ABSTRACT

Title of Document: JAPANESE AND U.S. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE IRAQ WAR: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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This study investigates the relationship between the media and politics by analyzing the Iraq War coverage of two leading U.S. and Japanese newspapers: the New York Times and the Asahi. This dissertation reveals that these two print media, although both liberal in their general orientation, treated the Iraq War differently. First, it quantitatively finds that they are quite distinctive in their choice of main topics. During the run-up period to the war, the Asahi put more focus on the role of the United Nations while the majority of the stories appearing in the New York Times addressed U.S. decisions about Iraq.

Second, the dissertation’s qualitative analysis of editorials reveals that a different emphasis on who the “evil” doers in the war are. While the New York Times treated the oppressive Saddam Hussein regime and terrorists as the “evildoers,” the Asahi portrayed the U.S. as the big evil doer. Further, content analysis of articles written by embedded journalists who were with coalition forces in Iraq revealed that
the two newspapers’ articles showed significant disparities in the degree of sympathy they showed to the forces.

Numerous background factors have influenced this media content. Interviews with Japanese journalists and scholars revealed that the cultures of anti-militarism held by Japanese that originated from Japan’s defeat in World War II remain firm within Japanese news organizations. Anti-militaristic sentiments and cultural factors, such as religion, appear to have influenced how their organizations portrayed the war in Iraq.

Further, this dissertation statistically shows that the media’s impact is significant in shaping the political agenda and public opinion. Poll data of Japanese sentiments about the United States show a decline in positive feelings towards the United States as the ratio of negative stories of U.S. Iraq policies carried by the Asahi rose. In addition, the Asahi’s critical assessments of the Japanese government’s Iraq policies showed a moderate negative congruence with public support for their Cabinet. Also, there was a moderate negative relationship between the New York Times’ unfavorable coverage of the U.S. government’s policies of Iraq and presidential approval ratings.
JAPANESE AND U.S. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE IRAQ WAR: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

By

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2007

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Dedication

I wish to recognize the sacrifice and endurance of my wife, Hyunsook Kim. Her smile provides motivation for my life, both academic and personal. Without her dedication, I might have terminated this work.

Also, I want to express special thanks to my beloved late mother, Miyo. Although her life was too short, she lives on in my mind and in my heart.
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I would like to thank Dr. Miranda Schreurs, the chair of my committee. This study would not have been possible without her strong support. While I was working on my dissertation, I had several misfortunes. Among those, my mother’s long hospitalization and eventual demise was the toughest. Every time I was in a trouble, Dr. Schreurs’ considerate advice encouraged me. She touches my heart. My dream is to be a wonderful academic mentor like her.

I would also like to thank all the members of my committee, Dr. Margaret Pearson, Dr. Michael Gurevitch, Dr. Virginia Haufler, and Dr. Shawn Parry-Giles for their kind help and guidance. Without the teachings I received from professors at the University of Maryland, I could not have navigated to this point in my academic life.

I would also like to express my thanks for the help I received from all those whom I interviewed for this dissertation. I am indebted to each one of the scholars and journalists who took precious time out of their daily activities to be interviewed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction---Difference in the Media Cultures of the U.S. and Japan

This study investigates the relationship between the media and politics in the case of the Iraq War by extensively analyzing the contents of both U.S. and Japanese leading print media. The purpose of this research is not only to analyze the difference across the Pacific in media content pertaining to the Iraq War, but also to explain how background factors, such as different media cultures and the politics-media relationship, have influenced media content. This study also focuses on how the difference in media content of the war affects public opinion.

My personal experiences reporting on news from within Japan and the United States influenced my choice of research topics. I was a staff writer in a major newspaper company in Japan where I was in charge of reporting on U.S.-Japan trade frictions during the early 1990s. After this, I was assigned to report on the Enola Gay controversy in 1995 on behalf of the Japanese media while I was in the United States. The impact of these experiences is worth briefly reflecting upon.

Section 1 Reporting U.S.-Japan Trade Frictions

Soon after finishing my undergraduate studies, I started to work for the Chunichi newspaper company. The newspaper company uses three different names, the Chunichi, the Hokuriku Chunichi, and the Tokyo, in different regions of Japan. Their combined circulation is more than four million. It is one of the
largest mass media companies in Japan. During my five years of experience in the early 1990s as a staff writer of the company, I worked in three sections: economics, social affairs, and life style. All of these sections provided me with frequent opportunities to handle foreign and international issues.

When I was at the economic section in early 1991, I was in charge of issues concerning U.S.-Japan trade frictions. The trade issue was, without a doubt, the hottest issue between the two countries during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Japan was perplexed by the changing trade relationship with the United States---the biggest trade partner of Japan since the end of World War II. I interviewed a wide variety of Japanese citizens, both in the public and private sectors, related to this issue. One of my daily “beats” at the time was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which was in charge of formulating and implementing Japan’s international trade policy. Automobile exports and rice imports were the most serious issues then. Once I reported on the restructuring of the Toyota automobile company. The company had just started to move several sections of the company from the Koromo and Tahara plants in Aichi, Japan to Georgetown, KY, United States. The company had just built its first wholly owned United States plant. I also often had the chance to interview rice farmers who faced a real threat to their livelihood if the Japanese rice market were opened to American imports. The Japanese rice market was completely closed until the Japanese government accepted the 1993 decision by the GATT Uruguay Round to partially open it.
When I reported on these issues, I often found differences between Japanese and U.S. reporting. For example, even in cases where the same development in relation to trade frictions occurred on a particular date, American papers, such as the Washington Post and the New York Times, presented different perspectives than did Japanese newspapers. In some cases, these papers presented completely opposite views from what I was writing. In political communication terminology, I realized that the “news frames” used across the Pacific were quite different. Typical Japanese news frames about the U.S.-Japan trade frictions during the early 1990 were as follows: America was threatened by the rising Japanese economy and became very impatient with the existing trade and even social customs of Japan. Americans were anxious about their future, and especially that their economic superpower status might be taken over by the Japanese. Trade friction between the two countries became severe because of Americans’ irritations and anxiety. The wane of the American economic power was the symbol of the end of the “American Century”; the 21st century would be the “Asian Century.” Japanese journalists, myself included, often reported on daily developments related to U.S.-Japan trade frictions using these frames.

The international sections of the Japanese print media, including the Chunichi, were preoccupied with the issue of U.S.-Japan trade frictions. The issue was so important that it was often the top news in the section. American newspapers, on the other hand, did not feature the issue as often as Japanese media organizations did. U.S.-Japan trade friction was on the political agenda in the 1992 U.S. presidential election, but it was not at all the biggest issue in the
international sections of major U.S. papers. Instead, the end of the Cold War and Central American political developments were very frequently written about; U.S.-Japan trade frictions seemed to be less important to the U.S. media than were the human rights problems in China. This was certainly partly because the Tiananmen Square Protest in 1989 was still vivid then. Another alarming factor for me was that the American media frames were completely different from those of the Japanese media. The typical storylines of American papers about the trade issue focused on the fact that Japanese trade practices were not fair enough and the Japanese market was not as open as those of Western democracies. American papers reiterated their views that the Japanese government protected its domestic market by imposing high taxes on imports, while Japanese automobile and electronic companies freely exported their products to the United States.

These American media frames were backed by quotations from a group of hard-line critics. These critics were called the "revisionists." These revisionists included Karel van Wolferen and James Fallows. Van Wolferen suggested that Japanese power was so diffuse that no official will accept responsibility for governmental actions. According to van Wolferen, the Japanese economic success was the result of the workings of a mysterious “System” in which Japanese power is so diffuse that it is difficult to determine where the buck steps, that is who should be held accountable for governmental actions (van Wolferen 1990). James Fallows went a step further and asked Americans to change their view of Japan: Japan is not an ally but an enemy that must be “contained.” The title of his article
was “Containing the Japanese,” a name obviously borrowed from George
Kennan’s famous 1947 article about the Soviet Union (Fallows 1989).

Although there were several differences in their focus of criticism, these
revisionists’ arguments were similar in their acerbic critique of Japanese trade
practices. They proclaimed that the Japanese are not only mercantilist in their
trade policies, but that they are different from Western democracies. Japan is not
committed to democracy and free trade, they asserted, and as a result, there is an
inevitable conflict between Japanese and American interests and long-term goals
(Prestowitz 1982 and 1990). The arguments of the revisionists originated from the
Miracle*, Johnson argued that Japan is not a state that respects the principle of
free-trade, but rather is a "capitalist developmental state" along with other newly
risen Asian countries, most notably, Taiwan and South Korea. A "capitalist
development state" is a state in which governmental commitment to economic
growth exerts a strong influence over the normal market behavior of the economy
(Johnson 1980). Thus, Johnson concluded that the United States must treat Japan
differently from other Western nations.

Interestingly, the Japanese media often emphasized the frame that
“America is irritated by the rapid growth of the Japanese economy.” They quoted
this American news frame and featured the revisionists. Also, just as the
American media frequently quoted the revisionists, the Japanese media often
featured Japanese critics of America. The typical arguments of these critics were
that the U.S. is a country of arrogance and bad management, and is a declining
superpower that will be surpassed by rising Asian power. The most quoted book
taking this line of argument is *The Japan That Can Say No* ("Nou To Ieru
Nippon") published in 1989. The book was co-written by Shintaro Ishihara, a
novelist-turned-politician (Ishihara is now the governor of Tokyo and was a
Lower House Representative when the book was written) and the founder of the
Sony Corporation, the late Akio Morita. At the center of their book is the
argument that the trade deficit was the result of the unpopularity of American
products. According to the authors, America was becoming lazy, and weakened
by social conflicts and a failing system of education. Thus, Ishihara and Morita
concluded that Japan should stop bowing to the United States and take an

Perhaps an American journalist reading these Japanese articles on U.S.-
Japan trade frictions, and especially quotations from critics such as Ishihara and
Morita, might feel the exact same feeling I did: “Realities” are in the eyes of the
 beholder. The same issues were reported differently when the reporters’
backgrounds (countries, cultures, and societies) were different.

*Section 2 Reporting on the Enola Gay Controversy*

My experience as a public policy researcher in the United States also
influenced my views on media coverage. Soon after I started to study for my
Master’s degree at Georgetown University, I started to work at a small American
research company in Bethesda, MD. Since the company was founded by
Japanese, many clients are from the Japanese public and private sectors. Many of the company’s assignments were about reporting developments in American policies that were related to Japan. Most of my assignments at the company dealt with telecommunications and environmental policies, but because of my journalist background, I often engaged in reporting on American social issues on behalf of Japanese media organizations.

In the summer of 1995, I reported a series of news stories about the Enola Gay exhibition at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum. The Enola Gay is the airplane that dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan in August 1945, just before the end of World War II. The Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum decided to display the wartime icon permanently in 2003. Prior to that decision, the museum for the first time in the summer of 1995, commemorating the 50 year anniversary of the bombing, exhibited the partially restored silver body of the Enola Gay along with a model of "Little Boy," the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

The exhibition created a controversy in both Japan and the United States. The centerpiece of the controversy was whether the A-bomb was a savior or a devil to the people in Japan, East Asia, and the United States. Even before the exhibition started, the Enola Gay was unlike other museum pieces. The display raised the anger of U.S. veterans because the original plan had been to exhibit photos of the victims and other related materials including a lunch box containing charred food, a burned uniform, melted glass, and a watch that stopped ticking at 8:15 a.m. on August 6, 1945, when the atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima.
Veterans suggested that these displays were not politically correct, that these displays deflated the important role the bomber played in facilitating Japan’s surrender, and could leave people with the impression that the U.S. soldiers, as opposed to the Japanese, were the ruthless aggressors.

Because of the harsh response from veterans, in the end the exhibit not only excluded these objects, it also had no clear explanation of the number of causalities, no pictures of ground zero in Hiroshima, and many other related materials. The director of the museum had to resign in the face of all the controversy (Funabashi 1995).

On the other side of the Pacific, the exclusion of some displays outraged atomic bomb survivors in Japan and some anti-war groups in the United States. In response to the efforts of those groups, the American University in Washington DC, hosted an exhibition focusing on victims of the blasts. The alternative version of the exhibition provided a sharp contrast to the Enola Gay exhibition at the Smithsonian Institution. The exhibition included a detailed explanation of the causalities of the bomb and the burned uniform, melted glass and a watch that was stopped by the blast. All of these items had originally been planned to be shown at the Smithsonian (“Nuclear Bomb Exhibition at the American University in Washington, DC,” The Asahi, July 11, 1995).

I was personally involved both in the first Smithsonian display and the alternative exhibition at the American University as a reporter for a television crew from Hiroshima in the summer of 1995. At that time, I was surprised that the U.S. media had such different accounts of the Enola Gay controversy from that of
Japanese journalists, including myself. I wondered why the same issue was portrayed so differently by the medias of different countries.

The Japanese media reports on the Enola Gay controversy suggested that many Americans simply do not want to know what the A-bomb did to its victims, and that U.S. hardliners distorted the facts of the great atrocity (Funabashi 1995). According to the Japanese media, the Enola Gay was an icon of mass killing and one of the most brutal war events of the 20th century. Many stories referred to the victims who still suffer 50 years after the A-bomb was dropped. There were also several emotional feature stories by the Japanese media about the survivors who actually visited the Enola Gay display (e.g. “Atomic bomb victims visit the Enola Gay exhibition in U.S.,” The Yomiuri, July 12, 1995).

In contrast to those portrayals, many stories, if not all, in the U.S. media emphasized the view that the dropping of the atomic bomb terminated the war and saved the lives of many soldiers. The general American media’s standpoint was that the use of the atomic bombs were justified because they abruptly ended the long and bitter war and saved many more lives ---Japanese, American and other East Asian --- than were lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thus, the bomber was portrayed as the plane of saviors (Burchard 1995). It was a righteous part of the memories of The Good War (Terkel 1984, 2004).

My impression at that time was that the different portrayals did not only come from the difference of the definition about what is and is not moral and ethical in wartime, but also from more fundamental differences in world views. In addition, I felt that I wanted to investigate in a scholarly manner how such a
particular issue was reported differently and why the difference was created and developed. This was the original point of this dissertation.

A few years later when I actually started to think about a dissertation topic, I considered several topics for international comparison. There were many possible subjects for comparison, but I believe that a big issue which affected both the U.S. and Japan would be most suitable. My original choice was the Asian Economic Crisis of the late 1990s. Thus, I started to compare the U.S., Japanese, and South Korean newspaper accounts of the Asian economic crisis. I found through my pilot study that there was a stark difference among the U.S., Japanese and South Korean print medias’ portrayals of the economic crisis, similar to the differences in reporting on U.S.-Japan trade frictions and the Enola Gay controversy. While I was conducting my pilot study on the crisis, the Iraq War began. Since the war appeared to be a much more important issue for the international community, I switched topics. Still, the differences in media portrayals of international issues were further attested to by my pilot comparative content analysis as is explained in the next section.

Section 3 A Pilot Study: Comparing articles about the Asian Economic Crisis

Asian economic problems have raised international political and economic concerns. Beginning in the early 1990s, Japan and South Korea experienced profound economic downturns. Scholars wondered whether the collapse and reorganization of some of the once-mighty South Korean chaebols (business conglomerates) and Japanese financial banks epitomized the “death” of
the Asian miracle (Woo and Sachs 2000). There have been contending diagnoses as to the causes of the crisis, most centering on government and policy failures, regional financial instabilities, and more deeply, the “crony” capitalism of Asian markets (Wade 1998, Kang 2002, Pempel 1999). The media in the U.S., Japan and South Korea attempted to analyze the crisis, pinpoint its origins, explore possible reforms, and recast "the Asian miracle," the term used to trumpet the shining stars of the East Asian model viewed as Western capitalism in Asia. Touted as a model for the developing world not so long ago, the "East Asian model" was brought into question---at least in the U.S. media.

My study compared how major American, Japanese, and South Korean newspapers portrayed the economic downturn of Japan and South Korea and their subsequent economic reforms (1997-1999) and investigated how the “same” issues were portrayed by these countries. The pilot study limited the period of analysis to three months: December 1997; June 1998; and January 1999 and compared how major American, Japanese, and Korean newspapers constructed images of the Asian economic crisis and the following reforms. The pilot study limited the newspapers to be analyzed to the New York Times and the Washington Post for the U.S.; the Kyodo News Service for Japan; and the Chosun Ilbo and the Korea Times for South Korea.

Except for the Chosun Ilbo, all articles were from the Lexis-Nexis database and written in English. Articles of the Chosun Ilbo were analyzed from the daily American edition of the paper (written in Korean). After excluding articles whose topic was not exactly the economic crisis, the numbers of articles...
analyzed were as follows (December 1997; June 1998: and January 1999): The New York Times (19,5,2) and The Washington Post (19, 7, 2); the Kyodo News Service (48, 27,19); and South Korea: the Chosun Ilbo (102, 53, 39), The Korea Times (66, 20, 16). From this we can see that the South Korean papers paid most concern to this problem and American papers the least. Obviously, South Korea was the center of the economic downturn; thus, the South Korean media showed the most concern. The Japanese media also showed interest in the news, partly because the economic impact on Japan was huge, and partly because Japan is in close proximity to South Korea.

Also, this pilot study found that the “same” issue was portrayed differently. According to my study of the Washington Post and the New York Times’ coverage, the American media’s view of Japanese economic problems appears to have reflected the position of the American government. The American media reported the Japanese economic reform mostly in terms of its influence on the U.S. economy, thereby justifying quick rescue packages, including increased spending on public works and a series of tax cuts. At the same time, one of the frequent themes of the articles was the inefficiency of the Japanese economic system and inappropriate policy maneuvering by the Japanese government. Another major theme was a challenge to the belief in the "Asian economic model," suggesting that the Asian model is no more than "crony capitalism."

The Kyodo news in Japan responded to the economic reform from a different standpoint from that of the U.S. media. While Japan's media’s coverage certainly indicated that the immediate economic reform was mandatory, it did not
support the idea of investing on spending on public works and a series of tax cuts as strongly as the American newspapers. More significantly, the Japanese media frequently framed the news of the economic reform in terms of economic conflicts between Japan and the United States. Typically, the Kyodo News Service suggested that the Japanese government was being reactive to and controlled by gaiatsu (U.S. foreign pressure). This "gaiatsu schema" was very salient at the time of the "bridge bank" policy discussion in the summer of 1998. Using this schema, the hegemonic image of the American economic superpower dominated over an extended period of reporting (the functions of "gaiatsu" will be further explained in Chapter 2).

In a quite different vein, Korean newspapers (the Chosun Ilbo, the Korea Times) frequently constructed "self-reflective" images, criticizing the impractical business practices of the chaebols and corruption in the government. The Korean media portrayed their nation as positively and resolutely accepting the IMF imposed mandatory economic reform. Along with hopeful reports on the advent of the new political leader, Kim Dae Jung, the Korean media frequently framed the issues in terms of a "metamorphosis" of the nation.

Section 4 Overview of the Dissertation

My two personal experiences and the pilot study I conducted on the Asian economic crisis suggest that the “same” issues are often portrayed differently by different country’s media. Other scholars have reached similar
conclusions (Chang and Wang 1998, Soesilo and Wesburn 1994). These studies and other related works will be explained in detail in Chapter 2.

This dissertation explores news stories about the war in Iraq. Specifically, the study investigates the relationship between the media and politics in the case of the Iraq War by extensively analyzing the content of two leading U.S. and Japanese newspapers: the New York Times and the Asahi Shimbun (henceforce, the Asahi). I choose them because the two print media have similar status in their own countries. Both newspapers arguably are the most respected in their country. They have the reputation of “quality papers” among their countries’ news media and are widely read by decision-makers. Also, both are leading newspapers whose circulations are one of the largest in their respective countries. Further, it is a well-known fact that both papers are considered to be politically liberal in relation to other papers.

The study employs both quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods, and uses an interdisciplinary approach, combining insights from political science and media studies. Because comparative media studies are a relatively new field, it is necessary to draw on theory coming from multiple academic disciplines.

This dissertation asks whether the same “realities” (developments about the war in Iraq) are portrayed similarly, and if not, what kind of factors influence a paper’s characterization of events. There are three main research questions. First, how similar or different are the articles about the Iraq War in the Asahi and the New York Times? Second, what are the reasons for the differences and
similarities in the articles about the war between these two liberal papers? Third, what are the ramifications of the differences and similarities in media content? Especially how much is public opinion in both the U.S. and Japan influenced by the differences and similarities in media content?

This dissertation consists of eleven chapters. The first chapter is the introduction to the whole study, explains the goals of this project, and provides an overview of each chapter. The second chapter covers the foundations on which this dissertation is built. It clarifies the basic approaches used in comparative media studies and explains findings from related studies. The chapter first stresses the importance of cultural sensitivities in conducting comparison across cultures. It examines studies by Peter Winch and debates over positivism. Since the area of study of this dissertation is political communication studies, this chapter also clarifies a range of theories of political communications. A major focus is on the contributions of earlier comparative analyses in the field of political communication. In this chapter, the relationship between the media and politics is also explored in detail. The chapter first briefly reviews timelines of the Iraq War. Then, the chapter explains political communication during the Iraq War. Special focus is placed on the role of the media in the process of making foreign policy and during the Iraq War as both cheerleader and watchdog of the war.

Chapter three explains the research design, research questions, hypotheses, and the goal of this study. This chapter also explains the methodologies used to make the comparison between Japanese and U.S. media coverage of the Iraq War.
Overall, 4624 *Asahi* and 4320 *New York Times* articles were selected from both newspapers.

The main methodology used was content analysis, one of the most frequently used methodologies in political communication research to make generalizations about the content of the news in newspaper and electronic media. The chapter explains both quantitative and qualitative content analysis, complementary methodologies. Quantitative content analysis is a powerful tool for revealing certain trends and tendencies in articles because they can be clearly displayed in numbers. Qualitative content analysis focuses on the background of the texts. Qualitative analysis of newspapers sheds light on the untold portions of the quantitative content analysis.

In order to systematically analyze the stories in the two newspapers, a code system was developed. The coding and other important aspects of content analysis used are fully explained in this chapter. The chapter also explains the basic strategies of the interviews. This dissertation uses interviews in determining the reasons for differences and similarities of the news content in the two papers.

After clarifying the above-mentioned three research questions, the hypotheses of this research are explained. The content analysis in the following chapters reveals that the two media presented quite different accounts of the Iraq War. Three hypotheses are presented to explain the reasons for the difference between the two media’s coverage. The first hypothesis focuses on the difference in the relationship between the media and politics in the two countries. The second and the third hypotheses deal with the influences of cultural experiences
and public opinion. Finally, the research goals and possible contributions of this work are presented.

Chapter four summarizes the results of the content analysis and compares the basic tendencies between the two papers. This chapter corresponds to the first research question of this dissertation and provides the explanation for the differences and similarities of the two papers’ accounts of the Iraq War. I use several figures and examples in order to illustrate the findings. There are six points of comparison. First, the major topics and key concepts of the war are explored. The main topics are literally the most important ingredients of the newspaper articles. Second, major actors are analyzed from the two papers’ articles. Third, positive-negative portrayals of each actor are examined. Special attention will be paid to the two papers’ positive-negative portrayals of the U.S. decision to initiate the Iraq War. Fourth, the sources and quotations of the articles are explored.

This chapter reveals that *the New York Times* and *the Asahi* present fairly dissimilar news content. In the analysis of negativity of particular actors, for example, *the Asahi* was very negative toward the U.S. invasion into Iraq in most articles throughout the period of examination. Positive articles toward the U.S. decision are almost non-existent. In contrast, *the New York Times*’ position changed overtime. *The New York Times* first carried more positive articles than negative. Only over time did the coverage converge in tone with that found in *the Asahi*. Eventually, the paper also became very negative toward the U.S. government.
Chapters five to seven focus on specific topics and periods, and types of articles. Chapter four specifically focuses on the run-up period of the war. This chapter reveals that the two allies’ media have quite distinctive treatments of the war, especially their rationalization of the cause of the Iraq War, the role and the power of the United Nations in relation to the war, and the degree of intensity in the coverage of civilian causalities and anti-war movements, among other things. This chapter concludes that even the same or similar phenomenon are sometimes quite differently portrayed by the two media.

Chapter six extensively compares editorials of the two papers during the period of the actual battle. Editorials are regarded as the best place to look at the qualitative similarities and differences of the two papers because editorials express opinions rather than attempts to simply report news. According to the content analysis, it seems that *the Asahi* believes that starting a war is the worst and most sinful action that can be taken by humankind. This is because many innocent lives are lost and the livelihoods of families are destroyed. By contrast, *the New York Times* regarded the threat posed to international security by Saddam Hussein as almost sinful. Saddam Hussein, the despotic leader who might have weapons of mass destructions, was portrayed as an evildoer. Although both papers’ notion of sin and evil gravitates around the possibility of endangerment of people, *the Asahi* focused more attention on the killings that were occurring as a result of the war while *the New York Times* paid more attention to the prevention of mass killing.
Chapter seven specifically analyzes the articles written by embedded journalists, both from the U.S. and Japan during the actual major battle (from March 20, 2003 to May 1, 2003). This chapter concludes that while “embedded journalists” produced articles that are sometimes similar in their personal and realistic descriptions of the events they saw and in their focus on daily activities in the field, there were nevertheless significant disparities in their formats and the degree of sympathy they showed the coalition forces.

As discussed in chapters four to seven, the results of the content analyses of *the Asahi* and *the New York Times* during the period of the Iraq War reveal that the major liberal newspapers in both Japan and America have quite different portrayals of the U.S. policies over Iraq. Both previous studies suggest that even the same or similar phenomenon are sometimes quite differently portrayed by the two media. While *the Asahi* was always strongly negative, *the New York Times* was supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, *the New York Times* also became gradually critical of U.S. government actions. Nevertheless, even in this later stage, the two papers were quite different in the degree of their negativity and in terms of the topics they focused on.

This suggests a real puzzle. The United States and Japan have one of the most close alliances in the world. Japan cannot survive without the protection of the U.S. military in East Asia. Because of the US-Japan security treaty, Japan has been protected by the military umbrella of the United States. Thus, the Japanese government has been reluctant to oppose the United States on foreign policy issues. Regarding the Bush Administration’s war on terrorism, the Japanese
government had only one choice: It supported the war from the beginning and become part of the “coalition of the willing.” The two countries have strong economic ties as well. Also, U.S. popular culture, such as movies, television programs, and music, have tremendously influenced Japanese psyche.

Considering the political and economic proximity between the United States and Japan one would expect more similarity in their media portray of issues. What explains the major differences that have been found? A major portion of the remainder of this dissertation deals with this puzzle.

Chapters eight to ten examine the reasons for the differences of the two papers’ coverage of the Iraq War. These three chapters address the second research question of this dissertation and explore why the accounts of the two papers have the particular tendencies that are discussed in chapters four to seven.

Why at times were the differences in coverage so large? Do the disparities reflect the different public opinions of the two countries? Or, should they be attributed to the different organizational characteristics of the Asahi or the New York Times? Is it a possibility that their government’s different positions on the war led to dissimilar accounts? Do differences in the relationship between politics and the media, including those that have emerged to do historical experiences with media censorship, generate particular styles in reporting? Are there any factors that may be rooted in these countries’ cultures or traditions? Chapters eight to ten examine each of these questions based on data, findings from the literature, and interviews.
Chapter eight clarifies the differences between American and Japanese political communication systems. First, the chapter discusses differences and similarities in the relationship between the media and politics in the two countries. Both the media in Japan and the U.S. have strong impacts on their countries’ politics; the media and political worlds have interdependent relationships in both nations. There are, however, several dissimilar points. One of these is the difference in the political system itself. Japan has a parliamentary system versus the U.S. strict separation of powers. There is something almost akin to one party rule in Japan versus a competitive two-party system in the United States.

Beyond this, this chapter compares the national security policies and public relations activities of the two countries. Japan’s and the United States’ roles in the international order are, of course, quite different. Since the end of World War II, Japan has been the closest ally of the United States in the Pacific Rim. Their military powers, however, are quite dissimilar. The United States is the only remaining hegemon; Japanese military annual expenditure is less than nine percent of that of the United States. Further, media ownership rules are different between the two countries, thus, the public relations activities by their government is quite different in terms of military strategies.

Along with these differences, this chapter focuses on the historical experience of the Japanese media during and after World War II, examining how the concept of “war” has come to be negatively perceived and anti-militarism has come to be shared by both the media and the public. Especially, it demonstrates the fact that Japanese media organizations, including the Asahi, supported the
jingoistic government during World War II. This proved to be a traumatic reality for them after Japan’s defeat. Large parts of the argument in this chapter are based on interviews with Japanese scholars.

Chapter nine focuses on cultural differences between Japan and the United States. The main claim in this chapter is that the cultural differences about the notion of warfare may create a different perspective among the two countries’ journalists and citizens. This chapter uses the concept of social construction and suggests that the different accounts of the war by the two papers can be attributed to the fact that different realities of “evilness” are socially constructed between the two countries. First, this chapter explains the theories of social construction of realities. Then, I refer to C. Fred Alford’s study about South Koreans’ notion of “evilness” and apply his findings to the difference between Japan and the United States about the concept of the Iraq War. Third, this chapter discusses the different notions of “evilness” that are portrayed in the articles of the _Asahi_ and _the New York Times_. After reviewing the results of this content analysis, I conclude this chapter by suggesting that the notion of “evilness” is socially constructed in the two countries. I reach this conclusion after conducting several interviews with Japanese scholars and journalists.

Chapter ten quantitatively analyzes the difference in public opinion between the two nations. Drawing data from public opinion polls, I use statistical methods to analyze the congruence between the trends of news about the war and changes in public opinion. Chapter ten also touches on the third research question of this dissertation because it investigates the ramifications of the difference in
news content about the Iraq War across the Pacific. Finally, this chapter explains the “so what?” question: Why is it important that two representative print media organizations in Japan and the U.S. portray different “realities” in the Iraq War? And how does the difference affect governments and citizens in each country and the international community? The difference in media portrayals of the same issues matters because it creates different reactions from the public and this eventually can affect the public policy process.

This chapter responds to these questions mainly by exploring the media’s agenda-setting functions. The media is generally assumed to be an important factor in shaping public opinion. At the same time, the contents of the media are presumed to be reflective of public opinion: the media in this view is tantamount to public opinion. Also, the influence of the media on the policy process is enormous. To those who are involved in politics, public opinion polls send signals regarding new policies. Thus, the difference in portrayal of the war can potentially have a very important impact on public opinion and the political agenda. This chapter explores the connection between the “media agenda” (the main topics covered by the media) and public opinion using various polls. This chapter finds that there is a strong connection between the media agenda and citizens’ attitudes toward their governments, as well as governments overseas. At the same time, the chapter explains that it is not easy to determine the media’s impact on public opinion because there are many other factors that also shape public opinion.

Chapter eleven summarizes the whole work. This chapter first argues the significance of the findings of the previous chapters. The content analysis of this
study shows that the two allies’ major print media have quite distinctive treatments of the war, especially their rationalization of the cause of the Iraq War, the role and the power of the United Nations in relation to the war, and the degree of intensity in the coverage of civilian causalities and anti-war movements, among other things. Moreover, the content analyses found that both the New York Times and the Asahi have different characterization of the actors involved in the war. 

The New York Times portrayed that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein as an embodiment of evil and the United Nations as an incompetent organization, which could not stop this evildoer from potentially using weapons of mass destruction. According to the paper, the United States, therefore, had to actively engage in Iraq. In contrast, the Asahi portrayed the United States as a warmonger whose bellicose desires threaten the world. According to the Asahi, the United Nations had extended its full-fledged efforts to halt America’s pugnacious attempts to invade Iraq, but to no avail. According to the Asahi, Hussein is a dictator, but the paper defined the United States as a bigger evil than the Iraqi President. The stark differences are attributable to the different notions of “evilness” in the two countries. The chapter also emphasizes the fact that the media’s impact is significant in shaping public policy, the political agenda, and public opinion.

Along with reviewing the major findings of the previous chapters, this chapter discusses possible future research related to this dissertation. Further analysis will be needed to fill in the gaps of my arguments as well as extending the scope of research.
Chapter 2: Literature Review: Comparing Different Cultures, Comparative Analysis of Political Communication, the Iraq War and the Media, and U.S. and Japanese Foreign Policies

This chapter reviews theories and studies related to this dissertation. The chapter addresses a wide range of literature because this dissertation is interdisciplinary. The chapter explores the difficulty of comparing different cultures. Then, it considers major theories and conducts a literature review of relevant works from political communication, including comparative studies. In addition, this chapter reviews the relationship between the media and politics during the Iraq War. The chapter first briefly reviews the timeline of the Iraq War. Then, special focus is given to the role of the media in the process of making foreign policy and explores the media’s role during the Iraq War both as cheerleader and as watchdog of the war.

Section 1 Difficulties in Understanding Different Cultures: Peter Winch’s Arguments of Cultural Sensitivities

Since societal factors are one of the major agents of social construction, cross-cultural comparison faces the very fundamental and difficult question about the role of culture in language. The question is centered upon language and its representation because one cannot be sure if an equivalent concept or a word
exists in the language being compared. Even if an individual finds a similar concept or word in another language, there is always the possibility that the word has quite a different cultural context and its meaning may be different. Thus, it is imperative to be sensitive in understanding the usage of words in a specific culture. A scholar who attempts to compare cultural artifacts needs to have sensitivity to the culture of the societies from which those artifacts come; the same is true for words.

Subsection 1 Peter Winch’s Criticism of Positivism

Cultural sensitivity toward a different society has been a matter of heated discussion. One of the most significant arguments about cultural sensitivity is Peter Winch's criticism of positivism in the social sciences. Winch claims that social science will fail to successfully understand human actions as long as it employs the same kind of justification as the natural sciences, such as setting certain criteria to judge human actions in other cultures. Winch, whose analysis is based on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, argues that we should not view a society through our own pre-set standards of judgment. Thus, Winch suggests that the best way to avoid misunderstanding a society that seems quite different from our own is to try to approach the society from the inside and to establish rational criteria that are specific to that culture.

In his seminal article, “Understanding a Primitive Society” (1964), Winch explains this argument by critiquing E. E. Evans-Pritchard's anthropological study of the mystical practices of the Azande, a "primitive"
people living in central Africa (Evans-Pritchard 1937, 1976). The centerpiece of Winch’s argument is a critical analysis of Evans-Pritchard's findings related to the Azande’s “alien” practices of witchcraft, magical medicine, and oracles.

The scientific method of investigation used by Evans-Pritchard led him to argue that there are no relations of cause and effect in the beliefs and practices of the Azande. Evans-Pritchard critically pronounced that their belief in the existence of witches is false, magical medicine is illusionary, and oracles are ineffective. Winch claims, however, that this conclusion was not fair to Azande society, and that Evans-Pritchard is crucially wrong. This is because of the difference in the concept of “objective reality” between Western and Azande societies. Winch elucidates:

Evans-Pritchard, although he emphasizes that a member of scientific culture has a different conception of reality from that of a Zande believer in magic, wants to go beyond merely registering this fact and make the scientific conception agree with what reality actually is like, whereas the magical conception does not. (308)

Winch challenges the philosophy of the social sciences. According to Winch, Evans-Pritchard applies a criterion which is appropriate to the evaluation of technology in relation to social practices, but which does not play a technological role in the Azande society. Winch further finds flaw with Evans-
Pritchard’s preoccupation with a positivistic approach. Winch questions the dogma of the social sciences:

We may ask whether a particular scientific hypothesis agrees with reality and test this by observation and experiment. Given the experimental methods, and the established use of the theoretical terms entering into the hypothesis, then the question whether it holds or not is settled by reference to something independent of what I, or anybody else, care to think. But, the general nature of the data revealed by the experiment can only be specified in terms of criteria built into the methods of experiment employed and these, in turn, make sense only to someone who is conversant with the kind of scientific activity within which they are employed. . . . What Evans-Pritchard wants to be able to say is that the criteria applied in scientific experimentation constitute a true link between our ideas and an independent reality, whereas those characteristic of other systems of thought—especially, magical methods of thought—do not.

(309)

Winch holds that the reason why a Western scholar, such as Evans-Pritchard, often regards magic as an irrelevant form of technology is that the scholar draws his explanations from his own culture. According to Winch, Western culture is “a culture whose conception of reality is deeply affected by the achievements and methods of the sciences” (307).
In order to remove the stereotypes derived from our own culture, Winch suggests that “the conception of ‘reality’ must be applicable outside the context of scientific reasoning. Although concept of witchcraft, oracle, and magic in Western culture is a perversion of other orthodox concepts both in religious and scientific sense, it has, according to Winch, “reality” in Zande culture. Winch notes, “A Zande would be utterly lost and bewildered without his oracle. The mainstay of his life would be lacking. It is rather as if an engineer, in our society, were asked to build a bridge without mathematical calculation, or a military commander to mount an extensive coordinated attack without the use of clocks. (311)

Comparing them with Western society, Winch suggests a different role for “primitive” practices in Zande life. Winch implies that Evans-Pritchard may underestimate the religious depth of traditional mystical practices of the Azande. Winch sees Zande magic, like Christian prayer, as expressing certain attitudes about the contingencies of life:

I do not say that Zande magical rites are at all like Christian prayers of supplication in the positive attitude to contingencies, which they express. What I do suggest is that they are alike in that they do, or may, express an attitude to contingencies, rather than an attempt to control these. (321)

Winch’s answer to the intelligibility of religion and of cross-cultural understanding is investing *sui generic* in the ‘language-game’ of the society. This
is because language usage in a society has its own methods and standards. In *The Idea of Social Science* (1958), Winch stresses the importance of language. In Winch’s view, language is not only a tool of analysis, but also the indispensable access to reality. This is because “in discussing language we are in fact discussing what counts as belonging to the world. Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language we use” (11-12).

Winch’s assertions are not completely free from problems. I believe cultural relativism may hinder his view. However, it is true that cultural sensitivity toward different societies is a very basic requirement for a scholar conducting any kind of cross-cultural study.

**Subsection 2  Debates between Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, and Others**

It is important to note that Winch's work continues to be seen as seminal and that his critique of positivism and especially its emphasis on “scientific methods” still holds true. One of the most famous and most heated discussions over positivism is observed between Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn. In his major work, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, originally published in 1959 (2002), Popper suggests that the principle of induction cannot be purely logical “like a tautology or an analytic statement” because inductive inferences are only “probable inferences” (28, 29). Thus, Popper argues that the true aim of the scientist should not be to prove hypotheses as true, but to prove them false. Through the work of falsification, false understandings can be systematically
rejected. Falsification also requires a hypothesis. According to Popper, knowledge grows not through simple observation, but through the imaginative formulation of a hypothesis and its test. Popper believes that falsification emerges as the point of demarcation between science and non-science, and that only empirical tests can play a role in the development of knowledge (57-73). In this way, Popper holds that scientific advancement is achieved. His doctrine of falsifiability is important to a post-positivist view of scientific activity, and it has a particularly noticeable influence on research methods in the social sciences, including political science.

Although Popper rejects simple inductivism in science, his assertion is based on traditional views of positivism (or so-called post-positivism) in comparison with Kuhn (Fuller 2004; Ruddock, 26-36, 2001). Like other positivists, Popper believes that truth exists “out there,” and that it is available as a basis for a genuine scientific theory, if approached correctly. In his major work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962, 1996), Kuhn suggests that scientific advancement does not occur the way Popper explains it, but rather results from a series of paradigm shifts. Kuhn argues that scientific advancement is not evolutionary, but rather is a "series of peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions," and in those revolutions "one conceptual world view is replaced by another" (10). Instead of seeing the history of science as a natural progression towards ultimate truth, Kuhn regards it as a long series of conflicts between different and competing ways to process data and explain results. The transformations resulting from the conflicts are gradual as old beliefs are replaced by the new paradigms creating "a new gestalt" (112).
With regard to the theory of a paradigm, there is a parallel between Winch and Kuhn. There is a clear resemblance in Winch and Kuhn’s views about societal impacts on the formation of a concept. Winch illustrates with the conceptual development of the “theory of disease.” Winch argues this development:

involved the adoption of new ways of doing things by people involved, in one way or another, in medical practice. An account of the way in which social relations in the medical profession had been influenced by this new concept would include an account of what that concept was. Conversely, the concept itself is unintelligible apart from its relations to medical practice (Winch 1958, 122).

