

ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

TOWARD THEORY BUILDING FOR
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF PUBLIC
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: A MACRO-COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON,
D.C.

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Despite a century of history, public diplomacy research has lacked defining conceptual frameworks for two focal constructs, public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy management. Without such frameworks, the discipline has focused on historical, ideological, and descriptive research on public diplomacy practices and management. At the same time, research has been instrumental, serving the policy concerns of government by studying what effects public diplomacy programs have, can have, and should have from the paradigm of communication effects.

Consequently, public diplomacy seldom has been studied as a set of dependent variables. Scholars have rarely asked theoretical questions about what factors affect public diplomacy behavior and management. The lack of conceptual frameworks has further discouraged comparative questions about whether and why governments are different or similar in their practices and management of public

diplomacy. Even when comparative questions were asked, they lacked methodological frameworks for comparative study on a large scale—of a large number and different types of governments.

To overcome the limitations, this dissertation proposed a conceptual framework for the two focal constructs based on an application of the Excellence study (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002), a program of public relations research. From the perspective of international relations, this study constructed and tested a theory of comparative public diplomacy on how a government's contextual variables— culture, political system, interest-group system, and interstate dependence— are associated with her public diplomacy behavior and management. Lastly, this study employed an innovative methodological framework of using embassies as “matching samples” as well as “surrogate governments.” Out of 169 embassies in Washington, D.C., 113 embassies participated in a survey that measured their policy communication behavior in the form of press relations and overall management of the public diplomacy function.

This study found that uncertainty avoidance, one of Hofstede’s (2001) four dimensions of culture, was the most salient in explaining excellence in public diplomacy. Countries with a low uncertainty avoidance culture were most excellent in public diplomacy management. It also found no significant empirical evidence for linkages between culture and public diplomacy behavior. Of the contextual variables investigated, only the political system had significant associations with public diplomacy behavior. The findings also suggested that electoral and non-democracies have more excellent public diplomacy overall than liberal democracies. In addition,

the findings showed that interstate dependence is empirically associated with the outsourcing practices of foreign governments for their public diplomacy through local public relations and lobbying firms. The findings also indicated that the outsourcing practices, in turn, increased the excellence of the clients' (i.e., embassies) public diplomacy behavior.

Moreover, the findings confirmed an empirical convergence between public relations and public diplomacy not only at the level of communication behavior but also at the level of communication management. This dissertation, a macro-replication study having governments as the units of analysis, replicated the normative theory of global public relations (Vercic, J. Grunig, & L. Grunig, 1996). Among other things, this study pioneered the macro-comparative research strategy of studying embassies throughout the world capitals. This methodological framework for comparative public diplomacy should offer a myriad of opportunities for advanced theory building from various theoretical perspectives and research methods.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A MACRO-COMPARATIVE STUDY
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by

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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my wife Eun-Woo, Son and my daughter Hye-Young, Yun, who have been with me in joy and sorrow. I dedicate this dissertation to my son Young-Min, Yun who was just born and will be me forever. This dissertation is also dedicated to my father Jae-Seok, Yun, my mother Hyo-Sung Lee, my brother Chang-Hun Yun, and my sister Dr. Mi-Kyung, Yun — my lifelong supporters and believers.

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Special credit is owed to the 113 diplomats in Washington, D.C. who have participated in this study. Without their help, this dissertation would not have been brought to life.

I would like to share a moment of joy with my companions who have gone through hard times standing shoulder-to-shoulder at College Park. They are my brothers and sisters— Sungeun Chung, Nayoung Lee, MinJung Kang, Hyo-Sook, Kim, Jeong-Nam Kim, Yunna Rhee, MinJung Sung, Sung-Un Yang, and Hyuk Yi.

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CHAPTER I

Purpose

Governments have become major communicators in international communication in recent decades. Governments try to communicate not only with their counterparts through traditional diplomacy but also with global publics beyond national borders under the name of public diplomacy. Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has rapidly transformed the old international system in which sovereign states were the most important actor, and a very few powerful states had much influence.

Globalization has spawned transnational challenges such as environmental threats, global financial pressures, epidemics, immigration, and international terrorism. These challenges have constrained the role of governments in the world system and, at the same time, forced them to actively work with emerging non-governmental actors such as global activist groups in order to address the challenges.

Governments are nowadays facing assertive global publics, including Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and anti-globalization protesters in Seattle and Washington, D.C. The activist global publics have the potential to organize across borders and shape global public opinion with the help of revolutionized information technology (i.e., the Internet). In the worst case, governments cannot avoid terrorist organizations such as Osama bin Laden's Al Queda.

Along with globalization, the global spread of democracy has increased the importance of public diplomacy. According to Diamond (1999), there were only 39 countries in 1974 with an electoral democracy, in which citizens participate in politics through free elections. However, in 1997, only about two decades later, the number had

tripled to 117. In a democracy, ordinary citizens form public opinion in interaction with the agenda-setting role of the media and eventually influence the foreign policy decision-making processes of their governments. At the same time, globalization has interwoven domestic policies and foreign policies that were relatively separated from each other in the past.

As a result, citizens have become strategic stakeholders for the success of foreign governments in dealing not only with traditional foreign policy concerns for national security but also increasingly important economic ones for promoting exports, tourism, and investment.

Public diplomacy also has been redefined as a new source of “soft power” for governments. According to Nye (2004, p. 256), the era of “hard power” has ebbed away, when tangible and material military power (coercion) was the ultimate means with which governments pursued their self-interests. Instead, a new era of “soft power” has arrived, in which intangible and normative power (attraction) — culture, political ideals, policies, credibility, accountability, integrity, genuine leadership, and an ethical, humanitarian reputation of governments in both domestic politics and global affairs— is the alternative means with which governments seek their national interests.

Leonard (2000) characterized the era of “hard power” as “power projection” and the era of “soft power” as “partnership” (p. 66). In the era of “partnership,” excellent public diplomacy becomes a new source of “soft power.” Governments must strive to initiate and maintain quality communication with their non-traditional partners, including global activist publics and ordinary citizens in other countries.

Consequently, governments across the world have realized the value and potential of public diplomacy in the 21st century. Norwegian State Secretary Thorhil Widvey (2003) declared that, in a globalized world, public diplomacy should be a strength and asset of Norway. In 2000, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs laid out a grand blueprint for the country's public diplomacy in the new millennium and now is implementing the first five-year (2000-2005) executing plan (Lending, 2000). Scholars now envision public diplomacy as "a new paradigm of diplomacy" (Leonard, 2000, p.4).

Many other foreign ministries worldwide as well as their internal and external foreign policy think-tanks, such as the United Kingdom's Foreign Policy Centre and university institutes, are now searching for ways to conduct excellent public diplomacy. As a result, a great deal of scholarly work has been conducted recently on public diplomacy.

Disappointingly, little of this research has a theoretical perspective for public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy management. Most of the research has been historical, ideological, and descriptive, lacking a theoretical conceptual framework. In addition, the research has subscribed to the paradigm of communication effects and has been instrumental in serving the immediate concerns of governments for how to maximize the effects of public diplomacy programs.

In short, public diplomacy has been treated as an independent variable whose effects are to be demonstrated; and public diplomacy seldom has been studied as a set of dependent variables. Without a theoretical conceptual framework, scholars have rarely asked questions about what factors affect public diplomacy behavior and management.

Scholars have documented differences and similarities in public diplomacy behavior and management across governments and wondered why they occur. However, they have not developed theoretical frameworks for comparative study of why governments practice and manage their public diplomacy as they do.

Even when comparative questions were asked, they lacked methodological frameworks for comparative study on a large scale of a large number of developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries. Existing comparative studies are based on a single or a few cases (countries) and exclusively focused on a handful of developed Western countries. Subsequently, a majority of governments in the world have been excluded from the study of comparative public diplomacy although they are actively reacting and adjusting to systemic changes such as globalization, revolutionized information technology, the spread of democracy, and the post Cold-War— by invigorating their public diplomacy.

This dissertation has three purposes in order to address the limitations of public diplomacy scholarship identified above and to initiate theory building for comparative public diplomacy. The first purpose is to develop a conceptual and measurement framework for public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy¹ as the foundation on which comparative study can be based. The second purpose is to develop a

¹ The term “excellence in public diplomacy” in this dissertation specifically refers to excellence in managing the public diplomacy function inside a government or an agency responsible for public diplomacy. Excellence in public diplomacy concerns a normative and positive way in which the public diplomacy function should be organized, managed, and practiced in order to make the greatest contribution to general foreign affairs of a government. Thus, the term can be distinguished from a similar term “excellent public diplomacy.” The latter term is generally associated with successful or outstanding public diplomacy and thus with a desirable condition in which public diplomacy has achieved its goals and objectives.

theoretical framework for comparative public diplomacy by constructing and testing a theory of comparative public diplomacy that explains why and how governments practice and manage their public diplomacy as they do. The third purpose is to develop a macro-methodological framework for comparative public diplomacy on a large scale, which allows for inclusion of a wide spectrum of developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries.

In the following, I review the literatures of public diplomacy, public relations, and international relations—the three academic disciplines engaged in the study of public diplomacy—in order to shed light on the limitations with public diplomacy scholarship.

Literature Overview

Public Diplomacy

Research on public diplomacy has a respectable history as long as the history of public diplomacy practices. There, however, have been surprisingly few established theories in the field. Instead of theoretical works, historical, ideological, and descriptive works on public diplomacy practices have prevailed.

Many works surveyed the historical development of public diplomacy with emphasis on “public diplomacy as a tool” for the international power politics including the Cold War (Barghoorn & Friedrich, 1956; Fisher, 1987; Kunczik, 1997; Lord, 1998; Mitchell, 1986; Ninkovich, 1996; Tuch, 1990). Other works contributed to thick, rich, and in-depth records of a variety of public diplomacy programs for both policy communication—the provision of news and information—and cultural communication—the exchange of students, academics, and artists (Bu, 1999; Killmer, 2002; Maak, 2001; Mikhailova, 2003; Smyth, 2001; Vincent, 1993).

For the most part, policy concerns of governments have driven the practices of public diplomacy; and this has set a decisive tone for the focus of public diplomacy research. Serving policy concerns, the discipline has become largely instrumental, lacking theoretical thrust; the expenditures for public diplomacy come from taxes, and this condition puts pressure on public servants to demonstrate the programs' immediate effectiveness to elected representatives.

Consequently, the discipline has taken root in the so-called communication effects paradigm. Some scholars have focused on the impact of information and communication technology on public diplomacy practices and studied the potential of new media, including the Internet, in revolutionizing traditional public diplomacy practices, which were based on analog media such as TV, radio, and printed publications (Berry, 2003; Greene, 2003; Potter, 2002).

A breed of scholars has picked up media effects theories such as cultivation and agenda setting theories (Albritton & Manheim, 1985; Kunczik, 2003, 1997; Manheim, 1994; Manheim & Albritton, 1984; J. Wang & Chang, 2004; Zhang & Cameroon, 2003). They explained the process through which strategic communication campaigns are believed to exert influence on target audience. Subscribing to the media effects paradigm, these scholars mostly have studied the asymmetrical aspects of public diplomacy practices.

On the other hand, a different group of scholars has begun to doubt the effectiveness and ethics of persuasive, propagandistic, and asymmetrical practices. They have turned to the symmetrical aspect of the practices. Leonard and Alakeson (2000) championed two-way symmetrical programs, calling for a shift from "power projection to

partnership” and “beyond one-way propaganda” (p. 66). Tuch (1990) argued for realistic and obtainable objectives of public diplomacy programs, rejected propaganda and persuasion, and proposed “two-way dialogue” (p. 116). Fisher (1987) urged practitioners to give up “communicating from a position of predominant bigness and power” (p. 150).

Despite much scholarly work on public diplomacy practices, public diplomacy scholarship has mounted little serious endeavor to put various policy and cultural communication programs into a conceptual framework for empirical theory building. Analytical themes have emerged from descriptive works on practices, such as purpose (symmetrical vs. asymmetrical), direction (one way vs. two ways), and channel (mediated channel vs. interpersonal channel); but they remain underdeveloped. As a result, the practices have remained discrete and unorganized and have not been systematically conceptualized for empirical study.

In one rare attempt to conceptualize, German intercultural scholar Peisert (1978, as cited in Signitzer & Coombs, 1992) put diverse patterns of cultural communication by governments into a typology. He classified cultural programs into four models: exchange and cooperation, transmission, information, and self-portrayal. Peisert’s pioneering typology, however, has not further developed into a conceptual framework, failing to generate a program of research on models of public diplomacy practices.

Meanwhile, compared to “thick” descriptive works on public diplomacy practices, the study of excellence in public diplomacy—public diplomacy management—has been “thin”; the subject has not received much scholarly attention. There are, however, some notable exceptions. Mitchell (1986) categorized the ways in which several developed Western countries managed cultural relations into three models,

focusing on the role of government: government control, non-governmental and autonomous agencies, and mixed system. He touched upon how each model contributes to the effectiveness of cultural programs.

Malone (1988), in his seminal book *Organizing the Nation's Public Diplomacy*, searched the best organizational arrangement for both policy and cultural communication in the conduct of U.S. public diplomacy. He argued for autonomy of cultural communication from policy communication. In U. S. public diplomacy, the organizational integration of both functions has resulted in a bureaucratic power struggle and debate in Congress and academia as exemplified in the *Stanton Panel Report* in the mid-1970s.

Overall, however, works on excellence in public diplomacy have been partial in scope, focusing on one or two management issues such as the degree of government involvement in public diplomacy and the integration of specialized public diplomacy functions.

It was Leonard (2002) who first brought the topic of excellence in public diplomacy to the forefront and called attention to it, proposing a set of excellent management principles: strategic (proactive) communication, regional and global coordination of public diplomacy agencies, and relationship building (symmetrical communication).

Leonard and Alakeson (2000) further pointed out the need for empowering the public diplomacy function in the making as well as execution of foreign policy by highlighting its emerging strategic role in the systemic transformation from the Cold War to “complex interdependence” (Keohane & Nye, 2000). Moreover, they emphasized the

importance of ethical and globally responsible humanitarian conduct of foreign policy for excellence in public diplomacy.

However aspiring it is, the recent focus on excellence in public diplomacy has not developed enough for empirical theory building. Most works are for policy makers and frontline practitioners; theoretical propositions on excellence are set forth for the readers outside academia. The propositions, however, are simply stated without being translated into a conceptual and measurement framework for empirical study.

Consequently, theoretical questions about independent factors of excellence in public diplomacy have remained unanswered, such as “What brings about the excellence,” “How does it come into being?”, and “Why and how do countries differ in their management of public diplomacy?” Also, other questions about the effects of excellence in public diplomacy have become difficult to answer, such as “How do we know what contribution excellence makes to governments and in what ways?

With the lack of conceptual framework, the discipline is subsequently devoid of a comparative perspective. Most works on public diplomacy are case studies on a single or small number of countries with respect to their public diplomacy practices and management. Some works with a comparative focus have come out, but they are mostly descriptive and, at best, exploratory.

Mitchell (1986) described differences in the management of cultural relations among the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Recently, Wyszomirski, Burgess, and Peila (2003) compared the management of cultural relations among nine countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Their

comparison is, however, of descriptive nature: They compared the countries on the five dimensions of terminology and role, goals and priorities, administrative structure, program tools, and the size of funding.

The comparative scope also has been limited, involving only a handful of countries, because the objects of comparison were high-cost practices for public diplomacy and management by a few developed Western governments. The limited scope partially resulted because public diplomacy was narrowly conceived to be an international communication adventure by affluent countries that afford costly international broadcasting, art centers, and exchange programs. Alleyne (1995; 1994) even claimed that public diplomacy is a tool for new imperialism in the arena of international communication.

Meanwhile, scholars have newly recognized and studied public diplomacy practices by U.S. public relations firms toward U.S. publics and media on behalf of developing and underdeveloped countries (Albritton & Manheim, 1985; J. Grunig, 1933; Kunczik, 2003, 1997; Manheim, 1994; Manheim & Albritton, 1984; J. Wang & Chang, 2004; Zhang & Cameroon, 2003). Gilboa (1998) termed these practices “a reversed public relations variant of public diplomacy” (p. 6), and Manheim (1994) labeled them “strategic public diplomacy” (p. 7).

Most works on public diplomacy practices by these countries have as the objects of analysis communication campaigns by U. S. public relations firms for the countries. Those works have rarely employed a systematic comparative approach to differences and similarities in the practices and management of programs among governments. In fact,

the studies have been conducted mostly at the level of communication campaigns, with respect to the campaign's effects on the agenda setting process of the media.

To conclude, public diplomacy research has not developed theoretical conceptual frameworks for both practices and management that are applicable cross nationally and amenable to comparative theory building. Moreover, the frameworks have been further delayed because comparative study has suffered a methodological limitation: The research has not been anchored in comparatively equivalent units or levels of analysis.

Consequently, public diplomacy research has been unable to initiate theory building for comparative public diplomacy that encompasses a large number of developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries and explains why governments practice and manage their public diplomacy as they do.

Public Relations

As a latecomer into inquiry on global communication, public relations scholarship had grown virtually locked into the study of international communication by multinational corporations (MNCs). This continued until the early 1990s when public relations scholars Signitzer and Coombs (1992) first issued a wake-up call to the discipline's disinterest in public diplomacy. They said:

How nation-states, countries, or societies manage their communicative relationships with their foreign publics remains largely in the domain of political science and international relations. Public relations theory development covering this theme has yet to progress beyond the recognition that nations can engage in international public relations. (p. 138)

Signitzer and Coombs (1992) attempted to theoretically bridge the gap between public relations and public diplomacy by first demonstrating model convergence between both spheres. They showed that Grunig and Hunt's (1984) four models of public relations and Pesiert's (1978, as cited in Signitzer & Coombs, p. 143) four models of public diplomacy are so similar that both models share the same constitutive dimensions. Their work laid the foundation for subsequent public relations research on public diplomacy. In the hope of advancing the convergence between both spheres beyond these models, they urged public relations scholars to undertake empirical research on public diplomacy, based on public relations theories:

The exact ideas/concepts which can be transferred from one area to the other have yet to be fully delineated and tested... researchers should test which concepts best transfer... Only a series of theory-based empirical studies will facilitate this convergence of research tradition. (pp. 145-146)

Disappointingly, however, there have been few studies in response to Signitzer and Coombs' (1992) call. Subsequent works ventured into public diplomacy but still remained conceptual, elaborating on further theoretical convergence between both spheres. Focusing on the policy communication side of public diplomacy, J. Grunig (1994, 1993) expanded the model convergence by identifying strategic communication campaigns by U.S. public relations firms on behalf of foreign governments with his four models of public relations.

Similarly, L'Etang (1996) discussed a functional convergence between diplomats and public relations professionals: Both professions share such functions from the

boundary-spanning role as representational (advocacy), dialogic (collaboration), and advisory (counseling).

Recently, however, public relations scholarship has produced some empirical works. In a descriptive study, Zaharna and Villalobos (2000) investigated policy communication practices by four Latin American embassies (Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, and Cuba). Applying the agenda setting theory from mass communication, Zhang and Cameron (2003) conducted a case study of Chinese President Jiang Zemin's state visit to the United States in 1997 with a focus on the effects of the Chinese government's strategic communication campaign in U.S. national media.

In a similar vein, Wang and Chang (2004) examined the effects of the same Chinese campaign on U.S. local media. Moreover, Zhang and Benoit (2004) applied a rhetorical theory of image restoration discourse to the Saudi Arabian government's attempt to repair its damaged reputation after the September 11 attack.

These theoretical and empirical studies have rekindled interest in the study of public diplomacy in public relations scholarship. Their contribution, however, is limited in theoretical focus and the scope of subjects under study: The studies concentrate on "a reversed public relations variant of public diplomacy" (Gilboa, 1998, p.6) and on media and message effects from the perspective of mass communication and rhetorical theories.

To conclude, public relations scholarship has not progressed toward the establishment of a research program to inquire public diplomacy from a public relations perspective. To the likely disappointment of Signitzer and Coombs (1992), after a decade little advancement has been made to determine what public relations concepts and theories are transferable and applicable to the study of public diplomacy.

For the first purpose of this dissertation, I propose public relations theories that are applicable to developing theoretical conceptual frameworks for public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy management.

International Relations (Foreign Policy Analysis)

The current underdeveloped theory building for public diplomacy is, to a greater extent, the result of disinterest in public diplomacy among scholars of international relations, including foreign policy analysis. Public diplomacy is, by definition, the international communication affairs of a government and hence a legitimate subject of study for international relations. International relations is mostly a field of inquiry into why governments behave in the ways they do in the world system, and much scholarly work in the field is comparative in scope. Theory building for comparative public diplomacy cannot proceed without delving into the rich theoretical contribution by international relations.

Lamenting the neglect of public diplomacy, Fisher (1987) said that “study of international communication, the ways that people and states communicate in this highly wired world, deserves academic attention and recognition as an integral part of the international relations process” (p. 2).

However, the former Assistant Director-General of the British Council, J. M. Mitchell (1986), pointed out that inquiry into international communication has been neglected in international relations because of the discipline’s preoccupation with topics of hard politics, such as war, security, military alliances, and political economy. Such topics as public diplomacy have been considered soft and secondary and marginalized in

both foreign policy decision-making and academia. Consequently, public diplomacy has been left unattended in international relations scholarship.

For the second purpose of this dissertation, I propose a theoretical framework for comparative public diplomacy, based on the perspectives of international relations, including foreign policy analysis, and put forward a theory of comparative public diplomacy that explains why government around the world are similar or different in their practice of public diplomacy.

In the following, I discuss the theoretical framework of this dissertation project and then briefly introduce a methodological framework for comparative public diplomacy on a large scale, which was used for the third purpose of this dissertation.

Theoretical Framework

Both public relations theories and international relations theories (foreign policy analysis) constitute the theoretical framework of this study. The Excellence study, a program of public relations research on communication practices and excellence in communication management, lends a conceptual framework to the study of public diplomacy. Thus, the Excellence study is proposed to be applicable for the foundational work to conceptualize the two underdefined focal constructs in public diplomacy research: public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy.

The Excellence study has developed a conceptual and measurement framework for public relations behavior (Huang, 1997; J. Grunig, 1997; J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984; J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1992; L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002; Rhee, 1999; Sha, 1999). The conceptual framework for one part of the Excellence study, models of public relations, started with a four model typology and later culminated in a dimensional

framework that decomposes public relations behavior into four dimensions: direction (one-way vs. two-way), purpose (symmetrical vs. asymmetrical), channel (mediated vs. interpersonal), and ethics (ethical vs. unethical).

Originated from the practices in the United States, the conceptual dimensions have accumulated evidence for their universal nature through cross-cultural replication studies in countries such as South Korea (Rhee, 1999), Taiwan (Huang, 1997; Sha, 1999;), India (Sriramesh, 1991), and Greece (Lyra, 1991).

The study also has built a broader Excellence theory (J. Grunig, 1992; L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002), a theory of the characteristics of excellence in communication management. The theory conceptualizes 10 principles for Excellence in public relations and theorizes that the principles constitute excellence in communication management. It is comprehensive enough to integrate three levels of excellent characteristics: communication programs, public relations department, and the organization:

1. Involvement of public relations in strategic management.
2. Empowerment of public relations in the dominant coalition or a direct reporting relationship to senior management.
3. Integrated public relations function.
4. Public relations as a management function separate from other function.
5. The public relations unit headed by a manager rather than a technician.
6. Two-way symmetrical model of public relations.
7. Symmetrical internal communication.

8. Departmental knowledge potential for the managerial role and symmetrical public relations.
9. Diversity.
10. Ethics.

The Excellence theory, through a series of empirical studies, has established a widely accepted conceptual framework for excellence in communication management in public relations research. In its inception period between 1990 and 1991, the theory was put to the largest, most intensive investigation ever conducted of public relations and communication management; over 5,000 participants in 327 organizations in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States participated in a survey for the investigation. The study confirmed the existence of a single Excellence factor that consists of the Excellence principles for communication management.

Afterwards, successful quantitative replication studies have followed in diverse cultural and political settings such as South Korea (Rhee, 2002, 1999) and Slovenia (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Vercic, 1998). Qualitative studies were also conducted in Slovenia (Vercic, J. Grunig, & L. Grunig, 1996) and Malaysia (Kaur, 1997). In addition, Delphi studies with 29 countries provided support for the generic nature of the Excellence principles (Wakefield, 2000).

The Excellence theory also reported on empirical evidence that the Excellence principles hold true, regardless of the type of organization—whether it is for-profit, non-profit, or governmental (Dozier, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1995). Recently, some works (e.g., J. Grunig, 1997) elaborated on the fit of the Excellence principles to governmental organizations; and the Norwegian government was studied as an exemplar of a

government that showcases the principles of Excellence in communication management (J. Grunig & Jaatinen, 1998).

In theory building for comparative public diplomacy, the two focal constructs in public diplomacy, which are newly defined through an application of the Excellence theory, become dependent variables. Tapping into theories of international relations (foreign policy analysis), I theorize on why and how governments practice public diplomacy as they do, proposing independent variables affecting public diplomacy and specifying theoretical associations between both ends.

The comparative foreign policy (CFP) approach (East, Salmore, & Herman, 1978; Rosenau, 1966; Wilkenfeld, Hopple, Rossa, & Andriole, 1980) in international relations guides theorizing work for comparative public diplomacy. The CFP is based on the central notion that differences in a country's contextual variables are related to differences in foreign policy behavior.

Rosenau (1966) proposed a schema for categorizing all possible contextual variables into five variable clusters: idiosyncratic (personal characteristics of political leaders), role, governmental, societal, and systemic. Similarly, Wilkenfeld et al. (1980) classified determinants of foreign policy behavior into five components: psychological (i.e., idiosyncratic), political, societal, interstate dependence, and global (polarity, alliances, and power status).

Of the proposed factors of foreign policy behavior, this dissertation focuses on four contextual variables of a government—societal culture, political system, interest group system, and interstate dependence. Those factors are most relevant to the public diplomacy behavior and management of a government.

I synthesize middle range theories from both international relations and public relations in discussing theoretical linkages between each factor and public diplomacy behavior and management. For cultural consequences for public diplomacy, theories of culture (Hofstede, 2001), cultural theories of foreign policy behavior and decision-making process (Hudson, 1997; Sampson III, 1987; Sampson & Walker, 1987; Shih, 1988; Zurovchak, 1997) are synthesized.

For consequences of political system for public diplomacy, I synthesize theories of political culture (Diamond, 1999; Pye, 1990; Verba, 1965) and the democratic peace literature. Theories of interest group politics (Katzenstein, 1985; Lijphart, 1999; Zeiger, 1988) contribute to laying out theoretical linkages between interest politics and public diplomacy; and theories of interstate dependence relationships (Wilkenfeld et al., 1980) are integrated into the linkages between dependence and public diplomacy.

Lastly, theories of the consequences of culture, political system, and interest group system for public relations behavior and management (J. Grunig & Jaatinen, 1998; L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Vercic, 1998; Rhee, 1999; Sriramesh & White, 1992; Vercic, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1996) are integrated with the theories of culture, comparative politics, and international relations.

Methodological Framework

Cross-national comparative study on a large scale in any discipline is no easy task because of the overwhelming logistical barriers, among other things. Any attempt at comparative theory building suffers more from limitations with methodological frameworks than from problems with theoretical frameworks.

To overcome the barriers, I tapped into the uncharted methodological potential of studying embassies as “matching samples” as well as “surrogate governments” for comparative public diplomacy. Hofstede (2001) recommended the use of matching samples as a preferable research strategy for comparative study because it controls for compounding variables. Yun and Yang (2001) reported that an embassy is “a microcosm of government” (p. 24) in which public diplomacy behavior and management at the homeland governmental level directly manifest themselves.

As a cultural enclave or island abroad, embassies preserve a strong national identity in their organizational worldview, processes, and structures— their public diplomacy behavior and management. The physical concentration of embassies in the world capitals makes it possible to conduct comparative research of a macro scale. This dissertation uses Washington, D.C., as the research setting because the city hosts a population of governments: It has embassies from 169 independent states in the world, which have more than one million citizens.

Meanwhile, I used two different methods to gather data on the contextual variables of a government, such as culture, political system, interest group system, and dependency and her public diplomacy behavior and management. Except for the dependency variable, I used secondary data for the other contextual variables, which are available from the literatures of cultural studies, comparative politics, and interest politics.

First, the Freedom House’s freedom score index (Freedom House, 2004a) provided data on the political system of the countries. The index has been a widely used measure of democracy, along with the Polity I~IV democracy index (Marshall, 2004). Second, Hofstede’s (2001, 1984) index offered cultural data on 80 countries. He

measured culture through four dimensions: individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity.

Third, Lijphart's (1999) corporatism index provided data on the interest group systems of 36 countries. The index supplied the most comprehensive and currently available country data on corporatism and pluralism. Lastly, I constructed an index for dependency that captures economic dependency that a country has on the United States, using export and tourism revenues data from the World Bank, the United Nations, and the World Tourism Organization. I then used a survey to collect data on public diplomacy from 113 of 169 embassies in Washington, D.C. A combination of survey and secondary data has become a conventional way of doing comparative study (Schmitter, 2001).

Significance and Delimitations

This study is an initiative to launch an ongoing research agenda for theory building on comparative public diplomacy as well as to search for excellence in public diplomacy from an interdisciplinary approach. First, this study proposes a conceptual and measurement framework for public diplomacy behavior and excellence based on the Excellence study (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002), a program of research on communication behavior and management in public relations.

Second, this study constructs a theoretical framework for comparative public diplomacy—the inquiry into why and how governments across the world practice and manage their public diplomacy as they do—from the perspectives of international relations, including foreign policy analysis. As the first step, this study conceptualizes and empirically tests the linkages between the contextual variables of a government—culture, political system, interest group system, and interstate dependence—and her

public diplomacy behavior and management. Most importantly, this study first employs a macro-methodological framework for comparative public diplomacy on a large scale—the research strategy of using embassies as “matching samples” and “surrogate governments.”

In short, this dissertation is the first research project that has ever incorporated conceptual, theoretical, and methodological frameworks for comparative public diplomacy in public diplomacy scholarship.

This study also is the first empirical research to test the theoretical convergence between public relations and public diplomacy not only at the level of communication behavior but also at the level of communication management. At the same time, this dissertation is a macro-replication of the Excellence study (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002) on a global scale, based on embassies as the sources of data.

In addition, this study should enlarge the scope of international relations scholarship to include the uncharted and much unattended area of study—public diplomacy—in the discipline. Thus, the findings of this study should offer valuable implications for various theories of international relations such as theories of the consequences of culture and democracy on foreign policy behavior and decision-making processes.

Meanwhile, this study has two delimitations mainly in its scope. First, in inquiring public diplomacy behavior, this study examined only press relations at embassies in Washington, D.C. for maximum comparability across as many embassies as possible. Not all embassies conduct congressional or NGO relations, but press relations is the staple of public diplomacy activities across embassies. Thus, this study did not cover other

specialized programs such as cultural, congressional, Diaspora, academia, and NGO relations.

Second, this study does not see the contextual variables of a government as the most salient factors of her public diplomacy behavior and management. The contextual variables are in fact the background variables or parameter variables of public diplomacy. There should be other levels of factors influencing public diplomacy inside embassies.

At the organizational level, embassies have their own unique organizational culture. At the professional level, diplomats share a universal professional culture, which is historically rooted and more coherent than the professional cultures of established professions such as lawyers and medical doctors. At the individual level, practitioners influence the ways in which public diplomacy is practiced and managed, depending on experience, knowledge, and worldview,

In short, this study investigated empirical associations only between the contextual variables of a government — factors at the highest level— and her public diplomacy. Further research should integrate all the levels to fully understand public diplomacy.

CHAPTER II

Conceptualization

In this chapter, I first conceptualize the two focal dependent variables in public diplomacy research—public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy—through an application of the Excellence study, a program of research in public relations.

Specifically, I start the conceptualizing of public diplomacy behavior with a review of the Excellence study's conceptual and measurement framework for public relations behavior. Later, I shed light on the conceptual convergence between public diplomacy behavior and public relations behavior and finally propose an application of the Excellence study's framework to public diplomacy behavior.

The conceptual work for excellence in public diplomacy follows the same procedure—reviewing the Excellence study's theory of excellence in communication management, discussing the conceptual convergence between excellence in public relations and excellence in public diplomacy, and proposing an application of the Excellence theory to conceptualizing excellence in public diplomacy.

Public Relations Behavior

Models of Public Relations

An academic discipline passes a critical point in development when scholars collectively define, conceptualize, and measure the focal dependent variable to be explained in the discipline. Until the 1970s, most public relations scholars did largely descriptive and evaluative work, making records of public relations practices and prescribing how to make the practices more effective. To exaggerate, it was more art than science. For the most part, scholars did not look at the practices as the focal dependent

variable; instead, they considered public relations practices as the independent variable whose effects are to be studied.

J. Grunig (1976) was one of the few scholars who did the critical groundwork of conceptualizing public relations practices and developing instruments to measure the profession's practices. Using two modes of communication, he conceptualized two models of public relations behavior, synchronic and diachronic models.

Organizations practicing the synchronic model use one-way and manipulative communication without attempting to adapt to publics, while the diachronic model is two-way communication to reach mutual understanding with publics. The two-model typology, however, turned out to be insufficient in capturing the complex nature of reality in subsequent studies, for the concepts are too gross and oversimplified (J. Grunig & L. Grunig, 1992).

In fact, all one-way communication is not manipulative; and, by the same token, all two-way communication is not balanced. This revised conceptualization yielded a four-model typology (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984): press agentry/publicity, public information, two-way asymmetrical, and two-way symmetrical. The four-model typology is the first comprehensive conceptual and measurement framework for public relations behavior in public relations research that became later part of the Excellence study.

The models were constructed with two skeleton variables, communication direction and purpose, along with four subsumed variables. The direction is whether communication is one-way or two-way. One-way is about disseminating information and two-way about exchanging information. The purpose is whether communication effects are balanced or not.

Asymmetrical communication is defined as imbalance of intended effects and symmetrical communication as balance. The direction and purpose variables serve as two latent factors underlying the four variables: communication goal as control versus adaptation; communication role as advocacy, dissemination, or mediation; use of research; and media relations as an application of the models. J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) elaborated on the characteristics of the four models.

- *The press agentry/publicity model* describes public relations programs whose sole purpose is getting favorable publicity for an organization. The practitioners of this model see the mass media as means for achieving their own ends and use a one-way, source-to-receiver communication model. Moreover, information the organizations disseminate about them is usually incomplete or not entirely true. The organizational goal in this model is to control or dominate the environment.
- *The public information model.* Practitioners in this model function as if they were “journalists-in-residence.” They do not volunteer unfavorable information about the organization. This model is similar to the press agentry model in its lack of concern for audience responses and research on its communication activities. The main role of communication in this model is to disseminate information.
- *The two-way asymmetrical model.* Practitioners of this model use social science theories about attitude and behavioral changes, as well as sophisticated research methods, to persuade or influence publics in the organization’s favor and to become a supporter of the organization’s interests.

- *The two-way symmetrical model.* The goal of this model is to seek a balanced purpose, promoting mutual understanding and managing conflict between the organization and its publics by changing both entities. For this goal, practitioners use social science theories and conduct sophisticated research.

The four-model typology became an established conceptual and measurement framework for public relations behavior in public relations research worldwide (Dozier, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1995; Huang, 1991; J. Grunig, L. Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang, & Lyra, 1995; Lyra, 1991; Sriramesh, 1991).

Criticism and Development

J. Grunig and Hunt (1984) initially proposed a contingency theory of situations in which each of the four models could be effective, depending on the structure of the organization and the nature of its environment. Later, however, J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1992) dropped the contingency theory and instead put forward a normative theory that the two-way symmetrical model would be most effective in most situations. The normative proposition and the four-model typology have generated a line of research effort to apply them to the experiences of practitioners across the world. They have also served as a practical guideline for practicing ethical and effective public relations.

More important was that public relations research was ready to advance to the next developmental stage: investigation of the determinants of public relations behavior. At the same time, the models have become a target of criticism. The genuine meaning of the core concept, symmetry, was not fully articulated. The normative nature of the two-way symmetrical model also has been continuously challenged by competing contingency theories.

The first criticism came from scholars of game theory, persuasion, and rhetoric (Miller, 1989; Murphy, 1991; Van der Meiden, 1993). Their argument was that the symmetry model abandons the organization's interest in favor of the public's. Borrowing insight from game theory, Murphy identified the model with a game of pure cooperation where the organization gives priority to accommodating the public's.

In a reply to her critique, J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1992) said that the model is not equal to games of pure cooperation. Rather it shares the same mixed-motive goal (cooperation and competition) with game theory, which drives the organization to try to satisfy its own interest as well as the public's simultaneously. They further clarified the symmetrical model as negotiation and conflict resolution. Later, the works of Plowman (1995) and Huang (1997) incorporated negotiation strategies into the two-way symmetrical model.

The newly clarified mixed-motive model and model of symmetry as negotiation have helped reformulate the normative symmetrical model into a contingency theory (J. Grunig, 2000, 2001; L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002). The new contingency theory, however, does not espouse the original idea of contingency, that any of the four models can be appropriate in some situation. Rather, it stated that "the symmetrical model can include persuasion of both parties or of one, depending on the situation" (J. E. Grunig, personal communication, May 4, 2004).

Early on, Dozier, J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1995) had already proposed the new contingency model when they reported that organizations with excellent public relations were found to use both asymmetrical and symmetrical models.

The second type of critiques came from critical scholars (Gandy, 1982; L'Etang, 1996; Pieczka, 1996) who argued that the symmetrical model is unrealistic. They said that the model has presuppositions that rarely exist in reality, such as a shared mission of social progress, social equilibrium, and harmony. To this critique that symmetry strives for unrealistic harmony as the outcome, J. Grunig (2000) and J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1992) emphasized that symmetry describes a process of public relations and not an outcome. They defended symmetry as "moving equilibrium" or "dialogue" in Habermas' (1984) term. Symmetry as a process and dialogue was a counterargument to L'Etang's (1996) critique that public relations is necessarily partisan and intrinsically undemocratic.

More significantly, symmetry as a process has led J. Grunig and his colleagues to define ethics as a process. The symmetrical model provides a forum for dialogue, discussion, and discourse on issues for which people with different values generally come to different conclusions. As long as the dialogue is structured according to ethical rules, the outcome should be ethical. There is not usually an outcome, however, that fits the value system of all competing parties (J. Grunig, 1997a).

Dimensions of Public Relations Behavior

In parallel to the deepened theoretical understanding of symmetry as a mixed-motive mindset, a series of quantitative-based methodological critiques have called for close examination of the validity of the four-model typology. Deatherage and Hazleton (1998) and Leichty and Springston (1993) found through exploratory factor analysis on indicators of the four models that only two models exist, one-way and two-way. The critiques also presented empirical evidence for symmetry as mixed motive. Deatherage

and Hazleton reported that asymmetrical and symmetrical worldviews are found to have an insignificant correlation ($r = -.07$), suggesting that the two worldviews may coexist and rejecting the idea that one worldview prevails over the other.

Pointing at the weakness (non-theoretical) of exploratory factor analysis, L. Grunig, J. Grunig, and Dozier (2002) conducted confirmatory factor analysis on the four-model typology. They compared the competing two-model typology with the four-model typology to see which fit the data best and presented evidence that the latter yielded a satisfactory and better model fit than the former.

More importantly, L. Grunig et al. (2002) reported that the four-model typology best fit the data when it is specified that the four models or factors covary with each other. The covarying nature of the four models strongly suggested the existence of common underlying dimensions in the four models.

This quantitative evidence also lent support to an on-going effort to move beyond a simple typology to conceptualizing and measuring theoretical dimensions of public relations behavior. J. Grunig (1997) issued a call for this shift, and subsequent studies (Huang, 2001, 1997; Grunig, 2001, 2000; L. Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002; Rhee, 2002, 1999; Sha, 1999) have successfully described public relations behavior, using dimensions instead of the four-model typology.

In their collective work, J. Grunig and his colleagues isolated four dimensions: direction (one-way, two-way), purpose (asymmetrical, symmetrical), channel (interpersonal, mediated), and ethics (ethical, unethical). L. Grunig, J. Grunig, and Dozier (2002) and Huang (2001, 1997) elaborated on the four dimensions.

- *Direction dimension.* This first dimension represents the extent which public relations is one-way or two-way. It was part of the original conceptualization of the four models. One-way means disseminating information, while two-way means exchange of information. Huang (1997) included feedback, listening, and research as part of two-way communication.
- *Purpose dimension.* This second dimension consists of symmetry and asymmetry. It refers to the extent to which collaboration and advocacy describe public relations behavior.
- *Channel dimension.* This dimension captures the extent to which public relations practitioners use an interpersonal channel or mediated channel of communication. Huang (1997) equated the interpersonal communication channel with face-to-face, direct communication and mediated communication with indirect communication through the mass media. Early on, public relations was understood as mainly a form of mass communication. Sriramesh (1991), Huang (1993), and Lyra (1993), however, identified what they called a personal influence model of public relations in their studies of India, Taiwan, and Greece. In the model, practitioners favored not only face-to-face communication but also interpersonal relationships and social networks with leaders of activist groups and labor unions, journalists, politicians, and government officials. Later, J. Grunig, L. Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang, and Lyra (1995) reported that the personal influence model seems to be universal in that it is also practiced in lobbying and media relations in the United States.

- *Ethics dimension.* This last dimension captures the degree to which public relations behavior is ethical. J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996) and J. Grunig and White (1992) argued that symmetrical communication is inherently ethical, and, at the same time, that asymmetrical communication can be ethical, depending on the rules used to ensure ethical practice. J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996) and Huang (1997) identified characteristics of public relations ethics by focusing on teleology, disclosure, and social responsibility. Ethical public relations is responsible for consequences of public relations behavior on the publics (teleology). The scope of responsibility reaches all the members of society beyond the immediate and directly related publics such as customers and employees (social responsibility). Lastly, advocacy and asymmetrical communication can be ethical as long as the public is informed of whose interests they serve (disclosure). Thus, the reconceptualization work has yielded a four-dimensional conceptual framework for public relations behavior. In operationalizing the conceptual framework, Huang (1997), L. Grunig, J. Grunig, and Dozier (2002), Rhee (1999), and Sha (1999) broke the channel dimension into two separate dimensions (interpersonal and mediated dimensions). Interpersonal and mediated communications are not exclusive to each other. They also treated the ethical dimension as a single continuum (ethical vs. unethical), and Huang measured the direction dimension using a single two-way scale.

The purpose dimension, however, has been treated differently. Huang (1997) measured it as a single continuum (symmetrical vs. asymmetrical) while J. Grunig (2000) and Rhee (1999) measured it as two separate continua (symmetrical dimension and asymmetrical dimension, respectively) because symmetry and asymmetry may coexist. L.

Grunig, J. Grunig, and Dozier (2002) reported that use of two separate continua yielded a better reliability. Similarly, Deatherage and Hazleton (1998) reported a quantitative finding that the asymmetrical worldview exists in parallel with symmetrical worldview.

Rhee (1999) and Huang (1997) both included bribery and exploitation of personal relationships in the interpersonal channel dimension. In contrast, I reconceptualized the dimension to be exclusive of these components. They are theoretically distant from the interpersonal channel dimension that basically concerns only the nature of face-to-face communication, although bribery and exploitation of personal relationships are quite often accompanied by other aspects of the interpersonal channel.

Huang's (1997) finding from factor analysis of the indicators of the interpersonal channel dimension, which included bribery, supported this exclusion. She obtained two separate factors rather than a single factor from the indicators. Indicators purely related to the interpersonal channel formed a factor while those related to bribery resulted in another factor, which Huang later named the "social activity factor." I included the social activity indicators into the ethical dimension because they are more related to unethical behavior than to channel properties.

Moreover, I refined the ethics dimension by reconceptualizing it to exclude the subdimension of teleology because Huang (1997) showed that the teleology dimension theoretically and empirically overlapped the dimension of symmetry.

To conclude, I operationalized the four dimensions of public relations behavior, using six factors: two-way (direction), symmetry (purpose), asymmetry (purpose), interpersonal communication (channel), mediated communication (channel), and ethics.

Thus, I proposed a six-factor measurement model of public relations behavior. As Huang (1997) showed, each factor theoretically and empirically covaries with each other factor.

Conceptual Convergence between Public Relations and Public Diplomacy Behavior

There was a time when a world of corporations was hardly comparable to a world of national states. Likewise, public relations was rarely likened to public diplomacy. When it was, both were lumped together as either “crude propaganda” or “sophisticated propaganda” as exemplified in Kunczik (1997) and Manheim (1994). Or, the focus was on only one aspect, the propagandistic or persuasive aspect of the two communication practices.

An early effort was made by European public relations scholars in the late 1980s to place all the aspects of both communication practices into perspective. According to Signitzer and Coombs (1992), Austrian scholar Weiss (1988) and Signitzer (1988) attempted to capture a resemblance between the two practices through comparison of their model typologies. Weiss and Signitzer compared German intercultural scholar Peisert’s (1978, as cited in Signitzer & Coombs, 1992) four models of cultural communication with American public relations scholar J. Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) four models of public relations.

Piesert’s (1978) models focused on one of the two functions of public diplomacy, cultural communication. He categorized diverse patterns of cultural communication worldwide into four models. The first is the exchange and cooperation model involving a situation in which both countries have equal rights and join together in combined efforts to substitute national for international loyalties. The ultimate purpose is mutual understanding. The second is the one-way transmission of one’s own culture abroad. This

model seeks unilateral information flow and, thus, attempts attitude and behavior change on one side.

The third is the information model with the aim of creating understanding and sympathy abroad for one's own country. This model requires close monitoring of relevant social and cultural developments in the target country and scientific planning. The last is the self-portrayal model. Its purpose is to consciously draw a specific picture abroad of one's own country. A typical example is a cultural institute with a strong national profile and staff members who are experts about their own country.

Signitzer and Coombs (1992) further elaborated on convergences between both sets of models. They said that both sets of models consist of the same dimensions: direction of communication (one-way vs. two-way) and purpose of communication (asymmetrical vs. symmetrical). According to their analysis, the one-way transmission of one's own culture model best fits into the press agency model of public relations. Both are one-way in the direction of communication and have an unbalanced relationship.

The self-portrayal model corresponds with the public information model of public relations since the two are concerned with comprehension and very little persuasion, at least, at face value. Plus, these two models send out information from inside to outside, not vice versa. The information model is compared to the two-way asymmetrical of public relations in that the goal of these models is to secure sympathy and acceptance. Thus, scientific formative and evaluative research and planning are required. Both are asymmetrical because no change is intended to one's own attitude and behavior. The last match-up is between the exchange and cooperation model and the two-way symmetrical

model of public relations. Both strive for dialogue and balanced communication effects in which both sides are exposed to attitudinal and behavioral change.

While Signitzer and Coombs (1992) worked on the cultural communication side of public diplomacy, J. Grunig (1993) addressed its political communication side. He identified political advocacy campaigns that U.S. public relations firms conducted for foreign governments, using his four models of public relations, along with a fifth personal influence model. He analyzed communication campaigns that Edward L. Bernays, the often-called father of U.S public relations, ran for the Lithuanian National Council in the aftermath of the World War I.

J. Grunig (1993) identified the campaign programs mainly with the public information model and two-way asymmetrical model. A South African communication campaign under the Apartheid regime was characterized mostly as the two-way asymmetrical and personal influence model. J. Grunig concluded that “most of these campaigns have relied on the press agency or public information models... to gain press coverage and polish the image of the client” (p. 145). With analysis of the models’ ethics and effectiveness, he emphasized that only the two-way symmetrical model is inherently ethical and eventually effective.

