

ABSTRACT

Title of Document: HUMANITARIAN AID AND RESILIENCE: A STUDY OF RURAL NEPALI EDUCATORS' PERSPECTIVES ON COPING AND ADAPTABILITY IN RECREATING AN EDUCATIONAL LEARNING ENVIRONMENT FOR THEIR STUDENTS AFTER THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES

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The 2005 Hyogo Framework pointed to the need for countries to increase resilience at the local level and reduce the need for international aid. Nepal, considered a “fragile” state per the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), received significant international aid to meet the aims of Education for All and Millennium Development Goals. When the 2015 earthquakes struck, international aid for education only reached 1% of the youth impacted. This research investigated educators’ perspectives of responding to and recovering from the earthquakes through a mixed-method, multisite case study to answer the questions: As reported by the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, what is the relationship between the intensity and type of humanitarian aid received (school kits, recreation kits, temporary learning centers and teacher training) by schools in the 14 worst earthquake-hit districts, and the distance from

Kathmandu and school population? What are the perspectives of community educators on the level and type of humanitarian aid received after the 2015 earthquakes? What coping capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes? What adaptive capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes? My research found that educators possessed individual resourcefulness, initiative, and personal strength in addition to community trust to respond to the disaster. Educators lacked access to consistent disaster risk and preparedness information. Lastly, rural educators with connections obtained international aid raising perceptions of inequitable distribution of aid.

Keywords: resilience, adaptive capacity, coping capacity, education in emergencies, disaster, earthquake, teachers, Nepal, humanitarian aid, development aid

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STUDENTS AFTER THE 2015 EARTHQUAKES

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Dedication

To Badhri Sir

To the educators of Nepal who literally picked up the pieces of their schools
and slowly put them back together.

Acknowledgements

The manifestation of this dissertation has been a long process that has involved not only the growth of knowledge, but personal growth as well. I would equate it to the journey along a river, maybe because of the dissertation process graphic presented to me by Professor Tirza Wilbon White. Many people have assisted in this journey in large and small ways. There are two people I need to mention who are no longer with us on Earth, but I have felt their influence throughout this journey. The first is Dr. Laura Povinelli, a grade school friend, and the second is Dr. Leslie Eliason, one of my professors at the Monterey Institute. When I took up long distance running to reduce stress and stay in shape, I felt Laura's spirit running with me. Dr. Eliason was key in pushing me to finish my Master's thesis. I know she was spiritually pushing me to finish my dissertation.

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foundations to pursue this research, and with their faith and confidence in me, I set off on my journey to conduct this research.

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List of Acronyms

ANDRI	Australian Natural Disaster Resilience Index
BBB	Build Back Better
CAFS	Conflict Affected and Fragile States
CCL	Child Centered Learning
CEEPAARD	Community Environment Education and Public Awareness Association for Rural Development
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CRED	Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
CSE	Conflict Sensitive Education
DAP	Disaster Accountability Project
DEO	District Education Office
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EDC	Early Childhood Development
EEPCT	Education in Emergencies Post Crisis Transition Program
EFA	Education for All
EiE	Education in Emergencies
EMIS	Education Management Information Systems
ERA	Education Resilience Approaches
ETC	Educate the Children
FCA	Finn Church Aid (Finnish)
FSP	Fragile State Principles
FTS	Financial Tracking System
IRB	Institutional Review Board
GADRRRES	Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction & Resilience in the Education Sector
GHD	Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship
GMR	Global Monitoring Report

GON	Government of Nepal
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
HDI	Human Development Index
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IIEP	International Institute for Education Policy
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
JYC	Junior Youth Club
LIC	Low Income Country
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NESP	National Education Sector Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPE	National Plan of Education
NPR	Nepalese Rupee
NRA	National Reconstruction Authority
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD - DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
OSOCC	On-Site Operations Coordination Center
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment
QUAL	Qualitative
QUAN	Quantitative
ROTA	Reach Out to Asia

SABER	Systems Assessment and Benchmarking for Education Results
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SMC	School Management Committee
SOS CV	SOS Children's Villages
TLC	Temporary Learning Center
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIASC	United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VDC	Village Development Committee
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program
3W	Who, What, Where

Chapter I - Introduction

The international community affirmed children's human right to education as well as education's importance in acute and protracted humanitarian crises in the newly established 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDG) and the Education for All (EFA) Incheon Declaration. Education has been declared one of the means for developing countries to extricate themselves from poverty, and for increased stability, economic development and peace. Research has shown that disruption from conflict, natural disasters, epidemics and displacement can last up to seventeen years, the entire educational career of children (UNICEF, 2016). It is essential that education is not disrupted. However the education sector globally remains significantly underfunded receiving only 36% of requested aid, compared to 60% for all other sectors (UNESCO, 2015c). The Hyogo Framework (2005) and the Busan Partnership (2011) agreement promoted strengthening local community resilience to reduce the destruction caused by disasters and reduce the dependence on international aid (Busan, 2011; Hyogo, 2005).

Nepal is listed by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a "state of fragility." The OECD characterizes states of fragility as more highly predisposed to instability due to violent conflicts, and human-made and natural disasters. By 2015 Nepal made great strides towards achieving the World Education Forum's Education for All (EFA) Dakar Framework and the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). But in April and May of 2015, Nepal was struck by two significant earthquakes and thousands of aftershocks destroying 7,000 schools and impacting an estimated one million children (United Nations, 2015). The devastating earthquakes were followed by landslides and flooding, intensified by the earthquakes,

during the June to September monsoons. Response and recovery efforts were further compromised by political tensions between India and Nepal and violent protests resulting in the border between the two countries being closed for six months blocking the flow of critical goods needed for recovery.

Although the government reported that “schools” had reopened May 17th, a month after the April 25th earthquake, over one year later schools were just starting to be rebuilt. During this time students either did not have access to education or they had been studying in temporary learning centers (TLC). Given the limits of international financial support for education during humanitarian crises and the emphasis on local resilience, it is important to analyze educators’ efforts to reestablish schools in their communities. Consequently, the events in Nepal provide the opportunity for a valuable mixed method study that captures local educators’ perspectives on the humanitarian aid provided, and on their own resilience to reopen their schools.

Statement of Problem

The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) conducted by Nepal estimated the cost to rebuild the country at US\$7 billion (Nepal, 2015a). The international community responded with donations of up to US\$4.1 billion through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). Of the more than US\$24 million requested by UNOCHA for humanitarian aid for education, donors met 47% of the request. A month after the second earthquake, four international response organizations asked 1,838 youth in 14 of the hardest hit districts what they considered were the priorities for humanitarian response. The children listed education in their top three priorities (Withers & Dahal, 2015). However, the international aid provided reached only

an estimated 13,700 children, a little over 1% of the one million children affected by the quakes. Of the aid that was provided to targeted recipients, it was reported that only 56% of children benefited from emergency school kits, 64% had access to Temporary Learning Centers and 15,644 teachers out of 19,000 received training (UNOCHA, 2016). Given the large discrepancy between the needs stated in the PDNA and the aid received, questions emerge as to the scope of the distribution and level of aid provided. In the cases where gaps in aid existed, what were the resilience capabilities educators demonstrated to reopen their schools?

Purpose of Study & Research Questions

In an effort to contribute to increased understanding of school community resilience in light of the scope and intensity of humanitarian aid distribution in the aftermath of a natural disaster, I conducted an exploratory mixed methods study of the humanitarian response during the three years following the April and May 2015 earthquakes in Nepal to answer the following research questions:

Quantitative: *As reported by the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, what is the relationship between the intensity (level) and type of humanitarian aid received (school kits, recreation kits, temporary learning centers and teacher training) by schools in the 14 worst earthquake-hit districts, and the distance from Kathmandu and school population?*

Qualitative: *What are the perspectives of community educators on the level and type of humanitarian aid received after the 2015 earthquakes?*

What coping capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes?

What adaptive capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes?

Conceptual Framework

There are three conceptual frameworks I used to guide my research. The first framework is the international principles that guide the provision of international humanitarian and development aid. As discussed in Chapter II, these principles attempt to provide guidance to international donor organizations when engaging in countries considered fragile. There is a recognized gap between when humanitarian actors respond to a disaster and when the development community resumes its ongoing work. The principles guiding humanitarian aid conflict with principles guiding development aid in their respective efforts to guide international donor organizations. These principles consist of the OECD's Fragile State Principles in Development, the Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship and the INEE Minimum Standards. When the 2015 earthquakes struck, the government of Nepal had yet to approve a new constitution following its civil war, which ended in 2006. Although nine years had passed between the signing of a peace deal and the devastation of the earthquakes, conflict and instability had persisted and Nepal continued to be designated a fragile state. Therefore, international humanitarian and development engagement should have been guided by the Fragile State Principles (FSP), the Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) and Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies' (INEE) Conflict Sensitive Education principles.

The second framework is the quality learning environment that international organizations have defined as promoting student learning. There is an exhaustive amount of research on quality learning environments within developed and developing country


contexts. However, quality learning environments in disaster situations are widely recognized by the humanitarian and disaster response community as defined by the INEE Minimum Standards (INEE, 2010). The INEE Minimum Standards defines five domains for preparedness, response, and recovery. I selected three domains of the INEE Minimum Standards to analyze: Access and Learning Environment, Teaching and Learning, and Teachers and Other Education Personnel. Within these domains are subdomains that include: equal access, protection and well-being; teacher training, professional development and support; recruitment and selection, conditions of work, and support and supervisor (INEE, 2010). These domains reflect the types of support that were provided and documented by the United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) Education Cluster 3W report: temporary learning centers with WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) facilities; school kits; recreation kits; and teacher training. As described in Chapter II, the provision of a “quality learning environment” is important to encourage students to return to the classroom.

The last framework is centered on resilience and specifically on the capabilities of educators and school management members to cope and adapt to the impacts of a disaster. As discussed in Chapter III, the concept of resilience has evolved from being focused predominantly on the individual to encompass communities as they may be defined, such as village, school, or ethnic group (Parsons et al., 2016). The World Bank’s Education Resilience Approaches (ERA) is careful to describe its framework’s focus not on the “resilient student” but on the “resilient process,” yet the theory underlying the framework and the components are centered on the student (World Bank, 2013). The ERA framework does not delve into the resilience challenges rural school educators in

developing countries face. Rather it focuses ultimately on students and how to identify, prepare and build their resilience to crises. Parsons et al. (2016) argue that they offer the first resiliency framework that focuses on assessing community resilience to natural disasters in the Australian Natural Disaster Resilience Index (ANDRI). Two key elements of the index are the coping and adaptive capacities of the community and its members in response to the disaster.

Coping capacities are defined as “the means by which people or organizations use available resources, skills and opportunities to face adverse consequences” (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 6). Adaptive capacities are the “arrangements and processes that enable adjustment through learning, adaptation and transformation” (Parsons, et al., 2016, p. 6).

Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for the Research



The ANDRI index lays out six themes for coping capacity of the community, which include social character, economic capital, infrastructure and planning, emergency services, community capital and information and engagement. Adaptive capacity encompasses two themes: governance, policy and leadership, and social and community engagement (Parsons et al., 2016).

My research sought to investigate the ANDRI coping and adaptive capacities of the educators and the school management committees, in conjunction with the concepts of the INEE quality learning environment and international aid principles. The research speaks to the World Bank ERA framework by narrowing in on the ERA's first resilience lever, as part of the third resilience component in "how schools provide support and opportunities to students through actions or approaches regarding access, permanence, teaching and learning" (Reyes, 2013, p. 22).

The blend of these conceptual frameworks helped to structure the research by centering it on the resilience of the school educators and School Management Committee members. The ANDRI community resilience framework helped to frame the interview questions that I developed to explore how the INEE Minimum Standards' concept of a quality learning environment in a disaster context is established and supported through international humanitarian aid and the resilience capacities of the school community impacted by the natural disaster.

Organization of the Study, Design Overview & Cultural Notes

The study first presents a discussion of international humanitarian and development aid and the importance of the field of Education in Emergencies (EiE). Chapter III discusses the concept of resilience and how the international aid community

looks toward local community resilience as a means to reduce the impacts of disaster and the need for international aid. Chapter IV provides an overview of Nepal, its government, its strides in meeting the Education for All (EFA) aims and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It then presents a picture of the impacts of the 2015 earthquakes to the education system and the challenges schools faced in obtaining aid.

In order to answer the research questions, I proposed a mixed methods multisite case study design. Chapter V presents the thinking behind the research methodology and design, the data collection and analysis conducted, and discussion on validity, reflexivity, limitations and ethics. Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX present the in-depth qualitative analysis of each of the four case studies following the themes of the conceptual framework and structural coding. Chapter X presents the quantitative and cross-case analysis after conducting initial structural coding and subcoding in response to the research questions. Chapter XI presents my key findings, recommendations, future research, and personal reflections.

There are a few cultural aspects that readers should be aware of. The first is that Western news agencies and international organizations describe Nepal experiencing two earthquakes, the April 25th earthquake, commonly referred to as the Gorkha earthquake, and the May 12th earthquake. However, the informants I interviewed referred to the May 12th earthquake as an aftershock, one among thousands experienced after the Gorkha earthquake. The second aspect is that Nepal follows the Virkam Samvat calendar and not the Gregorian calendar. Therefore, the date of the Gorkha earthquake per the Gregorian calendar is April 25, 2015 and per the Virkam Samvat calendar, Baishakh 12, 2072. The May 12, 2015 earthquake occurred on Baishakh 29, 2072 per the Nepali calendar (See

Appendix A, Figures 12 and 13). Nepal's currency is the Nepalese Rupee and is represented by the symbol NPR.

Personal Interest in this Research

I have combined my international work experience in education administration, finance, and budgeting, my graduate studies on education and conflict, and my volunteer and paid work with the American Red Cross into my PhD studies to focus on the critical need to maintain the education of future generations during humanitarian crises in states of fragility.

My specific interest in Nepal stems from the natural disasters the country experienced in 2015, and that I would be able to conduct my research within three years of the events. To prepare for the research, I spent seven weeks in the country volunteering at a government supported school with fewer than eighty students from October to December 2016 and visited three other school sites in the district to assess their rebuilding. I built the scope and focus of my research on this experience. Since conducting my research, I am now serving as Secretary of the Board for Altruistic Odyssey, a U.S. – Nepal – French non-profit focused on providing teacher training for and access to Information Communication Technology in rural areas of Nepal.

Chapter II – Humanitarian and Development Aid for EiE

With Graça Maçhel's 1996 groundbreaking report on the plight of children during conflict, "Impact of Armed Conflict on Children," the international community has come increasingly to recognize the importance of education for children during humanitarian crises. At the end of 2014, an estimated 230 million children were impacted by armed conflict and an estimated 66 million children were impacted by natural disasters (UNICEF, 2014; UNICEF, 2015). Children whose education is interrupted by natural or human-made disasters and conflicts are denied the human right to education and the access to knowledge and skills they need in order to become productive, active members of their community, their country and the world.

Since the first world conference on Education for All (EFA) in 1990, educators from around the world recognized the need to make access to education a priority for every child and reiterated it in the 2000 Dakar Framework (UNESCO, 2000). The greater international community also demonstrated its realization of the importance of education in regards to economic development, peace and stability by including access to education in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and subsequently the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Goal number four of the SDGs identifies education as one of the key components to achieving the three main objectives of ending poverty, combating climate change and fighting injustice and inequality by 2030¹. The Global Partnership for

¹ The Global Goals for Sustainable Development: www.globalgoals.org

Education (GPE) takes the vision further by demonstrating how education is fundamental to reaching all seventeen of the SDGs².

UNESCO's tracking of EFA and MDGs to 2015 showed that 50% of out-of-school children were located in "states of fragility."³ Fragile states, as described by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), have weak government infrastructure and are more vulnerable to human-made and natural disasters (OECD, 2011b).

Research also revealed that the average length of conflicts was 12 years, and that natural disasters can disrupt countries for up to 8 years during which an entire generation's education may be interrupted (UNESCO, 2011; Wedge, 2008). As a result, the international community acknowledged that specific action needed to be taken, to ensure that countries faced with disasters, disease and/or conflict receive the support they need to ensure their children have access to quality education. The Dakar Framework 2000 promised international support to any country in need to achieve the EFA aims by 2015 (UNESCO, 2000). However, time and time again, the technical assistance and financial support for education in fragile states during times of crises have fallen far short of what was needed (UNESCO, 2015c).

In May 2015, the importance of providing education during humanitarian crises and to fragile states was underscored in the Incheon Declaration "Education 2030" stating that:

² Global Partnership for Education. Infographic-17 ways education influences the SDGs: <https://www.globalpartnership.org/news/infographic/17-ways-education-influences-sustainable-development-goals>

³ United Nations SDGs Education: <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/education/>

Many of the largest education gaps are found in conflict and emergency situations. It is, therefore, critical to develop education systems that are more resilient and responsive in the face of conflict, social unrest and natural hazards – and to ensure that education is maintained during emergency, conflict and post-conflict situations. Better education is also central to preventing and mitigating conflicts and crises and to promoting peace (UNESCO, 2015a).

The commitment outlined above was reinforced with the May 2016 creation of the Education Cannot Wait global fund to specifically support “education in emergencies.” Although the international community recognized the need to provide access to education in times of humanitarian crises and backed it up with the creation of a global fund, the delivery of financial and technical support is fraught with challenges. Questions exist as to the impact the funding actually has on the beneficiaries on the ground. The new global fund may help to gain more international financial support and address some of the international coordination issues, but further research needs to be conducted to assess how funds are tracked and used for education during emergencies and what it means for education systems to be more resilient.

This chapter will provide a definition of “education in emergencies (EiE),” and a brief history of the development of the field within the context of the EFA movement. It will go on to describe the importance of EiE and the debate regarding humanitarian response versus development support. It will discuss the specific needs of “states of fragility” and the importance of education in that context. It will then describe the challenges of bridging the humanitarian-development divide, the gap in funding for EiE

and the need for greater understanding of the humanitarian aid architecture. Chapter II will discuss the concept of resilience and how it is applied to educational systems.

International Recognition of Education in Emergencies

Parents have always sought ways to provide education for their children during times of crisis (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). However, only during the past few decades has the focus of education in emergencies and in fragile states gained international recognition and global community support. This section will describe what “education in emergencies (EiE)” means and how the field of education in fragile states has evolved.

What is Education in Emergencies?

Various international humanitarian organizations and the Sphere Project⁴ have put forth different definitions of what constitutes “emergency” and “education in emergencies.” This paper will use the definition by the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), which defines education in emergencies as “quality learning opportunities for all ages in situations of crisis, including early childhood development, primary, secondary, non-formal, technical, vocational, higher and adult education. Education in emergencies provides physical, psychosocial and cognitive protection that can sustain and save lives” (INEE, 2010, p. 117).

INEE defines emergency as “a situation where a community has been disrupted and has yet to return to stability” (INEE, 2010, p. 117).

⁴ The Sphere Project is a voluntary community of humanitarian actors, established in 1997 with the aim to improve the quality of humanitarian assistance. The project developed the Sphere Handbook: *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response*.

Education for All, Including Children Impacted by Crises

Education for All (EFA) was initially launched at the World Conference on Education for All held in Jomtein, Thailand in 1990 by UNESCO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and the World Bank. The participants from 155 countries “endorsed an ‘expanded vision of learning’ and pledged to universalize primary education and massively reduce illiteracy by the end of the decade” (UNESCO, 2000). Although the country representatives recognized that education is a fundamental human right of all children and pledged to provide basic learning needs, it was unclear how best to accomplish this goal.

In 2000, the country representatives met again in Dakar, Senegal. Many of the countries had not yet addressed the goal set in 1990. Although some efforts had been made, statistics showed that:

[more than] 113 million children have no access to primary education, 880 million adults are illiterate, gender discrimination continues to permeate education systems, and the quality of learning and the acquisition of human values and skills fall far short of the aspirations and needs of individuals and societies (UNESCO, 2000, p. 8).

The representatives reaffirmed their acknowledgement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Conventions on the Rights of the Child (CRC):

that all children, young people and adults have the human right to benefit from an education that will meet their basic learning needs in the best and fullest sense of the term, an education that includes learning to know, to do, to live together and

to be...so that they can improve their lives and transform their societies
(UNESCO, 2000, p. 8).

Participants in the forum established the Education for All (EFA) Dakar Framework that outlined six measurable goals countries would strive to achieve by 2015 (Dakar Framework, 2000):

1. Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children.
2. Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities have access to free and compulsory primary education of good quality.
3. Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programs.
4. Achieving 50% improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.
5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005 and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality.
6. Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills.

In order to track international efforts and identify issues to reach the six goals, UNESCO established the EFA Global Monitoring Reports (GMR) (UNESCO, 2015b).

The Dakar Framework was linked to the establishment later in September 2000 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). One hundred eighty-nine representatives from the United Nations member states attended the Millennium Summit, during which they acknowledged the interconnectedness of all countries and the fact that some countries may be in varying stages of development. The representatives stressed that the peace and security of all countries would be impacted by the turmoil of another. The impact of a fragile country in conflict, for example, would have a detrimental impact on its own population with spill-over effects on its neighboring countries (United Nations, 2000).

The resulting Millennium Declaration established a series of policies and priorities aimed to eradicate poverty, improve economic development and increase peace and security. Eight specific goals were outlined and a 2015 deadline set to meet those goals. The MDGs pointed to the Convention on the Rights of the Child established in 1989 reiterating that “each child is born with the right to survival, food and nutrition, health and shelter, an education, and to participation, equality and protection” (UNICEF, 2000, webpage). MDG Goal 2 was to “achieve universal primary education” declaring that all children, girls and boys, would have access to primary schooling as well as equal access to all levels of education (United Nations, 2000). Therefore, the EFA Dakar Framework and the MDGs were linked in establishing education both as a human right as well as the means of achieving the goals of the MDGs (Wedge, 2008).

As 2015 approached, the international education community took stock of its progress toward the Dakar Framework. Although globally great strides were made toward reaching each of the six EFA goals, it was estimated that 58 million children world-wide still did not have access to education and 100 million did not complete primary school, with the highest concentration of out-of-school children from countries that are described as “states of fragility” (OECD, 2015; UNESCO, 2015b).

The 1990 World Declaration on EFA declared that education was a human right for all, but stated that “Only a stable and peaceful environment can create the conditions in which every human being, child and adult alike, may benefit from the goals of this Declaration” (UNESCO, 2000, p. 77). The impact of conflicts and disasters during the 1990s began to generate discussions around access to education for children in crisis. Then Graça Maçhel’s 1996 groundbreaking report *“Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”* exposed the short- and long-term effects of war on children and showed how children’s basic human rights including education were abrogated. It was after and partly as a result of Maçhel’s report that the international community was spurred into action to focus on education in emergencies, including reference points in the EFA Dakar Framework and the MDGs (Aguilar & Retamal, 1998). In the Dakar Framework, the participants pledged to “meet the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability and conduct educational programmes in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict” (UNESCO, 2000, p. 9). In addition a pledge was made by international donors to assist countries in need with funding to achieve the goals (UNESCO, 2000, p. 9).

Out of the Dakar meeting, UN agencies and international NGOs created the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) (UNESCO, 2015b). INEE was established as a global network to bring together “practitioners and policy makers...to ensure all persons the right to quality education and a safe learning environment in emergencies through to recovery” (INEE, 2010, cover). As INEE grew, so did its knowledge base and resources on how to provide quality education and services in crisis situations. In response to the Sphere Project’s creation of best practices in humanitarian response for food, shelter and water, INEE developed the Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies (INEE, 2010). Since 2004 the Minimum Standards have been translated into over 20 languages and used as a guide to respond to emergencies and were officially incorporated into the Sphere’s guidelines in 2008 (Save the Children, 2010). INEE serves as a resource for educators, emergency responders, international organizations and governments around the world and has been instrumental in raising awareness of and support for education in crisis situations.

As progress toward achieving EFA goals by 2015 was tracked and the grassroots knowledge base of INEE built, it became clearer that the greatest number of out-of-school children were found in countries that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) initially defined as “conflict-affected fragile states (CAFS).” The term was changed to “states of fragility” in 2015 (OECD). Statistics identified that over half the world’s 72 million out-of-school children—40 million—lived in states of fragility (Turrent, 2009).

Further research found that the average length of modern-day conflicts is 12 years, and natural disasters can disrupt lives for up to 8 years, which may encompass a

child's entire school career (INEE 2009; Wedge, 2008). As a result, an entire generation of children would lose the educational opportunities necessary to become productive and engaged members of society (Wedge, 2008). In 2010, the United Nations passed a resolution on the right to education in emergencies, which recognized the substantial number of children without access to school in conflict and disaster impacted areas and stated that "this is a serious challenge to the fulfillment of the international education goals, including Millennium Development Goal 2" (United Nations, 2010, p. 2). The 2011 annual EFA Global Monitoring Report, entitled "The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education," focused on the issues surrounding children's access to education in conflict settings, further highlighting the need to support states of fragility in achieving the EFA goals (UNESCO, 2011).

As the 2015 deadline approached for countries to achieve the EFA and MDG goals, focus on education in emergencies intensified in part catalyzed by several major natural disasters, along with conflicts in other parts of the world. The massive earthquake in Haiti, the civil war in Syria, and most recently the devastating earthquakes in Nepal are just a few examples. Scientists warn that natural disasters are increasing as the effects of climate change are intensifying (Leaning & Guha-Sapir, 2013; Rees & Anthony, 2015). Statistics show "there were three times as many natural disasters from 2000 through 2009 as there were from 1980 through 1989" (Leaning & Guha-Sapir, 2013). UNICEF estimates that "100 million children are affected by natural disasters every year" (UNICEF Website, 2015).

Research by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicated that the year 2014 saw an increase in armed conflict of 18% over 2013, with 40 identified armed conflicts, the

greatest number since 1999 (Koffmar, 2015). In addition, 2014 was the deadliest year in terms of the most conflict-related deaths recorded in 20 years (Meander, 2015). Conflicts and climate change have disrupted people's lives across borders with forced migration, as refugees seek safety away from the conflict and environmental changes.

In May 2015, 1,600 participants from 160 countries gathered for the 2015 World Education Forum in Incheon, Republic of Korea, during which they reaffirmed that “education is a public good, a fundamental human right and the basis for realizing other rights” (UNESCO, 2015a, p. 6). The participants agreed on the new expanded vision for EFA outlined in the Incheon Declaration which was informed by the Muscat Agreement that had been developed at the global EFA meeting in 2014. The new vision was then incorporated into the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) as goal number 4, Quality Education, to “Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.”⁵ The international community again stated that education was both a human right as well as the means to achieve the goals of SDG.

In addition, the 2015 Incheon Declaration and SDGs formally recognize the importance of providing education to children in humanitarian crisis. As António Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, states:

We have a collective responsibility to ensure education plans take into account the needs of some of the most vulnerable children and youth in the world—refugees, internally displaced children, stateless children and children whose right to education has been compromised by war and

⁵ United Nations SDGs-Education: <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/education/>

insecurity. These children are the keys to a secure and sustainable future, and their education matters for us all (UNESCO, 2015a, p. 14).

Point 15 of the Incheon Declaration referenced the commitment the international community made in the Dakar Framework to provide financial and technical assistance by encouraging and recommending “improving aid effectiveness through better coordination and harmonization, and prioritizing financing and aid to neglected sub-sectors and low income countries” (UNESCO, 2015a, p. 9). However, it did not go as far as the Dakar Framework to commit the international community to provide funding.

It would seem that no one disagrees about the importance of providing education in emergencies; the Dakar Framework, the MDGs, the Incheon Declaration, and now the SDGs all highlight the importance. However, education continues to receive the least amount of overseas development assistance (ODA) and the least amount of humanitarian aid of any category, as will be discussed later in this paper (Turrent, 2009; UNESCO, 2015c; UNESCO, 2013b). But first, this paper will provide more background regarding the importance of EiE, and the debate surrounding where education falls within humanitarian response and development programs.

The Importance of Education during Crisis

There are currently both development and humanitarian efforts directed toward providing relief in emergencies, and the question arises: Who should provide education in emergencies—the development or the humanitarian agencies? Many feel the delivery of education is better suited to the development arena. However, natural disasters and armed conflicts present special extenuating circumstances that can impact delivery of services by those agencies, so the notion of “should” is not so simple. As will be described, the

length and character of a crisis makes it difficult to place definite boundaries around the two categories of humanitarian aid and development aid. Who provides what may not be of concern to children and parents requesting water, food, shelter and education during a crisis. The parents and children know what they need and recognize not only the short-term, life-saving benefits of providing education during a humanitarian response, but the long-term benefits as well. Short-term benefits to children include psychosocial and health support as well as safety. Long-term benefits include economic growth, poverty reduction, peace and stability as well as building resiliency in the face of potential future disasters and crises (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013, p. 2).

Defining the Phases of Humanitarian Response and Development

The timeline of a crisis is often hard to define. When a crisis occurs, there is an initial, immediate response to save lives and provide basic necessities, typically referred to by UNHCR as an acute stage (Burde et. al., 2015). After the initial response, the community moves on to recovery and then to rebuilding. However, with the life cycles of disasters or conflicts averaging 8-12 years, the initial humanitarian response may last several months to years. In cases in which emergencies last for more than five years and a significant majority of the population is affected, UNHCR describes these as protracted or chronic crises (Burde et. al., 2015). For example, the intensity of conflicts can ebb and flow causing disruptions and then a return to relative normalcy, such as with the intermittent, recurring eruption of hostilities between Palestinians and Israelis or between Afghan government forces and the Taliban. An area already in crisis may be adversely impacted by secondary effects such as a natural disaster, the onset of an epidemic or pandemic, or eruption or renewal of fighting in an armed conflict (GFDRR, 2015).

What happens to education during the first years of a crisis? Waiting to resume education until a crisis is over and the country has moved to the recovery or rebuilding stage may take months or years, too long to go without school. It is acknowledged that “Education Can’t Wait” —that by the time a conflict or crisis is addressed, critical learning years are missed. Studies have shown that children who have been out of school find it difficult to return (Save the Children, 2010). To support themselves and their families, children will turn toward low-skilled labor or other activities. Parents may pressure girls to enter into marriage early to reduce their family’s expenses and obtain a dowry. After being out of school for a period of time, older youths find it hard to return to lower level grades. Therefore, learning opportunities are needed to encourage these students to obtain their education (Save the Children, 2010). Providing continuity and the opportunity for children to remain in school is important for them to achieve their potential and contribute to the development of their country.

Parents and Children Request Education in Humanitarian Crisis

Although international agencies and donors debate the provision of education during natural and human-made disasters, families impacted by the crises repeatedly ask for education for their children (Save the Children, 2010; Wedge, 2008). In 2012 Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon established his Global Education First Initiative. In a statement introducing the initiative, the Secretary-General declared: “In almost all my visits to areas ravaged by war and disaster, the plea of survivors is the same: education first.” He goes on to say, “We cannot afford to waste the talents of a generation. We must provide safe learning environments, textbooks, support for parents, transportation to school and training for teachers” (UNESCO, 2012, para. 3). The

initiative establishes three goals: putting every child in school; improving the quality of learning; and fostering global citizenship (Education First, 2012). Since 2012, further studies have been conducted to assess the importance that parents and children place on education during a humanitarian crisis. Research of voucher programs in which spending patterns were tracked showed that when school fees became due, spending on food dropped (Nicolai & Hine, 2015). Other surveys conducted during crises have parents and children ranking education in the top three to five of their priorities along with food, health, water and sanitation (Nicolai & Hine, 2015). In the United Nations My World 2015 Survey, a global survey in which over 7 million people from over 194 countries participated, education was selected as the top development priority, higher than any other area (United Nations, 2014).

Short-Term Benefits of Education During Humanitarian Response

Education can be part of a life-saving humanitarian response during a crisis. Children who have access to education during emergencies can receive life-saving information such as how to avoid landmines, and protect themselves and their families from diseases and contaminated water (Nhan-O'Reilly & Mason, 2015; Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). Even just providing educational spaces for children can prevent children from being trafficked, kidnapped, or forced into child labor. A safe space can also protect children from sexual or gender-based violence and help prevent early marriage (Turrent, 2009; UNESCO, 2011; UNESCO, 2013a; Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). Maintaining safe school facilities is not without its challenges. International laws and efforts protect schools from being attacked during conflict, but as UNESCO's 2007 report "Education Under Attack" points out, the international community is limited in its ability to enforce

these laws during a crisis. Natural disasters are indiscriminate in their destruction. International organizations have worked to establish standards for building construction to withstand earthquakes and other events, yet school buildings are also viewed as safe spaces to provide shelter and protection for the community, hindering the ability to continue schooling (GPE, 2012, Hyogo, 2005; INEE, 2010).

The resumption of education during a crisis provides psychosocial support to children and families. The re-establishment of the routine of attending school on a daily basis helps to provide a sense of normalcy, a stable environment during a time of chaos, and a sense of hope for the future (Nhan-O'Reilly & Mason, 2015; Wedge, 2008). Research on the effects of trauma and conflict on children indicates that access to education and the care and attention received from adults helps instill a feeling of identity and self-worth. In turn, this helps give children optimism and purpose, which enhances their ability to deal with the crisis and develop resiliency (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013).

For a fragile government, the ability to restore educational services as soon as possible can help increase its legitimacy to its people. "Education's ability to touch every community makes it a power symbol of government's responsiveness" (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013, p. 11). With the considerable number of people employed in the education sector, the ability to restore this very visible public service can provide a stabilizing effect on a country (OECD 2011b; Winthrop & Matsui, 2013).

Long-Term Benefits of Education in Emergencies

The disruption of education prevents children from attaining their educational potential and severely limits the economic development of a country. Research on how the disruption of education impacts long-term human and social capital development is

forthcoming, as it requires a greater investment of time to study (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). However, economic studies have documented that increased levels of education reduce poverty and improve health indicators such as infant and child mortality. “Each additional year of schooling increases an individual’s potential income by as much as 10% and economists estimate that each additional year of schooling increases annual gross domestic product (GDP) by 1%” (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013, p. 6). The earning potential for girls is even higher, increasing to as high as 15% (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013, p. 6). Therefore low-income, fragile countries have an even greater impetus to ensure their children have access to education that is not disrupted by emergencies. The connection between more and better education and improved general health is well established (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). A study published in 2010 estimates that girls’ education has been one of the main factors in decreasing child mortality between 1990 and 2009 (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). Another study demonstrated that improved literacy rates for mothers increased their ability to read and follow medical instructions (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013).

A government’s provision of education can be a means to build peace and contribute to state building (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). As mentioned previously, the ability of a government to reestablish its educational system quickly after an emergency can help to enhance its legitimacy with its citizens. It should be kept in mind that the reverse is true as well. “Corruption, limited transparency and uncoordinated or unaccountable delivery of education can reduce trust in the government, undermine attempts at state building and increase fragility” (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013, p. 11). Studies have also shown that increased levels of education and expanding educational

opportunities help to build peace. Two conflict researchers, Gudrun Ostby and Henrik Urdal, found that higher average levels of education, particularly primary and secondary education, lead to a reduced risk of armed conflict (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013).

Lastly, education helps a country's citizens to develop resiliency to handle future crises, by teaching students skills to identify risks and prepare for disasters (Reyes, 2013, Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). Research on the effects of education on mortality, conducted for the Education Commission Secretariat of the International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity (also known as the Education Commission) estimates that increased education levels of women and girls have prevented "more than 30 million deaths of children under five years old and a hundred million deaths in adults since 1970" (Education Commission, 2016, p. 34).

The Importance of Quality Education

The benefits of providing education during a crisis have been outlined above, but the quality of the education provided needs to be addressed as well. Children who do not feel the time spent in the classroom is worthwhile will leave to earn money, possibly be recruited as child soldiers, be trafficked looking for other opportunities, or be forced into early marriage (Save the Children, 2009; Sommers, 2002). Statistics show that the survival rate of children in conflict countries to the secondary level of schooling is only 65%, compared to 86% in stable, developing countries (Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). In addition to keeping children in school, the provision of "quality education" is important as a tool to promote peace and stability by ensuring equal access to minority groups and by being gender sensitive (Save the Children, 2009). Schools which provide education in minority languages and sanitation facilities for girls help increase equal access to

academic opportunities (Save the Children, 2009). INEE, with funding support from USAID, developed the Minimum Standards for Education: Preparedness, Response, Recovery (INEE Minimum Standards) and the Conflict Sensitive Education (CSE) toolkit to promote “quality education systems that are inclusive, promote tolerance, diversity, and intellectual freedom.” INEE brought together educators from around the world in a consultative process to develop these tools to be used in response to natural and human-made disasters and conflicts (INEE, 2010). INEE Minimum Standards outline five domains with subcategories identified as standards: Foundational Standards of community participation, coordination and analysis; Access and Learning Environment that covers aspects of equal access, protection and well-being, and facilities and services; Teaching and Learning which covers curricula, training and professional development, instruction and learning, and assessment of learning outcomes; Teachers and Other Educational Personnel that includes recruitment and selection, conditions of work, support and supervision; Education Policy which covers law, policy formulation, planning and implementation (INEE, 2010). The CSE toolkit provides guidance to humanitarian and development actors on how they can provide services to the impacted community that reduce factors which have created tension and exacerbated conflict. These documents help to inform and guide humanitarian and development aid actors to strive to provide “quality” education that attempt to “do no harm” and to “build back better.”

Although the case has been made for education in emergencies, and it has been enshrined in the Incheon Declaration and recognized as key to achieving the SDGs,

education financing in states of fragility is severely lacking (Steer & Smith, 2015). The next section will discuss international aid for EiE in the fragile state context.

Financing of Education in Emergencies

The importance of education in emergencies—from access to education as a human right to the psychosocial health and security of children to the future economic development benefits of countries—has been recognized in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the renewed commitment to Education for All in the Incheon Declaration. The special needs of countries considered “states of fragility” and the lack of financial support for education in emergencies have also been recognized (Steer & Smith, 2015, Winthrop & Matsui, 2013).

The international community committed itself to helping states of fragility achieve EFA and the MDG goals. Due to the characteristics that define these countries, both development and humanitarian funding streams provide aid. This presents challenges to the international community (Scott, 2015; Winthrop & Matsui, 2013).

Countries that are considered “states of fragility” are defined by their weak government structures, which can be further destabilized with an emergency (OECD, 2013). In response, the OECD developed best practices for effective provision of international development aid, known as the Fragile States Principles (FSP). These principles guide the international development community to provide aid in ways that align with a developing government’s priorities, strengthen its ability to provide public services and increase its legitimacy (OECD, 2011a). The Operational Framework for Effective Support in Fragile and Conflict Affected States of the Global Partnership for

Education (GPE), which generates and provides financial support for EFA and SDG, reiterates its alignment with the OECD's FSPs (GPE, 2013).

When crises strike, the humanitarian community responds by following its principles of “neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence” (OECD, 2012). Humanitarian aid is directed to those most in need, with individual responders often circumventing governments in order to adhere to the responder's principles as well as address crises which cross borders (Scott, 2015). The main principles are supported by the 2003 Stockholm Declaration Principles of Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (Stockholm, 2003).

Since 2000, requests for humanitarian support have increased 660%, from US\$2.9 billion (adjusted for inflation) to US\$18.6 billion 2015 (Scott, 2015). The increased funding level reflects the expansion of humanitarian aid's role in not only responding to acute and protracted emergencies, but also,

being pressed into covering the full range of disaster risk reduction activities, and to tackle longer-term tasks such as post-disaster reconstruction, state building and delivering peace dividends in fragile state contexts—clearly areas that are beyond the scope of merely saving lives (OECD, 2012 p. 7).

The increased need for both development and humanitarian aid, and the limited funding, has increased the need for greater collaboration between the development and humanitarian communities, as well the need for greater efficiency in the use of donor support. As the OECD paper “Towards Better Humanitarian Donorship” states:

[OECD-DAC] members are now committed to: i) through development assistance, preventing crises, or at least minimizing their risk to people

and development; ii) through humanitarian assistance, to respond to crises; and iii) using a mix of humanitarian and development assistance, to achieve a better transition from a humanitarian situation to longer-term development (OECD, 2012, p. 7).

The inadequate financial resources for both education development and education during humanitarian response necessitate that aid in both sectors be more clearly tracked and efficiently used (Scott, 2015; Winthrop & Matsui, 2013). International efforts have been underway to better integrate or bridge the guiding principles of both approaches, in order to address concerns of states of fragility. However, a review of the literature indicates there is a gap in research to understand the current EiE humanitarian aid response to a natural disaster in a fragile context (Burde et. al., 2015; Nicolai & Hine, 2015).

The Promise of the Dakar Framework and “States of Fragility”

When the international community recommitted itself to EFA in the Dakar Framework, it also made the commitment to provide financial aid to countries in need to achieve the goals. Participants acknowledged that overall, countries did not give education sufficient priority in their national budgets (Dakar Framework, 2000). The Dakar Framework reiterated that it is the responsibility of the government to provide free, quality basic education, so that no child will be denied access because of an inability to pay. Governments that agreed to the Dakar Framework were compelled to develop plans by 2002 to address the chronic underfinancing of basic education, by establishing budget priorities that reflected a commitment to achieve EFA (Dakar Framework, 2000). However, participants also recognized that for developing countries, generating equitable

and sustainable resources would be a formidable challenge. Therefore, international donor organizations committed themselves to provide the financial support necessary to countries in need (Dakar Framework, 2000):

The international community acknowledges that many countries currently lack the resources to achieve education for all within an acceptable timeframe. New financial resources, preferably in the form of grants and concessional assistance must be mobilized by bilateral and multilateral funding agencies, including the World Bank and regional development banks, and the private sector. We affirm that no countries seriously committed to education for all will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by a lack of resources (Dakar Framework, 2000, p. 9).

Understandably, reaching the goals of EFA presents many challenges for developing low-income countries. It is even more challenging for the countries considered “states of fragility” in which 43% of their populations live on less than US\$1.25 per day (OECD, 2015). Although there is no internationally accepted definition of the term “fragile” country (Berry, 2009; Davis, 2009; Miller-Grandvaux, 2009; Turrent, 2009), the generally accepted description is that fragile countries lack the willingness and/or legitimacy to provide basic services, such as education, to their citizens (Davis, 2009; Miller-Grandvaux, 2009; Turrent, 2009). The OECD previously described these “conflict-affected and fragile” countries in its discussion paper, “Service Delivery in Fragile Situations: Key Concepts, Findings and Lessons” as (2008, p.14):

[a] fragile state lacks the capacity (effectiveness) and/or willingness (legitimacy) to sustain itself over time. It is unable to perform the basic

functions of a state: to maintain security across its terrain; to enable economic development; to ensure the essential needs of its population are met.

A fragile state is more susceptible to conflict, and human-made and natural disasters causing it to have to redirect resources needed for long-term educational development to more urgent security and humanitarian response activities (OECD, 2015). As a result, the goals of EFA and MDG, which aim to increase growth and stability in a fragile country, are hindered by the countries' own state of affairs. As was acknowledged during the Millennium Declaration Summit, countries are interconnected; surrounding countries are impacted by the spill-over effects of instability in a fragile country. Therefore, efforts at addressing issues of legitimacy and improving the distribution and equity of public services in fragile states were recognized as key to achieving the MDGs (OECD, 2015).

As the international community works toward achieving the SDGs by 2030, current long-term projections estimate that 62% of the global poor will be concentrated in fragile states by 2030 (OECD, 2015, p. 21). Given that fragile states are more susceptible to conflict, epidemics, pandemics, and natural and human-made disasters, and that the average length of conflicts and recovery from disasters can be close to a decade and more, the need for sufficient and effective financial support and technical assistance during humanitarian crises is evident.

Better Development Aid Effectiveness and States of Fragility

By committing itself to financially support developing countries to meet EFA and MDGs, the international community recognized the potential cost and the need to

develop better means of providing aid. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD initiated a series of meetings aimed at developing methods to improve the outcomes of development finance. The first two meetings held in Paris (2005) and Accra, Ghana (2008) resulted in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda on Aid Effectiveness. The Declaration and Agenda are based on five key principles: ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability. The Accra Agenda for Action identified three major challenges to be addressed to accelerate progress on aid effectiveness:

- Strengthening country ownership over development
- Building more effective and inclusive partnerships for development
- Delivering and accounting for development results.

During the Paris Declaration meeting held in 2005, it was recognized that states of fragility required special consideration regarding aid effectiveness. In 2005, the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States was held. During this forum, ten principles were drafted to help guide aid effectiveness for donors to states of fragility. These Fragile State Principles (FSPs) were later refined in 2007. The ten principles are:

1. Take context as the starting point
2. Ensure all activities do no harm
3. Focus on state building as the central objective
4. Prioritize prevention
5. Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives

6. Promote nondiscrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion (“aid orphans”).

What has emerged from the establishment of these principles is that development organizations should work with governments to provide funding that will address state-building and legitimacy (Scott, 2015). Education, because of its high profile as a public service and with large numbers of public employees in its service, is a strategic area to focus on. Issues in education as to equitable access, transparency, corruption, security, curriculum content, and discrimination have been documented to contribute to the inability of a government to provide such a basic service for its citizens and create tensions that can lead to violent conflict (Davis, 2009; Miller-Grandvaux, 2009, UNESCO, 2011). The OECD paper on Service Delivery in Fragile Situations rightly identifies justice/security and education as the most “transformative kinds of services” but also the most difficult areas for international donors to work collaboratively with the fragile government as they are the sectors most “prone to polarization and manipulation” (OECD, 2011b). In addition, the international education community has established guidelines for conflict-sensitive education to ensure that educational development in fragile countries is done in a way to reduce the factors that cause conflict (Sigsgaard, 2012). Therefore, the INEE developed its Minimum Standards for Engagement in Fragile

Contexts which in some ways mirror the FSP Principles, in order to avoid education becoming a point of tension within a fragile country context.

Education is perceived as a political issue because it is influential in consolidating a society's structures of power. This connects education to some of the root causes of conflict, such as distribution of resources, access to political power or recognition of identity (Wedge, 2008, p. 9).

INEE went further and developed its Conflict Sensitive Education pack specifically to guide education providers to develop and implement programs aimed to reduce the causes of potential conflict (INEE, 2010).

On an interesting side note, in conducting a search through the 2011 OECD paper "International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't We Do Better," out of sixty-six pages there was only one instance found of the word "education," and it was in the context of promoting gender equality in health and education. In contrast, the word "health" was mentioned twenty-nine times and the word "security" mentioned forty-one (OECD, 2011c).

The Clash of Humanitarian Response vs. Development in States of Fragility

International support for education in developing countries used to be viewed as solely within the realm of "development" (Sinclair, 2002; Sommers, 2002; Winthrop & Matsui, 2015). When a crisis struck, such as a natural or human-made disaster, epidemic, pandemic or violent conflict, a "humanitarian" response was mobilized focusing on the immediate survival, security and support for victims, refugees and internally displaced people. Many humanitarian aid donors and organizations did not view education as within their scope of providing immediate life-saving necessities such as shelter, food

and water, especially when funding was limited. The governments of the countries impacted took a similar view, especially in conflict prone areas where it was viewed that limited resources should be directed toward security needs (Sommers, 2002). Further, development donors and organizations, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank, would wait until the crisis had passed and moved into the reconstruction phase to resume their support for education development (Sommers, 2002). With research showing that the average disruption from conflicts and disasters is over twelve years disrupting the majority of a child's school career and with greater emphasis placed on ensuring the right of children to education, the international community now recognizes that the provision of education should fall within the humanitarian sphere as well as the development domain (INEE, 2009). This recognition triggered the rallying cry made during the 2012 67th session of the UN General Assembly that "Education Cannot Wait" (UNESCO, 2012). However, the humanitarian sphere has principles different from the FSP to guide its actions. As stated previously, FSP development aid works with fragile state governments addressing issues of state-building and legitimacy, working to align its funding with the priorities of the developing country (OECD, 2015).

In 2003, humanitarian organizations met and developed the Stockholm declaration that includes 23 principles of good practice that cover financing and accountability. Humanitarian aid remains on the outside of government, sometimes running programs parallel to government services and plans and responding directly to impacted communities (Scott, 2015).

Working around state structures is the norm for humanitarian agencies. This is primarily because of humanitarian principles, and for practical reasons: in a humanitarian crisis where rapid provision of basic services is critical, state systems are often not up to the task. Humanitarian actors who are wary of the politicization of aid may also be reluctant to work with development actors, given their close relationship with the state (Scott, 2015, p. 14).

However, with the increase in the number and length of crises, especially in states of fragility, humanitarian aid is being stretched. The humanitarian and development spheres have been faced with the challenge of finding ways to merge their two approaches, made even more complicated due to the number of organizations with different mandates involved in providing services.

International Organizations with Different Mandates

Many international organizations engaged in the effort of assisting states of fragility to achieve the Millennium Development and EFA goals, including: the UN agencies such as UNESCO and its International Institute for Education Policy (IIEP), UNICEF, UNDP; multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), the International Monetary Fund, and Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) like Save the Children, CARE, International Rescue Committee, and Plan International; and bilateral organizations like the Norwegian Refugee Council and the United Kingdom's Department of International Development (DFID), just to name a few. Some of the organizations are purely development focused and some are

focused on humanitarian response, while some provide both humanitarian response as well as development.