Just as Popper’s idea of falsifiability has wielded a huge influence on research methods, Winch and Kuhn’s notion of scientific development affected many scholars’ ideas about how to conduct research. Many scholars, both in the social sciences and humanities, have followed strikingly similar approaches to that of Winch. Especially in the field of cultural anthropology, many studies are conducted from viewpoints similar to Winch’s. One example is a series of studies by Clifford Geertz. Geertz’s famous observation of a Balinese cockfight is based on the investigation of the ‘language-game’ of the society that Winch emphasizes as so important (Geertz 1972). In order to properly understand the cultural importance of the Balinese cockfights, it was essential for Geertz to become more
a part of the Balinese culture. According to Geertz, the only way to understand the meanings of various expressive forms is to observe them in a particular context. Using this methodology, Geertz finds the cockfights’ vital meanings for the Balinese. For example, cockfights are well attended events by men only, which is significant to their notion of masculinity. Also, bets are taken on these events, although the money isn’t all that is at stake. Further, Geertz discovers Balinese conceptions of the State and divinity based on the cockfight. Geertz concludes that the fight is a central symbolical structure of Balinese society.

In the field of social science, several research methodologies, mainly qualitative methodologies, follow the notion of scientific development advocated by Winch and Kuhn. One of those most typical research methods is participant observation. Participant observation is a popular and widely used research method and requires close involvement with a given group of individuals and observation of their activities in their natural environment. An observer should immerse his/herself in the culture of a given society as fully as possible over extended periods of time. Participant observation originated in cultural anthropology, but because of its recognized validity, social scientists, including political scientists, use the same method. An example of participant observation in contemporary political science is a seminal study by Richard Fenno. Fenno has studied members of Congress by following them around on their visits to their states and districts, trying to blend in with the members’ environments (Fenno 1978). Fenno’s description of his work as “soaking and poking” (Fenno 1978, 249) has became synonymous with this style of research. Many political scientists, such as James
Glaser, who undertook participant observation, have utilized some of the lessons from Fenno’s projects, such as the know-hows of establishing and developing rapport, and keeping intellectual distance from the object observed (Fenno 1978, 1990; Glaser 1996).

Section 2 Political Communications

As a theoretical framework, it is necessary to review previous studies of political communication. Political communication is an emerging subfield of political science. The widening of the subfield can be attributed to the gradual change surrounding our political process. Specifically, the media has come to be more and more involved in virtually all aspect of the political process; thus, the relationships between the mass media and political actors have been undergoing a transformation over the past few decades. Looking at the transference of political models and theories across political systems, researchers of political communication as well as other subfields of political science have broadened their perspectives.

Political communication is defined as the process by which a government, the media, and citizenry exchange and confer meaning upon messages that relate to a wide scope of politics and society (Perloff 1998, 8). To put it differently, political communication is a transactional process of messages among political actors. The messages are concerned broadly with the governance or the conduct of public policy.
The study of political communication analyzes the construction, sending, receiving, and processing of political messages (Arota and Lasswell 1969). The message senders may be journalists, politicians, bureaucrats, members of interest groups, or private unorganized citizens. The recipients can be citizens as well as political actors, such as politicians. Since the senders can be the message recipients, and vice versa, political messages always create interdependent relationships between the message senders and recipients.

A distinguishing characteristic of a political communication study is that a political message is the center of attention. Political communication scholars investigate political messages which provide political effect on the thinking, beliefs, and behaviors of individuals, groups, institutions, and whole societies in which they exist. The impact may be direct or indirect, immediate or delayed. Direct messages may relate to political activities, such as an appeal for votes, or an appeal for support of a particular policy. In the indirect mode, messages may create images of reality that affect political thinking and action by political elites and the public at large. The impact of messages can be manifested quickly by “instant” public opinion polls conducted after a televised political debate (e.g., Jamieson and Birdsell 1988). The power of messages, however, may be latent and observed later. In a series of famous “cultivation analyses,” George Gerbner argues that political messages from the media have gradually shaped our political orientations—whether we pay particular attention to the messages or not. According to Gerbner, this is because people consume vast amounts of information from the media over a long period of time, and therefore, there is no
such thing as a “light viewer” of television in terms of the media’s impact (e.g., Gerbner et al. 1982).

Although political communication is one of the oldest areas of political studies, as a sub-disciplinary area of political science it is one of the youngest. Nimmo and Sanders (1981) suggest in their seminal *Handbook of Political Communication* that political communication emerged as distinctly cross-disciplinary in the 1950s. Despite its newness, it has made remarkably fast progress in exploring a variety of topics, such as analyzing communication by political leaders, examining images created by the mass media and other sources, and probing how people process information. The relevance of political communication in particular has emerged with the rapid growth of the media, especially television. Nowadays, it is perhaps an understatement to declare that mass media plays a pervasive role in political life in industrial nations.

It might be a common misunderstanding that political communication is concerned only with elections. This is because political communication research has developed with the growth of election studies. Elections provide unique opportunities for political communication scholars to analyze the relationship between the media, politics, and society. Specifically, each election produces numbers of significant panel studies and other kinds of surveys, many of which satisfy the demands of scholars who seek an ample amount of data to analyze the impact of political messages.

Indeed, the history of political communication research is akin to the history of election studies. When political communication studies started in the
mid-1940s in the United States, they were based largely on the “hypodermic 
(needle) hypothesis” In contrast to the view that audiences are active, 
“hypodermic hypothesis,” also known as the “bullet hypothesis,” was predicated 
on the notion of audience passivity. Exposure to media messages were equated 
with its absorption by the receiver in its original form (Greenberg and Salwen 
1996, 64-65).

Armed with the hypodermic theory, political scientists began to 
investigate the impact of mass media stories on voting decisions. They expected 
media impact to be profound. Unfortunately for the progress of political 
communication research, the voting studies, including epoch-making works by 
Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), Berelson et al. (1954), and Campbell et al. (1960) did not 
find the expected effects. Consequently, hypodermic theory became discredited 
and "minimal effects" theory came into fashion. According to minimal effects 
theory as applied primarily to mass media messages, election news was 
insignificant, compared to other choice criteria such as party identification or 
group allegiance.

Studies of mass media influence on elections have rekindled since the 
1970s. This is largely because the notion of media impotence in election contests 
was contradictory to the "minimal effects" theory (Patterson and McClure 1976, 
Iyengar and Kinder 1987). The investigations into media influence, rather than 
looking for universal effects, tried to discover under what conditions effects might 
occur. For instance, interested voters and political experts might be more and 
differently affected by media than disinterested citizens and political novices.
This new approach to research, which confirmed such differential effects, coincided with major social and political changes that affected the interaction between media and politics (e.g. Owen 1991).

When questions arose about the impact of political advertising during elections, numerous researchers turned their attention to this long neglected array of messages (Diamond and Bates 1988). Advertising content has been examined, with particular emphasis on the balance between issues and images and on the messages conveyed by visual images. Political commercials also appear to be an important source of information for disinterested, poorly informed voters (Owen 1991, Maeshima 2005).

Although political communication research has centered on election studies, the subfield has become more and more inclusive in its scope and methods. Political communication has become increasingly interdisciplinary because the questions raised by it require political scientists to draw on sister disciplines, such as political psychology and comparative politics, as well as to go outside the field of politics, for example to rhetorical communications and journalism theories. Thus, the conceptual underpinnings of political communication studies are diverse and largely borrowed from these sister disciplines.

Psychological analysis has been used by political communication scholars since the early 1980s. How human beings process political information is their main concern. Media stimuli are transformed by audiences who bring their own cognition and feelings to bear in the process of extracting meanings from media
content. The psychological approach is grounded in a variety of information-processing theories. Among them, schema theories are currently enjoying the broadest support. According to these theories, people develop mental models about various aspects of their world on the basis of direct experiences and information transmitted by the mass media and other sources. Such schemata guide information selection, provide the framework for assimilating new information, and furnish the basis for developing repertoires of inferences (Graber 1988).

Political scientists and communication scholars disagree about whether media content is shaped primarily by proponents reflecting the right or left side of the ideological spectrum. Scholars like Robert and Linda Lichter and Stanley Rothman (1986) have argued that media elites who work for the leading news media lean to the political left, relying on sources holding biased views. Scholars like Lance Bennet (1988) and Benjamin Ginsberg (1986) consider media to be the minions of big business and right-wing politicians. They suggest news selections by the media have strengthened white middle class values and suppress competing left-wing views. Some critics, most notably Noam Chomsky (1988), contend that these choices are made deliberately to perpetuate a capitalist exploitation of the masses in line with the ideological preferences of media owners.

Relating to these ideology issues, the normative “gatekeeping” role of journalists is also a matter of scholarly concern. The notion of “gatekeeping” or “watchdog” is a famous metaphor for journalists. The term “gatekeeping” has
been widely used to describe the process by which selections are made in media work, especially decisions whether or not to admit a particular news story to pass through the “gates” of a news medium and into the news channels. As a “gatekeeper,” reporters select the sources and news stories according to their criteria of newsworthiness and the degrees of fitness to the stories they believe ought to be reported.

The media’s normative role of “watchdogs” or “gatekeepers,” however, has been changing. As discussed later in Section 3, Larry Sabato suggests that the "watchdog" function of the media has significantly waned. According to Sabato, the media in the United States changed into "junkyard-dog" journalism since the 1980s. In the "junkyard-dog" journalism, the media often relies on rumor and gossip or focuses on irrelevant subjects (Sabato 1993).

Also, the media organizations arguably have been much influenced by their business motives. The media in the United States is increasingly owned by a few very large multinational corporations. Media organizations have to compete harder to reach their audiences in order to survive. The merger and acquisitions of the whole U.S. media has created a “media monopoly,” as Ben Bagdikian calls it. According to Bagdikian (2004), America's daily newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations, book publishers, and movie companies dwindled at first from 50 down to 10 to now stand at only 5. Because of business interests, Kurtz (1994, 1997) argues that the distinction between traditional journalism and entertainment became very blurred in the United States. Media organizations in the U.S. seek “infotainment” rather than investigative reporting, in order to satisfy
the needs of their owners. In Japan, traditional journalism has turned more and more into an entertainment “infotainment” entity as well. Also, office holders and their aides have increased their capability to do their own “spin.” They deliberately manipulate the media and attempt to control political reactions. Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Paul Waldman (2006) argue that media’s ability to report stories are very limited as opposed to the “spin control” of the politicians. Because of the changing environment between the press and politics, the journalist’s normative role of “watchdogs” or “gatekeepers” may be in peril.

Section 3 Comparative Analysis of Political Communications

One of the more exciting developments in recent years is that the political communication subfield has become more intercultural and has adopted new theories and methodologies to compare political communication systems across countries. Until the 1980s, most political communication scholars conducted their research only within one set of societal boundaries. Now, political communication researchers conduct more comparative research, examining the differences of media content and media systems that exist between or among nations.

Comparative political communication studies examine political messages in diverse societies and study its effects and ramifications cross-culturally. It goes without saying that it is important to examine political communication systems from various cultural perspectives. Examining the relationship between politics and the media in other societies permits us to see a wider range of political
alternatives and illuminates the virtues and shortcomings in our own political system. By taking us out of the network of assumptions and familiar arrangements within which we operate, comparative analysis helps expand our awareness of the possibilities of studies in political communication (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990). This is because it is assumed that different countries have different political and mass communication systems. Mass media reporting is closely associated to a country’s politics, society, culture, and public opinion. It is widely believed that differences in political communication systems produce different media coverage (e.g., Blumler and Gurevitch 1975).

Comparative analysis of political communication started with elections studies. Election messages and depictions of public officials have been compared in various countries (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995, Semetko et al. 1991, Swanson and Mancini 1996). That literature paid particular attention to four key elements of the modern U.S. model of election campaigning that many countries have adopted in recent years. The four key elements in the U.S. model are: 1) the perpetual dependency (interdependency) of the mass media, 2) the personalization of campaigns (U.S.-style “candidate-centered” campaigns, as opposed to “party-centered” traditional elections), 3) the frequent use of public opinion polls, and 4) a general professionalization of campaigns, such as the advent of election consultants. Looking at the four elements, scholars have examined the extent to which electoral politics in a particular country have been affected by the U.S. model (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995, Semetko et al. 1991, Swanson and Mancini 1996, Hallin and Mancini 2004).
The comparative analysis of political communication has focused on other areas than elections as well. Regarding the government-media relationship, Blumler and Gurevitch (1996) point out that the media systems in different nations can be classified as more or less subordinate to, or autonomous from, political institutions, depending on the degree of state control over mass media organizations, the degree of media/political elite integration, and the nature of the legitimizing creed of media institutions (Blumler and Gurevitch 1996).

Hallin and Mancini (2004) examine the principal dimensions of variation in media systems and the political variables based on a survey of media institutions in eighteen West European and North American countries. They develop three major models of media system development to explain why the media have played a different role in the politics of each of these systems: the Polarized Pluralist, the Democratic Corporatist, and the Liberal models.

According to Hallin and Mancini, the Liberal Model in Britain, Ireland and North America is characterized by a relative dominance of market mechanisms in media industry. In the Democratic Corporatist Model found in northern continental Europe the commercial media coexist with organized social and political groups. There is a relatively active but legally limited role for the government. The Polarized Pluralist Model found in the Mediterranean countries of southern Europe is characterized by a weak commercial media and a very strong government; the media tends to be integrated into party politics.

Along with these theory-generating studies, many comparative case studies have been conducted in recent years. Some have attempted to empirically
test the above-mentioned theories. Most of these studies are comparisons between the content of coverage of a specific event in two countries' representative media. Notably, many of these comparative case studies suggest that the government-media relationship may significantly influence the differences and similarities in media content.

Soesilo and Wesburn compare the accounts of the "Crisis in the Gulf" constructed by a leading American newspaper, the New York Times, and a leading Indonesian newspaper, Kompas. Their study suggests that the Indonesian newspaper discussed the position of the Iraqi government more frequently than did the New York Times. Also, it framed the news of the "Gulf Crises" in terms of its implications for the political economies of the Third World nations more than twice as often as it identified its implications for the West. In contrast, the New York Times discussed the position of the American government more frequently than the position of the government of Iraq in relation to Iraq’s actions as a threat to the political economy of the West and, more generally, as a threat to world order, thereby legitimizing American policy---at least in some Western eyes. In addition, both countries' leading newspapers exhibited their own patterns of selective omissions: While the Indonesian newspaper failed to cover alleged human rights violations and made no reference to the principle of sovereignty of nations in explaining the "crisis," the New York Times paid little attention to expressions of dissent over U.S. policy in the Gulf region prior to the outbreak of war. Soesilo and Wesburn attribute these differences to the relation between the Indonesian government and the press. Indonesia's ties to both the United States
and Iraq led its government to adopt a neutral position in the unfolding conflict. According to the scholars, *Kompas*, as a developmental press normatively committed to supporting the policies of its government, reported the crisis in ways that helped legitimate this stand (Soesilo and Wesburn 1994).

Another intriguing study is about the comparison between Chinese and U.S. leading network news. Tsan-Kuo Chang and Jian Wang compared the television network news content between the United States' ABC *World News Tonight with Peter Jennings* with *CCTV (China Central Television) News*. According to these scholars, the domestic news on CCTV tended to be ritualistic and progressive in that events and issues often revolved around current national efforts and governmental activities or achievements in moving the country forward, including collective concern and action against such natural disasters as flood and drought. In contrast, ABC's domestic news avoided the trappings of dignitaries and civic boosterism, focusing instead on telling stories that drew upon and reproduced institutional and social structures. Its foreign news, on the other hand, exhibited a pattern that persistently built on American ideas and interests, especially in the stories about racial problems and homeless veterans. It was concluded that the selection and presentation of news by the two networks depended not so much on the properties of the event or issue itself, but rather on the media’s positions in the broader social structure relative to their external context (Chang and Wang 1998).

The methodologies and frameworks of comparative political communication research of these studies are very similar to those of comparative
politics case studies. A study by Maeshima (2003) focuses on the impacts of
government industrial policies to adaptations of new technology in the media. The
study compares the policies on High Definition Television (HDTV) development
and standardization between Japan, the United States and Europe. The study
attempts to analyze and compare the policies on HDTV development and
standardization between Japan, the United States and Europe. The focus is on the
degrees of governmental involvement in the HDTV industry and the relationship
between the government and industry.

The Japanese government took the lead role in promoting HDTV
developments. Especially, the former Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) and the former Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT),
championed the new technology. Also, NHK, the Japanese public broadcasting
corporation, played a pivotal role in development of the MUSE, a once-dominant
analog HDTV standard.

Japanese HDTV policies provide typical features of a “developmental
state,” in which a state pursues a strategic approach to develop its economy. For
instance, the intimate relationship between the government and the private sector,
and the intensity of governmental involvement in the market have been clearly
observed in the HDTV developments.

In Europe, the European Research Coordinating Agency (EUREKA),
government-industry consortium, had been the main driving force behind the
pursuit of the European-originated HDTV standard, MAC. Its EUREKA-95
project strongly promoted the standard both in Europe and abroad. Another
characteristic of European HDTV policy is that it produced conflict between the European Union (EU) and EU member states and the electronic industries in the region. As a result, in 1991, the states and the industries formed Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) Group, a new independent organization to promote digital television applications. Since then, the EU’s leadership role in HDTV development greatly weakened.

In contrast with Japan and the EU, the U.S. government has been reluctant to engage in the HDTV sector. Many government officials and members of Congress believe in the “free-market approach” to industrial development. The approach elucidates that governmental support is more effective when focused on creating an environment that promotes the competitive forces of the market. Nonetheless, in two specific periods, the U.S. government was relatively active in promoting HDTV technology. In the late 1980s, numerous calls were made for direct United States government initiatives to promote HDTV. Several bills then were submitted to Congress for government initiatives to promote HDTV. This was the period when international trade competition with Japan was getting fierce, and the possibility of military applications of the HDTV technology became viable.

The U.S. government resumed its engagement in the HDTV market around 1999. The drastic change in the paradigm of the consumer market, most notably, the surge of interactive commerce, took place in this period, and the retooling of the existing HDTV policies became necessary. This study concludes that various changes in international relations and consumer markets are the
factors that forced the U.S. government to become involved in the HDTV industry.

As mentioned above, the comparative analysis of political communication has expanded its scope to the relationship between the media and governments. Also, the influence of media industry on politics has become a subject of analysis. Regarding the Iraq War, several scholars have started to analyze the relationship between the media and politics (e.g. Schechter 2003, Brandenburg 2005). Yet, most of these studies are concerned with situations within a boundary of one particular country, chiefly within the United States. There are only a few studies about the media and politics in the Iraq War from a comparative perspective (Aday, et.al.2005, Dimitrova et.al.2005). The next sections review the relationship between the media and politics during the Iraq War, including explanations found in the emerging literature on this subject.

Section 4 The Iraq War, and U.S. and Japanese Foreign Policies about the War.

The Iraq War (The war in Iraq, the Second Persian Gulf War, the Second Gulf War) was fought between a "Coalition of the Willing," consisting primarily of American and British forces, but also including Polish, Australian, and Iraqi forces. Approximately 250,000 United States troops, with support from 45,000 British, and smaller forces from other nations, entered Iraq primarily through a staging area in Kuwait (Milbank, 2003). Twelve years after the Persian Gulf War
of 1991, the U.S.-led forces dominated the early conflict, which officially started on March 20, 2003.

The initial coalition attacks swiftly destroyed strategic targets in Iraq, and the entire nation of Iraq was brought under the control of U.S. and British forces in just over three weeks, with relatively little initial loss of coalition lives. President George W. Bush announced the end of “official combat” on May 1, 2003. The official “war” lasted for 42 days. The announcement, however, failed to recognize the many ramifications of the war. The official war was only the beginning: Iraqi insurgent attacks dominated the news since then until, at least, the fall of 2005, when the content analysis for this dissertation was conducted. The official number of U.S. troops who have died in the Iraq war hit 2,000 on October 25, 2005 (White and Tyson 2005). According to the Iraq Body Count, the civilian death toll was between 26,000 and 30,000 by the end of October 2005. Kidnappings and subsequent murders of civilians from the United States and other allies, including Japan, have terrified audiences all over the world. The revelation of several military scandals, most notably the Abu Ghraib incidents, provided an occasion to reconsider the meaning of this war. Prior to the launch of the Iraq War, President Bush repeatedly suggested that the U.S.-led military actions have two missions: disarming Iraq and transforming it into a free and hopeful society. That second goal has yet to be seen as of June 2007.

The Iraq War is not a popular battle to a large part of the international community, partly because the cause of the conflict itself is controversial and partly because the U.S. policies over Iraq did not receive the full-fledged support
of the United Nations. According to critics, the Bush administration hastily started to attack Iraq without obtaining clear evidence. Hussein’s preparations for a nuclear attack, which was the main justification for the war, have not been found to date. Since Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq were not found, public distrust over the Iraq policy has grown. Further, the alleged connections between Al Qaeda and Iraq turned out to be incomplete and unreliable. Thus, many critics around the world suggest that the war was actually a purposeful act of invasion of Iraq. Prior to the war, so-called, neo-conservatives (the neo-cons) both inside and outside of the Bush administration clearly suggested the need for an aggressive military policy toward Iraq in order to secure the national interests of the United States. This has led to conspiracy theories that the Bush administration intentionally started the war in order to secure its Middle-East military dominance and energy security.

During the period covered by this study, U.S. foreign policy took a new direction. After the “9-11 attacks,” the Bush administration initiated new sets of policies in U.S. foreign relations, the so-called Bush doctrine. The Bush Doctrine seeks to retool the global order on the strength of overwhelming U.S. military might. The doctrine includes several elements. First is that the U.S. has the right to pursue unilateral military action when acceptable multi-lateral solutions cannot be found (unilateralism). Second, if the U.S. or its allies are threatened by terrorists or by rogue states that are engaged in the production of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. can initiate pre-emptive attacks (pre-emption). Third, the U.S. will exploit its military and economic power to encourage "free and open
societies" (extending democracy and liberty). Fourth, the U.S. intends to take actions as necessary to continue its status as the world's sole military superpower (expansionism).

The architects of those new sets of policies are the so-called neo-conservatives (the neo-cons) in Washington. The neo-conservatives are a small group of right-wingers that shaped U.S. foreign policy during the period after 9-11. At the time of the Iraq War, they were at the center of the Bush administration. At that time, Deputy secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz led their forces at the Pentagon. Undersecretary Doug Feith and Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, were well-placed hawks, as was Pentagon adviser Richard Perle. They orchestrated their voices to present an imperial vision of an international order (Mann 2004).

Arguably, the neo-conservatives’ views were so opinionated that several scholars see America making a grand historic turn toward imperial rule of the world. Among others, Chalmers Johnson, well-known specialist of Japanese politics, claims that the emerging American empire is coercive, exploitative, and destructive. Johnson suggests that American military alliances during the Cold War have been consolidated over the last decade into a new form of global juggernaut—that of a ruling empire, in which the U.S. exaggerates threats and uses its military-industrial complex in self-serving ways (Johnson, 2004).

Similarly, Benjamin Barber (2004) finds that American foreign policy has gone wrong. He suggests that America has become a unipolar power and that unilateral military action perpetuates an image of America as an aggressive force that
operates outside the accepted precepts of international law and policy. Thus, he concludes that America's imperial reach will exceed its grasp and destabilize the global system.

Other scholars, such as Niall Ferguson (2004) and Andrew Bacevich (2002), also liken the current United States to the British or Roman Empires. However, they believe that America’s “liberal empire” is welcomed by the current global system. According to Ferguson, this is because the U.S. provides order, security and public goods. His fear is that the U.S. will fail in its imperial duties and interests. Ferguson notes that the U.S. should embrace its imperial status and work to set up free-market democracies in states stunted by tyranny and anarchy. Bacevich also stresses that the U.S. administrations have maintained continuity of purpose in achieving the goals of reshaping the world in the U.S. image, through free trade, military dominance, and globalization. According to Bacevich, central to this goal is a commitment to global openness -- removing barriers that inhibit the movement of goods, capital, ideas, and people. Also, he suggests that the creation of an open and integrated international order based on the principles of democratic capitalism is America’s ultimate objective. For pursuing these goals, he argues, the difference between the Clinton and G.W. Bush Administrations’ foreign policy is not big enough.

Unlike these arguments, G. John Ikenberry (2006) suggests that U.S. power is neither as great as most claim nor as dangerous as others fear. Ikenberry asserts that the notion of empire is misleading because it misses the distinctive aspects of the global political order that has developed around U.S. power. First,
the United States has pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries, but American relations with Europe, Japan, China, and Russia are different from those because these advanced democracies operate within a "security community" in which the use or threat of force is unthinkable. Also, according to Ikenberry, the debates over the American empire do not refer to the long peace among great powers, which can be explained by both “liberal empire” views and strong U.S. rules.

Japanese foreign policy, both military and economic, has been closely linked to U.S. policy in the Pacific Rim since the end of World War II. A half-century after its occupation, the United States still garrisons troops in Japan, the world’s second largest economy. American relations with Japan have evolved over the decades, but Japan is still dependent on American military protection and the American market. Although East Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea, are connected by bilateral ties and loose multilateral economic relations, the East Asian regional order is organized according to the military presence of the United Stated. Indeed, American extended deterrence and regional trade linkages are at the heart of Japanese foreign policy.

Because of its dependence on American military presence, Japanese post-war foreign policy has been uniquely formed. Renunciation of war is one of the most crucial parts of the Japanese post-war Constitution. The re-arming of Japan in the 1950s was therefore cast in terms of self-defense. The activities of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were rigorously limited inside Japan. Overseas deployment of the SDF was finally decided in 1992, when SDF troops were sent to Cambodia.
to watch over the first free election. However, Self-Defense Force participation in UN peacekeeping missions and relief work has sparked vigorous debate inside Japan; even the missions are strictly limited to peacekeeping. This is because dispatching SDF troops overseas may infringe on the Article Nine of the Constitution, which clearly renounces force as a means for settling international disputes and prohibits the creation of an army, navy, and air force. The debate has not ended in Japan. Asian countries, especially nations that were victims of Japanese aggression in World War II, opposed the revised role of the SDF.

As regards Iraq issues, the Koizumi Administration (2001-2006) supported the U.S. policies towards Iraq. In July 2003, the Japanese legislature passed a special bill that allows the SDF to help to rebuild Iraq. This bill enables the Japanese government to deploy the SDF to Iraq without an UN agreement as long as the area of deployment is in a “non-combat” zone. This bill also met serious opposition both in Japan and overseas.

The United States has wielded substantial influence on economic and defense policy-making in Japan. Several authors, such as Prestowitz, suggest that the Japanese policy-making process has a familiar pattern: Japan promises to make changes that would harm some special interest group within its society, but only after loud and insistent U.S. demands. This process is known as "gaiatsu." Although "gaiatsu" originally means "foreign pressure" in Japanese, it chiefly connotes foreign pressure from the United States or multinational corporations headquartered mainly in the United States. Although some argue that pointing out foreign pressure is not an ideal way to get results, several analysts of Japan find it
very effective. Prestowitz states that “Nothing can happen in Japanese politics without foreign pressure” (the International Herald Tribune April 17, 1998). Interestingly, the U.S. pronouncements are often used as an excuse for taking politically unpopular actions and as a justification for instituting policy changes (Stockwin 1999).

Since Japanese politics has been vulnerable to gaiatsu, Kent E. Calder suggests that the concept of the "reactive state" is useful in understanding the foreign policy making process and behavior of Japan. According to Calder, Japanese reactive state behavior is the result of both domestic institutional characteristics and the structure of the international system. Domestic features such as bureaucratic fragmentation, political factionalism, and the lack of a strong central executive have played an especially important part in Japanese policy formation. Also, certain other middle-range powers are becoming deeply integrated in the global political economy and particularly during the periods of economic turbulence when international regimes do not fully safeguard their economic interests (Calder 1990).

Section 5 The Iraq War and the Media: A Cheerleader of a Watchdog?

The Iraq War and its aftermath is, without a doubt, one of the biggest news events in this decade. The war was probably the most media-centered conflict in history. More than 1500 journalists from around the world, including Japanese, entered the battle zone. They attempted to report what was happening
on the battlefront, analyze developments, and explore the new world order after
the demise of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Some 600 were actually embedded
within the coalition forces during the combat. Moreover, “unilateral” independent
journalists joined the camps of journalists (Kurtz, 2003). During the war in Iraq,
small video camera revolutionized war reporting. Not only newspapers and
television, 24-hour cable and satellite networks, but also an internet blog became
a tool for a citizen who wants to participate in debates over Iraq issues. Numerous
internet blogs reported the latest developments and delivered their analyses.

As in the case of all warfare, the media has played a controversial role in
are significant and interesting aspects in the relationship between the media and
politics that revealed themselves during the war in Iraq. Especially, the U.S.
media’s role in the war has been a matter of concern for scholars and the media
organizations themselves. Since the war ended, a great amount of literature has
been produced to critique the media’s role in the war ---much has been written
about the media by media critics, and many critical self-examinations have been
done by journalists themselves. ‘Mea culpas’ have been abundant, particularly
after David Kay, former U.S. chief weapons inspector, announced in early 2004
that “we were almost all wrong” about Iraqi weapons of mass destructions
(Achenbach 2004).

Some critics argue that the U.S. media played a cheerleading role to the
Bush administration and promoted the war without serving as a watchdog of the
government. Schechter (2003) calls the U.S. media’s role in the war “weapons of
mass deception,” because the media put an emphasis on supporting the war effort of the Bush administration over reportorial objectivity (Schechter 2003). Not only in the U.S., but also in Europe and Asia, including Japan, this literature has cast doubt on the functions of the media during the Iraq War (e.g. Ishizawa 2005).

One obvious example is the controversial role of a *New York Times* reporter Judith Miller. Miller’s serial reporting on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq helped garner public support for the initiation of the Iraq War. The reports, however, were later shown to be false. Miller’s coverage had depth, but the depth was based on a series of propaganda statements of the Bush government. Also, in relation to the Bush administration’s Iraq policy, Miller’s staunch defense of confidential sources related to the Valerie Plame scandal, which became widely publicized in 2005, made her name synonymous with an unhealthy relationship between the media and politics (Van Natta, Liptak and Levy, 2005).

As shown by Miller’s case, objectivity is one of the most difficult issues in war reporting. Since the attacks of 9-11, there has been an active discussion over manipulation of the media by the Bush administration (Cole, 2005). Karl Rove of the Administration and his media team worked a great deal on public relations. Especially during the run-up period of the Iraq War, many critics argue that the Administration was very skillful in emphasizing the need and urgency of attacking Iraq. The Administration superbly presented the dichotomous arguments between “us and them” or “good and evil.” These presentations of the Administration include the contrast between the “despotic and Al Qaeda-related” Hussein regime and the “democratic and free” United States, or “procrastinated
and with loopholes” UN inspections and U.S. “serious attempts to end the terror network.” Since the Bush administration was more skilled in providing these images than their counterparts, such as the Hussein Administration or the UN inspections teams, the U.S. media constantly resorted to the Bush administration as the primary source of the news. Thus, not only the people in the United States, but also relatively large portions of the international community, came to believe such self-serving presentations.

On initiating attacks in Baghdad, the Administration also introduced another method to control the content of the media in the battlefield. The Administration allowed journalists to embed in specific military units in the war. Arguably, this practice of “embedding” was the most controversial aspect of political communication during the Iraq War. The practice of "embedding" reporters makes for compelling journalism; however, some warn of the dangers of losing independence.

"Embedding" was not an invention of the Iraq War. It is a conventional practice of the media to report a very real image of the battleground for audiences in the U.S. and around the world. During the war in Vietnam, however, the images from photographers and television broadcasts of war brought the horror of the situation into the home of Americans. Thus, the U.S. government has attempted to control the news media's coverage of the hostilities as the war dragged on, especially since the Tet Offensive in 1968, which is believed to have been a turning point in the Vietnam War. Similarly, the media complained that they were being denied access to the battlegrounds of Kuwait during the first Gulf
War of 1991 (Davis, 2001, Chap. 19). After decades of battling reporters who demanded access to frontline troops during combat operations, the Pentagon finally allowed journalists to join a military unit involved in an armed conflict during the war in Iraq.

What is unique about “embedding” during the Iraq War is the fact that the Pentagon systematically resumed the old convention in order to appease the media. The Pentagon found that embedding was not only a way to ease decades of hostility and mutual suspicion within the media, but also was a public relation strategy designed in large part as a means of waging information warfare against Saddam Hussein.

The U.S. government allowed about 500 reporters and photographers from around the world, both print and electronic media to embed in the military during the war in Iraq. They were indeed given unprecedented direct access to the battle frontline. These so-called "embedded" reporters were on the ground in Iraq, ate and slept alongside soldiers and reported on firefights and artillery onslaughts first hand. The world was getting an unprecedented look at war as it happens.

Among the 500 embedded reporters, many were from the American press. Major U.S. media organizations, such as the New York Times and the Washington Post, were allowed to send dozens of journalists. The international press also received certain slots for embedding. The BBC from the UK had 16 embedded reporters in Iraq. The Japanese print media organizations had six slots: three from the Kyodo News Service, two from the Asahi, and one from the Yomiuri Shimbun, and the electronic media six as well: four from Nihon Hosō Kyokai (NHK) and
two from *Fuji Television* and *Nippon Television Network (NNN)* (Nojima, 2003, 22).

Although journalists experienced unprecedented access to the battlefield and their stories were as a result very real, there were concerns about the cost of embedded journalism. First, there were numerous restrictions on reporting; embedded journalists had to sign a contract restricting when and what they could report. Although the Pentagon claimed that there was no censorship, there were several rules about reporting set by the U.S. forces: the details of military actions could only be described in general terms and journalists were not allowed at all to report possible future missions or about classified information they might find. Journalists could not give specific details about the locations or outline the future plans of their unit. Also, the commander of an embedded journalist's unit could declare a 'blackout' in filing stories via satellite for security reasons. Thus, some critics feel that the level of media censorship by the Pentagon was too strict, and that media organizations struck a Faustian bargain by agreeing to become embeds and consequently losing their objectivity (Brandenburg, 2005).

More importantly, some suggest that embedded journalists made reports that were so sympathetic to the American side of the war that the objectivity of their story might be endangered. There is a strong possibility that sympathy was likely to develop between embedded journalists and soldiers since journalists were protected by the soldiers in the field (Schechter, 2003). Also, embedding reports may increase the respect of the military for journalists who are prepared to put themselves at risk (Schechter 2003). Embedded journalists may be more likely
to be sympathetic toward the coalition forces, even if they are not conscious of this or necessarily want to be. This is because embedded journalist’s lives were at the mercy of the fate of his or her troop, and as a result were subject to the “Stockholm syndrome.” The Stockholm syndrome describes how an onlooker becomes part of that group. The “embeds” are protected by the U.S. forces and their lives are in the hands of the forces (Brandenburg 2005). Thus, objectivity may be lost under such extraordinary conditions.

Since the end of the war, scholars and critics have attempted an empirical examination of the media content of embedded journalists in order to define the impact of embedding journalism, but the results about how much embedding affected the contents are mixed. These studies are in the preliminary stages. Some suggest that coverage of the Iraqi conflict by embedded journalists is problematic when it is subjected to closer analysis (Schechter, 2003). While Pfau et al.’s 2004 study finds that the embedding experiment actually distorted the media content, Aday, Livingston and Hebert (2005) conclude that the impact was relatively small. Scholarly debate over the impact of embedding will not end for some time.

The Bush administration also attempted to affect the language being heard in the media. There were always plenty of euphemisms about the Iraq War. One of the most widespread terms emerging from the Administration during the war was "shock and awe," a bombing campaign by the coalition forces designed to terrify an enemy into submission. Also, other jargon of the Pentagon came to be frequently used in the media during the war. One example is “to decapitate.” The U.S. media came to use phrases such as "the coalition forces tried to
'decapitate' the Iraqi regime," to describe the concept "it tried to kill Saddam Hussein." In addition, the more familiar term 'collateral damage' was frequently used to indicate Iraqi civilian casualties. There are acute criticisms about the new phrases that the government crafted to describe actions in the war. Critics argue that some reporters were quick to adopt the Administration’s new terminology that simplified the complexities of the war and sanitized the battle. These terms present a reality that lacks an understanding of the impact and scope of the military actions. Consequently, the media may eventually mislead the public (Bowers, 2003).

This battle euphemism was one of the legacies of the First Gulf War of 1991. During the first Gulf War, the military supplied attractive battlefield pictures that journalists found difficult to refuse. The military also could bar press access to potentially embarrassing scenes and persuade the public that such restraint was necessary for national security. Critics suggest that the war became a picture-book war that glorified skills of military leaders and largely concealed the bloody realities of the combat. Along with videos, new terms were created by the senior Bush Administration during the First Gulf War. These terms include “pinpoint attack” or “smart bombs.” These technological terms disguised plenty of botched bombings that lacked in accuracy. However, because of the technological superiority of the United States, audiences came to believe that “smart” meant precision attacks with a minimum amount of civilian damage (Hachten and Hachten 1996).
Although the media in the United States functioned as a cheerleader of their government during the initial stage of the Iraq War, the media turned more critical as time progressed and after major combat operations were over. The media became more of a watchdog checking governmental actions related to Iraq. As far as I know, there are no scholarly studies about the U.S. media’s regaining its watchdog function. This dissertation explains in later chapters that negativity toward U.S. Iraq policies in *the New York Times* articles significantly increased after major combat operations were over and that the surge became clearer as time progressed.

Reporting on war makes explicit the differences that exist between the media of different countries. The Iraq War was not an exception. There is an interesting article in *the New York Times* written by Paul Krugman (“Behind the Great Divide” February 18, 2003) regarding the media reporting and international perceptions of U.S. policies over Iraq. Krugman argues that media reporting of the pre-war period was partly responsible for the different ways in which Europeans and Americans see the world and “are suddenly at such odds.” According to Krugman, the United States and Europe have different views partly because “we see different news.” He provides two possible explanations for the “great trans-Atlantic media divide”: either the European media present pervasive anti-American bias or the U.S. media takes it as their assignment to sell the war, evading the role of watchdog. His explanation is plausible because as discussed above, the news may affect public opinion and vice versa.
At the time Krugman wrote this piece, he was not certain whether the European media distorted the news or the U.S. media failed to present a mix of information that might question the justification of the war. However, Krugman’s analysis turned out to be correct (at least during the time I wrote this dissertation). Many critics, including American ones, suggest that the U.S. media may have played a cheerleading role in order to help start the war. In contrast to this, European media have been more reputable in their reporting of the war (Aday, Livingston, and Hebert 2005).

In the vein of Krugman’s “great trans-Atlantic media divide”, the U.S. and Japan media have reported differently on the war in Iraq. This study explores the trans-Pacific media gap over Iraq.
Chapter 3: Research Designs: Methodologies, Research Questions, Hypotheses and Goal of This Project

This chapter explicates the methodological concerns in this work. Specifically, it discusses the methodologies, research questions, hypotheses, and goals of this project. The most important methodology for this work was content analysis. In order to systematically investigate the New York Times and the Asahi’s news content, I employed both quantitative and qualitative content analysis of newspaper articles. Since this project aims at multi-disciplinary theories and works, mainly from political science and media studies, the methodologies were selected for their broad and inclusive approaches. The goal of this work is to contribute an international and multi-disciplinary study of media reporting on war to the political communication literature. Also, this study will provide an international viewpoint in the discussion of the interactions between the media and politics, both in academia and in journalism.