Through the conceptual bridging work, Weiss (1988), Signitzer and Coombs (1992), and J. Grunig (1993) juxtaposed the two different worlds (corporation vs. nation-state) and revealed the model convergence between public relations and public diplomacy. The pioneers opened the door to the application of Grunig and Hunt’s (1984) four models of public relations and the later four dimensional conceptual framework for public

diplomacy behavior to describing and characterizing both practices of cultural communication and political advocacy in public diplomacy.

Conceptualization of Public Diplomacy Behavior

The shift from typology to dimension should provide a fuller and more detailed description not only of public relations behavior but also of public diplomacy behavior. Especially, this is true when considering the salience of the channel dimension in public diplomacy. Cultural and educational exchange programs are typical of interpersonal face-to-face communication, while news programs are characterized by mediated communication. Otherwise, the typology of four models would miss this important characteristic.

The addition of the ethical dimension also would be appropriate for public diplomacy, after facing a century of ethical cynicism. Public diplomacy has been criticized for excessive concern with consequences on self-interests (i.e., national interests) rather than on cosmopolitan interests. Moreover, it has been conducted quite often secretly and thus, unethically.

Focusing on unethical practices of the government of Kuwait and its U.S. public relations agent Hill & Knowlton during the Gulf War in 1990, J. Grunig (1994) proposed that ethics should be at the heart of public diplomacy. The Hill & Knowlton fiasco is notorious for the sheer size and breadth of its deception of the American public. On October 20, 1990, a teary-eyed 15-year-old Kuwaiti girl, Nayirah, testified to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus that she had seen Iraqi soldiers take babies from hospital incubators in Kuwait and leave them on the floor to die (J. Grunig, 1993).

However, afterwards, TV investigative news shows such as “60 Minutes” and “20-20” along with *New York Times* uncovered that Nayirah was the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States and that she had never witnessed any such atrocity. According to Trento (1992), while representing a Kuwait government front organization, Citizens for a Free Kuwait, Hill & Knowlton not only arranged the hearing but also provided witnesses for the hearing, coached them, wrote testimony, and produced videotapes detailing the alleged atrocities. After these revelations, the firm and the Kuwaiti government were hurled into a barrage of criticism for their lack of integrity. Consequently, their credibility was severely and appropriately damaged.

Drawing upon a wide array of unethical practices in public diplomacy, J. Grunig (1994) has emphasized the importance of disclosure for ethics in public diplomacy. He stressed that in public diplomacy, two principles of openness are most crucial. The first is full disclosure. It must be made clear in both accompanying materials and in the text of informational materials that public relations resources (such as press or video releases) have been produced by public relations firms or by their representatives for international clients [foreign governments] whose names must also be disclosed. A second principle is that practitioners or [foreign governments] must discontinue the use of front organizations, such as Citizens for a Free Kuwait, and openly acknowledge and disclose the identities and names of their real clients.

The 1963 congressional hearings chaired by Sen. William Fulbright identified seven common unethical public diplomacy practices perpetuated by both U.S. public relations firms and foreign governments (J. Grunig, 1993). Three of the unethical

practices involve violation of disclosure, and two practices concern violation of integrity (bribery) and honesty:

1. Trips and junkets for news personnel paid for by public relations practitioners with foreign government funds.
2. Failure to label releases as the products of foreign agents.
3. Dishonesty in client-agency relations by “puffing” activities on behalf of client government.
4. Contributions to U.S. political campaigns.
5. Employment of government officials as part-time “consultants” for a foreign agent.
6. Front or conduit organizations formed to act as cover organizations to keep sources of support for a cause hidden from public view.
7. Failure to identify a foreign agents’ association with a foreign principal in dealing with our government or with the American public (p. 69).

Beyond disclosure, integrity, and honesty, other principles of communication ethics apply to public diplomacy. One is truthfulness of message in the form of providing factual and accurate information.

Also, the subdimension of social responsibility in public relations ethics applies to public diplomacy ethics. Just as an organization has a social responsibility to seek actions that protect and improve the welfare of society along with its own interests, a government in the world system has the same kind of obligation to the welfare of people beyond its borders. This idea fits closely with J. Grunig and L. Grunig’s (1996, p. 7) distinction of “social responsibility” (extended obligation to society at large) from “public

responsibility” (limited obligation only to stakeholders) and Donaldson’s (1989) similar differentiation between minimal and maximal duty.

From a Hobbesian worldview, some may doubt that governments or states should have any ethical obligations whatsoever like a corporation or an individual in society should. In the literature of international relations, however, raising the state’s level of moral reasoning and accountability to match that of individuals and corporate entities has been widely acknowledged (Hoffman, 1981; Rosenthal, 1999). Social responsibility comes into being out of recognition that individuals and corporations have an ethical obligation to all members of society because all people are interconnected to each other within the same community.

Similarly, ethics in public diplomacy should also include the unique moral reasoning of global responsibility: A government or state should have an ethical obligation to all humans beyond its borders. As Pratt (1989) discussed, the advancement of human internationalism and globalization have made this world a global village in which all people are so interconnected that each person’s actions can have consequences on other people’s lives across their own borders. This is the foundation of global responsibility for elimination of poverty, humanitarian disasters, and inequalities of all kinds throughout the world.

Patrick (2003) referred to global responsibility as cosmopolitan ethics in the sense that ethical obligation goes beyond borders and serves every human in the world. He further distinguished between cosmopolitan ethics and nationalist ethics in which government officials recognize and emphasize ethical obligation and loyalty only to their citizens confined by national borders over ethical obligation to people beyond borders.

Nationalist ethics corresponds exactly to the concept of public responsibility (limited responsibility for the stakeholders), whereas cosmopolitan ethics matches the concept of social responsibility (extended responsibility for society at large). States pursuing cosmopolitan ethics strive to become “a good citizen of the global civil society,” fulfilling the maximal duty, which bears a resemblance to Donaldson’s (1989) expression a “corporate good citizen” of national society.

In sum, in this study, I reconceptualized ethics in public diplomacy behavior to include the new subdimension of “global responsibility” instead of “social responsibility.”

The relevance and immediacy of applying the conceptual and measurement framework for public relations behavior on public diplomacy could not be better underscored when the current status of public diplomacy research is considered. Unfortunately, the diagnosis of public relations research in 1970s fits contemporary public diplomacy research.

Despite much attention and descriptive, normative work on public diplomacy behavior, little serious endeavor has been mounted to conceptualize and measure the behavior. In fact, the public diplomacy literature is replete with thick, rich, in-depth, and historical records of a variety of ways in which public diplomacy has been conducted. Almost all of the four dimensions of public relations behavior are the staple subjects of descriptive work in public diplomacy research.

The purpose, direction, and channel dimension of public diplomacy practices have naturally commanded much work. With a few exceptions, virtually all scholars have devoted one or two chapters to a discussion of one or two dimensions, especially the

purpose and direction dimensions. The scholars' normative endorsement (Fisher, 1987; Leonard, 2003, 2002; Leonard & Alakeson, 2000; Malone, 1988; Ninkovich, 1996; Tuch, 1990) of a two-way, symmetrical model of public diplomacy over a one-way, asymmetrical model brings to mind the parallel of the support of public relations scholars for the two-way, symmetrical model of public relations.

Public diplomacy research, however, has not developed a conceptual and measurement framework for public diplomacy behavior. Although there have been some classifying schemes such as Piesert's (1978) four models, they have remained at the level of preliminary conceptual discussion and have not been developed into conceptual and measurement frameworks.

To conclude, I conceptualized and measured public diplomacy behavior through an application of the four dimensional conceptual framework for public relations behavior and the six-factor measurement model. Following Signitzer and Coombs' (1992) call, I put the theoretical convergence between both spheres to empirical test in which public diplomacy behavior by embassies in Washington, D.C. is described by the measurement model. A way of empirically testing the convergence is exploring how well the six-factor measurement model fits the embassies' public diplomacy behavior.

Research Question 1: How well does the six-factor measurement model of public relations behavior describe and characterize public diplomacy behavior of embassies in Washington, D.C.?

Excellence in Public Relations

In this section, I introduce the Excellence theory in public relations (J. Grunig, 1992; L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002) as a public relations theory of

communication management applicable to public diplomacy. Then, I delineate the theoretical convergence between the Excellence theory and theories of excellence in public diplomacy and move on to conceptualize excellence in public diplomacy by applying excellence in public relations. I conclude this section by putting the excellence (management) convergence between both spheres to empirical test.

Theory of Excellence in Public Relations

Few public relations theories are more fundamental and comprehensive than the Excellence theory (Dozier, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1995; J. Grunig, 1992; L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002). Before the theory, public relations was loosely understood as organizational communication without sophisticated theories on its roles and values for organization and society. Many public relations theories were so myopic that they were narrowly concerned with the effects of communication programs.

Indeed, some theories focused on the roles of public relations practitioners: technician vs. manager (Broom & Smith, 1979; Broom & Dozier, 1990) and others, the models of public relations. They, however, lacked the overarching grand question that the International Association of Business Communicators (IABC) foundation first posed for research proposals in 1984: How, why, and to what extent does communication contribute to the achievement of organizational objectives?

To address the question, J. Grunig and his colleagues formed a research team and launched a historical 15-year program of research, the Excellence study, with two guiding research questions. The first question, the “Effectiveness Question,” asked about the relationship between the value of public relations and organizational effectiveness. It asked how public relations makes an organization more effective.

The second question, also called the “Excellence Question,” asked how the public relations function must be organized and managed to make its contribution to organizational effectiveness. The question asked what characteristics of a public relations function make an organization more effective. Because of the theory’s general and integrating nature, few public relations theories are more eligible for a test of theoretical convergence between public relations and public diplomacy.

For the Effectiveness Question, the theory adopted the competing-values approach to organizational effectiveness, which is one of the four main approaches in organizational theories: goal-attainment, systems, strategic constituencies, and competing-values. The competing-values approach accepts the difficulty of having one single definition of organization effectiveness. Campbell (1977) identified 30 criteria of effectiveness, denying the viability of discussing effectiveness in general terms.

The competing-values approach posits that, depending on the stage in an organizational life cycle, a set of values in competition with another set of values functions as the standard of effectiveness. For instance, when an organization starts to grow, the values serving as the criterion for organizational effectiveness are human resources and training through cohesion and morale (Quinn & Hall, 1983). If those values fully materialize, the organization is judged to be effective. However, after the organization is established as an institution, the value of human resources is no longer the standard of effectiveness. Instead, another set of values such as stability and control through information management and communication takes the place of the previous values set.

In sum, the competing-values approach argues that an organization should incorporate the values of strategic constituencies into its goals so that the organization attains the goals most valuable to its strategic constituencies (J. Grunig & Huang, 2000).

Along with the competing-values understanding of organizational effectiveness, the Excellence theory interweaved theories of strategic management to answer the Effectiveness Question. The theories emphasize the importance of developing organizational goals consistent with the threats and opportunities posed by strategic constituencies in the environment. Pearce and Robinson (1982) distinguished strategic management from traditional management in that the former balances internal processes or activities with strategies for dealing with external factors in the environment.

Wheelen and Hunger (1987) deepened understanding of the environment. They made a crucial distinction between the task environment representing the market and the societal environment consisting of economic, technological, political, and cultural spheres. They further explained the importance of the latter environment and its effects on the former environment.

The emphasis that theories of strategic management place on monitoring the external environment and adjusting the organization's missions to it suggests a crucial role of public relations in the process (J. Grunig & Repper, 1992). Theories of strategic management, combined with the competing-values approach to organizational effectiveness, provided an answer to the Effectiveness Question. Public relations has value when it makes the organization more effective by identifying strategic constituencies that can impose threats and opportunities on the accomplishment of the

organization's goals and by building and maintaining quality relationships with the constituencies (J. Grunig & Jaatinen, 1998).

Moreover, theories of strategic management offered an organizational framework for how to maximize excellence in public relations with the concept of levels of strategic management (Pearce & Robinson, 1982). Strategic management takes place at three levels: the organizational level, business level, and functional level.

J. Grunig and Repper (1992) put forward a theory of strategic public relations prescribing that public relations should play a dual strategic role at both the organizational and functional level. The theory argues that the public relations function makes the greatest contribution to organizational effectiveness when it participates in the overall strategic management of the organization—issues management—and strategically manages public relations function—communication programs.

Dealing with the second, Excellence, question, the Excellence study first conceptualized the organizational, departmental, and program-level characteristics that are indispensable for excellent public relations (J. Grunig, 1992). The researchers identified 14 characteristics of excellent communication through a comprehensive literature review of theories from communication, public relations, management, organizational psychology and sociology, social and cognitive psychology, feminist studies, political science, decision making, and culture.

The theorized characteristics were then put to the largest, most intensive investigation ever conducted of public relations and communication management. In 1990-1991, 5,330 participants (public relations senior managers, CEOs, and employees) in 327 organizations in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States completed

questionnaires containing over 1,700 pieces of information, which were designed to test the theory. As a second wave of investigation, in 1994, 25 organizations from the original 327 participated in case studies for which face-to-face and telephone interviews were conducted, along with document analysis (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002).

Using factor analysis, the Excellence researchers analyzed 20 variables representing the 14 characteristics of excellent public relations and successfully isolated a single factor on which the 20 variables clustered, as the theory expected (Dozier, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1995). The pattern of factor loadings was also consistent with the Excellence theory: Characteristics of knowledge base of communication department loaded higher than those of “shared expectation” about communication with senior management, which loaded higher than characteristics of organizational culture.

Combined with the results of the qualitative case studies, several similar characteristics of the 14 were consolidated into nine. Later, a tenth Excellent principle, ethics, was added to the existing principles (Vercic, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1996). Through a case study of Slovenian public relations, Vercic et al. found that ethical practices are a crucial element of excellent public relations and called for further research on ethics.

Additionally, Rhee (1999) reported that the ethical dimension of public relations behavior clustered along with the other existing Excellence principles. Following are the 10 Excellence principles (J. Grunig, 1994).

1. *Involvement of public relations in strategic management.* Effective organizations engage in long-term strategic planning to develop a mission and to set goals that are appropriate for their environment. Excellent public

relations units are involved in this strategic planning process by helping management recognize stakeholders or strategic publics. An organization that practices public relations strategically, therefore, develops programs to communicate with the strategic publics, both external and internal, that provide the greatest threats to and opportunities for the organization.

2. *Empowerment of public relations in the dominant coalition or a direct reporting relationship to senior management.* The strategic management of public relations must be an integral part of the strategic management of the overall organization. For that to happen, the public relations unit must be empowered to practice public relations according to professional principles rather than the often misguided ideas of senior managers. When public relations is empowered, the senior public relations executive usually becomes part of the dominant coalition. Effective organizations place the public relations department in the organizational structure so that the senior public relations person is part of this powerful group of senior managers or has ready access to that group.
3. *Integrated public relations function.* Many organizations develop more than one public relations unit. These units usually develop historically rather than strategically, reflecting the most critical relationship problems of the organization when the public relations function first developed, such as relationships with employees, the media, donors, governments, or stakeholders. In contrast, excellent departments integrate all public relations functions into a single department or have a mechanism set up to coordinate the departments.

Only in an integrated system of public relations is it possible for public relations to develop new communication programs for changing strategic publics—that is, to be managed strategically.

4. *Public relations is a management function separate from other function.* Many organizations splinter the public relations function by making it a supporting tool for other departments such as marketing, human resources, law, or finance. When the public relations is sublimated to other functions, it cannot be managed strategically because it cannot move communication resources from one strategic public to another—as an integrated public relations function can. Public relations counsels all the management functions on their communication and relationship problems with publics, but it must be independent of any one of these functions if it is to counsel all of them.
5. *The public relations unit is headed by a manager rather than a technician.* Public relations practitioners fill two major roles in organization—the manager who plans programs strategically and the technician who writes, edits, or produces publications. Without a manager to coordinate public relations activities, the public relations unit cannot be a part of strategic management.
6. *Two-way symmetric model of public relations.* Excellent public relations departments model more of their communication program on the two-way symmetric than on the other three models although they often combine the symmetric model with elements of the two-way asymmetric model in a “mixed-motive” model.

7. *A symmetric system of internal communication.* Communication inside an organization is crucial to effective management. Excellent organizations have decentralized management structures that give autonomy to employees and allow them to participate in decision making. They also have participative, symmetric systems of internal communication. Symmetric communication with employees increases job satisfaction because employee goals are incorporated into the organizational mission.
8. *The department has the knowledge needed to practice the managerial role and symmetric public relations.* Excellent public relations department have practitioners who have learned a theoretical body of knowledge in public relations. Excellent programs are staffed by professionals, people who are not only are educated in the body of knowledge but active in professional associations and read professional literature.
9. *Diversity embodied in all roles.* The principle of requisite variety states that effective organizations have as much diversity inside the organization as in the environment. Requisite variety is especially important in public relations because the unit is responsible for communicating with varied publics. Thus, excellent public relations includes both men and women in all roles, as well as practitioners of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds.
10. *Ethics.* To be effective, organizations must be responsible to their publics and to society in addition to being profitable or effective in meeting organizational goals. Effective organizations have the ethical responsibility to communicate with publics on which they have consequences. The public relations function

should have primary responsibility for determining social responsibility by communicating with publics who define this responsibility (pp. 22-25).

These 10 principles of Excellence in public relations address the characteristics of communication programs, the public relations department, and the organization, all of which make public relations excellent. The two principles of two-way symmetrical communication and ethics are the excellent characteristics of external communication programs, thus, public relations behavior.

Hence, these principles are operationalized through the dimensions of public relations behavior. The principle of two-way symmetrical model is decomposed into the behavior's two dimensions—two-way and symmetry. In addition, the ethical dimension of public relations behavior is the principle of ethics.

Conceptual Convergence Between Excellence in Public Relations and Public Diplomacy

In their search for the convergence of public relations and public diplomacy, Signitzer and Coombs (1993) called for “a series of [public relations] theory-based empirical studies” (p. 146). By “a series of empirical studies,” they suggested that public relations scholars should further identify, delineate, and empirically test the theoretical convergence of both spheres on a fundamental level.

In this dissertation, I first put the model or behavior convergence to empirical test to initiate a series of theory-based studies on a more fundamental convergence between public relations and public diplomacy. Model convergence means that both organizational communication behaviors can be characterized and described with the same set of concepts or dimensions.

Organizational communication behaviors are an outcome of a more fundamental process—the management of organizational communication functions. Identifying and testing a theoretical convergence on the level of communication management should further advance public relations theory-based research on public diplomacy.

Public relations has developed as a management function of organizational communication (J. Grunig & Hunt, 1984), searched for excellence in communication management, and formulated theories of communication management. As organizations, governments also have sought the ways in which they should manage and organize the public diplomacy function. The situation has resulted in a convergence between theories of communication management in both areas.

Public diplomacy research also has a long history of searching for excellence in public diplomacy. From the beginning, in fact, the same but contextually modified “Excellence Question” overshadowed public diplomacy research: How must the public diplomacy function be organized and managed to make government effective in the world system. Like the Excellence theory, theories of excellence in public diplomacy have looked for characteristics at three levels (program, department, and organization level). The theories, however, had a more fragmented and partial focus than the Excellence theory.

In searching for organizational characteristics, Leonard and Alakeson (2000) alluded to the empowerment of the public diplomacy function in the making and execution of foreign policy by highlighting its emerging strategic role in systemic transformation from the Cold War to globalization and complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2000).

Fisher (1987) suggested that the “international communication dimension,” public diplomacy, deserves a top priority for governments facing the turbulent systemic transformation. Moreover, Leonard and Alakeson (2000) emphasized the importance of ethical conduct of foreign policy for excellence in public diplomacy.

Scholars have developed propositions about the characteristics of excellent public diplomacy programs. Leonard and Alakeson (2000) and Tuch (1990) emphasized two-way dialogic communication programs. Similarly, Fisher (1987) argued for giving up “communicating from a position of predominant bigness and power” (p. 150).

Along with the search for program characteristics, scholars have investigated the organizational issue—the integration or separation of specialized public diplomacy functions. Malone (1988) searched for the best organizational framework for the two main functions, policy advocacy and cultural communication, in the context of U.S. public diplomacy. Leonard (2002, 2003) pointed out that without global and regional coordination among public diplomacy agencies, there could be no such thing as excellence in public diplomacy.

However convergent these theories are with the Excellence theory, no single theory of excellence in public diplomacy in the field has integrated all three levels and articulated, conceptualized, and operationalized a set of comprehensive excellence characteristics like the Excellence theory has. Thus, it should be promising to apply the Excellence theory to the task of conceptualizing and measuring excellence in public diplomacy.

Following is a detailed discussion of how each of the 10 principles of Excellence in public relations can be theoretically transferred to the components of excellence in public diplomacy.

First of all, three principles underlying the theory of strategic public relations (J. Grunig & Repper, 1992) are relevant to public diplomacy: *involvement of public relations in strategic management, empowerment of public relations in the dominant coalition or a direct reporting relationship to senior management, and the public relations unit is headed by a manager rather than technician*. These principles form the backbone of the theory of strategic public relations, which advises the public relations manager to participate in the overall strategic management of organizational level and, at the same time, strategically run communication programs at the functional level.

The importance of strategic public relations becomes more obvious for governmental public relations, i.e., public affairs, than for other type of organizations. As J. Grunig (1997b) astutely pointed out, a governmental agency needs strategic public relations more than a corporation or non-profit organization does. The environment (the public sector) surrounding the agency is full of greater uncertainty, more actors, and more significant external influences than there are in the private sector.

Moreover, the conditions for strategic management are less favorable because “the leaders who provide strategic direction for a government agency are not only the managers of that agency but also legislators and the chief executive of the nation, state, or locality” (p. 253). Bingman and Kee (1989) echoed this point:

[In a governmental agency], very often the manager must follow a vision set by others, with limited ability to influence its design. Even where the manger helps

to establish the vision, it is subject to annual change and validation in the legislative budget process. (p. 400)

The fact that governmental agencies have a complex environment and ever-changing leadership increases the need for strategic governance and strategic public relations to support it. For a government or state, the environment of world politics should be much more complex than its domestic environment. The world system in which governments operate is turbulent and uncertain, featuring a myriad of hot publics such as anti-globalization activists in Seattle, the militant Greenpeace, and terrorist organizations, such as Al Queda, to name a few.

In addition, with regime change or administration change, a state's foreign policy often swerves off the previous track, changing the mission of public diplomacy accordingly. In order for states to survive and prosper in this ever complex international system, states must develop boundary spanning and environmental scanning functions—public diplomacy.

Leonard and Alakeson (2000) argued for the emerging strategic role of public diplomacy in international relations in the 21st century. Foreign policy elites around the world recognize the importance of strategic public diplomacy in the conduct of foreign policy. Albright (1999), the former Secretary of State of the United States, made an insightful observation:

In our era of public diplomacy, it is not simply nice to have it; it must be a core element in our foreign policy... public diplomacy must and will be an integral part of our major foreign policy initiatives from the day those policies are

conceived. Your [public diplomacy's] unique angle of vision will be vital to us as we frame our strategy. (p. 9)

In addition to these strategic management principles, the two principles of knowledge potential and symmetric communication also have value in the context of public diplomacy: *the two-way symmetric model of public relations and the department has the knowledge needed to practice the managerial role and symmetric public relations.*

The Excellence study (Dozier, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1995; L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002) showed that the knowledge principle is the prerequisite that makes operational many of the other Excellence principles, especially the strategic management-related principles. The principle of two-way symmetrical communication is the way in which an organization builds and maintains quality relationships with strategic constituencies that can pose threats and opportunities for the organization's objectives.

Another Excellence principle particularly relevant to public diplomacy concerns the integration of all specialized organizational communication functions: *integrated public relations function*. For public relations, the theme of integrated communication is mainly interpreted with respect to how to integrate specialized communication functions such as investor relations, employee relations, and government relations.

The Excellence theory's integration principle suggests that all specialized communication functions should be housed in a public relations department or that the public relations department should coordinate the specialized programs if they are arranged into each relevant management function such as investor relations in the finance department (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002).

This principle speaks to a thorny and chronic coordination problem with public diplomacy practices. In the case of U.S. public diplomacy, Malone (1988) said that it has been a recurring problem to structure the two main functions of public diplomacy, policy advocacy and cultural communication, into an organizational framework. As a reaction to the so-called “policy advocacy imperialism” over cultural communication, the aborted *Stanton Panel Report* in 1975 was a futile and desperate effort to coordinate the two specialized functions.

For other countries that have ministries, such as the foreign ministry and the cultural ministry, carry on the functions, the coordination task becomes more critical, given that governmental organizations tend to seek bureaucratic self-interest. Some countries organize public diplomacy such that embassies are specialized in policy advocacy under the supervision of foreign ministry, while cultural centers or specialized public diplomacy agencies conduct cultural communication under the guidance of a culture ministry or an independent public diplomacy ministry. To solve this problem, Leonard (2002) called for a close coordination among diverse governmental and semi-governmental agencies engaging in public diplomacy.

Roughly a third of the embassies in Washington, D.C., outsource many public diplomacy functions to local public relations firms. Outsourcing varies from simple execution of media relations and lobbying to integration and orchestration of the strategic planning of communication programs. The extent to which public diplomacy functions are relegated outside, however, is not known and nor is the degree of integration.

This integration principle leads to another closely-related principle: *public relations is a management function separate from other functions*. For communication,

integration would not be even imaginable without a separate and independent public relations function or unit. By the same token, integration of specialized public diplomacy functions would not be possible if public diplomacy is not a separate management function.

The next two principles involve organizational culture: *a symmetric system of internal communication and diversity embodied in all roles*. Although these principles seem to be less relevant, compared to the other principles in the context of public diplomacy, they directly affect the other excellence principles and eventually, communication excellence.

Focusing on the effect of organizational culture, Sriramesh, J. Grunig, and Buffington (1992) identified authoritarian and participative cultures. An authoritarian culture produces a closed-system approach to management, which results in minimal input of outside information into the dominant coalition. Exchange of information is discouraged, as is the amalgamation of diverse perspectives from environmental scanning into the decision-making process.

An authoritarian culture and structure hinder strategic management within an organization. Members of the organization are deprived of opportunities for participation and self-expression. Gradually, they become conservative and avoid new thinking and innovation. On the other hand, in a participative culture, everything proceeds in the opposite way.

Related to organizational culture, gender diversity also affects excellence in organizational communication. It has emerged as an imperative in the management of public relations departments. The U.S. Department of Commerce (1998) reported that as

of 1997, women constituted nearly 65.7% of the public relations labor force in the nation (Toth, 2000).

Today it is hard to envision any public relations department without a majority of women practitioners. Without developing and supporting a female labor force, an organization cannot be effective. Feminization of the public relations profession directly links the role and status of women practitioners to the likelihood of empowerment in public relations services and, hence, to excellence in communication.

When women practitioners are discriminated against and marginalized, then so is the role and status of the public relations function. In fact, the public diplomacy profession has also been experiencing this same feminization trend. A brief survey of the gender composition of public diplomacy practitioners at embassies in Washington, D.C., clearly reveals this trend. As of December, 2003, according to the Internet home pages of embassies, nearly all public diplomacy units have women heads or a majority of women practitioners. In fact, the public diplomacy units of the Royal Danish and Finish embassies consist entirely of women heads and women practitioners.

Dozier, J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1995) compared, in their Excellence study, the most excellent and least excellent organizations in terms of three categories: the existence of nondiscrimination policies for women, the existence of a supportive work environment for women, and the existence of mentoring and advancement programs for women. They reported that, generally, the most excellent organizations outperform the least excellent organizations in each category of support for women employees.

Feminist scholars offer insights into why the presence of a supportive culture for women contributes to organizational effectiveness. Effectiveness is achieved not because

women practitioners are a majority but because they add positive value to organizations. Wetherell (1989) pointed out that feminine values are linked to a two-way symmetrical model of public relations, which invokes cooperation, collaboration, and relationship building.

Helgesen (1990) added that the propensities of cooperation and collaboration might be defined as female because such skills have been nurtured in the private, domestic sphere where women have been historically relegated. Scholars also suggest that women's communication and management styles are more appropriate for fostering cooperation and collaboration and ultimately contribute to organizational effectiveness.

Conceptualization of Excellence in Public Diplomacy

Up to now, I have delineated the theoretical convergence between excellence in public relations and excellence in public diplomacy. Through an application of the Excellence theory, excellence in public diplomacy can be conceptualized to share the same principles that excellence in public relations has. Following are the 10 newly conceptualized principles of excellence in public diplomacy:

1. Involvement of public diplomacy in strategic management of foreign policy.
2. Empowerment of public diplomacy.
3. Integrated public diplomacy function.
4. Public diplomacy is a management function separate from other functions.
5. The public diplomacy unit or agency is headed by a manager rather than a technician.
6. Two-way symmetric model of public diplomacy.
7. A symmetric system of internal communication.

8. The public diplomacy unit or agency has knowledge for practicing the managerial role and symmetric public diplomacy.

9. Diversity

10. Ethics.

In this study, however, I studied only eight principles of the 10: involvement, empowerment, integration, two-way symmetrical communication, symmetrical internal communication, knowledge, diversity, and ethics. Two principles—separated management function and manager head—were excluded. Investigating the principle of integration of specialized public diplomacy functions would substitute for testing the two principles of separate management and manager head. Integration of the functions should require, as a prerequisite, a section or department in charge of integration to exercise a management function.

When the section or department assumes a management function, the section becomes independent and separate from other sections and its head is likely to be a manager. Moreover, unlike a corporation in which the marketing department other than the public relations department sometimes assumes the integrating role, the public diplomacy department in an embassy must be the only integrator.

Embassies, along with governmental agencies, do not have a marketing department. Thus, testing the integration principle would amount to testing the two principles of public diplomacy as a separate management function and manager head.

In testing the empirical convergence between excellence in public diplomacy and excellence in public relations, I further narrowed five principles: involvement, integration, symmetrical communication, knowledge, symmetrical internal

communication. I made this decision to deal with problems of a small sample, which are discussed in detail in chapter III on methodology. Lijpart (1971) described the principal problem in macro-comparative research as “many variables but small number of cases” (p. 685) and suggested model parsimony as a solution. As a macro-comparative study, this dissertation faced the problem.

Of the five principles, involvement, knowledge, symmetrical communication, and integration are the core of excellence in communication management (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002; Doizer, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1995). Rhee (2001) selected involvement, empowerment, knowledge, and symmetrical communication in isolating the second-order single Excellence factor.

To conclude, in empirically examining the theoretical convergence, I constructed a second-order, five-factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy, which has the five excellence principles as the first-order factors.

Research Question 2: Is the Excellence theory transferable to public diplomacy; that is, does the second-order, five-factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy fit well with public diplomacy data from embassies in Washington, D.C.?

Comparative Public Diplomacy

Herman (1978) posited that “in order to attempt to understand, explain, or forecast something, one must first be clear about what that something is” (p. 25). Drawing upon the model and excellence convergence, that something in public diplomacy became clear through the application of the Excellence study. Here, that something is public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy.

The application of the Excellence study introduced a way to conceptualize, operationalize, and measure the two focal dependent variables in public diplomacy research. Comparative theory building in any discipline is not possible before its core dependent variables are firmly anchored. With the groundwork complete, one is ready to embark on the task of theorizing on what independent variables affect or are responsible for variations in the dependent variables and specifying the theoretical linkages between both variables.

A government's international communication—public diplomacy—is part of its general foreign policy behavior and decision-making process. Thus, I believe that theory building for comparative public diplomacy should start from the perspective of international relations, including foreign policy analysis. I based theory building for comparative public diplomacy on, specifically, comparative foreign policy (CFP), an approach of foreign policy analysis (Hudson & Vore, 1995).

Originating from Rosenau's (1966) call for general theory, the approach has attempted to build a grand unified theory that explains a variety of foreign policy behaviors across different types of countries. On the road to development of a grand theory, middle-range theories have been proposed to mediate grand principles and any complexities imposed by the great diversity of country contexts that exist. Countries are classified into types based on several structural factors. Rosenau proposed three such factors: magnitude of size, level of economic development, and degree of political accountability.

In addition, Rosenau (1966) presented a schema for categorizing all possible independent variables influencing foreign policy into one of five variables clusters:

idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic. The dependent variable, foreign policy, is conceptualized into a behavioral construct—a foreign policy event—with its behavioral dimensions being systematically coded and aggregated. After event data are generated, middle-range theories are tested empirically and statistically in order to specify causal relationships between a set of independent variables at multiple levels and different types of foreign policy.

Some exemplar research programs in this tradition include the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project (East, Salmore, & Herman, 1978) and the Interstate Behavior Analysis (IBA) project (Wilkenfeld, Hopple, Rossa, & Andriole, 1980).

Of a number of independent variables, I chose societal culture, political system, interest group system, and interstate dependence to investigate the empirical linkages between the variables and public diplomacy behavior/ management.

In contrast to the three other variables, the interest group system has not gained as much scholarly attention in foreign policy analysis as it has in comparative politics. A few existing works from the perspective of foreign policy analysis studied the relationship between foreign aid policy and the welfare state (Imbeau, 1989; Noel & Therien, 1995). The latter subject, the welfare state, is closely related to the interest group system. Some other works have identified foreign policy behaviors—foreign aid and mediating international conflicts—with a group of Scandinavian and Northern European countries where societal corporatism prevails (Pratt, 1990).

I included the interest group system because it has theoretical significance for foreign policy behavior and decision-making processes. Governments of welfare and

societal corporatist countries enact their domestic intervention roles for social security and harmony in a similar way in the international system. They are active in providing foreign aid and mediating international conflicts. Moreover, the governments' decision-making processes in the foreign policy area must be similar to those in the domestic policy area, which are embedded in a web of consultation and integration among governmental agencies and interest groups (Heclo, 1978; Pross, 1986).

The set of independent (contextual) variables in this study has three domestic national attributes (societal culture, political system, and interest group system) and one relational external variable (interstate dependence). These variables should allow a thick and intensive inquiry of the empirical linkages between the contextual variables and public diplomacy behavior and management.

Studies (e.g., Lane & Ersson, 2002) suggested that although societal culture, the political system, and the interest group system overlap, they are also distinct from each other. Although some countries share a similar cultural profile, they may have different political systems, with certain countries being more or less democratic because of different historical experiences.

A further divergence among the same democratic countries may follow such that some countries become more corporatist while others become more pluralist in their interest politics. Investigating societal culture may generate a broad picture of the process in which a government's public diplomacy is conditioned. Moreover, investigating the political system and interest group system would offer a more detailed and specific explanation of the big picture.

Up to now, I have introduced the comparative foreign policy (CFP) approach as a theoretical framework for theory building and for the testing of hypotheses on comparative public diplomacy. However, I have not introduced in depth the ways in which the contextual variables of a government affect its foreign policy behavior and decision-making processes.

The foreign policy contexts approach (Holsti, 1970; Sampson III & Walker, 1987; Shih, 1988; Wish, 1987, 1980) in foreign policy analysis sheds light on the relations between the contextual variables and foreign policy behavior. The approach has the central notion that the background attributes contextualize the psycho-cultural milieu of decision-makers in foreign policy and frame their outlook on the international system and their scripts for action in the system. In other words, the decision-makers enact world affairs through their cultural lenses, externalizing their value and preference systems onto public diplomacy behavior.

Holsti (1970) argued, in his role theory, that socialization processes of elites serve as a salient context for evaluating foreign policy decision-making. He laid out a process in which social and cultural characteristics affect a national role conception of the elites and, in turn, determines foreign policy behavior.

The national role concept “bridges between the general beliefs held in a society and the beliefs of the foreign policy decision makers” on the world system (Hudson & Vore, 1995, p. 226). Role conception is regarded as the decision-makers’ worldview, which incorporates culturally imbued assumptions and images of the international system and the roles, norms, and strategies that the nation should pursue in the system.

Subsequent studies have shown that differences in role conceptions can, indeed, lead to differences in foreign policy behavior. Wish (1980) discovered that differences in role conceptions correspond to variations in four kinds of foreign policy behavior: international participation, hostility, independence of action, and resource commitment.

Similarly, Wish (1980), using multidimensional scaling analysis, uncovered two dimensions in national role conceptions by 29 decision makers from 17 nations: power status (high-low) and motivational orientation (cooperative-competitive). Later on, Wish (1987) developed her analysis of role conception into a capability-motivation model of role conception.

Her model specified and tested theoretical associations between two national attributes (size and level of economic development and political orientation) and 10 attributes of national role conception: dominance, influence domain, individualistic, competitive, change, territorial, ideological, diplomatic, universalistic, and economic.

A country high in power status was hypothesized to strongly motivate the decision-makers to dominate and influence other countries, to make them competitive with a wider range of issues and stuck to the status quo and concerned with more territorial and ideological issues. A democratic country was theorized to possess a more universalistic value orientation, more involved in diplomatic issues, and more interested in cooperation than competition and conflict.

Through correlation analysis, Wish (1987) reported evidence supporting the national attribute-role conception hypotheses in which two national attributes, power status and political system, were used to investigate associations with national role conception.

Aside from power status and the political system, the effect of a country's culture on its role conception has been studied (Sampson & Walker, 1987; Shih, 1988). Shih (1988) has extensively discussed the diversity of Chinese cultural traditions such as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism as the sources of the country's national role conceptions.

Samson and Walker (1987) provided insight into how culture indirectly affects role conceptions by comparing the French and Japanese national role conceptions and characteristics of organizational decision-making process. All other conditions were assumed equal except for culture. General or societal culture was hypothesized to directly mold organizational culture and characteristics of the decision-making process inside governmental agencies responsible for foreign affairs.

The organizational culture and characteristics were, in turn, assumed to affect role conception in the minds of decision-makers. Collectivist societal culture in Japan creates organizational norms such as consensus and harmony seeking. These norms then elicit a set of national roles strongly associated with collectivism. On the other hand, French individualist culture is conducive to organizational norms and, accordingly; national role conceptions are organizational when compared to Japanese counterparts.

In sum, the foreign policy contexts approach views the ways that a government's contextual variables influence foreign policy behavior as a two-step process in which the variables indirectly affect foreign policy behavior through the decision-makers' worldview.

In contrast to the indirect process, the contextual variables directly frame

a government's foreign policy decision-making processes, and thus the organizational process and structure inside foreign policy decision-making agencies such as the foreign ministry. Comparative management theorists have studied how national attributes affect organizational process and structure. Societal culture has received much attention as a powerful explanatory variable of why organizations in different countries differ in management.

Other contextual variables such as the political system and interest group system have an impact on the decision-making process. The two attributes, by their nature, have a greater impact on the organizational process and structure of a government than on that of other types of organizations. Moreover, the variable of dependence should affect the decision-making process, also.

Following are the theoretical logics linking the four contextual variables in this study with the dimensions of public diplomacy behavior and the excellence principles of public diplomacy.

Culture

Scholars have different views on the meaning of a nation's culture, which serves as a factor forming national worldview of foreign policy decision-makers and thus affects foreign policy and public diplomacy behavior. Behavioralists believe that an individual's behavior and attitude can be explained by the person's psychological characteristics (i.e., personality). Personality, in this sense, is the individual predisposition, which influences a person's behavior and distinguishes that individual from others.

A national predisposition can be conceived of as the psychological characteristics of a nation, those attributes that distinguish it from other nations. Behind this statement is

an observation that members of a group who share economic, political, and other aspects of life are psychologically different collectively from those who do not share the same experiences.

The group not only refers to a nation but also to all kinds of collective human entities such as a family. National predisposition can be roughly defined as the psychological attributes shared by a national population, a group of people having a sovereign government and inhabiting a circumscribed geographical area (Farber, 1959).

The first scientific attempt to capture national predispositions was made by the so-called national character studies popular between the 1930s and 1950s. Despite conceptual confusion, a widely agreed-upon definition was that “national character refers to relatively enduring personality characteristics and patterns that are modal among the adult members of a society” (Inkeles, 1961, p. 173).

Methodologically, scholars believed that a modal personality—typical personality, which represents the personality trait or pattern with the greatest frequency—is the national character. However, the use of modality yielded more problems than promises. The most frustrating findings were that the members of a nation are more different from each other than from the members of other nations being compared. That is, within group variance is far greater than between group variance.

Also, modality meant bi- or multi-modality, especially in nations with complex ethnic configurations. Another flaw came from a conceptual confusion that the building block, personality, was treated vaguely although several efforts followed (Inkeles, 1953; Terhune, 1970) in an attempt to specify the concept so as to make it more analytically useful.

Inkeles (1953) re-specified personality to be social personality. Social personality refers to the systems of beliefs, the attitudes, and the values an individual forms through socialization. Social personality is more amenable and appropriate to national character theory than “core personality,” a deeper personality that originates from individuals’ unique upbringing (Terhune, 1970, pp. 207-208).

Naturally, some scholars had an interest in the relationship between national character and foreign policy (Hennessy, 1962; Terhune, 1970); as a result of conceptual and methodological limitations, their thrust to identify the interface between national predisposition and foreign policy remained embryonic. In addition, the then-mainstream actor-general theory in international relations helped suffocate this new research direction.

Field theory argues that it is not domestic conditions but rather systemic conditions such as the balance of power in the international systems that determine foreign policy orientation and behavior of states. Field theory was prevalent during the Cold War, but it waned near the end of the War. Proliferation of ethnic and nationalistic conflicts at the end of the 20th century rekindled interest in the interface between culture (ethnicity) and foreign policy.

Focusing on societal culture, Hudson and her associates (1997) initiated a program of research to capture national predisposition and its relations with foreign policy behavior. Studies of national and organizational culture in anthropology, social psychology, and management contributed greatly to correction of the conceptual and methodological flaws that had plagued national character studies.

Organizational anthropologist Hofstede (2001) discussed how the contemporary national culture study conceptually and methodologically addresses problems with the

national character study. Generally speaking, national culture studies measure social personality in terms of value systems. Instead of using singular or plural modal points, these studies interpret the entire distributional pattern to discern cultural difference among nations.

Hofstede (1984) defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another” (p. 21). His definition is, however, only one of a myriad of definitions of culture. As Hudson (1997) astutely pointed out, conceptions of culture have become so inclusive and holistic that they mean everything and, at the same time, nothing. To preserve analytical utility of the culture concept, she proposed breaking culture down into three major facets: “culture as the organization of meaning, culture as value preferences, and culture as templates for human strategy” (pp. 7-9).

It is the very conception of culture as templates for human strategy that offers a strong theoretical logic of the interface between a nation’s culture and its foreign policy behavior and thus, public diplomacy behavior. Definitions focusing on the programming, training, and cultivation aspects of culture argue that culture as shared preference cannot be a sufficient explanatory variable of actual behavior.

Echoing this point, Hofstede (2001) further explained culture as “the interactive aggregate of common characteristics that influence a human group’s response to environment” (p. 10). Hudson (1997) added a succinct point that “what culture provides its members is a repertoire or palette of adaptive responses from which members build off-the-shelf strategies of action” (p. 9).

Templates for action to which the members of a culture are conditioned must be available guidelines for interaction with out-groups and the external environment. In this sense, ethnocentrism is the default condition. Hudson (1997) went on to assert that individuals will play the game their culture has conditioned them to play and they will play it well. More explicitly, Linton (1945) argued that “individuals tend to imitate the culture patterns of their own society when confronted by a new situation” (p. 104).

It is not unusual to hear how awkward travelers and businessmen abroad look in the eyes of local people. Studies of international negotiation styles have revealed that the negotiation styles of governments reflect their country’s societal culture (Shih, 1993). Kunczik (1990) provided a vivid episode of how a country’s public diplomacy behavior can be programmed by scripts for action in the country’s culture. He described an incident in which an Indian ambassador to the United States visited and threatened the *New York Times* when the paper criticized the Indian government’s stance in the Kashmir dispute, just as he would do with domestic media outlets in India.

As culture manifests its effects at the individual level, these same effects should exist at the collective level. Culture programs the collective enactment of international reality among foreign policy decision-makers. Through consultation and discourse a nation’s grand foreign policy orientation and strategy will emerge.

Hofstede (2001, 1984) has done the most comprehensive work on the relations between societal culture and management (organizational process and structure) and made the strongest case for cultural consequences on comparative management. Also, cultural consequences have ignited an on-going research program on in public relations research (i.e., comparative public relations) (Culbertson & Chen, 1996; Sriramesh &

Vercic, 2003). Comparative public relations has inquired about the relationships between culture and excellence in public relations.

Sriramesh and White (1992) called attention to the relationship between culture and the management of organizational communication, tapping into Hofstede's (1984) four dimensions of culture. They proposed that "societal cultures that display lower levels of power distance, authoritarianism, and individualism, but have higher levels of interpersonal trust among workers, are most likely to develop the excellent public relations practices" (p. 611).

J. Grunig (1994) elaborated on the theoretical linkages between each of Hofstede's four dimensions and each of the principles of Excellence in public relations. Rhee (1999) reported that the four dimensions of culture and most of the Excellence principles are empirically related to each other. Her correlation analyses revealed that power distance is negatively and significantly correlated with an index of excellence in public relations. The characteristic of support for public relations from the dominant coalition was shown to be negatively associated with power distance, $r = -.34^{**}$, $p = .001$.

For the most part, the study of cultural consequences on organizational management has been overly concerned with one particular type of organization, (i.e., corporation). There has been a paucity of research on cultural consequences on foreign policy organizations. Sampson III (1987) and Zurovchak's (1997) works, however, have pioneered the study of cultural consequences on organizational process and structure inside foreign policy organizations.

The foreign ministry is the organization in many countries that is responsible for public diplomacy. Through a comparative study of Japanese and French foreign

ministries, Sampson III (1987) showed that cultural consequences on corporate management still hold true with foreign policy management or decision-making process. According to him, differences in organizational decision-making processes between these two foreign ministries are congruent with differences in their corporate management and societal culture.

Zurovchak (1997) investigated differences in decision-making processes between the Czech Republic's and Slovakia's foreign ministries. Applying Hofstede's (2001) four dimensions of culture, he hypothesized that differences in societal culture would produce differences in foreign policy decision-making processes. He found evidence for hypotheses on the effects of two of Hofstede's dimensions—individualism/collectivism and power distance.

According to Zurovchak (1997), the two countries—Slovakia and the Czech Republic—had only small difference on the scores of Hofstede's four dimensions, but the small difference resulted in great differences in organizational decision-making processes inside their foreign ministries. He concluded that “even a small difference in culture is influential enough to make a big difference in the foreign policy decision-making process” (p. 126).

Insights from Sampson III's (1987) and Zurovchak's (1997) works are not limited to the foreign ministry. Cultural consequences on organizational process should exist in any governmental organization, regardless of whether it is the foreign ministry, culture ministry, specialized governmental agency, half-governmental public diplomacy agency, or even embassies abroad.

Having established the theoretical linkage between national culture and public diplomacy behavior, the next step is put this proposition to empirical test by investigating whether variations in national culture produce variations in public diplomacy. Prior to this test, one must know and measure how different and similar national cultures are. This requires a framework for comparison of national cultures.

As Hofstede (2001) underscored, comparing national cultures assumes that there must be common properties that allow for comparisons to be drawn between national cultures. The comparison framework is the researcher's theoretical construct imposed across national cultures. According to Hofstede, this etic approach to understanding culture involves "the application of general, poly-cultural classification schemes." This stands in contrast to the emic approach, "the study of unique and specific wholes" (p. 25).

