the progress made in implementing the ICPD Program of Action. Countries reported on significant progress in implementation of the ICPD Program of Action, and how well the ICPD agenda has been integrated into national policies and strategies. The meeting re-affirming the theme for 2005, “Population, Development and HIV/AIDS,” and also considered an additional topic for 2005: the contribution of the implementation of the ICPD Program of Action to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (Countdown 2015 – Events,
The UNFPA held a Special Event Panel Discussion, “Putting People First: Implementing the ICPD Agenda and Achieving the MDGs,” on June 21\textsuperscript{st}, 2004 in Geneva, Switzerland.

The UNFPA also organized four thematic high-level roundtables for the 10-year review, on issues they believed to be essential to the further implementation of the ICPD Program of Action. Of the two that occurred in 2004, one was the High Level Global Consultation on Linking HIV/AIDS with Sexual and Reproductive Health. In May 2004, technical experts met in New York to discuss the linkages between HIV/AIDS and sexual and reproductive health, and proposed actions that would help form the ‘Commitment to Action;’ this Commitment to Action was then discussed and endorsed by the high-level global leaders from both the reproductive health and HIV/AIDS fields that met at the High Level Global Consultation in June 2004 in New York. The reproductive health and HIV/AIDS leaders came together to reach consensus on a set of actions and recommendations that would “ensure more effective integration and linkage between policies and programs that address HIV/AIDS and those that address reproductive health” (Countdown 2015 – Events, 2004). The second meeting that occurred in 2004 was the October Roundtable on Promoting Reproductive Health and Rights: Reducing Poverty, in Sweden. Policy-makers, experts, and “selected social and opinion leaders” gathered for a meeting meant to present evidence on the importance of reproductive health and rights in helping to reduce poverty, which would then be used to inform the 2005 UNGA Review of the Millennium Declaration. The declared goal of the meeting was stated as “positioning Reproductive Health and Rights as a cornerstone of national poverty eradication strategies, in order to promote social and economic growth within a human
rights framework, and at presenting arguments to prioritize investments in Reproductive Health and Rights” (Countdown 2015 – Events, 2004).

7.2 Analysis

7.2.1 Abortion-rights movement

Framing and Alliances:

Women’s health and rights organizations have made some smaller framing changes since the Cairo and Cairo+5 conferences. Organizations have tended to shy away from names that denote a purpose dedicated to strictly population decrease, and instead adopted names that indicate broader concerns; in addition to the crisis view of population becoming unpopular since the Cairo conference, funding opportunities have become restricted since the perception that population growth is no longer an urgent issue has become more widespread (Gillespie 2004: 35). In addition, long-time family planning experts and demographers have argued that reproductive health and rights are too vague a formulation for policy-makers and donors to fund, and that the greatly decreased funds for family planning worldwide are a direct result of the Cairo Program of Action’s emphasis on formulations that are too complex and indirect to be compelling to policy-makers or donors (Gillespie 2004).

Duff Gillespie was a long-time population and health expert with USAID and a member of the U.S. delegation to Cairo and he is currently affiliated with the Gates Institute for Population and Reproductive Health at Johns Hopkins. He believes that pushing for the entire Cairo Program of Action is too difficult, but that there are certain components of the program that could be championed effectively because of their clear goals and concrete actions (Gillespie 2004). He emphasizes several components that he

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believes are “best bets,” including averting HIV/AIDS transmission from mother to child with a one-dose anti-retroviral drug as well as family planning services directed at HIV/AIDS positive women and reducing abortion, especially unsafe abortion, as an explicit goal of family planning services.

Most abortion-rights advocates continue to use a human rights basis to frame reproductive health and rights rather than the security framework that justified population control policy in the past (environmental, resources, or otherwise); however, they have attempted to regain an urgency for their programs and to raise funds for their programs by connecting them intimately with the Millennium Development Goals, and more specifically, to HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. Beginning with the adoption of the Millennium Declaration in 2000 and the Millennium Development Goals in 2001 and continuing to the 2005 review of the MDGs, reproductive health and rights advocates have framed the Cairo Program of Action as essential to the fulfillment of the MDGs, and they have worked to include a reproductive health and rights MDG in order to maintain funding and visibility at the UN. The reproductive health and rights organizations have also worked to ally themselves with the HIV/AIDS community and frame their issue as essentially connected to the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, especially at Countdown 2015, the liberal NGO ten-year review of Cairo. These are the biggest changes in both framing and coalition building for the abortion-rights network from 2000-2004, and the alliance with the HIV/AIDS community is one that almost every interview respondent from the abortion-rights NGO community cited as a present or future goal. Jill Sheffield of Family Care International (FCI) stated that as an organization, FCI added HIV/AIDS as a major objective in the context of safe
motherhood; to her, it was clear at that time that women and girls were suffering disproportionately, especially in Africa (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). When discussing future allies, the HIV/AIDS community was high on the list of many of these NGOs, along with the human rights community (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006, Barbara Crane Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006).

I will first elaborate on the Millennium Development process and how reproductive health and rights came to be left out of the Declaration and the Goals, and how women’s reproductive health and rights groups have worked to keep reproductive health and rights on the agenda; I will then trace how this movement has worked to re-frame their issues in relation to HIV/AIDS and ally with the HIV/AIDS organizations in the 2000-2007 time frame, especially in the 10-year NGO review of Cairo, a meeting called Countdown 2015.

The absence of reproductive health and rights from the Millennium Development Goals

The Millennium Development Declaration and Goals were meant to provide the UN and its member nations with a roadmap for world development by 2015, a culmination of the work done throughout the 1990s in global conferences with individual UN agencies, governments, and NGOs in identifying issues and solutions of global importance. Rights language continues to play an important role in the Millennium Declaration, which includes a section on “Human Rights, Democracy, and Good Governance” that elaborates on human rights, minority rights, and development rights. However, neither the Declaration nor the Goals included a recommendation on, or indeed any explicit mention of, reproductive health and rights. This exclusion has been a major
setback for the women’s health and rights movement; despite the consensus on reproductive health and rights at Cairo and the reiterated support for that consensus at the five-year review of Cairo, reproductive health and rights was not included in the blueprint for the UN’s future agenda and work. The Millennium Development Goals have also been adopted by NGOs and private organizations throughout the world as the minimum that must be done for the world’s poor and developing nations, and the omission of reproductive health and rights further distances civil society from the concept and language. Although this might seem a victory for the anti-abortion network working to roll back UN language on reproductive health and rights, in fact it seems the network was only indirectly responsible for the omission.

The Millennium Development Declaration and Goals both evolved from the Secretary General’s Millennium Development Report, published in April 2000. It was written under the leadership of John Gerard Ruggie, Kofi Annan’s chief adviser for strategic planning from 1997 to 2001 (Crossette 2004: 4). Theo-Ben Gurirab of Namibia, the General Assembly president for the year that preceded the Millennium Assembly, wanted the draft of the Declaration written quickly and without the typical intense debate over social issues; as a result, he did not create a preparatory committee and asked two experienced diplomats to put together the Declaration without the involvement of NGOs in order to streamline the process. These were Ambassador Gert Rosenthal of Guatemala and Michael John Powles, the permanent representative of New Zealand at the UN; Rosenthal testifies that drawing up a draft Millennium Declaration was difficult even without a preparatory process, and that it was largely drawn from the Secretary General’s Report, a document that he “admits had been composed to skirt controversy” (Crossette
2004: 4). The Millennium Development Declaration was brought to a vote in the fall of 2000, and the Millennium Development Goals were adopted in August 2001. The Millennium Development Goals included eight broad goals, 18 specific targets, and 48 indicators.

**Millennium Development Goals**

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The Report did not include a recommendation incorporating reproductive health, although reproductive health is indirectly mentioned in connection to poverty, disease, and the prevention of HIV-AIDS (Millennium Development Report 2000). As a result, the Millennium Declaration and later the Millennium Development Goals also did not include any specific recommendations concerning reproductive health. This absence is all the more glaring because the topic of every other major global conference of the 1990s was included in the Millennium Development Goals. Journalist Barbara Crossette researched the reasons for this omission at the request of the Hewlitt Foundation; one key reason she detailed in her report ironically involved the success of the five-year review of the Cairo conference in 1999. The strong efforts of NGOs and official delegations at that time, and the success of those efforts at the review, led the NGOs and government delegations to be fatigued and overconfident concerning their issue; they did not turn their attention to the Millennium Development process quickly or effectively enough,
according to Stan Bernstein, senior researcher and editor at UNFPA, and sexual and reproductive health advisor to the Millennium Project (Crossette 2004: 9).

The opposition of the G-77 nations in 1999 was another key reason for the absence of reproductive health and rights from the Declaration and Goals; the G-77 government delegations were divided about women’s rights, and states such as Iran and Libya kept negotiations going until 3 AM in order to prevent a consensus that they opposed. The opposition of many Islamic and Catholic countries was also apparently a factor in the Secretariat’s decision to not fight for reproductive health and rights as a recommendation or goal. “I think the calculation of the Secretariat was, Let’s not sacrifice the greater coherence and get involved in these highly controversial topics” (Rosenthal in Crossette 2004: 10).

In addition, some key leadership during the Cairo process was missing during the Millennium Development process; Nafis Sadik had stepped down as Secretary-General of the UNFPA, and the head of the U.S. delegation to Cairo, Tim Wirth, had left the Clinton administration to be the head of the UN Foundation. The Clinton administration was still responsible for the U.S. mission to the UN, but by 2000, the conservatives had captured Congress and opposed the Clinton administration’s stance on many issues, but especially abortion, and as a result, the administration had stopped promoting women’s rights at the UN. Vice President Al Gore, then running for president in 2000, chose not to emphasize women’s rights at a time when the conservatives, especially on the issue of abortion, were strengthening their hold on the American electorate. Dr. Nafis Sadik in an interview with Barbara Crossette blamed the Secretariat’s caution and John Ruggie’s need for concrete indicators for the lack of reproductive health in the Millennium Development
process (Crossette 2004: 11). Ruggie, she said, did not understand how reproductive health could be quantifiably measured, and as a result, he did not want to include it as a goal.

By the time NGOs realized that reproductive health and rights was in danger of not making it as a Millennium Development Goal, their efforts were too late. The many letters written to Thora Obaid and phone calls to Dr. Sadik, private meetings with UN officials and sympathetic country delegates, were not able to change the content of the Millennium Development Goals; it was now 2001, Michael Doyle had replaced John Ruggie, and in addition to the opposition from G-77 countries, Doyle believed that “the Bush administration was waiting in the wings to block any reference to women’s rights or even to the use of the term ‘reproductive health,’ which conservatives argue is a cloak for a ‘feminist agenda’ that included the right to abortion” (Crossette 2004: 12). This represents a change in the opportunity structure for abortion-rights organizations.

However, Doyle also believes that the Secretariat and UN agencies were not opposed to the Cairo program, only trying to wait out the opposition from G-77 and the U.S. at the time, which would have made the Millennium Development Goals with a reproductive health and rights MDG very hard to pass. Doyle in fact worked to include reproductive health and rights in the indicators and targets of the existing MDGs. Several that survived include: the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel, considered a basic measure of a woman’s right to good reproductive care by Unicef and the World Health Organization; in the section devoted to HIV-AIDS, indicators such as the condom prevalence rate among married women and sex workers and a more general measure of contraceptive prevalence are used. But reproductive health is not included as an indicator
of gender equality or the empowerment of women, and the major reasons seem to be the conservative opposition from G-77 countries as well as, later, the Bush administration. In addition, some NGO members and UN employees cite a difficult situation for NGOs who were facing a backlash against “civil society” involvement at the UN in 2000 and 2001 (Crossette 2004, Joseph Chamie Interview 2006). Although they did not directly aim for the exclusion of reproductive health and rights from the MDGs necessarily, the conservative organizations of the anti-abortion movement certainly succeeded in identifying the phrase “reproductive health and rights” as code for abortion, an issue that raised the hackles of many conservative Islamic and Catholic countries in addition to women’s rights in general. This, in addition to the desire of the General Assembly president to draft the Millennium Development Declaration quickly and without a great deal of prolonged deliberation, a change of leadership in key places, and the inability of women’s rights NGOs to be significantly involved in the Millennium Development process, kept reproductive health and rights out of the Millennium Development Goals.

Using this general overview and analysis, I see the exclusion of reproductive health and rights in the UN Millennium Development Goals as an indirect victory for the conservative anti-abortion movement, and one that served notice to the abortion-rights movement that they must adjust their strategy to account for a more robust anti-abortion movement than they had so far encountered in the international realm. The Vatican and anti-abortion organizations did not directly influence the Millennium Development process, but the furor created by the reproductive and sexual health and rights language in the conservative countries of the G-77 and the lack of support from the Bush
administration for such language was enough to make important decision-makers within the UN want to sidestep any possible landmines in the approval process for the MDGs.

The reaction of the women’s reproductive health and rights movement to the exclusion of their concerns from the MDGs tells us a great deal about the importance of the UN and its declarations to this community and to the foundation community; their strategies in response to the exclusion of reproductive health and rights from the MDGs tells us much about the future of the movement and how they have learned to adjust to the presence of a larger and more vocal anti-abortion international NGO presence. The results of the omission of reproductive health and rights as an MDG has resulted in decreasing funds from established progressive foundations such as the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, but new sources such as the Hewlett, the Packard, and the Bill & Melinda Gates foundations have displayed their commitment to and given resources to reproductive health and rights (Basu 2005: 133). However, funds have continued to decrease for reproductive health/family planning programs as a whole, as governments decrease their funding, and so the reproductive health and rights movement has continuously worked to insert their concerns into the targets and indicators of the MDGs, and to introduce it as a new MDG after the 2005 review of MDGs.

Although the MDGs are worded as simply as possible in action-oriented terms, their elaboration in the Millennium Development Declaration make it clear that they are founded in a human rights framework. The Declaration begins with a statement of the “fundamental values” which the authors consider “essential to international relations in the 21st century” (UN 2000). These include freedom (the right to live in dignity, free from hunger, violence, oppression or injustice), equality (of rights and opportunities),
solidarity (distributing costs and burdens of global challenges fairly), tolerance (respect for human beings, a culture of peace and dialogue), respect for nature (sustainable development), and shared responsibility (multilateral responsibility for economic and social development, as well as international peace and security) (UN 2000). Thus, the rights framework continues to be important for the key issues reflected in the Millennium Development Declaration and Goals, but the opportunity structure and the strength of the opposition’s framing efforts combined to keep reproductive health and rights out of these documents.

Individuals at institutions such as the UNFPA, World Bank and the IPPF have been working since 2001 to connect reproductive health and rights concerns with the existing MDGs, especially maternal health and child health and empowerment of women, as well as MDG targets and indicators (Gillespie 2004: 35, Oppenheim 2004: 4). The Commission on Population and Development held a “Seminar on the Relevance of Population Aspects for the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals” in November 2004. A sample of the papers presented at that seminar, and the organizations that were represented there, provide a comprehensive understanding of how UN organizations and reproductive health and rights advocates worked to connect reproductive health and rights to the MDGs. Many papers listed each MDG and formulated different arguments concerning how the language of the ICPD or its goals or prescriptions helped accomplish that particular goal (Stan Bernstein 2004, UNFPA 2004). Most papers focused on the MDGs dealing with reducing maternal and child mortality,

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5 Papers were submitted by Stan Bernstein, Senior Policy Advisor for Sexual and Reproductive Health, the UNFPA, UNESCO, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, UNAIDS, UNICEF, as well as professors from the Harvard School of Public Health, SUNY and Population Council, Johns Hopkins University, and the Universities of Hawaii and Minnesota.
increasing gender equality and empowerment of women, and halting and reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS. Karen Oppenheim from the World Bank details the contribution of the ICPD Program of Action to the third Millennium Development Goal of gender equality and empowerment of women in particular, and as a result, to several other MDGs, arguing “the first and most important step to empowering women may be to enable them to control their reproduction… Historically, then, women’s ability to control the timing and numbers of their pregnancies may be one necessary, even if not sufficient, condition for undermining the traditional gender-based division of labor that results in men’s dominance over women” (Oppenheim 2004: 5).

