

ABSTRACT

Title of Document: WHAT MATTERS MOST?: THE EFFECTS OF GOAL COMMITMENT ON CLAIMING DISCRIMINATION

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Three studies explored the possibility that goal activation and goal commitment influenced attributions to discrimination. I hypothesized that some goals would lead to greater claiming of discrimination, while others would lead to less claiming of discrimination, and that this effect would be enhanced as commitment to the goal increased. I found some preliminary evidence supporting this hypothesis. In Study 1, when participants were more committed to being well liked, they reported discrimination less than when less committed to the goal. In Study 2, when participants were more committed to maintaining self-esteem, they claimed discrimination more than when less committed to the goal. Study 3 provided less conclusive evidence to support my hypothesis. Finally, I found that in conditions where participants claimed discrimination more or were expected to claim discrimination more, they also reported greater self-esteem, less anxiety, and less depression.

WHAT MATTERS MOST?: THE EFFECTS OF GOAL COMMITMENT ON
CLAIMING DISCRIMINATION

By

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Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
2007

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What Matters Most?: The Effects of Goal Commitment on Claiming Discrimination

Research on targets of discrimination has increased dramatically in recent years (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002, Stangor, Swim, Sechrist, Decoster, Van Allen, & Ottenbreit, 2003, Steele, 1997, Swim & Stangor, 1998). Social psychologists have researched when individuals make attributions to discrimination (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999, Major, Gramzow, McCoy, Levin, Schmader, & Sidanius, 2002, Stangor, Swim, & Sechrist, 1999), and how making these attributions to discrimination impact stigmatized individuals (Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993, Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001). Feeling that one has been discriminated can have serious consequences for members of stigmatized groups (Schultz, Israel, Williams, Parker, Becker, & James, 2000, Williams, Spencer, & Jackson, 1999, Williams & Williams-Morris, 2000). Many studies find that the more unfair treatment and discrimination individuals are exposed to, the lower their overall physical and mental health (Corning, 2002, Kessler, Mickelson, & Williams, 1999, Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002, Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001). Other studies find that making attributions to discrimination produces still other costs, such as being disliked (Kaiser & Miller, 2001) or fear of retaliation (Swim & Hyers, 1999). However, Crocker and Major (1989) proposed that making attributions to discrimination can also be beneficial. They have found evidence in a number of experiments that claiming discrimination protects an individual's self-esteem (Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993, Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991, Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003a, Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003b).

In sum, while there is evidence suggesting that individuals should be motivated to avoid claiming discrimination (Jetten et al., 2001, Swim & Hyers, 1999), there is also

evidence suggesting that individuals should be motivated to make attributions to discrimination (Crocker & Major, 1989, Kaiser & Miller, 2001). The costs and benefits of making attributions to discrimination are complex, and much remains to be learned in order to gain a full understanding of when individuals claim discrimination. The present research aims to add to this literature by conceptualizing these processes in terms of goal commitment. The goals that an individual holds in a situation will impact the costs and benefits relevant to that individual in the particular situation. For example, Crocker and Major (1989) assume in their theory of claiming discrimination that one's primary goal is to protect the self-esteem, particularly from failure. However, when fear of others' rejection is a motivator, participants respond differently than when desiring to protect self-esteem from failure (Stangor, Swim, Van Allen, & Sechrist, 2002).

In the current research, three different studies each compared goals that individuals may hold when in a potentially discriminatory situation – self-presentation concerns, self-esteem maintenance, and fighting injustice. The goal of self-presentation involves a desire to create a positive public impression, a desire to be liked by others. If this goal is challenged, individuals will not claim discrimination in order to prevent creating a negative impression (Kaiser & Miller, 2001). The goal of self-esteem maintenance relates to one's need to maintain a positive sense of self. This is particularly relevant when one fails on a task and when this failure could be the result of discrimination. When this occurs, the likelihood that individuals will claim discrimination should increase in order to protect self-esteem from the negative consequences that failure evokes (Crocker & Major, 1989). Finally, the goal of fighting injustice relates to an individual's desire to work to improve the life situation of groups

that are of low status or that need help. This goal should lead to increased attributions to discrimination.

While the activated goals that an individual brings to a situation influence when someone will make an attribution to discrimination, sometimes one can have many goals active at once. In these situations how committed one is to a particular goal will increase the likelihood that the goal is used in deciding whether or not to make an attribution to discrimination. The more committed one is to a goal, the more she is determined to pursue that goal, the more effort she invests in the goal, and the sooner she endeavors to complete the goal (Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2002, Oettingen, Pak, & Schnetter, 2001). Therefore, the more committed an individual is to a goal that increases the likelihood of claiming discrimination, the more she will claim discrimination. Conversely, the more committed an individual is to a goal that decreases the likelihood of claiming discrimination, the less she will claim discrimination. In the current set of three studies, goal commitment was manipulated. In Study 1 regulatory focus was used to manipulate goal commitment, as it has been found to affect goal commitment (Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002). In Studies 2 and 3, goal commitment was manipulated using an article prime that varies the importance of the goal it activates.

To summarize the current three studies, in Study 1 the goal of self-esteem maintenance was compared to the goal of self-presentation using private vs. public reporting of attributions to discrimination. When making attributions privately after a failure, the goal of self-esteem maintenance should be more important than any other goal. When claiming discrimination publicly, self-presentation concerns should be more

important to participants than should self-esteem maintenance because the presence of others should increase participants' concerns about creating a positive image and being liked by the others. Goal commitment was manipulated using regulatory focus. In Study 2, self-esteem maintenance goals were again compared to self-presentation goals, using an article that participants read. Goal commitment was manipulated using a questionnaire. In Study 3, injustice goals, self-esteem goals, and self-presentation goals were compared to one another, again manipulated using an article. Goal commitment again was manipulated using a questionnaire. In all three studies, I also measured self-esteem, anxiety, and depression to further explore the costs of claiming discrimination.

Research On Attributions To Discrimination

Whereas few studies have examined the relationship between claiming discrimination and goals, research on claiming discrimination as it relates to costs and benefits abounds. Crocker and her colleagues (1991) demonstrated a benefit that can come from claiming discrimination – self-esteem maintenance when faced with failure. In their experiment, Black participants purportedly received negative feedback from a White evaluator, indicating that the evaluator would not like to work with them, be a classmate with them, or be their roommate. Participants were told that this evaluator either could, or could not see them through the blinds covering a one way mirror looking into the participants' room. All participants then made attributions for their negative feedback and completed a measure of self-esteem.

Black participants were significantly more likely to make attributions to discrimination when the evaluator could see them than when he could not see them. Also, when the evaluator could see participants, Black participants reported significantly

higher self-esteem than when the evaluator could not see them. Therefore, when participants could be seen by the evaluator, they claimed discrimination more, and they reported higher self-esteem relative to those who could not be seen. Crocker and her colleagues (1991) interpret these findings as a buffering effect. When participants are able to attribute their negative feedback to prejudice (when the evaluator could see that the participants were Black), they feel better about themselves as compared to those who have no reason to attribute the negative feedback to prejudice (when the evaluator could not see the participants) and therefore do not make prejudice attributions. When participants were able to make attributions to discrimination, they did not internalize the feelings aroused from the negative feedback they received. Instead, they blamed their negative results on the experimenter and felt more positive about their own abilities.

Major, Quinton, and Schmader (2003b) conducted a study to test the influence of claiming discrimination on self-esteem in women. They found that women who were highly identified with their gender claimed discrimination more than did women who were low on gender identity. They also found that the more participants made attributions to discrimination relative to ability, the higher their self-esteem. This study again demonstrates that making attributions to discrimination buffers the self-esteem when faced with a potential failure.

While these studies examined the self-esteem benefits of making attributions to discrimination, other studies have examined some of the costs of making such attributions. Kaiser and Miller (2001) found that when an individual claimed to be the victim of discrimination, participants reported lower levels of liking for the individual than when the individual did not claim discrimination. Swim and Hyers (1999) found

that participants were unwilling to confront discrimination due to fear of retaliation from the discriminator. Stangor, Swim, Van Allen, and Sechrist (2002) examined how these potential costs influence when individuals make attributions to discrimination. In their experiment, participants indicated the extent to which negative feedback they had received was due to discrimination. They made this attribution either privately, or they were told that they would have to read their attributions out loud. Participants who were to read their responses out loud in the presence of a member of the opposite social category (e.g. men, if the stigmatized group was women) claimed discrimination significantly less than did participants who made their ratings either privately or in the presence of a member of the same social category. These individuals seemed to be aware of the potential social costs of claiming discrimination.

Sechrist, Swim, and Stangor (2004) replicated these results and examined the direct impact of self-presentation goals as compared to need for control goals. In this study, all participants thought that they would have to read their responses out loud, activating the self-presentation goal. Half of these participants completed a computer task designed to create the need to reassert personal control over one's outcomes. Sechrist and her colleagues found that when need for control was increased, participants were more likely to claim discrimination than when the self-presentation goal alone was activated. This study demonstrates that goal activation and commitment play a role in determining which costs and benefits are more important to an individual in any particular situation. When the need for control goal was increased, participants were less concerned about the costs associated with self-presentation (not being liked) and more concerned about the benefit of regaining a sense of control.

In the current research, I manipulated the activation of goals that are expected to lead to different discrimination attributions. In Study 1, I manipulated the goal of self-esteem maintenance in one condition and self-presentation concerns in another condition. Self-esteem maintenance should increase attributions to discrimination, whereas self-presentation concerns should decrease attributions to discrimination. In Study 2, I again manipulated self-esteem maintenance and self-presentation goals, again in separate conditions, using different manipulations. In Study 3, I manipulated self-esteem maintenance in one condition, self-presentation in another condition, and the goal of fighting injustice in a third condition. In each of these studies I also measured self-esteem. Because self-esteem is both a potential cost and a potential benefit of claiming discrimination, how individuals' goals influence both claiming discrimination and the resulting self-esteem will enable researchers to further understand when and how individuals benefit by claiming discrimination, and when and how claiming discrimination can be costly. Finally, not only must a goal be activated in order for it to influence claiming discrimination, but individuals must also be more committed to the goal than they are to another, competing goal in order for it to influence attributions to discrimination.

Goal Commitment

Goal commitment refers to the extent to which an individual desires, or is determined to pursue a goal (Kruglanski et al., 2002; Shah et al., 2002). Generally, goal commitment has been thought of as a multiplicative function of the value a person puts on a goal and the expectancy of attainment of the goal. Thus the more valuable a goal, and the more one expects to achieve the goal, the more committed one is to that goal.

Goal commitment can be increased by increasing either the perceived value of the goal or by increasing the expectation that one will achieve the goal. The more committed individuals are to a goal, the more they persist in working on the goal, the more they desire to return to goal striving when it is interrupted, and the more they inhibit alternative goals. One factor that has been shown to influence goal commitment is regulatory focus.

Higgins' (1997) theory of regulatory focus is based on the belief that individuals have different types of goals. We have ideal goals, goals involving our hopes, wishes, aspirations, and achievements; goals that are nurturance-related. We also have ought goals, goals involving our duties, obligations, and responsibilities; goals that are security-related. Ideal goals lead us to strive to approach matches to desired end-states and to a promotion focus. Ought goals lead us to strive to avoid mismatches to desired end-states and to a prevention focus. Promotion focused individuals are sensitive to the presence or absence of positive outcomes, while prevention focused are sensitive to the presence or absence of negative outcomes.

We can also think of regulatory focus in terms of signal detection theory. In signal detection theory, a signal is either presented or not and an individual then responds either with a yes, there was a signal, or a no, there was not a signal. Four possible outcomes can result from a signal detection trial. One could have (1) a hit – correctly detecting a present signal, (2) a false alarm – saying yes when no signal was presented, (3) a correct rejection – correctly saying no when there was no signal, or (4) a miss – saying there was no signal when one was presented. Promotion focused individuals strive to ensure hits. This can lead to errors of commission, or false alarms. Prevention

focused individuals, in contrast, are more concerned about correct rejections. They are thus more likely to commit errors of omission or misses.

Crowe and Higgins (1997) tested this theory using a recognition memory task. Participants were shown a series of nonsense syllables. Then after a filler task, they were shown a second list of nonsense syllables containing both the syllables they had seen previously and other syllables that they had not seen. When indicating whether or not they had seen the syllables before, promotion focused participants had a risky bias of saying that they had seen the syllable before to many more syllables than did prevention focused participants. Promotion focused participants desired to increase the likelihood that they find correct responses (hits) and did not worry about false alarms. Prevention focused participants were much more conservative in their responses, saying no more often in an attempt to ensure against including any syllables that they may not have seen, making correct rejections. Promotion focused participants were more risky while prevention focused participants were more conservative, avoiding risk as much as possible.