During a humanitarian crisis, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee (UNIASC) for humanitarian assistance takes the lead in coordinating other UN agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP) and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). As part of the IASC, UNICEF takes the lead in providing educational services in times of crisis. Typically, UNICEF is already active in up to one-third of the countries that are impacted by epidemics, pandemics and human-made and natural crises. Through a Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR, UNICEF also provides education services for refugees in other countries. UNICEF's Back to School programs provide tents, supplies and human resources to give children impacted by a humanitarian crisis a sense of normalcy, safety and security, especially for girls who are vulnerable to the risk of exploitation. In addition, UNICEF bridges the humanitarian to development gap by working with international and local organizations and governments to organize mass back-to-school campaigns, offer longer term assistance to governments to rehabilitate schools and infrastructure, and develop accelerated and adapted learning strategies for children who have missed significant amounts of schooling.

UN and multilateral agencies may contract with international NGOs that have experience providing emergency education services. In the IASC Education Cluster, UNICEF and Save the Children International are co-leads for the education committee. In addition, other INGOs, such as International Rescue Committee (IRC), Plan International

and World Vision, to name a few, are identified to be well-positioned and already working in fragile countries to respond quickly to a crisis and can be depended upon to fulfill their responsibilities with little oversight from UN agencies (Sommers, 2002). As noted by Sommers, some of the “best field situations involve international non-governmental organizations (INGO) developing synergies with communities to stabilize, expand and formalize positive and productive education initiatives (2002, p.12)” Save the Children has created School Management Councils (SMCs) or Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in countries such as Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Funding for United Nations humanitarian response to emergencies is directed through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) which is managed by UNOCHA. This standing fund is utilized to provide funds to meet the needs of both underrepresented and large-scale crises when the needs extend beyond the resources generated.

The OECD Financial Tracking Services (FTS) provides data and the estimated monetary need to fund projects in order to respond to crises. It tracks commitments and donations made by OECD member governments to respond to emergencies.⁶ However, reporting to this service is voluntary so it does not capture the full picture of the donor funds committed and provided. Additional funds are also provided to other international multilateral and bilateral organizations, international non-profit organizations and foundations, national country budgets and non-profit organizations as well as directly to individuals. Therefore sources and amounts of funding provided in response to humanitarian crises is extremely opaque.

⁶ About FTS/What is FTS?: <https://fts.unocha.org/content/about-fts-what-fts>

Estimated Humanitarian and Development Funding for Education

The picture of funding for education in states of fragility is stark. As indicated in the OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) principles and reiterated in the EFA frameworks, national governments are responsible for providing this basic human right to its citizens. The UNESCO 2015 EFA Global Monitoring Report estimates that over the next fifteen years, to achieve the 2030 SDG and EFA goals, low-income countries (LICs) will need to significantly increase their annual spending on education. For example, for primary level quality education, annual spending will need to increase from US\$7.3 billion in 2012 to an average US\$19.9 billion from 2015-2030 (UNESCO, 2015d). Spending for lower secondary education will need to increase from US\$3.6 billion in 2012 to an average US\$11.6 billion from 2015-2030 (UNESCO, 2015d).

It is estimated that overall, LICs will need to apply 20% of their national budgets to education, or 3.9% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The amount does not include international funding (UNESCO, 2015d). This is a significant increase over the 2.6% of GDP that LICs spent on education in 2012 (UNESCO, 2015d).

Even in cases where countries have increased spending on education, studies reveal that the increase is not reflected in the spending per student. UNESCO's EFA Global Monitoring Report (GMR) in 2009 estimated that LICs would need to have spent US\$147 per primary student and US\$237 per lower secondary student between 2007 and 2015 to provide high quality education. But spending was only US\$116 and US\$168 respectively (Steer & Smith, 2015). The UNESCO 2015 EFA GMR Policy Paper 18 highlights that for LIC's to reach the 2030 goals, US\$197 would be needed per student for quality primary school and US\$284 for lower secondary school (UNESCO, 2015d).

Due to the challenges LICs face, especially states of fragility, it is unlikely that these countries will be able to generate the public funds needed to apply to their educational systems (UNESCO, 2015d). The EFA Dakar Framework (2000) specifically included a pledge by developed countries to assist countries in need. The international development community initially responded by increasing aid from US\$6.7 billion in 2002 to US\$14.4 billion in 2010. But then funding began to drop, especially to states of fragility. In 2013, only 10% of overall development aid was directed toward education (UNESCO, 2013c, UNESCO, 2015d). It is not a promising picture when the annual funding gap for LICs to reach the SDGs by 2030 is estimated at US\$21 billion, close to seven times the current amount of international aid now made available to LICs as of 2015 (UNESCO, 2015d).

The picture of humanitarian assistance for education is even starker. States of fragility need not only development support, but also aid to assist them when crises strike. However, donations for humanitarian response for education also fell over the past decade. In the humanitarian aid sphere, the education sector on average received 36% of requested aid as compared to 60% received of the need requested by all other sectors (UNESCO, 2015c). As a result, of the 4% that is the UN Global Education First Initiative's goal for education in humanitarian response, the education sector only receives on average 2% (UNESCO, 2015c).

With overall humanitarian aid falling short of what is needed, aid allocated for development ends up being utilized. (UNESCO, 2015c, p. 4). The “[e]ducation sector is losing out from both the development and humanitarian resources” (UNESCO, 2015c, p. 5). Through a concerted effort of international EiE NGOs and multilateral donor

organizations working together to lobby for increased financial support for education in emergencies, a global fund was established during the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 specifically to support EiE. The purpose of the fund is to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development aid (UN, May 2016). By establishing the fund, the international community demonstrated the political will to provide EiE in crisis the financial support it needs, but it remains to be seen if it will lead to action.

Even with the recent establishment of the fund, the education community still needs to find more efficient and effective ways of utilizing both its development and humanitarian aid. Humanitarian aid, in particular, has several problems. The humanitarian policymaking and response approach is designed as a “one size fits all” structure. Different types of crises all receive the same type of response. “As a result, funding is not context appropriate, is not targeted according to need and often arrives too late, with funding cycles that are too short” (World Vision, 2015, para. 4). In addition, the same funding mechanisms are applied to diverse types of crises. These could be “sudden-onset natural disasters, responses to complex and protracted emergencies, rural crises (compared with urban ones), national emergencies and regional cross-border crises” (World Vision, 2015, para. 4).

Second, although various organizations have developed methods to conduct needs assessments, the capacity of the country and/or international organizations to do so varies. To compound the lack of financial resources being provided to education, international organizations have also noted the discrepancies regarding clearly identifying the extent of the humanitarian need. Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP) are formulated based on needs assessment methodologies which have been identified as “poorly

coordinated and not well implemented” (Save the Children as cited in UNESCO, 2015a, p. 21). For example, in 2013 an estimated 85% of those who should have received access to education through the Humanitarian Response Plans did not receive any support. There were an estimated 21 million of those needing education support, but the projects submitted only reached 8 million. Funding was received for only 3 million, leaving 86% of children in need without access to education (UNESCO, 2015c).

Especially in states of fragility where government infrastructure is already considered weak, the ability to carry out a comprehensive needs assessments in response to a crisis can be daunting. In addition, various organizations have their own methods of conducting needs assessments. As a result, the information provided on the needs of the country can vary dramatically and not fully capture what the priorities are or the true level of funding needed (Srodecki, 2015).

Capturing and tracking humanitarian aid that has been provided in response to crises is also challenging. There is not one complete database to which all donors submit information. The Financial Tracking System (FTS) of UNOCHA publishes response plans and appeals and then tracks humanitarian aid needs and support provided. But reporting is voluntary. Other agencies try to capture humanitarian aid and development assistance but are limited in scope. The OECD-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members are obligated to report official development assistance (ODA) and humanitarian aid, but the requirement only applies to its 28 members. As a result, the data does not include substantial humanitarian aid and ODA support provided by non-OECD-DAC members such as China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, as well as private foundations, smaller INGOs, and individuals not living in their native

countries (remittances) (OECD, 2015, p. 22). These databases also do not capture philanthropic aid, remittances or other private flows of aid. As the OECD 2015 report states, “Data on domestic revenues are currently available or reported for only 15 of the 50 countries and economies on the fragile states list. Better quality data are also needed for other flows, such as philanthropy and other private aid flows” (OECD, 2015, p. 22).

Tracking the flow of aid provided and what level has reached the intended beneficiaries is another challenge. Many of the lead organizations that submit projects for funding subgrant to other non-government organizations who may have better connections within the country. In some cases, organizations that do not have a presence in the country apply for or receive donations and have to seek out partners. These organizations then take a portion of the funding and apply it to overhead administrative costs. As each organization does this, the total amount of funding available to assist those in need diminishes (Scott, 2015; Troutman, 2015a). Although countries, bilateral organizations and multilateral organizations commit to providing a certain level of aid, the actual aid provided to the recipients is even more limited. Various researchers have provided details as to the lack of sufficient funding for education, as with other humanitarian needs, but also the loss of funds as aid makes its way through the myriad of international and national organizations providing response (Troutman, 2015a).

Lastly, as described above, donor receiving organizations will subgrant to groups who have presence on the ground or humanitarian aid may be provided directly to individuals or small NGOs through already established contacts. As a result, the distribution of aid may not reach the communities or groups most in need.

The IASC developed the 3W Operational Presence report (who does what, where) to help guide humanitarian response. It was first implemented in 2013-2014 for Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. Although the report helps to identify services provided, location, organization providing services and target beneficiaries, it is not linked to monetary amounts of aid provided. Although the report helps to provide more transparency on how aid was distributed and by whom, it does not link to the FTS or the OECD-DAC financial reporting mechanisms.

Other resources available to an international donor, who is interested in knowing how international humanitarian aid helped children return to school, are the individual non-profit organization donor reports which speak only to how the funds provided to that specific organization were used. Since these reports are intended to cultivate trust in the particular organization and encourage more donations, the reports focus on accomplishments and do not provide comparisons with overall need versus the need met. These reports also do not reflect relationships with coordinating or subgranting organizations. An example is when three different organizations report they provided temporary learning centers (TLCs). In reality, UNICEF subcontracted with an INGO to provide them the funding to obtain and provide the materials for TLCs. The INGO then subcontracted with a local NGO to deliver and ensure the TLC was installed. As a result, determining the actual number of TLCs provided may be inflated and masks the extent of the population that did not receive aid.

Resilience and DRR to Bridge the Aid Gap

During the decade of 2000, several other international agreements and acknowledgements were reached. These include the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Disaster

Risk Reduction and the Busan Agreement, in which the concept of resilience and disaster risk reduction was promoted to bridge the funding gap between the humanitarian and development sectors (Hyogo, 2005, Busan, 2011). As a result, strengthening and promoting resilience at the local level to support disaster risk reduction was seen as the answer to reducing the international donor burden for future natural and human-made disasters. It was understood that due to climate change, natural disasters would only be increasing and placing greater and greater stress on the level of international aid that would be available to communities. The focus on resilience and how this has been applied to the education systems in fragile countries will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter III - Resilience: Coping and Adaptive Capacities

As covered in Chapter II, the role of education in emergencies is an important component of humanitarian response. First and foremost, access to education is a human right. The provision of education during times of crisis provides lifesaving benefits to children including reducing trafficking, child marriage and recruitment into armed services. It also provides a sense of stability and hope for the future. Although these arguments have been made, the international humanitarian support for education in times of crisis is much lower than for all other sectors of response. This gap in attention—and funding—is reflected in the level of development aid as well, especially in countries considered fragile.

As the tracking of the EFA Dakar Framework and the Millennium Development Goals of 2000 progressed further into the decade, the international community sought ways to address the gaps in aid, especially given the generally accepted understanding that incidence of natural disasters (as well as human-created conflicts and crises) was increasing. The international community turned its focus on strengthening disaster resilience and promoting disaster risk reduction (DRR).

This chapter will lay out how the concept of resilience has become the buzzword⁷ for the international humanitarian and development community, how the term “resilience” has been defined in the human-made and natural disaster context, and how the education community has incorporated resilience into the EiE field. This chapter also discusses how frameworks for measuring community resilience can be better applied to assess school community resilience.

⁷ Alexander, 2013

Resilience in Humanitarian Response and Development

The concept of resilience as it relates to human-made and natural disasters has gained traction with the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action and the 2011 Busan 4th High-Level Forum on Aid-Effectiveness. International development and humanitarian agencies have made efforts to create multilateral agreements, aimed at reducing impacts of natural and human-made hazards since at least 1989 if not earlier (Hyogo Framework, 2005; Mosel & Levine, 2014). The United Nations declared the 1990s the International Decade for Disaster Risk Reduction. The Yokohama Strategy for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation declaration and its Plan of Action ("Yokohama Strategy ") was adopted in 1994. A review of the achievements and lessons learned since the adoption of the Yokohama Strategy stressed the "importance of disaster risk reduction being underpinned by a more pro-active approach to informing, motivating and involving people in all aspects of disaster risk reduction in their own local communities" (Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 2). In 1999, the United Nations General Assembly and Economic and Social Council ratified the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) (Gordon, 2011). The vision of UNISDR was "[t]o enable all communities to become resilient to the effects of natural, technological and environmental hazards, reducing the compound risks they pose to social and economic vulnerabilities within modern societies" (IDNDR, 1999, p. 1).⁸

The efforts to focus on resilience in the realm of conflict and disaster preparedness coalesced during the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in Japan, when the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of

⁸ UNISDR is now the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) <https://eird.org/americas/we/what-is-the-international-strategy.html>

Nations and Communities to Disasters was adopted (Hyogo Framework, 2005). The Conference “underscored the need for, and identified ways of, building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters” (Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 1). The Hyogo Framework reflected commitments that were made in the UN Millennium Declaration of September 2000, Section IV. Protecting Our Common Environment, point 23 “to intensify cooperation to reduce the number and effects of natural and human-made disasters” (UNMD, 2000, para. 23).

The overarching goal of the Hyogo Framework was for international organizations and governments to incorporate disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies and programming into their humanitarian response and development activities. The framework further specified that the DRR activities should be implemented at the local community level, as stated in the framework: “[t]he development and strengthening of institutions, mechanisms and capacities at all levels, in particular at the community level, that can systematically contribute to building resilience to hazards” (Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 4).

The focus on disaster risk reduction and resilience was presented as a means to reduce deaths, mitigate disasters and increase sustainability of development, and address the gap in aid (Manyena, 2006). It is generally accepted internationally that the incidence of natural disasters is on the rise and the financial impact is increasing (DFID, 2011; Gordon, 2011; Hyogo Framework, 2005). Countries that are most susceptible to devastating humanitarian crises are also the least likely to have the resources or the infrastructure to respond, placing a greater burden on international donor organizations. “Disaster-prone developing countries, especially least developed countries and small

island developing States, warrant particular attention in view of their higher vulnerability and risk levels, which often greatly exceed their capacity to respond to and recover from disasters” (Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 5). The term resilience gained even more traction during the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid-Effectiveness held in Busan, South Korea in 2011. During the forum, governments and international organizations committed to:

ensure that development strategies and programmes prioritise the building of resilience among people and societies at risk from shocks, especially in highly vulnerable settings such as small island developing states. Investing in resilience and risk reduction increases the value and sustainability of our development efforts (Busan, 2011, p. 8).

The promotion of resilience in development was a way to reduce the financial destruction of disasters, and to bridge the time from when humanitarian aid response ends and development projects start or resume (Busan, 2011; Hauck, 2012; Levine et al., 2012). The purpose of promoting resilience was made explicit by Kristalina Georgieva, Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, during her keynote speech to the European Parliament on September 3, 2012: “It is a “mean(s) to close the gap between humanitarian and development action, preventing an interruption in the system when humanitarian assistance leaves” (Hauck, 2012, para. 1).

Another aspect of resilience was the focus on local communities to be able to respond to disasters with minimal assistance. The concept of resilience and DRR was extended, in that “increasing attention is now paid to the capacity of disaster-affected communities to ‘bounce back’ or to recover with little or no external assistance following a disaster” (Manyena, 2006, Abstract). The international development community saw

resilience and DRR as the means to help communities struck by conflicts and natural disasters recover more quickly and focus on “building back better.” The “bounce back” approach then saw its formation into the “build back better (BBB)” approach as disaster recovery was introduced in 2006 by former U.S. President Bill Clinton, serving as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery (Fernandez & Ahmed, 2019, Abstract).

In an effort to achieve the MDGs and reduce costs of the impacts of increasing natural disasters, national governments and international organizations began to adopt resilience as a new means for approaching humanitarian response and development programming. With the 2015 deadline approaching on the MDGs, EFA, Hyogo Framework, etc., the focus was on how to sustain the achievements being worked for—building disaster resilience into programming was a way to ensure that donor funding was not being wasted. The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) committed to including resilience programming in its future humanitarian and development work and published its “Disaster Resilience: An DFID Approach Paper” in 2011, in which it outlines the UK government’s new policy approach to humanitarian response. The new policy described “disaster resilience as ‘a new and vital component [of our] humanitarian and development work’” (DFID, 2011, p. 4). In addition, there was an effort to make the case to donors to fund DRR and resilience programming as part of international aid. In 2012, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) published “The road to resilience: Bridging relief and development for a more sustainable future” (IFRC, 2012). In this document, the IFRC indicated its full support of the Busan agreement and highlighted the need for communities to be prepared

for and resilient to disasters. Within this commitment, the IFRC requested funding to support its efforts at strengthening community resilience. The IFRC committed to “an integrated and coherent Red Cross and Red Crescent vision and approach to resilience” and sought to prepare and engage its donors in providing funding to incorporate resilience programming into any future efforts (IFRC, 2012). As the IFRC document states: “Ownership, donor alignment and harmonization, and managing for results with mutual accountability remain as relevant as ever. However, this means nothing without the organized participation of local communities’ themselves” (IFRC, 2012, p. 4).

The effort of the international humanitarian and development community to focus on resilience, especially indicating that resilience needs to be present at the “local community” level, raises the question of what resilience is and how it applies in human-made and natural disasters. “Many are struggling (in the international humanitarian and development fields) to know exactly what resilience *is*...” (Levine et al., 2012, p. 1).

The Concept of Resilience in Disasters

First, before we delve into the term “resilience” it is helpful to provide the definition for what constitutes a disaster. The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) defines a disaster as “a situation or event that overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request at the national or international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering” (Below, Wirtz & Gurah-Sapir, 2009, Annex II).

The term “resilience” has a long and varied history that is reflected in different disciplines such as ecology, engineering, psychiatry and disaster mitigation, but the concepts and research on resilience have developed within the specific disciplines with

little cross-fertilization (Norris et al., 2007; Nelson, Adger, Brown 2007; Alexander, 2013). There are multiple definitions of resilience even within the disaster response field (Alexander, 2013; DFID, 2011; Mayunga, 2007; Parsons et al, 2016; USAID, 2013). As Alexander states, “the amount of literature on resilience is now so copious that it is becoming increasingly difficult to summarise” (Alexander, 2013, p. 2713). On the one hand “nothing is ‘new’ about the term of resilience—it is just ‘new’ within the discourse of disaster and development discourse” (Manyena, 2006, p. 435).

Its meaning is still being debated (Klein et al., 2003; Levine et al., 2012).

“Resilience is currently too vague a concept (Hanley, 1998) to be useful in informing the disaster risk reduction agenda” (Manyena, 2006, p. 445). However, in the Parsons et al. (2016) review, the researchers felt that three aspects exist across the disaster resilience definitions: the ability to absorb; the ability to recover; and the capacity to learn, adapt or transform (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 6).

Within the different academic fields, the concept of resilience has been considered an outcome, a process or a set of characteristics. From the ecological and engineering perspectives, resilience is seen as an outcome in which a resilient natural or mechanical process that incurred a shock can return to its normal state and continue functioning (Alexander, 2013). Within the social science sphere, the concept of resilience is viewed as a process and has evolved from being focused predominantly on an individual to encompass communities, as they may be defined, such as a village, a school, an organization or an ethnic group (Mayunga, 2007; Parsons et al., 2016). In addition, the term has taken on the additional aspect of “build back better” in which the process not only returns the system to its normal state, but an improved state that can then respond

better to future shocks and events. As it refers to disasters, this would mean a reduction in the risk to the system from future disasters, hence the disaster risk reduction (DRR) approach. As seen in the frameworks, disaster risk reduction (DRR) has become a common approach to how humanitarian and development policies and programming should be developed in order to strengthen resilience (Twigg, 2009). Lastly, resilience is seen as a set of characteristics that an individual, group, institution, and community possess in order to cope and adapt to disasters (Manyena, 2014; Parsons et al., 2016). In this way, criteria can be developed in which to measure whether an individual, group, institution, or community possesses the necessary characteristics and capacities in order to respond to, recover from and resume development after a crisis. The idea of strengthening these capacities is informing international humanitarian and development programming (USAID, 2013; DFID, 2011).

For the most part, the definitions of resilience put forth by international organizations combine resilience characteristics with process. For example, the definition of resilience put forth in the Hyogo Framework is focused on the process of response and recovery:

The capacity of a system, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of organizing itself to increase this capacity for learning from past disasters for better future protection and to improve reduction measures. (UNISDR, 2004, para. 36).

The Hyogo Framework definition focuses on “capacity-development” programs that would strengthen and increase resilience by invoking characteristics related to resilience, such as the capacity to adapt, organize and learn. (Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 5). The International Federation of the Red Cross defines resilience as the “ability of individuals, communities, organizations or countries exposed to crises and underlying vulnerabilities to: anticipate; reduce the impact of; cope with; and recover from the effects of adversity without compromising their long-term prospects” (IFRC, 2012, p. 7). And DFID defines resilience as “the ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses...without compromising their long-term prospects” (DFID, 2011, p. 6).

Many of the definitions put forth by international organizations and governments on what constitutes resilience within the disaster field have similarities, in that resilience can apply to individuals, groups, communities, local institutions/organizations, national governments, and international organizations. They all indicate that these groups should have resilience characteristics displayed in the capacity to “cope,” “adapt” and “change” in order to move through the processes of responding to the crisis by returning to normal function and, if possible, improve their conditions to reduce the impact of future disasters. The extensive literature and debates which exist, on the characteristics that determine individual resilience, will not be covered here as the focus of the research is on the mounting literature on community resilience. Researchers of community resilience indicate that the growing interest in the characteristics of community resilience stem from donors interested in assessing the best use of limited funds (Sharifi, 2016).

Disaster scholars seem to agree with the idea that disaster resilience is about the capacity of communities to cope with external hazards and threats: ‘local resiliency with regard to disasters means that a locale is able to withstand an extreme natural event without suffering devastating losses, damage, diminished productivity or quality of life without a large amount of assistance from outside the community’ (Miletti, 1999, as cited in Baharmand et al., 2016, p. 4).

In 2014, the Overseas Development Institute published a report entitled “Remaking the Case for Resilience.” It discusses how the idea or concept that “resilience” bridges the gap between humanitarian aid and development has been considered for over 20 years, but that little has been done to support the strengthening of resilience. The report questions whether the new focus on resilience to address the gap is just more talk, or whether there is something valuable to be found in resilience to meet the need and, therefore, its strengthening should be supported (Mosel & Levine, 2014).

Overall, the outlook is dire for humanitarian and development organizations to have the resources and abilities for responding to the rising level of crises. As education and, particularly, education in emergencies is already receiving limited support, the increased pressure for funds needed elsewhere leaves funding for education in emergencies even more deficient. The concept of resilience in the disaster response and development fields is still being defined. In a review of the extensive number of definitions in the literature (Alexander, 2013; Mayunga, 2007; USAID, 2013), all have similarities yet, as Alexander (2013) states, confusion regarding the term resilience creates confusion in how it is applied in international humanitarian and development

policies and programming. The next section will look at how resilience is being approached in the education in emergencies field.

Education in Emergencies and Resilience

With the level of aid provided to education in emergencies (EiE) so low, especially in contexts considered fragile, it is important to see how the international education community is implementing resilience in humanitarian and development policies and programming. A review of the different approaches EiE organizations have taken to include resilience in their policies and programming shows the difference in how the term “resilience” is defined within the disaster education context. The Hyogo Framework included action steps for “Education and Training” that included six items. The first three focus on implementing programs in schools such as the “inclusion of disaster risk reduction knowledge in relevant sections of school curricula at all levels.” (Hyogo Framework, 2005, p. 9). The other two action steps include implementing programs to teach about risk assessment, disaster preparedness and how to reduce the impacts of hazards (Hyogo Framework, 2005). International education organizations, therefore, began designing disaster risk reduction (DRR) programming to be included in their guidelines, training programs and program implementation. Efforts at disaster risk reduction were a way to assist individuals and communities in strengthening resilience before and during times of crisis. DRR is reflected in guidelines for safe school construction, agreements to protect education from attack, tools for disaster risk assessments, and conflict sensitive education (CSE) to promote equity and peace. Various international organizations have created DRR toolkits such as UNICEF’s Comprehensive School Safety document from 2012, World Vision’s 2013 Toolkit, and the creation of the

Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction & Resilience in the Education Sector (GADRRRES), with an indication that these DRR toolkits and resources will enhance student resilience to disasters. These frameworks, tools and guidelines do not look to assess the existing resilience capacities of educators or the school as a “community” in times of crisis. Rather they provide information on how to identify disaster risks and prepare for them.

One of the first examples of the inclusion of resilience and DRR in EiE is the UNICEF and Government of Netherlands funded Education in Emergencies Post Crisis Transition Program (EEPCT) which was implemented for five years from 2006 to 2011 (UNICEF, 2012b). Overall the EEPCT programming reached 47 countries. The EEPCT had four goals:

1. Improved quality of education response in emergencies and post-crisis transition countries;
2. Increased resilience of education sector service delivery in chronic crises, arrested development, and deteriorating contexts;
3. Increased education sector contributions to better prediction, prevention and preparedness for emergencies due to natural disaster and conflict; and
4. Evidence-based policies, efficient operational strategies and fit-for-purpose financing instruments for education in emergencies and post-crisis situations. (Netherland, 2012, p. 72).

The authors of the final comprehensive report indicate that one of their findings was the lack of consistent understanding of what the term “resilience of the education sector” meant (UNICEF, 2012b). A significant number of respondents to the evaluation

pointed to Accelerated Learning Programs as a form of “resilience” and aspects of Goal 3, related to DRR were not conceptualized as “resilience” (UNICEF, 2012b). As a result, INEE created and hosted a blog to generate discussion on what “resilience” meant to educators. The report did not include an outcome to the blog. However, in 2012, UNICEF and Save the Children published an independent study of EEPCT programming which is referred to in the report as an EiE Training Program that started in May 2009 and was implemented in 21 African countries. Out of the 21 countries, five countries participated in the study: Burundi, Comoros, Madagascar, Malawi and Rwanda (UNICEF, 2012a). The report indicates that the program helped to “build a culture of resilience” which comprised 10 items⁹ that were “necessary for promoting successful EPR/DRR programs” (UNICEF, 2012a, p. xiv). The study was focused on the capacity building for Emergency Preparedness Response (EPR) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in the policies and programming of the target countries’ educational sectors. The program was a first step in laying the foundation for a culture of resilience in the education sector in Eastern and Southern Africa Region.

The report goes on to say that the training implemented sought to focus on Goal 3 and Goal 4, not Goal 2 which was related to resilience and that actions steps included “capacity building...” The report indicates that training activities took place in 21 countries, with 2,800 participants. That leaves an average of 133 participants in each country, including local to national government representatives, NGOs, international agencies and donors. The listed number of participants for the countries were: Burundi, 42; Comoros, 47; and Madagascar, 226. No numbers of participants for Malawi or

⁹ See Appendix C: UNICEF 10 Items of a Culture of Resilience

Rwanda were included in the report. The research showed that in only one or two countries studied did the training information reach down to the level of school director, even less to teachers and least to schoolchildren (Madagascar) (UNICEF, 2012a). Dutch funding for the project ended in 2012 and it was not continued. The report goes on to indicate that “build a culture of resilience” meant a “combination of 10 key elements identified by the present evaluation as necessary for promoting successful EPR/DRR programs” (UNICEF, 2012a, p. 72). The term resilience referred to the promotion of EPR/DRR programs assuming that the successful promotion of these programs resulted in “resilience,” which was never really defined and the successful implementations of the programs were not demonstrated.

The next example of the inclusion of DRR in curriculum materials is the 2008 “Adaptation and Localization: Guidelines for Development of DRR Public Education Materials.” This document is available on INEE's website in English and is produced by Risk RED (Risk Reduction Education for Disasters), a U.S. based non-profit organization. The guide encourages users to not “reinvent the wheel” of disaster preparedness education materials, but instead to seek materials that are already created and adapt them, by leading a team of native speakers who can translate materials into the target language and cultural context. Although the document contains useful information, the audience assumes native English speakers as outsiders will make the documents available to a local team, that can convert the materials to their own language and context (Risk RED, 2008).

In 2009, INEE and Qatar Foundation helped support Reach Out To Asia (ROTA) to implement a project to increase DRR in schools in Nepal. The project was

implemented in the far western area of Nepal, in the Kailali District. It is difficult to reach the district which is often impacted by flooding. The project's content was informed by the INEE Minimum Standards and engaged members of the community to improve coordination, improve equal access to education, especially for girls and members of disadvantaged groups, improve school services and facilities such as conducting small scale infrastructure improvements, and provide first aid kits and Child Centered Learning materials (CCL). It also supported the development of context specific DRR curriculum to be taught to students in the schools. The evaluation of the program indicated some success such as community participation, which identified a local resource person who helped the local community "own" the project, and developed a project team that helped coordinate with the Village Development Committee (VCD), District Education Office (DEO) and Junior Youth Club (JYC). The project presented new teaching and learning techniques and incorporated drama into its DRR presentations to engage students and parents (ROTA, 2009). The overall program was to inform communities of the INEE Minimum Standards and encourage the community to adopt its principles, including the child-centered learning approaches. However, the assessment of the project (ROTA, 2009) indicated that the community had a difficult time internalizing the program and participants moved away, taking their knowledge and training with them. There was no indication that the program assessed the resilience of the school or the community, other than to address resilience by trying to strengthen DRR through the provision of services and training.

UNESCO's International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) Education for Safety, Resilience and Social Cohesion includes an assessment of a program in Nepal that

was implemented from 2007 to 2012, with the support of UNESCO, UNICEF, Save the Children and the Ministry of Education to revise the social studies curriculum to integrate civic and peace education in order to reduce conflict, based on materials supported by INEE (Smith, 2015). Two assessments were conducted of the program, one commissioned by Save the Children and implemented by the Ministry of Education Department of Education in 2010; and the second by the United Nations Development Program in 2014. The assessments found that, although the curriculum changes were mainly achieved, the teacher training component was not as successful, (Smith, 2015) reducing the long-term sustainability of the program.

In 2013, UNESCO put forth the *Comprehensive School Safety Framework: Working towards a global framework for climate-smart disaster risk reduction, bridging development and humanitarian action in the education sector (CSS)*. The framework was supported by UNICEF, Save the Children, INEE and several other international education organizations. The guidelines of the framework are generated from the Hyogo Framework, MDGs, EFA, GPE and Education First initiatives. The framework was initially published in 2013 (the cover is red), then republished in 2017 (the cover is blue) under the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction & Resilience in the Education Sector (GADRRRES) and made available on GADRRRES's website in 2019.

The foundation of the guidelines is the recognition of children's human rights to survival and protection as well as education and participation. The framework comprises three pillars: "1) safe learning facilities; 2) school disaster management; 3) risk reduction and resilience education" (GADRRRES, 2017, p. 2). The goals of the CSSF are to

“[p]rotect learners and education workers from death, injury and harm; [p]lan for educational continuity in the face of expected hazards; [s]afeguard education sector investments; [s]trengthen climate-smart disaster resilience through education” (GADRRRES, 2017, p. 2). The framework is to be used to inform national to local level education disaster management plans. The resilience component is implemented through curriculum and teaching materials. Therefore, the CSSF is not an assessment of resilience, but a toolkit on how to implement DRR activities that are child-centered in efforts to build individual student resilience.

Sorensen et al. (2014) provide an overview of DRR in education in their piece “DRR in an education goal. Realising the interplay of education and disaster risk reduction in development goals: a review of integrated indicators and options for post-2015.” The authors conducted research on DRR in education programming literature up to 2014. They then set forth broad recommendations for indicators and targets for the post-2015 agenda in order to achieve the EFA and Sustainable Development Goals. The indicators and targets do not define or assess resilience and, therefore, do not take into consideration the measurement of the education communities’ existing capabilities for resilience and how that measurement contributes to DRR.

The most targeted document that addresses resilience in education is the 2013 World Bank Education Resilience Approaches (ERA), as part of its Systems Assessment and Benchmarking for Education Results (SABER) (Reyes, 2013). In the World Bank SABER paper, *What Matters Most for Education Resilience: A Framework Paper*, the author presents the conceptual background and operational tools of the World Bank’s Education Resilience Approaches (ERA). The definition of resilience that he uses is “the

ability of human beings (and their communities and the institutions that serve them) to recover, succeed and undergo positive transformations” (Reyes, J., 2013, p. 5). The ERA framework consists of four components. The first two are used to gain better understanding of the dangers school communities face and assess their resources and engagement processes to address those adversities. The third and fourth components consider how schools mitigate and foster resilience in students to face future adversities (Reyes, 2013). Although the definitions and concepts that are put forth are laudable, there are three main concerns about their conceptualization.

The first concern is that the ERA is positioned to apply to developing countries that face violent conflict, yet the concepts used to formulate the ERA framework are based on stable, developed country contexts. As the author states in the Framework, the ERA approach “has made it a priority to understand resilience in contexts of pervasive violence and conflict” (Reyes, 2013, p. 16). When looking at the research cited upon which the ERA was developed, the research was conducted in developed countries with strong and intact governmental systems, civic societies and social safety nets (Reyes, 2013).¹⁰ The research discusses programs focused on youth development and strengthening student resilience in the face of such factors as poverty, parents with alcoholism, physical abuse, etc. (Reyes, 2013). The author confirmed in public comments during a roll-out of the 2019 USAID White Paper on Resilience that he had not looked at resilience in developing country contexts, not to mention rural areas of developing countries (USAID Webinar Education and Resilience White Paper, December 18, 2019). Therefore, the resilience framework is conceived from a developed country context and

¹⁰ Research cited: Benard, 2012; Ungar, 2008, 2011.

makes assumptions about the strengths of the government structures available for local schools in a developing country context. One of these strengths is the ability of the community to provide accessible social services to help foster resilience in children and youth. In a fragile, developing country context, the presence of available social services is severely lacking.

The second concern is that the ERA is positioned to focus on the student, rather than the school community and the individual educators. The ERA recognizes the importance of the education system and defines key characteristics of the system that are needed to promote individual student resilience, yet, it positions the school community as part of the “environment” that assists students in building resilience (Reyes, 2013). There are many references in the document that indicate this. As the second to last paragraph in the ERA Abstract states:

ERA stresses the central role of education systems to understand the risks faced by children and youth, to protect the assets and opportunities inherent in education communities, and to provide the school and educational supports to help students navigate the difficult environments in which they live (Reyes, J. 2013, p. 9).

Other references in the ERA indicate that the overall resilience being referred to is the student’s and not the school’s or the educators’:

Evidence on resilience and school effectiveness has identified several factors that correlate with learning and school success” and “emerging empirical evidence points to opportunities for change that contexts of adversity can facilitate: improving education systems, (re)-building back better, and finding space to

introduce reforms that can improve the relevance of an education system as per the needs of some of the most vulnerable learners (Reyes, 2013, p. 5).

When referencing the school community, the ERA is focused on relationship factors: “Reciprocal caring, respectful, and participatory relationships are the critical determining factors in whether a student learns; whether parents become and stay involved in the school; whether a program or strategy is effective; whether an educational change is sustained;etc.” (Reyes, J., 2013, p. 16). To do this, the ERA approach assesses risks, identifies assets and the level of interest among communities to provide for the well-being of students to be academically successful (Reyes, 2013). The lens through which the ERA approaches resilience is focused on what education systems need for students to be resilient, but not on the school community holistically.

Lastly, the World Bank SABER platform includes domains for education systems such as school finance, school autonomy and accountability, and information management, to name a few. The ERA is considered a cross-cutting theme that is an addendum to these main domains. There is very little overlap in the domains with the concepts of the ERA and vice versa. For example, the domain on finance does not make reference to the ERA or resilience funding needs. The lack of overlap or integration raises the question if the ERA’s lens is missing key aspects of resilience, especially in the fragile country context. Levine et al. (2012) point to the soloing of frameworks and how it may be difficult to integrate the information across the domains and with the ERA framework (Levine et al., 2012).

As highlighted in the examples above, the review I conducted of how the concept of resilience is being applied in the education in emergencies field is varied. In some

cases, the concept of resilience is being viewed as individual characteristics to be strengthened in students, with civics and peace education. In other cases, it is being considered a process of DRR and “build back better.” There is no effort to identify the characteristics or assess the resilience of an education community within a developing, fragile country context. In order to consider resilience in the education in emergency context, it may be possible to apply a community resilience lens to the school community as it is structured in the rural, developing country context.

Community Resilience Assessment Frameworks

Research conducted by Watson and Bogotch on “school as community” found that the term “community” in education, sociology and ecology provided no specific definition (Watson & Bogotch, 2016, p. 94). Nevertheless, Norris et al. (2007) write that typically, but not always, the term community means “an entity that has geographic boundaries and a shared fate” (Norris et al., 2007, p. 128). According to Mayunga (2007) and Parsons et al. (2016), the term community could be applied to a village, school or ethnic group. The USAID Feed the Future Learning Agenda put forth the following definition of community drawn from Murphy (2007): “A group of people in a shared geographic space with diverse characteristics and priorities, linked by social ties, interactions shaping local life, shared identity, collective action, and providing a means for accessing external resources” (USAID, 2013, p. 2).

The term community was referenced several times in the Hyogo Framework and especially in building “local and community” resilience (Hyogo Framework, 2005). The humanitarian and development fields have focused on developing not only DRR and resilience programs for communities, but there have been extensive efforts to create

assessments of community resilience. Sharif (2016) indicated that community resilience assessments grew in the decade after the Hyogo Framework was adopted, as donor organizations sought ways to assess the resilience of communities and measure them against international standards to make better investment decisions (p. 629). Sharif selected and reviewed thirty-six community resilience assessments, and although the assessments he reviewed were designed for assessing urban communities, he recommended that frameworks for rural communities should be developed in the future (p. 630). Parsons et al. (2016) also conducted a review of the field of community resilience assessments. Parsons et al. reference two earlier reviews: Cutter, S. (2016), who evaluated over 27 different disaster resilience assessment approaches and Beccari (2016), who evaluated over 106 that looked at risk, vulnerability and resilience. Parsons et al. (2016) selected seven of these assessments to review and inform the development of their resilience assessment approach.

One of the assessment frameworks Parsons et al. reviewed was a framework developed by Norris et al. (2007) to measure the degree communities have the capacity to “bounce back.” The four categories the framework included were: economic development; social capital; information and communication; and community competence (Norris et al., 2007). The literature on CSAs reflects that “community resilience” constitutes certain “capacities” which are referenced in Norris et al. (2007). The “focus on resilience means putting greater emphasis on what communities can do for themselves and how to strengthen their capacities” (Twigg, 2009, p. 8). Yet, one of the criticisms of the Norris community resilience framework was that it did not include external impacts to the community, such as the influence of local, regional, national and

international governing bodies and international NGOs (Twigg, 2009). When considering the developing country context, external influence would be a factor, considering the influence of and reliance on international donors and NGOs.

Building from the concepts in the Norris framework, Parsons et al. (2016) argue that their Australian Natural Disaster Resilience Index (ANDRI) offers the first resilience framework to focus on assessing community resilience to natural disasters by looking at coping and adaptability capacities (Parsons et al., 2016). The framework assesses the current state of disaster resilience at a specific time, as a baseline to measure improvements to disaster resilience in the future (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 5). The Australian Natural Disaster Resilience Index defines resilience as the “capacity of communities to prepare for, absorb and recover from natural hazard events, and the capacities of communities to learn, adapt, and transform towards resilience” (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 2). Parsons et al. posit that the use of the coping and adaptive capacities lens helps to assess the community resilience without applying the specific context of a disaster (2016).

The first key element of the index is the coping capacities of the community and its members in relation to the disaster. Coping capacities are defined by Parsons et al. (2016) as “the means by which people or organizations use available resources, skills and opportunities to face adverse consequences” (p. 6). For our purposes here, further explanation of what constitutes coping capacities is distilled from the research by Parsons et al. as: “the ability to absorb or accommodate the effects of an external disturbance or stressor event; the ability to recover and return to a functioning state or to persist following an event” (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 6). The index lays out six themes for coping

capacity of the community, which include social character, economic capital, infrastructure and planning, emergency services, community capital and information and engagement. These five themes capture the character of the community in relation to its ability to prepare for and respond to a crisis.

Although not a new term, the second key element of the ANDRI is adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacities are the “arrangements and processes that enable adjustment through learning, adaptation and transformation” (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 6). As with coping capacity, adaptive capacity has become an integral part of the humanitarian and development fields, especially in response to the impacts of climate change and the desire to increase DRR and sustainability in developing countries. Adaptive capacity was being written about in earlier literature on community resilience. For example, Nelson et al. (2007) write that “[t]his necessitates looking beyond the capacity to respond or to absorb the impact and considering the essential and non-essential elements of community systems able to adapt to and survive the shocks” (Nelson as cited in Manyena, 2006, p. 436). Parsons et al. (2016) state that adaptive capacity is a way to describe the preconditions necessary for a system to be able to adapt to disturbances: “The ‘available resources’ for adaptive capacity are: economic capital, technology and infrastructure, information, knowledge, institutions, the capacity to learn and social capital” (p. 398). Overall, the ability to “adapt” in the disaster context was seen as the means for impacted communities to “bounce back” with minimal external assistance (Manyena, 2006). As referenced in Nelson, Adger and Brown (2007):

...adaptation is about decision making and the power to implement those decisions. It is a process in which knowledge, experience, and institutional

structures combine together to characterize options and determine action. The process is negotiated and mediated through social groups (p. 398).

Although research on adaptive capacity seems extensive, Parsons et al. (2016) argue that “[a]daptive capacity has been identified as a key component of disaster resilience but is rarely included in disaster resilience assessments” (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 6). In the ANDRI Framework, adaptive capacity encompasses two themes: governance, policy and leadership, and social and community engagement (Parsons et al., 2016).

The ANDRI framework attempts to assess the current level of community resilience by combining indices for both coping and adaptive capacity. The framework was created to assess large communities in Australia and conduct top-down assessments using quantitative data. The authors argue that the use of the framework and quantitative methods in smaller communities would not be feasible. Top-down approaches are better for standardization and comparisons across cases (Sharifi, 2016). However, as discussed in Sharifi (2016), Carter argues that bottom-up assessments conducted through participatory approaches can better identify the needs and priorities of a community. The indices of the ANDRI for coping and adaptive capacity provide a structure by which qualitative interviews can be developed.

When applying the ANDRI coping and adaptive capacities back to the ERA framework, and in conjunction with the concepts of the quality learning environment, my research will narrow in on ERA’s first resilience lever as part of the third resilience component in “how schools provide support and opportunities to students through actions or approaches regarding access, permanence, teaching and learning” (Reyes, 2013, p. 22).

However, utilizing the lens of the ANDRI coping and adaptive capacities of communities to frame the questions for the qualitative interviews as well as analyze the quantitative data, will provide a more holistic approach to exploring the resiliency of the school community and its educators.

Chapter IV - The Context of Nepal

Nepal is known internationally for Mount Everest and its famous Sherpas, who assist climbers from around the world to reach the summit. For many people, this is all they know about Nepal. Others may be aware that the United Nations Committee for Development Policy includes Nepal on its list of “Least Developed Countries”¹¹ and that Nepal is classified by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a “state of fragility” (OECD, 2011d). *Global Finance Magazine* in 2016 ranked Nepal 156 out of 185 poorest countries in the world (Pasquali, 2016). These low rankings are due to the instability and weakness of Nepal’s government structures, insufficient human capital and slow economic development, which is not surprising given Nepal’s turbulent history (OECD, 2015).

Although a poor country, Nepal is rich in diversity—diversity of geography as well as culture, language and religion. The resilience and independence of its people, along with international financial and technical support, have helped Nepal make great strides in improving its rankings on internationally recognized development indicators (World Bank, 2014b). Even during a ten-year civil war that ended in 2006, the country continued to strive to achieve the global Millennium Development and Education for All goals by 2015. And now Nepal committed itself to the Sustainable Development Goals and endeavors to graduate from “Least Developed” to “Developing” country status by 2022 (World Bank, 2014b).

¹¹ Least Developed Countries are “characterized by weak human and institutional capacities, low and unequally distributed income and scarcity of domestic financial resources.”
<http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/>

Just as the deadline approached to assess the status of achieving the 2015 goals, two major earthquakes hit Nepal. The earthquakes set in motion additional events that further destabilized the country for the rest of 2015. The international community responded by committing substantial humanitarian and development aid, as well as sizable remittances from Nepal's own diaspora population abroad. The funds were meant to help Nepal respond, recover and rebuild from the destruction of the natural disasters and, as the Natural Disaster Assessment Report stated, to "build back better." Yet one year after the earthquakes, there was little evidence that infrastructure was being rebuilt. International non-profits were still waiting to disburse the substantial donations they received (Troutman, 2015a).

To "build back better" and reach "developing" country status, Nepal will need to educate its future citizens, not only to improve the economic and government infrastructure of the country, but also to be prepared for future disasters. The best way to do this is through improving access to and quality of its education system. International research indicates that "least developed" countries are more prone to human-made and natural disasters, which drag a country down (UNDP, 2014). Scientists have warned that the earthquakes Nepal experienced in 2015 are just a prelude to even larger quakes (Pulla, 2015).

With Nepal's characterization as a state of fragility, prone to human-made and natural disasters, better management of humanitarian aid for recovering and rebuilding its education system is imperative. To look at Nepal's context and the international relief aid structure to build the education system "back better," this chapter will offer a brief description of the country and historical development of its education system. It will then

review the Education for All achievements reached by 2015, the impact of the earthquakes on the education system and the status of humanitarian aid provided for response, recovery and rebuilding.

Description of the Country

Geography

Nepal is a small, landlocked country engulfed by China and India, and almost totally dependent on India for transit facilities and access to the sea. With eight of the 10 world's tallest mountains and many villages situated in remote, high altitude areas, Nepal's challenging geography significantly defines its people and economy. Geography is also a factor in the increasing intensity of the natural disasters the country experiences.

Nepal has three ecological belts that experience five different seasons, including four monsoon seasons (CIA, 2016; Savada, 1991). The north of the country, where the winters are harsh and the summers mild, is hemmed in by the soaring Himalayas with Mount Everest, Sagarmatha in Nepali, reaching 29,000 feet (8,839 meters). The center of the country, where the capital Kathmandu is located, is dominated by hills that may reach to 8,000 feet (2,438 meters). The southern part of the country consists of lowland plains called the Terai. "Terai" means damp and adequately describes the hot and humid climate of the terrain (CIA, 2016; Savada, 1991). Due to the diversity of its ecosystem and its location on a tectonic plate fault line, Nepal feels the effects of both climate change, with increasingly frequent and severe weather-related natural disasters and earthquakes (World Bank Overview Nepal, 2015). Depending on the severity and frequency of monsoons, thunderstorms, flooding and landslides, drought and famine are becoming more frequent and devastating (Savada, 1991). In his November 2015 address to the

United Nations, Minister of Education Giriraj Mani Pokharel commented that with the impact of global climate change on the country, the incidence and severity of natural disasters will increase (MOE 2015 address to the UN; World Bank Overview Nepal 2015).

Nepal's People

The diversity of Nepal's geography is reflected in its people. Nepal is home to a little more than thirty million people and is slightly larger than Arkansas (CIA, 2016). The country is predominantly an agricultural society, with 80% of the population living in rural areas (CIA, 2016). Reflecting the three ecological belts described above, three principle groups can be defined within the country: the Tibetan-Nepalese in the northern, mountainous terrain; the indigenous Nepalese in the central area of the country; and the Indo-Nepalese in the southern areas of the country (Savana, 1991). The Tibetan-Nepalese located in the north are migratory and predominately rely on raising livestock and seasonal trading to survive (Savana, 1991). The population located in the central hill area, Kathmandu valley, consists predominantly of Brahmins or indigenous-Nepalese. Due to their central location near the capital of the country, Brahmins dominate the political and civil service positions (Savana, 1991). The Terai region in the south, which contains the country's agriculture and lumber wealth, is dominated by Indo-Nepalese, a grouping that is comprised of different tribes that have ties to India (Bennett et al., 2008; Savana, 1991).