Hilary Anderson of the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) at the UN wrote on the missing links between gender equality, the MDGs and the ICPD; she argues that the holistic vision of reproductive health, rather than a more narrow focus on education of women, is necessary to the fulfillment of MDG 3, promoting gender equality and empowerment of women. In addition, Anderson argues that the ICPD’s holistic focus on reproductive as opposed to the more narrow maternal health “ensures that young girls and women have access to the services needed to ensure safe and freely chosen motherhood with the involvement of their partners” (Anderson 2004: 4). For Anderson, this holistic focus contributes not only to achieving MDG 5, reducing maternal mortality, but also to reducing extreme poverty (MDG 1), achieving universal primary education (MDG 2), reducing child mortality (MDG 4), and ensuring environmental sustainability (MDG 7). Kofi Annan, directly after the formulation of the MDGs, spoke on the importance of
reproductive health to the reduction of extreme poverty, the first MDG that is often shorthand for all of them:

The Millennium Development Goals, particularly the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, cannot be achieved if questions of population and reproduction are not squarely addressed. And that means stronger efforts to promote women’s rights, and greater investment in education and health, including reproductive health and family planning. (UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan)

Knowing that the MDGs would be reviewed in 2005, the women’s health and rights community has also campaigned tirelessly to have their issue included as an additional MDG by writing about the importance of reproductive health and rights to the fulfillment of other MDGs, and holding regional and international meetings on the topic. In November 2004, the International Planned Parenthood Federation joined the UNFPA, the Alan Guttmacher Institute and UNAIDS in publishing a report titled “The Role of Reproductive Health Providers in Preventing HIV,” which urged the integration of health and family planning services (Crossette 2004: 14). In addition, Steven Sinding of IPPF promoted the introduction of a ninth Development Goal to explicitly cover reproductive rights, involving organizations that are broadly concerned with health and women’s issues as well as poverty reduction. Sinding felt very strongly that in order to get reproductive health and rights included in 2005 as an MDG, the G-77 countries had to take the lead in pressing for the inclusion of women’s sexual health (Crossette 2004: 15), and IPPF worked with their many national affiliates in developing countries to support a reproductive health and rights MDG.

Family Care International (FCI) documents two years of advocacy at the UN beginning in 2003-2004 on behalf of integrating sexual and reproductive health into the MDGs “on the grounds that global health and poverty reduction cannot be achieved otherwise” (FCI 2006). From 2001 to 2006, FCI claimed that sexual and reproductive
health was closely related to the two Millennium Development Goals of reducing maternal mortality and morbidity, and combating HIV/AIDS (FCI, Global Sexual Health and Rights 2007).

The 2005 World Summit was the 60th session of the General Assembly and also where a comprehensive review of the progress made in the fulfillment of all commitments contained in the UN Millennium Declaration and Goals as well as the UN global conferences would be made (UN 2004). Prior to this Summit, FCI distributed its Millennium Development Goals and Sexual and Reproductive Health Briefing Cards, a set of easy-access fact sheets “designed to help UN delegates, advocates, and government officials work these concepts into their development plans and policies” (FCI 2006).

As demonstrated, reproductive health and rights advocates have worked hard to connect reproductive health and rights to the Millennium Development Goals, and also lobbied long and hard for reproductive health and rights to be included as an MDG; the success of this lobbying by NGO activists as well as those inside UN agencies, is demonstrated by the General Assembly formally approving the Secretary-General’s report in October 2006, which recommends that the reproductive health objective be adopted as one of four new global development targets. The other targets include decent work for youth and women, universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment, and preserving biodiversity (FCI 2006). The inclusion of reproductive health as a new target connected with the MDGs is not the same as the inclusion of a new reproductive health MDG; however, it does put reproductive health on the radar for all organizations that look to the MDGs for guidance on programs and funding, along with key issues for the future, such as the environment, HIV/AIDS, and employment.
The abortion-rights network has lobbied diligently in response to the success of the framing efforts of the anti-abortion network to put reproductive health and rights back on the UN agenda by connecting it to the MDGs. Their adjustment is made easier by the many key figures at the UN, such as former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, that are committed to reproductive health and rights, as well as the close connections abortion-rights activists continue to have with UN and UNFPA personnel. The Millennium Project was commissioned by the Kofi Annan in 2002 to develop a concrete action plan for the world to achieve the MDGs, and the project was headed by Professor Jeffrey Sachs, who was also extremely committed to reproductive health and rights as a means to the fulfillment of the other MDGs. Stan Bernstein, who works for the UNFPA, was enabled to work on the Millennium Project as a special reproductive health advisor as a result of extra funding provided by foundations “who were concerned that the whole Millennium Project wasn’t putting enough emphasis on reproductive health and rights” (Barbara Crane 2006). Bernstein was then made responsible for the Sexual and Reproductive Health Report, detailing the importance of sexual and reproductive health for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (Bernstein 2006). Stan Bernstein has a long-time professional relationship with Barbara Crane of the abortion-rights NGO IPAS, and asked her to submit a background paper on abortion for the Sexual and Reproductive Health Report, which allowed her to access and influence the Millennium Project on behalf of abortion rights (Barbara Crane Interview 2006). The background paper co-authored by Crane is titled “Access to Safe Abortion: An Essential Strategy for Achieving the Millennium Development Goals to Improve Maternal Health, Promote Gender Equality, and Reduce Poverty” (Crane and Smith 2006).
Cancellation of ICPD +10

One fundamental change in reaction to the growing strength and influence of the anti-abortion network was the cancellation of ICPD +10, with most interview respondents citing the influence of the anti-abortion network under the Bush administration as the main reason why the conference was limited to regional meetings (Interviews with Stan Bernstein 2006, Steven Sinding 2006, Stirling Scruggs 2006, Suzanne Ehlers 2006). Activists and UN officials have mixed opinions on whether it was a warranted move on the part of abortion-rights activists (Interviews with Steven Sinding 2006, Suzanne Ehlers 2006). However, even the regional meetings and international meetings taking place under the Commission on Population and Development and the UNFPA show the change in frame and growing emphasis on connecting reproductive health and rights with the HIV/AIDS issue, as well as to the Millennium Development Goals.

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*NGO review of Cairo, 2004*
An NGO ten-year review of Cairo, outside the UN framework but with participation from many former and several current UN officials, took place in London in 2004, organized and sponsored by International Planned Parenthood Federation, Population Action International, and Family Care International. Conservative organizations were not invited (Barbara Crane Interview 2006), which is not surprising since the UN website lists this conference as involving a wide range of NGO and donor partners “committed to making the ICPD vision a reality” (http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/10/note.htm). The meeting, called Countdown 2015: Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights For All, was attended by 700 people, with 100 of those being youth delegates. The declaration put out by the meeting stated its purpose as a partnership of civil society to reinvigorate commitment to the Cairo Consensus and measure global progress towards those goals. “Countdown 2015 seeks to set clear priorities, recruit new allies, and focus on the critical role of young people… the campaign has come to involve a wide range of NGOs, donors, UN and governmental agencies with a singular commitment to making the ICPD vision a reality” (Countdown 2015 Global Roundtable Declaration 2004).

The impressive list of speakers, representing organizations and countries from all over the world, included key figures from the 1994 Cairo Conference: former Director of UNFPA and Secretary General of ICPD Dr. Nafis Sadik, her deputy-secretary general Jyoti Singh, and the leaders of the two major working groups Fred Sai and Nicolaas Bieglm. Other key figure from the current UN administration was Thoraya Obaid, Director of UNPFA, and Jeffrey Sachs, special adviser to the Secretary General and head of the Millennium Project at Columbia University. Several employees or consultants with
the World Bank, involved with reproductive health and rights programs, included:

Elizabeth Lule, the Population/Reproductive Health Adviser with the Human
Development Network at the World Bank, and Tom Merrick, advisor for the World Bank
Institute’s Learning Program on Reproductive Health, Poverty, and Health Sector
Reform. High-profile reproductive health and rights NGO advocates included Steven
Sinding, Director General of IPPF; Frances Kissling, president of Catholics for a Free
Choice, Amy Coen, President and CEO of Population Action International; Jill Sheffield,
founder and President of Family Care, International; and Sonia Correa, Coordinator for
DAWN. Although this meeting was organized by NGOs, the presence of important
former and current UN employees at the meeting made this nearly a substitute for the
official 10-year review that did not occur at the UN level, but with the decided bias
toward supporting reproductive health and rights.

The Countdown 2015 Roundtable Declaration also listed several established and
new progressive foundations as donors: not only the Ford Foundation, MacArthur
Foundation and Rockefeller Foundations, but the UN Foundation, the Bill and Melinda
Gates, Hewlett, and Packard Foundations. Several governments were also listed as
donors, including the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Kingdom
Department for International Development, the Swiss Agency for Development
Cooperation, and the European Union; in addition, the UN Population Fund and the
World Bank, two very strong supporters of reproductive health and rights since the Cairo
conference, also financially donated to the Countdown 2015 Global Roundtable.

The participants of the Roundtable summarized the challenges to implementation
of the ICPD Program of Action as mainly consisting of the opposition of conservative
forces, including the U.S. Bush administration, and the failure of governments around the world to commit the resources they promised to ICPD-related programs. In particular, they noted the global gag rule reinstated by President Bush on his first day in office in 2001, preventing overseas groups from receiving U.S. family planning funding if they discussed, advocated, or provided abortion counseling or services, even if the groups used non-U.S. funds for these particular activities. They also documented the fact that the Bush administration has repeatedly opposed reaffirming the ICPD Program of Action at various international conferences, and that Bush’s “Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS” requires that one-third of $5 billion over 5 years be used to promote sexual abstinence until marriage, a method of dealing with reproductive health issues that most long-time activists dislike, believing it is unrealistic and not as effective as providing condoms. In relation to funding, the participants noted that in 2001, total global spending toward ICPD goals was $9.6 billion, less than half the international commitment for the year 2000.

The action agenda for the conference detailed ten topics that the Roundtable participants believed important for the future of reproductive health and rights. These included the necessity of welcoming youth as equal partners on sexual and reproductive health issues; fully integrating HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment with sexual and reproductive health education and services; pushing for greater funding from donor countries by making the case for sexual and reproductive health and rights in economic as well as social benefits; working to make safe, legal abortion accessible and available to every woman who chooses it; urging human rights bodies to take on the challenge of recognizing sexual orientation and gender identity as human rights issues; ending poverty
in relation to public health care and services; improving maternal health by both
empowering women and improving access to medical personnel; better defining the
rights-based approach to sexual and reproductive health and rights; engaging in strategic
partnerships with the women’s movement; and finally, fully understanding opposition
strategies and developing countermeasures.

The prominent position of the goal of fully integrating HIV/AIDS prevention and
treatment with sexual and reproductive health in this action agenda demonstrates how
keenly activists regard the importance of the HIV/AIDS issue to reproductive health.
Steven Sinding admits, “Well, any SRH organization that ignores AIDS is crazy. That’s
where the money is, and to a very considerable extent AIDS mortality and morbidity has
replaced high fertility as the reproductive health issue of our time. And the organizations
have got to change their focus in response that changing reality” (Steven Sinding
Interview 2006). This view is not exactly representative, as Sinding feels quite strongly
that reproductive health and rights took away the urgency and thus the funding for
population programs. Most abortion-rights activists frame their alliance with HIV/AIDS
as natural, given that sexual and reproductive health deals with the same issues as
HIV/AIDS programs. Others, such as Nafis Sadik, argue that the HIV/AIDS epidemic
would be better addressed and if the Cairo Program of Action was better implemented
(Nafis Sadik Interview 2006). Part of the strategy to bring reproductive health and rights
back into public focus is the widening of the frame to include preventing and treating
HIV/AIDS, and allying with the NGOs that deal with HIV/AIDS to present reproductive
health as a crucial aspect of dealing with HIV/AIDS. Steven Sinding, in his statement at
the end of the Roundtable meeting, declares
it is essential that we unite the sexual and reproductive health movement with the movement fighting HIV/AIDS… But family planning and reproductive health programs have been sidelined as many funders support stand-alone AIDS programs. In the process, they have bypassed tremendous experience, knowledge and resources available through our existing infrastructure. The enormous challenge of taming the HIV/AIDS pandemic will only succeed if everyone is working together. (Sinding 2004)

Sinding also argues in his statement that IPPF and the participants of the conference do not believe that the ICPD went far enough in calling for universal access to safe abortion where it is legal; because unintended pregnancies cannot be eliminated altogether, safe abortion must be legalized and accessible for “every woman in every country” (Sinding 2004: 2). Abortion continues to be a key goal for the movement, as evidenced by its place in the Action Agenda for the 2015 meeting. The goal of pushing for reproductive health and rights by emphasizing its economic benefits as well as its rights benefits reflects the realization by many in the movement that the Cairo Program of Action has not been funded adequately, and that ten years later, governments seem further from their commitments than before. Duff Gillespie remembers one of the themes of the 2015 meeting being the realization that “we haven’t done well at all and in some ways have back-slid the vision of Cairo… Basically the entire meeting [of foundations] was: What can we do? What went wrong? How do we reinvigorate Cairo? Is it the right package? … Should we try for something more realistic?” (Interview with Duff Gillespie 2006)

Strategy for the future of advocacy for reproductive rights, sexual health, and abortion was discussed in great detail at this NGO roundtable. In addition to the Global Roundtable, a series of regional meetings reflecting the themes and program of the Roundtable took place just prior to the Roundtable and continued to take place into 2005; these were organized by IPPF regional offices along with other NGOs and networks. IPPF also launched national advocacy initiatives, to focus on building national support,
action, and mobilization of partners on the issue of reproductive health. The three sponsoring NGOs planned a magazine that will in effect be a report card on the progress of countries on ICPD commitments, as well as featuring articles on substantive issues relating to sexual and reproductive health and rights. A deliberate communications campaign “aimed at refocusing attention on the importance and urgency of the goals of the ICPD and at generating media coverage of the events taking place in 2004 and 2005” was also part of the strategy developed at the Countdown 2015 (Countdown 2015 Global Roundtable Declaration 2004: 8). The regional meetings, Global Roundtable, national advocacy initiatives, magazine and communications campaign can all be seen as an effort in bringing sexual and reproductive health and rights back into the public eye, but especially to the attention of governments and donors. The Global Roundtable also reiterated the importance of the Cairo consensus for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, and blamed the mostly male UN delegates’ apparent squeamishness about sexuality for leaving out sexual and reproductive health and rights as an MDG (Sinding 2004: 2). The final component of the strategy for promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights was to welcome and youth leadership in advocacy.

**Information Politics:**

In the new century, abortion-rights groups have also adjusted to the stronger presence of anti-abortion organizations at the UN by compiling information concerning anti-abortion organizations and sharing it among their network; this information generally takes the form of research publications, informally published by individual abortion-rights groups on their websites, or formally published in journals or reports funded by
foundation grants. Barbara Crane of IPAS notes “There’s more sharing of info between abortion-rights groups in response to anti-abortion groups. There’s more coming together” (Barbara Crane Interview 2006).