While many studies manipulate regulatory focus, Freitas, Liberman, Salovey, and Higgins (2002) treated regulatory focus as an individual difference measure. They found in a number of studies that the more prevention focused an individual is, the sooner he desires to begin a task. In another study, this time manipulating regulatory focus, Freitas and his colleagues (2002) found that participants completed prevention focused tasks before they completed promotion focused tasks, again showing the urgency that prevention focus creates. Pennington and Roese (2003) replicated the results of Freitas

and his colleagues (2002), and they also found that prevention focused participants estimated that they would complete goals sooner than did promotion focused participants.

Theories on goals have indicated that another quality of increased goal commitment is resumption of an interrupted task (Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trotschel, 2001, Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). A study by Liberman, Idson, Camacho, and Higgins (1999) tested the relationship between regulatory focus, and task persistence and resumption. In their study, promotion and prevention focused participants were interrupted while working on a task. They were then asked if they would prefer to start a new task or if they would prefer to resume the interrupted task. Prevention focused participants were significantly more likely than were promotion focused participants to desire to continue with the interrupted task. Promotion focused participants preferred to begin a new task. So, prevention focus increases commitment to an original task, leading these individuals to ignore a new task.

Shah, Friedman, and Kruglanski (2002) also examined how regulatory focus influences goal commitment. In their study, participants listed two goals. They then rated the extent to which they felt that attaining each goal was a duty or responsibility and the extent to which they would ideally like to attain each goal. Participants then completed a lexical decision task to assess the activation of target goals as compared to the inhibition of alternative goals. They found that the more a goal was seen as a duty or obligation (a prevention focused goal), the more it inhibited alternative goals. The more a goal was seen as an ideal or aspiration, the less it inhibited alternative goals. They also found that anxiety significantly increased the inhibition of alternative goals, and that this effect was magnified when participants were prevention focused.

Taken together, this research demonstrates that prevention focus increases commitment to an activated goal, and that this is particularly likely with increased anxiety. Therefore, when discrimination is present, increasing prevention focus should lead to increased commitment to the activated goal, influencing when individuals report feeling discriminated against. If the activated goal decreases the likelihood of making attributions to discrimination, greater goal commitment, or prevention focused individuals should claim discrimination less than promotion focused individuals. Similarly, if the activated goal increases the likelihood of making attributions to discrimination, increased goal commitment, or prevention focused individuals should claim discrimination more than promotion focused individuals.

In the current studies, anxiety was also measured to examine its relationship to goal commitment. Because increased goal commitment is related to increased anxiety, I considered the possibility that anxiety would mediate the relationship between goal commitment and claiming discrimination. The more committed individuals are to a goal, the greater their anxiety, and the greater their need to act in ways that are consistent with the goal to which they are committed. This should then lead to increased or decreased attributions to discrimination, depending on whether the activated goal should increase or decrease attributions to discrimination. If the activated goal leads to increased attributions to discrimination, increasing goal commitment should lead to increased anxiety, which should increase attributions to discrimination, but if the activated goal leads to decreased attributions to discrimination, increasing goal commitment should lead to increased anxiety, which should decrease attributions to discrimination.

The Current Research

In the current studies, female participants experienced a potentially discriminatory situation. Only women were used because they may experience discrimination as a result of membership in this stigmatized group, and because they are a readily available stigmatized group. Goal commitment was manipulated using both regulatory focus (Study 1) and by directly increasing the importance of the activated goal (Studies 2 and 3). To produce a perception of potential discrimination, participants completed a task on which they were all told that they had performed poorly. They were then told that like many women, they displayed traditional thinking where inventive thinking was more appropriate. The dependent measures were the extent to which participants felt that their results were due to discrimination and a measure of self-esteem. Anxiety and depression were measured to assess their functions as both a mediator and as a dependent measure.

Participants completed a measure of anxiety because prior research has demonstrated that anxiety is related to goal commitment. Shah and his colleagues (2002) showed that anxiety is related to increased goal commitment, particularly for prevention focused participants. Further, other studies have shown that anxiety is associated with regulatory focus, and in particular with prevention focus (Higgins, 1997, Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). Because prevention focus is associated with avoiding negative outcomes, the more anxious one feels, the more concerned she should be with the avoiding negative outcomes. This should also mean that increased anxiety increases a concern for the potential costs associated with an unfulfilled goal, which increases an individual's desire to act in ways that do not conflict with her activated goal. Acting in ways that conflict with their goals could lead to negative outcomes, which these individuals are striving to avoid. Therefore, anxiety was measured to examine its

relationship to goal commitment and claiming discrimination. Increased anxiety should be associated with an increase in goal commitment, and thus with a desire to make attributions to discrimination in ways that will not conflict with their activated goal. Further, increased anxiety could be a cost associated with claiming discrimination, independent of self-esteem. Anxiety was also included to examine this possibility. Overall, I believed that anxiety would mediate the relationship between goal commitment and attributions to discrimination.

Depression was measured because it also has been associated with regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997, Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997), and particularly with promotion focus. Thus, promotion focused individuals, or low commitment participants, could report more depression as a result of their negative outcomes than the higher commitment participants. Likewise, depression could be a cost associated with claiming or not claiming discrimination, independent of self-esteem. Thus it was also measured to examine these possibilities.

Participants completed a measure of self-esteem to further examine the costs and benefits associated with making or minimizing attributions to discrimination, particularly as it relates to activated goals. Crocker and her colleagues (1991, 1993, Major et al., 2003a, Major et al., 2003b) have shown that making attributions to discrimination can protect the self-esteem. I intend to replicate this result in conditions where self-esteem maintenance is the activated goal. It is possible that the self-esteem is only protected when individuals are most committed to the self-esteem maintenance goal, and not when they are more committed to another goal. This could be the case regardless of whether the alternative goal leads to discrimination attributions or not. However, it is also

possible that by acting in accordance with the goal to which an individual is most committed, self-esteem will be protected regardless of discrimination attributions.

Overall, I predict that only when self-esteem maintenance is the activated goal will self-esteem increase as attributions to discrimination increase. When an individual is more committed to another goal, attributions to discrimination will not relate to self-esteem.

Discrimination should create some kind of negative outcome for the target, whether it be not receiving a job or promotion, failing on a task, or being degraded. Any of these things could lead to a decrease in self-esteem. Individuals may protect the self-esteem by claiming discrimination if it is their goal to protect the self-esteem. However, if individuals are more committed to another goal, they will act to fulfill that goal, concerning themselves with the costs and benefits associated with that goal at the expense of improving self-esteem. Individuals will not address the negative outcome resulting from discrimination, but choose to ignore it to act in accordance with the goal to which they are more committed. Thus after the goal is satisfied, individuals must still deal with the negative outcome resulting from the discrimination. Because the negative outcome has not been addressed, individuals' self-esteem will not be protected by acting in accordance with a goal other than self-esteem maintenance. Self-esteem was measured in the current experiments to show this.

In Study 1, regulatory focus was manipulated and then participants completed the task on which they received negative feedback. Before receiving the feedback, half the participants were told that they would read their responses to their questionnaires out loud to the experimenter (self-presentation condition). In order to increase the salience of the public nature of their responses, participants first read their responses to a

demographic questionnaire aloud to the experimenter. Believing that they have to read their responses out loud should activate self-presentation goals in these participants. The other half of the participants were told that their responses were private, that they will seal their responses in an envelope (self-esteem maintenance condition). These participants did this with a demographic sheet, again to increase the salience of the private nature of their responses. Then participants received their feedback, which was poor for all participants. The negative feedback was expected to activate a self-esteem maintenance goal only in participants whose responses were private. Because participants in the self-presentation condition have the goal of self-presentation activated, they should inhibit alternative goals and focus on the currently activated goal (Shah et al., 2002). After receiving their results, participants indicated the extent to which their results were due to discrimination (the dependent measure). Finally participants completed measures of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression. For these last three measures, all participants were told that their responses would be private.

I predicted a main effect of the activated goal. Participants in the self-esteem maintenance (private) condition should claim discrimination more than participants in the self-presentation condition (public). I also predicted an interaction between the activated goal and goal commitment (regulatory focus), such that high commitment (prevention focused) participants will display greater commitment to the activated goal, evidenced through attributions to discrimination. In the self-esteem maintenance (private) condition, high commitment (prevention focused) participants should make more attributions to discrimination than should low commitment (promotion focused) participants. In the self-presentation condition (public), high commitment (prevention

focused) participants should make fewer attributions to discrimination than should low commitment (promotion focused) participants. For self-esteem, I predicted an interaction between the activated goal and goal commitment. In the self-esteem maintenance condition (private), high commitment (prevention focused) participants should report higher levels of self-esteem, as they make more attributions to discrimination, protecting their self-esteem from the negative consequences of failure. In the self-presentation condition (public), participants should display equal levels of self-esteem, as attributions to discrimination are not made to protect self-esteem from failure. For anxiety I predicted a main effect of goal commitment (regulatory focus). The high commitment (prevention focused) participants should report more anxiety than low commitment (promotion focused) participants, regardless of the activated goal. I also predicted an interaction between the activated goal and anxiety on claiming discrimination. In the self-esteem maintenance (private) condition, the more anxious participants feel, the more they should claim discrimination. In the self-presentation (public) condition, the more anxious participants feel, the less they should claim discrimination.

Study 2 again compared the goals of self-esteem maintenance and self-presentation. Participants again completed the task on which they all did poorly. While their responses were being graded, participants read an article describing the importance of either having high self-esteem or describing the importance of being well liked by others in order to prime the respective goals. Participants in the high commitment condition then completed a questionnaire about the content of the article, including an item that asks the participants to list three ways they can work to achieve the described goal. Those in the low commitment condition completed a questionnaire about the

grammar and sentence structure of the article. After reading the articles and completing their accompanying questionnaires, participants again completed the attributions questionnaire, and they handed their questionnaire to the experimenter after completing it. This procedure should make participants feel less anonymous than sealing their responses in an envelope, but it should not increase self-presentation concerns to the same degree as does reading responses aloud. Finally, all participants completed measures of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression.

I again predicted a main effect of goal activation, such that those in the self-esteem maintenance condition should claim discrimination more than those in the self-presentation condition. I also predicted an interaction between the activated goal and goal commitment. I believed that in the self-esteem maintenance condition, highly committed participants would again make more attributions to discrimination than would participants in the low commitment condition. They would do this in order to protect their self-esteem from the negative consequences of doing poorly on the experimental task. In the self-presentation condition, participants in the high commitment condition should again make fewer attributions to discrimination than should participants in the low commitment condition in order to present a more positive public image.

For self-esteem, I predicted an interaction between the activated goal and goal commitment. In the self-esteem maintenance condition, participants in the high commitment condition should report higher levels of self-esteem than should participants low in commitment, just as in Study 1. In the self-presentation condition, participants in the high and low commitment conditions should again report equal levels of self-esteem. Finally, I predicted that anxiety would mediate the relationship between goal

commitment and attributions to discrimination. In the self-esteem maintenance condition, the more committed participants are to maintaining their self-esteem, the more anxious they should feel. This should lead to greater attributions to discrimination. In the self-presentation condition, the more committed participants are to the self-presentation goal, the more anxious they should feel, and the less they should claim discrimination.

In Study 3 I introduced a new goal that is expected to influence discrimination attributions. In Study 3, I compared the goals of self-esteem maintenance, self-presentation, and fighting injustice. System justification or believing that the system is legitimate is a goal that has been examined in conjunction with claiming discrimination (Major et al., 2002, Jost & Kay, 2005). The more an individual sees the system as just or legitimate, the less likely he is to claim discrimination. The goal of fighting injustice was designed to be the opposite of the goal of justifying the system. It induced participants to see the system unjust and in need of change. In the experiment, participants again completed a task on which they all failed. Before receiving feedback, participants read an article to prime the goal of maintaining a positive self-esteem, the goal of being well liked by others, or the goal of fighting to correct injustice. Participants also completed a questionnaire accompanying the article, again to manipulate goal commitment. Participants then received their feedback and completed the attributions questionnaire and measures of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression.

For Study 3, I predicted an interaction between the activated goal and goal commitment. In the self-esteem maintenance condition, the high commitment participants should claim discrimination more than should low commitment participants.

In the injustice condition, the effect should be the same, with high commitment participants again claiming discrimination more than low commitment participants. In the self-presentation condition, high commitment participants were expected to claim discrimination less than low commitment participants. Anxiety should again mediate the relationship between goal commitment and attributions to discrimination. In the self-esteem maintenance and fighting injustice conditions, the more committed participants are to their goal, the more anxious they should feel. This should lead to greater attributions to discrimination. In the self-presentation condition, the more committed participants are to the self-presentation goal, the more anxious they should feel, and the less they should claim discrimination. In this study, self-esteem should relate to discrimination attributions only in the self-esteem maintenance condition, as participants in the other conditions make attributions to discrimination to fulfill other goals that are unrelated to self-esteem maintenance.