However, Nepal's ethnic diversity is more complex. There are nine major ethnic groups and over forty different races and tribes (CIA, 2016). The Chhettri and Brahmin-hill are the two largest ethnic groups comprising approximately 28% of the population

(CIA, 2016). There are more than eight different languages spoken, with Nepali spoken by about 45% of the population (CIA, 2016).

The country is also home to four predominant religions: Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and Kirant, along with several smaller practices (CIA, 2016). In the 1990s Nepal was the only constitutionally declared Hindu country in the world. However, Hindu and Buddhist traditions are extremely intermingled in the country with Hindus and Buddhists worshipping at each other's temples. Even so, in a 2001 census, 81% of the country identified with Hinduism (Bennett et al., 2008).

Nepal has an entrenched caste system which has existed for centuries independently of Hindu influence and still significantly defines people's socio-economic status (Bennett et al., 2008). The system is slowly eroding but still plays an important role in Nepalese society, with those identified in the "untouchable" class as the poorest in the country (Bennett et al., 2008).

Nepal is a "young" country in that children and adolescents, from birth to age 24, comprise over 50% of the population; approximately 31% are under the age of 14 (CIA, 2016). These youths are the future of the country, and in order to become engaged citizens and economically productive, they need access to quality education and higher skilled employment opportunities.

Government

The current Nepalese government is still nascent, having only voted on and passed a new constitution in September 2015. Due to its lack of infrastructure, inability to provide basic services to its citizens, and recurrent conflicts, Nepal is included on the

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's list of "states of fragility" (OECD, 2015). As the OECD describes:

A fragile state has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and its territory, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society. Consequently, trust and mutual obligations between the state and its citizens have become weak (OECD, 2011b, p. 21).

For Nepal, contemporary government trust and mutual obligations have not *become* weak, rather they have not yet had the opportunity to develop.

Until the mid-twentieth century, Nepal maintained a feudalistic, agrarian-based economic structure, in which the caste system reinforced the division of economic classes. The social structure was based on the extended family kinship system; however, it was difficult for the Nepalese peasant to accumulate property or wealth because traditionally upon the death of the male, property was divided among the sons diluting family wealth (Savada, 1991). The feudalistic system started to break down only with the overthrow of the Rana rule of government in 1950-51. Ten years later, although elections were held, then king Mahendra—who believed in his own divine right and feeling threatened by a strong congress—abolished the elected government and all political parties, and instead set up the *panchayat* (partyless) system. The *panchayat* was a system of village councils in which some members were generally elected, but many were appointed by and were loyal to the king; importantly the king maintained absolute authority (Savana, 1991).

There were some reforms under King Mahendra. Malaria was mostly eradicated and a highway was constructed in Terai; land settlement programs encouraged people to

move to the Terai, which saw an increase in agricultural production. The *panchayat* system remained entrenched during the reign of King Mahendra's successor and oldest son, Birenda, although political unrest started to build. In 1980, King Birenda held a first of its kind referendum to allow the people to vote on the panchayat system (Savada, 1991). Fifty-four percent of people who participated voted to support the system, although the small margin signaled to the king that an increasing number of people wanted change (Savada, 1991). Even so, the country saw little reform and very small growth throughout the 1980s.

In 1989 Nepal suffered a major blow when India announced they would not renew trade and transit agreements with Nepal. After negotiations failed, India followed by closing all but two borders, causing economic growth to fall from 9.7% to 1.5% and inflation to increase to 11% in 1988-89 (Savada, 1991). Student demonstrations in Kathmandu erupted, initially aimed at India but quickly turning against the Nepalese government. Increased unrest continued to fester causing the king to end the *panchayat* system in 1990 and institute a "constitutional monarchy" based on the British model.

Although the democracy movement led to a new constitution and parliamentary process, people soon realized that no real change had taken place. Ordinary citizens and various ethnic groups continued to feel that elites held the power, while they themselves remained marginalized with no improvement in government services (Carney & Rappleye, 2011; Hart, 2001). Overall, "democratic rule and demand for equitable access to public services were major concerns arising out of the 'People's Movement'" (Flanagan, 2015, p. xiv). As a result, the "People's War" started to grow stronger resulting in the outbreak of violent conflict in 1996 (Hart, 2001).

During the civil war 1996-2006, tourism dried up and more and more young people went abroad for work. In 2006, a peace agreement was achieved and a parliamentary democracy established with the Maoist party included in the government; however, political instability continued (CIA, 2016). In 2008, a Constituent Assembly was elected. They voted to end the 240-year old monarchy on May 28, 2008 and declared Nepal a federal democratic republic (Oulai & da Costa, 2009). However, when the assembly failed to draft a new constitution by May 2012, the appointed Prime Minister Bhattarai dissolved the Constituent Assembly. Negotiations among the politicians continued until, in 2014, new Constituent Assembly elections were held and a new coalition government formed. After nine years and the impact of two massive earthquakes, a new constitution was finally approved and came into effect in September 2015 (CIA, 2016).

Economy

Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 25% of its population living below the poverty line (CIA, 2016; Flanagan, 2015). In 2015, Nepal ranked 145 out of 188 countries on the UNDP's Human Development Index scale (UNDP HDR, 2015). One-third of the country's GDP comes from agriculture and employs over 70% of its labor force (CIA, 2016). Yet, Nepal has some of the highest malnutrition rates in the world, and unchecked logging is depleting the country's forests and exacerbating the impacts of natural disasters (Savada, 1991; United Nations, 2015).

Tourism made up 8.9% of the economy in 2014 with international tourists lured by the highest mountain peaks in the world and Buddhist temples (WTTC, 2015). Foreign visitors provide employment opportunities for guides and other services, but the

volume of tourists brings its own problems, in relation to infrastructure required and wear and tear on the environment.

In 2008, the unemployment rate was 46% driving many Nepalese to seek work outside the country. It is estimated that 1.92 million Nepalese are employed externally in low-paying jobs (Flanagan, 2015). Nepal is “heavily dependent on remittances,” funds sent back from Nepalese working outside Nepal. The remittance rate is considered the highest in the world and amounts to 30% of the government’s GDP (World Bank, 2016).

Within the country, “low education attainment, in addition to lack of electricity, and political instability constrain higher economic growth” (Flanagan, 2015, p. 2). Given the challenges it faces, Nepal has committed itself to graduate to middle-income (“developing”) country status, as defined by the World Bank, by 2022 and a significant means of reaching “developing” country status will be through educating its youth (World Bank, 2014a).

Historical Background of Educational Development

Nepal’s education system is described as one of the youngest in the world. Up until the 1950s, access to education in Nepal was practically non-existent, except for children of the monarchy and elites (Flanagan, 2015, Savada, 1991). From the 1950s until the official dissolution of the monarchy in 2008, and since that time, international and national influences have been working to improve access to education. The 2000 global summit on Education for All (EFA) established the Dakar Framework, which helped Nepal set concrete goals to improve the provision of education in the country. The decade-long civil war hindered progress but continuing national efforts and significant

international technical and financial support kept Nepal striving to reach the EFA Dakar Framework goals by 2015 (Carney & Rappleye, 2011; Oulai & da Costa, 2009).

Educational Development from 1950s to 1990s

Until the 1950s, the ruling Rana government restricted education to children of elites, for fear of losing power to an educated population (Flanagan, 2015; Savada, 1991). When the Tri-Chandra College was established for children of elites in 1918, its founder, Prime Minister Chandra Shamsheer Rana foretold that it would be the downfall of the Rana rule (Savada, 1991). The desire for increased access to education was ultimately one of the causes of the overthrow of the government (Hart, 2001; Savada, 1991).

Part of the push for increased access to education originated with the return of Nepalese soldiers (Gurkha), who had served and been educated in the British army during WWI, and began teaching in their villages when they returned (Savada, 1991). In addition to the Gurkha, international influence was more directly felt with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) sending technical and financial assistance for educational development (Carney & Rappleye, 2011; Savada, 1991; World Bank, 2009). The Ministry of Education and Sports was created in 1951 with the task of “initiating and systematizing educational activities across the country” (Oulai & da Costa, 2009, p. 130), to be renamed in 1991 as the Ministry of Education (MOE) (Carney & Bista, 2009).

In the 1970s, the *panchayat*, with support provided by USAID, created the National Education Sector Plan (NESP) to centralize the public education system in Nepal (Carney & Bista, 2009). As part of the NESP, the Education Act of 1971 allowed for the establishment of private and public schools. Under the Act, public schools began to receive financial support from the Government of Nepal (GON), and public education,

including textbooks, was to be free up to the secondary level (Carney & Bista, 2009; Flanagan, 2015).

With the establishment of the MOE and the support of USAID, the number of schools in Nepal increased from 321 primary schools and 11 secondary schools in 1951 to 8,708 primary schools that enrolled 59% of children and 2,809 secondary schools enrolling 12% by 1975 (Sellers et. al., 1981; World Bank, 2001). The schools are now commonly classified into three main groups: community or public schools supported by the government; institutional or private schools supported by parents and trustees; and religious schools such as Madrasas (Nepal, 2012a). The public schools can be further categorized into community-aided (fully supported by the government for teachers' salary and other expenses), community-managed (fully supported by the government for teachers' salary and other funds, but their management responsibility lies with the community); and community-unaided (getting either partial or no support from the government) (Nepal, 2012a, p. 6). The government may provide support to religious schools when they agree to follow the government's education acts and regulations and register with the Department of Education (DOE) (Nepal, 2012a).

Nepal's efforts to centralize the education system was challenging in two main respects. The first was the sudden growth of the government's civil service, as teachers and administrators were added to the management and payroll. The second was that local community leaders no longer had control over how education was provided in their communities (Carney & Bista, 2009). As part of the centralization process, the MOE developed a standardized curriculum that was to be taught only in Nepali; this disenfranchised over half of the population who did not speak Nepali as their native

language. Current estimates are that only 45% of the population claim Nepali as their native language (CIA, 2016; Hart, 2001). In addition, although primary education was to be free, the government did not grant enough money to support the public schools and, as a result, the quality was extremely poor. Private schools, able to charge fees, began to propagate, and the disparity in the quality of education available to those who could pay versus those who could not underscored the lower quality and poor management of the public schools (Carney & Bista, 2009). Toward the end of the 1980s, more and more voices called for improvement in the public education system (Carney & Bista, 2009).

Increased focus on education and International Development Agencies

From the 1950s to the 1980s, USAID was the sole international entity aiding Nepal for its educational system (Sellers et. al., 1981). With the increasing calls for improvements in the education system, the United States funded a study in the late 1980s entitled “Improving Efficiency of Educational Systems.” The study identified weaknesses in the centralized system and recommended that the education system be decentralized (Carney & Bista, 2009). In 1990, Nepal became a signatory of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which declares education is a fundamental right of every child, and participated in the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtein, Thailand (United Nations, 1990). Between 1991 and 2001, the downfall of the monarchy and re-emergence of democracy allowed policy makers, who viewed education as key to transforming Nepalese society, to focus on revising the education system (Carney & Bista, 2009).

The MOE, with assistance predominantly from the World Bank, developed a ten-year Basic and Primary Education Master Plan, for which the World Bank conducted a full analysis of Nepal’s education system (Carney & Bista, 2009). The Master Plan

incorporated the ideas of the World Declaration on EFA and planned to shift management of schools to local municipalities (Carney & Bista, 2009). The analysis included models for population growth and measures for quality, efficiency and return on investment (Carney & Bista, 2009). The Bank “communicated that education was an investment” in the future growth and development of the country; that it should be viewed as more than just a social good and the financial investment not wasted (Carney & Bista, 2009).

Although the government tried to lead the decentralization process, international agencies pressured the government on how best to implement it (Carney & Bista, 2009). The World Bank insisted on establishing an autonomous unit within the MOE rather than focusing on students, teachers and communities. Thus a sizable portion of the international support was focused on capacity building within the MOE. As a result, the reform process remained centralized between the international donors and the MOE, marginalizing participation of the local municipalities that were supposed to assume school management (Carney & Bista, 2009). Because local communities did not receive the funding and technical support they needed, the quality of the schools remained low and the proliferation of private schools continued. Nonetheless, the viewpoint that decentralization of the school system and empowerment of the local communities was the only way to improve the school system grew (Carney & Bista, 2009).

Education and the “People’s Movement” – 1990 to 2006

Although Nepal experienced some increase in democracy beginning in the 1990s, tensions and frustrations were building. Access to education was still limited, and efforts to provide instruction in languages other than Nepali continued to be met with resistance

by ruling elites (Hart, 2001). A significant factor in the People's Movement and outbreak of civil war in 1996 was equitable access to public services, especially quality education (Flanagan, 2015). The People's Movement had both negative and positive impacts on education. On the plus side, the Maoists wanted to expand free education without regard to caste, ethnicity, language or gender. They especially wanted to improve access to education for girls and increase female literacy (Hart, 2001). Although the central government declared that education was free, it was not always the case; Maoists would stop local school officials from collecting fees in areas that they controlled (Hart, 2001). Some children felt compelled to join the People's Movement as a way of showing their support for their right to education (Hart, 2001). As one child's perspective was documented: "You didn't give me a chance to study and now I am eager to solve the problems of the people and the nation. I want to fight for liberation" (Hart, 2001, p. 28).

On the negative side, because the movement focused on education, schools were targeted and either destroyed or used as military or political headquarters (HRW, 2007). Teachers and students were abducted, and either conscripted to serve the insurgency or killed. Schools were closed and government financial support for education was redirected to support security services against the insurgency (Karki, 2015; Oulai & Costa, 2009).

During the ongoing conflict, the MOE developed its Second Master Plan from 1997 to 2002. The plan continued to stress decentralization of the education system giving District Education Offices the responsibility of handling the finances, school management and engaging local parent organizations. School Management Committees comprised of parents and local leaders were created as well as Parent Teacher

Organizations in some locations. The MOE continued to be responsible for providing a standardized curriculum for the country (Carney & Bista, 2009).

The Maoists' platform insisted that the government should be responsible for providing free access to public schools, and that efforts to decentralize the public school system were resulting in "inequitable distribution of educational opportunities and resources" (Carney & Bista, 2009, p. 202). In addition, they decried the expansion of private institutions, claiming that schools that catered to elites did not instill a sense of service or proper morality in the students (Carney & Bista, 2009).

In 2000 the World Education Forum was held in Dakar, Senegal. Nepal committed itself to the goals outlined in the Dakar Framework, and the international community committed itself to provide financial and technical support to governments that needed it (Dakar Framework, 2000). Improving the education system in Nepal was seen as serving a "dual purpose of fostering both economic development and peace-building" (Flanagan, 2015, p. xv). Therefore, in order to continue educational services during the conflict, international agencies contributed up to 14% of the budget for educational funding and expanded their involvement in the country (Karki, 2015).

As required by the Dakar Framework, Nepal developed its National Plan of Education (NPE) by 2002 (Nepal, 2012a). In 2004, with international support, the MOE implemented the UNESCO Flash Reporting method to collect educational data at the beginning and end of the school year to track progress in meeting the EFA targets (Nepal, 2012a). Further it adopted the Educational Management Information System (EMIS), a data collection system that informs the Flash Reports. The beginning and end of year

Flash Reports are combined into the Consolidated Reports that provide the overall status of Nepal's efforts to achieve EFA (Nepal, 2012a).

Once the civil war ended and the 2006 peace agreement was signed, the 2007 Interim Constitution established that basic education was a fundamental right of all citizens and emphasized that free education would be provided by the government up to the secondary level. The government's objectives were outlined in the National Development and Strategy Paper (2008) and successive Three-Year Interim Plans (Flanagan, 2015). The most recent three-year plan was 2011-2013, in which education was identified as a priority to alleviate poverty and sustain peace through, as stated in the GON Flash II 2009-2010 Report, "employment-centric, inclusive and equitable economic growth" (Flanagan, 2015, p. 11).

Despite the turmoil of civil war and government instability after the 2006 peace agreement, Nepal strove to achieve the Dakar Framework EFA goals by 2015. With financial and technical support from the international community, the government worked to address the specific challenges the country faced to improve its educational system, and, in doing so, added a seventh goal to the six EFA goals (Karki, 2015; Nepal, 2015b). The seventh goal aims to improve access to education in indigenous languages. The following section outlines the specific challenges facing Nepal in reaching the EFA goals.

Specific Challenges to Achieving Education for All

Nepal's diversity in language, religion, culture and geography create several challenges to its efforts to achieve EFA. The geography of the country contributes to the economic disparity between the urban and rural populations, with unequal access to

government services and opportunities for economic development (Flanagan, 2015). The country depends predominantly on agriculture and, to some extent, service industries and cross-border trade for its economy, and children are expected to help support the family (Flanagan, 2015). In order to encourage children to stay in school, families need to see the benefits education will bring them and their children, which is difficult when unemployment in 2008 was estimated at 46% (CIA, 2016; Flanagan, 2015). In addition, children need to feel they are progressing in their studies, and achieving knowledge and skills that are more valuable than immediate family needs and cultural expectations (Save the Children, 2010). In my interview with a Nepalese woman, Sradda Thappa, she shared a story of a family who sent their sons to school. The boys obtained their education, but in order to find employment, the older son had to leave the village. As part of Nepalese culture, one child is expected to stay with the parents to care for them. Since the second son had gone to school as well, he did not learn the family business that had been handed down from generation to generation, trading butter across the border with China. As a result, the family suffered economically since other sources of employment in the village were scarce (Thappa, 2009).

The government needs to ensure quality education that is universally accessible, and demonstrate its practical benefits (Save the Children, 2010). Yet government funding even with the addition of international aid is insufficient, especially for rural schools. School facilities are limited or decaying, and teachers and administrators are poorly supported (Aryal, 2013). Rural families feel that in order for their children to obtain a quality education, they need to send their children to urban areas. During the civil war, trafficking of children increased, with traffickers taking children and money from parents

in the countryside and promising their son or daughter would be educated in Kathmandu. Instead, the children were sold into slavery, left in “orphanages” run mostly by international agencies, or just abandoned (Grennan, 2010).

The diversity of languages in the country poses additional difficulties. The ruling elites were historically reluctant to grant access to education in any other language than Nepali, although only 45% of the country spoke the language. Even when education in other native languages was allowed, it would be extremely difficult for a student to access secondary schools and tertiary schools if he or she did not learn Nepali and/or English (Acharya, 2007). Faced with poor quality schools, economic concerns and language challenges, children and their families become frustrated. The children may attend school for one or two years and then drop out to help their families (Save the Children, 2010).

Educational access for girls was especially fraught. The disparity between male and female access to education became obvious when the literacy rate was measured by gender—66% for males and 42% females (Nepal, 2004). Culturally, Nepal is a patriarchal society in which women were granted limited access to education or other opportunities. Education for girls was not considered important, as a girl was expected to prepare for marriage at an early age and not “become a ‘burden’ to (her) parents” (Yeo, 2008). In the Terai region, madrasas provided girls the only access to education (Yeo, 2008). Yet because the curriculum taught by the madrasas was generally not recognized by the Nepalese government, once girls completed the course of study, the only opportunity for further education was to go abroad to a school in India or Pakistan (Yeo, 2008). Most families did not have the financial means. Due to the limited opportunities

for education, teachers were predominately male adding another barrier to encourage girls to attend school (Acharya, 2007).

The Nepal government needs to ensure that public schools are sufficiently funded, well managed and provide a quality education in order to overcome the challenges of engaging children in relevant education, increase access to education for girls, and create linkages to economic opportunities. Otherwise, the country will continue to struggle with a low-skilled workforce unable to contribute to increased development.

2015 Assessment of Nepal's Education for All Achievements

UNESCO and other international development agencies praised Nepal for its impressive efforts to achieve the Education for All goals by 2015, especially during a civil war and times of government instability (Karki, 2015; Nepal, 2015b). The School Level Educational Statistics of Nepal: Consolidated Report 2011 (Nepali year 2068) and the Education for All (EFA) National Review Report 2000-2015 captured the statistical data that confirmed the progress Nepal made in relation to the six goals of the 2000 Dakar Framework. Yet, even with these glowing reports, stories of unequal access, lack of quality and poor management were prevalent (Flanagan, 2015). In addition, the reports were compiled and produced prior to the April and May 2015 earthquakes (Nepal, 2015b).

Based on the 2000 Dakar Framework, Nepal adopted the following seven Education for All Goals, and included a seventh based on the needs of the country (Nepal, 2015b):

1. Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children.
2. Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities have access to free and compulsory primary education of good quality.
3. Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programs.
4. Achieving 50% improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.
5. Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2015 and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in, basic education of good quality.
6. Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills.
7. Ensuring the right of indigenous people and linguistic minorities to basic and primary education through mother tongue.

The MOE utilized the EMIS to collect biannually comprehensive data on students, teachers and schools for the Flash Reports. The information from the Flash Reports were then used to generate the national Consolidated Reports that tracked Nepal's progress toward achieving the EFA goals (Nepal, 2015b). The EFA National Review Report data show that, based on statistical comparisons between 2001 and 2012 and targets for 2015, Nepal was on its way to achieving the EFA goals 1, 2 and 5 by 2015 (Nepal, 2015b, p. 12). To address goals 3 and 7—to encourage children from marginalized groups to attend school—scholarships were created and implemented (Karki, 2015). Goal 3—vocational and skills-focused education programs—was offered as non-formal education to make it relevant to the needs of older youths and adults (Karki, 2015).

In an independent evaluation for the World Bank, the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) noted that indicators for increased enrollment and gender parity showed Nepal met or exceeded its targets (Karki, 2015; Flanagan, 2015). The Secretary of the Ministry of Education indicated that for the past few years, more girls than boys were sitting for the Secondary School Leaving Examinations (Nepal, 2015b). Per the 2013 Flash Report, net enrollment at the primary level increased from 80.1% in 2000 to 95.3% in 2013 (Karki, 2015).

The 2011 Consolidated Report shows an increase in the availability of access to lower secondary, then secondary schools; however the statistics are not broken down geographically, raising the question of whether increased access was reflected across the country (Nepal, 2012a).

Progress was made on goals 3 and 4 related to literacy, but there was still far to go. A 2008 Nepal Labor Force Survey II reported youth literacy for males at 91% and females at 75.8%, but there was a large variation between the urban and rural areas. The male literacy rate in urban areas was almost 96%, but only 90% in rural areas; female literacy in urban areas was just over 90%, but 72.8% in rural areas (Nepal, 2012a). To address goal 4, the government implemented in 2009 the Nepalese National Literacy Campaign Program, which provided instruction in both native languages and Nepali and created learning programs at Community Learning Centers (Karki, 2015). A variety of other programs reported improvements in literacy, but some statistics were not reported to the government and so not reflected in the national statistics; therefore, literacy rates in Nepal may be more improved than reflected in the 2008 statistics (Karki, 2015).

In comparison to the significant achievements Nepal has made toward goals 1 through 5 of EFA, goals 6 and 7 of providing relevant quality education and access to education in indigenous languages that keeps children in school remains challenging (Karki, 2015). Flanagan's report indicates that teacher allocations and the ability for local communities to manage the school system were poor (Flanagan, 2015). Political issues in managing the school system continue to hinder teachers' and parents' involvement in the schools, and the 2015 EFA GMR indicates that "parents' engagement in school management has decreased over the years" (Karki, 2015, p. 15). Data show that the education system is still encumbered by high repetition rates and learning achievement remains low (Karki, 2015).

When Nepal joined the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) in 2009, it gained access to new sources of financial support and received funding from the World Bank.

The newly established government of Nepal, with the support of international multilateral and bilateral organizations, clearly supported the Education for All goals and made efforts to improve all aspects of its education system, at least at the national government level. As the 2015 deadline approached, Nepal had made great strides in achieving its goals and was set to progress further with the newly established Sustainable Development goals and EFA Incheon Declaration. Then four months into 2015, the country was hit with two devastating earthquakes and hundreds of minor aftershocks that severely tested the country's resilience and efforts to leave behind its "least developed country" status.

2015 Earthquakes

On April 25, 2015 Nepal experienced a 7.8 magnitude earthquake, recognized as the "Gorkha" earthquake, followed by hundreds of sizable aftershocks, and two weeks later a second devastating earthquake of 7.3 magnitude (BBC, 2015; Burke et al., 2015; Nepal, 2015a). "The earthquake-impacted area is 8,744 square miles, a size equivalent to the state of New Jersey. It includes some of the world's highest and most dangerous mountains" (Troutman, 2015c). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid (UNOCHA) Flash Appeal report estimated the total number of people impacted at 2.8 million (United Nations, 2015). The number of deaths surpassed 8,600, with 100,000 injured (Nepal, 2015a; United Nations, 2015). Reports by UNOCHA, UNICEF and other response organizations stated that more than one million children needed assistance (United Nations, 2015). The Prime Minister activated Nepal's National Disaster Response Framework and the Natural Disaster Relief Funds. In addition, a call was sent out to the international community for support (Nepal, 2015a).

Initial Impacts

Out of Nepal's 75 districts, 39 districts were impacted with 14 districts identified as "severely impacted" (United Nations, 2015). The country not only suffered significant loss of infrastructure, housing and roads but also many historic and cultural sites including World Heritage Sites were destroyed (Nepal 2015a; United Nations, 2015). The earthquakes destabilized the mountainous terrain causing landslides that blocked and further damaged roads, hindering the humanitarian response efforts to reach victims (United Nations, 2015).

UNOCHA proposed to extend the humanitarian appeal from an initial three months, beginning in April, until September due to the June-September monsoon season (United Nations, 2015). UNOCHA anticipated that the approaching monsoon rains would further exacerbate the humanitarian crisis since the ground would be even more susceptible to landslides and flooding due to the impact of the earthquakes (Nepal, 2015a). The added destruction would further hinder access to remote locations in need of earthquake relief assistance (United Nations, 2015). So the flash appeal was extended to five months, with the idea that the additional time would also allow for the identification of "issues of concern and vulnerability to be addressed in longer-term recovery—particularly those related to protection, emergency education, the restoration of primary health care and livelihood support" (United Nations, 2015, p. 13).

Even though UNOCHA extended the humanitarian appeal from three to five months, on May 26th, a few weeks after the second earthquake, the Nepalese government began to charge customs duties up to 20% on humanitarian aid, except for medicine and tarps, being brought into the country by international agencies. The tax was applied to

such items as rope that is used to set-up tarps for emergency shelters and temporary schools (Troutman, 2015c). The government made it difficult for non-profits not already registered to register in the country; therefore, a non-registered non-profit would have to partner with an already legally recognized organization to provide aid (United Nations, 2015).

Impelled by the devastation, the Nepalese government passed a new constitution in September 2015 in an effort to help the country recover. Instead, the new constitution ended up “stoking old political fault lines” (Kumar, 2016). Indigenous groups began protests, declaring that they were not equally represented in the process of developing or passing the constitution. The protests turned violent causing India to close the border, preventing much needed supplies from entering the country, especially gas and supplies for earthquake victims. More than 50 people were reported killed in the protests which lasted from October 2015 to February 2016 (Kumar, 2016). Tensions between Nepal and India grew as Nepal claimed that India was interfering in internal affairs in support of indigenous groups with close ties to India (*Outsider Magazine*, 2016; Pokharel, 2015; United Nations, 2015). When aid relief ground to a halt due to the constitutional protests and blockade in the south, more people perished without materials for sufficient shelter during the harsh winter (Kumar, 2016).

In addition to the monsoon season disasters and the political unrest, Nepal was inundated with well-intentioned international humanitarian response agencies that brought their own complications and maneuvering. The initial response by international relief teams and agencies was impressive. However, communication and coordination were lacking. Although the Flash Appeal indicated that all “sectors” were working

closely with the government of Nepal to respond to the crisis in an effort to “build back better,” the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) report highlighted that the humanitarian response was not well coordinated, with duplication of efforts in some cases and unbalanced efforts in others (Flash Appeal, 2015; Nepal, 2015a). Due to landslides, flooding and general destruction, many of the roads and access points to victims were impassible. The only way to reach some of the victims was with helicopters, of which only three were available in the country (Troutman, 2015c). Therefore, it is unclear how well relief services and supplies were distributed, leaving “wasteful and unnecessary surpluses in some locations and dangerous deficits in others” (DAP, 2015). As highlighted in a report published by the Disaster Accountability Project (DAP), relief organizations that responded to the DAP’s survey did not specify exactly where their services had been provided, raising red flags about the size of the areas the organizations indicated. “There is a real concern that some organizations may distribute more aid in easier to access locations of hard-hit districts without specifying their activity on a village-level” (DAP, 2015).

In addition, the amount and kind of actual materials provided is unknown, due to the number and intersecting relationships of relief organizations, in which multiple agencies may report on the same aid. Independent journalist Emily Troutman assessed the reports of 45 aid organizations and counted the number of tarps recorded as having been provided. It was 3 million, or four times the amount documented by the shelter coordination officials, who reported that only 762,000 people had received shelter (Troutman, 2015c). This illustrates how the government was unable to track who received what kind of and how much aid.

The international community also responded through donations, but again, it is difficult to track the total amount received from whom, and how it was distributed. The UNOCHA Flash Appeal was initiated in April 2015, with 78 organizations requesting funding up to US \$422 million for 183 projects (Flash Appeal, 2015). As of the PDNA report's publication date in June 2015, US\$129.1 million (31%) of the appeal was met (Nepal, 2015a). However, the Flash Appeal report indicated that only 28% (US\$119.6 million) of the request was received (United Nations, 2015). On its website, Charity Navigator reported that "330 humanitarian agencies launched 2,200 different relief programs and services," some of which are listed in the Flash Appeal (Charity Navigator, 2016). Charity Navigator reported that charities listed on its website communicated they had received US\$230.7 million. Save the Children reported the highest amount receiving US\$56.3 million (Charity Navigator, 2016).

The PDNA showed that the United Nations, international multilateral agencies and over sixty countries contributed assistance following the earthquakes (Nepal, 2015a). The Flash Appeal reported that the private sector contributed the most significant support with companies such as Coca-Cola, UPS and Microsoft (30%) followed by the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocations (12%) (United Nations, 2015). However, some of the private sector companies that contributed funds indicated that they gave them to charities responding to the crisis (Petroff & Rooney, 2015). In addition, Flanagan reports that the GON was able to generate US\$300 million in additional funding. However, it is unclear where this money is from, whether it is an amount that is double counted from ongoing development projects or a separate area of funding (Flanagan, 2015). The World Bank reported that remittances from Nepalese

workers outside Nepal rose from 3.2% in 2015 to close to 30%, an estimated US\$6.6 billion (Subedi, 2016). The total picture of financial aid available to Nepal is opaque at best.

Even though it seems that significant donations were generated for Nepal, in fact the majority of the aid was directed to international organizations and not local Nepalese groups. From analysis conducted by Emily Troutman, only 0.8% of the Flash Appeal aid was provided to Nepali organizations (Troutman, 2015b). The DAP reports that some of the organizations soliciting donations did not have a presence in Nepal, but “re-granted” funds to local organizations. Other international organizations had to partner with Nepalese organizations for language, cultural and in-country skills, or because the international organizations were new and unable to register in Nepal quickly enough (DAP, 2015). When these organizations accept funds, they outsource to other organizations to provide the humanitarian aid directly or further subcontract out; each organization and subcontractor takes its share of administrative costs (DAP, 2015; Troutman, 2015a). In a survey conducted by Charity Navigator, 34 out of 35 charities that responded to the survey said they worked with “other charity and/or organizations while providing relief in Nepal” (Charity Navigator, 2016).

Donors and most non-profits are told that 10% to 12% is the accepted standard for administrative costs (Troutman, 2015c). Save the Children and CARE state upfront that 10% of all donations received will be used to cover administrative costs. However, during her investigation, Troutman contacted the Save the Children media representative who revealed that 10% was an average across all of its programs. In humanitarian situations, such as Nepal’s, the administrative costs were upwards of 30% (Troutman,

2015c). The Disaster Accountability Project investigation found that one in ten organizations does not even guarantee where donations will go (Esslemont, 2015).

In June following the earthquakes, the Government of Nepal set out to establish the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) in order to manage the US\$4.1 billion in financial aid to the country (Kumar, 2016). Amid political infighting between the Prime Minister and the opposition party over who would control the NRA, the Authority was not launched until January 2016, almost a full year after the earthquakes. Even though the NRA was officially launched, there were no staff, as the new Chief Executive Office was unable to garner political support (Kumar, 2016; Shakya, 2016).

In addition to establishing the NRA, the government wanted to put in place requirements for the construction of earthquake resistant buildings before reconstruction took place. At the one-year anniversary of the earthquakes, only limited reconstruction had occurred and the government had still not issued the new quake resistant building codes (Kumar, 2016). Nepali officials blame the delay in reconstruction on the blockade caused by the protests in the south (BBC Asia, 2016). In the meantime, “Tens of thousands of earthquake victims prepare to endure a second monsoon season without adequate housing,” and the country risked additional protests and unrest (Kumar, 2016). The government requested an increase in international donor support from US\$7 billion to US\$8 billion, without providing specifics of why (BBC Asia, 2016).

Given the delay in disbursing or utilizing the humanitarian aid that was generated in response to the earthquake, some donors and aid organizations turned away. International aid workers agreed that the government bureaucracy was the hold-up in reconstruction efforts, and that some organizations gave up as a result (Kumar, 2016).

“We just lost a donor who wanted to give \$400,000,” UNESCO’s representative to Nepal, Christian Manhart, told AP news agency (Kumar, 2016). UNESCO still had US\$1.8 million earmarked for Nepal but not yet spent it as of 2016 according to AP reports (Kumar, 2016).

Longer-term Impacts

Within a month of the April 25 earthquake, a Post Disaster Needs Assessment was conducted based on a methodology provided by the international community (Nepal, 2015a). The results of the analysis estimated that the total cost for rebuilding Nepal, due to damages and losses, would be US\$7 billion (Nepal, 2015a). To indicate the scope of the loss, the report described the effect of the devastation as the equal to one-third the Gross Domestic Product of the country in 2013-2014 (Nepal, 2015a).

Although Nepal was making progress in lowering the percentage of the population who fell below the poverty line, the earthquakes’ destruction of infrastructure, health services, sanitation, and education negatively impacted the poorer and more vulnerable segments of the population (Nepal, 2015a). The World Bank estimated that approximately 700,000 additional Nepalese would fall below the poverty line, predominately in the rural mountain and hill regions (Nepal, 2015a). “Many people affected by the disaster are highly vulnerable on the basis of socio-economic language, religious caste, ethnic and geographic factors” (United Nations, 2015, p. 6). In particular, it was projected that nine of the fourteen most affected districts would be pushed to even lower scores on the Human Development Index (HDI), with the disruption of education as well as other impacts that would have lasting effects on “multidimensional poverty” (United Nations, 2015).

The PDNA highlighted that the damage of the earthquakes would have greater short and long-term impacts on women and girls because water sources and sanitation facilities were destroyed. Women/girls would need to travel further to obtain water for household chores, and access to available and safe sanitation facilities was impeded. In addition, the loss of income for a family would most likely increase trafficking of children, child marriage, child labor as well as gender-based violence (Nepal, 2015a, Forward XVII; United Nations, 2015).

The fourteen worst impacted districts have a lot of “out-migration” to jobs overseas, and these districts received a high amount of remittances that support the local households (Nepal, 2015a). The Needs Assessment indicated that many of these migrants returned home since the earthquake to rebuild their houses and help their families. Their return brought skilled labor and connectivity to the outside world and necessary resources for the area. However, the level of remittances was expected to fall, due to shifts in migration and the outpouring already sent in 2015 (Nepal, 2015a; Subedi, 2016).

Impacts on Education and Humanitarian Response

The April 25th earthquake happened on a Saturday when children were not in school. The May 12th 7.3 aftershock occurred at 12:35 pm on a Tuesday, when, if children were at school, they were outside for lunch. As the BBC reported, “a nurse in Namche Bazaar, Rhita Doma Sherpa, told Reuters: ‘The school building is cracked and bits of it, I can see, they have collapsed. It was lunchtime. All the kids were outside’” (BBC Asia, 2015). As a result, the loss of children’s lives was a minimum compared to what it could have been, considering reports of the number of schools that collapsed. The PDNA, which was conducted within a month after the first earthquake, reported that

7,000 schools were completely destroyed or severely damaged (Nepal, 2015a). The Flash Appeal's statistics provided more details by indicating that 30,000 classrooms were destroyed and another 15,350 were damaged (United Nations, 2015).

The Flash Appeal reported that the earthquakes left an estimated 1.5 million children out of school overall. Through the UNOCHA's Financial Tracking System, nineteen responding international agencies requested US\$24 million for humanitarian assistance to address the immediate educational needs of one million children for the districts impacted.

The Flash Appeal's Education cluster requested projects that would focus on the following strategic objectives (United Nations, 2015, p. 11):

1. Children, including adolescents, access protective learning environments, psychosocial support, and child protection services including family reunification, prevention and response to trafficking.
2. Protection systems to ensure physical security of vulnerable populations including prevention and response to gender-based violence (GBV) are strengthened.
3. Restoring vital social services—including education—with a view to integrating disaster risk reduction and improving resilience.

The Priority Actions of the Flash Appeal for Education were listed as (United Nations, 2015, p. 20):

1. Targeted girls' and boys' access to early childhood, primary and secondary education in safe and protective learning spaces.

2. Through quality age-appropriate learning, targeted girls and boys acquire lifesaving and disaster preparedness skills and psychosocial support to restore wellbeing and build the resilience of children and their communities.

A month later the PDNA assessed the estimated monetary impact of the disaster on the education system at US\$397 million, with 80% of the damages and losses concentrated in the fourteen districts most severely impacted (Nepal, 2015a, p. xix). Public schools accounted for 92% of the total damages and losses (Nepal, 2015a, p. 11). International donations submitted for education were distributed to three international organizations and only met 47% (US\$11 million) of the requested total (United Nations, 2015). As a result, the Flash Appeal funded projects only reached an estimated 13,700 children, 1% of its goal (United Nations, 2015).

The short-term plan for recovery was to remove debris, provide temporary or transitional learning spaces and instructional materials, conduct structural assessments of schools that were damaged, and provide psychosocial support and vocational training in construction related fields (Nepal, 2015a). The Flash Appeal indicated that international organizations would work with communities to “ensure actors such as school management committees and the Village Development committees (VDCs) are engaged to support the provision of education activities, including through cash-for-work when appropriate” (United Nations, 2015, p. 36).

As with the general response to the earthquakes, it is difficult to track the actual impact of the humanitarian response on education. Many of the international non-profit organizations published reports for their donor audience on the impact of their donations, but the PDNA noted that the distribution of aid was imbalanced, due to lack of access and

overlapping responses (Nepal, 2015a). As Emily Troutman reported on her website Aid.Works, three different non-profits may have reported providing tarps for school shelters. However, one organization may have provided the tarp, another may have delivered the tarp to the site, while a third organization may have coordinated the tarp being delivered. All three non-profits reported that they provided a tarp (Troutman, 2015c). As a result, it is difficult to determine from the various non-profit donor reports exactly how many tarps were provided and how many have been counted multiple times. Each non-profit engaged in the provision of the tarps took a share of administrative costs, driving up the price of each tarp (Troutman, 2015c).

To provide an example of some reports from responding organizations, the UNOCHA Flash Appeal provided funds to three international organizations and reported that the funds donated for education helped provide as of May 2015:

- Establishment of 137 Temporary Learning Centers (TLC) and Child Friendly Spaces (CFS) in 16 districts;
- Orientation on psychosocial support and lifesaving messages for 94 teachers and facilitators and ongoing Master Trainings of Trainers;
- Structural assessments of 1,231 schools;
- Electronic data gathering by 100 structural engineering teams working in the affected districts on levels of damage and classification of classroom safety (United Nations, 2015, p. 35).

UNICEF received over 90% (US\$10 million) of its request and the bulk of the Flash Appeal donations. It is unclear if the list of aid provided above represents how the total amount of funds for education were spent, or just the funds UNICEF received

(United Nations, 2015). Plan International was the second Flash Appeals recipient receiving US\$275,000, or 13% of its request (United Nations, 2015). In its own report it states that it raised US\$25 million and spent US\$12 million by April 2016. With the funds received, Plan says that it built 310 temporary schools to provide safe learning spaces for 21,000 children in five of the fourteen worst affected districts. Plan says that in the year after the earthquakes, it helped 117,230 children by building TLCs with drinking water and bathroom facilities; distributing student kits; training early childhood care and development facilitators and teachers; and distributing supplies to winterize TLCs (Plan, 2016). ACT Alliance member Finn Church Aid (FCA) received the least amount of funds, 55% of its request at US\$664,000. FCA reported that with funds received from UNICEF, it constructed TLCs for 20,000 students and would repair partially damaged schools and repair or tear down unsafe ones (Act Alliance, 2016).

Reviewing the reports of the 330 organizations that reported donations received to Charity Navigator, it is clear that additional donations went to support education, but where, when and how are unclear. Save the Children reported that it and its “partners” constructed 586 TLCs for 193,000 students in nine of the worst affected districts (Save the Children, 2016). It does not list its “partners” nor which districts. Further research will need to be done to determine exactly where its impact was felt. The organization also provided educational materials, teacher-learning kits and back-to-school bags (Save the Children, 2016). It may be possible that SOS Children’s Villages was a partner of Save the Children, as SOS CV reported providing 9,000 students with uniforms and school supplies (Charity Navigator, 2016).

Nepal announced that classes resumed on May 31, 2015 in temporary learning centers but reports from international non-profit organizations and investigative journalists contradict this (Flanagan, 2015; Plan, 2016a; Save the Children, 2016). Although there was a focus on constructing TLCs, as Emily Troutman reported from her on-the-ground observations the structures were tents, which would be unable to stand up to heavy rains and winds of the approaching monsoon season (Troutman, 2015c). Troutman's report goes further to question the use of humanitarian funds for tents with the following example from the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA): "the 'Temporary Learning Centers,' which are actually just tents, are indicated to cost US\$76,174. Their plans state that they will erect 26 tents at an estimated cost of US\$2,929 for each. This amount could build a permanent classroom, but the plan is for tents instead" (Troutman, 2015).

As Nepal marked the one-year anniversary of the Gorkha earthquake, Nepalese protested the reconstruction delays and government inaction while the international community assessed the status of the recovery (Taylor, 2016). As of April 2016, no permanent schools had been rebuilt or repaired by the government (UNICEF, 2016). Reconstruction was delayed first by delay in establishing the National Reconstruction Authority, then by protests and subsequent border closings, and lastly by the desire of the government to establish earthquake resistant building codes before reconstruction started.

Plan International's one-year report indicates that children felt they were studying in unsafe environments and in schools without adequate sanitation facilities (Plan, 2016). Even though 3,576 TLC were constructed, children reported attending school less frequently than before the earthquakes (Plan, 2016).

There are documented cases of children not returning to school either because they needed to help support their families, or due to safety or other concerns. Lack of safe environments at school, including secure bathroom facilities, meant girls felt less confident returning to school (Plan, 2016). Girls who are unable to access education are more vulnerable to being pressured into early child marriage and/or exposed to sexual and gender violence (Nepal, 2015a). A report from UNICEF Canada states that during the year following the earthquakes, the police prevented 850 girls and boys from possibly being trafficked (UNICEF, 2016). Yet one village alone reported that 80 girls had gone missing, possibly as a result of trafficking (World at School, 2016). The number of children possibly being trafficked was 20% higher than statistics from the year before (UNICEF, 2016). The UNICEF report clarified that the increased percentage could be due to either the increased vigilance by the police resulting in more traffickers being caught or the extenuating circumstance of the earthquakes (UNICEF, 2016). In any case, the statistic only speaks to the number of cases that were prevented.

The damage from the earthquakes resulted in both girls and boys having to spend more time working to support their families (Plan, 2016). In a photo journal of the anniversary of the earthquakes, *The Atlantic* published a photo of a ten-year-old boy working at a brick factory to help support his family (Taylor, 2016).

The need to deliver education and related services for earthquake-impacted children is indisputable. Yet, the international and government response did not seem to meet the needs of those impacted. Charity Navigator asked agencies to report on the short-term support they provided. What is contradictory is that overall, the charities say that the support they provided “has been successful” (Charity Navigator, 2016).

However, reports continued to indicate that only temporary schools had been built, and 28 out of the 35 charities that responded to the survey were still accepting donations to help fund their efforts in the country, which they claim is still in dire need (Charity Navigator, 2016).

The UNOCHA Flash Appeal references the term to “build back better;” however, UNICEF indicates that its goal for Nepal is to build 800 “semi-permanent” schools that consist of two classrooms each (UNICEF, 2016). Plan International also refers to building “semi-permanent” schools—which do not fit the aspirational specifications to “build back better.”

International research indicates that “least developed” countries are more prone to human-made and natural disasters, which drag a country down (UNDP, 2014). Scientists have warned that the earthquakes Nepal experienced in 2015 are just a prelude to even larger quakes (Pulla, 2015). Leading up to 2015, Nepal made great strides toward the EFA and MDG goals, but the dual earthquakes in 2015 hampered that trajectory. The international community responded to the disaster by providing humanitarian aid, however the needs far outweighed the response. Reports from international humanitarian aid organizations do not provide a complete picture as to the level of funding provided, the scope of aid distributed, and how local educators got children back to school. The international community touts the phrase “build back better” and the government of Nepal reiterated its intention to reach “developing” country status by 2020. A key to resuming this trajectory is improved understanding of the limitations of humanitarian aid, and how educators overcome the limitations to continue to provide education to their students in times of disaster.

Chapter V – Research Methodology, Conceptual Frameworks and Implementation

UNOCHA reported that humanitarian funding and support for education only reached 1% of the impacted population in Nepal. Although the Ministry of Education stated that schools reopened a month after the Gorkha earthquake, some rural schools were still struggling to hold classes in temporary learning centers two and a half years after the earthquakes struck—with no aid in sight. My experience visiting a rural school in Nepal in 2016, and comparing the school’s reality to the dialogue of the international community, points to a chasm in understanding the developing country context as it relates to resiliency in times of crises. The purpose of my study sought to expand understanding of the distribution of humanitarian aid as reported by the IASC Education Cluster 3W report, and to obtain the perspectives and actions of the educators in rural communities impacted by the earthquakes on reopening their schools.

Therefore, my research aimed to answer the following questions:

Quantitative: *As reported by the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, what is the relationship between the intensity (level) and type of humanitarian aid received (school kits, recreation kits, temporary learning centers and teacher training) by schools in the 14 worst earthquake-hit districts, and the distance from Kathmandu and school population?*

Qualitative: *What are the perspectives of community educators on the level and type of humanitarian aid received after the 2015 earthquakes?*

What coping capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes?

What adaptive capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes?

As my qualitative research included adult participants (no children), I had minimal difficulty in obtaining approval from the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (IRB). After submitting my interview protocol and the confirmations from the headmasters to participate in the study, I received IRB approval on October 30, 2017. Since the headmasters did not have access to the internet, the IRB approved the submission of emails from my interpreter stating that she had sent my translated email invitation to each respective headmaster and he/she agreed for their school to participate in the study. I was unable to obtain the written approval for one school until I was in Nepal. The IRB allowed me to submit that headmaster's agreement in an amendment.

In this chapter, I will describe the methodological approach and design of my study, the conceptual framework, the quantitative heatmaps, case study sites and participant selection, data collection, and data analysis. I will then discuss the quality and limitations of the study as well as ethics.

Research Methodology and Design

I chose to conduct a mixed methods research design in order to peel back the layers of complexity that shrouded the humanitarian and development aid response for education after the 2015 earthquakes, and to obtain the perspectives of the educators directly impacted. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) discuss two major purposes for mixed methods research as outlined by Green et. al. (1989): complementary and expansion. The complementary purpose is to enhance, illustrate and clarify the results from one method with results from another. The purpose of expansion is to “expand the

breadth and range of research” by utilizing the results from one method to further illuminate the research conducted by the other method (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 22). The design of the research was to conduct a quantitative analysis of data to provide a foundation for the qualitative research. The quantitative and qualitative data were then compared and contrasted through structural coding and subcoding approaches (Saldaña, 2013).

Epistemological and Ontological Approach

As I set out to investigate the recovery of the rural school systems in Nepal after the earthquakes, it was evident that numerical data on the number of students and schools impacted, and the level of aid provided, left out the voices of educators ultimately responsible for literally picking up the pieces. The available international reports focused on the humanitarian assistance given to students, whom international organizations considered the key beneficiaries. The reports did not include the local educators and the role they played in their schools’ recovery. Yet local educators were ultimately responsible and invested in ensuring their schools reopened. My research focus was to investigate the rural educators’ perspectives on the aid received and their own actions. Therefore, the epistemological approach of my research was one of inquiry rather than evaluation, as described by Eisner (1997, in Wise, p. 162). Creswell (2013) describes this form of inquiry best as “pragmatic” in which the researcher “focus(es) on the outcomes of the research—the actions, situations, and consequences of inquiry” (Creswell, 2013, p. 28).

The pragmatic approach does not seek to prove a theory or cause and effect as the more traditional research method of postpositivism does. Instead, the approach seeks to

answer the research questions within the context of the situation by utilizing a variety of research methods (Creswell, 2013). The method is flexible and considers that “truth is what works at the time; it is not based in a dualism of between reality independent of the mind or within the mind” (Creswell, 2013, p. 28).

