

ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: BRINGING THE INSIDE OUT: HEALTH,
PERSONALITY, POLITICS, AND THE
TRAGEDY OF LIN BIAO

Adrian Luna, Master of Arts, 2007

Directed By: Professor James Gao, Department of History

The following study is a close scrutiny of Lin Biao. This study will focus on Lin Biao's private life during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969). This study argues that Lin suffered from two distinct personality disorders: schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder. After assessing the private behavior of Lin Biao and how the two disorders disabled Lin, this study will then move to illustrate the consequential enabling affect the two disorders had on Lin Biao's wife, Ye Qun. Thereafter, this study will reexamine several key cases that occurred immediately prior to and during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) where Lin Biao is typically portrayed as being deeply involved. The conclusions are that Lin suffered from two distinct disorders, the disorders had an enabling affect on Ye Qun, and that Lin is a tragic figure, as he was placed in a political position that he could not appropriately administer under Chairman Mao.

BRINGING THE INSIDE OUT: HEALTH, PERSONALITY, POLITICS, AND THE
TRAGEDY OF LIN BIAO

By

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Advisory Committee:
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DEDICATION

In Loving Memory of My Grandfather Lee Luna
1931-1992

Acknowledgements

This journey has not been traveled alone.

Professionally, I must first thank my advisor, James Gao, for his helpful guidance and feedback on my work. George Quester and Keith Olson have both offered me helpful hints on improving this study and also took the time to carefully read the manuscript multiple times in preparation for being members of my defense committee. In particular, George Quester filled a void prior to the defense of this work and also assisted me in spring 2006, as he read the earliest drafts of this work. Andrea Goldman also provided helpful feedback on an early draft.

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Moving from the professional to the personal realm I must first thank my parents, Beverly and Randy, for the infinite support they have provided me. Ranging from my days in diapers, to my youth, and even today as an adult, they have consistently been present through the best and worst of times. They have always been willing to assist me in a multitude of instances and have offered every form of loving support, ranging from parental advice to nurturing hugs. I love them both. They are outstanding parents.

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break away from my work and helped me keep the delicate balance of life and work intact.

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Although seemingly infinite hours have been spent on this study, much of it spent alone in a bedroom or office slogging through mountains of Chinese sources, the research itself has been deeply fascinating and intellectually arousing. The more I dug into the lifestyle and personality of Lin Biao, the more engaging the subject became. At times, even though I would sit alone reading and writing, I felt as if I was not. I am grateful to the authors of the multiple memoirs utilized in this study. They have sought to unmask China’s most mysterious modern figure. Lin Biao, for me, is bittersweet. I cannot thank him, for obvious reasons, but his life, as sad and tragic as it is, is something I have never felt so passionate about in all my life. While being completely objective is at the top of every historian’s agenda, it became difficult at times to maintain the required level of objectivity as I sometimes felt sympathy for this tragic figure. From a historian’s point of view, this is exceedingly dangerous, as it could jeopardize the historian’s duty to be completely objective. Undoubtedly, I reminded myself of this important rule on a consistent basis and consequently always weighed the evidence carefully, objectively, and professionally. Any errors found in this study are, of course, my own. I cannot ignore

though, that during the course of this study, Lin Biao's life has become an important part of my own, one which offers me a continuous, never ending, intellectual stimulation and an interest for research for the future. For this alone I am eternally grateful to Lin Biao's life and memory.

Finally, I must recognize and remember my grandfather, Lee Luna. Lee was a hardworking young man, the son of a poor immigrant mother from Mexico. Lee grew up working on a small farm in Colorado. He later joined the U.S. Army and served briefly in the Korean conflict. It was during his time in the army when he became interested in histotechnology and soon thereafter founded the National Society for Histotechnology in Maryland. Lee was a tenacious worker, who dedicated himself to performing duties accurately, professionally, and as close to perfection as possible. He was also a loving husband and father of three. My fondest memories of Lee were the times I spent with him as a child. He filled my days with laughter and fun, as he would always tease me with his dry sense of humor. During his mid-life, Lee began a lengthy, encyclopedic tome dedicated to histotechnology. As a child I recall days of visiting the basement in his home to play, surrounding me were piles of notebooks filled with an assortment of notes and information. Lee spent copious amounts of time reviewing and organizing his study. The home was often filled with the sounds of thunderous key strokes made on his Macintosh computer. It was during this time period though that Lee contracted colon cancer. Despite this dreadful setback, Lee remained steadfast and focused on finishing his study with the highest degree of perfection possible and concomitantly battling the disease too.

It is this same tenacious spirit that I drew on many times during the course of my research. At times I would feel frustrated, alone, overworked, and highly stressed. I

continuously reminded myself of my grandfather, how he fiercely worked to complete his book, battle cancer, and continued to be a loving family man. I endlessly strived to emulate his spirit and, consequently, always felt his presence close to me during the course of my exhausting days and late nights reading, writing, and translating Chinese texts. His attitude, work ethic, and endless love and devotion are qualities that I hold very close to me today. It is for these reasons that I have dedicated this work, my first major study, to his memory.

Adrian T. Luna
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Introduction

Adrian T. Luna

“...there is no one who cannot be analyzed.”

Mao Zedong

Of all the events that took place during the Cultural Revolution in China, the infamous Lin Biao incident, which took place on the evening of September 12 into the early morning hours of September 13, 1971, remains the most mysterious and perhaps least understood. In the course of simply a few hours Lin Biao, his wife Ye Qun, and son Lin Ligu, accompanied by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) best pilot Pan Jingyin, allegedly attempted to flee China in a British Trident aircraft bound for the Soviet Union after a failed attempt to assassinate Mao Zedong. Mysteriously, the Trident crashes over the People's Republic of Mongolia, incinerating everyone on board and ending the life of Chairman Mao's second chosen successor.

More than three decades later, the Lin Biao incident remains a puzzle, a riddle that has seen many attempts of interpretation in order to set the historical record straight. Some explanations appear more plausible than others. The official version pieced together by Chinese officials shortly following the event construct a historical tale based on "top secret" documents extolling serious charges against Lin Biao; the conclusions reached are that 1) Lin Biao had conspired to assassinate Mao Zedong; 2) that Lin Biao had planned to take over the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the country by means of a military coup with the close collaboration of his fellow military comrades; 3) after these conspiracies were exposed and the military coup failed Lin attempted to defect to the Soviet Union. The Party officially declares that:

After the Lin Biao anti-Party clique failed in their plot to launch a counterrevolutionary coup d' etat, Lin Biao, accompanied by Ye Qun, Lin Ligu, and several other diehards commandeered a plane to defect to the Soviet revisionists in betrayal of their Party and country. The plane carrying them crashed in the vicinity of Undur Khan in Mongolia. Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and the others aboard were killed though as renegades and traitors they deserved a penalty worse than death....As early as before the Ninth Congress was held Lin Biao assembled his men for selfish purposes and together with his wife Ye Qun, colluded with Chen Boda, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li

Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo, and others to form a bourgeois headquarters with himself as the head.¹

Bringing the Inside Out

As fascinating as it may be, this study does not aim to reinterpret the Lin Biao incident and the events of the evening of September 12, 1971. There is not only a lack of evidence but the event is so politically sensitive that reinvestigating it remains nearly impossible.

Thus, instead of tackling the mysterious murder of Lin Biao head-on by proposing a new conspiracy theory, this study targets a different area of Lin Biao history. This study will focus on Lin Biao during the years of the Cultural Revolution when Lin was at the apex of the CCP and at the height of his political career. This period is characterized as China's most turbulent years in modern history. It was during these few years that Mao aimed to destroy the foundations of the Party, completely eliminating any potential capitalists that might possibly exist who had intentions of leading China down a bourgeois Soviet Khrushchev type of revisionism. It was during this period that private and personal hatreds and animosities were used against fellow Party members for quick power grabs too.

The first three years of the Cultural Revolution is the primary time period of Lin Biao's life under investigation for one main reason. Aside from the Western and Chinese assumptions based on Lin's supposed coup attempt and subsequent escape to the Soviet Union, the majority of Western and Chinese sources have assumed Lin Biao as being a cruel and evil Party member who exercised maximum prejudice when eliminating

¹ "Zhonggong zhongyang tongzhi" (Circular of the CCP Central Committee). "Guanyu Lin Biao fandang zhituan fangeming zuixing di shencha baogao." (Report on the Investigation of the Counterrevolutionary Crimes of the Lin Biao Anti-Party Clique). Zhongfa no. 34 (1973), September 8, 1973.

potential rivals for Party power. During these turbulent years Lin's power allegedly accumulated, setting alarm bells off inside Mao's head leading to his infamous southern tour where he attacked Lin.

Indeed, there is some validity that Lin's extension of power burgeoned during the Cultural Revolutionary period. At the time Lin was the only Vice Chairman of the Party. Lin also held pervasive influence throughout the Military Commission, the key decision making body of the PLA. This administrative group was composed of ten members. Lin's key deputies in the group were Chief of the General Staffs Department Huang Yongsheng and PLAAF Commander Wu Faxian. Key members included Lin's wife Ye Qun, People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Political Commissar, Li Zuopeng, and General Logistics Department General, Qiu Huizuo. The ten marshals that originally made up the group upon its creation in 1955 were no longer existent on the board. Peng Dehuai was removed in 1959 following his downfall at Lushan, He Long became a victim of the Cultural Revolution, Zhu De was removed upon the MC's reorganization in 1969. Liu Bocheng retained his position but was blind and politically inactive during the Cultural Revolution. The remaining members, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Chen Yi, all came under intense political fire during the period in question, thus deeply affecting their abilities to administer the MC and challenge any major decisions by Lin Biao.

Moreover, Lin's military control extended into the realm of Party itself. The PLA, by 1969, had more than doubled its representation within the Central Committee, growing from a minimal nineteen percent to an impressive forty-five percent. Ye Qun,

and Lin's four trusted generals-Huang, Wu, Li, and Qiu-were all members of the Politburo as well.

Historical interpretations of Lin during the Cultural Revolution period typically follow the above interpretation. Little or no difference is seen in both Chinese and Western sources. Conclusions about Lin's behavior have been based largely on the conclusions of the CCP's interpretation and record of what occurred.

In sum, traditional Party history and nearly all Western interpretations of this period illuminate Lin as:²

- A vicious, odious historical figure who possessed personal interests and ambitions to gain and consolidate his control of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and then to attain the position of successor to Mao.
- During the active phase of the Cultural Revolution, Lin was a forceful proponent of the movement, even to the extent of advocating or at least sanctioning measures which disrupted the economy of the country and the PLA.
- Lin was power hungry and in his hunt he intentionally aggrandized the persona of Chairman Mao in public in order to take a political shortcut and ascend to the highest levels of the Party in the quickest amount of time.
- Lin was a fervent revolutionary with dreams and aspirations of worldwide peasant uprisings in Latin America and Africa, which would eventually

² The following points have been partially drawn from Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) pp. 6-7.

lead to the downfall of U.S. capitalism and the beginning of a worldwide socialist revolution.

- Lin was a great risk taker and fearless military romantic who planned to initiate a war with the Soviet Union for his own unique political ends against the Party and Chairman Mao.

A critical review of the evidence presented throughout this study reveals a very different Lin Biao. After examining existing evidence, discussed at greater depth below, the following points are omnipresent in Lin Biao and are consistent themes throughout this study:

- Lin Biao possessed personality blots that affected his overall behavior and interactions with other Party members and his personal secretaries. Health problems heavily affected Lin's abilities to interact and carry out the daily duties within the position he held and also effectively function as a father and husband.
- Lin Biao was a weak, feeble Party figure. His health was unstable and erratic consequently affecting his ability to manage the inner political atmosphere of his home and family.
- Lin Biao showed very little interest at all in Party politics and, even more specifically, the politics of the Cultural Revolution. Lin did do his best though to follow the zigs and zags of Mao's political behavior fulfilling Mao's expectations. In addition, Lin's political behavior appears to be more *reactive* rather than *proactive*.

- Lin Biao did express emotion toward fellow Party members and utilized the Cultural Revolution to settle some personal disputes. But overall Lin did not take advantage of the turbulent Cultural Revolution to actively purge and remove Party members; instead he sought to limit chaos in both the military and the economy.

Challenging orthodox Party beliefs and Western assumptions of Lin during this period, the three primary questions to answer in this study are:

- What were the true political motivations and plans, if any, of Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution? Did Lin truly have an intense desire to strengthen his own stature within the PLA and favor his military rule over the country effectively dismissing the Chairman's wishes for civilian control or were Lin's suggested ambitions actually the motivations and manipulation of Ye Qun?
- What were the psychological and health deficiencies that Lin Biao possessed and how did these personality idiosyncrasies affect his private and public behavior? How did these personality and health inadequacies affect his ability to effectively manage his high-ranking position and his familial position as father and husband?
- To what extent is Lin Biao's wife, Ye Qun, involved in the Cultural Revolution drama due to Lin's two personality disorders and how did she manage in Lin's aloof absence from daily life as the pragmatic manager for the Lin Biao family in both the political and private familial realm?

These three points are deeply intertwined. By examining these three issues, a vastly different Lin Biao will appear, a man that hardly fits the description seen in political Party history and traditional Western interpretations—as a political sniper of sorts for Mao. Instead, a rather shy, introverted, and passive Lin Biao, one who rarely shows any interest in either politics or close personal relationships with a large number of people. Lin's placement in a grand position of authority and decision-making during the Cultural Revolution and his concomitant social and personality problems led to his consequent reliance on Ye Qun. The enabling affect that Lin's reliance had on Ye Qun was monstrous. While Ye Qun respected the authority of Lin and had a limited knowledge of sensitive top-level political matters, Ye still carried out periodic political escapades for Jiang Qing and orchestrated and managed political melodrama. Exacerbating the situation even further for Lin is that since he was so aloof, introverted, and passive, much of Ye Qun's political missions were carried out underneath Lin's nose without him either realizing her role in such affairs or with him simply not taking a firm position of opposition or favoritism for her behavior due to his disinterest in political affairs.

Thus, this study is a *revisionist history*; it is targeted at reexamining the character of Lin Biao, opening the screen of secrecy that surrounds Lin and reinterpreting both Western and Chinese accounts of his political and personal behavior. This reexamination will consequently effect traditionally held beliefs concerning Lin's assumed radical behavior. This study is also what should be labeled an *indirect history*, that is, it addresses another historical question while not *directly* focusing on that question. Within the context of this study, deconstructing Lin's personal habits, personality, health, and

political attitude during the most tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution will also offer insight into whether or not Lin could have possibly been a wicked planner to execute Chairman Mao in 1971, as stated in traditional Party sources.

Since this study is complex, with themes and sub-themes constantly interwoven throughout the text, a brief blueprint detailing the layout of this study is in order. The following chapter explicitly deals with the private Lin Biao and the personality that he displays in the source material that is available. The following chapter basis its evidence on the private conversations and experiences he had with secretaries and family. By thoroughly discussing the behavior of Lin Biao within the private sphere, a different Lin Biao will appear. The chapter will also illustrate the social inhibitions and personality deficiencies that Lin coped with on a daily basis. To further highlight both the inabilities of Lin Biao and the oddities of his behavior, chapter two will also offer a private view of Lin's energetic wife, Ye Qun, based on the personal observations of the Lin Biao staff. Ye's behavior heavily contrasts that of Lin, in both her daily routine and her social behavior toward other individuals. Outgoing and loquacious, Ye Qun was the ideal candidate to act on Lin's behalf in administering, offering guidance, and performing the daily chores required politically and in managing the family. Overall, the analysis in chapter two will provide us with the striking personality differences between Lin Biao and Ye Qun. Examples will also be offered of how Lin's aloof and weak personality played a subservient role to Ye's more demonstrative personality and political opinions and ambitions. Chapter three will move partially away from the private sphere and into the public arena. Chapter three will offer a series of re-examinations of often cited cases where Lin is labeled as culpable. While re-examining these cases, additional information

from Lin Biao and Ye Qun's private life will be utilized. Consequently, Lin Biao's social inhibitions caused by his personality disorders will become apparent as the debilitating affect on his capability to effectively make key decisions on policy are clear.

Furthermore, the consequential enabling affect that Lin's personality had on Ye's own political ambitions; much of which bolstered the revolutionary excesses that occurred during the Cultural Revolution as well as the political targeting of certain prominent Party members that have typically been attributed to Lin Biao. A brief conclusion will then be offered, summarizing the findings of this study.

Chapter 2: Lin Biao the Man

Adrian T. Luna

“In that one moment, my view of Lin Biao changed—from bold and brilliant military commander to troubled soul unfit to lead.”

Mao Zedong’s personal physician Dr. Li Zhisui

Understanding the depths and complexities of the human mind and the reasons why individuals act in certain ways is a puzzling and challenging task. Human beings are certainly complex as we are composed of emotions, bodily chemicals, and external stimuli that all have effects on the behaviors and compositions of personalities. This is certainly highlighted as humans try to understand themselves everyday—a constant process of self-reflection and examination that can take years before any significant amount of enlightenment and understanding might be achieved. For this particular study of Lin Biao, this examination is even more difficult as the ability to speak to the specific targeted subject is devoid. Comprehending Lin then, must come from those who shared close, intimate connections with him and are willing to tell their tale.

While a definitive, precise diagnosis cannot be made of Lin Biao's personality, the existing evidence that is available portrays Lin Biao as possessing two distinct disorders: *schizoid personality disorder* and *social anxiety disorder*.³ Schizoid personality disorder is described by the DSM-IV as “a pervasive pattern of detachment from social relationships and a restricted range of expression of emotions in interpersonal setting...and are present in a variety of contexts.”⁴ Individuals with schizoid personality disorder tend to lack any actual desire for intimacy and seem indifferent to opportunities to develop close relationships. As the DSM-IV also states, “They prefer spending time by themselves, rather than being with other people. They often appear to be socially isolated or ‘loners’ and almost always choose solitary activities or hobbies that do not include

³ This study will not stray into a vague argument by labeling Lin's personality problem as mere health or mental problems. The two personality disorders described below will be consistently mentioned throughout this study as Lin Biao, based on existing evidence, displayed symptoms of the two disorders.

⁴ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (Washington DC, 1994) p. 638.

interactions with others.”⁵ Schizoid personalities typically have a bland “exterior without visible emotional reactivity and rarely reciprocates gestures or facial expressions, such as smiles or nods....They often display a constricted affect and appear cold and aloof.”⁶

According to the DSM-IV, four of the following seven criteria must be met by a patient in order for a diagnosis. They are:

- Neither desires nor enjoys close relationships, including being part of a family
- Almost always chooses solitary activities
- Has little, if any, interest in having sexual experiences with another person
- Takes pleasure in few, if any, activities
- Lacks close friends or confidants other than first-degree relatives
- Appears indifferent to the praise or criticism of others
- Show emotional coldness, detachment, or flattened affectivity⁷

It should be added here that the labeling of *schizoid personality disorder* is itself a controversial topic. Some psychologists argue that schizoid personalities are not a *disorder* but simply a *personality type*. The core of their argument is that psychologists should not name a personality a *disorder* if it is simply unorthodox and unlike other personalities seen in society. These psychologists prefer to label the schizoid personality as “schizoid personality type.” Aside from differences over the title of schizoid personality, there exists no other differences i.e., criteria and symptoms, that are controversial. For purposes of clarity, this study will continue to call it *schizoid personality disorder*. Closely related to schizoid personality disorder are *schizotypal*

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid p. 641.

personality disorder, paranoid personality disorder, and avoidant personality disorder.

These three disorders are often confused for schizoid personality disorder, but according to the DSM-IV can be easily distinguished. Individuals who suffer from schizotypal personality disorder often suffer from delusional episodes where the individual is intensely superstitious toward others. Individuals may also believe they have special powers, to sense events before they happen, or believe they have the ability to read other people's thoughts.⁸ The distinguishing component of paranoid personality disorder is that patients are filled with suspiciousness and paranoid ideation.⁹ Like schizoid personality disorder, avoidant personality disorder sufferers are inclined to remain aloof and away from social interaction. The two disorders are similar, but avoidant personality disorder differs since the individual favors solitude for an underlying psychological fear of rejection or embarrassment. Avoidant personality types typically feel inadequate, have low feelings of self worth, and are overly preoccupied and concerned that others may be critical or reject them. Unlike this disorder however, Lin was not dominated by a psychological trepidation of rejection. Rather, Lin possessed a more pervasive detachment and overall limited desire for social intimacy. It should also be briefly touched on that schizoid personalities are not necessarily always detached or aloof. Depending on the severity of the disorder, the individual may be more constrained and more reserved than others. The personality may be open to some people in their life, such as intimate family members or close friends. Furthermore, the DSM-IV observes that under some circumstances, the individual may be temporarily comfortable in revealing themselves; the individual may acknowledge having painful feelings, particularly related

⁸ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994), p. 641.

⁹ *Ibid* p. 640.

to social interactions.¹⁰ As discussed in the following chapter, Lin did express emotion at varying moments in reaction to both current Party policies during the Cultural Revolution and during brief encounters with fellow Party members. Lin also expressed his disgust to his staff about being required to meet people and being placed in social situations. But the majority of the evidence we have contradicts these instances, showing an emotionally detached Lin Biao. This is not a dismissal of evidence which showed an emotional Lin Biao, but merely a factual point that must be considered. Lin Biao did indeed, at times, show some type of emotion, which, as mentioned above, is not absolutely uncharacteristic trait of schizoid personalities. Moreover, instances when Lin showed emotion were often *reactionary* from the input, influences, or suggestions from others.

The second disorder revealed in this chapter and pertinent to this analysis is *social anxiety disorder*. Sometimes labeled social phobia, social anxiety disorder is among the most common of all psychiatric disorders. Social anxiety disorder is defined by the DSM-IV as “an excessive, irrational fear of social or performance situations due to an expectation that others will scrutinize the person’s actions. Individuals with social anxiety disorder experience anticipatory anxiety prior to a feared event and, if the situation is endured, suffer intense and distressing symptoms of anxiety during exposure.”¹¹ The primary characteristic of social anxiety disorder is that the individual experiences a dramatic fear of exposure to a particular situation, often leading to marked, acute anxiety symptoms, including blushing, tremor, sweating, muscle tension, palpitations and

¹⁰ Ibid p. 638.

¹¹ American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994).

gastrointestinal discomfort.¹² In addition, those who have social anxiety disorder have difficulty interacting sexually and overall have a substantial impairment in the quality of life and emotional functioning.

Alarming similar to social anxiety disorder is the already discussed avoidant personality disorder. Avoidant personality disorder is the most common comorbid personality disorder, as it has been identified along with social anxiety disorder in individuals in some studies.¹³ Both social anxiety disorder and avoidant personality disorder are chronic illnesses that are not easily distinguishable. Both have very similar symptoms including social discomfort, fear of negative evaluation, and extensive interpersonal avoidance.¹⁴ The distinguishing feature between the two however is that avoidant personality disorder is not characterized by panic or anxiety attacks. Also, individuals with avoidant personality disorder have an underlying desire for social interaction, as long as there is no risk of rejection; whereas those who have social anxiety disorder have no interest in having social interaction whatsoever. Some confuse social anxiety disorder with mere shyness, thus leading the individual to live his daily life trying to cope with what had been deemed as ‘shyness’ but in actuality is living with a very real and common psychiatric disorder. But shyness does not lead to acute anxiety attacks for the sufferer when in social interactions.

What should now be discussed and contemplated are the potentially jarring affects that such a type of disorder can have on an individual. For this analysis, the affects are

¹² Martin Keller, “The Lifelong Course of Social Anxiety Disorder: A Clinical Perspective” *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica*, Vol. 108 p. 86.

¹³ Martin Keller, “The Lifelong Course of Social Anxiety Disorder: A Clinical Perspective” *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica*, Vol. 108, p. 90. Keller notes that thirty-six percent of patients he examined suffered from both avoidant personality disorder and social anxiety disorder.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

even more important to examine as Lin Biao was not a normal person in a basic position in society. Lin was not a farmer, shopkeeper, craftsman, or peasant. Lin was a statesman in a very important and politically sensitive position. Lin held a position as Mao's so-called "closest comrade in arms". As Mao's close sycophant, Lin was expected to loyally follow the Chairman's every wish; from making public appearances to making politically sensitive decisions over ideology and Party members, Lin had to constantly gauge and predict the wishes of an ambiguous and always changing leader who also struggled with his own personality and psychological challenges.¹⁵ Such a position entailed in-depth and critical scrutiny of an ever-changing Cultural Revolution political landscape. When considering these facets of the context of which Lin Biao existed, his personality deficiencies create a potentially disastrous situation that Lin was forced to live within. Lin's *social anxiety disorder* and *schizoid personality disorder* greatly affect his ability to effectively function in such a position. First, the ambivalence that surrounds *schizoid personalities* affected Lin's ability to make solid and firm decisions, a must in the Cultural Revolution battlefield. The net effect was that Lin could be easily convinced to make decisions suiting another's own political priorities despite the geopolitical realities. Of course much of Lin's opinion was swayed in favor of Ye Qun who always attempted to look out for her family's best interest, but Ye also held political ambitions that took precedence over a more careful, cautious, and rationale approach to politics. Second, Lin's aloof and introverted characteristics that match that of a *schizoid personality* allowed Ye Qun to often act covertly and carry out political schemes without Lin's knowledge. Certainly, Ye's secretive behavior suggests that she felt concerned over the

¹⁵ On Mao's psychological troubles see Lucian Pye, *Mao Tse-tung: The Man in the Leader* (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

potential ramifications of how Lin Biao may react, which contradicts my description of an introverted and ambivalent Lin Biao. However, Ye was dependent on Lin Biao for her political survival, and to act carelessly and risk rejection by Lin Biao would be political jeopardy. Lin's passive and constant absence from the ongoing melodrama of Maojiawan though enabled Ye Qun to act. Even more importantly, Lin's passive and carefree attitude associated with *schizoid personalities* permitted Ye to not inform Lin at all since an assumption could be easily made by Ye that Lin Biao would most likely not care about the matter anyway or that he simply did not wish to have a social interaction to learn of the political details of the ongoing Cultural Revolution. Exacerbating Lin's capability of obtaining the appropriate information required during such a politically turbulent and sensitive time period was caused by Lin's *social anxiety disorder*. Lin struggled daily to meet and have pleasurable social interactions with people who could be considered trustful and respectful. Lin's secretaries and staff members were confined to brief meetings with Lin Biao on a daily basis. This greatly contrasts with the more politically active Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai who would often spend countless hours working into the late nights and early morning hours. Although Lin's briefings, as discussed further below, contained news about new developments in the Cultural Revolution, Lin's struggle to meet socially for long periods of time with his secretaries led to an inefficient and less enlightened political acumen than Mao or Zhou. In terms of attending social functions, on the surface Lin Biao appeared to have no problems. He is widely remembered as the classic military man; brandishing the Little Red Book next to Mao on the rostrum at Tiananmen. But Lin suffered heavily in this role too. Lin loathed attending public functions, a definite requirement of a man with such a high-ranking position. This

disgust was not hidden from the Chairman's knowledge and such knowledge undoubtedly led to Mao's questioning of Lin Biao in the role of Vice Chairman. And what might be argued as Lin's greatest downfall is Lin's constant struggles could have led to Mao's own suspicions of what Lin Biao's true intentions were. Mao, as a masterful strategist on the political battlefield, likely could have read Lin's introverted, aloof, and detached personality as passive-aggressive, thus shifting Mao's mistrustful mind into overdrive leading him to doubt Lin's loyalty. This chapter will now move to probing the inner halls of Maojiawan, closely scrutinizing the available evidence and offering examples that corroborate my argument that Lin Biao did indeed suffer from two personality disorders that affected his capacity to perform to the level of political position.

Understanding Lin Biao: The Man

The darkness, enigma, and secrecy that shrouds the private life of Lin Biao is exposed through the memoirs and recollections of Lin's Secretary, Zhang Yunsheng, who served for Lin from August 1966 to late 1970, and Ye Qun's personal assistant Guan Weixun. Emerging from the vivid memories of these individuals are intimate experiences that reveals the fallacies, bizarre rituals, personality blots, backbiting, and unstable nature of Lin Biao and his family. Lin is revealed as a private, quiet, and introverted man; a man who remained aloof from others and showed little actual interest in domestic or foreign policy decision-making. This passive persona can be seen as a political tactic for survival during the Cultural Revolution. But, as seen below, Lin's behavior in private was peculiar, and meets the criteria for schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder.

Lin's solitude and preference for limited human interaction forces us to consider the behavioral observations of the other members of Lin's family as well. In particular, Lin's wife, Ye Qun, played a prominent role as the leading secretary of Lin's personal office. She was also appointed as general secretary, with Mao's approval, of the Military Affairs Council (MAC), one of the top-level decision-making bodies of the military, in 1960. Ye's primary role as head secretary can be seen as managing the day-to-day affairs of the Maojiawan household. As head secretary and Lin's major advisor, Ye was in charge of monitoring current issues and reminding him of what should or should not be said on different occasions. Ye Qun was responsible for a variety of tasks, both major and seemingly minuscule, such as instructing Lin's secretary Li Wenpu to insure that Lin would always carry the "little red book" in his hand at all public appearances. Guaranteeing that Lin's secretaries and assistants could perfectly time the arrival of Lin Biao during public appearances with the Chairman, such as standing atop the rostrum at Tiananmen together to receive millions of fervent Red Guards, also fell into Ye Qun's list of to-dos as Lin's political coordinator. For public appearances, Lin could not arrive before the Chairman since it would upstage him, nor could Lin arrive long after him since this would force the Chairman to wait alone, an overt sign of disrespect. Since Mao lived in Zhongnanhai and Lin resided within Maojiawan, Mao's geographical distance to Tiananmen was closer than Lin. Under Ye Qun's direction, Lin's personal assistants would allow Lin to depart two minutes following the news of Mao's departure from Zhongnanhai to Tiananmen. Lin's secretaries would also remind him not to stand too close to the Chairman but also not too far away. Standing too close might be perceived as an attempt to block Mao or his view, while standing afar could potentially be

apprehended as ignoring the Great Helmsman. Being more than less cautious, Lin was always reminded to keep an appropriate distance, finding the perfect balance between smothering Mao's personal space and disassociation.¹⁶ That Lin trusted Ye to coordinate such activities certainly illuminates how powerful she was as a political conductor and the level of trust that Lin had for his wife. Ye's position also highlights the seemingly babying nature and constant guidance Lin constantly needed.

Ye's respected, influential position is highlighted by the memoirs of Lin's secretaries. In fact, the memoir of Zhang Yunsheng could also be labeled as "A Memoir of Ye Qun's Secretary," as a great deal of the study is filled with Ye Qun's mischievous double-dealing and everyday interests. The daily interactions that Ye Qun had with Lin's secretaries compels us to also examine her behavior and actions within the Lin Biao household. Ye was headstrong and virulent, striking fear into the hearts of her assistants and Lin's secretaries. She also would take regular covert trips to Diaoyutai to associate with Jiang Qing (who she looked up to as a model), Kang Sheng, and Chen Boda; these field trips were often completely contrary to Lin's wishes. Ye's position influenced the transmission of information and decisions to the aloof Lin Biao too. Even the most sensitive family drama was kept from Lin Biao by Ye Qun, such as the two attempts at suicide by their daughter, Lin Doudou. Indeed, Ye acted as a filtration system, carefully assessing what information and news should be passed along, or deciding what new political revelations needed to reach Lin Biao. Sifting through documents and deciding which ones should be passed on to a superior is indeed the duty of a secretary, however, Ye's sneaking around without Lin's knowledge leads to the conclusion that Ye possessed

¹⁶ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) p. 231 and Wen Feng, *Shentanxia de Lin Biao* (Lin Biao Down to Earth) (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1993) p. 33

ulterior motives contrary to the desires of Lin or simply unknown to him due to his reclusive and solitary confinement.

The politically prominent position that Ye held is further impacted through Lin's acute dependency on Ye Qun. Aside from the brief thirty minute daily meetings Lin held with Secretary Zhang Yunsheng, Lin would deny others from seeing him. Ye though was one of the few individuals who had easy access to Lin and, as Lin's wife, one of the few individuals Lin genuinely trusted. Lin would often ask Ye Qun to attend political meetings in place of him. His dependency on Ye Qun extended into even the most peculiar realms. In one interesting and rather bizarre incident when Lin Biao and Ye Qun were residing at their seaside resort at Beidaihe, one of Lin's secretaries came barging into Ye's resting room where she was having her hair brushed by one of her personal assistants. In a panic, Lin's secretary asked quickly whether or not Lin should spit out the phlegm he had coughed up. Ye, frustrated with being disturbed, vehemently replied "spit it out!"¹⁷ This incident, while bizarre, is particularly enlightening. What is crucial is that Lin Biao could not make a decision in this instance and shows a sense of neediness and dependency on Ye Qun. A key characteristic of schizoid personality is that the individual is care-free and often devoid in decision-making. Lin's secretary needed to gain some sort of approval from Ye before Lin would spit out the phlegm he had coughed up. This is a rather shocking and profound example, but one that illuminates Lin's ambivalence and what appears to be insecurity. Lin could not make a decision that any normal thinking rational person could perform on his or her own. As seen further below, this

¹⁷ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 214.

ambivalence was constantly present and allowed Ye to make certain decisions and push Lin Biao in certain political directions.

Lin and Ye's son, Lin Ligu, also had a prominent role within the family. He received special treatment for his family connections. Lin Ligu, for instance, served as deputy head of the combat department of the PLAAF and held a concurrent position as PLAAF office committee assistant director. For a twenty four year old, with only two years of enlisted experience, this is an extraordinary powerful position. Official Party histories state that Lin Biao directed PLAAF commander Wu Faxian for Lin Ligu's promotion. Lin's secretary Zhang Yunsheng reports, though, that Lin Biao did not know of his son's promotion, and Zhang was specifically ordered by Ye Qun not to tell him; "You [Zhang Yunsheng] should not say anything about the matter of promotion; the *shouzhang* [Lin Biao] will not agree."¹⁸ This example and others, including Lin Biao's disinterest in his son's selection of a wife, are more evidence that bolsters the argument that the private Lin Biao was aloof, and is a display of Lin's impaired social skills—characteristics of schizoid personality disorder.

If the private Lin Biao was effete, the public figure is remembered as a fiery and robust military strategist whose mastery for combat is paralleled by his wicked political maneuvering. As Ebon notes, "He [Lin Biao] is its [the CCP] most successful army commander....He is a strong man in his own right. Within his slight frame exists a steely determination....To Lin Biao, life is warfare."¹⁹ A sycophant of Mao, Lin Biao's adulation for the Chairman was officially recognized in a special paragraph of the new

¹⁸ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 328

¹⁹ Martin Ebon, *Lin Biao: The Life and Writings of China's New Ruler* (New York: Stein and Day, 1970) pp. 11-13

Party Constitution which lauds him for “consistently holding high the great red banner of Mao Zedong thought and has most loyally and resolutely carried out and defended Mao Zedong’s proletarian revolutionary line.”²⁰ Such recognition was so grand that it solved Mao’s question of succession. In contrast, below this study will offer alternative views of both Lin Biao and Ye Qun. As Nie Rongzhen has noted, “Lin was a fatuous and self-indulgent ruler (*hunjun*) Ye Qun was the real master of his affairs.”²¹ This analysis of Lin’s private life and the behavior of his family members bolster Nie’s statement made in 1980.

Physical Health and Personality Complications

Any discussion of the private life should begin with an understanding of his or her home. Lin Biao’s residential compound, known as Maojiawan, is a private remote setting where we will stage our analysis and reveal Lin’s personal lifestyle. Unlike Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Zhu’s gun toting wife Kang Keqing who all lived within the Zhongnanhai compound and were only a brief three minute stroll away from each other, Lin Biao, preferred isolation and chose a completely separate residential compound.²²

The atmosphere surrounding Maojiawan contrasted with the hustle and bustle of Zhongnanhai as well. Guan Weixun, Ye Qun’s personal assistant and secretary, remarked that Maojiawan’s courtyard and compound was silent, similar to an intensive care unit at

²⁰ Cited in Witold Rodzinski, *The People’s Republic of China: A Concise Political History* (New York: The Free Press, 1988) p. 175

²¹ Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993) p. 208

²² Lin’s residence was a treasured old style house and the former residential home of the Yu family, an ancient Han family of great wealth. The residence was large and sprawled over several acres. The home had been built during the Ming dynasty and reportedly was home of one of the most impressive gardens in Beijing and also housed a pool. After the liberation of China in 1949, the Yu family sold their home to the Ministry of Finance for fifteen thousand dollars. Bo Yibo, head of the Ministry of Finance, chose not to use it for his own personal use. Instead, the swimming pool and garden transformed into a parking lot and the house became a clinic. Lin took over the house shortly after this transformation. Lin refurbished the home and also had an underground tunnel constructed that connected to Zhongnanhai. See Harrison Salisbury, *The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng* (New York: Avon Books, 1992) p. 75

a hospital. Guan even questioned if Lin actually worked at Maojiawan, commenting that the empty atmosphere of the area forced one to think if Lin actually lived in Zhongnanhai and not Maojiawan.²³ Unlike the endless hours of work that were exhibited at Zhongnanhai throughout the late night hours, Maojiawan had very few lights illuminating the residence. Guan Weixun notes “How does Vice Chairman Lin command?”²⁴ In one interesting incident Guan Weixun, shortly following his arrival at Maojiawan, entered a restroom that was designated for use by staff members. The restroom was dirty and only had a single squat pot installed for dozens of secretaries and staff members to use. Guan noted that while in the restroom he saw a stash of newspapers, some of them torn and ripped, laid on the bathroom floor. The papers were filled with photographs of Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin.²⁵ What is particularly striking in this case is that somebody, whether be a staff member or secretary, behaved in a blasphemous fashion completely disrespecting both the Chairman and Vice Chairman. If witnessed by anyone outside of Maojiawan, the consequences would be devastating, most likely leading to accusations of counter-revolutionary behavior and of opposing Mao Zedong and Vice Chairman Lin Biao in the paranoia that had engulfed China during the Cultural Revolution. Yet, within the inner walls of Maojiawan, lifestyles greatly contrasted traditional assumptions held by the public.

