ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: ENDURING DILEMMAS: SOURCES OF AMERICAN AMBIVALENCE TOWARD EUROPEAN DEFENSE AUTONOMY, THE EDC AND ESDP IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE.

David T. Armitage, Jr., Doctor of Philosophy, 2005

Dissertation Directed By: Professor George Quester, Department of Government and Politics

Since World War II, transatlantic security relations have reflected a tension between American desires for Europeans to share more of the defense burden without having to give up its leadership role and European desires for greater defense autonomy without having to devote more resources toward military capabilities. The dissertation explores this tension and argues that systemic theories of international relations do not adequately explain why the US supported a potentially competitive institution with NATO – the European Defense Community (EDC) – during the 1950’s, while resisting a much-looser version of European defense cooperation in European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the late 1990’s. The dissertation focuses on additional variables at the domestic level, such as fragmented political systems, divergent threat perceptions, and core beliefs and influence of policy entrepreneurs in explaining US behavior toward European defense ambitions during these two discrete periods of time.
ENDURING DILEMMAS: SOURCES OF AMERICAN AMBIVALENCE TOWARD EUROPEAN DEFENSE AUTONOMY, EDC AND ESDP IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

By

David Templeton Armitage, Jr.

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Advisory Committee:
Professor George Quester, Chair
Professor Martin Heisler
Professor David Lalman
Professor Warren Phillips
Professor Keith Olson
Dedication

To Dr. and Mrs. David T. Armitage and Kristin Smith-Armitage.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Background

The idea for the dissertation evolved from a reading of Edward Fursdon’s classic history of the European Defense Community (EDC).\(^1\) As I was reading the book in early 1999, it had only been a few months since the French and British governments at St. Malo had announced their intention to cooperate more closely in defense. Specifically, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac had agreed to pursue greater European defense autonomy through the framework of the European Union (EU) in what has since become known as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Shortly thereafter, the US government produced several statements that exhibited skepticism and suspicion of this latest European defense initiative.\(^2\) In particular, US government officials expressed concern that ESDP in no way threaten NATO. As I read Fursdon’s book, I was struck by the similarity of the situation compared to the development of the European Defense Community (EDC). In the earlier case, however, the US came out in strong support of the EDC. I wondered what accounted for the apparent reversal. Was it simply a matter of the end of the Cold War, as some neorealists would posit? Or was there something else? Has the existence of NATO hindered or fostered greater cohesion in the European foreign and security context? In other words, has the institutionalization of the Atlantic Alliance, which took shape in the early 1950’s,

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\(^2\)
permitted Europeans to draw closer to developing their own security policy, or did it cement American interest in maintaining its military presence in Europe even after the threat of a Soviet attack ceased after the end of the Cold War?

Throughout my educational and professional experience, I have been fascinated by transatlantic relations and European politics. I also have been interested in American foreign policy because of the relationship between domestic politics and the international system. From my work studying NATO and the EU, I became aware of the relationship between state preferences and international institutions in pursuing foreign policy objectives. Thus, researching this apparent puzzle seemed an ideal topic, given my combined interests in European politics and American foreign policy.

**Research Question and Dissertation Proposal**

Since the end of World War II, transatlantic security relations have reflected a tension between American desires for Europeans to share more of the defense burden without having to give up its hegemonic leadership role, and European desires for greater defense autonomy without having to devote more resources toward military capabilities.\(^2\) While there are an increasing number of studies seeking to explain the dynamics of European security and defense cooperation, there has not been the same level of attention to the policy responses of the United States. Most of the literature on the subject addresses US policy only from the perspective of NATO or Alliance

politics, but few explore the determinants of US policy specifically toward European defense autonomy. This dissertation seeks to rectify this deficiency in the literature by examining US policy toward the European Defense Community during the early 1950’s and systematically comparing it with US policy toward the European Security and Defense Policy during the late 1990’s. Why in the 1950’s did the United States promote the creation of a new security institution besides NATO, an institution of which the US would not be a member? On the other hand, in the 1990’s, despite American reluctance to become involved in security crises in the Balkans and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Washington fought hard to preserve NATO as the premier security organization. Were the structural components of the Cold War, highlighted by the division of Germany and perceptions of the Soviet threat, sufficient explanations to explain this apparent anomaly?

A subset of questions also will be addressed: when officials are faced with several policy choices to achieve a stated goal, what determines their selection? For example, neorealists would argue that a prime reason of the United States in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s for supporting European security integration was in response to the emerging threat from the Soviet Union.4 Because of the structural conditions of the international system, it was in the American interest to counterbalance the Soviet threat to the European continent. The only way to do that was to rearm Germany. As Dulles told the National Security Council in August 1954, “The

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Soviets successfully used Mendes-France to kill, or at least to maim, EDC. Will they now try to destroy NATO?” Dulles went on to say, “We must not assume that we can go ahead independently to rearm Germany if the French won’t agree.” The question remains: why did the United States allow France to possess so much blocking power on an issue of vital importance to the national security of the United States? Why did Washington risk its own security interests to ensure French approval, even when it was apparent that French indecision could put in jeopardy not only French security, but also the final question in Germany, which was key to Western security and the entire American strategic posture in Europe?

Was the European Defense Community the best option? NATO already existed as a political and security institution, and there was a plan to rearm Germany through the Alliance. Why, then, did the United States not pursue the NATO plan?

One explanation was that the French worried that NATO’s plan would not meet their needs. Consequently, the French devised the Pleven Plan, which sought to adapt the European integration model that had been used in steel and coal to security and defense. Neorealists might contend that the Soviet threat was the main concern, and, therefore, the United States would support the EDC to assuage France and ensure its support for defending Europe. This raises two concerns: if the Soviet threat was so looming (which, from a structural point of view, would be axiomatic), should not the French (from their own calculus) want to counterbalance the Soviets

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6 See Fursdon, 86-97.
and be willing to work through NATO? Second, there was no indication that the EDC had any better chance of passing the French Assembly than a purely intergovernmental Alliance arrangement as proposed by the NATO plan. Thus, neorealism theory appears to be insufficient to explain why the Americans did not opt for the NATO plan and devote their energies toward demonstrating how the Alliance could accommodate French security concerns as effectively as the EDC.

Once the choice is made and a particular institutional or policy equilibrium achieved, those outcomes often are “locked-in,” making it particularly difficult for new actors to change the situation. Certain actors benefit from the status quo and resist efforts to change it. George Tsebelis has called these actors “veto players,” and he observes that the more veto players there are, the harder it is to change policies or institutions. I would argue that US policy toward European defense autonomy reflects this condition. Once NATO as an institution was “locked-in” as the institutional preference, actors in the Pentagon, as well as at NATO headquarters and elsewhere, developed a transnational network geared to preserving the Alliance for its own sake. Maintaining NATO became the end political goal.

Footnotes:


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By seeking answers to the above questions, the dissertation contributes to the debate over America’s role in the world, especially given the discussion in recent years over American unilateralism.9

The focus will be on decisions as outputs of the political system that result in policy choices that may not be congruent with the structural imperatives of the international system of the time.10 While the notion of a political system and its relationship to the role of nation-states in the international system continue to spark debate, a general consensus is emerging, with different schools focusing on different aspects of the political system. Simon Hix has posited that political science as a discipline involves “the systematic study of the processes of government, politics, and policymaking.”11 It involves political structures and institutions, such as governments, bureaucracies, decision-making rules, and norms, but it also involves the interests, motivations, and behaviors of political actors. Contemporary political scientists see these two dimensions - institutions and actors - as complementary, and there has been an attempt to integrate the two into a more coherent analytical framework.12

According to Hinich and Munger, policy outputs can be described in a simple equation:

11 Hix, 9.
This “fundamental equation of politics” can be broken down, where “preferences” refer to the desires and wants of political actors, and “institutions” - both formal and informal - reflect the rules that constrain political actors’ options in collective decision-making. “Outcomes” or “outputs” reflect the result (either policies or new institutions) of the interactions between preferences and institutions. If one changes and the other remains constant, the outcomes will change. Thus, the political situation is fluid and dynamic. As Simon Hix notes, “Actors choose actions to maximize their preferences within a particular set of institutional constraints and a particular structure of strategic interests.”

However, preferences and institutions alone are not enough. Policy outcomes also depend on actions, which means that the role of the actors is also important. If preferences are only the desires and institutions are only the constraints, an additional element must be factored in – action itself. After all, if actors have certain preferences but are not willing to act on them (whether because they perceive the cost too high or the risk too great), the outcome will be different despite everything else being equal. Thus, an additional variable I call “action” needs to be included. Now, the new equation should read:


15 Hix, 12.

16 This additional variable is derived from prospect theory. See Rose McDermott, *Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy* (Ann Arbor: University of
Preferences + Institutions + Action = Outcomes

It is my contention that, because systemic theories of international relations place too much emphasis on one aspect of the equation, they are not sufficient to understand US behavior toward European efforts to increase their defense autonomy. Rather, the domestic imperatives also matter (particularly the role of the actors themselves) and are necessary to understand the influences on the formation of US policy responses toward both the EDC and ESDP.

Post-Cold War Developments in Europe

The end of the Cold War renewed interest among European states in exploring ways to cooperate more fully in the realm of security and defense. Political developments since the December 1998 St. Malo declaration by the UK and France have attracted the attention of scholars and practitioners alike to the issue of European security and defense cooperation.17

Regarding European efforts during the 1990’s to develop their own security and defense instruments, neorealists might argue that, in the absence of a Soviet

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threat, the United States would be concerned about the Europeans forming their own cohesive military capabilities. For example, John Ikenberry argued the notion of “soft-balancing” to describe the EU’s behavior after the Cold War. Europeans reacted to the sole superpower by “soft balancing” the United States. Because the EU had emerged as a counterweight to American economic power, the United States would want – as the world’s lone superpower – to stop any challenge to its status. In other words, the United States would seek to prevent any potential competitor – including its European allies – from arising. To some extent, this appears to conform to events.

Democratic peace theorists and social constructivists posit that the United States and European states reflect a security community because they share similar values. Proponents of a pluralistic security community would find it difficult to explain why the Europeans would fear the United States or vice versa. If transatlantic values were similar, then one should expect the Americans to trust the Europeans to develop their own security arrangements. A subset of this approach would argue that identity development on the part of Europeans would explain the efforts to build ESDP (originally known as ESDI – a European Security and Defense Identity).

However, the neorealist explanation requires that the US consider the Europeans as the primary threat or area of concern. Yet, according to stated US national security strategies, the main security threats to the US originate from

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elsewhere, notably instability in the Middle East and South Asia, as well as threats from transnational terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The leading states of concern are China and Russia, not countries in Europe working together. Consequently, neorealism fails to address an essential US interest: with worldwide responsibilities (and interests), the United States needed the Europeans to secure the Balkans and tend to the Europeans’ own backyard. Thus, one would expect Americans to appreciate European efforts, but that was not the case.

Liberal institutionalists would contend that economic interests explain why the United States would support the EDC but resist ESDP. Policy preferences are in fact a large component in shaping the outputs. However, given the increasing economic interdependence (particularly in terms of transatlantic foreign direct investment), one might expect that these arguments fare better in explaining US-EU political economy than US-EU security relations.

Foreign Policy: National Action in International Politics

Foreign policy decision-making sits at the nexus of domestic politics and the international system. To understand foreign policy outputs, one needs to trace the

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23 The literature on foreign policy is vast. For a sample, see Henry Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” Daedalus 95 (2) (Spring, 1966): 503-529; Richard L. Merritt, ed., Foreign Policy
inputs in the domestic and bureaucratic contexts as they relate to outputs in the international context. 24 According to Richard Merritt, “Foreign policymaking is essentially the task of devising strategies that utilize a nation-state’s capabilities to achieve the goals its leaders set.” 25 There are external constraints from the international system and internal constraints from the domestic political scene. Foreign policy reflects the interaction of these two – sometimes cross-cutting – dynamics. As Merritt goes on to say, “The ecology of national foreign policy decision system poses varying degrees of constraint upon its options and behavior…. [Such] constraints include the structure of the international system, varying levels of technology, enduring patterns of trade and other transactions, perceptions, norms of individual and state behavior, and… religion and other cultural components.” 26

Standard theories of international relations may be insufficient to gain an adequate understanding of the interactions and behaviors related to US behavior toward European attempts to increase defense autonomy. As Alexander George has noted, structural realist theory, rational choice theory, and game theory (i.e., deductive approaches) often “black-box” the process of policymaking and strategic interaction between states by using assumptions to introduce the process. In George’s

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words, “I felt it necessary to engage in direct but admittedly difficult empirical study of policymaking processes and strategic interaction between actors.” Of course, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive; they both serve to illuminate and contribute to a better understanding of international relations and the substantive undertakings of American foreign policy.

George also notes the need to broaden the scope of international relations theory in a way that still provides value and stresses systematic methods of sound social science. In addition, George takes issue with those who argue that incorporating insights from foreign policy analysis is not relevant to international relations theories when he writes, “Indeed, proponents of structural realism explicitly acknowledge that it is not a theory of foreign policy – although a theory of foreign policy is precisely what policymakers need.” Rather than discounting the value of incorporating foreign policymaking processes into general theories of international relations, there is a growing recognition of the utility of examining “how leaders, groups, and coalitions of actors can affect the way foreign policy problems are framed, the options that are selected, the choices that are made, and what gets implemented.”

25 Merritt, Foreign Policy Analysis, 1.
26 Ibid., 1-2.
27 George, Bridging the Gap, xxi.
One area to consider is the decision unit shaping foreign policy: is it individual, group, or bureaucracy? One needs to examine the situational variables and different stages of the policy processes to identify circumstances likely to influence the priority (or preferences) of different decision units. A superficial reading of the two periods (1950’s and 1990’s) might suggest that external factors and constraints were the primary variables affecting the policy, but a more careful analysis reveals that the cases are more complex and interesting. In particular, the domestic and internal forces were much more influential than commonly attributed. As Snyder and his colleagues observed, the definition of the situation and how it is defined influences who gets involved in the policymaking process, and the consequent shape of the foreign policy depends on the configuration of the particular groups, leaders, and coalitions involved. Thus, relying upon systemic theories of international relations alone does not fully capture the interaction between the United States and Europe. The explanatory value is insufficient. One needs to delve down a level and integrate the domestic and international levels of analysis in order to gain a more complete understanding of the determinants of American ambivalence toward European defense autonomy.

Research Methods

This dissertation concentrates on two major periods in transatlantic defense relations: the first covers the period from 1949 to 1954 (from the creation of NATO to the defeat of the EDC), and the second covers the period from 1998 to 2003 (from the St. Malo declaration to the first EU military mission). Isolating and “freeze framing” these two periods through the use of process tracing will permit a discrete and systematic treatment of the contributing factors influencing American foreign policy, essentially turning them into comparative case studies.\(^{33}\) Bennett and George define process tracing as “the attempt to trace empirically the temporal and possibly causal sequences of events within a case that intervene between independent variables and observed outcomes.”\(^{34}\) There indeed are limitations to process tracing, just as there are to other methods (including statistical methods). Nevertheless, process tracing can highlight the path to an outcome, identify decision points, and suggest causal inference, especially if the case sample is small.\(^{35}\)

To provide context, the first case study will be preceded by a discussion of developments following the end of World War II, the start of the Cold War, and the impact of the Korean conflict. The second case study will be preceded by a


\(^{34}\) Bennett and George, 144.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.
discussion of the end of the Cold War, the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, and the conflict in the Balkans (both Bosnia and Kosovo).

While historical periods are by their very nature unique and impossible to control for all variables, the 1950’s and 1990’s exhibit striking similarities, thus lending themselves to systematic comparison. First, both reflect a dramatic break in the international order (World War II and Cold War). Therefore, there was an opportunity for states to establish new positions and policies. There was the opportunity for states to rethink previous ways of interacting with other states. Both periods centered on the establishment or reappraisal of institutions to address international problems. Of course, the most notable difference is the explicit absence of a perceived military threat from the Soviet Union.

Much of the research for the first case study involved reviewing detailed secondary sources and supplemented where necessary by primary sources to determine the main purposes and motives for US policy formation regarding the creation of the European Defense Community. I also turned to excellent biographies and memoirs of principal actors at the time (e.g., Acheson, Bruce, Dulles, Eden, Eisenhower, Macmillan, Monnet, Spaak, and Truman). Examining such source material through alternative theoretical lenses helped me to sift through the rhetoric and revision regarding the US role, thinking, and interests in this area. It also facilitated testing the strength of various independent variables that influenced US policy. As Achen and Snidal note, “In international relations, only case studies

36 In particular, I relied heavily on Furdson, European Defense Community and Kevin Ruane, The Rise and Fall of the European Defense Community (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). Both of these sources have been thoroughly researched and provided useful data. Primary sources included archival
provide the intensive empirical analysis that can find previously unnoticed causal factors and historical patterns.37

Much of the research for the second case study involved structured interviews and examination of primary material where available (some material was still classified or sensitive). Because of the recentness of the period, many important actors are still accessible, and their perspectives were invaluable. Moreover, enough time has elapsed to permit a more objective perspective and, perhaps, candor from those removed from the day-to-day policymaking activities of governments and institutions. I also benefited from employment at the Department of State during some of the period of the second case study, which allowed for an “insider” perspective to the deliberations and policymaking process.

Organization of the Dissertation

Chapter Two explores the contending theoretical perspectives and reviews the academic literature related to international relations and foreign policy decision-making that are most relevant to transatlantic defense relations. The factors shaping policy formation – from initial discussion and decision shaping to policy output and implementation – are explored in further detail as they pertain to the dynamic between national and international spheres.

Chapter Three is a structured empirical account of case one: the development of US policy toward the EDC. The chapter outlines the strategic context, the choices

material from the Foreign Relations of the United States series, official NATO documentation, and declassified material at the National Defense University library.
Chapter Four is a structured empirical account of case two: the development of US policy toward ESDP. In similar fashion to the first case, it outlines the strategic context, the choices facing American decision-makers, the principal actors and decision units, patterns of interaction, and the policy output.

Chapter Five considers theoretical explanations for the first case. After evaluating the first case from the perspectives of major contending international relations theories, the chapter explicates the role and influence of domestic political forces and policy entrepreneurs in shaping US policy.

Chapter Six considers theoretical explanations for the second case. Again, after evaluating US policy toward ESDP from the perspectives of major contending international relations theories, the chapter shows how the role and influence of domestic political forces and presence of institutional elements shaped and constrained US policy.

The final chapter summarizes these findings in comparative perspective and explores avenues for further research. It also delineates uncertainties in the outcome, ambiguities and difficulties in the investigation.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives – The Links Between Domestic Actors, Foreign Policymaking, and International Relations

Introduction

The field of International Relations (IR) seeks to understand the dynamics of interaction between and among state and non-state actors in the world. Unlike in other fields of political science, here there is less consensus on the range of perspectives by which to study international political phenomena. There is the level-of-analysis question, including the debate over whether the study of international relations should take into account the role of leadership and governmental decision-making bodies or units, as well as the relationship between international relations and foreign policy decision-making.

The central core of IR as a field is to understand the “causes of conflict and the conditions for cooperation” in an international context characterized by anarchy. Although there is no universal agreement on the term “anarchy,” many use it to describe the absence of a central government possessing a global monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. At the same time, almost all would concede that the international system is not completely chaotic; there is some order and expectation of reciprocal treatment. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff note, “Even in the anarchic society posited by classical realists and their neorealistic successors, states achieve their
security goals by both cooperative and conflictual means. Therefore, theories of cooperation, together with theories of conflict, form the necessary basis for a comprehensive theory of international relations.\(^{39}\)

And yet, the field of IR is in flux and disarray. Ethan Kapstein argues that the study of international relations is experiencing a “theoretical crisis.” That is because the dominant theory, structural realism, or neorealism,\(^{40}\) has been under attack, and these "broadsides leave a sinking hulk" where neorealism "once ruled the theoretical seas."\(^{41}\) However, no adequate replacement has yet been found.

In the following section, I will examine structural realism, outlining its ability to explain state behavior, particularly in terms of its ability to explain specific policy actions. This will be followed by a review of criticisms and weaknesses to the theory. Then, I will examine a second major theoretical framework, liberalism,\(^{42}\) to judge its ability to explain and predict state behavior. I will then examine the latest approach to explaining state behavior – social constructivism – before concluding with some thoughts on the implications of such debates on US views towards European defense autonomy.

\(^{38}\) James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations* (New York: Longman, 1997), 418.


\(^{40}\) In this chapter, I use the terms “structural realism” and “neorealism” interchangeably.


\(^{42}\) The liberal paradigm includes approaches known as liberal institutionalism and democratic peace theory.
Structural Realism: Is It Structurally Flawed?

Structural realism continues to be the dominant paradigm for explaining world politics. Structural realism is identified with the work of Kenneth Waltz. Updating the thought of classical realism, Waltz strove to develop a generalizable and universal theory of international relations. The basic assumptions are: the state, representing the aggregate interests of society, is the primary unit of analysis; the international system, composed of states, is inherently conflictual, anarchic, without a global or supranational force; and power is the final arbiter of politics and economics. It is assumed that states, which act in their own self-interest, are generally in conflict with one another for survival. The crucial independent variable is power, especially its distribution within the system.

One of the first to clearly formulate a framework stressing the systemic constraints on state capabilities, Waltz emphasized the structure of the international system, which he described as horizontal and anarchic, in the sense that the units (i.e., states) are equal with regard to each other. This differs from the structure of domestic politics, which is hierarchical in nature. However, that is not to say states do not possess different capabilities. On the contrary, it is the variance in capabilities that distinguishes one state from another and places it in the international system. Fundamentally, neorealists believe it is power and its distribution that influence the behavior of states. In short, the structure, characterized by the distribution of power, determines what state actors can and cannot do.

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Neorealists contend that the international distribution of power (defined as military and economic capacities) leads states to maximize their power in order to assure their survival. Consequently, states will seek to balance other powers in order to prevent a hegemonic power from dominating the entire system. The type of state actor (democracy, authoritarian, etc.) is of little relevance, and domestic politics do not play a major role in explaining state behavior. Such neorealists believe in the billiard ball approach to understanding international relations, where what goes on inside the state is of little consequence to explaining conflict, cooperation, war, and peace.

Neorealists tend to explain order in one of two ways: through either balance of power theory or hegemonic stability theory. Thus, either states feeling threatened will balance against increasing concentrations of power or one single stateields a preponderance of power that reduces the incentives of others to counterbalance or resist. In the latter case, the weak states will “bandwagon” by either joining the hegemon through alliance or allowing themselves to be dominated by the hegemon. States may balance internally through domestic mobilization, or they may seek temporary coalitions or alliances with other states.⁴⁶

Because states are treated as unitary actors “who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, strive for universal domination,” a key ingredient is balance of power. As Waltz writes, “balance-of-power theory is micro theory precisely in the economist’s sense. The system, like a market in economics, is made by the actions and interactions of its units, and the theory is based on

⁴⁵ For examples of classical realism, see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1948) and Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).
assumptions about their behavior. Therefore, one should expect to see states form alliances and balance against potential hegemons.

According to Joseph Grieco, there are three main assumptions underlying balance-of-power as the natural order of world politics: 1) all states seek security, but security is never absolute; 2) because a state’s intentions are never absolutely knowable, an ally may become an adversary, thus turning alliances into temporary pacts against a common threat; and 3) relative power is more important than absolute power, since states only care about their power in relation to other potentially competing states.

A second explanatory theory within the neorealist framework is hegemonic stability theory, which at first glance seems to be the opposite of balance-of-power theory. Such a view of the preponderance of power often is taken from an international political economy perspective. Some have fused elements of political realism with economic liberalism to create the theory of hegemonic stability. For example, Charles Kindleberger uses public choice theory and the theory of hegemonic stability to explain changes in the world’s economy. Combining neoclassical economics’ methodological individualism with Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action, Kindleberger argues that an open and liberal world trading system requires an economic hegemon. This hegemonic or dominant power is required to provide necessary stability. In Kindleberger’s words, “For the world economy to be stable, it needs a stabilizer, some country that would undertake to provide a market for distress goods, a steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, and a rediscount

47 Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 118.
mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic.49

The role of the hegemonic power is to maintain the international economic order by preventing cheating or “free-riding” of public or collective goods. Kindleberger defines a public good as “one the consumption of which by an individual, household, or firm does not reduce the amount available for other potential consumers.”50 Examples of public goods at the international level include collective security, an open trading system, and stable currency.

One way the hegemonic or dominant power performs its role is to use its influence to create international regimes that determine proper and improper behavior.51 It is also the case, according to proponents of this theory, that if there were no hegemon to impose and maintain these international regimes, the world economy would become unstable, prone to economic nationalism, protectionism, and a general break-down in free trade.52

The danger implicit from this theory is that the system is prone to decay as the hegemon has the tendency to shift from providing proper leadership to exploitation, or when the hegemon fails to lead. This can occur because the hegemon is tired of

50 Kindleberger, 243.
52 For a critique of the need for a hegemonic power for the preservation of a liberal international economy, see Keohane, *After Hegemony*.
carrying what it perceives as the bulk of the burden of maintaining the system. Kindleberger suggests that the inability of Britain to maintain international monetary stability after the First World War was a key factor which led to the Great Depression, and “[p]art of the world’s economic problem today is that the United States has resigned (or been discharged) as leader of the world economy, and there is no candidate willing and acceptable to take its place.”

Kindleberger concludes that entropy of world economic leadership is inevitable, and that the demise of the hegemon can come either from within or without. What happens, in Kindleberger’s view, is that the system breaks down, and instability ensues until a new leader emerges. As he writes, “After breakdown, there follows a long, drawn-out, and dangerous process of establishing a new basis of legitimacy, under a new leader.”

A weakness of this theory is that it tends to ignore or underemphasize the importance of domestic political factors and social forces in the development of the international market. Critics also note its inability to predict hegemonic behavior under various conditions or to demonstrate the causal links between power and outcome.

Realists tend to view international economic relations from the perspective of “national interest,” paramount of which is the survival of the state. Such a collective interest is often assumed clear and definable. Many realists interpret the world economy in terms of a zero-sum game; thus, it is critical to maximize one’s wealth at

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53 Ibid., 248.
54 Ibid., 252.
the expense of others. As two scholars put it, “From this perspective, the national interest is usually seen to imply the need for increasing the dependence of other states on the home state’s economy. The other side of the same coin is reducing the home state’s dependence on others.”56 Dependence is to be avoided because it could lead to dominance by others. Thus, for a realist, a state’s ideal position in terms of economic security would be complete self-sufficiency. As Gill and Law note, “Given that self-sufficiency is largely unobtainable for most states, the second-best condition would be one of asymmetrical interdependence, balanced in favour of the home state.”57 Realists working from this perspective would advocate countries identifying strategic industries and “see domestic and international aspects of the global political economy as linked in that they view ‘national capital’ operating internationally.”58 Realists and mercantilists blame the export of corporate expertise in transnational firms to less developed regions for the relative decline of economic power in the United States. If they pay any attention to transnational social forces and the role of non-state actors, they view, as Ruggie notes, “transnationalization as a direct reflection of hegemony.”59

The essence of the neorealist position is one that attempts to explain the economic difficulties of the 1970’s while responding to critics who argue that the end of the nation-state is near. In the words of one author, “The inability of nation-states to control or manage turbulent change in the 1970’s was not attributed to the demise

57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 30.
of the nation-state,...but to the power vacuum resulting from the decline of American
hegemony....” 60  For neorealists, “International agreements are nothing else than
tough bargains struck between conflicting parties in which the strongest gets its way.
Not to strive for hegemony is to lose the game.” 61

Waltz’s theory, however, unleashed a debate that has “dominated the
international-relations theoretical landscape since the early 1980’s.” 62  Structural
realism has been attacked and faulted for a number of reasons. Although a realist
himself, Stephen Walt disputed the claim that states balance solely against the
strongest state in the system, arguing that instead “states balance against the greatest
threats to their interests, defining threats as a product of perceived intentions,
ideology, and distance, as well as capabilities.” 63  Under conditions of anarchy,
security is scarce and intentions are uncertain. Consequently, states tend to balance
one another based on the distribution of power in the system. Unfortunately, a
number of scholars have taken issue with the lack of precision to the terms “balance
of power” as conceptual tools of analysis. 64  According to George, “the few structural
variables encompassed by the theory operate not as determinants of statesmen’s
choices of policy, but merely as constraints, though certainly important constraints,
on those choices.” 65  George goes on to question the term “power” as a concept, both
in its ambiguity in definitional terms but also as a heuristic device. As he writes,

60 Robert A. Isaak, *International Political Economy: Managing World Economic Change* (Englewood
61 Ibid.
63 Jack Levy, “Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design,” in Vasquez and
For more on Walt’s views, see his classic, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1987).
“The emphasis on the importance of the differences in power among states fails to take into account that not all capabilities a state possesses come into play and influence outcome of its interactions with other states. The theory fails to distinguish – and cannot distinguish – between what might be called the totality of gross capabilities a state possesses and the often much more limited usable options that its leaders can employ or wish to employ in particular situations.” By focusing almost exclusively on the totality of a state’s power and resources, important aspects related to international relations may be missed. Raw power capabilities may overlook the intensity of the weaker state’s preference in a particular dispute. Thus, “asymmetry of motivation” may work against the stronger state, as its strategic outlook is broader and encompasses multiple interests across an array of issue areas. In other words, “the more powerful state may not attach enough importance to these particular interests to warrant a heavy expenditure of resources to achieve a maximum payoff in the dispute with a weaker but highly motivated adversary.”  

A major criticism is that because neorealists focus almost exclusively at the system level, they neglect the structure of the units themselves and the role that might play on the behavior of the units. A number of analysts fault neorealists for not considering domestic sources and influences on international relations.  

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65 George, Bridging the Gap, 109–110. Emphasis in the original.  
66 Ibid., 111.  
approach these critics take is to reject or minimize the role of the system. According to Kapstein:

Critics argue either that there is no objective international system with an independent existence or that systemic pressures are so weak and uncertain that they are indeterminate with respect to the foreign policy choices that states make and the outcomes of their international interactions. In order to understand state behavior, therefore, scholars must reject the “billiard ball” model of structural realism and begin their exploration inside the “black box” of domestic politics. The causal logic of this explanation thus begins with what is happening inside a particular unit.  

Kapstein proceeds to demonstrate that, according to the latest proponents of democratic peace, a multipolar world of liberal states would likely be more stable than a multipolar world with various regimes. In Kapstein’s words, “[R]egime type is a more significant determinant of international relations than polarity, or the distribution of power.” Others reject the entire relevance of unipolarity, bipolarity, balance of power, and structural realism.

A second major criticism of structural realism is that it does not account for transnational actors. Because the units in the system are only states, it cannot respond to what may be a growing influence in the world -- non-state actors such as terrorist groups, organized crime syndicates, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, etc. For example, neorealists tend to

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70 Kapstein, “Is Realism Dead?” 756.
ignore the development of the European Union as a global actor since the EU is not a
nation-state.

A third critique is that neorealism fails to adequately explain cooperation
among states and the influence of governing norms, principles, and rules in
constraining state behavior. This is made even more pronounced by the implicitly
pessimistic neorealist view of a world where states are seen as automatically at odds
with one another. Whereas realists have no difficulties assuming the development of
a collective, national interest, they believe it stops there without recognizing that there
may be common interests beyond the state or domestic level. Neorealists have
responded that alliances and hegemonic stability account for cooperation, but claim
that the distribution of power and states’ threat perceptions – not norms – are the
driving forces. Some scholars propose that besides power as a variable, “rules,
regimes, and international institutions need to be brought into the definition of
international political structure.”