Catholics for a Free Choice (CFFC) particularly makes an effort to report on anti-abortion organizations and their activities, with many of their publications dating from 2000, after anti-abortion organizations succeeded in bringing around three hundred delegates to the Beijing +5 conference. CFFC’s journal, Conscience, often includes articles on how best to combat the Catholic Church’s opposition to reproductive health and rights (Farrell 2005). CFFC publishes an Opposition Watch report, doing research on the “anti-choice” movement by attending their networking events, such as the World Congress of Families conferences, and investigating individual organizations, especially conservative Catholic groups and individuals. In their investigative series on conservative Catholic influence in Europe, they have put together reports on the World Youth Alliance; Catholic Action Group in the United Kingdom; Anna Zaborska, elected chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in 2004; Dr. Rocco Buttiglione, a conservative Catholic doctor who was proposed as Vice President of the European Commission in 2004; Opus Dei, an organization within the Catholic Church that is active in international affairs; and the Vatican’s agenda at the European Union. The reports on individuals detail each person’s biographical information, including family, education and professional positions, and their positions on all issues of interest to the abortion-rights movement. Organizational reports include their funding sources, founders and leaders, and campaigns.
CFFC has also put out detailed reports on the anti-abortion organizations Human Life International (1997), the Culture of Life Foundation (2004), and the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (Kissling and O’Brien 2001), considered by many on both sides to be the lead anti-abortion organization at the UN. The reports on Human Life International and the Culture of Life Foundation follow the general template of organizational reports by CFFC by detailing the people, funding sources, and positions on issues of interest to CFFC; however, the report on Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute seems to have the specific purpose of proving the organization’s unfitness for lobbying at the UN. This report alleges that the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute (C-FAM) is controlled by Human Life International, an anti-abortion organization that was rejected for ECOSOC accreditation, and so created C-FAM with the purpose of obtaining accreditation to lobby at the UN. Using quotes from speeches by Austin Ruse, the president of C-FAM, and documents obtained from a court case involving the first president of C-FAM, CFFC questions the organization’s conduct at the UN, whether it meets the requirements for ECOSOC status, whether it undermines the work of the UN, and how it addresses human rights. CFFC presents a case against C-FAM receiving accreditation from ECOSOC in an investigative and well-documented manner, but, interestingly, concludes that C-FAM has little effect on policy-making at the UN. Nevertheless, the most damaging quotes CFFC cites against Austin Ruse are repeated several times in different articles on their website, and have come up in conversation with interviewees from other abortion-rights organizations, demonstrating this new use of research by the abortion-rights network in response to the greater presence of anti-abortion organizations at the UN.
CFFC is also one of the organizations that manages a project called Religion Counts, along with the Park Ridge Center for the Study of Health, Faith, and Ethics. The project put together a research report, funded by a grant from A Better World Foundation, called “Religion and Public Policy at the UN” (Religion Counts 2002); the report is meant to explore religion’s place and power at the UN, which as a secular institution was dealing with the increasing presence of religious organizations of different types attempting to influence its policy-making process. The report is quite extensive, and is clearly spurred by the tension between conservative anti-abortion organizations and abortion-rights organizations at the Cairo and Beijing conferences and reviews (Green 1999, Religion Counts 2002). Of particular interest in the report are statistics concerning the number of religious NGOs that have ECOSOC status: only 9%, or 180 of 2,000 NGOs with ECOSOC status have a religious identity, and only 11% of those, or 19, have the most desirable, general consultative status with ECOSOC (Religion Counts 2002: 14, 17). The report also notes the possibility of censure of exclusion of religious NGOs by the UN, and obstacles facing religious groups at the UN; however, it does not elaborate on these possibilities, instead focusing on the political or institutional obstacles that may face any NGO at the UN (Religion Counts 2002: 26-27).

The Public Eye is a publication of the progressive think tank, Public Research Associates (PRA); PRA’s goal is to “advance progressive thinking and action by providing research-based information, analysis, and referrals” by exposing “movements, institutions, and ideologies that undermine human rights” (www.publiceye.org/about.html). The Public Eye has published several extended articles concerning conservative organizations working domestically and at the UN. Two in
particular deal with the anti-abortion network, one published by Jennifer Butler in 2000 that documents the growing alliance in the international sphere between conservative evangelicals, Catholics, Mormons, and Muslims. A more recent article on the anti-abortion network, written by Pam Chamberlain (2006), has circulated quite widely among the abortion-rights network (Interviews with Barbara Crane, Jill Sheffield, Confidential Interview III, 2006). This piece, titled “The Right Targets the UN with its Anti-Choice Politics,” details the major anti-abortion organizations working at the UN, their impact on the Bush administration, and their successes and failures at the UN. One incident Chamberlain details is of interest because it deals with the work of reproductive health and rights organizations’ work to ensure the right to abortion. Chamberlain claims that the “forward momentum of the anti-choice efforts at the UN suffered a setback” in November 2005 when the UN Human Rights Committee, an 18-member group that monitors the implementation of the UN’s human rights covenants, decided in its first abortion case, KL v. Peru, that abortion is a human right (Chamberlain 2006: 2). “This decision affirmed the work of international women’s health advocates and sent anti-choice NGOs into tailspins” (Chamberlain 2006:2). While anti-abortion organizations claim that the decision is non-binding, the Center for Reproductive Rights claims that every woman who lives in any of the 154 countries that are party to the UN human rights covenants, including the U.S., “now has a legal tool to use in defense of her rights” (Center for Reproductive Rights 2005). However, that right can only be enforced where abortion is already legal (Center for Reproductive Rights 2005).

These reports and articles demonstrate how abortion-rights organizations are reacting to the presence of anti-abortion organizations at the UN by conducting and
publishing investigative research on the organizations and the network as a whole.

Although they recognize the growing savvy of the network, many conclude their research with sentiments similar to Jon O’Brien, president of Catholics for a Free Choice:

> It’s good for the soul, as we have discovered time and again that these groups are far less scary up close than one might think if one relied solely on their propaganda for information. They are less than the sum of their parts and reminding ourselves of this is always a useful exercise. To know them is to know their weaknesses and it always helps to expose what little there is behind the veneer of their bombast. Knowing them makes us stronger and in that spirit we are always happy to share the information we find with the movement… (O’Brien 2007)

### 7.2.2 Anti-abortion movement

The anti-abortion movement in the 2000-2004 time period has greatly increased the resources and attention directed to the international sphere, as well as their efforts in building international coalitions. Several key organizations have expanded their lobbying by involving organizations in other states where they have affiliates, in order to influence delegates prior to UN meetings or conferences. They have also worked to build stronger alliances with international Latin American and Muslim organizations. These efforts have resulted in increasing the influence of the anti-abortion network on these issues, especially since the Bush administration’s support for “natural family” issues has boosted the ability of these organizations to block language they object to at several UN meetings and conferences; the conservative U.S. administration’s opposition to reproductive health and rights was cited by both UN employees and activists from both movements as one of the key factors in the decision not to hold an international conference for the ten-year review of Cairo.

*Scale shifting* A greater number of anti-abortion organizations have become involved on an international scale, receiving NGO consultative status and bringing hundreds of NGO
participants to UN conferences. Focus on the Family received NGO consultative status in 2003 (Thomas Jacobson Interview 2007), a significant addition given the credibility and political capital Focus on the Family wields among evangelicals in the U.S., and the international ministries that Focus on the Family supports. Through its national affiliates in twenty countries around the world, it is able to lobby other countries within their capitals to respond in pro-family ways to UN resolutions. In one recent example of Focus on the Family’s reach, the Costa Rican affiliate successfully lobbied their government to respond to a UN draft resolution to ban human cloning. In 2003, Costa Rica then submitted a draft that would seek a total ban on all forms of cloning, including therapeutic cloning, rather than the ban on reproductive cloning that most other countries supported. Other anti-abortion NGOs, including Concerned Women of America, lobbied in Washington, Latin America and Eastern Europe to support this total ban on cloning, but a motion to adjourn the debate was passed by one vote, reflecting the failure of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to support the ban. Several key anti-abortion organization leaders were upset that the OIC did not support the resolution, and one leader saw this as indicative of the fact that the issue of cloning has not been a subject of debate in Islamic society. The incident demonstrates the difficulty in bringing together so many diverse countries with diverse interests into a voting bloc on conservative issues. The OIC itself “includes members from several regional groupings that often have competing interests” (Butler 2006: 123).

**Framing** The framing of conservative social views on abortion, gay marriage, women’s roles and adolescent rights as pertaining to the preservation of the “natural family” as the
central unit of society has become more widespread, especially at the meeting celebrating the tenth anniversary of the International Year of the Family in 2004 in Doha, organized by anti-abortion organizations. As noted by Butler (2006), conservatives speak about the family as a social category in and of itself, which is how speakers from the developing countries speak of the family, thus allowing them to relate better. In contrast, “liberals view family policies through the analytical lens of the family’s various components… important less as an issue in and of itself, and more in terms of how family policy impacts other social issues like women’s rights, children’s rights, and reproductive health” (Butler 2006:77).

Concerned Women of America’s concern for international issues began to emerge in the late nineties, pre-dating their actual involvement at the UN. A common theme from that time to the present has been the importance of preserving a country’s national sovereignty against the UN’s attempts to interfere in domestic policy. One of CWA’s early concerns was the environmental movement, because they saw an explicit link between environmental initiatives such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Biodiversity Convention and population policy. Historically, population concerns were framed in terms of environmental scarcity, as when Thomas Malthus argued that population control was necessary because of limited food production, or when more contemporary environmentalists argued that population growth was directly harming the environment (Ehrlich 1970; Kaplan 1994; Bandarage 1997). Most environmentalists do not take such an extreme view, but population as an environmental threat has been a recurring theme in the literature. As a result, anti-abortion groups such as the CWA have spoken against environmental initiatives; in several articles published in 1996-1997,
CWA critiqued international environmentalism as a threat to American sovereignty, an attempt to control the lives of Americans, and a means of justifying population control (Buss and Herman 2003: 70). In a 1998 publication specifically on the United Nations, CWA argued that international environmentalism was “predicated upon the belief that people are a ‘plague’ upon the earth…” and therefore rejected international environmentalism (CWA 1998). In addition, the CWA opposed “the redistribution of wealth” and “entitlement to food” at the World Food Summit, which is consistent with a conservative rejection of government interference in social, political, and economic policy (Buss and Herman 2003: 74).

However, beginning in 1999 and continuing into the 21st century, CWA has de-emphasized the political implications of environmentalism, and argues for a more complex understanding of the relationship between population and environment (CWA 1999). Instead of calling for U.S. withdrawal from international aid commitments, CWA now argues for humanitarian aid and technology to alleviate the effects of famine. This fits with the larger change in CWA discourse, moving away from criticizing international environmentalism and international aid as Marxist concepts that would ultimately take away American sovereignty, independence and values, to arguing for compassion on “the needs of the world’s people,” and against Western imperialist methods of population control (CWA 1999b). This change has been observed by other scholars, and attributed to the growing connection between CWA and C-FAM, a Catholic organization that also emphasizes the need to deal with poverty in the Third-World. I would argue that although that might be the case, this does not answer why the Catholic Church emphasizes the need to deal with poverty and maternal mortality and health in the international system,
speaking of the right to development and health rather than the right to reproductive health and rights or women’s rights. Anti-abortion organizations are moving towards a rights-based framing of their arguments, and for the CWA a discourse that emphasizes the need to deal with poverty in the third world points toward an adjustment in framing and coalition-building necessitated by interaction and advocacy at the UN.

Another illustration of the adjustment of the anti-abortion network to the UN is to praise the initial foundations of the UN, including the UN Charter and the Declaration of Universal Human Rights, because it endorsed the natural family and respected the sovereignty of each nation, and criticize the abortion-rights network as corrupting the UN as a forum for good in the international system. Gwendolyn Landolt, the vice-president of REAL Women of Canada, spoke at the third World Congress of Families, citing the language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16, which endorsed the family: “The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State” (UN 1948). She also cited the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that went into effect in 1976, which reiterated the same language on the family from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This example demonstrates another framing adjustment by some organizations in the anti-abortion network: they attempt to use language from early documents of the UN to demonstrate the legitimacy of their position, and implicate the abortion-rights network for turning the UN away from that position.
Coalition building: World Congress of Families held its third conference in 2004, bringing together many conservative organizations, especially those concerned with the natural family and the issue of abortion. The third World Congress of Families was held in Mexico City, with the number of delegates more than doubling again to over 3,300 from over 60 countries; the location of this event in Mexico City was seen as a strategic move to engage Latin America in the anti-abortion movement (Buss and Herman 2003). Red Familia, an anti-abortion coalition of 150 regional and international organizations in Mexico, was a co-sponsor of the event in Mexico City. Red Familia as an organization began as a result of Mexican activists attending the 1999 World Congress of Families; several prominent activists and Catholic businessmen joined forces to create what is now a “an aggressive, pro-family, pro-life” umbrella organization representing about 12 million people, with offices in a dozen Mexican cities and a representative office in New York City engaging the UN on a full-time basis (Allan Carlson Interview 2006).

Red Familia’s collaboration with the Howard Center to plan and host the third World Congress of Families demonstrates the possibilities of successful alliances with other developing countries for the anti-abortion network. Two leaders of Red Familia, Jesus Hernandez and Fernando Milanes, began the process of bringing the World Congress of Families to Mexico City by bringing a proposal to Allan Carlson at the Howard Center; they believed they could raise the resources necessary for the conference, and according to Allan Carlson, their planning abilities were key in ensuring a World Congress conference took place in 2004. Red Familia emphasized the importance of stable families in maintaining a stable economy, and thus appealed to Catholic businessmen and secured the support of corporate sponsors such as Grupo
Bimbo, one of the largest bakeries in the world. Lorenzo Servitje, the founder of the bakery, is known as a supporter of conservative cultural values; he has spoken in public of the links between Catholic values and his business practices, and has tried to bring pressure to bear on Mexican television to change its content (Butler 2006: 128). At the 2004 World Congress of Families, Servitje urged business to take a leading role in strengthening the family in order to maintain the social fabric. Such sentiments are clearly in line with the pro-family American organizations leading the international network; indeed, Servitje warned that the “family and society were being undermined by poor education at home, unstable marriages, mothers who worked outside the home, sexual immorality and a media that promoted irresponsible behavior as well as contraceptives” (Butler 2006: 129). Other powerful Mexican corporate sponsors of the 2004 conference included Pemex, the national oil company; Cementos Mexicanos (CEMEX), the world’s fourth largest cement company; Gigante, the Mexican superstore; and Grupo Televisa, the world’s largest producer of Spanish language television programs. President Vincente Fox demonstrated his support for the natural family point of view by being one of the few that responded early on to the lobbying of Red Familia, and contributing to the conference through the Division of Family Services and the Division of Social Services; his wife, Martha Fox, added a note of personal support by speaking at the conference (Butler 2006: 129).

The truly international character of the planning process for this conference is evident by the many different people on the planning committee: those involved came from the Czech Republic, the Philippines, the Congo, Nicaragua, Mexico, Pakistan, India, and Russia (World Congress of Families III,
Those with important political connections included Moktar Lamani, the head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Francisco Tatad, former majority leader of the Philippines Senate. From the Bush administration, Ellen Sauerbrey, Ambassador to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, and Wade Horn, Assistant Secretary for Children and Health at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services both attended and spoke at the conference; Sauerbrey read a letter from President Bush encouraging the delegates of the conference and stating support for the main causes of the conference, including strong families, sanctity of marriage, the well-being of children, adoption, crisis-pregnancy programs, and parental notification laws (Bush 2004). Five Congressmen, including Chris Smith, also sent a letter to the conference on behalf of the United States Congress, affirming support for the conference’s goals, and commending the delegates for their work (Smith et al 2004).

The high profile of the conference was no accident; Jesus Hernandez and Fernando Milanes spent time and resources recruiting regional leaders and UN diplomats to attend the conference. Hernandez and Milanes flew to New York City repeatedly the months leading up to the conference, meeting with diplomats at the UN and other missions; as a result of these meetings, twenty-six UN delegates attended the third World Congress of Families, as well as representatives of the family services divisions of ten Latin American countries (Butler 2006: 130). Red Familia’s success in organizing and lobbying politicians and diplomats is matched by its success in reaching out regionally in Mexico. Since 2004, Red Familia has opened offices in twelve Mexican cities. The organization, although led by Catholic businessmen, has showed a great willingness to
reach out in inter-religious collaboration, making close connections with other Protestant, Mormon, Pentecostal and Jewish activists and organizations (Butler 2006: 131).