Section 1 Newspapers to Investigate

Two newspapers were selected for this study: the Asahi and the New York Times. There are three reasons why I choose these two papers for comparison. First, both papers are arguably the most respected in their countries. Both newspapers have the reputation of “quality papers” among their countries’ news media. Second, their political leanings are similar. It is a well-known fact
that both papers are considered to be politically liberal. Third, both are leading newspapers whose circulations are very large, if not the largest in their respective countries. *The Asahi* has the second biggest circulation of any paper in Japan after *the Yomiuri*, with 850 million daily subscribers. *The New York Times* has the fourth largest circulation in the U.S. after *U.S.A Today*, *the Wall Street Journal*, and *the Los Angeles Times*.

Since both papers have positioned themselves as liberal or left of center, it may be assumed that they will be critical of their government’s actions and those who hold power. However, since this study compares the leading liberal papers from the United States and Japan, the liberal bias of these papers relative to others in both countries are at least kept constant across the study.

For the sake of analysis, this research limits its comparison to only print media. The comparisons of electric media is, however, very significant, and I would like to conduct analysis of television programs, including their visual aspects in future research.

Articles were collected from two databases, *the Asahi Shimbun database (Kikuzo)*, and the *Lexis-Nexis (the New York Times)*. Although *the Asahi* has five different regional editions, this study uses the Tokyo edition, which is circulated in the metropolitan Tokyo area. Also *the Asahi* has morning and evening daily editions except on Sundays and holidays, and both versions are examined. Thus, as is clear in the later section notes, *the Asahi’s* total number of articles about Iraq exceeds that of *the New York Times*. 
Section 2 Methodologies (1): Content Analysis Strategies for This Work

Two methodologies are adopted by this research. One is content analysis of newspapers, the other is interviews. First, this section fully reviews both quantitative and qualitative content analysis methodology. Qualitative and quantitative analyses mutually complement each other. Second, specific content analysis strategies used in this work are explained. Third, the coding strategies that were used for the content analysis are documented. Finally, this section discusses the interviewing strategies that were used for this research.

Subsection 1 Content Analysis

Content analysis is a research methodology that utilizes a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text (Weber 1985). Content analysis methodology has been frequently used in studies of political communication to determine generalizations of the content of recorded instances of communication, such as newspaper articles, speech texts, and academic textbooks. The chief strength of content analysis---both quantitative and qualitative---is that it enables us to study messages that occur in the media. Both methods were employed for this study.

Quantitative content analysis can provide a systematic method for understanding the particular traits of media messages or news content. Quantitative content analysis counts frequencies of particular words to identify basic trends in both written and electronic texts. This is a powerful tool to clearly
reveal trends and tendencies in the content of articles because they can be clearly displayed in numbers.

There are numerous quantitative content analysis methodologies that have been demonstrated by various scholars. A central approach to content analysis classifies the many words of a text into fewer content categories. Some scholars (Riffe, Lacy Fico 1998, Krippendorff 1980, Weber 1985) believe that content analysis must follow several standard procedures of quantitative methodologies. First, content analysis research must follow a systematic analytical procedure. It requires identification of key terms involved in a phenomenon, specification of possible relationships among concepts, and generation of verifiable/falsifiable hypotheses. Second, content analysis is supposed to be a working replicable examination of symbols of communication. Ideally, different coders even when working under different circumstances will yield the same content analysis results. Also, content analysis must be objective in order to maintain the reliability of research. Third, results of content analysis are accepted as valid inferences from text.

However, quantitative content analysis cannot examine the tone and intensity of particular types of descriptions or the images of photographs or cartoons. This is, obviously, because such content cannot be counted. Thus, quantitative content analysis sometimes misses the impressions of texts. In order to avoid this problem, this work uses qualitative analysis as well.

Qualitative content analysis literally investigates the texts of the media without quantifying them. Instead, qualitative content analysis explores the tone
and impressions of texts. Content analysis permits a scholar to scrutinize the nuances of a particular article or of even a particular sentence. Furthermore, qualitative content analysis permits one to investigate the underlying content in the text or to define the “purpose” of the text the author intentionally (or sometimes unintentionally) wants to deliver to the readers (Hofstetter 1981). In this way, qualitative content analysis can be used to comprehensively inspect the hidden intentions of the writers of the texts.

The object of qualitative content analysis can be any of a wide range of recorded texts. It is common with qualitative content analysis to examine themes, main ideas, and major storylines of a text.

One of the strengths of qualitative content analysis is that “media frames” can be identified. A particular media frame consists of accounts of the construction of news stories and interactions with various antagonists in reporting particular types of news events. One of the most famous “media frames” is the horse race perspective of U.S. presidential campaigns. Thomas Patterson argues that the dominant theme for the reporters who cover the presidential campaigns is “a strategic game,” in which a journalist tends to interpret new information within a schematic framework according to which candidates gain advantage from the information (Patterson, 1993).

This dissertation first extensively explores the key concepts and main topics (major storylines) related to the Iraq War and its aftermath as they appeared in the Asahi and in the New York Times. Along with analyzing the two papers’ storylines, their media frames are investigated. Comparing the two newspapers’
storylines and media frames will show such differences in perspectives that at times one might be led to believe that “two separate wars” were being reported on.

“Media frames” are the narrative structures the news media provide (Johnson-Cartee, 2005). The media presents “frames” by providing readers with a fairly common view of the major actors, events and themes. Understanding each particular media frame provides a clue to figure out ways of constructing news stories.

Since the media delivers reports in order to fit those frames and portray events with certain viewpoints, reports tend to have certain storyline(s). These storylines are sometimes hidden and difficult to observe in ordinary news stories. They are, however, likely to become very clear in big news events. This is because the news media does not want its audience/readers to be inundated with numerous, but unconnected new findings. Big news events continuously generate an abundant number of articles or television newsfeeds, and the media unintentionally or intentionally present the news with familiar storylines. Also, for the purpose of satisfying its audience/readers, the media often features human interest stories in big news events. These stories are likely to be about common episodes that most audiences have often heard about. Since the war in Iraq is, without a doubt, a big news event, there is ample data for media frames and media storylines in reporting. This research categories the major thrust of stories along several issues, such as “causes of the war in Iraq,” “freedom in Iraq,” “civilian
casualties,” and “Japanese SDF commitment,” and so on. Each article was coded based on criteria which will be explained later in this chapter.

Another important part of the content analysis is the identification of the sources of news, which presents clues to understanding the flow of information. In war reporting, flows of information are crucial to revealing “propaganda” of the government. The identification of sources determines who is in charge of disseminating information, and also who wants to propagate their own perspectives of the war. Also, it may highlight the power relationship among political actors and reveal who the agenda-setters of policies are. A critical question at the heart of news coverage is, indeed, whose perspectives will be heard. It is also important to consider the absence of certain facts in reporting and whether or not coverage favors certain interests (such as particular sources).

Subsection 2  Three Content Analysis Strategies

In conducting content analysis, I attempt to pay attention to the “real” meaning of each word, phrase, and sentence. As discussed in chapter 2, cross-cultural comparison faces the very fundamental and difficult question about the role of culture in language. A scholar who attempts to compare different culture needs to have sensitivity to the language. Even if I find a similar concept or word in both the Asahi and the New York Times, there is always the possibility that the word has quite a different cultural context and their meanings may be not the same. In order to remove the stereotypes derived from our own culture, Winch
(1964) suggests that “the conception of ‘reality’ must be applicable outside the context of scientific reasoning” (311). It is imperative to be sensitive in understanding the usage of words in conducting content analysis.

Specifically, this dissertation used three strategies in content analysis. First, several key concepts were qualitatively chosen from each article. The number of key concepts depended on the article. Some had only one concept, others had more than five. On average, about three to five concepts were extracted from an article. Each key concept was recorded as a phrase which explicitly describes an idea in the article, such as 1.) neo-conservative commentators’ criticisms on the UN’s nuclear inspection in Iraq or 2.) the Iraq war’s growing impact on Iraqi citizens, especially their lifelines. These key concepts were further analyzed in both quantitative and qualitative ways. In the quantitative analysis, major key concepts were tabulated so that their frequencies could be observed. The counts are presented chronologically for the purpose of comparison.

Second, qualitatively examining the key concepts obtained by the first part, the main topic or storyline of the article was determined. The main topic or storyline is literally the most important ingredient of the newspaper articles. They are the core of the journalist’s views about “what is news.” They also provide crucial indications for comprehending basic trends in comparing newspapers. In qualitative investigations, the key concepts become crucial earmarks in probing the whole storylines of an article. In most cases, the main idea corresponds with the title of the article. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this content analysis, the
main idea was recorded with a full sentence as opposed to the title, which sometimes consists of only a phrase.

Third, the author specifically investigated the portrayals of five issues and examined whether an article was negative toward actors and their actions. The actions considered were: (1) U.S. policies of Iraq (including President George W. Bush’s views of Iraq); (2) Japanese government support for U.S. policies toward Iraq (including Prime Minister Koizumi’s views on Iraq); (3) the United Nation’s role related to Iraq; (4) Saddam Hussein; (5) French policies on Iraq. This part of the analysis required both qualitative and quantitative analysis partly in order to both catch a tone (e.g. the negative portrayals of particular issues) and the frequency of a particular tone. If an article’s general tone about U.S. actions in Iraq was critical, the article was recognized as N (negative). If the tone of an article was neutral or supportive on the actions, the article was regarded respectively, as M (middle-ground) or S (Supportive). Unless an article was very short or focused on a particular actor, the article usually contained more than one actor. If an article contained more than one actor, all actors in the article became objects of analysis.

The number of articles is not an accurate indicator of an article’s slant in and of itself. This is because there are huge discrepancies in the numbers of articles during the 26 month period of analysis. The numbers of articles peaked when the war in Iraq was started, the number became much smaller during the period of rebuilding Iraq. Thus, the negativity of each issue is tabulated in ratio to the total number of negative articles out of all stories in the subject area being
explored (e.g. stories about the U.S. and Japanese policies on Iraq). Also, for the purpose of comparison, the negativity is tabulated monthly.

Subsection 3 Coding

The coding of articles is an important factor in content analysis. In order to systematically analyze the stories in the two newspapers, a code system was developed in this study. Coding must be reflected in an accurate analysis of the newspaper contents. I first attempted to read as many articles in both the Asahi and the New York Times as possible and filter out a common theme, key dimensions, and key words from them.

However, I had to modify coding strategies occasionally when a significant news event was additionally found. Each time latent concepts came to be visible in a later period of analysis, I had to return to the initial section and check the coding of each article again. Thus, coding of these large data sets was time-consuming.

In a separate sheet of note paper, the main topic and key concepts of each article were recorded. Also, other noticeable descriptions, including the tone of the language and sources of the news were noted. Key words and concepts were examined for the seven periods covered by this analysis. Several key concepts are consistently found throughout the analysis. Some, however, appear in only a certain period. Obviously, this is because some events are frequently discussed in the media during particular periods.
In addition to myself, I asked different coders to analyze the text. This is because the data is supposed to be replicable. I asked two coders for help. One is Professor Yoshimi Nakamura, who is a colleague of mine at Keiwa College, Japan, and is in charge of both Japanese (the Asahi) and English (the New York Times) articles. He received an MA degree from Georgetown University and taught Japanese several years at Howard University in Washington, D.C. Another coder is Hyunsook Kim, who was in charge of coding the New York Times articles. Ms. Kim is a good academic friend of mine while we were students at Georgetown University, and later became my wife.

The coding used for key terms and concepts in this study are as follows:

(1) actors and sources

Sources for articles influence news content. Journalists are often reliant on sources, especially “authoritative sources.” Their superiors and peers provide feedback; thus, news organizations counterbalance pressure from sources by reinforcing journalists’ notions of quality. Even so, the power of sources in deciding news stories is large. As Leon Sigal has written “sources make the news” as sources have a strong influence on the decisions journalists make in choosing topics (Sigal 1986). In other words, sources are very influential agenda-setters for the media.

The choice of sources also is influenced by the particular tendencies of the media organization. This is because selecting a specific source may favor
certain interests. Also, the absence of a source may reflect the ideology of an organization.

I coded and categorized news actors and sources by role and looked at patterns of who was in the news, who was speaking, and whose perspectives were being heard in debates. Examples of the actors and sources include U.S. officials, military officials, citizens, anti-war movements, reactions from the international community, UN officials, the Japanese government, Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and so on.

(2) causes of the war

There are several well-publicized explanations for the war in Iraq. These explanations fall into two broad categories, those with supportive and critical views of the war. First, one of the most published explanations is that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and the weapons inspections by the United Nations had failed. Another explanation is that Iraq had ties to Al Qaeda. This view suggests that since Iraq had strong connection with Al Qaeda terrorism, the terrorist network had to be destroyed. The third explanation is the dictatorship in Iraq. According to this explanation, Saddam Hussein needed to be removed to liberate and democratize Iraq. Fourth is the American expansionism. From this view, the U.S. wanted to control Iraqi oil and thus, the war promoted its expansionism and imperialism.

This study tracks these various reasons for the war in the two newspapers. All of these explanations for the war were visible both in the New
York Times and in the Asahi. At the same time, this study attempts to find differences between the two, especially because some of the reasons may be more clearly stated in either one of the papers than the other to create a sense of justification for the invasion.

(3) UN visibility

I coded each story for UN visibility, whether the UN appeared in an article, who was talking about the UN and how the UN was described. One of the most frequently published analyses of the Iraq War is that the Bush administration effectively marginalized the role of the United Nations. Many critics suggested that multilateral political solutions to the Iraq crisis were not possible because of a series of public relations “propaganda” efforts by the administration. The administration had a “carefully planned, tightly controlled and brilliantly executed media war” (Schechter, 2003, 15). This study investigates how the Japanese and U.S. media presented the UN and its role in this crisis, and how they approached the possibilities of international diplomacy.

(4) civilian casualties and anti-war protest movements

I coded each story for Iraqi civilian casualties and anti-war protest movements, whether they appeared in an article, and how they were described. Compared to the casualties in the coalition forces, Iraq civilian casualties have been scarcely reported on, especially in the New York Times. By contrast, the
Asahi featured both civilian casualties and anti-war protest movement very frequently.

(5) Others

This study also tracked other specific topics of news stories related to the war and its consequences. This is because I wanted to find out if there were important differences in the issues that the different national media see as important. These include the role of religion, culture and history of Iraq, ethnicity in Iraq, international views on the war, “embedded” journalists, the similarity between the occupation of Iraq and Japan by the United States after World War II, and so on.

Also, technical and strategic language in the military operations are covered. It came to my attention that several insider terminology and language was presented by the U.S. media. One typical example for this is the use of the term "collateral damage" to describe civilian deaths. Such usage of military jargon and inventions of new military words may be an effort to sanitize the battle and the meaning of the war.

Criticism toward the Bush administration’s handling of the war was tracked. The media, especially the Asahi, has been strongly critical of the diplomatic hastiness and warmonger nature of the Bush administration. Compared with the Asahi, the New York Times’ attitude toward the Administration was not as cynical, at least until the end of the period of official combat. The New York Times, however, turned out to be very harsh on the administration after WMD
were not actually found. In addition, critics often blamed media for their cheerleading role during the war in Iraq. Also, both the American and Japanese media have been critical of their own roles. This criticism by the media of their own war reporting is also analyzed.

Subsection 4  Time spans

The content analysis is not limited to the period of actual battle (from March 20 to May 1, 2003), but rather covers October 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004. Specifically, the comparison over these two years is divided into the following seven periods: (1) from the U.S. Congressional approval of the Iraqi attack (October, 2002) to the beginning of the Iraq War (March 20, 2003); (2) from the beginning of the Iraq War to the presidential announcement of the ending of the “major combat” (May 1, 2003); (3) from the end of “major combat” to the passage of the Iraqi Special Law in Japan (July 26, 2003); (4) from the passage of the Iraqi Special Law in Japan to the first arrival of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in Samawa, Iraq (Feb. 4, 2004); (5) from the first arrival of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in Samawa, Iraq to the release of the three captured Japanese civilians in Iraq (April 20, 2004); (6) from the release of the three captured Japanese civilians in Iraq to the murder of the first captured Japanese civilian (October 30, 2004); (7) the murder of the first captured Japanese civilian to the extension of sending Japanese SDF to Iraq (December 31, 2004).

It is not an easy task to divide one political and historical event into several periods. First, the divisions are not always clear and sometimes appear to
be arbitrary. Also, especially if the event is an international one, divisions are dependent on the views and positions the analysis explores.

These seven divisions are created from the view of the Japanese side. Although the first two periods and their divisions are clear for both the U.S. and Japan, the latter five periods are made based on the Japanese view of the Iraq War and its aftermath. Until the end of “major combat” in Iraq, to most Japanese the Iraq War was a battle taking place in a distant part of the world. Indeed, except for the oil industry in Japan, no Japanese seems to have been a serious stakeholder. This situation changed after the end of “major combat”. In order to reconstruct Iraq, the Japanese government has had to contribute funds and personnel.

Especially, sending Japanese Self-Defense Forces to rebuild Iraq became a wedge issue in Japanese politics. This is because of the pacifist constitution that effectively bans the use of military force except in self defense and natural disasters. It was no wonder that when the bill passed to send Japanese troops to Iraq to help U.S.-led reconstruction efforts, the opposition movement, both by the lawmakers and citizens reached its peak.

Also, during periods five to seven, several Japanese civilians were killed in Iraq. These murdered civilians included journalists, volunteer helpers, and security guards at a private company. These killings brought the Iraq War much closer to ordinary Japanese citizens and drastically altered their views of the battle.

Both newspapers produced numerous stories about the war in Iraq during this period. There were a total of 16,084 Asahi and 15,245 New York Times
articles that contained the word “Iraq” in this period. *The Asahi’s* total number of articles about Iraq exceeds that of the *New York Times* because *The Asahi* has both morning and evening editions.

These articles include stories where Iraq issues are not the primary focus of the article, such as stock market forecasts or sports page news. Stories were selected for analysis based upon the criteria that the news focused on Iraq. Overall, 4624 *Asahi* and 4320 *New York Times* articles were selected from both newspapers.

*Section 3 Methodologies (2): Interviews*

Although most are not incorporated in the main body of this work, interviews of officials and journalists were a crucial part of the formulating of research questions and hypotheses. Also, the interviews provide background information of the relationship between the media and politics in Japan. These are quoted as explanatory analysis of this work, especially, in chapters four and five.

I interviewed with officials of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, staff writers of *The Asahi*, the *Yomiuri* and the *Tokyo Shimbum*. The questions during the interviews ranged from the analysis of the reasons for the differences/similarities of media content to the policy stance of the U.S. and Japanese governments, the press-government relationship, the mass media organizations, journalists' political orientations, notions of objectivity; and to the news bias during the war in Iraq. Nineteen individuals were interviewed, mostly persons whom I came to know when I was working for the *Chunichi (Tokyo)*
Shimbun as a staff writer. Some were introduced by other interviewees. Interviews were conducted from April 2002 to the end of 2004. Also, I conducted interviews with two U.S. journalists stationed in Japan. The interviews of the U.S. journalists were conducted in English. Other interviews were conducted in Japanese.

Since I wanted to draw out their honest opinions and develop trust with my interviewees, before each interview, I told the interviewees that their names would not be publicized in this work, and only their genders might appear when quotations are needed. I followed the method of anonymity utilized in Richard Fenno’s seminal work “Homestyle” (Fenno, 1978). I hope that anonymity lends effectiveness to my interviews. Indeed, the interviewees sometimes gave very frank opinions, especially about their jobs or colleagues. Most of the interviews were used for the foundation of this work. For example, several interviews provided me an opportunity to notice the importance of articles by Richard Armitage in agenda-setting in Japanese policy. Although only parts of the interviews are utilized in this dissertation, the interviews added important perspectives for this project.

Section 4 Research Questions and Hypotheses

The following are the two main research questions asked in this dissertation:
Research Question 1: Have the U.S. and Japanese news media portrayed similar / different “realities” of the war in Iraq?

Research Question 2: What are the possible causes of the similarities and differences between the two countries’ media’s reporting on the war? What are the relationships between the media and politics, both in the United States and Japan? Are the relationships between the media and politics reasons for any differences or similarities in reporting? How does the relationship between the media and politics affect media content? Does a cultural aspect affect media content of the two liberal print media? How about the impact of public opinion?

Research Question 3: What are the ramifications of the differences and similarities in media content? Especially how much is public opinion in both the U.S. and Japan influenced by media content?

The following chapters reveal that the two media presented quite different accounts of the Iraq War. Three hypotheses are offered to explain the differences:

Hypothesis 1: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies about Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by the different war-time experiences of the two countries’ media during earlier wars.
Hypothesis 2: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies in Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by differences in the notion of “evilness” in their societies.

Hypothesis 3: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies toward Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by differences in the degree of support for the war by their publics.

In addition to these hypotheses, chapter ten tests several hypotheses to specifically clarify the relationship between media content and public opinion. The details of the hypotheses will be explained in that chapter.

Section 5 Goals and Contributions of this Research Project

The goals of this study are two-fold. First, is to compare the U.S. and Japanese media coverage of the Iraqi War over a two year period. Second, this study not only compares and analyzes the two countries’ media, but also it analyzes interactions among policy-makers and the public in setting the media agenda. Especially, the role of gaiatsu will be analyzed in the Japanese foreign policy and the media’s agenda.

One of the most significant contributions of this project is its comparative media analysis between the United States and Japan. As discussed in the next chapters, the media’s role in shaping public opinion and the political
agenda is a rising field of study for political communication scholars. Nevertheless, most political communication studies are conducted in only one region or on one country, and there is not enough study of the media’s agenda role setting across cultures and beyond national boundaries. This seems to be because comparative political communications is a relatively new field.

Since this work is a comparative analysis over the two countries’ media systems that produce media content, there is, I believe, a certain contribution for the development of political communication studies. According to Blumler and Gurevitch, international comparative media research is an essential antidote to naive universalism since mass communication research was pioneered by American scholars and American models of communication and society have dominated the field for many years (Blumler and Gurevitch 1990). This is, of course, not to argue that these models were "incorrect" or misleading, but that they reflected American society and its communication processes. I am sure that my study will contribute to the literature of political communication studies and expand the horizons of the field.

Section 6 Possible limitations of the Research

This research itself may not be perfectly free from bias. Since the author is not a U.S. citizen, his perspectives may not have been completely neutral toward the U.S. government’s positions. No matter how objective I attempted to be in reading a text, it is possible that I might have unconsciously rejected the
New York Times’s standpoint and accepted the Asahi’s view. The coders were also not U.S. citizens. Although they are competent in English, one is Japanese, and the other is a South Korean national. These facts might raise some issues of objectivity. However, the main focus of this study is a comparison of the content between the U.S. and Japanese leading print media over Iraq issues, and not a political critique. Thus, I believe, the above-mentioned possible biases, even if they existed, are not significant.

Also, this research limited its comparison to the print media. Of course, the electronic media is also very important. In fact, television has penetrated more deeply into our daily lives than have newspapers. Also, the widespread internet use, especially the impact of blogs, has altered the traditional political communication system. Yet, due to limitations of time and finances, it was necessary to put boundaries on what I studied. As discussed above, I would like to conduct other analyses in the future that can address questions left unanswered by this dissertation.
Chapter 4: Content Analyses (1): General Findings

This chapter presents the general findings of the content analysis of the war in Iraq as covered by the Asahi and the New York Times. Especially, this chapter reviews the results of five different category analyses, each of which shows the basic differences in the portrayals of the Iraq War. The five categories are: the main topics of the articles (“media agenda”), key concepts, actors in the Iraq War, positive-negative portrayals of each actor, sources and quotations of the news.

Although this chapter puts more emphasis on the quantitative side, the chapter presents findings from both the quantitative and qualitative analyses. First, the coder (mainly myself) extensively scrutinized and categorized the object of analysis (qualitative analyses). Then, the frequencies of the objects were tallied.

The results of the content analysis reveals that articles of the New York Times and the Asahi had quite different portrayals of U.S. policies toward Iraq: While the Asahi was always strongly negative, the New York Times was supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, the New York Times also became gradually critical of the U.S. government. Nevertheless, the degree of the two newspapers’ negativity was not exactly the same. The two papers are quite different in the degree of their negativity, and the topics they focused on in the coverage of the war differed remarkably.
Section 1 Main Topics (Major Storylines) and Key Concept

Analyzing main topics is the first step in understanding the differences or similarities of the two papers’ news about the Iraq War. *The Asahi* and *the New York Times* sometimes show quite distinctive differences in their choice of main topics. The main topics of the Iraq War also varied in the periods of analysis.

Main topics are the most important ingredients of newspaper articles. They are the core of journalists’ views on “what is news.” They also provide crucial indications in comprehending basic trends in comparing newspapers. Analyzing main topics is the first step to understanding the differences or similarities in media coverage. Thus, this work started with an investigation of the main topics covered by news articles.

In this study, I refer to main topics as the “media agenda.” There are two reasons for this. First, I want to identify agenda-setting mechanisms in the articles. In the next section of this chapter, the actors involved in the war and news sources are analyzed. Their frequencies may explain their agenda-setting role in newspaper articles.

Second, news articles are not only created based on information itself, but also by a number of factors specific to a media’s organization. For this reason I feel that media agenda may be a more suitable word to use when referring to the main topic of an article. Journalists face questions of what is and is not news (let alone what is and is not the truth), but Gaye Tuchman suggests that journalist
always follows established rules and routines in deciding the value of information. Rather than recognize news by preexisting characteristics of events, journalists define what is news by the processes they used to come up with their stories. Thus, Tuchman suggests that journalists must “routinize the unexpected” to decide newsworthiness (Tuchman, 1973, 1978).

During the run-up period of the war (from October 1 2002 to March 19, 2003), two topics were dominant in both papers: the role of the United Nations and U.S. decisions on Iraq. However, the two papers have stark differences in the ratio of attention paid to the two topics. While *the Asahi* puts more focus on the role of the United Nations (49 percent of all stories on the Iraq War), *the New York Times* spends 65 percent of its stories on the U.S. decisions about Iraq. The two papers’ key concepts are even more distinctive. *The New York Times*’ main concern is how well the Bush administration prepared for the war. Other *New York Times*’ key topics are that the United Nations is a dysfunctional organization that Saddam Hussein can manipulate to pursue his scheme to build Weapons of Mass Destruction. One of the concepts that most frequently appeared in *the Asahi*, on the other hand, is the hasty American preparation for the war. Based on my analysis, *the Asahi* is often very critical about the half-baked rationality for the war and the self-righteous attitude of the United States. Therefore, another key concept of *the Asahi* is that the United Nations must play a key role to stop the actions of the United States.

The difference of the two papers is manifested ever more clearly during the period of actual battle (from March 21 to May 1, 2003). While the two topics
to appear most frequently are the same (the development of the war and U.S. strategies), *the Asahi* has more diverse topics than *the New York Times*. *The Asahi*’s topics include reactions from the international community, including Europe and Asia, and Iraqi civilian casualties and anti-war protests. Key concepts of the two papers are also more different. *The New York Times* focuses on the view from the United States. For example, repeated key concepts of *the New York Times* include in-detail stories about the strategies of the Bush administration, the lives of the troops in Iraq and the opinion of U.S. citizens. The families and local towns of those who were sent to Iraq and were participating in the war are often featured in the paper. The key concepts of *the Asahi* are more varied.

After the end of the actual battle of the war in Iraq (May 1, 2003), *the Asahi* and *the New York Times* feature a greater number of different topics and key concepts. *The Asahi* articles contain numerous stories about the Japanese involvement in Iraq. The vast number of topics and key concepts are about developments concerning Japanese engagements in Iraq, such as the Japanese contribution to the rebuilding of Iraq and captured Japanese civilians. The top five most discussed topics as well as most recurrent key words from May 1, 2003 to December 31, 2004 are as follows: 1) the Iraqi Special Law in Japan (July 26, 2003); 2) the first arrival of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in Samawa, Iraq (Feb. 4, 2004); 3) the release of the three captured Japanese civilians in Iraq (April 20, 2004); 4) the extension of sending Japanese SDF in Iraq (December 31, 2004); and, 5) the murder of the first captured Japanese civilian (October 30, 2004).
Just as in *the Asahi*, in *the New York Times* the largest share of main topics and key concepts is on U.S. strategies for rebuilding Iraq, including governmental actions and coverage of the daily lives of the military, and captured U.S. civilians. Interestingly, the newspaper pays more attention to the lives of the Iraqi civilians than in the previous periods. Recurring key concepts include civilian casualties of the war, sectarian violence between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, and various topics such as education, female liberation, and rebuilding infrastructures.

Both *the Asahi* and *the New York Times* are very critical of scandals. Two prominent scandals during the post war period are the fabrications of heroic deeds of U.S. Army private Jessica Lynch and the torture of captured Iraqis in the Abu Ghraib jail. Both incidents appear as main topics in both papers around the time the scandals were revealed (spring 2003, fall 2003, respectively). However, *the Asahi* focused on these subjects in their articles for a longer period of time than *the New York Times*.

*Section 2 Major Actors of the War*

I examined the frequencies of appearance of major actors in the newspapers’ coverage of the war in Iraq. There are several key actors: the United Nations, the U.S. government, European governments (France, Germany, and Russia), the Iraqi government, the Japanese government, anti-war activists, and Iraqi civilians.
Since these actors are potential major agenda-setters for each paper, comparing their appearances reveals some basic tendencies in the reporting of the two papers. First, both papers have different patterns in their treatment of U.S. policies toward Iraq. As Figure 1 (Negativity of the U.S. Policies about Iraq) suggests, the basic trends of the negativity of both papers are not exactly the same. *The Asahi* is strongly negative throughout the period of analysis, *the New York Times* is supportive until the end of the actual battle, but in a later stage, *the New York Times* also becomes gradually critical of their government.

![Figure 1: Negativity of the U.S. Policies about Iraq](image)

Upper line: Percentage of negative articles about U.S. polices out of all stories on Iraq in *the Asahi*; Lower line: Percentage of negative articles about U.S. polices out of all stories on Iraq in *the New York Times*.

The negativity of each issue was tabulated in ratio to the total number of negative articles out of all stories in the subject area being explored.
The two papers are different in the peak periods of negativity and in their degree of negativity. During the run-up period of the war, for example, *the Asahi* is much more negative than *the New York Times*. While the degree of negativity among articles in *the Asahi* rises sharply toward the end of the actual battle (May 2003), the percentage of negative article do not increase much in *the New York Times* during the same period. Both papers, however, become more negative after the end of the actual battle. *The Asahi* continues to be more negative than *the New York Times* until the fall of 2003. The point of departure is the end of 2003. The New York Times, however, became very harsh toward the Administration when Weapons of Mass Destruction were not actually found. In some months, *the New York Times* was even more negative than *the Asahi*, and the negativity gap between the two papers grew smaller towards the end of year 2004.

Other actors are not fully covered by both papers or are featured only for a limited period. During the run-up period of the war, both the United Nations and France often appeared in both papers. While the portrayals of these two actors are very positive in *the Asahi*, *the New York Times* contains more negative than positive stories. Neither the United Nations nor France is consistently reported on by the two media organizations. I assume that France’s different treatment by the two papers derives from that fact that the country was publicly opposed to the U.S. invasion into Iraq. Studies in later chapters find that *the Asahi* portrayed the United Nations as the last possibility to halt the war; thus, the paper’s coverage of the UN may be very supportive.
Saddam Hussein is quite frequently reported on by both papers, although the number of articles decreases as time progresses. While his portrayals were constantly negative in *The New York Times*, *The Asahi* was much less negative. Interestingly, the negativity against Hussein in *The Asahi* was greatly alleviated by the U.S. invasion into Iraq and the capture of Hussein (December 13, 2003). For example *The Asahi*'s negativity against Hussein was found in almost 55% of all articles on Iraq in October 2002. However, the number dropped significantly to 11% at the time of the U.S. invasion into Iraq (March 20, 2003).

*The Asahi*'s portrayal of the Japanese governments’ Iraq policies has been continuously negative. Apparently, a part of the reason for this is that Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his cabinet members were very supportive of the U.S. actions. Since *The Asahi* is critical against the U.S. policies toward Iraq, the paper was also very vocal in its criticism of the Prime Minister’s decisions about Iraq. The paper was especially unhelpful to the government soon after Prime Minister Koizumi announced his support for the U.S. action to start the war (March 20, 2003) and his Cabinet’s decision to send the Self-Defense Forces to Iraq (June 13, 2003). *The New York Times* did not contain many articles about the Japanese governments’ Iraq policies, but when it did most of the reports were not negative.

It may be logical to surmise that differences in public opinion between the United States and Japan may be one of the significant causes for the different portrayals of the war. This may be because media organization is supposed to mirror the opinions of a certain strata of a society. Since both *The Asahi* and the
New York Times are among the largest newspapers in their countries, the articles in both papers reflect the public in Japan and the United States, respectively.

Section 3 Conclusion

This chapter has summarized the basic trends of the Asahi and of the New York Times about their articles of the war in Iraq. The analysis of this study finds that the Asahi has been strongly critical of the diplomatic hastiness and warmongering nature of the Bush administration. Compared with the Asahi, the New York Times’ attitude toward the Administration was not as cynical, at least until the end of official combat. The New York Times, however, turned into a very harsh critic of the Administration after its failure to find Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Chapter 5: Content Analyses (2): Prelude to the Iraq War （from October 1, 2002 to March 20, 2003）

This chapter compares between the U.S. and Japanese media coverage of the Iraqi Crisis and its aftermath and investigates how the U.S. and Japanese media differ in their reporting on the war in Iraq.

Section 1 Research Design

The period analyzed is from the U.S. Congressional approval of the Iraqi attack (October 1, 2002) to one day before the beginning of the Iraq War (March 19, 2003). The six-month period before the war in Iraq was crucially important not only for determining the course of the conflict, but for also providing the basic ground of several international schisms, such as the break between the U.S.-UK alliance and some continental European countries. During this period, the New York Times had more than 4000 articles that contained the word “Iraq,” and the Asahi had more than 3000 with the word “Iraku” (Iraq in Japanese). Those articles included unrelated stories such as ones appearing on sports or entertainment pages. This study analyzed articles that featured Iraq war issues. In total 1242 New York Times and 990 Asahi articles were selected for analysis that actually featured the war in Iraq.
During the run-up period to the war, the United States related to international affairs from a crisis mode. The United States continued to fight the “war against terror,” a consequence of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Although the alleged links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime were not proven, the war in Iraq was prepared based on the perceptions that Iraq was on the side of the terrorists.

There are several important developments during the run-up period. First, the U.S. Congress authorized an attack on Iraq on October 11, 2002. Second, the UN Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1441, which imposed tougher new arms inspections on Iraq on Nov. 8. After 2003 began, war became more and more inescapable. On January 28, President Bush announced in his State of the Union Address that he was ready to attack Iraq even without a UN mandate. Although only Spain and Bulgaria supported the idea, the United States and Britain seriously lobbied to garner support for a strike on Iraq among UN Security Council members. Finally, at 5:30 a.m. Baghdad time on March 20 (9:30 p.m. U.S. Eastern Standard Time, March 19), the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom. The war in Iraq began.

This work does not include events prior to this period. Critics suggest, however, that the Bush administration had been steadily preparing for the war. Bush stated in his State of the Union Address that Iraq was part of an “axis of evil” (January 29, 2002). Also, Bush publicly introduced the new defense doctrine of preemption in a speech at West Point (June 2, 2002). Based on this preemption doctrine, Bush asked the UN to swiftly enforce its own resolutions against Iraq on
September 12, 2002. Bush also stressed that if the UN did not follow his suggestion, the United States would have to act on its own.

Section 2 Major Results of the Content Analysis

There are significant differences in media reporting in the United States and Japan in the five months prior to the war in Iraq. During this period, the two countries’ media show sharp distinctions in many ways, especially in the degree of support for U.S. governmental decisions and how much power the United Nations has. Also, the two newspapers have different accounts as to whether the U.S. invasion of Iraq is imminent or not. One of the major storylines of the New York Times is that a second Gulf War was near at hand because Saddam Hussein was not cooperating with United Nations’ nuclear inspections. By contrast, in the Asahi the dominant storyline is that the United States must not rush to start any military action, although Saddam Hussein was not cooperative and a terrible despot. Also, a striking difference is found between the two media in their description of certain incidents would occur in the war, such as civilian casualties. As a result, the two countries’ leading media have portrayed different “realities” of the war in Iraq, as if two different wars were developing at the same time. In the following subsections, five major storylines of the two papers are explained in detail.
The two media organizations emphasize different storylines. *The New York Times* features articles on “U.S. policies toward Iraq.” For *the Asahi* “international relations” is the most common storyline during this period. While 65% of the articles of *the New York Times* contain some reference of the American policies toward Iraq, only 32% of *the Asahi* articles refer to the U.S. actions. Instead, 49% of *the Asahi* articles refer to UN diplomacy or the relationship between the UN and other countries, such as France, Germany and Japan.

During this period, *the New York Times* uses large portions of the Iraqi stories to discuss the next possible actions by the Bush administration. Compared with *the Asahi*, it is very noticeable that the articles of *the New York Times* attempted to deliver to their readers a very concrete analysis of the administration’s actions. This may, however, raise the question of objectivity during the war. As mentioned before, objectivity is one of the most difficult tasks in war reporting. To a staff writer at *the New York Times*, these stories were written based on “correct” information from their news source. However, the problem is that the more they had to follow “accurately” their particular news sources that happened to coincide with the government’s perspectives, the closer their stories came to being government propaganda. As a consequence, often *the New York Times* writer whether consciously or not played the role of a cheerleader to the administration even if the writer wanted to be as objective as possible. In this way, many stories of *the New York Times* were framed from the
perspective of the Bush administration. Accordingly, the stories of the *New York Times* present a relatively favorable view of the pre-emptive attack on Iraq.

In contrast to the *New York Times*, the *Asahi* was consistently critical of the Bush administration’s policy over Iraq. Yoichi Funabashi, one of the most famous editors in the newspaper reiterates during this period his disagreement with U.S. policies. Writing in an article named “An Open Letter to the Bush administration” (October 8, 2002), he presents his argument against the Administration. Funabashi says, “[I]f the United States overreacts militarily, there is also the fear that it could lead to more war.” Thus, he believes that the United States should not rush and act on the Iraq crisis in light of long-term national interests.

Also, it is clearly noticeable that the *Asahi* reports much less information about the American side. While the *Asahi* frequently quotes comments of the officials of the Bush administration, the paper does not share large portions of the U.S. government’s views on Iraq issues. Significantly, regarding the Bush administration’s contemplations about going to war, the *Asahi* did not report the possible plans of attack or the degrees of preparation for an attack.

The *Asahi*’s anti-Bush “media frame” became obvious in November 2002 when German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder announced his decision not to join the coalition forces as a way to oppose the Bush administration’s policies over Iraq. Both the *New York Times* and the *Asahi* featured Schroeder’s decision in several articles. The *New York Times*’ articles focus on the loss of the help of Germany, a former ally in the First Gulf War. The *Asahi*’s tone, in contrast, is
somewhat laudatory. *The Asahi* indicates that the decision by the Schroeder Administration appears to be rational while it seems to find that U.S. polices have become too bellicose.