STUDY 1

Method

Participants

Participants were 92 undergraduate women at the University of Maryland. They participated in exchange for extra credit in lower level psychology courses. Twenty-two participants were dropped due to suspicion, leaving a total of 70 subjects.

Procedure

Participants arrived at the lab in pairs and were greeted by a male experimenter. The experimenter was male in order to decrease the possibility that participants would perceive the experimenter as supportive or empathetic. Participants were told that the

study was about how an individual's goals influence their intellectual inventiveness. The experimenter explained that the research was being conducted in conjunction with a statistical analysis firm in Laurel, MD. He told participants that previous research has found a relationship between intellectual inventiveness and future success, and that now we were interested in examining how goals interact with intellectual inventiveness to predict future success. The experimenter then told participants that first they would describe their goals; then they would complete a cognitive task. He told them that they would receive feedback on how well they did on the cognitive task and that they would complete a questionnaire evaluating their feedback and a questionnaire on their mood and current attitudes. Participants were then told that their responses to the word completion task would be graded by Matthew Davis, an evaluator from the statistical analysis firm who is an expert on the relationship between intellectual inventiveness and future success, and they were told that he is generally very accurate at evaluating individuals' levels of intellectual inventiveness.

Participants were given consent forms to sign before beginning the experiment. They then began by writing about their goals in order to manipulate regulatory focus. Half the participants wrote about their hopes and aspirations as a manipulation of promotion focus (see Appendix A). The other half wrote about their duties and obligations as a manipulation of prevention focus (see Appendix A). After this, the experimenter described the word completion task (see Appendix A) to participants. The word completion task contained eight letter strings each containing ten letters. Participants were given five minutes to find as many words as possible from the letter strings. Participants were told that the more words they found, and the longer the words,

the better they would do. The experimenter handed out the word completion task and then left the room for exactly five minutes.

When the experimenter returned, he asked participants to write their initials and their gender at the top of the page in order to increase participants' awareness of their gender. Then he collected participants' tasks and took them to the evaluator. He told participants that it would take the evaluator a few minutes to grade the tasks and that while he is grading them, he would like the participants to complete some demographic information. The experimenter then left the room, ostensibly to take the word completion tasks to the evaluator, and he returned one minute later with demographic information sheets (see Appendix B). He then explained to the participants in the self-esteem maintenance (private) condition that they should complete the form, seal it in an envelope that he would give them, and then put it in a pile of other envelopes which were sitting on a table where participants could see it. To participants in the self-presentation (public) condition, the experimenter explained that in order to save time with data entry, they would read their responses out loud to him while he wrote them down on a legal pad.

Participants then completed the demographic information sheets. Participants in the self-esteem maintenance (private) condition sealed their sheets in an envelope and put it in the pile of other envelopes, and participants in the self-presentation (public) condition read their responses out loud to the experimenter while he wrote them on a legal pad. The experimenter alternated between participants in the self-presentation (public) condition as they read responses out loud. Participants in this condition read their responses out loud in order to increase the realism of and concern for having to read responses out loud.

Once participants had finished with the demographic sheets, the experimenter left the room and returned with their feedback on the word completion task. Feedback was written on separate evaluation forms (see Appendix C). The experimenter explained that he would give all participants a minute to look over their scores before he gave them the feedback evaluation questionnaire. The experimenter handed back the grades. All participants received a score of a D with the comment “like many women, you exhibit traditional thinking where inventive thinking is more appropriate.” The experimenter then left the room for one minute, and returned with the feedback evaluation questionnaire. Participants were told that, as they had done with the demographic information sheet, they would either seal their responses in an envelope or they would read their responses out loud to the experimenter.

The feedback evaluation questionnaire (see Appendix D) asked participants to rate on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*completely*) the extent to which they felt that their responses were due to their own ability and effort, bias, the quality of their answers, and discrimination. Bias and discrimination were averaged as the measure of attributions to discrimination ($\alpha = .80$). After participants completed the feedback evaluation questionnaire, they completed measures of their mood and attitudes (see Appendix E for measures). They were all told that the mood and attitude measures would be completely anonymous, and that no one would know their responses to the questionnaire. Mood was measured using a six-item measure rated on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 9 (*completely*). Participants rated the extent to which they felt each of the following at that moment – nervous, happy, tense, discouraged, relaxed, anxious, calm, and depressed. Nervous, relaxed (reverse scored), tense, and anxious were used as a measure of anxiety ($\alpha = .85$).

Discouraged, happy (reverse scored), and depressed were used as a measure of depression ($\alpha = .65$). The attitude measures were 14 items from the Heatherton and Polivy (1991) state self-esteem scale and the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale ($\alpha = .88$). Heatherton and Polivy (1991) included the social ($\alpha = .91$) and performance ($\alpha = .79$) subscales. Items were rated on a scale from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*completely*). The Rosenberg scale included 10 items on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 4 (*strongly agree*). Finally, participants were asked what they thought the experiment was about, and then they were checked for suspicion, debriefed, and dismissed.

Results

Attributions to Discrimination

To assess the effects of my manipulations on attributions to discrimination, I conducted a 2 (activated goal: self-esteem maintenance (private) vs. self-presentation (public)) by 2 (goal commitment: high (prevention) vs. low commitment (promotion focus)). I found a significant interaction between activated goal and goal commitment on attributions to discrimination, $F(1, 66) = 4.37, p < .05$. The effect size effect size was (η_p^2) = .06. As predicted, in the self-presentation (public) condition, high commitment (prevention focused) participants claimed discrimination significantly less than did participants in the low commitment (promotion focused) condition (see Table 1 for means), $F(1, 66) = 4.80, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .14$. In the self-esteem maintenance (private) condition, although in the predicted direction, high (prevention) and low commitment (promotion focused) participants (see Table 1 for means) did not differ significantly, $F(1, 66) = .52, ns$. Finally, as would be expected, in the high commitment (prevention focused) condition, I found a significant difference between the self-esteem maintenance

(private) and self-presentation (public) conditions, $F(1, 66) = 4.60, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .12$, but I found no difference between the self-esteem maintenance (private) and the self-presentation (public) conditions in the low commitment (promotion focused) condition, $F(1, 66) = .60, ns$.

Self-Esteem and Mood Measures

Next, I conducted 2 (activated goal: self-esteem maintenance (private) vs. self-presentation (public)) by 2 (goal commitment: high (prevention) vs. low (promotion focused) commitment) ANOVAs to test the influence of activated goal and goal commitment on self-esteem, anxiety, and depression. I found no effects on the social state self-esteem (see Table 2 for means) or on the performance state self-esteem subscales (see Table 2). Neither did I find any effects on the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale (see Table 2). I also did not find any effects on anxiety (see Table 3 for means). However, I found a marginal main effect of goal commitment on depression, $F(1, 66) = 2.80, p = .10, \eta_p^2 = .04$, such that those in the low commitment (promotion focused) condition reported greater depression than did those in the high commitment (prevention focused) condition (see Table 3 for means).

Mediator Checks

In order to explore the possibility of mediators, I examined the relationships among attributions to discrimination, self-esteem, anxiety, and depression. I conducted a series of correlations that are presented in Table 4. Attributions to discrimination were significantly negatively related to the state self-esteem performance subscale. Attributions to discrimination were also significantly negatively related to Rosenberg self-esteem. Thus, the more participants claimed discrimination, the lower their self-

esteem. I also found that overall, the lower participants' self-esteem, the more anxious and the more depressed participants felt.

Next, in order to assess whether any of the correlations among the dependent variables differed in separate conditions, I examined the correlations in the goal activation conditions and in the goal commitment conditions separately. I correlated the variables in the self-esteem maintenance (private) condition, and then I conducted the correlations in the self-presentation (public) condition. The correlations in the goal activation conditions were not different from one another, nor were they different from the overall correlations. I had predicted that attributions to discrimination and self-esteem would only be related in the self-esteem maintenance condition, but I did not find this relationship. However, within goal commitment conditions, I found significant correlations in the high commitment (prevention focused) condition that were not significant in the low commitment (promotion focused) condition. In the low commitment (promotion focused) condition, attributions to discrimination did not correlate with any measures of self-esteem, anxiety, or depression; however the correlations among the measures of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression were all significantly correlated, as in the overall correlations. In the high commitment (prevention focused) condition, attributions to discrimination were significantly correlated with social state self-esteem, $r(33) = -.37, p < .05$, performance state self-esteem, $r(33) = -.49, p < .05$, Rosenberg self-esteem, $r(33) = -.48, p < .05$, anxiety, $r(33) = .43, p < .05$, and depression, $r(33) = .44, p < .05$. The correlations among the self-esteem measures, anxiety, and depression were again all significantly correlated as in the promotion focused condition, and as in the overall correlations.

To assess whether any correlations in the promotion focused condition were different from the prevention focused condition, I conducted moderated multiple regressions, including the interaction term between the condition (self-esteem maintenance vs. self-presentation) and attributions to discrimination. For the relationship between social state self-esteem and attributions to discrimination, the slope in the high commitment (prevention focused) condition did not differ significantly from the slope in the low commitment (promotion focused) condition. Likewise, for the relationship between performance state self-esteem and attributions to discrimination the slope in the high commitment (prevention focused) condition was not significantly different from the same slope in the low commitment (promotion focused) condition. However, the slope predicting Rosenberg scores from attributions to discrimination in the high commitment (prevention focused) condition was marginally different from the slope in the low commitment (promotion focused) condition, $\beta = -.77, t(68) = -1.88, p < .07$. The slopes predicting anxiety from attributions to discrimination differed significantly by condition, $\beta = .95, t(68) = 2.29, p < .05$. Finally, the slopes predicting depression from attributions to discrimination differed significantly by condition, $\beta = .89, t(68) = 2.15, p < .05$.

These results show that for those in the high commitment (prevention focused) condition, attributions to discrimination predicted increased anxiety and depression, and decreased self-esteem as measured by the Rosenberg self-esteem scale, but that attributions to discrimination did not predict these things in the promotion focused condition.

Discussion

The results of Study 1 provide some initial evidence for my hypothesis that certain goals will lead to increased claiming of discrimination while others lead to decreased claiming of discrimination, and that this behavior is also largely determined by how committed an individual is to the goal. As predicted, in the self-presentation condition (public condition), those in the high commitment condition (the prevention focused condition) claimed discrimination less than did those in the low commitment condition (the promotion focused condition). The public manipulation activated the goal of being well liked, leading the highly committed, but not the less committed participants to claim discrimination less in order to appear more likeable to the experimenter. However, in the self-esteem maintenance condition (private condition) the high (prevention) and low commitment (promotion focused) conditions did not differ in their attributions to discrimination, contrary to my predictions. This may have been because, although the private condition likely would have led to activation of the self-esteem maintenance goal, the goal was not directly manipulated. Thus other goals likely were also present, and this may have resulted in the weak or non-existent effect. It is also possible that the goal was not activated at all. In Study 2, I more directly activated the goals of self-esteem maintenance and self-presentation in order to further examine the relationship between goal activation and goal commitment.

Upon examination of the correlations, I found that in the high commitment condition (prevention focus condition), attributions to discrimination predicted self-esteem, anxiety, and depression, but that attributions to discrimination did not predict any dependent measures in the low commitment condition (promotion focused condition). It is possible that for those in the high commitment condition, increased anxiety and

depression led to increased claiming of discrimination. Another possibility is that for prevention focus, but not high goal commitment, increased anxiety led to increased claiming of discrimination. Because prevention focus is a more indirect manipulation of high commitment, and because it likely manipulates more than just goal commitment, the prevention focus, not the high commitment aspect of the manipulation, may have led to the findings. In Study 2, I conducted a conceptual replication of Study 1 to gain additional understanding of the impact of goal commitment alone on the relationship between attributions to discrimination and self-esteem, anxiety, and depression.

I had wanted to test the possibility that anxiety or depression mediated the relationship between goal activation and attributions to discrimination. However, because goal activation was not a significant predictor of attributions to discrimination, nor was anxiety or depression, I was unable to test for mediation. I did find that the low commitment (promotion focused) participants reported greater depression than did the high commitment (prevention focused) participants. This is likely the effect of the promotion focus manipulation, as promotion focus has been associated with depression when faced with a lack of success (as opposed to anxiety in the case of prevention focus).