The World Congress of Families Conference has continued to build networks and increase the awareness of conservative NGOs from all over the world on UN activities and committee meetings that are of importance. Several speakers over the years have contradicted the traditionally conservative view that what happens at the UN is unimportant or corrupt. Ellen Sauerbrey as the U.S. Representative to the UN Commission on the Status of Women continued her tradition of speaking of the UN’s influence on the family at the World Congress of Families. In her speech to the conference, Sauerbrey noted that the UN’s environment over the past 20 years had become hostile towards families. She cited Harvard Professor Mary Ann Glendon’s shock when she realized that a draft document from the Committee on the Status of Women barely mentioned marriage or motherhood. Sauerbrey however cautioned against dismissing UN conferences and the language that comes out of them, citing that these norms may become legally binding in the future. She detailed the efforts of the Bush administration to insert positive language on the family in UN meetings on the Status of Women, and while praising the UN’s efforts to “improve health, access to food, literacy, and other areas that impact the family,” she encourages countries not to bow to “extreme pressure” to conform to the liberal consensus at the UN, but take a stand when issues concerning the family are debated at the UN.

*Information Politics:* Coalition building at the World Congress of Families has increased the number of conservative organizations that focus their advocacy at the UN, and helped
them to do it in a way that conforms to the research-oriented manner in which advocacy is conducted at the UN. One example that illustrates the anti-abortion network’s adjustment to research and statistics as the support for advocacy on the international stage occurred in 2002, when the World Congress of Families held a meeting in New York City to give UN delegates and pro-family advocates “the latest statistics and evidence on marriage, family and religion” (Wright 2002). This meeting was co-sponsored by other conservative organizations that had worked at the UN, and it was timed to bolster the advocacy of conservative NGOs during the upcoming World Summit on Children.

Speakers included the First Lady of Uganda, Janet Museveni, who spoke on the benefits of abstinence to slow the spread of AIDS; Dr. Wade Horn, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Family and Children for the Department of Health and Human Services, who spoke on the importance of stable marriages for the health and safety of children; and Jeremy Rabkin of Cornell University on the inability of a world body to govern better than a nation-state.

One of the key arguments made by anti-abortion organizations to support their position on the natural family concerns the ill-effects on society as a whole and mothers and children in particular of the erosion of the institution of marriage and a liberal view of sexuality and abortion. This argument is supported by research and statistics produced by the Heritage Foundation, in particular Dr. Patrick Fagan (World Congress of Families 1999). He argues that divorce weakens the family by weakening the relationship between children and parents; it particularly hurts children by increasing behavioral, emotional and psychiatric risks. He also elaborates on the harmful effects of divorce for other aspects of society: in education, divorce diminishes learning capacities and high school
and college attainment; in the economy, divorce reduces household income and drastically cuts the life-wealth of individuals; and affecting government and citizenship, divorce massively increases crime rates, abuse and neglect rates, and the use of drugs. These arguments concerning the importance of marriage and the natural family for the stability of society are significant because of the way in which they are presented: not in terms of the traditions or religions that endorse these views, but in terms of the costs and benefits to society. These more neutral standards for evaluating the arguments of anti-abortion networks are an important adjustment to the environment of science and research that these organizations perceive to be prevalent in both the U.S. and in the international sphere.

Non-occurrence of Cairo+10

Participants and observers have offered many reasons for why the ten-year review of Cairo did not occur, including conference fatigue (Eager 2004), a lack of resources (Interview with Suzanne Ehlers 2006), and the fact that the scope of the Program of Action adopted in Cairo was twenty years, and the most fruitful review would be closer to that timeline (Interview Stan Bernstein 2006). However, my interviews with UN employees, abortion-rights activists and anti-abortion activists lead me to believe that a major contributing factor to the cancellation of the ten-year review was the growing success of the anti-abortion NGO network. UN officials responsible for organizing the ten-year review of Cairo were greatly influenced by abortion-rights activists and their own fears of a Bush-appointed U.S. delegation and anti-abortion activists undoing the
reproductive health and rights framework attained at Cairo if they were to re-open the Cairo Program of Action for debate (Ruse Interview 2006; Wright Interview 2006).

One interestingly contrary opinion came from Steve Sinding, former president of International Planned Parenthood Federation. He believed it was a tactical mistake to preemptively withdraw the possibility of a Cairo +10 meeting, which he believed happened because there was consensus among the principal donors to population programs, supported by the most influential progressive organizations that supported reproductive health and rights, that an international meeting would open up the opportunity to “roll back the gains that had been made at Cairo.” Sinding thought that withdrawal was a victory for the anti-abortion organizations because “every time there is an international meeting and a confrontation, the right winds up losing.” Although an international ten-year review of Cairo would have been controversial, he would have welcomed the confrontation because he believes that “global opinion overwhelmingly supports the progressive agenda.” Sinding cites as evidence the 1984 Mexico City conference on population and development, when a Reagan-appointed U.S. delegation announced that the U.S. did not support family planning unequivocally and would withdraw funding for any organization that provided abortion services.

What the U.S. did in effect, completely unintentionally, was to create a much stronger consensus among the developing countries about the importance of population and doing something about it than probably would have existed otherwise. And in a sense, the Bush administration’s done the same thing since it took office. There is more money flowing to the UNFPA and IPPF from Western Europe and Japan than we could hope to have been receiving had the U.S. not created such a contrarian position. And what we did see in the Cairo Plus Ten events that occurred, which were the regional conferences, was tremendous solidarity in opposition to the American position. (Sinding Interview 2006)

Sinding’s opinion seems justified given the events preceding the ten-year review of Beijing in 2005, which was tentatively approached by progressive women’s NGOs and
countries. Many of the abortion-rights NGOs believed that the review conference should focus on implementation rather than textual negotiations and different countries counseled carefully considering the possibility that anti-abortion activists, especially within the U.S. delegation, would try to erase the gains made in the area of sexual and reproductive rights (Butler 2006: 60). In order to test the political climate, women’s rights activists asked the Commission on the Status of Women to reaffirm the Beijing Platform of Action; even though the U.S. had signed it, it opposed this current affirmation, and called for a vote on the issue, which is usually avoided at the UN, where consensus is highly valued. Even though the European Union among other groups asked the U.S. to abstain rather than voting against the measure, in order to voice dissent more diplomatically, the U.S. voted against the measure. Jennifer Butler describes the trepidation and suspense felt by women’s movement NGO representatives as they waited for the votes to be tallied, wondering if the international community would reaffirm the Beijing Platform of Action or if the U.S.’s breaking of ranks would influence many other countries to break away from the consensus. In the end, “when the votes were posted on the UN voting board, only one country had voted against it: the United States. NGO representatives breathed a sigh of relief” (Butler 2006: 60).

Although this incident demonstrates the strength of the global consensus on the Beijing conference on women, the willingness of the U.S. delegation to pull out of the consensus and oppose the global women’s movement and their agenda caused leaders of the women’s movement to advocate that the Beijing +10 focus on reviewing the implementation of the Platform of Action. The only document that would involve
negotiation would be a general political declaration that would affirm the Beijing Platform for Action. Butler notes:

Rather than push the international community into new territory, the global women’s movement realized it would struggle just to hold its ground. The decision reflected the fragile political climate caused by the presence of new conservative players on the UN scene. (Butler 2006: 61)

In fact, the U.S. delegation held up the adoption of the draft declaration affirming the Platform of Action by insisting that the gathering add wording to clarify that the declaration created neither any “new international human right” nor “the right to abortion” (Hoge 2005). Women’s NGOs and European country delegations objected to this, arguing that UN conferences had heretofore remained neutral on the legality of abortion, and this wording would push the declaration more in the direction of making abortion illegal. Toward the end of the conference, the U.S. delegation dropped its insistence on adding the new wording and the declaration was adopted unanimously. Significantly, the leader of the U.S. delegation, Ellen Sauerbrey, explained the U.S.’s adoption of the resolution by saying that the debate on the new wording had assured the U.S. delegation that the Beijing documents did not “create new human rights and that the terms ‘reproductive health services’ and ‘reproductive rights’ do not include abortion” (Butler 2006:62). Thus, despite the affirmation of the global consensus on the Beijing Platform of Action, the U.S. delegation was able to prevent any discussion on furthering the Beijing consensus, and further establish that the current wording of international documents did not provide the right to abortion.
7.3 Conclusion

7.3.1 Findings

The abortion-rights movement was greatly affected by decreased funding of population programs from the late nineties to 2004, especially by governments. The lack of funding by governments, the lack of a reproductive health and rights MDG, and the subsequent lack of funding opportunities from traditionally progressive foundations, caused the abortion-rights movement to reassess its strategies, particularly its coalition-building strategies. The Countdown 2015 Meeting was especially telling in that abortion-rights organizations and leaders did not change their framing of the issue as a key human rights issue, but did their best to connect reproductive health and rights as integral to treating and preventing HIV/AIDS. This was both to boost the visibility and funding of reproductive health and rights, since most international attention and funding is directed towards the HIV/AIDS issue; HIV/AIDS is one of the few issues most governments can agree on as an urgent need, including the Bush administration. Another key event for the abortion-rights network was the cancellation of the 10-year review conference of Cairo; many abortion-rights and UN interviewees admitted that they encouraged the review to be limited to regional conferences in order to prevent the Bush administration and anti-abortion organizations from having the opportunity to reverse the language on reproductive health and rights.

The anti-abortion movement greatly increased their presence as NGOs at UN conferences; they were more organized, with larger delegations, and more coordinated with other NGOs. However, they are still very much a minority presence as far as NGOs at any global review or meeting. This reflects the strategy of the conservative movement, in that they do not direct a majority of their resources towards the UN, but strategically
invest as much time, effort, and resources as they believe necessary to convince enough
government delegations as they will need to block language they find objectionable at
any particular meeting. The anti-abortion organizations do not put as much effort into
cultivating relationships with UN officials, because they believe they will be unsuccessful
and wasting their time and resources. This is especially interesting given the
contradictory opinions of my interviewees from abortion-rights organizations and the
UN: several interviewees from abortion-rights organizations felt that anti-abortion
organizations got perfectly fair or preferential treatment from UN officials (Jill Sheffield
Interview 2006, Nafis Sadik Interview 2006), while other abortion-rights interviewees
and UN officials felt that due to relationships and underlying philosophies, abortion-
rights organizations were able to work more closely with many UN agencies and funds
(Barbara Crane Interview 2006, Sterling Scruggs Interview 2006).

The anti-abortion organizations’ big successes have been indirect, but their re-
framing of reproductive health and rights as “code” for the international right to abortion
on demand contributed to many Catholic and Muslim countries within the G-77 opposing
a reproductive health MDG, and also to the reluctance of the UNFPA, sympathetic
European governments, and abortion-rights organizations to hold a 10-year review of
conference of the Cairo Program of Action, where negotiations on reproductive health
language might occur. As a result, one might argue that reproductive health and rights as
an initiative continues to be eclipsed at the UN; however, the language of reproductive
health and rights is still the clearly legitimate framing of population policy at the UN.
**7.3.2 Comparison of the two movements**

Women’s health and rights organizations have angled their rhetoric and their alliances towards connecting themselves with the HIV/AIDS community, in order to restore visibility to their cause, and especially to keep themselves on the radar of organizations that use the Millennium Development Goals to direct their funds and programs. They have done this by working tirelessly from 2000-2004 to frame reproductive health and rights as integral to nearly all the Millennium Development Goals, especially maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS, and poverty and hunger. They have continued to use research in papers presented to UN agencies and UN meetings to support their claims that reproductive health will help improve maternal and child health, reduce maternal mortality, help treat and prevent HIV/AIDS, empower women, and overall contribute to the reduction of poverty and hunger (Stan Bernstein 2004, Oppenheim 2004).

The anti-abortion movement continued to build coalitions with other faiths and bring more U.S. domestic organizations into the international sphere; in this time period, they also worked with affiliates in developing countries, who in turn lobbied their domestic governments in order to get more support for anti-abortion concerns at the UN. This is very similar to the strategy employed by abortion-rights organizations to build widespread developing country support for their initiatives at the UN during the Cairo conference. In addition, anti-abortion organizations began to frame their arguments in more progressive and rights-oriented terms, particularly in their new take on environmentalism as conserving God-given resources and their focus on combating infectious diseases, poverty, and hunger around the world. These groups also use the
tools of science and research much more than they did in the past to bolster their advocacy on behalf of natural families, marriage, and against alternative conceptions of the family, gay marriage, and abortion.

Although the right to safe abortion continues to be a central issue for women’s health and rights groups, they have reacted to anti-abortion groups’ re-framing of that term by trying to preserve the status quo of reproductive health and rights; in other words, given the hostile U.S. administration, they are doing more to keep reproductive health and rights from being eroded rather than pushing the envelope concerning sexual health and rights, or abortion rights. However, organizations that focus on the right to abortion such as IPAS have worked to develop relationships with key women’s groups in developing countries who formerly did not want to get involved in the issue, such as a group of female lawyers, in order to change their perception of abortion, and eventually get their support for legal reform of domestic policy on abortion. For example, Barbara Crane notes

It was a very big thing recently, the national council of women’s societies in Nigeria has come around to support legal reform [on abortion] in Nigeria. Adrienne wrote an article 15 years ago on this topic – the fact that the women’s groups wouldn’t support it then was a major factor in defeating it in Nigeria. What changed was that there was generational change, leadership change, IPAS has a very strong presence in Nigeria, and a very charismatic leader and he’s really been cultivating them. (Barbara Crane Interview 2006).
8 Recent Work of the Two Networks

To illustrate how each network continues to adjust to each other’s presence at the UN and use the strategies of framing, coalition building, and research-based advocacy to better influence the UN since 2004, I will discuss two recent conferences for each movement as representative of the work each is doing: the UN Review on HIV/AIDS for the abortion-rights movement, and the World Congress of Families IV for the anti-abortion movement. The abortion-rights movement has lobbied diligently to frame HIV/AIDS as a sexual and reproductive health issue, and the fulfillment of the ICPD Program of Action as central to the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS. The attention, urgency, and resources in the international sphere have shifted to the HIV/AIDS issue, as evidenced by the continued increase in infrastructure and funding from the UN and developed country governments (Blanc and Tsui 2005, Chowka 2005). The abortion-rights movement has recognized both a natural fit between their issue and HIV/AIDS and the need for a new way to connect to sources of funding that have decreased steadily since the Cairo conference. The results of their lobbying and coalition building efforts at the UN Review are most evident in the way that the NGO community involved has embraced a holistic approach to the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS that involves providing for sexual and reproductive health and rights. These lobbying efforts continue to build on the norms established as part of the UN system, including those of a rights framework, coalition building, and scientific research-based advocacy.

The anti-abortion network continues to build ties with other organizations from around the world, and the World Congress of Families conferences are key coalition-building events for these organizations. However, there are important divides in the
approaches of the core of the anti-abortion network, the U.S. organizations, and the international organizations they are trying to build ties with, as demonstrated by my analysis of the most recent World Congress of Families conference, that involve the liberal norms of world culture.

8.1 HIV/AIDS Conferences

Two HIV/AIDS conferences were held in 2006 to review the progress made since the 2001 Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, the consensus document signed at the UN General Assembly Session (UNGASS) on HIV/AIDS: the UNGASS Review, held from May 31-June 2, and the XVI International Conference on AIDS, held in Toronto from August 13-18. The Declaration of Commitment (DoC) set goals and targets for halting and reversing the spread of HIV and AIDS around the world, but most countries had failed to reach the targets. The UNGASS Review was meant to bring together government delegations, experts, and civil society on an unprecedented scale to review the technical and political aspects of implementing the DoC. The International Conference in Toronto was based on the theme, “Time to Deliver,” and is held every two years to publicize the latest research and program approaches on HIV/AIDS. Women’s reproductive health and rights organizations were especially interested and involved in these conferences, and continued to frame sexual and reproductive health and rights as central to the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS; their attendance at these conferences and their interest in the reproductive health and rights implications of the political declaration that came out of the UNGASS Review signals the on-going coalition-building efforts of these organizations with the HIV/AIDS community. A brief
analysis of the newsletters of many of these organizations also signals a serious framing effort to transform HIV/AIDS into a sexual and reproductive health and rights issue.