Scholars who use the etic approach generally conceptualize common properties through dimensional continua upon which national cultures are placed for comparison (Crozier & Thoenig, 1976; Hofstede, 2001, 1984; Tayeb, 1988). Hofstede's (2001, 1984) four-dimension framework is among the more popular works. He argued that national cultures can easily reveal their differences and similarities through clustering patterns on his four dimensions of culture: individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity-femininity. Hofstede (2001) used his four-dimensional framework to compare 80 national cultures. He conducted a comprehensive statistical analysis of how cultural differences are related to other differences in nations' societal, political, and economical characteristics.

Below, I will theorize on the associations that Hofstede's four dimensions of culture might have with the dimensions of public diplomacy behavior and the excellence principles of public diplomacy.

Individualism/collectivism. This dimension is the construct used most by culture scholars. It captures the degree to which members of a group feel independent from or dependent upon each other. Individualist cultures show a high degree of independence, while collectivist cultures express a high degree of dependence. Collectivist cultures emphasize group goals and group harmony, collaboration, and consensus.

Individualist cultures value personal goals, achievement, and competition. Hui and Triandis (1986) explained that collectivists are more concerned about the impact of their actions upon the other members of group, are more willing to share resources, and are likely to feel involved in the lives of other members.

According to Leung, Fernandez-Dols, and Iwawaki (1992), individualist and collectivist cultures differ in their styles of conflict management. Leung et al. reported that collectivist cultures prefer harmony-enhancing procedures, negotiation, and compliance when dealing with conflicts. Individualist cultures, on the other hand, prefer procedures involving threat, accusation, and ignoring, all of which are confrontational in nature.

Given the logic of this dimension, one can hypothesize that nations with collectivist cultures form a set of scripts for actions from their worldviews, such as interdependence, collaboration, harmony, negotiation, and solidarity. Conversely, nations with individualist cultures can be hypothesized to externalize an opposite set of scripts, such as independence, competition, confrontation, and individual responsibility. In theory,

nations with collectivist cultures are more likely to pursue cosmopolitan interests over national self-interests—the path that nations with individualist cultures are likely to pursue.

One cannot assume naively that collectivist norms will be replicated intact in the international system in the same way that they operate within a society or nation. The individualism-collectivism dimension essentially refers to the relationship between an individual and his or her in-group, and it corresponds to the distinction between a self-centric orientation vs. a collective or group-centric orientation.

Concerning foreign policy behavior, the norms that govern relationships with out-groups (other nations) are, however, more relevant than norms for in-group relationships within their own country. Hofstede (2001) suggested that another dimension—particularism and universalism—represents inter-group relationships, and he argued that collectivist and individualist culture correspond to particularism and universalism, respectively. Particularism means that following social norms is contingent upon group membership; universalism means that the same norms should be applied to everyone regardless of group membership.

According to Hofstede (2001), in collectivist cultures, “attitudes toward others depend on their group membership, and relationships with colleagues are cooperative for in-group members but hostile for out-group” (p. 236). In contrast, in an individualist culture, “attitudes toward others are independent of group membership, and relationships with colleagues do not depend on group identity” (p. 224). Parsons and Shils (1951) also observed that an individualist culture believes that “value standards should apply to all,”

while a collective culture sees that “value standards differ for in-group and out-groups” (as cited in Hofstede, 2001, p. 227)

Hwang (1987) discussed the consequences of Confucian particularism on relationships with out-groups. The relationship between the particularism/universalism dimension with out-groups suggests profound implications for the worldviews of nations and public diplomacy behavior. In a Confucian culture, people have a highly developed sense of obligation toward the members of their in-group; but they have a weak sense of duty, social responsibility, and obligation to the members of out-groups that are viewed as impersonal social entities.

The dominant norm for inter-group relationships in a collectivist culture is equity, which generally is demonstrated as an instrumental relationship, established and maintained only as long as costs do not exceed benefits. The norm of equity is likely to lead to a preference for equitable rather than egalitarian outcomes. No gaining, no giving. Hwang (1987) went on to say that this preference can explain why the Chinese appear less helpful toward strangers than Americans.

Confucians are bound by social obligation to help others who need help in the social groups to which they belong but are not necessarily helpful toward strangers. When an organization in a Confucian society perceives the public to be diffused and remote and thus a group of strangers with no visible relevance to the organization, it is not willing to be unconditionally constructive in promoting social relationships with the public. As long as the organization maintains sharp in-group and out-group distinctions, it is less likely that the organization will achieve quality relationships with diffused publics.

Another far-reaching consequence of collective particularism can be seen in the conflict management area. In contrast to how in-group conflicts are handled, Confucians who perceive social exchange (equity) relationships with strangers to be unfair, seldom quarrel overtly with other parties. This is especially true when the quarrel is justified as a defense of in-group interests.

Bond and S. Wang (1982) suggested that Confucians tend to discourage and inhibit aggressive outbursts in order to maintain interpersonal harmony within their group, but their collective acts of aggression toward a stigmatized out-group might be drastic and even exaggerated for the sake of serving in-group purposes. If organizations and publics in collectivist cultures view out-group members as strangers and do not see links between each other, there can be severe conflicts that are difficult to resolve.

Therefore, in reality, governments from collectivist cultures are more likely to pursue in-group interests (i.e., national interests or nationalism), over cosmopolitan interests and lack the sense of global responsibility and ethical obligation to all humans regardless of their nationality. Scripts for harmony seeking and collaboration are not warranted in their default national worldviews.

No hypotheses concerning relations between collectivism and public diplomacy behavior, however, can be proposed with absolute confidence. Driven by globalization and the emergence of the “global village,” the distinction between the in-group (one’s own nation) and out-groups (other nations and people) may be slowly dissolving. Collectivism in the minds of foreign policy elites in collectivist cultures is being diluted to accommodate the new global reality of complex interrelatedness.

Some collectivist cultures, because of their open and trade-oriented economic systems, are riding and will ride the globalization trend, embracing out-groups and adopting them into their in-groups. Other collectivist cultures, however, may backpedal and develop sharper distinctions between in-group and out-group. Thus, one needs more information in order to confidently hypothesize about how governments from collectivist cultures behave and communicate abroad.

Hofstede (2001) showed that individualism is highly correlated with Schwartz's (1994) two attitudes of intellectual autonomy and egalitarian commitment. These can play an important role in inter-group relationships. Intellectual autonomy comprises such values as "broad-mindedness; egalitarian commitment consists of loyalty, equality, freedom, responsibility, social justice, world at peace, and helpfulness" (as cited in Hofstede, p. 221).

Universalism in individualist cultures might work as a force behind egalitarian commitment and cosmopolitanism. Individualist cultures also might project, as expected from ethnocentric application of norms, into their national worldviews a set of individualist norms and scripts such as independence, competition, individual goals and interests over group interests (i.e., nationalism). As with collectivism, this situation does not allow for confident hypotheses on the relations between individualism and public diplomacy behavior.

To conclude, regarding the relations between the dimension of individualism/collectivism and the behavior's two dimensions (symmetry and ethics), the current theoretical status permits only exploration of the relations, not hypothesis testing.

Research Question 3: How does the dimension of collectivism/individualism affect the symmetry and ethical dimensions of public diplomacy behavior at embassies in Washington, D.C.?

In contrast, one can confidently hypothesize about the relationships between the dimension of collectivism/individualism and the channel dimension (interpersonal vs. mediated) of public diplomacy behavior. Lee (1983) said that Confucian Koreans seek to build personal relationships even in public relationships such as those of business or other transactions. They make frequent personal contacts and have common experiences through sports, drinking, or travel. Lee's discussion suggests that collectivism is interrelated with heavy use of the interpersonal channel.

Supporting this proposition, Huang (1997) reported that the interpersonal channel characterized the public relations practices of the Executive Yuan of Taiwan. Rhee (1999) added further evidence for the association of the collective dimension with use of the interpersonal channel in her study of South Korea. She reported that collectivism was correlated with use of the interpersonal channel with statistical significance but not with use of the mediated channel. Hofstede (2001) pointed that "knowing the right people is most important for a career" (p. 226) in collectivist cultures.

Hypothesis 1: Embassies from collectivist countries are more likely to use the interpersonal channel than their counterparts from individualist countries in their public diplomacy behavior.

As with public diplomacy behavior, the collectivism/individualism dimension should have effects on the ways that public diplomacy is managed (excellence in public diplomacy). Collectivist cultures appreciate and value interdependence; whereas,

independence is applauded in individualist cultures. Belief in interdependence places group interests and well-being over individual interests and well-being. Individual initiative, freedom, competition, and confrontation are accepted as normal in individualist cultures. But collectivist cultures refrain from breaking group harmony, opting for negotiation and compromise over harsh conflict.

Organizational decision-making procedures in collectivist cultures reflect consensus more than the majority rule. Consensus cannot exist without information sharing and consultation during every stage of the organizational decision-making process. Sampson III (1987) discussed a Japanese organizational practice of *ringesi* as an example of a collectivist consensus making procedure.

In *ringesi*, documents necessary for a decision are circulated among all relevant people within an organization, eliciting ideas from each person prior to the finalization of the documents. Hofstede (2001) pointed that individualist cultures see withholding information as a key to organizational success while sharing information is considered to be a key to success in collectivist cultures.

This consensus-seeking and information-sharing feature of a collectivist culture should have direct bearing on *the two principles of excellence in public diplomacy: integrated public diplomacy function and symmetric system of internal communication*.

In theory, specialized public diplomacy units or agencies from countries with individualist cultures should compete with each other for administrative power and budget. In contrast, those specialized agencies from collectivist cultures should work closely together, maintaining collaborative and symmetrical inter-agency communication.

However, one may doubt that there is a sharp distinction between in-group and out-group among specialized agencies and units from collectivist governments, brewing more competition and information-withdrawal than coordination and information sharing. The agencies, however, would conceive of themselves as in-group members more than as out-group members. The collectivist mindset should serve intra- and inter-agency communication well, especially in building a symmetrical system of internal communication inside an agency.

The effects of individualism/collectivism on excellence in public diplomacy can be hypothesized as following:

Hypothesis 2: Embassies from countries with collectivist cultures are more likely to integrate specialized public diplomacy functions as well as have symmetrical internal communication than their counterparts from countries with individual cultures.

Power distance. This dimension concerns the ways in which different cultures deal with inequality in power, prestige, and wealth. Specifically, it refers to how much inequality members of a society will accept. The smaller acceptable inequality is the smaller power distance, and vice versa.

The concept of power-distance was devised as a measure of the interpersonal power or influence between B [boss] and S [subordinate] in the workplace (Hofstede, 1984). That is, the concept was about interpersonal power at the within-group level. Hofstede, however, applied measures of power-distance in the workplace to understanding national cultures and even national political systems.

Egalitarianism is the norm in societies, that are characterized by small power distance, while hierarchical stratification is the de facto organizing principle in societies

with high power distance. Hofstede (2001, pp. 98, 116) further discussed the consequences of power distance on societal norms and politics. In a low power distance culture, people believe that “inequality should be minimized,” “government is frequently led by parties stressing equality, usually social democrats,” and “political parties exist and tend to be in the center with relatively weak left and right wings.”

In cultures having small power distance, attitude toward authority becomes so democratic that people are not afraid to challenge it. Authority or power is decentralized; and, consequently, interpersonal trust is high in such cultures. The opposite is the case for societies with high power distance; power is so centralized that any challenge to authority is rarely acceptable and people distrust each other.

In sum, cultures with small power distance are likely to instill into the minds of foreign policy decision-makers symmetrical, egalitarian scripts for both political and economic action. Governments from low power distance cultures are also likely to recognize a sense of global responsibility as a way to diminish economic inequality in the world. In contrast, cultures marked by high power distance should implant asymmetrical, hierarchical scripts of action in the decision-makers’ worldview. For them, economic inequality in the world might be regarded as something inevitable.

Hypothesis 3: Embassies from countries with small power distance are more likely to practice symmetrical and ethical public diplomacy than their counterparts from countries with high power distance cultures.

Power distance also should affect the management side of public diplomacy. Cultures with small power distance view individuals as being equal; cultures with high power distance, on the other hand, view individuals as being unequal. The dimension

concerns the relationships and the nature of vertical communication between superiors and subordinates. Organizational hierarchy exists even in cultures with small power distance; it is, however, less rigid and steep than that in cultures with high power distance.

From the perspective of organizational behavior, power distance should have a wide range of consequences for the four principles of excellence in public diplomacy: *involvement of public diplomacy in strategic management of diplomacy, empowerment of public diplomacy in the dominant coalition in charge of diplomacy, symmetric system of internal communication, and diversity.*

Power and authority are centralized in cultures with high power distance. This leads to a centralized decision-making process in which only a handful of members of the dominant coalition are allowed to participate and most members of an organization are excluded from the process.

J. Grunig (1994) said that “senior management [in cultures with high power distance] would seem less likely to treat public relations managers as equals—thus relegating public relations to a technical support function and excluding it from strategic management”(p. 47).

In cultures with high power distance, the dominant coalition in charge of foreign policy do not tend to make the most of the public diplomacy function in formulating strategic foreign policy. The public diplomacy function would be called into service for traditional diplomacy only on the stage of executing foreign policy and not on the planning stage.

When there is high power distance, the head of a public diplomacy agency or department should have little chance to be a member of the dominant coalition, receive

budgetary or personnel support, or achieve recognition for the function through high-level promotions. The public diplomacy function, however, should be empowered inside a government from a culture with small power distance.

In addition, as the organizational decision-making process becomes open to subordinates in cultures with small power distance, subordinates are offered autonomy and encouraged to express their own ideas and even to disagree with the dominant coalition. Democratic norms take root in organizational culture; and multiple, diverse ideas are respected, nurturing the diversity principle of excellence in public diplomacy.

Hofstede (2001) pointed out that the dominant coalition in cultures with small power distance becomes democratic, relying on support from subordinates and seeking consultative leadership as an open decision-making process develops. Zurovchak (1997) added that subordinates feel strong self-efficacy and actively and responsibly participate in organizational decision-making process. The emergence of democratic leadership should be conducive to the Excellence principle of a symmetrical system of internal communication.

The effects of power distance on excellence in public diplomacy can be hypothesized as following:

Hypothesis 4: Embassies from countries with low power distance are more likely to involve the public diplomacy function in the execution and making of foreign policy, empowering the function, enhancing diversity and providing symmetrical internal communication than their counterparts from countries with high power distance.

Uncertainty avoidance. Universally, people tend to avoid uncertainty since it produces anxiety. Different cultures, however, differ in the degree to which they tolerate

uncertainty. Some cultures are more tolerant of uncertain and ambiguous situations. But others are less so. According to Vercic, L. Grunig, and J. Grunig (1996), cultures with high uncertainty avoidance find risky, untested ideas to be anathema. Consequently, these cultures prefer tradition and the status quo to innovation and change.

Conversely, cultures characterized by low uncertainty avoidance more easily tolerate ambiguity and diversity and downplay bipolar language such as “black or white” and “right or wrong” (p. 49). They are less ideological, dogmatic, and self-righteous; and they are more likely to support mutual respect, negotiation, and adaptation. Moreover, there is a widely shared belief in low uncertainty avoidance cultures that one’s “own truth should not be imposed on others, and compromising with opponents is safe.” In contrast, people in high cultures believe that “there is only one truth, and we have it,” and that “compromising with opponents is dangerous” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 180-181).

Hofstede (2001) also stressed the linkage between uncertainty avoidance and xenophobia. In low uncertainty avoidance cultures, xenophobia is weak such that “other races are accepted as neighbors, and immigrants are tolerated.” But in high uncertainty cultures, “other races and immigrants are rejected” (p. 180).

Logically, national cultures with low avoidance are likely to have a worldview that includes a set of scripts of action such as win-win, diplomacy, open system, and moving-equilibrium. National cultures with high avoidance, on the other hand, are likely to have scripts of action such as win-lose, dogmatic, closed system, conservative, and status quo. Thus, when worldview is colored by a low avoidance culture, the government should have a strong affinity with the symmetry dimension of public diplomacy behavior.

Hypothesis 5: Embassies from countries with a low uncertainty avoidance culture are more likely to practice symmetrical public diplomacy behavior than their counterparts from countries with high avoidance cultures.

As an essential part of excellence in public diplomacy, participation in strategic management should be less likely in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance. Such a culture would hinder the development of strategic management because organizations encountering high uncertainty avoidance tend not to see benefits from strategic management. The primary objective of strategic management is to embrace rather than avoid uncertainty in the environment. Strategic management presupposes an open system and a moving equilibrium that requires information exchange with other systems in the environment.

Cultures with low uncertainty avoidance should have an affinity with an open system; organizations in these cultures are not afraid to exchange information, explore new ideas, engage change, and seek innovation. On the other hand, organizations in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance are more likely to be closed-systems and to favor tradition, the status quo, and conservatism.

Hofstede (2001) said that top managers in organizations are involved in strategy in cultures with low uncertainty avoidance, while, in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance, the managers are involved in operations, enforcing rules and regulations and repeating traditional management. The dimension of uncertainty avoidance also should have the same effects in the context of public diplomacy. The dominant coalition in charge of diplomacy in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance tend not to value

strategic management and thus remains blind to the potential value of public diplomacy, which, as a boundary spanner, introduces uncertainty and variety from outside.

In this regard, cultures with high uncertainty avoidance would not support two principles of excellence in public diplomacy: *involvement of public diplomacy in strategic management of diplomacy and empowerment of public diplomacy in the dominant coalition*.

Another consequence would occur for *the diversity principle*. Diversity would be championed in cultures with low uncertainty avoidance because these cultures tolerate uncertainty. In these cultures, foreigners are accepted as managers, while they are suspected in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede, 2001).

The effects of power distance on excellence in public diplomacy, therefore, can be hypothesized as following:

Hypothesis 6: Embassies from countries with low uncertainty avoidance are more likely to involve the function in strategic management, empower it, encourage diversity, and have a system of symmetrical internal communication than their counterparts from countries with high uncertainty avoidance.

Masculinity/femininity. Hofstede (2001) measured the extent to which people of both sexes in a culture endorse masculine or feminine traits. Masculine cultures are characterized by assertiveness and competitiveness, feminine cultures by nurturing and compassion. As in individualistic cultures, people in masculine cultures are more likely to value personal recognition, achievement, performance, and equity; people in feminine cultures express more appreciation for solidarity, equality, benevolence, and service.

These feminine scripts of solidarity with and benevolence toward the weak and poor find their expression, among other things, in the establishment of a welfare society. Hofstede (2001) pointed that “masculine culture countries strive for a tough, performance society; feminine countries, for a tender, welfare society” (p. 317).

In feminine countries, “the percentage of people living below the poverty line is low, and people believe that the needy should be helped and that the wealthy should pay taxes to help the poor.” In contrast, in masculine countries, the percentage of people living below the poverty line is high, and people believe that the strong should be supported, and that the fate of the poor is the poor’s problem” (p. 323).

Hofstede (2001) traced the consequences of feminine values on the foreign policy behaviors of states, specifically in the area of foreign aid to poor countries and international conflict resolution. His findings from an analysis of 20 donor countries in OECD revealed that feminine countries have larger foreign aid budgets, while masculine countries have smaller foreign aid budgets. The correlation between the percentage of the 1994 government budget spent on development assistance and this dimension was $-.78^{**}$ ($p = .001$). The range was from 0.15% for the United States with a masculine score of 62 to 1.05% for Norway with a masculine score of 5.

Hofstede (2001) added that “feminine cultures believe international conflicts should be resolved through negotiation and compromise, while masculine cultures see the conflicts should be resolved through show of force or fighting” (p. 323).

Foreign aid and support for peaceful resolution of international conflicts can be seen as the external expressions of feminine values. Governments in feminine cultures should possess a strong sense of global responsibility and ethics. In sum, foreign policy

elites of feminine countries are expected to incorporate humanitarianism, relationship-caring, benevolence, and social security scripts of action into their worldviews.

Meanwhile, decision-makers from masculine cultures are likely to be programmed by hierarchies of dominance, a performance orientation, and solitary scripts of action

Hypothesis 7: Embassies from countries with feminine cultures are more likely to practice symmetrical and ethical public diplomacy than their counterparts from countries with masculine cultures.

The masculinity/femininity dimension also should strongly influence *the diversity principle*, especially gender diversity. In feminine cultures, “values of women and men are hardly different, and social role differentiation between the genders is minimum” (Hofstede, 2001, pp. 298-299). As a consequence, a “larger share of women in professional and technical jobs” (p. 312) is normal in these cultures. In contrast, the opposite is likely in masculine cultures.

Considering the trend toward feminization in the public relations and public diplomacy professions, the status and role of women are closely interrelated with the two Excellence principles: *involvement and empowerment of public diplomacy in the dominant coalition*. In short, without empowerment of women, no involvement and empowerment of the public diplomacy function is likely. Feminine cultures emphasize benevolence, equality, solidarity, relationship, and cooperation (Hofstede, 2001) and thus tend to build a *symmetrical system of internal communication*.

The effects of the feminism dimension on excellence in public diplomacy can be hypothesized as following:

Hypothesis 8: Embassies from countries with feminine culture are more likely to involve the function in strategic management, empower it, and establish diversity. Also, they should have a more symmetrical internal communication system than their counterparts from countries with masculine cultures.

Political System

A government's worldview is political in nature. The world system is primarily a macro political arena in which a variety of actors play a hard as well as a soft game. Players include national states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), global non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even terrorist organizations. A foreigner invited to a local party would take time to think about how to behave at the party through reenacting scripts of party behavior at home.

Standing at the door to a political arena, the international system, foreign policy decision-makers may not reenact their societal culture as a whole. Rather, the elites would narrow the alternatives to more relevant templates of action from the entire set of templates—the templates of political action (i.e., political beliefs and attitudes). More relevant and immediate are scripts and beliefs about the rules of political interaction and the nature of politics.

Prior to discussing the way a political system affects public diplomacy, it is necessary to deal with the relationship between societal culture and political culture. One view of this relationship is that the general, broad systems of belief (societal culture) permeate all spheres of social life regardless of whether they are economic, political, or personal.

Political culture cannot be separated from societal culture. Hudson (1997), for example, understood that “to snip the overtly political elements of culture from their roots is to cut the researcher off from the wellsprings” (p. 10). Lane and Ersson (2002) observed that civic participation, a political belief, boils down to interpersonal trust and, generally, societal belief.

Another view, however, is that even though political culture is an integral aspect of societal culture, the two still can be, analytically and perhaps even substantially, separated from each other. From the analytical point of view, the isolation of aspects theoretically closer to political life from those closer to general, societal culture is more useful than a global approach. In addition, even though societal culture is the wellspring of political culture, these two cultures may not be the same.

Verba (1965) pointed out that “under some circumstances, there might be discontinuities between values associated with political interaction and those associated with other sorts of interactions—personal or economic interaction, for instance” (p. 524). Considering the fact that belief systems are not completely coherent, values in one sphere of life may not be congruent with those in another sphere.

This inconsistency strongly suggests that societal culture may not be the only source of political culture. Almond and Verba (1963) argued that political culture in a nation derives, among other things, from experiences that individuals have had with the political process. That is, the workings of the political system, political socialization, and learning influence political culture more than the general, societal culture. Verba suggested that one way to learn about political beliefs is to observe the ways in which political structures operate.

Almond and Verba's (1963, 1965) view of relations between political culture and the political system suggests that a nation's political system affects its worldview via political culture. Thus, one can view a political system as a structural source of a nation's worldview.

Methodologically, use of the political system as a variables facilitates a more comprehensive comparative study of public diplomacy. Aggregate and time-series data on the political system for nearly all nations are available from sources such as the Freedom House indices (Freedom House, 2004) and the Polity III data (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995). On the other hand, contemporary data on political culture are more limited in scope than data on the political system.

Findings from democratic peace research support the proposition that the political system influences the worldviews of decision-makers through political culture and, therefore, affect public diplomacy behavior. The peace research program is an interface between comparative politics and international relations. Traditionally, the causes and effects of the political system, for instance, democracy, were extensively studied in comparative politics.

Most studies in comparative politics basically were concerned with domestic effects of democracy on a nation's economic and social development. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) studied the consequences of political regime on economic growth. Other scholars also took an interest in democracy's consequences on income distribution (Bollen & Jackman, 1985).

Democratic peace research expanded the horizon from domestic concerns to foreign policy concerns. Initiated by Rummel (1983), the research program has

established as “a matter of fact” the proposition that democracies do not go to war against each other. Levy (1989) argued that the practical absence of war among democracies is “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (p. 270).

No conclusive theoretical explanation, however, has yet been proposed for the democratic peace proposition. Currently, the proposition is empirically taken for granted, but the question of why is unanswered. In the democratic peace literature, two major competing theoretical explanations have been put forward and extensively tested: the structural constraints model and the normative model. The structural model views constitutional and legal constraints on executive action as the key to understanding how governments act in their international politics (Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman, 1992; Morgan & Campbell, 1991). The normative model looks primarily at the effects of norms of domestic political behavior on international politics (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993).

Specifically, the structural constraints model posits that foreign policy decisions in democratic systems, especially risky decisions such as war, require the mobilization of public opinion and institutions that make up the system of government, such as the legislature, political bureaucracies, and key interest groups. As a result, democracies find it difficult and cumbersome to go to war with each other.

The normative model also is based on the fundamental assumption that governments externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and that characterize their domestic political processes and institutions. Maoz and Russett (1993) expressed this normative assumption by saying that “political culture and political norms constitute images that a state transmits to its external environment” (p. 625).

According to Russett (1993), leaders who come to power in democratic states have already learned to view politics as a non-zero sum game. They tolerate, negotiate, compromise with opponents, and learn to bargain rather than fight. They prefer to follow the same standards and rules in international interaction as well. The structural and normative situations are assumed to be exactly opposite in non-democratic political systems.

Although the relative potency of these two theoretical explanations has not yet been determined, the normative model has gained more recognition than the structural model (Chan, 1997; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Owen, 1994; Starr, 1992; Weart, 1994). Weart (1994) found the single most important factor for peace to be the development of a political culture conditioned to nonviolently contest power. Owen (1994) observed that “democratic structures were nearly as likely to drive states to war as to restrain them from it” (p. 91). Consistent with Almond and Verba’s (1963, 1965) view of political system as the major independent variable of political culture, therefore, democratic peace research has developed convincing theoretical logic to explain the link between the political system and public diplomacy behavior.

Diamond (1999) elucidated upon the cultural correlates of democracy, a set of political norms and attitudes that democracy nurtures, and thus, a set of scripts for political action available to leaders in democracies standing at the door to the arena of world politics.

Tolerance for opposing political beliefs and positions and also more generally for social and cultural differences; pragmatism and flexibility, as opposed to a rigid and ideological approach to politics; trust in other political actors and in the social

environment; a willingness to compromise, springing from a belief in the necessity and desirability of compromise; and civility of political discourse and respect for other views. (p. 166)

A democratic political culture thus encompasses flexibility, trust, efficacy, openness to new ideas and experiences, tolerance of differences and ambiguities, and acceptance of others. Extended logically, a non-democratic culture, or what Pye (1990) termed an authoritarian political culture, is the inverse of the democratic political culture: blind faith in powerful leaders, hatred of outsiders and deviates, a sense of powerlessness and ineffectiveness, cynicism, suspicion, distrust of others, and dogmatism.

Although the political system and societal culture are different, the ways in which the political system affect public diplomacy behavior can be understood as similar to the ways in which societal culture influences that behavior. Democracy is characterized by tolerance (i.e., the dimension of uncertainty avoidance); moreover, the foundation of democracy is inherently the equality of political power or rights, which intuitively links democracy to the dimension of power distance.

The effects of the political system, or of democracy, on public diplomacy behavior can be hypothesized to be the same as the effects of the two dimensions of culture.

Hypothesis 9: Embassies from more democratic countries are likely to practice symmetrical and ethical public diplomacy than their counterparts from less democratic countries.

In the same way, the political system or democracy should have consequences on organizational processes and structure. The relationships between a government and its

citizens are likely to be replicated inside all organizations in the polity, regardless of the type of organization. The ways in which a political system operates permeate the ways in which family, school, church, corporation, and other kind of institutions are run and organized.

Consequently, an equal relationship between a democratic government (the ruler) and citizens (the ruled) should be observed in the relationship between superior and subordinates in organizations. Because of the equal relationship in democracies, organizations tend to have smaller power distance between superiors and subordinates than in those in authoritarian and totalitarian polities. The smaller power distance also should be found in governmental agencies in democracies. The effects of democracy on organizational behavior are similar to those of the dimension of power distance on the behavior.

Moreover, a democratic political system nurtures tolerance, openness to new ideas, trust, and negotiation. As a result, the political system is likely to have effects on organizational management that are similar to the effects that uncertainty avoidance has on management. Governmental agencies in democracies are more open to uncertainty than their authoritarian and totalitarian counterparts. Consequently, public diplomacy agencies from democracies can be expected to excel in *the principles of involvement, empowerment, symmetrical internal communication, and diversity*.

Another consequence of the political system should be found in *the principle of knowledge potential*. Although this consequence should be felt throughout all organizations in democracies, it is likely to be magnified inside governmental agencies.

In fact, the political system itself has the greatest influence on the ways in which a government communicates with its citizens.

Authoritarian and totalitarian governments generally are not willing to communicate with their citizens. Totalitarian governments, especially, use propaganda to dictate what their citizens should see, think, and do. Vercic, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig (1996) saw propaganda as discommunication prohibiting genuine communication. Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes rarely allow freedom of speech, freedom of media, interest groups, and activist publics. As a result, the regimes have little incentive to develop two-way symmetrical communication with the media and activists.

These regimes and their governmental agencies are accustomed to dictating to the media what to report and not report and suppressing activist publics by acknowledging only “one collective public that is embodied in the state” (J. Grunig, 1994, p. 49). Public diplomacy practitioners from totalitarian and authoritarian governments, therefore may not be offered opportunities to learn and practice sophisticated symmetrical communication and the managerial role at home.

Abroad, these practitioners would be incompetent in facing free media and global activists. Although they may want to practice symmetrical public diplomacy, their shallow knowledge potential would frustrate their wish. In the worst case, such as an Indian ambassador to the United States who visited and threatened the *New York Times* (Kunczik, 1990), some practitioners would turn their public diplomacy into a disaster, falling victim to their domestic practices.

On the other hand, democracy liberates the media and activists—the two major strategic constituents in the domestic environment of a democratic government.

Democratic governments have become well versed in media relations and activist relations through intensive interaction with these two stakeholders and have accumulated advanced knowledge and experience to practice strategic, symmetrical communication.

Thus, public diplomacy practitioners from democracies should possess higher levels of the Excellence principle of knowledge than their counterparts from authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. The effects of the political system on excellence in public diplomacy can be hypothesized as follows:

Hypothesis 10: Embassies from more democratic countries are more likely to involve the function in strategic management, empower it, support diversity, to have knowledge potential, and to develop symmetrical internal communication than their counterparts from less democratic countries.

Interest Group System

Verba (1963) suggested that the best way to understand political culture is to observe how political structures operate. By using the plural term, “political structures,” he implied that there is a multi-dimensional nature of political structure or system. Different dimensions of the political system, although interrelated, may be responsible for different dimensions of political culture. The political system and political culture can be viewed as onions with multiple layers inside.

Political experience, political socialization, and political learning structure political life and bring about the system of political culture. Perhaps the most visible dimension of the political system might be the form of government or regime—its legal and institutional organization and relations between rulers and the ruled. Democracy as a concept refers to this dimension (Schmitter & Karl, 1996).

This governmental dimension of political life certainly sets the parameters of political culture, but not all its details and contents. Informal or semi-formal dimensions of political life work inside and affect, in a sense, more deeply the inner configurations of political culture than does the formal governmental dimension.

In this regard, investigation of the effects of democracy on public diplomacy behavior should accompany inquiry into the relations between deeper political processes—the underlying realities of how a government functions—and how the processes affect public diplomacy behavior.

The underlying realities might be termed “the infrastructures of politics.” The concept of interest group system captures one of the realities responsible for the political beliefs and attitudes that are deeply ingrained in the minds of the members of a political community.

Intuitively, interest politics baptizes citizens through everyday political experiences in organizing and pursuing their interests and interacting with the government and other interest groups. In contrast, a majority of these same citizens participate in democratic politics only periodically through party and electoral systems.

It is misleading, however, to simply consider the dimension of government—democracy—to be superficial. Without democracy, interest politics would not exist. Dahl (1971) defined two essential attributes of democracy: opposition (organized contestation through regular, free, and fair elections) and participation (the right of virtually all adults to vote and contest for office). These two attributes essentially concern political rights and presuppose a third attribute, civil liberty (Diamond, 1999).

Without the civil liberties to speak, publish dissenting views, and form and join organizations, the political right to oppose and participate would be inconceivable. In this regard, democracy is the legal and institutional condition that enables interest politics. Guaranteed by civil liberty, “beyond parties and elections, citizens have multiple, ongoing channels for expression and representation of their interests and values, including diverse, independent associations and movements, which they have the freedom to form and join” (Diamond, 1999, p. 11).

Interest group systems in which independently organized groups freely operate and act as intermediaries between the public and the government exist only in democracies. Non-democracies, including authoritarian and totalitarian governments, do not allow groups to organize outside the established political system. Because interest groups are outside, their actions are unpredictable; and their unpredictability is seen as a threat to governments. A good example of this is the protracted opposition between 1980 and 1989 of the Polish communist government to an independent labor union and the solidarity movement (Derbyshire & Derbyshire, 1996).

Another qualifying, enabling condition is the level of economic development. In economically undeveloped countries, it is difficult to discuss interest politics because groups there are considerably less organized and less sophisticated than in developed countries. Sometimes they represent little more than an updating and extension of old tribal allegiances. For this reason, comparative politics generally discusses the concept of interest group system with reference to industrialized or at least industrializing democracies.

Democracy itself, however, does not determine the ways in which interest politics are managed. Democracy enables the existence of some expression of interest politics, but it does not determine the particular kind. Interest-group systems differ across democracies, generating variations across political cultures even though they have common forms of democratic political culture.

Corporatism and pluralism are two widely used terms that describe two distinctive and opposite patterns of interest politics. Some scholars (e.g., Zeigler, 1988), however, have divided corporatism into societal corporatism as a democratic variation of corporatism and state corporatism as an authoritarian version. On the other hand, most scholars equate societal corporatism with the more generic term, corporatism, and exclude state corporatism from the category of interest politics since state corporatism lacks the democratic prerequisite (Lehmbruch & Schmitter, 1982; Lijphart, 1999).

Meant literally, corporatism is an interest-group system in which labor, industrial, financial, and agricultural interest groups are nationally, functionally, and hierarchically aggregated, coordinated, and organized into a limited number of larger peak organizations. Interests are incorporated into an approximately singular body. Scandinavian countries are representative of corporatism.

In contrast, pluralism lacks key corporate characteristics; numerous interest groups are less organized and coordinated, as if they were mere particles and fragments. The groups can aggregate, but in the rare instances when they do, they do so mostly on a temporary basis and in the form of a policy or issue coalition. The United States is an exemplar of this system.

These two systems are further differentiated in the ways in which conflicting interests are handled. For corporatism, a decision-making process is installed by the state inside the political community, which subjects conflict to cooperation and compromise. A few peak organizations are recognized and licensed by the state and attain a regular role in policy making through the delegation of administrative power or participation in public councils or committees.

Important government decisions are only made after consultation with peak organizations. In essence, the corporatist structure of interest representation can be regarded as consensually oriented, designed to allay conflict through a corporate base of representation that upholds the common good (Williamson, 1986).

In contrast, pluralism has no such consensual mechanisms. As Zeigler (1988) put it, pluralists view conflict and competition, normatively, as either healthy or unavoidable, while corporatists regard them as pathological. Pluralist governments do attempt to regulate conflict, but they do so without relying on the corporatist mechanism. Instead, pluralist governments enforce a set of legal and acceptable rules of fighting and competition, arrange compromises in an ad-hoc fashion, balance one interest against another, and impose settlements on disputants in the worst cases.

Decades of political experience with corporatism should affect the configurations of political culture. Katzenstein (1985) saw “an ideology of social partnership and the absence of “a winner-take-all mentality” (pp. 157) as the essence of a corporatist political culture. In short, corporatism serves as a catalyst for a strong orientation toward compromise, negotiation, collaboration, and cooperation out of a belief in the existence of the common good.

Corporatist political culture may differ from its counterpart, pluralist culture, mostly in intensity. Pluralism also upholds the same democratic political culture as corporatism—consisting of tolerance, pragmatism, flexibility, trust in other political actors, and willingness to negotiate.

Corporatism is, however, more likely to intensify and strengthen these democratic beliefs and values than pluralism by institutionalizing a web of consensus-seeking mechanisms into everyday political experiences. Some substantial differences may lie in kind, also, given that cooperation and competition stand in sharp contrast.

Since pluralism and corporatism both have democracy as their base, interest politics should share the same causal paths that the political system (democracy) has on the two dimensions of public diplomacy behavior: symmetry and ethics. However, corporatism should have a greater impact on the two dimensions than pluralism.

Hypothesis 11: Embassies from more corporatist countries are more likely to practice symmetrical and ethical public diplomacy than their counterparts from less corporatist countries.

In addition to its effect on public diplomacy behavior, the interest-group system should influence organizational processes in the same way as democracy because democracy is the foundation of interest politics. Thus, the interest group system also should affect the *principles of involvement, empowerment, symmetrical internal communication, diversity, and knowledge potential*.

Organizations in corporatist countries, however, should feature these principles more than organizations in pluralist countries. Although corporatist and pluralist societies are equally democratic, corporatist societies are likely to have a more intense democratic

political culture than pluralist societies. Thus, corporatism is likely to have a greater effect on the above principles than pluralism.

Also, the interest group system should affect the ways in which a government communicates with its constituents more than does democracy. J. Grunig and Jaatinen (1998) discussed the effects of the interest group system on a government's communication with its citizens and argued that corporatist governments are more likely to practice strategic, symmetrical communication than pluralist governments.

According to J. Grunig and Jaatinen (1998), corporatist governments seek collaborative and bargaining relations with interest groups, which are potentially activist groups, because they are driven by the ideology of social partnership. Corporatist governments collaborate and bargain with publics to balance the interests of those publics and society at large through symmetrical communication.

A web of consultative and coordinate relations evolves not only between governmental agencies and interest groups but also among interest groups. Likely (1990) observed that "in societal corporatism, relationships develop between administrative departments, legislative committees and pressure groups, and various coalitions form within and between these groups" (as cited in J. Grunig, 1994, p. 224).

This multifaceted web of relationships and communication channels has been called a "subgovernment" (Pross, 1986) or "issue network" (Heclo, 1978). The web of relationships becomes routine, personal, and informal and creates an environment in which corporatist governments strive to practice a sophisticated form of communication (i.e., strategic symmetrical communication).

In contrast, pluralist governments typically have unfavorable relationships with interest groups and; the relationships are not conducive to strategic, symmetrical communication. Pluralist governments also deal with conflict and competition among interest groups for access to public policy. However, they do so not as the patron of social partnership but as the referee who reactively enforces resolution to conflict only when necessary.

In pluralist countries, pre-emptive governmental involvement in interest politics is generally regarded as an illegal interference with the private sector as well as a major threat to democracy itself. J. Grunig and Jaatinen (1998) said that pluralist governments have little motivation to “practice strategic public relations because they expect activist groups to come to them for services; and the agency has no need to identify them” (p. 227).

J. Grunig and Jaatinen (1998) added that pluralist governments mostly practice a less advanced model of public relations—the public information model—by providing information on laws, rules, and regulations in advance or when requested by their citizens. Compared to pluralism, corporatism, sets up a more demanding environment for the government to learn and obtain knowledge and experience to practice strategic, symmetrical public relations.

In a corporatist governmental agency, once the head of a public affairs department possesses relevant knowledge, he or she is likely to get involved in strategic management and to be empowered by the dominant coalition. As a result, corporatist governments become more likely to practice the Excellence principles of public relations.

As an exemplar of a corporatist government's communication management, J. Grunig and Jaatinen (1998) discussed the Norwegian Central Government Information Policy, which Norwegian governmental agencies at all levels are supposed to implement. The Policy consists of five principles. Two principles are the same as the Excellence principle of symmetrical communication, and the other three are equivalent to the principles of involvement and empowerment of the communication function.

1. *Communication*. The communication principle implies that the administration and its users are regarded as equal partners who alternate as senders and receivers of information.
2. *Active information*. The administration must inform the public, actively and systematically, not according to the public service's own premises, but on the basis of the needs and assumptions of the users.
3. *Comprehensiveness*: All information issued by a government body, as far as possible, must be compiled so as to be perceived as a whole by the user.
4. *Line management*. Like financial, legal, physical, and organizational means, information must be viewed as an instrument to be used by ministries and services.
5. *Information as a management responsibility*. Line managers must take their responsibilities seriously and take steps to ensure that any information tasks that form a natural part of the other duties to be performed are so treated, with the same priorities and the same requirements as to quality and goal achievement as the rest of the work. (pp. 230-231)

The interest group system also should have a unique consequence for *the characteristic of integrated public diplomacy*, on which political system has little effect. Corporatism nurtures a web of consultative and coordinate relationships not only between governmental agencies and interest groups but also among the agencies and among the groups. The web of relationships and communication channels among governmental agencies should be naturally conducive to the integration and coordination of specialized governmental public diplomacy agencies.

As a showcase of excellent public diplomacy, Leonard (2002) discussed Norwegian public diplomacy, for which three governmental agencies—the Ministry of Culture, the Norwegian Agency for International Development Cooperation (NORAD), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)—work in tandem on a functional and regional base.

According to Leonard (2002), the scope of integration and coordination of Norwegian public diplomacy goes beyond the circle of governmental agencies. Since there is another web of relationships among government, interest groups, and NGOs, Norwegian governmental agencies involved in public diplomacy also work closely with other actors in public diplomacy from the private sector, such as a number of trade, investment, and industrial associations operating abroad.

The effects of the interest group system on excellence in public diplomacy can be hypothesized as follows:

Hypothesis 12: Embassies from corporatist countries are more likely to involve public diplomacy in strategic management, integrate specialized public diplomacy functions inside and outside, empower the function, encourage diversity, have knowledge

potential for excellence, and practice symmetrical internal communication than their counterparts from less corporatist countries.

Dependence

The political system, societal culture, and interest-group system are a government's domestic attributes. These national attributes, as a constant, provide the context for the government's foreign policy behavior and decision-making process. Although a government has a broad orientation toward world politics, its foreign policy behavior is always relation-specific. A government displays different foreign policy behaviors, depending upon the nature of historical, geographical, cultural, economic, strategic, and security relations that it has with a particular government.

Foreign policy analysis largely approaches the relationships between interstate relations and foreign policy behavior from the perspective of dependence. Many works (e.g., Richardson & Kegley, Jr., 1980) focus on the economic dimension of dependence.

Richardson and Kegley, Jr. (1980) studied the relationships between trade dependence and foreign policy compliance. They reported that 25 nations that were trade dependent on the United States complied with U.S. foreign policy preferences in roll calls of the United Nations General Assembly. In reviewing the literature on Latin American foreign policy, Hey (1993) examined how Ecuadorian economic dependence in the 1980s resulted in the country's dependent foreign policy behaviors and processes toward the United States.

Foreign policy analysis, however, has not inquired into how interstate dependence relations influence the public diplomacy behavior and management of a government. In

contrast, public relations research has paid a great deal of scholarly attention to the relationships between dependence and organizational communication behaviors.

The study of the personal influence model in public relations research helps theorizing on the relationships between interstate dependence and public diplomacy behavior/management. In search of models of public relations other than the four models initially found in the United States, Huang (1990), Lyra (1991), and Sriramesh (1992) discovered the personal influence model in India, Taiwan, and Greece.

Later, J. Grunig, L. Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang, and Lyra (1995) argued that the model is universal because it was also found in lobbying in the United States. Moreover, J. Grunig (1992) identified public diplomacy practices by U.S. public relations and lobbying firms on behalf of foreign governments with this model.

J. Grunig et al. (1995) defined the model as one in which organizations on the dependent side try to establish personal relationships—friendship, if possible—with key individuals in powerful groups such as the media, government, congress, or political and activist groups in order to take advantage of the relationships in the organizations' interests.

Explaining circumstances for the model, Taylor and Kent (1999) analyzed the public relations practices of Malaysian corporations toward their government. In Malaysia, “close relationships with government officials and bureaucrats can help organizations win lucrative projects and is considered the secret of corporate success since the government is in control of approval of a wide variety of important business activities—licensing, business permits, and even the availability of scarce resources” (pp. 137, 139).

Huang (2000) also discussed a dependence context for the model in China. To strive for social resources controlled by a particular allocator (e.g., money, goods, information, and status), dependent organizations may adopt several strategies to enhance influence over the allocator. The most popular strategy for strengthening *guanxi* (relationship) in China is to “deliberately increase the social interaction between two parties, by means of visiting, giving gifts, and inviting the other person to banquets on such occasions as weddings, funerals, or birthday parties in one’s family and festivals in one’s home village” (p. 227).

The implication of these studies is that the more dependent a party, an organization, or a government is upon its counterpart, the more likely that the dependent party practices the personal influence model.

The personal influence model in the context of public diplomacy can be deconstructed into three dimensions of public diplomacy behavior: channel, ethics, and purpose. Specifically, the model uses interpersonal channels of communication more than or at least as much as mediated channels of communication. Although the model theoretically can be theoretically in an ethical, symmetrical manner, as a model of interpersonal relationships it is mostly unethical and asymmetrical, accompanied by offering hospitality and bribery (J. Grunig et al., 1995).

Thus, the associations between dependence and public diplomacy behavior can be hypothesized as following:

Hypothesis 13: Embassies from more dependent countries practice more interpersonal, less symmetrical, more asymmetrical, and less ethical public diplomacy than their counterparts from less dependent countries.

Dependence is also likely to influence the ways in which a government manages public diplomacy at its embassy. Among other things, when a country is more dependent upon the target country, it is more likely to involve public diplomacy at the embassy in the formulation of foreign policy toward the target country, launching strategic and proactive communication campaigns. Consequently, public diplomacy functions at the embassy should be well supported and integrated inside and around the embassy for the maximum effectiveness of public diplomacy.

Hypothesis 14: Embassies from more dependent countries are more likely to involve public diplomacy in strategic management, support public diplomacy, and integrate specialized functions than are their counterparts from less dependent countries.

Moreover, dependence is likely to affect a government's public diplomacy management in a particular way through the outsourcing of many public diplomacy functions to local public relations and lobbying firms. Kunczik (1997) and Manheim (1994) documented the outsourcing practices of foreign governments and embassies in the United States in the area of policy communication. Gilboa (1998) termed this phenomenon "a reversed public relations variant of public diplomacy" (p. 6), and Manheim (1994) labeled it "strategic public diplomacy" (p. 7).

U.S. public relations firms such as Hill and Knowlton have specialized in conducting communication campaigns toward U.S. publics and media on behalf of foreign governments. According to *the 2002 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) First Semi-Annual Report* (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003), 39 embassies in Washington, D.C., hired U.S. public relations and lobbying firms.

Apart from embassies, a broad spectrum of other governmental agencies such as tourism, economic, trade, and investment ministries are now engaged in public diplomacy. They constitute another customer base for the services of local firms. As of June 2002, governmental agencies, including embassies from 73 countries, used American public relations and lobbying firms to directly communicate with the U.S. media, congress, state governments, and opinion leaders (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003).

Concerning the association between dependence and the practice of outsourcing, Lobsenz (1984) suggested that the more dependent a country is on the target country in the areas of tourism, trade, and investment, the more likely it is that the country will hire local public relations and lobbying firms. Similarly, Kunczik (1997) hypothesized that “the more important (economically and/or politically) an entity (whether country or union, e.g., the European Community), the more likely it is that foreign countries will undertake campaigns there” [using the services of local firms] (p. 25).