It is important to suggest that *the Asahi*’s frame of news does not reflect the Koizumi administration’s official positions at all. The Koizumi administration supported U.S. policies toward Iraq. During the run-up period to the war, Prime Minister Koizumi publicly expressed support for the U.S. effort to fight against terrorism and criticized Hussein’s unwillingness to cooperate with UN weapons inspections. Koizumi also quickly announced his support for the U.S.-led coalition fighting in Iraq when the war actually started, saying that he expected people in Japan would understand the decision of the Bush administration.

In *the Asahi*, there is a clear anti-U.S. tone in the news stories. There are several possible reasons for this. First, *the Asahi*’s U.S.-based foreign correspondents, mostly stationed in Washington, D.C. and New York, reported the latest actions of the Bush administration’s policies over Iraq. It seems that those correspondents implicitly or explicitly selected the news they felt was appropriate for their Japanese audience. Thus, relatively simple content, such as that obtained from official press conferences, were often selected out of the information they could obtain in the United States.

Second, *the Asahi* included many opinions by commentators and editors. They often criticize U.S. expansionism in their commentaries. These commentaries openly criticize U.S. expansionism and imperialism after the 9-11 attack. They are very critical of U.S. Iraq policy, especially the Bush doctrine, a
new foreign policy strategy including the right to launch pre-emptive war and to pursue unilateral military action, if necessary. These commentaries often deliver relatively simple plots. For example, one commentary suggests that after the 9-11 attacks, the United States turned into a warmongering nation that rushed into a war, not for the elimination of the terrorist networks, but to benefit their own country, by securing oil interests in the Middle East.

There are commonalities among the commentators the Asahi chooses. They appear to share similar points of view about Iraqi to that which the Asahi often presented in its stories and editorials. For example, an interview article with Sadako Ogata, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and one of the most famous scholars of international relations in Japan, presents her remarks, many of which sound familiar to readers of the Asahi. She basically points out that the way the United States prepared for the war in Iraq is problematic because although Hussein has been dictatorial, the link between the War on Terror and the overthrow of the Hussein regime is not firmly established (December 11, 2002).

Third, the Asahi features the U.S. actions’ possible impact on Japanese politics. This includes reactions from Japanese legislatures, officials, and the public and disputes over the possible dispatch of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to Iraq. Since the Asahi has been very negative toward both the Bush doctrine and the overseas dispatch of the SDF, these articles usually accentuate unfavorable opinions about helping the Bush administration.
Subsection 2 Imminence of the War with Saddam

It is essential that the two media differently recognize the feasibility and the imminence of the war with Saddam Hussein. While *the New York Times* reported in this period that the war is imminent, *the Asahi’s* major storyline is that the war is only a possibility. Especially, after the U.S. Congressional resolution to use force against the Iraqi regime, *the New York Times’* storyline indicated that the question is not whether to start the war, but when to start it. In contrast, *the Asahi* often suggested that the most important agenda is to find the weapons of mass destruction, not to rely on further discussions over sanctions towards Iraq.

One conscious media frame that *the New York Times* employs is that “war is imminent and inevitable.” An article (“The Hazardous Path Ahead,” October 11, 2002) suggests that information gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency made clear “how difficult it will be to manage an escalating crisis in Iraq in ways that assure a constructive outcome.” Also, even before the Congressional resolution to attack Iraq was passed, this article reports about the Bush administration’s post-war governance of Iraq. According to the story, Washington must be mindful “to establish a postwar Iraqi government that does away with Saddam Hussein's weapons programs and reflects the desires of Iraq's diverse population.” The story also suggests that the administration has already warned Iraqi military officers that they risk prosecution for war crimes.

Another article appearing in *the New York Times* (“Testing Iraq on Arms Inspectors,” October 1, 2002) suggests that the problem is that Iraq has “never fully complied with the [UN] resolutions, which contain no meaningful deadlines
or enforcement provisions beyond the continuation of increasingly porous economic sanctions.” Several articles of the New York Times’ op-ed page are more clearly framed stating that the “war is imminent and inevitable.” A typical article is written by a conservative columnist, William Safire. He calls for ousting Saddam Hussein in an article (“Saddam’s Last Ploy,” October 7, 2002). According to Safire, without the regime change, the destruction of all potential weapons of mass destruction is impossible. Although not explicit, many New York Times’ articles, including the Safire column, imply that “the evil” is the Iraq regime and that “the good “is the United States. This “good vs. evil” dichotomy is the frame that the Bush administration employed and it was the most basic storyline of the New York Times during the run-up to the war period.

In contrast, the Asahi basically maintains its assertion that there must be a way not to initiate a military conflict, even though the United States believes that the war is inevitable. The Asahi’s standpoint is that it is still possible to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction before resorting to military intervention. The Asahi seems to insist that renunciation of war is the fundamental strategy for achieving world peace and that there are no better alternatives for maintaining international security. Because of this fact, many, if not most articles in the Asahi had very strong anti-war sentiments.

In the last minutes before the war started, the anti-war rhetoric of the Asahi became very emphatic. The editorial dated one day before the war began (“There is No Justification for the War,” March 20, 2003) suggests that there is global opposition to the war, and the international community is very suspicious
about America’s motives. Also, the article argues that the Bush administration is “rushing into war unilaterally” at the cost of the authority of the United Nations. Thus, the paper repeatedly suggests that there is no reasonable justification for the war in Iraq.

Regarding the urgency of the war, another pivotal difference between the two papers is how much the anti-war protests are covered in their papers. The Asahi frequently refers to more anti-war activities around the world than the New York Times does. In an article regarding the “human shield” in Iraq, the Asahi reports Japanese civilian volunteers’ anti-war tactics to deter the coalition forces from attacking Iraq (March 13, 2003). Although the paper quotes a Japanese official’s warning not to enter Iraq for safety reasons, many articles are more sympathetic to the anti-United States activists’ position.

Subsection 3 Roles of the United Nations

Another crucial difference in reporting between the two media during this period is about the role and the strength of the United Nations. The gap regarding the UN stories between the two media is supported by quantitative analysis. In terms of frequency, the United Nations was mentioned in 36% of the articles from the Asahi, but in only 15% of the articles from the New York Times during the run-up period.

Frequent storylines that the New York Times adopts is that “UN inspection is not effective enough to rectify the deeds of Saddam.” The New York Times is generally very skeptical of the inspections. Thus, the limits of UN
inspections in Iraq are reiterated in the New York Times stories. Eventually this leads to the newspaper emphatically pointing out the impossibility of any peaceful solutions. While the paper often refers to the importance of diplomatic solutions to prevent a conflict, the calls for such a deliberative policy are frequently juxtaposed to the fact that Saddam Hussein procrastinated in his reform of his administration for a long time after the First Gulf War. In addition, it is interesting that in the New York Times articles most of the quotations from the Iraq officials are framed as “phony.” Especially, Mohammed Saeed al-Shahaf, the Minister of Information of Iraq, is often the subject of derision by the paper.

What is characterized as even more different is the degree to which the UN is effective. The Asahi’s stories have a tendency to refer to the UN as if the organization can decide “the fate of the world.” According to the Asahi, the UN is a very powerful organization, which seems to be an ultimate, omnipotent police regarding world order. In contrast, the New York Times has more focus on domestic actions toward Iraq. In the New York Times articles, the UN is also portrayed as having a strong impact on international security and the ability to decide on the direction of the inspections and sanctions. The UN, nonetheless, is characterized in the articles as simply a place to negotiate, and as a body whose decision making regarding sanctions is perennially dragging.

In an article, the New York Times admits that the United States cannot defeat Al Qaeda without the help of dozens of other nations, and stresses the deliberation not to give way to the use of force until peaceful paths to Iraqi disarmament become impossible (“The Rush to War” March 3, 2003). However,
the article’s position about the use of powers is based on a very realist worldview. The article says, “[w]e are not under any illusion that Mr. Hussein is disabling his missiles simply because he likes the idea. . . The U.N. must realize that whatever success it has achieved of late in getting Iraq to abide by its directives has come only because of American military might.” Here we find that *the New York Times’* basic perspective regarding the use of military forces is quite different from that of *the Asahi*. While *the New York Times* is relatively realist in its views on Iraq, *the Asahi* seems to believe that denouncing military attacks is a starting point toward resolving the tension among nations.

Moreover, the basic frames of the issue are quite opposite between the two media. One of *the Asahi*’s major storylines is that “the evil doer” may be the United States, and “the do gooder” is the international community, most notably the United Nations. This is in sharp contrast to *the New York Times* which has as one of its basic storylines that “the evil doer” is the Iraq regime and “the gooder” is the United States.

Subsection 4  Civilian Casualties

In the run-up period to the war, it is interesting to compare the two media regarding how they refer to civilian casualties and damages. While 39 articles in *the New York Times* contain some reference to civilian casualties and damages, *the Asahi* has twice as many articles (44) as *the New York Times* (21) regarding
the impact on civilians. Also, the Asahi’s emphasis on civilian suffering is
demonstrated not only by the number of articles but also by their content.

A war’s potential impact on the people in Iraq seems to have been of
little interest to journalists in the New York Times. Only four of the articles focus
on “Iraqi casualties” as their main topic during this period. Nine articles feature
“coalition casualties” as their main topic. A lack of attention on the victims of war
is one aspect of a neglect of another country’s culture and society, as well as a
dehumanization of an enemy. Since the war had not started yet in this period,
many of these references to casualties are assessments of possible numbers of
casualties should a war begin.

Instead of featuring Iraqi casualties, the New York Times features the
Bush administration’s preparation to conduct an “ethical war”. Many of the New
York Times articles explain the Bush administration’s attempts to reduce
“collateral damage,” the terminology the Pentagon uses to refer to civilian
casualties and damages which are “unavoidable accidents” (or “by the military”) in the war. Several articles report new weapons to reduce “collateral damage”
(e.g., “Talking Aim at an Enemy’s Chips” February 20, 2003). Another
interesting article (“Battle Plan: Spare Iraq’s Civilians” February 23, 2003)
explains in great lengths that “damage control” has become a standard part of
mission planning, unlike the war in Vietnam. According to the article, the Bush
administration has designed an air campaign that tries to avoid destroying bridges,
roads and other public works so that the country can be rebuilt quickly, and
peoples’ daily lives will not be completely disrupted. Also, the administration has
instructed its planners to select targets where homes, schools and mosques are least likely to be damaged and even required them to calculate whether bombs that drift off target might hit civilian targets.

In another article in the New York Times (“Ethical War? Do the Good Guys Finish First?” March 8, 2003), the paper also suggests that there are limitations to an “ethical war”. The article points out that the problem is that “collateral damage” control becomes so important for every aspect in military operations that military personnel sometimes cannot effectively attack the enemy. According to the article, since American military policy requires legal advisers to approve combat targets in advance, “clearance delays and denials allowed important Taliban and Qaeda members to escape unscathed” during the War in Afghanistan. Also, the article emphasizes the difficulty of distinguishing between civilians and military personnel in an actual battlezone.

While the New York Times articles present the vague possibility of civilian damages, the Asahi describes more seriously, sometimes emotionally the impact with which the war affects civilians in Iraq. An Asahi article ( “There is No Reasonable Justification for Iraq War” March 20, 2003) suggests "Even if the war ends quickly, as America hopes, it will still have to bring Iraq and its capital to submission with quite a different outcome from the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Many innocent civilians will be killed or harmed in the process. This conflict may well throw the world into unexpected chaos."
Subsection 5 News Sources

Also, in the run-up period to the war, the content of the two media are quite different in light of their news sources. While *the New York Times* often quotes from officials of the Bush administration as well as members of Congress and scholars, *the Asahi* largely depends on a U.S. government spokesperson, such as the press secretary. Also, it is notable that *the Asahi* features one government official more frequently than others. Richard Armitage, the Deputy Secretary of State, who is famous as a Japanese specialist. Although *the New York Times* quotes Armitage as well, the presence of Armitage in *the Asahi* is very conspicuous. Each time Armitage appears in public lectures, *the Asahi* seems never to fail to feature him. *The Asahi* seems to believe that Armitage’s remarks are trustworthy sources for understanding the Bush government’s official views on Iraq and to assess future U.S. policies over Iraq.

Also, the newspapers’ choice of commentators differs sharply. As mentioned above, *the Asahi* mostly features scholars. *The New York Times* commentators are however, more varied from scholars and former military personnel to technology analysts of weaponry.

Section 3 Findings and Analyses

There are four major findings coming out of this component of my research.
Finding 1: The U.S. and Japanese news media framed quite differently the war in Iraq.

Finding 2: The U.S. and Japanese news media show quite different patterns of sympathy and antipathy toward the U.S.-led forces in the Iraq War.

Finding 3: The Japanese media’s approach to the Iraq War is less military-strategy centered and more diplomacy oriented than the U.S. media.

Finding 4: The Japanese news media put more importance on civilian casualties in Iraq than did the U.S. media.

Regarding Finding 1, it is concluded that the U.S. and Japanese news media quite differently framed the war in Iraq. Since mass media reporting is closely associated to its own country’s politics, society, and public opinion, there are significant differences in how the media tended to frame the issues related to the justification for war, the progress of the war, and the outcome of the war.

Also, Japan is not the part of the coalition forces and distanced itself from this conflict, although the Koizumi Government supported U.S. government positions. Thus, the U.S. and Japanese news media show quite different patterns of sympathy and antipathy toward the U.S.-led forces in the Iraq War (Finding 2). The Japanese media’s approach to the Iraq War is more focused on diplomatic relations, especially in the United Nations, and less military-strategy centered than the U.S. media (Findings 3). Finally, the reporting of civilian casualties in Iraq
show significant differences in the U.S. and Japanese media because there is a more sympathetic view of Iraq and Arabs in the Japanese media (Findings 4).

Section 4 Conclusion

This comparative study of prewar reporting suggests that in time of crisis, the New York Times and the Asahi provided different “realities” even though they were reporting the same events. The main finding is that the contents of the two media are quite different both qualitatively and quantitatively, especially on the question of UN weapons inspections.

Also, it is interesting that the two leading liberal media show completely different reactions toward their respective governments. Compared with the Asahi, the New York Times is less critical of the U.S. government’s policies toward Iraq. Critics often suggest that the absence of critical reporting in the American media allowed the Bush administration to dominate the foreign policy agenda (e.g. Schechter, 2003). During the run-up period to the war, the United States continued to fight the “war against terror”. Although the alleged links between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s regime were not proven, there was a consensus in the United States that the link was plausible. Many critics suggested that media reporting in the United States implicitly catered to the predominant consensus that appeared to take the links for granted.

Although the Japanese government officially supported U.S. Iraq policies, the Asahi was very negative toward both the Koizumi and Bush
administrations. *The Asahi* basically maintained its assertion that there must be a way to avoid a military conflict. The frame of *The Asahi* may reflect the liberal ideology of the paper. In general, *The Asahi* keeps its distance from the American media such as *The New York Times*. Arguably, the consistent use of liberal commentators and perspectives from other countries and international organizations helps *The Asahi* maintain more diverse views than those found in *The New York Times*. 
Chapter 6: The Different Notion of “Evilness” in the war in Iraq between the U.S. and Japanese Media: A Content Analysis of Editorials

This chapter compares the editorials between the two major print media organizations during the period of actual combat of the Iraq War (from March 20, 2003 to May 1, 2003). Specifically, this chapter selects three memorable moments during the combat and qualitatively compares them: Marching into Iraq, tearing down Hussein’s statue in Baghdad, and President Bush’s “mission accomplished” address. These moments represent important developments in U.S. Iraq policies and military strategies. Articles about these moments are a good reference point for understanding the differences and similarities between the two papers.

Section 1 Research Design

This section qualitatively compares typical editorials of the Asahi and the New York Times, written in similar periods during the Iraq War. The editorials compared are: (1) immediately after the launch of the war (March 20); (2) ten days after the war was initiated (March 31); (3) The fall of Baghdad (April 9); and (3) President Bush’s “mission accomplished” speech (April 30). Editorials are the most visible outlets of the political position of a newspaper. These editorials express fundamental differences between the two leading newspapers. The
research question asked in this chapter is whether the papers’ characterizations of “evil” differ, even when both papers report on the same or similar news. Are there differences in the way they construct “realities” of evilness related to the Iraq War? After presenting the major finding of the comparison (subsection B), detailed illustrations will be explained using editorials that appeared immediately after the launch of the war (subsection C) and the fall of Baghdad (Subsection D).

Section 2 Major Findings

The two print media portrayed the war in Iraq quite differently. The biggest difference in the results of the content analysis of this work is that the two leading liberal papers constructed “evildoers” differently.

Subsection 1 The Asahi

Contrary to the New York Times, the Asahi depicts America as the bigger “evil,” the country which initiated an unjustified war. The Asahi also indicates that the United Nations is the organization that should halt the “American invasion.” Unlike the New York Times, French actions about the Iraq War are, in the Asahi, portrayed as noble. In the Asahi, America’s evilness is more conspicuous than that of Hussein.

In every editorial, the Asahi firmly suggests that the U.S. action to start the war is wrong and that U.S. attacks on Iraq are immoral acts of invasion. It is noticeable that the Asahi’s responses to the war in Iraq matched Westerners’
views about “evil” in Christian terminology. It seems that the Asahi believes that any actions to start a war are the worst and most sinful action that can be taken by humankind. This is because many innocent lives are lost and the lives of families are destroyed during war. Also, President Bush’s “us vs. them” and “good vs. evil” dualism are targets of the Asahi’s criticism. Several editorials analyzed in this chapter imply that in the eyes of the editors anyone—even those with a decent cause---who starts a battle are “evil.” The Asahi seems to define evil as the U.S. side, which committed a sin for the peace of the world by initiating the war.

Subsection 2  The New York Times

The New York Times portrays Saddam Hussein as the personification of “evil.” In the newspaper, Hussein is described as having supported terrorists’ activities and tormented Iraqi citizens who want to have freedom. Indeed, Hussein is described as America’s archenemy. The paper repeatedly indicates that the United Nations is a powerless organization that cannot stop Hussein’s plot. French opposition is one of the main reasons why the United States was not able to obtain full support from the United Nations. Thus, a series of French actions are also portrayed rather negatively in the New York Times.

While the New York Times treated the war as a hasty invasion without UN mandate, the paper’s editorials sometimes shed light on aspects of “liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein’s despotic regime.” Also, the paper explained the
importance of ousting Hussein for the sake of American national security and peace in the Middle East. Furthermore, *the New York Times* devoted a relatively large portion of its editorials to the daily activities of the coalition forces, consisting mostly of U.S. and UK forces.

Along with their strategies and actions, the soldiers’ daily lives are fully depicted. These articles include anything from mundane chores, such as the way to dig a foxhole and to eat and sleep in the desert, to soldiers’ relationships with colleagues, and to the families they left at home. Also, there are a number of editorials which referred to soldiers’ interactions with local residents, which the coalition forces “liberated.” These articles provide an image of “common people like us” making efforts to save innocent people who were “suffering from the tyrant regime.”

In contrast with *the Asahi*, it appears that *the New York Times* regards the threat to international security of Iraq as “evil” in a Christian sense. Thus, Saddam Hussein, the despotic leader who might have weapons of mass destruction is an “evildoer.” Although both papers’ notion of evil gravitate around the possibility of endangering a number of people, *the Asahi* focuses more on the action of killing and *the New York Times* pays more attention on the prevention of massive killing.
Section 3 The Editorials of Both Papers on the Beginning of the Iraq War

As an illustration of the above-mentioned findings, the editorials of both papers appearing immediately after the launch of the war need to be thoroughly explored.

Subsection 1 The Asahi

Regarding the Iraq War, the Asahi has been unequivocally anti-war. In the editorial immediately after the beginning of the Iraq War, the Asahi declared its firm opposition to the war. This is because the paper seems to believe that military intervention was preventable. The editorial on March 22, 2003 is titled “End the conflict swiftly: The 21st Century's War Must not be Religious War.” This article suggests: “Even when it was still possible to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction short of resort to military intervention, the Bush administration chose to use force, despite widespread opposition to war. We do not support this war.” The Asahi disapproves of the U.S. choice to use force because “it was still possible to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction short of resorting to military intervention.”

The Asahi’s major concern that any conflict must be avoided seems to have originated from the fact that damages to Iraqi civilians would be huge because “in any conflict, those who suffer most are those who are ruled, not those who rule” and “many people, civilian and military, are being killed or wounded and property is being destroyed.” The editorial suggests that minimizing civilian
casualties is essential now that the war was initiated. The editorial asserts that:

“considering the realities [of the fact that the war was started], the next challenge is to determine what course would be best for the people of Iraq and the world. Above all, the challenge is to bring the war to a swift conclusion with minimal casualties.” According to the article, the best practical measure after the launch of the war is a swift conclusion with minimal casualties.

For the welfare of Iraqi citizens, the paper hopes U.S. and British military strategies would be citizen-friendly. According to the Asahi, the attacks must be “narrowly focused upon military targets and facilities related to weapons of mass destruction” and must not use hugely destructive new weapons, as was the case “during NATO air strikes upon Yugoslavia or in the U.S.-initiated assault upon terrorist targets in Afghanistan.” At the same time, the Asahi demands that Saddam Hussein not sacrifice the people of Iraq for his own honor and especially demands that chemical and biological weapons not be allowed.

The Asahi further notes the importance of offering assistance to the people of Iraq. The paper asserts:

The United Nations anticipates 10 million people will be short of food within six weeks. The United States is said to be committed to continuing to provide food and medical supplies. We hope arrangements will be made as soon as possible to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Iraq from the international community. The flood of refugees can be expected to be significant. The United States and Britain should do their
best to secure the safety of the refugees, in cooperation with Iraq's neighbors.

_The Asahi’s_ basic assertion has been that the United Nations should dictate Iraq policies even once the war had been started. This editorial put an emphasis on the role of the United Nations’ rebuilding efforts in postwar Iraq. Since it is not easy to maintain peace in postwar Iraq because of ethnic and religious complications, the editorial predicts that it is “next to impossible” for the United States to stabilize Iraq without the assistance of the United Nations and other countries. The article elucidates:

In the United Nations Security Council meeting just before the start of the war, which the American and British foreign ministers chose not to attend, their counterparts in France, Germany and other countries opposed to the war expressed their readiness to provide cooperation and humanitarian assistance in Iraq after the war, even though they criticized Washington for the war itself. We hope those nations and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan will pursue diplomacy toward ending the war quickly.

The editorial juxtaposes the televised statement of President George W. Bush with those of Saddam Hussein, noting the detached way that the two leaders “presented their causes in televised statements.” The tone of the article is, however, more disapproving of the U.S. situation: “In the 48-hour countdown to
the start of hostilities, American television networks broadcast the unfolding pre-war developments. The war being waged by the United States is evolving as if it were some sort of game.”

An interesting finding is that the Asahi suggests the root cause of the Iraq War as the difference in religions and cultures. In this editorial, the Asahi analyzes that Christian “good and evil” dichotomy that lies at the basis of Bush’s decision on Iraq:

The phrase “Arab world” also turns up in many references in Saddam Hussein’s address. He said the Arab world is a source of dignity, and added, “Long live the Arab world.” And, he said, since Bush has made this American-initiated war a conflict directed at the whole Arab and Islamic world, the Arab people would rise up in a jihad (holy war). Since the conflict began, the Arab and Islamic nations have come to regard the role of American and British troops as a revival of the Crusades of the Middle Ages. Some Islamic leaders even go so far as to call for a “jihad against the infidels.” The concepts of good and evil that President George W. Bush ascribes to are said to be heavily influenced by fundamentalist Christianity. The fact that Bush often quotes the Bible in his addresses only adds to the credibility of that observation. Bush is also the president who likened war in Afghanistan to the Crusades. Officials of his administration do not hesitate to speak of democratization in the nations of
the Middle East as if to ignore the cultures and traditions of the Arab world.

Christians and Islam discord is a familiar concept for political scientists. *The Asahi* argues the prime mover of the conflict is “The Clash of Civilizations.” This notion was proposed by Samuel Huntington during 1990s. The editorial continues:

Samuel Huntington, the noted U.S. political scientist, noted that with the end of the Cold War, there would be a clash of civilizations of Christianity, Islam and other religions. The Middle East is already afflicted with the unresolved problems of the fate of the Palestinians in a dispute that stems largely from religious discord. Depending upon how the war develops, there is a danger it will aggravate the clash of civilizations.

Thus, the conclusion of the editorial is that the Iraq War must not be shaped as a religious conflict caused by the abhorrence of other religions: *The Asahi* quotes a part of George H. W. Bush’s memoir and implies that the current president’s father had endeavored not to frame the First Gulf War as a religious confrontation between the West and the Islamic world and further argues:

Pope John Paul II has pleaded for peaceful resolution of the Iraqi problem, and other Christian leaders have expressed similar concerns of a clash of
civilizations. In his address announcing the start of war against Iraq, Bush said he would pay “due respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice.” We hope he will clearly remember what he has said. War at the beginning of the 21st century must not become a religious conflict.

Subsection 2 The New York Times

At the beginning of the war, the New York Times carried two editorials consecutively for two days. One seems to be written simultaneously with the launch of the conflict (“The war Begins,” March 20, 2003), while the other is about the initial progress of the war (“How to Watch the War,” March 21, 2003). The editorials of the New York Times clearly present a different perspective of the Iraq War. While the Asahi stresses the importance of the lives of Iraqi civilians and excludes the concerns of those in the United States and British forces, the New York Times attempts to care about both. From the context, the New York Times put emphasis on the safety of the American military.

No one who knows the American military doubts that it will do its job to the best of its ability and with an unswerving consciousness of the balance between opportunity and risk. The lives wagered in this operation belong to young Americans and to Iraqis of all ages. Perhaps no military has ever
known as well as this one how important it is to have a care for those lives.

While the Asahi does not touch upon strategies or new developments in the military, the New York Times points out the goal of the mission and the latest advancements in military technology, especially as a comparison with the first Gulf War:

Many Americans remember the first gulf war all too vividly, and the temptation will be to read this war against the backdrop of that one. The terrain is the same, but everything else has changed. A military that, even a dozen years ago, still found itself shuttling paper battle orders back and forth is now electronically linked and coordinated in ways that would have seemed unimaginable then. There is no strategic exit in the offing, as there was when the coalition forces stopped well short of Baghdad in 1991. Now it is Saddam or nothing.

Whereas the Asahi presents a clear opposition to the war, the New York Times position is ambivalent. This is partly because the New York Times has asserted that the war should be undertaken only with broad international support. Also, its ambivalence is reflective of strong supportive sentiments for military action; the scars of the 9-11 terrorists’ attacks were still vivid for many Americans.
Our job here is not as transcendentally clear as the soldiers' job. Now that the first strikes have begun, even those who vehemently opposed this war will find themselves in the strange position of hoping for just what the president they have opposed is himself hoping for: a quick, conclusive resolution fought as bloodlessly as possible. People who have supported Mr. Bush all along may feel tempted to try to silence those who voice dissent. . . . If things go as well as we hope, even those who sharply disagree with the logic behind this war are likely to end up feeling reassured, almost against their will, by the successful projection of American power. Whether they felt the idea of war in Iraq was a bad one from the beginning, or -- like us -- they felt it should be undertaken only with broad international support, the yearning to go back to a time when we felt in control of our own destiny still runs strong. Of all the reasons for this mission, the unspoken one, deepest and most hopeless, is to erase Sept. 11 from our hearts.

The conclusion of the New York Times editorial is vague, compared with the Asahi. The New York Times suggests only that debate over what comes next is imperative because “we have scarcely begun to talk about how it should be accomplished.” The paper claims:
As a nation we have scarcely begun to talk about how it should be accomplished. Even as we sit here at home, worrying about the outcome of the fighting, we must start to debate what comes next. That public discussion has to start soon, even tomorrow. But for now, all our other thoughts have come to rest. We simply hope for the welfare of those men and women -- sons and daughters -- who will be flinging themselves into the Iraqi desert.

In the next editorial after the initial attack, the *New York Times*’ position on the war becomes more noticeable. The editorial is very supportive of American actions in Iraq (“How to Watch the War,” March 21, 2003). The tone of the editorial is almost jingoistic; the results of the initial attack were described as “breathtaking”:

The war's opening barrage was a bold effort to kill Saddam Hussein and other top leaders of his regime even before a large-scale invasion had started. Reacting quickly to intelligence that Iraqi leaders were holed up in a bunker, American ships fired nearly 40 cruise missiles from the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and stealth fighters dropped bombs on the compound shortly after. It was a breathtaking example of coordination and precision.

Whereas the *Asahi*’s major concern is the lives of Iraqi citizens, the editorial of the *New York Times* pays attention to the degree of success of the
attacks. The editorial argues that success of the initial attack of the Iraq War remains uncertain. This is because the effectiveness of high-tech weapons was exaggerated by the media during the 1991 Gulf War---even when that war was a real victory for America. Thus, the editorial proposes four benchmarks that can be used to measure the progress of the ongoing military campaign. These proposals are: command of the air, protection of the oil fields, speed, and most importantly, creating a welcoming attitude among Iraqi citizens. These pieces of advice are stated to help obtain “the ultimate prize”: the control of Baghdad. The article argues that “wise handling of the end game will be the final measure of allied success.”

The four benchmarks proposed in the editorial are constructed through the eyes of military commanders. First, the editorial claims that “command of the air” is important because “allied planes will need to sweep Iraq's feeble air force from the skies and suppress its air defenses, a more difficult task.” Second, the article urges that ground forces must protect the oil fields quickly because Iraq has already set oil wells on fire before they fall into American hands. It further notes: “failure to do so will risk the loss of an asset important for rebuilding the country.” The third proposal is quick action, aiming to contain the conflict inside Iraq. The editorial claims that speed is very critical in preventing Iraqi missile attacks on Israel. Once Israel retaliates, the article suggests, the anger of the Muslim world will be gravely incited and tough diplomacy will be needed by the United States. Also, the article notes that quick action will keeps Kurds and Turks from clashing into a battle in Northern Iraq. Thus, the article proposes that
“airborne troops will need to establish a presence quickly before the north disintegrates into chaos.” Fourth and most crucial the editorial notes, is the creation of a welcoming attitude to Iraqi citizens. To Asahi’s editors, the fourth benchmark that the New York Times’ editorial offers must sound very controversial. The New York Times’ editorial provides only a neat public relations idea for U.S. forces among Iraqi citizens, whereas the most important concern of the Asahi’s editorial is protecting Iraqi citizens. Furthermore, the New York Times suggests having a good “package” to control the images of the forces in order to justify the war. The New York Times’ editorial states:

Nothing could make this invasion look better around the world than evidence that it is welcomed by the Iraqis themselves. So mass defections by Iraqi soldiers and crowds of joyous civilians hailing the invaders as liberators would be very good signs. If that is going to happen, it will most likely be in the south, where morale is said to be low among Iraqi troops and where Shiite Muslims have long been in conflict with the Hussein regime. By the same token, nothing could damage the justification for this war more than extensive "collateral damage," harming great numbers of civilians. Precision-guided weapons will be relied on to keep the damage limited to military targets, and military leaders have pledged to avoid civilian casualties. If they fail, it will be a black mark on the invasion.
Section 4 The Editorials of Both Papers on the Fall of Baghdad

The fall of Baghdad was a symbolic incident: the toppling of a statue of Saddam Hussein at a square in central Baghdad. This incident was a most crucial media spectacle as it marked the genuine overturning of the long-standing ruler in Iraq.

Subsection 1 The Asahi

The Asahi’s portrayal of this incident is very cynical, to say the least. The editorial on the U.S.-led forces’ control of Baghdad is filled with pessimistic perspectives of the U.S. actions in Iraq (“After the war in Iraq ‘Might Makes Right’ not the Road to Real Progress,” April 21, 2003). As this title indicates, the editorial seeks fundamental change in U.S. polices in Iraq.

The editorial first cites the statement of President Bush made soon after a statue of Saddam Hussein was removed from the streets in central Baghdad. The Asahi regards the statement “Human beings yearn for freedom. That is a God-given doctrine” as a self-congratulatory remark without understanding the ramifications of the war. Then, the article refers to the fact that the some of the American media is jubilant about the fact that the entire nation of Iraq came under the control of U.S. and British forces with relatively little loss of coalition lives. Furthermore, the article finds that several Japanese media organizations have started to rationalize the U.S. actions in Iraq. The editorial, however, warns that
the situation is not as simple as those media organizations both in the United States and Japan think it is. The article continues:

Many media in America praised the victory, with neo-conservative magazines making bullish declarations that this victory marks the return of a “strong America,” and that the war against terrorist states had gotten off to an “auspicious start.” The tone of Japanese newspapers and other media also tended to argue that the legitimacy of the decision by the United States and Britain to go to war was proved. Reasons cited in that argument included the easy victory of the coalition forces, as well as upbeat reports on the liberation of the Iraq people from Saddam's brutal regime. . . . We question, however, whether the situation is really so simple. It would be risky to simply forget matters of greater importance. Above all else, this refers to the great sacrifices that have accompanied the victory on the battlefield.

The rationale of the warning is, among other things, the damage to Iraqi civilians. The article notes the suffering of Iraqi people, including Iraqi soldiers:

The number of Iraqi civilian lives lost in the air strikes is estimated in the thousands. The ranks of the injured amount to several times that number, with many suffering because they cannot obtain adequate medical treatment for their wounds. The number of Iraqi soldiers killed in the
conflict is yet unknown, but must certainly defy any comparison with the moderate losses on the U.S. and British side.

The editorial is also concerned with difficulties in reconstructing postwar Iraq noting that “the task of rebuilding a nation comprised of a complex mix of different religious sects and tribes will not be an easy one. Signs of confusion are already appearing in the move to establish a working transitional governing body.”

The paper points out that the United Nations was “a big loser in this game, having been summarily snubbed by the United States and Britain,” and also the organization seems destined for further complications because U.S. leaders are reluctant to involve the United Nations in the rule of postwar Iraq, while France and Germany still support the role of the UN in its reconstruction.

The Asahi’s standpoint remains anti-U.S. The editorial suggests the troubled relationship between the United States and Europe has deepened the European distrust of America in a wide range of policies such as a ban on nuclear weapons testing and solutions for global warming. According to the paper, one growing problem is the increasing power of neo-conservatives in the United States who may “exacerbate the split between America and Europe and bolster the belief in the irrelevance of the United Nations.” The editorial contrasts the “lawful UN” and the “bellicose” United States, and provides a prediction that the anti-U.S. sentiments in other countries will render a troublesome scenario. It explains: what will come about if the U.N.-centered “control by law” is vanquished by “rule by
force”? One dark scenario is rampant support for the logic of opposing the United States with weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and any other means available, leading to a chaotic and danger-packed world.

To avoid the problem, *the Asahi’s* editorial proposes that one of the major tasks that America is facing is reassurance of the United Nations’ authority. It also suggests that the international community has to seek a way to lure America back under the reign of the United Nations. This is because “there is no organization that plays a greater role in working for peaceful solutions to disputes than the United Nations.” The article, however, considers the effort “the tremendous challenge of how to truly prevent the spread of terrorism.”

The editorial implies a possibility of reforming the UN’s anti-terrorism functions, but its emphasis is on the effort of America and its allies because “regardless of how great a superpower it has become, it [America] cannot function alone in the global community.” Thus, the article argues that action must be taken by U.S. allies to firmly convince America to debate in the arenas of the United Nations. The paper brings up an anecdote of *Gulliver's Travels* written by Jonathan Swift:

Taking stock of the current power balance, we wonder if the Bush administration does not indeed view the United Nations as being intent on stealing away its freedoms—much like the Lilliputians used ropes to tie down mighty Gulliver. In fact, that metaphor is currently finding considerable sympathy and acceptance around the world. . . . If Gulliver
were to wrest free of the ropes and go on a rampage, the giant itself would also find it difficult to live and prosper in the midst of the chaotic mayhem most likely to follow.

Subsection 2 The New York Times

As opposed to the pessimistic Asahi’s editorial about the U.S. invasion into Iraq, the New York Times’ editorial on the fall of Baghdad (“The Fall of Baghdad,” April 10, 2003) is jubilant about the demise of the Hussein regime. The editorial states that “the murderous reign of Saddam Hussein effectively ended yesterday as downtown Baghdad slipped from the grip of the Iraqi regime and citizens streamed into the streets to celebrate the sudden disintegration of Mr. Hussein’s 24-year dictatorship.” The article, indeed, celebrates the ousting of Saddam Hussein. The paper claims that “the scene in central Baghdad, where jubilant Iraqis and American marines collaborated in toppling a huge statue of Mr. Hussein, signaled that a complete American military victory in Iraq may be achieved within a matter of days, not months.” The editorial continues with an optimistic tone:

The swiftness of the American advance and the relatively low number of American and British casualties reflect a well-designed battle plan and the effective use of air power to weaken and demoralize Iraq’s ground forces.
The numbers of Iraqi casualties, military and civilian, remain to be determined, but they are likely to be considerable.

The editorial acknowledges the criticism of the U.S. actions in Iraq (“Opinion about This War Has Been Divided from the Beginning.”). The paper’s focus is, nonetheless, different. The editorial suggests that it is important to focus on rebuilding Iraq after the dictator is gone. The tone of the description may sound hypocritical, compared with that of the Asahi. The paper notes, “Now that Mr. Hussein’s rule has ended, there is unity among good-hearted people everywhere, a hope that what comes next for the Iraqi people will be a better, freer and saner life than the one they had before.” Also, the importance of peacekeeping is emphasized because “cities where the sudden collapse of the government have left a power vacuum that invites lawlessness. In the absence of civil government, there is an ominous potential for strife and bloodshed in a nation ripe with ethnic divisions and hatreds.” While the editorial warns of the necessity to stabilize the country, it positively summarizes the event by noting that “the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime can be the opening chapter in a positive and historic transformation of Iraq.”

Section 5 Conclusion

My own research on editorials of Japanese and American print media finds that different understanding of the word “evil” exists in the two media.
Since the scope of my research is limited, further comprehensive qualitative and possibly quantitative analyses are needed to understand the notion of evil during the war in Iraq. For example, another term may broaden the horizons of this comparison of media content across the Pacific. One of these terms may be the word “invasion.” There were some discussions over this term in the Japanese media. Although the Japanese equivalent word of “invasion” is “shinryaku” (entering forcibly); the Japanese word has a stronger connotation than the English equivalent. While *the Asahi* uses the term “shinryaku” from the beginning of the war, some print media, such as *the Sankei* or *the Yomiuri*, disliked the strong connotation and employed the word “shinkou,” advancing troops, instead. From the beginning of the war, *the New York Times* used the word “invasion.” It seems that there is no big debate in the United States over the word “invasion” and its connotation.

Such further examinations will enlarge the scope of understanding of difficult cultures. Comparison of the papers of different cultures may make us sensitive to differences among cultures. Comparing texts written in different languages needs special attention, but doing so can deepen our perceptions of a different society.
Chapter 7: Comparing "the Embedded" Stories of the Japanese and U.S. Media during the war in Iraq

Section 1 Introduction

This chapter compares articles written by embedded journalists of both the Asahi and the New York Times. Also, the difference in articles between those who were stationed in Iraq and their colleagues covering the story from back home will be examined. Although both papers sent their correspondents to Iraq to embed with troops of the coalition forces, content analyses of the articles conclude that journalists from the two papers presented quite different views of the war, including evaluations on the everyday developments in battalions. There were also distinct differences in the journalists’ level of sympathy with members of the units with which they were embedded.

Section 2 Research Design

The Asahi sent two of their staff writers to embed in the coalition forces. One is Tsuyoshi Nojima embedded in the First Marine Division and the other is Ishihara Takefumi embedded on the Aircraft Carrier Kittyhawk. The First Marine Division was a ground troop. The Division was assigned to attack Baghdad, moving up from the Southern tip of Iraq. The Aircraft Carrier Kittyhawk was stationed in the Persian Gulf where it was considered in the safe zone, which had
the smallest possibility of counterattack by the Iraq forces. Since Nojima’s assignment was in the actual battleground, his reports are more important for this analysis.