The first two days of the UNGASS Review meeting were technical in nature, with roundtables, panel discussions, plenary sessions, and an interactive hearing with civil society. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly in December 2005 calling for this comprehensive review made specific provisions for civil society participation in the meeting, inviting NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC, as well as accrediting representatives from many other NGOs, civil society organizations, and the private sector (Fried 2006a). Governments were also encouraged to include civil society representatives in their national delegations. Three hundred and twenty NGOs were accredited from Africa, with a significant number attending from Nigeria (43), and Kenya (79); 114 NGOs were accredited from Asia, 160 from Europe, 104 from Latin America, 20 from the Middle East and North Africa, and 68 from North America, the majority of those being from the U.S. (53). One example of a private sector organization that was included in the list of U.S. NGOs accredited to attend the meeting was Merck, the pharmaceutical company. These nearly 800 organizations were accredited especially for this conference; another 600 participants were registered from organizations that were already accredited with ECOSOC. Representatives from reproductive health and rights organizations of interest to this study made up nearly one-sixth of those 600 participants, including: Catholics for a Free Choice; Center for Reproductive Rights; Center for Development and Population Activities (CEDPA); Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN); Family Care International, with 13 representatives; the Guttmacher Institute; International Planned Parenthood Federation, Western Hemisphere, with 21
representatives; International Women’s Health Coalition, with 24 representatives; and IPAS.

The preliminary documents published by UNAIDS for the UNGASS Review made special note of the importance of civil society participation, particularly in order to ensure involvement from every sector of society to stem the spread of AIDS.

The decision by UN Member States to accommodate such a high number of organizations marks a critical moment in the history of the AIDS response helping to underline commitment from many corners of the world to work on AIDS across sectors and in partnership. The Review promises an unprecedented level of involvement for civil society including presentation slots in plenary, roundtable and panel sessions. (UNAIDS 2006)

The “Information for Civil Society” document (UNAIDS 2006) goes on to note the financial support UNAIDS raised with donors to support NGO representatives from developing countries. This support, both rhetorical and financial, for civil society participation highlights the failure of official AIDS initiatives to reach their goals, and the prevailing view that local civil society support and representatives of those living with HIV/AIDS are needed to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS.

In addition to the many NGOs focused on the issue of HIV/AIDS, the reproductive health and rights organizations kept track of all the preparations for the UNGASS Review through several e-bulletins throughout 2006, encouraging those interested in reproductive health and rights to attend the conference and/or get in touch with their UN mission, and pointing out the role of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the preliminary political declaration of the UNGASS Review (FCI and IWHC 2006, Fried 2006). Although the Toronto International Conference was mentioned often, the majority of the attention was given to involvement in the UNGASS Review; one can
safely assume that many of these reproductive health and rights organizations believed that the UNGASS Review was of greater importance.

Prior to the UNGASS Review, the Commission on the Status of Women issued a Resolution on Women, the Girl Child, and HIV/AIDS in March 2006, which called for placing women and girls at the center of the response to HIV/AIDS, and urged governments to provide universal access to reproductive health by 2015, enable women’s empowerment, protect women’s human rights, and strengthen policy and programmatic linkages between HIV/AIDS and sexual and reproductive health, among many other recommendations. The second FCI/IWHC newsletter sent out prior to the UNGASS Review noted “This resolution will be an important contribution to the 2006 HIV/AIDS UNGASS review and high-level meeting and can be used to advocate for a stronger commitment to addressing the needs of women and girls and increasing linkages between HIV/AIDS and sexual and reproductive health in the meeting’s outcome document” (FCI/IWHC 2006b).

There were many other indications of the importance these organizations have placed on connecting sexual and reproductive health and rights with HIV/AIDS. The Sexual Health and Rights Project of the Soros Initiative also sent out several newsletters to reproductive health and rights organizations prior to the UNGASS Review detailing the many ways that reproductive health and rights activists and organizations could get involved in the civil society portions of the conference, and also the connections that had already been made and that, in their view, needed to be made between sexual health and rights and HIV/AIDS. The Soros newsletter reviewed the current status of the negotiation for the political declaration that would be signed by the delegates to the
UNGASS Review, and highlighted the key sexual health and rights issues included, commenting that the conference would be “a key opportunity to highlight… the connections between sexuality and health and rights and HIV/AIDS information and services” (Fried 2006a). The newsletter also did its best to prepare activists to be savvy advocates at the conference by listing the key UN documents to which they could refer for language already agreed upon on sexual and reproductive health and rights, including the Program of Action from ICPD and its reviews, and the Plan of Action from the Beijing Women’s conference and its reviews. In addition, the key civil society activities during the conference were also listed, and for those who would not be able to attend the conference, a form letter that they could send to their UN mission was attached. This letter expressed concern that the draft of the political declaration to come out of the UNGASS Review did not address the feminization of the HIV and AIDS epidemic, and failed to “assert unequivocal support for and real commitments to reproductive and sexual rights and health” (Fried 2006a). In addition, the letter asks that the Declaration “take an unmitigated position of support of the promotion and protection of basic human rights, including reproductive and sexual rights, of all persons” and urged “the inclusion in the final UNGASS declaration of all of the points outlined below regarding the strengthening of efforts to promote both sexual and reproductive rights and expanded services” (Fried 2006a, emphasis in the original). These newsletters demonstrate how carefully and precisely reproductive health and rights activists are re-framing HIV/AIDS as a sexual and reproductive health and rights issue. They also argue that the HIV/AIDS issue cannot be resolved without proper attention to sexual and reproductive health services.
The second issue of the FCI/IWHC newsletter highlights the recommendations on sexual and reproductive health and rights made by early regional consultations on HIV/AIDS, including the fact that Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States did not make any specific recommendations on women or sexual and reproductive health and rights issues. The second newsletter put out by the Soros initiative also printed the actual language from the draft Political Declaration, including the textual changes recommended by civil society in general; in addition, the newsletter also highlighted the particular changes needed to make sexual and reproductive health and rights much more clear and specific in the Political Declaration, including specific paragraph numbers. Written just prior to the UNGASS Review, the newsletter also had a tentative listing of sexual and rights-related NGO side-events during the conference, so that advocates would be better able to network with each other.

During the actual UNGASS Review, the Soros initiative also put out a briefing on each day’s events. These briefings described the frustration of many NGOs who were pushing for greater acknowledgement of the marginalized populations suffering from HIV/AIDS, such as women and girls, sex workers, and men having sex with men, as well as those who were pushing for a greater commitment to sexual and reproductive health and rights services in connection with HIV/AIDS. The necessity of striving for consensus in a UN document made many government delegations sidestep much of this language. The newsletter described what was going on at the review as “inside the negotiation rooms, the real issues, it seems, are being whitewashed in favor of ‘consensus’ or, in reality, the lowest common denominator” (Fried 2006c). While many government delegates diplomatically spoke on what they believed they could develop consensus on,
civil society representatives again and again refused to speak diplomatically, and according to this newsletter, “noted the devastating linkages of gender inequality and women’s subordination with HIV/AIDS” (Fried 2006c). To stress this point even further, a statement by an NGO representative from India was printed in full, ending with the point that governments must allocate resources for comprehensive sexual and reproductive health services, subsidized condoms, and comprehensive sexuality education, among others things (Fried 2006c).

The Soros newsletter described the second day of negotiations on the Political Declaration as coming out with much stronger content on sexual health and rights, and human rights more generally, and without making the explicit connection between the two statements, that civil society organizations had worked hard to provide recommendations on the Declaration. The newsletter also printed the full press statements of several NGOs, many of which continued in the vein of the previous newsletter; included were statements by a coalition of women’s groups to the negotiation process at the Review, the African civil society coalition on AIDS, and the Coalition on Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies. In their statement, the women’s groups condemned governments for not acknowledging the importance of women’s rights issues to the pandemic, in particular the need for universal access to and protection of sexual and reproductive health and rights. The African civil society coalition contended that the African government delegations were negotiating in bad faith by refusing to include measures to protect and promote the human rights of vulnerable groups. The Coalition on Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies took the Organization of Islamic Countries to task for not representing “the civil society perspectives and best practices regarding
HIV/ AIDS within our countries, as well as our commitment to the universality and indivisibility of human rights” (Fried 2006d).

The end of the conference saw marked disappointment on the part of civil society and some governments over the disconnect between the Political Declaration and the speeches and recommendations of most civil society groups. The civil society press release on the last day of the conference, when the language of the Political Declaration was set, denounced the meeting as a failure because it failed to set hard targets on funding, prevention, care and treatment; it also did not acknowledge at-risk populations, promote sexual and reproductive health and rights, or the establish the centrality of human rights. The statement by human rights groups seemed to capture well the body of issues civil society had with the Political Declaration: “For human rights to be respected, protected and fulfilled in relation to HIV and AIDS, cultural exceptionalism cannot qualify human rights provisions and cannot inform programmatic responses to comprehensive sexual education” (Fried 2006e). Thus, despite the advocacy of many AIDS NGOs as well as sexual and reproductive health and rights NGOs, and the strenuous attempts of many of the latter NGOs to frame sexual and reproductive health and rights as central to the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, not enough of the country delegations agreed on the language and recommendations of these civil society groups to include them in the Political Declaration. This was due mainly to the opposition of the U.S. delegation, influenced by the Bush administration, and several other Islamic countries. Although the official newsletters of the reproductive health and rights organizations only very generally named conservative countries as opposing their language, unofficial blogging reports from the conference named the U.S. as a major
obstacle to the sexual and reproductive rights language sought by many NGOs to frame
the HIV/AIDS issue. The U.S.’s insistence on the language “evidence-informed” rather
than “evidence-based” policies caused one irate blogger to suggest, “As the public health
community continues to voice its concern about the triumph of ideology over science
(perhaps now over reason as well?), this news suggests that the U.S. delegation is not
listening” (RHRealityCheck.org, May 31, 2006). In addition, several bloggers wrote that
the conservative NGOs were conspicuously missing from the civil society forum at
UNGASS:

the conservative ideologues who back such language are "evidence-invisible." They have
not even applied to participate in any of the public forums where their ideas could heard
and debated. At the recently concluded hearing of Civil Society and governmental
representatives, not one NGO spoke in favor [sic] the abstinence-only until marriage
policies that others were complaining about. No one with a conservative perspective was
there to explain why condoms are bad, to show the "evidence" that "informs" their
ideology or to articulate clearly why public health data should not be the basis for
decisions about the AIDS pandemic. (RHRealityCheck.org, May 31, 2006)

The UNGASS Review of the commitments made to treat HIV/AIDS was an important
conference that demonstrates the ongoing work of reproductive health and rights
organizations to put their issue back at the forefront of UN and donor attention by
framing HIV/AIDS as a sexual and reproductive health and rights issue.

The Toronto International Conference was another conference that many
reproductive health and rights organizations attended; although their framing of the
HIV/AIDS issue was not successful on the intergovernmental level at the UNGASS
Review, it has been successful among many NGOs dealing with the HIV/AIDS issue.
However, not many anti-abortion organizations attended the conference, similar to the
UNGASS Review; Jill Sheffield of Family Care International noted especially that “the
opposition sees the link between reproductive health and rights and HIV/AIDS, but they
weren’t there in force to oppose it at Toronto” (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). This suggests that the anti-abortion organizations do not see the HIV/AIDS issue as one they can profitably contest, given the enormous support from both conservative and progressive organizations for HIV/AIDS (Chowka 2005). It may also indicate that anti-abortion NGOs were relying on the voice of the U.S. government in this case.

The intense interest of the abortion-rights organizations in building an alliance with the HIV/AIDS community is based mainly in their need to find alternative streams of funding as a result of their decreasing influence after the Millennium Development Goals were released. However, the ways in which the abortion-rights network has gone about trying to regain that influence conform quite closely to the tactics that were successful at the 1994 Cairo conference: coalition building, framing HIV/AIDS as a human rights issue that needs to be dealt with holistically in a sexual and reproductive health context, and producing research that supports reproductive health as essential to the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS, especially among women. Thus, the abortion-rights network continues its advocacy at the UN by using strategies that conform to UN norms.

8.2 World Congress of Families

The anti-abortion network continues to build alliances with similar organizations around the world; one of the key events since 2004 that demonstrates the international focus of this network is the World Congress of Families IV, held in 2007. The documents and speeches from the conference also demonstrate the continuing adjustment of anti-abortion organizations to the norms of the UN, including framing in terms of human rights and using research to support advocacy. The World Congress of Families IV also
demonstrates a key divide within the coalition, between those who are just beginning to focus on their attention on the international arena, and those who have done so for the past ten years.

The Fourth World Congress of Families was held in Warsaw, Poland, from May 11-13, 2007. Around 3,000 people attended, from 70 different countries; the conference was again organized by the Howard Center, and co-sponsored by many pro-family organizations, such as Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, Concerned Women for America, Defend the Family International, Red Familia, Family Research Council, Focus on the Family, the Heritage Foundation, Human Life International, Population Research Institute, and United Families International. The Howard Center chose Warsaw was chosen as the site of this most recent Congress of Families because many pro-family organizations see Europe as an overwhelmingly liberal policy environment, and Poland, as a staunchly Catholic country, as one of the only countries in Europe whose conservative leaders will speak out for traditional views of the family and against abortion. The WCF IV website maintains, “Through demographic winter and the rule of anti-family elite, Europe is almost lost to family values. …Poland is a bastion of tradition, faith and family” (World Congress of Families IV Information 2007).

The stated goals of the conference were to shift the terms of the public policy debate from “The family as an obstacle to development” to “The family as the source of social renewal and progress;” from “overpopulation” to “under-population” as the demographic challenge of the 21st century; from “The small family and voluntary childlessness as good” to “The celebration of the large family as a special social gift;” and from religious orthodoxy as a “threat to progress” to “religious orthodoxy as the source of humane values and cultural progress.” World Congress of Families IV, Background 2007

This statement of purpose demonstrates the intent of these organizations to re-frame the debate on population and development in the terms that would further their own goals; each of the changes stated above describe a major shift, especially in the population field.
The main themes of the conference - larger families as a source of human capital rather than an detriment to development and the environment, population aging and negative birthrates as the real problem of the modern world, traditional marriage and family as the building blocks of a successful society, and religion as the source of stability and values that anchor that successful society – can all be found in the statement on shifting terms (World Congress of Families IV, Background 2007). It seems clear that in addition to networking with other like-minded organizations and building an international movement, one of the major goals of the pro-family movement at the World Congress of Families IV was to also re-frame the terms of debate.

The networking aspect of the conference was also prominent, as evidenced by the many different organizations from different parts of the world represented at the conference, and the many NGOs represented in the booths set up for that purpose. The on-line conference literature (World Congress of Families IV, Background, Information, Planning 2007) touts the international character of the conference; the simultaneous translation of all conference speeches for the attendees, the reference to these attendees as delegations from different countries, and the adoption, as at previous conferences, of a Declaration, all point to obvious parallels to UN global conferences. In fact, an article on Christianwire.com quotes Alan Carlson, founder of the WCF conferences, as saying “You might say we’re the United Nations of the pro-family movement” (Christian Newswire April 24, 2007). Carlson describes the gathering:

In terms of speakers, organizers and attendees, the Congress spans six continents. This demonstrates the universality of family concerns and the desire of pro-family leaders, scholars and activists to network and develop joint plans of action to address those concerns at the national level as well as in international forums.
NGO booths at the conference reflected the interest of a wide variety of conservative organizations in the issue of the family, as well as the resource that such a conference is for brand-new organizations such as Watchmen on the Walls, that began only a year ago. Watchmen on the Walls bills itself as an International Christian Movement for Human Rights, founded mainly by Latvian and American journalists and activists to provide support to Christians all over the world who want to advocate for their values. Many well-established American organizations such as Focus on the Family, Heritage Foundation, and United Families International had booths side by side with newer Polish organizations, both religious-based and advocacy-based. These organizations were not only focused on the natural family and the issues that go along with that concept, but also advocated for more traditional conservative concerns, such as the involvement of government in private life. One example was a representative of a home-schooling organization, which passionately argued for the dismantling of the public school system as one of the largest, most wasteful and ineffective government programs, which also indoctrinated children to agree with and support the government rather than criticize it. The representative of this organization believed home-schooling children was the best way of educating them, that parents could and would step up to the challenge if they were required to do so. The sheer proximity of these NGOs to each other created networking opportunities that would not have otherwise existed.