A fourth criticism is that neorealism does not conform to history. If structural
realism has strong explanatory power, it should be testable, and history should
substantiate the theory. However, Paul Schroeder has taken structural realists to task,
stating that their “view of the unchanging, repetitive nature of balance-of-power
politics and outcomes throughout the ages, may make the theory of international
politics simple, parsimonious, and elegant; they also make it...unhistorical, unusable,

72 See Krasner, *International Regimes* and Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New
74 Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural
and wrong."75 Schroeder discovered that states tended to behave in ways other than
neorealist theory would predict, including bandwagoning instead of balancing, or
remaining neutral altogether. More recently, structural realism has been criticized for
its inability to predict the peaceful end of the Cold War.76

In conjunction with Schroeder’s critique, neorealist theory is faulted for not
addressing cultural influences and social contexts. Numerous postmodern theorists,
social constructivists, and others argue that culture and identity are important
explicators of international behavior and that anarchy and the state are created
concepts that reflect normative thought.77

Finally, the terms used by neorealists (e.g., national interest, power, etc.) are
difficult to operationalize in that concepts such as national interest may be
tautological and, in any event, are open to interpretation. The notion that policy is in
the “national interest” has posed dilemmas for scholars seeking precision in concepts.
Such a collective interest is often assumed to be clear and definable. In reality,
though, finding meaning in the term “national interest” is difficult. If it were not, the
foreign policy advocates would find it easy to implement a certain policy because it
would be obvious that it was in the national interest to do so. After all, no one

75 Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” *International Security* 19 (Summer
(Summer): 5-46. Hagan analyzes state behavior in the run-up to the twentieth century’s great conflicts
– World War I, World War II, and the Cold War – to demonstrate anomalies in neo-realist
expectations.
76 See John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” in Sean
Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds) *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge, MA:
77 See N.J. Rennger and Mark Hoffman, “Modernity, Postmodernity and International Relations,” in
John Doherty et. al. (eds) *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences* (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
97-104; Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*
advocates a particular foreign policy on the grounds that it is not in the national interest. That would be absurd. Thus, meaning of the term “national interest” reflects the views of leaders in power at a given point in time. It also suggests that national interests are not fixed, but rather may fluctuate over time depending on the leadership structure.

As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff point out, however, “Among the focal points of neorealist analysis is an effort to reformulate and refine the national-interest concept to encompass a perceived calculus of benefits and losses, in accordance with alternative posited goals for the state.”

Although on the defensive, structural realists continue to push back. Despite its numerous critics, structural realism still “ranks as the most important attempt thus far to isolate and focus on a key variable in political behavior -- namely, power -- and to develop a theory of international relations.” Kapstein adds, “[N]eorealism provides a useful starting point for understanding outcomes in the international system.”

Not long after the end of the Cold War, leading structural realists such as John Mearsheimer, Christopher Layne and Kenneth Waltz argued that the American
“unipolar moment” would be fleeting. Drawing on balance-of-power theory, they argued that major states and/or regional groupings (e.g., China, EU-Europe, Japan, India, and Russia) would soon counter-balance the US hegemonic position, leading the world system to become multipolar and inherently less stable. Structural realists also argued that the US would strategically disengage from the international scene, as it became only one of many voices on the world scene. However, to date, those predictions have not borne out. As several scholars have noted, the US position in the world has remained uniquely pre-eminant and arguably stronger since the end of the Cold War.

Neoliberalism: Suitable Replacement?

A second approach to international relations is drawn from the liberal or idealist school and emphasizes the cooperative nature of states. Neoliberals tend to focus on interdependence and emphasize the common interests of states. According to Joseph Nye, a defining characteristic of liberalism in international relations is the stress placed on the impact of domestic and international society, interdependence,

81 Kapstein, “Is Realism Dead?” 773.
83 Krauthammer, “Unipolar Moment.”
and international institutions. Nye describes three major causal strands of classical liberal theory. One of them, democratic liberalism, asserts the pacific effects of republican government. One definition of Liberalism is the belief that democracy can solve international conflict and a correct domestic society (namely, America’s) leads to peace.

Francis Fukuyama argued in the early 1990’s that the grand philosophical dialectic of ideas had ended. Emerged was a new synthesis: the decisive victory of liberalism over communism. Adopting evolutionary theories of modern natural science to what he termed the modern rational social world, Fukuyama believed that “History” was linear, moving in a direction that could not be reversed. Thus, events would lead to the evolutionary creation of a universal consumer culture based on liberal economic principles and technology. Linked with technology are education, economic development, and democracy. Consequently, the historical process, by what Hegel viewed as the struggle for recognition, could only move forward to its natural conclusion – democracy. Only liberal democracy, according to Fukuyama, is characterized by universal and reciprocal recognition. Thus, the end of history occurs because “no other arrangement of human social institutions is better able to satisfy this longing, and hence no further progressive historical change is possible.”

87 Ibid., 246.
89 Ibid., 85-86.
90 Ibid., 125.
91 Ibid., xviii.
He optimistically likens the process to a wagon train, where, although some may get lost or temporarily off track, the vast majority makes it to the new town at the end of the journey called “History.” Although subsequent events (e.g., the wars in the Balkans and terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001) made his ideas appear naïve, nonetheless the basic tenets of liberalism remain popular, especially with respect to democratization.

Incorporating the strength of Fukuyama’s liberal democracy with the significance of transnational interdependence, Joseph Nye argues that, although America’s relative position may have decreased since World War II, the United States will remain the dominant world power into the 21st century. For myriad reasons, according to Nye, neither communist challengers such as the former Soviet Union and China nor Allied challengers such as the European Union and Japan will be able to supersede the United States. Only the United States can – and must – lead. In Nye’s view, “If the largest country in a world of nation-states abdicates leadership… the results can be disastrous for all.”

Nye differentiates between two types of decline: 1) a decrease in external power and 2) internal deterioration or decay. Rejecting naysayers’ claims that America is on a downward spiral, Nye asserts that the US has merely returned to its natural position following the unnatural dominance caused by World War II.

Arguing against traditional approaches to contemporary international politics, Nye warns that the focus should not be on other state actors that might threaten US power, but on the process itself. The author writes:

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92 Nye, *Bound to Lead*, 16.
The traditional models of power transition and hegemonic change may be profoundly misleading, possibly leading to self-defeating American policy responses. The problem is not that one or the other of America’s postwar allies will challenge the United States for hegemony, but that the United States will have to adapt to new patterns of interdependence and new political agendas in the twenty-first century.  

Nye argues against isolationism, claiming that withdrawing from international commitments would “reduce US influence without necessarily strengthening the domestic economy.” He reassures the reader that the United States has sufficient wealth to handle both international commitments and domestic needs.

Nye concludes by stating that, although the US has both the “traditional hard power resources and the new soft power resources to meet the challenges of transnational interdependence,” the real question is whether America “will have the political leadership and strategic vision to convert these power resources into real influence in a transitional period of world politics.” Nye warns of the dangers of complacency and irrational withdrawal from international leadership.

In response to neorealist theory, a number of scholars began to reinvigorate various strands of Liberal theory, including those that stressed the growing importance of institutions and regimes to mitigate aggressive tendencies. Multilateral institutions form a foundation of stability within the world system. Some accept the realist premise of states as primary actors in the world that seek to

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93 Ibid., 170.
94 Ibid., 259.
95 Ibid., 260.
maximize their power, but they conclude that cooperation occurs within an institutionalized framework that then constrains their behavior.98 One characteristic assumption underlying liberal institutionalism is that institutions provide information and transparency to other states and thus reduce the incentive for cheating.99

Emphasizing the importance of changeable political processes rather than simply immutable structures, Robert Keohane introduced what he terms “neoliberal institutionalism.”100 Keohane eschews determinism and emphasizes the pervasive significance of international institutions without denigrating the role of state power. He argues that “complex interdependence exemplifies the role of expectations and conventions in world politics.”101 These expectations become the driving force for cooperation rather than confrontation in international relations. For example, the complex interdependence of transnational monetary regimes can lead to cooperation. Unlike an economic liberal point of view, however, Keohane states that it does not ensure harmony. According to Keohane, “An open international economic environment, characterized by opportunities for mutually rewarding exchange under orderly sets of rules, provides incentives for peaceful behavior....Cooperation is not automatic, but requires planning and negotiation.”102

99 See Keohane, After Hegemony.
100 See Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, especially ch. 1.
101 Ibid., 9.
102 Ibid., 11.
This is similar to points John Ruggie makes in his article, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change.” In the article, Ruggie examines how regimes for money and trade have influenced the international economic order since World War II. Ruggie emphasizes the restraining influence of regimes on state behavior in order to maximize market forces. “Specific regimes,” writes Ruggie, “in the areas of money and trade, for example, limit the discretion of states to intervene in the functioning of self-regulating currency and commodity markets.” He talks of “embedded liberalism.” The essence of embedded liberalism is multilateralism that is compatible with ensuring domestic stability. As such, Ruggie argues that changes in the international monetary and trade regimes or “norm-governed change accounts for more of the variance than claims of fundamental discontinuity.” Ruggie suggests that stability can be maintained despite the decline of American hegemony (or any hegemony for that matter). The past twenty years seem to support his argument.

Others posit that shared values create a mutual interdependence leading to cooperation. Ikenberry contends that America has maintained its hegemonic position after the Cold War through the wise use of self-restraint, multilateralism, and institutionalized diplomacy.

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104 Ibid., 381.
105 Ibid., 399.
106 Ibid., 405.
Joseph Nye writes:

Sophisticated versions of Liberal theory address the manner in which interactions among states and the development of international norms interact with domestic politics of the states in an international system so as to transform the way in which states define their interests. Transnational and interstate interactions and norms lead to new definitions of interests, as well as to new coalition possibilities for different interests within states. 109

Pointing to several instances (e.g., dilemmas of common interest and common aversion) when independent, self-interested decision-making might actually be counterproductive or suboptimal, Arthur Stein argues that the existence of regimes is “fully consistent with a realist view of international politics, in which states are seen as sovereign and self-reliant.” 110 Regimes circumscribe state behavior by encouraging alternative, cooperative actions that are in the state’s own interests.

Axelrod and Keohane too look at neoliberal ways of achieving cooperation under anarchy. They define cooperation not as harmony but “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others,” and anarchy as “a lack of common government in world politics.” 111 They note the influence of mutuality of interests, shadow of the future, and number of players on the success or failure of cooperation attempts in both the military-security and political-economic fields. 112 Other factors influencing cooperation include: issue linkage; connection between international and domestic politics; the institutionalization of reciprocity; and

perception. The results are multi-level games with competing and cooperating and sometimes overlapping actors. Reciprocity and regime formation can facilitate cooperation by delegitimizing defection and making its cost higher.

One method of fostering interdependence is to develop institutions. Stanley Hoffmann discusses the role of institutions in present-day Europe. The important fact, for Hoffmann, “is the role of a bewildering array of overlapping institutions, within and through which states seek altogether joint benefits, the balancing of partners who are also potential adversaries, national advantage..., and a variety of insurance and reassurance policies.”113 Hoffmann highlights a crucial function of these institutions in the security realm. They “reassure their members or signatories against fears that could, if left untended, turn a generally cooperative Europe into, once more, a continent of mutual suspicions and antagonistic precautions....Thus, institutions can be life preservers that either save one from drowning or save one from having to drown others to survive.”114

Keohane agrees with Hoffmann and argues that the dense, interlocking array of institutions in Western Europe have constrained states and provided incentives for cooperation, contrary to realist theory expectations. He emphasizes the conditionality of relative gains, noting that institutionalism does not predict universal cooperation. Keohane asserts that institutionalism and realism are not diametrically opposed, but diverge on emphasis. Institutionalists believe realists are too pessimistic about

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112 Ibid., 86-98.
114 Ibid., 284-285.
potential for cooperation and role of institutions, while realists think neoliberals exaggerate the value of institutions in fostering cooperation.

Robert Keohane welcomes the end of the Cold War because the structural changes provide an opportunity to test the quality of different interpretations offered by realism and institutionalism. “Strict realism,” writes Keohane, “should lead one to expect a decline in the number and significance of international institutions; institutionalists such as myself expect no such decline. Institutionalists expect existing international institutions to adapt and to persist more easily than new institutions, formed by states on the basis of changing interests, can be created. Realists make no such prediction.”115 As Keohane argues about the situation in Europe, “The continued salience of international institutions after the end of the Cold War is quite evident from an examination of state strategies. All five major powers used international institutions in their strategies of adaptation to the structural changes of 1989-91.”116 Keohane adds, “Institutionalists argue that organizational inertia, considerations of reputation, and connections to domestic politics mean that institutions often persist even when the conditions for their creation have disappeared, and that institutions exert impacts on state policy when policies are not dictated by clear interests.”117 Realists such as Waltz respond that “NATO’s days are not numbered, but its years are.” In his view, institutions may persist through bureaucratic inertia, but are ultimately undermined by structural change.118

116 Ibid., 288.
117 Ibid., 295.
Joseph Grieco argues that cooperation can go only so far. The big difference between realists and neoliberals in their regard for anarchy, according to Grieco, is that neoliberals stress the lack of a central agency to enforce promises, while for realists anarchy means “there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them.”\footnote{Joseph Grieco, “Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation: The Limits of Neoliberal Institutionalism and the Future of Realist Theory,” in David Baldwin (ed.), \textit{Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate} (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 126.} The issue for neorealists is not cheating, but survival. The threat of extinction drives all states to a certain level of fear and mistrust. Thus, as Grieco writes, “The fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities.”\footnote{Ibid., 127.} Grieco argues that defensive state positionality affects the willingness of states to cooperate, not institutions. Neoliberal institutionalism fails to overturn structural realism.

\textit{Social Constructivism: Newest Challenger}

A relatively recent approach that has emerged since the end of the Cold War is that of social constructivism. Constructivists discount the claims of neo-realists and neo-liberals that there is an objective reality and focus on identity development and discourse. They argue that states create their own reality through symbols, declarations, and associations.\footnote{See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” \textit{International Organization} 46 (Spring 1992): 391-425.} Thus, the images of power and perception are more important than actual capability or “facts.”
Unlike neorealists, constructivists do not have as unified a theoretical approach. As one scholar notes, “Constructivism is the blanket term for a broad range of scholarship that, at its root, attempts to return human agency to the study of international relations by moving ideas, norms, culture, and language from the periphery of analysis to its center.”\textsuperscript{122} A diverse set of perspectives falls in this category: critical theorists, post-modernists, feminists, etc. Thus, it is hard to categorize except for the common element that international relations – because human agency is involved – is much more complex, fluid, and unpredictable than neorealists and liberal institutionalists contend.\textsuperscript{123}

In particular, since the end of the Cold War, interest in the role of political culture in international relations has grown. Numerous recent studies have focused on various aspects of culture as a critical variable in explaining world politics.\textsuperscript{124} What is political culture, and what has shaped its development as a concept in international politics?

Political culture originated from theories and concepts of culture itself, found in sociology, anthropology, small group studies, personality studies in psychology, and socialization. For example, the anthropologist Frank Boas defines culture as “all the manifestations of social habits of a community, the reactions of the individual as


\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 86-87.

affected by the habits of the group in which he lives, and the products of human activities as determined by these habits.”125 Before the early 1960’s, the “dominant approaches to explanation in the social sciences were sociological theory, culture and personality theory, and social psychological theory.”126 For example, Benedict drew on anthropological theory, explaining various components of different societies in terms of “national character,” that is, those “cultural themes, modal personality, and the like – mixes of beliefs about authority and human relations – which result in part from the ways in which members of these societies were inducted into their adult roles.”127 According to Chilcote, “Dissatisfaction with efforts to characterize national character or national culture of various countries prompted a reformulation of concepts and a substantial effort in comparative politics to view culture in a political context.”128

While the concepts and categories used in the analysis of political culture (e.g., subculture, elite political culture, political socialization, and cultural change) can be seen in the texts of ancient and early modern philosophers, it was not until the late 19th and early 20th century that the study of political culture developed.129 Of particular influence were European sociologists such as Max Weber and Talcott

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128 Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics*, 178.
Parsons, and advances in the development of research methodologies, especially techniques used in survey research.\textsuperscript{130}

The classic and seminal work on political culture was Almond and Verba’s 	extit{Civic Culture}.\textsuperscript{131} An empirical study of public attitudes toward political symbols and beliefs based on surveys in five nations, Almond and Verba outlined their views of political culture compared to general culture. They defined political culture as “consisting of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations to political phenomena, distributed in national populations or in subgroups.”\textsuperscript{132} They concentrated on the political orientations of individuals in relation to the political system of those individuals. In their words, “When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. People are induced into it just as they are socialized into nonpolitical roles and social systems.”\textsuperscript{133} In other words, the beliefs, feelings, and values of individuals in society come to play an important part in the formation of political structures and institutions and influence political behavior that emanate therein.

In an effort to link political attitudes with the formation of different regimes, they constructed a typology classifying the general distribution of political attitudes as either parochial (little or no awareness of national political systems), subject (those oriented toward the system and its outputs but not inclined to participate on the input

\textsuperscript{132} Almond, “The Civic Culture Concept,” 77.
\textsuperscript{133} Almond and Verba, \textit{Civic Culture}, 14.
side), and participant (those oriented toward the input structures and decisionmaking processes of political systems).\textsuperscript{134}

In a later study, Almond and Powell elaborate on how political culture may connect micro and macro levels of analysis between individual and the collective by revealing patterns of distribution of orientations to political action.\textsuperscript{135} They also stressed political culture’s empirical advantages, giving “a behavior form of analysis to such terms as ideology, national spirit, and values of people.”\textsuperscript{136}

While it has been noted that the concept of political culture was regarded in many ways as a resurrection of the concept of “national character,” many scholars applied the new term almost entirely to the Third World, particularly toward the newly independent states in Africa and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{137}

Near the end of the 1960’s, however, and coinciding with the behavioral revolution in political science, scholars increasingly challenged the role of culture as an explanatory variable. Among the criticisms included allegations that the approach was classificatory and static; descriptive rather than analytic; scientifically inadequate and substantively irrelevant.\textsuperscript{138} Others claimed the concept itself was culture-bound and ethnocentric, lauding the Western model as superior to other cultures.\textsuperscript{139}

Reflecting the turbulent world situation at the time, many scholars shifted their interests from the conservative and stable patterns represented by political

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 17-21.
\textsuperscript{136} Chilcote, \textit{Theories of Comparative Politics}, 180.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 208-209.
\textsuperscript{139} See Chilcote, \textit{Theories of Comparative Politics}.  

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culture to the more radical approaches that emphasized upheaval, conflict, discontinuities, and change. Increasingly, students of international politics turned toward rational choice theory. They favored the elegant simplicity and parsimony of deductive reason, adopted from economics, which avoided the complexity of heterogeneous, cultural explanations, which seemed to be at odds with the drive for scientific generalization. Rational choice theorists, adopting what they claimed to be a positivist perspective, criticized Almond and others for the subjectivity of their works. Because these scholars desired a positive theory, where the “facts” spoke for themselves, the role of culture was minimized. Instead, choice and expected utility functions supplanted subjective and fuzzy items such as “culture.”\(^{140}\) Some even dismissed the notion as being irrelevant.\(^{141}\)

Consequently, there emerged a clear break of rational choice theorists from earlier traditions of social science to the “self-conscious adoption of the deductive strategy of economics in the analysis of political phenomena.”\(^{142}\) Eventually, rational choice analysis achieved prominence as a dominant approach for explaining social science phenomena.

Two main features of the deductive strategy form the core of rational choice: methodological individualism and maximization of material interest. The first feature, methodological individualism, holds that all social and political phenomena can be derived from the properties and characteristics of individuals. The second


\(^{141}\) For example, see George Tsebelis, “Rational Choice and Culture,” *APSA-CP Newsletter* 8 (1997): 15-18. For a fuller discussion of his critique, see Tsebelis, *Nested Games*.

tenet holds that the prime motivation of political actors is maximization of material interest – i.e., seeking “benefits in the form of votes, offices, power, at least cost.”143

The key advantage of this approach is its ability to facilitate analysis by relying on the simplicity and power of deduction. Hypotheses generated are explicit and efficient. Culture is not a concept rational choice theorists readily choose because it complicates. According to Ross, “Culture violates canons of methodological individualism while raising serious unit of analysis problems for which there are no easy answers.”144

In their article, “Formal Rational Choice Theory: A Cumulative Science of Politics,” David Lalman, Joe Oppenheimer, and Piotr Swistak describe and defend the way rational choice theory has influenced thinking about politics and has grown as a major area of research.145 Using examples from voting theory, collective action, and coalition stability, the authors describe formal analysis’ major findings and successes. While admitting certain limitations – “predictions are often not to be expected” – they conclude that formal theory represents the best hope for a true “science of politics.”146 If “science is not an answer so much as it is a method of obtaining answers,...[it] has the power to change what we believe about the world.”147 For them, rational choice theory, whether one likes it or not, “has fundamentally changed how the discipline ought to proceed in studying politics and training students.”148

143 Ibid.
146 Ibid., 92.
147 Ibid., 98.
148 Ibid.
Tracing the evolution of political science and its relationship to rational choice theory, Theodore Lowi argues that before big government and the New Deal, political science was atheoretical, empirical, and concerned with establishing the “facts.”\(^\text{149}\) This changed, however, with the rise of the bureaucracy as a social force and government’s strong commitment to science. Consequently, economics replaced law as the language of the state. By focusing on interests, preference orders, and expected utility, and the individual, regardless of cultural background, rational choice theorists have only recently revisited the cultural dimension in international politics.

However, with the rapid and unexpected changes in the world during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, punctuated by the collapse of the Soviet empire, democratization in Latin America, and the adoption of neoliberal economic policies by many governments, the role of culture staged a comeback.\(^\text{150}\) At the same time, the limits of rational choice theory were beginning to be noted with greater fervency.\(^\text{151}\) For example, Gabriel Almond argues that the metaphor of the market is merely one of several alternatives for explaining politics. He points out that rational choice theorists tend to use unacknowledged side assumptions of doubtful validity upon which to base their inferences.\(^\text{152}\) Furthermore, he cautions that “rational choice analysis may lead to empirical and normative distortions, unless it is used in


\(^{151}\) For example, see Douglass North et. al., eds. *The Limits of Rationality* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A
combination with the historical, sociological, anthropological, and psychological sciences which deal with the values and utilities of people, cross-culturally, cross-nationally, across the social strata, and over time. 

Likening rational choice to the blank tile in Scrabble, Almond concludes, “This failure of rational choice theorists to confront these literatures directly...leaves them with theories that cannot travel very far in space and time, and cannot deal effectively with political change.” Similarly, Lowi chastises his colleagues for their fascination with economics. In his words, “I must confess that both the Democratic and the Republican politicians were smarter than the political scientists because they took [economic analysis] as weaponry, while we took it as science. We swallowed economics before subjecting it to a political analysis.”

Thus, the role of rationality and individual maximization remains subject to debate. Green and Shapiro note that many rational choice theorists “have left unexplained the extent to which a phenomenon is explained by individual maximization as opposed to habit, blunder, and the like. Nor have they devoted much attention to how individual maximization interacts with other independent variables.” Ferejohn has argued that because of the possibility of multiple game-theoretic equilibria, rational individual maximization can only explain a portion of political outcomes. In his words, “unless we substantially enrich the concept of rationality itself, or supplement it with extra assumptions about human nature,

Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); and Eckstein, “A Culturalist Theory.”
153 Ibid., 36.
154 Ibid., 49.
156 Green and Shapiro, 27.
rationality by itself cannot fully account for the selection of one outcome rather than another.\textsuperscript{157} He posits that rational choice theories might be more suited for some political phenomena, especially those that are more closely aligned to economics (such as budget or trade issues), while at times rational choice theories may need to be supplemented by cultural or other theories (e.g., ethnic conflict or other issues closely related to identity).

Consequently, the renaissance of political culture and rise of social constructivism may be attributed, in part, to the inability of economic variables alone to explain or predict rapid changes in the real world, and a growing acceptance of the limitations of reductionist rational choice models. The diminution of ideological focus that was so prominent during the Cold War, likewise, may have influenced scholars to search for variables which, although always present (as attested by the work of some scholars whose research continued in this area even during the “dormant” decades of political culture), had been minimized, underemphasized, or altogether rejected. A third possible factor is the more pluralistic and diverse views developing within American society in general and the social sciences in particular.

Those focused on political culture have developed a research school that joins ranks with the neorealists and liberal institutionalists to contend for a coherent theoretical and methodological approach to both international relations and comparative politics. As Lichbach and Zuckerman note, “Rationalist, culturalist, and structuralist theories are embedded in strong research communities, scholarly

traditions, and analytical languages. As they dominate comparative politics, they provide the locus for assessments of theory in this area of knowledge.”

Recognizing the varying degrees of sophistication and nuance within the different schools, including differences over methodology, level of analysis, and assumption, nevertheless, it appears that the debate is clustering around three principal and very broad explanatory variables: economic (rational choice); cultural (political culture); and systemic (structuralist-institutionalist).

In addition to culture as a variable, social constructivists also focus on ideas, ideology, and discourse as they contribute to the perceptions of different actors in international politics. As Wiarda notes, “No one claims that political culture is the only variable in understanding other political systems; rather that in conjunction with other factors political culture can be a useful explanatory tool.” For example, several scholars studying the development of the European Union point to the building of a “European” mindset through the socialization from regular EU meetings and summits. It is through such informal norms, practices, and interactions that

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158 Lichbach and Zuckerman, *Comparative Politics*, 8.
government officials begin to identify themselves as part of a new group/entity. In other words, history is not dead, and ideas do matter.

The emerging trend is for a combination of variables to be analyzed to explore relationships among and between diverse political systems. Institutions, belief systems, values, interest, motives: these all have a part to play. James Johnson encourages interpretive and rational choice theorists alike “to recognize the limits of their respective work and to consider potential links to other modes of inquiry with a greater sense of equanimity.” Thus, what is likely to occur is a gradual cross-fertilization and perhaps overlapping or synthesis of various models, reflecting changes in the real world, and, possibly, a greater understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of embracing, rejecting, and revisiting intellectual approaches and explanatory variables in world politics.

As this overview reveals, although often portrayed as opposites, neorealism and neoliberalism have much more in common than other theories of IR, especially when compared with the latest challenger, social constructivism. There has been an effort to proceed toward synthesis and to develop theory in a manner that accounts for not only structure but also process and change as well.

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Levels of Analysis and the Limits of Systemic IR Theories

An increasing number of scholars have become dissatisfied with broad systemic explanations. They note that these theories require three main conditions: information certainty, goal maximization, and unitary decision-making. The assumption is that national leaders recognize the systemic pressures upon them and can respond quickly, efficiently, and effectively. Rather, “complex decisions” often involve uncertainty, “value” trade-offs, and dispersion of authority.

Despite their ability to describe the broad outlines of how states behave, systemic theories are not enough to explicate the nuances of inherently complex foreign policy problems. For example, several scholars have shown that often a basic dichotomy exists within domestic political systems between those that take a hard-line view toward a problem and those with more moderate positions. In other words, governments do not respond in a linear fashion to systemic pressures, but rather there is a range of policy options to a perceived threat and in some cases a time lag between awareness of a problem or threat and demonstrable response to that problem. The point is not that governments do not respond to system pressure; only

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169 Although the number of levels of analysis can vary depending on theories used and causal variables analyzed, the most common is three as offered by Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959): the individual, the state, and the international system. For a classic treatment of the level-of-analysis problem, see David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14 (October 1961): 77-92. Some scholars have also described the various levels of analysis as first, second, and third images (see Vasquez and Elman, eds., Realism and the Balancing of Power, 278).
that the discipline of policy formation and implementation is critical to the outcome – and such discipline varies widely across time and regime.\textsuperscript{171} A policy area may drift according to the tides of the system, or government leaders may act as a rudder to steer the policy vessel toward the desired outcome.

How to respond to perceived threats depends on preferences of principal decision-makers within a political system. Macro-level International Relations theories sometimes fall short in capturing how interests are formed in the first place.

While the dissertation has begun with some overall comments related to the system-level of international relations and state behavior, its real focus will be to illuminate and draw insights from the micro-level for explanations into why individuals act in international relations and why certain foreign policies are chosen over alternatives that may serve the same end.

Since the end of World War II, European governments have sought to contribute to their own defense. For decades, though, this goal seemed unattainable. In particular, the economic capacity for defense was lacking, and the main emphasis was rebuilding broken societies after a devastating conflict. Meanwhile, Soviet behavior became more menacing by the late 1940’s, as the Cold War dawned. Thus, it became imperative for the United States to remain in Europe and provide the security umbrella that Europeans themselves could not provide.

By the end of the Cold War, European governments were in much better economic shape. The freedom to pursue economic prosperity had born fruit; in many

ways, the Europeans were now in a position to provide for their own defense. However, the United States was no longer interested in European defense autonomy and, in fact, responded with great suspicion through much of the 1990’s. The Americans sent contradictory messages: on the one hand, the Europeans needed to do more in terms of providing their own defense by improving their military capabilities. However, they needed to do it only through NATO, where American leadership was paramount. Any alternative approach would be rejected. Thus, American policy implicitly shifted from support for European integration and defense autonomy to opposition. Why? To gain better insight to this question, one needs to examine foreign policy decision-making. As Hudson notes, “There were two complementary but distinct approaches to IR: ‘(1) the description and measurement of interactions; and (2) decision-making - the formulation and execution of policy. Interaction patterns can be studied by themselves without reference to decision-making except that the “why” of the patterns cannot be answered.’”

One of the difficulties with the explanatory power of rational choice theories and formal models has been that, although they contribute much through their parsimony and rigor, their reliance on assumptions of perfect and/or complete information, as well as actors responding rationally to the situations, might lead to false results when faced with the facts of real-world events. However, much of the real world involves risk, uncertainty, and incomplete information, conditions much harder (though perhaps not impossible) to recreate in the laboratory of formal models.

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As Snyder and his colleagues note, “[W]e might summarize our comments on the nature of choice as follows: information is selectively perceived and evaluated in terms of the decision-maker’s frame of reference. Choices are made on the basis of preferences which are in part situationally and in part biographically determined.”173 In other words, rational choice theory and decision-making analysis are not antithetical, but have the potential of being complementary. As Hudson writes, “[T]he two traditions need each other: rational choice without the study of human decision-makers can only aspire to be vague and pray not to be inaccurate; yet, without rational choice, a conceptualization of the strategic elements of choice may not be realizable.”174 Thus, decision-makers tend to make policy choices in relation not only to the situation at hand, but their responses also tend to be animated by cultural, ideational, and even biological factors. These responses may refer to the context of a situation.175 As Hulsman writes:

Schools-of-thought first principles influence decision-makers who create foreign policy outputs. This process exists, whether admitted or not, and as all agree it is crucial to understand action (foreign policy outputs), so it is essential to comprehend sub-ideological motivations, a contributing variable to foreign policy inputs.176

In other words, such influences need to be inserted into the equation if there is to be any hope of gaining insight that approaches empirical reality.

While neorealist theory may be able to say accurately that US interests were served by policy “x,” the theory cannot explain how policy “x” came to be. There may have been several policy choices, and thus a model for interest formation and policy selection is required. Such a model of decision-making draws on theories of bureaucratic politics, policy entrepreneurship and transnational networks, domestic politics, and identity politics to explain why certain policies were chosen.