Hypothesis 15: Governments with more dependence on the United States are more likely to hire local public relations and lobbying firms for their public diplomacy than governments with less dependence.

According to the U.S. Department of Justice (2003), U.S. public relations and lobbying firms provide the following outsourcing services to embassies: (a) preparation and placement of publicity materials; (b) preparation of publications and position statements directed to journalists, congressmen, government officials, and opinion leaders; (c) arrangement of meetings for the clients with the same strategic publics above; (d) consultation on, monitoring of, and analysis of the current development of issues

concerned to the clients; (e) provision of formative and evaluative research; (f) consultation on strategic communication campaigns; and (g) consultation on the overall management and integration of specialized public diplomacy functions.

Manheim (1994) conducted the first descriptive study of the outsourcing practices to local firms, looking at the profile of foreign clients (governments) in regional distribution, the rank of accounts by size in U.S. dollars, and the kinds of purchased services. The public diplomacy literature, however, has not studied the effects of the outsourcing practices on public diplomacy practices and management at client embassies.

For a fuller investigation of empirical associations between dependence and public diplomacy, it is necessary to inquire into the effects of outsourcing practices on public diplomacy behavior and management at client embassies.

Research Question 4: How do the outsourcing services provided by U.S. public relations and lobbying firms affect the practices and management of public diplomacy at client embassies?

Summary of Research Questions and Hypotheses

Research Question 1: How well does the six-factor measurement model of public relations behavior describe and characterize public diplomacy behavior of embassies in Washington, D.C.?

Research Question 2: Is the Excellence theory transferable to public diplomacy; that is, does the second-order, five-factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy fit well with public diplomacy data from embassies in Washington, D.C.?

Research Question 3: How does the dimension of collectivism/individualism affect the symmetry and ethical dimensions of public diplomacy behavior at embassies in Washington, D.C.?

Hypothesis 1: Embassies from collectivist countries are more likely to use the interpersonal channel than their counterparts from individualist countries in their public diplomacy behavior.

Hypothesis 2: Embassies from countries with collectivist cultures are more likely to integrate specialized public diplomacy functions as well as have symmetrical internal communication than their counterparts from countries with individual cultures.

Hypothesis 3: Embassies from countries with small power distance are more likely to practice symmetrical and ethical public diplomacy than their counterparts from countries with high power distance cultures.

Hypothesis 4: Embassies from countries with low power distance are more likely to involve the public diplomacy function in the execution and making of foreign policy, empowering the function, enhancing diversity and providing symmetrical internal communication than their counterparts from countries with high power distance.

Hypothesis 6: Embassies from countries with low uncertainty avoidance are more likely to involve the function in strategic management, empower it, encourage diversity, and have a system of symmetrical internal communication than their counterparts from countries with high uncertainty avoidance.

Hypothesis 7: Embassies from countries with feminine cultures are more likely to practice symmetrical and ethical public diplomacy than their counterparts from countries with masculine cultures.

Hypothesis 8: Embassies from countries with feminine culture are more likely to involve the function in strategic management, empower it, and establish diversity. Also, they should have a more symmetrical internal communication system than their counterparts from countries with masculine cultures.

Hypothesis 9: Embassies from more democratic countries are likely to practice symmetrical and ethical public diplomacy than their counterparts from less democratic countries.

Hypothesis 10: Embassies from more democratic countries are more likely to involve the function in strategic management, empower it, support diversity, to have knowledge potential, and to develop symmetrical internal communication than their counterparts from less democratic countries.

Hypothesis 11: Embassies from more corporatist countries are more likely to practice symmetrical and ethical public diplomacy than their counterparts from less corporatist countries.

Hypothesis 12: Embassies from corporatist countries are more likely to involve public diplomacy in strategic management, integrate specialized public diplomacy

functions inside and outside, empower the function, encourage diversity, have knowledge potential for excellence, and practice symmetrical internal communication than their counterparts from less corporatist countries.

Hypothesis 13: Embassies from more dependent countries practice more interpersonal, less symmetrical, more asymmetrical, and less ethical public diplomacy than their counterparts from less dependent countries.

Hypothesis 14: Embassies from more dependent countries are more likely to involve public diplomacy in strategic management, support public diplomacy, and integrate specialized functions than are their counterparts from less dependent countries.

Hypothesis 15: Governments with more dependence on the United States are more likely to hire local public relations and lobbying firms for their public diplomacy than governments with less dependence.

Research Question 4: How do the outsourcing services provided by U.S. public relations and lobbying firms affect the practices and management of public diplomacy at client embassies?

CHAPTER III

Methodology

Macro-Comparative Study

This study is macro-comparative in magnitude. Kohn (1987) defined macro-comparative research as “utilizing systematically comparable data from two or more nations” (p. 714). Similarly, Bollen, Entwistle, and Alderson (1993) conceived it as “comparison of two or more nations regarding the nations’ global, aggregate, or individual-level structure or process” (p. 323). In terms of scope and aim, there are three kinds of cross-national research. The first is to test for cultural universals across nations or cultures. Rokkan (1966) termed it “micro replications” to test out in other national and cultural settings a proposition already validated in one setting. Much work in contemporary comparative public relations has been done to test the cultural universality of, for instance, the Excellence theory (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Vercic, 1998; Rhee, 1999; Vercic, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1996; Wakefield, 2000, 1997).

The second kind is the “nation as context” approach in Kohn’s (1987) typology of cross-national research, which is similar to the micro replication approach. The nation as context approach deals with the question of how national characteristics influence events or individual, group, or organizational-level phenomena.

The nation as context approach can be seen as one step beyond micro replication. Once one finds cultural universals and wonders why nations differ on the universals, it is logical to move on to search the potential sources of the differences in the macro contexts of nations.

It is also plausible, without agreeing on the universality of a certain phenomenon such as excellence in public relations, that one can search the particularities of public relations in a country and explore how the country's national attributes affect the particularities. A great deal of comparative public relations research (e.g., Culbertson & Chen, 1996; Sriramesh & Vercic, 2003) has striven for this particularity.

With focus on cultural universality, another kind of cross-national research derives from the nation as context approach. As the result of a micro replication study, one might conclude that the phenomenon under study is generic and that nations differ on a scale of the phenomenon. The micro replication approach is not able to explain why nations differ but is only able to describe and explore the generic status of a phenomenon across nations.

To answer the why question, one needs to investigate the relationships between the background characteristics of nations and the phenomenon of interest: How variations in the phenomenon are systematically related to variations among characteristics of nations qua nations.

Methodologically, those characteristics and the phenomenon are treated as universal independent and dependent variables or dimensions on which each nation as a whole can be measured. Kohn (1987) classified this approach as nation as “the unit of analysis,” and Rokkan (1966) termed it as a “macro hypotheses” analysis concerning “interrelations of structural elements of total systems” (pp. 19-20). Regarding the relation between nation as the unit of analysis and nation as the context, Kohn (1987) said that “research in which a nation is treated as context is simply a way-station to more general

analyses in which the pivotal distinguishing background characteristics of nations become variables in the analysis” (p. 715).

In this dissertation, I take the nation as the unit of analysis approach. This study poses macro hypotheses of how variations in nations’ public diplomacy behavior and excellence are systematically related to variations among contextual variables (culture, political system, interest group system, and interstate dependence).

There has little comparative public relations research regarding the nation as the unit of analysis because such research faces logistic problems in collecting data from a number of nations. The research has not advanced to the nation as the unit of analysis approach from the micro replication and the nation as the context approach. Public diplomacy research has also suffered from the same limitation.

Methodological Issues of Macro-comparative Study

Any macro-comparative study based on the nation as unit of analysis approach inherently suffers from two major methodological problems that must be addressed to ensure generizability and validity of findings. They are the issue of small N (sample size) and the issue of comparability (measurement).

Small N Issue

The problem of a small sample is serious in macro-comparative research with nation as the unit of analysis. The problem is more likely when a study conducts a survey to gather primary data from a large number of nations because of the formidable logistic barriers. As the result, large-scale studies are a rarity in macro-comparative research. Several exceptional studies are Inglehart’s World Values Survey (World Values Survey, 2004) and Hofstede’s (2001) work that covered 65 and 80 countries, respectively.

Despite their large scope, these studies were based on convenience samples of nations; these samples were not drawn through probability sampling. The results of such studies cannot be generalized to a population, and the validity of cross-national findings from small samples is not guaranteed, especially when the studies use statistical analysis.

Lijphart (1971) pointed out that “the principal problem facing the comparative method can be succinctly stated as: many variables, small number of cases” (p. 685). Combined with a large number of variables, a study with a small sample is further plagued by the power problem in significance testing. In addition, a study with a large sample is also not exempt from the problem if it deals with many variables. The criterion for “small” or “large” is not absolute but is always relative to the number of variables.

Although not a perfect solution, it is always desirable to have as many cases as possible in dealing with the sample problem. In this regard, Lijphart (1971) suggested making many cases available for comparative analysis by focusing on universal constructs on a functionally equivalent level of abstraction. The objective of having a large sample can be achieved in other ways such as inventions in research design.

Comparability Issue

Comparative survey research faces its own unique issues but also shares many methodological issues with mono-culture survey research (Harkness, Mohler, & Van de Vijver, 2003). In mono-culture survey research, “total survey error” (Anderson, Kasper, & Frankel, 1979) refers to a multitude of sources of error in the survey design and implementation. Groves (1989) identified four kinds of error constituting total survey error: sampling error, coverage error, non-response error, and measurement error.

The possible sources of measurement error include instrument, interviewer, respondent, and mode of data collection. Mono-culture survey research generally assumes that respondents reach similar interpretations of the standardized questions, and it attempts to prevent and detect systematic biases such as social desirability in responses. On the other hand, cross-cultural survey research takes caution against the same interpretation assumption. It is mostly concerned with measuring the same construct across cultures with a standardized questionnaire.

All measurement issues in cross-cultural survey research hinge on the issue of comparability or equivalence. Cross-cultural survey research concentrates on bias that jeopardizes comparability. Harkness, Mohler, and Van de Vijver (2003) referred to bias as “the presence of nuisance factors that challenge the comparability of measurements across cultures” (p. 13). Van de Vijver and Leung (2003) listed three kinds of bias: construct bias, method bias, and item bias.

Construct bias exists when the measured construct is not identical across cultures. This may be the case when the construct of interest is not, in fact, generic. Another source of construct bias is poor translation. Although the construct might be genuinely generic, poor translation would prevent measuring the same construct. Poor translation may result from simple mistakes as well as from fundamental linguistic cultural differences. When the construct of interest is unique only in one culture, other cultures do not have a similar or equivalent word for the construct. Hofstede (2001) said that “observers are not led by the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated” (p. 21).

Method bias comes into being through all stages in a survey: research design, sampling (sample incomparability), instrumentation (measurement level incomparability), and data collection (differential impacts from interviewer effects and mode of data collection). When the instruments used across cultures have the same measurement level (e.g., all interval or ratio), measurement unit equivalence is achieved (Van de Vijver, 2003).

Lastly, item bias emerges when anomalies are found at the item level. An item is biased when it shows differential functioning across cultures. It usually happens when items are poorly translated or contaminated by a differential impact of social desirability. A scalar or full score equivalence is secured when construct and method bias are confirmed absent or negligible, and when item bias is absent, detected, or corrected. This allows for genuine comparison of observed scores across cultures (Van de Vijver, 2003).

Identification of bias and verification of equivalence are the core methodological tasks in cross-national survey research. In dealing with bias, two complementary approaches have been developed: *a priori* and *post hoc*. *A priori* techniques are applied before data collection, focusing on instrument and sample design. *Post hoc* techniques are used after data collection by conducting statistical analysis to identify and correct biases, if possible. Arguing for use of both measures, Van de Vijver (2003) stressed that “the quality of a cross-national survey is the net result of success in dealing with bias at all stages of a project” (p. 155).

Research Design

A study’s research design is the strategy to enhance the internal validity of findings as well as to solve problems with data collection. In this study, I defined public

diplomacy as “a government process of communicating with foreign publics” (Tuch, 1990, p. 3). The unit of analysis is a government, and the possible sources of empirical data were 169 embassies in Washington, D.C.

Embassies around the world carry out a large bulk and variety of public diplomacy practices. As field offices executing traditional as well as public diplomacy, embassies conduct policy advocacy and practice cultural communication either on their own terms or in tandem with other agencies for public diplomacy. They are more relevant targets of study than public relations firms practicing public diplomacy for foreign governments.

I chose embassies over special public diplomacy agencies such as the British Council (the United Kingdom), the Alliance Francaise (France), the Goethe Institute (Germany), and the Japan Foundation because only a handful of developed Western countries operate these specialized agencies for cultural diplomacy abroad. In contrast, 169 embassies from developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries around the world function not only as equivalent units of comparison but also as a population pool of governments.

Embassies are matching and functionally equivalent—a desirable sampling strategy for cross-national comparative study (Hofstede, 2001). The equivalence is readily discernable when considering the unique development of the embassy as a historical organization. Since the time that diplomatic practices were invented in Europe during the 14th century, embassies have become homogeneous across governments.

Language, professional standards and qualifications, and diplomatic protocols have become standardized (Solomon, 1992); and most of the same functions are carried

out within similar organizational arrangements. As the result, diplomats as a profession and embassies as a diplomatic organization have come to share uniquely similar professional and organizational cultures throughout the world. These matching samples make it possible to control for the effects of differences in professional and organizational cultures in this study.

It would be problematic to compare directly a Swedish police station with a Japanese counterpart. The embassies of these countries in Washington, D.C., however, can be compared because of the homogeneity of embassies, regardless of their nationality. Moreover, the choice of embassies in Washington, D.C. controls for compounding factors of public diplomacy. The embassies deal with a similar profile of publics: In the area of media relations, virtually all the embassies share the same pool of U.S. media outlets such as the *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*, and CNN. The embassies also deal with the same congressmen, think-tanks, scholars, and opinion leaders, although they differ, to some extent, in the kind of activist groups and Diaspora communities with which they have relationships.

Hofstede (2001) recommended “matching samples of individuals, situations, and organizations, depending on the nature of characteristics being compared across nations” (p. 23). By comparing functionally equivalent embassies in the same place, this study’s findings can have more internal validity. Respondent samples are also more functionally equivalent and matching. All of the respondents carry out the same function as director or head of the public diplomacy function or section across embassies.

With the subjects functionally matching and with the same profile of publics, the research design approximates a “natural experiment.” If differences or variances exist in

the practices of public diplomacy among the embassies, the results can be attributed to variances in both the contextual variables of foreign governments and their relationships with U.S publics.

What is more, comparing excellence in public diplomacy at the embassy level is a substitute for comparing excellence at the governmental level because embassies are surrogates for governments. Embassies are known as “miniature governments” consisting of diplomats dispatched from a variety of cabinet ministries ranging from the foreign ministry to trade, education, defense, information, and other ministries. A public diplomacy practitioner at the South Korean embassy in Washington, D.C., described an embassy as “a microcosm of government” in which the macro-level bureaucratic processes in the homeland government exactly manifest themselves (Yun & Yang, 2001).

The ways in which an embassy manages the public diplomacy function closely approximates how the function is managed on a macro-level inside the homeland government. For example, if the function is relegated to a role of secondary importance in foreign policy decision-making and execution on the governmental level, the function most likely will also be marginalized in an embassy.

This situation distinguishes public diplomacy management by an embassy from intercultural communication by a U.S. subsidiary of a multinational corporation. Samsung USA and Sony USA are not the microcosms of Samsung and Sony headquarters in South Korea and Japan. These subsidiaries, staffed by U.S. personnel, from CEOs to employees, are American in organizational process and organizational culture; thus, communication management is American. It makes little sense to measure

these subsidiaries' communication management and argue that the measurements taken represent the headquarters' communication management.

In contrast, a cultural island or enclave, an embassy abroad preserves intact the flavor and footprint of the homeland societal culture, no matter how big or small the embassy is. The same effects of other national attributes on the homeland government are equally felt in the embassy's organizational culture, processes, and management of public diplomacy.

In a pretest for this study, in August 2004, I experienced the presence of homeland culture when visiting a small embassy from a Middle East country with fewer than five diplomats. During the visit, a man in his 50s served Arabic tea to me and a host diplomat—both who were in their late 30s. The man was not a diplomat but rather a staff member of the country's nationality. After pouring the tea, the man quickly retreated to and was standing in a corner, waiting for a signal for a refill from the diplomat. The diplomat behaved like a master, condescendingly calling the man without any title, while the man acted like a servant—a familiar scene in the Arab country.

In 1973, Hofstede (2001) replicated the cultural differences obtained from his IBM data, using a sample of 362 managers who were students at IMEDE Management Development Institute in Lausanne, Switzerland. The managers came from 30 different countries and from a variety of private and public organizations that were not related to IBM. His findings suggested that even individuals who live or stay abroad for a while still preserve their cultural values and that an embassy, as an organization, should be more likely to have its inside organizational process and structure influenced by its homeland societal culture.

Moreover, studying embassies in a city also provides a solution to the formidable and frustrating logistic problem that has plagued cross national comparative studies with a large number of countries. The ideal way to gather data on how governments around the world manage public diplomacy would be to take a life-long research tour across borders. This, however, is improbable.

Of a total of 192 independent countries in the world, 169 countries have embassies in Washington, D.C. Many of the embassies are located alongside “Embassy Row” stretching over two streets, Massachusetts Avenue and New Hampshire Avenue. Geographical space is warped as if countries were moved across oceans and continents into a space within one hour driving distance of College Park, Maryland. This is made possible only because the research setting, Washington, D.C., is the capital of world politics. There would be no match for Washington, D.C., in the world in the capacity to host such a universe.

In short, the research design of this study can be termed “embassy as ‘matching samples’ and ‘surrogate governments’.” By substituting the universe of governments with a universe of embassies, this study dealt with the two major methodological issues of macro-comparative study: It has equivalent units or levels of comparison across almost all governments over the world.

Two-Step Data Collection

Gathering the public diplomacy data required a two-step procedure. The first step had to do with the selection of participating embassies (governments), and the second step concerned how to measure the actual public diplomacy practices of the embassies.

Typically, the selection of countries in a macro-comparative study is based on non-probability sampling mainly because of problems with the availability of data.

In most cases, the sample of countries or governments at the researcher's hands is a convenience one, lacking generalizability to the population of countries (Bollen, Entwistle, & Alderson, 1993; Warwick & Osherson, 1973). In better cases, the researcher attempts to do a systematic (not random) sampling similar to quota and dimensional sampling for a theory-driven test. In rarer cases, the researcher would aspire to do a random probability sampling of nations for testing a theory's generalizability (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997).

Although a probability sampling is the best selection procedure available, it is still secondary to the ideal procedure—a census. Any probability sampling inherently suffers from sampling error, while a census is theoretically free from the error. In a census, the researcher does not need to estimate the population parameters from sample statistics; and instead, he or she directly measures the parameters. Researchers rely on probability sampling mainly when it is impractical to conduct a census of all the elements of a population. For this reason, I attempted to conduct a census of the 169 embassies in Washington, D.C. Since the United States is the host country, it was not included in this study. The census population consisted of 169 embassies in the city. The census frame was the *Diplomatic List* that the United States Department of State issued in fall 2004.

Single Respondent Organizational Survey (SROS)

In this study, a survey was the method for measuring the public diplomacy data. The method involves asking individual respondents to complete a standardized questionnaire. Typically, a survey is used to gather data on constructs at the individual-

level such as beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. The method is also used to measure constructs at the organizational-level such as organizational behavior, processes, and structure, based on responses from individuals. Moreover, the survey has been widely used in organizational management research.

I selected respondents within embassies based on purposive sampling. The researcher uses purposive sampling based on his or her information needs and knowledge of the population and its elements. The researcher exercises informed judgment to determine what element(s) are most appropriate for the purposes of the study (Babbie, 1992; Broom & Dozier, 1990).

The purposive sampling resulted in a single respondent sample for each embassy; and the single respondent was the director or head of the public diplomacy function, section, or department within each embassy. A director or head was chosen based upon my belief and judgment that the person was the key informant to observe or have unique access to relevant information on the embassy's public diplomacy behavior and management.

Use of a key informant is justifiable when measuring objective properties of organizational behaviors and internal processes such as management. For instance, a public diplomacy director can observe whether the public diplomacy function is involved in strategic management inside the embassy and whether it is empowered by the dominant coalition. A single key informant would have little problem in providing information on global and configural constructs—mainly, the objective properties of organizational processes and structure (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).

Although the SROS has been the mainstream practice in measuring objective organizational-level constructs in management research, some researchers have called for a more rigorous approach to reduce measurement error. Seidler (1974) said that “asking a single informant to describe properties of large and complex organizations is like asking the person to perform calculations otherwise [best] left to computers” (p. 817). In other words, a single respondent within a complex organization would not have the ability or opportunity to accurately and objectively observe the organizational properties. Similarly, Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, and Snell (2000) called for use of multiple respondents and an index of inter-rater reliability such as intra-class correlation (ICC).

In contrast, Huselid and Becker (2000) argued that “multiple rater techniques do not guarantee construct validity” and that for observation of structural properties, “multiple, random raters are not presumed to have equal validity” (pp. 842, 850). They went on to specify some conditions under which the SROS can be safely used. First, organizational size matters. The SROS would be problematic for large organizations but less problematic for small organizations. Second, organizational structure matters. The SROS would be more vulnerable to error with a heterogeneous organization than with a homogeneous one.

Complex and large multinational and national organizations are not appropriate for the SROS, but simple and small organizations or subunits within complex and large organizations are appropriate. Huselid and Becker’s (2000) discussion lends support to my decision to use the SROS in measuring the public diplomacy practices of the embassies.

If the unit of analysis were public diplomacy practices at the homeland governmental level, use of the SROS would be questionable. An embassy is, however, like a subunit of a large organization—the homeland government. The number of personnel at an embassy is small, compared to that of the homeland government.

Another reason for purposefully opting for the SROS over the MROS is that, with the SROS, a census of 169 embassies would be more likely, which ensures a sufficient number of cases for statistical analysis. Huselid and Becker (2000) pointed that “the choice may well be between one respondent and a sample size sufficient to conduct the type of empirical analyses and small potential improvements in reliability at a very substantial cost in response rate” (p. 850).

I partly used the *Diplomatic List* issued in fall 2004 by U.S. Department of State as a framework for purposive sampling and mostly relied on contact information from the websites of embassies and telephone inquiries.

Pretest

Identifying bias and verifying equivalence or comparability in the instrument are the crucial methodological tasks in cross-national survey research. For the tasks, I first took an *a priori* measure, a pretest of the instrument, before proceeding to data collection. After one and half months of preparation, in July 2004, I conducted a pretest with 20 embassies in two ways: qualitatively and quantitatively.

I met 20 diplomats who were responsible for public diplomacy at their embassies. The diplomats had diverse ranks: deputy chief of mission, ministers, counselors, first, second, third secretary, and press attaché. On average, I carried out one hour interviews, asking if there were questions that did not make sense and also asking for consultation on

ways to make the questions more sensible. Moreover, I asked participants to complete a pretest questionnaire. The qualitative consultation and the quantitative pretest data revealed problems with the questionnaire and suggested remedies for the final questionnaire.

Selection of Embassies

I purposefully selected 20 embassies for pretest based on two considerations. The purpose of the pretest was to check if the questionnaire traveled well, first of all, across embassies from different countries. I chose embassies to pretest in order to test the questionnaire on representatives of countries around the world. First, I selected participants for the pretest by geographical region.

Second, I considered the organizational arrangement of the public diplomacy function inside each embassy. I had previously examined the organizational arrangements inside all the embassies in Washington, D.C. The function was organized in two ways: Some embassies have a specialist diplomat or diplomats for public diplomacy, while others have a generalist diplomat or diplomats for the function. The second variable was used because it makes a difference in the management practices of the function.

Geography-wise, the pretesting embassies consisted of five from Asia, five from Europe and North America, four from Africa, three from Latin America, and three from the Middle East. Arrangement-wise, nine embassies had specialists, and eleven had generalists (Table 1).

Table 1

Twenty Embassies for Pretest by Region and Organizational Arrangement

	Asia	Europe/ North America	Africa	Latin America	Middle East
Specialist	3	2	1	2	2
Generalist	3	3	3	1	1

Pretest Questionnaire

I constructed a questionnaire for pretest by modifying several instruments in public relations research: the Excellence questionnaire (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002) and the questionnaires of the dimensions of public relations behavior (Huang, 1997; L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002; Rhee, 1999).

For the pretest questionnaire, I initially operationalized the four dimensions of public diplomacy behavior into a five-factor measurement model—direction (one-way vs. two-way), purpose (symmetry vs. asymmetry), personal communication, mediated communication, ethics (ethical vs. unethical). Later, however, I reoperationalized the dimensions into a six-factor measurement model after pretest by separating the purpose factor into two separate factors, symmetry and asymmetry.

Some items were original, developed for this project. Other items from the public relations instruments were modified to take into consideration different contexts between embassies and corporations. The public relations items were developed mainly for other types of organizations such as corporations, business associations, non-profits organizations, and governmental agencies (domestic).

The modification in this study was “a terminological and factual adaptation” (Harkness, Van de Vijver, & Johnson, 2003) in which adaptation was minimally made to simply reflect different organizational structures and processes between embassies and other organizations. For example, instead of titles such as “the chief executive officer (CEO),” functionally corresponding embassy titles were used, such as ambassador.

One important revision was made in question statements to make them sensible across the organizational arrangement of the public diplomacy function. The original public relations instruments contained some constructs at the departmental level: the Excellence principles of involvement and knowledge potential of the public relations department. Thus, the statements in the instruments were phrased to measure the degree of the departmental involvement and knowledge.

Given the different organizational arrangement of the public diplomacy function, however, the statements might not have been applicable to small embassies where one or two generalist diplomats usually conduct public diplomacy without a separate, specialized section or department for the function. With these embassies, it was possible only to measure the degree of the individual involvement and knowledge potential.

Thus, in the pretest questionnaire, I used different statements in order to measure the constructs on the individual level when necessary. For instance, with involvement items, the question statement asked how much contribution the diplomat in charge of the public diplomacy function makes. For knowledge items, the statement asked about either individual or departmental knowledge potential; and the statement for integration items inquired about the degree of integration among either individuals or departments engaged in public diplomacy.

Additionally, I constructed items for integration and included them in the pretest questionnaire. In fact, the original public relations instruments did not include items to measure the degree of integration of specialized public relations functions. I developed two different sets of items to measure integration at two levels: integration inside and integration outside the embassy. The items were developed by investigating the ways in which specialized public diplomacy functions are integrated inside and around embassies through content analysis of their websites, newsletters, and all available publications.

An additional change was made in measuring the Excellence principle of symmetrical internal communication. In the Excellence study, this principle was conceptualized as a shared construct and measured through subjective perceptions of the construct among multiple employees. I, however, measured the construct by using items designed to capture the structural properties of internal communication system, such as communication policies, practices, procedures, rules, and rituals. In sum, I measured the degree of institutionalization of symmetrical internal communication because the structural properties can be reliably and validly observed by a single key respondent.

Identical items were used to measure all the constructs under study across embassies. Harkness, Mohler, and Vand de Vijver (2003) pointed out that the universal construct of religiosity is measured by frequency of attendance at church in one culture but by observation of rites at home in another culture— equivalent rather than identical measures. However, I used identical items instead of searching for equivalent items because I believed the constructs could be observed by using identical descriptors across embassies.

For instance, for descriptors of the empowerment principle, a South Korean corporation and a U.S. counterpart may have different descriptors because the organizational processes and structures in both firms may not be the same. Both are similar as corporations, though. On the other hand, embassies are, as discussed before, highly homogeneous across governments because diplomatic practices have long become standardized (Solomon, 1992).

On a functional level (organizational structure and process), embassies would be identical, allowing for use of identical descriptors for the same construct. The effects of cultural, national differences are expected to manifest in difference in degree not in kind of descriptors. Also, use of identical items across cultures permits a variety of rigorous statistical tests for construct equivalence (Harkness, Van de Vijver, & Johnson, 2003).

For linguistic equivalence, I used a single language (English) version of the instrument without translation. As diplomats, participants should be bilinguals who are fluent in both English and their mother tongues.

Use of a single language version itself, however, does not guarantee linguistic equivalence. Scholarly findings are not in agreement on the equivalence of use of a single language version with bilinguals. Katerberg, Smith, and Holy (1977) reported that there are few and negligible differences in scores between responses to two different language versions from a group of bilinguals. In contrast, Bennett (1977) reported significant differences with an independent study.

Hofstede (2001) reviewed Katerberg et al.'s (1977) and Bennett's (1977) findings and attributed the differences in their findings to different degrees of fluency in English among the two groups of bilinguals. Katerberg et al.'s subjects lived in an English-

speaking country and spoke English as frequently and fluently as they spoke their mother tongue. Bennett's bilinguals spoke English as a secondary language while living in their native-language country.

The bilingual subjects in this study, diplomats, are similar to Katerberg et al.'s (1977) bilinguals in that as a prerequisite qualification, they should be well versed in English in order to practice diplomacy in the United States. Thus, use of a single language (English) version of the instrument with bilingual diplomats can be expected to achieve linguistic equivalence.

Moreover, I used the same level of measurement and employed the same mode of data collection (self-administered) to address bias from differences in measurement level and mode of data collection. The Excellence study used an open-ended fractionation scale that contained a true zero for the complete lack of a certain characteristic. Instead, I used a 7-point Likert-type scale, considering the relatively uncommon use of the fractionation scale (Huang, 1997; Rhee, 1999; Sha, 1999).

Pretest Procedures

I met 20 diplomats in their embassies for a month between July 20, 2004 and August 20, 2004. After sending a solicitation letter, I called each diplomat and set up an appointment for a visit. On average, each visit ran one hour. For the first 15 to 20 minutes, the diplomats completed the pretest questionnaire. The remaining time was spent on consultation about the questionnaire. They were asked to point out confusing or nonsensical questions and phrases and to suggest ways for clarification and alternatives.

The diplomats even suggested ways to elicit more participation from fellow diplomats at other embassies. They knew well what motivates diplomats to participate in

an outside research project and what makes them avoid it. In short, they suggested elaborating on the promise of confidentiality by providing persuasive and detailed information on concrete procedures to keep confidentiality.

Results and Reconstruction of Questionnaire

For analysis of the questionnaire data, statistical package SPSS 11.5 was used. Each construct was investigated for reliability, factor structure, standard deviation, and means of the items (Table 2). The sample size was only 17 because three embassies (one from the Middle East, one from North America, and one from East Asia) did not complete the questionnaire.

Table 2

Results of Analysis of the Pretest Questionnaire

Construct	Cronbach's Alpha	Theorized # of Factors	Explored # of factors
Direction	.39	1	2
Mediated Channel	.71	1	2
Interpersonal Channel	.70	1	2
Purpose	.24	1	2
Ethics			
-Global Responsibility	.77	1	1
-Deontology	.07	1	2
Involvement	.77	1	1
Support	.66	1	2

(table continues)

Table 2 (*continued*)

Construct	Cronbach's Alpha	Theorized # of Factors	Explored # of factors
Knowledge	.83	1	2
Integration (Inside)	.92	1	1
Integration (Outside)	.96	1	1
Symmetrical Internal Communication	.89	1	1
Diversity	.89	1	1

Overall, items for the constructs of public diplomacy behavior had poor reliability while items for the constructs of the management constructs performed well. The two subdimensions of the ethics factor—global responsibility and deontology—were treated as if they were two separate factors simply for analytical purpose.

The results of pretest analysis did suggest the presence and location of problems with the instrument. In this respect, analysis of the data from qualitative consultation helped me understand the kinds and locations of the problems. The data also provided solutions for problems with item wording and other aspects of the questionnaire, such as the flow of items, use of an introductory statement, and the contents of the consent form.

Below I present the pretest results for each of the constructs, problems identified with items, ways to address the problems, and the entire process of reconstructing the pretest questionnaire into the final one used in the main survey.

Direction. The five items for the direction dimension performed poorly in exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and on Cronbach's alpha (Table 3). The items registered a poor alpha coefficient of .39 and revealed two factors, unlike what was

expected: a two-way factor (D2 and D3) and a one-way factor (D1, D4, and D5). The two-factor structure seemed to suggest measuring one-way and two-way communication separately.

Table 3

Results of Analysis of Direction (Two-way vs. One Way) Items in the Pretest

Questionnaire

Value	Factor Loading		α if item deleted	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	1	2			
D1: Information flows out from the embassy to the publics, not into.	.36	.52	.33	4.07	1.83
D2: Before initiating a policy communication program with the publics, survey or informal research is done to determine and profile the publics' attitudes toward our government's policies.	.94	-.09	.26	3.06	1.85
D3: After completing a policy communication program, research is done to determine how effective the program has been.	.89	-.11	.29	3.00	1.69
D4: Most policy communication programs in the embassy are designed to disseminate information to the publics.	-.12	.91	.34	3.07	1.58
D5: For this embassy, policy communication program means policy publicity.	-.32	.74	.45	3.80	1.32
Variance Accounted for (%)	43	29			
Eigenvalue	2.16	1.44			
Alpha Coefficient	.39				

Note. Factor loadings resulted from Varimax rotation method.

The consultation data corroborated the statistical results. For instance, a diplomat from a Central African country mentioned, “Depending on different publics, communication is one-way or two-way.” Another diplomat from a Central European country directly added, “Questions about direction should be separated into two kinds (one-way and two-way).”

Many of them were confused especially with D1 because they thought that with certain publics, information mostly flows out from embassy, but with other publics, not necessarily. Moreover, a diplomat from a Mediterranean country and two diplomats from two East Asian countries were confused about the meaning of “publicity” in D5. All in all, this confusion seemed to have contributed to the poor alpha.

Two steps were taken to address these problems in reconstructing the final questionnaire. The part for public diplomacy behavior in the pretest questionnaire was phrased to measure the practices of policy communication with unspecified “publics.” Because of the plural term “publics,” diplomats had multiple publics in mind in answering the questions.

Instead of “publics,” in the final questionnaire, a singular public was provided as the referent group: American journalists. The journalists were chosen over congressmen for the sake of comparison. Although only about a third of the embassies in Washington, D.C., conduct policy communication with congressmen in the names of lobbying or congressional affairs, almost all the embassies practice media relations by default. Zooming in on a comparable practice, media relations, across embassies would ensure more comparability in this cross-national research.

In the final questionnaire, the question statement for items to measure the dimensions of behavior was also rephrased to reflect the choice of American journalists. The statement became simple and clear in that it asked only about the ways that embassies practice media relations for policy communication. In addition, three one-way items (D1, D4, and D5) were deleted and replaced by three new two-way items (D'1, D'4, and D'5) (Table 4).

Table 4

Direction (Two-Way) Items in the Final Questionnaire

D'1: Keeping a clipping file is about the only way there is to determine the success of a program.

D2: Before initiating a policy communication program with the publics, survey or informal research is done to determine and profile the publics' attitudes toward our government's policies.

D3: After completing a policy communication program, research is done to determine how effective the program has been.

D'4: At budget time, funding depends on the demonstrated effectiveness of the communication program.

D'5: We are so busy in releasing policy statements and producing news briefings & publications that there is little time to do research.

I decided to measure only two-way communication for two reasons. The two-way items (D2 and D3) were shown to be more coherent and clearer than the one-way items in both qualitative and quantitative analyses. Secondly, it would be more meaningful to focus on the degree of two-way communication over one-way because two-way items are research-based and theoretically more interesting.

Mediated channel. The items for mediated communication produced an acceptable Cronbach's alpha of .71 but revealed a two-factor structure unlike what was

expected (Table 5). Item M4 seemed to play a detrimental role in determining the value of α and the factor structure; thus it was deleted. Item M2 also was deleted because it did not make sense in the context of press relations in which diplomats do not use television, radio, and newspapers as the first channels to communicate with journalists.

Table 5

Results of Analysis of Mediated Communication Items in the Pretest Questionnaire

Value	Factor Loading		α if item deleted	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	1	2			
M1: We distribute news releases, briefings, and position statements.	.87	.15	.57	5.50	1.41
M2: We use mass media such as television, radio, newspapers, and magazines.	.76	-.31	.72	5.25	1.61
M3: We use new media such as the Internet and email to communicate with publics.	.79	.19	.64	6.00	1.10
M4: We use advertising or other form of paid space in the media.	-.05	.89	.76	2.44	1.26
M5: We use printed media such as newsletters, brochures, flyers, pamphlets or other publications to communicate with the publics.	.63	.66	.58	4.81	2.07
Variance Accounted for (%)	50	25			
Eigenvalue	2.52	1.23			
Alpha Coefficient	.71				

Note. Factor loadings resulted from Varimax rotation method.

Instead, a new item M6 was added to the final questionnaire: “We use audio-visual materials such as audio and VHS tapes, CDs, or DVDs to communicate with

journalists.” The final questionnaire had four items to measure mediated communication (Table 6).

Table 6

Mediated Communication Items in the Final Questionnaire

M1: We distribute news releases, briefings, and position statements.
M3: We use new media such as the Internet and email to communicate with journalists.
M5: We use printed media such as newsletters, brochures, flyers, pamphlets or other publications to communicate with the publics.
M6: We use audio-visual materials such as audio and VHS tapes, CDs, or DVDs to communicate with journalists

Interpersonal channel. The items for interpersonal communication registered an acceptable alpha coefficient of .70 and displayed a two-factor structure largely because of the influence of item I2 (Table 7).

Table 7

Results of Analysis of Interpersonal Communication Items in the Pretest Questionnaire

Value	Factor Loading		α if item deleted	M	SD
	1	2			
I1: We make formal face-to-face contacts with the publics by holding parties and special events.	.79	-.40	.61	5.56	1.32
I2: We use interpersonal negotiating techniques to resolve conflict and disagreement between our government and the publics.	.06	.88	.83	4.19	1.33
I3: We, policy communication managers, and our Ambassador meet personally with leaders of the publics.	.87	.29	.54	5.81	1.22

(table continues)

Table 7 (*continued*)

Value	Factor Loading		α if item deleted	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	1	2			
I4: We make phone calls to members of the publics to keep in touch.	.86	.19	.56	5.44	1.36
I5: We make informal contacts with the publics such as having dinner and playing golf.	.72	-.40	.64	5.12	1.31
Variance Accounted for (%)	53	24			
Eigenvalue	2.66	1.21			
Alpha Coefficient	.70				

Note. Factor loadings resulted from Varimax rotation method.

In fact, the diplomats were confused about the item's real meaning. Some tended to focus more on "negotiating" than on "interpersonal." Thus, for the final questionnaire, I2 was rephrased to emphasize the interpersonal component: "We prefer face-to-face communication in resolving misunderstanding or disagreement between our government and journalists."

Purpose. The purpose items produced a very poor alpha of .24 and a two-factor structure (Table 8). The factor structure seemed to suggest that symmetrical and asymmetrical communication coexist. A closer examination of the factor loadings was perplexing, however, since asymmetrical item P5 was grouped with symmetrical items P1 and P2. Moreover, symmetrical item P3 was paired with asymmetrical item P4.

Table 8

*Results of Analysis of Purpose (Symmetry vs. Asymmetry) Items in the Pretest**Questionnaire*

	Value	Factor Loading		α if item deleted	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
		1	2			
P1: We believe that the purpose of policy communication is to develop mutual understanding between our government and the publics concerned for her policies.		.74	-.23	.23	6.38	.80
P2: We believe that policy communication should provide mediation for our government---to help the government and the publics negotiate conflict.		.82	.14	.06	.58	1.13
P3: We not only try to change the attitudes and behaviors of members of the publics, but also try to change our government's policies.		.30	.85	-.18	3.63	1.54
P4: In policy communication, our paramount goal is to persuade the publics to behave as our government wants them to behave.		-.50	.66	.55	4.38	1.90
P5: We believe that any outcome of conflict and disagreement between our government and the publics is a zero-sum game---that one party is the winner, and the other party is the loser.		.74	.11	.19	6.63	.62
Variance Accounted for (%)		42	25			
Eigenvalue		2.11	1.24			
Alpha Coefficient		.24				

Note. Factor loadings resulted from Varimax rotation method.

At the same time, some diplomats did not like or feel comfortable with the ways that the items were phrased. In their view, there was a need to tone down or soften the

expressions. For example, the word “conflict” in P2 was considered as “having too strong tone” (two diplomats from two East Asian and North American country), and the phrase “change the attitudes and behaviors” and “change our government’s policies” in P3 were thought “inappropriate” (two diplomats from two Middle East countries). The word “persuade” was also recommended being replaced because it has a bad connotation.

In the final questionnaire, I decided to measure the purpose dimension not as a single continuum (symmetrical vs. asymmetrical) but rather as two separate continua (symmetrical and asymmetrical scales). The factor structure did not seem to support operationalizing the purpose dimension as a single scale.

I also suspected that the perplexing factor loadings may be attributed to the annoying or bothering phrases of the items. In the final questionnaire, the five items were rephrased following the consultation, and one new symmetrical item (P6) and two new asymmetrical items (P7 and P8) were added so that there were two separate scales of four items, each for symmetrical and asymmetrical communication (Table 9).

Table 9

Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Items in the Final Questionnaire

Symmetrical items	P1: The purpose of press relations is to develop mutual understanding between our government and journalists. P2: Press relations should help our government and journalists resolve misunderstanding or disagreement if there is any. P3: We not only try to make journalists favorable to our government, but also try to inform our government of U.S.’ public opinion so that our government can change polices when it is appropriate. P6: We do whatever we think is best for the relationship with journalists even if journalists sometimes do not reciprocate our commitment.
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Asymmetrical items	<p>P4: The broad goal of press relations is to make journalists favorable to our government and its policies.</p> <p>P5: We believe that misunderstanding or disagreement between our government and journalists results in a zero-sum game in which one party is the winner, and the other party is the loser.</p> <p>P7: Accurate information is disseminated but unfavorable information is not volunteered to journalists.</p> <p>P8: In press relations, we mostly attempt to get favorable publicity into the media and to keep unfavorable publicity out.</p>
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Ethics. The ethics construct had two sub-dimensions: deontology and global responsibility. The items for deontology registered an extremely poor alpha of .07 as well as a two-factor structure instead of one (Table 10). The diplomats were confused about the meaning of “open lobbying” in De1 because lobbying is generally considered “public” and “open” (two diplomats from a Middle East country and a North America country). Others thought that the word “open lobbying” makes sense because there is “secret, private lobbying” (two diplomats from a Central African country and a East Asia country).

The results of the reliability test also suggested that without De1, the level of α would increase significantly. In addition, De1 no longer was appropriate for measuring media relations because journalists are not the target of lobbying. For these reasons, De1 was deleted in the final questionnaire.

Moreover, De2 was also deleted because it is more relevant to asymmetrical communication than to ethics. L. Grunig, J. Grunig, and Dozier (2002) classified De2 as an asymmetrical item. Instead, De2 was re-grouped into the asymmetrical battery. Lastly, two new items, De5 and De6, were added to the final questionnaire (Table 11).

Table 10

Results of Analysis of Deontology Items in the Pretest Questionnaire

Value	Factor Loading		α if item deleted	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	1	2			
De1: We conduct open lobbying.	-.54	.05	.34	3.50	1.71
De2: In our policy communication, we believe that favorable information should be disseminated but unfavorable information should be kept from the publics.		.79	-.40	.08	3.87 1.26
De3: We disclose our motivations or why we do things to the publics when conducting policy communication programs or campaigns.		.88	.33	-.41	4.63 1.67
De4: We offer party favors, valuable gifts, or memorabilia to leaders of the publics.		-.02	.98	.00	5.62 1.86
Variance Accounted for (%)	42	30			
Eigenvalue		1.70	1.21		
Alpha Coefficient		.07			

Note. Factor loadings resulted from Varimax rotation method

Table 11

Deontology Items in the Final Questionnaire

De3: We disclose our purpose or why we do things to journalists when conducting programs for press relations.
De4: We offer party favors, valuable gifts, memorabilia, trips, or junkets to journalists.
De5: We get involved in dialogue with journalists whenever they come to us with an issue---we do not avoid dialogue on any terms.
De6: Disclosure of unfavorable information to journalists depends on whether it is in the interests of our government than on whether it is true.

The items for global responsibility displayed an acceptable alpha of .77 as well as the expected one-factor structure (Table 12). The diplomats, however, expressed reservations about the appropriateness of G1 in which nationalism and cosmopolitanism were presented to be exclusive to each other.

Table 12

Results of Analysis of Global Responsibility Items in the Pretest Questionnaire

	Value	Factor Loading 1	α if item deleted	M	SD
G1: We believe that nationalism should be the norm of the international society, not cosmopolitanism.		.89	.40	4.67	1.88
G2: We are concerned about the well-being of people beyond our national border as well as that of our national citizens.		.60	.85	5.75	.75
G3: We feel greater ethical obligation to our national citizens than to people beyond our national border.		.70	.61	4.08	1.98
Variance Accounted for (%)		73			
Eigenvalue		2.2			
Alpha Coefficient		.77			

Note. Factor loadings resulted from Varimax rotation method

They mentioned: “Nationalism and cosmopolitanism do not exclude each other.” (two diplomats from a Middle East country and an East Asia country); “National interests are the end, while cosmopolitanism is the means.” (a diplomat from an East Africa country); “Relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism is not a matter of choice.” (a diplomat from a Mediterranean country); “Both coexist. In fact, national interests can be pursued through cosmopolitanism” (a diplomat from a Central Europe

country). Thus, in the final questionnaire, G1 was rephrased to describe the relationship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism as a mixed-motive one.

G3 was also rephrased to make it more comfortable to answer. Some diplomats recommended this revision because they felt G3 “undiplomatic.” For them, it was not comfortable to answer G3, although the meaning was clear to understand. To enhance the comfort level, I changed the object of ethical obligation from “humane” people to “inhumane” law. In addition, a new item G4 was added into the final questionnaire (Table 13).

Lastly, I grouped the four items for global responsibility under a separate introductory statement in the final questionnaire, instead of scattering them around. Some diplomats initially did not answer the original three items for global responsibility in the pretest questionnaire because they saw little relevance of the items to the practices of public diplomacy (two diplomats from an East Africa country and a Latin America country). They suggested kindly explaining why the items are being presented in a separate statement.

Table 13

Global Responsibility Items in the Final Questionnaire

G1: We believe that our national interests can be pursued only through taking into consideration the interests of other nations.

G2: We are concerned about the well-being of people on the globe as much as that of our national citizens.

G3: We feel greater obligation in abiding by our domestic, national rules and laws than in observing internationally agreed rules and laws when the both collide with each other.

G4: Humanitarian, developmental, human rights, and environmental issues, which concern the well-being of people on the globe, is an official pillar of our foreign policy.

Involvement. The involvement items registered an acceptable alpha of .77 and revealed one factor structure (Table 14). The items were intended to measure the degree of involvement of public diplomacy in the process in which a government strategically manages its foreign affairs. The degree of the involvement can be measured by the extent to which the function is engaged in policy formulation and issue management.