Lin’s secretaries when first beginning their position had the rare opportunity to meet Lin Biao. Typically these encounters included an informal aloud reading of a political report detailing the current foreign or domestic situation. The secretary classified

²³ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 187

²⁴ Ibid pp. 46-47

²⁵ Ibid p. 45

as an office administrator, has duties which included: receive, dispatch, classify, type, print, encode and decode, and report documents.²⁶ But simply having a clear, understandable dialect is not enough. As General Zeng, Vice Commander-in-Chief of the Shenyang Military Region, told Zhang Yunsheng upon his appointment, “choosing a secretary for Lin Biao is more difficult than selecting the top candidate of the [ancient imperial] palace examinations.”²⁷ This is certainly not an understatement, to qualify one had to have: previous service in Lin Biao’s [Fourth] field army, no connections with high-ranking cadres in Beijing, Mandarin speaking ability, good personality, no busybodies, good education but not a high ranking cadre, good family background [i.e. worker-peasant-soldier], and good health.²⁸ The expectations placed on secretaries for employment indirectly speaks to the sensitivity surrounding elite political life in China. The first three aforementioned requirements are reflections of personal loyalty. In the competitive and unstable world of Chinese politics, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, loyalty is an absolute necessity for survival. The final requirement of good health however is particularly interesting. Considering Lin’s ubiquitous concerns for his physical health, discussed at greater length below, this minimal prerequisite is not surprising. Also, when considering the multitude of standards required to becoming a secretary and that Lin Biao still, despite the degree of trustworthiness exhibited by secretaries, preferred not to be in the presence of a secretary offers further credence to the

²⁶ There are many classifications though for a secretary. The categories that a secretary could be classified as include: major advisor; ghost writer; coordinator; office administrator; personal manager; servant; and chief bodyguard. For the sake of clarity, the secretaries included in this study can be categorized as follows: Secretary Zhang Yunsheng can be labeled as an office administrator; and Guan Weixun, Wang Landuo, and Lao Yang can all be categorized as servants. Servants are described as responsible for the housing, food, transportation, bathing, and haircuts. See Wei Li and Lucian Pye, “The Ubiquitous Role of the Mishu in Chinese Politics,” *China Quarterly*, no. 132 (1992) pp. 913-936, especially pp. 916-923

²⁷ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 3

²⁸ Ibid.

argument that Lin Biao suffered from debilitating health problems and a continuous desire to be alone.

Zhang's first encounter with Lin Biao was not one that is particularly eventful, but somewhat telling. After reading a brief excerpt from a report extolling the close relationship between Mao and Lin, one of the first questions from Lin was if Zhang was in good health and if Zhang could sleep at night.²⁹ Ye Qun's personal servant, Guan Weixun, only after working in the Maojiawan residence for an extended and long period of time, was allowed to meet Lin Biao. Guan records that the encounter was short and was not impressed with Lin Biao's overall appearance or ability to make conversation. Guan described Lin as being pale, thin, and sickly. During the meeting Ye Qun controlled the conversation, constantly answering questions for Lin Biao, speaking before Lin Biao could answer, and digressing from topic to topic. The entire engagement did not last more than five minutes.³⁰ Other assistants in Maojiawan shared equally unimpressive meetings. One secretary states that while perusing around the hallways he viewed a man sitting in a chair, head dropped back, and eyes shut. To his surprise, the man was Lin Biao. Lin was awakened by another secretary who had been reading a report to him. Upon coming to, Lin simply stated, "You manage it."³¹

Lin Biao, in these three examples, again presents a picture that illuminates his lack of social skills, emotion, and general interest in carrying an in-depth conversation. Lin appears as a cold and detached figure. What is also noted is Ye's demonstrative

²⁹ Ibid. p. 11-12 Zhang also noted that Lin was bald, something that he had never known since Lin always donned a PLA or CCP during nearly every public event where Lin was visible to the masses. Ibid. p. 6.

³⁰ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) pp. 197-199

³¹ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 24

behavior as she interjected periodically answering questions for Lin Biao and switching topics constantly. Like a great conductor, Ye seemingly controlled the demeanor of even this innocent conversation. This not only underlines Ye's unconstrained domination of every situation that surrounds her husband but also construes Lin's ambivalence and non-existent like nature that is a primary facet of his personality. The final example, though brief, also reminds us of Lin's lack of emotion and careless attitude. Even though we have no knowledge of the topic which the secretary was discussing with Lin, thus making it impossible to judge Lin's careless attitude toward politics in this instance, it is clear that Lin found little interest in whatever he was being briefed on and gave unilateral control to his assistant to handle the matter.

These brief meetings with Lin Biao were not limited to Guan Weixun. Even for Lin Biao's key office administrator, Secretary Zhang Yunsheng, visitations were confined to time constraints. When Zhang began his duties as Lin's secretary he received instructions concerning his daily briefings to Lin. Zhang was directed to curb his discussions and updates with Lin Biao to thirty minute time periods. When Zhang heard this rule he was dumbfounded. Since Lin was atop the hierarchy of the CCP, on average, Lin's office received hundreds of documents, telegrams and reference materials every day. Each document contained at least two hundred characters and some, such as those from various ministries and government departments, contained upwards to twenty thousand characters. Such a massive pile of reading material equates to hours of review and study for even native Chinese speakers. Reviewing this deluge in depth would require lengthy, detailed meetings with Lin Biao. However, Zhang was instructed by his fellow secretary, Old Zhao, to only verbally summarize the most important documents.

“You have to select the most important ones to ‘summarize.’ Right now since our leader is not in good health and can’t tolerate long working hours, he only listens to these summaries about twice a day, each time for only thirty minutes or so.”³² Another variable that needed consideration was Lin’s eating schedule. Lin would not meet with his secretaries for any meeting directly following a meal. Lin required his secretaries to wait at least a half hour after he finished any eating activities before a report could be given. Lin argued that any meeting that violated this special schedule would lead to “sweating.”³³ Old Zhao suggested that Zhang choose the reports that detailed the most current trends in China’s domestic situation. “Documents dealing with events relevant to new tendencies and developments that might result in radically new circumstances should be given more attention than documents covering rather routine matters.”³⁴ In order to lighten the tremendous work load, Zhang and Old Zhao decided to divide the materials. Zhang summarized reports dealing with new tendencies and developments occurring in the Cultural Revolution, Old Zhao reported on military and international affairs. Lin also could not be disturbed during his sleep. Unless a major incident occurred or if the Chairman or Jiang Qing requested his presence, Lin was not to be awakened from his time of rest. If Lin was awakened for any reason, he would usually become anxious and begin to “sweat” upsetting the delicate cycle required for Lin to fall back asleep.³⁵

One of Zhang’s first reports to Lin Biao enabled him to see more of the odd intricacies of the second most powerful man in China, offers us more evidence to assess

³² Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 13

³³ *Ibid.* p. 15

³⁴ *Ibid.* p. 13

³⁵ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 25

Lin Biao's personality deficiencies. One summer day, Zhang Yunsheng arrived at Zhejiang Hall in the Great Hall of the People. Lin enjoyed staying in Zhejiang Hall during the summer months since it reportedly had better air circulation, allowing Lin to tolerate Beijing's sweltering summers. Upon Zhang's entrance the first thing he noted was the absence of light in Lin's room. Only a few small lamps were present. Zhang, as with any military soldier, did what is expected when a lower officer meets a higher rank: he saluted. But Lin's reaction took Zhang aback, Lin not only told Zhang not to salute him, but he added that if somebody salutes him he feels uncomfortable and begins to "sweat" (*chu han*). Zhang, perplexed enough already by Lin's dim lighting selection, did not know how to react, Zhang only took note not to salute Lin again. Confounding Zhang even further is Lin's behavior while Zhang read his report to Lin. While listening, Lin picked up a box of matches and began striking each match, blowing it out, putting the match to his nose in order to smell residual smoke, and dropping the match to the ground. Lin continuously repeated this process throughout the entire meeting, pacing back and forth across the room, his feet plodding over extinguished matches.³⁶ Even the loyal Secretary Zhang Yunsheng, perplexed with this encounter, commented in his memoir, "This is a really weird *shouzhang* [leader]!"³⁷ Lin's match-lighting episode is a colorful example that displays the complexities of Lin's social anxiety disorder. A key condition to social anxiety disorder is a fear of social situations since there is an underlying fear of how the person will be judged. The consequent behavior can be particularly intense especially if the individual is forced to be in a social situation. In Zhang Yunsheng's meeting, Lin lit matches, blew them out, and paced the floor. This is not simply odd or

³⁶ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) pp. 13-15

³⁷ Ibid. p. 15

aberrant behavior but a display of anxiety due to his meeting with Zhang. Likely irritating Lin's anxieties even further is that Lin met with Zhang alone and Zhang was still fairly new to Maojiawan thus placing Lin Biao in a situation that he not only loathed but also in which he felt unfamiliar. There is no available evidence as to understanding the peculiarity of Lin's order to Zhang not to salute him and why it makes Lin sweat.

However, what can be deducted from this interaction is that Lin felt some degree of anxiety upon being saluted as he reacted with profuse sweating. What should be noted at this point is that it is common in those who suffer with social anxiety disorder to also struggle with hyperhidrosis. Hyperhidrosis is a well recognized dermatological condition that is characterized by excessive sweating seen in the hands, arms, or face. The condition has been noted of being disabling, as it interferes constantly with a person's ability to carry out professional work responsibilities in public. What is alarming for the purposes for this work is that one particular study has shown that up to thirty-two percent of those individuals who have hyperhidrosis also have social anxiety disorder, thus illustrating a distinctive link between the two disorders.³⁸ Important for this analysis, is that Lin Biao demonstrates both symptoms of social anxiety disorder and hyperhidrosis in our example as his anxieties about meeting with other people stimulated and aggravated his degree of comfort, consequently leading to profuse outbreaks of perspiration.

Lin's odd eccentricity does not end here. Lin's bedroom in Maojiawan is not conventional by any means. Unlike other residential homes in China during the Cultural Revolution draped with Mao Zedong posters and Mao's calligraphy written atop lengthy scrolls hanging from walls, Lin's bedroom did not possess these orthodox characteristics.

³⁸ Jonathan R.T. Davidson, Edna B. Foa, Kathryn M. Connor, L. Erik Churchill, "Hyperhidrosis in Social Anxiety Disorder" *Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry*, Vol. 26, pp. 1327-1331

Lin's bedroom was surprisingly empty. He had one bed, a sofa, a couple chairs, and a table. One small lotus lamp framed his bedside and was the sole source of all light that would fill his entire room. Ye Qun's room was the complete opposite. Her room was filled with Maoist statements and she even touted her own collection of Mao badges.³⁹ Lin's bedroom windows that exposed occupants to a view of the outside courtyard were covered at all times by brown draperies.⁴⁰ Lin's diet was also bland just as he lived. Lin limited himself to very few Chinese dishes. He did not delve into adventurous spicy dishes like those from Hunan or Sichuan, nor did he eat fish or even rice. Rather, Lin preferred a bland diet, consuming beans and an occasional meat patty.⁴¹ Dark, morbid, and solitary, Lin remained aloof, spending the majority of his time locked inside this room, allowing only certain visitors of Maojiawan to see him for brief periods. He received his daily political reports from Secretary Zhang Yunsheng and Old Zhao who were confined to thirty minute periods each.

Lin's anomalous behaviors are not limited to the aforementioned examples. The connection to Lin's solitary confinement is partially attributed to the fears he had of three elements appearing in nature: coldness, wind, and water. Lin's fear of coldness or feeling chilled is the foundation for his fear of wind and water. Due to Lin's sensitivity to chilly temperatures, he would sense small temperature shifts in his room. Thermostats were installed and constantly monitored to avoid any major dips and changes in temperature. Should any sudden shifts occur Lin would make it apparent letting his staff know immediately. If Lin felt a slight chill for just an instant he would holler aloud notifying

³⁹ Lin also kept a small flashlight beneath his pillow for use at night during his many sleepless nights. See Wen Feng, *Shentanxia de Lin Biao* (Lin Biao Down to Earth) (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1993) p. 24

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 25

⁴¹ Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil), (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) p. 374

his personal assistants who then would shine bright lights on Lin in order to warm him up.

Lin also preferred that his clothing be kept at a certain comfort level. Lin's personal assistants warmed his shoes and socks in an oven before he would snuggle his feet in them. Lin's fear of cold led him to deny any item made of glass from his bedroom. This stemmed from his belief that glass was naturally cold to the touch, thus leading to Lin's omission of anything containing glass. With the exception of Lin's windows, his bedroom contained nothing made of glass. A glass table present in Lin's room for instance, was without the necessary glass plate for it to function properly. Even Lin's writing pencil reportedly needed to be warm before he would use it. Like the room of his wife Ye Qun, Lin's room was equipped with a metal buzzer that would ring if Lin needed anything from his assistants. But Lin made sure to wrap the button with cloth or silk in order to avoid any potential risk of feeling gelidity on the button's bare metal surface. Lin's footrest, constructed of iron, was also modified for Lin's use as it was draped with a wool blanket to eliminate any risk of Lin's bare feet feeling the least bit nippy from the metal construction. Lin's personal interactions with his secretaries were also affected by his fear of coldness. Lin, if not perambulating about the floor, would force his secretaries to sit at least six feet away from him during any political briefings. Even Lin's personal assistants were constrained to their distance from Lin if they accompanied him even on a simple walk. Lin would not allow others to walk close to him or directly in front of him for fear of a passing breeze that he may feel and the consequent shock it would incur on his body.⁴² Lin's motivation was to avoid any cool breezes that may blow his way as a

⁴² Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 25

secretary shuffled through his papers. Maojiawan was also devoid of any electrical fans.⁴³ Lin's drinking water needed to also be far above freezing, it was required reportedly to hover at about forty-five degrees Fahrenheit in order to avoid chilling the Vice Chairman. Lin even had a customized toilet seat created by Qiu Huizuo. The seat was cloaked by red velvet thus eradicating the possibility that Lin could feel a chill from the porcelain.⁴⁴

Alterations in temperature even affected Lin's dressing habits. Since Lin did not enjoy being too cold nor too hot he only preferred certain materials to be used in his clothing. Typical military dress uniforms of the PLA are weaved in cotton or wool. However, Lin would not wear anything that contained any of the above. He would only wear a lighter cloth material. One of Lin's close bodyguards and personal assistants, Li Wenpu, was in charge of carefully selecting the appropriate clothing for Lin to wear based on current atmospheric temperature.⁴⁵

Lin's fear of chills led to his concomitant fear of water. Lin believed that any contact with water would enhance his sensitivity to any source of coolness. Lin disliked bathing and preferred to use damp towels to pat his face down. Even Lin's hands were devoid of contact to water. Lin created his own hand-washing method by rubbing the palms of his hands back and forth along the arms of his sofa at a rapid speed. Like the timing of Lin's match sniffing episode, Lin would typically buff his palms clean during the daily political reports given to him by his secretaries.⁴⁶ While Lin's hand-rubbing may seem as an odd way of supposedly washing a person's hands, it should also be

⁴³ Ibid. p. 25

⁴⁴ Zhao Ran, *Ye Qun yeshi* (An Informal History of Ye Qun) (Liaoning: Shenyang chubanshe, 1988) pp. 115-116

⁴⁵ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 230

⁴⁶ Zhao Ran, *Ye Qun yeshi* (An Informal History of Ye Qun) (Liaoning: Shenyang chubanshe, 1988) p. 9

suggested that Lin's hand rubbing took place during his meetings with members of his staff. Lin's hand rubbing behavior is an example of anxiousness, highlighting Lin's nervousness and anxieties that he experienced whenever meeting with individuals. Like Lin's match-lighting episode, Lin's hand rubbing is a display of another form of anxious behavior while meeting with people in social situations. This behavior is likely linked to his bouts with social anxiety disorder; Lin felt nervous and heavily stressed in meetings, the anxiety was then materialized by perspiration and/or obsessive tendencies such as hand rubbing.

Lin's obsession and fears affected his capabilities to function as Vice Chairman, Defense Minister, and even as a human being. Lin did not frequent the outdoors, rather Lin preferred to remain inside and did not enjoy leaving his bed or his bedroom. The simplest, most routine tasks for normal people were challenges for Lin. For instance, Lin disliked crawling from beneath his piles of blankets and sheets to use the bathroom. A special screened area was constructed in his bedroom so that Lin would not be encumbered with exiting his bedroom and walking down the hallway to the bathroom. Lin even opined that the digestive system in the human body was naturally faulted, that it should have the capability to digest and utilize one hundred percent of the food and liquid that enters the body.⁴⁷

Lin's frustrations concerning digestion are attributed to the unchanging condition of diarrhea that he was forced to deal with on a fairly regular basis. Even though we do not have a daily record of Lin's bathroom habits, Lin's secretaries and personal assistants, as well as Ye Qun's personal assistants, all note Lin's vexing digestive health problems. If temperature fluctuations were sensed by Lin bouts of diarrhea would ensue.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 116

According to Ye Qun's personal assistant Guan Weixun, Lin's digestive habits were closely monitored by a medical team on staff at Maojiawan. According to Guan, Lin had experienced stomach and intestinal problems ever since his return from the Soviet Union in February 1942.⁴⁸ Since Lin's digestion was irritable he chose a fairly simple lifestyle. Lin did not put salt or oil on any of his foods.⁴⁹ Lin also chose to abstain from drinking alcohol. In one interesting episode, during Lin's visit to Moscow in October 1950, Lin refused to take even the smallest sip from his glass during a toast given by Stalin. Stalin reportedly quipped sarcastically to Lin not to worry and that the drink "contained no poison."⁵⁰ While a medical diagnosis is impossible to perform, Lin's struggling digestive system can be partially attributed to social anxiety disorder. Common in those suffering from the disorder are symptoms such as sweating, trembling, and diarrhea. These conditions are all caused by excessive anxiety in social situations. Considering that Lin's social anxiety disorder played a role in his struggles with digestion, this point is corroborated by his preference to be given a thirty minute time period prior to meeting with his personal staff. Lin might also be suffering from irritable bowel syndrome, a condition where the descending colon goes into spasms forcing the individual to have excessive diarrhea or feel the urge to use the restroom. Irritable bowel is typically triggered in situations when the individual is suffering from anxiety over a particular situation. Considering these points, Lin is likely to have been a victim of this particularly painful disorder, as his reaction to social situations stimulated his need to use the restroom. Regardless it is obvious that Lin suffered from digestive problems to some

⁴⁸ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 187

⁴⁹ Wen Feng, *Shentanxia de Lin Biao* (Lin Biao Down to Earth) (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1993) p. 24

⁵⁰ Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian-Shi Zhe Huiyilu* (At the Side of a Historical Giant-The Memoirs of Shi Zhe) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1991) pp. 497-500

degree as he did make efforts to change his diet. Most likely, Lin simply did not know of irritable bowel or any other gastrointestinal disorder.

Another persistent problem Lin lived with on a daily basis is “sweating.” This condition, though not explored to a great extent by those who knew Lin best, did not go unnoticed. As mentioned above, Lin ordered his secretaries to exclude the orthodox military practice of saluting when seeing him. If Lin did witness a salute, he would begin to sweat profusely. If Lin’s daily meetings with his secretaries went in excess of thirty minutes his perspiration would kick into overdrive as well. This physical ailment also hindered his capability to maintain relationships outside of his family and close confidants within Maojiawan. Even Mao took note of Lin Biao and his problems with perspiration. Late one evening during one of Lin’s public appearances with the Chairman upon the rostrum at Tiananmen, Lin told the Chairman that he was sweating and would be leaving; the Chairman’s reply was “you are human, are human beings not supposed to perspire?”⁵¹ This, again, is an example of Lin’s problem with hyperhidrosis caused by social anxiety disorder. In the last example, Lin’s hyperhidrosis affected his ability to appropriately function and meet the needs of his demanding boss: Chairman Mao. Mao’s angst and frustration can also be sensed here leading one to question if Mao knew that he had made a serious mistake when choosing him as a successor.

Lin’s physical body seemed drained from actual energy too. Guan Weixun acknowledges that Lin’s muscles were so weak that he would typically stumble and fall

⁵¹ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 25

to the ground, but unlike a healthy individual, Lin could not stand back up on his own without the aid of another.⁵²

Contributing to Lin's social dislocation and aloofness from the political world that he existed were Lin's efforts to understand the health disorders, specifically those that were physical, i.e. stomach problems and excessive sweating, that plagued him. Lin indeed made note of his frequent health issues and seemed to show keen interest in the research. Like a studious scholar, Lin would spend hours perusing through books. Guan Weixun remarks how Lin would spend a great deal of time reading and researching Chinese medical textbooks searching for a way to diagnosis himself and pharmaceutical books that offered ancient herbal, natural remedies for illnesses and toilsome issues with the human body. In contrast to the often cited statements that Lin was a loyal follower to Mao Zedong who always studied the Chairman's works and who always carried the "Little Red Book" at his side, Lin spent the majority of his time reading medical books. One source indicates that Lin took the research he performed with great passion, spending time to even look up characters in Chinese dictionaries that he did not recognize.⁵³ Lin's interest in medical texts even concerned Ye Qun. According to Guan Weixun, Ye Qun ordered that nearly all medical texts within Maojiawan be seized, especially at times prior to major meetings. The primary reason for Ye's motivations to take Lin's texts was that Lin's research reportedly caused him excessive worry.⁵⁴ Lin would obsess over any discoveries or revelations he made and would consistently ponder them in his head. Prior to major meetings or public appearances, Lin needed to focus on

⁵² Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 49

⁵³ Zhao Ran, *Ye Qun yeshi* (An Informal History of Ye Qun) (Liaoning: Shenyang chubanshe, 1988) p. 116

⁵⁴ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 205

other issues such as speech reciting, political knowledge, and carrying his copy of “The Little Red Book.” With wheels spinning in Lin’s mind over his vitality, concentrating on political trends was a challenge. Within the sensitive political context that Lin existed, other political matters, regardless of their importance, needed to be shoved to the side so that Lin’s own personal concerns could be met satisfactorily. Lin’s excessive, almost obsessive; displays of concern toward his health further illuminate Lin’s schizoid personality disorder. As the DSM IV suggests, individuals with schizoid personalities typically are attracted to solitary activities including those of work. Lin’s intense, emotional preoccupation to understanding his health problems were unitary projects that Lin could abscond to, away from the explosively turbulent world that he lived in during the Cultural Revolution.

One element that is consistent in the memoirs of Lin’s personal secretaries is Lin’s aloof nature. This study will now briefly discuss the observations made and recorded by Lin’s personal staff members. Consistent themes are Lin’s indifference and lack of opinion toward political matters and overall lack of interest in politics in general—a primary symptom to schizoid personality. It will also be apparent how the benighted Lin Biao burdened his fellow Party members’ abilities to communicate with him. Whether it is a major foreign or domestic political development or the most trivial piece of government information, Lin showed little interest. For a man in such a high-ranking position in the Party, such an approach is dangerous. Not only is Lin responsible to critically understand political trends, but a misstep in following the general line laid down by Mao would be political suicide. What is also acute is that fellow Party members

and personal staff were required to collaborate with and work under an individual difficult to contact and to have a meaningful social interaction.

One of the most colorful examples of Zhang Yunsheng's memoirs that highlights Lin's carefree attitude in decision-making, occurred during a major crisis in Fujian. Han Xianchu, the military commander of the Fujian Military Region, contacted Maojiawan reporting on major political developments occurring at the grassroots level in Fujian province. Lin's secretaries however reported to Han that Lin could not speak on the telephone for fear of potentially catching a cold. Lin's secretaries advised Han Xianchu that he could share the new leading political trends and relay those issues to Lin Biao or Han could write down all the troubling matters and send them by telegram to Maojiawan. Han stated to Lin's secretaries that neither option was appealing and suggested that a loudspeaker be connected to the Lin Biao office phone line enabling Lin to hear Han's concerns without having to hold a phone receiver to his ear and mouth. The proposal was denied by Ye Qun. Han soon traveled to Beijing for medical treatment. While being nursed, Han was visited by Lin's secretaries. Han formally told Zhang Yunsheng about the complications that were bearing heavily on the military, including the pervasive ultra leftist trends arising and the consequent affects it was having on the PLA. Other troubling issues existed but Han felt that if Zhang could at least relay the latter two points to Lin he would feel very grateful. Han also expressed that his desire to meet with Lin personally had not extinguished and reminded Zhang of this wish. Zhang and Han spoke all morning and completed their discussion by early afternoon. According to Zhang, the meeting between him and Han lasted about five hours. Zhang, being the diligent secretary that he was, made sure to narrate the content of his conversation with Han to Lin and of the

current irksome matters in Fujian. Zhang also divulged to Lin that his discussion with Han lasted for nearly five hours and that Han still wanted to meet with Lin personally. Lin, upon hearing this, cracked a large smile, chuckled, and stated “Five hours and he [Han] still hadn’t finished?”⁵⁵ Lin also recommended that Han only need to meet with Zhang and that ten minutes would be sufficient for the matters concerning Han Xianchu and the Fujian military region.⁵⁶ While Lin does express some emotion in this example, his passive approach and seemingly laidback attitude toward the crisis suggests a lack of concern and consideration. This emotional coldness is a common behavioral trait of schizoid personalities. For Han, Lin’s brief ten minute meeting, assuming it occurred, could possibly have affected his opinion of Lin Biao. Considering the crisis and stress that Han endured, Lin’s phlegmatic attitude most likely left an acerbic aftertaste. While there is no specific evidence of Han-Lin relations before or after this event, one should contemplate how Lin’s apathetic behavior from his schizoid personality disorder affected how other Party members viewed him.

In another incident, during a meeting with a secretary that focused on current trends and recent political attacks by rebel Red Guards in Lanzhou and Sichuan, Lin Biao reportedly was insipid showing no emotion whatsoever. The report even included news of officials that were being attacked with great vigor from radical, rebel students. Lin then, after growing impatient through the course of the meeting, chimed in and stated with little emotion, “Today this province is attacked. Tomorrow that province is attacked. This is not news to me.”⁵⁷ Even following Mao’s infamous Southern Tour from August

⁵⁵ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 305

⁵⁶ The details of the above incident were drawn from Ibid. pp. 302-305

⁵⁷ Wen Feng, *Shentanxia de Lin Biao* (Lin Biao Down to Earth) (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1993) p. 29

to September 1970, when Mao alerted local leaders to his dissatisfaction with Lin Biao and his followers, Lin showed little emotion. Zhou Enlai, accompanied by Qiu Huizuo, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Li Desheng, in an attempt to ameliorate the acerbic relationship state between Lin and Mao, made a special trip to Beidaihe to meet with Lin and encourage him to attend a conference, at the Chairman's request, to rectify the mistakes of the then error laden Party member Chen Boda. Lin, faced with a possible opportunity to begin taking steps for political Party survival, did not interrupt. Lin politely let Zhou Enlai speak and finally declined the offer simply stating, "I cannot participate. You all can go and examine your mistakes."⁵⁸

Another illustration of Lin's care-free attitude occurred during one of the PLA's greatest scientific successes and one of China's greatest moments as a united nation. On June 17, 1967, at approximately 8:20 in the morning, China successfully detonated its first hydrogen bomb. The bomb was a multistage thermonuclear bomb, a three megaton device that was dropped from a Hong-6 bomber. The bomb was an illustration that China had acquired and caught up with Western nations in terms of nuclear technology. The explosion undoubtedly shocked the world, as China's level of strategic deterrence made leaps with one successful test of a weapon that melted steel plates four hundred meters from ground zero and brick houses that fourteen kilometers away collapsed.⁵⁹ The event changed the strategic outlook for the Chinese; China could no longer be bullied by "imperialist aggressors" as it had in previous conflicts with the U.S. or in any potential

⁵⁸ Shi Dongbing, *Zhongnanhai da guanxia Wang Dongxing* (Zhongnanhai's Great Housekeeper Wang Dongxing) (Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu youxian gongsi, 1998) p. 37

⁵⁹ John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) p. 206

future conflicts with the Soviet bear to the north and northwest.⁶⁰ Suddenly China needed to consider a military doctrine for its newly found weapon that was not far from Western nuclear devices in terms of power. Secretary Zhang Yunsheng, held the distinct pleasure of sharing this exciting news to his *shouzhang* Lin Biao. Lin Biao as one of China's great marshals, liberators, and one of the original founding fathers of the PRC should naturally find the news stimulating and invigorating as the event is a hallmark of Chinese will, ambition, growth, and technological advancement. But, Lin showed no emotion. As soon as Zhang Yunsheng received word that the Hong-6 was airborne flying toward ground zero, he informed Lin Biao in his room. Lin, who was sitting on his sofa upon Zhang's entrance, received the news with little enthusiasm. Lin only stated "good," waved his hand in the air, and walked out.⁶¹ This episode contradicts what would commonly be expected from the Defense Minister of the PLA and a brilliant military strategist. Unlike other Party members who praised the accomplishment, Lin Biao showed no emotion. Consistent for this analysis is that this is another example of Lin's emotionless persona—a key component of schizoid personality.

In another episode, one November evening in 1966, Maojiawan received a phone call from the Vice Chairman of the General Political Department Liu Zhijian. The phone call was received at about three o'clock in the morning by Secretary Zhang Yunsheng. Liu Zhijian reported that several hundred students were standing outside the Western

⁶⁰ The nuclear monopoly held by the U.S. and the Soviets had been broken earlier by China as the test in June 1967 was not China's first successful detonation of a nuclear device. China held five previous nuclear tests, their first occurring on October 16, 1964. The other tests took place on May 14, 1965, May 9, 1966, October 27, 1966, and December 28, 1966. These tests were nowhere near the destructive power of the hydrogen device detonated on June 17, 1967, as the earlier devices ranged from twenty to five-hundred kilotons. What makes the test on June 17, 1967 such a monument is its power of three megatons and its thermonuclear characteristic. For more on China's development of nuclear weapons see John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

⁶¹ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) pp. 297-299

entrance to the Defense Ministry, demanding that Li Tianyu, the PLA Deputy Chief of Staff, be surrendered to them. The students believed that Li had been following a “bourgeois line.” At this point in the Cultural Revolution tension was close to its highest point, characterized by student Red Guards vehemently denouncing traditional authority figures such as parents, teachers, and government officials. Nearly one hundred students stood outside the compound, shouting “Long Live Chairman Mao” and “Down with Liu Shaoqi.” The incident was filled with such energy that a few students had even jumped over the walls that surrounded the compound. To protect the Defense Ministry, a human wall was made with soldiers inner-locking each others arms preventing a massive stampede by the students into the building. Liu, concerned for the safety of Li Tianyu, demanded to speak to Lin Biao. Zhang could not dare wake the resting Lin Biao, for doing so could risk a bout of sweating for Lin or severely alter Lin’s already delicate sleeping pattern. Zhang stated that the matter could not be reported to Lin until nine o’clock in the morning. Precisely when Lin awoke later that morning, Zhang reported the matter to Lin Biao. Accompanying Lin during the meeting were his wife Ye Qun and son Lin Ligu. Zhang informed Lin of Liu Zhijian’s emergency phone call and of the danger that surrounded Li Tianyu. Lin however, showed little interest or emotion. He simply pointed to Ye and Lin Ligu and quietly stated, “I don’t have any ideas. Let them [Ye Qun and Lin Ligu] handle it.” Ye Qun however, objected immediately. She instructed Lin that instructions should be given and that he should show some sort of emotion toward the matter, if not, the decision may appear as counter-revolutionary and damage the image of Lin Biao and his entire family. Ye suggested that efforts should continue to have the students leave the Western area of the Defense Ministry but that no arrests

should be made. Lin Liguo then added that the students should not be forced to make self-criticisms. Lin Biao agreed to his wife and son's suggestions and they were subsequently carried out.⁶²

What is particularly interesting in this example is that Lin again showed no emotion when learning of Li Tianyu's struggle and also displayed ambivalence toward the event. The effect is that Lin simply "passed the buck" and allowed Ye Qun and Lin Liguo to handle the problem. This is, again, another example of Lin's schizoid personality. Ye showed some concern with Lin's attitude and reacted by suggesting what Lin should do. Ye acted, in this instance, as Lin's political lookout and advisor, a position that she had to take due to Lin's ambivalence caused from his schizoid personality. The degree however to how much Ye actually looked out for Lin's best interest is questionable though. As discussed below, Ye acted for her own self-interest numerous times. But in this instance, Ye and Lin Liguo sat in the political driver's seat as Lin shunned at having to make a decision to the affair. Also of key importance is that Lin Biao appears to contradict the common often cited argument that he was simply a "passive" political tactician during the Cultural Revolution. Lin Biao, Ye Qun, and Lin Liguo were in one place at one time upon hearing the news of Li Tianyu's struggles. When Lin heard the news of the disastrous situation at the Defense Ministry he simply pointed to Ye and Lin Liguo and asked for them to handle it. Ye then suggested solutions to handling the affair. It was *then* that Lin agreed to Ye's propositions. If Lin was a "passive" political tactician and strategist Lin would have rationally thought over, at the very least, Ye's proposals and either suggested alternatives or opted not to take *any*

⁶² Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) pp. 56-59

action. But instead, Lin simply agreed to Ye's first proposals and suggestions, even offering no feedback or substitute solutions. Moreover, Ye's resolution to the problem contained political action that would undoubtedly be known by other Party members as coming from Maojiawan and consequently could possibly risk some political aftershock from the Center. If Lin were a politically adept and interested figure, a more plausible reaction from Lin would have been suggesting a discussion within the family and extending that discussion to other key Party members at the time, particularly the CCRG. But Lin's behavior in this example certainly does not match this description and leads one to favor that Lin was simply uninterested as opposed to someone who might be viewed as purely politically docile.

As Defense Minister and Vice Chairman of the Party during the Cultural Revolution, Lin was thrust into official receptions of visiting foreign dignitaries, forcing Lin into the public spotlight at the close side of the Chairman. Little difference could be seen in Lin's attitude toward foreign guests than those trying to meet with him at Maojiawan. In early 1970, China received two North Vietnamese officials. The delegation came at the beginning of a turning point for Chinese foreign policy. U.S. President Richard Nixon was then expanding the Vietnam War into Cambodia, suggesting an expansion of U.S. military forces in the region and a complete reversal of his doctrine of Vietnamization—favoring limited U.S. involvement and an increase in South Vietnamese forces in the conflict with the North by using U.S. weapons, advising, and financing. President Nixon's policy toward Indochina and particularly the aggression made in Cambodia, made Mao suspect the true intentions of the U.S., forcing Mao to

reconsider the small diplomatic gestures then occurring between the U.S. and China.⁶³ China was also beginning to withdraw and lessen the amount of military and logistical aid given to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Zhou Enlai emphasized in an April 1969 meeting with Hoang Van Thai and Pham Hung that the DRV needs to follow the principle of self-dependence and self-reliance.⁶⁴ It was a time when Beijing felt a push and a pull from all foreign policy directions, one day feeling growing warmth of openness from the U.S., the next day feeling chilly reminders of the Cold War from an expanding Indochina War. It is within this context that two key DRV officials visited China and spoke with Lin Biao. The delegation naturally had an interest to meet one of the heroes of the Chinese Revolution and one of the greatest military minds in modern Chinese history. Given the foreign policy climate and Beijing's interest to move the DRV toward self-reliance, Beijing's guests had curious minds and wanted feedback from the second most powerful man in China. But Lin showed little interest toward his fellow Vietnamese comrades. In fact, Zhang Yunsheng notes that Lin was not enthusiastic (*bu rexin*). Lin's only comments to his foreign guests was "Facing the great strength of America your method must be to endure, enduring is victory" (*mian dui qiang da de Meiguo, nimen de banfa jiu shi ao, ao jiu shi shengli*).⁶⁵

In another example, Lin met with an Albanian delegation in 1970 shortly following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1969. The delegates demanded that

⁶³ The diplomatic efforts by China and the U.S. included China's December 1969 release of two American yachtsmen who had been under China's custody for several months after straying into Chinese waters and President Nixon ceasing the patrols of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits.

⁶⁴ Hoang Van Thai was then Deputy Defense Minister of the DRV and Pham Hung was then Secretary of the Southern Bureau of the Vietnamese Workers Party (VWP). For more on China's relationship with Vietnam during the Vietnam War and the impact of how the Cambodian crisis affected Beijing's perception of the U.S. see Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000) especially Chapter 8.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 329

Lin come and visit them. Zhang informed Lin of their desires. Lin wanted no part, as he claimed his health was poor and wanted to remain at home. But Lin reluctantly went to the Xinjiang room in the Great Hall of the People to receive them. Lin awkwardly accepted the good graces and warm welcoming of the visiting party. A few photos were taken, which Lin shied away from, and the group chatted with Lin for approximately five minutes. Lin then excused himself from the meeting and returned to his residence. Upon returning, Lin told his staff that he really has no desire to receive foreign dignitaries.⁶⁶

Lin's preference for solitude away from social situations and foreign visitors was even observed by the Chairman. On the evening of the May Day celebrations in 1971, Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai sat on the rostrum overlooking Tiananmen Square. Joining them was Prince Sihanouk and Madame Sihanouk of Cambodia. Lin Biao however, was not present. Lin, refused to go to the meeting, citing health reasons. Zhou Enlai attempted to ameliorate the situation by conveying Lin's health problems to the Chairman. Mao, however, dismissed Lin's health deficiencies as he always had and stated, "Lin is always idealistic about his health." Ye Qun, however, cried and begged Lin to depart for Tiananmen, thereby making the required showing as Vice Chairman of the Party. Better late than never, Lin arrived but did not greet the Chairman nor did he stay for an extended length of time. Lin even departed without excusing himself.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 330

⁶⁷ As Teiwes and Sun point out, this incident is an example of the downward spiral for Lin. This event took place shortly following the August-September 1970 Lushan Plenary session, which marked the beginning of the end for Lin. Lin either simply had very little ethos left following his disgrace at Lushan and probably lost all hope for survival or was disgusted by Mao following his downfall at Lushan leading to an utter dismissal of any more potential sycophancy toward the Chairman. See Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 157. While this point holds validity, we must also consider personality and health problems as constant factors affecting Lin's ability as a leader in attending public functions and being in social situations.

Lin also refused to meet with Edgar Snow in May 1970. Snow's visit, remembered mainly by the historic image of him standing next to Mao and Chinese interpreter Ji Chaozhu atop the rostrum at Tiananmen Square during the May Day celebrations, was an indirect diplomatic gesture to the U.S. indicating China's interest in opening the door to the West after nearly twenty years of Western xenophobia. Mao appealed to Lin, asking Lin to join an intimate speaking session between Mao and Snow. Lin denied the offer though. According to several of Lin's assistants, Lin stated that he knew Snow while in Yan'an. Lin's aversion toward attendance were his qualms about being questioned by Snow and consequent distress the meeting would place on his mind, worrying if he answered everything to the Chairman's degree of expectation.⁶⁸

Lin's dislike of meetings due to his social anxiety disorders even extended to his personal meetings with figures typically seen as being close colleagues during the Cultural Revolution. Jiang Qing for instance who Lin, at a meeting with top ranking cadres prior to the Armed Forces Literature and Arts Symposium hailed as "very strong in the politics of literary and artistic work....She has many valuable ideas that you should heed, that you should apply to your thinking and organized life", attacked in one episode.⁶⁹ Such statements are often observed as evidence that revealed Lin's close relationship with Jiang Qing. Zhang Yunsheng however, recalls one evening when reading a series of documents to Ye Qun, hearing Lin Biao screaming down the hallways of Maojiawan, "Ye Qun, get Jiang Qing out of here!" In his memoirs, Zhang states that Lin could be heard jumping up and down, pounding the floor. Ye Qun later told Zhang

⁶⁸ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 210

⁶⁹ Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, *Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 189-190

not to disclose this incident to anybody else.⁷⁰ Despite Lin's apparent frustrations and abhorrence of Jiang Qing, Ye still managed to arrange private meetings at Diaoyutai's Building Number 11, the workplace of Jiang Qing. Zhang Yunsheng recalls that Lin Biao did feel uneasy when Ye met with Jiang Qing. One evening Lin Biao inquired about Ye Qun's whereabouts. Zhang notified Lin that she went to Diaoyutai for business. Lin had an immediate outburst and ordered that Zhang make a phone call to Diaoyutai and request Ye's return. Later that evening, following Ye's return to Maojiawan, she informed the staff in private that, "The *shouzhong* only knows that I am at Diaoyutai, he does not know that I am at Building 11 (Jiang Qing's workplace)! Building 11 is in Diaoyutai, but Diaoyutai is not Building 11!"⁷¹ Not only do we see Lin's objections to Ye's personal side trips to see Jiang Qing, which completely contradicts the normally asserted position that Lin maintained a close amicable relationship with Madame Mao, but it also displays Ye Qun's attempted secret activities that Lin knew very little about, an element which I will explore further below.