The Asahi database Kikuzo identified 24 articles written by Nojima during the period in which major combat occurred (between March 20 and May 1, 2003). Most are written when he was in the field. Some are memoirs after he left the battalion. Nojima was asked by editors of the Asahi to cut his assignment short and leave the field in early April 2003, when his troop was heading for Baghdad. This is because the editors found that it was too dangerous for him to continue his duties in the field after they read Nojima’s experience during the assault by Iraqi forces in Nasiriyah (Nojima 2003, 87). Because among his 24 articles, three are reports on preparations for an interim government in the area where Iraq forces were ousted and these were written after he left the field, they are excluded from this analysis.

In the New York Times articles, it is noticeable that almost all the embedded stories contain words in their headline such as “in the field 101st Airbone” or “With the troops—First Marine Division.” Also, every headline starts with either such phrases as “A Nation at War” (March 20 to April 20) or “AfterEffects” (April 21 to May 1).” During the period of analysis, the New York Times sent fifteen reporters into the field. These writers’ embedded stories are found in the NexisLexis database. In the alphabetical order, they are: C.J. Chivers (twenty-five articles), James Dao (fourteen), Jim Dwyer (eighteen), Dexter Filkins (thirty-three), Remy Gerstein (one), John Kifner (seven-teen), Charlie LeDuff (thirteen),
Judith Miller (twenty-one), Steven Lee Myers (twenty-two), David Rohde (thirty-four), Marc Santora (eighteen), Craig S. Smith (twenty-five), Patrick E. Tyler (twenty-three), Bernard Weinraub (twenty-seven), and Michael Wilson (fourteen). Several of them are written by more than one author. Excluding these overlaps, two hundred and sixty eight articles are selected for analysis.

Section 3 Findings

There are mainly four findings that come from comparing articles written by the embedded journalists of the Asahi and the New York Times. The two leading newspapers articles are similar in their personal and realistic descriptions and their focus on the daily activities of the troops in the field. They have, however, huge differences, not only in their formats and structures, but in the degree of sympathy shown toward the coalition forces.

Subsection 1 Difference in Formats and Structures

Reports from “embedded” journalists in both papers are very different in their formats and structures. First, the lengths of articles are different. In the Asahi, many articles written by embedded journalists are relatively short: 200 to 1500 Japanese letters (not words), which is equivalent to about 75 to 565 words in English. Most articles of the New York Times are between 900 and 2000.

Another difference in formats and structures may be related to length. In the Asahi, many articles written by embedded journalists are parts of stories about
general developments in the Iraq War. Six articles among twenty-one of Nojima’s articles are about the latest developments of the war and are treated as “related stories” to the main news. The most typical example is Nojima’s story at the time when the U.S. forces moved into Iraq to initiate attacks on March 20. His story was one piece among other related stories from Washington, Kuwait, and Jordan that came after a short description of the U.S. decision to start a war with Hussein’s regime (March 21). On the other hand, unlike the Asahi, most articles in the New York Times are independent of the main stories about the war.

Perhaps, the most interesting difference in news format is that the Asahi clearly notes that the contents of their embedded stories are controlled by U.S. forces, and many of Asahi’s articles have eye-catching disclaimers. Although there are several versions of the disclaimers, the main point is the same: “This story is reported under the rules set by the U.S. military. Contents of this story may be affected by the rule.” According to Nojima, the disclaimers were presented because the editors in the Asahi found that the embedding rules set by the U.S. forces could greatly affect reporting of the truth. Interestingly, Nojima himself believed that the disclaimers were unnecessary partly because allowing journalists to embed their troops in the battleground is considered a great opportunity to be closer to the truth. Nojima also suggests that the disclaimers might suggest to their readers that the stories are not trustworthy (Nojima, 2003, 117-123).

The New York Times does not have similar disclaimers in its embedded stories. Also, among articles written by embedded reporters, there is no reference
about the media control of the U.S. government. Instead, articles written by several staff writers who were not embedded questioned the objectivity of their reports. However, these criticisms appear mostly on electronic media, such as the cable news network. For example, an article written by David Carr on March 31 (“Reporters’ New Battlefield Access Has Its Risks as Well as Its Rewards”) claimed that television news reports from the battlefield provided striking images of the war, but raise questions about their objectivity because these reports were based on the information from the coalition forces.

Although the length and structure of the articles are different in the two leading newspapers, there is one clear similarity: every article written by embedded reporters has a byline, which carries the author’s name. In general, one of the well-known practices of Japanese print media is that the author’s name of an article is not explicitly provided. There is no clear reason for this convention, but unlike the print media in the United States, only some articles, mostly commentaries, are entitled to have bylines. Thus, in this respect, the articles written by the embedded reporters were rather unique within the Japanese media.

Subsection 2 Similarities in Personal and Realistic Descriptions

Reports from “embedded” journalists in both papers have one very clear similarity: both are very personal and realistic in their descriptions. Since embedded stories are the products of reporters and photographers who risked their
lives alongside coalition forces in Iraq, there is no doubt that their stories are very personal and realistic.

Nojima’s report in *the Asahi* became suddenly tense after the troop with which he was embedded was attacked by Iraqi forces in Nasiria. He reported this incident several times. His first report (March 24) was about the incident in which the members of the troops almost panicked at the news that other forces were ambushed and more than 50 marines were killed. His second and third reports (both articles were on March 26) were more realistic because his own troop was involved in a fierce battle with Iraqi forces. The battle lasted about 20 minutes and he had to dodge bullets so that he would not be shot. He was amidst the smoke of gun power and a shower of bullets and reported “I prayed not to get shot.”

Reporters of *the New York Times* also experienced serious battles. Many articles of the actual battles chronicled with exact time the actions of the troops and recorded further developments in the field. These articles sometimes contain raw comments of the excited or panicked troops when they were facing crucial moments in the battle. For example, a story written by Steven Lee Myers on March 31 featured several changes of strategies and rules of command in the field because of an attack by an Iraqi suicide bomber. In his article, Lieutenant Colonel Scott E. Rutter bluntly mentioned how to handle Iraqi civilians, “Five seconds . . . . They have five seconds to turn around and get out of here. If they’re there in five seconds, they’re dead.” Also in the article Major General Bufford C. Blount III, commander of the Third Infantry Division recognized “an unfortunate but
necessary step” to ensure the safety of his troops and stating that “We went to into this hoping to keep collateral damage and civilian casualties to a minimum. . . . They’ve not let us do it.”

It seems that personal relationships between soldiers and reporters were developed in the course of the action. One of the most personal stories in the Asahi is about the death of Jim Cawley with whom Nojima was embedded in the same Division. Cawley’s death was caused by the mistake of a young Marine who ran over Cawley with a humvee, when Cawley was lying on the ground. During the time of his embedding, Nojima became very close to Cawley because he was fluent enough to converse in Japanese with Nojima. Thus, Nojima wrote a very sentimental obituary of him as a close friend (April 9). The article explained that Nojima became a very special person for Cawley because it was Nojima who had to explain about his death in detail to Cawley’s Japanese wife, Miyuki.

Because of trust, even during the time of non-combat, soldiers in the field seemed to talk very frankly with New York Times reporters. For example, an article written by Dexter Filkins (April 1) carried the politically incorrect comment of Colonel John Pomfret, who referred to a newly captured piece of Iraqi territory somewhere close to the south of Baghdad, “We’re in bad-guy country. . . I like it.”

Also, stories of embedded journalists in both papers are full of the sounds and smells, they sometimes witnessed in memorable scenes. In an article of March 24 written by Patrick Tyler, the New York Times reporter saw American marines ripping down images of Saddam Hussein while jubilant residents greeted
them. Nojima of the Asahi reported in detail how the troop searched for Iraqi militia members who hid themselves among the civilians (March 31). The members of the troop took all the residents from their houses in a small village of the Kut Al Hay area and collected weaponry such as machine guns. Among those 50 residents many were women and children, and the crying of children echoed in the area. James Dao in the New York Times (April 14) told how hundreds of children and teenagers rushed to the forces and tried to catch food and cigarettes given out by U.S. troops.

Subsection 3 Similarities in the Focus on Daily Activities in the Field

As much as their reports are very personal, both papers report on the soldiers’ daily activities in the field. As mentioned above, both papers differ in the length of their articles. Since articles of the New York Times have more volume than those of the Asahi, most stories written by embedded journalists of the New York Times contain much more concrete descriptions of daily activities. Although the details differ in degree, articles of both papers paid great attention to many aspects of the military activities.

In an Asahi article (April 2), Nojima explained daily life in the field in great detail. According to him, each package of field food (“Meal Ready to Eat”) was attached with heating pads. Soldiers love beef ravioli and hamburgers, but pork chops were their least favorite. Also, Nojima reported how all members of the battalion, including himself, had to dig human-size foxholes for their beds.
Since *New York Times* articles were more voluminous, reporters featured issues beyond daily activities in the field. The psychology of soldiers was especially focused on. A story by Steven Lee Myers (April 13) featured the fear of soldiers who might be facing a gas attack. Although it turned out to be a false alarm later, sensors of their armored vehicle registered traces of a nerve agent. Thus, the brigade’s soldiers had to wear their gas masks, hoods, and rubber gloves. They were very nervous for a while until they found a bird flying over them. Looking at the survival of the creature, they became relieved but also learned that even the most sophisticated sensors could be wrong.

Subsection 4 Difference in the Degree of Sympathy with the Forces.

There is a sharp contrast between the two newspapers’ embedded stories in the degree of sympathy toward the coalition forces. Although it is not clearly stated, it seems that *New York Times* articles do not indicate their hesitation to report activities in the field through the eyes of the coalition forces. News sources are from members of the troops; thus, a large portion of the reports are occupied with further military strategies, results of the battle, or human interest stories of soldiers, such as their comradely with other members who lost their lives. In this way, arguably, it seems that the *New York Times* articles imply a sympathetic view toward the forces.

In contrast, Nojima’s articles in *the Asahi* are ambivalent toward the U.S. forces. Although he was sometimes sympathetic with the troop in which he was
embedded, he showed a strong sense of “otherness” to the forces at other times. In
the article on April 1, Nojima himself admitted that his articles were ambivalent
toward the forces. Nojima recalled the time when his troop was fighting with Iraqi
forces and a 60-milimeter mortar of his troop destroyed the enemy. He yelled with
joy for the successful attack, but soon realized that he was supposed to be an
objective observer. He also presented his feeling that he had been constantly
evaluating whether or not his articles were too sympathetic toward the coalition
forces. Thus, although a close friendship between Nojima and the members of the
troop developed, he had to be very aware to screen out information provided by
the forces because the troop might manipulate him.

In another article (April 2), Nojima found another occasion for feeling a
sense of “otherness” from the members of the troop because his perspective about
what was important or valuable was different from theirs. He explained to
members of the forces that the Tigris-Euphrates River area was one of the origins
of the world’s earliest civilizations, only to find that the soldiers wanted to chat
about women and food most of the time and many of them looked at porn
magazines or took pictures of the land where they were located. Also, their eyes
suddenly turned very “beastly,” according to Nojima’s description, before the
battle, and Nojima concluded that they were “totally different from a Japanese
civilian like him.” In another article (April 16), Nojima suggested that the
soldiers seemed to hold a firm belief that the Iraq War was justifiable and that the
U.S. government had made a correct decision to initiate the war. He continued
that the soldiers seemed to believe in a simplified idea of the war as one between “the good guys” and “the bad guys”

It is interesting that Nojima’s stories are different from other articles in Asahi on the Iraq War. Many of the other Asahi articles imply more anti-U.S. sentiments. Considering this, his articles are more sympathetic with the U.S. forces than other Asahi articles. One example of this is the story on March 24. His articles several times feature some sort of interactions between Iraqi civilians and the troop with which he was embedded. In the March 24 article, the members’ faces turned very relieved when many civilians waved their hands and smiled at them in Basra, the Southern part of Iraq. According to the story, the members of the troop seemed to believe that building up good relationship with civilians, especially with those who had anti-Hussein sentiments, might hold the key to their future mission in Iraq; thus, they had been very anxious about Iraqi civilians’ reactions.

Although Nojima witnessed that many civilians were cordial to the troops with which he was embedded in Basra (March 24), another story on the same day written by another staff writer denied this, citing a telephone interview with a civilian from Baghdad. She mentioned, “although the U.S. forces announced that Iraqi civilians welcomed them in Basra, I believe many Iraqis never welcomed them because we have been protecting our country. . .” As discussed in the previous Chapter, stories of Asahi leading up to the Iraq War period implied more anti-war and anti-military stance than the articles of the New York Times. Thus,
the slight but significant discrepancy between the Asahi journalists may be quite interesting in understanding the paper’s position on the war.

Nojima’s articles during his embedding with soldiers were not as anti-American as those written by other Asahi staff writers. Although his case may be an isolated case, it may be that the fact that Nojima established friendly relationships with soldiers might have had an impact on his stories. As discussed above, Nojima’s articles sometimes presented some detachment from the troops. This may be because Nojima’s is a non-native English speaker and his period at the battleground was much shorter than New York Times embedded reporters. Even so, Nojima’s articles’ differences from those of his colleague are noteworthy.

Section 4 Conclusion

This chapter presented a case study of comparative political communication, between the articles written by Japanese (Asahi) and U.S. (New York Times) embedded reporters during the Iraq War. According to the content analyses of the articles, the two leading newspaper articles are similar in their personal and realistic descriptions and in their focus on daily activities in the field. Nonetheless, there are significant disparities in their formats and the degree of sympathy they have with the coalition forces.
Chapter 8: Analyzing the Reasons for Difference in Media Reporting (1): Organizational Experiences and Views about Warfare.

Chapters eight to ten explore reasons for why the accounts of the *Asahi* and the *New York Times* are so distinct. Chapter nine investigates American and Japanese media organizations’ different views about warfare. One of the focal points of the discussion in this chapter is on how Japanese media organizations influence their war reporting, and especially *the Asahi’s* mentality of anti-militarism. I argue that this anti-military sentiment in the Japanese media partly explains the reasons for the differences between the *New York Times* and the *Asahi*’s reporting about the Iraq War.

Specifically, the chapter first examines how the concept of warfare has been negatively perceived and anti-militarism has come to be prevalent in the media in Japan. The main argument in this segment of the chapter is that the historical experiences of the Japanese media during and after World War II was a traumatic one. The memories of the experiences of World War II still haunt the Japanese media although more than sixty years have passed. Because many Japanese journalists share anti-militarism sentiments, their portrayals of war tend to be critical. Large portion of this chapter are based upon my interviews with Japanese journalists.
This chapter also investigates how the anti-militaristic sentiments in the Japanese media created a different media-politics relationship from that found in the United States. Both the media in Japan and the United States have strong impacts on politics; the media and politics have an interdependent relationship in both nations. Anti-militarism as well as the Japanese political system have played a different role than their American counterparts. I suggest that the Japanese media has served as a strong opposition voice against the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and has formed a coalition with the weak opposition parties so that progressive issues, such as preventing Japan’s remilitarization, have been brought up effectively in political dialogues. Although the anti-militarism in the Japanese media is still very strong, the media organizations’ uniformity in support of progressive issues has gradually waned. Some may argue that the Japanese sense of democracy may gradually face a turning point because it was supported by anti-militarism.

Section 1 Research Question and Hypothesis

The research questions and hypothesis for this chapter are as follows:

Research Question 2-1: What is the cause for the differences between the two countries’ media’s reporting on the Iraq War? What are the relationships between the media and politics, both in the United States and Japan? Is the relationship between the media and politics a contributing factor to the differing media
depictions of the Iraq War? How does the media-politics relationship affect media content?

Hypothesis 1: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies about Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by the different experiences of the two countries’ media in relation to the past wars.

Section 2 Japanese Journalists’ Perception on Warfare: Different Historical Development between the United States and Japan

One of the biggest differences in political communications between the United States and Japan lies in the historical experiences during World War II. The different political communication systems during World War II created the foundation for Japanese media organizations’ subsequent critical stance towards warfare. Japanese media organizations, including the Asahi, supported the jingoistic government that ruled Japan during World War II. This reality left a heavy burden that the press had to deal with after the defeat of Japan.

As Thomas Berger (1998) claims both Japan and Germany have widespread anti-militaristic sentiments in their societies. One of the most important developments in the post World War II period was the media’s denouncing of the chauvinistic stance of past regimes. War has come to be a very sensitive topic among Japanese journalists. All journalists I interviewed displayed strong concerns about war in general. Three journalists were actively trying to
prevent war. Journalist A suggests: “The reason I became a journalist is to inform citizens about atrocities of wars. Wars are the most miserable products that humankind has created, but have never been extinct. Therefore, journalists, including myself, have to report details of wars and help to minimize the escalation of the current wars and stop the possibility of future wars.” Journalist B refers to a book named *The Good War* (1984, 2004), which consists of 121 interviews about World War II, compiled by Studs Terkel, and elucidates: “I was very surprised when I read Terkel’s book because so many American citizens approved past wars in which their government was involved, although some interviewees in the book showed strong concerns about the war. I believe there are not such things as good wars. No matter how great the cause may be, wars are the worst possible forms of infringement on human rights. Starting to kill others is the silliest action. All I can do is to write a story against wars.” Journalist C summaries the history of Japan after the Second World War: “Because of Chapter Nine of the Japanese Constitution (nullification of wars), Japan has enjoyed peace for more than sixty years. The current Japan is quite different from Japan during World War II. Nonetheless, if we, journalists, stop the effort to be alert against the possibility that Japanese government may become involve in the war, I am afraid that Japan may become jingoistic again. The peace may be fragile, thus, the role of journalists is crucial”.

Anti-militarism of the Japanese media originated in the “mea culpa” of the Japanese media during World War II. It is often noted by scholars that Japanese major news organizations, such as *the Asahi*, helped the propaganda activities of
the imperial Japanese government. During World War II, the news media in Japan supported the war by propagating the government’s jingoistic ideas. The support included the forceful propaganda of patriotism.

The key to the control of the media during World War II was governmental censorship. Central to pre-1945 developments in Japanese political communication were the limitation placed on the freedom of the press. The early Meiji government actively fostered the media and encouraged newspapers to reestablish themselves. However, as Gregory Kasza (1988) suggests, the Japanese government already early in the 20th century attempted to control the media by using draconian measures of censorship. Kasza further shows that, although the degree of state control over the content of newspapers in wartime Japan equaled that in Nazi Germany, the effectiveness of control was greater in Japan. Without using the coercive methods of the Germans, the Japanese bureaucrats produced a propaganda network more effective than that of Joseph Goebbels in molding public opinion. Although during the so-called “Taisho Democracy” period (1913-1925) ---the post Meiji and the pre-World War II period---Japanese media enjoyed relative freedom from the government, the imperial government of Japan started to control media ownership and ordered the consolidation of many newspapers as the war approached.

Media ownership during World War II was strictly controlled by the Japanese government. Kasza argues that this consolidation made it easier for the government to censor each paper. If a media organization did not follow the censorship rules, the publication of the articles in question was banned. If a
journalist did not accept the alteration ordered by the government, the journalist had to be detained and, in some cases, physically tortured (Kazsa 1988, Chap. 6).

During World War II, the Japanese media organization reported the official announcements of the government without critically verifying facts; thus, the media became like a public relations branch of the government. Many anecdotes of war heroes were fabricated during that time. One of the famous fabrications is the story of "Our Three Human Bomb Patriots" (Bakudan Sanyushi). This story is about three Japanese soldiers who died while trying to blow up enemy camps at Shanghai in 1932. The Asahi and the Mainichi immediately featured their "patriotic deeds." Within weeks, they became the subject of songs, movies and stage plays. The story about the soldiers, however, later turned out to be false. They had died in an accident and had not killed their enemies. Scholars have revealed that most of the media’s patriotic stories were fabricated (Maesaka 2004).

The Allied Occupation (1945-1952), led by the United States, imposed another form of censorship on Japanese media organizations. Since the Allied Occupation saw the media as vehicles to convey its own policies of democratization, it did not hesitate to institute measures of its own to thwart criticism of Japanese “undemocratic” institutions. Given the zeal with which it abolished the Japanese military’s censorship apparatus, it is striking that the Allied Occupation censored materials. Materials that were censored included expressions of jingoistic ideas and traditional “undemocratic” Japanese notions, such as the strong role of first son or male dominance of society. There was
censorship of all major publications, including newspapers, magazines, books as well as radio broadcasting.

Some of the censored materials later were brought by a U.S. government official named Gordon W. Prange to the United States and are now stored at the McKeldin Library of the University of Maryland, College Park. Jun Eto (1989) who researched the censored materials at the UMD Library claims that the censorship and propaganda of the Allied Forces was so effectively entrenched in the media and educational system in Japan that even after the occupation period ended Japanese society was internally “destructive”; it had lost its traditional cultural roots. In addition to the censorship, the Allied Occupation established a new Constitution for Japanese citizens; the Constitution attempted to transplant democratic ideas and instill in the Japanese a desire to prevent future warfare by any means. In this way, democratic ideals and the sense of anti-militarism were brought into Japan hand-in-hand.

For Japanese journalists, the memory of the censorship by the imperial government during the war was a trauma. Because of their experience, the Japanese media in general has been strongly anti-war; the Asahi in particular has been most critical opponent of any conflict that might involve civilians. In the Asahi’s case, patriotism is a sin because it led Japanese citizens into war. Also, religion was associated with government oppression during the war because it reminds them of Japanese government-led Shintoism. The Meiji government designated Shintoism as the state religion and abolished many Buddhist and Confucian ideals. This "state Shintoism" considered the emperor as a divine being.
Citizens in Japan were under a strong pressure to compromise their beliefs and practice the state religion of Shintoism. This was especially true during World War II; thus, some citizens in Japan may associate the worship of the emperor and Shintoism with the tough memories of the war.

After the defeat of World War II, the Japanese media manifested a strong sense of remorse because of the fact that their reports had been inaccurate and the media had acted as a cheerleader of militarism. Their regret was so deep that it created an anti-militarism media culture. The anti-militaristic media culture remains dominant now. Journalist D claims, “Although there are no current staff writers who experienced World War II, the sense of remorse is still strong at my news organization. Many senior writers seem to believe that one of the reasons why the imperial government effectively censored the media was that the media lost its watchdog functions and did not stop the censorship.” Journalist E claims: “I often heard terrible stories about the censorship during World War II from my senior colleagues. They never went to the military, but they heard the stories from their seniors. Most of these stories were very vivid. Some stories were about the physical tortures that compelled young colleagues to share the fear of his/ her seniors about the resurgence of a militaristic government in Japan. Anti-militarism has been delivered by word of mouth, from one generation to the next, inside the news organizations.”

Another reason why anti-militarism has been strong in Japan is that anti-military sentiments became closely associated with democracy, the post-war Constitution defined its concept and advocated it. After World War II, the
Japanese government became democratic because of a number of political reforms imposed by the United States. Among them, the creation of the Constitution in 1946, written by the U.S. occupation government headed by General Douglas MacArthur, symbolized American influence in post-war Japan. The new Constitution is considered to be a "brain-child" of American judicial principles and reflects basic principles such as the employment of judicial review and the separation of powers. Other important changes are the notion of equality among citizens and the denouncement of the Emperor’s involvement in politics. Prior to World War II, Emperor Hirohito had been considered a "human God."
The 1946 Constitution has functioned as the highest law of the country without any amendments since its creation (Holland 1991, 301).

Thus, along with the experiences of World War II, the post-War Constitution has impacted how the media in Japan perceives war. Article Nine of the Constitution denounces any Japanese involvement in military attack. Mamoru Fukuo, a specialist of the judiciary, suggests that except for in cases of self-defense, Japan can not initiate war under the post-war Constitution. Fukuo claims: “I believe the media as well as the public have believed that anti-militarism promotes the democratic and peaceful ideals the Constitution advocates.

The Constitution has not only kept Japan from becoming involved in another war, but also it gives journalists a rationale for their anti-military stance. Journalist D suggests that the media’s anti-militarism sentiment was nurtured by the Constitution. He emphasizes that there is a connection between the “Peaceful” Constitution and the anti-war sentiments of the media and notes that the media in
Japan can be anti-military because Japan has been protected by the United States under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty: “There is virtually zero possibility that Japan can wage a war under the Constitution. Although Japan has not been free from dangers in national security terms, a possibility of a war is very unlikely. Also, there were only a few limited occasions that the Self-Defense Forces could actually face a foreign enemy. I believe Japan is safer than any other countries in Asia. For Japanese journalists, it is easy to criticize other countries’ war efforts because they, including myself, believe that wars are things of a different world. Hypothetically, if Japan had to be involved in a war, the attitudes of journalists might be different.” Thomas Berger (1989, 4) also suggests that part of the reason for Japanese anti-militarism is its geostrategic position; Japan focuses on trade instead of defense.

The critical views of the Iraq War by the Japanese media, including *the Asahi*, seem to have been formed by the media’s anti-militaristic traditions. Journalist C explains the anti-war sentiments: “Every time a major war broke out, I guess the memory of World War II resurfaced in Japanese media organizations, including the company I belong to. When we were watching the developments of a new major war, our past experience of censorship was retold, and the tragedies of the World War came back. In this way, the anti-militaristic culture became dominant in Japanese media organizations even if our generation has not experienced war. I believe the Iraq War also has strengthened this culture.”

Indeed, the Japanese media in general have presented very progressive views about wars after World War II. Among the wars the United States has been
involved in, the most severely criticized by the Japanese media was the Vietnam War. Arguably the Japanese criticism was even more severe than that of the U.S. media. A series of articles condemning the battles in South East Asia dominated the Japanese media during the 1960s and the 1970s. U.S. positions and policies in the Korean War in the 1950s and the Gulf War in the 1990s were also described harshly by the Japanese media (Kinoshita 2005, Ishizawa 2005). It seems that not only the Iraq War, but also wars in general are considered to be “evil” entities by the Japanese media. Wars tend to be portrayed negatively, and especially the countries that have stronger military power, such as the U.S., are more likely to be targets of criticism. Also, the Self-Defense Forces in Japan have often become the target of harsh criticisms (Berger 1998, Chap.5).

As discussed above, the different media cultures and the strength of the anti-war sentiments in Japan and the United States can be attributed to Japan’s very bitter past experience with war. All of my interviewees suggest that historical incidents affect the media culture of the two countries. For instance, Hisashi Tomikawa, a scholar of international politics, agrees with the view that America has not experienced large numbers of civilian casualties: Many Americans lost lives in World War II, Korea and Vietnam, but they were soldiers. Tomikawa asserts: “Because of this historical path, American cultural views about the military are not as antagonistic as those of Japan. Not only media culture, but also political culture in Japan was molded by the severe experiences in World War II. History is, I believe, the key to understanding the different portrayals of the Iraq War by the two media.”
Anti-militarism in Japan has been institutionalized in the Japanese public. Fukuo refers to the “Aikokushin” debates. As mentioned in chapter 8, the literal meaning of “Aikokushin” is the sentiment of loving one’s own country, but the connotation of this word is in most cases very negative because of the experience during World War II. Fukuo explains: “There are still great discussions in Japan over the concept of loving our own country.”

In a bid to explain the anti-militarism of the Japanese media, several interviewees refer to commercialism: media organizations’ progressive attitudes toward the war may attract many audiences. This is because the public largely has shared the same experiences as the media. In my interview with Hiroyasu Komine, a political scientist at a think tank in Japan, anti-militarism has not been faded despite the passage of time because the media has continuously provided information with progressive perspectives about warfare. Komine claims: “Every summer around August, the Japanese media, both print and electronic, feature tragedies about World War II. The media reiterate how civilians went through hardships with hunger and the death of families in the massive bombings in Tokyo and other major cities by the United States. Also, both nuclear bombings the United States in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are the major topic in television dramas every August. Coincidentally, the traditional Buddhist ancestor ceremony is in August. This ceremony is called ‘obon festival,’ which is to honor the departed spirits of one’s ancestors; Japanese anti-war sentiment often reaches the peak in the month. In this way, anti-militarism in the public has been continually reproduced, it has never been faded.”
Atsushi Izumi, a scholar of international relations, also finds an interesting parallel between mid-August in Japan and early September in the United States. Izumi claims explains that the American media portrayals about the terror victims of the 9-11 incidents every early September have great similarities to how the Japanese media reports citizens’ experience of the Second World War in Japan. Izumi explained in an interview with me: “They are very similar because the most important topic is how an innocent civilian who once lived happily were suddenly at the mercy of fate. In addition, every year the memory about the tragedies is refreshed after the bombardment of stories about the tragedies. Just as anti-militarism becomes stronger at least for a while every summer, anti-terrorism sentiments in the U.S. have been recreated every September since 2001.”

Section 3 The Japanese Media’s Anti-militarism and Its Ramifications on the Political Communication System: A Comparative Analysis between Japan and the United States

This section further argues that the anti-militarism sentiments in the Japanese media have created a different media-politics relationship compared with that of the United States. Specifically, this section first investigates differences and similarities between the two political communication systems. Second, I argue that the strong anti-militarism as well as the difference in political system itself has brought a different role for the Japanese media.
Subsection 1 Similarities between the Two Political Communication Systems.

Arguably, political communication systems between Japan and the United States have many common aspects. According to the Hallin and Mancini categorizations (2004) discussed in Chapter 2, Japanese political communication system may be categorized as the Liberal Model, same as the U.S. system. The political communication systems both in Japan and in the U.S. are similar in the sense that both countries’ media industries are very robust. Both the U.S. and Japan are virtually saturated by the media, such as around-the-clock television coverage and a wide variety of newspapers, many of which have a circulation of millions.

Along with the United States, Japanese are enjoying one of the highest labels of media saturation in the world. Its five national dailies each with a circulation of over two million translate into the highest per-capita newspaper circulation in the world, some ninety percent of adults read newspapers daily, and the average person watches more than three hours of television a day. Given the rising importance of the media in all the industrial societies, Japan thus presents itself as a laboratory for exploring the role the media plays today in democracies.

Media independence from politics is protected both in Japan and in the U.S. Independence is secured by laws as well as media ownership structures. In both countries, freedom of press is included in their Constitutions, and the media has enjoyed freedom as a sacred symbol of democratic societies. Reporters Without Borders, an international organization for defending freedom of the press, published of “Worldwide Press Freedom Index” in 2002. The list includes 139
countries and ranks each country’s degree of press freedom. Both the United States and Japan ranks among top 30 (17th and 26th, respectively) in the list (Reporters Without Borders, 2002).

Except for a few examples, such as National Public Radio or Public Broadcasting Cooperation, media organizations in America, both print and electronic, are mostly privately owned. Excluding Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Cooperation), Japanese media organizations are also independently and internally owned, with the various newspapers and broadcasting companies competing against each other (Westney 1996).

Owing to media saturation and independence, both the American and Japanese media’s political impacts are strong. “The fourth estate” is so actively involved in government along with the formal three branches of government that the relationships between the media and politics in both the United States and Japan have been symbiotic. Politics needs the media for the purpose of public relations and the advocating of new policies. For political figures, the most important interface with their supporters is through the media. The media need new political developments, such as new policies or attractive politicians to run for office, and sometime political scandals.

However, the symbiotic relationship between politics and the media does not mean they always help each other. Although politicians may desire to control the media, the media does not want to be their messengers: The media sees its role as performing watchdog functions. In fact the media often target politicians and
attack their negligence and inability. The media sometimes ruthlessly attack politicians for their political and private scandals.

Larry Sabato suggests that there have been three stages in the relationship between the media and politics in the United States. First, the relationship was cozy from 1941 to 1966. The media was relatively docile in its treatment of politicians and reported what politicians wanted to tell. If reporters found information that politicians did not tell, the audience would not be informed of the news. Sabato believed the media was a "lapdogs" of politicians. Next, the relationship became more antagonistic from 1966 to 1974. During this period, Sabato suggests that the media acted as a "watchdog" of the government. The pinnacle of the media’s function as a guardian of a free society was the Watergate. The "watchdog" journalism, however, has transformed into "junkyard-dog" journalism since the 1980s. In the age of "junkyard-dog" journalism, Sabato argues that the U.S. media often relies on rumor and gossip or focuses on irrelevant subjects, such as womanizing, instead of significant matters such as a politician’s questionable dealings with major defense suppliers. According to Sabato, the media’s vivacious reporting is similar to piranhas during a feeding frenzy. Such practices have eroded journalism's credibility with the public, and actually trust in the media has reached a low ebb since the 1980s (Sabato 1993).

Scott Flanagan (1991, 1996) finds the Japanese media to have less influence on voting behavior than in the United States, due to strict regulation of political advertising. However, Flanagan reveals the significant role of the media in stimulating interest in Japanese politics and in facilitating political activity.
Although media exposure to politics has no direct effects, he claims it has stronger indirect effects on political participation than any other important variables, including parochial values, socioeconomic status, and political knowledge. Flanagan finds media exposure is associated with increasing political interest and issue awareness, with more psychological involvement and political knowledge, and, through these, greater political participation.

Kabashima (1990, 2007) further argues that the media in Japan plays a significant role in politics. Referring to the survey data he and his colleagues collected, Kabashima discovered that the media is perceived as the most powerful but neutral actor compared to other major stakeholders in politics, such as political parties, labor unions, citizens groups, and industry. Also, he finds that journalists do not have strong partisan preferences. Kabashima concludes that the media in Japan functions as the center arena of democracy, and that Japanese democracy should be defined as “media pluralism.”

Subsection 2  The Japanese Media’s Anti-militarism and the Media as the Effective Opposition

There are obviously several dissimilarities between the United States and Japanese political systems, such as between the Japanese parliamentary system versus the American strict separation of powers, and the almost one party rule in Japan versus the competitive two-party system in the United States. In the less
competitive Japanese political systems, I claim that the Japanese media has served as an effective opposition voice that checks the ruling LDP.

The Japanese media’s political stance is, unlike Kabashima suggests, not neutral. Although Kabashima’s “media pluralism” theory is intriguing, his methodologies to locate media neutrality need more elaboration. Since one of the most important norms of journalism is neutrality, a journalist is highly likely to respond to survey questions saying that he or she does not have a strong partisan preference. This is because their professional norm is not politically biased. Also, the media is perceived by other stakeholders as the center of those stakeholders in politics simply because other stakeholders are more clearly partisan in nature. We can intuitively locate the labors as more liberal than the media; and the leaders in industry are more conservative than the media. Additionally, the media is not only perceived as being located at the center stage of politics but also the media is considered as constituting a pseudo-entity in politics by other stakeholders because of its role as medium in politics through which other political stakeholders’ ideologies can be expressed. As Lichter et al, (1986) suggested when they conducted interviews and other psychological tests, including the Rorschach ink blot tests, we have to use more qualitative methodologies to identify journalist ideologies.

Instead of Kabashima’s “media pluralism” theory, I claim that the Japanese media organizations have played an effective opposition role in Japanese politics after the end of World War II. This is because the media has provided the alternative views that were not well offered by opposition parties. Japanese
opposition parties, most of which are liberal, have been weak and politically incompetent ever since the end of World War II. The media has stepped into the void and advocated progressive views.

Opposition parties did not offer a viable alternative to the LDP. The Social Democratic Party of Japan---now essentially defunct---had been the strongest of the post-1945 opposition parties. Yet, even during the 1970s, at the height of its presence in politics, the power of the party was regarded as only “half” that of the LDP (Kume et.al., 2004, Chap.5). The media, as mentioned above, has been critical against the ruling LDP and been supportive of the weak progressive parties because of the anti-war stance of the media. I claim that the media has augmented the liberal views of the weak opposition and has become a de facto the strongest opposition to the LDP in Japanese politics.

The media has supported the policies of the progressive opposition parties because the media and parties share their anti-militarism. Both journalist A and Komine suggest that during the period of the Cold War, the media was favorable to the socialist bloc and idealized China and North Korea. In contrast, the media was not favored in the United States and Japanese government as well. According to Komine, this is because “the U.S.-Japan military alliance may heighten the possibility of becoming involving in another war.” Also, almost all the interviewees agree that that the media have been unfavorable in their reporting on the ruling Liberal Democratic Party because the LDP has kept a strong relationship with the United States and has supported and strengthened the U.S.-Japan military alliance. By contrast, the media has been supportive of the liberal
opposition parties, most notably the now greatly weakened Democratic Socialist Party of Japan. Also, several interviewees, such as Komine and Fukuo, claim that the media, especially the Asahi, are regarded as having a progressive attitude and antigovernment stance. The core of the Japanese media’s political preference is their anti-war viewpoints.

Kabashima’s theory that the media is a neutral entity may also be explained by the complicated relations between the LDP and progressive journalists. The media’s role as the de facto strongest opposition to the LDP in Japanese politics functioned in an interesting way. It is interesting that the media may have a cozy relationship with the LDP. Therefore, the media’s stance may appear to be neutral from the views of conservative political leaders at least in surveys. Ofer Feldman (1993) analyzes the interaction between Diet members of both houses and political reporters, mainly those of the national daily newspapers and concludes that in the era of the Liberal Democratic Party’s predominant party rule, a symbiotic relationship existed between the two groups. Reporters and politicians had to rely upon one another to do their jobs, and their interdependence produced a high degree of cooperation and sympathy. Media organizations commit large resources to political news, although they are heavily oriented (and biased) towards the governing coalition; opposition parties seem to receive much less attention. Reporters work mainly through press clubs’ attached to each ministry, party or faction. The relationships, however, do not translate into the pro-war stance. Journalist A reiterates that because of anti-militarism, the Japanese media has kept a distance from the ruling Party: “Media organizations in
Japan were able to gather important information from LDP officials and bureaucrats. However, journalists’ ideologies have been at more left of center. However, there has been a complicated psychological barrier between the LDP politicians and journalists, especially, liberal newspapers, such as the Asahi, the Mainichi, and the Tokyo, in Japan.”

It is interesting that the media in the United States have been criticized for their liberal biases. The media’s political ideology is often a matter of debate in the United States. Political scientists and communication scholars disagree about whether media content is shaped primarily by proponents reflecting the right or left side of the ideological spectrum. Scholars like Robert and Linda Lichter and Stanley Rothman (1986) have argued that media elites who work for the leading news media lean to the political left, relying on sources holding kindred views. Scholars like Lance Bennet (1988), Michael Parenti (1986), and Benjamin Ginsberg (1986) consider media to be the minions of big business and right-wing politicians. They fault the media for using news selection to strengthen white middle class values and suppress competing left-wing views. Some critics, such as Herman and Chomsky (1988) contend that these choices are made deliberately to perpetuate capitalist exploitation of the masses in line with the ideological preferences of media owners. According to Herman and Chomsky, far from performing a watchdog role, the "free press" serves the needs of those in power.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that the Japanese media because of its anti-military stance has been informally against the LDP until at least the early 1980s. Several scholars, including the interviewees, agree to this point of view.
Ofer Feldman (1996) suggests that the Japanese media, especially newspapers, almost all presented almost identical views about political news. Feldman reviews studies on Japanese newspapers and claims that some critics “go so far as to say that the distinctive character of Japanese newspapers is that they have no distinctive character” (28).

Many papers were almost identical in how they handled the war, the LDP, and progressive parties. In a classic study of the Japanese media, Young C. Kim (1981) asserts that the Japanese media, especially the print media, have leftist bias in contents. Japanese journalists and their employers, notably the Asahi, have desperately tried to maintain their special status and their access to Communist society, such as China, at the highest levels. In so doing they have, at times, sacrificed their basic mission to seek the news and report them impartially.