Traditionally, students of foreign policy have developed four basic approaches to explain and understand foreign policy behavior: the rational actor, groupthink, bureaucratic politics, and decision-making or organizational process. The rational or strategic actor model is the traditional and ideal (where the President with centralized control formulates policy based on a value-maximizing strategic calculation, and the government apparatus implements that policy in accordance with the President’s wishes). The second (groupthink) focuses on the consequences of a centralized Presidential policy-making environment, and the final two models concern the effects of a decentralized Presidential policy-making environment on policy outputs.177

Different models have been used to try to understand and explain the foreign policy process. The dominant model used is the Strategic or Rational Actor model. Decision-makers (or states) are viewed as “solitary actors searching to maximize their goals in global politics.”178 Consequently, each action and reaction is considered part of a game where each action reflects a rational calculation to a move made by other actors. Many scholars are drawn to the simplicity and elegance of the model.

However, several criticisms have been noted of the rational actor approach. First, the rational actor model assumes that the state or decision-maker reacts only to the behavior of other external actors, and usually the focus is on one other actor only. While this may have been useful during the Cold War, the binary nature of the action-reaction model does not account for domestic and/or other international influences. Rarely do decision-makers face a single move, but they must respond to multiple moves made by multiple actors. Also, the model assumes that the President’s wishes are implemented as intended by the bureaucracy.

Second, the model assumes rationality but does not define what different leaders consider “rational.” Rarely do decision-makers have complete information to make fully informed decisions or fully “rational” calculations. Because the ideal situation upon which the rational actor approach depends is so rare, the model’s explanatory utility may suffer significantly. Moreover, what is rational (in terms of benefit seeking and cost avoidance) for one actor may vary for another, thus requiring more input into the preferences and weighting of actors’ calculus.

Third, the rational actor approach often leads scholars and analysts to input motives from a sequential series of actions in order to explain foreign policy behavior. As Jensen notes, “If State B responds in a hostile fashion, the researcher is likely to look for hostile actions committed by State A, which in turn are used to justify B’s response. With such a focus, various conciliatory moves on the part of State A may be completely overlooked, given the researcher’s expectations.”

While it is generally understood that decision-units do act rationally, in the sense that they seek to maximize their preferences for specific outcomes, the rational
or strategic actor model falls short because it does not account or identify those preferences.

Groupthink is an approach that was developed by Irving Janis, who drew upon insights from social psychology to explain why some administrations produce sub-optimal outcomes. The process of conforming to one view is associated with a situation in which a President is surrounded by a small cluster of advisors with similar backgrounds who do not allow for an open flow of information. The combination of centralized control and strong peer pressure to conform to a single view results in a policy direction that is far from “rational” and may not achieve expected maximized returns concerning a decision outcome.

Recognizing the limitations of the rational actor’s “black box” approach, scholars began to consider the impact of the domestic structure, in particular the degree to which bureaucracies compete with one another to maximize their personnel, budgets, and “power,” and in the process, shape foreign policy outputs.

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179 Ibid., 6.
bureaucrats are in the position of managing information flows, implementing policy, and institutional longevity, they arguably are able to influence the timing and outcomes of foreign policy. Often key decision-makers (especially in a democracy such as the United States) are transitory (moving every 2-8 years), and they must rely on their bureaucratic subordinates to execute and implement policy choices.

The size of bureaucracy has increased substantially since the end of World War II. As the needs of the US to respond to the Soviet threat and remain engaged in the world grew, so too did corresponding diplomatic and military establishments. As Jensen notes, “Foreign-policy personnel now number in the thousands and are located not only in the State Department but also in the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Treasury, Labor, and so forth.” One might also add the Energy Department, Commerce Department, the US Trade Representative’s office (USTR), Justice Department, and Department of Homeland Security – in other words, almost every Cabinet agency now has a foreign policy component – adding to the challenge of government leaders.

One of the major criticisms of the bureaucratic politics model is that it conflates individual mind-sets, preferences, and general dispositions with the offices and bureaucracies those individuals represent. In other words, is it the office that determines the positions of the players or the players themselves that determine their

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positions? Proponents provide no clear answer. As Art notes, “We must qualify [bureaucratic politics paradigm] with so many amendments before it begins to work that when it does, we may not be left with a bureaucratic paradigm, but may in reality be using another one quite different.” As Welch underscores, “If the idiosyncrasies of particular individuals determined these important actions and policies, specifically bureaucratic determinants can hardly have played an important role.” Perhaps more important than bureaucratic routines as an indicator of constraints on decision-making are the predispositions and attitudes associated with organizational affiliation.

**Decision-Unit as a Framework for Analysis**

As a growing number of scholars have pointed out, decision-making structures vary not only among states but also within states and across time. Consequently, understanding the importance of such variability across time is one of the key goals of this dissertation. What I will argue is that, while systemic conditions no doubt change, so too does the composition of decision-units within a state, and this also will affect the foreign policy outcome.

Domestic structures vary among states and are independent of the international systemic conditions. At the same time, decision units, as Hagan argues, “are a theoretically fluid phenomenon that cannot be inferred directly from either

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184 Krasner, “Are Bureaucracies Important?” 171.
185 Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy,” 473.
187 Ibid., 131.
systemic or domestic structures."\(^{189}\) Variation in decision-units is not to be considered the same as or even a direct correlation of the domestic regime type. For example, there can be loose as well as concentrated authority within different democratic regimes, and even within different authoritarian regimes (although less likely in the latter). Moreover, within a single state, constraints can vary over time. For example, in the United States, the tension between the Executive and Congress has fluctuated despite the intensity of the external threat.\(^{190}\)

An essential component of decision units is the policy entrepreneur. Policy entrepreneurs possess certain key characteristics: they have extensive networks and solid relationships with and access to key decision makers. They are essentially transnational actors because they have to be in order to understand and bridge state interests. They also are able to identify preference convergence and exploit them. They act as change agents and can tip the balance in favor of a policy position that has not yet become fixed or implemented.

The balance of influence among bureaucratic leaders can shape the range of policy options facing the President. In other words, decision units operate as important intervening (and fluid) variables, contributing to the dynamic propelled by

\(^{188}\) For example, see Hagan, “Does Decision Making Matter?” Valerie Hudson, “Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” and Snyder et. al., *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*. 


domestic and international political constraints. As Hagan concludes, “decision units appear to operate in a way that is often independent of the otherwise compelling constraints of both international and domestic politics.”

The policymaking structure in the United States, especially as it pertains to foreign policy, also reflects the decision-making style of the President. Presidential decision-making style can be analyzed from two dimensions: how open is the style with respect to access and information flow, and at what level are decisions made? Regarding the first dimension, there are two main options: 1) closed or centralized decision-making; or 2) open or decentralized decision-making. All of these aspects must be considered.

One of the problems with many decision-making studies is that they tend to focus almost exclusively on crisis situations. The rationale is that, since crises could lead to the direst of consequences, they are the most important phenomena to understand and resolve. While perhaps true, one can also argue that crises are rare, and most international relations happen short of crisis. Therefore, it is useful to examine policy-making and interaction in non-crisis situations, since that is the setting and context where most activity occurs. Moreover, with a better understanding of non-crisis dynamics, there may be an opportunity to recognize the elements and indicators at the pre-crisis stage.

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192 Rosati, 41.
Chapter 3: Case One – The US and EDC

Introduction

Out of the ashes of World War II, the United States emerged as a superpower and eventual hegemon in the West. The decade from 1945-1955 represented a fluid period in international relations, much more uncertain and ambiguous than is often portrayed today. The cement of that historical period had not dried, and the US had not yet identified its national interests, even as the Iron Curtain drew across Europe.

What was the international framework of the time? How did the United States view the situation in Europe? Who were the lead actors? How did the Europeans view the US? Were they willing to accept US leadership, or was there a competition? This chapter aims to lay the empirical ground outlining US action with respect to European defense autonomy during the first decade after World War II. Chapter five will analyze the contending theoretical explanations and variables influencing such behavior.

The strategic context during the first decade can be divided into three phases: Postwar/early Cold War (1945-1949); Korean War to the death of Stalin (1950-1953); and death of Stalin to defeat of the EDC (1953-1954). Policy choices and influences will be considered during each phase in turn.

Phase One: 1945-1949
Strategic Context and Distribution of Power

The period 1945-1949 reflected a critical transitional period, as the international system witnessed a remarkable transformation. There was the creation of various international institutions – the UN, IMF and World Bank, the Council of Europe, the OECD, and eventually, NATO in 1949. On the European continent, events leading to what became known as the Cold War – unrecognized at the time – occurred. Four Power relations broke down resulting in the division of Germany into the Federal Republic in the West and the Democratic Republic in the East in 1949. The Berlin airlift and Soviet testing of an atomic weapon confirmed the shift toward bipolar confrontation. The economic struggle in Western Europe, as well as the threat of communist takeovers in France and Italy, also reflected important variables, in the sense that their flirtation with communism left officials in Washington nervous.193

At the end of World War II, the United States had developed a vast global network of bases and basing relationships connected with defense. While American officials accepted that the current network could not be sustained indefinitely at current levels because of pressures for returning to a peacetime stance, “a complete return to the status quo ante of 1940 also seemed unlikely in view of America’s now virtually unavoidable role as global power and guarantor of the peace.”194 By 1945, the United States possessed or used 434 bases of different size: 228 were in the

Atlantic area, including 63 in the UK, France, and Germany.\textsuperscript{195} What to do with these bases and to what extent should the United States maintain a global presence became a item for debate within the government. Basing issues became a part of a larger debate over America’s role in the world, how it should interact with the Soviet Union, the collective security and Wilsonian norms advocated by the newly created United Nations, and postwar reconstruction. There was a split between “hawks” and “doves” that was not exactly the same as between internationalists and isolationists. Such a distinction should be made between those that advocated keeping a global international presence diplomatically on the one hand, and those who pushed for an aggressive forward-based defense strategy. Those promoting the latter often referred to the surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and easy captures of America’s weak Pacific perimeter defense to buttress their case.

Others, more sensitive to the impact such a move might have on the Soviet Union, believed nuclear technology and strategic air power would suffice in defending the United States without provoking the Soviets into an unnecessary arms race.\textsuperscript{196} While the political debate continued, the Joint Staff quietly conducted numerous plans and reports over how best to adapt US military forces to the new postwar environment.\textsuperscript{197} What is striking about these military plans and requirements is the continued emphasis on hemispheric defense, as well as the anticipated use of air

\textsuperscript{195}Harkavy, 45.
\textsuperscript{196}For good analyses of the debates over American foreign policy during the early years after the end of World War II, see Quester, \textit{American Foreign Policy}; and John Lewis Gaddis, \textit{Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
and naval bases on islands in the Pacific and off North Africa and the Middle East.

Very little attention is devoted to the European continent. As Harkavy observes:

A large land army presence on the European continent was not anticipated nor was...the magnitude of the accompanying large-scale presence of forward air and naval bases. It appears that US planners either underestimated the forthcoming Soviet threat, or, somehow assumed that forward defense in Europe could be handled by Britain and France.198

**Policymaking Structure**

With respect to the Truman Administration, the Presidential decision-making style may be considered as relatively loose, but with clear guidance. As Hilsman notes, “President Truman had no chief of staff, but he tended to give his staff permanent assignments and to divide responsibility along clear lines of authority and jurisdiction.”199

During the early months of the Truman Administration, the equivalent of the inter-agency coordination process for foreign policy was handled by an ad-hoc State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. There was no National Security Advisor (Admiral William Leahy came closest at the time as White House chief of staff), no Department of Defense (only the Departments of War and Navy), and no Central Intelligence Agency. These domestic structures would not be created until 1947.200

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198 Harkavy, 49.

199 Hilsman, 128. Also see David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Touchstone, 1992), especially chapter 12.

For example, with the crisis over the Turkish Straits in August 1946, Acting Secretary of State Acheson (Secretary of State Byrnes was out of town) hosted a series of meetings with representatives from State, War, and Navy, plus the service chiefs, to coordinate a policy recommendation to President Truman. Once the policy recommendation was decided (in this case to show resolve to the point of arms), it was Acheson who made the recommendation to Truman (although Secretary of Navy Forrestal and the service chiefs were also present). At that point, Truman gave the nod, and the decision was implemented.²⁰¹

The National Security Act of 1947 created, among other things, the National Security Council (NSC). Composed of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce, as well as the Director of the newly-created CIA and often the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the NSC served as an interagency focal point to help the President make decisions. Also, a national security advisor job was created to referee and manage the NSC agenda. Under President Truman, the National Security Advisor (Special Assistant to the President for national security affairs) served more as an executive secretary, managing and coordinating the President’s agenda.

**Policy Evolution and Implementation**

Before World War II, American foreign policy fluctuated between isolationism and Wilsonian activism.²⁰² Those tendencies existed even during the immediate postwar period. At the same time, American officials realized the need to reorganize government agencies and establish institutions to shape the new world

order and prevent future European wars. The twin goals of maintaining economic prosperity and security at home while promoting stability and peace in the world would serve as the underpinnings for US policy toward Europe.

There were two schools of thought in American thinking toward how to bring this about. As Winand writes, “By the end of the Roosevelt administration, the supporters of European integration had been overruled by their opponents, who much preferred worldwide arrangements to a European union, which, both for security and economic reasons, they viewed as a potentially dangerous regional organization.”

Others, such as John Foster Dulles and George Kennan, believed that integrating Germany into a “federalized” Europe would be the best option. For example, in September 1941, Dulles suggested that the solution for eliminating Europe’s “war-breeding divisions” was to be found in “the political reorganization of continental Europe as a federated commonwealth.” Likewise, Kennan, then a junior foreign service officer, believed that integrating Germany whole into a greater Europe would be preferable to partition.

A second cluster of policy-makers, led by Treasury Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary of State Hull, advocated gutting or emasculating the war-making potential of Germany by de-industrializing the Ruhr and Saar regions. Such “punishment economics” was considered by John Foster Dulles and Secretary of War Stimson (who happened to be a friend of Jean Monnet) as a recipe for fostering long-term

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202 See Quester, American Foreign Policy.
204 Quoted in Winand, 7.
resentment in Germany, and would be almost certain to create a negative backlash and be counterproductive for the United States and Western Europe.\textsuperscript{206}

Certainly, there were concerns of a “Fortress Europe,” even as far back as 1942. As one historian notes, “As a sense of ‘European nationhood’ developed, the government of a European union might then consider using ‘the economic weapon as a means of furthering continental policy.’”\textsuperscript{207} Secretary of State Hull worried that, if a European union developed, “such a union might lead to the formation of other economic power blocs and undermine prospects for a liberal trade policy and the formation of an international organization after the war.”\textsuperscript{208}

During World War II and even in the immediate aftermath, there was no clear indication that the United States desired European defense autonomy. In fact, the first years after hostilities witnessed a policy that implicitly assumed that the UK and France would resume their natural independence in world affairs, although they would also likely lead or represent Europe on the world stage. For example, American policy promoted Britain and France to individual seats on the UN Security Council and other global agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.\textsuperscript{209}

In the end, the question revolved around how best to prevent a resurgence of European economic nationalism (the high tariffs and rampant competitive protectionism), open the door for American goods, channel European economic

\textsuperscript{206} Winand, 7.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{209} For more on the evolution of American policy toward European integration in the early years after World War II, see Hojo Holborn, “American Foreign Policy and European Integration,” World Politics 6 (October 1953), 1-30.
potential positively, while at the same time encouraging Europeans to develop their militaries strong enough to defend against the Soviets but not in a way that would threaten intra-European actors, such as France. A large problem, indeed. Economic prosperity, political stability, and strong defense against the Soviet Union: all without resurrecting internecine strife on the European continent. A long term consideration at the same time was: how to build up Europe into an organized union of sorts without it becoming dominated by a single European hegemon, or eventually turning against the United States in the global order? Such long views often are subsumed by the immediate challenges of the day.

An examination of State Department records reveals the gradual shift of support for European political and/or economic “unification” in 1943 to the more guarded and ambiguous wording in early 1944 of “closer economic and political collaboration” in Europe.210

One possible reason for this shift might be that President Roosevelt did not want the creation of a European federation to alienate the Soviets, whom he regarded as a partner in the post-war peace process. As Winand observes:

The possibility of alienating Soviet Russia probably is what convinced Roosevelt to put the creation of some sort of European federation on the back burner. The president perceived the Russians as a friendly people, whose hostility sprang from a sense of insecurity vis-à-vis Japan and Germany, and the West’s aversion to bolshevism. He accordingly envisioned a postwar world order designed by wartime allies, in which the Soviet Union would be granted a prominent place.

In order to enlist the cooperation of the Russians to help to rebuild the Continent in a way acceptable to all Allies, Roosevelt hoped to make them partners in the peace, side by side with the United States.211

Reinforcing this notion, Donald Cook writes, “While maneuvering and compromising at Yalta to build his peacekeeping machinery, Roosevelt displayed an almost total indifference to problems of postwar Western security in Europe.”212 His main concern was to keep an eye on the latent forces of isolationism. As Cook writes, “Roosevelt had shown this concern at Yalta when he told Stalin and Churchill that he did not believe American troops could be kept in Europe for more than two years or so.”213

At first, the Truman Administration sought to continue working with the Russians in trying to reach a pan-European settlement. The concept of defending Europe militarily had not gelled. The emphasis was on avoiding economic and political instability. There was an explicit need to revive the sluggish European economy. Even though the influence on American foreign policy at that time remained that of the late President Roosevelt, during the winter of 1946-47, it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union’s negative actions limited the chances of pan-European approaches. As Cook writes, “Although illusions about the Soviet Union were fading fast, it nevertheless was still the first goal of American policy to seek Great Power understanding and accord to maintain peace in the world.”214

In March 1947, President Truman addressed Congress promising economic and financial help to those defending communism. Still, planners in Washington at

211 Winand, 8. Also, see Chace, chapter 12.
213 Ibid., 10.
that time did not envision a direct Soviet attack. The scenario that concerned them was one of “European economic disintegration, social demoralization, and political upheaval.”\textsuperscript{215} Undersecretary of State Clayton worried that, unless the US intervened financially, “there will be revolution.”\textsuperscript{216}

By spring 1947, the realization began to dawn that the emphasis should switch from seeking German unification (fear that it would fall under Soviet domination) to promoting European integration, even if it focused only on the western part. This way, Germany’s industrial strength would be channeled peacefully and contribute to the economic prosperity of its neighbors while also limiting the risk of a return of a new Reich seeking military conquest of the Continent.\textsuperscript{217} It would also put the United States in a better position to deal with the Soviets. For example, George Kennan, head of Policy Planning at the State Department, “calculated that a prosperous Europe, with Germany’s industrial potential anchored firmly to the West, would give the United States and its allies a much more secure economic and political base from which to negotiate and overall European peace settlement with the Soviet Union in the future.”\textsuperscript{218}

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{217} Writing two months before Marshall’s Harvard speech, Allen Dulles argued that Germany must be addressed in the framework of Europe rather than just through the US-Soviet prism. According to Dulles, “We should not look on the German problem merely as a factor in our relations with Soviet Russia…. We should view Germany first of all in its European setting. No solution which fails to take account of the needs of Europe will last.” Allen W. Dulles, “Alternatives for Germany,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} (April 1947), \url{http://www.foreignaffairs.org} (accessed November 25, 2003), 5.
\textsuperscript{218} Winand, 11.
Following various recommendations from Kennan and Undersecretaries Acheson and Clayton, in June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall delivered his famous Harvard speech announcing what has become known as the “Marshall Plan.” Marshall’s speech emphasized the Europeans working together amongst themselves (but with American financial support and advice) to develop greater political and economic cohesion. There was no mention urging the Europeans to increase their own defense or military cooperation. As one biographer noted:

The creators of the Marshall Plan devised it out of a sense of self-confidence about America’s place in the world. They had fought isolationists before the war; victory proved them right. After the war they fended off those same isolationists on the right and idealists on the left who thought they could reason with the tsar of the Gulag [Stalin].

By 1948, many in Washington circles noted the continued hardening of Soviet positions toward the West. In February, Moscow orchestrated a coup in Prague, raising alarm bells across Europe and the Atlantic of possible takeovers in Norway and Italy. While those in Europe feared the prelude to a Soviet attack, most Washington policymakers considered the threat to be more political than military. Nevertheless, European threat perceptions fostered anxiety, and such fears could not be overlooked. To help alleviate European fears, the State Department proposed an explicit commitment to defend Western Europe, but with caveats. John Hickerson, chief of the State Department’s Office of European Affairs, and his colleagues sought to assuage Congress that such a commitment would not include additional American troops on the Continent. Instead, “Europeans would provide the manpower
themselves.”220 Thus, what the US was promising with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 was the psychological reassurance the Europeans needed that American military might would be there if necessary.

However, Kennan now worried that, with a treaty signing and legal commitment, the United States had now formally conceded the division of Europe and had abandoned any hopes of fostering unity on the Continent and “the development of a real federal structure in Europe which would aim to embrace all free European countries, which would be a political force in its own right.” Instead of making Europe self-sufficient, allowing the United States to gradually withdraw from the responsibility of defending Europe, Kennan now saw the US forced into the “legal perpetuation of that responsibility.” According to Kennan, “In the long-run, such a legalistic structure must crack up on the rocks of reality; for a divided Europe is not permanently viable, and the political will of the US people is not sufficient to enable us to support western Europe indefinitely as a military appendage.”221

There were certainly influences in the State Department promoting European unity, even to the point of making it an independent (or at least, semi-independent) power center. In the summer of 1949, Kennan believed that without Europe the United States “would be a lonely nation in the world in the sense that we would be on the minority side not only in the sense of world resources but also in the sense of philosophy and outlook on the world.”222 A year earlier, Hickerson had argued for

222 Winand, 14-15.
the establishment of “a third force which was not merely the extension of US influence but a real European organization strong enough to say ‘no’ both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, if our actions should so require.”

There was a view that the Europeans needed to rationalize their state system, which had developed based on the concept of nationalism. It was the division of Europe and balance of power politics, in John Foster Dulles’ view, which had led to the disastrous wars of the first half of the twentieth century, and Europeans had “an obligation to tie themselves together” to eliminate such nationalist tendencies.

Encouraging European defense autonomy also was supposed to allow the Europeans to graduate from dependence on American military and economic assistance. In the words of one historian:

Effective integration would enable the Europeans to stand on their own feet and allow the United States to reduce the scale of its aid to Europe, begun with the Marshall Plan and continued through military assistance to the NATO powers. There was a danger, of course, that a United Europe might, over time, prove to be a rival to America, but Washington tended to see the perpetuation of European dependency as a greater long-term problem. Partnership, not American dominion, was the objective.

Others disagreed, arguing that, although Washington’s promotion of integration of Western Europe was different from behavior by previous Great Powers, it still “wanted to exercise some form of control over Western Europe.” In effect, the United States acted like a “loose empire,” but an empire nonetheless.

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Consequently, American action and reaction to European defense autonomy should reflect the degree of control and domination that Washington had in order to influence European governments. However, was it the case?

Washington faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the growing Soviet hostility and disintegration of the Four Power postwar arrangement in Germany between 1945 and 1950 required a united front by the Western powers. On the other hand, the US was aware of French sensitivities to German irredentism. Still, a united Western front without Germany was impossible.

Some scholars suggest that the US response was a dual-Containment one toward the existing threat from the Soviet Union and a potential one from a fully independent and rearmed Germany. While this may be true, the response was more nuanced than that. The manifestation of such containment was different. The United States sought to contain the Soviets through blocking and counter-blocking moves and isolation. With Germany, though, the Americans sought to contain through integration. In other words, the US employed a containment-by-isolation strategy with the Soviets and a containment-by-engagement strategy with the Germans.

In the American view, if the Germans gained full independence, there was a fear that Germany would be vulnerable to irredentism. But, as some would argue, the greater fear was that Germany might either side with the Soviet Union or try to play the East off the West, thus aggrandizing itself while sapping Western efforts to

227 See Lundestad, chapter 1, and Ruane, 1-15.
confront the Soviets. In a conversation with Churchill in June 1954 before the fate of the EDC had been decided, Eisenhower told the British leader that “we could not afford to lose Germany even though we were to lose France.” The essential question was how to leverage German resources and strength without them posing a threat to the Alliance or Germany’s neighbors.

Phase Two: 1950-1953

Strategic Context and Distribution of Power

The situation reached a crescendo in 1950, ironically, on the other side of the world from Europe – on the Korean peninsula. Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the United States and its European allies feared that this might be the opening gambit of a global Soviet strategy to distract the US and conquer the European continent. It was imperative to buttress the weak military forces in Europe, which were still recovering from the end of World War II.

The fledgling North Atlantic Alliance – only in existence for a year – was primarily a paper organization. The “O” in NATO had not yet been institutionalized in any meaningful way. Nevertheless, NATO represented a forum for consultation among the defense ministers, and the skeleton of a structure for distribution of military forces.

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At the end of June 1950, the US had 122,158 troops in Europe.\textsuperscript{230} Only two years earlier, in 1948, there had been about 140,000 military personnel.\textsuperscript{231} The big question in the minds of many was what to do about Germany. Resolving the “German question” was key to organizing a credible defense against a conventional Soviet threat. Only Germany had the requisite troop numbers to add real teeth to the forces on the ground. However, valid fears about German irredentism (above all in France) required a delicate handling of the situation. So, the question was: how best to integrate Germany into the West without provoking potential negative responses in communist-laden countries such as France and Italy? The psychological considerations had to be addressed. Surveys revealed that, in some quarters, French respondents were more fearful of Germany than they were of the Soviet Union. After all, the Germans had ravaged France three times within the living memory of some French. Such trauma is not easily forgotten – or forgiven.

Churchill, who was in opposition at the time, took up the baton of a European army. Some suspected that French federalists had outmaneuvered him, but, according to Walton, “Churchill himself viewed his approach not as a wedge toward federalism but as a lever to pry open American commitments for Europe by demonstrating Europe’s readiness to help itself.”\textsuperscript{232} This was evident when Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons in September 1950, included in his discussion of the requirements for a European army a request for an American contribution amounting


\textsuperscript{231} Cook, 32.

\textsuperscript{232} Clarence Walton, “Background for the European Defense Community,” \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 68 (March 1953), 52.
to about 20 percent of the total forces.\textsuperscript{233} As Cook keenly observes, “The primary of British postwar policy, therefore, had to be to ensure that American power was not withdrawn from Europe. America would have to take up in Europe a role that Britain had played for nearly two centuries.”\textsuperscript{234}

Some in Europe reacted suspiciously to the idea, suggesting that a European army would not contribute to western defense and might actually distance the continent from the United States. For example, in August 1950, Norwegian Finn Moe asked of his fellow colleagues in the Council of Europe:

> Is the idea behind all this talk about European defense and a European Army the creation of the famous Third Force which might be independent in the world-wide struggle between democracy and totalitarianism…? We should take care that European unity does not lead to European isolation.\textsuperscript{235}

Advances in military technology allowed for a reduction in the need for numerous air bases in Western Europe. As Harkavy notes, “By 1952, for instance, the US had seven main air bases in the UK, four in France, six in Germany, and a few others in French Morocco.”\textsuperscript{236} With more advance aircraft armed with more lethal weapons, the US required fewer numbers to achieve the same level of military capability as only seven years earlier.

Policymaking Structure

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{234} Cook, 11.
\textsuperscript{235} Quoted in Walton, “Background,” 49.
\textsuperscript{236} Harkavy, 55.
\end{footnotesize}
With the National Security Act of 1947, the policymaking structure changed. New agencies were established, including the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. The Departments of War and Navy were consolidated to form the Department of Defense. However, it took time for these new bureaucracies and structures to develop.

**Policy Evolution and Implementation**

For the United States, the perceived threat was real (especially after the US had lost its nuclear monopoly with the Soviet testing of an atom bomb in August 1949), and the response was clear: rearm Germany or risk losing the European continent to Stalin less than a decade after having lost the continent to Hitler. A solution was found in NATO. The United States proposed the creation of an integrated military command in the Alliance, which would include a West German contribution. In September 1950, at the Foreign Ministers meeting in New York, Secretary of State Acheson announced a revamping of NATO to include both an integrated military command and the introduction of German divisions within a unified NATO structure, subordinate to an American Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR).

The proposal represented the optimal short-term solution to the “German problem” and most efficient from a military perspective. Even the French military agreed that the NATO solution was best. The nuclear guarantee was not nearly as

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237 See Fursdon, 105-149.
established as many would believe, especially around 1950. The advantage of the NATO plan (Petersberg Conference and later Spofford Plan) was it would account for the French fear because the German contribution would be subsumed under the NATO integrated command, under the leadership of the American SACEUR. Unlike the EDC, the NATO plan would include the US and UK, which would ensure that Germany would not be in a position to threaten France.

However, France was the only ally that did not approve the NATO solution at the time. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, who were trying to implement the Schuman Plan creating a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), worried that Acheson’s NATO proposal might jeopardize their European project. If Germany regained its full sovereignty – including rearmament – then German enthusiasm for ECSC might wane.

Faced in September 1950 by the united Anglo-American front, Schuman insisted that the proposal needed to be vetted by the French Cabinet and brought before the entire Assembly as well.

The resulting debate created a clash between logic and emotion, a distinction not always appreciated in the rational theories of international relations. For the Americans, the argument was straightforward: the Pentagon had calculated that NATO needed an additional twelve divisions (Congress had already agreed to the presence of four US divisions) to defend against a potential Soviet attack in central Europe. Because of overseas obligations in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the French

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physically did not have the forces to fulfill that requirement. Thus, the American perspective was that the US should be allowed to look to Germany.\(^ {239}\)

The French also had a logical response, though it was a cover for the emotional trauma stemming from three German onslaughts in just over a generation. The French response was as follows: Of course, German troops could be used to defend against a Soviet invasion, but the Americans were proposing the impossible—“a one-way army, a German legion built to march only East, never West.”\(^ {240}\) This would be historically unprecedented, and there was no guarantee that Germany could or would remain a pliant tool of Western policy. The French reminded Americans that Germany’s rise to power came from its ability to toggle back and forth between Russia and Western Europe. The fear was that Germany, after a few years, might outgrow the bounds imposed by the US and invade East Germany to try to unite Germany by force, sparking the very war with Russia that the West so fervently sought to avoid.\(^ {241}\) Therefore, the perfect French response to a question that could not be answered by either a “yes” or a “no” was “Europe.”\(^ {242}\) The French responded, one month later in October 1950, with the Pleven Plan—the concept for what later would become known as the European Defense Community.

The Pleven Plan attempted to solve two separate problems of Germany at once by infusing them into one grand bargain solution. The first was political, and the second was military. Whereas the Americans treated them as distinct issues, the


\(^{240}\) White, 267-268.

\(^{241}\) Ibid., 268.

\(^{242}\) Ibid.
French managed to integrate them into the EDC concept. The Pleven Plan was named after René Pleven, who had made his name originally as a Gaullist.\textsuperscript{243} Ironically, the proposed ESDP fifty years later would also spring from Gaullist heritage. However, the strongest resistance to the EDC had come from the communists on the left and the Gaullists on the right.