The epistemological approach of the qualitative component of my research can also be seen through the lens of social constructivism. As Creswell (2013) describes, through this lens the “goal of research, then, is to rely as much as possible on the participants’ view of the situation” (p. 24). Social constructivism is also referred to as interpretivism in that the researcher, aware of his/her position, interprets the responses of participants to open-ended questions that allow them to describe their experience within their historic and cultural setting (Creswell, 2013). By gathering the perspectives and experiences of the educators, and reflecting on my own position within the research, I searched for patterns to help explain a complex situation.

As the main purpose of my research was inquiry rather than evaluation, I felt the need to create a foundation on which to launch the inquiry. As Creswell defines the pragmatic research approach, “reality is known through using many tools of research that reflect both deductive (objective) evidence and inductive (subjective) evidence” (Creswell, 2013, p. 37). The objective evidence available was the reported level and type of humanitarian aid distributed by international organizations. The deductive analysis of the aid would then be compared with the experiences of the educators from their perspectives. Combining the quantitative data on the distribution of aid provides a clearer picture of the aid that was provided, and the role educators played in reopening their schools. By analyzing the quantitative data and comparing it to the qualitative responses,

the information provided by one method of research is then confirmed or contested by the other form of research, triangulating sources of data to increase validity (Creswell, 2013). As Eisner is cited in Wise (2007), “Using multiple methods of research makes our studies ‘more complete and informative’” (p. 163). Given the limited number of beneficiaries that received educational aid, the validity of the quantitative data is questioned: a school with 200 students realistically cannot continue when provided one tent that holds one classroom of 20 to 25 students. To understand the response and recovery of the school community, it is necessary to conduct qualitative research, which as Creswell describes, “means that the researchers try to get as close as possible to the participants being studied” (Creswell, 2013, p. 20). The purpose of the multisite case study is described by Creswell (2013) as instrumental, in that I attempt to better understand a specific issue. Creswell (2013) indicates that typically researchers do not like to develop generalizations from multiple case studies, as the individual contexts of each case may vary. However in the context of my research questions, the need to gather perspectives from multiple case sites—in order to discover similarities and differences among the cases—is inherent to understanding the issue of the distribution of humanitarian aid and the experiences of teachers. From an ontological perspective, the multisite case studies provided richer descriptions of the viewpoints and realities experienced by educators than the quantitative data alone.

Within the context of my research, the questions posed to each participant were broad to allow the individual to respond within the context of their relationship to the school, community and experience of the disaster. As Creswell describes, “Evidence of multiple realities includes the uses of multiple forms of evidence in themes using the

actual words of different individuals and presenting different perspectives” (Creswell, 2013, p. 20). By gathering multiple individual perspectives, I as the researcher “inductively develop a theory or pattern of meaning” (Creswell, 2013, p. 25), to provide insight into the real extent to which educators drew upon their resilience. The theory or patterns from the qualitative research are then compared, analyzed and reflected upon in relation to the quantitative data, in order to determine if assertions can be formulated as to the outcomes of the research.

Research Design


The pragmatic epistemological approach to my study guided me to utilize both quantitative and qualitative data to better inform the research questions. As the emphasis of the research was to explore the resilience capability of educators—to meet the financial, social and cultural needs of their schools and resume teaching after a natural disaster—more emphasis was placed on the qualitative interviews. The quantitative research was a means to provide a high-level view of how humanitarian aid for education was distributed, which in turn informed the qualitative research conducted. Therefore, I designed a mixed methods study in which quantitative data was enhanced by in-depth qualitative case studies (Creswell, 2013).

I describe my research process using the typology offered by Leech and Onwuegbuzie, who offer more flexibility in combining the two approaches through three dimensions (2009). The first dimension is the “levels of mixing,” whether the two approaches are partially or fully mixed. The second is the consideration of time, whether the different strategies occur sequentially or concurrently. The last is dominance, whether one strategy is emphasized more than another (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009, p. 267).

Utilizing their typology, the mixed method study I conducted was partially mixed, concurrent dominant status design (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009). The study was partially mixed in that the quantitative data and analysis were used to inform the qualitative case studies and were incorporated into the final analysis. The study was concurrent in that the quantitative research was conducted alongside the qualitative research. Lastly, the study's dominant theoretical method is qualitative.

The design typology, as described by Leech and Onwuegbuzie and based on Morris's (1991) notation, is symbolized with a lower case quan for its weaker dominance in the research, and a capitalized QUAN for the emphasis on the qualitative research. The design can be symbolized as:

Figure 2: Mixed Methods Research Design



The first step of my research was to understand better the distribution of the humanitarian aid to rural schools in the fourteen worst hit districts. On the recommendation of my dissertation proposal committee, I used basic heatmaps. Heat maps are a form of scientific visualization that can be used for both quantitative and qualitative data analysis (Fielding, 2012). As described by Docherty et al. (2016), “[s]cientific visualization is the use of graphic images to display varying combinations of empirical data, enabling scientists to process, explore, understand and gain insight form

complex data” (p. 1). Scientific visualization can be used with any type of data including numbers and text to create a visual representation that can be quickly understood, is transparent, and in which patterns or trends can be quickly perceived (Docherty et al., 2016). Heat maps are particularly useful when they are shown on a geographic map to indicate the intensity of an activity within a specific area. Although international organizations generated various heat maps for the Nepal earthquake, these nationwide, geographically generated heatmaps did not provide the level of detail and did not combine the data to answer my research questions. Therefore, I generated another form of heatmap in Excel. Multivariate heat map matrices in Excel are typically structured as a matrix of columns and rows with light to dark color shading of data that illuminates possible patterns (Few, 2006). For the heatmap to work, it must contain shaded colors and not a variety—the shading indicates the intensity of an activity or count. There are two types of hues that can be used: 1) sequential scale, where a single hue shifts from dark (concentrated) to light; or 2) diverging scale, where the concentrated area is one color which transitions through a lighter, sometimes grey hue, to a new color that indicates the diluted level (Few, 2006). The heatmaps I created included data from the Education Cluster 3W report, the 2011 Nepal Census (the most recent census prior to the earthquake), and from the Nepal Education Flash Report. The use of heatmaps to analyze multivariate data was a simple process, since the amount of data to be analyzed was small compared to the size of data for which scientific visualization techniques were created (Few, 2006). The quantitative data I analyzed included the distance of the district from Kathmandu, district school population size including total number of students broken down by gender, total number and type of teachers, number and type of schools in the

district, and the level of aid provided according to the Education Cluster 3W report. Based on my initial analysis, I utilized the Excel functions to generate four heatmaps that compared the level of humanitarian aid as reported in the 3W report received by the fourteen districts, the distance of the district from Kathmandu, the population of youth in the district, and the number teachers. The heat maps were beneficial in obtaining insights into the distribution of humanitarian aid based on the details of the district and where it was located. However, it became evident that there were inconsistencies in the data reported.

The second step of my research was to gather in-depth data on the “interpretation of reality that is useful in understanding the human condition” (Bogdan & Biklen, 2009, p. 27). Four case study sites were selected following Creswell’s recommendation that four to five sites “should provide ample opportunity to identify themes of the cases as well as conduct cross-case theme analysis” (Creswell, 2013, p. 157). I initially thought that the results of the quantitative analysis would guide the selection of the case sites based on remoteness and the intensity of aid received. The heatmaps provided guidance to the districts where I should conduct my research, but in order to select specific school sites, I used criterion and purposeful sampling to select diverse cases that would provide multiple perspectives from the contexts of the different schools (Creswell, 2013).


To provide what Creswell describes as an in-depth understanding of the cases, different forms of qualitative data were collected such as interviews, observations, documents and photographs (Creswell, 2013). The qualitative data was used to generate in-depth case studies for each of the four sites. Once the in-depth case studies were written, the case studies were compared and contrasted and combined with the

quantitative data into a cross-case analysis to answer the research questions following the components of the conceptual framework of international aid, quality learning environments, and resilience capabilities. Further analysis was conducted on the cross-case analysis to identify assertions that would speak to future policy recommendations for the international aid community and the Nepal government, as well as ideas for further research.

Case Sites and Participant Selection

I selected the country of Nepal to conduct my research for four reasons. The first reason is the country experienced two major earthquakes and thousands of aftershocks in

Figure 3: Map of Nepal and 14 Worst Hit Districts



Spring 2015. The second reason is that the OECD defines Nepal as a fragile state, therefore, the provision of international aid provided should be guided by the FSP, the GHD and the INEE Conflict Sensitive Education principles. Since Nepal is classified as a fragile state and falls into the LIC designation, it received international aid prior to the earthquakes to implement EFA and MDG goals and hence the country fell into the humanitarian/development aid gap. The third reason is that Nepal indicated that it was making strides toward achieving the EFA and MDG goals. The last reason was due to time, as I was able to conduct my research within three years of the disaster. During these years, schools and homes had still not been fully rebuilt and educators continued to be confronted with challenges.

Case Site Selection

The first step in selecting the case study sites was to determine the districts in which the schools were located. As described in my research design, the case sites to be visited required that they be in the hardest hit regions, distant from Kathmandu, and difficult to reach by vehicle. Based on the quantitative research, analysis of international organization documents and reports, I identified three districts out of the fourteen worst hit—Rasuwa, Dolakha and Sindhupalchok—in which to select the case sites. Per the District Wide Damage Summary published by the non-profit Karuna Shechen, all the government schools were destroyed in these three districts (Karuna Shechen, 2015).

Once the districts were identified, schools were selected through personal contacts and by contacting international non-profit organizations who had contact with headmasters in those districts. Through an interpreter, I contacted the headmaster of each school to ask if they, their teachers and members of the School Management Committee

(SMC) would participate in the study. Final school selection was done based on my ability to visit the location and conduct interviews and observations given personal constraints of time and money. I spent one week in each district with an interpreter/translator to conduct interviews and observations.

To investigate the qualitative research questions, a school served as a unit of inquiry for the multisite case studies (Creswell, 2013). Each school case site was given the pseudonym of a Himalayan mountain in Nepal: Kabru, Jannu, Saipal, Gangapurna. The schools were community supported with School Management Committees and in some cases Parent-Teacher Associations. All schools were small with less than 300 students. The four school sites are historically similar in that the schools were started through the initiative of the community. In two of the cases, the community was able to obtain government support such as a salary for a teacher or teaching materials as a starting point. In the other two cases, the community supported the schools for several years until the government recognized them. Once the government recognized the school, the school received, at a minimum, salaries for teachers and textbooks. Each of the schools had a mix of funding to pay its teachers with some teachers paid by the government, some paid by the community through school fees and some paid by international organizations. When asked about salaries, all schools indicated that the earthquake did not prevent the teachers from being paid, as teachers receive their salaries on a quarterly basis and had been paid prior to the earthquakes.

The four schools selected for this study are located in remote locations; trucks or tractors are possible to reach two of the school sites. Two of the schools were located close to main roads, whereas the other two required up to a mile hike from the main road.

Although a large tractor could drive to two of the sites, two other sites could only be accessed on foot—these were the two school sites that had not yet been rebuilt.

In each of the villages, the predominant livelihood was livestock and agriculture. There were some local shops and small industry, for example one location was close to a cheese factory and another had a tailor business. Two of the sites are promoted as tourist and trekking areas, however, only the village where Gangapurna is located boasted several hostels with restaurants. Of the four sites, Saipal suffered significant deaths and injuries, including the deaths of two students. No students or teachers were killed at the other school sites, although all of the sites suffered extensive damage to housing and infrastructure.

Two of the sites, Jannu and Saipal, had limited water, while Gangapurna and Kabru were located near mountain streams and could easily access water. Even so, all four school sites indicated that obtaining water was an issue after the earthquakes as infrastructure had collapsed and access to water became difficult.

Within one and a half years of the earthquake, the schools at Saipal and Kabru were rebuilt and had electricity. At Jannu and Gangapurna, the schools were still functioning out of temporary learning centers with dirt floors and no heat or electricity. In most cases, schools did not see a dramatic decline in students. In one case, the school enrollment increased as students fled Kathmandu thinking that coming to a remote area would be safer from the impacts of the earthquake and continuous aftershocks. But all the educators at the four schools were aware that they would need to keep enrollment numbers up in order to ensure the school remained viable within the community, not only

to provide educational access to the students for a brighter future, but also to provide local employment opportunities.

The case studies included observations, face-to-face interviews and one focus group with teachers and members of the School Management Committee (SMC).

Each of the school sites was identified on the IASC's Education Cluster 3W report and received some level of aid. However, two of the schools received further support in order to reconstruct and resume normal studies, while two schools were still being held in TLCs and waiting to receive funding to rebuild.

Table 1: Case Study School Sites

D-Kabru	D-Jannu	S-Saipal	R-Gangapurna
ECD Primary	ECD Primary	ECD Lower Secondary	ECD Lower Secondary
5 Interviews	1 Focus group – (5) 2 - 1 teacher and 1 headmaster/teacher	7 Interviews	4 Interviews
Community School	Community School	Community School	Community School
Access on foot (possible tractor access)	Access on foot	Access on foot (possible tractor access)	Access on foot
84 Students	152 Students	210 Students	281 Students
7 Teachers	5 Teachers	8 Teachers	12 Teachers
2004 Community founded	1999 Community founded	1996 Community founded	1972 Community founded
6/2017 Rebuilt	Not rebuilt*	12/2016	Not rebuilt*

* As of November 2017

Participants

Interviewees chosen through criterion sampling were those educators and educational administrators who were present at the school prior to, during and after the earthquakes (Creswell, 2013). With the assistance of my interpreter/translator, the headmasters at the school were contacted to ask if the school would be willing to participate in the case studies. Once their participation was confirmed, at all four case sites, the headmasters facilitated setting up interviews with teachers and members of the SMC who met the criteria. In some cases, purposeful sampling was combined with a snowball sampling technique, in which additional educators connected to the school during the time of the earthquakes were interviewed (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). The criteria limited the number of interviewees at Jannu and Kabru, as teachers had left after the earthquakes and were not available. In one instance, the husband of the teacher whose house we stayed at in Kabru was a teacher during the earthquakes, and he agreed to be interviewed after he learned about the research. Overall, there were eighteen educators who participated in seventeen interviews and one focus group held at Jannu. The focus group started with five individuals, but when it became evident that three of the participants had started teaching after the earthquakes those three individuals left the focus group.

Each participant was informed of the purpose of the research and asked to sign a consent form to be interviewed and audio recorded. They were informed both in writing and during the interview introduction that their responses would remain confidential, and to the extent possible, anonymous. All the interviewees agreed to participate after the

research project was explained and the consent form translated in Nepali was presented to them.

Table 2: Research Participants

School	Gender	Caste	Age Range	School Role
Kabru	3 Male 2 Female	Thomi	20-35	1 Headmaster/Teacher 1 SMC Chair 2 Parent Teacher Assoc. 1 Former Asst. Headmaster/Teacher
Jannu	1 (3) Female 1 Male	Thomi	35-45	4 Teachers 1 Headmaster/Teacher
Saipal	6 Female 1 Male	Giri	24-49	4 Teachers 1 SMC 1 Headmaster 1 Former Headmaster/Teacher
Gangapurna	4 Male	Tamang	25-55	1 Headmaster/Teacher 1 Former Headmaster/Teacher 1 Teachers 1 SMC
Total	18			

Data Collection and Analysis

Quantitative Data Collection—The proposal committee suggested that I prepare heat maps to define the quantity and distribution of humanitarian aid to the fourteen districts. Starting with the April 2016 Final UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report and the UNOCHA Humanitarian Data Exchange reports on the 2015 Nepal Earthquake, I completed a spreadsheet with the data available (UNOCHA, 2016). I then supplemented the 3W report data with the most recent data on district population sizes, population of children and youth under 19, number of schools in the district, number of teachers, and distance from Kathmandu (Nepal, 2017). I first generated a table that included all the data

listed above. I then broke out the data to analyze only specific categories of humanitarian aid: TLCs, School Kits, Recreation Kits, and Teacher Training. I included the miles from Kathmandu and student and teacher populations for the district in order to compare the population size to the level of humanitarian aid estimated for and reported as distributed by the 3W report. I then analyzed each level of aid and the data. It was difficult to determine a consistent pattern. In some instances, districts that were far from Kathmandu received more aid than districts closer to Kathmandu. Or, districts with a small number of school-aged children received more aid than districts with a higher population. An in-depth analysis of the different data indicated that there did not seem to be a consistent pattern of one district receiving more or less aid than another. In addition, the 3W report had inconsistencies which raise concerns about the veracity of the data reported. For example, the number of enrolled students was reported as 100 for a significant grouping of schools, a clear sign that these numbers were not reflective of the actual enrollment or the numbers reported in the EMIS. A second indicator was that in one counting of TLCs, the number provided was one, yet in the breakdown of the type of TLCs, the number was two. The discrepancies discovered in the data, through generating the heatmaps, were then compared to the information gathered in the in-depth case studies.

Qualitative Data Collection—Initially three schools were selected for the case studies. These schools are located in the districts hit hardest by the earthquakes. A fourth school was added as it provided a significant contrast and balance to the three case studies selected. Creswell (2013) recommends limiting the number of cases to no more than five, as increasing the number dilutes the purpose of the case study (Creswell, 2013). Critical or contrasting cases were selected which “permits logical generalizations and

maximum application of information to other cases” (Creswell, 2013, p. 158). In this case, the stark contrast between two school sites helped to highlight differences in aid received.

In November and December 2017, after the monsoon season and national holidays had passed, my interpreter and I spent one week at each case study site. For three of the locations, we traveled by public bus, and for one site we were able to obtain a ride by jeep with a representative of a non-profit organization. We stayed with the families of the headmasters or teachers. In three of the sites, we stayed in houses that were reconstructed. In the fourth site, we stayed in a temporary corrugated steel structure that held three cots. During the entire trip, the weather was mild with constant sunshine and mostly warm temperatures during the day. On two occasions we felt mild earthquakes which put everyone on edge, but no aftershocks followed. One challenge we faced in accessing the research sites was that district elections were held and were plagued with intermittent violence that resulted in one dead and twenty-six injured. On one occasion, our bus was stopped while the military defused an improvised explosive device along the road. Although we were in no immediate danger, the fear and intimidation being perpetrated became real when we saw the smoke, through the bus windows, generated when the military exploded the device. Most of the attacks were targeted on voting centers and election rallies (United States Department of State 2018). Thankfully, none of the school areas we visited were engaged in the elections.

An interview protocol was created that focused on themes of community resilience but allowed for open-ended responses based on what the interviewee felt was important to communicate. The style of interviews was structured to be open-ended and

conducted with deliberate naiveté (Kvale, 1996) to encourage the participants to share their thoughts and perceptions on the general research question, and so allow information to emerge. As the interviews were conducted through an interpreter, it was difficult to know how the open-ended structure was conveyed to the participant. However, the interpreter seemed to be able to generate an easy and relaxed rapport that encouraged participants to be forthcoming in their responses. We conducted seventeen audio recorded interviews which each lasted for an average of an hour. Due to the schedule of the interviews, home stays and access to electricity, I was unable to write a memo directly following the interview, and had to wait until a day or two later to record my impressions, the description of the participant, cultural or language aspects of the interview, and atmosphere of the interview to provide thicker description of the context of the interviews. For confidentiality purposes, signed consent forms and handwritten field notes were scanned and the original documents destroyed. The scanned documents, interview recordings and typed transcripts were secured on a password protected computer and password protected backup flash drive (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007).

While at the school site, I took photographs and made field observations to document the current status of the schools. I requested photos from before the earthquakes, but only one school, Kabru, was able to provide me with photos. All of the other school educators indicated that their photos had been destroyed by the earthquakes.

Upon return to the United States, I hired two Nepalese bilingual, Nepali-English speakers to translate and transcribe each interview to a password protected University of Maryland Google Drive document. The transcriptions were reviewed and compared to identify questions for clarification and follow-up (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). Due to the

timeframe of my research and limited ability to be in-country, follow-up questions could not be directed to individual participants, but were asked of the headmaster and through an interpreter. I had difficulty obtaining responses to my follow-up questions, due to the difficulty of communicating specific details to my interpreter regarding the questions, and the lack of reliable communication technology to interact with the headmasters. Although the transcripts from the first interviews could not be transcribed back into Nepali and reviewed by each participant, the multiple interviews at each case site which provided similar perspectives, and the triangulation of the data with the Education Cluster 3W report and observations, helped to ensure the participants' responses were captured correctly (Wolcott, 1990).

The first step I took in the data analysis process was to review each transcript based on the concepts of the conceptual framework: humanitarian aid; quality learning environment; the six aspects of coping capacity and the two aspects of adaptive capacity. I used the categories of the conceptual framework to create an Excel spreadsheet for each case site and listed each of the categories in a column with the interviewees listed across the top in rows. I then used structural coding to categorize the interviewee statements to the framework (Saldaña, 2013). This analysis along with the quantitative data analysis informed the development of the case site descriptions. I then uploaded the interviews into NVivo and, starting again with the concepts of the conceptual framework, began to analyze interviewee responses across the cases and began sub-coding the responses. After generating several codes for each of the elements of the conceptual framework, I reviewed and condensed some while expanding others. I then compared and contrasted these codes across the conceptual framework to identify the responses to the research

questions and generate the cross-case analysis. Lastly, I again reviewed the quantitative and qualitative data, and the cross-case analysis and compared all of these to the literature on coping and adaptive capabilities as components of the resiliency discourse, the INEE description of a quality learning environment and international aid principles that led to the assertions in the final chapter (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Saldaña, 2013). Please see Appendix F, Table 17 for the list of codes. A breakdown of the data collected can be found in the table below.

Table 3: Data Collected

Data Source	Amount	Time
Documents	12	
Heat Maps Generated	6	
Interviews	17	19 Hours 201 pages of transcript
Informal Observations and Photographs	198 Photographs 1 video 4 Observations/Field Notes	16 days

Quality Assurance, Limitations and Ethics

Validity and Reflexivity

In order to achieve validity and reliability of my research, I gathered and analyzed international organization and Nepali government reports and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) heat maps on the humanitarian response and aid provided to Nepal. The quantitative data was then augmented with the interviews of the educators from the schools where I conducted my case studies. Due to the nature of my mixed-methods processes, the criteria for validity is heavily weighted on the case-study qualitative research and not so heavily on the quantitative component (Collins et al., 2012). Field notes and photographs were taken as to the condition of schools, attendance, availability

of resources and facilities. I was not able to have prolonged engagement as time and money were limited, but I did stay at each site for one week to develop a thick, rich description of each school and the experiences they faced. By triangulating these sources of data—interviews, documents, and observation—I was able to validate my findings.

There were two main concerns I had prior to conducting my research. The first was how I would be perceived, in the community and by the educational professionals, as a blond, white, American with Western culture and values. I would not be able to follow Bogdan & Biklen's (2007) guidance to be discreet. Some of the questions I asked myself were: What is my interest in the educational system in Nepal? Why would I care? What would compel educators and educational administrators to truthfully share their perspectives with me? My awareness of these issues was one of the reasons I volunteered in Nepal in 2016, prior to conducting my research. Then I was able to explore my position about the research in relation to the setting where I would be conducting it. I was also able to strengthen relationships and identify new contacts in the country that would be helpful, not only in conducting my research but in providing sounding boards and peer checks for my research, analysis and findings.

After I began conducting my research, I felt that these concerns did not manifest themselves. With the assistance of my interpreter, participants seemed willing to share their experiences with me. However, I still followed the guidelines of Bogdan & Biklen (2007) to demonstrate trust, discretion, and confidentiality by ensuring my interpreter communicated to participants that I would be maintaining the confidentiality of their responses. When starting the interviews, we assured them that we were not associated with the Nepali government, the non-profit organization that assisted us with the contact,

nor the District Education Office (DEO). As the headmasters were contacted by my interpreter and not through the DEO, I believe that I gained a measure of assurance that the responses I received were genuine. While reviewing the interview questions and my notes, I was concerned that there was still some thought by the interviewees that I was associated with the non-profit—the participants made sure during interviews to thank that specific non-profit for the assistance they received. However, when asked which specific non-profit was key to the school being restarted, the participants did not automatically name the non-profit that assisted me with contact. In fact, only one of the schools indicated that the non-profit that facilitated my contact was key to reopening the school. I did offer to assist the schools in teaching English or conducting capacity building training, however, none of the schools availed themselves of my offer.

The second concern I had, about conducting research in a different culture and language from my own, was feeling confident in my own ability to fully understand the meaning conveyed by the interviewee, since the interview questions and responses would be processed through the understanding of an interpreter. Yet, I felt my previous experience living and working in four different cultures and speaking two languages besides English would help me to navigate the cultural differences between my own experience and those of the Nepalese. Nonetheless, I had difficulty distinguishing the subtle differences in language and culture at each school site. Especially since I have previous experience being able to function in a foreign language without an interpreter, I was frustrated that I was unable to engage directly with the interviewees. However, I did use my previous experiences to reflect on the cultural and language aspects of my interactions with participants and wrote these reflections in memos. I discussed with my

Nepali interpreters and translators any terms or concepts that I was unfamiliar with, to be better able to understand them in the local context. I have included my own reflections at the end of each case study, to review my limitations on the understanding of the information collected through the interviews and the quantitative data.

Limitations

The limitations I experienced included those I was aware of when I proposed my research: understanding the fragility of the country and historical provisions of education; the reliability of the Education Cluster 3W report; and the authenticity of the participant responses and the generalizability of the findings. Upon conducting the research, I added to these the language barrier and reliance on an interpreter, and access to funding.

Although I feel I gained insight into the power and decision dynamics within the community—and how this informs or doesn't inform policy at the national level and vice versa—I felt that my being an outsider limited my ability to thoroughly understand the historic and current instability of the country. While I conducted my research in November 2017, the country was going through a major shift in its national governing structure, to a federal democratic republic as outlined in its 2015 constitution. As a result, district elections were being held and there was intermittent violence with small improvised explosive devices meant to scare people away from voting (United States Department of State, 2018). Seventeen people were injured, some severely. A young mother lost her leg when she and her seven-year-old son stepped on a mine. The child was undergoing surgery for his injuries and was expected to recover. However, in remote areas of Nepal mobility is necessary and, by losing her leg, this young mother's quality of

life will be profoundly impacted. The violence was being blamed on Maoist groups that did not want the elections held (Bhandari & Schultz, 2017).

Even though I felt limited in my understanding of the context of instability in the country and community, I felt I gained an understanding from the educators of the importance of education in their communities. All the headmasters, teachers and parents expressed their desire to see their schools rebuilt for the benefit of the children in their communities. From the interviews, it was also evident that the school was an important source of income for teachers employed by the school.

The second limitation was the strength and reliability of the data collection of the Education Cluster 3W report. As I described in the Research Design section, I was able to discover that the data submitted to the 3W report was incorrect and therefore unreliable. The level of the humanitarian aid provided did not match the level of aid the educators reported receiving, nor did it capture the monetary value of the aid provided.

The third limitation that concerned me was the authenticity of the participants' responses. Prior to conducting my research, I felt that depending on the motivation of the participant, and his or her perceptions of who I was or what power the participant thought I had, the participant might exaggerate or withhold information. I feel this limitation was addressed through multiple interviews and analysis of documents that corroborated or contradicted the information provided in interviews.

The last limitation I anticipated was the generalizability of the research. The generalizability of this study is complicated. First, every disaster context is different in scope and impact, and added to this is the specific context of Nepal as a fragile state. The conditions in each country that make the country fragile are linked to variables including

political, economic and social conditions unique to that country. One of the aspects of Nepal that stands out and makes the research conducted context specific is that Nepal receives a high number of tourists. The connections with international tourists create means by which rural villages not only earn income but can directly seek and obtain outside support for aid and development as well, bypassing the local and national government. Although the government of Nepal is seeking to limit such aid, informal networks and ties are already created that make this aid difficult to block.

One aspect of the study that is generalizable, I feel, is the methodological structure of the research combining an analysis of the international aid provided and comparing it to the experiences of the recipients on the ground. Efforts to research the international aid impacts on local communities and communities' expression of resilience can be recreated elsewhere. A second aspect of generalizability is to apply a community resilience framework that includes the concept of agency to ask questions that assess the resilience of the school community.

There were two limitations that I did not anticipate. The first was the challenge of having limited funding. As I was self-funded, I was limited by the cost of my trip and the hiring of an interpreter and translator. In order to keep costs down I was limited by the amount of time I could stay in country, however, I made a commitment to stay within a community for five days, which for one school was a surprise that a foreigner would stay that long. However, this limitation also meant that I was unable to travel to school sites that were even harder to reach. One school I contacted that I would have liked to visit would have taken eleven days of my schedule, nine of those travel days with only two days for interviews.

One of the main challenges for the international researcher is to be able to identify and pay for a qualified interpreter/translator. As I was self-funded, hiring a qualified interpreter was difficult. I had to identify someone willing to travel with me and stay in remote villages with possibly non-existent infrastructure at a price I could afford. I was able to find someone to work with me, but I feel the level of interpretation prevented me from asking important follow-up questions and delving into a topic further. To counter this, I recorded my interviews and had them translated and transcribed, requiring, again, difficulty in balancing funds over quality. I was able to find a talented interpreter/translator who was willing to do the work for a fee I could afford. Once I was able to read through the English transcripts, I identified several areas that I needed to follow-up on and explore more in-depth. However, as I was no longer in the country on-site, following up with the educators posed further challenges. I was able to follow up with one headmaster by setting up a Facebook telephone chat between my interpreter in the U.S. and his brother in Nepal. The brother in Nepal then used his cell phone to call the headmaster's cell phone. The brother set his phone next to his laptop so that communication could flow from me to the interpreter on Facebook, through his brother's laptop to his brother's cell phone to the headmaster's cellphone and back.

Ethical Consideration

I expressed my concern in my research proposal about the anonymity of the participants and uncovering information that stakeholders might not want to be made public. To address this concern, I tried to be mindful of the surrounding atmosphere and dynamics of the situation as I conducted my research (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Ford, et al., 2009). I took cues from my interpreter and personal contacts as to the extent that I

could push on asking information. After conducting the initial interviews, I felt that participants might be telling me what they thought I wanted to hear, about how the school was reopened when the government told them it should be opened. The response to questions about the DEOs were short and limited. For ensuring candid interviews, I asked the interpreter to reaffirm with the participant that we had no connection with the Nepal Ministry of Education, the District Education Office or the non-profit that had assisted in establishing my contact with the school. The statement seemed to be effective as I did not sense interviewees' reticence in speaking about the DEO, and interviewees were more forthcoming about when they felt the students were able to start learning again.

To further address the ethical concerns, every effort was made to conceal the identities of the participants involved in the study within the research (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Ford, et al., 2009). All confidential materials related to the study, such as field notes and interview transcript audio recordings, were transcribed onto a password protected computer. The hard copy consent forms were scanned immediately to the computer after the interview. I kept the original copies with me until I was able to return to Kathmandu and ensure they were destroyed (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). All journaling and notes were done on the password protected computer (Weseon & Wong, 2000). The case sites were provided with pseudonyms, named after Nepali Himalayan mountain peaks. Individual interviewees were assigned pseudonyms of Nepali names that aligned with the pseudonyms of the case sites. Peer checks with trusted scholars familiar with the concerns in Nepal were done during the data analysis and writing process.

Another aspect of ethics that is important to raise when conducting research in a disaster context such as Nepal, when participants have suffered, is the impact of repeated

and secondary trauma. The interviewees each experienced their own form of loss, in some cases significant, such as the loss of a daughter. I felt privileged that the participants felt comfortable in sharing some of the pain of those experiences and recounted them, but I also felt a sense of guilt in requiring them to recall this time. As Sangita stated: “I don’t want to remember that scene again. It was so sad.” And not only did the participants experience this trauma. After conducting several interviews, my interpreter expressed how difficult it was for her to hear these stories. I felt the interpreter’s ability to connect with the participants on a personal level was conducive to the unguarded sharing of the participants’ experiences. However, I was concerned about the possibility of my interpreter suffering from secondary traumatic stress (STS) (NCTSN, Current). The National Child Traumatic Stress Network defines STS as “the emotional duress that results when an individual hears about the firsthand trauma experiences of another” (NCTSN, Current, para. 1). The interpreter/translator experienced the earthquakes in Kathmandu, but her family and home were not directly impacted. Throughout the research, she listened to the experiences of seventeen individuals and what they experienced during the earthquakes. When asked if she wanted to stop interpreting, however, she said it was okay and that she felt it was important to assist me in my research. Once the possibility of STS came up, we did try to incorporate a break into the week and spent time exploring the area we were in. For example, while in Rasuwa we spent an afternoon hiking to a cheese factory and bought yak cheese.

Chapters VI, VII, VIII, IX describe the four school sites, Kabru, Jannu, Saipal, and Gangapurna, that were visited. Each case site description includes a description of the district, the local area, the school, the impact of the earthquakes, the humanitarian aid

received as per the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, other assistance received, and responses regarding the coping and adaptability aspects of the educators. The case site descriptions will be followed by a cross-case analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data.

Chapter VI - Kabru - Dolakha

District Description

My site visit to Kabru was from November 19 to 24. It took a ten-hour public bus ride, with rest stops, leaving Kathmandu at 6:00 am to reach the site in Dolakha, around 94 miles from Kathmandu. For half of the journey the roads were paved, winding through mountainous terrain, along rivers and through small villages. Some sections of the road were washed out by landslides and the path turned into rutted dirt and dust. At times the bus felt more like a boat slowly maneuvering over rough waves. Traveling to the village, my interpreter and I sat toward the back of the bus crowded with passengers sitting and standing, holding each other's children and belongings on their laps. We could not see the road ahead, just the dusty, opaque view from the side windows. Most of the journey was

Figure 4: Dolakha - Road to Kabru and Jannu



uneventful until close to the end, when the bus started to slide around a steep mountain curve. The passengers started to panic and those with access to the door jumped off, apparently afraid the bus would careen down the mountainside. My translator and I were stuck in the back with no way out. If the bus fell, we would be on it. The driver persisted and the wheels finally gained traction and pulled forward. Thankfully, not too long after this harrowing event, the bus passed through a smattering of small shops, went a bit farther, then stopped and the driver informed us we had reached our destination.

The District of Dolakha sits east and north of the capital Kathmandu and borders China. Dolakha is known for two famous Hindu sites, the Bhimshwar Temple and the Kalinchowk Bagawati, that attract pilgrims and tourists. The majority of the population is Hindu (126,492) followed by Buddhist (41,600), and then Prakriti (15,058). The site of Kabru is a village of predominantly Thomi caste, identified as a marginalized group within the 2011 census (NEAU, 2015). The total population of the district per the 2011 census was 186,557 with 25% below the age of 19. The overall literacy rate was 62%, with males at 73% and females at 53%. (Nepal, 2012b). The economy is predominantly agricultural with some small industry and tourism.

The epicenter of the May 12, 2015 earthquake, that registered 7.3 on the Richter scale, was on the border of Dolakha and Sindhupalchok to the west. The April 25, 2015 Gorkha earthquake, centered east of Gorkha District at Barpak, Gorkha, 48 miles northwest of Kathmandu, had already damaged 90% of Dolakha's buildings. The May 12 earthquake demolished all of them. The OSOCC Assessment Cell reported of the total of 617 primary and lower secondary schools in the District, 90% were damaged though other reports indicated all government schools were damaged (OSOCC, 2015, Karuna

Shechen, 2015). The OSOCC reported that an estimated that 62,766 school-age children and approximately 1,270 teachers were impacted (OSOCC, 2015; Nepal, 2017).

Specifically in the Kalinchowk VDC, the Nepal Earthquake Assessment Unit (NEAU) report indicated that 81-100% of the classrooms were destroyed (NEAU, 2015). Per the NEAU district profile, humanitarian agencies had almost met the goals for establishing TLCs by July 2015. However, it pointed out that TLCs had not been established in hard to reach locations (NEAU, 2015).

The NEAU report also signaled that women and children were especially vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation at the time and that Dolakha had “anecdotal reports of external migration being higher than national averages” (NEAU, 2015, p. 2).

We stepped down from the bus onto a dirt road in front of a small shop, with no other buildings in sight. My interpreter asked someone for directions to the school. I followed her, both of us carrying our backpacks, to the side of the store building and, walking in a small stream, we started up the hill. The stream led to a dry trail that crossed back and forth over the stream, which I discovered lay on the edge of a settlement of houses. When we crested the hill, I was astonished. In front of us sat a completely rebuilt eight-classroom school, painted bright yellow, with a bank of solar panels. To the right of the solar panels stood bathrooms, cleanly painted white and marked in bold English letters “Girls,” with the boys’ bathrooms on the other side. Farther back on the right stood a two-room structure painted blue that housed a teachers’ office and the Early Childhood Development (ECD) room. To the side of the pathway leading to the school stood a rusted out, corrugated steel privy structure and the school yard had a rusted swing and slide structure that was unusable.

We walked up to the school and teachers' office. A teacher caught sight of us from her classroom, came out to meet us and exchanged words with my interpreter. The headmaster was home sick. I found out later that, even though we had received permission to conduct research at the school and had confirmed the dates, the headmaster

Figure 5: Kabru - Rebuilt School Building



had not communicated to anyone about our arrival—because he was convinced that a foreigner would not bother coming to their village for a week to conduct research.

Everything was quickly straightened out and a teacher invited us to stay at her house. The teacher indicated that the headmaster would meet us at the school early the next morning and set up interviews.

As the school day was almost finished, we waited in the teachers' office and then followed the teacher to her family's house. To get there, we followed a rocky path, through family gardens, passing along the side of a rebuilt house, less than a half mile from the school. There were no identifiable pathways to different houses along the way. We passed the communal water source, a very elaborate fountain with three large spigots, repaired after the earthquakes. Each day that we passed the fountain, we saw people bathing and obtaining water. The teacher explained that her family's house was rebuilt since the earthquakes and had recently been painted. She and her husband were married about a year, and had an extra room for my interpreter and me to stay in. The teacher's house was a two-story structure with our room on the second floor. A small room stood to the side of the house that contained the "kitchen" and small wood cooking area as well as shelter for storage and animals. A few steps down and away from the house was the outdoor latrine and a faucet that provided water. I was unable to determine if the water was from a well or piped to the house. There was no internet connection at the house, but electricity seemed consistent during our stay. The night was cold, but with both our sleeping bags and the blankets the teacher provided, we were able to stay warm. The next morning, we returned to the school to begin interviews.

During my site visit, I conducted five interviews, with the headmaster, one teacher and three members of the SMC. The three male interviewees were Keshav, Kumar and Kishor. The two female interviewees were Kanya and Kriti. The interviews were held in a classroom in the reconstructed school building, that held a table and chairs along with several tall cabinets filled with glass science laboratory beakers. When I asked the headmaster about them, he said the equipment was being stored there by the DEO for

another school. I was able to record my interviews, but it was challenging for the interpreter because the children were excited about the presence of foreign visitors and would try to yell and shout at the door.

The original school was started in 2004 when the community petitioned the District Education Office (DEO) and the Village District Committee (VDC) to provide money to pay for a teacher. At that time, the community members asked the now headmaster, who was trained as a schoolteacher, to move to the village and start a school. As a parent of one of the students and a member of the School Management Committee (SMC), Kriti conveyed that the headmaster started the school by rounding up the children playing in the roads, and knocking on doors to ask parents to encourage the children to come to school. There was no school building, so the teacher taught the students on the ground in an open field. As Keshav recalled:

The school started once I came here. It was an open public ground called “Simko Chaur” at that time. The land was slope, not plain. It was even difficult to sit on the place. It was slippery, and water everywhere. I started the school teaching on ground—under the open sky. There was even no shelter for the rain. When it rained, we used to go to the house over there.

During monsoons, one of the villagers who lived near the field agreed to allow the teacher and 15 to 25 students into his home.

The school building was built over time by the community with some financial support from the DEO and VDC, using local resources of bricks, rocks, mud and wood. The villagers started by constructing two classrooms and eventually a two-story structure was added, which included 4 classrooms. Keshav said:

We continued the same way, and after two years., in 2063 (2006)¹²,...not from 2063, but from 2062 (2005),...the small building, over there, was constructed with the support of the District Development Committee and Village Development Committee. At that time, very small budget...5,000...10,000 rupees (US\$83 7/25/2020). With the money and community support for labor work, we constructed a two-roomed building in 2062 (2005). We established the school with difficulty, with a very minimum pay.

During interviews, we learned that the Village Development Committee (VDC) Chairman took personal interest in ensuring the original school was built. After a year of construction, the government recognized it by providing salaries for teachers and textbooks. In 2013, the school was recognized by the VDC as a model school out of the 10 schools in the area due to its teaching quality, school monitoring and evaluation reports.

The reports on the number of students before and after the earthquakes were not consistent. Responses from interviewees, including the Chair and another member of the (SMC), gave counts between 80 and 100 students prior to the earthquakes, and 103 and 115 after the earthquakes. The reported number of teachers was also inconsistent, with 4 or 5 before and 6 or 7 after. When I reviewed a request for funding by Educate the Children after the earthquake, the organization lists the number of students at 89 and the number of teachers at 6 (ETC, 2015). A photograph of the daily roster of teacher and students present on the day of my first visit showed 84 students, 45 boys and 39 girls, and seven teachers, including the headmaster.

¹² Nepal follows the Vikram Samvat Calendar compared to the U.S. Gregorian Calendar. A calendar conversion for the dates of the earthquake is represented in Appendix A – Figure 12 and 13.

Impact of the Earthquakes

The Gorkha earthquake on April 25 destroyed the existing two-story structure. The school had just received a shipment of government textbooks, which had not yet been distributed. With the building collapse, most of the books, benches and desks were destroyed or broken. Many houses had cracked walls and people were nervous about staying inside due to constant aftershocks. As people were warned to stay out of buildings, and not to risk pulling items out, the textbooks were not recovered. When the second large earthquake hit, the remaining buildings collapsed and all the houses in the village were destroyed. Thankfully, no teachers or students were killed, but several were injured. During my stay, I heard that someone in the area died due to a landslide generated by the earthquakes.

Water was scarce, as the earthquakes damaged the communal water fountain. People had to hike down to a stream and carry water back to their tents for cooking and personal needs, limited food preparation, washing and bathing. Access to the area was challenging if not impossible as the roads were blocked by debris or destroyed by landslides and TV and phone services was cut-off.

Response and Recovery – Humanitarian and Development Aid

The interviewees stated that the government announced by battery-operated radio that the schools would reopen a month after the April 25th earthquake. The timing of the humanitarian response by government, international agencies, or NGOs is unclear due to the varied responses I received from the interviews and key documents. Initially, there was an effort to bring the students together in an open space. The village received a tent from the DEO, which was brought to the village by truck and carried up from the road by

the teachers and parents. One interviewee stated that there was no outside response until two months after the first earthquake, when a representative from Looks Nepal¹³ came to the village. Due to the roads being destroyed, the representative arrived on foot. He visited several schools in the area to assess the condition and needs. The interviewees indicated that UNICEF School and Recreation Kits arrived four to five months after the earthquakes. As various NGO representatives began to arrive and bring supplies, they encouraged the community to restart the school and one representative from an NGO reportedly said teachers needed to “be strong enough to show the students” as the headmaster recounted.

The Education Cluster 3W report indicates that 79% or 386 of the targeted 488 Temporary Learning Centers (TLC), or tents that can hold up to 25 people, were distributed in the District (Ed Cluster, 2016). Per the OSOCC, the total number of primary and lower secondary schools in Dolakha was 617 with an estimated 62,766 students. Given 62,766 students and estimating 25 (tent capacity) students per classroom, a minimum of 2,510 TLCs would be needed. Because of the shortfall of TLCs provided, the school communities needed to find other ways to provide additional classroom space for their students. From interviewee comments, Kabru was provided one tent about a month after the first earthquake. After three months, the community members gathered up bamboo from the surrounding area, and tin and other materials that could safely be recovered from the old school, to create an additional shelter for students to be taught in. As Kanya recalled:

¹³ Looks Nepal is a Nepali non-profit. Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/pg/NepalLOOKSI/about/?ref=page_internal

After the earthquake, the buildings were gone and the children were studying in the small space. Teachers, guardians and neighbors, we all worked together to collect bamboo to make a small shelter. Many different organizations were also involved in the process.

The teachers hired people to repair or make benches and tables, and the Salvation Army provided up to 35 tin sheets for the bamboo TLC. The headmaster and teachers were trying to manage five classes in these TLCs. All the interviewees indicated that students were unable to start participating in formal classes until the temporary learning shelters were established due to the lack of space and ability to provide a sufficient learning environment. As Kumar stated: “It was difficult. The space was limited. We had a few TLCs. The students had to sit tightly.” Added to the difficulty with the TLCs, the teachers were unable to obtain replacement textbooks for five months. As Kriti reflected, “Well, all the books and everything were buried after the earthquake. They used to study the used book from other students...Yes after 5 months [they were able to get books]. It was hard for the teachers.”


Reports of the recovery vary among interviewees. The responses may be what they thought I wanted to hear since the government had stated that schools were to reopen one month after the Gorkha earthquake. When pressed, interviewees initially said three months, and then when asked about actual learning, the time-frame was closer to five months, once better TLC structures were built and the teachers obtained books. Interviewees indicated that it was challenging to get students to return, some due to fear of the aftershocks and others due to distance, as some students had to travel over an hour and a half each way, on foot, to reach the school.

Per the Education Cluster 3W report, humanitarian organizations planned to distribute 4,514 School Kits in the district, but only 449 were distributed. Each school kit provides supplies for up to 40 students, and 449 kits would serve 17,960 (out of 62,766) students. The organizations also planned to distribute 232 Recreation Kits in the district, but only distributed 192. If each Recreation Kit¹⁴ served 40 students, the distribution would serve 7,680 (out of 62,766) students. The Education Cluster 3W report for Kabru indicated the school received 91 school kits. I observed a couple metal boxes in the headmaster's office, and when asked, the headmaster confirmed they had received 2 boxes.

The 3W report indicated that 314 teacher trainings for psychosocial support had been planned, but only 261 (or 83%) actually took place within the district. The 3W report does not provide a breakdown of the number of schools and teachers reached. Looking at the 3W snapshot for Kabru, the report indicates no teachers received training. When asked if teachers had received training, one interviewee commented that the DEO had sometimes provided training, but the reference was to a time prior to the earthquake. Only the headmaster referenced some training he received when he went to the district capital to pick up the tent.

¹⁴ See Appendix D for contents of the UNICEF Recreation Kits

Table 4: Education Cluster 3W Report Snapshot for Kabru



Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 11, 2016

Interviewees mentioned a multitude of organizations providing support, as Kanya said, “[t]here were so many organizations and I don’t know the names.” During my interviews, educators mentioned Educate the Children (a US based NGO) which was already working in the area prior to the earthquakes, Salvation Army of Nepal, Nepali NGOs Looks Nepal¹⁵, CEEPAARD¹⁶, and Chhantyal Samaj (Chhantyal Society—a Thomi caste related organization) and a French organization, Karuna Shechen¹⁷. The interviewees indicated that the students received stationery, notebooks, pens, pencils and backpacks from several NGOs. The teachers received white boards and markers. The school had a printed poster hanging on the wall of the headmaster’s offices, from Educate the Children (ETC), that listed specific items received from restaurants, organizations

¹⁵ Looks Nepal: <https://www.facebook.com/NepalLOOKS/>

¹⁶ CEEPAARD: <https://www.facebook.com/ceepaard/>

¹⁷ Karuna Sheshen: <https://karuna-shechen.org/>

within the district, and organizations in Kathmandu along with an estimated value. Yet, none of the educators referenced this poster during the interviews.

Per the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, Plan International was the reporting organization and CEEPAARD was the implementing partner that provided direct humanitarian assistance. There was a Plan International comment box nailed to the post outside of the headmaster's/teachers' office, asking for feedback. After conducting several interviews, I noticed the comment box. Up to that point in my interviews with the educators, I had not yet heard Plan International mentioned. But I did hear CEEPAARD. When the research participants were asked who played the prominent role in getting the school restarted, the interviewees indicated Looks Nepal and ETC. As I continued my interviews, Plan Nepal was first mentioned in relation to providing food to the community, and then mentioned in conjunction with Looks Nepal in regards to the construction of the TLCs.

After the teachers requested it, the DEO gave NPR1,000 (US\$8.00 - 4/20/2020) to the families for each student to purchase new school uniforms. Families paid the local tailor in the village to make the new uniforms.

The school serves a minority caste, the Thomi caste; the headmaster is also from this caste. The headmaster felt that it influenced his ability to obtain aid from Chantiyaal Samaj, a Nepali NGO. As Keshav described, “[t]he central president of Thami Samaj [a part of Chantiyaal Samaj] is from here. Because this area has a big population of Thomi people and their children study here. Most of the children come from the Thomi community.” Keshav described the organization as a strong group with members who are educated with good jobs and the willingness to donate funds to help other members of the

Thomi caste. Furthermore, the school was selected by an international NGO to receive support because the NGO wanted to specifically support a minority caste. As Kishor stated: "...they were interested in lower cast community too. They had their own criteria of having lower cast students." The NGO assessed ten different schools and selected Kabru to receive support. The aim was to rebuild Kabru as a model school. As a result, the school received three years of funding to rebuild, as well as additional support for the community. This school—and the community—benefited because the students and others were members of the Thomi caste.