Section 6 The Changing Face of Anti-militarism in the Japanese Media: a Turning Point in Japanese Democracy

Since Kim published his study in the early 1980s, there have been remarkable changes in the Japanese media. Although anti-military media culture in Japan has been very dominant since then, one of the biggest changes is that anti-militarism has become less prominent than before. Since the 1980s, the Yomiuri has moved itself from the left much more to the right of the ideological spectrum. In addition, the politically conservative Nikkei has gained more readers since 1980s. The Sankei has kept its conservative ideological roots. Although the
Asahi, the Mainichi, and the Tokyo are still on the liberal side of the spectrum, the tug-of-war between liberal and conservative media has become more balanced. Although the political ideology of the Japanese television networks is less obvious than newspapers, several networks lean either more to the left or right because major newspapers own certain amount of stocks of the key network television stations. TBS (related to the Mainichi) and TV Asahi (related to the Asahi) are allegedly more liberal than other networks. Fuji TV (related to the Sankei) has more conservative news programming than its counterparts.

Also, conservative media, such as the Sankei, have gradually become more influential. The discussion over re-arming Japan is not “taboo” for the conservative strata in Japan. It is interesting that recent bestseller lists contain several books that put an emphasis on patriotism. Interestingly, titles based on anti-militarism are on the lists as well. Journalist E suggests, “I believe the vast majority of Japanese want to keep this peace forever. Nonetheless, some portion of Japanese citizens feel that the article nine has gradually grown out of date. This is because the Constitution does not clearly refer to the right of self-defense. Every time the Self-Defense Forces need to go abroad to engage in Peace Keeping Operations, the Japanese legislature has to create a law for each occasion.”

Westney (1996) also deals with the rise of the conservatives in the Japanese media by focusing on the industrial structure of the Japanese media. According to Westney, the Japanese media are frequently independently and internally owned. Various newspapers and broadcasting companies compete
against each other, so that a pluralistic environment was secured for the press. In fact, however, newspapers are highly integrated with the established business world through non-ownership connections and governmental networks. This factor is exemplified by the media’s frequent membership in various shingikai (government advisory councils). Thus, Westney claims that newspapers appear to be an integral part and defender, even supporter, of the established order. National newspapers have close connections with and influence over broadcasting. Moreover, structural diversity seems to result not in a great variety of information and opinion, but in conformity in content.

Another change is the increasing role of the electronic media. The print media, such as newspapers, had been very strong among Japanese media organizations. However, several scholars suggest that the strength of television has finally surpassed the print media at least, since the 1990s. This changing of place between the print and electronic media has brought a more important ramification to politics: television is not as prominently anti-war as newspapers. Japanese electronic media organizations may be more loyal to the press releases of the government; thus, they tend to be more conservative than the print media.

Regarding the contents of the television news, Krauss (1996) conducted content analysis of the 7 PM news of NHK, which has the largest viewers among major Japanese television news programs. His content analysis reveals that in comparison to news items regarding foreign countries or national defense and the economy, NHK tends to devote more news items and time to politics and government (as well as society), with much more news on the work of the
national bureaucracy and new policy or policy change. In comparison to the cable and national network news coverage in the United States, NHK devotes greater attention to government decisions, proposals, and ceremonies, and this is "one of the most important and seemingly distinctive aspects of the content of NHK television news compared to American network news" (102).

Also, the relationship between the media and politics has gradually changed as technological innovations progress. Since advances in technology have increased outlets for information dissemination, new styles of reporting have changed the nature and characters of news. These changes coincide with citizens’ demands to express their opinions and to have their voices heard by political leaders. "New media" formats, such as radio and television talk shows, electronic town meetings, and computer bulletin boards, provide outlets for the public to express their political views in a way that is unprecedented in our history. These developments in mass communication and how they influence the ways in which politicians and citizens view the political world has become a theme which underlies the field of political communication (Neuman 1991, Abramson, Arterton and Orren 1988). Using the "new media" has now become an integral part of candidates’ communication strategies in Japanese elections.

The diffusion of the internet has created a new venue for political communication as well. Internet blogs posted by ordinary citizens have power to influence the politics. Among those blogs, “Kikko no blog” made its name known to the nationwide of Japan with its scoop of corner-cutting in the construction industry. An interesting fact is any social critics, such as Rika Kayama, claim that Japanese
digital media is more conservative than the mainstream media, although the
degree of conservatism is not blatant. Kayama defines the change of the public as
“petite nationalism syndrome” (Koyama 2005).

Hiroyasu Komine in my interview suggests that the public is changing its
attitude about the Constitution and the Self-Defense Forces: “if the Constitution
had been amended to the extent that it did not prohibit Japan from active
involvement in war, the media’s anti-militarism would have altered a lot. I believe
the media’s perception already has changed a little since the Japanese legislature
passed the law to allow the Self-Defense Forces to engage in peacekeeping
operations in foreign lands in the early 1990s. The media, I feel, has become
lenient to the Self-Defense Forces.”

In support of Komine’s claim, many Japanese have come to believe that
the 1946 Constitution may be out of date. According to a survey by the Mainichi
in April 2007, fifty-one percent of those polled suggested that they support the
revision of Japan’s pacifist Constitution. 19 percent of them were against its
revisions. Many of the respondents claim that the main reason for revisiting the
Constitution is that some 60 years have passed since it was created. Since 46
percent said they approved of constitutional revision in a September 2004 poll,
there seems to be a gradual gain in the number.

Some scholars, such as Komine, argue that the advent of pro-militarism
and conservatism in the media may be related to the fact that democracy was
transplanted to Japan by the United States. According to scholars, Japanese
democracy was "transplanted" by Americans and the imposed system has few
traditional roots. Thus, it may still be perceived as foreign and given from an outside power in origin and yet even now felt either as under ongoing process of internalization of that given outside tradition or as continuing process of fusion and adjustment of both preexisting Japanese internal democratic tradition and introduced American democratic tradition for Japanese society. The reforms aim at the reduction of Confucian traditions and samurai ethics as well as the loss of imperial sovereignty. An example is the emphasis on equality instead of respect of seniority and upbringing (ibid.). Hideo Uchiyama, one of the leading political scholars in Japan, states:

Since the end of the Pacific War, Japan was democratized as part of the occupation policy. All social and political institutions underwent a process of reform. Nevertheless, many Japanese have become doubtful as to the stability of their western inspired democracy. (279)

Uchiyama’s observation is supported by recent public opinion polls. According to a Gallop poll in 1995, Japanese are much less inclined than Americans to express satisfaction with the way democracy is working. While 64 percent of American respondents are satisfied with their democracy, only 35 percent of Japanese are content with theirs (Ladd and Bowman 110). In a survey by the Asahi, just 14 percent of respondents said they had read the Constitution thoroughly and 67 percent of them had not read it at all (ibid. 104).
Many Japanese feel that the concept of democracy itself is "rootless" because it is a "borrowed" idea from Americans. For example, under the Constitution of 1946, the Japanese judiciary has the power of judicial review just as in the U.S.; however, the judicial culture in Japan is more self-restrained, and the Supreme Court rarely exercises its power. Traditionally, the Court is extremely reluctant to deviate from judicial precedent for fear of upsetting the status quo ante and the predictability of governmental policy-making (Itoh 197). Also, citizens’ minds are difficult to change because of their tradition. On the occasion of Emperor Hirohito’s death in 1989, a CBS / NYT / TBS (Tokyo Broadcasting Station) consortium conducted a poll on the Imperial system. Surprisingly, 20 percent of the Japanese respondents still expressed allegiance to the pre-war idea that the Emperor was a "human God." Moreover, 40 percent of persons sixty-five years old and older accepted the Emperor’s divinity (Ladd and Bowman 1996, 105). In sum, the weak support of Japanese democracy appears to be caused by the lack of a traditional background in democratic concepts.

Alex de Tocqueville claimed that religion plays an important role in keeping American democratic society from becoming despotic (Tocqueville 1988). If unchecked by religion, according to him, individualism could lead to a "passionate exaggerated love of self" which threatens all forms of public and private life (Tocqueville 1988, 506). If we apply this Tocquevillian link between organized religion and democracy, the current Japanese society is endangered by the threat of political instability and anarchy. According to the World Values Survey, while 93% of the American respondents believe in God, just over a third
(37%) of Japanese respondents do. Whereas 67% of Americans believe in "a personal God," only small fractions (4%) of Japanese do so. Among Americans 80% surveyed had been brought up religiously at home; compared with only 22% of Japanese (Ladd and Bowman 1996, 93-97). In post-war Japan, a number of influential civil activists such as Makoto Oda are influenced by Karl Marx’s idea that religion maintains economic oppression. Therefore, these Marxist "spin doctors" regard religion as a menace to the society (Herzog 1993, 252-255).

In the current "Godless" society of Japan, democracy has a fragile basis because the religious tie among citizens is weak and their new political system is divorced from traditional mores. A social critic, Peter Herzog expresses the same concern in his book, Japan's Pseudo-democracy. “There are numerous instances,” he says, “in which democratic principles and values have been disregarded or distorted in Japanese life” (Herzog 1993, 257) and “it can hardly be maintained that at present democracy is flourishing in Japan” (Herzog 1993, 10). He explains that this malfunction of democracy is caused by the big difference between the pre-war and post-war political system and discontinuity from traditional mores. He asserts: “The disparity between the old and new dispensation was too acute to allow a smooth transition. It would have been overly sanguine to expect a thorough understanding of the new order to emerge at once” (Herzog 1993, 10). Coincidentally, Paul Tillich, a leading theologian of the twentieth century, also stresses that the Japanese political system does not have a strong religious safety net (Nobuhara 1999).
In the case of post-war Japan, democracy was imposed by Americans during the occupation period. The idea of democracy appears to lacked roots and established in Japanese culture at that time, but Japanese democracy has grown its own style after in more than sixty years since its inception. However, in the minds of Japanese citizens, Japanese democracy still seems to be fragile because of its divorce from traditional mores and the public's weak ties to organized religions. The increased demands to amend the 1946 Constitution may be related to Japanese doubts about their democratic roots. Japanese democracy may be facing a turning point.

Section 4 Conclusion

In an attempt to understand the differences of in the reporting about the war in Iraq, Chapter nine clarifies differences in the backgrounds of the media of Japan and the U.S. along several aspects. Among these factors, this chapter stresses the importance of the historical experience of the Japanese media during and after World War II. This chapter examines how the concept of war has been negatively perceived the by the Japanese media and how the concept has been shared and nurtured by the political system. Anti-militarism has been a norm for the Japanese media, and I suggest that the media has played an effective role as a progressive voice with their anti-war stance. Finally, although the anti-military sentiment is still very strong, I claim that the intensity of the progressive stance has gradually waned. This change has occurred as the public demand for the
amendment of the 1946 Constitution increased and also Japanese attempts to revisit their roots of democracy have intensified.
Chapter 9: Analyzing the Reasons for Difference between the Two Media (2): Cultural Factors ---Social Construction of Different “Evilness” between the U.S. and Japan

Chapter nine explores another factor that may have affected the two print media organizations’ different perspectives on the Iraq War: culture. This chapter first focuses on the influence of the different religious traditions of the two countries: Judeo-Christianity in the United States and a mixture of three religions in Japan. The main argument of this chapter is the comparison between American and Japanese notion of evilness and how the differences combined with other cultural aspects, has affected the views and basic understanding of the happenings, including the war in Iraq. The cultural differences about the notion of evilness may influence the perspective in two countries’ journalists. In other words, this chapter suggests that the different accounts of the war by the two papers can be attributed at least in part to the fact that different realities of “evilness” are socially constructed between the two countries.

As a basis of this argument, the chapter first explains the theories of social construction of reality in detail. Then, I compare religious impacts on citizens’ perceptions of “evil” acts. The arguments of this subsection are based upon the interviews conducted in Japan. Also, I refer to C. Fred Alford’s study about South
Koreans’ notion of “evilness” and apply his findings to the difference between Japan and the United States about the concept of the Iraq War.

Section 1 Research Question and Hypothesis

Research question and hypothesis for this chapter is as follows:

Research Question 2-2: What was the cause of the differences between the two countries’ media’s reporting of the Iraq War? Does a cultural aspect affect media content of the two liberal print media? If so, what kind of cultural aspects may affect the different accounts?

Hypothesis 2: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies about Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by the different notion of “evilness” in their societies.

In order to test this hypothesis, I will first explain both social construction theory and difference of “evilness” between Western and Asian societies.

Section 2 The Theory of Social Construction of Realities

In order to test this hypothesis, I will first explain both social construction theory and difference of “evilness” between Western and Asian
societies. Social construction theory suggests that what we see as “real” is the result of human interaction. Through such interaction, we create certain artifacts, objectify them, internalize them and then take these products for granted. These institutionalized artifacts become “realities,” which is the result of “construction” by participants in a particular society. Since the publication of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s *The Social Construction of Reality* (1967), the term “social construction” has been in the mainstream of the studies of social sciences, including studies in political communication.

Subsection 1 Stages and Types of Social Constructions

According to Berger and Luckmann, there are three stages in the social construction of reality. The first stage is *externalization*, in which we create artifacts through social interaction. In the second stage, *objectivation* occurs when the artifacts appear to take on a reality of their own and become independent of those who created them. Finally, *internalization* is the stage in which we learn such “a reality” about the artifacts through some form of socialization.

Language is a quintessential example of artifact constructed by the participants in a society. In any given society, people create languages through social interaction both in verbal and non-verbal manners. Languages become independent of creators when people notice them and start to use them. Further, we internalize languages by agreeing to follow certain conventions, such as
grammar and correct usage. It is interesting that language is also a strong vehicle of socialization to all aspects of “realities” because language continuously provides us with “necessary objectifications” and posits “the order” in our everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1967, 22). Just as pervasive and obvious as language, money is an obvious example of a social construction because people use money as if it has the constructed value and agree to follow certain rules in its use.

In social construction theory, it should be noted that there are two different “facts.” While the actual conditions and situations are “brute facts,” social institutions or cultural artifacts are called “institutional facts.” Cultural and societal factors are one of the major producers of “institutional facts.” The two kinds of “facts” are not always identical because “brute facts” are not ontologically dependent on “institutional facts,” and vice versa.

The distinction between the two kinds of “facts” is important in understanding less obvious examples of social constructions. These include class, race, religion, and sexuality. The concepts of these may be constructed by society in such a way that certain types of perception (including a stereotyped view) are reinforced, although the “brute facts” belonging to the concepts are different or unchanged. Some of these institutionalized concepts are believed to be arbitrary and even made-up by certain social interactions, regardless of the “brute facts.”

Race and ethnicity is another typical example in researching social construction. Omi and Winant argue that race consciousness is largely a modern phenomenon. According to these scholars, what is important about the
construction of race categories in the United States is that race is a sociohistorical concept, in which racial categories and the meaning of race are given concrete expression by the specific social relations and historical context. Furthermore, they suggest that racial and ethnic categories are significant in that they are constructed in a hierarchy from “superior” to “inferior” (Omi and Winant 2006). In a similar vein, Karen Brodkin illustrates that Jewish people, as well as some other immigrants to the United States in the late 19th century, were once seen as belonging to an “inferior race.” Economic and educational advancements, as well as others, played an integral role in constructing the immigrants as “inferior” and in later “reconstructing” them as white and no longer an inferior ethnic group (Brodkin 2006).

Social construction theory may suggest that there are multiple “realities” even for the same “brute fact.” In other words, “realities” are different in the eyes of each beholder. These multiple “realities” are considered “the Rashomon effect,” named after a famous movie Rashomon (1950). It is the phenomenon by which observers of an event produce a statement bearing substantial differences, although they experienced the same incident.

Subsection 2 Social Constructions of Hate Crime

In order to a give further explanation of social construction theory, I will introduce my study on hate crime legislations in the United States during the late
1990s (Maeshima 2000). I examined the legislation process of two federal hate crime related pieces of legislation: the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 and the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1994. The former is the law to gather data on hate crimes in 50 states. It requires the Justice Department to acquire data on crimes which “manifest prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity” from law enforcement agencies across the country and to publish an annual summary of the findings (28 United State Code 534). The latter attempts to strengthen penalties when criminals commit federal crimes whose motives were based on hate. These were separate legislation, but later this measure was enacted into a part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The provision directed the United States Sentencing Commission to provide a sentencing enhancement of “not less than 3 offense levels for offenses that the finder of fact at trial determines beyond a reasonable doubt are hate crimes” (Public Law 103-222). The two hate crime legislations intended to curb frictions among different racial, ethnic, and religious groups. In a diverse, multi-cultural society, such as the United States, these laws have the potential to act as deterrents against schisms and as a catalyst that will bind people together. The two legislations were enacted; however, I argue that the two Acts are so ineffective that they have been only symbolic rules to fight against hate crimes. Part of the reasons for the complications in actual enforcement of the laws is that there is a grave issue yet to be solved before the bills became laws. The issue in question is related to social constructed images and ideas of a hate crime.
Hate crime is by its nature socially constructed, but among socially constructed concepts, “hate” is not easy to conceptualize. This is because “hate” is rooted in each individuals’ feelings and the definition of hatred varies. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish a real hate crime, caused by a pure hatred toward a particular group, and just law-breaking conduct toward a particular person who happens to be part of the group. Thus, prosecutors and law enforcement officers encountered difficulties in prosecuting hate crime because of the need to identify hate and assess the perpetrator’s bias or prejudice.

Another complication is that the nuance of “hate” is quite different in each region of the United States. Interestingly, after the image of “a hate crime” is widely recognized in a particular area, the offense itself becomes more numerous in that area. This is because both the citizens and the police became well aware of the existence of the nature of hate crime. However, it is noted that the areas where the image is not socially established, the same crime is not the object of a prosecution or an arrest, or even an investigation. Thus, the data collected by the mandate of the Statistics Act are far from accurate. Several states introduced various types of state hate crime acts, but it is common that the details about what constitutes a hate crime are quite different.

Comparison between the states in the Northeast and states in the so-called Deep South gives an explanation for different treatments of hate crime. Northeastern states have a larger number of reported hate crimes. The numbers of reported hate crimes in 1997 in the states of Massachusetts, Maryland were 497 and 335, respectively. These states are generally considered to be sensitive toward
race and ethnic relations among their residents. In contrast, the states in the Deep
South, such as Mississippi or Alabama, reported significantly smaller numbers of
reported hate crime incidents during the same year. In the same year, Alabama
and Mississippi also reported zero hate crimes, and Louisiana reported only five.
Although racial and ethnic tension is much alleviated from what once existed,
these Southern states used to be a pinnacle of racial inequality. For instance,
Alabama is the state about which Martin Luther King lamented strong racial
prejudice in his famous speech in Washington in 1963. In these Southern States,
“hate crime” is not sufficiently socially recognized (Maeshima 2000, Federal
Bureau of Investigation 1998).

Subsection 3  Social Construction Theory and Political Communication

Social construction theory is often adopted in the field of political
communication. Especially, since the 1990s, the social construction of reality has
attracted growing attention in political communication research (see Tuchman
1978, Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, and Sasson
1992). These studies have focused upon news content as a form through which the
mass media view and perceive an event or issue, and how they construe “realities”
in their production process. Using content analysis as a method, these studies seek
to analyze the concepts, categories, and ideologies in news selections and
reporting. They suggest that “newsworthiness” is not a quality inherent in events,
but a negotiated social process between the sources and newsmakers, greatly
constrained by the distribution of the newsmakers in time and space. Gaye Tuchman argues that “news is perpetually defining and redefining, constituting and reconstituting social phenomena” (1978, 184).

Murry Edelman (1988) claims that media news accounts are not simply factual presentations. Rather, such accounts represent an interpretation of the day’s political facts, which are interpretations of issues, events, situations, and problems as generated by interest groups, government officials, and elected representatives among others. According to Edelman, the mass media constructs and reconstructs the world of public affairs, and political news is arranged as a series of dramatic symbols, such as “enemies,” “leaders,” and “problems.” Edelman argues that media accounts evoke a spectacle that is a construction by political actors, including media organizations themselves. Political roles, statuses and ideologies are given certain meanings in the media spectacle.

News selection and treatment are not free from values and ideology. Analyzing the interaction between media professionals and their “sources” in political and state institutions is crucial for understanding the production of media content. Thus, one of the typical ways of analyzing the media's social construction of reality is to investigate the sources used in the reporting. Gamson suggests that the media are likely to selectively omit several important components of the news, and that the absence of certain facts can reveal a story line that favors certain interests (such as industrial interests and bureaucratic process) which the media are representing (Gamson 1989, 158). Sources are chosen based on “suitability” (Gans 1979). Tuchman (1978) traces the organization of the “news-net” through
which reporters find occurrences to be transformed into stories; defines the “web of facticity” that accepts information from legitimated institutions as “facts,” but rejects the facticity of information from other sources. Cohen et al. further point out that social reality is a media product of the interaction between objective reality and a society's own pragmatic and social needs (Cohen, Adoni, and Bantz 1990).

By choosing sources, news media simultaneously conduct processes of “framing.” As defined by Entman (1993), framing essentially involves salience and selection. Noting the impact of frames on the public, Entman wrote, “Frames call attention to some aspects of reality while obscuring other elements, which might lead audiences to have different reactions” (Entman, 1993). Framing is one of the crucial aspects of the media’s social construction of reality; therefore, the construction and impact of media frames have become major areas of research in political communication. Gitlin (1980) introduced the concept of framing to mass communication studies in his classic examination of how an American television network trivialized a major student political movement during the 1960s. News coverage of any social movement can use a variety of framing strategies. The news can describe the scope of the social problem, critique alternative proposals for coping with the problem, or detail the tactical moves of activists and officials. Iyengar (1991) observed that television news frames issues in either an episodic or thematic fashion. Episodic news focuses on concrete events and personalities. Thematic news puts events in a larger social and economic context. According to
Iyenger, television has a need for simplicity and brevity, and thus, episodic framing dominates news coverage.

Another aspect of framing is making “story lines.” Through framing, political elites, including the media, attempt to simplify a complex issue into relatively simple storyline and shape citizens’ political preferences. These storylines are in nature reflected by the elites’ definition about what a public policy issue is about. According to Gamson and Modigliani, through this storyline making, political elites attempt to direct attention toward a particular aspect of a public policy issue and, consequently, away from others. They suggest that the same basic story line is repeated in so many different media that many people are likely to accept it as a common point of reference (Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson 1992).

The concept of social construction is also widely used not only in political communication, but also in public policy analysis. Some studies deal with social constructions as a notion to categorize political participants, created by social or political strata. In Schneider and Ingram’s own definition, “social construction” is certain shared characteristics that connote a discrete social group of positive or negative connotations (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 335). Their definition of social construction focuses on the government’s policy attention, not exclusively on media. According to Schneider and Ingram, this definition of social construction gives rise to a four-cell classification scheme for social groups. Powerful, positively constructed groups are “advantaged;” powerful, negatively constructed groups are “contenders”; weak but positively constructed groups are
called “dependents;” and the unfortunate weak and negatively constructed groups are labeled as “deviants.” Advantaged populations have considerable political power and are positively constructed as meritorious groups. They include scientists, business, veterans, and the elderly. “Contenders” are groups that are powerful, but are constructed as vocal and in some cases greedy strata of society, such as Wall Street investors, savings and loan executives, big labor, and gay and lesbian activists. “Dependants” lack political power and are constructed as good people. Typical examples are children, mentally and physically disabled or sick people. “Deviants” are in the worst situation, as they lack political power and are negatively constructed as undeserving, dangerous, and generally “bad people.” Examples of deviants are criminals, drug dealers, flag-burners, and child-abusers.

This classification then explains how policies allocate burdens and benefits among target populations. “Advantaged” groups, for example, will receive high benefits, low burdens, and control over agendas and policymaking. Deviants, on the other hand, get low benefits and high burdens. This four-cell classification gives rise to potentially testable hypotheses about policy outcomes (Schneider and Ingram 1993).

Section 3 Investigating the Meaning of the Word “Evil” between Cultures

As discussed in Chapter 2, the debate over positivism is deeply rooted in the difficulties of understanding different cultures. The discussion requires scholars working across cultures to be sensitive toward different cultures. When
cross-cultural investigation involves comparing the same word or concept, it can especially pose another complexity. This is because the same word may sometimes have different connotations in different cultures, even if its denotative meaning is similar. In order to further explore the sensitivity of cultures, this section exemplifies different accounts of the notion of “evil” in the Western world and in East Asia, such as Japan. This section concludes that “evilness” may be one of the most socially constructed concepts between the Western world and Japan as well as a very sensitive cultural difference.

Subsection 1  “Evilness” in Judeo-Christianity in the United States

Many textbooks attribute the difference of political culture to beliefs (e.g., Almond et.al. 2003, Chap.3). These textbooks suggest that most parts of the Western world, including the United States, are areas where the cultural influence of Judeo-Christianity is strong. Japan is in the area that is under the influence of Buddhism.

The reality of the cultural influence of religion is not simple in America, but there is no doubt that Christianity is the dominant culture in the United States. America has been enjoying religious plurality since the birth of the country: The first Amendment of the U.S. Constitution declares that there is no single state religion in the United States and respects free exercise of religion. Religious freedom in America has created a wide variety of denominations among Protestants. Major denominations such as Episcopalian, Methodists, American
Lutherans, and Southern Baptists, have exhibited doctrinal and attitudinal differences among Protestantism. Unlike conventional wisdom, American Catholicism is not monolithic, either. Religious behavior within Roman Catholics has been different for each ethnic group, such as Irish and French Canadians, and Italians. Also, the American Catholic church has received a significant number of new members from Asian and Latin American countries for the past 40 years. Along with Protestants and Catholics, Jewish tradition has been very strong, especially in the states of New York and Florida or major big cities. Religions of Native Americans, Amish and others give more colorful ingredients to American religion (Schaefer 2004). Nonetheless, the fact that the United States holds diversity in religions does not mean that American religious concepts are unconnected to each other: the vast majority of the people obviously believe in Judeo-Christianity. According to a data source, a dominant 84.1 percent of Americans are Christians. Adding the 1.9 percent of respondents who are Jewish, the Judeo-Christian tradition is predominant in the United States. If we exclude 9.2 percent of respondents who reported being non-religious, less than five percent of Americans are non-Judeo-Christian. The ratio of Muslim, Buddhists and other religions are 1.5 percent, 0.9 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively (Central Information Agency, 2005). Judeo-Christianity has been a virtual national religion and arguably affected American culture.

One of the manifestations of Judeo-Christian culture in the Western world, including the United States, is the dichotomous view that exists between good and evil. The word “evil” has a very strong connotation because Western
culture is rooted in Christianity. In Western culture, practicing Christianity and leading a daily life based on the Christian ideal is considered “good.” Typical Christian rules, such as found in the Ten Commandments, teach their believers to be “good” and act according to the will of God. In Christianity, the antonym of the word “good” is, of course, “evil.” An aberrant act from “goodness” is believed to be an “evil” deed. Thus, “evil” is a detestable concept, and an “evil” deed is an act of aberration which must be avoided in the Christian societies (Arellano 2004).

In theology, the concepts of evilness and goodness in Christianity are both sides of a coin. Tokiyuki Nobuhara, a philosopher and a scholar of theology, suggests that evil in Christianity is defined as one who acts as if he/she is God. Nobuhara quotes Genesis 3:5 (“For God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.”) and explains that an evil act is to usurp others to believe a wrong deed a good one. Nobuhara also suggests that evilness in Christianity is the opposing concept of goodness, as if on opposite sides of a coin. Thus, according to Nobuhara, evil should not be tolerated in Christianity.)

Subsection 2 “Evilness” in Asian Societies

Concepts about “evil” may be difficult to translate into Asian cultures. Compared with Western ideas, the East Asian concept of “evilness” does not have a strong religious connotation. This is partly because East Asian countries have a
tradition of polytheism or henotheism. Polytheistic or henotheistic religious traditions are widely spread throughout the regions of East Asia. Buddhism and Confucianism, the two most widely accepted religious traditions in East Asia, are considered very inclusive in their beliefs, as opposed to the “mutually-exclusive, either-or values” of monotheistic tradition (Kunihiro 2006). In addition to the two religions, other local polytheistic religious traditions, such as Shintonism in Japan and Shamanism in Korea, have provided historically agnostic cultural backgrounds. Unlike monotheistic religions, such as Christianity and Islam, polytheism acknowledges multiple gods and divinities, and “the good” acts are relative. In polytheistic cultures, the dichotomy between “good-versus-evil” tends to be blurred because people’s belief systems are more likely to accept the relativity of “evilness” (Hawkins 2003; Ooms 1988; Bellah 1957).

C. Fred Alford (1999) examines Korean society where there is no word that equates to the Western term “evil.” Korean term such as “ak” or “saak” mean “very bad,” but they are not what the Western world called “evil.” Alford questions whether there are societies without a sense of "evil" and how such a society sees human nature. He searched for answers in Korea by interviewing two-hundred and fifty Koreans, including thirteen Korean Americans. The interviewees consisted of a wide range of citizens, chosen from economic, political, religious, and demographic cross-sections of Korea. The questions asked in the interviews are about their views on evilness, the self, and globalization. He also asked college students to write an essay about the same questions. Alford talked ---and sometimes ate and drank together as well---with interviewees and
actually found that a nonexistence of evil in the perception of Koreans. The interviews reveals that his initial hypothesis that "evil would be divided into different areas of life governed by different religious principles" (89) was rejected.

Alford argues that Koreans regard evil not as a moral category but as an intellectual one. Alford explains his views: "I do not imagine that I have explained the Korean view of evil. Rather, I have mapped its absence. This map is fundamentally a Western overlay, showing where the East does not match the West. It is all I could do, all any Westerner can do, I believe. The trick is to know it" (7). Alford also discovers the Koreans’ sentiment that evil results from the creation of dualisms, oppositions between people and ideas, and that the content of the Korean view of evil is "the fear of absolute otherness and difference" (12). Interestingly, this fear is not the fear of the other as the Western views it, but the Korean version of the fear is "the fear of becoming other to oneself"(12). Alford also finds in the mind of Koreans that the real evil is "the evil that cannot be spoken: unrelatedness, the dread of absolute alienation and unconnectedness, pure loneliness, absolute difference" (11).

Alford concludes that evil cannot exist in Korea because “Koreans have created a universe in which there is no place for it. . . . the Korean ak and choe are not really about evil at all” (89).” The absence of evil is explained by Koreans’ sentiment toward themselves and social relationship with others. Alford maintains that in Korean such values as chong (affection), han (suffering), and kibum (mood) are held together in the tightly woven social networks; thus; social
relationship is itself “the standpoint of judgment” (94) for Koreans. At the same time, Koreans have a concept of 
uri (we) which shows loose boundaries between the self and the group-self. Similar to this point is that what Koreans fear most is isolation from the group-self and social values associated with it. Alford argues that Koreans are very anxious about domination by individuals other than themselves because it is against their social relationships.

Since the interviews were conducted immediately before and after the economic collapse of December 1997, Alford also found an intriguing fact that related to Koreans’ account for evil. Alford discovered that Koreans’ responses to globalization matched Westerners’ views about evil. Alford argues that globalization threatens to create a world “in which Koreans no longer recognize themselves, in which Koreans are other to themselves” (12). Globalization (segyehawa) to Koreans is evil because it is for Koreans a great failure of the economy which also isolates individuals from close social relationships. Globalization represents “the dangers of atomization, isolation, fragmentation and loss, turning Koreans into strangers in their own world” (145). Thus, Alford suggests that globalization is “what Koreans most fear, becoming alien to themselves, living in a world of pure otherness” (155).

Subsection 3 “Evilness” in the Mixture of Three Religions in Japan

The Japanese society may share very similar views on “evilness” with South Koreans and have different concept on evilness from the Western nations.
This is because of the cultural resemblance between Korea and Japan. Just like Korea, eclectic mixtures of religion co-exist in Japan as well. For Japanese people, the good-versus-evil dichotomy is sometimes blurred, compared with Western nations whose dominant cultural root is in Christianity, and the word “evil” is quite a relative and nuanced term. However, Japanese cultural traditions have created different notions of “evilness” among their mixture of religions.

Unlike the United States, one of the complications to understanding the in the Japanese sense of religion is that there is no single dominant religious tradition. Buddhism has a strong influence in Japan, but Japanese sense of religion has not been molded by the teachings of Buddha only. Japanese religious traditions are an eclectic mixture of Buddhism, Shintoism (or Shinto), and Confucianism.

In addition to the fact that no single religion is exclusively pervasive in Japan, but it is also true that Japanese religious traditions may appear as a form of cultural manner, sometimes without involving any religious rituals. As discussed above, a vast majority of the citizens in Japan suggest that they do not have beliefs in any particular organized religions. While 78.8 percent of the people in the United States reply that they believe in organized religions, only 37.8 percent in Japan do so (Ukai et.al 2007, 49).

Nonetheless, many scholars suggest that Japanese citizens are as religious as Westerners, such as Americans, and conduct rituals based on their beliefs without being aware of what the beliefs are. Buddhism, Shintoism, and Confucianism each have understandings of evil respectively. In the Japanese
sense of religion, there is not much of a dichotomous relationship between good and evil. Goodness and evilness have a relative relation in Japanese religious tradition, compared with Christianity.

Among the three religions, Shintoism has a strong influence on the Japanese concept of evilness because its main principle deals with evilness in the Japanese sense. Shintoism (or Shinto) is the indigenous religion of Japan and involves the worship of spirits known as *kami*. Shintoism has no founder and no official scripture, except books about collections of ancient legends. In the beliefs of Shintoism, there is an equivalent of good and evil dichotomy in Christianity: Shintoism put an emphasis on the distinction between *hare* (“cleanliness”) and *ke* (“filth”), and *ke* (“filth”) is supposed to be purified (Tanaka 2007).

Evilness in Buddhism may be a more nuanced term. A Buddhist should not create the illusion of permanence because everything is transitory. Thus, enlightenment in Buddhist life will be achieved by non-attachment to things and equanimity. The stage of enlightenment in Buddhism is called “emptiness,” which may be equivalent to goodness in Christianity and purity in Shintoism. “Emptiness” in Buddhism does not connote futility. Instead, “emptiness” is a very positive word with the sense of non-attachment to a worldly existence. Reversely, the antonym of “emptiness” in Buddhism is a wondering mind which has no sense of achievement. There are many denominations in Buddhism and many terms are attached to the antonym of “emptiness,” but one of the most famous one is called *mumyo* in Zen Buddhism. *Mumyo* includes the wondering mind that controls and
unnecessary kills animated lives, including human beings, animals and even
vegetations (Suzuki 1994). Thus, an evil act is to resort violence.

Another Buddhist denomination does not only have the dichotomy
between the evil and the good dichotomy, but also embraces it. It is interesting
that some denominations of Buddhism in Japan even welcome evilness. Shinran,
founder of Pure Land Buddhism (Jyodo Shinshu) in the 13th century, suggested
that an evil human being should be saved by praying. Shinran believes that the
persons who are benefited most by Amida-nyorai (Buddhist main deity), are evil
persons. According to Shinran, Amida-nyorai is so benevolent that evil persons,
such as those who committed crimes, can be saved, as well as good persons who
are naturally protected by Amida-nyorai (Hirota 2000). Pure Land Buddhism has
been a strong influence in Japan, and most recently, Itsuki Hiroyuki, a popular
novelist, wrote a best selling book about Shinran’s ideas (Itsuki 2005). The book
was translated into English and sold in the United States (Itsuki 2006).

Confucianism was partially developed as a strategy for political leaders.
Since the development of Confucianism is different from Shintonism and
Buddhism, both of which is a religion for common citizens, the notion of evilness
in Confucianism is quite unique. Confucianism puts an emphasis on the notion of
rei (ritual; rei in Japanese and Korean, li in Chinese), and the action against rei is
regarded as an evil deed in Confucianism.

Rei has a broad significance and can mean everything from etiquette to
protocol to principle, but the core of li is the rationality. If a leader takes a
common-sensical approach in the process of actions, the results will be orderly.
One of the most famous scholars of Confucianism, Herbert Fingarette (1972) claims for Confucius, \textit{rei} is not only the catalogue of our ceremonial duties, but descriptive and normative of all of the actions we perform in our interpersonal relations as well. Observing table manners, using correct forms of address and wearing proper clothing are all forms of practicing \textit{rei}, as is a minister following the right protocol in raising a petition to the ruler, or a ruler going through the appropriate steps of consulting his ministers before enacting a new policy. Thus not only does it establish an order of priority and authority, thus enforcing the social hierarchy, but also provides a way of communication and negotiating between people of different stations.

\textit{Section 4 Evilness in the war in Iraq: Cultural Comparison between the U.S. and Japan}

Based upon the different concept of evilness between the U.S., a Christian society, and Japan, I claim that evilness as it relates to the Iraq War may be socially constructed and different.

There are many discussions about the influence of culture on recent important incidents in the world, including the 9-11 attacks and the Iraq War. The central theme of these debates about the U.S. invasion into Iraq is it that it was partially motivated by the religious difference between Christianity and Islam. These discussions often ask explanations from past works of political culture. Two of these studies have received international attention: \textit{The Clash of}
Civilization by Samuel Huntington and Jihad vs. McWorld by Benjamin Barber. The former focuses on cultural difference among nations and suggests that the post Cold War era is an era of conflict among five civilizations (Western, Orthodox, Latin America, Muslim, Hindu, China, Japan, and Africa). The latter deals with struggles between ever-increasing globalization of American culture and economy (McWorld) and the passion to fight against it (Jihad). Both bestsellers directly and indirectly discussed the cultural discrepancies of religious norms between Christianity and Islam.

One of the most respected Japanese religious scholars, Tetsuo Yamaori frequently suggests that the monotheistic nature in both Christianity and Islam may create dichotomous “us vs. them” stereotypes. Yamaori claims that the dichotomy between good and evil in the U.S. and Iraq government may be a part of the reason behind the Iraq War (e.g. Yamaori 2004, Chap.7; Yamaori and Ishii 2007).

Whether Yamaori’s suggestion is accurate or not, the rhetoric of the U.S. government especially during the run-up period to the Iraq War is dominated by a good-evil dichotomy. During this period, the oppressive Saddam Hussein regime and terrorists were considered “evildoers,” and the citizens of the United States personifications of “goodness.” As in Christianity, there was a clear dichotomy between the good and the evil: both situated at completely opposite sides.

The dichotomous view about the Iraq War was most represented by President Bush’s remarks in the State of the Union Speech in 2002 (January 29, 2002). Now famous, the phrase “an axis of evil” was coined for this speech. Bush
first refers to oppressive states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, and their terrorist allies calling them “an axis of evil,” which arm to threaten the peace of the world. Bush also elucidates as follows:

Our enemies believed America was weak and materialistic, that we would splinter in fear and selfishness. They were as wrong as they are evil. The American people have responded magnificently, with courage and compassion, strength and resolve. As I have met the heroes, hugged the families, and looked into the tired faces of rescuers, I have stood in awe of the American people.... None of us would ever wish the evil that was done on September the 11th. Yet after America was attacked, it was as if our entire country looked into a mirror and saw our better selves. We were reminded that we are citizens, with obligations to each other, to our country, and to history. We began to think less of the goods we can accumulate, and more about the good we can do.

President Bush’s speech has similarities with sermons in Christianity. Bush further delivers views on the cultural importance of being “good.”

This time of adversity offers a unique moment of opportunity -- a moment we must seize to change our culture. Through the gathering momentum of millions of acts of service and decency and kindness, I know we can overcome evil with greater good. And we have a great opportunity during
this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting peace.... The last time I spoke here, I expressed the hope that life would return to normal. In some ways, it has. In others, it never will. Those of us who have lived through these challenging times have been changed by them. We've come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real, and it must be opposed. Beyond all differences of race or creed, we are one country, mourning together and facing danger together. Deep in the American character, there is honor, and it is stronger than cynicism. And many have discovered again that even in tragedy -- especially in tragedy -- God is near.