The American government’s initial reaction was considerable skepticism toward the project.\textsuperscript{244} After all, NATO had just been formed only a few years earlier in 1949 and, while there was a certain logic to the integration of European coal and steel sectors, the same logic was questioned when applied to European military integration. American political officials in particular questioned the efficiency and nature of establishing a European army that would be answerable to a common assembly, akin to the European Coal and Steel Community proposed only months before. As one commentator noted, “By the time Jules Moch, the Defense Minister of France, had finished explaining the Pleven Plan to the NATO Council it was evident that Washington’s second thoughts more accurately mirrored American official policy.”\textsuperscript{245}

According to Secretary of State Acheson, both he and President Truman reacted with “consternation and dismay” to the proposal. They concluded that the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{243} Walton, 53.\\
\textsuperscript{244} Much of the debate in the United States focused on the utility of building up European ground forces to protect against a Soviet challenge, especially compared to other means of defense, such as air power and nuclear weapons. For example, see Hans Morgenthau, \textit{In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy} (New York: Knopf, 1951). Still others expressed a sense of defeatism even toward attempting to build up European defenses at all, arguing that to do so would only invite an aggressive Soviet response. For a useful overview of various strands of the debate at the time, see Lawrence Kaplan, “NATO and its Commentators: The First Five Years,” \textit{International Organization} 8 (November 1954): 447-467.\\
\textsuperscript{245} Walton, 55.
\end{flushright}
Pleven Plan was “hastily conceived without serious military advice and…unrealistic and undesirable.”\textsuperscript{246} As Walton describes:

Washington blew hot and cold. Secretary of State Acheson first welcomed the Pleven Plan as a means of lessening differences between the United States and France but on second thought recognized that acceptance of the French proposal meant an indefinite postponement in building the effective fighting force that America felt was necessary.\textsuperscript{247}

Not just political officials were doubtful. US military planners also were skeptical of the practical defense implications of a European army where German units were integrated below the division level. General Eisenhower initially hated the project, believing that it would actually produce disharmony and friction rather than unity, not to mention the plan being “militarily unsound and ineffective.” He suspected that the French had introduced the plan hoping it would be rejected and thus either delay or prevent German rearmament.\textsuperscript{248}

From the French perspective, the British position was key to getting the Americans on board. As Walton notes, “If the United Kingdom could be persuaded to cooperate in the venture the chances of softening American opposition were excellent.”\textsuperscript{249} However, the initial British response under the Labor government was not promising. According to Walton, “The first hint to England’s official policy toward the Pleven Plan came during the speech from the throne on October 31, 1950 when the government pledged full support toward building Europe’s defenses within

\textsuperscript{246} Dean Acheson, \textit{The Struggle for a Free Europe} (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1971), 142-143. Also quoted in Winand, 27.
\textsuperscript{247} Walton, 54-55.
\textsuperscript{248} Winand, 27-28.
\textsuperscript{249} Walton, 55.
the Brussels Pact and NATO.”250 There was no mention of a European army or the need for one per se. In fact, a House of Commons report in November 1950 was even more explicit when it reported that the “government ‘was unable to accept the proposals put forward for a European Army and a European Minister of Defense’ since NATO already covered the field and the European army plan would only result in ‘duplication, confusion and divided responsibility.’”251

French Foreign Minister Schuman also noted the gap between France and the United States over European defense when he told the National Assembly on November 24, 1950 that the Americans wanted “direct participation of autonomous German military units in Atlantic defenses.”252 However, he made the rather clever distinction between a joint European army and a political union that European federalists had been pushing. By stating that the EDC would not be “rearming Germany” because the Germans participating in the EDC would not be under the German government’s full control, while at the same time not committing France to any supranational political structure for Europe, Schuman managed to open up some doubt among the British. According to Walton:

By divorcing the army plan from political federation, Schuman drove a sharp wedge into British opinion which, up to this point, had maintained a fairly solid opposition. Ernest Bevin continued to find Europe’s salvation only in the framework of [NATO] but Anthony Eden now saw no incompatibility between the two concepts.253

250 Ibid.
251 Ibid., 56.
252 Ibid., 57.
What was interesting was how Eden viewed the permanence of NATO compared to a possible EDC. Eden considered the Atlantic Alliance to be a “temporary” coalition and had no assurance that the Americans would remain committed to Europe’s defense. Meanwhile, he viewed a European army as a “permanent” force. This reversal was revealed when Ernest Davies (the author of the earlier House of Commons report denouncing the European Army concept) announced that the “Government did not rule out altogether the possibility of a European Army being fitted into the pattern of the Atlantic defenses provided that there was no delay in building up Western defenses and no danger of weakening the security of the Atlantic Powers.”

Despite reservations – especially with respect to fusing the political and military problems – the United States agreed to allow the French to explore their proposal. However, the Americans continued to seek a NATO solution. Thus, for about 18 months, there were two sets of discussions on how to rearm Germany, the Pleven Plan in Paris and the NATO plan at the Petersburger Hof in Germany. As one observer notes, “[T]hese discussions went their separate ways, like a two-ring circus, with spectators bobbing their heads back and forth to find out what was going on.”

The discussions reflected different views of how to incorporate the German military potential. In Paris, the French framed the desired outcome as one that essentially brought the Germans in almost as legionnaires, in small units of 3,000-4,000 and under an international flag. Their potency as a massed force would be almost completely subsumed under the EDC rubric. The French contribution,

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255 White, 269.
however, would remain unified as France’s army in Europe until the very last moment, thus allowing Paris to maintain its dominance both in force terms as well as its control of the EDC military staff, comprised mostly of French officers.256

Meanwhile, the talks in the Petersberg were much more focused on speed and military capacity. This was much more in line with German and US Army desires. As White notes, “The United States Army wanted German troops, flesh and blood soldiers, quickly, not a long philosophical discussion about the creation of a new superstate. Philosophers might talk at Paris, but soldiers talked at the Petersberger Hof.”257 Moreover, military specialists remained skeptical that a multilingual fighting force was possible.258

The contrast was stark. Whereas in Paris, the Germans would provide forces in 3,000-4,000 person increments, in the Petersberg talks, Germany would contribute 250,000 troops, twelve heavily armored divisions, complete with its own General staff and War Minister. The equipment would be provided by the United States, until the Germans could resume its own armaments production.259

The composition of the EDC was forty standing divisions. Of those, 14 would be French; 12 German; 11 Italian; and 3 from the Benelux countries. Soldiers would be led by their own nationality up to the division level. After that, the nationalities would be mixed.260

Be that as it may, Acheson concluded that the United States might be able to accept the EDC, but only if it “did not detract from NATO’s strength and did not

256 See Fursdon, especially chapter 5, and White, 269-272.
257 White, 270.
258 Walton, 58.
259 See Fursdon, 168-174. Also, see White, Fire in the Ashes.
delay Germany’s contribution to the defense forces of Western Europe….The European army and its command structure had to be strictly integrated within NATO. In other words, there would be no autonomous European command. The EDC would be a pillar within the Atlantic Alliance – but not separate from it.

Some observers noted the consequences of promoting a new institution, even if that were to be an internal institution within NATO. The fact that the UK and the United States were excluded from the institution suggested the seeds of NATO’s own potential demise, since there was no guarantee that the continental Europeans would maintain similar interests as those in London or Washington.

Radical revision of the Pleven Plan made the EDC more palatable to the Americans. Taking advantage of the transition following the June 1951 French elections, the Americans persuaded the French to accept a shift in the Plan. The German units would be the same size as the French, and they would all be brought under control of the supranational authority at the same time. With the encouragement of Monnet, Eisenhower, and Bruce, the Americans moved the plan forward and made it possible. Eisenhower’s staff at SHAPE formed the military

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260 White, 280. Also, see Fursdon, 160-161; and Walton, 67.
261 Winand, 27.
262 Although acknowledging the global interests and demands of the United States and British Empire, Lionel Robbins argued the dangers of developing institutions within institutions, especially if the UK remained excluded. See Lionel Robbins, “Towards the Atlantic Community,” Lloyds Bank Review (London: New Series 17, July 1950): 1-25. Advancing a French neutralist position, Jacques Gascuel welcomed the potential of a continental supranational community, but his argument – that the new European polity would emerge as a powerful neutral bloc, leave NATO, and mediate between the Americans and the Soviets – only reinforced the fears of those who argued against such a path. See Jacques Gascuel, “Vers une politique europène,” Politique Étrangère 15 (September 1950): 437-446. For references to others who worried that promoting a supranational European polity would create a new “Holy Roman Empire” that would destroy NATO, see Kaplan, “NATO and its Commentators.”
structures, while Bruce’s staff outlined the civilian, budget, and political organization of the EDC. 263

Enthusiasm for the Pleven Plan waned as early as a year later, even in France. The very reason that the Pleven Plan was considered the superior route was that it would “solve” the German problem by incorporating German forces (and thus diluting their power) it into a larger European force. Yet, even as early as December 1951, French Defense Minister Jules Moch worried that the EDC concept had merely become “a camouflage for a revived Wehrmacht.” 264 Thus, even at that stage, there were continued doubts about the EDC’s ability to assuage French fears and fulfill American military goals. Yet, the American position remained in favor of the Pleven Plan and EDC.

In October 1951, the Conservatives regained power, which seemed to heighten French hopes that the British would join the EDC. However, those hopes were soon crushed when, on November 28, 1951, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe told the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg that “England could never participate in a Defense Community built on federalist principles.” 265 As Walton notes:

France and England seemed astonished at the other’s action and in a real sense both camps had a measure of reason on their side. The Conservatives had never once intimated that they would actually join a supranational authority and resented what they felt was a misrepresentation of their position. On the other hand, the French had never made any attempt to conceal their interpretation of the Churchill motion as a supranational project and felt incensed that Churchill, the

264 Walton, 61.
265 Ibid., 62.
Prime Minister, was unwilling to support Churchill, the parliamentarian.266

Some of the questions that lingered in 1952 after the EDC Treaty had been signed reflected fundamental concerns over the practical nature of a supranational armed force operating during crisis. For example, would the decision-making structure, which required unanimity, prove to be too slow and bulky to be effective? Would linguistic challenges create misunderstanding in the transmission of orders through the chain of command, with costly and catastrophic results? Would the military formation of *groupements*, untested in war or peace, stand up to a potential invasion by seasoned Soviet troops? Would national troops be willing to cede homeland territory for tactical advantage?267 All of these questions remained unanswered as the United States considered its policy position toward the EDC.

The debate continued in Washington over how to view the EDC proposal. Ambassador to France David K.E. Bruce, an ardent Europhile and close confidant of Jean Monnet, favored it strongly, arguing that a European army would expedite the rearming of the Continent through European rather than national channels, thus fostering economies of scale and eliminating unnecessary duplication of limited resources. Such an effort would meet US short-term needs and speed up the process of strengthening NATO by “reducing [the] number of is major elements to three: United States, Brit[ain], and Europe.”268

Once it was clear that France would not accept the NATO plan, others – including the US and UK turned their attention to the EDC, despite the obvious

266 Ibid.
267 Ibid., 69.
drawbacks. Even after the agreement for EDC, it was an uphill battle for Americans promoting it. According to Lankford:

At a high-level NATO meeting, Bruce found himself “almost its sole upholder” when the subject of EDC came up within the American delegation. He urged State to forget about alternatives and to pressure “participants to bring matter to conclusion as rapidly as possible.” He called the NATO Council’s ratification of EDC “the most significant political action (outside of war) taken in Europe for centuries.” He knew the critical point would come later when individual parliaments voted on the plan, and he anguished over what he called Washington’s insensitivity to French concerns and the Pentagon’s pro-German attitudes.269

After receiving instructions from Washington to force the French to accept the Petersberg Plan to integrate German units directly into NATO, Bruce wrote his own “long telegram” on July 3, 1951, where he responded to the EDC critics. In it, Bruce outlined why the Pleven Plan (in addition to the Schuman Plan for the European Coal and Steel Community) actually would lead the French to accept German parity with France. According to Bruce, the “French must recognize that German integration with European community through Schuman Plan and European Army must be their main safeguards.” Bruce went on to argue that US leverage with the French would be lost if Washington rejected the Pleven Plan, thus causing a huge break in the relationship with France. In Bruce’s words, “Such rift in Atlantic community would be most damaging and great opportunity would have been missed to create real situation of strength in Europe, perhaps for period far into future.”270 The cable from Bruce, along with an endorsement from SACEUR Eisenhower and backing from

269 Lankford, 234. See also FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 5 (January 3, 1952), 574.
McCloy in Germany, seemed to work, because a month later, Acheson reversed his position.\textsuperscript{271} According to one biographer, “The decision to back the EDC happened because American Europeanists, mainly Bruce, Eisenhower, and McCloy, saw a vision of long-term benefit in the military as well as the economic integration of Europe.”\textsuperscript{272}

\textit{Phase Three: 1953-1954}

\textbf{Strategic Context and Distribution of Power}

Following a bogged down, drawn out negotiating and ratification process (delayed most conspicuously in the French assembly), the future of the EDC languished as world events changed. The Korean War ended in a stalemate and cease-fire. Soviet leader Stalin died in March 1953, resulting in a slight thaw in US-Soviet relations. New governments existed in both Washington and London. The distribution of power was such that the United States remained the most powerful country in the West.

The changing international circumstances had an impact on French and German views of EDC, most notably in terms of diminishing the sense of urgency for incorporating German troops into Western defense. The Korean War ended in


\textsuperscript{272} Lankford, 233.
armistice, Stalin died, and no assault came in Europe from Russia. The French were
growing weary of their military efforts in Southeast Asia and increasingly felt the
weight of their overseas commitment in Africa. Some in Paris also feared that,
because of these overseas military obligations, the Germans might come to dominate
the EDC over time. Such a prospect worried many swing voters in the French
Assembly.

Policymaking Structure

While the structure of policymaking did not change during this phase, the
nature did because of a new Administration. The Republican Dwight Eisenhower
was now President. In contrast to Truman, the decision-making style of President
Eisenhower was considered open but much more centralized. As a former
commanding army general, Eisenhower tended to build his presidency around the
military headquarters model. This meant having a strong chief of staff to keep
things in order. The main exception was in foreign policy. According to Hilsman,
“In the first part of the Eisenhower administration, this chief of staff was Sherman
Adams, through whom everything had to flow. The single exception was foreign
policy, over which John Foster Dulles, the secretary of state, kept tight control.”

Under President Eisenhower, the NSC met weekly, and he established an
interagency coordinating committee to draft decision recommendations, which was
managed by the National Security Advisor. According to Hilsman:

273 For more on Eisenhower’s leadership style, see Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*
274 Hilsman, 128.
The Eisenhower system was heavily criticized by both Congress and the press on the grounds that the committee system tended to paper over differences between the contending departments. The president, critics argued, ended up rubber stamping compromises that were often internally consistent rather than actually choosing between true policy alternatives. The result, they felt, was that the government tended to drift along until an international crisis finally forced the departments and the president to face up to the problems that had caused the crisis.275

Policy Evolution and Implementation

There was a marked contrast between the Truman Administration and that of the Eisenhower Administration toward the EDC. Chief of Staff Bradley had thought the EDC was impractical and militarily inoperable. Acheson had allowed for grudging support, primarily based on the benefits to US-French relations. Eisenhower, on the other hand, recognized the political and economic benefits from favoring the EDC. Here was a chance for the Administration to scale back its resource commitments, develop geo-political flexibility, all at the marginal relative cost of power.276 In fact, the Eisenhower Administration took the original French-inspired Pleven Plan and turned it into an American one, becoming essentially more converted than the original creators themselves.277

By the summer of 1953 – the critical run-up to the now famous rejection by the French Assembly in 1954 – US agitation over the EDC situation was making European allies nervous. There were rumors that the US was considering a

275 Ibid., 130.
277 For more on this point, see Hulsman, “The Guns of Brussels,” 36-38.
redeployment of US forces in Europe. Admiral Arthur Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was considered to be one of the leading figures to be “beating the tom-toms” on redeployment.278

The other element was the reconsideration of the use of nuclear weapons to defend Europe. Three factors influenced Eisenhower’s thinking in this regard. First, he sought to reduce the high defense budget he inherited from the previous administration. Second, he believed that, from a military standpoint, the US should rely less on quantity (hundreds of aircraft employing conventional munitions) and more on quality (i.e., tactical nuclear weapons). Finally, it was important for Eisenhower to avoid making the impression that the United States planned a fixed and permanent presence in Europe. He continued to stress that Europe should be primarily responsible for its own security. From his perspective, it was not “possible – and most certainly not desirable – that Europe should be an occupied territory defended by legions brought in from abroad, somewhat in the fashion that Rome’s territory vainly sought security many hundreds of years ago.”279 Although redeployment of US forces in Europe was a long-term US government goal, Eisenhower wanted to keep it quiet lest such a move create anxiety among the European allies, reduce NATO cohesion, and kill the concept of the EDC (and thus force the Americans to remain on the Continent).280

In other words, the United States did not want European dependence, but at the same time, Washington did not want an independent Europe to be opposed to the US either. The foundations of American ambivalence were being set. As Lundestad

278 Ruane, 63.
279 Galambos, 369. Also, see Winand, 36; and Ruane, 64.
writes, “It is easy to go against dependence as such; it is more difficult to do so when independence actually leads to opposition.” This put Europe in a difficult position. In the best of all possible worlds for the Americans, “Europe was to be both independent of and dependent on the United States at the same time.” The issues of an “Atlantic Community” only emerged later in the Kennedy Administration. Before that time, the explicit support was directed toward building up Western European economic structures, as well as the defense components (until the collapse of EDC in 1954), and American leadership therefore was naturally assumed.

Dulles’ initial effort as Secretary of State was to project an image of a strong America prepared to defend itself and its allies against Soviet aggression by any means, including and especially nuclear weapons. However, this strategy ironically had the unintended consequence of creating fear and anxiety among European allies regarding US intentions.

Differences between American and European perceptions over the value of using nuclear weapons to deter all war (not just general) became clear and divisive. In January 1954, the Eisenhower administration unveiled its new national security strategy. This strategy promoted “more security at less cost,” which meant a greater reliance on deterrence (and nuclear weapons) than ever before. Yet, to the Europeans, it looked like a withdrawal and provoked new anxieties. According to one historian, “America’s nuclear weaponry, for all its sheer destructiveness, did not possess anything like the psychological and symbolic value of large manpower

281 Lundestad, 18.
282 Ibid.
283 Winand, 139-160. Also, see Lundestad, 8-9.
deployments.”

Unlike today, it was the mass army that instilled fear and respect in the minds of the enemy and comfort and security for allies, not the atomic bomb. The Administration’s “New Look” was scary to the Europeans, who feared that the Americans would remove the comfort of troops for the bulls-eye of nuclear weapons. As Dulles acknowledged at an NSC meeting on 10 December 1953, “While we regarded atomic weapons as one of the great new sources of defensive strength, many of our allies regarded atomic capability as the gateway to annihilation.”

The consequence of this situation was that American statements designed to encourage the Europeans had the boomerang effect of creating additional fear of US intentions and apathy about contributing to European defense among the very governments the US had sought to reassure. As Dockrill notes, “[A]lthough Dulles and [SACEUR] Gruenther had hoped to strengthen European morale by emphasizing the importance of the contribution of American nuclear weapons to European security, this emphasis was, in fact, likely to have the opposite effect.”

The latter half of 1953 proved a difficult time, even for Anglo-American relations. Secretary of State Dulles issued his famous “agonizing reappraisal” message in Paris in December 1953, a statement that reverberated throughout Europe. President Eisenhower was upset because it went contrary to a National Security Council meeting earlier that month, where it was agreed that only the President would speak publicly to US troop considerations. The first order was to

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284 Ruane, 78. See also Williams, *Senate and US Troops*; and Dockrill, *Eisenhower’s New Look*.
286 Ibid.
288 Ruane, 67-68.
ensure the establishment of the EDC. Any hint of a change in US policy towards 
Europe would have the potential of “important psychological implications” in 
Europe.\textsuperscript{289} Therefore, was this a failure of diplomacy? Or was it a calculated 
political risk, designed to exert leverage on a divided French Assembly? If it was a 
deliberate effort on Dulles’ part to sway the French, it seems to have backfired. The 
initial response in France was to galvanize the anti-EDC lobby.

The difference between selling the Schuman Plan and selling the Pleven Plan 
of EDC rested in persuading the French. However, unlike the European Coal and 
Steel Community, the EDC concept was much more complex. As one observer at the 
time noted, “It has become too complex in detail for ordinary people to understand its 
critical essence, and thus the politicians who support it have difficulty rallying 
popular support.”\textsuperscript{290} Moreover, while the institutional structures and logic of the 
ECSC and EDC were comparable, they led to different implications. According to 
the same observer:

\begin{quote}
The Schuman Plan could be explained to Frenchmen as an act of 
common sense, for one could bring the delinquent back to decency 
only by giving him a decent opportunity to earn a decent living. But it 
was something else to give a delinquent Germany arms again so 
swiftly after she had so shockingly abused them.\textsuperscript{291}
\end{quote}

In the end, what it proved was the limit of executive influence by one 
government on the legislative assembly of another. The United States had a goal of 
the EDC; yet, it failed to persuade the French Assembly – the one legislature yet to 
have ratified – to confirm the project. Thus, American government policy was

\textsuperscript{289} Ibid., 66. 
\textsuperscript{290} White, 280.
blunted, and Washington – as well as the West – needed to find an alternative. As the French government continued to delay the debate and vote on the EDC Treaty, American and British frustration grew. For example, in March 1954, after Prime Minister Laniel once more put off the EDC debate, Dulles was “deeply disturbed,” and the British foreign minister was “furious.”\textsuperscript{292} There was increasing concern that such delay would spillover into US congressional views toward troops and money in Europe, as well as fostering pressure on Germany and in the Alliance as a whole.

The response to that frustration was to move as close as possible to reassure the French of US and British commitment to the defense of Western Europe. Thus, virtually the entire defense of the West was held hostage to the whims of the French Assembly. For its part, London beefed up its commitment to associate with the EDC, including the promise to put a British division under an EDC commander. Washington agreed to keep American troops in Europe, reinforcing its commitment to NATO and calling for a close relationship between NATO and the EDC.\textsuperscript{293} It seemed that the French held all the cards. If France did not agree, there was greater fear that Germany would be lost to the Soviets (or neutralism), and Germany was the key for defending the West.

Thus, with so much at stake, it seemed remarkable that the United States was unable to exert greater pressure on Paris to follow through. It was as if the US could go only so far, just as Washington had failed to persuade London to take the lead in European integration a few years earlier.

\textsuperscript{291} White, 267.
\textsuperscript{292} Ruane, 74.
\textsuperscript{293} Ibid., 75.
What were the domestic constraints on the major powers in play? One needs to examine the constraints on France (especially from the framework of the Fourth Republic’s constitution), Germany (divided into two states; worried about other divisions), and the US (isolationism, peripheral defense, resource and burden sharing issues). For the UK, the major domestic constraint at the time centered on the debate over how entangled to be on the European continent, given its commitments to the Commonwealth and relationship with the United States.

As David Bruce advised his superiors in Washington in March 1954 that “the constitutional defects of the Fourth Republic rendered decisive government almost impossible, particularly in relation to controversial issues like the EDC.”

For the British, there remained a lingering doubt about US staying power and commitment to Western Europe. According to Ruane, “Even US participation in the Second World War had not wholly dissipated the suspicion in London and other European capitals that, beneath the surface of Washington’s newly-acquired internationalism, old isolationist instincts still lurked.” Eden, whose political life included the decade of the 1930’s American isolationism, worried that the US would get fed up with the Europeans and withdraw back to its shores. The British Foreign Minister’s main concern was the “haunting possibility that [America] may slip back into a new form of isolationism…and try to ‘go it alone,’ or, alternatively, be tempted to ‘do a deal’ with the other great Power in the world.”

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294 Ibid., 79.
296 Ruane, 76-77.
In the United States, the domestic constraints were considerable. While the hardening of the US position toward France in the spring of 1954 reflected frustration from French vacillation on EDC over the previous two years, it also stemmed from the situation in Congress, specifically the approaching consideration of the Mutual Security Budget for Fiscal Year 1955. As Ruane notes, “If France had not ratified the EDC by April [1954], when hearings on the Budget would begin, State Department officials predicted that ‘our “agonizing reappraisal” will occur but in the most explosive place – the floor of the Congress.’” 297 What was at stake was the Richards Amendment, which specifically prohibited military assistance to those EDC countries that had not ratified the treaty (e.g., France), while giving full assistance to non-EDC NATO countries such as the UK. Thus, to add pressure to French ratification, as well as stave off Congressional action, the State Department recommended “shock treatment” for the French by having the administration support the Richards Amendment. 298

Just as the situation with the EDC appeared to reach a climax in the spring of 1954, events in Asia once more provided a critical external factor into the equation. This time, it was Vietnam, as the French were seeking to withdraw honorably after the loss at Dien Bien Phu in May. The Americans were not happy, interpreting the French administration’s preoccupation with Geneva peace negotiations yet again as another delaying tactic. According to one historian:

The Americans were frustrated by this latest source of delay and some in Washington thought the French might be “deliberately stalling” on the EDC in order to improve their negotiating hand at Geneva….But

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297 Ibid., 81.
298 Ibid., 81-82.
the French, concluding that their negotiating hand with the Soviets vis-à-vis Indochina would be stronger if they appeared to retain the power to veto German rearmament, seemed ready to risk arousing Washington’s displeasure. 299

The Americans were worried that if there was too much pressure on the Laniel government, his coalition might fall, and the consequent government might not be so pro-EDC as Laniel’s was. The domino theory was not limited to the spread of communism in Indochina. As Dulles warned, “We must be on our guard lest Indochina also carry [the] European Defense Community down the drain.” 300

It seemed that the issue of national identity was preoccupying France just as everyone else needed the French to sacrifice some of their sovereignty for the sake of the EDC. The collapse of Vietnam and the pooling of forces for the EDC would be too much. Dulles remarked, “France seems to be deteriorating as a great power and losing capacity to govern itself or to deal with its problems.” 301 Dien Bien Phu in particular symbolized the shattered image of a France having totally lost all confidence. According to Ruane, “The fortress had become a ‘symbol out of all proportion to its military importance,’ and its fall portended a ‘collapse of French will, in relation both to Indochina and EDC.’” 302 The irony was that France seemed to be the pivotal player in those decisions affecting US national security strategy not just in Europe but also in Asia. Washington was dependent on France, despite the prominence of American military and economic power. American leverage seemed

299 Ibid., 84.
300 Quoted in Ruane, 85.
301 Ibid.
to be insufficient to move the French Assembly. For example, by the spring of 1954, the United States “was underwriting around 75 percent of the total financial cost of the French war effort” and did not want to squander that investment.  

There was a spillover effect from Indochina on Anglo-American relations as well. The two countries differed fundamentally on how to respond to the Dien Bien Phu siege. Washington believed that there needed to be a military intervention to prevent Vietnam from communism, while London feared that such an aggressive move would almost certainly result in Chinese intervention, the possibility of another Korea or worse, the opening gambit of another global conflict. After the US administration called for “united action” by the US and a coalition of “like-minded powers,” the British refused support. According to one historian, “Denied British support – the key to wider allied and international approval – and unwilling to intervene on its own, the Eisenhower administration had no alternative but to await the outcome at Geneva.”  

The American reaction to this refusal was sharp and deep. As Ruane notes, “[I]t was clear that the Americans felt they had been badly let down during the crisis by their closest ally. London’s rejection of ‘united action’ had exposed Anglo-American relations to ‘the gravest strain,’ and generated a ‘smoldering resentment’ among many senior policymakers.” Dulles in particular felt that he had been double-crossed and lied to by Eden, and agreement on other issues at that time was difficult to contemplate.

From his perspective, Eden accused the United States of unilateralism and believed that the Americans were trying to steamroll the British into doing something

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303 Ruane, 85.
304 Ibid., 86.
they did not believe was in their best interest. He “accused Dulles of trying to ‘bulldoze’ him into supporting military intervention and charged the US government in general with unilateral decisionmaking on matters that vitally affected the interests of Britain.” According to Eden, “Americans may think the time past when they need to consider the feelings or difficulties of their allies.”

On July 13, 1954, as the pressure built on France to move on EDC, Dulles met with Mendès-France. Dulles implied that if France did not support EDC – and soon – “it might perhaps be better for the United States to ‘write off what we have tried to do to build up the defensive strength of Western Europe as a noble but unproductive experiment,’ and in line with Congressional preferences, opt for a ‘peripheral form of defense involving the UK, Spain, Greece, Turkey and other peripheral countries.’” Mendès-France found himself in a corner. In order to relieve domestic pressure and external pressure from the US, he tried to foist the eventual blame for any failure of EDC onto his European partners. On August 19, 1954, all the EDC powers met in Brussels. At that gathering, the French proposed major modifications, changes they knew the other powers would almost certainly reject. In essence, France was asking everyone to alter the very nature of the EDC in both form and content.

The level of frustration in Washington continued to build. According to Ruane:

Ultimately, what probably irritated the Eisenhower administration most was the new French Premier’s determination to put his country’s

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305 Ibid.
307 Ruane, 92. See also, Winand, 54-59.
interests before those of the United States….In many ways, therefore, 1954 was the year that “France finally declared its independence of Washington,” with Mendès-France sowing the seeds that de Gaulle would later reap.308

What probably made matters worse was that the United States had committed all its energies into the EDC, with no fallback position. In other words, Eisenhower had no contingency plan to France and the EDC.309 Churchill criticized the Americans for their “obstinate adherence” to EDC and “natural reluctance to countenance any competitive idea.”310

In the end, the Americans in effect have relied on the British – from 1950’s to the present – to influence and shape US policy toward European security and in particular, European defense autonomy. At first, the US focused on the French, hoping they would deliver on the Continent. However, with French vacillation in the 1950’s culminating with their ultimate rejection of the EDC, American confidence in French leadership was permanently lost. A plan conceived in peace for an imminent war that never came, the EDC fell victim to French domestic politics too powerful for the United States to overcome.

309 Ruane, 97.  
310 Ibid., 104.
Chapter 4: Case Two – The US and ESDP

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to lay out the empirical conditions for the second case study, the period after the end of the Cold War leading to the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Although there were obvious differences (the kind that one should expect from the passage of years), this time frame does share many of the same characteristics as that following the end of World War II. Consequently, the context and structure related to the foundation of the European effort once again to develop an autonomous security and defense entity bear mention.

As with the first case with the EDC, the strategic context of case two can be broken down into three distinct phases: 1) end of the Cold War (1989-1993); 2) Berlin Plus and NATO’s engagement in the Balkans (1994-1998); and 3) St. Malo and ESDP (1998-2003).

The first was from 1989-1993, highlighted by the Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union, and the infamous 1991 declaration by Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques Poos, who declared, “This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the
Americans.” The European failure in Yugoslavia showed the gap between rhetoric and reality.

The second phase was 1994-1998, when it appeared that the issues causing tension and anxiety within the US toward what the EU wanted to do subsided. The CJTF concept was introduced in 1994, France rejoined the NATO Military Committee in 1995, and “Berlin Plus” was agreed to in 1996. NATO operations (both IFOR and SFOR) and the Dayton Accords in Bosnia seemed to reestablish American and NATO dominance in European security. The WEU languished, soon to be subsumed for good in the EU. Although France and Germany succeeded in establishing and operationalizing the Eurocorps, the center of gravity in security moved back towards NATO. From an American perspective, it seemed that the transatlantic security crisis had passed. At the same time, as Guay notes, “NATO members finally grasped the notion that there may be crises in Europe in which the US does not want to intervene, and which it makes the most sense for only Europe to address.”

The third phase occurred between 1998 and 2003. There was a renewal of tension between the US and the Europeans, starting with the St. Malo declaration in December 1998 and its consequences. Transatlantic tensions increased with a new Republican Administration in 2001 and accusations of American unilateralism.