From reports and articles written by abortion-rights organizations, they seem to be aware of but not react very strongly to the WCF IV; reports on both sides are visibly biased, but the abortion-rights reaction can be described as disgusted. Catholics for a Free Choice posted daily reports on the conference that mainly represented it as a gathering of
delusional right-wingers, not worthy of much notice (Catholics for a Free Choice, May 11-14, 2007). Catholics for a Free Choice was one of the few reproductive health and rights organizations that reported on the WCF IV; one of their Opposition Watch reports (Catholics for a Free Choice, May 11 2007) derides the speakers at the Congress as being known anti-choice advocates, and describes the Polish Prime Minister and President, slated to speak at the conference, as men who either are not married or have only one child, and therefore hypocritical in their support of the “natural family.” In the end, however, neither Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski nor President Lech Kaczynski spoke at the conference, the latter sending someone to read his speech instead.

In addition, both the Opposition Watch summary report (O’Brien 2007) and the daily reports from the conference took pains to report the indifference of the city of Warsaw in general and the Polish mainstream media to the conference, and the fact that prominent members of the city did not strongly associate themselves with the conference. This includes the city mayor, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, who actually is a member of the WCF honorary committee, but did not take special pains to welcome the conference, nor announce her involvement in her public appearances.

A letter sent by a working group of the European Parliament to U.S. Representative to the UN Commission on the Status of Women, Ellen Sauerbrey in late March of 2007 represents a more serious reaction to the WCF IV. The letter asks her not to participate in the WCF IV because as a senior representative of the U.S. government, she lends the conference and its supporting organizations legitimacy and a government stamp of approval, which they deemed inappropriate because the major organizations attending the conference hold “extremist and intolerant views” (European Parliamentary
Working Group on Separation of Religion and Politics, March 28, 2007). The letter lists organizations by name and details statements made by their founders or members against gay rights, abortion, or alternate concepts of the family, including Friar Thomas Euteneuer of Human Life International, Steven Mosher of Population Research Institute, and Austin Ruse of the Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute. The MEPs then characterize the WCF as a gathering whose sole aim is to “turn back the clock on recent advances in civil and political rights around the world, with the work done at the UN and the EU a particular target” (European Parliamentary Working Group, March 28, 2007), and cautions Sauerbrey that her participation would lend official support to these groups and undermine their efforts to promote tolerance in Europe, especially among newer members of the European Union. The letter goes on to state “In your role as Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration, you must be aware of the impact that the unrepresentative views of the people attending this conference will have on the life and death issues that affect the world’s poor” (European Parliamentary Working Group, March 28, 2007). This last statement seems to be the strongest acknowledgement of the impact of conservative groups at the regional and international level.

Christianwire.com also published an article detailing the reaction of feminists, humanists, and the Sex Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS) to the World Congress of Families IV, using as a subhead “Why is the left so agitated over World Congress of Families IV? Why has the Warsaw Congress become a target of anti-family forces?” (Christian Newswire March 27, 2007). This article, along with others published by anti-abortion organizations and more conservative sites, seem to
emphasize the reactions of abortion-rights organizations to the World Congress of Families, implying that the gathering has international importance and a significant effect of some kind – why else would these opposing organizations bother to criticize the gathering or its participants? It is an interesting tactic, because the subhead only implies that abortion-rights organizations view the World Congress of Families IV through questions, while the article itself goes on to state quite explicitly “Feminists, militant secularists, and the vanguard of the sexual revolution agree that the World Congress of Families is a threat to their agenda.” Although there has been some reaction to the World Congress of Families by abortion-rights organizations, most notably the letter to Ellen Sauerbrey from the European Parliamentary Working Group, for the most part even organizations who keep close track of anti-abortion and conservative opposition groups did not attribute much importance to the World Congress of Families. However, the one aspect in which World Congress of Families was similar to UN conferences was the opportunity it presented for anti-abortion groups to network with each other, and this article astutely noted not only that this was part of the aim of WCF and as the most likely goal to be accomplished would cause anti-abortion groups some worry, but that as a strategy, it was taken from the abortion-rights movement. “They worry about WCF following their example by networking with allies in Europe and the Third World and working together for common goals” (Christian Newswire March 27, 2007).

As an attendant of this conference for this research, I noticed two things in particular that stood out as representative of the gathering. The first is that this conference could easily be described as a celebration of the family, marriage, and conservative values; as such, it did not resemble an international meeting at the UN, but demonstrated
the differences between such a meeting and one that only included NGOs that agreed on the issue. It did not include the type of negotiation that one would associate with a global UN conference that included many different groups of differing views, and even the substantive speeches assumed that the audience already agreed with the speaker’s point of view, and merely needed more information to strengthen that agreement. Many other speeches, especially by Polish nuns and priests, were encomiums to marriage and the family, to religion’s place in upholding the family, and to the family’s place in upholding society. In addition, several hours in each conference day were taken up by cultural entertainment with a purpose; artwork by Polish schoolchildren depicting families, a concert by youth at the end of the first day, and an exhibition by the cast of a popular Polish children’s television show, Ziarno. The host of the show was a grandmother who took care of the children when they came to visit her, and helped them to learn traditional and national Polish songs as well as Polish poetry. The children sang and spoke of their experiences on the show, and an episode of the show was shown on a large screen in which children and older youth came to the grandmother with different problems that she helped them deal with, such as fighting parents or falling in love at first sight. This celebration of family and marriage was interesting to me, because it seemed to be one of the primary purposes of the conference – to reinforce and celebrate the issues the conference attendees found important.

The second thing I noticed was that many of the speakers from Poland were nuns and priests, whereas many of the speakers from the U.S. were activists, academics, and leaders of their own non-governmental organizations. I do not believe that in Poland, all those concerned with the natural family and the issues highlighted by the World Congress
of Families were only religious figures; in fact, Polish academics and scientists spoke at many of the breakout sessions. However, the fact that so many of the Polish plenary speakers were religious figures or politicians that referred heavily to religion, seems to me an indication that religious figures are still given pride of place in a way that seems out of place in the United States for those involved in advocacy.

The substantive sessions tended to be in the breakout sessions rather than the plenary sessions, but the plenary sessions by U.S. speakers, such as Pat Fagan of the Heritage Foundation, or Steven Mosher of the Population Research Council, tended to include research and statistics to provide evidence for their point of view. Pat Fagan showed graphs and charts relevant to his argument that every child had a right to the marriage of its parents because that is where children are safest – in a two-parent, married family. Steve Mosher argued that no country whose birthrate has fallen below replacement has ever succeeded through government policies in bringing birthrates back up to replacement levels. Paul Mero, President of the Utah-based Sutherland Institute, spoke about “The Physics of the Natural Family,” arguing that as the science of physics guides the integrity of structures, there are scientific reasons why families lose the integrity of their structures. Mero carried the metaphor through to his claim that the natural family is more able to withstand a load, to bend and not break, whereas other types of arrangements are not as elastic. He specifically appealed to a scientific point of view by saying, “Because of emotions, we prefer not to think about families in honest, scientific terms. … Ideologies don’t explain away natural families – ideology is defenseless against truth” (Mero 2007). Paul Mero’s speech stood out in great contrast to an earlier Polish speaker in that he approached the study of the family scientifically, and
presented his argument as more valid as a result. Several of the Polish speakers notably did not have a scientific approach to the family, but made statements like, “There is nothing more beautiful than life, and above life is love.” Although both the Polish speakers and the Western speakers ended up with similar conclusions about the natural family and the importance of marriage to society, and Paul Mero concluded his speech by alluding to Christ’s admonition to be like a little child, the arguments supporting their conclusions were starkly different between the Polish religious figures and the mostly American NGO speakers. Although the American speakers for the most part also referred to their religious backgrounds, they kept them to the background, rather than foregrounding them the way many of the Polish speakers did.

The World Congress of Families IV in Poland demonstrates the continuing importance that the anti-abortion movement places on building coalitions with organizations from Europe and developing countries in order to further their goals, at country levels and at the international level. The conference also presents a good opportunity to compare the reports made by the abortion-rights and anti-abortion organizations on the event and try to decipher what each was trying to accomplish with these reports, as well as what about the event concerned or excited each respective group. The abortion-rights groups took pains in their reports to denigrate the effects of the conference and to downplay the participation of high-ranking Polish government officials, while anti-abortion groups took pains to emphasize the negative or “threatened” reactions of abortion-rights groups, and to highlight the importance of the conference. The participants’ speeches at World Congress of Families also provided an interesting comparison between the scientific arguments of Western speakers, especially U.S. NGO
leaders, and the more religious statements made by Polish speakers. Although this was very much an “insiders” gathering, Western speakers in general still approached their topic from a scientific point of view, with arguments to convince and persuade their audience, while Eastern European speakers tended to celebrate the family and their common religious convictions.

These observations about the differences between the conservative organizations at the World Congress of Families suggest that a period of adjustment awaits the Polish organizations that have joined the anti-abortion coalition but have not yet moved fully into advocacy at the UN. In addition, the divide between the Western groups’ approach to advocacy and the Polish groups’ approach may be a sign that the two groups have not exchanged significant information or worked very closely together. Whether the alliance will last and whether the Polish groups will change as they attempt to join Western groups in advocacy attempts at the UN remains to be seen. I believe the scientific and research-based arguments of the Western NGO leaders demonstrates some of the substantive change that has occurred in these organizations as a result of their lobbying at the UN.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I discuss the tensions demonstrated at the World Congress of Families IV within the conservative movement between those organizations that are more comfortable with the scientific and research-based advocacy that is the norm of the UN and those that continue to use moral and religious arguments. Acknowledging these tensions add nuance to an understanding of the anti-abortion movement and the different norms within the conservative tradition to which these organizations hold. As I have
discussed in earlier chapters, there is also nuance within the liberal tradition, which is closer to the center, while many progressive women’s rights organizations belong further on the left on the political and philosophical spectrum. Many of the left-leaning organizations wanted to focus more on economic rights and enact more radical change than is implied in an individualist, private, liberal human rights framework. In fact, these more progressive organizations, while they continue to ally themselves with liberal organizations, have been more vocal about the need for more economic and development rights, and struggle in a similar manner, if not to the same degree, as anti-abortion organizations to maintain their identity apart from the liberal tradition of the UN. Thus, the alliance of liberal and progressive (or more radical) women’s organizations on the issue of reproductive health and rights required similar adjustments to the norms of the UN as those made by anti-abortion organizations, in framing, coalitions, and research-based advocacy.
9 Conclusion

Both the abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks established themselves at the UN, and regardless of changes in funding from both governments and foundations, or rhetorical support from influential institutions in the population field such as the U.S. government, they have adjusted their strategies in order to continue to influence UN norms and policy as best they can. The theoretical framework I am suggesting can help explain specifically how these organizations have adjusted. Although I argue that the UN is characterized by certain ideological elements, such as the emphasis on the individual, the drive for progress through reason, and the environment of bureaucratic rationalism, I do not argue that these norms are deterministic for individuals or movements; they are elements that have evolved over time in importance as a part of the UN system, and it is possible to influence the UN without them or to work around them. However, for NGO networks and social movements without the authority of a state, adapting to the norms of the UN is especially important in order to influence international norms and policy on abortion. In particular, I argue that both movements have adjusted to the norms of the UN by shifting their scale appropriately, whether up to the UN level or down to include grassroots organizations; adjusting the framing of their arguments to include a more individual emphasis on rights; building coalitions to increase their numbers and connections to issues already in the public eye; and using science and reason to professionalize their advocacy.

The theoretical framework that I am proposing helps us understand more than conventional explanations for why the abortion-rights movement was so successful in the early nineties, and why the anti-abortion movement gained momentum and influence in
the latter part of the century and the beginning of this decade. A top-down explanation using world-polity theory or globalization theory would suggest convergence of norms and practices, a structural perspective that minimizes the role of actors. I believe such theories and explanations miss the ability of actors to change and adapt, if only instrumentally, to succeed in their goals. Some alternative bottom-up explanations using social movement theories would suggest resources, in the form of abundant sources of funding, or openings in political opportunity structures, in the form of the support of the U.S. government, as the determining factors in which the movement rose in influence. While the support of the U.S. government is very important, in that each administration fills the delegation with appointees that fit its point of view and allocates or takes away resources accordingly, the changing U.S. administrations does not provide a full explanation for the success or staying power of these movements. The networks’ influence at the UN is not consistent with the change in administrations. The abortion-rights movement began to build relationships and gain traction at the UN well before the Clinton administration came into office, and lost some influence while Clinton was still in office. The anti-abortion network has continued to work at the UN and increase its numbers there long after the Bush administration took up their concerns there. In addition, the decrease in resources to the abortion-rights network cannot be said to have a causal connection to its loss of influence, because one could argue that the decrease in resources occurred as a result of its loss in influence, especially when the Millennium Development Goals were released without a reproductive health and rights goal.\(^6\)

\(^6\) I will address the role of resources and an alternative explanation from the transnational advocacy network literature more fully in following sections.
Both of these movements asserted themselves at the UN at a time when they were not being supported by the current U.S. administration, and built up their influence slowly by appealing to grassroots organizations and scaling up from there. In the nineties, the abortion-rights movement had the support of the U.S. administration, but several other factors played equally important roles in contributing to its influence at Cairo. First, women’s organizations put together a few very important and pragmatic lobbying strategies to create one document that incorporated all the changes in language and policy that women’s rights organizations around the world wanted to work toward; as a result, they were able to distribute this language directly to many country delegations and lobby them directly to support it (Confidential Interview 2006). Second, the relationships women’s health and rights organizations built with foundations and UN officials played the biggest role in bringing feminist NGOs to Cairo in such great numbers; their good relationships with UN officials also allowed them to attend the preparatory meetings for Cairo, where they were able to influence the wording of the Program of Action to a great extent.

In the late 90s, the anti-abortion movement was not making much visible progress, in that the Cairo+5 conference, which was supposed to be a low-key review, became a huge international conference in which abortion-rights activists continued to advocate successfully for abortion rights and sexual health in addition to reproductive health and rights. However, it was precisely during this time, when the influence of the anti-abortion movement could least be seen, that the anti-abortion movement began adapting its strategies to the international sphere. Although not many internationally active anti-abortion organizations exist, especially in comparison to the number of
feminist NGOs supporting the right to reproductive health and especially to abortion, those that exist were created in or became active at the UN between the late 90s or and early 2000s. Many of the important organizations in the anti-abortion network currently are Christian Right organizations from the U.S. that turned their attention to the issue of abortion and the natural family at the UN as a result of the Cairo conference. They began to build alliances with other NGOs, both Catholic and Mormon groups, and then reached out to developing countries through their affiliates in those developing countries, and also through international conferences held on the topic of the natural family. Throughout the 21st century, these anti-abortion organizations have expanded the ways they frame their arguments; not only do they argue in terms of rights, especially the right to life, but organizations that once rejected the environmental movement and other progressive causes have now embraced such causes and connected them to the natural family and, importantly, argued that money spent on abortion does not address the larger problems of infectious disease, hunger, and environmental blight.

9.1 Major findings

9.1.1 Abortion-rights and Anti-abortion movements

The anti-abortion movement has a more difficult time reconciling their position on the issue of abortion with liberal norms, but they have been able to adjust their strategies in order to have more of an impact on the UN. As previous chapters show, conservative organizations have adjusted to the environment of the UN by shifting the scale of their advocacy, changing the framing of their arguments, building coalitions across faiths and borders, and professionalizing their advocacy to include science and reason as rationales for policy change. This case study provides evidence that a movement not based in
liberal philosophies can adopt the strategies required to lobby in a liberal environment, and that although these norms may not be natural to the network, they can be instrumentally manipulated.