Nobuhara suggested in an interview that the American invasion into Iraq may reflect the view of a dichotomy between “us vs. them.” The U.S. government has committed an evil deed in the sense that the war has been killing many citizens and U.S. soldiers. However, the invasion has been rationalized by the U.S. government, with the argument that it wants to save the Western civilization by ousting the Hussein regimen and securing oil source in Iraq. Nobuhara claims that the President Bush’s memorial speech in Washington National Cathedral soon after the 9-11 incidents was so significant partly because it had strong biblical connotations, and partly because it was delivered at the most significant Christian sanctuary.

As opposed to Bush’s speech, Japanese culture usually does not accept dichotomous view between us vs. them. Yoshimi Nakamura, a scholar of
intercultural communication, suggested in an interview that the emphasis on “cleanness” and “pureness,” both of which are the most basic principles of Shintoism, affect Japanese views of the Iraq War. According to Nakamura, “cleanness” in Shinto connotes “pureness” in mind. For example, when a person helps others, the important point in Shintoism is not only the action of him/her, but the intention of the actor. Being altruistic to help others without intending to receive his/ her rewards by doing so represents “pureness” and “cleanness” in Shintoism. Reversely, the scheme to frame someone is “impure” and “filthy” action. Nakamura claims that that the action of the U.S. invasion into Iraq is, in a Shinto sense, very “filthy” because the intention to initiate the war is not “pure” at all: the U.S. attack of Iraq is a scheme that was partially motivated by interest in oil. Nakamura notes that no matter how the U.S. government logically presents their version of official reasons the start of the war (e.g., disarming Iraq’s weapon of mass destruction and liberating Iraqi citizens), the intention to invade is still impure. Nakamura suggests: “I believe there may be other factors, such as securing oil source, in the U.S. decision to attack Iraq. Thus, many Japanese feel the U.S. invasion was ‘filthy’ in the Shinto sense.”

Nakamura further suggests that the above-mentioned Shinto mentality has clearly affected the portrayals of the Japanese press about the war in Iraq. Therefore, Nakamura claims that the Japanese media, including the Asahi, doubted the U.S. action from the beginning and have been very negative about the Iraq War and its aftereffects. Nobuhara also agrees with Nakamura’s view on the interpretation of the Japanese media’s critical perspectives about the Iraq War.
Nobuhara goes further to explain that the Japanese media may believe that the “filthy” U.S. intentions to invade Iraq must be “purified.”

Several interviewees agree that there was a Shinto influence on Japanese view about the Iraq War. Journalist B claims: “although we are mostly unaware of the fact, “filthiness” in Shinto is underlying in our mind every time we cover stories. The U.S. actions in Iraq were not pure at all, especially the U.S. has a strong interest in oil in the Middle East.” Hiroyasu Komine, a political scientist, suggested in an interview that another Japanese tradition may be intertwined with Shinto tradition. Komine notes: “Japanese has a tradition to prefer losers than a strong winner (hangan biiki), the media may treat the U.S. much worse than it should be in reality. In addition to this, I guess we have a natural sense of Shinto about which side is pure or filthy.”

Along with Shintoism, Buddhism appears to have a certain influence on the attitude of Japanese press about the Iraq War. One of the main tenents of Buddhism is its non-violence. Non-violence of Buddhism comes from its acceptance of relativity: there are “others” whom we cannot understand, but the importance lies on acknowledging existence of discrepancies and agreeing onto co-existence. Resorting to violence is not the solution. Even the current world has enough amount full of pain, therefore, acceptance of “others” is one way to easy the pain (King 1990). Yamaori further suggests that Buddhism may be a good solution to avoid such stereotypes because of its non-violence and acceptance of differences. As discussed above, Yamaori believes a part of the reasons for the
Iraq War are the stereotypes in monotheism such as Christianity and Islam and their “good versus evil” mentality (Yamaori 2004).

Nobuhara suggested in his interview that the American invasion into Iraq may be equal to an act of *mumyo*. As discussed above, *mumyo* refers to a wondering mind that controls and unnecessary kills. *Mumyo* provides a karma so that one cannot escape from past deeds. Nobuhara claimed that the Japanese press referred to the aftermath of the war even before the beginning of the war: the bad actions in the Iraq War will haunt America as *karma* into the next generation.

Although Journalist A may be skeptical about the Shinto influence, he strongly agrees about the Buddhist interpretation of the Iraq War. Journalist A claims: “I am not sure how other journalists think, but I personally do not distinguish things between pure and filthy when I report news. Nonetheless, I believe in Buddhist non-violence. One of the most basic approaches of my report is, similar to my idea of anti-war, non-violent solutions to conflict. Whenever I report on some conflicts---whether they are domestic or international, I attempt to frame news to say that violence should not be the solution.”

Another Japanese religion, Confucianism may strongly condition Japanese view of the Iraq War. One of the most important lessons in Confucianism is to keep harmony and order. For the purpose of realizing a harmonious situation, Confucianism put an emphasis on the procedure and a rule to govern a political system. The procedure and the rule are supposed to be common sensical. Confucianism has been developed for political leaders as
strategies to govern. Asian political leaders have used its status quo approach and attempted to govern their countries (de Bary 2000). The U.S. invasion into Iraq was completely against the Confucian ideal of harmony. The decision to start the war was very ideological and an unruly action. Thus, Nakamura suggests that in the Confucius sense, the war is not permissible.

It seems that this sense also provides the basis for Japanese journalism. Several Japanese journalists I interviewed agreed to the notion of the Confucian ideal and were critical against the U.S. decision to start the Iraq War. Journalist C claims: “I guess the Confucian tradition is so invisible that I was not aware of it. But, if I refer to Asian ideas, such as the ideals of Confucianism. President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq was very juvenile. If he had been more prudent, there would not have such as large number of deaths away U.S. soldiers after the end of the initial combat.” Journalist A refers to the general mindsets of Japanese journalists about the Iraq War: “Japanese journalists tend to be anti-war. This is partly because most of us are Buddhists whose most important lesson is non-violence, partly because we are Confucian who believe a harmonious world is desirable. Contrary to our views, U.S. policies about Iraq have appeared to be very self-centered and unwise.” Journalist D also agrees with other journalists: “I believe the procedure and process to negotiate is important in Confucianism. In the Iraq War, the U.S. government’s negotiations were not refined. The Bush administration should have talked more effectively with both Saddam Hussein and other UN Council member countries.”
As discussed above, “evilness” may be one of the most socially constructed concepts in the Western world and Japan as well as a very sensitive part of their cultural differences. Also, different views about the Iraq War between the U.S. and Japan may be derived from their different conceptions of evilness.

Japanese religious notions are not unrelated to the anti-war sentiment. As discussed in Chapter nine, warfare has been negatively viewed by the public in Japan since World War II. War has become a socially constructed taboo in the post-War period of Japan. Buddhist ideals resurged and became very influential immediately after the defeat of World War II. John Dower (1999) finds a parallel between the idea of Shinran, the founder of the True Pure Land Sect, the most popular Buddhist denomination, and the zeitgeist of World War II. According to Dower, Japan and Japanese embraced their own defeat and desperately transcended themselves by accepting the anti-war sentiment (496-503). Similar to Dower, Journalist E stresses the influence of Buddhism in the Japanese public after World War II: “Every religion advocates the importance of loving others. I suppose, however, in many religions the love reaches usually only to the believers of the religions or toward all humans. One of the most important points of Buddhism is the mercy to all lives, including not only human beings, but also animals and vegetations. This benevolence may be something to do with the anti-militarism in Japan.”

Some of the Asahi’s articles analyzed in this work are clearly influenced by Japanese religious values. The Asahi frequently argues in their articles about the limitation of monotheism and its dichotomous views of good versus evil, as if
the paper accepted Yamaori’s suggestions. A typical story about the criticism is
the limitation of the monotheism found in the editorial on January 1, 2003. This
editorial is about the news that the animated film, *Spirited Away*, by Hayao
Miyazaki won the Golden Bear Award at the Berlin Film Festival.

After explaining the plot of the film that a girl was abducted to another
world and found that myriad gods/monsters are living their lives with their crude
nature, the editorial explains the importance of accepting the weakness and
loneliness of the monsters: “In much of the world, there are many other monsters,
filled with contradictions and sorrows, causing trouble to other people. But, they
cannot be controlled simply by force or by hatred. That seems to be the message
we can take from *Spirited Away*. Much has been made of a “clash of civilizations”
in the context of the clashes of the monotheistic religions of Islam, Judaism and
Christianity. These religions hold that their god is absolute.” The editorial quoted
Takeshi Umehara, a famous philosopher, and claims that what the world needs
now is a polytheistic ideology that believes that gods are everywhere—in the
forests and in the mountains. The editorial further argues: “Japanese, with an
ancient legacy of polytheism, encountered tragedies from trying to set up, as it
were, a monotheistic religious state after the Meiji Period. It seems Japan needs to
take advantage of that bitter lesson—to make good use of the spirit of myriad gods.
We need to look squarely at the harsh reality of the world around us. In doing so,
however, we need to keep a level-headed, flexible perspective.”

During the Iraq War, the Japanese citizens are repeatedly reminded of the
“evilness” of warfare. The underlying factor of the anti-militarism of the media as
well as public may be attributed to cultural differences, particularly the religious ones. This cultural reason may be combined with the historical experiences that have made anti-militarism very dominant in Japan. In this way, the notion of “evilness” in Japan may be social constructed.

Section 5 Conclusion

One of the main arguments in this section is that both American and Japanese senses of evilness derive from their own religious traditions. Thus, the actions or notions against their religious beliefs are considered “evil” in both the Western world and Japan. Nonetheless, the evilness between the Western world and Japan is different because actions that their religious traditions regard as “evil” may not always overlap. The two countries have different notions of “evilness,” molded by different religious traditions. More importantly, this chapter argues that because of the different notions of evilness are central to media coverage of the Iraq War. I conclude that the notion of “evilness” is socially constructed in the two countries and that this notion may affect the portrayals of journalists both in Japan and in the United States. Finally, I conclude that the notion of “evilness” is socially constructed in the two countries.
Chapter 10: Analyzing the Reasons for Difference between the Two Media (3): Difference of Public Opinion

Chapter ten explores another factor that may affect the two print media organizations’ different perspectives about the Iraq War: public opinion formation. More specifically, this chapter investigates interrelationships among the public policy process, public opinion and news media coverage about the war in Iraq. I use statistical methods to analyze the congruence between the trends of news about the war and changes in public opinion. Special attention is paid to the Japanese media’s negativity toward American Iraq policies.

Although this chapter addresses the second and third research questions of this dissertation, the chapter uses a separate research design from that employed in other parts of this work. The separate research design requires more detailed research questions and hypotheses than those used above. In order to generate more specific research questions and more operational hypotheses to test, this chapter first examines previous studies that have been conducted on the relationship between public opinion and the media.

The research question is whether a leading newspaper’s negativity on particular issues affects the views of citizens. Based on this research question, four hypotheses are tested, and three are confirmed. First, poll data concerning the Japanese sentiments about the United States worsens when the ratio of negative stories about U.S. policies the Asahi carries becomes higher. Second, the Asahi’s oppositional treatments of the Japanese government’s Iraq policies deteriorate
public support for the Koizumi Cabinet. Third, there is moderate congruence between the New York Times’ unfavorable coverage of the U.S. governmental policies on Iraq and U.S. presidential approval ratings. In contrast to these, one hypothesis is rejected: the Asahi’s negative contents toward United States policies over Iraq do not have much affect on the popularity of the Koizumi Cabinet in Japan, except for the period during which the Cabinet pronounced its strong support for the actions of the United States in the Iraq War. This study further discovers that the U.S. presidential approval ratings during the year of 2004 have a certain congruence with Japanese sentiments about the United States.

Section 1 Public Opinion, the Media and the Policy Process

This chapter at first briefly reviews the political science literature addressing the connections among public opinion and the media. The notion that public opinion conditions public policy is appealing. Democratic theory presupposes that citizens will make informed choices about the issues of the day. Citizens expect their views to be considered in public policy because their political leaders are chosen to represent and serve the interest of their constituencies. Several scholars, however, believe that this premise of democratic theory does not hold well. These scholars assume that people do not possess even the most elementary knowledge about politics. In his class study, The American People and Foreign Policy (1960), Gabriel Almond argues that public opinion is often swayed by the pervasive and destructive nature of "mood swings."
Vulnerable opinions especially exist in the lower social strata that feel powerless. Unlike the premise of democratic theory, Almond concludes that public reaction to foreign policy is moody, rather than thoughtful. The mood may vary from indifference to fatalism to anger, but it is almost always a "superficial and fluctuating response." (9) More recent studies, however, discover a certain rationality to public sentiments. Shapiro and Page (1992) discover that public attitudes change, but even in the short run they are less erratic than often presumed. Page and Shapiro find that American collective public opinion about issues ranging from racial equality to the MX missile, welfare to abortion are remarkably coherent, notwithstanding fluctuations in the opinions of individuals. Their research also indicates that changes in public attitudes are quite reasonable instead of being volatile and meaningless and should not be attributed to shifts in “mood.”

To those who are involved in politics, public opinion polls have a huge impact on the initiation of new policies. Thus, political leaders have attempted to influence the public and generate a wider support. All of these actions are to exert their political agenda. Samuel Kernell calls this strategy “going public” (Kernell 1997). According to Kernell, “going public” is a presidential strategy when he promotes himself and his policies among Washington elites by appealing to the American public for support (1). Kernell argues that the popularity of presidential initiatives is linked to public evaluation of the president himself. Kernell finds that presidents have gradually replaced the earlier “bargaining” style with “going public” in the last 50 years. Recent examples, such as President Clinton’s
unprecedented amount of travel outside of Washington, illustrate the process and serve as a basis to compare Clinton's style with those of his recent predecessors. According to Kernell, this public leadership strategy is necessary because modern presidential-congressional relations have become very tense. Congress has been in an era of “individualized pluralism” where members of Congress are essentially free agents that can be persuaded to ignore traditional institutional attachments in favor of public pressure from constituents and interest groups.

Besides Kernell, a number of scholars have focused on the use of presidential electronic communication as a political tool to overcome congressional opposition (e.g. Tulis 1987; Lowi 1985). Instead of trying to negotiate with congressional leaders, these scholars also suggest that presidents now appeal to the country by “going public” using electronic media, such as television. If the president is popular, the public is likely to rally around him, making it difficult for the Congress to deny approval. Even before presidents go public, the possibility of such action may persuade members of Congress to succumb to presidential wishes.

Because of the political leaders’ role of “going public,” several scholars have analyzed the rhetoric of political executives, primarily at the presidential level (Hart 1984, Edelman 1988). The interest in this has been based on the assumption that presidential messages are potent political stimuli because they emanate from the top official of the country. The power or lack of power of the message sender is transferred to the message itself. According to this point of
view, one needs to know the senders' political role and orientation to accurately interpret message meanings.

The popularity of political leaders, however, is not a constant. Every U.S. president and Japanese prime minister has seen his approval ratings wax and wane in public opinion polling for several reasons. Many scholars of public opinion claim that people’s views are closely linked to the public policy process. Public opinion is, therefore, a referendum of their political leaders’ performance in public policy (Ostrom and Simon 1985, Mackuen 1983, Lewis-Beck 1988). Some scholars even found that the public is swayed, in some cases purposefully manipulated, by the public policies their political leaders created. Brace and Hinckley (1992) find a danger of the so-called public relations presidency. Brace and Hinckley address the democratic implications of the proliferation of opinion polls in relation to the executive branch. Specifically, they analyzed how the presidents’ daily activities affect their subsequent approval ratings and pondered the strength of the democratic linkage between American presidents and citizens. According to Brace and Hinckley, the presidents’ major domestic policy addresses and foreign travel are “curiously timed to accord with month-to-month changes in approval ratings” (55). The use of military force abroad, foreign policy addresses, and international “rally points” (dramatic, or dramatized events that include but are not limited to the use of force) are more likely to occur in the immediate aftermath of negative, dramatic domestic events (e.g., white House scandals) or amid worsening economic conditions. The authors suggest that these foreign policy activities are preemptive strikes taken to prevent a drop in the
presidents’ approval ratings that would otherwise follow such negative events. The problem with all this, Brace and Hinckley explain, is that decisions and actions based on what is popular are not necessarily in the best interest of the nation; they may even conflict with what the public actually wants. Thus, the scholars’ conclusion is that modern presidents concerned about their popularity may find that the polls control them more than they control the polls. Democracy is not well served in either case. Brace and Hinckley conclude that we should lower our expectations regarding the level of support an incumbent president would receive.

Studies of policy process models stress the role of public opinion and the media. One of the famous models that deal with public opinion is the “punctuated equilibrium” model proposed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). Baumgartner and Jones claim that in the agenda setting stage of public policymaking, issue changes may occur through two distinctly different, yet not mutually exclusive processes. One is an incremental change, the other is a dramatic one. Baumgartner and Jones suggest that the balance of political power between groups of interests remains relatively stable over long periods of time; however, the balance is punctuated by relatively sudden shifts in public opinion on particular policy problems. The shifts are created first by greater media attention to an issue. Media attention to issues can grow when small but compelling or influential groups of people tell of problems with a policy to which members of the policy community do not effectively respond. When the “equilibrium” of policy process is “punctuated” by a drastic change, Baumgartner and Jones argue that the “policy monopoly” held
by a particular policy community breaks down. Public opinion and the media coverage on particular issues are the key to the break down of the “equilibrium” in the policy process and of the “policy monopoly” of the established policy community.

As Baumgartner and Jones suggest, both public opinion and the media are important actors that form and change the process of public policy. Also, the media is generally assumed to be an important factor in shaping public opinion. Thus, the media’s agenda-setting role has become an area of increasing interest in political communication studies. At the same time, the contents of the media are presumed to be reflected by public opinion. To some scholars, such as Walter Lippmann, the media is tantamount to public opinion (Lippmann 1922, 1997). Arguably, the influence of the media on the policy process is enormous. Thus, the media’s portrayal of the Iraq War---the topic that this study deals with---is potentially a very important factor shaping public opinion and the political agenda.

As discussed in chapter two, columnist Paul Krugman suggests an intriguing argument in the New York Times (Krugman 2003). Krugman believes that the division between the United States and Europe on the Iraq War was partly created by different public opinion. According to Krugman, the difference in public sentiments was formed by different portrayals of the media between America and Europe. He provides two possible theories for the “great trans-Atlantic media divide.” One idea is that European media presented the news about the Iraq War with blatant anti-American bias. Another account is that U.S. media
organizations became shameless cheerleaders for American governmental actions in Iraq. It is not the purpose for this work to examine the validity of the two theories, but the basic tenent of Krugman’s theories is very persuasive: the media may affect public opinion and vice versa.

Arguably, the Iraq War is not a popular battle in international media around the world partly because the cause of the conflict itself is controversial and partly because the U.S. policies toward Iraq did not receive the full-fledged support of the United Nations. According to critics, the Bush administration hastily started to attack Iraq without obtaining clear evidence about Saddam Hussein’s plot to make Weapons of Mass Destruction. Since Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq were not found even after the initial combat, public distrust of U.S. Iraq policy has grown. Further, the alleged connections between Al Qaeda and Iraq turned out to be incomplete and unreliable. Thus, many critics around the world suggest that the war was actually a purposeful act of invasion into Iraq. Also, prior to the war, so-called, neo-conservation strata (the neo-con) both inside and outside of the Bush administration clearly suggested an aggressive military policy toward Iraq in order to secure the national interests of the United States. This has created the conspiracy-theory-type argument that the Bush administration intentionally started the war in order to secure its Middle-East military dominance and the Middle East’s energy supplies.
Section 2 Research Design

Based upon the above-mentioned literature reviews, specific research questions and testable hypotheses are formed. Two major assumptions for these studies are: (1) that the media provide information that affects the formation of public opinions; and (2) that the media has the power of agenda-setting among the public. Several pools of data are gathered for testing the hypotheses. The major research questions and hypothesis addressed in this chapter are as follows:

Research Question 2-3: What was the possible cause of the differences between the two countries’ media? Was the role of public opinion a major factor?

Research Question 3: What are the ramifications of the differences in media content? Especially how much is public opinion in both the United States and Japan influenced by differences in media content?

Hypothesis 3: Differences in the level of sympathy towards U.S. policies about Iraq in the U.S. and Japanese press are caused by the differences of support for the war by their publics.

Since the type of analysis of this chapter is quantitative in nature, more specific research questions and more operational hypotheses than those presented in earlier chapters are needed. The more detailed research questions and hypotheses are discussed below.
Subsection 1 More Specific Research Questions

As some of the most renowned and most representative media in Japan and the United States, the Asahi and the New York Times may affect the views of people. The research question is whether a leading newspaper’s negativity on particular issues affects the views of citizens. The underlying concern is that the differences of the portrayals of the war may create different public opinion.

Specifically, there are four questions. First, how do the Asahi’s negative stories of U.S.-Iraq policies affect the views of the Japanese public about the United States? The second and third questions are whether the Asahi’s negative treatments of the U.S. and Japanese policies on Iraq influenced public support for the Koizumi Cabinet? Fourth how do the New York Times negative articles about U.S. policies on Iraq sway public support for the Bush presidency?

Subsection 2 More Operational Hypotheses

Corresponding to the above-mentioned research questions, four hypotheses can be designated. First, it is hypothesized that the Asahi’s negative treatment of U.S. policy may generate negative public view on the United States. Second, it is assumed that the negative treatment of U.S. policy on Iraq by the Asahi may cause a lack of public support for the Koizumi Cabinet. Third, the Asahi’s opposition toward Koizumi’s policies on the war produces lower approval
ratings of his cabinet. Fourth, it is also supposed that unhelpful coverage of U.S. Iraq policies by the New York Times may influence support for President Bush.

The four hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 1:
The more negative the treatment of U.S. Iraq War policies is in the Asahi, the smaller is the number of Japanese who feel favorable to the United States.

Hypothesis 2:
The more negative the treatment of U.S. Iraq War policies is in the Asahi, the smaller is the number of Japanese who feel supportive of the Koizumi Cabinet.

Hypothesis 3:
The more negative the treatment of U.S. Iraq War policies is in the Asahi, the smaller is the number of Japanese citizens who feel supportive of the Koizumi Cabinet.

Hypothesis 4:
The more negative the treatment of U.S. Iraq War policies is in the New York Times, the fewer is the number of Americans who feel supportive of the Bush Presidency.
Subsection 3 Data

Along with content analysis, several pools of public opinion data were gathered for this analysis. The following five types of data that were used for examining the hypotheses: a) content analysis of *the New York Times* around the period of the Iraq War, b) content analysis of *the Asahi* around the period of the Iraq War, c) Japanese public opinion about the United States, d) Japanese Cabinet approval ratings, and e) U.S. Presidential approval ratings. In all of the above, the timeline of analysis is from Oct. 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004.

(1) Japanese Public Opinion Poll

This chapter uses the two pools of data gathered by *The Jiji Press (Jiji Tsushin sha)* in Japan. *The Jiji Press* is the second largest wire service company in Japan after the Kyodo News Service. The first data is about the public approval ratings for the Koizumi Cabinet. *The Jiji Press* conducts the survey on the second Saturday in every month. During the period of analysis, the highest point is 56 (November 2002) and the lowest point is 36 (December 2004). Throughout Prime Minister Koizumi’s term, his Cabinet received a very warm welcome by the Japanese. When Koizumi took office in the spring of 2001, his Cabinet’s popularity was more than 70 points. The Koizumi Cabinet is the second most popular Cabinet (average 48.8 point) among the 19 past Cabinets from 1960. Although the Hosokawa Cabinet in the early 1990s received the highest in
popularity (average 59 point), Hosokawa’s term was short-lived (8 months). Since the Koizumi Cabinet lasted the third longest (65 months) in history, Prime Minister Koizumi’s popularity is remarkable. (Hirama 2004, Maeda 2005)

The second poll is about the Japanese sentiment toward the United States. Since this poll is unique in character, there is a need for a detailed explanation. The Jiji Press has been conducting a public opinion poll about favorable and unfavorable feelings towards foreign countries. Japanese sentiment about the United States is a portion of this poll. The poll has only two questions. One asks a respondent to pick three countries that he/she feels “favorable” toward among ten countries that are on a prepared list. The other asks the respondent to choose three “unfavorable” countries among the same ten countries. The ten countries include the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland, India, China, the Republic of Korea, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The polls are conducted monthly by face-to-face interviews between Jiji representatives and 2,000 respondents randomly selected from every prefecture in Japan. The data is summarized by the percent of respondents who pick a particular country as a “favorable” or “unfavorable” country. Since the original poll, which was started in 1960 with a brief termination in the spring of 1970, the cumulative data is a good indicator about Japanese sentiment toward particular countries.

This study focuses on the percent of respondents who chose the United States either as a “favorable” or “unfavorable” country. During the period of analysis, the highest point of Japanese favorability toward the United States was
recorded in July 2003 (43 points) and the lowest point was witnessed in October 2004 (31 points). In contrast, the month of May 2004 (15 points) recorded the highest percentage of the respondents who had an unfavorable image toward the United States, and the month of December 2002 had the least unfavorable rating toward the United States among Japanese.

During this research period, the United States was the second most favored country after Switzerland. Unlike the United States, many Japanese do not regularly receive much news about Switzerland. Thus, one may wonder why that country is more favored than the United States about which there is an inundation of information about in the media. Since the polls do not ask respondents about the reason for their choice, it is assumed that the “peaceful” image of the mountainous country may have contributed to the good image of Switzerland. Katumi Muoya, who did research about the Jiji poll data during the past 45 years (from June 1960 to May 2005), claims that the Japanese favorable image of Switzerland in part comes from its politics of permanent neutrality (Muoya 2005). Muoya also finds that the 45-year average point of Japanese favorability to the United States is 31. Thus, it is considered that Japanese sentiment toward the United States during the period of this study is considered relatively favorable.

(2) The U.S. Presidential Approval Rating

This study uses data from the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press for data on U.S. Presidential popularity. The Center is a non-profit and
non-partisan research institute and has conducted a wide range of public opinion polls. During the period of analysis, the highest approval rating was 74 (April 9, 2003) and the lowest was 43 (April 1-4, 2004). Prior to the period of research, President Bush’s popularity recorded its highest point soon after the 9-11 incidents (86 point, September 21-25, 2001). After that, his popularity gradually declined as time passed.

**Section 3 Results**

This section discusses the results of the tests of the four hypotheses. Although hypothesis 2 is not verified, hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 are confirmed. Additionally, this section explains the implications of the results in the public policy process, and the possible limitation of this research.

Among the four tests, hypothesis 1 is relatively clearly proven. The poll data about the Japanese sentiments about the United States deteriorates as the ratio of negative stories of U.S. policies *the Asahi* carries becomes higher (Figure 2). The correlation coefficient between them is -.77 and is statistically significant. Figure 2 indicates that there is a clear relationship between the amount of negative coverage of the Iraq War and the decline in the positive image of the United States among Japanese. The more the Iraq War receives negative treatment by *the Asahi*, the less the Japanese feel favorable to the United States. Four periods need to be paid attention to. First, toward the time the Iraq War started (the end of March 2003), the negative news of the U.S. policies surges in number. Japanese
sentiments toward the United States corresponded to the change. Second, the media became less negative during the short period around the time when the actual battle ended in the early part of May 2003.

![Figure 2: Testing Hypothesis 1](image)

The data of favorability also improved by a few points during this period. Third, both Japanese sentiment toward the United States and *The Asahi*’s treatment of U.S. policy toward Iraq turned substantively sour soon after the end of the actual battle. Fourth, both data were temporally ameliorated in January 2004. Fifth, the former ratings returned until they hit bottom in October 2004. The data of November 2004 shows a slight surge, but still it is very small in number.

The test results of Hypothesis 2 and 3 exhibit interesting discord. Figure 3 suggests that the monthly approval ratings of the Koizumi Cabinet during the period of study are relatively stable. *The Asahi*’s negative coverage toward U.S. Iraq policies, however, has more fluctuations, with a tendency of gradual decline.
throughout the period of analysis. The Asahi’s negative content toward United States policies about Iraq do not have a large impact upon the popularity of the Koizumi Cabinet in Japan. The correlation coefficient between them is -.11 and is not statistically significant enough. Thus, hypothesis 2 is rejected.

Figure 3: Testing Hypothesis 2

In contrast to this result, the Asahi’s oppositional treatments of the Japanese government’s Iraq policies present a moderate negative congruence with public support for the Koizumi Cabinet (Figure 4). The Asahi’s negativity toward the Japanese government’s Iraq policies has been consistent except for two brief periods (April to June 2003, April to May 2004). The stable curve in the data is similar to those of the Cabinet approval ratings, except for the fact that the two are
reverse sides of the same coin: the Asahi’s small surges in negativity correlate with imperceptible increases in Cabinet popularity. In addition, from May 2004 to the end of 2004, both approval ratings of the Koizumi Cabinet and the Asahi’s affirmative stories of its Iraq policies display slow-paced drops in number. Therefore, it appears that there is certain congruence between the ratings and the paper’s portrayals of Japanese policies about Iraq. The correlation coefficient between them is -.64, which is statistically significant. Thus, hypothesis 3 is confirmed.

![Figure 4: Testing Hypothesis 3](image)

Hypothesis 4 is also confirmed. There is a moderate negative relationship between the New York Times’ negative coverage of the U.S. government’s Iraq policies and their presidential approval ratings (Figure 5). The correlation coefficient
between them is -.62 and is statistically significant. Except for a few periods, the coverage of the paper becomes increasingly negative toward the U.S. government’s policies on Iraq. By the same token, presidential approval ratings manifest a gradual drop until the end of 2004.

Furthermore, there is one interesting tendency that is revealed when we look at the data during the year 2004 (Figure 6). The trends in Japanese sentiments about the United States display similar rises and falls with presidential approval ratings during 2004.
Section 4 Implications of the Results in the Policy Process

Next, this chapter addresses the “so what?” question: Why is it important that two representative print media organizations in Japan and the United States portray different “realities” about the Iraq War? And how does the difference affect governments and citizens in each country and the international community? The difference in the media portrayals about the same issues matters because it creates different reactions from the public and about the issue, which eventually affects the public policy process.

This chapter responds to these questions mainly by arguing the media’s agenda-setting functions. The media is generally assumed to be an important factor in shaping public opinion. At the same time, the contents of the media are
presumed to be reflected by public opinion. The media is arguably tantamount to public opinion. Also, the influence of the media on the policy process is enormous. To those who are involved in politics, public opinion polls are very influential in determining how to initiate new policies. Thus, the difference in portrayal of the war could have a potentially very important influence on the shaping of public opinion and the political agenda.

Since the media is an intermediary between the public and the political regime, the public policies generated by their political leaders play an important role in altering public opinion. Public opinion is a referendum of their political leaders’ performance in public policy as well as an indication of how another country’s policy is internationally accepted. This chapter finds that there is a strong connection between the media agenda and citizens’ attitudes toward their governments, as well as governments overseas.

The media, public opinion and the policy process are fighting for the political agenda. Cohen (1963) asserts that the media do not tell us what to think, but what to think about. Shaw and McCombs (1972) first tested the agenda-setting principle during the 1968 presidential campaign and provided evidence that the agenda of issues communicated by the media became the agenda of issues salient to voters. The agenda-setting function of the media is widely accepted in political communication research.

One of the most notable policy process models addressing agenda-setting is John Kindon’s “policy window” model. Kingdon synthesizes elements of agenda setting in U.S. public policies in his seminal work, *Agendas, Alternatives,
and Public Policies (1984, 2003). Kingdon argues that issues gain agenda status, and alternative solutions are selected, when elements of three “streams” come together. One stream encompasses the state of politics and public opinion (the “politics stream”). A second stream contains the potential solutions to a problem (the “policy stream”). The last stream is the “problem stream” which occupies the attention of government officials who want to generate public policy proposals to ameliorate the problem. These streams usually run independently until something happens to cause two or more of the streams to meet in a “policy window.” This “policy window” provides a possibility of policy change. In Kingdon’s agenda-setting model, the media is portrayed as a sometimes powerful outsider, although the media is not a direct participant inside of government. This is because how the media covers an event and what they cover (and do not cover) may have a direct bearing on the saliency of an issue. Nonetheless, Kingdon finds in his interviews with policy participants that the importance of the media may vary from one type of policy participant to another, and concludes that the media have much less effect on governmental policy agendas than he had anticipated. (Kingdon 2003, 57-61). Kingdon argues that three “streams” are crucial to form a policy change.

The results of this chapter’s hypotheses testing also suggest the interplay among the media, public opinion, and the policy process regarding agenda-setting. First of all, the above-mentioned hypothesis testing discovered that policy and public opinion is closely related. This confirms the previous studies of public opinion explained in the literature review section. In hypothesis 1 testing, both Japanese sentiment toward the United States and the Asahi’s negative treatment
took a turn for the worse every time some Iraq policy was developed. In the beginning of the Iraq War (March 2003), the discussion of the Iraqi Special Law in Japan (June to July 2003), and the first arrival of the Japanese Self Defense Forces to Iraq (February 2004) are the events that altered the past trends negatively. Also, several developments further made both data decline. These developments include the capture of the first three Japanese civilians in Iraq (April 2004) and the murder of the first captured Japanese civilian (October 2004). Conversely, the end of the actual battle in the Iraq War (May 2003) lifted numbers in both data.

Regarding hypothesis 2, it is assumed that the Asahi’s negative treatment about the U.S. Iraq policies may be only a small factor for the public to evaluate the Koizumi Cabinet. As discussed before, the Koizumi Cabinet had been very popular, and there are several other big factors, such as economic conditions, that may have made a larger contribution to the approval ratings. Although hypothesis 2 is rejected, there are two occasions in which we can find a certain relationship between the Asahi’s negative coverage about the U.S. policies toward Iraq and the approval ratings of the Koizumi Cabinet. One occasion was when the Koizumi Cabinet pronounced its strong support for the U.S. decision to start the Iraq War (March 2003), the other is the time of the passage of the Iraqi Special Law in Japan (July 2003). Both occasions are related to Japanese policies in Iraq. Also, in testing hypothesis 3, two periods (April to June 2003, April to May 2004) display a moderate increase in the Koizumi Cabinet’s popularity, during which the Asahi’s coverage of the Cabinet recorded a moderate improvement. Both periods
are considered recovery periods after important negative policies were declared in public (pronouncing support for the U.S. invasion into Iraq and the first SDF dispatch to Iraq).

Also, in the test of hypothesis 4, a few periods of recovery in presidential approval rating are related to several changes in U.S. policies. One of those periods is the summer of 2004, when the Bush administration seriously warned the public about the imminent danger of Al Qaeda terrorism and raised the terrorism warning label up to “Orange,” the second most dangerous level. The Administration at that time also explained the possible targets and detailed ways to attack the targets with bombing by a suicidal attack of pick-up tracks. Secretary of Homeland Security Thomas Ridge named September 2004 as a “National Preparedness Month” for terrorism. Although these warnings turned out to be a false alarm, the presidential approval rating during the period temporally lifted. Since the Bush administration was allegedly very tactful about public relations, there were some discussions about whether the terrorism warning incident was a sort of public manipulation to raise the presidential approval ratings. Whether this was an intentional manipulation is not certain; analysts agree that the summer of 2004 is a typical “rally” period for the population who faced a danger in their country and had a desire to support their political leader (Maeshima 2004).

Additionally, this study found that there is some similarity between Japanese public sentiment toward the United States and U.S. presidential approval ratings (Figure 6). The correlation coefficient between them is .70 and is statistically significant as well. The Japanese media constantly report those rating;
thus, there is a possibility that the two data displayed similar changes over time. If this is the case, U.S. presidential policies affect the citizens even outside of the United States. Also, it is assumed that this correlation may be caused by the internationalization of media content because the Japanese media organizations usually receive news of presidential ratings from the U.S. media. The U.S. media because of its reach undoubtedly has international influence, and to some extent must also affect public sentiment across the Pacific. Since television images are so powerful, public opinion outside of the United States can also be influenced by U.S. reporting. This study confirms this so-called “CNN effect.” The effect is due to the development of popular 24-hour international television news channels which have had a major impact on the international understanding of the policies of both the United States and other countries (Livingston 1997).

Media effects are, however, sometimes cancelled out by other factors. In Japan, there is only a relatively small amount of news about U.S. presidents; therefore, for example, news about changes in the presidential ratings may have a big impact. By contrast, Japanese media consumers are inundated daily with information about the president and his policies. That may be the part of the reason why the CNN effect happened in Japan, but the influence of news stories about presidential ratings on the public opinion was relatively small in the United States.
Section 5 Possible Limitations of the Tests

Although the author believes that the hypotheses tests are valid in their methodology, there are possibly some limitations in all four tests. The hypotheses tests 2, 3, and 4, for example, involve media portraits of policies and their influence on political leaders’ approval ratings. The ratings seem to be, however, an amalgam of several influences, and there are other factors that can contribute to the ratings. Previous studies suggest that there are several components that condition these ratings. Two of those components are the time constraint and the economic situation. Time appears to be a very important factor. Presidential and prime minister approval is characterized by a gradual and steady erosion over the course of a presidential term, and while events and developments may temporarily delay or even reverse this decline over the short-term, it cannot be forestalled indefinitely (Cronin 1980, Stimson 1976, Maeda 2005). Economic circumstances also can be powerful conditioning factors. While prime ministers and presidents can make marginal adjustments, they cannot overcome endemic problems or worldwide economic trends (Lewis-Beck 1988, Maeda 2005). Also, scholars find that there is a certain congruence between the approval ratings of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the approval ratings of the Prime Ministers’ Cabinets (Maeda 2005).

Also, the nature of the content analysis methodology is not perfectly free from some biases by the coder, the author himself. No matter how objective the coder attempts to be in his treatment of the text, there is a possibility that he might unconsciously reject a certain standpoint. Since the author of this work is not a
U.S. citizen, his perspectives may not be neutral toward the U.S. or Japanese government’s position. Although the author believes himself to be non-partisan, there is some possibility that he is influenced by a particular political ideology.

In addition, one can argue that the choice of papers may create some bias. One of the basic methods of comparative politics is to compare similar political systems and actors. The reason why the author selected *the New York Times* and *the Asahi* is that both are arguably the most respected newspaper in their countries, and also they are considered politically liberal. Nevertheless, the author cannot deny the fact that comparative content analysis of more conservative print media, such as *the Sankei* in Japan and *the Washington Times* in the United States might generate different results.

As for the choice of the media, this research limits its comparison to only print media for the sake of analysis. The importance of electronic media in recent years is stronger than ever before. In the modern era, television has penetrated into our daily lives more than newspapers. In addition, the diffusion of the internet, especially the impact of blogs, has altered the traditional political communication system. The author would like to conduct a similar analysis of these electronic media in the future.

Finally, I must argue whether the two papers can represent the whole media of the two countries. There are many media outlets both in the United States and Japan. Electronic media, such as television and radio, are virtually saturated in both countries. Also, there are many traditional print media, such as magazines and newspapers, in both countries. In addition, new media, most
notably internet has become a mainstream source of information. Internet provides not only the supplement information of those traditional media organizations, but also a powerful source of alternative news stories.

Among those different kinds of media outlets, I believe *The New York Times* and *the Asahi* are the best possible samples. First, the two liberal newspapers are arguably most respected and influential in their own countries. As for *the New York Times*, the Columbia Journalism Review ranks America’s best newspapers (Cummings and Wise 2001, 221). There is no equivalent study about the Japanese media; however, I believe *the Asahi* may rank the top. *The New York Times* is widely read by decision-makers of the United States, and so is *the Asahi*. Although they are not the top circulation in each country (the New York Time is the fourth largest in daily circulation, and *the Asahi* is the second), they are often believed to representatives of the whole media of each country.