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Each one of these phases will be described in more detail below, along with a portrait of the power distribution of the US presence in Europe (in terms of relative economic and military strength), policymaking structure, and evolution of US policy.

Phase One: 1989-1993

Strategic Context and Distribution of Power

The period 1989-1993 represented a watershed transition, characterized by democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, the first Gulf War, dissolution of the Soviet Union, and disintegration of Yugoslavia leading to conflict in the Balkans. These changes in the international system affected relations between the US and European allies, but also altered the dynamics within the European Community. All of these events reinforced the general trend of transformation underway and with it, new views of how to interact.

On November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall fell. Although it was widely recognized that something had changed, few realized the magnitude and long-term consequences of “the end of history.”\(^\text{314}\) The atmosphere was euphoric – there had been no nuclear holocaust. The end of the Cold War meant the end of “terror” (from a possible Soviet-US nuclear exchange). Only later would analysts and observers begin to comprehend the paradigm shift that had occurred. One of the earliest was John Mearsheimer, who actually saw the end of the Cold War as a bad thing, making the world more dangerous and less predictable.\(^\text{315}\) Charles Krauthammer also was one of the early ones to characterize the post-Cold War era. His essay coining the

\(^{314}\) See Fukuyama, The End of History.
term “unipolar moment” became a lighting rod and began a debate on the changing nature of the international system.  

A central event - German unification - produced ripple effects throughout Europe and beyond. The two Germanys - caught in the middle of the bi-polar confrontation that had characterized the Cold War - united faster than most (even the optimists) had anticipated. The bold political decision (though foolish economically) by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to adopt parity for the West and East German deutsche marks produced a drag on the German economy, which had been the engine for the entire West European economy. Unification also renewed a fear in France against the Germans that the French had not known since the 1950’s. Suddenly, Germany again was the largest nation in Europe, and France was no longer equal or superior.

French President Mitterand sought to bind Germany in Europe through European institutions, especially the European Community. His main goal was to ensure that what emerged was a “European Germany” rather than a “German Europe.” The German problem, which had been put on hold for forty years, had now returned.

Events began to unfold in rapid succession. In 1990, communist rule dissolved in Central and Eastern Europe, even as the situation in the Middle East became worse. In August, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. In November, as the US was leading the coalition in the UN to repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, a “Transatlantic Declaration” was signed. Its main components were to reaffirm

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315 See Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future.” Mearsheimer understood that the Cold War was over, but he viewed the situation as creating a power vacuum that would produce new instability in Europe.
commitment to the Alliance and a determination to modify NATO in accordance with new security realities.

Just as the shift in US global strategy following the important developments between 1945-1950 had led to changes in the US global basing policy, so its significance was reinforced in 1989-1991. According to Harkavy, “By the early 1950’s, [the 1945] emphasis had shifted to an emphasis on a rimland defense perimeter all around Eurasia, but with a strong concentration on Europe from Norway to Turkey and on Northeast Asia.”\(^{317}\) Only later did the US bases and depots in Europe become springboards or points of departure for US “power projection” either into Africa or the Middle East. Consequently, the importance of these bases to the United States, which originally had been intended to defend Western Europe against a possible Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack, took on new meaning. For example, some have suggested that the US staging and prosecution of the first Gulf War in 1991 would not have been possible without the elaborate NATO structures and basing that had been established during the Cold War.\(^{318}\) Moreover, the repeated patterns of behavior and institutionalized norms developed and practiced over the years in the military sphere heightened NATO’s importance for American interaction with the Europeans. The rise of an alternative institutionalized European-only framework might be perceived by some in the American government as a threat to this instrument.

\(^{316}\) See Krauthammer, “Unipolar Moment.”
\(^{317}\) Harkavy, 53.
In the event, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent first Gulf War revealed the limits of European Political Cooperation (EPC). European leaders renewed efforts to cooperate more fully in foreign and security policy arena.  

In April 1990, Mitterand and Kohl called for a “European Union.” An intergovernmental conference among the twelve members of the European Community began in December, culminating in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in December 1991. In the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty negotiations, there were many behind-the-scenes expressions of concern from US officials, including a “full campaign of aggressive diplomacy and backchannel pressure.” The Bush Administration was clear that any move in the EC should not threaten or rival NATO.

In the end, EC member states agreed to a “constructively ambiguous” notion about a common defense in the explicitly intergovernmental second pillar of the EU. A component of the Maastricht Treaty was the inclusion of a desire to establish a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Specifically, Article J.4 of the treaty

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stated that “the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including
the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a
common defense.”

Thus, one saw the first mention of a European Security and
Defense Identity (ESDI) that, in principle, could lead the EU to provide for a common
defense. However, such language masked the major disagreements over how far to
cooperate in foreign and defense.

In 1991, Yugoslavia crumbled, with Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina all declaring their independence from Belgrade. This development
echoed the general dissolution of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact.

However, not all of these political transformations were as peaceful as the
“velvet revolutions” in Germany and other parts of Central Europe. Conflict broke
out in the former Yugoslavia, forcing both NATO and the Europeans to re-examine
crisis and security management.

In 1989, the US had 341,278 military forces in Europe. Only a year later, that
number had dropped to 309,827. In 1990, the US share of world economic output
was 25 percent. By contrast, the Soviet Union/Russia’s share of world output was 2
percent, about the same as for the Benelux countries. Clearly, in economic terms,
there was no bipolar world, at least at the end of the Cold War.

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323 Treaty on European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, 1992).
324 For more on the origin of ESDI, see Willem van Eekelen, Debating European Security (The Hague:
325 US Department of Defense, “Active Duty Military Personnel by Regional Area and by Country,”
326 World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Policymaking Structure

The next step in the empirical process is to establish the principal actors in making decisions regarding American policy towards European defense. Was the locus of decision at the same level through each of the three phases? Or, did Administration priorities and attention shift to other arenas, thereby lowering the level of decision-making?

The structure between the G.H.W. Bush Administration and the Clinton Administration remained basically the same. Under George HW Bush, the Presidential decision-making style was considered closed but informal. President Bush chose Brent Scowcroft, who followed Kissinger’s philosophy of realism, as his national security advisor. James Baker III, long-time Bush friend and trusted ally, became the Secretary of State. After a failed effort to appoint John Tower as Secretary of Defense, Bush chose Richard Cheney to serve in that capacity. Cheney was very conservative, from his time in the Ford Administration and during his days in Congress. Cheney chose as Paul Wolfowitz to be his Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was General Colin Powell.

Policy Evolution and Implementation

Early during this phase, there was a debate over the US role in Europe and the world. The question became even more pronounced following fiascoes in Somalia, Haiti, and early part of Bosnia. With the Cold War won, would the US withdraw back into a neo-isolationism? The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, the first one since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, would set the framework for defense budgets beginning in 1994. It also posited a vision of US military power after the end
of the Cold War. An early draft, leaked to the press in March 1992, called for the US to prevent any potential power from emerging as a global competitor or military rival to the US. This included language that implied that the United States should make sure that even allies – “advanced industrial nations” would be kept from “challenging America’s leadership.”327 After a flurry of criticism, the strategy paper was rewritten, but its emphasis on unmatched military strength remained.

A second policy question that needed to be asked was: what was the value of international institutions? During the Cold War, NATO was viewed as the policy instrument of choice in American relations in Europe. While the United States maintained numerous bilateral relations with individual European countries, the official American foreign policy position was that NATO would be the central forum for transatlantic security relations. Would that change after the Cold War, and if so, how?

A third question that affected US policy selection was: what was the definition of the threat? The Soviet threat no longer existed, but was there a new threat that would concentrate minds on both sides of the Atlantic? How the threat was perceived and defined would affect the range of policy responses and instruments used.

A final question that affected US policy selection was: what were the links between the security and economic dimensions of transatlantic relations, and how would they impact on American policy towards European defense autonomy?

A general period of restructuring occurred, at a much faster pace than many had expected. France and Germany called for the establishment of a “Eurocorps” in October 1991. Earlier in June, the US was not pleased with developments and threatened to pull out of its role in contributing to European security if the European Community took matters into its own hands. Thus, as the Europeans, led by Paris, were finally beginning to do what Washington had wanted back in 1951-54, the US administration now had second thoughts and viewed with increasing suspicion.

Meanwhile, an American-led effort pushed NATO strategy at its November 1991 Rome summit to adopt a “New Strategic Concept,” replacing the former “Flexible Response.” The new strategy moved NATO's military emphasis away from massive mobilization toward enhanced crisis management capabilities and peacekeeping operations. It also established the framework for an Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force (ARRC). However, some observers considered this “a ‘coup’ against the Europeanists’ plans for the Euro-Corps.”

Only a month earlier, the US and Germany had proposed that NATO establish the “North Atlantic Cooperation Council” (NACC) to engage the former Warsaw Pact countries.

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In a paper on NATO expansion Jeffrey Simon called the Alliance's response both extraordinary and yet insufficient. “NATO’s institutional responses have been extraordinary, wrote Simon, “in that so many new initiatives have been taken in such a short period of time. Yet they have been insufficient in that events have moved at such a fast pace that NATO’s responses have not kept up with expectations in the region.” The Alliance reached out to former enemies at its Rome Summit in November 1991 by creating the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NAAC). The purpose of the NAAC was to strengthen security and defense ties among members. There were annual meetings at the ministerial level and working groups on diverse security issues such as peacekeeping and defense conversion. Unfortunately, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, membership (not counting NATO) in the NAAC mushroomed to more than twenty (from the original five non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members plus the USSR). Moreover, the diversity of the new members (Hungary or Poland compared to Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan) essentially limited the effectiveness of the organization.

As the events in the Balkans continued to erode, the roles of the WEU and the EC took on new urgency. On September 7, 1991, the European Community convened a peace conference on ex-Yugoslavia. France and Germany wanted to place a WEU peacekeeping force between the warring parties in Croatia, but the UK blocked such a move. The peace conference did not go well, and in October 1991

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335 Simon, 6.
the EC and WEU acknowledged their failure by accepting the primacy of the UN in the crisis.

During 1992, events within NATO and the WEU followed parallel tracks, as questions began to surface on the long-term health and purpose of the Alliance.\(^{336}\) In June 1992, leaders of the WEU held a summit at the Petersberg in Germany. The now-famous “Petersberg Declaration” announced that WEU forces would be available to undertake a variety of tasks, including “humanitarian missions, rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and task of combat forces in crisis management (including peacemaking).”\(^{337}\) Even as press coverage of the escalating Yugoslav conflict (with reports on the siege of Sarajevo and death camps) increased, European leaders sought a response. On July 1, 1992, Eurocorps established an interim staff in Strasbourg, and by the end of August, the WEU agreed to send a humanitarian intervention force of 5,000 into the former Yugoslavia.

In October 1992, ARRC headquarters was officially stood up, led by British Lieutenant-General Jeremy McKenzie. However, with US elections only a month away, the issue of NATO intervention, especially involving US troops, was off the table.

For the next several years, an institutional competition ensued, as Western security institutions sought to exploit the terrible events in the Balkans to enhance

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their own credibility and legitimacy. France promoted the EC/WEU because of these institutions’ independence from the United States-dominated NATO. Tensions continued between NATO and EU/WEU officials that stemmed from American efforts to avoid getting the Alliance entangled in the region, and from the EU/WEU’s inability to stop the violence.

In 1992, with Congress wanting a peace dividend, the US economy slumped and went into recession. Increasingly, it appeared that the United States was turning inwards, with attention devoted to domestic issues. The election of Bill Clinton, with his focus on the US economy, created concerns in Europe regarding US foreign policy, in particular continued American commitment to European security. Ironically, many in Europe were worried about the President-elect, believing that European interests would have been better served had George HW Bush been re-elected. In any case, the time seemed ripe for the Europeans to do more in the field of security.

In early 1993, newly-elected President Clinton decided to reexamine US military forces deployed. Instituting a bottom-up review, Clinton sought to reap a peace dividend from the end of the Cold War. His interest in domestic policy – health care, education, and the environment – led some to believe that he was looking for an excuse to downsize the armed forces. Whatever the motivation, the result of

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the bottom-up review was a reorganization of US forces, including base closures and realignment. This affected the plans underway at NATO. A debate began in the Alliance on revamping NATO forces from static defense to more mobile units that would be able to respond to crises, such as that developing in Bosnia.

Henry Kissinger urged policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic not to allow security organizations such as NATO to wither lest there be a resurgence of nationalism (especially in Germany). In one editorial, Kissinger wrote of America’s presence in Europe through NATO, “It gives France a safety net against German hegemony and Germany an emotional harbor as European unification slows down, as well as protection against outside dangers and excessive European nationalism.”

Phase Two: 1994-1998

Strategic Context and Distribution of Power

The January 1994 NATO Summit launched the introduction of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, designed to reach out to former Warsaw Pact countries that increasingly desired a relationship with NATO. It was also at this summit that members sought to develop closer ties between NATO and the WEU in order to strengthen a European Defense Identity (EDI). Members agreed that NATO and the WEU would consult one another in future contingencies “through Joint Council
meetings [and]...stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available...for WEU operations.”  

In line with this, NATO agreed to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. This concept was developed to “facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.”

This would allow NATO to pursue non-Article 5 operations with non-NATO members, including those in the WEU. It seemed to be a way of strengthening the European pillar of NATO and to prevent the Europeans from developing their own autonomous defense framework.

However, the CJTF concept did not stop the Europeans from pursuing their own efforts under the auspices of the WEU. At its May 9th summit, the WEU issued the “Kirchenberg Declaration” where the Council of Ministers authorized the WEU to begin working on a “Common European Defense Policy.”

In August and September (respectively) of 1994, the final Russian and Allied troops departed from Berlin, marking the return of full sovereignty to a united Germany. Earlier, in July, the German Constitutional Court ruled that German troops could participate - with a simple majority in the Bundestag - in UN or NATO operations ranging from peacekeeping to combat missions. At the same time, the reorganization of NATO under its new “Strategic Concept” proceeded.


342 Ibid.


344 For a historical review of the evolution of the WEU, especially its reactivation in 1984, see Alfred Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO: Building a European Defence Identity within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity (London: Brassey’s, 1989).
Tensions between the US and European governments continued, especially over how to stop the fighting in Bosnia. The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 into competing factions highlighted many of the difficulties associated with ethnic conflict and the limits of intervention.\textsuperscript{346} The situation deteriorated most dramatically in March 1992, when Bosnia-Herzegovina formally declared its independence, unleashing a civil war among three ethnic and religious groups -- the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. In June 1992, the UN Security Council extended its mandate of UNPROFOR to include Bosnia. By August, there were 7,500 European peacekeepers in the region maintaining a fragile cease-fire.

By the end of the year, the international community had implemented other measures including a no-fly zone (Operation Deny Flight), an arms embargo (which favored the Serbs because they had alternative sources of arms), economic sanctions against the former Yugoslavia (now composed of Serbia and Montenegro), as well as several unsuccessful diplomatic initiatives to partition Bosnia peacefully (most notably the Vance-Owen Plan, which, according to critics, rewarded aggression).\textsuperscript{347}

The Americans wanted to conduct military air strikes on the Bosnian Serbs, but the Europeans opposed this idea. According to Guay, there were three reasons: 1) fear that the air strikes might endanger humanitarian relief operations in the area; 2)

\textsuperscript{345} See Western European Union, \textit{Kirchenberg Declaration} (Luxembourg, May 9 1994), \url{http://www.weu.int/documents/940509en.pdf} (accessed March 26, 2005).

disrupt peace negotiations; and 3) expose British and French troops on the ground
protecting Bosnian “safe havens.” The lack of consensus led to further institutional
tension between NATO and the EU/WEU on next steps.

The year 1995 served as a watershed for NATO. After NATO-led airstrikes
on Bosnian Serb military targets beginning in September (Operation Deliberate
Force), political negotiations resumed with new intensity. The Dayton Peace
Accords led to the introduction of a NATO-commanded Implementation Force
(IFOR) into Bosnia to enforce the peace agreement. The force would consist of
60,000 troops, composed of 15 NATO nations and at least 15 non-members.

By intervening in Bosnia, the Alliance conducted its first military mission
“out-of-area” reflecting a new dimension for European defense. No longer was it a
defense of “territory” but defense of “principle.” For some critics, it was a defense of
NATO as an organization. In his column, Charles Krauthammer, for example,
wrote, “We have staked both American credibility and the future of NATO. These
are no small things. Were we to leave and have the war resume and the Bosnians

348 Terrence Guay, *The United States and the European Union* (Sheffield, UK: Sheffield Academic
Press, 1999), 89.
349 For background to the military situation shortly before Operation Deliberate Force, see United
Special Report, August 1995.
350 John Pomfret, “UN Hands Over Its Bosnia Duties to NATO Force,” *Washington Post* (December
351 See Richard Lugar, “NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business,” Remarks at the Open Forum, US
Department of State (August 2, 1993).
crushed behind us, it would rightly be seen as an enormous failure for America and NATO.”352

**Policymaking Structure**

The structure during the Clinton Administration remained similar to that of the Bush Administration. There were two main differences: the players in key cabinet positions and the presidential leadership style of Clinton compared to that of Bush. For his national security team, Clinton chose William Christopher to be his Secretary of State, Les Aspin to be Secretary of Defense, Anthony Lake to be National Security Advisor, and James Woolsey to head the CIA. Vice President Al Gore tended to limit his participation in foreign policy to environmental matters.

President Clinton’s leadership style initially could be considered loose and open. The new president gained a reputation for poor time-management skills, with foreign dignitaries often having to wait 30-60 minutes for meetings. It took about one year and a new chief of staff before the Clinton White House was considered organized and on-track. According to one Democratic appointee, any meeting that dragged on without apparent purpose was nicked-named as being on “Clinton time.”353 Clinton’s leadership style evolved, however, as he became more familiar with foreign policy issues. He was considered sensitive to the political context and adroit at “triangulation.” For the most part, the President was open to argument and debate, and the access was minimally constrained.

Policy Evolution and Implementation

There was a shift in domestic politics with the 1994 Republican “revolution” in Congress. Newt Gingrich became Speaker of the House and brought with him a distinctly more conservative group of Republicans to Capitol Hill. By 1996, their impact on foreign policy issues became apparent, especially their contempt for President Clinton’s internationalist-oriented policies. The shift was more than just partisan politics. While Republican Presidential nominee Bob Dole tended to side with President Clinton on issues such as intervention in Bosnia and NATO enlargement, the new generation of Republican lawmakers were much more skeptical. The split was less between parties as within the GOP itself. The rift was most stark when it came to the value of NATO. For example, during the debate over whether NATO should intervene in Bosnia, Representative John Linder (R-Ga) stated bluntly, “I’m not the least bit interested in the prestige of NATO.”

Of the 74 freshman Republicans, only eight voted against a House proposal to cut funding for deployment of US troops as part of a NATO intervention force to Bosnia. One of the veteran members of the House International Relations Committee, Representative Doug Bereuter (R-Neb) observed, “I think time will show the newer members have less confidence in the foreign policy establishment…to reach right decisions. They’re more skeptical about use of force.” He added, “There’s a different test about what’s in our vital national interest.”

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353 Interview with former State Department official, November 1, 2004.
355 Ibid.
Thus, during this period the Clinton Administration needed to tread lightly on how best to implement its Europe policy, especially in response to European calls for greater defense autonomy. In June 1996, American officials persuaded NATO members to agree on a framework for using NATO assets in European-only operations, known as “Berlin Plus.” As part of the bargain, NATO foreign ministers agreed to strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO as part of the Alliance’s internal adaptation. This would result in the use of CJTFs in cooperation with the WEU for the European members of NATO to conduct humanitarian operations without the US.

This was a welcome development for those seeking a compromise between the two organizations, and it appeared that France was turning toward rejoining the integrated military command of NATO. After the initial flurry of Europeanist-only activity (e.g., the Maastricht Treaty, promotion of Eurocorps, etc.), French leaders had become pragmatic. The experiences of the Gulf War and the Balkans conflict appeared to have sunk in. As one report noted, “French leaders began to see that in some ways their global outlook brought them closer to the United States than their would-be partners in European defense identity.” The manifestation of these changes included greater French participation related to peacekeeping operations in NATO’s Military Committee; an agreement on the relationship between NATO and

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Eurocorps; and placement of French aircraft under NATO operational control as part of Operation Deny Flight in the former Yugoslavia.\(^{358}\)

However, at the September NATO defense ministerial, the price for full French reintegration into NATO’s military command was too high. The US balked at French demands for command of AFSOUTH. The meeting deteriorated, and Paris reneged on its intention, causing suspicion and hostility within US circles at French motives in European defense.\(^{359}\) Consequently, in practice, CJTF fell far short of its potential, playing no role in the Bosnia or Kosovo conflicts.\(^{360}\) As the situation in Kosovo deteriorated, it became clear that the fragile peace between the US and France over how to organize European security also would not last.

Phase Three: 1998-2003

Strategic Context and Distribution of Power

During this period, central and eastern European countries were vying to join both NATO and the EU. In 1997, NATO (after a behind-the-scenes contentious dispute between the Americans and French over the invitees) agreed at a Madrid

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\(^{358}\) Harris and Steinberg, 46. Also see, “La France siége désormais avec voix délibérative au comité militaire de l’Otan,” *Le Monde* (May 14, 1992), 5.


\(^{360}\) See Guay, *United States and the European Union*. 
Summit to invite three former Warsaw Pact countries – Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary – to join the Alliance. In EU circles, the Union had enlarged in 1995 with three wealthy, developed new members: Austria, Finland, and Sweden. In 1997, the EU had agreed to the Amsterdam Treaty, designed to streamline the institutions and allow for additional members. Included in the Treaty was provision for a High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. This person would help coordinate the EU’s foreign policy in an attempt to provide more coherence as the EU expanded further. Commentators noticed, however, the slow process of bringing the numerous (and relatively poor) candidates from central Europe, the Baltics, and Mediterranean into the Union.

Turning to developments beyond Europe, support for maintaining Iraq sanctions was eroding in the UN, as France and Russia (and, to a lesser extent, China) sought to relax or even lift the sanctions regime against Baghdad. On June 25, 1996, the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia was bombed, killing 19 American servicemen and wounding scores others. The terrorist attack provided one of several subsequent warning signs of the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network. Two years later, on August 7, 1998, the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar el Salaam were bombed, killing 213 people in Nairobi and a dozen

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362 For example, see “In the Gray Zone,” Washington Post (May 18, 1997), A17. Also, Fraser Cameron, “The European Union and the Challenge of Enlargement,” Central European Issues 2 (Spring 1996): 46-59.
in Dar el Salaam, most of them African bystanders. Several thousand were injured. Only twelve Americans died in the nearly simultaneous blasts.\textsuperscript{364} Retaliatory missile strikes by the Clinton Administration were considered ineffective and perhaps even an attempt to divert attention from the Monica Lewinsky scandal.

In 1990, the United States had 309,827 military forces stationed in Europe. A decade later, in 2000, that number had decreased to 117,089.\textsuperscript{365} The US’s share of world economic output in 1990 was 25 percent. By 2000, that share had increased to 26 percent.\textsuperscript{366}

By comparison, the Soviet Union in 1990 had only 2 percent of world output. In 2000, Russia’s share was 1 percent. In Western Europe, Germany had the largest economy and one of the largest military forces. In 1990, West Germany had 545,000 troops and 8 percent of the world’s economic output. In 2000, German forces had shrunk to 319,000 and its share of world output remained at 8 percent (even taking into account unification).

No individual European nation could come close to matching US economic power or military capability. Collectively, however, the Europeans (as the EU) could “compete” with US in economic terms. In 2000, the EU’s share of world output was about 24 percent.\textsuperscript{367}


\textsuperscript{366} World Bank, \textit{World Development Indicators}.

\textsuperscript{367} Ibid.
In 2000 the combined total of military forces of France, Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries, and the UK equaled 1.4 million. By contrast, as mentioned above, US forces in Europe totaled 117,089. Many of America’s military forces were elsewhere around the globe, especially in the Middle East and Asia. Despite the manpower disparity, most European forces lacked mobility, deployability, and sustainability. Although the combined defense spending of European NATO was about two-thirds that of the United States, deployable forces were less than a quarter compared with those of the Americans.\textsuperscript{368}

Two years after events in Bosnia led to SFOR and NATO involvement there, ethnic tensions in neighboring Kosovo increased, spurring calls for renewed action on the part of Europeans to solve a new Balkan problem. Would this be another Bosnia? Would Europeans witness another Sarajevo massacre, but this time, however, involving Albanian Kosovars against ethnic Serbs?\textsuperscript{369}

The British held the EU presidency in the first half of 1998. On March 2, London called for mutual restraint by the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. On March 31, the UN Security Council adopted UNSCR 1160 imposing an arms embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

For the next several months, into the summer of 1998, Europeans discussed (along with the Contact Group, which included the Americans and Russians) what to do to stem the escalating violence. On June 12, the Contact Group called for an


immediate ceasefire, and for all Yugoslav and Serbian security forces to withdraw from Kosovo. It also called for the introduction of international monitors and for a new round of talks between Belgrade and ethnic Albanian Kosovars. Three days later, at the European Council Summit in Cardiff, the EU endorsed the demand to halt military operations against civilians in Kosovo.\textsuperscript{370}

The deteriorating situation in Kosovo increasingly frustrated British Prime Minister Tony Blair. On June 24, Blair warned that NATO reserved the right to use air strikes and ground forces against Yugoslavia. In reality, though, what Blair needed was a more robust European military capability.

Blair saw the convergence of two sets of interests: first, because the UK was not part of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), London could not be a full partner in the EU. The UK, therefore, needed to establish its EU credentials in some other way. The second was the widening gap in military capabilities between the US and the other NATO allies.\textsuperscript{371} The only way for the Europeans to play an important role in their own backyard was to develop true military capabilities.

The NATO campaign in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force) began March 24, 1999, only days before the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Alliance’s founding. It also served as a strange introduction to NATO’s newest members, the former Warsaw Pact countries: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.\textsuperscript{372}

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\item[371] For example, according to one scenario of a medium-sized conflict in Africa, within six weeks the US could deploy and maintain a force of 250,000. By contrast, the Europeans would be hard-pressed to do the same for 20,000 forces. “Knights in Shining Armor? A Survey of NATO,” \textit{The Economist} (April 24, 1999), 13.
\item[372] See Clark, \textit{Waging Modern War}; Also see Daalder and O’Hanlon, \textit{Winning Ugly}.
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The operation proved to be strange in more ways than just timing. It was a 78-day air campaign, with no ground assault. Pundits called it “Operation Partial Force” or the 10,000-meter war. Americans, using stealth bombers and long-range missiles from the continental US, swept in unnoticed by European NATO radars, dropped their payload, and returned to the US. It was as if the US no longer needed the Alliance. Although the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Canada also flew sorties, the ratios of US sorties and use of smart munitions to those of the other Allies were stark.

Despite changes in institutional structures, including the creation of an EU Military Staff; Military Committee; and Political-Security Committee to deal with European Security and Defense Policy issues, European military capabilities by 2003 had changed little. For example, while there were 1.7 million Europeans in uniform, only 170,000 were considered ready for combat. Of those, only between 40,000 and 50,000 could be deployed for a Kosovo-like operation at any one time. In other words, five years after the St. Malo declaration, less than three percent of European

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375 See John Peters et. al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 18-24. Of the total 1,005 aircraft used in OAF, more than 700 were American (or over 70%). The US flew more than 29,000 sorties. To compare, the second highest was France, which deployed over 100 aircraft and flew 2,414 sorties. For a summary, see Peters et. al., European Contributions, 20. Also, see http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/natoorderofbattle.htm (accessed March 26, 2005).
military forces were deployable for high-intensity conflict (as opposed to UN-style peacekeeping).  

**Policymaking Structure**

The policymaking structure did not change part way through this phase, but the key actors did, with the start of a new Administration in 2001. From 1998-2001, the principal Cabinet-level players were Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Secretary of Defense William Perry (and then William Cohen), National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and CIA Director George Tenet.

The key players in foreign and security policy during the Bush Administration were: Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, also had supporting roles.  

Beginning in 2001, the role of the Vice President’s office (OVP) became more prominent with respect to national security and transatlantic relations than during the Clinton years. This is attributed in part to the fact that Vice President Al Gore did not particularly care about ESDP, but Vice President Cheney, on the other hand, did (along with almost all aspects of national security policy). Cheney significantly increased his staff, which allowed for OVP representation in almost every White House meeting.

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378 Interview with Esther Brimmer, November 1, 2004.
House meeting, as well as many other policy-making meetings related to national security. According to one account, “Rarely in history, possibly never, has the vice-presidential staff been so ubiquitous.”

The Presidential leadership style also was considered more disciplined, focused, and tightly controlled. The Administration gained a reputation for its ability to stay “on message” while minimizing leaks or unauthorized disclosures.

**Policy Evolution and Implementation**

The shift in British policy became most apparent by the St. Malo Declaration on December 4, 1998. In it, the UK and France agreed to the EU developing an “autonomous military capability” and the start of a new European defense project.

The St. Malo declaration injected new life into the ESDI/ESDP debate and opened the door again to American concern. It occurred as the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating and just one month before the introduction of the euro, the single European currency.

According to one Pentagon official, the US had felt “betrayed” by the British for having “broken” the 1994-1998 promise regarding Berlin Plus. This same official noted that there was no “heads-up” by the British, and that the surprise reflected not

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only the substance of the St. Malo proposal but also the process of notification as well.382

In many ways, the Clinton administration echoed some of the concerns and warnings that had been expressed by the G.H.W. Bush administration. For example, the US supported ESDI within NATO, but made it emphatically clear its strong reservations for the Europeans to develop “autonomy” in defense outside the NATO framework. Washington stated that St. Malo’s declaration could be “misconceived, misunderstood, or mishandled” so giving the impression that the Europeans sought to replace the Atlantic Alliance with a European-only accommodation.383 Secretary of State Madeline Albright announced her famous “three D’s” - no decoupling, no duplication, and no discrimination.384 Other arguments made by the US Administration included the cost issue: if Europeans are spending money to develop their own military institutions, they may not be able to assist central and eastern Europeans wanting to join the EU. Or, if Europeans spent their scarce resources on developing new institutional structures (which they eventually did), they would not be devoting them to improving military capabilities.385

Throughout the fall of 1999 and into 2000, a number of articles came out expressing concerns that the EU’s security ambitions would come at the expense of NATO’s own transformation.386 According to one Defense Department official, there

382 Interview with DoD official, May 24, 2005.
383 Guay, 90.
385 See Hunter, 55-56.
was paranoia in the Pentagon that the EU was “bad.” There was a general ignorance of the EU and how it operated, but the gut reaction was a uniform dislike and distrust of ESDP. This same official, who served at the US Mission to NATO from 1998 until 2002, noted that there was little communication between the US Mission to NATO and US Mission to the EU. Only later were better channels developed to the point where now USNATO and USEU even send joint cables on occasion. Also, after 2000, recognition increased on the part of Pentagon officials on the need to understand the EU better.

Also during this period, there was great attention in Washington to ensuring that ratification of NATO enlargement in the Senate succeeded. Senator Warner (R-Va), who, in the words of one DoD official, was a “big fan of NATO,” expressed concerns about how this new move toward greater European defense autonomy would impact NATO.