However, the anti-abortion movement has a core set of ideas and goals that has motivated its activism for decades, first domestically, and now internationally. The movement is supported by grassroots organizations that emphasize the key norms and beliefs that motivate the movement’s goals, such as belief in God, the importance of family, tradition, and the ability of people to thrive apart from the interference of governments. The frames and alliances these advocacy organizations undertake do not stray from these core norms, for doing so would jeopardize the support of the grassroots organizations that are generally much more focused on domestic concerns than international ones. This means that although many of the conservative organizations mentioned in this research emphasize democracy, they do not subscribe to global civil society’s goals of inclusiveness and voice for all; although they lobby at the UN, they consistently deride the idea that the solutions to important problems can be left in the hands of UN agencies, citing their inefficiency, scandals of corruption at the UN, and their “clear bias” toward liberal or leftist claims and NGOs (Crouse 2002). Therefore, the changes I have observed in the strategies these NGOs have used over time have not substantially changed the content of their claims, nor the underlying values that motivate their activism. As a result, I would argue that it is possible for social movements coming from different philosophies to lobby at the UN without changing the content of their claims, although their influence is more limited. The example of the anti-abortion network in particular demonstrates that these activists have chosen not to change
their framing substantially, or be more in line with the norms governing the
progressive NGOs. This disadvantages them in their ability to influence UN officials
and build broader alliances, but the anti-abortion group chooses such disadvantages at the
UN rather than materially damaging their standing with their constituents.

Despite the generally negating influence these organizations have had on UN
conferences and conference reviews, in that they have been more successful in blocking
language or watering down resolutions than in inserting language they approve of, it is
important to realize that they have not been working in the UN system for very long or in
great numbers. If these organizations grow in numbers or in the number of actors they
deploy, and if they are able to command greater resources and influence more countries
with conservative leadership, they may well be a greater influence on future UN global
conferences or consensus documents. If the conservative organizations do grow in
numbers and resources and are still unable to greatly influence UN policy, such a finding
might have interesting implications for the world-polity structural perspective on the
international system. Therefore tracing the interaction of these organizations, their change
over time, and the characteristics of the system in which they work, will help us better
understand the nature of the international system and how structure and agency interact.

My findings indicate that even though the abortion-rights movement had an
easier time because its position is built on a liberal understanding of the world, the
abortion-rights movement also had to adjust its strategies to work at the UN.
Activists not only had to tone down the radical elements of their movement, which many
politically successful movements in many environments must do, but they had to adjust
their frame within the UN – they moved to a human rights framing of reproductive
health. This is a mainstream liberal perspective on reproductive health, and many feminists argued then and continue to argue now that the private, rights-based framing of reproductive health surrenders key ground. What they are concerned about is the ability to carry out reproductive health choices, both to prevent or terminate a pregnancy and to carry one to term. That is where, according to many feminists, the right to reproductive health falls short, because once the baby is born, there is little provision to take care of the baby in a way that allows the woman to work and make further choices about her life, unless she is financially well-off. However, in order to fit their agenda with other issue areas of importance at the time (environmentalism), or with a powerful perspective (human rights), abortion-rights activists made choices about how to frame their arguments and what goals to accomplish: they chose to frame their argument as the right to reproductive health services, concerned that women should have access to family planning services and other health services that would allow them to make crucial decisions about their fertility. Subsequently, many feminist organizations have brought up these issues of access to services, and the economic and social rights connected with raising children; however, sexual health and rights has become the prevailing frame with which reproductive health and rights organizations have tried to overcome the problem of being excluded from the UN Millennium Development Goals and reconnecting to sources of funding.

*Levels of Influence for the Two Movements*

Analysis of interview data, in particular, demonstrates that groups influence the UN on two levels. At the first level, advocates influence UN employees at the
different agencies and funds that deal with population issues; they operate by working on the same issues in the field, building relationships, and finding common understandings of the world, or underlying beliefs and assumptions. At this level, abortion-rights organizations are able to exert much more influence than anti-abortion organizations because they have worked with UN agencies over time, have built strong relationships with UN employees, and have similar views on human rights, women’s rights, and reproductive rights. Abortion-rights activists, I would argue, build strong working relationships based on their common views on human rights, women’s rights, and reproductive rights, which are in turn built on similar liberal values concerning the importance of the individual, a rights framework, and the importance of science and reason in developing and changing policy.

Anti-abortion organizations, on the other hand, do not work in the family planning services field, have not as a result built strong relationships with UN agencies and funds that support such services, and do not have similar views on human rights, women’s rights, or reproductive rights. This is a result of the incongruence of their underlying conservative values with the liberal norms governing the UN environment, especially those of the rights framework and the importance of the individual. I see the key anti-abortion organizations that have emerged from developed countries and especially the U.S. as much more willing to adapt to the use of science and reason as the basis for their advocacy, but mainly when presenting their arguments to those outside their known supporters, or those who may be undecided. The use of science and reason to support their advocacy is much less likely to alienate them from grassroots supporters, as long as they continue to refer to religious backgrounds and traditional or
moral reasons for being involved in this advocacy. However, the importance of the individual and the rights framework are too much associated with such liberal institutions as the UN, and therefore must be carefully manipulated by these anti-abortion organizations in order to avoid negative reactions from their constituents.

At the second level, advocates influence government delegations at the UN during meetings and conferences on relevant issues. Success requires that advocates have knowledge or experience with the UN global conference process, and lobbying strategies and resources appropriate to the UN environment. Both abortion-rights and anti-abortion organizations had to learn how UN global conferences worked, and how best to influence the language of the final document. The abortion-rights organizations had a head start by scaling up to international advocacy in the 1970s, and gaining experience with UN global conferences through the Women’s Decade conferences from 1975-1985; however, anti-abortion organizations have quickly learned to operate on this level over the last ten years and have adjusted their strategies to the UN environment.

Many of those who have worked at the UN on population issues since the 1970s believed in the family planning paradigm, in which demographers were the experts and allowing men and women to control their fertility was both the answer to a population crisis and a step towards helping women better their lives (Stan Bernstein Interview 2006, Stirling Scruggs Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006). These same UN employees did not have far to go to be persuaded of the reproductive health and rights paradigm, which emphasized the right of women to a holistic treatment of their reproductive needs, including family planning services, rather than the wholesale distribution of contraceptives. Most employees were already working for the
empowerment of women (Steven Sinding Interview 2006), and they also sympathized with the reproductive health and rights activists who argued for safe abortion, although the UN itself does not support abortion as a family planning method. As a result of this confluence of interests at the UN Secretariat level, abortion-rights NGOs work closely with UN agencies and funds, and are able to use UN meetings and publications to network and advocate for their point of view. For instance, Barbara Crane noted that the networks and relationships in the field of reproductive health and rights are deep and long lasting.

That’s one of the sociological facts. There are pretty close networks, pre-Cairo, Cairo, post-Cairo, of people who are scattered around, even when we don’t specifically coordinate, we can help each other quite a bit. … WHO, UNFPA, World Bank Reproductive Health Training Institute, they don’t do so much specifically with abortion, but all that activism and work that happens broadly around RH creates an environment, it creates a network, and frameworks around which abortion activism happens. (Barbara Crane Interview 2006)

Abortion-rights organizations also have close ties and influence with UN employees because many of these organizations are not only advocacy organizations, but use the funds distributed by UNFPA to provide services on the ground in developing countries. As a result, they have built close relationships, and since the 1994 Cairo conference, have been working together for the same goals. Amy Tsui, a demographer at Johns Hopkins University who has studied the relationships between reproductive health and rights service NGOs and the UN, felt that reproductive health and rights organizations may have directed their efforts to persuade the UNFPA prior to the Cairo conference, but that “Today, I would say… they are completely aligned. They correspond almost completely in their goals” (Amy Tsui Interview 2006). The cross-fertilization of personnel between the UN and the abortion-rights NGOs demonstrates the concurrence between these two sectors and encourages further cooperation between them. For instance, Maria Jose Alcala, a key figure in helping to mobilizing input from abortion-
rights NGOs from all over the world into a consensus document at Cairo, at the time worked for Family Care International; soon after the Beijing Women’s conference, she was hired by UNFPA, where she still works (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). Barbara Crane also considered that there was mobility between the abortion-rights NGOs and the UN system: “For example, the IPAS Mexico director has just become a country representative for Guatemala. I mean, there’s not a huge amount, but there’s a certain amount of movement, and that facilitates the bonding and ability of NGOs to have access” (Barbara Crane Interview 2006).

This type of influence seems to depend on the relationships abortion-rights activists have with UN employees, but also on the liberal point of view that most of them have, which allies the two against the conservative activists at the UN. Stirling Scruggs, formerly with UNFPA, noted that although UNFPA works closely with many reproductive health and rights NGOs, they do not tell each other what to do. However, he acknowledged that “we are usually singing the same song and working together, just as the Holy See and the people that work with them are doing the same thing” (Stirling Scruggs Interview 2006). Another example of the concurrence of interests and liberal point of view that enables the influence of abortion-rights activists at the UN level was the power and influence of former IWHC president, Bella Abzug; many interviewees spoke of Bella Abzug’s close relationships and influence over influential figures such as Al Gore, Tim Wirth, and Nafis Sadik. Stirling Scruggs humorously remembers that Nafis Sadik and Bella Abzug did not originally get along, “but by the end they were best friends. I remember going into Nafis’s office, and the two of them were in a corner deciding what to do about the Program of Action” (Stirling Scruggs Interview 2006). At
this first level of influence, adjusting their strategies would not help anti-abortion NGOs unless either UN personnel completely changed, or the anti-abortion NGOs over time changed their conservative assumptions and beliefs.

The quote by Amy Tsui demonstrates at a minimum goal convergence between the UNFPA and the abortion-rights activists: both see their different goals served by the same actions and working together. However, based on my research and the examples of the exchange of personnel between the two groups and their close connections during conferences, I would argue that the UNFPA and reproductive health and rights activists come together in their goals due to the deeper convergence of liberal values. The two groups have demonstrated similar approaches especially to the human rights framework, the need for consensus building, and the use of science and reason to support policy change. In addition, the UNFPA has committed to the concept of reproductive health and rights so completely that even when it would have been easier to distance themselves from abortion-rights activists and reproductive health, because they believed that reproductive health and rights was the right, correct approach to family planning. One example is when the Bush administration took away UNFPA’s funding because of the possibility that reproductive health and rights included abortion. The UNFPA at that time distanced itself from the issue of abortion to some extent (Barbara Crane Interview 2006), but not from the reproductive health and rights approach. Another example is when reproductive health and rights were not included in the Millennium Development Goals, the UNFPA spent a great deal of its resources in researching and presenting how reproductive health and rights alleviates hunger, poverty, and maternal and child mortality.
The second level of influence is at the intergovernmental level, which requires that advocates have knowledge of how UN global conferences work and lobbying expertise in order to reach out to the many different delegations. Lobbying depends on building relationships, but many of these relationships are temporary since new delegates are often sent to each meeting, whereas relationships with UN employees tend to be longer lasting. Lobbying government delegations, especially those they believe will be sympathetic to their beliefs, is something that anti-abortion organizations have learned to do by attending conferences since Cairo 1994, as abortion-rights organizations learned to do by attending Women’s conferences. In fact, many abortion-rights activists commented that the anti-abortion activists have become much more organized and savvy about the UN conference lobbying process. Jill Sheffield, of Family Care International, in particular deemed that the anti-abortion NGOs got smarter after the Cairo conference: “They’ve decided that you only need twelve governments to disrupt any meeting. I was appalled, but I was also impressed that the opposition had done their homework so well. That’s what makes them so serious” (Jill Sheffield Interview 2006). Barbara Crane of IPAS also believes that anti-abortion organizations have gotten more organized, and have figured out how to lobby better at the UN as a result of coming to UN conferences since Cairo: “They’ve figured out now, how to press certain buttons and make certain things happen, and how to get a certain delegate to say something or do something to benefit your side. …So the international conference process has been a major opportunity for NGOs to learn how these processes work, and how to influence them” (Barbara Crane Interview 2006).
In addition to learning to work within the lobbying system that the UN allows NGOs, abortion-rights NGOs were also able to push the envelope of the rules governing NGO participation, especially in the 1990s conferences. However, one of the ways in which anti-abortion NGOs have been able to curb the influence of abortion-rights NGOs is to insist on strict rule enforcement of the NGO voice, and to fuel the debate concerning the unrepresentativeness of NGOs. Thus, Wendy Wright of Concerned Women of America argues that NGOs do not have a place at plenary sessions, and should not be able to speak or vote, as some NGOs would like to (Wendy Wright Interview 2006). This is corroborated by Jill Sheffield, who says of anti-abortion organizations: “They make access to delegates tighter just by enforcing the rules – they got lax for a while, and now I think they’re tighter again” (Jill Sheffield Interview 2007). Thus, the second level of influence, which is working within the UN meetings and conferences to lobby government delegations, is one that both abortion-rights and anti-abortion organizations have been able to successfully use by adjusting their strategies and taking advantage of political opportunities.

9.1.2 Social Movements

This research also speaks to the literature that explores how and when socialization of actors occurs by international bodies, and how deep that socialization can go. Recent literature on the socialization of national actors by transnational or international bodies suggests a continuum of change or socialization, which is “defined as a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community” (Checkel 2005: 804). On one end lies strategic calculation, in which no socialization has occurred because agents are instrumentally rational and seek to maximize their interests by
adapting their behavior to the norms and rules favored by the international community. In the middle lies Type I internalization, where agents switch from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this involves moving from strategic calculation to conscious role-playing. Type II internalization involves going beyond role playing and accepting community or organizational norms as right and good. Agents who have been socialized in this more significant way adopt the interests or even the identity of the community, and no longer think instrumentally about their position (Checkel 2005: 804).

I would argue that the way conservative NGO networks work in the international sphere is very similar to progressive groups – they work as lobbyists. But there is one important difference: they don’t subscribe to the same underlying liberal philosophy, so they do not seek consensus, work inclusively, or work for the greater legitimacy of the UN. This causes them to clash severely with progressive NGOs working at the UN, and with most UN personnel as well. Research findings in this area also support the argument that form does not automatically guarantee content. Although much of the literature on NGOs and civil society has assumed that NGOs and civil society hold only progressive goals, conservative NGOs and networks work in nearly identical ways to progressive NGOs and networks, and work at the UN in similar ways. However, while conservative organizations may have similar goals as progressive organizations and express them in rights or health language, this language is usually reserved for the persuasive arguments directed at the UN or outside their own organizations. My research suggests that conservative organizations are instrumentally rational and engage in strategic calculation to further their interests in the international community. However,
one of the mechanisms of the shift to internalization explored by Checkel and other scholars (2005) is that of strategic calculation, because what “starts as behavioral adaptation, may—because of various cognitive and institutional lock-in effects—later be followed by sustained compliance that is strongly suggestive of internalization and preference change” (Checkel 2005: 809). Research in the future may demonstrate more effectively whether the conservative network is being more substantively changed as a result of its work at the UN; based on my findings, I would argue that there are core norms that the anti-abortion network cannot change, including the importance of community and society rather than individual freedom. However, I do think substantial change will occur the longer that these organizations lobby at the UN, especially when they no longer have the backing of a conservative U.S. government.

The evidence of more substantial change in the conservative network emerges in recent years as many anti-abortion organizations join in the call for more positive changes related to the Millennium Development Goals. For instance, Concerned Women for America shifted its position on the environment, from a rejection of the environmental movement because of its connection with neo-Malthusian population policies, to advocating for the conservation of God-given resources as good stewards (Randall 2006). This is more than merely strategic or instrumental adaptation because anti-abortion organizations do not derive any alliance or framing benefits from supporting the environmental movement. The environmental movement does not extend itself on behalf of population issues in the current era, and so there are no obvious benefits for this change. I believe this is an effort to be more in step with other religious organizations that are advocating for the Millennium Development Goals. In a similar
way, Concerned Women for America has also joined several other conservative groups in advocating for resources to be spent on the alleviation of hunger and the reduction of infectious diseases (Crouse 2006). This can be traced to the effect of Protestant evangelical organizations with Catholic organizations that have been lobbying for international efforts to address these problems for many years.

Alternative explanation

Many of the most influential anti-abortion organizations that work at the international level have come from the U.S., and began to direct their attention toward the UN during the late nineties. An alternate explanation for why these anti-abortion organizations shifted their focus to the international system could stem from the “boomerang” explanation of Keck and Sikkink (1998), in which non-state actors gather transnational allies and draw on international resources in order to affect an intractable domestic government or situation. Some might argue that this is the case for American anti-abortion NGOs, seeking to influence the Clinton administration during the nineties. However, it would not explain why these organizations have chosen to increase the number of resources they focused on the international system even while President George W. Bush has been in office. The complexity of the connections between their international and domestic advocacy cannot be so simply characterized, as the anecdote below illustrates.