Table 14

Results of Analysis of Involvement Items in the Pretest Questionnaire

Value	Factor Loading	α if item deleted	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	1			
In1: Formulating our government's U.S. policies by providing information on U.S. publics' opinions and attitudes.	.68	.78	4.63	1.63
In2: Response to major political, economic, and cultural issues in the United States, which concern our government.	.86	.66	5.31	1.35
In3: Major initiatives (e.g., launches of strategic and proactive communication campaigns) and conduct of issues management (issue identification and tracking).	.66	.79	3.94	1.48
In4: Routine operations (e.g., development and maintenance of media relations, congress relations, NGOs relations, or cultural/educational programs).	.89	.62	4.75	1.57
Variance Accounted for (%)	61			
Eigenvalue	2.43			
Alpha Coefficient	.77			

Note. Factor loadings resulted from Varimax rotation method

Item In3 contained both sides of issue management (issue identification and launch of strategic communication programs to handle the issues). The item was divided into two separate items (In5 and In6) in the final questionnaire. In2 and In4 were deleted since embassies are likely to display small variations on these two items. In other words, these are basic activities that almost all embassies do. Instead, two new items (In7 and In8), which were expected to produce large variations across embassies were added. All of these items were research-based and related to issues management. The final questionnaire has five involvement items (Table 15).

Table 15

Involvement Items in the Final Questionnaire

In1: Formulation of our government's U.S. policies by providing it with information on U.S. publics' opinions and attitudes.

In5: Launches of strategic and proactive communication campaigns.

In6: Conduct of issue management (identification and tracking of major issues in the U.S., which concern our government).

In7: Specific research conducted to address specific issues or communication challenges.

In8: Regular conduct of research activities such as surveys to gather information for use in planning or evaluation of communication programs.

Support. The support items showed a mediocre alpha of .66 and a two-factor structure (Table 16). The items underwent a complete overhaul, and five (S1~S5) out of the six items were deleted. Throughout the visits for pretesting, I became used to the inner workings of embassy and came to conclude that the support items used in the pretest were likely to be invalid indicators of the level of support for the public diplomacy function.

Table 16

Results of Analysis of Support Items in the Pretest Questionnaire

Value	Factor Loading		α if item deleted	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	1	2			
In fulfilling public diplomacy, the official in charge of the function at our embassy...					
S1: Has a direct reporting relationship with the Ambassador.	.84	.09	.63	6.63	.62
S2: Serves as a counselor or adviser to the Ambassador.	.91	.02	.62	5.94	1.39
S3: Mostly implements what the Ambassador and other top officials dictate.	-.09	.57	.73	3.00	2.03
S4: Makes final decisions about communications fairly autonomously.	.28	.75	.56	4.13	1.54
S5: Participates in nearly every meeting of the top officials in the embassy.	.15	.77	.60	5.75	1.29
S6: Is supported and recognized by the Ambassador.	.61	.55	.56	6.19	1.22
Variance Accounted for (%)	43	20			
Eigenvalue	2.62	1.20			
Alpha Coefficient	.66				

Note. Factor loadings resulted from Varimax rotation method

Although the items may precisely measure the support inside large embassies, they would be imprecise for small embassies. I observed that because of size, regardless of the level of support for public diplomacy, the diplomat in charge of the function at a small embassy has a direct reporting relationship with the Ambassador and participates in every meeting with the Ambassador and other high officials.

Moreover, diplomats carrying out the function at small embassies are usually generalists whose main job responsibility is political, economic, or consul affairs. Thus, the generalist practitioners may have a direct reporting relationship or participate in meetings not because of public diplomacy affairs but because of other primary affairs.

I devised four new items (S'1~S'4), focused on the ways that resources such as budget and personnel are allocated to the execution of and research on public diplomacy on the governmental level. The items were also focused on the extent to which the function is appreciated in terms of promotion (Table 17). The new items should do a better job with precisely measuring the level of support across embassies, no matter how small or large they are.

Table 17

Support Items in the Final Questionnaire

S'1: Public diplomacy is assigned a priority in allocation of resources such as budget and personnel.

S'2: The government allocates resources to research on and training for excellent public diplomacy.

S'3: When there is a budget cut at the embassy or governmental level, it is usually first felt in conduct of public diplomacy.

S'4: Public diplomacy is so appreciated that good performance on the function or specialization in the function is an advantage in promotion.

S6: The Ambassador substantially supports and recognizes the importance of public diplomacy.

Knowledge. The items for knowledge resulted in an acceptable alpha of .83 but a two-factor structure (Table 18). Factor 1 can be named “knowledge factor for communication management,” while Factor 2 can be termed “general political expertise

factor.” In fact, the two items (K5 and K6) with large factor loadings on Factor 2 showed higher means than the other items, which may mean that K5 and K6 are everyone’s job.

Table 18

Results of Analysis of Knowledge Items in the Pretest Questionnaire

Value	Factor Loading		α if item deleted	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	1	2			
K1: Conduct evaluation research.	.82	.27	.78	4.38	1.45
K2: Develop goals and objectives for communication programs.	.80	.30	.78	4.81	1.33
K3: Perform environmental scanning.	.76	-.05	.84	4.81	1.56
K4: Develop strategies for solving communication programs.	.72	.43	.78	5.06	1.06
K5: Help the Ambassador understand the opinion of particular publics.	.05	.91	.83	5.56	1.26
K6: Manage the embassy’s response to issues.	.38	.85	.79	5.25	1.23
Variance Accounted for (%)	57	18			
Eigenvalue	3.4	1.09			
Alpha Coefficient	.83				

Note. Factor loadings resulted from Varimax rotation method

Measuring knowledge for communication management would be better than measuring general political expertise. Thus, items K5 and K6 were deleted and replaced by a new item K7 that has to do with knowledge for communication management. Item K3 was rephrased because most diplomats interpreted the word “environmental” more through its first connotation with “nature” than through its second connotation with

“societal milieu.” Lastly, items K1 and K7 were reversely phrased in the final questionnaire (Table 19).

Table 19

Knowledge Items in the Final Questionnaire

K1: Conduct little research to evaluate the effectiveness of communication programs or campaigns carried out.

K2: Develop goals and objectives for communication programs or campaigns.

K3: Identify and track through monitoring the media and contacting informants.

K4: Develop strategies for solving communication problems.

K7: Conduct little research to segment publics in order to tailor communication programs or messages for different segments of the publics.

Integration (inside), integration (outside), internal communication, and diversity.

All of these constructs showed a good range of alpha: integration (inside) (.92), integration (outside) (.96), symmetrical internal communication (.89), and diversity (.89). They also produced a one-factor structure as expected. Moreover, the diplomats expressed little problem with the items for these constructs. Only a slight change was made to the wordings for more clarity and simplicity (Table 20).

Table 20

Items for Integration, Internal Communication, and Diversity in the Final Questionnaire

Integration (inside)

II1: We seldom carry out joint projects, programs, or campaigns.

II2: We share resources such as budget or personnel.

II3: We develop and maintain common databases on biographical and contact information on publics.

II4: We hold regular meetings to coordinate the activities.

II5: We seldom do joint planning for strategic programs or campaigns.

Integration (outside)

IO1: We carry out joint projects, programs, or campaigns.

IO2: We seldom share information of many kinds.

IO3: We seldom hold regular meetings to coordinate separate activities.

IO4: We operate an executive sub-committee to enhance cooperation.

IO5: We do joint planning and financing for strategic programs or campaigns.

Symmetrical Internal Communication

IC1: An upward communication channel formally exists, through which subordinates express diverse ideas and different opinions.

IC2: Subordinates are seldom informed about major changes in policy that affect their job before the changes take place.

IC3: A communication channel formally exists, through which subordinates bring out complaints and issues related to job assignments, performances appraisal, and promotion.

IC4: In staff meetings, superiors mostly speak, and subordinates mostly listen.

IC5: The purpose of communication is to get subordinates to behave in the way superiors want them to behave.

Diversity

DI1: Developed specific guidelines for handling sexual harassment.

DI2: Established effective policies to deal with sexual discrimination.

DI3: Set up a system of maternity and paternity leave.

DI4: Fostered women's leadership abilities.

DI5: Provided the same opportunities for women as those for men to take risks in performing job.

A major change, however, was made to the question statements for symmetrical internal communication and diversity. I added a sentence in the statements, which allows diplomats to answer the items with respect to the situation inside the foreign ministry if they feel that their embassies are too small for them to meaningfully talk about internal communication and diversity. In fact, several embassies are so small that they are less likely to have institutionalized polices and practices for symmetrical internal communication and diversity at the embassy level.

I did not expect any problems with lumping together data from embassies and foreign ministries because communication policies and affirmative actions for women at the ministry level should apply to those at the embassy level. The items were intended to measure the degree of formalization or institutionalization of symmetrical internal communication polices/ practices and affirmative actions for women.

Measures against social desirability. Before the pretest, I expected the questionnaire to suffer from the bias of social desirability. Although the items were meant to measure communication behaviors and management structure/process, the items never could be free from value-laden interpretation.

For instance, institutionalizing policies/ practices for symmetrical internal communication and affirmative actions for women is a “good” thing, but a lack of those qualities is “a shame.” Moreover, the respondents are diplomats who conceive of themselves as “representatives” of their countries. Diplomats may possess a strong propensity to make their governments and countries look “globally desirable.”

After examining responses, I came to suspect that the bias might have plagued the responses, to a worrisome extent. Among other things, there was no significant difference

in the degree of symmetrical internal communication and affirmative action between embassies from democratic governments and their counterparts from authoritarian governments. This was contrary to the expectation that the less democratic a country is the less symmetrical communication and affirmative action the country has inside. In fact, I detected some signs of social desirability from responses for other constructs such as knowledge and integration.

Initially, I planned to implant into the final questionnaire some scales to detect social desirability, such as the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) that has been widely used in dealing with the bias. The Scale has 33 true-false items, and each of the items describes either culturally acceptable but improbable or culturally unacceptable but probable behaviors (Johnson & Van de Vijver, 2003).

I did not pursue the idea after consulting with diplomats in pretest. Completing the pretest questionnaire took about 20 minutes on average, and many respondents strongly suggested making completion shorter to elicit more participation. Adding 33 more items would mean at least 15 more minutes to fill out the questionnaire and thus would discourage participation.

In addition, some respondents in the pretest initially hesitated to answer items for global responsibility, symmetrical internal communication, and diversity simply because they thought those items to be irrelevant to what they are doing in the name of public diplomacy. In sum, I decided not to use the social desirability scale in order to encourage participation, although use of the scale would help dealing with social desirability.

Instead, I chose to elaborate on the confidential nature of presenting and analyzing responses in the introductory statement of the questionnaire. A detailed

explanation of the procedures for data analysis and presentation was added to the statement in order to assure diplomats that they did not need to think “providing responses” to be presenting their governments to the global publics. Several other sentences were also included to further motivate them not to be subject to the bias.

In addition, headings before each question statement for constructs were deleted because they might give diplomats a cue for the bias. Although the headings would be useful in orienting diplomats to upcoming questions, they would activate social desirability at the same time. The headings may imply that there are socially desirable answers to choose: “involvement of public diplomacy,” “support for public diplomacy,” “integration of all public diplomacy activities,” “knowledge,” “Internal communication,” and “programs for women.”

Data Collection Procedure

I collected data for six months from August 2004 to January 2005. After the pretest, a solicitation letter (Appendix A) was mailed to 169 embassies. About four weeks later, a survey package was mailed to 100 embassies including the 20 pretested embassies. I asked the 20 diplomats to complete the final questionnaire again.

The survey was conducted on two stages because of two considerations. First, I wished to examine the response rate from the first stage in order to make necessary adaptations for a better response rate for the second stage. Second, while contacting the embassies via telephone, I learned that many diplomats would be out of country for vacation or for replacement when the first mailing was initially scheduled. The remaining 69 embassies were put aside for the second stage that started in November 2004.

The survey package included a letter of introduction, a directory of public diplomacy diplomats, a bibliography for public diplomacy, a copy of the 5-page final questionnaire that contained 69 items (Appendix B), and a stamped, return-addressed envelope. The directory and bibliography were prepared as a token of appreciation for participation.

The 35-page directory included contact information for diplomats in charge of public diplomacy at 169 embassies. It also contained valuable information on the organizational arrangement of the function at a substantial number of embassies. The information was collected, for the most part, through call inquiries to each embassy.

After sending the pre-notification letter, I first called the prospective respondents to check the delivery status, briefly introduced myself and the purpose of study, and asked if they wish to have the survey package. I sent the package to only those who wished to have it. After sending the package, I called again to check the delivery and asked the diplomats to consider participating in the survey. A week later, I called again to ask if they had any questions or concerns about the survey.

In the beginning, I gave the diplomats two weeks to fill out the questionnaire and mail it back to me. Two weeks later, I sent the first reminder package, including a letter, a copy of the final questionnaire along with a stamped, addressed return envelope, and a list of embassies that had already participated in the survey. Four weeks later, I sent the second reminder package including the same contents.

Of the 169 embassies, I collected 120 questionnaires, 50 of which were through the mail and 70 of which were through in-person visits. I visited 70 embassies that made

verbal commitments to the survey but had not returned the questionnaires. I visited 30 of the 70 embassies twice and the remaining 40 embassies once to collect the questionnaires.

Of 120 questionnaires returned, seven were unusable for analysis because some of the questionnaires were not completed at all, and the others had only the number 1 checked for all the items. Thus, 113 of the 169 embassies in Washington, D.C. participated in the survey. The participation rate was 67%. As a result, I was not able to conduct a census of embassies as I had intended. Nevertheless, the accomplished sample made up a large proportion of the population.

Data on Contextual Variables

Although the survey method was used to collect the public diplomacy data, a set of widely used secondary data was used for the contextual variables of governments, except for the variable of dependence.

Culture

Hofstede (2001, 1984) conceptualized culture using four universal dimensions: individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity-femininity. His etic approach allows for comparison of a large number of different cultures in a quantifiable manner, addressing not only the extent to which cultures are different but also in which respect they differ.

Hofstede (2001) originally attempted to measure the four dimensions for 72 countries, relying on matching samples of IBM's subsidiaries in the countries. He administered 116,000 questionnaires to employee samples of the subsidiaries operating in those countries between 1967 and 1973. An initial analysis was done with 40 countries

that met a conservative sample size criterion. In 1982, 24 countries were added to the country data set. The latter countries met a less conservative but still acceptable criterion.

In the late 1990s, Hofstede extended the data set to include 16 new countries, which were not included in the original 72 countries, incorporating the results of his own observations, descriptive data, and small-scale extension studies such as Nanhekhan's (1990, as cited in Hofstede, 2001, p. 464). As the result, Hofstede's data set has come to cover as many as 80 national cultures, providing the most representative data set in cross-cultural study: Europe (27), Asia (16), Latin America (16), Africa (10), Middle East (9), and North America (2).

Since publication of his book *Culture's Consequences* (1980), Hofstede's four-dimensional conception of culture and the measured country scores have received much attention from many academic disciplines ranging from public relations, management, organizational study, international relations, business ethics, and information decision science. Fernandez, Carlson, Stepina, and Nicholson (1997) noted the status of Hofstede's framework as "a watershed foundation for many subsequent cross-national research endeavors" (pp. 43-44).

Hofstede's cultural scores have faced two persistent criticisms. First, his culture scores, from the beginning, did not capture real national culture because they were not based on representative samples of national populations. The scores were not about national culture as much as IBM's organizational culture.

In response, Hofstede (2001) argued that "although the IBM subsidiaries' matching samples are atypical for their countries, it does not matter as long as they are atypical in the same way from one country to another country" (p. 16). He further added

that “the use of IBM subsidiaries’ matching samples had an effect of controlling for organizational culture and that, thus the remaining variability after the controlling is a conservative estimate of the true variability among countries” (p. 16).

The second critique is that even if his culture scores captured real differences and similarities among national cultures, the scores were only valid at the time of his survey and have become obsolete as culture has shifted. Behind this critique is the popular notion that, forced by globalization, cultures are converging in a way that people of different cultures consume the same products and share the same life styles and practices (Ohmae, 1985; O'Reilly, 1991). Although the cultures were once different three decades ago, they have become homogeneous, casting doubt on the explanatory power of Hofstede's four dimensions and the measured scores in later periods (Alder, Doktor, & Redding, 1986).

To the convergence proposition, Hofstede (2001) put forward a stability proposition that culture is stable across time and when it changes, it does so only gradually. A culture has an internal stability mechanism; once a culture has molded social institutions such as family, religion, and political system for a long time, the institutions reversely reinforce the culture, resisting change from outside and maintaining identities.

Hofstede (2001) said that “culture change basic enough to invalidate the country dimension index scores will need either a much longer period—say, 50 to 100 years—or extremely dramatic outside events” (p. 34). For Hofstede, “the software of machines may be globalized, but not the software of the minds that use these machines” (Vishwahath, 2003, p. 595).

Empirical replications and check of correlations between the replicated scores and Hofstede's original ones would be a good validity test of his scores across time. It would answer the question of whether the differences and similarities among cultures captured in the scores measured in the early 1970s still hold true three decades later. Many replication studies, however, have been on a small scale, involving only a few countries because of the difficulty of having a large sample. The situation has prevented a direct validity test of the 1970s' scores (Hofstede, 2001).

Instead, empirical support for the scores' validity across time came from a series of indirect validity tests. Hofstede (2001) argued that validity is shown by correlating test results with outside criteria expected to correlate according to some kind of theory or logic— theoretical validity. He validated his scores against about 200 external comparative studies, more than half of which were conducted between 1990 and 2001. For example, for life satisfaction data from 10 European countries collected in each of the years between 1982 and 1998 his scores on uncertainty avoidance yielded a range of strong Pearson's product correlations coefficients between -.70 and -.87.

Along with simplistic correlation analyses, many theory-driven studies have supported the validity of his measures. Using Hofstede's data on uncertainty avoidance, Vishwahath (2003) successfully predicted differential impact of uncertainty avoidance on on-line bidding behavior across Japan, Germany, and the United States.

Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) corroborated Hofstede's culture stability proposition, using longitudinal data spanning almost three decades. They investigated the effects of cultural distance, a concept derived from cultural differences in Hofstede's data,

on the incidence of international joint ventures (IJVs) and the hazard rate of IJVs. Their findings showed that the effects have remained the same throughout the decades.

Their longitudinal data covered 828 foreign entries of 25 Dutch multinational corporations between 1966 and 1994. They concluded that “our results support Hofstede’s key assumption that culture is stable over time and do not show a decrease in the effects of cultural distance over the last three decades” (p. 859). To conclude, the results of these studies support use of Hofstede’s cultural data in this study.

Political System

The concept of political system, as used in this dissertation, refers to the governmental dimension of a broad definition of political system. It concerns the form of government and where the government is located along a continuum of democracy vs. autocracy. The Freedom House indices were used for data on the degree of democracy for this study. The Freedom indices are one of the most widely used measures of democracy in the comparative politics and international relations literature, along with the Polity I~IV democracy indices (Marshall, 2004).

Since 1972, Freedom House has annually rated the degree of democracy for 192 independent states whose governments reside within their officially claimed borders and 17 related and disputed territories such as Cyprus (Freedom House, 2004b). The Freedom indices are computed based on two dimensions of democracy: political rights (freedom of contestation, opposition, and participation) and civil liberties (freedom of expression, assembly, association, and religion).

Political rights and civil liberties are each measured on a 7-point scale, with a rating of 1 indicating the most free and 7 the least free; and the two scores are averaged to

produce an overall rating of democracy for a country (Freedom House, 2004c). The Freedom House ratings reflect a broad conception of democracy (liberal democracy) as opposed to a narrow, minimalist procedural definition of democracy (electoral democracy) (Diamond, 1999).

In this study, data for specific years, for instance, the latest 2004 ratings or the previous five-year ratings, were not used. Rather, I used average scores on the indices for 1972 through 2004 to accurately capture the degree of democracy. A slice of data (one-year or several-year mean ratings) would fail to accurately measure democracy, which nurtures a democratic political culture and eventually affects the choice of public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy.

A country may become a democracy through an overnight civil revolution after decades of autocracy and achieve a 1 or 2 rating for that one transition year. It would be, however, impossible for democratic culture to take root in the country within just one year. By the same token, a country might experience a setback from a century-old liberal democracy to military dictatorship and slide back to a 3 or 4 rating for the year. The democratic political culture inside the country, however, would be still pervasive and viable for a long time.

Echoing this point, Maoz and Russett (1993) emphasized the concept of political stability in measuring the extent to which democratic or other kind of norms operate in a society. They said:

A society that undergoes fundamental change requires a considerable period of time to develop norms of political conduct and for citizens to internalize those norms and become accustomed to them. The longer a given political system exists

without fundamental change, the more likely that norms of political conduct, whether democratic or non-democratic, will form and influence the foreign policy codes of conduct of the government. (p. 630)

As a measure of political stability, The Freedom House (Freedom House, 2004d) used “Freedom’s Tenure” by analyzing the past 31 years of data. Of the world’s 192 governments, 24 governments (12.5%) have been free for the lifetime of the survey. Twenty more countries have enjoyed freedom for 15 to 30 years, while 44% or half of the current total of free countries have been free for fewer than 15 years.

Compared to “Freedom’s Tenure,” however, longitudinal average scores on the Freedom indices should represent political stability of a polity with precision. The Freedom indices have more differentiating numerical values than “Freedom’s Tenure” that has only a few categorical values. Thus, the mean indices can better measure the extent to which a governmental system will affect the formation of political culture and the effect of the culture on public diplomacy.

Interest Group System

The interest group system concept refers to mediation of interest conflicts by government. Scholars have used a continuum of corporatism versus pluralism to represent the phenomenon but developed different definitions and measures.

Lehmburk (1982) saw that the multiplicity of definitions of corporatism is due to a preponderance of country-specific case studies in corporatism research. Case studies focus on the particularities of a case or cases. Corporatism has been understood, conceptualized, and generalized from one or two dimensions prevalent in a few countries, which may not be as salient in many other countries.

Kenworthy (2003) identified as many as 42 quantitative scales of corporatism from the literature. A majority of the scales are exclusively focused on one or two dimensions out of the four dimensions of corporatism identified and conceptualized across countries: interest group organization (Schmitter, 1981), wage setting arrangements (Soskice, 1990), interest group participation in policy making (Lehmbruch, 1984), and political-economic consensus (Katzenstein, 1985).

Lijphart and Crepaz (1991) pointed out that even though the measures with different foci are in reasonable agreement with one another, there is far from perfect agreement. In addition, most of the measures are based on rough trichotomous classifications—high versus medium versus low pluralism or corporatism, and they usually cover short periods and only from 15 to 18 Western industrialized OECD countries (Lijphart, 1999).

Lehmbruch (1982) proposed that, as a highly complex phenomenon, corporatism should be covered by diverse conceptualizations using composite (aggregate) measures rather than single scales. Siaroff (1999) made a composite measure of corporatism-pluralism, incorporating all the four dimensions. He rated 24 Western industrialized democracies on each of the dimensions, using a 5-point scale, and then averaged these ratings to arrive at a comprehensive score for each country. Moreover, he did so for two periods: 1963~1970 and 1983~1990.

Lijphart (1999) extended the number of countries in Siaroff's study by adding 12 more countries through consultation with area experts. He argued that the degree to which a country is pluralist or, to some extent, corporatist is measurable on the basis of expert judgment. As evidence of converging validity, Lijphart reported a strong

correlation coefficient, $r = .95^{**}$, $p < .01$, between his 36 country measure and the “combined wisdom measure” that he and Crepaz (1991) had devised by standardizing and averaging six other measures of corporatism.

For this study, I used Lijphart’s (1999) ratings of corporatism for 36 countries because it provides the most comprehensive data currently available. In addition, Lijphart’s 36 countries uniquely include 12 developing democracies from Latin America, Africa, South Asia, and the Caribbean. The inclusion of developing democracies enlarges the limited focus on OECD countries in corporatism research. Also, his ratings cover a long time span from the late 1940s to 1996.

Dependence

Interstate dependence is a multifaceted phenomenon, and its major facets include, but are not limited to, economic, strategic, and security (military) dependence between two countries. It would be improbable to capture all of the complexities of dyadic dependence by focusing exclusively on one dimension over the others. For comparative inquiry of the relations between dependence and public diplomacy, however, it would be necessary to focus on a dimension of dependence that is conducive to comparison across as many countries as possible.

In this regard, although strategic and security dependence should influence public diplomacy, these dimensions would not easily allow for comparative inquiry of a large scale because not all dyadic countries have strategic and security dependence. Only some dyads of countries may have these dimensions.

On the other hand, the economic dimension seems amenable to comprehensive comparison. Almost all dyads of countries have economic relations. Moreover, data on

interstate economic dependence are easily available and more quantifiable than data on strategic and security dependence.

According to Wilkenfeld, Hopple, Rossa, and Andriole (1980), interstate economic relations include trade, international monetary policies and flows, financial and investment dynamics, foreign aid, and multinational and transactional activities. Of these subdimensions of economic relations, trade, investment, and foreign aid are of major concern for governments in conducting public diplomacy.

Considering the comparability and comprehensiveness of a measure of dependence, trade seems to be the best subdimension on which economic dependence in a vast number of dyads can be compared. Not all dyads of countries have foreign aid and investment relations. To be sure, not all dyads of countries have trade relations; but compared to foreign aid and investment relations, trade relations are more universal.

The public diplomacy literature (e.g., Kunczik, 1997; Kunczik & Weber, 1994; Lobsenz, 1984) suggests that trade, especially exports and tourism, is the main determinant of a government's public diplomacy. Accordingly, in this study, I focused on trade, specifically its two main components, exports and tourism, in devising a measure of economic dependence. In the contexts of public diplomacy, a country is most dependent upon the largest importing country of its goods and tourism services.

The absolute magnitude of export of goods and tourism services to a partner country in the dyad, however, probably is not an accurate measure of dependence. It is possible that country A exporting \$ 20 billion of goods and tourism service to country B is less dependent upon country B than country C exporting \$ 1 million of goods and services to country B.

Thus, the absolute magnitude of exports must be converted to a relative term: How vital is the absolute magnitude of exports to the partner country for the entire gross domestic product (GDP) of a country. For this reason, a measure of dependence based on exports of goods and tourism services should capture the proportion of the absolute magnitude of exports in a country's GDP: Country A's dependence on country B is equal to the sum of export of goods and tourism service to country B divided by country A's GDP.

The dependence indicator does not take into consideration the import side. It is, however, relevant to the study of public diplomacy in that governments prioritize their public diplomacy effort, focusing on the export side.

In constructing the indicator, I used the export, tourism, and GDP data in U.S. millions in the year of 2000 from *International Trade Statistics Yearbook 2000* (the United Nations, 2002), *Yearbook of Tourism Statistics 1996-2000* (the World Tourism Organization, 2002), and *World Development Indicators* (the World Bank, 2003), respectively.

The *Yearbook* does not provide specific data on a country's tourism revenue coming from another country. Instead, the publication supplies a country's total tourism revenue and the percentage of tourist arrivals per country. Thus, I divided the total revenue by the percentage to obtain a country's tourism revenue from another country, i.e., the United States, for this study.

Statistical Techniques and Procedures for Data Analysis

Preliminary Analysis

Missing data. With public diplomacy data from the survey, I used an imputation method called EM (Expectation-Maximization), which the statistical program SPSS 11.5 provides. The EM method involves maximum likelihood estimation techniques that attempt to model the processes underlying the missing data and to make the most accurate and reasonable estimates possible.

I also conducted Little's test to check if imputation can be warranted in generating replacement values for the missing data without introducing biases into analysis. Little's test is an overall test of the missing data for being missing completely at random (MCAR), which makes a comparison of the actual pattern of missing data with what would be expected if the missing data were totally randomly distributed.

With the contextual variables, I chose not to use any imputation method because the missing variable pattern is not random. All of the 113 participating countries have measurements on the political system, and 109 countries have measurements on dependence. Of the 113 countries, however, only 23 countries have measures on interest group system, and 52 countries on societal culture.

The missing variable pattern in the contextual data was affected by nonrandom procedures. From the beginning, Hofstede's (2001) data on societal culture and Lijphart's (1999) data on interest group system covered only 80 and 36 countries, respectively, and the countries were selected based on a convenience sampling framework.

Outliers. In dealing with outliers, I examined the two sets of data only to see if there were mistakes in data entry, without employing statistical techniques to deal with

outliers. The decision was made based on two considerations. I judged outliers in the contextual data to represent true scores because the data were originally produced with rigorous standards in measurement and have been verified through tests of theoretical validity with respect to their theoretical relations with other outside constructs.

Based on this judgment, I did not attempt to detect and delete outliers in order to accommodate the small sample problem in macro-comparative study. Any deletion of outliers would result in an inappropriately small sample for statistical analysis. Retention of outliers in this study would enhance generalizability of the findings, although it may weaken statistical power in testing the hypothesized relations between the contextual variables and public diplomacy. Thus, I took a conservative approach in addressing outliers by retaining them in the analysis.

Normality. The benchmark assumption for statistical analysis with metric variables is normality. The assumption is that the shape of the data distribution should be normal for statistical tests to be valid. The public diplomacy and contextual data in this study consist of metric variables. To check the assumption, I conducted statistical tests for normality, which calculate the level of significance for the differences from a normal distribution. When nonnormality was found, I first tried to transform the data to meet the normality assumption. If no transformation worked, I converted the data into nonmetric data if conversion was appropriate.

In testing the normality assumption with the public diplomacy data, I calculated and used principal component scores for each construct of public diplomacy behavior and excellence.

Refinement and assessment of public diplomacy constructs. I conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to first refine the constructs of public diplomacy. After examining regression coefficients (standardized loadings), I deleted an indicator or indicators with coefficients less than .30 in order to refine the construct. Bryant and Yarnold (1995) suggested a coefficient value of .30 as the cutting point for meaningful interpretation.

Afterwards, I assessed the quality of the refined constructs of public diplomacy. Typically, two measures are employed for the assessment: construct reliability and validity. Construct validity is captured by the amount of variance that is extracted from the measured variables. The variance extracted is equivalent to an eigenvalue in factor analysis, and it is generally recommended that a factor accounts for at least 50 % of the variance in the original variables (items).

In assessing construct reliability, I used Coefficient H, an improved index over the traditional index of construct reliability that actually assesses “the reliability of an equally weighted composite of standardized variables” (Hancock, 2004a). The traditional index has been criticized for being inconsistent with the latent variable system in which the factor is not a composite of the variables.

Coefficient H is known to be unaffected by the sign of the loadings, never detracted by additional indicators, and never smaller than the reliability (squared loadings) of the best indicator (Hancock, 2004a). Its recommended minimum size is between .70 and .80. Cronbach’s alpha tests were also conducted to assess internal-consistence reliability of items. This reliability index assumes that the constructs involved are the simple sum of the constituent variables. I relied more on Coefficient H over Cronbach’s

alpha in assessing reliability of the constructs since the H does not make the simple sum assumption. Generally, the accepted benchmark for adequate Cronbach's alpha is .80 (Nunnally, 1978).

The refined construct models were used for further tests of the validity of the two multi-construct measurement models that research question 1 and 2 proposed: the six-factor measurement model of public diplomacy behavior and the second-order, single factor model of excellence in public diplomacy.

As composites, principal component scores were extracted to represent scores on the refined sets of indicators for the constructs of public diplomacy and used in testing hypotheses and research questions on empirical associations between the contextual variables and public diplomacy.

Test for construct equivalence. The structural equivalence of a measurement model for a construct is the assumption on which scores derived from the construct can be safely compared across cultures. If the measurement model is found to be invariant, thus generic, the researcher can make comparisons of scores on the construct. In this regard, a test of construct equivalence should be performed as a prerequisite to substantive analysis in cross-cultural study.

CFA has been widely used in testing the equivalence of a measurement model across groups or cultures. Radloff (1977) used the technique to determine the equivalence of a four-factor measurement model of depression across cultures. A CFA for equivalence test is commonly called multi-group CFA. The procedure is to compare CFA models across groups or populations. A multi-group CFA concerns measurement

invariance (factorial invariance), which indicates whether a set of indicators assesses the same latent variable across groups (Kline, 1998).

According to Hancock (2004b), the procedure has the following steps: (a) a test of the model fit for each group, (b) a test of the model fit for both groups simultaneously, (c) a test of the differences between corresponding parameters, (d) LM (Lagrange Multiplier) tests of constraints, and (e) comparison of both groups.

In this study, I recognized a unique situation in testing the generic nature of the two measurement models across cultures: the six-factor measurement model of public diplomacy behavior and the second-order, single factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy. For this study, I took the nation as the unit of analysis approach, treating a nation as if it was an individual or entity; a single score represents a nation.

This study cannot conduct a multi-group CFA in the same manner that a study taking the “micro replications” approach (Rokkan, 1966, pp. 19-20) can. In a “micro replications” study, the researcher can use multi-group CFA with within-nation samples to test the equivalence of a construct across nations.

To conduct a CFA within the macro replication framework, I clustered the participating embassies (governments) into two groups with different cultures. Creating more than two groups would result in too few cases in each group to conduct a CFA. The concept of culture in macro-comparative research is mostly associated with “national culture.” A number of nations in a region, however, typically share similar cultural heritages.

By the same token, countries can be clustered into groups with a similar profile on universal characteristics of culture such as Hofstede’s (2001) individualism/collectivism

dimension. If the 113 participating governments in this study had scores on Hofstede's indices, one could easily cluster the governments into two groups: a group of governments or countries with scores above the mean (individual culture group) and another group with scores below the mean (collectivist culture group). Unfortunately, Hofstede's data cover 80 countries, only 52 of which took part in this study.

In addressing this problem, I employed a strategy to use a strong predictor variable for the individualism/collectivism dimension, which desirably has measures for all the participating embassies. The predictor was national wealth measured by GNP or GDP per capita. Exploratory correlational studies have shown a strong relationship between national wealth and Hofstede's (2001) scores on the individualism dimension. Hofstede (2001) reported a strong correlation coefficient of .84** ($p < .01$) between his individualism scores and 1970 GNP per capita across 50 countries.

Use of national wealth as a surrogate variable of the individualism/collectivism dimension is not without problems. Few theoretical explanations for the strong relationship have been provided (Johnson & Van de Vijver, 2003). Use of national wealth, however, was desirable for the purpose of clustering the participating governments into two groups of governments: a group of governments with GDP per capita above the mean and another group with GDP per capita below the mean. The two groups could be treated as if they represented an individualist culture group and a collectivist culture group, respectively.

In creating the two cultural groups, I used 2000 GDP per capita data from the *World Development Indicators* (the World Bank, 2003). The individualist group

consisted of 40 countries with GDP per capita above the mean (U.S. \$ 8,429), and the collectivist group consisted of 73 countries below the mean.

The clustering procedure, however, resulted in inappropriately small groups for conducting two-group CFAs testing the equivalence of the six-factor measurement model of public diplomacy behavior and the second-order, single factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy. Given an extremely unreasonable ratio between the number of estimated parameters and the number of cases, I decided to test the equivalence of each construct of public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy.

Testing each construct separately should suffice for the purpose of analysis. In this study, I did not intend to test the equivalence of factor structure of the two measurement models as a whole but rather the comparability of scores on each construct of public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy across cultures. Moreover, this decision makes the size of the two groups enough for conducting CFA.

Substantive Analysis

Fit of the public diplomacy measurement models. Research questions 1 and 2 were proposed to empirically test theoretical convergence between public diplomacy and public relations. Specifically, research question 1 inquired about the applicability of the six-factor measurement model of public relations behavior to public diplomacy behavior. Research question 2 asked about the applicability of the second-order, single factor measurement model of excellence in public relations to excellence in public diplomacy.

I conducted a CFA with the proposed two measurement models of public diplomacy, which were newly conceptualized through an application of the two

measurement models of public relations, to test how well the public diplomacy measurement models fit public diplomacy behavior and excellence in public diplomacy measured at the 113 participating embassies in Washington, D.C.

I based the CFA with the six-factor measurement model of public diplomacy and the second-order, five-factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy on the refined single factor measures for each of the public diplomacy constructs.

Empirical associations between contextual variables and public diplomacy. Research questions 3 and 4, and all of the hypotheses from 1 to 15 were proposed to empirically test the theoretical linkages between a government's contextual variables and its public diplomacy behavior/excellence in public diplomacy. I conducted simple and partial correlation analysis, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and *t*-tests in testing the linkages between each contextual variable and the public diplomacy constructs.

In testing research questions 3 and 4, and all the hypotheses, I used four different case bases (samples) in terms of size. For maximum generizability of the findings, I tested the research question and hypotheses with different case bases. For instance, I based the test of hypotheses related to the political system on a case base consisting of all the 113 participating countries that have measurements on the variable. For test of hypotheses on dependence, a second case base of 109 countries was used, which have measurements on dependence. In addition, a third case base of 52 countries with cultural data was used to test hypotheses on culture. A fourth case base of 23 countries with measurements on the interest group system was used in testing hypotheses on the variable.

Criteria for evaluating statistical results. I used the statistical program AMOS 4 in conducting all CFAs in this study: (a) a CFA to assess each of the single measurement

models for the public diplomacy constructs, (b) a CFA to test the equivalence of each of the single measurement models, and (c) a CFA to test the six-factor measurement model of public diplomacy behavior and the second-order, single factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy.

In CFA, a number of goodness-of-fit indices are used to indicate the extent to which a proposed model fits the observed data. Hu and Bentler (1999) suggested using joint criteria to retain a model, such as (a) the comparative fit index ($CFI \geq .96$) and the standardized root mean-square residual ($SRMR \leq .10$) or (b) the root mean-square error of approximation ($RMSEA \leq .06$) and $SRMR \leq .10$.

The statistical program AMOS 4, which was used in this study, however, does not provide information on SRMR. Thus, I chose to use information on the CFI and RMSEA to assess model fits. MacCallum, Browne, and Sugawara (1996) and Browne and Cudeck (1993) elaborated on the cutting points of RMSEA: values less than .05 indicate a good fit, values as high as .08 represent a reasonably good fit, values ranging from .08 to .10 indicate a mediocre fit, and those greater than .10 indicate a poor fit. Hu and Bentler (1999), however, cautioned that when sample size is small (fewer than 250 cases), the RMSEA tends to overreject true population models, yielding values greater than .10.

In principle, this study as a macro-comparative one dealing with a population of governments was not subject to statistical significance tests. Given the finite nature of the government population, significance tests in macro-comparative research have not been rigorously performed. Bollen, Entwistle, and Alderson (1993), however, argued that “they [rigorous significance tests] might still be justified in terms of super-populations where

the observed sample is treated as a single realization of the possible samples that could be drawn from a hypothetical population” (p. 334).

Consistent with Bollen et al. (1993), I performed significance tests on observed statistics, but in making conclusions on research questions and hypotheses, I also interpreted insignificant findings with meaningful effect size to accommodate the unique nature of a macro-comparataive study that addresses an infinite population with small cases. For instance, I examined not only the significance level of observed statistics but also the direction and (or) magnitude (e.g., the negative or positive sign of correlation coefficients and group means differences).

Meanwhile, Cohen’s (1988) recommendations were used in interpreting the size of empirical associations (e.g., the magnitude of correlation coefficient). According to him, correlation coefficients with absolute values less than .10 indicate a small association. Absolute values around .30 mean a medium one, and values above .50 indicate a strong association. Thus, I did not interpret correlation coefficients with values less than the minimal cutoff point of .10.

Ethical Considerations

Voluntary participation and protection of participants from harm are two major ethical considerations in research on human participants. To ensure voluntary participation from the beginning, I first mailed solicitation letters to prospective participants; I then made calls to ask if they wished to participate in the survey; and, finally, I mailed questionnaire packages only to people who said that they wished to take part in the survey.

The packages included an informed consent form approved by the Human Subjects Committee (HSC) of the Department of Communication and the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Maryland, College Park. Participants were asked to read through the consent form before they made the final decision to participate. Participants signed the form to confirm their voluntary participation before completing the questionnaire.

In the consent form, I explicitly explained the purpose and confidential nature of this study, procedures for participation, anticipated risks and benefits from participation, and their rights to ask questions and or to withdraw from participation at any time and or decline to answer certain questions. As a benefit from participation, I promised to provide each participating embassy with an executive summary of the findings from this study as soon as it is completed.

To protect participants from potential risks and harms, I kept the identity of participants and their embassies confidential in presenting the findings in this dissertation. Further, I will keep their identities confidential in any kind of publication in the future, even in the executive summary that will be in circulation among the participating embassies. Thus, their identities will not be open to other embassies and the general population.

CHAPTER IV

Results

Descriptions of Survey Participants

Out of 169 embassies in Washington, D.C., 113 embassies participated in the survey, yielding a participation rate of 67%. Table 21 summarizes the profiles of participating embassies and diplomats by region, rank, sex, type of specialization, and years of experience with public diplomacy.

Region-wise, the 113 participating embassies were from all over the world: 36 from Africa, 26 from Europe, 24 from the Americas, 20 from Asia, and 7 from the Middle East. Embassies from North, Central, and South America were lumped together into Americas; and embassies from Oceania and the Pacific region were included in Asia.

Rank-wise, diplomats with a variety of ranks, except for ambassadors, took part in the survey. The biggest rank group was secretary. Of the 113 participating diplomats, 45 diplomats (40%) were first, second, or third secretaries. Twenty seven counselors (24%) constituted the second biggest group. In addition, 20 attachés and 13 ministers made 17% and 12% of the participant's pool. Moreover, 8 deputy chiefs of mission, the second highest rank at embassy, participated in the survey.

By gender, 80 diplomats (71%) were male, and 33 diplomats (29%) were female. By the type of specialization, 83 diplomats (73%) were generalists who had responsibility not only for public diplomacy but also for political, economic, or consular affairs. Thirty diplomats were specialists solely devoted to public diplomacy.

Regardless of whether they were specialists or generalists, the majority of the diplomats were veterans in public diplomacy. Sixty diplomats (53%) had more than five

years of experience, and only 11 diplomats (10%) were novices who had just started practicing public diplomacy less than a year ago.

Table 21

Descriptions of Survey Participants

		N	Percent (%)
Region	Africa	36	32
	Europe	26	23
	Americas	24	21
	Asia	20	18
	Middle East	7	6
Rank	Deputy Chief of Mission	8	7
	Minister	13	12
	Counselor	27	24
	Secretary	45	40
	Attaché	20	17
Sex	Female	33	29
	Male	80	71
Specialization	Generalist	83	73
	Specialist	30	27
Year of Experience	≤ 1 year	11	10
	2 - 5 years	42	37
	6 - 10 years	32	28
	>10 years	28	25

Preliminary Analysis

Missing Value Analysis (MVA)

The public diplomacy instrument used in the survey contained 69 items: 66 items to measure the public diplomacy constructs and three items to gather demographic data

on the participants. Thus, the public diplomacy data in this study could have contained 7,797 pieces of information if the respondents had fully answered all the items.

The results of missing value analysis (MVA) showed that 365 pieces of information were missing: The percentage of missing values was fractional (4.68%). Also, the missing data pattern was completely random: Little's MCAR tests resulted in χ^2 (2607, $N = 113$) = 33.624, $p < 1.00$.

Normality

The results of normality tests showed that all of the public diplomacy constructs reasonably came from normal populations. In evaluating the normality assumption with the constructs ($N = 113$), I referred to the results of K-S Lilliefors tests. The tests are recommended when sample size is greater than 50 while Shapiro-Wilk's tests are preferable for samples with fewer than 50 cases. All of the significance levels for the constructs were large enough that the normality assumption is not unreasonable ($p > .05$)

Normality tests of the contextual variables (political system, societal culture, interest group system, and dependence) yielded mixed results. K-S Lilliefors tests of Hofstede's (2001) four dimensions of culture showed that the dimensions ($n = 52$) met the assumption. The same tests of political system (Freedom scores, $N = 113$) and dependence ($n = 109$), however, violated the normality assumption. Similarly, the results of Shapiro-Wilk's test for the interest group system (Lijphart's pluralism scores, $n = 23$) did not uphold the assumption.

As a remedy for non-normality, dependence was successfully transformed using a natural logarithm to meet the assumption. Political system and interest group system, however, did not permit any kind of transformation (e.g., square root and inverse) for

normality. Graphical examination of these variables' histograms showed that there were subgroups in terms of distribution shape.

Instead of transformation, I chose to recode the Freedom index into a categorical variable, following the classification scheme of the Freedom House, the source of Freedom scores. The organization not only assigns numerical scores to all independent countries but also groups the countries into three categories based on degree of freedom: "Free" (liberal democracy), "Partly Free" (electoral democracy), and "Not Free" (non-democracy). Countries with scores ≥ 1 and < 3 were classified into the "Free" group, and countries with scores between ≥ 3 and < 5.5 were included into the "Partly Free" group. The "Not Free" group included countries with scores ≥ 5.5 and ≤ 7 .

For the interest group system, I created two groups using mean scores such that countries with pluralism scores above the mean were designated into a pluralist group while countries with the scores below the mean were classified into a corporatist group.

Table 22 summarizes the results of normality tests for political system, dependence, and interest group system before and after transformation.

Table 22

Normality Tests of Political System, Dependence, and Interest Group System

	K-S Lilliefors Tests		S-W tests		Sig. after transformation
	Statistic	Sig.	Statistic	Sig.	
Political System	.126	.000			
Dependence	.264	.000			.200
Interest Group System			.904	.031	

Reliability, Refinement, and Descriptive Statistics of Public Diplomacy Constructs

Two-way construct. The CFA of the measurement model for the two-way construct showed that item TW3 had a regression coefficient of .17, which was below the cutting coefficient value of .30 (Table 23).

Table 23

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Two-Way Construct

Items	Original Model (Coefficients)	Refined Model (Coefficients)	M	SD
TW1: Conducting formative research before communication programs.	.63	.63	3.27	1.59
TW2: Conducting evaluative research after communication programs.	.87	.89	3.62	1.58
TW3: Keeping a clipping file, about the only way to determine the success of a program ^a (R).	.17			
TW4: Funding, depended on the demonstrated effectiveness of communication programs.	.59	.59	3.55	1.67
TW5: Too busy to conduct research (R).	.54	.52	3.96	1.75
Cronbach's coefficient		.73		
Variance extracted (%)		46		
Coefficient H		.84		

Note. ^a The item was eventually removed from the original model. (R) indicates item was reverse-scored.

Item TW3 asked about the extent to which diplomats relied on clipping files as the only way to evaluate the success of a communication program. Consequently, the item was deleted; and four items were retained in the refined model. With construct reliability, the refined model yielded a Coefficient H of .84. Also, with construct validity, the construct extracted 46% of the total variance in observed variables.

The means of all the items fell between 3.27 and 3.96, indicating that embassies practiced two-way communication only to a “little” or “some” degree. On a 7-point Likert-type scale in this study, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 represented “not at all,” “very little,” “little,” “some,” “much,” “very much,” and “exactly.”

Interpersonal communication. The CFA of the measurement model for the interpersonal communication construct showed that item IP2 had a regression coefficient of .05 (Table 24). IP2 asked how much diplomats preferred face-to-face communication in resolving misunderstanding or disagreement between their governments and American journalists. This item was taken out, and four items were retained in the refined model.

The construct reliability of the refined model was a Coefficient H of .93, and the construct explained 63% of the total variance in the model.

Examination of the means indicated that embassies practiced interpersonal communication to a “some” or “much” degree. The means ranged from 3.76 to 5.29. Diplomats seemed cautious about informally cultivating personal relationships by having dinner or playing golf together: Item IP5 to measure informal cultivation registered a lower mean of 3.76 than did IPI ($M = 4.31$), which measured formal face-to-face contacts by holding official parties or events.