The contrast between the communiqués from the April 1999 NATO Summit in Washington and the June 1999 European Council Summit in Cologne exacerbated the situation and revealed the underlying tension that existed. As was noted, the European Councils in 1999 and 2000 fleshed out the St. Malo declarations in ways that did not always seem aligned with US interests. The Cologne Summit in particular showed French desire to pursue a “counterweight” strategy by “toying with

389 Interview with DoD official, May 24, 2005. According to this official, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO and European Policy would add an extra day of consultations with USEU in addition to meetings at NATO.
390 Ibid.
the idea of using the new force for (really) autonomous actions.” 391 In the words of one observer, “the ritual words that would implicitly or explicitly acknowledge NATO’s primacy were noticeably absent.” 392

The timbre of warnings rose considerably during 1999. For example, then-US Ambassador to NATO Alexander Vershbow delivered a speech questioning the motives of developing ESDP:

Is ESDP primarily a political exercise, the latest stage in the process of European construction, or is ESDP’s main goal to solve real-world security problems in Europe? If ESDP is mostly about European construction, then it will focus more on institution-building than on building new capabilities, and there will be a tendency to oppose the ‘interference’ of NATO and to minimize the participation of non-EU Allies. The danger here is that, if autonomy becomes an end in itself, ESDP will be an ineffective tool for managing crises, and transatlantic tensions will increase. 393

In October 1999, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott delivered a speech in London, where he warned:

[The United States] would not want to see an ESDI that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO, since that would lead to an ESDI that initially duplicates but that could eventually compete with NATO. 394

Increased US pressure from the summer into the fall resulted in the December 1999 European Council in Helsinki moderating its declaration by reiterating explicitly

392 Hunter, 56.
393 Quoted in Philippart and Winand, 429.
394 Quoted in Hunter, 57-58. Also see US State Department, *Washington File* (October 7, 1999).
that the European force would be used “where NATO as a whole is not engaged.”

As some European observers noted, this would lead in effect to an American veto on any European desire to develop security independence from the US. Lest there be any misunderstanding, the NATO Summit a few days after the Helsinki Summit repeated the notion expressed in Helsinki that a European Security and Defense Policy “does not imply the creation of a European army.”

Some Europeans, especially in Paris, felt that US insistence at managing ESDP at the NATO-EU level (rather than US-EU) was a means of propping up NATO as well as maintaining US control of European security leadership through the Alliance. As Frellesen noted, “The EU and the US have in many ways been in a learning phase since the end of the Cold War in terms of managing their relations and finding new ways of cooperating to meet a new range of common challenges.”

Early during this phase, there was a debate over the US role in Europe and the world. With the Cold War won, would the US withdraw back into a neo-isolationism? The question seemed even more pronounced following fiascoes in Somalia, Haiti, and early part of Bosnia.

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395 Helsinki European Council, *Presidency Conclusions* (December 10-11, 1999); can also be found in Rutten, *From St. Malo to Nice*, 82. In contrast, the Cologne European Council statement referred to EU action responding “without prejudice to actions by NATO” and stressed the need for the EU to “have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces.” Cologne European Council, *Presidency Conclusions* (June 3-4, 1999); Rutten, *From St. Malo to Nice*, 41. For more on the interaction from Cologne to Helsinki, see Karen Donfried and Paul Gallis, *European Security: The Debate in NATO and the European Union* (Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, April 25, 2000).

396 See Philippart and Winand, 427-428. According to one DoD official, this was not an overt attempt by the Americans to impose their “hegemonic” will over the rest of Europe as some European officials and analysts inferred. It was simply a matter of not being able to imagine a European operation of significance that did not involve the United States. Interview, May 24, 2005.

397 Helsinki European Council, *Presidency Conclusions* (December 10-11, 1999), paragraph II; Rutten, *From St. Malo to Nice*, 82.

398 Interview with DoD official, December 16, 2004. Also, see Philippart and Winand, 427-430.
In 2001, the new Bush Administration did not view the EU as a security actor and had not appreciated the changes within the EU since 1993. Thus, there was a learning curve. As one former State Department official noted, “The Republicans had missed nearly a decade of thinking in EU and conflict prevention.” A Defense Department official echoed this characterization, observing that the Bush Administration needed time to “adjust” to the new NATO/EU environment.

However, much of the tension appeared to lose steam with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Suddenly, the issue of ESDP seemed somewhat trivial compared to the new threat and vulnerability presented by transnational terrorism.

James Mann notes how the new policy traced its evolution from earlier debates dating back to Woodrow Wilson to a shift during the Reagan years.

According to Mann:

Until the late 1980s the causes of democracy and self-determination overseas had been espoused mostly by liberals and Democrats; Woodrow Wilson, America’s most ardent proponent of an idealistic foreign policy, had been a liberal Democrat. After the Philippines, promoting democracy abroad gradually turned into a cause of the political right more than of the left. When in 2002 and 2003 the George W. Bush administration began to call for democratic government for the Palestinians, in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, it was following a line of policy and doctrine that first took root when the Reagan administration dealt with the Philippines.

Along with the new emphasis on the “war against terror” was a diminished focus at the highest levels on transatlantic security relations. Instead, responsibility

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400 Interview with Brimmer, November 1, 2004.
401 Interview with DoD official, May 24, 2005.
for managing US policy toward ESDP was pushed down several layers. Consequently, what emerged was what one State Department official called “a battle of skirmishes.” The goal was to get the President or Secretary of State on the record for taking certain public positions. If one could get a policy statement into a public speech, that was considered a success.\(^\text{403}\) In this case, as Henry Kissinger observed, “[M]odern decision-makers often find themselves the prisoners of their advisors.”\(^\text{404}\)

By the time of the Bush Administration, and especially after the September 11 attacks, interest in the debate over ESDP and European defense autonomy seemed to wane within Administration circles. To the extent that Republican officials paid attention, it centered primarily on how the Europeans could contribute militarily (and otherwise) to the “war on terrorism.”\(^\text{405}\)

Even before September 11, 2001, Europeans had worried over the new Administration’s apparent “unilateralist” bent. After several high-profile moves on the part of the Bush Administration – e.g., dismissing the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, not participating in the International Criminal Court, withdrawing from the ABM and other international treaties, and pursuing national missile defense – Europeans became convinced that the US had made a strategic decision to ignore its allies and international institutions such as NATO. As one commentator noted, “The actions of the Bush Administration, almost 100 days into office, suggest it is philosophically further from European ideals than perhaps any US administration in

\(^{403}\) Interview with Brimmer, November 1, 2004.


The last 50 years.” The comment came on the same day as the EU and NATO agreed to move forward on consultations related to military planning. Before then, Turkey had blocked NATO from discussing NATO-EU military issues with the EU because the Turks had wanted a greater say in ESDP operations even though Turkey was not a member of the EU.

After the military invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, but especially after the US-led military invasion of Iraq in March 2003, there were numerous outcries that the transatlantic relationship was over, and that the US no longer cared about NATO.

The situation was not helped by the Turkish resistance within NATO to allow the EU access to NATO assets as agreed by Berlin Plus. Officials at the US Mission to NATO felt that the Alliance was being torn apart by the ESDP debate. The issue, conflated with Turkish EU membership desires and coupled with suspicions of US unilateralism, was a significant concern.Officials at the US Mission to NATO felt that the Alliance was being torn apart by the ESDP debate.


407 See Judy Dempsey and Alexander Nicoll, “EU and NATO to hold talks on military planning,” Financial Times (April 24, 2001), 2.

408 Both practitioners and commentators perceived a rift between the United States and Europe from the Iraq war. For example, see Javier Solana, “Atlantic Drift,” The Guardian (July 10, 2003); Christopher Patten, “Europe and America: Has the Transatlantic Relationship Run Out of Road?” Speech delivered at Lady Margret Hall, Oxford (February 13, 2004), http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp04_77.htm (accessed February 26, 2004); Nicholas Fraser, “Le Divorce: Do Europe and America Have Irreconcilable Differences?” Harper’s Magazine (September 2002): 58-65; Daniel Hamilton, “Transatlantic Tensions,” SAISPHERE (June 2003): 28-32; and Gustav Lindstrom (ed), Shift or Rift: Assessing US-EU Relations After Iraq (Paris: EU/ISS, 2003). However, the cries of the death of the transatlantic relationship are not new. Even during the Cold War, there were suggestions that the US and its European allies would drift apart. For one such example, see Alastair Buchan, Europe and America: From Alliance to Coalition (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1973).

409 See, for example, Thomas Fuller, “Summit Talk of Close European Military Ties Upsets US,” International Herald Tribune (October 17, 2003). 3. Also, see Judy Dempsey, “US to Confront Brussels Over Defense Policy,” Financial Times (October 17, 2003), 1. In the article, Dempsey quotes then-US Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns as warning that EU defense aspirations represented “one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship.”
over impending Cypriot EU accession, became quite a problem. France and Turkey engaged in numerous debates over ESDP and EU access to NATO. What to US officials were confusing, arcane discussions reflecting internecine EU battles drifted into NATO channels to the point that it became quite difficult to agree on NATO communiqués. The US could not form a position. Consequently, there was little guidance from Washington. According to one US official at NATO, “it was hell.”

Nevertheless, the EU continued to develop its ESDP institutional structures, in particular, the EU Military Staff, Military Committee, the PSC, and support elements within the Council Secretariat, and to work on its Headline Goal for the European Rapid Reaction Force. In March 2002, EU leaders at the Barcelona European Council Summit declared its “availability” to take over NATO’s operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), under the condition that final agreement on Berlin Plus was achieved.

At the November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague, Alliance leaders introduced the NATO Response Force (NRF) and Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), a more focused version of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), which was considered overtaken by the September 11 terrorist attacks. A new round of NATO enlargement also was announced. At the same time, tension was building over Iraq and potential for military intervention.

411 For more on the institutional framework, see Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP Bodies,” www.iss-eu.org, (accessed December 2, 2004); and Howorth, European Integration and Defense, 32-37.
Finally, in December 2002, NATO and EU governments reached a framework agreement on the consultation mechanisms and conditions for implementing Berlin Plus (especially concerning the transfer and use of NATO assets for EU operations). Officials from NATO and the EU began to meet on a regular basis, including at the ambassador and foreign minister level. Meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and Political-Security Committee (PSC) were generally superficial, but the symbolism of working together seemed to matter most.414

At the end of March 2003, the EU conducted its first military mission, Operation Concordia, in FYROM, employing “Berlin Plus” mechanisms. While minimal in terms of force projection (350 personnel), it marked a symbolic watershed for the EU’s military aspirations. It also coincided with the US led military invasion of Iraq.415

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Chapter 5: Theoretical Considerations for Case One (US-EDC)

Introduction

This chapter posits how different International Relations theories or conceptual models would explain American foreign policy behavior toward the European Defense Community (EDC). In particular, it discusses what one should expect from neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism. The chapter then moves down one level of analysis to examine other possible explanations at the domestic level, including presidential decision-making and bureaucratic politics models. It also examines the role of policy entrepreneurs and transnational networks as potential contributing variables in explaining American support for the EDC.

Neorealist Explanation

Neorealists would focus on the systemic constraints stemming from the distribution of power in the international system. The external environment would dominate over internal or domestic considerations. Thus, it would be for all practical purposes irrelevant whether there were a Republican or Democrat in the White House, and the personalities and leadership styles, not to mention the institutional and alliance arrangements would be of little value.
Neorealists would argue that American foreign policy was conditioned on the Soviet threat and the need to unify Western Europe in order to balance and counter the emerging threat. With Western Europe in economic ruins and political disarray, the logical solution would be to prop up the continental Europeans through political, economic, and security integration. Such a neorealist argument would explain how the United States might seek alliances with the West Europeans. However, it would not explain why the initial reaction to the continuing massive Soviet presence in the aftermath of World War II was to demobilize and reduce the American counter-balancing presence in Europe. Judging from the international distribution of power, neorealists would find it difficult to explain why the US demobilized from 1945-1947. As a utility-maximizing unitary actor, the United States should have been expected to lock-in its relative gains at the end of the War. If one used balance-of-power theory, the US would have stayed in order to balance the Soviet presence, which did not recede after the end of hostilities in 1945. If one applied hegemonic stability theory, the US would have stayed in order to preserve its advantage as a regional hegemon. In fact, the opposite occurred. The United States rapidly demobilized. Even when it became abundantly clear that Soviet intentions were hostile to the Western democracies, the Americans vacillated before finally pushing through the Marshall Plan for economic assistance. It was not until the summer of 1950 and the shock of the Korean invasion (i.e., open hostilities) that the Americans began building up its military forces in Europe. Even then, there was a substantial debate within Washington – especially between the Administration and Congress –
over the scope and scale of an American military contribution to the defense of Europe.416

Neorealists might respond by arguing that the United States was slow to recognize the emerging threat, but once American policymakers did, they counterbalanced as expected. The United States increased its military contribution, returned troops to Europe, and increased defense expenditures accordingly. The Americans took the lead in the creation of NATO in 1949, as well as consolidating the Western sectors into the Federal Republic of Germany in the same year.

As the Korean War wound down in the summer of 1953 and after Stalin’s death in March 1953, neorealists would expect the United States to take commensurate measures to lessen the tension. They would expect greater transatlantic tensions in NATO and diminished American support for the EDC, since a unified European political community with its own army might begin to pose a significant challenge to the Americans should Europe continue to gain economic strength, especially with the Germans at the center. And yet, the opposite occurred. In early 1953, Secretary of State Dulles made his famous “agonizing reappraisal” speech, where he intimated that the United States would reconsider its entire approach to European security if the EDC failed to be ratified. Neorealists would discount any efforts to form a supranational community as “false promises” and therefore of little consequence.417 Since the EDC would be more than an alliance (from a realist perspective) as a fully-fledged entity – but also a caucus in NATO – which could potentially slow down decision-making in a time of crisis, neorealists

416 For example, see Williams, Senate and US Troops; and Cook, Forging the Alliance.
would have to adjust their predictions by adding numerous qualifiers and other
corollaries. Such qualifiers might include a contention that European integration was
welcomed as a means of providing stability and harmony on the continent, reducing
costs to the United States. However, this would imply that the continental Europeans
would find it in their self-interest to abandon their state sovereignty for the sake of
American national interests. Consequently, supporting such a position would require
neorealists to set aside their logic for the Europeans while maintaining their logic in
the bipolar confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union.

Neoliberal Institutionalist Explanation

For neoliberals, the explanation of US foreign policy towards European
defense autonomy in the 1950’s would focus on three strands: the role of democratic
peace; the role of political economy and institutional influences; and the role of
domestic political variables. Because neoliberals focus on the potential for progress
and cooperation in international relations, they would not feel threatened by the
development of a European Defense Community.

Many scholars have observed the link between domestic politics and foreign
policy, but most have focused on the economic and trade benefits of such policies. SCHILLER FOR A SOPHISTICATED NEOREALIST PERSPECTIVE TOWARD INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, SEE MEARSHEIMER, “THE FALSE PROMISE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.”
418 For example, see Keohane, International Institutions and State Power.
the short-term gains and strategic calculations traditionally seen in military alliances.419

First, neoliberals might suggest that the US supported the EDC because democracies tend not to fight one another. Such a position would be consistent with a Wilsonian concept of foreign policy. Wilson endorsed the notion of collective security built around shared values rather than just a common threat. It was Wilson’s belief that shared values and a “sense of community” would be more lasting and durable over time than narrowly defined self-interests.420 As Deutsch and others have argued, the North Atlantic Area was a pluralistic community that shared values and allowed for a security community to develop.421 Consequently, the development of the EDC might be welcomed as a step toward the future, where the rule of law governed the behavior of nation states. In conjunction with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Political Community (EPC), the development of the defense component would be viewed as natural and desirable. Since the EDC would be associated with NATO, neoliberals would accept the institutional constraints of the EDC as a positive element of additional interdependence among the members and encouraging positive economic and trade benefits.

However, both Hampton and Deutsch stressed the collective security and plurastic elements of shared values within a NATO context. Thus, the idea of creating an additional institution – the EDC – cannot be derived directly from their

420 Ibid., 614-615.
argumentation. Neoliberalism does not account for circumstances where states would embed institutions rather than incorporate new members into existing institutional structures. In fact, neoliberals would argue that the US should have pushed France to accept the NATO proposal of binding Germany into NATO. Otherwise, they would have to concede to neorealism’s argument that institutions and economic interdependence are in fact “false promises.” The neoliberal argument that respect for the rule of law, and budding economic interdependence would be sufficient to allay French fears of Germany does not seem to match the historical record. Neoliberals also would have difficulty explaining fears over the loss of French sovereignty.  

Thus, neoliberal arguments do not differentiate between allowing for either the US supporting the EDC or supporting German rearmament through NATO. Both avenues would provide for greater interdependence as well as economic and trade benefits. However, there appears to be no decisive factor from neoliberalism that guides an observer in either direction.

Social Constructivist Explanation

Social constructivists would focus on the cultural contexts in which policy was formulated. They would argue that the threat perception from the Korean War created an atmosphere of fear in Washington. They would contend that cultural factors in US foreign policy, such as reproducing the American federalist model,

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would have strongly influenced US behavior toward European defense autonomy. Ideological traditions would have played a major force in policy formation.

Social constructivists would argue that American policymakers conducted coordinative discourse among themselves on the best option to pursue. Once consensus was reached, American policymakers then began a communicative discourse, in which they explained their policy preferences to the Europeans and Soviets, as well as to the American public and Congress.

The difficulty here is that coordinative discourse can easily be confused with discussion over the interagency process. Is coordinative discourse merely a means for policy formation or is it an identifiable explanatory variable in its own right? How else can policy be made and implemented without discussion? Once a policy is agreed, the output is reflected in communication, declaration, or other such action. Thus, what is the difference between communicative discourse and policy implementation?

Ideological traditions may play a role here. After 1950 and the Korean invasion, the United States experienced a wave of tension over Communism known as the “Red Scare.” Numerous concerns were expressed that sympathizers within the State Department were somehow “soft” on Communism. This perception heightened following the loss of China to the Communists and the North Korean invasion. Somehow, the State Department was suspect.

One could argue that the US Administration felt it necessary to remain tough on Communism in Western Europe, felt constrained that any show of weakness in

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422 For example, see Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds), *France Defeats EDC* (New York: Praeger, 1957).
Europe might cement the perception that the Communists were winning the Cold War. Moreover, by the early 1950’s, there was a small group of Republicans in the Congress (led by Senator McCarthy) adding pressure not soften on Communism in any way. However, if this argument is adopted, then one might question the support and enthusiasm within the Eisenhower Administration for the European Defense Community. After all, the EDC might weaken NATO, as an institution within an institution. The Soviets would see that the EDC did not strengthen European defense and might interpret American support as a sign of weakness and desperation. The only way around this view is to consider the EDC as a glue for binding France and Italy into the West and thus diminish the threat from Communism. In other words, because France and Italy possessed the highest percentage of Communists in Western Europe, the real American motive would be not to preserve NATO per se, or just to rearm Germany, but to keep France and Italy within the fold. If the main American motive had been to prevent the Germans from accepting Soviet overtures of reunification in exchange for German neutrality, then trying to subvert German sovereignty by promoting the supranational EDC would have killed German reunification permanently. Germany would have lost most – if not all – of the trappings of sovereignty. The NATO solution would have preserved German hopes of eventual reunification because rearmament would have been channeled through national means. Also, at least in France, but also in Italy, the Communists were among the most outspoken critics against the EDC. In fact, the EDC galvanized Communist opposition, mobilizing a strange alliance with the right-of-center Gaullists to help reject the EDC in the National Assembly.423

423 See Lerner and Aron, France Defeats EDC.
Domestic Level Explanation

Bureaucratic Politics

Some scholars have argued that American foreign policy can be explained best by adopting a bureaucratic politics model. From this model, one would expect the State Department to promote a diplomatic solution, the Defense Department to promote NATO and SHAPE (with suitable support from the Joint Chiefs), with other bureaucratic agents playing lesser roles.

However, is this what occurred? On a superficial level, this approach may seem attractive and hold some promise. The State Department, in fact, did support the EDC over the NATO solution, but not immediately. What would be the material or bureaucratic benefits for the State Department to promote the EDC over the NATO alternative? Additionally, why was the Defense Department surprisingly silent in the debate over German rearmament? There did not seem to be the level of discord as one might have expected. The strongest opponent of the policy tended to come from the Treasury and Commerce Departments, which worried about the longer-term economic implications of a European economic cartel. Rather, the Senate had firm views as will be described below, but these views were not uniform strictly along institutional lines. Moreover, the bureaucratic politics model generally does not emphasize the role of Congress or similar non-Executive branch actors.

424 See Allison and Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics;” and Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy.
425 On this point, see Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy” and Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy.
In addition, the bureaucratic politics model would have difficulty explaining how General Eisenhower, both in his capacity as SACEUR and later as President, would support a militarily-unsound plan for the defense of Europe.

As Art and others have noted, the bureaucratic politics model focuses on the organization as the central determinant, rather than the mindset or “school of thought” perspective on international affairs of the participants. Thus, a policy is promoted for its ability to become endorsed and accepted by other power centers.

**Domestic Politics**

Other domestic variables include the relationships between the Congress and Executive and between the Democrats and Republicans. First, with respect to Congress, the focus will be the Senate, since the upper house – with its ability to approve treaties and fund armies – is more relevant than the lower house in terms of American foreign policy. Thus, how did the Senate view the EDC? Was there a difference between Congressional-Executive relations during the Truman Administration and during the Eisenhower Administration?

American foreign policy was not as unified as often portrayed. During the Truman Administration, the foreign policy objectives were supported by Congress through the 1948 Presidential election. The radical changes – the Marshall Plan, creation of NATO, etc. – reflected the need to respond to a rapidly new international environment. However, the Korean invasion of 1950 and Truman’s response to it, allowed the Senate to play a bigger role in American foreign policy. First, the decision on 9 September 1950 to send more US troops to Europe was momentous but
received scant attention by the Senate until January 1951. Initially, the Senate considered the troop announcement as part of a larger, tougher policy against communism.\textsuperscript{427} Also part of the reason can be attributed to the November 1950 mid-term election and the changing political party balance in the Senate. Republicans gained seats in November and, although they were still a minority, the gap had been closed from twelve to two. This permitted more freedom for criticism.

In particular, the mid-term election allowed for a more conservative and partisan group of Senators to gain influence within the Republican party. Senator Taft, for one, represented a challenge, after he delivered a speech stating that isolationism was dead, but American policy towards Western Europe needed to be re-examined.\textsuperscript{428} Secretary of State Acheson delivered a forceful rebuttal in a speech thereafter, leading to a general decline in bipartisan relations. As Williams notes,

If, on the one hand, important segments of the GOP, fortified by electoral success, were looking for a confrontation with the Democratic Administration over foreign policy, it appears, on the other hand, that the Administration itself was prepared to countenance such a challenge with equanimity. Thus, the breakdown of bipartisanship was the result of suspicion and intransigence on both sides. The careful efforts to build a bipartisan coalition that had characterized the discussions over the North Atlantic Treaty had not been paralleled by similarly extensive efforts in the military assistance program.\textsuperscript{429}

\textsuperscript{426} See Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy.” For more on a schools-of-thought approach to understanding American foreign policy, see Hulsman, \textit{Paradigm for New World Order.}
\textsuperscript{427} For a good analysis of the Senate’s role in the “Great Debate” of 1951 over stationing US troops in Europe during this period, see Williams, \textit{Senate and US Troops}. For details about US troops stationed in specific European countries in the decade after World War II, see Duke and Krieger, eds., \textit{US Military Forces in Europe.}
\textsuperscript{429} Williams, 46. Emphasis in the original.
The connection between events in Korea and Europe was evident by both the Truman Administration and Republican opponents in the Senate. However, the two sides – while agreeing on the basic facts of the situation – came to opposite conclusions, with telling implications for American foreign policy. Whereas Truman saw the need to augment vulnerable European defenses with US troops, Republican Senators viewed Truman’s actions as adventurous and reckless, with no guarantee that a land war in Europe would succeed any better than in Korea. As Williams describes:

Truman had committed American forces to Korea without formal congressional approval (let alone a declaration of war). The consequences, it now appeared, were disastrous. He had done the same in Europe - but there was little reason to believe that a land war strategy would fare any better there than in Asia. Certainly, Congress should have had an opportunity to discuss the matter prior to the actual dispatch of American forces. As events had demonstrated, the Executive, far from having a monopoly of wisdom in foreign affairs, appeared at the very minimum to be inept. And for those who went further than this and suggested that traitors and Communist sympathizers were in charge of United States foreign policy, the setbacks in Korea were seen merely as further confirmations of their suspicions.430

For many US senators, the main concern revolved around the sending of US troops and the costs imposed. Senators such as Connally and Vandenberg worried that the US would be stuck footing the bill for European free-riding. First, a treaty, then military aid, and finally, troops all added up to a bill that the Congress was not willing in paying. For this reason, US State Department and other Administration officials focused on the European self-help components.431 The main thing for

430 Ibid., 47.
431 Ibid., 30-31.
Senator Vandenberg was the North Atlantic Treaty that had shifted the United States from an isolationist, neutral country to one willing to associate itself (and its massive war making capacity) with Europe. It was the public notice to the Soviet Union – not the build-up of forces – that Vandenberg wanted to convey.\textsuperscript{432}

Consequently, for cost reasons, the State Department in its testimony stressed the minimal costs associated with American security aid and troop deployment. NSC-68, which was completed in April 1950, two months before the North Korean invasion, called for substantial increase in European rearmament through greater American assistance and participation than heretofore expected, foreshadowing a potential conflict between the Administration and the Congress. As Williams notes, “The Secretary of State and his department were in favor of further involvement in European affairs whereas the sentiment in the Senate was that the limits of participation had already been reached.”\textsuperscript{433}

Indicative of the climate of tension and suspicion between the Republicans and the Truman Administration, former President Hoover delivered a radio broadcast on December 20, 1950 not only critiquing the Administration’s proposed troop deployment to Europe but also positing an alternative strategy to combat Communism, one that did not require the costly commitment to the Europeans. In his speech, Hoover argued that to try to defend the European continent against the Communists would be futile and doomed to failure. Instead, the US should adopt a perimeter strategy in concert with the island nations of Great Britain on the Atlantic side and Japan, Taiwan (Formosa), and the Philippines on the Pacific in order to

\textsuperscript{432} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{433} Ibid., 35.
“preserve for the world this Western Hemisphere, Gibraltar of Western Civilization.” Hoover’s proposal differed from classic isolationism. What it emphasized was the use of strategic, air, and naval power over ground and land forces to contain Communism. In the meantime, the Europeans would have to fend for themselves, according to Hoover’s strategy.

The response to Hoover’s broadcast was strong, although there were splits even within the GOP, so it would be a mistake to claim that the controversy was merely one of Republican opposition attacking a Democratic Administration.

Nevertheless, the Administration’s attempt to refute Hoover only made matters worse because of a lack of coordination among government officials. Truman took a defensive stance by invoking presidential prerogatives in a manner viewed as crude and arrogant. As Williams notes, “The Administration’s stance succeeded only in arousing the institutional pride of the Senate.”

The debate fell along numerous fault lines: isolationism vs. internationalism; Asia-firsters vs. Atlantic-firsters; Executive vs. Legislative; Democrat vs. Republican – in other words, the issue revealed the core question of America’s role in world affairs. As Williams aptly explains:

The question of whether or not United States troops should be sent to Western Europe was, of course, the kernel of the dispute; but the Senate deliberations quickly revealed a more fundamental and far-reaching divergence among several competing philosophies of foreign affairs. Such a divergence was not new, but, for the most part, had been subdued through the late 1940s, partly by the attempts to build a bipartisan consensus and, more importantly, by the limited sacrifices apparently required for America to fulfill its new role as guardian of Atlantic security. The fear that the United States would send a vast land army to Western Europe, by challenging the comfortable and
somewhat complacent assumptions about the limited costs of American involvement, brought the different perspectives into sharp relief, highlighting a lack of consensus on the purpose, scope and instruments of United States foreign policy.436

More than a few Senators began to conclude that the Administration was taking the Atlantic Alliance down a “mission creep” path that would bleed American resources and personnel at a critical period in domestic politics. The debate over troops to Europe was yet another in a series of debates at critical junctures over the future direction of American foreign policy. That other issues were conflated or exaggerated to score tactical points might be considered incidental.

Although former President Hoover’s broadcast brought attention to the troop issue, the real battle began in the Senate in January 1951. On January 5, Senator Taft, who more than most Republicans, had a definitive alternative to the Truman/Acheson foreign policy, delivered a speech on the Senate floor that emphasized his view of American foreign policy. The Ohio Republican’s position was that the priority for American foreign policy should be its internal effect on America rather than the external impact on other nations. As Williams describes:

    Taft’s starting point for thinking about foreign policy was not the kind of world he would like to see, but the kind of America he wanted. The Truman Administration, in contrast, began from the premise that the freedom of the United States was inseparable from that of its European allies, that security was indivisible for the members of the Atlantic Pact, and that the obligations and responsibilities shouldered by the United States from 1947 onwards had to be fulfilled regardless of how costly and burdensome this proved.437

436 Ibid., 50.
437 Ibid., 52.
Taft was not unaware of the Communist threat. In fact, he considered the threat to be of a long-term nature. Thus, he feared that the surge in cost to support Western Europe would be too high price that in the end would drain American resources and reduce liberty by promoting big government and a large armed forces. Again, compared to traditional isolationists, Taft would refrain from that association. Rather, he argued that the United States should be a “good citizen” of the world, no more, no less. He was one of the first to warn against the dangers of overstretch and even the possible development of a “national security state” or what Eisenhower later referred to as the “military-industrial complex.” As Williams describes, the strategy proposed by Taft was this:

Priority was to be given to the defense and protection of America, the “Citadel” of the free world. This entailed an American attempt to obtain control of both sea and air. Taft was a strong advocate, therefore, of an expanded air force and argued that the strategic capabilities of the United States had been allowed to deteriorate as a result of the Administration’s short-sightedness.

Taft believed that building up the air force would prove a greater deterrent and more successful than a ground force build-up, which might actually have a counter-productive effect, even to the point of possibly provoking the Soviets to conduct a pre-emptive war before Western forces were prepared.

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439 Williams, 53.
440 Wells, 189.
Policy Entrepreneurs and Transnational Networks

A final set of domestic variables that might account for the US decision to support European defense autonomy through the EDC is what might be termed policy entrepreneurship and transnational networks. The fragmented political systems within the United States and Europe allow for policy entrepreneurs and transnational networks to play an influential role in policy formation and implementation.

Consequently, what emerges within the Administration are various power centers or decision units. These are locuses of policy influence and may be either individuals or organizations. Such power centers or decision units are shaped by a core set of beliefs that “at a given social moment…acquire a compelling importance.”441 For example, a strong Secretary of State may represent a power center. So too could a group of elites that share similar beliefs.442 Individual actors can become influential power centers even if they move from one job to another. These individuals bring into their new job goals and beliefs stemming from their own ideological mind-sets or perspectives.443 In Hilsman’s words, “[N]ot only does each power center…have different motives and goals, but…each may have a different view about means, about how to achieve a particular goal. Historically, in fact, it seems that policy disagreements are more frequently over means than goals.”444 Thus, not only is there

442 Hampton describes one such a group as Wilsonians. They included President Truman, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and John J. McCloy. I would add David Bruce and Dwight Eisenhower to such a group. This group perceived their security interests based on a set of beliefs derived from historical lessons of World War I and the subsequent inter-war period. Such beliefs work their way into the decision-making process. See Hampton, “The Wilsonian Impulse,” 613. Hulsman pursues a similar vein with his schools-of-thought approach. See Hulsman, A Paradigm for the New World Order, especially chapter 1.
443 Hulsman, Paradigm for the New World Order, 3.
444 Hilsman, 76.
a question about competing and multiple goals, but also a choice must be made over specific means for achieving certain goals.