The overwhelming support to rebuild Kabru is starkly clear, given the beautifully rebuilt primary school with solar panels. Kishor mentioned that when NGO representatives came to the area to view the needs of the communities, the NGO representatives understood that the government would rebuild the high school. Kishor said he felt bad because the government started to rebuild, but the progress was extremely slow. Kishor explained that over one month, only three pillars had been set in place, commenting that "if only they (the government) had made the building faster, then students would be able to learn."

Kabru was selected to receive more substantial aid from international donors and was able to construct a two-room structure, the six-classroom structure, boys' and girls' bathroom structure, provide for education materials, and install a bank of solar panels and energy bank for uninterrupted access to electricity. The headmaster indicated that the solar panels provided by Shechen Foundation were not working, but that the plan was for the solar panels to provide steady electricity to power a computer in each classroom.

Learning Environment

In 2004, when the community first asked for a school and for a teacher to start teaching their children, there was no school building. The teacher, who since became the headmaster, would collect the students and teach them in an open field. A community member would let the teacher and the 15 to 25 students into his house when it rained. Gradually, the community built the school out of stone and mud. After the school was completely destroyed by the earthquakes, the teachers and students returned to the field for lessons, until they were able to obtain a tent and construct the bamboo structures. Kumar said students only started to really learn again when the new school building was built. The first “learning environment” was again the open field. As Keshav said:

Right after the earthquake, we had neither a white board nor a marker nor a duster. Our first necessities were white board, duster and marker. It was not possible to construct blackboard then. When we demanded for white boards, at the beginning, by Educate the Children, and by the school itself as well. Anyhow we needed them. Even for the open ground, we needed white board.

The temporary learning centers (TLC) that consisted of two bamboo structures and a tent were established after three months. Community members, having to locate flat spaces to live and cook, had set up tents and shelters on the school playground. Another interviewee said the headmaster had to ask community members to move their tents off the playground so the TLCs could be set up, and the members complied. The teachers, with help from parents, cleared debris and helped build the bamboo structures, obtaining salvageable materials from the old school. The conditions of the TLCs were challenging

especially due to the monsoon weather. Interviewees noted when it rained it was loud on the tin TLC roofs and made it difficult to hear. Rain also turned the dirt floor to mud. Structures were cold in the winter, and interviewees noted they feared the tin roofs would be blown off of the TLCs and injure the students (or others). During his interview, Kishor used the term “TLC” frequently. When asked about the acronym, he said he heard it for the first time during the humanitarian response to the 2015 earthquake, when representatives from the INGOs kept using the term.

As a result of the earthquakes, students were traumatized. When the first call went out for students to return to school (in the field), only about 20% came. The teachers went family to family to convince the parents that students should resume their lessons. Even when they returned, the children were sleeping or shouting at one another in class. As part of the humanitarian aid response, teachers were to receive psychosocial support training, but only one of the interviewees referenced receiving training.

When we started the school after a month, around Jestha 10-12 (May 24-25), they were not mentally ready to learn at school. At that time, they had psychological problems and they used to scream, shout and cry frequently in the classroom. They also used to stand up from their benches. They still had some kind of fear with them. That was their problem. So, during that time, we did not push them for reading/study. Instead of normal teaching, we tried our best to create entertaining environment and activities in the classrooms, such as playing games. We exercised hard to prepare them for the class—by bringing a lot of learning materials in the class. With the help of those activities, we prepared them for class. We also conducted

some informal research and evaluation to find out they are ready, and whether their situation had improved since the initial days. We continued those activities to make them mentally prepared. At the point we found that they were ready for actual/normal class with our evaluation and research, we continued the normal classes 15-20 days after we started our school.

Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain more information on the research the educators conducted to assess their students' readiness.

Teachers noted that while food was accessible and provided by Plan Nepal, water was difficult to obtain and children were dirty. They also did not have school uniforms or clean clothes, but teachers encouraged students to come to school anyway. When the teachers saw that the uncleanliness might be causing health issues, they petitioned and obtained funds from the DEO for new uniforms.

The government-issued textbooks were buried and destroyed in the earthquake and the headmaster was not able to convince the government to issue new ones. As a result, the students borrowed old books from each other until the school could obtain donations to purchase new books. From the interviews, many organizations provided school materials and supplies. However, the UNICEF school and recreation kits did not arrive until 3 to 4 months after the government called for the schools to reopen.

The new school was built by Karuna Shechen, a French INGO, within a year of the earthquake. From my observations and photos I noted that it was painted a bright, inviting yellow. The school yard was cleared except for an old rusted swing/slide set blocked off from use. The school yard included a bathroom building with separate sides

for boys and girls. The bathroom was clean, painted bright white and lit by sky lights built into the roof. Each toilet had a door that closed. The classrooms were bright with neat desks, white boards, small bookshelves, posters decorating the walls, electricity, windows and doors. An Early Childhood Center next to the headmaster's office was decorated with posters and artwork and included toys and supplies.

The headmaster and other interviewees indicated that the school still needed to build a fence around the grounds to protect students from animals and strangers wandering onto the property. While I sat on the steps of the school in the morning waiting for an interviewee, I was joined by a goat munching on flowers growing by me. From my observations, the school did not provide accommodations for students with mobility handicaps. To reach the school, students and teachers had to walk on uneven terrain and rocks through the village, climb steps up to the playground from one side or cross a stream to enter the school grounds from the other side, and go up at least four steps to reach the classrooms.

In the mornings, students lined up outside school to sing the national anthem in front of the Nepal flag, and do calisthenics while the teachers observed. One uncomfortable scene I witnessed was a few older students punishing younger ones for mistakes during the calisthenics by hitting the younger children with sticks. None of the educators intervened to discourage or reinforce this behavior. This was surprising since Kriti said that, as a member of the SMC, one of her roles was to ensure teachers were not beating the students but talking to them.

They [teachers] don't beat the children up but instead they try to counsel them and convince them to be better. It's not good if they beat the children. If they see the

student cry they try to convince them. They are happy to spend 10-15 Rupees to buy them chocolate out of pocket to convince a crying child.

Coping and Adaptive Capabilities of Resiliency

Coping Capacity: Community Capital

The school community demonstrated its community capital in several ways. The strongest evidence was that the community itself requested the school be established, by petitioning the DEO and VDC for funds to pay a teacher and then asking a community member to teach. As Keshav describes:

Mainly the community here. At that time, there was a competition to start a new school in each Tole (Tole is similar to area, locality). When other Toles started schools in their areas, we recognized a need for opening a school here. Mainly two to three people...played a key role to establish the school. They went to the District Education Office and demand a need of school in this area.

As the teacher started gathering the children, the parents supported him by sending their children to be taught. Another community member provided space in his house on rainy school days. The community helped build the initial school for their children and provided the financial support to pay for two teachers. From the beginning, the community demonstrated a vested interest in the success of the school.

When the earthquakes occurred, even though the community members themselves were severely impacted, they helped remove debris from the school site, constructed the bamboo classrooms and recovered materials from the destroyed school. They also helped carry the tent and other supplies up from the road when needed.

Coping Capacity: Economic Capital

The community did not have funds to rebuild the school, replace furniture and provide materials and textbooks, but again, the community did what it could. As Kishor describes, the teachers and parents discussed what could be done for the school given the personal destruction everyone had experienced. It was pointed out that every little help counts, so parents and teachers focused on recovering materials from the old school and gathering what material they could from the forest to construct the bamboo center. Funds were requested and received from the DEO to pay the local tailor for uniforms, and the DEO provided the steel beam that was used to construct the new school building. Kishor indicated the school had a small bank account that was used to purchase small gifts for the students, as prizes during academic competitions and to pay the community supported teachers. Otherwise, the school had difficulty obtaining sufficient support from the DEO to maintain its “model” school status as required by the INGO. Keshav described his dilemma as the headmaster to maintain a limited teacher to student ratio:

When we are demanding teachers, according to the government's policy, there should be at least 40 students per teacher in the hilly region. Our student number is okay for three teachers. So, we are in a difficult situation. We are running up to grade five. Additionally, there is the issue of quality as well. So, we have some problems now.

As Keshav continued, by accepting funding from an INGO:

Organizations [INGOs] have their own rules and regulations. We discussed a long time about many things like, he asked “Will [you] go work with us or not? Will you be able to accept and implement our

educational programs?” Then we assured him [the INGO representative] that, “If you will support us here, we do our best whatever is needed.”

Kumar expressed concern that the government and INGO supported teachers received a higher salary than the community paid teachers. In addition, when the three-year (2016-2019) agreement with the INGO to pay two of the teachers end, and the school will have to either let those teachers go, lowering the quality standards of the school, or find another source of funding.

Coping Capacity: Emergency Services

Interviewees indicated that at the school and community levels, there was no disaster planning prior to the earthquake. Several of the interviewees indicated that they had not thought about an earthquake. As Kishor stated:

We didn't even think about it. We had that for the flood as a natural disaster plans but earthquake was [something] we didn't even imagine.

Our elders used to talk about the earthquake back in 90s and it seems like a story to us. We didn't imagine this at all.

Prior to the earthquakes, the natural disaster they were concerned about was flooding. When asked if any disaster planning had been done since the earthquakes, the responses were disheartening. Most of the responses included comments about how the next earthquake will not be that bad and that the buildings have been reconstructed as earthquake resistant. As Kumar said: “Instead of plan, the preparation for escaping...Now the buildings are earthquake resistant. Now, we don't have tall buildings like that were before.”

The headmaster did indicate possible preparedness plans stating:

...[f]irst we have the capacity to accept the disaster. We need to be mentally ready for this. We have planned to manage Jhatpat Jhola (in English, “a go bag”) in school now. It’s a bag to had on the door or center, for the emergency use. The bag as a box, a hat like helmet to save a head, first aid kits for immediate needs. We are thinking and making a plan for this.

I did not observe any “to go bags” for the students at the school.

Keshav also indicated that the teachers were providing information to the students about what to do if another earthquake should occur: “If an earthquake happens during school time, go under a table or bench. If happens while at house, go under a bed/cot, we told them. They practiced those things practically.” Initially I was unable to ask where he obtained this information. When asked if the school had received guidance from the DEO, the response from Keshav was: “Not really that you asked. We have demanded for that. We have informed them that teachers should be trained. But, it has not been implemented yet.” There was also no discussion of first aid kits or teachers being trained in emergency response. However, when I conducted a follow-up call, he said he had received training from the DEO when he went to pick-up the tent.

When Kriti was asked about emergency planning, she spoke about the SMC seeking money to install a fence around the school yard to prevent strangers and stray animals from coming onto the school grounds.

Coping Capacity: Infrastructure and Planning

Before the earthquakes, no one thought to plan for this type of disaster as it wasn't anticipated. The school building was built by hand by the community with bricks, mud and wood. When they constructed the school, they were not provided with information about the need for or how to construct an earthquake resistant school building.

After the earthquake, the roads were inaccessible due to the damage and subsequent landslides. Yet, as one interviewee commented, all the supplies were brought from Kathmandu.

When asked about future planning, there was no indication that alternative ways of obtaining or prepositioning supplies was being considered. The educators said the government had issued earthquake resistant building guidelines and they seemed confident that the new structures would be secure.

Coping Capacity: Information & Engagement

The first aspect that arises related to information and engagement is that, before the earthquakes, the educators were unaware of an earthquake hazard and information on how to construct an earthquake resilient building. The educators also indicated that they had not received any prior disaster training before the earthquakes struck.

After the earthquake, the headmaster recounts how he and the teachers provided information to the parents and children. Keshav said he and the teachers held information sessions for the parents telling them: "Earthquake does not come with notice and information, and happen at any time. Thus, you have to take care of your children. Do not send them to jungles and other risky areas. Don't send them to the old houses." In my follow-up call, he went on to describe the training provided to the children:

We provided the safety education and information to the school children on how to survive from the aftershocks. We also provided some practical exercises or training to the children on how to stay safe if an earthquake happens again.

Keshav said that when aftershocks occurred and they saw the students follow the instructions, it made the teachers feel confident that the students would be safe.

Coping Capacity: Social Character

The social character of the community varied among interviewees. Three of the interviewees were educated, had been supporting the school or teaching for a long time, and felt responsible for ensuring the rebuilding and future success of the school. Two interviewees expressed their limited education but also their trust and support of the teachers. One member indicated she did not read or write, so “just relies on what the teachers tell us.”

The predominant caste in the area is Tamang and Thomi. The headmaster identified himself as Thomi, saying, “[m]y caste is Thami. We have our own language—Thami language. We have our own customs and culture, religion and rituals.” He also indicated that the majority of the students and people living in the area were Thomi. In the case of Kabru, this helped the school obtain funding.

Other social characters that the school educators possessed were initiative and persistence, especially the headmaster and the chairman of the SMC. It seemed from the very beginning when the school was first established, the community members sought funding from a variety of sources. As Keshav illustrated:

Without any hesitation, we requested to various organizations, as I mentioned before, to support us whatever they could—it could be a pencil. ‘Please support whatever you can, for the children, for school and for the purpose of education.’ With that effort, we are able to stay in a good building now.

Lastly, Keshav described the characteristics that supported the teachers in reopening the school such as courage. It is best to hear Keshav describe in his own words his reflections on this difficult time:

Facing and managing a disaster is an unimaginable thing in life. To speak about this, it was a very difficult and different time for ourselves, and for others too to think about this. With the earthquake, we had lost Dhanajana (human beings and property). Actually, we were homeless. We have lost everything. However, we had to have courage; we need to return to the previous conditions; and we have to face and manage it. We were thinking that. We have to continue school. We, teachers, instead of thinking about our families and ourselves, we took the school as our first priority and responsibility. Because school is directly related to our young children and their future. That’s why we shared with teachers about working and fulfilling our responsibilities at any cost. We all were united and committed for that. We all had the same voice.

Adaptive Capacities: Governance & Policy

Adaptive capacity of resilience was less reflected in the governance, policy and leadership areas in relation to the District Education Office. Prior to the earthquake, the

headmaster and chairman of the SMC shared their frustration of not being able to obtain sufficient financial support. As Keshav stated: “The government should take the responsibility of providing salary and other allowances.”

As mentioned in the Emergency Services section, there were no prior, long-term planning or policies provided by the government. Also after the earthquakes, interviewees indicated that the DEO did not provide any guidance on what to do. The government informed the districts that schools would reopen, without obtaining feedback from the school communities as to the extent of the damage. As Kishor indicated, the government announced the decision to restart the schools by radio, because there was no TV. They did not receive information or guidance from the DEO about how to recover or respond. Kishor stated, “there is a suggestion (from the DEO) that the (school) buildings should be earthquake resistant so the students and teachers don’t get hurt.” Kanya said the school received one tent from the DEO, otherwise she wasn’t sure what support that office provided. Kishor indicated that representatives from the DEO brought interested INGO representatives to the village who wanted to look at different schools that needed to be rebuilt and select one to support. As the Kishor mentioned,

...[t]he relation is good [with the DEO], but the problem is there are many schools but they can't fund all the schools. We need to wait for our turn to get funded. [The] higher secondary school is building their school with the help of district office but it is taking forever to make them.

Keshav seemed to sum up the relationship with the DEO by saying:

It is not necessary that Education Office’s plans can be fully implemented in school. We need to prepare plans as per our local needs. We share the

same thing to our teachers at school. We discuss in our staff meeting regarding how to move ahead, and we make plans. And, we prepare plans that are suitable for school, students, and parents. This type of system we have now.

The relationship with the SMC seems stronger predominantly due to the Chairman of the SMC. After the earthquakes, the SMC met regularly and the meetings were, as Keshav indicated, compulsory. As Kumar stated: “At that time, [SMC] we had a meeting in every 15 days. Now, we have a regular and compulsory meeting once a month.” Kumar felt that the SMC, led by the headmaster, worked in collaboration to reopen the schools. However, it is unclear how strong the SMC truly is. When I asked Kanya, another member of the SMC, about the SMC and teacher collaboration, she said, “Probably they did. I am not sure. I don't know read and write so whatever teacher told us in the meeting is something I don't really remember.”

Adaptive Capacities: Social & Community Engagement

The social and community engagement characteristics for Kabru were very strong. The ties between teachers and their involvement in the school were demonstrated by the fact that they built the original school by hand. As Keshav describes:

The management of school including the preparation of a playground was mainly the responsibility of teachers. We all teachers used to work during the school break time. We taught classes until 1 pm, and then for an hour we used work with hammers and other manual tools to prepare the playground. We also broke the stones. It has not been fully prepared yet. We continuously worked for the school.

The community seemed to trust the teachers, as explicitly expressed by two interviewees and shown by the community sending their children back to school after the earthquakes. Teachers expressed to the parents the importance of the students returning to school, so they could resume their learning and “be distracted” from the devastation. As Kanya recounted:

Teachers convinced the students so much during that time. They loved students more than their house. They tried their best to convince the students who were not ready to come. They tried giving them chocolates and counseling them. Teachers used to go to every house and call the student. They used to convince student to go to school. They used to announce the school opening date but not many students used to show up so they used to convince them mostly to come to school.

Another strength demonstrated by the community was the strong relationships that were cultivated with representatives from external organizations able to help support the school. The headmaster took the initiative to write to Educate the Children prior to the earthquakes and submitted a proposal for financial support,. That meant when the earthquake struck, there was already a relationship that seems to have encouraged that international organization to provide support. After the quakes, the headmaster wrote to as many organizations as he could seeking assistance. One of the examples is how the school obtained the solar panels. As Keshav recounted:

Actually, the solar was not for this school. It was for another school in another area. We were close to the Alternative Energy Promotion Center since earlier. That school already had some materials. I asked them, “We

also need. I have a plan to establish this school as a Model School. I have been thinking that we can use multimedia in this school. Along with multimedia, I am interested to manage computers in each classroom. Now, the children cannot see a computer in the village.”

Another example is Kishor who had a connection to someone at the Salvation Army. Kishor said in his interview, “It isn’t nice to ask, but we needed help,” and so they received some tin to build the TLC.

Summary and Reflection

When my translator and I first arrived in Kabru, I was overwhelmed by the beautifully rebuilt school. Upon our arrival, I was a little concerned that I was not going to be able to conduct my research since the headmaster was not there and no one seemed to know about our visit. However, as soon as a teacher contacted the headmaster and everything was worked out, the week went very well. Observing the day-to-day activities, it looked like the school had resumed its normal schedule. The day started with students lined up outside to do morning calisthenics, then sing the national anthem. Students then dispersed to their classes with their teachers. While I conducted my interviews, classes were held consistently during the day. One concern I had was that the room which the headmaster set aside for me and my interpreter to conduct interviews had a row of tall glass door cabinets that held what looked like glass science beakers. None of the cabinets were attached to the walls and the doors were not latched. If an earthquake occurred, the room would be extremely dangerous for anyone to be in. I mentioned this to the headmaster and he smiled. When asked about the brackets, he indicated that the prefabricated walls were not conducive to installing brackets. I have not followed up

through my interpreter to ask whether anything had been done to mitigate the possible danger, let alone the cost of losing all the science equipment. I observed that the teachers' office also had one wall stacked with containers and items on tall shelves. The classrooms, on the other hand, did not have any tall shelves or heavy items hanging on the walls.

Overall, the impression I had from the headmaster, teachers and members of the SMC was one of pride, enthusiasm and dedication to provide the best education and school facilities for their students. It was refreshing to see a rebuilt school within two years of the earthquakes where teachers could provide education to their students and parents could feel confident that their children were safe.

Chapter VII - Jannu - Dolakha

District Description

The INGO that helped me make contact with the headmaster at Kabru told me about the Jannu school that was located in the same VDC as Kabru, but had not been rebuilt. Prior to traveling to Nepal, I had difficulty, through my interpreter, making contact with the headmaster. When I arrived in Nepal, my interpreter was finally able to obtain confirmation that the school agreed to be a case site. I was able to quickly amend my IRB and add the school, however, my planned travel schedule to Kabru left me with only one day, November 21, to conduct my site visit to Jannu. The site of Jannu is located more than a one-hour hike up the mountain from the village road. Early in the morning my interpreter and I left the road that was lined by a small cluster of shops and took an uneven, rocky trail through tall grasses and wildflowers up to the school. Although the classroom structure sat on the side of the mountain, the steepness of the terrain made it difficult to see and determine where the path led to reach it. We lost the trail several times and at one point had to find someone to ask for directions. When we came upon the school site, children were chasing each other, climbing nearby trees, hanging out by the TLC and playing games. The site included a two-room structure painted blue that housed the Early Childhood Development (ECD) classroom and the teachers' office. A small concrete building that housed pit toilets stood along the trail that led by the school, with three doors hanging open. There was no sign above the doors to indicate if there were separate toilets for boys and girls, or teachers. A temporary learning structure made of corrugated steel and wood, with five classrooms, sat along the hillside. The school is not

located near any village center and there is no accessible road available to reach the school.

Figure 6: Jannu - Inside a TLC Classroom



The teachers and headmaster explained that the original school was established in 1999 by a local man. The community collected money to start and support the school. It was only after five years of the school's existence that the government recognized it, and began providing teachers' salaries, textbooks, and food support. Prior to the 2015 earthquakes the school boasted a seven-classroom, two-story structure and enrolled up to 152 students with five teachers. The current manager of the school was appointed in 2013. She lives in the village among the cluster of shops on the main road and hikes back and forth every day. There are five teachers currently teaching at the school. There are no reported teachers supported by local or international non-profits.

Like Kabru, the teachers and students are of the Thami (Thangmi) caste. The Thami caste is a small group (about 40,000) who live in the hills of Dolakha and Sindhupalchok and are predominantly farmers (Subedi, 2000). As Dhara commented, “This is an area of indigenous people and minorities community. Educate the Children (ETC) [an INGO] mainly works for indigenous people, minorities including Dalits, and moreover, the focus is on women/mothers.” Dhara continued to describe the community and the challenges they face:

In one way, this is a backward community. It is also backward in language as well. We teach in Nepali and they (students) are finding it difficult to understand. We teach in Nepali and English. Their mother tongue is Thami. All the students are from Thami community. 100% students are Thami here. It is hard to make them learn even Nepali, and English is more difficult. English is their third language which is not meaningful to them. But, we are doing our best to make them learn. It is our responsibility to teach them.

As I only had one day, I decided to conduct a focus group. Initially all four teachers and the headmaster indicated they would participate even though I indicated that I was seeking participants who were working at the school at the time of the earthquake. Since all five educators were present and going to participate in the interview, it meant that classes were not being conducted. Four members of the group were female and one was male. As it turned out, of the five, only two interviewees were at the school at the time of the earthquake—the headmaster, Dhara, and the one male teacher, Deepak. Both of them have up to an hour walk to reach the school. As the quasi focus group

progressed, the teachers who were not at the school at the time of the earthquake (Deepti, Darsana, Diya) left the room.

Impact of the Earthquakes

During the April 25 earthquake, the headmaster, Dhara, was in the process of transporting her husband who was recovering from a motorcycle accident from Kathmandu back to the village. The damage from the earthquake left the second story of the school building cracked and tilting. The headmaster, teachers and parents considered recovering materials from the school, but the government warned against going into buildings in case they collapsed. The second earthquake completely destroyed the school and damaged the desks and supplies inside. As Dhara recounted, “[a]fter the first earthquake, the top story was affected/slightly tilted. We were thinking to take out the things gradually from the building. But the second earthquake completely destroyed the building. We could not take out anything from the building.”

The headmaster returned to the village with her husband three days after the April 25 earthquake. Then during the May 12th earthquake, Dhara’s newly built house was also completely destroyed. As Dhara described:

An army camp was based at the Laakilang Higher Secondary School. Because of the situation of my husband, the army provided us a tripal (tarp). They said that ‘keep the tripal, you have a very difficult situation. Put the tripal on an open space and stay there.’ Then, my relatives and neighbors prepared a temporary shed/hut (like cow-shed, “Gotha” in Nepali). We stayed in the hut, and prepared food in an open ground for a month. No tents for that. Preparing and eating food on the open ground.

We had a tripal, and under which we the family of four to five people including my mother-in-law, and one sister.

She continued to describe how her husband was unable to get up or move unassisted. Yet, she commented, she had to care about the students and the school. Thankfully, no teachers or students were killed or injured during the earthquakes.

After the earthquakes, enrollment dropped by 30 students. Families left the area to go to the district capital, Kathmandu or India. Both Dhara and Deepak commented that it was really hard to start classes because there were no classrooms. Deepak:

It (school) was supposed to start from the 30th, but another big earthquake came on 29th again (May 12). After that earthquake, we started on Jestha 17th (May 31). Whatever the materials available here, with them, we constructed temporary buildings.

Figure 7: Jannu - Temporary Learning Center




Eventually they obtained tents and built the TLC. Overall, the educators felt the children were not really able to start learning until three months after the second earthquake.

Response and Recovery—Humanitarian and Development Aid

Immediately after the April 25th earthquake, the parents and teachers made an initial structure. As Dhara stated, “For the initial days, during emergency we made out of the workable wood and tin available. Later, the Education Office provided us some Tarpaulin (Tripal).” Per the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, Jannu was provided one tent as a TLC structure, however, Dhara indicated in her interview that she received two. She described the current 5-classroom TLC as the structure that was built three to four months after the earthquake with the aid of Plan International. The 3W report indicates that 151 school kits and 0 recreation kits were distributed to the school.

Table 5: Education Cluster 3W Report Snapshot for Jannu



Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 11, 2016

The educators did not recall, during my initial interviews, receiving the UNICEF stationery or recreation kits. Yet in follow-up questions, the manager said they received

one school kit and one recreation kit. When I was at the school, I observed one of the metal boxes in the teachers' office. It is hard to imagine 151 school kits were provided when there was nowhere to store or secure such a large number of metal boxes, considering all the building structures were destroyed, not to mention the amount of work it would entail to carry the boxes up the mountain. The 3W report indicates that no teachers were provided psychosocial training. The main implementing partner listed on the 3W report was Plan International and CEEPAARD was the implementing agency.

The national government indicated the school should start one month after the April 25th earthquake. The VDC decided the schools would reopen and hold classes from 6:30 am to 10:30 am, because it seemed the aftershocks were lighter before noon. The teachers agreed that the schedule helped the children, as they were fearful of the continuous aftershocks. Dhara stated that the school management committee met and decided how to return the children to school. The community cleared the debris and built a temporary school structure with old wood and tarps that were distributed.

A couple of days after the second earthquake, Dhara traveled to the District Education Office (DEO) in Charikot, the district capital, for a meeting with all the headmasters. The DEO distributed tents based on the number of students enrolled at the school. Jannu was issued two tents that the headmaster transported back by tractor. Dhara recounts the story:

Yes, I went myself. I had not faced such difficult situation before because I brought at 11 pm on a tractor. A sad incident was that, at the then Sunkhani VDC (now it is Kalinchok VDC), the tractor was changed to an automatic unloaded position. The lady teacher (madam) on the front seat

beside the driver pressed somewhere with her feet. We were sitting at the back on the stuff. We also pushed up and almost to unload. Then a male teacher (sir) informed the driver and it was managed. We brought the tents around 11 pm. I cannot forget this moment as we arrived while facing many challenges.

Once the tractor arrived in the village, parents and teachers carried the tents up from the main road to the school site. The parents and teachers set the tents up themselves following instructions on a paper they received. As Dhara described:

For the initial days, during emergency we made out of the workable wood and tin available. Later, the Education Office provided us some Tarpaulin (tarps). Along with that other organizations have been supporting us. At the beginning, the Education Office managed some tarpaulin and tents. Then CEEPAARD in association with Plan Nepal... The Plan Nepal constructed the TLC building. That was made at the beginning...over there, the short one. The tall one we made later. First our school made that, and later Plan Nepal constructed it again destroying the previous one.

The taller TLC with three classrooms was constructed by Plan Nepal three to four months after the earthquake. The teachers recalled receiving help from UNICEF, Plan International (Plan)/CEEPAARD Nepal, Educate the Children and the Salvation Army.

As Deepak recounted:

After that, we received many support and aid. The Plan Nepal provided constructed the TLC and also provided bags to children. UNICEF provided clothes—shorts (underwear) and vests, and sandals for children.

This building (teachers' office/ECE classroom) was constructed by ETC in association with Plan Nepal. And, the Salvation Army, an organization based in Lalitpur, Nepal which provided tins and stationery materials to the students.

Educate the Children (ETC), a U.S. based organization that had been active in the community for a couple of years, has an office in the area, and was recognized as the first organization that provided the most help for the school to restart. It built the two-room structure teachers' office and ECD classroom. As Deepak indicated: "The big support is done by ETC." Dhara continued:

After the earthquake, we had no teaching resources. ETC provided all including the white board, markers, ink. Providing the bags and stationery since 2072 (2015), after the earthquake. It has been two years. It has been four years they have been working here, but bags and stationery for two years.

Although ETC was seen as providing the most and first support to the school, the organization is not listed in the 3W report.

Dhara and Deepak indicated that Dhara, the headmaster, was key in obtaining the Salvation Army's support. When the April 25th earthquake occurred, Dhara was in Kathmandu. Dhara learned from a Taekwondo teacher, who had volunteered at the school a couple of years prior, that the Salvation Army would provide assistance: "When I was in Kathmandu, I met them in office with the help of [Taekwondo teacher]. They were foreigners. And, we received the support in Bhadra (August/September) through the [Taekwondo teacher]." The organization provided tin for the TLC roof, notebooks, pens

and paper. These materials had to be carried up from the road as well. The parents and teachers hired porters to carry the materials up to the school site and paid them with food. The government distributed books to schools in the VDC prior the earthquakes and the school had distributed them immediately, so they were not destroyed in the school building like Kabru's textbooks.

The teaching staff expressed feeling upset because Kabru received more international aid after the earthquakes and the school had already been rebuilt as a "model" school, yet Jannu was still not rebuilt. An international NGO had expressed its intent to provide funding and even conducted a site visit, but at the time of my visit, the headmaster was still waiting for confirmation. When I followed up two weeks later with the headmaster, the NGO had finally contacted her to tell her they were not going to provide the aid. And when I checked in 2018, the school was still not rebuilt. During my interview, the headmaster commented that her school's children were from a lower caste and that is why she thought they were not receiving support. Dhara lamented: "We have faced many challenges in the school after the earthquake. More than that, our school is left behind."

Learning Environment

As Dhara recalled:

It was very difficult at the beginning. It was extremely hard for us during the initial period as we did have nothing—no teaching materials, no seating arrangement even for teachers in school. Despite the challenges, we ran the school.

The parents and teachers built an initial TLC with the materials they had available. The structure consisted of two rooms and no doors. Dhara describes, “Just for the immediate needs, the structures without doors...Because of the situation, we managed to keep the two classes (grades) students in the same classroom.” The school then received two tents from the DEO. Each of the structures held up to 25 students. For a school that boasted 152 students prior to the earthquake, it would have meant that upwards of 50 students had to be accommodated in the TLCs.

The headmaster made a comment that the other teachers were not at the school at first, only she and Deepak. They both described how difficult it was to hold classes in the summertime in the TLC and tents. The tents did not have windows and so there was no airflow. As Deepak stated: “During the sunny hot days, it was very difficult to teach under the tin and tents. The students were sweating a lot.” Dhara reiterated this by saying:

What happens inside the tent was.... The tents provided to us were closed type—the door and window are also closed. It was of a chain (zipper) system tent. We all used to sweat inside the tents. As soon as we entered the tents, we started sweating. Sometimes we felt that we were keeping the children forcefully. We had to teach them, and it was problematic while teaching them. The environment was not interesting for the children to study there.

The teachers and students recovered some benches from the destroyed school in order to have somewhere to sit, otherwise, the children sat on the dirt floor. The school operated at the early morning schedule from 6:30 am to 10:30 am until the fall.

When I visited the school in November 2017, the school was still operating out of the TLC, except for the headmaster's office and ECD classroom. The teachers' office and ECD is a two-room structure with a cement floor, windows, carpeting, furniture and electricity. The outside was painted blue. When we visited the school and interviewed the educators, it didn't look like classes were being held, and the ECD room was closed and locked. As my interpreter and I came upon the school site, there were children running and chasing each other, children were climbing nearby trees and it seemed like chaos.

One of the first things I noticed when we arrived was the bathroom structure doors were sitting open and it was dark inside. Although there were three separate doors and toilets, there was no indication that there were separate bathrooms for boys and girls. The building sat right on the trail that passed by the school and provided no privacy.

The five-classroom TLC was made from a mixture of corrugated tin and recovered wood, with dirt floors. The rooms each had a window that let in light and air. But there were no safety bars, screens or glass on the windows which looked out over the steep mountainside. When the wooden shutters were closed, the rooms were very dark as there was no electricity. The interiors of the classrooms were dark, with dirt floors and rough wood desks with attached benches with metal legs. The wooden desks were serviceable, but it was clear that they had been recovered from the earthquake and repaired. The metal legs help to prevent mice or other animals from chewing on the wood. Teachers had hung educational posters on the wood walls. As Dhara described, "It has been 3 years since the earthquake and we are teaching in TLC. It's okay, but sound from one classroom disturbs to others. We wish we have a permanent type of building."

It is difficult to describe the impression of the dark classrooms with their corrugated steel walls that could be heard through. Firsthand experience having stayed in a corrugated steel structure, at one of the other locations, told me that the space would become extremely hot or extremely cold. During the rainy season, the floor would turn to mud and the noise would be loud on the roof. The school ground was rough dirt with a rock ledge and no fencing. As we visited, I observed people walking through the school site.

Coping and Adaptive Capabilities of Resiliency

Coping Capacity: Community Capital

The teachers described the parents as being extremely helpful in supporting the needs of the school. The community started and supported the school up till the government recognized it. When the earthquakes hit, although the parents and teachers had their own concerns, when it was clear the school needed help the parents gave it. As the headmaster Dhara, described:

Another thing about the parents here is that they have the spirit of collective work and support. In some places we hear parents saying that ‘the school is the business of teachers, why should we support them.’ But the parents of this school are very helpful. They are working in the spirit that ‘this is our school.’ If we ask for help, they help us—one person from each family.

The parents cleared the debris of the destroyed school, pulling materials out of the collapsed building that could be salvaged. Dhara said: “All the parents helped to clear out all the collapsed infrastructures. The temporary structures were also prepared by their

support. All the support is done by them. Just for the immediate needs, the structures without doors.”

As mentioned above, the community linkage with the volunteer who taught Taekwondo helped the school access aid from the Salvation Army. As Dhara informed:

He worked for 2 years here, but he was not here during that time. He is not from this place. Since he used to teach here and he loves this place, he was interested to know what happened to... this place.

The community also had assistance of ETC, since it had already been active in the area for five years providing assistance to mothers and children. Dhara said: “The ETC is supporting us with what we need for the school. They are helping in many ways. With the support of ETC, it’s very easy for us to run the school.”

Coping Capacity: Economic capital

When the school was initially established, the community supported it until the government recognized it and provided funding. When the earthquakes struck, the community pulled together to support the school. As Dhara indicated: “The parents provided volunteer support for the construction (labor support) (of an initial TLC). But the school provided snacks/meals to them.” Although the community supports the school, the school does not have its own bank account or funds for emergencies. The teachers indicated that they did not receive any financial support from the DEO, just tents and lunch for the children. In addition, during the interview the teachers stated that the government deducted money from their salaries, saying it was for the earthquake victim. As Dhara recounted: “How much of our salary deducted sir? 11,000? To support the earthquake victim, the government also deducted some money from teachers. It was

11,000, isn't it sir?" Deepak confirmed it was NPR11,000 (US\$89.00-4/20/2020).

However, when asked to confirm the salary deductions in a follow-up, the headmaster said this did not happen.

The rest of the aid the community received to support the reestablishment of the school came from in-kind materials from international NGOs.

Coping Capacity: Emergency Services

The school did not have a disaster plan prior to the earthquake. As Dhara stated, they had no idea it was coming: "We did not expect about the earthquake. We experienced small earthquakes before as well, but we did not think about such a devastating earthquake."

There was no one on the staff trained in first aid or health. ETC had been providing the school with health and first aid supplies. Dhara explained, "ETC provided medicine for emergency treatment or first aid. They provided one time before the earthquake, and two times after the earthquake. In total, we received simple medicines, such as for the common cold, cough, fever, and minor injuries."

When asked about future disasters and disasters plans, the teachers spoke about landslides and the possibility of future earthquakes. However, their current focus was on how to reconstruct the school and make it earthquake resistant. Dhara stated:

We don't have any specific plans for example—this way we deal with the challenges. However, we are trying for earthquake resistant buildings. We all—teachers, parents—are approaching for resources for such resistant buildings. To be honest, we do not have any exact plan for the next earthquake.

There are no roads to access the school. If a child is injured, he/she would need to be carried to reach aid. There is also no phone system except for the teachers' personal cell phones.

Coping Capacity: Information & Engagement

The school was informed by the government and the VDC when the school should reopen, even though the building had completely collapsed and there were no resources. Once the headmaster had obtained the tents and the date was set for when schools should restart, the SMC met with the teachers. They discussed how the VDC established the start times for school. The headmaster and teachers assured the SMC that it would take care of the children. The teachers and headmaster either saw parents or contacted them to inform them when school would restart. As Dhara described:

Initially, discussed with the parents live close to school. The parents asked me, 'When and how will you start school?' Then I said, 'From 17.' Thus, with the discussion of teachers, we started from 17, and all the teachers came from that period. In case of students, we told them, 'Don't be afraid. We will be with you. The classes will be in the morning and students come to school regularly.'

As mentioned, neither Dhara nor Deepak had information that there was a possibility of such a devastating earthquake. In addition, the level of education in the community is not high. As Dhara described, "They [the parents] lack information, awareness, and they are behind in many respects."

Coping Capacity: Infrastructure and planning

There was no planning or consideration for a disaster such as an earthquake. The school itself is hard to reach by a steep rocky trail, that turns into a muddy river during monsoon season. As Dhara stated, “The vehicles did not use to reach here then. Now, it comes closer here. At that time, the road was up to my home [down in the village].” The tents had to be carried from the village up to the school site. When the parents helped to set up the tents, they did not know how, as Deepak explained: “There was a paper with instruction, and we set up looking at the paper. At first, we tried to set up the tents just lifting them up but could not. Then I think of an idea that worked.”

The school yard is mainly dirt with several steps leading down to the TLC structure and not accessible to students with mobility issues. The bathrooms were inaccessible as well.

There were two landslides soon after the May 12 earthquake, in which two villagers died. Even so, the TLC was built alongside the mountain and not further into the side. There was no indication that the construction of the new school would take landslides into consideration. The only concern was ensuring the school be built earthquake resistant.

Coping Capacity: Social character

When the headmaster returned home with her husband, their newly constructed house was destroyed and they had to stay in a tent, which was difficult for her husband who was recovering from surgery. The headmaster expressed that during the time she was really depressed, but the parents and people from the community pitched in to help.

Although as headmaster Dhara had these personal losses and concerns, she still went to the school to see what could be done:

And, remembering the school's situation, my responsibility, and the situation of my husband...for the six months I was...(not clear). No other can help support him [the husband]. The earthquake was unfortunate for me. Despite the situation, I managed the school as if I had no any other challenges.

Even the headmaster's husband showed his character, as Dhara describes: When the school started, I had a big challenge. I had to come to school in the morning at 6am. There was no one to take my husband to a toilet. I can never forget this incident. He did not eat for 1-2 meals. He said that 'I do not eat because there is no one to take me to the toilet after you go to school. So, I make a practice of going to the toilet in the evening only.'

When Dhara began to speak about her personal experiences she said she wasn't sure she could tell us without crying, but she did. Even with the pressure of her family and personal losses, the headmaster took responsibility for the school.

Adaptive Capacities: Governance & Policy

The teachers indicated that they received minimal support or guidance from the DEO. The VDC and DEO called all the headmasters together for a meeting and to distribute tents, but as Dhara states: "No. We received just tents. Oh, yeah, they have provided snacks" (school lunches). Since then, the teachers did not indicate the school had received any help for rebuilding or guidance on disaster planning.

Educate the Children and CEEPAARD were the two main organizations that provided assistance to reopen the school. As Dhara stated,

Yes, after the earthquake. ETC helped for the building. ETC helped more than that. ETC has been supporting even now. ETC is like heart for us. For constructing a permanent building, ETC does not have that big funds, but they provide everything other than that. Thus, if we have a permanent building, we won't have to worry about it again and again. The best support we received for running the school smoothly is from CEEPAARD and ETC. I would like to mention ETC again and again. ETC was the center of hope for us at that time. They said to us, "Don't worry about anything. Ask us whatever you need." When they said so, we had to worry about nothing.

Dhara explained that ETC had been working within the community for over 3 years. The organization started a women's group and as part of it, each child of a member of the group receives a school bag with supplies.

Adaptive Capacities: Social & Community Engagement

When asked who took the lead in ensuring the children returned to school, Dhara said, "To start the school...the community here, administration and teachers." As Dhara explained, after the earthquake the SMC met to discuss how the school would be restarted. Then they took action helping to clean up debris, salvage materials from the destroyed school and set up the tents. Dhara stated,

The parents are continually committed to work for the school because they represent a backward community. They support school if the school calls

them for help. They are not proactive, and do not make any plans, but they support if we call them for help.

Dhara also showed tremendous strength in handling all that she had to during this time. As she described, she was having mental health issues. As word of the extent of the earthquakes' destruction spread, but direct communication was down, she was unable to find out if her oldest son was alive:

After I heard that the Dharahara collapsed, I did not hear anything what people were talking. "My son is no more. Husband is in this situation. We survived somehow but the oldest son is no more." I was like senseless and faint.

Once she was able to know her family was safe, she became more comfortable. As she continued, "I do have many personal experiences related to the earthquake. I solved many problems."

But both she and Deepak described their view of their roles: "Living a simple life along with doing service. In addition, we are simple teachers and this is a small school, not big. If our students do better in future, that will be a matter of pride for us—our students have done this!"

Summary and Reflection

After having visited Kabru, the condition of Jannu was stark—the dirt floors of the classrooms, and the dark pit toilets with no privacy, especially for girls. The condition of the TLCs was extremely rough. The dedication of Dhara and Deepak was evident in their concern for the school to be rebuilt. Dhara especially stood out for her role in responding to the needs of the school when she was burdened with so many personal

issues. Although she indicated that she was living under a tarp with family, there was no indication that they were assisting her with her husband and his recovery. So, along with taking care of the school, the students, she was also having to find and cook food for her husband and take care of his recovery. She did comment on how the students' parents and other teachers helped out. So she didn't feel as isolated.

It seemed that the organization providing the most assistance was ETC, which already had strong ties in the community. In addition, the Salvation Army was identified through a volunteer teacher who felt a special connection to the community.

The school did not have an emergency plan and there was no discussion of a plan after the earthquake, as the headmaster and teachers were still focused on trying to get the school rebuilt.

Reflecting on my visit to the school, it seemed that day there was limited education taking place. When my translator and I arrived mid-morning, the children were running and playing around the school. All the teachers initially joined the focus group while the children played outside. The teachers who were not present at the school during the time of the earthquake eventually left, but I do not recall them calling the children back to classrooms during the rest of my interview with the headmaster and teacher. Once the interview was over, the interpreter and I hiked back down to the village with the headmaster.

Chapter VIII - Saipal - Sindhupalchowk

District and School Description

The district of Sindhupalchok is located just over 42 miles northeast of Kathmandu. It takes a three-hour bus ride on public transportation to reach Saipal's village through winding mountain roads, sections of which are often wiped out by landslides. When I visited in 2017, a newly built section of the main highway leading to Saipal, about one hour outside of Kathmandu, was destroyed. Buses, trucks, cars and motorcycles maneuvered around each other, hugging the mountainside through the remains of a recent landslide. When we arrived at the market area of the village and stepped down from the bus, a teacher/former headmaster was there to greet me and my interpreter. As his sister owns a small café in the village, we stopped to have doodh chai (milk tea) before walking to the teacher's house. In 2016 I volunteered at Saipal to teach English and stayed with this teacher's family. That year the village was quiet. It seemed that the impact of the earthquake was still hanging heavily in the air. Now as we sat in the café¹⁸, the air reverberated with the sounds of reconstruction activity.

Per the 2011 census, the total population of the district was approximately 287,798 with 24.56% under the age of 19. When I visited the village in 2016, I was struck by the number of students who commented that their fathers worked either in Kathmandu or abroad. As Sabita recounted during her interview, her husband was in Afghanistan until several Nepalis were beheaded there; then he went to Somalia and was there when the 2015 earthquake struck Nepal. The education statistics for Sindhupalchok

¹⁸ The cafe consisted of a dirt floor with stone walls and a tin roof. Hard wooden benches and tables lined one side of the room. Two single light bulbs hung from the ceiling. Dishes were washed from a hose outside on the ground with chickens running back and forth.

indicate there were a total of 570 schools for grades 1-12, of which 546 were government schools and 24 were institutional (private) schools, for a total of 80,833 students. The total number of teachers was 2,466, with 923 of them being non-government supported (rahat) teachers (Nepal, 2017). The high illiteracy rate of 37% for the district reflects the low level of schooling (Nepal, 2017). The weather at the time of the earthquake was typical for the region at about 55 degrees F (13 degrees C). The majority of the population is Hindu with 59% followed by Buddhism at 38% and less than 2% Christian and Prakriti (Nepal, 2012a)

Saipal sits on the side of a mountain about a one mile walk from the village market, along an unmaintained dirt road and down a steep rocky path that turns into a muddy river during monsoon season. The school was started in 1996 by the community and received some government support for teachers' salaries and textbooks. In 2009 the school was recognized as a model school by the DEO and several national and international visitors came to see it. It was even highlighted in a Thailand newspaper (Sangita, Interview, 2017). Prior to the earthquake the school had 210 students.

The rocky path, which passes by the temporary learning center built by SOS Children's Villages (SOS CV), leads down to a two-room building that houses the teachers' office on one side, and a library and small kitchen area on the other. Two small corrugated steel structures sit to the far side of the building, housing enclosed pit toilets for the teachers' use. These toilets were built after the earthquake. Prior to the earthquake, the teachers used the same bathrooms as the children. Further down the hill sits a one-level building with eight classrooms and a small locked storage space. A small cement building sits in front of the classrooms and contains two separate entrances to pit

toilets. The entrances are marked in English “Girls” and “Boys.” Next to this structure sat an open-roofed structure with a cement floor, that the school used for outdoor activities such as their morning exercises and singing the national anthem.

When I visited the school in 2016, a bamboo structure that had served as a TLC sat in front of the rebuilt classroom building and was filled with twisted metal and broken wood benches and desks. The main building had just been fully repaired, and the classrooms were being painted and electricity installed for lights and ceiling fans. The safety bars for the windows looking out over the mountain had not yet been reinstalled. An international volunteer was building wooden floors for the first and second grade classrooms, as younger students usually sit on carpets on the floor.

I interviewed seven people: the headmaster, five teachers—one who was the headmaster at the time of the earthquake—and one member of the SMC. Six of the interviewees were women. All six teachers were employed with the school when the earthquakes occurred. The member of the SMC joined the committee right after the earthquake.

Impact of the Earthquakes

Located between the epicenters of the two major earthquakes, the district suffered the most in terms of lives lost, compared to the other fourteen districts impacted. The total number of deaths in the district was 2,071 (Code for Nepal, 2015). Twenty-seven teachers and 612 students died. Per the Nepal Post Disaster Needs Assessment, over 95% of the classrooms were destroyed or damaged which represents 3,607 classrooms destroyed and 1,166 severely damaged with over 70,000 impacted (Nepal, 2015a). The

estimated cost of the destruction to the education sector was over US\$19 million (Sindhupalchok DEC, 2017).

The earthquake devastated the village where the school is located. Sangita recalled the day the first earthquake hit, when she and her family were sitting outside in their courtyard eating a noon-day meal: “The earthquake struck and there were screams and then silence. It felt like the whole world had died around us.”

It took a week for the surviving villagers to pull the bodies from the debris. So many had been killed that the villagers had to load trucks with 10 to 12 bodies to transport them for burial. Two students of the school were killed, including the youngest daughter of the headmaster, Sadeep, serving at the time of the earthquake. Sadeep’s two-story house was destroyed, and he lost his buffalo he depended upon for farming. One afternoon he took me on a tour of his property and showed me the plots of land he could not plant because he had lost his buffalo. Many of the villagers lost farm animals on which they depended for food, milk and cultivation. As Sangita recounted, “We were in so much trauma, we didn’t care about the animals at all.” She added that several days passed before they began to identify animals that were still alive. By then the village had other issues as Sahana described, “all our cattle were killed and eaten by tigers because the cattle were shifted to an open land.”