Because I only found significant differences in the self-presentation condition (public), and not in the self-esteem maintenance condition (private), and because I did not directly manipulate goal activation or goal commitment, in Study 2 I sought to replicate Study 1 using different, more explicit manipulations of goal activation and goal commitment. I desired to demonstrate that the public and private manipulations did in fact activate the predicted goals, and that regulatory focus actually did manipulate goal commitment, by replicating the results of Study 1. To manipulated goal activation, I used

an article designed to prime the self-esteem maintenance and self-presentation goals. I manipulated goal commitment using a questionnaire that participants responded to regarding the goal activation article. The questionnaire that was designed to create high commitment asked participants to relate the main ideas of the article to their own lives, increasing the importance and value of the goal. For low commitment, the questionnaire asked participants about the grammar of the article.

In Study 2 I also added an implicit measure of self-esteem, the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). Because self-esteem maintenance was explicitly manipulated in Study 2, I felt that self-esteem, particularly in the self-esteem maintenance condition, may be affected by socially desirable responding. As a result, I felt that the IAT may provide a more accurate assessment of participants' self-esteem. My predictions for Study 2 were the same as those for Study 1 for all my dependent measures.

STUDY 2

Method

Participants

Participants were 73 undergraduate women at the University of Maryland participating in exchange for extra credit in lower level psychology courses. Thirteen participants were dropped due to suspicion, leaving a total of 60 subjects.

Procedure

Participants arrived at the lab in pairs and were greeted by a male experimenter. Again, a male experimenter was used in order to decrease the possibility that participants would perceive the experimenter as supportive or empathetic. The cover story of this

experiment was similar to Study 1. Participants were told that the purpose of the experiment was to learn more about intellectual inventiveness. They were again told that the research was being conducted in conjunction with a statistical analysis firm in Laurel, MD that has done a large amount of research on intellectual inventiveness, and that we were expanding that research to examine the relationship between intellectual inventiveness and future success. The experimenter then told participants that first they would complete a cognitive task. They would receive feedback on how well they did on the task, and then they would complete a questionnaire evaluating their feedback and a questionnaire on their mood and current attitudes. Participants were then told, as in Study 1, that their responses would be graded by Matthew Davis, an evaluator from the statistical analysis firm who is an expert on intellectual inventiveness, and they were told that he is generally very accurate at evaluating individuals' levels of intellectual inventiveness.

Participants signed consent forms and began the experiment. Then the experimenter described the word completion task to participants (Appendix A). He handed out the word completion task and then left the room for exactly five minutes. When the experimenter returned, he asked participants to write their initials and their gender at the top of the page. Then he collected participants' tasks and took them to the evaluator. He told participants that it would take the evaluator a few minutes to grade the tasks, and he left the room for one minute.

When the experimenter returned, he asked the participants if they would mind reading an article he was planning to use in another experiment. This article primed the goal of maintaining one's self-esteem (self-esteem maintenance) in half the participants,

and it primed the goal of being well liked by others (self-presentation goal) in the other half (see Appendix F). The self-esteem maintenance article described research that has shown that maintaining a positive sense of self is critical to future success. In the self-presentation condition, the article described research that has shown that being well liked by others is critical to future success.

Goal commitment was manipulated using a questionnaire that asked the participants to attend to different aspects of the article. Participants in the low goal commitment condition completed a questionnaire asking about the grammar, structure, and main ideas of the article (see Appendix G). Participants in the high commitment condition were asked to complete a questionnaire about the content of the article (see Appendix G). The questionnaire related to the points made in the article. The last item on the questionnaire reminded participants that soon they would be entering the job market and that every day they do things that may contribute to their success. The item went on to ask participants to list three things that they can do, based on the findings in the article, to improve their chances of success in life.

Once participants had finished reading the articles and had responded to the questionnaire, the experimenter returned with their feedback on the word completion task. As in Study 1, the feedback was written on separate evaluation forms (Appendix C), and the experimenter explained that he would give them a minute to look over their scores before he gave them the feedback evaluation questionnaire. Again as in Study 1, the experimenter handed back the scores, and all participants received a score of a D with the comment “like many women, you exhibit traditional thinking where inventive thinking is more appropriate.” The experimenter then left the room for one minute, and

returned with the feedback evaluation questionnaire (described in Study 1; Appendix D). Participants rated on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) the extent to which their scores were due to bias and discrimination as the measure of attributions to discrimination ($\alpha = .84$).

After participants completed the feedback evaluation questionnaire, they completed measures of their mood and attitudes (described in Study 1; Appendix E). They were all told that these measures would be completely anonymous, and that no one would see their responses to the questionnaire. Then participants completed the self-esteem Implicit Association Test (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), a reaction time measure, on one of two IBM compatible Pentium 2 computers. Participants were to press a left or right key (d or k) to categorize each of a series of words shown on the screen. During two practice rounds, the word was categorized as relating to either “self” or “other,” or as being “good” or “bad.” Each trial included 20 words, 10 self or good and 10 other or bad, which were randomly shown to the participant. Self words included *me*, *myself*, *mine*, the participant’s first and last name, and her student identification number. Other words included *other*, *them*, *their*, *they*, another student’s first and last name, and another student’s student identification number. Examples of good words include *joy*, *smile*, and *pleasant*; examples of bad words include *pain*, *death*, and *tragedy*.

After the practice trials, participants had to categorize items into combined categories. On the *match* trials, self was paired with good items and other with bad items. On the *mismatch* trials, self was paired with bad items and other with good items. The order of appearance of match and mismatch trials was randomized. Participants completed 1 trial of 20 words, followed by a trial of 40 words for both the match and the

mismatch pairings. To correct for errors, I replaced each error latency with the block mean plus 600 milliseconds as instructed by Greenwald and his colleagues (2003). The IAT was scored by averaging the two match trials then averaging the two mismatch trials. The match trials were then subtracted from the mismatch trials to create a difference score, such that a bigger number represents higher self-esteem. Then all of the latencies were averaged to get a total standard deviation. The difference score (mismatch - match) was divided by the total latency standard deviation to create a D score which Greenwald and his colleagues (2003) consider to be the best way to score the IAT. Higher scores on the D score represent greater self-esteem.

Finally, participants completed a measure of goal commitment as a manipulation check (see Appendix H). This self-report measure included the following instructions: “Many things contribute to future success. Listed below are a number of goals one may have to aid them in their future success. Please indicate on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*) how valuable you think each goal is, how important each goal is to you, and how committed you are to each goal.” The questionnaire listed six different goals, including creating and maintaining a positive public impression, maintaining a positive view of one’s self, and four other filler goals. The three items (how valuable each goal is, how important each goal is, and how committed you are to each goal) were averaged to create a measure of commitment to each of the listed goals. I expected that participants in the self-presentation condition would consider creating and maintaining a positive public impression the goal to which they are most committed, while participants in the self-esteem maintenance condition would see maintaining a positive view of one’s self as the goal to which they are most committed, and that this

should be particularly true for those in the high commitment condition. For maintaining a positive view of one's self, $\alpha = .63$; and for creating and maintaining a positive public impression, $\alpha = .91$. Finally, participants were checked for suspicion, debriefed, and dismissed.

Results

Manipulation Check

To assess the effectiveness of my manipulations, I conducted a 2 (goal ratings: self-esteem maintenance vs. self-presentation) by 2 (goal activation: self-esteem maintenance vs. self-presentation) by 2 (goal commitment: high vs. low commitment) repeated measures ANOVA on the goal commitment manipulation check. I found a significant main effect of goal, such that all participants were more committed to maintaining a positive self-esteem ($M = 8.23$, $SD = .81$) than they were to creating a positive impression ($M = 7.76$, $SD = 1.33$), $F(1, 52) = 5.10$, $p < .05$. These results did not interact with goal activation or with goal commitment.

Attributions to Discrimination

To assess the effects of the manipulations on attributions to discrimination, I conducted a 2 (goal activation: self-esteem maintenance vs. self-presentation) by 2 (goal commitment: high vs. low commitment) ANOVA. I found a significant interaction between activated goal and goal commitment on attributions to discrimination, $F(1, 56) = 4.35$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$. As predicted, in the self-esteem maintenance condition, highly committed participants claimed discrimination significantly more than did participants in the low committed condition (for means see Table 5), $F(1, 56) = 7.61$, $p < .05$, $\eta_p^2 = .19$. In the self-presentation condition, high and low committed participants (see Table 5) did

not differ significantly, $F(1, 56) = .02, ns$. Then I examined how participants in the high commitment differed by goal. In the high commitment condition, the self-esteem maintenance and self-presentation conditions did not differ on their attributions to discrimination, $F(1, 56) = .28, ns$; however in the low commitment condition, participants in the self-esteem maintenance condition claimed discrimination less than did participants in the self-presentation condition, $F(1, 56) = 5.74, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .17$. This finding is somewhat unexpected, as I would have not expected the low commitment conditions to differ in their attributions to discrimination.

Self-Esteem and Mood Measures

Next, I conducted 2 (goal activation: self-esteem maintenance vs. self-presentation) by 2 (goal commitment: high vs. low commitment) ANOVAs to test the influence of activated goal and goal commitment on my self-esteem measures, anxiety, and depression. I found a significant interaction between activated goal and goal commitment on social self-esteem subscale, $F(1, 56) = 5.64, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .08$. In the self-esteem maintenance condition, self-esteem of the high and low commitment conditions (see Table 6 for means) did not differ, $F(1, 56) = .29, ns$. However, in the self-presentation condition, those in the high commitment condition reported lower self-esteem than did those in the low commitment condition (see Table 6 for means), $F(1, 56) = 7.31, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .$ In the high commitment condition, participants in the self-esteem maintenance condition reported significantly more self-esteem than did participants in the self-presentation condition, $F(1, 56) = 7.91, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .$, but these differences were not significant in the low commitment condition, $F(1, 56) = .19, ns$ (see Table 6 for means). Next I conducted Tukey-Kramer tests (Tukey HSD adjusted for unequal sample sizes) to

assess these mean differences with alpha controlled. The differences between high and low commitment in the self-presentation condition were significant, $qTK = 3.83, p < .05$. Likewise, I found significant differences between the self-esteem maintenance and self-presentation conditions in the high commitment condition, $qTK = 3.97, p < .05$. These findings replicate my t-tests and lend more support to my findings. I did not find any main effects or interactions on the performance state self-esteem scale, the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale, or the IAT (see Table 6 for means).

I found a significant interaction between activated goal and goal commitment on anxiety, $F(1, 56) = 4.65, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .08$. Likewise, I found a significant interaction between goal activation and goal commitment on depression, $F(1, 56) = 8.73, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .14$. In the self-esteem maintenance condition, participants in the high commitment condition reported less anxiety and less depression than did participants in the low commitment condition (see Table 7 for means), though neither of these differences were significant, $F(1, 56) = 1.72, ns, \eta_p^2 = .05$ and $F(1, 56) = 1.76, ns, \eta_p^2 = .06$, respectively. In the self-presentation condition, in contrast, the high commitment participants reported greater anxiety and greater depression than did those in the low commitment condition (see Table 7 for means). The difference between these conditions was marginal for anxiety, $F(1, 56) = 3.05, p < .09, \eta_p^2 = .11$, and was significant for depression, $F(1, 56) = 8.28, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .22$. Next I conducted Tukey-Kramer tests (Tukey HSD adjusted for unequal sample sizes) to assess these mean differences, controlling for alpha. I found no significant differences on the anxiety measures; however, for depression, I found significant differences between high and low commitment conditions for the self-presentation condition, $qTK = 4.07, p < .05$.

Upon examination of the high and low commitment conditions separately, I found that in the high commitment condition, the self-esteem maintenance participants reported significantly less depression than did the self-presentation participants, $F(1, 56) = 8.88$, $p < .05$ (see Table 7 for means); but these means were not significantly different in the low commitment condition, $F(1, 56) = 1.50$, *ns* (see Table 7). For anxiety, participants in the self-esteem maintenance condition did not differ significantly from participants in the self-presentation condition in either the high or low commitment conditions (see Table 7). Upon examination of the Tukey-Kramer test, I found a significant difference between self-esteem maintenance and self-presentation in the high commitment condition on depression, $qTK = 4.21$, $p < .05$.

Mediator Checks

In order to check for possible mediators, I correlated each measure of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression with attributions to discrimination. Only the measures of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression significantly correlated with each other (see Table 8). To examine the possibility that some of the correlations among these variables, particularly correlations with attributions to discrimination, were different among the conditions of one of the independent variables, I conducted these correlations in the self-esteem maintenance and self-presentation conditions separately, and then I conducted them in the high and low commitment conditions separately. I did this predominantly to check for differences between conditions on the correlation between anxiety and attributions to discrimination, as I had initially predicted that anxiety would increase claiming discrimination in the self-esteem maintenance condition, but that it would decrease

claiming discrimination in the self-presentation condition. However, these analyses did not yield any results different from the correlations for the overall data set.