Table 24

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Interpersonal Construct

Items	Original Model (Coefficients)	Refined Model (Coefficients)	M	SD
IP1: Making formal face-to-face contacts with journalists by holding parties and special events	.72	.72	4.31	1.67
IP2: Preferring face-to-face communication in resolving misunderstanding between our government and journalists ^a	.05			
IP3: Personally meeting journalists	.77	.77	5.29	1.68
IP4: Making personal calls to journalists to keep in touch	.94	.95	4.61	1.75
IP5: Making informal contacts with journalists by having dinner or playing golf to cultivate personal relationships	.73	.72	3.76	1.88
Cronbach's coefficient		.87		
Variance extracted (%)		63		
Coefficient H		.93		

Note. ^a The item was eventually removed from the original model.

Mediated communication. The CFA of the measurement model for the mediated communication construct yielded no single item with a regression coefficient below .30 (Table 25). The original model was not refined. Coefficient H was .79, and 40% of the total variance was accounted for by the construct.

Table 25

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Mediated Construct

Items	Original Model	Refined Model	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	(Coefficients)	(Coefficients)		
M1: Distributing news releases, briefings, and position statements	.51		4.45	1.55
M2: Using new media such as the Internet and email to communicate with journalists.	.46		5.35	1.54
M3: Using printed publications to communicate with journalists	.84		3.99	1.75
M4: Using audio-visual materials to communicate with journalists	.63		3.37	1.74
Cronbach's coefficient	.70			
Variance extracted (%)	40			
Coefficient H	.79			

The means of the items showed that embassies used computer assisted media ($M = 5.35$) such as the Internet and email more extensively than printed ($M = 3.39$) and audio-visual media ($M = 3.37$).

Symmetrical communication. The CFA of the measurement model for the symmetrical communication construct showed that the original model was retainable. All four items yielded coefficient values greater than .30 (Table 26). Coefficient H was .79, and the construct extracted 41% of the total variance in the model.

Table 26

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Symmetrical Construct

Items	Original Model (Coefficients)	Refined Model (Coefficients)	M	SD
SY1: Press relations should help resolving misunderstanding	.76		5.65	1.18
SY2: The purpose of press relations is to develop mutual understanding	.81		5.55	1.35
SY3: We try not only to make journalists favorable to our government, but also to change our government's policies	.49		5.33	1.54
SY4: We make unconditional commitment to quality relationships with journalists	.39		4.98	1.32
Cronbach's coefficient	.70			
Variance extracted (%)	41			
Coefficient H	.79			

The items registered relatively high means ranging between 4.98 and 5.65, which indicated that diplomats had symmetrical purpose to a “much” degree in conducting public diplomacy. This finding was in line with the professional nature of diplomats. Diplomacy by nature acts from a symmetrical worldview. Thus, it was not surprising that the participants had a relatively strong orientation for symmetrical purpose.

Asymmetrical communication. The CFA of the measurement model for asymmetrical communication showed that there was no need for refinement of the original model. All the items registered retainable regression coefficients (Table 27).

Coefficient H was .74, and 38% of the total variance in the model was extracted by the construct.

Table 27

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Asymmetrical Construct

Items	Original Model	Refined Model	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	(Coefficients)	(Coefficients)		
ASY1: Disseminating accurate information but not volunteering unfavorable information	.64		4.66	1.65
ASY2: The purpose of press relations is to make journalists favorable to our government	.61		4.99	1.47
ASY3: Disagreement between our government and journalists results in a zero-sum game	.38		3.72	1.50
ASY4: Attempting to get favorable publicity into the media and to keep unfavorable publicity out	.76		4.64	1.52
Cronbach's coefficient	.68			
Variance extracted (%)	38			
Coefficient H	.74			

The range of the means was between 3.72 and 4.99, indicating that diplomats had asymmetrical purpose also to “some” or “much” degree in practicing public diplomacy: The value of 4 on the Likert scale represented “some.” Compared to the range of means between 4.98 and 5.65 of symmetrical communication, however, the asymmetrical range indicated that diplomats had a mixed-motive but more symmetrical propensity.

Ethical communication. The CFA of the measurement model for the ethical communication construct showed that three of eight items had regression coefficients well below .30 (Table 28).

Table 28

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Ethical Construct

Items	Original Model	Refined Model	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	(Coefficients)	(Coefficients)		
ED1: Always getting involved in dialogue with journalists	.39	.38	5.81	1.21
ED2: Disclosing our purpose when conducting communication programs	.30	.30	4.24	1.76
ED3: Offering party favors, valuable gifts, memorabilia, and etc ^a (R)	.16			
ED4: Disclosure of unfavorable information depends more on whether it is in the interests of our government than on whether it is true ^a (R)	.15			
EGR1: Believing national interests can be pursued only through taking into consideration the interests of other nations	.46	.46	5.31	1.69
EGR2: Humanitarian, developmental, human rights, and environmental issues, which concern the well-being of people on the globe, is an official pillar of our foreign policy	.81	.82	6.20	1.09

(table continues)

Table 28 (*continued*)

Items	Original Model (Coefficients)	Refined Model (Coefficients)	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
EGR3: Feeling greater obligation in abiding by our domestic, national rules and laws than in observing internationally agreed rules and laws when the both collide with each other ^a (R)	-.02			
EGR4: Concerned about the well-being of people on the globe as much as that of our national citizens	.36	.34	5.74	1.24
Cronbach's coefficient		.53		
Variance extracted (%)		25		
Coefficient H		.73		

Note. ^a The item was eventually removed from the original model. (R) indicates item was reverse-scored.

Those items were deleted, and the refined model had a minimum Coefficient H of .73. Only 25% of the total variance was extracted by the construct.

The original eight items contained four items for deontology (ED) and four items for global responsibility (EGR). The items retained were two ED items and three EGR items. The poor indices of construct reliability and validity seemed to result from lumping together items for deontology and global responsibility into one single ethical communication construct.

The means of the items showed that diplomats practiced ethical public diplomacy to “some” and “very much” degree: The means range was between 4.24 (ED2) and 6.20

(EGR2). Item ED2 measured degree of disclosure. The lowest mean of ED2, compared to the other means, suggested that although diplomats disclosed the purpose of communication programs to “some” degree, they were relatively reluctant to disclose because of the inherent secrecy in diplomacy about a government’s foreign affairs.

Involvement. CFA of the measurement model for involvement construct showed that except for item IV1 (.28), the other items had regression coefficients above .30 (Table 29).

Table 29

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Involvement Construct

Items	Original Model	Refined Model	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	(Coefficients)	(Coefficients)		
IV1: Getting involved in the formulation of our government’s U.S. policies	.28		5.35	1.40
IV2: Launching proactive strategic communication campaigns	.66		4.55	1.68
IV3: Conducting issues management	.55		5.33	1.43
IV4: Conducting regular formative and evaluative research	.90		3.66	1.67
IV5: Conducting special research for specific issues and communication challenges	.81		3.79	1.70
Cronbach’s coefficient	.78			
Variance extracted (%)	46			
Coefficient H	.88			

Item IV1 asked how much the public diplomacy function gets involved in the formulation of the government's policies toward the United States. This item, however, was retained because it was the most direct indicator of the construct. The degree of involvement of the function in formulating foreign policy captures the essence of the construct. Additionally, its coefficient (.28) approached the cutting point.

The items were designed to tap into the public diplomacy function's level of involvement in strategic management of foreign affairs. Item IV1 mostly captured the function's involvement in strategic management on the organizational level, focusing more on involvement in the policy-making process rather than in the policy execution process. On the other hand, the other items mostly concerned involvement in strategic management on the program level.

Given that item IV1 registered the highest mean (5.35), showing it to be the most frequent activity, the item's separation from the other items hinted that the organizational and program dimensions of involvement may need to be measured separately.

Examination of the means suggested that embassies in Washington, D.C. participated in the formulation of their governments' policies to a "much" degree, while they participated to a "less" degree at the program level.

With construct reliability, the construct had a Coefficient H of .88, and with construct validity, it explained 46% of the total variance in the model.

Support. The CFA of the measurement model for the support construct showed that only one item, SUP1, had a regression coefficient of -.02. SUP1 asked about the extent to which public diplomacy is subject to budget cuts at the embassy and

governmental levels (Table 30). The item was deleted, and four items were retained. The construct had a Coefficient H of .89 and extracted 56% of the total variance.

Table 30

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Support Construct

Items	Original Model	Refined Model	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	(Coefficients)	(Coefficients)		
SUP1: Public diplomacy has a priority in allocation of budget and personnel	.91	.91	4.13	1.70
SUP2: Our government invests on research on and training for public diplomacy	.82	.82	3.74	1.69
SUP3: When a budget cut happens at the embassy or government level, it usually first occurs in public diplomacy ^a (R)	-.02			
SUP4: Public diplomacy enjoys high recognition and an advantage in promotion	.70	.70	4.26	1.57
SUP5: The Ambassador substantially supports public diplomacy	.50	.50	6.08	1.12
Cronbach's coefficient		.83		
Variance extracted (%)		56		
Coefficient H		.89		

Note. ^a The item was eventually removed from the original model. (R) indicates item was reverse-scored.

The means of the items indicated that although public diplomacy is “very much” supported by ambassadors ($M = 6.08$), it is less supported in terms of budget/ personnel ($M = 4.13$), recognition/ promotion ($M = 4.26$), and training/ research ($M = 3.74$) at the

governmental level. Especially, item SUP2 suggested that governments pay “little” attention to the infrastructure of public diplomacy—research on and training for public diplomacy).

Integration (inside). The CFA of the measurement model for integration (inside) construct showed that all the items performed well in capturing the construct with the coefficients well above .30 (Table 31).

Table 31

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Integration (Inside) Construct

Items	Original Model (Coefficients)	Refined Model (Coefficients)	M	SD
INTEGI: Seldom carry out joint projects, programs, or campaigns (R)	.63		4.93	1.68
INTEGI2: Share resources such as budget and personnel	.69		4.62	1.81
INTEGI3: Develop and maintain common databases on biographical and contact information on publics	.84		4.81	1.68
INTEGI4: Hold regular meetings to coordinate activities	.80		4.97	1.62
INTEGI5: Seldom do joint planning for strategic programs or campaigns (R)	.60		4.89	1.78
Cronbach’s coefficient	.84			
Variance extracted (%)	49			
Coefficient H	.86			

Note. (R) indicates item was reverse-scored.

Assessment of construct reliability resulted in a Coefficient H of .86, and the construct extracted 49% of the total variance.

The items captured the degree of integration or coordination among specialized public diplomacy functions inside an embassy— press, cultural, congressional, Diaspora, think-tank, and NGO relations. The literature (e.g., Leonard & Alakeson 2000; L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002) has emphasized the paramount importance of integrating specialized communication (public diplomacy) functions inside an organization.

The means of the items indicated that embassies in fact integrated their specialized public diplomacy functions to “some” degree: The means range was between 4.62 and 4.97.

Integration (outside). CFA of the measurement model for integration (outside) construct showed that all five items registered relatively high regression coefficients (Table 32). The items were all retained, accordingly. Coefficient H was .88, and 53% of the total variance was explained by the construct.

The construct referred to integration or coordination in the conduct of public diplomacy among governmental and civilian organizations: ministries of foreign affairs (embassy), tourism, trade, or investment, as well as corporations, business, and trade associations from the home country.

By nature, integration (outside) is more difficult to achieve, compared to integration (inside), which concerns only the inside of an embassy. Expectedly, the means of the items registered a lower range, between 3.18 and 4.76; the means range of the integration (inside) items was between 4.62 and 4.97.

Table 32

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Integration (Outside) Construct

Items	Original Model (Coefficients)	Refined Model (Coefficients)	M	SD
INTEGO1: Carry out joint projects, programs, or campaigns	.79		4.37	1.65
INTEGO2: Seldom share information of many kinds (R)	.56		4.76	1.66
INTEGO3: Seldom hold regular meetings to coordinate activities (R)	.62		4.41	1.77
INTEGO4: Operate an executive sub-committee to enhance cooperation	.76		3.18	1.84
INTEGO5: Do joint planning for strategic programs or campaigns	.87		3.76	1.92
Cronbach's coefficient	.85			
Variance extracted (%)	53			
Coefficient H	.88			

Note. (R) indicates item was reverse-scored.

The means indicated that basic activities for integration (outside) were a “little” or “some” degree underway, such as executing joint projects ($M = 4.37$), sharing information ($M = 4.76$), and holding regular meeting ($M = 4.41$): The value of 4 meant “some” on the Likert scale. Advanced practices for integration (outside), however, were “little” underway—operating an executive sub-committee on a constant basis ($M = 3.18$) and joint planning ($M = 3.76$).

Knowledge. The CFA of the measurement model for the knowledge construct showed that all items represented the construct well. Assessment of construct reliability showed a Coefficient H of .88, and the construct extracted 50% of the total variance (Table 33).

Table 33

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Knowledge Construct

Items	Original Model (Coefficients)	Refined Model (Coefficients)	M	SD
KNOW1: Conducting little evaluative research (R)	.54		3.81	1.42
KNOW2: Developing goals for communication programs	.90		4.44	1.64
KNOW3: Identifying and tracking issues	.72		4.98	1.65
KNOW4: Developing strategies for solving communication problems	.81		4.79	1.61
KNOW5: Conducting little research to segment publics (R)	.47		3.57	1.47
Cronbach's coefficient	.83			
Variance extracted (%)	50			
Coefficient H	.88			

Note. (R) indicates item was reverse-scored.

The construct measured knowledge potential at the departmental or individual level for conducting strategic management of public diplomacy. The range of the means

was between 3.57 and 4.98, indicating that the public diplomacy departments or practitioners had knowledge potential to a “little” and “some” degree. A noticeable pattern was that the means range of the items (KNOW 2, 3, and 4) to measure the “general knowledge dimension for strategic management” was between 4.44 and 4.98, which was higher than the means range between 3.57 and 3.81 for the items (KNOW1 and 5, which measured the “research-related knowledge dimension.”

These means indicated that the departments or practitioners had more general knowledge than research knowledge. Moreover, item KNOW5 to measure sophisticated knowledge potential for segmentation of publics had a lower mean than item KNOW1 to measure knowledge potential for evaluative research.

Symmetrical internal communication. The CFA of the measurement model for the symmetrical internal communication construct revealed that two items (SYIC1 and 3) had regression coefficients below .30 (Table 34). The items were initially phrased to measure the degree of formalization of symmetrical internal communication. SYIC1 and 3 assessed the extent to which symmetrical communication inside was institutionalized through formal channels to address complaints or diverse opinions.

Only SYIC1 (.22), however, was deleted while SYIC3 (.29) was retained because its coefficient was close to .30. The CFA of the refined model, however, showed that the coefficient of item SYIC3 dropped to .24. Despite this recurring problem, I chose to retain the item to make the model identifiable. The other three items in the refined model seemed to tap more into process (communication culture) than structure (communication system) because of their wording; the items were supposed to measure the structuralization of symmetrical internal communication.

Table 34

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Symmetrical Internal Communication Construct

Items	Original Model (Coefficients)	Refined Model (Coefficients)	M	SD
SYIC1: Existence of a formal upward communication channel for subordinates to express diverse and different ideas ^a	.22			
SYIC2: Subordinates are seldom informed in advance of policy change that affects their job (R)	.53	.51	4.89	1.79
SYIC3: Existence of a formal communication channel for subordinates to bring out complaints related to job assignment, performance appraisal, and promotion	.29	.24	4.97	1.59
SYIC4: Superiors mostly speak, and subordinates mostly listen (R)	.82	.89	5.02	1.71
SYIC5: The purpose of internal communication is to get subordinates to behave in the way superiors want (R)	.66	.61	5.20	1.73
Cronbach's coefficient	.64			
Variance extracted (%)	37			
Coefficient H	.82			

Note. ^a The item was eventually removed from the original model. (R) indicates item was reverse-scored.

This situation may explain why SYIC3 performed poorly in the refined model; it was more of a structural indicator. The construct had a Coefficient of H of .82 and extracted 37 % of the total variance in the model.

Diversity. The CFA of the measurement model for the diversity construct showed that all five items registered moderate and large regression coefficients above .30 (Table 35). The Coefficient of H was .95, and 55% of the total variance was accounted for by the construct.

Table 35

Refinement, Assessment, and Descriptive Statistics of Diversity Construct

Items	Original Model	Refined Model	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
	(Coefficients)	(Coefficients)		
DIV1: Developing guidelines for handling sexual harassment	.90		4.16	2.04
DIV2: Establishing policies to deal with sexual discrimination	.97		4.38	2.08
DIV3: Setting up a system of maternity and paternity leave	.52		5.81	1.55
DIV4: Fostering women's leadership abilities	.67		5.05	1.64
DIV5: Providing the same opportunities for women as those for men to take risks in performing job	.55		5.30	1.70
Cronbach's coefficient	.85			
Variance extracted (%)	55			
Coefficient H	.95			

The items measured the extent to which embassies formalize affirmative actions for women. Examination of the means indicated that embassies institutionalized support for women to “some” or “much” degree: The means had a range between 4.16 and 5.81.

Interestingly, embassies seemed to pay less attention to issues of sexual harassment (DIV1, $M = 4.16$) and discrimination (DIV2, $M = 4.38$) than to maternity leave (DIV3, $M = 5.81$), fostering women’s leadership (DIV4, $M = 5.05$), and providing opportunities for risk-taking to further enhance the leadership (DIV5, $M = 5.30$).

Construct Equivalence

As a prerequisite analysis for cross-national study, a multi-group CFA was conducted with each of the public diplomacy constructs to ensure comparability of the constructs across countries. For this analysis, two cultural groups were created, based on Hofstede’s (2001) individualist/ collectivist dimension and GDP per capita as a classifying variable. The individualist group consisted of 40 countries, and the collectivist group of 73 countries.

Before testing factorial invariance of the constructs of public diplomacy across the two groups of culture, construct reliability (i.e., coefficient H) of the construct models (baseline models) were evaluated separately for each group. Except for three constructs (two-way, ethical, and symmetrical internal communication), all constructs had acceptable coefficient Hs above .70 in both groups (Table 36).

Two-way communication had coefficient Hs close to the minimal cutoff point: the individualist group ($H = .68$) and the collectivist group ($H = .64$). Ethical communication had a coefficient H of .59 in the individualist group, and symmetrical internal communication also had a coefficient H of .67 close to the cutoff point.

Overall, these results indicated that the public diplomacy constructs were reliably measured across the individualist and collectivist groups.

Table 36

χ^2 Statistics and Coefficient Hs of Baseline Models for Public Diplomacy Constructs

Construct	Group	N	χ^2	df	Sig.	Coefficient H
T	I	40	1.27	2	.54	.68
	C	73	1.89	2	.39	.64
P	I	40	6.62	2	.04	.94
	C	73	.13	2	.94	.93
M	I	40	14.84	2	.00	.79
	C	73	5.40	2	.07	.82
SY	I	40	.10	2	.95	.71
	C	73	10.33	2	.01	.85
AS	I	40	5.00	2	.08	.76
	C	73	9.86	2	.00	.75
ET	I	40	1.77	5	.90	.59
	C	73	6.63	5	.25	.87
IV	I	40	9.37	5	.10	.81
	C	73	17.60	5	.00	.94
SU	I	40	1.82	2	.40	.88
	C	73	10.12	2	.00	.90

(table continues)

Table 36 (*continued*)

Construct	Group	<i>N</i>	χ^2	<i>df</i>	Sig.	Coefficient H
II	I	40	6.11	5	.30	.87
	C	73	13.88	5	.02	.86
IO	I	40	24.92	5	.00	.92
	C	73	44.08	5	.00	.86
K	I	40	9.10	5	.11	.87
	C	73	64.22	5	.00	.91
SI	I	40	.71	2	.70	.78
	C	73	.47	2	.80	.67
D	I	40	6.03	5	.30	.98
	C	73	26.16	5	.00	.93

Note. T = two-way communication; P = interpersonal communication; M = mediated communication; SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

Group I = individualist; Group C = collectivist.

At the center of procedures for a multi-group CFA is the significance test of chi-square differences between a base model with no equality constraint and its nested model with an equality constraint. As an omnibus test, a multi-group CFA usually starts with a nested model with equality constraint on all parameters such as factor loadings and variances. If the differences turn out to be statistically insignificant with this global test, the result suggests factorial invariance and does not necessitate further investigation.

When the differences result in statistical significance, it is necessary to conduct a series of further tests to find out the locations of factorial variance across groups.

The results of the multi-group CFA on the individualist and collectivist groups showed that all of the 13 constructs were equivalent in terms of factorial invariance (Table 37).

Table 37

Factor Invariance Tests for Public Diplomacy Constructs between Individualist and Collectivist Groups

Construct	Model Description	Comparison Model	χ^2	df	$\Delta \chi^2$	Δdf	Sig.
T	NECM		3.11	4			
	ECM	NECM	11.98	8	8.07	4	NS
P	NECM		6.80	4			
	ECM	NECM	8.20	8	1.4	4	NS
M	NECM		20.33	4			
	ECM	NECM	22.88	8	2.55	4	NS
SY	NECM		10.39	4			
	ECM	NECM	15.36	8	4.97	4	NS
AS	NECM		14.86	4			
	ECM	NECM	16.39	8	1.57	4	NS
ET	NECM		8.38	10			
	ECM	NECM	15.07	15	6.70	5	NS

(table continues)

Table 37 (*continued*)

Construct	Model Description	Comparison Model	χ^2	df	$\Delta \chi^2$	Δ df	Sig.
IV	NECM		26.97	10			
	ECM	NECM	32.56	15	5.59	5	NS
SU	NECM		11.91	4			
	ECM	NECM	13.91	8	2.01	4	NS
II	NECM		19.98	10			
	ECM	NECM	21.16	15	1.18	5	NS
IO	NECM		69.01	10			
	ECM	NECM	70.08	15	1.79	5	NS
K	NECM		73.10	10			
	ECM	NECM	76.70	15	3.59	5	NS
SI	NECM		1.18	4			
	ECM	NECM	13.36	7	12.18	3	NS*
D	NECM		32.13	10			
	ECM	NECM	40.13	15	8.00	5	NS

Note. T = two-way communication; P = interpersonal communication; M = mediated communication; SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

NECM = no equality constraint model; ECM = equality constraint model.

NS = no significant at the level of .05; NS* = no significant at the level of .01.

Except for the symmetrical internal communication construct, the CFA of factorial invariance of the other constructs resulted in chi-square differences insignificant at the level of .05, based on the omnibus test. The CFA of the symmetrical internal communication construct, however, still yielded a chi-square difference insignificant at the level of .01.

In this study, multi-group CFAs were performed only on two cultural groups that were theoretically created, based on one cultural dimension, individualism/collectivism. The findings of invariance, however, supported the comparability of the constructs and paved the way for testing and answering hypotheses and research questions on comparative public diplomacy.

Substantive Analysis

Fits of the Two Public Diplomacy Measurement Models

The six-factor measurement model of public diplomacy behavior. Research question 1 inquired into empirical convergence between public relations behavior and public diplomacy behavior. A CFA was conducted to examine how well the data of public diplomacy behavior fit the six-factor measurement model, which resulted from an application of the six-factor measurement model of public relations behavior.

The proposed six-factor measurement model of public diplomacy behavior had the following constructs of public diplomacy behavior—two-way, mediated, interpersonal, symmetrical, asymmetrical, and ethical communication. Except for ethical communication with five indicators, the other constructs all had four indicators. The model was, also, specified to have covariance among the six constructs. The model was overidentified with 260 degrees of freedom: The number of sample moments was 350,

and that of parameters to be estimated was 90. The results of the CFA showed that the six-factor model had a reasonably good fit to the data for public diplomacy behavior, $\chi^2(260, N = 113) = 419.94, p = .00$, CFI = .98, and RMSEA = .07 (Figure 1).




Figure 1: CFA of the six-factor measurement model of public diplomacy behavior.

Note. CFA chi-square = 419.94, $df = 260, p = .00$; CFI = .98; RMSEA = .07.

All parameters are significant at .05 except for parameters with *.

The CFI of .98 was above the cutting point of .96 for a good fit. Although the RMSEA value was above .05, the cutoff value for a good fit, it was still smaller than .08, the upper bound cutoff value for a reasonably good fit. Because CFA was conducted to test a hypothesis on model fit, modification procedures were not conducted.

At the same time, examination of factor correlations in the model supported the co-existence nature of asymmetrical and symmetrical communication, thus that of asymmetrical and symmetrical worldview. The two factors were substantially correlated, $r = .60^{**}, p = .007$.

The magnitude and significance level of correlation between asymmetrical and symmetrical communication was substantial, compared to what Deatherage and Hazleton (1998) found between asymmetrical and symmetrical worldviews. They reported a very small and negative correlation coefficient of -.07, which was statistically insignificant at the .05 level.

Nevertheless, ethical communication was correlated more with symmetrical communication, $r = .64^{**}, p = .001$, than with asymmetrical communication, $r = .33^*, p = .05$. This finding suggests that ethical acts related to deontology and global responsibility have a strong affinity to symmetrical acts based on a mixed-motive.

The second-order, five factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy. Research question 2 examined empirical convergence between excellence in public relations and excellence in public diplomacy. The Excellence theory in public relations research posits that the Excellence principles constitute a single factor, which is called the “Excellence Factor.” The research question asked two questions simultaneously: (a) whether the newly conceptualized excellence principles in public

diplomacy cluster into a single factor like the Excellence principles in public relations did and (b) whether the patterns of factor loadings are identical.

With the first question, research question 2 inquired how well the second-order measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy fits the public diplomacy data from embassies in Washington, D.C. For model parsimony, the second-order model in this study was specified to be based on the five core Excellence constructs, not on all the constructs: symmetrical communication, involvement, integration (inside), knowledge, and symmetrical internal communication. Thus, a second-order, five-factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy was put to test for its fit to the data.

Except for two constructs with four indicators, symmetrical communication and symmetrical internal communication, the other three constructs had five indicators. The overall model was overidentified with 226 degrees of freedom: The number of sample moments was 299, and that of parameters to be estimated was 73. Also, the identification status of the second-order part of the model was overidentified with five degrees of freedom: With the five constructs in the lower part, the second-order, (i.e., the upper) part of the model had 15 sample moments and 10 parameters (five regression coefficients and five residuals) to be estimated.

The results of the CFA graphically showed that the five Excellence principles clustered into a single second-order factor (Figure 2). The model fit indices also indicated that the second-order measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy was reasonably retainable: $\chi^2(226, N = 113) = 435.76$, $p = .00$, CFI = .97, and RMSEA = .09.




Figure 2: CFA of the second-order, five-factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy.

Note. CFA chi-square = 435.76, $df = 226$, $p = .00$; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .09.

All parameters are significant at .01.

The CFI value was greater than the cutting point of .96. The RMSEA value, however, was above .08, the upper bound cutoff value for a reasonably good fit. It still fell in the range between .08 and .10, which indicates a mediocre model fit. Since the CFA was conducted to test a hypothesis on model fit, modification procedures were deemed unnecessary.

For the patterns of factor loadings, the second-order measurement model showed an identical pattern of factor loadings (regression coefficients) to what resulted from the Excellence study (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002).

Conducting principal axis factoring (PAF) analysis of the Excellence variables, L. Grunig et al. (2002) presented the order of factor loadings in magnitude. In their findings, the knowledge principle had the greatest loading on the Excellence factor. Following were principles related to “shared expectations,” such as involvement, support, and symmetrical communication. Lastly, principles related to participative culture, such as symmetrical internal communication and diversity registered the smallest loadings on the factor.

The pattern of factor loadings resulted from CFA in this study exactly corresponded to that of the Excellence study. The order of factor loadings in magnitude was following: knowledge (.98), involvement (.68), integration (inside) (.63), symmetrical communication (.38), and symmetrical internal communication (.35). All the loadings were significant at the level of .01.

Because L. Grunig et al. (2002) did not include the integration principle in the analysis of factor loadings, direct comparison for the principle was not possible. Integration, however, can be treated as part of shared expectation because shared high

expectation about the role of communication among the dominant coalition and communication directors would enable principles such as involvement, support, and integration. Consistent with the theory, the pattern of factor loadings in this study showed that two principles related to shared expectation, involvement and integration, had almost similar factor loadings as the second-tiers.

Empirical Associations Between Contextual Variables and Public Diplomacy

Before investigating research question 3 and all the hypotheses on comparative public diplomacy, principal component analyses (PCA) were conducted in order to produce composites representing each of the constructs of public diplomacy. For the composites, a single largest principal component was extracted from each construct (Table 38).

For the most of the behavior constructs, around 50% of the variances were accounted for by the extracted single components, with the interpersonal and ethical components explaining 71.8% and 37% of the total variance, respectively. On the other hand, most of the management constructs had around 60% of the total variance accounted for by their extracted components with the involvement and symmetrical internal communication component accounting for 53.9% and 49.1% of the variance.

In addition, a second-round of PCA was conducted to extract composites for overall excellence, based on the composites representing the following Excellence principles (constructs) of public diplomacy: symmetrical, two-way, ethical communication, involvement, support, integration inside and outside, knowledge, symmetrical internal communication, and diversity.

Table 38

Principal Component Analysis for Composites of Public Diplomacy Constructs

	SY	AS	T	M	P	ET	IV	SU	II	IO	K	SI	D
Eigenvalue	2.15	2.05	2.23	2.16	2.87	1.85	2.70	2.63	3.06	3.10	3.00	1.97	3.11
Variances													
Accounted for (%)	53.7	51.4	55.8	52.9	71.8	37	53.9	65.8	61.3	62	60	49.1	62.1

Note. Eigenvalue is the one of the largest principal component extracted.

SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; T = two-way communication; M = mediated communication; P = interpersonal communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

The pattern of factor loadings of the Excellence composites on the extracted single principal component for excellence was almost identical to the pattern from CFA of the second-order, five-factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy (Table 39).

Table 39

Principal Component Analysis for Composites of the Overall Excellence Construct

	Value	SY	T	ET	IV	SU	II	IO	K	SI	D
Factor Loadings		.44	.57	.48	.76	.76	.70	.70	.83	.70	.60
Eigenvalue		4.14									
Variances Accounted for (%)		41.35									

Note. Eigenvalue is for the largest principal component extracted.

SY = symmetrical communication; T = two-way communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

In this second-order PCA, composites of the knowledge construct registered the largest factor loading (.83), followed by those of the constructs of “share expectation”: involvement (.76), support (.76), and integration inside/ outside (.70).

Based on the composites, simple and partial correlation analyses, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and *t*-tests were performed to investigate empirical associations between the contextual variables—societal culture, political system, interest groups system, and dependence—and the constructs of public diplomacy.

Culture

Of the 113 participating countries, measurements on Hofstede's (2001) four dimensions of culture (individualism/collectivism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity/femininity) were available for 52 countries. These 52 countries made up the case base on which empirical associations between societal culture and public diplomacy were examined.

Individualism/collectivism. Research question 3 and hypotheses 1 and 2 inquired into empirical associations between individualism/collectivism and public diplomacy. First, research question 3 examined how the dimension is associated with three constructs of public diplomacy behavior—symmetrical, asymmetrical, and ethical communication.

The results of correlation analysis showed that the dimension had a low to medium, negative association with asymmetrical communication, $r = -.20$, $p = .17$, and very small associations with symmetrical, $r = .04$, $p = .80$, and ethical communication, $r = -.02$, $p = .88$. Also, none of the coefficients was statistically significant at the level of .05 (Table 40).

Given the low to medium size of the coefficient, asymmetrical communication seemed to deserve interpretation. The direction of the coefficient suggested that embassies from countries with individualist cultures displayed less asymmetrical public diplomacy behavior than their counterparts from countries with collectivist culture.

Governments in individualist cultures enact equality and social justice more in inter-group relations (public diplomacy), which Schwartz (1994) related to individualism, than other actions associated with individualism, such as competition in inter-group relations (public diplomacy). Conversely, collectivist governments seemed to enact

particularism, pursuing in-group interests over out-group interests in the conduct of public diplomacy, more than in-group collectivist actions such as collaboration and harmony.

Table 40

Empirical Associations between Individualism/Collectivism and Public Diplomacy

	E	SY	AS	T	M	P	ET	IV	SU	II	IO	K	SI	D
R		?	?					?						
H							--			--	--		--	
<i>r</i>	.21	.04	-.20	.09	-.08	.11	-.02	.18	.11	.22	-.04	.16	.13	.30*
<i>p</i>	.14	.80	.17	.53	.60	.45	.88	.21	.45	.12	.79	.25	.37	.03

Note. E = excellence; SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; T = two-way communication; M = mediated communication; P = interpersonal communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

R(?) = research question; H = hypothesis; -- = negative association; *r* = Pearson's correlation coefficient; *p* = probability value.

**p* < .05.

Hypothesis 1 predicted that the individualism/collectivism dimension would be associated with use of interpersonal channels of communication, such that embassies from countries with collectivist culture rely more on these channels than their counterparts from countries with individualist culture. The dimension's coefficient, however, was small and statistically insignificant (*r* = .11, *p* = .45). The positive direction indicated that collectivist embassies used interpersonal channels to a lesser degree than individualist embassies—the opposite of hypothesis 1.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that the individualism/collectivism dimension would affect the management of public diplomacy, such that embassies from collectivist cultures would integrate their specialized public diplomacy functions more inside and outside and have symmetrical internal communication compared to their counterparts from individualist cultures. Correlation analysis showed that the dimension had (a) a slightly medium and statistically insignificant association with integration inside, $r = .22$, $p = .12$; (b) a rather small and insignificant association with symmetrical internal communication, $r = .13$, $p = .37$; and (c) a very small and insignificant association with integration outside, $r = -.04$, $p = .79$.

Given the relative magnitude and significance levels, interpretation of the coefficient for integration inside and symmetrical internal communication seemed meaningful. The positive direction of the coefficient was in fact the opposite of hypothesis 2, and it suggested that embassies from individualist cultures might have more integration inside among specialized public diplomacy functions.

At the same time, the dimension also had very small and insignificant associations with the other public diplomacy constructs, except for diversity, $r = .30^*$, $p = .03$. The dimension had a slightly medium but insignificant association with the overall excellence construct, $r = .21$, $p = .14$.

Power distance. Hypotheses 3 and 4 examined empirical associations between power distance and public diplomacy behavior. Specifically, hypothesis 3 predicted that power distance would have negative associations with symmetrical and ethical communication and positive association with asymmetrical communication.

Correlation analysis, however, showed that the dimension had (a) a medium association with symmetrical communication, $r = .28$, $p = .84$; (b) a rather small association with ethical communication, $r = .14$, $p = .33$; and (c) a very small association with asymmetrical communication, $r = -.03$, $p = .86$. All of the coefficients were statistically insignificant (Table 41).

Table 41

Empirical Associations Between Power Distance and Public Diplomacy

	EX	SY	AS	T	M	P	ET	IV	SU	II	IO	K	SI	D
H		--	+				--	--	--			--	--	--
<i>r</i>	-.18	.28	-.03	-.07	.03	-.00	.14	-.19	-.12	-.20	-.05	-.11	-.07	-.27*
<i>p</i>	.20	.84	.86	.64	.86	.98	.33	.18	.40	.17	.75	.45	.62	.04

Note. EX = excellence; SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; T = two-way communication; M = mediated communication; P = interpersonal communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

H = hypothesis; -- = negative association; + = positive association; *r* = Pearson's correlation coefficient; *p* = probability value.

**p* < .05.

In addition, the direction of the coefficients was opposite to what was predicted in hypothesis 3. The direction indicated that embassies from countries with a high power distance culture tended to practice more symmetrical and ethical communication than their counterparts from countries with low power distance culture.

On the other hand, the direction of the coefficients for four constructs of public diplomacy management corresponded to what was predicted in hypothesis 4: High power

distance culture seemed associated with less involvement, support, and diversity. The coefficients, however, were small to very small and statistically insignificant except for diversity: involvement, $r = -.19, p = .18$; support, $r = -.12, p = .40$; symmetrical internal communication, $r = -.07, p = .62$; and diversity, $r = -.27^*, p = .04$.

The results of the correlation analysis also showed that power distance had somewhat small and insignificant associations with overall excellence in public diplomacy, $r = -.18, p = .20$, as well as the other constructs of public diplomacy.

Uncertainty avoidance. Hypothesis 5 predicted that uncertainty avoidance would have negative and positive associations with symmetrical and asymmetrical communication in public diplomacy behavior, respectively. The hypothesis predicted that embassies from countries with a low uncertainty avoidance culture, would practice more symmetrical and less asymmetrical public diplomacy than their counterparts from countries with high uncertainty avoidance.

A low uncertainty culture was theorized to promote negotiation and the pursuit of mutual interests based on a win-win worldview. The results of correlation analysis, however, showed that the dimension had very small and statistically insignificant associations with symmetrical, $r = -.03, p = .86$, and asymmetrical communication, $r = -.03, p = .86$ (Table 42). In sum, hypothesis 5 was not supported because the sizes of associations were too small for meaningful interpretation.

The results reported in Table 42, however, supported hypothesis 6: Low uncertainty avoidance culture is associated with more involvement, support, and symmetrical internal communication.

Table 42

Simple and Partial Correlations Between Uncertainty Avoidance and Public Diplomacy (n = 52)

	EX	SY	AS	T	M	P	ET	IV	SU	II	IO	K	SI	D
H		--	+					--	--				--	
1)														
<i>r</i>	-.36*	-.03	-.03	-.03	-.01	-.01	-.07	-.33*	-.40*	-.16	-.20	-.33*	-.18	-.18
<i>p</i>	.01	.86	.86	.82	.97	.94	.60	.02	.01	.23	.17	.02	.20	.19
2)														
<i>r</i>	-.32*	-.02	-.06	-.01	-.02	.02	-.09	-.29*	-.40*	-.11	-.21	-.30*	-.16	-.13
<i>p</i>	.02	.91	.66	.96	.91	.87	.54	.05	.01	.46	.14	.04	.27	.40
3)														
<i>r</i>	-.36*	-.02	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.02	-.06	-.33*	-.40*	-.17	-.19	-.33*	-.17	-.19
<i>p</i>	.01	.88	.98	.86	.94	.89	.68	.02	.01	.23	.19	.02	.22	.18
4)														
<i>r</i>	.14	.01	-.05	.05	.25*	.28*	.05	.07	-.01	.15	.01	.25*	.04	.21*
<i>p</i>	.15	.89	.57	.63	.01	.01	.61	.46	.99	.11	.92	.01	.69	.03
5)														
<i>r</i>	-.35*	-.08	-.04	-.03	.01	-.01	-.11	-.31*	-.39*	-.14	-.18	-.32*	-.21	-.18
<i>p</i>	.01	.60	.76	.85	.96	.95	.46	.03	.01	.31	.21	.02	.15	.21

Note. EX = excellence; SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; T = two-way communication; M = mediated communication; P = interpersonal communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU =

support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

1) = simple correlations; H = hypothesis; -- = negative association; + = positive association; 2) = partial correlations with power distance, individualism/collectivism, and masculinity/femininity controlled; 3) = partial correlations with natural log of 2000 GDP per capita controlled; 4) = simple correlations between natural log of 2000 GDP per capita and public diplomacy ($n = 113$); partial correlations with natural log of dependence controlled.

r = Pearson's correlation coefficient; p = probability value.

* $p < .05$.

The results showed that the uncertainty avoidance dimension had medium and significant associations with involvement, $r = -.33^*$, $p = .02$, and support, $r = -.40^*$, $p = .01$. The coefficient for symmetrical internal communication was slightly medium and statistically insignificant, $r = -.18$, $p = .20$. Its direction, however, was consistent with what was hypothesized. In addition, although not hypothesized, the dimension turned out to have a medium and significant association with knowledge, $r = -.33^*$, $p = .02$.

Moreover, analyses of partial correlations between uncertainty avoidance and public diplomacy with the other cultural dimensions, dependence, and GDP per capita controlled showed that uncertainty avoidance maintained the strengths and direction of its empirical associations with public diplomacy (Table 42). The results further supported that uncertainty avoidance has unique and real empirical associations with public diplomacy.

For governments, the international system is itself an environment full of uncertainty. In principle, public diplomacy performs the role of a boundary spanner for a government, which must live with the overwhelming uncertainty in ever-changing world politics. The moderate but significant associations between the core management constructs of public diplomacy and uncertainty avoidance strongly indicated that, by nature, embassies from countries with a low uncertainty avoidance culture are more active in and open to understanding the environment of international politics. Put differently, governments from low uncertainty avoidance cultures seek an open system over closed system in interaction with the international environment through exchange of information, a search for a moving-equilibrium, and introduction of uncertainty and variety from outside.

Moreover, the order of the coefficients in magnitude seems to suggest a sequence in which uncertainty avoidance is enacted in the conduct of public diplomacy: Foreign policy elites from countries with low uncertainty avoidance culture, in the first place, support the public diplomacy function and then involved it in the formulation and execution of foreign policy, while strengthening knowledge potential to conduct strategic management of public diplomacy. In addition, this dimension had medium and significant association with the overall excellence construct, $r = -.36^*$, $p = .01$, meaning that the lower uncertainty avoidance is, the better the overall performance on public diplomacy.

Masculinity/femininity. Hypothesis 7 examined whether embassies from countries with feminine culture practice more symmetrical, less asymmetrical, and more ethical public diplomacy behavior, compared with embassies from masculine countries. Feminism was hypothesized to be related to solidarity, benevolence, equality, negotiation, and compromise and thus to symmetrical and ethical public diplomacy behavior.

Correlation analysis, however, showed that the dimension had small to very small and statistically insignificant associations: symmetrical, $r = .11$, $p = .43$; asymmetrical, $r = -.05$, $p = .72$; and ethical communication, $r = .11$, $p = .88$ (Table 43). The direction of the coefficients was the opposite of what was expected, indicating that embassies from masculine cultures may practice more symmetrical and ethical communication.

Hypothesis 8 was related to empirical associations between the masculinity/femininity dimension and the management constructs of public diplomacy. It predicted that embassies from feminine cultures would have more involvement, support, symmetrical internal communication, and diversity.

Table 43

Empirical Associations Between Masculinity/ Femininity and Public Diplomacy

	EX	SY	AS	T	M	P	ET	IV	SU	II	IO	K	SI	D
H		--	+				--	--	--			--	--	
r	-.02	.11	-.05	.04	.11	.23	.11	.11	-.06	.01	-.13	.02	.00	-.19
p	.91	.43	.72	.77	.43	.10	.43	.42	.70	.97	.36	.89	.99	.19

Note. EX = excellence; SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; T = two-way communication; M = mediated communication; P = interpersonal communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

H = hypothesis; -- = negative association; + = positive association; r = Pearson's correlation coefficient; p = probability value.

Correlation analysis showed that the dimension had (a) a small to very small and statistically insignificant association with involvement, $r = .11, p = .43$, and support, $r = -.06, p = .70$; (b) no association with symmetrical internal communication, $r = .00, p = .99$; and (c) a less than medium association with diversity, $r = -.19, p = .19$. The direction of the coefficients indicated that although involvement had a correlation in the opposite direction, diversity had a correlation in the direction consistent with what was predicted. The findings indicated that embassies from feminine cultures had less involvement and more diversity. However, masculinity/femininity had very small and insignificant associations with the other constructs of public diplomacy, including the overall excellence, $r = -.02, p = .91$.

Political System

Hypotheses 9 and 10 investigated the empirical associations between a government's political system and her public diplomacy behavior/management. In this study, the political system was operationalized with a democracy measure— Freedom scores. The scores, however, did not meet the normality assumption. Hence, the democracy measure, which was initially metric, was converted into a categorical one with three different groups of countries. All the participating countries were grouped into liberal democracy ($n = 34$), electoral democracy ($n = 57$), and non-democracy ($n = 22$).

According to the Freedom House (2003a), countries with a liberal democracy are the most democratic in that citizens enjoy fully civil liberties as well as political rights. Countries with an electoral democracy are somewhat democratic in that the citizens enjoy political rights such as the rights to vote and to participate in elections but they do not fully enjoy civil liberties such as freedom of speech and organization. Lastly, countries

with non-democracy are least democratic because citizens are deprived of political rights as well as civil liberties.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the public diplomacy constructs with these three groups. To test the equality of means across the three groups, *F*-tests were conducted with the constructs that met the assumption of homogeneity of variances, while Brown-Forsythe (*B-F*) tests were conducted with the constructs that did not meet the assumption. Following the omnibus tests, Fisher's least significant difference (LSD) tests for multiple comparisons were performed to identify pairs of group that had statistically significant differences in means. Table 44 summarizes the results of the ANOVA.

Hypothesis 9 predicted that embassies from more democratic governments would practice more symmetrical, less asymmetrical, and more ethical public diplomacy behavior. Democracy was hypothesized to be related to tolerance and the equality of political and economic rights. The omnibus tests showed that the three groups had significant differences in means only for asymmetrical communication, $F(2, 110) = 3.01^*, p = .05$. The differences in means for symmetrical and ethical communication were statistically insignificant, $F(2, 110) = 1.35, p = .27$ and $F(2, 110) = 1.85, p = .16$. The LSD tests of asymmetrical communication revealed statistically significant differences in means only between the liberal democracy and non-democracy groups ($p = .02$). The liberal democracy group had the lowest mean (-.30), and the electoral democracy group had the second lowest (.05).

Table 44

*ANOVA of the Public Diplomacy Constructs on Three Groups of Political System
(Liberal Democracy, Electoral Democracy, and Non-Democracy)*

	Group	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	Levene's Test Sig.	<i>F</i> (Sig.)	<i>B-F</i> (Sig.)	Multiple Comparison	
							Groups	Sig.
EX	1 (Liberal)	34	-.01	.00*		.79 (.46)		
	2 (Electoral)	57	.11					
	3 (Non)	22	-.25					
SY	1		-.19			1.35 (.27)		
	2		.01					
	3		.26					
AS	1		-.30			3.01 (.05)*	1 & 3	.02*
	2		.05					
	3		.34					
T	1		-.14			.99 (.38)		
	2		-.03					
	3		.30					
M	1		.07			.29 (.75)		
	2		.14					
	3		-.14					
P	1		.00			.63 (.54)		
	2		.08					
	3		-.20					
ET	1		-.27			1.85 (.16)		
	2		.15					
	3		.03					
IV	1		-.01			.95 (.39)		
	2		.11					
	3		-.27					
SU	1		-.10			.27 (.76)		
	2		.03					
	3		.08					
II	1		.19			4.40 (.02)*	1 & 3	.007*
	2		.10					
	3		-.55					
IO	1		.02			2.18 (.12)	2 & 3	.009*
	2		.14					
	3		-.38					
K	1		.02			1.16 (.32)		
	2		.11					
	3		-.31					

(table continues)

Table 44 (*continued*)

	Groups	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	Levene's Test Sig.	<i>F</i> (Sig.)	<i>B-F</i> (Sig.)	Multiple Comparison	
							Groups	Sig.
SI	1 (Liberal)	34	.02	.02*		.14 (.87)		
	2 (Electoral)	57	.03					
	3 (Non)	22	-.11					
D	1		.26		.41	3.10 (.05)*	1 & 3	.02*
	2		.15					
	3		.03					

Note. EX = excellence; SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; T = two-way communication; M = mediated communication; P = interpersonal communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

Group 1 = liberal democracy; Group 2 = electoral democracy; Group 3 = non-democracy
B-F = Brown-Forsythe test for the equality of means when the assumption of homogeneity of variances is not met. Fisher's LSD test was used for multiple comparison.

* $p \leq .05$.

Lastly, the non-democracy group registered the highest mean (.34). The order of the means indicated that the more democratic a government is the less asymmetrical is the public diplomacy behavior it displays.

The findings supported the hypothesized association between democracy and asymmetrical public diplomacy behavior in the comparison between the liberal democracy group and the non-democracy group: Embassies from countries with a liberal democracy practice less asymmetrical communication than embassies from non-democratic governments.