In another example, Lin was asked by the Chairman in May 1970 to make another public appearance on the rostrum at Tiananmen and to make a public pronouncement to the country during a rally. The speech was to express Mao's support for the Indochinese

⁷⁰ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) pp. 163-164. It is interesting to note that this incident occurred in February 1967, the time of the February Adverse Current and the promulgation of the Eight Points, a document which aimed to curb radical attacks upon the PLA, which Lin heavily supported. For more details on Lin's role in the February Adverse Current, see chapter 3. It is plausible that Lin could have been disgusted altogether with Jiang's statements, whatever they may have been. A decisive conclusion cannot be made about this incident since the content of the conversation is non-existent, but Jiang's ongoing challenges at the time with PLA veterans during the February Adverse Current as a topic of discussion is not a far-fetched possibility. If this is indeed the case, then Lin's behavior is quite striking as this episode would offer further evidence that Lin was against the excessive radicalism favored by the CCRG. Also, although Lin displayed some degree of emotion in this case which is unlike a schizoid personality, this episode altogether does indeed contradict the typical close-knit image that is normally associated with Lin and Jiang.

⁷¹ Zhang Yunsheng and Zhang Congkun. "Wenge" *qi jian wo gei Lin Biao dang mishu* (The Cultural Revolution Period, I Served as Lin Biao's Secretary), (Xianggang: Xianggang nuer chubanshe, 2004) p. 57

people and his denunciation of the April 1970 American invasion of Cambodia. Lin readily agreed. The rally was to occur on May 20. In order to prepare, as mentioned before, Lin relied on his secretaries to brief him on all foreign and domestic events as well as requesting his ghost writers to create a speech for him to display for his audience. Prior to Lin's public appearance and speech, which was requested by Mao, Lin met with Secretary Zhang Yunsheng. Following Lin's speech at the rally, Lin was to meet with foreign dignitaries and visitors. Lin spoke to Zhang slowly saying, "Today as I will participate in the rally and meeting, I need to be informed." Unlike the typical Lin Biao that Zhang had known, Lin allowed Zhang to sit within six feet of him on his sofa. Lin's departure of customary behavior and rules, according to Zhang, is attributed to his absence from political meetings for several weeks and thus Lin's acknowledgement that he needed to pay close attention the matter which Zhang was addressing. Zhang began to read his report to Lin, detailing recent events in foreign affairs which included U.S. President Richard Nixon's expansion of the Vietnam War into Laos and Cambodia, the current anti-Israel struggle by the Arab countries and the Palestinian people, and the new situation in the Soviet Union. During Zhang's report he happened to glance briefly at Lin. The Vice Chairman sat on the sofa with eyes shut. Zhang let him be, believing that Lin was trying to concentrate and Lin attentively. But after several minutes Zhang peeled his eyes from his report a second time and saw that Lin remained in the same position with eyes shut, completely inattentive to Zhang's report. Vice Chairman Lin Biao had fallen asleep.⁷²

⁷² These details, including Lin's quote, was pulled from Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) pp. 330-332

Lin's naptime could not have come at a worse time and is what makes this little incident so appealing for this discussion. Once again Lin is illustrated as a man who shows little, if any, interest in politics. Moreover, four hours following this episode, Lin made a public appearance at Tiananmen, addressing several hundred thousands who received him. The speech was broadcasted publicly. Zhang Yunsheng did not accompany Lin to Tiananmen but heard his speech from his office in Maojiawan on the radio. The rally began at ten o'clock in the morning. Directly following the playing of "East is Red" (*Dong fang hong*), Lin began his speech stating "In my speech I'm going to talk about Vietnam...two Vietnams...half of a Vietnam." It was clear to Zhang that Lin had forgotten to read from the written text prepared by his ghost writers. Instead, Lin began speaking utter nonsense. Lin also mispronounced "Palestine" (*Balean*) in his speech as "Pakistan" (*Bajisitan*). Ye Qun became enraged when she heard the speech. She blamed Lin's fumbled speech and the errors that occurred on Lin's secretaries and personal assistants by suggesting that they had given him too many sleeping pills. Ye Qun vehemently scolded her staff, "This time I'll forgive you, but if this ever happens again, you'll be punished for consciously carrying out political destruction."⁷³

There is no recorded evidence that Lin took sleeping pills, such as a personal assistant's recollection of giving Lin his required prescription. But evidence exists that does indeed point to Lin having some symptoms of insomnia. Recalling Zhang Yunsheng's first meeting with Lin Biao, Lin asked Zhang if he had any problems sleeping. The glass windows that framed Lin's room, though cloaked with a brown curtain twenty-four hours a day, were also soundproof.⁷⁴ Li Wenpu, one of Lin's key

⁷³ Ibid p. 332

⁷⁴ Ibid p. 167

personal bodyguards, reminded Lin's staff that Lin can never receive a secretary to receive a report late at night since the meeting will affect Lin's ability to fall asleep.⁷⁵ Lin has also been noted to take frequent midnight drives around Beijing in order to help relax and handle his bouts with insomnia.

We cannot completely dismiss Ye Qun's accusations in the former example in regards to Lin's public speech. But what seems even more alarming is Zhang Yunsheng's observation prior to his meeting with Lin in preparation for the May 20 rally at Tiananmen. According to Zhang, prior to any public appearance when Lin would have to "walk on stage", Ye Qun would permit a nurse to give him an injection that would reportedly "lift his spirits right away." Whenever Lin would return home though the impact of the injection would lessen and Lin would become weak again.⁷⁶ There is a dearth of literature that details Lin's alleged use of narcotics. What is important for our analysis is that Lin, again, is documented as being relatively detached from social situations. If narcotics were utilized, its affects of "perking" him up were no doubt needed to remove Lin from his "detached" state caused by his schizoid personality. Otherwise, Lin would not appear as an appropriate public image of Mao's Vice Chairman and "closest comrade in arms". If narcotic usage did take place, which it appears that it did occur, it is obvious that Maojiawan took measures to assist Lin in making required public appearances in a reasonable and optimistic state—one that coincided with the Chairman's wishes. This not only reinforces this study's analysis that Lin suffered from a detached emotional state, but also illustrates the considerable measures taken designed to

⁷⁵ Ibid p. 173

⁷⁶ Ibid p. 330

meet the Chairman's wishes and insure political survival. For our analysis of Lin Biao, the above examples also portray the canyon between Lin's public and private image.

A few brief points should be highlighted for the sake of clarity here. First, many of Lin's personal yeomen witnessed Lin's odd personality and aberrant health problems. They had no idea of why Lin behaved in these puzzling ways, but there is no doubt that Lin's schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder were key components in his behavioral traits. Lin, like precious china, needed to be handled with great care. The delicate balance needed to be maintained at all times and surely added to the stress of all Maojiawan staff members who would suffer the wrath of Lin's political house keeper, Ye Qun. Lin's dread toward attending a social function such as meeting with foreign guests indicates the anxiousness and social pressure that he felt. Although Lin did not display any behaviors that may be seen as typical of an individual suffering from social anxiety disorder in the examples offered when Lin met foreign guests, it is clear that Lin disdained going into public and being in a social situation for any extended length of time. Second, it is also evident that Lin exhibited an indifferent attitude toward politics, both foreign and domestic. Lin showed an emotional detachment toward any developments during the Cultural Revolution. It should not be argued or thought that Lin was completely mute toward Cultural Revolution developments or that he never displayed hardly any emotion, but Lin contrasts heavily with his overall level of interest to politics when compared to either Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong. Unlike the Premier or the Chairman who both toiled and slogged through paperwork deep into the midnight hours, Lin preferred, if he could, to sleep at night and, more importantly for this study, had no real opinion toward every new political development. Lin showed no interest in meeting

foreign delegations either, completely dismissing their presence and, at times, arriving late toward receptions, and necessitating an extra “push” from his secretaries or Ye Qun to make him attend regulatory celebrations for Beijing’s foreign company. Third, throughout this discussion on Lin’s health and personality there is a constantly reappearing character. A figure has intervened in various instances, has taken control of situations, and who has managed the rules, guidelines, of policy. This individual would also either obstruct or allow visitors to meet with Lin Biao completely at her own discretion. That person is none other than Lin’s wife, Ye Qun. It is her personality and the impact she had on Lin’s life to which we now turn.

Ye Qun Ba Guan (Ye Qun Guarding the Pass)

If Lin was the aloof, private, solitary, and effete figure of the family, than Ye Qun was the manager, a crafty strategist and the independent and salient front woman of Maojiawan and the Lin Biao household. In ways, her position as major advisor and head of the Lin Biao office as well as the General Office of the Military Affairs Committee (MAC) since 1960, at Mao’s blessing, dictated that she be in command of the ebb and flow of information in the Lin Biao home. Ye Qun, in her position, could be regarded as Lin’s brain trust, offering advice on everything and would speak freely about various matters. What becomes pertinent for this study is the consequent ability for Ye Qun to take advantage of her special status and manipulate data and facts for her own political needs, or perhaps what she felt would be in the best interest of her family. As seen below, rejiggering documents and comports general information to how she thought it might fit the political puzzle of the time was common. This chapter will now describe Ye’s role in Maojiawan, her managerial behavior both politically and within the family, and the

contrasting behavior and personality that illustrates the great juxtaposition between her and Lin.

Personal Intricacies and Behavior

Unlike the quiet and reserved Lin Biao, who hardly ever dared to venture away from his private little sanctuary, Ye Qun was a vibrant being. She typically would awaken around ten o'clock in the morning. Her personal assistants always prepared her wardrobe, making sure that her clothing was neatly pressed and cleaned. Her aides also abetted by dressing her. Ye would always receive a morning breakfast that was served on a white enamel tray. Ye's morning diet typically was eggs and noodles and was then washed down by green tea.⁷⁷ Like Chairman Mao, Ye was particularly fond of swimming and enjoyed it as an extracurricular activity for cardiovascular health. Ye also had a pool installed at the Lin Biao family vacation home at Beidaihe and at Maojiawan. Despite Lin Biao's detest for water, Ye Qun did not hesitate on the pool's installation inside Maojiawan. The swimming pool that Ye had constructed was state of the art for the 1960s. The pool measured twenty five meters in length, seven meters wide, with a depth that did not exceed two meters. The pools cost a reported 250,000 yuan to build and cost 200 yuan per month in electricity.⁷⁸ Lin Biao, so detached from the world, did not even know about its construction.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 26

⁷⁸ Zhao Ran, *Ye Qun yeshi* (An Informal History of Ye Qun) (Liaoning: Shenyang chubanshe, 1988) p. 118 and Wen Feng, *Shentanxia de Lin Biao* (Lin Biao Down to Earth) (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1993) p. 26 The pool built and installed at the Maojiawan residence was exactly alike with the pool at Beidaihe with the exception that it was only five meters in width. The pools hosted state of the art technology as they

Following Ye's afternoon swim her day would be finished with dinner and a movie. Like lunch, Ye dined on vegetable and beef dishes. According to Ye's personal assistants, Ye finished her evening with a movie, some of which were imports that were obtained in secret.⁸⁰ Ye also, unlike Lin, would wake at night and not be bothered by the interruption in sleep. Ye would typically take advantage of the situation and make late midnight snacks such as eggs at one or two o'clock in the morning.⁸¹

Vanity was a major issue in Ye's daily lifestyle. As already mentioned she enjoyed swimming for its benefits to cardiovascular health. But she also experimented with diet pills that were imported into China. The pills were taken daily and were supposed to curb excess weight gain.⁸² Ye would also receive massages from her staff. Ye requested that one assistant massage her temples at night prior to falling asleep. According to one source, Ye's temple massage lasted usually for twenty minutes before she would drift off and become comatose.⁸³ Thus, quite a contradiction exists when comparing both Lin Biao and Ye Qun. Lin Biao was the reserved and quiet type; Ye Qun was an outgoing and physically active ball of energy who enjoyed her waking moments and took advantage of the Party perks that came with being married to such a high-ranking figure.

Ye Qun the Intellectual

contained automatic filtration and circulation systems, and heating systems. The pool's temperature was behaved to hover at a temperature of thirty-one degrees Celsius, roughly eighty-seven degrees Fahrenheit.

⁷⁹ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 219

⁸⁰ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 27 Ye reportedly enjoyed films that featured gratuitous violence and fighting, filling a void for excitement that does not exist while married to a solitaire, sickly, CCP parvenu like Lin Biao.⁸⁰

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Zhao Ran, *Ye Qun yeshi* (An Informal History of Ye Qun) (Liaoning: Shenyang chubanshe, 1988) p. 118 Ye also had an electric toothbrush that she used everyday as well as an electric massage machine.

⁸³ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 28

Aside from swimming, eating, and receiving massages, Ye Qun also held an enthusiastic attitude toward education, particularly history, philosophy, and even literature. Guan Weixun, a well known officer within PLAAF circles, was recommended by PLAAF Commander Wu Faxian's wife Chen Suizhe. Chen endorsed Guan to become a Maojiawan staff member for his talents in reading, writing, and outstanding knowledge of history. Guan was a staff member in Maojiawan from 1968 to 1970.

Prior to Guan's arrival, Maojiawan was devoid of literature. But soon after Guan arrived, Maojiawan became filled with literary works that were confiscated from military libraries in Beijing. Guan would give frequent lectures to Ye Qun. Topics would range from history of the ancient Greeks and the pharos of Egypt. Ye was especially stimulated by Egypt's first female pharaoh, Cleopatra. Ye Qun reportedly took great interest in these meetings, constantly scribbling down notes.⁸⁴ Ye's interest in Guan was so deep she ordered the Maojiawan staff not to contact her while she received her history lessons from Guan. If a phone call came in, unless it were Jiang Qing or Chairman Mao, Ye Qun ordered the staff to handle the call and to notify the caller that she would contact them later. Ye also became enthralled by the palace-type intrigue in Shakespeare's masterpieces such as *Hamlet* and *Romeo and Juliet*. Ye also enjoyed Homer's *The Odyssey*.⁸⁵

Ye also found a great interest in Chinese cultural relics. In the midst of the Cultural Revolution and the destruction of the 'four olds' Ye seized many relics including

⁸⁴ Ibid pp. 51-53

⁸⁵ Ibid p. 98

paintings and hid them inside the Maojiawan residence. The relics and paintings were all safely hidden from eyesight and Lin Biao was unaware of their presence in the home.⁸⁶

Ye Qun's Sexuality

Electric toothbrushes, swimming pools, and massages aside, Ye Qun also enjoyed wearing lingerie and viewing pornographic videos and magazines which were imported and secretly obtained by private sources.⁸⁷ Ye Qun's attention to her appearance and to vanity reflects a sense that she, unlike Lin Biao, took advantage of the perks that come with entering elite level politics. Ye's diva-like attitude was nothing new for her character. While in Yan'an she was known as one of the "eight Yan'an beauties" for her incredible appearance and keen political acumen, a unique package indeed considering the rough, rural, and ragged lifestyle that was omnipresent during the Yan'an period. One evening while receiving a massage from her personal assistant Tang Jie, Ye began to aggrandize her personal looks, buttressing her great beauty by emphasizing the soft, fine, white skin that she possessed.

In perhaps one of the most strangest and intimate of all incidents in Maojiawan, Ye Qun personally made private maneuvers in order to achieve intimate moments with Chief of the General Staffs Department Huang Yongsheng. On February 10, 1970 a letter reportedly arrived at Maojiawan. The letter was addressed to Ye Qun but no statement appeared on it that omitted other secretaries opening, reviewing, and reporting it. The letter was from Huang Yongsheng's wife, Ding Huilao, who shared her concern and suspicions of Huang Yongsheng having an affair with a maid servant working at the Headquarters Office of the Chief of Staffs Department. Ding requested Ye's assistance in

⁸⁶ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenzue chubanshe, 1993) p. 219

⁸⁷ Ibid p. 28

the matter, hoping that Ye would speak to Lin Biao about the issue and then resolve it. Ye, upon receiving news of Ding's suspicions, telephoned Huang Yongsheng's residence and spoke with Ding. Ye reported that Lin, other than expressing his usual superficial attitude, felt that what is important is whether or not Huang is holding high the banner of Mao Zedong thought. To Ding's relief however, Ye Qun stated that she would investigate into Ding's concerns.⁸⁸

Several days later, Huang arrived at Maojiawan for a meeting with Ye Qun. Ye met with Huang in her bedroom. Wang Landuo, a personal assistant to Ye Qun, was in Ye's bathroom which was adjoined to Ye's bedroom. Ye's bathroom was layered with ceramic tile and contained a sofa, massage tables, and a one-way glass specially imported from Japan enabling the bathroom occupant to peek into Ye's bedroom but eliminating any possibility of somebody to see inside of the bathroom. According to Wang's recollections, Ye Qun and Huang Yongsheng met in Ye's bedroom and discussed the rumors and suspicions about Huang's illicit affair. Huang performed a self-criticism in front of Ye, calling himself and his family a great misfortune. Ye reassured him however, demonstrating forgiveness, showing her maternal instincts as she told him that everything would be fine. Huang then disclosed his wish of a successful family lifestyle like that of the Lin Biao family. Ye vetoed Huang's statement and exposed her emotions of sadness and frustration, stating that Huang's perception was incorrect, that the Lin Biao family was filled with problems. Ye uncovered her true feelings of "once being as pretty as a spring flower" but now feeling old. Huang reassured her, grasping her hands, stating that she "does not look too old, does not look too young, but is the same old alluring person."

⁸⁸ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 216

Ye concluded the meeting by suggesting that Huang and Ding come to Maojiawan for a friendly lunch in the future. Huang happily agreed.⁸⁹

Nearly five months later, on June 21, 1970, Huang and Ding came to Maojiawan for the lunch that was mentioned in the privacy of Ye Qun's bedroom. Ye ordered that eight different dishes were to be prepared, four hot and four cold. Fish was also to be included on the menu. Ye also instructed her staff to prepare her best clothing and to also spray a small hint of perfume onto her white silk underwear. Phone messages and phone calls were also to be eliminated during the lunch date and after, as Ye stated that she needed to speak with Huang following the meal. No visitors were allowed to come to Maojiawan during or after the meal either. The three dined for two hours, after which Ye excused herself to the main secretaries' office and reported that she must lay down in her chambers since she felt she had drunk a bit too much. Ye's personal assistants informed Ding and Huang about the reasons for Ye's sudden departure. Ding responded by expressing the warmest wishes for Ye Qun and that she did not wish to stay any longer since she understood the level of work that Ye still needed to complete. Huang however, did not accompany his wife since he was directed to meet with Ye shortly to discuss a few important matters.⁹⁰

Nearly two hours following Huang's summons to Ye's bedroom, he reemerged with beads of sweat framing his face, his military cap off, and his hair in a jumbled mess. According to Ye's personal assistant, Xiao Shi, who was inside Ye's adjoining bathroom during Huang and Ye's two hour meeting, Ye slinked from behind a dressing screen scantily clad in lingerie. Ye became emotionally unstable; weeping and sharing with

⁸⁹ The information in the above paragraph has been drawn from Ibid. pp. 216-220

⁹⁰ Ibid. pp. 224-225

Huang that the public understanding of the Lin Biao family does not represent the murky reality. Ye imparted to Huang that there was a complete dearth of intimacy in her marriage to Lin Biao, as she stated to Huang, “Who is my sympathizer, who understands me, who is my intimate person?” (*shei tongqing wo, shei lijie wo, shei shi wode zhixin ren*) Huang reportedly embraced Ye, holding her in his arms and returned similar emotions, stating that he always admired Ye and had always cherished her. The two disrobed, and Xiao Shi witnessed Ye and Huang in *filgrante dilecto*.⁹¹ This colorful example may seem like gossip but for this analysis it is a telling incident. Ye’s statement to Huang indicates some degree of emotional disturbance. Clearly, Lin’s coldness affected Ye emotionally. We cannot exonerate Ye’s promiscuity as she has been rumored as being a sexually vibrant being, but when factoring Lin’s preference for isolation from everyone, including his family, then there is little doubt that Lin’s schizoid personality affected his marriage to Ye. For this study, it is particularly revealing as the DSM IV specifically cites lack of sexual desire or intimacy as a primary symptom of schizoid personality disorder.⁹² Moreover, when we consider that Lin Biao was socially

⁹¹ Ibid pp. 226-229. The actual sexual encounter is noted as ending on June 21, 1970 at approximately 3:30pm.

⁹² Ye’s recorded sexuality between her and Huang did not terminate here however. One evening Ye Qun requested that her personal assistant tidy up her bedroom while she take a bath and relax in private. Ye Qun took a phone call while lounging in her bathtub. The door between the bathroom and Ye’s bedroom reportedly remained ajar, enabling Ye’s assistant to overhear a bits of dialogue here and there from Ye Qun. The individual that Ye was supposedly speaking to was Huang Yongsheng. Ye Qun asked questions such as “Do you know what I am doing right now, I am taking a bath” and “I want to relive that intoxicating moment with you.” Ye Qun also discussed a supposed male drug sexual performance enhancer that she had smuggled secretly from Hong Kong by fellow Party members. Ye requested that Huang take the pill and to keep a record of its effectiveness. Huang and Ye’s affair continued outside of Maojiawan as well. One evening, around eight o’clock, Ye had her car prepared and asked that she be taken for an evening drive. Ye’s personal assistants accompanied her and rode along, not knowing the location or why the request was made. The chauffeur took the car through the streets of Beijing, winding through back alleys and taking side streets. Ye’s assistants noted that a car followed closely. Ye never indicated who was following them. Ye’s car arrived and came to a halt at Xishan, on the outskirts of Beijing in a rural field. Exiting the pursuing car was Huang Yongsheng. Huang escorted Ye into the field, approximately one thousand paces away from the cars. Huang took a lantern and a wool blanket with him. Nearly three hours later, Huang and Ye emerged. Shortly following this escapade, Ye Qun discovered that she was five days

disconnected with his staff and preferred being alone, this behavior could have extended into his relationship with Ye Qun. Ye's alleged affair with Huang, if it did indeed occur, illustrates a manifestation of feelings and emotion on Ye's part, feelings that point toward a need for intimacy and a feeling of needing to be desired. These feelings could be interpreted as partially stemming from Lin's relative absence from Ye's life as a husband due to his schizoid personality.

Though Ye's ordeal may seem like tantalizing gossip that parallels the dirtiest of Western tabloids and smut rags, the incident gives us some insight into both the character of Ye Qun and indirectly exposes the character of Lin Biao. On the surface, Ye's private love affair is an obvious example of her independence and free will. She did not feel that her behavior should be constrained by the powerful position that she was placed in by being Lin's wife. She was not only a vibrant risk-taker, but also devious and furtive. The political ramifications of such an affair during the Cultural Revolution would not only be devastating to her, but to the entire Lin Biao family, as the Chinese consider the family a single, solitary unit. In relation to understanding Lin Biao however, we should mention briefly his own relationship with Ye and how the two perceived each other. Lin Biao, according to the sources that are available, did have strong emotional feelings for Ye. During Lin's post in the Northeastern region prior to the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War, Lin would make sure that Ye, then pregnant and confined to an antiquated hospital,

late for her normal, monthly visitor that all females must graciously encounter. A physician was phoned and asked to come to Maojiawan for an examination of Ye's physical state. Ye's vitals were taken and a test was later run at a hospital. To Ye's delight she was not pregnant. Ye emphasized the importance of keeping her health examination a secret. For more on these escapades see Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) pp. 235-240, 283

would receive bowls of chicken soup on rainy nights. Lin also expressed his love for Ye in a poem he wrote one evening in Maojiawan that stated:

To My Endearing Wife:
 My blood is as warm as yours
 Though the color of our hair is not the same,
 Our bodies will be buried in the same tomb
 Though we were not born in the same place
 Lin Biao⁹³

Lin also enclosed a note with the poem indicating his desire to have his ashes with Ye Qun upon their deaths. These issues aside however, Lin also had moments when he scolded Ye Qun and physically attempted to harm her, such as when he attempted to push her out of a moving car, an event that Mao later laughed about after her appeal to him.⁹⁴ Lin also loathed having conversations with Ye. So annoyed and vexed by her long winded and detailed discussions Ye would have with Lin, he took some initiative and ordered his secretaries to write a message on a scroll to hang on the wall which stated “In work, do not exceed your authority; in speaking do not be long winded and wordy [*zuoshi mo yuequan, shuohua mo luosuo*].”⁹⁵ Ye however, differed in her opinion of Lin Biao. Most of Ye’s behavior seemed highly superficial toward Lin. It constantly seems, at least from a secretary’s perspective, that the atmosphere which Ye brought to her encounters with Lin seemed to be all about “business.” In Zhang Yunsheng’s memoirs for instance, Ye, instead of referring to Lin by his name, referred to him constantly as either *shouzhang* (leader) or 101. Ye remarked once that “There is little difference between me

⁹³ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 238

⁹⁴ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 222

⁹⁵ Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil), (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) p. 375

and the palace maids of ancient times.”⁹⁶ Aside from Mao’s unremitting snide remarks about Lin’s health, Ye also held the dubious distinction of being a critic of her husband’s aforementioned medical problems, as she noted in a diary in 1961 while staying in Fuzhou, calling Lin “a living corpse.”⁹⁷ These remarks certainly hold an acerbic tone to them. There can be little doubt that Lin’s continuous medical battles made him a perennial vexation for Ye Qun. Not only did Ye need to manage Lin’s office, her private life with Lin most likely held little actual romance or intimacy. Not only was there a considerable age gap of about fifteen years, Lin was, as mentioned before, struggling with a personality that was detached socially. Furthermore, as noted in the DSM IV, schizoid personalities do not have a sex drive. While Lin’s age may be the sole reason for his lack of intimate physical contact with Ye as she asserted to Huang, we must also consider the other numerous instances when Lin displayed no interest in social functions, close interaction, long-winded conversations, and overall emotional detachment.

Managing the Family

From what we have discussed thus far, personal observations tell us that Ye Qun was a vibrant and busy figure. Whether her interests spread into scholastic literature or focused on maintaining her personal beauty, Ye was not the secluded, shy personality like her husband. Her busybody nature even continued into the realm of managing the family, such as finding a spouse for her and Lin’s son, Lin Ligu. In a rather bizarre series of events, Ye personally orchestrated Maojiawan staff members, including Zhang Yunsheng, to find a wife for Lin Ligu. When two potential wives were found they were

⁹⁶ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 214

⁹⁷ Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil), (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) p. 376

invited to Maojiawan where Ye Qun personally interviewed them. Ye asked for the ladies to recite a quotation from “Quotations from Chairman Mao” which they did successfully in a low trembling voice. Lin Biao, as usual, showed no emotion to either lady or to the situation in general. He simply looked on. He did not move, he did not say anything.⁹⁸ This little episode is not only another illustration of Lin’s ambivalence but also gives offers an example of Ye’s position as a key coordinator of the Lin Biao family.⁹⁹ Lin Biao showed no emotion and no interest, a typical characteristic of schizoid personality. Ye Qun though, as the conductor of the Lin Biao family, took keen interest in the event and continued her search for Lin Liguó’s spouse.

Like her son Lin Liguó, Ye Qun also took an interest in finding a future husband for her daughter, Lin Liheng (Lin Doudou). Unlike the collaboration and agreement between Ye and Lin Liguó in finding a spouse, Lin Doudou had no interest in getting married, much less having her future spouse chosen with the help of Ye Qun. Both Ye Qun and Lin Doudou had a dysfunctional and extremely abnormal relationship. Ye constantly demanded that Doudou follow Ye’s every word without question. Doudou was a very stubborn female. When Ye ordered Doudou to perform a task or even asked her a simple question, Doudou would ignore Ye, and either not follow through on Ye’s request

⁹⁸ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) pp. 334-347

⁹⁹ In an even more provocative incident, Yao Ming-le records that Lin Liguó had a special room in the residence of a “former capitalist” that contained one way mirrors which allowed Lin to sit and view a prospective spouses in the nude. The women had no problems being nude since they were told by Lin’s pals that a secretary’s position in a special military organ had become available and a physical examination was part of the application process. Although very little validity can be seen in Yao’s work and the fact that we cannot confirm his work as authentic due to its largely undocumented sources, what should be observed is that Yao takes note of Lin Liguó’s “beauty contest.” What makes this so interesting is that no source, either Western or Chinese, existed at the time of Yao’s publication which took note of Lin Liguó’s search for a wife. Yao’s account, at least in this incident, does supplement other more authentic sources such as Zhang Yunsheng’s account. For Yao’s narration of Lin Liguó’s private showing of a bevy of beauties, see Yao Ming-le, *The Conspiracy and Death of Lin Biao: How Mao’s Chosen Successor Plotted and Failed* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf: 1983) pp.-28-29

or by refusing to give an answer. This behavior would enrage Ye. Guan Weixun reports that Ye would virulently scold and scream at Doudou for her obstinate attitude that would sometimes lead to violent beatings.¹⁰⁰

In perhaps one of the saddest and disturbing incidents in CCP elite political life, Ye Qun attempted to find a husband for Doudou, which led to one of two of Doudou's suicide attempts. Ye felt that Doudou was getting far too old to be single any longer. Ye was puzzled that Doudou had not found a spouse, as she stated "It's about time that Doudou got married. She is already twenty-three. How can she bear the loneliness? I fell in love even before the age of twenty. I couldn't have waited three more years myself!"¹⁰¹ Ye dispatched the Maojiawan staff to different areas of the country in search of the perfect spouse for Doudou. When Doudou met her potential match for the first time, the results were not good. Reportedly, Doudou knew that Ye was up to her old tricks, trying to play matchmaker for Doudou. Doudou supposedly confronted the young man and asked him questions such as "who sent you" and "who told you to say these things?" Ye Qun reportedly became enraged after hearing the news. In vitriolic fashion Ye screamed at Guo who was reporting on behalf of Secretary Wang, Ye also called Doudou's prospective spouse a bastard (*wandan*).¹⁰²

Not long after this affair, Doudou became angered, upset and emotionally overwhelmed with her mother's constant control. Shortly following an intense argument between the two, which reportedly involved Ye pummeling Doudou until her head began

¹⁰⁰ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 168

¹⁰¹ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 279

¹⁰² Ibid pp. 282-288

to bleed, Doudou locked herself in her private room in Maojiawan.¹⁰³ Doudou did not reemerge from her room for three days, not even for food. Ye stood by Doudou's door periodically, pounding on it and demanding that Doudou unlock it. After three days of Doudou's self-entrapment, the lock on the door was broken and Ye and a few Maojiawan staff members found Doudou passed out with her mouth open, framed by white foam. Doudou had overdosed on sleeping pills. Ye panicked but quickly took Doudou to the local hospital. Fortunately doctors were able to revive her. According to Zhang Yunsheng, Doudou had taken twenty sleeping pills.¹⁰⁴ Ye ordered the Maojiawan staff not to report the incident nor say anything to anybody about what occurred. She also instructed all staff members not to report the incident to Lin Biao.¹⁰⁵ Ye's demonstrative and controlling behavior in this instance suggests again the primary role that Ye played in the Lin Biao family. Unlike Lin, Ye Qun was an omnipresent force who always felt a need to know every tidbit of information and personal matter occurring inside the family. Lin's schizoid personality and social anxiety disorders, no doubt played a prominent role in enabling Ye Qun to manage the family in such a way as he was largely absent from the family and from being a father figure in the traditional sense.

¹⁰³ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 168

¹⁰⁴ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 273

¹⁰⁵ It was ordered that if Lin should happen to inquire about Doudou's whereabouts, Ye commanded that all staff members simply state that she is too busy or preoccupied to see anybody. If suspicions intensified for Lin, Ye would proclaim that Doudou had contracted pneumonia and that she could not see Lin for fear that he might contract an infection. If Doudou should request to meet with Lin, Ye would obstruct the encounter stating that Lin wished not to meet with anybody at the time. No precise figures are available indicating how long the separation between Lin Biao and Lin Doudou lasted following Doudou's suicide attempt. Given Lin's already established dislike for visitors though, the separation must have been of considerable duration. When Lin and Doudou finally did get to see one another, Ye was present and regulated what would be discussed. Ye constantly interrupted, answered questions for Doudou, and quickly altered the ongoing colloquy between Lin and Doudou if she felt the conversation was straying into sensitive topics such as Ye Qun's controlling behavior over Doudou. See Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 169

There are questions that still exist in this little episode of elite political life that are left unanswered. No evidence exists that can confirm why Doudou would not simply run to Lin Biao and tell him of her continuing troubles with her mother. One assertion though is that Doudou had no realistic opportunity of meeting with Lin Biao since he preferred being withdrawn from others. If any meeting would occur it was overseen and controlled by Ye Qun. Another contention could be made, though closely related to the former, that Lin's indifference and ambivalence toward nearly everything that came his way, either political or personal, would discourage any meaningful attempt by Doudou to maliciously report to her father about her mother's contentious actions. Another point that needs consideration is the concept of the family unit in Chinese culture. Filial piety, though hardly exhibited in Doudou's conflicts with her overbearing mother, could possibly have weighed heavily on Doudou's conscience and thus deterred her from sharing her dilemma with Lin. Doudou's overall respect for her father, the key figurehead in the Chinese family, might also have an affect on her decision not to share her problems with Lin. Taking into consideration Lin's overbearing personal problems that he dealt with daily, Doudou's abstention makes further sense as she most likely, out of respect to her father, wished not to disturb or upset him.

One conclusion drawn from the above instances is that Ye Qun acted independently. Ye pulled the strings and held the reigns during important familial affairs and would occlude the dissemination of information to Lin Biao. Lin held little, if any, actual interest in the "beauty contests" that Doudou managed for their son and daughter. Furthermore, Ye's interest in finding a spouse for Lin Ligu and Lin Doudou represents her interests of extending the Lin Biao family into the future. Like any powerful family,

its continued success and survival hinges on the capability of the next generation to carry out and perform necessary tasks for survival and eventually superseding the older generation. Ye Qun, potentially foreseeing a powerful family dynasty, controlled the search for a spouse for her two children. Moreover, Ye's choice for the appropriate spouses is for political reasons. Ye could not afford to have a mate for her children who were from heinous class backgrounds or appeared as a weak representative for the Lin Biao family, nor could she afford anybody that would potentially rebel against the family. Two elements seen in this chapter will extend into the next: Ye's active, independent decision-making with very little participation or input from Lin Biao; and Ye's personal coordination and filtering, altering, and obstruction of information. Like Doudou's suicide attempt, Ye restricted what she wished Lin to know and what she wished he didn't know. In the instances below however, Ye's blockage involved politically sensitive materials and decisions.

Controlling the Flow and Managing Affairs

Ye Qun's unique position as major advisor to the Lin Biao office places her into a special position. Ye personally commanded what documents and information would be received by Lin Biao during her own private encounters or in the duration of a brief thirty minute meeting from Lin Biao's secretaries. Ye chose courses of action that she felt would suit her family the best, insuring its survival or enhancing its prestige.

Ye's obstruction and control of information can be seen in several episodes that occurred throughout the Cultural Revolution period. In one instance, Lin Biao agreed to travel to Nanchang where he was to meet with Jiangxi provincial governor Cheng Shiqing. Ye strongly disapproved of Lin's meeting with Cheng, fearing what potentially

digressive political influences the meeting may have on Lin Biao. While flying to Nanchang to meet with Cheng, Lin fell asleep. While Lin dozed off, Ye ordered the plane to continue onward, completely bypassing Nanchang and skipping ahead to the next destination on Lin's tour. When Lin finally awoke, Ye reported to Lin that they had already passed Nanchang. There is no objection noted on Lin's part to missing the meeting with Cheng Shiqing. Taking into account Lin's previously documented disgust with social situations, an absence of objection on Lin's part is not surprising.¹⁰⁶

Forgery also became a common trend inside Maojiawan. Ye, after receiving a document from the Chairman in 1967 related to Jiang Qing's Proletariat status, phoned Li Genqing, Maojiawan's forgery expert, and demanded that he come to visit. Ye Qun, when asked why Lin Biao could not comment on the document, replied, "The *shouzhang* [Lin Biao] needs to rest. We cannot go and disturb him with this matter right now."¹⁰⁷ Li Genqing soon thereafter arrived and began to make multiple attempts at matching Lin's handwriting. Ye ordered that Li write "Salute Jiang Qing's Proletariat Knowledge." Lin's secretaries closely observed Li's forgeries and commented that the writing appeared to be too small to be Lin Biao's penmanship. Ye was hardly as picky as Lin's secretaries though, and ordered that twenty copies be made.¹⁰⁸ In another manipulative instance, Ye Qun would utilize Lin's sensitivity to temperature to her advantage. At times, Ye Qun would want to leave Maojiawan without informing Lin of her whereabouts or reason for departure. Ye, according to Lin's secretaries, would alter the temperature inside Maojiawan, consequently vexing Lin's health and preventing any potential chance of him

¹⁰⁶ Wen Feng, *Shentanxia de Lin Biao* (Lin Biao Down to Earth) (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1993) p. 229

¹⁰⁷ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 172

¹⁰⁸ Ibid pp. 172-175

roaming the residence in search for her. Ye also created a small, hidden exit inside her resting room, enabling her to dispatch from the residence without being heard through Maojiawan's hallways.¹⁰⁹ If Lin did happen to inquire about Ye's whereabouts, the Lin Biao staff was instructed simply to state that she was sleeping.