Next, they are the most important agenda-setter for other media. For journalists who cover the national or international political news in the United States, *the New York Times* is one of the first newspapers to read in the morning among other major papers. Newspaper and television reporters in the U.S. find out the latest information in *the New York Times* to receive updated information. *The New York Times*’ position on a particular political issue may set the agenda among those journalists. *The Asahi* also has a strong agenda-setting power for other journalists. An important morning ritual for many Japanese journalists is to compare other news media organizations’ coverage. I myself compared rival newspapers and NHK morning news when I was a staffwriter for *the Chunichi*. 
Always, the first paper to look at was *the Asahi*. This is because *the Asahi*’s tone of the articles for a particular social or political issue often resonated well with the public.

Finally, because of the growing power of the internet, the two liberal media organizations have extended their influence. *The New York Times* and *the Asahi* were on of the frontier of newspapers that went digital during the 1990s. Among newspaper websites, these two papers’ sites are leaders in their respective country.

Although these are the reasons I believe why the two papers are the best representatives of print media in both the U.S. and Japan, there are of course many other important media organizations. There are literally thousands of media outlets, if major internet sites are included. A study just focusing on these two papers has its weaknesses. Still, there are many reasons why the comparison can be justified for comparative research on the relationship between the media and public opinion.

While it is difficult to know for sure that the media was shaping public opinion rather than public opinion shaping the media or vise versa (the chicken and egg problem), this is a perennial debate in the literature. My tentative conclusion is that it is difficult to figure out which influences which. This is because public opinion is formed over a long period in which public opinion influences the media and the media defines public opinion. This part of the discussion will be further explained in the Conclusion Chapter.
Section 6 Conclusion

This chapter focuses on the role of public opinion in creating different accounts of the Iraq War by the two media. It may be logical to surmise that differences of public opinion between the United States and Japan may be one of the significant causes for the different portraits of the war by the two media. This is because any media organization is supposed to mirror the opinion of strata of its society. Since both *the Asahi* and *the New York Times* are among the largest newspapers in Japan and the United States, the articles in both papers reflect the public in Japan and the United States, respectively. Further, the government’s positions on Iraq affect public opinion and the contents of the media both in the United States and Japan.

Using the data derived from content analysis, the four hypotheses were tested in this chapter. These hypotheses were created to investigate the connection between public opinion and the portrayals of leading media organizations. Since the media is an intermediary between the public and politics, public policies are important determinants of the change of public views about their political leaders. Of the three accepted hypotheses, it is especially intriguing that *the Asahi*’s treatment of U.S. Iraq policies appears to be related to Japanese sentiments about the United States. As discussed, the Japanese views of the United States perhaps reflected, and possibly originated in the views of U.S. citizens because the U.S. presidential approval rating and the Japanese feeling toward the United States demonstrate some congruence. This interrelationship may be caused by the “CNN effect,” which is basically the impact of international satellite network television.
Both Primer Koizumi and President Bush’s approval ratings alter after portrayals of their Iraq policies by their leading liberal print media changed. These results indicate that the media have strong impacts on the public image of political leaders. Nevertheless, this finding must be tempered as there are not strong relations between the Asahi’s coverage of U.S. Iraq policies and public support for the Koizumi Cabinet’s support.
Chapter 11: Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: discussing the significance of this dissertation and of its contributions to political communication studies and exploring possible future directions of study. Specifically, I will ponder four possible directions for further analysis: adding analyses of different media sources, comparing between the results of this work and analyses of news contents of other wars, altering the time frame of analysis, and paying attention to more specific topics, such as how cultural and political stereotypes might affect reporting on the Iraq War. Finally, after discussing the possible limitations of this research, I will conclude this chapter.

Both objectives speak to the question I raised in the beginning of this work: why was the same issue sometimes portrayed quite differently by the media in Japan and the United States?

Along with discussing the different accounts of the Iraq War as they appeared in the Asahi and the New York Times, this work showed that the media’s impact is significant in shaping public policy and the political agenda. It also molded public opinion. This was true both in the United States and Japan. Another important finding of this work is that there are historical and cultural reasons why Japanese media organizations, including the Asahi, hold anti-war standpoints. I will show in this conclusion that some of the reasons discussed in earlier chapters for the Asahi’s anti-militarism can be generalized to other cases, thereby contributing to the development of a more general theory about why
media organizations pick up particular stories and report them with particular frames.

Section 1 Empirical Contributions of This Work

One of the most significant contributions of this dissertation to the literature of political communication is that the work systematically analyzed the news contents about the Iraq War between the Asahi and the New York Times. Most political communication studies conducted to date on the Iraq War are concerned with the situation within a particular country (chiefly within the United States). There are only a few studies about the media and politics in the Iraq War that take a comparative perspective (Aday, et.al.2005, Dimitrova et.al.2005), but even these studies tend to exclude East Asian media content. This dissertation therefore fills an empirical gap. In this respect, I believe this dissertation is at the frontier of comparative media studies on the war between the United States and Japan.

Second, this dissertation also adopted multiple methodologies. The contents of the two leading liberal papers in each country were investigated by both quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods. Also, I conducted several interviews to explore the findings in the content analysis.

The results of the quantitative content analysis suggested that the two print media indeed portrayed the war differently. First, this study quantitatively found that The Asahi and the New York Times sometimes show quite distinctive
differences in their choice of main topics. The main topics of the Iraq War also varied in the periods covered by this analysis. During the run-up period to the war (from October 1, 2002 to March 19, 2003), the role of the United Nations and the U.S. decisions about Iraq were dominant in both papers. However, *the Asahi* put more focus on the role of the United Nations while the majority of the stories appearing in *the New York Times* addressed U.S. decisions about Iraq. The differences between the two papers’ perspectives were more clearly manifested during the period of actual battle (from March 21 to May 1, 2003). *The Asahi* covered a wider and more diverse range of topics—such as civilian casualties and anti-war protests than *the New York Times*. *The New York Times* tended to focus its coverage on the view of the war as found in the United States. After the end of the actual battle in Iraq (May 1, 2003), *the Asahi* and *the New York Times* featured a far greater number of different topics and key concepts. In the case of both papers, the largest portion of the articles covered information and events related to their own countries’ involvement in Iraq. Also, the study found different patterns in how both papers treated U.S. policies in Iraq. *The Asahi* was strongly negative throughout the period of analysis; *the New York Times* was initially supportive and stayed supportive until the end of the actual official battle (May 1, 2003), but as time progressed, *the New York Times* gradually became more critical toward U.S. government’s policies and performance in Iraq.

This study qualitatively analyzed the basic trends found in Iraq related coverage by the two liberal media and supported the quantitative findings. Stories during the prewar period of the two media suggested that *the New York Times* and
the Asahi provided different “realities” even though they are reporting the same events, especially related to UN weapons inspections as well as their reactions toward their respective governments’ activities. Compared with the Asahi, the New York Times was less critical toward U.S. policies in and toward Iraq. Analyses of editorials between the two major print media organizations during the period of actual combat also revealed that different understandings of the concept “evil” existed in the two media. While the New York Times treated the oppressive Saddam Hussein regime and terrorists as “evildoers,” the Asahi portrayed the United States as the big evil doer—the instigator of an unjustified war. Further, my content analysis of the articles written by journalists who were embedded with coalition forces operating on the ground, and thus were covering the war from the same “inside” position, revealed that the two leading newspapers’ articles were similar in their personal and realistic descriptions and in their focus on daily activities in the field. Nonetheless, there were significant disparities in their formats and the degree of sympathy they showed to the coalition forces.

Third, this work crystallized that there was an interplay among the media, public policy, and public opinion in relation to the Iraq War and the formulation of related policies. This finding addresses the “so what?” question about the main topic of this dissertation: Why it is important to understand the reasons behind why two representative print media organizations in Japan and the United States portrayed different “realities” about the Iraq War? This work found that the media had a significant impact on the shaping of public policy and the political agenda, as well as the molding of public opinion. The media affected
public opinion by reporting about the war and Iraq-related policies. This work found that there was clear congruence between the media’s content and public opinion polls. Of particular note, both Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush’s approval ratings altered after the liberal print media’s portrayals of their Iraq policies changed in tone and content. Those results indicate that the media has a strong impact on the public image of their political leaders. Also, it revealed that there were some connections between governments’ war-related policies and surges and falls of public support for their governments. In addition, an intriguing finding of this study is that the Japanese media’s treatments of U.S. Iraq policies appear to affect Japanese sentiments about the United States. This may be caused by the “CNN effect,” meaning that the Japanese public is influenced by the media outside of Japan. As an example discussed in chapter ten, Japanese media organizations typically receive news of presidential ratings from the U.S. media. The U.S. media may have an international influence, which affects public sentiment across the Pacific.

Fourth, this dissertation discovered that different historical experiences and political cultures influenced the lenses used by journalists. It was assumed in this dissertation that the views created by journalists influenced public views about the world. The cultures of anti-militarism and the strong anti-war sentiments held by Japanese originated from Japan’s defeat in World War II. Despite the passage of 60 years of time; those feelings remain firm in the news organizations in Japan. This work examined how the concept of war has been negatively perceived by the Japanese media and how this sentiment has been
shared and nurtured by the political system. Anti-militarism was a norm for the Japanese media for many decades. The media in Japan as a whole was visibly anti-war until at least the 1980s (Kim 1981). The anti-war perspective of the media is reflected in (or has been reflective of) public sentiments; anti-militarism has become a zeitgeist in post World War II Japan. Because of these cultural and historical reasons, Japanese media organizations have negatively portrayed all warfare, including the war in Iraq. Even during the war in Afghanistan, the tones of Japanese media were very negative toward the U.S. retaliation to Taliban. During the time of the war, I went back and force between the United States and Japan. I was surprised at the degree of negativity in Japanese coverage about the U.S. actions---this is my casual observations, though.

To understand the reasons why this has been the case, it can be helpful to apply a more general theory about the characteristics of political communication. In particular, there are several factors that influence how a media organization picks up a particular story and reports it with a particular frame. First, media organizations live within the political cultures of the country to which they belong. The different views of warfare that have become a part of the political cultures of the U.S. and Japan may affect the content of media reporting on war. As argued in this work, since Japan experienced massive damage and lost a large number of civilians during World War II, anti-militarism became one of the biggest components of the country’s post-World War II political culture. Also, the Japanese public has very mixed sentiments regarding the Self-Defense Forces (SDF). According to several recent surveys, the majority of Japanese feel that
Japan should more actively participate in international affairs using the SDF. But, these surveys suggest that most respondents feel that the contribution should be restricted to non-military purposes, such as peace-keeping operations in foreign lands. Those who believe that the SDF should be transformed into a full-fledge military, and that Japan should actively be re-armed are very much limited in number (The Mainichi 2007). By contrast, the United States has not experienced a major attack by foreign countries except the Pearl Harbor attack, and in slightly different contexts, during the war for Independence against Britain and the 9-11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. As a military superpower, the United States has been involved in many, if not most, major wars. In some wars, most notably, the Vietnam War, the U.S. military incurred severe damage. The U.S. military suffered heavy casualties and many soldiers went missing in action. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. public became strongly anti-war, but the sentiment was not as strong as that of Japanese. Although some strata of society in the United States strongly manifest anti-military sentiments, their numbers are relatively small (Ladd and Bowman 1996). Japanese anti-military political culture served as a backdrop to media coverage of the Iraq war and may be behind the strong anti-war framing used in creating news stories by Japanese journalists. The New York Times, on the other hand, was more supportive of U.S. policies in Iraq, at least until the initial invasion.

Second, but related to the first point, public opinion had a strong impact on the media’s reporting. As found in chapter ten, President Bush’s support ratings showed strong correlations with the New York Times’ positive-negative
treatments about Iraq issues. The initial high support for President Bush may partly accounted for by the nationalistic zeal created by the 9-11 attacks. As time went by, however, support faded. The same was the case with *the New York Times*’ level of positiveness in their treatment of U.S. policies toward Iraq.

Chapter ten further revealed that there were certain relations between the public support of Prime Minster Koizumi and the level of negativity in *the Asahi*’s treatment of the Iraq War, when the Japanese government’s Iraq War policies were under discussion. As these examples suggest, the media’s reporting can not ignore the mood of the public.

Third, the government’s policies and positions related to a particular issue may influence the contents of the media. Past history tells us that government policies for a particular issue may directly affect media coverage in some extreme cases, such as when the government severely controls media reporting. As discussed in Chapter 9, the Japanese government during World War II put their journalists under draconian controls that governed how they could report on Japanese politics and the war. Although this is an extreme example, governmental policies often provide a basic framework within which a journalist reports on a particular issue. For example, there was a clear difference in the governmental policies towards Iraq between the United States and Japan. The United States is the main actor in this war and must deal with the war’s aftermath. It goes without saying that the American media recognized the importance of the war. Since the war began, U.S. media organizations have continuously reported in
detail about U.S. government policies pertaining to Iraq as well as human interest stories about U.S. soldiers and their families.

In comparison, Japanese involvement in the war was very limited. The Japanese SDF did not participate in the invasion and only finally joined the allied forces in the fall of 2004 to help the Iraq rebuilding efforts. The main reason why the Japanese government did not send the SDF was that the 1946 Constitution prohibits Japanese re-armament and abandons the right to engagement in war as well as the holding of weapons for the reason of invading a foreign country. Because of the Constitution, as well as public anti-war sentiments, the Japanese government’s role in the Iraq War has been very limited. As analyzed in the previous chapters, to the Japanese media, the Iraq War was news from a far away land. Since only a fraction of Japanese citizens (mostly the SDF forces) were involved in the war, there were not many Iraq-related human interest stories in the Japanese media. Instead, the Japanese media’s coverage tended to focus on U.S. policies and their effects on the international community. As such, the larger political context behind a particular policy often provides a basic background that influences what reporters focus on.

Fourth, the media have organizational reasons for why a particular issue is favored, and another is not. First, the organization’s ideological standpoint may affect which issues are picked as well as the frames in the stories. In this study, the Asahi is more progressive than the New York Times in terms of its views on warfare; thus, the paper was more negative toward U.S. policies towards Iraq. A related finding was made in a recent study about Japanese newspaper editorials.
The study suggests that *The Sankei* tends to select more negative stories about China and North Korea because of the paper’s conservative positions. In contrast, the more liberal *the Asahi* paid more attention to social welfare issues than the other three newspapers (Ishikawa 2007). Second, a media organization’s level of commitment to a particular issue will affect the content of its coverage. During the Iraq War, the U.S. military allowed only three Japanese media organizations to embed with the forces in Iraq: *the Asahi*, *NHK* and *the Nippon Television*. Except for *the Asahi*, no Japanese print media was permitted to report from the actual battle ground. Unlike their Japanese counterparts, the U.S. media organizations were allowed to send a far larger number of their reporters to the battleground. It is natural that the more journalists there are to cover a particular issue from different angles, the more diverse their stories will be. This does not, however, necessarily mean per se that American press coverage was more diverse than Japanese. Since U.S. media organizations were allowed to send a far larger number of their reporters to the battleground, they were in a better position to report various stories about the troops with whom they were embedded. Their focus was, however, closer to that of the coalition forces. As discussed in previous chapters, *the New York Times*’ stories written by embedded journalists were very sympathetic with the forces.
Section 2 Theoretical Contributions of This Work

There are several theoretical contributions that can be from the results of this work. First, a country’s political communication system is significantly affected by its history. Each society creates an idiosyncratic political communication system based on its own history and media culture, a product of its history. This work confirmed that anti-military sentiments created by Japan’s involvement and huge loss in World War II affect the content of the media even now. In contrast, while the United States has experienced wartime causalities in World War II, it has not suffered a similar catastrophic damage like that experienced by Japan on its homeland because the wars the United States has been engaged in have been fought overseas. The role of history has molded both political communication systems.

Indeed, Japanese experiences during World War II have had long lasting effects. They became the fundamental underpinnings of the media’s views on international politics in the post-World War II era, and shaped the media’s progressive role in political society. Media culture in Japan has been strongly affected by the wartime experience. The war taught the Japanese public to mistrust the use of armies to solve problems. Interestingly, as anti-war sentiment was reproduced and held by even subsequent generations, the media’s progressive roles are still very present in society. As Berger (1998) suggests, anti-militarism has been very strong in Japanese society in the post World War II period. Berger claims that there has been consistent opposition to expenditures and preparation for war due to the lack of elite or popular support.
for national defense. Berger also emphasizes the effects of the American occupation as the origin of antimilitarism.

General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) made several efforts to demilitarize Japan. The reforms included five key areas: emancipation of women, permitting the unionization of labor, liberalizing education, creating a judicial system that put a high esteem on human rights, and dismantling zaibatsu (conglomerates). These reforms successfully transformed a militaristic political regime into a democracy.

Interestingly, the ways of demilitarization and democratization of Japan by the U.S. occupation forces were top-down and not sufficiently democratic. Since MacArthur was not happy with the original constitutional plan presented by the Japanese government, SCAP staff prepared a more liberal draft. That became the 1946 Constitution in which Article Nine explicitly denounced the right to war. It was not clear whether Article Nine was MacArthur’s idea or it was proposed by Japanese officials who might have thought denouncing war was both good for Japan and SCAP. Either way, strong top-down decision-making was SCAP’s way of reforming militaristic and undemocratic Japan.

SCAP also paid attention to the content of the Japanese media. One of those efforts was to censor the content of all magazines, books and newspapers. Militaristic or undemocratic descriptions in the media were severely censored by the U.S. occupation forces (Eto 1989). In this way, notions of democracy and a strong sense of anti-militarism was implanted in the public by the occupation forces.
Post war democratization is a logical consequence for the Japanese public as well. The public welcomed the reform and joined the democratization bandwagon that was being pulled by the U.S.; the public was weary of war and came to detest the wartime militaristic regimes that imposed government-led oppressive policies on Japanese citizens (Dower 1999). The fact that the 1946 Constitution remained in force in Japan and has never been amended, despite having been heavily influenced by Americans (and many argue drafted by them) indicates just how strongly the public embraced both democracy and a peaceful political regime.

As the U.S. occupation became more legitimate in Japan, the public started to aspire to their goals for a democratic political regime that would not resort to military might to win its interests. This was, I believe, the origin of anti-militarism in Japan.

This background information is helpful for understanding why the Japanese public was outraged when there was a sudden shift in the emphasis of U.S. occupation policies from demilitarization to the limited rearming of Japan after the inception of the Cold War (beginning around 1947). The public was opposed to the U.S. Occupations policy reversal, often known as the “reverse course”; this suggests that by that time already a feeling of anti-militarism was commonly shared by the public. The strong public opposition against the United States was mainly because the Japanese public felt betrayed by the United States, the great liberator from past militarism. Indeed, the Japanese public has remained constant in their support of peace for over half a century.
The United States since the beginning of the Cold War has been pushing Japan in stages to rebuild its self-defense forces and to turn these into a functioning military, in essence to create a “normal state” again out of Japan. While the Japanese government has shown strong loyalty to the United States on this question—undoubtedly because of Japan’s national security concerns as it is completely dependent up on the post-war alliance with the U.S. for its protection. In sharp contrast to the position of the Japanese government, in the eyes of the Japanese media, the U.S. has become an ambivalent figure. While the U.S. was revered as a symbol of democracy and seen as important because of its interdependent economy with Japan, the U.S. has been one of the most jingoistic regimes among industrialized states in the world. Some fear that the U.S. could pull Japan into a traumatic wartime situation.

Although the U.S. has successfully implanted a sense of guilt and Japan has responded by developing a national sense of shame about its role in the war, Japan internalized the guilt and shame in an interesting way. The guilt and shame were directed more toward domestic than international concerns. The Japanese public has started to recreate the memory that they were the victim of the war, instead of the fact that Japan was an aggressor against other Asian countries. The Japanese media has played a major role in this recreation of war memory. As one interviewee suggested in Chapter 8, every summer around August, the Japanese media reminds its listeners, readers, and viewers how civilians suffered hardships from hunger and the death of family members due
to the massive bombings of Tokyo and other major cities by United States’ forces.

Second, media and public opinion cannot be separated. One of the problems pointed out in chapter 10 is that it is difficult to distinguish whether the media affected public opinion or vice versa. This is a perennial puzzle that social scientists grapple with, but that is almost impossible to solve. This is because both are so intertwined, and as Walter Lippman (1922) argues in his class study, public opinion is the synonym of the media.

One of the basic assumptions of this chapter is that the media has a strong impact on public opinion. This is a debated subject. The media’s impact on public opinion polls, for example, is a major field of study in political communication. Yet, while some scholars believe that exposure to the mass media could have a strong influence on the views of the public, others question this (Owen 1991). Historically, there have been three main directions that arguments have taken:

First, until at least the mid-1940s, the media was believed to have had “magic bullets” that could penetrate audiences’ minds and control public opinion. Over the next decades, these strong effects were brought into question by several electoral studies. These studies found that the media affect was not as strong as the “magic bullets” that were painted by earlier scholars. They instead argued that the media reinforces preferences that were obtained and nurtured by audiences before media contact occurred (Berelson et al. 1954). Then, in the 1970s, arguments about the media’s limited effects were challenged when
scholars found that the media has a clear effect of agenda-setting of the issues discussed among the public (Shaw and McCombs 1972). In addition to those agenda-setting studies, scholars have investigated the media’s power to frame news. That is, because the media covers news stories with particular framings, the public is affected by the media’s portrayal of the news (Gamson 1989).

More recently, in contrast to studies that focused on the limited effect of the media, scholars again have focused attention on the media’s impact on public opinion and argued that it is large. The consensus among scholars is that the media has a strong impact in setting agendas, although the media’s power is not large enough to fundamentally alter people’s minds.

Regarding the media’s influence on public opinion, the media arguably may be becoming less influential in U.S. elections.1 One of the more interesting recent electoral campaign strategies of candidates in the United States is to try to bypass the traditional media and directly appeal to the public. This is because campaign managers believe that the media does not tell well what the candidates want to tell to the public. Especially, Republican candidates believe that the media’s liberal biases sometimes hinder their electioneering. In the 2004 election, Karl Rove, the media advisor for George W. Bush also tried to bypass the media by having Bush meet as many of his constituencies face-to-face as possible. This was done in order to solidify potential voters’ support. This approach is called a ground war as opposed to the air wars that emphasize the opportunities to appear in the media in the campaign (Kohut 2006).

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1 This was pointed out to me by Dr. Shawn Parry-Giles.
ground wars, it is assumed that public opinion is not affected by the media. Although the ground war strategy may solidify faithful supporters, the number of people whom a candidate or his campaign supporters can contact is very limited. The ground war strategy may be a supplement of the regular “airwars” in which the media can reach a large number of populations and create interface between the candidate and voters. Thus, the media’s impact in the U.S. political campaign cannot be negated.

These arguments of media effects however, may ignore one fundamental question. Studies that attempt to find a media influence on public opinion do not discuss much about public opinion’s impact on the media. There is an obvious reason for this. Public opinion and media information are so co-mingled that it is difficult to distinguish which influences which. There is theoretically the possibility of exploring which factor is the first to influence the other by using time series analysis. The problem with this method, however, is that since public opinion on particular issues is in some cases molded over a long period of time, it is not always practical to use the statistical method.

It is difficult to distinguish whether the media influences the public opinion or vice versa. Although I admit that chapter 10 my work obviously has this chicken-and-egg problem, this may be inherent to the question being researched. There appears to be a bi-directional influence. Japanese negativity toward U.S. policies about Iraq appears to be influenced by public opinion at the same time that media content is being influenced by public opinion.
Third, this work confirmed that there may not be such a thing as “completely objective” media coverage because the media cannot exist independent of its societal background. As discussed previously, different portrayals of the Iraq War between the *Asahi* and the *New York Times* suggest that historical and social factors influenced the stories.

The debates over the philosophies of social science in Chapter 2 are good references to argue the media’s objectivity. Winch (1964) claims that we should not view a society through our own pre-set standards of judgment. Instead, Winch suggests that the best way to avoid misunderstanding a society is to try to approach the society from the inside and to establish rational criteria that are specific to that culture. Winch discusses the mystical practices of the Azande, a "primitive" people living in central Africa and claims that it is not fair to judge Azande society by labeling their belief in the existence of witches as false, magical medicine is illusionary, and oracles are ineffective. Winch argues that the reason why a Western scholar, such as Evans-Pritchard, regards Azande magic as irrelevant is that the scholar draws his explanations from his own culture. Winch also emphasizes that social science has a different conception of reality from that of Azande believers in magic.

The media’s coverage during the Iraq War may be akin to Zande magic. The media has its own context of reporting in its own society. This context, however, may be difficult to be perceived by another country. While anti-militarism has been a widely accepted culture in Japanese media organizations, the American media has different idiosyncratic positions to their own military
actions that have been molded by its own society. Thus, it may be difficult to see whether the media can be “objective” to controversial issues, such as warfare. The difference between the New York Times and the Asahi is a good example that the media cannot see a fact “objectively” because a journalist views an event through our own pre-set standards of judgment.

Similar observation of my analysis is found by Cohen, Levy, Roeh, and Gurevitich (1996). They dealt with the concept of “global newsroom” in which coordination among broadcast organizations across national boundaries takes place. They examined such an organization as Eurovision in its supplies and demands of the news. Decision-making in Eurovision is not centralized, but it is up to individual news service in each European country. Interestingly, the authors found that there is a consensus on the top stories, but individual national news services decide how to deliver the news. The authors found that the importance of the news is socially constructed by its own country.

Section 3 The Most Puzzling Question: The Media’s Unfavorable Coverage Given the Good U.S.-Japan Relationship

Finally, I want discuss the most puzzling question raised by the results of this work. The political and economic proximity between the United States and Japan did not translate into favorable coverage for U.S. policies on Iraq. Why did the Asahi’s portrayals of U.S. policies about the Iraq War not reflect the good relationship that exists between the two countries? Especially, the embedded
journalists, both from the U.S. and Japanese media organizations, must have seen similar events in the battlefield

Indeed, the United States and Japan have a very close relationship. In terms of national security, Japan cannot survive without the U.S. military presence in East Asia. Because of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan has been protected by the military umbrella of the United States. Also, the Koizumi cabinet (2001-2006) was known to be pro-U.S. and declared that the U.S.-Japan relationship is the most important in its foreign policy. The Japanese government has supported the Bush Administration’s war on terrorism from the very beginning. Although the Japanese Constitution’s Article Nine prohibits the Self Defense Forces from engaging in combat, the Japanese government sent the SDF to Afghanistan and Iraq for peacekeeping operations. As of July 2007, Japan’s Self Defense Forces are stationed in a compound in Samawa, Iraq, as part of President Bush’s “coalition of the willing.”

The two countries have close economic ties as well. Arguably, the Japanese government has been able to put resources into economic development because the government did not have the need to fully remilitarize Japan due to the military protection of the United States (Krauss 1992, MacDougall 1988). The United States has for a long time been the biggest international trade partner for Japan (although China’s trade with Japan for the first time in 2004 exceeded that of the United States, and the total amount of exports and imports between Japan and China exceeded those between the United States and Japan,
Still, U.S.-Japan economic ties are still very viable. According to the trade statistics compiled by the Treasury Ministry of Japan, the trade between Japan and the United States consists of one-fifth of the total amount of the international trade of Japan (Treasury Ministry of Japan, 2007). Also, there have not been many discussions over “unfair trade practices” from Japan although Japan’s trade surplus with the United States is at record levels. Moreover, these two economic colossi are becoming ever more integrated in the financial, manufacturing and high-tech sectors. The future of the economic relations between the two countries is likely to continue to be strong.

Because of its political, military and economic ties, it is logical to imagine that the media in the two countries may be quite similar in their content. In fact, the Japanese government supported the United States in its decision to go to war. Why then was there such different media coverage of the war? As this work revealed that there was a huge discrepancy between the Japanese government’s position on the Iraq War and the Asahi coverage. Contrary to expectations, the Asahi’s coverage of the Iraq War from the beginning was very antagonistic toward the U.S. position.

There are several explanations for the difference. First, as chapter 8 discussed, anti-militarism is commonly shared by Japanese media organizations. Among other media organizations, the Asahi is arguably most politically liberal and dovish. Cultural factors, such as religion, also have contributed to the development of anti-militarism in both Japanese media and society.
Second, the relationship between the media and the Japanese government is sometimes very antagonistic. While the Liberal Democratic Party has for a long time held a majority in the lower house of the Japanese parliament (in fact, since the party’s formation in 1955---except for a few years immediately after the 1993 party realignment, there has not been a strong opposition party. Critics suggest that the media has played the opposition party’s role because the media has critically checked the policies the LDP-led government and filled the void by the lack of a major opposition party (Kabashima, et al. 2007). Among the Japanese media, the Asahi is usually very critical toward LDP policies. Since the LDP-led government supported the U.S. Iraq War policies, and the Asahi tends to be both anti-militaristic and critical of LDP policies, it is in fact not that surprising that the paper portrayed negatively the U.S. invasion into Iraq.

Third, another interpretation is that the Japanese media is not the outlier among the media of the world. American Iraq War policies have been criticized by media organizations in many parts of the world (Dimitrova et al. 2005). Arguably, the Japanese media may not be an exception. It may be the U.S. media that was the exception.

Regarding the articles from embedded journalist, my dissertation may generate a hypothesis. The Asahi articles were critical toward the U.S. policies over Iraq throughout the period of analysis. This includes the articles written by Nojima, an embedded journalist from the Asahi. However, it is worthwhile to note that Nojima’s articles during his embedding with soldiers were not as blatantly anti-American as those written by other Asahi staff writers. Nojima’s articles in
the Asahi are ambivalent toward the U.S. forces: Although he felt a strong sense
of distance to the forces at other times, he was sometimes sympathetic with the
troop in which he was embedded. Although his case may be an isolated case, it
certainly generates a hypothesis that personal contacts with American soldiers (or
any Americans or the U.S. society in general) may reduce the preconceptions
toward the United States: The more time a Japanese journalist is personally
involved with U.S. society, the less likely it is that his or her articles will be anti-
American.

This hypothesis shares a similar perspective to the “contact hypothesis”
used in political psychology. The contact hypothesis maintains that contact
between groups under optimal conditions reduce intergroup prejudice. The
hypothesis presents a rationale for social integration and interracial harmony
between different racial groups in the United States, especially the white and the
blacks (Allport 1954). However, there is a completely opposite hypothesis for
intergroup contact. Conflict hypothesis suggests that contact between intergroups
aggravates prejudice between groups. Research has had mixed results. Some
support the contact theory both directly and indirectly, and some support the
conflict theory (Taylor 2000, Levine and Campbell 1971). Although this study
does not intend to test these hypotheses, it would be a good future study for some
political scientist to consider whether a contact or conflict hypothesis is supported.
Section 4 Future Research

This study is but a beginning. It opens many possibilities for further research. Further analysis will be needed to fill in gaps in my arguments as well as to deepen research into this timely and important topic. Specifically, three directions that could be taken to broaden the horizon of this study will be discussed.

First, analyzing news contents about the Iraq War from more diverse sources would add additional and possibly even more interesting perspectives. Second, comparing between the results of this work and the analysis of news contents about other wars would be very useful. Third, and in a slightly different vein, it would be intriguing to focus on how cultural and political stereotypes are manifested in reporting about the Iraq War. I will explain these three possible areas for future research in greater detail below.

First, adding the analysis of a different media organization would expand the scope of this research. This work selected the Asahi and the New York Times because they are suitable for comparison: both papers are liberal and arguably among the most trusted and influential media organizations in their countries. The Asahi is the Japanese counterpart of the New York Times, and vice versa. There is, however, a possibility that more interesting results might be found if I compared different print media, such as between the Asahi and the Washington Times or between the Yomiuri and the New York Times.

For example, comparing news about the Iraq War between conservative media organizations in Japan and the U.S. may bring other perspectives and
findings. As briefly explained in Chapters eight and nine, the Japanese media, both print and electronic, is dominated by progressive media. Several conservative media outlets, however, have gradually arisen during the past twenty years. Two of the most prominent examples in the print media are the Yomiuri and the Sankei. The Yomiuri was regarded as a fairly liberal newspaper until at least the early 1980s (Kim 1981). The paper, however, became less dovish after the editorial board was occupied by conservative editors, led by Tsuneo Watanabe in the 1980s (Ito et al. 2000). Watanabe, now in the top management position of the paper, has been very close to conservative leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, most prominently former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. Watanabe orchestrated with the LDP leaders’ ways of altering Japan’s politico-military stance by featuring a number of articles about the idea of amending the Japanese Constitution and Japanese remilitarism (Uozumi 2003). The Sankei was conservative from its origin, but their conservative stance gradually became even more clearly manifested in the mid-1980s when Japan rose up to the position of an economic superpower and the role of Japanese international contributions was revisited by other countries, such as the United States.

The same as the case of Japan, conservative media organizations in the United States have become gradually more influential since the 1980s. The circulation of the Wall Street Journal, one of the most pro-business newspapers, has increased, and the Washington Times, founded in 1982 by the conservative Unification Church, has transformed itself into one of the main stream media organizations inside the Beltway. These conservative media both in Japan and the
U.S. may portray the Iraq War differently from their liberal competitors.

Analyzing the content between The Sankei and the Washington Times about the Iraq War, for example, could be very intriguing.

Second, along with analyzing the conservative media, adding a few additional print media sources could produce more comprehensive research findings. In addition to the Asahi, The Sankei, and The Yomiuri, three other newspapers (the Mainichi, the Nikkei, and the Tokyo-Chunichi) have circulation levels of more than one million. Two of these papers are considered liberal (the Mainichi and the Tokyo-Chunichi), and one (the Nikkei) is regarded as more conservative than the others. Analyzing the content of the six papers could present a more accurate Japanese media portrayal of the Iraq War. As for the United States, five print media organizations have more than a million daily copies (the Wall Street Journal, the USA Today, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times). However, other newspapers, such as the Washington Post and the Chicago Tribune, are believed to have a significant impact in politics. Thus, adding these papers to a comparison would provide a more inclusive picture of the U.S. media as a whole. To make this analysis more comprehensive, important wire services (Associated Press and Reuters in the United States and Kyodo News Service and Jiji Press in Japan) and news magazines (Time and Newsweek in the United States and Bungei Shunjyu and Chuo Koron in Japan) could be included. This, however, would require a team of researchers. Going even a step further, it would be exciting to conduct such a study across a larger number of nations. The media from Arab countries may have a quite different account of the Iraq War.
Along with the Arab view, the work would be more global comparisons if the French, German and Russian media were included. The three countries, especially France, opposed most strongly the U.S. position on sanctioning Iraq militarily in the United Nations’ dialogues that occurred just before the Iraq War began. These kinds of studies are obviously far beyond the ability of a single scholar; they would require a coordinated team. As a team of researchers it would be possible to make an international comparison about the media’s treatment of the Iraq War.

Thirdly, electronic media, such as television and digital media, such as blogs, may demonstrate unique differences with the results of the print media. There are several studies about news contents of television and internet pages about the Iraq War (e.g., Aday, Livingston and Hebert, 2005; Dimitrova, Kaid, Williams, and Trammell 2005). These studies may include some comparative viewpoints, but most of them are analyses of U.S. sources. So far, there has been no significant study about Japanese television and internet pages about the war in Iraq. There is a published diary written by an embedded journalist in the Iraq War from the Nippon Television Network (Imaizumi 2003), and this book illustrates well the journalist’s effort to report from the battleground. But there is ample room for better understandings about how the war was reported in Japan.

Second a possible direction of future studies is to compare the results of this work with studies about other wars. There are two ways for such a comparison. One is to examine articles about each major war by focusing on one paper. Analyzing how the New York Times or the Asahi described each major war illustrates a specific pattern for the paper. The other is to compare the two papers’
descriptions of each past war. There are several studies about how the media reported major warfare (Ishizawa 2005, Kinoshita 2005). Although these studies are very intriguing, these are not comprehensive enough to fully explain the media’s role in each war. It would be worthwhile to conduct such an analysis about how news outlets address different wars.

A third direction of possible future research is to do the same study but with slightly altered time frames. This analysis covered from October 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004, but the situation in Iraq has deteriorated significantly since this time. As of May of 2007, more than four years had passed since the beginning of the Iraq War. Initial combat in the Iraq war started on March 20, 2003. Operation Iraqi Freedom ended May 1, 2003. Officially, it was a very brief war compared with the size of the attack. But it turned out in fact to be but the beginning of a very lengthy battle to achieve stability that has yet to be won. It is surprising to consider that when the period of Iraqi reconstruction and attempted stabilization led by the U.S.-led forces is included, the length of the Iraqi conflict is now longer than was the Pacific War (1941-1945). The total number of U.S. soldiers’ causalities stood at more than 3200 as of May 2007. Further, much larger numbers of lives have been lost among Iraqi citizens. Adding in the amount of the proposed fiscal 2008 budget, the total expense for the war has amounted to 800 billion dollars, which easily surpasses the 600 billion dollars that was the total expense for the Vietnam War (Morimoto 2007). The Iraqi situation is now officially a civil war, and more chaos will certainly continue for a certain period. Further, the rationale used to invade Iraq has become very weak. Documents
revealed that the prewar consensus that Iraq and al-Qaeda had contacts and
deeper ties were based on dubious or unconfirmed data. With all these conditions
combined, public opinion in the United States has become more negative about
the war. It would be useful to include the most up-to-date state of the war in a new
research project. Doing this might reveal yet more changes in media coverage of
the war and show differences with the periods discussed in this dissertation.

A fourth direction would be to focus on the subject of political culture.
During the course of content analysis, I found that there are several obvious
cultural stereotypes in the descriptions of both the Asahi and the New York Times.
For example, the Asahi often expressed the idea that monotheism in Christianity
was the origin of hatred against other cultures, and most notably Islamic cultures.
Also, there were some articles in the Japanese press about how Japanese society
was “morally higher” than others simply because Japan does not have a full-
fledged military. It seems that the anti-war sentiments that have been nurtured
since the defeat of World War II may have created this view. Although the Asahi
repeatedly cautioned to the U.S. that accepting other cultures and views is the first
step to understanding other societies, the paper itself alienates American culture
and political history. These alienations may create in Edward Said’s term
“othering,” which is a concept of ignoring different identities and justifying one’s
own (Said 2003).

As for the New York Times, there are not many stereotypes related to
Japan or Japanese that appeared in the articles examined. This is because the
articles were about the Iraq War, and Japan was not a major actor. Yet, there was
prominent othering of Arab citizens by the New York Times. As this study has found, Iraqi citizen causalities and damages suffered by Iraqis were largely ignored by the newspaper, especially during the actual official battle period.

Section 6 Conclusion

This dissertation confirmed that the Asahi and the New York Times treated the Iraq War differently. The chapter also emphasizes the fact that the media’s impact is significant in shaping the political agenda and public opinion. Further, I put an emphasis on the fact that different political communication systems, including different historical experiences and political cultures, influence the environment in which the media operate. These different backgrounds provide idiosyncratic environments and may influence how a media organization portrays a particular issue, such as the war in Iraq.

Since there are only a few comparative political communication studies regarding the Iraq War, I am sure that my dissertation expanded the horizons of the media studies about war. I believe my dissertation filled in the void because there were, as far as I know, no comparative analyses about the Iraq War between the Western and the Asian media. Also, the fact that this dissertation used multiple methodologies may widen the scope of political communication studies. I used both quantitative and qualitative content analysis methods as well as interviews. Further, I hope this work will become a reference for those interested
in the interplay among the media, public policy, and public opinion, as well as cultural influences on the media.
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