Although the three groups did not show statistically significant differences in means for symmetrical and ethical communication, the order of the means across the groups seemed to reject what was predicted in hypothesis 9. In fact, the order for

symmetrical communication turned out to be the opposite of the hypothesis: non-democracy ($M = .26$), electoral democracy ($M = .01$), and liberal democracy ($M = -.19$). This order suggested that the less democratic a government is, the more symmetrical the public diplomacy behavior of its embassy.

In addition, the order for ethical communication was electoral democracy ($M = .15$), non-democracy ($M = .03$), and liberal democracy ($M = -.27$), which meant that embassies from electoral democracies practice the most ethical communication while embassies from liberal democracies conduct the least ethical communication. Hypothesis 10 predicted that embassies from more democratic countries would be high on five management constructs of public diplomacy— involvement, support, knowledge, symmetrical internal communication, and diversity— than embassies from less democratic countries.

The tests showed that of the five constructs, only diversity had statistically significant differences in means across the groups, $F(2, 110) = 3.10^*, p = .05$. Similar to the case of asymmetrical communication, the results of LSD tests found significant difference in means only between the liberal democracy and non-democracy groups ($p = .02$): Embassies from liberal democracies had more diversity than embassies from non-democracies. Additionally, the order of the means for diversity seemed to support what was initially predicted in hypothesis 10: liberal democracy ($M = .26$), electoral democracy ($M = .15$), and non-democracy ($M = .03$).

On the other hand, hypothesis 10 seemed incongruent with the order of the means for the other four constructs, which had insignificant differences in means across involvement, support, knowledge, and symmetrical internal communication.

For involvement, the order suggested that embassies from electoral democracies ($M = .11$) were highest, followed by embassies from liberal democracies ($M = -.01$) and non-democracies ($M = -.27$). For support, the order was non-democracies ($M = .08$), electoral democracies ($M = .03$), and liberal democracies ($M = -.10$). For knowledge, the order was electoral democracies ($M = .11$), liberal democracies ($M = .02$), and non-democracies ($M = -.31$). For symmetrical internal communication, electoral democracies ($M = .03$) were first, followed by liberal democracies ($M = .02$) and non-democracies ($M = -.11$).

Although hypothesis 10 did not predict that democracy would have empirical association with the construct of integration inside, the findings revealed statistically significant differences in means on the construct, $F(2, 110) = 4.40^*$, $p = .02$. Subsequent LSD tests showed significant differences in means between two pairs of groups: liberal democracy/ non-democracy ($p = .007$) and electoral democracy/ non-democracy ($p = .009$). The order of the means was, first, electoral democracies ($M = .99$), second, liberal democracies ($M = .19$), and lastly, non-democracies ($M = -.55$).

In addition, the overall pattern of the means for all of the constructs of public diplomacy suggested that embassies from electoral democracies had higher scores than liberal democracies and non-democracies. The electoral democracy group had the highest score on the overall excellence construct and six other constructs including ethical communication, involvement, integration inside, integration outside, knowledge, and symmetrical internal communication. The non-democracy group scored highest on three constructs: symmetrical communication, two-way communication, and support. In

contrast, the liberal democracy group was highest on only two constructs: asymmetrical communication and diversity.

Interest Group System

Hypotheses 11 and 12 investigated empirical associations between the interest group system and public diplomacy. For this inquiry, 23 of the 113 participating countries with measurements on Lijphart's (1999) pluralism/corporatism index were classified into two groups. Fourteen countries with scores above the mean constituted a pluralist group, and nine countries with scores below the mean made up the corporatist group. This grouping approach was taken because the normality assumption did not hold with the index.

T-tests were conducted to test hypotheses 11 and 12, using a one-tailed significance test because the hypotheses were directional. Specifically, hypothesis 11 predicted that embassies from corporatist countries would practice more symmetrical, less asymmetrical, and more ethical public diplomacy behavior than embassies from pluralist countries. Corporatism was theorized to be more associated than pluralism with social partnership, a win-win worldview, collaboration, and negotiation, although both systems share most characteristics of democratic culture. The results of *t*-tests showed that the corporatist and pluralist group did not have statistically significant differences in means on the three constructs: symmetrical communication, $t(19.10) = 1.31, p = .10$; asymmetrical communication, $t(21) = .89, p = .38$; and ethical communication, $t(21) = .43, p = .33$ (Table 45). At the same time, the corporatist group had higher means than the pluralist group on symmetrical ($M = .41$ vs. $M = .06$), asymmetrical ($M = .09$ vs. $M = -.28$), and ethical communication ($M = .07$ vs. $M = -.09$).

Table 45

*T-test of the Public Diplomacy Constructs on Two Groups of Interest Group System
(Corporatist and Pluralist)*

	Group	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	Levene's Test Sig.	<i>t</i> (Sig.)	
					Equal Variance	Non-Equal Variance
EX	1 (Corporatist)	9	.69	.51	.95 (.35)	
	2 (Pluralist)	14	.31			
SY	1		.41	.02*	1.31 (.10)	
	2		.06			
AS	1		.09	.12	.89 (.38)	
	2		-.28			
T	1		.33	.25	.10 (.92)	
	2		.28			
M	1		.08	.71	-1.16 (.26)	
	2		.54			
P	1		.52	.11	.08 (.94)	
	2		.49			
ET	1		.07	.81	.43 (.33)	
	2		-.09			
IV	1		.49	.42	.63 (.27)	
	2		.27			
SU	1		.41	.45	.50 (.31)	
	2		.20			
II	1		.68	.01*	1.30 (.10)	
	2		.24			
IO	1		.17	.92	-.12 (.90)	
	2		.22			
K	1		.75	.04*	1.01 (.16)	
	2		.39			

(table continues)

Table 45 (*continued*)

		Groups	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	Levene's Test Sig.	<i>t</i> (Sig.)	
						Equal Variance	Non-Equal Variance
SI	1 (Corporatist)	9	.05				
	2 (Pluralist)	14	-.07		.47	.24 (.40)	
D	1			.86			
	2			.24	.44	1.79 (.045)†	

Note. EX = excellence; SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; T = two-way communication; M = mediated communication; P = interpersonal communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

Group 1 = corporatist; Group 2 = pluralist.

* $p < .05$, two-tailed.

† $p < .05$, one-tailed.

The mean differences suggested that members of the corporatist group practice more symmetrical ($M = .35$) and ethical communication ($M = .16$) but more asymmetrical communication ($M = .37$) than the pluralist group. On the other hand, hypothesis 12 predicted that embassies from corporatist countries would score higher than embassies from pluralist countries on all of the management constructs of public diplomacy: involvement, support, integration inside and outside, knowledge, symmetrical internal communication, and diversity.

T-tests, however, showed a statistically significant difference in means only on diversity, $t(21) = 1.79^*$, $p = .04$ (one-tailed). The mean difference is .62 between both groups, which means that corporatist embassies emphasized diversity more than pluralist embassies.

Although both groups had statistically insignificant differences in means on the other management constructs, corporatist embassies registered higher means than pluralist embassies on most of the constructs, except for integration outside: involvement ($M = .49$ vs. $M = .27$); support ($M = .41$ vs. $M = .20$); integration inside ($M = .68$ vs. $M = .24$); knowledge ($M = .75$ vs. $M = .39$); symmetrical internal communication ($M = .05$ vs. $M = -.07$); and integration outside ($M = .17$ vs. $M = .22$).

The mean differences indicated that corporatist embassies were higher on involvement ($M = .22$), support ($M = .21$), integration inside ($M = .44$), knowledge ($M = .36$), and symmetrical internal communication ($M = .12$) than their counterparts, but slightly worse on integration outside ($M = -.05$). Moreover, on the overall excellence construct, corporatist embassies scored higher than pluralist embassies ($M = .69$ vs. $M = .31$; $M = .38$).

To conclude, the results of t -tests showed that only diversity had a statistically significant difference in means between the corporatist and pluralist embassies, as predicted in hypothesis 12. The substantial differences in means on the most of the excellence constructs, however, indicated that, as predicted in hypothesis 12, the corporatist embassies may succeed more in managing excellent public diplomacy than the pluralist embassies. However, the small sample size prevented most of these differences from being statistically significant.

Dependence

Hypotheses 13, 14, and 15 were put forward to investigate empirical associations between interstate dependence and public diplomacy. Specifically, hypothesis 13 predicted that embassies from countries with more dependence on the United States

would practice less symmetrical, more asymmetrical, more interpersonal, and less ethical public diplomacy behavior than embassies from countries with less dependence on the country.

Interstate dependence was hypothesized to be related to the personal influence model of public diplomacy behavior: A government displays asymmetrical, unethical, and interpersonal public diplomacy behavior toward a foreign country upon which the government is dependent for trade and tourism.

Correlation analysis was conducted with 109 embassies out of the 113 participating countries, which had measurements on interstate dependence. The analysis showed that interstate dependence had (a) a very small and statistically insignificant associations with symmetrical, $r = -.04$, $p = .72$; asymmetrical, $r = -.07$, $p = .47$; and ethical communication, $r = .02$, $p = .82$, and (b) a small, insignificant association with interpersonal communication, $r = .11$, $p = .26$ (Table 46).

The directions of the coefficients for symmetrical and interpersonal communication corresponded to what was expected in hypothesis 13, showing that more dependent embassies practice less symmetrical and more interpersonal communication than less dependent embassies. The directions for asymmetrical and ethical communication, however, were opposite to what hypothesis 13 predicted. It indicated that more dependent embassies conduct less asymmetrical and more ethical public diplomacy. However, the correlations were so small that these differences have little meaning.

Hypothesis 14 predicted that more dependent countries would score higher on the four management constructs of public diplomacy than less dependent countries: involvement, support, integration inside and outside. Correlation analysis showed that

interstate dependence had (a) less than medium but statistically significant associations with involvement, $r = .21^*, p = .03$ and integration outside, $r = .21^*, p = .03$; and (b) a less than medium and insignificant association with integration inside, $r = .17, p = .09$, but (c) a small and insignificant association with support, $r = .12, p = .22$.

The direction for all of the constructs were congruent with what was predicted by hypothesis 14, indicating that the more dependent upon the United States a government is the more involvement, support, integration inside and outside the government has in its management of public diplomacy.

For overall excellence in public diplomacy, interstate dependence had a less than medium and statistically insignificant association, $r = .16, p = .10$. The positive direction of its coefficient, however, indicated that the more dependent an embassy, the better overall performance it shows on public diplomacy.

Table 46

Simple and Partial Correlations Between Dependence and Public Diplomacy with GDP Per Capita Controlled (n = 109)

	EX	SY	AS	T	M	P	ET	IV	SU	II	IO	K	SI	D
H	--	+			+	--	+	+	+	+	+			
<hr/>														
1)														
<i>r</i>	.16	-.04	-.07	-.00	.06	.11	.02	.21*	.12	.17	.21*	.11	-.01	.11
<i>p</i>	.10	.72	.47	.98	.55	.26	.82	.03	.22	.09	.03	.27	.96	.25
<hr/>														
2)														
<i>r</i>	.11	-.04	-.06	-.02	-.03	.02	.00	.19*	.12	.11	.21*	.24	-.01	.05
<i>p</i>	.24	.66	.57	.81	.76	.84	.99	.05	.21	.24	.03	.80	.89	.64

Note. EX = excellence; SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; T = two-way communication; M = mediated communication; P = interpersonal communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

1) = simple correlations; H = hypothesis; -- = negative association; + = positive association; 2) = partial correlations with natural log of 2000 GDP per capita controlled.

r = Pearson's correlation coefficient; *p* = probability value.

**p* < .05.

In addition, partial correlations between dependence and public diplomacy with GDP per capita controlled showed that with involvement and integration outside, dependence still had somewhat medium and statistically significant correlation coefficients almost identical to what were found in the simple correlation analysis (Table 46). The results indicated that the empirical associations of dependence were viable even when the effects of GDP per capita on public diplomacy were considered.

Hypothesis 15 inquired into empirical associations between dependence and the outsourcing practices of public diplomacy. Dependence was hypothesized to be related to the current practices of foreign governments to hire local public relations and lobbying firms in conduct of their public diplomacy. Specifically, hypothesis 15 predicted that governments with more dependence on the United States are more likely to outsource their public diplomacy activities to local firms than governments with less dependence on the country.

In the United States, a wide spectrum of governmental agencies including tourism ministries, trade and investment ministries, and embassies outsource many of their public diplomacy activities to U.S. public relations and lobbying firms, such as Hill and Knowlton. Of the 113 participating governments, as of 2002, 73 governments were clients for the outsourcing services; and some governments had as many as 36 accounts with the local firms for their public diplomacy (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003).

Based on data from the *Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) First Semi-Annual Report 2002*, the participating governments were classified into three groups. Governments with no accounts were designated into group 1 ($n = 36$). Governments with

one or two accounts made up group 2 ($n = 47$). Lastly, governments with more than three accounts constituted group 3 ($n = 26$).

To test the equality of means in dependence across the three groups, analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. Following the omnibus F test, Fisher's LSD tests for multiple comparisons were performed to identify pairs of group that had statistically significant differences in means.

As expected, group 3 had the highest mean score on dependence ($M = 1.89$), followed by group 2 ($M = .79$), and group 1 ($M = .16$). Moreover, the results of the omnibus test showed that the groups had statistically significant differences in means on dependence, $F(2, 106) = 7.74^{**}, p = .001$. The LSD tests revealed that two pairs of groups had significant differences, group 3 and 1 ($M = 1.73, p = .000$) and group 3 and 2 ($M = 1.1, p = .01$), but that there was not significant difference between group 2 and group 1 ($M = .63, p = .09$) (Table 47).

Table 47

ANOVA of Dependence on Government Accounts for Public Diplomacy Outsourcing

Government Account Group	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	Levene's Test Sig.	<i>F</i> (Sig.)	Multiple Comparison	
					Groups	Sig.
1 (No Account)	36	.16				
2 (One or Two Accounts)	47	.79	.05	7.74 (.001)**	1 & 3	.000**
3 (More than Three Accounts)	26	1.89			2 & 3	.01*

Note. Government account data came from 2002 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) First Semi-Annual Report (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003).

Fisher's LSD test was used for post-hoc multiple comparison.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

The overall results indicated that dependence is empirically related to the outsourcing practices of foreign governments for their public diplomacy. The results lent support to hypothesis 15, that governments with more dependence on the United States would outsource their public diplomacy activities to the local firms than governments with less dependence on the country. Research question 4 asked what effects the outsourcing services provided by U.S. public relations and lobbying firms would have on the practices and management of public diplomacy at client embassies. Research question 4 involves using data on embassy accounts, not the same data on government accounts as used in testing hypothesis 15. Government accounts refer to all the accounts with local firms that a foreign government has under the names of any ministries including embassies or agencies while embassy accounts are those commissioned only by embassies.

Of the 113 participating embassies, as of 2002, 39 embassies purchased some or many of the services from the local firms while 74 embassies had no accounts. *T*-tests were performed on two groups of embassies with group 1 designated as those without an account and group 2 as those with accounts to examine the effects of the services on the constructs of public diplomacy. The results showed that the two groups had statistically significant differences in means only on three behavior constructs: two-way communication, $M = .41$, $t(111) = -2.08^*$, $p = .04$; mediated communication, $M = .49$, $t(111) = -2.49^*$, $p = .01$; and interpersonal communication, $M = .44$, $t(111) = -2.25^*$, $p = .03$ (Table 48). The mean differences indicated that group 2, those with accounts, practiced significantly more two-way, mediated, and interpersonal communication than group 1.

These findings showed that by purchasing the outsourcing services, embassies with accounts used more formative and evaluative research in planning and evaluating their press relations programs, used more publications and mediated channels, and more frequently had face-to-face communication with American journalists.

Table 48

T-test of the Public Diplomacy Constructs on Two Groups of Embassy Accounts for Public Diplomacy Outsourcing (No Account and Accounts)

		Embassy Account Group	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	Levene's Test (Sig.)	<i>t</i> (Sig.)	
						Equal Variance	Non-Equal Variance
EX	1 (No Account)		74	-.08	.72	-1.17 (.25)	
	2 (Accounts)		39	.15			
SY	1			-.10	.11	-1.52 (.13)	
	2			.20			
AS	1			-.12	.62	-1.77 (.08)	
	2			.23			
T	1			-.14	.84	-2.08 (.04)*	
	2			.27			
M	1			-.17	.65	-2.49 (.01)*	
	2			.32			
P	1			-.15	.71	-2.25 (.03)*	
	2			.29			
ET	1			.05	.58	.79 (.43)	
	2			-.10			
IV	1			-.07	.90	-.97 (.33)	
	2			.13			
SU	1			-.08	.91	-1.24 (.22)	
	2			.16			

(table continues)

Table 48 (continued)

	Embassy Account Groups	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	Levene's Test (Sig.)	<i>t</i> (Sig.)	
					Equal Variance	Non-Equal Variance
II	1 (No Account)	74	-.02	.15	-.26 (.80)	
	2 (Accounts)(39	.03			
IO	1		.01	.53	-.26 (.80)	
	2		-.01			
K	1		-.10	.61	-1.38 (.17)	
	2		.18			
SI	1		-.04	.65	-.56 (.58)	
	2		.07			
D	1		-.02	.79	-.33 (.74)	
	2		.04			

Note. EX = excellence; SY = symmetrical communication; AS = asymmetrical communication; T = two-way communication; M = mediated communication; P = interpersonal communication; ET = ethical communication; IV = involvement; SU = support; II = integration inside; IO = integration outside; K = knowledge; SI = symmetrical internal communication; D = diversity.

Embassy account data came from *2002 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) First Semi-Annual Report* (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003).

Group 1 = no account; Group 2 = accounts.

* $p < .05$, two-tailed.

CHAPTER V

Conclusions and Implications

This study had three main purposes: (a) developing a conceptual and measurement framework for public diplomacy behavior and excellence, (b) constructing a theoretical framework for comparative public diplomacy (the inquiry into how and why governments practice and manage their public diplomacy as they do), and (c) initiating a macro-methodological framework for comparative public diplomacy on a large scale.

For the first purpose, this study developed a conceptual and measurement framework for public diplomacy through an application of the Excellence study (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Dozier, 2002). The findings showed that the frameworks of the Excellence study are applicable to public diplomacy: the two conceptual and measurement models of public relations behavior and excellence fit well with the public diplomacy data from embassies. This fit of data to theory provided empirical evidence of theoretical convergence between public relations and public diplomacy not only on the level of communication behavior but also on the level of communication management.

For the second purpose, this study constructed a theoretical framework for comparative public diplomacy and investigated why and how governments practice public diplomacy as they do by testing a theory of comparative public diplomacy—a set of hypotheses and research questions on empirical associations between the contextual variables of a government and her public diplomacy behavior and management.

The findings revealed the salience of uncertainty avoidance, one of Hofstede's (2001) four cultural dimensions, in the conduct of public diplomacy, specifically for overall excellence in public diplomacy. Countries with a low uncertainty avoidance

culture were most excellent in public diplomacy management. The findings also confirmed the dependence thesis that the more dependent a country is on the target country the more likely it is that the dependent country will outsource its public diplomacy to local public relations and lobbying firms in the target country. In addition, the findings suggested that the outsourcing practices increased excellence in public diplomacy by affecting mostly public diplomacy behavior of the client embassies, but not public diplomacy management.

In investigating the empirical associations, this study also provided some unexpected findings stimulating new theoretical reasoning on why they occurred, even though the findings lacked statistical significance. The findings showed that power distance is a favorable condition for excellent public diplomacy in that embassies from countries with high power distance fit the criteria of excellence better than did their counterparts from countries with low power distance. Similarly, this study found that liberal democracies do not necessarily outperform electoral democracies and non-democracies in public diplomacy. In contrast, the findings indicated that electoral democracies and non-democracies outperform liberal democracies

Overall, this study found that the strengths of empirical associations between the contextual variables of a government and her public diplomacy were not strong, but at best, medium. This finding suggested the need for further investigation of the effects of local variables such as the political, economic, and media conditions of the host country on public diplomacy of a foreign government.

Lastly, for the third purpose, this study tapped into the methodological potentials of using embassies as “matching samples” as well as “surrogate governments.” By the

merits of the research strategy, this study was able to conduct a large-scale comparative investigation of public diplomacy behavior and management by as many as 113 embassies, thus 113 governments.

In the following section, I briefly recapitulate the results of this study discussing them to highlight the major findings. Then, I will discuss further implications and limitations of this study. Lastly, I will set directions for future study.

Summary and Discussion

Descriptive Data

Analysis of descriptive data was conducted with means of the items for each construct of public diplomacy. The data helped draw a broad picture of what embassies are doing in practicing press relations and managing their public diplomacy. The respondents reported that they practice two-way communication based on formative and evaluative research only to “little” and “some” degree.

The data showed that use of new media such as the Internet and email has become a staple in communicating with U.S. journalists. The diplomats said that they use new media more than printed publications and audio-visual materials. In addition, embassies rely on interpersonal channels of communication almost as much as new media. Notable was that holding official parties and events is a more frequently used way of personal contact than cultivating personal relationships by having dinner and playing golf with journalists.

Conforming to the nature of diplomacy, the diplomats have a stronger symmetrical purpose than asymmetrical purpose. The difference was small, though. Diplomats also said that they practiced ethical public diplomacy “some” to “very much.”

They, however, seem to be reluctant about disclosing the purpose of communication programs, making public their purpose only to “some” extent. The reluctance may reflect secrecy inherent in diplomacy.

Descriptive data also presented a general look at the ways that embassies manage the public diplomacy function. The public diplomacy function at embassies is engaged in government’s strategic management of foreign affairs in the forms of strategic communication campaigns and issues management. The function contributes a great deal to formulating policies toward the United States.

The involvement in strategic management on the organizational level, however, seems to lack support from strategic management of public diplomacy. On the program level, embassies seldom use regular and issue-specific research.

In addition, the public diplomacy function is strongly supported by ambassadors, but it receives less substantive support (e.g., allocation of budget/personnel and recognition/promotion). According to diplomats, their governments appreciated the function with substantial support to “some” degree, but invest “little” in the infrastructure of public diplomacy (i.e., research on and training for excellent public diplomacy).

Embassies also integrate their inside specialized public diplomacy functions such as press, congress, and cultural relations to “some” degree while governmental agencies, including embassies and civilian organizations, coordinate public diplomacy efforts less. The public diplomacy departments or individual practitioners have some knowledge potential to conduct strategic public diplomacy. Specifically, they possess more generalist manager-related knowledge for developing goals and strategies for communication programs than specialist manager-related knowledge for conducting research.

Descriptive data also provided insights into the degree of participative culture inside embassies. Diplomats reported that their embassies have institutionalized symmetrical internal communication to a large extent. They also said that their embassies have taken steps to formalize affirmative actions for women.

Reliability and Validity of the Instrument

The Coefficient H was used to assess construct reliability of each of the 13 constructs of public diplomacy in the instrument, along with another measure of internal consistence reliability, Cronbach's alpha coefficient. As a measure of construct validity, variances extracted by the constructs in the model were assessed.

Assessment of Coefficient Hs showed that all the constructs had acceptable construct reliability. The Hs exceeded the minimum cutting point of .70. Specifically, all the management constructs registered Coefficient Hs above .80: involvement (.88), support (.89), integration inside (.86), integration outside (.88), knowledge (.88), symmetrical internal communication (.82), and diversity (.95). The behavior constructs, however, registered Coefficient Hs between the minimum range between .70 and .80 except for two-way communication (.84) and interpersonal communication (.93).

With construct validity, assessment of variances extracted showed that of the 13 constructs, only five exceeded the minimum cutting point of 50%: interpersonal communication (63%), support (56%), integration outside (53%), knowledge (50%), and diversity (55%). Specifically, most behavior constructs except for interpersonal communication, explained less than 50% of the total variance: two-way (46%), mediated (40%), symmetry (41%), asymmetry (38%), and ethical communication (25%). On the

other hand, of the management constructs, involvement (46%), integration inside (49%), and symmetrical internal communication (37%) did not reach the cutting point.

Overall, the management constructs seemed to perform an acceptable job on both construct reliability and validity while the behavior constructs showed mediocre performance.

Cronbach's alpha tests also provided a similar assessment. Cronbach's alpha coefficients for the management constructs, except for involvement and symmetrical internal communication, exceeded the benchmark of .80: involvement (.78), support (.83), integration inside (.84), integration outside (.85), knowledge (.83), symmetrical internal communication (.64), and diversity (.85).

Cronbach's coefficients for the behavior constructs, however, exceeded .80 only for only interpersonal communication: symmetrical (.70), asymmetrical (.68), two-way (.73), mediated (.70), interpersonal (.87), and ethical communication (.53).

Tests of Empirical Convergence between Public Relations and Public Diplomacy

Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted of the six-factor measurement model to test empirical convergence between public relations behavior and public diplomacy behavior. The behavior measurement model comprised the six behavior constructs: two-way, symmetrical, asymmetrical, interpersonal, mediated, and ethical communication.

The fit indices showed that the model had a reasonably good fit, CFI = .98 and RAMSE = .07. The CFI exceeded the cutoff value of .96 for a good fit. The RAMSE fell outside the cutoff value of .05. It was, however, still below .08, the upper bound cutoff

value for a reasonably good fit. Given the sensitivity of RAMSE to small samples, the fit indices indicated that the model fit the data relatively well.

Additionally, assessment of factor correlations revealed that symmetrical and asymmetrical communication were substantially correlated with each other, $r = .60^{**}, p = .007$. Moreover, ethical communication turned out to be more correlated with symmetrical communication, $r = .64^{**}, p = .001$, than with asymmetrical communication, $r = .33^*, p = .05$.

The convergence between excellence in public relations and excellence in public diplomacy was investigated to test further empirical convergence between public relations and public diplomacy. A CFA was conducted with the second-order, five-factor measurement model of excellence in public diplomacy to see whether the five first-order factors (five Excellence principles) constitute a single second-order Excellence factor.

Given the small sample size ($N = 113$), only the five core Excellence principles composed the model: symmetrical communication, involvement, integration (inside), knowledge, and symmetrical internal communication.

The fit indices showed that the model had a good to mediocre fit to the data, CFI = .97 and RAMSE = .09. Although the RAMSE exceeded .08, it was still smaller than .10, which indicated that the model had, in terms of RAMSE, a mediocre model fit. When the characteristics of RAMSE were considered, however, the model was deemed retainable.

The model also showed an identical pattern of factor loadings to that found in the Excellence study: Knowledge construct had the greatest factor loading (.98), followed by the constructs of “shared expectation”—involvement (.68) and integration (inside) (.63)—and by symmetrical communication (.38) and a construct of participative culture,

symmetrical internal communication (.35). All the factor loadings were significant at the level of .01.

All the results of CFAs of the two models and assessment of the pattern of factor loadings supported empirical convergence between public relations behavior/excellence and public diplomacy behavior/excellence.

Construct Equivalence

Multi-group CFAs were conducted to ensure comparability of the constructs across two cultural groups— individualist ($n = 40$) and collectivist ($n = 72$) —, which were created based on 2000 GDP per capita. The results from preliminary CFAs of the baseline models for each group showed that overall, the public diplomacy constructs had acceptable coefficient Hs above .70 in both groups, except for three constructs: two-way, ethical, and symmetrical internal communication.

As the second procedure of the multi-group CFA, significance levels of chi-square differences were assessed between a base model with no equality constraints and its nested model with equality constraints on all the factor loadings and variances. The results of significance test confirmed that the constructs had factorial invariance across both groups: All the constructs had insignificant differences in chi-squares at the level of .05 except for symmetrical internal communication ($p > .01$).

These results of two-group CFA lent support to the equivalence of the constructs across the collectivist and individualist group.

Empirical Associations between Contextual Variables and Public diplomacy

Simple and partial correlation analyses, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and t -tests were conducted to answer and test proposed research questions and hypotheses on

comparative public diplomacy. Principal component analysis (PCA) was used to build composites representing the 13 constructs. Based on composites of the Excellence principles (constructs), a second round of PCA was conducted to obtain composites representing a construct of overall excellence in public diplomacy. Subsequently, all statistical analyses were performed on these composites.

Cohen's (1988) recommendations were used in interpreting the size of Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient: (a) $r < .10$ = small, (b) r around $.30$ = medium, and (c) $r > .50$ = large. Thus, correlation coefficients with values less than the minimal cutoff point, $.10$ were not interpreted.

Culture

Empirical associations between Hofstede's (2001) four dimensions of culture and the public diplomacy constructs were examined by simple and partial correlation analyses with a case base ($n = 52$). Of the 113 participating countries, 52 countries had measurements on the four dimensions.

Individualism/collectivism. A research question asked about how this dimension is associated with symmetrical, asymmetrical, and ethical communication. The results showed that the individualism/collectivism dimension had slightly medium association with asymmetrical, $r = -.20$ and very small associations with the other two constructs, $r < \pm .10$ and that none of the associations was statistically significant. The negative direction of the coefficient for asymmetrical communication indicated that the more individualist a country is the less asymmetrical is the communication its embassy practices.

The dimension was hypothesized to have negative associations with interpersonal communication, integration inside and outside, and symmetrical internal communication. The analyses found out that it had (a) a small but positive coefficient of .11 with interpersonal communication, (b) a slightly medium but positive coefficient of .22 with integration inside, (c) rather small but positive coefficient of .13 with symmetrical internal communication, and (d) a very small coefficient with integration outside, $r < \pm .10$. None of the coefficients was significant.

The direction of associations indicated that contrary to the predictions, the more individualist a country is the more interpersonal communication, integration inside, and symmetrical internal communication its embassy has. Although not hypothesized, the dimension turned out to have (a) a significant, positive, and medium association with diversity, $r = .30^*$ and (b) a slightly medium but insignificant association with overall excellence in public diplomacy, $r = .21$. All things considered, individualism seems to have desirable associations for most of the Excellence constructs, thus for overall excellence in public diplomacy.

Power distance. The dimension was theorized to have negative associations with symmetrical and ethical communication and a positive association with asymmetrical communication. In contrast, the findings showed that the dimension had (a) a positive and medium association with symmetrical communication, $r = .28$, (b) a positive and rather small association with ethical communication, $r = .14$, and (c) a very small association with asymmetrical communication, $r < \pm .10$. None of the coefficients was significant.

On the other hand, the dimension's hypothesized associations with management constructs were supported by the findings: involvement, $r = -.19$; support, $r = -.12$; diversity, $r = .27^*$, $p = .04$. The dimension also had a negative and somewhat small association with the overall excellence, $r = -.18$. It indicated that high power distance has desirable associations with excellence in public diplomacy—an intriguing finding open to further investigation of why.

Uncertainty avoidance. The dimension was hypothesized to have negative and positive associations with symmetrical and asymmetrical communication, but the data revealed very small associations, $r < \pm .10$. None of the coefficients was significant. However, the findings supported hypotheses on the dimension's associations with management constructs: involvement, $r = -.33^*$, $p = .02$; support, $r = -.40^{**}$, $p = .01$; and symmetrical internal communication, $r = -.18$. Although not predicted, knowledge had a medium and significant association with the dimension, $r = -.33^*$, $p = .02$.

Consequently, the dimension had a significant, negative, and medium association with overall excellence in public diplomacy, $r = -.36^*$, $p = .01$, and it indicated that low uncertainty avoidance has a significantly favorable association with excellence in public diplomacy.

A reasonable explanation of this favorable association is that embassies from cultures with low avoidance inherently tend to embrace uncertainty in the international system. They make most of the function of public diplomacy as an environmental scanner as well as boundary spanner. They support, get the function involved in strategic management of foreign affairs, and enhance their knowledge potential.

Maculinity/femininity. This dimension was hypothesized to have negative associations with symmetrical and ethical communication and a positive association with asymmetrical communication. In contrast to the predictions, however, the dimension had positive and small associations with symmetrical and ethical communication, $r = .11$ and a very small association with asymmetrical communication, $r < \pm .10$. None of the coefficients was significant.

The dimension showed a positive and rather small association with involvement, $r = .11$. The direction was, however, opposite to what was predicted. The dimension also had a negative and larger than small association with diversity, $r = -.19$, and the direction supported what was hypothesized. The results showed very small and insignificant associations with support and symmetrical internal communication, $r < \pm .10$. Moreover, the dimension had a very small association with overall excellence and seemed to be least associated with public diplomacy, compared to the other three dimensions of culture.

Discussion. The results of the correlation analysis showed that of Hofstede's (2001) four cultural dimensions, uncertainty avoidance is the most salient for public diplomacy. It registered four medium but statistically significant coefficients with involvement, $r = -.33^*$, $p = .02$; support, $r = -.40^*$, $p = .00$; knowledge, $r = -.33^*$, $p = .02$; and the overall excellence, $r = -.36^*$, $p = .01$.

Individualism/collectivism registered only one medium and significant coefficient with diversity, $r = .30^*$, $p = .03$, and power distance also had only one medium and significant coefficient with diversity, $r = -.27^*$, $p = .04$. Masculinity/femininity, however, had very small and insignificant coefficients with all the constructs of public diplomacy.

All of the findings suggested that uncertainty avoidance has a greater effect than other cultural variables on public diplomacy and that it might also affect a government's management of foreign affairs in general, compared to the other contextual variables. The salience of uncertainty avoidance does make sense, given that the role of public diplomacy is itself a boundary spanner whose main task is to deal with uncertainty in the world system. The uncertain nature of the system must serve as an environment in which governments from a low uncertainty avoidance culture embrace uncertainty more than governments from a high avoidance culture.

In addition, the overall pattern of the coefficients suggests that societal culture has less effect on public diplomacy behavior than on public diplomacy management. The pattern showed that the cultural dimensions had mostly small to very small correlation coefficients with behavior, and none of the coefficients was statistically significant. Moreover, most hypothesized associations with respect to public diplomacy behavior were contradicted by opposite empirical findings.

In contrast, the four dimensions registered medium and statistically significant coefficients with management constructs such as involvement, support, knowledge, and diversity. In addition, the direction of empirical findings was consistent with what was theorized.

This finding was deemed sensible, given that the path from societal culture to the public diplomacy behavior was hypothesized to be a two-step process in which culture first frames the worldview of foreign policy elites and then indirectly affects the behavior of the public diplomacy function. Public diplomacy behavior seems to be a complex phenomenon that is influenced by many factors other than cultures.

For instance, the nature of the media system, the status of media freedom, and the level of economic development in the host country probably affect how embassies practice symmetrical, interpersonal, mediated, and ethical communication. Perhaps, choice of public diplomacy behavior is polycentric rather than ethnocentric, subject to the conditions of the host country.

On the other hand, the path from societal culture to public diplomacy management was hypothesized to be a one-step process in which culture directly affects the ways that an embassy manages public diplomacy. Management in general may be seen as mostly, if not wholly, free from the conditions of the host country. Inside an embassy, societal culture has a direct footprint on public diplomacy management.

Political System

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the LSD tests for multiple comparison were conducted to test hypotheses on empirical associations between the political system and public diplomacy. For the analyses, 113 participating governments were clustered into three groups of political systems, consistent with the classification scheme of the Freedom House (2004a): a liberal democracy ($n = 34$), an electoral democracy ($n = 57$), and a non-democracy group ($n = 22$).

Democracy was hypothesized to have positive effects on symmetrical and ethical communication and negative effects on asymmetrical communication. *F*-tests, however, showed that democracy produced statistically significant differences in means across the three groups *only* for asymmetrical communication, $F(2, 110) = 3.01^*, p = .05$. Subsequent LSD tests revealed a significant difference in means *only* between the liberal ($M = -.30$) and non-democracy group ($M = .34$) such that the liberal democracy group had

a lower mean than the non-democracy group ($M = .64$). The electoral democracy group had a mean between these two ($M = .05$). These findings supported what was predicted.

In addition, democracy was theorized to have positive effects on involvement, support, knowledge, symmetrical internal communication, and diversity. The findings showed that *only* diversity had significant differences in means across the groups, $F(2, 110) = 3.10^*$, $p = .05$. Similar to asymmetrical communication, the comparison only of both the liberal democracy and non-democracy group revealed a significant difference in means. The order of means showed that diversity had the highest mean in the liberal group ($M = .26$), followed by the electoral group ($M = .15$) and the non-democracy group ($M = .03$).

Meanwhile, even if not hypothesized, integration inside also had significant differences in means across the groups, $F(2, 110) = 4.40^*$, $p = .02$. Two pairs of groups (the electoral vs. non-democracy and the liberal vs. non-democracy) showed significant differences in means. The differences in means indicated that the electoral democracy group ($M = .99$) had more integration than the other two groups while there was no significant difference between the liberal ($M = .19$) and the electoral group. The non-democracy group showed the smallest mean score ($M = -.55$).

The overall pattern of means indicated the most excellence in public diplomacy for the electoral democracy group and the least excellence for the liberal group. The former group had the highest means on seven constructs including overall excellence, ethical communication, involvement, integration inside and outside, knowledge, and symmetrical internal communication. The non-democracy group scored highest on three constructs: symmetrical communication, two-way communication, and support. In

contrast, the liberal group scored highly on only two constructs: asymmetrical communication and diversity.

Discussion. The analyses showed that political system as measured by Freedom scores has statistically significant associations with three constructs of public diplomacy— asymmetrical communication, integration inside, and diversity. The empirical findings supported *only* hypotheses for asymmetrical communication and diversity, however.

Of Hofstede's (2001) four dimensions of culture, power distance is most theoretically and empirically related to the political system. Hofstede said that "both political system and PDI scores [power distance index] are symptoms of the same underlying societal norms" (p. 110).

As noted before, power distance had statistically significant associations only with diversity, $r = -.27^*$, $p = .04$, out of the 13 constructs. In contrast to Hofstede's (2001) view, the analyses of the political system and power distance seemed to support the notion that the political system may be separable from and matter more than power distance in the conduct of public diplomacy.

The analyses showed that power distance and the political system alike have associations with diversity, while the political system showed significant associations with two more constructs, asymmetrical communication and integration inside.

As a cultural dimension, power distance seems to affect the management side of public diplomacy. The political system, however, seems to influence the behavior side of public diplomacy, asymmetrical communication. In fact, Hofstede's four dimensions, including uncertainty avoidance, which has significant associations with the management

side did not show any statistically significant associations with any of the constructs of public diplomacy behavior. To conclude, all these findings suggest that the political system of a government affects its choice of public diplomacy behavior more than societal culture.

Meanwhile, although the political system seems to be more potent than power distance in affecting public diplomacy behavior, overall, the findings for both variables do not seem to suggest strong explanatory power of these variables for the behavior. On the contrary, the findings indicated that power distance and the political system may not work in the direction hypothesized in this study.

The results from analysis of power distance showed that embassies from higher power distance cultures practice ethical and symmetrical communication more than embassies from lower distance cultures. Moreover, power distance had a positive and less than medium association with overall excellence: Embassies with high power distance outperform their counterparts from low power distance. Similarly, the results for the political system revealed that liberal democracies practices symmetrical and ethical communication least than electoral democracies and non-democracies. In addition, the results indicated the most excellence in public diplomacy for electoral democracies and the least excellence for liberal democracies.

All these findings seem to suggest that the norms of power distance and the political system (democracy) may not be reenacted intact in the conduct of foreign affairs, specifically public diplomacy. There might be mediating variables interrupting the reenacting process for power distance and the political system in foreign policy behavior.

A further theoretical reasoning is necessary to understand the process, which takes into account the nature of the international system as the environment for governments. In this respect, Hofstede's (2001) power-distance needs to be leveled up to the world system as a concept of international power distance that does not refer to a component of national culture but to a component of power relations between countries.

Originally, the concept of power distance was devised as a measure of the interpersonal power or influence between B [boss] and S [subordinate] in the workplace (Hofstede, 2001). That is, the concept was about interpersonal power at a within-group level. Hofstede, however, applied power-distance in the workplace to understanding national culture and even national political system.

Countries are viewed as groups in the world. Thus, scholars have discussed power-distance among countries and societies. Power distance is intuitively relevant to understanding interactions among countries because the world is seen as a system of anarchy without world sovereignty, the political polity that can govern the world affairs (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999). Polities in which national sovereignty has legitimacy to strike and manage power balance between groups in politics, economy, law, and other areas; but the international system has no such authority, so that power balance between countries and societies is not in check.

Hofstede (1984) discussed the two dimensions of power distance (within-group and between-group) and argued that any group can have two kinds of power distance, internal power distance and external power distance, at the same time. Hofstede pointed out a possible discrepancy between within and between-group power distance norms, which may shed light on understanding communication behavior between groups and

countries. Hofstede added that “It is possible that within certain groups small power distance between ‘bosses’ and ‘subordinates’ are maintained, while from one group to another the power and other inequalities are very large” (p. 73).

Thus, when a country enters the international power dimension, it assumes its power position with respect to other countries, adopting a corresponding communication pattern to its power-distance to other countries. In this regard, a country with a democratic political system and a low power distance culture may have a high power distance with its counterparts in the international system and thus behave and communicate in a non-democratic way. By the same token, a non-democratic country with a high power distance culture may communicate democratically, depending on its power distance with other countries.

High power distance could impede symmetrical communication; and as power relations become more symmetrical, the chance grows greater for symmetrical communication. Sriramesh and White (1992) pointed out that the smaller power distance, the more likely symmetrical communication is to take place. Another theoretical perspective needs to be taken, which considers the existence of middle camp.

In reality, any society does not consist of two camps; the powerful and powerless, rather it has a middle camp, called “criss-cross” (Galtung, 1966, p. 148) or just middle-class in a sociological term, which is positioned between the other two camps. For Galtung, “criss-cross” indicated “the degree to which there are individuals who can serve as bridges between completely disparate conflict groups in the structure” (p. 148).

With the international system, Wallerstein (1979) depicted a stratification of world power, consisting of three camps: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. In Cooper,

Higgott, and Nossal's (1993) typology, semi-periphery is grouped as middle power. Cooper et al. described middle power states as those "occupying the 'middle' point in a range . . . usually measured by reference to such quantifiable attributes as area, population, size, complexity and strength of economy, military, [communication] capability, and other comparable factors" (p. 17). Pratt (1990) grouped Canada, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, and Denmark into middle powers that are active supporters of the international community and have both the capacity and the will to play an important role in the international scene (p.14).

One major implication of being a middle power for public diplomacy is that countries with this power position may have relatively small a power distance with both the core and the periphery. Thus, middle powers might be in a better position to practice excellent public diplomacy with the both, and the relations between excellent public diplomacy and middle power position were suggested by some studies in the public diplomacy literature (Baxter & Bishop, 1998; Leonardo & Alakeson, 2000). Leonard and Alakeson (2000) asserted that excellent public diplomacy might be strongly associated with middle-ranking countries like Sweden and Norway (pp. 41, 61).

Scholars have found associations between a country's political system and its wealth (GDP per capita), the essential component of a country's power status. Lane and Ersson (2002) and Hofstede (2001) reported a strong positive correlation between both variables; the more affluent a country is, the more democratic it is. The studies may suggest a match between the classifications of the political system (democracy) and power status.

In this regard, the liberal democracy, electoral democracy, and non-democracy groups in this study may be generally viewed as the top-power, middle-power, and minor-power groups, accordingly. There are some exceptions, however; for example, top-powers such as China and Russia are classified into non-democracies by the Freedom score, and middle powers such as Sweden and other Nordic countries are liberal democracies. Notwithstanding, many of affluent Western liberal democracies generally occupy the top position in the world system, and a great number of electoral democracies in the Americas and Asia are, in fact, middle-powers. In addition, underdeveloped countries in Africa are mostly non-democracies.

This power position of polities may explain why electoral democracies had the most excellence in public diplomacy while liberal democracies had the least excellence in this study. This explanation, however, seem to contradict the findings that liberal democracies displayed least symmetrical and ethical communication, given that as top-powers, their power distance with the United States is relatively small, compared to the distance that other middle-powers and minor-powers may have with the country.

The findings call into question the equation of power relations and symmetry: Power symmetry is the condition for symmetrical communication (Rubin & Brown, 1975; Slusher, Rose, & Roering, 1978). Recently, scholars in negotiation, especially in the school of structural negotiation, have provided findings that do not uphold the equation when they explained the consequences of power relations on the outcomes and processes of negotiation. Through studying nine historical cases for governmental negotiations, Rubin and Zartman (2000) found that in contrast to the mainstream thought, power

symmetry does not necessarily work in the favor of integrative, cooperative, and symmetrical negotiation processes and outcomes.

Rubin and Zartman (1995) argued that symmetrical negotiations tend to go less smoothly than their asymmetrical counterparts and produce less mutually satisfactory outcomes less efficiently. According to them, high-power symmetry involving two parties with a similar high power status brings together them experienced in domineering behavior. The condition allows each party to hold the other in check, driving them to care much about keeping their equal status and face maintenance, instead of striking a mutually satisfying agreement. Thus, high-power symmetry in conflict situations tends to produce and reinforce hostility and prolonged negotiations.

In addition, Zartman and Rubin (2000) suggested that power asymmetry does not always produce distributive negotiation rather can entail integrative negotiation under a certain condition, interdependent and historical relationships. To conclude, their findings may explain the least symmetrical and ethical public diplomacy behavior of liberal democracies and the most symmetrical and ethical behavior of electoral democracies and non-democracies toward the United States.

However, the findings leave unexplained the least asymmetrical communication, which was significant, by liberal democracies. These puzzles can be solved only through more comprehensive theoretical reasoning and multivariate analyses including other factors than the political system.

Interest Group System

T-tests were conducted to test hypotheses on empirical associations between the interest group system measured by Lijpart's (1999) pluralism/corporatist index and public

diplomacy. For the analyses, 23 countries with measurements on the index were classified into two groups of interest group system, based on the mean: the pluralist ($n = 14$) and corporatist group ($n = 9$).

Corporatism was hypothesized to have (a) positive effects on symmetrical, ethical communication, involvement, support, integration inside and outside, knowledge, symmetrical internal communication, and diversity and (b) negative effects on asymmetrical communication. Because directional alternative hypotheses were proposed, one-tailed significance tests were performed.

The results, however, showed a significant difference in means between both groups *only* on diversity, $t(21) = 1.79^*$, $p = .04$; and they showed that the corporatist embassies have a significantly higher mean than the pluralist ones. Meanwhile, the differences in means indicated that although no significant difference existed, the corporatist group had far higher scores on all other constructs except for asymmetrical communication and integration outside: overall excellence ($M = .38$), symmetrical communication ($M = .35$), ethical communication ($M = .16$), involvement ($M = .22$), support ($M = .21$), integration inside ($M = .44$), knowledge ($M = .36$), symmetrical internal communication ($M = .12$), asymmetrical communication ($M = -.37$), and integration outside ($M = -.05$).

Dependence

Interstate dependence was hypothesized to have (a) positive associations with asymmetrical, interpersonal communication and (b) a negative association with ethical communication. Thus, it was theorized to be associated with the personal influence model

of public diplomacy. Correlation analysis was conducted with 109 countries that had measurements on dependence.

The results showed that dependence has (a) a small positive association with interpersonal communication, $r = .11$, but (b) very small associations with asymmetrical and ethical communication, $r < \pm .10$. None of the coefficients was significant. The findings for interpersonal communication supported what was predicted.

Meanwhile, dependence had (a) less than medium and significant associations with involvement, $r = .21^*, p = .03$, and integration outside, $r = .21^*, p = .03$, (b) but a less than medium but insignificant association with integration inside, $r = .17$, and a rather small and insignificant association with support, $r = .12$. These findings showed that as hypothesized, dependence has positive associations with these four management constructs. Moreover, partial correlation analysis with GDP per capita controlled resulted in almost identical strengths of the coefficients for involvement and integration outside.