In one of the most colorful incidents illustrative of Ye's obfuscation of information during the Cultural Revolution is directly following the Ninth Party Congress. This incident not only illuminates Ye's manipulative behavior, but shows that Ye was perfectly willing to act against Lin's wishes. Before the Ninth Party Congress Mao commented that Jiang Qing should not be a Politburo member, which would consequently eliminate any chance of Ye's candidacy on the Politburo due to Jiang's higher status within the Party hierarchy. Moreover, such a decision would cause Lin to deny any support for Ye's Politburo membership. Ye could not tolerate the thought of not being promoted to the Politburo. As one of her secretaries recalls, Ye felt that the opportunity had arrived and it could not be dismissed since the chance would not return.¹¹⁰ A three man group consisting of Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Huang Yongsheng had been appointed by Mao to assemble a list of candidates for membership. The three men did not believe that Mao would be so bold as to block his own wife, a powerful, key Central Cultural Revolutionary Group (CCRG) member, from Politburo status. Thus, the three men included Jiang Qing in their list. Mao was agreeable to the decision when informed, but sent the men to see Lin Biao to confirm and finalize the ruling. On the evening that the three men visited Maojiawan to speak to Lin however, Ye

¹⁰⁹ Wen Feng, *Shentanxia de Lin Biao* (Lin Biao Down to Earth) (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1993) pp. 54-56

¹¹⁰ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 220

Qun stated that Lin was ill and could not be seen by anybody, thus bypassing any potential risk that Lin might possibly object to Jiang's nomination to become a Politburo member. As Guan Weixun notes, this incident made many of the secretaries in Maojiawan conclude that it was easy for Ye to conspire and act behind the scenes without Lin's knowledge.¹¹¹ It has also been noted in another source that Ye spoke to Lin Liguo and uttered her concerns for the future of the Lin Biao family by suggesting that Lin's health is only worsening and the continued and future success of the family lays in Ye's attainment of high-ranking Party status.¹¹²

Maintaining Close Relations with Jiang Qing

Critical for this analysis is the role that Jiang Qing played in Ye Qun's life and their relationship. As Ye Qun was the key pragmatist for the Lin Biao family, Ye sought to build a firm relationship with Jiang Qing. Doing so would aid in the political survival of the Lin Biao family. As a leading member of the Central Cultural Revolutionary Group and Mao's wife, Jiang Qing held high esteem within the Party. Jiang, often viewed as a close collaborator with Lin Biao in the purge and removal of Party members during the Cultural Revolution, is quite the contrary to what existing evidence now illustrates. As with other venues seen thus far—family politics and political participation in certain major events—maintaining a close relationship with Jiang Qing and Diaoyutai fell on the shoulders of Ye Qun. The level of participation, admiration, and pleasure that Ye took toward her relationship with Jiang Qing illustrates a keen interest in potential power and influence that could be gained by maintaining good *guanxi* with Jiang. There is also little doubt that Jiang and Ye took advantage of the crass violence of the Cultural Revolution

¹¹¹ Ibid p. 168

¹¹² Zhao Ran, *Ye Qun yeshi* (An Informal History of Ye Qun) (Liaoning: Shenyang chubanshe, 1988) p. 45

for their own political machinations and the elimination of potential rivals as we will see in the following chapter. As Jiang told Ye, “Now it is chaotic, you go and capture enemies for me, I will go and capture any enemies for you.”¹¹³

Ye Qun held a high level of respect for Jiang. Like the careful rules of following the Chairman, Ye did not wish to disrespect or “show up” Ye in public meetings. As Ye Qun stated, if Jiang Qing, “goes there, I will go there. If she does not go there, I will not go there.” On the eve of National Day in 1967, Ye waited at Beijing airport for a visiting Albanian delegation to arrive. Jiang Qing however was not present and consequently was not able to receive the incoming guests. Instead of greeting the delegation upon their arrival, Ye chose to leave before their entrance, fearing that her presence would upstage Jiang politically.¹¹⁴

Ye also did not shy away from helping Jiang with matters that were politically sensitive concerning Jiang’s past as doing so only enhanced the level of trust between the two. In the summer of 1966, Jiang Qing became worried about her past from Shanghai artistic circles in the 1930s. Both Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao chose to closely collaborate with Ye Qun in obtaining past evidence that could be used to implicate Jiang and tarnish her political image as a “pure” revolutionary. Ye Qun was requested by Jiang to obtain the evidence and upon hearing of the opportunity Ye jumped at the chance and ordered Wu Faxian to stage a “household confiscation” of the evidence, which consisted of diaries and letters, in Shanghai. Ye and Wu orchestrated a staged seizure of the home of Wang Jiangxian by Red Guards under the command of Jiang Tengjiao. The seizure

¹¹³ Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil), (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) p. 383

¹¹⁴ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) pp. 171-172

was successful and, according to Zhang Yunsheng, the evidence found was returned to Beijing where it was then placed in a secure area in an Air Force office that contained top secret information. A month later, both Ye Qun and Xie Fuzhi reportedly burned the documents at Jiang Qing's request.¹¹⁵

As witnessed above, Lin's relations with Jiang within the private realm were less than cordial. Ye however, capitalized on Lin's absence, by both currying favor and respecting Jiang, Ye tried to maintain a bridge between Maojiawan and Diaoyutai. Although a certain degree of Ye's motive can be seen as the need to insure political survival, especially considering Jiang's powerful political position within the Cultural Revolution Group, it should also be noted that both Ye and Jiang viewed their relationship as mutual and symbiotic, complementing each other and enhancing their status insuring their survival within the Party. As illustrated in the following chapter, Ye and Jiang's elaborate scheming extended to Party purges and influencing political trends during the Cultural Revolution. However, what must also be considered is to what degree Ye was acting as to follow current political trends occurring in the country.

Unmasking the Private

This chapter will now briefly review and conclude with the findings uncovered. A review of the basic characteristics that make up schizoid personality disorder is necessary. As described in the DSM IV, when considering Lin Biao, schizoid personality disorder is shown in Lin as:

- Lin Biao rarely shows any desires nor does he seem to enjoy close relationships, including being an intimate member of the family

¹¹⁵ Ibid pp. 159-163

- Lin Biao almost always chooses to be in solitude and prefers performing solitary activities
 - Lin shows little, if any, amount of intimacy and interest in of being intimate with Ye Qun
 - Lin takes pleasure in few, if any, activities
 - Lin Biao, with a couple of notable exceptions, lacks close friends or confidants
 - Lin Biao appears indifferent to the praise or criticism of others
 - Lin Biao shows emotional coldness, detachment, or flattened affectivity.
- Lin rarely shows or illustrates any feeling toward political matters and matters of the family. Communication thus is virtually non-existent.

Several observations will now be made to conclude this chapter. First, an extremely private and introverted Lin Biao caused by his schizoid personality and social anxiety disorder has been illustrated. This image of Lin Biao as seen by his secretaries and personal assistants is hardly the picture normally associated with him: a man brimming with political energies, completely intoxicated by his growing political status and the unstable political and economic affects of the Cultural Revolution. In this analysis though, Lin is aloof and has no desire to have any sort of intense physical or emotional intimacy with anyone. Instead, Lin preferred living in the quiet solitude of his bedroom, locked away from others, his room cloaked with drawn curtains keeping in rays of sunshine from entering his room. On the rare occasions when visitors were allowed to see Lin, the meetings did not last long. Lin's secretaries, who gave political reports on

current trends, were confined to small thirty minute time periods—hardly enough time to grasp the current trends in Party politics.

Second, Lin's attitude toward politics can be characterized as ambiguous, indifferent, and carefree—a facet of schizoid personality disorder. For example, Lin, when hearing some of China's greatest accomplishments such as the successful detonation of China's first hydrogen bomb in June 1967, responded to this news with hardly any emotion. Any news that Lin heard from his secretaries was usually scoffed, completely ignored, or Lin became so disinterested that he fell asleep. While some may label this behavior as being politically passive, the evidence that reviewed has indicated in several instances that Lin was *not* passive but carefree and seemingly clueless. As we should recall, upon hearing of Li Tianyu's problems at the Defense Ministry, Lin's only response was, "I have no ideas," and then allowed Ye Qun to decide and make a solution. Ye's answer involved political action. If Lin wanted to fly low on the political radar screen he should, at the very least, have offered other alternatives to his most private and trusted folk. But Lin simply agreed with Ye and showed no displeasure or grievances toward her suggestion and expressed little concern over any potential consequences. Indeed, often Lin seemed more clueless than a political strategist who preferred laying low as part of an overall strategy for survival.

Third, while Lin was nearly devoid of the lives and political drama of his family and of the Cultural Revolution, Ye Qun became the master commander, catalyst for change, and political housekeeper within Maojiawan. The jarring contradiction between the two can be highlighted by Lin's private, reclusive behavior and Ye's outgoing, social, and domineering actions. From the perspective of her personal assistants, Ye seemed to

enjoy the “court” like lifestyle that accompanied her powerful position in the Party. Ye’s daily affairs such as swimming in her own personal pool, having a private poetry and history tutor, and full body and temple massages are all illustrations of the commodities Ye, unlike her husband Lin Biao, took advantage of being near the top of the CCP plateau. Lin’s dysfunctional personality and daily struggles with social anxiety disorder also had an enabling affect on Ye Qun, as she could make decisions for Lin.

Fourth, Lin’s social and emotional detachment crossed over family boundaries, affecting the level of intimacy between Lin and Ye Qun. There is no direct, available evidence of Lin’s sexual activities with Ye Qun. However, Ye’s vivid sexual promiscuity and affair with Huang Yongsheng does reveal that Lin was most likely largely removed from any amount of intimacy with his wife. Moreover, Ye expressed some feeling of loneliness and sadness as she confided to Huang Yongsheng asking “Who is my sympathizer, who understands me, who is my intimate person?” This statement is illustrative of the emotional coldness that existed between Lin and Ye. We cannot firmly conclude that Lin had no sexual contact with Ye, but considering Lin’s emotional partition from family and associates as well as Ye’s private statements to Huang Yongsheng, we can assume that Lin and Ye’s relationship lacked a large degree of affection. Crucial for this analysis is that when contemplating Lin’s emotional and sexual disassociation from Ye Qun, Lin appears to meet criterion three to schizoid personality disorder.

Also, utilizing the private observations of Lin’s secretaries and Ye’s personal assistants, it is evident that Lin private behavior resembles that of an individual suffering from schizoid personality disorder. Lin meets criterion one, two, three, six, and seven.

Fifth, Ye's position as major advisor in the Lin Biao office and the MAC along with her sneaky behavior affected the flow of information into and out of Lin Biao's hands. While Ye did not have an extraordinary amount of influence upon other top-ranking Party members, she served as Lin Biao's official mouthpiece and manager—in the political and familial realms. Not only was Lin Biao limited to the information he received caused by his own personality blots, Ye Qun's control of the flow of information further hindered Lin's overall knowledge. However, to what extent did Ye's information to Lin even matter? Indeed, even if it is assumed that Ye loyally followed her position as major advisor and meticulously reported every minor and major detail to Lin, what difference would that have made given Lin's schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder? The ambivalence, lack of emotion, and reluctance to be in social situations that Lin lived with deterred him from making any solid policy decisions that were of political value.

By utilizing the private observations of Lin's secretaries and Ye's personal assistants, it is evident that Lin meets criterion one, two, three, six, and seven for schizoid personality disorder.

Lin's life then was extremely problematic during the Cultural Revolution. Lin could not tolerate the required meetings that would come with his high ranking Party position either they be with his trusted secretaries or with visiting foreign delegates nor could he afford to remain completely disengaged from politics. Given the unstable nature of politics during the Cultural Revolution, Lin needed to follow closely the ever changing barometer set by Mao. But given the available evidence, it becomes doubtful if Lin had the capability to do just that or if he even had any desire or interest to perform the required

duties that were called upon him. Lin rarely cared little about policies or ongoing trends that came about during the Cultural Revolution. This was not because of political passiveness but because Lin's schizoid personality overruled his ability to make firm decisions as well as to have any interest in current political trends. This study must now place Lin's *intrapersonal* behavior discussed in this chapter within the context of his *interpersonal* relations and actions during the Cultural Revolution. The following chapter will highlight the tragic impact that Lin's personality disorders played in his decision-making, or lack thereof, as the Cultural Revolution unfolded. The following chapter will also offer further evidence of the enabling affect that Lin's personality difficulties had on Ye Qun. This study will now turn to specific cases, and witness how Lin's personality and social problems dramatically impacted his eventual downfall. We will also view how Lin's personality and dislocation affected his depth of involvement in inner-Party political struggle. What is particularly shocking is that Lin's role is virtually non-existent in most cases due to his personality own struggles to interact with other peoples. It is these issues that this study now turns to.

Chapter 3: Lin Biao and the Cultural Revolution

Adrian T. Luna

Thus far this study has probed the private life of Lin Biao. This examination has offered a detailed overview of the behavior and personality that Lin expressed toward the most intimate people in his life. Thus far it is also evident that Lin Biao has personality quirks that may or may not inhibit his ability to appropriately govern the position as Vice Chairman. The previous chapter has also illustrated the juxtaposition between Lin and his wife Ye Qun. While Lin Biao preferred to spend his days sitting in solitude and only coming into contact with individuals for limited amounts of time; Ye Qun was a social butterfly who always babbled and spoke with everyone ranging from the Maojiawan staff to Party big shots like Jiang Qing and Chen Boda. Lin Biao resided and spent the majority of his time in a bedroom with a dearth of decorations; Ye Qun's décor was all Mao-centric as she hung the Chairman's calligraphy and posters on her walls and even boasted an impressive collection of Mao buttons. If ever there was an odd couple in Chinese history, Lin Biao and Ye Qun accurately fit the description.

This chapter will take this study to the next level. This study must now turn its attention to the public sphere and seek to understand the role that Lin Biao played in a series of cases where Lin has been traditionally viewed as a maniacal, devious political plotter in order to gain power inside both the Party and the PLA. This chapter will take a case study approach and will focus on the "active" (1966-1969) phase of the Cultural Revolution.

Several critical points should be made here. These points will serve as important guidelines to keep in mind while reading about the politically puzzling and bizarre cases presented in this chapter. First, throughout this chapter, one must consider the *actual* role that Lin plays in each case. In several instances, this chapter may seem to stray away

from Lin Biao, the primary subject under investigation. However, the absence of Lin through a great deal of this chapter not only highlights the remarkable disassociation from social interactions that he preferred but also allows us to consider the engagement that other actors played in each respective case. This chapter will also illustrate that Lin, at times, did indeed act politically with either his own best interests, interests of the PLA, or interests of the Chairman in mind. However, Lin's political behavior should be seen as primarily *reactive* rather than *proactive*. Second, while slogging through this chapter one must also keep in mind the discussion of Lin's private life. Keeping this notion in mind will illustrate the increased primacy of Ye Qun in many of the political feuds and altercations discussed below. Finally, this chapter will not only reweigh the political salience of Lin Biao in the Cultural Revolution, but also illuminate facets of Chinese elite politics under the direct control of Chairman Mao. We will also see that petty contradictions and animosities rather than political policy differences paved the way for elite conflict. In addition, each actor discussed below existed and strived for continued survival by aligning and bandwagoning with various cliques and groups, all the while attempting to interpret the wishes of Chairman Mao.

The Attack on Lu Dingyi

The case of Lu Dingyi is one of the greatest examples of palace intrigue that occurred during the Cultural Revolution. Lu Dingyi, as an alternate Politburo member, member of the Central Secretariat, and head of the Central Propaganda Department, had been accused of cooperating with Peng Zhen in an effort to curb the debate surrounding *Hai Rui Dismissed* to a purely academic one. In addition, in Mao's view, Lu's interest and spirit toward the Party rectification campaigns in the 1960s were seen as weak, not

possessing the amount of fervent emotion that the Chairman wished for. The official accusations against Lu are: opposition to Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought; opposition to the Cultural Revolution; and persecuting the Lin Biao family.

For the purposes of this discussion, the primary concern is the last charge. The accusation was based on a series of anonymous letters that were written by Lu Dingyi's wife, Yan Weibing. From March 1960 onward, Yan Weibing wrote several epistles slandering Ye Qun. The letters contained acerbic accusations that exposed Ye's personal life and family. The first letter accused Ye Qun of maltreating Lin Biao's eldest daughter, Lin Xiaolin, who was from Lin's first marriage to Liu Xinmin.¹¹⁶ The letter also accused Ye of participating in a promiscuous lifestyle prior to her marriage to Lin Biao. The letter specifically accuses that Ye had an affair with the counterrevolutionary Wang Shiwei and was not a virgin at the time of her marriage to Lin Biao.¹¹⁷ In addition to her affair with Wang, Ye Qun is also noted as having an affair with a Guomindang military drill sergeant and her Russian tutor while Lin was in Harbin in 1945.¹¹⁸ Ye Qun was accused of living in a decadent lifestyle too, a "feudal aristocrat and member of the privileged social class."¹¹⁹ Finally, Ye Qun's Party authenticity was placed in question as Yan brought up Ye's past connections with the Guomindang as a radio announcer in Nanjing.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Liu Xinmin is more commonly known as Zhang Mei.

¹¹⁷ Wang Shiwei was a translator of Marxist texts during the Party's Yanan period. Wang wrote a series of critical essays that struck Mao and led him to begin a "rectification" of the artistic and literary fields within the Party, which led to Wang's execution in 1947.

¹¹⁸ Xiao Zhang, "Lin Biao jie xian mishi" (Lin Biao's Marriage and Secret Love), *Jingbao* (The Mirror), May, 1989, pp. 56-57

¹¹⁹ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 47

¹²⁰ This fact was also well known by He Long's wife, Xue Ming. See the discussion on He Long below, pp. 102-113

The case of Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing is important for this study since it is a primary example of the initiative that is taken by Ye Qun during the Cultural Revolution as well as being an excellent example of how seemingly trivial, personal matters crossed into the political sphere resulting in violence. Ye's initial reaction to the letters was absolute terror. She informed her staff members that the content of the letters is a matter of "national security." Ye reportedly began to weep noisily one evening due to mental stress caused by the spread of the letters. Lin Biao, upon hearing the noise, decided to investigate. When Lin entered Ye Qun's room, Ye dropped on the floor screaming, "you must rescue me, otherwise I might as well die."¹²¹ Lin consoled Ye, telling her that he will inform the Public Security Bureau immediately to find the anonymous author. By summer 1963, six handwriting specialists were brought to Maojiawan. The specialists studied the letters and confirmed it was the handwriting of Yan Weibing.¹²²

Ye Qun did not waste time in formulating a counterattack against Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing. Ye wrote a series of essays and circulated them throughout the Party. The

¹²¹ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) pp. 50-52

¹²² Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 41 and Hei Yannan, *Shinian Dongluan* (A Decade of Turbulence), (Xian: Xian International Publishing Company, 1988) p. 13. There is little doubt that the content of Yan Weibing's letters that pertains to Ye Qun's promiscuity is indeed authentic. Although there is no direct evidence that is available which clearly can verify Ye's sex life while in Yan'an, multiple Party figures have confirmed Ye's behavior as a sexually promiscuous. One source indicates that Ye Qun was seen in Yan'an frequently absconding with Wang Shiwei to caves or taking walks in forests together.¹²² Guo Xiyu, a former lover of Ye Qun during the Yan'an days, confirms that Ye had an affair with Wang Shiwei. According to Wang Landuo, Guo Xiyu arrived in Yan'an in 1939 and quickly befriended Ye Qun. Both went for frequent swims and walks along the Yan River where the level of intimacy between the two intensified. It is even rumored that Ye Qun forced Guo to confess his undying love to her. In 1940, Guo was required to travel to Shandong province and leave Ye Qun. While in Shandong, Guo remained monogamous but soon learned of Ye Qun's affair with Wang Shiwei. Wang Landuo also notes that Li Liqun, a longtime friend of Ye Qun, accidentally caught Ye and her Russian tutor in bed together in 1945 while Lin Biao was in Harbin. It is also noted that Ye Qun had the nickname "bus" (*gonggongqiche*) since it was stated that everybody "rode her" and the nickname "old shoe" (*po xie*) since she was rumored to be "worn." As we should recall here, in the previous chapter we also witnessed Ye Qun's affair with General Huang Yongsheng. See Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) pp. 45-46, 69-74.

documents written by Ye were entitled “Eight Major Points on Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing’s Counterrevolutionary Letters.” The content accused both Lu and Yan of whimsical crimes. One accusation argued that Lu and Yan objected to Lin Biao as Defense Minister since their son’s name contained the same “*de*” as seen in “Peng Dehuai”. Ye believed that this represented their longing to bring back Peng as Defense Minister.¹²³ Ye also revised and influenced the punishment that was to be inflicted upon Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing for their crimes.

In September 1966, Chen Boda issued a series of punitive measures against Lu Dingyi that did not permit Lu to have more than twelve yuan a day, a sofa, a bed and a writing desk, and he was required to be judged by the Red Guards. The material had passed through Maojiawan and was approved by Lin Biao. Ye Qun however, felt that the punishments were not harsh enough and far too humane. One morning, Ye awakened early and made a personal trip to Diaoyutai to visit Chen Boda. Ye informed Chen that revisions needed to be made to the document. Chen challenged Ye, arguing that the document had been approved by Lin Biao. Ye however countered and argued that Lin Biao always marks “agree” (*tongyi*) on everything.¹²⁴ Shortly following Ye’s visit, changes were made to how Lu’s punishment should be carried out, violent interrogations and being deprived of cold drinking water was included in the revisions.¹²⁵

Ye Qun’s role in the Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing case even extends further as she showed interest in viewing Yan and Lu’s struggle sessions under the control of Red Guards. One afternoon, after learning that a Red Guard rally would be held where Lu

¹²³ Zhao Ran, *Ye Qun yeshi* (An Informal History of Ye Qun) (Liaoning: Shenyang chubanshe, 1988) p. 6

¹²⁴ This is yet another example of Lin’s lack of position or emotion toward political matters, a manifestation of his schizoid personality.

¹²⁵ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) pp. 79-82

Dingyi would be denounced, Ye said, gritting her teeth, “Today’s rally will condemn Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing. It serves them right since they once attacked our leader [Lin Biao] and me. I plan to have a good time watching them be denounced.” The rally was held at a sports stadium in Beijing where Red Guards were everywhere. Ye and her associates viewed the rally and the violence that ensued. In the midst of the murderous onslaughts that were occurring, Zhang Yunsheng walked over next to Ye Qun and could hear her murmuring to herself, “How come we haven’t seen Yan Weibing?” When returning to Maojiawan, the entire car was in complete silence except for Ye Qun growling, “What a pity, we didn’t see Yan Weibing there.”¹²⁶

Lin Biao’s role in the Lu Dingyi-Yan Weibing case is minute, as Ye Qun took control of the situation and exercised her own political machinations and showed clear intense hatred for the Lu Dingyi family. Lin showed some concern for Ye Qun and the content of Yan Weibing’s letter. For instance, Lin met with Ye Qun and asked her if the substance of Yan’s letter was true. Lin also ordered the handwriting to be studied so that the authors of the letters were found. While Lin can be perceived as taking hold of the situation, his actions were more *reactive* than *proactive*. As in other instances, when Lin acted politically it stemmed from the influence of another. In this case Lin’s wife was under attack. If Lin hadn’t acted it could have led the family down a path of disgrace and trouble. But, this matter aside it is important, again, to keep in mind that Lin was not *proactive* but *reactive*, as he needed a source of stimulation for him to act.

¹²⁶ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) pp. 47-52. Ye hid her face at the rally, taking the time to disguise herself by wearing a huge gauze mask, a pair of sunglasses, and a scarf that, according to Zhang Yunsheng, made her look like a “foreign monster” (*yiguotaxiang laide guaiwu*).

Ye Qun denied that there was any authenticity to the letters and argued that Lin and her were married at the time under question.¹²⁷ It is also clear that Lin, even though he approved the punishments that were to be inflicted on Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing, had no actual input on what was formally decided. As seen in other cases Lin simply agreed (*tongyi*) with what was given to him. One example of Lin showing a degree of significant interest in the Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing case is that Lin wrote a letter personally, which confirmed Ye Qun's virginity at the time of her marriage to Lin Biao. The letter very plainly stated, "Ye Qun was a virgin," signed Lin Biao, and was circulated to the Party on May 20, the date of Lu Dingyi's self-criticism. Lin's action though signifies nothing more than a basic defense of Ye Qun, not an attack on Lu Dingyi or Yan Weibing. Perhaps the most spectacular example though of Lin Biao defending Ye Qun's honor however is his outlandish and blatant statement to Lu Dingyi during the May 20 Politburo meeting when Lin exclaimed to Lu, "I'd love to shoot you."¹²⁸ Wang Li however notes a more tepid Lin Biao, noting that Lin Biao never stated, "I'd love to shoot you" but rather the exchange involved Lin questioning Lu, "Why are you harming me? I like you. What is your intention?" Lu responded, "I truly did not know [about Yan Weibing's letter]". Lin Biao then banged his hand on the table and stated, "You sleep in the same bed, how is it possible that you did not know?"¹²⁹ Both interpretations indicate that Lin had some interest in defending Ye's honor. However, the primary political player was Ye Qun, as she made personal efforts to revise the punishments against Lu Dingyi

¹²⁷ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 53

¹²⁸ Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil) (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) pp. 18-19

¹²⁹ Wang Li, *Wang Li fan silu* (Wang Li Counters Trains of Thought), (Xianggang: Beixing chubanshe, 2001) pp. 593-594

and Yan Weibing and even made attempts to see them during their torturous struggle sessions. While Lin Biao was clearly well informed of what was occurring in the Lu Dingyi-Yan Weibing case, the available evidence shows that he made little efforts that formally pushed for their purge and removal. Lin, for instance, did not formulate the charges against Lu Dingyi-Yan Weibing, nor did he spread malicious rumors throughout the Party or take pleasure in viewing their struggle session as Ye Qun attempted to do. While this does not exonerate Lin Biao, it noticeably illustrates that other characters are accountable for Lu and Yang's purge.

The Luo Ruiqing Case

The Luo Ruiqing affair is an incident in Party history that is remembered as Lin Biao's offensive elimination of a potential rival in the PLA power chain and the beginning formations of a Lin Biao and Jiang Qing clique. The common source of tension between Lin and Luo resided, as Lin saw it, in the latter's challenge for Mao's admiration, the contrasting principles of strategy and warfare between the two, and the extension of power that Luo had throughout the military. Luo, retorting against the slogans of Lin Biao such as the "Peak Theory" stated, "You mean to say Marxist-Leninist Mao Zedong Thought will no longer develop? To treat the theories of our revolutionary mentor as the 'peak' is in itself a negation of Mao Zedong Thought." In terms of war strategy, a contradiction also existed as Lin Biao expounded that politics should be placed in command, that Mao Zedong Thought should be studied, practiced, and applied on the battlefield. Lin's position deemphasized the importance of weaponry and instead insisted that Mao Zedong Thought is the only weapon needed. Lin labeled large scale military exercises in the PLA as "disrupting politics." Luo rebutted Lin's objection, arguing that

“Politics is in command, for political work ought to guarantee that *military tasks* can be accomplished. On the other hand, talking every day of emphatic politics will never improve our duties and tasks.” Luo placed greater value on modernization and practicality as well, insisting that the armed forces “posses the most modern and up-to-date equipment.”¹³⁰

Ideological squabbles aside, the Lin-Luo conflict also reportedly arose from Luo’s extended power permeating throughout the PLA. Luo’s position and influence by the 1960s was firmly rooted in his achieved status during the Long March in 1934 when he stayed close to Mao as his chief of security, following and guarding him during times of war and peace.¹³¹

The crimes that Luo was accused of were: Opposition to Mao Zedong Thought on the grounds that he had openly challenged Lin Biao’s statements on the matter. Second, Luo was accused of having intentions to take over Lin Biao’s position as defense minister. The third accusation is that Luo attempted to implement a bourgeois military line by advocating military training over political training. Fourth, Luo was accused of collaborating with He Long to usurp power in the army and the navy over which they had little influence. In addition to these crimes, Luo was also accused of other minor infractions such as opposing the argument that Soviet-like revisionists had entered the

¹³⁰ Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, *Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 185-186

¹³¹ Luo also closely served with Lin Biao as dean of studies and deputy president of Red Army University (later the Resist Japan Military and Political University). After China’s Liberation in 1949, Luo became chief of Public Security where he again was designated as the chief individual in responsible of ensuring Mao’s safety. Wherever Mao traveled, Luo traveled. During Mao’s symbolic swims in the Yangzi and Xiang rivers for instance, Luo arrived prior to the Chairman and inspected the water, judging whether or not Mao should swim based on the tumultuous currents and waves. Luo’s close relationship with Mao and his loyal work and duties quickly paid off. By 1959, Luo was deputy premier of the State Council, deputy minister of defense underneath Lin Biao, secretary general of the Military Commission, and Chief of the General Staffs Department of the PLA.

Party and needed to be removed. Luo's effectiveness as a Party member was also questioned as he was accused of cutting others off in speech and holding long grudges over petty disputes against Party members.¹³²

The basic assumption consequently made based on the aforementioned crimes is that a sense of jealousy and threat was felt on Lin Biao's part when confronted with the Luo Ruiqing problem. Jealousy, since Luo was close to the Chairman and had a long term working relationship with him; and threat, since Luo's power extended seemingly everywhere within the PLA infrastructure. Consequently, Lin felt it necessary to remove a potential opponent striving for his position in power. The motivation for Luo's purge is thus based on personal, private matters. Again, the realm of the private and public intersect. The net effect is that the contrast between the public reasons for Luo's purge and the private reasons become apparent.

A hefty amount of these feelings stems from Luo's personal abhorrence toward Lin's powerful political positions. These convictions held by Luo were expressed in several instances. In one episode, Luo Ruiqing expressed his animosity toward Lin Biao to former People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) commander Liu Yalou. The exchange between Luo and Liu took place following the third session of the National People's Congress in January 1965 when Lin was chosen to serve as Vice-Premier and to serve concurrently as Minister of Defense. Luo, antagonized by the decision, privately confided to Liu Yalou stating, "I cannot believe that this person has comeback....After today, our bombs will not fly and I will die."¹³³ By February 1965, shortly before the death of Liu Yalou, Ye Qun visited Liu who conveyed the following message to Ye Qun

¹³² *Zhonggong wenhua dageming zhongyao wenjian huibian* (Collection of Important CCP Documents on the Cultural Revolution). (Taipei: Zhonggong yanjiu zazhishe binjibu, 1973) pp. 22-34

¹³³ *Ibid* p. 30

about Luo Ruiqing. The message stated from Liu stated that Luo felt, “Everybody has to retire from politics sooner or later. This applies to Lin Biao too, Ye Qun should take care of Lin Biao’s health. Lin Biao should concentrate more on his work at the Center, and Luo would take care of the army. Luo would reward Ye Qun, if she performed this service for him.”¹³⁴ PLAAF commander Wu Faxian also expressed that Luo had opposed Lin Biao’s appointment as Defense Minister, replacing Peng Dehuai in 1959. Luo’s spite, according to Wu, emanated from one instance when Lin Biao was unable to meet with Luo due to an illness. Luo reportedly had lashed out against Lin, shouting, “If he’s sick so often, how can he be responsible for anything? Let someone else take over his job. Don’t stand in the way.”¹³⁵

The reigns of the movement against Luo Ruiqing were under the direction and control of Ye Qun. The first offensive move came on November 30, 1965 when Ye Qun personally visited the Chairman in Hangzhou. Ye brought with her a letter that expressed Luo’s disenchantment with politics in the military. Ye met with Mao for several hours in Hangzhou. Consequently, Mao reportedly sided with Ye stating, “Those who do not

¹³⁴ Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993) pp. 68-69

¹³⁵ Dr. Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao*, ed. Anne Thurston. Trans. Tai Hongchao (New York, Random House: 1994) p. 436 Luo also steamed over Lin’s refusal to see Luo Ronghuan due to a proclaimed illness by Lin Biao. Luo Ronghuan was a close confidant to Luo Ruiqing, serving as a security chief to the CCP during the Long March and later becoming a marshal in 1955. Luo Ronghuan agreed with Luo Ruiqing’s viewpoints that the dead memorization of Chairman Mao’s works was not exercising the idea of “theory and practice.” Exacerbating Luo Ruiqing’s abomination toward Lin even more is that Lin attended Luo Ronghuan’s funeral upon his death in December 1963. Luo exclaimed that this was purely to make an appearance. In addition, Luo expressed his dissatisfaction with Lin being Defense Minister when Lin reportedly illustrated his unsociable tendencies when he denied wanting to meet with a foreign minister visiting China. Lin shied away from the meeting because of rumors that photos of war would be viewed. Lin reportedly disliked viewing photos of violence and of blood flowing. Luo, upon hearing of Lin’s disinterest in attending the meeting, asked and complained why Lin was serving as Defense Minister if he could not fulfill its necessary duties of meeting with foreign dignitaries. See *Zhonggong wenhua dageming zhongyao wenjian huibian* (Collection of Important CCP Documents on the Cultural Revolution). (Taipei: Zhonggong yanjiu zazhishi binjibu, 1973) p. 31 and Liu Peiyi, *Yuanshuai wannian sui Yue: Wenge zhongde gongheguo yuan shuai* (The Twilight Years of the Marshals: The Marshals in the Middle of the Cultural Revolution of the People’s Republic of China), (Beijing: Zhongguo da baikequanshu chubanshe, 2000) p. 172

believe in putting politics in command and only give lip service to the idea are trying to propagate ‘eclecticism.’” Mao wrote on the document, “We have to beware of their [Luo Ruiqing] position.”¹³⁶

A large part of Ye’s initiative came from personal animosity she held toward Luo. Ye, due to a number of memorable personal interactions with Luo, felt that Luo disliked her and occluded her advancement within the military and the Party. Following the Liberation of the country in 1949, Ye received frequent military promotions. By the early 1960s, Ye had been promoted to colonel, a high rank within the PLA hierarchy but not meeting her expectations of being elevated to senior-colonel. Luo Ruiqing, as Chief of the General Staffs Department, had been in control of Ye’s promotion to colonel and made his decision based on military standard operating procedure. Ye however, fumed over Luo’s lack of recognition of her. In another instance, in spring 1965, Lin Biao was to distribute the “Five Principles of Special Politics,” Luo Ruiqing suggested excising any mention of Ye Qun’s name in the document.

Ye’s meeting with Mao in Hangzhou was successful from her perspective as the Chairman, on December 2, 1965, publicly announced a war against Luo Ruiqing stating that “these men do not believe in the prominence of politics, in public they believe in politics but in private they do not.”¹³⁷ Mao also added in his speech that Luo Ruiqing “treats Lin Biao as an enemy. Luo also does not ask for instructions from me and he does not respect fellow marshals....Luo is a careerist.”¹³⁸ A conference was convened by mid-

¹³⁶ Dr. Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao*, ed. Anne Thurston. Trans. Tai Hongchao (New York, Random House: 1994) p. 436

¹³⁷ Pang Xianzhi, Jin Chongji, *Mao Zedong zhuan 1949-1976* (Biography of Mao Zedong 1949-1976), (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chunbanshe, 2003) pp. 1399-1400

¹³⁸ Ding Kaiwen, *Zhong shen Lin Biao zui an* (New Concepts in the Lin Biao Incident), (Carle Place: Mingjing chubanshe, 2004) p. 872

December in Shanghai which was managed by Mao and which Luo was ordered to attend. With the exception of Mao, Lin, and Zhou Enlai, nobody knew that the conference concerned Luo Ruiqing's political errors. On the second day of the conference Ye Qun spoke on behalf of Lin Biao.¹³⁹ Ye spoke several times during the course of the eight day emergency meeting and she was consequently regarded as the "heavy artillery" of the meeting. One of Ye's speech-lasting ten hours-vehemently attacked Luo Ruiqing at the conference, suggesting that Luo opposed Lin Biao and opposed politics in the military. Ye's comments also focused on Luo's ulterior motives to take control of Lin's position within the military, which was Ye's primary source of bitterness toward Luo. As Ye anxiously retaliated against Luo during the meeting feverishly stating:

Luo Ruiqing came to possess great authority over the armed forces. He also controls the power of public security. If there is any untoward happening, the loss will be great. His individualism has reached the stage of an ambitious schemer. He will not stop until comrade Lin Biao yields the defense ministership to him. But if he were to be defense minister, he would want to be something higher still. There is no end. Ever since 1964, Luo Ruiqing has been pressing Comrade Lin Biao to yield to his position. After the last national holiday, Luo Ruiqing came to our house to see Lin Biao saying loudly, "You are sick. Do not disturb yourself. Let some other virtuous one take over for you! Let someone take over for you!" As he was leaving, he kept shouting, "Don't block the way!"¹⁴⁰

Following Ye's condemnation of Luo, the members of the meeting decided to order Luo, who was not at the meeting but making in an inspection tour in the south-western military region, to fly to Shanghai. Luo, upon arriving, was forced to announce his crimes to the Party. Both Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping assisted in managing the

¹³⁹ Liu Peiyi, *Yuanshuai wannian sui'yue: Wenge zhongde gongheguo yuan shuai* (The Marshals Later Years: The Party's Marshals in the Cultural Revolution), (Beijing: Zhongguo da baikequanshu chubanshe, 2000) p. 172

¹⁴⁰ Da Qing, "Luo Ruiqing jiangjun meng nanyi" (Record of General Luo Ruiqing's Calamity) in ed. Zhou Ming, *Lishi zai zheli chensi: 1966-1976 nian jishi* (Thinking Deeply About History: A Factual Account of 1966-1976), (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1986) Vol. 1, p. 350

discussion. Luo begged to speak with Mao and Lin face-to-face in a meeting but Zhou Enlai would not meet his request.¹⁴¹ The outcome of the meeting was Luo's removal from his positions and the appointment of General Yang Chengwu as Chief of the General Staffs Department, thereby replacing Luo Ruiqing.¹⁴²

Despite the dismissal of Luo made at the enlarged Politburo meeting in December 1965, criticism and attacks against Luo continued. Zhou Enlai managed a central small group in charge of investigating Luo's mistakes and errors.¹⁴³ From March 4 to April 8, Mao decided to convene a month long criticism session against Luo Ruiqing at the Jingxi Guesthouse in Zhongnanhai which was managed by Xiao Hua. The attendees included members of the Military Commission, Ministry of Public Security, National Defense Science Committee, Military Science Committee, and the Military Academy of Science. By March 22, the meeting also included members of the Central Committee which made the total number of attendees ninety-five. Ye Qun and Wu Faxian also attended. The meeting denounced Luo as an opponent of the Party and of Mao Zedong thought. The conference also accused Luo of being a "conspirator" alleging that during the anti-Japanese war he had followed the right opportunist line represented by the so-called counter-revolutionary's Wang Ming and Peng Dehuai. Luo, in the midst of his denunciations and undue psychological torture, leaped from a second story window attempting suicide but which resulted in only a pair of broken legs. On May 16, at the

¹⁴¹ Ding Kaiwen, *Zhong shen Lin Biao zui an* (New Concepts in the Lin Biao Incident), (Carle Place: Mingjing chubanshe, 2004) p. 873

¹⁴² Following the meeting's conclusion on December 15, Zhou Enlai arranged a major banquet complete with food and drink as well as dancing. Ye Jianying, who later replaced Luo Ruiqing as General Secretary of the Central Military Commission (CMC), sang a song in celebration of the meeting's conclusion. See Luo Diandian, *Hongse jiazuo dangan: Luo Ruiqing nuer de Diandian jiyi* (Red Family Record: Luo Ruiqing's Daughter Diandian's Recollections), (Haikou: Shinanhai chuban gongsi, 1999) pp. 189-195

¹⁴³ Ding Kewen, *Zhong shen Lin Biao zui an* (New Concepts in the Lin Biao Incident), (Carle Place: Mirror Books, 2004) p. 873

enlarged meeting of the Politburo managed by Liu Shaoqi, Luo was formally dismissed from the Central Committee, stripped of all his positions, and a lengthy list of Party members all offered attacks against Luo Ruiqing.¹⁴⁴

Luo's tribulations were not easy either. Shortly following Luo's leap from the second story of a building breaking both legs, Luo was taken to a small, unknown solitary space with only a hard board bed and a small square table. Luo received a beastly and distasteful diet of grass and crushed stone mixed together, an abominable concoction that echoed times of the famine ridden countryside of the Great Leap Forward. Luo's diet and living conditions were formally decided by Minister of Public Security Xie Fuzhi.¹⁴⁵

When reviewing the evidence of the Luo Ruiqing case and the supposed decisions made by Lin Biao that decided Luo's fate, there is no direct evidence linking Lin to Luo's dismissal. In contrast, the typical view of Lin Biao in reference to the Luo Ruiqing affair is best summarized by one Party historian who states, "Lin Biao treated him [Luo Ruiqing] as an infirm ignominious enemy, a criminal who tried to use suicide to express 'opposition to Party and to country.' Lin Biao clearly delighted in Luo Ruiqing's calamity and pushed him further into despair."¹⁴⁶ However, as this review of evidence

¹⁴⁴ The report issued at the meeting officially accused Luo of: Taking a bourgeois military line; opposing Marxist-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought; and opposing Mao Zedong and Lin Biao. The report also branded Luo's suicide attempt as a complete insult and an illustration of Luo opposing Mao Zedong thought and theory of "curing the sickness to save the patient." Luo's failed suicide attempt was thus seen as his attempts of taking the "easy way" and not facing his crimes head on in harsh struggle sessions. The assailants against Luo included Ye Jianying, Xie Fuzhi, and Xiao Hua. Ye Jianying offered a report entitled "Thoroughly Crush Comrade Luo Ruiqing's Armed Forces Counter Party Plot and Lift High the Banner of Mao Zedong Thought." Xie Fuzhi made a formal statement in a speech entitled "Lift Up High Mao Zedong's Great Red Flag and Eliminate Minister Luo's Bourgeois Toxins Spreading in the Ministry of Public Security." Xiao Hua's address was entitled, "Firmly Defend Mao Zedong Thought and crush Comrade Luo Ruiqing's Bourgeois Military Line and Grave Counter-Party Plot."