Discussion

While my manipulation checks did not show any significant effects, it is evident from the significant results of my other dependent measures that my manipulations were successful in creating changes between my conditions (Sigall & Mills, 1998). In partial support for my hypothesis, I found in the self-esteem maintenance condition that those in the high commitment condition claimed discrimination significantly more than did those in the low commitment condition. Unexpectedly I found no differences between the high and low commitment conditions in the self-presentation condition.

One possibility for this unexpected finding is that my manipulation of goal commitment was not successful. However, because it was successful in the self-esteem maintenance condition, this seems unlikely. Also, and more importantly, because I found differences on my measures of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression, my manipulation of goal commitment in the self-presentation condition appears to have had some effect. One possible reason for the lack of differences on the attributions of discrimination measure is that participants did not see the goal of self-presentation as relevant to claiming discrimination in this situation. To assess this possibility, in Study 3 I added a public component to the self-presentation condition, so that as in Study 1, participants in this condition believed that they would have to read their responses to the feedback evaluation questionnaire out loud to the experimenter. Making the situation public in this way should increase the relevance of the self-presentation goal, but only for the highly committed participants. They should therefore be more concerned about achieving the

goal of being well liked and about the costs of claiming discrimination that relate to the goal (e.g. being liked less), thus decreasing their attributions to discrimination.

My predictions for self-esteem were not fulfilled. While I predicted that self-esteem would be related to attributions to discrimination only in the self-esteem maintenance condition, I found no differences on self-esteem in this condition. In this condition, I had predicted that high commitment participants would claim discrimination more and therefore report greater self-esteem than the low commitment participants, but again, I found no difference between the high and low commitment conditions. However, in the self-presentation condition, where I predicted no difference between the high and low commitment conditions, I found that the high commitment condition reported lower self-esteem than did the low commitment condition. Therefore, instead of self-esteem being affected only in the condition where it was the activated goal, I found that self-esteem did not differ in this condition, but was affected in the conditions where another goal was activated. In retrospect, this seems logical. Because participants in the self-esteem condition were told that maintaining a positive sense of self is important to future success, these participants may have reported higher self-esteem in order to reaffirm to themselves that they will be successful in the future. It is also possible that these participants believed that they were successful people, and because they read that successful people have high self-esteem, they report higher self-esteem in order to be consistent with the reading.

I also predicted that self-esteem would be correlated with attributions to discrimination, particularly in the self-esteem maintenance condition. However, none of my measures of self-esteem correlated with attributions to discrimination, neither overall

nor in separate conditions. For anxiety and depression, instead of serving as mediators, I found significant interactions. For both measures, I found in the self-esteem maintenance condition that participants in the high commitment condition reported less anxiety and depression than did participants in the low commitment condition, though these differences were not significant. In the self-presentation condition, I found that the participants in the high commitment condition reported more anxiety and depression than did participants in the low commitment condition. These interactions are in the direction I would have expected for anxiety, such that in conditions where participants claim discrimination more, they also report less anxiety and depression, but I predicted that these would be correlational effects, not mean differences.

Overall, I unexpectedly found differences in the self-presentation condition between high and low commitment on self-esteem, anxiety, and depression. I also found some trends for differences on anxiety and depression in the self-esteem maintenance condition, though not true differences. Based on these findings, it appears that when an individual's goal is not fulfilled by claiming discrimination, but rather claiming discrimination conflicts with that goal, self-esteem, anxiety, and depression are all negatively affected. Also, because scores on self-esteem, anxiety, and depression were not related to attributions to discrimination, this effect seems to occur regardless of whether one actually claims discrimination or not, which thereby implies that the effects of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression are the result of the manipulations, not of attributions to discrimination.

The findings of Study 2 indicate that when an individual is committed to a goal that is fulfilled by claiming discrimination, he also reports higher self-esteem, and less

anxiety and depression, though they are not claiming discrimination as a result of these measures, nor are these measures the result of claiming discrimination. Rather these findings are the effect of the manipulations, of exposure to discrimination when one's goal is consistent with or contradictory to perceiving discrimination. In Study 3, I sought to further clarify these findings by replicating Study 2 and adding a public element to the self-presentation condition, as was done in Study 1. In addition, in Study 3 I added a third goal, the goal of fighting injustice, to examine how this goal affects claiming discrimination, self-esteem, anxiety, and depression. For Study 3, I also adjusted my predictions for my measures of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression to align with my findings on these measures in Study 2. I predicted that overall self-esteem would be higher, and that anxiety and depression would be lower, in the conditions where participants claimed discrimination more. Thus, I predicted that in the self-esteem maintenance condition, high commitment participants would claim discrimination more and report less anxiety and less depression than the low commitment participants. In this condition I also predicted that self-esteem would not differ by goal commitment condition, as occurred in Study 2. In the self-presentation condition I predicted that the high commitment participants would claim discrimination less and report lower self-esteem, more anxiety, and more depression than would the low commitment participants. Finally, for the fighting injustice condition, I predicted that the high commitment participants would claim discrimination more and report greater self-esteem, less anxiety, and less depression than would low commitment participants.

STUDY 3

Method

Participants

Participants were 128 undergraduate women at the University of Maryland participating in exchange for extra credit in lower level psychology courses. Twelve were dropped, leaving a total of 116 participants.

Procedure

Participants arrived at the lab in pairs and were greeted by a male experimenter. Again, as in Studies 1 and 2, a male experimenter was used in order to decrease the possibility that participants would perceive the experimenter as supportive or empathetic. The cover story and instructions for this study were the same as those in Study 2. Participants were told the cover story and instructions for the experiment, and then before beginning, participants were given consent forms to sign. After this, the experimenter described the word completion task to participants (described in Study 1, Appendix A). Then the experimenter handed out the word completion task and left the room for exactly five minutes.

When the experimenter returned, he asked participants to write their initials and their gender at the top of the page. Then he collected participants' tasks and took them to the evaluator. He told participants that it would take the evaluator a few minutes to grade the tasks, and then he left the room for one minute. When the experimenter returned, he asked the participants if they would mind reading an article he was planning to use in a future experiment and then answering a few questions about it. This article primed the goal of maintaining one's self-esteem for a third of participants (Appendix F), being well liked by others (self-presentation goal) in another third of participants (Appendix F), and it primed the goal of fighting injustice in the last third (Appendix I). The self-esteem

maintenance article described research that has shown that maintaining a positive sense of self is critical to future success. In the self-presentation condition, the article described research that has shown that being well liked by others is critical to future success. In the injustice condition, the article described research that has shown that fighting injustice is critical to future success.

Goal commitment was manipulated using a questionnaire that asked the participants to attend to different aspects of the article (Appendix G), as in Study 2. Participants in the low goal commitment condition completed a questionnaire asking about the grammar, structure, and main ideas of the article. Participants in the high commitment condition were asked to complete a questionnaire about the content of the article. The questionnaire related to the points made in the article. The last item on the questionnaire reminded participants that soon they would be entering the job market and that every day they do things that may contribute to their success. The item went on to ask participants to list three things that they can do, based on the findings in the article, to improve their chances of success in life.

Once participants had finished reading the article, the experimenter returned with demographic sheets (Appendix B) for the participants to complete. To participants in the self-presentation condition, the experimenter explained that in order to save time with data entry, they would read their responses out loud to him while he wrote them down on a legal pad. He gave no additional instructions to the participants in the self-esteem maintenance or fighting injustice conditions. Participants then completed the demographic information sheets. Participants in the self-esteem maintenance and fighting injustice conditions completed the sheets and returned them to the experimenter.

Participants in the self-presentation condition read their responses out loud to the experimenter while he wrote them on a legal pad. The experimenter alternated between participants in the self-presentation condition as they read responses out loud.

Participants in this condition read their responses out loud in order to increase the realism of and concern for having to read responses out loud.

Then the experimenter returned the feedback on the word completion task. Feedback was written on separate evaluation forms (Appendix C). The experimenter explained that he would give the participants a minute to look over their scores before he gave them the feedback evaluation questionnaire. The experimenter handed back the feedback, and all participants received a score of a D with the comment “like many women, you exhibit traditional thinking where inventive thinking is more appropriate.” The experimenter then left the room for one minute, and returned with the feedback evaluation questionnaire (described in Study 1; Appendix D). Participants rated on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) the extent to which their scores were due to bias and discrimination as the measure of attributions to discrimination ($\alpha = .87$). Before he left, he reminded participants in the self-presentation condition that they would have to read their responses out loud at the end of the experiment.

After participants had completed the feedback evaluation questionnaire, the experimenter collected them, and participants completed measures of their mood and attitudes (described in Study 1; Appendix E). They were all told that these measures would be completely anonymous, and that no one would see their responses to the questionnaire. Next participants completed the self-esteem implicit association test (IAT) (see Study 2 for description and scoring).

Finally participants completed a measure of goal commitment as a manipulation check (see Appendix H). This self-report measure included the following instructions: “Many things contribute to future success. Listed below are a number of goals one may have to aid them in their future success. Please indicate on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*) how valuable you think each goal is, how important each goal is to you, and how committed you are to each goal.” The questionnaire listed six different goals, including maintaining a positive view of one’s self, creating and maintaining a positive public impression, and fighting injustice. The three items (how valuable is each goal, how important is each goal, and how committed are you to each goal) were averaged to create a measure of commitment to each of the listed goals. For maintaining a positive view of one’s self, $\alpha = .82$; for creating and maintaining a positive public impression, $\alpha = .71$; and for fighting injustice, $\alpha = .88$.

The mean for commitment to each manipulated goal was compared to the other manipulated goals. Participants in the self-esteem maintenance condition should see maintaining a positive view of one’s self as the goal to which they are most committed. Participants in the self-presentation should consider creating and maintaining a positive public impression as the most valued and important goal, while participants in the injustice condition should consider fighting injustice as the most valued and important goal, and this should be particularly true for participants in the high commitment condition. Finally, all participants were checked for suspicion, debriefed, and dismissed.

Results

Manipulation Check

To assess the effectiveness of my manipulations, I conducted a series of 2 (goal ratings) by 3 (goal activation: self-esteem maintenance vs. self-presentation vs. fighting injustice) by 2 (goal commitment: high vs. low commitment) repeated measures ANOVAs of the goal commitment manipulation check. I found a significant main effect of goal, such that all participants were more committed to maintaining a positive self-esteem ($M = 8.26$, $SD = 1.10$) than they were to creating a positive impression ($M = 7.66$, $SD = 1.08$), $F(1, 104) = 19.20$, $p < .01$. Likewise, all participants were more committed to maintaining a positive self-esteem than to fighting injustice ($M = 7.48$, $SD = 1.48$), $F(1, 104) = 30.98$, $p < .01$. Ratings of creating a positive impression and fighting injustice did not differ. These results did not interact with goal activation or with goal commitment.

Attributions to Discrimination

To assess the effects of my manipulations on my dependent measures, I conducted 3 (goal activation: self-esteem maintenance vs. self-presentation vs. fighting injustice) by 2 (goal commitment: high vs. low commitment) ANOVAs on each of the dependent measures. I found a non-significant interaction between activated goal and goal commitment on attributions to discrimination, $F(2, 110) = 1.35$, ns , $\eta_p^2 = .02$. In the self-esteem maintenance condition, the high and low commitment conditions did not differ on attributions to discrimination, $F(1, 110) = .23$, ns (see Table 9 for means). In the self-presentation condition, highly committed participants claimed discrimination marginally more than did less committed participants, $F(1, 110) = 3.36$, $p < .07$, $\eta_p^2 = .07$ (see Table 9). In the fighting injustice condition, the high and low commitment conditions did not differ on attributions to discrimination, $F(1, 106) = .32$, ns , $\eta_p^2 = .02$. Please see Table 9 for means.

Self-Esteem and Mood Measures

Next I examined the effect of goal activation and goal commitment on each measure of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression. I did not find any main effects or interactions on social state self-esteem, $F(2, 110) = 1.71, ns, \eta_p^2 = .03$ (see Table 10 for means). I found a marginally significant interaction on performance state self-esteem, $F(2, 110) = 2.71, p = .07, \eta_p^2 = .05$. In the self-esteem maintenance condition, the high commitment condition reported lower self-esteem than did the low commitment condition, though this difference was not significant, $F(1, 110) = 1.77, ns, \eta_p^2 = .04$ (see Table 10 for means). In the self-presentation condition, those in the high commitment condition reported higher self-esteem than did those in the low commitment condition, though again this difference was not significant, $F(1, 110) = .99, ns, \eta_p^2 = .02$ (for means see Table 10). Finally, in the fighting injustice condition, those in the high commitment condition reported marginally higher self-esteem than did those in the low commitment condition, $F(1, 110) = 3.20, p < .08, \eta_p^2 = .11$ (for means, see Table 10). However, upon examination of means using the Tukey-Kramer test (Tukey HSD adjusted for unequal sample sizes), in order to control for Type 1 error, I found no significant differences between any means on performance state self-esteem scores.