This framework differs from the bureaucratic politics model advocated by Allison, Destler, Halperin, and others. According to Hilsman:

The bureaucratic-politics model implies that the organization is the single most important determinant of the policy the different participants espouse and that the large and powerful bureaucracies are the most important determinant of the policy outcome. The political-process model regards the organization as only one determinant of what the participants espouse and the great bureaucracies are important, but not nearly the most important, determinant of the policy outcome. 445

Here, individual actors may cut across organizations and even states to push a particular policy. Thus, the role of Jean Monnet and his American network becomes vital. Initial American reaction to the EDC, as has been mentioned before, was ambivalent, even dismissive. However, Monnet’s constant meetings and interactions with key American policy makers, from David Bruce to Dwight Eisenhower, allowed for other avenues to be pursued and helped to sell the policy approach to Secretary Acheson and skeptics in Congress. As Monnet himself recalls in his memoirs, the “network of contacts” he developed in the United States was essential to his success. According to Monnet, “That network, small and more or less invisible to the public eye, did not correspond to any permanent administrative structure. It was made up of men in whom the President had confidence, and who were wholly devoted to him.” 446

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445 Ibid., 77. Emphasis in the original.
The network of contacts and relationships was an important factor. Individuals were able to persuade others to adopt their positions or make them their own. Consequently, these transnational coalitions were able to work both domestic audiences to accomplish their common goal. As Lankford notes of Monnet’s influence on David Bruce:

Through his friendship with Monnet, Bruce became intimately involved with the men and the institutions conjured by the Frenchman. Their partnership illustrates the complexity of the Marshall Plan. It was not just imposed on an unwilling France but was an intricate collaboration between like-minded factions within the ruling elites of both countries who were opposed by powerful skeptics in America and in France.447

Another important individual to produce a tipping-point difference was Dwight Eisenhower. Whereas the United States had vacillated between the desire for European integration (as reflected by the ECSC and EDC/EPC) and a reconstituted German army to support collective defense, Eisenhower chose the former as a means to the latter. As one observer writes, Eisenhower “affirmed that European Union and German rearmament were, as the French suggested, equally and inseparably interwoven in the need of American security….The intervention of General Eisenhower in the making of Europe was the climax of an American attitude which had been slowly forming since the war.”448

The major concern in Western Europe following the 1950 North Korean invasion of South Korea was over command and control of NATO forces. Up to that

time, NATO’s orientation had been toward planning, not commanding. There was no unified way to conduct a Western defense given multiple armed forces under diverse command arrangements. As Field Marshall Montgomery warned, “As things stand today, and in any foreseeable future, there would be scenes of appalling and indescribable confusion in Western Europe if we were ever attacked by the Russians.”

Field Marshall Montgomery was not the only one to recognize the need for a more integrated defense. As Pedlow writes:

Many European leaders believed that NATO needed a true command structure, but such a move was being resisted by the United States, which did not want to become more deeply involved in the defense of Europe. Thus at the beginning of June 1950, the U.S. delegation to the Standing Group informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the growing pressure by the European members of NATO for the creation of a command structure and ventured the opinion that “we can no longer completely avoid approaching the question of a command organization under the North Atlantic Treaty.”

The Korean War changed the US Administration’s reluctance almost overnight. As NATO’s first SACEUR, Eisenhower soon came to realize the role of national prestige and the sensitivities of positions in choosing his command structure. In particular, there was quite a dispute between the US and the UK over naval positions, most famously the command of SACLANT, but also over which

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451 For more on the changing attitudes towards developing NATO’s command structure, see Wells, 182-189. Also, Cook, *Forging the Alliance*; and Williams, *Senate and US Troops*. 
admiral commanded the Mediterranean. While the Anglo-American sides were haggling with one another over various NATO commands, other allies felt ignored. This was particularly difficult for the French, which still considered themselves to be active players, especially in the Mediterranean. Thus, the strategic imperative of rapidly responding to a looming Soviet threat obviously was not sufficiently strong enough to prevent political delays over command structures in both the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

Given the initial hesitancy of the US role in developing an integrated command within NATO, the enthusiasm the Americans displayed toward its implementation may seem odd. As Pedlow writes:

Once the US position had swung over to strong advocacy, the United States seemed overly conscious of its new, postwar strength and at times showed little tolerance for the sensitivities of the other NATO members, as was clearly demonstrated in the handling of the SACLANT appointment and in the complicated naval command relationships that had to be developed in the Mediterranean because the United States was not willing to place the Sixth Fleet under a NATO command that was not headed by an American. This stand was strongly influenced by American insistence on maintaining a direct chain of command over forces equipped with atomic weapons, but a belief that the United States’ military strength entitled it to fill the key command positions also played a role.

However, to suggest that the United States promoted the increase of American military troops to reinforce its hegemony over Western Europe is to misread the elements of the debate. Not all wanted to commit to such a step, even after the

452 For more on Eisenhower’s encounters with the jealousies of national command positions within NATO, see Pedlow, “Politics of NATO Command;” and Ambrose, Eisenhower.

453 Pedlow, 30-31. The entire chapter is a good analysis demonstrating that political considerations often trump military efficiency, even in critical security situations.

454 Ibid., 41-42.
Korean War highlighted the Communist threat. Others were equally or more concerned over the burden that such a move would have on the United States, both in terms of domestic freedom and economic prosperity. According to Williams:

Taft was firm in his belief…that the United States should not assume the leadership in the “formation of a great international army” or appoint an American Commander in Chief as this would only encourage European pressures on Washington to enlarge its presence. Commitments, he felt, could develop a life of their own - and it was essential to prevent this happening.\(^\text{455}\)

Taft’s view though was not purely isolationist. As mentioned earlier, his concern focused primarily on the trade-off between short-term exigencies and long-term principles. For Taft, it was essential to set strict limits on the parameters of a US troop deployment to Europe. Without such “safeguards,” Taft believed that the American commitment could quite easily escalate, resulting in an American military presence “more enduring and substantial than was either desirable or necessary.”\(^\text{456}\)

These concerns went beyond simple partisan politics but rather reflected his core beliefs about America’s place in the world. He was not alone. Many senators viewed the situation in Europe from the perspective of the Korean War, where the United States had carried 90 percent of the burden.\(^\text{457}\) These senators wanted to make sure that the Administration did not do the same in Europe.

Consequently, as one can see, while no one disputed the Soviet threat, what was disputed was how to respond. In other words, the preference ordering for responding to the Soviet threat was more subtle and even ambiguous than neorealist

\(^{455}\) Williams, 55.
\(^{456}\) Ibid.
\(^{457}\)
scholars would expect. Moreover, Taft’s national interests differed from those of Truman and Acheson, reflecting different philosophical views of foreign affairs.

At the same time, Taft recognized that the Administration’s announcement of sending more US troops to Europe had to be honored, since the Allies’ expectations had been raised. So, there is a discourse element involved, as some social constructivists would posit. Since it was too late to withdraw the offer, the next best step would be to tone down and limit the numbers, with more a token show of support in “the spirit of the Atlantic Pact” than actual major substantive increases. 458

In the end, by raising numerous questions over the role and limits of the Executive branch to deploy troops overseas, as well as the terms of the American security commitment to the defense of Europe, Taft introduced into the discourse many of the issues (most notably, the burden-sharing debate) that continue to this day. It was in the context of debate over how high a price should the United States be willing to pay for its security and the role that Western Europe played in that security policy that the idea of the Europeans establishing their own defense force evolved. It became a suitable political response, even if not an optimal military one. Several prominent Republican congressmen were in the lead in suggesting that the Europeans should be pressured into providing more of their own defense, especially in terms of ground forces. After all, the United States, according to these Republicans, was already providing the overwhelming bulk of naval and air forces in the defense of Europe. Other, more internationalist Republicans, such as Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, felt that it should not be an either/or proposition. Consequently,

457 Ibid., 70.
458 Ibid., 54.
various formulas and ratios were argued, but what came out was that there should be a link between an American military contribution and the European one. How much more the Europeans would do was left open.459

The other issue that becomes conflated with the strategic response to the Soviet threat was the role of the Congress in US foreign policy, especially the institutional pride of the Senate to be adequately consulted and approached on the matter of US troops. However, to portray the issue of a unified Congress against a unified Executive is to oversimplify and mislead. The institutional cleavages were more subtle and cross-cutting. This is particularly true on the Congressional side, where the Administration could turn to pockets of support to counter the pockets (or coalitions) of opposition.

Convincing the Europeans to rearm for their own defense was another issue. As Ambrose aptly describes, “To the Europeans, NATO meant a guarantee that the United States would not desert them, that they could count on the atomic bomb to deter the Red Army. They could see little reason to rearm themselves. Rearmament would merely provoke the Russians, they reasoned, without creating sufficient strength to repel them - at least without using atomic bombs - and if they were going to use atomic bombs, why rearm?”460 The danger at the time was not of an immediate nuclear holocaust, but that the building up of conventional forces in Western Europe might tempt the Soviets into launching a pre-emptive war against the West. With 175 armed divisions, this would be a war the Soviets would not lose on the ground. NATO had only twelve divisions. Eisenhower argued that the Alliance

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459 Wells, 187.
460 Stephen Ambrose, Americans at War (Jackson: University of Mississippi, 1997), 178.
could defend Western Europe with forty (later the number would be boosted to 96), only six of which needed to come from the United States. Eisenhower considered himself to be a “Moses” that would inspire and cajole and buck up the low morale of defeated and fatalistic Europeans. He spent much of his time as SACEUR traveling through Europe and the United States “selling NATO.” He held press conferences and consulted frequently - not just with government officials but also with public audiences and opposition leaders doing what he called “selling and inspiring.”

To skeptics in the American Congress, he emphasized the short-term nature of American participation in building up NATO. As he bluntly stated: “If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed.” In February 1951, Eisenhower reaffirmed his position in hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he believed the American troop commitment would be an interim confidence-building measure to the Europeans that would supply “the needed mobile active strength pending the time that the European nations can build up their own defense forces.”

However, not everyone was convinced. In fact, some remained quite hostile to the Administration’s policy. For example, Senator Malone of Nevada considered Eisenhower’s testimony to be “propaganda for the preconceived decision of the State Department to send our boys to make up a Maginot Line in Europe.” Still others were worried that political considerations were taking precedence over national

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461 Ibid., 181-182.
462 Ibid., 181.
463 Quoted in Ambrose, Americans at War, 181-182.
464 Quoted in Williams, 71. Emphasis in original.
security and military concerns. Rhetorical reassurances from Eisenhower also were not enough to convince Senator Taft, who had presidential aspirations in addition to substantive doubts over the exact nature, magnitude, and duration of a potential American troop commitment to the defense of Europe. As mentioned earlier, while Taft had no objections to sending arms and materiel to Europe (he even was not opposed to a minor and very temporary troop deployment), he wanted to do everything he could to prevent an incremental and irreversible process.466

At the same time, Taft was not the only senator who worried about the European reliability to contribute to its defense. Others expressed unease and continued skepticism that the Europeans could ever unite in sufficient fashion to achieve a common defense. It was in the course of debating the American commitment to Europe that several conservative Republican Senators (e.g., Senators McCarthy of Wisconsin and Case of South Dakota) began discussing bringing in the full military potential of non-NATO Europeans, including Germany and Spain. According to Williams, “As well as the original language in the resolution concerning European self-help, there were now recommendations that the resources and manpower of Italy, West Germany and Spain be mobilized for the defense of Western Europe.”467

Despite these misgivings, the Administration’s case was strong, in part because of a publicly unified position, but also because of the backing from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Indeed, according to Williams, “The testimony of the members of the JCS had an impact beyond the substantive arguments they deployed: with the

465 Williams, 71.
466 Ibid., 72.
prestige and popularity of both the President and the Secretary of State at a low ebb, they gave the decision a certain authoritativeness, legitimacy and non-partisan character which would otherwise have been lacking."

The influence of Monnet’s relationship with Eisenhower was indispensable. Eisenhower’s position as soldier and NATO commander made his view on European defense credible – and critical. It would be only a slight exaggeration to say that Eisenhower, therefore, could have blocked or changed American policy. Monnet recognized this and went to work to persuade the General to favor European integration over a purely NATO solution. At a meeting with Eisenhower and his Chief of Staff General Gruenther (who, later would become SACEUR himself), Monnet made the case that Europeans responsibly providing for their own defense could occur only from unification. According to Monnet, “The strength of the West does not depend on how many divisions it has, but on its unity and common will. To rush into raising a few German divisions on a national basis, at the cost of reviving enmity between our peoples, would be catastrophic for the very security of Europe that such a step would be intended to ensure.”

Eisenhower came to believe that European unification would solve many of the problems facing him, both in terms of alleviating the drain on American resources, promoting the security of Western Europe in the long-term, and facing up to the Soviet threat. As he told Averell Harriman, “Every day brings new evidence that Western Europe must coalesce both politically and economically, or things will get worse instead of better. It seems remarkable that all European political leaders

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467 Ibid., 106.
468 Ibid., 76.
recognize the truth of this statement but just sit down and do absolutely nothing about it.”\(^470\)

Once he had decided, Eisenhower proceeded to tout the European army idea, from public speeches to Senate testimony.\(^471\) For example, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee in July 1951, Eisenhower argued:

I believe in it this much – when I came over here [to Europe] I disliked the whole idea of a European Army, and I had enough troubles without it. However,…I made up my mind to go into the thing with both feet…and I realize that a lot of my professional associates are going to think I am crazy. But I tell you that joining Europe together is the key to the whole question!\(^472\)

Thus, the role of policy entrepreneurs – who act based on their formative beliefs and in conjunction with transnational networks built on relationships of trust – appears to represent a significant determinant in American policy towards the European Defense Community.

\(^{470}\) Quoted in Ambrose, *Americans at War*, 182-183.
\(^{471}\) Fursdon, 118-119.
Chapter 6: Theoretical Considerations for Case Two (US-ESDP)

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze various theoretical explanations for US policy towards European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The analysis will begin at the systemic level with an examination of how different International Relations theories would explain case two. Then, I will analyze how the state level of analysis influences the potential outcome, demonstrating the need to link the state level with the system level in order to gain a thorough understanding of foreign policy outputs, especially with regard to the interaction between the US and Europe. Does the absence of a consensus regarding the role of the US in the world increase the likelihood for institutional rivalries and domestic interests to influence foreign policy outcomes? The role of policy entrepreneurs, bureaucratic politics, transnational networks, and political discourse will be addressed. Finally, a word will be said in conjunction with the individual-level factors, such as worldviews, core beliefs, and management styles of key foreign policy actors.
**Neorealist Explanation**

Neorealists believe that the states are the primary actors in the international system.\(^{473}\) Their emphasis is on the geo-political and military aspects of power, and they place a great deal of importance to issues of stability, state survival, power polarity, and war and peace. For them, the key to understanding a country’s foreign policy lies primarily with that country’s place in the international system. By place, they mean structurally – land mass, size of economy, access to natural resources, military might, etc. The ideology or personal chemistry of individual leaders, domestic issues such as bureaucratic politics or regime type, or the role of non-governmental actors and international institutions are of little consequence in explaining state behavior.

According to neorealists, the end of the Cold War should lead to greater friction between the United States and Europe, especially since there is no great security threat to keep the nations united. For example, Mearsheimer led the pack of neorealist scholars who ran counter to the exuberant joy following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions of 1989-90 in Central and Eastern Europe. As Mearsheimer argues:

The profound changes now underway in Europe have been widely viewed as harbingers of a new age of peace. With the Cold War over, it is said, the threat of war that has hung over Europe for more than four decades is lifting....I argue that the prospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase markedly if the Cold War ends.\(^{474}\)

\(^{473}\) For example, see Grieco, “Anarchy and Limits of Cooperation,” and Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future.”

\(^{474}\) Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future,” 5-6.
He based this negative outlook on his belief that the root causes of war and peace rest on the distribution and character of military power. Mearsheimer’s article was an example of what Snyder termed an “aggressive” variant of realism.⁴⁷⁵ Lynn-Jones and Miller described aggressive realism as a theory where the “international system fosters conflict and aggression. Security is scarce, making international competition intense and war likely. Rational states often are compelled to adopt offensive strategies in their search for security.”⁴⁷⁶

Neorealists might argue that NATO would disband, since the Soviet threat had disappeared. With the US more concerned about strategic competitors and challenges outside the European sphere (especially from Asia), neorealists might argue that Washington would be more than happy for the Europeans to develop the military capabilities necessary to defend their own backyard.

However, is that what occurred?

In fact, neorealism can explain only so much in the post-Cold War developments, and many of the events actually go contrary to neorealist expectations. According to Guay, “Neorealism would not have predicted the success of the [Single European Act], Maastricht Treaty, Transatlantic Declaration or EMU.”⁴⁷⁷ Moreover, Peterson faults neorealism for not accommodating changing notions of security that “give both sides stronger incentives to pool efforts and resources within international

⁴⁷⁷ Guay, 99.
organizations.478 For example, Mearsheimer’s famous prediction that the end of the Cold War would lead to greater instability within Europe (especially in terms of competition among Big Three powers Germany, France, and the UK) so far has not been born out by the facts.479 Wohlfarth writes that one of the greatest problems for neorealists is that “unipolarity contradicts the central tendency of their theory. Its longevity is a testament to the theory’s indeterminacy.”480

Neorealists might suggest that the G.H.W. Bush Administration’s interference in (and opposition to) the pre-Maastricht negotiations over a common European defense can be attributed to US concern over a rival to NATO being created.481 It is possible that the international environment creates the context and parameters for political choice, but it does not dictate the decisions and strategies.482 The actual outcome or policy is the result of interagency bargaining and the decision of the President. The inability to maintain coherent national policy can lead to mixed signals, thus creating further confusion and misunderstandings. The lack of consistency is often the result of foreign ministries and defense ministries (in Europe) and US State and Defense Departments advocating different approaches.

478 Peterson, Europe and America, 198.
482 Guay, 111.
Beginning in the late 1990’s and through 2003, the neorealist explanation revived. Particularly, with respect to the 2003 Iraq war, the charge was that the US was “cherry picking” its allies in Europe and promoting a policy of “disaggregation.” Such views would support the contention that structural factors best explains US policy toward ESDP. Neorealists may counter that the Europeans, fearful of US military hegemony, have begun to counter-balance or even “soft” balance the US, while hedging against complete severing of reliance on the US for European defense. This could be seen as internal cooperation for external competition. The EU may be developing security liberalization in order to balance externally, taking almost a security mercantilist position towards the US. Wohlforth notes that Europeans would need to “suspend the balance of power locally” in order to create a “balance of power globally.” Such a decision would not be easy for the Europeans. “A world with a European pole,” writes Wohlforth, “would be one in which the French and British had merged their conventional and nuclear capabilities and do not mind if the German controls them.”

Nevertheless, debate over the future of security institutions and relevance of NATO became intense during the first few years of the 1990’s. For example, Simon Duke argued that Cold War logic continues to stifle the innovative and imaginative

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485 For example, see Kapstein and Mastanduno, eds., Unipolar Politics; Ikenberry, After Victory; and Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony,” International Security 28 (Summer 2003), 5-46.
486 Wohlforth, 31.
thinking required to respond effectively to the current uncertainties in Europe.\textsuperscript{487} In fact, Duke contended that NATO should be phased out, replaced by a new pan-European structure, one that reflected more than just military security.

Sharing Duke’s pessimistic outlook for the Alliance, Heisbourg reasoned, “At best [NATO] will become a transatlantic covenant based on the recognition of a uniting Western Europe: at worst the cold war partners will drift apart.”\textsuperscript{488} Heisbourg claimed that other institutions, especially the European Union, are replacing NATO because they serve the needs of a broader-based security, one founded in European integration. Since the United States is not a member of the EU, this would represent a threat to American influence in the region. As a realist solution, Christoph Bertram argued for the creation of a new triple alliance composed of the United States, Europe, and Russia.\textsuperscript{489}

According to Peterson, conflicts between the US and European countries will increase due to three factors that have emerged since the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{490} First, the Soviet threat no longer serves as a common threat that acts as glue holding the two sides together. The need for collective action to defend against the threat no longer exists. During the Cold War, Europeans were dependent on the US for strict military security guarantees, which would create forces pushing the two sides together. Now, the pressure is gone, and the forces pushing the two sides together are much weaker. Moreover, the nature of security threats has changed from classic

military invasion threat to the asymmetric and/or non-military threats to security: transnational terrorism, migration, ethnic conflict, organized crime, proliferation of WMD, ecological concerns, and potential for nuclear disaster.\textsuperscript{491} Such threats do not depend solely on US military forces.

Second, there was the expansion of domestic influences in foreign policy. According to Guay, “foreign policies have become subject to a wider range of domestic pressures. This has resulted in an expansion in the foreign policy agenda (to include trade, investment and environmental issues), and in the groups with a stake in international affairs (including sub-national governments, non-governmental organizations, and business and labor groups).”\textsuperscript{492} Manning and Putnam have noted the increasingly blurred relationship between domestic and foreign policy interests.\textsuperscript{493} Cooper adds that such a blurring is particularly evident in the evolution of the European Union.\textsuperscript{494}

The third factor is globalization and the increasingly uncontrollable nature of the global economy. As evidenced in the stalled WTO Doha round of trade negotiations, the US and EU - although they are the two major power blocs in world trade - can no longer dictate the terms of agreement as in the past. At the same time, as other regions began to liberalize their economies following the end of the Cold

\textsuperscript{492} Guay, 95.
War, the incentives for the US and the EU to pursue alternative regional arrangements (e.g., NAFTA, APEC, Mercosur) established the conditions for economic competition as well as cooperation.495

Others have echoed such sentiments. For example, Michael Smith argues that the end of the Cold War created uncertainties over what had been institutionalized over the previous four decades: the European Community’s development as a “civilian power” and US leadership of European security.496 However, with the end of the Cold War, those givens were placed in doubt because the US began to retreat from active engagement and intervention in world affairs just as the Europeans had begun to seek an expansion of the EC/EU beyond its traditional “civilian” role.497 According to Smith:

The significance of this trend…raises major questions about the ability of the US and the EU to take institutional initiatives capable of containing or shaping the post-Cold War order and the security politics of the new millennium….Not only this, but it links economic and political stabilization firmly to the broader security order in ways not made as explicit since the end of the Second World War.498

One of the interesting points about the developments surrounding the EDC compared to that of the ESDP was the fact that the British remained outside the EDC. They supported its creation and promised “association,” but they were determined not to be a direct participant. This contrasted greatly with the evolution of the European

495 Guay, United States and European Union.
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the late 1990’s. In the latter case, London was not only a participant, but it also was one of the prime leaders.

In the late 1940’s, the UK still considered itself a “world power,” not just a “European power.” As such, London preferred to avoid any organizations with the hint of supranationalism. As one historian notes of the British view, “Status as a world power required staying away from entangling commitments with the European continent from which the United Kingdom could not ‘extricate’ itself should Europe embark on policies that were prejudicial to British interests or British ‘position as a world Power [sic].”

The situation became equally apparent not only concerning economic integration but also later when the EDC was under consideration. Dean Acheson concluded as early as October 1949 that the United States should not expect to rely on the British to participate in American plans for integrating Western Europe. According to Winand, “Tired of waiting for British cooperation, the United States hoped that the initiative would now come from the French.”

**Neoliberal Institutionalist Explanation**

Another theoretical approach is neoliberal institutionalism. This approach argues that “complex interdependence” between states is an important factor in international relations. In other words, institutionalism looks beyond the state by noting the development of multiple transnational channels connecting societies, as

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499 Winand, 16.
500 Ibid., 17.
well as the role of international organizations, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and other transnational actors pursue their own agendas, which may differ from those of state actors.  

Contrary to neorealist expectations, there has been quite a bit of cooperation between the United States and West Europe after the Cold War. Neoliberals argue that one of the main reasons for such cooperation owes to the intricate linkages that remain embedded among the North Atlantic states. This is because, “despite numerous disagreements, European and American interests coincide in the long run.” In a speech given in 1997 in Germany, Secretary of Defense William Perry stated, “One of the great lessons of the 20th century is that American and European security are inextricably linked. The alliance is critical to security on both sides of the ocean, and this fact did not go away with the Cold War.” The containment of Communism was not the only reason for the United States to be engaged on the Continent. The danger of thinking otherwise, as Kahler notes, is that “excessive concentration on one feature of the international environment – however dramatic – may lead to a deceptively monocausal view of the future.”

While realists seem to have overstated their case regarding the impact of the Cold War’s end, institutionalists should not believe that policy will remain in force by inertia alone. The focus of early efforts to respond to the end of the Cold War, according to Ronald Asmus, “was much more to sustain the relevance of the old Cold

501 Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*.
War institutions,...than to apply them to the newly emerging security challenges.”

Continuing, Asmus writes:

The problem in European security is not a lack of institutions, but a lack of strategic vision and coherence along with political will. Without those elements, interlocking institutions become “inter-blocking” institutions or decaying and impotent institutions; with these elements, even radical institutional changes become possible. 506

One must be reminded that institutions are in many respects the product of the political will of their constituent members.

A weakness of neoliberal institutionalism is its ability to identify the appropriate institution through which states work. According to Guay:

Institutionalism does not make clear, however, whether the appropriate institution for European security is NATO (implying a new mission and expanded membership), or the EU (which would require a merge with the WEU and a redefining of Europe’s role within NATO), or whether some institutional arrangement should exist between them (such as the combined-joint task forces concept). 507

Neoliberal institutionalism does put the focus on domestic interests in shaping national foreign policy agendas, as well as the revival of Kantian notions of democratic peace theory. 508 As Guay explains:

Cooperation is more complex, in that international agreements are shaped by national preferences, which in turn are determined by the demands of influential domestic interest groups. This approach is

507 Guay, 100.
508 On the influence of domestic interest groups in shaping national preferences, see Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously.” For the revival of democratic peace theory, see Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace.
“liberal” in the sense that it focuses on the competition among domestic interest groups to shape national foreign policy agendas.\footnote{Guay, 101.}

While liberal institutionalist arguments may explain economic cooperation and international agreements within the EU (the grand bargains), its explanatory force is weaker in the security context. By overemphasizing the comparative advantages of trade - especially the positive-sum logic of free trade - it neglects other aspects of international relations. Even in economic terms, there are limits, since strong, protectionist domestic pressure groups exist to limit the bargaining freedom at the international level. Often, the negotiations are more about “fair trade” than “free trade.”\footnote{For an example of the grand bargain approach within Europe, see Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). For more on the limits of economic incentives, see Peterson, Europe and America.}

For example, neoliberal institutionalism would have difficulty explaining the lack of European unity in responding to the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s. A more plausible rationale for the discord can be attributed to “different historical ties of Member States, and disagreement over the organization (EU, NATO, WEU, or UN) best placed to handle the conflicts.”\footnote{Guay, 111.} Likewise, the EU as an institution has had trouble forming a common defense because of the “reluctance of larger members to relinquish sovereignty in this area, and the preference of others to rely on NATO and US involvement in Europe for the region’s security.”\footnote{Ibid.}

The role of institutions in impeding the development of new patterns of international relations cannot be ignored. Santis argues, for example, that NATO

\footnotesize\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Guay, 101.}
\item \footnote{For an example of the grand bargain approach within Europe, see Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). For more on the limits of economic incentives, see Peterson, Europe and America.}
\item \footnote{Guay, 111.}
\item \footnote{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
actually stands in the way of continued European integration, a publicly expressed US foreign policy goal. “It is, therefore, curious,” writes Santis, “that the United States and its allies, at the very moment that the division of Europe has ended, are seeking ways to sustain the utility of NATO. In fact, efforts to shore up NATO may actually serve to retard European unity.”

Social Constructivist Explanation

Social constructivists would focus on ideological factors, including political culture, social norms, and human agency to explain US policy. One such ideological factor centers on the isolationist tendency within American foreign policy. Much of the European angst mistakenly has been prodded by isolationist rhetoric in the United States. After the Cold War, a debate arose regarding America’s role in the world. Should the United States continue as the world’s sole superpower, or should the country go “back to the womb” and retreat into neo-isolationism?

For example, Arthur Schlesinger discusses prospects for continued American involvement in world affairs. Tracing the history of isolationism in the United States, Schlesinger argues that a new variant, unilateralism, is threatening the collective security model of internationalist presidents such as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. Schlesinger claims that isolationism put American foreign policy in a

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“straitjacket” before World War II, allowed Hitler to rise to power, and almost prevented the United States from entering the war itself.515

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faced what Schlesinger calls the “return to the womb in American foreign policy.”516 However, it is not classical isolationism. Instead, the isolationist impulse is reflected in a new form of unilateralism. This occurred, writes Schlesinger, because “as the Soviet threat faded away, the incentives for international collaboration faded away too.”517

Others have argued equally as strongly that the only way Europeans will be motivated truly to take charge of their own security problems is do so without American involvement. Once the US disengages completely from the Continent, they argue, Europe will be forced to confront its own security.518 Still others argue that regardless of the American presence, a European defense identity is, above all, “a matter of dignity.” The emphasis is on “identity.” In Robert Bussière’s words, “[I]n the case of Europe, [defense] is a matter of identity...As an attribute of identity and sovereignty, defense does not require a precise threat from a known enemy in order to exist.”519 In other words, an EDI is not a means to an end, but an end in itself.520

514 For a useful summary of US isolationist tendencies, see Quester, American Foreign Policy, especially chapter one.
516 Ibid., 5.
517 Ibid., 6.
519 Bussière, 32.
Several scholars and officials have observed that NATO and the EU have different cultures. A concern that topped the minds of many American officials was over handling and security of classified material. In the minds of these officials, the EU did not have a “security” culture. The response, according to EU officials, is the development of EU defense and security institutions that would lead to a “socialization” process and lead inevitably to a similar strategic culture.

Acknowledging in 2000 that the EU was “devoid of any defense culture,” Gilles Andréani argued that “only in a specialized institutional setting will such a culture hopefully be imported into it, and solidify.”

**Domestic Level Explanations**

**Bureaucratic Politics**

A bureaucratic politics explanation would focus on the different agencies and expect their views to reflect the interests of the agencies. Thus, a bureaucratic politics model would expect the Pentagon to defend NATO and for the State Department to promote the EU, since NATO is primarily a military alliance and the EU primarily a political and economic entity.

In some respects, this bears out. According to one Department of Defense official, there was a general sense of paranoia that the EU was “bad.” There was a

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concern that the French wanted to “do away” with the US, and French political rhetoric encouraged the sense of threat within the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{524}

In Brussels, this too was seen in the discourse coming from respective US Missions to NATO and the EU. For example, initially, there was little communication between individuals working at USNATO and those working at USEU. However, that “stove piping” problem improved as new channels of communication developed, including the sending of joint cables on ESDP.\textsuperscript{525}

However, can these perceptions and views be attributed solely to the position of office, or can they can be conflated with personal, national, and group interests? As Allison himself acknowledged, “Each person comes to his position with baggage in tow. His bags include sensitivities to certain issues, commitments to various projects, and personal standing with and debts to groups in society.”\textsuperscript{526} He also goes on to admit that, even within organizations, there will be differences of perceptions to a particular issue. Allison writes, “These differences will be partially predictable from the pressure of the position plus their personality.”\textsuperscript{527} As one Defense Department official acknowledged, with respect to ESDP, “Personalities played a big part. They influenced their participation and depth of interest in issues.”\textsuperscript{528} As Allison himself conceded, “The hard core of the bureaucratic politics mix is

\textsuperscript{524} Interview with Townsend, November 10, 2004.
\textsuperscript{525} Interview with Townsend, November 5, 2004. Also, new bureaucratic arrangements were established, including the position of defense advisor at USEU, who served as a Department of Defense representative and an unofficial liaison between USEU and USNATO. Interview with James Q. Roberts, December 16, 2004.
\textsuperscript{526} Allison, \textit{Essence of Decision}, 166.
\textsuperscript{527} Ibid., 180-181.
\textsuperscript{528} Interview with Townsend, November 5, 2004.
personality.” However, what is the relationship between personality and bureaucratic position? Is personality linked to the bureaucratic position? As Welch argues, “bargaining skills and advantages, and the will to use them, are idiosyncratic. They are not necessarily linked to bureaucratic positions per se.”