¹⁴⁵ Huang Yao, "Duo nian jingli chang kegui bazai molian geng tongxin: Ji Luo Ruiqing, Hao Zhiping fufu" (Many Years Together Were Indeed Precious and Eight Years of Hardship Forged their Hearts Together: Remembering Luo Ruiqing and Hao Zhiping), *Renwu*, (Personality) May, 1992, No. 73, p. 71

¹⁴⁶ Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, *Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 191

suggests, rather than Lin the available data seems to point directly to Ye Qun and Mao. First, Lin did not pen the infamous letter which listed Luo's supposed crimes that Ye shared with Mao while visiting him in Hangzhou. The authors of the damning epistle were People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) political commissar Li Zuopeng and deputy head of the Military Operations Department of the Chief of the General Staffs Department of the People's Liberation Army Lei Yingfu.¹⁴⁷ There is also evidence from personal assistants of the Lin Biao office that suggest Lin was not fully aware of the current events surrounding Luo Ruiqing. According to Guan Weixun, during a meeting Lin held with his secretary the topic of Luo Ruiqing was brought up. Lin inquired about the events surrounding the question of Luo Ruiqing. Ye Qun, sitting in with Lin during the meeting, quickly took the secretary and escorted him out of the room, thereby keeping Lin from bringing up the affair any further during the meeting.¹⁴⁸ Guan himself noted that Ye Qun played a big role in the Luo Ruiqing case.¹⁴⁹ Luo Diandian, Luo Ruiqing's daughter, noted that Lin Biao was so aloof that it caused difficulty for Luo to interact with Lin. As Luo Diandian recalls:

[My father's] biggest problem was when and how to report on his work to Lin Biao. If he didn't phone first, but just took the car, he would be stopped at the door and told Lin wasn't feeling well and couldn't see him. If he phoned first, the reply would be "How many times do I have to tell you that you don't have to make an appointment to report on your work but can come at any time." Then if [my father] really just went there, [Lin] would say it was an ambush, and that he didn't have time to mentally prepare himself...and that because he was ill it made him all apprehensive and break into a sweat. The next time, if [my father] phoned he'd be told later that because of the phone call Lin hadn't been able to get to sleep but had been awake all night.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Ding Kaiwen, *Zhong shen Lin Biao zui an* [New Concepts in the Lin Biao Incident] (Carle Place: Mingjing chubanshe, 2004) p. 872

¹⁴⁸ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 224

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Luo Diandian, "Luo zongzhang mengnan jishi" (A Record of Chief of Staff Confronted by Dangers), in Cheng Min, ed., *Haojie chuqi* (How the Calamity Began) (Beijing: Tuanjie chubanshe, 1993) p. 210

Relevant in this example is that Lin was difficult to contact and meet with on a regular basis. Like Lin's secretaries, Party members were also forced to deal with Lin's erratic behavior. Luo experienced difficulty in meeting with Lin to discuss political and managerial matters in the PLA. Concomitantly, Lin's erratic behavior affected Luo's perceptions of him. While Luo Diandian's records are heavily biased against Lin Biao, it is evident that Lin's personality disorder, even in Diandian's skewed sources, corroborates the evidence presented in the memoirs of Zhang Yunsheng and Guan Weixun. Luo Ruiqing, like other Party members, only knew half of the story regarding Lin Biao. While difficulty in contacting Lin is perceived as a political tactic utilized in order to aid in the removal of Luo, this is inaccurate and is a clear example of how easily perceptions can be formed based on the limited *public* knowledge gathered of individuals.

Lin also never made any condemning references to Luo Ruiqing in public. With the exception of Lin's May 18 speech that focused on coups and which made a brief reference to the problem of Luo Ruiqing, Lin Biao never attacked Luo publicly. Utilizing Lin's May 18 speech as evidence of Lin's intentions against Luo is doubtful as CCRG Party radical Zhang Chunqiao penned the majority of the speech. In contrast, Ye Jianying, Xiao Hua, and Xie Fuzhi all made public vilifications of Luo Ruiqing. General Yang Chengwu also attacked Luo. Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai also followed the trend at the enlarged Politburo meeting in December and subsequent meetings in early 1966, despite the questionable validity of the charges against Luo. In addition, Lin is not recorded as a willing participant in either public meetings or celebratory banquets following Luo's dismissal based on available evidence. In contrast to Ye Jianying who,

as mentioned above, sang a song following the dismissal of Luo in the December meeting, most likely since he knew of his pending ascendancy, Lin however was not present at the banquet. Ye Jianying's ambitions are highlighted even further when considering that he headed a special investigative team delving into the crimes and errors that Luo committed in an attempt to absolve him of any wrongdoing. Of course, no evidence was found by Ye Jianying exculpating Luo of the charges against him.

Another key source that historians argue regarding Lin's removal of Luo is that Luo's contradicting beliefs in the role of politics within the military is a key source of tension and prompted Lin's urge to remove Luo from his position. It is certainly true that Lin showed little interest in military modernization, for instance, Lin did not attend, despite his invitation, the joint military exercises by the Beijing and Jinan military regions conducted under the unified command of Luo Ruiqing, Yang Yong, and Yang Dezhi near the Ming tombs in June 1964. However, given Lin's reluctance and hesitant attitude to public appearances this is certainly not surprising. Moreover, Lin most likely did not wish to risk showing an interest in the role of weaponry since this position challenged the role that ideology, Mao's own personal baby, played in military policy and action.

In addition, as mentioned above, Lin Biao did not have any input regarding the living conditions and treatment during Luo's imprisonment; rather these matters were decided by the radical Xie Fuzhi. In fact, it is highly unlikely that Lin had any idea of what officially happened to Luo due to his introverted personality and the lack of complete transparency and information from Ye Qun.

The removal of Luo Ruiqing can also be viewed as a movement initiated and assisted, not by Lin Biao, but by the Chairman. When reviewing the evidence Mao is a primary actor. The emergency December meeting held in Shanghai for instance was not planned and held at Lin's request, but by the Chairman. Moreover, there is personal evidence that suggests Mao's disdain and hatred toward Luo stemmed from Luo's outright push for modernization in the military in opposition to stressing politics and Mao Zedong Thought. As Mao quipped to Dr. Li Zhisui one afternoon, "Luo isn't worth the clothes on his back."¹⁵¹ A well placed historian in the PLA completely dismisses the notion that Ye Qun came to Hangzhou to inform Mao of the Luo problem. This historian notes that it would be "naïve to believe that Mao would simply accept Ye's story. In fact, it was Mao who summoned Ye to Hangzhou and expressed *his* discontent with Luo on the political work issue."¹⁵² This transforms the argument from one based on personal jealousies and animosities in the Lin Biao camp to a political issue based on Mao's disgust with Luo. Whatever the case may be, Mao's initiative is clear and became quite apparent when he issued his statement on December 2, claiming that there are those in the military who "do not give prominence to politics." Thus, Lin's position against Luo based on ideological differences, assuming that Lin was even fully aware of the current political trends of the time, can be viewed as a loyal following of the Chairman's wishes. As Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun have noted, "the clear political logic for all concerned was to give Mao what he wanted."¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Dr. Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao*, ed. Anne Thurston. Trans. Tai Hongchao (New York, Random House: 1994) p. 435

¹⁵² Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 30

¹⁵³ *Ibid* p. 31

The Attack on He Long

Like Luo Ruiqing, He Long became a marshal in 1955 and was a recognized hero of the country for his duties in the Liberation Army during the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. He Long later became a victim of the Cultural Revolution. His downfall is normally attributed to the personal plot laid against him by Lin Biao. According to Party history, Lin began to formulate accusative letters against He Long. The force behind Lin's decision, like Luo Ruiqing, is the trepidation that Lin felt because of the power He held throughout the PLA. As one Party historian notes, Lin reportedly told Wu Faxian, "He Long puts his oars in everywhere—chief of general staff, navy, air force, the Institute of Politics. The air force is a tantalizing morsel that whets the appetite of most people. He Long is sending people to usurp your power. You must pay attention to this and take preventative measures."¹⁵⁴ The fabricated material reportedly created by Lin soon reached Mao who held a meeting with He Long to review the list of charges against He. Mao suggested that he still supported He Long and reportedly told him "I will be your protector."¹⁵⁵ Later, in another meeting, Mao suggested that He go speak to Lin and sort their problems out. At the subsequent meeting between Lin and He, Lin questioned He, asking him who he supported. Lin, hoping that he would have swayed He to his camp, was disappointed when He replied, "Whoever opposes Chairman Mao I will oppose." Reflecting on He's response; Lin understood the statement as He's opposition to Lin's clique and only support for Mao. Consequently, Lin ordered Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, and Song Zhiguo to escalate their attacks against He Long, thus commencing a major political offensive against the old marshal. By January 1967, He Long was

¹⁵⁴ Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, *Turbulent Decade: A History of the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 199

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid* p. 200

escorted to the hilly country outskirts of Beijing with his wife Xue Ming to reside temporarily. He consistently hoped that either Mao or Zhou would pay him a visit. But, by mid-year, He had lost all hope as Lin reportedly tightened his control of He Long. He's living conditions paralleled that of a prison, with curtains pulled tight blocking out any light. He was also forced to sleep on a hard board bed. He was also told that a shortage of water had occurred. When it rained, He and Xue Ming were forced to collect water in face basins, buckets, and even water glasses. He's living conditions only exacerbated even further from this point. By spring 1969, He, living on a steady diet of vegetables cooked only in hot water without oil or salt, and spongy turnips and tough beans, only complicated his diabetic medical condition. By June 8, 1969, He Long had entered a state of continued vomiting and quickened breathing. On June 9, 1969, He Long's life slipped away, ending years of misery and strangulation spearheaded by Lin Biao.¹⁵⁶

A review of available evidence however contrasts the picture shown in Party history. Unlike the active, scheming, and plotting Lin Biao who clearly holds a personal vendetta against He, the illustration that we will discuss and examine shows strong personal animosities being held by Ye Qun toward He Long. Ye's actions in the following discussion will not only serve as a clear indicator of the dominating role she played in politics in the Lin Biao family due to Lin's constant social distance caused by his social anxiety disorder, but will also clearly depict her insidious behavior. In addition, Lin is relatively absent from the ongoing drama and seems to be mostly on the periphery of political affairs.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid pp. 203-204

The strong source of friction held by Maojiawan against He Long rests in the questionable past of Ye Qun. Ye Qun was born into a humble family in Fuzhou. Her father became a Guomindang military general though and Ye followed in her father's footsteps, joining the Guomindang and later becoming a radio announcer for a Guomindang broadcasting station in Nanjing. Ye also trained as a youth in battlefield tactical fighting.¹⁵⁷ Ye's status in Guomindang circles continually grew as she won a speaking contest on the theme "There Is Only One Party in China [the Guomindang] and Only One Leader [Jiang Jieshi]."¹⁵⁸ Prior to her switch to the Communist Party Ye Qun knew Xue Ming, the future wife of He Long. Upon Lin's return to China from Moscow in 1942, Lin wrote a personal letter to Ye. The epistle openly expressed Lin's desire to wed Ye. Ye took the letter lightly and with very little emotion, reportedly sharing the letter's content with her fellow girlfriends and giggling about its message. He Long, by this time spouse to Xue Ming, advised Xue to communicate to Ye that she should respond to Lin and stop giggling about, what was supposed to be, Lin's private letter to Ye. According to Xue Ming, when she approached Ye about the letter, Ye "didn't say whether she would keep the letter private or not. She didn't say one way or the other. She just kept skipping stones over the river." What should be noted from this incident is that personal tension existed early on between the Lin Biao, He Long, and their spouses. This tension soon worsened by 1942.

In addition to the potentially disastrous knowledge held by Xue Ming about Ye's childish pre-matrimonial behavior regarding Lin's private letter, Xue also became well

¹⁵⁷ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 70

¹⁵⁸ Harrison Salisbury, *The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng* (New York: Avon Books, 1992, p. 280

aware of the questionable Guomindang past that Ye had. The personal blots on Ye's past came to light during Mao's Rectification Movement in Yan'an in 1942. Both Lin Biao and He Long were away in Chongqing. While the two husbands were away the wives did indeed play as Xue approached Ye and advised her to expose her past mistakes that would exonerate her of her troubling Guomindang past. Ye declared that Xue was attempting to frame her in Lin Biao's absence. Xue ignored Ye's fury and dragged her to the Party Organization Department head Wang Heshou. When He Long and Lin Biao returned to Yan'an, He Long told Lin, rather casually, "There are problems with your wife and Xue Ming has exposed them. This is good." Then He Long, patting Lin on the shoulder and laughing, stated, "There are problems with my wife too, and your wife can expose this!"¹⁵⁹

The events that took place before Liberation carried their weight as Ye Qun and Xue Ming did not speak again for nearly twenty years. Bitterness persisted into the summer of 1966. Ye Qun, according to Zhang Yunsheng, met privately with Song Zhiguo, the chief of Lin's personal security force, multiple times in August. In one instance, the two spoke privately for hours. Following the meeting, Song emerged and entered the office of the Lin Biao staff requesting writing paper. Zhang casually inquired if Song was practicing calligraphy to which Song replied, "No! Director Ye has given me a very important assignment." Zhang later received documents from Ye that were labeled as "Top Secret" but permitted him to view. Zhang discovered that the content of the documents contained defamations against He Long. Zhang, testing Ye Qun, inquired if Song Zhiguo had written the statement. Ye confirmed Zhang's inquiry, and even added that Song had done so completely unilaterally. Zhang knew better though, based on his

¹⁵⁹ Lin Qingshan, *Lin Biao zhuan* (Biography of Lin Biao), (Beijing: Zhishi chubanshe, 1988) p. 220

recent brief exchange with Song Zhiguo who stated that “Director Ye has given me a very important assignment.” What confirms Zhang’s point further is Ye’s behavior at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee at which Ye, believing she saw He carrying a pistol, shrieked and accused He of being armed. To Ye’s embarrassment though when He Long was frisked by security they only found a tobacco pipe.¹⁶⁰ Immediately following the meeting, Ye Qun spoke with Jiang Qing who told Ye that she appeared as if she had “seen a ghost.” Ye then expressed her concern to Jiang over He Long as well as the knowledge that Xue Ming possessed concerning Ye’s troubling past in the pre-Liberation years.¹⁶¹

In the days directly following Song’s repeated visits to Maojiawan to meet with Ye Qun in early September, Ye Qun was remembered as “running around in circles” making personal field trips to visit the leaders of the PLAN, PLAAF, the Armored Forces, the Engineering Corps, and the Second Artillery Division [Nuclear Forces]. According to Zhang Yunsheng, Ye was delivering the slanderous material that had been written by Song Zhiguo.¹⁶² The content of the material was accusatory statements against He Long, branding He as a conspirator who was extremely close to Luo Ruiqing, Hao Zhiping, Peng Zhen, and Yang Shangkun who were commonly seen in secret conversations with He Long. The accusations also stated that He did not stress appropriate training tactics for military personal. It was also suggested that He Long’s home telephone had been bugged with a listening device. Outlandish accusations were included too, such as He reportedly sleeping with a gun under his pillow and always

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 222

¹⁶¹ Ibid

¹⁶² Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) pp. 31-34

carrying a gun with the intent to kill Chairman Mao at his first available chance. Kang Sheng also added that He secretly wanted to travel to the Soviet Union to covertly plan for a coup attempt against Mao.¹⁶³

Ye's paranoia and concern over the He Long issue is further reflected by the meeting held between Lin Biao and He Long. Mao, after receiving the fabricated materials poolside at Zhongnanhai by Wu Faxian, suggested directly to He a visit to Maojiawan to smooth things over with Lin Biao. He took Mao's advice and requested a meeting with Lin Biao. Upon hearing He's request for a meeting Ye Qun quickly panicked and ordered several personal security guards to arm themselves with pistols and prepare to ambush He Long in case he should attack Lin Biao. Ye's delusional sort of behavior and concern for Lin's safety stemmed from the aforementioned rumors stating that He concealed and carried a pistol with him at all times. Ye Qun and Maojiawan's security force reportedly hid secretly behind a curtain during the meeting between He and Lin. The tension in the room was thick, the security personnel placing their hands on their guns ready to draw and storm the room at Ye Qun's signal. Ye ordered the guards that nobody could cough and nobody could make a sound. Ye, drawing back the curtain slightly to make sure she could view part of the meeting, decided against an outlandish offensive attacking He Long. In addition, despite Ye Qun's heavy concerns for Lin's safety, no attempt on Lin's life by He were made.¹⁶⁴ In fact, the overall tone of the meeting was bland and reportedly held very little stimulating rhetoric. In typical Lin Biao

¹⁶³ Qian Gang "Eryue bingbian zhenxiang" (The Truth About the February Mutiny) in ed. Zhou Ming, *Lishi zai zheli chensi: 1966-1976 nian jishi* (Thinking Deeply About History: A Factual Account of 1966-1976), (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1986) Vol. 2, p. 51

¹⁶⁴ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) pp. 35-39

fashion, Lin again showed his ambivalence and lack of emotion as Lin told He, “I have no opinion of you.”¹⁶⁵

In the above examples discussed it is evident that Ye Qun played a prominent role in the steps taken in removing He Long as well as his wife Xue Ming from the Party. Ye’s motivation and animosity was rooted in the fear of her past blemishes being exposed and consequences thereafter. Other evidence suggests that there were sources of agitation between He Long and the Party that are not directly linked to Lin Biao. First, it is questionable how much trust still existed between He and the Party shortly following the dismissal of Luo Ruiqing. At the enlarged Politburo meeting in Shanghai in December 1965, He expressed his support for Luo Ruiqing, arguing that Luo was not a counterrevolutionary. Following the meeting, He was stripped of his duties as managing the day-to-day work of the Military Affairs Commission, his most significant position within the Party. Nearly a year later, at the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, Mao noted that He held back during meetings which struggled against Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Mao had asked He if he had joined the struggle meetings but He replied that he could not make such allegations with the same amount of intensity as those offered by other Party members.¹⁶⁶ The source of this tension lay in He’s lack of motivation, belief, and aggrandizement of the Cultural Revolution. Following the infamous “Bombard the Headquarters” poster issued by Mao in late August, a series of posters began to appear along the streets of Wangfujing. The posters specifically targeted Liu Shaoqi and condemned him. He however, disagreed with the

¹⁶⁵ Liu Peiyi, *Yuanshuai wannian sui yue: Wenge zhongde gongheguo yuan shuai* (The Twilight Years of the Marshals: The Party’s Marshals in the Middle of the Cultural Revolution of the People’s Republic), (Beijing: Zhongguo da baikequanshu chubanshe, 2000) pp. 184-185

¹⁶⁶ Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 34

rising tide exclaiming “This is not appropriate! Liu Shaoqi is our state president!” In addition, He told the students at Qinghua University that Liu Shaoqi’s wife, Wang Guangmei, is “the wife of our nation’s president. You need to support the work that she does.”¹⁶⁷ He also openly expressed disenchantment with the Cultural Revolution students as he vehemently denounced two factional student parties clashing in the Beijing gymnasium. The student groups fought and in the process of their struggle obliterated sporting equipment. He reportedly commented on the incident critically stating “destroying the sporting equipment serves no principle. No matter what the situation is we cannot permit the destruction of our nation’s belongings.”¹⁶⁸

Some scholars point to Lin Biao and the MAC meeting he convened in September 1966 which addressed the He Long problem. Though this seems to show initiative on Lin’s part, the meeting was Mao’s initiation and ordered Lin to “criticize first and then protect” (*yi pi er bao*).¹⁶⁹

There is also evidence that cites He’s distaste for Lin’s ascendancy and positions within the Party. Like Luo Ruiqing, He Long also expressed bewilderment at Mao’s decision to put Lin Biao in command noting his frequent health problems and virtual absence from politics. In one source He is noted as stating privately, “At Lushan, Mao was the Chairman and Deng was a key commander, everybody recognized Deng as a successor. Now Lin Biao is the designated successor. I supported the Chairman’s decision. But Lin Biao does not have the prestige and he does not have the energy.”¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁷ Ibid

¹⁶⁸ Ibid. pp. 178-179

¹⁶⁹ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) p. 35

¹⁷⁰ Liu Peiyi, *Yuanshuai wannian sui Yue: Wenge zhongde gongheguo yuan shuai* (The Twilight Years of the Marshals: The Party’s Marshals in the Middle of the Cultural Revolution of the People’s Republic), (Beijing: Zhongguo da baikequanshu chubanshe, 2000) pp. 175-176

Another element that illustrates the parallel between Luo and He is their mutual interest in military modernization. He labored and tried to convince other Party members of the need for modernization in the national defense industry. After inspecting and investigating the state of military industry in 1960, He concluded that aircraft fuselage and aircraft engine production were very poor. He argued that the approach being used to produce aircraft materials-fast and numerous-hindered quality. He stated that, “When there is a choice between quality and speed, you must favor quality.” He also closely collaborated with Luo and the need for appropriate military training for the PLA. In terms of training He argued that the PLA must continually strive to be “the cream of the crop (*jianzi*).”¹⁷¹ Although He was never formally charged and cited with carrying out a “bourgeois military line” He did support military modernization and, with his overt references for the need to enhance the quality of military production by sacrificing quantity, denied the importance of the Maoist theory of “more, faster, better.” He’s position, similar to Luo’s, exacerbated an already fragile relationship between him and Mao following the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee as well as his lack of overall interest and support of increased radicalism at the onset of the Cultural Revolution.

There is also considerable evidence that Jiang Qing had motivations to remove He Long from his position. Given the already intense hatred by Ye Qun toward He and the obvious need for Jiang to receive the support from Lin in order to gain influence within the PLA’s culture and arts arena, the He Long problem may be viewed as an opportunity for Jiang to enhance her image to Maojiawan. Publicly, Jiang certainly made her strong

¹⁷¹ Liu Yansheng, “He Long” *Jiefangjun jiangling zhuan* [Biographies of PLA Generals], (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1985) pp. 354-355

distaste for He, as she launched a public attack on September 8, 1966, calling He a “bad person” and a “big butcher.”¹⁷² It is also noted in another source that Jiang pleaded to the Chairman demanding that he permit her to attack He Long, asking, “Why won’t you let me expose He Long? I have piles of material that is conclusive evidence. He is a bastard! He wants to perform a coup....his wife is also a bad person!”¹⁷³ And on December 30, 1966, Jiang Qing spoke at a mass rally, calling for the people to oppose He Long and to support his removal from the Party.¹⁷⁴ Clearly, Jiang became a key driving force for He’s removal from the Party. Kang Sheng also played a prominent role in the removal of He Long as Kang, along with Ye Qun, established a special case group on November 8, 1966 aimed at gathering slanderous, defaming material against He.¹⁷⁵

In reviewing the above evidence we have found that the events leading up to He’s purge cannot be blamed squarely on Lin Biao. Clearly personal antagonisms held by Ye Qun were motivating factors for her to steal the initiative and begin gathering outlandish evidence to be used against He and his wife Xue Ming. Ye needed to make a move before He in order to ensure that Ye’s troublesome past, which could have easily jeopardized her place within the Party, was not revealed during the paranoid and rumor filled Cultural Revolution. To what degree of intimate knowledge Lin held of Ye’s collection of

¹⁷² Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil) (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) p. 383

¹⁷³ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 156

¹⁷⁴ Liu Peiyi, *Yuanshuai wannian suiyue: Wenge zhongde gongheguo yuan shuai* [The Twilight Years of the Marshals: The Party’s Marshals in the Middle of the Cultural Revolution of the People’s Republic], (Beijing: Zhongguo da baikequanshu chubanshe, 2000) p. 192

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid* p. 193. The special case group undoubtedly shared evidence and worked closely with Jiang Qing to push for He’s removal. The culpability for He’s mistreatment in the outskirts of Beijing is a source that also renders questions. It is difficult to pinpoint precisely who controlled He’s horrid living conditions and dissipation in Xishan, but some sources point to Kang Sheng as instigating and controlling the torturous treatment He underwent.

blasphemous material is not certain. There is little doubt that Lin knew to some degree of the movement to remove He, as he himself suggested the removal of He's close colleagues Wang Shangrong and Lei Yingfu following the appearance of the poster "Bombard Yang Chengwu." However, following this suggestion during the late August meeting, Lin completely disappears from the political radar screen. The prominent players in He's downfall from September through December are Jiang Qing, Ye Qun, and Kang Sheng. In addition, the Chairman clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with He, which stemmed from his lack of enthusiasm to the radical tides at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution to the close relationship with Luo Ruiqing and support for military modernization, thereby dismissing the importance and need for Maoist ideology in warfare. Lin's role, as with other cases, seems to be strictly from the sideline with minimal support or interest in the purges that were occurring. Even the September MAC meeting that Lin convened was done at the request of the Chairman and followed Mao's order to "first criticize then protect." In addition, Lin abstained from making vicious comments about He, only noting that He had "problems." In contrast to Lin, Jiang Qing launched most of the artillery at the meeting at He. What should also be mentioned and be kept in mind is that He had very little political authority and influence within the PLA by the time of the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. Not only had Luo Ruiqing been removed, but He's position of running the daily affairs of the MAC had been cutoff at the emergency Shanghai meeting in December 1965. Thus, the accusation that Lin felt threatened by He's political power and prominence in the PLA lacks credence.

Overall, there is little factual, direct evidence that specifically links Lin to He's purge. What seems to be more precise, is that Ye's own personal concerns of being

exposed led her to push for the removal of a potential muckraker, while Mao, Jiang Qing, and Kang Sheng all viewed He as a key opponent to enhancing the struggle and radicalism of the Cultural Revolution. Lin's actions, when Lin does act, seem to be merely following the decisions or emotions of Mao. Once again the Chairman's feelings are the paramount priority when making key political decisions and Lin's political behavior is *reactive* rather than *proactive*.

The Attack on Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao's Ascendancy

The removal of Liu Shaoqi and subsequent rise of Lin Biao leads many to believe that Lin had a keen interest in Liu's close position with the Chairman. However, this analysis portrays a different Lin Biao, one who does not appear to have any interest in the position itself. It is not necessary to rummage and repeat the details of Liu's purge here; one should only mention that the violence against the Liu Shaoqi family was the orchestration of Mao and the dangerous Jiang Qing and CCRG radicals.

In assessing Lin's attitude toward his position under Mao it is first necessary to offer Lin's attitude toward Liu Shaoqi and his attitude toward the void he needed to fill following Liu's removal. Lin's personal feelings also illustrate a contradiction between the official understandings of Lin's involvement in the removal of Liu Shaoqi. According to Lin's daughter, Lin Doudou, Lin Biao felt that both Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were good comrades. In addition, after learning of his promotion to second on the Politburo, Lin plead illness and decided not to attend the conference announcing his new position. In an attempt to reverse the decision of moving Lin to second on the Politburo, Lin wrote an emotional letter to the Chairman, beseeching Mao for another Party member to take Lin's place. Lin also declared that he did not have the political acumen and

admiration to hold such a high place within the Party. Mao reportedly received the letter, commented on it, and returned it to Lin denying him his request. Lin reportedly ripped the letter up in frustration and threw it into a spittoon.¹⁷⁶ Lin also loathed the title of Vice Chairman, preferring its non-usage in official documents. In one instance Lin, while reviewing a document with his secretarial staff that was in circulation and had already been seen by the Chairman and Zhou Enlai, saw that he was referred to in the document as “Vice Chairman” and “Glorious Example.” Lin, when hearing that he had been labeled with these two titles objected stating, “Cross it out.” Ye Qun intervened however and stated “Do not cross it out!” Lin then stated, “Okay, okay, do not cross it out, this point is alright.”¹⁷⁷ In addition to Lin’s obvious distaste for being labeled “Vice Chairman” or “Glorious Example” is the demonstrative behavior of Ye Qun, always interposing her strong views upon Lin Biao and he easily swayed due to his ambivalent nature.

Lin’s public rhetoric also suggests no particular bitterness toward Liu. As his remarks illustrate which concluded the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, Lin showed no hostilities toward Liu but rather only mentioned that “mistakes in policy line led to a hindrance that was set upon the Great Cultural Revolution,” but that the “Chairman reversed the situation and enabled the Cultural Revolution to continue.” Unlike Lin, Chen Boda expressed a more stringent and acerbic speech, fiercely attacking the mistake in line committed by the work groups, a clear indicator that Chen attempted to point the finger at the fallacy performed by Liu and

¹⁷⁶ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenxue chubanshe, 1993) p. 215. Supposedly, Ye Qun took the torn pieces of the letter and pieced it back together. Rumor has it that the letter still exists in the Central Archives in Beijing today.

¹⁷⁷ Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil) (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) p. 372

Deng.¹⁷⁸ The absence of an even mildly pernicious attack on Liu by Lin is even more striking when one considers that Liu himself admitted his own errors of policy line regarding the work groups at the beginning of the conference. Moreover, Mao's explosive diatribe in "Bombard the Headquarters" published August 5 overtly set the tone and attitude for others to follow. Lin's statement at the conference was merely nothing more than an echo of the position that Mao and the radical Chen Boda took. Lin offered nothing new to the attack on Liu and his rhetoric was hardly tainted with hostility.

In some ways, through Liu's purge we can deduct that Lin had some understanding of Mao's tactical way of operating. Assuming Lin understood Mao's ambivalence Lin most likely took the safe political road, always obeying the Chairman and always agreeing with the Chairman. As Wang Nianyi has indicated, Lin took the attitude of, "If the Chairman circles, I circle it. If the Chairman agrees, I agree."¹⁷⁹ As discussed in the previous chapter, Lin's ambivalence and lack of emotion is partially attributed to the mental condition known as schizoid personality disorder. This aspect is particularly relevant as Lin had no inkling of the current decisions that were about to be made at the plenary session. Also, even if Lin had an idea of what decisions were going to be made, Lin absconded to Dalian and requested not to attend the conference due to health reasons. Mao personally ordered Wu Faxian to go to Dalian and escort Lin to Beijing. Wang Dongxing arranged for the conference to be held in the air-conditioned Zhejiang Hall of the Great Hall of the People which would permit climate control in the

¹⁷⁸ Xu Dashen, *Gongheguo shi ji* (Remembering the History of the People's Republic) (Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe), Vol. 3, p. 115 and p. 121, and Lowell Dittmer, *Liu Shaoqi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998) p. 77.

¹⁷⁹ Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil) (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) p. 372

room to meet Lin's required temperature setting.¹⁸⁰ We cannot accurately say if Lin was or was not ill at the time. Recalling Lin's anxious nature when in the company of others though, discussed in the previous chapter, it would not be difficult to fathom that part of Lin's reason for absence is due to the physical and mental toll such a public gathering may have upon him. It is thus difficult to put any sort of smoking gun in Lin's hand for the purge of Liu Shaoqi. Furthermore, there is simply no evidence that directly points to Lin as being a key plotter or decision-maker in the drop of Liu's status within the Party and his own ascendancy. The attack on Liu is purely one that was directed by key Central Cultural Revolutionary Small Group (CCRG) members such as Jiang Qing and Chen Boda; Party radicals such as Kang Sheng; and militant youths such as Kuai Dafu.

Lin thus, inherited a position that was one which he actually had little aspiration to hold. Lin was thrust into the seat of Vice Chairman and second in stature on the Politburo at the Chairman's request. Ambivalence abounded too, as Lin now stood on the side of the Chairman whose political barometer constantly changed, who would frequently argue one point but quickly make a one hundred and eighty degree turn and head in a completely different direction. For Lin, a man who showed little interest in politics, little actual emotion or clear stance, and who preferred anonymity due to schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder, a position close to the Chairman was hardly something that can be perceived as favorable. How Lin handled the coming chaos is the issue which this study now turns to.

Extending Chaos throughout the Country-August 1966-December 1966

¹⁸⁰ Ding Kaiwen, *Zhong shen Lin Biao zui an* (New Concepts in the Lin Biao Incident) (Carle Place: Mingjing chubanshe, 2004) p. 885

Disorder shortly followed the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee meeting as Mao endorsed disorder to take hold of the country in order to thoroughly criticize and remove the bourgeois reactionary line represented by Liu Shaoqi. As Mao stated on August 23, 1966, “The principal question is, what policy should we adopt regarding the so-called disturbances in various areas. My view is that we should let disorder reign for a few months....Even if there are no provincial Party committees, it does not matter.”¹⁸¹ New mass organizations were soon formed by radical students named Red Guards who became the instruments of disorder. The Chairman officially baptized their creation as he wore a Red Guard armband and wrote a letter to Peng Xiaomeng, the first person to organize a Red Guard group. A proliferation of Red Guard and rebel organizations soon followed. From August 18 through November 26, Mao personally reviewed millions of Red Guard organizations in public. The chaos that ensued is memorable and remains one of the saddest incidents in modern Chinese history. Red Guard organizations followed the call to attack the four olds: old custom, old culture, old habits, and old ideas. Street names were renamed such as the street where the Soviet Embassy sat which became “anti-revisionist road” (*fangxiu lu*), the old Dongan (Eastern Peace) market was renamed Donghong (East Wind) market since it was believed that the east wind represented socialism and the west wind represented capitalism. Historical monuments and relics were also destroyed as these pieces represented China’s past bourgeois feudal ideas. In Beijing, which has 6,843 classified historical sites, 4922 of them were damaged or destroyed from August to September 1966.¹⁸² Valuable paintings and old books were ripped apart, obliterated, and then burnt in an effervescent cloud of

¹⁸¹ Cited in Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993) p. 93

¹⁸² *Ibid* p. 98

smoke. Well known writers, artists, actors, and scholars all suffered horribly as Red Guards attacked them, condemning them as revisionists and for being culpable for carrying out a bourgeois reactionary line. The Ministry of Culture came under intense attack as over two thousand people were persecuted to death.

For the purposes of this study, it is necessary to now look at the impact that this period had on the PLA and Lin Biao's role. The PLA, like the universities around China, had work teams in place during the fifty day period under Liu Shaoqi in the summer of 1966. On August 7, following Mao's "Bombard the Headquarters" poster, Mao ordered that the work teams be removed from universities. The General Political Department in the PLA followed the Chairman's order. However, contrary to civilian units, the PLA confirmed that the Cultural Revolution would be directed by Party committees. The PLA also issued a series of rules and regulations restraining Cultural Revolution activities in the PLA and by students in military schools. The PLA thus contradicted the civilian sphere in that behavioral boundaries were clearly delineated for soldiers and students in military academies to follow and which could not be crossed. The ability of the PLA to participate in the Cultural Revolution was severely limited as it was argued that order needed to be maintained in some arenas.

In reaction to the restrictions placed upon military academies, PLA schools responded with a desire to participate in the "radicalism" (*zaofan*). Many military students traveled to Beijing and demanded that they receive the same amount of power as civilian students thereby granting them the right to engage in opposition to the bourgeois reactionary line. These demands were reported to Lin Biao by his administrative staff. At the same time, according to Zhang Yunsheng, a Red Guard representative from the

Second Military Medical School in Shanghai came to meet with Lin carrying a coat stained with blood and demanded Lin's support. Lin was moved by the meeting and soon met with the directors of differing Cultural Revolution committees. Lin brought the coat to the meeting, pointed to it, and stated, "We would be committing a big error unless we supported these students." Lin then gave an order to rehabilitate all students in military academies that had been accused of being revisionists by the then dismissed work groups. Lin also ordered that all the "black materials" relating to the students be destroyed. Lin gave permission to the students to engage in the "four bigs" (*sida*)-big character posters, great debates, airing one's views, and contending in a big way-to criticize the bourgeois reactionary line. Lin ordered that a document be drafted stating his demands. Directly following its drafting by Liu Zhijian, Mao looked the document over approved it, and stressed its importance.¹⁸³

The document came to be known as the October 5 directive. The directive clearly stated:

There is still the phenomenon of suppressing democracy....Therefore, based on the recommendation of Comrade Lin Biao, the cultural revolution movement in army academies and schools must do away with all the bonds that have shackled the mass movement...and there must be full development of democracy, with great blooming, great contending, big character posters, and great debates; and the army academies and schools should make themselves into good examples in this respect.¹⁸⁴

Lin, thus extended the movement into the military by permitting students at military academies to initiate, respond, and behave in similar fashion to the increasing radicalism occurring throughout the country by the Red Guards. The order reflected the position of

¹⁸³ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) pp. 42-43

¹⁸⁴ "Urgent Directive of the Military Commission and the General Political Department Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the Military Academies and Schools" from *CCP Documents of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1976* (Hong Kong: Union Press Limited, 1968) p. 85

the Cultural Revolutionary Group in abolishing excessive Party committee control over PLA educational units. The order was widely distributed as it reached all schools including those that were non-military.