John Mallon of Inside the Vatican provides a vivid description of the tension between the Vatican’s representative, John Klink, and the head of the U.S. delegation Margaret Pollack, illustrating the increasing savvy of the anti-abortion network and the obstacle that a pro-choice U.S. delegation presented to them. The negotiation was going
late into the night, and John Klink addressed the chair and said, “Mr. Chairman, in a
document that makes explicit references to ‘sexual and reproductive rights’ in practically
every paragraph, I fail to see why it should be so difficult to have the phrase “the rights,
duties and responsibilities of parents’ appear in even one paragraph of this document”
(Mallon 2000). However, Margaret Pollack would not concede the point to the Holy See,
and so Mr. Klink read out several quotations compiled for him by pro-family
organizations on the rights, duties and responsibilities of parents, not letting on until the
end that Bill Clinton and Al Gore had made them. “The entire assembly erupted in
laughter, except for Margaret Pollack who did a slow burn” (Mallon 2000). John Mallon
included this description of the tension between a Clinton-appointed U.S. delegation and
the Holy See in an editorial published in the Washington Times on October 18, 2000. The
tactics of the pro-family organizations may not be remarkable, but this editorial,
published in the month prior to the presidential election between Bush and Gore, began
with Mallon almost nonchalantly brushing aside an attempt to paint Bush as anti-Catholic
as a result of a visit to Bob Jones University and ends with the sentence, “… Mr. Gore is
one of the key leaders of this anti-family and anti-life apparatus that has been the true
face of the Clinton-Gore administration that few Americans ever get to see.” The editorial
was published well after the five-year review of Cairo in order to demonstrate to a U.S.
conservative electorate how inimical the Clinton-Gore administration was to their
interests in the international arena, specifically a UN global conference. This
demonstrates a change in how the conservative leadership as well as their constituents
viewed the UN, because prior to the mid-90s, these voters would not have cared about
how their presidential choice affected the debate or policy at the UN.
This editorial was also attached to a letter sent out one week later by Susan Roylance of the Mormon NGO United Families International, titled “If We Could Change the U.S. Presidency to One More Supportive of the Family than Clinton-Gore.”

Roylance begins the letter by saying

The following article shows how tough it is for those of us lobbying at UN International conferences when our most powerful opposition is the United States. The negotiators for the U.S. are appointed by the State Department, in consultation with the White House. If we could change the U.S. Presidency to one that is more supportive of family values it would make ALL THE DIFFERENCE in our efforts to promote family-friendly public policy for the world. … So -- please pass this message on to everyone in your e-mail address list -- and let it get to as many people as possible in the United States. We desperately need a change in the Presidency of the United States -- so that the State Department appointments will be more pro-family. (Roylance 2000)

This letter demonstrates very clearly a point of view that is expressed both explicitly and implicitly by many conservative NGO leaders, that although they worked in the international sphere when the U.S. administration was hostile to them, they did not do so with the aim of affecting the domestic political arena through international resources and alliances, the “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998). If anything, conservative NGO leaders have expressed an inclination towards a reverse boomerang effect, the motivation to change the progressive character of the U.S. administration into a conservative one so that they could then more effectively work at the UN. I would argue that the connections between the domestic sphere and the international arena are even more complex than that: these anti-abortion activists used an international framing of the issue of family values to lobby for a domestic change, which would then change the international opportunity structure to one more favorable for their advocacy.

9.1.3 International Relations Theory

World-polity theory, while providing us with a concrete explanation of what norms are prevalent in the international system, does not give us a complete explanation
of how actors may instrumentally adjust to them in order to accomplish their goals. However, I incorporated a social movements perspective to better understand the strategies that NGO networks used to adjust to or work around these norms at the UN. Thus, I would argue that world-polity theory is incomplete as a structural theory, and benefits from a complementary agent-oriented approach.

What I believe world-polity theory does add to my research, and to international relations in general, is the ability to step back and acknowledge that what appears to be the ingrained practices or inevitable actions of a “reasonable” person are choices that actors in the past have made; these choices then reach a tipping point such that they appear to be the only reasonable available option, an established norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Many may question how useful it is to trace the ways advocates adjust to the norm that science and reason are the means to progress, since this norm is so pervasive. However, this norm was not always so dominant; how this norm became so prevalent and how groups who do not subscribe to it adjust to a world that does, is what interests me. In part, this dissertation tries to trace the growing strength of such norms at the UN, and how different actors played a part in making these norms a part of the foundation of the UN. I spend a greater part of the dissertation tracing the effect of these norms on activists as they try to make claims from a traditional and different philosophical basis. I think it is important to acknowledge that many other cultures and societies around the world still hold these traditional views, and that within even Western societies, conservative views have a stronghold that have an impact on both domestic and international politics.
The Power Dynamics between States, IGOs, and NGOs

In the international system, states have both authority and institutional power; IGOs have as much authority as states are willing to cede to them, and the legal authority to compel states who are signatories of international legal treaties or conventions; and NGOs have no hard power or legal authority, but depend on the power of ideas, norms, and public opinion to help enforce what has been agreed to in IGO forums. The realist approach to international relations views states as the major actors, with the only true power, in the international system, and argues that IGOs and NGOs may only peripherally affect states. To realists, IGOs and NGOs do not have any material power over states that is not granted to them by states. The liberal approach would see the key explanation for changes such as the adoption of reproductive health and rights language as rooted in domestic actors within states. The constructivist approach to international relations emphasizes the importance of ideas and how they constitute the identities and interests of actors. Although my research takes a constructivist approach to IR, this approach specifically documents the influence of both structural norms and the importance of actors working with or around those norms. Individuals within states, IGOs, and NGOs all played an important part in the adoption of reproductive health and rights as the new paradigm for population policy. However, I would argue that the world-polity approach is helpful because they were all also affected in some way by basic liberal and rational norms that were the foundation of the UN environment they were attempting to influence.

This research also shows that the power relationships between states, IGOs and NGOs are not as uni-directional as any one of these approaches might argue. While
the liberal culture is a powerful influence enacted by Western liberal states and embedded in IGOs such as the UN, conservative NGOs are able to create opportunities within that culture for their interests by both instrumentally adjusting to these norms and working around them with the power of like-minded states. While states have the most power in a material sense, even the U.S. during the Clinton administration was greatly influenced by NGOs actors to support reproductive health and rights, and the Bush administration, despite its best efforts, has not been able to reverse the language on reproductive health and rights at the UN. The UN as an IGO is able to exert a great deal of power over the NGOs that work within its global conferences and lobby within its various meetings by creating a space in which NGOs must adjust to its norms; however, that influence does not run in only one direction NGOs representatives were also able to influence UN officials to allow NGOs to participate in the PrepCom process, and to support reproductive health and rights to the exclusion of traditional population and development concerns. As I will discuss later, many UN social agencies now have to deal with a backlash by member governments against the inclusion of NGOs in the decision-making process of UN global conferences and meetings; they must address exactly what populations NGOs represent and how well, and how accountable they are for their actions and use of funds.

9.2 Other important factors for further research

Several factors emerged in my research that may be significant for my central argument, but that I was unable to follow up on as thoroughly as I wished. The limiting of NGO participation in global conferences and the increased questioning of the legitimacy of NGOs as participants in intergovernmental negotiations are recent
developments that might significantly affect the influence of NGO advocacy at the UN. In future research, I would explore how these recent developments might constitute political opportunities that may or may not be connected to underlying norms, and whether progressive and conservative organizations are differentially affected.

Another factor that emerged during my research was the importance of resources and especially the key role of foundations in enabling NGOs to exert as much influence as they did. I discuss briefly how underlying norms help determine whether foundations support progressive and conservative organizations, I would like to investigate further how foundations may have shaped the advocacy of the NGOs they supported, and thus the goals and strategies of the network.

### 9.2.1 Backlash Against Inclusion of NGOs at UN

An issue I would like to explore further in future research is how the role and access of NGOs at the UN is being questioned, not simply by states that do not wish to be held accountable to the issues for which most NGOs advocate, but by scholars, UN officials, and activists themselves. I believe this is an instance of the involvement of NGOs causing the UN as an IGO to adjust in specific ways; this issue of questioning the accountability, representativeness, and legitimacy of NGOs at the UN will also undoubtedly have future implications for the ability of NGOs to participate as fully in global conferences. Their participation and influence may be limited until these issues are addressed, or until they find another strategy by which to work around these issues.

NGOs in the 21st century have been subjected to greater scrutiny due to several well-publicized instances of corruption, inefficiency, and the growing realization that terrorist groups often use NGOs to front their activities. Up to this point, most democratic
institutions generally considered NGOs beyond questioning because of their positive impact in alleviating poverty, protecting human rights, preserving the environment, and providing relief, emergency and otherwise, worldwide (McGann and Johnstone 2005). However, the efficiency, accountability, transparency, and legitimacy of NGOs are now being investigated in greater depth, and especially at the UN. In 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a Panel of Eminent Persons to investigate the UN-civil society relations; this panel put together a report, commonly known as the Cardoso Report, published in 2004. The report calls for reforms in the way that the UN deals with NGOs; NGOs approved of some of its suggestions, such as possible accreditation to the General Assembly and a de-politicized accreditation process. Other suggestions seemed to express much more wariness concerning the role of civil society at the UN, and might weaken access for NGOs while increasing access for business in the UN system.

Joseph Chamie, the former Director of the Population Division of the United Nations, is an example of a long-time UN employee who has viewed the increasing role for NGOs at the UN with wariness. He articulated the need to step back and be aware of what role NGOs can and should play in an intergovernmental institution. Although he believes that NGOs can contribute to the decisions and working of the UN, they should not be primary actors in decision-making because there is no standard governing the interests or groups NGOs purport to represent, how well they represent any particular group of people, and who supports these NGOs financially. “So what starts happening then is that you start having NGOs who say I’m representing all the disenfranchised women, or children, or AIDs cases, or gays, or indigenous, or whatever group it is. And then another group gets started that says, I’m representing them, and then they start
fighting” (Joseph Chamie Interview 2006). Chamie believes that the UN is still wrestling with the issue of just how much access to grant NGOs, because their role has not been fully thought through. For instance, what rationale does the UN use to justify NGOs participating in social issues, but not security issues? Questions like these are ones that the UN is currently dealing with, and the results may change both NGOs and the UN.

In addition, while many NGOs and scholars on NGOs themselves admit the need to have standards of efficiency, accountability, and representativeness for NGOs that will have influence on the international level, there are also those who argue that bringing the credibility and legitimacy of NGOs into question is a tactic of the conservatives (Lobe 2005). I would like to explore to what extent conservatives initiated these issues, and to what extent they simply used them in an attempt to curb the influence of the much more numerous liberal organizations.

9.2.2 The Role of Resources and Foundations in the Influence of NGOs

Resource mobilization is one popular approach within social movement theory to account for the influence of social movement organizations. Resources are an important part of any explanation of social movements, and given that the agent-oriented, social movement theory is part of my theoretical framework, I do see resources playing a role in how networks and movements are able to influence policy. However, my research shows that ideational structures and the framing of reproductive health and rights strongly influenced whether resources were made available to the abortion-rights and anti-abortion networks.

The contribution of funds by UNFPA and progressive foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation helped pay the way of many
developing country NGOs to attend the Cairo conference, as well the passage of many feminist developing country NGO representatives to attend as part of their government delegations. These funds were a key factor allowing representatives of feminist NGOs from developing countries to attend the conference, giving physical form to the coalition feminist NGOs were building; the funds that allowed NGO members to attend as members of government delegations were also important because they were able to directly influence the negotiations of language during the conference and the approval of their delegations for that language. However, those who would argue that as a result the resources were what determined the influence of these NGOs would be missing the ideational structure that brought those resources to bear on behalf of feminist NGOs in 1994.

Women’s reproductive health and rights activists had been writing and advocating for reproductive health and rights for years prior to the Cairo conference or Prepcoms. They did not automatically receive funding from progressive foundations, which had been funding population programs even prior to the U.S. government, until after they had worked to frame existing population programs as coercive and a holistic approach to reproductive health a much better framework for these programs. In addition, the Reagan administration’s about-face concerning population programs in the 1980s caused foundations that were still supportive of family planning and women’s reproductive health and rights activists to be more encouraged to work together. As a result, in 1990, Carmen Barroso, a women’s health and rights academic and activist, became the Director of the Population and Reproductive Health Program for the MacArthur Foundation, and she was a key player in directing funds towards reproductive health and rights; the
MacArthur Foundation set aside $1.5 million to support NGOs at Cairo (Carmen Barroso Interview 2006). It was also the relationships that women’s activists built with UNFPA officials especially Secretary-General Nafis Sadik, Director of Communications and External Relations Sterling Scruggs, and Stan Bernstein, and their framing of reproductive health and rights as a far better framework for population programs than population control that persuaded them that NGOs should be involved in the Cairo process and conference, and that UNFPA would contribute funds for that purpose (Carmen Barroso Interview 2006, Sterling Scruggs Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006).

Another instance of the influence of resources, and especially foundations, on the practical operation of NGOs is precipitous decline in funding dedicated to population programs by the U.S. government since the late 1990s. The Bush administration actively opposed family planning programs and reproductive health and rights, directing funds instead toward HIV/AIDS programs, alleviation of infectious diseases, and education. Some abortion-rights activists have suggested that it has become more difficult to win resources from important progressive foundations because of the current hostile political environment in the U.S.; these foundations support the right to reproductive health and abortion just as strongly, but they are reluctant to “throw money away” given the Bush administration’s opposition to reproductive health and rights (Duff Gillespie Interview 2006). Some would argue that the lack of funding for population programs and the new influx of funds to HIV/AIDS programs would better explain the shift of feminist NGOs to connect with the HIV/AIDS issue through framing and coalition-building. However, I
would argue that ideational structures again better explain at least the direction of funds away from reproductive health and rights.

The anti-abortion organizations and the Holy See’s efforts to identify reproductive health and rights as a term synonymous with the right to abortion made reproductive health and rights a hot-button issue for many organizations looking to avoid controversy (Confidential Interview 2006). The disagreement surrounding the term of reproductive health and rights was cited as one of the first factors that prevented reproductive health and rights from being considered as an MDG. The controversy created by the framing efforts of the anti-abortion organizations combined with the opposition of the Bush administration has now channeled funding from progressive foundations away from reproductive health to some extent (Amy Tsui Interview 2006); however, as evident by Countdown 2015, both traditionally progressive foundations and relatively new ones such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation are directing money to population programs, and other states have increased their funding to cover some of the decrease in U.S. government spending (Barbara Crane Interview 2006, Steven Sinding Interview 2006, Duff Gillespie Interview 2006).

Although I do not see resource mobilization as a sufficient explanation for the influence of NGOs, I am interested in the literature within resource mobilization theory on how foundations shape social movements, and I would like to in the future draw on this literature to explore how foundations shape and open opportunities for both liberal and conservative networks. Some sociologists have argued that foundations may act as gatekeepers by selecting social movement organizations that are more moderate than radical and more professional than protest-oriented; as a result, foundations over time
shape a social movement to be more moderate and professional (Jenkins and Eckert 1986, Brulle and Jenkins 2005). Other sociologists argue that foundations act as a transformative influence; when foundations fund NGOs, they pressure them to develop bureaucratic procedures and professional staffs, which as a result makes them dependent on donors and less grass-roots oriented (Jenkins and Halcli 1999, Brulle 2000). Tim Bartley argues that foundations also create entire fields and recruit social movement organizations to be a part of that field (Bartley 2007).

Further research on these issues would benefit from tracing the possible channeling influences of conservative and progressive foundations on NGOs. The research to date seems to concentrate on progressive foundations and their effect on organizations; given the different goals and underlying philosophies of the conservative foundations, I would like to explore whether conservative and progressive foundations have similar effects on the NGOs they fund, or if they have different effects.
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