As the villagers thought about survival, they gathered their resources. Sangita recounted how 45 people stayed in one shelter and combined what food they could salvage from the debris. She continued to describe how there was no water or electricity available to prepare rice, their main food staple, in pressure cookers, so they were unable

to feed the children and could not send them to school. The former headmaster, Sadeep, described how they didn't have any clean clothes to wear to school. As Sadeep recalled:

The same clothes while at home, and when going to school as well. We had to go to the jungle to take a bath—had to wash the clothes, and could return to school only the clothes got dry. That was such a bad!

All their clothes had been damaged or lost in the earthquake and, with the lack of water, there was no means to wash what they still had. Sadeep went on to say how they received t-shirts from Save the Children:

At last, the Save the Children gave a white T-shirt, and a red umbrella to use during the monsoon and “Save the Children” was written on it. An umbrella and a T-shirt per teacher. “Washing Your Hands” was written on the umbrella, and “Keep Clean” was written on the T-shirt, something like that.

The interviewees were conflicted regarding the impact on the teachers and the children. As Sangita stated: “All these situations made a huge impact on the children. I am happy that we didn't see any mental trauma in the children due to the situation.” Sahana indicated that the children were upset and crying and were not ready to go to school at all:

We had such a bad impact, and the impact to the children was even more. They had very bad impact as they used to cry during aftershocks, and they had a psychological and mental impact. At that time, school was completely closed, and there was not an environment and mood of teaching and studying.

After the first earthquake, the eight-classroom structure was severely damaged. The two-room building for the teachers' office and library/kitchen sustained cracks but was deemed safe. The bathroom building for the students was undamaged. The teachers were gathering and trying to teach the children in the teachers' office/library when the second earthquake struck. The younger children were in the library. The teachers and two SOS Children's Village (SOS CV) volunteers rushed to get the children out of the building, and their parents came and took them home. As Sahana recounted:

SOS was helping at school to save children. I was in another room, around 11 after making my child sleep. We were all sitting there along with children, and at the same time the earthquake came again. After that, we were terrified more than before.

The children didn't return to school until a month later. Sadeep recalled: The government also gave one month leave (holiday). Why gave the one month leave because there were no homes for the people who survived. During the period, we collected the dead bodies, and took the sick people to hospital. Then, we went back to school.

With the earthquakes and continued aftershocks, the school enrollment declined by 50 children whose families migrated from the area, some moving to Kathmandu. One of the children who was injured and could not walk was taken to Kathmandu to recover and remained there to continue his studies. The teachers indicated that they were concerned if enrollment did not recover, the school would be closed. Overall, teachers reported that the students did not really start learning until a year after the first earthquake. Sangita said, "We taught them nothing for a year at all. We never thought


that we could start this all over again. But with patience we were able to start the school again.”

Response and Recovery—Humanitarian and Development Aid

The 3W Education Cluster report for the district indicated that 85% of the projected TLCs were built, with 838 estimated/planned and 715 reported complete. The UNICEF school kits and recreation kits were reported to have achieved 97% and 85% coverage, respectively (1512 estimated to 1468 distributed school kits, and 740 estimated to 630 distributed recreation kits). Teacher training on how to provide psychosocial support for the students was reported to exceed the estimated participants, with 1,209 estimated and 1,280 reported being trained. For Saipal, the 3W report indicated that one TLC was provided (one was the target). However, under the data for type of TLC, the type is not indicated, but two TLCs are counted. In reality, Sadeep was able to obtain five tents from the VDC and one bamboo TLC was constructed. Teacher training was provided to four teachers, with three as the target. From the interviews, the teachers indicated that only two of the teachers received psychosocial support training. The 3W report indicated that 4 school kits and 2 recreation kits had been distributed to the school. The teachers only recalled receiving three of the grey metal UNICEF boxes. I observed four metal boxes stored in the library. Three of the boxes were the same size, two of which were being used to contain school supplies including unused chalk. The third stored used and unused recreation equipment. The fourth box was smaller and had a mix of notebooks, pens, and wall posters thrown in it. Samita commented that they received the UNICEF school kits and recreation kits, but that the metal boxes were not received

until four months after the earthquake. The implementing partner/reporting organization per the 3W report was Save the Children and Nepal Red Cross/Tuki Sang.

Table 6: Education Cluster 3W Report Snapshot for Saipal



Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 11, 2016

The first organization which educators and the SMC member recalled providing assistance was SOS Children's Village (SOS CV). However, SOS CV was not referenced in the 3W report at all. Sadeep's cousin worked for the organization in Kathmandu. The cousin was from the village and had just finished building a house there, and was preparing to retire and move back. However, the earthquake destroyed the new house. Through SOS CV, the cousin was able to direct immediate emergency supplies to the village and school. Sagari indicated that SOS CV provided food to the smaller children to encourage them to return to school. Sangita recalled that SOS CV provided a tarp to provide a space protected from the rain and sun where the younger children would learn and play. As there was limited space for the older children, the 6th, 7th and 8th grade students remained at home. When a storm tore up the tarp, the younger children were sent home as well. If the weather was nice, children were brought together on the open ground

to play. The timing is unclear, but one of the key items SOS CV provided was a two-room corrugated steel structure to be used as a TLC. As Salini recounted in her interview:

I don't know exactly who provided [the SOS CV TLC]. It might be from SOS organization or any other organizations. There were 3-4 tents. After the cottage (SOS CV TLC) was prepared, the students above 3 classes [grade three] were taught here [in the tents]. They get excited to come to school because they used to get meals at school and could play. Otherwise, it was difficult.

Sadeep, the former headmaster, indicated that it was a challenge to obtain tents: "We tried to find/search who give school tents, where to find. Since I was the headmaster, I was working on how to bring back the children (students) to school." Sadeep discovered that the VDC was distributing tents, but he had to negotiate to get them:

Some political party workers were engaged with the relief distribution. If possible, they did not like to distribute to anyone. Instead they wanted to distribute to the people from their place or to their relatives. No one was interested to give us.

Sadeep indicated that he begged for the tents and the workers finally told him he could take what he could carry away. Sadeep remembered:

I asked the senior people there. Even then, they were not interested give me. After that, I was alone, and I said. 'Please give to me. They are being damaged here but we are not able to manage shelter for our children to study.' They angrily said, 'Please take away right now, and you have to

take them yourself alone' and challenged me. Then, I also told them 'I can take myself' and dragged the tents a little further below the place and threw over there. Later, I requested to my own brothers to bring them. They were surprised. We brought the three with the help of 4-5 people. Again, it was not sufficient. Then, I again asked them, 'Give me the other two, the three are not enough.' 'Can you take the same way you did yesterday?' 'Yes, I can take.' I dragged in front of them. I could not bring myself alone, and thus, we brought with the support of 4-5 people.

Although Sadeep obtained the tents, there were no instructions on how to set them up. Through a personal connection with the local Nepali Army, Sadeep asked the soldiers to show him how to set up the tents. He was then able to have the older students help him set up the remaining tents. When asked about timing, the general consensus was that two months after the first earthquake the tents and a TLC were set up. At this time a representative from Save the Children (Save) came and collected data. Several of the teachers recounted how Save provided materials like bamboo and steel sheets to erect the bamboo TLC. Sabita said that Save provided school supplies such as backpacks, notebooks, water bottles and solar lights for grades 1 to 6, but not the 7th and 8th grades. She went on to point out that SOS CV provided materials for all the students.

When asked to recount the different organizations and aid provided, most of the interviewees commented that it was hard to recall, as it was such a difficult time. For example, Salini stated: "The great role by SOS. For the foods and living of the kids. Other organizations also helped, but I do not remember. My children went to SOS. Other organizations also provided backpacks, tiffins (metal lunch containers), and others."

Sadeep's cousin worked at SOS CV in Kathmandu and, although not indicated on the Education Cluster 3W report, the interviewees all identified SOS CV as the main driver to re-establish an education environment after the earthquakes. As Sabita said: "SOS Children's Village told us to get the children back to school immediately – one week after the earthquake." SOS CV built a two-room TLC structure in which the smaller children gathered to play games. The organization provided sweaters, jackets and food for the smaller children for several months. As the school was rebuilt and electricity restored, SOS CV provided desks, chairs, and other furniture. Lastly, SOS Children's Village committed to a three-year contract of support to ensure the school was rebuilt, painted, and a sidewalk and fencing installed.

WASH Nepal installed the corrugated steel bathrooms for the teachers' use. Prior to the earthquakes, the teachers did not have separate bathrooms. WASH Nepal also provided buckets, jugs and dustbins. One comment that was repeated, and which I also observed, was about dust and dirt prevalent everywhere. This was especially a problem in the teachers' office where dust and dirt covered the two computers and a printer. There was only one computer for the teachers to teach a class of 20 to 25 students. The second computer was for the teachers' use, although I didn't observe it being used.

Around October after the earthquake, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal, a political party, provided money to build an open air, covered structure with concrete floors, metal posts and a roof.

Another INGO, the Umbrella Foundation, provided international volunteers rather than materials. The volunteers taught the children, installed flooring in the grade 1 to 3 classrooms so the students would not have to sit on bare dirt floor, built bookshelves for

the library and fixed furniture in the teachers' office. Sangita commented how the volunteers saved the school having to find money to pay construction workers.

The school received at least two UNICEF school kits. However, the kits included chalk. As the school used whiteboards, the chalk was still sitting unused when I arrived in 2016. In the recreation kit, I could see that the jump ropes and some sort of rubber rings had never been used as well. Teachers indicated Nepal Red Cross/Tuki Sangh provided dry-erase markers, additional white boards and story books for the teachers.

Figure 8: Saipal - French volunteer building classroom floor



Sangita commented how a women's organization in Sindhupalchok, Mahila Atma Nirvarta Kendra¹⁹, created children's groups after the earthquake. The organization

¹⁹ Website of Mahila Atma Nirvarta Kendra: <https://www.gaatw.org/members/asia/127-membership/asia/474-mank>

provided training to the children and had the children take responsibility and get involved. This organization is a local member organization supported by the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women (GAATW). I was unable to obtain more detailed information on what the organization did regarding the training of the children.

Sadeep indicated that he heard each of the staff members at another school nearby received NPR10,000 (US\$82.00-4/20/2020) in cash, as well as clothes too. When asked, he did not provide the name of the school and did not know the name of the organization that supposedly provided the school this aid.

Two teachers noted in interviews that they received psychosocial and health training, but other teachers did not recall receiving training. Sabita mentioned that she joined about 30 other teachers at a training provided by the government, a couple of months after the first earthquake at another school site. Sangita stated that the other teachers received the psychosocial support training, but did not incorporate it into their teaching. As Sangita described, “They received the training happily, but then they were passive about it.” Sadeep summed up this time by stating: “It was so hard for a week after the earthquake. It gradually became normal after that.”

Learning Environment

After the April 25 earthquake, volunteers from SOS CV arrived and encouraged the teachers and families to return the children to school. Sahana described the atmosphere:

The students were fearful. They did not have any mood of studying in school. How do they study! It was shaking all the time. We did not even

sleep on the earthquake night. How to sleep? We were sleeping on the open land there.

Initially, the teachers tried gathering the children in the teachers' office/library building. However, on May 12 the second earthquake struck, and the children were sent home.

One of the main concerns was that there was no water. Food could not be made, there was no water for the toilets, and students didn't have clean clothes to wear for school. As Sangita lamented:

There was water shortage and mothers couldn't make food for their kids and because of that they couldn't send their kids to school. We couldn't say anything about it. It was a very bad situation. They were so dirty. There was dust and mud everywhere. It wasn't a learning and teaching environment at all.

The former headmaster was able to obtain the tents and encouraged the students to return. When the parents complained about the teachers keeping the students in the remaining building, the teachers moved all the students out into the tents. As Sagita said, "The earthquakes kept coming and it occurred almost a year. We took it (the tent) down there in the ground and kept there three tents. We were scared that the building will fall." However, the tent structure was not conducive to studying. Each tent could hold one class of 20 to 25 students. When the monsoon season started, the teachers were confronted with new challenges. Teachers complained about the water coming into the tent. Sadeep said that the tents had to be moved several times because of the shifting conditions of the ground. As Sadeep commented:

It was very hot during sunny days and difficult to stay there. It was okay during the light rain. We drained the rainwater from there. It used to be water everywhere because it used to rain in the night. The lower grade students would (sit) on thick plywood. The seniors stayed on the regular furniture and there used to be water under the furniture. A lot of rainwater used to be collected there under the tent like a pond because we had to set-up the tents on the plain (flat) surface. We used to clear the water through a drain trail...that is what we used to do in the morning.

The corrugated steel structure that had been built by SOS CV as a TLC was very hot in the summer and very cold in the winter. Although the building was uncomfortable, as Salini, a member of the School Management Committee with two children at the school said,

It was difficult to get involved my two kids as well because the aftershocks were frequent, and the kids did not want to stay at home without parents. We had to take them with us every time. After that building, we could leave them at school and they [could] engage with toys and other activities in school. It was safe after they came here. Before it was a terrifying moment.

Teachers indicated that books and papers were destroyed by the earthquakes as well as the rainstorms. Sangita indicated that they could not save them from getting wet. Samita said she wished there had been a way to lock materials up and secure them.

Figure 9: Saipal - Newly built steps down to school



I first visited the school in November 2016. At that time, the classroom building had been rebuilt. The bamboo temporary learning center was still standing in front of the rebuilt school, bursting with broken and mangled desks and other materials. The “playground” surrounding the TLC was open and littered with debris. The Early Childhood Development programs were taking place in the SOS CV TLC. While I was teaching at the school, the interior rooms were painted, light and ceiling fan fixtures were installed, and teachers were just beginning to decorate the classrooms. The safety bars on the windows had yet to be reinstalled. Although the school was being repaired and returning to normal, the rest of the village remained quiet of any reconstruction activity. People were still living in temporary housing structures. As I was staying with Sadeep, I

had a cot in a steel corrugated structure that I shared with three other people. We had enough space to walk in and out of the structure. At night, we would sit on the cots and watch mice run around. It made me realize, that even if the children returned to school, the ability to do any studying at home would be greatly compromised.

When I returned in November 2017, the village reverberated with the sounds of construction. The National Reconstruction Authority had recently issued the first installment of funds to individual families to begin rebuilding their homes per recently government-issued earthquake-proof construction requirements. Observable, significant improvements to the school grounds and teachers' office had been made within the year, mostly funded by the SOS CV three-year contract. The bamboo TLC that had been situated in the center of what is now considered the playground was gone, and a protective fence had been installed surrounding the school area. The teachers' building had been painted a bright yellow and blue and the office had been cleaned of the items being stored in it after the earthquake. A French volunteer, who had helped rebuild the floors in the classrooms the previous year, had returned and was helping rebuild cabinets in the teachers' office. From the school, a new concrete staircase had been built leading up past the teachers' office and the SOS CV TLC to the unpaved "road." Unfortunately, the road that led back to the village was no longer being maintained, since the church that was being constructed in 2016 was completed and no longer needed the access. So, now it was only accessible by four-wheel trucks, tractors, motorcycles, or on foot.

Coping and Adaptive Capabilities of Resiliency

Coping Capacity: Community support

The community support for the school was demonstrated by the linkages with family, the army and the connection between the parents and the teachers. The initial and long-term aid that the school and village received was through the former headmaster's cousin, who was able to facilitate support from SOS CV. A political party, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal, built the covered outdoor structure for the students.

Although Sadeep was able to obtain five tents, he didn't have the instructions on how to set them up. As he knew the captain of the Nepali army stationed in the village, he was able to seek their help to show him how to set the tents up. Even when I visited the village, Sadeep demonstrated close relationships with the members of the Nepali army, with them stopping by his house or joining him for tea at his sister's café. Once the headmaster understood how to set up the tents, he showed the older students and they set up the rest of the tents.

When the teachers were asked what the community did to help restart the school, they replied that the parents sent their children back to school. As Sahana stated: "Teachers and parents—since the parents sent the children to the school." Comments from the educators indicated that the parents and community members were overwhelmed with the destruction and dealing with surviving. As Sangita described regarding accessing water:

The first thing was we had nothing to start with. We didn't have copy, pencil and board. The first important thing was water. It was so worse that if a child wants to go to toilet there was no water. Parents used to go out at

4 in the morning to get water and used to come back at around 2 [in the afternoon] with one bucket of water. If there was no water problem that it would have been so better.

When asked what would happen if the school enrollment dropped, the response was that the teachers would lose their jobs. Initially, parents in the community did not want to send their children to the school. They were concerned that the children would be injured at the school if there was another earthquake. However, with encouragement from Sadeep and the teachers, the parents started sending their children again. As Sahana stated: "After the earthquake...they sent the students...support for the school...they themselves were in trouble." The shop owners in the community also supported the teachers by allowing them to purchase school supplies on credit, trusting them to pay the stores back once they were able.

An area in which the community support was weak is that many fathers worked in Kathmandu or elsewhere. Prior to the earthquake, there were around 250 students. But afterward, enrollment dropped by at least 50 students. Sadeep explained that since their homes were destroyed in the village, many families joined their fathers to live in Kathmandu.

Lastly, the vast destruction of the earthquakes left even the teachers unable to support the school. Salina backs up this comment by stating: "In the school, Sir and Miss taught them sometime under a tent and sometimes in other ways," indicating that it was mainly the former headmaster, Sadeep, and the now current headmaster, Sangita, who restarted the school.

Coping Capacity: Economic capital

The school has limited funds of its own and does not have its own bank account. The school receives funds through the DEO but is partially funded, meaning that the government only pays for some of the teachers. If the school needs additional teachers or supplies, it must find its own way to pay for it. As Sangita indicated, the school can submit a budget to the DEO but cannot expect support, especially if they want to do something new. So, although schools are not allowed to collect fees, the SMC approves small fees in order to cover the remaining non-government salaried teachers it needs. Salini, a member of the SMC with students at the school, indicated that school fees were increased after the earthquake: “There is not any other external resources for school. Though we have to pay, we are happy for that.” Some of the community funds come from scholarships to encourage lower caste girls to attend the school. Otherwise the school has no additional financial resources, especially to respond to a disaster. As Salina commented: “Money was the basic need for us then. How to bring things without money?” At another point in the interview she commented, “The school is poor, and we cannot build ourselves.”

The school received NPR200,000 (US\$1,600-4/20/2020) from the District Education Office. A sum of NPR100,000 (US\$816-4/20/2020) was to be used to pay for workers to clear away debris. The other NPR100,000 was to be used to construct a bamboo TLC. Sadeep said he was advised by one NGO “not to depend on the tents, only tents do not work, and it’s getting hot. Construct a two-roomed cottage having big-sized rooms, same size like this, with a gable roof, and pillars of bamboo.” A bamboo TLC was built at an estimate of NPR50,000 (US\$408-4/20/2020); responses from interviews

suggest that it was Save the Children that provided the money for the bamboo TLC. The funding to rebuild the school came from SOS CV.

Sangita indicated that the teachers were able to request supplies from local shops on credit and paid the stores back when the banks reopened and they could obtain their salaries. Teachers, who had not lost farm animals or who could replace them, were able to bring in extra money for their families during this time, for example by selling buffalo milk. When I volunteered in 2016, this was the former headmaster's daily chore, to collect milk from his remaining buffalo, and walk into the village to sell it. When the TLC was dismantled, the teachers sold the bamboo.

Coping Capacity: Emergency Services

As mentioned above, the school did not have an emergency fund. They have difficulty just making ends meet, and there is no money for emergencies. The school also had no disaster plan prior to the earthquake. I did not observe any phone system at the school and access to the school by vehicle is limited. As part of the earthquake response, Sabita indicated that UNICEF provided a first aid kit, although I didn't observe one. She also said she had received health and first aid training prior to the earthquake. Another teacher, Samita, indicated that she also had some health training. She explained she was responsible for testing the children's eyesight and informing the parents if there were any problems.

When asked if the school was developing a disaster plan for the future, most of the teachers responded no, while a few said the plan was just to have the children run out of the buildings. Sabita indicated, "Since childhood, taught to go under the bed or under the desk. But that is how people died. Now children taught to go outside." So now they

teach the children to go outside into an open area. The only other disasters the teachers were aware of were jungle fires or electric shock.²⁰ A general comment that I heard was that the school was built to be earthquake resistant, so they did not have to worry. As Sahana stated: “For now... The earthquake-resistant building has been constructed. We have made a seat-planning for children to escape easily. That’s all.” In general, the teachers indicated that they received minimal guidance from the DEO, which just advised them to have the children run out of the classrooms and not to hang heavy items on the walls. However, my interpreter and I were surprised when the current headmaster said they were working on a disaster plan during their meetings, and showed us a written document laying out the responsibilities for each of the teachers; none of the teachers referred to this initiative. I took a photograph of the document and had it translated.²¹ The plan is the division of work for the teachers and includes “disaster management” among four other topics. Two teachers are assigned to ensure “First Aid provider to accidental incidents, wounds and injuries; proper management of the classroom materials that might cause accidents; teaching the children the techniques to be safe, protected and keep patience during disaster; conduct of first aid box.” The plan seems appropriate to address minor day-to-day accidents and/or disasters, but is insufficient to address large-scale disasters like the 2015 earthquakes.

Coping Capacity: Information & Engagement

SOS CV encouraged the teachers to start the school again and continue teaching.

The organization engaged two “volunteers” to organize a safe space and play with the

²⁰ A man died the previous year by an electrical wire coming into contact with the corrugated steel temporary housing.

²¹ See Appendix E – Table 16

children. Sadeep contacted the teachers and families nearby to let them know when the tents had arrived, and contacted the army to ask for their help in showing them how to set up the tents. He was able to contact others by phone. About one month after the first earthquake, teachers went to the parents' houses to convince the families to stay in the village and send their children back to school. A non-profit provided a book for the children discussing the earthquake and what to do. However, the books were all stacked in the teachers' office and looked like they had not been distributed.

When asked about information from the DEO, the educators stated that the announcement to reopen the school was made by the government over the radio. The DEO only provided minimum guidance on what to do if further earthquakes occurred, and that was to run out of the building. As for the reconstruction of the school, SOS CV asked the DEO for permission to help the school, but once that was given, it was SOS CV that oversaw the reconstruction of the school with Sadeep.

Coping Capacity: Infrastructure and planning

Prior to the earthquakes, there was little disaster planning or infrastructure available. The dirt pathway that led from the unmaintained dirt road was steep and rocky. It would prevent any student with mobility issues to reach the school, let alone allow emergency vehicle access. When I was at the school in 2016, I observed a plastic chair that had been fashioned with wheels. When asked about it, Sangita indicated that it had been for a student who was injured in the earthquake and couldn't walk. However, the student was taken to Kathmandu by SOS CV and remained there to attend school. The teachers' office building has a ramp to enter the building, but it would require descending

or scaling the steps from the road and crossing a small grass area. The school building has small steps to enter each classroom.

For rebuilding the school, Sadeep communicated to SOS CV to obtain the necessary funds to reconstruct it based on his plan:

For school, the building is completely repaired. According to the design we provided, I also talked about this yesterday. I asked to construct this way and that way by saying “we need more resilient building; we need a reserve water tank; the pathway is not good; we need to build a gable roofed building. And, designing false ceiling to make cool during the hot days; rainwater management through drain trail; the quality aluminum roof, that blue color; fans for the summer; electric light with fluorescent light bulbs.

Instructions from the DEO included not to hang heavy objects on the classroom walls and not to have large trees near the buildings. The DEO also indicated that the students and teachers should leave the building as quickly as possible if another earthquake occurred. A teacher stated that they had arranged the chairs and seating, for a couple of months, to facilitate the students leaving the classrooms, but then the students messed up the chairs. I observed that the desks provided to the students are made of metal, with one long wooden bench and table top that seats up to four students next to each other with no breaks. Students must step into and out of the bench and often had difficulty even when getting into and out of their seats during a typical class, let alone during an emergency. In addition, the benches are closely packed into the classroom leaving minimal space for aisle or passage to the doorway.

Coping Capacity: Social Character

The majority of Saipal's teachers have been teaching at the school for a long time, and it is clear that there are strong ties to and support for the school. The former headmaster, Sadeep, and current headmaster, Sangita, both live nearby and expressed very strong, positive feelings about the school and the students. They both did the most to respond to the disaster and ensure the school was able to recover. In addition, Sangita's brother, who had worked at the school but left to teach at another school, came and helped Sadeep. As Sangita describes:

My brother was a teacher and he as well as the school got honored before the earthquake. After he was transferred, community people were not happy and took it in a negative way. [Sadeep] was there and after my brother got transferred they thought one of the best teachers left the school and not much support was given to the school. We were so united though. We used to say that we are doing this together and we are doing great. My brother came in school days and he convinced everyone about changing their attitude about the school and supporting the school. He loves this school. He helped with the tents and helped them set up. It was hard for [Sadeep] and my brother came and helped him a lot.

Though the former headmaster lost his youngest daughter, his entire home and valuable farm animals, he felt responsible to see the school up and running. He contacted his cousin at SOS CV and worked to obtain tents. As Sangita stated:

During that time I am very thankful to [Sadeep]. He lost his daughter during the earthquake. We couldn't fully support him at all. I realize that

this position (headmaster) is so important. If there is someone to take the position, all the responsibilities will be under that person.

At the same time, Sadeep lamented:

I am a weak person, and I don't have contacts and relations with powerful/resourceful persons. No resources. I am a very common person.

A common man like me had to face such big thing. Though it was so hard, I...I could not think now how I did that. We did all. To come to this stage, I did myself, but now I think how I did that?

However, his actions impacted the other teachers, as Sangita stated: "At that time, [Sadeep] was there for the community and school, even though he lost his daughter. All of our staff were encouraged and inspired from [the headmaster]."

Most of the teachers at the school suffered their own personal losses and traumas but were there for the children. One teacher indicated that her husband was working in Somalia during the earthquake. She and her children were able to escape from the house before it was destroyed. However, as Sangita described, "Children used to scream and cry during night. Parents used to share that with us and we took special measures to take care of those kids. We made sure that the earthquake will never harm us again. We provided them counseling all the time. We were more like family member to them."

Lastly, Salini, a member of the SMC, stated, "I will make/develop the school, and I will make this school better." She also described the efforts of the SMC Chairperson saying, "He is also from our ward. Now, he lives a bit far from here. He is from below here. Now he has a shop on the roadside. Thus, it is far. He is in the committee with his interest to improve the school and future of the children."

Adaptive Capacities: Governance & Policy

Per the Nepal Education Act, 1971, the SMC provides direct governance to the school with support from the DEO (Nepal, 1971). The DEO receives its information and guidance from the Ministry of Education. Teachers provided no indication that the DEO or the SMC provided any guidance or training for disaster preparedness or were involved in the clean up or rebuilding of the new school. The school did not have any disaster plans or autonomous funds for emergencies.

After the earthquakes struck, the perception of the teachers was that they did not receive significant support from the DEO. The TLCs were provided by the VDC and international NGOs. Teachers indicated that SOS CV took the lead role in the recovery of the school and getting the teachers back to work. They mentioned that SOS CV contacted the DEO to ask if SOS CV could provide a three-year contract to rebuild and support the school and the DEO gave its permission, but the timeline on when this happened is unclear.

The perceptions of the teachers regarding the support and guidance provided by the SMC was that it was also minimal. As Sadeep stated: “The SMC is just for name, cannot do anything. The School Management Committee has a vital role to play. But we don’t have that type of people anymore. The SMC is very important. But they don’t care about these things. Everything has to be done by teachers and the headmaster.” The SMC representative seemed to back this statement up. Although the representative stated that the purpose of the SMC was to keep the students safe and provide oversight of the teachers, as Sahana noted, “I don’t know very well about it whether there were any plans (disaster plans) or not. The headmaster might have known. The SOS CV submitted a plan

for repairing the building.” The member of the SMC said that, as a member, the school fees are waived. But it is difficult for other people in the community to pay the fees, giving the impression that the fee waiver was an incentive to serve on the SMC.

The SMC let SOS CV take the lead in working with the construction company to rebuild the school. The chairperson of the SMC moved away from the village and lives about an hour away, but the SMC member felt that he still feels strongly about making the school nice. One respondent felt that the SMC wasn’t strong and that they should play a bigger role in the school and disaster planning, as well as in obtaining resources.

Adaptive Capacities: Social & Community Engagement

The headmasters and teachers themselves felt strongly about the school. As demonstrated by the actions of the former headmaster, the current headmaster and her brother, these individuals personally took responsibility to ensure they obtained the resources needed, and the support from the parents of the children to return them to school. A key message was that when parents sent the children back to school they did so because they trusted the teachers to care for their children and keep them safe.

Through the connections of the former and current headmasters, they were able to generate support for the school from SOS CV to the Nepali Army. In addition, the school received support from the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal, which helped build an outdoor meeting space that is used for multiple purposes like the students’ morning calisthenics and meetings of the SMC. However, when the former headmaster went to obtain relief supplies from representatives of a political party, they stated that they wanted to keep the supplies for their own areas and relatives.

Summary and Reflection

What struck me the most about researching Saipal was the dedication of the former and current headmasters of the school. It was clear that, even though they both suffered their own trauma and losses from the earthquakes, they made the reopening of the school a priority.

The formal headmaster of Saipal established relationships with Umbrella Foundation and had the personal contact with SOS CV. I was not able to discover how the former headmaster developed the relationship with Umbrella; however, prior to the earthquake he had arranged to have international volunteer teachers come and teach at the school. There were even teachers staying at his house when the earthquake struck. When conditions seemed feasible, international volunteers were invited to return in the Fall of 2016. When I volunteered, a volunteer from Ireland and I replaced two other volunteers who had been at the school for a month. Those volunteers indicated that they had mostly played games with the children, but we were tasked with ensuring the children attended classes and be more engaged in formal instruction. As the previous volunteers pre-warned, the children would ask us to play games instead. The volunteers were invited by and stayed with the former headmaster in the steel corrugated structures of his temporary home. He created the opportunity for volunteers to return to the school and show the community the international support for the school.

Although Sadeep and Sangita, the past and current headmasters, seemed extremely vested in ensuring the school was rebuilt and continued, I did not feel that the rest of the teachers shared the same passion. As one teacher indicated, she did not want to teach, but took the job because it was located in the village. Sangita indicated that it was

difficult to ask the other teachers to assist with the school as they were overwhelmed with their own issues, yet, one of the teachers stated that where she lived was not impacted by the earthquake as much as the village where Saipal was.

The level of humanitarian and development aid for the school was unclear. Given the circumstances in which the 3W information was collected, it is understandable that there were discrepancies. However, issues can arise when rumors of more aid were given to a school other than to Saipal (Sadeep's comment). The organization that stood out the most as supporting the rebuilding of the school was SOS CV. Neither the DEO nor the SMC was heralded as being integral to reopening the school.

The capabilities demonstrated by the school included having social capital, in regards to the headmasters' connections to INGOs and the Nepal Army. Individual strength, such as demonstrated by the former headmaster, was shown when he had to negotiate in order to obtain enough tents for the TLCs. Once the school restarted and teachers returned, the trust parents had in the teachers helped to encourage families who had not relocated to the capital city, to send their children back to school.

Certain capabilities were lacking and would have helped the school respond and recover to the earthquakes. The school headmaster and teachers were not given the capacity to ensure the school was restarted, through access to funds. The school only receives a small budget that the DEO determines. After the earthquakes, teachers themselves bought supplies and materials from local shops and paid them back once the banks reopened. The villagers themselves were so impacted by the earthquakes, that it was challenging for them to be more active in the response and recovery of the school. During the interviews, only one local organization was mentioned as being able to

provide support to the students. Importantly, there had been no guidance or assistance in preparing for disasters prior to the earthquakes. And although the current headmaster showed us the disaster plan she said that the schoolteachers were working on, the teachers themselves did not recall it in their interviews.

Chapter IX - Gangapurna - Rasuwa

District & School Description

The school Gangapurna is located in a village over 80 miles northwest from Kathmandu, in the Rasuwa District, on a trade route between China and Nepal. The village is within three miles of the China border. The trip requires a winding drive through both paved and dirt mountain roads, passing through the Langtang National Park. When we reached the park, we had to pass through a security checkpoint. The population for the district per the 2011 census was 43,300 with 25.36% of the population below the age of 19. Most of the district's population is Buddhist (70%) followed by Hindu (25.4%). Per 2015 OSOCC data, 44% of the District population could read and write. Data from 2013 indicated the district had 113 primary schools, 46 lower secondary schools, 25 secondary and 10 higher secondary schools (OSOCC, 2015). The average temperatures in the village in April and May range from mid-40s to mid-50s Fahrenheit. When we visited in November, the average temperature was in the 40s during the day.

The village sits on a popular, internationally known trekking route developed in 2004, and boasts the "black roofs" the area is known for. The people who live in the area are predominantly Tamang and Tibetan Buddhist. The economy depends on tourism, agriculture, and textiles produced mainly by the women.

My interpreter and I left Kathmandu in the afternoon on November 26 by jeep. After we passed through security at the Langtang National Park, we traveled till about 9 pm and stayed at a hotel that hugged the side of a mountain. As I was conducting research on a devastating earthquake, it was unnerving to see the next morning just how precariously the hotel was built. We rose early and traveled to Dunche, the district

capital, where we stopped for breakfast. We continued our journey through the mountains along dirt and rutted roads that at times hugged the mountain with no guardrails and arrived in the village in early afternoon. As the jeep entered the village, we passed a newly constructed trekking hostel and several houses, then stopped right above the school site. Concrete steps led down from the dirt road to the school yard. As we approached the school, a few children were running and playing games on the grounds and in the open classrooms. A group of teachers were sitting on plastic chairs in the sun. We were informed that school was cancelled for the day because it was too cold. After waiting for an hour chatting with the teachers, the headmaster arrived and welcomed us. He then led us down a mountain path, crossing a stream, passing by a small mill and through a pasture to his home. The headmaster had rebuilt his home after the earthquake and included two additional floors to serve as a tourist hostel. Below where the building stood was a dirt road lined with more houses. The family stayed in one room on the ground floor while another room served as a kitchen. A trekker from Europe spent two nights during the week my interpreter and I stayed there, an indication that tourists were starting to return. The view from the building was impressive as it looked over the valley and a distant mountain range. The building did not have heat or hot water. In the evenings, the kitchen was kept warm with the windows and door shut and the stove on. In our room, however, we had to climb into our sleeping bags and under the heavy blankets to stay warm.

Gangapurna school was started prior to 1972, but received government authorization in 1977 (Gagan Interview 2017). There was a green, two-story building with 4 classrooms upstairs. There were doors to rooms on the first floor, but they were

locked and while I was there, only one room on the first floor was being used for an Early Childhood Development (ECD) program. From interviews, I was told that prior to the earthquake there were two one-story buildings. Unfortunately no one I interviewed had photographs of the school prior to the earthquake. On the edge of the school yard stood two-bathroom buildings that had two doors but were not clearly designated by gender. The doors were closed and I did not observe anyone use them while I was there. There were fountains with piped water located next to each building. The teachers indicated that the school had specialized teachers including a science and computer teacher, and, prior to the earthquakes, the students had access to a computer lab and printers. Girish said that around 2013, the school enrolled up to 500 students, however, before to the earthquake, the number began to drop to around 250-280 students and 14 teachers. Teachers were both from the area and on contract from other villages. When I visited in 2017, there were eleven teachers from the village and five from other districts. A temporary housing structure for visiting teachers made of corrugated steel stood on the school grounds.

I interviewed three teachers and one member of the School Management Committee of the school, all male; Gagan, Girish, Gyan and Gopal. Girish worked for the school for nine years and was headmaster prior to the current headmaster from 2012 to 2013.²² The teachers indicated that the students did not return to fully learning until 5 to 6 months after the earthquakes, after the TLCs were constructed.

Impact of the Earthquakes

The Gorkha earthquake hit the district of Rasuwa the hardest in terms of the destruction of buildings and cutting-off access routes. Many of the roads within the

²² During this time, Umbrella Foundation, an INGO provided aid to the school.

district were difficult to navigate prior to the earthquake. The 2015 earthquakes triggered landslides that blocked road and trekking access. In addition, it knocked out phone and electric lines leaving villages with limited options to communicate with the outside to ask for help. Two community radio stations in the district were damaged. To compound the crisis, immediate response was delayed due to bad weather and the limited availability of helicopters available to deliver urgent supplies such as food and tents. Per initial estimates, the Gorkha April 25 earthquake destroyed 90% of the schools in the district.

Figure 10: Gangapurna - Steps to teachers' office



The village where Gangapurna is located, on the side of a steep mountain, was among the worst hit in the district with over 70% of the buildings destroyed and up to 95% needing major repairs. With roads destroyed, the village was inaccessible by land

routes. Within the community, all of the houses were destroyed. Fortunately, the culture of the area meant that villagers maintained cattle sheds. As Gagan described:

We have cattle shed system. If we did not have that system, many people would be outside as tarps were provided later. Since we have the cattle shed system we have the practice of living with the cattle in the shed.

Every household has a shed. It became easier because of that. The sheds are like TLCs. They are constructed with bamboo and other similar materials so it does not collapse.

Although six villagers died, no one associated with the school was killed. Up to 25 students were injured, but from the interview responses, not seriously. There was a health assistant located in the village who was able to treat them.

The economy of the village was severely hit by the death of farm animals and the loss of international tourists (Actalliance, 2016). After the Gorkha earthquake on April 25, the police warned people not to try salvaging items from cracked or damaged houses, in fear that they would collapse while the villagers were inside. When the May 12 earthquake hit, the remaining buildings collapsed, and the villagers said they lost everything. When my interpreter and I arrived in the village two and half years later and looked down the mountainside, the majority of the houses were still covered by blue tarps.

Thankfully the Gorkha earthquake hit on a Saturday, when school was closed, as it destroyed the school buildings. Some classrooms still stood but were severely cracked. The computer lab was completely lost as well as the headmaster's office. In the location

of one of the destroyed school buildings now stands a shelter for visiting teachers and a yellow TLC.


After the earthquakes, the student population dropped by about 50 students to around 200. Twelve of the teachers stayed, while the contract teachers from outside the village returned home. Although some students and teachers left, other students and teachers returned to the village from Kathmandu due to the destruction in the capital.

Response and Recovery—Humanitarian and Development Aid

Prior to the 2015 earthquake, the school received support from different international sources. This included funds from the Chinese Embassy for 20 computers and 4 printers, so the school boasted a computer lab and a computer teacher. International NGOs supported the school by providing salaries for two teachers, one teacher supported by a Spanish organization, the other supported by a German organization. The Umbrella Foundation, another international NGO, provided international volunteer teachers as well as scholarships for two female students. Girish indicated that Umbrella Foundation used to help the school by financially supporting one science and one Nepali teacher. As Girish stated, “We have to run school with private funding too.”

After the earthquake, per the 3W report, the school received 5 tents, 14 school kits, 8 recreation kits and had 12 teachers trained in psychosocial support. Yet looking at the breakdown of the 3W data, there is a discrepancy in the number of recreation kits, with one data screen showing that only 1 recreation kit was provided, while another indicates that 8 were provided.

Table 7: Education Cluster 3W Report Snapshot for Gangapurna



Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 11, 2016

Save the Children was the main organization providing response to the Gangapurna school. Interviewees indicated that one month after the Gorkha earthquake, a representative from Save the Children arrived and three to four tents were brought to the area by helicopter. The roads to the village were inaccessible, so tractors brought materials and supplies as close as possible and then were carried the rest of the way by the villagers. The supplies included food, clothing, tarps, corrugated steel sheets, and additional tents. Villagers had to hike around three hours to reach the supplies, and hike four to five hours uphill carrying items back. As Gagan described,

They used to bring the materials in odd times, sometimes around 5 o'clock [pm] and sometimes before the school off. Their representative and staff come, and leave the materials in an irresponsible way. I provide them a paper as received. They do not tell about using the materials. There is a lot of boxes with materials. One cannot carry them all. Thus, it was difficult. During this time, aftershocks kept occurring.

When asked about other organizations that provided support, the interviewees indicated it was hard to recall. As Girish stated, “Don’t remember—many organizations came. Came as an individual basis as well.... Something like dry food...not remember the names of the organizations. Mainly the dry foods like biscuits (cookies)...rice... some young adults who were in Kathmandu collected those.” They didn’t have enough food at their homes so the children were getting hungry at the school. They were able to get some food/supplies from different organizations.

Gagan, the headmaster, expressed some frustration with the aid that was provided: Organizations came, but they did not work the way we wanted. Some organizations did not bring the things we asked for. They already made a decision from their higher office and then they brought. For example, when we asked that we need them, they told that those did not fall under their norms. Even for the Save the Children, we asked many times for the things we required, but they did not do because that were already fixed from the upper level. They told us that “we have to do the same as per the instruction from the top.”

However, all the interviewees felt that Save the Children (Save) took the lead in encouraging the school to start again and provided the most support. One reason is that Save the Children provided salaries to two girls from the community to come and play with the children at the school site. One interviewee recalled that Save also provided supplies for the children to play games. Other items that interviewees recalled Save the Children provided included uniforms, notebooks, pens, paper, and materials to build a TLC.

The Umbrella Foundation which had been active in the area prior to the earthquake provided the school plastic chairs, white boards and markers, a computer and a printer for the teachers' office. The Foundation then provided chairs and benches for the students after eight months.

After four or five months, once the roads were open, the interviewees indicated they received 20 to 25 metal boxes from UNICEF, although they did not specify the number of school versus recreation kits. The number of boxes received coincides with the number reported on the 3W report. Increased supplies were brought to the village including materials to build additional TLCs. Per Girish, the DEO gave about NPS100,000 (US\$816.19 - 4/40/2020) to build one of the TLCs. Lagos Organization, a Nepali NGO based in Rasuwa with support from UNDP, built another one of the TLCs. Eventually, six yellow TLC classrooms were built along with the teachers' residence. Again, per Girish's recollection, international volunteers came to help paint the schools.

Learning Environment

Interviewees gave conflicting timelines as to when the school reopened. The government stated that the schools would reopen one month after the April 25th earthquake, but some interviewees indicated that they didn't reopen until months later, and some indicated that they reopened five months later, after the TLCs were built and they received school materials. "It took 3-4 months, 4-5 months to have the teaching and learning smoothly," Gagan said and continued to describe that even the teachers found it difficult to return to classes. "Before that, even our minds were not free."

Initially the children gathered on the open ground. They received tents from Save the Children and Save hired two girls from the village to play with the children and

provide toys such as soccer balls. As Gopal described, “We used to teach them openly in the ground. Almost probably 15-20 days, Save the Children organization helped us with the tent and we taught them in the tent. They helped us to make the toilet by providing pan. We taught them little though.” As Girish commented, the teachers would fit two grades into one TLC classroom.

Figure 11: Gangapurna – Inside TLC Classroom



The teachers agreed that a tent was helpful, but said when the monsoons started, water would get inside and the tent smelled. The teachers moved the tent to a more level area to stop water from coming in. As Gopal stated: “First of all, it was raining after the building got collapsed. There was no room at all. They used to sit in the ground and it was raining so I couldn't send the children to the school. After it wasn't hard but they

used to sit in ground. There was river and we thought of flood might take away kids because of the raining. It was difficult at that time.” In addition, they had no school supplies. Girish described: “At the beginning they did not have books, bags...no pens and copies [notebooks]... When some came for the relief materials, they distributed pens/pencils and copies. They needed the basic things that they had to carry to school.”

It took up to eight months to build the current TLCs and teacher housing. When asked why it took four to five months to build the initial TLCs, Gyan stated “because there was no proper economic sources.” Within five months of the earthquakes, the roads were opened and materials and supplies were delivered by tractor. The school then received up to 25 UNICEF school and recreation kits. However, the teachers indicated that there were no instructions and they were not sure how to use some of the items. Save the Children provided the teachers with kits that included markers, notebooks, pens and bags. Initially, the teachers and students moved any salvaged desks and benches, even if they were damaged, into the TLCs. With the roads open, after 8 months they were able to obtain supplies for new benches and desks.

While they were teaching, however, they were always thinking of the aftershocks. Besides the monsoon, they also had strong winds that were blowing the roofs off of the buildings for up to six to seven months after the TLCs were built. Girish said: “Yes, for ourselves as well. We used to keep alerted even with a small sounds, such as when the tin of the roofs made sound because of the wind, we thought it was also because of the earthquake...We could not stay with calm like we sit here now.” Overall, the educators indicated it was difficult to focus on teaching during this time.

Another issue that teachers were concerned about was that the children were

hungry. Due to the destruction and loss of livestock and agricultural resources, access to food was limited. As Girish reflected, “They also came to school not having enough food. They used to get hungry early.” The teachers recounted how representatives from NGOs and students from Kathmandu helped to provide food for the children.

The headmaster clearly recalled receiving psychosocial training from Save the Children and the Lutheran Welfare Federation four to five months after the earthquakes. He was invited to the district capital, Dunche, to be trained; then he and a representative from Save the Children traveled to other schools in the area to provide training to the teachers at the schools. As the headmaster, Gagan, stated:

The training was interesting. It was totally a new experience. Before that we used to use bad words to say something to students. We did not know before. Then we realized that they needed psycho-social support after the earthquake. Some students are doing this or that in an abnormal way. Then we thought that those students might require psycho-social support. Before that we used to scold them, but later we recognized that they should be provided some psycho-social support.

Another teacher, Girish, recalled what he liked most about receiving the training: “Training...the most important thing during the disaster is to generalize the thing as usual...if we think deeply about the situation, we may die. So, we have to feel that there is also another world...take the situation easily...” Lastly, the topic of the training came up in a discussion with Gyan about the construction of the TLCs in which he said, “They made the TLC and after that the school started. They started the school to decrease the aftereffect the earthquake had over student emotionally.”

When my interpreter and I visited in November 2017, the school was still being held in the TLCs. When we arrived, classes had been canceled for the day as it was too cold. Several of the teachers were sitting in chairs outside in the sun to stay warm. Children were running in and out of the classrooms and playing. There were two concrete buildings with observable cracks—the first concrete building was a stand-alone, one room building that had some information hung on the wall. Some chairs were stored in the room and it may have been a teachers' office, but it was cold and dark with limited lighting and no desks or chairs. The second concrete building had two stories. In one room on the first floor, there was an early childhood program. Children had to walk through sewage water to enter the room. Concrete stairs, that were cracked and had no banister, went to the second floor where there were four rooms. Only one room was recovered, with chairs, a computer and printer, the headmaster's desk, decorations hung on the wall, carpets and pillows on the floor and filing cabinets. The room across from this was damaged with part of the wall and ceiling falling in. The other two rooms were blocked with boards, but looking through cracks into the rooms, you could see a pile of debris that included broken desks, tables and parts of the building. The teachers' office in the two-story green building, another storage room and the temporary teachers' residences had electricity.

There were two pre-fabricated TLCs that had been constructed and painted yellow. In several of the buildings the windows were broken. There was another section built with corrugated steel which had a few classrooms that were very dark inside, cold and with dirt floors. There was no electricity available in the TLC classrooms. Therefore, the rooms were dark even during the day. Another corrugated steel building was situated

along the side of the school area and was designated as teacher housing. As Girish described, “There is not possible to run the classes in temporary buildings for a long—it’s so cold when we are sitting now. How much cold for the children! It’s not possible to run classes here permanently.”

Gyan said, “I teach about computers and it was all gone. Now we are just teaching the students theory because we don’t have computers to show them and give them practical knowledge.” From the teachers’ perspective, the children did not really start learning until eight months after the earthquakes, when the TLCs had been constructed and they had teaching materials. However, considering classes were not being held due to the cold, the children were still not back to school.

Coping and Adaptive Capabilities of Resiliency

Coping Capacity: Community Capital

As Girish recounted, the school did not have proper math or science teachers. As a result, if parents had the means, they would send their children away to boarding schools for a better level of education. The teacher commented that the local enrollment had dropped the past five years as a result. Through connections within the community, a trekking guide from the village worked with another trekking guide from Solukumbu district who introduced him to a German tourist. That tourist began supporting the school by providing the salary for one of the teachers.

When asked about the community’s involvement in restarting the school, the teachers initially responded that the community members did not do much. As one of the interviewees stated, the teachers were facing their own problems with losing their houses and taking care of their families, so they were unable to help at first. However, the

community cleared the debris from the school grounds to make room for the tents and TLCs. The teachers and community members hiked to obtain the supplies that NGOs delivered and would carry the heavy materials back. The community members gathered wood from the forests to construct temporary shelters and pulled out the benches and desks from the collapsed buildings. As Girish stated, “For the TLC, the tins brought from down there—down the side of the road. The woods were from the locality with the support of the public. Some of the woods from jungle.” There were people from Save the Children who taught the teachers how to set up the tent, but Save the Children also hired people from the community to set up the tent. The community members who helped set up the tents got NPR1,000 (US\$8.16-4/20/2020) per day/per person.

Lastly, the teachers commented on how the parents sent their children back to school. As Gyan stated, “We were in the state where we had to go to their house to bring back the students so they helped us by sending the children to the school. They encouraged their children and parents were understandable.”

Gopal indicated that, “the community had this concept that they should teach the children and send them to the school. Teachers also thought that the future of the students is important and they slowly started teaching.”