Although Lin's can be viewed as being a primary initiator and extender of the Cultural Revolution into the military, his decision was heavily influenced by the current political tendencies of the time period. First, Lin was not the only firm supporter of the order. Zhou Enlai, Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, and Ye Jianying all buttressed the widespread proliferation of the document throughout the country and were present at multiple public readings of the document. On October 1, 1966, during the National Day Review, Mao stated atop the rostrum at Tiananmen that he would continue the Cultural Revolution at all costs, noting that no Party committees should be able to occlude its progressive transformation. As Wang Li recalls, the Chairman stated, "The Cultural Revolution must be carried through to the end. If anyone is to be shot for it, I will be shot along with you."¹⁸⁵ Wang noted in one source that "it seemed that the more rebuffs the Chairman met, the more determined he was to continue."¹⁸⁶ Mao possessed a constant seemingly never ending desire for extending the revolution. Initially, in February 1966, the Chairman held a limited vision of the Cultural Revolution and its length, believing that only a three month period was required to make the necessary cultural transformations in the Party and society. Wang Li notes that by October, when the bourgeois reactionary line was officially recognized within the Party, Mao favored a

¹⁸⁵ Wang Li, "Yi nian ling liangge yue de huiyi—1966 nian 6 yue zhi 1967 nian 8 yue." (Memoirs of a Year and Six Months—June 1966 to August 1967). Unpublished Manuscript appearing in *Chinese Law and Government* no. 6, 1994, p. 22

¹⁸⁶ Ibid

one year Cultural Revolution.¹⁸⁷ Implicit for this discussion of Lin Biao and the October 5 directive is that Lin made his decision for extending the revolution into the military academies during a time period that was shrouded with the Chairman's lust to prolong the fervency of the revolution. We can thus view Lin's promotion of the directive as reactionary, or somewhat crafty, as Lin flowed with the political winds which were brewed by a radical Mao.

Lin Biao's role within the growing trend to have representation to mass organizations is confined to merely repeating rhetoric that reflected the Chairman's own views, as he publicly backed the position of Mao and the CCRG radicals. Lin's most radical behavior during this time is the criticism he made against Gu Mu at several Central level meetings which were coincidentally accompanied by attacks from radical Wang Li against Tao Zhu. With the exception of mentioning Tao Zhu by name at the meeting, no record of Lin actually *denouncing* Tao Zhu exists, rather, Lin's attacks were limited mainly to Gu Mu, which can be viewed merely as finding a point of contention in order to show some sign of disgruntle so that his views matched the Chairman's. Moreover, Lin did not attack Zhou Enlai either, even though the Premier had assigned Tao Zhu and Gu Mu to draft, under Mao's orders, what became a blasphemous anti-Cultural Revolutionary document. Unlike Lin, Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng fervently attacked Tao Zhu. Officially, Tao was charged with objecting to the stoppage of production to engage in revolution. Tao, unlike Jiang, also supported the insertion of Deng Xiaoping in a photo that appeared throughout the country on the seventeenth anniversary of National Day. The source of the position that Lin eventually took must also be considered in our reexamination. One Party historian notes that the October 5

¹⁸⁷ Ibid p. 21

directive, a document that clearly was a catalyst in Lin's radical position which continued through December and which liberated students in military academies to participate in the Cultural Revolution, stemmed from a discussion at the rostrum at Tiananmen where Lin Doudou, Tao Shiliang (Tao Zhu's daughter), and Mao's daughter discussed and was critical of the suppression of army institutions. Lin Doudou then reportedly relayed the content of the conversation to Ye Qun who then ordered her to "blow wind in Lin's ear" on the matter and make it seem as if it came directly from Mao. If there is validity behind this claim then it illustrates two important points for our discussion. First, Ye is again acting as a political tactician, orchestrating and directing her family to manipulate and shape the views of Lin Biao. Second, we see Lin attempting to shape Lin's opinion. This suggests a Lin Biao who could be molded and was politically malleable. Once again, Lin's schizoid personality plays a role as his emotional detachment and lack of a clear stance on any particular issues allows those closest to him to steer him in certain directions. If this is indeed the case, then the majority of Lin's position from October through December—during the ongoing controversy surrounding the extension of the Cultural Revolution—can be perceived as being a reflection of Ye's own political, revolutionary agenda. Moreover, when we consider the desires by Ye Qun to gain favor from Jiang Qing and the CCRG radicals, then Ye's intentions becomes even more obvious as she not only is bolstering the position of the Party radicals but also one of Jiang's primary enemies—Tao Zhu.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ For more on Jiang's hatred for Tao Zhu see Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) pp. 115, 117. Jin Chunming, *Wenhua da geming shigao* (A Draft History of the Cultural Revolution) (Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996) p. 225. Qian Gang "Eryue bingbian zhenxiang" (The Truth About the February Mutiny) in ed. Zhou Ming, *Lishi zai zheli chensi: 1966-1976 nian jishi* (Thinking Deeply About History: A Factual Account of 1966-1976), (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe,

The role of Lin during the later months of 1966 can be viewed again as peripheral rather than a central figure. As we have seen, Lin's behavior is more reactive rather than proactive. Lin's October 5 directive can be viewed as a reflection of the Chairman's current wishes rather than Lin's own personal desires. In addition, Lin showed little interest in struggle sessions or outright attacks against fellow Party members. Lin for instance did not chair the struggle session against his friend Tao Zhu and he only briefly mentioned Gu Mu by name during a Party meeting attacking Tao. Moreover, after reviewing available evidence, the actual movement against Tao Zhu is primarily initiated by Jiang Qing for personal reasons, and the CRG members Kang Sheng and Chen Boda who loyally followed Jiang's lead. Even Lin's own reaction, after learning of Tao's attack against Jiang, was expressionless and showed no indication that Lin felt an attack on Tao should be commenced.

Coping with Chaos January-March 1967

Following the rise of mass organizations in November and December 1966, the New Year ushered in a massive movement around the country that called on the masses to overthrow the existing organs of power and to seize power for themselves. On December 30, Jiang Qing at Qinghua University issued a call commanding that in 1967 we "must begin an attack on every front."¹⁸⁹ This message set the tone for January 1967, as an editorial quickly followed after the New Year stating, "This is the year of nationwide class struggle."¹⁹⁰ At the heart of this movement was Mao's vision to create

1986) Vol. 2, p. 59. And Wang Li, "Yi nian ling liangge yue de huiyi—1966 nian 6 yue zhi 1967 nian 8 yue." (Memoirs of a Year and Six Months—June 1966 to August 1967). Unpublished Manuscript appearing in *Chinese Law and Government* no. 6, 1994, p. 26

¹⁸⁹ Qian Gang "Eryue bingbian zhenxiang" (The Truth About the February Mutiny) in ed. Zhou Ming, *Lishi zai zheli chensi: 1966-1976 nian jishi* (Thinking Deeply About History: A Factual Account of 1966-1976), (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1986) Vol. 2, p. 58

¹⁹⁰ Ibid

“great alliances” known as “revolutionary committees.” The committees were an amalgam of military representatives, members from mass organizations, and veteran Party cadres. The seizure of power and struggle, in Mao’s eyes, represented a thorough cleansing of the Party that would exorcise the bourgeois, revisionist line of Liu Shaoqi. The concept of power seizure was inspired by the events in Shanghai where rebels declared power over local municipal Party committees. The movement witnessed a series of strikes by rebellious workers that led to the desertion of Party posts which consequently allowed the rebels to seize power without disrupting the functionality of the economy. The Chairman blessed the movement, stating the rebels in Shanghai should be emulated by other revolutionaries throughout the country. On January 16, Mao authorized the publication of a *Red Flag* article, calling for Red Guards to seize control of organizations throughout the country. As the article notes, “to wrest power from these persons means the revolution of one class to overthrow another class...i.e. a revolution of the proletariat to overthrow the bourgeoisie.”¹⁹¹ Mao’s approval quickly paved the way for other attacks upon municipal authorities throughout the country. Power seizures occurred at the provincial level as well, as Shanxi’s provincial Party committee was removed on January 14, in Guangdong and Jiangsu on January 22, in Guizhou on January 25, in Anhui on January 26, in Beijing on January 28, and in Heilongjiang on January 31.¹⁹² The Party hailed the power seizures as “an extremely great pioneering undertaking,” a “great event without precedent in mankind’s history, a great event which has bearing on the future of the world and the destiny of mankind.”¹⁹³ Nobody was

¹⁹¹ Cited in Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993) p. 113

¹⁹² Ibid p. 114

¹⁹³ Ibid p. 115

immune to the violence, regardless of their rank within the Party. The minister of coal Zhang Linzhi was beaten to death. The secretary of the Shanxi provincial Party committee, Wei Heng, committed suicide after having been imprisoned and tortured by Red Guards.

The PLA was no exception to the increasing radicalism occurring throughout the country at this time. PLA cadres were both attacked and abused by surging forces throughout the country. Veteran cadres were criticized in harsh struggle sessions. In Beijing, large crowds surrounded Zhongnanhai where rebels demanded that military cadres Chen Yi and Li Xiannian emerge to meet the militant youths. In the official view, Zhou Enlai is seen as a protectorate of the old marshals, asking the fuming Red Guards to cease their harsh attacks upon the military veterans. For instance, the old marshal Zhu De, life-long comrade to Mao and former commander-in-chief of the Red Army during the pre-Liberation period, faced stringent attacks by Red Guards but was rescued by Zhou. The situation only exacerbated as soon as the aforementioned January 16 article in *Red Flag* appeared calling for the seizure of power from a handful of capitalists in the Party.

Within this atmosphere, orthodox histories perceive Lin as a figure who supported the inciting attacks on the PLA and utilized the continuous anarchy as a means to strengthen his position within the military. However, as with many cases thus far, the official version contradicts what Lin's true intentions are.

Beginning in early January and continuing through February 1967, an enlarged meeting of the CMC was held at the Jingxi Guesthouse and at Huairen Hall. The meetings placed CMC members and CCRG radicals against one another. The

congregation was filled with emotion and intensity as Marshalls Xu Xiangqian and Nie Rongzhen denounced the radicalism occurring throughout the country, arguing that it had debilitating affects on the production of agriculture and industry, and the ability of the PLA to effectively operate under such stringent conditions.

On February 11 at Huairen Hall, a Politburo meeting was held and was attended by CCRG members. The engagement quickly turned into another fierce attack between the Marshalls and the CCRG. On February 13, Ye Jianying attacked the CCRG, exclaiming, “You have caused chaos, you have caused chaos in the government, in industry, in agriculture! But this still is not enough; you want to cause chaos in the military!”¹⁹⁴

Tan Zhenlin wrote a personal letter to both Mao and Lin Biao which expressed his complaints about the developments of the Cultural Revolution and the continuous torture that Party cadres had experienced stating, “Nearly all [Party cadres] have struggled, worn the dunce cap, and rode the airplane.”¹⁹⁵ Tan pointed out that the cause of the disaster was due to the evil acts of a few people who hoped to usurp power for themselves. Tan also mentioned Chen Boda and Jiang Qing by name, saying that they should be held accountable.

On the evening of February 16, the day that witnessed the most virulent attacks upon the CCRG, Yao Wenyan, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, and Wang Li reported the events of the day to Jiang Qing. Jiang composed a quick letter stating, “Chairman, Zhang, Yao, and I have a very important matter to report to you. I hope that you will see

¹⁹⁴ Qian Gang “Eryue bingbian zhenxiang” (The Truth About the February Mutiny) in ed. Zhou Ming, *Lishi zai zheli chensi: 1966-1976 nian jishi* (Thinking Deeply About History: A Factual Account of 1966-1976), (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1986) Vol. 2, p. 64

¹⁹⁵ Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil) (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) p. 211

us quickly.” Only a few hours later, at 10 p.m., Mao received them and listened to their report concerning the events that transpired. The Chairman did not respond to the report from Zhang Chunqiao, Kang Sheng, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Li, he only smiled.¹⁹⁶ However, Mao soon became concerned. Consequently, on February 18, the Chairman convened a Politburo meeting where he expressed his support for the CCRG. Mao claimed that the CCRG is wrong “one, two, three percent of the time but correct ninety seven percent of the time.”¹⁹⁷ The Chairman also suggested that “Whoever opposes the CCRG, I will firmly oppose them!” Ye Qun, who was attending the meeting on behalf of Lin Biao, was told by the Chairman, “Comrade Ye Qun, you go and tell Lin Biao that his position is not secure, there are people who want to take his place. He and I will go back to Jinggangshan and then wage a guerilla war!”¹⁹⁸

This study will now examine Lin Biao’s role within the January-February period. As the evidence below shows a Lin Biao contradicts the typical image of a man who supported continuing chaos in order to bolster his own power position in the PLA.

It cannot be denied that Lin knew of the ensuing chaotic situation occurring throughout the country in January, as well as the increasing pressure and violence the PLA experienced from student radicals. As Zhang Yunsheng recalls, several reports came into Maojiawan. One report detailed the attacks that eight military commanders in the region had been subjected to from various military academies. Commander Xu Shiyou’s situation had become so bad that he constantly drank and threatened to kill himself if he

¹⁹⁶ Wang Li, “Yi nian ling liangge yue de huiyi—1966 nian 6 yue zhi 1967 nian 8 yue.” (Memoirs of a Year and Six Months—June 1966 to August 1967), Unpublished Manuscript appearing in *Chinese Law and Government* no. 6, 1994, p. 47

¹⁹⁷ Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil) (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) p. 216

¹⁹⁸ Ibid

were touched. A report came from Shenyang, in which the Vice Commander of the military region, Tang Zian, was reported to having been assaulted and almost tortured to death by radicals. Commander Han Xianchu of the Fuzhou military region reported to Maojiawan that radical students had done nothing but “fool around, causing all kinds of chaos and trouble that has interfered with our preparation for war. If this continues, I’ll go up into the mountain and engage in guerilla war.” In Beijing, military leadership organs all around the city were subjected to attacks.¹⁹⁹ In reaction to these broadcasts, Lin was not apathetic but rather decided to take action. Lin personally gathered all the telegrams he received from the varying military regions to give to the Chairman for examination. On January 20, 1967, Lin held an urgent meeting with Marshals Ye Jianying and Nie Rongzhen, Xu Shiyou, and Chief of the General Staff Department Yang Chengwu. The meeting, according to Zhang Yunsheng, was a detailed discussion of the attacks that were occurring on PLA leaders throughout the country and the need to outlaw any attacks made upon PLA leaders.²⁰⁰ On January 24, Marshal Xu Xiangqian personally visited Maojiawan and spoke with Lin Biao. Lin and Xu were not particularly close. Both knew each other from their days as students at the Huangpu Military Academy during the pre-Liberation period, but both Lin and Xu fought on separate fields of battle during the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. Moreover, Xu, like Lin, was known to struggle with intra-Party personal relationships. However, these

¹⁹⁹ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) p. 76

²⁰⁰ Ibid p. 77

detriments did not hinder collaboration between Lin and Xu in response to the anarchy thundering its way through China.²⁰¹ As Xu Xiangqian recalls:

On January 24, 1967 after dinner, I sat down with Lin Biao at Maojiawan. I went straight to the point. I told Lin about the present chaotic situation in the military and told him that the military needed stability. When chaos is like this it is not good. Lin Biao nodded in agreement and stated, 'Yes, there cannot be chaos in the military. I will make a document.' At that time Lin left immediately and ordered his secretaries to compose the Eight points.²⁰²

Seven points were drawn up and passed to the Chairman for his approval.

According to Xu Xiangqian, Lin personally took the points to the Chairman at Zhongnanhai on the evening of January 28. Mao reviewed the points, readily agreed, and added another—"Educate the Children of Cadres." The Eight Points stipulated that:

The question of assaults on military leading organs which had already taken place should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. If assaults were made by counterrevolutionaries, they should be suppressed, but no action was needed if leftists were responsible for the attacks. Henceforth no assaults or exchange of revolutionary experience shall be permitted in units of the armed forces dealing with war preparation systems and security....Armies, divisions, regiments, battalions, companies and special units designated by the Military Commission should not carry out the Cultural Revolution.²⁰³

The Chairman approved the Eight Points, stating, "The Eight Points are very good. Have them issued." Reportedly following the Chairman's approval, Lin Biao uncharacteristically burst into emotion and shouted, "Long live Chairman Mao! Long live Chairman Mao! (*wan wan sui*)"²⁰⁴ What is significant in our analysis is that in January 1967, Lin Biao supported a political move that would counter the chaos that was then

²⁰¹ Liu Peiyi, *Yuanshuai wannian suiyue: Wenge zhongde gongheguo yuan shuai* (The Twilight Years of the Marshals: The Party's Marshals in the Middle of the Cultural Revolution of the People's Republic), (Beijing: Zhongguo da baikequanshu chubanshe, 2000) p. 327

²⁰² Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil) (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) pp. 195-196

²⁰³ Cited in Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993) pp. 137-138

²⁰⁴ Wang Nianyi, *Dadongluan de niandai* (Years of Great Turmoil) (Henan: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988) p. 196

consuming the military. Unlike the Lin Biao that is seen in orthodox Party histories, the Lin Biao seen in this study, actually reacted and responded to the calls for help to reduce the chaos occurring in the country, particularly against the military. However, what should also be kept in mind is that Lin, again, did not create the Eight Points proactively but rather reactively after meeting with Xu Xiangqian and hearing about the continued troubles that PLA figures were encountering throughout the country.

Within the context of the politically tumultuous time of January-February 1967, Lin failed to take a clear, defined stance without knowing the position of another first. In the context of Tan Zhenlin's critical letter, mentioned above, the Chairman became concerned over the direction that the February meetings were taking after receiving Tan Zhenlin's letter, however Lin showed no reaction to the blasphemous comments made in Tan Zhenlin's letter. In fact, Zhang Yunsheng specifically states that Lin initially ignored Tan's letter and that it was not until *after* a February 19 meeting when Mao publicly denounced the behavior of certain military officials that Lin wrote stinging remarks about Tan. Lin commented on the letter he sent to Mao that Tan's thoughts "are becoming worse." Mao, upon receiving the letter, did not comment on the letter and returned it to Lin Biao unmarked.²⁰⁵

Lin's passive behavior contradicts the demonstrative role of Ye Qun during this time period. During a visit made to Maojiawan by Jiang Qing and Wang Li on February 18, Jiang informed Lin Biao and Ye Qun about the events at Huairan Hall. Lin did not

²⁰⁵ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) p. 95, Wen Feng, *Shentanxia de Lin Biao* (Lin Biao Down to Earth) (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1993) p. 107. Lin threw the letter away in aggravation. As Teiwes and Sun have noted, Lin's frustration stemmed from his inability, in this instance, to curry favor with the Chairman rather than the normal perception that Lin's supposed "plot" to overthrow Tan had been foiled. See Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 78

respond to anything Jiang stated. Following this meeting Ye Qun quickly went to Diaoyutai and reportedly stated, “Those old men, they oppose Chairman Mao, attack the *shouzhang* [Lin Biao], and slander Jiang Qing. They want to perform a coup.” Later, Ye’s personal assistant came upon materials from Party radicals Wang Li and Zhang Chunqiao. The documents were filled with inflamed details that were outrageous exaggerations of what truly transpired at Huairen Hall in early February.²⁰⁶ Ye, as noted above, also attended the Chairman’s meeting where he expressed his continued support for the CCRG. According to Wang Landuo, Ye stated that Lin was not permitted to go to the meeting since he is not coping well with the issue.²⁰⁷ Ye Qun, according to Zhang Yunsheng, was also remembered as playing both sides of the political game. Zhang Yunsheng recalls a conversation held between Ye Qun and Marshall Ye Jianying who expressed his pleasure and happiness at the turn of events against the CCRG at Huairen Hall.²⁰⁸

Shortly following the Chairman’s public support of Party radicals, the CCRG did not forget the salvos of criticism from early February. From late February through March, Huairen Hall hosted the CCRG’s return attack upon the PLA Marshalls. Kang Sheng led an attack stating, “Xu Xiangqian, the military is not yours. Do you want a reversal of verdicts for Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping? Do you wish to oppose the Party?” It was also added that the PLA Marshalls had “slandered Chairman Mao,” “opposed Chairman Mao’s revolutionary path,” “opposed the Great Cultural Revolution,” “denied the Yan’an Rectification movement,” and “protected the old cadres, protected the rebels, and

²⁰⁶ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) pp. 151-154

²⁰⁷ Ibid p. 157

²⁰⁸ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) pp. 86-90

protected the spies.”²⁰⁹ On March 10, 1967, Wang Li, Qi Benyu, and Guan Feng accompanied Tan Houlan to the Agricultural College where they participated in attacks against Minister of Agriculture Tan Zhenlin.²¹⁰

According to available evidence, Ye Qun, on behalf of Lin Biao, attended the meetings which attacked the PLA Marshals. One source notes that Ye Qun recalled receiving a dirty look during one meeting from Marshal Ye Jianying. During the period that witnessed the reversal against the Marshals, Ye Qun warned the Maojiawan staff that Marshals Nie Rongzhen or Ye Jianying may attempt to visit Maojiawan in order to meet with Lin Biao. Ye ordered the staff to turn them away so that Lin would not have any interaction with them.²¹¹ Despite Ye Qun’s control of the flow of information into Maojiawan, one source indicates that Lin Biao did offer some sympathy to Marshal Ye Jianying in March 1967, when Ye was forced to participate in harsh struggle sessions. Lin reportedly learned that Ye Jianying requested a period of rest since his health was in poor shape. Lin Biao averred his appeal and also told his secretary to inform Ye that he can take time to think over the issue concerning the struggle he was currently entangled in. Lin allegedly intimated to his secretary that Ye Jianying is a heroic soldier and has done many meritorious deeds.²¹²

Similar to other events thus far reviewed throughout this chapter, Lin Biao is not seen at the forefront of the political battle. Lin is aloof and rarely formulates an opinion or stance. Ye Qun however is a vibrant political actor. Ye’s control of information to Lin,

²⁰⁹ Qian Gang “Eryue bingbian zhenxiang” [The Truth About the February Mutiny] in ed. Zhou Ming, *Lishi zai zheli chensi: 1966-1976 nian jishi* [Thinking Deeply About History: A Factual Account of 1966-1976], (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1986) Vol. 2, p. 72

²¹⁰ Ibid p. 75

²¹¹ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) pp. 159-160

²¹² Wen Feng, *Shentanxia de Lin Biao* (Lin Biao Down to Earth) (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 1993) p. 110

ordering the Maojiawan staff to forbid visits from PLA Marshalls has also been observed. Indeed, in this section it is evident that Ye Qun would frequently *ba guan* (guard the pass). However, perhaps what is most striking after the review of the January-March 1967 period is that Lin did respond to his fellow Marshals' calls for assistance in creating an order that would deny continuing violence upon military leaders. The behavior seen by Lin is a contrariety to the more standard account damning account of Lin that historians have become accustomed to. But, as alluded to earlier, Lin's behavior is seen as reactive rather proactive. Just as Lin was easily swayed by the demands and positions of his wife, so to was Lin formed and directed by his fellow Marshals. What is telling in this behavior is that Lin, most likely, was reactive since he most likely lacked an overall position. The lack of position on Lin's part can be partially attributed to Lin's lack of political acumen and, most likely, his overall lack of emotion or feeling—a key trait in schizoid personality disorder.

The Wuhan Incident, the Arming of the Left, and Countering the Left

The infamous Wuhan Incident which witnessed the attack on Wang Li and Xie Fuzhi by a “conservative” faction backed by local Wuhan military commander Chen Zaidao, led to a radical upsurge that disseminated prolific attacks against PLA units throughout the country. By August-September, following months of excessive violence and disorder, a reigning in of the left occurred in policy leading to a resumption of PLA and Party authority.

Lin is seen as a primary instigator of the continuing extension of lawlessness throughout the country following the July 20 Wuhan incident in Chinese sources. Western sources are less grating on Lin though as they tend to present him as a figure

who vacillates between the pursuit of increasing radicalization by the CCRG and the need to provide some form of stability in the military.

First, it should be noted, that Lin declined to attend the welcoming reception for Wang Li and Xie Fuzhi on July 22, two Party members portrayed as heroes due to their actions in Wuhan. On July 26, at the Jingxi Guesthouse, Zhou Enlai managed an organized criticism and dismissals of Chen Zaidao and Zhong Hanhua. Marshal Xu Xiangqian, General Peng Shaohui, and first political commissar of the Wuhan military Wang Renzhong were also relieved of their positions at the meeting for having been accused of supporting Chen. According to Zhang Yunsheng, Lin showed little enthusiasm to the revolutionary fervor surrounding the removal of Chen Zaidao. As Zhang reported the news of that the Jingxi guesthouse had been surrounded by fervent demonstrators shouting, “Down with Chen Zaidao,” Ye Qun responded, “This is a revolutionary deed which we should support.” Lin, unlike Ye, remained silent, choosing not to comment on the situation.²¹³ As we have seen in previous examples throughout this chapter, Lin chose not to attend the public function, shying away from making a public appearance. In fact, Lin asked Zhou to preside over the criticism session of Chen Zaidao for him, further illustrating Lin’s aversion to attend functions and to be in social situations—no doubt due to Lin’s social anxiety disorder.²¹⁴ Not only does Lin’s absence from the meeting speak volumes concerning his interest in political matters, it also questions the validity of the commonly seen perspective that Lin wanted to remove Chen for reasons dealing with Lin’s ability to control Chen and his loyalty to Lin. As most

²¹³ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) p. 129

²¹⁴ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, *Zhou Enlai nianpu 1949-1976* (Chronology of Zhou Enlai 1949-1976), (Beijing: Zhonggong wenxian chubanshe, 1997) p. 931, 3 Vols.

would assume, if Lin viewed Chen as an uncontrollable military regional head, he would most likely exhibit some form of emotion to his removal. But, in typical Lin Biao fashion, he showed little interest to Chen's removal.²¹⁵

Perhaps one of the most vivid illustrations however that should be considered in lessening the amount of blame upon Lin is Lin's infamous letter to Mao in 1967. In the letter, Lin brandished his concerns for the proliferation of weapons amongst the masses, completely contradicting the persona of a man aimed at continued violence and chaos for his own political means. Lin, assessing the situation, declared in the letter that, "the issue at the moment is still one of opposing factions and escalating armed struggles.... In particular, there is the matter of the theft of rifles from the armed forces. Such thefts are already occurring in five provinces in the south. This seems to be a growing trend and we urgently need to find a way of putting it to an end."²¹⁶ The letter was transferred to Diaoyutai where it was reviewed by Qi Benyu, Guan Feng, Chen Boda, and Yao Wenyuan. The letter was flown direct to Mao, who was still in Shanghai, where he responded most optimistically. According to Mao, there was no need to worry about the weapons seizures, feeling that the appropriate measures would be taken at the appropriate time.

Lin also showed little zealousness for Mao's "arming the left" policy in public. In a public speech made on August 9, Lin made no reference to Mao's policy, opting instead

²¹⁵ Lin's lack of emotion to Chen's removal also undercuts any potential personal animosities that Lin may have held toward Chen. One source of tension between Chen and Lin could possibly stem from be from a personal matter between Lin and Chen. According to Chen Zaidao's memoir for instance, Lin may have been upset by Chen's failure to return to Wuhan in 1965 to greet him when Lin visited Wuhan on an inspection trip. This example is cited in Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 82

²¹⁶ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) p. 129. Wang Li also makes note of this in *Wang Li fan silu* (Wang Li Opposes Trends of Thought), (Xianggang: Beixing chubanshe, 2001) p. 1013

to focus his comments on giving praise to Lieutenant General Zeng Siyu and Major General Liu Feng, the newly appointed heads of the Wuhan military region. Lin's only mention of the deluge of mass arming throughout the country was an interjection he made during a report on the situation in Wuhan by Zeng and Liu. Lin jeered, "It is very clear how *they* viewed the situation; *we* [on the other hand] *must comply* with Chairman Mao's instructions, arm the left and distribute rifles to the masses."²¹⁷ Implicit in Lin's footnote to Zeng and Liu's speech for our purposes is that whatever backing that Lin gave to the movement, it was merely to follow the wishes of the Chairman who felt that the growing turmoil possessed propitious qualities.

Another point that must be considered is that by mid-August, Lin absconded to Beidaihe leaving matters in the hands of Ye Qun and Wu Faxian. Lin therefore missed the formal appointment of the Military Commission Management group on August 17, an organization composed of Ye Qun, Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo, and Zhang Xiuchuan. The organization was created by Jiang Qing, under an order from Zhou Enlai, and was meant to oversee the Cultural Revolution in the military and to report directly to the CCRG. Thus, in Lin's absence, Ye Qun took control of formal political issues. Once again, we see Lin Biao existing outside the political perimeters of Beijing and his disinterest overall in politics. Ye Qun, again acting as Lin's political housekeeper, was put in his place during the meeting, in all likely hood due to Lin's despising of public functions and lack of emotion toward politics in general.

What is perhaps the most clear, delineating factor that exonerates Lin from the disruption and violence following the Wuhan incident is the degree of responsibility that

²¹⁷ Michael Schoenhals, "Why Don't We Arm the Left? Mao's Culpability for the Cultural Revolution's Great Chaos of 1967", *China Quarterly*, no. 182 (2005). p. 288

should be placed upon Mao for the continuing anarchy. Existing evidence clearly shows that the Chairman had keen interests in the masses continued pursuit of radical action against conservative mass organizations and the military. As Mao noted in an August 4 letter to Jiang Qing, Mao stressed that there existed an urgent need for the dismissal and attack on elements in society that had begun to tilt toward the political right. According to the Chairman, more than 75 percent of the PLA officer corps “supports the [civilian] right” and “by arming the [civilian] left on a massive scale” and by having “the masses exercise dictatorship,” so Mao told Jiang, “the left will gain great fame and high prestige, while the arrogance of the right will be kept in check.”²¹⁸ When amalgamating both Lin and the Chairman’s position, we clearly see a contradiction between two key Party figures: Lin Biao was a key member concerned about the pejorative violence occurring throughout the country, and Mao, who favored the continued engendering of armed chaos. What is key for this analysis of Lin Biao is that he attempted, uncharacteristically, to take initiative and address his concerns for the country which was drowning in a welter of gunfire and strife. This was evident in Lin’s proclamation of the Seven Points, though his decision may have been influenced by Xu Xiangqian, his letter to Mao regarding the increasing violence in August, and the display made in public on August 9. Thus, labeling Lin as liable for the radical expatriation of violence in the summer months of 1967 is questionable as the initiative for instability can be clearly linked to Mao and Lin showed some tendencies to curb excessive violence currently occurring throughout the country.

Regarding the formal removal of Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu, Lin also does not appear to have played any significant role. In fact, Lin did not even respond to

²¹⁸ Ibid p. 281

Yang Chengwu who visited Lin in Beidaihe to report about the situation. Reportedly, upon hearing of the situation, Lin simply shook his head. Yang asked if Lin had any instruction regarding their dismissal to which Lin denied.²¹⁹ Furthermore, the removal of Wang, Guan, and Qi should be considered purges that were exercised by Mao in order to curb the excessive violence in the country that had begun to be too much even for Mao's taste. Wang, Guan, and Qi were simply expendable pawns in Mao's brutal political game.

The Yang-Yu-Fu Incident

The Yang-Yu-Fu case erupted as part of the growing power the PLA possessed following the removal of Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu and the movement to decrease excessive leftism. In late 1967 and early 1968 Yang Chengwu had been responsible for resolving provincial disputes and assisted in the "appropriate" formation of the new provincial revolutionary committees.²²⁰ Yang supported a "conservative" coalition of military units and mass organizations, thus following the trends of the new "anti ultra-left" policies favored by Chairman Mao. But these activities inevitably led to conflict with the CCRG radicals who began to fear a "rightist verdict of reversals." In terms of purposes of political power, it is commonly assumed that Lin supported the removals of Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Fu Chongbi since his their replacements were Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, and Wen Yucheng respectively, all close supporters of Lin Biao.

These three generals and their mysterious dismissals remain one of the most bizarre and troubling events of the Cultural Revolution. There mistakes were summarized

²¹⁹ Dong Baocun, *Yang Yu Fu Shijian zhenxiang* (The Truth About the Yang-Yu-Fu Incident), (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987) pp. 76-77. Dong also notes that Lin Biao's room was completely bare in Beidaihe and dark with the curtains drawn. Lin also was described as appearing like a corpse during this meeting.

²²⁰ The new revolutionary committees, which followed the three-in-one combination aimed to place more "conservative" elements to be elected.

by Lin Biao on the evening of March 24, to an audience that contained Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, and Ye Qun. The content of Lin's speech focused primarily on the three serious errors of Yang Chengwu: 1) mountaintopism 2) Yang's double dealing and two faced nature 3) Yang's gross distortion of Marxist-Leninism. Lin only briefly mentioned the mistakes committed by Yu Lijin and Fu Chongbi. Puzzlingly, Lin never mentioned the alleged conservative stance that Yang-Yu-Fu took toward the Cultural Revolution which was then being cited as a possible oncoming "second February Adverse current." The speech itself that Lin provided was an outline provided by Mao. Thus, again, we see the key, central role that Mao and the CCRG plays in dictating policy and the political direction of the country.

According to Lin Biao's speech, Yang's "mountaintopism" was a betrayal of communism, as it supported the mentality that only a small few can be trusted—a direct betrayal of the Communist Party and the historical fact that the Chinese Revolution was won by the entire Party. Yang's error and the source of Lin's accusation stemmed from Yang's refusal to employ cadres unless they had worked with him in the Shanxi-Hebei military region during the Chinese Civil War period. As Lin Biao stated, "The total military victory was achieved by the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Field Armies."²²¹ Lin noted that "mountaintopism" leads to "all kinds of bad behavior. This kind of backward thinking can evoke traitorous behavior—some of this has already become a reality."²²² Lin buttressed the argument that Yang, together with Yu Lijin, had plotted the overthrow of PLAAF commander Wu Faxian, and Beijing political commissar and head of the Beijing revolutionary committee Xie Fuzhi. In addition, Yang was also

²²¹ Michael Kau, *The Lin Piao Affair: Power, Politics, and Military Coup* (White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975) p. 490

²²² Ibid

accused of harboring a strident personal ambition to remove Xu Shiyou, Han Xianchu, and Huang Yongsheng.²²³

The next element of Yang's crimes was his "double-dealing" and "two faced" behavior. As Lin stated, "Yang Chengwu's political character is evil. He is a two-faced, three sworded man."²²⁴ Lin accused Yang of giving the appearance of opposing Luo Ruiqing, He Long, and Peng Zhen, but, had in fact, sided with them and their beliefs. "Everyone thought that Yang Chengwu opposed Luo Ruiqing, but in fact he was a Luo Ruiqing element—he followed closely behind Luo....He took part in the struggle against Peng Zhen, but actually he supported Peng Zhen."²²⁵ In addition, Lin stated that Yang had pretended to support Jiang Qing and the actions of the CCRG, but, in actuality, Yang had collected material about her for which he intended to utilize in order to expose her and contaminate her reputation.

The article Yang Chengwu had written and appeared in People's Daily on August 24, 1967, entitled "To Establish the Absolute Authority of Great Mao Zedong Thought" was also used against Yang during Lin's speech. According to Lin Biao, the Chairman disagreed with Yang's application and terminology of "absolute authority". As Lin noted in his speech, "Chairman Mao said, 'This way of bringing up absolute authority is not proper, for never has there been separate absolute authority. All authority is relative; all absolute things exist within relative things.' Marxism does not recognize isolated absolutes."²²⁶ With this statement, Yang's errors officially extended into an ideological realm, as he was accused of foul interpretations and ideological deviations of Marxism.

²²³ Ibid p. 488

²²⁴ Ibid p. 492-493

²²⁵ Ibid p. 493-494

²²⁶ Ibid p. 497

Lin Biao also prosecuted Fu Chongbi for having led two trucks full of armed soldiers into Diaoyutai with the intention of arresting people. Interestingly, Lin did not directly address any wrongdoings by Yu Lijin, although his name was mentioned briefly as a figure in Yang's plot to usurp power from Wu Faxian and take control of the PLAAF.

While reading Lin's public statement that was given on March 24, 1968, can be interpreted as conclusive evidence that Lin obviously knew of Yang's downfall and his own belief that he was attempting to commandeer control of the military, more specifically the PLAAF, a critical review of available evidence invites other interpretations and factors that must also be carefully considered.

Before critically reviewing this case it is important to briefly mention the close inner-working personal relationship that existed between Lin Biao and Yang Chengwu. Lin and Yang had contact with each other as early as 1930. In the Jiangxi base areas, Yang acted as commander and political commissar of a division under Lin Biao's 1st army corps. On the Long March, Yang also served as one of Lin's subordinates. Their relationship extended into the post-Liberation period as Yang and Lin reportedly developed a close working relationship following Lin's appointment as Defense Minister in 1959. After the purge of Luo Ruiqing in 1965, Yang's power, influence, and intimacy with Lin grew even more as Yang became Chief of the General Staffs Department. Yang was thus, as in the words of Barnouin and Yu, "Lin's man". Yang's career was made possible principally by Lin's backing and trust.²²⁷ With this in mind, the argument that Lin removed Yang to replace him with an individual who was close to him, in this case

²²⁷ Dong Baocun, *Yang Yu Fu Shijian zhenxiang* (The Truth About the Yang-Yu-Fu Incident), (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987) pp. 114-115 and Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993) p. 168

Huang Yongsheng, becomes highly questionable. According to official sources though, shortly following the onset of the unstable and tumultuous Cultural Revolution the camaraderie and trust seeped slowly away between Lin and Yang. Lin's gradual disappearance in trust for Yang, though not formally stated in Lin's accusations of March 24, was a key primary motivator for his dismissal and is the first point of discussion and reconsideration here. In addition, the role of Ye Qun in Yang's dismissal also is apparent as she, most likely, supported the move to purge Yang in an effort to continue to curry favor to Jiang Qing and the CCRG. As seen further below, the Yang-Yu-Fu purge fell within the context of curbing a possible return of rightism in the Party.