I also found a significant interaction on Rosenberg self-esteem, $F(2, 110) = 5.12, p < .01, \eta_p^2 = .09$. In the self-esteem maintenance condition, the high commitment participants reported significantly lower self-esteem than did the low commitment participants, $F(1, 110) = 4.47, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .10$ (for means see Table 10). In the self-presentation condition, the high commitment participants reported significantly higher self-esteem than did the low commitment participants, $F(1, 110) = 5.09, p < .05, \eta_p^2 = .12$.

In the fighting injustice condition, the high commitment participants reported slightly, though not significantly higher self-esteem than did low commitment participants, $F(1, 110) = 1.07, ns, \eta_p^2 = .03$. However, upon examination of means using the Tukey-Kramer test (Tukey HSD adjusted for unequal sample sizes), I found no significant differences between any means on Rosenberg scores, though I did find a marginal difference between the high commitment, self-esteem maintenance and the high commitment, self-presentation conditions, $qTK = 3.98, p < .10$, such that those in the self-esteem maintenance condition reported lower self-esteem than did those in the self-presentation condition.

On the IAT, I found a marginal main effect of goal commitment, $F(2, 110) = 3.56, p = .06, \eta_p^2 = .03$, such that those in the high commitment condition had greater self-esteem than did those in the low commitment condition (for means see Table 10).

Next, I found a marginally significant interaction on anxiety, $F(2, 110) = 2.79, p < .07, \eta_p^2 = .05$. Upon examination of the means in each article condition separately, I found a non-significant difference between the high and low commitment conditions in the self-esteem maintenance conditions, $F(1, 110) = 1.83, ns, \eta_p^2 = .02$ (for means see Table 11). In the self-presentation condition I found marginally significant differences between the high and low commitment conditions, $F(1, 110) = 3.25, p < .08, \eta_p^2 = .10$ such that those in the high commitment condition reported lower anxiety than did those in the low commitment condition (see Table 11). Finally, in the injustice condition, I found a marginally significant difference between the high and low commitment conditions, $F(1, 110) = 3.81, p < .06, \eta_p^2 = .10$, such that those in the high commitment condition reported lower anxiety than did those in the low commitment condition. For means, please see

Table 11. However, upon examination of means using the Tukey-Kramer test (Tukey HSD adjusted for unequal sample sizes), none of the means for anxiety differed by condition. Finally, I did not find any significant main effects or an interaction on depression, $F(2, 110) = 1.82, ns, \eta_p^2 = .03$. For means on depression see Table 11.

Mediator Checks

In order to check for possible mediators, I correlated the dependent measures with one another. Attributions to discrimination significantly correlated with IAT scores, $r(116) = .25, p < .05$. Other than this correlation, only the measures of self-esteem, anxiety, and depression significantly correlated with each other (see Table 12 for overall correlations). To examine the possibility that some of the correlations among these variables, particularly with attributions to discrimination were different among the conditions of an independent variable, I conducted these correlations in the goal activation conditions separately, and then I conducted them in the high and low goal commitment conditions separately. For the goal activation conditions, these correlations did not yield any results different from the correlations for the overall data set; however, in the goal commitment conditions, I did find some differing correlations between the high and low commitment conditions.

In the low goal commitment condition, the correlation between social state self-esteem and attributions to discrimination was negative, though not significant, $r(63) = -.22, p = .08$. However, in the high commitment conditions, this correlation was positive, $r(53) = .24, p = .08$. These correlations were in the same direction for performance state self-esteem, for the low commitment conditions, $r(63) = -.21, p < .10$, and for the high commitment condition, $r(53) = .25, p < .08$. Next, I conducted a moderated multiple

regression analysis to test whether the correlations in the low commitment condition were significantly different from the correlations in the high commitment condition. I found significant interactions between goal commitment and attributions to discrimination on social and performance state self-esteem, $\beta = .89$, $t(114) = 2.53$, $p < .02$ and $\beta = .88$, $t(114) = 2.50$, $p < .02$, leading me to conclude that the slopes in the high commitment condition was significantly different from the slopes in the low commitment condition for both social and performance state self-esteem.

Discussion

While my manipulation checks did not show any significant effects, it is evident from the significant and marginal differences I found that my manipulations were successful in creating changes between some of my conditions (Sigall & Mills, 1998). This is particularly true for the self-presentation and fighting injustice conditions.

For Study 3, my hypotheses for attributions to discrimination were not supported. In the self-esteem maintenance condition I found no differences between the high and low commitment conditions on attribution to discrimination, where I expected that the high commitment participants would claim discrimination more than would the low commitment participants. I found the same results for the fighting injustice condition, where I again expected the high commitment participants to claim discrimination more than the low commitment participants. In the self-presentation condition, I found a marginal difference between the high and low commitment conditions in the opposite direction of my predictions. Here, the high commitment participants claimed discrimination more than did the low commitment participants, not less as they did in Study 1.

For self-esteem, the three explicit measures were in the same direction as one another, and the IAT was in the same direction as the explicit measures for the self-presentation and fighting injustice conditions. I found significant differences on the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale for the self-esteem maintenance and the self-presentation conditions, and I found a marginal difference in the injustice condition on the performance state self-esteem scale. On the IAT I found that high commitment participants reported higher self-esteem than did low commitment participants. For fighting injustice, the self-esteem differences were in the direction I predicted, such that the high commitment participants claimed discrimination more than did the low commitment participants. For the self-esteem maintenance condition I predicted no difference between the high and low commitment condition, as I found in Study 2, and instead, I found that high commitment participants reported lower self-esteem than did low commitment participants on the explicit measures (only significantly different on Rosenberg scores). Similarly, for the self-presentation condition, the results were the opposite of what I predicted, and they were the opposite of the findings of self-esteem for Study 2. In this condition, the high commitment participants reported higher, instead of lower, self-esteem than the low commitment participants.

On the IAT I found that high commitment participants reported higher self-esteem than did low commitment participants. This is likely because in both the self-presentation and fighting injustice conditions, high commitment participants claimed discrimination more and reported higher self-esteem (though not necessarily significantly) than did the low commitment participants. In these two goal activation conditions (self-presentation and fighting injustice), the IAT shows the same pattern of

results as the explicit measures of self-esteem, with those who claim discrimination more also report greater self-esteem, replicating this finding from Study 2. For the self-esteem maintenance condition, the results on the IAT, which differ from the explicit measures of self-esteem, are unclear and difficult to interpret. Future studies should continue to explore how the IAT and explicit measures of self-esteem relate, particularly when self-esteem maintenance is an important and salient goal.

For anxiety, I found marginal differences between conditions. Specifically, in the self-presentation and fighting injustice conditions, the high commitment conditions reported less anxiety than did the low commitment conditions. In the self-esteem maintenance condition, contrary to my hypothesis, results were not significantly different, with the high and low commitment participants reporting similar levels of anxiety. For the fighting injustice condition, the findings were as I predicted. However, for the self-presentation condition, I predicted that anxiety would differ in the opposite direction of what I found, just as with attributions to discrimination. Because both measures are opposite of my predictions, I am again finding, as in Study 2, that when the manipulations result in greater claiming of discrimination, participants also report less anxiety.

In terms of correlational analyses, I found a significant overall correlation only between attributions to discrimination and the IAT. The more participants claimed discrimination, the higher their self-esteem as measured by the IAT. I also found that the relationship between attributions to discrimination and social state self-esteem, and attributions to discrimination and performance state self-esteem were significantly different by goal commitment conditions, such that in the high commitment condition,

these relationships were positive, and in the low commitment condition, these relationships were negative. Thus for the highly committed participants, claiming discrimination led to increased self-esteem, but for the less committed participants, claiming discrimination led to decreased self-esteem. For the high commitment condition, this finding is exactly opposite my findings from Study 1, where I found that attributions to discrimination negatively correlated with self-esteem.

The reason for these different correlations is unclear. Possibly, it is because in both the self-presentation and fighting injustice conditions, high commitment participants claimed discrimination more and reported greater self-esteem, whereas only the self-esteem maintenance condition were the high commitment participants were reporting lower self-esteem relative to the low commitment participants. Thus, possibly because two of the three conditions were in the same direction, I found the positive correlation. Likewise, for the low commitment condition, possibly because again, self-presentation and fighting injustice were in the same direction, I found a negative correlation. Another possibility is that these correlations occurred due to problems with the manipulations. The reasons for the IAT correlation and for its difference from the explicit correlations are also unclear. While the positive correlation between attributions to discrimination and IAT self-esteem has theoretical basis and makes sense based on prior literature, why it differed from the explicit measures is unknown. Likewise, whether or not the IAT represents a more accurate assessment of the relationship between attributions to discrimination and self-esteem is also unknown. Future research should continue to examine these relationships.

General Discussion

The results of these three studies are mixed and somewhat conflicting. In Study 1 I found, in support of my hypothesis, that in the self-presentation condition, the high commitment participants claimed discrimination less than the low commitment participants. However, I did not find significant differences between the high and low commitment participants in the self-esteem maintenance condition, contradictory to my hypothesis.

In Study 2, I replicated Study 1 using different manipulations of goal activation and goal commitment. In this study, I found significant differences between high and low goal commitment in the self-esteem maintenance condition, in support of my hypothesis. However, I did not find differences in the self-presentation condition, contradictory to my hypothesis. Finally in Study 3 I did not find significant differences between the high and low commitment condition in the self-esteem maintenance or fighting injustice conditions. I found a marginal difference between high and low commitment in the self-presentation condition, but this condition was in the opposite direction of my hypothesis and of my findings from Study 1. In this condition, the high commitment participants claimed discrimination more than did the low commitment participants, not less as predicted.

Overall these findings provide mixed support for my hypothesis. In Study 1 I found evidence that when claiming discrimination conflicts with a goal that participants are committed to, they claim discrimination less. In Study 2 I found evidence that when participants are more committed to a goal that can be fulfilled by claiming discrimination, they will claim discrimination more. However, in Study 3 I found little evidence to support my hypotheses, and in fact it provided some results contradictory to my

hypothesis that when claiming discrimination conflicts with a goal that participants are committed to, they claim discrimination less.

My findings for self-esteem, anxiety, and depression also produced conflicting findings. In Study 1 I found no effects of goal activation or commitment, but I found that attributions to discrimination negatively related to self-esteem as measured by the performance state self-esteem subscale and by the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (1965). In Study 2, I found that self-esteem (as measured by social state self-esteem), anxiety, and depression were all affected by goal activation and goal commitment. In each case, the means for these measures followed my predictions (and some results) for claiming discrimination. In the self-esteem maintenance condition, the high commitment participants claimed discrimination more, and reported greater self-esteem, less anxiety, and less depression, than did the low commitment participants. Likewise, in the self-presentation condition, the high commitment participants, whom I predicted would claim discrimination less, reported lower self-esteem, more anxiety, and more depression, than did the low commitment participants. However, attributions to discrimination did not correlate with self-esteem, anxiety, or depression as in Study 1.

Finally, in Study 3, I found few effects of goal activation and commitment on self-esteem, anxiety, and depression; however, the effects I did find were in the same direction as the attributions made to discrimination, just as in Study 2. Likewise, means on these dependent measures tended to be in the same direction as attributions to discrimination, though often not significantly different. In the fighting injustice condition, these effects supported my hypotheses, such that the high commitment participants would report greater self-esteem, less anxiety, and less depression than

would the low commitment participants. However, in the self-esteem maintenance and self-presentation conditions, these effects were in the opposite direction of what I predicted, just as the attributions to discrimination were. For these two conditions, because of the consistency of the findings for the dependent measures in that self-esteem, anxiety, and depression, in that they were all in the same direction as one another and in the same direction of attributions to discrimination, it appears that my manipulations of goal activation and goal commitment were interpreted differently than anticipated.

Many reasons may exist for these contradictory findings, particularly those for Study 3. In Study 3, one possibility for the self-presentation condition is that when I directly activated the goal of self-presentation, particularly for the high commitment participants, and then had them read the demographic sheet out loud, participants felt that they had made progress toward the goal. Previous studies have shown that perceived progress toward a goal can lead to increased interest in and pursuit of goals inconsistent with the primed goal (Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). Thus, reading the demographic sheet out loud may have led high commitment participants particularly to feel that they had made progress toward the goal of being well liked, which then led them to pursue alternative goals, ones that led to increased claiming of discrimination.