Coping Capacity: Economic Capital

The school has a school account, but there are no savings or emergency funds. The government provides funds to pay for eight teachers’ salaries based on enrollment and distributes textbooks to the school for free. The government also grants scholarships for girls, at about NPR800 (US\$6.53-4/20/2020) per student, that is distributed directly to the girls. The school hired two additional teachers funded by two separate international

NGOs. The German organization that supports one teacher also provided funding to repair the two-story green building that housed the teachers' office. Yet when we checked the building, the three other rooms upstairs were blocked. I was only able to see inside two of them, which still had cracks open to the outside, mangled desks and wood as well as debris strewn all over.

The teachers indicated that Save the Children provided money to hire two girls from the village to play with the children. The organization then paid members of the community to gather wood from the jungle and help set up the TLCs. The DEO provided NPR100,000 (US\$816.00-4/20/2020) to build a TLC that included the teachers' residences and classrooms. The Lagos Organization²³ provided funding and materials to build one of the TLCs. The school paid a carpenter NPR1,000 (US\$8.00-4/20/2020) per day to help repair items.

In addition to paying villagers for work, Save the Children provided school supplies. After eight months, the Umbrella Foundation also gave the school 50 desks and benches, one computer and printer for the teachers' office.

The teachers were seeking international support to rebuild the school as well as re-equip the computer lab. They indicated that the DEO was working with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to obtain the funding to rebuild the school. The educators even asked me about sources of support. During the interview, Gopal said, "At last I am trying to say is if she knows any friends or any organization that can help us. In winter season our children if they get one jacket will be also enough. Nowadays they

²³ The Lutheran Welfare Organization

don't come to school in dress. We have other organizations too but even small help will be a great support for us.”

When asked what would happen if more and more students dropped out of the school, Gyan responded, “We are trying to get students to the school so that they can be educated. This is not the business. This is like a social service where we want all the children to come and get educated.”

Coping Capacity: Emergency Services

The school did not have a disaster plan before the earthquake. Once the earthquake occurred, they realized that any disaster may occur. Gyan stated that they had received disaster training before the earthquake:

Yeah. It's called USAID and it was under Red Cross. With their help they taught us and kids about mapping and what to do when there is an earthquake. But I don't think it was really helpful. They taught us to go inside the table and bed. When there was an earthquake a child went inside the house to get away from the danger but he was trapped and got killed while the house fell on him. I don't think it's a good idea.

Gopal did not recall a disaster plan: “They might have given the training of what are we supposed to do but no, not really.”

Girish commented that the SMC and teachers had not established any future disaster plan, as they were still making plans to rebuild the school. In the interview responses, the teachers expressed that the main disaster plan for a future earthquake would be that the new school was built earthquake resistant. As Gagan stated: “For the earthquake, the main (plan) for now is the construction/buildings...now we are building

new earthquake resistant type of building.” However, the teachers did add that if another earthquake occurs, everyone should evacuate the buildings and gather in a safe place. The teachers also indicated that they have a verbal plan for strong winds, as it can blow the tin roofs off of the buildings and injure someone. Girish commented that after the earthquake, the wind was blowing hard for six to seven months afterward and they were fearful that the roofs would blow off and injure someone. The understood plan if the wind became too strong was to move everyone to the green two-story building. However, on reflection of this statement, I wondered if the teachers thought about having to leave the current structure to cross the school yard in the wind to reach the green building.

Besides not having a written disaster plan, the school did not have a phone system other than the teachers’ personal cell phones. There was also no way to bring a vehicle to the school site. If someone was severely injured, the person would need to be carried up to the dirt road above the school. The community had limited access to health care; the injured students were taken care of, as Gopal described, by “a guy who was health assistant...” When I visited in November 2017, I observed a small clinic had been newly built down the mountainside from the school.

Coping Capacity: Information & Engagement

The village has an established communication tree in which two people are assigned each year during the Dashain holiday²⁴ to go from house to house to spread information to all the community members.

When the earthquake occurred, the NCell, a privately owned telecommunication company in Nepal, service was knocked out along with the local radio station, and there

²⁴ Holiday held in October/November, starting with the waxing of the moon and ending on the night of the full moon.

was no electricity. As Gopal related, “Those people who had solar, we charge our phone and there was no network too. We went to place far away to call because of the network. There was no network for NCell.”

The government initially announced that schools should open one month after the April 25th earthquake, but with the May 12th earthquake, it was another month before Save the Children encouraged the children to come and play. Gopal indicated that the parents, teachers and members of the SMC had a meeting about ten to fifteen days after the May 12th earthquake. The teachers and SMC members spoke to the parents to encourage the students to come back to school. As Gopal indicated, “We told them they should not be scared. We need to think about the children’s future. How long will we stay like this?” As Girish described,

Not such a special plan. But when we met, we discussed orally, and we all did from our side. The households were scattered—some were here, some were over there. We all supported from our side, for example to pass the message to those people scattered around. We asked them to come to school as we started classes...though not completely...partially ran the school.

Coping Capacity: Infrastructure and planning

In general, the construction and location of the school was not conducive to access or disaster preparedness. The location of the school and the access to the rooms did not take into consideration students or teachers with mobility issues. The access to the school was a steep stairway down from the main road. The ground was uneven and rough, and the two-story green building had stairs that went up over an open sewage

stream and did not have any railing. The school did not have a fence surrounding it, allowing villagers to walk through the school yard to and from the houses below, to reach the main road above the school. Lastly, the prior school buildings were not built to be earthquake resistant.

After the earthquakes which triggered landslides, the roads to the village were impassible, making it difficult to provide humanitarian aid. The Nepal government had limited helicopters²⁵ and due to the widespread destruction, the availability of sending helicopters was limited. At least one helicopter was sent with tents and tarps. Additional aid was left at drop sites which villagers had to hike out to and carry materials back. As a result, additional tents, TLC materials and school supplies did not start reaching the village until four to five months after the earthquakes when access routes were cleared. The school infrastructure included housing for visiting teachers and some students who lived up to three hours away. Therefore, materials for temporarily housing the teachers and students needed to be provided as well.

Thankfully, some villagers had solar power and shared this with other members in order to charge phones and increase the availability of communication outside the village. Otherwise, there was no electricity.

At the time of my visit, the SMC and teachers did not have plans to rebuild the school. They were aware that the DEO had given the school's name to the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the teachers seemed confident that JICA would soon build an earthquake resistant school.

²⁵ At the time of the earthquakes, Nepal's Army only had 9 functioning helicopters.

Coping Capacity: Social Character

All of the interviewees had been involved with the school prior to and during the earthquake. Each of them expressed feeling personally responsible for seeing that the school was rebuilt. One respondent, Gagan, received his education and taught for two years in Kathmandu. He returned to the village and has now been at the school for nine years, four of those years as the headmaster. As Gagan described, “I felt being a headmaster is too much pressure in a place like this. I was going to leave the job, but once the earthquake happened, I felt more responsibility toward the school. I need to help rebuild the school. I need to find a way. The earthquake made me more responsible for the school.”

The other person who expressed strong feelings for the school was Gopel. As he indicated during his interview:

If the school cannot provide a good education, then they will not have good future all know that. I wanted to help school and do social work. I have passed high school. I know that it is hard to live without education. I have taught small classes in one of the school. I used to teach in a small room in my house. After than I closed it. Because of that experience, I thought I can do something for the school. I should take the opportunity to do great things and do something good for the school and children. I got that motivation to help for the bright future.

Gyan indicated that the SMC and teachers felt it was important to encourage the students to return to school so they would not drop out. When pushed on what would happen if the students did not return to the school, he responded: “We are trying to get

student to the school so that they will be educated. This is not the business. This is like a social service where we want all the children to come and get education.”

Adaptive Capacities: Governance & Policy

The government announced one month of no school after the April 25 earthquake, but the Gangapura school did not open until two months after. The government and DEO did not provide any plans for reopening the school. As Gopal described, “They gave us order to open the school but they didn’t give us any plans.” The DEO did provide NPR100,000 (US\$816.00-4/20/2020) to build the two-room teacher residence.

Girish and Gopal both felt that the relationship with the DEO was positive. However, Gopal said that the DEO does not know what is going on at the school. The DEO just tells them to teach the children and that they should go to school on time. Sometimes the DEO provides training to teachers. Gagan felt that the relationship with the DEO was not that strong, and his main interaction with the office was when he had to get papers signed. They did indicate that the DEO brought representatives from INGOs to the school site for them to consider providing the support to rebuild the school, with JICA agreeing. As Gagan stated: “There is no particular support of them. They help to connect with NGOs and that is helpful for long-term support.”

Before an INGO provides aid to rebuild a school, it is supposed to obtain permission from the DEO. The school submitted a request for more teachers and other support, but the DEO only provided salaries for eight teachers. The school hired additional teachers with support from INGOs and the community. The teachers and members of the SMC are asking for financial support through their own contacts in order

to replace the computer lab. There was no indication that the DEO would have to approve this aid.

Prior to the earthquake, interviewees indicated that the SMC was not very involved with the school, but they are now expressing interest. They have organized emergency meetings. They are participating in the rebuilding/construction process and are checking on teachers' absences. As Gagan described, "Locally, we are very close with SMC. SMC also has full rights. The responsibility to work for school is given to SMC. For example, with the support of SMC, buildings can be constructed, and new rules can be formed at school. They do have that authority." Girish described how the members of the SMC "have frequent communication on how, where and when to construct the buildings. To find the resources." He also commented that the SMC was engaged in helping return the children to school.

However, from the headmaster's point of view there is no improvement with the SMC and Teacher/Parent association. He stated, "The idea of supporting the school has not been developed in our school committee." As Gagan continued,

In our country, management committee is not to support the school but to construct buildings in school because they came here thinking that if they might get the chance to work here and get some advantages. This is what I clearly observed. They come to school thinking that what I get from school, instead of what I can contribute to school. When I started teaching, 3-4 school committee members have been changed. I noticed everyone interested in working for themselves rather than the school. I don't know if it is because of illiteracy or poverty, but I saw that.

When asked who or what was the impetus for returning children to school, the interviewees indicated that the NGOs and especially Save the Children encouraged them to restart the school and provided salaries for “teachers” to play with the children. As Girish described: “Since the beginning...They came with tents in a team....Mainly the Save the Children. They provided salary to 2-3 local sisters (bahini—young girls) to support the school—to create an entertaining environment in school, rather than teaching.”

Adaptive Capacities: Social & Community Engagement

Due to community connections, the school received financial support from two international sources. The first was through the help of a trekking guide who established links with a German tourist, and the second was with a Spanish couple who adopted a Nepali girl and then set up a foundation to provide aid to the community. Gyan raised the possibility of receiving financial support to rebuild the computer lab through the Paldopik Youth Club²⁶.

From the headmaster’s point of view, he felt the teachers were the ones who really triggered the children to return to the school, because of the teachers’ self-confidence. As Gagan stated, “The most important thing is—self-confidence. If we are alone, it was not possible. We had a unity. Organizations come and provide the materials directly. They asked us to distribute. Just bringing the materials is not enough. If we did not have done in an organized way, it could not have happened.”

Gagan also went on to describe how the teachers encouraged the parents and the students to return to school:

²⁶ Paldopik Youth Club activities are aimed at conserving Buddhism and the environment

If they (the teachers) hadn't worked hard to get the children back to school, so the teachers united to encourage the children to return to school.

It was like that... There used to be some organizations, but at first we thought that we have to do something else by ourselves. Though our houses were messed up, we thought that we have to do something for school. Our thought was that we have so many children, and so we need to do something.

Summary and Reflection

The condition of Gangapurna two and a half years after the earthquakes was heartbreaking. Although there were TLCs available, it was obvious that the conditions for the teachers and the students were difficult. The cold alone was enough to discourage formal classes from being held. Added to this was the dirt floors and lack of electricity in the rooms. The teachers did seem hopeful that the school would be rebuilt soon, as they all were aware that JICA had agreed to construct earthquake resilient classrooms. The teachers themselves seemed dedicated to supporting the children and the school, and trying to improve the quality by seeking out support to reestablish “a more modern” education, as Gyan had expressed during his interview.

Even with all the challenges the teachers faced in their own lives, they worked to obtain the resources to restart the school, like having to hike the distance to reach the drop-off point for the necessary supplies. It seemed to help that representatives from Save the Children were there to provide an influx of financial support and encouragement.

Although the training for psychosocial support was done much later after the earthquakes occurred, it made an impact on the teachers, as evidenced by the comments

regarding the children's behavior and the understanding that provision of education would help the children recover from the trauma.

It seems to me that the teachers were reluctant to provide much detail regarding their experiences. However, the headmaster was more forthcoming with his perspectives, especially in his disappointment with the support from the NGOs, the SMC and the DEO.

Chapter X – Cross-Case Analysis

The questions that guided my research stemmed from the lack of humanitarian funding for education and my wondering about the experiences of educators responding to and recovering from the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal. There are many international principles and guidelines established to guide international aid to fragile countries. At the same time, the Hyogo Framework and subsequent thinking have touted resilience to strengthen disaster risk reduction and reduce the dependence on external aid. The Nepal 2015 earthquakes provided an opportunity to explore the resilience capabilities of rural educators in a fragile state contexts. The structure of my mixed methods study was to conduct a small quantitative analysis that would supplement a more in-depth, qualitative multisite case study. The cross-case analysis incorporates the quantitative analysis with the qualitative case studies and is informed by the conceptual themes of international aid, quality learning environments and the coping and adaptive capacities of resilience. The questions that guided my research were:

Quantitative:

As reported by the UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report, what is the relationship between the intensity (level) and type of humanitarian aid received (school kits, recreation kits, temporary learning centers and teacher training) by schools in the 14 worst earthquake-hit districts, and the distance from Kathmandu and school population?

Qualitative:

- a. *What are the perspectives of community educators on the level and type of humanitarian aid received after the 2015 earthquakes?*

- b. *What coping capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes?*
- c. *What adaptive capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes?*

To start the analysis, it is good to refer to the expectations of the Nepal government for the education sector as laid out in the Nepal Earthquake 2015: Post-Disaster Recovery Framework of April 2016:

In the education sector, all stakeholders will ensure provision of education during the recovery period, through the establishment of semi-permanent child, adolescent and youth-friendly education facilities, including gender-friendly sanitation facilities across all sub-sectors. A holistic approach to assure both learning and psychosocial support in the school will be maintained, in line with the recovery vision of the education sector, namely that all children and youth should have access to high quality and safe learning environments. These should comprise resilient infrastructure, strong disaster resilient management in schools, as well as preparedness and awareness of disaster risk reduction measures on the part of communities, parents, school management, teachers and students (p. 8).

This chapter will address the responses to my research questions by first discussing the international reporting on the humanitarian aid received by the schools in the fourteen worst hit districts, and the perspectives of the community educators on the

aid received. The chapter will then discuss the coping and adaptive capacities of the educators.

Quantitative Analysis

The estimate of the number of beneficiaries who received aid for education was 1% of the total number of children impacted. Yet the government of Nepal stated that schools would reopen one month after the April 25th earthquake. In order to better understand the impact on the educators, the first research question I asked was what the scope and level of the distribution of aid looked like. To obtain a better understanding of the level and distribution of aid, I generated heatmaps. I initially wanted to see if, due to the locations of and difficulty accessing the 14 worst impacted districts, less aid was distributed to those districts farthest from Kathmandu taking into consideration the size of the school population. The first spreadsheet I generated captured the distance of the 14 worst hit districts from Kathmandu, the size of the youth population, the number of teachers and, utilizing the April 2016 Final UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W report and the UNOCHA Humanitarian Data Exchange reports on the 2015 Nepal Earthquake, reviewed the distribution of aid (UNOCHA, 2016). Overall, I found that distance did not seem to impact the distribution of aid. However, inconsistencies in the 3W report raised concerns as to its reliability. This section presents four heatmaps that provide insight into the distribution of the four items of humanitarian aid provided to create a learning environment: temporary learning centers (TLCs); school kits; recreation kits and teacher training in psychosocial support.

Distribution of Temporary Learning Centers (TLCs)

The Temporary Learning Centers (TLC) Distribution heat map represents the TLCs distributed by the DEO/aid organizations in the 14 worst hit districts after the 2015 earthquake as reported by aid organizations. Miles is the mileage from Kathmandu Central to the district capital for each of the 14 districts. Community (Gov) Schools is the number of government supported schools in the district (Nepal, 2017). Population Youth (Grade 1-12) is the number of youths in the district per the 2011 Nepali Census (Nepal, 2017). Population Need is the number of TLCs needed based on Population Youth (Grade 1-12) divided by 25 (the number of students one tent can accommodate). Population need was used rather than the number of community schools as the Nepal (2017) data did not capture the number of classrooms per school. The 3W Estimate is the estimate of tents needed based on the aid organization's assessment and reported to the 3W report. 3W Done is the number of TLCs distributed to schools as reported to the 3W by aid organizations. Percentage (%) 3W Done vs. 3W Est. is the distribution of TLC done compared to the 3W Estimate. Percentage (%) 3W Done vs. The last column is the 3W Done compared to the Population Need of TLCs distributed. The dark green color represents the higher counts and the lighter green to white represent a reduced count or zero.

The TLC Distribution heat map shows that, based on the 3W assessment and distribution, there is no difference between districts further away such as Gorkha and Okhaldhunga, and a district closer to Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, as they received 100% of the 3W assessed needed tents. Distance does not appear to be a factor when comparing the %3W Done vs. Need either. One item that does stand out is the low percentages of

TLCs distributed versus the population need. Rasuwa, Sindhupalchok and Dolakha received the highest percentage of TLCs compared to the population need. Overall, Rasuwa was the only district that received a just over a quarter of the tents needed based on youth population.

Table 8: Heat Map Temporary Learning Centers Distribution

District Data	Miles	Community	Population	Population	3W	3W	%3W Done	%3W Done
		(Gov)	Youth					
		Schools	(Grade 1-12)					
Bhaktapur*	8	130	71,898	2,876	91	91	100	3
Dhading	37	594	91,394	3,656	463	381	82	10
Dolakha	94	402	52,584	2,103	488	386	79	18
Gorkha	92	484	82,401	3,296	178	178	100	5
Kathmandu								
Kavrepalanchok	20	589	99,667	3,987	369	224	61	6
Lalitpur*	8	184	127,909	5,116	263	182	69	4
Makwanpur	57	520	112,790	4,512	192	157	82	3
Nuwakot	17	476	76,767	3,071	466	353	76	11
Okhaldhunga	75	334	40,925	1,637	110	110	100	7
Ramechhap	48	466	54,664	2,187	317	297	94	14
Rasuwa	76	102	11,109	444	121	119	98	27
Sindhuli	49	550	98,222	3,929	100	72	72	2
Sindhupalchok	51	546	80,833	3,233	838	715	85	22

Miles: Calculated from Kathmandu, District Capital to district headquarters using GlobeFeed.com Distance Calculator for Nepal: https://distancecalculator.globefeed.com/Nepal_Distance_Calculator.asp

Community (Gov) Schools Source: Nepal Education in Figures 2017. The Community School Data doesn't provide the breakdown of the number of classrooms, therefore youth population was used.

Population Youth Source: Nepal Education in Figures 2017, based on Nepal 2011 Census, for all types of schools.

Population Need: Youth Population per 2011 census (Nepal, 2017), divided by 25. TLCs hold an average of 20-25 students.

3W Estimate Source: Education Cluster 3W (2016) estimated number of temporary learning centers needed.

3W Done Source: Education Cluster 3W (2016) estimated number of temporary learning centers distributed.

* The % of private schools to government schools for districts is 165% and 158% respectively. Three districts, % of private to government schools is less than 20%, 8 districts with % private to government less than 10%.

Distribution of School Kits

The School Kit Distribution heat map represents the distribution of UNICEF school kits to schools in the 14 worst hit districts after the 2015 earthquakes as reported by aid organizations. The first column lists the 14 districts. The second column represents the mileage from Kathmandu Central to the district capital for each of the 14 districts. It then looks at the population of youth (Grade 1-12) based on the 2011 Nepali Census per

each district (Nepal, 2017). Population need is the number of school kits needed based on the Population Youth (Grade 1-12) divided by 40 (the number of students the kit serves). 3W estimate is the estimated number of school kits to be distributed by aid organizations. 3W Done is the number of school kits distributed as reported by aid organizations to the 3W report. The %3W Done vs. the Est. is the percentage of school kits distributed as compared to the estimated goal. The last column, %3W Done vs. Population Need, is the percentage of school kits reported to be distributed (3W Done) compared to the Population Need. The dark green color represents the higher counts and the lighter green to white represent a reduced count or zero.

Overall, the heat map indicates that the intensity of the distribution of school kits was not dependent on the distance from Kathmandu as the %3W Done vs. Est. shows almost all districts receiving 91% to 100% distribution. From the table, Nuwakot and Lalitpur, districts located close to Kathmandu, received less reported aid than districts located farther away such as Gorkha. Rasuwa and Okhaldhunga, are located a similar distance from Kathmandu (76 miles and 75 miles respectively), yet the %3W Done vs. Est. is wildly different. The difference may stem from reporting inaccuracies as the 3W estimate is higher than the Population Need (128% Okhaldhunga, 113% Rasuwa).

The 3W estimate for Dolakha compared to the other districts is extremely high and may also reflect inaccuracies of reporting. For example, the 3W estimated number of School Kits needed for Dolakha is 4,514, compared to Gorkha, 142, yet Gorkha's youth population is almost 30,000 more than Dolakha. There is also a significant difference in the percentage of school kits distributed per the population need, with Gorkha receiving 7% and Dolakha receiving 34% (3W Done vs. Population Need). The 3W Snapshot for

Jannu (Table 5) indicates that Jannu received 151 School Kits and the 3W Snapshot for Kabru (Table 4) indicates Kabru received 91. However, when the educators were asked how many School Kits they received, both schools indicated two.

Table 9: Heat Map School Kit Distribution

District Data	Population		3W Estimate	3W Done	%3W Done vs. 3W Est.	%3W Done vs. Need	
	Miles	Youth (Grade 1-12)					Population Need
Bhaktapur*	8	71,898	1,797	149	149	100	8
Dhading	37	91,394	2,285	446	446	100	20
Dolakha	94	52,584	1,315	4,514	449	10	34
Gorkha	92	82,401	2,060	142	142	100	7
Kathmandu							
Kavrepalanchok	20	99,667	2,492	493	469	95	19
Lalitpur*	8	127,909	3,198	388	388	100	12
Makwanpur	57	112,790	2,820	1,881	1,863	99	66
Nuwakot	17	76,767	1,919	478	474	99	25
Okhaldhunga	75	40,925	1,023	1,305	250	19	24
Ramechhap	48	54,664	1,367	973	885	91	65
Rasuwa	76	11,109	278	314	308	98	111
Sindhuli	49	98,222	2,456	193	183	95	7
Sindhupalchok	51	80,833	2,021	1,512	1,468	97	73

Miles: Calculated from Kathmandu, District Capital to district headquarters using GlobeFeed.com

Distance Calculator for Nepal: https://distancecalculator.globefeed.com/Nepal_Distance_Calculator.asp

Population Youth Source: Nepal Education in Figures 2017, based on Nepal 2011 Census, for all types of schools.

Population Need: Youth Population per most recent census, 2011, divided by 40. UNICEF School Kits serve 40 students.

3W Estimate Source: Education Cluster 3W (2016) estimated aid needed.

3W Done Source: Education Cluster 3W (2016) estimated number of kits distributed.

* The % of private schools to government schools for districts is 165% and 158% respectively. Three districts, % of private to government schools is less than 20%, 8 districts with % private to government less than 10%.

Distribution of Recreation Kits

The Recreation Kit Distribution heat map represents the distribution of UNICEF recreation kits to schools in the 14 worst hit districts after the 2015 earthquake as reported by aid organizations. Mileage is the mileage from Kathmandu Central to the

district capital for each of the 14 districts. Population Youth (Grade 1-12) is the population of youth in the district based on the 2011 Nepali Census (Nepal, 2017).

Population Need is the is the number of recreation kits needed based on the Population Youth divided by 40 (the number of youths the recreation kit serves). 3W Estimate is the estimated number of kits as reported to the 3W report by aid organizations.

3W Done is the number of kits distributed as reported to the 3W report by aid

Table 10: Heat Map Recreation Kit Distribution

District Data	Miles	Population Youth (Grade 1-12)	Population Need	3W Estimate	3W Done	%3W Done vs. 3W Est.	%3W Done vs. Need
Bhaktapur*	8	71,898	1,797	57	57	100	3
Dhading	37	91,394	2,285	291	221	76	10
Dolakha	94	52,584	1,315	232	192	83	15
Gorkha	92	82,401	2,060	143	143	100	7
Kathmandu							
Kavrepalanchok	20	99,667	2,492	276	213	77	9
Lalitpur*	8	127,909	3,198	225	225	100	7
Makwanpur	57	112,790	2,820	900	884	98	31
Nuwakot	17	76,767	1,919	826	694	84	36
Okhaldhunga	75	40,925	1,023	645	175	27	17
Ramechhap	48	54,664	1,367	435	427	98	31
Rasuwa	76	11,109	278	153	123	80	44
Sindhuli	49	98,222	2,456	105	92	88	4
Sindhupalchok	51	80,833	2,021	740	630	85	31

Miles: Calculated from Kathmandu, District Capital to district headquarters using GlobeFeed.com Distance Calculator for Nepal: https://distancecalculator.globefeed.com/Nepal_Distance_Calculator.asp
 Population Youth Source: Nepal Education in Figures 2017, based on Nepal 2011 Census, for all types of schools.

Population Need: Youth Population per most recent census, 2011, divided by 40. UNICEF Recreation kits serve 40 students.

3W Estimate Source: Education Cluster 3W (2016) estimated aid needed.

3W Done Source: Education Cluster 3W (2016) estimated number of kits distributed.

* The % of private schools to government schools for districts is 165% and 158% respectively. Three districts, % of private to government schools is less than 20%, 8 districts with % private to government less than 10%.

organizations. %3W Done vs. 3W Est. is the percentage 3W Done compared to the 3W

Estimate. %3W Done vs. Need is the 3W Done compared to the Population Need. The dark green color represents the higher counts and the lighter green to white represent a reduced count or zero.

Overall, the heat map indicates the intensity of the distribution of recreation kits was not dependent on the distance from Kathmandu. The 3W Done vs. Estimated intensity shows that Bhaktaur (8 miles) and Gorkha (92 miles) is equal at 100%. Rasuwa, located 76 miles from Kathmandu shows that it received the highest number of kits based on population need than districts closer to Kathmandu. Gorkha, the farthest district from Kathmandu received a less intensity of kits, however, Bhaktapur is showing one of the lowest distributions. Overall, the distribution of recreation kits does not seem to reflect the need based on youth population size.

Distribution of Teacher Training

The Teacher Training heat map represents the intensity of the psychosocial and disaster trainings that were provided to teachers in the 14 worst hit districts after the 2015 earthquake as reported by aid organizations. The first column lists the districts. The second column represents the mileage from Kathmandu Central to the district capital for each of the 14 districts. Total Teachers is the number of government approved and Rahat teachers (Grade 1-12) in the district as reported in the Nepal Education Report 2017 (Nepal, 2017). 3W Estimate is the estimated number of teachers to receive training as reported by aid organizations. 3W Done is the number of teachers who received training as reported by aid organizations. %3W Done vs. 3W Est. shows the reported training done compared to the 3W estimate. %3W Done vs. Need shows the percentage of

training done compared to Total Teachers in the district. The dark green color represents the higher counts and the lighter green to white represent a reduced count or zero.

Table 11: Heat Map Teacher Training Distribution

District Data	Miles	Total Teachers	3W Estimate	3W Done	%3W Done vs. 3W Est.	%3W Done vs. Need
Bhaktapur*	8	1,411	541	482	89	34
Dhading	37	2,491	3,875	3,852	99	155
Dolakha	94	1,771	314	261	83	15
Gorkha	92	2,528	401	393	98	16
Kathmandu						
Kavrepalanchok	20	3,144	1,071	1,066	100	34
Lalitpur*	8	1,870	2,166	2,311	107	124
Makwanpur	57	2,645	423	400	95	15
Nuwakot	17	2,120	1,129	1,106	98	52
Okhaldhunga	75	1,527	530	534	101	35
Ramechhap	48	1,832	1,027	802	78	44
Rasuwa	76	511	362	202	56	40
Sindhuli	49	2,225	90	82	91	4
Sindhupalchok	51	2,466	1,209	1,280	106	52

Miles: Calculated from Kathmandu, District Capital to district headquarters using GlobeFeed.com Distance Calculator for Nepal:

https://distancecalculator.globefeed.com/Nepal_Distance_Calculator.asp

Total Teachers Source: Nepal Education in Figures 2017 (available reports up to 2017 did not breakdown by district). Includes approved and rahat, primary to secondary, grade 1-10.

3W Estimate Source: Education Cluster 3W (2016) estimated number of teachers who needed training.

3W Done Source: Education Cluster 3W (2016) reported number of teachers who received training.

* The % of private schools to government schools for districts is 165% and 158% respectively. Three districts, % of private to government schools is less than 20%, 8 districts with % private to government less than 10%.

The table shows that the level of teachers trained was consistent based on the 3W Estimate and the 3W Done for all districts. When looking at the percentage of teachers trained versus the Total Teachers, it appears that the intensity of training is weak for the farthest districts, Dolakha and Gorkha. However, the headmaster of Dolakha indicated

that he did receive training when he went to the district capital to pick up a tent and provided information on how he and the other teachers used the training to support the students. The training was not reflected in the 3W report.

Based on the heat maps generated, it appears that the distance of the district from Kathmandu did not impact the distribution or level of aid received. However, the visualization does show that there may be discrepancies or inaccuracies in reporting and provides a starker view of the gap between the needs versus the levels of aid distributed especially in areas where the number of trainings reported exceed the number of teachers.

Humanitarian Aid Received and the Perspectives of Educators

The Education Cluster 3W report is an effort to offer transparency and coordination to the humanitarian aid distribution process, however, due to discrepancies in the report, I was concerned that it did not correctly reflect aid distribution. These concerns were further confirmed when I conducted my site visits and was able to compare the information in the 3W report to the aid educators reported they received. The details are provided in Table 12.

Table 12: 3W Reported Compared to Educator Reported Aid and Observations

Education Cluster 3W Report - Humanitarian Aid Received Reported as of April, 2016				
Description	Gangapurna	Kabru	Jannu	Saipal
Miles from KTM	76	93.6	93.6	51.45
# of Informant Reported Students	250-280	80-100	152	200
# of Informant Reported Teachers	14	4-5	5	8
Temporary Learning Centers				
TLC Needed*	10	3	6	8
3W Report Distributed	5	1	1	1
# Informant Reported TLCs	5	3	2	7
Tents	3-4	1	2	5
Bamboo	1	2	1	1
Other	0	0	0	1
School and Recreation Kits				
School kits needed**	6	2	4	5
Recreation kits needed**	6	2	4	5
Total	13	4	8	10
3W School Kits Distributed	14	91	151	4
3W Recreation Kits Distributed	8	0	0	2
Total	22	91	151	6
Kits Informant Reported	20-25	2	2	4
Teacher Training				
3W Teacher Training Done	12	0	0	4
Teacher Training Informant Reported	14	1	0	2
*Based on # of Informant Reported Students divided by 25 students per TLC				
**Based on # of Informant Reported Students divided by 40 students per kit				

What is of note in the report is the discrepancy between the School and Recreation Kits distributed to Jannu (151) and Kabru (91). However, Gangapurna and Saipal are close to what the school needed, based on the number of informant reported

enrolled students. Kabru and Saipal were able to achieve close to the number of TLCs needed, whereas Jannu and Gangapurna had half of the TLCs to accommodate their students.

The Education Cluster 3W report does not capture the extensive aid that educators and School Management Committee members reported receiving. By analyzing the heat maps and comparing them to the educators' reported aid received, several themes emerged: humanitarian aid reporting difficulties, donor principles and funding, transparency and equity, and timing and type of aid. These will be discussed below.

Humanitarian Aid Reporting Difficulties—The Education Cluster Who, What, Where (3W) report is a report that was first utilized during Typhoon Haiyan (UNOCHA, 2014). It attempts to capture data on who is doing what and where in regards to the distribution of humanitarian aid. The data on the ground is gathered by the INGO/NGO that is assigned to a specific response area, and the reporting quality is dependent on the representative of the INGO/NGO. The final report for the Education Cluster 3W was completed in April 2016.

The report is extensive and tries to capture all the schools that received aid. However, there were several discrepancies found in the data. The first was that the report did not provide an accurate count as to the number of students at each school; some of the enrollment data listed zero students and some had the same rounded number of either 100 or 200. For one school, the report indicates that one recreation kit was delivered, yet the data on another screen shows that two recreation kits were delivered. In another case, the number and type of TLCs reported were not consistent in the report and did not align with the data I gathered through interviews and observations. When looking at the

number of TLC's provided to Saipal in the 3W report, on one table the number of TLCs provided is one. On another table which presents the number and type of TLCs (tent, bamboo), the same report indicates two. The Saipal educators reported that they received five tents. It is possible that such discrepancy in the reported numbers for these items is technological glitch of the coding structure of the report itself, but it reduces the confidence in the overall accuracy of the data being provided.

The report lacks key data given the INEE Minimum Standards for equity and access. Although data fields are available, the report did not capture the breakdown by gender or disabilities. The report focuses on the schools to which materials were distributed and does not capture information on how many children from each school were unable to access education due to road/trekking access routes. Although the description of the report indicates that it tries to identify overlap in aid, it does not capture information on other INGOs/NGOs that were already active in the area and providing support, such as SOS CV or Educate the Children.

The report does not provide any financial information regarding the cost of the aid materials, the cost of transportation of materials or the distribution of cash funds. For example, educators at Gangapurna stated that Save the Children provided salaries for villagers to remove debris from the school yard and to hire two young, female villagers to care for the small children during the day. Kabru indicated that money was distributed to the families so they could have the local tailor make the children new school uniforms. Gangapurna also reported having a TLC tent delivered by helicopter, while other schools had to find tractors and carry supplies to the school site by hand.

In comparing the information provided by the 3W report to the information on aid that teachers recalled receiving, many more discrepancies emerged. The most startling was that Jannu's 3W report indicates that the school received 151 school kits and no recreation kits. When the headmaster was asked if UNICEF kits were received and how many, she indicated that one school kit and one recreation kit were received. Any supplies that were distributed to Jannu had to be carried for about an hour up a mountain. It is hard to believe that community members carried 151 metal school kit boxes up the steep winding path. For Saipal, the 3W report indicates that the school only received one tent. However, the headmaster recounted how he was able to negotiate with the members of the VDC distributing the tents to give him five. Lastly, the 3W report indicates that the number of teachers trained in psychosocial support in the district of Sindhupalchok (1,280) exceeded the estimated goal set in the 3W report (1,209) by 106%. The 3W Saipal snapshot report shows that four of the Saipal educators received training but when asked, the Saipal educators only recalled two teachers receiving training. Gangapurna is the one school in which the data from the 3W report was supported by the responses of its educators.

During the interviews, educators did not easily recall the NGO that was identified as the lead INGO/NGO for that area as per the 3W report. Kabru had a comment box hanging outside the teachers' office from Plan International. Per the 3W report, Plan had been the lead organization providing support to the school. Yet, when the educators were interviewed about the aid they received, the headmaster was the only one who clearly recalled Plan International. Teachers recalled organizations that provided aid that were not captured on the report, like SOS Children's Villages, Educate the Children and

Shechen Monastery. In addition, I heard anecdotally from two different sources, when I was volunteering in 2016, that international organizations were posting signs outside already rebuilt schools, taking photographs and using them to show their donors and take credit. Unfortunately, I was unable to confirm whether or not this was true.

The concerns are many about the validity of the quantitative data available, and it is unclear if, within a fragile context with limited government infrastructure, better data could have been collected and, more importantly, provided to local educators. From my research, it was clear that roads were impassable after the earthquakes. Communication is difficult even under normal conditions within the country, making it hard for reporting to be done. Both Gangapurna and Kabru indicated that representatives from NGOs came several weeks after the earthquakes, arriving to the communities by foot. Overall, the Education Cluster Who, What and Where report attempts to gather data on humanitarian aid distribution to track distribution and avoid overlaps, yet discrepancies, inaccuracies and reporting gap challenges remain.

One of the positive aspects I found about the 3W report was that all four case study school sites were included and easily identified in the report. In that aspect, the 3W report was successful in tracking the schools that received some sort of aid, even though there were discrepancies. Overall, I found the 3W report was a good effort to document the damage to the schools and the distribution of basic humanitarian aid for education, but it could be improved to provide a more complete and transparent picture of the needs, the aid distributed, and the beneficiaries.

Donor Principles and Funding—In comparing both the humanitarian aid principles and the development aid principles, several issues arose. The first principles to

consider are for the provision of humanitarian aid impartially and without political ties. If one would review the 3W report by itself, it seems that the international humanitarian response did try to distribute aid equally and impartially. However, the 3W report was incomplete and inaccurate. Therefore, the picture of the distribution of the aid is more opaque and did not capture the number of non-profits that educators said provided backpacks, stationery, food, and other supplies. The reality highlights how some educators perceived unequal distribution of aid, such as one educator who heard that another school's teachers had received money to purchase clothes. Educators said that some aid was distributed only to the younger students. Also, one educator indicated that the tents were distributed by members of a political party who wanted to give the tents only to their families and friends. The report was completed by the INGO that was given the lead for the area, and the representative doing the reporting may not have been aware of other non-profits active in the area or been assigned responsibility to capture the type and level of additional aid provided.

On the development aid principles, aid should be provided in line with the government policies and provided in such a way as to strengthen government structures. One of the aspects that became evident from my interviews was that each of the four schools directly sought international funding. At each school, at least one educator asked me, in his or her interview, if I knew of a source of international financial support that I could link them to. (I was even asked by an English teacher at another rural school whom I randomly met). The educators asked because even prior to the earthquakes, they said, the funds they received from the DEO were not enough to hire a sufficient number of teachers or seek out better quality teachers and obtain supplies. The DEO determines the

number of teachers to be provided salaries based on total school enrollment, not on the number of class levels needed. Additional funding is not available to accommodate student academic levels or for specialized teachers for subjects like computers or English. The school communities themselves found alternative sources of support such as seeking international volunteers to teach English and/or financial sources to pay specialized teachers. During my interviews, three of the schools indicated that they had teachers that received their salaries directly from an INGO. Educators expressed concerns about the funding such as what to do when the agreement with the INGO expired, and the unequal payment levels of the government paid teachers compared to the INGO and the community supported teachers. One school did not have any INGO supported teachers.

After the earthquakes, there was recognition by the local educators that international organizations offering to rebuild a school had to go through the DEO for approval. Yet, the educators were not looking toward the DEO and the government for support, but understood that they were dependent on being able to identify and cater to international donors directly to help provide them the resources to rebuild (Rasuwa—computer lab; Sindhupalchok —Umbrella Foundation/SOS CV; Jannu—seeking funding to rebuild; Kabru—received funding from a French non-profit). However, schools had to meet requirements established by the INGO that might conflict with the DEO policies and guidelines. A specific example was Kabru which agreed to the requirements of the INGO in order to obtain the INGO's support for three years, but the requirements of the INGO did not align with the DEO. The educators all seemed to indicate that to help their school, they themselves would need to identify an international source of financial or in-kind support. It is important to keep in mind that my research only represents four

schools out of over 6,000 that were reported destroyed and possibly all seeking international funding or support.

Both schools that were able to garner support from INGOs were rebuilt within a year and a half of the earthquakes. Saipal, the school that was able to garner support from an INGO through a family contact, was rebuilt in one and half years and then was completed with electricity, school yard fencing, repainting, and steps leading down from the access road within two years. Kabru and Jannu each initially received support through ETC for a two-room structure that included an ECD classroom and the teachers' office. A French non-profit then selected Kabru to be rebuilt as a "model" school for the area. Jannu and Gangapurna, which had not been rebuilt, were still both seeking international sponsors or support in November 2017 and asked me for assistance.

Transparency and Equity—There was clearly a perceived lack of transparency and equity in the distribution of aid to the schools after the earthquakes, as expressed by the educators. The extent of the disaster created many challenges (road closures, environmental conditions), and the layers of bureaucracy in distributing supplies contributed to the inability to ensure transparency and enable accurate perceptions of (in)equity. In addition, the longer-term recovery makes the lack of transparency and inequality even more pronounced. This was evident in Dolakha, where Kabru was rebuilt as a "model" school complete with the capability for solar power during power outages, whereas Jannu, one hour away, still functioned out of the temporary learning structures with grey metal corrugated steel walls and roofs, dirt floors and no electricity. Jannu's headmaster said she felt the reason Jannu did not receive support from an INGO was because they were a lower caste. Yet, Kabru serves students of the same caste and ETC,

which supports lower caste areas, provided both Jannu and Kabru support. Saipal teachers mentioned that other schools received more support than their school did, yet Saipal had received a three-year commitment of aid from SOS CV. The school had been rebuilt and a cement walkway installed, yet when the teachers were interviewed, they made comments that they thought SOS CV was helping other schools more than their school.

Prior to the earthquakes, there is evidence that some districts received disaster and INEE Minimum Standards training, yet other districts did not. For example, in 2009, the Kailali District received INEE Minimum Standards training due to the high frequency of flooding. A Rasuwa educator mentioned receiving earthquake preparedness training from USAID after the Haiti 2010 earthquake. Yet, from the interviews I conducted, the schools in Sindhupalchok and Dolakha showed no indication of prior disaster training.

Education for All, the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable Development Goals, the Hyogo Framework, and the Sendai Framework are noteworthy as international declarations and goals, but they achieve nothing if the communities that need them most are not aware of them. In the first place, many of these international agreements, guidelines and tools are only available in English. International organizations generating the tools and policies either do not budget or do not have the funds to translate materials into country or local languages. For education specific policies and guidelines, the Nepal Ministry of Education may print materials in English and Nepalese based on funding. Some materials may be made available on the internet, yet most rural areas do not have internet access. If the Ministry of Education prints documents in Nepali, they are to be distributed to the DEOs, yet, DEOs are not consistent in distributing the materials to

the headmasters and Nepal does not have an effective postal service (K. Raj Sedhai, personal communication, April 18, 2020). As a result, local educators lack access to needed information.

Timing and Type of Aid—Overall my research indicated that schools restarted, but the conditions of the learning environments were not conducive to learning. The benefit that the TLCs provided was difficult to determine as the tents were cumbersome and a challenge to set up, take down, and move. The floors were muddy and the tents did not protect from the rain, wind and cold. It was a challenge to teach in such a confined space. Teachers also commented on the combination of students and teachers being fearful of aftershocks, the stress from family situations and lack of available school materials. I asked teachers when they felt actual teaching and learning started after the earthquakes, and the average of the responses was 5 months—after more permanent TLCs were constructed. Yet, when I volunteered in Saipal in 2016, 18 months after the earthquakes, it seemed that teaching and learning were just starting to occur. During my volunteer orientation prior to heading to Saipal, I was advised by the INGO representatives that I would have to be strict with the students to keep them in class and tell them that we could no longer play games. When I started volunteering, the students did pester me to let them play football (soccer) and were initially indifferent to learn. Even by 2017, when I conducted my research, regular classrooms at the two schools, Gangapurna and Jannu, had yet to be rebuilt and teaching and learning had still not returned to normal. The TLC classrooms were too cold to hold classes or not conducive to teaching, with the uneven dirt ground, noise and lack of electricity.

The 3W report indicated that UNICEF school and recreation kits were delivered, and I observed the grey metal boxes in at least three of the schools. However, the educators indicated that the kits were not delivered until 4 to 5 months after the earthquakes, and 3 to 4 months after the schools were ordered by the government to reopen. Educators stated that the kits were dropped off at a distance and had to be carried to the schools. They also commented how the kits did not include instructions on how the materials should be used. As I was checking out the school kits that one school received, I noted the items that were not used. One school kit contained boxes of white chalk which was no longer being used as there were no blackboards, only white boards. Another non-profit provided the school with dry erase markers, but then teachers were faced with the difficulty of replacing/refilling the ink. It seemed to me that white chalk would have been easier to keep and distribute, yet it was communicated that white chalk was no longer being used because it causes breathing problems from the chalk dust. Other items that looked like they had never been touched were jump ropes and a ring toss game. The most used items in the recreation kit were vests to distinguish teams, like for playing football (soccer). In fact, Saipal was still using the sports vests while I was at the site two years later. It seemed some of the contents of the UNICEF kits were still being used and the metal boxes were practical storage containers. Even with the challenges, the kits seemed helpful to the school community to provide the children notebooks and recreation activities that encouraged them to return to school, which provided a safe space where the students could gain a sense of stability, interact and have fun.

Specific to Gangapurna's case, an educator expressed frustration that the organizations providing aid did not take into consideration the school's requests for

specific items needed, and that aid materials were dropped off at different times and were difficult to collect; villagers had a three-hour hike to reach the drop off site. One teacher pointed out that there was no means to lock items up to keep them secure. For the most part, teachers themselves did not indicate they received supplies. The supplies that were received were provided to the students. Teachers recounted how the students received backpacks with notebooks, pens, pencils, lunch tins, clothes such as winter coats, sandals, and underwear. In one case, the school received money in order to pay the local tailor to sew new school uniforms for the students. I should note, that although every educator indicated that NGOs had delivered backpacks to the students, I did not observe any backpacks with the names of INGOs/NGOs in use (a common scene in international organization report photos). The only aid that teachers at one school indicated they themselves received directly, related to the school (besides the whiteboards and markers), were t-shirts with the INGO's logo and umbrellas for monsoon season. One educator said he heard that a nearby school had received clothes or money for clothes, but he did not recall which school. He indicated that clothes or money for clothes was an item he really wished they had received.

INEE Minimum Standards indicate that training and professional development and support should occur. The provision of psychosocial training falls into the Access and Learning Environment Domain, Protection and Well-Being Standard 2, as well as the Teaching and Learning Domain, Curriculum Standard 1. The Education Cluster Report indicated that psychosocial training had taken place at two of the school locations, Gangapurna and Saipal and that Kabru and Jannu did not receive training. Teachers who received the training had limited recall of the content and indicated that it happened

months after the earthquake. However, from my research, educators who participated in the trainer program and were tasked with presenting this training to other teachers had better recall of receiving this training. The educators who recalled the training said it was helpful to understand what the children were going through and to have more patience with them, rather than assuming the children were acting out just to be disruptive. There was no indication from the teachers that follow-up training or guidance was provided from the DEO or external organizations.

Although the 3W report indicates that educators at Kabru did not receive training, the headmaster at Kabru indicated that they observed the children were traumatized by the earthquakes and implemented activities to help their students. In a follow-up conversation to understand where the headmaster obtained psychosocial training or information, he indicated that headmasters were provided the information when they went to the district headquarters to collect tents.

Educators' Coping Capacities to Create a Learning Environment

The ANDI framework describes coping capacity as “the means by which people or organizations use available resources, skills and opportunities to face adverse consequences that could lead to disaster” (Parsons et al., 2016, p. 6). From the World Bank ERA framework, the first two levers of the framework consist of gaining a better understanding of the dangers school communities face and assessing their resources and engagement processes to address those adversities (World Bank, 2013). The coping capacities for community resilience as laid out by the ANDRI framework include community capital, economic capital, emergency services, infrastructure and planning, information and engagement and social character.

Coping Capacity: Community Capital

In the ANDRI Framework, community capital is described as the cohesion of the community to cooperate and coordinate for mutual benefit. The boundaries that define the community within my research consisted predominately of the headmasters, teachers and the SMC, which is comprised of parents and community members. Prior to the earthquake, according to the educators, a local community member or members had organized the schools and supported them until they were recognized by the government. The most recent case was Kabru, where the community asked the current headmaster to start the school in 2004 by gathering up the children and teaching them in a field. The community lobbied the government to provide a salary for the teacher. The community members themselves built the school building later.

Educators from all four sites described times, after the earthquakes struck, when the community worked together to help each other and specifically to support the reopening of the schools. For example, community members helped clear the debris from the school area in order for TLCs to be set up. Community members helped to carry tents, from vehicles that delivered them, to the school sites and helped set the tents up. They also helped to salvage materials from the debris such as desks and benches. At Jannu and Gangapurna, the two schools impossible to access by vehicle, community members transported aid up mountains from drop off sites, which took up to three hours. The aid items included the tents as well as school and recreation kits loaded with supplies.

Another expression of community capital was the trust that teachers said the parents had in them to send their children back to school, feeling that the children would

be safe. All the schools indicated that students went back to school based on the trust of the community/parents in the teachers, whom they knew as members of their community.

Community capital also stemmed from the small communities in which people knew each other and where communication could be conducted from house to house. In the case of Gangapurna, every year the community identifies two of its members to be responsible for informing the rest of the villagers of any news. Also, in Gangapurna, members of the community who had solar panels at the time of the earthquake shared access to the charging power so other members of the community could charge their mobile phones.