In July 1967, Yang was assigned to escort the Chairman to Wuhan, where he would accompany him and help insure his safety and security. The purpose of the Chairman's trip was inspection; the Chairman personally planned to speak with varying military and civilian Party figureheads. During the inspection tour, Mao made several comments pertaining to Cultural Revolution trends. First, Mao noted that the Cultural Revolution needed to occur for a total of three full years, thus concluding in 1968. Second, Mao made several complimentary remarks about several old marshals who had recently been under heavy fire during the Cultural Revolution. Mao remarked that Zhu De, was a red commander in chief; Ye Jianying, during important moments had made good contributions; Chen Yi is a good comrade; Nie Rongzhen is an honest man; Commander Xu should not be persecuted; He Long was the banner of the second front army.²²⁸ The third comment made by the Chairman occurred in Shanghai. The Chairman noticed a newspaper which had the "four greats" plastered all over its front page in Lin's

²²⁸ Dong Baocun, *Yang Yu Fu Shijian zhenxiang* (The Truth About the Yang-Yu-Fu Incident), (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987) pp 43, 47

calligraphy. After seeing this, the Chairman confided to Yang asking who gave him the title of the “four greats”. The Chairman also noted the slogan “forever healthy” (*yongyuan jiansheng*), a slogan that was popular due to Lin’s rumored health problems, that accompanied the “four greats” in the headline. The Chairman questioned the validity of “forever healthy” asking, “What is ‘forever healthy’?” The Chairman also inquired if it were the “forever healthy” (a nickname for Lin Biao) that had given him the title of the “four greats”. After the Chairman’s critique, he emphasized that the “four greats” should no longer be propagandized, rather the focus and praise should be placed on Marxist-Leninism and that Marxist-Leninism should be thoroughly reinforced throughout public media channels.²²⁹

Yang Chengwu, under orders from Zhou Enlai and Mao, did not relay Mao’s statements to Lin Biao. Yang’s obstruction of information from Lin is the first source of tension that caused for Maojiawan’s relationship with Yang to turn sour. One evening, Ye Qun met with Yang and inquired about his southern tour with Mao. Lin Biao was not present during the meeting, but at the seaside town of Beidaihe trying to relax. Yang mentioned nothing of Mao’s crucial comments concerning the Cultural Revolution or of his praise for the old Marshals. The meeting reportedly was warm and cordial though. Following the discussion, Ye Qun met with Wu Faxian. Ye requested that Wu meet with Yang and inquire about the Chairman’s actions during his southern tour so as to make sure Yang had disclosed everything. Wu, reportedly, casually asked Yang about what criticisms the Chairman had of Lin and what comments he had made. Yang simply dismissed the question, responding that no negative statements had been made, thus illustrating that Yang covertly had no intention of disclosing what Mao had stated.

²²⁹ Ibid pp. 45

Yang's non-disclosure of pertinent information initiated an ever decreasing spiral of suspicion of Yang's intentions toward Maojiawan. Beliefs began to form toward Yang as to a possible usurpation of power in the military. In addition to Yang's lack of information sharing, oft-handed comments quickly turned into venomous accusations and poisoning thoughts that only exacerbated the situation. In one incident, Wu asked Yang, "There is so much chaos occurring throughout the country now. Do you know what can be done to stabilize the situation?" Yang affirmed the omnipotent position of Mao stating "Whatever the Chairman decides and agrees to. If the Chairman wants chaos, only the Chairman can stabilize it". Wu countered Yang's statement, saying "No, there is still Vice Chairman Lin" to which Yang blasted, "The key is Chairman Mao!"²³⁰

The second source of hatred and animosity toward Yang Chengwu stemmed from his decision to avoid any personal backing for Ye Qun during her plight with the anonymous letters written by Lu Dingyi and Yan Weibing. As mentioned above, the letters vitiated Ye Qun's image, accusing her of being a "sham Party member" alleging that she had failed to pass through the procedures which were required to join the Party and that she had lucid and profound connections to the Guomindang prior to the liberation of the country. Lin Biao, in an effort to clear his wife's name, telephoned Yang

²³⁰ In another episode, Yang Chengwu, during a major PLA meeting at the Jingxi Guesthouse, failed to accurately shout the slogan that pertained to Lin Biao. Instead of shouting, "To the Forever Healthy Lin Biao" Yang omitted "forever" (*yongyuan*) from the slogan. When the rallying cries from the crowd ensued, the slogan was heard as "To the Healthy Lin Biao". Lin Biao did not attend the conference, however, Ye Qun was present and Yang later realized his error and offered food and drink with Ye to ameliorate the situation. Ye denied the request and left Yang with an icy departure. In a similar incident, Yang failed to raise his hand in exclamation during a General Staffs meeting during the slogan, "We Always Wish Good Health for Vice Chairman Lin". Quick conclusions were drawn as a consequence to these trivial yet important events. Conclusions from Yang's behavior led to alternative perceptions, as Wu Faxian colorfully mentioned to Ye Qun in one discussion, "Yang Chengwu looks down upon Vice Chairman Lin." See Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) pp. 173-174 and Dong Baocun, *Yang Yu Fu Shijian zhenxiang* (The Truth About the Yang-Yu-Fu Incident), (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987) p. 114

Chengwu and met with him about the matter. Lin appealed to Yang, asking him to write a letter and circulate it to the Party that would explicitly avouch Ye Qun's Party authenticity. The letter, Lin implored, needed to state that Ye Qun had joined the Party at the age of sixteen. Lin added that he had dispatched a series of investigators to confirm the matter and mentioned they had found conclusive evidence which professed Ye's membership in the Party but that these individuals did not hold high esteem in the Party thereby making the claim questionable. Yang Chengwu, to Lin's dismay, denied Lin's request, pointing out that he did not know Ye Qun at the time in question. Yang stated that he had only truly gotten to know Ye in 1960.²³¹

Lin was also taken aback in early 1968 when Maojiawan received a report from the Management Affairs Group of the Central Military Commission written to Lin Biao and the Chairman, which contained information on the promotion of an army vice commander in one military region to the position of full army commander in another military region. At the end of the report were the signatures of Yang Chengwu and Wu Faxian. Lin, after reading over the report, ordered Zhang Yunsheng to research the individual being promoted. After learning that the man being promoted had been a member in the North Field Army, a key area of influence and connection for Yang Chengwu, Lin ordered the report to be filed away and only commented, "What's the point of promoting him [the officer being promoted] into another region instead of giving him a promotion within his own region where he has already served?"²³² This example

²³¹ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) pp. 185-186 and Dong Baocun, *Yang Yu Fu Shijian zhenxiang* (The Truth About the Yang-Yu-Fu Incident), (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987) pp. 115-116.

²³² Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1988) p. 135-136

may be interpreted as an episode where Yang is practicing “moutaintopism”, a key crime that led to his dismissal. While Yang’s behavior in this instance is an indication that he favored certain comrades over others, thereby also following the common principle of *guanxi* (connections) in Chinese politics, we must also consider that Lin, while showing some interest, ordered that the file be put away and thereby ignored and inhibited others, i.e. Ye Qun, from obtaining it and possibly utilizing it. Lin’s irritation over Yang’s alleged “moutaintopism” is highly questionable since he decided to dismiss his concern over the promotion. This is another example of Lin’s lack of concern in political affairs and his overall lack of emotion, both illustrations of his schizoid personality. The fact that Wu Faxian, a close subordinate, intimate comrade of the Lin Biao camp, and member of the Fourth Field Army, did not object to Yang’s push for his colleagues promotion is also striking as it completely undercuts that factional organizations were forming within the PLA. Wu’s signature of approval on the promotion also illustrates that Wu had little concern for Yang’s alleged interests in seeking power within the military.²³³ This latter point, in particular, raises questions if Yang actually had intentions of usurping power within the PLA.

Yang’s accused crime of “moutaintopism” is questionable when considering Lin’s relationship with Yang directly prior to his removal. Prior to Yang’s downfall, Lin and Yang shared intimate conversations with each other, both expressing their feelings on certain political and military matters. On the evening prior to Yang’s arrest for instance, Zhang Yunsheng notes that Lin met with Yang at Maojiawan. Lin, commenting on the

²³³ It is important to remind us here that Yang Chengwu’s “moutaintopism” was from consistent promotions for military personnel who he had ties with from the North Field Army. Wu Faxian, as a member of the Fourth Field Army, was not part of this clique and also did not object to Yang’s suggested promotion, thereby Wu’s behavior completely contradicts firmly held beliefs of the salience of military factionalism.

current situation in Beijing, reportedly told Yang, “It is very important to pay attention to what is going on in Beijing. If we close our eyes to the chaos, it [the current situation] is only going to become a big joke”. What is even more striking is that Lin also openly discussed military appointments with Yang. Lin’s comments included his feelings toward Li Xiannian and Xu Xiangqian, two major military comrades who Yang championed to his side. “Regarding commander Xu, I can feel at ease. I do not feel at ease with Li Xiannian, he seems to be trustworthy but in fact he is not.” Yang then offered, “Can we suggest bringing Li Tianhan into the Military Commission.” Lin, neutral as always, stated, “We will look into it.”²³⁴ Not only does the exchange illustrate that Lin supported some of Yang’s promotional moves, it also illustrates a certain degree of translucency, as Lin and Yang both chatted about military matters. Moreover, it is questionable that Lin Biao would be so transparent to a key PLA figure such as Yang if he did not trust him. Lin expressing his feelings about the current chaos in Beijing and his feelings concerning other key PLA members illuminates a certain degree of trust to Yang.

Like other political cases examined, it is also questionable as to what extent Lin knew the details of Yang’s errors and if he agreed with them or not. For instance, on the day of March 24, when Yang’s crimes were formally announced by Lin, Zhang Yunsheng recalls that Maojiawan was engulfed in an atmosphere of hustle and bustle; two hours before Lin’s infamous speech no draft or script had been written. The content of the speech itself was composed, not by Lin Biao, but by Wang Fei and Zhou Yuchi under the direction of Ye Qun. Ye herself listed the crimes that Yang committed and ordered Wang and Zhou to include them in the speech. Ye also asked Li Chunsheng, a

²³⁴ Zhang Yunsheng and Zhang Congkun, “Wenge”*qi jian wo gei Lin Biao dang mishu* (The Cultural Revolution Period, I Served as Lin Biao’s Secretary), (Xianggang: Xianggang nuer chubanshe, 2004) pp. 247-248

secretary for Lin Biao, to select a few quotes from Marx and Lenin and from Chairman Mao's works.²³⁵ Not only was Lin uninformed of the subject matter of the speech and had no direct input regarding its content, he was also befuddled at Yang's supposed crimes. Following the meeting Lin's daughter, Lin Doudou, asked her father, "What problems are there concerning Yang Chengwu? Why overthrow him?" Lin agreed and retorted, "Yes, what is the problem with Yang Chengwu?" Doudou then inquired, "Everybody heard your speech, how can you not know what problems there were with Yang Chengwu?" Lin then answered, "Yes, well what did I say? Call Ye Qun and ask her what problems there are with Yang Chengwu". Doudou later said to one of Ye's secretaries, "You see, this is our Vice Chairman, he has already spoken and dismissed Yang-Yu-Fu but he still doesn't know what the problems with Yang Chengwu are".²³⁶ Moreover, the general comments made by Lin Biao on March 24 were not as stringent and stinging as those made by Zhou Enlai and CCRG radicals.

Thus, it remains questionable of Lin's actual involvement and personal action toward removing Yang. As before, Lin appears to have little if any actual knowledge as to the details of what Yang's crimes are. Furthermore, it appears that based on existing evidence, Yang and Lin were still sharing fairly amicable relations in early 1968, as Lin and Yang met just days prior to his removal and spoke about fairly sensitive military issues. The only source of friction between Yang and Lin appears to be petty, personal matters. Although these issues should not be ignored, there is no direct evidence which links Yang's removal to these matters.

²³⁵ Ibid pp. 151-154

²³⁶ Guan Weixun, *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenzue chubanshe, 1993) p. 225

Another incident in the Yang-Yu-Fu case concerned Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin on the one hand, and Wu Faxian on the other. In the midst of the Cultural Revolution, Yang Chengwu received two anonymous letters from the PLAAF Headquarters. The letters accused four Air Force officials who were close and under Wu Faxian's command: Zhou Yuchi, Liu Peifang, Yu Xinye, and Wang Fei, as having had sexual relations with unmarried women and who had become pregnant as a result. Yang Chengwu wasted no time and quickly delivered the letter to Lin Biao for his review.²³⁷

Exacerbating this soap opera even further is that Wu Faxian soon discovered via a love letter, that Yu Lijin's secretary had an affair with Yang Chengwu's daughter, Yang Yi. Yang Yi had recently taken a position as an editor for the *Air Force Daily* (*Kongjun ribao*). Wu Faxian suggested that an investigation take place to confirm the case. Wu telephoned Yu Lijin's wife and inquired if she had any lingering suspicions of a possible affair. Yu's wife reportedly denied the incident altogether and was puzzled by the entire situation. The two anonymous letters caused continuous concerns from the accused, as Wang Fei begged Wu Faxian to arrest Yu's secretary. Wu rebutted Wang's request and shortly thereafter Wu suffered the consequences from an ill-tempered Ye Qun, who had learned of the affair from Zhou Yuchi. According to Zhang Yunsheng, Ye Qun played a prominent role in this elite, political, sexual scandal. Ye, wanting to gain evidence that could be used to smear Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin's reputations as being linked to the rumored affair, ordered Wu Faxian to arrest, interrogate, and gain a written confession from the wife of Yu Lijin's rumored promiscuous secretary. Ye scolded Wu when Wu showed his hesitation, asking him, "Why don't you do something about this girl? You

²³⁷ Dong Baocun, *Yang Yu Fu Shijian zhenxiang* (The Truth About the Yang-Yu-Fu Incident), (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987) p. 117

lead thousands of people, you have tremendous strength but you don't know how to use it. What are you afraid of? I support you, arrest her!"²³⁸ Shortly following this meeting, Wu arrested the wife of Yu Lijin's secretary. Soon thereafter, Yu Lijin's secretary was placed into custody.

Yang Chengwu's wife, Zhao Zhizhen, did not ignore the invidious incidents that had recently occurred which concerned her daughter Yang Yi. Initially, Zhao made personal phone calls to Maojiawan. Ye Qun did not take the phone calls and ordered her secretaries to tell Zhao, "Ye Qun is busy now; she cannot take your phone call. But I will report the issue to her. I will also report it to Vice Chairman Lin."²³⁹ Shortly thereafter, Zhao made several personal trips to Maojiawan in order to clarify and express her concern of the rumors and character defamation of her daughter. Yu Lijin accompanied Zhao. The meetings were well received from Ye Qun, who did her best to act normal and not to give any indication of the potential involvement she had regarding the slanderous remarks and investigation currently being carried out by Wu Faxian. Zhao informed Ye that her daughter had just recently started working at the *Air Force Daily* and that there was nothing abnormal about the relationship between Yang Yi and Yu Lijin's secretary. Zhao reportedly trembled when speaking, adding that she believed that Wu Faxian harbored evil intentions and cannot be trusted. Yu also objected to Wu's actions, noting that he should have spoken with other Party members before taking Yu Lijin's secretary and his secretary's wife into custody. Shortly following the meeting and Zhao and Yu's

²³⁸ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao's Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 138. In a meeting with Zhang Yunsheng, Ye Qun reportedly acted surprised when she learned that Wu had arrested the wife of Yu Lijin's secretary. She responded to the information by stating, "Normally Wu is very indecisive, very calm." See Ibid pp 141-142

²³⁹ Jiao Ye, *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhongde Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: Ye Qun and Lin Biao in the Eyes of a Secretary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubangongsi, 1993) p. 190

departure, Ye requested Wu's presence at Maojiawan. Ye informed Wu of the meeting with Zhao and Yu, and urged Wu, "You must stand your ground. You cannot give in."²⁴⁰

Aside from this infamous sexual scandal, Yu's problems with Maojiawan were similar to Yang's in that Yu also accompanied the Chairman during his southern tour in July 1967. Like Yang, Yu was under direct orders from Zhou Enlai, failed to report to Lin about the various events that had taken place as well as the Chairman's important comments that he expressed during his tour.

In assessing the evidence of the case against Yu Lijin, there is no direct evidence though that links Lin Biao to his removal. Unlike Yang Chengwu, where some petty minor infractions occurred which are seen as potential motives for his removal, Lin appears to hold no personal animosities toward Yu. Ye Qun, based on available evidence, made concerted efforts to dismiss Yu Lijin from his position within the PLAAF. While her motivations cannot be precisely pinpointed, consolidation and solidification of continuing influence within the PLAAF under Wu Faxian seems as a most likely stimulant as well as her efforts to participate in the movement to illustrate her continued support for Jiang Qing and the CCRG. Unfortunately for Wu, who showed reservations of launching the political offensive against Yu Lijin, he was stuck in the middle of Ye's imaginative counterattack and simply followed Ye's lead, carrying out the political plan after being scolded from a nagging Ye Qun. In addition, as witnessed above, Ye Qun asked her secretaries to inform Zhao Zhizhen that the matter would be reported to her *and* Lin Biao. While this appears to be a rather small, anecdotal piece of information, it should be contemplated. When considering that Lin was unable to accurately address the crimes that Yu had committed when asked by Doudou, it is valid to argue that it is

²⁴⁰ Ibid pp. 143-145

entirely doubtful that Ye Qun either never discussed the ongoing political melodrama concerning Zhao Zhizhen and Yu Lijin with Lin as she said she would, or Lin simply had no interest in the rumored sexual affairs, shying away from any discussions dealing with the issue or simply not wishing to take the time to meet with anybody to be informed about the issue. Also, as Zhang Yunsheng revealed in his memoirs, Lin Liguotold Zhang in confidence that Ye Qun is a very “curious person” and that she “loves to know about the affairs and details of other people.”²⁴¹ Lin Liguot’s comments are a colorful description and certainly match the observations made by Zhang Yunsheng during the ordeal over Yang Chengwu’s daughter and Yu Lijin’s secretary.

Just as the blame for Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin’s removal cannot be placed squarely on the shoulders of Lin Biao, the removal of Fu Chongbi is another purge that Lin is not actively involved or a decisive factor. Rather, Fu’s removal emanates from personal animosity and anger generated from Jiang Qing and the Cultural Revolutionary Group.

Fu Chongbi, as deputy commander of the Beijing military region and commander of the Beijing garrison, was responsible for the security and safety of key Party members and stated leaders in the country’s capital. This, as noted by Barnouin and Yu, placed Fu in an awkward position with respect to the CCRG since high-ranking cadres, who had been assaulted and attacked by the Party and put in Fu’s custody, were in his charge.²⁴² The first source of considerable tension then between the CCRG and Fu Chongbi is

²⁴¹ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) p. 140

²⁴² Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993) p. 170

rooted in Fu's protection of Party cadres, which affected the CCRG's capability of continuing to carry out radical and violent action upon the Party.²⁴³

The CCRG shortly thereafter, fueled by Jiang Qing rage, performed a two day long interrogation of Fu at Diaoyutai. There, Jiang Qing, Chen Boda, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao all catechized and cross-examined Fu on the current absconding of Party members accused of committing crimes. As Jiang Qing stated, "Fu Chongbi, there is no need to be confused, those people, they were part of the capitalist faction, where did they go?" Fu only stated that he did not know. Yao Wenyuan added, "You are the Beijing garrison commander, how can you not know." Inquiries into trivial matters such as Fu's sentimental treatment toward disgraced Party members were also performed. Jiang Qing for instance, accused Fu for delivering healthy food such as fruit to Huang Kechang who had not received an appropriate diet and consequently had become constipated. Jiang also objected to Fu permitting Liu Zhijian's wife to visit and deliver medicine to him.²⁴⁴

The second, and more significant, source of tension generated from a collection of missing manuscripts, approximately one-thousand pages, from the Lu Xun museum in Shanghai. Shortly after the death of Lu Xun's widow, Xu Guangping, Zhou Enlai ordered that the manuscripts be recovered for the museum. Jiang Qing asked Fu Chongbi to investigate the matter. In order to find the missing documents Fu followed a wild paper

²⁴³ During the turbulent months of 1967, Zhou Enlai gave Fu a list filled with names. The list included Party members such as Wang Renzhong, Li Jingquan, and Wang Weiqing as well as the names of old, dismissed cadres and provincial Party leaders who sought asylum in Beijing, away from marauding Red Guards seeking to punish them. Zhou accompanied an order with the list, instructing Fu to move the cadres into well protected areas on the outskirts of Beijing, and made sure that they were provided with daily living necessities to assure their survival. Fu also provided protection to the controversial Chen Zaidao, who fell under attack in Beijing while staying at the Jingxi Guesthouse. Thousands of angry Red Guards surrounded the compound, demanding to come in. Fu dispatched public security personnel to encircle the compound and create a human barrier, obstructing the Red Guards from entering. Fu, as a precautionary measure, hid Chen inside a suspended elevator inside the guesthouse. Dong Baocun, *Yang Yu Fu Shijian zhenxiang* (The Truth About the Yang-Yu-Fu Incident), (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987) pp. 52-54. Zhou reportedly laughed at Fu after learning of the measures that he took in order to protect Chen.

²⁴⁴ Ibid pp. 49-52

trail, moving from contact to contact. Fu's investigation led him to the Xiyuan hotel in the western districts of Beijing. Fu spoke with He Xianlun at the hotel who informed Fu that the documents' location was known by Bo Xinrong—a PLAAF cadre—who was currently at Diaoyutai. On March 8, Fu took two jeeps filled with armed soldiers to Diaoyutai. Upon entering the compound to report to Jiang Qing, Jiang appeared and shouted at Fu yelling, "Fu Chongbi, who invited you to come?" Fu informed Jiang of his findings, stating that the missing files from the Lu Xun museum had been in Diaoyutai the entire time. Jiang denied the validity in this allegation. However, shortly after looking through several boxes of files, the misplaced documents appeared. Jiang fumed and was filled with embarrassment.²⁴⁵ After this loss of face, Jiang harbored an intense hatred toward Fu, one that ignited her fire within and made Fu into a direct target of the CCRG.

One major, final consideration that should be made regarding the Yang-Yu-Fu Incident is the political atmosphere that surrounds it. The Chairman had no actual reason to purge Yang, Yu, or Fu. However, as Barnouin and Yu have astutely noted, Mao needed scapegoats to counter what he believed to be a surging rightist deviationist wind occurring throughout the country at the time. Labeling the three generals as representatives of the right deviationists allowed him to reinforce the campaign against this trend.²⁴⁶ Taking the Chairman's political barometer into account, Lin Biao and Maojiawan can be viewed as simply following the current trends of the period in order to avoid being labeled as rightist revisionists as well. But the crux of the efforts against Yang, Yu, and Fu were Jiang Qing, the CCRG, and Ye Qun. Lin Biao, unlike this sordid

²⁴⁵ Dong Baocun, *Yang Yu Fu Shijian zhenxiang* (The Truth About the Yang-Yu-Fu Incident), (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987) pp. 98-105

²⁴⁶ Barbara Barnouin and Yu Changgen, *Ten Years of Turbulence: The Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1993) p. 171

group, seemed, in private, to be puzzled over the purges of Yang, Yu, and Fu and also exhibited no actual distaste for the men, as Lin was still close to them just directly prior to their removal from office. Key considerations in this case again are the primary roles played by Mao, Ye Qun, Jiang Qing and the CCRG, and the petty personal matters formulated by these figures that fueled the need to remove Yang, Yu, and Fu from their positions.

Lin Biao's Defense Policies and Order Number One

There is no doubt that Lin Biao is considered as a tremendously successful military strategist. During the three major campaigns to liberate the country during the Chinese Civil War (June 1946-October 1949): the Liaoxi-Shenyang (Liao-Shen) Campaign, the Beiping-Tianjin (Ping-Jin) Campaign, and the Huai-Hai Campaign, Lin emerged as a victorious commander who led over a million troops in the years that China witnessed its most bloody years.²⁴⁷

Lin's success and craftiness as a military leader in the annals of PRC history was not forgotten as it offered buttressing energy to the accusations against Lin that stated he

²⁴⁷ In the Liao-Shen campaign alone, Lin was appointed to oversee the campaign and managed 1.1 million soldiers. The campaign was conducted between September 12 and November 2, 1948. It was composed of three successful phases that, by their conclusion, had awarded CCP forces with 38,000 prisoners, 150 artillery pieces, 22 tanks, 6,000 horses, 600 vehicles, and a 1 million man reduction of Nationalist forces. It was also a major evolution in PLA warfighting strategy as the forces transformed from guerilla units engaged in unconventional mobile warfare, to a force that was made up of larger units operating in a coordinated manner emphasizing mobility and mass on the battlefield. Just three weeks after the successful conclusion of the Liao-Shen Campaign, Lin was asked to lead the Ping-Jin Campaign which lasted for sixty-four days (November 21, 1948 through January 31, 1949). The campaign, though bloody, liberated Beijing and Tianjin as well as acquiring 250,000 Nationalist troops who decided to join the PLA. Fu Zuoyi, who commanded the Nationalist forces in the Ping-Jin battles, later became Minister of Water Conservancy following the founding of the country. The Ping-Jin Campaign, like the Liao-Shen Campaign, asserted the transition for PLA strategic forces as they moved from small guerilla units in battle to large scale coordinated formations. For more on Lin's brilliance during the Civil War Years see Larry Wortzel, "The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign of 1948-1949", in eds. Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt, *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003) pp. 56-69

attempted to assassinate Mao. In the official documents from the Central Committee that address the full extent of Lin's counterrevolutionary crimes, it is cited that the:

Lin Biao anti-Party clique immediately made preparations for their armed counterrevolutionary coup d'état. They drew up the plan for an armed counterrevolutionary coup...and stepped up their treacherous activities in the fields of politics, military affairs, organization, and intelligence....Under the direct command of Lin Biao, the sworn followers of Lin Biao employed vicious means in a wild attempt to assassinate Chairman Mao.²⁴⁸

Whatever rumored plots Lin allegedly planned, it is clear that the Party perceives Lin as a conspiring murderer who sought the removal of Mao and took measures in order to succeed, craftily plotting as the military genius he was during the Chinese Civil War. As most Party members believed, if Lin could command over a million men he could easily use his strategic savvy in order to plan to assassinate the Chairman.

This portion of the chapter will discuss and expose a rather different Lin Biao in relation to his capabilities as a Defense Minister. In this analysis I will present numerous instances which will offer us a vastly different illustration of the crafty, military tactician. My aim is not to challenge Lin's military accomplishments during the Chinese Civil War, as there is little doubt to the brilliance of his ability to command during this historical period. Instead, our discussion will focus on Lin's views regarding defense policy for the PRC during the 1966-1969 years. Even more specifically, this section will review several military experiments and tests Lin was devoted to during the Cultural Revolution. What this analysis will illustrate, is that Lin's overall position toward military experimentation and defense policy for the PRC ranges from the sublime to the bizarre. The aggregate impression that these episodes offer is suspicion as to the validity that Lin could have

²⁴⁸ Michael Kau, *The Lin Piao Affair: Power, Politics, and Military Coup* (White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975) p. 113

carefully plotted an elaborate scheme to assassinate Chairman Mao, the plan typically thought of as Lin Biao directing Lin Liguo to lead his misfits to attack Chairman Mao's train with bazookas and flame throwers upon Mao's return from his Southern Tour.

One of the most tactically questionable military experiments that Lin conducted was referred to as "building up mountains" (*dui shan*). This tactic was a way to confront modern, conventional, superior militaries by building man-made mountains on both sides of a plain in order to force an advancing enemy through narrow corridors and thereby save time to prepare a counterattack. According to Zhang Yunsheng, Lin, upon hearing it was almost completed, sent him to the countryside east and southeast of Beijing. The commander in charge of the project informed Zhang that building up the mountains had consumed large amounts of reinforced concrete and enough man-hours to have built an entire factory. Inside the mountain a complex, intricate maze of hallways was constructed completely of concrete. Lin's man-made mountains seemed to be wonderful construction feats, but Zhang wrestled with the idea and critically questioned the commander in charge about possible wartime scenarios. Zhang asked the commander, "If the enemy has already advanced to this point that means that Tianjin [to the East] has already been captured. Thus the basis of this design rests on the assumption that the defenses around Tianjin have been breached. However, what if the enemy did not attack from the Tianjin direction, but from the west or north of Beijing?" The commander reportedly laughed and commented, "We are merely construction soldiers." Zhang then inquired, "What if the enemy attacked the mountains from the air? Are these man-made mountains sufficiently well constructed to protect you from enemy air attack?" The commander then stated, "The bunkers can withstand conventional bombs, at least for a short time." Secretary Li,

another Maojiawan staff member who accompanied Zhang on this field trip, interjected, “Where will you emplace the antiaircraft guns? It seems to me that the hallways are pretty narrow.” The commander replied, “This is a defect.” Upon returning to Maojiawan, both Secretary Zhang and Li reported on the progress of the project. In typical Lin Biao fashion he did not utter a word or express any emotion.²⁴⁹

In another example, Zhang recalls of a project that Lin Liguo was given by Lin Biao. In what is perhaps one of the most humorous instances in Zhang’s memoirs, Lin Liguo is noted as disassembling two bicycles one afternoon in the Maojiawan courtyard. Zhang Yunsheng came upon Lin Liguo’s project and curiously stared, trying to decipher what Lin was doing. Zhang could not contain his inquisitiveness any longer and finally asked Lin what he was doing with two bicycles. Lin informed Zhang that Lin Baio had requested him to construct a two person bicycle since there might be a possible lack of oil in the event of a war. Lin Liguo informed Zhang that, with the exception of the two front tires which would not stay parallel, he was nearly successful in completing the project. Zhang thought the idea was a joke and tried to contain his laughter.²⁵⁰

Considering the two aforementioned examples, which clearly question Lin’s ability to craftily plan and execute affective military experiments designed to enhance PRC defenses, we must now move our attention to the infamous “Order Number One” of October 1969, that is typically portrayed as the first steps taken by Lin Biao in order to successfully execute a “counterrevolutionary coup” against the Party. In multiple perspectives, it is viewed as Lin’s trial run for his alleged failed coup attempt that occurred in 1971, and as a persecution of the old marshals who were dispatched from

²⁴⁹ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) pp. 293-297

²⁵⁰ Ibid pp. 297-299

Beijing to various locations in China as part of war preparations. It is also seen as an effort to consolidate Lin's power, or at least as an effort to test how much authority Mao was actually willing to grant him.²⁵¹

“Order Number One” emerged from the growing concerns of potential war in early 1969 with China's former ally—the Soviet Union. The seeds of Sino-Soviet tension were planted in the late 1950s in the wake of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign and withdraw of Soviet nuclear advisors in 1961. The other major reason for the rise in concern came from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, out of which emerged the Brezhnev doctrine. The invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred concomitantly with increased Soviet criticism of China's Cultural Revolution. As a result of mounting Chinese suspicious that Moscow's intentions were potential security threats, as early as May 1967 Beijing ordered *Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Soviet Central Committee, correspondents to leave China immediately. In June 1967, Soviet permission to fly into Chinese airspace in order to reach North Vietnam was cancelled. These corrosive events debilitated the overall relationship which reached its most agitated point in 1969 as a massive military buildup of several hundred thousand troops took place along the shared Sino-Soviet border.²⁵² The tense security situation erupted in March

²⁵¹ These perspectives are drawn from Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 111

²⁵² Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) p. 216. On the withdraw of Soviet technical advisors in 1961 in the midst of China's research to build their first nuclear weapon see, John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). The seeds of Sino-Soviet tension pre-date even the 1961 withdraw of Soviet advisors. Mao's trip to Moscow in 1950 was filled with coldness and tension as Mao, in order to obtain a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, was forced to make humiliating concessions to Stalin which included economic rights and permission to install Soviet military bases on Chinese territory. For more on this and the questionable foundation of the Sino-Soviet relationship see, Sergei Goncharov, John Wilson Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).

1969, when two bloody conflicts burst between Sino-Soviet garrison forces on Zhenbao Island located near the Chinese bank on the Ussuri River.²⁵³

Lin Biao's behavior during the Sino-Soviet crisis from March-October 1969 is difficult to pinpoint as he did indeed exhibit brief moments of overreacting during the crisis, but also appeared aloof in several instances. We cannot determine precisely what Lin's attitude and position toward the crisis is, however, through the following discussion validity of the accusation that Lin Biao's so called "Order Number One" was a trial run for Lin's later alleged coup attempt in September 1971 will be brought into question.

Lin's concern for the security of the nation can be seen in several instances. First, Lin gave a September 30 order for water conservancy units to open dams in order to prevent flooding in case of a potential bombing on the city.²⁵⁴ Marshals Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, and Xu Xiangqian strongly disagreed with the order and convinced Zhou Enlai to rescind it. Zhou then went to see Lin and persuaded him to cancel the command. Lin was also highly suspicious of Soviet negotiators who he believed were acting covertly in order to initiate an attack. Lin suspected that the resumption of border negotiations planned for October 20 was cover for a full scale attack against China. Lin Biao did not hesitate and acted quickly on his beliefs. On the eve of the National Day celebrations, taking place on October 1, Lin ordered an

²⁵³ For more details on the conflict see Thomas Robinson, "The Sino-Soviet Border Conflicts of 1969", in eds. Mark Ryan, David Finkelstein, and Michael McDevitt, *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003) pp. 198-216. Casualties are questionable in the two battles as both Chinese and Soviet sources conflict with one another. In the March 2 battle, the Chinese calculate that the Soviets had lost more than 60 men; the Soviets claim that they lost 31 men. Chinese casualties are rumored to be 17. In the March 15 conflict, casualty estimates are even more varied as Chinese claim that 60 Soviets were killed and 12 Chinese were killed. Soviet sources calculate 800 Chinese were either killed or wounded. The details of the Sino-Soviet border war are far more intricate than presented here. For an excellent study, see Thomas Robinson's aforementioned chapter in *Chinese Warfighting*.

²⁵⁴ Zhang Yunsheng, "Shihua shishuo 'Yi hao ling'" (Speaking the Truth "Order Number One"), in ed. Ding Kaiwen, *Zhong shen Lin Biao zui an* (New Concepts in the Lin Biao Incident), (Carle Place: Mingjing chubanshe, 2004) p. 72

immediate redeployment of all military planes from Beijing, that all runways must be in good working order, and that all military personnel must be prepared for potential combat. Lin also made a brief tour of areas on the outskirts of Beijing in order to meet with military personnel and stress preparedness for war. Lin, accompanied by Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, Lin Liguo, and several Maojiawan staff members, flew from Beijing and visited Wutaishan, Yanmenguan, Badaling, then finally returned to Beijing.²⁵⁵

Lin cannot be blamed for his so called “overreaction” as it appears that it took shape within the context of the Chairman Mao’s dim view toward the strategic situation. Following the Ninth Party Congress in August, Mao, at the suggestion of Zhou Enlai, issued an order on August 28 stressing the need to heighten security on China’s borders in order to prepare for a war of aggression. Chinese intelligence sources by September began to report that the Soviets had an intention to launch a surgical strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. On September 27, the Chairman, at the Great Hall of the People, ordered, “Don’t keep anybody in Beijing over the National Holiday. Everybody will leave early and prepare for combat readiness and strategy.” Zhou Enlai and Kang Sheng also made speeches mirroring the Chairman’s request for war preparation. By mid-October the Chairman, following another meeting at the Great Hall of the People, stressed the need to scatter all major Party members throughout the country. Mao told Wu Faxian before leaving for Wuchang, “I am taking the first step. You need to pass along to Lin Biao that he needs to leave too.” Lin Biao shortly thereafter departed for Suzhou, where he temporarily resided at the former home of Soong Meiling (Madame

²⁵⁵ Zhang Yunsheng, *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan: The Memoirs of Lin Biao’s Secretary) (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe) pp. 302-315

Chiang Kai-shek), and meanwhile Zhou Enlai headed for Fragrant Mountain.²⁵⁶ It is within this context that Lin Biao's "Order Number One" was conceived, that of an intense and heightened security atmosphere which was recognized as an immediate concern to the country's safety by top Party officials as well as the Chairman. Lin can be viewed as simply following the Chairman's lead and not plotting to execute a pre-trial run of a coup attempt.

The actual "order" that Lin issued was made on October 17. According to Zhang Yunsheng, Lin called him into his office and immediately ordered him to take notes. Altogether, Lin mentioned six points which included the dispersal of military units and that all vital military equipment be camouflaged in order to avoid its sabotage and destruction. Communications were to be maintained at all costs and national defense industries were to increase their armament production. The Second Artillery Division (*dier paobing*), China's nuclear forces, were to put their weapons on high alert.

The casualness of Lin Biao during the period should be noted. During Zhang's reports which stated that the Soviet Union was contemplating usage of nuclear weapons which could easily destroy the major cities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai, Lin is noted as not responding or showing any reaction to the news. Zhang also writes that Lin did not receive reports directly following the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict on Zhenbao Island in March. Instead of pondering the international situation and assessing the possible perils of conventional or nuclear warfare with the Soviet giant, Lin departed for Beidaihe where he did not receive any secretaries for daily updates on the situation. In another instance, Lin was seen viewing a large seven meter long map of the border area

²⁵⁶ Chi Zehou "'Yi hao hao ling' fachu qianhou" ('Order Number One' From Beginning to End), in ed. Ding Kaiwen, *Zhong shen Lin Biao zui an* (New Concepts in the Lin Biao Incident), (Carle Place: Mingjing chubanshe, 2004) pp. 98, 100

detailing the Zhenbao Island and Usurri River area. Ye Qun saw Lin studying the map and felt that the event was so unusual that she quickly ordered one of the Maojiawan staff members to take a photo of Lin as he appeared pensive, analyzing the map finally showing a spark of interest with the international situation.²⁵⁷ Implicit in these examples is that Lin is exhibiting behaviors that can be characterized as aloof and solitary, again illustrating tendencies often seen in a schizoid personality. Also, as seen earlier, Lin showed little or no emotion to the entire international war situation. Lin's introverted and overall disinterest further questions the validity of the official charges that Lin attempted to use Order Number One and the intense security situation as a trial run for his alleged coup attempt made in 1971. What may appear puzzling is that in these instances Lin contradicts the examples we discussed earlier—Lin suggesting to Zhou Enlai that the dams be opened so that Beijing could not be flooded and Lin's issue of public statements supporting full scale military preparations directly after the Ninth Party Congress—but what is a key element in the earlier discussed examples is that Lin's actions were in public and, perhaps more importantly, Lin's actions were closely following the lead of the Chairman who clearly felt an extreme urgency from the pressures of the Soviet military buildup and outbreak of fighting along the Sino-Soviet border. It could be asserted then that whatever motivations Lin may have appeared to have were stimulated by the Chairman. In private however, the views of Lin, as so often seen throughout this study, contradicted those seen in public.