In addition, dependence has a less than medium, insignificant, and positive association with overall excellence in public diplomacy, $r = .16$, indicating that the more dependent a country is on the United States, the better its embassy conducts public diplomacy toward the United States.

Dependence was also hypothesized to have positive effects on the outsourcing practices by foreign governments for public diplomacy in the United States. Based on data from the *2002 Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) First Semi-Annual Report* (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003), 109 countries with dependence measures were classified into three groups: governments with no accounts (group 1, $n = 36$),

governments with one or two accounts (group 2, $n = 47$), and governments with more than three accounts (group 3, $n = 26$).

ANOVA of dependence showed that the three groups had statistically significant differences in means, $F(2, 106) = .74^{**}, p = .001$; and the LSD tests revealed significant differences in means in two pairs of group: group 3 vs. group 1 ($M = 1.73$) and group 3 vs. group 2 ($M = 1.1$). The findings showed that group 3 with more than three accounts has a significantly higher mean on dependence than group 2 with one or two accounts as well as group 1 with zero account.

Moreover, a research question asked about the effects of the outsourcing services on public diplomacy practices and management at embassies. Of the 113 participating embassies, 39 embassies had accounts in U.S. public relations and lobbying firms, and 74 embassies had no account, according to the *2002 FARA report*. *T*-tests were conducted of the constructs of public diplomacy on two groups: group 1 with no accounts and group 2 with accounts. The results showed that group 2 has significantly higher means than group 1 on three behavior constructs—two-way communication, $t(111) = -2.08^*, p = .04$; mediated communication, $t(111) = -2.49^*, p = .01$; and interpersonal communication, $t(111) = -2.25^*, p = .03$.

The findings indicated that by purchasing services from the firms, embassies with accounts practice more two-way, mediated, and interpersonal communication with strategic publics than embassies without accounts.

Meanwhile, both groups display insignificant differences in means on the other constructs. Still insignificant, though, the significance levels of the difference in means on the other constructs, except for ethical communication, closely approached the cutting

level of .05: asymmetrical communication, $p = .08$ and symmetrical communication, $p = .13$.

On the other hand, the significance levels for the management constructs far exceeded .05: involvement, $p = .33$; support, $p = .22$; integration inside, $p = .80$; integration outside, $p = .80$; knowledge, $p = .17$; symmetrical internal communication, $p = .58$; and diversity, $p = .74$.

The overall pattern in these levels of significance suggested that the outsourcing services have greater effects on embassies' public diplomacy behavior than on their management of public diplomacy. It also suggested that although the local firms consulted on the overall management of public diplomacy at embassies, their service does not affect the management side.

A broad picture seems to emerge of the paths through which dependence might affect public diplomacy behavior and management by embassies. The results for dependence showed that the variable had a significant and medium association with the involvement of public diplomacy; and the outsourcing services also had significant and medium associations with two-way, interpersonal, and mediated communication.

A possible path would be that embassies from countries with more dependence first involve the public diplomacy function in their strategic management of foreign affairs with the United States. Then, in order to conduct issues management, regular, and specific research for the involvement, the embassies purchase services from U.S. public relations and lobbying firms; the services, in turn, have effects on the three dimensions of public diplomacy behavior by embassies, contributing to overall excellence in public diplomacy.

Overall Discussion for Empirical Associations of Contextual Variables

This study investigated if and how the contextual variables of a government—culture, political system, interest group system, and interstate dependence—are empirically associated with her public diplomacy behavior and management. The results of this study indicated that overall, the contextual variables (i.e., the parameter variables) do not have *strong* empirical associations with public diplomacy.

Uncertainty avoidance was shown to have significant associations with overall excellence and the core management principles such as involvement, support, and knowledge. Dependence also had significant associations with involvement and integration. However, the sizes of correlations for these two contextual variables were, *at best, medium*, falling around a coefficient of .30; the other contextual variables had even small to less than medium associations with only a few principles.

The associations between public diplomacy and GDP per capita, another promising contextual variable, were not hypothesized in this study. However, the results from correlation analysis of the associations, which were reported in table 42, showed that GDP per capita has significant *but still medium* associations with mediated communication, $r = .25^*, p = .01$; interpersonal communication, $r = .28^*, p = .01$; knowledge, $r = .25^*, p = .01$; and diversity, $r = .21^*, p = .03$.

In fact, there might be factors at different levels such as the organizational and individual levels, which affect public diplomacy behavior and management. As an exploratory investigation, this study conducted ANOVA of the constructs of public diplomacy on two kinds of diplomats in charge of public diplomacy, specialists versus generalists—a factor at the individual practitioner-level. The results showed that the

specialists group ($n = 30$) has a significantly higher mean than the generalists group ($n = 83$) on knowledge, $M = .72$, $t(111) = 13.00^{**}$, $p = .000$.

This finding suggests that the individual-level factor, specialists vs. generalists, also affects knowledge potential at the embassy level, the core of core Excellence principles, *more than or as much as* uncertainty avoidance and GDP per capita do—the two contextual variables that have significant and medium correlations with knowledge.

The factor of specialists vs. generalists captures knowledge potential at the individual practitioner-level while years of practicing public diplomacy tap into experience potential at the practitioner-level. Correlation analysis of the associations between years of experience transformed through a natural logarithm and the constructs of public diplomacy showed that years of experience also are significantly associated with public diplomacy *as much as* other contextual variables: two-way communication, $r = .20^*$, $p = .03$; involvement, $r = .21^*$, $p = .03$; and integration outside, $r = .19^*$, $p = .05$.

All these findings strongly indicate the significance of individual-level factors, especially the knowledge and experience potentials of the practitioner, in conducting excellent public diplomacy. The findings also are consistent with L. Grunig, J. Grunig, and Dozier's (2002) recognition of the importance of the knowledge potential of an individual professional in practicing excellent public relations. To conclude, the findings of this study necessitates a multi-level investigation of how factors at different levels—the contextual, organizational, and individual levels — affect the ways in which public diplomacy is practiced and managed.

Implications

This study has contributed to developing three academic disciplines—public diplomacy, public relations, and international relations including foreign policy analysis.

Public Diplomacy

Conceptual and methodological framework for comparative public diplomacy.

After it was dishonored as propaganda for a century, public diplomacy has suddenly found itself in the spotlight as the tide of globalization has swept through governments in the world. Expectations of what public diplomacy can do have risen, and the discipline has started to search for ways to meet the expectations. The discipline, however, is not free from the policy concerns of governments.

Consequently, the discipline has mostly served immediate policy concerns, although scholars have begun to pay attention to building public diplomacy theory. In practice, however, public diplomacy has failed to gain respect as a serious academic discipline from established neighbors such as international relations.

Despite its century of history, the discipline has lacked defining conceptual frameworks for two core subjects of study: public diplomacy behavior and excellence. The lack of a conceptual framework has further plagued the development of comparative perspective for understanding why and how governments practice and manage public diplomacy as they do. Moreover, this myopic vision has worsened as the discipline has failed to develop methodological frameworks for comparative theory building of a large scale, which involve a wide spectrum of developed, developing, and underdeveloped countries.

As a pioneer, this study was an effort to provide comparative public diplomacy with a conceptual framework that can establish the discipline as not only a theoretical but also an instrumental one. This study proposed a systematic way of conceptualizing and measuring public diplomacy behavior and excellence.

Along with the conceptual framework, this study introduced an innovative methodological framework for building a theory of comparative public diplomacy that covers a large number of governments—the research strategy to use embassies as “matching samples” as well as “surrogate governments.”

As an academic adventure, this study attained the participation of 113 of 192 independent governments worldwide. The scope of this study went far beyond that of a few existing comparative works on public diplomacy. Mitchell (1986) and Wyszomirski, Burgess, and Peila (2003) studied public diplomacy only of nine developed countries. Because of the merits of the research strategy, this study covered not only more developed countries but also a sizable number of developing and underdeveloped countries: Africa (36), Americas (24), Asia (20), the Middle East (7), and Europe (24).

The methodological framework using embassies as the sources of data has further implications for comparative research in general. Studying embassies around the world should present a new methodological opportunity for diverse macro-comparative studies, such as comparative management or comparative public diplomacy. The existence of embassies in the form of matching samples in the world capitals offers a myriad of opportunities for replication and further advanced theory building and testing from various theoretical perspectives.

For instance, it would be promising to investigate public diplomacy practices and management by embassies in Seoul, Korea, and compare them with those by the same embassies in Washington, D.C. — a paired dependent samples design. Moreover, the theoretical focus and epistemological foundation of the study can shift the choice or combination of research settings as well as qualitative or quantitative research methodology. Also, the embassy research strategy would facilitate worldwide academic cooperation among scholars.

Beyond “a reversed public relations variant of public diplomacy.” Public diplomacy scholarship to this time has focused on what Gilboa (1998) termed “a reversed public relations variant of public diplomacy” (P. 6). It has been virtually locked in investigating strategic communication campaigns by U.S. public relations firms for their foreign government clients from the perspective of media effects theory. This study, however, shifted the focus to the clients from the agents and the presumed effects of their communication campaigns by inquiring about the clients’ public diplomacy practices and management. Thus, it brought a managerial perspective to scholarship in public diplomacy.

In so doing, this study put the reversed variant of public diplomacy into the perspective of comparative management of public diplomacy. It delved not only into antecedents of the outsourcing practices but also into their reversed effects on the practices and management of public diplomacy by the clients.

Public diplomacy scholarship has proposed untested hypotheses on the relationship between outsourcing practices and the dependence of a country. Lobsenz (1984) and Kunczik (1997) hypothesized that the more dependent a country is upon a

target country, the more likely the dependent country is to use local public relations and lobbying firms in the target country.

The findings of this study confirmed this dependence hypothesis: Foreign governments with more dependence on the United States use more outsourcing services from the local firms. This study also found out that the outsourcing services provided by the local firms mostly affected public diplomacy behavior and not management inside client embassies.

Using the services of public relations and lobbying firms, embassies with accounts practice more two-way communication, which is based on formative and evaluative research, and use more mediated and interpersonal channels to communicate with strategic publics such as American journalists than embassies without accounts.

To be sure, the dependence hypothesis should be treated as country specific in that the public relations variant of public diplomacy in the United States might not be found in other countries with different domestic conditions. The existence of this variant form of public diplomacy most likely hinges on the status of media freedom and economic development as well as the legal status of lobbying in the host country.

In this respect, a new line of research would be necessary to inquire into how the conditions in the host country affect the ways that interstate dependence influences how governments practice and manage public diplomacy. Moreover, future research should benefit from the embassy research strategy used in this study.

Public Relations

Beyond theoretical convergence between public relations and public diplomacy.
This study theoretically as well as empirically bridged public relations and public

diplomacy. Departing from the previous works on theoretical convergence, this study for the first time showed empirical convergence between both spheres, following Signitzer and Coombs' (1992) call for research on public diplomacy based on public relations theory.

This study identified the Excellence study as applicable to public diplomacy research, conceptualized theoretical convergence on two levels (communication behavior and management) and tested the convergence empirically. The fit indices of the two measurement models of public diplomacy supported empirical convergence beyond theoretical convergence between both spheres—the six-factor model of behavior and the second-order, five-factor model of excellence.

As the result, this study paved a way for public relations scholarship to initiate a program of research into public diplomacy, locating other converging theories and practices and putting them into a theory of public diplomacy. At the same time, this study also contributed to public relations theories, also.

Excellence theory. The contribution to public relations theories lies beyond “exporting” the theories or “enlarging” the territory of public relations scholarship into public diplomacy. The test of the second-order model of excellence was, in fact, another replication of the Excellence theory.

This study showed that as the theory posits, the Excellence principles constitute a second-order, single Excellence factor. Not only that, the model produced almost the same pattern of factor loadings. This replication lent more support to the Excellence theory than two previous quantitative replications conducted in Korea (Rhee, 1999) and Slovenia (L. Grunig, J. Grunig, & Vercic, & 1998) in two ways.

First, this study used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), which is a more powerful statistical technique in testing the Excellence theory than principal axis factoring (PAF) analysis used by the previous replications. Second, while the previous replications were based on a single country case study from the micro-replication approach, this study, following “the nation as the unit of analysis” approach (Kohn, 1987), tested the Excellence theory on a global scale, having 113 embassies, representing 113 governments, as the cases—“a macro-replication.”

Normative theory of global public relations. A replication of the Excellence theory on a global scale would be, at the same time, a replication of the normative theory of global public relations (Vercic, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1996). Vercic et al. proposed the theory whose central tenet is “generic principles and specific applications,” based on the concept of “structured flexibility” from the literature of developmental management (Brinkerhoff & Ingle, 1989).

Brinkerhoff and Ingle (1989) argued that it is possible to implement five principles of normative and generic management across countries by adapting them to the specific local conditions. In building the theory, Vercic, et al. (1996) initially theorized that the Excellence principles of public relations are generic and applicable through specific adaptations across cultures.

Preliminary support for the normative theory had already come from the Excellence study. Dozier, J. Grunig, & L. Grunig (1995) reported that the Excellence principles clustered into a single factor in an almost identical way across three Anglo Western countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Since these

countries share a similar cultural heritage, the findings from the study, however, were not powerful evidence for the generic nature of the principles across cultures.

In a different cultural setting, Vercic et al. (1996) first tested and found support for the normative theory in a qualitative case study of Slovenia, a former socialist country in transition into market economy and liberal democracy. Following their qualitative study, L. Grunig, J. Grunig, and Vercic (1998) conducted a quantitative study of Slovenia and successfully confirmed the theory, using a national sample of 30 organizations.

Other support came from South Korea, a culturally Confucian and then politically democratizing country. Rhee (1999) replicated the Excellence principles, isolating the same single Excellence factor. In addition, Wakefield (1997) asked a Delphi panel of 23 public relations experts in 18 countries to evaluate the extent to which they believed that the principles are generic across cultures. He (2000) also conducted a second Delphi study with 54 experts in 29 countries.

Despite accumulating support, in terms of theory testing, the normative theory of global public relations can be judged “under-tested”: Quantitative replication studies have been conducted based on a single country.

This study had unique implications for replication of the normative theory as a macro-comparative one involving 113 governments across the world. This study did not attempt to replicate the second-order model of excellence in its entirety in both individualist and collectivist groups of country because of the small sample problem.

It, however, conducted another kind of replication of the normative theory by performing two-group CFA to test factorial invariance for each of the 13 constructs of public diplomacy. The results from tests of construct reliability and chi-square

differences supported factorial invariance of all the constructs across both cultural groups. This finding supported the generic nature of the Excellence principles even if it came from analysis of two cultural groups of countries.

The results of two-group CFA had further implications for future replications of the normative theory. The results indicated that despite factorial invariance, the constructs may perform differently across both groups in terms of construct reliability—coefficient H. In relative terms, seven constructs had slightly higher coefficient Hs in the individualist group than in the collectivist group: two-way, interpersonal, asymmetrical, integration inside and outside, symmetrical internal communication, and diversity. Meanwhile, six constructs had higher coefficient Hs for the collectivist group: mediated, symmetrical, ethical, involvement, support, and knowledge. This differential performance suggests that the indicators of the constructs may be culturally biased toward either individualism or collectivism.

Qualitative data from interviews of diplomats provides evidence for the differential performance. A female diplomat from a small island country with collectivist culture in the Pacific region pointed out that items to measure diversity are inappropriate in their embassy and government. The items measured the degree of institutionalization of affirmative actions for women in forms of written and formal organizational policies and practices. In retrospect, the items had a biased assumption that written and formal institutionalization prevalent in a low-context culture like individualism would be the same in high-context culture like collectivism.

The female diplomat said:

You know? We don't have any formally written policies to guarantee and enhance

the rights of women. However, even if there are no laws or governmental policies, women in my country and this embassy feel as much protected and respected by men or perhaps more as women in this country [the United States].

Moreover, another female diplomat from a very small Caribbean country with collectivist culture made a similar point about items to measure integration outside. The items measured the degree of integration among governmental and civilian agencies in conduct of public diplomacy. She said:

Because we are so small a country, our ministries have not many offices here and likewise, there are only a few trade and business associations here from our country. Instead of working alone, we do work together with other neighbor Caribbean embassies for public diplomacy. We do conduct joint programs and regularly hold meetings to discuss what to do together. They are brother countries.

This study used identical indicators, but the findings and quotes seem to suggest use of equivalent indicators in replicating the normative theory in a different cultural setting. The differential performance found in this study does not necessarily mean that the Excellence principles (constructs) are not generic. Rather, it may more suggest that, as the normative theory implies, the Excellence principles should be specifically “measured” as well as “applied” across cultures.

Refinement of conceptual and measurement framework for public relations behavior. The Excellence study has continued refining its conceptual and measurement framework for the four dimensions of public relations behavior: purpose, channel, direction, and ethics. This study had implications for further refinement, especially, of two dimensions—purpose and ethics.

In reaction to Murphy's (1991) criticism, J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1992) clarified the concept of symmetrical communication as a mixed-motive one in which asymmetrical and symmetrical purposes can coexist. Based on the clarification, scholars have operationalized the purpose dimension into two separate continua: symmetrical and asymmetrical communication. L. Grunig, J. Grunig, and Dozier (2002) reported that use of two separate continua yields a better reliability. Deatherage and Hazleton (1998) also found evidence for the coexistence of symmetrical and asymmetrical purposes by separately measuring symmetrical and asymmetrical worldviews.

The pretest questionnaire of this study, however, initially measured the purpose dimension as a single continuum not because the dimension was thought to be inherently singular but because this study deals with the dimension at the organizational level instead of at the individual level. This study deals with all the constructs at the organizational level.

An individual member of a group may have two opposite intentions at the same time, and it is not unusual that he or she behaves both symmetrically and asymmetrically. Unlike the individual member, however, the organization is a highly unitary and unified actor. The voice and behavior of an organization are in sync through organizational control. Hence, the organizational purpose is better located at one point on a single continuum (symmetrical vs. asymmetrical) than on two continua (symmetry and asymmetry).

Hofstede (2001) addressed this issue when measuring collectivism/individualism as a single continuum, and he said:

At the individual level there is no reason a person cannot show idiocentric and

allocentric personality traits at the same time, so the two should be treated as separate dimensions. At the societal level, however, collective mental programs and institutions that are individualistically [asymmetrically] inspired exclude those that are collectivistically [symmetrically] inspired. (p. 216)

In the pretest, diplomats were asked to provide information on the purpose of their media relations, and thus the dimension was measured at the organizational level based on responses from a single key informant in charge of public diplomacy at embassies. As noted in the report of the pretest, diplomats said that their media relations programs actually had both symmetrical and asymmetrical purposes and further added that the symmetrical items were confusing to answer. Accordingly, the symmetrical construct yielded an extremely poor reliability ($\alpha = .24$).

In the final questionnaire, the purpose dimension was measured as two continua (symmetrical and asymmetrical), and the two constructs showed much improved reliability: symmetrical ($\alpha = .70$) and asymmetrical communication ($\alpha = .68$). More importantly, CFA of the six-factor measurement model of behavior found strong evidence for the coexistence of symmetrical and asymmetrical purposes: The two constructs had a statistically strong correlation coefficient of $.60^{**}$ ($p = .007$). In short, these findings supported the newly refined conceptual and measurement framework for the purpose dimension.

This study also had implications for refining the conceptual and measurement framework for the ethical dimension of behavior. J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996) and J. Grunig and White (1992) reasoned that symmetrical communication is inherently ethical,

and, at the same time, that asymmetrical communication can be ethical, depending on the rules used to ensure ethical practice.

J. Grunig and L. Grunig (1996) conceptualized the ethical dimension to comprise three subdimensions: teleology, deontology, and social responsibility. In an empirical study based on the three subdimensions, Huang (1997) found that the ethical dimension could be merged into the symmetrical dimension. She interpreted the result to show that as conceptualized, symmetrical communication is inherently ethical communication. Huang (1997) obtained the result mainly because the symmetrical dimension is conceptually related to teleology, a subdimension of the ethical dimension. Because of the common component, both constructs were merged into one in her study.

This study, however, reconceptualized the ethical dimension to have only two subdimensions, deontology and global responsibility, while taking out teleology. The results of the CFA of the behavior model showed that the ethical dimension exists as a separate one distinguished from the purpose dimensions. Moreover, this study found convincing empirical evidence for the coexistence of asymmetrical ethics as well as symmetrical ethics: Asymmetrical communication can be ethical as is symmetrical communication.

The results of the CFA revealed that ethical communication is strongly correlated with asymmetrical communication, $r = .33^*$, $p = .05$, as well as symmetrical communication, $r = .64^{**}$, $p = .001$. Even if ethical communication correlates with both asymmetrical and symmetrical communication, it is associated more with symmetrical than asymmetrical communication. This finding suggests that symmetrical communication is inherently *more* ethical than asymmetrical communication.

At the same time, the results of assessment of construct validity and Cronbach's alpha coefficient indicated a problem with the measurement framework for ethical communication. As for construct validity, the ethical construct extracted only 25% of the total variance in the indicators, a half of the minimum cutoff point (50%) for acceptable construct validity. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient was only .53, far below the .80, which is often cited as the standard for acceptable internal consistency reliability.

The poor performance of the construct may indicate that the indicators used were problematic. However, it seems to more suggest that the two subdimensions, deontology and global (or social) responsibility, should be measured separately as two separate continua. Theoretically, deontological communication ethics such as telling the truth and not committing bribery do not necessarily go hand in hand with global (social) responsibility ethics such as "commitment to the well-being of people beyond national border" or "extended responsibility to society at large."

International Relations (Foreign Policy Analysis)

This study has implications for expanding the scope of international relations scholarship to include public diplomacy behavior and management. From the perspective of international relations, the study initiated theory building for comparative public diplomacy. It conceptualized and empirically tested the linkages between the four contextual variables—culture, political system, interest group system, and interstate dependence—and public diplomacy behavior and management.

This study also defined public diplomacy as part of general foreign policy behavior and management. Thus, its findings offer implications for research programs in international relations and foreign policy analysis.

This study did not conduct multivariate analyses to explore the relative potency among the contextual variables on public diplomacy. Simple and partial correlation analysis was used to separately investigate empirical associations of each contextual variable with public diplomacy. The results of this correlation analysis can be viewed as those of exploratory analysis that guide the direction of an integrated theory building and testing for future research. In this respect, the results are a starting point from which future research can study complex relations between and among the contextual variables and public diplomacy, such as causal webs.

Relative Potency on Foreign Policy Behavior and Management

Foreign policy behavior. In foreign policy analysis, a line of inquiry has addressed the relative effects of causes of foreign policy behavior. The causes can be, for simplicity, classified into two categories: internal or domestic causes and external or systemic causes. A simple rule of thumb to distinguish between these categories is that internal causes are defined and measured on their own right—without reference to other countries—while external or systemic causes must be referred to other countries. Among the four contextual variables in this study, societal culture, the political system, and the interest group system belong to the domestic category while interstate dependence falls into the external category.

Advancing the argument for relative potency of systemic causes over domestic ones, East and Gregg (1967) found that the domestic factors were not as important as the systemic ones in explaining international conflict behavior. Rummel (1968) consistently obtained the same results concerning conflict behavior. He proposed, in his field theory

of international politics, that domestic causes do not themselves affect foreign policy behavior, but rather that they do so only in relative terms.

On the opposite is the domestic potency argument. The democratic peace proposition, which supports the argument, posits that democracy matters when there is likely or actual involvement in international conflict. This argument subsumes the new research program on consequences of societal culture on foreign policy behavior (Hudson, 1997).

The findings of this study seem to support the domestic potency argument. Only the political system (democracy) had a statistically significant association with one of the constructs of public diplomacy behavior, asymmetrical communication. None of the domestic variables— Hofstede's (2001) cultural dimensions including uncertainty avoidance and interest group system— showed significant associations with any of the behavior constructs.

The external variable, dependence, also had no significant associations with public diplomacy behavior. Instead, dependence seems to be indirectly associated with the behavior. Dependence had significant associations with the outsourcing practices of public diplomacy, and in turn, the practices were shown to affect embassies' public diplomacy behavior— two-way, mediated, and interpersonal communication.

Foreign policy management. Unlike foreign policy behavior, foreign policy management seldom has been studied from the perspective of the relative potency between the domestic and external factors. This study, however, investigated not only the associations of the three domestic contextual variables with public diplomacy management but also those of dependence with management. An interesting finding was

that dependence also has significant associations with management, specifically, the involvement and integration outside constructs. This study also found that the domestic variables had significant associations with management.

A different, meaningful relative potency question can be asked concerning variables in the domestic category. The question is whether societal culture has greater associations with public diplomacy management than do the political system and interest group system. A popular consensus is that societal culture is an overarching factor that overshadows other domestic factors (Lane & Ersson, 2002, Hofstede, 2001, 1984; Hudson, 1997).

The results of this study seem to provide a preliminary answer to this question. The political system has significant associations with involvement, integration inside, and diversity constructs while the interest group system showed no significant associations. On the other hand, power distance and individualism/collectivism alike have significant associations only with the diversity construct while masculinity/femininity has no significant associations. Uncertainty avoidance, however, had significant associations with the involvement, support, and knowledge constructs.

The relative potency can be judged from the associations of the domestic variables with overall excellence in public diplomacy, and the findings suggest that societal culture has a greater effect than the political system and interest group system. Only uncertainty avoidance, a cultural dimension, had a significant association with overall excellence.

Moreover, comparison of the overall excellence seems to indicate that domestic variables—uncertainty avoidance—is more potent than external variables—

dependence— on foreign policy management. Dependence did not have a significant association with overall excellence.

Cultural Consequences on Foreign Policy Management

In international relations, only a few works (e.g., Sampson III, 1987; Zurovchak, 1997) have begun to look at the effects or associations of societal culture on and with foreign policy management. Sampson III (1987) and Zurovchak (1997) studied cultural consequences on organizational processes and structure inside a foreign ministry. Through a comparative study of Japanese and French foreign ministries, Sampson III concluded that there are societal cultural consequences on foreign policy management or decision-making process, just as there are on the management of corporations.

Applying Hofstede's (2001) cultural dimensions, Zurovchak (1997) found the same consequences by comparing the Czech Republic and Slovak's foreign ministries. Specifically, he found consequences from of two of the four dimensions—individualism/collectivism and power distance— and concluded that “even a small difference in culture is influential enough to make a big difference in the foreign policy decision-making process” (p. 126).

My study contributed to the body of knowledge on cultural consequences on foreign policy management by investigating not just two countries but 52 countries. Among other things, it found the salience of uncertainty avoidance in public diplomacy management. The finding makes a strong theoretical sense in that public diplomacy plays the role of boundary spanner in managing foreign affairs. Hence, this study invites further investigation of the consequences of uncertainty avoidance on foreign policy management.

Consequences of Democracy on Foreign Policy Behavior and Management

In international relations, democratic peace research has inquired into the consequences of democracy on foreign policy behavior, particularly on international conflict behavior. Initiated by Rummel (1983), the research tradition has established as “a matter of fact” the proposition that democracies do not go to war against each other. In other words, democracies have a low level of aggressiveness or propensity for confrontation toward each other.

This study expanded the scope of the study of democratic consequences on foreign affairs by looking at their effect on international communication behavior and management. The results showed that democracy has a significant association with asymmetrical communication behavior such that liberal democracies practiced the least asymmetrical communication toward a fellow democracy—the United States—compared to electoral democracies and non-democracies.

One interesting finding is that liberal democracies display the least symmetrical and ethical communication toward the United States, compared to electoral and non-democracies. The finding was statistically insignificant, however. In the order of magnitude of means, electoral democracies and non-democracies practiced the most ethical and symmetrical communication, respectively, toward the United States.

In addition, this study suggests that electoral democracies have the most excellent public diplomacy and liberal democracies the least in both practice and management. Electoral democracies have the highest means on seven constructs including overall excellence, ethical communication, involvement, integration inside and outside, knowledge, and symmetrical internal communication. On the other hand, liberal

democracies have the highest means only on two constructs—asymmetrical communication and diversity. The means of liberal democracies are significantly higher than those of non-democracies, but are insignificantly higher than those of electoral democracies.

Thus, this finding stimulates further theoretical reasoning on why liberal, electoral, and non-democracies behave as they do in public diplomacy.

Limitations

Omission of Systemic Factors

This study is limited in its theory building for comparative public diplomacy because it did not theorize and test the linkages between systemic variables and public diplomacy. Scholars in international relations have delved not only into domestic and relational factors but also into systemic factors such as power status, polarity, and balance of power (East, Salmore, & Hermann, 1978; Galtung, 1964, 1966; Wilkenfeld, Hopple, Rossa, & Andriole, 1980).

Especially, the omission of power status left a gap in the coverage of this study. Power status in the international system has proven to be promising in explaining foreign policy behavior. In Galtung's (1964) simplistic but insightful scheme, there are three distinct country clusters, depending on a country's power status: top-dogs, middle-dogs, and under-dogs.

The power position frames a country's general foreign policy orientation. Top-dogs or great powers and middle-dogs or middle powers by default pursue unilateralism and multilateralism, respectively (Bull, 1977; Franck, 1985). Galtung (1966) related multilateralism to the structural middle position in the international system and

envisioned middle powers as “criss-cross” countries that bridge between two completely disparate groups of countries in the system: top powers and minor powers

Unilateralism and multilateralism have substantial implications for a symmetric and an asymmetric dimension of foreign policy behavior. They affect an ethical dimension of foreign policy behavior as well. Unilateralism logically negates and disrespects any common ethics binding all governments in the world and pursues the freedom of power. On the other hand, multilateralism abides by ethics and rule-bound forms of cooperation, and values partnership, consultation, and consensus building (Bertele & Mey, 1998; Patrick, 2003; Ruggie, 1993; Wight, 1978). Based on the middle power-multilateralism thesis, Pratt (1989) advanced a middle power humane internationalism.

Recently, power status has received serious attention from public diplomacy scholars because of its promising theoretical relevance. Baxter and Bishop (1998) and Leonardo and Alakeson (2000) argued for a linkage between excellent public diplomacy and the middle power position.

Bivariate Analysis

This study used bivariate analyses such as simple and partial correlation analysis, one-way ANOVA, and *t*-tests to test proposed hypotheses and answer research questions on comparative public diplomacy for two reasons.

First, although hypotheses were put forward for test, this study was more of an exploratory one, which attempted to initiate a program of research for comparative public diplomacy. As the first step toward advanced theory building and testing, this study

proposed bivariate hypotheses and research questions between each of the contextual variables and the constructs of public diplomacy in order to orient future research.

This study, however, still acknowledges the inherent limitation of bivariate analyses in that the techniques cannot completely capture complex relations between and among the contextual variables and public diplomacy. Only a simultaneous, integrated, and multivariate investigation can approximate the actual size and direction of association or effect of each contextual variable concerning public diplomacy.

Validity of Findings

The validity of results of this study also is limited. First, the assessment of the constructs of public diplomacy showed that of the 13 constructs, five constructs performed poorly on construct validity, extracting 40% or less of the total variances: ethical communication (25%), symmetrical internal communication (37%), asymmetry (38%), mediated (40%), and symmetry (41%).

Second, construct validity in this study may have been hampered by the bias of social desirability. The results of the pretest strongly suggested a high likelihood of social desirability, and some priori actions to address the bias were taken in the question statements and item wordings of the final instrument. It should be noted, however, that whether and how much social desirability biased the measurements is unknown.

In order to obtain a high participation rate, this study did not use a set of items to detect social desirability. In the pretest, diplomats expressed a strong concern about the length of time (20 ~ 30 minutes) spent on the pretest questionnaire and recommended not making the time longer. Thus, the inability to detect social desirability is a trade-off for participation rate.

Third, the contextual variable of interstate dependence was narrowly operationalized based on an economic dimension because of the availability of data and the need for maximum comparability across countries. Other important dimensions of dependence were not included in the measure, such as security and strategic dependence.

Moreover, the economic dimension consisted of only two components, exports and tourism, for the same reasons. Thus, other important components were omitted from the measure, such as foreign aid and investment. The decision to omit these variables was theoretical. The public diplomacy literature (Kunczik, 1997; Lobsenz, 1984) suggested that the two components, exports and tourism, are most salient for a government to prioritize its public diplomacy effort.

Notwithstanding, the dependence measure is still incomplete because it did not take into account all the dimensions of interstate dependence.

Generizability of Findings

In this study, 113 governments participated out of 192 independent governments in the world and out of 169 governments with embassies in Washington, D.C. This study intended to deal with a population of governments, but that population is small and finite. Overall, this situation may guarantee high generizability of the findings onto the population.

The findings, however, still have different levels of generizability because they came from four different case bases. First, the results from analyses of the measurement models of public diplomacy and from test of hypotheses on political system were based on the largest case base comprising all 113 participating governments. The second biggest case base, for testing the dependence hypotheses, consisted of 109 governments

out of the 113 participating governments. Thus, these results may have a high level of generizability because of the sheer size of case bases even if the bases did not result from random probability sampling.

The findings for societal culture and the interest group system, however, may have a relatively low level of generizability because they resulted from medium to small case bases. The hypotheses on societal culture were tested on a medium case base consisting of 52 countries with measurements on Hofstede's (2001) four dimensions. These 52 countries are from all over the world. There is, however, no guarantee that they represent the population of countries.

Lastly, the findings for the interest group system may have the least generizability. The case base was the smallest comprising only 23 countries with measurements on Lijphart's (1999) pluralism/corporatism index. An interest group system is found only in democratic or, at least democratizing and industrial or at least industrializing countries. Thus, findings on the interest group system can be generalized only to a subgroup of countries in the population. The case base for the interest group system, however, has the characteristics of a convenience sample, which limits the generizability of the findings to the subgroup of countries with an interest group system.

Future Research

First, I plan to conduct a qualitative study with embassies that ranked in the top 10 % on the overall excellence measure in this study for in-depth exploratory inquiry into their public diplomacy practices and management. Second, I plan to carry out a study to replicate the findings of this study with 191 Permanent Missions to the United Nations in

New York by investigating their practices of press relations and management of public diplomacy.

Later, I will embark on a series of studies with embassies throughout the world capitals in collaboration with local scholars to further replicate the findings of this study as well as to advance theory building for comparative public diplomacy. These future studies will also put to test the methodological assumption of this study: Embassies are matching samples and surrogate governments. The name for this research agenda is *a comparative public diplomacy project*.

My second research agenda is a logical extension of this study that stopped at proposing ways for conducting excellent public diplomacy. This study put forward a set of principles that helps governments strive for excellence in managing and practicing public diplomacy. However, it did not attempt to show if the Excellence principles really make a government or an embassy's public diplomacy excellent as the prefix "excellent" promises.

In short, the second agenda involves seeking empirical evidence for the effects of excellence in public diplomacy based on the findings of this study as a stepping stone. Relationship studies in public relations research will guide the second research agenda. The studies suggest that excellence in public diplomacy has direct effects upon relationship quality between governments and their foreign publics.

According to J. Grunig and Hung (2002), relationships with publics provide the best indicator for the effects of excellence in public relations better than reputation or image. The concept of relationship is associated with publics possessing first hand experience with the organization or foreign government. In contrast, the concepts of

image and reputation are less specific and related to masses with only second-hand experience. Thus, the focus of the research agenda will be on relationships of governments with specific and strategic foreign publics such as congressmen, journalists, and opinion leaders.

The first project for the second research agenda will be built upon this study, which measured the degree of excellence in public diplomacy across embassies. In order to examine if excellent embassies really have quality relationships with their strategic publics, the project will involve measuring the quality of relationships perceived by U.S. journalists.

APPENDIX A

SOLICITATION LETTER

I am doctoral candidate Seong-Hun Yun in the Department of Communication at the University of Maryland, College Park. To find out the ways that embassies can practice and manage excellent public diplomacy, I am conducting a survey of 169 embassies in Washington, D.C., in consultation with five professors at the University: Dr. James E. Grunig, Dr. Larissa A. Grunig, and Dr. Linda Aldoory from the Department, Dr. Virginia Haufler (Government & Politics), and Dr. Gregory R. Hancock (Statistics).

My research is a joint practice of public diplomacy for two reasons. First, on the preparation stage for the past two weeks, 20 embassies have provided consultation for me to help developing a questionnaire to be used for the actual survey. Second, to share the fruits from your participation, I will payback to you what I have learned from the survey about the ways for excellent public diplomacy by providing a copy of the executive summary of the findings.

Your participation involves completing a 5-page questionnaire, and it would take about 15 minutes. As a token of our appreciation, I have prepared two presents worth more than 300 hours of work: 1) a directory of public diplomacy diplomats representing the 169 embassies, as of July, 2004; and 2) an annotated bibliography for public diplomacy.

Within the next two weeks, I would like to deliver to you 1) a booklet of the questionnaire, 2) the two presents, and 3) an informed consent form containing detailed information on my research, which is independent from governmental funding. The survey is also part of my doctoral dissertation project. Thank you very much for your time.

Sincerely,

Seong-Hun Yun, PhD candidate
Communication Department
University of Maryland, College Park
Phone: 301-405-0872
Email: hun@wam.umd.edu

APPENDIX B

FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE



**Public Diplomacy
(Questionnaire)
2004**



INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Identification of project/Title	A search for excellence in public diplomacy: A macrocomparative study of embassies in Washington, D.C.
Statement of Age of Participant	I state that I am 18 years of age or older and wish to participate in a survey being conducted by Dr. James E. Grunig and doctoral student Seong-Hun Yun at the University of Maryland College Park, Maryland 20742
Purpose	The purpose of the research is to understand how embassies conduct and manage public diplomacy and to search the ways that embassies practice and manage excellent public diplomacy.
Procedures	The procedures involve completing a 5-page questionnaire. I understand my participation will require approximately 15 minutes.
Confidentiality	<p>My responses should be kept confidential, not appearing in any kind of publication resulting from this research, including even the executive summary that will be in circulation among participating embassies. Thus, I am informed that my responses are not open to other embassies and the general public. I understand that Dr. James E. Grunig and Mr. Seong-Hun Yun will be the only people who have access to my responses.</p> 
Risks	I understand that participation in the study involves minimal psychological discomfort and little physical harm.
Benefits	I understand that the survey is not designed to help me personally, but that the researchers wish to find out the ways for excellent public diplomacy, and, thus that the findings of this study, in the long run, can assist me in practicing excellent public diplomacy.
Freedom to Withdraw, & Ability to Ask Questions	I understand that I am free to ask questions and/or to withdraw from participation at any time and/or decline to answer certain questions.
Contact Information of Investigator(s)	Dr. James E. Grunig Department of Communication, 2112 Skinner Building University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-7635 Phone: 1-301-405-6525; E-mail: jgrunig@umd.edu
Contact Information of Institutional Review Board (IRB)	If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report a research-related injury, please contact: Institutional Review Board Office, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742; (E-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu ; (telephone) 301-405-4212
Obtaining a copy of the research results	I understand that I obtain a copy of the results of this research after December 31, 2004 by contacting Seong-Hun Yun at 301-405-0872 or hun@wam.umd.edu

INTRODUCTION

This questionnaire consists of PART I and PART II. PART I asks questions about the practices of press relations, and PART II addresses the management of the public diplomacy function inside embassy. You may feel some questions asking in much detail, but please understand that only close study of communication management enables researchers to find out the ways for excellent public diplomacy. Because our research is confidential, the general public cannot know your responses. Please be assured that 'providing responses' is not 'presenting your embassy and government' to the public. We researchers do not study and present any individual embassy's responses. Rather we lump your responses together with responses from other embassies for statistical analysis in order to identify the management principles for excellent public diplomacy. By providing responses, you only 'participate' in a confidential research project on public diplomacy. Accurate responses are the key to the success of our joint practice of public diplomacy. Thanks for your understanding.

PART I

- 1) Following is a set of statements that describes **the ways your embassy communicates with American journalists**. Using the following scale, **please circle a number that indicates how much each statement applies to the practices of press relations at your embassy**.

1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7
Not At All	Very Little	Little	Some	Much	Very Much	Exactly
1 We distribute news releases, briefings, and position statements.....						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Before a communication program, survey or informal research is done to determine and profile journalists' attitudes toward our government's policies.....						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Press relations should help our government and journalists resolve misunderstanding or disagreement if there is any.....						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. After completing communication programs such as press release, research is done to determine how effective the program has been.....						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5 We make face-to-face contacts with journalists by holding parties and special events.....						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
6. The purpose of press relations is to develop mutual understanding between our government and journalists.....						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
7. We get involved in dialogue with journalists whenever they come to us with an issue---we do not avoid dialogue on any terms.....						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

8. Accurate information is disseminated but unfavorable information is not be volunteered to journalists.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

9. We not only try to make journalists favorable to our government, but also try to inform our government of U.S.' public opinion so that our government can change policies when it is appropriate.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

10. Keeping a clipping file is about the only way there is to determine the success of a communication program.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

11. We prefer face-to-face communication in resolving misunderstanding or disagreement between our government and journalists.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....
Not At All	Very Little	Little	Some	Much	Very Much	Exactly

12. We, public diplomacy diplomats, and our Ambassador meet personally with journalists.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

13. The broad goal of press relations is to make journalists favorable to our government and its policies.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

14. We make personal phone calls to journalists to keep in touch.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

15. We believe that misunderstanding or disagreement between our government and journalists results in a zero-sum game in which one party is the winner, and the other party is the loser.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

16. At budget time, funding depends on the demonstrated effectiveness of the communication program.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

17. We make informal contacts with journalists such as having dinner or playing golf to cultivate personal relationships.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

18. In press relations, we mostly attempts to get favorable publicity into the media and to keep unfavorable publicity out.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

19. We use on-line media such as the Internet and email to communicate with journalists.....

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

20. We are so busy in releasing policy statements and

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

producing news briefings & publications that there is little time to do research.....

21. We disclose our purpose or why we do things to journalists when conducting programs for press relations.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

22. We offer party favors, valuable gifts, memorabilia, trips, or junkets to journalists.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

23. We keep continuing most communication programs mainly because they have been put into place for a long time..

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

24. We use printed media such as newsletters, brochures, flyers, pamphlets or other publications to communicate with journalists.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

25. Disclosure of unfavorable information to journalists depends more on whether it is in the interest of our government than on whether it is true.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

26. We use audio-visual materials such as audio and VHS tapes, CDs, or DVDs to communicate with journalists.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

27. We do whatever we think is best for the relationship with journalists even if journalists sometimes do not reciprocate our commitment.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

The following questions ask about the general foreign policy orientation of your government. We, researchers, ask these questions out of belief that the orientation affects the practices of press relations.

1..... Not At All	2..... Very Little	3..... Little	4..... Some	5..... Much	6..... Very Much	7..... Exactly
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28. We believe that our national interests can be pursued only through taking into consideration the interests of other nations.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

29. Humanitarian, developmental, human rights, and environmental issues, which concern the well-being of people on the globe, is an official pillar of our foreign policy.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

30. We feel greater obligation in abiding by our domestic national rules and laws than in observing internationally agreed rules and laws when the both collide with each other..

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

31. We are concerned about the well-being of people on the globe as much as that of our national citizens.....

PART II

- 2) Following are **some activities with which the public diplomacy function you carry out at your embassy may be involved**. Using the same scale above, **circle a number that indicates how much each statement applies to the situation**. The public diplomacy function at our embassy involves...

1. Formulation of our government's U.S. policies by providing the government with information on U.S. publics' opinions and attitudes.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. Launches of strategic and proactive communication campaigns.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. Conduct of issues management (identification and tracking of major issues in the United States, which concern our government).....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

4. Regular conduct of research activities such as survey to gather information for use in planning or evaluation of communication programs.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

5. Specific research conducted to address specific issues or communication challenges.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

- 3) Using the same scale above, please indicate **the ways that public diplomacy is supported at your embassy and in your government by circling a number that indicates how much each statement applies to the situation**.

1. Public diplomacy is assigned a priority in allocation of resources such as budget and personnel.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. The government allocates resources to research on and training for excellent public diplomacy.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. When there is a budget cut at the embassy or governmental level, it is usually first felt in conduct of public diplomacy.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

4. Public diplomacy is so appreciated that good performance on the function or specialization in the function is an advantage in promotion.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

5. The Ambassador substantially supports and recognizes the importance of public diplomacy.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

- 4) At embassies, **different diplomats may handle the following public diplomacy functions; press relations, congressional affairs, cultural programs, Diaspora relations, or think-tank/ NGOs relations**. Please indicate how much each statement applies to the situation at your embassy.

1. We carry out joint projects, programs, or campaigns.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. We share resources such as budget or personnel.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. We develop and maintain common databases on biographical and contact information on publics.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. We hold regular meetings to coordinate the activities.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. We do joint planning for strategic programs or campaigns....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

- 5) An embassy may carry out public diplomacy not only with other ministries' (trade, tourism, or investment) offices in the United States but also with corporations, business, or trade associations from the home country. Please circle a number that indicates how much each statement applies to your situation.

1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....
Not At All	Very Little	Little	Some	Much	Very Much	Exactly

1. We carry out joint projects, programs, or campaigns.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. We share information of many kinds.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. We hold regular meetings to coordinate separate activities....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. We operate an executive sub-committee to enhance cooperation.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. We do joint planning and financing for strategic programs or campaigns.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

- 6) Following is a series of statements that describes some activities that you or your department may carry out. Using the same scale above, please indicate the extent to which each statement applies to you or your department. I or my department...

1. Conduct little research to evaluate the effectiveness of communication programs or campaigns carried out.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
2. Develop goals and objectives for communication programs or campaigns.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
3. Identify and track issues through monitoring the media and contacting informants.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
4. Develop strategies for solving communication problems.....	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
5. Conduct little research to segment publics in order to tailor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

communication programs or messages for different publics.....

- 7) The next set of statements describes **the ways in which communication takes place inside many organizations**. Using the scale below, please choose a number that indicates how much each statement applies to **communication inside your embassy**. However, if you feel that your embassy is so small that it is less meaningful to talk about communication inside your embassy, then you may answer the questions with respect to communication inside your foreign ministry with a V mark here ().

1. An upward communication channel **formally** exists, through which subordinates express diverse ideas and different opinions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. Subordinates are seldom informed about major changes in policy that affect their job before the changes take place.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. A communication channel **formally** exists, through which subordinates bring out complaints and issues related to job assignment, performance appraisal, and promotion.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

4. In staff meetings, superiors mostly speak, and subordinates mostly listen.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

5. The purpose of communication is to get subordinates to behave in the way superiors want them to behave.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

The following questions ask about how women are treated at your embassy. You may feel it irrelevant to public diplomacy itself. However, please be assured that treatment of women is linked to the management of public diplomacy, given that a growing number of public diplomacy diplomats consists of women.

- 8) The next set of statements describes **the ways that female personnel are dealt with at your embassy**. Using the scale below, please choose a number that indicates how much each statement applies to the situation at your embassy. However, if you feel that your embassy is so small that it is less meaningful to talk about the treatment of female personnel inside your embassy, then you may answer the questions with regard to the condition inside your foreign ministry with a V mark here ().

1.....2.....3.....4.....5.....6.....7.....
Not At All	Very Little	Little	Some	Much	Very Much	Exactly

1. Developed specific guidelines for handling sexual harassment.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

2. Established effective policies to deal with sexual discrimination.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

3. Set up a system of maternity and paternity leave.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
---	---	---	---	---	---	---

4. Fostered women's leadership abilities.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

5. Provided the same opportunities for women as those for men to take risks in performing job.....

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

9) Are you solely involved in public diplomacy? () or are you involved in other matters such as political, consular, or economic affairs but also in charge of the public diplomacy function at your embassy? (). **Please check only one.**

10) How many years of experience do you have with public diplomacy? _____ Years

11) Are you male () or female ()?



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