Another possibility for these inconsistent findings is that because the priming of goal activation and commitment was supraliminal and very blatant, particularly for the self-presentation high commitment condition where participants also had to read responses out loud, it produced a contrasting effect (Higgins, 1996), such that participants responded exactly opposite of the primed goal. Future studies should examine these and other possibilities, using new manipulations of goal activation and commitment,

including implicit priming, in order to better understand the relationship of goal activation and commitment on claiming discrimination, self-esteem, anxiety, and depression.

On my measures of self-esteem, I found a number of mixed results. I had predicted that self-esteem would be positively correlated with attributions to discrimination, but only when protecting one's self-esteem was an important goal. This is not what I found. Overall, I found mean differences on self-esteem, not correlations, and few of the correlations I did find were conflicting. In both Studies 2 and 3 I found mean differences on self-esteem. In Study 2, in the self-presentation condition, high commitment participants reported lower self-esteem than did low commitment participants. In Study 3, I found the opposite result in the self-presentation condition, such that the high commitment participants reported greater self-esteem. In the fighting injustice condition I also found that high commitment participants reported greater self-esteem than did the low commitment participants, and in the self-esteem maintenance condition, I found that the high commitment participants reported less self-esteem than did the low commitment participants.

The most consistent finding among the self-esteem results is that in the conditions where participants claimed discrimination more (or were predicted to claim discrimination more), they also reported greater self-esteem. I found similar results with anxiety and depression, though I did not consistently find these results. For both anxiety and depression, in the conditions where participants claimed discrimination more, they also reported less anxiety and less depression. The findings also indicate that the manipulations of goal activation and goal commitment, not attributions to discrimination,

led to changes on self-esteem, anxiety, and depression. The lack of correlations between attributions to discrimination and the other dependent measures leads to this conclusion.

One problem with the findings for self-esteem is the lack of consistent findings among the measures of self-esteem across the three studies. In Study 1 I found no effects of self-esteem, and in Study 2 I found significant interaction only on the measure of social state self-esteem. In Study 3 I did not find differences on this measure, but instead I found a marginal interaction on the performance state self-esteem measure, and a significant interaction on the Rosenberg self-esteem scale, and I found a main effect of goal commitment on the IAT. However, in Study 2 and again in Study 3, overall the means for all four self-esteem measures are in the same direction as one another. Possibly, because the effects of the manipulations in Study 3 caused different results on the attributions to discrimination measure from those in Study 2, they also caused different measures of self-esteem to be affected by the manipulations. Future studies should continue to explore the effects on these different measures of self-esteem.

In addition to the mixed and sometimes contradictory findings on attributions to discrimination and self-esteem, these studies leave many other questions unanswered. The first of these questions regards the low commitment conditions. While these conditions should have functioned as control conditions, in some instances the data seem to indicate that they did not. The findings for the self-esteem maintenance condition in Study 2 in particular highlight this concern. A likely explanation for this change is that in the low commitment conditions, participants did not use the activated goal, and many possible reasons exist for this occurrence. One possibility is that participants had multiple, competing goals activated, leading to an increased amount of resources being

allocated to alternative goals, and resulting in greater use of those other goals (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002). Because of the low commitment to the primed goal, these participants also may then have seen other goals as more relevant to the situation, and then chosen to use those goals, leading to the unexpected changes in claiming of discrimination (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Another possibility is that these participants were inhibiting the activated goal. Because the goal was supraliminally primed, the low commitment participants, without the increased relevance to the self (listing ways suggested in the article that they could increase their chances of future success), may have inhibited the goal or intentionally chosen not to use it, possibly because the situation increased the relevance of other goals, increasing commitment to those goals and inhibiting the primed goal (Shah et al., 2002).

To gain a better understanding of how this low commitment manipulation affects attributions to discrimination, self-esteem, anxiety, and depression, future studies should include a neutral condition as well as a low commitment condition. Future studies should also more directly measure commitment to a variety of goals, including the activated goals as well as other goals in order to gain a more clear understanding of how participants are impacted by the low commitment manipulation. Because my free response questionnaire measure of goal commitment yielded no results, other measures, such as implicit or behavioral measures like reaction times should also be considered to measure goal commitment. This type of measure may provide a more accurate indication of goal commitment, as many of the goals affecting attributions to discrimination, including the goals studied here, operate outside participants' awareness.

Future research should continue to examine the influence of goals on claiming discrimination and on the costs and benefits associated with experiencing and claiming discrimination. In particular, future research should continue to examine other goals that may influence when individuals claim discrimination. The three goals used in this study were chosen because they have been discussed and considered with reference to claiming discrimination in the literature. However, many other goals may also play a role in attributions to discrimination and in resulting self-esteem and anxiety, including the need to appear competent, the need for structure, and the need to believe that the world is just. Likewise, future research should examine how individuals respond when they are highly committed to two conflicting goals, and how individuals choose which goals they will use when faced with discrimination. For example, some individuals may have a high need to believe that the world is just, and simultaneously be highly motivated to defend women's rights. Future studies should examine what traits and circumstances will determine which goals women will use when choosing whether or not to claim discrimination.

In conclusion, research on targets of discrimination has grown tremendously in the last 15 years. Researchers have learned much about when and how stigmatized and non-stigmatized individuals react to discrimination. Yet much more research needs to be conducted. The three studies here provide evidence that goal activation and goal commitment do influence not only when individuals claim discrimination, but also their self-esteem, anxiety, and depression when faced with discrimination. These studies provide some preliminary evidence that when an individual's goal is not fulfilled by claiming discrimination, but claiming discrimination conflicts with that goal, self-esteem,

anxiety, and depression are all negatively affected. These studies also demonstrate that these effects seem to occur as a result of the goal activation and commitment manipulations specifically, and not as a result of claiming discrimination.

The more we understand about when individuals claim discrimination and about the costs and benefits of claiming discrimination, the better equipped society will be to help stigmatized individuals deal with the discrimination they face. Likewise, the more we understand about when individuals claim discrimination, the more we as a society can create an environment encouraging stigmatized individuals to report the discrimination they face. This ultimately will provide society with a greater understanding of stigmatized individuals and of the unique circumstances they face, and ideally it will lead to decreased stereotyping and discrimination.

Table 1.

Study 1 means for attributions to discrimination by goal activation and goal commitment conditions.

Goal Activation	Goal Commitment	
	High Commit (Prevention)	Low Commit (Promotion)
Self-Esteem Maintenance (Private)	3.75 (1.80)a	3.34 (1.74)a
Self-Presentation (Public)	2.47 (1.68)b	3.78 (1.61)a

Note: Means in the same row or column with different subscripts differ at the $p < .05$ level.

Table 2.

Study 1 means for each measure of self-esteem by goal activation and goal commitment conditions.

Goal Act and Commit	Social State SE	Performance State SE	Rosenberg SE
Self-Esteem Maint. (Private)			
High Commit (Prev)	5.41 (1.41)	5.15 (1.02)	3.39 (.58)
Low Commit (Prom)	5.48 (1.34)	5.28 (1.29)	3.57 (.43)
Self-Presentation (Public)			
High Commit (Prev)	5.49 (1.27)	5.51 (.80)	3.60 (.40)
Low Commit (Prom)	5.44 (1.36)	5.46 (.97)	3.61 (.51)

Note: Means in the same column within goal activation condition with different subscripts differ at the $p < .05$ level.

Table 3.

Study 1 means for anxiety and depression by goal activation and goal commitment conditions.

Goal Activation and Commitment	Anxiety	Depression
Self-Esteem Maintenance (Private)		
High Commit (Prevention Focus)	3.43 (1.92)	3.19 (1.12)b
Low Commit (Promotion Focus)	3.03 (1.49)	3.70 (1.72)a
Self-Presentation (Public)		
High Commit (Prevention Focus)	3.17 (2.01)	3.07 (1.55)b
Low Commit (Promotion Focus)	3.61 (1.60)	3.80 (1.75)a

Note: On depression, the high commitment condition significantly differs from the low commitment condition controlling for goal activation condition.

Table 4.

Correlations among the dependent measures of Study 1.

	Attrib to Disc	Social SSE	Perf SSE	Rosen	Anxiety	Depress
Attrib to Disc	-	-.18	-.28*	-.25*	.20	.14
Social SSE		-	.80*	.55*	-.55*	-.58*
Perf SSE			-	.69*	-.46*	-.51*
Rosen				-	-.37*	-.32*
Anx					-	.65*
Depress						-

Note: * denotes significant relationship.

Table 5.

Study 2 means for attributions to discrimination by goal activation and goal commitment conditions.

Goal Activation	Goal Commitment	
	High Commitment	Low Commitment
Self-esteem Maintenance	4.00 (1.83)a	2.10 (1.23)b
Self-presentation	3.65 (2.13)	3.75 (2.05)a

Note: Means in the same row or column with different subscripts differ at the $p < .05$ level.

Table 6.

Study 2 means for each measure of self-esteem by goal activation and goal commitment conditions.

Goal Act and Commit	Social SSE	Performance SSE	Rosenberg SE	IAT
Self-esteem Maintenance				
High Commitment	5.44 (1.17)	5.17 (.84)	3.40 (.40)	2.03
Low Commitment	5.23 (.84)	5.05 (.82)	3.43 (.51)	1.71
Self-presentation				
High Commitment	4.38 (1.24) ^b	4.66 (1.06)	3.32 (.58)	1.72
Low Commitment	5.40 (.82) ^a	4.98 (.86)	3.36 (.61)	2.05

Note: Means in the same column within goal activation condition with different subscripts differ at the $p < .05$ level. These mean differences are based on t-tests and do not sufficiently control the Type 1 error rate.

Table 7.

Study 2 means for anxiety and depression by goal activation and goal commitment conditions.

Goal Activation and Commitment	Anxiety	Depression
Self-esteem Maintenance		
High Commitment	2.63 (1.11)	2.81 (1.38)b
Low Commitment	3.33 (1.84)	3.44 (1.17)
Self-presentation		
High Commitment	3.47 (1.56)a	4.20 (1.18)a
Low Commitment	2.55 (1.13)c	2.86 (1.44)b

Note: Means in the same column with subscripts a vs. b differ at the $p < .05$ level. Means with subscripts a vs. c differ at the $p < .10$ level. These mean differences are based on t-tests and do not sufficiently control the Type 1 error rate.

Table 8.

Correlations among the dependent measures of Study 2.

	Attrib to Disc	Social SSE	Perf SSE	Rosen	IAT	Anxiety	Depress
Attrib to Disc	-	.09	.16	.05	.11	.03	.00
Social SSE		-	.60*	.43*	-.20	-.50*	-.72*
Perf SSE			-	.72*	.04	-.35*	-.54*
Rosen				-	.07	-.32*	-.46*
IAT					-	.05	.07
Anx						-	.50*
Depress							-

Note: * denotes significant relationship.

Table 9.

Study 3 means for attributions to discrimination by goal activation and goal commitment conditions.

Goal Activation	Goal Commitment	
	High Commitment	Low Commitment
Self-esteem Maintenance	3.28 (2.04)	3.57 (1.72)
Self-presentation	4.42 (2.15)a	3.27 (2.03)c
Fighting Injustice	3.50 (2.08)	2.95 (2.02)

Note: Means in the same row within goal activation condition with subscripts a vs. b differ at the $p < .05$ level. Means with subscripts a vs. c differ at the $p < .10$ level.

Table 10.

Study 3 means for each measure of self-esteem by goal activation and goal commitment conditions.

Goal Act and Commit	Social SSE	Performance SSE	Rosenberg SE	IAT
Self-esteem Maintenance				
High Commitment	4.58 (1.55)	4.69 (1.11)	3.20 (.63)a	2.03
Low Commitment	5.09 (1.47)	5.11 (1.01)	3.55 (.46)b	1.87
Self-presentation				
High Commitment	5.60 (1.37)	5.41 (1.05)	3.69 (.34)b	2.38
Low Commitment	5.20 (1.41)	5.08 (1.09)	3.30 (.66)a	1.70
Fighting Injustice				
High Commitment	5.52 (1.36)	5.47 (.83)a	3.56 (.55)	2.21
Low Commitment	4.89 (1.40)	4.82 (1.00)c	3.36 (.56)	1.94

Note: Means in the same column within goal activation condition with subscripts a vs. b differ at the $p < .05$ level. Means with subscripts a vs. c differ at the $p < .10$ level. These mean differences are based on t-tests and do not sufficiently control the Type 1 error rate.

Table 11.

Study 3 means for anxiety and depression by goal activation and goal commitment conditions.