One final key point that must be discussed in our analysis of Lin's role and culpability related to "Order Number One" is the tremendous amount of undue suffering

²⁵⁷ Zhang Yunsheng, "Shihua shishuo 'Yi hao ling'" (Speaking the Truth "Order Number One") in ed. Ding Kaiwen, *Zhong shen Lin Biao zui an* (New Concepts in the Lin Biao Incident), (Carle Place: Mingjing chubanshe, 2004) pp. 63, 66, 71

through an entire winter that the older marshals were forced to endure as a result of the order. Zhang Yunsheng, Lin's secretary, even mentions that one of his brothers was in the army at the time of Order Number One. However, as Teiwes and Sun have astutely noted, the dispersal of Party members and old marshals was linked to war preparations, *not* a consequence of "Order Number One". Measures to remove Party leaders from their offices in Beijing had been underway for a considerable amount of time. These measures began within the context of the aforementioned concern by Mao directly during the time of the Ninth Party Congress. The measures involved seminars on war preparations and warfare conferences of the "three Norths" regional area (Northwest, North, and Northeast). It should also be noted that Lin had no role in the actual physical movement of Party cadres. The placement of Party members and old marshals was carried out by Zhou Enli with the helpful assistance of Wang Dongxing.²⁵⁸ What is also obvious is that Mao, as the key figurehead of the country, paid close attention to the CMC's activities as he believed in and stressed the need for the "Party to command the gun." Very little, if at all possible, could ever slide past the Chairman concerning military matters. Troop movements and rotation of positions were often reported and approved by Mao. Furthermore, as we discussed above, according to Zhang's account Ye Qun personally saw the importance of Mao looking over the order since the order was being made during a time that was not considered "war." There is no evidence which specifically cites that Ye delivered the order to Mao, but given her close attention to politics, there is little doubt that she did not miss the opportunity to forward the order to Mao for his approval.

²⁵⁸ Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p. 113

There is thus little reason to believe that Mao, as official sources state, knew nothing of Lin's so-called military order.

Conclusions

While the following chapter will formally conclude this study, the discussion throughout this chapter has been exceedingly lengthy; consequently a few key points should be mentioned to allow for an easier digestion and gestation process before we move forward to the conclusion. This chapter has attempted to scrutinize a series of cases which occurred directly prior and during the active phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) when Lin Biao is traditionally viewed as 1) acting vibrantly as a direct actor and executing a series of measures meant to eliminate his opponents in the Party 2) as an actor who may not be viewed as a direct actor but is widely assumed as being having a level of culpability due to assumption and public rhetoric 3) as a sly and scheming plotter who cleverly was planning to devise an elaborate scheme against Mao as early as 1969. These views have been largely based on evidence compiled by official Party organs and propaganda departments. The evidence compiled by Party organs has been utilized in major scholastic Chinese studies such as Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao's *Turbulent Decade*, as cited extensively throughout this chapter.

But these long-time accepted views are largely one dimensional, as they only analyze Lin Biao and draw conclusions about him from perceptions formed through a public lens. What is even more troubling is that these positions are formed on assumption and wild accusations. This chapter however, has aimed to reinterpret Lin and his role in those cases where he is seen as a primary actor and culprit in the dismissal or key Party members in the consolidation of his power. Unlike those studies which have only

employed sources that analyze Lin in the “public” sphere, the Lin Biao viewed in this chapter is seen within the “private” sphere which consequently raises questions about the actual level of involvement that Lin Biao played during the Cultural Revolution period.

Several major points unraveled throughout this chapter need to be mentioned here. First, Lin Biao displayed behavioral tendencies that meet several criteria needed which are needed in order to be diagnosed with *schizoid personality disorder*. This disorder is a malfunction in personality that is typically characterized by displaying a preference to withdraw from society and having limited interaction with others. Another key element is that schizoids rarely project any type of emotion, as their emotions are usually restricted in an interpersonal setting. Most schizoid personalities have little or no reaction to social contact. Lin Biao presented these characteristics in a number of cases. As observed for instance when Lin heard of China’s impending war with the Soviets and the decision not to attend and manage Chen Zaidao’s criticism session, it is evident that Lin displayed no or little emotion and shied away from public situations. Absence from major dismissal meetings or criticism sessions and displaying no emotion and showing little interest in political matters are all behaviors that were the consequences of Lin’s thought process, one that had to pass through the mindset of a man who preferred privacy and who was rarely moved or stimulated by any particular instance.

The second primary conclusion that is the affect that Lin’s disorder had on the ability of Maojiawan to make policy. As second in command of the Party, Lin held a formal position that demanded intelligent and assertive decision-making skills, especially since it was during the paranoid Cultural Revolution period. Since Lin lacked the necessary social tools and overall political acumen to function within his role, the reigns

needed to be controlled by someone else. Lin's wife Ye Qun played a dominant and commanding role as she would *ba guan* (guard the pass). With her increased stature that resulted from Lin's rise and concomitant inability to appropriately administer major political matters, Ye did her best to continually enhance the power for herself and for Maojiawan. While one can certainly argue that Ye was fighting for her family's survival during a period that when any misstep could lead to one's downfall, Ye clearly made use of the power that came with her position as she personally aided in the removal of several potentially jeopardizing Party members and enemies of Jiang Qing and the CCRG. Lu Dingyi, Yan Weibing, Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin were all figures that Ye sought to eliminate with maximum prejudice. Ye also sought to maintain favorable relations with Jiang Qing and the powerful CCRG by craftily sneaking away at various times from Maojiawan and the uncommunicative Lin Biao. Lin's aloofness caused by his schizoid personality and social anxiety disorder thus enabled Ye to operate on the level that she wanted, a level that led to a tremendous consolidation of power for Maojiawan, but also contributed to the eventual downfall of the family.

The third conclusion that can be made is the consistent role that Jiang Qing and the CCRG played in Cultural Revolution politics. In the case against He Long, Luo Ruiqing, and Fu Chongbi, the CCRG is seen as the primary actor in the political melee. Lin Biao's role, for what its worth, is seen as peripheral. Lin did not initiate nor show any overt emotion to the removal of any of the aforementioned Party figures. Lin merely echoed existing rhetoric in *public* that backed the strategic political attacks made by the CCRG. When combining the public support from Lin Biao to the CCRG as well as the construction of a firm and supportive relationship between Maojiawan and Diaoyutai

covertly created by Ye Qun, it is evident how easily and quickly false perceptions can be formed. The assumption that is formed is that Lin Biao, since he both lauded the CCRG in public and formed a strong relationship with CCRG members in public, is naturally associated with all political maneuvers made by Diaoyutai. This historical picture though is obviously flawed as it completely disregards Lin's own personal views of Diaoyutai as well as the close relationship that Ye, *not* Lin, forged with Jiang Qing.

Whatever support Lin showed for the Cultural Revolution was conducted by the political context in which he existed. The leading figure that always needed to be considered before making any decision was the prodigious and sagacious Chairman Mao. When considering Mao's decisions and political barometer that always needed to be interpreted, Lin's *public* image should drastically be reconsidered. As we witnessed numerous times, Lin's tacit approval for certain Party policies and for CCRG radicalism, appears as always closely following the Chairman's own position on the matter. As Lin Biao once remarked, "If the Chairman agrees, I agree." In addition, Lin's political activity, when he did act politically, was primarily *reactive* rather than *proactive*.

This chapter has also illustrated how easily the images of individuals can be grossly misconstrued if based only on the behavior displayed in public. As witnessed with Lin Biao, a deeper story is present, one that involves the inner complexities of a troubled mind as well as the enabling affect that Lin's personality deficiencies had on the role of his wife. What can be clearly concluded from this chapter is that Lin Biao's position in the reviewed cases is peripheral at best. Although we cannot completely exonerate Lin from these cases, as it is clear he did have *some* knowledge of the events occurring, the level of blame that has been traditionally placed on Lin's shoulders should

be reconsidered as Ye Qun and the CCRG seem to be the primary culprits in the political dance of death that ensued during the reviewed cases of the Cultural Revolution.

Conclusion: Bringing the Inside Out

Adrian T. Luna

This study has explored and analyzed the most intimate details of Lin Biao, one of modern China's most enigmatic figures. By probing the discreet personal lifestyle of Lin Biao, this study has examined Lin Biao through a *private* lens, a lens that has not been mucked and clouded by the orthodox interpretations and biases of *public* analyses. In the broadest of terms, this review and close scrutiny of the evidence has revealed several major points. First, Lin Biao's role in policy-planning and policymaking on the domestic, economic, and foreign policy fronts during the Cultural Revolution is virtually nonexistent due to his schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder. As witnessed in several instances in the recollections of Zhang Yunsheng, Lin Biao exhibited an attitude colored with listlessness and a distinct detachment from the daily reports and briefings on policy, both foreign and domestic, which were given to him. The harsh and rough dismissal of Party figures and PLA comrades that Lin knew well, and who were perceived as potential challenges to his own consolidation of power, was managed by Ye Qun, Jiang Qing, the CCRG, or Mao. The degree of Lin's knowledge regarding these removals cannot be precisely measured; however, it can be argued that a certain degree of the deluge of petty personal squabbles, scuttlebutts, and plotting by Ye Qun and the CCRG were kept from Lin Biao. Moreover, Lin's disconnection from social contact caused by his schizoid personality and social anxieties disintegrated chances that Lin had at keeping running tabs of the political eruptions occurring around China and what his wife was up to. When Lin did learn of radical surges, he almost always lacked any specific opinion regarding what policy direction should be taken. When some degree of action did take place on Lin's part, he contradicts the image that is normally conjured, as Lin was not always the bastion of revolutionary ideals, but actually exhibited

tendencies to curb excessive violence such as publishing the Eight Points and writing a personal letter to Mao requesting that the “arming of the left” be reconsidered. In addition, Lin’s actions during the Cultural Revolution that could be interpreted as “radical” were usually *reactive* rather than *proactive*. Lin rarely held the initiative in any petty, political squabble, instead usually choosing to follow in the political footsteps of another or by simply agreeing with whatever suggestion came to him. The position of Lin following policy suggestions and being easily swayed is a further illustration of Lin’s schizoid personality, as schizoid personalities typically do not have a particular opinion or stance toward external events and stimuli.

The brief points listed above support the argument that Lin Biao was diffident toward politics, that he chose to remain aloof from the political storm and whirlpool that one could drown in during the Cultural Revolution. In this argument Lin can be perceived as cleverly sitting on the side and “letting the tigers fight.” As Lin Biao told his close friend Tao Zhu, summarizing his political strategy, in December 1966 and again in January 1967, “Be passive, passive, and again passive.”²⁵⁹ There is certainly validity in this argument. There is also no doubt that this is a consistent theme that has been weaved throughout this study. But despite the cogency in this claim, the argument may still be perceived by many historians as lacking the necessary evidence to draw a decisive conclusion. For instance, as most historians would legitimately argue, even though it is evident that Lin Biao shied away from attending public denunciations of his supposed political enemies this *does not* legitimately exonerate Lin nor does it confirm that Lin

²⁵⁹ Quan Yanchi, *Tao Zhu zai ‘Wenhua dageming’ zhong* (Tao Zhu during the ‘Cultural Revolution’) (No City: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991) pp. 196, 215

knew nothing of the ongoing political debacles, or even that he did not want their downfall.

The key to understanding Lin's role or lack thereof during the Cultural Revolution, are the personality and behaviors he demonstrated in chapter 2. As observed in the evidence that is currently available, Lin Biao displayed distinctive traits that meet the criteria for both *schizoid personality disorder* and *social anxiety disorder* cited in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM). The former disorder is characterized by displaying little or no emotion whatsoever due to the failure of a successful development of the *self*. The latter disorder is composed by a fear of social situations where the sufferer would often display anxious behaviors or in some instances excessive sweating. Lin loathed meeting with personnel for any extensive length of time, when meeting with his staff members he either fought excessive perspiration or displayed obsessive tendencies which can be viewed as being linked to nervousness or anxiety. Lin preferred being alone, sitting in solitude in a bare bedroom with curtains drawn, limiting his social contact to occasional chats with Ye Qun. Even Lin's daughter and son had little contact with their father. When public appearances were absolutely necessary, Lin did not withhold his reluctance to attend and was even given a narcotic in one known reported instance in order to "perk" him up. Aside from the periodic anxious displays of behavior during his daily meetings, Lin virtually showed no emotion or interest when hearing the reports of the current political situation from his secretaries.

What is also consistent throughout this study is that Lin Biao always presented an element of ambivalence in his behavior. This irresolute and uncertainly is closely linked again to Lin's schizoid personality disorder. Lin would rarely make a decision that was

based on *his* deductions and values. As seen in numerous instances, Ye Qun would nearly always insert her own feelings and opinion on any matter that may come Lin's way, whether it is in terms of policy or private matters of the family. Lin Biao, always indecisive, would almost always agree to Ye's suggestions no matter how antagonistic or counteractive they may be to the situation; Lin would rarely consider the consequences to her suggestions and the incapacitating affect they may have on policy or on Party members. A case might be made that Ye's decisions and input occurred on matters that could be considered minor. However, Lin's promulgation of the Eight Points is a vivid example of Lin taking direction at the bequest of another. Lin responded to Xu's pleas about excessive revolutionary violence by writing a personal letter to the Chairman and also writing down seven points for Mao to review. That Lin did this after hearing Xu's pleas smacks of Lin's irresolute and constantly wavering attitude, Lin would almost always follow the suggestions of others due to his inability to formulate specific, firm decisions. This dysfunction, again, based on existing evidence is rooted in Lin's schizoid personality disorder. Lin's unsure attitude is seen further when contemplating his reactions to the Chairman. In the previous chapter, Lin would never challenge the authority of the Chairman and would simply mark *tongyi* (agree) on nearly every document that passed through his hands. While this image unquestionably aims to corroborate the argument presented by Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun, who argue that politics in Maoist China were similar to the politics at an Emperor's court, it also represents the indetermination that Lin had in his personality. In many ways, Lin's actions may be perceived as only *reactions*. On the rare occasions when Lin is seen formulating an opinion, it was kept to himself, as these positions were all anti-Maoist and

viewed by Maojiawan staff members in Lin's diary. The ambivalence that fills the mood of the private interactions and meetings with Lin Biao are examples of Lin's schizoid personality disorder, which clearly affected his ability to judge and assess the crucial aspects of Chinese elite politics as well as keep abreast of the current situation.

The importance of Lin's personality blots are further enhanced when contemplating the enabling affect it had on Ye Qun. In a sense, Lin himself was an enabler. Lin enabled Ye Qun so that he could remain disabled. This was not done intentionally on Lin's part but rather was caused by Lin's schizoid personality and social anxiety disorders. For Lin, his wife was a seemingly perfect substitute to act on his behalf, as she seemed to have a great interest in politics and was a vibrant, energetic woman. As seen in both chapters 2 and 3, Ye's persona and overall behavior contrasted as much as day and night when compared to Lin. Even though Ye held no true formal power or influence over top-ranking Party members, she still served in several key positions on behalf of Lin Biao. As a pragmatic and smart political tactician, Ye managed the affairs of Lin's family and kept track of the current political trends of the time period. Ye was a ball of energy who was filled with curiosity, a gossip who did her best to be informed of political knowledge. Ye was a stickler for details, one who strived to obtain the latest news from the political turf wars between Diaoyutai and the so-called Cultural Revolution "conservatives." While it could be viewed that Ye was only doing her best to insure the safety and continued foundation of her family who was devoid of a capable leader, Ye undoubtedly took advantage of the destabilized and excessively radical national situation. Ye exercised the advantages of the growing instability during the Cultural Revolution in order to remove those Party members who she held personal

animosities toward such as Lu Dingyi and his wife Yan Weibing. Thus, given Ye's outgoing and vibrant personality and Lin's reclusive solitude, this study has also attempted to illustrate who the true manipulator of events were behind the closed doors of Maojiawan. Whether Ye kept details from Lin intentionally or if she simply decided not to disclose the facts to Lin since she knew he would be indifferent anyway is open to interpretation. However, painted in any color, the illustration carries the same message, that is Lin Biao, who suffered from two personality disorders which affected his ability to function properly in his position as Vice Chairman, gave operational authority to his wife Ye Qun, who utilized this founded power to its maximum in order to enhance the political stature and position of the Lin Biao family.

In the introduction to this study the infamous September 13 incident was briefly mentioned. Since the incident challenged the very legitimacy of the Chairman's rule, Lin's death quickly became taboo with very little discussion of the alleged incident amongst the Chinese people. The incident itself has become nearly legendary, with a variety of interpretations of what "really" happened on the fateful evening/early morning of September 12 and September 13. A key problem with reexamining the current existing evidence is that so much conspiracy and controversy surrounds the subject that achieving an accurate historical account of the incident becomes nearly impossible. This study has not dissected the existing evidence on the September 13 incident, but it has opened the door to understanding the persona of Lin Biao. This study has stressed the indifferent, aloof, introverted, gormless nature of Lin Biao. As observed, Lin was a man who preferred privacy, a man who disliked making public appearances, a man who could barely withstand a thirty minute meeting with his staff members, and a man who held no

interest in politics. The Lin Biao revealed throughout this study is *not* the portrait of a power-hungry politician who hoped to take over the position as Chairman, thereby becoming the emperor of contemporary China. The question must certainly be posed then, is the Lin Biao portrayed in this study the cunning and crafty tactician who sought to assassinate Mao and, after that failed attempt, tried to flee China? Within the realm of the September 13 incident, this study has challenged these norms of thinking.

The Tragedy of Lin Biao

In 1996 Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun published *The Tragedy of Lin Biao*, the first “revisionist” study of Lin Biao to appear in Western scholarship. In similar aspects, Teiwes and Sun examined Lin Biao during the Cultural Revolution period, directing their attention to the political behavior of Lin but ignoring the behavioral characteristics that we have examined. In 1999 Jin Qiu, daughter of PLAAF commander Wu Faxian, followed in the footsteps of Teiwes and Sun by publishing *The Culture of Power*, which offered a new, detailed, minute-by-minute description of the evening of Lin Biao’s fateful flight. In both works Lin Biao is portrayed as a tragic figure. Teiwes and Sun assert very intelligently that Lin Biao’s tragedy was circumstantial, that Lin was forced into a high ranking political position against his own wishes, that he was thrust into Mao’s harsh political games of Chinese elite politics during the country’s most volatile and paranoid period. Volition, according to Teiwes and Sun, existed only in the hands of the Chairman, leaving Lin little choice but to loyally follow. Jin Qiu argued that the tragedy of Lin was his inability to control his family as both Ye Qun and Lin Liguang allegedly plotted to assassinate the Chairman covertly without Lin’s knowledge. But the tragedy of Lin Biao began at a much earlier point in time.

Like the revisionist pieces published by Teiwes, Sun, and Jin, this study also has broadcasted a tragic message throughout its analysis. Similar to Teiwes and Sun, this study has buttressed the position that Lin Biao was a victim of circumstance during the Cultural Revolution. However, what exacerbates the tragedy of Lin's circumstance is the material presented in this piece. Lin was placed into a position that he by no means was prepared to perform at the appropriate level, either mentally or physically. As Vice Chairman, Lin needed to follow and remain well aware of the constant shifts in the political storm that was ensuing during his tenure. But being the deeply disturbed man that he was, Lin Biao could not function effectively in his role as Vice Chairman and carefully follow the storms of both the subtle and overt shifts of the Chairman. Based on existing evidence the two disorders that Lin had, schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder, crippled his ability to affectively play the elite political game of Maoist politics during the Cultural Revolution. Lin was withdrawn, aloof, and resisted social contact. Lin showed little emotional feeling toward anything and thus was muzzled from making distinct and valuable decisions when the need arose. The consequences were staggering as Lin rarely would receive the information he should have received. Lin was also a politically malleable figure as his opinion could be finessed and refined to suit whoever wanted his blessing or to have Lin perform a particular political task. The immeasurable psychological impact of being forced into such a role, which demanded such careful tip-toeing around the wishes of the Chairman, did not help matters, especially when considering the constant anxieties that Lin was forced to deal with on a personal level. Amidst the tumultuous and violent times that the people of China lived through during the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao was battling his own personal war

within himself. The personal deficiencies that Lin dealt with, seen in this study, thus only heighten the tragic level of his tale.

What must also be considered is the fact that Lin Biao and his family had very little communication. The family unit was indeed dysfunctional. Lin's troubled and disturbed personality severed any possibility for intimacy with his wife and family. Moreover, Ye's demonstrative behavior did little to attract the attention of her daughter, Lin Doudou. At a time period when close intimacy to reinforce a strong level of political acumen was necessary, the Lin Biao family lacked this much needed survival tool.

Apart from the elements of Lin Biao's personality which only enhance his tragic tale, another tragedy is our own ignorance toward the case. Until this study, Western and Chinese scholarship has only viewed Lin Biao through a *public* lens, largely ignoring the *private* Lin Biao that is exposed by Zhang Yunsheng. This study has revealed that the *public* heavily contrasts with the *private*, that beneath Lin's public image as a military hero who appeared responsible in his position, a lauding champion for Chairman Mao and Mao Zedong Thought, laid a man who held vastly different views but was deeply disturbed psychologically that he would rarely express or have a policy position or pay attention to politics. Beneath the *public* was a sub-text that was filled with complexities and a problematic persona. Also, Mao used Lin Biao as his political sniper to remove Peng Dehuai from his position as Defense Minister. Assuming that the Chairman knew of Lin's plights, Lin's tale becomes even more tragic.²⁶⁰ Not only does Lin merely represent

²⁶⁰ To the degree that the Chinese leadership knew of Lin's physical and mental health complications is questionable; however, considering the first thing that the Chairman asked Lin upon seeing him at Lushan in 1959 was "how has your health been" and Lin's private letter to Mao pleading that he could sufficiently carry out the duties of a Vice Chairman leads this author to feel that Mao knew of Lin's personal problems. See Quan Yanchi, "Peng Dehuai luonan yu Lin Biao deshi zhenxiang" (The Truth about Peng Dehuai's Downfall and Lin Biao's Ascendancy), *Yanhuang chunqiu* (Spring and Autumn of the Chinese People), no. 4, 1993, p. 31

a pawn, a toy soldier of sorts, to help carry out Mao's revolutionary chimera, but it also overtly states that the inner complexities and problems of one man were completely ignored by another in order to fulfill his own wishes. It is entirely possible that the Chairman knew that Lin's health would be advantageous to him. Mao, after feeling the thunderous criticism from Peng over the Great Leap, wanted somebody next to him in the Party that would not dare challenge his authority and wishes. Mao chose Lin since he knew of Lin's socially dislocated and easily swayed personality—a personality that contrasted the rough, tough, bulldog like personality of Peng Dehuai. Lin Biao's schizoid personality disorder and social anxiety disorder was a double-edged sword for Lin, as they contributed to his eventual downfall but also aided him in his ascendancy to power. Chairman Mao, China's last emperor, not conceding to the potential feelings or reservations that Lin might have did not matter as the Chairman was the omnipotent force whose wishes and deepest desires for political power and unquestioned authority were the only things to be concerned about. The Chairman was the epicenter of modern China, whatever the Chairman desired, the Chairman received. Like planets revolving around the sun, Party members were required to loyally abide by the Chairman's wishes. In this context Lin had little choice but to loyally follow the demands of this modern day emperor.²⁶¹

Arguably, what seems most tragic about the tale of Lin Biao is the lack of clear understanding of the depths of this man. This is further heightened for the Chinese people, who are bound by the *public* images of those who are in power. The deification of men in power is a cultural throwback which has historically been part of the long-held

²⁶¹ The theory that elite political life in Maoist China paralleling an Emperor's court was first asserted by Frederick Teiwes in *Politics at Mao's Court*.

tradition that those in power are omnipotent rulers who will guide the kingdom. This view applies to Lin Biao, who is believed to be the evil genius behind the purge and removal of many men, a diabolic craftsman of terror. But as this study has revealed, a profound secret life existed beneath the man who stood atop the rostrum at Tiananmen side-by-side with the Chairman, a *private* life which divulges a distressed and overwrought persona who could hardly cope with the daily tolls that his position demanded. It is here where the tragedy truly lies, that certain perceptions for so long of Lin have been shaped by the *public* pictures and appearances that form peoples' beliefs. We have consequently ignored, to a very large degree, the convolution that existed beneath Lin. This curious subtext rests within all of us. Until the public begins to direct its attention to the elaborate elements that compose human beings, people may never truly understand the depths of themselves. For the case of Lin Biao, further studies should be directed to understanding the inner-battle that he faced and was forced to cope with while serving in a position that he never wished for. Scholars should continue to strive to seek an understanding of the disorders that he lived with and what caused them. As scholars enhance their understanding of the depths of this man, the public's knowledge will also grow regarding the degree of Lin's supposed involvement in Mao's Cultural Revolution drama. This study will hopefully lead us in that direction.

A Note on Sources

Any attempt at unveiling the curtain that cloaks the personal lifestyle of an individual is a daunting task. When the personality for examination is the already historically enigmatic Lin Biao, the task seems infeasible and consistently disrupted by the politically sensitive nature that surrounds his tale. Indeed, the question arose shortly following Lin's demise on that fateful morning of September 13, 1971 of how Lin Biao, the closest comrade in arms to Mao and the greatest extoller of Mao Zedong thought, could betray the Chairman? The event indeed was groundbreaking. The consequences of such an event could have shaken the foundations of the Party and the faith that had been placed in China's modern emperor: Mao Zedong. Since such political weight is placed on the incident, the tendency that consequently arose in scholarship shortly following the incident is the pervasive and omnipresent view that Lin was evil, and efforts to protect the personalities of Mao and Zhou Enlai during the Cultural Revolution period became the general bias.

As with many cases in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) history, historians are limited to what the CCP chooses to release. Open sources (*kaibu*) that would generally be considered key evidence is often infected with political slants or questionable validity. For instance, the infamous trial that investigated the alleged Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques from November 1980 to January 1981, which would normally be considered as filled with pertinent information, should actually be viewed as questionable testimonies. People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) commander Wu Faxian, while on trial from November 1980 to January 1981, accused of assisting Lin Biao in his strive for power, simply agreed to the charges against him. Taking into account the nine years Wu had already been in custody following the alleged September 13 incident and the

fabricating laden nature of the Chinese judicial system, Wu could expect to spend the next nine years in jail unless remission was granted. Wu took the passive path; his statements were feeble and non-confrontational stating, “The Prosecutor’s account of my crimes is all based on fact, as is the evidence. I have confessed to them already. I have no submission to make. My crimes have been described with absolute accuracy!”²⁶² In contrast to this official statement however, one historian noted to me that Wu would never had opposed Chairman Mao, and if Lin Biao had ever hatched a plan to assassinate the Chairman he would have opposed Lin and informed either Zhou Enlai or Mao of Lin’s intentions.²⁶³ Other materials, such as the infamous document detailing Lin’s plan for a coup entitled “An Outline of Project 571” are of questionable validity and appear to be fabricated, especially when considering its discovery in November 1971, two months following the September incident.²⁶⁴ In addition, the document, even if it were authentic though likely not, was a piece of torn notebook paper with a few quick notes written upon it, hardly sufficient planning for a group attempting to assassinate China’s most closely guarded individual: Chairman Mao.

Further occlusions occur with the availability of new source material. Since there is a heightened political sensitivity surrounding the Lin Biao case, historical materials are virtually nonexistent and CCP archives, unlike archives in the West, cannot be accessed for research of any kind. Moreover, the events that surround Lin Biao are tainted in some ways by the Cultural Revolution period. General biases of the period seep into most

²⁶² David Bonavia, *Verdict in Peking: The Trial of the Gang of Four* (London: G.T. Putnam Books, 1984) p. 175.

²⁶³ I am grateful to Jin Qiu, daughter of Wu Faxian, for sharing this point with me.

²⁶⁴ For a Chinese version of the document see Yuan Yue, *Lin Biao shijian yuanshi wenxian huibian* (A Collection of the Original Documents Concerning the Lin Biao Incident) (Taipei: The Institute of the Problems of Mainland China, no date), for an English version see ed., Michael Y.M. Kau, *The Lin Piao Affair: Power, Politics, and Military Coup* (New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975).

analyses that are available. The events of the period itself are inherently confusing, with sources contradicting each other making the historical picture murky.

In addition, Lin Biao does not possess the same charm, intellectual stimuli, and enhanced status of Mao that drove reporters such as Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, and Robert Payne to the remote Communist base camp of Yan'an. Eyewitness accounts of the period do not focus heavily on Lin Biao but seem to target Mao. Moreover, unlike Mao, there exists no record by any personal friends that Lin had known during his youth.²⁶⁵ No guilt by any means should be placed on these reports or lack thereof, but how the content continuously revolves around Mao is an illustration that studies on the Chairman may be less challenging in certain circumstances than other Party figures. Indeed, there is no dearth of sources on Mao, but for military heroes such as Lin Biao, the reality is painfully obvious with an extremely incomplete picture.

Despite these setbacks, the Lin Biao incident and the figure of Lin Biao has received increasing attention in both Western and Chinese scholastic arenas. Part of this renewed interest is due to the increasingly open and less hush-hush academic atmosphere of the Deng era. Historical objectivity has become a key focus as the CCP follows the dictum “seeking truth from facts,” renewing their previously held beliefs on Party history and posthumously recognizing those Party members that had been thoroughly criticized, denounced, and purged from their positions during the Cultural Revolution. The “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the

²⁶⁵ See Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), Agnes Smedley *Battle Hymn of China* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1943), Robert Payne *Journey to Red China* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1947), Li Rui, *Mao Zedong tongzhi di chuqi geming huodong* (Comrade Mao's Early Revolutionary Years). Beijing, Zhongguo Qingmian chubanshe, 1957, Siao Yu (Xiao Yu) *Mao Zedong and I were Beggars* (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1961). One notable exception of Yan'an time period reporters producing works not “Mao centered” is Agnes Smedley's *The Great Road: The Life and Times of Zhu De* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956).

People's Republic of China," adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee and published in 1981, recognized, for instance, that "the so-called bourgeois headquarters inside the Party headed by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping simply did not exist,"²⁶⁶ therefore refuting officially held positions during the Cultural Revolution. Such reexaminations are attributed to the Dengist era; nevertheless official Party positions surrounding Lin Biao remain mostly unchanged.

Newly published materials in China though begin to challenge and negate traditional Party positions of Lin Biao's history. The fact that studies dating from 1989 to 2005 that expose and contradict Lin Biao's official history, which continue to be published in China without any apparent censorship, does smack of non-official recognition by the Party of a new historical interpretation of Lin Biao's case. Scholars are beginning to find new primary sources that expose the private lives of CCP leaders. Oral accounts are becoming increasingly available as well, as individuals who participated in events are more willing to talk about their experiences now more than ever. With the absence of access to Chinese archives, these sources are invaluable for any contemporary Chinese historian as they offer a contrasting historical image of China's leaders than those commonly remembered and known through public exposure.

The primary sources for exposing the private life of Lin Biao are seen in the personal memoirs by his secretaries and servants. These sources are valuable because of the close interpersonal relationships and ties that are commonly forged between secretaries and their *shouzhangs*. As Mao noted about one of his own secretaries, Quan Yanzhi, "there are no secrets about me or my family that I can hide from you even if I

²⁶⁶ "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," taken from eds. Orville Schell and David Shambaugh, *The China Reader: The Reform Era* (New York: Vintage, 1999).

can hide them from heaven or earth.”²⁶⁷ The personal life of Lin Biao is exposed by the memoirs of Zhang Yunsheng in *Maojiawan jishi: Lin Biao mishu huiyilu* (True Account of Maojiawan; The Reminiscences of Lin Biao’s Secretary). Zhang, a military officer from the Shenyang Military Region and Lin Biao’s old Fourth Field Army, served as one of Lin Biao’s personal secretaries from 1966 to late 1970. As a secretary, Zhang and his fellow factotums were officially responsible for a variety of duties that are traditionally given to a secretary including: speech drafting; looking after the work environment and personal life of leaders including housing, transport, food, health care, recreation, to coordinate working and interpersonal relationships among leaders; to organize conferences and arrange leaders’ activities, and to read and summarize daily domestic and foreign newsworthy events.²⁶⁸ Zhang’s position within the Lin household provides us with a perfect aperture to view the personal life of Lin Biao and his family. The details Zhang provides are tantalizing and parallel Western tabloids possessing a voyeuristic tone throughout the bulk of the text. Very little historical or political analysis is present in Zhang’s record. Zhang’s memoir is not mere propaganda nor does it seem to have an overt political slant; although Zhang is sympathetic toward his former *shouzhang*. Zhang’s memoir divulges striking personality blots possessed by Lin and the domineering personality of Ye Qun, Lin’s wife and manager of his personal office. The source is invaluable as it is the best window into the inner life of the Lin residence and provides us with a legitimate account of the personal lifestyle of Lin Biao. Zhang’s account thus contrasts with the vitriolic denunciations that accompany more traditional

²⁶⁷ Quan Yanchi, *Zouxia shengtan de Mao Zedong* (Mao Zedong Down to Earth) (Beijing: Zhongwai wenhua chubun gongsi, 1989) p. 1

²⁶⁸ For more on the role of secretaries or *mishu* see Wei Li and Lucian Pye, “The Ubiquitous Role of the Mishu in Chinese Politics,” *China Quarterly*, no. 132 (1992) pp. 913-936.

CCP examinations of Lin. Although the piece is peppered with Zhang occasionally carrying a task out for Ye Qun or meeting with Lin Biao, Zhang does not portray himself as the outstanding secretary that performed endless duties and yeomen services for his *shouzhang*. It is this aspect that tends to lend increased credibility to Zhang's tale, as a careful reading suggests he does not perform the usual self-aggrandizement that normally accompanies *mishu* memoirs.

Guan Weixun's *Wo suo zhidao de Ye Qun* (Ye Qun According to Me) is similar, though not as lengthy and enriched as Zhang's documentation. Guan held the position as deputy director of the army's cultural arts bureau and resided in the Lin residence from 1968 to 1971. He was responsible to read and educate Ye Qun on both Western and Chinese classical literature. Guan's information is credible and enriches our understanding of the personal lifestyles of elites within the CCP. His memoir also includes several valuable interviews he conducted with Lin Biao's daughter Lin Liheng (Lin Doudou) in the 1980s.

Jiao Ye's fantastic study *Ye Qun zhi mi: Yige mishu yan zhong de Ye Qun yu Lin Biao* (The Riddle of Ye Qun: A secretaries reflections of Lin Biao and Ye Qun) is a detailed oral history. Jiao interviewed a number of personal staff members to Ye Qun and Lin Biao. The majority of recollections and invaluable information came from the mouth of Ye Qun who would gossip wildly about certain issues. These secretaries also constantly lived with Ye's vents of spleen that would engulf her completely and consequently lead to intimate conversations with her secretaries to aid in calming Ye down. It is during these therapeutic-like sessions that Ye would spill information and offer some juicy tidbits about herself, Lin Biao, or other Party members. These

eyewitness accounts complement Zhang's memoir and offer insight and details into an otherwise impenetrable world.

In addition to the memoirs mentioned above, Chinese scholars have made major strides in publishing scholastic studies of Lin Biao that offer analysis that is objective and not peppered with political undertones. Li Tianmin's *Lin Biao pingzhuan* (A Critical Biography of Lin Biao) was published in 1979 in Hong Kong. Even though its insight is limited to the extremely sensitive political nature surrounding Lin Biao and Party history in general during the time of its publication, it still holds water today and is a valuable resource for Lin's earlier life. However, like most CCP elite studies of the 1960s and 1970s, the study is simply filled with information and aggregate data, primarily concerned with understanding the personalities that are at the apex of the CCP. Basing most of its evidence on provincial origin and revolutionary experience, these studies stressed the Chinese cultural importance of *guanxi* or connections in CCP politics but offered little or no analysis of the data they provided.

One of the latest editions in Lin Biao literature is Shao Hua's *Lin Biao de zhe yisheng* (Such as Lin Biao's Life). Shao's study is filled with personal interviews of Lin's closest childhood friends and is also the latest account of Lin Biao's life that is published in the PRC. However, Shao's study still carries the heavy political undertones so common in PRC publications, as Lin Biao is seen as a revolutionary hero but quickly took to political assassinations against presumed enemies in the Party during the Cultural Revolution. Not only does Shao largely follow the traditional interpretation but he also offers no analysis of how Lin made the so-called dramatic transformation from military God to political sniper. Also new to Lin Biao studies is Shu Yun's comprehensive study

Lin Biao shijian wanzheng diaocha (A Complete Investigation of the Lin Biao Incident) published in 2006, and Wu Runsheng's *Lin Biao yu wenhua da geming* (Lin Biao and the Cultural Revolution). Both are published by Mirror Books and sway heavily away from the traditional interpretations held by the Party and most Western scholarship.

Western sources have performed surprisingly little research about Lin Biao. This stems largely from the typical stereotype that is exuded by so many toward the Lin Biao topic: there are no sources. As indicated above, since Deng's reforms and the lessened pressure and control within the Chinese academic arena, publications have become available that tackle Lin Biao. All one must do is to be able to read Chinese. Citizens in China who knew Lin are also more open to speaking out. The hardships that Chinese scholars faced during the 1960's, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, is painfully obvious by earlier Western studies of Lin Biao. The general bias seen in Western accounts can be illuminated by Martin Ebon's *Lin Piao: The Life and Writings of China's New Ruler*. The only redeeming value of Ebon's work is the collection of Lin's speeches compiled and inserted in the second half of the book which at the time of its publication were no doubt valuable. But his analysis is based solely on the public Lin Biao, the figure seen standing next to the Chairman, extolling the Four Greats, and always grasping the Little Red Book. The publisher even claims that Ebon's book is "without doubt of major importance to the security of the Western world." Even Lin's writings are labeled as Lin Biao's "*Mein Kampf*" and can be ignored only at our extreme peril." These statements are obvious reflections of a Cold War mindset. But their importance pertaining to this study is that, as we will see, the public and private greatly differ, particularly with regard to Lin Biao.

Fortunately, Western scholarship has progressed and the two newest studies of Lin Biao are stimulating and inspirational for the author of this study. Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun's *The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution* gives an extremely detailed analysis of Lin Biao's life during the Cultural Revolution and challenging traditional assumptions of key Cultural Revolution events and Lin Biao's level of guilt based on Party history. The second work is Jin Qiu's *The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution*. Published in 1998, Jin's piece is the latest Western account that examines the Lin Biao incident. Unlike Teiwes and Sun, Jin's study does not deeply analyze particular Cultural Revolution events, instead Jin opts to primarily give her attention to the actual "Lin Biao Incident" that occurred on the tragic evening of September 12, 1971. Jin argues in her persuasive hour-by-hour account of the evening of September 12, 1971 that Ye Qun and Lin Biao's son Lin Liguang both planned to take Lin Biao from Beidaihe to Guangzhou or to Dalian, the latter is where Lin Biao was more prepared to go. Lin Liheng (Lin Doudou) informed Zhou Enlai and members of Unit 8341, Mao's central bodyguard unit, of Ye and Lin's intended plans. After Zhou relayed the message to Mao and inquired if Lin's plane should be intercepted, Mao refused, saying "Rain will fall, widows will remarry. What can we do? Let him go." Jin's account is based on both Chinese and Western sources as well as first hand interviews with Lin Doudou. Jin also utilizes unpublished source material such as Wu Faxian's own recollections of the event to which she, being Wu's daughter, has privileged access.

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