Moreover, the views of ESDP tended to reflect less a uniform view of the bureaucratic agency than sub-cultures within the agencies. For example, within the State Department, those working in the European Bureau’s Office of Regional Political-Military Affairs (RPM) that dealt with NATO tended to side with the Pentagon view that ESDP was dangerous – or at least “bad.” Meanwhile, those working in the European Bureau’s Office of European Union and Regional Affairs (ERA) tended to be more sympathetic with the goals and aspirations of the EU. Consequently, the public speeches on ESDP tended to reflect this ambiguity, by stating (with various degrees of emphasis, depending on the official speaking) that the US supported the EU and ESDP as long as it complemented and did not threaten NATO.

Contrary to bureaucratic politics expectations, General Wesley Clark, then SACEUR following the St. Malo declaration and initial development of ESDP, reportedly did not provide much input into US policy towards ESDP. A bureaucratic politics paradigm would argue that Clark’s position would result in a strong input to defend either NATO or to encourage development of European military capabilities. But this did not occur. His successor, General Joseph Ralston, tended

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529 Allison, Essence of Decision, 166.
530 Welch, 122.
531 Interview with Brimmer, November 1, 2004.
to hold an ambivalent position as well. According to one senior official on the Joint Staff, his view was, “don’t obstruct, but don’t encourage either. If the Europeans can do the job, let them. Just don’t enable them.” In fact, for many on the Joint Staff, their concern was not that the Europeans were too strong, but that they were too weak to make a difference.\footnote{Ibid. For more on General Ralston’s views on how shifts in US military planning from force-oriented to capabilities-oriented approaches on European allies, see Joseph Ralston, “Keeping NATO’s Military Edge Intact in the 21st Century,” Presentation to the NATO/GMFUS Brussels Conference (October 3, 2002), \url{http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003d.htm} (accessed April 16, 2005).}

To conclude, while there may be some soft relationship between organizational affiliation and perceptions toward certain policies, in the end that relationship does not seem strong enough to be convincing. As Kissinger noted, “Presidents listen to advisors whose views they think they need, not to those who insist on a hearing because of the organizational chart.”\footnote{Henry Kissinger, \textit{White House Years} (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 31.} Thus, it appears that, in Welch’s words, “influence may well be fully determined by such intangible factors as personality, preference congruity, and access to superiors.”\footnote{Welch, 132.}

\textbf{Domestic Politics}

Turning now to the question of domestic politics, how important are they as a factor in explaining US policy toward ESDP? From a partisan standpoint, there seemed to be very little impact. The Democrats during the Clinton Administration responded rather defensively to the St. Malo declaration and subsequent development of ESDP just as the G.H.W. Bush Administration had done in 1990-1991. While President George W. Bush continued the Clinton policy of officially supporting ESDP, but with caveats (that it not harm NATO), such support remained
“shallow.” For example, meeting his NATO counterparts during his first trip to Europe as Commander-in-Chief, President Bush stated:

We agreed that NATO and the European Union must work in common purpose. It is in NATO’s interest for the European Union to develop a rapid reaction capability. A strong, capable European force integrated with NATO would give us more options for handling crises when NATO, as a whole, chooses not to engage. NATO must be generous in the help it gives the EU. And similarly, the EU must welcome participation by NATO allies who are not members of the EU. And we must not waste scarce resources, duplicating effort or working at cross purposes.  

Thus, it appears that partisan politics has little influence on the US policy toward ESDP. What about the executive-legislative relationship? Hamilton notes that many ESDP skeptics include members of Congress, who “question the wisdom of ESDP and prospects of its success.” These skeptics doubt whether the Europeans have the “will or the wallet” to implement stated goals. However, both supporters and skeptics inhabit both branches of government; there is no fault line between the two either one way or the other.

**Policy Entrepreneurship and Transnational Networks**

What is the influence of policy entrepreneurs and transnational networks? Such a variable serves as a bridge between the three levels of analysis by linking individual core beliefs, networks of shared interests, all working to shape and

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536 Interview with Daniel Hamilton, November 1, 2004.
538 Ibid., 150.
implement US policy in response to changes at the systemic level. By the 1990’s, the effort to preserve NATO became an end in itself. The NATO Secretary General and International Staff in Brussels had established connections with their defense ministry counterparts and found that their relationships were well placed to curb any substantive promotion of ESDP. The September 11 attacks brought into question the role of NATO and made even the debate over ESDP seem “quaint – and largely irrelevant.”

The core beliefs of individuals in key positions reflect a significant variable in explaining the views toward the second case. In the Bush Administration, there were three schools of thought that contended for influence in American foreign policy: pragmatists, traditional conservatives or nationalists, and neo-conservatives. The pragmatists were represented by Secretary of State Powell and National Security Advisor Rice. Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld could be considered assertive nationalists. Finally, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Feith represented the neoconservatives.

Unlike the traditional realists or pragmatists, such as Powell and Rice, traditional conservatives and neoconservatives share several things in common. This includes a belief in US exceptionalism, the value of US military strength, and a deep distrust of international agreements and multilateral institutions. Their belief in the exceptionalism of the United States, however, emerged from opposite ends:

539 Ibid., 152.
540 Daalder and Lindsay refer to the second group as “assertive nationalists.” They also will refer to neoconservatives as “democratic imperialists.” In their words, “The bulk of Bush’s advisors, including most notably Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, were not necons. Nor for that matter was Bush. They were instead assertive nationalists – traditional hard-line conservatives willing to use American military power to defeat threats to US security but reluctant as a general rule to use American primacy to remake the world in its image.” (Daalder and Lindsay, 15).
conservatives from a pessimistic view of the world and neoconservatives from an optimistic view of the US ability to remake the world. 541 From that perspective, one could almost label them “neo-Wilsonian,” because of the fact that the inherent optimism of liberal transformation permeates their ends (reflective of the missionary zeal of Wilsonianism to spread democracy), but their means are more aligned with realists (i.e., a reliance on military force to transform). 542 The main difference between the neoconservatives and their traditional conservative counterpart was whether to use military power to protect the internal strength of the US or to use it to spread “good” and transform the rest of the world. However, they both shared a common disdain for the utility of international agreements and certain multilateral institutions. As Daalder and Lindsay point out:

Although neoconservatives and assertive nationalists differed on whether the United States should actively spread its values abroad, they shared a deep skepticism of traditional Wilsonianism’s commitment to the rule of law and its belief in the relevance of international institutions. They placed their faith not in diplomacy and treaties, but in power and resolve. Agreement on this key point allowed neoconservatives and assertive nationalists to form a marriage of convenience in overthrowing the cold-war approach to foreign policy…. 543

Thus, it was no surprise that in Europe there was noted hostility to American officials who represented these core beliefs, and that their “favorite American” was Secretary of State Powell.

At first, the traditional conservative view led by Vice President Cheney prevailed. The talk of “national” missile defense and several high profile unilateral decisions regarding participation in international agreements (e.g., refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty) suggested a withdrawal from world affairs as many Republicans in Congress would have favored. It appeared that the pragmatists, such as National Security Advisor Rice, were being overshadowed by Cheney and Rumsfeld. As NSA Rice described her role at a conference in January 2001, “What we need today is an NSC system that unites the government to prepare, not for total war but for the total spectrum of policy instruments we can use when military power is not appropriate.” She went on to add that:

We’ve gotten ourselves into a quite bipolar discussion: We either intervene militarily or we’re isolationist and we don’t intervene at all. In fact, there are a whole host of instruments in between that need to be fine-tuned for the times when military power is clearly not appropriate.\(^{544}\)

However, the perception emerged that the US remained focused on its military strength. This perception led to the charge of “unilateralism.”\(^{545}\) That perception was cemented after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The convergence of views changed the dynamic and gave the neoconservatives a new lease on American foreign policy. Increasingly, traditional conservatives such as Vice President Cheney concluded that,

\(^{543}\) Daalder and Lindsay, 15-16.  
\(^{545}\) For example, see Steven Everts, \textit{Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe? Managing Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy} (London: Center for European Reform, 2001).
in the long term, “the US would only find security in a world in which US values were widely held and spread.”\textsuperscript{546}

Thus, the battle for policy dominance toggled to and fro among the various power centers of influence, leading to a series of mixed messages, continuing the US ambivalence toward European aspirations for defense autonomy.

\textsuperscript{546} Fidler and Baker, 12.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Findings

What the research has shown is that the explanation for US ambivalence toward European defense autonomy is more complex than what systemic theories of international relations alone would suggest. For example, the US decided to pursue the EDC route - one that was sub-optimal from American security interests or what systemic theories would expect - but one that was considered more likely to succeed in terms of the overall interest in getting Germany re-armed and France to participate in West European defense. Similarly, the interest for the US to resist Europe’s development of a non-NATO security and defense policy may have been to prevent the emergence of a potential competitor in the absence of a threat, but it also shows how policy choices actually run deeper than superficial interests alone. For the US, it became as much about the preservation of NATO (defended by a transnational network) as it was concern about preventing Europe from counter-balancing and becoming independent of the US. At the same time, the US was expanding its relationship with the EU. From an interest standpoint, it served US interests to allow the EU to handle security concerns in Europe.

One cannot discount the very real international and domestic components, but, as with Snyder’s original thesis a half century ago, decision-making does influence the course of a very complex and dynamic process of interactions between states.\(^{547}\)

\(^{547}\) Snyder et. al., *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics.*
Moreover, two major meta-level phenomena can be identified that inform decision-makers’ calculus: globalization and American power predominance. These areas influence how world leaders and other international actors view the world order. As Neack explains in her book:

Within this framework of globalization and American predominance, *The New Foreign Policy* rests on the assumption that foreign policy is best understood as a “nested game” in which national leaders attempt to “play” the two games of domestic and international politics to their advantage. Foreign policy analysis, then, is best undertaken as a study of this nested game, or, as a multilevel study. 548

It appears from examination of these two cases – the EDC and ESDP – that three factors are important. First, a perceived problem (including threat perception) must exist. This does not necessarily stem from the distribution of material capabilities or resources, which, as Stephen Walt pointed out, may or may not indicate a threat. 549 Rather, specific events more so than the distribution of material resources drove the policy response. For example, in the 1950’s, the fear of Communism and perceptions of aggressive Soviet behavior (based, in part, on Soviet military advantage in terms of armed forces and subsequent nuclear capability) influenced the general views of US policymakers, but the impetus to move rapidly on developing institutional arrangements in Europe resulted directly from external shock of the Korean invasion. Arguably, without that event to heighten the sense of urgency and pressure, the US would not have had to choose how to respond to the EDC since the Pleven Plan might not have been necessary.

549 Walt, *Origin of Alliances*. 
In the late 1990’s, the conflict in the Balkans had a substantial impact on US policy towards European defense. Again, it was not so much the distribution of material capabilities in the Balkan states or even the material capabilities of states in Western Europe (as has been shown), but rather American interest in maintaining the credibility of NATO and, in fact, the desire to increase European military capabilities. Structural realists would argue that the US would try to prevent Europeans from developing military capabilities, when, in fact, the opposite is the case. US policymakers complained constantly that the Europeans were too weak, not too strong. Only after the military invasion of Iraq did the rhetoric of “counter-balancing” the US increase on the European side (and only in several few but vocal places), despite on-the-ground cooperation between Americans and Europeans in the military, legal, law enforcement, financial, and intelligence spheres. Moreover, any marginal increases in European “power” capabilities do not rise to the level that would justify American expressions of concern over ESDP or European hyperbole on what ESDP actually has achieved. Rather, if not for interpretations of certain European behavior (namely, the French, but also the British at St. Malo), the US would not have had to choose how to respond to ESDP.

Second, institutions – whether they are strong or weak – impact on the courses of actions available. They serve as constraints and produce an element of path dependence. In the 1950’s NATO was relatively undeveloped. The binding quality from allies’ repeated interactions through various committees and military exercises had yet to congeal. NATO was more an agreed treaty than formal international organization. By the late 1990’s, however, NATO had become a mature institution.

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and international organization with its own constituency and interests (e.g., those on the International Staff as well as at SHAPE and among the various defense ministries). Overlapping participation between NATO allies and EU members of ESDP created institutional challenges that had to be managed and overcome. The fact that the United States was not a member of the EU did influence the behavior and perceptions of certain elements within the US government (especially at the Pentagon) because of ignorance and lack of information.\textsuperscript{551} Thus, institutions too are important but not sufficient explanations.

Finally, the role of individuals and their philosophical perspectives and networks forming power centers are important because they influence the choices pursued. Within any Administration are various power centers. These are locuses of policy influence and may be either individuals or organizations. For example, a strong Secretary of State may represent a power center. So could the US military because of its ability to deploy force quickly. While these power centers may share the goals of the Administration, they may also have other goals. These goals may reflect personal ambitions (if the power center is an individual) or organizational goals if the power center represents an organization. As Hilsman observes:

Secretaries of state, for example, share in the state goals of the United States and in the organizational goals of the Department of State. But secretaries of state will also have personal goals. They will want the good opinion of colleagues and of their fellow citizens. They would like to have a place in history. They might also have further ambitions, perhaps to run for president some day.\textsuperscript{552}

\textsuperscript{551} For more on the role of information as a variable, see Keohoane and Martin, \textit{Institutional Theory}, 78-81.

\textsuperscript{552} Hilsman, 76.
In these case studies, individuals often had additional goals stemming from their own ideological mind-sets or perspectives. Individual preferences reflected a worldview that informed policy decisions and implementation. Truman and Acheson adopted policies that reflected their liberal internationalist leanings. Eisenhower recognized the advantages of promoting the EDC for solving multiple problems both at home and in Europe. Strategic considerations were not the most important or sole driver for US policy. Economic considerations and reducing domestic costs likewise were important; however, not in the way often argued by liberal institutionalists. Eisenhower found the EDC solution to be one that met several needs and preferences.

Likewise, the preferences of leading power centers in the both the Clinton and Bush Administrations influenced their actions and positions toward ESDP. For President Clinton and his cabinet, promoting NATO as a vehicle for post-Communist engagement in Central and Eastern Europe was a primary aim. A general uncertainty over whether European defense initiatives would help or hinder that aim contributed to a sense of suspicion and qualified support favoring the status quo.

Within the Bush Administration, the leading power centers (Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld) had been out of office for years and had been influenced by the consequences of the Clinton Administration’s military interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. They were skeptical generally of military intervention for “non-strategic” purposes. Rumsfeld, in particular, had been influenced by his time as Ambassador to NATO in the early 1970’s. While officially supportive of ESDP, their support was shallow and conditional. The messages that

553 For more on this point, see Hulsman, *Paradigm for the New World Order*. 

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Europeans received from different American quarters were mixed, adding to a sense of anxiety and confusion.\textsuperscript{554}

While the analysis reveals that partisan politics (especially between the Truman Administration and certain Republican Senators in the first case, and the Clinton Administration and Republican Congress in the second case) may have contributed slightly to the development of, and reaction to, European defense initiatives, it was not as strong a factor as the other elements. Likewise, analysis of traditional bureaucratic politics does not indicate its influence as strongly as other variables. For example, although infighting occurred at lower levels, it tended to exist within specific departments rather than between. Moreover, it has been shown that there was general consensus among the different agency heads at the Cabinet level (e.g., Slocombe and Talbott worked together).\textsuperscript{555} Empirical analysis reveals that the fight for policy closure or direction often centered on speeches. As Chollet and Goldgeier note, “Speeches are often seen as action-forcing events that serve as endpoints for internal debates.”\textsuperscript{556} This study has demonstrated such an insight in both the EDC and ESDP cases.

While appreciating the desire to achieve parsimony of explanation and to leverage as much explanatory power as possible from a simplified model of reality, there is a danger of distortions or missing important contributing factors. If one assumes that all governments are a “black box” and that outcomes are merely “political resultants,” there is a danger of losing intellectual credibility as empirical

\textsuperscript{554} See Peters, “ESDP as a Transatlantic Issue,” 382-384. He delves into the consequences of sending mixed signals, which he identifies as the problem of “mutual ambiguity.”
\textsuperscript{555} Interview with DoD official, May 24, 2005. Interview with Brimmer, November 1, 2004.
\textsuperscript{556} Chollet and Goldgeier, “Scholarship of Decision-Making,” 170.
anomalies multiply. As Hermann argues, “[D]ecision-making dynamics do not have a direct, singular impact on foreign policy. Rather, they can produce various results from consensus to deadlock, from compromise to domination by one individual or faction.”

In this respect, the focus on policy entrepreneurship and decision-unit clusters helps to identify the intensity and pace of interest formation and policy implementation. In the 1950’s, there were several US interests, sometimes cross-cutting, just as there were in the 1990’s. Such an approach helps to explain why the preference ordering came to be. Structural realism fails to do this. Liberal institutionalism likewise falls short. Realist theories may be able to show that x responds to y, but it does not adequately explain how x came to be x rather than z. Distrust of French motives that had developed over decades and after several bad experiences contributed to resistance to a European development that arguably was actually in the US national interest. The views of key policymakers and decision-shapers in Washington and Brussels help to explain how the interests came to be.

The research has shown that policy entrepreneurs are much more important in the absence of strong institutions. When institutions are weak, there are fewer actors with entrenched interests or established norms of behavior. For example, in the 1950’s, there were only a handful of key actors to influence the decisions. As an institution, NATO was new and relatively unformed, more treaty than organization. The International Staff was small. SHAPE was not established until 1951. The Defense Department had been consolidated and in existence only since 1947. This left policy space wide open for individual actors in which to maneuver and operate.

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557 Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy,” 50.
Consequently, we can see the role of policy entrepreneurs as vital in the initial phases. Key policy entrepreneurs during this period were: Jean Monnet, David Bruce, George Kennan, Dean Acheson, George Ball, and Dwight Eisenhower. Monnet’s network had bought into European integration and served in essential locations for influencing policy. If David Bruce had not written his “long telegram” on the merits of supporting EDC, and if Eisenhower had not reversed his own view on the issue, the US could have gone in a different direction.558

Convergence of tactical interests allowed for policy partnerships: the US wanted Europeans to assist in their defense. Monnet wanted to build up Europe to keep France and Germany from fighting one another again. Thus, policy entrepreneurship helps to explain why second-best solutions sometimes are chosen. Systemic theories do not explain which choice is made to achieve the same end.

Similarly, Javier Solana used the force of his personality to carve out a space for himself as the EU’s High Representative for CFSP and a power center within the EU. British Prime Minister Tony Blair found a convergence of interests to allow for the UK to play in ESDP when the UK had traditionally been aloof toward European defense autonomy. Much less a desire to counter-balance, or even soft balance, Blair needed to establish his European credentials, especially since the UK was not a member of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Consequently, a policy space available in the EU was security and defense. The British were able to marry a tactical coalition with the French, who did want to use ESDP as a “counterweight” to the US. From their respective positions, the British tended to punch above their

558 For a detailed analysis of Bruce’s influence in the policy process, see Martin F. Herz, David Bruce’s “Long Telegram” of July 3, 1951 (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy,
weight while the French tended to punch below. Each of those relative power
dynamics influenced the direction and development of ESDP.

By the 1990’s, NATO had become a fixed institution, with its own set of
transnational networks that resisted anything that would threaten its existence. Why
did NATO remain when the Warsaw Pact dissolved after the end of the Cold War?
One reason is that NATO was a voluntary association, not forced upon it like the
Warsaw Pact. As soon as the Soviet Union disappeared, so did the Warsaw Pact.
However, the US was not willing to discard the Alliance. It still served a purpose.

US anxiety over a particular policy direction may be calmed by the
introduction of key personalities (e.g., Solana, former NATO Secretary General and
transatlantic in orientation) whose policy perspectives and world views are shaped by
their backgrounds.

Conversely, personalities may have the opposite effect by informing or
framing the policy debate. For example, almost all of the principal foreign policy
advisors to President George W. Bush (e.g., Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Rice,
Armitage, and Wolfowitz) had spent some (or even the bulk) of their government
service in the Pentagon. None had been career diplomats, trained to develop and
work through international institutions. That is not to say that there were not
disputes, especially between the Departments of State and Defense; rather, most of
these were over the application of US military power. This is in contrast to the
diplomatic experiences of Dean Acheson or George Kennan in the 1950’s.\(^559\)

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\(^{559}\) Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 274.
Such a perspective is not limited to the United States but can be applied to other states. Charles de Gaulle also played a strong role in French politics with the establishment of the 5th republic and his taking personal control of foreign and defense policy (unlike some of his predecessors in the 4th republic).

The second case on ESDP stopped at the EU’s first military mission in 2003. Since then, the EU has conducted several more military and civilian ESDP missions. Both NATO and the EU have developed various means of working with one another. Nevertheless, the American ambivalence towards European defense autonomy reveals itself even today, as NATO and the EU encounter tension over how best to engage in crisis management operations in Africa and elsewhere.

Systemic theories of international relations may reflect the rules of the game, the dimensions of the playing field, and the ultimate objectives, but decision-units and power centers explain the timing of certain actions and serve as regulators of progress, either speeding up or slowing down the pace of interaction and state behavior. This helps explain why some actors are effective in certain jobs and are more activist in them than others, although the rules of the game and structural factors remain the same.

Thus, macro-level theories of international relations might be useful for providing a broad brush picture of how states interact, and institutional theory does a good job of filling in some blanks for non-state actors and revealing the importance of the rules of the game; however, policy entrepreneurship and decision-making approaches fill in further for those moments and capture two areas that until now have
not been satisfactorily explained: specific state actions (when several policy choices are available) and state behavior in conditions of weak institutions and uncertainty. A decision-units approach emphasizing policy entrepreneurship does that.

It has been difficult to isolate American policy towards European defense autonomy because the real world application of policies does not occur in a vacuum. The context of a problem must also be considered. By tracing these two cases, it can be shown that linkages with other issues under review (linkage politics) often come into play as well. Rarely is one policy implemented to solve a single problem. As Snyder, Bruck and Sapin described, “The burden of simultaneous responses to external demands may be a crucial determinant in the timing of actions and the nature or amount of policymaking resources which are devoted to specific actions.”

Thus, reducing policy preferences to a single range of preference ordering does not do justice to the demands and responses of policy-makers. However, it does challenge the investigator to resist the temptation of allowing the empirical analysis to degenerate toward an “everything matters” approach that results in complete indeterminacy.

To avoid the trap of trying to reconstruct the totality of an event (which is neither possible nor desirable), it was necessary to focus on particular determinants that tended to weigh more heavily on the decision-making process and outcome. These determinants were often located in the power centers of key individuals and

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560 The most recent example has been in Darfur, Sudan, where NATO and the EU have pledged to support the African Union peace mission (AMIS II), but the NATO-EU dynamic has not escaped a certain degree of prestige competition.
561 Quoted in Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, 173.
their corresponding influences. Since all factors were not relevant to all situations, neither did they need to be captured in the analytical framework. Thus, by returning human decision-makers to the equation, there is a hope to bridge some of the theoretical islands that have emerged in IR, with a desire to weave theoretical strands and contribute to the field.

Avenues for Further Research

It is becoming increasingly apparent that political outcomes in international relations are determined by the ratio or balance of several factors – structural distribution of power, institutional participation and constraints, and individual/philosophical views of actors in domestic power centers. Therefore, one might conclude that it is in this multi-level direction that further theoretical research should go.

In foreign policy terms, the metaphor of lanes of the road might be apt. The international systemic conditions reflect the terrain and type of road. The institutions are the signs and rules of the road. States are the vehicles on the road, each with different sizes, engine capacity, capabilities and number of passengers. Non-state actors are the pedestrians and cyclists crossing the road or nearby. The driver is the leader. Depending on passenger input of power centers and policy entrepreneurs, the driver has certain constraints, lest others in the car choose an alternative driver. The temperament and personality of the driver, his/her aversion to risk, also are factors. There are aggressive drivers and passive drivers. Consequently, this mix of variables
all contribute to the understanding of why there are collisions, accidents, fatalities, 
brinksmanship, road rage, or safe arrival.

Asserting reductionist views on the major variables influencing American 
foreign policy captures only part of the picture. If actions and outcomes are the result 
of capabilities, intentions, and opportunity, neo-realists emphasize capabilities, social 
constructivists emphasize intentions, and institutionalists emphasize opportunity. 
Measuring the weight of the different perspectives remains difficult and the avenue 
for further research. What should be pursued are theoretical frameworks that 
integrate multiple levels of analysis and recognize multiple policy linkages. As 
Chollet and Goldgeier contend, the goal should be to “integrate propositions about 
decision-making in specific situations with larger structural factors in international 
politics to generalize about behavior.”563 Given the current development of IR 
theory, Moravcsik in a similar vein urges students of international relations to pursue 
what he calls “structured synthesis,” taking different theories from different levels of 
analysis and combining them in a way that proves more effective than merely 
searching for a single overarching dominant paradigm.564

Democratism (promoting the ideological value of democracy), institutionalism 
(global economic interdependence), and neo-realism (geopolitical/military 
dominance) all reflect three aspects of American foreign policy.565 In almost every 
State Department mission statement or National Security doctrine is reference to 
promoting democracy, free trade and commerce, and maintaining US values through 
strength of America’s armed forces. The differences in belief systems are revealed by

the prioritization of those preferences as seen in foreign policy outputs.\textsuperscript{566} Thus, democratists stress ideology ("free and fair elections"), institutionalists economic factors and rule of law, and neo-realists the threat and military aspects of the overall power equation.

However, there is another axis by which foreign policy professionals can be measured: isolationist or internationalist. This can be moderated among the three earlier schools of thought, as individuals contend whether it is preferable to engage the rest of the world or withdraw into the "gated security" of American borders. The effects of globalization may have an impact on either accentuating this axis (e.g., increased calls for domestic protectionism) or making it irrelevant, in the sense of forcing an internationalist posture.

A third axis that is similar but different to the previous one is the unilateral/multilateral axis. Should the US work within alliances, ad-hoc coalitions, or alone? Under what conditions? What policy instruments are best suited for alliances, coalitions, or unilateral action? What are the consequences and perceptions of acting in concert with others or alone? Does it reinforce legitimacy or resentment? What if alliance or coalition partners are not able to hold their end of the bargain? It could lead to unequal distribution of labor and mutual resentment. If the Europeans prove their ability to deploy military forces in crisis situations that complement US policy goals, policymakers in Washington will gain the reassurance that European independence does not guarantee opposition. As the Europeans regain confidence in

\textsuperscript{565} See Hulsman, \textit{Paradigm for the New World Order}.
\textsuperscript{566} Liberal theorists such as Moravcsik concede that liberal theories, while highlighting the role of state preferences in international relations, do not actually pursue the origin of those preferences "all the
their ability to providing security, they may be more willing to shoulder a share of the defense burden, and the US would be more willing to take on a supporting role in certain areas.

In the end, though, how such desired foreign policy outputs rests on the influence and perspective of actors in key positions to formulate and implement policies. Comprehension and understanding of this vital component can come only from the state and individual levels of analysis.

(“Liberal Theory,” 168). Here, constructivist and decision-making theories have more to offer.
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe</td>
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<td>AF SOUTH</td>
<td>Allied Forces Southern Europe</td>
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<td>ARRC</td>
<td>ACE Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Defense Capabilities Initiative</td>
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<td>D/SACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>EAPC</td>
<td>Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defense Agency</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<td>EC</td>
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<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capabilities Actions Plan</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>International Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>International Military Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRF</td>
<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJC</td>
<td>Permanent Joint Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecGen</td>
<td>Secretary General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>USEU</td>
<td>US Mission to the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNATO</td>
<td>US Mission to NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Glossary

**Berlin Plus**: The agreement at the NATO Summit in Berlin, June 1996, reiterated in Washington in April 1999, to make NATO planning and other assets, such as intelligence and equipment, available to the European allies for non-NATO operations.

**Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)**: Concept that was endorsed at the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels and established at the June 1996 NATO Summit in Berlin. The concept permits a more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, including new missions. It is designed to facilitate NATO contingency operations, the use of “separable but not separate” military capabilities in EU-led operations, and allow non-NATO nations to participate in operations such as KFOR. CJTF is the basic model for NATO’s International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan (ISAF).

**Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)**: A framework for EU member states to coordinate policy by formulating “common positions” and conducting “joint actions” in the name of the Union. The EU’s stated aim is to use CFSP to create consistent policies which are preventative rather than reactive and which assert the EU’s political identity. The CFSP’s scope of activity includes diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, military, and security issues. It was established when the Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993. Javier Solana became the first High Representative for CFSP in November 1999.

**Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI)**: Launched in April 1999 at the NATO Summit in Washington. Its purpose is to improve the Alliance’s defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full spectrum of NATO missions, with a special focus on improving interoperability among Alliance forces. Specific objectives include improvement in deployability, sustainability, survivability, effective engagement, and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I). The DCI was considered too ambitious and was recast at the November 2002 NATO Summit in Prague as the Prague Capability Commitments (PCC).

**ESDI vs. ESDP**: Developing a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO is viewed as a means of creating a capacity for Europeans to act militarily on their own (see CTJF above), while concurrently strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Members of the EU are striving to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as the military dimension of the CFSP
(see above). ESDP is also the process of building European institutions and portraying the EU as a global actor in world politics. The semantic debates, which reached its apex in 2000, have abated with most observers now using the term ESDP, even within NATO circles.

**EU-Led Operation**: A military operation conducted by European forces under the political control and strategic direction of the European Union. It may be an operation with or without recourse to NATO collective assets and capabilities. Since 2003, the EU has conducted two military ESDP operations and two civilian ESDP operations. Of the military ESDP operations, one – Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo – was considered an autonomous EU mission.

**EU-NATO Links**: The formal and informal structures and procedures that will allow these two organizations to conduct operations, to include planning, intelligence and asset sharing, on a regular basis and in a transparent manner.

**Headline Goal**: Declared at the December 1999 European Council Summit in Helsinki. Calls on EU members to be able to deploy within 60 days and then sustain for up to a year as many as 60,000 troops (corps level) capable of conducting the full range of Petersberg tasks, including the most demanding, peacemaking. The geographic range given is 4,000 km. Based on the shortfalls identified, the EU launched a European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) at the December 2001 European Council Summit in Laeken, to address these shortfalls.

**Petersberg Tasks**: The tasks identified at the 1992 WEU Summit in Petersberg, Germany. They include humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and disaster relief. It is on the basis of these tasks that the EU’s military aspirations focused.

**Three D’s**: Phrase popularized by Secretary of State Madeline Albright to present the US position on European defense aspirations. They are: no *decoupling* of the transatlantic link; no *discrimination* against non-EU NATO members (e.g., Turkey); and no *duplication* of existing NATO capabilities and structures.

**Three I’s**: Phrase used by NATO Secretary General George Robertson to present a less confrontational version of European defense aspirations. They are: *improvement* of military capabilities; *inclusiveness* of all NATO allies; and *indivisibility* of security structures.
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