Goal Activation and Commitment	Anxiety	Depression
Self-esteem Maintenance		
High Commitment	3.63 (1.55)	3.92 (1.82)
Low Commitment	3.19 (1.67)	3.27 (1.45)
Self-presentation		
High Commitment	2.59 (1.16)a	3.44 (1.39)
Low Commitment	3.43 (1.41)c	3.35 (1.75)
Fighting Injustice		
High Commitment	2.71 (1.19)a	3.31 (.88)
Low Commitment	3.74 (1.74)c	4.00 (1.27)

Note: Means in the same column within goal activation condition with subscripts a vs. b differ at the $p < .05$ level. Means with subscripts a vs. c differ at the $p < .10$ level. These mean differences are based on t-tests and do not sufficiently control the Type 1 error rate.

Table 12.

Correlations among the dependent measures in Study 3.

	Attrib to Disc	Social SSE	Perf SSE	Rosen	IAT	Anxiety	Depress
Attrib to Disc	-	0.01	0.02	0.12	.25*	0.01	-0.04
Social SSE		-	.79*	.62*	.08	-.54*	-.64*
Perf SSE			-	.67*	.08	-.40*	-.63*
Rosen				-	.17	-.27*	-.45*
IAT					-	-.02	-.08
Anxiety						-	.44*
Depress							-

Note: * denotes significant relationship.

Appendix A

GOALS QUESTIONNAIRE

Please describe your current hopes and aspirations. How do these hopes and aspirations differ from the hopes and aspirations you had when you were growing up?

Please describe your current duties and obligations. How do these duties and obligations differ from the duties and obligations you had growing up?

WORD COMPLETION TASK

Please find as many words as you possibly can from each string of letters. Longer words are worth more points. There are 8 strings total. You will have 5 minutes to complete this task.

1. AOGBMSCEST

2. TNSREMWEAP

3. CIOPLHUSMA

4. YEDBMCAEOA

5. PEENGSAIOR

6. GTAXEEGREA

7. LUETNGIEAN

8. DWMEBPAIEO

Appendix B

Demographic Information Sheet

Directions: Please answer each of the following questions by filling in the blank or circling the most appropriate answer.

Name: _____

Student Identification Number: _____

Gender (circle): Male Female

Class Standing (circle): Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior

Major(s) in school: _____

Do you work while going to school (circle)? Yes No

If yes, where: _____

Appendix C
Evaluation Form

Evaluator Name:

Location of exam:

Grade earned on task (A – F scale):

Feedback provided by evaluator:

Appendix D

OUTCOME RATINGS

To what extent do you feel that your outcome was due to each of the following:

My own ability and effort

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

Bias

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

The quality of my answers

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

Discrimination

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

Appendix E

MOOD EVALUATION

Please rate each of the following based on how you feel right now at this moment.

Happy

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

Nervous

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

Satisfied

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

Tense

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

Sad

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

Discouraged

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

Relaxed

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

Low

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

Anxious

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

Calm

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

Disappointed

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Completely

HEATHERTON AND POLIVY

1. I feel confident about my abilities

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

2. I feel that I am having trouble understanding things that I read.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

3. I feel as smart as others.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

4. I feel confident that I understand things.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

5. I feel that I have less scholastic ability right now than others.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

6. I feel frustrated or rattled about my performance.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

7. I feel like I'm not doing well.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

8. I am worried about looking foolish.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

9. I feel concerned about the impression I am making.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

10. I feel inferior to others at this moment.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

11. I am worried about what other people think of me.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

12. I feel displeased with myself.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

13. I feel self-conscious.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

14. I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

15. I feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

16. I feel that others respect and admire me.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

17. I am dissatisfied with my weight.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

18. I feel good about myself.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

19. I am pleased with my appearance right now.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

20. I feel unattractive.

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Completely

ROSENBERG MEASURE

1. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal base with others.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree

2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree

3. All in all, I am inclined to think that I am a failure.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree

4. I am able to do things as well as other people.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree

5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree

6. I take a positive attitude towards myself.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree

7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree

8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree

9. I certainly feel useless at times.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree

10. At times I think I am no good at all.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 Strongly Agree

Appendix F

MAINTAINING A POSITIVE VIEW OF ONE'S SELF PREDICTS FUTURE SUCCESS

Everyone wants to be successful. No matter how you define success, we are all striving for it in one way or another. This begs the question, how does one achieve success? Psychological researchers have been examining this question for many years. They have examined a variety of goals and personality traits individuals have that may contribute to both feeling successful in life and to actual worldly success. Researchers at the Kellogg school of business recently published a study examining the effects of a number of goals on success in the workplace. The Kellogg study surveyed over 1000 individuals at more than 50 companies of varying size, industry, and profit margins, including companies such as Lockheed Martin, Price Waterhouse, and Navigant Consulting. They surveyed individuals at entry levels, in management, new employees, executives and partners, and administrative personnel. They asked their participants about their feelings of success and satisfaction in the workplace and in life overall. They also took more objective measures of workplace success, including rank, promotion record, salary, salary increases over the years, and evaluations.

Among the goals that they found lead to success, maintaining a positive view of oneself accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in not only feelings of success, but also in actual success as measured by the more objective measures. This goal accounts for a significant proportion of future success independently of other goals. In fact, it alone accounts for as much as 30% of future success as measured life satisfaction, job satisfaction, salary, and workplace accomplishments. They found that individuals who maintained a positive view of themselves were 10 times more likely to say that they felt that they were successful. These individuals were in higher status positions in their companies. They were in positions of greater responsibility and power. They were managers and high level executives. Those with greater positive self-images also promoted through the ranks faster than those reporting a less positive self-image, sometimes by a significant margin such as 3 or 4 years before a peer. Further, as self-esteem maintenance increased, average salary also increased. On average, they made 20-30% more than those who report more negative self views. In addition, those who reported a more positive self-image also reported feeling more connected to those they work with. These individuals liked their coworkers more and reported more enjoyment of their working environment. They were also less likely to express concern about their future at their company, less likely to say they were considering quitting their job, and less likely to express interest in finding a new job.

Maintaining a positive view of one's self not only predicted increased job satisfaction, but it also predicted job hiring outcomes. Those feeling more positively about themselves were more likely to receive job offers than were those who felt less positively about themselves. Similarly, more positive individuals received 5-10% higher initial salary offers. Finally, maintaining a positive view of one's self predicted marital/familial satisfaction, overall happiness, and life satisfaction. Overall, the more positive one felt about herself, the more satisfied and happy she was. The study found

that those who maintain a positive view of themselves take advantage of all the opportunities life affords them and use those opportunities to their benefit.

In summary, while researchers have found many traits and goals that contribute to future success, maintaining a positive view of one's self has been found to be a crucial goal. In fact, many consider it to be the most important goal in predicting future success.

BEING WELL LIKED BY OTHERS PREDICTS FUTURE SUCCESS

Everyone wants to be successful. No matter how you define success, we are all striving for it in one way or another. This begs the question, how does one achieve success? Psychological researchers have been examining this question for many years. They have examined a variety of goals and personality traits individuals have that may contribute to both feeling successful in life and to actual worldly success. Researchers at the Kellogg school of business recently published a study examining the effects of a number of goals on success in the workplace. The Kellogg study surveyed over 1000 individuals at more than 50 companies of varying size, industry, and profit margins, including firms such as Lockheed Martin, Price Waterhouse, and Navigant Consulting. They surveyed individuals at entry levels, in management, new employees, executives and partners, and administrative personnel. They asked their participants about their feelings of success and satisfaction in the workplace and in life overall. They also took more objective measures of workplace success, including rank, promotion record, salary, salary increases over the years, and evaluations.

Among the goals that they found lead to success, being well liked by others accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in not only feelings of success, but also in actual success as measured by the more objective measures. This goal accounted for a significant proportion of future success independently of other goals. In fact, it alone accounted for as much as 30% of future success as measured life satisfaction, job satisfaction, salary, and workplace accomplishments. They found that individuals who were well liked were 10 times more likely to say that they felt that they were successful. These individuals were also in higher status positions in their companies, positions of greater responsibility and power. They were managers and high level executives. Those well liked also promoted through the ranks faster than those reported as being liked less, sometimes by a significant margin such as 3 or 4 years before a peer. Further, as being well liked increased, average salary also increased. On average, they made 20-30% more than those who reported being less well liked. In addition, those who were better liked also reported feeling more connected to those they work with. These individuals liked their coworkers more and reported more enjoyment of their working environment. They were also less likely to express concern about their future at their company, less likely to say they were considering quitting their job, and less likely to express interest in finding a new job.

Being well liked not only predicted increased job satisfaction, but it also predicted job hiring outcomes. Those well liked were more likely to receive job offers than were those less well liked. Similarly, well liked individuals received 5-10% higher initial salary offers. Finally, being well liked predicted marital/familial satisfaction, overall happiness, and life satisfaction. Overall, the more one was liked by others, the more satisfied and happy she was. The study found that those who are well liked take advantage of all the opportunities life affords them and use those opportunities to their benefit.

In summary, while researchers have found many traits and goals that contribute to future success, being well liked has been found to be a crucial trait. In fact, many consider it to be the most important goal in predicting future success.

Appendix G

Grammar Check Questionnaire

1. Please list any grammar mistakes you found.
2. Discuss the sentence structure of the article. Is it at the college level or should improvements be made?
3. Did you find the article to be well written overall?
4. What improvements should be made to the article?
5. What was the main idea of the article?

Article Pilot Questionnaire

1. Did you find the article to be well written?
2. What was the main idea of the article?
3. What were the primary findings reported in the article? (please list at least 3)
4. What other aspects of success would you be interested in learning about?
5. Soon, you will be entering the job market and every day you do things and make decisions that can contribute to your success in life. Please list 3 things you can do, based on the findings presented in the article, that may improve your chances of succeeding.

4. Fighting social injustices targeted at minority groups

Valuable

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely

Important

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely

Committed

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Completely**5. Doing well in college**

Valuable

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely

Important

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely

Committed

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Completely**6. Creating and maintaining a positive (likeable) public impression**

Valuable

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely

Important

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Extremely

Committed

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Completely

Appendix I

FIGHTING INJUSTICE PREDICTS FUTURE SUCCESS

Everyone wants to be successful. No matter how you define success, we are all striving for it in one way or another. This begs the question, how does one achieve success? Psychological researchers have been examining this question for many years. They have examined a variety of goals and personality traits individuals have that may contribute to both feeling successful in life and to actual worldly success. Researchers at the Kellogg School of Business recently published a study examining the effects of a number of goals on success in the workplace. The Kellogg study surveyed over 1000 individuals at more than 50 companies of varying size, industry, and profit margins, including companies such as Lockheed Martin, Price Waterhouse, and Navigant Consulting. They surveyed individuals at entry levels, in management, new employees, executives and partners, and administrative personnel. They asked their participants about their feelings of success and satisfaction in the workplace and in life overall. They also took more objective measures of workplace success, including rank, promotion record, salary, salary increases over the years, and evaluations.

Among the goals that they found lead to success, feeling and fighting injustice accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in not only feelings of success, but also in actual success as measured by the more objective measures. This goal accounts for a significant proportion of future success independently of other goals. In fact, it alone accounts for as much as 30% of future success as measured life satisfaction, job satisfaction, salary, and workplace accomplishments. They found that individuals who work harder to ensure justice were 10 times more likely to say that they felt that they were successful. These individuals were in higher status positions in their companies. They were in positions of greater responsibility and power. They were managers and high level executives. Those who fought injustice also promoted through the ranks faster than those who did not fight injustice, sometimes by a significant margin such as 3 or 4 years before a peer. Further, as concern about injustice increased, average salary also increased. On average, they made 20-30% more than those who report less concern for justice. In addition, those who reported greater concern about injustice also reported feeling more connected to those they work with. These individuals liked their coworkers more and reported more enjoyment of their working environment. They were also less likely to express concern about their future at their company, less likely to say they were considering quitting their job, and less likely to express interest in finding a new job.

Fighting injustice not only predicted increased job satisfaction, but it also predicted job hiring outcomes. Those who fight injustice were more likely to receive job offers than were those who did not fight for justice. Similarly, those who appeared competent received 5-10% higher initial salary offers. Finally, fighting injustice predicted marital/familial satisfaction, overall happiness, and life satisfaction. Overall, the more one fought injustice, the more satisfied and happy she was. This study found that those who fight injustice take advantage of all the opportunities life affords them and use those opportunities to their benefit.

In summary, while researchers have found many traits and goals that contribute to future success, fighting injustice has been found to be a crucial goal. In fact, many consider it to be the most important goal in predicting future success.

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