On the other hand, educators at all the school sites mentioned that hands-on community support was minimal, since the members of the community were overwhelmed having to deal with so many personal issues. Also, because of this, headmasters and teachers expressed reluctance to ask parents or other community members for help. However, headmasters and teachers said that, for the most part, if they asked for something, parents and the community would do what they could to help. In some of the responses, it seemed that community members were ultimately prompted to help with the debris removal and building of TLCs by receiving payment from INGOs/NGOs which is not reflected in the 3W report.

Coping Capacity: Economic Capital

From the ANDRI Framework, the ability of the schools to cope is influenced by the ability to access financial resources. One of the weakest aspects of coping capacity was that the educators indicated the school did not have its own financial accounts or resources. All the schools indicated that their government funding was received through

the DEO, and each school indicated that the government funding was not enough to run the school in the way they felt it should be run. None of the schools had access to emergency funds in the case of even a minor emergency, such as a student being injured, let alone a major emergency such as an earthquake. In one case, a school that had been provided a laptop by an international volunteer did not have the funds to get it fixed when it broke.

The educators did express ways in which they were resourceful. One example is after the earthquakes, teachers in Saipal were able to use their relationships with store owners in the town to purchase supplies for the school on credit, and then pay for the materials when banks reopened and access to DEO funds was restored. Teachers and community members were able to obtain materials such as bamboo from the forests and they were able to salvage materials from the damaged schools. At one school, teachers paid for plastic chairs for the teachers' office out of their own money.

Another example is how educators sought funding, through personal or community contacts, from INGOs either to pay salaries for additional teachers or to obtain supplies and engage volunteers. Even when I arrived, one educator asked me directly if I would be able to provide support or provide information on where they could obtain international support to rebuild their school. The two schools that were rebuilt were built predominantly through personal connections that the headmasters were able to develop prior to the earthquakes. Construction for wood floors was done by an international volunteer engaged through an INGO that also provided carpets for the young children to sit on. It was clear that the economic capital that the school could

generate was linked to the educators' ability to tap into social and/or community relationships with links to INGOs/NGOs.

Coping Capacity: Emergency Services

The ANDRI framework describes emergency services as the potential for the community to respond to a disaster by having access to emergency services and disaster response plans. None of the schools reported having disaster plans prior to the earthquakes. Even though a Nepalese non-profit had been established in the 1990s, during the international decade for disaster risk reduction, to prepare schools by 2020 for earthquakes, only one educator, at Gangapurna, recalled receiving information or training about what to do during an earthquake. No other disaster preparedness training prior to the 2015 earthquakes was indicated. The comments I heard revealed that educators had no idea that Nepal could experience such a devastating earthquake, let alone how they should prepare for and respond to such an occurrence. This gives rise to the question of disaster risk reduction programming, in which one of the first steps is for communities to self-identify the hazards they may face. With the responses I received, I would say that none of the schools I visited would have identified a major earthquake as a disaster they had to prepare for.

The educator who recalled earthquake response training said the training, organized in Nepal by USAID after the 2010 Haiti earthquake, provided bad information. He said the training instructed them to go inside and hide under furniture. He said the people and children who followed this advice were the ones who were killed. So, he said, the USAID advice/recommendation would no longer be followed in Gangapurna. In

potentially dangerous contrast, the school manager in Kabru said that after the 2015 earthquake, they started teaching the children to go under furniture.

Educators in Saipal mentioned that two teachers had received prior training for health issues. Some of the educators mentioned receiving first aid kits from the INGOs after the earthquakes. But besides that, there was no other disaster preparedness/response or training that seemed evident. Thankfully when the April earthquake struck school was not in session, otherwise, the deaths and injuries may have been much greater.

When asked about future disaster planning for earthquakes, the educators' first response was to say that the schools were being rebuilt to be earthquake resistant, so they would not have to be afraid of the buildings collapsing. When asked if the DEO provided any guidance, the educators seemed to wave off the DEO information, saying they were told just to evacuate the buildings and not hang anything heavy on the walls. Educators at most of the schools repeated the DEO advice to evacuate the buildings, except for Kabru which was teaching the students to go under furniture. In Gangapurna, the educators expressed more concern about the strong winds that impacted the village by blowing roofs of buildings. The educators in this school community said they had established a plan for strong winds which was to move the students into the main concrete building—but I observed that they would have to exit the classrooms and walk across the school yard to reach the building. Saipal educators mentioned jungle fires and that the community had a bell that would be rung if there was a fire. But as the school stands in an open area away from the forest, there was no plan. It was interesting to note that landslides occurred after the earthquakes and during monsoon season, but educators did

not raise these concerns when asked about other disasters they were aware of or would anticipate occurring in the future.

Two headmasters indicated that they were preparing disaster plans. However, none of the other interviewees at these two schools indicated that they were aware of any plans. In the one case, the headmaster enthusiastically said she was working on a plan with the other teachers and showed me a document. However, when I obtained the translated version, it was a list of day-to-day teacher responsibilities (Appendix E-Table 16). The other headmaster indicated that the teachers were thinking of creating “to go” bags for the children with helmets and other materials. But I did not observe that this had been done. None of the members of the SMC indicated they were aware of any disaster planning. Instead they pointed out that they still needed to rebuild the school or expressed the desire to obtain a fence to encircle the school yard.

Coping Capacity: Infrastructure & Planning

Educators indicated that prior to the earthquakes they did not have disaster plans including safe school construction, school site placement or other infrastructure to ensure schools were safe. During the 1990s, for disaster risk reduction, the non-governmental organization NSSP was formed with the goal of having all Nepali schools retrofitted to be earthquake resistant by 2020. There was even a teachers’ manual available in Nepali on the NSSP website. However, none of the teachers I interviewed indicated they had received any preparedness information or training prior to the earthquake (NSET, 2012). Schools were built on the edges of mountains, stairways lacked bannisters, and school yards were open to strangers and farm animals walking through. One example is the school in Kabru which was built by the community members themselves out of wood,

mud and stone with no references to earthquake activity. Another example is the site placement for Jannu and Saipal, which were built on the edges of mountains. The TLC for Jannu was constructed in the same location as the original school, and Saipal was reconstructed in its previous location. Both schools have windows that look over an approximate two-story drop, if not higher. Saipal, once it was fully rebuilt, did have bars on the classroom windows to prevent children from falling out and down the hillside. If another earthquake or landslide occurs, it is possible those schools would fall.

The INEE Minimum Standards recommends establishing safe spaces where students are able to meet and to access learning opportunities. Though the Nepal government indicated that schools should reopen one month after the earthquakes, some schools did not have any safe structures where the children could meet. As a result, teachers gathered the children in open fields. In all locations the children gathered at the school site and all the schools indicated that the children played games. Given the history of how the community schools started, for some like Kabru, gathering the children in an open space or field was familiar.

Educators indicated that within a month of the earthquakes, the DEO and VDC distributed tents to the schools, based theoretically on the number of enrolled students. However, the number of tents was insufficient compared to the number of students. As a result, all of the sites constructed their own temporary structures with bamboo collected from forests, or wood and metal salvaged from the destroyed schools as walls, and tin for the roofs. These temporary learning centers (TLCs) posed many challenges for the educators and, from observations and interviews, were not conducive for a quality learning environment. Even with the bamboo structures, noise from other classes and

noise from rain hitting the tent or the tin roofs were problematic. Educators at Kabru and Gangapura indicated they were concerned about strong winds blowing the roofs off and injuring someone. The TLCs had dirt floors that caused different problems with monsoon season, the cold weather and live creatures such as mice and snakes. One school manager mentioned that they were constantly having to move the tents to different areas, because the water from the monsoon would pool in the tents and there was mud everywhere. Some schools were able to salvage or obtain benches and desks for the students to sit on. The educators found wood planks and carpets for the smaller children to sit on and not touch the ground itself. Wind, heat, cold and rain all caused issues for the tents and temporary structures, making it very difficult for teachers to teach and students to learn. As the educators described, the tents and temporary structures should be as temporary as possible. It was clear from the differences among the four schools I visited that the two rebuilt schools returned to normal schooling, while the two that continued to only have TLCs were still struggling.

Teachers mentioned the issues of having access to food and water for the children during the recovery. Before aid arrived, community members gathered what they could salvage and shared food. However, it wasn't until they started receiving food aid that parents felt encouraged to send their children to school again. Two of the schools are located by mountain streams, while two other schools required teachers and students to hike down to a water supply source and carry the water back to the school. One educator recounted that since water was scarce and they had lost all of their clothing except what they were wearing at the time of the earthquake, they would have to go into the jungle to

find privacy so they could wash themselves and their clothes and wait for the clothes to dry. One school mentioned receiving water filters from the INGO for their water.

INEE Minimum Standards promotes equality of access for all students. The landscape of Nepal does not promote easy access to schools for children with mobility issues. All of the schools I visited had to be accessed by foot. There are no paved accessways and ramps. At Saipal, the teachers did have a plastic chair that had been fashioned into a wheelchair by having two wheels attached to its sides, indicating that there was an effort to provide access to school for a disabled student. When asked, the teachers confirmed that the student had been injured in the earthquakes and that a non-profit organization took the child to Kathmandu to get the necessary care and have access to education. Even prior to the earthquakes, two of the schools I visited had to be accessed on foot. Only two of the schools could be accessed by vehicles.

Realistically, my observations indicated that the children would have difficulty quickly exiting the classrooms. The desks that are provided to the children have attached benches where 3 to 4 children sit in a row. The children must step over the bench they sit on to get “inside” the bench. The desks are not individual to each student. The benches are usually tightly packed together into a classroom, making it difficult for children to easily enter, let alone to quickly exit without getting injured. Many of the teachers commented on being told not to hang anything heavy on the walls. However, teachers’ offices and storage rooms and the library at Saipal all had tall shelves with heavy items (books, papers, computer equipment and, in one case, glass containers to be used, I was told, for science classes). None of the shelves were braced or bracketed to the walls. In fact, in Saipal’s library, the bookshelves were set up to cross the room and create a wall

blocking off an area for a kitchen. There were no brackets to prevent the shelf divider from falling over on top of students or teachers if an earthquake should occur.

Coping Capacity: Information & Engagement

As has been raised before, the educators lacked access to information about Nepal's earthquake hazards, safe building construction and disaster preparedness. When I visited the schools, the only communication technology I observed was the teachers' personal cell phones. I did not see any school telephones to make phone calls or the ability for teachers to have access to information from the internet. The village where Saipal is located had been gifted with a device to provide free WIFI after the earthquakes, but the headmaster said that it had been stolen. Gangapurna indicated that it had a computer lab (without internet connection) prior to the earthquakes, but it had been destroyed. Educators in Gangapurna also indicated that there were two radio stations that reached the village, but both had been damaged in the earthquakes. After the earthquakes, all of the schools obtained word—that they were to reopen in one month—through personal communications or battery-operated radios. Gangapurna was the only village where educators indicated they had an established method of ensuring everyone received news. Every year during the Dashain holiday, two villagers are selected to communicate the news to all the villagers. After the earthquakes, this existing method of communication was utilized.

When the schools were told to reopen one month after the April earthquake, the educators said that no one had asked or come yet to assess the destruction of the school. And the DEO did not provide any plans to educators on how to reopen the schools. As a result, educators who were able to, gathered children in an open field; in other cases,

schools took longer to restart. Participants indicated that they were informed to pick up tents around the time they were to open the schools and that is when representatives from INGOs/NGOs began to arrive to assess the situation.

The INEE Minimum Standards recommend that teachers and educators receive training to help support students in times of disaster, and that educators should be aware of resources to which students who need extra support can be referred. In the case of rural Nepal, such resources are non-existent. Educators at Saipal and Jannu mentioned local non-profits that support mothers and children, but other than that there were no other resources in the broader community that the educators mentioned they could refer students to for support. Teachers spoke about having to show students that they themselves were not scared of aftershocks, to encourage the students to return to school. In other cases, educators spoke about giving out small candies and chocolate to encourage students. The educators at Kabru spoke about keeping the students busy and active. As educators who received the psychosocial training said they didn't receive it for several months, teachers relied on their close relationships with the students and parents to support the students after the earthquakes.

Coping Capacity: Social Character

Most of the schools had relatively young teachers and headmasters. The headmaster of Saipal at the time of the earthquakes was the oldest, at 48. When asked why the teacher or member of the school management committee was interested in teaching or participating in the SMC, I received a mix of responses. The majority of the SMC members were interested because their children attended the school. Some of the teachers indicated that they were not really interested in teaching, but it was a paying job

that allowed them to remain close to home and take care of their families. A few of the teachers expressed their dedication and love for the school, the students and for the profession. All of the headmasters expressed how they felt responsible for the school, its students and teachers and for ensuring that the school was reopened. In all the cases, each school had at least one educator who took the lead in making sure the school reopened.

Two headmasters faced tremendous personal difficulty during the earthquakes, and yet they still felt responsible for the school and did what they had to do to get the school reopened. One of them lost his youngest daughter, his second daughter was severely injured, and his house was demolished. Even though he was faced with such tremendous loss, he still obtained resources for the school and served as an inspiration for the other teachers. The second headmaster's husband was recovering from a severe injury when the earthquakes struck and she also lost her house, which had recently been built. Still she also persevered and did what she could to reopen her school.

At least three of the headmasters used their own initiative and personal connections to establish contacts with international NGOs prior to and after the earthquakes. It seemed one of the keys for the schools to obtain aid was for one of the educators to have established relationships external to the village. Each school seemed to have one key person, either the headmaster or a member of the School Management Committee (parent), who had contacts able to generate support for the school.

One of the weaknesses in social character that emerged was the low literacy rate of members of the SMC. One SMC member expressed her trepidation with being interviewed at first because, as she said, she had minimal education. Another SMC member was unable to read the Informed Consent form and, once it was read to her, she

signed the form with an X. The impact of the low literacy rate of the SMC members is discussed more in the Adaptive Capacities and governance below.

Educators' Adaptive Capacities to Create a Learning Environment

The ANDRI framework identifies two components of adaptive capacity: governance, policy and leadership, and social and community engagement. From the responses of the educators, these adaptive capacities seemed to be the weakest at the time I conducted my research compared to the strengths educators expressed in the coping capacities.

Adaptive Capacity: Governance, Policy & Leadership

Governance, policy and leadership is the capacity for government organizations to learn, review, and adjust policies and procedures to adapt to a crisis. One of the first themes that emerged from the cross-case analysis was weak governing relationships. Educators' descriptions of the relationships with the District Education Office (DEO) indicated that they did not think the DEO provided sufficient funding, training or policy guidance. Prior to the earthquakes, educators indicated that they did not receive enough funding from the DEO for teachers' salaries for the teachers they felt they needed. Along with teachers' salaries, the DEO provided a modest amount for supplies such as white board markers, pens, pencils, paper and teaching materials. All the schools sought funding through their networks with external sources and non-profit organizations to hire additional teachers, engage volunteers or obtain donations from the community. Sangita (Saipal) described it best when she said that she could ask for the funds she needed, but could not expect to receive them, let alone ask for additional funds for any innovations. Educators at all four schools sought international aid to rebuild the schools and provide

supplies and funds for teachers' salaries. They made it clear that an INGO would have to obtain approval from the DEO to provide the funding to rebuild the school, but it was clear the educators were not depending on the DEO to obtain or find the funds to rebuild.

The same situation exists for psychosocial and health training. The educators indicated that they received minimal training from the DEO. When educators referenced the psychosocial training that was provided after the earthquake, they referred to an INGO representative conducting the training with the DEO present. Only Kabru's headmaster indicated that the DEO provided training.

Lastly, the educators indicated they received minimal guidance from the DEO regarding recovery and rebuilding. As one educator (from Gangapurna) stated, "They gave us order to open the school but they didn't give us any plans." As for future disaster preparedness, the DEO told educators not to hang anything heavy on walls and, if another earthquake occurs, they and the students should exit the building. The educators and others interviewed were not aware of whether the DEO provided or led any training, or whether any collaborative process was done to identify risks and prepare for future disasters. Even for the schools that were rebuilt, educators stated that the DEO was not involved. The educators at the schools that were rebuilt (Saipal/Kabru) indicated that the INGO/NGO and the school community handled the process. The DEO provided its initial approval for the INGO/NGO to provide the funding, and let the INGO/NGO manage the rest. In fact, one educator expressed relief that the DEO was not involved in the reconstruction of his school, recounting that another school nearby was supposed to be rebuilt by the government, but after three pillars were installed no further progress had been made for months.

Overall, educators expressed how they obtained and sought guidance from INGOs/NGOs. They indicated that the INGO/NGO representatives were encouraging the teachers to reopen the school and show the children they were not scared. When asked who they felt took the lead in reopening the schools, the predominant answer was an INGO/NGO followed by the headmaster and teachers. As one educator said from his perspective: “We got so much of help from the organization, but I would say we didn't get as much help as we needed from the government.”

The other governing structure is the School Management Committee. Overall, it was clear that the support and guidance from the SMC was also weak. Some schools stated that the parents' interest in the SMC was due primarily to see if the parents could benefit personally from their involvement and not in a true effort to help the school. When members of the SMC were asked about the relationship with the teachers and the DEO, the connections were not strong. The SMC members expressed that they were not sure what the DEO had done for the school, or what plans the DEO had for the school. Another aspect was that members of the SMC indicated that they were uneducated and, although they understood their role in providing oversight to the school, a few said they were unsure of what was going on and that they just did what the teachers told them to do. My observation from my interview with these SMC members was that they were embarrassed by their illiteracy, and their responses about doing what the teachers said indicated to me that they did not feel empowered to be providing oversight to the school due to their lack of education.

Adaptive Capacities: Social & Community Engagement

I felt that all of the educators and school management committees expressed their vested interest in the school. All four of the schools were initially established through the initiative of the community. Each of the schools had a School Management Committee, even with the difficulties with members' education levels. The educators interviewed indicated that the communities were overwhelmed by the destruction and trauma in their personal lives, and that they were only able to provide minimal assistance to the school. They did help the school by removing debris from the school yard and salvaging desks and chairs and other supplies from the destroyed buildings. In most cases, community members helped to set up the tents for TLCs.

Another aspect that resonated from my interviews was the trust that the community had in the educators to keep their children safe. The teachers and the parents were aware that if the parents did not send their children back to school, it was possible the school would have to close, leaving the children without local means to be educated and the teachers without jobs. Reciprocally, educators felt the parents sending their children back to school was a significant contribution by the community.

The other key aspect of obtaining support was having personal relationships with contacts who had agency and resources to be able to provide to the school. This was evident with at all four schools in which educators at each of the schools had relationships with someone at an INGO/NGO who was able to provide additional humanitarian or development aid prior to and after the earthquakes. For Kabru, it was through ETC and the Shechen Foundation; for Saipal, it was through SOS CV and

Umbrella Foundation; for Jannu, it was a volunteer teacher who provided support from Salvation Army; and for Gangapurna it was from a Spanish INGO.

My reflection on the adaptive capacity of the schools was that the governance structures are too weak for any meaningful ability for the DEO, SMC or educators to generate coherent sustainable policies, funding or training to strengthen their resilience and enhance their ability to reduce their disaster risk in the future. On the other hand, the school community showed strength in its school and community engagement, through the educators' desire to ensure the success of the school for their students, the trust that parents had in the educators to send their children back to school, and the educators' networks and personal connections shows that given the proper resources and governance abilities, they can strengthen their resilience.

The next chapter will look at recommendations, future research, and my personal reflections on the research.

Chapter XI – Conclusion

Key Findings

After generating the cross-case analysis, I reviewed the subcodes and compared and contrasted them with the quantitative data, the literature on international aid and resilience, and reflections on my research, applying my exploration back to the rural school setting in a fragile country context. Several themes emerged. The first themes are resourceful, initiative, and personal strength. The educators demonstrated resourcefulness, initiative, and personal strength to reopen their schools. The next theme is lack of information. The educators lacked necessary information in order for them to prepare for and respond to the earthquakes. The last theme that emerged is transparency and equity in the perceived and real access to and receipt of international aid.

The indication from international literature on resilience is that the response and recovery should be at the local level and within the community (Hyogo Framework, 2005). Parsons et al. (2016) describe the resilience characteristics that the school educators and community should possess to act in a disaster as “social cohesion, community involvement and trust” (p. 2). The educators and school management committee members demonstrated these characteristics to some degree. However what emerged as well are resourcefulness, initiative, personal strength and leadership, mainly demonstrated by the headmasters.

The ability to augment access to aid was strengthened through the resourcefulness and initiatives of the headmasters, through their networking with international aid organizations. Some of these organizations were already established or had been working in the village, and the educators were able to tap into these connections to obtain

necessary resources. These connections were key to two of the schools being rebuilt by the time I visited to conduct my research in November 2017. In all the cases, the educators at the schools were seeking—through their own networks—ways to obtain funding and support, and those schools that had established those pathways were able to be rebuilt.

Headmasters especially demonstrated personal strength and leadership. Two headmasters specifically described the devastating impacts the earthquakes had on their personal lives, destroying their homes and killing a loved one. The headmaster whose daughter died also had to contend with his second youngest daughter sustaining severe injuries. Even so, they accepted the responsibility and leadership of seeking out the aid needed to return their students to school, and literally picking up the pieces of their schools to start anew.

The theme that arose the most which needs consideration is the lack of information provided and/or available to headmasters, teachers and school management committee members regarding disaster risk, preparedness and response. To strengthen resilience, rural school educators, especially headmasters and members of School Management Committees, need access to information regarding disaster risks, preparing plans for response and recovery, and psychosocial training and support for their students and themselves.

One of the aspects of the Hyogo Framework and DRR programs is having the community itself identify potential risks. However, in the case of the earthquakes, the educators I interviewed indicated that they had no idea they were at risk for such powerful earthquakes nor did they have information about being prepared. Any previous

large earthquakes had been decades earlier. Yet information available on the internet in English indicates that Nepal lies on a major fault line and the country is vulnerable to a much greater earthquake in the future, even upwards of 9.0 on the Richter scale (Howard, 2015). The potential damage is almost unfathomable. As Nelson, Adger, and Brown (2007) ask in their article on unexpected flooding in Indonesia, is it possible for communities to be aware of all the potential risks they may face? When asked, my interviewees were concerned with strong winds and forest fires, and even though landslides occurred after the earthquakes, they did not refer to them. Disconcertingly, they did not express concern that they would experience another large earthquake.

After I conducted my interviews, further research revealed a Nepali non-governmental organization called Earthquake Safe Communities in Nepal (NSET, 2012). Its website indicates that it was established in 1993 and officially registered in 1998. Its mission was to have earthquake safe communities by 2020 predominantly through better construction practices, including retrofitting schools. It established its Nepal Safer Schools Project in 2009. Their School Earthquake Safety program to support safer and more resilient schools was started in 1999 (I should note that the 1999 timeframe coincided with the ongoing war). The information on the website claims that it retrofitted 300 schools and trained 3,000 masons. Partner organizations are all national or international. However, the website, from what I can see, is only available in English and many of the documents and information seem to be predominately in English. It seems to be outward looking instead of inward looking towards the intended beneficiaries. The program is financially supported by DFID with an international organization supporting safe school construction, and Save the Children working on incorporating DRR in the

curriculum. The website seems to have been established in 2012. And even though this information exists, and reportedly was available before the earthquakes, most of the educators in rural schools indicated to me that they had not received any disaster training or preparedness.

When asked about receiving training or information about preparing for an earthquake, only one educator indicated receiving training through USAID, and that was after the 2010 Haiti earthquake. There was no reference to further training. When another educator used the term TLC, I asked where he heard the term and he said he heard it from the INGOs/NGOs who responded to the 2015 earthquakes. As for disaster response, educators from the same school that received the USAID training said that prior to the earthquakes, they were taught to seek safety under furniture. Since the 2015 earthquakes, when people died because they followed that advice, those educators stopped following that guidance. Yet meanwhile, an educator at another school said that, *in response to the 2015 earthquakes*, they were training students to hide under furniture. Responses from informants, my own observations and review of key documents indicate that educators in rural areas do not have access to the best information they need to even survive let alone be resilient in times of disaster.

In response to the Nepal 2015 earthquakes, it is important to keep in mind that Nepal is considered, per the OEDC's definition, a "fragile state." When the earthquakes struck, the country was still functioning with an interim constitution put in place after the 2006 peace agreement. Conflict and instability were still prevalent when the government adopted a constitution in September of 2015. The continued instability was evidenced in the violence that broke out in the Terai region after the constitution was approved in Fall

2015, and later in 2017 when district elections were held. All in all, in order for Nepal to continue working toward developed country status, its governing institutions need to be strengthened.

The international community established principles for humanitarian and development aid to “do no harm.” The development of these international principles arose from the concern of development and humanitarian actors, engaging with fragile countries, to avoid exacerbating crises, and in hope of supporting countries in ways that would strengthen weak governments, prevent conflict and reduce the impacts of disaster (GHD, 2003; INEE, 2010; OECD, 2008). However, the humanitarian aid principles conflict with the principles that guide development aid, in that humanitarian aid seeks to aid the victims of a disaster without regard to the government. The Fragile State Principles encourage development organizations to work to strengthen and support weak governments. Yet, due to the changing nature of disasters, humanitarian aid is overlapping with development aid. The demarcation of when humanitarian aid stops and development aid starts is unclear. The demarcation is especially unclear when it comes to the provision of education. In comparing the international aid principles to the impact on rural schools in Nepal, the concerns raised in the literature review were evident, as were additional aspects that will be discussed below.

To review the definition of a fragile state, it is one that “lacks the capacity (effectiveness) and/or willingness (legitimacy) to sustain itself over time. It is unable to perform the basic functions of the state such as the provision of education (OECD, 2008). Due to Nepal’s fragile state status, the international donor principles for humanitarian and development aid provide significant guidance in order to “do no harm.” From a distance,

international donors tried to adhere to these principles, but on the ground, in rural areas of the country, it was clear that these efforts were not successful. The role of international humanitarian and development aid organizations dominated the response in the eyes of the educators. Educators pointed to representatives from INGOs who came to assess the damage. When asked who led the effort to return students to school, if the educators did not indicate themselves, they pointed to an INGO. The educators looked to international organizations or contacts to obtain the financial support to rebuild their schools.

As discussed in the cross-case analysis, the humanitarian aid reported to the Education Cluster 3W report by implementing organizations was incomplete or inaccurate and did not capture other external philanthropy, private aid flows, or volunteerism. Given the extent of the destruction, the Nepali people were in desperate need for immediate aid. Due to the history of the fragile state of the Nepali government, international development organizations were already on the ground implementing programs. Some schools with international connections were receiving support for teacher salaries, international volunteers, and school supplies including a computer lab. Some schools received disaster training, while others did not.

After the earthquakes, there was an attempt to distribute humanitarian aid for education equally. However, as my research shows, the reporting was compromised and the uncontrolled influx of development and humanitarian aid from already established INGOs, as well as the inaccurate reporting, allowed some schools, which had the capacity, to obtain more aid than other schools. This was evidenced by the situation of Jannu, where interviewees noted the unequal distribution of assistance; Jannu educators identified Kabru, located only an hour hike away, as being rebuilt as a “model” school

while their own school, with more students, still functioned out of a TLC. The unequal distribution of aid raised comments of discrimination because of caste—even though Kabru and Jannu served the same caste. The perception of the unequal distribution of aid was clear in statements by the Saipal educators, who felt that a school nearby had received more aid than they did, even though they received a three-year contract from SOS CV for support and had been completely rebuilt. In addition, the school manager for Saipal was able to insist the VDC/DEO give him more tents even when the representatives wanted to give them to their friends and families; this contrasts with the 3W report that only showed one tent had been distributed to Saipal. All of the schools sought international aid to rebuild—noting that the INGO would have to be approved by the DEO, but otherwise, it seemed the schools were circumventing the DEO to obtain what they needed. All four schools that participated in the case study were able to access international aid. Yet, what about schools that do not have access to international networks?

The headmasters, teachers and school management committee members demonstrated some of the aspects of coping and adaptive capacity, yet one of the main items they lacked in order to strengthen resilience is information. The second finding is that even with the international principles guiding the provision of aid to fragile countries, and humanitarian and development aid actors striving to “do no harm,” the means by which aid is provided and the lack of government support perpetuates the perception of inequality and weak governing structures.

Recommendations

It is challenging to make recommendations based on the case-study analysis, as the circumstances upon which my research was conducted were dependent on the unique disaster and government conditions in Nepal. The research I conducted was a snapshot in time within a specific context and informed by the experiences of a select group of schools with their own particular contexts in that the schools in my study had connections to international and national non-profits. Other rural schools in Nepal may not have this luxury and are more inaccessible than the schools I visited. However, I feel a few key recommendations can be made to the greater picture of identifying and strengthening the resilience of rural educators in fragile country contexts.

The first is to consider how the agency of rural schools can be strengthened keeping in mind already limited resources. The indication from the international literature on resilience is that the response and recovery should be at the local level and within the community (Hyogo Framework, 2005). For this to happen, however, it requires that the school educators and communities have agency to act. As described in Parsons et al. (2016), the “resilience approach to managing natural hazards has emerged more recently and contends that people have agency to prepare, adapt and transform given the presence of social cohesion, community involvement and trust” (p. 2). From my interviews, one recommendation is to provide educators access to information they need in order to understand the risks within their communities and how to prepare for them. I am not referring to one-off “professional training” programs that are provided by INGOs/NGOs, but a platform that provides relevant and ongoing information that educators themselves can access through their own initiative. Most educators I met had mobile phones and

access to Facebook (evidence is that I am in Facebook contact with three of the four headmasters). When I checked Facebook, there is an (unofficial) Government of Nepal MOE Facebook page, but it doesn't have any information on it, and there were only 36 followers. It may be possible for the Ministry of Education to leverage the use of Facebook to provide access to information for its educators. An easily accessible, social media platform through a mobile phone may be able to transmit current policy and guideline information to educators as well as provide space for educators to communicate to the government and share information with each other.

Second, international INGOs/NGOs need to understand the impact their programming has on local and surrounding communities when they select a project to support. Obviously INGOs/NGOs have limited funding and therefore cannot give financial support to large and expansive projects. However, in their effort to provide salaries or training for teachers in one school, they increase the tension with other schools in the area who are unable to obtain the same funding. I know that since the earthquakes, the Nepali government has tried to restrict the number of INGOs/NGOs who could be active in the country. However, it may be helpful to construct a system in which donors apply through the government to provide funding for their projects in a specific area of Nepal. An application system could be created that would need to be transparent and streamlined to avoid the workarounds that are currently being done to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy and possible corruption. Funding could be streamlined through Nepali government structures in a way that schools can look to their DEOs to fully fund their schools and programs. A mechanism would need to be created for donors to see that their aid has been transferred to the right school or program.

Lastly, I would recommend developing a Rural School Community Resilience Assessment for Fragile Contexts that includes the aspects of the World Bank ERA, but that takes into consideration the context of the developing/fragile state, rural school. The resilience and disaster risk reduction materials created for education in these contexts, as I discuss in Chapter III, are not a good fit for the developing country rural school context. These materials overlook measuring the capacities of the school community educators to adapt the disaster risk reduction actions advised by the tool kits and frameworks. These materials focus on strengthening resilience of the student by incorporating DRR in the curriculum so the student can ultimately succeed academically. The frameworks do not look specifically at the capabilities of the school community educators to take ownership in order to prepare for and recover from disasters. In comparing Sharifi's (2016) community resilience assessment document and Parsons et al., (2016) on what constitutes a good assessment for a School as Community, I would recommend creating an assessment or index that considers the time-frame, the spatial aspects (of community), the agency, adaptive components of agency, and power (having agency over management decisions as well as funds to do what is needed).

Future Research

The mixed methods study that I conducted provides a glimpse into the challenges of strengthening resilience in rural community schools in developing countries. In order to increase disaster risk reduction, the national government should focus on providing local school educators the agency to respond in disasters, and work to strengthen the linkages and trust in its government services. Given that this research occurred within a specific timeframe, as Nolen and Talbert (2011) write, the "findings simply begin a new

conversation” (p. 7). Further exploration of the challenges for rural schools in fragile contexts to develop resilience would need to be done to ensure future DRR efforts are successful.

Future research that would help to provide more insight on the agency of educators as well as community members who serve on school management committees, would investigate the administrative and management training provided to headmasters as well as to teachers in the teacher colleges, and extend professional development provided by the government versus INGOs. The key aspect is one of agency and how educators and the school community are empowered to manage, respond to and recover from a disaster. In the cases that I investigated, the headmasters assumed the responsibility of ensuring the schools restarted per the government’s decree, but, as one headmaster stated in his interview, “What to do?” When asked about training during interviews, there seemed to be a lack of training offered to headmasters—let alone to school management committee members—to manage the school, supervise and support the teachers and oversee care for the students. The research conducted would include training provided for resilience and disaster risk reduction. Examining the level and type of training provided by the government rather than an external INGO would be insightful, as to the message that the government is sending to its educators about their responsibilities toward the school and its students during times of disaster.

From my interviews, I noted that there was also no discussion of professional development for teachers, headmasters or members of the SMC, especially in disaster preparedness and psychosocial support. Research to be conducted would include more investigation into the psychosocial support needed by teachers. Two of the headmasters

demonstrated their strength of character and resilience to not only reestablish their schools, but to do so while dealing with the overwhelming loss they experienced from the earthquakes, including the death of a family member and the loss of their houses.

Further beneficial research would examine in more detail any potential conditions or arrangements to distribute information to the local school community in developing countries. A more concerted effort needs to be made to translate materials into Nepali as well as other local languages (Jannu) and ensure distribution. Alternatives to INGO/NGO one-off training programs that are locally based and accessible to the community need to be considered.

Lastly, my research did not investigate in depth the linkages between the Ministry of Education, the district education offices, the teacher colleges and rural schools. My research does indicate that there is a weak relationship between schools and the DEO and that schools sought external, INGO help rather than seeking assistance from their own government offices. In order to strengthen the ability for governments to provide key public services to their people, it would be important to understand the existing relationship gaps and how they can be improved.

Benefits of this Research & Conclusion

As I set out to conduct this research, I was skeptical of the benefits my research would have. However, I feel that the research I gathered is informative in painting a picture of the extent of humanitarian aid and the very real experiences rural school educators face when trying to recreate a learning environment after a natural disaster. It helps to identify the capacities and strengths the educators have as well as gaps that can be addressed.

The second aspect is to help inform international donors and non-governmental organizations about the extent and limitations of international humanitarian aid for education that reaches local beneficiaries. I feel the research I conducted provides recommendations to the international community on the level, timing and type of aid that can be provided to schools before, during and after crises, in order to return students to the classroom ready to learn.

Lastly, the study seeks to provide information to the national government. As Nepal would like to meet developed country status by 2022, it is imperative that the government continue to strengthen and expand its ability to provide education services in crisis situations. As discussed earlier, Nepal is subject to increasing natural and human-made disasters and therefore needs to be able to strengthen its resiliency, to continue providing education services in various contexts. Local schools are getting up and running with or without the government's assistance. School activities should be supported, to help Nepal meet the goals of EFA and the SDGs to expand educational opportunities, reduce poverty, increase economic growth and enhance stability and peace. It should be noted that in 2017, Nepal held elections to shift its governance structures. As Nepal continues to recover from its civil war and the devastating earthquakes, and strives to reach developed country status, it will be important to see if the new decentralized governance structures will help build the agency of rural schools, and increase the government's strength in providing public services for all its citizens.

Appendices

Appendix A – Nepal Calendar of Earthquake Events

Figure 12: Nepal Vikram Samvat Calendar & Gregorian Calendar April – May 2015

BAISHAKH 2072			Today		APR-MAY 2015	
Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
		नयाँ वर्ष 1	बरुथिनी एकादशी 2	प्रदोष व्रत 3	मातातिचहे पूजा 4	आमाको मुख हेर्ने 5
		Dashami 14	Ekadashi 15	Dwadashi 16	Chaturdashi 17	Aaunsi 18
ल.पु मत्स्येन्द्रनाथ रथारोहण 6	7	अक्षय तृतिया परशुराम जयन्ती 8	पृथ्वी दिवस 9	पुस्तक दिवस 10	लोकतन्त्र दिवस 11	गंगोत्पत्ति सप्तमी जोला दिवस 12
Pratipada 19	Dwitiya 20	Tritiya 21	Chaturthi 22	Panchami 23	Sasthi 24	Saptami 25
अष्टमी व्रतम् गौरखकाली पूजा 13	सीता जयन्ती 14	राष्ट्रिय चिया दिवस 15	विश्व नृत्य दिवस 16	17	मजदुर दिवस 18	19
Astami 26	Nawami 27	Dashami 28	Ekadashi 29	Dwadashi 30	Trayodashi 1	Trayodashi 2
20	बुद्ध जयन्ती उभौली पर्व 21	विश्व दमरोग दिवस 22	23	किरात समाजसुधार दिवस 24	रेडक्रस दिवस 25	26
Chaturdashi 3	Purnima 4	Pratipada 5	Dwitiya 6	Tritiya 7	Chaturthi 8	Panchami 9
27	अष्टमी व्रतम् गौरखकाली पूजा 28	विश्व नर्स दिवस 29	30	अपराएकादशी व्रत 31		
Sasthi 10	Astami 11	Nawami 12	Dashami 13	Ekadashi 14		

Source: Ashesh's Blog. WebApps. Nepali Calendar: Retrieved April 12, 2020 from <https://www.ashesh.com.np/nepali-calendar/>.

The dates marked represent the dates of the April 25 and May 12, 2015 earthquakes per the Gregorian calendar and Baishakh, 12 and 29, 2072 per the Nepalese calendar.

Figure 13: Nepal Vikram Samvat Calendar & Gregorian Calendar May – June 2015

JESTHA 2072				MAY-JUN 2015		
Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
प्रदोष व्रत 31 Trayodashi	दिता चःहे पूजा 32 Chaturdashi				प्रदोष व्रत 1 Dwadashi	सिठी चःहे पूजा 2 Trayodashi
दर्शत्रादम् 3 Chaturdashi	सोमवारे औंसी 4 Aaunsi	दशहरा खानारम्भ 5 Pratipada		सांस्कृतिक विविधता दिवस 7 Chaturthi	जैविक विविधता दिवस 8 Panchami	
कुमार षष्ठी 10 Sasthi	कुमार यात्रा 11 Saptami	अष्टमी व्रतम् 12 Astami		दशहरा गंगारामेश्वर मेला 14 Dashami	निर्जला एकादशी व्रत 15 Ekadashi	
प्रदोष व्रत 17 Trayodashi	वन उपभोक्ता दिवस 18 Chaturdashi	पनौती स्नान 19 Purnima		बातबालिकामाफिको अत्याचार विरुद्धको दिवस 21 Dwitiya	यातावरण दिवस 22 Tritiya	
	विश्व समुद्र दिवस 25 Sasthi	अष्टमी व्रतम् 26 Saptami	देवपाटनमा त्रिशूलयात्रा 27 Astami		स्मार्तानां योगिनी एकादशी व्रत 29 Ekadashi	श्रेष्ठवानां योगिनी एकादशी व्रत 30 Dwadashi

Source: Ashesh's Blog. WebApps. Nepali Calendar: Retrieved April 12, 2020 from <https://www.ashesh.com.np/nepali-calendar/>.

The date marked represent the date when the Nepali government ordered schools to reopen, May 31, 2015 per the Gregorian calendar and Jestha 17, 2072 per the Nepalese calendar.

Appendix B

Table 13: Interview Protocol – Guided Interview

<p>Project: Humanitarian Aid for Education in a Disaster Context: An exploratory study of Nepali educators' perspectives on aid received and local resources and actions needed to return children to school after the 2015 Earthquakes.</p>	
<p>Coping Capacity – means by which people or organizations use available resources, skills and opportunities to face adverse consequences</p>	
<p>Social character</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Would you describe your involvement with the school? (role, length of experience, any special responsibilities) • Would you describe the impact the 2015 earthquakes had on the school and the school community? (extent of damage, injuries, deaths, students/teachers leaving) • When were the students able to return to school? • Would you describe what the community did to return students to school?
<p>Economic capital</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Would you describe any external aid the community received for the school and students? (international humanitarian aid, remittances, financial or resources, received from, how and when) • Would you describe what resources you, the students and the school needed in order to reopen the school? • How were these resources obtained? • Are there still resources needed and if so, is there a plan to obtain them?
<p>Infrastructure and planning</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the School Management Committee, headmaster, or teachers formulate plans to return the students school? • Did the district or national government provide plans on how to return students to the classroom? Please describe.
<p>Emergency services</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did the school have a disaster service plan? Were you aware of it and was it utilized to respond to the earthquakes? • Did the principal, assistant principal, headmaster or teacher take initiative to respond? If so, did they engage with external representatives and if so, with whom and what resources/responses were generated? • What emergencies services were available or needed for the school?

Community capital	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who took the leadership role in getting the school rebuilt, ensuring the children had access to education?
Information and engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How was communication handled regarding the status of the school and plans to bring students back to the classroom?

Adaptive capacity – arrangement and processes that enable adjustment through learning, adaptation and transformation	
Governance, policy and leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As the process of rebuilding the school has moved forward, how would you describe the leadership and management of school? Have there been improvements, status quo or decline in management and capacity? If another earthquake would strike, how do you feel the school management would respond? •
Social and community engagement.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As the school has recovered, how would you describe the relationships with the other teachers? With the school management? With students? Have new structures been established? • What discussions have occurred regarding preparing for the next disaster?

Appendix C - UNICEF 10 Items for Resilience

Figure 14: UNICEF 10 Key Elements for Future Strategy Building a Culture of Resilience



Source: UNICEF, 2012a, p. 75

Appendix D – Contents of UNICEF School and Recreation Kits

Table 14: UNICEF School Kit Contents

Nepal Education Cluster नेपाल शिक्षा समूह		SCHOOL KITS INFORMATION		DATE: Apr-11-2016
For 40 children and 1 teacher in Temporary Learning Centers				
S.No	Item Description	Unit	Qty	Per Kit
1	Sheets Cardboard Paper, A4 size, 5 assorted colors (10 each)	Sheet		50
2	Scissors (stainless steel blades with plastic handles), 6"	Piece		5
3	Glue Bottle, 250 mill litter	Bottle		5
4	Small pencil sharpener	Piece		20
5	30cm plastic or wooden ruler	Piece		10
5	Craft Knife, with 127mm plastic handle, with 5 break off blades	Piece		1
6	Masking tape self-adhesive, Crepe paper, 25mm x 50m roll	Roll		5
7	Water Color	Packet		5
8	Fullscape Paper	Rim		3
9	Board Marker - Red, Black, Green, Blue	Box (doze)		2
10	Crayons, preferable brand: "Camel"	set		20
11	School Exercise Book, 60 pages	Piece		80
12	HB Pencils with rubber	dozen		6
13	Colour Pencil - Big	Packet		10
14	Ball of string (hardware shop)	Piece		1
16	White Sticker (As alternative to a white board) with metal rivet holes to hang 150cm width x 100cm high	Piece		1
17	Students Attendance register	Piece		2
18	Carbon Paper, preferable brand: "Kangaroo"	Packet		1
19	Picture books in Nepali - Basic Primary Level	Pieces		20
20	Picture books in Nepali - Advanced Primary Level	Pieces		20
19	Big nylon waterproof drybags with handles and rope to tie	Piece		1

Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 2016

From my research #9, Board Marker was not included?

Table 15: UNICEF Recreation Kit Contents

Nepal Education Cluster नेपाल शिक्षा समूह		SCHOOL KITS INFORMATION		DATE: Apr-11-2016
For 80 children and 1 teacher in Temporary Learning Centers or Child Friendly Spaces				
S.No	Item Description	Unit	Qty	Per Kit
1	Football, Junior size 5, 350g, outer casing synthetic leathers suitable for all types of synthetic leathers, pl	Piece		3
2	Ball Pump to inflate football complete with inflating connector, 5"	Piece		1
3	Skipping Rope	Piece		8
4	Rubber play ring	Piece		8
5	Frisby	Piece		3
6	Small color rubber ball	Doz		2
7	Dominos	Sets		4
8	Puzzels for older kids	Boxes		4
10	Snake and Ladders - Disaster preparedness messages (Strong Plastic covered cardboard Board - vendor	Set		2
11	Financial Literacy Board Game (vendor available)	Set		1
12	Chess set and strong plastic covered coarboard board	Set		1
12	Big nylon waterproof drybags with handles and rope to tie	Piece		1

Source: UNOCHA Education Cluster 3W Report, April 2016

When I observed the recreation kit, the rubber rings and the jump ropes were not used. And light, nylon vests were included for football team identification.

Appendix E – Saipal’s Disaster Plan

Table 16: Saipal Disaster Plan and Translation

कार्य विभाजन २०७४

क्र.सं.	विभाग	निम्नोच्च शिक्षक	गर्भपर्ने कार्यहरू
१	भौतिक व्यवस्थापन	वर्द्धमान गिरी हेमात श्रेष्ठ	फर्निचर तथा इयाल ढोका समेत, झोचालय, धारा पानीको व्यवस्थापन, खेलभेदानको रेखदेख, सामग्री भण्डारण, विद्युत् खर्चपानीको झाडकी तथा कन्च्युटरको रेखदेख संरक्षण र समेत।
२	विपद् व्यवस्थापन	झरिना गिरी शांता वन	अवलोकन गर्ने दुर्घटना, घाउचोटपटकको प्राथमिक उपचार, कक्षाकोठामा भएका दुर्घटना हुन सक्ने सामग्रीहरूको उचित व्यवस्थापन, बालबालिकालाई विपद्को घडीमा सुरक्षित, संरक्षित र संयमित हुने उपायहरू सिकाउने, प्राथमिक उपचार खाकसको परिचालन गर्ने।
३	स्वास्थ्य-यौषण	देवकी भारती सृजना गिरी	समय समयमा विद्यार्थीहरूको तौल, उचाइ तथा लुप्ट परीक्षण गर्ने / गर्न लगाउने, झोचालय, धारा, केन्द्राकोठा तथा विद्यालय हाताभित्रको सरसफाईको अवलोकन गर्ने, सम्पूर्ण बालबालिकालाई घरसम्मै खाना/खाजा खाउन प्रोत्साहन गर्ने, मुलाको ओषधी खुवाउने, समय समयमा बालबालिकाहरूसँग स्वास्थ्य, सरसफाई र सम्बन्धित भोजनका खरिमा अवबोधना गर्ने/गर्नुपर्ने।
४	बाल क्लब	रञ्जना कार्की दिनेश श्रेष्ठ करुणा कोइराला	बाल क्लबको वार्षिक कार्ययोजना निर्माण गर्ने, गर्न लगाउने। बाल क्लबले सम्चालन गरेका हरिक क्रियाकलाप तथा कार्यक्रममा उत्तरदायी भूमिका निर्वाह गर्ने, बालबालिकालाई सिर्जनसकृद क्रियाकलाप तर्फ उत्प्रेरित गर्ने, बाल क्लबको बैठकमा उपस्थित हुने, बाल क्लबका लागि- अवसरक, सक्ताह र सहयोग अर्जन गर्ने।

Division of Work 2074 (2017)

Department	Teacher	Tasks to be done
1 Infrastructure Management	1	Furniture and door window maintenance; restroom(toilet), management
	2	of water tap; look after the playground; materials storage; protection and maintenance of electricity, drinking water tank and computers
2 Disaster Management	3	First Aid provider to accidental incidents, wounds and injuries; proper
	4	management of the classroom materials that might cause accidents; teaching the children the techniques to be safe, protected and keep patience during disaster; conduct of first aid box
3 Health-Nutrition	5	To test/ ask the students to be tested their weight, height and eye-sight
	6	on a timely manner; observe the cleanliness of toilets, taps, classroom and the inbound areas of school; encourage all the children to eat homemade meals and snacks; make them take worm medicine; conduct timely interaction with children about health, hygiene and balanced diet
4 Child(ren) Club	7	Prepare or ask them to prepare the annual action plan of the Children's
	8	club. Take a responsibility for the activities and programs/events organized by children's club; encourage the children for creative activities/works; present at the children's club meeting; provide suggestions and support for the children's club.

Appendix F – Table of Codes

Table 17: Structural Coding to Research Questions

Research Questions	Structural Coding	Subcoding	Key Findings
What are the perspectives of community educators on the level and type of humanitarian aid received after the 2015 earthquakes?	International Aid	-Aid Reporting -Donor Principles -Transparency & Equity -Timing and Type of Aid	Transparency and equity
What coping capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes?	Learning Environment	Community Capital -Cohesion -Overwhelmed Economic Capital -Lack of Autonomy -Resourceful Emergency Services -Lack of Information -Lack of Ownership -Timing Infrastructure and Planning	
What adaptive capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes?	Coping Capacities - Community Capital - Economic Capital -Emergency Services -Infrastructure and Planning - Information and Engagement Social Character	-Lack of Information -Resourceful Information and Engagement -Lack of Information -Timing Social Character -Education Level -Initiative -Personal strength	Resourcefulness, initiative and personal strength
What adaptive capacities did educators utilize in order to establish an educational learning environment for their students after the 2015 earthquakes?	Adaptive Capacity - Governance, policy and leadership - Social and community engagement	Governance, policy and leadership -Lack of collaborative management -Leadership Social and community engagement -Invested -Trust	Lack of information

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